

E PLURIBUS UNUM

DEFENSE  
BASE  
CLOSURE  
AND  
REALIGNMENT  
COMMISSION

1995  
REPORT TO  
THE PRESIDENT



**THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION**  
1700 NORTH MOORE STREET SUITE 1425  
ARLINGTON, VA 22209  
703-696-0504

ALAN J. DIXON, CHAIRMAN

COMMISSIONERS:  
AL CORNELLA  
REBECCA COX  
GEN J. B. DAVIS, USAF (RET)  
S. LEE KLING  
RADM BENJAMIN F. MONTROYA, USN (RET)  
MG JOSUE ROBLES, JR., USA (RET)  
WENDI LOUISE STEELE

July 1, 1995

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are pleased to submit the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment report for your consideration. This report contains the Commission's findings and recommendations based on a thorough review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary of Defense together with the Commission's recommendations for closure and realignment of military installations within the United States.

Over the past four months, the Commission has reviewed thousands of pages of testimony and written documentation. We held 16 regional hearings across the country, visited 167 military activities, and met with hundreds of local community groups. In 13 hearings in Washington, D.C., we received expert testimony from Department of Defense officials, the General Accounting Office and Members of Congress. All of the Commission's activities and all of the documentation used by the Commission were open to the public.

The decision to close a military installation is a painful one. Every installation recommended for closure or realignment has enjoyed a proud history and offered a priceless service to our nation. Our review indicates that, with a concerted effort, communities can recover from the impact of a base closure, but we realize that our recommendations will result in economic hardship for many families and communities. We also realize that it is essential to our national security that we reduce our defense infrastructure in a careful, deliberate way. We believe our recommendations will help the military services maintain readiness, modernize their forces and preserve the force structure necessary to protect our nation's vital interests in the future.

The Commission has also included some recommendations in this report regarding the post-closure activities of the federal government concerning military installations, as well as some ideas on how to address base closings in the future.


This third and final report of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission brings to a close a unique and, in our view, remarkably successful experiment in open, participatory government.




Alan J. Dixon  
Chairman



Alton W. Cornella  
Commissioner




Rebecca G. Cox  
Commissioner




GEN James B. Davis, USAF (Ret.)  
Commissioner



S. Lee Kling  
Commissioner



RADM Benjamin F. Montoya, USN (Ret.)  
Commissioner




MG Josue Robles, Jr., USA (Ret.)  
Commissioner



Wendi L. Steele  
Commissioner





# 1995 Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission Actions



**Legend**


- Closure/Disestablishment
- ◆ Realignment/Redirect

See Following Pages for List of Installations



○ 74

# 1995 Defense Base Closure & Realignment Commission Actions - Northeast Region





# LIST OF 1995 DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION ACTIONS

Number Name

1 Army Bio-Medical Research Lab, Fort Detrick, MD  
2 Aviation Troop Command (ATCOM), MO  
3 Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY  
4 Bergstrom AFB, TX  
5 Big Coppett Key, FL  
6 Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, CA  
7 Camp Bonneville, WA  
8 Camp Kilmer, NJ  
9 Camp Pedricktown, NJ  
10 Chicago O'Hare IAP ARS, IL  
11 Concepts Analysis Agency, Bethesda, MD  
12 DCMC International, Dayton, OH  
13 DCMD South, Marietta, GA  
14 DCMD West, El Segundo, CA  
15 Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH  
16 Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
17 Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA  
18 Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN  
19 Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT  
20 Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX  
21 Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA  
22 Detroit Arsenal, MI  
23 East Fort Baker, CA  
24 Eglin AFB, FL  
25 Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO  
26 Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam  
27 Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC  
28 Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland, CA  
29 Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico  
30 Fort Chaffee, AR

Number Name

31 Fort Dix, NJ  
32 Fort Greely, AK  
33 Fort Holabird, MD  
34 Fort Hunter Liggett, CA  
35 Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
36 Fort Lee, VA  
37 Fort McClellan, AL  
38 Fort Meade, MD  
39 Fort Missoula, MT  
40 Fort Pickett, VA  
41 Fort Ritchie, MD  
42 Fort Totten, NY  
43 Grand Forks AFB, ND  
44 Griffiss AFB, 10th Infantry Airfield Support, NY  
45 Griffiss AFB, 485th Engineering Installation Group, NY  
46 Hill AFB, UT  
47 Hingham Cohasset, MA  
48 Homestead ARB, 301st Rescue Squadron, FL  
49 Homestead ARB, 726th Air Control Squadron, FL  
50 Information Systems Software Center, VA  
51 Investigations Control & Automation Directorate, MD  
52 Kelly AFB, TX  
53 Kelly Support Center, PA  
54 Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
55 Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA  
56 Lowry AFB, CO  
57 MacDill AFB, FL  
58 Malmstrom AFB, MT  
59 MCAS, El Toro, CA  
60 MCAS, Tustin, CA  
61 McClellan AFB, CA  
62 Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ  
63 NAS, Agana, Guam  
64 NAS, Alameda, CA  
65 NAS, Barbers Point, HI

<b>Number</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>Name</b>
66	NAS, Cecil Field, FL	96	NSWC, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, MD
67	NAS, Corpus Christi, TX	97	Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Orlando, FL
68	NAS, Key West, FL	98	NUWC, Keyport, WA
69	NAS, South Weymouth, MA	99	NUWC, Newport Division, New London, CT
70	Nav. CC & Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service, East Coast Det , Norfolk, VA	100	Oakland Army Base, CA
71	Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Det., Orlando, FL	101	Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA
72	Naval Security Group Command Detachment, Washington, DC	102	Onizuka AGS, CA
73	Naval Activities, Guam	103	Ontario IAP AGS, CA
74	Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK	104	Public Works Center, Guam
75	Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI	105	Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore, MD
76	Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA	106	Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, NY
77	Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL	107	Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC
78	Naval Aviation Engineering Services Unit, Philadelphia, PA	108	Red River Army Depot, TX
79	Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA	109	Reese AFB, TX
80	Naval CC & Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA	110	Reserve Center Santa Ana, Irvine, CA
81	Naval CC & Ocean Surveillance Center, Warminster, PA	111	Reserve Center, Cadillac, MI
82	Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, VA	112	Readiness Command Region 7, Charles- ton, SC
83	Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD	113	Reserve Center, Huntsville, AL
84	Naval Management System Support Office, Chesapeake, VA	114	Reserve Center, Laredo, TX
85	Naval Personnel Research & Development Center, San Diego, CA	115	Readiness Command Region 10, New Orleans, LA
86	Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC	116	Air Reserve Center, Olathe, KS
87	Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA	117	Reserve Center, Pomona, CA
88	Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL	118	Reserve Center, Sheboygan, WI
89	Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA	119	Reserve Center, Staten Island, NY
90	NAWC, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA	120	Reserve Center, Stockton, CA
91	NAWC, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, IN	121	Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA
92	NAWC, Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA	122	Roslyn AGS, NY
93	Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, PA	123	Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA
94	NSWC, Louisville, KY	124	Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL
95	NSWC, Carderock Detachment, Annapolis, MD	125	Seneca Army Depot, NY
		126	Ship Repair Facility, Guam
		127	Sierra Army Depot, CA
		128	Space & Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, VA
		129	Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT
		130	Sudbury Training Annex, MA
		131	Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Long Beach, CA
		132	Williams AFB, AZ



# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Closing military facilities is a difficult and painful process. Every installation recommended for closure or realignment has enjoyed a proud history and has offered a priceless service to our nation. At the same time, these installations have become an integral part of their local communities, and in turn, have received strong support from the local citizenry. Rightfully, these citizens are concerned about the effect of base closures on the economic livelihood of their communities.

The undeniable fact remains, however, that U.S. military requirements have been fundamentally altered. The end of the Cold War, combined with the growing urgency to reduce the Federal budget deficit, compels the United States to reduce and realign its military forces. To reduce the number of military installations in the United States, and to ensure the impartiality of the decision-making process, Congress enacted the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-510, as amended).

Signed by President George Bush on November 5, 1990, this Act established the independent Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC). The Commission was established "to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States." Authorized to meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995, the Commission's authority expires on December 31, 1995. (See Appendix F).

Because this is the third and final round under Public Law 101-510, the 1995 Commission is proud to have the opportunity to bring this pro-

cess to a successful and prudent conclusion and to make suggestions regarding the future. The Commission has taken the approach that the base closure process should not be simply a budget cutting exercise. Base closures must be undertaken to reduce our nation's defense infrastructure in a deliberate way that will improve long-term military readiness and ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent in the most efficient way possible. The Commission's challenge was to develop a list of base closures and realignments that allows the Defense Department to maintain readiness, modernize our military, and preserve the force levels needed to maintain our security. The Commission believes that it has met this challenge.

In compliance with the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, the Secretary of Defense submitted a list of proposed military base closures and realignments to the Commission on February 28, 1995. The Secretary's 1995 recommended actions affected 146 domestic military installations, including 33 major closures, 26 major realignments, and an additional 27 changes to prior base closure round decisions, or "redirects" (See Appendix I). The statute also required the Secretary of Defense to base all recommendations on a force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department's FY 1996 budget request and on selection criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress. For the 1995 Commission process, the Secretary of Defense announced that the selection criteria would be identical to those used during the 1991 and 1993 base closure rounds.



## 1995 DoD Force-Structure Plan

	FY1994	FY1997	FY1999
Army Divisions			
Active	13	10	10
Reserve	8	8	8
Marine Corps Divisions			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
Aircraft Carriers	12	11	11
Reserve Carriers	-	1	1
Carrier Airwings			
Active	11	10	10
Reserve	2	1	1
Battle Force Ships	387	363	344
Air Force Fighters			
Active	978	936	936
Reserve	795	504	504
Air Force Bombers			
Active	139	104	103
Reserve	12	22	26
<hr/>			
<b>DoD Personnel (End strength in thousands)</b>			
Active Duty			
Army	543	495	495
Navy	468	408	394
Marine Corps	174	174	174
Air Force	426	385	382
TOTAL	<u>1,611</u>	<u>1,462</u>	<u>1,445</u>
Reserves and National Guard	997	904	893
Civilians	913	799	759

## 1995 DoD Selection Criteria

### *Military Value*

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations.
4. The cost and manpower implications.

### *Return on Investment*

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.

### *Impacts*

6. The economic impact on communities.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.
8. The environmental impact.

Upon receipt of the recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, the Commission is required to hold public hearings on the recommendations before making any findings. To change any of the Secretary's recommendations, Public Law 101-510 requires the Commission to find substantial deviation from the Secretary's force-structure plan and the final criteria approved by Congress.

Like previous DBCRC rounds, the 1995 Commission's process was a model of open government. Its recommendations resulted from an independent review of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations, without political or partisan influence. As part of its review and analysis process, the Commission solicited information from a wide variety of sources. Most importantly, communities affected by the recommendations played a major role in the Commission's process. Every major site proposed for closure or realignment was visited by at least one commissioner. These visits enabled the commissioners to gain a first-hand look at the installations. Commissioners also heard from members of the public about the effect that closures would have on local communities. The Commission held 13 investigative hearings, conducted 206 fact-finding visits to 167 military installations and activities, held 16 regional hearings nationwide, listened to hundreds of Members of Congress, and received thousands of letters from concerned citizens from across the country. All meetings were open to the public. All data received by the Commission, as well as all transcripts of Commission hearings, were available for public review. Throughout the process, the Commission staff members maintained an active and ongoing dialogue with communities, and met with community representatives at the Commission offices, during base visits, and during regional hearings.

At the Commission's investigative hearings, Commissioners questioned senior military and civilian officials of the Defense Department directly responsible for the Secretary's recommendations. Defense and base closure experts within the Federal government, private sector, and academia provided an independent assessment of the base closure process and the potential impacts of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. Public Law 101-510, as amended, also requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) to evaluate DOD's selection process and recommendations, and provide the Commission and Congress a report containing their detailed analysis of the process by

April 15, 1995. GAO testified before the Commission on April 17, 1995, presenting its findings and recommendations. All of the Commission's hearings and deliberations were held in public. Many were broadcast on national television (see Appendices O and P).

Based on military installation visits, hearings, and its review and analysis, the Commission voted to consider alternatives and additions to the Secretary's list. On March 7, 1995, and again on May 10, 1995, the Commission voted to consider a total of 32 installations as possible alternatives and additions to the 146 bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense (see Appendix I).

Communities that contributed to our country's national security by hosting a military facility for many years should rest assured their concerns were heard, carefully reviewed, and analyzed. The Commission would also like to reassure communities there can be life after a base is closed. Economic recovery is, however, in large part dependent upon a concerted community effort to look towards the future. The same dedicated effort expended by communities over the last several months to save their bases should be redirected towards building and implementing a reuse plan that will revitalize the community and the local economy.

The Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) was established to help communities affected by base closures, as well as other defense program changes. The OEA's principal objective is to help the communities affected by base closures to maintain or restore economic stability. According to an OEA survey, approximately 158,000 new jobs were created between 1961 and 1992 to replace nearly 93,000 jobs lost as a result of base closures. The OEA has also been working with 47 communities located near bases recommended for closure by the 1988 and 1991 Commissions, and has provided \$20 million in grants to help communities develop reuse plans.

As part of the 1995 Commission's interest in post-closure activities, the Commission also reviewed and developed recommendations on how to improve the Federal government's performance in the area of conversion and reuse of military installations. The 1988, 1991, and 1993 base closure rounds have resulted in more than 70 major, and almost 200 smaller, base closings. The Federal

government has an obligation to assist local communities in the challenge of replacing the base in the local economy. The Commission held two hearings in which local elected officials, private sector groups, and officials from the Federal government presented testimony on post-closure activities of the Federal government, and includes its findings and recommendations in chapter 2 of this report.

The commissioners selected for the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds in public service, business, and the military (see Appendix Q). In accordance with Public Law 101-510, as amended, two commissioners were nominated in consultation with the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, two in consultation with the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and one commissioner with the advice of each of the Minority Leaders of the House and Senate. The remaining two nominations were made independently by the President, who also designated one of the eight commissioners to serve as the Chairman.

The Commission staff included experts detailed from several government agencies, including the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Pro-

tection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the General Accounting Office, as well as the Department of Defense (see Appendix R). Ten professional staff members were detailed by the General Accounting Office to serve full-time on the Commission's Review and Analysis staff. All detailees fully participated in all phases of the review and analysis effort; they verified data, visited candidate bases, participated in local hearings, and testified before the Commission at its public deliberative hearings.

### *Costs and Savings of the Commission's Recommendations*

After thorough review and analysis, the Commission recommends the closure or realignment of 132 military installations in the United States. This total includes 123 of the 146 closure or realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense, and 9 of the 36 military installations identified by the Commission as candidates for consideration during its deliberations.

The Commission estimates that the closure or realignment of these 132 military installations will

### **1995 Closure & Recommendations (\$ in Millions)**

	1-Time Cost	Annual Savings	20-Year Savings
DoD Submission (28 February 1995)	3,743	1,768	21,026
DoD Revised Baseline*	3,521	1,569	18,994
Final Commission Results	3,561	1,606	19,317
Change from DoD Revised Baseline	+40	+37	+323

\*Reflects revisions in costs and savings estimates submitted to the Commission by the Defense Department, as well as the removal of the following installations from the list as requested by the Secretary of Defense: Kirtland Air Force Base, NM; Dugway Proving Ground, UT; Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ; and Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV.

require one-time, upfront costs of \$3.6 billion, and will result in annual savings of \$1.6 billion once implemented. Over the next 20 years, the total savings will be approximately \$19.3 billion.

The preceding table summarizes the costs and savings estimates of the recommendations submitted to the Commission by the Secretary of Defense on February 28; the costs and savings of these estimates as revised by the military services as a result of site surveys taken after the submission of the original recommendations, as well as the removal of certain installations from the original list by the Secretary of Defense, and the costs and savings estimates of the Commission proposals contained in this report.

While the Commission believes that the one-time costs of implementing its recommendations will exceed the Defense Department's revised estimates by \$40 million, the annual savings and 20-year savings from the Commission's recommendations will exceed the Defense Department's revised estimates by \$37 million and \$323 million, respectively. These 1995 recommendations represent the first time that the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission has recommended savings greater than those proposed by the Secretary of Defense.

The following list summarizes the closure and realignment recommendations of the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.

## 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Recommendations

### *Part I: Major Base Closures*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort McClellan, AL  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
Oakland Army Base, CA  
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO  
Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL  
Fort Ritchie, MD  
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ  
Seneca Army Depot, NY  
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
Fort Pickett, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK  
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA  
Ship Repair Facility, GU  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, IN  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, KY  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, MD  
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

McClellan Air Force Base, CA  
Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, CA  
Chicago O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve Station, IL  
Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY  
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX  
Reese Air Force Base, TX

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN  
Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT

### *Part II: Major Base Realignments*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort Greely, AK  
Fort Hunter Liggett, CA  
Sierra Army Depot, CA  
Fort Meade, MD  
Detroit Arsenal, MI  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Fort Buchanan, PR  
Red River Army Depot, TX  
Fort Lee, VA  
Department of the Navy  
Naval Air Station, Key West, FL  
Naval Activities, GU  
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, WA

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Onizuka Air Station, CA  
Eglin Air Force Base, FL  
Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND  
Kelly Air Force Base, TX  
Hill Air Force Base, UT (Utah Test and Training Range)

### *Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignments, Disestablishments or Relocations*

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, CA  
East Fort Baker, CA  
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA  
Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT  
Big Coppett Key, FL  
Concepts Analysis Agency, MD  
Fort Holabird, MD  
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD  
Hingham Cohasset, MA  
Sudbury Training Annex, MA  
Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), MO  
Fort Missoula, MT  
Camp Kilmer, NJ  
Camp Pedricktown, NJ  
Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY  
Fort Totten, NY  
Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC  
Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), VA  
Camp Bonneville, WA

## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland, CA  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast Division, San Diego, CA  
Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, CA  
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, CA  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, CT  
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, GU  
Public Works Center, GU  
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA  
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, MD

Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit, Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, PA  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, VA  
Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, VA

### **Navy/Marine Reserve Activities**

#### Naval Reserve Centers at:

Huntsville, AL  
Stockton, CA  
Santa Ana, Irvine, CA  
Pomona, CA  
Cadillac, MI  
Staten Island, NY  
Laredo, TX  
Sheboygan, WI

#### Naval Air Reserve Center at:

Olathe, KS

#### Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:

New Orleans, LA (Region 10)  
Charleston, SC (Region 7)

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, NY

## DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta, GA  
Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA

## DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, MD

*Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved  
BRAC Recommendations*

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Tri-Service Project Reliance, Army Bio-Medical  
Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, MD

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA  
Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL  
Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center,  
Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL  
Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL  
Naval Air Station Agana, GU  
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI  
Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI  
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command,  
Arlington, VA  
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC  
Naval Security Group Command Detachment  
Potomac, Washington, DC

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL (301st Rescue  
Squadron)  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL (726th Air Control  
Squadron)  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (Airfield Support for  
10th Infantry Division [Light])  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (485th Engineering  
Installation Group)

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

Defense Contract Management District West,  
El Segundo, CA

*Part V: DoD Recommendations Rejected  
by the Commission*

**PROPOSED CLOSURES REJECTED  
BY THE COMMISSION**

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA  
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA  
North Highlands Air Guard Station, CA  
Price Support Center, IL  
Selfridge Army Garrison, MI  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Naval Technical Training Center Meridian, MS  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Lakehurst, NJ  
Rome Laboratory, Rome, NY  
Springfield-Beckley MAP Air Guard Station, OH  
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, PA  
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator  
Activity, Fort Worth, TX  
Brooks Air Force Base, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX

**PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS REJECTED  
BY THE COMMISSION**

Robins Air Force Base, GA  
Fort Hamilton, NY  
Tinker Air Force Base, OK  
Hill Air Force Base, UT

**PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS REJECTED BY  
THE COMMISSION AT THE REQUEST OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ  
Kirtland Air Force Base, NM  
Dugway Proving Ground, UT  
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity  
(AMSA), WV



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# CHAPTER 1

## COMMISSION FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Secretary of Defense, in compliance with Public Law 101-510, as amended, officially transmitted his recommendations for base closures and realignments to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on February 28, 1995. The Commission held 13 investigative hearings, conducted 206 fact-finding visits to 167 military installations and activities, held 16 regional hearings nationwide, listened to hundreds of Members of Congress, and received hundreds of thousands of letters from concerned citizens from across the country. By June 22, 1995, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission had completed its review and analysis of the Secretary's recommendations, and began its final, two days of deliberations, all in public. This chapter contains a summary of the Commission's findings and its recommendations for closures and realignments.

Information on each of the Commission's base closure and realignment decisions is presented below. The paragraphs entitled "Secretary of Defense Recommendations" and "Secretary of Defense Justifications" were taken verbatim from the *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report* dated March 1995. The paragraphs entitled "Community Concerns" provide a brief summary of arguments presented to the Commission by local communities; they are not all-inclusive. Where applicable, substantial deviations from the application of the force-structure plan and final criteria are identified.

### Department of the Army

#### Fort McClellan, Alabama

*Category: Training Schools*

*Mission: Fort McClellan is home to the U.S. Army Chemical School, U.S. Army Military Police School, and the DoD Polygraph Institute, and the site of the nation's only Chemical Defense Training Facility*

*One-time Cost: \$231.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-109.5 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$40.6 million*

*Return on Investment: 2005 (6 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave and minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot. Relocate the U. S. Army Chemical and Military Police Schools to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, upon receipt of the required permits. Relocate the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army National Guard.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This closure recommendation is based upon the assumption that requisite permits can be granted to allow operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The Governor of the State of Missouri has indicated that an expeditious review of the permit application can be accomplished.

Collocation allows the Army to focus on the doctrinal and force development requirements of Engineers, Military Police, and the Chemical Corps. The synergistic advantages of training and development programs are coordination, employment, and removal of obstacles; conduct of river crossing operations; operations in rear areas or along main supply routes, and counter-drug operations. The missions of the three branches will be more effectively integrated.

This recommendation differs from the Army's prior closure recommendations submitted to the 1991 and 1993 Commissions. The Army will relocate the Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. By relo-

cating the CDTF, the Army can continue providing live-agent training to all levels of command. The Army is the only service that conducts live agent training, and it will continue this training at Fort Leonard Wood.

The Army has considered the use of some Fort McClellan assets for support of the chemical demilitarization mission at Anniston Army Depot. The Army will use the best available assets to provide the necessary support to Anniston's demilitarization mission.

### *Community Concerns*

The Fort McClellan community believes that DoD failed to comply with the 1993 Commission's direction to pursue permits prior to recommendation. They further argue the issued permits may be invalid, and obtaining a hazardous waste permit may delay completion of a Chemical Defense Training Facility (CDTF) at Fort Leonard Wood beyond 6 years. The community estimates the cost of a new CDTF at up to \$70 million, and the cost of environmental remediation of the existing site at \$50 million. The community claims that building a new CDTF risks the loss of live-agent chemical training should environmental litigation at Fort Leonard Wood prevail following closure of Fort McClellan. The recommended move, the community argues, also risks turbulence in chemical and military police training at a time when those specialties have been identified as particularly essential to the services' missions. The community also sees a risk in reducing the Chemical School to a department of a larger school, costing the Chemical School the influence and prominence needed to carry out its national and international role. The Fort McClellan community claims that environmental restrictions on smoke training at Fort Leonard Wood would imperil the training mission. The community notes the economic impact of this proposal was the highest for any Army closure, and the National Guard enclave and environmental cleanup sites would leave little of the post available for community reuse.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Department of the Army complied to the extent possible with the 1993 Commission's directive to pursue all necessary environmental permits before submitting a recommendation to close Fort McClellan. Accordingly, the Army prepared the applications and

submitted them concurrently with the recommendation on March 1, 1995.

The Commission found determining the validity of individual state-issued permits was beyond the Commission's charter; other avenues of appeal exist to determine their validity. The Commission concurred, however, with the finding that a hazardous waste permit, under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, was not required for operation of the Chemical Defense Training Facility, as evidenced by the successful operation of the Fort McClellan CDTF without such a permit, and information supplied by the Army to the State of Missouri. The Commission found that all permits issued by the State of Missouri conformed to the Army's requests. The Commission further found permits, once issued, were vested as property rights of Fort Leonard Wood, making revocation difficult. The Commission found the Army's projected construction cost of a new CDTF to be reasonable.

With regard to the support provided by the Army to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot, the Commission found the Army accounted for the costs of such support, but did not specify the assets to be used. The Commission further found the Army's commitment was to supply particular capabilities, independent of where those capabilities were stationed.

The economic impact on the Anniston, Alabama, area was found to be significant.

Minimizing turbulence when moving the Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood was found to be a challenge to Army management. To ensure the capability for live-agent training was maintained, however, the Commission revised the DoD recommendation to require that the Fort McClellan CDTF not be closed until a similar facility was operational at Fort Leonard Wood.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort McClellan, except minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave, minimum essential facilities, as necessary, to provide auxiliary support to the chemical demilitarization operation at Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and the Chemical Defense

Training Facility (CDTF). The CDTF will operate at Fort McClellan until such time as the capability to operate a replacement at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, is achieved. Relocate the U.S. Army Military Police School and the U.S. Army Chemical School to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Relocate the Defense Polygraph Institute (DODPI) to Fort Jackson, South Carolina. License Pelham Range and current Guard facilities to the Alabama Army National Guard. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Greely, Alaska**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Provide administrative and logistical support to the Northern Warfare Training Center and the Cold Regions Test Activity; assist military organizations and units in their training*

*One-time Cost: \$23.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$38.7 million*

*Annual: \$17.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Region Test Activity (CRTA) and Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Fort Greely currently supports two tenant activities (CRTA and NWTC) and manages training areas for maneuver and range firing. Over 662,000 acres of range and training areas are used by both the Army and the Air Force. These valuable training lands will be retained.

The Army has recently reduced the NWTC by over half its original size and transferred oversight responsibilities to the U.S. Army, Pacific. The garrison staff will reduce in size and continue to support the important testing and training missions. The Army intends to use Fort Wainwright as the base of operations (107 miles away) for these activities, and "safari" them to Fort Greely, as necessary. This allows the Army to reduce its presence at Fort Greely, reduce excess capacity and perform essential missions at a much lower cost. The Army intends to retain facilities at Bolio Lake (for CRTA), Black Rapids (for NWTC), Allen Army Airfield, and minimal necessary garrison facilities to maintain the installation for contingency missions.

### *Community Concerns*

Residents of the Delta Junction community have expressed strong opposition to the DoD recommendation based upon Fort Greely's military value as a major training area, its unique location in the Cold Triangle, which facilitates almost year-round testing by the Cold Regions Test Activity, and the severe economic impact that the area would suffer upon realignment. Community leaders and citizens emphasized that with no other economic base, the recommendation could have a devastating impact on the area, and diminish the size of the local school population by half.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army plans to continue its actual arctic testing and arctic training activities at Fort Greely. Fort Greely is in the most suitable location, the North American Cold Triangle, to conduct arctic activities. The Commission found the realignment to Fort Wainwright of those personnel and functions not required to support the Cold Regions Test Activity and the Northern Warfare Training Center at Fort Greely is operationally sound and will generate significant savings.

The Commission also found increased base operating efficiencies would occur if the headquarters and support elements for the Cold Regions Test Activity and Northern Warfare Training Center move to Fort Wainwright. The Commission found that personnel can travel to Fort Greely's Bolio Lake and Black Rapids training facilities to perform their mission, when NWTC courses or CRTA testing is required. While the Commission found the economic impact on Delta Junction, Alaska, and its local school system will be serious, these factors were outweighed by both the military value and significant savings that will result from implementation of the Secretary's Recommendation. To lessen the economic impact and to facilitate community planning for the future, the Commission further found the execution phase of the recommendation should not begin earlier than July 1997, the latest date permitted by Public Law 101-510 to begin a move, and should not be completed before July 2001, the latest date permitted to complete a move. The Army is encouraged to ensure that buildings and facilities at Fort Greely which do become non-essential as a result of the realignment shall be maintained in good working condition to maximize future reuse possibilities.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Greely by relocating the Cold Regions Test Activity (CRTA) and the Northern Warfare Training Center (NWTC) to Fort Wainwright, Alaska, but begin the move no earlier than July 1997. The move should not be completed earlier than July 2001. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Chaffee, Arkansas**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Support active Army and Reserve*

*Component training*

*One-time Cost: \$9.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$38.2 million*

*Annual: \$13.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential buildings, and ranges for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements.

Fort Chaffee is the former home of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). In 1991, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission approved the JRTC's relocation to Fort Polk, LA. The transfer was completed in 1992. The post is managed by an Active Component/civilian staff, although it possesses virtually no Active Component tenants.

Fort Chaffee ranked last in military value when compared to other major training area installations. The Army will retain some ranges for use by the RC units stationed in the area. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Chaffee can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Polk, Fort Riley and Fort Sill. The Army intends to license required land and facilities to the Army National Guard.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes that the military value was improperly assessed, dropping from fifth of ten in 1993, to last among the same ten installations in 1995. The Arkansas Army and Air National Guard are concerned about the future use of both maneuver acreage and the Razorback Range aerial bombing and strafing course, and wish to retain the ranges and most of the maneuver areas. They contend that stopping Reserve Component annual training at Fort Chaffee, and traveling out of state, will cause the quality of training and readiness to suffer severely. Additionally, they believe the increased costs and time required to travel greater distances will result in no significant overall savings. The community further argued DoD should not close Fort Chaffee so that current tenant activities could remain. Finally, concern was expressed that employer support for the Reserve Components may dwindle if additional time away from work is required by employees to get to and from more distant training locations.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army evaluated all its major training area installations equally. The Commission also found the Army's process of integrating a quantitative installation assessment with a qualitative operational blueprint, based upon operational and stationing requirements of the Army Stationing Strategy, is a sound approach to develop a military value assessment (MVA) for each installation in this category.

The Commission carefully considered the change in Fort Chaffee's military value assessment from 1993 to 1995, validating the ranking that resulted from changes in the attributes and weights, and found them equally applied to all installations in this category. The Commission found the Army's original recommendation, which omitted any reference to training land remaining in the enclave, was a legitimate concern of the National Guard and other Reserve Component units, as it decreased their ability to meet training requirements. Therefore, the Commission found the remaining enclave, after closure, must contain sufficient maneuver and artillery training areas to meet the needs of the Guard and Reserve. Because of potential problems with increased travel times to more distant installations, the Commission found the National Guard and other RC

units must have access to the training area for both individual and annual training purposes

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Chaffee, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Lompoc, California**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Currently has no military mission*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

***FINAL ACTION: Close***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, CA.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Branch USDB, Lompoc consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 812,000 square feet of detention facilities. It is permitted to and operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. There are no Army activities on USDB, Lompoc. Accordingly, it is excess to the Army's requirements.

### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Lompoc, California.

### **East Fort Baker, California**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provides facilities and housing*

*One-time Cost: \$11.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-7.6 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$1.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 2009 (11 years)*

***FINAL ACTION: Close***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all real property to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

East Fort Baker is at the north end of the Golden Gate Bridge in Marin County, CA. The post consists of approximately 347 acres and 390,000 square feet of facilities. It provides facilities and housing for the Headquarters, 91st Training Division (U.S. Army Reserve) and the 6th Recruiting Brigade, Army Recruiting Command. The 91st Training Division has a requirement to remain in the San Francisco Bay area, while the 6th Recruiting Brigade has a regional mission associated with the western United States. Both the 6th Recruiting Brigade and the 91st Training Division can easily relocate to other installations. The 91st Training Division will relocate to Parks Reserve Forces Training Area, where it better aligns with its training mission. Closing East Fort Baker saves operations and support costs by consolidating tenants to other military installations without major construction.

### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close East Fort Baker. Relocate all tenants to other installations that meet mission requirements. Return all real property to the Golden Gate National Recreation Area.

## **Fort Hunter Liggett, California**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Home of the Test and Experimentation Command Experimentation Center and the major maneuver training area for the California Army National Guard and western United States Army Reserve forces*

*One-time Cost: \$6.7 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$12.5 million*

*Annual: \$5.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Fort Hunter Liggett is low in military value compared to other major training area installations and has few Active Component tenants. Relocation of the Test and Experimentation Center optimizes the unique test capabilities afforded by Fort Bliss and White Sands Missile Range.

Fort Hunter Liggett's maneuver space is key to Reserve Component training requirements. Since it is a primary maneuver area for mechanized units in the western United States, retention of its unique training lands is essential.

### ***Community Concerns***

Local and state officials are concerned with the cumulative economic impact of previous base closure and realignment actions, coupled with recent major fires and floods in this sparsely populated area. Residents do not want the Test and Experimentation Command's Experimentation Center to move to Fort Bliss, Texas. They maintain that Fort Hunter Liggett, with its varied terrain, a natural bowl surrounded by hills, which permits non-eye-safe laser testing, low artificial light, and no radio frequency interference, is the premier location for operational testing. They believe that possible frequency interference, arid desert conditions, and proximity to the large city of El Paso, make Fort Bliss undesirable as a test site. Some believe Fort Hunter Liggett should have been evaluated as a proving ground or an operational test facility, instead

of as a major training area. The California Army National Guard is keenly interested in training at the installation and retaining access to ranges and training areas.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the Army properly evaluated Fort Hunter Liggett as a major training area and found no basis to change the installation's category. The realignment of this installation ends the Active Component presence while preserving the U. S. Army Reserve Command garrison. The Army will license the training facilities and training area to the California National Guard as part of the realignment.

The Commission examined the community's claim that Fort Hunter Liggett is ideal for TEC's location and found them to be accurate. The community believed relocation of TEC to Fort Bliss would be unwise, unworkable, and too expensive. The Commission examined each issue raised by advocates of keeping TEC in California and found non-eye-safe laser testing within a 360-degree area is not required for most tests, the frequency conflict between White Sands Missile Range and TEC telemetry can be resolved by coordination of future tests, and the Army has plans to digitize required areas of Fort Bliss. The Commission found although Fort Hunter Liggett is suited to its current mission, the mission can be relocated to Fort Bliss without disruption, and the Army will achieve substantial savings as a result.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Hunter Liggett by relocating the U.S. Army Test and Experimentation Center (TEC) missions and functions to Fort Bliss, Texas. Eliminate the Active Component mission. Retain minimum essential facilities and training area as an enclave to support the Reserve Components (RC).

## **Oakland Army Base, California**

*Category: Ports*

*Mission: Manage movement of DoD cargo throughout the western US and Pacific; manage port operations on the West Coast and at Pacific locations*

*One-time Cost: \$36.5 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$22.9 million*  
*Annual: \$15.9 million*  
*Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### **Community Concerns**

The community argues Oakland Army Base provides a critical capability during any major regional contingency. Without Oakland, significant combat forces deploying from Continental United States (CONUS) will not arrive in time to meet the theater commander's required delivery dates. Further, Oakland can efficiently ship overweight, oversized, and non-container military cargo that commercial ports have difficulty handling. The community contends Oakland's availability on short notice and its secure operating environment offer vital flexibility to military planners. Commercial facilities are becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee staging and berthing space, within 48 hours, to military cargo. Because commercial facilities are operating near capacity, they are hesitant to disrupt normal traffic, fearing damage to customer relationships and their long term profitability.

### **Commission Findings**

The Commission found the normal workload of Oakland Army Base does not justify its continued operation as a military terminal. Oakland's role in a west region contingency is based on transportation feasibility analysis that models an obsolete force structure and stationing plan. To date, DoD has not conducted analysis of Oakland's requirements from a ten division Army viewpoint. The Commission observed DoD transportation engineers list six commercial ports on the West Coast capable of deploying a mechanized infantry division. Further, the Commission acknowledged at least two other military ports on the West Coast handled military cargo in support of Desert Storm. The Commission addressed the growing resistance by commercial operators to disrupt commercial traffic to give priority to military needs. They noted the Maritime Administration (MARAD), Port Authorities, and DoD were undertaking two initiatives to address the issue. The Commission

recognized legal means exist under the National Shipping Authority Service Priority Orders to obtain priority for military cargo in contingency situations. Based on deliberations, the Commission found the Secretary of Defense had deviated substantially from operational blueprint criteria by not recommending closure of Oakland Army Base.

### **Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Oakland Army Base, California. Relocate Military Traffic Management Command—Western Area and 1302nd Major Port Command to locations to be determined. Enclave Army Reserve elements. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, California**

*Category: Minor Installation*  
*Mission: Formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit*  
*One-time Cost: None*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.6 million*  
*Annual: \$0 1 million*  
*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.

### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

Rio Vista Army Reserve Center consists of approximately 28 acres. It formerly supported an Army Reserve watercraft unit. Since Reserve Components no longer use Rio Vista Reserve Center, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Rio Vista will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 28 acres.

### **Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### **Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Rio Vista Army Reserve Center.

### **Sierra Army Depot, California**

*Category: Ammunition Storage Installations*

*Mission: Receive, store, maintain, issue, demilitarize, and calibrate special weapons, conventional ammunition, and general supplies; store Southwest Asia Petroleum Distribution Operational Project and Water Support Equipment Project for the Army*

*One-time Cost: \$10.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$40.8 million*

*Annual: \$18.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Sierra Army Depot by eliminating the conventional ammunition mission and reducing it to a depot activity. Retain an enclave for the Operational Project Stock mission and the static storage of ores.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1—Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2—Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war

reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3—Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Sierra Army Depot is a Tier 3 Depot.

Complete closure is not possible, since Sierra is the Center of Technical Excellence for Operational Project Stocks. This mission entails the management, processing and maintenance of: Force Provider (550-man tent city), Inland Petroleum Distribution System; and Water Support System. It also stores such stocks as Clam Shelters (mobile maintenance tents), bridging, and landing mats for helicopters. The cost of relocating the Operational Project Stocks is prohibitively expensive. Therefore, the Army will retain minimum essential facilities for storage.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues the Army military value assessment undervalues or overlooks Sierra's demilitarization mission. They point out Sierra has over 40 percent of the Army's open detonation capability, without which Army demilitarization goals cannot be met. The community notes conflicts between the Army's goals expressed in the Wholesale Ammunition Stockpile Program and criteria weighting factors in the military value analysis have not been resolved, and inclusion of the ammunition tiering plan in the operational blueprint short-circuits the military value analysis process. They contend due to a data error, the recommendation would cut only 125 direct positions, not 305, and reduce expected savings. Savings would also be reduced by the \$38 to \$91 million dollar cost of moving ammunition, and by having to ship ammunition in wartime from installations farther from west coast ports. The community contends Sierra received no credit for its almost complete ammunition surveillance facility or its missile maintenance and test facilities, and was undercounted by 88 percent in demilitarization capability. It also states the depot's desert location, with dry outdoor storage, was scored the same as less-desirable locations. In addition, the community states the 839 jobs projected to be lost would constitute an 88 percent increase in county



unemployment, resulting in total unemployment of 20.7 percent.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found conventional ammunition demilitarization, one of Sierra's principal missions, was undervalued, as no measure of demilitarization capacity was included in the installation assessment. While the operational blueprint considered long-term demilitarization capacity, the recommendation's effect on near- to mid-term capacity was not considered. The Commission also found the recommendation conflicted with the Army operational blueprint by overcommitting demilitarization capacity. In addition, the Commission found the ammunition tiering plan should not have been used for BRAC purposes, as it prevented installations in the category from being fairly compared against each other, did not use certified data, and had several other flaws.

The Commission found the Secretary of Defense's alternative recommendation preserved essential demilitarization capacity and necessary covered and outdoor storage, reduced the original recommendation's significant economic impact, and avoided substantial ammunition moving costs.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Sierra Army Depot by reducing the conventional ammunition mission to the level necessary to support the conventional ammunition demilitarization mission. Retain a conventional ammunition demilitarization capability and an enclave for the Operational Project Stocks mission and the static storage of ores. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, Colorado**

***Category: Medical Centers***

***Mission: Provide medical services, train providers, and perform medical research***

***One-time Cost: \$105.3 million***

***Savings: 1996-2001: \$4.6 million***

***Annual: \$36.4 million***

***Return on Investment: 2002 (2 years)***

***FINAL ACTION: Close***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except for Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate the Medical Equipment and Optical School and Optical Fabrication Laboratory to Fort Sam Houston, TX. Relocate Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) activities to Denver leased space. Relocate other tenants to other installations.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

FAMC is low in military value compared to other medical centers. This recommendation avoids anticipated need for estimated \$245 million construction to replace FAMC while preserving health care services through other more cost-effective means. This action will offset any loss of medical services through: phased-in CHAMPUS and Managed Care Support contracts; increased services at Fort Carson and US Air Force Academy; and redistribution of Medical Center patient load from Region Eight to other Medical Centers. FAMC is not collocated with a sizable active component population. Its elimination does not jeopardize the Army's capability to surge to support two near-simultaneous major regional contingencies, or limit the Army's capability to provide wartime medical support in the theater of operations. Closure of this medical center allows redistribution of medical military personnel to other medical centers to absorb the diverted medical center patient load. These realignments avoid a significant cost of continuing to operate and maintain facilities at this stand-alone medical center. DoD's Joint Cross-Service Group for Military Treatment Facilities supports the closure of Fitzsimons.

### ***Community Concerns***

The community argues the installation assessment criteria employed by the Army to measure Fitzsimons Army Medical Center were inappropriate and it was unfair to limit the comparison to only the three stand-alone Army medical centers. In particular, the community points to the use of size as a comparative measure in several criteria, saying larger hospitals do not necessarily mean better or more efficient hospitals. They also observe the Army assessment criteria differed significantly from the criteria measured by the Medical Joint Cross Service Group. In addition, the community points out what they considered to be many inconsistencies and mistakes in the Army's scoring.

The community also argues closure of the hospital would have substantial negative impacts on the health and financial security of the large retired community in the Denver area. They say closing the hospital would break the promise of “free health care for life” that many feel was made to military retirees. They note the medical center’s mission as a regional referral center for a 14-state region and the lack of any other tertiary care hospitals in the region. Further, the community questions the readiness impact of closing the medical center and eliminating the civilian personnel positions, as well as the readiness impact of losing its satellite communications capability.

The community also argues the economic impact on the City of Aurora would be extremely high. They say the area has already been badly hurt by previous base closures, and closure of Fitzsimons Army Medical Center would mean more direct and indirect job losses than reported by the Army. Finally, they question the one-time costs in the Army’s analysis, the increased cost of transporting referral patients to other hospitals if the medical center closes, and the impact of the closure on DoD-Indian Health Service sharing agreements.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the Army’s recommendation to close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center is in line with the Army’s stationing strategy that military hospitals should primarily support active duty military personnel and their families. Fitzsimons does not primarily support a nearby active duty population, and its closure permits the Army to redirect medical personnel and resources to other hospitals that do. The Commission also found the medical center’s referral mission can be economically absorbed by other facilities. The Commission agreed with the community that closure of Fitzsimons will create disruptions and raise costs for retirees seeking health care, but noted other government programs—CHAMPUS, Tricare, Medicare, and continued pharmacy benefits—will help to mitigate these impacts. The Commission found DoD’s evaluation of joint service training consolidation alternatives could result in a decision to relocate tenants elsewhere; hence, it agreed to the request of the Secretary of Defense to not specify gaining locations.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure

plan and final criteria 2 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fitzsimons Army Medical Center (FAMC), except Edgar J. McWhethy Army Reserve Center. Relocate other tenants to other installations. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Stratford Army Engine Plant, Connecticut**

*Category: Industrial Facilities*

*Mission: Engine production*

*One-time Cost: \$6.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$20.5 million*

*Annual: \$6.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Stratford Army Engine Plant.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

The Stratford facility has produced engines for heavy armor vehicles and rotary wing aircraft. Reduced production requirements and the Army’s increased capability for rebuild and repair have eliminated the need for the Stratford Army Engine Plant. There is no requirement for use of the installation by either the Active or Reserve Components.

The Army has an extensive capability to repair engines at Anniston and Corpus Christi Army Depots. The current inventory for these engines meets projected operational requirements. During mobilization, the capability to rebuild engines can be increased at both depots. In the event of an extended national emergency that would deplete stocks, the depots could reconfigure to assemble new engines from parts provided by the manufacturer until mothballed facilities become operational. Prior to closing the facility, the contractor will complete all existing contracts.

### ***Community Concerns***

The community contends closing Stratford Army Engine Plant will result in loss of the Army’s only capability to produce turbine engines for tanks. The loss of this capability and the associated technical and engineering support, in the community’s view, will have significant readiness impact. Another concern is the loss of 1600 contractor jobs from the local economy. The community claims a study, under Corps of Engineers direction, requires \$17 million in environmental stabilization

costs to close Stratford Army Engine Plant. The community questions whether or not the Army's recommendation complies with a Defense Science Board Tank Engine Industrial Base Task Force recommendation. The community challenges the Army's economic impact estimates and cost analysis. The community contends the Army is underestimating costs for equipment movement or disposal, military construction at gaining installations, and personnel. They also point out the Army analysis does not account for loss of \$2 million in rental income from the contractor.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army can sustain the tank engine and helicopter turbine engine base through Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, and Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas. With the decreasing need for new engines and technological capabilities currently available in the private industrial sector, retention of Stratford Army Engine Plant was not necessary. The Commission found the Army estimates on the costs of this recommendation were understated. Recognition of the costs associated with movement of Defense Contract Management Personnel and movement of equipment necessary to future production of spares for engine rebuild changed the return on investment to one year instead of immediate.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Stratford Army Engine Plant.

### **Big Coppett Key, Florida**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Formerly provided communication support to the U.S. Army*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.05 million*

*Annual: \$0.01 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Big Coppett Key.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Big Coppett Key, an island near Key West, consists of approximately five acres and 3,000 square feet of facilities. Big Coppett Key formerly provided communications support to United States Army. Since the Army no longer uses Big Coppett Key, it is excess and to Army requirements. Closing Big Coppett Key will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Big Coppett Key.

### **Price Support Center, Illinois**

*Category: Command, Control and Administration*

*Mission: Administrative and logistics support*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-01: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Charles Melvin Price Support Center, except a small reserve enclave and a storage area.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Charles Melvin Price Support Center provides area support and military housing to the Army and other Federal activities in the St. Louis, MO, area. It is low in military value compared to similar installations. Its tenants, including a recruiting company and a criminal investigative unit, can easily relocate.

This recommendation is related to the Army's recommendation to relocate Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM) from St. Louis, MO, to other

locations. A reduction in the Army's presence in the area warrants a corresponding reduction in Charles Melvin Price Support Center.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the military value was understated because it did not adequately consider logistical value of the Price Support Center. The Army Center provides most of its support to other DoD organizations, and only limited support to the Aviation-Troop Command. The community argued the Army's savings were overstated because housing allowance costs were not considered, and closure costs were understated because the Army did not include costs to relocate the various DoD tenants. Finally, the community believes adequate housing is not available in the local market.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army did not include housing allowances for all personnel remaining in the St. Louis area. The Commission analysis shows the Army will save only \$77,000 annually by paying housing allowances rather than operating and maintaining the family housing at Price Support Center. The Commission found the housing has no deferred maintenance, primarily because 100 of the 164 units were built during 1988/90 time frame. In addition, the Commission noted 257 personnel are already in off-base housing that is deemed unacceptable due to cost and distance from their work location. The Commission found the tenant activities do not have to be relocated, since the enclave includes all the warehouse and storage space. Finally, the Commission found the relocation of the Aviation-Troop Command has minimal effect on the Price Support Center.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Charles Melvin Price Support Center will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Savanna Army Depot Activity, Illinois**

*Category: Ammunition Storage Installations  
Mission: Receive, store, and issue conventional ammunition and critical strategic material;  
Technical Center for Explosives Safety; U.S.*

*Army Defense Ammunition Center and School  
One-time Cost: \$66.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-41.6 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$12.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2006 (5 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Savanna Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1—Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2—Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3—Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate its stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Savanna Army Depot Activity is a Tier 3 depot.

USADACS performs the following basic functions: munitions training, logistics engineering, explosive safety, demilitarization research and development, technical assistance, and career management.

Relocation of USADACS to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant (AAP) allows it to collocate with an active ammunition storage and production operation. McAlester AAP, a Tier 1 depot, is the best for providing the needed capabilities.

### *Community Concerns*

The community claims an Army study concluded all indoor Army ammunition storage would be full in Fiscal Year 95, arguing no such facilities can be closed. In addition, they argue costs of moving ammunition and personnel, as well as building a new facility to house the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) are understated. The Savannah community also alleges facilities identified to house USADACS at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma, are inadequate. The community contends the explosive waste incinerator and depleted uranium demilitarization facilities on site at Savannah are essential to achieving Army demilitarization goals. Local officials note the unemployment resulting from a closure would reach 10.6 percent in Carroll and Jo Daviess counties, and increased unemployment would have extra impact on their rural area. They project \$14 million in extra costs due to DoD's obligation to buy unsold homes, given the poor local real estate market. The community also notes reuse of Savannah would be inhibited by buried ammunition from its years as an artillery range.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found facilities at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant will be adequate to house USADACS when construction is complete, and the community's estimate of \$50 million in facilities costs was not documented. The economic impact in Carroll and Jo Daviess Counties was judged to be significant.

The Commission found the ammunition tiering plan used as an input to the Army's operational blueprint was not intended for BRAC purposes, and contained both internal inconsistencies and flaws arising from its use in the BRAC context. Because of the inclusion of the tiering plan, bases in different tiers could not be fairly evaluated against each other. DoD's estimated cost of moving residual ammunition was at the low end of the cost range established by Industrial Operations Command. Also, the Commission agreed with the Department that it was more economical to store depleted uranium munitions than to demilitarize them.

The Commission found no significant excess capacity existed in the Army ammunition storage system. The Commission, however, also found retention of the demilitarization capability at Sierra Army Depot left enough demilitarization capacity to create excess storage capacity equal to two installations over the next six years if demilitarization of existing ammunition stored outdoors is deferred. Given that ability, the Commission ultimately decided Savannah could be closed.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Savannah Army Depot Activity (ADA). Relocate the United States Army Defense Ammunition Center and School (USADACS) to McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, Oklahoma.

### **Concepts Analysis Agency, Maryland**

*Category: Leases*

*Mission: Independent studies*

*One-time Cost: \$2.7 million*

*Savings: 1996-01: \$0.1 million*

*Annual: \$0.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 2002 (4 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort Belvoir, VA

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned space.

Since Army studies indicate that space is available at Fort Belvoir, the Concepts Analysis Agency can easily relocate with limited renovation. The annual cost of the current lease is \$1.5 million.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close by relocating Concepts Analysis Agency to Fort Belvoir, Virginia

### **Fort Holabird, Maryland**

*Category: Miscellaneous*

*Mission: Provide support to tenant activities*

*One-time Cost: \**

*Savings: 1996-2001: \**

*Annual: \**

*Return on Investment: \**

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

\* Costs and savings for this recommendation are included in the Defense Investigative Service recommendation.

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### *Community Concerns*

The Community supports closure of Fort Holabird after the relocation of the last remaining tenant—the Investigation Control & Automation Directorate of the Defense Investigative Service.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found Fort Holabird to be excess to the needs of the Army.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Holabird. Relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (IC&AD) to Fort Meade, Maryland. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Meade, Maryland**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Provide base operations support to the National Security Agency and other tenants*

*One-time Cost: \$1.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$16.4 million*

*Annual: \$3.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Meade, MD by eliminating inpatient services at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS).

### *Community Concerns*

The community contends the net effect of the Army's recommendation would be increased costs, not savings. They argue current hospital inpatient workload would go to CHAMPUS at rates higher than the Army estimates, and the cost of workload moving to Walter Reed Army Medical Center would be higher than the cost of the same workload at Kimbrough Army Community Hospital. The community also believes there could be negative impacts on the 57 tenant activities on Fort Meade and the 778 Fort Meade families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program. Finally, the community contends there would be negative cost and access implications for current hospital users, especially retirees.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found realignment of Kimbrough Army Community Hospital, to an outpatient clinic, will reduce costs by eliminating excess acute care hospital beds in an area with a number of other military hospitals. The Commission recognized current hospital users will have to travel to Walter Reed Army Medical Center or to civilian hospitals in order to receive needed inpatient services.

While the Commission found this recommendation will save the government money, the Commission acknowledges the inconvenience some current Kimbrough users, particularly families enrolled in the Exceptional Family Member Program and some members of the retired community, will experience.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Meade by reducing Kimbrough Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services

### **Fort Ritchie, Maryland**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Provides base operations and real property maintenance for the garrison installation, the National Military Command Center Facility Site R, satellite activities, and other tenants (including Camp David)*

*One-time Cost: \$69.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$23.3 million*

*Annual: \$26.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2001 (2 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Fort Ritchie. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, MD. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, AZ.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation assumes that base support for Defense Intelligence Agency and other National Military Command Center support elements will be provided by nearby Fort Detrick. Closing Fort Ritchie and transferring support elements of the National Military Command Center to Fort Detrick will: (a) maintain operational mission support to geographically unique Sites R and C (National Military Command Center) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (b) capitalize on existing facilities at Site R and C to minimize construction; (c) maintain an active use and continuous surveillance of Site R and Site C facilities to maintain readiness; (d) collocate signal units that were previously

separated at two different garrisons; (e) consolidate major portion of Information Systems Engineering Command-CONUS with main headquarters of Information Systems Engineering Command to improve synergy of information system operations; and (f) provide a direct support East Coast Information Systems Engineering Command field element to respond to regional requirements. These relocations, collocations and consolidations allow the elimination of Fort Ritchie's garrison and avoids significant costs associated with the continued operation and maintenance of support facilities at a small installation.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues Fort Ritchie provides vital joint service support of high military value within the National Capital Region. As such, the installation met the Army's operational blueprint for a critical facility and should have been excluded from closure consideration. In the community's view, Fort Ritchie provides critical support to the Alternate Joint Command and Control Site R. Relocation of that support to Fort Detrick, Maryland, would unacceptably degrade emergency response time to Site R. The community maintains the DoD recommendation to close Fort Ritchie misses an opportunity to achieve synergy by not consolidating disparate Defense Information Systems Agency—Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) elements at Fort Ritchie. They also note the primary customer base for numerous tenants is located in the National Capital Region (NCR). Relocation of those tenants to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, would result in increased operating costs not captured in the DoD cost estimates. The community further contends existing water shortages at Fort Huachuca will be exacerbated by relocating elements from Fort Ritchie.

The community argues that initial Army cost estimates were fatally flawed. Personnel strength figures and family housing operations were erroneous, and cost estimates failed to consider the requirement for continued on-site garrison activities at Site R. From the community's perspective, the flawed estimates invalidate the foundation of the closure recommendation. The community also notes the impact of closing Fort Ritchie will be a severe economic blow to the surrounding Northern Maryland/Southern Pennsylvania area where the unemployment rate is consistently greater than state and national averages.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found support to the Alternate National Military Command Center (Site R) is a vital requirement, and that response time from Fort Detrick, Maryland, is 45 minutes or more longer than from Fort Ritchie. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, accepts the lengthened response time, and thus the Commission found this recommendation does not adversely impact operation of Site R.

The Commission noted the Defense Information Systems Agency—Western Hemisphere (DISA-WESTHEM) performs valuable oversight of Defense Department automated management database links. The Commission found DISA-WESTHEM's mission is not location dependent. It can be accomplished anywhere appropriate communication nodes exist.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Ritchie except for a National Guard enclave. Relocate the 1111th Signal Battalion and 1108th Signal Brigade to Fort Detrick, Maryland. Relocate Information Systems Engineering Command elements to Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore, Maryland**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Publications distribution*

*One-time Cost: \$7.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$27.3 million*

*Annual: \$7.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Consolidation of the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore with the U.S. Army Publications Center, St. Louis, combines the wholesale

and retail distribution functions of publication distribution into one location. The consolidation eliminates a manual operation at Baltimore in favor of an automated facility at St. Louis and creates efficiencies in the overall distribution process. This move consolidates two leases into one less costly lease.

### *Community Concerns*

The community expressed concern that greater savings would be achieved by consolidating all of the DoD Publications Centers into the Baltimore and St. Louis Centers. They argue because both are DoD's most sophisticated publications centers, the lesser, more manual facilities throughout DoD should be consolidated into the two best. The community expressed concern the Baltimore Center was classified as a manual operation when in fact it is a highly automated facility. Despite the fact that forklift operators are still required to store and retrieve stock, the rest of the facility is highly automated. The community expressed concern if the Baltimore Center closed, the St. Louis Center would be required to lease additional warehouse space in St. Louis because they do not possess the space required to absorb Baltimore's stock.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found although the Department of Defense is currently studying the consolidation of all DoD publication distribution centers, no such consolidation is expected to involve the Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore. The Commission found Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore is an automated facility despite the Secretary of the Army's assertion that it is a manual facility. Additionally, the Commission found the Army will be using warehouse space on an Army-owned installation during the transition period involving the consolidation of the two Army publications distributions centers.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close by relocating the U.S. Army Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore to the U.S. Army Publications Center St. Louis, Missouri.



## **Tri-Service Project Reliance (Fort Detrick, Maryland)**

*Category: Commodity*

*Mission: Provide facilities and services to tenant activities*

*One-time Cost: \$0.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$4.5 million*

*Annual: \$0.03 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL) at Fort Detrick, MD, do not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Instead relocate the health advisories environmental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, and maintain the remaining functions of conducting non-mammalian toxicity assessment models and on-site biomonitoring research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort Detrick as part of Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There are no operational advantages that accrue by relocating this activity to Wright-Patterson AFB. Substantial resources were expended over the last 15 years to develop this unique laboratory currently used by researchers from across the DoD, other federal agencies, and the academic community. No facilities are available at Wright-Patterson to accommodate this unique aquatic research activity, which supports environmental quality R&D initiatives developing cost effective alternatives to the use of mammalian species in toxicity testing. The Commission found necessary significant new construction would be required at Wright-Patterson to duplicate facilities at Fort Detrick to continue this critical research. No construction is required at Aberdeen Proving Ground, however. Furthermore, the quality of water required for the culture of aquatic animals used in this research is not adequate at Wright-Patterson. The Commission found to maintain the water quality it would necessitate additional construction

and result in either several years of costly overlapping research in Maryland and Ohio, or the loss of over 10 years experience with the unique lab colonies used at Fort Detrick. The Navy and the Air Force agree that true research synergy is possible without executing the planned relocation.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found this recommendation would permit DoD to avoid the cost and disruption of relocating a unique facility without compromising the cross-servicing goals of the Tri-Service Project Reliance Study. Therefore, the Commission found this recommendation does not deviate from the 1991 Commission's intention to consolidate biomedical research functions

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance. Upon disestablishment of the U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory (USABRDL) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, do not collocate environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Instead relocate the health advisories environmental fate research and military criteria research functions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, and maintain the remaining functions of conducting non-mammalian toxicity assessment models and on-site biomonitoring research of the Research Methods Branch at Fort Detrick as part of Headquarters, U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command.

## **Hingham Cohasset, Massachusetts**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Currently has no mission*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.8 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Hingham Cohasset.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Hingham Cohasset, formerly a U.S. Army Reserve Center, is essentially vacant and is excess to the Army's requirements. The site consists of approximately 125 acres and 150,000 square feet of facilities. Closing Hingham Cohasset will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Hingham Cohasset.

## **Sudbury Training Annex, Massachusetts**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provide storage facilities for various DoD activities*

*One-time Cost: \$0.8 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-0.1 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$0.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Sudbury Training Annex.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Sudbury Training Annex, outside Boston, consists of approximately 2,000 acres and 200,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Sudbury Training Annex is to provide storage facilities for various Department of Defense activities. Sudbury Training Annex is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing the annex will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 2,000 acres.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Sudbury Training Annex.

## **Detroit Arsenal, Michigan**

*Category: Commodity*

*Mission: Tank Production*

*One-time Cost: \$1.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$7.9 million*

*Annual: \$3.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Detroit Arsenal by closing and disposing of the Detroit Army Tank Plant.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Detroit Tank Plant, located on Detroit Arsenal, is one of two Army Government-owned, contractor-operated tank production facilities. A second facility is located at Lima, Ohio, (Lima Army Tank Plant). The Detroit plant is not as technologically advanced as the Lima facility and is not configured for the latest tank production. Moreover, retaining the plant as a "rebuild" facility is not practical since Anniston Army Depot is capable of rebuilding and repairing the M1 Tank and its principal components. Accordingly, the Detroit Tank Plant is excess to Army requirements.

### *Community Concerns*

The community expresses concern over the loss of approximately 150 civilian contractor employees. While the impact is less than one percent of the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area, the community argues the loss of these jobs should be included in the Army's analysis of the Detroit Arsenal recommendation. Additionally, the community challenges transfer of gun mount produc-

tion to Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, arguing Detroit Arsenal could produce gun mounts of better quality at lower cost. They further state movement of gun mount production from a Government-owned, contractor-operated facility (Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant) to a Government-owned, Government-operated facility (Rock Island Arsenal) is in conflict with guidance in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. The community believes there are inaccuracies in the Army's cost analysis of the recommendation. They fault the Army for not recognizing the need to relocate 40 Defense Contract Management Office personnel located at the plant and for not including costs for equipment movement and military construction at gaining installations in its economic analysis

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found omission of contract job losses had no significant bearing on the overall recommendation or the local community. The total impact is less than one percent of the Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area. Input from the Army indicated that Rock Island Arsenal and Lima Army Tank Plant can accept transfer of production requirements without additional equipment or construction. The Commission found consolidating gun mount production at Rock Island would result in unit cost reduction to approximately \$38,000 from the current \$53,000. There was no indication quality at either location varies, therefore, it is not a significant issue. In addition, there was no indication the Secretary of Defense's recommendation conflicted with Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76. Finally, the Commission found Defense Contracting Management Office personnel would move to other space on Detroit Arsenal

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Detroit Arsenal by closing and disposing of the Detroit Army Tank Plant

### **Selfridge Army Garrison, Michigan**

*Category: Command, Control and Administration*

*Mission: Installation and logistical support*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-01: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

*FINAL ACTION: Remain Open*

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close U.S. Army Garrison, Selfridge.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Closing Selfridge eliminates an installation that exists primarily to provide housing for activities (predominantly Detroit Arsenal) located in the immediate area although such support can be provided through a less costly alternative. Sufficient commercial housing is available on the local economy for military personnel using Variable Housing Allowance/Basic Allowance for Quarters. Closure avoids the cost of continued operation and maintenance of unnecessary support facilities. This recommendation will not degrade local military activities

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the base has high military value since it is a model of joint operations. The community argued the savings are significantly overstated because the Army, (1) did not include housing allowance costs for all personnel residing in the family housing, and, (2) overstated the cost of family housing operations. Furthermore, the community contends suitable housing is not available in the local market. Because no other DoD activities are relocating, the community contends the base operations savings are overstated and these activities will have to increase their funding.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the savings from closing family housing were overstated. The Commission analysis shows the Army will save \$500,000 annually by paying housing allowances rather than operating and maintaining the family housing at Selfridge, because the Army did not include the cost of housing allowances for all personnel remaining in the area. The Commission found the housing allowances are adequate for the area rents, but a two percent vacancy rate may make it difficult to find housing. The Commission found the 765 active units meet current DoD standards and there is \$150,000 in deferred maintenance. Finally, the Commission found another service would have to increase its base operations funding, which would reduce the estimated savings.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: U.S. Army Garrison, Selfridge will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Aviation-Troop Command, Missouri**

*Category: Leases*

*Mission: Logistics support*

*One-time Cost: \$152.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-01: \$31.3 million*

*Annual: \$56.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 2001 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), and close by relocating its missions/functions as follows:

- Relocate Aviation Research, Development & Engineering Center; Aviation Management; and Aviation Program Executive Offices to Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, AL, to form the Aviation & Missile Command.
- Relocate functions related to soldier systems to Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center, MA, to align with the Soldier Systems Command.
- Relocate functions related to materiel management of communications-electronics to Fort Monmouth, NJ, to align with Communications-Electronics Command.
- Relocate automotive materiel management functions to Detroit Arsenal, MI, to align with Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In 1993, the Commission suggested that DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities.

In 1991, the Commission approved the merger of Aviation Systems Command and Troop Systems

Command (ATCOM). It also recommended that the Army evaluate the relocation of these activities from leased space to government-owned facilities and provide appropriate recommendations to a subsequent Commission. In 1993, the Army studied the possibility of relocating ATCOM to a military installation and concluded it would be too costly. It is evident that restructuring ATCOM now provides a financially attractive opportunity to relocate.

Significant functional efficiencies are also possible by separating aviation and troop support commodities and relocating these functions to military installations. The aviation support functions realign to Redstone Arsenal to form a new Aviation & Missiles Command. The troop support functions realign to Natick, MA to align with the new Soldier Systems Command.

This recommendation preserves crucial research and development functions while optimizing operational efficiencies. Moving elements of ATCOM to Natick and Redstone Arsenal improves the synergistic effect of research, development and engineering, by facilitating the interaction between the medical, academic, and industrial communities already present in these regions. Vacating the St. Louis lease will collocate/consolidate similar life cycle functions at military installations for improved efficiencies and effectiveness.

### *Community Concerns*

The community contends the Army did not conduct a military value assessment of leased facilities, which is a substantial deviation from DoD policy. The community believes the civilian personnel eliminations were overstated because, (1) too many mission support positions were eliminated, (2) positions required for area support in St. Louis were eliminated, (3) the number of base operation support positions at the gaining installations is understated, and (4) the Army counted force structure reductions as savings. The community also believes the Army failed to comply with its Stationing Strategy which states consolidations should increase efficiency and reduce overhead. According to the community, transfer of ATCOM's functions to the proposed receiving bases would increase the Army's overhead costs. The community believes the Army could achieve significant savings if they moved activities from leased space in Huntsville, Alabama to Redstone Arsenal. The community also argued the cost to establish Soldier System Command should have been

included. Finally, the General Services Administration contends the recommendation would significantly increase the cost to the government, because they would have to close the St. Louis facility and relocate the remaining tenants

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the Army did a military value assessment of the Aviation-Troop Command, and, although the process was different than the one used for the other installation categories, all leased facilities were analyzed equally. The Commission found the personnel savings were not overstated to the degree stated by the community, although the Commission did reduce the number of civilian position eliminations for planned force-structure changes. The personnel savings represent a 21 percent reduction in personnel, which can be achieved by merging Aviation-Troop Command and Missile Command. The Commission found the community incorrectly counted force-structure reductions in the Program Executive Office-Aviation and Systems Integrated Management Activity as base closure savings.

The Commission found disestablishing Aviation-Troop Command, and realigning its functions, to military organizations with similar life-cycle functions is consistent with the Army's Stationing Strategy. The Commission found the recommendation will reduce base operating costs by \$7.4 million.

The Commission also found the savings from realigning ATCOM are much greater than moving activities from leased space in Huntsville, Alabama, onto Redstone Arsenal. The Army is moving some activities in leased space in Huntsville onto existing space at Redstone Arsenal, as well as consolidating into fewer leased facilities. These actions will save \$2.1 million annually.

Finally, the Commission found the Army did not consider the total cost to the government from relocating ATCOM. According to General Services Administration (GSA) officials, they can not back-fill the 700,000 square feet of space, so the remaining tenants will be relocated. GSA estimated it will cost \$11.1 million to relocate the tenants, and they will incur rent increase of \$3.8 million annually. Even when these costs are included, and total cost to the government is considered, the Commission found the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense still provided significant savings.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), and close by relocating its mission/functions as follows: relocate Aviation Research, Development & Engineering Center; Aviation Management; and Aviation Program Executive Offices to Redstone Arsenal, Huntsville, Alabama, to form the Aviation & Missile Command. Relocate functions related to soldier systems to Natick Research, Development, Engineering Center, Massachusetts, to align with the Soldier Systems Command. Relocate functions related to materiel management of communications-electronics to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to align with Communications-Electronics Command. Relocate automotive materiel management functions to Detroit Arsenal, Michigan, to align with Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.

### **Fort Missoula, Montana**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provides administration, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Components*

*One-time Cost: \$0.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.6 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (2 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Fort Missoula, except an enclave for minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Component units.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Fort Missoula consists of approximately 35 acres and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The post also provides facilities for the United States Forest Service. Fort Missoula has land and facilities excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Fort Missoula will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 25 acres. The Army intends to continue to license buildings and land currently occupied by the Army National Guard.

### *Community Concerns*

The Rocky Mountain Heritage Group has expressed interest in property.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation to close Fort Missoula reduces unnecessary infrastructure; however, there is a need to maintain minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Components.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Missoula, except an enclave for minimum essential land and facilities to support the Reserve Component units.

## **Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, New Jersey**

### *Category: Ports*

*Mission: Manage movement of DoD cargo throughout the eastern US and Atlantic; manage port operations on the East Coast and at Atlantic locations in support of European, African, Mediterranean, and South American Theaters of Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$79.7 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-23.9 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$17.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal. Relocate the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 1301st Major Port Command to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. Retain an enclave for the Navy Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, and Navy Resale and Fashion Distribution Center.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The primary mission of Bayonne is the shipment of general bulk cargo. It has no capability to ship bulk munitions. There are sufficient commercial port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts to support power

projection requirements with a minimal loss to operational capability. Bayonne provides the Army with few military capabilities that cannot be accomplished at commercial ports.

### *Community Concerns*

The community states Army ownership of Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal (MOT) provides a vital capability unavailable through use of commercial port facilities. Bayonne offers a secure environment and the flexibility to stage and reconfigure equipment. The communities argue staging and temporary storage is extremely limited at area commercial ports. Some commercial automobile cargo is staging on Bayonne MOT property due to lack of commercial holding space. The community also pointed out commercial facilities generally lack the reinforced pavement necessary to handle certain heavy military vehicles. Additionally, commercial ports are not configured to handle most military cargo efficiently. (Military cargo is characterized as outsized, overweight, and non-container.) Further, the specialized contract work force at Bayonne provides skill in handling military cargo that is not available at area commercial ports.

The community argues New York area commercial ports are operating near or above capacity. While commercial port operators are willing to work with military planners to augment military terminal capacity, they are not willing to guarantee meeting all crisis military staging and berthing requirements within the 48 hour period specified by Port Planning Orders. Abrupt disruption to their commercial business could prove damaging to their long-term workload and profitability. They note that 12-14 days was a more appropriate time frame to clear staging and berthing facilities for priority military cargo.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission acknowledged the request of the Secretary of Defense to modify the DoD recommendation to allow relocation of tenants to a non-specific destination. The Commission found the normal workload did not justify continued military operation of the installation. Further, the Commission found commercial ports could handle military cargo requirements. The Commission also noted six commercial ports capable of deploying an infantry division exist within one day's rail movement of Bayonne. The Commission observed the growth in commercial port workload has resulted

in port operators becoming increasingly unwilling to guarantee priority to military cargo within the 48-hour period required by Port Planning Orders (PPO). In some cases they desire 12-14 days to clear staging and berthing facilities for military deployments. The Commission acknowledged the Maritime Administration (MARAD), Port Authorities, and DoD were undertaking initiatives to address the commercial port concerns. Further, the Commission noted legal means exist through the Maritime Administration for compelling commercial operators to give priority to military deployments during contingency situations.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal. Relocate the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Eastern Area Command Headquarters and the traffic management portion of the 1301st Major Port Command to a location to be determined. Move the Navy Military Sealift Command, Atlantic, and Navy Resale and Fashion Distribution Center to a location to be determined. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Camp Kilmer, New Jersey**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provides administration, maintenance, and logistical support to Reserve Components*

*One-time Cost: \$0.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$1.0 million*

*Annual \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Camp Kilmer, except an enclave for minimum necessary facilities to support the Reserve Components.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Camp Kilmer consists of approximately 75 acres and 331,000 square feet of facilities. The camp provides administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of the site is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Camp Kilmer will save base operations and maintenance funds

and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 56 acres.

#### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation to close Camp Kilmer, New Jersey reduces unnecessary infrastructure; however, there is a need to maintain minimum necessary facilities to support current and future requirements of the Reserve Components.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Camp Kilmer, except an enclave for minimum necessary facilities to support the Reserve Components.

#### **Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provides administration, maintenance, and logistical support to Reserve Components*

*One-time Cost: \$0.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$1.8 million*

*Annual: \$0.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Camp Pedricktown, except the Sievers-Sandberg Reserve Center.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Camp Pedricktown consists of approximately 82 acres and 260,000 square feet of facilities. Its primary mission is to provide administration, supply, training, maintenance, and logistics support to Reserve Component forces. The vast majority of Camp Pedricktown's land and facilities are excess to Army requirements. Closing it will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities for approximately 60 acres.

#### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Secretary's recommendation to close Camp Pedricktown, New Jersey reduces unnecessary infrastructure; however, there is a need to maintain the Sievers-Sandberg Reserve Center.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Camp Pedricktown, except the Sievers-Sandberg Reserve Center.

### **Caven Point Army Reserve Center, New Jersey**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provides administration and logistical support to Reserve Components*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Caven Point U. S. Army Reserve Center. Relocate its reserve activities to the Fort Hamilton, NY, provided the recommendation to realign Fort Hamilton is approved.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center (USARC) is located near Jersey City, NJ, and consists of approximately 45,000 square feet of administrative and maintenance facilities on 35 acres. It is overcrowded and in generally poor condition. The primary mission of Caven Point USARC is to provide administrative, logistics and maintenance support to the Army Reserve. The consolidation of tenants from Caven Point USARC with Reserve Component activities remaining on Fort Hamilton will achieve savings in operations costs.

### *Community Concerns*

The City of Jersey City has expressed concern they have an agreement to lease land that runs through Caven Point for the purpose of extending a highway and want to ensure the BRAC process will not jeopardize that arrangement.

### *Commission Findings*

As stated by the Secretary of Defense's letter dated June 14th, 1995 and upon independent evaluation, the Commission found the closure of Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center is no longer viable. While planning to implement the closure and relocation of this facility to Fort Hamilton, New York, the Commission found new construction (\$10.5 million) is required to execute the move. The minor savings (\$29 thousand annually) did not justify the expense. Furthermore, this new facility requires a larger area than is available for construction at Fort Hamilton.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Dix, New Jersey**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Support active Army and Reserve Component training*

*One-time Cost: \$11.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$27.9 million*

*Annual: \$12.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U.S. Army Reserve garrison. Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In the past ten years, the Army has significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

This proposal retains facilities and training areas essential to support Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units in the Mid-Atlantic states. However, it reduces base operations and real property maintenance costs by eliminating excess facilities. Additionally, this reshaping will truly



move Fort Dix into a preferred role of RC support. It retains an Army Reserve garrison to manage Fort Dix and provides a base to support RC logistical requirements. The Army intends to continue the Army National Guard's current license of buildings

Various U.S. Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve activities regularly train at Fort Dix. The post houses the National Guard High Technology Training Center, a unique facility providing state-of-the-art training devices for guardsmen and reservists in a 12-state area. Fort Dix's geographic proximity to a large portion of the nation's RC forces and the air and seaports of embarkation make it one of the most suitable RC Major Training Areas in the United States. This recommendation is consistent with the decision of the 1991 Commission, but better aligns the operation of the installation with its users.

### *Community Concerns*

Members of the Fort Dix community and Burlington County expressed strong support for keeping Fort Dix open in accordance with the realignment recommendation. Earlier concerns that enough personnel would not be retained in the workforce to support Reserve Component training in the region were allayed when the Army agreed that 700-750 employees would be required for this support.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense for the realignment of the Active Army garrison to an Army Reserve Command garrison was both reasonable and well-suited to enhancing this installation as a model for supporting Reserve Component (RC) training in the region. The efficiencies gained, and savings generated, will permit greater support for RC forces as the installation garrison focuses on carrying out its primary mission. The Commission found the community's concern that enough garrison staff be retained to support the RC training mission was valid, and noted the Army's agreement to provide adequate personnel to do so.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign

Fort Dix by replacing the Active Component garrison with a U.S. Army Reserve garrison. Retain minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas required for Reserve Component (RC) training as an enclave.

### **Bellmore Logistics Activity, New York**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Maintenance and logistical support*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$2.1 million*

*Annual: \$0.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Bellmore Logistics Activity.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Bellmore Logistics Activity, located on Long Island, consists of approximately 17 acres and 180,000 square feet of facilities. It formerly provided maintenance and logistical support to Reserve Component units. Since Reserve Components no longer use Bellmore Logistics Activity, it is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Bellmore Logistics Activity will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Bellmore Logistics Activity.

### **Fort Hamilton, New York**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Provide administrative and logistical support for Army and DoD agencies in the New York metropolitan area; serve as headquarters for sub-installation—Fort Totten*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Realign Fort Hamilton. Dispose of all family housing. Retain minimum essential land and facilities for existing Army units and activities. Relocate all Army Reserve units from Caven Point, New Jersey, to Fort Hamilton.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Fort Hamilton is low in military value compared to the other command and control/administrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for additional growth or military development. No new or additional missions are planned.

This proposal reduces the size of Fort Hamilton by about one-third to support necessary military missions in the most cost effective manner. The New York Area Command, which includes protocol support to the United Nations, will remain at Fort Hamilton. Another installation will assume the area support currently provided to the New York area.

The Armed Forces Reserve Center at Caven Point was built in 1941. Its sole mission is to support reserve component units. The buildings on the 35-acre parcel are in poor condition. Relocating to Fort Hamilton will allow the Army Reserve to eliminate operating expenses in excess of \$100 thousand per year.

### ***Community Concerns***

The community argues adoption of the DoD recommendation would close family housing, force military families onto the economy, and yield only minor cost savings to the government. They also maintain the combined military entitlements of Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) are \$200-\$500 per month less than the cost of area rentals. Further the availability of local rentals is very low. Access to the tight rental market is further compounded by culturally cohesive neighborhoods, where long-term residency is the norm. The community asked the Commission to give the recent military housing privatization initiative a chance to mature through the legislative process and reject the DoD recommendation to close Fort Hamilton's family housing. The community believes Fort Hamilton is

a highly cost efficient installation providing vital services to military elements and retirees in the New York area. The Army has a historic presence in New York City dating back to the Revolution. Adoption of the DoD recommendation would effectively terminate the last active Army facility in the New York City area.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the age and condition of housing is generally comparable to the local market, even though a significant backlog of unfunded maintenance exists. The Commission noted local housing is expensive, and vacancies are limited due to culturally cohesive neighborhoods where long term residency is normal. Rentals comparable to family housing would exceed military quarters entitlements by \$200-\$500 per month. The Commission found adoption of the DoD recommendation would result in shifting an unwarranted cost burden onto a family housing population composed of relatively junior enlisted military families (currently 37.5 percent E-5 and below).

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Fort Hamilton will remain open. Army Reserve units at Caven Point, New Jersey will remain in place. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Totten, New York**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: As a sub-post of Fort Hamilton and part of the New York Area Command, provides support to active duty and retired personnel within the local area; serves as host to Headquarters, 77th U.S. Army Reserve Command*

*One-time Cost: \$1.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$1.5 million*

*Annual: \$0.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Fort Totten, except an enclave for the U. S. Army Reserve. Dispose of family housing.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Fort Totten, a sub-installation of Fort Hamilton, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in the New York City metropolitan area.

Fort Totten is low in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. The post has limited capacity for growth or further military development.

Fort Totten is home to the Ernie Pyle U.S. Army Reserve Center, the largest in the country. Realignment of the Center to nearby Fort Hamilton is not possible since Fort Hamilton has little available space. Therefore, the Army decided to retain this facility as a reserve enclave.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes Fort Totten constitutes a highly cost-effective operation. Costs associated with programs, facilities, and military services provided to active and reserve armed forces members would increase substantially if they were drawn from the local economy. While quarters are early 1960s standards approaching the end of their useful life span, they are commensurate with units available in the local area. All local rentals are expensive and difficult to find. Most rentals require three months advance rent, a security deposit and a broker's fee for start-up costs. Combined military entitlements for Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) are \$200-\$500 per month less than the cost of area rentals. In addition, there are very few local rentals available. Access to the tight rental market is further compounded by culturally cohesive neighborhoods, where long-term residency is the norm. The community also notes that Old Fort Totten, an unofficial historic site and museum, has an historic legacy and artifacts dating back to the Revolutionary War. Any potential development at Fort Totten would pose a threat to historic preservation.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the DoD recommendation to close Fort Totten pertains primarily to family housing. The Ernie Pyle Reserve Center and 77th Army Reserve Command are not at issue in the recommendation.

The Commission acknowledged family housing had a significant backlog of deferred maintenance

requirements. At least 24 units were inactive due to unsatisfied rehabilitation needs, and occupied units contained limited amenities. The Commission also noted the area around Fort Totten was an upscale community where rentals are expensive, and vacancies are limited. By Commission cost estimates, moving Fort Totten's military families on the economy would result in a total out-of-pocket expense of \$0.5 million to family housing members. Alternatively, the draft Army plan to rehabilitate quarters at the Navy's Mitchell Field, Long Island housing area is financially unattractive. The Commission found, however, a sufficient number of vacant quarters exist at Fort Hamilton to satisfy Fort Totten's military family housing requirements. The Commission found acceptance of the DoD recommendation would result in a reduction of excess infrastructure.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Totten, except an enclave for the U.S. Army Reserve. Dispose of family housing

### **Seneca Army Depot, New York**

*Category: Ammunition Storage Installations*

*Mission: Receive, store, issue, maintain and demilitarize conventional munitions; receive, store, and issue general supplies, including hazardous materials and prepositioned reserve stocks*

*One-time Cost: \$29.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$12.9 million*

*Annual: \$19.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Seneca Army Depot, except an enclave to store hazardous material and ores.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation is supported by the Army's long range operational assessment. The Army has adopted a "tiered" ammunition depot concept to reduce infrastructure, eliminate static non-required ammunition stocks, decrease manpower requirements, increase efficiencies and permit the Army to manage a smaller stockpile. The tiered depot

concept reduces the number of active storage sites and makes efficiencies possible:

(1) Tier 1—Active Core Depots. These installations will support a normal/full-up activity level with a stockage configuration of primarily required stocks and minimal non-required stocks requiring demilitarization. Normal activity includes daily receipts/issues of training stocks, storage of war reserve stocks required in contingency operations and additional war reserve stocks to augment lower level tier installation power projection capabilities. Installations at this activity level will receive requisite levels of storage support, surveillance, inventory, maintenance and demilitarization.

(2) Tier 2—Cadre Depots. These installations normally will perform static storage of follow-on war reserve requirements. Daily activity will be minimal for receipts/issues. Workload will focus on maintenance, surveillance, inventory and demilitarization operations. These installations will have minimal staffs unless a contingency arises.

(3) Tier 3—Caretaker Depots. Installations designated as Tier 3 will have minimal staffs and store stocks no longer required until demilitarized or relocated. The Army plans to eliminate stocks at these sites no later than year 2001. Seneca Army Depot is a Tier 3 depot.

### *Community Concerns*

The Seneca community contends Seneca should be a Tier 1 instead of a Tier 3 installation due to its power projection capabilities. They note Seneca received no credit for its on-post airfield and missile maintenance facilities, and received insufficient value for its conforming small-arms warehouses. They contend the tiering plan further used irrelevant measures for location, storage, and power projection, and inclusion of the ammunition tiering plan in the stationing strategy negates the military value analysis. The community also argues all other Army ammunition storage is full, so there would be nowhere for Seneca's ammunition to go. They believe the Department would save more money by closing Letterkenny and transferring the missile maintenance mission to existing facilities at Seneca.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the ammunition tiering plan used as an input to the Army's operational blueprint was not intended for BRAC purposes,

and contained both internal inconsistencies and flaws arising from its use in the BRAC context. Its inclusion caused Seneca to lose one position (3rd to 4th) in military value ranking. Because of the inclusion of the tiering plan, bases in different tiers could not be fairly evaluated against each other.

The Commission found no significant excess capacity existed in the Army ammunition storage system. The Commission also found, however, with the retention of demilitarization capability at Sierra Army Depot, the system contained enough demilitarization capacity to create excess storage space equal to two installations over the next six years if demilitarization of existing ammunition stored outdoors was deferred.

The Commission also found Seneca was particularly hurt by the choice of square feet as a storage metric, and Seneca was not given proper credit for its airfield and conforming small-arms warehouses. Given the ability to reduce ammunition storage by two installation equivalents, however, the Commission found Seneca could be closed.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Seneca Army Depot, except an enclave to store hazardous material and ores.

### **Recreation Center #2, North Carolina**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Currently leased to City of Fayetteville, North Carolina*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Recreation Center #2 consists of approximately four acres and 17,000 square feet of community facilities. Recreation Center #2 is currently being leased to the city of Fayetteville, NC, and is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing Recreation Center #2 will provide reuse opportunities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, North Carolina

### **Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Support active Army and Reserve Component training*

*One-time Cost: \$8.5 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$74.8 million*

*Annual: \$18.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION:** Close

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential facilities as a Reserve Component enclave.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In the past ten years, the Army significantly reduced its active and reserve forces. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet future requirements

Fort Indiantown Gap is low in military value compared to other major training area installations. Although managed by an Active Component garrison, it has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for Reserve Component units which now use Fort Indiantown Gap can be conducted at other installations in the region, including Fort Dix, Fort A.P. Hill and Fort Drum.

Fort Indiantown Gap is owned by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and leased by the U.S. Army through 2049 for \$1. The government can terminate the lease with one year's written notice. Facilities erected during the duration of the lease are the property of the U.S. and may be disposed of, provided the premises are restored to their natural condition.

### *Community Concerns*

Members of the surrounding communities in the Lebanon Valley, as well as officials of the Pennsylvania National Guard, believe the training and readiness of Reserve Component units within the state will suffer as a result of the recommendation. The recommendation made by the Secretary of Defense would require travel out of state for annual training. The community would like to continue the current level of daily operations and training on the installation with the support and funding provided by having an active Army garrison. The Pennsylvania National Guard pointed to several inaccuracies in the original data calls to The Army Basing Study, which resulted in the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) being recomputed and showing lower savings from closing the installation than first estimated. With the various tenant activities and daily work and training sites dispersed throughout the base, advocates of keeping the post open pointed out that any "enclave" would contain virtually the entire installation.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army's recommendation to close Fort Indiantown Gap to be reasonable in view of the cost of maintaining the large amount of aging infrastructure. The Commission carefully examined other installations in the region and found adequate locations exist with sufficient capacity for Reserve Component annual training, without Fort Indiantown Gap, but scheduling of such training would be more difficult, especially during peak training load periods. The Commission also found National Guard and other RC units required continued access to Fort Indiantown Gap for both individual and annual training.

Claims by elected officials, the Pennsylvania National Guard, and community members that the Army's COBRA analysis was flawed were carefully reviewed by Commission Staff, the Army Audit Agency, and the General Accounting Office. Each review supported the Army's COBRA.

The Commission found the Army's analysis objective and an accurate projection of future, substantial savings.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure

plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Indiantown Gap, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Command, Control and Administration*

*Mission: Administrative and logistics support*

*One-time Cost: \$0.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-01: \$2.1 million*

*Annual: \$0.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

#### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. Relocate the Army Reserve's leased maintenance activity in Valley Grove, WV, to the Kelly Support Center.

#### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

Kelly Support Center, a sub-installation of Fort Drum, NY, provides administrative and logistical support to Army Reserve units in western Pennsylvania. It comprises five separate parcels of property.

The Kelly Support Center is last in military value compared to other command and control/administrative support installations. Reserve usage is limited to monthly weekend drills. It possesses no permanent facilities or mobilization capability.

This proposal eliminates two parcels of property, approximately 232 acres and 500,000 square feet of semi-permanent structures, from the Army's inventory. Since there are no other feasible alternatives, the Army is retaining three small parcels for Army Reserve functions and Readiness Group Pittsburgh.

Relocating the Army's Reserve activity from Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV, to the Kelly Support Center consolidates it with its parent unit and saves \$28,000 per year in lease costs.

### **Community Concerns**

Based on current staffing and reimbursable positions, the community contends the personnel savings are overstated. The community also argued the personnel savings appear questionable since the implementation plan indicates 70 percent of the current workforce would be retained to support the recently designated Reserve Support Command. Finally, the community believes no lease savings will be realized, because a new maintenance facility is being constructed in West Virginia for the Valley Grove unit.

#### **Commission Findings**

The Commission found the revised Army cost analysis keeps the area support mission at the Kelly Support Center with a majority of the existing workforce. In addition, the Secretary of Defense informed the Commission on June 14, 1995, it was no longer viable to relocate the Valley Grove maintenance activity to the Kelly Support Center because a new facility is being built for the unit in West Virginia.

#### **Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Kelly Support Center by consolidating Army Reserve units onto three of its five parcels. Dispose of the remaining two parcels. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Depots*

*Mission: Depot maintenance*

*One-time Cost: \$49.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$226.5 million*

*Annual: \$76.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

#### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot. Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and storage. Change the 1993 Commission's decision regarding the consolidating of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring missile guidance system workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Letterkenny Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Letterkenny receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. A review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. The heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston cannot be absorbed at Letterkenny without major construction and facility renovations. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realigning Letterkenny to the two depots the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Letterkenny is supported by the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

The Army's recommendation to transfer missile workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot preserves Letterkenny's missile disassembly and storage mission. It capitalizes on Tobyhanna's electronics focus and retains DoD missile system repair at a single Army depot.

### *Community Concerns*

The community was critical of DoD's proposal to change the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's recommendation which consolidated DoD's tactical missile maintenance work at Letterkenny Army Depot. The community believes Letterkenny was recommended for realignment as a result of what they believed to be the Army's flawed military value analysis. The community argued the military value analysis inappropriately gave more weight to (1) depot capacity, which is based on the number of workstations, (2) the average age of depot buildings, and (3) hourly base operating costs. The community believes the military value should have placed more weight on a comparative analysis of

relative depot size, including expandable acres and building square footage. If the Army had done so, the community believes Letterkenny would not have been targeted for closure or realignment. The community further stated the Army's military value analysis did not consider current and future missions, including ongoing efforts to consolidate interservice tactical missile maintenance, and benefits gained from current and future public and private depot teaming arrangements. They suggested the public and private partnership arrangements should be continued to make more efficient use of available infrastructure. The community also voiced concerns about the Army's failure to consider above core workload in its initial COBRA estimates. Finally, the community argued the one-time cost to realign Letterkenny's workload to the Anniston and Tobyhanna Army Depots was significantly understated and the return on investment would exceed 90 years, compared to the DoD estimate which calculated an immediate return on investment.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army treated all of its depots equally. The Army's military value rating process was driven by the Army's desire to eliminate excess capacity within its depot infrastructure. Higher overhead expenses, coupled with a lower direct labor hour base, resulted in Letterkenny's lower military value rating. The Commission found Letterkenny's forecast future workload was not sufficient to maintain a cost efficient depot.

The Commission carefully examined the Army's one-time cost for realigning the Letterkenny Army Depot and found some uncertainties. The Commission found the Army failed to include in its COBRA analysis, construction costs of approximately \$5.7 million and personnel training costs of approximately \$10 million. These oversights would raise the one-time costs to approximately \$65 million, but do not change the projected annual savings. The estimated one-time costs support the transfer of 450 personnel to Tobyhanna Army Depot and 392 tenant personnel to Base X. In making its final decisions, the Commission considered these instances where costs could ultimately be other than what DoD has projected. The Commission adopted the DoD recommendation, and the DoD cost projections while recognizing the uncertainties associated with these costs.

The 1993 Commission assigned Letterkenny responsibility for the interservice repair and overhaul of DoD's tactical missiles and related support equipment. The Letterkenny personnel have made excellent progress in their efforts to implement the 1993 Commission's recommendation. The 1995 Commission notes that the *Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces* suggested the eventual privatization of depot maintenance activities. The consolidated tactical missile repair program is a likely candidate for future privatization. In response to community concerns about the Army's failure to consider above core tactical missile maintenance workload in its original COBRA analysis, the Army Materiel Command changed its assumptions to reflect retention of an additional 310 personnel to work in the enclaved tactical missile area of Letterkenny. The Commission suggests the Department of Defense explore options for transferring workload to the private sector, as appropriate.

The Commission found using Letterkenny facilities for Paladin weapon system upgrades was highly efficient and cost effective. The Commission further recognizes OSD policy generally dictates that future weapon system upgrades should be accomplished within the private sector. For this reason, the Commission finds the Department of Defense should make every effort to dispose of Letterkenny's combat vehicle shops as an intact, complete and useable facility that could be used by the private sector for future weapon system upgrades. This would afford the community a better opportunity of recovering from the economic effects that may occur following the realignment of the Letterkenny installation.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama. Retain an enclave for conventional ammunition storage and tactical missile disassembly and storage. Change the 1993 Commission's decision regarding the consolidation of tactical missile maintenance at Letterkenny by transferring missile guidance system workload to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania or private sector commercial activities. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Coordinate and support mobilization of Reserve Component forces, and provide base operations and other support to government activities in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands*

*One-time Cost: \$7.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$23.3 million*

*Annual: \$8.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Fort Buchanan by reducing garrison management functions and disposing of family housing. Retain an enclave for the reserve components, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the Antilles Consolidated School.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Fort Buchanan, a sub-installation of Fort McPherson, provides administrative, logistical and mobilization support to Army units and activities in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean region. Tenants include a U.S. Army Reserve headquarters, AAFES and a DoD-operated school complex. Although the post is managed by an active component garrison, it supports relatively few active component tenants. The family housing will close. The activities providing area support will relocate to Roosevelt Roads Navy Base and other sites. The Army intends to license buildings to the Army National Guard, that they currently occupy.

#### *Community Concerns*

The community believes Fort Buchanan's strategic and historic value were incorrectly assessed during the assessment/selection process. It is the last active Army presence in the Caribbean and soon to be the last in Latin America, a legacy dating back to 1898. The community maintains the manpower impact of the DoD recommendation is underestimated and that actual job losses will exceed 500 personnel. The community believes Army cost estimates understate closure costs and operating costs. Thus, savings from adoption of the DoD recommendation are inaccurate. The community contends Roosevelt Roads, while only 42 road miles from Fort Buchanan, is an unacceptable alternative for family housing. Travel between the two installations routinely takes up



to two hours. Further, Roosevelt Roads already has a 400 unit family housing deficit and the San Juan housing rental market is very tight and expensive. Lastly, the community notes Fort Buchanan's closure would be a severe blow to the 15,000 plus retired community, and would be devastating to the already depressed Puerto Rican economy.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission reviewed information concerning the current state and cost of Fort Buchanan's family housing, deferred maintenance, and the status of the installation's utility infrastructure. The Commission noted while family housing was generally well maintained, units are old, amenities limited, and the supporting installation utility infrastructure is old. The Commission found closure of family housing results in savings to DoD, significant cost avoidance, and the reduction of excess infrastructure.

The Commission discussed the range of installation missions. Mobilization support is important, and its support is best fulfilled by a resident active component garrison. The Commission found the concept to disestablish the installation garrison exceeded the scope of the DoD recommendation to realign Fort Buchanan. The Commission reviewed cost estimates to maintain a garrison capable of supporting mobilization and the enclaved tenant units. Although savings are reduced from the DoD estimates, the Commission recommendation reduces infrastructure and retains an active presence in Puerto Rico while still providing savings.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following realign Fort Buchanan. Dispose of family housing. Retain garrison facilities as necessary to fulfill mobilization missions and requirements, and enclave support functions. Retain an enclave for the Reserve Components, Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and the Antilles Consolidated School. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Red River Army Depot, Texas**

*Category: Depots*

*Mission: Depot maintenance*

*One-time Cost: \$7.2 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$83.9 million*

*Annual: \$20.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Red River Army Depot. Transfer the ammunition storage mission, intern training center, and civilian training education to Lone Star Army Ammunition Plant. Transfer the light combat vehicle maintenance mission to Anniston Army Depot. Transfer the Rubber Production Facility to Lone Star.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Red River Army Depot is one of the Army's five maintenance depots and one of three ground vehicle maintenance depots. Over time, each of the ground maintenance depots has become increasingly specialized. Anniston performs heavy combat vehicle maintenance and repair. Red River performs similar work on infantry fighting vehicles. Letterkenny Army Depot is responsible for towed and self-propelled artillery as well as DoD tactical missile repair. Like a number of other Army depots, Red River receives, stores, and ships all types of ammunition items. A review of long range operational requirements supports a reduction of Army depots, specifically the consolidation of ground combat workload at a single depot.

The ground maintenance capacity of the three depots currently exceeds programmed work requirements by the equivalent of one to two depots. Without considerable and costly modifications, Red River cannot assume the heavy combat vehicle mission from Anniston. Red River cannot assume the DoD Tactical Missile Consolidation program from Letterkenny without major construction. Available maintenance capacity at Anniston and Tobyhanna makes the realignment of Red River into Anniston the most logical in terms of military value and cost effectiveness. Closure of Red River is consistent with the recommendations of the Joint Cross-Service Group for Depot Maintenance.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues closure of Red River Army Depot will destroy the special efficiencies that result from collocation of the Red River Army Depot with the Defense Logistics Agency Distribution Depot, Red River. They claim DoD substantially deviated from the final selection criteria by

not conducting a combined value assessment of the two. They also believe closing Red River Army Depot will overload Anniston Army Depot, limit surge capability, and jeopardize readiness. Retention of only one maintenance depot for ground combat vehicles will severely limit the Army's ability to respond to national emergencies. The community also believes that the Army understated the costs associated with the recommendation. Additionally, the community claims the Army analysis is flawed by omitting significant mission requirements, such as the Missile Recertification Office, and by including non-BRAC personnel savings. The community also believes the Army understated unemployment costs in their economic analysis. The community proposes retention of Red River Army Depot and Anniston Army Depot, realignment of Letterkenny Army Depot to Anniston and Red River and downsizing of both to core. To fill vacant infrastructure, the community recommends teaming with industry.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army has treated all its depots equally. The Army's recommendations were an aggressive approach to minimize depot infrastructure, maintaining the minimal capacity to support Army peacetime and wartime requirements. In addition, the Army recommendations supported its stationing strategy and the operational blueprint. The Army's operational blueprint, however, assumed too great a risk in readiness in the attempt to reduce infrastructure costs. While Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, has the capacity to accept the ground combat vehicle depot maintenance workload from Red River, the Commission found placing all this workload into a single facility places too much risk on readiness. Retention of both Anniston Army and Red River Army Depots keeps the Army's top-rated ground combat depots and preserves future readiness.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Red River Army Depot by moving all maintenance missions, except for that related to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Series, to other depot maintenance activities, including the private sector. Retain conventional ammunition storage, intern training center, Rubber Production Facility, and civilian training education at Red River. The Com-

mission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Dugway Proving Ground, Utah**

*Category: Proving Ground*

*Mission: Test and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Dugway Proving Ground by relocating the smoke and obscurant mission to Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, and some elements of chemical/biological research to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Dispose of English Village and retain test and experimentation facilities necessary to support Army and DoD missions.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Dugway is low in military value compared to other proving grounds. Its test facilities conduct both open air and laboratory chemical/biological testing in support of various Army and DoD missions. The testing is important as are associated security and safety requirements. However, this recommendation enables the Army to continue these important missions and also reduce costly overhead at Dugway.

Yuma can assume Dugway's programmed smoke and obscurant testing. Aberdeen Proving Ground can accept the laboratory research and development portion of the chemical/biological mission from Dugway, since it is currently performing chemical and biological research in facilities that carry equivalent bio/safety levels. Open air and simulant testing missions will remain at Dugway.

The State of Utah has expressed an interest in using English Village and associated firing and training ranges at Dugway for the National Guard, including the establishment of an artillery training facility.

### *Community Concerns*

The major community concern at Dugway is the Army's planned closure of English Village and the resultant impact on the military value of Dugway Proving Ground. Two thousand residents and employees of Dugway live at English Village.

There is no nearby housing available and, according to the community, the loss of productivity in making long commutes, often during inclement weather, would be staggering. The 592 housing units that comprise English Village cost the Army \$15 million annually. The community believes that English Village should be kept open to support Dugway's vital missions and quality of life.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found closure of English Village would significantly impact Dugway's testing mission and the residents' quality of life. The Commission found permitting problems at Yuma and Aberdeen Proving Grounds, the planned receiver sites for part of Dugway's mission, made the move virtually impossible. On June 14, 1995, the Secretary of Defense asked that the recommendation on Dugway Proving Ground be set aside. The Secretary said testing must remain at Dugway, and because of facility restrictions and permitting requirements, the base operating support, including English Village, should remain open.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 8. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Dugway Proving Ground, including English Village, will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Fort Lee, Virginia**

*Category: Training Schools*

*Mission: Provide facilities and services to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, the Quartermaster Center and School, the Army Logistics Management College, and other tenants*

*One-time Cost: \$2.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$15.5 million*

*Annual: \$3.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Fort Lee, by reducing Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation, suggested by the Joint Cross-Service Group on Medical Treatment, eliminates excess medical treatment capacity at Fort Lee, VA by eliminating inpatient services at Kenner Army Community Hospital. Inpatient care would be provided by other nearby military medical activities and private facilities through Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)

### *Community Concerns*

The community contends the Army recommendation would decrease staff at the facility below the level needed to support adequately an outpatient clinic. They argue these staff reductions and elimination of inpatient care services would mean the loss of critical medical support to Fort Lee's mission, as well as diminished access and increased costs for beneficiaries in and beyond the hospital catchment area. In addition, they say these reductions would result in half of the hospital's current demand for outpatient workload falling to outside providers, thus greatly increasing the Army's predicted cost of the recommendation. The community also argues DoD would lose the ability to manage CHAMPUS costs in the Fort Lee area, further increasing the cost of the program beyond the Army's estimate. Finally, the community points out the Joint Cross-Service Group's functional value score for Kenner Army Community Hospital was higher than many other hospitals not recommended for realignment.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the realignment of Kenner Army Community Hospital, to an adequately staffed and resourced outpatient clinic, will eliminate excess acute care inpatient beds and reduce costs, without compromising the mission effectiveness of Fort Lee. The Commission recognized the validity of the community's concern that a poorly staffed clinic could potentially impair Fort Lee's important training and other missions. While the Commission found the adequacy of clinic resources is an Army responsibility and will be resolved during the implementation of this recommendation, it urges the Army to pay close attention to ensure continued, adequate, outpatient care to beneficiaries.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Fort Lee, by reducing Kenner Army Community Hospital to a clinic. Eliminate inpatient services.

### **Fort Pickett, Virginia**

*Category: Major Training Areas*

*Mission: Regional training center that supports active Army and Reserve*

*Components and other DoD activities*

*One-time Cost: \$25.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$46.7 million*

*Annual: \$21.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential training areas and facilities as an enclave for the Reserve Components. Relocate the Petroleum Training Facility to Fort Dix, NJ.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In the past ten years, the Army has reduced its active and reserve forces considerably. The Army must reduce excess infrastructure to meet the needs of the future.

Fort Pickett is very low in military value compared to other major training area installations. It has virtually no Active Component tenants. Annual training for reserve units that now use Fort Pickett can be conducted easily at other installations in the region, including Fort Bragg, Fort A.P. Hill and Camp Dawson. The Army intends to license required facilities and training areas to the Army National Guard.

### *Community Concerns*

Members of the rural community strongly support keeping Fort Pickett open, stressing what they believe is its high military value and the employment opportunities it provides. Residents of the town of Blackstone and employees on the installation have both stressed the long-term, outstanding military-community relations that exist, and cited the lack of environmental impediments to training that exist at other military bases. Community groups believe the Army's analysis was flawed, and failed to take into account the training con-

ducted at Fort Pickett by the other services' active and reserve components, as well as increased active duty Marine and Army training occurring there due to training congestion at installations such as Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Army evaluated all its major training area installations equally. The Commission also found the Army's process of integrating a quantitative installation assessment with a qualitative operational blueprint, based upon operational and stationing requirements of the Army Stationing Strategy, is a sound approach to develop a military value assessment (MVA) for each installation in this category.

The Commission examined all of the issues presented by the local community and elected officials, especially with regard to the military value of Fort Pickett as a major training area. The Commission found members of all components from all the armed forces train at Fort Pickett. In evaluating the future access to the training facilities and training area of the installation, especially by members of the Reserve Component (RC), the Commission was satisfied that such access can continue. The Commission found adequate training locations existed in the region to handle additional RC annual training requirements, without Fort Pickett, but scheduling of such training would be more difficult, especially during peak training load periods. The Commission also found the National Guard and other RC units required continued access to Fort Pickett for both individual and annual training.

Finally, the Commission found closing Fort Pickett, and preserving an enclave for training for the Reserve Components, would reduce excess infrastructure and generate substantial savings.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1 and 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Fort Pickett, except minimum essential ranges, facilities, and training areas as a Reserve Component training enclave to permit the conduct of individual and annual training. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), Virginia**

*Category: Leases*

*Mission: Software support*

*One-time Cost: \$ 9.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-01: \$-4.9 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$1.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 2007 (9 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close by relocating Information Systems Software Center to Fort Meade, MD

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

In 1993, the Commission suggested DoD direct the Services to include a separate category for leased facilities to ensure a bottom-up review of leased space. The Army has conducted a review of activities in leased space to identify opportunities for relocation onto military installations. Because of the cost of leasing, the Army's goal is to minimize leased space, when feasible, and maximize the use of government-owned facilities

This activity can relocate easily for a minor cost. The annual cost of the current lease is \$2 million

### ***Community Concerns***

Even though the lease on the facility occupied by the Information Systems Software Center expires in 2000, the community contends there would be no savings to the government, as a result of the recommendation because the General Services Administration must continue to pay the rent. The community argued there is no existing space to renovate at Fort Meade, so the Army must construct a new building. They noted the return on investment for new construction is 18 years versus 9 years under the renovation option.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the Army plans to back-fill the leased space occupied by the Information Systems Software Center (ISSC) with activities currently in less desirable leased space. The Commission found the lease savings should be comparable because the lease costs for the activities under consideration are approximately the same as ISSC's lease cost. The Commission found the recommendation is consistent with the Army's Stationing Strategy to reduce leased space and

move into government-owned space where economically feasible.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close by relocating Information Systems Software Center to Fort Meade, Maryland.

## **Camp Bonneville, Washington**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Provide training facilities for active*

*Army and Reserve Component units*

*One-time Cost: \$0.04 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.8 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Camp Bonneville.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Camp Bonneville consists of approximately 4,000 acres and 178,000 square feet of facilities. The primary mission of Camp Bonneville is to provide training facilities for Active and Reserve units. Training currently conducted at Camp Bonneville will be shifted to Fort Lewis, Washington. Accordingly, Camp Bonneville is excess to the Army's requirements. Closing the camp will save base operations and maintenance funds and provide reuse opportunities.

### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Camp Bonneville.

## **Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support**

### **Activity, West Virginia**

*Category: Minor Installation*

*Mission: Maintenance support to Army*

*Reserve activities*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA). Relocate reserve activity to the Kelly Support Center, PA, provided the recommendation to realign Kelly Support Center is approved.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Valley Grove AMSA, located in Valley Grove, WV, consists of approximately 10,000 square feet of leased maintenance facilities. Its primary mission is to provide maintenance support to Army Reserve activities. Consolidating tenants from Valley Grove AMSA with the Reserve Component activities remaining on Kelly Support Center will reduce the cost of operation.

### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### ***Commission Findings***

As stated by the Secretary of Defense's letter dated June 14th, 1995 and upon further evaluation, the Commission found the closure and relocation of Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity to Kelly Support Center, Pennsylvania is no longer viable. The Commission found Congress added a construction project (\$6.8 million) to build a new maintenance shop at Wheeling-Ohio County Airport. The project is now underway, obviating the need to move to a new facility at Kelly Support Center.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity (AMSA) will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## Department of the Navy

### Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska

*Category: Operational Air Stations*

*Mission: Support for Anti-Submarine Warfare*

*Surveillance Mission*

*One-time Cost: \$9.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$108.8 million*

*Annual: \$26.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignments, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. In the case of Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska, the Navy's anti-submarine warfare surveillance mission no longer requires these facilities to base or support its aircraft. Closure of this activity reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessary capabilities and can be accomplished with no loss in mission effectiveness.

#### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions of concern from the local community. The U.S. Coast Guard, however, expressed concern about the closing of NAF Adak because of its use as a support base for their law enforcement, search and rescue, and navigation aid maintenance operations. Without NAF Adak's support facilities, the Coast Guard would be forced to obtain support for their operations at a greater distance from their patrol areas which would increase their overall operating costs.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. The closing of NAF Adak, however, caused the

Coast Guard to voice concern about losing a base from which they can stage some of their operations. The Commission recognizes that the use of NAF Adak is important to the Coast Guard's missions of law enforcement and search and rescue. This operational need, however, is not sufficient to justify keeping the facility open.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Facility, Adak, Alaska.

### Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland, California

*Category: Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers*

*Mission: Supply Support*

*One-time Cost: \$23.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$29.7 million*

*Annual: \$12.6 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

#### *Community Concerns*

FISC is located in three jurisdictions: Oakland, Alameda, and Richmond, California. Alameda and Richmond would like to have the land in their cities closed under base closure rules, which would expedite the land transfer. Initially, Oakland was concerned that any base closure action would prevent implementation of special legislation authorizing the Secretary of the Navy to sign long-term leases with the City of Oakland, the Port of Oakland and the City of Alameda for \$1. The Port of Oakland and the Navy recently signed leases for two parcels of FISC land. The Port was originally concerned that closure of FISC as a BRAC action would delay their large port development plan. The Port recognized that closure would allow the Port to acquire the land and would not interfere or prevent ongoing lease negotiations.

### *Commission Findings*

The Secretary of the Navy removed FISC Oakland from the list of recommendations presented to him because of excessive job losses in California. The Commission added FISC Oakland for consideration. The Commission found employment levels and workload at FISC decreasing as the bases it supported were closed. FISC's primary function would be to operate office space for Government tenants.

The Commission agreed with the Richmond and Alameda communities that the closure of FISC land in their communities would facilitate transfer of the land. To clarify that these were distinct parcels of land the Commission addressed these parcels in a separate closure motion. The Commission and the Oakland community ultimately agreed that the closure of the main FISC compound in Oakland would not interfere with their ongoing lease negotiations or previously signed leases, and would facilitate transfer of the property. The proposed closure actions received the endorsement of the Port of Oakland and the mayors of Oakland, Alameda, and Richmond. The Commission also found that additional savings would result if the two major tenants at FISC, Military Sealift Command and Defense Finance and Accounting Service, move to other Government-owned space.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 5 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland. Close Point Molate Naval Refueling Station, Richmond, California. Close Navy Supply Annex, Alameda, California. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### *Commission Recommendation II*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 5 and 6. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Oakland. Relocate Defense Finance and Accounting Service and Military Sealift Command to Government-owned space. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, California, and Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, California**

*Category: Operational Air Stations*

*Mission: Support Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$90.2 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$293.0 million*

*Annual: \$6.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect (amended)**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving sites for "squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar" specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-18) from "NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon" to "other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, Virginia, NAS North Island, California, and NAS Fallon, Nevada." Change the receiving sites for MCAS Tustin, California, specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton" to "other naval air stations, primarily MCAS New River, North Carolina; MCB Hawaii (MCAF Kaneohe Bay); MCAS Camp Pendleton, California; and NAS Miramar, California."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This recommendation furthers the restructuring initiatives of operational bases commenced in BRAC 93 and also recognizes that the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan further reduced force levels from those in the FY 1999 Force Structure Plan applicable to BRAC 93. These force level reductions required the Department of the Navy not only to eliminate additional excess capacity but to do so in a way that retained only the infrastructure necessary to support future force levels and did not impede operational flexibility for the deployment of that force. Full implementation of the BRAC 93 recommendations relating to operational air stations would require the construction of substantial new capacity at installations on both coasts, which only exacerbates the level of excess capacity in this subcategory of installations. Revising the receiving sites for assets from these installations in this and other air station recommendations eliminates the need for this construction of new capacity, such that the total savings are equivalent to the replacement plant value of an existing tactical aviation naval air station.



Further, within the context of the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan, the mix of operational air stations and the assets they support resulting from these recommendations provides substantial operational flexibility. For instance, the single siting of F-14s at Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia, fully utilizes that installation's capacity and avoids the need to provide support on both coasts for this aircraft series which is scheduled to leave the active inventory. This recommendation also permits the relocation of Marine Corps helicopter squadrons in the manner best able to meet operational imperatives.

### *Community Concerns*

The MCAS El Toro, MCAS Tustin, California redirect affects numerous communities, several of which expressed concerns. There were no formal expressions, however, from the communities near the following bases: MCAF Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii; NAS North Island, California; NAS Fallon, Nevada; NAS Miramar, California, MCAS Camp Pendleton, California; and NAS Lemoore, California.

The NAS Oceana community is willing to accept the F-14 aircraft. An airport zoning ordinance was passed preventing certain types of incompatible development, and thus helping the NAS Oceana preserve their AICUZ (air installation compatible use zones). Approximately \$25 million has been slated by the local government to move two schools away from the air station, and out of the accident potential zones. The community believes overcrowding is not an issue for the air station and that the actual levels of aircraft assigned after the redirects will be less than were assigned in 1991.

The March AFB, California community, although not involved in the DoD recommendation, submitted a proposal to move the Marine helicopter assets to March AFB. They cite savings for DoD and operational improvements as the major reason for their desire to have the helicopter assets assigned to their base. March AFB is located in Riverside County, California. The community asserts the cost of living is less than that in the San Diego, California area and the Marines could use the over 700 family housing units available at March. The community also asserts that location of helicopters away from fixed wing aircraft offers more training opportunities for the helicopters. In addition, the community believes separate basing of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft eliminates safety and operational concerns.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that redirecting the F-14 and E-2C aircraft from NAS Lemoore to other naval air stations eliminates the need for \$345 million in construction costs at NAS Lemoore. Additionally, the Secretary's recommendation takes advantage of already existing capacity at NAS Oceana.

During final deliberations, the Commission debated other receiving sites for the Marine Corps helicopter squadrons, including March AFB, California. Although relocating helicopters to March AFB might be operationally attractive, operating costs, according to the Marine Corps, would be significantly more expensive. The Commission was assured that the collocation of fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft at NAS Miramar can be safely accomplished through careful base and flight operations planning. The Commission believes, however, that the recommendation for redirect to specific airfields may restrict the service to a location that may not be desirable after detailed implementation planning. Therefore, the Commission recommended the language be changed to "other air stations" to allow greater operational flexibility including the ability to locate the helicopter squadrons at March AFB or other locations if appropriate.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following change the receiving sites for "squadrons and related activities at NAS Miramar" specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-18) from "NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon" to "other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, Virginia, NAS North Island, California, and NAS Fallon, Nevada." Change the receiving sites for MCAS Tustin, California, specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton" to "other air stations consistent with operational requirements." The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Air Station, Alameda, California**

*Category: Operational Air Stations*

*Mission: Support Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*  
*Annual: None*  
*Return on Investment: None*  
**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission for the closure of Naval Air Station, Alameda, California (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-35) for "aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support" and "reserve aviation assets" from "NAS North Island" and "NASA Ames/Moffett Field," respectively, to "other naval air stations, primarily the Naval Air Facility, Corpus Christi, Texas, to support the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas."

### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

The decision to collocate all mine warfare assets, including air assets, at the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas, coupled with the lack of existing facilities at Naval Air Station, North Island, support this movement of mine warfare helicopter assets to Texas. With this collocation of assets, the Navy can conduct training and operations with the full spectrum of mine warfare assets from one location, significantly enhancing its mine warfare countermeasures capability. This action is also consistent with the Department's approach for other naval air stations of eliminating capacity by not building new capacity.

### **Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### **Commission Findings**

The Commission found that locating mine warfare aviation assets to NAS Corpus Christi enhances training by collocating the full spectrum of mine warfare assets near the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence in nearby Ingleside, Texas. The Commission also found that directing Marine Reserve aviation assets to other naval air stations, affords the operational commander more flexibility in placing these assets. Because all costs and savings were realized in the original recommendation, no additional savings are claimed in this redirect.

### **Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission for the closure of Naval Air Station, Alameda, California (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-35) for "aircraft along with the dedicated personnel, equipment and support" and "reserve aviation assets" from "NAS North Island" and "NASA Ames/Moffett Field," respectively, to "other naval air stations, primarily the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas, to support the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, Naval Station, Ingleside, Texas."

### **Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast Division, San Diego, California**

*Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories*  
*Mission: Electronic In-Service Engineering*  
*One-time Cost: \$1.8 million*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: \$19.3 million*  
*Annual: \$4.3 million*  
*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Disestablish the In-Service Engineering West Coast Division (NISE West), San Diego, California, of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC), including the Taylor Street Special Use Area, and consolidate necessary functions and personnel with the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, either in the NCCOSC RDT&E Division spaces at Point Loma, California, or in current NISE West spaces in San Diego, California.

### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation

of activities wherever practicable. This action permits the elimination of the command and support structure of the closing activity resulting in improved efficiency, reduced costs, and reduced excess capacity.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that personnel efficiencies could be realized through elimination of duplicative workload between NCCOSC's R&D and in-service engineering divisions.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the In-Service Engineering West Coast Division (NISE West), San Diego, California, of the NCCOSC, including the Taylor Street Special Use Area, and consolidate necessary functions and personnel with the NCCOSC RDT&E Division, either in the NCCOSC RDT&E Division spaces at Point Loma, California, or in current NISE West spaces in San Diego, California.

## **Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, California**

*Category: Technical Centers and Laboratories*

*Mission: Biomedical Research*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC), San Diego, California, and relocate necessary functions, personnel and equipment to the Bureau of Naval Personnel (BUPERS) at Memphis, Tennessee.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This activity performs research and modeling and maintains databases in a number of personnel health and performance areas, and its consolidation with the Bureau of Naval Personnel not only reduces excess capacity but also aligns this activity with the DON's principal organization responsible for military personnel and the primary user of its products. The resulting synergy enhances the discharge of this responsibility while achieving necessary economies.

### *Community Concerns*

The community asserts that the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC) should be located in close proximity to a fleet concentration in order to have a ready source of test subjects. It argued that realigning NHRC to Memphis would seriously affect NHRC's ability to perform its mission, and would result in inordinate travel costs to bring subjects to the Center or to send researchers out to the field. An attendant concern was expressed that NHRC was identified in a joint study to become an armed forces research unit under the auspices of a new agency, the Armed Forces Medical Research and Development Agency (AFMRDA). The community contends that NHRC's utility to AFMRDA is based upon its proximity to test subjects as well as its potential status as the only research unit located on the west coast of the United States. The community raised questions about the suitability of realigning a medical command with a personnel administration command. Finally, the community maintained that the vast majority of NHRC's work is biomedical, and while some of NHRC's research may see applications in personnel programs, it should remain in a medical chain of command for tasking and funding.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that NHRC's work is overwhelmingly biomedical, not personnel research. The Commission was concerned that placing NHRC under the Bureau of Naval Personnel

(BUPERS) pursuant to the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense would have a detrimental effect on its biomedical research. NHRC has been chosen to become a research unit under Armed Forces Medical Research and Development Agency (AFMRDA). If NHRC were moved to BUPERS, its access to the medical research community would be curtailed and its utility to AFMRDA would be questionable. The Commission found, therefore, that NHRC should remain within the chain of command of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, and at its present location. Severing well-established operational research ties in San Diego would have a deleterious affect on NHRC's mission performance not sufficiently offset by the proposed savings.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Health Research Center (NHRC), San Diego remains open and is not disestablished. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California**

*Category: Technical Centers and Laboratories*

*Mission: Personnel Research*

*One-time Cost: \$7.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-4.3 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$1.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 2004 (4 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California, and relocate its functions, and appropriate personnel, equipment, and support to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Memphis, Tennessee, and Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, Orlando, Florida.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However,

the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Disestablishment of this technical center not only eliminates excess capacity but also collocates its functions with the primary user of its products. This recommendation permits the consolidation of appropriate functions at the new headquarters concentration for the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Memphis, Tennessee, and at the technical concentration for training systems and devices in Orlando, producing economies and efficiencies in the management of these functions.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center should be in close proximity to a fleet concentration in order to have a ready source of test subjects. It argued that realigning NPRDC to Memphis would seriously affect NPRDC's ability to perform its mission, and would result in inordinate travel costs to bring subjects to the Center or to send researchers out to the field. Concerns were also expressed over the number of personnel positions that DoD claims would be eliminated in the realignment. The community claimed some positions were eliminated through force level reductions and would have occurred regardless of whether NPRDC relocated. The relative operating costs at Memphis and San Diego were also questioned, and the community contends that those at Memphis are too low. Finally, the community believes that military construction costs at Memphis were arbitrarily reduced in DoD's analysis.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that NPRDC is the Navy's manpower and training research laboratory and should be collocated with the Navy's personnel headquarters, the primary user of NPRDC products. While access to a concentration of ready test subjects in San Diego is certainly convenient, the central location of Memphis provides access to an equally large number of test subjects. Although the Navy underestimated construction costs at Memphis, the Commission found relocation of NPRDC to Memphis was still cost effective.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, California, and relocate its functions, and appropriate personnel, equipment, and support to the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Memphis, Tennessee, and Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, Orlando, Florida

### **Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California**

*Category: Administrative Activities*

*Mission: Personnel Support*

*One-time Cost: \$0.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.1 million*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California, specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) from "Naval Air Station North Island" to "other government-owned space in San Diego, California."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The North Island site is somewhat isolated and not necessarily conducive to the discharge of a recruiting mission. Moving this activity to government-owned space in a more central and accessible location enhances its operations. Additionally, with the additional assets being placed in NAS North Island in this round of closures and realignments, there is a need for the space previously allocated to this activity.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of the Navy that relocating Naval Recruiting District from a remote location at NAS North Island to a more centrally located site in San Diego would enhance its ability to attract new recruits. This redirect will

create space to accommodate the relocation of other commands to NAS North Island, resulting from other Commission recommendations

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, California, specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) from "Naval Air Station North Island" to "other Government-owned space in San Diego, California."

### **Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California**

*Category: Naval Shipyards*

*Mission: Repair and Maintenance of Naval Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$74.5 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$725.6 million*

*Annual: \$130.6 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California, except retain the sonar dome government-owned, contractor-operated facility and those family housing units needed to fulfill Department of the Navy requirements, particularly those at Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, California. Relocate necessary personnel to other naval activities as appropriate, primarily Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach and naval activities in the San Diego, California, area.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. Force structure reductions by the year 2001 eliminate the requirement for the Department of the Navy to retain this facility, including its large-deck drydocking capability. As a result of BRAC 91, the adjoining Naval Station Long Beach was closed, and some of its assets were transferred to the naval shipyard for "ship support functions." Of those transferred assets, only those housing units required to fulfill Department of the Navy requirements in the local commuting area will be retained after closure of the naval shipyard.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues that closing Long Beach reduces the least amount of excess capacity and does not address the 37% excess nuclear capacity estimated to remain. The community maintains that the Navy capacity analysis is based solely on peacetime workload, with no consideration of drydock capacity for contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements. They believe the Navy closure process, with respect to drydock facilities, is not in conformance with United States Code Title 10, Section 2464, which requires DoD activities to maintain a logistics capability to respond to a mobilization or national emergency. The community questioned this process, noting the high percentage of drydock usage throughout the Department of the Navy. The community also maintains that the Navy process did not properly consider the current or future force-structure with regard to large-deck vessels in the Pacific Fleet.

The community argued that Long Beach could support homeporting of up to three nuclear carriers at less cost to the Navy than San Diego. Alternatively, they argue homeporting at least one carrier, and making Long Beach Naval Shipyard a detachment of Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, would reduce overhead, maintain the large drydock, and eliminate some of the expense of homeporting ships in San Diego.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Department of Defense that the Navy has excess shipyard capacity. The Commission found that although the number of large-deck ships has not decreased, a general decrease in force structure has resulted in an increased flexibility to accommodate unscheduled maintenance. The Commission acknowledged closure of Long Beach Naval Shipyard, and closure of Drydock 1, is not without some risk, but concluded that the risk is manageable, given the availability of the carrier-capable drydocks at Puget Sound and Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyards. The Commission agreed with the Navy's contention that the closure of the Long Beach Shipyard would benefit west coast private shipyards. The Commission found that the savings and return on investment resulting from closure supported the Department of Defense recommendation, even with an increase in the original cost to close estimate. Although the community asked the Commission to pursue the possibility of homeporting carriers at Long Beach, the Commission believes

the assignment of ships to homeports is an operational, not base closure issue, and thus not appropriate for inclusion in its recommendation.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Shipyard Long Beach, California, except retain the sonar dome Government-owned, contractor-operated facility and those family housing units needed to fulfill Department of the Navy requirements, particularly those at Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach, California. Relocate necessary personnel to other naval activities as appropriate, primarily Naval Weapons Station, Seal Beach and naval activities in the San Diego, California area.

### **Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California**

*Category: Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair*

*Mission: Administration of DON shipbuilding, conversion, modernization and maintenance contracts with the private sector*

*One-time Cost: \$0.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.8 million*

*Annual: \$0.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California. Relocate certain functions, personnel and equipment to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, San Diego, California.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Because of reductions in the fiscal year 2001 Force-Structure Plan and resource levels, naval requirements for private sector shipbuilding, conversion, modernization and repair are expected to decrease significantly. The combined capacity of the current thirteen SUPSHIP activities meaningfully exceeds the DON requirement over that Force Structure Plan. Additionally, with the closure of the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, the future requirement for this work in this region is anticipated to be quite nominal. The predicted workload can be efficiently absorbed by SUPSHIP San Diego.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the closure of Long Beach Naval Station in 1991, and the relocation of the homeported ships had significantly decreased the need to overhaul ships in privately owned shipyards in Long Beach. The Commission found closure consistent with the Navy's decreased needs.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, Long Beach, California. Relocate certain functions, personnel and equipment to Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, USN, San Diego, California

### **Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut**

*Category: Technical Centers / Laboratories*  
*Mission: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost: \$23.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$14.3 million*

*Annual: \$ 8.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut, and relocate necessary functions with associated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island. Close the NUWC New London facility, except retain Pier 7 which is transferred to the Navy Submarine Base New London. The site presently occupied by the U.S. Coast Guard Station, New London, will be transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard. The Navy Submarine Base, New London, Magnetic Silencing Facility will remain in its present location as a tenant of the U.S. Coast Guard. Naval reserve units will relocate to other naval activities, prima-

rily NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, and Navy Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity completes the undersea warfare center consolidation begun in BRAC 91. It not only reduces excess capacity, but, by consolidating certain functions at NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, achieves efficiencies and economies in management, thus reducing costs.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the Secretary's closure recommendation is significantly flawed, and asserts: (1) military value is compromised, (2) costs are understated, and (3) savings are overstated. The community's primary concerns relate to the rationale and costs associated with the BRAC 91 recommendation to close the New London Detachment. Overall, the community contends the 1991 realignment has significantly overrun estimated one-time costs and, as a result, the payback period now exceeds 100 years. The community believes because of inaccuracies and discrepancies in data submitted in 1991, the Commission should stop the 1991 decision, and reject the 1995 recommendation to complete the relocation of the New London Detachment to Newport, Rhode Island

### *Commission Findings*

Closure of the New London Detachment completes the undersea warfare center consolidation begun in BRAC 91. The Commission found that closure of this activity reduces excess capacity, consolidates research and development functions, and reduces cost. The Commission found that no significant losses in technical capabilities or delays in ongoing research, development, test and evaluation would result from this action. Buildings at

the receiving site are suitable to host equipment moved from New London. Furthermore, the Commission found the Navy adequately supported its cost and savings estimates.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, New London Detachment, New London, Connecticut, and relocate necessary functions with associated personnel, equipment, and support to Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island. Close the NUWC New London Facility, except retain Pier 7 which is transferred to the Navy Submarine Base New London. The site presently occupied by the U.S. Coast Guard Station, New London, will be transferred to the U.S. Coast Guard. The Navy Submarine Base, New London, Magnetic Silencing Facility will remain at its present location as a tenant of the U.S. Coast Guard. Naval reserve units will relocate to other naval activities, primarily NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, and Navy Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut.

### **Naval Recruiting Command Washington, D.C.**

*Mission: Personnel Support*

*One-time Cost: \$ 6.5 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$ 1.1 million*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C., specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) from "Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois" to "Naval Support Activity, Memphis, Tennessee."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

This relocation permits the single-siting of the Department's personnel recruiting and personnel management headquarters-level activities, enhancing their close coordination, and supporting the Department's policy of maximizing the use of government-owned space. It also reduces the require-

ment to effect new construction, and reduces resulting potential building congestion, at NTC Great Lakes.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that changing the relocation site for NRC from NTC Great Lakes to the Naval Support Activity, Memphis would avoid military construction costs at the already congested NTC Great Lakes. The Commission found that the recommendation increases the efficiency of the NRC by collocating the Navy's recruiting and personnel management commands.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving site for the Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C., specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) from "Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois" to "Naval Support Activity, Memphis, Tennessee."

### **Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.**

*Category: Naval Security Group Activities*

*Mission: Space Surveillance*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving site for the Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C., from "National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, Maryland" specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) to "Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The mission of this activity requires that it be collocated with space surveillance hardware. This



can most effectively be accomplished by housing this activity at the Naval Research Laboratory. By this redirect, the cost of moving this activity to Fort Meade can be avoided.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that permitting the Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac to remain in its present location at the Navy Research Laboratory incurs no additional cost and preserves the command's access to space surveillance equipment essential to mission performance.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving site for the Naval Security Group Command Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C., from "National Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland" specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) to "Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C."

### **Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, Florida**

*Category: Operational Air Station*

*Mission: Support Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$66.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$303.6 million*

*Annual: \$11.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-20) from "Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina" to "other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air Station, Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and support infrastructure." In addition, add the fol-

lowing: "To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. This recommended redirect achieves several important aims in furtherance of current Departmental policy and operational needs. First, it avoids the substantial new construction at MCAS Cherry Point that would be required if the F/A-18s from NAS Cecil Field were relocated there, which would add to existing excess capacity, and utilizes existing capacity at NAS Oceana. This avoidance and similar actions taken regarding other air stations are equivalent to the replacement plant value of an existing tactical aviation naval air station. Second, it permits collocation of all fixed wing carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) air assets in the Atlantic Fleet with the other aviation ASW assets at NAS Jacksonville and NAVSTA Mayport and support for those assets. Third, it permits recognition of the superior demographics for the Navy and Marine Corps reserves by relocation of reserve assets to Atlanta, Georgia.

### *Community Concerns*

The MCAS Cherry Point community feels the DoD recommendation for the redirect of F/A-18 assets originally based at NAS Cecil Field is flawed. They contend the costs used for the redirect to NAS Oceana, Virginia were based on a significantly smaller number of aircraft than was used for the 1993 DoD recommendation. Therefore, the figures should be adjusted to account for the current force structure and construction standards. Since the 1993 Commission report was released, the Cherry Point community claims that significant money has been spent in and around the base to accommodate the additional aircraft. New schools have been built and the private sector has invested in community services anticipating execution of the 1993 Commission recommenda-

tion. The community also believes this redirect would eliminate inter-servicing of aircraft at Cherry Point. The community believes Cherry Point is a better area for these additional aircraft because it is less populated, and can accommodate an additional 60 aircraft with little or no construction. The community asserts there are no environmental problems at Cherry Point, and severe water and air quality issues at Oceana. The community believes that the redirect was prepared to keep Oceana from being closed. They feel that this action is a deviation from the selection criteria.

The NAS Oceana community strongly supports the redirect. An airport zoning ordinance was passed preventing certain types of incompatible development and thus, helping NAS Oceana protect their AICUZ (air installation compatible use zones). Approximately \$25 million has been slated by the local government to move two schools away from the air station and out of the accident potential zones. The community believes overcrowding is not an issue for the air station and the actual levels of aircraft assigned after the redirects will be less than were assigned in 1991.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the accelerated retirement of the A-6E aircraft at NAS Oceana creates a vacancy in existing facilities. This redirect uses this capacity and avoids substantial new construction at MCAS Cherry Point, North Carolina. The recommendation also provides several operational advantages including the collocation of carrier-based anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft with land-based ASW aircraft at NAS Jacksonville. It also bases active duty Navy carrier based jets with similar Marine Corps units at MCAS Beaufort, South Carolina, and sends two reserve squadrons of F/A-18's to NAS Atlanta. In addition, the Commission agreed with the need to retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area to support NAS Jacksonville. The Commission believed that MCAS Cherry Point should be considered for additional missions in the future.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change

the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-20) from "Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, North Carolina; Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; and Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina" to "other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station, Oceana, Virginia; Marine Corps Air Station, Beaufort, South Carolina; Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida; and Naval Air Station, Atlanta, Georgia; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations with the necessary capacity and support infrastructure." In addition, add the following: "To support Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area."

### **Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida**

*Category: Operational Air Stations*

*Mission: Support for aviation training*

*One-time Cost: \$0.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$8.2 million*

*Annual: \$1.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realignment**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida, to a Naval Air Facility and dispose of certain portions of Truman Annex and Trumbo Point (including piers, wharves and buildings).

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. In the case of NAS Key West, its key importance derives from its airspace and training ranges, particularly in view of other aviation consolidations. Full access to those can be accomplished by retaining a downsized Naval Air Facility rather than a large naval air station. This realignment disposes of the waterfront assets of this facility and retains both the airspace and the ranges under its control for continued use by the Fleet for operations and training.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the proposed realignment of NAS Key West will allow the Navy to continue to access needed airspace and ranges while at the same time reduce excess infrastructure. The original recommendation was changed to reflect the Navy's request to allow them the option to divest additional property

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Naval Air Station, Key West to a Naval Air Facility and dispose of all property not required to support operational commitments, including certain portions of Truman Annex and Trumbo Point (including piers, wharves and buildings). The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, Florida**

*Category: Naval Aviation Depots*

*Mission: Aviation Maintenance*

*One-time Cost: \$1.5 million*

*Savings 1996-2001: \$2.4 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-42/43) by striking the following: "In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and dynamic components facility be moved to Cherry Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the private sector, in lieu of the Navy's plan to retain these operations in a stand-alone facility at NADEP Pensacola."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that

needs to be eliminated. Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, was closed in BRAC 93, except for the whirl tower and dynamic components facility. Subsequent to that decision, no requirement for the facility has been identified within either the Army or the Navy, and insufficient private sector interest in that facility has been expressed. Additionally, the Depot Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG-DM) examined these functions in response to Congressional interest in reexamining the BRAC 93 action. The JCSG-DM determined that the Pensacola facilities could not independently fulfill the entire future DoD requirement, but that the Army facilities at Corpus Christi Army Depot, combined with the Navy facilities at NADEP Cherry Point, could. This recommendation will allow the disposal of the whirl tower and the rehabilitation of the dynamic components facility buildings for use by the Naval Air Technical Training Center.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-42/43) by striking the following "In addition, the Commission recommends that the whirl tower and dynamic components facility be moved to Cherry Point Navy or Corpus Christi Army Depots or the private sector, in lieu of the Navy's plan to retain these operations in a stand-alone facility at NADEP Pensacola "

### **Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando, Florida**

*Category: Navy Research Lab*

*Mission: Sets standards and calibrations for underwater sound measurements*

*One-Time costs: \$8.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$3.7 million*

*Annual: \$2.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, Florida. Relocate the calibration and standards function with associated personnel, equipment, and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island, except for the Anechoic Tank Facility I, which will be excessed.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and of the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The disestablishment of this laboratory reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on alternative lakes that exist in the DON inventory. By consolidating necessary functions at NUWC Newport, Rhode Island, this recommendation achieves efficiencies and economies.

### *Community Concerns*

The Orlando community expressed the concern that the cost to move this facility from Orlando to Newport, Rhode Island would be prohibitively high, and the mission's operations would be jeopardized. In addition, the community maintained the Lab utilizes a nearby lake that has unique properties that would be difficult to duplicate, and there could be a large cost associated with accommodating calibrations at different locations. Moreover, the community maintained the Navy did not fully consider consolidation of similar test facilities in Orlando. The community believes that the professional staff at Orlando will not move to Newport.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary's recommendation. The Commission found that while this facility has a long history and a unique lake nearby, advances in technology have obviated the need for the Lab.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment (NRL UWSRD), Orlando, Florida. Relocate the calibration and standards function with associated personnel, equipment, and support to the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport Division, Newport, Rhode Island, except for the Anechoic Tank Facility I, which will be excessed.

### **Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion**

#### **Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida**

*Category: Naval Training Center*

*Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted Personnel*

*One-time Cost: \$146.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$41.5 million*

*Annual: \$8.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) for the "Nuclear Power School" (or the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center) from "the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London" to "Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, South Carolina."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The decision of the 1993 Commission to retain the submarine piers at Naval Submarine Base New London, Connecticut, meant that some of the facilities designated for occupancy by the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center were no longer available. Locating this school with the Nuclear Propulsion Training Unit of the Naval

Weapons Station, Charleston achieves an enhanced training capability, provides ready access to the moored training ships now at the Weapons Station, and avoids the significant costs of building and/or renovating facilities at New London

### *Community Concerns*

Community concerns were received from both New London, Connecticut and Orlando, Florida. The New London community expressed concern over whether they were fairly evaluated. The community argued the cost estimates for New London construction were greater than in Charleston because the projected student load used was higher for New London. Additionally, the community asserted the Navy added unnecessary costs for the school in general when they decided to move the school to a new location. The New London community questioned the decision to create new infrastructure in Charleston, and also questioned whether the Charleston cost estimates included all new infrastructure expenses. Finally, the New London community believes synergy would be lost between the Nuclear Power School students and the Sub School in New London if the redirect was accepted.

The Orlando community expressed concern that the Navy had not considered retaining the school in Orlando following a change in the situation that necessitated the redirect in the first place. The Orlando community argued no large military construction costs would be necessary to keep the school in Orlando and that this represented the best scenario for the Department of the Navy.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that even after considering possible variances in the original cost estimates, the final analysis still supported the recommendation to redirect the training center from New London to Charleston. The Commission found the recurring savings associated with the Charleston site overcame cost avoidance and cost of construction at the New London and Orlando sites. The recurring cost savings at Charleston derived from both lower base operating costs and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) cost avoidances. The PCS savings occur because the Navy Nuclear Prototype Trainer, a follow-on school attended by one half of each graduating class, is already located in Charleston. Other causes of cost variance reviewed by the Commission included updated

bachelor housing requirements which raised the amount of space per person from the original standard and student base loading which decreased from the 1993 recommendation baseline. The Commission also found that there was sufficient room for development at the Charleston site without encroaching on any wetlands or explosive arcs from the Naval Magazine.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) for the "Nuclear Power School" (or the Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center) from "the Submarine School at the Naval Submarine Base (NSB), New London" to "Naval Weapons Station, Charleston, South Carolina."

### **Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam**

*Category: Supply Center*

*Mission: Supply Support*

*One-time Cost: \$17.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$128.8 million*

*Annual: \$27.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers (FISC) are lower activities whose existence depends upon active fleet units in their homeport area. Prior and current BRAC actions closing both Naval Air Station, Guam and a portion of Naval Activities, Guam have significantly reduced this activity's customer base. The remaining workload can efficiently be handled by other activities on Guam or by other FISCs.

### *Community Concerns*

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval Activities Guam section, Guam's community expressed concern that the fuel farm the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) owns and operates

could not be turned over to a private organization because of its age, as well as a possible requirement to store DoD fuels. Additionally, the community expressed concern the language in the recommendation was not specific enough for Guam to be assured it would be able to reuse the facilities for economic revitalization.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the requirement for the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) was tied to the location of its largest customer, the Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels. If the MSC ships remain on Guam, a supply center would have to be retained by the Navy. Retention of the FISC would eliminate most of the savings projected by the Navy and the Commission.

The Commission agreed with the Commander in Chief United States Forces, Pacific that appropriate assets, the fuel farm and associated facilities should be retained given the strategic location of Guam.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Guam. Retain appropriate assets and the FISC fuel facilities, including piers D and E, tank farms, and associated pipelines and pumping systems, under DoD operational control to support military service fuel requirements. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Activities, Guam**

*Category: Naval Station*

*Mission: Support Homeported Ships*

*One-time Cost : \$93.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$66.2 million*

*Annual: \$42.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Naval Activities Guam. Relocate all ammunition vessels and associated personnel and support to Naval Magazine, Lualualei, Hawaii. Relocate all other combat logistics force ships and associated personnel and support to Naval Station,

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Relocate Military Sealift Command personnel and Diego Garcia support functions to Naval Station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center-WESTPAC, except for the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, which relocates to the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Afloat Training Group-WESTPAC. All other Department of Defense activities that are presently on Guam may remain either as a tenant of Naval Activities, Guam or other appropriate naval activity. Retain waterfront assets for support, mobilization, and contingencies and to support the afloat tender.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during the 1993 round of base closure and realignment, since DON force structure experiences a reduction of over 10 percent by the year 2001, there continues to be additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. In evaluating operational bases, the goal was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support the future force structure without impeding operational flexibility for deployment of that force. Shifting deployment patterns in the Pacific Fleet reduce the need for a fully functional naval station. Operational and forward basing considerations require access to Guam. However, since no combatant ships are homeported there, elimination of the naval station facilities which are not required to support mobilization and/or contingency operations allows removal of excess capacity while retaining this necessary access.

### *Community Concerns*

The Guam community expressed concern on a variety of issues. Foremost was the issue of reuse. The community believes it should be given every opportunity for full use of the facilities and property for economic revitalization. The community believes this is essential in light of the unique difficulties Guam has experienced since the end of World War II.

The Guam community argued two other related scenarios should be looked at instead of the proposed recommendations: First, the reference to the receiving site should be removed from all recommendations. This would give the Navy more flexibility in properly stationing the assets to meet operational requirements.

Second, all accepted recommendations should be executed on the last day of the two year implementation period. This would allow a two year transitional period and permit more time for economic revitalization planning

In addition to the alternative scenarios, the community voiced concern over the land disposition process. During the turnover process associated with Guam Land Use Plan 1977 (GLUP 77), lands were tied up in legal proceedings for decades, thus removing any chance for revitalization. The community asked that all lands marked as excess during GLUP 77 and 94, which had not been turned over for reuse, be included in the Commission's recommendation.

The community also asked the Commission to direct the Navy to bring to full, efficient, working order any facilities that were to be closed before being turned over to the community. This included Piti Power plant, fuel farms and any piers damaged by the last earthquake.

Finally, the Guam community asked the Commission to close the Naval Magazine and that its associated water reservoir be turned over to the Government of Guam. The magazine would then be consolidated with the magazine at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the key to all of the Guam recommendations was the disposition of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) vessels. The Commission concurred with the Secretary of Defense's position that shifting deployment patterns in the Western Pacific (WESTPAC) have lessened the requirement for the MSC ships to be stationed out of Guam. This changing requirement impacts the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (FISC) mission and HC-5 helicopter squadron because this support needs to be located wherever the MSC vessels are to be stationed. Concurrently, the Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that Guam would continue to be of strategic importance and require continued access to the facilities and harbor.

The Commission also agreed with the request of the operational commander to allow flexibility in locating the Military Sealift Command vessels and their support. If a decision is made to retain the MSC vessels on Guam, then most of the savings projected in the above figures will not occur.

The Commission reviewed the 1994 Guam Land Use Plan (GLUP) implementation process at the community's request. The Commission found including the release of GLUP lands in the Commission's recommendation would allow a more rapid transfer of lands and property. The Commission also analyzed the possibility of closing the Naval Magazine on Guam or consolidating it with the magazine on Andersen Air Force Base (AAFB). With the assistance of the Navy, the Commission found closing or consolidating the magazine was uneconomical, unsafe, and would mean the loss of irreplaceable training capabilities.

Finally, the Commission found that it was in the best interests of both the Navy and the community to work together for economic revitalization. The Commission supports the Navy's position, as stated in Assistant Secretary of the Navy Pirie's April 21, 1995 letter to Delegate Robert A. Underwood of Guam.

*It is our objective to convey, through long-term leases, outright transfers, or any other mutually agreeable arrangement, as much of the land and facilities as possible from the affected activities on Guam so as to stimulate local economic growth while, at the same time, providing us [the U.S. Navy] with the strategic flexibility to maintain the necessary operational access to Guam port facilities*

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Naval Activities, Guam. Locate all Military Sealift Command assets and related personnel and support at available DoD activities or in rented facilities as required to support operational commitments. Disestablish the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center-WESTPAC, except for the Joint Typhoon Warning Center, which relocates to the Naval Pacific Meteorology and Oceanographic Center, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. Disestablish the Afloat Training Group-WESTPAC. All other Department of Defense activities that are presently on Naval Activities may remain either as a tenant of Naval Activities or other appropriate naval activity. Retain waterfront assets for support, mobilization, contingencies, to support the afloat tender, and to support shared use of these assets consistent with operational requirements if appro-

priate. Dispose of property owned by Naval Activities declared releasable under the 1994 Guam Land Use Plan with appropriate restrictions. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam**

*Category: Naval Air Station*

*Mission: Support Naval Aviation Operations*

*One-time Cost: \$43.8 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$213.8 million*

*Annual: \$21.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-21) for “the aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment” from the closing Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam from “Andersen AFB, Guam” to “other naval or DoD air stations in the Continental United States and Hawaii.”

#### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Other BRAC 95 actions recommended the partial closure of Naval Activities, Guam, with retention of the waterfront assets, and the relocation of all of the vessels currently homeported at Naval Activities, Guam to Hawaii. Among the aircraft at Naval Activities, Guam is a squadron of helicopters performing logistics functions in support of these vessels. This redirect would collocate these helicopters with the vessels they support. Similarly, regarding the other aircraft at the closing Naval Air Station, the Fleet Commander-in-Chief desires operational synergies for his surveillance aircraft, which results in movement away from Guam. This redirect more centrally collocates those aircraft with similar assets in Hawaii and on the West Coast, while avoiding the new construction costs required in order to house these aircraft at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, consistent with the Department’s approach of eliminating capacity by not building new capacity.

#### ***Community Concerns***

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval Activities Guam section, Guam’s community expressed concern that while the redirect of the VQ-1 and VQ-5 squadrons is understandable, the

redirect of the HC-5 helicopter squadron would leave Guam with no organic Search and Rescue (SAR) capability.

#### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the fixed wing air squadrons originally planned for relocation from NAS Agana to Anderson Air Force Base are more appropriately located at other locations. The Commission found the HC-5 helicopter squadron should be located near the homeport of the Military Sealift Command ships currently on Guam. Movement of HC-5 aircraft off the island will eliminate the only current helicopter Search and Rescue (SAR) capability on Guam.

#### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-21) for “the aircraft, personnel, and associated equipment” from the closing Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam from “Anderson AFB, Guam” to “other naval or DoD air stations.” The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Public Works Center, Guam**

*Category: Public Works Centers*

*Mission: Public Works Support*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

#### ***Community Concerns***

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval Activities Guam section, the community expressed concern over the proposal to retain the officer housing at the former Naval Air Station (NAS) Agana, Guam, and over the status of the Piti



Power Plant. The community believes the officer housing should be turned over to the community because it is the only part of the former NAS that was retained. In addition, the community believes that because the housing is in a separate area, retaining it would not be consistent with the Guam Land Use Plan (GLUP), which stated consolidation of facilities was a primary goal. The community further believes there is sufficient housing available for military officers. The community is worried that the Navy would not maintain the Piti Power Plant prior to turning it over to the Government of Guam. Additionally, the community believes that because the closings or realignments will not reduce any PWC functions, closing it would not make sense.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found it was not economical to entirely close the Public Works Center but the Navy should be allowed to reduce workforce and facilities as workload decreases. The Commission also found, there was no need to retain the officer housing on the former Naval Air Station Agana, Guam, because the number of officers on Guam has been reduced.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds that the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Public Works Center, Guam, to match assigned workload. Close the officer housing at the former Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Ship Repair Facility, Guam**

*Category: Naval Shipyards*

*Mission: Maintenance and Repair of Naval Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$8.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$171.9 million*

*Annual: \$37.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam, except transfer appropriate assets, including the piers, the floating drydock, its typhoon basin anchorage, the recompression chamber, and the floating crane, to Naval Activities, Guam.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. While operational and forward basing considerations require access to Guam, a fully functional ship repair facility is not required. The workload of SRF Guam can be entirely met by other Department of the Navy facilities. However, retention of the waterfront assets provides the DON with the ability to meet voyage repair and emergent requirements that may arise in the Western Pacific.

### *Community Concerns*

In addition to the concerns mentioned in the Naval Activities Guam section, the community expressed concern Guam was being penalized under the Navy's interpretation of 10 U.S.C. 7309, which has prohibited performance of any non-voyage repair work on U.S. Navy vessels other than those homeported in Guam. If Guam is prohibited from bidding on U.S. ship repair work, then a major potential source of income would be excluded from any economic revitalization efforts. The community also argued the best way for the facilities and equipment to be maintained at the SRF would be for them to be used by the private sector because the high humidity and heat would deteriorate the equipment if it were left idle.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that large reductions in workload, present excess capacity at the facility, and the possible departure of the Military Sealift Command (MSC) ships from Guam, justified closure. The Commission also found that if the MSC ships remain on Guam, then a private sector ship repair capability must be developed. The Commission was concerned about a current Navy policy which does not allow Guam repair facilities to bid on certain U.S. ship repair work. The Commission believes that this policy should be modified to allow more work at private repair facilities on Guam.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the

Naval Ship Repair Facility (SRF), Guam, except transfer appropriate assets, including the piers, the floating drydock, its typhoon basin anchorage, the recompression chamber, and the floating crane, to Naval Activities, Guam.

### **Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii**

*Category: Naval Air Stations*

*Mission: None; Base Closed*

*One-time Cost: \$.04 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$17.6 million*

*Annual: \$0.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

#### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding items excepted from the closure of Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii (1993 Commission, at page 1-19) from "Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use" to "Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use, including the following family housing support facilities: commissary facilities, Public Works Center compound with its sanitary landfill, and beach recreational areas, known as Nimitz Beach and White Plains Beach."

#### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

While specific mention was made of retention of family housing in the BRAC 93 recommendation relating to NAS Barbers Point, certain aspects conducive to supporting personnel in family housing were not specifically mentioned, which is required for their retention. Quality of life interests require either that these facilities be retained or that new ones be built to provide these services. Another advantage of retaining these facilities to support multi-service use is the avoidance of the costs of closing the existing landfill and either developing another one on other property on the island of Oahu or incurring the costs of shipping waste to a site off-island.

#### **Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### **Commission Findings**

The Commission found retaining the requested portions of the Naval Air Station would avoid

costs in developing replacements and would improve Quality of Life issues in the affected area.

#### **Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding items excepted from the closure of Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, Hawaii (1993 Commission, at page 1-19) from "Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use" to "Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use, including the following family housing support facilities: commissary facilities, Public Works Center compound with its sanitary landfill, and beach recreational areas, known as Nimitz Beach and White Plains Beach."

### **Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana**

*Category: Navy Technical Center*

*Mission: In-Service Engineering for Avionics and Electronics*

*One-time Cost: \$77.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$7.7 million*

*Annual: \$39.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 2001 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Naval Air Warfare Center (NAWC), Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, Indiana. Relocate necessary functions along with associated personnel, equipment and support to other naval technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana; Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland; and Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, California.

#### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a rec-

ognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This recommended closure results in the closure of a major technical center and the relocation of its principal functions to three other technical centers, realizing both a reduction in excess capacity and significant economies while raising aggregate military value.

### *Community Concerns*

The Indianapolis community believes that the military value calculation performed by the Navy for integrated capabilities does not accurately reflect the integrated value of the installation. They also expressed concern that many more employees than projected would not transfer to the receiving locations with the workload. The City of Indianapolis has proposed a public-private partnership as an alternative reuse of the installation if the recommendation to close is approved. The community is concerned that a recommendation not interfere with its proposal.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that the Navy excluded \$8.6 million in costs for a duplicative EP-3/ES-3 system capability that would have jeopardized fleet support during the estimated moving time to NAWC China Lake, California. The Commission also found that the Navy excluded \$38.6 million in closure related moving costs. The Commission believes that these exclusions could raise the one-time closure cost to \$125 million. The Commission found that the Navy under-evaluated the military value for the integrated capabilities that currently exist at NAWC Indianapolis. The Commission found that the avionics and electronics systems engineering functions at Indianapolis are consistent with operational requirements, and that collocation of these engineering functions, with the prototyping functions performed at the facility, has contributed substantially to the effectiveness of the facility in serving the Department of the Navy. These integrated engineering and prototyping capabilities, along with NAWC Indianapolis's consistent level of \$330 million in reimbursable funding, lead the Commission to conclude that the NAWC Indianapolis is a prime candidate for privatization. The Commission strongly urges the Department of the Navy to allow privatization of these assets.

The Commission found that if the Community proposal for privatization of NAWC Indianapolis is successful, the costs and savings estimated by DoD could be different. As a result of this uncertainty, and because the Commission is prohibited from considering reuse planning when making its recommendations, the Commission has accepted and used the DoD cost and savings data in its deliberations. The Commission has also identified uncertainties in the Navy's cost to close but these are speculative. The Commission adopted the DoD costs in making its final recommendation. The Commission also adopted the DoD recommendation to close NAWC Indianapolis, but provided the Navy discretionary authority to implement fully the Community's proposal.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis. Transfer workload, equipment and facilities to the private sector or local jurisdiction as appropriate if the private sector can accommodate the workload onsite; or relocate necessary functions along with necessary personnel, equipment and support to other naval technical activities, primarily the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana; Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland; and Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, California. To the extent that workload is moved to the private sector, such personnel as are necessary should remain in place to assist with transfer to the private sector; to perform functions compatible with private sector workload, or are necessary to sustain or support the private sector workload, and to carryout any transition activities. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky**

*Category: Navy Maintenance Depot*  
*Mission: Support for Naval gun systems*  
*One-time Cost: \$103.9 million*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-39.4 million (Cost)*  
*Annual: \$28.6 million*  
*Return on Investment: 2003 (3 years)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville, Kentucky. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other naval activities, primarily the Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia; the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme, California; and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Consistent with the Department of the Navy's efforts to remove depot level maintenance workload from technical centers and return it to depot industrial activities, this action consolidates ships' systems (guns) depot and general industrial workload at NSYD Norfolk, which has many of the required facilities in place. The functional distribution of workload in this manner offers an opportunity for cross-servicing part of the gun plating workload to the Watervliet Arsenal in New York. System integration engineering will relocate to NSWC Port Hueneme, with the remainder of the engineering workload and Close-in-Weapons System (CIWS) depot maintenance functions relocating to NSWC Crane. The closure of this activity not only reduces excess capacity, but relocation of functional workload to activities performing similar work will result in additional efficiencies and economies in the management of those functions.

### *Community Concerns*

The Louisville community believes that \$240 million of closure related costs were improperly excluded from the one-time closure costs by the Navy. The community is concerned about the economic impact and has made a proposal for a public-private partnership involving two private companies, the Navy, and the City of Louisville. This proposal would be implemented as an alternative reuse of the closed facility. The community is concerned that a recommendation not interfere with its proposal.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that the Navy did not estimate the necessary Technical Repair Standard (TRS) costs at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and that implementation of this transferring workload could require an additional \$18 million in TRS costs. The Commission also found that the Navy did not include \$13.4 million in closure related moving costs. The Commission found that these additional costs could increase the one-time cost to close to \$136 million. A Naval Audit Service Report was conducted as a result of allegations about improper handling of data call information from Louisville to the Base Structure Analysis Team. The Commission found that the Naval Audit Service Report would have no impact on the Navy's decision to recommend closure of NSWC Louisville. The Commission found that the gun systems engineering functions at Louisville are consistent with operational requirements, and that collocation of these engineering functions with the maintenance and overhaul functions performed at the facility has contributed substantially to the effectiveness of the facility in serving the Department of the Navy. These integrated engineering, maintenance and overhaul capabilities, along with NSWC Louisville's plating facility, led the Commission to strongly urge the Department of the Navy to allow privatization of these assets.

The Commission found that if the Community proposal for privatization of NSWC Louisville is successful, the costs and savings estimated by DoD could be different. As a result of this uncertainty, and because the Commission is prohibited from considering reuse planning when making its recommendations, the Commission accepted and used the DoD cost and savings data in its deliberations. The Commission has also identified uncertainties in the Navy's cost to close but these are speculative. The Commission adopted the DoD costs in making its final recommendation. The Commission adopted the DoD recommendation to close NSWC Louisville, but provided the Navy discretionary authority to implement fully the Community's proposal.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 4. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville. Transfer workload, equipment and facilities to the private

sector or local jurisdiction as appropriate if the private sector can accommodate the workload onsite, or relocate necessary functions along with necessary personnel, equipment and support to other naval technical activities, primarily the Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia; Naval Surface Warfare Center, Hueneme, California; and the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane, Indiana. To the extent that workload is moved to the private sector, such personnel as are necessary should remain in place to assist with transfer to the private sector; to perform functions compatible with private sector workload, or are necessary to sustain or support the private sector workload, and to carryout any transition activities. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria

**Naval Biodynamics Laboratory,  
New Orleans, Louisiana**

*Category: Navy Research Lab*  
*Mission: Conducts biomedical research on the effect of motion on military personnel*  
*One-time costs: \$0.6 million*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: \$14.1 million*  
*Annual: \$2.9 million*  
*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Close**

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana, and relocate necessary personnel to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, Florida.

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this laboratory reduces this excess capacity and fosters joint synergism. It also provides the opportunity for the transfer of its equipment and facilities to the public educational or commercial sector, thus

maintaining access to its capabilities on an as-needed basis.

**Community Concerns**

There were no formal expressions from the community.

**Commission Findings**

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary's recommendation or justification. The Commission understands this capability will not be lost and will be assumed by the University of New Orleans

**Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, Louisiana, and relocate necessary personnel to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, and Naval Aeromedical Research Laboratory, Pensacola, Florida.

**Naval Medical Research Institute,  
Bethesda, Maryland**

*Category: Navy Research Lab*  
*Mission: Conducts biomedical research in support of combat forces*  
*One-time Cost: \$3.4 million*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: \$19.0 million*  
*Annual: \$9.5 million*  
*Return on Investment: 2000 (1 year)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Close**

**Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland. Consolidate the personnel of the Diving Medicine Program with the Experimental Diving Unit, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. Relocate the Infectious Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational Medicine programs along with necessary personnel and equipment to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research at Forest Glen, Maryland

**Secretary of Defense Justification**

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through

FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and of the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. This closure and realignment achieves a principal objective of the DoD by cross-servicing part of this laboratory's workload and furthers the BRAC 91 Tri-Service Project Reliance Study decision by collocating medical research with the Army. Other portions of that workload can be assumed by another Navy installation with only a transfer of certain personnel, achieving both a reduction in excess capacity and a cost savings by eliminating a redundant capability in the area of diving research.

### *Community Concerns*

The Maryland community generally supports the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense, with the exception of the part that concerned the Diving Medicine Facility. The community supported cantonment of the Diving Medicine Facility, because of its unique facilities and research. The community believes the COBRA data were flawed and the cost to move understated. In addition, the community expressed a concern that the hyperbaric chambers used for animal research, not just the "manned" facilities, should be retained for future studies.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Department of Defense recommendation or justification. The movement of all but the Diving Medicine Facility to Walter Reed had been planned before the Secretary's recommendations were submitted to the Commission, and has the universal support of all parties concerned. The Commission found this part of the recommendation consistent with the DoD-wide goal of interservicing.

While the Diving Medicine Facility at Bethesda has a long history in its field, the Commission found the Navy Experimental Diving Unit in Panama City, Florida was well-equipped to include this mission in its large spectrum of activity.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Medical Research Institute (NMRI), Bethesda, Maryland. Consolidate the personnel of the Diving Medicine Program with the Experimental Diving Unit, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division, Coastal Systems Station, Panama City, Florida. Relocate the Infectious Diseases, Combat Casualty Care and Operational Medicine programs along with necessary personnel and equipment to the Walter Reed Army Institute for Research at Forest Glen, Maryland.

### **Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland**

*Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories*

*Mission: RDT&E Fleet Support*

*One-time Cost: \$24.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$23.8 million*

*Annual: \$11.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the Department of the Navy budget through 2001. Specific reductions

for technical centers are difficult to determine because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The total closure of this technical center reduces overall excess capacity in this category of installations, as well as excess capacity specific to this particular installation. It results in synergistic efficiencies by eliminating a major site and collocating technical personnel at the two primary remaining sites involved in hull, machinery, and equipment associated with naval vessels. It allows the movement of work to other Navy, DoD, academic and private industry facilities, and the excessing of some facilities not in continuous use. It also collocates RDT&E efforts with the In-Service Engineering work and facilities, to incorporate lessons learned from fleet operations and to increase the technical response pool to solve immediate problems.

### *Community Concerns*

The community expressed concern and believes the Navy underestimated costs related to base overhead, facility moving, alternative testing procedures, tenant relocation, and loss of skilled staff. The community believes that the proposal would eliminate two major test facilities and would require the substitution of extensive live testing at greatly increased costs or risk to personnel. They pointed out that other vital projects would be delayed, perhaps unacceptably. For example, the community identified a delay in testing systems, which might make them unavailable for installation on the lead ships in their respective classes. More serious, the community identified a potential delay in the chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) replacement program. The Clean Air Act and an international treaty, the Montreal Protocol, halt all U. S. production of CFCs by the year 2000. Production of the materials used by the Navy has already ceased. The community also noted that NSWC Annapolis is surrounded by water, as well as Naval Station Annapolis, which is not closing. Thus, overhead costs would remain and reuse of the land would be highly problematic.

The community expressed concerns about the movement of much of their R&D mission to NSWC Philadelphia which has in-service engineering, not research, as its primary function. They pointed out significant differences between research experience and educational levels of the employee populations at the two commands. They suggested that the number of positions the Navy said could be eliminated was questionable and that the scenario eliminated, instead of relocating, some critical personnel, such as those conducting CFC work.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that closing NSWC Annapolis and relocating key facilities and personnel would achieve cost savings through the elimination of overhead and efficiencies associated with the collocation of R&D with In-Service Engineering. The Commission accepted the Navy's position that it was willing to assume the risk associated with the closure of two research facilities in Annapolis. The Commission found that even after considering possible increases in the original cost estimates relating to moving costs, facility closing date, and elimination of billets, the savings from the recommendation remain attractive.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis, Maryland, including the NIKE Site, Bayhead Road, Annapolis, except transfer the fuel storage/refueling sites and the water treatment facilities to Naval Station, Annapolis to support the U.S. Naval Academy and Navy housing. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment and support to other technical activities, primarily Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Naval Surface Weapons Center, Carderock Division, Carderock, Maryland; and the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C. The Joint Spectrum Center, a DoD cross-service tenant, will be relocated with other components of the Center in the local area as appropriate.

**Naval Surface Warfare Center,  
Dahlgren Division Detachment,  
White Oak, Maryland**

*Category: Technical Centers  
and Laboratories*

*Mission: Research, Development,  
Testing, and Evaluation Support*

*One-time Cost: \$2.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$28.7 million*

*Annual: \$6.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland. Relocate the functions, personnel and equipment associated with Ship Magnetic Signature Control R&D Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock, Maryland, and the functions and personnel associated with reentry body dynamics research and development to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.

***Secretary of Defense Justification***

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland, reduces this excess capacity, and its consolidation with two other major technical centers that already have capability will result in further economies and efficiencies. This closure also eliminates unnecessary capabilities, since a few Navy facilities were left at NSWC White Oak only because Naval Sea Systems Command was relocating there as a result of BRAC 93. However, those facilities can be excessed, and the Naval Sea Systems Command can be easily accommodated at the Washington Navy Yard.

***Community Concerns***

The community expressed concern that the DoD recommendation makes no provision for the continued operation of a number of facilities at NSWC White Oak, which the community believes are critical national assets. These assets, the community argues, see joint, interagency, and commercial use. Two facilities were of the greatest concern: the Nuclear Weapons Effect Test Facility and the Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel. The community felt there is a clear ongoing need for these facilities, and because no comparable assets exist elsewhere, they must remain operable. The community believes any savings from the closure of NSWC White Oak would evaporate when the costs to continue to operate these facilities, to move them, or to duplicate them in another location are added to the analysis.

***Commission Findings***

The Commission's primary concern regarding this recommendation was the final disposition of the technical facilities located at White Oak, especially the Hypervelocity Wind Tunnel and the Nuclear Weapons Effect Facility. The recommendation of the Secretary of Defense contended that these facilities were no longer critical, however, there was ample data that pointed to a continuing need. The Commission concurred with the Secretary of Defense that if a sponsor desired to continue to operate the facilities, they could acquire them in the reuse process. In its analysis, the Commission was unable to identify a potential DoD user willing to take over the facilities. The Commission found that the facilities were excess to the Department's needs, and thus the White Oak detachment could close with no adverse impact on DoD operational requirements.

***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak, Maryland. Relocate the functions, personnel and equipment associated with Ship Magnetic Signature Control R&D Complex to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock, Maryland, and the functions and personnel associated with reentry body dynamics research and development to the Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren, Virginia.



**Naval Air Station,  
South Weymouth, Massachusetts**

*Category: Reserve Air Station*

*Mission: Support for Reserve Units*

*One-time Cost: \$17.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$50.8 million*

*Annual: \$27.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine. Relocate the Marine Corps Reserve support squadrons to another facility in the local area or to NAS Brunswick. Reestablish Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, and change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-64) for consolidation of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts, and Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, from "NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts" to "Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts"

***Secretary of Defense Justification***

As a result of the Base Closure and Realignment Commission's actions in BRAC 93, the Department of the Navy retained several naval air stations north of the major fleet concentration in Norfolk. Despite the large reduction in operational infrastructure accomplished during BRAC 93, the current Force Structure Plan shows a continuing decline in force levels from that governing BRAC 93, and thus there is additional excess capacity that must be eliminated. The major thrust of the evaluation of operational bases was to retain only that infrastructure necessary to support future force levels while, at the same time, not impeding operational flexibility for the deployment of that force. In that latter context, the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT), expressed an operational desire to have as fully-capable an air station as possible north of Norfolk with the closest geographic proximity to support operational deployments. Satisfaction of these needs both to further reduce excess capacity and to honor CINCLANTFLT's operational imperative can be accomplished best by the retention of the most fully capable air station in this geographic area, Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine, in lieu

of the reserve air station at South Weymouth. Unlike BRAC 93, where assets from Naval Air Station, South Weymouth were proposed to be relocated to three receiving sites, two of which were geographically quite remote, and where the perceived adverse impact on reserve demographics was considered unacceptable by the Commission, this BRAC 95 recommendation moves all of the assets and supporting personnel and equipment less than 150 miles away, thus providing most acceptable reserve demographics. Further, the consolidation of several reserve centers at the Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, provides demographics consideration for surface reserve assets. In addition, this recommendation furthers the Departmental preference to collocate active and reserve assets and personnel wherever possible to enhance the readiness of both

***Community Concerns***

NAS South Weymouth is the only operational Naval Air Reserve activity in the New England/New York area. The community believes closure would preclude active participation by aviation qualified Naval Reservists in the northeastern United States, because reservists are geographically connected to their homes and civilian occupations. The community noted the Navy ranked NAS South Weymouth fourth of six in military value, well ahead of NAS Ft. Worth and NAS Atlanta. The community emphasized that the highly educated technical workforce and large population of qualified veterans in the Boston area support recruitment for both the current mission and any expanded role.

The community questioned the Navy's recommendation to close South Weymouth despite the continued high value as borne out by the Navy's military value matrix. Further, the community believes the decision to close South Weymouth, which links a reserve facility with an active facility, is without analytical support. In addition, the community believes the operational requirement expressed by the Navy for a fully capable base north of Norfolk represents a last minute methodological shift on the part of the Navy.

The community conducted its own independent analysis of the distance of Naval Air Reserve Stations to the nearest major population centers. The community argues that relocation of South Weymouth reserve units to Brunswick, Maine would place them more than twice as far from a major population center as any of the other Reserve Air Station. The community believes

when the increased distance required for reservists to commute is coupled with a sparse population base from which reservists can be recruited, the result will be understaffed units that are not ready to perform their missions.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found closing NAS South Weymouth will alleviate excess capacity at both a reserve air station and an active duty air station. In addition, closing NAS South Weymouth will generate substantial savings. The Commission considered several options to closing NAS South Weymouth, however, they were less cost effective than the South Weymouth closure

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, Massachusetts. Relocate its aircraft and necessary personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Brunswick, Maine. Relocate the Marine Corps Reserve support squadrons to another facility in the local area or to NAS Brunswick. Reestablish Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, and change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-64) for consolidation of Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, Massachusetts; Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, Massachusetts; and Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts, from "NAS South Weymouth, Massachusetts" to "Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, Massachusetts."

### **Naval Air Facility, Detroit, Michigan**

*Category: Reserve Air Station*

*Mission: Support for Marine Corps Reserve Unit*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$9.4 million*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-25) for the Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center, including MWSG-47 and supporting units, from "Marine Corps Reserve Center,

Twin Cities, Minnesota" to "Air National Guard Base, Selfridge, Michigan."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

In addition to avoiding the costs of relocating the reserve unit from this reserve center to Minnesota, this redirect maintains a Marine Corps recruiting presence in the Detroit area, which is a demographically rich recruiting area, and realizes a principal objective of the Department of Defense to effect multi-service use of facilities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-25) for the Mt. Clemons, Michigan Marine Corps Reserve Center, including MWSG-47 and supporting units, from "Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, Minnesota" to "Air National Guard Base, Selfridge, Michigan."

### **Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi**

*Category: Training Air Station*

*Mission: Undergraduate Pilot Training*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Naval Air Station, Meridian, Mississippi, except retain the Regional Counterdrug Training Academy facilities which are transferred to the Academy. Relocate the undergraduate strike pilot training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas. Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training Center, will close, and its training functions

will be relocated to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The 1993 Commission recommended that Naval Air Station, Meridian remain open because it found that the then-current and future pilot training rate (PTR) required that there be two full-strike training bases, Naval Air Station, Kingsville, Texas, and Naval Air Station, Meridian. In the period between 1993 and the present, two factors emerged that required the Department of the Navy again to review the requirement for two such installations. First, the current force-structure plan shows a continuing decline in the PTR (particularly in the decline from 11 to 10 carrier air wings) so that Navy strike training could be handled by a single full-strike training base. Second, the consolidation of strike training that follows the closure of NAS Meridian is in the spirit of the policy of the Secretary of Defense that functional pilot training be consolidated. The training conducted at Naval Air Station, Meridian is similar to that conducted at Naval Air Station, Kingsville, which has a higher military value, presently houses T-45 assets (the Department of the Navy's new primary strike training aircraft) and its supporting infrastructure, and has ready access to larger amounts of air space, including over-water air space if such is required. Also, the Undergraduate Pilot Training Joint Cross-Service Group included the closure of Naval Air Station, Meridian in each of its closure/realignment alternatives. The separate recommendation for the consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center functions at two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of these training functions and aligns certain enlisted personnel training to sites where similar training is being provided to officers.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argued the Navy's training plan did not provide enough capacity to accomplish needed strike pilot training without NAS Meridian. The community believes NAS Meridian is needed to meet the requirement. The community also claimed the Navy's military value ranking of NAS Meridian was too low. It argued Naval training requires primarily "over-ground" airspace, but the

Navy's military value matrix was heavily weighted for "over-water" airspace. Since Meridian has considerable "over-ground" airspace but no "over-water" airspace, the community believes its military value ranking was unfairly diminished.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found excess capacity existed in the Naval Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT) base category. The Commission, however, reviewed the specific capacity requirements for carrier-based aircraft pilot training when considering this facility. The pilot training rate (PTR) for the strike pilot training subcategory was increased by the Navy in May 1995, above the level used for the closure analysis, because of a new mission and additional planned squadrons. In addition, if the requirement to train all carrier airplane pilots using the Navy-proposed single-sited T-45 trainer is implemented, the PTR would increase further. If the Navy's 20% surge requirement is added to the increased PTR, the Commission found the Navy could not meet its UPT training requirements, without NAS Meridian. The Commission recognized that keeping a second strike pilot training base open resulted in excess UPT capacity, but found the risk associated with having only one UPT strike pilot training base to be unacceptable. The Chief of Naval Operations also expressed his personal concern about the difficulties of meeting this surge based requirement with only one strike pilot training base.

The Commission believes that the Secretary of Defense's decision not to base its recommendations for the UPT category on a cross-service analysis significantly limited opportunities for more efficient usage of pilot training bases. The Commission urges the Secretary of Defense to pursue joint training opportunities in the future.

See the separate discussion concerning Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) Meridian.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Naval Air Station, Meridian remains open. Its major tenant, the Naval Technical Training Center, also remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi**

*Category: Naval Training Center*

*Mission: Training of Enlisted Personnel*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, Mississippi, and relocate the training functions to other training activities, primarily the Navy Supply Corps School, Athens, Georgia, and Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, Rhode Island.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Projected manpower reductions contained in the DoD Force Structure Plan require a substantial decrease in training-related infrastructure consistent with the policy of collocating training functions at fleet concentration centers when feasible. Consolidation of the Naval Technical Training Center functions at two other major training activities provides improved and more efficient management of these training functions and aligns certain enlisted personnel training to sites where similar training is being provided to officers.

### ***Community Concerns***

The Meridian community expressed concern the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) was being included in the Naval Air Station, Meridian closure recommendation and was not evaluated on its own merits. They felt the surge capability the school provided, as well as its modern facilities, demonstrated the need to keep the school at its present location. Additionally, the Meridian community argued it would be more cost effective to keep the school at its present location and avoid the one-time costs at the gaining facilities.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found when the Naval Technical Training Center (NTTC) Meridian was analyzed separately from NAS Meridian, the economic results of closure were not favorable. The modern facilities, a need for large military construction at receiving locations and the Commission recommendation not to close NAS Meridian contributed

to the Commission finding that the NTTC Meridian should also be left open.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey**

*Category: Navy Technical Center*

*Mission: Research, Development, Test & Evaluation, and In-Service Engineering for carrier catapult and related functions*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, New Jersey, except transfer in place certain facilities and equipment to the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland. Relocate other functions and associated personnel and equipment to the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland, and the Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, Florida. Relocate the Naval Air Technical Training Center Detachment, Lakehurst, to Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida. Relocate Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 21, the U.S. Army CECOM Airborne Engineering Evaluation Support Activity, and the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office to other government-owned spaces.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource

levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure and realignment of this activity permits the elimination of the command and support structure of this activity and the consolidation of its most critical functions at a major technical center, allowing synergism with its parent command and more fully utilizing available capabilities at major depot activities. This recommendation retains at Lakehurst only those facilities and personnel essential to conducting catapult and arresting gear testing and fleet support

### *Community Concerns*

The Lakehurst community is concerned that costs to close were excluded improperly from the DoD recommendation. They identified problems with the capabilities of the recommended receiving installations, to accommodate the incoming missions for the costs used in the COBRA analysis. The community also expressed concern that by splintering the inter-dependent catapult RDT&E, prototype manufacturing, and support capabilities, the performance level of fleet responses would decrease. The community further argued that Lakehurst should not be closed, so that the current tenant activities may remain

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that the DoD's recommendation will dismantle inter-dependent functions at NAWC Lakehurst and relocate them to other naval facilities. The Commission found this recommendation, by splintering these inter-dependent functions would result in a loss in industrial, economic and performance advantages. The Commission found that the catapult research, development, and test and evaluation functions depend upon collocation with prototyping and manufacturing functions. The Commission found splitting these interdependent functions would increase the time needed to respond to carrier fleet emergencies because of the travel time for parts and personnel between NAWC Lakehurst and NADEP Jacksonville. The Commission found overall response time to carrier catapult emergencies would be unacceptable if the DoD recommendation was implemented, and efficiencies resulting from collocation would be lost

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. There-

fore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst remains open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories*

*Mission: Technical Publication Support*

*One-time Cost: \$5.7 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$1.5 million*

*Annual: \$ 2.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 2001 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island and achieves the synergy from having the drawings and manuals collocated with an in-service maintenance activity at a major fleet concentration. Additionally, it enables the elimination of the NATSF detachment already at North Island and results in a reduction of costs.

### *Community Concerns*

The Philadelphia community believes its ties to Aviation Supply Office (ASO) are stronger than those with Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island. NATSF already has a Memoranda of Understanding to reduce overhead costs by hav-

ing personnel, computer, mail, and other services provided to it by ASO. The community pointed out its employees did not travel to NADEP North Island in 1994, and only a relatively small percentage of its work supports the NADEP. They also cite evidence which suggests they may be moved to a San Diego location other than the NADEP.

The community stressed that in 1993, the Commission "found compelling the potential cost savings and reduction in workload among the Services of establishing a joint organization under the auspices of NATSF." There were no indications, however, that this concept has been pursued.

The community also asserted the significant difference in housing costs between Philadelphia and San Diego, and thus, most employees will be unable to afford to make the move, and few will actually move.

The community also asserted there is more commonality with ASO, and that more positions can be eliminated by leaving NATSF in Philadelphia. Finally, the community maintained that substantial travel to Naval Air Systems Command would be required, greatly increasing per diem and personnel costs. They also asserted that moving from a fully loaded urban base in Philadelphia to another well loaded base will not generate substantial savings.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that NATSF is a Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) activity and that moving to NADEP, North Island, California will facilitate the implementation of NAVAIR's reorganization of its field activities. The Commission recognized that NATSF had very strong ties to ASO, where NATSF is a tenant, but concluded its relationship with NAVAIR is more important.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Air Technical Services Facility (NATSF), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot, North Island, California.

## **Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories*  
*Mission: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost: \$8.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$33.1 million*

*Annual: \$7.6 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline in the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the consolidation of the relocated functions with its parent command at the new receiving site. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on a clearer understanding of what is now required to be retained in-house. Closure and excessing of the Human Centrifuge/Dynamic Flight Simulator Facility further reduces excess capacity and provides the opportunity for the transfer of this facility to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining access on an as-needed basis.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, Maryland

### **Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Test and Evaluation*

*Mission: Test and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost : \$0.05 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.03 million*

*Annual: \$0.02 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility reduces excess capacity by eliminating unnecessarily redundant capability, since requirements can be met by reliance on other lakes that exist in the DON inventory.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, Pennsylvania.

### **Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories*

*Mission: Aviation Field Engineering Assistance*

*One-time Cost: \$2.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$5.3 million*

*Annual: \$2.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island, California

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Closure of this facility eliminates excess capacity within the technical center subcategory by using available capacity at NADEP North Island. Additionally, it enables

the consolidation of necessary functions with a depot activity performing similar work and results in a reduction of costs.

### *Community Concerns*

The Philadelphia community believes its ties to Aviation Supply Office (ASO) and Naval Aviation Technical Services Facility (NATSF), (an ASO tenant), are stronger than those with NADEP North Island. NAESU is presently negotiating a Memoranda of Understanding to reduce overhead costs that resulted from its June, 1995 move from the closed Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to the ASO compound. The community pointed out that the employees rarely traveled to NADEP North Island in 1994, and only a relatively small percentage of NAESU work supports the NADEP. They also cite evidence that they say suggests they may be moved to a San Diego location other than the NADEP.

The community pointed out the significant difference in housing costs between Philadelphia and San Diego. Most employees will be unable to afford to make the move, and thus, they believe fewer than 10% of the employees will actually move.

The community also asserts there is more commonality with NATSF and ASO, and that more positions can be eliminated by leaving NAESU in Philadelphia. The community believes the closure scenario would eliminate fewer jobs than reflected in the Navy position. Finally, the community pointed out that substantial travel to Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) would be required, greatly increasing travel, per diem, and personnel costs.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the NAESU's strongest ties are to NAVAIR. The Commission recognized that NAESU can be situated in Philadelphia as readily as in San Diego, but concluded its relationship with NAVAIR is more important. The Commission also concluded that the personnel movements were not correctly presented in the Navy's COBRA due to issues relating to NAESU's San Diego detachments. The Commission found that the DoD costs and savings are uncertain; savings may have been overestimated and costs underestimated. In making its recommendation, however, the Commission adopted the DoD costs while recognizing the uncertainties

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and consolidate necessary functions, personnel, and equipment with the Naval Aviation Depot (NADEP), North Island, California.

### **Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Technical Centers/Laboratories*

*Mission: Research, Development, Test  
and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost: \$8.4 million \**

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$33.1 million \**

*Annual: \$ 7.6 million \**

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

\* Combined with Naval Air Warfare Center,  
Aircraft Division, Warminster, PA.

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California; and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity reduces excess capacity with the resultant efficiencies and economies in the management of the relocated functions at the new



receiving sites. Additionally, it completes the process of realignment initiated in BRAC 91, based on a clearer understanding of what is now required to be retained in-house. Closure and excessing of the Inertial Navigational Facility further reduces excess capacity and provides the opportunity for the transfer of these facilities to the public educational or commercial sectors, thus maintaining access on an as-needed basis.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense. Some employees of the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania detachment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center (NCCOSC) in San Diego, California told the Commission they report to a different NCCOSC organization not specifically mentioned in the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense and therefore should not be included in the recommendation. Navy provided information indicating it was their intention to move the Philadelphia detachment to San Diego in accordance with an organizational restructuring begun in 1991 with the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard. The Commission accepted the Navy's explanation that the Philadelphia Detachment is appropriately part of the planned move to San Diego.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster, Pennsylvania. Relocate appropriate functions, personnel, equipment, and support to other technical activities, primarily the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division, San Diego, California; and the Naval Oceanographic Office, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi

### **Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Naval Shipyards*

*Mission: Repair and Maintenance of Naval Ships*

*One-time Cost: \$0.03 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$51.9 million*

*Annual: \$8.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendations*

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission relating to the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (1991 Commission Report, at page 5-28) to delete "and preservation" (line 5) and "for emergent requirements"(lines 6-7)

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Despite substantial reductions in depot maintenance capability accomplished in prior base closure evolutions, as force levels continue to decline, there is additional excess capacity that needs to be eliminated. The contingency seen in 1991 for which the facilities at this closed shipyard were being retained no longer exists, and their continued retention is neither necessary nor consistent with the DON objective to divest itself of unnecessary infrastructure.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The 1991 Commission closed the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, a non-nuclear capable yard. At the Navy's request, the Commission retained the propeller shop and deep-draft drydocks and associated facilities as surge assets. The Navy also retained facilities to accommodate two tenants. Given the private sector's ability to meet surge workload and the existing excess capacity within the remaining active naval shipyards, the Navy recommended closure of the retained drydocks and associated facilities. The Commission found the recommendation consistent with the Navy's goal to divest itself of unnecessary infrastructure.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following change to the recommendation of the 1991 Commission relating to the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (1991 Commission Report, at page 5-28) to delete "and preservation" (line 5) and "for emergent requirements" (line 6-7)

## **Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina**

*Category: Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers*

*Mission: Supply Support*

*One-time Cost: \$2.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$2.3 million*

*Annual: \$0.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (2 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Fleet and Industrial Supply Centers are follower activities whose existence depends upon active fleet units in their homeport area. Prior BRAC actions closed or realigned most of this activity's customer base, and most of its personnel have already transferred to the Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering, East Coast Division, Charleston, South Carolina. Further, in accordance with the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan, force structure reductions through the year 2001 erode the requirement for support of active forces even further. This remaining workload can efficiently be handled by other FISCs or other naval activities

### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the Secretary of Defense's recommendation.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, South Carolina.

## **Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas**

*Category: Training Air Station*

*Mission: Undergraduate Pilot Training*

*One-time Cost: \$13.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$61.1 million*

*Annual: \$5.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Realign Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, Texas, as a Naval Air Facility, and relocate the undergraduate pilot training function and associated personnel, equipment and support to Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida, and Naval Air Station, Whiting Field, Florida.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Reductions in force structure have led to decreases in pilot training rates. This reduction has allowed the Navy to consolidate maritime and primary fixed wing training in the Pensacola-Whiting complex while retaining the airfield and airspace at Corpus Christi to support the consolidation of strike training at the Kingsville-Corpus Christi complex. The Corpus Christi Naval Air Facility is also being retained to accept mine warfare helicopter assets in support of the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence at Naval Station, Ingleside, and to provide the opportunity for the movement of additional aviation assets to the NAF as operational considerations dictate. This NAF will continue to support its current group of DoD and Federal agency tenants and their aviation-intensive needs, as well as other regional Navy air operations as needed.

### ***Community Concerns***

The NAS Corpus Christi community would like the base retained as a major shore command, Naval Air Station status, rather than reduced to a Naval Air Facility. The community agrees with the Navy's recommendations to single site T-45 training aircraft at NAS Kingsville, T-34 training aircraft at NAS Whiting Field, and the redirect of MH-53 mine warfare helicopters to NAS Corpus Christi. The community, however, opposes the transfer of T-44 maritime aircraft training to NAS Pensacola, claiming that NAS Corpus Christi has the capacity to accept T-45 operations as well as continue maritime training. Although the community would like to retain the Chief of Naval Aviation Training (CNATRA) Headquarters at NAS Corpus Christi, they realize that the recommendation to relocate CNATRA to NAS Pensacola is an internal Navy decision and they support that decision.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that sufficient capacity exists to accommodate the NAS Corpus Christi pilot training mission at NAS Pensacola and NAS Whiting Field. The Commission did not believe, however, the receiving sites specified offered sufficient flexibility to accommodate future training requirements. Therefore, the specified training sites were removed from the recommendation. The Commission found that the Navy must move training functions to achieve the cost benefits of this recommendation. The Commission also found that the Navy had the authority to realign the Naval Air Station to a Naval Air Facility without the requirement for action by the Commission.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi remains open and realigns as necessary. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk, Virginia**

*Category: Navy Technical Center*

*Mission: In-Service Engineering  
for Naval Command, Control,  
Communications, Computers  
and Intelligence functions*

*One-time Cost: \$4.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$0.1 million*

*Annual: \$2.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2002 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close the In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, St. Juliens Creek Annex, Norfolk, Virginia, of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, except retain in place the transmit and receive equipment and antennas currently at the St. Juliens Creek Annex. Relocate functions, necessary personnel and equipment to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The closure of this activity and the relocation of its principal functions achieves improved efficiencies and a reduction of excess capacity by aligning its functions with other fleet support provided by the shipyard.

### *Community Concerns*

The Norfolk community is concerned about the mission disruption of NISE East caused by the BRAC 93 transfer of personnel and functions to Charleston, South Carolina, and the BRAC 95 recommended transfer of personnel and functions to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard. The community believes that the savings of \$2 million does not justify the potential disruption to the mission.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that after implementation of the 1993 Commission recommendation was complete, there would be an excess of 130,000 square feet at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard's St. Juliens Creek Annex. The relocation of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center In-Service Engineering, East Coast Detachment to 28,100 square feet of space within the Norfolk Naval Shipyard would result in a recurring savings of \$2.1 million for the Department of the Navy.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close the In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, St. Juliens Creek Annex, Norfolk, Virginia, of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, except retain in place the transmit and receive equipment and antennas currently at the

St. Juliens Creek Annex. Relocate functions, necessary personnel and equipment to Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia.

### **Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington, Virginia**

*Category: Administrative Activities*

*Mission: Information Management*

*One-time Cost: \$0.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$.3 million*

*Annual: \$0.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (2 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Relocate**

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Relocate the Naval Information Systems Management Center from leased space in Arlington, Virginia, to the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

#### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result in further reductions of personnel in administrative activities. This relocation reduces excess capacity and achieves savings by the movement from leased space to government-owned space, and furthers the Department's policy decision to merge this activity with the Information Technology Acquisition Center which is already housed in the Navy Yard

#### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that moving the Naval Information Systems Management Center from leased space to the Washington Navy Yard saves money and furthers the overall effort to move military commands in the National Capital Region to Government-owned space. In addition, it permits consolidation with a similar command, the Information Technology Acquisition Center, already located at the Navy Yard.

#### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-struc-

ture plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Naval Information Systems Management Center from leased space in Arlington, Virginia, to the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.

### **Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia**

*Category: Technical Facilities/Laboratories*

*Mission: Information Systems Support*

*One-time Cost: \$2.2 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$ 9.0 million*

*Annual: \$2.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Disestablish the Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, Virginia, and relocate its functions and necessary personnel and equipment as a detachment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, California, in government-owned spaces in Norfolk, Virginia.

#### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. The disestablishment of this activity permits the elimination of the command and support structure of this activity and the consolidation of certain functions with a major technical center. This recommendation also provides for the movement out of leased space into government-owned space, a move which had been intended to occur as part of the DON BRAC 93 recommended consolidation of the Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Centers in Portsmouth, which the 1993 Commission disapproved.

#### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that NAVMASSO should relocate from leased to Government-owned space. The Commission was concerned, however, that appropriate Government-owned space in Norfolk might not be available. Accordingly, with the concurrence of the Navy, the Commission modified the recommendation to expand the receiving location to the entire Tidewater, Virginia area. The Commission found no other reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Naval Management Systems Support Office (NAVMASSO), Chesapeake, Virginia, and relocate its functions and necessary personnel and equipment as a detachment of Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, California, in Government-owned spaces in the Tidewater, Virginia area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia**

*Category: Administrative Activities*

*Mission: Systems Command Headquarters*

*One-time Cost: \$160.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$50.6 million*

*Annual: \$10.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) for the relocation of the Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (SEA 08), the Human Resources Office supporting the Naval Sea Systems Command, and associated PEOs and DRPMs, from "the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland" to "the

Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or other government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area."

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result in further reductions of personnel in administrative activities. As a result, the capacity at the White Oak facility in Silver Spring, Maryland, or at the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia is no longer required to meet DON administrative space needs. This change in receiving sites eliminates substantial expenditures otherwise required to rehabilitate both White Oak and the Navy Annex. The net effect of this and the White Oak recommendation is a decrease of excess administrative space by more than 1,000,000 square feet.

### *Community Concerns*

The community expressed a number of concerns regarding this redirect, all of which centered on the relative cost to move the Naval Sea Systems Command to either White Oak or the Washington Navy Yard. Independent analysis of the certified data was conducted by the community. Based upon this analysis, the community believes military construction costs were not accurate. The community felt that the estimates for White Oak were overstated and those for the Navy Yard were understated. Relative square footage numbers, as well as construction costs per unit, were questioned. The community also felt that site-specific costs to build at the Navy Yard had not been accounted for in the DoD analysis. Foremost among these costs were floodplain considerations and historical preservation requirements. Additionally, the community contends that improvements needed to convert the Navy Yard from an industrial to an administrative facility had not been included in the Navy's costs. The community felt that the costs of facility improvements, other than office space, should be included in the analysis. These costs, outlined in a Master Plan, are designed to enable the Navy Yard to support a base population of ten thousand. Finally, the community voiced a concern over quality of life issues. White Oak, it claimed, offered a far superior working environment.

### *Commission Findings*

The overriding concern of the Commission was the cost of this recommendation. The Commission compared construction costs at NSWC White Oak to those at the Washington Navy Yard. At White Oak, costs were based on a project which had already been extensively engineered. At the Navy Yard, costs were based upon similar projects already completed at the Navy Yard. The Commission concluded that the costs projected by the Navy were accurate. Although the military construction costs were higher at the Navy Yard, the Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the higher construction cost was offset by personnel eliminations and lower overhead costs.

The Commission also examined the ability of the Washington Navy Yard infrastructure to accommodate an influx of over four thousand people. The Commission found that the existing facilities and planned improvements would allow the Navy Yard to support the added population. The availability of parking also concerned the Commission, but the planned parking allowance was found to be sufficient for an installation located in an urban setting with good access to public transportation.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-59) for the relocation of the Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Nuclear Propulsion Directorate (SEA 08), the Human Resources Office supporting the Naval Sea Systems Command, and associated PEOs and DRPMs, from "the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D C ; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland" to "the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or other Government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D C area."

### **Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Virginia**

*Category: Technical Centers and Laboratories  
Mission: Research, Development, Testing,  
and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$5.2 million*

*Annual: \$-1.4 million (Cost)*

*Return on Investment: Never*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-59/60) by deleting the Office of Naval Research from the list of National Capital Region activities to relocate from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Because of other BRAC 95 actions, space designated for this activity pursuant to the BRAC 93 decision is no longer available. Other Navy-owned space in the NCR would require substantial new construction in order to house this activity. Permitting the Office of Naval Research to remain in its present location not only avoids this new construction, but also realizes the synergy obtained by having the activity located in proximity to the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the National Science Foundation. Further, this action provides the opportunity for future collocation of like activities from the other Military Departments, with the attendant joint synergies which could be realized. While this action results in a recurring cost, the cost is minimal in light of the importance of these two significant opportunities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that some benefits accrue from ONR's present location in close proximity to the National Science Foundation and the Advanced Research Projects Agency. In addition, the Commission found the recurring cost associated with remaining in leased space is outweighed by the potential advantage of coordinated research efforts that would result from the collocation of all of the Services' research offices with ONR. If ONR were to move to the Navy Yard, there would be insufficient space to accommodate the other research offices.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at pages 1-59/60) by deleting the Office of Naval Research from the list of National Capital Region [NCR] activities to relocate from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR

### **Space and Naval Warfare Systems**

#### **Command, Arlington, Virginia**

*Category: Administrative Activities*

*Mission: Systems Command Headquarters*

*One-time Cost: \$24.0 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$120 0 million*

*Annual \$25.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation for the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, specified by the 1993 Commission (Commission Report, at page 1-59) from “[r]elocate...from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR, to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland” to “Relocate .from leased space to Government-owned space in San Diego, California, to allow consolidation of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and Naval Warfare Command headquarters This relocation does not include SPAWAR Code 40, which is located at NRL, or the Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who will remain in Navy-owned space in the National Capital Region ”

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The resource levels of administrative activities are dependent upon the level of forces they support. The continuing decline in force levels shown in the FY 2001 Force Structure Plan coupled with the effects of the National Performance Review result

in further reductions in administrative activities. Space available in San Diego resulting from personnel changes and work consolidation permits further consolidation of the SPAWAR command structure and the elimination of levels of command structure. This consolidation will achieve not only significant savings from elimination of unnecessary command structure but also efficiencies and economies of operation In addition, by relocating to San Diego instead of the NCR, there will be sufficient readily available space in the Washington Navy Yard for the Naval Sea Systems Command

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the proposal does not reflect the significance of a Washington location to their mission performance. Most of the other organizations that Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR) works with are either in the local area or in easily reached East Coast locations. The community believes the very small staff proposed for retention in Washington would not be able to continue their current activities. The community believes this would result in major increases in travel costs and lost staff time that were not included in the Navy analysis They also stated that equivalent personnel savings could be made without a move through reorganization of the subordinate commands currently in San Diego, and elimination of excess overhead personnel at SPAWAR Headquarters, possibly through consolidation with Naval Sea Systems Command The community also noted that the cost of renovating office space in San Diego was not included in the Navy's cost estimates for this proposal.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the movement of SPAWAR to San Diego would enable the Navy to eliminate management layers and to enhance productivity by collocating headquarters with the majority of its subordinate staff. The Commission was concerned about the small size of the staff retained in Washington to maintain contact with the many organizations regularly interacting with SPAWAR, and with the absence of office renovation costs in San Diego The Commission found, however, that even if the Washington-based staff were substantially increased and renovation costs added, the savings from the recommendation remain attrac-

tive. The Commission also agreed that increased travel costs could be minimized through the use of modern communication methods such as computer networks and teleconferencing.

The Laboratory Joint Cross Service Group recommended consideration of a joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) acquisition organization. The Commission found that the implementation of a joint C4I organization was incompatible with the Secretary of Defense's recommendation to relocate SPAWAR headquarters to San Diego. Because the Secretary of Defense did not submit any recommendations in support of a joint C4I organization, the Commission concluded that implementing this recommendation was consistent with the Department's plans.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation for the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington, Virginia, specified by the 1993 Commission (Commission Report, at page 1-59) from "[r]elocate...from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR [National Capital Region], to include the Navy Annex, Arlington, Virginia; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; 3801 Nebraska Avenue, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Virginia; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, Maryland" to "Relocate...from leased space to Government-owned space in San Diego, California, to allow consolidation of the Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, with the Space and Naval Warfare Command headquarters. This relocation does not include SPAWAR Code 40, which is located at NRL [National Research Laboratory], or the Program Executive Officer for Space Communication Sensors and his immediate staff who will remain in Navy-owned space in the National Capital Region."

### **Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington**

*Category: Technical Centers*

*Mission: Test, evaluation, in-service engineering, maintenance and repair and industrial base support for undersea warfare systems*

*One-time Cost: \$2.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$ 9.8 million*

*Annual: \$2.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)*

***FINAL ACTION: Realign***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Realign Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington, by moving its ships' combat systems console refurbishment depot maintenance and general industrial workload to Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Bremerton, Washington.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

There is an overall reduction in operational forces and a sharp decline of the DON budget through FY 2001. Specific reductions for technical centers are difficult to determine, because these activities are supported through customer orders. However, the level of forces and the budget are reliable indicators of sharp declines in technical center workload through FY 2001, which leads to a recognition of excess capacity in these activities. This excess and the imbalance in force and resource levels dictate closure/realignment or consolidation of activities wherever practicable. Consistent with the Department of the Navy's efforts to remove depot level maintenance workload from technical centers and return it to depot industrial activities, this action consolidates ship combat systems workload at NSYD Puget Sound, but retains electronic test and repair equipments at NUWC Keyport, as well as torpedo depot maintenance, thereby removing the need to replicate facilities. The workload redistribution also furthers the Pacific Northwest Regional Maintenance Center initiatives, more fully utilizes the capacity at the shipyard, and will achieve greater productivity efficiencies within the shipyard.

### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found that the realignment was consistent with the Navy's goal to reduce infrastructure and to shift depot-level maintenance from technical centers to depot industrial activities.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Com-



mission recommends the following realign Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, Washington, by moving its ships' combat systems console refurbishment depot maintenance and general industrial workload to Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Bremerton, Washington.

### **Naval Training Centers (Orlando, Florida and San Diego, California)**

*Category: Naval Training Centers*

*Mission: Training of Officer and Enlisted Personnel*

*One-time Cost: \$5.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$24.8 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida, by deleting all references to Service School Command from the list of major tenants. Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, by deleting all references to Service School Command, including Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) and Service School Command (Surface), from the list of major tenants

#### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Service School Command is a major component command reporting directly to the Commanding Officer, Naval Training Center, and, as such, is not a tenant of the Naval Training Center. Its relocation and that of its component courses can and should be accomplished in a manner "consistent with training requirements," as specified by the 1993 Commission recommendation language for the major elements of the Naval Training Centers. For instance, while the command structure of the Service School Command at Naval Training Center, Orlando Florida, is relocating to the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois, the Torpedoman "C" School can be relocated to available facilities at the Naval Underwater Weapons Center, Keyport, Washington, and thus be adjacent to the facility that supports the type of weapon that is the subject of the training. Simi-

larly, since the Integrated Voice Communication School at the Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, uses contract instructors, placing it at Fleet Training Center, San Diego, necessitates only the local movement of equipment at a savings in the cost otherwise to be incurred to move such equipment to the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. Likewise, the relocation of the Messman "A" School at Naval Training Center, San Diego, to Lackland Air Force Base results in consolidation of the same type of training for all services at one location, consistent with Department goals, and avoids military construction costs at Naval Air Station, Pensacola.

#### ***Community Concerns***

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found economic and operational advantages in collocating certain component schools of the Service School Command with existing facilities or with similar schools of other military branches

#### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-38) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida, by deleting all references to Service School Command from the list of major tenants. Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission (1993 Commission Report, at page 1-39) concerning the closure of Naval Training Center, San Diego, California, by deleting all references to Service School Command, including Service School Command (Electronic Warfare) and Service School Command (Surface), from the list of major tenants

### **Reserve Centers/Commands**

*Category: Reserve Activities*

*Mission: Reserve Support*

*One-time Cost: \$1.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$43.0 million*

*Annual: \$8.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Recommendation*

Close the following Naval Reserve Centers:  
Stockton, California  
Pomona, California  
Santa Ana, Irvine, California  
Laredo, Texas

Sheboygan, Wisconsin  
Cadillac, Michigan  
Staten Island, New York  
Huntsville, Alabama

Close the following Naval Air Reserve Center:  
Olathe, Kansas

Close the following Naval Reserve  
Readiness Commands:  
Region Seven—Charleston, South Carolina  
Region Ten—New Orleans, Louisiana

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Existing capacity in support of the Reserve component continues to be in excess of the force structure requirements for the year 2001. These Reserve Centers scored low in military value, among other things, because there were a fewer number of drilling reservists than the number of billets available (suggesting a lesser demographic pool from which to recruit sailors), or because there was a poor use of facilities (for instance, only one drill weekend per month). Readiness Command (REDCOM) 7 has management responsibility for the fewest number of Reserve Centers of the thirteen REDCOMs, while REDCOM 10 has management responsibility for the fewest number of Selected Reservists. In 1994, nearly three-fourths of the authorized SELRES billets at REDCOM 10 were unfilled, suggesting a demographic shortfall. In addition, both REDCOMs have high ratios of active duty personnel when compared to SELRES supported. The declining Reserve force structure necessitates more effective utilization of resources and therefore justifies closing these two REDCOMs. In arriving at the recommendation to close these Reserve Centers/Commands, specific analysis was conducted to ensure that there was either an alternate location available to accommodate the affected Reserve population or demographic support for purpose of force recruiting in the areas to which units were being relocated. This specific analysis, verified by the COBRA analysis, supports these closures.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the data presented by DoD in justifying the recommendation for the Naval Reserve Center Laredo, Texas closure is unconvincing, and that travel costs incurred by reservists in the event of closure would exceed the operating costs of the center. There were no formal expressions from the other communities.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission agreed with the Secretary of Defense that the recommended Reserve Center closures would reduce excess capacity and preserve reserve support and effective recruiting demographics.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Naval Reserve Centers at Stockton, California; Pomona, California; Santa Ana, Irvine, California; Laredo, Texas; Sheboygan, Wisconsin; Cadillac, Michigan; Staten Island, New York; and Huntsville, Alabama. Close Naval Air Reserve Center, Olathe, Kansas. Close Naval Reserve Readiness Command, Region Seven, Charleston, South Carolina. Close Naval Reserve Readiness Command, Region Ten, New Orleans, Louisiana.

## Department of the Air Force

### Williams Air Force Base, Arizona

*Category: Air Force Installation*

*Mission: Aircrew Training and Research Facility*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$18.4 million*

*Annual: \$0.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the relocation of Williams AFB's Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, as follows: The Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Mesa, Arizona, will remain at its present location as a stand-alone activity.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility located at Williams AFB, Arizona, be relocated to Orlando, Florida. This recommendation, was based on assumptions regarding Navy training activities and the availability of facilities. Subsequent to that Commission's report, it was discovered that the facilities were not available at the estimated cost. In addition, Navy actions in the 1993 BRAC reduced the pilot resources necessary for this facility's work.

In light of these changes, the Air Force recommends the activity remain at its current location. First, it is largely a civilian operation that is well-suited to remain in a stand-alone configuration. It has operated in that capacity since the closure of the rest of Williams AFB in September 1993. Second, its proximity to Luke AFB provides a ready source of fighter aircraft pilots who can support the research activities as consultants and subjects. Third, the present facilities are consolidated and well-suited to the research activities, including a large secure facility. Finally, the activities are consistent with the community's plans for redevelopment of the Williams AFB property, including a university and research park.

#### *Community Concerns*

The Phoenix community expressed strong support to retain the Armstrong Lab's Aircrew Training

Research Facility, located on the former Williams AFB, as a stand-alone facility, according to the current DoD recommendation. If this is not possible, the community supported moving the Lab to Luke AFB, just west of Phoenix, where it already conducts part of its mission.

The community has established a strong University consortium, focused on aviation, at the former Williams. The community maintained the Williams-Luke relationship has a long history, and that Williams relies upon fighter pilots from Luke for its simulation studies. The Orlando community expressed support for moving this facility to Orlando, which was the recommendation of the 1991 Commission. It maintained the Lab should be collocated with other Army and Navy flight simulation centers in the Orlando area.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission reviewed the recommendation of the 1991 Commission, which was to move the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training and Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, and found the justification put forth by the Secretary of Defense to reverse this 1991 decision was sound and cost-effective. The Air Force Base Closure Executive Group estimated the cost to move this facility to Florida would be approximately \$15 million. As a result of a number of changes since the 1991 Commission, there is no longer a ready source of fighter pilots within 250 miles of Orlando. Fighter pilots are essential to the Lab's mission. The Lab maintains a small liaison staff in Orlando that interacts with the Army and Navy facilities there. The Lab also performs cooperative combat simulation studies and research routinely with the Orlando facilities through electronic means. This capability did not exist in 1991, and obviates the need to move the facility to Florida.

The relationship between Williams/Armstrong Laboratory and nearby Luke AFB is an important factor in the Commission decision to retain the facility at its present location. A portion of the Williams facility is located at Luke. The Commission found that an option the Air Force may wish to consider strongly in the future is moving the Williams portion of the facility to Luke AFB. Estimates reveal this could be done for approximately half the cost of moving anywhere but Luke if existing excess space at Luke is renovated. The simulators at Luke are overcrowded, and Luke would benefit from the substantial opportunity for researcher access at a relatively small cost. The

community has a strong re-use plan in effect at the former Williams AFB that includes the Armstrong Lab as a stand-alone facility. However, the Lab is only a small part of a very strong plan, and the Commission found this plan will continue implementation whether the Lab is actually on the Williams property or located at nearby Luke.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the relocation of Williams Air Force Base's Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility to Orlando, Florida, as follows: the Armstrong Laboratory Aircrew Training Research Facility at Mesa, Arizona, will remain at its present location as a stand-alone activity.

### **McClellan Air Force Base, California**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support: Depots*

*Mission: Provide depot maintenance and materiel management support to the Air Force*

*One-time Cost: \$409.8 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$45.1 million*

*Annual: \$159.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 2001 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure and realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### *Community Concerns*

Environmental concerns are of paramount importance to the Sacramento Community. The community believes that the environmental condition of McClellan Air Force Base is dire. According to the community, if the installation were to close, the cost to clean up the base would rise significantly, because of the need to accelerate the clean-up schedule. The community believes that sufficient environmental funds would not be made available to meet the accelerated schedule. Further, it would be very difficult to attract new businesses to the base because of liability concerns.

The Community believes the Air Force and the DoD Joint Cross Service Group improperly assessed the functional value of the McClellan depot. The Community calculated the McClellan depot to be the highest functional value DoD depot. In addition, the Community states that the McClellan depot does five times more interservicing than any other DoD depot.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that the significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air Force depot system requires closure of McClellan Air Force Base. The Air Force recommendation to downsize all five Air Logistics Center depots through mothballing excess space would reduce the amount of space utilized by the depot, but would not eliminate infrastructure and overhead costs. Downsizing would result in elimination of depot direct labor personnel, but not overhead personnel. The Commission found that closure of McClellan AFB permits significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduces DoD operating costs.

The low military value "tier" assigned by the Air Force was among the factors considered in the determination to close McClellan Air Force base (at the request of the Air Force, the Joint Cross Service Group used the tier system as a proxy for military value). The Air Force tier system uses rankings of I through III with tier III being the lowest rank. McClellan AFB and the depot at the Sacramento ALC received tier III and tier II rankings, respectively. The Commission found that the determination of military value is complex and difficult to translate into easily auditable numbers. The tier is an appropriate description of the collective military judgment of the officials on the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group.

The Commission questioned the community's method for calculating depot military value. The Sacramento community simply summed the values for each of the commodity groupings reported to the DoD Joint Cross Service Group. The commodity groupings describe the types of depot maintenance work performed by the ALC. For example, the Sacramento ALC performs hydraulic, instrument, avionics and ground communication maintenance work. A summation of scores indicates the variety of work performed but does not reflect quality or relative importance of core capabilities.

The reduced mission needs for McClellan AFB was also a consideration in the determination to close McClellan AFB. In addition, the Commission found the McClellan AFB closure costs to be less than the costs estimated by DoD and the annual savings significantly greater than DoD's estimate. The differences in cost and savings estimates are based on differing closure assumptions of the Air Force and Commission. The Commission assumed that a depot closure and consolidation of work would permit a personnel reduction of 15% of selected ALC personnel and a 50% reduction of management overhead personnel. The Air Force did not reflect any direct labor personnel savings due to a closure and reflected a 20% reduction in overhead personnel. The Commission assumed that closure would occur over a five year period, and the Air Force assumed six years. Another significant factor explaining the difference between savings estimates is that Air Force assumed all personnel savings would occur in the last year of implementation; the Commission assumed that personnel eliminations would be evenly phased over the last four years. The Commission also did not agree with a number of one-time costs that the Air Force considered to be directly related to closure.

The Commission found that McClellan AFB has extensive environmental contamination, but that pursuant to DoD guidance, environmental restoration costs should not be considered in cost of closure. DoD has a legal obligation for environmental restoration regardless of whether a base is closed or remains open. Similarly, the availability of environmental funding is a concern to all bases, whether closing or remaining open, and therefore is not a closure decision factor. The Commission notes the Air Force could lease structures and property while cleanup continues, thereby allowing reuse to begin. The DoD, pursuant to Public Law 102-484 indemnifies future owners and users of DoD property from liability resulting from hazardous substances remaining on the property as a result of DoD activities. Indemnification should help to allay the community's concern about liability.

The Commission found that the DoD should be allowed to retain the Nuclear Radiation Center for dual-use and/or research, or close it as appropriate. The Commission believes closure of McClellan presents an opportunity for cross-servicing and thus, directs the Defense Depot Maintenance Council to determine and direct the appropriate

distribution of the work to other DoD depots or to the private sector. The Commission directs that all McClellan common-use ground communication/electronics maintenance work, as categorized by the DoD Joint Cross Service Group for Depot Maintenance, be transferred to the Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. The common-use ground communication/electronics workload categories include radar, radio communications, wire communications, electronic warfare, navigation aids, electro-optic and night vision, satellite control/space sensors, and cryptographic/communications security

Each of the Air Logistics Centers operated by the Air Force are excellent organizations. The Sacramento community is clearly supportive of the military and McClellan Air Force Base. The decision to close the McClellan Air Force Base is a difficult one, but given the significant amount of excess depot capacity and limited Defense resources, closure is a necessity. The McClellan AFB closure will permit improved utilization of the remaining ALCs and substantially reduce DoD operating costs

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close McClellan Air Force Base including the Air Logistics Center. Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot, Sacramento. Move the common-use ground-communication electronics to Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Retain the Radiation Center and make it available for dual-use and/or research, or close as appropriate. Consolidate the remaining workloads to other DoD depots or to private sector commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council. Move the required equipment and any required personnel to the receiving locations. All other activities and facilities at the base will close. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

#### **Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station, California**

*Category: Air National Guard*  
*Mission: Combat Rescue*  
*One-time Cost: None*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: None*  
*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*  
**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station. Relocate the 129th Rescue Group and associated aircraft to McClellan AFB, California.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

At Moffett Federal Airfield, the 129th Rescue Group (RQG) provides manpower for the airfield's crash, fire and rescue, air traffic control, and security police services, and pays a portion of the total associated costs. The ANG also pays a share of other base operating support costs. These costs to the ANG have risen significantly since NAS Moffett realigned to Moffett Federal Airfield, and can be avoided if the unit is moved to an active duty airfield.

### *Community Concerns*

Community officials are concerned about the future viability of Moffett Federal Airfield, in light of the critical airfield services the 129th Rescue Group provides. Relocation of the unit would force National Aeronautical Space Administration (NASA)-Ames Research Center to replace those services, possibly at a higher cost. These costs would be passed onto NASA-Ames in continuing to operate Moffett Federal Airfield. The community believes higher costs could make it difficult for NASA-Ames to attract and retain tenants at the airfield.

Community officials believe the Air Force's analysis was flawed because the analysis does not consider costs that would be passed on to NASA. They assert that costs and savings should be calculated government-wide and not just DoD-wide. Finally, the community asserts that this recommendation should not have been submitted to the Commission for review because, the Guard Station does not meet the 300 civilian threshold required for recommendations to be submitted to the Commission.

### *Commission Findings*

The DoD recommendation on Moffett Federal Airfield AGS directed the unit to relocate to McClellan AFB, California. Because the Commission recommends closure of McClellan AFB, the DoD recommendation can not be implemented. Given the cost associated with relocating the unit to another Air Force base, the Commission found

the Guard Station and unit should remain at Moffett Federal Airfield.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **North Highlands Air Guard Station, California**

*Category: Air National Guard*  
*Mission: Combat Communications*  
*One-time Cost: None*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: None*  
*Annual: None*  
*Return on Investment: None*  
**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close North Highlands Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 162nd Combat Communications Group (CCG) and the 149th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) to McClellan AFB, California.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Relocation of the 162nd CCG and 149th CCS onto McClellan AFB will provide a more cost-effective basing arrangement than presently exists by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation. Because of the very short distance from the unit's present location in North Highlands to McClellan AFB, most of the personnel will remain with the unit.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The DoD recommendation on North Highlands AGS directed the unit to relocate to McClellan AFB, California. Because the Commission recommends closure of McClellan AFB, the DoD recommendation can not be implemented. Given the cost associated with relocating the unit to another Air Force base, the Commission found the Guard Station and unit should remain at North Highlands.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: North Highlands Air Guard Station will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Onizuka Air Station, California**

*Category: Space*

*Mission: Satellite Control*

*One-time Cost: \$121.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: -\$78.7 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$16.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2007 (7 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Onizuka AS. The 750th Space Group will inactivate and its functions will relocate to Falcon AFB, Colorado. Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFMC) will relocate to Falcon AFB, Colorado. Some tenants will remain in existing facilities. All activities and facilities associated with the 750th Space Group including family housing and the clinic will close.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Air Force has one more satellite control installation than is needed to support projected future Air Force satellite control requirements consistent with the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. When all eight criteria are applied to the bases in the Satellite Control subcategory, Onizuka AS ranked lower than the other base in the subcategory. Among other factors, Falcon AFB has superior protection against current and future electronic encroachment, reduced risks associated with security and mission-disrupting contingencies, and significantly higher closure costs.

### *Community Concerns*

The community expressed concerns about the national security implications of closure. In addition, the community is concerned that operational requirements of satellite control redundancy (dual node versus single node capability) would be jeopardized. They note the mission objective requires robust, flexible, responsible, and enduring satellite control capability. Back-up resources are required to eliminate single failure points and

provide continuous, uninterrupted control capability in the event of war, natural disaster, or sabotage. In addition, a U.S. Air Force Space Command Backup Satellite Control policy directive dated January 30, 1995, requires geographically separated back-up satellite control capability. The community argues that the Air Force needs both Onizuka Air Station (AS) and Falcon Air Force Base (AFB) satellite control nodes.

Community representatives believe the Air Force was not forthcoming regarding the existence of a "Single-Node Operations Study" and its cost estimates. The community argues the Air Force misled the Commission in its answers to questions about this study. The community suggests the Air Force had planned to close Onizuka since 1994. They also conclude that all costs associated with moving Detachment 2 and the classified tenants properly belong in the cost calculations of DoD's recommendation. They argue the total one-time costs to close Onizuka AS are \$699 million (versus DoD's estimate of \$291.3 million) and the return on investment is 27.1 years (versus DoD's calculation of 7 years). Finally, community representatives believe some portion of the costs for a communications switching system upgrade should be included in DoD's recommendation.

The community also questions the Air Force's military value analysis. They argue the analysis is unauditably, the Air Force relied on "military judgment," and the approach was undocumented. Community representatives believe the Air Force's analysis is flawed because the Air Force violated its guidance and the decision-making process was subjective. They note the General Accounting Office supports the conclusion that the Onizuka AS rating was arbitrary. The community also suggests Air Force savings were shifted as costs to other federal agencies. Also, one-time closure costs may be overstated at Falcon AFB and understated at Onizuka AS. Finally, the community notes Onizuka AS was penalized for air quality restrictions, although there is no operational impact on satellite control.

The community presented an alternative proposal to realign Onizuka AS to Moffett Federal Airfield. This proposal would provide commercial utilization of available capacity at Onizuka AS and maintain the integrity of Moffett Federal Airfield. They argue realignment of Onizuka AS would jeopardize the whole concept of a federal airfield. Closure of family housing units; the medical clinic;

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation program facilities; and the Navy Exchange, which is sponsored by Onizuka AS, would have a detrimental impact on Moffett Federal Airfield's ability to provide services to remaining DoD personnel. It also would result in the loss of a significant airfield user, increased costs to remaining resident agencies, and diminished attractiveness to federal agencies.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found backup capability and redundancy for controlling individual satellites will not be lost with this realignment. The Commission found that, although the United States currently has a requirement for satellite control redundancy and the U.S. Air Force Space Command Backup Satellite Control policy directive requires geographical separation for backup control capabilities and communications, two fully operational satellite control nodes are no longer required. Back-up capability currently can be provided through payload command and control, mission processing facilities, remote satellite tracking stations, mobile assets, and/or the use of the Onizuka AS assets as required. The Commission also found the recommendation to realign Onizuka AS will not increase risk associated with satellite control or reduce redundancy. Future developments will make geographical separation unnecessary. Therefore, the Commission found that the U.S. Air Force has one more satellite control installation than it needs to support future Air Force satellite control requirements. In addition, the Commission found while the Air Force would like to close Onizuka AS at some point in the future, it must keep it open to support classified tenants whose missions will not phase out or move until after the BRAC 1995 timeframe (after 2001). Thus, DoD's recommendation is for realignment and not closure.

The Commission found the "Single-Node Operations Study" was not part of the BRAC 1995 analysis because it was conducted before the BRAC 1995 process and its assumptions were fundamentally different from DoD's recommendation. Detachment 2 consists of two components, only one of which belongs in the closure cost calculations. The Commission included the cost of realigning the engineering component in its analysis. Under the realignment, only one classified mission is required to relocate. The other classified missions will remain at Onizuka AS until they complete their missions. The cost to realign the one classi-

fied mission is \$80.2 million and is included in the total \$121.3 million realignment costs. The Commission found the recommendation for realignment is not connected to on-going multi-year research and development efforts to upgrade the Air Force Satellite Control Network. These upgrades are not the result of the Onizuka AS realignment and are required with or without the realignment.

The Commission found air quality does not have a significant impact on current operations, but is a major factor affecting realignments and the transfer of additional functions and personnel into the area. The Commission also found realignment to Moffett Federal Airfield is not a viable alternative.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Onizuka Air Station. The 750th Space Group will inactivate and its functions will relocate to Falcon AFB, Colorado. Detachment 2, Space and Missile Systems Center (AFMC) will relocate to Falcon, AFB, Colorado. Some tenants will remain in existing facilities. All activities and facilities associated with the 750th Space Group including family housing and the clinic will close.

### **Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, California**

*Category: Air National Guard*

*Mission: Combat Communications and Weather*

*One-time Cost: \$0.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: -\$0.4 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$0.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 2006 (9 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 148th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and the 210th Weather Flight to March ARB, California.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Relocation of the 148th CCS and the 210th Weather Flight onto March ARB will provide a more cost-effective basing arrangement by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation. Because of the short distance from



the unit's present location on Ontario International Airport AGS, most of the personnel will remain with the unit

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following. Close Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 148th Combat Communications Squadron (CCS) and the 210th Weather Flight to March ARB, California.

## **Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado**

*Category: Air Force Installation*

*Mission: Space Systems Support*

*One-time Cost: \$2.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$10.2 million*

*Annual: \$3.0 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the 1001st Space Support Squadron at the Lowry Support Center as follows: Inactivate the 1001st Space Systems Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, Space Systems Support Group (SSSG). Some Detachment 1 personnel and equipment will relocate to Peterson AFB, Colorado, under the Space Systems Support Group while the remainder of the positions will be eliminated.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The 1991 Commission recommended that the 1001st Space Systems Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, SSSG, be retained in a cantonment area at the Lowry Support Center. Air Force Materiel Command is consolidating space and warning systems software support at the SSSG at Peterson AFB. The inactivation of Detachment 1, SSSG, and movement of its functions will further consolidate

software support at Peterson AFB, and result in the elimination of some personnel positions and cost savings.

### *Community Concerns*

The community supports the inactivation of Detachment 1, Space Systems Support Group, and the closure of all related building structures. It also supports acceleration of the closure process. The community opposes Air Force retention of the hangar for contingency use by the 2nd Space Warning Squadron, a continental United States Defense Support Program (space early warning) ground site located at Buckley Air National Guard (ANG) Base, Colorado.

Detachment 1 plans to upgrade the cooling capacity for its computers. The Lowry Redevelopment Authority requests that the Air Force follow its standard policies concerning real and personal property when eventually transferring the equipment to Buckley ANG Base.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found DoD's intent to inactivate Detachment 1 was supportable but the recommendation failed to include closure of all related facilities at the former Lowry AFB. The Air Force subsequently informed the Commission it wants to close all related facilities. The community supports the inactivation of Detachment 1 and the closure of all related building structures. The Commission found the Air Force policy to avoid retention of "islands of operations" within closed bases, where alternatives already exist (for example, at nearby Buckley ANG Base), is justified.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 2. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following. Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the 1001st Space Support Squadron at the Lowry Support Center as follows: inactivate the 1001st Space Systems Squadron, now designated Detachment 1, Space Systems Support Group (SSSG) and close all related facilities. Some Detachment 1 personnel and equipment will relocate to Peterson AFB, Colorado, under the Space Systems Support Group while the remainder of the positions will be eliminated. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Eglin Air Force Base, Florida**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:*

*Test and Evaluation*

*Mission: Electronic combat test and evaluation*

*One-time Cost: \$6.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$6.3 million*

*Annual: \$ 3.7 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (2 Years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Realign Eglin AFB, Florida. The Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE), consisting of eight Electronic Combat (EC) threat simulator systems and two EC pod systems will relocate to the Nellis AFB Complex, Nevada. Those emitter-only systems at the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC) at Eglin AFB necessary to support Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the USAF Air Warfare Center, and Air Force Materiel Command Armaments/Weapons Test and Evaluation activities will be retained. All other activities and facilities associated with Eglin will remain open.

### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

Air Force EC open air range workload requirements can be satisfied by one range. Available capacity exists at the Nellis AFB Complex to absorb EMTE's projected EC workload. To ensure the Air Force retains the capability to effectively test and realistically train in the Armaments/Weapons functional category, necessary emitter-only threat systems will remain at Eglin AFB. This action is consistent with Air Force and DoD efforts to consolidate workload where possible to achieve cost and mission efficiencies

### **Community Concerns**

The Eglin community has raised the following concerns over the movement of electronic combat threat simulators and pod systems from Eglin to Nellis Air Force Base: (1) congressional committee direction requiring DoD to submit a master plan to Congress before changing the electronic combat infrastructure has been circumvented by Air Force, (2) despite being given the highest rating of all electronic combat test ranges by a joint service panel, Air Force chose to dismantle Eglin and discontinue its role as a leader in electronic combat, and (3) the Air Force's one-time cost to move the electronic combat equipment is significantly understated.

### **Commission Findings**

The Commission staff's predominant analysis was performed on a 17 threat simulator-2 pod system scenario while the motion, based on the DoD recommendation, was for 8 simulators and 2 pods. The Commission found an additional \$96 million in military construction costs and an additional annual cost of \$7.4 million would never net a return on investment for the 17 threat simulator-2 pod scenario.

In making its final decision, however, the Commission accepted the DoD recommendation for moving 8 simulators and 2 pod systems, to centralize activities at the Western Test Complex.

Development of an electronic combat master plan is expected to result in cost effective changes to DoD's test and evaluation infrastructure. However, the Commission found that DoD has not yet completed the master plan for consolidation of electronic combat assets DoD-wide. The Commission recognizes the high military value of the Electromagnetic Test Environment at Eglin Air Force Base. It was rated as a superior electronic combat test and evaluation facility by the independent Board of Directors which is comprised of the Services' Vice Chiefs of Staff. The Commission found that the Electronic Combat Master Plan should be used to establish the infrastructure for optimum asset utilization.

### **Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. The Electromagnetic Test Environment (EMTE), consisting of eight Electronic Combat (EC) threat simulator systems and two EC pod systems will relocate to the Nellis AFB Complex, Nevada. Those emitter-only systems at the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC) at Eglin AFB necessary to support Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), the USAF Air Warfare Center, and Air Force Materiel Command Armaments/Weapons Test and Evaluation activities will be retained. All other activities and facilities associated with Eglin will remain open.

## **Homestead Air Force Base, Florida**

### **301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES)**

*Category: Air Force Reserve*

*Mission: Air Force Reserve Rescue Squadron*

*One-time Cost: \$6.6 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-0.5 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$1.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 2002 (5 Years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding Homestead AFB as follows: Redirect the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) with its associated aircraft to relocate to Patrick AFB, Florida.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The 301st Rescue Squadron (RQS) is temporarily located at Patrick AFB, pending reconstruction of its facilities at Homestead AFB which were destroyed by Hurricane Andrew. As part of the initiative to have reserve forces assume a greater role in DoD peacetime missions, the 301st RQS has assumed primary responsibility for Space Shuttle support and range clearing operations at Patrick AFB. This reduces mission load on the active duty force structure. Although the 301st RQS could perform this duty from the Homestead Air Reserve Station, doing so would require expensive temporary duty arrangements, extensive scheduling difficulties, and the dislocation of the unit's mission from its beddown site. The redirect will enable the Air Force to perform this mission more efficiently and at less cost, with less disruption to the unit and mission.

### *Community Concerns*

**Homestead:** The Homestead community is in the process of converting the base to a municipal airport. The 301st Rescue Squadron (RQS) and the 482nd Fighter Wing (FW) would be anchor tenants. The community believes south Florida is an attractive location from which to recruit for the Reserves, and that most reservists in the 301st still live in south Florida—anticipating the return of the unit to Homestead, as recommended by the 1993 Commission. The community contends the Air Force Reserve has set-up the 301st for a redirect to Patrick by taking several deliberate actions, e.g., focusing all recruiting since Hurricane Andrew in central Florida, delaying the construction of the unit's facilities at Homestead until 1996, and taking on the Space Shuttle support mission as the unit's primary peacetime function. In addition, the Homestead community believes the loss of the 301st might lead to the closure of the base. Such an occurrence would have a much greater eco-

nomic impact on the small Homestead community than that shown for the entire Dade County Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area (PMSA). The redirect would result in the loss of hundreds of returning full-time Air Reserve Technicians (ARTs) now, and the loss of part-time reservists who would relocate to Patrick in the future. The community asserts the base has a high military value, having frequently served as the key military facility in support of operations in the Caribbean and Latin America, a major responsibility of the 301st RQS. Homestead is an excellent site for peacetime readiness training and rescue support of the collocated F-16 unit. In addition, the facilities at Homestead are being rebuilt at no cost to the Air Force by a Fiscal Year 1992 Hurricane Andrew Supplemental Appropriation. The community believes some savings can be achieved if the 301st RQS is collocated with the 482nd FW at Homestead because the Air Force could eliminate 20 support personnel positions.

**Patrick:** The Patrick community argues that it is an excellent area from which to recruit for the Air Force Reserve. Since the evacuation from Homestead following Hurricane Andrew in August, 1992, most 301st RQS personnel and their families now live in the Patrick community. The community believes most unit members do not want to move again. In addition, Patrick is a safe, low-cost, area. They also contend that although the mission of the 301st RQS is Combat Rescue, its primary peacetime function is NASA Space Shuttle and spacecraft launch support. They believe Patrick is an ideal location to perform this mission. The Air Force will save \$1 million per year in travel costs if the 301st is at Patrick instead of Homestead. The community argues that at least \$7 million additional funding would be required at Homestead for military construction, in addition to the funds provided in the Fiscal Year 1992 Hurricane Andrew Supplemental Appropriation, to move the unit back to Homestead. Finally, the community points out the central Florida area has never suffered serious hurricane problems—one reason for the siting of the Kennedy Space Center there—whereas South Florida is prone to hurricanes.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the demographics of the central Florida location of Patrick AFB sufficient to support the recruiting requirements of the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES). The Commission found

Homestead ARB should remain an open installation, given the presence of the 482nd Fighter Wing (AFRES), a Florida Air National Guard detachment, and other Federal agency tenants. Although the unit's support to the NASA space program is important, the primary mission of the 301st remains combat rescue. The Avon Park Gunnery Range, located in close proximity of Patrick AFB, supports unit readiness training for the primary mission. The Commission found the Reserves are well suited to the NASA Shuttle Support mission because it allows unit personnel to meet their duty requirements and not disrupt their regular civilian employment. The Commission found retention of the unit at Patrick allows the active duty unit to focus exclusively on its Combat Rescue mission. Although there is no military construction cost avoidance as a result of this recommendation, the Commission found the \$1 million annual travel cost needed to support the NASA mission from Homestead make this redirect cost effective.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding Homestead Air Force Base as follows: redirect the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) with its associated aircraft to relocate to Patrick AFB, Florida.

### **Homestead Air Force Base, Florida 726th Air Control Squadron**

*Category: Air Force Reserve*

*Mission: Active Component Air Surveillance,  
Command, and Control*

*One-time Cost: \$7.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$1.8 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the relocation of the 726th Air Control Squadron (ACS) from Homestead AFB to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as follows: Redirect the 726th ACS to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The 726th ACS was permanently assigned to Homestead AFB. In the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, the 726th ACS was temporarily moved to Shaw AFB, as the first available site for that unit. In March 1993, the Secretary of Defense recommended the closure of Homestead AFB and the permanent beddown of the 726th ACS at Shaw AFB. Since the 1993 Commission agreed with that recommendation, experience has shown that Shaw AFB does not provide adequate radar coverage of training airspace needed to support the training mission and sustained combat readiness.

### *Community Concerns*

The Shaw community argues the 726th Air Control Squadron (ACS) can adequately perform readiness training at Shaw AFB. Moreover, with the recent cancellation of the Idaho Range project, the rationale for moving the squadron has been eliminated. The community asserts the Air Force is considering options to correct the training deficiencies at Shaw. This would include radar and communications links with 726th remote and FAA facilities to provide improved radar and radio coverage of the surrounding training airspace. The airspace is frequently used by both local and transient units and provides 726th personnel ample training opportunities. In addition, Shaw is optimally positioned for world-wide deployments to the Persian Gulf and Europe via lift resources in Charleston. The community also argues that although the Air Force plans to shrink the unit from squadron to element-size, the COBRA military construction costs at Shaw assume a squadron-sized facility. In contrast, the military construction costs at Mountain Home AFB assume an element-size facility. As a result, the community believes the \$3.5 million construction cost avoidance at Shaw is not real. Keeping the unit at Shaw would save \$1 million in moving expenses and \$1.4 million in one-time unique costs at Mountain Home. The community believes remaining at Shaw saves the Air Force \$2.4 million in up-front-costs, minimizes the benefits of the recurring savings, and avoids any impact on training and readiness. The Shaw community points out there will be a sizable economic impact to the Sumter area with the transfer of the 726th from Shaw.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found combat readiness training for the personnel assigned to the 726th Air Con-

Control Squadron is deficient at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina. Shaw is far from training airspace, thus is unable to provide suitable radar coverage. In addition, the Commission found Shaw does not offer enough of the needed types of training flights. The training options suggested by the community are unsatisfactory substitutes for putting the unit where there is adequate radar coverage, suitable airspace, and frequent training opportunities. Mountain Home Air Force Base, Idaho, offers all of these features. The recent decision to cancel the Idaho Range complex has no bearing on airspace. It pertains solely to the delivery of ordnance from fighter aircraft onto a surface range, and has no effect on the overlying airspace. Simulated ordnance delivery in the existing airspace will still occur offering the 726th ACS abundant training opportunities. Deployment requirements for the 726th ACS are distinct from the other units at Shaw. With both European and Asia-Pacific taskings, the unit's deployment capability is not impacted by its Mountain Home location. The unit is downsizing, so military construction costs at Mountain Home are similar to Shaw. The Commission found the cost to move the unit is justified because of the increase in training opportunities.

#### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the relocation of the 726th Air Control Squadron (ACS) from Homestead Air Force Base to Shaw AFB, South Carolina, as follows: redirect the 726th ACS to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho

#### **MacDill Air Force Base, Florida**

***Category: Administrative***

***Mission: Support Unified Commands,  
U.S. Southern Command and U.S  
Central Command***

***One-Time Cost: None\****

***Savings: 1996-2001: None\****

***Annual: None\****

***Return on Investment: None\****

***FINAL ACTION: Redirect***

- \* Cost and savings for this recommendation are included in the Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana recommendation.

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Change the recommendations of the 1991 and 1993 Commissions regarding the closure and transfer of the MacDill AFB airfield to the Department of Commerce (DOC) as follows: Redirect the retention of the MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. The Air Force will continue to operate the runway and its associated activities. DOC will remain as a tenant.

#### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Since the 1993 Commission, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have validated airfield requirements of the two Unified Commands at MacDill AFB and the Air Force has the responsibility to support those requirements. Studies indicate that Tampa International Airport cannot support the Unified Commands' airfield needs. These validated DoD requirements will constitute approximately 95 percent of the planned airfield operations and associated costs. Given the requirement to support the vast majority of airfield operations, it is more efficient for the Air Force to operate the airfield from the existing active duty support base. Additional cost savings will be achieved when the KC-135 aircraft and associated personnel are relocated from Malmstrom AFB in an associated action.

#### ***Community Concerns***

The community fully supports the retention of the airfield at MacDill Air Force Base as an active Air Force installation to satisfy the airfield requirements for the United States Central Command and the United States Southern Command. In addition, the community supports the transfer of 12 KC-135 tanker aircraft from Malmstrom AFB, Montana to MacDill. Further, the community notes MacDill has the capacity to accommodate more aircraft and supports the assignment of additional resources to MacDill AFB.

#### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found there is Deputy Secretary of Defense direction and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) support for of an operational airfield at MacDill Air Force Base. In addition, the Commission found it is the responsibility of the Air Force to provide operational airfield support to the joint commands located at MacDill AFB. The JCS completed an operational assessment of MacDill support requirements for the deployment of USCENTCOM and USSOCOM elements and the Joint Communica-

tions Support Element, which were validated by the Chairman of the JCS and Deputy Secretary of Defense. Studies indicated these deployment requirements could not be supported by Tampa International Airport. In addition, an economic analysis performed by the Air Force determined airfield operating costs would be \$9-\$10 million annually whether the Department of Commerce or the Department of the Air Force operated the airfield. The Commission agrees with the Air Force's position that it would be more efficient for them to continue to operate the airfield in view of the validated requirements and similar costs to the Air Force whether as a tenant or host of the installation.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1991 and 1993 Commissions regarding the closure and transfer of MacDill Air Force Base airfield to the Department of Commerce (DOC) as follows: redirect the retention of the MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. The Air Force will continue to operate the runway and its associated activities. DOC will remain as a tenant.

### **Chicago O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station, Illinois**

*Category: Air Force Reserve*

*Mission: Tactical Airlift*

*One-time Cost: \$24.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$53.7 million*

*Annual: \$17.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure and realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### ***Community Concerns***

The community position is not unanimous. The Suburban O'Hare Council, Air Force Community Council, and Armed Forces Council support retention of the Air Force Reserve installation and all reserve forces units at O'Hare International Air-

port. The City of Chicago desires to acquire the Air Force property for additional development. The local community support groups argue the City of Chicago has no funding identified to pay for the proposed relocation of all units at the Reserve Air Station as directed by the 1993 Commission and, thus, the reserve units should remain at the O'Hare location. Conversely, the City of Chicago maintains they are progressing with plans to finance relocation of the Air Reserve Component units from O'Hare pursuant to the 1993 Commission recommendations under the 1993 recommendation. The City has until July 1, 1995, to develop a financial plan to pay for the relocation and replacement of facilities of the Air Force and Army Reserve activities and Air National Guard units at a site acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found the costs to operate O'Hare International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS) and two other Air Force Reserve C-130 locations, used by the Air Force were inaccurate. Using corrected costs, the Commission found the Air Force operating costs at O'Hare were understated in this case. The Commission found closure of O'Hare IAP ARS and deactivation of the 928th Airlift Wing produced the highest savings of any base in this category. In addition, the Commission noted the City of Chicago would like to acquire the Air Reserve Station property for revenue producing development as outlined in the Commission's 1993 recommendation. Before the Reserve Station can close, however, the City must fund relocation of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units from O'Hare to another site acceptable to the Air Force and relocation of the Army Reserve units to a site acceptable to the Secretary of the Army.

The Commission noted the Secretary of the Air Force supports the deactivation of the 928th Airlift Wing as a substitute for the Department of Defense recommendation, and to alleviate the expense to the City of Chicago in their compliance with the 1993 recommendation. The Air Force also supports relocation of the 126th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to Scott Air Force Base, Illinois, and the remaining Air National Guard units to other locations within the State. The Commission found it necessary to close one C-130 Reserve Station. O'Hare provides the opportunity to support the Department of Defense efforts to

reduce infrastructure and the City of Chicago's desire to acquire O'Hare IAP ARS property for revenue producing development.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: modify the closure of O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station as recommended by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission by deactivating the 928th Airlift Wing (AFRES), rather than relocating the unit, and distribute its C-130 aircraft to Air Force Reserve C-130 units at Dobbins ARB, Georgia and Peterson AFB, Colorado, or as appropriate. Close O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station as proposed by the City of Chicago, relocate the 126th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) to Scott AFB, Illinois, and relocate the remaining assigned Air National Guard units to locations acceptable to the Secretary of the Air Force provided the City of Chicago can demonstrate that it has financing in place to cover the full cost of replacing facilities (except for FAA grants for airport planning and development that would otherwise be eligible for Federal financial assistance to serve the needs of civil aviation at the receiving location), environmental impact analyses, moving, and any added costs of environmental cleanup resulting from higher standards or a faster schedule than DoD would be obliged to meet if the base did not close, without any cost whatsoever to the Federal government. If the City of Chicago agrees to fund the full cost of relocating the Army Reserve activity, such activity shall also be relocated to a mutually acceptable site; otherwise it shall remain. Extend the commencement of the closure from the recommendation of the 1993 Commission to July, 1996 with a completion date no later than July, 1999. If these conditions are not met, the 126th Air Refueling Wing (ANG) and other assigned units will remain at O'Hare International Airport. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana**

*Category: Large Aircraft (Missile)*

*Mission: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles*

*One-time Cost: \$265 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: -\$2.4 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$4.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 2002 (5 Years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Malmstrom AFB. The 43rd Air Refueling Group and its KC-135 aircraft will relocate to MacDill AFB, Florida. All fixed-wing aircraft flying operations at Malmstrom AFB will cease and the airfield will be closed. A small airfield operational area will continue to be available to support the helicopter operations of the 40th Rescue Flight which will remain to support missile wing operations. All base activities and facilities associated with the 341st Missile Wing will remain.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Although the missile field at Malmstrom AFB ranked very high, its airfield resources can efficiently support only a small number of tanker aircraft. Its ability to support other large aircraft missions (bomber and airlift) is limited and closure of the airfield will generate substantial savings.

During the 1995 process, the Air Force analysis highlighted a shortage of refueling aircraft in the southeastern United States. The OSD direction to support the Unified Commands located at MacDill AFB creates an opportunity to relocate a tanker unit from the greater tanker resources of the northwestern United States to the southeast. Movement of the refueling unit from Malmstrom AFB to MacDill AFB will also maximize the cost-effectiveness of that airfield.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argued the excess capacity and modern award winning facilities at Malmstrom Air Force Base can accommodate two more squadrons of KC-135 tankers. The community believes the Air Force should close Grand Forks AFB, North Dakota, and realign two of the tanker squadrons to Malmstrom AFB. This realignment would accomplish full closure of an Air Force base, assuming the Grand Forks missile field is closed as recommended by DoD, and would improve the tanker shortage in the southeastern United States. The community also argued the aircraft maximum take-off gross weight limitations impact a small percentage of the missions performed from Malmstrom AFB. The community argued that because the Malmstrom missile field is the largest missile field, it must be maintained to meet Commander-in-Chief Strategic Command requirements for a 500 Minuteman III missile force-structure.

### *Commission Findings*

With 70 tankers based at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, the Commission found a saturation of KC-135 tanker support in the northwest continental United States. Also, the Commission found basing tankers at Malmstrom exacerbated the tanker saturation problem. On the other hand, the Commission found a shortfall in tanker capability in the southeastern United States. The Commission also took into consideration recent Secretary of Defense direction to the Air Force to continue to support joint command airlift deployment flying requirements at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The Commission was concerned about operating limitations for the aircraft based at Malmstrom which could adversely impact on operational mission requirements. Aircraft at Malmstrom are unable to take-off fully loaded because of the 3,500 foot field elevation and 11,000 foot runway length. This limitation reduces tanker range and the amount of fuel available for receiver aircraft.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Malmstrom Air Force Base. The 43rd Air Refueling Group and its KC-135 aircraft will relocate to MacDill AFB, Florida. All fixed-wing aircraft flying operations at Malmstrom AFB will cease and the airfield will be closed. A small airfield operational area will continue to be available to support the helicopter operations of the 40th Rescue Flight which will remain to support missile wing operations. All base activities and facilities associated with the 341st Missile Wing will remain.

### **Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:  
Product Center*

*Mission: Laboratory*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Kirtland AFB. The 58th Special Operations Wing will relocate to Holloman AFB, New Mexico. The AF Operational Test and Evaluation Center

(AFOTEC) will relocate to Eglin AFB, Florida. The AF Office of Security Police (AFOSP) will relocate to Lackland AFB, Texas. The AF Inspection Agency and the AF Safety Agency will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas. The Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas (Field Command) and Nellis AFB, Nevada (High Explosive Testing). Some DNA personnel (Radiation Simulator operations) will remain in place. The Phillips Laboratory and the 898th Munitions Squadron will remain in cantonment. The AFRES and ANG activities will remain in existing facilities. The 377th ABW inactivates and all other activities and facilities at Kirtland AFB, including family housing will close. Air Force medical activities located in the Veterans Administration Hospital will terminate.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

As an installation, Kirtland AFB rated low relative to other bases in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory when all eight selection criteria were considered. The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group, however, gave the Phillips Laboratory operation a high functional value. This realignment will close most of the base, but retain the Phillips Laboratory, which has a high functional value and the 898th Munitions Squadron, which is not practical to relocate. Both of these activities are capable of operating with minimal military support. Also, the Sandia National Laboratory can be cantoned in its present location. This approach reduces infrastructure and produces significant annual savings, while maintaining those activities essential to the Air Force and the Department of Defense.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argued the cost to close Kirtland Air Force Base would be much higher than the DoD estimate. The community's estimate to realign Kirtland Air Force Base is \$526 million, whereas the DoD's initial estimate to realign Kirtland Air Force Base was \$275 million. The community also states the annual recurring savings that DoD projected of \$62 million a year would actually be a cost to the United States government of \$13 million a year. The community comments that DoD used only costs associated with DoD organizations, and that all costs to United States government organizations, such as the Department of Energy (DOE), should be considered. The community says that the realignment of Kirtland Air



Force Base would have a negative impact on nuclear surety, and the cohesion between Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) and DOE organizations located on Kirtland Air Force Base. The community notes that the 58th Special Operations Wing training would be disrupted for a period of six to 12 months. The community believes Kirtland Air Force Base was evaluated unfairly for air quality, and asserted that "thousands" could move to Kirtland Air Force Base without detrimental effects on local air quality. After the proposed realignment, the community would have access to only 5% percent of the installation because the remainder of the installation would be cantoned to support the missions remaining behind. Finally, the community notes that during previous base closure rounds the Air Force insisted that Kirtland was "essential in supporting several irreplaceable research and testing facilities essential to DoD, DOE, and other government agencies "

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the DoD recommendation to realign Kirtland Air Force Base would be very expensive to enact and the savings anticipated from the realignment would not be realized. The DoD originally estimated the one-time cost to realign Kirtland Air Force Base would be \$275 million, and the annual recurring savings would be \$62 million. After completing site surveys, the Air Force revised the estimate to realign Kirtland Air Force Base to \$538 million, and the annual recurring savings to \$33 million. Over and above these costs, the DOE presented information to the Commission that DOE would incur a one-time cost of \$64 million, and an annual recurring cost of \$32 million if the Secretary's recommendation was adopted. When the Commission reviewed the total costs to the National Defense Budget, it found the one-time cost to enact this proposal to be \$602 million with an annual recurring savings of \$2 million. The Commission also found the realignment would have a detrimental effect on the mission of DNA. The recommendation would relocate most of the DNA personnel assigned on Kirtland Air Force Base to Kelly Air Force Base while leaving a number of DNA facilities at Kirtland Air Force Base. Also, because DNA's mission is intrinsically tied to DOE, if this recommendation was enacted, key synergism between DNA and DOE would be lost. The Commission also found keeping Kirtland Air Force Base open results in better security for the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex. Finally, in a

June 9, 1995, letter to the Commission, the Secretary of Defense stated, "After reviewing the results of the site survey, it is my judgment that the recommendation for the realignment of Kirtland AFB no longer represents a financially or operationally sound scenario."

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following Kirtland Air Force Base will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Griffiss Air Force Base, New York 485th Engineering Installation Group**

*Category: Air Force Installation*

*Mission: N/A*

*One-time Cost: \$1.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$25.4 million*

*Annual: \$2.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of the 485th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) from Griffiss AFB, New York, to Hill AFB, Utah, as follows: Inactivate the 485th EIG. Transfer its engineering functions to the 38th EIG at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Transfer its installation function to the 838th Electronic Installation Squadron (EIS) at Kelly AFB, Texas, and to the 938th EIS, McClellan AFB, California.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Reorganization of the installation and engineering functions will achieve additional personnel overhead savings by inactivating the 485th EIG and redistributing the remaining activities to other units. The originally planned receiver site for the 485th EIG at Hill AFB has proven to require costly renovation. This redirect avoids these additional, unforeseen costs while providing a more efficient allocation of work.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the Department of Defense recommendation to inactivate the 485th Engineering Installation Group would save money by avoiding military construction and by reducing personnel. The Commission has recommended closure of McClellan Air Force Base, and, thus, the Air Force will be unable to relocate a portion of the 485th Engineering Installation Group to that base as set out in the recommendation. The Commission found the 485th should move but allowed the Department of the Air Force to relocate this unit in accordance with operational requirements.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of the 485th Engineering Installation Group (EIG) from Griffiss Air Force Base to Hill AFB, Utah, as follows: inactivate the 485th EIG. Transfer its engineering and installation functions as operational requirements dictate in accordance with Department of the Air Force policy. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Griffiss Air Force Base, New York Airfield Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division**

*Category: Air Force Installation*

*Mission: N/A*

*One-time Cost: \$51.5 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-21.4 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$9.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 2004 (6 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division, Fort Drum, New York, at Griffiss AFB, as follows: Close the minimum essential airfield that was to be maintained by a contractor at Griffiss AFB and provide the mobility/contingency/training support to the 10th Infantry (Light) Division from the Fort Drum airfield. Mission essential equipment from the minimum essential airfield at Griffiss AFB will transfer to Fort Drum.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Operation of the minimum essential airfield to support Fort Drum operations after the closure of Griffiss AFB has proven to far exceed earlier cost estimates. Significant recurring operations and maintenance savings can be achieved by moving the mobility/contingency/training support for the 10th Infantry (Light) Division to Fort Drum and closing the minimum essential airfield operation at Griffiss. This redirect will permit the Air Force to meet the mobility/contingency/training support requirements of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division at a reduced cost to the Air Force. Having airfield support at its home location will improve 10th Infantry (Light) Division's response capabilities, and will avoid the necessity of traveling significant distances, sometimes during winter weather, to its mobility support location. Support at Fort Drum can be accomplished by improvement of the existing Fort Drum airfield and facilities.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The 1993 Commission recommended keeping "a minimum essential runway...maintained and operated by a contractor." Since that recommendation, the cost to operate the runway has substantially exceeded original estimates. The Commission found closing the minimum essential runway on Griffiss Air Force Base and constructing a new runway on Fort Drum, New York, would save money and improve the operational capability of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division. Locating a runway directly on Fort Drum increases response capability and decreases response time.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry (Light) Division, Fort Drum, New York at Griffiss Air Force Base as follows: close the minimum essential airfield that was to be maintained by a contractor at Griffiss AFB and provide the mobility/contingency/training support to the 10th Infantry (Light) Division from the Fort Drum airfield. Mission essential

equipment from the minimum essential airfield at Griffiss AFB will transfer to Fort Drum.

### **Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo, New York**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:*

*Test & Evaluation*

*Mission: Air Defense Ground Test*

*Simulation Facility*

*One-time Cost: \$3.7 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-0.1 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$0.9 million*

*Return on Investment: 2002 (4 Years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York. Required test activities and necessary support equipment will be relocated to the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Edwards AFB, California. Any remaining equipment will be disposed of.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) recommended that REDCAP's capabilities be relocated to an existing facility at an installation with a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) open air range. Projected workload for REDCAP is only 10 percent of its available capacity. AFFTC has capacity sufficient to absorb REDCAP's workload. REDCAP's basic hardware-in-the-loop infrastructure is duplicated at other Air Force T&E facilities. This action achieves significant cost savings and workload consolidation.

#### *Community Concerns*

The community argues the REDCAP activity is one of unique military value, and remains an effective instrument for testing Electronic Combat air defense equipment. The community maintains that in order to retain the unique test capabilities of the REDCAP activity, the entire mission must be transferred. The estimated cost submitted by the community to move the facility, is approximately \$13.8-\$15.6 million. The community claims the Department of Defense underestimated both the projected workload and customer utilization levels. The community explains that many of these test systems were being upgraded, and could not be fully utilized at the time workload estimates were being formulated. In addition, the commu-

nity notes that the operation of particular test systems can inhibit the use of certain other systems. Finally, the community asserts they should not have been considered under the BRAC process because they are below the 300 federal civilian employee threshold, set forth in the statute.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that although the cost to disestablish the REDCAP activities is higher than that included in the recommendation, this action continued to result in overall annual savings. The Commission found the cost-to-close was significantly below those submitted by the community. The Commission found the Air Force had properly assessed the types of test capabilities required to be transferred to the receiving site. The Commission also found sufficient capacity existed at the receiver site. The Commission found this action reduced excess capacity by eliminating excess equipment and transferring just the 44 percent of the REDCAP test simulation equipment necessary for future requirements. The reduction of excess capacity, through the consolidation of electronic combat activities on military installations with Major Range Test Facility Bases (MRTFB), was one of the objectives of the Joint Cross-Service Group for Test & Evaluation. The Commission concurred in this objective. The Commission further found the receiver site was sufficiently capable of absorbing the estimated level of projected test workload as determined by the Commission. Finally, the Commission found the Air Force had jurisdiction to include this facility in its recommendation.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity (REDCAP) at Buffalo, New York. Required test activities and necessary support equipment will be relocated to the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) at Edwards AFB, California. Any remaining equipment will be disposed of.

### **Rome Laboratory, New York**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:*

*Laboratory and Product Center*

*Mission: Research and Development for Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

***FINAL ACTION: Remain Open***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Rome Laboratory, Rome, New York. Rome Laboratory activities will relocate to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts. Specifically, the Photonics, Electromagnetic & Reliability (except Test Site O&M operations), Computer Systems, Radio Communications and Communications Network activities, with their share of the Rome Lab staff activities, will relocate to Fort Monmouth. The Surveillance, Intelligence & Reconnaissance Software Technology, Advanced C2 Concepts, and Space Communications activities, with their share of the Rome Laboratory staff activities, will relocate to Hanscom AFB. The Test Site (e.g., Stockbridge and Newport) O&M operations will remain at its present location but will report to Hanscom AFB.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

The Air Force has more laboratory capacity than necessary to support current and projected Air Force research requirements. The Laboratory Joint Cross-Service Group analysis recommended the Air Force consider the closure of Rome Laboratory. Collocation of part of the Rome Laboratory with the Army's Communications Electronics Research Development Evaluation Command at Fort Monmouth will reduce excess laboratory capacity and increase inter-service cooperation and common C3 research. In addition, Fort Monmouth's location near unique civilian research activities offers potential for shared research activities. Those activities relocated to Hanscom AFB will strengthen Air Force C3I RDT&E activities by collocating common research efforts. This action will result in substantial savings and furthers the DoD goal of cross-service utilization of common support assets.

### ***Community Concerns***

The Griffiss AFB community does not believe Rome Laboratory should be closed and relocated as recommended by DoD. The community believes the Lab should remain in its existing facilities as a stand-alone Air Force laboratory. Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work force and it is located in

adequate and secure facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB, which was realigned in 1993. Rome Lab serves as the anchor tenant for the community's Griffiss AFB reuse strategy, which includes a research park. The reuse plan is based on the Air Force's May 1993 comment to the Commission that: "the Air Force has no plans to close or relocate the Rome Laboratory within the next five years." The Lab is the Air Force's Tier I Center of Excellence for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I). The community believes the Lab's relocation will compromise its military value because its essential mission cannot be accomplished at multiple locations. If the DoD recommendation is implemented: (1) The Lab's activities will be split between three locations, which will reduce its mission effectiveness, (2) Many scientists and engineers will not relocate to these higher cost areas, (3) Classified and other important work will suffer unacceptable delays that customers will not tolerate, and (4) There will be no cross-servicing with the Army at Fort Monmouth. Moreover, the community believes there will be a negative return on investment because there will be no savings and costs will be significantly higher than stated in the DoD recommendation

### ***Commission Findings***

The Rome Laboratory has a large civilian work force and is located in adequate facilities that can be separated from the rest of Griffiss AFB, which is closing. For the past year, as a result of the Griffiss Air Force Base realignment recommended by the 1993 Commission, the community has been working to make the lab part of a high technology industrial park. The Commission found the costs to close Rome Laboratory and relocate its activities to Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, and Hanscom AFB, Massachusetts, were significantly understated and savings overstated. The Commission found the Air Force closure costs were difficult to verify with any accuracy. Although difficult to ascertain, the Commission found the costs had increased substantially from the original. In addition, the Commission found that collocation of this facility at Ft. Monmouth would not add to the Lab's capability. While the move would reduce excess laboratory capacity, it would result in an unacceptable return on investment. Moreover, these actions would seriously degrade the laboratory's ability to meet its current and future mission requirements.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Rome Laboratory will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Roslyn Air Guard Station, New York**

*Category: Air National Guard*

*Mission: Combat Communications and Electronics Installation*

*One-time Cost: \$ 14.2 million*

*Savings: 1996-2011: \$ 9 million*

*Annual: \$0.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (2 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close (conditional)**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Roslyn Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 213th Electronic Installation Squadron (ANG) and the 274th Combat Communications Group (ANG) to Stewart International Airport AGS, Newburg, New York. The 722nd Aeromedical Staging Squadron (AFRES) will relocate to suitable leased space within the current recruiting area.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Relocation of the 213th Electronic Installation Squadron and 274th Combat Communications Group to Stewart International Airport AGS will produce a more efficient and cost-effective basing structure by avoiding some of the costs associated with maintaining the installation.

### *Community Concerns*

The community is concerned about the loss of community services provided by the Guard Station. They also assert the costs of relocating the unit to Stewart International Airport are understated. Finally, the community has raised doubts as to whether the sale of the property for commercial development is realistic, given zoning restrictions.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found personnel and base operating support savings would not exceed the cost of relocating of the Roslyn units. The Commission found this recommendation was not cost effective. The station is located on valuable residentially-zoned property. If the property can be sold at its

fair market value, this recommendation is cost effective. The Commission identified no concerns about the ability to recruit Guardsmen at Stewart International Airport.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Roslyn Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 213th Electronic Installation Squadron and the 274th Combat Communications Group to Stewart International Airport AGS, Newburg, New York if the Roslyn Air Guard Station can be sold for its fair market value. The 722nd Aeromedical Staging Squadron (AFRES) will relocate to suitable leased space within the current recruiting area. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota**

*Category: Large Aircraft (Missile)*

*Mission: Strategic Deterrence/Strategic Mobility*

*One-time Cost : \$11.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$111.7 million\**

*Annual: \$35.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

- \* The savings associated with the closure of the missile field were previously programmed in the Air Force budget.

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Grand Forks AFB. The 321st Missile Group will inactivate, unless prior to December 1996, the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain ballistic missile defense (BMD) options effectively precludes this action. If the Secretary of Defense makes such a determination, Minot AFB, North Dakota, will be realigned and the 91st Missile Group will inactivate.

If Grand Forks AFB is realigned, the 321st Missile Group will inactivate. Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. A small number of silo launchers at Grand Forks may be retained if required. The 319th Air Refueling Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 319th Air Refueling Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

If Minot AFB is realigned, the 91st Missile Group will inactivate. Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. The 5th Bomb Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 5th Bomb Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

A reduction in ICBM force structure requires the inactivation of one missile group within the Air Force. The missile field at Grand Forks AFB ranked lowest due to operational concerns resulting from local geographic, geologic, and facility characteristics. Grand Forks AFB also ranked low when all eight criteria are applied to bases in the large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements and maintain consolidated tanker resources.

If the Secretary of Defense determines that the need to retain BMD options effectively precludes realigning Grand Forks, then Minot AFB will be realigned. The missile field at Minot AFB ranked next lowest due to operational concerns resulting from spacing, ranging and geological characteristics. Minot AFB ranked in the middle tier when all eight criteria are applied to bases in the large aircraft subcategory. The airfield will be retained to satisfy operational requirements.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues the Grand Forks missile field is the newest in the Air Force. It has always been considered fully capable of performing its assigned mission, and remains so today according to the Base Closure Executive Group. The community contends closing the Grand Forks missile field could send a misleading signal to the former Soviet Union that the United States intends to unilaterally change the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and could jeopardize any future treaty negotiations with former Soviet republics. They believe closing the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) field would unduly restrict any future ballistic missile defense options and would require the dismantlement and demolition of the existing Grand Forks ABM facilities, significantly increasing the cost to close the Grand Forks ICBM field. The community argues the Air Force erred in excluding the Minuteman field at F.E. Warren AFB from consideration because the Peacekeeper mis-

siles there are scheduled to complete their retirement in 2003, thus providing an opportunity for a complete base closure. They also argue that retaining Grand Forks AFB as a multi-mission base (ICBMs and tankers), and completely closing Malmstrom AFB, would provide significantly greater operating efficiencies and savings than the DoD proposal to realign the missile group at Grand Forks AFB and the tanker group at Malmstrom AFB. The community believes the 50 additional Minuteman missile silos at Malmstrom AFB should carry no weight in the analysis, because the Nuclear Posture Review specifically accepts an ICBM force of 450 or 500 Minuteman missiles. The community further argues the Air Force and DoD correctly assessed the military value of Grand Forks AFB in 1993 when selecting it as a core tanker base because of its ideal location, and its capacity, facilities, and infrastructure. They believe there is no tanker saturation problem in the north central United States because on average 66 percent of the Grand Forks tanker aircraft are deployed to forward operating locations. They also point out the runway was upgraded to Code 1 in 1994, there is a direct fuel supply pipeline feed to the base, an improved Type III hydrant system assures rapid and effective aircraft refueling capability, and state and local zoning guarantee no future runway encroachment problems. The community notes the evaluation criteria for "Facilities Condition: Housing" is based on the number of units needing upgrade to whole house standards not current condition. Finally, the community is concerned the University of North Dakota is a strong asset in the Grand Forks community and should be taken into account in the evaluation process.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found all four Minuteman fields were fully capable, but the high water table at Grand Forks Air Force Base reduced survivability and required an increased level of on-site depot support. Total on-site support costs per Minuteman silo over the past three years were higher at Grand Forks AFB than at Minot or F.E. Warren AFBs, but lower than at Malmstrom AFB. Efforts to counter water intrusion accounted for five percent of these costs, and were highest at Grand Forks AFB. The missile alert rate at Grand Forks AFB has been consistently lower than at Minot AFB. The Commission agreed with the Air Force's decision to exclude F.E. Warren AFB from consid-

eration because of a requirement for Peacekeeper missiles beyond the period under which Commission actions would be taken, and because of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty implications of directing realignment of the only Peacekeeper missile base. In addition, the Commission agreed with the Commander-in-Chief of United States Strategic Command that retention of the Malmstrom AFB missile field was militarily important because of the presence of 50 additional Minuteman silos. Thus, retention of the Malmstrom AFB missile field took precedence over the economies associated with closing Malmstrom AFB and retaining a multi-mission base at Grand Forks AFB. At the time the recommendation was received from DoD, there was uncertainty about whether there were possible treaty implications for the Grand Forks antiballistic missile (ABM) system and ballistic missile defense that would preclude inactivation of the Grand Forks AFB Minuteman field. On May 9, 1995, the Commission received a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense stating that representatives of DoD, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council Staff had determined that ABM treaty considerations would not preclude inactivation of the Grand Forks AFB Minuteman field. The letter also stated: "Realignment of Minot AFB and inactivation of the 91st Missile Group is no longer a necessary alternative." Subsequent correspondence with DoD confirmed that inactivation of the Grand Forks AFB Minuteman field would not affect the right to retain an ABM deployment area at Grand Forks and would not require demolition of the existing ABM facilities. DoD, however, reiterated the fact that it could be necessary to leave a small number of empty Minuteman silos in place at Grand Forks AFB. Finally, the Commission found DoD included a one-time cost of \$5.5 million for housing demolition at Grand Forks AFB, thereby increasing recurring savings by \$3.7 million annually. This appeared to be a sound investment strategy that produced substantial savings over time, but was not necessitated by a decision to realign Grand Forks AFB. Consequently, the costs and savings associated with this action were removed from the decision COBRA.

#### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure

plan and final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Grand Forks Air Force Base. The 321st Missile Group will inactivate and Minuteman III missiles will relocate to Malmstrom AFB, Montana, be maintained at depot facilities, or be retired. A small number of silo launchers at Grand Forks AFB may be retained if required. The 319th Air Refueling Wing will remain in place. All activities and facilities at the base associated with the 319th Air Refueling Wing, including family housing, the hospital, commissary, and base exchange will remain open.

#### **Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station, Ohio**

*Category: Air National Guard*

*Mission: Power Projection and Combat  
Communications*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

***FINAL ACTION: Remain Open***

#### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Close Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station (AGS) and relocate the 178th Fighter Group (ANG), the 251st Combat Communications Group (ANG), and the 269th Combat Communications Squadron (ANG) to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio

#### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

The 178th Fighter Group provides crash, fire and rescue, security police, and other base operating support services for ANG activities at Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport. By relocating to Wright-Patterson AFB, significant manpower and other savings will be realized by avoiding some of the costs associated with the installation.

#### ***Community Concerns***

The community maintains that the quality of facilities and operating environment at Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport are superior to those at Wright-Patterson AFB. The community is also concerned about the Air National Guard/State share of base operating support costs at Wright Patterson AFB. Community officials assert that the savings associated with the proposed relocation are overstated because the Air Force analysis did not include all costs that would be incurred by

basing the unit at Wright-Patterson AFB. The community is concerned about the continued existence of the Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport if the Guard unit leaves, as a significant portion of airport revenues will be lost. The community is also concerned about the economic impact on the community if the station closes.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the extended return on investment and the inadequacy of facilities at Wright-Patterson AFB did not justify relocating the unit from its current location. Further, the Commission found the facilities and basing arrangement at Springfield-Beckley ideal for meeting the needs of the Air National Guard units. The Commission found the small savings generated by closure of the Springfield-Beckley facilities did not justify their closure and potential degradation to the units.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard Station will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## **Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Air Force Reserve*

*Mission: Tactical Airlift*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station (ARS). The 911th Airlift Wing will inactivate and its C-130 aircraft will be distributed to Air Force Reserve C-130 units at Dobbins ARB, Georgia, and Peterson AFB, Colorado.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Air Force Reserve has more C-130 operating locations than necessary to effectively support the Reserve C-130 aircraft in the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. Although Greater

Pittsburgh ARS is effective at supporting its mission, its evaluation overall under the eight criteria supports its closure. Its operating costs are the greatest among Air Force Reserve C-130 operations at civilian airfields. In addition, its location near a number of AFRES and Air National Guard units provides opportunities for its personnel to transfer and continue their service without extended travel.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes the cost analysis of the air reserve stations in this category was faulty. Specifically, the base operating support cost experienced by one Air Force Reserve C-130 base was used as the cost for two other air reserve locations, as well as Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, resulting in false savings and cost information. Further, the community argues the Air Force did not consider the 30 acres of additional aircraft parking apron currently being used under a memorandum of agreement with Allegheny County. The community disagrees with the Air Force color code ranking for the airfield evaluation, facilities condition, and air quality and maintains that higher ranking in accordance with real conditions would enhance military value.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the costs to operate Pittsburgh International Airport (IAP) Air Reserve Station (ARS) and two other Air Force Reserve C-130 locations were inaccurate. With corrected data applied to the COBRA model, the Commission found Pittsburgh was one of the least costly installations to operate. The Air Force indicated they had received the offer of additional acreage at Pittsburgh IAP ARS, but determined it was inappropriate to act on the offer pending the outcome of the base closure process. Review of the November 1994 Airfield Pavement Evaluation substantiated the community's assertions the airfield can accommodate all types of aircraft. Information submitted by the community demonstrates Allegheny County Bureau of Environmental Quality has applied to the US Environmental Protection Agency for air quality redesignation to attainment, having met air quality standards during 1991-93. The Commission found that the low operating costs and expansion opportunities were not fully considered by the Air Force.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 4 and 5.



Therefore, the Commission recommends the following. Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, Texas**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:  
Test and Evaluation*

*Mission: Electronic Combat Simulation*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

#### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Disestablish the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) activity in Fort Worth. Essential AFEWES capabilities and the required test activities will relocate to the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California. Workload and selected equipment from AFEWES will be transferred to AFFTC. AFEWES will be disestablished and any remaining equipment will be disposed of.

#### **Secretary of Defense Justification**

The Test and Evaluation Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) recommended that AFEWES's capabilities be relocated to an existing facility at an installation possessing a Major Range and Test Facility Base (MRTFB) open air range. Projected workload for AFEWES was only 28 percent of its available capacity. Available capacity at AFFTC is sufficient to absorb AFEWES's workload. AFEWES's basic hardware-in-the-loop infrastructure is duplicated at other Air Force Test and Evaluation facilities. This action achieves significant cost savings and workload consolidation.

#### **Community Concerns**

The community claims that no factual basis exists to support disestablishment and relocation of the Air Force Electronic Warfare Simulator Facility to Edwards Air Force Base as recommended by the Secretary of Defense. The community addressed each element of the rationale used by Air Force supporting the recommendation as well as the actual facts applicable to each issue as viewed by the community. Community concerns challenge

Air Force positions on projected workload, cost savings, workload consolidation, infrastructure reductions and personnel reductions. Further, the community believes the proposed action is in conflict with congressional language in the fiscal year report of the Senate Appropriations Committee that requires a study addressing datalink versus consolidation at least 120 days prior to the approval of any changes affecting electronic combat facilities.

#### **Commission Findings**

The Commission found disestablishment of the Air Force Electronic Warfare Simulator Facility is not cost effective. The Air Force estimated a cost to close of \$8.9 million and a return on investment of 13 years. The Commission estimated the closure cost was \$34.9 million and would result in a payback in excess of 100 years. The Commission estimated additional costs of \$6 million for military construction at Edwards Air Force Base and \$20 million for documentation, training and other support costs. The Commission also found that relocating electronic combat testing capabilities poses major technical risk because of the system's unique ability to evaluate fully aircraft in a dense threat environment. The Commission found that electronic datalink is a sound and cost effective alternative to collocating Air Force's Electronic Warfare Simulator Facility on a major test range.

#### **Commission Recommendation**

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator (AFEWES) will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, Texas**

*Category: Air Force Reserve*

*Mission: Air Force Reserve Base,*

*F-16 Fighter Operations*

*One-Time Cost: \$17.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$75.2 million*

*Annual: \$17.8 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

#### **Secretary of Defense Recommendation**

Close Bergstrom ARB. The 924th Fighter Wing (AFRES) will inactivate. The Wing's F-16 aircraft

will be redistributed or retire. Headquarters, 10th Air Force (AFRES), will relocate to Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Texas.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Due to Air Force Reserve fighter force drawdown, the Air Force Reserve has an excess of F-16 fighter locations. The closure of Bergstrom ARB is the most cost effective option for the Air Force Reserve. The relocation of Headquarters, 10th Air Force to NAS Fort Worth will also collocate the unit with one of its major subordinate units.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues there was a commitment on the part of the Air Force and both the 1991 and 1993 Commissions to keep Bergstrom Air Reserve Base open, if the community converted the base to a municipal airport. In May 1993, Austin voters approved a \$400 million referendum to fund the airport project. The citizens of Austin voted for this measure, in part, to keep the reserves in Austin. The community claims it has upheld its part of the commitment. Beyond that, the community stresses its long military tradition makes it ideal for recruiting for the Reserves. The community argues the base is capable of supporting either F-16 or KC-135 operations. In addition, joint training opportunities are enhanced at Bergstrom due to its proximity to the Army's Fort Hood. This also enhances the mission of the Ground Combat Readiness Center (AFRES), a Security Police training unit. The community informed the Commission that several other DoD and Federal government agencies are actively seeking space at the base, including the Texas Army National Guard, the Naval Reserves, and a NASA flight detachment. The Regional Corrosion Control Facility (RCCF) was transferred by the Air Force to the Austin Municipal Airport Authority in September 1994. Due to its unique capability, Air Combat Command will contract for 100 aircraft per year to be processed by the RCCF. The community claims it makes economic and operational sense to locate the Reserves at Bergstrom to provide transient support for aircraft using the facility. Finally, the community contends the cost to station the Reserves at Bergstrom is much lower than the Air Force has stated. The community noted that when Austin takes over the airfield in October 1996, the cost to the Air Force will decrease further, putting Bergstrom at parity with Homestead.

### *Commission Findings*

The Air Force overstated the savings for the closure of Bergstrom Air Reserve Base due to its failure to account for the decrease in base operating support costs, once the Austin city government assumes control of airport operations in 1996. Even so, the Commission found that closure of Bergstrom remains the most cost effective option in the Air Force Reserve F-16 category. Although the Reserve has an excess of two F-16 squadrons, the Commission found it necessary to close only one reserve installation. Additional closures would have an adverse impact on recruiting and operational readiness. Although the base has infrastructure in-place to support both F-16 and KC-135 aircraft, the Commission found that overall excess capacity in the Reserve category and cost savings factors require closure. The Commission also found other Reserve F-16 locations rate higher than Bergstrom for facilities, training, and joint operations. The RCCF contractor will provide all aircraft servicing support as part of its contract with Air Combat Command. The Ground Combat Readiness Center mission is under review by the Air Force; if the mission remains, either Carswell or other facilities in the area are satisfactory transfer locations. The Air Force and previous Commission commitments regarding the development of the Austin airport at Bergstrom were conditioned upon future Air Force force-structure requirements remaining stable.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Bergstrom Air Reserve Base. The 924th Fighter Wing (AFRES) will inactivate. The Wing's F-16 aircraft will be redistributed or retire. Headquarters, 10th Air Force (AFRES), will relocate to Naval Air Station Fort Worth, Joint Reserve Base, Texas.

### **Brooks Air Force Base, Texas**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:*

*Laboratory and Product Center*

*Mission: Human systems research and product development*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

***FINAL ACTION: Remain Open***

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Brooks AFB The Human Systems Center, including the School of Aerospace Medicine and Armstrong Laboratory, will relocate to Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, however, some portion of the Manpower and Personnel function, and the Air Force Drug Test laboratory, may relocate to other locations. The 68th Intelligence Squadron will relocate to Kelly AFB, Texas The Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence will relocate to Tyndall AFB, Florida. The 710th Intelligence Flight (AFRES) will relocate to Lackland AFB, Texas The hyperbaric chamber operation, including associated personnel, will relocate to Lackland AFB, Texas. All activities and facilities at the base including family housing and the medical facility will close.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Air Force has more laboratory capacity than necessary to support current and projected Air Force research requirements. When compared to the attributes desirable in laboratory activities, the Armstrong Lab and Human Systems Center operations at Brooks AFB contributed less to Air Force needs as measured by such areas as workload requirements, facilities, and personnel. As an installation, Brooks AFB ranked lower than the other bases in the Laboratory and Product Center subcategory.

### *Community Concerns*

The community believes that if Brooks moves, the existing synergy within San Antonio's one-of-a-kind biomedical community, would be significantly impaired. While the community would prefer that Brooks remain open, it has developed an alternative plan that would canton most activities at Brooks. Under the community's cantonment plan, the Human Systems Center, Armstrong Laboratory, School of Aerospace Medicine and the Center for Environmental Excellence would be retained, while the remainder of Brooks would close and other tenants would relocate. Specific boundaries would be determined by the Air Force. Base operation and other support would be provided by nearby Lackland or Kelly. The community argues that the cantonment (1) is cost effective, (2) offers an immediate return on investment, (3) preserves existing synergy, and (4) avoids risk to existing research missions.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that closing Brooks AFB would have required a significant upfront cost of at least \$211.5 million Closure of Brooks AFB would interrupt critical ongoing research. The Commission found that the delays associated with re-accreditation of equipment and laboratories at the receiving sites were unacceptable. The Commission found that the move would also create one of two equally unacceptable events—either large numbers of people would move, keeping the costs high, or large numbers of people would not move, interrupting vital research. In a response to a survey, more than half the professional staff said they probably would not move. In addition, the Commission found that if the Brooks' human systems research mission were relocated, existing synergy with the large San Antonio military and civilian biomedical communities would be lost.

While excess capacity exists at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, the primary receiving location, the excess is mainly office space and is not currently suited to accommodate Brooks' research activities The Air Force projects it would have to construct or renovate nearly 1 million square feet to be able to take on the Brooks mission. Brooks currently operates in "world-class" facilities

The Commission found the community's cantonment proposal would have saved, at a minimum, the \$211.5 million upfront cost to close, would have offered additional annual savings of nearly \$18 million and net present value savings of \$248 million. The cantonment savings were credible, and were similar to those shown in Air Force certified COBRAs compiled at the request of the Commission. In addition, cantonment would have preserved existing synergies, allowed portions of Brooks to be made available for re-use, and saved opportunity costs.

The Air Force informed the Commission that it would prefer to keep Brooks open rather than place Brooks into cantonment. The Air Force believes cantonment, in general, is awkward and unworkable in the long term The Commission found the costs and disruption to research that would result from relocation unacceptable. The Commission rejected the Air Force's original recommendation to close Brooks AFB and deferred to the Air Force request to have Brooks AFB remain open rather than place the mission's activities into an enclave area.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: Brooks Air Force Base will remain open. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Kelly Air Force Base, Texas**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support: Depots*

*Mission: Provide depot maintenance and materiel management support to the Air Force*

*One-time Cost: \$412.8 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$106.2 million*

*Annual: \$178.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 2001 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure and realignment as a proposed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### *Community Concerns*

The San Antonio Community believes the Air Force tiering system was subjective and did not recognize the true value of Kelly Air Force Base or the San Antonio Air Logistics Center. The community believes the environmental condition was misstated by DoD. The community stated that the water use issue that resulted in a low environmental score has been corrected, but asserted the Air Force failed to revise the base's environmental score. The closure of Kelly Air Force Base would have a severe economic impact; it would result in a 73 percent increase in San Antonio Hispanic unemployment (60% of Kelly employees are Hispanic, 45% of Hispanics employed by the Air Force are employed at Kelly). Concern was expressed that the middle class Hispanic community would be devastated.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that the significant excess capacity and infrastructure in the Air Force depot system requires closure of the San Antonio Air Logistics Center (ALC). The Air Force recommendation to downsize all five Air Force ALC depots through mothballing excess space would reduce the amount of space utilized by the depot but

would not eliminate infrastructure and overhead costs. Downsizing would result in the elimination of depot direct labor personnel, but not overhead personnel. The Commission found that closure of the San Antonio ALC, and related activities at Kelly AFB, including the distribution depot and information processing megacenter, permits significantly improved utilization of the remaining depots and reduces DoD operating costs.

The low military value "tier" assigned by the Air Force was second among the factors considered in the determination to realign Kelly AFB and the San Antonio ALC. The Air Force tier ranking system uses rankings of I through III with tier III being the lowest rank. (At the request of the Air Force, the DoD Joint Cross Service Group used the tiering system as a proxy for military value). Kelly AFB and the depot at the San Antonio ALC received tier III rankings. The Community expressed concern the Air Force military value was subjective. The Commission agreed that the determination of military value is complex and difficult to translate into easily auditable numbers. The tier is an appropriate description of the collective military judgment of the officials on the Air Force Base Closure Executive Group.

The proximity of Kelly AFB to Lackland Air Force Base, Texas was also considered in the determination to realign Kelly AFB. Lackland AFB will be able to provide support to a realigned Kelly AFB. Through consolidation of support costs, the Commission found the Air Force could achieve substantial savings.

The Commission found the cost to realign Kelly AFB to be less than that estimated by the DoD and the annual savings significantly greater the DoD's estimate. The differences in cost and savings estimates are based on differing closure assumptions of the Air Force and Commission. The Commission assumed that a depot closure and consolidation of work would permit a personnel reduction of 15% of selected ALC personnel and a 50% reduction of management overhead personnel. The Air Force did not reflect any direct labor personnel savings due to a closure and reflected a 20% reduction in overhead personnel. The Commission assumed that closure would occur over a five year period, and the Air Force assumed six years. Another significant factor explaining the difference between savings estimates is that Air Force assumed all personnel savings would occur in the last year of implementation; the Commission assumed that personnel

eliminations would be evenly phased over a four year period. The Commission also did not agree with a number of one-time costs that the Air Force considered to be directly related to closure.

The level of Hispanic employment at Kelly AFB was recognized by the Commission. The Commission took steps to minimize the negative economic impact on the community by cantoning a significant portion of the Kelly AFB activities. The Commission recommends that the DoD make maximum use of the priority placement system and take steps to retain the Kelly employees within DoD.

The Commission staff presented data indicating large annual savings could be realized by consolidating engine maintenance activities at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma. Both Kelly and Tinker are operating at less than 50% of their engine maintenance capacity. These savings would be in addition to those shown in the Commission's COBRA summaries. The Commission urges the Air Force to consolidate engine maintenance activity at Tinker to reduce excess capacity. The Commission firmly believes that consolidation of engine activities will result in lower costs and increased efficiencies.

Each of the Air Logistics Centers operated by the Air Force are excellent organizations. The San Antonio community is clearly supportive of the military and the ALC. The decision to close the San Antonio ALC is a difficult one, but given the significant amount of excess depot capacity and limited Defense resources, closure is a necessity. The Commission's decision permits closure of the San Antonio ALC and related activities without disruption of the other military missions on the base. The San Antonio ALC closure will permit improved utilization of the remaining ALCs and substantially reduce DoD operating costs.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria 1, 4, and 5. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Kelly Air Force Base including the Air Logistics Center. Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot, San Antonio. Consolidate the workloads to other DoD depots or to private sector commercial activities as determined by the Defense Depot Maintenance Council. Move the required equipment and any required personnel to the receiving locations. The airfield and all associated support

activities and facilities will be attached to Lackland AFB, Texas as will the following units: the Air Intelligence Agency including the Cryptologic Depot, the 433rd Airlift Wing (AFRES), the 149th Fighter Wing (ANG), and; the 1827th Engineering Installation Squadron (EIS). The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Reese Air Force Base, Texas**

*Category: Undergraduate Flying Training*

*Mission: Undergraduate Pilot Training*

*One-Time Cost: \$46.4 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$95.7 million*

*Annual: \$32.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (2 Years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Reese AFB. The 64th Flying Training Wing will inactivate and its assigned aircraft will be redistributed or retired. All activities and facilities at the base including family housing and the hospital will close.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Air Force has more Undergraduate Flying Training (UFT) bases than necessary to support Air Force pilot training requirements consistent with the Department of Defense (DoD) Force Structure Plan. When all eight criteria are applied to the bases in the UFT category, Reese AFB ranks low relative to the other bases in the category. Reese AFB ranked lower when compared to other UFT bases when evaluated on such factors as weather (e.g., crosswinds, density altitude) and airspace availability (e.g., amount of airspace available for training, distance to training areas). Reese AFB was also recommended for closure in each alternative recommended by the DoD Joint Cross-Service Group for Undergraduate Pilot Training.

### *Community Concerns*

The community argues the Air Force has always rated Reese very high in the past. As proof of this, they point to the selection of Reese as the first specialized undergraduate pilot training site with the introduction of the T-1 training aircraft, and initiation of the consolidation of undergraduate pilot training (UPT) with the Navy in a joint primary training program. The community questions whether Reese is being downgraded because it

lacks actual ownership and control of required airspace, even though access to the airspace it uses for UPT training activities is unimpeded. They question the use of weather attrition factors such as icing and crosswinds. Crosswinds were used as a limiting factor at Reese but icing was not used as a limiting factor at Vance AFB, Oklahoma. The Air Force configures each of its UPT bases nearly the same, consequently the community believes the UPT-JCSG (Joint Cross-Service Group) analysis is suspect because it shows Reese substantially inferior to the other bases. The community argues the Air Force is underestimating future pilot training requirements. If these estimates prove to be incorrect, closing Reese will result in the loss of needed training capacity. The community believes the Air Force is ignoring a quality of life indicator: Reese AFB is the number one choice of student and instructor pilots in Air Education Training Command (AETC) for base of assignment; base accessibility is enhanced by its proximity to a large international airport served by major jet airlines; and Reese offers superior higher education opportunities. In addition, because of the significantly high quality medical facilities the city has made available to the base, the Reese Clinic has been able to execute "right-sizing" initiatives. The community believes these factors combine to reduce significantly the cost to the Air Force of operating Reese AFB.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the decrease in pilot training requirements resulting from the drawdown in force structure has created excess capacity in the UFT category. After the 1991 round, the Air Force did not plan to close another UPT base. Air Force evaluations of UPT bases that led to the decision to place the T-1 Airlift/Tanker training aircraft at Reese AFB first reflected the need to station the aircraft at a base that would allow easy airline access for contractor personnel, rather than a judgment on the military value of the base. Similarly, joint primary training with the Navy was initiated at Reese because it was the only Air Force UPT base that had transitioned to the new primary training syllabus required for the joint program, a direct result of the T-1 introduction. In conducting its review of bases for the 1995 round of base closures, the Air Force evaluated UPT bases on their functional value to perform undergraduate pilot training. The functional value of Reese AFB, as determined by the UPT Joint Cross-Service Group, was initially questioned by the

Commission as a result of the community's concerns. After conducting an independent staff analysis of functional value, the Commission validated the Air Force ranking. This analysis included evaluations of icing and airspace issues, concerns expressed by the community. Functional value is the primary determinant of military value in the UFT category. Quality of life was an issue addressed at each UPT base. Commission staff conducted interviews with instructors, students, and their spouses to determine the quality of life at each base. Each community has put programs in place to support the military in locating off-base housing, employment, education, and health care, and is fully committed to providing the military the highest possible quality of life. The commission found closure of one Air Force UPT base contains some risk due to uncertainty about future pilot retention rates, airline hiring, and Reserve requirements. The Commission found the Air Force has many options available to it to meet future requirements using the remaining UFT and Small Aircraft category bases. The commission found any risk to the ability of the Air Force to meet its pilot training requirements is acceptable.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Reese Air Force Base. The 64th Flying Training Wing will inactivate and its assigned aircraft will be redistributed or retired. All activities and facilities at the base including family housing and the hospital will close.

### **Hill Air Force Base, Utah**

#### **(Utah Test and Training Range)**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support:*

*Test and Evaluation*

*Mission: Test and Evaluation*

*One-time Cost: \$0.2 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$34.1 million*

*Annual: \$6.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign Hill AFB, Utah. The permanent Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) test range activity at Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) will be disestablished. Management responsibility for operation of the UTTR will transfer from AFMC to

Air Combat Command (ACC). Personnel, equipment and systems required for use by ACC to support the training range will be transferred to ACC. Additional AFMC manpower associated with operation of the range will be eliminated. Some armament/weapons Test and Evaluation (T&E) workload will transfer to the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC), Eglin AFB, Florida, and the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California. Note: The Commission voted that Hill Air Force Base, UT, currently on the list of bases recommended by the Secretary of Defense for realignment, be considered by the Commission for closure or to increase the extent of the realignment.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Most of the current T&E activities can be accomplished at other T&E activities (AFFTC and AFDTC). Disestablishing the AFMC test range activities and transferring the range to ACC will reduce excess T&E capacity within the Air Force. Retaining the range as a training range will preserve the considerable training value offered by the range and is consistent with the current 82 percent training use of the range. Retention of the range as a training facility will also allow large footprint weapons to undergo test and evaluation using mobile equipment.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found no reason to disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The permanent Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) test range activity at Utah Test and Training Range (UTTR) will be disestablished. Management responsibility for operation of the UTTR will transfer from AFMC to Air Combat Command (ACC). Personnel, equipment and systems required for use by ACC to support the training range will be transferred to ACC. Additional AFMC manpower associated with operation of the range will be eliminated. Some armament/weap-

ons Test and Evaluation (T&E) workload will transfer to the Air Force Development Test Center (AFDTC), Eglin AFB, Florida, and the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC), Edwards AFB, California.

### **Air Logistics Centers**

*Category: Industrial/Technical Support: Depots*

*Mission: Maintenance Depots*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Rejected**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign the Air Logistics Centers (ALC) at Hill AFB, Utah; Kelly AFB, Texas; McClellan AFB, California; Robins AFB, Georgia; and Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. Consolidate the followings workloads at the designated receiver locations.

Commodity/Workload	Receiving Locations
Composites and plastics	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Hydraulics	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Tubing manufacturing	WR-ALC, Robins AFB
Airborne electronic automatic equipment software	WR-ALC, Robins AFB, OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OO-ALC, Hill AFB
Sheet metal repair and manufacturing	OO-ALC, Hill AFB, WR-ALC, Robins AFB
Machining manufacturing	OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, WR-ALC, Robins AFB
Foundry operations	SA-ALC, Kelly AFB, OO-ALC, Hill AFB
Instruments/displays	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB (some unique work remains at OO-ALC, Hill AFB and WR-ALC, Robins AFB)
Airborne electronics	WR-ALC, Robins AFB, OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OO-ALC, Hill AFB
Electronic manufacturing (printed wire boards)	WR-ALC, Robins AFB
Electrical/mechanical support equipment	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Injection molding	SM-ALC, McClellan AFB
Industrial plant equipment software	SA-ALC, Kelly AFB
Plating	OC-ALC, Tinker AFB, OO-ALC, Hill AFB, SA-ALC, Kelly AFB, WR-ALC, Robins AFB

Move the required equipment and any required personnel to the receiving location. These actions will create or strengthen Technical Repair Centers at the receiving locations in the respective commodities. Minimal workload in each of the commodities may continue to be performed at the other ALCs as required.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Reductions in force structure have resulted in excess depot maintenance capacity across Air Force depots. The recommended realignments will consolidate production lines and move workload to a minimum number of locations, allowing the reduction of personnel, infrastructure, and other costs. The net effect of the realignments is to transfer approximately 3.5 million direct labor hours and to eliminate 37 product lines across the five depots. These actions will allow the Air Force to demolish or mothball facilities, or to make them available for use by other agencies. These consolidations will reduce excess capacity, enhance efficiencies, and produce substantial cost savings without the extraordinary one-time costs associated with closing a single depot.

This action is part of a broader Air Force effort to downsize, reduce depot capacity and infrastructure, and achieve cost savings in a financially prudent manner consistent with mission requirements. Programmed work reductions, downsizing through contracting or transfer to other Service depots, and the consolidation of workloads recommended above result in the reduction of real property infrastructure equal to 1.5 depots, and a reduction in manhour capacity equivalent to about two depots. The proposed moves also make available over 25 million cubic feet of space to the Defense Logistics Agency for storage and other purposes, plus space to accept part of the Defense Nuclear Agency and other displaced Air Force missions. This approach enhances the cost effectiveness of the overall Department of Defense's closure and realignment recommendations. The downsizing of all depots is consistent with DoD efforts to reduce excess maintenance capacity, reduce cost, improve efficiency of depot management, and increase contractor support for DoD requirements.

### **TINKER**

**Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 3,040 jobs (1,180 direct jobs and 1,860 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.5 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.3 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Tinker AFB will continue.

### **ROBINS**

**Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,168 jobs (534 direct jobs and 634 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the Macon, Georgia Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.7 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.7 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration of Robins AFB will continue.

### **KELLY**

**Impacts:** Assuming no economic recovery, this recommendation could result in a maximum potential reduction of 1,446 jobs (555 direct jobs and 891 indirect jobs) over the 1996-to-2001 period in the San Antonio, Texas Metropolitan Statistical Area, which is 0.2 percent of the economic area's employment. The cumulative economic impact of all BRAC 95 recommendations, including the relocation of some Air Force activities into the San Antonio area, and all prior-round BRAC actions in the economic area over the 1994-to-2001 period could result in a maximum potential decrease equal to 0.9 percent of employment in the economic area. Environmental impact from this action is minimal and ongoing restoration will continue.



## **McCLELLAN and HILL**

**Impacts:** The recommendations pertaining to consolidations of workloads at these two centers are not anticipated to result in employment losses or significant environmental impact.

### *Community Concerns*

Kelly Air Force Base, San Antonio

- The Kelly Community has not expressed an objection to the DoD plan to downsize all 5 Air Force depots

McClellan Air Force Base, Sacramento, California

- The original DoD recommendation would result in a net gain of 14 personnel. The Air Force revised its BRAC recommendations several times, the final iteration would result in a loss of 521 personnel from the depot. The original BRAC recommendation would have single-sited instrument work at McClellan. The revised BRAC recommendation would locate the instrument work at two other depots. The community points out that the revised BRAC recommendation is at odds with Air Force policy to single site depot work.

Robins Air Force Base, Macon Georgia

- The Secretary of Defense recommendations would result in the reduction of depot workload. The community notes that this reduction would be in addition to many years of downsizing of the Air Force depot system. The DoD BRAC recommendation threatens to make Robins inefficient and non-competitive because overhead costs remain relatively unchanged while the amount of depot work will be reduced.

Hill Air Force Base - Ogden, Utah

- The community argued that realignment of Hill Air Force Base as recommended by the Department of Defense assumes a 15 percent savings from reengineering which might be difficult to achieve. They questioned how mothballing unneeded buildings would save money. The community strongly believes the Ogden Air Logistics Center should be considered as a receiver for the consolidated tactical missile maintenance workload, in the event the Letterkenny Army Depot is realigned or closed.

Tinker Air Force Baser Oklahoma City, Oklahoma

- The community questioned how mothballing unneeded buildings, as required by the Department of Defense recommendation, would save money. The community also objected to Tinker's depot work being transferred to lower tiered depots. Tinker community officials strongly support transfer of aircraft and engine workload from other DoD facilities being studied for closure or realignment.

### *Commission Findings*

See McClellan AFB, California and Kelly AFB, Texas.

### *Commission Recommendation*

Commission rejects DoD's downsizing proposal. See McClellan AFB, California and Kelly AFB, Texas.

## Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)

### Defense Contract Management District West (DCMDW), El Segundo, California

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Perform contract administration services for DoD organizations and other U.S. Government agencies*

*One-time Cost: \$10.3 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$10.9 million*

*Annual: \$4.2 million*

*Return on Investment: 1996 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Redirect**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

This is a redirect of the following BRAC 93 Commission recommendation: "Relocate the Defense Contract Management District, El Segundo, California, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, California, or space obtained from exchange of land for space between the Navy and the Port Authority/City of Long Beach." The current recommendation is expanded to read: Relocate the DCMD, El Segundo, California, (a) to Government property in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area, or, (b) to space obtained from exchange of land between the Navy and Port Authority/City of Long Beach, or (c) to a purchased office building, whichever is the most cost-effective for DoD.

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Defense Contract Management District West is currently located in GSA-leased administrative space in El Segundo, California. The BRAC 93 Commission found it was cost effective for DCMD West to move from leased space to DoD-owned property. The Navy has been involved in exploratory discussions on behalf of DLA. However, the President's Five-Point Revitalization Plan, which affords communities the opportunity to obtain installations without substantial compensation, has significantly impacted the Navy's ability to consummate a land exchange at Long Beach with the Port Authority/City of Long Beach. The Long Beach Naval Shipyard, another option, has been placed on the BRAC 95 list for closure.

In order to attain the significant savings which will result by moving the organization into DoD space, the BRAC 93 recommendation is revised/expanded. This redirect eliminates the cost of a warehouse and reflects the requirement for reduced administrative space. This recommenda-

tion is consistent with the DCMC Concept of Operations and the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules.

#### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found the proposed change in the 1993 Commission recommendation involving Defense Contract Management District West would provide the DLA the flexibility to acquire suitable facilities at the least cost to DoD.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: This is a redirect of the following BRAC 93 Commission recommendation: "Relocate the Defense Contract Management District, El Segundo, California, to Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, California, or space obtained from exchange of land for space between the Navy and the Port Authority/City of Long Beach." The current recommendation is expanded to read: Relocate the DCMD, El Segundo, California, (a) to Government property in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area, or, (b) to space obtained from exchange of land between the Navy and the Port Authority/City of Long Beach, or (c) to a purchased office building, whichever is the most cost-effective for DoD.

### Defense Distribution Depot McClellan (DDMC), Sacramento, California

*Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated*

*Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$13.6 million\**

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$30.6 million\**

*Annual: \$13.4 million\**

*Return on Investment: 1998 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

\* Also included in McClellan Air Force Base, California costs and savings.

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a pro-

posed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### ***Community Concerns***

See McClellan Air Force Base, California.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission recommended closing the Sacramento Air Logistics Center. Because the Sacramento Air Logistics Center was the principal customer of Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, the Commission found the distribution depot was no longer required and should be disestablished. Although disestablishment of the distribution depot increased the storage shortfall for the DLA, the Commission believes that DLA will be able to accommodate this shortfall via other public and private storage facilities.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

See McClellan Air Force Base, California.

## **Defense Contract Management District South (DCMDS), Marietta, Georgia**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Perform contract administration services for DoD organizations and other U.S. Government agencies*

*One-time Cost: \$3.8 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$17.9 million*

*Annual: \$61 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

***FINAL ACTION: Disestablish***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Disestablish DCMD South and relocate missions to DCMD Northeast and DCMD West.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

The Contract Management Districts provide command and control, operational support, and management oversight for 90 Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAOs) and Defense Plant Representative Offices (DPROs) located throughout the continental United States. Due to the impact of the DoD Force-Structure drawdown, budget cuts and the resulting decline in acquisition workload, a number of Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices have been disestablished thereby reducing the span of control responsibility at the Districts. As

the drawdown continues, the number of Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices is expected to decline even further. Based on the above, the closure of a district and realignment of assigned Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices to the remaining two districts is feasible with only a moderate risk. Although the difference between second and third place was not sufficiently broad to dictate a clear decision by itself, DCMD South received the lowest military value score.

Military judgment determined that a single contract management district presence on each coast is necessary. A west coast district is required because of the high dollar value of contracts and the significant weapon-systems related workload located on the west coast.

There is a higher concentration of workload in the northeast, in terms of span of control, field personnel provided support services, numbers of contractors, and value of contract dollars obligated, than in the south. In addition, the northeast district supports its Area Operations Offices and Plant Representative Offices with a lower ratio of headquarters to field personnel than DCMD South. On the east coast, due to the higher concentration of workload in DCMD Northeast, as well as its significantly higher military value score, there is a clear indication that DCMD South is the disestablishment candidate. As a result, the BRAC Executive Group recommended to the DLA Director, and he approved, the disestablishment of DCMD South.

### ***Community Concerns***

The community contends that the trend is for companies to move their operations from northern to southern locations. Therefore, closing the Contract Management District in Marietta will result in dramatically increased travel costs for the remaining two District Offices in Boston and Los Angeles. They argued that these increased costs were not considered by DLA in the cost-to-close computations. The community further contended that current information management systems are not capable of handling the additional workload of the two remaining offices. The community recommended that DLA maintain three smaller and leaner Defense Contract Management District Offices. The community believes this approach would provide better service to the customer.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found consolidating the Defense Contract Management Districts from three to two districts was a reasonable approach to increasing management efficiencies. The Commission also found the quantity of the assigned workloads, geographical locations, and other factors analyzed supported the Secretary's recommendation. Once the consolidation is completed, DLA will realize \$6.1 million per year steady-state savings with no mission degradation.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish DCMD South and relocate missions to DCMD Northeast and DCMD West.

### **Defense Contract Management Command International (DCMCI), Dayton, Ohio**

*Category: Command and Control*

*Mission: Perform command and control for 13 overseas Defense Contract Management Area Operations offices outside the continental United States*

*One-time Cost: \$3.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$8.7 million*

*Annual: \$3.1 million*

*Return on Investment: 1999 (1 year)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign the DCMCI (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and merge its mission into the Defense Contract Management Command Headquarters (DCMC HQ), Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The mission of the DCMCI is to provide command and control, including operational and management control and oversight, for 13 overseas Defense Contract Management Area Operations (DCMAO) offices located outside of the continental United States. The Command's mission could be performed from any locality. Military judgment concluded that merging the mission with the headquarters affords the opportunity to capitalize on operational and management oversight and to maximize use of shared overhead with DCMC. It also affords the opportunity to take advantage of

the close proximity to the State Department and the international support infrastructure in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas. This decision is consistent with DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules, the DCMC Concept of Operations and the Force-Structure Plan.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found merging Defense Contract Management Command International's mission into the Defense Contract Management Command Headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, was an effective method to increase efficiency and reduce costs. Moving this Command to Fort Belvoir capitalizes on this location's close proximity to the State Department and the international support infrastructure in Washington, D.C., which is vital to the Command's mission

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the DCMCI (Gentile AFS), Dayton, Ohio, and merge its mission into the Defense Contract Management Command Headquarters (DCMC HQ), Ft. Belvoir, Virginia.

### **Defense Distribution Depot Columbus (DDCO), Columbus, Ohio**

*Category: Distribution Depots—Stand-Alone Depots*

*Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$7.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$51.2 million*

*Annual: \$11.6 million*

*Return on Investment: 1997 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Realign**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Realign the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio, and designate it as a storage site for slow moving/war reserve material. Active material remaining at DDCO at the time of realignment will be attrited. Stock replenishment will be stored in optimum space within the distribution system.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, is a Stand-Alone Depot that supports the two large east/west coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. The decision to realign the Columbus depot was based on storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and the need to comply with BRAC 95 Decision Rules. Columbus ranked sixth of six depots in military value for the Stand-Alone Depot category.

The other Stand-Alone Depots were not considered for realignment for the following reasons. The higher military value of both the Susquehanna (DDSC) and San Joaquin (DDJC) depots removed them from consideration for closure or realignment. The Richmond Depot (DDRV) was not selected for realignment because of the large amount of conforming hazardous material storage space, new construction and mechanization, and collocation with supply center, which has the best maintained facilities of any in DLA. Both the Ogden and Memphis distribution depots were selected for closure.

The decision to realign rather than close the Columbus depot was based on the need for inactive storage capacity in the overall system and with the long-range intent of minimizing use of this site as storage requirements decline. Moving highly active stock to San Joaquin and Susquehanna will allow DLA to take advantage of economies of scale from large distribution operations. The decision was also based on the further consideration that Columbus, the highest ranking DLA location in the Installation Military Value analysis, will remain open and most likely expand its operations, thereby allowing DLA to maximize the use of shared overhead and optimize the use of retained DLA-operated facilities. In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model favored the retention of Columbus over either Ogden or Memphis. Realigning the Columbus depot is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to realign DDCO.

### *Community Concerns*

There were no formal expressions from the community.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found realigning the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus to a storage site for slow moving/war reserve material was cost-effective and efficient. Redesignating the distribution depot was consistent with the reduced requirement for storage capacity and the need to provide a low cost alternative for siting slow moving/war reserve material.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: realign the Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio, and designate it as a storage site for slow moving/war reserve material. Active material remaining at DDCO at the time of realignment will be attrited. Stock replenishment will be stored in optimum space within the distribution system.

### **Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny (DDL), Chambersburg, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated*  
*Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of DLA and the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$44.9 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-21.2 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$12.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 2003 (3 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. Material remaining at DDL at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama (DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny is collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its largest customer. While Collocated Depots may support other nearby customers and provide limited world-wide distribution support, Letterkenny's primary function is to provide rapid response in support of the maintenance operation. The Distri-

bution Concept of Operations states that DLA's distribution system will support the size and configuration of the Defense Depot Maintenance System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are disestablished, Collocated Depots will also be disestablished.

The recommendation to disestablish the Letterkenny depot was driven by the Army recommendation to realign Letterkenny Army Depot, Letterkenny's primary customer, and the Agency's need to reduce infrastructure. The Letterkenny depot was rated 3 of 17 in the Collocated Depot military value matrix. However, that military value ranking was based on support to the maintenance missions. With the realignment of the Army's maintenance mission to the Anniston Army Depot that value decreases significantly. Other customers within the Letterkenny area can be supported from nearby distribution depots. Production and physical space requirements can also be met by fully utilizing other depots in the distribution system.

Disestablishing DDLP is consistent with both the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to disestablish DDLP.

### ***Community Concerns***

See Letterkenny Army Depot, Pennsylvania.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission recommended realigning Letterkenny Army Depot by transferring the towed and self-propelled combat vehicle mission to Anniston Army Depot, Alabama. Because the Letterkenny Army Depot was the principal customer of Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, the Commission found the distribution depot was no longer required and should be disestablished. Although disestablishment of the distribution depot increased the storage shortfall for DLA, the Commission believes that DLA will be able to accommodate this shortfall via other public and private storage facilities.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania. Material remaining at

DDLP at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama (DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

### **Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC), Philadelphia, Pennsylvania**

*Category: Inventory Control Point*

*Mission: Provide wholesale support of industrial type items to the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$55.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$21.2 million*

*Annual: \$18.4 million*

*Return on Investment: 2000 (1 year)*

***FINAL ACTION: Disestablish***

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

The Defense Industrial Supply Center is disestablished. Distribute the management of Federal Supply Classes (FSC) within the remaining DLA Inventory Control Points (ICP). Create one ICP for the management of troop and general support items at the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in Philadelphia, PA. Create two ICPs for the management of weapon system-related FSCs at the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, Ohio and the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), Richmond, Virginia.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

Four of the five Inventory Control Points manage differing mixes of weapon system, troop support, and general support items. Troop and general support items largely have different industry and customer bases than weapon system items. They are also more conducive to commercial support, and are thus managed differently than weapon system items. Consolidating management of items by the method of management required will improve oversight, streamline the supply management process, increase internal efficiency, and reduce overhead.

DLA manages nearly five times as many weapon system items as troop and general support items. A single troop and general support ICP is adequate, but two weapon system ICPs are necessary. DPSC is almost entirely a troop support ICP. No other ICP currently manages troop support items. The percentage of general support items at other ICPs is relatively small. Singling-up troop and general support items under DPSC management is the most logical course of action.

DISC had the lowest military value of the three hardware ICPs. The Columbus and Richmond centers are host activities of compounds which house a number of DLA and non-DLA activities, conforming to the DLA decision rules concerning maximizing the use of shared overhead and making optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities. Both the Richmond and Columbus sites have high installation military value, and take advantage of the synergy of a Collocated Depot. Both also have considerable expansion capability. The facilities at Columbus are the best maintained of any in DLA, and Richmond has several new buildings completed or in progress. DISC is a tenant on a Navy compound. Disestablishing DISC allows the Agency to achieve a substantial cost avoidance by back-filling the space already occupied by DISC and substantially reducing the amount of conversion required to existing warehouse space. Based on the above, military judgment concluded that disestablishing DISC is in the best interest of DLA and DoD.

### ***Community Concerns***

The Philadelphia community contends disestablishing the Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) and moving its weapon system coded items to the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC) would have a negative impact on military readiness. They reasoned that moving 1.4 million items over a relatively short period of time would substantially degrade performance for customers. They cited past experience where moving fewer items caused mission degradation. The community asserted that during the 1993 round of base closures, DLA determined that a mass movement of items would be risky. The community believes nothing has happened since BRAC 93 to minimize this risk. The community further contended that DISC, and not DGSC, should be the weapons system Inventory Control Point because DISC has a higher percentage of weapon system items than DGSC, and is better able to perform the complex work involved.

The community also argued that the cost savings were understated because the actual costs to move the items and the cost to keep Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) at its current location for an additional two years, while awaiting movement of personnel and items to DGSC, were not included in the COBRA costs. In addition, they believe that the synergy between the Navy's Aviation Supply Office and DISC, which

was recognized by the Navy during BRAC 95, was ignored by DLA. Finally, the community was concerned because disestablishment of DISC did not preserve job retention rights even though DLA assured employees in writing that maximum efforts would be exerted to ensure placements in the Philadelphia area.

### ***Commission Findings***

The Commission found DLA's Concept of Operations to consolidate management of weapon system and troop and general support items was a rational approach to increase management efficiencies and achieve significant annual savings. Moreover, the Commission found that disestablishing DISC allowed DLA to distribute item management responsibility among three geographically separated Inventory Control Points, two dedicated to weapon system management and one to troop and general support management. Pursuing this option also allowed DLA to achieve a substantial cost avoidance by back-filling space presently occupied by DISC with the new Troop and General Support Inventory Control Point without substantial building modification. In addition, the Commission believes DLA should ameliorate job losses at DISC by offering displaced employees positions at the new Troop and General Support Inventory Control Point.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Defense Industrial Supply Center is disestablished. Distribute the management of Federal Supply Classes (FSC) within the remaining DLA Inventory Control Points (ICP). Create one ICP for the management of troop and general support items at the Defense Personnel Support Center (DPSC) in Philadelphia, PA. Create two ICPs for the management of weapon system-related FSCs at the Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC), Columbus, OH and the Defense General Supply Center (DGSC), Richmond, VA.

### **Defense Distribution Depot Memphis (DDMT), Memphis, Tennessee**

*Category: Distribution Depots - Stand-Alone  
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$85.7 million*  
*Savings: 1996-2001: \$14.8 million*  
*Annual: \$23.8 million*  
*Return on Investment: 2001 (3 years)*  
**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee. Material remaining at DDMT at the time of closure will be relocated to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDMT, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDMT will be excess to DLA needs.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, is a Stand-Alone Depot that supports the two large east and west coast depots and is used primarily for storage capability and local area demand. It is also the host for the Memphis complex. The decision to close the Memphis depot was based on declining storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and on the need to reduce infrastructure within the Agency.

Memphis tied for third place out of the six Stand-Alone Depots in the military value analysis. The higher scores for the Susquehanna and San Joaquin distribution depots in this analysis removed them from further consideration for closure. The variance of only 37 points out of a possible 1,000 between the third and sixth place depots in the military value analysis for this category reinforced the importance of military judgment and compliance with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules in the decision-making process.

A further consideration was the Agency's desire to minimize distribution infrastructure costs. Closure of an entire installation will allow DLA to reduce infrastructure significantly more than disestablishment of a tenant depot (DDCO at Columbus, Ohio, and DDRV at Richmond, Virginia). Memphis was rated six out of six in the Installation Military Value analysis. The Columbus installation ranked the highest. The facilities at Richmond are the best maintained of any in DLA. Both Columbus and Richmond take advantage of the synergy of a collocated Inventory Control Point. This closure action conforms to the Decision Rules to maximize the use of shared overhead and make optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities, while closing an installation.

In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model optimized system-wide costs for distribution when the Ogden and Memphis depots were the two Stand-Alone Depots chosen for closure. Sufficient throughput and storage capacity are available in the remaining depots to accommodate projected workload and storage requirements. Closing DDMT is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Therefore, military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to close DDMT.

### *Community Concerns*

The community contends that DLA should retain the Distribution Depot at Memphis because of its excellent infrastructure. The Memphis area is known as "America's Distribution Center." The depot is located near major highways, rail, air, and shipping facilities, and has never been closed due to weather. The community was dismayed that weather factors were considered during DLA's BRAC 93 analysis, but not in BRAC 95. Because of these factors, the community argued that the depot is strategically sited to support any major regional conflict. This support would be especially vital if support for two simultaneous regional conflicts was required. The community contends that closure of both the Memphis and Ogden Depots was predetermined when DLA (1) combined the Tracy and Sharpe Depots into the San Joaquin, California Depot and the New Cumberland and Mechanicsburg Depots into the Susquehanna, Pennsylvania Depot, effectively removing them from further BRAC consideration; (2) determined it would maintain a distribution presence at service maintenance facilities; and (3) performed an installation military value analysis. The community argued that military value had not been properly assessed because DLA removed tenant missions, all depots were given equal credit for rail and surface capabilities, proper consideration was not given for consolidated containerization capabilities, and throughput capacity was underestimated. Finally, the community argued closure of the depot would impact the minority community disproportionately since approximately 80% of the Depot's employees are African-Americans.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that force-structure reductions had resulted in a corresponding decrease in DoD's storage requirements. Moreover, the Com-



mission found the distribution depots designated as primary distribution sites on the east and west coasts provide sufficient mobilization support. Therefore, the Commission found closing Defense Distribution Depot Memphis would reduce both overall excess capacity and infrastructure within the Defense Distribution Depot system and, at the same time, yield significant cost savings. The Commission recognizes the adverse economic impact on the Memphis African-American community. Although closure of the distribution depot increases the storage shortfall for the DLA, the Commission believes that DLA will be able to accommodate this shortfall via other public and private storage facilities. The Commission believes leasing space in the local area is a viable option for accommodating any short or long-term shortfall.

### ***Commission Recommendation***

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee. Material remaining at DDMT at the time of closure will be relocated to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDMT, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDMT will be excess to DLA needs.

### **Defense Distribution Depot Red River (DDRT), Texarkana, Texas**

*Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated  
Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of the military services*

*One-time Cost: None*

*Savings: 1996-2001: None*

*Annual: None*

*Return on Investment: None*

**FINAL ACTION: Remain Open**

### ***Secretary of Defense Recommendation***

Disestablish the Defense Distribution Depot Red River, Texas. Material remaining at DDRT at the time of disestablishment will be relocated to the Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama, (DDAA) and to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System.

### ***Secretary of Defense Justification***

The Defense Distribution Depot Red River is collocated with an Army maintenance depot, its larg-

est customer. While Collocated Depots may support other nearby customers and provide limited world-wide distribution support, Red River's primary function is to provide rapid response in support of the maintenance operation. The Distribution Concept of Operations states that DLA's distribution system will support the size and configuration of the Defense Depot Maintenance System. Thus, if depot maintenance activities are disestablished, Collocated Depots will also be disestablished.

The recommendation to disestablish the Red River depot was driven by the Army recommendation to realign its Red River Army Depot, Red River's primary customer, and the Agency's need to reduce infrastructure. DDRT was rated 5 of 17 in the Collocated Depot military value matrix. However, that military value ranking was based on support to the maintenance missions. With the realignment of the Army's maintenance mission to Anniston, Alabama, that value decreases significantly. Other customers within the DDRT area can be supported from nearby distribution depots. Production and physical space requirements can also be met by fully utilizing other depots in the distribution system.

Disestablishing DDRT is consistent with both the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to disestablish DDRT.

### ***Community Concerns***

The community contends that because 85% of the depot's mission is to provide support to bases in the central United States rather than the Army Depot, Defense Distribution Depot Red River should have been evaluated as a Stand-Alone Depot. The community argued that elimination of the depot would deprive DoD of storage facilities to accommodate surge requirements in times of national crisis. They further raised concerns over the efficiency and cost effectiveness of maintaining only two primary stand-alone distribution facilities in San Joaquin, California and Susquehanna, Pennsylvania. In addition, the community contended that DLA had overstated the savings and understated the costs for this action. The community asserted that the cost to relocate the vehicles and other material located at the depot was \$319 million, significantly above DLA's figure of \$58.9 million. The community's figure would make the return on investment for this action 22 years, not 2 years as calculated by DLA.

The community further asserted that the depot's preservation/packaging and support of rubber products mission was not considered in DLA's analysis. A storage capability would still be required because these missions will remain at Red River. Finally, the community argued that closing both the Army and the Distribution Depot would be economically devastating to the community, because this facility is the largest employer in the area.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission recommended that the Red River Army Depot be realigned and that maintenance missions related to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle Series be retained. In addition, the Commission recommended retention of the Rubber Production Facility and other activities supported by the Defense Distribution Depot Red River. The Commission found, therefore, the Defense Distribution Depot Red River, which provided principal support to the Red River Army Depot, was required and should remain open.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criterion 1. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: the Defense Distribution Depot Red River (DDRT) remains open and is not disestablished. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

### **Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio (DDST), San Antonio, Texas**

*Category: Distribution Depots - Collocated*  
*Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$22.1 million\**

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$32.7 million\**

*Annual: \$18.5 million\**

*Return on Investment: 1999 (Immediate)*

**FINAL ACTION: Disestablish**

Also included in Kelly Air Force Base, Texas costs and savings.

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

None. The Commission added this military installation to the list of bases to be considered by the Commission for closure or realignment as a pro-

posed change to the list of recommendations submitted by the Secretary of Defense.

### *Community Concerns*

See Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission recommended closing the San Antonio Air Logistics Center and consolidating its maintenance function among the remaining Air Logistics Centers or the private sector. Because the San Antonio Air Logistics Center was the principal customer of Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, the Commission found the distribution depot was no longer required and should be disestablished. Although disestablishment of the distribution depot increases the storage shortfall for the DLA, the Commission believes that DLA will be able to accommodate this shortfall via other public and private storage facilities.

### *Commission Recommendation*

See Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.

### **Defense Distribution Depot Ogden (DDOU), Ogden, Utah**

*Category: Distribution Depots - Stand-Alone*  
*Mission: Receive, store, and issue wholesale and retail material in support of the military services*

*One-time Cost: \$110.8 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-28.0 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$21.3 million*

*Return on Investment: 2003 (4 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Close**

### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Close Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah, except for a 36,000 square foot cantonment for Army Reserve personnel. Material remaining at DDOU at the time of closure will be relocated to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDOU, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDOU will be excess to DLA needs.

### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The Defense Distribution Depot Ogden is a Stand-Alone Depot that supports the two large east and west coast depots and is used primarily for stor-

age capability and local area demand. It is also the host for the Ogden complex. The decision to close the Ogden depot was based on declining storage requirements and capacity estimates for FY 01 and on the need to reduce infrastructure within the Agency.

Ogden tied for third place out of the six Stand-Alone Depots in the military value analysis. The higher scores for the Susquehanna and San Joaquin distribution depots in this analysis removed them from further consideration for closure. The variance of only 37 points out of a possible 1,000 between the third and sixth place depots in military value ranking for this category reinforced the importance of compliance with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and military judgment in the decision-making process

A further consideration was DLA's desire to minimize distribution infrastructure costs. Closure of an entire installation will allow DLA to reduce infrastructure significantly more than disestablishment of a tenant depot (DDCO at Columbus, Ohio, and DDRV at Richmond, Virginia). The Ogden depot was rated five of six in the Military Value Installation analysis. The Columbus installation ranked the highest. The facilities at Richmond are the best maintained of any in DLA. Both Columbus and Richmond take advantage of the synergy of a collocated Inventory Control Point. This action conforms to the DLA Decision Rules to maximize the use of shared overhead and make optimum use of retained DLA-operated facilities while closing an installation.

In addition, the Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems (SAILS) model optimized system-wide costs for Distribution when Ogden and Memphis were the two Stand-Alone Depots chosen for closure. Sufficient throughput and storage capacity are available in the remaining depots to accommodate projected workload. Closing the Ogden depot is consistent with the DLA BRAC 95 Decision Rules and the Distribution Concept of Operations. Military judgment determined that it is in the best interest of DLA and DoD to close DDOU.

### *Community Concerns*

The community contends the closure of the Ogden Depot was predetermined when DLA combined the Tracy and Sharpe Depots into the San Joaquin, California Depot and the New Cumberland and Mechanicsburg Depots into the Susquehanna, Pennsylvania Depot, and desig-

nated them both as primary distribution sites, effectively removing them from further BRAC consideration. The community argued that each of the depots should have been treated separately and equally. The community further contended that Ogden is DLA's most cost efficient depot. They argued that DLA did not recognize the Ogden Depot as the most efficient operation in the DLA Distribution System. The community further asserted that the shipping costs from the Ogden Depot are lower than from the San Joaquin, California Depot. In addition, they argued that the supplier destination costs would increase as items shipped from east coast suppliers would have to pass the Ogden area for storage at the San Joaquin Depot, only to be reissued to bases located east of the San Joaquin Depot. The community also argued that since any depot can perform the functions of a Consolidated Containerization Point, no points should have been given for this capability. DLA gave such points only to those depots currently performing the function (San Joaquin and Susquehanna Depots). The community also asserted that DLA underestimated the depot's throughput capacity, did not consider all of its tenants in the installation military value analysis, and did not consider the Army's desire to retain the deployable medical systems (DEPMEDS) mission at Ogden.

### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found that force-structure reductions had resulted in a corresponding decrease in DoD's storage requirements. Moreover, the Commission found the distribution depots designated as primary distribution sites on the east and west coasts provide sufficient mobilization support. Therefore, the Commission found closing Defense Distribution Depot Ogden (DDOU) would reduce both overall excess capacity and infrastructure within the Defense Distribution Depot system and, at the same time, yield significant cost savings. The Commission found, however, that the Deployable Medical Systems mission performed by DDOU for the Army was essential to military readiness and should remain, as requested by the Executive Agent (US Army), in the Ogden area. Moreover, the Commission found that the Army Reserve requirement at DDOU was greater than the 36,000 sq. ft. identified in the DoD recommendation. In fact, the Army Reserve notified the Commission that the requirement, although not exactly determined, was substantially above

36,000 sq. ft. Although closure of the distribution depot increases the storage shortfall for the DLA, the Commission believes that DLA will be able to accommodate this shortfall via other public and private storage facilities. The Commission believes leasing space in the local area is a viable option for accommodating any short or long-term shortfall.

### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense deviated substantially from final criteria 2 and 3. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: close Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah except for minimum essential land and facilities for a Reserve Component enclave. Material remaining at DDOU at the time of closure will be relocated to optimum storage space within the DoD Distribution System. As a result of the closure of DDOU, all DLA activity will cease at this location and DDOU will be excess to DLA needs. The Commission finds this recommendation is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria.

## Defense Investigative Service (DIS)

### Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird, Baltimore, Maryland

*Category: Investigations Control and Automation*

*Mission: Receives and controls all requests for investigations and maintains all investigative records*

*One-time Cost: \$11.1 million*

*Savings: 1996-2001: \$-0.5 million (Cost)*

*Annual: \$0.5 million*

*Return on Investment: 2003 (5 years)*

**FINAL ACTION: Relocate**

#### *Secretary of Defense Recommendation*

Relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (IC&AD) from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to a new facility to be built on Fort Meade, Maryland. This proposal is a revision to the 1988 Base Closure Commission's recommendation to retain the Defense Investigative Service at Fort Holabird. Once DIS vacates the building on Fort Holabird, the base will be vacant

#### *Secretary of Defense Justification*

The IC&AD is located in Building 320, a Korean War-era building. The building is in disrepair and continues to deteriorate costing over \$0.3 million in repairs since FY 1991 in addition to the annual Interservice Support Agreement cost of approximately \$0.4 million. A recent Corps of Engineers (COE) Building Analysis indicated that the cost to bring the building up to code and to correct the environmental deficiencies would cost DIS approximately \$9.1 million based on current space requirements. A military construction project on Fort Meade based on 1998 DIS force-structure is estimated to cost \$9.4 million.

#### *Community Concerns*


There were no formal expressions from the community.

#### *Commission Findings*

The Commission found it was cost effective to move DIS's Investigations Control and Automation Directorate to new facilities on Fort Meade, Maryland, rather than renovate its current facilities on Fort Holabird or move into leased space. The Commission also found that moving the organization to Fort Meade would improve the work environment, enhance security, and maintain a knowledgeable work force. These factors are all consistent with DoD policy.

#### *Commission Recommendation*

The Commission finds the Secretary of Defense did not deviate substantially from the force-structure plan and final criteria. Therefore, the Commission recommends the following: relocate the Defense Investigative Service (DIS), Investigations Control and Automation Directorate (IC&AD) from Fort Holabird, Maryland, to a new facility to be built on Fort Meade, Maryland. This proposal is a revision to the 1988 Base Closure Commission's recommendation to retain the Defense Investigative Service at Fort Holabird. Once DIS vacates the building on Fort Holabird, the base will be vacant.



## CHAPTER 2 LIFE AFTER BASE CLOSURE

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 provides the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission the statutory authority to review and analyze recommendations from the Secretary of Defense for base closures and realignments. After six years of base closings (the 1988 round under Public Law 100-526, and the 1991 and 1993 rounds under the current law), the Commission has accumulated much information, heard many suggestions, and learned many lessons about how the Federal government can more effectively assist communities affected by base closures to recover from the economic consequences of a base closure.

The Commission believes that in addition to making recommendations to close or realign military bases during the 1995 round, it is also appropriate to undertake two other tasks not mandated in its charter. These tasks are:

- 1) to examine the current status of reuse programs and regulations, and,
- 2) to make recommendations to the President, Congress, and communities for improving the Federal government's performance in fostering a timely, successful transition of bases from military use to civilian reuse.

This Commission will cease to exist, under current law, on December 31, 1995. The disruption visited upon hundreds of communities by its decisions, however, will continue for many years to come. The purpose of this section of the Commission's report is to offer suggestions to improve the interaction among Federal, state, and local officials, as well as the private sector, that is so critical to economic development.

### OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT REUSE PROCESS

#### *Key Elements*

In this report, "reuse" refers to the new use of a former military base intended for productive civilian activities.

*The Local Redevelopment Plan* Critical to the reuse process is a comprehensive redevelopment plan which contains various options the community intends to use to create jobs and effect economic recovery. The plan is developed by local community representatives who are recognized by the Department of Defense to carry out the redevelopment plan. The plan is also used as the basis for a federally required environmental impact analysis.

*Property Disposal Process.* Normally, the General Services Administration (GSA) is responsible for Federal property disposal. Pursuant to statutory direction, however, the Administrator of GSA has delegated the authority to dispose of military facilities to the Secretary of Defense, who has redelegated the authority to the Secretaries of the military departments.

Once the disposing military department determines it no longer needs to retain real property on a closing base, priority claims for use of the property go to DoD entities, and then to other federal agencies. If no federal agency requests the property, it is declared surplus. State and local governmental entities, including redevelopment authorities, may acquire the property through direct sales, public benefit conveyance, or economic development conveyance.

Transfers of property on those bases that will be closed under the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process are exempted from claims on behalf of homeless care providers that receive priority in other Federal property transfers. Transfers of property at bases closed in previous BRAC rounds are also eligible for this alternate process if the local redevelopment authority opts for it. In such cases, a community reuse plan must balance the needs of the homeless with other community and economic development needs.

*Public Benefit Conveyance:* Under a public benefit conveyance, closing base property may be transferred by the disposing military department in conjunction with other Federal agencies, for use by the local community at minimal or no cost for certain specified purposes. Examples include property used for airports, parks, schools, health care, ports, or prisons. In many cases, the continued presence of significant public services on former bases can provide an anchor to attract additional development.

*Economic Development Conveyance:* As an incentive to provide immediate jobs and to speed up economic redevelopment, the disposing military department may sell or lease all or portions of the real property, either at or below the fair market value, to a local redevelopment authority.

The disposing military department may also negotiate terms and conditions of payment for the property with the local redevelopment authority, and may transfer the property with or without initial payment, or with only partial payment at the time of transfer. In addition, the property may be transferred for in-kind services, such as environmental restoration, or exchanged for other real property. Generally, DoD and the local redevelopment authority share any net profits in cases where property is conveyed without an initial cost and is subsequently leased or sold.

*Environmental Restoration:* Environmental restoration of military bases is often the most difficult obstacle to civilian reuse. A transfer of real property by deed cannot be made until environmental cleanup is completed, or a clean-up remedy is in place and operating successfully. As a result of this prohibition, leasing base closure property to communities and businesses in advance of transfer has become a common practice. It is a means of giving communities and businesses early access to the property so that they may begin the economic redevelopment process.

In preparation for reuse, each major closing base has a BRAC cleanup team of experts from the DoD, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the state regulatory agencies. The team is responsible for expediting and improving environmental response actions in order to facilitate disposal and reuse, while protecting human health and the environment. Generally, DoD does not accelerate cleanup if the property is not likely to be used by the community or another user. The team also solicits public input on cleanup plans and on progress of the plans from community members of the local Restoration Advisory Boards.

The DoD BRAC account is the exclusive source of funds for environmental restoration at closing bases. This account is funded by annual appropriations and by proceeds from the sale of base closure properties. According to DoD, as of March 31, 1995, of the 252 military installations closed in the 1988, 1991, and 1993 BRAC rounds, there have been 24 negotiated or public sales (adding \$69.4 million to the account), and three sales via economic development (adding \$59.2 million to the account).

The issues of air quality and the reduction of air pollutants present a unique problem for some communities that are impacted by base closures. Communities which do not meet Federal standards for air quality are required to reduce air emissions in state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act.

Presently, there is no guarantee that the air emission credits available to the closing bases will be made available for reuse to the communities. The DoD may wish to retain the credits for its other installations in the same air district. This raises at least one major emission credits issue which continues to be unresolved: should air emission credits be retained for base reuse as personal property, or does DoD have priority claims on the credits and, therefore, may retain them for its own use elsewhere? At this writing, emissions trading rules have yet to be issued by DoD.

### *Federal Agencies and Reuse*

Many Federal departments and agencies provide programs that in some way directly or indirectly impact reuse activities. Although not inclusive, the following provide some major reuse programs.

*The Department of Defense* is the primary agency for setting overall policies relating to reuse at closing bases. It has delegated the responsibility for transferring and leasing base closure properties to each of its military departments. The DoD is also responsible for preparing environmental impact analyses, and for cleanup of contaminants at military bases.

The DoD retains responsibility for cleaning up any contamination caused by DoD that is discovered subsequent to transfer. It is not responsible, however, for cleanup of contaminants caused by future users. Additionally, DoD indemnifies transferees (owners or leasees) for any damages caused by contamination associated with DoD activities

The DoD's Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) offers technical assistance to local communities on how to organize for reuse activities. It also provides limited economic development planning grants as transitional assistance.

*The Department of Commerce's* (DOC) Economic Development Administration (EDA) provides grants to help communities implement comprehensive and innovative economic development strategies in response to base closures, including projects involving architectural and utility renovations, and overall industrial developments.

*The Department of Education* (DOEd) offers programs to certain former military and civilian personnel.

*The Department of the Interior* (DOI) ensures compliance with the Endangered Species Act. Many military bases have extensive wetland areas, and many have wildlife habitats.

*The Department of Labor* (DOL) provides retraining services and other readjustment services to communities for defense workers, particularly civilians at closing bases.

*The Environmental Protection Agency* (EPA) is the regulatory agency that oversees DoD's completion of environmental remedial investigations and feasibility studies, sets cleanup schedules, and selects environmental remedies for military bases on the National Priority List. The EPA concurs on DoD's identification of uncontaminated property, and participates as a member of the BRAC Cleanup Team at closing bases.

*The Federal Aviation Administration* (FAA) determines whether military airfield components are part of the National Airspace System, and if they should be retained within this system. The FAA

also assists communities with design criteria and procedures when converting military airfields to civil aviation use.

*The Small Business Administration* (SBA) provides loan guarantees and management and technical assistance to small businesses impacted by base closings.

### *Legislative and Administrative Changes Affecting Reuse Activities*

In recent years, Congress has passed, and the Executive Branch has implemented, far-reaching new laws to assist impacted communities. The DoD, EPA, DOL, and other Federal agencies have also adopted innovative regulatory and policy changes that provide a variety of assistance to impacted communities, their workers, and businesses. The most significant of the changes are discussed below.

- 1) The Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act (CERFA) was enacted in 1992 to release uncontaminated property for early reuse. It amends the basic legal framework (Section 120 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act or CERCLA, also known as the Superfund law) for the identification, restoration, and transfer of contaminated military properties. CERFA requires that uncontaminated parcels of land at closing bases be identified, and allows these clean parcels to be transferred while long-term cleanup of contaminated parcels continues. In addition, CERFA allows the transfer of property by deed when the cleanup remedy is in place and operating successfully.
- 2) On July 2, 1993, President Clinton announced a Five Point Plan to redevelop communities affected by base closures and realignments. The major goals of the plan are to create expeditious community redevelopment, and to foster new jobs in communities facing base closings. The plan was designed to offer communities: a) jobs-centered property disposal; b) larger Federal grants for economic development planning and technical assistance; c) on-site base transition coordinators as community ombudsmen; d) easy access to transition and redevelopment help, and e) fast-track environmental remediation for base reuse.
- 3) In 1993, Congress adopted a series of legislative provisions introduced by Senator Pryor of Arkansas during consideration of the National



Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994. These provisions, referred to as the Pryor Amendments, incorporate and expand the President's Five Point Plan. The Pryor Amendments permit the Secretary of Defense to transfer or lease all or portions of closing military bases to communities at or below fair market value or—in some cases—at no cost, and to negotiate terms and conditions of payments for properties. The legislation also permits the military departments to sell a parcel of land for the cost of cleanup or in exchange for cleanup at a closing base. In addition, the Pryor Amendments allow certain personal property—any property except land, fixed-in-place buildings, ships and Federal records—to be retained at the closing base to facilitate reuse, if there is no military need for the property.

- 4) The Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act, enacted into law on October 25, 1994, deleted the statutory requirement of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act to give priority claims for excess base closure properties to organizations that provide housing and services to the homeless. The new law balances local economic and community development needs with needs of the homeless in a way that is supportive of overall redevelopment efforts.
- 5) Legislation was included in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1995 to prohibit the Pentagon and the Commission, in their base closure and realignment decision-making processes, from penalizing communities that begin early reuse planning for redevelopment. In addition, this legislation also permitted DoD to provide financial assistance to communities for early reuse planning.

## HEARINGS AND SITE VISITS

The Commission held two public hearings in Washington, D.C. to address reuse issues and activities. During the first hearing, the Commission received testimony from Senator David Pryor of Arkansas, from local governmental officials and representatives of various organizations involved with reuse activities.

During the second hearing, the Commission received testimony from representatives of Executive Branch departments and agencies responsible for implementing reuse programs and activities.

The Commission also received letters, documents, and information about the reuse process from a variety of other sources, including Members of Congress and concerned citizens. Finally, the Commission staff conducted three fact-finding site visits, made numerous office visits, and maintained an active dialogue with community groups and organizations.

## FINDINGS

- 1) The Commission believes that the Executive Branch has recognized the difficulties communities face when military bases are closed or realigned. The Executive Branch and Congress have worked to reform the reuse process, and to provide financial and manpower assistance to the affected areas. The Commission found that as a result of the joint efforts, major achievements have been accomplished, such as the acceleration of cleanup efforts for contaminated sites on closing military bases, and improved local determination for the consideration of needs of the homeless in the reuse process.
- 2) The Commission found that DoD, through the military departments and defense agencies, has a continuing responsibility to clean up contaminated property at defense facilities. This obligation remains the same whether a base is closed pursuant to the base closure statutes or remains an open base. Federal agencies, including DoD, are precluded, however, from transferring property to another owner until that property is cleaned up. Specifically, section 120(h) of CERCLA requires DoD to include in the deed of sale a covenant that "all remedial action necessary to protect human health and the environment ..has been taken." To promote interim reuse while cleanup continues, DoD needs clear statutory authority that it can enter into long term leases of land that is not suitable for transfer. While the land should be leased only if there is no threat to public health and safety, long term leases are key to beginning the reuse process. DoD and EPA have already put into place a mechanism to determine when land is suitable to lease. However, DoD should be provided clear authority to enter into long term leases. Without long term leases, financing for redevelopment is difficult to obtain, and reuse is delayed.

- 3) Clearly, environmental cleanup is very costly. Funding levels for environmental restoration programs are declining. This could mean postponement of environmental cleanup, presenting further difficulties for impacted communities. The Commission notes that Congress is considering reduced funding levels for other Federal programs that are essential to communities for economic recovery, such as the OEA and EDA programs, and job training and retraining programs. The Commission feels strongly that adequate funding is crucial to programs that: a) assist in environmental restoration; b) help communities organize for reuse, and offer economic development planning grants and economic devastation grants; c) provide job training and retraining; and d) offer infrastructure and aviation improvements, and overall industrial development. A reduction of funding for any of these programs will cause a significant setback for communities that are working to recover from base closures.
- 4) Recently, the General Services Administration issued a ruling that would prevent DoD from making property available to a local redevelopment authority if the DoD continues to use the property, and DoD is interested in leasing rather than retaining ownership of the property. In some instances, when a base closes, some tenants remain on the base in an enclave. Oftentimes, these tenants are reserve or guard units with strong ties to the community. The units are left with the responsibility to maintain the small parcel of Federal property that is an island in the middle of the community's redevelopment effort. Should the DoD tenants decide to move outside of the base closure process, the community would be unable to acquire the property under the base closure statutes and would have to revert to acquiring the property under normal procedures of the Federal Property Act. The Commission believes that in some limited circumstances, it may be in the best interests of the communities and the remaining DoD tenants to allow the property to be transferred to the reuse authority, which would in turn lease the property back to the tenants for a token amount, generally \$1 per year.
- 5) The Commission received testimony from many communities that the property disposition process is insensitive to local concerns. The communities believe that in some instances, properties selected for Federal uses leave communities with a hodgepodge of disjointed parcels unsuitable for the development of any cohesive plan.
- 6) The Commission found that achieving sufficient environmental cleanup in a timely fashion presents one of the greatest obstacles in the entire reuse process. During the March 16, 1995, Commission hearing, numerous witnesses expressed concern about delay in environmental cleanup at closing bases that hampers communities engaged in economic redevelopment. The Commission believes that after public health concerns have been addressed, the most commercially viable properties should be given priority for site investigation and cleanup.
- 7) The Commission heard testimony that there are frequent delays in the formal screening of real property at closing bases that have been deemed excess to the needs of DoD and surplus to the needs of the Federal government. Notwithstanding statutory deadlines for completing the screening process, the system is often unnecessarily slow and cumbersome.
- 8) On April 6, 1994, DoD issued an interim final rule, and on October 26, 1994, issued an amendment to the rule which, together, implement the President's Five Point Plan, the Pryor Amendments, and the Homeless Assistance Act Amendments. The interim final rule provides guidance to DoD on its authority to give priority to early reuse of real and personal properties on closing military bases in order to stimulate and encourage community reinvestment and speedy job creation. The interim final rule amendment clarifies the application process and criteria to be used to evaluate applications for real properties on the bases. The Commission found that as of this writing, the final rule to implement essential reuse programs has not been promulgated.
- 9) The Commission found that allocating air emission credits or planning offsets presents problems for some communities located in areas which do not meet Clean Air Act standards for air quality. Military installations that remain open or expand in the same air basin may need air credits or planning offsets that could be used by communities to attract businesses and revitalize economic activities at losing bases. The Commission found the issue

of who should retain the air emission credits or offsets, the community or DoD, continues to be unresolved.

- 10) Officials of the Environmental Protection Agency told the Commission they believe some military departments do not retain senior environmental staff throughout the BRAC cleanup process. The EPA testified that its experience shows as bases downsize for closure, they often lose the most experienced environmental cleanup personnel. According to EPA, an experienced and knowledgeable BRAC Cleanup Team is a significant element in the speedy environmental cleanup at a closing base.
- 11) Most major closing bases have an on-site Base Transition Coordinator (BTC) who works with the local community as an ombudsman. Base Transition Coordinators often serve as a conduit between the community and Federal departments and agencies. The Commission found that, far too often, decisions by BTCs at the local level are revoked by higher headquarters.
- 12) The Commission found that while many communities value the importance of advance planning for the transition of closed bases to civilian use, a significant number of communities delayed early planning for fear it would be counted against them in the base closure and realignment decision-making process. The Commission found that over the years, seminars have been held, information has been printed and disseminated, discussions have been had, and just last year, legislation was enacted, all with the intent to inform the public that early planning for base closings is a wise decision, and that decision-makers will not use their early planning against them. Nevertheless, the Commission found that many communities continue to delay advance reuse planning to avoid a perception that the community is preparing for a potential base closure or realignment.
- 13) Many local officials in areas where major military installations are located believe base closures will result in severe economic disruption to their local communities. For many of them, the military bases are the largest employers. Moreover, the Commission recognizes that generally, urban areas tend to attract reuse activities more easily than rural areas because urban areas tend to have a more diverse economy and a greater demand for those services and the real estate that a redeveloped military base can offer.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

### TO CONGRESS:

- 1) The Commission believes certain legislative changes to the statutory cleanup process could benefit the communities by returning property to productive reuse and save money in the long run. These changes were suggested initially by DoD, and in some instances, in conjunction with EPA:
  - a) Allow DoD to take into consideration the long-term, anticipated land use when making cleanup decisions. According to DoD, this would facilitate the transfer of property and yield better coordinated cleanups and reuse plans.
  - b) Provide flexibility in the choice of remediation methods—permanent solutions may not make sense in all instances.
  - c) Provide EPA with discretionary authority—similar to that enjoyed by private sites—not to place closing military bases on the National Priority List (NPL) if, in EPA's judgment, sufficient progress is being made towards cleanup.
  - d) Clarify section 120(h) of CERCLA to allow long term lease of contaminated property at closing military bases. This would help to speed up the return of bases to productive reuse, and ensure DoD access to the property to perform the required remediation.
  - e) Amend CERFA to clarify that storage of hazardous material does not automatically prevent a parcel of land from being clean, if the amount of material stored was either minimal or if there was no release. According to DoD, the current statutory language excludes many residential areas from being considered clean parcels because domestic hazardous materials, such as paint and home heating oil, were stored for more than a year.
- 2) The Commission recommends that Congress provide adequate funding levels to those programs that are determined to impact critically on community planning and economic development (including the OEA and EDA programs), and job training and retraining (various Labor Department programs).
- 3) The Commission recommends Congress carefully review and support DoD funding levels to meet its environmental obligations to clean up contamination and prevent future contamination.

The Commission believes Congress should provide adequate funding levels for environmental restoration activities at closing bases

- 4) The Commission recommends a change in the property disposal law to allow all parties demonstrating an interest in property at closing bases to come to the table at the same time, bringing their needs and requests for evaluation. This would allow for planned reuse decisions that meet the needs of the local community, and would retain within the Executive Branch the ability to obtain property for beneficial public uses. The current system permits former military bases to be “picked apart” by other Federal agencies, which have first call on the most desirable portions of the installation.

#### ***TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH:***

- 1) The Commission recommends DoD clean up the most commercially viable contaminated base areas first, and the least desirable contaminated areas later, as long as the sites are stabilized and no public health threats are imminent.
- 2) The Commission recommends DoD and other Federal government departments and agencies adhere to the statutory deadlines for completing the screening process of surplus real property at closing bases
- 3) The Commission urges the General Services Administration to reconsider its interpretation of the Federal Property Act to allow the transfer and leaseback of base closure property in certain limited circumstances where there are economic advantages to the community and to the DoD tenants. If the GSA determines that it does not have authority under the Federal Property Act to approve the transfer and leaseback of the property, then the Commission urges GSA to pursue a legislative initiative that would allow this type of transaction.
- 4) The Commission recommends DoD act expeditiously to promulgate the final rules and regulations required to implement the President’s Five Point Plan to stimulate and encourage community reinvestment and speedy job creation.
- 5) The Commission recommends DoD act expeditiously to promulgate an emissions trading policy which would clarify who retains air emission credits when base closing properties are transferred from military departments to

communities


- 6) The Commission recommends DoD and EPA identify factors that will encourage senior DoD environmental cleanup personnel to remain at closing bases throughout the cleanup process.
- 7) The Commission recommends Base Transition Coordinators (BTC) be given authority to make and implement more local decisions in a timely fashion. The DoD should establish a better working relationship with the BTCs to avoid frequent revocations from the Pentagon, a problem that can be an obstacle to speedy economic development.
- 8) Since early community planning is so crucial to successful community redevelopment, the Commission urges DoD to take a more proactive role and work more aggressively with public and private organizations in developing strategies that will help communities use advanced reuse planning as a tool rather than seeing it as an obstacle.

#### ***TO COMMUNITIES:***

It is far easier to identify what legislative and policy steps Congress and the Executive Branch might take to assist communities in making a successful economic transition after base closure than it is to direct suggestions to the hundreds of diverse communities. Nonetheless, some changes in community attitudes and activities can also make a large contribution to improving the quality of life after closure.

- 1) Communities are encouraged to contact the various Federal departments and agencies that are mentioned earlier in this report for assistance in the reuse process. As an example, DoD’s Office of Economic Adjustment (OEA) provides technical assistance and grants to communities that wish to do advance reuse planning. OEA can help the community form a committee of appropriate public and private sector representatives to plan, coordinate, and implement economic adjustment efforts. A request for assistance can be made to the Director, Office of Economic Adjustment, 400 Army Navy Drive, Suite 200, Arlington, Virginia 22202-2884. OEA can be reached by telephone at 703/604-6020. Communities are also encouraged to contact the Commerce Department’s Office of Economic Conversion Information (listed below) for a list of successful base closings that can serve as a model. In

- addition, both offices can offer other important and relevant information about closing bases.
- 2) Early organization is crucial to a community. Should the community decide to fight to keep a base open, the Commission recommends that concurrently, the community organize and work just as hard toward developing a contingency civilian reuse plan as early as possible, and not wait for base closure to occur.
  - 3) Early formation of a local redevelopment authority is critical to early development of a comprehensive redevelopment plan. Membership should be kept to a manageable size, and should not exclude any key elements of the community. This is the body that must develop the base reuse plan.
  - 4) The local redevelopment authority should be well organized and speak as a single body from the time of its initial approach to the Federal government, and throughout the reuse process. Community and jurisdictional disagreements may cause confusion for those who have to work and communicate with the redevelopment authority, and may prohibit the group from reaching its goal of reuse of the closing base in a timely fashion. In many instances, failure to develop a reuse plan is the result of unresolved local disagreements.
  - 5) The Commission recommends that the local redevelopment authority solicit early support for its community reuse plan from surrounding impacted jurisdictions.
  - 6) It is crucial for the local redevelopment authority to identify as early as possible all real and personal properties it wishes to retain for reuse. Additionally, it is crucial for the authority to work with the disposing military department to resolve issues surrounding the properties, such as tenant use of utilities, and responsibilities for property maintenance.
  - 7) It is important for local redevelopment authorities to work with the disposing military department in developing an effective marketing strategy for reuse of the base.
  - 8) The Commission recommends the free services of the Office of Economic Conversion Information in Washington, D.C. to communities, individuals, and businesses who seek information about the Federal reuse process and activities. This is a Federal clearinghouse that is cosponsored by the Departments of Commerce and Defense. The clearinghouse can be reached by telephone at 1-800-345-1222. (Participating Federal Depository Libraries are also available at this number.) The hearing impaired may access the clearinghouse by dialing 1-202-501-0868 TDD. A request for information can be made to: The Office of Economic Conversion Information, Economic Development Administration, Room 7231, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230-0001.



# CHAPTER 3 ISSUES FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION

## The Future of the Base Closure and Realignment Process

Under current law, this Report of the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission represents the final opportunity for the Defense Department to close or realign military installations in the United States under the expedited process established in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. At the completion of the work of this Commission, the closure or realignment of military installations in the United States will be governed by section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code.

Under section 2687, the closure of any military installation in the United States with at least 300 civilian employees, or the realignment of any installation involving a reduction of more than 1,000 civilian employees or of more than 50 percent of the installation's civilian workforce, cannot take place until the Secretary of Defense carries out "an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of such closure or realignment." If the Secretary concludes as a result of these evaluations that the closure or realignment should proceed, the Secretary must notify Congress of the proposed closure or realignment and wait 30 legislative, or 60 calendar, days before proceeding.

Experience has demonstrated that the process for closing or realigning bases contained in section 2687 is unworkable. During the decade following enactment of this statute in 1977, the Defense Department did not close or realign a single major military installation in the United States. Changing mission requirements and reductions in defense spending, however, placed growing pressures on both Congress and the Defense Department to deal with the problem of eliminating unnecessary and inefficient facilities and installations. These pressures ultimately led Congress and the Executive Branch to set aside the base closure process

contained in section 2687 and to create the 1988 Base Closure Commission and then to enact the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

Despite four rounds of base closures and realignments, reductions in domestic infrastructure in the Defense Department have not kept pace with reductions in funding and force levels. In the last ten years, the defense budget has declined in real terms by almost 40 percent. Under current plans, defense spending will continue to decline in real terms each year through 1999. Overall, the Defense Department has reduced the size of the military services by 30 percent. By the end of this decade, the Army will have eliminated 45 percent of its divisions, the Air Force 44 percent of its tactical fighter wings, and the Navy 37 percent of its ships.

At the same time, the three previous closure rounds (1988, 1991 and 1993) have resulted in a decrease in our domestic base infrastructure of 15 percent. With the additional reductions proposed by this Commission, the cumulative reduction in military installations will be approximately 21 percent if accepted by the President and the Congress.

Secretary of Defense William Perry acknowledged to the Commission that the Defense Department will still have excess infrastructure after the 1995 round of closures and realignments. Secretary Perry suggested the need for an additional round of closures and realignments in 3 to 4 years, after the Defense Department has absorbed the effects of the closures and realignment from this and prior rounds.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also testified to the Commission that excess capacity would remain in the Defense Department after this closure round. General Shalikashvili agreed with Secretary Perry on the need for additional base closing authority in the future, and said that opportunities remain in DOD to increase cross-servicing, particularly in the area of joint-use bases and training facilities.

In testimony during the Commission's final public hearing on June 14, 1995, Joshua Gotbaum, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security, indicated that "Even after BRAC 95 has been implemented, we will continue to have excess infrastructure." Secretary Gotbaum also indicated that "Future base closure authority will be necessary." The Commission agrees with these statements.

The base closure process established in the Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 has worked well. As Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan told the Commission, if the defense budget continues to decline and additional base closings are necessary, "the only way to do it is to have a BRAC commission."

The Defense Department will be implementing the closures and realignments of the 1995 and prior Commissions through the end of this decade. The requirement in the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act that all closures be completed within 6 years means that the closures from the 1995 round will not be completed until 2001. For that reason, the Commission recommends that the Congress authorize another Base Closure Commission for the year 2001 similar to the 1991, 1993 and 1995 Commissions.

Between now and the time another Commission is authorized, all of the military services have expressed the need to be able to make changes to the decisions of this and prior Commissions. During the 1995 Commission process, 27 of the 146 recommendations submitted to the Commission by the Secretary of Defense were changes to prior Commission decisions. The 1991 and 1993 Commissions made changes to prior Commission decisions, and it is very likely that modifications or changes will be required to other Commission decisions in the future.

The Commission agrees with the Defense Department that the existing authority provided in section 2687 of Title 10 should be revised to allow modifications to past base closure Commission recommendations between now and the time that another base closure round is authorized. Any modifications under this process to previous closure decisions should be covered by the same special statutory and regulatory provisions addressing the disposal and reuse of military installations closed under the 1988 and 1990 base closure statutes.

The Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 created a fair, open and objective process

through which large numbers of excess military installations in the United States have been or will be closed or realigned. Establishing another Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 2001 will give the military services time to complete the current closures in an orderly fashion, while ensuring that the Defense Department has the opportunity in the future to make further reductions in military installations in the United States.

### *Military Hospitals*

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Defense Department aggressively pursue military medical consolidation and restructuring, use civilian sector resources where doing so would be cost-effective, eliminate excess capacity in the direct care system, and maximize the utilization of remaining resources across the military services. The Medical Joint Cross-Service Group, created by DoD for the 1995 round of base closures, was a valuable first step towards accomplishing these goals. DoD is taking another important step in this direction with the creation of the Tricare program. This program, currently in its initial implementation phase, is designed to provide DoD with a systematic way to find the most cost effective means of delivering health care services, whether those means entail the use of direct care infrastructure, civilian providers, or some combination of the two.

The Joint Cross-Service Group developed a list of suggested hospital realignments that represents a good first step towards restructuring of the military medical system, although most of the Group's alternatives were not forwarded to the Commission as closure or realignment recommendations. DoD officials have stated that they are pursuing some of these actions outside of the base closure process. The Commission reviewed the Joint Cross-Service Group's recommendations for military medical facilities. During this review, the Commission received assurances from senior OSD and service officials that they will work together and aggressively pursue further consolidation and integration of military medical facilities, including restructuring actions across service lines. The Commission urges OSD and the military services to work together in this important effort.

This combination of hospital restructuring initiatives within and outside of the base closure process, however, should be viewed as the beginning point of a process and not the end. Even after the

implementation of the recommendations of this Commission and the actions the services are taking outside of the base closure process, many opportunities will remain for consolidation of resources across service lines and with civilian sector medical resources.

DoD should aggressively seek out and pursue these opportunities. Appropriately targeted reductions in direct care capacity, particularly inpatient bed capacity, would likely enhance both the cost and mission effectiveness of the military medical system. Cost effectiveness would be enhanced when DoD provides directly only those services that would be more costly to purchase from the civilian health care system. Mission effectiveness would be enhanced when infrastructure reductions permit the DoD to focus its direct care assets in the most mission critical areas directly related to medical care.

A careful assessment of requirements and available civilian resources is particularly important for the small military hospitals located in areas with an over-capacity of civilian medical resources. Realignment of these hospitals to clinics or sub-acute care inpatient facilities is likely to be cost effective without eroding the department's ability to accomplish either the peacetime or wartime missions of the military health services system.

Finally, no efforts to address DoD medical infrastructure issues, no matter how well designed, will be able to accomplish meaningful, appropriate reductions in the size of the military medical system unless DoD reaches a consensus on the readiness requirement of that system. Without consensus about the size of the medical system needed to support readiness requirements, significant changes to military medical infrastructure will be difficult to achieve. The Defense Department needs to reach a clear understanding of its wartime medical requirements and how it will meet them.

### *Privatization of DoD Industrial and Commercial Activities*

During the Commission's review of Defense Department recommendations to close the maintenance functions at Louisville and Indianapolis, the local communities presented proposals that would allow a local redevelopment authority to obtain ownership of the closed depot facilities. These facilities would then be offered to private companies or employee groups for use in proposing bids on

work previously performed at these installations. Acceptance of these proposals is beyond the Commission's authority to direct, but they appear to be a positive approach to solving the Navy's excess infrastructure problem.

The former government employees would provide a skilled labor pool, and, if successful, the local communities could transition the excess infrastructure into industrial parks or other businesses. The Commission strongly urges innovative approaches such as these be developed in partnership with local communities as a way to promote use of excess infrastructure and also reduce costs for required functions.

It would be possible for the communities to acquire the facilities through the reuse process, but only an active partnership with DoD can resolve the issues of workload, staff carryover, and technology transfer which could make such enterprises both viable and beneficial to the community, employees, and DoD.

While this initiative is in line with the privatization goals cited by the recent Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, it goes one step farther by including DoD and the local community as active participants in the process. By creating truly cooperative ventures, rather than simply divesting an operation to the private sector, DoD can ensure that its requirements are met directly, while enjoying the efficiency of private operation.

The Commission believes reducing infrastructure by expanding privatization to other DoD industrial and commercial activities will reduce the cost of maintaining and operating a ready military force. Many industrial and commercial activities now performed by military and civilian personnel throughout the military services could be operated by the private sector without any loss of military capability. Privatization of these functions would reduce operating costs, eliminate excess infrastructure, and allow uniformed personnel to focus on skills and activities directly related to their military missions.

The Commission received testimony indicating that the current statutory requirement that at least 60 percent of the depot maintenance workload in each military service must be done in DoD depots may be an impediment to further privatization. The Commission urges Congress and the Defense Department to review this matter carefully.



### *Cross-Servicing Within the Department of Defense*

In previous BRAC cycles, the analyses and development of recommendations for closure and realignment actions were conducted solely within the military services. In preparation for the 1995 cycle, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established five Joint Cross-Service Groups to examine the following functional areas: medical; undergraduate pilot training; test and evaluation activities; research and development laboratories; and depot maintenance. Each group was chaired by a senior executive from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and was composed of members from each of the military services. Each of the groups established useful policy objectives to downsize DoD infrastructure and encourage cross-servicing of workload. The groups also established data call procedures which resulted in data that were comparable between the military services.

Despite the attempts through the BRAC 1995 preparation process, few cross-servicing recommendations were included in the Secretary's base closure recommendations to the Commission. The Joint Cross-Service Groups produced a number of cross-servicing recommendations. The Depot Maintenance Joint Cross-Service Group, for example, developed two sets of base closure alternatives. Both alternatives suggested eight maintenance depots for closure and both contained significant cross-servicing opportunities. However, rather than transmitting their suggestions to the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the DoD BRAC recommendations, the Joint Cross-Service Groups submitted their suggestions to the military departments for consideration. The military departments did not include most of the Joint Cross-Service Groups suggestions in their BRAC recommendations to the Secretary of Defense.

The Commission recommends the Department of Defense include efforts to establish cross-servicing during any future base closure rounds. The Joint Cross-Service Groups should be responsible for assessing the workload component and the cost and savings aspects of their recommendations. For that reason, these Groups and not the military services should prepare COBRA analyses to reflect the impact of their recommendations. The Group leaders should propose cross-servicing recommendations directly to the Secretary of Defense for review and consideration early in the process of

developing the Department's proposals.

### *Military Family Housing*

In its recommendations to the Commission, the Army recommended the disposal of family housing in many high-cost and remote areas. The justification for these recommendations was that sufficient commercial housing is available on the local economy using Basic Allowance for Quarters and Variable Housing Allowance. The Commission viewed this to be an erosion of quality of life for the soldier and his family and a transfer of DoD's shortfall in funding for family housing operations and maintenance to a significant out-of-pocket expense to the soldier.

The Commission encourages DoD to expedite its effort to draft, and the Congress to enact, legislation that will allow the private sector to acquire and revitalize military family housing for the Department of Defense.

### *Engineering Field Activity (EFA) West, San Bruno, CA*

The Navy's Engineering Field Activity (EFA) West, in San Bruno, California was added for consideration by the Commission as a potential closure or realignment. Although the Commission did not take any action to realign or close this activity, the Commission is concerned that the activity occupies a compound much larger than it needs which is expensive to operate and maintain. This property is in a location well-suited for more intensive commercial development.

In the past, the Navy held preliminary discussions with the city of San Bruno about an exchange of property for the construction and conveyance to the federal government of a building which would reflect the value of any parcel acquired by the city. If the Navy retains the property in its current configuration, it will continue to pay for unnecessary operating costs, and it will forfeit the opportunity to locate EFA West, and potentially other federal tenants, in modern office space at minimal cost. The city will also lose the opportunity to obtain the economic benefit from the appropriate development of property in their community. The Commission strongly recommends that the Navy pursue the opportunity to maximize the use of the EFA West compound for the benefit of the Navy and the local community.

While this discussion refers to one specific base, there may be many others that could be more effectively used if creative solutions are investigated by the services in consultation with the local communities. The Commission encourages the use of innovative approaches to the effective utilization of Department of Defense real estate. Implementation of solutions such as the one for EFA West can create significant infrastructure savings without base closure actions.

### *Return on Investment*

Like DoD, the Commission used return on investment as one of the eight criteria in making decisions regarding the realignment or closure of an installation. Over the past three rounds, several issues regarding the calculation of return on investment surfaced during the process. This round was no exception. The most significant issues to surface during this round follow:

- First, even after four rounds, there still existed a significant amount of difference among the services regarding how they conducted their Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model runs
- Second, the exclusion of environmental cleanup costs and locality pay for civilian employees continued to be a point of contention with many communities.
- Third, the exclusion in the calculations of some relevant costs and savings tended to obscure the actual economic benefit to the DoD
- Finally, the largest area of concern was the policy of using a yearly revised “cost of money” rate as the discount rate used to calculate net present value.

Each service or defense agency was responsible for conducting its own COBRA runs. This policy permitted significant differences among the services in how they calculated return on investment. Even though the GAO and service Inspector Generals audited this process, several differences in the methods to generate COBRA runs were not captured through these audits. For instance, the Navy, in several of their COBRA runs, excluded the cost of mission personnel assigned to an installation who provide disassembly, packing, unpacking, reinstallation and recalibration of specialized equipment, while the other services and agencies reported a one-time moving cost for these activities. This allowed the Navy to avoid showing moving costs associated with a realignment or closure action

that sometimes were significant. Although the other services generally did not, the Air Force sometimes included a Base Conversion Agency cost even though COBRA automatically calculated a program planning cost to manage the base realignment or closure activity. Finally, the Army did not include many of the costs included by the other services because they conducted COBRA runs from a macro viewpoint. All of these and other differences led to different costs and savings estimates.

A second area of concern was the treatment of environmental cleanup costs and locality pay. The DoD policy excluded both of these costs. This policy was vigorously challenged by communities. Some communities asserted that any closure or realignment action would likely result in a change in the overall cost to cleanup an installation, either by accelerating the cleanup or conducting the cleanup with old technologies. DoD policy had been able to virtually ignore the impact on environmental restoration costs as a result of the realignment or closure action. While this may have been a valid approach, the policy should be reviewed for any future base closure efforts. The second cost ignored by DoD was the change in locality pay for civilian employees. The COBRA captured Variable Housing Allowance for military personnel and local construction cost differences in a local “Area Cost Factor.” It was therefore inconsistent not to consider civilian locality pay differences. This concern was especially relevant since locality pay is based on federal law and was a recognizable cost to DoD as a result of an action which realigned personnel from a low-cost area with no locality pay to one with a high cost of living.

The next area of concern was the number of legitimate costs and savings which were not included in the COBRA calculations. One of these was the savings that occurs when greater efficiency is achieved by consolidating functions into fewer locations. Even though these savings were difficult to estimate, it was a legitimate savings due to the closure process. Another legitimate and sometimes significant savings was the avoidance of future capital investment that occurs when a large installation is closed. Most real property has to be replaced every forty to fifty years. Therefore, a portion of a base’s infrastructure which needs to be replaced each year was not captured in military construction budgets or real property maintenance accounts. These very real and significant savings were missed in the current execution of

COBRA. Also, there were costs for projects that were delayed due to a move or realignment that were not captured in the COBRA model. For instance, in this round, the Navy sometimes put a program on hold while a move was taking place. Even though this might incur a significant cost to DoD, it was not included in the COBRA. Finally, DoD should make every attempt to capture all costs associated with the base closure process. Costs such as increased CHAMPUS costs, Medicare impacts, and active duty/reserve forces cost sharing arrangements have historically been omitted from COBRA considerations.

The last major area of concern involved the use of an annually revised cost of money as the discount rate. The discount rate was used to calculate the present worth of future savings. These savings were discounted for the decreased value of money in the future. In 1991, the discount rate was 10 percent. In 1993, DoD used a 7 percent rate and in 1995, a 2.75 percent rate was used. These different rates caused a large difference in the net present value of future savings. Using a 10 percent rate decreased the savings to a third of what they would be if a discount rate of 2.75 percent were used. Instead of using a rate which can vary greatly from year-to-year, a reasonable estimate of 5 to 7 percent should be used and not changed over time. The General Accounting Office recommended the use of a 4.85 percent discount rate for the 1995 round. Using the same discount rate is the only way to compare one round of BRAC with another round.

### *Analysis of Economic Impact*

Economic analysis of bases identified for closures and realignments in the 1995 round improved significantly from prior base closure rounds. Economic data provided to the Commission from the Joint Cross-Service Group (JCSG) on Economic Impact provided a coherent and comprehensive analytic approach for estimating the economic impact of military base closures. Similarly, the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's economic impact computer software was far superior to economic capabilities available to past Commissions. Despite the ongoing improvements in calculating the economic impact of a base closure, there were a number of areas that could be improved.

The primary focus of the JCSG economic impact software was to determine the number of military, civilian, and private contractor personnel eliminated or reassigned from a defense establishment and to determine the indirect job loss resulting from base closures and realignments. Personnel may be relocated on paper among several different duty stations before their final destinations are determined. Personnel reassigned from their original station to a new station were not efficiently tracked by the economic impact software. This deficiency resulted in significant reconciliation efforts by the Commission's economic and Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) analysts.

A modification to the economic analysis software to automatically account for reassigned military, civilian, and private contractor personnel from each origin to all destinations would be a significant improvement to the current software. Also, the software should be able to account for the changes in the number of military, civilian, and private contractors arriving at each destination from all origins. These modifications would reduce the potential for errors in cost and economic analysis.

The DoD Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact decided that cumulative economic impact would include prior BRAC actions if personnel losses occurred in 1994 or later. The Group decided that historical government economic trend data would capture the actual economic impacts of BRAC actions prior to 1994. Therefore, the 1995 Commission economic database did not include any closure or realignment personnel actions completed prior to 1994. The 1995 Commission concluded that this approach did not fully accommodate the concerns of the communities affected. To improve the database as a tool for computing cumulative economic impact, all prior base closure actions in an economic area should be included in the grand totals of the cumulative economic impact calculations.


A job multiplier obtained from government economic source material was used in calculations to determine the indirect job loss resulting from a base closure or realignment. The Commission's review of multipliers found that a number of the services' multipliers appeared lower than those independently computed by the Commission. Ongoing discussions with the Joint Cross-Service Groups clarified multiplier differences. To reduce

conflicting economic analysis based on multipliers, the military services should provide official documentation to the Commission explaining any changes in multipliers used to calculate indirect job loss.

Existing unemployment in an area that might be affected by a BRAC action was important when calculating the total economic impact of a potential base closure or realignment. One method to assess the total potential unemployment rate is to combine the current unemployment rate with the impact computed for BRAC, making sure the employment base definition is consistent, i.e., does or does not include military personnel between each economic area analyzed.

The Joint Cross-Service Group used the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data for an employment data base by economic area. The Commission approved the Department of Defense's use of BEA data which represented a change from relying solely on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data during previous base closure rounds. The Commission agreed to use BEA, because unlike BLS, the data found in BEA included military personnel. However, historical information on employment and rates of unemployment in the economic impact database were published by BLS. Consequently, the use of two data sources on employment led to confusion. The Commission recommends that separate reports be generated for economic impacts using BEA data and for the historical trends using BLS data.

The Commission also found that the use of COBRA personnel summary sheets to alter the economic database worksheets led to possible errors in economic calculations when personnel changes were within the same economic area or when the economic impact was computed from a "redirect" action. These errors could be eliminated if the services provided the Commission separate economic impact data base revisions in the same manner as they provide separate COBRA revisions.



# CHAPTER 4 PREVIOUS BASE CLOSURE ROUNDS

## HISTORY OF BASE CLOSURE

Closing military installations has always been a difficult process. Whether closures are designed to reduce military overhead, enhance readiness and modernization, or reflect the realities of changing international threats, the impact of these decisions on local communities can be dramatic and painful. Additionally, the decision-making process itself has had a controversial history, punctuated with accusations of political interference and retribution.

In the early 1960's, President Kennedy concluded that the large defense base structure developed during World War II and the Korean conflict was no longer necessary. At the President's direction, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara developed and implemented a base closure program. The criteria governing the selection process were established primarily within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with minimal consultation with the military departments or Congress. Hundreds of bases closures and realignments took place during this period, and more than 60 major bases were closed. Despite these accomplishments, charges that base closures were used by the Executive Branch to punish uncooperative legislators were prevalent.

In 1965, Congress passed legislation setting up reporting requirements designed to involve itself in any DoD base closure program. The legislation was vetoed by President Johnson, further exacerbating the growing confrontation between the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. Despite this antagonistic situation, the Department of Defense was able to complete base realignments and closures routinely throughout the 1960's.

During the 1970's, however, DoD found it increasingly difficult to realign or close installations due to continued attempts by Congress to regulate the base closure process and to limit or deny base closure funding. In 1976, the Military Construction

Authorization Bill contained a provision prohibiting any base closure or reduction of more than 250 civilian employees until the Department had notified Congress of the proposed actions, assessed the personnel and economic impacts, followed the study provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and waited nine months. This bill was vetoed by President Ford, and the Congressional veto override effort failed.

An important turning point in the struggle between Congress and the Executive Branch occurred in 1977. In that year, Congress succeeded in enacting legislation which severely restricted DoD's ability to close military bases. This statute—Title 10, United States Code, Section 2687—required the Department of Defense to notify Congress if an installation became a closure or realignment candidate. The law also subjected all proposed closure actions to the lengthy environmental evaluation requirements of the NEPA process, as well as to local economic and strategic consequence reports. In addition, DoD was required to wait 60 days for Congress to respond to its recommendations. These and other procedural requirements established in Section 2687, combined with Congressional reluctance to close military bases, effectively halted base closures (Section 2687 appears in Appendix C of this Report).

For a decade following the passage of Section 2687, all attempts at closing major installations failed, and proposed realignments of small military units were often thwarted. At the same time, the 1980's witnessed a dramatic increase in defense spending and rapid military expansion, reaching its peak in 1985. As the defense budget declined in subsequent years, the size of the U.S. armed forces changed, yet the base structure remained unaltered. As a result, readiness was being threatened as the services struggled to pay the operating costs of unneeded bases and infrastructure.

## THE 1988 COMMISSION

By 1988, the Defense budget had declined for three straight years and was predicted to decline further. To ensure that scarce DoD resources would be devoted to the most pressing operational and investment needs rather than maintaining unneeded property, facilities, or overhead, Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci chartered the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure on May 3, 1988 (See Appendix D). The Commission sought to close obsolete military bases and bring the base structure in line with the declining force structure. Enacted into law in October, 1988, Public Law 100-526 provided the statutory basis for this one-time approach. The law also provided relief from certain statutory impediments to closures, such as a partial exemption from NEPA, delegated property disposal authority, and an expedited process for Congressional review of BRAC recommendations (Public Law 100-526 appears in Appendix E).

The 1988 Commission was co-chaired by former Senator Abraham Ribicoff and former Congressman Jack Edwards. Other commissioners appointed by the Secretary of Defense were Louis W. Cabot; W. Graham Claytor, Jr.; Donald F. Craib, Jr.; Thomas F. Eagleton; Martin R. Hoffmann; Bryce Poe II; William H. Rowden; James C. Smith II; Donn A. Starry; and Russell E. Train. The 1988 Commission issued its report on December 29, 1988. It recommended the closure of 86 military facilities and the realignment of 59 others, with an estimated savings of \$693.6 million annually. The 1988 Commission's recommendations represented a reduction of approximately 3 percent of the domestic base structure. The 1988 Commission's authority expired after the submission of its final report (a complete list of the 1988 recommendations are contained in Appendix L on a state-by-state basis, and in Appendix M by military service).

Major base closure and realignment recommendations of the 1988 Commission include:

### 16 CLOSURES

George Air Force Base, CA  
Mather Air Force Base, CA  
Norton Air Force Base, CA  
Presidio of San Francisco, CA  
Chanute Air Force Base, IL  
Fort Sheridan, IL  
Jefferson Proving Ground, IN

Lexington Bluegrass Army Depot, KY  
Naval Station Lake Charles, LA  
Army Material Tech Lab, MA  
Pease Air Force Base, NH  
Naval Station Brooklyn, NY  
Philadelphia Naval Hospital, PA  
Naval Station Galveston, TX  
Fort Douglas, UT  
Cameron Station, VA

### 11 REALIGNMENTS

Fort Huachuca, AZ  
Pueblo Army Depot, CO  
Fort McPherson, GA  
Fort Devens, MA  
Fort Holabird, MD  
Fort Meade, MD  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Umatilla Army Depot, OR  
Fort Bliss, TX  
Naval Station Puget Sound, WA

Public Law 100-526 required Secretary Carlucci to accept or reject the 1988 Commission's recommendations in its entirety. In January, 1989, he accepted all of the recommendations. The law provided Congress with the same accept or reject in full option. In May, 1989, the Congressional review period expired without the enactment of a joint resolution of disapproval. As a result, the Commission's 1988 recommendations went into effect and have the force of law.

Implementation of the 1988 Commission's recommendations was required to start by January, 1990, and to be completed by October, 1995. As of June, 1995, 14 of the 16 installations recommended for closure have been closed.

Enactment of P.L. 100-526 constituted a recognition that consolidation in the military basing structure could be a way to realize savings in the defense budget, while not impairing the ability of the armed forces to carry out their missions. Although designed to break the stalemate and balance the prerogatives of the two branches of government, the Congressional response was reminiscent of the base closing activities of the early 1960's. Congressional critics claimed that the list unfairly targeted districts represented by certain members of Congress. The 1988 Commission was appointed by, and reported directly to, the Secretary of Defense.

It generated its own list of recommended closures and realignments. All hearings and votes were conducted in closed sessions. Little information about how the Commission arrived at its recommendations was made available to the public.

#### CHANGING WORLD SITUATION

The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the international political landscape. The late 1980's and early 1990's saw the fall of the Berlin Wall, the demise of the Warsaw Pact, and the breakup of the Soviet Union. These events dramatically changed U.S. military requirements. It became clear that our national defense posture could be strengthened, and costs reduced, through a more efficient military base structure. At the same time, the rapidly growing national debt became an increasingly urgent political issue. Thus, base closures and realignments became a part of each military department's budget strategy for balancing their base structure with their declining force structure.

Public Law 100-526, however, established a one-time only Commission, which expired on December 31, 1988. Consequently, closing bases was once again governed by the procedures mandated by Section 2687 of Title 10, United States Code—procedures that had prevented base closures for over a decade.

To address the problem of excess infrastructure, in January, 1990, Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney unilaterally proposed the closure of 35 additional bases and the realignment or reduction of forces at more than 20 other bases. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, however, had failed to provide specific written guidance to the military services and defense agencies on how to evaluate bases for possible closure or realignment. The services, consequently, all used different processes to come up with their recommendations.

As in the past, the 1990 recommendations submitted by Secretary Cheney were met with Congressional protests that the list was politically influenced. And, as in the past, Congress was criticized for being institutionally incapable of making decisions that were good for the country but painful for some congressional districts. Recognizing the need to further reduce the defense base structure, and to ensure a fair process, Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (Title XXIX of Public Law 101-510).

This law effectively halted all closures based on the Secretary's January, 1990, list and required new procedures for closing or realigning bases. (Title XXIX of P.L. 101-510, as amended, appears in Appendix F).

#### P.L. 101-510: THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT COMMISSION

Signed by President Bush on November 5, 1990, P.L. 101-510 created an independent, five-year Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission (DBCRC) with closure rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995. The act outlines procedures, roles, and time lines for the President, Congress, Department of Defense, General Accounting Office, and the Commission to follow.

The 1990 legislation required that all bases be compared equally against the Department of Defense's current force-structure plan and Congressionally approved selection criteria. For each of the three DBCRC rounds, the services and DoD agencies submit their candidates for closure and realignment to the Secretary of Defense for his review. After reviewing service candidates, the Secretary submits his recommendations to DBCRC for its review.

The Commission has four months to scrutinize and analyze the Secretary's recommendations. In addition, the Commission possesses the authority to add, delete, or modify the Secretary's list. On July 1, the Commission submits its report with recommendations to the President for his consideration. The President has 15 days to either accept or reject the Commission's recommendations in their entirety; if he rejects them, the Commission can give the President a revised list of recommendations. If the President accepts the Commission's recommendations, he forwards the list to the Congress. The law provides Congress with only two options: do nothing and accept the list, or reject it in full by passing a joint resolution of disapproval. If such a resolution is passed by both Houses of Congress, it would be subject to a veto by the President. In the absence of a joint resolution of disapproval, the Commission's recommendations have the force of law.

The DBCRC was created "to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States." Established as an independent Presidential Commission, lawmakers intended DBCRC to be a

model of open government. Public Law 101-510 required each Commission to conduct public hearings on the Secretary of Defense's list of closures and realignments and on any proposed changes to those recommendations. In addition, its records are open to public scrutiny.

Procedurally, the 1988 DoD Commission and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission differ substantially. The 1988 Commission, working for the Secretary of Defense, generated its own list of recommended closures and realignments. Under the current law, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission independently reviews and analyzes the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and submits its findings and recommendations directly to the President. To ensure an independent process, the law requires the General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide the Commission a detailed analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations and selection process. The GAO also assists the Commission in its analysis of the Secretary's recommendations.

The process by which the DBCRC operates is also uniquely open and insulated from partisan politics. The Commission meets only during the non-election years of 1991, 1993, and 1995. All meetings and hearings are open to the public. The DBCRC provides numerous opportunities to receive testimony and viewpoints from interested parties, as well as community and Congressional leaders. Transcripts of hearings, correspondence, and other data received by the Commission are available for public review. Every major site proposed for closure is visited by at least one commissioner, in order to gain a first-hand look at the installations, as well as to provide the public with an opportunity to explain the economic and other impacts a closure would have on the local community.

## THE 1991 COMMISSION

As provided in the statute, the DBCRC consists of eight members appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. In selecting individuals to be nominated for membership on the Commission, the President is directed to consult with the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members, the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of an additional two members, and the minority leaders of both Chambers for one member each. The final two appointments are made independently by the President.

The 1991 Commission was chaired by former Representative Jim Courter. Other commissioners were William L. Ball III; Howard H. Callaway; General Duane H. Cassidy, USAF (ret.); Arthur Levitt, Jr.; James C. Smith II; Robert D. Stuart, Jr.; and Alexander B. Trowbridge (Commissioner Trowbridge resigned from the Commission on May 17, 1991).

The Commission received Secretary of Defense Cheney's recommendations on April 12, 1991. It held 47 base visits, 14 regional hearings, and 9 investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. The Commission sent its report to the President on July 1, 1991, recommending the closure of 34 bases and the realignment of 48 others. These actions generated an estimated FY 1992-1997 net savings of \$2.3 billion and recurring savings of \$1.5 billion annually after a one-time cost of \$4.1 billion. This represented a reduction of approximately 5.4 percent of the domestic base structure.

The President accepted all of the Commission's recommendations on July 11, 1991, and forwarded the Commission's report with his approval to the Congress. On July 30, 1991, by a vote of 60 to 364, the House rejected a resolution of disapproval. Consequently, the recommendations of the 1991 Commission have the force of law.

Major base closures and realignments of the 1991 Commission include:

### 26 CLOSURES

Eaker Air Force Base, AR  
Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Castle Air Force Base, CA  
Fort Ord, CA  
Hunters Point Annex, CA  
Moffett Naval Air Station, CA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Station Long Beach, CA  
Sacramento Army Depot, CA  
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
Fort Ben Harrison, IN  
Grissom Air Force Base, IN  
England Air Force Base, LA  
Fort Devens, MA  
Loring Air Force Base, ME  
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI  
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO  
Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH  
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA



Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA  
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC  
Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX  
Chase Field Naval Air Station, TX  
Naval Station Puget Sound, WA

## 19 REALIGNMENTS

Fort Chaffee, AR  
Beale Air Force Base, CA  
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA  
Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA  
Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City, FL  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Rock Island Arsenal, IL  
Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN  
Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN  
Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY  
Fort Polk, LA  
Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD  
Naval Surface Weapons Center, White Oaks, MD  
Aviation Systems Command/Troop Support  
Command, MO  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA  
Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ  
Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ  
Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station,  
Keyport, WA

The 1991 closures and recommendations were required to begin in July, 1993 and must be completed by July, 1997. As of June, 1995, 19 of the 26 major installations have been closed and two more are scheduled for closure by the end of FY 1995 (a complete list of the 1991 recommendations is contained in Appendix L on a state-by-state basis, and in Appendix M by military service).

## THE 1993 COMMISSION

The second Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission to operate under P.L. 101-510 was again chaired by former Representative Jim Courter, the 1991 Commission chair. Other commissioners included Captain Peter B. Bowman, USN (ret.), Beverly B. Byron; Rebecca G. Cox; General Hansford T. Johnson, USAF (ret.), Arthur Levitt, Jr.; Harry C. McPherson, Jr.; and Robert D. Stuart, Jr. (Commissioner Levitt, who also served as a commissioner during the 1991 round, resigned from the Commission on May 4, 1993, following his appointment by President Bill Clinton to be

Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission).

The Commission received Secretary of Defense Aspin's recommendations for base closures and realignments on March 12, 1993. The Commission held 125 base visits, 17 regional hearings, and 16 investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. It submitted its report to the President on July 1, 1993, recommending the closure of 130 bases and the realignment of 45 others. Estimated FY 1994-1999 net savings was approximately \$3.8 billion after one-time costs of approximately \$7.43 billion. The savings from these actions are estimated to total approximately \$2.33 billion annually. These approved closures and realignments represent a further reduction of approximately 6.2 percent of the domestic base structure.

Major base closures and realignments of the 1993 Commission include:


## 28 CLOSURES

Naval Station Mobile, AL  
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA  
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA  
Naval Station Treasure Island, CA  
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Naval Air Station Agana, GU  
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI  
Naval Air Station Glenview, IL  
O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve  
Station, IL  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,  
St. Inigoes, MD  
K. I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI  
Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY  
Defense Electronics Supply Center, OH  
Newark Air Force Base, OH  
Defense Clothing Factory, PA  
Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC  
Naval Station Charleston, SC  
Naval Air Station Dallas, TX  
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA  
Vint Hill Farms, VA

### 13 REALIGNMENTS

Anniston Army Depot, AL  
March Air Force Base, CA  
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA  
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Naval Surface Warfare Center (Dahlgren)  
White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI  
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN  
Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT  
Tooele Army Depot, UT  
Fort Belvoir, VA

The President accepted all of the Commission's recommendations on July 2, 1993, and forwarded the Commission's report with his approval to the Congress. On September 20, 1993, by a vote of 12-83, the Senate rejected a resolution of disapproval of the Commission's recommendations. Consequently, the recommendations of the 1993 Commission have the force of law. The 1993 recommendations are required to begin by July, 1995, and must be completed by July, 1999. As of June 1995, four of the 1993 major closures have occurred, and another four are scheduled for closure by the end of FY 1995 (a complete list of the 1993 Commission's recommendations are contained in Appendix L on a state-by-state basis, and in Appendix M by military service).



## CHAPTER 5 THE 1995 PROCESS AND PROCEDURES

### Composition of the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission

The commissioners chosen to serve on the 1995 round of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission have diverse backgrounds in public service, business, and the military. In accordance with the enacting statute, two commissioners were nominated in consultation with the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, two in consultation with the U.S. Senate Majority Leader, and one commissioner with the advice of each of the House and Senate Minority Leaders. The two remaining nominations were made independently by the President.

The Commission staff was drawn from divergent backgrounds encompassing government, law, academia, and the military. In addition to those hired directly by the Commission, other staff were detailed from the Department of Defense, the General Accounting Office, the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The expertise provided by the detailees from these diverse government agencies contributed significantly to the Commission's independent review and analysis effort.

The Commission's review and analysis staff was divided into five teams—Army, Navy, Air Force, Interagency Issues, and Cross Service. A direct-hire civilian managed each of the teams in accordance with the amended law which also limits the number of Department of Defense analysts to 20 percent of the total professional analysts.

### *THE 1995 BASE CLOSURE PROCESS*

#### KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LAW

Public Law 101-510, as amended, requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a list of proposed

military base closures and realignments to the Commission by March 1, 1995 (see Appendix F). In accordance with the statute, these recommendations must be based upon the force-structure plan submitted to Congress with the Department of Defense budget request for Fiscal Year 1996, and upon final criteria developed by the Secretary of Defense and approved by Congress. For the 1995 Commission process, the Secretary of Defense announced in December, 1994, that the final criteria would be identical to those used during the 1991 and 1993 base closure round.

The Secretary of Defense based the force-structure plan on an assessment of the probable threats to national security during the six-year period beginning in 1995, as well as the anticipated levels of funding that would be available for national defense (see Appendix G).

The final criteria cover a broad range of military, fiscal, and environmental considerations. The first four criteria, which relate to military value, were given priority consideration. The remaining four criteria, which address return on investment, economic impact, community infrastructure, and environmental impact, are important factors that may mitigate against the military value criteria (see Appendix H).

The law requires the Commission to hold public hearings on base closure and realignment recommendations of the Secretary of Defense and on any changes proposed by the Commission to those recommendations. The Commission must report its findings to the President by July 1, 1995, based on its review and analysis of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations. To change any of the Secretary's recommendations, the Commission must find the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-structure plan and final selection criteria.

Once the President receives the Commission's final report, he has until July 15, 1995 to approve or disapprove the recommendations in their

entirety. If approved, the report is sent to the Congress, which then has 45 days to reject the report by a joint resolution of disapproval; otherwise, the report has the force of law. If the President disapproves the Commission's recommendations in whole or in part, he must transmit to the Commission and the Congress his reasons for disapproval. The Commission then has until August 15, 1995, to submit a revised list of recommendations to the President. At that point, the President either forwards the revised list to Congress by September 1, 1995, or the 1995 base closure process is terminated with no action taken to close or realign bases. The law prohibits the President or Congress from making any amendments to the recommendations, thereby requiring an "all-or-nothing" acceptance or rejection of the recommendations.

The 1995 Commission thoroughly analyzed all of the information used by the Secretary of Defense to prepare the recommendations. The Commission held a total of 13 investigative hearings in Washington, D.C. Military Department representatives directly responsible for the Secretary's recommendations testified before the Commission. In addition, several defense and base closure experts from the Federal government and private sector testified about the specifics of the base closure process, the potential impacts of the Secretary of Defense's recommendations, and ways the Federal government could better assist communities with re-use activities. The commissioners and staff members conducted over 206 fact-finding visits to military activities recommended by the Secretary of Defense and considered by the Commission for closure or realignment. Further, the Commission held 16 regional hearings to hear directly from communities nationwide, heard from hundreds of Members of Congress who testified before the Commission, and received over 200,000 letters from concerned citizens across the country. Finally, the Commission received input from the General Accounting Office, as required by the base closure statute, which included a report containing its evaluation of DoD's selection process (see Appendix O and Appendix P).

Based on the information gathered and the analyses performed, alternatives and further additions to the Secretary's list were considered. To perform a thorough analysis and consider all reasonable options, the commissioners voted on March 7, 1995, and on May 10, 1995, to add a total of 36 installations for further consideration as alterna-

tives and additions to the 146 bases recommended for closure or realignment by the Secretary of Defense. As required by law, the Commission published the required notice on May 17, 1995, in the *Federal Register* to inform communities their bases were under consideration by the Commission for possible closure or realignment. Public hearings were held for each of the installations the Commission added for consideration and each major base was visited by at least one Commissioner (see Appendix J).

#### THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD) GUIDANCE TO THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DEFENSE AGENCIES

The Deputy Secretary of Defense established the policy, procedures, authorities, and responsibilities for base realignment or closure (BRAC) actions by memorandum dated January 7, 1994. This policy guidance provided the Secretaries of the military departments and the directors of the defense agencies with the responsibility to provide the Secretary of Defense with recommendations for closures and realignments. This policy also required the Secretaries of the military departments and Directors of the defense agencies to develop recommendations based exclusively upon the force-structure plan and final selection criteria, consider all U.S. military installations (as defined in the law) equally, analyze their base structure using like categories of bases, use objective measures for the selection criteria wherever possible, and allow for the exercise of military judgment in selecting bases for closure and realignment.

The Deputy Secretary also established the BRAC 95 Review Group and the BRAC 95 Steering Group to oversee the entire BRAC process. The BRAC 95 Review Group was composed of senior level representatives from each of the military departments, Chairpersons of the BRAC 95 Steering Group and each Joint Cross-Service Group, and other senior officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and Defense Logistics Agency. It provided oversight and policy for the entire BRAC process. The BRAC 95 Steering Group assisted the Review Group in exercising its authorities.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security was given the responsibility to oversee the 1995 process, and was delegated authority to issue additional instructions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued the interim force-structure plan, as directed by the Deputy

Secretary's January 7, 1994, memorandum, on February 7, 1994. The Department issued the final selection criteria in the *Federal Register* on December 9, 1994. The Deputy Secretary provided the final force-structure plan on January 11, 1995. This Plan was updated on February 22, 1995, by the Deputy Secretary to reflect budget decisions, and was provided to Congress and the Commission on the same day.

#### JOINT CROSS-SERVICE FUNCTIONS

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission recommended that the Department develop procedures for considering potential joint or common activities among the military departments. For BRAC 95, the Deputy Secretary directed the creation of Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs) to consider these issues in conjunction with the military departments.

In the January 7, 1994, BRAC policy guidance, and further articulated in BRAC Policy Memorandum Number Two (issued on November 2, 1994), the Deputy Secretary announced a process involving both JCSGs and the individual military departments. This process was designed to establish alternatives for closure and realignment in situations involving common support functions for five functional areas. The five functional areas were: Depot Maintenance, Military Medical Treatment Facilities, Test and Evaluation, Undergraduate Pilot Training, and Laboratories. Additionally, the Department created an Economic Impact Group.

The Economic Impact Group included representatives from the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For a year, the Group reviewed methods for analyzing economic impact, established common measures and approaches, and developed a computer-based system to facilitate the analysis of economic impact, including cumulative economic impact.

The Department considered both cumulative economic impact and historical trends of economic activity as part of the economic impact criterion. In response to concerns raised by the 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission and the General Accounting Office, DoD analyzed economic impact and cumulative economic impact as relative measures for comparing alternatives. DoD did not establish threshold values, above which it would remove bases from consideration.

Economic impact was considered at two stages in the process. The military departments, in developing their recommendations, developed and analyzed data reflecting the economic impacts of prior BRAC rounds, as well as proposed Department actions during the current round. Once the service recommendations were made to the Secretary of Defense, the economic impacts were reviewed again, to determine whether there were instances in which separate service actions might have affected the same locality.

Each of the Joint Cross-Service Groups developed excess capacity reduction goals, established data collection procedures and milestone schedules for cross-service analysis of common support functions, and presented alternatives to the military departments for their consideration in developing recommendations. The JCSGs issued their alternatives to the military departments in November, 1994, and these alternatives were to be considered as part of their ongoing BRAC analysis.

#### THE ARMY PROCESS

The Army grouped all installations into categories with similar missions, capabilities, and characteristics. After developing a set of measurable attributes related to DoD's four selection criteria for military value, the Army then assigned weights to reflect the relative importance of each measure. The Army then collected data on its installations and estimated relative importance, using established quantitative techniques to assemble installation assessments.

Using both the installation assessments and its stationing strategy, the Army determined the military value of each installation. These appraisals represented the Army's best judgment on the relative merit of each installation and were the basis for selecting installations that were studied further for closure or realignment.

Once the list of final study candidates received approval by the Secretary of the Army, a variety of alternatives were examined in an effort to identify the most feasible and cost-effective way to close or realign. The Army applied DoD's remaining four selection criteria by analyzing the financial, economic, community, and environmental impacts of each alternative using DoD's standard models. The Army's senior leaders reviewed the results of these analyses and discontinued studies of alternatives they found financially or operationally unfeasible.

During the course of the study effort, the Army Audit Agency performed independent tests and evaluations to check mathematical computations and ensure the accuracy of data and reasonableness of assumptions throughout every step of analysis. The General Accounting Office monitored the Army's process from the very beginning and met regularly with the Army's auditors, as well as officials from The Army Basing Study (TABS) office.

#### THE NAVY PROCESS

The Secretary of the Navy established a Base Structure Evaluation Committee (BSEC), and a Base Structure Analysis Team (BSAT) to provide staff support to the BSEC. The BSEC had eight members, consisting of senior Department of the Navy (DoN) career civilians and Navy flag and Marine Corps general officers, who were responsible for developing recommendations for closure and realignment.

The BSAT was composed of military and civilian analysts who were tasked to collect data and to perform analysis for the BSEC. The Naval Audit Service reviewed the activities of the BSEC and the BSAT to ensure compliance with the approved Internal Control Plan and audited the accuracy and reliability of data provided by DoN activities. The Office of the General Counsel provided senior-level legal advice and counsel.

In compliance with the Internal Control Plan, a Base Structure Data Base (BSDB) was developed. Data included in the BSDB had to be certified as accurate and complete by the officer or civilian employee who initially generated data in response to the BSEC request for information, and then at each succeeding level of the chain of command. In conjunction with the requirement to keep records of all meetings that were part of the decision-making process, the BSDB and the certification policy were designed to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and integrity of the information upon which the DoN recommendations were based.

The BSEC developed five major categories for organizing its military installations for analysis and evaluation: Operational Support, Industrial Support, Technical Centers/Laboratories, Educational/Training, and Personnel Support/Other. These categories were then further divided into 27 subcategories to ensure that like installations were compared to one another and to allow identification of total capacity and military value for an

entire category of installations. Within these 27 subcategories were 830 individual Navy or Marine Corps installations or activities, each of which was reviewed during the BRAC 95 process.

Data calls were issued to these installations, tailored to the subcategory in which the activity was grouped, to obtain the relevant certified information relating to capacity and military value. "Conglomerate" activities having more than one significant mission received multiple capacity data calls and military value analyses relating to those missions. The certified responses to these data calls were entered into the BSDB and formed the sole basis for BSEC determinations.

Capacity analysis compared the present base structure to the future force-structure requirement for each subcategory of installations to determine whether excess base structure capacity existed. If total capacity was greater than the future required capacity, excess capacity was determined to exist, and the military value of each installation in a subcategory was evaluated. If there was no meaningful excess capacity, no further closure or realignment analysis was conducted. Of the 27 subcategories, eight of them demonstrated either little or no excess capacity.

The remaining 19 subcategories underwent military value analysis to assess the relative military value of installations within a subcategory, using a quantitative methodology that was as objective as possible. Information from the military value data call responses was displayed in a matrix and scored by the BSEC according to relative importance for a particular subcategory. A military value score for a particular installation was a relative measure of military value only within the context of the subcategory in which that installation was analyzed, in order to compare one installation in a subcategory against another installation in that category.

The results of the capacity analyses and military value analyses were then subjected to configuration analysis. Multiple solutions were generated that would satisfy capacity requirements for the future force-structure while maintaining the average military value of the retained installations at a level equal to or greater than the average military value for all of the installations in the subcategory.

The configuration analysis solutions were then used by the BSEC as the starting point for the application of military judgment in the develop-

ment of potential closure and realignment scenarios to undergo return on investment analysis. Additionally, the Joint Cross-Service Groups generated numerous alternatives derived from their analysis of data and information provided by the military departments. As a result of the scenario development portion of the process, the BSEC developed 174 scenarios involving 119 activities.

Cost of Base Realignment Actions, or "COBRA" analyses were conducted on all of these scenarios. The BSEC used the COBRA algorithms as a tool to ensure that its recommendations were cost effective.

The impact on the local economic area was calculated using the DoD BRAC 95 Economic Impact Data Base. The BSEC also evaluated the ability of the existing local community infrastructure at potential receiving installations to support additional missions and personnel. The impact of increases in base personnel on such infrastructure items as off-base housing availability, public and private schools, public transportation, fire and police protection, health care facilities, and public utilities was assessed.

Once the BSEC had determined the candidates for closure or realignment, an environmental summary was prepared which compared the environmental management efforts at losing and gaining sites. Differences in environmental management effort were presented as they relate to such programs as threatened or endangered species, wetlands, cultural resources, land use, air quality, environmental facilities, and installation restoration sites. The environmental impact analysis permitted the BSEC to obtain a comprehensive picture of the potential environmental impacts arising from the recommendations for closure and realignment.

#### THE AIR FORCE PROCESS

The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a Base Closure Executive Group of six general officers and seven comparable (Senior Executive Service) civilians. Additionally, an Air Staff-level Base Closure Working Group was formed to provide staff support and additional detailed expertise for the Executive Group. Plans and Programs General Officers from the Major Commands (MAJCOM) met on several occasions with the Executive Group to provide mission specific expertise and greater base-level information. Additionally, other potential service impacts were coordinated by a special inter-service working group.

The Executive Group developed a Base Closure Internal Control Plan that was approved by the Secretary of the Air Force. This plan provided structure and guidance for all participants in the base closure process, including procedures for data gathering and certification.

The Executive Group reviewed all active and Air Reserve Component (ARC) installations in the United States that met or exceeded the Section 2687, Title 10 U.S.C threshold of 300 direct-hire civilians authorized to be employed. Data on all applicable bases were collected via a comprehensive and detailed questionnaire answered at base level with validation by the MAJCOM and Air Staff. All data were evaluated and certified in accordance with the Air Force Internal Control Plan. As an additional control measure, the Air Force Audit Agency was tasked to continuously review the Air Force process for consistency with the law and DoD policy and to ensure the data collection and validation process was adequate. A baseline capacity analysis evaluated the physical capability of a base to accommodate additional force-structure and other activities (excess capacity) beyond what was programmed to be stationed at the base.

All data used in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations were certified as to its accuracy and completeness by appropriate officials at base level, MAJCOM, and Air Staff level. In addition, the Executive Group and the Secretary of the Air Force certified that all information contained in the Air Force detailed analysis and all supporting data were accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief.

The Executive Group placed all bases in categories, based on the installation's predominant mission. When considered by category, the results of the baseline capacity analysis represented the maximum potential base closures that could be achieved within each category. The results of the baseline excess capacity analysis were then used in conjunction with the approved DoD force-structure plan in determining base structure requirements. Other factors were also considered to determine actual capabilities for base reductions. The capacity analysis was also used to identify cost effective opportunities for the beddown of activities and aircraft dislocated from bases recommended for closure and realignment.

Bases deemed militarily or geographically unique or mission-essential were approved by the Secretary of the Air Force for exclusion from further closure consideration. Capacity was analyzed by category, based on a study of current base capacity and the future requirements imposed by the force-structure plan. Categories and subcategories having no excess capacity were recommended to and approved by the Secretary of the Air Force for exclusion from further study.

All non-excluded active component bases in the remaining categories were individually examined on the basis of all eight selection criteria established by the Secretary of Defense, with over 250 sub-elements to the grading criteria. These sub-elements were developed by the Air Force to provide specific data points for each criterion.

Under Deputy Secretary of Defense direction, the Executive Group and the Secretary of the Air Force considered and analyzed the results of the efforts of Joint Cross-Service Groups in the areas of Depot Maintenance, Laboratories, Test and Evaluation, Undergraduate Pilot Training, and Military Treatment Facilities including Graduate Medical Education. The Joint Cross-Service Groups established data elements, measures of merit, and methods of analysis for their functional areas. The Air Force collected data as requested by the joint groups, following the Air Force's Internal Control Plan. After receiving data provided by each of the Services, the joint groups developed functional values and alternatives for the activities under their consideration. These alternatives were reported to the Military Departments for consideration in their processes.

The ARC category, comprised of Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve bases, warrants further explanation. First, these bases do not readily compete against each other, as ARC units enjoy a special relationship with their respective states and local communities. Under Federal law, relocating Guard units across state boundaries is not a practical alternative. In addition, careful consideration must be given to the recruiting needs of these units. Realignment of ARC units onto active or civilian, or other ARC installations, however, could prove cost effective. Therefore, the ARC category was examined for cost effective relocations to other bases.

## THE DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY PROCESS

The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) is not directly identified in the DoD force-structure plan. Therefore, DLA developed Concepts of Operations to translate the effects of the force-structure plan within the Agency's mission planning.

The DLA Director established a Base Realignment and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate senior executives from the Agency's business and staff areas. The Group included both senior level civilian and military personnel, and was chaired by the Principal Deputy Director.

The Executive Group served as senior advisors to direct the 1995 study effort and present activity realignment and closure candidates for the Director's final recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. A BRAC Working Group was also established under the direction of the Executive Group. The Working Group developed analytical tools, collected and analyzed certified data, developed and evaluated alternative scenarios for Executive Group consideration, conducted sensitivity analyses, and compiled documentation to support the final recommendations.

The DLA BRAC analysis process ensured that all of the Agency's activities were fully evaluated. Formal charters were developed for the Executive Group and the Working Group, and audit and internal control plans were developed to document the collection and use of accurate certified data.

The Executive Group aggregated activities into categories and subcategories based on similarity of mission, capabilities, and attributes. From these, the following categories were defined: Distribution Depots, Inventory Control Points, Service/Support, and Command and Control Activities. Subcategories were defined within the categories to ensure that the activities were evaluated in a fair and consistent manner. Where possible, activities were compared to peers of similar function and size. Activities identified for closure as a result of previous BRAC decisions were not evaluated.

Comprehensive data calls were designed to support analysis of excess capacity; military value; and economic, environmental, and community impacts with certified data. The data call questionnaires were carefully designed to ensure uniform interpretation of questions, level of detail, and documentation requirements. Sources for the data were specified to the greatest extent practical.



DLA conducted an excess capacity analysis for each of the BRAC activity categories and subcategories. Where significant amounts of excess capacity were found, these sites could be considered as possible receiver sites in potential realignment recommendations.

The purpose of the military value analysis was to determine the relative ranking of each activity with respect to other activities in the same category or subcategory. OSD provided the military departments and the defense agencies with a list of selection criteria to be used as part of the military value analysis. The Executive Group developed more distinctive measures to assess the military value of DLA activities. The Measures of Merit used to develop military value were Mission Scope, Mission Suitability, Operational Efficiencies, and Expandability.

The next step was to identify potential realignment or closure candidates and eliminate the remaining activities from further consideration. Military value, in conjunction with military judgment, was the primary consideration in determining prospective realignment or closure candidates. Once an alternative was conceived, it was evaluated for reasonableness and then either refined or abandoned. DLA worked closely with each military department during this process to identify and consider potential excess space for joint use, to evaluate the impact of military department recommendations on its activities, and to ensure that the impacts of military department recommendations were appropriately factored into the Agency's recommendations.

The DLA BRAC Working Group evaluated potential realignment and closure scenarios using the COBRA model. The analysis results were reviewed by the BRAC Working Group and presented to the Executive Group for further consideration.

Each scenario was considered in terms of its overall risk, benefit, and cost to the strategic direction of DLA and the interests of DoD. Based on its review and best military judgment, the Executive Group made individual recommendations to the Director. After the approval of the Director, the recommendations were then returned to the Working Group for economic, community infrastructure, and environmental impact assessments. The Working Group reported its findings to the Executive Group for further consideration as appropriate.

An Internal Control Plan for the collection and analysis of data was developed for the BRAC 95 process. The plan, issued May 23, 1994, was reviewed and approved by the DoD Inspector General and the General Accounting Office (GAO).

The DoD Inspector General personnel were responsible for data validation, fully participated in the Executive and Working Group meetings, and observed the Working Group analysis process.

GAO representatives also participated in the DLA BRAC 95 process and attended Executive Group meetings, observed the Working Group analysis process, and visited selected field activities to observe the data collection and data validation processes.

Upon completion of the impact assessments, recommendations were returned to the Executive Group. The Working Group presented the results of the impact analyses and supported additional Executive Group deliberations. The Executive Group discussed the impact assessments, conducted an extensive review of each recommendation, and approved selected recommendations.

#### DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE PROCESS

The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) Director established a Base Realignment and Closure Executive Group comprised of appropriate principals from headquarters, and chaired by the Deputy Director, Resources. The Executive Group acted as senior advisors to direct the analysis effort and present the Director's final recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. A BRAC Working Group was established under the direction of the Executive Group. The Working Group was comprised of four headquarters elements and two investigations control and automation elements. An Internal Control Plan was developed to ensure that data were consistent and standardized, accurate and complete, certifiable, verifiable, auditable by external audit and inspection agencies, and replicable using documentation developed during data collection.

The selection process consisted of five steps to gather data and conduct analyses: (1) collect data, (2) analyze military value, (3) develop alternatives, (4) perform COBRA analyses, and (5) determine impacts.

Military value criteria were given priority consideration. Since the DoD Selection Criteria were designed specifically with the military services in mind, the Executive Group developed more distinctive measures to assess the military value of DIS activities. The Measures of Merit used to develop military value were Mission Essentiality, Mission Suitability, Operational Efficiencies, and Expandability.

The DIS used the COBRA model to assess the relative costs, savings, and return on investment of the alternatives. Working Group members gathered the necessary data regarding personnel, construction, and renovation.

The potential economic impact on communities was evaluated through the use of the BRAC 95 Economic Impact Data Base. The ability of the potential losing and receiving location's infrastructure to support each alternative was evaluated by the Executive and Working Groups. Impacts were also evaluated in terms of readiness, effectiveness, and efficiency with regard to the ability of DIS to support its customers. The analysis also considered potential environmental impacts at both the losing and gaining sites for each alternative.

The COBRA results, community and environmental impacts, and supporting rationale were presented to the Executive Groups for consideration and selection of the Agency's final recommendation to the Secretary of Defense.

#### OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE/ JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REVIEW

Using certified data, the Secretaries of the military departments and Directors of the defense agencies developed their recommendations based on the approved final selection criteria and force-structure plan, and submitted their base closure and realignment recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for review and approval. As part of the Secretary's review, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security provided for Joint Staff and OSD review of the recommendations received from the military departments and defense agencies.

The Joint Staff reviewed the recommendations from a warfighting perspective to ensure they would not adversely affect the military readiness capabilities of the armed services. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed all the military department and defense agency recommendations without objection.

Key staff elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff also reviewed the recommendations to ensure they would not sacrifice necessary capabilities and resources. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Economic Security reviewed the recommendations to ensure all eight selection criteria were considered and the recommendations were consistent with the force-structure plan. This review also assured that DoD policies and procedures were followed and that the analyses were objective and rigorous.

The Secretary approved the recommendations of the military departments and defense agencies and officially transmitted his list of closures and realignments to the 1995 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission on February 28, 1995.

#### COMMISSION REVIEW

The Commission established five teams within its Department of Review and Analysis—one team to review each respective service application of the military value criteria to the base closure process, an Interagency Issues Team which reviewed the Defense Agencies' application of the military value criteria to the base closure process, and a Cross Service Team to review the application of military value applied to depots, test and evaluation, and laboratories. Each team analyzed the services' methodology to ensure general compliance with the law, to confirm accuracy of data, and to determine if base-specific recommendations were properly offered by the Secretary of Defense.

In addition, the Interagency Issues Team analyzed the final four criteria—Return on Investment, Economic Impacts, Community Infrastructure, and Environmental Impacts—across all services. The Interagency Issues Team also provided analysis on airspace issues when applicable.

#### CRITERIA 1-4: MILITARY VALUE

In accordance with PL 101-510, as amended, all of the information used by the Secretary of Defense to prepare recommendations must be sent to Congress, the Commission, and the Comptroller General. Within the Commission, each team began its review and analysis with an examination of the documents provided by the services. First, teams determined whether the recommendations were based on the force-structure plan and eight criteria, and whether all bases were considered equally. Next, the teams considered if categories, subcategories, and base exclusions were reasonable.

Each of the teams reviewed the process the services used to assess military value, as well as the reasonableness of the data they used. Each team examined the capacity analyses performed by the services and highlighted installation categories that required additional scrutiny. Specific data analyses included a review and independent analysis of the COBRA input data and military construction cost estimates, as well as the capacity of receiver installations to accept missions.

Throughout the review and analysis process, the Commission staff maintained an active and ongoing dialogue with base-associated communities who made significant contributions to the entire process. Staff members also accompanied commissioners on base visits, attended regional hearings, and visited closure and realignment candidates and receiving installations.

#### CRITERIA 5-8: COSTS, SAVINGS, AND IMPACTS

While the first four selection criteria assessed military value and were given priority consideration, the remaining criteria were also applied in base closure and realignment evaluations. Because these criteria were not driven by military considerations specific to a service, the commission's Interagency Issues Team evaluated criteria application across all services to ensure process uniformity and compliance with the legal requirement to evaluate recommendations based on the final selection criteria.

#### CRITERION 5: RETURN ON INVESTMENT

As prescribed by OSD policy guidance, the COBRA model was used by the services and defense agencies to calculate costs, savings, net present value, and return on investment for base closure and realignment actions. Return on investment was the expected payback period in years for each proposed base closure or realignment. The COBRA input data consisted of standard factors, which generally remained constant, and base/scenario factors which were unique. Standard factor examples included civilian pay, national median home price, discount rates, and costs per mile of moving personnel and equipment. Examples of base/scenario factors included the number of authorized personnel at a base, the size of the base, the number of personnel moving, and construction costs required by the move. The output data were used by each of the services and defense agencies in their decision-making process.

All of the COBRA runs used by the services and defense agencies in formulating their recommendations were provided to the Commission with the Secretary's list. Other COBRA runs were submitted by the services and defense agencies upon Commission request. The Commission thoroughly reviewed the services and defense agencies data throughout its evaluation process.

The Commission also generated and ran its own COBRA models to evaluate various alternative realignment and closure scenarios. In total, including the original DoD submission COBRA runs, the staff received or generated nearly 400 COBRA runs for evaluation and consideration. Ten percent of these COBRA runs were generated by communities and submitted to the Commission for evaluation. In a number of these cases, the communities' analyses identified important cost and savings issues.

Another vital function performed by the Review and Analysis Interagency Issues Team was to track the costs and savings estimates of DoD recommendations throughout the review and analysis process. During the time from February 28, 1995, when the list of recommendations was submitted to the Commission, until the final deliberations in late June, DoD modified the return on investment calculations for 64 of the original 146 recommendations. Several of these revised COBRA runs substantially changed the estimate of the costs and savings associated with a particular realignment or closure action. In general, DoD originally underestimated the cost of executing realignment or closure actions and overestimated their projected savings.

#### CRITERION 6: ECONOMIC IMPACT

Two economists of the Commission's Review and Analysis Interagency Issues Team, one detailed from the Department of Commerce (DOC) and one from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), validated DoD's compliance with Criterion 6 on economic impact. Their review included (1) analysis of economic procedures provided to the Services by DOD's Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact, (2) validation of personnel changes resulting from the current BRAC action, in particular providing consistency in personnel changes between the Economic Impact Database (EID) and the COBRA personnel summary reports, (3) validation of employment data used in the economic impact equation and

historical economic data used to demonstrate actual economic activity, (4) a validation of the economic areas assigned to installations, and (5) an analysis of the indirect job multipliers used to measure indirect job impacts.

The services generally complied with the OSD guidance to estimate economic impact, and these impacts represented a “worst-case” estimate of job loss. Economic procedures used by the services complied with commonly used economic practice for measuring regional economic impacts. Personnel changes were consistent, in the majority of installations, between EID and COBRA. Where inconsistencies occurred, the Commission directed the services to resolve them. Economic data were validated by comparing the data in the EID with economic reports generated by the services and by validating these data from their sources—DOC’s Bureau of Economic Analysis and Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics. The Commission validated assignment of installations to appropriate economic areas, consistent with the Office of Management and Budget’s Revised Standard for Defining Metropolitan Areas, as appropriate.

The Commission, with further assistance of FEMA, assessed indirect job multipliers used by the services to estimate indirect job losses by independently computing multipliers for 32 major bases included on the Secretary’s list. In most cases, the multipliers used by the services were greater than those estimated by FEMA. Where the FEMA multipliers were greater, the Commission questioned DoD’s Joint Cross-Service Group on Economic Impact about the apparent discrepancies. The Commission found, through these discussions, that the lower DoD multipliers were from adjustments to standard multipliers to account for lower military wages and on-base services for DoD military personnel, compared to that of DoD civilian personnel. After this review, the Commission believed the indirect job multiplier values used by the services were consistent and complied with good economic practice.

#### CRITERION 7: COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE

The Commission’s Review and Analysis Inter-agency Issues Team validated DoD’s compliance with Criterion 7, “the ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities’ infrastructure to support forces, missions and personnel.” DoD did not provide specific guidance on how the

services should evaluate this criterion. The services determined their own measures for adequacy of community infrastructure which were based as much as possible on existing data sources. Each service appeared to address its measures adequately, so that no substantial deviation from established criteria was identified.

*Army:* In its report to the Commission, the Army stated that Criterion 7 was addressed with Criterion 6 using DoD’s standard model to evaluate economic impacts. The Army provided no additional description of its evaluation of community infrastructure. Some of the attributes selected for the Army’s military value analysis suggested that community infrastructure may have been taken into account in the analysis. These attributes included workforce statistics, cost of living index, family housing, health care index, and variable housing allowance.

*Navy:* The Navy rated selected aspects of community infrastructure in its military value analysis, including on- and off-base housing, child care availability, commute distance, access to education and health care, and crime statistics. Community infrastructure factors were rated and assigned weights for calculation within each installation category. The Navy’s data calls contained comprehensive listings and statistics on workforce attributes, spouse employment, education options, and ability of local infrastructure to accept growth at various levels.

*Air Force:* The Air Force quantified and rated several sub-elements: off-base housing, transportation, crime rate, medical care, education, and off-base recreation. The Air Force assigned color-coded ratings to the six sub-elements, which were averaged out to a single color-code assigned for community infrastructure. The analysis relied on various national, local, and service-specific data sources. The Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) survey evaluated various cost-related factors for individual bases, and was used to derive the VHA paid to enlisted personnel. VHA data were used by the Air Force to assess off-base housing and commute information. It should be noted that the objectives of the VHA survey (to measure need for VHA) tend to influence survey responders to maximize negative responses. Thus, quality of life data derived from the VHA survey may appear to show a negative bias towards community infrastructure.

*Defense Agencies:* The Defense Logistics Agency assessed community impact by using data on local economic indicators, transportation, utilities, workforce availability, housing, education, health care, crime, and climate/environment. Data sources included Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, state agencies, local transit authorities, and published business directories

#### CRITERION 8: ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

An environmental analyst detailed to the Commission's Review and Analysis Interagency Issues Team from the Environmental Protection Agency validated DoD's compliance with Criterion 8 on environmental impact. The review included (1) review of DoD guidance to the services and defense agencies, (2) review of each services' analysis and recommendations, (3) review of selected base-specific data calls for each service, and (4) interviews with an environmental analyst from the BRAC staff of each service to clarify interpretation of DoD guidance.

The Department required consideration of environmental impacts for closing, realigning, and receiving installations. Specifically, seven environmental attributes were to be evaluated: threatened and endangered species, wetlands, historic and archeological sites, pollution control, hazardous materials/wastes, land and air uses, and programmed environmental costs/cost avoidances.

Guidance was issued in December 1994 which addressed environmental restoration and compliance costs. The policy stated that "[e]nvironmental restoration costs at closing bases are not to be considered for cost of closure calculations," and cited DoD's legal obligation for environmental restoration at any base, whether or not it closes. Environmental compliance costs, however, could be a factor in a base closure or realignment decision, and were estimated for all facilities.

The services and defense agencies generally complied with the DoD guidance in their evaluation of environmental impacts. The services applied different weighting factors to environmental criteria, and some services selected certain environmental criteria to incorporate in their military value analysis. Specific comments follow:

*Army:* The Army assessed some environmental impacts in its military value assessment as environmental carrying capacity, which measured ability

to conduct current missions, receive additional units, and expand operations in light of environmental constraints. The Army also assessed environmental impacts and costs in Installation Environmental Baseline Summaries. Army documentation indicated that environmental factors did not impede any recommended BRAC action.

*Navy:* The Navy selected certain environmental factors to include in most of its military value calculations, under "Environment and Encroachment." These factors were selected and weighted differently for each subcategory of Navy facilities, as some environmental criteria were considered more significant to certain types of facilities. Of all environmental factors measured within military value evaluations, air quality was often assigned the greatest weight. All required environmental attributes and costs were assessed qualitatively in the base-specific environmental data calls.

*Air Force:* The Air Force quantified air quality as one of seven sub-elements in its military value analysis under Criterion II (Availability and Conditions of Land, Facilities, and Associated Airspace). The Air Force addressed and weighted all other environmental elements in general in Section VIII (Environmental Impact). Additional environmental information and costs were summarized in the base-specific data calls but were not weighted as criteria for comparison. The categories and level of detail for compliance costs varied from one base to another, and did not allow for effective comparison between bases.

*Defense Agencies:* The Defense Logistics Agency sent environmental questionnaires to installations, and sent responses to the Commission. DLA stated any environmental factors that would limit an installation's ability to expand were assessed. In two cases, Tracy/Sharpe and Ogden, air quality nonattainment was viewed as a potential limitation on expansion. The Defense Investigative Service completed an environmental analysis for the structure from which it will move.

*General Comments:* Air quality presented particular concerns for realigning and receiving candidate installations. The BRAC95 was the first round which considered regulations for conformity under the 1990 Clean Air Act, which prohibits a Federal agency from supporting an action unless it determines that it conforms to the air quality implementation plan for the area.

The Air Force appeared to assign air quality a greater weight than other services as they considered the military value implications. Air Force and DLA considered the probability of obtaining conformity determinations in making their recommendations. Although the Navy identified areas where conformity might be required, its recommendations assumed that implementation was possible, even at significant cost. The Army's documentation did not indicate that air conformity concerns affected closures or realignments.

#### THE ROLE OF THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO)

In compliance with Public Law 101-510, as amended, GAO evaluated DoD's selection process, provided the Commission and Congress a report containing its detailed analysis of the process, and testified before the Commission on April 17, 1995.

The GAO reported to Congress and the Commission that the services' selection processes were generally sound, well documented, and should result in substantial savings. However, the recommendations and selection processes were not without problems and, in some cases, raised questions about the reasonableness of specific recommendations. At the same time, GAO noted that improvements were made to the processes from prior rounds, including more precise categorization of bases and activities, resulting in more accurate comparisons between like facilities and functions, and better analytical capabilities.

GAO reported that the DoD and its components included the requirement to use certified data, i.e., information that was accurate and complete to the best of the originator's knowledge and belief. This requirement was designed to overcome concerns about the consistency and reliability of data used in the processes. GAO also found that the services improved their cost and savings estimates for BRAC95 recommendations. In developing cost estimates, they took steps to develop more current and reliable sources of information and placed greater reliance, where practicable, on standardized data. Some components sought to minimize the costs of base closures by avoiding unnecessary military construction. For example, the Navy proposed a number of changes to prior BRAC decisions that will further reduce infrastructure and avoid some previously planned closure costs.

The 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission required DoD to explore opportunities for cross-service use of common support assets. For the 1995 round, the Department of Defense established cross-service review groups to provide the services with alternatives for realignments and closures in the areas of depot maintenance, laboratories, test and evaluation facilities, undergraduate pilot training, and medical treatment facilities. GAO found that DoD's attempt at reducing excess capacity by proposing cross-service alternatives yielded some results. Agreements for consolidating similar work done by two or more of the services were limited, however, and opportunities to achieve additional reductions in excess capacity and infrastructure were missed. This was particularly true of depot maintenance activities and laboratory facilities.

GAO also found that although the services have improved their processes with each succeeding BRAC round, some process problems continued to be identified. In particular, the Air Force's process remained largely subjective and not well documented; also, it was influenced by preliminary estimates of base closure costs that changed when a more focused analysis was made. For these and other reasons, GAO questioned a number of the Air Force's recommendations. To a lesser extent, some of the services' decisions affecting specific closures and realignments also raised questions. For example, GAO found the Secretary of the Navy's decision to exclude certain facilities from closure for economic impact reasons was not consistently applied.

As stated above, GAO reported that, as in the past, key aspects of the Air Force's 1995 process remained largely subjective and not well documented. Documentation of the Air Force's process was too limited for GAO to fully substantiate the extent of Air Force deliberations and analyses. However, GAO determined that initial analytical phases of the Air Force process were significantly influenced by preliminary estimates of base closure costs. For example, some bases were removed from initial consideration based on these estimates. Also, in some instances, closure costs appeared to materially affect how the bases were valued.

Relative to the Navy, GAO concluded its process was generally thorough and well documented. It pointed out, however, that the Secretary of the Navy excluded four activities in California, and

one in Guam, from consideration for closure because of concerns over the loss of civilian positions. For the activities in California, the Secretary based his decision on the cumulative economic impact of closures from all three prior BRAC rounds. But the economic impact of the four California activities, as defined by OSD criteria, is less on a locality basis than that for similar activities recommended for closure in other states either by the Navy or by other DoD components. In this case, however, OSD did not take exception to the inconsistency.

GAO also found the Army's process and recommendations to be generally sound. GAO asserted the Army did not fully adhere to its regular process, however, in assessing military value when recommending minor and leased facilities for closure. In selecting 15 minor sites for closure, the Army based its decision on the judgment of its major commands which assessed the sites as excess and of low military value. In considering leased facilities, the Army relied on its stationing strategy and its guidance to reduce leases but did not assess the facilities separately as it did for other installations. The decisions were arrived at through some departure from the process used for installations

Regarding the Defense Logistics Agency, GAO reported its process and recommendations were well documented and flowed logically.

Finally, GAO certified that the Defense Investigative Service's recommendation was well documented and generally sound.

# APPENDIX A

## ABBREVIATIONS

AAA	Army Audit Agency	DDAA	Distribution Depot Anniston, Alabama
AAP	Army Amunition Plant	DDCO	Distribution Depot Columbus, Ohio
ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile	DDJC	Distribution Depot San Joaquin, California
AFAA	Air Force Audit Agency	DDLDP	Distribution Depot Letterkenny, Pennsylvania
AFB	Air Force Base	DDMC	Distribution Depot McClellan, California
AFEWES	Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator	DDMT	Distribution Depot Memphis, Tennessee
AFMC	Air Force Materiel Command	DDOU	Distribution Depot Ogden, Utah
AFRES	Air Force Reserve	DDRT	Distribution Depot Red River, Texas
AGB	Air Guard Base	DDRVS	Distribution Depot Richmond, Virginia
AGS	Air Guard Station	DDSP	Distribution Depot Susquehanna, Pennsylvania
ALC	Air Logistics Center	DDST	Distribution Depot San Antonio, Texas
AMSA	Area Maintenance Support Activity	DERA	Defense Environmental Restoration Account
ARB	Air Reserve Base	DESC	Defense Electronics Supply Center
ARC	Air Reserve Component	DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
ARS	Air Reserve Station	DGSC	Defense General Supply Center
AS	Air Station	DIS	Defense Investigative Service
ASO	Aviation Supply Office	DISC	Defense Industrial Supply Center
ATCOM	Aviation Troop Command	DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
BEA	Bureau of Economic Analysis	DLSC	Defense Logistics Services Center
BLS	Bureau of Labor Statistics	DOC	Department of Commerce
BOS	Base Operating Support	DoD	Department of Defense
BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure	DoD IG	Department of Defense Inspector General
BSAT	Base Structure Analysis Team	DOE	Department of Energy
BSDB	Base Structure Data Base	DOI	Department of Interior
BSEC	Base Structure Evaluation Committee	DoN	Department of Navy
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence	DPSC	Defense Personnel Support Center
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liabilities Act	DRMS	Defense Reutilization And Marketing Service
CHAMPUS	Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services	DSDC	DLA Systems Design Center
CINC	Commander-in-Chief	EDA	Economic Development Administration
COBRA	Cost of Base Realignment Actions	EFA NW	Engineering Field Activity Northwest
CONUS	Continental United States	EIG	Engineering Installation Group
DCMAO	Defense Contract Management Area Operations	EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
DCMC	Defense Contract Management Command		
DCMD	Defense Contract Management District		
DCSC	Defense Construction Supply Center		



FISC	Fleet and Industrial Supply Center	NSB	Naval Submarine Base
FSC	Federal Supply Classes	NSWC	Naval Surface Warfare Center
GAO	General Accounting Office	NSY	Naval Shipyard
GSA	General Services Administration	NTC	Naval Training Center
IAP	International Airport	NTTC	Naval Technical Training Center
IC&AD	Investigations Control and Automation Directorate	NUWC	Naval Undersea Warfare Center
ICP	Inventory Control Point	NWAD	Naval Warfare Assessment Division
ISSC	Information Systems Software Command	NWS	Naval Weapons Station
IUSS	Integrated Undersea Surveillance System	OEA	Office of Economic Adjustment
JPAT	Joint Process Action Team	OMB	Office of Management and Budget
JCSG	Joint Cross-Service Group	ONR	Office of Naval Research
LANTIRN	Low Altitude Navigation and Targeting Infrared System (Night)	OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
LMI	Logistics Management Institute	PTR	Pilot Training Rate
MAJCOM	Major Command	PWC	Public Works Center
MAP	Municipal Airport	RC	Reserve Component
MCAF	Marine Corps Air Facility	R&D	Research and Development
MCAS	Marine Corps Air Station	RDT&E	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
MCB	Marine Corps Base	REDCAP	Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor
MCLB	Marine Corps Logistics Base	REDCOM	Readiness Command
MSA	Metropolitan Statistical Area	ROI	Return on Investment
NADEP	Naval Aviation Depot	SAILS	Strategic Analysis of Integrated Logistics Systems
NAESU	Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit	SDIV	Southern Division
NAF	Naval Air Facility	SIMA	Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
NAS	Naval Air Station	SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
NATSF	Naval Air Technical Services Facility	SPAWAR	Space and Naval War Systems Command
NAVAIR	Naval Air Systems Command	SRF	Ship Repair Facility
NAVFAC	Naval Facility	SSN	Attack Submarine, Nuclear-Powered
NAVMASSO	Naval Management Systems Support Office	SUPSHIP	Supervisors of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair
NAVSEA	Naval Sea Systems Command	TC	Transition Coordinator
NAWC	Naval Air Warfare Center	UPT	Undergraduate Pilot Training
NBDL	Naval Biodynamics Laboratory	VHA	Variable Housing Allowance
NCCOSC	Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center	WDIV	Engineering Field Activity West
NCR	National Capital Region	WPSTA	Weapons Station
NESEC	Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center		
NETC	Naval Education and Training Center		
NHRC	Naval Health Research Center		
NISE	Naval In-Service Engineering		
NISMC	Naval Information Systems Management Center		
NMRI	Naval Medical Research Institute		
NPRDC	Navy Personnel Research and Development Center		
NPS	Nuclear Power School		
NPV	Net Present Value		
NRC	Naval Reserve Center		
NRD	Naval Recruiting District		
NRL	Naval Research Laboratory		



## APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS

*The Secretary of Defense used the following terms in developing the 1995 Recommendations to the Commission:*

**Close:** All missions of the base will cease or be relocated. All personnel (military, civilian and, contractor) will either be eliminated or relocated. The entire base will be excessed and the property disposed. Note: A caretaker workforce is possible to bridge between closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal, which are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

**Close, Except:** The vast majority of the missions will cease or be relocated. Over 95 percent of the military, civilian, and contractor personnel will either be eliminated or relocated. All but a small portion of the base will be excessed and the property disposed. The small portion retained will often be facilities in an enclave for use by the reserve component. Generally, active component management of the base will cease. Outlying, unmanned ranges or training areas retained for reserve component use do not count against the "small portion retained." Again, closure (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal are separate actions under Public Law 101-510.

**Inactive, Disestablish:** Terms used to describe planned actions which directly affect missions, units, or activities. Fighter wings are *inactivated*, bases are *closed*.

**Mothball, Layaway:** Terms used when retention of facilities and real estate at a closing or realigning base are necessary to meet the mobilization or contingency needs of Defense. Bases or portions of bases "mothballed" will not be excessed and disposed. It is possible they could be leased for interim economic uses.

**Realign:** Some missions of the base will cease or be relocated, but others will remain. The active component will still be host of the remaining portion of the base. Only a portion of the base will be

excessed and the property disposed, with realignment (missions ceasing or relocating) and property disposal being separate actions under Public Law 101-510. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is being *realigned* if it will experience a net reduction of DoD civilian personnel. In such situations, it is possible that no property will be excessed.

**Receiving Base:** A base which receives missions, units, or activities relocating from a closing or realigning base. In cases where the base is both gaining and losing missions, the base is a *receiving base* if it will experience a net increase of DoD civilian personnel.

**Relocate:** The term used to describe the movement of missions, units, or activities from a closing or realigning base to another base. Units do not realign from a closing or a realigning base to another base, they *relocate*.

### *The Base Closure and Realignment Statute defines the following terms:*

**Account:** The Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

**Congressional Defense Committees:** The Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives

**Commission:** The Commission established by section 2902 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

**Military Installation:** A base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

**Realignment:** Any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

**Secretary:** The Secretary of Defense.

**United States:** The 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other territory or possession of the United States.

### *The Commission uses the following terms in this Report:*

**BRAC 95 Economic Impact:** The BRAC 95 economic impact of an installation is the direct and indirect job loss resulting from a 1995 BRAC realignment or closure expressed as a percentage of the employment base within its economic area.

**CERCLA:** The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, also known as the Superfund, is the legal framework for the identification, restoration, and transfer of contaminated private property. In 1986, CERCLA was revised to include all federal property, including military installations.

**CERFA:** The Community Environmental Response Facilitation Act. It amends CERCLA and requires identification of uncontaminated parcels at closing bases and allows the clean parcels to be transferred while long-term cleanup of contaminated parcels continues.

**Clean Air Act:** The Clean Air Act refers to federal regulations upon which the nation's air pollution control program is based. The program is carried out by the Environmental Protection Agency and state regulatory programs. The program is based primarily on the 1970 version of the Act. It was most recently amended in 1990.

**COBRA:** COBRA, or the Cost of Base Realignment Actions, is an analytical tool for estimating the costs and savings associated with the execution of a realignment or closure action. The tool calculates the one-time cost, annual savings, return on investment, and the net present value of each action.

**Cumulative Economic Impact:** The cumulative economic impact of an installation is the direct and indirect job loss expressed as a percentage of the employment base resulting from the current (1995) BRAC action; other current BRAC actions across all Services within the same economic area;

and prior BRAC actions, across all Services within the same economic area, if the personnel losses occur in 1994 or after.

**Economic Area:** Economic areas for each installation were assigned by the Services and consist of either a county, multiple counties, or metropolitan statistical areas. These areas generally represent personnel commuting patterns and common components of supply and demand.

**Economic Development Administration:** The EDA, which is a part of the Department of Commerce, is to provide economic development grants to help communities implement their economic development plans.

**Enclave:** A section of a military installation that remains intact from that part which is closed or realigned and which will continue with its current role and functions subject to specific modifications.

**Local Redevelopment Authority:** The DoD recognized local organization whose role is to coordinate efforts of the community to reuse assets of the former military base.

**Office of Economic Adjustment:** The OEA is an agency within the DoD that is in charge of helping communities plan for base closures and realignments. The Office also provides planning grants to impacted communities.

**One-time Cost:** The nonrecurring cost to implement the recommendations.

**RCRA:** The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act which passed in 1976 and amended in 1984. RCRA provides "cradle-to-grave" control of hazardous waste by imposing management requirements on the military as generators and transporters of hazardous wastes and owners and operators of treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. The RCRA covers federal and private sites, and applies mainly to active facilities. The military can perform environmental cleanup under the Corrective Action portion of RCRA.

**Redevelopment Plan:** Contains the various alternatives the local community, through its Local Redevelopment Authority, intends to create jobs and provide economic recovery.

**Redirect:** Recommendation from the Secretary of Defense, or a decision of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, to change a base closure or realignment decision made by a prior Commission round (1988, 1991, or 1993). **Note:** This term is generally used when the receiver installation is changed.



APPENDIX C  
SECTION 2687, TITLE 10,  
UNITED STATES CODE

**§ 2687. BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS**

(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no action may be taken to effect or implement:

(1) the closure of any military installation at which at least 300 civilian personnel are authorized to be employed;

(2) any realignment with respect to any military installation referred to in paragraph (1) involving a reduction by more than 1,000 or by more than 50 percent, in the number of civilian personnel authorized to be employed at such military installation at the time the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Congress under subsection (b) of the Secretary's plan to close or realign such installation; or

(3) any construction, conversion or rehabilitation at any military facility other than a military installation referred to in clause (1) or (2) which will or may be required as a result of the relocation of civilian personnel to such facility by reason of any closure or realignment to which clause (1) or (2) applies, unless and until the provisions of subsection (b) are complied with.

(b) No action described in subsection (a) with respect to the closure of, or a realignment with respect to, any military installation referred to in such subsection may be taken unless and until:

(1) the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the military department concerned notifies the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives, as part of an annual request for authorization of appropriations to such Committees, of the proposed closing or realignment and submits with the notification an evaluation of the fiscal, local economic, budgetary, environmental, strategic, and operational consequences of such closure or realignment; and

(2) a period of 30 legislative days or 60 calendar days, whichever is longer, expires following the day on which the notice and evaluation referred

to in clause (1) have been submitted to such committees, during which period no irrevocable action may be taken to effect or implement the decision.

(c) This section shall not apply to the closure of a military installation, or a realignment with respect to a military installation, if the President certifies to the Congress that such closure or realignment must be implemented for reasons of national security or a military emergency.

(d)(1) After the expiration of the period of time provided for in subsection (b)(2) with respect to the closure or realignment of a military installation, funds which would otherwise be available to the Secretary to effect the closure or realignment of that installation may be used by him for such purpose.

(2) Nothing in this section restricts the authority of the Secretary to obtain architectural and engineering services under section 2807 of this title.


(e) In this section:

(1) The term "military installation" means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility, which is located within any of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, or Guam. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.

(2) The term "civilian personnel" means direct-hire, permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense.

(3) The term "realignment" includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions, but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, skill imbalances, or other similar causes.

(4) The term "legislative day" means a day on which either House of Congress is in session.



# APPENDIX D

## 1988 CHARTER: DEFENSE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE

In accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as amended (5 U.S.C. App. D), a Commission on Base Realignment and Closure is hereby ordered as follows:

### *Section 1. Establishment.*

There is established the Defense Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure. The Commission shall be composed of twelve members appointed or designated by the Secretary of Defense. The composition of the Commission shall include persons with broad experience in government and national defense. The Secretary shall designate two Chairpersons from among the members of the Commission

### *Section 2. Functions.*

The Commission shall study the issues surrounding military base realignment and closure within the United States, its commonwealths, territories, and possessions. The primary objectives of the Commission shall be to.

A. Determine, by November 15, 1988, the best process, including necessary administrative changes, for identifying bases to be closed or realigned; how to improve and best use Federal government incentive programs to overcome the negative impact of base closure or realignment; and, the criteria for realigning and closing bases to include at least:

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the military departments concerned
2. The availability and condition of land and facilities at both the existing and potential receiving locations.

3. The potential to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future force requirements at receiving locations

4. The cost and manpower implications.

5. The extent and timing of potential cost savings, including whether the total cost savings realized from the closure or realignment of the base will, by the end of the 6-year period beginning with the date of the completion of the closure or realignment of the base, exceed the amount expended to close or realign the base.

6. The economic impact on the community in which the base to be closed or realigned is located.

7. The community support at the receiving locations.

8. The environmental impact.

9. The implementation process involved.

B. Review the current and planned military base structure in light of force structure assumptions, and the process and criteria developed pursuant to subparagraph A, and identify which bases should be closed or realigned.

C. Report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense by December 31, 1988.

### *Section 3. Administration.*

Members of the Commission shall serve without compensation for their work on the Commission. However, members appointed from among private citizens may be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law for persons serving intermittently in


the government service (5 U.S.C. 5701-5707), to the full extent funds are available. The Secretary of Defense shall provide the commission with such administrative services, facilities, staff, and other support services as may be necessary. Any expenses of the Commission shall be paid from such funds as may be available to the Secretary of Defense.

The Commission shall be in place and operating as soon as possible. Shortly thereafter, the Commission shall brief the Secretary of Defense on the Commission's plan of action. The Commission's final report shall include recommendations to realign and close bases only upon a vote of a majority of members of the Commission. The Commission should complete its work by December 31, 1988.



Frank Carlucci  
Secretary of Defense

The Pentagon  
May 3, 1988  
(as revised November 3, 1988)



# APPENDIX E

## DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION AMENDMENTS AND BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1988 (P.L. 100-526)

*Enacted October 24, 1988*

As amended by the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1991 (P.L. 101-510), 1992/1993 (P.L. 102-190), 1993 (P.L. 102-484), 1994 (P.L. 103-160), and 1995 (P.L. 103-337), and the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-421)

### SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE

This Act may be cited as the "Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act".

## TITLE II—CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

### SEC. 201. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

The Secretary shall—

- (1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure in the report transmitted to the Secretary pursuant to the charter establishing such commission;
- (2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such commission in such report; and
- (3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than September 30, 1991, and complete all closures and realignments no later than September 30, 1995, except that no such closure or realignment may be initiated before January 1, 1990.

### SEC. 202. CONDITIONS

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation under this title unless—

(1) no later than January 16, 1989, the Secretary transmits to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report containing a statement that the Secretary has approved, and the Department of Defense will implement, all of the military installation closures and realignments recommended by the Commission in the report referred to in section 201(1);

(2) the Commission has recommended, in the report referred to in section 201(1), the closure or realignment, as the case may be, of the installation, and has transmitted to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a copy of such report and the statement required by section 203(b)(2); and

(3) the Secretary of Defense has transmitted to the Commission the study required by section 206(b)

(b) **JOINT RESOLUTION.**—The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment under this title if, within the 45-day period beginning on March 1, 1989, a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 208, disapproving the recommendations of the Commission. The days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of such 45-day period.

**(c) TERMINATION OF AUTHORITY.**—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the authority of the Secretary to carry out any closure or realignment under this title shall terminate on October 1, 1995.

(2) The termination of authority set forth in paragraph (1) shall not apply to the authority of the Secretary to carry out environmental restoration and waste management at, or disposal of property of, military installations closed or realigned under this title.

## SEC. 203. THE COMMISSION

**(a) MEMBERSHIP.**—The Commission shall consist of 12 members appointed by the Secretary of Defense.

**(b) DUTIES.**—The Commission shall—

(1) transmit the report referred to in section 201(1) to the Secretary no later than December 31, 1988, and shall include in such report a description of the Commission's recommendations of the military installations to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closures and realignments recommended by the Commission; and

(2) on the same date on which the Commission transmits such report to the Secretary, transmit to Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives—

(A) a copy of such report; and

(B) a statement certifying that the Commission has identified the military installations to be closed or realigned by reviewing all military installations inside the United States, including all military installations under construction and all those planned for construction.

**(c) STAFF.**—Not more than one-half of the professional staff of the Commission shall be individuals who have been employed by the Department of Defense during calendar year 1988 in any capacity other than as an employee of the Commission.

## SEC. 204. IMPLEMENTATION

**(a) IN GENERAL.**—In closing or realigning a military installation under this title, the Secretary—

(1) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance

and the availability of funds in the Account, may carry out actions necessary to implement such closure or realignment, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from such military installation to another military installation;

(2) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance and the availability of funds in the Account, shall provide—

(A) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(B) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of such closure or realignment, if the Secretary determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate; and

(3) subject to the availability of funds authorized for and appropriated to the Department of Defense for environmental restoration and the availability of funds in the Account, may carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration, including reducing, removing, and recycling hazardous wastes and removing unsafe buildings and debris.

**(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.**—(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary, with respect to excess and surplus real property, facilities, and personal property located at a military installation closed or realigned under this title—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484); and

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).



(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this title governing utilization of excess property and disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949; and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this title governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this title, the Secretary shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned

(E) The provisions of this paragraph and paragraph (1) are subject to paragraphs (3) through (6).

(3)(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, the Secretary, in consultation with the redevelopment authority with respect to each military installation to be closed under this title after such date of enactment, shall—

(i) inventory the personal property located at the installation; and

(ii) identify the items (or categories of items) of such personal property that the Secretary determines to be related to real property and anticipates will support the

implementation of the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation

(B) If no redevelopment authority referred to in subparagraph (A) exists with respect to an installation, the Secretary shall consult with—

(i) the local government in whose jurisdiction the installation is wholly located; or

(ii) a local government agency or State government agency designated for the purpose of such consultation by the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation is located.

(C)(i) Except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), the Secretary may not carry out any of the activities referred to in clause (ii) with respect to an installation referred to in that clause until the earlier of—

(I) one week after the date on which the redevelopment plan for the installation is submitted to the Secretary;

(II) the date on which the redevelopment authority notifies the Secretary that it will not submit such a plan;

(III) twenty-four months after the date referred to in subparagraph (A), or

(IV) ninety days before the date of the closure of the installation.

(ii) The activities referred to in clause (i) are activities relating to the closure of an installation to be closed under this title as follows:

(I) The transfer from the installation of items of personal property at the installation identified in accordance with subparagraph (A).

(II) The reduction in maintenance and repair of facilities or equipment located at the installation below the minimum levels required to support the use of such facilities or equipment for nonmilitary purposes.

(D) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the Secretary may not transfer items of personal property located at an installation to be closed under this title to another installation, or dispose of such items, if such items are identified in the redevelopment plan for the installation as items essential to the reuse or redevelopment of the installation. In connection with the development of the redevelopment plan for the installation, the

Secretary shall consult with the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan to identify the items of personal property located at the installation, if any, that the entity desires to be retained at the installation for reuse or redevelopment of the installation.

(E) This paragraph shall not apply to any related personal property located at an installation to be closed under this title if the property—

(i) is required for the operation of a unit, function, component, weapon, or weapons system at another installation;

(ii) is uniquely military in character, and is likely to have no civilian use (other than use for its material content or as a source of commonly used components);

(iii) is not required for the reutilization or redevelopment of the installation (as jointly determined by the Secretary and the redevelopment authority);

(iv) is stored at the installation for purposes of distribution (including spare parts or stock items); or

(v)(I) meets known requirements of an authorized program of another Federal department or agency for which expenditures for similar property would be necessary, and (II) is the subject of a written request by the head of the department or agency.

(F) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (C)(i) and (D), the Secretary may carry out any activity referred to in subparagraph (C)(ii) or (D) if the Secretary determines that the carrying out of such activity is in the national security interest of the United States.

(4)(A) The Secretary may transfer real property and personal property located at a military installation to be closed under this title to the redevelopment authority with respect to the installation.

(B)(i)(I) Except as provided in clause (ii), the transfer of property under subparagraph (A) may be for consideration at or below the estimated fair market value of the property transferred or without consideration. Such consideration may include consideration in kind (including goods and services), real property and improvements, or such other consideration as the Secretary considers appropriate. The Secretary shall determine the estimated fair market value of the property to be transferred under

this subparagraph before carrying out such transfer.

(II) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations that set forth guidelines for determining the amount, if any, of consideration required for a transfer under this paragraph. Such regulations shall include a requirement that, in the case of each transfer under this paragraph for consideration below the estimated fair market value of the property transferred, the Secretary provide an explanation why the transfer is not for the estimated fair market value of the property transferred (including an explanation why the transfer cannot be carried out in accordance with the authority provided to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2)).

(ii) The transfer of property under subparagraph (A) shall be without consideration in the case of any installation located in a rural area whose closure under this title will have a substantial adverse impact (as determined by the Secretary) on the economy of the communities in the vicinity of the installation and on the prospect for the economic recovery of such communities from such closure. The Secretary shall prescribe in the regulations under clause (i)(II) the manner of determining whether communities are eligible for the transfer of property under this clause.

(iii) In the case of a transfer under subparagraph (A) for consideration below the fair market value of the property transferred, the Secretary may recoup from the transferee of such property such portion as the Secretary determines appropriate of the amount, if any, by which the sale or lease of such property by such transferee exceeds the amount of consideration paid to the Secretary for such property by such transferee. The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for determining the amount of recoupment under this clause.

(C)(i) The transfer of personal property under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to the provisions of sections 202 and 203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483, 484) if the Secretary determines that the transfer of such property is necessary for the effective implementation of a redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such property is located.

(ii) The Secretary may, in lieu of the transfer of property referred to in subparagraph (A), transfer personal property similar to such property (including property not located at the installation) if the Secretary determines that the transfer of such similar property is in the interest of the United States.

(D) The provisions of section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)) shall apply to any transfer of real property under this paragraph.

(E) The Secretary may require any additional terms and conditions in connection with a transfer under this paragraph as such Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall take such actions as the Secretary determines necessary to ensure that final determinations under paragraph (1) regarding whether another department or agency of the Federal Government has identified a use for any portion of a military installation to be closed under this title after the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, or will accept transfer of any portion of such installation, are made not later than 6 months after such date of enactment.

(B) The Secretary may, in consultation with the redevelopment authority with respect to an installation, postpone making the final determinations referred to in subparagraph (A) with respect to the installation for such period as the Secretary determines appropriate if the Secretary determines that such postponement is in the best interests of the communities affected by the closure of the installation

(6)(A) Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this section shall limit or otherwise affect the application of the provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11301 et seq.) to military installations closed under this title.

(B)(i) Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense completes the determination under paragraph (5) of the transferability of any portion of an installation to be closed under this title, the Secretary shall—

(I) complete any determinations or surveys necessary to determine whether any

building or property referred to in clause (ii) is excess property, surplus property, or unutilized or underutilized property for the purpose of the information referred to in section 501(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 11411(a)); and

(II) submit to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development information on any building or property that is so determined.

(ii) The buildings and property referred to in clause (i) are any buildings or property located at an installation referred to in that clause for which no use is identified, or of which no Federal department or agency will accept transfer, pursuant to the determination of transferability referred to in that clause.

(C) Not later than 60 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits information to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (B)(ii), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall—

(i) identify the buildings and property described in such information that are suitable for use to assist the homeless;

(ii) notify the Secretary of Defense of the buildings and property that are so identified,

(iii) publish in the Federal Register a list of the buildings and property that are so identified, including with respect to each building or property the information referred to in section 501(c)(1)(B) of such Act; and

(iv) make available with respect to each building and property the information referred to in section 501(c)(1)(C) of such Act in accordance with such section 501(c)(1)(C).

(D) Any buildings and property included in a list published under subparagraph (C)(iii) shall be treated as property available for application for use to assist the homeless under section 501(d) of such Act.

(E) The Secretary of Defense shall make available in accordance with section 501(f) of such Act any buildings or property referred to in subparagraph (D) for which—

(i) a written notice of an intent to use such buildings or property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act;

(ii) an application for use of such buildings or property for such purpose is submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(e)(2) of such Act; and

(iii) the Secretary of Health and Human Services—

(I) completes all actions on the application in accordance with section 501(e)(3) of such Act; and

(II) approves the application under section 501(e) of such Act.

(F)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a redevelopment authority may express in writing an interest in using buildings and property referred to in subparagraph (D), and buildings and property referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii) which have not been identified as suitable for use to assist the homeless under subparagraph (C), or use such buildings and property, in accordance with the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such buildings and property are located as follows:

(I) If no written notice of an intent to use such buildings or property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act during the 60-day period beginning on the date of the publication of the buildings and property under subparagraph (C)(iii).

(II) In the case of buildings and property for which such notice is so received, if no completed application for use of the buildings or property for such purpose is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(e)(2) of such Act during the 90-day period beginning on the date of the receipt of such notice.

(III) In the case of building and property for which such application is so received, if the Secretary of Health and Human Services rejects the application under section 501(e) of such Act.

(ii) Buildings and property shall be available only for the purpose of permitting a redevelopment authority to express in writing an interest in the use of such buildings and property, or to use such buildings and

property, under clause (i) as follows:

(I) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(I), during the one-year period beginning on the first day after the 60-day period referred to in that clause.

(II) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(II), during the one-year period beginning on the first day after the 90-day period referred to in that clause.

(III) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(III), during the one-year period beginning on the date of the rejection of the application referred to in that clause.

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall express an interest in the use of buildings and property under this subparagraph by notifying the Secretary of Defense, in writing, of such an interest.

(G)(i) Buildings and property available for a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (F) shall not be available for use to assist the homeless under section 501 of such Act while so available for a redevelopment authority.

(ii) If a redevelopment authority does not express an interest in the use of buildings or property, or commence the use of buildings or property, under subparagraph (F) within the applicable time periods specified in clause (ii) of such subparagraph, such buildings or property shall be treated as property available for use to assist the homeless under section 501(a) of such Act.

(7)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B) or (C), all proceeds—

(i) from the transfer under paragraphs (3) through (6); and

(ii) from the transfer or disposal of any other property or facility made as a result of a closure or realignment under this title, shall be deposited into the Account established by section 207(a)(1).

(B) In any case in which the General Services Administration is involved in the management or disposal of such property or facility, the Secretary shall reimburse the Administrator of General Services from the proceeds of such

disposal, in accordance with section 1535 of title 31, United States Code, for any expenses incurred in such activities.

(C)(i) If any real property or facility acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part) with commissary store funds or nonappropriated funds is transferred or disposed of in connection with the closure or realignment of a military installation under this title, a portion of the proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of property on that installation shall be deposited in a reserve account established in the Treasury to be administered by the Secretary. The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance in appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and improving—

(I) commissary stores; and

(II) real property and facilities for nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.

(ii) The amount deposited under clause (i) shall be equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with such funds in the acquisition, construction, or improvement of that particular real property or facility. The depreciated value of the investment shall be computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

(iii) As used in this subparagraph:

(I) The term “commissary store funds” means funds received from the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code

(II) The term “nonappropriated funds” means funds received from a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(III) The term “nonappropriated fund instrumentality” means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

(8)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary may contract with local governments for the provision of police services, fire protection services,

airfield operation services, or other community services by such governments at military installations to be closed under this title if the Secretary determines that the provision of such services under such contracts is in the best interests of the Department of Defense.

(B) The Secretary may exercise the authority provided under this paragraph without regard to the provisions of chapter 146 of title 10, United States Code.

(C) The Secretary may not exercise the authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to an installation earlier than 180 days before the date on which the installation is to be closed

(D) The Secretary shall include in a contract for services entered into with a local government under this paragraph a clause that requires the use of professionals to furnish the services to the extent that professionals are available in the area under the jurisdiction of such government.

**(C) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER LAW.**—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq) shall not apply to—

(A) the actions of the Commission, including selecting the military installations which the Commission recommends for closure or realignment under this title, recommending any military installation to receive functions from an installation to be closed or realigned, and making its report to the Secretary and the committees under section 203(b), and

(B) the actions of the Secretary in establishing the Commission, in determining whether to accept the recommendations of the Commission, in selecting any military installation to receive functions from an installation to be closed or realigned, and in transmitting the report to the Committees referred to in section 202(a)(1).

(2) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to the actions of the Secretary (A) during the process of the closing or realigning of a military installation after such military installation has been selected for closure or realignment but before the installation is closed or realigned and the functions relocated, and (B) during the process of the relocating of functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated. In applying the provisions of such Act, the Secretary shall not have to consider—

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been selected for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to another military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or

(iii) alternative military installations to those selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), or with respect to any requirement of the Commission made by this title, of any action or failure to act by the Secretary during the closing, realigning, or relocating referred to in clauses (A) and (B) of paragraph (2), or of any action or failure to act by the Commission under this title, may not be brought later than the 60th day after the date of such action or failure to act.

**(d) TRANSFER AUTHORITY IN CONNECTION WITH PAYMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS.—**(1)(A) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection and section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)), the Secretary may enter into an agreement to transfer by deed real property or facilities referred to in subparagraph (B) with any person who agrees to perform all environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities that are required for the property or facilities under Federal and State laws, administrative decisions, agreements (including schedules and milestones), and concurrences.

(B) The real property and facilities referred to in subparagraph (A) are the real property and facilities located at an installation closed or to be closed under this title that are available exclusively for the use, or expression of an interest in a use, of a redevelopment authority under subsection (b)(6)(F) during the period provided for that use, or expression of interest in use, under that subsection.

(C) The Secretary may require any additional terms and conditions in connection with an agreement authorized by subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

(2) A transfer of real property or facilities may be made under paragraph (1) only if the Secretary certifies to Congress that—

(A) the costs of all environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities to be paid by the recipient of the property or facilities are equal to or greater than the fair market value of the property or facilities to be transferred, as determined by the Secretary; or

(B) if such costs are lower than the fair market value of the property or facilities, the recipient of the property or facilities agrees to pay the difference between the fair market value and such costs.

(3) As part of an agreement under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall disclose to the person to whom the property or facilities will be transferred any information of the Secretary regarding the environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities described in paragraph (1) that relate to the property or facilities. The Secretary shall provide such information before entering into the agreement.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to modify, alter, or amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) or the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.).

(5) Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) shall not apply to any transfer under this subsection to persons or entities described in subsection (a)(2) of such section 330.

(6) The Secretary may not enter into an agreement to transfer property or facilities under this subsection after the expiration of the five-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.

## **SEC. 205. WAIVER**

The Secretary of Defense may carry out this title without regard to—

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriation or authorization Act; and

(2) the procedures set forth in sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

#### SEC. 206. REPORTS

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—As part of each annual budget request for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this title in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions, and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

(b) **STUDY.**—(1) The Secretary shall conduct a study of the military installations of the United States outside the United States to determine if efficiencies can be realized through closure or realignment of the overseas base structure of the United States. Not later than October 15, 1988, the Secretary shall transmit a report of the findings and conclusions of such study to the Commission and to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives. In developing its recommendations to the Secretary under this title, the Commission shall consider the Secretary's study.

(2) Upon request of the Commission, the Secretary shall provide the Commission with such information about overseas bases as may be helpful to the Commission in its deliberations.

(3) The Commission, based on its analysis of military installations in the United States and its review of the Secretary's study of the overseas base structure, may provide the Secretary with such comments and suggestions as it considers appropriate regarding the Secretary's study of the overseas base structure.

#### SEC. 207. FUNDING

(a) **ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the "Department of Defense Base Closure Account" which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account with respect to fiscal year 1990 and fiscal years beginning thereafter;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the appropriate committees of Congress; and

(C) proceeds described in section 204(b)(4)(A).

(3)(A) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 204(a).

(B) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 204(a)(1) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the appropriate committees of Congress of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(4) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this title, the Secretary shall transmit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 204(a) during such fiscal year.

(5) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under

this title shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the appropriate committees of Congress receive the report transmitted under paragraph (6).

(B) The Secretary may, after the termination of authority referred to in subparagraph (A), use any unobligated funds referred to in that subparagraph that are not transferred in accordance with that subparagraph to carry out environmental restoration and waste management at, or disposal of property of, military installations closed or realigned under this title.

(6) No later than 60 days after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title, the Secretary shall transmit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing an accounting of—

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this title; and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

(7) Proceeds received after September 30, 1995, from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this title shall be deposited directly into the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a) of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 (part A of title XXIX of Public Law 101-510; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

**(b) BASE CLOSURE ACCOUNT TO BE EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.—**No funds appropriated to the Department of Defense may be used for purposes described in section 204(a)(3) except funds that have been authorized for and appropriated to the Account. The prohibition in the preceding sentence expires upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this title. *[Section 207 (b) does not apply with respect to the availability of funds appropriated before November 5, 1990.]*

## **SEC. 208. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT**

**(a) TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.—**For purposes of section 202(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced before March 15, 1989, and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure established by the Secretary of Defense as submitted to the Secretary of Defense on \_\_\_\_\_”, the blank space being appropriately filled in; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure.”

**(b) REFERRAL.—**A resolution described in subsection (a), introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

**(c) DISCHARGE.—**If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such resolution (or an identical resolution) before March 15, 1989, such committee shall be, as of March 15, 1989, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

**(d) CONSIDERATION.—**(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution (but only on the day after the calendar day on which such Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to do so). All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.



(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than 10 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

**(e) CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply.

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House; but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

**(f) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

## SEC. 209. DEFINITIONS

In this title:

(1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207(a)(1).

(2) The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The terms “Commission on Base Realignment and Closure” and “Commission” mean the Commission established by the Secretary of Defense in the charter signed by the Secretary on May 3, 1988, and as altered thereafter with respect to the membership and voting

(4) The term “charter establishing such Commission” means the charter referred to in paragraph (3).

(5) The term “initiate” includes any action reducing functions or civilian personnel positions but does not include studies, planning, or similar activities carried out before there is a reduction of such functions or positions.

(6) The term “military installation” means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department.

(7) The term “realignment” includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions.

(8) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Defense.

(9) The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands,


American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(10) The term “redevelopment authority”, in the case of an installation to be closed under this title, means any entity (including an entity established by a State or local government) recognized by the Secretary of Defense as the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation or for directing the implementation of such plan.

(11) The term “redevelopment plan” in the case of an installation to be closed under this title, means a plan that—

(A) is agreed to by the redevelopment authority with respect to the installation; and

(B) provides for the reuse or redevelopment of the real property and personal property of the installation that is available for such reuse or redevelopment as a result of the closure of the installation.



**APPENDIX F**  
**DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND**  
**REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990**  
**PUBLIC LAW 101-510,**  
**10 U.S.C. 2687 NOTE**

*Enacted November 5, 1990*

As amended by the National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 1992/1993 (P.L. 102-311), 1993 (P.L. 102-484), 1994 (P.L. 103-106), 1995 (P.L. 103-337), and the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-421).

**TITLE XXIX - DEFENSE BASE  
CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS**

***PART A—DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE AND  
REALIGNMENT COMMISSION***

**SEC. 2901. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE**

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This part may be cited as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990”.

(b) **PURPOSE.**—The purpose of this part is to provide a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.

**SEC. 2902. THE COMMISSION**

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT.**—There is established an independent commission to be known as the “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission”.

(b) **DUTIES.**—The Commission shall carry out the duties specified for it in this part.

(c) **APPOINTMENT.**—(1)(A) The Commission shall be composed of eight members appointed by the President, by and with the advise and consent of the Senate.

(B) The President shall transmit to the Senate the nominations for appointment to the Commission—

(i) by no later than January 3, 1991, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 102nd Congress;

(ii) by no later than January 25, 1993, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 103rd Congress; and

(iii) by no later than January 3, 1995, in the case of members of the Commission whose terms will expire at the end of the first session of the 104th Congress

(C) If the President does not transmit to Congress the nominations for appointment to the Commission on or before the date specified for 1993 in clause (ii) of subparagraph (B) or for 1995 in clause (iii) of such subparagraph, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated

(2) In selecting individuals for nominations for appointments to the Commission, the President should consult with—

(A) the Speaker of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of two members;

(B) the majority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of two members,

(C) the minority leader of the House of Representatives concerning the appointment of one member; and

(D) the minority leader of the Senate concerning the appointment of one member.

(3) At the time the President nominates individuals for appointment to the Commission for each session of Congress referred to in paragraph (1)(B), the President shall designate one such

individual who shall serve as Chairman of the Commission.

**(d) TERMS.**—(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), each member of the Commission shall serve until the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which the member was appointed to the Commission.

(2) The Chairman of the Commission shall serve until the confirmation of a successor.

**(e) MEETINGS.**—(1) The Commission shall meet only during calendar years 1991, 1993, and 1995.

(2)(A) Each meeting of the Commission, other than meetings in which classified information is to be discussed, shall be open to the public.

(B) All the proceedings, information, and deliberations of the Commission shall be open, upon request, to the following:

(i) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability, and Support of the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(ii) The Chairman and the ranking minority party member of the Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittee designated by such Chairman or ranking minority party member.

(iii) The Chairmen and ranking minority party members of the Subcommittees on Military Construction of the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, or such other members of the Subcommittees designated by such Chairmen or ranking minority party members.

**(f) VACANCIES.**—A vacancy in the Commission shall be filled in the same manner as the original appointment, but the individual appointed to fill the vacancy shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term for which the individual's predecessor was appointed.

**(g) PAY AND TRAVEL EXPENSES.**—(1)(A) Each member, other than the Chairman, shall be paid at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of

title 5, United States Code, for each day (including travel time) during which the member is engaged in the actual performance of duties vested in the Commission.

(B) The Chairman shall be paid for each day referred to in subparagraph (A) at a rate equal to the daily equivalent of the minimum annual rate of basic pay payable for level III of the Executive Schedule under section 5314 of title 5, United States Code.

(2) Members shall receive travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, in accordance with sections 5702 and 5703 of title 5, United States Code.

**(h) DIRECTOR OF STAFF.**—(1) The Commission shall, without regard to section 5311(b) of title 5, United States Code, appoint a Director who has not served on active duty in the Armed Forces or as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense during the one-year period preceding the date of such appointment.

(2) The Director shall be paid at the rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.

**(i) STAFF.**—(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), the Director, with the approval of the Commission, may appoint and fix the pay of additional personnel.

(2) The Director may make such appointments without regard to the provisions of title 5, United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive service, and any personnel so appointed may be paid without regard to the provisions of chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates, except that an individual so appointed may not receive pay in excess of the annual rate of basic pay payable for GS-18 of the General Schedule.

(3)(A) Not more than one-third of the personnel employed by or detailed to the Commission may be on detail from the Department of Defense.

(B)(i) Not more than one-fifth of the professional analysts of the Commission staff may be persons detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission.

(ii) No person detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission may be assigned as

the lead professional analyst with respect to a military department or defense agency.

(C) A person may not be detailed from the Department of Defense to the Commission if, within 12 months before the detail is to begin, that person participated personally and substantially in any matter within the Department of Defense concerning the preparation of recommendations for closures or realignments of military installations.

(D) No member of the Armed Forces, and no officer or employee of the Department of Defense, may—

(i) prepare any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the performance on the staff of the Commission of any person detailed from the Department of Defense to that staff;

(ii) review the preparation of such a report; or

(iii) approve or disapprove such a report.

(4) Upon request of the Director, the head of any Federal department or agency may detail any of the personnel of that department or agency to the Commission to assist the Commission in carrying out its duties under this part

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall provide assistance, including the detailing of employees, to the Commission in accordance with an agreement entered into with the Commission

(6) The following restrictions relating to the personnel of the Commission shall apply during 1992 and 1994

(A) There may not be more than 15 persons on the staff at any one time.

(B) The staff may perform only such functions as are necessary to prepare for the transition to new membership on the Commission in the following year.

(C) No member of the Armed Forces and no employee of the Department of Defense may serve on the staff.

**(j) OTHER AUTHORITY.**—(1) The Commission may procure by contract, to the extent funds are available, the temporary or intermittent services of experts or consultants pursuant to section 3109 of title 5, United States Code

(2) The Commission may lease space and acquire personal property to the extent funds are available.

**(k) FUNDING.**—(1) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Commission such funds as are necessary to carry out its duties under this part. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

(2) If no funds are appropriated to the Commission by the end of the second session of the 101st Congress, the Secretary of Defense may transfer, for fiscal year 1991, to the Commission funds from the Department of Defense Base Closure Account established by section 207 of Public Law 100-526. Such funds shall remain available until expended.

**(l) TERMINATION.**—The Commission shall terminate on December 31, 1995.

**(m) PROHIBITION AGAINST RESTRICTING COMMUNICATIONS.**—Section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, shall apply with respect to communications with the Commission.

#### **SEC. 2903. PROCEDURE FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENTS**

**(A) FORCE-STRUCTURE PLAN.**—(1) As part of the budget justification documents submitted to Congress in support of the budget for the Department of Defense for each of the fiscal years 1992, 1994, and 1996, the Secretary shall include a force-structure plan for the Armed Forces based on an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the six-year period beginning with the fiscal year for which the budget request is made and of the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period

(2) Such plan shall include, without any reference (directly or indirectly) to military installations inside the United States that may be closed or realigned under such plan—

(A) a description of the assessment referred to in paragraph (1);

(B) a description (i) of the anticipated force structure during and at the end of each such period for each military department (with specifications of the number and type of units in the active and reserve forces of each such department), and (ii) of the units that will need to be forward based (with a justification thereof) during and at the end of each such period, and

(C) a description of the anticipated implementation of such force-structure plan.

(3) The Secretary shall also transmit a copy of each such force-structure plan to the Commission.

**(b) SELECTION CRITERIA.**—(1) The Secretary shall, by no later than December 31, 1990, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the criteria proposed to be used by the Department of Defense in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. The Secretary shall provide an opportunity for public comment on the proposed criteria for a period of at least 30 days and shall include notice of that opportunity in the publication required under the preceding sentence.

(2)(A) The Secretary shall, by no later than February 15, 1991, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees the final criteria to be used in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States under this part. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before March 15, 1991.

(B) The Secretary may amend such criteria, but such amendments may not become effective until they have been published in the Federal Register, opened to public comment for at least 30 days, and then transmitted to the congressional defense committees in final form by no later than January 15 of the year concerned. Such amended criteria shall be the final criteria to be used, along with the force-structure plan referred to in subsection (a), in making such recommendations unless disapproved by a joint resolution of Congress enacted on or before February 15 of the year concerned.

**(c) DoD RECOMMENDATIONS.**—(1) The Secretary may, by no later than April 15, 1991, March 15, 1993 and March 1, 1995, publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the congressional defense committees and to the Commission a list of the military installations inside the United States that the Secretary recommends for closure or realignment on the basis of the force-structure plan and the final criteria referred to in subsection (b)(2) that are applicable to the year concerned.

(2) The Secretary shall include, with the list of recommendations published and transmitted

pursuant to paragraph (1), a summary of the selection process that resulted in the recommendation for each installation, including a justification for each recommendation. The Secretary shall transmit the matters referred to in the preceding sentence not later than 7 days after the date of the transmittal to the congressional defense committees and the Commission of the list referred to in paragraph (1).

(3)(A) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary shall consider all military installations inside the United States equally without regard to whether the installation has been previously considered or proposed for closure or realignment by the Department.

(B) In considering military installations for closure or realignment, the Secretary may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of an installation.

(C) For purposes of subparagraph (B), in the case of a community anticipating the economic effects of a closure or realignment of a military installation, advance conversion planning—

(i) shall include community adjustment and economic diversification planning undertaken by the community before an anticipated selection of a military installation in or near the community for closure or realignment; and

(ii) may include the development of contingency redevelopment plans, plans for economic development and diversification, and plans for the joint use (including civilian and military use, public and private use, civilian dual use, and civilian shared use) of the property or facilities of the installation after the anticipated closure or realignment.

(4) In addition to making all information used by the Secretary to prepare the recommendations under this subsection available to Congress (including any committee or member of Congress), the Secretary shall also make such information available to the Commission and the Comptroller General of the United States.

(5)(A) Each person referred to in subparagraph (B), when submitting information to the Secretary of Defense or the Commission concerning the closure or realignment of a military installation, shall certify that such information is accurate and

complete to the best of that person's knowledge and belief.

(B) Subparagraph (A) applies to the following persons:

(i) The Secretaries of the military departments

(ii) The heads of the Defense Agencies.

(iii) Each person who is in a position the duties of which include personal and substantial involvement in the preparation and submission of information and recommendations concerning the closure or realignment of military installations, as designated in regulations which the Secretary of Defense shall prescribe, regulations which the Secretary of each military department shall prescribe for personnel within that military department, or regulations which the head of each Defense Agency shall prescribe for personnel within that Defense Agency.

(6) Any information provided to the Commission by a person described in paragraph (5)(B) shall also be submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives to be made available to the Members of the House concerned in accordance with the rules of that House. The information shall be submitted to the Senate and the House of Representatives within 24 hours after the submission of the information to the Commission.

**(d) REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMISSION.**—(1) After receiving the recommendations from the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c) for any year, the Commission shall conduct public hearings on the recommendations. All testimony before the Commission at a public hearing conducted under this paragraph shall be presented under oath.

(2)(A) The Commission shall, by no later than July 1 of each year in which the Secretary transmits recommendations to it pursuant to subsection (c), transmit to the President a report containing the Commission's findings and conclusions based on a review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary, together with the Commission's recommendations for closures and realignments of military installations inside the United States.

(B) Subject to subparagraph (C), in making its recommendations, the Commission may make changes in any of the recommendations made by the Secretary if the Commission determines that the Secretary deviated substantially from the force-

structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1) in making recommendations

(C) In the case of a change described in subparagraph (D) in the recommendations made by the Secretary, the Commission may make the change only if the Commission—

(i) makes the determination required by subparagraph (B),

(ii) determines that the change is consistent with the force-structure plan and final criteria referred to in subsection (c)(1);

(iii) publishes a notice of the proposed change in the Federal Register not less than 45 days before transmitting its recommendations to the President pursuant to paragraph (2); and

(iv) conducts public hearings on the proposed change.

(D) Subparagraph (C) shall apply to a change by the Commission in the Secretary's recommendations that would—

(i) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the Secretary for closure;

(ii) add a military installation to the list of military installations recommended by the Secretary for realignment, or

(iii) increase the extent of a realignment of a particular military installation recommended by the Secretary.

(E) In making recommendations under this paragraph, the Commission may not take into account for any purpose any advance conversion planning undertaken by an affected community with respect to the anticipated closure or realignment of a military installation.

(3) The Commission shall explain and justify in its report submitted to the President pursuant to paragraph (2) any recommendation made by the Commission that is different from the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (c). The Commission shall transmit a copy of such report to the congressional defense committees on the same date on which it transmits its recommendations to the President under paragraph (2).

(4) After July 1 of each year in which the Commission transmits recommendations to the President under this subsection, the Commission shall

promptly provide, upon request, to any Member of Congress information used by the Commission in making its recommendations.

(5) The Comptroller General of the United States shall—

(A) assist the Commission, to the extent requested, in the Commission's review and analysis of the recommendations made by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (C); and

(B) by no later than April 15 of each year in which the Secretary makes such recommendations, transmit to the Congress and to the Commission a report containing a detailed analysis of the Secretary's recommendations and selection process.

**(e) REVIEW BY THE PRESIDENT.**—(1) The President shall, by no later than July 15 of each year in which the Commission makes recommendations under subsection (d), transmit to the Commission and to the Congress a report containing the President's approval or disapproval of the Commission's recommendations.

(2) If the President approves all the recommendations of the Commission, the President shall transmit a copy of such recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(3) If the President disapproves the recommendations of the Commission, in whole or in part, the President shall transmit to the Commission and the Congress the reasons for that disapproval. The Commission shall then transmit to the President, by no later than August 15 of the year concerned, a revised list of recommendations for the closure and realignment of military installations.

(4) If the President approves all of the revised recommendations of the Commission transmitted to the President under paragraph (3), the President shall transmit a copy of such revised recommendations to the Congress, together with a certification of such approval.

(5) If the President does not transmit to the Congress an approval and certification described in paragraph (2) or (4) by September 1 of any year in which the Commission has transmitted recommendations to the President under this part, the process by which military installations may be selected for closure or realignment under this part with respect to that year shall be terminated.

## **SEC. 2904. CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

(a) In General.—Subject to subsection (b), the Secretary shall—

(1) close all military installations recommended for closure by the Commission in each report transmitted to the Congress by the President pursuant to section 2903(e);

(2) realign all military installations recommended for realignment by such Commission in each such report;

(3) initiate all such closures and realignments no later than two years after the date on which the President transmits a report to the Congress pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments; and

(4) complete all such closures and realignments no later than the end of the six-year period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report pursuant to section 2903(e) containing the recommendations for such closures or realignments.

**(b) CONGRESSIONAL DISAPPROVAL.**—(1) The Secretary may not carry out any closure or realignment recommended by the Commission in a report transmitted from the President pursuant to section 2903(e) if a joint resolution is enacted, in accordance with the provisions of section 2908, disapproving such recommendations of the Commission before the earlier of—

(A) the end of the 45-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits such report; or

(B) the adjournment of Congress sine die for the session during which such report is transmitted.

(2) For purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection and subsections (a) and (c) of section 2908, the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than three days to a day certain shall be excluded in the computation of a period.

## **SEC. 2905. IMPLEMENTATION**

**(a) IN GENERAL.**—(1) In closing or realigning any military installation under this part, the Secretary may—



(A) take such actions as may be necessary to close or realign any military installation, including the acquisition of such land, the construction of such replacement facilities, the performance of such activities, and the conduct of such advance planning and design as may be required to transfer functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for use in planning and design, minor construction, or operation and maintenance;

(B) provide—

(i) economic adjustment assistance to any community located near a military installation being closed or realigned, and

(ii) community planning assistance to any community located near a military installation to which functions will be transferred as a result of the closure or realignment of a military installation, if the Secretary of Defense determines that the financial resources available to the community (by grant or otherwise) for such purposes are inadequate, and may use for such purposes funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for economic adjustment assistance or community planning assistance;

(C) carry out activities for the purposes of environmental restoration and mitigation at any such installation, and shall use for such purposes funds in the Account;

(D) provide outplacement assistance to civilian employees employed by the Department of Defense at military installations being closed or realigned, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for outplacement assistance to employees; and

(E) reimburse other Federal agencies for actions performed at the request of the Secretary with respect to any such closure or realignment, and may use for such purpose funds in the Account or funds appropriated to the Department of Defense and available for such purpose

(2) In carrying out any closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall ensure that environmental restoration of any property made excess to the needs of the Department of Defense

as a result of such closure or realignment be carried out as soon as possible with funds available for such purpose.

**(b) MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL OF PROPERTY.—**(1) The Administrator of General Services shall delegate to the Secretary of Defense, with respect to excess and surplus real property, facilities, and personal property located at a military installation closed or realigned under this part—

(A) the authority of the Administrator to utilize excess property under section 202 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483);

(B) the authority of the Administrator to dispose of surplus property under section 203 of that Act (40 U.S.C. 484),

(C) the authority of the Administrator to grant approvals and make determinations under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)); and

(D) the authority of the Administrator to determine the availability of excess or surplus real property for wildlife conservation purposes in accordance with the Act of May 19, 1948 (16 U.S.C. 667b).

(2)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C) and paragraphs (3), (4), (5), and (6), the Secretary of Defense shall exercise the authority delegated to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) in accordance with—

(i) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the utilization of excess property and the disposal of surplus property under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and

(ii) all regulations in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act governing the conveyance and disposal of property under section 13(g) of the Surplus Property Act of 1944 (50 U.S.C. App. 1622(g)).

(B) The Secretary, after consulting with the Administrator of General Services, may issue regulations that are necessary to carry out the delegation of authority required by paragraph (1).

(C) The authority required to be delegated by paragraph (1) to the Secretary by the Administrator of General Services shall not include the authority to prescribe general policies and methods for utilizing excess property and disposing of surplus property.

(D) The Secretary of Defense may transfer real property or facilities located at a military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, with or without reimbursement, to a military department or other entity (including a nonappropriated fund instrumentality) within the Department of Defense or the Coast Guard.

(E) Before any action may be taken with respect to the disposal of any surplus real property or facility located at any military installation to be closed or realigned under this part, the Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Governor of the State and the heads of the local governments concerned for the purpose of considering any plan for the use of such property by the local community concerned.

(3)(A) Not later than 6 months after the date of approval of the closure of a military installation under this part, the Secretary, in consultation with the redevelopment authority with respect to the installations shall—

(i) inventory the personal property located at the installation; and

(ii) identify the items (or categories of items) of such personal property that the Secretary determines to be related to real property and anticipates will support the implementation of the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation.

(B) If no redevelopment authority referred to in subparagraph (A) exists with respect to an installation, the Secretary shall consult with—

(i) the local government in whose jurisdiction the installation is wholly located; or

(ii) a local government agency or State government agency designated for the purpose of such consultation by the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation is located.

(C)(i) Except as provided in subparagraphs (E) and (F), the Secretary may not carry out any of the activities referred to in clause (ii) with respect to an installation referred to in that clause until the earlier of—

(I) one week after the date on which the redevelopment plan for the installation is submitted to the Secretary;

(II) the date on which the redevelopment authority notifies the Secretary that it will not submit such a plan;

(III) twenty-four months after the date of approval of the closure of the installation; or

(IV) ninety days before the date of the closure of the installation.

(ii) The activities referred to in clause (i) are activities relating to the closure of an installation to be closed under this part as follows:

(I) The transfer from the installation of items of personal property at the installation identified in accordance with subparagraph (A).

(II) The reduction in maintenance and repair of facilities or equipment located at the installation below the minimum levels required to support the use of such facilities or equipment for nonmilitary purposes.

(D) Except as provided in paragraph (4), the Secretary may not transfer items of personal property located at an installation to be closed under this part to another installation, or dispose of such items, if such items are identified in the redevelopment plan for the installation as items essential to the reuse or redevelopment of the installation. In connection with the development of the redevelopment plan for the installation, the Secretary shall consult with the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan to identify the items of personal property located at the installation, if any, that the entity desires to be retained at the installation for reuse or redevelopment of the installation.

(E) This paragraph shall not apply to any personal property located at an installation to be closed under this part if the property—

(i) is required for the operation of a unit, function, component, weapon, or weapons system at another installation;

(ii) is uniquely military in character, and is likely to have no civilian use (other than use for its material content or as a source of commonly used components);

(iii) is not required for the reutilization or redevelopment of the installation (as jointly determined by the Secretary and the redevelopment authority);

(iv) is stored at the installation for purposes of distribution (including spare parts or stock items); or

(v)(I) meets known requirements of an authorized program of another Federal department or

agency for which expenditures for similar property would be necessary, and (II) is the subject of a written request by the head of the department or agency.

(F) Notwithstanding subparagraphs (C)(i) and (D), the Secretary may carry out any activity referred to in subparagraph (C)(ii) or (D) if the Secretary determines that the carrying out of such activity is in the national security interest of the United States.

(4)(A) The Secretary may transfer real property and personal property located at a military installation to be closed under this part to the redevelopment authority with respect to the installation.

(B)(i)(I) Except as provided in clause (ii), the transfer of property under subparagraph (A) may be for consideration at or below the estimated fair market value of the property transferred or without consideration. Such consideration may include consideration in kind (including goods and services), real property and improvements, or such other consideration as the Secretary considers appropriate. The Secretary shall determine the estimated fair market value of the property to be transferred under this subparagraph before carrying out such transfer.

(II) The Secretary shall prescribe regulations that set forth guidelines for determining the amount, if any, of consideration required for a transfer under this paragraph. Such regulations shall include a requirement that, in the case of each transfer under this paragraph for consideration below the estimated fair market value of the property transferred, the Secretary provide an explanation why the transfer is not for the estimated fair market value of the property to be transferred (including an explanation why the transfer cannot be carried out in accordance with the authority provided to the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2)).

(ii) The transfer of property under subparagraph (A) shall be without consideration in the case of any installation located in a rural area whose closure under this part will have a substantial adverse impact (as determined by the Secretary) on the economy of the communities in the vicinity of the installation and on the prospect for the economic recovery of such communities from such closure. The Secretary shall prescribe in the regulations under clause (i)(II) the manner of determining whether communities are eligible for the transfer of property under this clause.

(iii) In the case of a transfer under subparagraph (A) for consideration below the fair market value of the property transferred, the Secretary may recoup from the transferee of such property such portion as the Secretary determines appropriate of the amount, if any, by which the sale or lease of such property by such transferee exceeds the amount of consideration paid to the Secretary for such property by such transferee. The Secretary shall prescribe regulations for determining the amount of recoupment under this clause.

(C)(i) The transfer of personal property under subparagraph (A) shall not be subject to the provisions of sections 202 and 203 of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (40 U.S.C. 483, 484) if the Secretary determines that the transfer of such property is necessary for the effective implementation of a redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such property is located

(ii) The Secretary may, in lieu of the transfer of property referred to in subparagraph (A), transfer property similar to such property (including property not located at the installation) if the Secretary determines that the transfer of such similar property is in the interest of the United States.

(D) The provisions of section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9602(h)) shall apply to any transfer of real property under this paragraph.

(E) The Secretary may require any additional terms and conditions in connection with a transfer under this paragraph as such Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Secretary shall take such actions as the Secretary determines necessary to ensure that final determinations under paragraph (1) regarding whether another department or agency of the Federal Government has identified a use for any portion of a military installation to be closed under this part, or will accept transfer of any portion of such installation, are made not later than 6 months after the date of approval of closure of that installation

(B) The Secretary may, in consultation with the redevelopment authority with respect to an installation, postpone making the final determinations referred to in subparagraph (A) with respect to

the installation for such period as the Secretary determines appropriate if the Secretary determines that such postponement is in the best interests of the communities affected by the closure of the installation.

(6)(A) Except as provided in this paragraph, nothing in this section shall limit or otherwise affect the application of the provisions of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11301 et seq.) to military installations closed under this part. For procedures relating to the use to assist the homeless of buildings and property at installations closed under this part after the date of the enactment of this sentence, see paragraph (7).

(B)(i) Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense completes the determination under paragraph (5) of the transferability of any portion of an installation to be closed under this part, the Secretary shall—

(I) complete any determinations or surveys necessary to determine whether any building or property referred to in clause (ii) is excess property, surplus property, or unutilized or underutilized property for the purpose of the information referred to in section 501(a) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 11411(a)); and

(II) submit to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development information on any building or property that is so determined.

(ii) The buildings and property referred to in clause (i) are any buildings or property located at an installation referred to in that clause for which no use is identified, or of which no Federal department or agency will accept transfer, pursuant to the determination of transferability referred to in that clause.

(C) Not later than 60 days after the date on which the Secretary of Defense submits information to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (B)(i), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall—

(i) identify the buildings and property described in such information that are suitable for use to assist the homeless;

(ii) notify the Secretary of Defense of the buildings and property that are so identified;

(iii) publish in the Federal Register a list of the buildings and property that are so identified, including with respect to each building or

property the information referred to in section 501(c)(1)(B) of such Act; and

(iv) make available with respect to each building and property the information referred to in section 501(c)(1)(C) of such Act in accordance with such section 501(c)(1)(C).

(D) Any buildings and property included in a list published under subparagraph (C)(iii) shall be treated as property available for application for use to assist the homeless under section 501(d) of such Act.

(E) The Secretary of Defense shall make available in accordance with section 501(f) of such Act any buildings or property referred to in subparagraph (D) for which—

(i) a written notice of an intent to use such buildings or property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act;

(ii) an application for use of such buildings or property for such purpose is submitted to the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(e)(2) of such Act; and

(iii) The Secretary of Health and Human Services—

(I) completes all actions on the application in accordance with section 501(e)(3) of such Act; and

(II) approves the application under section 501(e) of such Act.

(F)(i) Subject to clause (ii), a redevelopment authority may express in writing an interest in using buildings and property referred to subparagraph (D), and buildings and property referred to in subparagraph (B)(ii) which have not been identified as suitable for use to assist the homeless under subparagraph (C), or use such buildings and property, in accordance with the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation at which such buildings and property are located as follows:

(I) If no written notice of an intent to use such buildings and property to assist the homeless is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(d)(2) of such Act during the 60-day period beginning on the date of publication of the buildings and property under subparagraph (C)(iii).

(II) In the case of buildings and property for which such notice is so received, if no completed application for use of the buildings or property for such purpose is received by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in accordance with section 501(e)(2) of such Act during the 90-day period beginning on the date of the receipt of such notice

(III) In the case of buildings and property for which such application is so received, if the Secretary of Health and Human Services rejects the application under section (501)(e) of such Act.

(ii) Buildings and property shall be available only for the purpose of permitting a redevelopment authority to express in writing an interest in the use of such buildings and property, or to use such buildings and property, under clause (i) as follows

(I) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(I), during the one-year period beginning on the first day after the 60-day period referred to in that clause.

(II) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(II), during the one-year period beginning on the first day after the 90-day period referred to in that clause.

(III) In the case of buildings and property referred to in clause (i)(III), during the one-year period beginning on the date of rejection of the application referred to in that clause.

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall express an interest in the use of buildings and property under this subparagraph by notifying the Secretary of Defense, in writing, of such an interest.

(G)(i) Buildings and property available for a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (F) shall not be available for use to assist the homeless under section 501 of such Act while so available for a redevelopment authority.

(ii) If a redevelopment authority does not express an interest in the use of buildings or property, or commence the use of buildings or property, under subparagraph (F) within the applicable time periods specified in clause (ii) of such subparagraph, such buildings and property shall be treated as property available for use to assist the homeless under section 501(a) of such Act.

(7)(A) Determinations of the use to assist the homeless of buildings and property located at

installations approved for closure under this part after the date of the enactment of this paragraph shall be determined under this paragraph rather than paragraph (6).

(B)(i) Not later than the date on which the Secretary of Defense completes the final determinations referred to in paragraph (5) relating to the use or transferability of any portion of an installation covered by this paragraph, the Secretary shall—

(I) identify the buildings and property at the installation for which the Department of Defense has a use, for which another department or agency of the Federal Government has identified a use, or of which another department or agency will accept a transfer,

(II) take such actions as are necessary to identify any building or property at the installation not identified under subclause (I) that is excess property or surplus property;

(III) submit to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and to the redevelopment authority for the installation (or the chief executive officer of the State in which the installation is located if there is no redevelopment authority for the installation at the completion of the determination described in the stem of this sentence) information on any building or property that is identified under subclause (II); and

(IV) publish in the Federal Register and in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation information on the buildings and property identified under subclause (II)

(i) Upon the recognition of a redevelopment authority for an installation covered by this paragraph, the Secretary of Defense shall publish in the Federal Register and in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation information on the redevelopment authority.

(C)(i) State and local governments, representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties located in the communities in the vicinity of an installation covered by this paragraph shall submit to the redevelopment authority for the installation a notice of the interest, if any, of such governments, representatives, and parties in the buildings or property, or any portion thereof, at the installation that are identified under subparagraph (B)(i)(II). A notice of interest under this clause

shall describe the need of the government, representative, or party concerned for the buildings or property covered by the notice.

(ii) The redevelopment authority for an installation shall assist the governments, representatives, and parties referred to in clause (i) in evaluating buildings and property at the installation for purposes of this subparagraph.

(iii) In providing assistance under clause (ii), a redevelopment authority shall—

(I) consult with representatives of the homeless in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned; and

(II) undertake outreach efforts to provide information on the buildings and property to representatives of the homeless, and to other persons or entities interested in assisting the homeless, in such communities.

(iv) It is the sense of Congress that redevelopment authorities should begin to conduct outreach efforts under clause (iii)(II) with respect to an installation as soon as is practicable after the date of approval of closure of the installation.

(D)(i) State and local governments, representatives of the homeless, and other interested parties shall submit a notice of interest to a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C) not later than the date specified for such notice by the redevelopment authority.

(ii) The date specified under clause (i) shall be—

(I) in the case of an installation for which a redevelopment authority has been recognized as of the date of the completion of the determinations referred to in paragraph(5), not earlier than 3 months and not later than 6 months after that date; and

(II) in case of an installation for which a redevelopment authority is not recognized as of such date, not earlier than 3 months and not later than 6 months after the date of the recognition of a redevelopment authority for the installation.

(iii) Upon specifying a date for an installation under this subparagraph, the redevelopment authority for the installation shall—

(I) publish the date specified in a newspaper of general circulation in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned; and

(II) notify the Secretary of Defense of the date.

(E)(i) In submitting to a redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C) a notice of interest in the use of buildings or property at an installation to assist the homeless, a representative of the homeless shall submit the following:

(I) A description of the homeless assistance program that the representative proposes to carry out at the installation.

(II) An assessment of the need for the program.

(III) A description of the extent to which the program is or will be coordinated with other homeless assistance programs in the communities in the vicinity of the installation.

(IV) A description of the buildings and property at the installation that are necessary in order to carry out the program.

(V) A description of the financial plan, the organization, and the organizational capacity of the representative to carry out the program.

(VI) An assessment of the time required in order to commence carrying out the program.

(ii) A redevelopment authority may not release to the public any information submitted to the redevelopment authority under clause (i)(V) without the consent of the representative of the homeless concerned unless such release is authorized under Federal law and under the law of the State and communities in which the installation concerned is located.

(F)(i) The redevelopment authority for each installation covered by this paragraph shall prepare a redevelopment plan for the installation. The redevelopment authority shall, in preparing the plan, consider the interests in the use to assist the homeless of the buildings and property at the installation that are expressed in the notices submitted to the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C).

(ii)(I) In connection with a redevelopment plan for an installation, a redevelopment authority and representatives of the homeless shall prepare legally binding agreements that provide for the use to assist the homeless of buildings and property, resources, and assistance on or off the installation. The implementation of such agreements shall be contingent upon the approval of the redevelopment plan by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (H) or (J).

(II) Agreements under this clause shall provide for the reversion to the redevelopment authority concerned, or to such other entity or entities as the agreements shall provide, of buildings and property that are made available under this paragraph for use to assist the homeless in the event that such buildings and property cease being used for that purpose.

(iii) A redevelopment authority shall provide opportunity for public comment on a redevelopment plan before submission of the plan to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under subparagraph (G),

(iv) A redevelopment authority shall complete preparation of a redevelopment plan for an installation and submit the plan under subparagraph (G) not later than 9 months after the date specified by the redevelopment authority for the installation under subparagraph (D)

(G)(i) Upon completion of a redevelopment plan under subparagraph (F), a redevelopment authority shall submit an application containing the plan to the Secretary of Defense and to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

(ii) A redevelopment authority shall include in an application under clause (i) the following:

(I) A copy of the redevelopment plan, including a summary of any public comments on the plan received by the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (F)(iii).

(II) A copy of each notice of interest of use of buildings and property to assist the homeless that was submitted to the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C), together with a description of the manner, if any, in which the plan addresses the interest expressed in each such notice and, if the plan does not address such an interest, an explanation why the plan does not address the interest

(III) A summary of the outreach undertaken by the redevelopment authority under subparagraph (C)(ii)(II) in preparing the plan.

(IV) A statement identifying the representatives of the homeless and the homeless assistance planning boards, if any, with which the redevelopment authority consulted in preparing the plan, and the results of such consultations.

(V) An assessment of the manner in which the redevelopment plan balances the expressed needs of the homeless and the need of the

communities in the vicinity of the installation for economic redevelopment and other development.

(VI) Copies of the agreements that the redevelopment authority proposes to enter into under subparagraph (F)(ii).

(H)(i) Not later than 60 days after receiving a redevelopment plan under subparagraph (G), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall complete a review of the plan. The purpose of the review is to determine whether the plan, with respect to the expressed interest and requests of representatives of the homeless—

(I) takes into consideration the size and nature of the homeless population in the communities in the vicinity of the installation, the availability of existing services in such communities to meet the needs of the homeless in such communities, and the suitability of the buildings and property covered by the plan for the use and needs of the homeless in such communities,

(II) takes into consideration any economic impact of homeless assistance under the plan on the communities in the vicinity of the installation,

(III) balances in an appropriate manner the needs of the communities in the vicinity of the installation for economic redevelopment and other development with the needs of the homeless in such communities,

(IV) was developed in consultation with representatives of the homeless and the homeless assistance planning boards, if any, in the communities in the vicinity of the installation; and

(V) specifies the manner in which buildings and property, resources and assistance on or off the installation will be made available for homeless assistance purposes.

(i) It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall, in completing the review of a plan under this subparagraph, take into consideration and be receptive to the predominant views on the plan of the communities in the vicinity of the installation covered by the plan.

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may engage in negotiations and consultations with a redevelopment authority before or during the course of a review under clause (i) with a view toward resolving any preliminary determination of the Secretary that the redevelopment plan does not meet a requirement set forth in that

clause. The redevelopment authority may modify the redevelopment plan as a result of such negotiations and consultations.

(iv) Upon completion of a review of a redevelopment plan under clause (i), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall notify the Secretary of Defense and the redevelopment authority concerned of the determination of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under that clause.

(v) If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines as a result of such a review that a redevelopment plan does not meet the requirements set forth in clause (i), a notice under clause (iv) shall include—

(I) an explanation of that determination; and

(II) a statement of the actions that the redevelopment authority must undertake in order to address that determination.

(I)(i) Upon receipt of a notice under subparagraph (H)(iv) of a determination that a redevelopment plan does not meet a requirement set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), a redevelopment authority shall have the opportunity to—

(I) revise the plan in order to address the determination; and

(II) submit the revised plan to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

(ii) A redevelopment authority shall submit a revised plan under this subparagraph to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, if at all, not later than 90 days after the date on which the redevelopment authority receives the notice referred to in clause(i).

(J)(i) Not later than 30 days after receiving a revised redevelopment plan under subparagraph (I), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall review the revised plan and determine if the plan meets the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i).

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall notify the Secretary of Defense and the redevelopment authority concerned of the determination of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under this subparagraph.

(K) Upon receipt of a notice under subparagraph (H)(vi) or (J)(ii) of the determination of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development that a redevelopment plan for an installation meets the

requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), the Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings and property located at the installation that are identified in the plan as available for use to assist the homeless in accordance with the provisions of the plan. The Secretary of Defense may dispose of such buildings or property directly to the representatives of the homeless concerned or to the redevelopment authority concerned. The Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings and property under this subparagraph without consideration.

(L)(i) If the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development determines under subparagraph (J) that a revised redevelopment plan for an installation does not meet the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i), or if no revised plan is so submitted, that Secretary shall—

(I) review the original redevelopment plan submitted to that Secretary under subparagraph (G), including the notice or notices of representatives of the homeless referred to in clause (ii)(II) of that subparagraph;

(II) consult with the representatives referred to in subclause(I), if any, for purposes of evaluating the continuing interest of such representatives in the use of buildings or property at the installation to assist the homeless;

(III) request that each such representative submit to that Secretary the items described in clause (ii); and

(IV) based on the actions of that Secretary under subclauses (I) and (II), and on any information obtained by that Secretary as a result of such actions, indicate to the Secretary of Defense the buildings and property at the installation that meet the requirements set forth in subparagraph (H)(i).

(ii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may request under clause (i)(III) that a representative of the homeless submit to that Secretary the following:

(I) A description of the program of such representative to assist the homeless.

(II) A description of the manner in which the buildings and property that the representative proposes to use for such purpose will assist the homeless.

(III) Such information as that Secretary requires in order to determine the financial capacity of



the representative to carry out the program and to ensure that the program will be carried out in compliance with Federal environmental law and Federal law against discrimination.

(IV) A certification that police services, fire protection services, and water and sewer services available in the communities in the vicinity of the installation concerned are adequate for the program.

(iii) The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall indicate to the Secretary of Defense and to the redevelopment authority concerned that buildings and property at an installation under clause (i)(IV) to be disposed of not later than 90 days after the date of a receipt of a revised plan for the installation under subparagraph (J).

(iv) The Secretary of Defense shall dispose of the buildings and property at an installation referred to in clause (iii) to entities indicated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development or by transfer to the redevelopment authority concerned for transfer to such entities. Such disposal shall be in accordance with the indications of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development under clause (i)(IV). Such disposal shall be without consideration.

(M)(i) In the event of the disposal of buildings and property of an installation pursuant to subparagraph (K), the redevelopment authority for the installation shall be responsible for the implementation of and compliance with agreements under the redevelopment plan described in that subparagraph for the installation

(ii) If a building or property reverts to a redevelopment authority under such an agreement, the redevelopment authority shall take appropriate actions to secure, to the maximum extent practicable, the utilization of the building or property by other homeless representatives to assist the homeless. A redevelopment authority may not be required to utilize the building or property to assist the homeless

(N) The Secretary of Defense may postpone or extend any deadline provided for under this paragraph in the case of an installation covered by this paragraph for such period as the Secretary considers appropriate if the Secretary determines that such postponement is in the interests of the communities affected by the closure of the installations. The Secretary shall make such determinations in consultation with the redevelopment authority concerned and, in the case of deadlines

provided for under this paragraph with respect to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, in consultation with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

(O) For purposes of this paragraph, the term "communities in the vicinity of the installation", in the case of an installation, means the communities that constitute the political jurisdictions (other than the State in which the installation is located) that comprise the redevelopment authority for the installation

(8)(A) Subject to subparagraph (C), the Secretary may contract with local governments for the provisions of police services, fire protection services, airfield operation services, or other community services by such governments at military installations to be closed under this part if the Secretary determines that the provision of such services under such contracts is in the best interests of the Department of Defense.

(B) The Secretary may exercise the authority provided under this paragraph without regard to the provisions of chapter 146 of title 10, United States Code.

(C) The Secretary may not exercise the authority under subparagraph (A) with respect to an installation earlier than 180 days before the date on which the installation is to be closed

(D) The Secretary shall include in a contract for services entered into with a local government under this paragraph a clause that requires the use of professionals to furnish the services to the extent that professionals are available in the area under the jurisdiction of such government.

**(C) APPLICABILITY OF NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT OF 1969.**—(1) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) shall not apply to the actions of the President, the Commission, and, except as provided in paragraph (2), the Department of Defense in carrying out this part.

(2)(A) The provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall apply to actions of the Department of Defense under this part (i) during the process of property disposal, and (ii) during the process of relocating functions from a military installation being closed or realigned to another military installation after the receiving installation has been selected but before the functions are relocated.

(B) In applying the provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the processes referred to in subparagraph (A), the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the military departments concerned shall not have to consider—

(i) the need for closing or realigning the military installation which has been recommended for closure or realignment by the Commission;

(ii) the need for transferring functions to any military installation which has been selected as the receiving installation; or

(iii) military installations alternative to those recommended or selected.

(3) A civil action for judicial review, with respect to any requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 to the extent such Act is applicable under paragraph (2), of any act or failure to act by the Department of Defense during the closing, realigning, or relocating of functions referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) of paragraph (2)(A), may not be brought more than 60 days after the date of such act or failure to act.

**(d) WAIVER.**—The Secretary of Defense may close or realign military installations under this part without regard to—

(1) any provision of law restricting the use of funds for closing or realigning military installations included in any appropriations or authorization Act; and

(2) sections 2662 and 2687 of title 10, United States Code.

**(e) TRANSFER AUTHORITY IN CONNECTION WITH PAYMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION COSTS.**—(1)(A) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection and section 120(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620(h)), the Secretary may enter into an agreement to transfer by deed real property or facilities referred to in subparagraph (B) with any person who agrees to perform all environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities that are required for the property or facilities under Federal and State laws, administrative decisions, agreements (including schedules and milestones), and concurrences.

(B) The real property and facilities referred to in subparagraph (A) are the real property and facilities located at an installation closed or to be

closed under this part that are available exclusively for the use, or expression of an interest in a use, of a redevelopment authority under subsection (b)(6)(F) during the period provided for that use, or expression of interest in use, under that subsection.

(C) The Secretary may require any additional terms and conditions in connection with an agreement authorized by subparagraph (A) as the Secretary considers appropriate to protect the interests of the United States.

(2) A transfer of real property or facilities may be made under paragraph (1) only if the Secretary certifies to Congress that—

(A) the costs of all environmental restoration, waste management, environmental compliance activities to be paid by the recipient of the property or facilities are equal to or greater than the fair market value of the property or facilities to be transferred, as determined by the Secretary; or

(B) if such costs are lower than the fair market value of the property or facilities, the recipient of the property or facilities agrees to pay the difference between the fair market value and such costs.

(3) As part of an agreement under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall disclose to the person to whom the property or facilities will be transferred any information of the Secretary regarding the environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities described in paragraph (1) that relate to the property or facilities. The Secretary shall provide such information before entering into the agreement.

(4) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to modify, alter, or amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) or the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq.).

(5) Section 330 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102-484; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note) shall not apply to any transfer under this subsection to persons or entities described in subsection (a)(2) of such section 330.

(6) The Secretary may not enter into an agreement to transfer property or facilities under this subsection after the expiration of the five-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994.

## SEC. 2906. ACCOUNT

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—(1) There is hereby established on the books of the Treasury an account to be known as the “Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990” which shall be administered by the Secretary as a single account.

(2) There shall be deposited into the Account—

(A) funds authorized for and appropriated to the Account;

(B) any funds that the Secretary may, subject to approval in an appropriation Act, transfer to the Account from funds appropriated to the Department of Defense for any purpose, except that such funds may be transferred only after the date on which the Secretary transmits written notice of, and justification for, such transfer to the congressional defense committees; and

(C) except as provided in subsection (d), proceeds received from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under this part; and

(D) proceeds received after September 30, 1995, from the transfer or disposal of any property at a military installation closed or realigned under title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526; 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(b) **USE OF FUNDS.**—(1) The Secretary may use the funds in the Account only for the purposes described in section 2905 or, after September 30, 1995, for environmental restoration and property management and disposal at installations closed or realigned under title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526, 10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(2) When a decision is made to use funds in the Account to carry out a construction project under section 2905(a) and the cost of the project will exceed the maximum amount authorized by law for a minor military construction project, the Secretary shall notify in writing the congressional defense committees of the nature of, and justification for, the project and the amount of expenditures for such project. Any such construction project may be carried out without regard to section 2802(a) of title 10, United States Code.

(c) **REPORTS.**—(1)(A) No later than 60 days after the end of each fiscal year in which the Secretary carries out activities under this part, the Secretary

shall transmit a report to the congressional defense committees of the amount and nature of the deposits into, and the expenditures from, the Account during such fiscal year and of the amount and nature of other expenditures made pursuant to section 2905(a) during such fiscal year.

(B) The report for a fiscal year shall include the following

(i) The obligations and expenditures from the Account during the fiscal year, identified by subaccount, for each military department and Defense Agency.

(ii) The fiscal year in which appropriations for such expenditures were made and the fiscal year in which funds were obligated for such expenditures.

(iii) Each military construction project for which such obligations and expenditures were made, identified by installation and project title.

(iv) A description and explanation of the extent, if any, to which expenditures for military construction projects for the fiscal year differed from proposals for projects and funding levels that were included in the jurisdiction transmitted to Congress under section 2907(1), or otherwise, for the funding proposals for the Account for such fiscal year, including an explanation of—

(I) any failure to carry out military construction projects that were so proposed, and

(II) any expenditures for military construction projects that were not so proposed

(2) Unobligated funds which remain in the Account after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part shall be held in the Account until transferred by law after the congressional defense committees receive the report transmitted under paragraph (3)

(3) No later than 60 days after the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees a report containing an accounting of—

(A) all the funds deposited into and expended from the Account or otherwise expended under this part, and

(B) any amount remaining in the Account.

**(d) DISPOSAL OR TRANSFER OF COMMISSARY STORES AND PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) If any real property or facility acquired, constructed, or improved (in whole or in part) with commissary store funds or nonappropriated funds is transferred or disposed of in connection with the closure or realignment of a military installation under this part, a portion of the proceeds of the transfer or other disposal of property on that installation shall be deposited in the reserve account established under section 204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (10 U.S.C. 2687 note).

(2) The amount so deposited shall be equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with such funds in the acquisition, construction, or improvement of that particular real property or facility. The depreciated value of the investment shall be computed in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance in appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, and improving—

(A) commissary stores; and

(B) real property and facilities for non-appropriated fund instrumentalities.

(4) As used in this subsection:

(A) The term “commissary store funds” means funds received from the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code.

(B) The term “nonappropriated funds” means funds received from a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(C) The term “nonappropriated fund instrumentality” means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

**(E) ACCOUNT EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION PROJECTS.**—Except for funds deposited into the Account under subsection (a), funds appropriated to the Department of Defense

may not be used for purposes described in section 2905(a)(1)(C). The prohibition in this subsection shall expire upon the termination of the authority of the Secretary to carry out a closure or realignment under this part.

#### **SEC. 2907. REPORTS**

As part of the budget request for fiscal year 1993 and for each fiscal year thereafter for the Department of Defense, the Secretary shall transmit to the congressional defense committees of Congress—

(1) a schedule of the closure and realignment actions to be carried out under this part in the fiscal year for which the request is made and an estimate of the total expenditures required and cost savings to be achieved by each such closure and realignment and of the time period in which these savings are to be achieved in each case, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such actions; and

(2) a description of the military installations, including those under construction and those planned for construction, to which functions are to be transferred as a result of such closures and realignments, together with the Secretary's assessment of the environmental effects of such transfers.

#### **SEC. 2908. CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION OF COMMISSION REPORT**

**(a) TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION.**—For purposes of section 2904(b), the term “joint resolution” means only a joint resolution which is introduced within the 10-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), and—

(1) which does not have a preamble;

(2) the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: “That Congress disapproves the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission as submitted by the President on \_\_\_\_\_”, the blank space being filled in with the appropriate date; and

(3) the title of which is as follows: “Joint resolution disapproving the recommendations of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission.”.

**(b) REFERRAL.**—A resolution described in subsection (a) that is introduced in the House of Representatives shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives. A resolution described in subsection (a) introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.

**(c) DISCHARGE.**—If the committee to which a resolution described in subsection (a) is referred has not reported such a resolution (or an identical resolution) by the end of the 20-day period beginning on the date on which the President transmits the report to the Congress under section 2903(e), such committee shall be, at the end of such period, discharged from further consideration of such resolution, and such resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.

**(d) CONSIDERATION.**—(1) On or after the third day after the date on which the committee to which such a resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged (under subsection (c)) from further consideration of, such a resolution, it is in order (even though a previous motion to the same effect has been disagreed to) for any Member of the respective House to move to proceed to the consideration of the resolution. A member may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the House concerned the Member's intention to make the motion, except that, in the case of the House of Representatives, the motion may be made without such prior announcement if the motion is made by direction of the committee to which the resolution was referred. All points of order against the resolution (and against consideration of the resolution) are waived. The motion is highly privileged in the House of Representatives and is privileged in the Senate and is not debatable. The motion is not subject to amendment, or to a motion to postpone, or to a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the resolution is agreed to, the respective House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution without intervening motion, order, or other business, and the resolution shall remain the unfinished business of the respective House until disposed of.

(2) Debate on the resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith,

shall be limited to not more than 2 hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the resolution. An amendment to the resolution is not in order. A motion further to limit debate is in order and not debatable. A motion to postpone, or a motion to proceed to the consideration of other business, or a motion to recommit the resolution is not in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the resolution is agreed to or disagreed to is not in order.

(3) Immediately following the conclusion of the debate on a resolution described in subsection (a) and a single quorum call at the conclusion of the debate if requested in accordance with the rules of the appropriate House, the vote on final passage of the resolution shall occur.

(4) Appeals from the decisions of the Chair relating to the application of the rules of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, to the procedure relating to a resolution described in subsection (a) shall be decided without debate.

**(e) CONSIDERATION BY OTHER HOUSE.**—(1) If, before the passage by one House of a resolution of that House described in subsection (a), that House receives from the other House a resolution described in subsection (a), then the following procedures shall apply:

(A) The resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in subparagraph (B)(ii).

(B) With respect to a resolution described in subsection (a) of the House receiving the resolution—

(i) the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no resolution had been received from the other House, but

(ii) the vote on final passage shall be on the resolution of the other House.

(2) Upon disposition of the resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the resolution that originated in the receiving House.

**(f) RULES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE.**—This section is enacted by Congress—

(1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the Senate and House of Representatives,

respectively, and as such it is deemed a part of the rules of each House, respectively, but applicable only with respect to the procedure to be followed in that House in the case of a resolution described in subsection (a), and it supersedes other rules only to the extent that it is inconsistent with such rules; and

(2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of that House.

#### **SEC. 2909. RESTRICTION ON OTHER BASE CLOSURE AUTHORITY**

**(a) IN GENERAL.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on December 31, 1995, this part shall be the exclusive authority for selecting for closure or realignment, or for carrying out any closure or realignment of, a military installation inside the United States.

**(b) RESTRICTION.**—Except as provided in subsection (c), none of the funds available to the Department of Defense may be used, other than under this part, during the period specified in subsection (a)—

(1) to identify, through any transmittal to the Congress or through any other public announcement or notification, any military installation inside the United States as an installation to be closed or realigned or as an installation under consideration for closure or realignment; or

(2) to carry out any closure or realignment of a military installation inside the United States.

**(c) EXCEPTION.**—Nothing in this part affects the authority of the Secretary to carry out—

(1) closures and realignments under title II of Public Law 100-526; and

(2) closures and realignments to which section 2687 of title 10, United States Code, is not applicable, including closures and realignments carried out for reasons of national security or a military emergency referred to in subsection (c) of such section.

#### **SEC. 2910. DEFINITIONS**

As used in this part:

(1) The term “Account” means the Department of Defense Base Closure Account 1990 established by section 2906(a)(1).

(2) The term “congressional defense committees” means the Committees on Armed Services and the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives.

(3) The term “Commission” means the Commission established by section 2902.

(4) The term “military installation” means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, home-port facility for any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility. Such term does not include any facility used primarily for civil works, rivers and harbors projects, flood control, or other projects not under the primary jurisdiction or control of the Department of Defense.

(5) The term “realignment” includes any action which both reduces and relocates functions and civilian personnel positions but does not include a reduction in force resulting from workload adjustments, reduced personnel or funding levels, or skill imbalances.

(6) The term “Secretary” means the Secretary of Defense.

(7) The term “United States” means the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and any other commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States.

(8) The term “date of approval”, with respect to a closure or realignment of an installation, means the date on which the authority of Congress to disapprove a recommendation of closure or realignment, as the case may be, of such installation under this part expires.

(9) The term “redevelopment authority”, in the case of an installation to be closed under this part, means any entity (including an entity established by a State or local government) recognized by the Secretary of Defense as the entity responsible for developing the redevelopment plan with respect to the installation or for directing the implementation of such plan.

(10) The term “redevelopment plan” in the case of an installation to be closed under this part, means a plan that—

(A) is agreed to by the local redevelopment authority with respect to the installation; and

(B) provides for the reuse or redevelopment of the real property and personal property of the installation that is available for such reuse and redevelopment as a result of the closure of the installation.

(10) The term “representative of the homeless” has the meaning given such term in section 501(h)(4) of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 11411(h)(4)).

#### **SEC. 2911. CLARIFYING AMENDMENT**

Section 2687(e)(1) of title 10, United States Code, is amended—

(1) by inserting “homeport facility for any ship,” after “center,”; and

(2) by striking out “under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department” and inserting in lieu thereof “under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, including any leased facility,”.

### **Part B—Other Provisions Relating to Defense Base Closures and Realignments**

#### **SEC. 2921. CLOSURE OF FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

(a) **SENSE OF CONGRESS.**— It is the sense of the Congress that—

(1) the termination of military operations by the United States at military installations outside the United States should be accomplished at the discretion of the Secretary of Defense at the earliest opportunity,

(2) in providing for such termination, the Secretary of Defense should take steps to ensure that the United States receives, through direct payment or otherwise, consideration equal to the fair market value of the improvements made by the United States at facilities that will be released to host countries;

(3) the Secretary of Defense, acting through the military component commands or the sub-unified commands to the combatant commands, should be the lead official in negotiations relating to determining and receiving such consideration; and

(4) the determination of the fair market value of such improvements released to host countries in whole or in part by the United States should be handled on a facility-by-facility basis

(b) **RESIDUAL VALUE.**—(1) For each installation outside the United States at which military operations were being carried out by the United States on October 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense shall transmit, by no later than June 1, 1991, an estimate of the fair market value, as of January 1, 1991, an estimate of the improvements made by the United States at facilities at each such installation.

(2) For purposes of this section:

(A) The term “fair market value of the improvements” means the value of improvements determined by the Secretary on the basis of their highest use.

(B) The term “improvements” includes new construction of facilities and all additions, improvements, modifications, or renovations made to existing facilities or to real property, without regard to whether they were carried out with appropriated or nonappropriated funds.

(c) **ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**—(1) There is established on the books of the Treasury a special account to be known as the “Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account”. Except as provided in subsection (d), amounts paid to the United States, pursuant to any treaty, status of forces agreement, or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, for the residual value of real property or improvements to real property used by civilian or military personnel of the Department of Defense shall be deposited into such account.

(2) Money deposited in the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account shall be available to the Secretary of Defense for payment, as provided in appropriation Acts, of costs incurred by the Department of Defense in connection with—

(A) facility maintenance and repair and environmental restoration at military installations in the United States; and

(B) facility maintenance and repair and compliance with applicable environmental laws at military installations outside the United States that the Secretary anticipates will be occupied by the Armed Forces for a long period.

(3) Funds in the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Account shall remain available until expended.

**(d) AMOUNTS CORRESPONDING TO THE VALUE OF PROPERTY PURCHASED WITH NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS.**—(1) In the case of a payment referred to in subsection (c)(1) for the residual value of real property or improvements at an overseas military facility, the portion of the payment that is equal to the depreciated value of the investment made with nonappropriated funds shall be deposited in the reserve account established under section 204(b)(4)(C) of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act. The Secretary may use amounts in the account (in such an aggregate amount as is provided in advance by appropriation Acts) for the purpose of acquiring, constructing, or improving commissary stores and nonappropriated fund instrumentalities.

(2) As used in this subsection:

(A) The term “nonappropriated funds” means funds received from—

(i) the adjustment of, or surcharge on, selling prices at commissary stores fixed under section 2685 of title 10, United States Code; or

(ii) a nonappropriated fund instrumentality.

(B) The term “nonappropriated fund instrumentality” means an instrumentality of the United States under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces (including the Army and Air Force Exchange Service, the Navy Resale and Services Support Office, and the Marine Corps exchanges) which is conducted for the comfort, pleasure, contentment, or physical or mental improvement of members of the Armed Forces.

**(e) NEGOTIATIONS FOR PAYMENTS-IN-KIND.**—(1) Before the Secretary of Defense enters into negotiations with a host country regarding the acceptance by the United States of any payment-in-kind in connection with the release to the host country

of improvements made by the United States at military installations in the host country, the Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice regarding the intended negotiations.

(2) The notice shall contain the following:

(A) A justification for entering into negotiations for payments-in-kind with the host country.

(B) The types of benefit options to be pursued by the Secretary in the negotiations.

(C) A discussion of the adjustments that are intended to be made in the future-years defense program or in the budget of the Department of Defense for the fiscal year in which the notice is submitted or the following fiscal year in order to reflect costs that it may no longer be necessary for the United States to incur as a result of the payments-in-kind to be sought in the negotiations.

(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the appropriate congressional committees are

(A) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Defense Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Appropriations, and the Defense Subcommittees of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.

**(f) REPORT ON STATUS AND USE OF SPECIAL ACCOUNT.**— Not later than January 15 of each year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the operations of the Department of Defense Overseas Military Facility Investment Recovery Account during the preceding fiscal year and proposed uses of funds in the special account during the next fiscal year. The report shall include the following:

(1) The amount of each deposit in the account during the preceding fiscal year, and the source of the amount.

(2) The balance in the account at the end of that fiscal year.

(3) The amounts expended from the account by each military department during that fiscal year.



(4) With respect to each military installation for which money was deposited in the account as a result of the release of real property or improvements of the installation to a host country during that fiscal year—

(A) the total amount of the investment of the United States in the installation, expressed in terms of constant dollars of that fiscal year,

(B) the depreciated value (as determined by the Secretary of a military department under regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense) of the real property and improvements that were released, and

(C) the explanation of the Secretary for any difference between the benefits received by the United States for the real property and improvements and the depreciated value (as so determined) of that real property and improvements.

(5) A list identifying all military installations outside the United States for which the Secretary proposes to make expenditures from the Department of Defense Overseas Facility Investment Recovery Account under subsection (c)(2)(B) during the next fiscal year and specifying the amount of the proposed expenditures for each identified military installations.

(6) A description of the purposes for which the expenditures proposed under paragraph (5) will be made and the need for such expenditures.

**(g) OMB REVIEW OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENTS.—**(1) The Secretary of Defense may not enter into an agreement of settlement with a host country regarding the release to the host country of improvements made by the United States to facilities at an installation located in the host country until 30 days after the date on which the Secretary submits the proposed settlement to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. The prohibition set forth in the preceding sentence shall apply only to agreements of settlement for improvements having a value in excess of \$10,000,000. The Director shall evaluate the overall equity of the proposed settlement. In evaluating the proposed settlement, the Director shall consider such factors as the extent of the United States capital investment in the improvements being released to the host country, the depreciation of the improvements, the condition of the im-

provements, and any applicable requirements for environmental remediation or restoration at the installation

(2) Each year, the Secretary shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on each proposed agreement of settlement that was not submitted by the Secretary to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget in the previous year under paragraph (1) because the value of the improvements to be released pursuant to the proposed agreement did not exceed \$10,000,000.

**(H) CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF PAYMENTS-IN-KIND.—**(1) Not less than 30 days before concluding an agreement for acceptance of military construction or facility improvements as a payment-in-kind, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a notification on the proposed agreement. Any such notification shall contain the following

(A) A description of the military construction project or facility improvement project, as the case may be.

(B) A certification that the project is needed by United States forces.

(C) An explanation of how the project will aid in the achievement of the mission of those forces.

(D) A certification that, if the project were to be carried out by the Department of Defense, appropriations would be necessary for the project and it would be necessary to provide for the project in the next future-years defense program.

(2) Not less than 30 days before concluding an agreement for acceptance of host nation support or host nation payment of operating costs of United States forces as a payment-in-kind, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a notification on the proposed agreement. Any such notification shall contain the following

(A) A description of each activity to be covered by the payment-in-kind.

(B) A certification that the costs to be covered by the payment-in-kind are included in the budget of one or more of the military departments or that it will otherwise be necessary to provide for payment of such costs in a budget of one or more of the military departments.

(C) A certification that, unless the payment-in-kind is accepted or funds are appropriated for payment of such costs, the military mission of the United States forces with respect to the host nation concerned will be adversely affected.

#### **SEC. 2922. MODIFICATION OF THE CONTENT OF BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON ALTERNATIVE UTILIZATION OF MILITARY FACILITIES**

(a) **USES OF FACILITIES.**—Section 2819(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Public Law 100-456; 102 Stat. 2119; 10 U.S.C. 2391 note) is amended—

(1) in paragraph (2), by striking out “minimum security facilities for nonviolent prisoners” and inserting in lieu thereof “Federal confinement or correctional facilities including shock incarceration facilities”;

(2) by striking out “and” at the end of paragraph (3);

(3) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and

(4) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new paragraph (4).

“(4) identify those facilities, or parts of facilities, that could be effectively utilized or renovated to meet the needs of States and local jurisdictions for confinement or correctional facilities; and”.

(b) **EFFECTIVE DATE.**—The amendments made by subsection (a) shall take effect with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 2819 the National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, after September 30, 1990.

#### **SEC. 2923. FUNDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS SCHEDULED FOR CLOSURE INSIDE THE UNITED STATES**

(a) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**—There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense Base Closure Account for fiscal year 1991, in addition to any other funds authorized to be appropriated to that account for that fiscal year, the sum of \$100,000,000. Amounts appropriated to that account pursuant to the preceding sentence shall be available only for activi-

ties for the purpose of environmental restoration at military installations closed or realigned under title II of Public Law 100-526, as authorized under section 204(a)(3) of that title.

(b) **EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF FUNDING.**—(1) Section 207 of Public Law 100-526 is amended by adding at the end the following:

[See section 207, post at p. 1824]

(c) **TASK FORCE REPORT.**—(1) No later than 12 months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report containing the findings and recommendations of the task force established under paragraph (2) concerning—

(A) ways to improve interagency coordination, within existing laws, regulations, and administrative policies, of environmental response actions at military installations (or portions of installations) that are being closed, or are scheduled to be closed, pursuant to title II of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526); and

(B) ways to consolidate and streamline, within existing laws and regulations, the practices, policies, and administrative procedures of relevant Federal and State agencies with respect to such environmental response actions so as to enable those actions to be carried out more expeditiously.

(2) There is hereby established an environmental response task force to make the findings and recommendations, and to prepare the report, required by paragraph (1). The task force shall consist of the following (or their designees):

(A) The Secretary of Defense, who shall be chairman of the task force.

(B) The Attorney General.

(C) The Administrator of the General Services Administration.

(D) The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

(E) The Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army.

(F) A representative of a State environmental protection agency, appointed by the head of the National Governors Association.

(G) A representative of a State Attorney General's office, appointed by the head of the National Association of Attorney Generals.

(H) A representative of a public-interest environmental organization, appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives

#### **SEC. 2924. COMMUNITY PREFERENCE CONSIDERATION IN CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT OF MILITARY INSTALLATIONS**

In any process of selecting any military installation inside the United States for closure or realignment, the Secretary of Defense shall take such steps as are necessary to assure that special consideration and emphasis is given to any official statement from a unit of general local government adjacent to or within a military installation requesting the closure or realignment of such installation.

#### **SEC. 2925. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE BASE CLOSURE COMMISSION**

(a) **NORTON AIR FORCE BASE.**—(1) Consistent with the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of the Air Force may not relocate, until after September 30, 1995, any of the functions that were being carried out at the ballistics missile office at Norton Air Force Base, California, on the date on which the Secretary of Defense transmitted a report to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives as described in section 202(a)(1) of Public Law 100-526.

(2) This subsection shall take effect as of the date on which the report referred to in subsection (a) was transmitted to such Committees.

(b) **GENERAL DIRECTIVE.**—Consistent with the requirements of section 201 of Public Law 100-526, the Secretary of Defense shall direct each of the Secretaries of the military departments to take all actions necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and to take no action that is inconsistent with such recommendations.

#### **SEC. 2926. CONTRACTS FOR CERTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACTIVITIES**

(a) **ESTABLISHMENT OF MODEL PROGRAM.**—Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act [Nov 5, 1990], the Secretary of Defense shall

establish a model program to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the base closure environmental restoration program.

(b) **ADMINISTRATOR OF PROGRAM.**—The Secretary shall designate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Environment as the Administrator of the model program referred to in subsection (a). The Deputy Assistant Secretary shall report to the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition.

(c) **APPLICABILITY.**—This section shall apply to environmental restoration activities at installations selected by the Secretary pursuant to the provisions of subsection (d)(1).

(d) **PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.**—In carrying out the model program, the Secretary of Defense shall:

(1) Designate for the model program two installations under his jurisdiction that have been designated for closure pursuant to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526) and for which preliminary assessments, site inspections, and Environmental Impact Statements required by law or regulation have been completed. The Secretary shall designate only those installations which have satisfied the requirements of section 204 of the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act (Public Law 100-526).

(2) Compile a prequalification list of prospective contractors for solicitation and negotiation in accordance with the procedures set forth in title IX of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (Public Law 92-582; 40 U.S.C 541 et seq, as amended). Such contractors shall satisfy all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. In addition, the contractor selected for one of the two installations under this program shall indemnify the Federal Government against all liabilities, claims, penalties, costs, and damages caused by (A) the contractor's breach of any term or provision of the contract; and (B) any negligent or willful act or omission of the contractor, its employees, or its subcontractors in the performance of the contract.

(3) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, solicit proposals from qualified contractors for response action (as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980

(42 U.S.C. 9601)) at the installations designated under paragraph (1). Such solicitations and proposals shall include the following:

(A) Proposals to perform response action. Such proposals shall include provisions for receiving the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies.

(B) To the maximum extent possible, provisions offered by single prime contractors to perform all phases of the response action, using performance specifications supplied by the Secretary of Defense and including any safeguards the Secretary deems essential to avoid conflict of interest.

(4) Evaluate bids on the basis of price and other evaluation criteria.

(5) Subject to the availability of authorized and appropriated funds to the Department of Defense, make contract awards for response action within 120 days after the solicitation of proposals pursuant to paragraph (3) for the response action, or within 120 days after receipt of the necessary authorizations or approvals of the response action by appropriate Federal, State, or local agencies, whichever is later.

**(e) APPLICATION OF SECTION 120 OF CERCLA.**—Activities of the model program shall be carried out subject to, and in a manner consistent with, section 120 (relating to Federal facilities) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9620).

**(f) EXPEDITED AGREEMENTS.**—The Secretary shall, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, assure compliance with all applicable Federal statutes and regulations and, in addition, take all reasonable and appropriate measures to expedite all necessary administrative decisions, agreements, and concurrences.

**(g) REPORT.**—The Secretary of Defense shall include a description of the progress made during the preceding fiscal year in implementing and accomplishing the goals of this section within the annual report to Congress required by section 2706 of title 10, United States Code.

**(h) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING LAW.**—Nothing in this section affects or modifies, in any way, the obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law, including common law, with respect to the disposal or release of hazardous substances or pollutants or contaminants as defined under section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601).



# APPENDIX G

## FORCE STRUCTURE PLAN

This appendix is taken verbatim from the *Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report, March 1995.*

### BACKGROUND

Public Law 101-510 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit to the Congress and the Commission a force structure plan for fiscal years 1995 through 2001. The force structure plan which follows incorporates an assessment by the Secretary of the probable threats to the national security during the fiscal year 1995 through 2001 period, and takes into account the anticipated levels of funding for this period. The plan comprises three sections:

- The military threat assessment,
- The need for overseas basing, and
- The force structure, including the implementation plan.

The force structure plan is classified SECRET. What follows is the UNCLASSIFIED version of the plan.

### SECTION I:

#### *MILITARY THREAT ASSESSMENT*

The vital interests of the United States will be threatened by regional crises between historic antagonists, such as North and South Korea, India and Pakistan, and the Middle East/Persian Gulf states. Also the collapse of political order as a result of ethnic enmities in areas such as Somalia and the former Yugoslavia will prompt international efforts to contain violence, halt the loss of life and the destruction of property, and re-establish civil society. The future world military situation will be characterized by regional actors with modern destructive weaponry, including chemical and biological weapons, modern ballistic missiles, and, in some cases, nuclear weapons. The acceleration of regional strife caused by frustrated ethnic and nationalistic aspirations will increase the pressure on the United States to contribute military forces to inter-

national peacekeeping/enforcement and humanitarian relief efforts.

The United States faces three types of conflict in the coming years: deliberate attacks on U.S. allies or vital interests; the escalation of regional conflicts that eventually threaten U.S. allies or vital interests, and conflicts that do not directly threaten vital interests, but whose costs in the lives of innocents demand an international response in which the United States will play a leading role.

### ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

The Balkans and parts of the former Soviet Union will be a source of major crises in the coming years as political-ethnic-religious antagonisms weaken fragile post-Cold War institutions. These countries may resort to arms to protect narrow political-ethnic interests or maximize their power vis-à-vis their rivals. The presence of vast stores of conventional weapons and ammunition greatly increases the potential for these local conflicts to spread. Attempts by former Soviet republics to transform into democratic states with market economies and stable national boundaries may prove too difficult or too costly, and could result in a reassertion of authoritarianism, economic collapse, and civil war.

In the Middle East, competition for political influence and natural resources (i.e., water and oil), along with weak economies, Islamic fundamentalism, and demographic pressures will contribute to deteriorating living standards and encourage social unrest.

The major threat of military aggression or subversion in the Persian Gulf region may well emanate from Iran. Iran will find its principal leverage in subversion, propaganda, and in threats and military posturing below the threshold that would precipitate U.S. intervention.

Iraq will continue to be a major concern for the region and the world. By the turn of the century, Iraq could pose a renewed regional threat depending

on what sanctions remain in place and what success Iraq has in circumventing them. Iraq continues to constitute a residual threat to some Gulf states, particularly Kuwait.

#### ACROSS THE PACIFIC

The security environment in most of Asia risks becoming unstable as nations reorient their defense policies to adapt to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet empire, the breakup of the former Soviet Union, and the lessons of the Persian Gulf War. Political and economic pressures upon Communist or authoritarian regimes may lead to greater instability and violence.

Our most active regional security concern in Asia remains the military threat posed by North Korea to our treaty ally, the Republic of Korea. Our concerns are intensified by North Korea's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and the associated delivery systems.

China's military modernization efforts of the last two decades will produce a smaller but more capable military with modern combat aircraft, including the Su-27 FLANKER. By the end of the decade China will also have improved strategic nuclear forces.

Japan's major security concerns will focus primarily on the potential emergence of a reunified Korea armed with nuclear weapons, on the expanding Chinese naval threat, and on the possibility of a nationalistic Russia.

In South Asia, the principal threat to U.S. security will remain the potential of renewed conflict between India and Pakistan. The conventional capabilities of both countries probably will be eroded by severe budget pressures, internal security obligations, and the loss of Superpower benefactors.

#### THE REST OF THE WORLD

This broad characterization covers regions not addressed above and is not intended to either diminish or denigrate the importance of U.S. interests, friends, and allies in areas beyond Europe and the Pacific.

In Latin America, democratic foundations remain unstable and the democratization process will remain vulnerable to a wide variety of influences and factors that could easily derail it. Virtually every country in the region will be victimized by drug-associated violence and crime.

In Africa, chronic instability, insurgency, and civil war will continue throughout the continent. Two major kinds of security issues will dominate U.S. relations with the region: noncombatant evacuation and conflict resolution. Operations most likely to draw the U.S. military into the continent include disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping, and logistic support for allied military operations. Further, conflict resolution efforts will test the growing reputation of the United States for negotiation and mediation.

Direct threats to U.S. allies or vital interests that would require a significant military response in the near-future are those posed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. More numerous, however, are those regional conflicts that would quickly escalate to threaten vital U.S. interests in southeastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. These conflicts would pose unique demands on the ability of U.S. Armed Forces to maintain stability and provide the environment for political solutions. Finally, there will be a large number of contingencies in which the sheer magnitude of human suffering and moral outrage demands a U.S. response, probably in concert with the United Nations.

#### *SECTION II: JUSTIFICATION FOR OVERSEAS BASING*

Although we have reduced overseas presence forces, we nevertheless will continue to emphasize the fundamental role of mobile, combat-ready forces in deterring aggression by demonstrating our commitment to democratic allies and friends, and promoting regional stability through cooperation and constructive interaction. This is achieved through peacetime engagement, conflict prevention, and fighting to win. Overseas presence activities such as combined exercises, port visits, military-to-military contacts, security assistance, combating terrorism and drug trafficking, and protecting American citizens in crisis areas will remain central to our strategy. U.S. influence will be promoted through continuing these overseas operations.

Over the past 50 years, the day-to-day presence of U.S. forces in regions of geostrategic importance to U.S. national interests has been key to averting crises and preventing war. Our forces throughout the world show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and

provide crises response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Although the number of U.S. forces stationed overseas has been significantly reduced, the credibility of our capability and intent to respond to any crisis will continue to depend on judicious overseas presence. Overseas presence is also vital to the maintenance of the collective defense system by which the U.S. works with its friends and allies to protect our mutual security interests while reducing the burdens of defense spending and unnecessary arms competition.

#### EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, SOUTHWEST ASIA

U.S. interests in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia, require continuing commitment. We must maintain forces, forward stationed and rotational, with the capability for rapid reinforcement from within the Atlantic region and from the United States when needed.

The end of the Cold War significantly reduced the requirement to station U.S. forces in Europe. Yet, the security of the United States and of Europe remain linked, and continued support of the evolving Atlantic Alliance is crucial. Our long-term stake in European security and stability, as well as enduring economic, cultural, and geopolitical interests require a continued commitment of U.S. military strength.

Our overseas presence forces in Europe must be sized, designed, and postured to preserve U.S. influence and leadership in the Atlantic Alliance and in the future security framework on the continent. The remaining force is a direct response to the uncertainty and instability that remains in this region. Forward-deployed forces provide an explicit and visible commitment to the security and stability of Europe. Pre-positioned and afloat equipment supports rapid reintroduction of CONUS-based forces should the need arise in Europe or elsewhere.

Persistent Iraqi challenges to Persian Gulf security provide a solid grounding for continued U.S. presence in the region. Air, ground, and maritime deployments, coupled with pre-positioning, combined exercises, security assistance, and infrastructure, supported by a European and regional enroute strategic airlift infrastructure, greatly enhanced our recent crisis-response force build-up. Our future commitment will include rotational

deployments of battalion-sized maneuver forces, land-based tactical aviation units, and five surface combatants, reinforced by pre-positioned and afloat equipment, access agreements, bilateral planning, periodic exercises, deployments of Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), and Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEUs(SOC)), visits by senior officials, and security assistance.

#### PACIFIC FORCES

U.S. interests in the Pacific, including Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, also require a continuing commitment. As Asia continues its economic and political development, U.S. overseas presence will continue to serve as a stabilizing influence and a restraint on potential regional aggression and rearmament.

A strong US naval and land-based presence is designed to buttress our interests in the region. A carrier and amphibious force, including 1(+) CVBG and one Marine Expeditionary Force with one MEU(SOC) will be forward-based in this region. One Army division, less one brigade, with supporting Combat Support (CS)/Combat Service Support (CSS) elements, and one Air Force Fighter Wing Equivalent (FWE) in South Korea and 1(+) FWE in Japan are forward-based in this region. In addition, presence in both Alaska and Hawaii will be maintained.

#### ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD

In the less-predictable yet increasingly important other regions of the globe, the United States seeks to preserve its access to foreign markets and resources, mediate the traumas of economic and social strife, deter regional aggressors, and promote the regional stability necessary for progress and prosperity. From Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa to the far-flung islands of the world's oceans, American military men and women contribute daily to the unsung tasks of nation-building, security assistance, and quiet diplomacy that protect and extend our political goodwill and access to foreign markets. Such access becomes increasingly critical in an era of reduced overseas presence, when forces deploying from the United States are more than ever dependent on enroute and host-nation support to ensure timely response to distant crises. In the future, maintaining overseas presence through combined planning exercises,

pre-positioning and service agreements, combined warfighting doctrine, and interoperability could spell the difference between success and failure in defending important regional interests.

#### CONTINGENCY FORCES

U.S. strategy for the come-as-you-are arena of spontaneous, often unpredictable, crises requires fully trained, highly ready forces that are rapidly deliverable and initially self-sufficient. In regions where no U.S. overseas presence exists, these contingency forces are the tip of the spear, first into action, and followed if necessary by heavier forces and long-term sustainment. Therefore, such forces must be drawn primarily from the active force structure and tailored into highly effective joint task forces that capitalize on the unique capabilities of each Service and in the special operations forces. In this regard, the CINCs must have the opportunity to select from a broad spectrum of capabilities such as: airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deliverable armor and mechanized infantry forces from the Army; the entire range of fighter, fighter-bomber, and long-range conventional bomber forces provided by the Air Force; carrier-based naval air power, the striking capability of surface combatants, and the covert capabilities of attack submarines from the Navy; the amphibious combat power and rapid response Maritime Prepositioning Forces of the Marine Corps, which includes on-station MEU(SOC)s; and the unique capabilities of special operations forces. Additionally, certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units. Reserve forces perform much of the lift and other vital missions from the outset of any contingency operation.

### SECTION III:

#### THE FORCE STRUCTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

	FY 94	FY 97	FY 99
<b>ARMY DIVISIONS</b>			
Active	13	10	10
Reserve	8	8	8
<b>MARINE CORPS DIVISIONS</b>			
Active	3	3	3
Reserve	1	1	1
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS	12	11	11
RESERVE CARRIERS	-	1	1
<b>CARRIER AIR WINGS</b>			
Active	11	10	10
Reserve	2	1	1
BATTLE FORCE SHIPS	387	363	344
<b>AIR FORCE FIGHTERS</b>			
Active	978	936	936
Reserve	795	504	504
<b>AIR FORCE BOMBERS</b>			
Active	139	104	103
Reserve	12	22	26

#### DoD PERSONNEL

(End Strength in thousands)

	FY 94	FY 97	FY 99
<b>ACTIVE DUTY</b>			
Army	543	495	495
Navy	468	408	394
Marine Corps	174	174	174
Air Force	426	385	382
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,611</b>	<b>1,462</b>	<b>1,445</b>
RESERVES AND NATIONAL GUARD	997	904	893
CIVILIANS	913	799	759





# APPENDIX H

## FINAL SELECTION CRITERIA

### MILITARY VALUE

*(Given overall priority consideration)*

1. The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace at both the existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both the existing and potential receiving locations
4. The cost and manpower implications.

### RETURN ON INVESTMENT

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs

### IMPACTS

6. The economic impact on communities.
  7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.
  8. The environmental impact.
-



# APPENDIX I SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

## 1995 DoD Recommendations

### *Part I: Major Base Closures*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort McClellan, AL  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO  
Price Support Center, IL  
Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL  
Fort Ritchie, MD  
Selfridge Army Garrison, MI  
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ  
Seneca Army Depot, NY  
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
Red River Army Depot, TX  
Fort Pickett, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK  
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA  
Ship Repair Facility, GU  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Indianapolis, IN  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division  
Detachment, Louisville, KY  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division  
Detachment, White Oak, MD  
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA  
Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Lakehurst, NJ  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Warminster, PA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

North Highlands Air Guard Station, CA  
Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, CA  
Rome Laboratory, Rome, NY

Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY  
Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, OH  
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, PA  
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX  
Brooks Air Force Base, TX  
Reese Air Force Base, TX

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN  
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT

### *Part II: Major Base Realignments*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort Greely, AK  
Fort Hunter Liggett, CA  
Sierra Army Depot, CA  
Fort Meade, MD  
Detroit Arsenal, MI  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Fort Hamilton, NY  
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Fort Buchanan, PR  
Dugway Proving Ground, UT  
Fort Lee, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL  
Naval Activities, GU  
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, WA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

McClellan Air Force Base, CA  
Onizuka Air Station, CA  
Eglin Air Force Base, FL  
Robins Air Force Base, GA

Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT  
Kirtland Air Force Base, NM  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND  
Tinker Air Force Base, OK  
Kelly Air Force Base, TX  
Hill Air Force Base, UT

***Part III: Smaller Base or  
Activity Closures, Realignments,  
Disestablishments or Relocations***

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, CA  
East Fort Baker, CA  
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA  
Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT  
Big Coppett Key, FL  
Concepts Analysis Agency, MD  
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD  
Hingham Cohasset, MA  
Sudbury Training Annex, MA  
Aviation-Troop Command (ATCOM), MO  
Fort Missoula, MT  
Camp Kilmer, NJ  
Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ  
Camp Pedricktown, NJ  
Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY  
Fort Totten, NY  
Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC  
Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), VA  
Camp Bonneville, WA  
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity  
(AMSA), WV

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance  
Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast  
Division, San Diego, CA  
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Personnel Research and Development  
Center, San Diego, CA  
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and  
Repair, USN, Long Beach, CA  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division,  
New London Detachment, New London, CT  
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound  
Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, GU

Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA  
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division  
Detachment, Annapolis, MD  
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS  
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Technical Services Facility,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance  
Center, RDT&E Division Detachment,  
Warminster, PA  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance  
Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast  
Detachment, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Information Systems Management Center,  
Arlington, VA  
Naval Management Systems Support Office,  
Chesapeake, VA

**NAVY/MARINE RESERVE ACTIVITIES**

Naval Reserve Centers at:  
Huntsville, AL  
Stockton, CA  
Santa Ana, Irvine, CA  
Pomona, CA  
Cadillac, MI  
Staten Island, NY  
Laredo, TX  
Sheboygan, WI

Naval Air Reserve Center at:  
Olathe, KS

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:  
New Orleans, LA (Region 10)  
Charleston, SC (Region 7)

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA  
Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor  
Activity, Buffalo, NY  
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator  
Activity, Fort Worth, TX

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Contract Management District South,  
Marietta, GA  
Defense Contract Management Command  
International, Dayton, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA  
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX

#### DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

Investigations Control and Automation Directorate,  
Fort Holabird, MD

#### *Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved BRAC Recommendations*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory,  
Fort Detrick, MD

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA  
Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL  
Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center,  
Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Naval Air Station, Agana, GU  
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI  
Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI  
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command,  
Arlington, VA  
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC  
Naval Security Group Command Detachment  
Potomac, Washington, DC

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
(301st Rescue Squadron)  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
(726th Air Control Squadron)  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (Airfield Support  
for 10th Infantry [Light] Division)  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
(485th Engineering Installation Group)

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Contract Management District West,  
El Segundo, CA

## 1993 DoD Recommendations

### *Part I: Major Base Closures*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort McClellan, AL  
Vint Hill Farms, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Station Mobile, AL  
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA  
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA  
Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA  
Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA  
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI  
Naval Air Station Glenview, IL  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,  
St. Inigoes, MD  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA  
Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA  
Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC  
Naval Station Charleston, SC  
Naval Air Station Dallas, TX  
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI  
Newark Air Force Base, OH  
O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve  
Station, Chicago, IL

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH  
Defense Personnel Support Center,  
Philadelphia, PA

### *Part II: Major Base Realignment*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Tooele Army Depot, UT  
Fort Belvoir, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren White  
Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD  
1st Marine Corps District, Garden City, NY  
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI  
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

March Air Force Base, CA  
McGuire Air Force Base, NJ  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY

### *Part III: Smaller Base or Activity Closures, Realignment, Disestablishments or Relocations*

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

None

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory,  
Port Hueneme, CA  
Naval Facilities Engineering Command,  
Western Engineering Field Division,  
San Bruno, CA  
Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations  
(Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA  
Public Works Center San Francisco, CA  
Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering  
Center, Washington, DC  
Naval Hospital Orlando, FL  
Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock,  
 Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD  
 Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, MD  
 Sea Automated Data Systems Activity,  
 Indian Head, MD  
 Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI  
 Naval Air Facility, Midway Island  
 Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning,  
 and Procurement, Portsmouth, NH  
 Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
 Trenton, NJ  
 Department of Defense Family Housing Office,  
 Niagara Falls, NY  
 Naval Air Technical Services Facility,  
 Philadelphia, PA  
 Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations  
 (Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA  
 Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,  
 Charleston, SC  
 Naval Hospital Charleston, SC  
 Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC  
 Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme,  
 Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA  
 Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver, VA  
 Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk  
 Detachment, Norfolk, VA  
 Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations  
 (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk, VA  
 Planning, Estimating, Repair and Alterations (CV),  
 Bremerton, WA

**NAVY NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR)  
 ACTIVITIES**

Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA  
 (Including the Office of Military Manpower  
 Management, Arlington, VA)  
 Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
 Naval Facilities Engineering Command,  
 Alexandria, VA  
 Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA  
 Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
 Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
 (Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria,  
 VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA)  
 Security Group Command, Security Group Station,  
 and Security Group Detachment, Potomac,  
 Washington, DC  
 Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA

**NAVY/MARINE RESERVE ACTIVITIES**

Naval Reserve Centers at:  
 Gadsden, AL  
 Montgomery, AL  
 Fayetteville, AR  
 Fort Smith, AR  
 Pacific Grove, CA  
 Macon, GA  
 Terre Haute, IN  
 Hutchinson, KS  
 Monroe, LA  
 New Bedford, MA  
 Pittsfield, MA  
 Joplin, MO  
 St. Joseph, MO  
 Great Falls, MT  
 Missoula, MT  
 Atlantic City, NJ  
 Perth Amboy, NJ  
 Jamestown, NY  
 Poughkeepsie, NY  
 Altoona, PA  
 Kingsport, TN  
 Memphis, TN  
 Ogden, UT  
 Staunton, VA  
 Parkersburg, WV

Naval Reserve Facilities at:  
 Alexandria, LA  
 Midland, TX

Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:  
 Fort Wayne, IN  
 Billings, MT  
 Abilene, TX

Readiness Command Regions at:  
 Olathe, KS (Region 18)  
 Scotia, NY (Region 2)  
 Ravenna, OH (Region 5)

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

Defense Industrial Supply Center, Philadelphia, PA  
 Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic,  
 Philadelphia, PA  
 Defense Contract Management District  
 Northcentral, Chicago, IL

Defense Contract Management District West,  
El Segundo, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL  
Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT  
Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Defense Logistics Services Center, Battle Creek, MI  
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service,  
Battle Creek, MI

### *DoD Data Center Consolidation*

#### ARMY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS

None

#### NAVY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS

Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA  
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC  
Enlisted Personnel Management Center,  
New Orleans, LA  
Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, CA  
Fleet Industrial Support Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station, Brunswick, ME  
Naval Air Station, Key West, FL  
Naval Air Station, Mayport, FL  
Naval Air Station, Oceana, VA  
Naval Air Station, Whidbey Island, WA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Patuxent River, MD  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,  
China Lake, CA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,  
Point Mugu, CA  
Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance  
Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area  
Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area  
Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station,  
San Diego, CA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station,  
New Orleans, LA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station,  
Pensacola, FL

Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station,  
Washington, DC  
Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, TX  
Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA  
Navy Regional Data Automation Center, San  
Francisco, CA  
Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC  
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI  
Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA  
Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA  
Trident Refit Facility, Kings Bay, GA

#### MARINE CORPS DATA PROCESSING CENTERS

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA  
Regional Automated Services Center, Camp  
Pendleton, CA  
Regional Automated Services Center, Camp  
Lejeune, NC  
Marine Corps Air Station, Cherry Point, NC

#### AIR FORCE DATA PROCESSING CENTERS

Regional Processing Center, McClellan AFB, CA  
Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph  
AFB, TX  
Computer Service Center, San Antonio, TX  
7th Communications Group, Pentagon,  
Arlington, VA

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY DATA PROCESSING CENTERS

Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, MI  
Information Processing Center, Philadelphia, PA  
Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT  
Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA

#### DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA) DATA PROCESSING CENTERS

Defense Information Technology Service  
Organization, Indianapolis Information  
Processing Center, IN  
Defense Information Technology Service  
Organization, Kansas City Information  
Processing Center, MO  
Defense Information Technology Service  
Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, OH

*Part IV: Changes to Previously Approved  
BRAC 88/91 Recommendations*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Rock Island Arsenal, IL  
(AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL  
instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL)  
Presidio of San Francisco, CA  
(6th Army relocates to NASA Ames, CA  
vice Fort Carson, CO)  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
(Systems Integration Management Activity-  
East remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
vice Rock Island, IL)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station  
Treasure Island, CA  
(Retain no facilities, dispose/outlease  
all property)  
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA  
(Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for Marine  
Corps Air Station 29 Palms as one receiver of  
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin's assets)  
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center,  
San Diego, CA  
(Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems  
Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA into available  
Air Force space vice new construction)  
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity,  
Yorktown, VA  
(Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA)  
Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility,  
Albuquerque, NM  
(Retain as a tenant of the Air Force)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Castle Air Force Base, CA  
(B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from  
Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135  
Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to  
Altus AFB)  
Mather Air Force Base, CA  
(940th Air Refueling Group redirected from  
McClellan AFB to Beale AFB)

MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
(Airfield does not close. 482nd Fighter Wing  
[AFRES] is reassigned from Homestead AFB and  
operates the airfield. Joint Communications  
Support Element stays at MacDill AFB vice  
relocating to Charleston AFB)  
Chanute Air Force Base, IL  
(Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural  
Maintenance training courses from Chanute  
AFB to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS  
Memphis)  
Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH  
(Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the  
160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment  
area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of Wright-  
Patterson AFB and operate as tenants of the  
Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on the  
RPA's airport.)  
Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX  
(704th Fighter Squadron and 924th Fighter  
Group redirected from Bergstrom AFB to  
Carswell AFB cantonment area)  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX  
(Fabrication function of the 436th Training  
Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB to  
Luke AFB, maintenance training function  
redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB)



# 1991 DoD Recommendations

## *Recommended Closures*

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
Fort Devens, MA  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Fort McClellan, AL  
Ford Ord, CA  
Sacramento Army Depot, CA  
Harry Diamond Lab  
Woodbridge Research Facility, VA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Chase Field Naval Air Station, TX  
Davisville Construction Battalion Center, RI  
Hunters Point Annex, CA  
Long Beach Naval Station, CA  
Moffett Field Naval Air Station, CA  
Orlando Naval Training Center, FL  
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA  
Philadelphia Naval Station, PA  
10 RDT&E, Engineering and Fleet  
Support Activities  
Sand Point (Puget Sound) Naval Station, WA  
Tustin Marine Corps Air Station, CA  
Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX  
Castle Air Force Base, CA  
Eaker Air Force Base, AR  
England Air Force Base, LA  
Grissom Air Force Base, IN  
Loring Air Force Base, ME  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
Moody Air Force Base, GA  
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC  
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO  
Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH  
Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI

## *Recommended Realignment*s

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY


Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA  
Aviation Systems Command/Troop Support  
Command, St. Louis, MO  
Fort Belvoir, VA  
Fort Detrick, MD  
Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Fort Polk, LA  
Harry Diamond Laboratories, MD  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Rock Island Arsenal, IL  
White Sands Missile Range, NM

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Air Facility, Midway Island  
16 RDT&E Engineering and Fleet  
Support Activities

### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MacDill Air Force Base, FL



# APPENDIX J

## BASES ADDED BY THE COMMISSION FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION 1995, 1993, & 1991

### 1995 Commission

36 Bases Added

9. Final Commission Recommendations

#### *BASES ADDED FOR REALIGNMENT OR CLOSURE—32*

##### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (4)

Space and Strategic Defense Command, AL  
**Oakland Army Base, CA (Close)**  
**Fort Holabird, MD (Close)**  
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA

##### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (8)

Engineering Field Activity West, San Bruno, CA  
**Fleet and Industrial Supply Center,  
Oakland, CA (Close)**  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Point Mugu, CA  
Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA  
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and  
Repair, San Francisco, CA  
Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA  
**Public Works Center, GU (Realign)**  
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, ME

##### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (10)

**Chicago O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station, IL  
(Close)**  
Minneapolis-St. Paul IAP Air Reserve Station, MN  
Columbus Air Force Base, MS  
Minot Air Force Base, ND  
Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station, NY

Youngstown-Warren MAP Air Reserve Station, OH  
Vance Air Force Base, OK  
Carswell Air Reserve Station, TX  
Laughlin Air Force Base, TX  
General Mitchell Air Reserve Station, WI

##### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (6)

**Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA  
(Disestablish)**  
Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA  
Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK  
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA  
**Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX  
(Disestablish)**  
Defense Distribution Depot Hill, UT

#### *BASES ON THE SECRETARY'S LIST ADDED FOR FURTHER REALIGNMENT OR CLOSURE—4*

##### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (1)

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA

##### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (7)

Homestead Air Reserve Station, FL  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND  
Hill Air Force Base, UT  
**McClellan Air Force Base, CA (Close)**  
Robins Air Force Base, GA  
Tinker Air Force Base, OK  
**Kelly Air Force Base, TX (Realign)**

**Bold face indicates a final Commission recommendation**

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## 1993 Commission

72 Bases Added

17 Final Commission Recommendations

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (11)

#### **Anniston Army Depot, AL (Realign)**

Army Information Processing Center, Huntsville, AL

#### **Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA (Realign)**

Fort Gillem, GA

Fort McPherson, GA

Army Information Processing Center,

Chambersburg, PA

Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA

#### **Toboyhanna Army Depot, PA (Realign)**

#### **Red River Army Depot, TX (Realign)**

Fort Lee, VA

Fort Monroe, VA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (32)

Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA

#### **Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA (Realign)**

Naval Air Station Miramar, CA

Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA

Naval Shipyard Long Beach, CA

#### **Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA (Realign)**

Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL

Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA

#### **Naval Air Station Agana, GU (Close)**

Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL

Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL

Naval Ordnance Station Louisville, KY

#### **Naval Reserve Center Chicopee, MA (Close)**

#### **Naval Reserve Center Quincy, MA (Close)**

#### **Naval/Marine Corps Reserve Center Lawrence, MA (Close)**

Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME/NH

Naval Station Pascagoula, MS

Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC

#### **Naval/Marine Corps Air Facility Johnstown, PA (Close)**

Ships Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg, PA

Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC

Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC

Naval Air Station Memphis, TN

Naval Hospital Millington, TN

Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX

Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX

Naval Station Ingleside, TX

Naval Air Station Oceana, VA

Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center  
Portsmouth, VA

Naval Shipyard Norfolk, VA

Naval Station Everett, WA

#### **Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV (Close)**

### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (16)

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA

McClellan Air Force Base, CA

Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA

Regional Processing Center Warner-Robins Air  
Force Base, GA

Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA

Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND

#### **Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY (Close)**

#### **Gentile Air Force Station, OH (Close)**

Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK

Regional Processing Center Tinker Air Force Base,  
OK

Tinker Air Force Base, OK

Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX

Kelly Air Force Base, TX

Regional Processing Center Kelly Air Force Base, TX

#### **Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT (Realign)**

Fairchild Air Force Base, WA

### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (10)

Defense Contract Management District Northeast, MA

Defense Construction Supply Center Columbus, OH

Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL

Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX

Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA

Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA

Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL

Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA

Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC

Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA

### DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (3)

#### **Defense Information Technology Services**

**Organization Cleveland Information**

**Processing Center, OH (Close)**

#### **Defense Information Technology Services**

**Organization Columbus Information**

**Processing Center, OH (Close)**

Defense Information Technology Services Organiza-  
tion Denver Information Processing Center, CO

**Bold face indicates a final Commission recommendation.**

# 1991 Commission

35 Bases Added

1 Final Commission Recommendations

## DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY (10)

### **Army Corps of Engineers (Realign)**

Fort Richardson, AK  
Fort Drum, NY  
Fort Hamilton, NY  
Fort Totten, NY  
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
Fort Buchanan, PR  
Fort A P. Hill, VA  
Fort Pickett, VA  
Fort McCoy, WI

## DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (19)

Naval Station Mobile, AL  
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA  
Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, CA  
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, CA  
Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
Naval Station Treasure Island, CA  
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot, Jacksonville, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL  
U.S. Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA  
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam  
Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Naval Station Pascagoula, MS  
Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX  
Naval Station Ingleside, TX  
Naval Aviation Depot, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Station Everett, WA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,  
Portsmouth, VA

## DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE (6)

Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Mountain Home Air Force Base, ID  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY  
Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX

**Bold face indicates a final Commission recommendation**



# APPENDIX K REDIRECTS: CHANGES TO PREVIOUSLY APPROVED COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

Once approved by the President and Congress, the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's (DBCRC) recommendations have the force of law. Changes to any of the preceding Commission recommendations can only be accomplished by a subsequent Commission action, or by a direct Act of Congress. During the 1991 round, there were nine approved changes to previous recommendations. By the 1993 round, however, 15 redirects were approved by the Commission. On February 28, 1995, the Secretary proposed 27 changes to previously approved Commission recommendations. The 1995 Commission approved 27 redirects, with several modifications in gaining installations. This appendix summarizes all changes, or "redirects," of prior Commission recommendations.

## The 1995 Commission

### *Department of the Army*

#### **Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, MD**

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding Tri-Service Project Reliance by not collocating environmental and occupational toxicology research with the Armstrong Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. Instead, relocate portions of the Environmental Quality Research Branch to the U.S. Army Environmental Hygiene Agency (AEHA), Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD)

### *Department of the Navy*

#### **Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA, and Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA**

(Change the receiving sites for NAS Miramar specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS Lemoore and NAS Fallon" to "other naval air stations" Change the receiving sites for MCAS Tustin, CA specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton" to "other air stations consistent with operational requirements")

#### **Naval Air Station Alameda, CA**

(Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission from "NAS North Island and NASA Ames/Moffett Field" to "other naval air stations, primarily Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX to support the Mine Warfare Center of Excellence, Naval Station Ingelside, TX")

#### **Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA**

(Change receiver site specified by the 1993 Commission from "Naval Air Station North Island" to "other government-owned space in San Diego, CA")

#### **Naval Training Center San Diego, CA and Naval Training Center Orlando, FL**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission by deleting all references to the Service School Command)

**Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL**

(Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission from “MCAS Cherry Point, NC; NAS Oceana, VA; and MCAS Beaufort, SC” to “other naval air stations, primarily NAS Oceana, VA; MCAS Beaufort, SC; NAS Jacksonville, FL; and NAS Atlanta, GA; or other Navy or Marine Corps Air Stations.” In addition, add, “To support NAS Jacksonville, retain OLF Whitehouse, the Pinecastle target complex, and the Yellow Water family housing area”)

**Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission by striking language regarding whirl tower and dynamic components facility)

**Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center Orlando, FL**

(Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission from New London, CT to Charleston, SC)

**Naval Air Station Agana, GU**

(Change the receiving site for aircraft, personnel, and equipment specified by the 1993 Commission from “Andersen AFB, GU” to “other naval or DoD air stations”)

**Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding items from the closure of Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI from “Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use” to “Retain the family housing as needed for multi-service use, including specified support facilities”)

**Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI**

(Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission from “Marine Corps Reserve Center, Twin Cities, MN” to “Air National Guard Base, Selfridge, MI”)

**Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment Philadelphia, PA**

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission relating to the closure of the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard to delete “and preservation” (line 5) and “for emergent requirements”(lines 6-7))

**Naval Sea Systems Command  
Arlington, VA**

(Change the receiving sites specified by the 1993 Commission from “the Navy Annex, Arlington, VA; Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA; or the White Oak facility, Silver Spring, MD” to “the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C. or other government-owned property in the metropolitan Washington, D.C. area”)

**Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission by deleting the Office of Naval Research from the list of National Capital Region activities to relocate from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR)

**Space and Naval Warfare Systems  
Command, Arlington, VA**

(Change the recommendation specified by the 1993 Commission from “relocate...from leased space to Government-owned space within the NCR” to “Relocate... from leased space to Government-owned space in San Diego, CA”)

**Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, D.C.**

(Change the receiving site specified by the 1993 Commission from “Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL” to “Naval Support Activity, Memphis, TN”)

**Naval Security Group Command  
Detachment Potomac, Washington, D.C.**

(Change the receiving site from “National Security Agency, Ft. Meade, MD” specified by the 1993 Commission to “Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C.”)

*Department of the Air Force***Williams Air Force Base, AZ**

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the relocation of Williams AFB’s Armstrong Laboratory to Orlando, FL to keep it at the AZ location as a stand-alone activity.

**Lowry Air Force Base, CO**

(Change the recommendation of the 1991 Commission regarding the cantonment of the 1001st Space Support Squadron at the Lowry Support Center)

**Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL  
301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES)**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding Homestead ARB to redirect the 301st Rescue Squadron (AFRES) with its associated aircraft to remain at Patrick AFB, FL)

**Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL  
726th Air Control Squadron**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the relocation of the 726th Air Control Squadron (ACS) from Homestead ARB, FL to Shaw AFB, SC, as follows: Redirect the 726th ACS to Mountain Home AFB, ID)

**MacDill Air Force Base, FL**

(Change the recommendations of the 1991 and 1993 Commissions as follows: Redirect the retention of the MacDill airfield as part of MacDill AFB. The Air Force will continue to operate the runway and its associated activities. The Department of Commerce will remain as a tenant)

**Griffiss Air Force Base, New York Airfield  
Support for 10th Infantry (Light) Division**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding support of the 10th Infantry Division [Light] , Fort Drum, NY at Griffiss AFB, as follows. Close the airfield at Griffiss and transfer mission essential equipment from the minimum essential airfield at Griffiss AFB to Fort Drum)

**Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
485th Engineering Installation Group**

(Change the recommendation of the 1993 Commission regarding the transfer of functions from Griffiss AFB, NY to sites as required rather than to Hill AFB, UT)

*Defense Logistics Agency*

**Defense Contract Management District  
West (DCMDW) El Segundo, CA**

(Change the 1993 Commission recommendation receiver from "Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Los Angeles, CA" to "space which is the most cost-effective for DoD")

## **The 1993 Commission**

### *Department of the Army*

#### **Letterkenny Army Depot, PA**

(Systems Integration Management Activity - East remains at Letterkenny Army Depot, PA vice Rock Island, IL)

#### **Presidio of San Francisco, CA**

(6th Army remains at the Presidio of San Francisco instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO)

#### **Rock Island Arsenal, IL**

(AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL)

#### **Pueblo Army Depot, CO**

(Redirects supply mission from Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT to new location within the Defense Distribution Depot System)

### *Department of the Navy*

#### **Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, CA**

(Retain no facilities, dispose/outlease all property)

#### **Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA**

(Substitute Naval Air Station Miramar for Marine Corps Air Station 29 Palms as one receiver of Marine Corps Air Station Tustin's assets)

#### **Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA**

(Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center, Vallejo, CA into available space in Air Force Plant #19, San Diego, vice new construction)

#### **Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity Yorktown, VA**

(Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA)

#### **Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Albuquerque, NM**

(Retain as a tenant of the Air Force)

### *Department of the Air Force*

#### **Carswell Air Force Base, TX**

(Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB, TX to Luke AFB, AZ; maintenance training function redirected from Dyess AFB, TX to Hill AFB, UT)

#### **Castle Air Force Base, CA**

(B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB, WA to Barksdale AFB, LA and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB, WA to Altus AFB, OK)

#### **Chanute Air Force Base, IL**

(Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB, TX redirected to NAS Memphis, TN and then to Pensacola, FL)

#### **MacDill Air Force Base, Florida**

(Airfield to be operated by the Department of Commerce or another federal agency. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB, SC)

#### **Mather Air Force Base, CA**

(940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB, CA to Beale AFB, CA)

#### **Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH**

(Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of realigning to Wright-Patterson AFB, OH and operate as tenants of the Rickenbacker Port Authority (RPA) on the RPA's airport.)



## **The 1991 Commission**

### *Department of the Army*

#### **Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to relocate U.S. Army Recruiting Command from Fort Sheridan, IL to Fort Knox, KY rather than Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN)

#### **Fort Devens, MA**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to retain HQ Information Systems Command (ISC) at Ft. Huachuca, AZ and Ft. Monmouth, NJ; relocate selected ISC elements in the National Capital Region from Ft. Belvoir, VA to Ft. Ritchie, MD or another location)

#### **Letterkenny Army Depot, PA**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to realign the Material Readiness Support Activity from Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY, and the Logistics Control Activity from the Presidio of San Francisco, CA to Redstone Arsenal, AL)

#### **Army Laboratories (Lab 21 Study)**

##### **Adelphi and Aberdeen, MD**

(Revise the 1988 Commission recommendation by establishing the Combat Material Research Lab (CMRL) at Adelphi, MD. The Army Materiel Technology Lab (AMTL) in Watertown, MA should not be split among Detroit Arsenal, MI, Picatinny Arsenal, NJ; and Fort Belvoir, VA—realign the AMTL to Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD. Collocate the Structures Element at NASA-Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA)

#### **Tri-Service Project Reliance Study**

##### **Various Locations**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation by disestablishing the Letterman Army Institute of Research)

### *Department of the Air Force*

#### **Beale Air Force Base, CA**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to realign the Undergraduate Navigator Training and the 323rd Flying Training Wing from Mather AFB, CA to Randolph AFB, TX instead of realigning to Beale AFB, CA)

#### **Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX**


(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to realign the fuels training from Chanute AFB, IL to Sheppard AFB, TX instead of Goodfellow AFB, TX)

#### **March Air Force Base, CA**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation to realign 45 Air Force Audit Agency manpower authorizations from Norton AFB, CA to the National Capitol Region instead of March AFB, CA)

#### **Mather Air Force Base, CA**

(Change the 1988 Commission recommendation by leaving the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital open as an annex to McClellan AFB, CA instead of leaving the 940th Air Refueling Group at Mather AFB, CA and closing the 323rd Flying Training Wing Hospital)



# APPENDIX L

## BASE CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS BY STATE

### 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995

#### ALABAMA

1988	Alabama Army Ammunition Plant	CLOSE
1988	Coosa River Storage Annex	CLOSE
1991	Fort Rucker	REALIGN
1993	Naval Station Mobile	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Gadsden	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Montgomery	CLOSE
1993	Anniston Army Depot	REALIGN
1995	Fort McClellan	CLOSE
1995	Naval Reserve Center Huntsville	CLOSE

#### ALASKA

1995	Fort Greely	REALIGN
1995	Naval Air Facility Adak	CLOSE

#### ARKANSAS

1991	Eaker Air Force Base	CLOSE
1991	Fort Chaffee	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Fayetteville	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Fort Smith	CLOSE
1995	Fort Chaffee	CLOSE

#### ARIZONA

1988	Navajo Army Depot Activity	CLOSE
1991	Williams Air Force Base	CLOSE
1995	Williams Air Force Base	REDIRECT

#### CALIFORNIA

1988	George Air Force Base	CLOSE
1988	Hamilton Army Airfield	CLOSE
1988	Mather Air Force Base	CLOSE
1988	Naval Station San Francisco (Hunters Point)	REALIGN
1988	Norton Air Force Base	CLOSE
1988	Presidio of San Francisco	CLOSE
1988	Salton Sea Test Base, Imperial County	CLOSE
1991	Beale Air Force Base	REALIGN
1991	Castle Air Force Base	CLOSE
1991	Fort Ord	CLOSE
1991	Hunters Point Annex, San Francisco	CLOSE
1991	Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility San Diego	CLOSE
1991	Letterman Army Institute of Research Presidio of San Francisco	DISESTAB
1991	Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support Activity San Diego	REALIGN

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1991	March Air Force Base	REALIGN
1991	Mather Air Force Base	REDIRECT
1991	Naval Air Station Moffett Field	CLOSE
1991	Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center San Diego	CLOSE
1991	Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center Vallejo	CLOSE
1991	Naval Space Systems Activity Los Angeles	CLOSE
1991	Naval Station Long Beach	CLOSE
1991	Naval Weapons Center China Lake	REALIGN
1991	Pacific Missile Test Center Point Mugu	REALIGN
1991	Sacramento Army Depot	CLOSE
1991	Marine Corps Air Station Tustin	CLOSE
1993	Castle Air Force Base (B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB)	REDIRECT
1993	Data Processing Center Marine Corps Air Station El Toro	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division China Lake	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division Point Mugu	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance Center San Diego	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Navy Regional Data Automation Center San Francisco	CLOSE
1993	Defense Contract Management District West El Segundo	RELOCATE
1993	Defense Distribution Depot Oakland	DISESTAB
1993	Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island (Redirect to dispose of all property in any lawful manner, including outlease)	REDIRECT
1993	March Air Force Base	REALIGN
1993	Mare Island Naval Shipyard	CLOSE
1993	Marine Corps Air Station El Toro	CLOSE
1993	Marine Corps Air Station Tustin (Relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets to NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or MCAS Camp Pendleton)	REDIRECT
1993	Marine Corps Data Processing Center Regional Automated Services Center Camp Pendleton	CLOSE
1993	Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow	REALIGN
1993	Mather Air Force Base (940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Air Station Alameda	CLOSE
1993	Naval Aviation Depot Alameda	CLOSE
1993	Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center San Diego (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Vallejo into available space in Air Force Plant #19, San Diego, vice new construction)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Vallajo (Consolidate with Naval Electronics Systems Center San Diego into available space in Air Force Plant #19, San Diego, vice new construction)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Hospital Oakland	CLOSE
1993	Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco	CLOSE
1993	Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach	REALIGN

1993	Navy Data Processing Center Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme	CLOSE
1993	Navy Data Processing Center Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, San Diego	CLOSE
1993	Presidio of Monterey Annex	REALIGN
1993	Presidio of San Francisco (6th Army remains at the Presidio of San Francisco, CA instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory, Port Hueneme	CLOSE
1993	Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western Engineering Field Division, San Bruno	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Pacific Grove	CLOSE
1993	Naval Training Center San Diego	CLOSE
1993	Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center (Surface) Pacific San Francisco	DISESTAB
1993	Naval Public Works Center San Francisco	DISESTAB
1995	Oakland Army Base	CLOSE
1995	Naval Shipyard Long Beach	CLOSE
1995	McClellan Air Force Base	CLOSE
1995	Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station	CLOSE
1995	Defense Distribution Depot McClellan	DISESTAB
1995	Fort Hunter Liggett	REALIGN
1995	Sierra Army Depot	REALIGN
1995	Onizuka Air Station	REALIGN
1995	Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks	CLOSE
1995	East Fort Baker	CLOSE
1995	Rio Vista Army Reserve Center	CLOSE
1995	Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland	CLOSE
1995	Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast Division San Diego	DISESTAB
1995	Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and Repair, USN, Long Beach	DISESTAB
1995	Naval Reserve Center Stockton	CLOSE
1995	Naval Reserve Center Santa Ana	CLOSE
1995	Naval Reserve Center Pomona	CLOSE
1995	Marine Corps Air Station El Toro	REDIRECT
1995	Marine Corps Air Station Tustin	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Air Station Alameda	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Recruiting District San Diego	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Training Center San Diego	REDIRECT
1995	Defense Contract Management District West, El Segundo	REDIRECT

## COLORADO

1988	Bennett Army National Guard Facility, Arapahoe County	CLOSE
1988	Pueblo Army Depot	REALIGN
1991	Lowry Air Force Base	CLOSE
1993	Pueblo Army Depot (Redirects supply mission from Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT, to new location within the Defense Distribution Depot System )	REDIRECT
1995	Fitzsimons Army Medical Center	CLOSE
1995	Lowry Air Force Base	REDIRECT

## CONNECTICUT

1988	Family Housing Ansonia 04	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing East Windsor 08	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Fairfield 65	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Manchester 25	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Middletown 48	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Milford 17	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing New Britain 74	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Orange 15	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Plainville 67	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Portland 36	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Westport 73	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Shelton 74	CLOSE
1991	Naval Underwater Systems Center Detachment New London	REALIGN
1995	Stratford Army Engine Plant	CLOSE

## DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

1991	U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research	DISESTAB
1991	Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Microwave Bioeffects Research)	REALIGN
1993	Data Processing Center Bureau of Naval Personnel	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station	CLOSE
1993	Naval Security Group Command (including Security Group Station and Security Group Detachment) Potomac	REALIGN
1993	Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering Center	CLOSE
1995	Naval Recruiting Command Washington	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Security Group Detachment Potomac Washington	REDIRECT

## FLORIDA

1988	Cape St. George	CLOSE
1988	Naval Reserve Center (Coconut Grove) Miami	CLOSE
1991	MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa	REALIGN
1991	Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City	REALIGN
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Key West	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Mayport	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, Pensacola	CLOSE
1993	Homestead Air Force Base	REALIGN
1993	MacDill Air Force Base (Airfield to be operated by the Department of Commerce or another federal agency. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB.)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Air Station Cecil Field	CLOSE
1993	Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola	CLOSE
1993	Naval Hospital Orlando	CLOSE
1993	Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Pensacola	DISESTAB
1993	Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola	DISESTAB
1993	Naval Training Center Orlando	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Station Key West	REALIGN

1995	Eglin Air Force Base	REALIGN
1995	Big Coppett Key	CLOSE
1995	Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando	DISESTAB
1995	Naval Air Station Cecil Field	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola	REDIRECT
1995	Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center, Naval Training Center, Orlando	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Training Center Orlando	REDIRECT
1995	Homestead Air Force Base (301st Rescue Squadron)	REDIRECT
1995	Homestead Air Force Base (726th Air Control Squadron)	REDIRECT
1995	MacDill Air Force Base	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound Reference Detachment, Orlando	CLOSE

## GEORGIA

1993	Navy Data Processing Center Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Macon	CLOSE
1995	Defense Contract Management District South, Marietta	DISESTAB

## GUAM

1993	Naval Air Station Agana	CLOSE
1995	Ship Repair Facility	CLOSE
1995	Naval Activities	REALIGN
1995	Fleet and Industrial Supply Center	REALIGN
1995	Public Works	REALIGN
1995	Naval Air Station Agana	REDIRECT

## HAWAII

1988	Kapalama Military Reservation Phase III	CLOSE
1991	Naval Air Facility Midway Island	REALIGN
1991	Naval Ocean Systems Center Detachment, Kanaohe	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Pearl Harbor	CLOSE
1993	Naval Air Station Barbers Point	CLOSE
1993	Naval Air Facility Midway Island	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Station Barbers Point	REDIRECT

## IOWA

1988	Fort Des Moines	CLOSE
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## IDAHO

1991	Mountain Home Air Force Base	REALIGN
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## ILLINOIS

1988	Chanute Air Force Base	CLOSE
1988	Fort Sheridan	CLOSE
1988	USARC Addison Housing	CLOSE
1988	Worth Family Housing	CLOSE

1991	Aramament, Munitions, and Chemical Command Rock Island Arsenal	REALIGN
1993	Chanute Air Force Base (Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS Memphis)	REDIRECT
1993	Defense Contract Management District Northcentral, Chicago	DISESTAB
1993	Naval Air Station Glenview	CLOSE
1993	O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve Station	CLOSE
1993	Rock Island Arsenal (AMCCOM remains at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to Redstone Arsenal, AL)	REDIRECT
1995	Savanna Army Depot Activity	CLOSE
1995	Chicago O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve Station	CLOSE

## INDIANA

1988	Indiana Army Ammunition Plant	CLOSE
1988	Jefferson Proving Ground	CLOSE
1991	Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indianapolis	CLOSE
1991	Grissom Air Force Base, Peru	CLOSE
1991	Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis	REALIGN
1991	Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane	REALIGN
1993	Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Indianapolis Information Processing Center	CLOSE
1993	Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Center Fort Wayne	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Terre Haute	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis	CLOSE

## KANSAS

1993	Readiness Command Region Olathe (Region 18)	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Hutchinson	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Reserve Olathe	CLOSE

## KENTUCKY

1988	Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot	CLOSE
1991	Naval Ordnance Station Louisville	REALIGN
1995	Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division Detachment, Louisville	CLOSE

## LOUISIANA

1988	Naval Station Lake Charles	CLOSE
1988	New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal	CLOSE
1991	England Air Force Base	CLOSE
1991	Fort Polk	REALIGN
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station, New Orleans	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Monroe	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Facility Alexandria	CLOSE
1993	Navy Data Processing Center Enlisted Personnel Management Center New Orleans	CLOSE
1995	Naval Biodynamics Laboratory New Orleans	CLOSE
1995	Naval Reserve Readiness Command New Orleans (Region 10)	CLOSE

## MAINE

1991	Loring Air Force Base, Caribou	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Brunswick	CLOSE

## MARYLAND

1988	Army Reserve Center Gaithersburg	CLOSE
1988	Former NIKE site at Aberdeen Proving Ground	CLOSE
1988	Fort Detrick	REALIGN
1988	Fort Holabird	REALIGN
1988	Fort Meade	REALIGN
1988	NIKE Washington-Baltimore	CLOSE
1991	U.S. Army Biomedical Research Development Laboratory, Fort Detrick	DISESTAB
1991	David Taylor Research Center Detachment Annapolis	REALIGN
1991	Fuze Development and Production (armament and missile-related) Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi	REALIGN
1991	Naval Ordnance Station Indian Head	REALIGN
1991	Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment, White Oak	REALIGN
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Patuxent River	CLOSE
1993	Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center St. Inigoes	CLOSE
1993	Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren White Oak Detachment, White Oak	DISESTAB
1993	Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis	DISESTAB
1993	Sea Automated Data Systems Activity Indian Head	DISESTAB
1995	Fort Ritchie	CLOSE
1995	Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division Detachment, White Oak	CLOSE
1995	Fort Meade	REALIGN
1995	Concepts Analysis Agency	CLOSE
1995	Fort Holabird	CLOSE
1995	Publications Distribution Center, Baltimore	CLOSE
1995	Naval Medical Research Institute Bethesda	CLOSE
1995	Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division Detachment, Annapolis	CLOSE
1995	Tri-Service Project Reliance, Army Bio-Medical Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick	REDIRECT
1995	Investigations Control and Automation Directorate, Fort Holabird	RELOCATE

## MASSACHUSETTS

1988	Family Housing Bedford 85	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Beverly 15	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Burlington 84	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Hull 36	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Nahant 17	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Randolph 55	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Swansea 29	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Topsfield 05	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing Wakefield 03	CLOSE
1988	Fort Devens	REALIGN
1988	Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Watertown	CLOSE
1991	Army Materials Technology Laboratory, Watertown	REDIRECT



1991	Fort Devens	CLOSE
1991	Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station Keyport	REALIGN
1993	Naval Reserve Center Chicopee	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center New Bedford	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Pittsfield	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Quincy	CLOSE
1993	Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Center Lawrence	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Station South Weymouth	CLOSE
1995	Hingham Cohasset	CLOSE
1995	Sudbury Training Annex	CLOSE

## MICHIGAN

1988	Pontiac Storage Facility	CLOSE
1991	Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and Applied Research, Warren	REALIGN
1991	Wurtsmith Air Force Base	CLOSE
1993	Naval Air Facility Detroit	CLOSE
1993	Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing Center, Battle Creek	CLOSE
1993	K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base	CLOSE
1995	Detroit Arsenal	REALIGN
1995	Naval Reserve Center Cadillac	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Facility Detroit	REDIRECT

## MISSOURI

1988	NIKE Kansas City 30	CLOSE
1988	St. Louis Area Support Center Wherry Housing	CLOSE
1991	Aviation Systems Command and Troop Command Support, St. Louis	REALIGN
1991	Richard-Gebaur Air Reserve Station	CLOSE
1993	Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Kansas City Information Processing Center	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Joplin	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center St. Joseph	CLOSE
1995	Aviation-Troop Support Command	DISESTAB

## MONTANA

1993	Naval Reserve Center Great Falls	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Missoula	CLOSE
1995	Malmstrom Air Force Base	REALIGN
1995	Fort Missoula	CLOSURE

## NEW HAMPSHIRE

1988	Pease Air Force Base	CLOSE
1993	Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning, and Procurement Portsmouth	DISESTAB

## NEW JERSEY

1988	Fort Dix	REALIGN
1988	Fort Monmouth	REALIGN
1988	NIKE NY 54 Housing	CLOSE

1988	NIKE NY 60 Housing	CLOSE
1988	NIKE NY 79/80 Housing	CLOSE
1988	NIKE NY 93/94	CLOSE
1988	NIKE Philadelphia 41/43	CLOSE
1991	Electronic Technology Device Laboratory, Fort Monmouth	REALIGN
1991	Fort Dix	REALIGN
1991	Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst	REALIGN
1991	Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton	REALIGN
1993	Fort Monmouth	REALIGN
1993	Naval Reserve Center Atlantic City	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Perth Amboy	CLOSE
1993	Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Trenton	CLOSE
1995	Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal	CLOSE
1995	Fort Dix	REALIGN
1995	Camp Kilmer	CLOSE
1995	Camp Pedricktown	CLOSE

### NEW MEXICO

1988	Fort Wingate Ammunition Storage Depot	CLOSE
1991	Battlefield Environmental Effects Element of the Atmospheric Science Laboratory, White Sands Missile Range	REALIGN
1991	Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Albuquerque	CLOSE
1993	Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility Albuquerque (retain as a tenant of the Air Force)	REDIRECT

### NEW YORK

1988	Dry Hill Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Manhattan Beach Housing	CLOSE
1988	Naval Station New York (Brooklyn)	CLOSE
1988	NIKE NY 01 Housing	CLOSE
1988	NIKE NY 25 Housing	CLOSE
1988	NIKE NY 99 Housing	CLOSE
1993	Griffiss Air Force Base	REALIGN
1993	Naval Reserve Center Jamestown	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Poughkeepsie	CLOSE
1993	Naval Station Staten Island	CLOSE
1993	Plattsburgh Air Force Base	CLOSE
1993	Readiness Command Region Scotia (Region 2)	CLOSE
1993	Department of Defense Family Housing and Family Housing Office, Niagara Falls	CLOSE
1995	Seneca Army Depot	CLOSE
1995	Roslyn Air Guard Station	CLOSE
1995	Griffiss Air Force Base (Airfield Support for 10th Infantry [Light] Division)	REDIRECT
1995	Griffiss Air Force Base (485th Engineering Installation Group)	REDIRECT
1995	Bellmore Logistics Activity	CLOSE
1995	Fort Totten	CLOSE
1995	Naval Reserve Center Staten Island	CLOSE
1995	Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor Activity, Buffalo	CLOSE

## NORTH CAROLINA

1993	Data Processing Center Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point	CLOSE
1993	Marine Corps Data Processing Center Regional Automated Services Center Camp Lejeune	CLOSE
1995	Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville	CLOSE

## NORTH DAKOTA

1995	Grand Forks Air Force Base	REALIGN
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## OHIO

1991	Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base	CLOSE
1993	Defense Information Technology Service Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton	CLOSE
1993	Defense Information Technology Services Organization, Cleveland	CLOSE
1993	Gentile Air Force Station (Defense Electronics Supply Center), Dayton	CLOSE
1993	Newark Air Force Base	CLOSE
1993	Readiness Command Region Ravenna (Region 5)	CLOSE
1993	Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base (Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, and operate as tenants of the Rickenbacker Port Authority [RPA] on the RPA's airport)	REDIRECT
1995	Defense Contract Management Command International, Dayton	REALIGN
1995	Defense Distribution Depot Columbus	REALIGN

## OREGON

1988	Umatilla Army Depot	REALIGN
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## PENNSYLVANIA

1988	Coraopolis Family Housing Site 71	CLOSE
1988	Coraopolis Family Housing Site 72	CLOSE
1988	Irwin Support Detachment Annex	CLOSE
1988	Naval Hospital Philadelphia	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 02 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 03 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 25 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 37 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 42 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 43 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Pitt 52 Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	Tacony Warehouse	CLOSE
1991	Letterkenny Army Depot	REALIGN
1991	Naval Air Development Center Warminster	REALIGN
1991	Naval Station Philadelphia	CLOSE
1991	Philadelphia Naval Shipyard	CLOSE

1993	Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia	RELOCATE
1993	Defense Contract Management District Midatlantic, Philadelphia	DISESTAB
1993	Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory, Philadelphia	CLOSE
1993	Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing Center, Philadelphia	CLOSE
1993	Naval/Marine Corps Air Facility (Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown	CLOSE
1993	Letterkenny Army Depot (Systems Integration Management Activity-East remains at Letterkenny Army Depot vice Rock Island, IL)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Reserve Center Altoona	CLOSE
1993	Navy Data Processing Center Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia	CLOSE
1993	Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center (Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia	CLOSE
1995	Fort Indiantown Gap	CLOSE
1995	Charles E. Kelly Support Center	REALIGN
1995	Letterkenny Army Depot	CLOSE
1995	Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny	DISESTAB
1995	Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia	DISESTAB
1995	Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment, Philadelphia	REDIRECT
1995	Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit Philadelphia	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Technical Services Facility Philadelphia	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Open Water Test Facility, Oreland	CLOSE
1995	Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance RDT&E Division Detachment, Warminster	CLOSE
1995	Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Warminster	CLOSE

## PUERTO RICO

1995	Fort Buchanan	REALIGN
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## RHODE ISLAND

1988	Family Housing Davisville	CLOSE
1988	Family Housing North Smithfield 99	CLOSE
1991	Construction Battalion Center Davisville	CLOSE
1991	Trident Command and Control Systems Maintenance Activity, Newport	REALIGN
1993	Naval Education and Training Center, Newport	REALIGN

## SOUTH CAROLINA

1991	Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, Myrtle Beach	CLOSE
1993	Charleston Naval Shipyard	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center, Charleston	CLOSE
1993	Defense Distribution Depot Charleston	DISESTAB
1993	Naval Station Charleston	CLOSE
1993	Fleet and Industrial Supply Center (Naval Supply Center) Charleston	DISESTAB
1995	Naval Reserve Readiness Command Charleston	CLOSE
1995	Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Charleston	CLOSE

## TENNESSEE

1993	Naval Air Station Memphis	REALIGN
1993	Naval Reserve Center Kingsport	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Memphis	CLOSE
1995	Defense Distribution Depot Memphis	CLOSE

## TEXAS

1988	Fort Bliss	REALIGN
1988	Naval Station Galveston	CLOSE
1991	Bergstrom Air Force Base	CLOSE
1991	Carswell Air Force Base	CLOSE
1991	Goodfellow Air Force Base	REALIGN
1991	Naval Air Station Chase Field	CLOSE
1993	Air Force Data Processing Center Computer Service Center, San Antonio	CLOSE
1993	Carswell Air Force Base (Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB; maintenance training function redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB)	REDIRECT
1993	Data Processing Center Air Force Military Personnel Center, Randolph AFB	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi	CLOSE
1993	Naval Air Station Dallas	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Facility Midland	CLOSE
1993	Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Center Abilene	CLOSE
1993	Red River Army Depot	REALIGN
1995	Naval Reserve Center Laredo	CLOSE
1995	Bergstrom Air Reserve Base	CLOSE
1995	Reese Air Force Base	CLOSE
1995	Kelly Air Force Base	REALIGN
1995	Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio	DISESTAB
1995	Red River Army Depot	REALIGN
1995	Naval Air Station Corpus Christi	REALIGN

## UTAH

1988	Fort Douglas	CLOSE
1993	Defense Distribution Depot Tooele	DISESTAB
1993	Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing Center, Ogden	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Ogden	CLOSE
1993	Tooele Army Depot	REALIGN
1995	Hill Air Force Base (Utah Training and Test Range)	REALIGN
1995	Defense Distribution Depot Ogden	CLOSE

## VIRGINIA

1988	Cameron Station	CLOSE
1988	Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) site, Herndon	CLOSE
1988	Manassas Family Housing	CLOSE
1988	NIKE Norfolk 85 Housing	CLOSE
1988	Woodbridge Housing Site	CLOSE
1991	Army Research Institute, Alexandria	REALIGN

1991	Belvoir Research and Development Center, Fort Belvoir	REALIGN
1991	Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and Applied Research Element of the Center for Night Vision and Electro-Optics, Ft. Belvoir	REALIGN
1991	Harry Diamond Laboratory, Woodbridge	CLOSE
1991	Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown	CLOSE
1991	Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering Station Norfolk	REALIGN
1993	Air Force Data Processing Center 7th Communications Group, Pentagon, Arlington	CLOSE
1993	Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington (Including the Office of Military Manpower Management, Arlington)	REALIGN
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Oceana	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Norfolk	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington	CLOSE
1993	Defense Logistics Agency Information Processing Center, Richmond	CLOSE
1993	Fort Belvoir	REALIGN
1993	Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington	REALIGN
1993	Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk	CLOSE
1993	Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Portsmouth	CLOSE
1993	Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria	REALIGN
1993	Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity, Yorktown (Realign to Panama City, FL vice Dam Neck, VA)	REDIRECT
1993	Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington	REALIGN
1993	Naval Reserve Center, Staunton	CLOSE
1993	Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington	REALIGN
1993	Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington (Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria, VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA)	REALIGN
1993	Naval Surface Warfare Center - Port Hueneme, Yorktown Detachment, Virginia Beach (Naval Mine Warfare Activity)	REALIGN
1993	Naval Undersea Warfare Center - Norfolk Detachment	DISESTAB
1993	Navy Data Processing Center Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk	CLOSE
1993	Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Driver	CLOSE
1993	Tactical Support Office, Arlington	REALIGN
1993	Vint Hill Farms	CLOSE
1993	Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center (Surface) Atlantic, Norfolk	DISESTAB
1993	Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center Portsmouth	CLOSE
1993	Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command	REALIGN
1993	Office of the General Counsel (Navy)	REALIGN
1993	Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy)	REALIGN
1993	Office of the Secretary of the Navy (Legislative Affairs, Program Appraisal, Comptroller, Inspector General, and Information)	REALIGN
1993	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations	REALIGN
1993	Office of Civilian Manpower Management (Navy)	REALIGN

1993	International Programs Office (Navy)	REALIGN
1993	Combined Civilian Personnel Office (Navy)	REALIGN
1993	Navy Regional Contracting Center	REALIGN
1993	Naval Criminal Investigative Service	REALIGN
1993	Naval Audit Agency	REALIGN
1993	Strategic Systems Programs Office (Navy)	REALIGN
1993	Office of Naval Research	REALIGN
1993	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations & Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps	REALIGN
1993	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower & Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps	REALIGN
1993	Marine Corps Systems Command (Clarendon Office)	REALIGN
1995	Fort Pickett	CLOSE
1995	Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast Detachment, Norfolk	CLOSE
1995	Naval Information Systems Management Center, Arlington	REALIGN
1995	Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake	DISESTAB
1995	Fort Lee	REALIGN
1995	Information Systems Software Center (ISSC)	CLOSE

## WASHINGTON

1988	Midway Housing Site	CLOSE
1988	Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point)	CLOSE
1988	Youngs Lake Housing Site	CLOSE
1991	Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point)	CLOSE
1991	Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station Keyport	REALIGN
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Air Station Whidbey Island	CLOSE
1993	Data Processing Center Naval Supply Center Puget Sound	CLOSE
1993	Navy Data Processing Center Trident Refit Facility Bangor	CLOSE
1993	Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations Center (CV), Bremerton	DISESTAB
1995	Naval Undersea Warfare Center Keyport	REALIGN
1995	Camp Bonneville	CLOSE
1995	Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington	REDIRECT
1995	Office of Naval Research	REDIRECT
1995	Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, Arlington	REDIRECT

## WISCONSIN

1988	Sun Prairie Family Housing	CLOSE
1995	Naval Reserve Center Sheboygan	CLOSE

## WEST VIRGINIA

1993	Naval Air Facility Martinsburg	CLOSE
1993	Naval Reserve Center Parkersburg	CLOSE

## OTHER CLOSURES AND REALIGNMENTS

1991	Army Corps of Engineers	REALIGN
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APPENDIX M  
CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENTS  
BY SERVICE BRANCH  
1995, 1993, 1991, & 1988

1995 Defense Base Closure and  
Realignment Commission's Actions

*Part I: Major Base Closures*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort McClellan, AL  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
Oakland Army Base, CA  
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO  
Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL  
Fort Ritchie, MD  
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ  
Seneca Army Depot, NY  
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
Fort Pickett, VA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Air Facility, Adak, AK  
Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, CA  
Ship Repair Facility, GU  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Indianapolis, IN  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division  
Detachment, Louisville, KY  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division  
Detachment, White Oak, MD  
Naval Air Station, South Weymouth, MA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Warminster, PA

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

McClellan Air Force Base, CA  
Ontario International Airport Air Guard Station, CA  
Chicago O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve  
Station, IL  
Roslyn Air Guard Station, NY  
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX  
Reese Air Force Base, TX

DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN  
Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT

*Part II: Major Base Realignments*

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort Greely, AK  
Fort Hunter Liggett, CA  
Sierra Army Depot, CA  
Fort Meade, MD  
Detroit Arsenal, MI  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Charles E. Kelly Support Center, PA  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Fort Buchanan, PR  
Red River Army Depot, TX  
Fort Lee, VA

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Air Station, Key West, FL  
Naval Activities, GU  
Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Keyport, WA

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Onizuka Air Station, CA  
Eglin Air Force Base, FL  
Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND  
Kelly Air Force Base, TX  
Hill Air Force Base, UT  
(Utah Test and Training Range)



*Part III: Smaller Base or  
Activity Closures, Realignment,  
Disestablishments or Relocations*

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Branch U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, CA  
East Fort Baker, CA  
Rio Vista Army Reserve Center, CA  
Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT  
Big Coppett Key, FL  
Concepts Analysis Agency, MD  
Fort Holabird, MD  
Publications Distribution Center Baltimore, MD  
Hingham Cohasset, MA  
Sudbury Training Annex, MA  
Aviation-Troop Support Command (ATCOM), MO  
Fort Missoula, MT  
Camp Kilmer, NJ  
Camp Pedricktown, NJ  
Bellmore Logistics Activity, NY  
Fort Totten, NY  
Recreation Center #2, Fayetteville, NC  
Information Systems Software Center (ISSC), VA  
Camp Bonneville, WA

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland, CA  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance  
Center, In-Service Engineering West Coast  
Division, San Diego, CA  
Naval Personnel Research and Development  
Center, San Diego, CA  
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and  
Repair, USN, Long Beach, CA  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center-Newport Division,  
New London Detachment, New London, CT  
Naval Research Laboratory, Underwater Sound  
Reference Detachment, Orlando, FL  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, GU  
Public Works Center, GU  
Naval Biodynamics Laboratory, New Orleans, LA  
Naval Medical Research Institute, Bethesda, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock  
Division Detachment, Annapolis, MD  
Naval Aviation Engineering Support Unit  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Technical Services Facility  
Philadelphia, PA

Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division  
Open Water Test Facility, Oreland, PA  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean  
Surveillance Center, RDT&E Division  
Detachment, Warminster, PA  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Charleston, SC  
Naval Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance  
Center, In-Service Engineering East Coast  
Detachment, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Information Systems Management Center  
Arlington, VA  
Naval Management Systems Support Office  
Chesapeake, VA

**Navy/Marine Reserve Activities**

Naval Reserve Centers at:  
Huntsville, AL  
Stockton, CA  
Santa Ana, Irvine, CA  
Pomona, CA  
Cadillac, MI  
Staten Island, NY  
Laredo, TX  
Sheboygan, WI

Naval Air Reserve Center at:  
Olathe, KS

Naval Reserve Readiness Commands at:  
New Orleans, LA (Region 10)  
Charleston, SC (Region 7)

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer  
Processor Activity, Buffalo, NY

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

Defense Contract Management District  
South Marietta, GA  
Defense Contract Management Command  
International, Dayton, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA

**DEFENSE INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE**

Investigations Control and Automation  
Directorate, Fort Holabird, MD

*Part IV: Changes to Previously  
Approved BRAC Recommendations*

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Tri-Service Project Reliance, Army Bio-Medical  
Research Laboratory, Fort Detrick, MD

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Marine Corps Air Station, El Toro, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Recruiting District, San Diego, CA  
Naval Training Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station, Cecil Field, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot, Pensacola, FL  
Navy Nuclear Power Propulsion Training Center  
Naval Training Center, Orlando, FL  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Naval Air Station, Agana, GU  
Naval Air Station, Barbers Point, HI  
Naval Air Facility, Detroit, MI  
Naval Shipyard, Norfolk Detachment  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
Office of Naval Research, Arlington, VA  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command  
Arlington, VA  
Naval Recruiting Command, Washington, DC  
Naval Security Group Command Detachment  
Potomac, Washington, DC

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
(301st Rescue Squadron)  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
(726th Air Control Squadron)  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY (Airfield Support  
for 10th Infantry [Light] Division)  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
(485th Engineering Installation Group)

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

Defense Contract Management District West, El  
Segundo, CA

*Part V: DoD Recommendations  
Rejected by the Commission*

**PROPOSED CLOSURES REJECTED  
BY THE COMMISSION**

Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA  
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA  
North Highlands Air Guard Station, CA  
Price Support Center, IL  
Selfridge Army Garrison, MI  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division  
Lakehurst, NJ  
Rome Laboratory, Rome, NY  
Springfield-Beckley MAP, Air Guard Station, OH  
Greater Pittsburgh IAP Air Reserve Station, PA  
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation  
Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, TX  
Brooks Air Force Base, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX

**PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS  
REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION**

Robins Air Force Base, GA  
Fort Hamilton, NY  
Tinker Air Force Base, OK  
Hill Air Force Base, UT

**PROPOSED REALIGNMENTS  
REJECTED BY THE COMMISSION  
AT THE REQUEST OF THE SECRETARY**

Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ  
Kirtland Air Force Base, NM  
Dugway Proving Ground, UT  
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support  
Activity (AMSA), WV

# 1993 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's Actions

## *CLOSURES*

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Vint Hill Farms, VA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Naval Station Mobile, AL  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory  
Port Hueneme, CA  
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Western  
Engineering Field Division San Bruno, CA  
Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations  
(Surface) Pacific San Francisco, CA  
Naval Public Works Center San Francisco, CA  
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA  
Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA  
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering  
Center Washington, DC  
Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center  
(Naval Supply Center) Pensacola, FL  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center  
(Naval Supply Center) Charlestown, SC  
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Naval Air Station Agana, GU  
Naval Air Facility Midway Island, HI  
Naval Air Station Barbers Point, HI  
Naval Air Station Glenview, IL  
Navy Radio Transmission Facility Annapolis, MD  
Sea Automated Data Systems Activity  
Indian Head, MD  
Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI  
Submarine Maintenance, Engineering, Planning,  
and Procurement Portsmouth, NH  
Naval Air Warfare Center—Aircraft Division  
Trenton, NJ  
Department of Defense Family Housing Office  
Niagara Falls, NY  
Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations  
(Surface) Atlantic (HQ), Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Station Charleston, SC  
Charleston Naval Shipyard, SC

Naval Air Station Dallas, TX  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center  
Portsmouth, VA  
Navy Radio Transmission Facility Driver, VA  
Planning, Estimating, Repair, and  
Alterations (Surface) Atlantic Norfolk, VA  
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA  
Planning, Estimating, Repair, and  
Alterations (CV) Bremerton, WA  
Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV  
Naval/Marine Corps Air Facility  
(Joint Aviation Facility) Johnstown, PA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center  
St. Inigoes, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren  
White Oak Detachment, White Oak MD  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk  
Detachment, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Hospital Orlando, FL  
Naval Hospital Oakland, FL

### **Naval Reserve Centers at:**

Gadsden, AL  
Montgomery, AL  
Fayetteville, AR  
Fort Smith, AR  
Pacific Grove, CA  
Macon, GA  
Terre Haute, IN  
Hutchinson, KS  
Monroe, LA  
Parkersburg, WV  
New Bedford, MA  
Pittsfield, MA  
Joplin, MO  
St. Joseph, MO  
Great Falls, MT  
Missoula, MT  
Atlantic City, NJ  
Perth Amboy, NJ  
Jamestown, NY  
Poughkeepsie, NY  
Altoona, PA  
Kingsport, TN  
Memphis, TN  
Ogden, UT  
Staunton, VA  
Chicopee, MA  
Quincy, MA

### **Naval Reserve Facilities at:**

Alexandria, LA  
Midland, TX

**Navy/Marine Corps Reserve Centers at:**

Fort Wayne, IN  
Lawrence, MA  
Abilene, TX

**Readiness Command Regions at:**

Olathe, KS (Region 18)  
Scotia, NY (Region 2)  
Ravenna, OH (Region 5)

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**

O'Hare International Airport Air Reserve  
Station, Chicago, IL  
K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, MI  
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY  
Gentile Air Force Station  
(Defense Electronics Supply Center), OH  
Newark Air Force Base, OH

**DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY**

Defense Personnel Support Center  
Philadelphia, PA  
Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH

**Defense Distribution Depots**

Defense Distribution Depot Oakland, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot Pensacola, FL  
Defense Distribution Depot Charleston, SC  
Defense Distribution Depot Tooele, UT

**Service/Support Activities**

Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory,  
Philadelphia, PA

**DATA CENTER CONSOLIDATION****Navy Processing Center**

Facilities Systems Office, Port Hueneme, CA  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,  
China Lake, CA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,  
Point Mugu, CA  
Naval Command Control & Ocean Surveillance  
Center, San Diego, CA  
Navy Regional Data Automation Center  
San Francisco, CA  
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Washington, DC  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications  
Station, Washington, DC  
Naval Air Station Key West, FL  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Station  
Pensacola, FL

Naval Air Station Mayport, FL  
Trident Refit Facility Kings Bay, GA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area  
Master Station, EASTPAC, Pearl Harbor, HI  
Naval Supply Center, Pearl Harbor, HI  
Enlisted Personnel Management Center  
New Orleans, LA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications  
Station, New Orleans, LA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Patuxent River, MD  
Naval Air Station Brunswick, ME  
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Supply Center, Charleston, SC  
Navy Data Automation Facility, Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Air Station Oceana, VA  
Naval Computer & Telecommunications Area  
Master Station, Atlantic, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, VA  
Navy Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA  
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA  
Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound, WA  
Trident Refit Facility, Bangor, WA

**Marine Corps Data Processing Centers**

Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA  
Regional Automated Services Center  
Camp Pendleton, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC  
Regional Automated Services Center  
Camp Lejeune, NC

**Air Force Data Processing Centers**

Air Force Military Personnel Center,  
Randolph AFB, TX  
Computer Service Center, San Antonio, TX  
7th Communications Group, Pentagon  
Arlington, VA

**Defense Logistics Agency****Data Processing Centers**

Information Processing Center, Battle Creek, MI  
Information Processing Center, Philadelphia, PA  
Information Processing Center, Ogden, UT  
Information Processing Center, Richmond, VA

**Defense Information Systems Agency  
(DISA) Data Processing Centers**

Defense Information Technology Service  
Organization, Indianapolis Information  
Processing Center, IN  
Defense Information Technology Service  
Organization, Kansas City Information  
Processing Center, MO

Defense Information Technology Service  
Organization, Columbus Annex Dayton, OH  
Defense Information Technology Services  
Organization, Cleveland, OH

## ***REALIGNMENTS***

### **DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Anniston Army Depot, AL  
Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA  
Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Red River Army Depot, TX  
Tooele Army Depot, UT  
Fort Belvoir, VA

#### **Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations**

Presidio of San Francisco, CA (6th Army  
remains at the Presidio of San Francisco  
instead of moving to Fort Carson, CO)  
Pueblo Army Depot, CO (Redirects supply  
mission from Defense Distribution Depot  
Tooele, UT, to new location within the  
Defense Distribution Depot System)  
Rock Island Arsenal, IL (AMCCOM remains  
at Rock Island, IL instead of moving to  
Redstone Arsenal, AL)  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA (Systems  
Integration Management Activity—  
East remains at Letterkenny Army  
Depot vice Rock Island, IL)

### **DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA  
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA  
Naval Security Group Command (Including  
Security Group Station and Security Group  
Detachment Potomac), Washington, D.C.  
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI  
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN  
Bureau of Navy Personnel, Arlington, VA  
(Including the Office of Military Manpower  
Management, Arlington, VA)  
Naval Air Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
Naval Facilities Engineering Command,  
Alexandria, VA  
Naval Recruiting Command, Arlington, VA  
Naval Sea Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
Naval Supply Systems Command, Arlington, VA  
(Including Defense Printing Office, Alexandria,  
VA and Food Systems Office, Arlington, VA)

Naval Surface Warfare Center—Port Hueneme,  
Virginia Beach Detachment, Virginia Beach, VA  
Tactical Support Office, Arlington, VA  
Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command VA  
Office of the General Counsel (Navy), VA  
Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy), VA  
Office of the Secretary of the Navy  
(Legislative Affairs, Program Appraisal,  
Comptroller, Inspector General, and  
Information), VA  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, VA  
Office of Civilian Manpower Management  
(Navy), VA  
International Programs Office (Navy), VA  
Combined Civilian Personnel Office (Navy), VA  
Navy Regional Contracting Center, VA  
Naval Criminal Investigative Service, VA  
Naval Audit Agency, VA  
Strategic Systems Programs Office (Navy), VA  
Office of Naval Research, VA  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Installations  
& Logistics), U.S. Marine Corps, VA  
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Manpower  
& Reserve Affairs), U.S. Marine Corps, VA  
Marine Corps Systems Command  
(Clarendon Office), VA

#### **Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations**

Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure  
Island, CA (Dispose of all property by any  
lawful manner, including outleasing)  
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA  
(Relocate MCAS Tustin helicopter assets  
to NAS North Island, NAS Miramar, or  
MCAS Camp Pendleton)  
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center  
San Diego, CA (Consolidate with Naval Elec-  
tronics Systems Engineering Center Vallejo,  
CA, into available space in Air Force Plant  
#19, San Diego, vice new construction)  
Naval Electronics Systems Engineering Center  
Vallejo, CA (Consolidate with Naval Electronics  
Systems Engineering Center San Diego, CA,  
into available space in Air Force Plant #19,  
San Diego, vice new construction)  
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity,  
Yorktown, VA (Realign to Panama City,  
FL vice Dam Neck, VA)  
Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility, Albuquerque,  
NM (Retain as a tenant of the Air Force)

Presidio of San Francisco (6th Army remains at the Presidio of San Francisco instead of moving to Ft. Carson, CO)

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

March Air Force Base, CA  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY

#### **Changes to Previously Approved BRAC 88/91 Recommendations**

Castle Air Force Base, CA (B-52 Combat Crew Training redirected from Fairchild AFB to Barksdale AFB and KC-135 Combat Crew Training from Fairchild AFB to Altus AFB)  
Mather Air Force Base, CA (940th Air Refueling Group redirected from McClellan AFB to Beale AFB)  
MacDill Air Force Base, Florida (Airfield to be operated by the Department of Commerce or another federal agency. Joint Communications Support Element stays at MacDill vice relocating to Charleston AFB )  
Chanute Air Force Base, IL (Metals Technology and Aircraft Structural Maintenance training courses from Chanute AFB to Sheppard AFB redirected to NAS Memphis)  
Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH (Retain 121st Air Refueling Wing and the 160th Air Refueling Group in a cantonment area at Rickenbacker ANGB instead of Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, and operate as tenants of the Rickenbacker Port Authority [RPA] on RPA's airport )  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX (Fabrication function of the 436th Training Squadron redirected from Dyess AFB to Luke AFB; maintenance training function redirected from Dyess AFB to Hill AFB)

#### DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

##### **Regional Headquarters**

Defense Contract Management District West  
El Segundo, CA  
Defense Contract Management District  
Northcentral, Chicago, IL  
Defense Contract Management District  
Midatlantic, Philadelphia, PA

# 1991 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission's Actions

## *CLOSURES*

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Fort Ord, CA  
Sacramento Army Depot, CA  
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
Fort Devens, MA  
Harry Diamond Laboratory, Woodbridge, VA  
U.S. Army Institute of Dental Research  
Washington, D.C.

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Hunters Point Annex, San Francisco, CA  
Integrated Combat Systems Test Facility  
San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station Moffett Field, Sunnyvale, CA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center  
San Diego, CA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center,  
Vallejo, CA  
Naval Space Systems Activity, Los Angeles, CA  
Naval Station Long Beach, Long Beach, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA  
Naval Ocean Systems Center Detachment  
Kaneohe, HI  
Naval Weapons Evaluation Facility  
Albuquerque, NM  
Naval Station Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA  
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, PA  
Construction Battalion Center Davisville, RI  
Naval Air Station Chase Field, Beeville, TX  
Naval Mine Warfare Engineering Activity  
Yorktown, VA  
Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point)  
Seattle, WA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Eaker Air Force Base, AR  
Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Castle Air Force Base, CA  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
Grissom Air Force Base, IN  
England Air Force Base, LA  
Loring Air Force Base, ME

Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI  
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO  
Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, OH  
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC  
Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX

## *REALIGNMENTS*

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Army Corps of Engineers  
Fort Rucker, AL  
Letterman Army Institute of Research  
Presidio of San Francisco, CA  
Walter Reed Army Institute of  
Research Microwave Bioeffects  
Research, Washington, DC  
Armament, Munitions, and Chemical  
Command, Rock Island Arsenal, IL  
Fort Polk, LA  
Army Materials Technology Laboratory,  
Watertown, MA  
Fuze Development and Production  
Harry Diamond Laboratories, Adelphi, MD  
Ground Vehicle Propulsion Basic and  
Applied Research, Warren, MI  
Aviation Systems Command and Troop Support  
Command, St. Louis, MO  
Electronic Technology Device Laboratory, Fort  
Monmouth, NJ  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Battlefield Environmental Effects Element  
Atmospheric Science Laboratory  
White Sands Missile Range, NM  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Army Research Institute, Alexandria, VA  
Belvoir Research and Development Center  
Fort Belvoir, VA  
Directed Energy and Sensors Basic and  
Applied Research Element of the Center  
for Night Vision and Electro-Optics  
Fort Belvoir, VA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Fleet Combat Direction Systems Support  
Activity San Diego, CA  
Naval Weapons Center, China Lake, CA  
Pacific Missile Test Center, Point Mugu, CA  
Naval Underwater Systems Center Detachment  
New London, CT

Naval Coastal Systems Center, Panama City, FL  
Naval Air Facility Midway Island, HI  
Naval Avionics Center, Indianapolis, IN  
Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane, IN  
Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY  
Naval Undersea Warfare Engineering Station,  
Keyport, WA  
David Taylor Research Center Detachment  
Annapolis, MD  
Naval Ordnance Station, Indian Head, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center Detachment  
White Oak, MD  
Naval Air Engineering Center, Lakehurst, NJ  
Naval Air Propulsion Center, Trenton, NJ  
Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA  
Trident Command and Control Systems  
Maintenance Activity, Newport, RI  
Naval Sea Combat Systems Engineering  
Station Norfolk, VA

#### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

Beale Air Force Base, Marysville, CA  
March Air Force Base, Riverside, CA  
Mather Air Force Base, Rancho Cordova, CA  
MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL  
Mountain Home Air Force Base,  
Mountain Home, ID  
Goodfellow Air Force Base, San Angelo, TX



# 1988 Defense Secretary's Commission Base Closure and Realignment Actions

## *CLOSURES*

### DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

Alabama Army Ammunition Plant, AL  
Coosa River Storage Annex, AL  
Navajo Army Depot Activity, AZ  
Hamilton Army Airfield, CA  
Presidio of San Francisco, CA  
Bennett Army National Guard Facility,  
Arapahoe County, CO  
Family Housing Ansonia, CT 04  
Family Housing East Windsor, CT 08  
Family Housing Fairfield, CT 65  
Family Housing Manchester, CT 25  
Family Housing Middletown, CT 48  
Family Housing Milford, CT 17  
Family Housing New Britain, CT 74  
Family Housing Orange, CT 15  
Family Housing Plainville, CT 67  
Family Housing Portland, CT 36  
Family Housing Westport, CT 73  
Family Housing Shelton, CT 74  
Cape St. George, FL  
Kapalama Military Reservation Phase III, HI  
Fort Des Moines, IA  
Fort Sheridan, IL  
USARC Addison Housing, IL  
Worth Family Housing, IL  
Indiana Army Ammunition Plant, IN  
Jefferson Proving Ground, IN  
Lexington—Bluegrass Army Depot, KY  
New Orleans Military Ocean Terminal, LA  
Army Material Technology Laboratory, MA  
Family Housing Bedford, MA 85  
Family Housing Beverly, MA 15  
Family Housing Burlington, MA 84  
Family Housing Hull, MA 36  
Family Housing Nahant, MA 17  
Family Housing Randolph, MA 55  
Family Housing Swansea, MA 29  
Family Housing Topsfield, MA 05  
Family Housing Wakefield, MA 03  
Army Reserve Center Gaithersburg, MD  
Former NIKE site at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD  
NIKE Washington-Baltimore, MD  
Pontiac Storage Facility, MI

NIKE Kansas City 30, MO  
St. Louis Area Support Center Wherry Housing, MO  
NIKE NY 54 Housing, NJ  
NIKE NY 60 Housing, NJ  
NIKE NY 79/80 Housing, NJ  
NIKE NY 93/94, NJ  
NIKE Philadelphia 41/43, NJ  
Fort Wingate Ammunition Storage Depot, NM  
Dry Hill Family Housing, NY  
Manhattan Beach Housing, NY  
NIKE NY 01 Housing, NY  
NIKE NY 25, NY  
NIKE NY 99 Housing, NY  
Coraopolis Family Housing Site 71, PA  
Coraopolis Family Housing Site 72, PA  
Irwin Support Detachment Annex, PA  
Pitt 02 Family Housing, PA  
Pitt 03 Family Housing, PA  
Pitt 25 Family Housing, PA  
Pitt 37 Family Housing, PA  
Pitt 43 Family Housing, PA  
Pitt 42 Family Housing, PA  
Pitt 52 Family Housing, PA  
Tacony Warehouse, PA  
Family Housing Davisville, RI  
Family Housing North Smithfield 99, RI  
Fort Douglas, UT  
Cameron Station, VA  
Manassas Family Housing, VA  
NIKE Norfolk 85 Housing, VA  
Woodbridge Housing Site, VA  
Midway Housing Site, WA  
Youngs Lake Housing Site, WA  
Sun Prairie Family Housing, WI

### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Construction for Naval Station San Francisco  
(Hunters Point), CA  
Salton Sea Test Base, Imperial County, CA  
Naval Reserve Center (Coconut Grove) Miami, FL  
Naval Station Lake Charles, LA  
Naval Station New York (Brooklyn), NY  
Naval Hospital Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Station Galveston, TX  
Naval Station Puget Sound (Sand Point), WA

### DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

George Air Force Base, CA  
Mather Air Force Base, CA  
Norton Air Force Base, CA  
Chanute Air Force Base, IL  
Pease Air Force Base, NH

**INTERSERVICE**

Defense Mapping Agency site, Herndon, VA

***REALIGNMENTS***

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**

Pueblo Army Depot, CO

Fort Devens, MA

Fort Detrick, MD

Fort Holabird, MD

Fort Meade, MD

Fort Dix, NJ


Fort Monmouth, NJ

Umatilla Army Depot, OR

Fort Bliss, TX

**DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY**

Naval Station San Francisco (Hunters Point), CA



# APPENDIX N

## DoD RECOMMENDATIONS MODIFIED OR REJECTED BY COMMISSIONS: 1995, 1993, & 1991

### *1995 Commission*

Installation	Recommended Action	Commission Action
<b>Army</b>		
Fort Greely, AK	Realign	Realign (amended)
Fort Pickett, VA	Close	Close (amended)
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA	Close	Close (amended)
Fort Chaffee, AR	Close	Close (amended)
Fort McClellan, AL	Close	Close (amended)
Fort Ritchie, MD	Close	Close (amended)
Selfridge Army Garrison, MI	Close	Open
Price Support Center, IL	Close	Open
Fort Buchanan, PR	Realign	Realign (amended)
Kelly Support Center, PA	Realign	Realign (amended)
Fort Hamilton, NY	Close	Open
Sierra Army Depot, CA	Realign	Realign (amended)
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ	Close	Close (amended)
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO	Close	Close (amended)
Caven Point Reserve Center, NJ	Close	Open (DoD request)
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA	Realign	Realign (amended)
Red River Army Depot, TX	Close	Realign
Dugway Proving Ground, UT	Realign	Open (DoD request)
Valley Grove Area Maintenance Support Activity, WV	Close	Open (DoD request)
<b>Navy</b>		
Naval Activities, Guam	Realign	Realign (amended)
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center, Guam	Disestablish	Disestablish (amended)
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS	Close	Open
Naval Technical Training Center, Meridian, MS	Close	Open
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX	Realign	Realign as necessary
Naval Air Station Key West, FL	Realign	Realign (DoD request)
Naval Health Research Center, San Diego, CA	Disestablish	Open
Naval Management Systems Support Office, Chesapeake, VA	Disestablish	Disestablish (amended)

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Louisville, KY	Close	Close (amended)
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Indianapolis, IN	Close	Close (amended)
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division, Lakehurst, NJ	Close	Open

### Air Force

Rome Laboratory, NY	Close	Open
Kirtland AFB, NM	Close	Open (DoD request)
Brooks AFB, TX	Close	Open
Kelly AFB-ALC, TX	Realign (Depot)	Realign (amended)
McClellan AFB-ALC, CA	Realign	Close
Greater Pittsburgh IPA ARS, PA	Close	Open
Moffett Federal Airfield AGS, CA	Close	Open
North Highlands AGS, CA	Close	Open
Grand Forks AFB, ND	Realign	Realign (Amended)
Roslyn AGS, NY	Close	Close (Amended)
Springfield-Beckley AGS, OH	Close	Open
Robins Air Force Base, GA	Realign (Depot)	Open
Tinker Air Force Base, OK	Realign (Depot)	Open
Air Force Electronic Warfare Evaluation Simulator Activity, Fort Worth, TX	Disestablish	Open
Hill Air Force Base, UT	Realign (Depot)	Open

### Defense Logistics Agency

Defense Distribution Depot, Ogden, UT	Close	Close (Amended)
Red River Distribution Depot, TX	Close	Open

### 1995 REDIRECTS

#### Changes to Previously Approved 1988 Recommendations - Army

Fort Holabird, MD	Relocate all tenants except for Defense Investigative Service	Close
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#### Changes to Previously Approved 1991 Recommendations - Army

Fort Detrick, MD (Tri-Service Project Reliance)	Wright-Patterson AFB received toxicology research	Aberdeen Proving Ground receiver
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#### Changes to Previously Approved 1993 Recommendations - Navy

Naval Air Station, Agana, Guam	Andersen AFB is receiver	Unspecified receiver
Marine Corps Air Stations, El Toro and Tustin, CA	Specified receivers	Unspecified receivers

#### Changes to Previously Approved 1993 Recommendations - Air Force

Griffis AFB, NY (485th EIG)	Transfer units to Kelly, McClellan AFBs	No receiver specified
Lowry Air Force Base, CO	Inactivate	Close Facilities

## 1993 Commission

Installation	Recommended Action	Commission Action
<b>Army</b>		
Fort McClellan, AL	Close	Open
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA	Realign	Open
Presidio of Monterey Annex, CA	None	Realign
<b>Navy</b>		
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam	None	Close
Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV	None	Close
Naval Air Facility Johnstown, PA	None	Close
Naval Hospital, Charleston, SC	Close	Open
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS	Close	Open
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA	Close	Open
Naval Supply Center Charleston, SC	Disestablish	Realign
Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA	Close	Open
Naval Submarine Base New London, CA	Realign	Open
Aviation Supply Office, PA	Close	Open
Naval Air Technical Services Facility, Philadelphia, PA	Close	Open
Naval Electronic Security Systems Engineering Center, Charleston, SC	Disestablish	Open
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, Portsmouth, VA	Receive	Close
Naval Surface Warfare Center Carderock Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD	Disestablish	Open
Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Center, Lawrence, MA	None	Close
Naval Reserve Center, Chicopee, MA	None	Close
Naval Reserve Center, Quincy, MA	None	Close
<b>Air Force</b>		
Plattsburgh AFB, NY	None	Close
Homestead AFB, FL	Close	Realign
McGuire AFB, NJ	Realign	Open
Gentile AFS, OH	None	Close
Ogden ALC, Hill AFB, UT	None	Realign
<b>Defense Logistics Agency</b>		
Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA	Relocate	Open
Defense Reutilization & Marketing Service, MI	Disestablish	Open
Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, PA	Close, Relocate	Close, amend Relocate

Defense Logistics Services Center, Battle Creek, MI	Disestablish	Open
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA	Close	Open

### 1993 REDIRECTS

#### Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations — Army

Presidio of San Francisco, CA	Send 6th Army to Ft Carson	Keep 6th Army at Presidio of SF
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA	Send functions to Rock Island	Realign Keep functions at Letterkenny

#### Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations — Navy

Marine Corps Air Station, Tustin, CA	None	Realign
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#### Changes to Previously Approved 88/91 Recommendations — Air Force

Bergstrom AFB, TX	Close	Open
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## *1991 Commission*

<b>Installation</b>	<b>Recommended Action</b>	<b>Commission Action</b>
<b>Army</b>		
Fort McClellan, AL	Close	Open
Fort Dix, NJ	Close	Realign
Fort Chaffee, AR	Close	Realign
Army Corps of Engineers	None	Realign
<b>Navy</b>		
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA	Close	Open
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL	Close	Open
RDT&E & Fleet Support Activities	Close 10/Realign 16	Close 7/Realign 17
<b>Air Force</b>		
Moody AFB, GA	Close	Open



# APPENDIX O

## HEARINGS HELD BY

### THE COMMISSION

#### 1995, 1993 & 1991

#### 1995 Commission

#### *Washington, D.C. Hearings*

**March 1, 1995**

Presentation of the Department of Defense Recommendations  
Secretary of Defense William J. Perry;  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff  
General John M. Shalikashvili, USA; and  
Deputy Secretary of Defense John M. Deutch  
106 Dirksen Senate Office Building

**March 1, 1995**

Presentation of Department of Defense  
Methodology  
Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(Economic Security)  
106 Dirksen Senate Office Building

**March 6, 1995**

Presentation of Recommendations and  
Methodology for Services' Selection Process  
Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton,  
Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, Chief of Naval  
Operations; General Carl E. Mundy, Jr.,  
Commandant of the Marine Corps; and  
Assistant Secretary of the Navy Robert B.  
Pirie, Jr. (Installations and Environment)  
345 Cannon House Office Building

**March 6, 1995**

Presentation of Recommendations and  
Methodology for Services' Selection Process  
Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall;  
General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff of  
the Air Force; Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr.,  
Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Base  
Realignment and Transition; Mr. James  
Boatright, consultant to the Secretary; and  
General Thomas S. Moorman, Vice Chief  
of Staff of the Air Force  
345 Cannon House Office Building

**March 7, 1995**

Presentation of Recommendations and  
Methodology for Services' Selection Process  
Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr.;  
General Gordon R. Sullivan, Chief of Staff,  
Army; Assistant Secretary of the Army  
(Installations, Logistics, and Environment)  
Robert M. Walker; and Brigadier General  
James E. Shane, Jr., Director of Management,  
Office of the Chief of Staff, Army  
106 Dirksen Office Building

**March 7, 1995**

Presentation of Recommendations and  
Methodology for Defense Agencies' Selection  
Major General Lawrence P. Farrell, Jr., USAF,  
Principal Deputy Director, Defense Logistics  
Agency; and Mr. John F. Donnelly, Director,  
Defense Investigative Service  
106 Dirksen Office Building

**March 16, 1995**

Presentation by Elected Officials and  
Private-Sector Groups on Reuse Issues  
Senator David Pryor (D-AR), Mayor Joseph A.  
Griffo (Rome, NY), The United States Confer-  
ence of Mayors; Councilmember John Maxwell  
(Myrtle Beach, SC), National League of Cities;  
Commissioner Doug Bovin (Delta County,  
Gladstone, MI), National Association of  
Counties; City Manager Walter V. Graham  
(Vallejo, CA), International City/County  
Management Association; Mr. Brad Arvin,  
National Association of Installation  
Developers; and Mr. William Tremayne,  
Business Executives for National Security  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**March 16, 1995**

Presentation of Government Officials  
Testimony on Reuse Issues



Joshua Gotbaum, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security); Ms. Sherri Goodman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Environmental Security); Mr. Alan K. Olsen, Director of Air Force Base Conversion Agency, Department of the Air Force; Colonel Dennis C. Cochrane, Chief, Base Realignment and Closure Office, Department of the Army; Rear Admiral Patrick Drennon, Director of Facilities & Engineering Division, Department of the Navy; Mr. William Ginsberg, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Economic Development; Mr. James Van Erden, Administrator, Work-Based Learning, Department of Labor; and Mr. Timothy Fields, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental Protection Agency  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**April 17, 1995**

Presentation of GAO Report on the Department of Defense Analyses Supporting Proposed Closures and Realignments

Mr. Henry L. Hinton, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs; Mr. David Warren, Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues; and Mr. Barry W. Holman, Assistant Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**April 17, 1995**

Presentation of the Department of Defense's Joint Cross-Service Group

Mr. James Klugh, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics; Mr. Louis C. Finch, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness; Edward D. Martin, MD, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; Mr. Philip E. Coyle, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; Mr. John A. Burt, Director, Test, Systems Engineering and Evaluation; Dr. Craig Dorman, Deputy Director (Laboratory Management); Brigadier General James E. Shane, Jr., Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army; Mr. Charles Nemfakos, Vice Chairman, Navy Base Structure Evaluation Committee; Major General Jay D. Blume, Jr., Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Base Realignment and Transition; and Ms. Cathy Kelleher, Defense Logistics Agency BRAC Working Group  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**May 10, 1995**

Commission Deliberations/Votes on Additions to the Secretary's List for Further Consideration  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**June 12-13, 1995**

Congressional Testimony on Military Facility Closures and Realignments  
345 Cannon House Office Building (June 12)  
216 Hart Senate Office Building (June 13)

**June 14, 1995**

Testimony from Department of Defense Officials Regarding the Additional Bases Added to the Closure and Realignment List by the Commission on May 10, 1995

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security) Joshua Gotbaum; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations) Robert E. Bayer; Secretary of the Army Togo D. West, Jr.; General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA, Chief of Staff, Army; Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) Robert M. Walker; Brigadier General James E. Shane, Jr., USA, Director of Management, Office of the Chief of Staff, Army; Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton; Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Robert B. Pirie, Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Secretary of the Air Force Sheila E. Widnall; General Ronald R. Fogleman, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; Major General Jay D. Blume, Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Base Realignment and Transition; James Boatright, Consultant to the Secretary of the Air Force; Lieutenant General George T. Babbitt, Jr., USAF, Principal Deputy Director, Defense Logistics Agency; Ms. Marge V. McMananay, BRAC Team Chief, Defense Logistics Agency  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**June 22-23, 1995**

Commission Final Deliberations  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

## *Regional Hearings*

### **March 29, 1995**

Territory of Guam Regional Hearing  
Guam Legislature

### **March 30, 1995**

Grand Forks, North Dakota, Regional Hearing  
Chester Fritz Auditorium  
University of North Dakota

### **March 31, 1995**

Great Falls, Montana, Regional Hearing  
Great Falls Civic Center

### **April 4, 1995**

Birmingham, Alabama, Regional Hearing  
The Boutwell Municipal Auditorium

### **April 12, 1995**

Chicago, Illinois, Regional Hearing  
The Rosemont Convention Center

### **April 19, 1995**

Dallas, Texas, Regional Hearing  
Dallas Convention Center

### **April 20, 1995**

Albuquerque, New Mexico, Regional Hearing  
Albuquerque Convention Center

### **April 24, 1995**

Delta Junction, Alaska, Regional Hearing  
Delta Junction High School

### **April 28, 1995**

San Francisco, California, Regional Hearing  
The Westin Hotel

### **May 4, 1995**

Baltimore, Maryland, Regional Hearing  
University of Maryland, Baltimore County

### **May 5, 1995**

New York, New York, Regional Hearing  
USS Intrepid Sea-Air-Space Museum

### **May 25, 1995**

San Francisco, California, Regional Hearing  
Naval Station, Treasure Island

### **May 31, 1995**

Chicago, Illinois, Regional Hearing  
The O'Hare Hilton

### **June 3, 1995**

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing  
The John F. Kennedy Library

### **June 9, 1995**

Atlanta, Georgia, Regional Hearing  
The Fox Theater

### **June 10, 1995**

Fort Worth, Texas, Regional Hearing  
Fort Worth/Tarrant County Convention Center

## **1993 Commission**

### *Washington, D.C. Hearings*

#### **March 15, 1993**

Presentation of the Secretary's Recommendations  
2118 Rayburn House Office Building

#### **March 16, 1993**

Policy and Methodology in the Secretary's  
Recommendations  
2212 Rayburn House Office Building

#### **March 22, 1993**

Environmental Issues, Methodology, and Policy  
334 Cannon House Office Building

#### **March 29, 1993**

Base Closure Account and Execution,  
Budget Impact and Public Policy  
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building

#### **April 5, 1993**

Strategic Defense/Chemical Issues,  
Military Family/Retiree Issues  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

#### **April 12, 1993**

Economic Issues  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

#### **April 19, 1993**

Presentation of GAO's Analysis of the Secretary's  
Recommendations and Selection Process for  
Closures and Realignment  
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building

#### **May 21, 1993**

Commission Deliberations/Vote on Additions to  
the Secretary's List for Further Consideration  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

**June 14-16, 1993**

Congressional Testimony on Military Facility  
Closures and Realignments  
216 Hart Senate Office Building

**June 17-18, 1993**

Commission Deliberations  
325 Russell Senate Office Building (June 17)  
216 Hart Senate Office Building (June 18)

**June 23-27, 1993**

Commission Final Deliberations  
216 Hart Senate Office Building (June 23-24)  
2167 Rayburn House Office Building (June 25)  
G50 Dirksen Senate Office Building (June 26-27)

***Regional Hearings*****April 20-21, 1993**

Mid-Atlantic Regional Hearing  
Arlington, Virginia  
Gunston Arts Center

**April 25-26, 1993**

Oakland, California, Regional Hearing  
Henry J. Kaiser Convention Center

**April 27, 1993**

San Diego, California, Regional Hearing  
Holiday Inn on the Bay

**May 1-2, 1993**

Charleston, South Carolina, Regional Hearing  
Gaillard Municipal Auditorium

**May 3, 1993**

Orlando, Florida, Regional Hearing  
Orlando Expo Center

**May 4, 1993**

Birmingham, Alabama, Regional Hearing  
Boutwell Municipal Auditorium

**May 9-10, 1993**

Newark, New Jersey, Regional Hearing  
Symphony Hall

**May 11, 1993**

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing  
State House, Gardner Auditorium

**May 12, 1993**

Detroit, Michigan, Regional Hearing  
McGregor Memorial Conference Center

**June 1, 1993**

Columbus, Ohio, Regional Hearing  
Whitehall Civic Center

**June 2, 1993**

Grand Forks, North Dakota, Regional Hearing  
University of North Dakota

**June 3, 1993**

San Diego, California, Regional Hearing  
Holiday Inn on the Bay

**June 4, 1993**

Spokane, Washington, Regional Hearing  
City Council Chambers

**June 6, 1993**

Corpus Christi, Texas, Regional Hearing  
Bayfront Plaza Convention Center

**June 8-9, 1993**

Atlanta, Georgia, Regional Hearing  
Russell Federal Building

**June 11, 1993**

Norfolk, Virginia, Regional Hearing  
Chrysler Hall

**June 12, 1993**

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing  
State House, Gardner Auditorium

**1991 Commission*****Washington, D.C. Hearings*****April 15, 1991**

Presentation of Department of Defense  
Recommendations  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

**April 26, 1991**

Presentation of Force Structure Plan and  
Department of Defense Methodology  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

**May 10, 1991**

Presentation on Land Value, Environment,  
and Economic Impact  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

**May 17, 1991**

Presentation of GAO Report on the Department  
of Defense Analyses Supporting Proposed  
Closures and Realignment  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

**May 21-22, 1991**

Congressional Testimony on Military Facility  
Closures and Realignment  
215 Dirksen Senate Office Building

**June 5, 1991**

Testimony on the Army Corps of Engineers  
2167 Rayburn House Office Building

**June 6-7, 1991**

Commission Deliberations  
Office of Thrift Supervision, Washington, D.C.

**June 13-14, 1991**

Commission Deliberations  
General Services Administration Building  
Washington, D.C.

**June 27, 28, 30, 1991**

Commission Deliberations  
2167 Rayburn House Office Building  
1100 Longworth House Office Building

### *Regional Hearings*

**May 6-7, 1991**

San Francisco, California, Regional Hearing  
California Palace of the Legion of Honor

**May 8, 1991**

Los Angeles, California, Regional Hearing  
California Museum of Science and History  
Kinsey Auditorium

**May 13, 1991**

Denver, Colorado, Regional hearing  
Denver Auditorium

**May 14, 1991**

Fort Worth, Texas, Regional Hearing  
Will Rogers Memorial Center

**May 23, 1991**

Jacksonville, Florida, Regional Hearing  
Prime F. Osborn Convention Center

**May 24, 1991**

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Regional Hearing  
Philadelphia Civic Center

**May 28, 1991**

Boston, Massachusetts, Regional Hearing  
State House, Gardner Auditorium

**May 30, 1991**

Indianapolis, Indiana, Regional Hearing  
Indianapolis Convention Center

**June 17, 1991**

San Diego, California, Regional Hearing  
Marine Corps Recruit Depot

**June 17, 1991**

Washington, D.C., Regional Hearing  
334 Cannon House Office Building

**June 18, 1991**

San Angelo, Texas, Regional Hearing  
San Angelo Civic Auditorium

**June 20, 1991**

Regional Hearing  
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, New York

**June 21, 1991**

Regional Hearing  
Temple Theatre, Meridian, Mississippi

**June 21, 1991**

Regional Hearing  
Kingsville Naval Air Station, Texas



# APPENDIX P COMMISSIONER AND STAFF BASE VISITS

*1995 Commission  
206 Military Activities Visited*

## ARMY

Fort Greely, AK  
Fort Wainwright, AK  
Anniston Army Depot, AL  
Fort McClellan, AL  
Redstone Arsenal, AL  
Space and Strategic Defense Command, AL  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
East Fort Baker, CA  
Fort Hunter Liggett, CA  
Oakland Army Base, CA  
Sierra Army Depot, CA  
Fitzsimons Army Medical Center, CO  
Fort Carson, CO  
Stratford Army Engine Plant, CT  
Price Support Center, IL  
Savanna Army Depot Activity, IL  
Publication Distribution Center, Baltimore, MD  
Concepts and Analysis Agency, MD  
Fort Holabird, MD  
Fort Meade, MD  
Fort Ritchie, MD  
Detroit Arsenal, MI  
Selfridge Army Garrison, MI  
Aviation-Troop Command, MO  
Fort Leonard Wood, MO  
Publication Distribution Center, St. Louis, MO  
Bayonne Military Ocean Terminal, NJ  
Caven Point U.S. Army Reserve Center, NJ  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Fort Drum, NY  
Fort Hamilton, NY  
Fort Totten, NY  
Seneca Army Depot, NY  
Watervliet Army Arsenal, NY  
McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, OK  
Fort Indiantown Gap, PA  
Kelly Support Center, PA

Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA  
Fort Buchanan, PR  
Fort Bliss, TX  
Red River Army Depot, TX  
Dugway Proving Ground, UT  
Fort Lee, VA  
Fort Pickett, VA  
Information Systems Software Center, VA

## NAVY

Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,  
China Lake, CA  
Engineering Field Activity West, CA  
Fleet and Industrial Supply Center Oakland, CA  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Weapons Division,  
Point Mugu, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA  
Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance  
Center San Diego, CA  
Naval Health Research Center, CA  
Naval Command, Control, and Ocean Surveillance  
Center, In-Service  
Engineering, West Coast Division, San Diego, CA  
Navy Personnel R&D Center, CA  
Naval Postgraduate School, CA  
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA  
Naval Warfare Assessment Division, Corona, CA  
Construction Battalion Center Port Hueneme, CA  
Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion, and  
Repair, San Francisco, CA  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, New London, CT  
Submarine Base New London, CT  
Washington Navy Yard, DC  
Defense Contractor Management Command South,  
Marietta, GA  
Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA  
Fleet & Industrial Supply Center, Guam  
Naval Activities, Guam  
Naval Air Station Agana, Guam  
Ship Repair Facility, Guam  
Naval Magazine Lualualei, HI  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division,  
Indianapolis, IN

Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division,  
Crane, IN  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division  
Detachment, Louisville, KY  
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA  
Naval Medical Research Institute, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division  
Detachment, Annapolis, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division  
Detachment, White Oak, MD  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division  
Patuxent River, MD  
St. Inigoes Naval Command, Control, and Ocean  
Surveillance Center, MD  
Naval Air Station New Brunswick, ME  
Naval Shipyard Portsmouth, ME  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Marine Corps Air Station Cherry Point, NC  
Naval Air Warfare Center, Lakehurst, NJ  
Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Technical Services Facility  
Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Warfare Center Warminster, PA  
Naval Command, Control & Ocean Surveillance  
Center, RDT&E Division Detachment,  
Warminster, PA  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Carderock Division  
Detachment, Philadelphia, PA  
Naval Air Warfare Center Open Water Test Facility  
Oreland, PA  
Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, PR  
Naval Education and Training Center Newport, RI  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport, RI  
Weapon Station Charleston, SC  
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN  
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX  
Naval Air Station Oceana, VA  
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, VA  
Office of Naval Research Arlington, VA  
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command,  
Arlington, VA

## AIR FORCE

Luke Air Force Base, AZ  
Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
McClellan Air Force Base, CA  
Moffett Federal Airfield Air Guard Station, CA  
Onizuka Air Station, CA  
Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA

Falcon Air Force Base, CO  
Peterson Air Force Base, CO  
Eglin Air Force Base, FL  
Homestead Air Reserve Base, FL  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Patrick Air Force Base, FL  
Robins Air Force Base, GA  
Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center, GA  
Chicago O'Hare IAP Air Reserve Station, IL  
Minneapolis-St. Paul IAP Air Reserve Station, MN  
Columbus Air Force Base, MS  
Malmstrom Air Force Base, MT  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND  
Minot Air Force Base, ND  
Kirtland Air Force Base, NM  
Griffiss Air Force Base/Rome Laboratory, NY  
Niagara Falls IAP Air Reserve Station, NY  
Real-Time Digitally Controlled Analyzer Processor  
Activity Buffalo, NY  
Springfield-Beckley Municipal Airport Air Guard  
Station, OH  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH  
Youngstown-Warren Municipal Airport Air  
Reserve Station, OH  
Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, OK  
Tinker Air Force Base, OK  
Vance Air Force Base, OK  
Greater Pittsburgh International Airport Air  
Reserve Station, PA  
Bergstrom Air Reserve Base, TX  
Brooks Air Force Base, TX  
Carswell Air Reserve Station, TX  
Kelly Air Force Base, TX  
Lackland Air Force Base, TX  
Laughlin Air Force Base, TX  
Reese Air Force Base, TX  
San Antonio Air Logistics Center, TX  
Hill Air Force Base, UT  
Ogden Air Logistics Center, UT  
General Mitchell International Airport Air Reserve  
Station, WI

## DEFENSE AGENCIES

Defense Distribution Depot Anniston, AL  
Defense Contract Management District West, El  
Segundo, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot McClellan, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot San Joaquin, CA  
Defense Contract Management District South,  
Marietta, GA

Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA  
Defense Investigative Service, Investigations  
Control and Automation Directorate,  
Fort Holabird, MD  
Defense Distribution Depot Columbus, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
Defense Distribution Depot Tobyhanna, PA  
Defense Industrial Supply Center Philadelphia, PA  
Defense Distribution Depot Memphis, TN  
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot Hill, UT  
Defense Distribution Depot Ogden, UT

#### **ASSESSMENT OF REUSE ACTIVITIES**

Mather Air Force Base, CA  
Sacramento Army Depot, CA  
Charleston Naval Base Complex, SC

# *1993 Commission*

## *138 Military Activities Visited*

### **ARMY**

Anniston Army Depot, AL  
Fort McClellan, AL  
Fort Huachuca, AZ  
University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ  
Presidio of Monterey, CA  
Presidio of Monterey Annex/Fort Ord, CA  
Fort Gillem, GA  
Fort McPherson, GA  
Fort Leonard Wood, MO  
Fort Monmouth, NJ  
Letterkenny Army Depot, PA  
Marcus Hook U.S. Army Reserve Center, PA  
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA  
Corpus Christi Army Depot, TX  
Red River Army Depot, TX  
Tooele Army Depot, UT  
Fort Lee, VA  
Fort Monroe, VA  
Vint Hill Farms, VA

### **NAVY**

Naval Station Mobile, AL  
Hunters Point Annex to Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA  
Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center, 29 Palms, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station El Toro, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA  
Marine Corps Logistics Base Barstow, CA  
Naval Air Station Alameda, CA  
Naval Air Station Miramar, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot Alameda, CA  
Naval Aviation Depot North Island, CA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center, San Diego, CA  
Naval Hospital Oakland, CA  
Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA  
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA  
Mare Island Naval Shipyard, Vallejo, CA  
Naval Station Treasure Island, San Francisco, CA  
Naval Supply Center Oakland, CA  
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
Naval Weapons Station Seal Beach, CA  
Planning, Estimating, Repair, and Alterations (Surface) Pacific, San Francisco, CA  
Public Works Center San Francisco, CA  
Naval Submarine Base, New London, CT  
Submarine Base New London, CT

Naval Air Station Cecil Field, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot Jacksonville, FL  
Naval Aviation Depot Pensacola, FL  
Naval Hospital Orlando, FL  
Naval Station Mayport, FL  
Naval Supply Center Pensacola, FL  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Marine Corps Logistics Base Albany, GA  
Naval Air Station Atlanta, GA  
Submarine Base Kings Bay, GA  
Naval Air Station Glenview, IL  
Naval Hospital Great Lakes, IL  
Naval Training Center Great Lakes, IL  
Naval Air Station South Weymouth, MA  
Naval Air Facility Detroit, MI  
Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Patuxent River, MD  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center St. Inigoes, MD  
Navy Radio Transmission Facility, Annapolis, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center - Carderock, Annapolis Detachment, Annapolis, MD  
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren White Oak Detachment, White Oak, MD  
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, ME  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Naval Station Pascagoula, MS  
Naval Aviation Depot Cherry Point, NC  
Naval Air Warfare Center - Aircraft Division, Trenton, NJ  
Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, PA  
Ships Parts Control Center Mechanicsburg, PA  
Naval Education and Training Center, Newport, RI  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport, RI  
Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC  
Naval Hospital Beaufort, SC  
Naval Shipyard Charleston, SC  
Charleston Naval Station, SC  
Naval Air Station Memphis, TN  
Naval Hospital Millington, TN  
Naval Air Station Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Air Station Dallas, TX  
Naval Hospital Corpus Christi, TX  
Naval Station Ingleside, TX  
Naval Air Station Oceana, VA  
Naval Aviation Depot Norfolk, VA  
Naval Electronic Systems Engineering Center Portsmouth, VA  
Norfolk Naval Shipyard, VA  
Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Norfolk Detachment, Norfolk, VA  
Naval Station Everett, WA  
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, Bremerton, WA  
Naval Air Facility Martinsburg, WV



## AIR FORCE

March Air Force Base, CA  
McClellan Air Force Base, CA  
Travis Air Force Base, CA  
Homestead Air Force Base, FL  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Warner-Robins Air Force Base, GA  
Greater Rockford Airport, Rockford, IL  
O'Hare International Airport Air Force Reserve  
Station, Chicago, IL  
K I Sawyer Air Force Base, MI  
Grand Forks Air Force Base, ND  
McGuire Air Force Base, NJ  
Griffiss Air Force Base, NY  
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY  
Gentile Air Force Station, OH  
Newark Air Force Base, OH  
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH  
Tinker Air Force Base, OK  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX  
Kelly Air Force Base, TX  
Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill Air Force Base, UT  
Fairchild Air Force Base, WA

## DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY

Defense Distribution Depot Barstow, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot McClellan Air  
Force Base, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot San Diego, CA  
Defense Distribution Depot Jacksonville, FL  
Defense Distribution Depot Albany, GA  
Defense Distribution Depot Warner-Robins, GA  
Defense Contract Management District Northeast,  
Boston, MA  
Defense Logistics Service Center, Battle Creek, MI  
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service,  
Battle Creek, MI  
Defense Distribution Depot Cherry Point, NC  
Defense Construction Supply Center,  
Columbus, OH  
Defense Electronics Supply Center, Dayton, OH  
Defense Distribution Depot Oklahoma City, OK  
Defense Distribution Depot Letterkenny, PA  
Defense Industrial Supply Center, PA  
Defense Logistics Agency Clothing Factory,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Defense Personnel Support Center,  
Philadelphia, PA  
Defense Distribution Depot Red River, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot San Antonio, TX  
Defense Distribution Depot Norfolk, VA

## DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY

7th Communications Group, Pentagon,  
Washington, DC  
Regional Processing Center, Robins Air Force  
Base, GA  
Defense Information Technology Services  
Organization, Cleveland Information  
Processing Center, OH  
Defense Information Technology Services  
Organization, Columbus Information  
Processing Center, OH  
Regional Processing Center, Tinker Air Force  
Base, OK  
Army Information Processing Center,  
Chambersburg, PA  
Computer Services Center, San Antonio, TX  
Regional Processing Center, Kelly Air Force  
Base, TX

## *1991 Commission*

### *47 Military Activities Visited*

#### **ARMY**


Fort McClellan, AL  
Fort Chaffee, AR  
Fort Ord, CA  
Sacramento Army Depot, CA  
Rock Island Arsenal, IL  
Fort Benjamin Harrison, IN  
Fort Devens, MA  
Fort Dix, NJ  
Tobyhanna Army Depot, PA

#### **NAVY**

Hunters Point Annex, CA  
Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA  
Marine Corps Air Station Tustin, CA  
Marine Corps Recruit Depot,  
San Diego, CA  
Naval Air Station Lemoore, CA  
Naval Air Station Moffett Field, CA  
Naval Station Long Beach, CA  
Naval Training Center San Diego, CA  
Naval Underwater System Ctr, New London, CT  
Naval Training Center Orlando, FL  
Naval Station Staten Island, NY  
Naval Air Development Center, Warminster, PA  
Naval Station Philadelphia, PA  
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, PA  
Naval Electronic System Engineering Center,  
Charleston, SC  
Naval Air Station Chase Field, TX  
Naval Air Station Kingsville, TX  
Naval Air Station Meridian, MS  
Naval Air Station Whidbey Island, WA  
Naval Station Sand Point, WA

#### **AIR FORCE**

Eaker Air Force Base, AR  
Williams Air Force Base, AZ  
Castle Air Force Base, CA  
Sacramento Air Logistics Center, CA  
Lowry Air Force Base, CO  
MacDill Air Force Base, FL  
Moody Air Force Base, GA  
Grissom Air Force Base, IN  
England Air Force Base, LA  
Loring Air Force Base, ME  
Wurtsmith Air Force Base, MI  
Richards-Gebaur Air Reserve Station, MO  
Plattsburgh Air Force Base, NY  
Rickenbacker Air Guard Base, OH  
Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, SC  
Bergstrom Air Force Base, TX  
Carswell Air Force Base, TX  
Goodfellow Air Force Base, TX



# APPENDIX Q COMMISSIONER BIOGRAPHIES

**ALAN J. DIXON** was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on October 7, 1994, as chairman of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Dixon, 67, is a senior partner in the corporate and business department of the St. Louis-based law firm of Bryan Cave, which he joined in 1993 after representing Illinois in the U.S. Senate for 12 years. During his Senate career, Dixon was unanimously elected by his colleagues to be majority chief deputy whip. In addition, he held important positions on the committees on Armed Services, Small Business, and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. On the Armed Services Committee, he chaired the Subcommittee on Readiness, Preparedness, and Sustainability, which oversees 38 percent of the U.S. defense budget. In 1990, he co-authored the legislation that created the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Dixon is a graduate of the University of Illinois and holds a law degree from Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri.

**ALTON W. CORNELLA** is the President of Cornella Refrigeration Inc., a Rapid City, South Dakota firm specializing in commercial and industrial refrigeration. He is a U.S. Navy veteran with service in Vietnam and has been active in military issues for over a decade. Cornella has also served on a number of boards and commissions in South Dakota, including the Rapid City Chamber of Commerce. During his tenure with the Chamber, he served as Chairman of the Board of Directors from 1991-1992 and as Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee. In 1992, Mr. Cornella was appointed by former South Dakota Governor George Mickelson to serve on the State Commission on Hazardous Waste Disposal. Mr. Cornella currently serves on the boards of the South Dakota Air and Space Foundation and the Rapid City Economic Development Loan Fund.

**REBECCA G. COX** is currently a Vice President of Continental Airlines, Inc. She joined Continental in January, 1989. In 1993, she served as a Commissioner on the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission. Before joining Continental, Ms. Cox served as Assistant to the President and Director of the Office of Public Liaison, President Reagan's primary outreach effort to the private sector. She was also appointed by the President to serve as Chairman of the Interagency Committee for Women's Business Enterprise. Prior to her 1987 White House appointment, Ms. Cox had served as Assistant Secretary for Governmental Affairs at the Department of Transportation. Ms. Cox had previously served at the Department of Transportation as Counselor to Secretary Elizabeth Dole and as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Government Affairs. Before coming to the Department of Transportation, Ms. Cox worked in the U.S. Senate, first as staff assistant, then legislative assistant and, finally, as Chief of Staff to Senator Ted Stevens. In 1976, she received a B.A. degree from Depauw University in Greencastle, Indiana, and a Juris Doctorate degree from the Columbus School of Law, Catholic University, Washington, D.C., in 1981.

**GENERAL JAMES B. DAVIS, USAF (Ret.)** concluded a thirty-five year career with the United States Air Force as a combat fighter pilot, commander and strategic planner and programmer in August of 1993. General Davis has had numerous command positions during his career, including command of a Combat Fighter Wing and the U.S. Air Force Military Personnel Center. He was also the Commander of U.S. Forces, Japan, 5th Air Force and Pacific Air Forces while in Japan. His last military position was as the Chief of Staff Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (NATO). His military awards include the Defense Distinguished

Service Medal, Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters, Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster, Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal with 10 oak leaf clusters, Vietnam Service Medal with silver service star, Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm, Order of National Security Merit, Gouges Medal—South Korea, Grand Cordon of the Order of the Sacred Treasure—Japan, Award of Knight Grand Cross with Sash—Thailand, and the Order of the Sword, which is the highest honor noncommissioned officers can bestow. General Davis has a B.S. degree in Engineering from the U.S. Naval Academy, a Masters degree in Public Administration from Auburn University at Montgomery, and has attended multiple professional schools.

**S. LEE KLING** of St. Louis, Missouri, serves as Chairman of the Board of Kling Rechter & Company, a merchant banking firm formed in 1991. Additionally, he serves as a Special Advisor and Managing Director of Willis Corroon Corp. of Missouri. From 1974 to 1977, Mr. Kling served as Finance Chairman of the Democratic National Committee and a member of its Executive Committee. In 1976, he was Treasurer of the Democratic National Convention. He served as National Treasurer of the Carter-Mondale Election Committee, and in 1987-88 Mr. Kling served as National Treasurer of the Gephardt for President Committee. Mr. Kling serves on the boards of a number of public and private corporations and civic and charitable organizations. He attended New York Military Academy, Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York, and received his B.S.B.A. degree from Washington University in St. Louis. From 1950 to 1952, he served in the Army as a 1st Lieutenant and aide-de-camp to General Buy O. Kurtz.

**REAR ADMIRAL BENJAMIN F. MONTOYA, CEC, USN (Ret.),** is currently the President and Chief Executive Officer of Public Service Company of New Mexico, an investor-owned public utility serving gas, electricity, and water throughout the state. His private-sector career, which began in 1989 when he retired from the Navy, has included the positions of Manager, Vice President, and Senior Vice President of Pacific Gas and Electric Company, San Francisco. Admiral Montoya enjoyed a distinguished and decorated U.S. Navy career spanning 31 years, rising to the rank of Rear Admiral. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal, the Legion of Merit,

Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V," Meritorious Service Medal, Navy Commendation Medal, and the Navy Achievement Medal. Admiral Montoya is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He also holds a Bachelor of Science degree in civil engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, a Master of Science degree in sanitary engineering from Georgia Institute of Technology, and a law degree from Georgetown University Law School.

**MAJOR GENERAL JOSUE (JOE) ROBLES, JR., USA (Ret.),** is Senior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer/Corporate Controller for USAA Financial Services. He directs USAA's activities in the areas of Payroll and Compensation Accounting, Accounting Policy, Corporate Financial Analysis, Internal Audit and Taxes. He joined USAA in July 1994 as Special Assistant to the Chairman after retiring from the U.S. Army as a Major General after 28 years of service. He received a Bachelor of Business Administration degree in Accounting from Kent State University in 1972. He also holds a Master of Business Administration from Indiana State University. General Robles served in a variety of important command and staff positions, culminating in his assignment as Commanding General, 1st Infantry Division (Mech) at Fort Riley, Kansas. General Robles' military awards include the Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal, the Army Commendation Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Army Good Conduct Medal, and the Army General Staff Identification Badge.

**WENDI L. STEELE** served as the Senate liaison for the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission in 1991. She began her career in the Reagan Administration, working in the legislative affairs offices of both the Office of Management and Budget and the White House. Following her service in Washington, Mrs. Steele was a congressional and economic analyst for the Defense and Space Group of the Boeing Company in Seattle, Washington. She returned to D.C. during the Bush Administration and worked for the assistant secretary for legislative and intergovernmental affairs of the U.S. Department of Commerce. In 1993, she served on the staff of Senator Don Nickles and handled issues in the areas of defense, veterans' affairs, foreign policy, and trade.



# APPENDIX R COMMISSION STAFF

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
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5 Detailee from Federal Aviation Administration  
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