

Colby Calls Mexico Bigger Threat Than Russia to U.S.

BY ROBERT SCHEER
Times Staff Writer

Former CIA Director William E. Colby said Monday that the main threat against the United States is from the "have not" nations of the world, such as Mexico, rather than from the Soviet Union.

"The greatest danger of violence and difficulty in the world is between the "haves" and the "have nots"—them against us," Colby said in an interview with The Times.

He said that "one of the most serious problems we have to face" is the doubling of the population of Mexico by the end of the century, which, Colby said, would drive an additional 20 million illegal aliens across the border into the United States.

"You cannot stop the (population) growth at this point," he said. "The women are alive today who are going to bear those children. So you can have all the birth control you want between now and the end of the century. It isn't going to change those figures in real terms.

"So what's going to happen to that

extra 60-odd million Mexicans? Twenty (million) of them are going to be right here."

Colby said the United States did not have the means to stop the illegal migration of millions of jobless Mexicans.

"You're not going to be able to mount a wall there; you're being immensely unsuccessful doing that today," he said. "You're not going to be more brutal about it. The only way to keep them out . . . is to develop some light industry base and agriculture in Mexico, to give them something to do."

He said, however, that Mexico resisted aid from the United States and was "tense" about being a satellite of this country.

"Yet what they are doing is exporting their unemployed to the United States," the former CIA director said.

The migration of the Mexicans "is exactly what we did with black rural poor of the South in the '20's," he said. "We sent them all to the central



Colby during interview

Times photo.


cities. It was a better life for them—but the social costs for our country have been fantastic. We've managed to ruin our public school system and created ghettos."

Colby, who was CIA director from 1973 to 1976, stressed what he said was the continuing danger of Soviet influence in Africa but said he believed that the United States should not allow the problems in Africa to interfere with progress toward a strategic arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union.

At our sale price stereo system

Save \$30, Fisher cassette stereo system, 299.95.

Orig. 329.95. This matched and integrated stereo features a stereo receiver with a continuous power output of 8 watts per channel minimum at 8 ohms with than 10"



WORLDVIEW

VOLUME 21, NUMBERS 1-2

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1978

- ARTICLES
- 4 **Daring to Lead** Andrew Young
- 7 **Israel's No. 1 Dove**
Mark Bruzonsky Interviews Arie Eliav
- 14 **Quebec's Politics of Vengeance** Bernard Murchland
- 19 **Toward an American Coalition for Human Rights** Bayard Rustin
- 21 **"We Are Abandoned"**
Theodore Jacqueney Interviews Former Prime Minister of Nepal B.P. Koirala
- 26 **Food Stamps for International Neighbors** William E. Colby
- 44 **A Balance Sheet on Sixty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy—Part II**
Walter C. Clemens, Jr.

- EXCURSUS
- 28 **Why Worldview Keeps On/The Third Jerusalem Religion & Disarmament/Sacred Objects U.N. Special Session/An Evening With Billy Graham Revisited**
James Finn/Peter L. Berger/Richard John Neuhaus/
Wilson Carey McWilliams/Homer Jack/Renatus Denovo

- VIEW OF THE WORLD
- 40 Abraham Martin Murray

- CORRESPONDENCE
- 2 Warren Thompson, Dale Vree

- BOOKS
- 52 **The Uses and Limits of Restraint** Helmut Sonnenfeldt
- 56 John B. Sheerin *Auschwitz: Beginning of a New Era?* ed. by Eva Fleishner
- 58 Barry Rubin *The Legacy of Vietnam*, ed. by Anthony Lake; *Setting National Priorities*, ed. by Henry Owen and Charles Schultze
- 61 Paul Mojzes *Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia*, by Fred Singleton
- 62 Samuel Hux *Universities in the Western World*, ed. by Paul Seabury; *The Future of the Humanities*, by Walter Kaufmann
- 64 Briefly Noted

Editor: James Finn
Senior Editor: Richard John Neuhaus
Managing Editor: Susan Woolfson
Associate Editors: Peter L. Berger, Mark A. Bruzonsky, Theodore Jacqueney, Wilson Carey McWilliams
Research Editor: Anne Yarowsky
Contributing Editors: Robert W. Barnett, Nuri Eren, Gerald Freund, Robert C. Good, Michael Novak, Wolfhart Pannenberg
Business Manager: Harry W. Hochman
Publications Consultant: John Philip Sousa III
Cover: John Hite

WORLDVIEW is published monthly (except for July/August and January/February, when it is bimonthly) by the Council on Religion and International Affairs. Subscription-membership \$15.00 a year. Subscription only—\$12.00 a year; \$20.00 for 2 years; \$27.00 for 3 years. Student rate \$5.00 per year. Add \$1.00 per year for overseas postage. Second-class postage paid at New York, N.Y. and at additional entry offices. Opinions expressed in WORLDVIEW are those of the authors and not necessarily of the Council on Religion and International Affairs. © Copyright 1978 Council on Religion and International Affairs, a publicly supported organization of the type described under sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Internal Revenue Code. Unsolicited manuscripts must be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed return envelope. Editorial & Business Offices: 170 East 64th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021. Telephone: 212/TE 8-4120. Subscription Office: WORLDVIEW Subscription Dept., P.O. Box 986, Farmingdale, New York 11735. Advertising: Ruth Taylor, 40 Parkway Circle, Scarsdale, New York 10583. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts*, *America: History and Life*, *Index to Religious Periodical Literature*, and *Guide to Social Science and Religion in Periodical Literature*.

The former head of the CIA sets forth a very specific plan for interdependence between rich and poor

Food Stamps for International Neighbors

William E. Colby

A new international economic order, strategic arms limitations, the interminable problems of the Middle East—these and many other foreign problems swirl around the average American citizen in a dazzle of complexity. The language of concern in which these and other issues are debated falls on ears that heard the equally serious and sincere language leading to the massive and mistaken involvement in Vietnam. And serious academics publish revisionist histories that contend that the cold war that mobilized the nation's energies for two decades came more from American aggressiveness than from foreign threat. A new generation of Americans turns its main attention away from such faraway, difficult, and ambiguous problems to ones closer to home, such as energy, the environment, and the economy.

But close to home lies an easily understood danger to the United States. It invites the engagement of the best minds and the good will of our citizens. It might open new avenues for the solution of some of the larger and more distant problems of the future world. The danger is not one of immediate catastrophe, but its advent is predictable and certain and calls for rapid preventive action to avert enormous human and economic loss.

Simple mathematics displays the problem. The population of Mexico today is slightly over 60 million and is growing at some 3.5 per cent per year. Projection of the Mexican population by the end of the century, less than twenty-five years away, is about 120 million, with no opportunity for population control measures to reduce this by any significant degree. At present the number of Mexicans illegally in the United States in search of the jobs they cannot find at home is estimated at between 5 and 8 million. Among the additional 60 million Mexicans who will be present by the year 2000 it is obvious that a substantial proportion will make their way to the United States. Our border and immigration services will be helpless before this flood, dwarfing the flow that

already overwhelms them; the resulting social tensions between the Spanish and English-speaking communities will produce violence, misery, and turmoil. Mexico's recently found oil may alleviate that government's balance of payments and budgetary problems, but it certainly cannot provide the basis for jobs and industry to absorb its multiplying population in the few years available. Both within Mexico and between Mexicans and North Americans the affluence of the favored will come under increasing pressure from the misery and bitterness of the poor who strike at the steadily widening gap between them.

On a smaller scale there are equally predictable problems with respect to the rest of Central America and the islands of the Caribbean. The 19 million in the former and the 17 million in the latter (including Cuba but excluding Puerto Rico) face similar prospects of excess population, limited economic opportunity, and illegal migration to the rumored El Dorado of the north, exacerbated in many situations by the presence in their midst of dreamlike palaces for the holidays of the favored northerners. A more explosive mixture would be difficult to concoct, and the steady increase in pressure inside the regional chamber will make more certain the detonation when a spark ignites it.

Some idea of the social costs of allowing this process to run its course can be derived from the analogous, if not completely comparable, relationship between North and South within the United States after 1920. Then, too, millions of poverty-level black Southerners sought better lives in Northern cities than the rural South could offer, crowding the ghettos of New York, Detroit, and Chicago. The South sought capital for development of its "sunbelt" by offering low wages, minimum restrictions on new industry, and financial incentives to factories to shut their doors in New England and move, producing unemployment and depression in sections of the North. The social, cultural, and racial chasms between the new arrivals and the previous occupants of the urban centers of the North generated riots and violence at times and, more

WILLIAM E. COLBY, a Washington attorney with the firm of Colby, Miller & Hanes, is former director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

routinely, flight to the suburbs, thus producing the disaster of our central cities today.

The larger and more ominous process is already at work. Puerto Ricans have been supplemented by many others from the Caribbean to produce Spanish-speaking subworlds in sections of New York; waves of "wet-backs" spread through Texas and the Southwest, and Miami's Cuban colony is only different because, in great part, it consisted of upper-class political emigrés rather than the barely educated rural poor. Much of this new generation of "huddled masses" making their way to the United States faces the extra hurdle to assimilation of race, which we have not yet overcome even for our own citizens.

The significance of this analogy is the degree to which the social costs of the process were borne by the North in the United States, not merely by those involved in the migration. The lesson for today is that the costs of a similar process with respect to Central America and the Caribbean will bear heavily upon the U.S. In addition to the social injury it would do to our society internally this prospect has a great potential for outside harm. The effect of aroused Caribbeans and Central Americans among their ideological fellows of the Third World could create frustrations leading to violence and terror, with nuclear proliferation a nightmare prospect all too possible. Humanitarian concern about the grim prospects facing our southern neighbors thus combines with simple self-interest to compel a better solution than we in the United States found for our internal migration. This differentiates the problem from the more general one of our relations with Latin America as a whole, as the nations farther south do not face the kind of future our close neighbors do.

The first step in meeting this situation is to get public acceptance of the fact that it is indeed *our* problem; it is not another call for charity. Interdependence with the Third World as a whole is difficult for the normal citizen to grasp, but the certain overpopulation and further deterioration of our cities can be understood as something tangible. It is not difficult to perceive that it is a joint problem facing our near neighbors and ourselves, calling for joint solutions within our community. Cooperation will not be easy for either side. It is not easy for the United States to seek help from these smaller nations to meet its problem, nor for these nations to overcome their emotional resistance to working with the Yankee colossus in these days of Third World assertiveness.

But a structure can be developed for meeting the problem on a common basis. Both we and they have an incentive to do so, and collaboration as equals can produce the mutual respect necessary for a long-term relationship as fellow members of an American community. Political independence and sovereignty must be recognized along with economic and social interdependence. The progress of the European Community, which followed a strategy of working on the practical levels of economic interdependence while leaving political machinery essentially unchallenged, provides confidence that a similar approach is possible. Admittedly, the imbalances around the Caribbean basin are of a different order of magnitude than those of Europe.

The first element of such a strategy must focus on the principal factor involved, the present and probable future poverty of large numbers of the population in the southern region. That produces the pressures that push them north in search of jobs or simple escape, that continues the high birthrates, and that exacerbates envy and bitterness over the affluence of the *Yanquis*. This poverty requires a frontal approach, not merely the longer term hope of elimination through development. The United States has a tool for the purpose: the food stamp program that benefits almost 20 million of its own citizens. America's incredibly productive agriculture could easily supply food for the poor to our south, rather than reverting to the unacceptable policy of withholding production in the U.S. because of an apparent market glut while people who cannot generate a market demand in monetary terms go hungry. The food stamp machinery would provide a number of benefits over other techniques of providing aid.

The key feature of the food stamp is that it would be placed in the hands of the individual poor citizen, who would not only receive its benefits but would clearly recognize its origins. He would use the stamp in the normal market, where it would amount to an income supplement for his food needs. The market machinery would handle the logistics by using food stamps to pay for the import of U.S.-produced food, and the banking system could process this special form of "currency." Distribution of the stamps would be through several channels: voluntary and charitable organizations, nascent enterprises selected for incentive encouragement (for example, agricultural development projects) for partial payment of wage costs, and through government machinery. Accounting controls and a joint inspection service would be necessary to prevent abuse and partiality, but the visibility of the program and the stamps themselves at the market would generate public protest against substantial misuse. In addition, the impact of possible termination would induce public pressure to keep the program working fairly.

The use of stamps would provide another benefit, as the supply of stamps could be related to the prices of local agricultural products. The supply could be increased when these prices rose as a result of shortages and reduced when they fell, reflecting greater local production. This would avoid the danger of disincentives to local agricultural development and tendencies toward permanent dependency. These flexibilities show the food stamp's superiority to the PL 480 Food for Peace techniques. Under PL 480, shipment of the actual products is either for sale to the individual (and credit of the proceeds to government projects [Title I]) or distribution in kind, primarily through voluntary organizations (Title II). In both cases the American source of the assistance tends to be obscured by the intermediaries rather than brought home to the individual recipient.

The second major element of a new strategy would be to open United States borders to free entry of citizens of participating neighboring countries for job openings that had been registered with official employment services. Such jobs would have

(Continued on page 42)

been unfilled for a defined—and short—period, with a priority to the agricultural sector. This would not likely generate a large flow, but it would produce some immigration and, to that degree, reduce the pressure of illegal immigration. It would also improve the control and care of migrant workers. Any individual entering into such arrangement should be made eligible for welfare in the U.S. for a period after such employment ceased if he could not locate another job. He would also receive food stamp assistance upon returning to his country of origin for a period of time reflecting his time in the U.S. Social Security benefits proportional to his service (in a separate fund for this purpose) could be made payable in his country of origin. The purpose of these provisions is to encourage legal residence in the United States over illegal residence and also to encourage return to the country of origin. If it operates to increase official immigration, it would in fact replace only that degree of illegal immigration. Such official entry would also help ensure that minimum wage and other protections for the immigrant are respected by his employers. Employers would no longer be able to plead the need to circumvent the employment machinery by hiring illegal immigrants; the official employment machinery would be adequate to their needs.

The third element of the strategy is the familiar one of encouraging and aiding economic development in the countries of Central America and the Caribbean. The need is to increase employment opportunities for potential migrants in their home countries. In the U.S. scale of priorities this area of the world should lead the list when it comes to foreign aid appropriations. In addition to official aid to and through governments and international agencies, development assistance should be increased from private investment. On the world scale private investment now exceeds the flow of official assistance to developing countries from member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While much of this goes to the better-off Third World rather than to the poverty-stricken Fourth World nations, several in the Caribbean area—such as Mexico and Panama—already benefit from a substantial amount of it. As part of an overall strategy, bilateral arrangements might be made with a number of our southern neighbors, not only to offer investment incentives to private capital, but also for the United States to extend its present tax incentives for Western Hemisphere trading corporations to invest in development projects in participating neighboring nations. In particular these incentives should apply to investment in labor-intensive agricultural development programs and in mineral extraction and light industry for local consumption, rather than in capital-intensive heavy industry for export and competition with established U.S. concerns.

Of course such investment arrangements must meet the expectations of other governments that a new era has dawned, that the old days of Yankee economic imperialism are past. Thus entry for such private investment must be accompanied by restraints on its operations, such as limits on the degree of

foreign ownership of local enterprises, assurances with respect to the payment of minimum wages, and adherence to local regulations. There must also be negotiated levels of reinvestment of profits within the country, relative to the amounts repatriated to the foreign investors. These arrangements should also require adherence to the OECD guidelines for international investment and multinational enterprises. This combination of incentive and control could increase the speed of development, provide employment for many in the coming generations, and preserve the dignity and independence of these societies.


The fourth and final element of the strategy must consider the interests of established industries and workers in the United States. We need to avoid a repeat of New England's crisis when its textile and other factories fled to the cheap labor of the South. Countervailing tariff duties could be imposed on directly competing products of fugitive producers whose new labor costs undercut those of the U.S. But to carry out the overall strategy such duties should have a time-graduated scale, stepping downward over a period of a few years, and they should be integrated with a program of adjustment assistance for workers affected by the cheaper imports. They can be trained and assisted to relocate in other work of higher productivity more characteristic of the potential of United States workers. This would provide both the incentive for development investment and the necessary cushion for U.S. interests.

Some idea of a price tag for such a total strategy can be gained by projecting from somewhat similar existing programs. To service the 19 million people who have benefited from food stamps—about 8 per cent of our population—the annual cost to the federal budget in 1976 was some \$5.6 billion, or about \$310.00 per recipient (individual and family). A direct application of this experience to our southern neighbor nations presents the following picture:

	Population	8 per cent	U.S. cost per person	U.S. cost
Mexico	62,000,000	5,000,000	\$310	\$1,550,000,000
Central America	19,000,000	1,520,000	\$310	\$ 471,000,000
Caribbean	17,000,000	1,360,000	\$310	\$ 421,000,000

Of course the U.S. cost experience would not be repeated exactly. The percentage of the population needing assistance would be greater in several nations. At the same time, several nations would likely reject the program initially; for example, Cuba with its 9.3 million population would subtract almost 750,000 from the total of participants listed above. Since the program would have to be negotiated with each nation concerned, the percentage of participants could be controlled at all times, increasing only after experience showed its value for the costs involved. A reasonable initial target, then, might be 15 per cent of the population of participating nations.

The cost per person of \$310.00 in the analysis above would be far above the figure that would be needed in a



neighbor's program. The U.S. food stamp buys food on the American grocery store shelf, with its processing and packaging expenses included. A foreign program could be limited to such basic foods as flour, rice, beans, and so forth. Actually, that is the way the poorer markets to the south operate anyway, with the family doing the cooking and seasoning. This reduces the annual cost per recipient by at least two-thirds; a \$100.00 cost per recipient would undoubtedly prove more than adequate.

Thus a substantial food stamp program among these nations could readily be carried out within the following maximum annual appropriations:

	Population	15 per cent	U.S. cost per person	U.S. cost
Mexico	62,000,000	9,300,000	\$100	\$ 930,000,000
Central America	19,000,000	2,850,000	\$100	\$ 285,000,000
Caribbean (less Cuba)	8,000,000	1,200,000	\$100	\$ 120,000,000
		<i>Total</i>		<i>\$1,335,000,000</i>

In addition these appropriations would, of course, go to our own agricultural sector, where they would recycle into the U.S. economy.

The other elements of the strategy would not add a large additional cost. Assistance to legal migrants would add little to the costs of reacting to the present flow of illegal ones. The development aid could be found in present appropriations for such assistance by favoring the countries participating in this program. The adjustment assistance for American labor also exists in present programs, needing only new direction to support this strategy.

The costs involved are modest when compared to the social costs to U.S. communities if the certain flood of illegal migrants occurs. Add to this the costs of vainly attempting to hold back the flood through enforcement of present legislation, and the potential defense costs in a very few years of facing a poor and hostile set of neighbors on our southern borders. Again, the North-South experience within the United States offers a sad example of social costs. Those costs far exceed, even today, the amounts required to prevent a repetition of that experience in this larger arena.

This strategy is complex and subject to attack as too sweeping. It would have to survive the many hurdles posed by diplomatic negotiations and domestic legislation. But the administrative tools exist to implement it, from the Agency for International Development to the United States Employment Service. Variants in the design could emerge from congressional debate and negotiations and could be incorporated within its overall strategic concepts. Clearly governments of partner nations would have the option to join or reject the scheme; but the experience of the Puerto Rican people, who have benefited from a somewhat similar relationship in the field of welfare assistance and capital invitation, suggests that it would possess substantial political appeal. Puerto Rico's experience has not been perfect, of course, but the contrast between Puerto Rico's average hourly wage in manufacturing (\$2.59) and the Dominican Republic's (70 cents) would be a high price for a reluctant government to explain to its voters.

The charge might be made that this strategy represents a new form of Yankee imperialism that limits the sovereignty and independence of the smaller nations to our south. Joint, bilateral management of the effort with each nation involved would demonstrate that this need not be the case. Indeed, for other nations this would be a less humiliating way of solving a joint problem than condoning a continued flow of cheap and exploited labor to the United States. There must also be assurance that the U.S. cannot abruptly and unilaterally terminate its part in the program. The smaller governments must not be under the threat of either complying with U.S. wishes on unrelated issues or else facing a hungry popular outcry.

With such provisions for respect of their sovereignty, an invitation to participate in the economy and welfare system of the United States need in no way require these nations to surrender their independence in the political field. The obvious objective of the scheme is to forestall the growth of frustration and hostility and replace them with an attitude of cooperation to overcome our interdependent difficulties. Food stamps would bring this point home to each recipient and voter to our south; such solid evidence of United States concern for their personal welfare would contrast with whatever hostile demagoguery might be asserted by opponents.