bears." We believe that the apostle was entirely competent to write as good Greek as that found in the Hebrews; and instead of accepting the conclusion of Ebrard: "By how much the spirit and doctrine of the epistle is Pauline, by so little can it be supposed that this diction should have come from the hand of the apostle;" we should say: By how much the spirit and doctrine of the epistle is Pauline, by so much may it be believed that the diction is entirely the apostle's.

ARTICLE II.

A SKETCH OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

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India has never taken an active part in the drama of human history. Although emphatically the "land of desire" to all nations, it has itself, shut out both by physical barriers and natural inclination from engagement in the stirring scenes of earth, turned to the solution of those weightier problems which concern the spiritual life here and hereafter. Hence results that strange anomaly of a nation without a history; for events of time have too little significance in the estimation of the Hindu to be recorded on the calendar, or narrated for his own instruction or the benefit of his descendants.

But for this very reason is it that the history of India assumes so important a position in the esteem of a student of mankind, furnishing, as it does, an instance of a completely "home-sprung development," which finds no parallel elsewhere; a development, not so much of social, civil, and political, as of philosophical and religious ideas. To one who would acquaint himself with the history of such development in a country like India, where no documentary annals exist, the only resource left is to construct a history

out of the body of literature which that country presents to him, and which will faithfully reflect the varying phases of thought and feeling which time produces.

Such a work is now doing for India. Taking their point of observation at that period in the life of India which the Greek invasion has made historic, oriental scholars have succeeded in discovering a clue to the mazes of Hindu literature. As the result of long-continued, pains-taking investigation, they have been able to resolve this mass of writings into five distinct portions, each portion representing, in a certain sense, a well-defined historical epoch. These divisions are the Vedas, the Philosophical Treatises, the Buddhistic writings, the Epic Poems, and the Purânas.

The Veda is the oldest historical document of India, and, indeed, of the Indo-European race. In its original form it consists of hymns in praise of the gods, or of supplication to them, which the ancient Aryans sang on their first occupancy of the plains of the Panjâb. The religion of the people, as reflected in these hymns, was a religion of nature, and there was among them but little diversity of belief. As, however, from one mountain range two streams may rise which shall pursue totally diverse courses, so from the Veda as the source flowed two currents of thought and faith, existing together in history, yet constantly diverging in their character, so that the whole history of India life is but a history of these separate streams, in their individual courses and in their occasional enforced commingling. On the one hand we have the growth of a superstitious supernaturalism, finding a partial and an early representation in the Epic Poems, and its fullest development in the Purânas; and on the other a speculation, at first hesitating and latterly bold and uncompromising, best exposed to view in the productions of the several philosophical schools. Occasionally, also, and signally in the case of Buddhism, we have an attempt to unite religion and philosophy, and to bring the teachings of the few into the arena of practical life.[1]

[1] See the Preface to Wilson's Vishnu Purâna, and the review of E. Burnouf in the Journal des Savants, 1840.

Whoever, then, would possess an intelligent understanding of the internal history of India, must make himself familiar with these writings, keeping the above-mentioned distinction ever in mind.

To sketch briefly the rise and progress of philosophical speculation, as represented in Indian literature, is the purpose of the present Article.

We begin with the Veda. The Veda is clearly divisible into two portions: the Mantras and the Brâhmanas. The Mantra portion is the real Veda, consisting of the original hymns. The Brâhmanas, named so because composed by and for Brahmans, are later additions to the hymns, written when the original sense of the hymns was passing out of sight, and for the purpose of explaining these hymns in the interest of a growing priestly class. They consist, for the most part, of minute directions respecting religious ceremonies, and of puerile glosses upon the original text, including also a body of treatises called Upanishads, which are devoted to speculations respecting the source of the universe and the nature and destiny of man.

In the age represented to us by the Mantra portion of the Veda, the Aryan race was comparatively in its childhood. Its religion was, for the most part, a simple, unreasoning adoration of the elements, without much questioning whether one Spirit breathed through all, or whether all was under the control of a single will; and it was but seldom that the worshipper paused to ask the question: "Who knows whence this great creation sprang?" If philosophy was present, it lay unseparated from the religious faith; and yet there must have been in that religion the germs, at least, of later speculations; for, in the language of Müller, who has himself given us translations of some of these early utterances, "the Upanishads did not spring into existence on a sudden; like a stream which has received many a mountain torrent, and is fed by many a rivulet, the literature of the Upanishads proves, better than anything else, that the elements of their philosophical poetry came

from a more distant fountain."[1] For the most part, however, these Vedic hymns are occupied with simple prayers to the several deities of nature, with request for cattle, lands, health, long life, and preservation from foes, — the worshipper, engrossed in this world, thinking but little of what might be beyond.[2]

But the child grew, and in the stage immediately succeeding we find speculation indeed; a speculation unreasoning, wayward, wanton, like the first wild dreaming of youth uncurbed. Religion was not absent, yet it was no longer the simple expression of hope or fear, but a religion in which there was felt to be a conflict, and which was therefore the very occasion of sceptical thought. But there was as yet no avowed divorce between reason and faith; the worshipper, perplexed by difficulties, did not at once cast off his faith, or thrust aside his rational conviction. It is not until we pass to the following period that we see the estrangement to be complete, beholding on the one side a narrow formalism, a rigid ecclesiasticism, a blind allegiance to a crafty priesthood; on the other, a bold, independent, and even partially atheistic philosophical belief, where religion and philosophy, born sisters, are rudely separated, and religion becomes but an irrational superstition, philosophy an infidel dogmatism. The Brâhmanas proper, Müller characterizes as "a literature which, for pedantry and downright absurdity, can hardly be matched anywhere. The general character of these works is marked by shallow and insipid grandiloquence, by priestly conceit, and antiquarian pedantry. They deserve to be studied as the physician studies the twaddle of idiots and the raving of madmen."[3]

But the Upanishads, which are the later portions of the Brâhmanas, do not come under this condemnation; for, while full of puerilities and childish conceits, they are of positive and peculiar interest, as containing the earliest recorded results of Hindu speculation. These only, of all

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1 A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. By Max Müller. p. 566.

2 Rig Veda Sanhita. Translated by H. H. Wilson. 3 vols.

3 History, p. 389.

the Vedic writings, are to-day regarded by the Hindu as worth perusing, and they alone constitute for him the Veda. To these, under the title of Veds, did Rammohun Roy appeal, when he sought to call back his people from gross polytheism to the monotheistic faith of their fathers. Anquetil du Perron, a young and zealous Frenchman, was the first to bring these works to notice, from a Persian translation.[1] But this roundabout process did not add to the clearness of the original treatises; and, according to Wilson, his Latin version is nearly as unintelligible as the Sanskrit itself. H. T. Colebrooke, that prince of Sanskrit scholars, was the first to bring them fairly before us, in his celebrated Essay upon the Vedas, for thirty years the sole source of information upon these ancient writings.[2] His Essay contained various extracts from the Upanishads, and some complete translations. Rammohun Roy subsequently translated several of them, which were afterwards collected together.[3] His translations, however, while preserving the sense in the main, followed later glosses too implicitly to be wholly trustworthy. Besides the versions of Poley into French, and of Weber into German, we have lastly the valuable translations of Dr. Röer, in the Bibliotheca Indica.[4]

The number of these treatises is not large, ten only laying claim to any high antiquity, all of which we have through the translation of Dr. Röer. Their date is as uncertain as that of all early Hindu works, being placed by Müller at from B. C. 800—600, and by Wilson as far back as B. C. 1100, for their earliest limit.[5] As to character, these speculations are excessively mystical and obscure, often utterly unintelligible. They mostly treat of Brahma, or the Divine Spirit as the moving mundane force, in its various workings in nature and in man. As no description, however, can

[1] Oupnekhat, id est, Secretum tegendum, etc. 1801–2.

[2] Asiatic Researches, Vol. VIII. p. 369. Essays on the Religion and Philosophy of the Hindus, p. 1. We shall quote from the last edition of the Essays, Vol. I.

[3] Translation of the Veds. London, 1832.

[4] Bibliotheca Indica: a collection of oriental works. Calcutta. The following are the numbers containing translations: 27, 38, 41, 50, 78, 135.

[5] History, p. 445. Wilson's review of the same, Edinb. Rev. Oct. 1860.

adequately present either the matter or form of these treatises, we shall offer a sample of the more intelligible and interesting passages.

The first extract is the whole of the Isa Upanishad, whose object is to commend the study of the supreme Brahma as the chief road to bliss, and the practice of works as a secondary road.[1]

1. Whatever exists in this world is to be enveloped by (the thought of) God. By renouncing it (the world) thou shalt save (thy soul). Do not covet the riches of any one.

2. Performing sacred works, let a man desire to live a hundred years. If thou thus (desirest), O man, there is no other manner, in which thou art not tainted by work.

3. To the godless worlds covered with gloomy darkness, go all the people, when departing, who are slayers of their souls.

4. He (the soul) does not move, is swifter than the mind; not the gods (the senses) did obtain him; he was gone before: standing he outstrips all the other (gods, senses), how fast they run. Within him the Ruler of the atmosphere upholds the vital actions.

5. He moves, he does not move; he is far and also near; he is within this all; he is out of this all.

6. Whoever beholds all beings in the soul alone, and the soul in all beings, does hence not look down (on any creature).

7. When a man knows that all beings are even the soul, when he beholds the unity (of the soul), then there is no delusion, no grief.

8. He is all-pervading, brilliant, without body, invulnerable, without muscles, pure, untainted by sin; he is all-wise, the Ruler of the mind, above all beings, and self-existent.

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[1] Bib. Indica, No. 41, p. 71. The term "Upanishad," meant originally, according to Müller, "the act of sitting down near a teacher," then, "implicit faith," and lastly, "truth or divine revelation." Hist. p. 319. The native interpretation is, "that knowledge of Brahma which completely destroys all else." Brihad Arany. Upan. Bib. Indica, No. 27, p. 1. N. B. Brahma refers, throughout the Essay, not to Brahmâ (Masc.), one of the triad, but to the impersonal spirit.

He distributed according to their nature the things for everlasting years.

9. Those who worship ignorance, enter into gloomy darkness; into still greater darkness those who are devoted to knowledge.

10. They say, different is the effect of knowledge, different the effect of ignorance; thus we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us.

11. Whoever knows both, knowledge and ignorance together, overcomes death by ignorance, and enjoys immortality by knowledge.

12. Those who worship uncreated nature, enter into gloomy darkness; into still greater darkness those who are devoted to created nature.

13. They say, different is the effect from (worshipping) uncreated nature, different from (worshipping) created nature. This we heard from the sages who explained (both) to us.

14. Whoever knows both, created nature and destruction together, overcomes death by destruction, and enjoys immortality by created nature.

15. To me whose duty is truth, open, O Pushan, the entrance to the truth, concealed by the brilliant disk, in order to behold (thee).

16. O Pushan, Rishi thou alone, O dispenser of justice (Yama), O Sun, disperse thy rays, collect thy light; let me see thy most auspicious form; (for) the same soul (which is in thee) am I.

17. Let my vital spark obtain the immortal air; then let this body be consumed to ashes. Om! O my mind, remember, remember (thy) acts, remember, O mind, remember, remember thy acts.

18. Guide us, O Agni, by the road of bliss, to enjoyment, O god, who knowest all acts. Destroy our crooked sin, that we may offer thee our best salutation.

The following is from the Kena Upanishad, and might be added to Hamilton's appendix upon "Learned Ignorance."[1]

[1] Bib. Indica, No. 41, p. 80.

1. If thou thinkest, I know well (Brahma), what thou knowest of the nature of that Brahma (with reference to the soul) is indeed little (it is indeed little); what thou (knowest) of his nature with reference to the deities; therefore is Brahma even to be considered by thee. (The pupil says:) I think he is known to me. I do not think, I know (him well); but I do not know that I do not know (him). Whosoever amongst us knows that (word), "I do not know that I do not know him," knows him.

2. By him who thinks that Brahma is not comprehended, Brahma is comprehended; he who thinks that Brahma is comprehended, does not know him. Brahma is unknown to those who (think to) know him; known to those who do not (think to) know him.

3. If he is known to be the nature of every thought, he is comprehended. (Hence, from this knowledge) one gains immortality. He gains power by the soul; by knowledge, immortality.

4. If in this world one knows (the soul), then the true deed is (gained); if a person in this world does not know (the soul), there will be great calamity. The wise who discern in all beings (the one nature of Brahma), become immortal, after departing from this world.

We have space for but one more extract. It is from the Brihad Aranyaka Upanishad, the most extensive of all those yet published, and in contents will remind us of the current Hindu fable of the support of the universe. The fact that it forms a part of a dialogue between a holy Rishi and a young woman, is a point worthy of remark, revealing to us the condition of women in early days as much above that of their modern sisters.[1]

"Then asked him Gargi, the daughter of Vachaknu:

'Yâjnavalkya, all this earth is woven and rewoven upon the waters; upon what, then, are the waters woven and rewoven?'

'On the wind, Gargi.'

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[1] Bib. Ind. No. 135, p. 198. For a further quotation, see Müller, Hist. p. 22.

'On what, then, are woven and rewoven the wind?'

'On the worlds of the atmosphere, Gargi.'

'On what, then, are woven and rewoven the worlds of the atmosphere?'

'On the worlds of the Gandharvas, O Gargi.'

'On what, then, are woven and rewoven the worlds of the Gandharvas?'

'On the worlds of the Aditya, O Gargi.'"

Thus they proceed, by the worlds of the moon, stars, gods, Indra, Prajâpati, to the worlds of Brahma.

"'On what, then, are woven and rewoven the worlds of Brahma?'

'Gargi, do not ask an improper question, in order that thy head may not drop down. Thou askest the deity, which is not to be questioned. Do not question, O Gargi.' Thence Gargi, the daughter of Vachakna, became silent."

It would be difficult to construct any consistent system of philosophy from the loose rovings of thought in these Upanishads. They all breathe a more or less subtile pantheism; but the shades of sentiment are so various, the expressions so equivocal, and the statements at times so palpably contradictory, that we are not surprised to find all the widely differing schools of later days professing to build their doctrines upon these early writings, and sustaining their position by ample quotations.[1] It is only when we pass to the period next succeeding the Brâhmanas, that we meet with any clear and orderly attempt to explain the phenomena of existence, or to assign to them an intelligible source. This general period is represented to us in the extant writings of the different schools of philosophy.

Six schools of philosophy are usually enumerated by native writers, as follows:

I. The Sânkhya.
II. The Yoga.
III. The Nyâya.
IV. The Vaiseshika.

[1] Dr. Röer gives, in an introduction to each of his translations, a synopsis of the philosophical notions of each.

V. The Mîmânsâ.

VI. The Vedânta.

Of these, the third, fifth, and sixth have the honor of being reputed orthodox, that is, conformed to the Vedas; while the others are either openly denounced as heretical, or are but reluctantly acknowledged to be true exposition. Colebrooke was the first explorer also in this field. He has given us a faithful analysis of each of these six schools, and of various minor sects; and it is from him that such writers as Ritter, Tenneman, Schelling, and Cousin have gained their information, while their deductions from the facts afforded them are rarely reliable.[1] The missionary Ward also gives analyses of the different systems in his work;[2] but Colebrooke has shown them to be exceedingly faulty. Lastly, J. R. Ballantyne, LL. D., late Principal of Benares College, has been editing and translating the whole series of original texts, so that we are in a fair way of being supplied with authoritative works upon a topic where conjecture has too long supplied the place of accurate knowledge. These, with other special treatises, shall be specified in their places.

The Sânkhya philosophy, which is indisputably the oldest of the six systems, and the only independent and complete philosophy, derives the title, probably, from its character. It is the "sânkhya," or "rational" philosophy, in that it exalts reason above revelation. Its reputed author is Kapila, whom succeeding ages have identified, either with one of the seven sons of Brahmâ, or with an incarnation of Vishnu. His original teachings are considered to be still extant, briefly, in a work called Tattwa Samâsa,[3] and more at length in the Sânkhya Pravachana.[4] Both of these have been translated by Dr. Ballantyne. The original verses of these works, and of every work in which the doctrines of the founder of a

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[1] Essays, p. 143.

[2] View of the History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindoos. Vol. II.

[3] A Lecture on the Sânkhya Philosophy, embracing the text of the Tattwa Samâsa (Mirzapore, 1850).

[4] The Aphorisms of the Sânkhya Philosophy (Allahabad, 1852). Oriental works are procurable through Messrs. Williams & Norgate, London.

school are stated, are called "Sûtras," or "strings." All works in this form consist of a string of short sentences pressed together into the most concise form. Brevity is the great aim of the composers, and it is a proverbial saying among the learned, that "an author rejoiceth in the economizing of half a short vowel as much as in the birth of a son." They were probably written in this form to facilitate the committing of them to memory. Their excessive brevity renders them utterly unintelligible without a commentary, and such always accompanies them. For the Sânkhya we have also a more lucid original treatise by a follower of this school. It has been translated by Colebrooke, and edited by Wilson, together with a native commentary and copious illustrative matter. In its present form it serves as an admirable introduction to the study of this philosophy, and we shall follow, mainly, its orderly arrangement in our synopsis.[1] For an interesting, though too diffuse, dissertation upon the Sânkhya, we would refer to the Essay of Barthelemy St. Hilare.[2]

Without further preface, let us proceed at once to the synopsis of the system, remembering that what St. Hilare remarks of our dogma may apply to many others: "obscure, because false."

The Kârikâ opens with a formal announcement of the object of inquiry: "The inquiry is into the means of precluding the three sorts of pain; for pain is embarrassment," or, as the Sûtras have it, "well, the complete cessation of pain, of three kinds, is the complete end of man." Every system of Hindu philosophy is at one in stating the object of investigation; every philosopher admits man to be in bondage to nature; the sole points at issue are the nature of that bondage and the best methods of liberation. This liberation is also stated to be the *chief* end of man, the chief among four, the other three being merit, wealth, and pleasure. The three kinds of pain, the scholiast defines to be: 1. Those

[1] The Sânkhya Kârikâ, or Memorial Verses upon the Sânkhya Philosophy. Oxford, 1837. For convenience sake we shall quote distinctively the Tattwa Samâsa under its own name, and the Aphorisms as "Sûtras."

[2] Memories de l'Academie des Sciences de l'Institut de France. Tome VIII.

arising from one's self, as bodily diseases or mental distress; 2. Those arising from the elements; 3. Those arising from supernatural causes, as gods or devils.

An objector here interposes: Why betake yourself for relief from pain to the study of the truth, which the Sânkhyast is about to recommend, when you have adequate remedies at hand, such as medicines, spells, and potent herbs? The reply is: "Nor is the inquiry superfluous because obvious means of alleviation exist, for absolute and final relief is not thereby accomplished;" that is, the evil will return. Repeat it, then, rejoins the objector, whenever occasion requires; to which Kapila replies, that a physician will not always be procurable, nor his drugs infallible; and at last, to shut the objector's mouth, he quotes scripture against him. This summary appeal to revelation seems hardly to come with good grace from our rational philosopher, who plumes himself upon his superiority to external authority. He, however, is never loth to strengthen a weak spot by plastering it with a perverted text, a curious example of which is the second aphorism, where it is stated, that the revealed mode of liberation, by means of devotional rites, is no more effectual than that by physical remedies, and the Veda itself is forced to do unwilling service in his favor. It was, however, real policy on the part of Kapila not to break outwardly with the religionist, who, if he chose, could curse him to the death, while a quieter method of procedure suited his purpose equally well. But he is bolder at times.

From this point the Kârikâ proceeds to enounce the true method of liberation, and to develop the several tenets of the faith. The Sûtras, however, digress to reply to an objection. The objection is thus put: "Bondage is either essential or adventitious; if the former, it is indestructible; if the latter, it will perish of itself; why concern yourself about it?" To this it is replied, that bondage is neither essential nor adventitious: it is not essential, else scripture, which is "an exact measure of the truth," would not enjoin liberation, which would be impossible; that it is not adventitious, is proved by answering in detail the suggestions that "time,"

"space," "works," "ignorance," etc., may be the cause of bondage, and the true nature of this bondage is stated to be "the conjunction of 'nature' with 'soul.'" This bondage, further, is not real, not essential, nor adventitious, but "reflectional," caused by its proximity to nature, as a vase is colored by the presence of a rose.

We have noticed this discussion both for the sake of the definition of bondage here given, and to call attention to a single objection raised. Sûtra 41. b. affirms in the words of an objector: "Since nothing really exists except *thought*, neither does *bondage*, just as the things of a dream have no real existence. Therefore it has *no* cause, for it is absolutely *false*." To this idealistic assertion Kapila replies, with a directness which would do honor to a Scotch philosopher: "Not thought alone exists, because there is the intuition of the external." To the rejoinder that, if the mere intuition of the external world prove that world to exist, then the objects of thought in dreams actually exist, because we believe them to, Kapila replies, that if you deny the existence of the objective from the evidence of the senses, you cannot prove the existence of thought itself, — which is sheer nihilism. Thereupon, "the very crest-gem of the heretics rises up in opposition," and affirms: "The reality *is* a void; what is, perishes, because to perish is the habit of things," and bondage is thus merely phenomenal. To this Kapila deigns only to reply: "This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons," meaning, the scholiast would have us to believe, that a thing need not be perishable because it exists; "because things that are not made up of parts cannot perish." Kapila also takes occasion to declare that this mere void, this final annihilation of the soul, is not the "summum bonum," since all the world holds that the aim of the soul consists in the joys "which shall *abide in it*," implying thus its permanence.

But to return to the Kârikâ. The true method of liberation is declared to consist "in a discriminative knowledge of perceptible principles, and of the imperceptible one, and of the thinking soul." Under these three terms are em-

braced all the objects of knowledge, or categories of the Sânkhya philosophy. To familiarize ourselves with the terms of this philosophy, we shall first describe them in brief.[1]

Aphorism III. of the Kârikâ thus summarily divides all existing things: "Nature, the root, is no production. Seven principles, the Great or intellectual one, etc., are productions and productive. Sixteen are productions (and unproductive). Soul is neither a production nor productive." The term rendered "nature," is Prakriti, from "pra" (præ) and "kri," "to make," that is "primary." It is applied to the source of anything, whether original or secondary. In the latter sense it is applied to the "seven principles," etc., which are themselves products, but it is usually limited to the unproduced source, "the root," of all, save soul. In this sense we shall use it. It is also matter, the *substance* of all things, and not merely the "plastic nature" of the ancients, which would seem to have been a force residing in substance, rather than substance itself. It is not, however, matter in form; it is crude essence, incorporeal, invisible, and eternal, by an inherent energy and ever-acting self-necessity, unfolding itself, step by step, into the visible universe.

The first of the seven "perceptible principles," and the only immediate product of Prakriti, is Buddhi or Intellect, styled, from its preëminence, "The Great One." It occupies a prominent place in the system, as the principle by which knowledge is apprehended, and as the medium of communication between nature and the soul; of which more hereafter.

From Buddhi springs Ahankâra, literally, "the making of an Ego," having no exact equivalent in English, sometimes rendered Egotism, sometimes self-consciousness. It is that principle which gives rise to the sense of personality, leading one to say, "*I* feel," "*I* am rich," etc.[2]

[1] The sources of knowledge according to the Sânkhya, we shall consider under the Nyâya, which dwells at length upon them.

[2] Tattwa Samâsa, p. 9.

From self-consciousness issues a two-fold production: the first is what is termed "the eleven-fold set, comprising the five "organs of sensation," eyes, ears, nose, tongue, and skin; the five "organs of action," voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation; and "the eleventh," Manas (mens), mind, which is defined as both an organ of sensation and of action, its function being "to perceive the objects presented by the senses, and form them into a positive idea." The second set, which is the product of self-consciousness, is that of the "Five Rudimental Elements," sound, touch, form, flavor, odor. Do not confound these with the senses; for by them is meant not sound, etc., in the literal sense, but certain subtile elements, in which sound and the rest are supposed to inhere. They are styled "subtile," or "rudimental," in contrast with the remaining five, which proceed directly from the subtile, viz., The Gross Elements. Their origin is thus briefly described: "From the rudiment smell, earth proceeds; from the rudiment flavor, water; from form (color), fire or light; from touch (substance), air; and from the rudiment sound proceeds ether."[1]

We come, lastly, to Soul. Soul is coëternal with Prakriti, like it, no production; unlike it, no producer. It is without "qualities" (a technical term), void of merit and demerit, bound in pain only by its reflectional connection with Prakriti. It is not one, but many; one in genus, but distinct in each individual.

We conclude the outline by giving a native description of the mode of operation of these several prineiples. "The ear hears the twang of a bow-string; 'mind' reflects that this must be for the flight of an arrow; 'self-consciousness' says, it is aimed at me; and 'intellect' determines, I must run away."[2]

Let us now return and examine more in detail the several categories of the Sânkhya philosophy. Archer Butler uses the following language when discoursing upon the Physics of Plato: "The subject-matter of Plato is utterly

[1] Sânkhya Kârikâ, p. 119. [2] Ibid, p. 106.

without qualities, being considered antecedent to all sensible phenomena and their qualities. It could exist only in a state of things to which none of the forms of either sense or understanding have any reference. To express this original subject-matter Plato has exhausted every form of expression. It is the Receptacle, the Nurse of all that is produced. It alone gives any reality and definiteness to the evanescent phantoms of sense, for in their ceaseless change they cannot justly receive any title whatever." [1] With slight qualification, this language could be applied to what Kapila intends by his Prakriti, or nature. "The inaudible, intangible, invisible, indestructible, and likewise eternal, devoid of savor and odor, — without beginning or middle, anterior in order to mind, firm and chief, — thus do the learned designate it. Subtile, devoid of characteristic attributes, unconscious, without beginning or end, — so, too, whose nature it is to produce, without parts, one only, the common source, — such is the "undiscrete." [2] But while there does exist this similarity in language between the two philosophies, if we look more narrowly at the sense of the terms employed, we shall find a marked difference. In the mind of both Kapila and Plato (probably), this "nature" was eternal; but Plato advocated the existence of a supreme Ruler, who fashioned this nature into visible forms, after the pattern of certain archetypal ideas; according to Kapila, Nature possessed an inherent capacity of self-evolution. They both, furthermore, reasoning from the inconstancy, instability of the world as we see it, inferred the existence of something from which this world proceeded, but which was itself stable, always "the same." Plato declared this primitive Matter to be devoid of qualities, in order to difference it from formal matter, whose instability resulted from the possession of such qualities. Kapila, however (with better reason?), did not divest his Nature of qualities: he affirmed Nature to be nothing but those qualities *in equi-*

[1] Lectures upon Ancient Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 169. Ritter uses similar language. History of Ancient Philosophy, Vol. II. p. 340.

[2] Tattwa Samâsa, p. 6.

librio, and thus neutralizing each other, — at rest in the source, out of balance, and ever-working in the product.

But we may deceive ourselves by ambiguity of terms. We speak of "qualities;" what does Kapila mean by "qualities?" The Tattwa Samâsa gives us the best reply. "The triad of qualities consists of Goodness, Foulness, and Darkness."[1] The sense is not essentially different from the proverbial triad of "good, bad, and indifferent," in which we attempt to include all qualities. The Hindus of all schools, however, assert the really essential existence of these qualities, led to the position from the felt necessity of accounting for the diversities of animal or moral being. Thus one stanza says: "Above (in the divine regions) there is prevalence of goodness; below, the creation is full of darkness; in the midst, is the predominance of foulness, from Brahmâ to a stock."[2] "Goodness," continues the Tattwa Samâsa, "is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in calmness, lightness, complacency, attainment of wishes, kindliness, contentment, patience, joy, and the like. Summarily, it consists of happiness. Foulness is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in grief, distress, separation, excitement, anxiety, fault-finding, and the like. Summarily, it consists of pain. Darkness is endlessly diversified, accordingly as it is exemplified in envelopment, ignorance, disgust, abjectness, heaviness, sloth, drowsiness, intoxication, and the like. Summarily, it consists of delusion.[3] The term rendered quality, is "guna," and according to Prof. Wilson, is not to be regarded as signifying "an insubstantial or accidental attribute, but as a substance discernible by soul, through the medium of the faculties."[4] It is not, then, a property of nature; it is the essence, the substance; Nature itself. "We speak of the 'qualities of nature,'" says a native commentator, "as of the trees of a forest."

The nature of this first cause is still further elucidated in the endeavor to prove its existence. Says the Kârikâ: "It

[1] Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 49.
[2] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. LIV.
[3] Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 50—53.
[4] Sânkhya Kârikâ, p. 52.

is owing to the subtilty of nature, not to the non-existence of this original principle, that it is not apprehended by the senses, but inferred from its effects."[1] In this statement he concurs, strikingly with Anaximenes of Miletus, who, according to Ritter, maintained that the primary substance, "air, so long as it is perfectly homogeneous, *i. e.*, while as yet it is without the differences of its derivatory things, eludes perception; but that, through the qualities it assumes, through cold and warmth, moisture and motion, it becomes manifest."[2]

It is evident, furthermore, that this Nature was, in the mind of Kapila, in some sense what, according to Butler, matter was to Plato, "rather a logical entity than a physical; it is *the condition or supposition* necessary for the production of the world of phenomena;" for Kapila affirms that Prakriti is simply a *name* given to that which is the cause of all things, and such a cause there must be, else there would be a "*regressus in infinitum.*"

In attempting to prove the existence of Prakriti, Kapila is led to develop his theory of cause, which for substance is nothing but the old axiom, "ex nihilo nihil fit." Effect exists, he states, antecedently to the operation of cause; for "the production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place," and, "because of the rule that there must be some material;" and, "because everything is not possible everywhere, always;" and furthermore, "because it (the effect) is nothing else than the cause in the shape of the product." To the inquiry how that can *become*, which already *is*, he replies, that the becoming is simply "a manifestation" of what previously existed unseen.[3] The general argument in proof of the existence of a first cause is purely *à posteriori*, the author proceeding step by step from the more to the less known, under guidance of the principle that "like proceeds from like."

In his theory of cause and effect, the Hindu has but con-

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[1] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. VIII. [2] Ritter. Hist. of Anc. Phil. Vol. I. p. 206.
[3] Sûtras, Aph. 115—123.

firmed the statement of Hamilton, who affirms that "we are utterly unable to construe it in thought as possible, that the complement of existence has been either increased or diminished. We cannot conceive either, on the one hand, nothing becoming something, or, on the other, something becoming nothing.[1]

"Ascertainment is intellect. Virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power are its faculties, partaking of goodness. Those partaking of darkness are the reverse."[2] Such is the summary definition and description of the first product Prakriti, Buddhi, Intellect, The Great One. Upon the province of this principle, a native commentator thus enlarges: "Every one who engages in any matter, first observes or considers; he next reflects, It is I who am concerned in this; and then determines, This is to be done by me; thence he proceeds to act: this is familiar to all. Thence this ascertainment that such act is to be done, is the determination of intellect, which is, as it were, endowed with reason, from the proximity of the sentient principle (soul)."[3] This determination is not always connected with volition, but may be simply the ascertainment of a truth. A complete definition of Buddhi, or Intellect, necessarily involves a contradiction in our conceptions; for Intellect is sheer matter, not a spiritual essence, and works blindly, obeying instinctively the behests of soul, and equally instinctively conveying to soul the deliverances of sense, while at the same time it is the sole medium through which the soul can know anything, either within or without itself. This unnatural severance of soul or spirit, and the intelligent principle, arose, it would seem, from Kapila's desire to make soul a pure spiritual essence. Action, though virtuous, is, in the Hindu conception, impossible to pure spirit; for it entails evil. Hence Kapila, while affirming soul to be the only real seat of knowledge, of intelligence, denies it, if we may so speak, all *intellection;* it is, as we shall see, a

[1] Discussion on Philosophy, etc. p. 585. [2] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. xxiii. [3] Ibid, p. 86.

passsive intelligence. Kapila, then, led perhaps by the conviction that virtue and vice really belonged to the rational nature, proceeds to invest Intellect, the first great principle, and that most intimately associated with the spirit itself, with their faculties, virtue, knowledge, dispassion, and power, and their opposites. Action, remember, is but the result of the disturbed balance of the three qualities. Prakriti, the Equipoise of the three, is said to operate by means of them, producing effects varying in character according to the different proportions in which these may combine. Goodness preponderating, virtue and its fellows characterize Intellect; darkness preponderating, vice results. This predicating of vice and virtue, as constituents, not of spirit, but of an unintelligent, necessitated principle, is not the least of the evils resulting from such a faulty psychology.

The four faculties of Intellect and their opposites are severally subdivided. Knowledge is two-fold; knowledge external, relating to the Vedas, Purânas, logic, theology, and law; knowledge internal, the discriminative knowledge of nature and soul. The former is the occasion of admiration and worldly distinction; the latter, of liberation. Dispassion is two-fold: indifference to the world, resulting from disgust at its defects; and that which arises from desire of liberation. Power is eight-fold: the first four qualities of it are, minuteness, lightness, reach, and magnitude, by which a man may make his way into a solid rock, or "dance on a beam of the sun," or touch the moon with the tip of his finger, or expand himself so as to occupy all space.

Buddhi, it may be remarked, is identified by the Tattwa Samâsa, with Brahmâ, the mythological creator.

The second product of Prakriti, and equally material with Buddhi, is Ahankâra, Self-Consciousness, or Egotism. It is, as we have said, that principle which introduces the conception of "self" into every act of man. Originating from the Intellect, it first awakes to activity upon receiving impressions from the external world. It is, of course, wholly distinct, in essence, from Soul.

From Self-Consciousness issues a double product. Five

organs of perception or sensation, and five of action, together with Mind, constitute the first, resulting from Goodness. These ten organs are not the external and visible instruments, but rather the hidden faculty or sense. The Eleventh "internal organ," as it is styled, Mind, is of prime importance in this system. Its proper function is Reflection. According to the Kârikâ, it is both an organ of sensation and of action. "It ponders, and it is an organ, as being cognate with the rest."[1] It is cognate with the rest, that is, of the same material, and therefore, literally, a sensorium. It stands between the several senses and Self-Consciousness. As an organ of sensation, it receives the different deliverances of the different senses; as an organ of action, it combines these into a definite idea, which it transmits to the faculty behind it, which in turn hands it over to Intellect, for the use of Soul. Its function is analogous to that of Intellect, mediating between the outward world and Self-Consciousness, as Intellect does between the latter and Soul; indeed, the Tattwa Samâsa mentions "mind" as a synonyme of Intellect. This Mind is but the sixth sense, or Consciousness, of Dr. Brown, which gathers into one the several deliverances of sense, and is not unlike in character to the "Heart" of Aristotle.[2] St. Hilaire regards the doctrine as the saving feature in the Sânkhya scheme.[3]

The three principles, Intellect, Self-Consciousness, and Mind, form what is termed "the triad of internal organs;" their office is similar: in native phrase, "these three are warders, the rest (the senses) are gates." Perception results from the union of these three either instantaneously or successively, with any separate sense. The senses must operate at the instant that an object presents itself; the

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[1] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. XXVII.

[2] Ritter. Hist. Vol. III. p. 241.

[3] "Le Sânkhya sépare le moi de l'intelligence, il sépare l'intelligence de l'âme; mais pourtant il sent encore, malgré ces erreurs inormes, que l'être raisonnable et actif est un. Cette unité qu'il vient de detruire, il est forcé de la recomposer; cet ensemble qu'il a brisé, il faut le refaire; et c'est la theorie des manas qui le sauve d'une erreur complete." — *Memoir sur le Sânkhya*, p. 213.

three internal principles may act afterward, whenever a sensation formerly experienced is brought to mind. Another and unique function ascribed to these three principles, is that of being the efficient agents in the evolution and circulation of the vital airs, supposed to be essential to breathing, circulation, and digestion.

The second product of Self-Consciousness, in the evolution of which the "dark quality" is concerned, are the "elementary particles, or "subtile elements," Sound, Touch, Color, Flavor, Odor. These are defined by a native writer as "subtile substances, the elements which are the holders of the species of sound, touch, color, taste, and smell,"[1] designating these particles, not by their substances, but by their most prominent property. From these five proceed the five gross elements. The relation of gross matter to these intangible elements, which Kapila declares are perceptible only to the gods, is not unlike that which Thales, Anaximenes, and Diogenes assumed to subsist between their primal element and the subsequent products, while the strange association of the elements with the senses, noticed previously, finds a counterpart in Plato's doctrine that taste and touch may be referred to earth, smell to fire, hearing to air, and sight to water.[2]

We have considered the "eight producers," viz., Prakriti, Intellect, Self-Consciousness, and "the five subtile elements;" and also the "sixteen productions," viz., "the eleven organs," and "the five gross elements;" then remains the twenty-fifth principle, the correlate of Prakriti in the dual system of Kapila, Soul. "Soul," says the Tattwa Samâsa, "is without beginning, subtile, omnipresent, intelligent, without qualities, eternal, spectator, enjoyer, not an agent, the knower of body, pure, not producing aught."[3] We must again call attention to the fact that it was Kapila's anxiety to secure his "soul" from all the accidents of life, everything transient or changeable, which led him to rob it of any and all activity. To a Hindu, activity is

[1] Sânkhya Kârikâ, p. 120. [2] Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 34.
[3] Ibid, Aph. 34.

almost invariably a curse; activity from any interested motive always is. Hence Kapila conceived the idea of a spirit which should be at once the only intelligence, and purely inactive. "Through 'passion' and 'darkness,' through an erroneous view, it foolishly imagines, 'I am the agent' in regard to these 'qualities' which belong to nature. Though incompetent even to the crooking of a straw, soul imagines, 'All this was made by me — this is mine:' thus saying, it, through a vain imagination, foolish, insane, becomes as if it were an agent."[1]

To prove the existence of soul, Kapila adduces five arguments. 1. The existence of an assemblage of irrational objects, such as Intellect and the rest, suggests a user, just as the parts of a bed suggest an occupant. 2. The opposite of that which has the three qualities must exist. 3. Nature and its products are unintelligent; there must be one to direct and govern. 4. Nature and its products are fitted for enjoyment, but are themselves incapable of enjoying; therefore, soul is. 5. Every one has a conviction of his existence apart from body, manifested in his desire to be liberated from body.[2] Another and conclusive proof is sometimes added: "The soul exists, because there is no means of proving that it does not exist."

Strange was it, we may remark, that Kapila, after arguing for the existence of a soul in man from the presence of his faculties, did not take the next step in logical order, taken in fact by his successor, and affirm his belief in a Supreme Spirit, a divine artificer, God. But in India one need not dwell upon the proof that spirit exists: the dogma of transmigration was too deeply rooted in the popular mind to be easily displaced by any holding to the identity of spirit and body, and the death of the former with that of the latter. These arguments in favor of the existence of spirit we shall place with those of Socrates for its immortality, not as valid in themselves, but as ever pointing to that invincible conviction in every man, that "the soul dies not with the dying

[1] Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 43. [2] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. xvii.

frame," which is itself the highest evidence of that which in his weak way he would strive to prove.

An important question now arises: Is Soul one or many?

The Vedas, or at least the Upanishads, with the schools which arise immediately from them, are uniform in asserting the unity of soul in essence, allowing an individuality only in separate manifestations; in the words of a text, "this one soul is beheld collectively or dispersedly, like the reflection of the moon in still or troubled water." Kapila, however, boldly arrays himself against this orthodox tenet, in asserting the literal and eternal individuality of soul. "If," says the Tattwa Samâsa, and the Kârikâ asserts the same, "if there were only one soul, then when one is happy all would be happy; when one is grieved, all would grieve; when one is of mixed race, all would be of mixed race; when one is born, all would be born; when one dies, all would die." We may well ask, what right has Kapila to argue respecting the soul from the facts of virtue and vice, happiness and misery, birth and death, or any of the incidents of life, which have confessedly nothing to do with soul? But that he does hold to the multiplicity of souls is clear; and when a troublesome opponent thrusts in his face a text of scripture which countenances the opposite doctrine, he parries the objection by affirming that the text in question merely asserts the unity of soul in *genus*, and that he is ready to admit.[2] J. C. Thomson, in his introduction to the translation of the Bhagavad Gîtâ, would draw from the teachings of the Sânkhya philosophy the opposite tenet, — that all souls after liberation lose their personal identity, and are swallowed up in an Absolute Spirit. That personal identity may depart upon liberation, may be a logical inference from the teachings of a system which would make consciousness an attribute of perishable matter, though Kapila nowhere asserts this; but that the Vedânta tenet of the resolution of all souls into a primal source from which they were at first

[1] Tattwa Samâsa, Aph. 45. [2] Sûtras, Aph. 155.

drawn is to be found in the Sânkhya system, can only be asserted by one who has a special theory to support. Kapila could use no plainer language in support of the distinct and separate existence of souls, and any apparent ambiguity is attributable to his distinction between unity in essence and unity in genus.[1]

Soul is intelligent, but passive; matter is unintelligent, but active: for the proper exercise of its faculties, soul must therefore be in some way associated with matter, in the words of the Kârikâ, "For the soul's contemplation of nature and for its abstraction, a union of both takes place."[2] Why, if liberation is so desirable, a union should be sought, Kapila does not explain; he probably views the individual only as under the control of previously acquired character, which necessitates a new birth. But for the experience of pleasure and pain, which are properties of intellect, it is further and more definitely stated that there must be the enclosing presence of a "gross body," "such as springs from father and mother."[3] These gross bodies, the seat of emotion, are composed of the five gross elements, and dissolve at death. And, as the reward of good or evil deeds, in the shape of pleasure or pain, cannot be received when separate

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[1] Mr. Thomson has fallen into this error from too implicitly following the lead of Barthelemy St. Hilaire. The latter, in illustrating the tenet of the individuality of souls according to the Kârikâ, appeals to the Sûtras for confirmation. But he oddly enough adds to that Sûtra, which does contain the doctrine, two others which state the opposite doctrine, and which were cited by the Sânkhyast for the purpose of refuting them, and quotes all three as supporting the doctrine of Kapila. These three Sûtras he numbers 141, 142, 143, which in Ballantyne's edition are 150, 151, 152. Now Thomson expressly says, in support of his position, that "one instance will suffice," and quotes these very Sûtras 142, 143 in support. Well he might! We must give him credit for a keener sight than his teacher. See Memoir sur la Sânkhya, p. 179. Bhag. Gîtâ, p. LXVII.

Another instance in which Mr. Thomson errs from following St. Hilaire, is in repeating the assertion of the latter, that the Sânkhya system was alone in affirming the doctrine of the (apparent) individuality of souls. The Nyâya and Vaiseshika systems are no less explicit. It was an unpardonable oversight in Mr. Thomson not to have availed himself of any original authority save Colebrooke.

[2] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. XXI.

[3] Ibid. Aph. XXXIX.

from such gross body, the individual is forced to successive migrations from one such body to another, ever "eating the fruit of his own doings," until perfect discriminative knowledge shall absolve him from the necessity of further birth and death. But the Sânkhyast conceives it wholly unfitting that the spirit in its passage from one body to another should go utterly nude, and accordingly frames a second kind of vestment or body, less gross than the gross body, which he styles "the rudimental body." This inner wrapper, or coating of the soul, composed of all the products of Prakriti, save the gross elements, is conceived to have been always present as the indument of spirit, from the time of its union with matter, and to remain with it until its entire liberation from matter. It is "unconfined," "swifter than the wind," "able to pass through the solid rock." Colebrooke remarks: "This notion of animated atom seems to be a compromise between the refined dogma of an immaterial soul, and the difficulty which a gross understanding finds in grasping the comprehension of individual existence unattached to matter."[1] Barthelemy St. Hilaire regards it, and, as we think, with good reason, as a dogma to which Kapila was driven by his unnatural severence of soul and the faculties of intelligence, and in the restoration of this harmony, as a recurrence to a true psychology.[2] It is, in a word, our "person."

But, in the view of some later philosophers of this school, even this body is too ethereal to afford due protection to the spirit during its transit from one gross body to another, and they accordingly assume a third body, a medium between the other two, composed of the five gross elements, but in an exceedingly tenuous form, which they name, from its office, "the vehicular body."

That the conception of a covering of the soul, less gross than flesh, was not peculiar to this philosophy, may be seen by referring to the tenets of the early Greek philosophers, and especially the later Platonists, whose opinions have been

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[1] Essays, p. 155. [2] Memoir sur le Sânkhya, p. 453—461.

collected and commented on by Cudworth and his editor, Mosheim. "It appeareth," says Cudworth, "that the ancient asserters of the soul's immortality did not suppose human souls, after death, to be quite stripped stark naked from all body; but that the generality of souls had then a certain spirituous, vaporous, or airy body accompanying them, though in different degrees of purity or impurity respectively to themselves. As also that they conceived this spirituous body (or at least something of it) to hang about the soul also, here in this life, before death, as its interior indument or vestment, which also then sticks to it when that other gross earthly part of the body is, by death, put off, as an outer garment." [1]

Another interesting parallel is to be found in the common doctrine that a body of some kind is essential to suffering and enjoyment. The Sânkhya theory is, that in this birth and in a gross body we receive the rewards of conduct in a previous existence. The later Greek notion was that punishment was inflicted in Hades, and that a body formed of the more tenuous of the elements was the seat of the infliction; as Philoponus, an Alexandrian of the seventh century, affirms: "If the soul be incorporeal, it is impossible for it to suffer. How then can it be punished? There must of necessity be some body joined with it." [2]

To return to our text. The union of soul with nature for the sake of soul's benefit is variously illustrated; one aphorism states: "For the sake of soul's wish, that subtile person (nature) exhibits before it, like a dramatic actor;" that is, as an actor appears upon the scene, in turn a god, a mortal, a buffoon, "so the subtile body, through the relation of causes and consequences, having entered the womb, may become an elephant, a woman, or a man." Again: "This evolution of nature, from intellect to the special elements, is performed for the deliverance of each soul respectively; done for another's sake, as for self." Such evolution, it

[1] Intellectual System of the Universe (Harrison's Trans.). Vol. III. p. 265.
[2] Ibid. p. 266.

must be borne in mind, is the result of no rational conviction, but of blind necessity, as is well illustrated in an aphorism: "As it is a function of milk, an unintelligent substance, to nourish the calf, so it is the office of the chief principle to liberate the soul."[1]

This doctrine of the independent operation of these two principles, nature and soul, and the adaptation of the one to the other, St. Hilaire compares with Leibnitz' theory of preëstablished harmony, and also with that of Spinoza, "who believed in a parallelism between the soul and the body." But we shall discern a still closer analogy between certain doctrines of the early Greek philosophers and those of Kapila which respect the union of body and soul and their dissolution. After considering the union of the two, the Kârikâ thus treats of their dissolution: "Then does sentient soul experience pain, arising from decay and death, until it be released from its person: wherefore pain is of the essence of bodily existence. As a dancer, having exhibited herself to the spectator, desists from the dance, so does nature desist, having manifested herself to the gaze of soul. Generous nature, endued with qualities, does by manifold means accomplish, without benefit to herself, the wish of ungrateful soul, devoid as he is of qualities. Nothing, in my opinion, is more gentle than nature; once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the gaze of soul."[2] Mark, now, how closely this sentiment of the Hindu sage is echoed by his Greek brother. Ritter, commenting upon the doctrines of the Pythagorean school, remarks: "We must further add, that it is only the union of the soul with the body, however little this may seem to imply the otherwise perfect life of the soul, that furnishes it with means for its activity; for it is through the body that it receives the organs of its action and cognition — the senses. This was admitted in their dogma, that the soul loves the body, because otherwise it cannot employ the senses, which nevertheless are indispensable to it for

[1] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. XVII. LVI. LVII. [2] Ibid. IV: LIX—LXVII.

cognition. The soul's existence in the body, therefore, was regarded by them, on the one hand, as an unhappy state; on the other, as necessary, and having, in the universal interdependency of all things, its destination for good."[1]

The Kârikâ, the Sûtras, and the Tattwa Samâsa, all spend much time in treating of various hindrances to an impartial knowledge of the truth, in answering objections, and in discussing different incidental topics. These we omit, having, as we believe, presented a faithful outline of the general system, as found in its most approved text-book, the Sânkhya Kârikâ. This treatise sums up the discussion in the following vigorous statement: "So, through study of principles, the conclusive, incontrovertible, one only knowledge is attained, that neither I AM, nor is aught mine, nor do I exist." This somewhat startling declaration does not, however, as Cousin supposed, amount to "le nihilisme absolu, dernier fruit du scepticisme;" the writer simply intends to assert that the soul, the true self, has no real, but only an apparent, a reflectional connection with this world of matter, as the succeeding aphorism states: "Possessed of this (self-knowledge), soul contemplates at leisure and at ease nature, (thereby) debarred from prolific change." He desists, because he has seen her; she does so because she has been seen. In their (mere) union, there is no motive for creation."[2] A single objection yet remains to be answered. If this knowledge is attainable in this life, how happens it that the body still clogs our way? to which sensible inquiry the K rikâ replies, in conclusion: "By attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless; yet soul remains awhile invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it." "When separation of the informed soul from its corporeal frame at length takes place, and nature in respect of it ceases, then is absolute and final deliverance accomplished."[3]

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[1] Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. I. p. 410. [2] Sânkhya Kârikâ, Aph. LXIV—LXVI.
[3] Ibid. Aph. LXVII., LXVIII.

In taking a general survey of the Sânkhya philosophy, two points arrest our attention, the atheism of Kapila, and his theory of the origin of the universe. The Sânkhya system is styled in native writings "*nir-îswara*," literally "without God." Kapila is, however, often said not to have denied the existence of a God, but merely to have rejected his existence in the construction of his system. But this neglect to acknowledge a creator appears to us tantamount to a direct denial of his existence, especially when taken in connection with the only reference to a creator which we have met with in his writings. This is to be found in the Sûtras. The doctrine of Perception is under discussion, and the definition of perception given by the Sânkhyast is objected to, upon the ground that it would not apply to the perception of "the Lord." But to this Kapila simply replies: "This objection has no force, because it is not proved that there is a Lord."[1] The commentator here avers that this is nothing but a hypothesis for argument's sake, not an actual statement of Kapila's belief, but this is a mere make-shift on the part of a zealous defender of a later day, as is evident from the dilemma upon which Kapila proceeds to thrust the theist, by which it appears impossible to prove God's existence, as well as from his affirming that "all scriptural texts which make mention of 'the Lord' are either glorifications of the liberated soul, or homage to the recognized deities of the Hindu pantheon," whose existence Kapila could consistently admit. When, further, we find arising out of this esoteric philosophy a popular revolution, a fundamental tenet of which was the denial of a God, and when we find another philosophical school coming forward, avowedly to remedy this defect in the Sânkhya scheme, we cannot properly withhold our assent from the universal testimony of native works to the inherent atheism of the Sânkhya philosophy.

It is a less easy matter to give this system any of those special titles by which we are wont to designate the various

[1] Sûtras, Aph. 93.

shades of western philosophy. By most writers, Kapila is called a materialist; by some, though most falsely, a sceptic; and by St. Hilaire, an idealist. But neither of these terms accurately represents his position; and it will be best to accept the native phrase, and style his system the Sankhyâ, or Rational Philosophy of India. The opinion that the system is materialistic, rests upon the fact that not merely inanimate creation is developed from an unintelligent first principle, but that in these developments are included also Intellect, Self-Consciousness, and Mind. But how is this a fair imputation, while there exists by the side of this eternal nature an equally eternal Spirit or Soul, pure and free, and the only real intelligent being? We admit that only this doctrine of the Soul saves the philosophy from the charge of materialism; but that it does save it, who can deny? The inconsistency between the notions of a passive intelligence and of a material intellect, is patent; but we are better justified in holding to the real independent intelligence of soul, regarding the other principles as bare media, or organs of intelligence, than in wholly denuding the soul of sense and giving it to matter. This latter remark bears also upon the judgment of St. Hilaire, that Kapila was an idealist. True, he develops the sensible world from the triad of internal organs, the "le moi" among them; but these three are themselves but products of a principle still back of them, while the real Ego, the Self, is the eternal and unproductive Soul. That Kapila approaches each of the above positions is evident; that he adopts neither is no less clear. "He is saved by his inconsistencies."

One subject claims a passing notice, in concluding this synopsis of the Sânkhya philosophy. This is transmigration, to escape the necessity of which, is the chief end of this and every other system of Hindu speculation. As Prof. Wilson remarks: "This belief is not to be looked upon as a mere popular superstition; it is the main principle of all Hindu metaphysics; it is the foundation of all Hindu philosophy."[1]

[1] Preface to Sânkhya Kârikâ, p. 10.

Save by a meagre school of materialists, we do not know that the doctrine is ever brought in question in philosophical discussions. Yet nothing is more certain than that not the slightest foundation for the theory exists in the Vedic writings, the earliest authority of the Hindu faith. In the language of Prof. Wilson: "There is no hint in the Vedas of the metempsychosis, or of the doctrine which is intimately allied to it, of the repeated renovation of the world; on the contrary, there is one remarkable passage which denies this elsewhere unquestioned proposition. 'Once, indeed, was the heaven generated; once was the earth born; once was the milk of Prisni drawn.'"[1] When and how this doctrine, which now underlies all speculation, and saddens life in the Hindu world, took its rise, no mortal can tell; the mists of antiquity have hidden its cradle from our sight, and nothing but dim surmise is left to us. For the theory of Voltaire, who attributes its rise to climatic influences, which led men to abstain from killing, and at last to exalt animals to an equal rank with themselves, St. Hilaire would substitute the theory that "loss of the sense of personality, and the general adoption of a belief in a soul of the world, induced men to see this soul in all about them."[2] Mr. Thomson would refer the origin of the notion to the previously existing polytheism, and thinks that the exaltation of heroes to a divine rank led men to regard the gods as having like souls with themselves, while frequent intercourse with the beasts of the wood induced a like belief in their intelligence, and thus led men to fancy that this ever-acting universe was informed with a single soul, and that a man, a god, a tree, or a beast, might constantly interchange places.[3] Still another theory is that of Dr. Ballantyne, who deems the dogma but an attempt to explain the origin of evil by thrusting it back indefinitely through previous states of existence.[4] It only concerns us to know that the oldest philosophical system of India does not introduce the tenet, nor at all dis-

[1] Introduction to Rig Veda, Vol. III.
[2] Memoir, p. 208.
[3] Bhagavad Gîtâ. Introd.
[4] Tattwa Samâsa, p. 56.

cuss its origin or validity; it accepts it as as admitted fact, sad but true, and points to a mode of deliverance from it.

The Sânkhya system was a system of philosophy, but it had a moral significance. Kapila himself was a philosopher; his home was the forest, his class-room the shady walk, his pupils the thoughtful few; but the true springs of his philosophy were in the busy world without. For, as we hinted at the outset, there were other spirits at work in the bazaar and open field, than the spirits of philosophers. While anxious questionings upon man and God had engaged the minds of the few, which first found a scientific statement in the formulas of the Sânkhya school, there was gradually rising into power a class of men who arrogated to themselves the sole right of mediation between heaven and earth, and who had finally succeeded in crushing the masses of the people into a state of spiritual bondage. It is in this growing system of priestcraft, this spiritual despotism which was gradually rearing itself over the whole Hindu race, that the Sânkhya philosophy finds its explanation, against which it was a silent reaction and a virtual remonstrance. But Kapila did not openly break with the popular creed: he was willing to admit the existence of the several deities of the pantheon, as long as he was not forced to give them a nature superior to man's, or a position above that of the men who had attained perfect knowledge; he did not even discard the scriptures, though enthroning reason above them, but often made use of them against his opponents. The consequence was, that as long as this philosophy was held simply as a theory, the Brahmans suffered it to pass unrebuked, or at most scoffing at it as the empty dreamings of a hair-brained speculator, which never could harm them, and which none but a few like-minded ones gave heed to. But the crafty priests were for once in error; the great moral truth of the true spiritual equality of all men, which the Sânkhya philosophy held in scientific form, was also latent in the minds of the common people, and gradually working its way into some outward expression. The time came. The man in whom this word found expression, and through whom it

was proclaimed to multitudes of priest-ridden ones, was Sâkya-Muni, and the movement to which he gave form was Buddhism, the Protestantism of India.

Sâkya-Muni, "the 'solitary' of the race of Sâkya," or, as he afterward called himself, Buddha "the wise," was born, according to modern calculation, toward the close of the seventh century B. C., at Kapila-vastu, a city under the shadow of the mountains of Nepâl.[1] A Kshatriya by birth, the son of a king, a youth of bright promise and of high hope, he yet disdained the luxuries of court life, and declined the honor of sovereignty, deeming it a higher honor, a more ennobling employment, to seek to release his fellow-men from that spiritual bondage in which all were alike enslaved. Spending a series of years in diligent study of received doctrines, and in faithful performance of prescribed austerities, he at last broke loose from all instructors, announced a new mode of deliverance, as the only efficacious one, and went abroad, preaching freedom to all, "through the truth" contained in his "law." He gained many adherents during his lifetime, and after his decease his disciples propagated, still further, his doctrines. But events move slowly in India, and for many centuries Buddhism remained only one of many sects. It was first recognized as a state power about the middle of the third century B. C., whence it continued to have the ascendency for several hundred years, until Brahmanism again gained that foothold which it has never since lost.

The ruling spirit of Buddhism was not so much metaphysical as moral; and yet, as taking its rise, probably, in philosophical speculation, and itself embodying an individual philosophy, it claims a place in our sketch.

Our first thorough acquaintance with Buddhism dates from the year 1828, when Mr. B. H. Hodgson, then civil resident in Nepâl, having collected a series of native works from the Buddhist monasteries of the country, published the results of his investigations in the organ of the Asiatic

[1] Müller has lately shown the precarious ground upon which the conventional dates of Buddha's birth and death rest. Hist. Anc. Sans. Lit. p. 263.

Society of Bengal.[1] He continued the subject through the medium of the Bengal and London Asiatic Societies.[2] He was followed by Csoma de Körös, a young Hungarian, who presented an analysis of various Buddhist works in Tibetan, which were discovered by Mr. Hodgson. Turnour and Gogerly also furnished the learned world with Ceylonese documents bearing upon the same subject, while Schmidt and Remusat investigated Buddhism as it existed in Mongolia and China.[3] But Hodgson did the greatest service by forwarding to the various oriental societies and libraries of Great Britain and Europe the original documents discovered by him in such quantity. The dust still rests upon those in the libraries of Great Britain; but in France they fell into good hands, and it will be the lasting honor of Eugene Burnouf, that he first gave the world a true acquaintance with Buddhism, in his clear, careful, and exhaustive analysis of the Buddhist literature of Nepâl,[4] and by his translation of one of the most celebrated Buddhist works.[5] Lately, Mr. Hardy, Wesleyan missionary in Ceylon, has published two valuable works as results of his study of Singhalese documents.[6] Colebrooke also treats briefly of the Buddhist philosophy. For a general view of Buddhism we would refer to the two volumes of Barthelemy St. Hilaire,[7] and the interesting little pamphlet of Max Müller, a reprint from the *London Times*, April 17 and 20, 1847.[8]

In studying the metaphysics of Buddhism, we are not favored, as in studying the orthodox doctrines of Hindu schools, with succinct treatises upon the subject: the nature

[1] Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI.

[2] We give the most important references. Transactions of the Royal Asiat. Soc. Vols. II. and III.; Jour. Bengal Asiat. Soc. 1836, Nos. 49 and 50. 1834, Nos. 32—34. All Mr. Hodgson's papers were published collectively at Serampore, 1841, under title of Illustrations of the Literature and Religion of the Buddhists.

[3] Asiat. Res. Vol. XX.

[4] Introduction a lá histoire du Buddhisme Indien.

[5] Lotus de la Bonne Loi.

[6] Eastern monachism. Manual of Buddhism.

[7] Du Buddhisme. Bouddha et sa Religion.

[8] Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims.

of Buddhism reveals itself in the more popular form of its expositions. The authorities for the Buddhist doctrine are a three-fold collection, gathered, tradition says, at a council convened immediately after Buddha's death. This collection embraces the Sûtras, or doctrinal precepts, the Vinaya, or discipline of the priesthood, and the Abhidharma, or metaphysical portion. The Sûtras are said to be the very words of Buddha, and are the most important of the three collections, from which the other two collections gained the material which they arranged and added to. These original sources are not accessible to the English student: he must consult, for Indian Buddhism, the works of Hodgson, Burnouf, Turnour, and Hardy.

A doctrine which lies at the root of Buddhism, received everywhere, in the south and east as well as in the north, is that of the "Four Verities," which we will unfold after a translation of a native work.

"O religious one, what are these four sublime verities? Grief, the production of grief, the destruction of grief, the way which leads to the destruction of grief. What is that grief which is a sublime verity? The following: Birth; old age; disease; death; meeting with that which one loves not; separation from that which one loves; inability to attain that which one wishes and seeks for; form, sensation, idea, conception, perception; in one word — the five attributes of conception; all this is grief. What is that cause of grief which is a sublime verity? It is desire, constantly recurring, accompanied with pleasure and passion, which seeks to be satisfied here and there. What is that destruction of grief which is a sublime verity? It is the complete destruction of that desire which is constantly recurring, accompanied with pleasure and passion, and which seeks to be satisfied here and there; it is the detachment of desire; it is its death, its abandonment, its annihilation; it is its entire renunciation. What is that sublime verity, of the way which leads to the destruction of grief? It is the sublime way composed of eight parts: right view, right will,

right effort, right action, right life, right speech, right thought, right meditation."[1]

Popular tradition represents Sâkya-Muni as having been drawn away to a religious life, from meeting, at successive times, on his way to the pleasure-grounds of the palace, a sick man, an aged and infirm man, and a corpse, the sight of whom created in him a disgust at life, and a longing to know the true method of release from such woes, which, he was told, were common to men. Be the legend true or false, — and it bears the marks of authenticity, — a belief in the ceaseless round of birth, decay, and death characterizes Buddhism equally with all other Hindu faiths. "A past action," says a Sûtra of Buddha, "does not perish; it perishes not, whether it be good or bad. A good action, well accomplished, a bad action, wrongfully performed, when they have arrived at their maturity, bear equally the inevitable fruit."[2] This chain, which links action in man with its results, compelling to further servitude in the body, and from which it is the aim of Buddha to release man, is termed "the chain of causes and effects," and occupies a conspicuous place in all Buddhist metaphysics.[3]

Ascending from effect to cause, we have, as the cause of decay and death, Birth. Birth, in turn, is occasioned by Existence, not barely material and spiritual existence, but the moral state, or *status*, the result of past actions. Existence is caused by Conception, a term containing both a physical and metaphysical signification; in the latter sense implying some activity on the part of the one to be born, leading him to seize "the five attributes of conception" above specified, — form, etc., — "which, united with the five senses and the gross elements, of which the body is composed, mark his appearance in one of the six modes of existence." The fifth cause is Thirst or Desire, "the longing for renewal of pleasurable feeling, and desire to shun that which is painful."[4] "Thirst," says Burnouf, "is a con-

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[1] Burnouf: Introduction, etc. Note 2, p. 629.
[2] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 98.
[3] Ibid., p. 485 et. seq.
[4] Colebrooke, Essays, p. 255.

dition of the individual previous to conception, or of the archetypal being, according to Mr. Hodgson; which is not unlike the 'rudimental body,' or body composed of pure attributes, admitted by the Sânkhya school." "Starting with Desire," continues Burnouf, "we enter upon a series of conditions which are viewed independently of any material subject, and which form the envelope of an ideal subject. It is not easy for our European minds to conceive of qualities without substances, or of attributes without a subject; still less easy to understand how qualities can form an ideal person, which will at last become real. But nothing is more familiar to the Indians than the realization, and in some sort the personification, of absolute entities, apart from any being which we are accustomed to see joined to these entities; and all their systems of creation are but the passage, more or less direct, more or less rapid, of abstract quality to concrete subject. Making, then, to the term which occupies us, an application of these remarks which would be susceptible of further development, I would say that in the term Thirst or Desire we must not conceive of a material being who desires, but only an abstract, bare desire, which terminates the evolution of the immaterial and primitive forms of the individual, and which produces that 'conception' which commences the series of material and actual forms."[1]

The cause of Thirst is Sensation. This is not external sensation, but the internal sensibility, the product of that sixth sense which is affirmed to exist by Buddha equally with Kapila, the Manas or Mind, and belongs, of course, not to the material, but to the ideal person. The seventh cause is Contact, which, in turn, is conditioned upon the six seats of the five senses and manas. The doctrines of mediate and immediate perception, it is worth observing, both find advocates among different schools of Buddhists. Name and Form constitute the ninth cause. These give distinctness to objects, which facilitates perception. Regarded as a

[1] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 498.

single idea, they have for their cause Consciousness, or that sentiment which gives us discriminative knowledge. Its cause is termed Concept, or Imagination. Concepts are things which the mind fancies, "the belief in the reality of that which is but a mirage, accompanied with a desire for that mirage, and with a conviction of its worth and reality," as a native commentator has it. The twelfth and last cause in this order, the first in the order of nature, is Ignorance, "the mistake of supposing that to be durable which is but momentary." It has a double sense, including non-being as well as non-knowing, implying the denial of an external world, and to a certain extent the subject living within the world. But this extreme position Buddha did not himself take, though charged upon him by his opponents: his own words assert the real existence of a spirit or person who could believe or disbelieve in the existence of the external.[1]

To recapitulate this chain of causes and effects in the language of a native writer:

"Concepts have for their cause, ignorance; consciousness has for its cause, concepts; name and form have for their cause, consciousness; the six seats have for their cause, name and form; contact has for its cause, the six seats; sensation has for its cause, contact; desire has for its cause, sensation; conception has for its cause, desire; existence has for its cause, conception; birth has for its cause, existence; decrepitude and death, grief, sorrow, and despair have for their cause, birth. Thus is there occasion for the production of this world, which is nothing but a vast mass of sorrow. The production! the production!"[2]

These two theories, of the four verities and the chain of causes and effects, are held by all Buddhists, and doubtless were a part of the teaching of Buddha himself. But there is a marked difference between the doctrines of original Buddhism and those which have gained acceptance in later

[1] See also Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 391.
[2] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 488.

days. Mr. Hodgson has made us acquainted with four separate schools of philosophy, now recognized in Nepâl. These schools we shall describe, mainly in the language of Mr. Hodgson.

I. Swâbhâvikas.

"These deny the existence of immateriality; they assert that matter is the sole substance, and they give it two modes, called Pravritti and Nirvritti, or action and rest, concretion and abstraction. Matter is eternal as a crude mass; and so are the powers of matter, which powers possess not only activity, but intelligence. The proper state of existence of these powers is that of rest, and of abstraction from everything palpable and visible, in which state they are so attenuated, on the one hand, and so invested with infinite attributes of power and skill on the other, that they want only consciousness and moral perfections to become gods. When these powers pass from their proper and enduring state of rest into their casual and transitory state of activity, then all the beautiful forms of nature or of the world come into existence, not by a divine creation, nor by chance, but spontaneously; and all these beautiful forms of nature cease to exist when the same powers pass again from this state of Pravritti, or activity, into the state of Nirvritti, or repose."

"Inanimate forms are held to belong exclusively to Pravritti, and therefore to be perishable; but animate forms, among which man is not distinguished sufficiently, are deemed capable of becoming by their own efforts associated to the eternal state of Nirvritti; their bliss in which state consists of repose or release from an otherwise endlessly recurring migration through the visible forms of Pravritti." Some affirm that man is conscious in this state; others deny it. The Swâbhâvikas do not reject design, pointing to the beauty in nature as proof of an inherent intelligence in matter itself; but they reject a personal designer who created or gave order to the universe. A minor branch of this school, while adopting its general tenets, "inclines to unitize the powers of matter in the state of Nirvritti; to

make that unit duty, and to consider man's *summum bonum*, not as a vague and doubtful association to the state of Nirvritti, but as a specific and certain absorption into this deity, the sum of all the powers, active and intellectual, of the universe."

II. Aishwarikâs.

"These admit of immaterial essence, and of a supreme, infinite, and self-existent Deity, whom some of them consider as the sole deity and cause of all things, while others associate with him a coequal and eternal material principle; believing that all things proceeded from the joint operation of these two principles." Although this school believes in a God, it denies to him providence and dominion. The school is clearly later than the Swâbhâvika, and arose much, as we shall see, as did the Yoga branch of the Sankhya, in order to supply a radical defect in the older creed.

III and IV. Kârmikas and Yâtnikas.

"These derive their names, respectively, from Kârma, by which I understand conscious moral agency, and Yâtna, which I interpret conscious intellectual agency." These schools were also late, and occasioned probably by a reaction against the materialism of the first. They exalted the moral and the intellectual sense, declaring that through their culture could absolution be best achieved.[1]

The above sketch was derived by Mr. Hodgson from the Sanskrit authorities of Nepâl. But it is remarkable that Csoma de Körös, searching the Tibetan documents, brought to light authorities for the existence of four other schools of philosophy, having no connection with those of Nepâl, neither mentioning them, nor mentioned by them. Furthermore, Colebrooke, deriving his information from the controversial writings of the Brahmans, finds these same four schools which the Tibetan documents disclose. They are to us the more interesting, as having such intimate association with the six schools of Hindu philosophy, and also as being probably the most ancient. They are as follows:

[1] See for the above the Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI., and Jour. Bengal Asiatic Soc. 1836.

I. Vaibhâshika.

These were divided into four sects, said to have proceeded from the four pupils of Budda. They are said by Csoma to have discussed but little. According to Colebrooke they held to immediate perception in opposition to the contrary doctrine, which was maintained by —

II. Sautrântikas.

These separate into two divisions, one resting proof upon scriptural authority, the other upon argument. Colebrooke states that these two schools held to the doctrine of only four atoms, excluding ether, which the ordinary schools recognized:[1] but the original authorities do not bear him out in his opinion, which he gathered from their adversaries, as is evident from the following passage, attributed to the Vaibhâshikas:

"Upon what rests the earth, O Gôtama? demanded Kâsyapa. The earth, O Brahman, rests upon the circle of the water. And the circle of the water, Gôtama, upon what does it rest? It rests upon the wind. And the wind, Gôtama, upon what does it rest? It rests upon the ether. And the ether, Gôtama, upon what does it rest? You go too far, O great Brahman, you go too far. The ether, O Brahman, has nothing upon which it rests, it has no support."[2]

III. Yôgâchâras.

These maintained the existence of conscious sense alone, declaring all else to be void.

IV. Mâdhyamikas.

This is the most important school of Buddhistic philosophy. Its founder is said to have been Nâgârjuna, who lived, according to native authority, four or five centuries after the death of Buddha, though Müller shows the uncertainty of this date also.[3] This system is one of pure Pyr-

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[1] Essays, p. 253.

[2] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 448. Burnouf justly compares this passage to the speculations of the Upanishads. It is not unlike one previously quoted. See *ante*.

[3] Hist. Anc. Sans. Lit. p. 266.

honism; its name designates it as the "intermediate" system. Says Burnouf: "We may characterize the doctrine of Nâgârjuna as a scholastic nihilism. This philosophy does not suffer to remain any of those theses which are laid down in the different Buddhistic schools, respecting the world, beings, laws, the soul; by doubting, it destroys equally positive, negative, and indifferent affirmations; all is passed over, God and Buddha, the spirit and man, nature and the world. It is placed, in fact, between affirmation and negation; while speaking of things, it establishes that it is no more possible to affirm than to deny eternity."[1] "Buddha himself is like to an illusion," says an axiom of this author.

We remarked above that Buddha himself, while denying the actual existence of the external world, did not go to the length of denying the existence of spirit; but Nâgârjuna did. If we turn to the translations of Hardy, we shall find this sentiment emphatically asserted. Thus in a conversation between a king Milinda and Nâgasêna,[2] translated from the Singalese documents, "the king said, 'How is your reverence known? what is your name?' Nâgasêna replied: 'I am called Nâgasêna by my parents, and by the priests, and others; but Nâgasêna is not an existence, or being.' 'Then to whom are the various offerings made? who receives these offerings? who keeps the precepts? There is no merit or demerit; neither the one nor the other can be acquired; there is no reward, no retribution. Were any one to kill Nâgasêna, he would not be guilty of murder. Who is Nâgasêna? Are the teeth Nâgasêna? Or is the skin, or the flesh, or the heart, or the blood Nâgasêna? Is the outward form Nâgasêna? Are any of the five *Khandas* (seats of the five senses) Nâgasêna? Are all the five *Khandas* conjointly Nâgasêna? Leaving out the five *Khandas*, is that which remains Nâgasêna?'—'No!'—'Then I do not see Nâgasêna. Nâgasêna is a mere sound without any mean-

[1] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 560.

[2] The identity of Nâgârjuna and Nâgasêna is apparent. See Burnouf's Introduction, p. 750.

ing. You have spoken an untruth.' . . . . . 'It is not the skin, the hair, the heart, or the blood that is Nâgasêna. All these, united or combined, form the acknowledged sign by which Nâgasêna is known ; but the existing being, the man, is not hereby seen." [1]

Another point in which the later Buddhism differs from the teachings of the founder of the faith, is the doctrine of Nirvâna, the state of liberation from the evils of this world, to which Buddhism consigns the faithful. According to Burnouf, who is supported by the majority of scholars, Nirvâna (literally "blowing out"), meant, in the mind of Buddha, complete extinction, annihilation of being. All souls migrated through different existences, animate or inanimate, until, having obtained a full knowledge of "the law," they passed from this transitory existence into a state of annihilation, which, in contrast with this state of evil, could even be termed a joyful condition. The Singhalese documents are fully as explicit upon this tenet as are those of the North; and Mr. Gogerly gives us translations in which Buddha is supposed to be discoursing upon the future state of souls, where he states that Nirvâna is not a state of sensuous enjoyment, nor of intellectual enjoyment, nor of incorporeality, nor of consciousness, nor of unconsciousness, nor a state that is neither conscious nor unconscious. The only possible meaning, therefore, which can be applied to it, is that of nonentity.[2] Revolting as such a doctrine appears to us, and inexplicable as it may seem that it could exercise any influence over the popular mind, we cannot candidly place any other interpretation upon the term.[3] That such a tenet should become modified in the course of time, we should naturally expect. As Müller says: "Human nature could not change. Out of the very nothing it made a new Paradise."[4]

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[1] Hardy, Manual of Buddhism, p. 424.

[2] See Hardy, Eastern Monachism, p. 280. Gogerly gives an extended account of various doctrines in Jour. of Ceylon Branch of the Asiat. Soc. No. II. 1846.

[3] For the opposite view, see an article by M. Alfred Jacobs, Revenx de deux Mondes. March 1, 1860

[4] Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims, p. 21.

As many of the tenets of the Mâdhyamika school, though differing from those of primitive Buddhism, may be said to have flowed logically from them, so the doctrines of Buddha himself may be, and often are said to have been drawn from the teachings of Kapila, the Sânkhya philosopher. The general relation of Buddhism to the Brahmanism which it supplanted, we cannot give as well as in the words of Burnouf: "The doctrines of Buddha stand in opposition to Brahmanism, as a system of morals without God, and as atheism without nature. That which he denies is the eternal God of the Brahmans, and the eternal Nature of the Sânkhyas; that which he admits is the multiplicity and individuality of human souls, of the Sânkhya, and the transmigration of the Brahmans. That which he seeks to attain is the deliverance or freeing of the Spirit, as all the Indian world wishes. But he does not loose the Spirit, as do the Sânkhyas, by detaching it forever from Nature; nor, as do the Brahmans, by replunging it into the bosom of the eternal and absolute Brahma: he destroys the conditions of its relative existence by precipitating it into the void, that is to say, according to all appearance, into annihilation."[1]

But however close may be the connection between the philosophical tenets of Kapila and Buddha, it is in the practical bearing of the teachings of the Sânkhya school upon the Buddhistic reform that we recognize its chief importance. The truths which Kapila preached only to a select company, Buddha brought down to the arena of common life. He was a firm believer in the power of simple truth over the hearts of men, and with no martial equipment or political manoeuvering, but by the simple proclamation of his Law, he reconstructed Indian society. And when, in after years, a king gave in his adhesion to this new faith, he sent his own son and daughter as foreign missionaries of the word.[2]

[1] Introduction, p. 522.

[2] See also Barthelemy St. Hilaire. Memoire sur le Sânkhya, p. 493: De l'influence du Sânkhya sur le Bouddhisme. Oral proclamation of the word has been said to characterize the history of the spread of Christianity alone. For general comparisons between Buddhism and Christianity, see Hardwicke, Christ and other masters, Part II.

This practical influence of the Sânkhya philosophy upon Buddhism is specially seen in the relation which Buddhism bears to the Brahmanic religion, and to the Brahmanic theory of caste. Kapila, as we have seen, raised reason above revelation, yet did not suffer his speculative belief wholly to modify his practical life. But Buddha openly attacked the holy books of the Brahmans, and brought down upon his head their anathemas from this very cause. Burnouf furnishes us with an apposite illustration of this. Two young men were discussing the relative superiority of two favorite Brahmans, as teachers of "the way." Unable to settle the dispute, they resolve to repair to Buddha, of whose fame they have heard. Buddha, after listening to their inquiries, asks them if any of these Brahmans, or holy Rishis, had ever seen Brahma "face to face." They reply in the negative. He then says: "Things being so, is there not, on the part of these Brahmans who possess the three-fold knowledge an act of jugglery?" — "Yes, O Gôtama; these things being so, the language of those Brahmans who possess the three-fold knowledge is an act of jugglery." "Thus," concludes Buddha, "the language of those Brahmans is very like to the staffs of blind men: the first does not see, that of the middle one sees not, and the last sees no more. Their language is simply ridiculous; mere words, an empty, vain thing."[1]

It is from the Sûtras of Buddha, which contain various references to the several popular divinities, that we find evidence that this movement originated at a time when, on the one hand, the Brâhmanas were collecting and their compilers forging heavier fetters for the masses, and when, on the other hand, philosophy was beginning to find a footing apart from traditional revelation, and to be regarded no longer as the exclusive heritage of a favored class, but as the common birthright of all.[2] Buddhism finds its justification in India, as Mohammedanism did in Turkey, in the

[1] Lotus de la Bonne Loi, p. 494.

[2] The whole question as to the prior origin of Brahmanism or Buddhism is ably treated by Burnouf: Introduction, p. 129.

spiritual and moral condition of that society in which it originated. Sâkya-Muni found already existing in India various separate classes; the Brahmans, whose specific duty was the teaching of the Vedas, but who served also as the confessors and even political advisers of kings; the Kshatriyas, the warrior and royal caste, to which Sâkya himself belonged, who exercised the kingly function, and who are represented as being often extremely tyrannical, possessed of powers knowing no limit but that of caste-prerogative; the Vaisyas and Sûdras, mercantile and agricultural classes; and the Châṇḍâlas, outcasts, the lowest of the low. Sâyka, in direct opposition to both the spirit and practice of Brahmanism, built up, in place of a narrow and exclusive formalism, a system of morals without a God, and preached deliverance from sorrow alike to all. That a morality resting on no religion must be devoid of binding power, we must admit; but it was at least not less worthy than a gross polytheism which discarded virtue; while in fearlessly combatting the authority of a powerful hierarchy, and boldly challenging their right to enslave the consciences of men, Buddha stands side by side with Luther, and we seem to breathe the spirit of the great Protestant reformer when we hear Buddha declare: "My law is a law of grace for all."

It was this bold denunciation of the priestly prerogative which at once favored the spread of his doctrines and brought down upon him the curses of the Brahmans. But it must be borne in mind that Buddhism in its inception was no fanatical onslaught upon the existing order of things; it was no system of democratic communism which would seek to bring all classes of society to a dead level; it was solely against caste as a *religious* institution that Buddha inveighed: the feudalism of the age he did not attempt to break down, nor could he have succeeded, had he made the attempt.[1] On this ground only can we explain the apparent anomaly that caste exists in Buddhistic Ceylon, or the fact

[1] See an able review of Muir's original Sanskrit Texts, London *Times*, April 10 and 12, 1858. Doubtless by Max Müller.

that in the Buddhist Sûtras we find but slight allusion to opposition to any caste besides the Brahman. Nor was Buddha the first to oppose these insolent pretensions of the priests; long before his day, a Kshatriya had struggled long and successfully against a rival Brahman, for personal supremacy in a king's court.[1] But Buddha sought not personal aggrandizement; his aim was nobler; he sought liberation for a race enslaved; and not content, as was Kapila, barely to announce the truth, he established an organization to which all were invited on equal terms, and to which, in fact, persons from all grades and castes in society betook themselves.

The Brahmans bitterly reproached Buddha for taking out of their hands their means of subsistence. They were loth to part either with the flattering homage or the comfortable pecuniary benefits which they had so long exclusively enjoyed. But, if we may trust to their professions, it was a still sorer grief to these pure-minded maintainers of the faith that Buddha should receive among his disciples those who had been notorious for their crimes or their poverty,—the "publicans and sinners" of their day. A curious legend exists, which will exhibit this contrast between the two sects. A king, who was a Châṇḍâla by birth, presumed to seek the daughter of a Brahman, as a spouse for his own son. But on making his request, the Brahman rose upon him in wrath. "You are nought but a Châṇḍâla, and I am of the caste of Dvidyas. How dare you, wretch, to seek the union of the most noble with a being the most vile! The good, in this world, are united to the good, the Brahman to the Brahman. You demand a thing impossible, in wishing to join with us yourself, contemned in the world, the lowest of men. Châṇḍâlas are united here below with Châṇḍâlas, and so Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaisyas, and Sâdras, each with their caste; but never has one seen Brahmans allied with Châṇḍâlas." But to this outbreak the king replied: "Between a Brahman and a

[1] Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts. Part I. Early contests between the Brahmans and Kshatriyas.

man of another caste there is not the same difference as between gold and a stone, as between light and darkness. A Brahman, in fact, is born, not of the ether, nor of the wind; he is born of a woman, just as the Châṇḍâla. Where then do you see the cause which should make one being noble and another vile? The Brahman himself, when he is dead, is left as a thing impure and vile; it is with him as with other castes: where then is the difference?"[1]

No wonder that multitudes flocked to the standard of such a reformer. Hither came those who felt the despotism of kings, and dreaded incurring their displeasure. The hope of obtaining the rewards promised by Buddha to such as received his doctrines attracted others. The young Brahman, despairing of success in following the injunctions of his spiritual teachers, betook himself to Buddhism as a system of "easy devotion;" while multitudes whom some sudden reverse of fortune had impoverished, or calamity bereaved, or who were weary of their previous life, came to the retreat of a mendicant life as a solace for their souls.

In this last class the professional gambler is to be found, who is represented in the drama of the Toy Cart.

"*Gambler.* Lady, as I find my profession only begets disgrace, I will become a Buddha mendicant.

Lady. Nay, friend, do nothing rashly.

Gambler. I am determined, lady. In bidding adieu to gambling, the hands of men are no longer armed against me. I can now hold up my head boldly, as I go along the public road."[2]

It would be travelling too far out of our course to follow Buddhism in its progress from India to Tibet and China, and note the several phases of the faith as prevailing in these countries; but we cannot leave it without briefly explaining that peculiar form of Buddhism well known in Nepâl, which Mr. Hodgson developed in his first communication to the Asiatic Researches. The distinguishing tenet of this branch of Buddhism is that of a Supreme Being, or Âdi Buddha, who holds the same position in this school

[1] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 208. [2] Wilson's Hindu Theatre, Vol. I. p. 56.

as the absolute, impersonal Brahma does in the current Brahmanism. Âdi Buddha, according to this theistic school, the self-existent, infinite, and omniscient, created by five acts of wisdom five Dhyâni (divine) Buddhas. These Dhyâni Buddhas, thus originating in the combined power of knowledge and meditation, are mere "personifications of the active and intellectual powers of nature," but endowed with this double energy, each in turn gives birth to a divine or Dhyâni Bodhisatwa. These Bodhisatwas pass for the actual creators of the visible world. But this world is perishable and they perish with it. Three of the five creations have already passed away and we are in the fourth. The deity of this present "eon" is Padmapani, or Avalokiteswara. He is worshipped to-day in western Tibet and Nepâl as the tutelary deity, and to him divine homage is also paid among the Mongols and Chinese.

Besides this series of Dhyâni Buddhas, this school hold also to a series of human, or Mânushi Buddhas, seven in number, among whom Bhudda was the last. These are said to "win the rank and powers of a Buddha by their own efforts." But this notion of seven mortal Buddhas is simply the offspring of a desire, natural in India, to throw back the origin of any faith to as remote a date as possible. Sâkya is the only historical personage, and it is noticeable that the legends rarely refer to the acts of any other.

How opposed this doctrine of creative agents is to primitive Buddhism will be seen if we look at the original meaning of Bodhisatwa. According to Burnouf, a Bodhisatwa was originally "one who possesses the essence of Bodhi or of the intelligence of a Buddha," a man whom the practice of all virtues and the exercise of meditation had prepared for the securing the high state of a perfect Buddha. He who would acquire such a state must first gain, in numerous existences, the favor of some of those ancient and gigantic Buddhas, in whose existence the Buddhists believe. Descending, then, from heaven to earth, he appears as a Bodhisatwa, and, after severe proofs of his faithful performance of the required austerities and study, becomes a Buddha. As

a Buddha he is fit to proclaim the law and save men from the evils of transmigration, and is then, but not before, prepared to enter the state of a perfect Buddha, beyond which it is but a single step to Nirvâna, or annihilation.[1]

Another instance of the change which modern times have produced in Buddhism is seen in the different significations of the formula "Buddha, Dharma, Sangha." Originally, these words had a very simple sense: Buddha, The Law, The Congregation; but later Buddhists appear to have recognized in it a mystical trinity, akin to the Brahmanic. In the language of Hodgson, "in the transcendental and philosophic sense, Buddha means mind; Dharma, matter; and Sangha, the concretion of the two former in the sensible or phenomenal world," and may be interpreted theistically or atheistically, according as Buddha is placed before or after Dharma.[2]

As to the worship of Buddha or any other being as supreme, nothing could have been further from the thought of the founder of this faith. The only objects of religious reverence by early Buddhists were apparently images of Buddha, and his relics enshrined in sacred monuments or "topes": the worship or sacred reverence paid to the last of these was natural to enthusiastic admirers of the great master, while the use of images was merely to remind the pupil of the master's teachings, an aphoristic summary of which was always graven on the base of the statue.[3] Morality, in fact, was, in Buddha's estimation, far above religion. "Brahma," he was heard to say, "dwells in homes where the sons revere their father and their mother."[4]

It was owing, doubtless, to the rise of Sivaism in the

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[1] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 110. [2] Asiat. Res. Vol. XVI.

[3] Burnouf: Introduction, p. 344.

[4] The Bauddha, in the "Toy Cart," well puts his morality against religious practices:

> "Why shave the head and mow the chin,
> Whilst bristling follies choke the breast?
> Apply the knife to parts within,
> And heed not how deformed the rest:
> The heart of pride and passion weed,
> And then the man is pure indeed."
>
> *Wilson's Hindu Theatre*, Vol. I. p. 122.

north, and the local proximity of Buddhism and Brahmanism, that there came to be such an unnatural fusion of these opposing systems as is now common. We have, on the one hand, one sect of Brahmanism adopting Buddha as an incarnation of Vishnu, and, on the other, the Buddhists installing by the side of the image of their revered teacher the idols of Brahmanic worship, and even admitting into their holy places the female divinities, with all the unholy practises which find their full sanction in the abominable teachings of the Tantras.[1] But all these modifications of Buddhism are of quite modern growth. The belief in a supreme being did not arise, according to Csoma, before the tenth century of our era. In the terse phrase of Mr. Hodgson, pure Buddhism was "monastic ascetism in morals, philosophical speculation in religion." It was only after it reached its culminating point, and began to feel the rising power of Brahmanism, that there was introduced the notion of a God, the establishment of permanent religious houses, and the fiction of tiers of heavens and hells with their appropriate occupants, which characterize the Buddhism of the present day. From this we turn. But before resuming the consideration of the Brahmanic philosophy, it is proper to refer briefly to the tenets of that sect which alone in India inherits the doctrines of Buddhism, and is to be found more or less numerous throughout the country,—the Jains. The sources of our information respecting the Jains are the essays of Mackenzie, Buchanan, and Colebrooke;[2] the papers of Colebrooke, Delamaine, Hamilton, Franklin, Tod, and Miles;[3] the essay of Wilson on the Religious Sects of the Hindus,[4] the work of Mr. Bird upon the subject,[5] and the translations of Dr. Stevenson, published by the Oriental Translation Fund.[6]

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[1] Burnouf: Introduction, Sect. V.

[2] Asiat. Res. Vol. IX.

[3] Transactions of Royal Asiat Soc.

[4] Asiat. Res. Vols. XVI. and XVII. This Essay has been published in separate form, and is a valuable digest of the various sects. Calcutta, 1846.

[5] "Historical Researches on the Origin and Principles of the Bauddha and Jaina Religions." Bombay, 1847.

[6] "Kalpa Sûtra and Nana Tatva. Two works illustrative of the Jain Religion and Philosophy."

The Jains, who have flourished most in western India, probably originated between the fourth and seventh centuries of our era. They have often been confounded with the Buddhists, both by native and foreign writers, and not unnaturally, as their founder passes under the same name with the founder of Buddhism, while their tenets seem to be in truth little more than exaggerations of Buddhistic dogmas. Like the Buddhists, the Jains are atheists. The universe, according to them, is divisible into two portions: Jiva, animate, and Ajiva, inanimate. Both of these are eternal and imperishable. The latter has no divine creator: it originates from atoms, of which the various elements are modified compounds. Jiva, which represents the living principle and soul combined, is defined as "without beginning or end, endowed with attributes of its own, agent and enjoyer, conscious, subtle, proportionate to the body it animates; through sin it passes into animals or goes to hell, and through virtue alone it ascends to heaven: through the annihilation of both vice and virtue, it obtains emancipation."[1] The notion that the soul is always proportionate in size to the body it inhabits, has been selected as a special object of ridicule by their adversaries.

The highest stage to which a man can attain is called by various names: Tirthankara, Arhat, Jina. The term Arhat is evidently borrowed from the Buddhists. Among them it signified "venerable," and was applied to that class of holy followers of Buddha who surpassed others by their transcendent wisdom and supernatural power.[2] The exaggeration in the transfer is noticeable, since, while the Buddhists recognized but seven mortal Buddhas, the Jains count twenty-four in each of three eons, a past, present, and future. The last two of the present age were probably the founders of the faith, as in their reputed age and stature they resemble ordinary mortals much more than do their supposed predecessors. The Jains, like the Buddhists, allow the worship of the Brahmanic divinities, but exalt far above them their

[1] Wilson. [2] Burnouf: Introduction, pp. 294, 298.

deified saint Tirthankara. "There is no god superior to the Arhat, no future bliss superior to Mukti."[1] This Mukti, or final liberation, there seems to have been not a little confusion about, some asserting it to be, like the Nirvâna of Buddhism, sheer annihilation; others contending for a sort of dreamy, unconscious, and yet pleasing state.

The Jains are noted in Hindu dialectics as the discussers of seven points, to each of which they are wont to prefix a "may be." These are: 1. A thing is. 2. It is not. 3. It is and it is not. 4. It is not predicable. 5. It is, and yet not predicable. 6. It is not, and is not predicable. 7. It is and it is not, and is not predicable. This conceit is a favorite object of ridicule by a later school: "to say that a thing is and is not, is as incoherent as a madman's talk or an idiot's babble."

The following sentence from one of their works—"the world is without bounds, like a formidable ocean; its cause is action (Karma), which is as the seed of a tree"—may suggest to us a connection between the Jains and the Buddhist sect of Kârmikas, whose theory of the origin of the world is the same.[2]

The Jains are divided into two bodies: the Digambaras, literally "sky-robed," naked philosophers, veritable gymnosophists, and Swetambâras, or "clad in white." The latter are the more modern, while the former no longer retain their primitive habits. They do not essentially differ in doctrine. Another generic division of the Jains is into clergy and laity.

The Jains, as the Buddhists, pay more attention to moral precepts than religious practices; and here again push to an extreme the moderate doctrines of the latter, as is the case with religious characters, who, to avoid taking life, a crime also among Buddhists, wear a piece of cloth over their mouths to prevent insects flying in, and usually carry a brush, with which to sweep the path before them, or the seat on which they sit. "Upon the whole," says Wilson

[1] Kalpa Sûtra, p. 10.

[2] See also Bird, Historical Researches, p. 46.

"the doctrine of the Jains is a system of quietism, calculated to render those who follow it perfectly innoxious, but to inspire them with apathetic indifference towards both this world and the next."

We return to the Brahmanical philosophy. Buddhism, we have seen, was in great part but the application of the Sânkhya philosophy to social life. The result was a revolution. Sâkya-Muni was forced, by virtue of his own teachings, to break with the priesthood, and was consequently denounced by them as a heretic. But he quietly bore the brunt of their denunciation, and it is to his credit that the anathema of the Brahman became an empty sound, that the spell of priestly power was, for a season at least, broken. But this general movement, which in a revolutionary form became historical in Buddhism, in a form less avowedly opposed to received dogmas, found expression in a system of philosophy which we have specified as the second of the six chief systems of India, the Yoga.

This school seeks to popularize the Sânkhya philosophy, not merely by disrobing it of its practical exclusiveness, but by maintaining that the abstract meditation therein enjoined as the road to liberation would be facilitated by a previous discipline of austere practices and mortifications of the flesh. Its chief advance upon the Sânkhya was, however, in supplying the glaring defect in the latter system — the absence of a God. In contradistinction from the Sânkhya, the Yoga philosophy is popularly styled Theistic.

A sage called Patanjali is the reputed founder of this school; but, though he may have reduced the practice of rigorous austerities to a systematized form, and exalted it to the rank of a philosophical method, he was no more the first actually to practise or recommend such a course, than was Kapila the first to exercise his rational faculties upon the phenomena of existence; so that a native commentator is not extravagant in tracing the teachings of his master to the Katha Upanishad.

The doctrines of the Yoga school are contained in a treatise embracing four chapters. Of these, two have been

translated by Dr. Ballantyne, with a native commentary.[1] Besides this, the partial analysis of Colebrooke[2] and the questionable translation of a commentary by Ward,[3] are all that are available for the study of the doctrines.

The four chapters of the Yoga Sûtras are as follows: I. On Contemplation. II. On the means of its attainment. III. On the exercise of transcendent power. IV. On Abstraction or Spiritual Insulation.

The term Yoga is from a root "*yuj*," "to keep the mind fixed in abstract meditation." Rendered by Ballantyne "concentration," it is defined in the second aphorism to be "the hindering the modifications of the thinking principle," in other words preventing thought, in our view rather a paradoxical definition. Five modifications of the thinking principle are specified, that is to say, five states or exercises of the mind — evidence, misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory; in respect to which enumeration the commentator laconically adds "clear." Hardly, else Patanjali, if retaining his classification, should at least substitute for "evidence," right judgment resulting from evidence, and for "sleep," the condition of the mind in sleep, which was clearly what he meant. He then defines these several modifications, affirming sleep to be "that modification which depends upon the conception of nothing;" and that it is an act of the mind, the commentator argues from the fact that we remember having enjoyed ourselves during sleep.

The question then arises: How is this modification of the thinking principle to be effected? and the reply is: By "Dispassion" and "Exercise;" Dispassion being utter indifference to "objects seen on earth or heard of in scripture," and Exercise being the determined effort to preserve the mind in its unmodified state. The peculiar phraseology used we shall consider under the next school. The aim of all effort at concentration is to attain abstract meditation, through which liberation may be achieved. About this

[1] The Aphorisms of the Yoga Philosophy. Allahabad.
[2] View, etc., Vol. II. p. 199.
[3] Essays, p. 143.

notion of meditation the whole system is accordingly built up. Meditation is defined to be of two kinds: 1. That in which there is distinct recognition of an object; 2. That in which all distinct recognition is lost, and the mind is intently engaged, thinking upon nothing! Some, affirms the text, never pass beyond the first stage and thus fall short of complete liberation; others, perhaps most, will find this second stage a difficult one to reach, and accordingly, for their benefit an easier method of attaining the same height is proposed, namely, "by profound devotedness towards the Lord."

It is this introduction of a "Lord" into the system, which distinguishes this branch of the Sânkhya school, and accordingly Patanjali deems it fitting to dwell at some length upon the theme, and proceeds "to declare in order the nature, the proofs, the preëminence, and the name of the Lord, the order of his worship, and the fruit thereof."[1]

"The Lord is a particular Spirit, untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts." By "particular," is meant individual; by "troubles," any distress; by "works," actions involving merit or demerit, both equally obnoxious in the eye of a Hindu; by "fruits," whatever ripens out of works, as birth, life, and all that mortals experience as the consequences of their actions; by "deserts," the conditions or tendencies resulting from the same cause. The commentator also adds that the term "Iswara," Lord, denotes "one who is able to uphold the world by his mere will."

The proof of the existence of such a being is thus stated: "In Him does the germ of the omniscient become infinite." That is to say, explains the scholiast, just as properties which admit of degrees must find a limit somewhere; for instance, parvitude in atoms, magnitude in the ether; so knowledge and the like, which we find conditional in man, must somewhere be unconditioned, and he in whom this "germ" ripens into infinity is "the Lord."

He is preëminent; for "he is the preceptor even of the

[1] Aphorisms, 23.

first, for he is not limited by time." "Of the first," that is, of Brahmâ, the head of the recognized deities of the Pantheon, and as he is above the creator, as his instructor, he is above all.

"His name is Glory."

"Glory," the commentator says, "is the technical term employed in speaking of the mystical name of the Supreme — OM." This monosyllable is met with as the mystical name of God, in all Hindu writings, and is perhaps the most ancient general designation. It is of frequent occurrence in the Upanishads, where meditation upon it is held forth as the great means of bliss. Thus, in the Mândûkya Upanishad: "Om! this is immortal. Its explanation is this all; what was, what is, and what will be, all is verily the word 'Om;' and everything else which is beyond the threefold time, is also verily the word 'Om.'" And again, the Prasna Upanishad declares: "The wise obtain this threefold world by the word 'Om,' as means, and even the highest (Brahma) who is without strife, without decay, without death, and without fear."[1] "Om! peace, peace, peace," is a frequent exclamation at the commencement or close of a treatise. Analyzed, "om" is composed of three letters, a, u, m, and is variously defined, but usually as representing the three gods, Brahmâ, Siva, and Vishnu. Rammohun Roy says: "Om implies the three Veds, the three states of human nature, the three divisions of the universe, and the three deities."[2]

In the succeeding aphorism, Patanjali enjoins upon the disciple "the repetition of Om, and reflection upon its signification," with a view to abstract meditation. "Thence comes the knowledge of the rightly intelligent (Spirit), and the absence of obstacles." It will be remarked that, although Patanjali clearly holds to the existence of a supreme being as an intelligent creator and governor, he by no means

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[1] Bibliotheca Indica, No. 50, pp. 137, 167.

[2] Translation of the Veds, p. 109. For a more mystical explanation, current in South India, see Jour. Am. Orient. Soc. Vol. IV. p. 74, and Madras Christian Instructor, November, 1844.

exalts him to the position of a deity, to be worshipped and obeyed by man, as his chief end. Far from that; this worship is but subsidiary to the exercise of severe thought, its end being only to facilitate such thought, or wholly to take its place as an easier devotion. However much, then, we may place the Yoga philosophy above the Sânkhya, as recognizing a God, we can hardly deem it entitled to the honor of being called a theistic philosophy.

After stating this easy method of attaining abstract meditation through "devotion towards the Lord," the Yoga Sûtras proceed to treat of certain obstacles which may distract the mind from this single pursuit. These, such as laziness, fickleness, sickness, etc., are to be strenuously contended against by a variety of expedients, such as the practice of kindly virtues, which will bring the mind into an equable frame; keeping the thoughts fixed upon a single truth at a time; thinking of some renowned Yogi, whose example will inspire one; dwelling upon dreams; or, and chiefly, regulating the breath, forcibly restraining and expelling it, bearing in mind, we are cautioned, that expiration can take place only after inhalation; or finally, fixing the thoughts upon some sensuous object, as odor, color, sound; this latter exercise to be facilitated by fixing your mind upon the tip of your nose, "whence will arise the perception of celestial odor," or upon the root of the tongue, whence will arise a perception of sound, etc., etc. As the result of this, by withdrawing your thoughts gradually from one object and another, until you have but one remaining, this also will drop away, meditation will be "without a seed," and you will have reached that state of thoughtless, abstract meditation, when the world, with all its accompaniments, will have passed away, and you yourself be free.

Thus closes chapter first.

Chapter second takes us back of this, and discusses the "practical part of Concentration," which as conducive to meditation, must first be attended to by the disciple. This practical part is said to consist in "mortifications, mutterings, and resignation to the Lord;" and in the development of his

subject, the author states the varions afflictions of life, and the methods by which we may be freed from them. The subservients to Concentration are summed up as: 1. Forbearance; 2. Religious Observances; 3. Postures; 4. Suppression of the breath; 5. Restraint; 6. Attention; 7. Contemplation; 8. Meditation. Forbearance is said to consist of "not killing, veracity, not stealing, continence, and not coveting," and a curious result of the exercise of this habit is stated. From not killing, all creatures become the friends of the Yogi; from veracity, the fruit of any one's works will accrue to any individual at the Yogi's bidding; by abstinence from theft, "the jewels that exist in every quarter come to him, even though he covet them not;" from continence, he gains all power; from not coveting, he becomes perfectly familiar with all previous states of existence. Again, it is stated as a result of "inaudible mutterings, that "one's favorite deity becomes visible, and grants any boon desired."[1]

Patanjali has much to say upon the regulation of the breath, giving directions as to those postures which best facilitate such an exercise, explaining how the breath should be expelled to the distance of just twelve inches from the nose, and for the space of thirty-six moments, enjoining it upon the Yogi so to breath that there shall be perfect rest, the vital airs remaining motionless; and much more to like effect.

Of the third and fourth chapters we have nothing in English, save the doubtful translations of Ward and the brief analysis of Colebrooke. Transcendent power is treated of, which the Yogi may at last attain, even while invested with the body. He may thus hear sound, however distant; transform himself into each or all of the five elements; pass and penetrate anywhere; change the course of nature; and, finally, by means of that abstract meditation through which he gains this power, escape the thraldom of nature by destroying all consciousness of personality.

[1] The Buddhist dogma of the superiority of Buddha to the god is no more than an expansion of this. Wilson on Buddhism. J. R. A. S. 1850.

Mr. Thomson holds that the introduction of a supreme will into the system of Kapila was not the work of Patanjali himself, but of some other persons intervening between him and Kapila. Judging from the mere form of the doctrine as it appears in the Yoga Sûtras, we might naturally incline to the same opinion, as this form is not sufficiently apologetic to have been the earliest authoritative statement of the doctrine; but when we remember that one great obstacle to the satisfactory study of Hindu philosophy is the fact that we seldom see *processes*, but only *results*; that, further, the real utterances of a great teacher have rarely, if ever, come down to us, save in the scholastic formulas of his disciples; and that when any new statement of a doctrine had gained currency, all former treatises upon the subject have usually fallen into disuse, — we may hesitate before refusing Patanjali the honor of having remedied (so far as he did) the prominent defect of the Sânkya philosophy. As it now stands, however, the Yoga philosophy is less a system of metaphysics than a religious scheme, offered as a substitute both for the atheistic speculations of the philosophers, and the irrational superstitions of the common people.

(To be concluded).

ARTICLE III.

SOME REMARKS ON AN EXPRESSION IN ACTS, XXV. 26. — A MONOGRAPH.

BY REV. THEODORE DWIGHT WOOLSEY, D. D., PRESIDENT OF YALE COLLEGE, NEW HAVEN.

The words "of whom I have no certain thing to write τῷ κυρίῳ," suggest the inquiry whether a Roman official, like Festus, when speaking of the emperor, could, in conformity with Roman usage about the year 60 of our era, have uttered the words τῷ κυρίῳ, which are here attributed to him. This inquiry has not been overlooked or unan-