

A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK?
COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE IRAQ SURGE.

A thesis presented to the faculty of the Graduate School of
Western Carolina University in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in US History.

By

Matthew T. Buchanan

Director: Dr. Richard Starnes
Associate Professor of History, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.

Committee Members: Dr. David Dorondo, History,
Dr. Alexander Macaulay, History.

April, 2018

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations	iii
Abstract	iv
Introduction	1
Chapter One: Perceptions of the Iraq War: Early Origins of the Surge	17
Chapter Two: Winning the Iraq Home Front: The Political Strategy of the Surge.	38
Chapter Three: A Change in Approach: The Military Strategy of the Surge	62
Conclusion	82
Bibliography	94

ABBREVIATIONS

ACU - Army Combat Uniform
ALICE - All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment
BDU - Battle Dress Uniform
BFV - Bradley Fighting Vehicle
CENTCOM - Central Command
COIN - Counterinsurgency
COP - Combat Outpost
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority
CROWS- Common Remote Operated Weapon System
CRS- Congressional Research Service
DBDU - Desert Battle Dress Uniform
HMMWV - High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle
ICAF - Industrial College of the Armed Forces
IED - Improvised Explosive Device
ISG - Iraq Study Group
JSS - Joint Security Station
MNC-I - Multi-National-Corps-Iraq
MNF- I - Multi-National Force – Iraq Commander
MOLLE - Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment
MRAP - Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle)
QRF - Quick Reaction Forces
RPG - Rocket Propelled Grenade
SOI - Sons of Iraq
UNICEF - United Nations International Children’s Fund
VBIED - Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

ABSTRACT

A NEW WAY FORWARD OR THE OLD WAY BACK? COUNTERINSURGENCY IN
THE IRAQ SURGE.

Matthew Tyler Buchanan, M.A.

Western Carolina University (April, 2018)

Director: Dr. Richard Starnes

This work will consist of three chapters and a conclusion. The goal is to explain the need for the Surge, its image, and its relative success. Many of the histories written about the Surge appear within the first three years of the operation. Over a decade has passed since the start of the Surge in early 2007, and sources have come to light that did not exist in the immediate aftermath. Using these sources involves looking at the events that made the Surge a viable option, the political policy used in Iraq, and the tactical strategy employed by the US military and coalition forces. Also, new evidence allows for previous claims of success to be analyzed in a nuanced way and draw conclusions about the long-term strengths and weaknesses of the Surge.

INTRODUCTION

In a television address January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush announced, “Tonight in Iraq, the armed forces of the United States are engaged in a struggle that will determine the direction of the global war on terror and our safety here at home. The new strategy I outline tonight will change America's course in Iraq and help us succeed in the fight against terror.”¹ These words marked the commencement of the Iraq Surge, which increased the military strength in the Baghdad region by an additional 30,000 troops and a change of strategy. The new plan received criticism and support from both parties represented in Congress. The opposition to the Surge focused on the overall cost in dollars, lives, and long-term consequences. The supporters of the Surge viewed the action as a display of resolve to win the war. In the immediate aftermath, the consensus about the outcome suggests the Surge was an operational success, but a closer examination offers a more nuanced conclusion. The purpose of this research is to examine claims made about the Surge and review them using information that has surfaced over the past decade. The first step is to define the Surge and the parts of the strategy that added a new approach in Iraq.

The Surge was an increase of combat power into the Baghdad Province in 2007. It included operations designed to decrease regional violence, to increase the logistical capabilities, and to hinder growth of terrorist cells. The Surge had its roots in a bipartisan group appointed by congress in 2006 to determine a way forward for the U.S. in Iraq. The Iraq Study Group (ISG) suggested a new strategy that would allow the Iraqi

¹ George Bush, “President Bush Addresses the Nation on Iraq” (lecture, Washington D.C., January 10, 2007), accessed November 18, 2017. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/AR2007011002208.html>.

government and military to take a larger role in day-to-day operations. Also, the group laid out plans for a large increase of troops to quell sectarian violence and restore order. The report presented offered two choices. First, the ISG suggested a military cordon of Baghdad to cut off enemy personnel and supplies. The second phase of ISG recommendations included increasing the security forces within the city by establishing Joint Security Stations (JSS) and Combat Outposts (COP). In addition to more soldiers, the plan also expanded an ongoing strategy of recruiting local leaders as implemented by Multi-National Force- Iraq Commander (MNF-I) General George Casey and U.S. Central Command Commander (CENTCOM) General John Abizaid.²

Additional troops were opposed by both General Casey and General Abizaid, who argued an increase would only deliver a temporary solution to the deep factionalism separating political leaders in Iraq. However, the divide within the Iraqi political structure arose from more than secular differences. The ongoing sectarian violence between the Sunni and Shia compounded tensions. U.S. politicians, such as Representatives Ron Paul, Walter Johnson, and Jim Duncan believed the Surge would favor the Shia as a result of the changing demographics in Baghdad, causing long-term complications for any reconciliation. The loudest supporters of the Surge in Congress, Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, believed anything short of a complete military victory in Iraq would signal weakness in the international community. To implement the strategy correctly, the US needed a unified approach. President Bush replaced Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates. Also, General

² James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 22-30.

Raymond Odierno, an avid supporter of the Surge, replaced General Peter Chiarelli as the commander of the Multi-National-Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). Finally, General David Petraeus took as the commanding General of MNC-I, and with the help of analysts at Fort Leavenworth, produced a counterinsurgency field manual and stood ready to implement this new plan for Iraq.³

The year preceding the Surge was bloody and violent. The loss of American soldiers and civilian lives continued to rise due to the unrest and sectarian violence. General Casey cautioned that the increase of US troops would lead to a lengthened amount of time before the Iraqi government took control, while also augmenting the division between factions in Iraq. Despite warnings of current and previous leadership in Iraq, such as General Casey, General Abizaid, General Paul Eaton, General Charles Swannack, and General John Batiste, the implementation of the Surge offered a new direction in a war that had bogged down. Instead of allowing the Iraq government to act as a sovereign state and solve national issues over time, the United States elected for a more aggressive approach in an attempt to manipulate the outcome of a complex situation.⁴ The concept of increasing troop levels to change the momentum of a war is not new, but the motivations behind the choice often vary. Thus, the motivation behind the Surge requires exploration in order to understand operational goals and analyze the outcome.

The Surge is a recent event but is far from a unique phenomenon. Academics are divided about how the Surge was a success. Historian Kimberly Kagan was the first

³ George W. Bush, *Decision Points* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2010), 363-380.

⁴ David E. Sanger, Michael R. Gordon and John F. Burns, "Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush Team Says, *New York Times*, January 02, 2007, accessed January 2, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02war.html?mwrsm>.

academic to publish a book about this phase of the Iraq War. Founder of the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C. and author of *The Surge: A Military History*, she also taught at West Point, Yale, Georgetown, and American University. She served as a member of General Stanley McChrystal's strategic assessment team during his campaign review in June and July 2009 in Afghanistan. She was a member the Academic Advisory Board at the Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence at CENTCOM. She conducted multiple research trips to Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010 while General Petraeus and General Raymond T. Odierno served as the MNF-I Commanding General. She participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team for MFN-I from October 2008 and October 2009 and as part of the Civilian Advisory Team for CENTCOM's strategic review in January 2009. Per the bibliography, her research was active during the operation and her sources were retrieved from her own organization. Therefore, her book is less an historical analysis than a contemporary account of a strategy the author had a hand in creating.⁵

Kagan admits that while she believes the Surge was a success, the complexity of the operation offers opportunities for alternate interpretations. However, Kagan contends that "the current conflict has been presented largely through disjointed horror stories and is a very real problem, the result of which is that citizens with only the vaguest conceptions of ongoing operations feel qualified to pronounce their own country's defeat."⁶ Kagan clearly sets out to address the idea that the war on terrorism was not a spur of the moment decision, and seeks to display the deep level of

⁵ Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, xiv-xv.; "Dr. Kimberly Kagan," Institute for the Study of War, accessed August 15, 2017, <http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/staff-bios/dr-kimberly-kagan>, 1.

⁶ Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, xiv.

preparation taken by the United States military leadership. The book covers the period from January 2007 to the spring of 2008. The theoretical azimuth of her work is set on liberal intervention, which allows intervening in the affairs of sovereign nations for both foreign policy and humanitarian objectives. Kagan openly aims her arguments to reinforce the actions of the Bush Administration by concluding that the foundation for theory and doctrine involving a successful counterinsurgency is demonstrated through the Surge.

Kagan drew the supporting evidence for this book from limited sources. Her main resource is the Institute of War Studies to give an inside look at the operational structure. She uses the *New York Times* and *Time Magazine* to display the mainstream coverage of the Surge and the construction of US perceptions. The last group of sources used consists of official press releases and public statements. Kagan takes a top-down approach in her book. Interviews from key US military leaders and government officials in charge of the strategy in Iraq helps shape her narrative of the Surge.

William Knowlton, Jr, a Professor of Behavioral Science in the Department of Strategic Leadership, is a part of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) at the National Defense University. He subscribes to success of the Surge revolving around the reduction of sectarian violence. While reflecting on the Surge in 2010, he concludes that the largest reason for this decrease was innovative leadership on the part of General Petraeus and his staff and credits him with forming a strategy upon his appointment to lead the war in Iraq. The four points Knowlton discusses begin with Petraeus adopting a political strategy of seeking a cease-fire with individual groups and

key actors. By accomplishing this, General Petraeus sought to win the hearts and minds of the leadership in Iraq. Secondly, diplomatic relations in the Baghdad region allowed the coalition forces to build relationships with individual factions and control internal violence. Next, the Surge sought to equip the local and Iraqi government with the ability to control their own areas, therefore taking the pressure off the military. Lastly, to accomplish the first three goals, the Surge sought to remove instigators of sectarian violence from power.⁷

The importance of Knowlton's work is that he provides explanation of what he believes to be a successful strategy and highlights obstacles that had to be overcome. The violence towards civilians in 2006 had damaged the image of US soldiers in Iraq. The belief was that this approach would alleviate some of the pressure on soldiers through building rapport with people in the area. With the local population supporting the coalition forces, Petraeus could focus his attention on Iraqi leadership and facilitate an atmosphere of cooperation for peace by decreasing conflict over sectional differences.⁸

Knowlton also believes that the operation faced an uphill battle for support in the United States. The analysis of the teamwork between General Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker offers a new explanation for successful aspects of the Surge. Ambassador Crocker was an experienced diplomat who had been sent to Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, and Pakistan prior to Iraq. He was a student of the Middle East and also fluent in Arabic. The combination of General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker created relationship that put diplomatic and military goals on the same page.

⁷ William Knowlton. *The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq* (, Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Washington D.C., 2010), accessed January 24, 2018, <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309>, 9-10.

⁸ William Knowlton. *The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq*, 11-13.

Part of the military genius displayed by General Petraeus, according to Knowlton, was his ability to work with the government officials who controlled the resources needed to achieve political objectives set for the Surge. Knowlton's focus also includes the controversial congressional hearings where the competence and character of Petraeus was questioned.⁹ Through Knowlton's arguments, we see General Petraeus as an intellectual military leader, but also gifted in political maneuvering.

The majority of materials used to support the author's claims are personally generated. Knowlton relies on conversations that he had directly with General Petraeus. To substitute for other parts of the story, the author uses briefings and testimony from Congressional hearings. The author uses polling from the Fox News network to gauge Surge support among the American public. Finally, Knowlton also consults with multiple secondary sources in support of his findings, which include both works of scholarship and personal accounts.

Historian Dale Andrade's work, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*, was also published in 2010. The majority of the Surge took place in the Baghdad Beltway. However, Andrade focuses on the most southern tip of Surge operations. This was a part of the Surge that was not readily covered in the mainstream media, but had definite effects on the outcome of the strategy. This book is a traditional military history of the 3rd Infantry Division and their strategic movements along the Tigris River. The author discusses the increase in troops, innovative tactics, and strategic vision implemented by the Unit US military. However, a key for success identified by Andrade was not a standard recognized

⁹ Ibid, 10-14.

military achievement. Instead, in a chapter called “What Winning Looks Like,” he explores economic and humanitarian factors that made the Surge a success.¹⁰

First, Andrade makes a claim that the economic situation in Iraq improved significantly due to the actions taken during the Surge. His evidence to support this comes from an interview of General Rick Lynch in a 3rd Infantry Division newsletter called the *Dog Face Daily*, where Lynch stated, “Roads that were laced with IEDs a year ago are now littered with thriving markets.”¹¹ Second, he highlights humanitarian successes, which are a difficult factor to gauge due to a lack of information. The author once again relies on the assessment of General Lynch that, “Bombed out buildings are now schools and clinics.”¹² Evidence of civilian casualties, destruction to infrastructure, or the loss of normalcy are not addressed. Instead, the presentation of evidence highlights only positive attributes of the Surge.

Andrade also spent time in Iraq while doing his research, and he uses interviews that he conducted while in Iraq. He also uses executive summaries, which offers insight into tactical approaches by the military. When acknowledging public approval or opinion, Andrade consults well-circulated magazines and journals. However, the bulk of sources relied on by the author are brigade specific. Mission reports and official military documentation are how Andrade makes the case for tactical superiority. His work focuses on the mission as they transpired with no coverage of the outcome when the

¹⁰ Dale Andrade, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*, 383-392.

¹¹ “Marne 6 Sends: Meeting the Needs of the Iraqi People,” *Dog Face Daily*, 1 June 2008, 1.

¹² *Ibid*, 1.

combat subsided. Another work covering the Surge was written by a previous officer involved in the operation.

Peter Mansoor is a retired Colonel who served as an Executive Officer to General Petraeus, and was an early advocate of a troop increase in Iraq. He is also a professor of military history at Ohio State University. His contribution, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*, defends all declarations of success in 2013. According to Mansoor, the Surge was a military, political, and humanitarian success. He argues that the current situation in Iraq is not reflective of the achievements of the Surge. Mansoor sees Petraeus as a victor, and asserts the decline in Iraq did not officially start until President Bush left office.¹³ The focus of his work is to answer accusations by journalists and retired Generals that question the Surge as a viable operation.

Mansoor argues that the Surge was a turning point in American military history due to six points. The first was the Sunni Awakening and Reconciliation, which consisted of turning ordinary Sunnis against al Qaeda. Targeted special operations were next, which was the capture or killing of key terrorists. The development of Iraqi security forces turned every day Iraqi citizens into effective coalition partners. Civilian components focused on projects such as increasing electricity and oil production. The detainee operations and rule-of-law initiatives took preventive measures to stop insurgents from using detention camps as universities for terrorists. Finally, the Iraqi political component and strategic communications offered the opportunity to break the

¹³ Bob Woodward, *The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 152-153; Mansoor, Peter R. *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 18-46.

deadlock between Iraq's political factions and create a culture of support for the Iraq War in the United States.¹⁴ Thus far, the documentation of the Surge is lacking objective voices, or at the least individuals who carried out the operations.

The prevailing narrative of the Surge was designed by those closest to the development of the strategy. Many publications shaping the historiography of this event are previous assistants to generals or advisors to policy development. They have controlled the scholarship and the focus. The majority of scholarly writings concerning this event focuses on top leadership, paying little attention to over 130,000 troops who carried out the orders of the Surge. Historians often observe the Surge as a redirection in military strategy due to innovative thinking. However, regardless of the stance on this portion of the Surge, it has a clear influence on current military thinking on counterinsurgency. A bottom-up approach can offer insight into the Surge by exploring these events through a different lens. The work that follows attempts to bring a fresh historical perspective by focusing on the soldiers who fought as a part of the Surge.¹⁵

This work will consist of three chapters and a conclusion. The goal is to explain the need for the Surge, its image, and its relative success. Many of the histories written about the Surge appear within the first three years of the operation. Over a decade has passed since the start of the Surge in early 2007, and sources have come to light that did not exist in the immediate aftermath. Using these sources involves looking at the

¹⁴ Ibid, 20-68.

¹⁵ Andrew J. Bacevich, *Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 29-64.

events that made the Surge a viable option, the political policy used in Iraq, and the tactical strategy employed by the US military and coalition forces.

Chapter one will focus on the factors that led to the choosing and implementing of this specific strategy. The Surge was an operation that lasted over a year, and my research will seek to divide it into a political and tactical action plan. Chapter two will explore the political policy chosen for Baghdad and executed by the US military. The third chapter will investigate military involvement from a tactical standpoint by looking at different techniques used to secure Baghdad and restore the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. The conclusion will seek to connect the previous chapters and identify the inconsistencies in the traditional narrative of the Surge's success.

The first chapter will argue that the choice to implement the Surge was not made on a whim, but rather following a chain of events that challenged the perceptions of the war in Iraq. The first shift was due to the second battle of Fallujah in November 2004. The size, violence, and loss of *Operation Phantom Fury*, also called *Operation Al-Fajr*, caused an immediate reaction in the United States. In the aftermath of this operation, the Iraq War became vulnerable to comparisons with previous conflicts. General Anthony Zinni, former CENTCOM Commander who served from 1965-2000, stated: "I have seen this movie, it was called Vietnam." Fallujah was the bloodiest battle of the Iraq War and created the most casualties of any battle since the Battle of Hue City in 1968. Fallujah represents a turning point in the Iraq War. Both support for the war and

the confidence that the US military could win suffered. Fallujah also changed the focus from a war against the Ba'athist government to a fight against insurgents.¹⁶

Another shift was the increase in attacks towards coalition soldiers and incited violence between the Sunni and Shia. The brutality of sectarian violence in Baghdad destabilized the region and decreased the legitimacy and control of the Iraqi government. The culmination of these factors damaged the mission in Iraq and by the end of 2005, also brought into question the capacity of the Bush administration to lead. As political approval ratings fell, several factors forced the military towards a change in strategy. The first step was the formation of the ISG in the spring of 2006. The ISG highlighted problems with the current military strategy, and their suggestions encouraged a new approach to the war in Iraq. Among those proposals was to plan a decrease the number of troops due to the diversion of resources from Afghanistan and the transfer of power to officials in Iraq. A key factor that became a justification for the Surge was the Sunni Awakening in the fall of 2006. After an alliance with Sunni led al-Qaeda insurgents for several years, leadership in the Sunni communities in Baghdad removed their support. The new alliance with the United States, in combination with the December release of both the ISG report, and the *U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* offered hope that an increase of troops could secure Baghdad.¹⁷

¹⁶ Dexter Filkins and James Glantz, "With Airpower and Armor, Troops Enter Rebel-Held City," *New York Times*, November 08, 2004, accessed January 4, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/08/international/with-airpower-and-armor-troops-enter-rebelheld-city.html>; Thomas Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005* (NY: Penguin Press, 2007). 338-362.

¹⁷ Andrew J. Bacevich, *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*, New York: Random House, 2016, 184-202; Iraq Study Group (U.S.), "The Iraq Study Group Report : Iraq Study Group (U.S.) : Free Download & Streaming," Internet Archive, December 2006, accessed January 4, 2018,

The second chapter will explore the civil policy the United States sought to implement in Baghdad between January 2006 and May 2007. For an operation that lasted just over a year, expectations were immense. One of the primary goals of the Surge was to decrease sectarian and insurgent violence through the use of coalition forces and local militias. In addition, a reduction of violence would be an important factor for arguing the success of the Surge. Satellite imagery, collected by the University of California Los Angeles, offers a different explanation for the decrease of tension between the two factions in Baghdad. According to their data, Sunni neighborhoods went dormant, following targeted killings and a mass exodus, which removed the targeted population. Instead of a Surge influence, the findings of this report suggest that the reason behind the decline of local attacks was a product of the Shia successfully removing a large portion of the Sunni population.

Another point of contention concerns the relative success of the rebuilding of infrastructure. The building of schools, reopening of local economies, and reinstating of the Iraqi government offered the potential for stability and a return to normalcy. However, the lack of coverage on this portion of the Surge by previous authors creates possibility for original research when seeking answers regarding the Surge's success.¹⁸ Since the conclusion of the Surge, documentation of these efforts has continued to be declassified and released. Additionally, the decade since the Surge has increased the

<https://archive.org/details/theiraqstudygrou25686gut>; *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual U.S. Army Field Manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication no. 3-33.5*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), i-14.

¹⁸ Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 200-205; William Knowlton. *The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq* (Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Washington D.C., 2010), accessed January 24, 2018, <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309>, 9-10.

number of veterans who have retired, been discharged, or are more willing to discuss the operation. The combination of these sources will offer a fresh look at the Surge, while considering previous findings.

An additional plan for stability in Baghdad was the funding of local groups, like the Sons of Iraq (SOI) consisting of local residents and former insurgents from the region. Information released to the American public offered a way to gain and keep support of the new strategy. The desired outcome was to show an increase of local involvement in the media and display a shift of power from the United States to Iraqi officials. Cooperation between these two governments would show hope for a long-term democracy and a validation of the United States involvement in the Middle East. The US government plan contended that “the Pentagon team would portray a ‘new Iraq’ offering hope of a prosperous and democratic future, which would serve as a model for the Middle East.” American, British, and Iraqi media experts would be hand-picked to provide "approved USG information" for the Iraqi public, while ensuing a strategic information campaign displaying the transition towards a representative government over a period of one year. To accurately assess this approach, a review of fund allocation using media and congressional financial reports. The exploration of these documents display which groups received funding, how was it reported, and whether there were safeguards in place to avoid misallocation or abuse of resources.¹⁹

¹⁹ Donnelly, Thomas, and Frederick W. Kagan. *Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields*. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2010, 2-24; Joyce Battle, "Pentagon "Rapid Reaction Media Team" for Iraq," Iraq: The Media War Plan, May 8, 2007, accessed January 14, 2018, <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm>; Meg Sullivan. "UCLA study of satellite imagery casts doubt on surge's success in Baghdad." UCLA Newsroom. September 18, 2008, accessed January 12, 2018. <http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852>.

The third chapter will evaluate the tactical element of the Surge. First, the plan was to increase the troop level by an estimated 20,000 soldiers during the early months of 2007. New weapons technology and the introduction of new combat equipment, such as the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles, followed the rising troop levels. The goal of the troop increase was to secure the Baghdad region through continuous presence and remove the threat of a growing insurgency. The strategy had two parts. The establishment of JSS locations would be used to facilitate the training of the Iraqi Police and provide home bases for guarding routes through the city. Strategically placed COPs created secure sites to house soldiers, supply quick reaction forces (QRF) to repel attacks, and provide a constant presence. The second part of this equation was the development of local forces, such as the SOI and building relationships with the populace.²⁰

The goal was to secure Baghdad from inside, but also stop the steady flow of weapons into the city. Route clearance, security checkpoints, and night raids were all part of this plan. By stopping surrounding threats, the US military believed they could control the growth of the insurgency. The perception of the strategy is that it worked, but the implementation of US Counterinsurgency (COIN) in Baghdad needs further inspection from the perspective of the soldiers who carried out the missions. Through the use of military and media sources, the core of this chapter will analyze the

²⁰ John Pike, "Military," Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Program, October 1, 2012, accessed January 14, 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/mrap.htm>; Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*, 47-54.

effectiveness of these tactics, and whether short-term solutions achieved long-term goals.²¹

Each chapter offers a different approach to the Surge, while highlighting different areas of operations that contained specific objectives. However, each part contributes to the overall outcome and perception of success attributed to the Surge. As a consequence, the highlighting of similarities and contradictions within these claims will offer a fresh viewpoint about the operation. By parsing out the different components of the Surge, this study's desired outcome is to emphasize what worked and what failed while simultaneously applying the findings to the potential use of Surge operations in the future. Lastly, using the voices of Surge veterans offers a different perspective of the operation and displays how planning and implementing strategies are not the same thing. Instead, the voices of soldiers will offer the why to the questions about the relative successes and failures of the Surge.

²¹ *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication no. 3-33.5.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 34-43; Dale Andrade, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*, 383-392.

CHAPTER ONE: PERCEPTIONS OF THE IRAQ WAR: EARLY ORIGINS OF THE SURGE.

The Surge in Iraq was a complex mission that required significant logistical planning and resources. The decision to increase the number of troops on the ground meant identifying which units would be deployed, when they would deploy, and adjusting deployment lengths to compensate for the change in strategy. The plan required the identification of supply routes and locations for combat outposts (COP) and joint security stations (JSS). Understanding the level of support for such an undertaking involves exploration of the situations that led to the implementation of this approach. The years leading up to the Surge included a change in the enemy that coalition forces combatted, a significant increase in violence, and a long-lasting sectional divide within the Iraq populace that threatened the future of democracy in the region. To understand the events that justified the Surge, the focus will highlight the second battle for Fallujah in 2004, the rise of violence and the Sunni Awakening in 2005 and 2006, and the options given by the Iraq Study Group to counter these developments.¹

The decline of public support for the Iraq War began in November 2004 with the second fight for Fallujah, also known as Operation Al-Fajr or Phantom Fury. The second battle of Fallujah occurred only seven months after the initial battle for the city in April. The re-emergence of hostiles in Fallujah signified a shift for the war in Iraq. Although the coalition forces won, the six-week struggle altered the future of the Iraq War in three significant ways. First, the enemy the US was fighting changed from members of the

¹ William Knowlton. *The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq* (Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, Washington D.C., 2010), accessed January 24, 2018, <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309>, 12-20.

Ba'athist Regime to a full-scale insurgency. Secondly, the loss of troops invoked fear in the American population about the military's ability to win the war, which in turn damaged public perceptions and created an opportunity for people who opposed the Bush Administration's strategy in Iraq to gain traction.²

Fallujah is a large city located on the Euphrates River. In addition, the city is part of the Sunni Triangle, extending west to Ramadi, east to Baghdad, and north to Tikrit. With strong ties to Saddam, the de-Ba'athification of the region caused resentment from former military members who joined Sunni-led insurgencies. The change in the organizational alliance, from military to insurgency, also altered the way the enemy approached conflicts with coalition forces. By November 2004, Fallujah was littered with improvised explosive devices (IED) that added layers of difficulty to maneuvering through the city. These urban fighters also strategically placed weapon caches throughout the city and designated sniper positions. Furthermore, the motivation of this group no longer sought to protect a regime or leader. Instead, the purpose of fighting became ideological and was rooted in tribal identity and factionalism.³

The amount of violence following the initial contact on November 7, 2004 was immense. The insurgents that fought the Marines in Fallujah were better armed and

²Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005* (New York: Penguin, 2005), 394-401; Richard S. Lowry, *New Dawn: The Battles for Fallujah* (New York, NY: Savas Beatie, 2011), 269-280; Bill Ardolino, *Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 17-29.

³ Bill Ardolino, *Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), 42-50; Vince Crawley, "Clearing the Way for Elections : Some insurgents May Have Fled Fallujah Before Forces Arrived," Marine Corps Times (Springfield), November 22, 2004, accessed December 18, 2017, http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxy195.nclive.org/apps/news/openurl?ctx_ver=z39.88-2004&rft_id=info%3Aid/infoweb.newsbank.com&svc_dat=AWNB&req_dat=783B7306E53F4682A63F3866612EDCA6&rft_val_format=info%3Aofi/fmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Actx&rft_dat=document_id%3Anews%252F1076C1CEA22FCB38.

prepared than previous clashes between coalition forces and Hussein loyalists. The result of fighting a well-organized enemy was a high cost in lives and resources. An estimated 12,000 American troops were involved, both directly and indirectly, in the second fight for Fallujah. Injuries and deaths were a result of clearing the city by the block and encountering sniper fire, booby traps, and IEDs. Anti-personnel mines also came to the forefront of concerns in Fallujah. The debilitating nature of the injuries sustained created a push for better protection, and the number of IED attacks magnified the need for advanced technology to combat the enemy efficiently. The total number dead after the operation was 82, with another 600 injured. Loss during the campaign were the highest suffered since the Tet Offensive in 1968, and the parallels quickly circulated in the mainstream media.⁴

The loss of life and the injuries sustained were not the only points of political disagreement. The combination of human cost and rising budget deficits also compounded the situation in Iraq. By the end of 2004, war-related expenditures averaged \$7 billion dollars per month, and with Afghanistan and Iraq combined, the US added \$412 billion more to the deficit. Questions about the ability to win the war in Iraq, coupled with climbing expenses and no clear exit strategy, damaged the public opinion of the war and the credibility of the Bush Administration to lead. Concerns about our

⁴ Richard D. Camp, *Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 36-47; Phillip Carter and Owen West, "Body counts in Iraq and Vietnam," *Slate Magazine*, December 27, 2004, accessed December 27, 2017, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2004/12/iraq_2004_looks_like_vietnam_1966.html; Todd S. Purdum, "Flashback to the 60's: A Sinking Sensation of Parallels Between Iraq and Vietnam," *New York Times*, January 29, 2005, accessed December 27, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/29/politics/flashback-to-the-60s-a-sinking-sensation-of-parallels-between-iraq.html>.

ongoing role and in the Middle East and the viability of our strategy demanded attention and consideration.⁵

Days before the outbreak of violence in Fallujah, George W. Bush won the election over John Kerry for his second term. Both candidates ran a campaign that emphasized staying the course in Iraq and not leaving the mission unfinished, but each had different approaches to accomplishing this objective. The violence during Operation Phantom Fury served as a tool to further heighten political division. In the face of criticism for the high death toll and cost, Senator Lindsey Graham addressed the conflict in Fallujah on *Face the Nation*. His position was one of optimism for the way the military was conducting missions in the city. He contended that “Fallujah is a turning point in the sense that the Iraqis are fighting for their own freedom. They're better trained, they're better equipped. They're willing to die for their own freedom.” Graham admitted the costs were high, but also argued they were necessary to secure the permanent spread of democracy in Iraq. During the clearing of the insurgency in Fallujah, soldiers found large weapons caches and torture sites that exposed the rising tensions between religious factions in the Sunni Triangle. Earlier that year, the military uncovered letters addressed to senior al-Qaeda leaders expressing a desire to exacerbate sectarian pressure and cause a civil war. The goal in Fallujah was to eradicate the insurgents and stabilize the situation in pursuit of reconciliation. In addition, the defeat of al-Qaeda in

⁵ Andrew J. Bacevich, *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History* (New York, NY: Random House, 2016), 267; Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005*. (New York: Penguin, 2005), 394-401.

Fallujah served as an example of American forces effectively clearing the path for a successful election in January of 2005.⁶

The opposing side of the debate focused more on the cost of the operation. As previously stated, the high cost in lives and money created friction among the American public. Additionally, the amount of collateral damage that occurred in the city of Fallujah caused concern. The *Guardian* called Operation Al-Fajr a “humanitarian catastrophe” while prominent members of the Democratic Party, such as John Kerry, critiqued the mission for lacking vision and calling for a clear exit strategy. The media questioned the tactics employed and condemned the immense devastation of infrastructure and loss of civilian life. Despite warnings from the US military weeks in advance, everyone did not evacuate. Fallujah, due to the direct style of warfare waged by the insurgents and the US military, made eliminating civilians casualties unavoidable. The weapons used also came under scrutiny as accusations of employing white phosphorus munitions spread in the United States. The Pentagon initially denied the use of such weapons in the aftermath of Fallujah, but by November 2005 they reversed their answer and by 2006 were trying to justify the legality of their actions.⁷

The result of the second battle for Fallujah influenced both sides of the mainstream debate. For supporters, the conflict had eliminated a significant threat and

⁶ Terry H. Anderson, *Bush's Wars* (New York: Oxford Press, 2011), 186-187; Bob Schieffer, "CBS News Face the Nation." Other. *CBS News*, November 14, 2004, accessed February 24, 2018, https://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/face_111404.pdf.

⁷ Saddir, Abdul-Qadir. "Fallujah Residents Angry Over Destruction." *Newspaper Source Plus*, 11 Jan. 2005. Accessed December 18, 2017, <http://proxy195.nclive.org/login?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.ebscohost.com%2Flogin.aspx%3Fdirect>; J. R. Crook, (2006). U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq. *The American Journal of International Law*, 100(2), 487. Retrieved from <http://proxy195.nclive.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/201155134?accountid=14968>; Rory McCarthy and Peter Beaumont, "Civilian Cost of Battle for Fallujah Emerges," *Guardian*, November 13, 2004, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/14/iraq.iraq3>.

destroyed an enemy stronghold in the region and offered the opportunity for the United States to secure a political and military victory. In a panel debate on CNN, Representative Jane Harman argued that “I think there is a great opportunity finally after years of frustration, to use American power in the next four years actively to help achieve a peace in the region.” For critics of the war, Fallujah was an example of extreme force due to the use of questionable tactics and the amount of collateral damage. In addition, the perception of poor planning created tension as well. Senator Ted Kennedy claimed that “The president has lost all credibility with our allies, we’ve lost that support, and I believe that just because this president cannot develop a program to establish an Iraq that can be independent.” The discussion of how to proceed in Iraq, or whether the United States should stay, intensified over the next two years. Fallujah also magnified the sectarian violence that would become a leading factor for justifying the Surge in 2007. After Fallujah, the growing insurgency would not directly attack coalition forces in a traditional battle again. Instead, they would rely on full-scale guerrilla warfare.⁸

The two years between the end of the conflict in Fallujah and the announcement of the Surge are crucial for understanding how the implementation of the Surge came to pass. To adequately explain the timeline, the exploration of the military and political ramifications of a post-Fallujah Iraq will be separated and observed by the year. The

⁸ Ed Henry, "Bush: U.S. to Stay in Iraq till War is Won," CNN, December 1, 2005, accessed April 8, 2017, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/30/us.iraq/index.html>; Peter Baker and Dana Milbank, "Bush Says War Is Worth Sacrifice," *Washington Post*, June 29, 2005, accessed December 29, 2017, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/28/AR2005062801532.html>; Bob Schieffer, *CBS News*, "Face the Nation," Other. CBS News, September 26, 2004. Accessed February 24, 2018. http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/face_092604.pdf; Bob Schieffer, "CBS News Face the Nation," Other. *CBS News*, November 14, 2004. Accessed February 24, 2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/face_111404.pdf.

military lens will focus on the intensity of the violence, while the political factors seek to explain the controversy surrounding continued US involvement in Iraq.

The start of 2005 was plagued with violence, beginning with 106 US military deaths in the first month. The use of suicide bombers, both on foot and in vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), increased in regularity and severity creating an atmosphere of anxiety among both military personnel and civilians. By March the death toll for American soldiers in Operation Iraqi Freedom reached 1,500 and continued rising to 2,000 by October. The spike in violence was Sunni-led and focused on both coalition forces and the Shia. Violence between the two factions date back to 62 CE, but Baghdad was an anomaly for decades. Not only had the Sunni and Shias coexisted in Baghdad, but marriage between the two sects had become commonplace. However, the plan to remove such practices had been in motion since early 2004, and the active shift in ideology commenced in force by 2005. The breakdown between the two factions signaled desperation in the capitol and hope for cooperation between these two Iraqi sects was no longer viable, but due to the tactics used by the Sunni neither was the potential negotiations.⁹

The political division also reached new heights, both in the US and Iraq, in 2005. The elections in January did not bring the desired level of cooperation, and the reasoning behind the war in Iraq was now under more intense scrutiny. While the government in Iraq attempted to move forward by voting for a Transitional National

⁹ Cameron W. Barr and Karl Vick, "30 Marines, Sailor Die In Copter Crash in Iraq," Washington Post, January 27, 2005, , accessed January 28, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36938-2005Jan26.html>; Joel Roberts, "U.S. Death Toll In Iraq Hits 1,500," *CBS News*, March 04, 2005, accessed December 15, 2017, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-death-toll-in-iraq-hits-1500/>; Staff Writer, "Death toll for U.S. Troops in Iraq Reaches 2,000," *NBC News*, October 26, 2005, accessed December 15, 2017, <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9772398/#.Wm3Ur9WnHrc>.

Assembly in January, and to ratify a Constitution in October, their ability to rule was severely weakened by sectarian violence. The political front in the United States was also deteriorating in 2005. Early January revealed that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) provided inadequate controls on funding and lost track of \$8.8 billion in funds allocated for the development of Iraq. Other complications surrounded the decision to enter the war to find weapons of mass destruction and manifested themselves through approval ratings, support of the war, and military recruitment.¹⁰

According to Gallup, presidential approval ratings dropped below 40 percent for the first time under George W. Bush, and people who viewed the war as unfavorable surpassed 50 percent. The most important numbers reflect in military service. For the first time in five years, the Army missed a monthly recruiting target in February by 27 percent. By September the military failed to hit goals by the most significant margin since 1979. The National Guard fell short of their objective nine months in a row as numbers from injuries and deaths continued to decrease the availability of able-bodied soldiers. Finally, in November the Senate voted 79-19 to demand regular progress reports on plans to phase troops out of Iraq, followed by Democratic Representatives calling for a complete withdrawal.¹¹

¹⁰ John Diamond, "Iraq Weapons Assessments 'Dead Wrong,'" USA Today, March 31, 2005, accessed January 14, 2018, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-31-intel-panel_x.htm; Associated Press, "Iraq draft constitution approved, officials say," NBC News, October 25, 2005, accessed December 16, 2017, <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9803257/#.Wm3X3dWnHrc>; John Pike, "Military," Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction | Reports to Congress, January 30, 2005, accessed January 4, 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/sigir-jan05_report.htm.

¹¹ Gallup, accessed January 20, 2018. <http://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx>; Gallup, Inc. "Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush." Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush. Accessed January 16, 2018. <http://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx>; David Monitz, "Army Misses Recruiting Goals," USA Today, March 2, 2005, accessed January 21, 2018, https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-02-army-goal_x.htm.

The following year began with attempts to bolster enlistment numbers, especially in the Army. Andrew Krepinevich, Director of the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, stated in a study for the Pentagon that, "Stretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a "thin green line" that could snap unless relief comes soon." Krepinevich went on to write an article titled "How to Win in Iraq," which developed a plan that laid the groundwork for what would become the Surge. Changing recruitment tactics and counterinsurgency measures that required increasing the number of combat soldiers were among his recommendations. Meanwhile, in Iraq, sectarian violence continued to grow. The bombing of the Golden Mosque in the city of Samarra, which led to the deaths of an estimated 1300 civilians, deepened sectarian tensions. As civilian and military deaths mounted and al-Qaeda denying involvement, the political climate became strained as well.¹²

The Bush Administration began the year of 2006 on the defense of their strategy in Iraq. Also, the president requested \$120 billion for the budget in Iraq and Afghanistan, an increase of \$70 billion from the previous year, which revived the scrutiny over the missing \$8.8 billion from 2005. The president continued to promise a complete victory in Iraq and committing troops to the region through 2009. During the campaign to regain support for the war, backing within the government began to crumble. A former Central Intelligence Agency official, Tyler Drumheller, revealed evidence that Bush Administration received intelligence there were no weapons of mass destruction by a

¹² Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," Foreign Affairs, October 2, 2005, accessed January 16, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2005-09-01/how-win-iraq>; Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebt, "Toll in Iraq's Deadly Surge: 1,300," Washington Post, February 28, 2006, accessed January 30, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/27/AR2006022701128.html>.

high-profile Iraqi Informant before the invasion in 2003. One week later, Colin Powell commented in an interview on Britain's ITV that he was overruled by the President and military leadership when he expressed concerns that the plan did not include enough soldiers. Finally, in mid-June, one month after Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki oversaw the formation of Iraq's first permanent constitutional government since the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Vice President of Iraq, Adil Abdul-Mahdi, asked for a timeline to pull foreign forces out by the end of 2007 as the number of American lives lost in Iraq surpassed 2,500.¹³

June 8, 2006, was a pivotal day for the formulation of a new plan in Iraq. Amid allegations, investigations, and negative reports, the US military killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. With the leader of al-Qaeda dead, the United States had completed a substantial success on the ground, which served as a talking point for arguments defending the military strategy in Iraq. However, by August a *New York Times* update estimated the civilian deaths in August around 3,000 with the number of attacks still rising. Both General John Abizaid and General George Casey admitted that due to the factional violence, civil war posed the most significant threat to stability in Baghdad.¹⁴

The events of September changed the trajectory of the Iraq War. Due to the immense violence committed by al-Qaeda, local leadership in Baghdad and surrounding

¹³ Mohammed Tawfeeq, "PM: Iraqi Troops Battle-Ready in 2007," CNN, May 23, 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/25/iraq.main/>; Nelson Hernandez and Omar Fekeiki, "Iraqi Premier, Cabinet Sworn In," *Washington Post*, May 21, 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/20/AR2006052000392.html>; Daniel Schorn, "A Spy Speaks Out," *CBS News*, April 24, 2006, accessed January 30, 2018, <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-spy-speaks-out-21-04-2006/>.

¹⁴ Nina Kamp, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz, "The State of Iraq: An Update," *New York Times*, September 30, 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html>; Nina Kamp, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz, "The State of Iraq: An Update," *New York Times*, September 30, 2006, accessed January 6, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html>.

cities began meeting in councils to discuss solutions to the insurgency problem. What emerged out of those meetings became known as the Anbar, or Sunni, Awakening. The significance of the awakening was the glimmer of hope, both politically and militarily, that the movement symbolized for the future. The Sunni sect represented the resistance to change after Saddam, and the separation between the Sunnis and the insurgency in Baghdad offered a chance for national reconciliation.¹⁵

Politically, the movement created a united front between Sunni leadership and the United States against a common enemy, al-Qaeda. The new alliance offered US leadership the opportunity to gain trust with locals and display a more significant presence within major cities like Baghdad and Ramadi. From the military perspective, they won an ally that had intimate knowledge of the enemy's tactics and capabilities. Also, the Sunni forces who once opposed the presence of the United States were now working with coalition forces to eradicate insurgents. While controversy would surround the actions and use of groups like the Sons of Iraq (SOI) militia, they were invaluable to the implementation and outcome of the Surge.¹⁶

The SOI represented a way forward for a future independent Iraq. The existence of this group displayed the level of concern the United States needed to transfer the control of the country to Iraqi authorities. The construction of these militias depended on two types of people already living in Baghdad. The first group was concerned citizens who demonstrated the desire and ability to protect their neighborhoods. The more controversial members of the newly formed SOI came as a result of the Sunni

¹⁵ Evan F. Kolhmann, "The State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: 2006," Central Intelligence Agency, December 29, 2006, accessed January 22, 2018, 2-7 https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/54/54F87F15D446471E9A12A4A0324BCB87_iraqinsurgency1206.pdf.

¹⁶ Terry H. Anderson, *Bush's Wars* (New York: Oxford Press, 2011), 202-203,

Awakening. As local leaders severed ties with al-Qaeda, many previous members of Sunni insurgent groups also switched alliances and joined forces with the US military.¹⁷

While insurgent violence over the course of 2006 was changing the minds of Sunni leadership in Iraq, the Bush Administration showed resolve towards the Iraq War during speeches and public appearances in the United States. Public support among the American people dwindled as the political climate became more divisive over actions and outcomes in Iraq. The ISG formed in March with the goal of finding potential solutions with a non-partisan panel of experts. The ISG consisted of former high profile political and judicial. They worked closely with members of Congress and received reports with proposals from expert consultants on the economy, military operations, security threats, and political development in Iraq.¹⁸

Over the course of nine months, the ISG met with a total of 44 experts who offered advice *pro bono* to assist the group in considering different areas of concern and reaching well-prepared conclusions. The result of these consultations was 31 policy papers for the ISG to review. Also, the ISG met with 177 individuals directly involved in the day to day decisions made in Iraq. The ISG met with government officials and military officers from both the US and Iraq, foreign policy specialists, business executives, and key figures like President Bush and Prime Minister Al-Maliki. The final report was distributed to the President and White House officials, followed by Congress

¹⁷Greg Bruno, "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security." The Washington Post. April 28, 2008. Accessed February 09, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html>.

¹⁸ Ian Larsen and Lauren Sucher, "Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet," United States Institute of Peace, December 20, 2006, 1-4, accessed January 4, 2018, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/isg_fact_sheet.pdf.

on December 6, 2006, and offered 79 specific recommendations in regards to future operations in Iraq.¹⁹

The first recommendation of the ISG concerned the domestic situation in the US. The ISG admitted that “this report demands a tremendous amount of political will and cooperation by the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government. It demands skillful implementation. It demands unity of effort by government agencies. And its success depends on the unity of the American people in a time of political polarization.” Sectarian violence created the most significant threat to stability, but Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militias and death squads, al Qaeda, and widespread criminality were among the factors complicating the possibility of peace.²⁰

The focal points of the suggested strategy revolved around a plan for external and internal factors. Externally, the ISG concluded that the United States had an obligation to bring long-term stability in the region. One identified obstacle was the Arab-Israeli relationship. Other issues were the training and supplying of terrorists in the Middle East by Iran. The plan advised the United States to influence Syria constructively by encouraging the Syrian government to secure their borders and help stop the flow of terrorist activity into Iraq. The goal for Iran was the same, but included recognizing the sovereignty of Iraq and ceasing to train, fund, and support terrorist actions in Iraq and towards Israel.²¹

¹⁹ James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 3-11; Ian Larsen and Lauren Sucher, "Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet," United States Institute of Peace, December 20, 2006, 1-4, accessed January 4, 2018,

²⁰ James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 8-9.

²¹ *Ibid*, 16-24.

The internal plan depended on the actions of Iraqi citizens and their willingness to take on the responsibility of their new democracy. The recommendation was the accelerated takeover of combat and policing activities against al-Qaeda. The ISG report warned against open-ended commitments of a significant number of troops for extended periods of time and suggested that continued support should rely on the Iraqi government's ability to meet objectives and move towards both military independence and national reconciliation. With or without Iraq improvements, the committee asserted that the long-term goal should be to significantly reduce the number of troops deployed, and the capacity in which they serve should move from combat operations to strictly training or advising roles. Lastly, by freeing up resources in Iraq, the focus could return to Afghanistan by increasing the number of troops and supplies available there. The immediate response to the report was divided. Both political sides in the US agreed that change in Iraq needed to take place, but that type of change should be vastly different. The reaction is visible through the lens of political, media, and military responses.

The political reaction split down party lines. Democrats believed that the ISG did not go far enough. Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid agreed with the premise that change should come but claimed the people had spoken in the congressional election a month before: the United States should pull out of Iraq. In contrast, many Republicans equally believed the ISG did not go far enough by addressing potential military actions with neighbors in the region. Robert Gates, who was nominated for the Secretary of Defense directly following mid-term elections in November 2006, agreed that a direct approach with Iran would be beneficial for the United States and the whole Middle East.

However, diplomacy was not the only option that was on the table. The division visible in politics also manifested in the media portrayal as well.²²

The opinion in the media took a more dramatic tone. One argument presented the report as a plan to keep the United States at war in Iraq indefinitely by leaving deadlines for troop removal flexible, based on an Iraqi military takeover of combat missions. Among those upset were leaders in Iraq, who were used to highlight the American public's concerns of using Iraq as a launching pad for aggressively engaging Iran through sanctions, and potentially war. Khalaf al-Alayyan, a Sunni Sheikh and parliamentarian leader of the Iraqi National Dialogue Council, claimed that "Whoever has a chance to look at it would realize Iraq [under the proposed agreement] would not just be an occupied country, but as if it were part of the United States." Also, the response to Iraq's not meeting its obligations would enable the reduction of resources but did not mention a complete withdrawal. In addition, some Iraqi parliamentarians feared the proposed agreement would continue an Iraq occupation and offer a venue for the US to fight its battles with al-Qaeda and Iran.²³

The opposite side of the spectrum focused on the suggested negotiations with Iran. The logic was to make a deal with Iran that would decrease the likelihood of a future war. However, the plan that was proposed for negotiations did not address the issues of enriching uranium or the pursuit of nuclear weapons. President Bush, in a

²² Harry Reid, "Iraq Study Group Report Reaction, Dec 6 2006 | Video," C-SPAN.org, December 6, 2006, accessed January 16, 2018, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?195658-3%2Firaq-study-group-report-reaction>; Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert Michael Gates, and Suzanne Maloney, *Iran Time for a New Approach* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004), 34-66.

²³ Howard LaFranchi, "Talks to keep U.S. troops in Iraq Provoke Ire," [The Christian Science Monitor](https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2008/0610/p03s01-usfp.html), June 10, 2008, accessed March 01, 2018, <https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2008/0610/p03s01-usfp.html>.

speech to the Israeli Knesset, attacked supporters of a deal with Iraq by saying "We have heard this foolish delusion before. As Nazi tanks crossed into Poland in 1939, an American senator declared: 'Lord, if only I could have talked to Hitler, all of this might have been avoided.' We have an obligation to call this what it is - the false comfort of appeasement, which has been repeatedly discredited by history." The official position of the Bush Administration at the end of 2006 was to maintain resolve and achieving a complete victory in Iraq.²⁴

Not all reports of the situation in Iraq were equally divisive and driven by a political agenda. More moderate coverage took a long-term approach seeking stabilization and working towards the independent operation of a centralized government in Baghdad. The ISG highlighted a plethora of areas that needed improvement, but the primary focus was on the inability for the US to win the war militarily. The report stated shortcomings of the current policy, including heavy-handed military treatment of civilians, overzealous de-Ba'athification, and the failure to adequately transfer power to Iraq officials and their military. They supported the idea to phase out operations while transitioning to an Iraq-led assault on the insurgency. With Iraq forces in the lead, the government would also gain more legitimacy with its people and could seek reconciliation between the different factions in Iraq.²⁵

²⁴ Michael Rubin, *Dancing With the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes* (New York: Encounter Books, 2015), 2-16; Staff Writer. "A Bipartisan Path to Surrender?" *The Washington Times* (Washington, DC), December 7, 2006, accessed December 16, 2017, <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/6/20061206-095730-9143r/f>; Elaine Sciolino, "Nuclear Talks With Iran End in a Deadlock," *New York Times*, July 19, 2008, accessed March 01, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html>; Matthew Duss, "Down with Hitler!" *Guardian*, May 19, 2008, accessed March 1, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/may/19/downwithhitler>.

²⁵ *Wall Street Journal*, "The Iraq Muddle Group," *Wall Street Journal*, December 07, 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116545660766942936>; James Addison Baker, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, *The Iraq Study Group Report*, 44-49.

The military reaction to the report confirmed the importance of transferring power to Iraq officials, but lacked a concrete vision for a withdrawal by the United States. After the elections, a month before, the Bush Administration expressed the desire to consider new options to the complex problems in Iraq. The portions of the report that appeared in future planning revolved around the concept that the US had an obligation to help stabilize the region and protect her interests in Iraq. In the following days, the President and Vice-President received briefings about an alternative plan that would incorporate some findings of the ISG but would offer a more aggressive military solution to the situation. Retired General Jack Keane and Frederick Kagan, resident scholar for the American Enterprise Institute, oversaw directing the "Surge Study," which became known as the "Real Iraq Study Group" and was strongly supported by Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain.²⁶

The idea of a troop surge gained national recognition in an article in *Foreign Affairs* by Andrew Krepinevich in October of 2005. The concept was adopted and promoted by Jack Keane, who also discussed the possibility and implementation with General David Petraeus and General Raymond Odierno who were in the process of developing a new *Counterinsurgency Field Manual for the Army and Marines* to use in Iraq. Before the confirmation of General Petraeus in January of 2007, General Casey subscribed to the approach developed by Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, Commander of the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) in 2006, which aspired to "shoot less and rebuild more." Under this strategy, half of the 15 combat brigades in Iraq would

²⁶ Andrew J. Bacevich, *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History* (New York, NY: Random House, 2016), 350-354; Terry H. Anderson, *Bush's Wars* (New York: Oxford Press, 2011), 203.

be pulled back and used to train Iraqi military forces to take over operations. The plan was to reduce the number of troops in Iraq and phase out combat missions for US troops. However, on December 27, 2006, a co-authored opinion piece by Keane and Kagan appeared in the *Washington Post* entitled "The Right Kind of 'Surge.'" The potential policy presented by Keane and Kagan reversed the ideological foundation of the Chiarelli Plan and sought to increase combat troops and operations to provide stability in Baghdad and place the Iraq government in charge once the coalition forces regained control of the region.²⁷

The final report was released on January 5, 2007, under the title of *Iraq: A Turning Point*. It included written statements from Senators Lieberman and McCain in support of the findings. The report received support from the Republicans but failed to unite the American people. President Bush announced on January 10, 2007, that the Surge laid out by Keane and Kagan would transpire, beginning with an increase of 20,000 troops. In Congress, the accusations from the Democratic side of the aisle were that the Bush Administration had plans for this action all along but strategically waited for the right time, and that it was insincere about their willingness to consider other options in the Middle East.²⁸

²⁷ Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., "How to Win in Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, October 2, 2005, accessed June 16, 2017, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2005-09-01/how-win-iraq>; *The Evolving National Strategy for Victory in Iraq: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations of the Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, 2nd Session, July 11, 2006* (Washington: U.S. G.P.O., 2007); Jack Keane and Frederick W. Kagan, "The Right Type of 'Surge,'" *Washington Post*, December 27, 2006, accessed January 14, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122600773.html>.

²⁸ "A Case for Additional Troops," *The Washington Times* (Washington, DC), December 15, 2006, accessed January 4, 2018, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-155929304.html?refid=easy_hf; James S. Robbins; "Behind-Scenes Strategy That Led to Iraq Surge," *Washington Times* (Washington, DC), March 10, 2009, accessed January 4, 2018, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-195276812.html?refid=easy_hf.

Once the Surge was announced, planning for the strategy began immediately. Brigades set to be deployed in the summer were moved up to winter and spring departures. The cost of the rapid push for mission readiness inflated the national defense budget by 11 percent, reaching \$481.4 billion in 2007 with a request for an additional \$141.8 billion the following year. Additional expenses not present in the initial budget in early 2007 included a supplemental request of \$93 billion, including \$5.6 billion to add five Army brigades and 4,000 Marines to the force in Iraq. The justification for the cost of the Surge was based on the violence of the previous two years. A combination of the reports offered by the ISG and the American Enterprise Institute offered expert opinions that developed into the strategy executed in Iraq. The goal was to reinstate the government in Baghdad: reach reconciliation between the factions in Iraq: create stability in the region: and protect future interests in the Middle East.²⁹

The violent events that gave rise to the Surge steadily grew between 2004 and 2007. Civilian deaths and collateral damage caused by insurgents and the efforts of the US military to expel them from the region led American citizens to question US involvement in the Middle East. The growth of guerrilla tactics stifled coalition forces and highlighted the need for a new strategy in Iraq. Desired plans split between pursuing an Iraqi controlled country through political networking that would lead to withdrawal of US

²⁹ Ann Scott Tyson, "Bush's Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era," The Washington Post, February 06, 2007, accessed January 26, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007020501552.html>; "Iraq Study Group Report Released; Saddam Hussein Executed," *Foreign Policy*, no. 02 (January 2007), accessed January 20, 2018, doi:10.1017/s1052703607000160; Dale Andradé, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010), 2-18.

troops, and trying to secure a decisive military victory by staying the course. The combination of accusations, investigations, and findings created a divisive political climate in the United States that complicated the ability of key leadership to make decisions freely. The outcome, due to the second battle for Fallujah: the rise of sectarian violence: the Sunni Awakening: and the ISG was an atmosphere that was ripe for an acceptance of a more aggressive plan

CHAPTER TWO:

WINNING THE IRAQ HOME FRONT: THE POLITICAL STRATEGY OF THE SURGE

The goal of the Surge in 2007 was to rejuvenate United States' involvement in Iraq and turn the tide of the war in favor of a complete victory. Claims of success for the operation include both military and political success in the Baghdad region. The focus of this chapter is to examine factors designed to promote stability. An attempt to create a peaceful society revolved around establishing a legitimate government and transferring power to official Iraqi leadership. Contributions made by the Surge vary depending on the focus of the research. However, three common themes emerge: a decrease in sectarian violence: the involvement of local groups: and increasing political capabilities and physical infrastructure.¹

The key measure of success when reflecting on the political strategy in Iraq revolves around a decrease in sectarian violence. One of those claims was measured by comparing monthly statistics. For example, in the Anbar Province in November of 2006, a total of 3,475 Iraqis and 69 US soldiers died. In November of 2008, that number dropped to 500 Iraqis and 12 US service members. News outlets, such as the *Wall Street Journal* and *Washington Post*, combined praise for the Surge and the Sunni Awakening with the reduction of casualties in the region by declaring "It's no longer a close call: President Bush was right about the surge." Among the people credited with

¹ Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 27-30; Dale Andradé, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010), 24-60; Daniel A. Sjursen, *Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge*, (Lebanon, NH: Foreedge, 2015), 37-48.

leading the success were George W. Bush for his political will: retired General Jack Keane for his role in Surge plan: and General David Petraeus for a fundamental change in military thinking and successful implementation of the strategy. The debate over the Surge became central to political campaigns for the 2008 elections.²

Politicians expressed support for what they observed to be positive outcomes linked to the Surge. Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman co-wrote an editorial discussing the political and military victories of the Surge in January 2008. Even politicians who opposed the implementation of the Surge claimed a reduction in violence and regional stability occurred. The leadership on both sides had experience with this type of operation. Members of Congress who were in office during the first Gulf War had learned their lesson on two fronts. One, they believed that the choice to leave Saddam Hussein in power as a mistake. Second, the opposition to the war had cost the Democratic Party congressional seats in the following elections. So, while many still opposed long-term involvement in Iraq, the consensus is that the Surge worked in quelling sectarian violence in Baghdad. Historians, in the direct aftermath, also supported the claims made by the media and politicians.³

Scholarly works on the Surge have continued to highlight the reduction of violence as a success of the Surge. The Sunni Awakening is a crucial factor highlighted

² Peter Beinart, "Admit It: The Surge Worked," Washington Post, January 18, 2009, accessed February 06, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603719.html>; Matthew Kaminski, "Why the Surge Worked," The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2008, accessed February 06, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122186492076758643>.

³ John McCain and Joe Lieberman, "The Surge Worked," Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2008, accessed February 06, 2018, <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119992665423979631>; Peter Beinart, "Admit It: The Surge Worked," Washington Post, January 18, 2009, accessed February 06, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603719.html>.

in the ability of the United States to minimize deaths between rival factions in the Baghdad region. However, the coverage of the event concentrated on the political aspects and less on the destruction that led the Sunni leadership to seek out an alliance with coalition forces. The importance placed on uniting factions in Baghdad is accurate, but all potential explanations are not welcomed with equal consideration. As early as 2008, alternate explanations have come to light, yet the existing historiography on the Surge does not address the evidence presented.⁴

Combat operations for the Surge started in February 2007 and employed a Baghdad-centric strategy. Conventional wisdom places the early stages of the Surge at the forefront of the reduction in violence. Nonetheless, by 2008 there was proof that suggested a different narrative. The University of California at Los Angeles released a set of satellite images of Baghdad during the time in question. UCLA combined their own photos with those collected by NASA's Landsat Mapping Program, and the findings of this study are imperative to understanding what transpired in Baghdad in the years leading up to the Surge. These satellite images gauged light signatures throughout Iraq, but Baghdad stood out when compared with older NASA images. Other large cities, such as Kirkuk, Mosul, Tikrit, and Karbala increased light signatures over time as the operations in Iraq shifted from the invasion and removal of the Hussein regime to stabilization and reconstruction.⁵

⁴ John Agnew et al., "Baghdad Nights: Evaluating the US Military 'Surge' Using Nighttime Light Signatures," *Environment and Planning A* 40, no. 10 (October 1, 2008), accessed February 3, 2018, doi.org/10.1068/a41200.

⁵ Meg Sullivan, "UCLA Study of Satellite imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad," UCLA Newsroom, September 18, 2008, accessed February 08, 2018, <http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852>; John Agnew et al., "Baghdad Nights: Evaluating the US Military 'Surge' Using Nighttime Light Signatures," *Environment and Planning A* 40, no. 10 (October 1, 2008), accessed February 3, 2018, doi.org/10.1068/a41200.

Baghdad displayed a different trend. The images analyzed and released for the study centered on Sunni strongholds in East and West Rashid, neighborhoods which dropped by 80 and 57 percent, respectively by January 2007. In contrast, the night-light signature in the notoriously impoverished, Shiite-dominated Sadr City remained constant, as it did in the American-dominated Green Zone. Also, as the images displayed a dramatic drop in lighting for the Sunni neighborhoods, the Surge increased the lighting in the Shiite-dominated "New Baghdad." Lead author John Agnew stated "Essentially, our interpretation is that violence has declined in Baghdad because of intercommunal violence that reached a climax as the Surge was beginning," The evidence indicates that sectarian violence in Baghdad, by the start of the Surge, had eliminated most of the potential targets by either killing them or forcing them to seek refuge. In addition, the level of chaos and destruction within the Sunni-controlled portions of the city prevented anyone from taking up residency where others had fled. The findings of this research contend that a lack of targets decreased attacks between factions prior to the beginning of the Surge, and not because of the operation.⁶

Other than one *Huffington Post* article, the report gained little attention from the mainstream media. Congress appointed an independent investigation which led to a widely-circulated study called "The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq." The Independent Commission report claimed that the continued reduction in violence depended on the involvement of the US military. The Commission also credited the Surge with stopping the conflict between the two factions

⁶John Agnew et al., "Baghdad Nights: Evaluating the US Military 'Surge' Using Nighttime Light Signatures," *Environment and Planning A* 40, no. 10 (October 1, 2008), accessed February 3, 2018, doi.org/10.1068/a41200.

in Baghdad, but also included future actions the Coalition needed to take to be successful long-term. Part of that plan involved the use of local resources to solidify the gains made earlier that year. By using a combination of community leaders, local militias, and the Iraqi Police, the Commission believed the United States could emerge victorious in Iraq.⁷

By early 2007 the US military learned that overwhelming forces did not guarantee a victory in Iraq. Fallujah was an example that superior firepower would not create stability. Instead, the choice to pursue local support was the strategy officials in the United States believed would produce a successful outcome for the future of Iraq. The first step of the new plan was to gain favor with the local sheikhs who aligned themselves with the United States during the Sunni Awakening. Next, through the influence of local leaders, the United States sought to capitalize on militias comprised of local men in the region. Through the execution of this plan, Baghdad would have both a local government and multiple security forces that could stabilize the city and take responsibility from US forces.⁸

Leveraging tribal leadership was a topic of debate beginning in 2004. While some believed it was the way for reconciliation, others thought it would only deepen the sectional divide between factions in Iraq. Individuals who believed building relationships with Sunni leaders could lead to peace were focused on ending sectarian killings. One supporting example for this view was the withdrawal of one of the most prominent Shi'a militias, the 'Mahdi Army'. Muqtada al-Sadr, a popular and influential leader of the

⁷ James L. Jones, *The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq*, 2007, MS, Washington D.C, September 9, 2007, accessed February 8, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/independent-commission-security-forces-iraq>, 15-48.

⁸ Terry H. Anderson, *Bush's Wars* (New York: Oxford Press, 2011), 203-206

Sadrist Movement, was responsible for calling a 6-month ceasefire of its military wing in August 2007, and again in February 2008. Critics of using local leadership referred to the ongoing Shia death squads, who were small and disorganized, but who continued escalating the situation in Baghdad and generating a similar response from Sunni militias. The sheikhs served as informants, giving intelligence to US officials during meetings. These consultations served to discuss progress, consider modifications, and plan for future actions in regards to military, policing, and economic strategies the United States sought to implement through the Surge. Tribal leadership represented the way to achieve objectives, but the SOI illustrate what most have identified as a critical factor for success.⁹

The role of the SOI during the Surge was to operate alongside US and Iraqi forces, while also complimenting the efforts of the Iraqi Police. Controversy around the use of the Sons of Iraq stemmed from their origin. The Sons of Iraq consisted of local men who wanted to protect their neighborhoods, but they also included former insurgents who switched their alliances from al-Qaeda to the United States because of the Sunni Awakening. The support for using the SOI was not unanimous among the military leadership and was identified as a potential risk to long-term peace in Baghdad. The *New York Times* discussed reservations about the strategy in 2006 by claiming “critics of the strategy, including some American officers, say it could amount to the Americans’ arming both sides in a future civil war.” Nonetheless, the use of militia groups during the Surge represents a successful strategy that allowed the United States

⁹ David Petraeus, "How We Won in Iraq," *Foreign Policy*, October 29, 2013, accessed February 06, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in-iraq/>.

to gain ground over the course of the operation and create stability in the region. However, the resistance to this part of the strategy is essential when considering the overall achievements of the Surge.¹⁰

The fear of supporting the SOI revolved around tribal conflict and the ongoing sectarian tension. The *Washington Post* contended “despite the gains, the alliance is still viewed with suspicion by the Shiite-led government in Baghdad, which worries local forces -- some of whom targeted U.S. and Iraqi soldiers before switching sides -- seek to threaten government authority.” In addition, Colonel Martin N. Stanton, Chief of Reconciliation and Engagement for Multinational Corps-Iraq, acknowledged that “there's a lot of distrust in the government for the Sunnis. One could almost use the word paranoia.” A significant factor in the decision to support the groups was the ability to patrol and protect their neighborhoods. A considerable concern stemmed from the history of the region and the possibility of what would happen when a Shia-led government was handed the power with a majority Sunni militia in the same city. Additionally, since most of the volunteers came from a background as insurgents, the potential for security breaches was high. The US military began collecting fingerprints, biometric data, and retinal scans from all volunteers to help combat the threat of

¹⁰ Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh, “How the “Sons of Iraq” Stabilized Iraq,” *Middle East Forum: Promoting America's Interest*, 4th ser., 17, no. Fall (October 1, 2010), October 1, 2010, accessed February 6, 2010, <http://www.meforum.org/2788/sons-of-iraq>; “Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces,” Institute for the Study of War, February 21, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sons-iraq-and-awakening-forces>.; John F. Burns and Alissa J. Rubin, “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies,” *New York Times*, June 10, 2007, accessed March 1, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/11/world/middleeast/11iraq.html>.

infiltration by local insurgents. Individuals who passed the screening started their career serving the community in several capacities.¹¹

One accusation against the militias was that the United States persuaded the enemy to stop fighting through paid programs that led to the Sunni Awakening and the forming of the Sons of Iraq. Peter Mansoor claims, "Contrary to what some commentators believe, the coalition did not merely pay off the insurgents to get them to switch sides." Mansoor downplays the information published by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). In the report, the CRS states "In the course of the 'troop surge'," U.S. commanders have taken advantage of this Awakening trend by turning over informal security responsibility to 91,000 former militants called "Concerned Local Citizens" or "Sons of Iraq" in exchange for an end to their anti-U.S. operations." Another claim by the CRS is that the US was paying \$16 million per month to these groups. General Petraeus claimed, in testimony before Congress, that "savings in vehicles not lost because of reduced violence – not to mention the priceless lives saved – have far outweighed the cost of their monthly contracts." General Petraeus argued that the use of these groups saved the United States millions of dollars and lowered casualties, but he did not address how the costs manifested in other areas of the operation.¹²

¹¹ Greg Bruno, "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security," Washington Post, April 28, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html>.

¹² Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 141; Kenneth Katzman, *CRS Report RL31339: Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, 2008, Accessed October 18, 2016, <https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizations/106174.pdf>; CQ Transcript Wire, "Petraeus, Crocker Testify at Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Iraq," Washington Post, April 8, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/iraq_hearing_040808.html; Steven Simon, "The Price of the Surge," Foreign Affairs, July 08, 2014, accessed February 09, 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2008-05-03/price-surge>.

The perception of the SOI by Surge veterans offers a different lens into their competency. One concern expressed was the lack of training the volunteers received after joining. The timeline between joining and the end of training was increasingly short. Kimberly Ankrom, serving with the 759th Military Police Battalion, remembers “they could not even load and discharge their weapons properly.” The final decision was not to arm the militias with US weapons, and tactical training was two or three days at best. From a training perspective, the volunteers were not ready for combat action and lacked the discipline to perform at the level needed to secure the situation in Baghdad. Other perspectives also highlight the weaknesses in the plan to use volunteers.¹³

Soldiers who carried out combat missions offer an insight into the viability of relying on locals. Thomas Monk, a Bradley Gunner with the 3rd Infantry Division, experienced the complications that arose. He recalls “them moving into my line of fire and preventing me from properly defending my sector.” Another account is from a dismount leader, Bill Morris, who remembered “they did not follow plans or execute the missions correctly.” Among mistakes they made was “firing their weapons from locations that created confusion and put troops in a crossfire.” The lack of discipline led to friction between the two forces on missions, and in some instances, individuals died as members of the local forces found themselves in compromised positions. While training was a significant consideration, loyalty also caused apprehension for soldiers involved in combat missions as well.¹⁴

¹³ Kimberley Ankrom. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November, 2017.

¹⁴ Thomas Monk. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016;
Bill Morris. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016.

Responsibilities held by the militia members caused tension. Checkpoints were vital for controlling the flow of weapons and insurgents. Coverage for these stations was a combination of the Iraqi police, SOI, and US forces. Vetting the local forces was a requirement to serve, but the police were often recruited from other areas. Thomas Young, a section leader with the 3rd Infantry Division, remembered “we spent hours trying to get the equipment to work just to realize most of the people showing up did not have the correct documents or were not even eligible.” Technological deficiencies and a lack of support often resulted in lost data or incomplete records. Other problems were the number policemen that were brought in from other cities due to a lack of local resources.¹⁵

The challenges that arose were insurgents were also employed as police officers. Avoiding Iraqi recruits was not an option, and in some situation, soldiers also had to depend on them during missions. Sergeant Brian Jimenez with the 1st Cavalry “returned fire from a tower at a JSS. The Iraqi cops up there with us did not return fire and one ran away.” Other accounts, like Kenneth Raiford’s of the 3rd Infantry Division, did not like “having to pull guard with them,” and recalled that “they slept on duty all of the time.” Despite the local militia’s reputation in the media for taking combat responsibilities from Coalition forces, the reality for soldiers reveals increased danger and stress due to ill-equipped or corrupt members of the security forces.¹⁶

¹⁵ Thomas Young. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November 29, 2016.

¹⁶ Brian Jimenez. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Greenville, NC, July 18, 2017; Kenneth Raiford. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Houston, TX, July 18, 2017; Michael Wise, "Papers Give Peek Inside al Qaeda in Iraq," CNN, June 11, 2008, accessed February 6, 2018, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html>.

Documentation about the specific targeting of individuals who changed sides during the Anbar Awakening offers a glimpse into problematic areas of the operation. While overall attacks on Iraqi civilians was down by 2008, the number of rocket attacks and suicide bombers had slowly risen. Dan Malubag worked on security details with the 3rd Infantry Division that escorted high ranking officials, both civilian and military, to meetings with the sheikhs during the Surge. He recalled the awkwardness associated with the gatherings and the level of discomfort by both Americans and Iraqis. He stated that “our meetings were more about sizing each other up than listening.” During the summer and fall of 2007, 1-15 Infantry suffered three separate suicide-bomber attacks during the meetings and suffered the loss of multiple Iraqi security forces designated to protect tribal leadership and family members of the councilmen. Direct targeting of the wives and children of the Sons of Iraq further exacerbated issues of trust and caused some members of the councils to negotiate with insurgents or have a complete falling out with US operations in Baghdad.¹⁷

The use of Iraq security forces also created additional risk for US soldiers. Individuals sought after by al-Qaeda drew extra attention to everyday missions and involved US forces in tribal conflicts. Jimenez recollected a former member of a Sunni group who allied with al-Qaeda, but then became a leader of his local security group. During missions with this individual, they continued “receiving small arms or sniper fire every time,” which led to the leader “being shot on two different occasions and surviving.” Despite the targeting of militia groups by insurgents, support for their use

¹⁷ Dan Malubag. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016; Michael Wise, "Papers Give Peek Inside al Qaeda in Iraq," CNN, June 11, 2008, accessed February 6, 2018, <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html>.

continued. The best arguments made for the use of the Sons of Iraq was the rapid growth, sheer numbers, and cost. A common defense of the decision is to point out the amount of resources it would take for the United States to match the rapid accumulation of volunteers in Baghdad. While it is true that the US Army did not possess the manpower to generate the same type of operations, the defense of the strategy does not consider the additional threat to US forces assumed by using and funding former insurgents.¹⁸

The goal for stabilization reached to all aspects of life. The economy was an essential factor in a stable Baghdad, and eventually Iraq. The brutal reign of the al-Qaeda insurgencies had hindered the citizens in the region from day-to-day activities including the production, buying, and selling of goods. Desperation and fear are an essential part of individuals supporting an oppressive regime. Conventional wisdom for curbing local support for an insurgency is to improve the standard of living. US officials sought to promote normalcy through route clearance, eliminating the rebel presence, and gaining trust in the region. To win in Iraq, President Bush argued the United States must “assist the Iraqi government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy with the capacity to deliver essential services”. The Sons of Iraq became a critical component of winning over the local populace and creating an environment for the Iraqi government to take control.¹⁹

¹⁸ Guy Raz, "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge," NPR, January 08, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543>; Brian Jimenez. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Greenville, NC, July 18, 2017.

¹⁹ Bruno, "Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'," Council on Foreign Relations, April 23, 2008, accessed February 10, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/finding-place-sons-iraq>; George W. Bush, "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," *Washington Post*, November 30, 2005, accessed March 1, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/30/AR2005113000376.html>.

The restoration of law and order was the primary ambition of the Surge and the justification for the use of the Sons of Iraq. Coalition leaders believed that the constant presence of armed community members backed by the US military would restore confidence and stimulate the local economy. Reports of the operation claim that the Surge was successful on the economic front for two reasons. First, people felt safe to resume life in the business sector. General Rick Lynch, Commanding General of MNC-I, referred to the new businesses springing up and the rapid growth of the market in Baghdad in an interview. He stated that “Roads that were laced with IEDs a year ago are now littered with thriving markets.” Historian Dale Andradé explained the success as a cycle. The violence that transpired in the region led to the need for local security, which created jobs, and increased the flow of new funds into the local economy. This explanation is the most common but is not without critics.²⁰

Other views of the event do not deny that the economy grew, but rather that it was a natural occurrence and short-lived. Retired Colonel Douglas MacGregor, author of *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*, is among the top officials that support this view. Instead of the Surge causing the growth, MacGregor argues that the aligning of tribal groups in different regions of the city contributed to developments in Baghdad. The oppressive nature of al-Qaeda caused the Anbar Awakening and the violence that continued eventually cleansed the factions to the point of exhaustion. After all of this transpired, the Surge began which, in turn, followed the segregation of neighborhoods. The intensity of the operation continued to soften the

²⁰ “Marne 6 Sends: Meeting the Needs of the Iraqi People,” *Dog Face Daily*, 1 June 2008, 1. Dale Andradé, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010) 141-148.

tactics of al- Qaeda and drive out lingering remnants of rebel fighters. Business boomed in these sectors between members of the same sect, but did not spread out to a citywide economy. Instead, new marketplaces were built and supported by members of the same group in a small area. Colonel McGregor contends that 'Segregation works' is effectively what the U.S. military is telling you. We have facilitated, whether on purpose or inadvertently, the division of the country. We are capitalizing on that now." So the economic growth was not one solidified effort, but rather the result of multiple localized, independent movements that lacked the spirit of reconciliation the US and Iraq leadership desired.²¹

The Surge also sought to address humanitarian needs in Baghdad. While the Sons of Iraq were present for some of the operation, aspects of the strategy rested on US forces. The purpose was to project strength in the city, but also served as an attempt to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Administering aid to the war-torn region also served as an excellent opportunity to display a benevolent spirit after two previous years of brutal military action. The objective of this civil strategy was to garner favor through offering medical help, rebuilding infrastructure, and improving the standard of living.²²

The invasion in 2003 significantly damaged the healthcare system in Iraq. With the US aiming at winning hearts and minds, while simultaneously bringing stability to the region, the health of the citizens in Iraq was imperative. One early focus was children with debilitating diseases and deformities. Some veterans of the Surge were involved

²¹ Guy Raz, "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge," NPR, January 08, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543>.

²² Thomas E. Ricks, *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*, (New York: Penguin Press, 2009), 228-255.

with the transportation and security of the victims to airfields where they were flown to the Green Zone for intensive medical conditions, operations, and physical therapy. While some good transpired through humanitarian missions, they also carried a high-risk factor by exposing US soldiers to dangerous situations while in charge of individuals who slowed operations. The United States was able to help some individuals, but stability remained an issue. Charlotte F. Blatt, a fellow in the War and Peace Studies Program at Dartmouth College, summarized that “our inability to remain sufficiently engaged in Iraq added to the failure of providing accessible potable water, healthcare, and telephone services.” Consistently providing for the needs of the population in Baghdad required resources, but was equally hindered by the destruction in the city.²³

Another issue that arose was the safety of people who received help from Coalition forces. Sean Kane was part of a mission that pulled security while local citizens attempted to get electricity and running water in working order. After multiple days of trying, some houses were repaired. The following missions were similar, but located in a different part of the city. He recollects “as soon as our platoons moved out the insurgents could freely move again and those people we helped had their homes destroyed or worse.” In this scenario two factors were at play. First, people who were visibly seen either helping or being helped by US forces became a target. Second, infiltration into local groups by insurgents made it more difficult to complete any type of mission without participants being singled out later.²⁴

²³ Charlotte F. Blatt, "After 15 Years of Conflict Operational Success, Strategic Failure: Assessing the 2007 Iraq Troop Surge," Army War College, Spring 2017, accessed February 14, 2018, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Spring_2017/7_Blatt_2007IraqTroopSurge.pdf

²⁴ Sean Kane, emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbus, GA, August 23, 2016.

Government buildings served as sites for routine medical treatment such as checkups, immunizations, or treatment of minor ailments. Scout and infantry units were dispatched to secure and protect the site during the humanitarian operations. Such missions frequently faced resistance, as insurgents directly attacked medical staff, women, and children. By assaulting charitable events, the insurgents effectively stifled attempts to help, but also discouraged citizens in Baghdad from accepting US aid. Soldiers who experienced these attacks often reflected on the situation negatively. Josh Berner was a Specialist with the 3rd Infantry Division. His recollection of medical missions consisted of “being defenseless in dangerous regions of the city,” and “creating civilian targets by helping the people who came out.” The locations selected tended to be in high population areas and surrounded by tall buildings. Missions quickly shifted from helping civilians to a combat environment. Due to the reliance on air coverage, large amounts of collateral damage was created, which further complicated the US relationship with civilians. Other parts of the strategy sought to balance out the collateral damage by simultaneously focusing on rebuilding efforts.²⁵

The process of revamping old and building new infrastructure in Baghdad became a focus of the operation. During the Surge, an estimated \$3.6 billion went towards rebuilding damaged parts the city and covering the cost of security forces. A significant amount of money spent was meant to ensure trust among the local populace and create jobs so the Iraqi men could have alternate choices to joining insurgent

²⁵ Joshua Berner. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tahlequah, OK, November 7, 2016 ; Patrick Cullen, " Iraq: Armed Humanitarianism, International Relations and Security Network," Resources – Center for Security Studies | ETH Zurich, March 5, 2008, accessed February 6, 2018, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=54134> 16

groups. One example mentioned by previous authors was north of Baghdad. A prison, being built large enough for 3,600 inmates, was constructed to house individuals working to continue the destabilization of the region. In addition, the prison would create jobs while being built, and secure opportunities for future generations by generating a viable source of income. The contracts were initially awarded to Parsons Engineering Corporation in 2004, but new funds were allocated to complete the prison in 2007. However, the prison was handed over to the Ministry of Justice in late 2007 who refused to finish, occupy, or provides security for the site due to a lack of resources. An estimated \$40 million went towards the prison with over \$1 million worth of materials left untouched in the desert.²⁶

Other examples of the US trying to stabilize the region through nation-building policies sought to increase the quality of life for the people in Baghdad. Education became a concern among US officials and local leaders, but the disrepair of infrastructure made civil development difficult. Electricity became a luxury amenity most citizens in Baghdad lacked access to. Another significant obstacle to helping the people in the city included resolving the sanitation crisis. Running water was not available to most after the initial invasion, and resulted in streets that were full of trash and raw human sewage. The United Nations International Children's Fund (UNICEF) reported that "efforts to fix the country's municipal pipes and treatment plants – damaged by the impact of a decade of sanctions and war – have been seriously undermined by chronic under-investment, frequent power shortages, lack of qualified personnel, illegal water

²⁶ Kim Gamel, "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq," NBCNews.com, August 29, 2010, accessed February 6, 2018, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted-billions-rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd.

tapping and acts of sabotage.” Resistance to the presence of the United States, combined with corruption in leadership left Baghdad in disrepair.²⁷

The push to offer access to electricity had initial success, but as time continued the task grew in difficulty. The Ministry of Electricity in Iraq, in addition to millions of dollars in support from the United States, was able to get power back to multiple parts of the city at first. The invasion contributed to the initial damage to the infrastructure, but continuous conflict prevented repairs, which left much of the city in a dilapidated state. US soldiers recall seeing people splicing into main power lines, some fatally injured, in an attempt to route power to their houses and businesses. However, the low hanging lines also caused safety hazards for soldiers in gunner hatches on top of military vehicles. Anthony Burkhardt remembers his gunner “being knocked unconscious and falling out of the hatch after being electrocuted.” Michael McIntire was another gunner that got electrocuted during a mission. When asked about the event he remembers “rotating the turret, the next thing I knew I was laying in the floor of the MRAP with my crew standing over me.” By August the situation had deteriorated due to rebel groups still in the region. Continuous attacks on electrical stations shut down entire neighborhoods. Other complications came from the summer heat and the overload air condition units placed on the already strained system. By the end of 2007, rolling

²⁷ U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), January 09, 2007, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP>, 34-42; Ban Dhayi, "Iraq's water and sanitation crisis adds to dangers faced by children and families," UNICEF, March 19, 2008, , accessed March 1, 2018, https://www.unicef.org/wash/iraq_43232.html.

blackouts were occurring throughout the city. Unfortunately, the damage created by a lack of electricity was much worse than depriving air conditioning in a desert climate.²⁸

The issue of water had always been a problem in Iraq but was increased dramatically through the ongoing war. In 2008, the World Bank estimated the water systems in Iraq needed an additional \$14.4 billion to restore to acceptable working condition. By this time the US had already spent over \$8 billion on the construction and remodeling of water treatment plants in Iraq, with an estimated 30 percent of the funds allocated to the Baghdad region. Part of the civil strategy of the Surge was to alleviate the suffering of citizens in the city by improving sanitation and providing access to potable drinking water. The accounts that view the humanitarian efforts during the Surge tend to focus on the plan to fix the problem instead of the outcome.²⁹

The first challenge was keeping the plants running on a consistent basis. Problems surrounding sewage removal and water distillation had mounted since the invasion of 2003. Repairing damaged plants that survived, and re-building the ones destroyed began in late 2005. In 2007, the Bush Administration reinvigorated the urgency of completing the water treatment plants to help facilitate stability. Nevertheless, the lack of electricity prevented the plan from developing. By 2008, less

²⁸ Anthony Burkhart. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, September 23, 2016; Michael McIntire. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Indianapolis, IN, August 11, 2016; James Glanz and Stephen Farrell, "Militias Seizing Control of Iraqi Electricity Grid," New York Times, August 22, 2007, accessed February 8, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/middleeast/23electricity.html>.

²⁹ U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight." U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). January 09, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP>. 18-26

than 40 percent of the population had access to potable water and the low points in the city had become cesspools.³⁰

Servicemen in the Baghdad area experienced the issue firsthand, recalling the difficulties it posed for operations in the city. Soldiers handed out life-straws to families to provide a temporary solution to the water shortage. Other complications were the condition of the streets in the cities. Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) mired in the sludge, which slowed down mission speed, and creating a security risk. Also, the efficiency of performing route clearance, dismount patrols, and raid missions suffered due to the condition of the roads. Bruce Chambers, a driver with 1-15 Infantry, recalled a situation where “the road collapsed and my Bradley sank over the tracks in a ditch of water runoff and human shit.” Eric Blackburn also had problems when “it was impossible to drive down certain roads in the city and we had to turn around in tight areas, which made us a sitting target.” In a cyclic pattern, these problems contributed to each other. With the road system in disrepair, security became more difficult, making securing the electrical plants impossible. Furthermore, due to the lack of electricity and security, the city fell into further ruin. The last effort was to create wealth that could allow the Iraqi people to accomplish these tasks themselves.³¹

The final factor, and perhaps the most important, for contributing to infrastructure reconstruction involved oil. Before the invasion in 2003, the oil industry in Iraq was

³⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), January 09, 2007, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP>.; Joseph A. Christoff, *Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight* (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2010), 28-50.

³¹ Bruce Chambers. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tavares, FL, August 23, 2016; Eric Blackburn. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016.

nationalized entirely, giving Saddam Hussein total control of the resource. After the removal of Hussein, the United States took over energy production in Iraq. In 2007, George W. Bush pushed for new legislation that would promote “investment, national unity, and reconciliation.” These became known as the Iraq Hydrocarbon Laws, which encouraged foreign investment, but also ceded significant amounts of control to corporations located outside of Iraq. The goal was to revitalize the economy, create wealth, and seek to find common ground for the three main factions in Iraq. However, the response was different than anticipated.³²

The suggestion received stiff resistance from the population and officials. Usama al-Nujeyfi, a key leader in Parliamentary Energy Committee, walked out in protest. The fear was that the new laws would cede too much power to global interests and stifle the growth of the country in the future. Despite discontent with the program, the pressure persisted. With the prospect of continued foreign military occupation dimming as elections loomed in the U.S. and Iraq, the oil companies pursued a different approach in 2008. Corporations, with the help of the Coalition, by-passed Parliament and dealt directly with the top leadership. Iraqi lawmakers fought back but lost. The outcome was a system that offered much less security for the people of Iraq and centrally consolidated the power within the government. Not only did the strategy end up returning the oil industry to a nationally controlled entity, but further divided the Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leadership.³³

³² Antonia Juhasz, "Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil," CNN, April 15, 2013, accessed February 8, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html>;

³³ Adil E. Shamoo and Bonnie Bricker, "The Costs of War for Oil," Foreign Policy In Focus, October 19, 2013, accessed February 13, 2018, http://fpif.org/the_costs_of_war_for_oil/; Antonia Juhasz, "Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil," CNN, April 15, 2013, accessed February 8, 2018, <https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html>.

Despite glimpses of success for domestic policy in Iraq, the celebration was short-lived. Most journalists, historians, and military officials place the height of military operations for the Surge in the summer through the early winter of 2007. Violence reached new lows in mid-spring of 2008. As the dust appeared to be settling, the US began efforts to hand over power to officials in Iraq. In 2008, the continued logistical requirements, including pay, for the SOI was placed in the hands of the government in Iraq, and by November most of the volunteer force had not received payment and had reverted to insurgent activities. On December 11, in a meeting between Kurdish and Arab leaders about reconciliation, a Sunni suicide bomber killed 57 people in Kirkuk. Two weeks later a car bomb killed 22 civilians, and in early January a suicide bomber killed 32 people at a reconciliation lunch in Baghdad. With the unifying threat of al-Qaeda gone the situation showed no signs of solidified support behind the Iraq government, and once again moved towards civil war.³⁴

Political policy during the Surge has received praise but has also been subject to more criticism than the military strategy. Due to the dynamics in Baghdad, needs were visible, but solutions were hard to accomplish. The sectarian violence left a path of destruction, but guiding leadership towards reconciliation was involved. The use of local groups was imperative handing power back to the Iraq government, but made settling factional differences more difficult. Finally, infrastructure was a glaring issue but solving

³⁴ Patrick Cullen, "Iraq: Armed Humanitarianism, International Relations and Security Network," Resources – Center for Security Studies | ETH Zurich, March 5, 2008, accessed February 6, 2018, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=54134> 16; Kim Gamel, "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq," NBCNews.com, August 29, 2010, accessed February 6, 2018, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted-billions-rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd.

the problem presented further complications. People needed electricity, but rebel groups gained control of the grids and put pressure on supporters of the coalition forces. Without adequate power, providing water to the local populace was impossible, and the absence of both resources left stability out of reach in Baghdad as the quality of life decreased over time. The Surge, from a domestic point of view, highlights deficiencies in the previous approach of the Bush Administration in Iraq. Nonetheless, the remedies applied to Iraq during the Surge lacked the proper planning and did not yield the results needed to create a united Iraq.³⁵

³⁵ Simon, Steven. "The Price of the Surge." Foreign Affairs. July 08, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2008-05-03/price-surge>; Shamoo, Adil E., and Bonnie Bricker. "The Costs of War for Oil." Foreign Policy in Focus. October 19, 2013. Accessed February 13, 2018. http://fpif.org/the_costs_of_war_for_oil/.

CHAPTER THREE:

A CHANGE IN APPROACH: THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE SURGE.

Thus far, the exploration of the Surge has focused on the events that led to the operation and the domestic strategy employed to stabilize Baghdad. The goal of this chapter is to investigate the approach that shaped combat missions carried out by the United States during the Surge. Military achievements during the Surge are praised as the most successful part of the operation and has received credit for changing the operational art of counterinsurgency. While the large-scale plan for the Surge is multi-faceted, the overall desired outcome manifests itself through three distinct phases. The objective in Baghdad was designed to allow US forces to clear, control, and retain progress made in the city while working towards a long-term transfer of power to the government in Iraq.¹

When looking at the efforts to clear Baghdad of insurgent presence, the first ingredient was more service members in Iraq. Retired General Jack Keane, in his co-authored report about a Surge in Iraq, called for an increase of 21,500 troops. By March 2007, the number of military personnel in Iraq was 152,000, and President Bush called for an additional 7,000 bringing the Surge total to 28,500. The idea behind the increase was to adequately man regions in Baghdad and overwhelm the enemy by implementing the new counterinsurgency plan developed by General David Petraeus and his staff at Fort Leavenworth. With the influx of troops, US officials believed they could secure the region through a continuous presence, thus winning the support and trust of the local

¹ Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 24-59.

population while the new approach would provide the opportunity to defeat the insurgency. With the confidence of the locals and the stabilization of the region, the transfer of control to Iraq officials could take place.²

Media and academic coverage of the military strategy in Iraq focuses on operations and not the logistical side of the action. Logistical planning for the Surge was short-sided, and focused on moving troops and equipment quickly. There is no dispute in regards to the efficiency of getting the troops to the Middle East, but questions about the quality of preparation for the combat mission arose. Another concern was that the prescribed number of additional troops would still not be enough. Many of the soldiers sent were either in their desert training phase required before deployment for their unit's combat readiness certification or had not yet undergone training. Several combat readiness standards created concerns as the Surge unfolded. The main areas of consideration include the equipment many units deployed, combined with concerns about the physical and mental condition of the soldiers.³

Issues with the equipment revolved around two factors. First, a concern with the rapid deployment of troops was providing the proper gear needed for success. Military members recall deploying with two or three different camouflage patterns in a single platoon, and sometimes on one individual. The issue was soldiers standing out from the group, which could make them a more likely target. The Army began the switch from the

² Jack Keane and Frederick W. Kagan, "The Right Type of 'Surge'," Washington Post, December 27, 2006, accessed August 8, 2016, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122600773.html>; Luis Martinez, "Surge Numbers Approach 30,000," ABC News, March 1, 2007, accessed February 12, 2018, <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2958331&page=1>.

³ Anne Garrels, "U.S. Troops Spread Thin Despite Surge," NPR, May 17, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10226407>.

previous Battle Dress Uniform (BDU) to the Army Combat Uniform (ACU) in 2005 for garrison use. Other patterns in circulation were the Desert Battle Dress Uniform (DBDU). The situation for some soldiers was ACU uniforms mixed with BDU and DBDU combat gear. Devlin Johnson, a Staff Sergeant with the 3rd Infantry Division, recalls being “deployed with a woodland camo kevlar cover, a desert camo vest, and ACU MOLLE (Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment) gear.” Josh Berner, a member of the same platoon, had all ACU equipment “except for a woodland MOLLE “and the older version “ALICE (All-purpose Lightweight Individual Carrying Equipment) rucksack.” However, by the late summer of 2007, this problem was remedied as combat missions continued. The other significant issue with equipment was the quality of body armor issued to US soldiers. The Pentagon released a report in 2006, with little coverage, which stated some of the fatalities in Iraq resulted from the faulty vests given to military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan and the protective armor used on combat vehicles. The United States addressed the deficiencies in the gear, but the timing of the Surge predated the solution.⁴

American soldiers deployed for the summer operations in 2007 were among the first to receive the up-armored equipment. Reactive for HMMWV and Bradleys were issued in Kuwait and mounted before loading vehicles on the railhead for Baghdad. The reactive armor contained two metal plates, with explosives in between, which would

⁴ H.R. Rep. No. 110 Congress-V. 153 pt. 3 at 4030-4048 (2007); Devlin Johnson. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Perry, GA, August 9, 2016; Joshua Berner. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tahlequah, OK, November 7, 2016; Michael Moss, "Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor," The New York Times, January 07, 2006, accessed February 02, 2018, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/politics/pentagon-study-links-fatalities-to-body-armor.html>; Greg Mitchell, Joseph L. Galloway, and Bruce Springsteen, *So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, The Pundits, and The President Failed on Iraq* (New York: Union Square Press/Sterling Pub., 2008), 200-242.

repel shrapnel from roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG). However, many of the units already in place did not receive the update until the fall, after much of the intense combat had subsided. The failure to sync this technological advancement, initially created in the late summer of 2006, with the start of the mission displays differences between the plan presented and realistic expectations on the ground. In addition to trying to secure combat vehicles the military already possessed, they also began adding new technology by the fall of 2007.⁵

The beginning of the Surge led to technological growth for the US military, but the insurgency was evolving their tactics as well. New styles of IEDs in Baghdad created a panic among military personnel and raised concerns at home as the recruiting struggle for the Army and National Guard continued. Insurgents in Baghdad stopped relying on deep-buried IEDs to hinder movement. Instead, they switched to a style of weapon known as an Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP). The design of these weapons appeared in World War II and are as simple as they are deadly. Built in a cylindrical shape, the construction of EFP's consisted of scrap metal. Insurgents would mount a concave metal disc to a metal pole and attach copper or brass balls, which resembled a shotgun slug, facing towards the target. The metal slugs would project at over nine thousand feet per second for the first forty-five feet. The new reactive armor was penetrated with ease, creating another problem in need of a solution.⁶

⁵ Bill Piper. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016.

⁶ Andrew DeGrandpre and Andrew Tilghman, "Iran Linked to Deaths of 500 U.S. Troops in Iraq, Afghanistan," *Military Times*, Jan. & Feb., 2015, accessed February 18, 2018, <https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2015/07/14/iran-linked-to-deaths-of-500-u-s-troops-in-iraq-afghanistan/>.

The first attempt at stopping the EFP mines began in 2007. General Dynamics won the contract to design the new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles. In May, Congress authorized an additional \$4 billion in funding to have them produced by Force Protection Industries. By the winter of 2007, the US had invested an estimated \$50 billion to provide 27,000 new MRAP vehicles for Iraq and Afghanistan. Three issues quickly surfaced with the new vehicles. The design of the MRAP allowed the operation of weaponry from the inside of the vehicle through a digital Commonly Remote Operated Weapon Station (CROWS). Unfortunately, the system was not perfected in time and gunners were fifteen feet off the ground when in the gunner's hatch manually operating the weaponry. Low hanging electrical wires and makeshift structures in Baghdad made using the vehicle difficult. The second problem soldiers had with the MRAP was all the canals and rivers in Baghdad. Between the difficulty of escaping the vehicle and the amount of weight that body armor added several soldiers drowned in early 2008. Lastly, a lack of padding on the inside of the vehicle created unanticipated problems. While soldiers were protected from the blast outside, many were severely injured being inside of all-metal vehicles during the explosions. Between the late arrival of the MRAP, and multiple deficiencies, the response to the release of the new vehicle did not achieve the desired success.⁷

⁷ Guy Raz, "New Mine-Resistant Vehicles Aimed at Foiling IEDs," National Public Radio, May 18, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10241461>; "DOD IG Report on MRAP Delays," POGO Project On Government Oversight, December 10, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.pogo.org/about/press-room/releases/2008/ns-mrap-20081210.html?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F>; David Hambling, "MRAP Hazards: Drowning, Electrocution, Cancer," *Wired*, July 17, 2008, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.wired.com/2008/07/mrap-hazards-dr/>.

Another problem with the new strategy was the ramp-up of deployments. This came at a significant cost for combat troops. The worst cases saw units deployed six months ahead of schedule. Faster deployment time meant less recovery time for soldiers on rotation and decreased valuable training time. With the announcement of the Surge, many soldiers were forced to redeploy back to the Middle East without being home for more than a year. Another problem with the change in deployment date was the inability for those combat units to reach full combat strength, which forced them to deploy with a lack of manpower. The stress created by an early deployment and lack of manpower only compounded the seriousness of the mission at hand. In addition, once in Kuwait, many soldiers recall being told that their deployments would be extended from one year to 14-16 months depending on their role and the success of the mission.⁸

As the Surge hit full stride in the summer of 2007, the condition of US troops became a topic of debate. In addition to fatigue, the overall motivation for completing the mission came into question. One study found that “Despite eroding public support for the Iraq war, troop morale remains high. Experts warn that could change as U.S. forces get further bogged down in Iraq.” Others supported this conclusion and took it one step further by blaming the waning support on political posturing and rival media sources, and not the real sentiment of the American people. Per Oliver North, a Fox News war correspondent in Iraq, “those who believe that the campaign in Iraq is a lost cause better not tell that to the soldiers of the 3rd Infantry Division — they think they’re winning.” He continued by stating that “These troops ought to know — many of them are

⁸ Peter Beaumont, "Fatigue Cripples US army in Iraq," The Observer, August 11, 2007, accessed February 15, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/12/usa.iraq>.

here on their third, year-long tour of duty in Iraq.” While the argument made by these sources supported the view that troops remained motivated, they also admit that these soldiers were caught up in a rapid cycle of deployments.⁹ The level of troop resolve was highly contested during the Surge, but the individuals on the ground have a different perspective on the topic.

Exhaustion is a common word used by veterans discussing the combat conditions in Iraq during the Surge. There was a mixture of individuals who were on their first, second, and even third deployment to Iraq since 2003. Instead of reflecting on morale, the focus is more on the ability to accomplish the objective efficiently and the outcome of the mission. They recognize that without Iraq there was still a war in Afghanistan that made deployments unavoidable. However, the situation in Baghdad was made more difficult due to the lack of combat readiness. During the spring and summer of 2007, the regular rotation for soldiers in Baghdad was grueling. Anthony Wright discussed clearing operations and the difficulties involved. He recollected “clearing the city street by street in heat like I had never felt,” and “catching hell every step of the way.” Thomas Monk remembered “trying to stay hydrated during missions,” and “struggling to stay awake.” The pace of the missions, summer heat, and lack of sleep made the soldiers ability to stay hydrated, healthy, and alert more difficult.¹⁰

⁹ Lionel Beehner, "Is U.S. Troop Morale Slipping?" Council on Foreign Relations, June 14, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-troop-morale-slipping>; Oliver North, "Iraq Exclusive: Troops' Spirits Remain High, See Fruits of Labor Despite Political Pessimists," Fox News, December 7, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/07/iraq-exclusive-troops-spirits-remain-high-see-fruits-labor-despite-political.html>.

¹⁰ Anthony Wright. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kyle, TX, September, 23, 2016; Thomas Monk. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016.

A typical field rotation was between five and eight days, and twelve to forty-eight hours off before the next missions resumed. When on missions, sleep was scarce, but so was downtime. Cody Watson was a dismount with the 3rd Infantry Division, and remembers “sleeping two or three hours a night” during missions. In addition, they also “only got an hour or two of sleep at a time” because of “counterattacks and guarding battle positions.” When soldiers were not on a mission, the responsibilities shifted to servicing vehicles, cleaning weapons, repairing uniforms, catching up on personal hygiene, and, if needed, pulling guard shifts. The lack of rest created a high risk of operational exhaustion, which damages the individual's ability to be alert and function at the highest level, often leading the potential for fatal mistakes. Bill Piper recalled dismounted patrols becoming “sloppy” with soldiers lacking “situational awareness and forgetting training by stepping on trash, which could be potential anti-personnel mines.”¹¹ Long missions and a lack of sleep threatened the life and health of the troops, but this is overlooked in media coverage of the Surge. Instead, the essential part of the claim to success for the operation in Baghdad includes two significant military actions.

Operation Phantom Thunder was among the most extensive operations ever carried out in Iraq. For many people in the United States, June 16, 2007 and this mission marked the beginning of the Surge due to the increase of media coverage. In addition, Phantom Thunder also set the tone for the future operations carried out during the Surge. The objectives of this military action were to attack the al-Qaeda strongholds in the city and use the opportunity to display military superiority to the locals. Phantom

¹¹ Cody Watson. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Missoula, MT, August 9, 2016; Piper, Bill. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016.

Thunder was a quick-hitting operation that covered ground quickly. Lasting less than two months, coalition forces and the Iraqi military cleared the city of Baghdad with additional activity pouring out to the north, south, and west.¹²

The operation received many accolades from both military and civilian reporting. A key supporter of the Phantom Thunder was Lt. General Raymond T. Odierno, commander of the MNC-I. According to General Odierno, the mission's successes included 6,702 detainees, 1,196 dead insurgents, and 419 wounded enemy personnel. Combined forces also killed or captured 382 high-value targets. Other sources claimed the success involved killing or driving out the bulk of insurgent forces in the Baghdad beltway, allowing US forces to secure the cities perimeter. Analysts believed that this mission offered a path forward for both security and peace, but the reality soon set in that further action would be needed to ensure success and create an environment manageable without significant US military presence.¹³ Phantom Thunder was a short operation that ended on August 14 and foreshadowed the second significant military action that defined the Surge.

Operation Phantom Strike began on August 15, 2007. The objectives of this mission were the same as Operation Phantom Thunder, which was to remove the threat inside the city, but the approach was different. Instead of an intense push for results, Phantom Strike created a strategy for long-term damage to any insurgency operating inside the region. The operation was meant to serve as the transition from clearing the

¹² Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 112-115.

¹³ John J. Kruzal, "Odierno Highlights Operations Phantom Strike, Phantom Thunder," United States Department of Defense, August 17, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47086>; Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Thunder," Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-thunder>.

city to controlling the development and rebuilding in Baghdad. After Phantom Thunder attacked strongholds, Phantom Strike aimed at preventing future infiltration of enemy personnel and preventing the flow of weapons. One important objective of the Surge was to reduce the number of US troop involvement in combat missions. This portion of the operation was meant to increase the responsibilities of the Iraq forces. The Iraqi Army began conducting missions with US forces serving in a supportive role. In addition, the SOI performed continuous patrols in their neighborhoods while also receiving more responsibility with the expulsion of local insurgents and locating enemy armament. While both operations yielded desired results, much of their success occurred before the summer of 2007.¹⁴

The Anbar, or Sunni Awakening and the Baghdad Security Plan appear in the coverage as separate maneuvers from the Surge, or at least as a precursor. However, much of what the US military accomplished during Operations Phantom Thunder and Phantom Strike is in direct correlation with the gains made by these two factors. The sectarian violence led to the decrease of the Sunni population and the acceptance of insurgent groups in the Baghdad beltway. The oppressive nature of al-Qaeda eventually led to Sunni groups switching sides and allying with the US. Shortly after the Sunni Awakening, the US and militia groups began implementing the Baghdad Security Plan. In January 2007, the United States started seeking out places to establish Combat Outposts (COP). The new COP locations would allow the US to display a constant

¹⁴ Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Strike," Institute for the Study of War, February 2, 2008, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-strike>; Sarah Wood, "Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligence," United States Department of Defense, August 15, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47057>.

presence in the city and encourage the local population to move forward with a sense of security. Other operational changes were the establishment of Joint Security Stations (JSS), which would allow US and Iraqi forces to watch crucial areas and serve as a launching point for night patrols in different neighborhoods. Finally, the plan for security established checkpoints throughout Baghdad to help control the flow of munitions into the city.¹⁵

While the Baghdad Security Plan achieved some of its objectives, such as establishing a continuous presence in the city and tightening security, the plan also had ramifications that were not intended. Combat outposts offered a place for soldiers to live and stage missions within the neighborhoods they were patrolling. The location of the outposts allowed the completion of Surge objectives, but also made soldiers more vulnerable. The defensibility of the bases increased with time, but initially they were highly susceptible to sniper fire, rocket attacks, and even vehicle-bound explosives. Eric Blackburn was injured by a grenade while pulling guard. He stated that “the front line of defense was Iraqi soldiers who were not paying attention,” and “allowed a younger individual to lob a grenade over the barriers.” He also claimed another factor was heat and fatigue, and that “the explosion happened before any of us knew what was happening.” Soldiers, in the middle of the summer in Iraq, were required to wear body armor anytime they were not inside the structure where they lived, causing further discomfort, fatigue, and susceptibility to the heat.¹⁶

¹⁵ Sarah Wood, "Baghdad Security Plan Can Work, Commander Says," United States Department of Defense, February 16, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3082>.

¹⁶ Eric Blackburn. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016

Other problems caused by these outposts included the perception among the local population. The location of the new bases was frequently private property, and sometimes historical structures. For example, COP Blackfoot in Baghdad was a Catholic church before the combination of the invasion and sectarian violence drove its members from the city. The library at this cathedral contained documents fundamental to the history of Catholicism in Iraq. The confiscation of this property not only created feelings of resentment for Iraqi Catholics, but also damaged hopes of reconciliation inside the region due to a failure to recognize the historical and cultural significance of sites in the city.¹⁷

Establishing new JSS locations, combined with checkpoints, were another facet of the plan to secure Baghdad. Checkpoints were used to control traffic and slow the land-based movement of weapons. The US military also established temporary positions up and down the Tigris River to combat the movement of arms by water. JSS sites had multiple functions that were essential to the stabilization of the region. First, combined with the COP locations, the sites gave an additional presence in the city with hopes of protecting and building trust with the citizenry. Both U.S. and Iraqi forces manned the sites. Also, many were centrally located with tall towers so individuals could guard sectors 24-hours a day and have a good vantage point to prevent the placement of IEDs on major routes. While the JSS component did achieve some of the objectives

¹⁷ Timothy Hsia, "A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (COPs)," [Small Wars Journal](http://www.smallwarsjournal.com), March 2008, accessed February 16, 2018, file:///home/chronos/u-2efd1c7716ce4141fc985a128349ad72c1c3695b/Downloads/138-hsia.pdf.

desired, they also created concerns among service members and made the situation more dangerous for the US and Iraqi personnel.¹⁸

The structure of the JSS compounds, typically in the middle of the city with tall towers, made them susceptible to attacks. Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG), small arms fire, and car bombs were the most common forms of attack. The soldiers who occupied these locations had legitimate concerns about the Iraqi Police. They did not go through the same vetting process as the Sons of Iraq, and many of them commuted from other regions without being subjected to the same level of investigation. Sedrick Brown, a Platoon Sergeant with the 3rd Infantry, claimed that “the police were different,” because “we had a common objective with locals, but policemen were only in it for the highest pay.” Other concerns revolved around the checkpoints. US troops became sitting targets for car bombs due to their placement and lack of resources. Eric Blackburn, when asked about the aptitude of the Iraqi Police, concluded “they either didn’t pay attention or just didn’t care.” Both the JSS and checkpoints were in place by the end of January 2007 but were not fully operational until August. During that time, multiple preventable attacks occurred, including a truck bomb carrying chlorine gas.¹⁹ Data supports the claim of a reduction of violence, but there are two popular explanations of why. Both interpretations explore the conflict between religious sects, but neither addresses the victims from types of brutality.

¹⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman and Emma R. Davies, *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict*, vol. 1, Praeger Security International (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2007), 470-482.

¹⁹ Sedrick Brown. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Clarksville, TN, August 9, 2016; M. Wade Markel, Brian Shannon, and David E. Johnson, *The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat* (Rand Corporation, 2013), 9-15; Robert Burns, "Pentagon Condemns Iraq Poison Gas Attack," *Washington Post*, March 30, 2007, accessed February 18, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033001135.html>.

Throughout the Surge, violence towards US personnel reached new heights. News media reported in December that 2007 had become the deadliest year thus far of the war in Iraq. The highest number of soldier deaths in Iraq was in 2004 with 849, but 2007 ended with a total of 904 soldiers lost during operations. New technology acquired by the insurgent groups allowed them to cause more destruction with a single hit and intensified in the early summer due to a lack of equipment to combat the new developments. The US forces effectively cleared the city but large numbers of insurgents fled the city before being killed or captured. The beginning of fall 2007 witnessed a significant decrease in attacks towards the US forces. However, as insurgents began to return to the region those attacks rekindled as the year came to an end.²⁰

Another demographic that suffered during Surge operations were civilians. The death and displacement of civilians during the Surge is a topic that does not receive much recognition. The discussion that emerges from the loss of innocent life revolves around sectarian violence or is grouped in with collateral damage. May was one of the deadliest months of the Surge for any group. The US suffered a loss of 126 soldiers, but the Iraq civilian casualties reached 2,155. By the end of the year, the number of civilian casualties reached 18,610. Prior to 2007, the level of destruction peaked in 2004 at 13,813 civilians killed. While the numbers themselves may not represent success or failure of an operation, the cause of those deaths offers a deeper perspective. First, the aggressive missions beginning in January 2007 created an environment of danger for

²⁰ Associated Press, "2007 was the Deadliest Year for U.S. Troops," NBC News, December 31, 2007, accessed February 20, 2018, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22451069/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/was-deadliest-year-us-troops-iraq/#.WpWW92inHrc.

the people in the region. The use of air strikes, raids, and artillery to clear the city caused a massive amount of damage and loss of life. However, the SOI were another source of the death and destruction. Local forces consisted of concerned citizens, but also former insurgents. The explosive nature of tribal relations in the city would manifest again as the number of US forces decreased.²¹ Because of renewed violence, the US had to seek an alternative route for in hopes of victory.

The increase of violence at the end of 2007 hindered the goal of the US military. The plan was to switch from aggressive missions to maintaining the progress they had made. With the issue of insurgents migrating back into Baghdad, the objective was to increase the buffer between the Iraq government and insurgent strongholds. The response was Operation Phantom Phoenix, which lasted from January through July 2008, which targeted al-Qaeda strongholds and their weapon caches. In the first three weeks of Phantom Phoenix, coalition forces detained 1,023 terrorists and killed another 121. By the end of the operation, soldiers had killed 900 insurgents and captured 2,500. Among those caught or killed were 92 high-value targets. Soldiers also found 351 weapons caches, 410 improvised explosive devices, three vehicle bomb and improvised explosive device factories, and four tunnel complexes. Deaths of both military and civilians plummeted in the Baghdad region by the spring of 2008, but media and scholarly writings do not explore further than the initial execution of the mission and do not consider the long-term consequences.²²

²¹ Spencer Ackerman, "Training Iraq's Death Squads," *The Nation*, May 17, 2007, accessed February 20, 2018, <https://www.thenation.com/article/training-iraqs-death-squads/>.

²² Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Phoenix," *Institute for the Study of War*, August 23, 2008, accessed February 20, 2018, <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-phoenix>; Press Release, "Operation Phantom Phoenix: Pursuit of al-Qaeda continues," CENTCOM, January 14,

Phantom Phoenix was meant to be the mission that enabled the Iraq government to take over operations in Iraq. The missions conducted in 2008 effectively pushed re-emerging insurgents back out of the Baghdad region but did not do an adequate job of retaining gains and handing power back to the Iraqis. Instead, the mission ended in the summer without increasing the operational efficiency of the Iraqi forces. Also, the government in Iraq was equally ineffective at providing the leadership needed to secure the country. Veterans of the operation recall the inability to permanently secure areas. Bill Piper remembers “local families who offered any assistance were typically killed when we moved into another neighborhood.” The displacement and targeting of families was severe. Timothy Taylor, a dismount with the 4th Infantry Division, was tasked with the duty of “recovering dead bodies out of the river” who belonged to “families of supporters.” While the numbers of people killed dropped in 2008, the dependency on the US military to create stability stayed the same.²³

By the conclusion of the mission, the United States abruptly handed over significant parts of the operation to an ill-prepared Iraqi government and military. Many of the COP and JSS locations were disbanded and no longer used. Furthermore, the regular use of checkpoints and roadblocks subsided, and the street presence decreased. Another factor was the SOI, which by the fall of 2008 had disbanded due to a lack of pay by the Iraq government. As the members of the SOI left the local militias,

2008, accessed February 20, 2018, <http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/903464/operation-phantom-phoenix-pursuit-of-al-qaeda-continues/>.

²³ Steve Dobransky, “Why the U.S. Failed in Iraq: Baghdad at the Crossroads.” *Middle East Forum*. Middle East Forum, November 18, 2014. Last modified November 18, 2014, accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.meforum.org/3680/iraq-us-failure>; Piper, Bill. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016; Timothy Taylor. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Cullman, AL, September, 28, 2016.

insurgent activities began to rise again. The fall of 2008 made the worst fears about reconciliation, stability, and a capable central government in Baghdad a reality.²⁴

The US military did make gains in Iraq, but also suffered significant losses. However, when looking at success and failure of an operation one must consider the objectives. For the Surge, the purpose was to help facilitate reconciliation between rival factions, rejuvenate the local economy, and provide a stable environment so the government in Iraq could take over in Baghdad and gain the recognition of the people. In the short-term, the Surge was very efficient in gaining territory, but did not yield results to create a permanent solution.²⁵ Military personnel involved in the operations have a unique insight into how the Surge played out, and offer a first-hand account of the strategies implementation.

The opinion of veterans involved in the Surge is that the operation was not a successful strategy. However, the reasons behind that answer vary. From the soldiers' perspective, the Surge was incredibly violent and unforgiving. They perceived that violence in two separate ways. One perception is that the destructive nature of the Surge created more enemies than US forces could detain or kill. Sedrick Brown believed that "violence from previous deployments set us up for failure." Eric Blackburn, when asked if objectives were met, stated "No they were not, I do not believe that it can be done. Every kill, whether justified or not, will create more terrorists."²⁶

²⁴ Steve Dobransky, "Why the U.S. Failed in Iraq: Baghdad at the Crossroads." *Middle East Forum*. Middle East Forum, November 18, 2014. Last modified November 18, 2014, accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.meforum.org/3680/iraq-us-failure>.

²⁵ Greg Bruno, "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security," *Washington Post*, April 28, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120.html>.

²⁶ Sedrick Brown. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Clarksville, TN, August 9, 2016. Eric Blackburn. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016

Another view is that the Surge was not violent enough and allowed for insurgents to slip through the cracks and thereby damaged the US reputation on an international scale. Dan Malubag stated “we were a bit too caring towards the local population,” and that “we were there to win the hearts and minds, but we also were a little too trusting with the local leaders.” Additionally, the conditions surrounding the Surge also raised questions among the US military. The lack of responsibility the Iraqi army and police were willing to take on to defend their own country also created concern. Furthermore, the amount of infiltration into Iraq organizations destroyed trust, coupled with the Iraq government’s lack of progress taking control of the situation, and the lack of urgency in regarding the political divide between groups in Baghdad. Thomas Monk contends that the goal was to assist “the state of Iraq and better equip them to handle their own problems,” but “the outcome was that Iraq was unable to maintain themselves without United States Military present, once we pulled out Iraq crumbled and now they are in a state of Islamic terror which is far worse than before the Surge.” With a lack of involvement from the citizenry and government, the opinion is that the Surge was doomed, as presented to the American people, from the start.²⁷

The increase of troops created physical and psychological exhaustion among soldiers. In addition, the year of 2007 cost the US \$155 billion, followed by a cost of \$190 billion in 2008. The US lost over 1000 soldiers, while the cost in citizen lives are estimated to be over 20,000. The most glaring problem with the Surge is the outcome and the complete lack of willingness or desire to take over the responsibility and cost of

²⁷ Dan Malubag. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016; Thomas Monk. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016.

maintaining any progress made.²⁸ Exposure to harmful toxins also created casualties, but the presence of danger eluded most soldiers.

The operation did not stop costing the United States government when it concluded in 2008. Instead, recent findings have linked long-term injuries sustained by soldiers to actions taken during the Surge. The reports show exposure to contaminated water, uranium, and other chemicals during their time in Baghdad. Another point of concern was burn barrels, which became more widespread during the Surge due to a lack of running water and ability to remove waste properly. According to studies conducted in 2011, and again in 2015, the waste burn barrels had a direct correlation between veterans who have since suffered from respiratory illnesses like asthma, emphysema, and some reports of rare, but deadly lung diseases. The military also used burn pits and disposal sites to destroy explosives and weapons found during daily patrols. The proximity of the COP to the disposal sites during the Surge was very close due to security concerns. The inhalation of metal particles and exposure to dangerous chemicals released during the process of burning materials is believed to be connected brain damage. The damage appears as lesions on the brain, and the symptoms often manifest through nerve damage, severe headaches, and memory loss.²⁹ Despite the

²⁸ Kim Gamel, "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq," NBC News, August 29, 2010, accessed February 6, 2018, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted-billions-rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd.

²⁹ Patricia Kime, "New Burn Pit Report: Lung Disease, High Blood Pressure Common in Exposed Vets," Military Times, July 22, 2015, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/military-benefits/health-care/2015/07/22/new-burn-pit-report-lung-disease-high-blood-pressure-common-in-exposed-vets/>; John Ismay, "An Iraq Veteran's Experience With Chemical Weapons," New York Times, October 16, 2014, accessed February 16, 2018, <https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/an-iraq-veterans-experience-with-chemical-weapons/>.

high risk of death and injury, these new locations in Baghdad were considered essential to achieving success during the operation.

One point of contention regarding the success of the Surge is the lasting influences. When focusing on the short-term gains, the consensus has remained that the Surge was a tactical success. However, when examining the motives behind the operation, and the desired outcome the findings are different. The lack of planning during the invasion of Iraq is the culprit most people point to when describing the problems in Iraq. In reflection, the Surge was not so much different. Had the objective been to buy time to make a more permanent plan, the admission of success is inevitable. The issue lies within the idea of the clearing, controlling, and retaining the Baghdad beltway and stabilizing the region. As for the reduction in violence, the real question comes down to whether the findings reported in real time carry more weight than those released by the University of California Los Angeles. If a person does not believe the Surge was responsible for the decrease in violence, the influence of the Surge suffers. When the Surge ended in the summer of 2008, the country was no closer to reconciliation than when the operations began. The temporary successes of the Surge did not generate lasting results. When measuring the Surge based on its objectives, the strategy falls short of the expectation that a military victory was achievable.³⁰

³⁰ U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight," U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO), January 09, 2007, accessed February 4, 2018, <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP>. 39-52.

CONCLUSION

The Surge was a response to a complicated and failing situation in the Baghdad beltway. The implications of a collapse in Iraq carried the risk of losing political power, international influence, and a damaged projection of strength for the United States. The Bush Administration recognized the dire situation, and responded with a plan they anticipated could stabilize the region and offer a path to a military victory. The need for such an operation existed due to the spike in violence throughout 2006 because of increased sectarian tension that spilled over into a civil war. The new strategy aimed to decrease that violence while pursuing stability through a combination of political and military action, giving the operation a reputation over the past decade.

Coverage of the Surge, both in the media and in academia, views the operation in a positive light. In academia, the primary evidence used to support the claims of success is operational efficiency, the decline of sectarian violence, an increase of economic activity, and humanitarian efforts. Historian Kimberly Kagan also credits the Surge with “changing the operational art of counterinsurgency.” Fellow Historian Dale Andradé explains that humanitarian and economic factors influenced his perception of the operation. Retired Colonel Peter Mansoor, Chair of Military History at Ohio State University, argues that the vision of General David Petraeus allowed for the alliance between Sunni leadership and Coalition Forces, thus reducing the violence between the sects in Baghdad¹ However, when exploring the Surge, it is essential to compare the intended outcome with what the operation actually accomplished.

¹ Kimberly Kagan, *The Surge: A Military History*, (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), 29; Dale Andradé, *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3D Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*,

The new strategy would increase troop levels by over 20,000, create a stable environment in Baghdad, and begin transferring the power of governing from the United States back to Iraq. The presentation of the Surge to the American people explained how the operation would secure a military victory, restore order, and allow for their forces to reduce combat responsibilities. The success of this plan would limit the number of soldiers needed in Iraq and would enable the re-allocation of resources spent in Iraq to winning the effort in Afghanistan. Despite warnings from Generals George Casey, John Abizaid, and Peter Chiarelli, who warned that an increase of troops would damage the situation in Iraq, the Surge began in January 2007.²

The original purpose of the Surge, according to the speech given by President Bush, was to improve security in Baghdad, create a stable region, and begin the process of handing over operations to Iraqi officials. President Bush concluded that the new strategy would offer the opportunity of a victory through “tactical objectives, such as destroying a safe haven for insurgents; operational objectives, such as securing a city; strategic objectives, such as establishing a safe and democratic government.” The adoption of the new strategy was preceded by an unprecedented year of bloodshed. To stop this violence, the Surge sought to employ plans that involved both political and military components. Political aspirations for the government in Iraq consisted of gaining the trust of the people, providing essential needs, and reinstating elected officials in an

(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010), 383-390; Peter R. Mansoor, *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 18-34.

² George Bush, “President Bush Addresses the Nation on Iraq” (lecture, Washington D.C., January 10, 2007), accessed March 8, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/AR2007011002208.html>

official capacity. For the new approach to succeed, the United States had to complete a series of maneuvers in the region, which incorporated both Coalition and Iraqi forces.

A significant first step was the Baghdad Security Plan, which General David Petraeus saw as a way to further develop the relationship between the United States and local Sunni leadership. Consistently providing a constant presence was a weakness of previous years. The Baghdad Security Plan sought to remedy this problem by procuring locations in the Baghdad region to establish Combat Outposts and Joint Security Stations. These two additions offered the opportunity to place soldiers in the areas they patrolled continuously with supplies and reinforcements nearby. In addition, the new locations were meant to build trust between the American forces and civilians in the city and rekindle the hearts and minds campaign after the previous year of violence.³

Problems with this portion of the plan was the timing. The Baghdad Security Plan began in early 2007 and continued into the summer. In June, Operation Phantom Thunder commenced, which signaled the beginning of aggressive clearing of the Baghdad region. The purpose of the Combat Outposts and Joint Security Stations was to offer a continuous presence, a quicker response time, and a rapport with the community. However, at the start of Operation Phantom Thunder, many COP and JSS were not adequately equipped and lacked sufficient manpower. Logistically the Baghdad Security Plan did not provide the volume of support needed. Strategically, considerations of culture and the US perception in Baghdad were overlooked and

³ Sarah Wood, "Baghdad Security Plan Can Work, Commander Says," United States Department of Defense, February 16, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3082>.

added to the already tense situation between sects. Tactically, these locations contributed to the rapid pace that Coalition Forces moved through the city between June and August 2007. Lastly, the Joint Security Stations gave American forces a place to train Iraqi Police, in some situations screen potential militia members, and stage Quick Reaction Forces during combat operations.⁴

Leadership in the US military believed that this security plan would make Baghdad a safer city. Taking notes from David Galula's book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, General David Petraeus understood that "The population becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy." With a citizen-centric plan developed, General Petraeus sought to win the numbers game in Baghdad. By providing safety, Petraeus hoped to create a stable environment, which relied on two factors. First, working in tandem with security, was the expulsion of al-Qaeda. There were no illusions, if insurgents remained in the city and undermined progress, the future of Iraq was in question. The second part relied on the Iraqi government increasing its functionality and presence. The government in Iraq was the most critical component for a permanent Surge success.⁵

When the initial missions to clear Baghdad began, the level of US readiness did not match the expectation of the military strategy. Relying on kinetic operations, soldiers cleared the city using airstrikes, raids, and a continuous presence. Immense violence ensued, which followed the pattern of military actions in 2006, and many insurgents were captured or killed. However, many of the estimated insurgents fled the city. The

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2006).

systematic clearing Baghdad was bloody, but the Army initially had relative success in expelling al-Qaeda. Even when the American soldiers finished the first phase of seek and destroy missions in Baghdad, however, the situation on the ground was still chaotic and needed further support to achieve a lasting influence in the region.

During the second phase of the Surge, violence peaked in regards to the loss of civilian lives. Also, the number of soldiers killed in action remained high as the focus of the Coalition Forces shifted from clearing to controlling the region. The military, assisted by Iraqi forces, moved further outside the city in an attempt to secure the whole region. Coverage of the Surge focused on the territories gained and the defeat of al-Qaeda as opposed to the future of Iraq. The pressure applied during the first two phases routed the enemy and establish hope that a military victory was achievable. Logistically, the clearing phase of the Surge displayed the capabilities of American transportation by relocating combat vehicles, weapons, ammunition, food, and water for over 10,000 combat soldiers. Strategically, the approach to the mission was not planned to shape the future. The objective was to clear Baghdad, but the US lacked a subsequent plan and ended with significant number of insurgents merely moving to another location to fight another day. Tactically, the Coalition Forces were sound. While some of their tactics raised concerns, such as the use of white phosphorous munitions, the removal of the insurgents highlighted tactical superiority, especially at night. Immediately following the clearing phase came the attempt to control the region, which began in August and lasted until January of 2008.⁶

⁶ Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Thunder," Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-thunder>.

The United States initiated Operation Phantom Strike directly following Operation Phantom Thunder. Beginning in August 2007, Phantom Strike sought to capitalize on the victories of the previous mission. With Baghdad cleared, the next objective was to gain control of the surrounding areas. Missions faced outwards as American and Iraqi forces pushed to secure key locations outside of city's limits. In addition, checkpoints became imperative to the effort to stop the flow of weapons, regulating travel, and attempting to identify car bombs before they entered the secured sector. The logistical performance of this phase of the Surge was underwhelming. Technologically the United States was scrambling to keep up with the evolution of the insurgents' methods of attack. General Kevin Bergner, a Special Assistant to the President, admitted in a press conference in Baghdad that "Despite this progress, insurgents are still capable of staging large-scale attacks." The United States solution to these continued attacks was to use more Iraqi forces. One way to achieve this was through checkpoints and security stations, which remained understaffed moving into the fall. The strategy was good in theory but still needed a follow-up plan to establish long-lasting stability in Baghdad after gaining control. The tactical approach to this portion was also lacking. Reliance on checkpoints put American forces in increased danger. Iraqi Police and local militias were responsible for most checkpoint operations, which brought up concerns of corruption and infiltration of the groups by insurgents, and highlighted the almost non-existent third objective: to transfer the power back to the government in Iraq.⁷

⁷ "Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligence," United States Department of Defense, August 15, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018, <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47057>.

Success during the Surge was often short-lived. The nature of insurgency made winning in Iraq a significant challenge. When the United States went on the offensive, the insurgents would flee the area, only to return at a different time and disturb any plans of peace or stability. Infrastructure in Baghdad was another factor not adequately planned for in the initial stages of implementation. Dilapidated buildings, road erosion, and sewage overflow caused significant obstacles to successful operations. These conditions also contributed to the lack of cooperation between religious sects and the confidence citizens had in their government's ability to lead.

The failure of the Iraqi government to perform during the Surge contributed heavily to the outcome. Corruption and resistance to compromise made the situation in Iraq dismal. Furthermore, the Iraqi government also continued to struggle to provide services to citizens throughout the country with any regularity. The government in Iraq abandoned most projects implemented during the Surge, such as local militias, sewer treatment plants, and the distribution of potable water. Logistically Iraqi officials could not entice enough citizens to fill the roles needed and did not support the ones who did report. Pleas from the United States did not help the situation either. General Kevin J. Bergner continued by stating "It's very difficult, but we're continuing to pressure those networks and to encourage Iraqi people to come forward, work with their security forces, work with their government, because that's the fundamental thing that helps deal with the kinds of terrorist problems that are plaguing the Iraqi people," Also, the Iraqi government did not display any type of strategic or tactical vision for the situation in

Iraq. Instead, the focus returned to tribal tension as corruption further plagued attempts to improve the future of the country.⁸

A continuing problem for the outcome of the Surge lay in the presentation that US officials made to the American people. Members of the Bush Administration portrayed the plan as a long-term solution to deeply rooted problems in Iraq. The Surge failed to capitalize on the momentum of success. Instead, the production of short bursts of progress gave way to a lack of preparation. The operation correctly identified issues that existed, but the course of action taken continued to be short-sighted. The Surge fought the symptoms of the conflict by attacking sources of violence, such as al-Qaeda, without identifying why they were supported by locals or seeking to remedy their methods of recruitment. The goal was to "continue to target terrorists who kill innocent Iraqi citizens and try to disrupt the political process," yet the United States failed to address the collateral damage created through military action.⁹

The Surge is neither a complete failure nor a complete success. Logistically, the United States showed the capability to move massive amounts of equipment, supplies, and soldiers at a rapid pace. However, US leadership also sent soldiers into combat with faulty gear and inadequate training. Strategically, the same lack of vision that plagued the invasion reappeared in aspects of the Surge. Strategists of the Surge focused on the problem directly in front of them but failed to anticipate subsequent moves needed to keep momentum when they achieved their objectives. Tactically, the US military displayed skill and efficiency to clear large combat targets and secure

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Anthony H. Cordesman and Emma R. Davies, *Iraq's Insurgency and the Road to Civil Conflict*, vol. 1, Praeger Security International (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2007), 316.

multiple types of locations. Unfortunately, the goal of the Surge was to relinquish combat responsibilities to the Iraqi military and local militias, which proved to be a false hope.

When reflecting on the Surge a decade later, the most visible weaknesses surround the strategic objectives and outcomes. Starting in January 2007, the mission lasted until May 2008. During that sixteen-month time, the United States and Iraq accomplished many goals, yet almost all evidence of success disappeared within six months of the Surge's ending. This research has highlighted some of the achievements of the operation but also displayed them as short-lived victories that did not create long-lasting influence in Iraq. Nonetheless, the most damaging aspect of the Surge was the depiction given by the Bush Administration and media before its implementation. Supporters of the Surge were promised a permanent solution to the chaos in Iraq and received only momentary results. Colonel Douglas Macgregor claims "the Surge in Iraq won nothing, it only bought time. The thing that worries me most of all is what happens over the next 12 to 24 months in Iraq. Are we not actually setting Iraq up for a worse civil war than the one we have already seen?"¹⁰ The attempt to stabilize Iraq failed, and the eradication of insurgent safe havens did not materialize. Instead, factionalism deepened, the Iraqi government did not regain a hold on the power, and the operation fostered a new type of insurgent.

The historical memory of the veterans is also an essential perspective to consider. By asking the question "Were objectives met," the answers are different, yet

¹⁰ Guy Raz, "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge," National Public Radio, January 08, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543>.

similar. One response was “if you look at what we did there and look at the country now, we did not meet the intent of establishing a stable, secure, running government.” Another soldier claimed, “No they were not, they know the terrain and escape routes, the best places to ambush and every kill, whether justified or not, will create more terrorists.” An additional question asked was “is there anything you would like to add, in retrospect, concerning the perceptions and realities of the Surge?” The response to this varied, but also displayed a different approach to processing the operation. Common answers included the phrases “it has taken a toll on me,” or “it changed me as a person.” Others, who spent more than one deployment in Iraq, claimed that the Surge “rekindled the hatred I have for Iraq,” and “There was still a stigma from the prior deployment which made returning soldiers hold hatred against the locals and made the Surge more difficult to carry out.” The Surge influenced more than just the United States relationship in the Middle East. The remnants of the operation still exist in American today.¹¹

When considering the viability of such operations, there is little discussion about the level of intensity and the duration of the mission. The Surge lasted for 16 months, with the first ten months being the most aggressive. However, regarding the individuals interviewed, the average soldier was deployed for 14 months. The longevity of these missions and the stress on military personnel are not considered in the equation of success. The Surge represents, in general, a tactically sound mission that lacked real

¹¹ Dan Malubag. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016; Eric Blackburn. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016; Thomas Monk. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016; Bill Morris. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016; Kimberley Ankrom. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November, 2017.

strategic planning as to how the operation would influence Iraq a decade later. Despite the intent, the Surge further destabilized the region, took massive amounts of resources away from Afghanistan, and offered no real long-term solution to the foreseeable future of Iraq. Small achievements aside, the Surge became an attempt to use a logistical solution to a strategic, operational, and tactical problem.

Bibliography

Introduction

Primary Sources

- Baker, James Addison, Lee Hamilton, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger. *The Iraq Study Group Report*. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.
- Battle, Joyce, "Pentagon "Rapid Reaction Media Team" for Iraq," Iraq: The Media War Plan, May 8, 2007, accessed October 29, 2017, <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/index.htm>.
- Bush, George. "President Bush Addresses the Nation on Iraq." Washington D.C., January 10, 2007. Accessed November 14, 2016. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/>.
- Filkins, Dexter, James Glanz, and James Glantz, "With Airpower and Armor, Troops Enter Rebel-Held City," *New York Times*, November 08, 2004, accessed October 30, 2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/08/international/with-airpower-and-armor-troops-enterrebelheld-city.htm>.
- Katzman, Kenneth. *CRS Report RL31339: Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security*, 2008, Accessed October 18, 2016, <https://fpc.state.gov/documents/organizations/106174.pdf>.
- "Marne 6 Sends: Meeting the Needs of the Iraqi People," *Dog Face Daily*, 1 June 2008, 1.
- Sanger, David E. Michael R. Gordon, and John F. Burns. "Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in '06, Bush Team Says." *The New York Times*. January 02, 2007. Accessed October 19, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/02/washington/02war.html?mwrsm>.
- Sullivan, Meg. "UCLA Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad." *UCLA Newsroom*. September 18, 2008. Accessed August 12, 2016, <http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852>.
- The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24: Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Secondary Sources

- Andradé, Dale. *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010.
- Bacevich, Andrew J. *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
- _____. *Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Robert Michael Gates, and Suzanne Maloney. *Iran Time for a New Approach*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004.
- Bush, George W. *Decision Points*. New York: Crown Publishers, 2010.
- Donnelly, Thomas, and Frederick W. Kagan. *Lessons for a Long War: How America Can Win on New Battlefields*. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 2010.
- Kagan, Kimberly. *The Surge: A Military History*. New York: Encounter Books, 2009.

- Knowlton, Bill. *The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq*, Industrial College of the Armed Forces National Defense University, 2010. Accessed September 24, 2016. <http://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo69309>.
- Mansoor, Peter R. *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.
- Ricks, Thomas E. *The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008*. New York: Penguin Press, 2009.
- Sjursen, Daniel A. *Ghost Riders of Baghdad: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Myth of the Surge*. Lebanon, NH: Foreedge, 2015.
- Woodward, Bob. *The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-2008*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008, 152-153.

Chapter 1:

Primary Sources

- "A Case for Additional Troops." *Washington Times (Washington, DC)*, December 15, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-155929304.html?refid=easy_hf.
- Associated Press. "Iraq draft constitution approved, officials say." *NBCNews.com*. October 25, 2005. Accessed December 16, 2017. <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9803257/#.Wm3X3dWnHrc>.
- Barr, Cameron W., and Karl Vick. "30 Marines, Sailor Die In Copter Crash in Iraq." *The Washington Post*. January 27, 2005. Accessed January 28, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36938-2005Jan26.html>.
- Carter, Phillip, and Owen West. "Body counts in Iraq and Vietnam." *Slate Magazine*. December 27, 2004. Accessed December 27, 2017. http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2004/12/iraq_2004_looks_like_vietnam_1966.html.
- Crawley, Vince. "Clearing the Way for Elections: 'Some insurgents May Have Fled Fallujah Before Forces Arrived.'" *Marine Corps Times (Springfield)*, November 22, 2004. Accessed December 18, 2017, <http://infoweb.newsbank.com.proxy195.nclive.org/apps/news/>.
- Crook, J. R. (2006). U.S. Defends Use of White Phosphorus Munitions in Iraq. *The American Journal of International Law*, 100(2), 487. Retrieved from <http://proxy195.nclive.org/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/201155134?accountid=14968>.
- Diamond, John. "Iraq Weapons Assessments 'Dead Wrong.'" *USA Today*. March 31, 2005. Accessed June 14, 2017. https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-31-intel-panel_x.htm.
- Henry, Ed. "Bush: U.S. to Stay in Iraq till War is Won." *CNN*. December 1, 2005. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/11/30/us.iraq/index.html>.
- Hernandez, Nelson Hernandez, and Omar Fekeiki. "Iraqi Premier, Cabinet Sworn In." *Washington Post*. May 21, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/20/AR2006052000392.html>.
- "Iraq Study Group Report Released; Saddam Hussein Executed." *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 17, no. 02 (January 2007). Accessed January 20, 2018, doi:10.1017/s1052703607000160.
- Journal, Wall Street. "The Iraq Muddle Group." *Wall Street Journal*. December 07, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116545660766942936>.

Jr., Andrew F. Krepinevich. "How to Win in Iraq." *Foreign Affairs*. October 2, 2005. Accessed June 16, 2017. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2005-09-01/how-win-iraq>.

Kamp, Nina, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz. "The State of Iraq: An Update." *New York Times*. September 30, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html>.

Kamp, Nina, Michael O'hanlon, and Amy Unikewicz. "The State of Iraq: An Update." *New York Times*. September 30, 2006. Accessed January 6, 2018. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/01/opinion/01ohanlon.html>.

Keane, Jack, and Frederick W. Kagan. "The Right Type of 'Surge'." *Washington Post*. December 27, 2006. Accessed August 8, 2016. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122600773.html>.

Knickmeyer, Ellen, and Bassam Sebt. "Toll in Iraq's Deadly Surge: 1,300." *Washington Post*. February 28, 2006. Accessed January 30, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/02/27/AR2006022701128.html>.

Kolhmann, Evan F. "The State of the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: 2006." Central Intelligence Agency. December 29, 2006. Accessed July 18, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/abbottabad-compound/54/54F87F15D446471E9A12A4A0324BCB87_iraqinsurgency1206.pdf.

Larsen, Ian, and Lauren Sucher. "Iraq Study Group Fact Sheet." United States Institute of Peace. December 20, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/isg_fact_sheet.pdf.

Monitz, David. "Army Misses Recruiting Goals." *USA Today*. March 2, 2005. Accessed January 21, 2018. https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-02-army-goal_x.htm.

Pike, John. "Military." Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction | Reports to Congress. January 30, 2005. Accessed January 4, 2018. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2005/sigir-jan05_report.htm.

Purdum, Todd S. "Flashback to the 60's: A Sinking Sensation of Parallels between Iraq and Vietnam." *New York Times*. January 29, 2005. Accessed December 27, 2017. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/29/politics/flashback-to-the-60s-a-sinking-sensation-of-parallels-between-iraq.html>.

Reid, Harry. "Iraq Study Group Report Reaction, Dec 6 2006 | Video." C-SPAN.org. December 6, 2006. Accessed January 16, 2018. <https://www.c-span.org/video/?195658-3%2Firaq-study-group-report-reaction>.

Roberts, Joel. "U.S. Death Toll in Iraq Hits 1,500." *CBS News*. March 04, 2005. Accessed December 15, 2017. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-death-toll-in-iraq-hits-1500/>.

Saddir, Abdul-Qadir. "Fallujah Residents Angry Over Destruction." *Newspaper Source Plus*, Jan 11, 2005. Accessed December 18, 2017. <http://proxy195.nclive.org/login?url=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.ebscohost.com%2Flogin.aspx%3Fdirect>.

Schorn, Daniel. "A Spy Speaks Out." *CBS News*. April 24, 2006. Accessed January 30, 2018. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-spy-speaks-out-21-04-2006/>.

Staff Writer. "Death toll for U.S. Troops in Iraq Reaches 2,000." NBC News. October 26, 2005. Accessed December 15, 2017.
<http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9772398/#.Wm3Ur9WnHrc>.

Staff Writer. "A Bipartisan Path to Surrender?" *Washington Times (Washington, DC)*, December 7, 2006. Accessed December 16, 2017.
<https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/dec/6/20061206-095730-9143r/f>.

Tawfeeq, Mohammed. "PM: Iraqi Troops Battle-Ready in 2007." CNN. May 23, 2006. Accessed January 4, 2018. <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/05/25/iraq.main/>.

Tyson, Ann Scott. "Bush's Defense Budget Biggest Since Reagan Era." *Washington Post*. February 06, 2007. Accessed January 26, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/05/AR2007020501552.html>.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Terry H. *Bush's Wars*. New York: Oxford Press, 2011.

Ardolino, Bill. *Fallujah Awakens: Marines, Sheiks, and the Battle Against Al Qaeda*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014.

Bacevich, Andrew J. *America's War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History*. New York, NY: Random House, 2016.

Camp, Richard D. *Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq*. Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009.

Gallup, Inc. "Iraq." Gallup.com. Accessed January 20, 2018.
<http://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx>.

Gallup, Inc. "Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush." Presidential Approval Ratings -- George W. Bush, accessed January 16, 2018.
<http://news.gallup.com/poll/116500/presidential-approval-ratings-george-bush.aspx>.

Richard S. *New Dawn: The Battles for Fallujah*. New York, NY: Savas Beatie, 2011.

Ricks, Thomas E. *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003–2005*. . New York: Penguin, 2005.

Robbins, James S. "Behind-Scenes Strategy That Led to Iraq Surge." *The Washington Times (Washington, DC)*, March 10, 2009. Accessed January 4, 2018.
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-195276812.html?refid=easy_hf.

Rubin, Michael. *Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes*. New York: Encounter Books, 2015.

Chapter 2:

Primary Sources

Agnew, John, Thomas W. Gillespie, Jorge Gonzalez, and Brian Min. "Baghdad Nights: Evaluating the US Military 'Surge' Using Nighttime Light Signatures." *Environment and Planning A* 40, no. 10 (October 1, 2008): 2285-295. Accessed February 3, 2018.
[doi:doi.org/10.1068/a41200](https://doi.org/10.1068/a41200).

Berner, Joshua. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tahlequah, OK, November 7, 2016.

Bruno, Greg. "Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'." Council on Foreign Relations. April 23, 2008. Accessed February 10, 2018.
<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/finding-place-sons-iraq>.

_____ "The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security." *Washington Post*. April 28, 2008. Accessed February 09, 2018.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042801120>.

Burkhart, Anthony. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, September 23, 2016.

Chambers, Bruce. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Tavares, FL, August 23, 2016.

CQ Transcript Wire. "Petraeus, Crocker Testify at Senate Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Iraq." *Washington Post*. April 8, 2008. Accessed February 09, 2018.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/iraq_hearing_040808.html.

Cullen, Patrick. "Iraq: Armed Humanitarianism, International Relations and Security Network." Resources – Center for Security Studies | ETH Zurich. March 5, 2008. Accessed February 6, 2018, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=54134> 16 See Abby Stoddard%2CAdele Harmer and.

Editors, SWJ. "CCO Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor." *Small Wars Journal*. November 24, 2008. Accessed February 4, 2018.
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cmo-interview-with-colonel-peter-mansoor>.

"Fact Sheet: A New Way Forward in Iraq." National Archives and Records Administration. January 10, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018.
<https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html>.

Glanz, James, and Stephen Farrell. "Militias Seizing Control of Iraqi Electricity Grid." *The New York Times*. August 22, 2007. Accessed February 8, 2018.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/middleeast/23electricity.html>.

Jimenez, Brian. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Greenville, NC

Jones, James L. The Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq. 2007. MS, Washington D. C. September 9, 2007. Accessed February 8, 2018.
<https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/independent-commission-security-forces-iraq>

Kaminski, Matthew. "Why the Surge Worked." *Wall Street Journal*. September 20, 2008. Accessed February 06, 2018.
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122186492076758643>.

Kane, Sean. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbus, GA, August 23, 2016

Malubag, Dan. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016.

McCain, John and Joe Lieberman. "The Surge Worked." *The Wall Street Journal*. January 10, 2008. Accessed February 06, 2018.
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB119992665423979631>.

Monk, Thomas. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016.

Morris, Bill. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016.

Raiford, Kenneth. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Houston, TX, July 18, 2017

Raz, Guy. "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge." NPR. January 08, 2008. Accessed February 09, 2018. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543>.

"Sons of Iraq and Awakening Forces." Institute for the Study of War. February 21, 2008. Accessed February 09, 2018.
<http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/sons-iraq-and-awakening-forces>.

Sullivan, Meg. "UCLA Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad." UCLA Newsroom. September 18, 2008. Accessed August 12, 2016.
<http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852>.

SWJ Editors, "CCO Interview with Colonel Peter Mansoor," *Small Wars Journal*, November 24, 2008, accessed February 4, 2018, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/cco-interview-with-colonel-peter-mansoor>.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight." U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). January 09, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP>.

Wise, Michael. "Papers Give Peek Inside al Qaeda in Iraq." CNN. June 11, 2008. Accessed February 6, 2018. <http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/06/11/al.qaeda.iraq/index.html>.

Young, Thomas. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November 29, 2016.

Secondary Sources

Anderson, Terry H. *Bush's Wars*. New York: Oxford Press, 2011.

Andradé, Dale. *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010.

Beinart, Peter. "Admit It: The Surge Worked." *Washington Post*. January 18, 2009. Accessed February 06, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/16/AR2009011603719.html>.

Christoff, Joseph A. *Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*. Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2010.

Gamel, Kim. "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq." NBC News. August 29, 2010. Accessed February 6, 2018. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted-billions-rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd.

Juhasz, Antonia. "Why the War in Iraq was Fought for Big Oil." CNN. April 15, 2013. Accessed February 8, 2018. <https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/opinion/iraq-war-oil-juhasz/index.html>.

Mansoor, Peter R. *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.

Petraeus, David. "How We Won in Iraq." *Foreign Policy*. October 29, 2013. Accessed February 06, 2018. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/10/29/how-we-won-in-iraq/>.

Shadid, Anthony, and Saad Sarhan. "Peacemaking Event Is Attacked in Iraq." *Washington Post*. January 03, 2009. Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/02/AR2009010200692.html?hpid=moreheadlines>.

Simon, Steven. "The Price of the Surge." *Foreign Affairs*. July 08, 2014. Accessed February 09, 2018. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iraq/2008-05-03/price-surge>.

Shamoo, Adil E., and Bonnie Bricker. "The Costs of War for Oil." *Foreign Policy In Focus*. October 19, 2013. Accessed February 13, 2018. http://fpif.org/the_costs_of_war_for_oil/.

Wilbanks, Mark, and Efraim Karsh. "How the 'Sons of Iraq' Stabilized Iraq." *Middle East Forum: Promoting America's Interest*, 4th ser., 17, no. Fall (October 1, 2010): 57-70. October 1, 2010. Accessed February 6, 2010. <http://www.meforum.org/2788/sons-of-iraq>.

Chapter 3

Primary Sources

Ackerman, Spencer. "Training Iraq's Death Squads." *The Nation*. May 17, 2007. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.thenation.com/article/training-iraqs-death-squads/>.

Ankrom, Kimberley emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November, 2017.

Associated Press. "2007 was the Deadliest Year for U.S. Troops." NBC News. December 31, 2007. Accessed February 20, 2018. http://www.nbcnews.com/id/22451069/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/was-deadliest-year-us-troops-iraq/#.WpWW92inHrc.

Beaumont, Peter. "Fatigue Cripples US army in Iraq." *The Observer*. August 11, 2007. Accessed February 15, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/aug/12/usa.iraq>.

Beehner, Lionel. "Is U.S. Troop Morale Slipping?" Council on Foreign Relations. June 14, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-troop-morale-slipping>.

Blackburn, Eric. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016.

Burns, Robert. "Pentagon Condemns Iraq Poison Gas Attack." *Washington Post*. March 30, 2007. Accessed February 18, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR2007033001135.html>.

Brown, Sedrick. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Clarksville, TN, August 9, 2016.

Bruno, Greg. "Finding a Place for the 'Sons of Iraq'." Council on Foreign Relations. April 23, 2008. Accessed February 10, 2018. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/finding-place-sons-iraq>

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Emma R. Davies. *Iraq's Insurgency and The Road To Civil Conflict*. Vol. 1. Praeger Security International. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2007.

"DOD IG Report on MRAP Delays." POGO Project On Government Oversight. December 10, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://www.pogo.org/about/press-room/releases/2008/ns-mrap-20081210.html?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F>.

Garrels, Anne. "U.S. Troops Spread Thin Despite Surge." NPR. May 17, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10226407>.

Hambling, David. "MRAP Hazards: Drowning, Electrocuting, Cancer." *Wired*. July 17, 2008. Accessed February 16, 2018. <https://www.wired.com/2008/07/mrap-hazards-dr/>.

H.R. Rep. No. 110 Congress-V. 153 Pt. 3 at 4030-4048 (2007).

Hsia, Timothy. "A Quick Review of Combat Outposts (COPs)." *Small Wars Journal*. March 2008. Accessed February 16, 2018. <file:///home/chronos/u-2efd1c7716ce4141fc985a128349ad72c1c3695b/Downloads/138-hsia.pdf>.

Johnson, Devlin. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Perry, GA, August 9, 2016.

Keane, Jack, and Frederick W. Kagan. "The Right Type of 'Surge'." *Washington Post*. December 27, 2006. Accessed August 8, 2016. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/12/26/AR2006122600773>.

Kruzel, John J. " Odierno Highlights Operations Phantom Strike, Phantom Thunder." United States Department of Defense. August 17, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47086>.

Martinez, Luis. "Surge Numbers Approach 30,000." ABC News. March 1, 2007. Accessed February 12, 2018. <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=2958331&page=1>.

Moss, Michael. "Pentagon Study Links Fatalities to Body Armor." *The New York Times*. January 07, 2006. Accessed February 02, 2018. <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/07/politics/pentagon-study-links-fatalities-to-body-armor.html>.

North, Oliver. "IRAQ EXCLUSIVE: Troops' Spirits Remain High, See Fruits of Labor Despite Political Pessimists." Fox News. December 7, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/12/07/iraq-exclusive-troops-spirits-remain-high-see-fruits-labor-despite-political.html>.

Piper, Bill. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016

Press Release. "Defense AFP News Order General Dynamics Awarded \$108 Million for Production of Reactive Armor for Bradley Fighting Vehicle." General Dynamics Awarded \$108 Million for Production of Reactive Armor for Bradley Fighting Vehicle. August 20, 2007. Accessed February 10, 2018. <http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/85364/gd-wins-%24108m-for-bradley-reactive-armor.html>

Press Release. "Operation Phantom Phoenix: Pursuit of al-Qaeda continues." CENTCOM. January 14, 2008. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/903464/operation-phantom-phoenix-pursuit-of-al-qaeda-continues/>.

Staff Writer. "Operation Phantom Thunder." Institute for the Study of War. August 15, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-thunder>.

Staff Writer. "Operation Phantom Strike." Institute for the Study of War. February 2, 2008. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-strike>.

Staff Writer. "This Year Deadliest for U.S. Troops in Iraq." *Reuters*. November 06, 2007. Accessed February 20, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-usa-soldiers/this-year-deadliest-for-u-s-troops-in-iraq-idUSYAT64897120071106>.

Staff Writer. "Operation Phantom Phoenix." Institute for the Study of War. August 23, 2008. Accessed February 20, 2018. <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-phoenix>.

Sullivan, Meg. "UCLA Study of Satellite Imagery Casts Doubt on Surge's Success in Baghdad." UCLA Newsroom. September 18, 2008. Accessed August 12, 2016. <http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/ucla-study-of-satellite-imagery-62852>.

Taylor, Timothy. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Cullman, AL, September, 28, 2016.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. "Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight." U.S. Government Accountability Office (U.S. GAO). January 09, 2007. Accessed February 4, 2018. <https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-308SP>.

Watson, Cody. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Missoula, MT, August 9, 2016.

Wood, Sarah. "Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligent." United States Department of Defense. August 15, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47057>.

Wood, Sarah. "Baghdad Security Plan Can Work, Commander Says." United States Department of Defense. February 16, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018. <http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3082>.

Wright, Anthony. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kyle, TX, September, 23, 2016.

Young, Thomas. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Lynchburg, VA, November 29, 2016.

Secondary Sources

- DeGrandpre, Andrew, and Andrew Tilghman. "Iran Linked to Deaths of 500 U.S. Troops in Iraq, Afghanistan." *Military Times*. Jan. & Feb., 2015. Accessed February 18, 2018.
<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2015/07/14/iran-linked-to-deaths-of-500-u-s-troops-in-iraq-afghanistan/>.
- Dobransky, Steve. "Why the U.S. Failed in Iraq: Baghdad at the Crossroads." *Middle East Forum*. Middle, November 18, 2014. Last modified November 18, 2014. Accessed February 20, 2018.
<http://www.meforum.org/3680/iraq-us-failure>.
- Gamel, Kim. "U.S. Wasted Billions in Rebuilding Iraq." NBC News. August 29, 2010. Accessed February 6, 2018.
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38903955/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/us-wasted-billions-rebuilding-iraq/#.WoCCRminHrd.
- Ismay, John. "An Iraq Veteran's Experience with Chemical Weapons." *New York Times*. October 16, 2014. Accessed February 16, 2018.
<https://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/16/an-iraq-veterans-experience-with-chemical-weapons/>.
- Kagan, Kimberly. *The Surge: A Military History*. New York: Encounter Books, 2009.
- Kime, Patricia. "New Burn Pit Report: Lung Disease, High Blood Pressure Common in Exposed Vets." *Military Times*. July 22, 2015. Accessed February 16, 2018.
<https://www.militarytimes.com/pay-benefits/military-benefits/health-care/2015/07/22/new-burn-pit-report-lung-disease-high-blood-pressure-common-in-exposed-vets/>.
- Markel, M. Wade., Brian Shannon, and David E. Johnson. *The 2008 Battle of Sadr City: Reimagining Urban Combat*. Rand Corporation, 2013.
- Mitchell, Greg, Joseph L. Galloway, and Bruce Springsteen. *So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, The Pundits, and The President Failed on Iraq*. New York: Union Square Press/Sterling Pub., 2008.

Conclusion

Primary Source

- Blackburn, Eric. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Spokane, WA, September 12, 2016.
- Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*. PSI Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2006.
- Malubag, Dan. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Columbia, SC, August 12, 2016.
- Monk, Thomas. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Dixon, CA, August 24, 2016.
- Morris, Bill. emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Auburn, AL, August 9, 2016.
- Operation Phantom Strike Builds on Security Progress, Intelligence," United States Department of Defense, August 15, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018,
<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47057>.
- Piper, Bill. Emailed to Matthew Buchanan, Kissimmee, FL, August 9, 2016
- Raz, Guy. "Military Officials Disagree on Impact of Surge," National Public Radio, January 08, 2008, accessed February 09, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17899543>.
- Sarah Wood, "Baghdad Security Plan Can Work, Commander Says," United States Department of Defense, February 16, 2007, accessed February 16, 2018,
<http://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=3082>.
- Staff Writer, "Operation Phantom Thunder," Institute for the Study of War, August 15, 2007. Accessed February 16, 2018, <http://www.understandingwar.org/operation/operation-phantom-thunder>.

Secondary Source

- Andradé, Dale. *Surging South of Baghdad: The 3d Infantry Division and Task Force Marne in Iraq, 2007-2008*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2010.
- Kagan, Kimberly. *The Surge: A Military History*. New York: Encounter Books, 2009.
- Mansoor, Peter R. *Surge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013.