

*A Normative IR theory approach to contemporary Turkish Foreign policy through the  
Cosmopolitanism-Communitarianism divide*

**Abstract**

**This study seeks to open up a fertile ground for the empirical study of the cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide of normative IR theory with a special focus on the increasing weight of ethics and morality in Turkish foreign policy in recent years. First, this study outlines the current debates in normative IR theory with a special focus on the divide between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Second, it first seeks to assess whether Turkey has adopted in the past either a cosmopolitan or communitarian position, or both in its foreign policy discourse and actions. Then, it examines the slow rise of cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy in the 2000s, with particular reference to the ruling political party in Turkey, the AKP (The Justice and Development Party) tenure. Third, it examines the cosmopolitanist/communitarianist dilemma that the AKP government faces in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts, and specifically the Syrian civil war—and with reference to three conceptual tools: global ethics, international justice-world order juxtaposition, world (global) citizenship-global governance.**

**Key words:** Turkish foreign policy, normative international relations (IR) theory, cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide, global ethics, international justice-order, world (global) citizenship, global governance, Syrian crisis.

**Introduction**

Since the end of the Cold War, the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) has produced a number of new theoretical normative orientations and connotations. These new normative approaches also help explain the nature and the reasons of the emerging shift in the existing international world order in favor of rising powers like Brasil, China, India, South Africa, Turkey, etc. In addition, these countries seem to be contributing to a gradual and slow normative turn in international politics today with their own ethical, moral and value-based commitments to international developments. Of course, normative thought and the elaboration of new normative approaches have roots in history, and in modern times since the end of the Cold War. The revival of normative issues with the end of the Cold War has now gained momentum to the extent that they started to occupy a wider place in current IR debates. On the other hand, the last decade seems to have ushered in a new moment in normative IR scholarship pertaining to political oppression, poverty, human rights, and forced migration. The new political environment can serve as an appropriate time for us to (re)assess and analyze the challenges and promises of normative international relations theory, especially through the lenses of the cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide. At present the centrepiece of contemporary normative theory seems to be the search for a dialogue between the “communitarians” and “cosmopolitans”—which have so far been seen as two contrasting normative approaches. Reassessing the international developments normatively also necessitates a deeper study of the normative and ethical approach that each government takes to international affairs. The core research question of this study is: To what extent does current Turkish foreign policy discourse, through the lens of the Syrian conflict, shows some

signs of cosmopolitanist tendencies to world politics rather than those of communitarian tendencies or does the current foreign policy reflect a dual or merged foreign policy approach which is cosmopolitan at the rhetorical level, but at times communitarian in practice?

With this aim in mind, this study seeks to open up a fertile ground for the empirical study of the cosmopolitanism/communitarianism divide in normative IR theory in Turkish foreign policy towards the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts—especially the Syrian civil war. What does this new direction in ethics and morality in Turkish foreign policy tell us about the evolving normativity in international politics, particularly in notions of justice, state sovereignty, state responsibility and humanitarian intervention? For over a decade now, scholars have been debating the changing dynamics and new regional directions of Turkish foreign policy—and the impact of inter-cultural toleration and geopolitics on decision making. As yet the ethics of Turkish foreign policy, the ethical challenges that modern Turkey has confronted in its foreign policy choices, and the conceptual divide of cosmopolitanism/communitarianism have not been the subject to investigation. This paper is a modest attempt to apply normative IR theory to Turkish foreign policy on the basis of the cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide. Understanding this divide contributes to a better understanding of the changing paradigms of contemporary Turkish foreign policy, for instance, particularist and/or universal commitments to ethics and morality in politics. It also sheds light on the transformation of Turkish foreign policy towards a more ‘liberal-normative’ model within the context of wider global ethics, global justice, global citizenship, and global governance. Compared to the other theories of international relations such as realism, liberalism, constructivism and postmodernist and critical approaches—normative international theory has so far been neglected and thus understudied in Turkish IR scholarship. In this respect, the paper aims to improve theoretical and empirical understanding on the subject and to enrich the literature about Turkish foreign policy.

However, this paper acknowledges that a purely cosmopolitan foreign policy does not exist in absolute terms—since the existence of a cosmopolitan foreign policy discourse in support of ethical universality does not necessarily guarantee cosmopolitan practices on the ground. Indeed, states seeking to balance their national interests with ethics in the face of an unfolding international crisis might embrace either communitarianism or cosmopolitanism or even the accommodating forms of these two approaches, for instance, either cosmopolitanism with limited particularist commitments or communitarianism with universalist claims. In this respect, the following study restricts itself to understanding the manner and the degree to which cosmopolitanism, communitarianism, and combinations of both, have permeated contemporary Turkish foreign policy making, with a special focus on the last decade under the Justice and Development Party (AKP).

This paper contains three parts: In the first part, it seeks to understand the current debates in normative IR theory with a special focus on the divide between two normative conceptual categories of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. In the second part, it first seeks to assess whether Turkey has adopted predominantly a communitarian or cosmopolitan position, or both vis-à-vis international crises, both in rhetoric and practice in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Then, it examines the slow rise of cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, with particular reference to the ruling political party in Turkey, the AKP (The Justice and Development Party) tenure. While in the third part, it examines the cosmopolitanist/communitarianist dilemma that the AKP government faces in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ revolts, and specifically the Syrian civil war—and with reference to three conceptual tools within the normative IR theory: *global ethics, international justice-world order juxtaposition, world (global) citizenship-global governance*.

## 1. Cosmopolitanism/communitarianism divide in normative IR theory: opening out the debate

Normative international relations (IR) theory consider moral judgements, ethical considerations and prescriptions of states, as well as their responsibilities and obligations to others strong and prevalent aspects of international politics.<sup>1</sup> It thus borrows intensively from political theory, and moral philosophy and to a lesser extent from IR through the adaptation of a variety of approaches and of key conceptual distinctions such as *cosmopolitanism-communitarianism* (and *deontology and consequentialism*).<sup>2</sup> Although normative IR theory is mostly based on philosophical discourses, it also engages in responding to practical problems in world politics for instance humanitarian interventions, war, civilian casualties and questions of morality.<sup>3</sup>

The main concern of normative IR theory is to relate ethical values of the individual and the core normative concepts ( such as freedom, equality, justice, democracy, state autonomy, human rights, etc) with social institutions within which they live. According to Mervyne Frost, normative IR theory presupposes that people's normative ideas ( norms, values, justice and moral principles) can shape the international order in which they live.<sup>4</sup> In short, normative IR theory tries to make sense of ethical limitations of state sovereignty, distributive justice, ethics of intervention, state responsibility and demands with regard to human rights and etc.<sup>5</sup>

The cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide,<sup>6</sup> represents two different standpoints in explaining the moral significance of identities, memberships and shared practices. And

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<sup>1</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*, ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 3.

<sup>2</sup>Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 9.

<sup>3</sup>While some scholars refer to normative IR theory ( Mervyn Frost, *Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations*, ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986, 1996); Brown, *International Relations Theory*, 1992, Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) , R. Jackson and G.Sørensen, *Introduction to International Relations*, ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, 2008, Mervyne Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) ) in their writings, some theorists also label it as “international political theory ( IPT )” ( C.R. Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979/1999), Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the theory of International Relations*, (1982; reprint, London: Macmillan, 1990, Chris Brown, *State, Sovereignty and Justice: International Political Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), Kimberly Hutchings, *International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era*, ( London: Sage Publications, 1999) ) or “international ethics” ( C. R. Beitz et al., *International Ethics: A Critical Introduction*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), T. Nardin and D. Mapel, *Traditions of International Ethics*, ( New York:Cambridge University Press, 1992), T. Nardin, "Theorising the International Rule of Law", *Review of International Studies* 34, (2008), Richard Shapcott, *International Ethics: A Critical Introduction*, ( Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010).

<sup>4</sup>Mervyne Frost, *Ethics in International Relations*, 52.

<sup>5</sup>M. Hoffman, “Normative *International Relations Theory: Approaches and Issues*” in M. Light & A. J. R. Groom ( eds.), *International Relations*, (London: Pinter, 1994), 27-44.

<sup>6</sup>The cosmopolitanism-communitarianism divide is the most familiar conceptual category within the Normative IR theory. The cosmopolitanism-communitarianism dichotomy gained prominence in the field of IR after having been employed in 1992 by Chris Brown in *International Relations Theory : New Normative Approaches* and by Janna Thompson in *Justice and World Order: A philosophical Enquiry*. With the use of a similar opposition based on a different terminology, in his prominent 1982 book *Men and Citizens in the theory of International Relations*, Andrew Linklater had already made a distinction between our necessarily delimited moral obligations as citizens and our more extensive moral duties as human beings. See J. Thompson, *Justice*

notably so when individuals, communities or states face ethical dilemmas in determining their duties and responsibilities towards the outside actors and entities. Tony Erskine says:

“ we engage in ethical deliberation either as members of particularist associations and adopt a limited moral purview (communitarianism), or we eschew the moral force of these specific ties in favour of a broader membership and universalist commitments ( cosmopolitanism).”<sup>7</sup>

Cosmopolitanism and communitarianism have different uses depending on academic discipline. As stated by Tim Dunne, Mirja Kurki and Steve Smith, cosmopolitanism can be described under two categories: (a) political cosmopolitanism defends the elimination or radical transformation of state borders in order to establish a world government or a similar transnational entity. (b) Ethical cosmopolitanism refers to the idea of creating “ global sphere of equal moral standing”<sup>8</sup> The common denominator of these two categories is ‘world citizenship’. In this light, ethical cosmopolitanism emphasizes our duties to the others, regardless of national territory. Its advocates say “one can achieve an impartial point of view from which no one is excluded”<sup>9</sup> and we should rethink in more inclusive ways our particular identities, loyalties and social ties. Conversely, communitarians argue that particular identities are relevant for arriving at moral judgements. For them membership of particular communities and participating in their practices are morally defining or moral starting points.<sup>10</sup>

Cosmopolitanism, Chris Brown suggests, emanates from the idealist tradition, inspired by Kantian ideas of rationality and equality in law for all.<sup>11</sup> In Brown’s view, the cosmopolitanist idea links pure altruism to enlightened self-interest, between the ‘good’ and the political. This separation is far from clear-cut in the communitarian approach which claims that these distinctions are inseparably fused together. Brown underlines that communitarianism comes partially from the realist tradition. For instance, Carr’s argument sees morality as relative and not universal<sup>12</sup>— and this explains the relationship of realism with communitarian thought. Accordingly hard-line communitarians hold to the believe that different communities develop different ethical codes and practices, so a universal ethics does not exist.<sup>13</sup>

Another feature of the cosmopolitan/communitarian divide, as pointed out by Chris Brown, centers around the argument over the role of the ‘community’. For instance, cosmopolitanists, in his view, emphasize the universal moral dignity of the humans, while communitarians locate it in the local or ‘national community’ or the human being’s relationship to the dominant culture and community.<sup>14</sup> Here, it is important to note that there exists many

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*and World Order: A philosophical Inquiry*, (London:Routledge, 1992), Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the theory of International Relations*, (1982; reprint, London: Macmillan, 1990).

<sup>7</sup>Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, 35.

<sup>8</sup>Toni Erskine, "Locating Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Agency in International Relations", in Christian Reus-Smith and Duncan Snidal ( eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 15-23.

<sup>9</sup>Toni Erskine, "Normative International Relations Theory", in T. Dunne, M. Kurki, and S. Smith ( eds.), *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 42.

<sup>10</sup>Alasdair Macintyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981 and 1985), 220; Erskine, *International Relations Theories*, 42.

<sup>11</sup>Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches*, ( London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), 39.

<sup>12</sup> E.H.Carr, *What is history?*, ( Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), 19.

<sup>13</sup> Julia Gallagher, *Britain and Africa under Blair: In Pursuit of the Good State*, ( Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 29.

<sup>14</sup> Duncan Bell ( ed.), *Ethics and World Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 175.

studies challenging this dichotomy, or seeking to reconcile these two poles.<sup>15</sup> For instance, in normative theory in international relations, Molly Cochran aims to achieve reconciliation between communitarianism and cosmopolitanism through the analysis of different authors, such as John Rawls and Mervyn Frost, two anti-foundationalist approaches (French poststructuralism and American pragmatism) and finally the analysis of pragmatic approaches to ethical problems, such as Habermas's theory of discourse ethics.<sup>16</sup> Despite Cochran's efforts, the core tension between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism still remains structural, and thus unsolved. Another reconciling effort comes from Toni Erskine in *Embedded Cosmopolitanism* brought together insights from communitarian and feminist political thought and critically explored what can be achieved by taking a communitarian starting point in analysis. The main assumption of Erskine is that conventional cosmopolitan arguments neglect the profound importance of community as the source of moral ideas, and that community membership is morally constitutive—while underlining that communities are not necessarily territorially bounded.<sup>17</sup> Since cosmopolitan/communitarian debate still continues, these embedded approaches naturally seek to capture the middle ground for themselves. In parallel to Erskine's study, other alternative middle ground approaches start from the fact of shared humanity and accommodate particular attachments that could also be conceptualized as an attempt to go beyond the cosmopolitan/communitarian dichotomy and to test states' ethical approaches against a war, humanitarian crisis, or a popular revolt. For the purpose of facilitating the understanding of Turkey's ethical approach to international affairs, this study will read Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of the cosmopolitanism/communitarianism divide and additionally, of some conciliating approaches. Accordingly, an outline of cosmopolitanism and communitarianism is given below.

### ***The cosmopolitanist approach***

The term “cosmopolitan” which was first used by the Stoics<sup>18</sup> was revived in the eighteenth century by the Enlightenment thinkers, especially Kant. Retaking the Kantian conception of justice, another theoricien, John Rawls wrote in his famous book *The Theory of Justice* that humans can be disengaged from all social and contextual particularities. The Rawlsien idea aiming to determine principles of international and distributive justice also influenced extensively international relations and most particularly the flourishing of normative IR theory. Theorists like Thomas Pogge, Charles Beitz and Brian Barry later contributed to the

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<sup>15</sup> The recent works which have focused on this dichotomy are as follows: Fiona Robinson, *Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory and International Relations*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Molly Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kimberly Hutchings, *International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era*, (London: Sage Publications, 1999); Charles Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter Sutch, *Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community*, (London: Routledge, 2001); Richard Shapcot, *Justice, Community and Dialogue in International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Toni Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Of these works, Molly Cochran and Toni Erskine engaged most particularly in reconciling these two poles. See Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) and Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A pragmatic Approach*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>16</sup> Cochran, *Normative Theory in International Relations: A pragmatic Approach*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>17</sup> Erskine, *Embedded Cosmopolitanism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).

<sup>18</sup>It was Diogenes the Cynic who first said that “ he is a *kosmopolites*”, referring to a “citizen of the world (or universe)”. Chris Brown, “Cosmopolitanism, world citizenship and global civil society”, *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 3, no.1, 7-26; David Held, *Cosmopolitanism: Ideals and Realities*, (Cambridge, Malden:Polity Press, 2010), 13, 40.

literature by completing Rawls's assumption on "justice as impartiality" and by extracting the latent cosmopolitan commitments from Rawls's work.<sup>19</sup>

In brief, cosmopolitanism insists on the emergence of a single humanity and emphasize the factors of a unifying and homogenizing nature. In a theoretical context it refers to an intellectual framework where questions relevant to common humanity and of a global dimension can be theorised.<sup>20</sup> For Richard Beardsworth, since cosmopolitanism has strong legal, institutional and political implications in international politics, it should not be seen as a form of utopianism, rather, a differentiated form of universalism which depends on legal, political and institutional context. Compared to communitarianism, cosmopolitanism also underscores the instrumental value of sovereignty which takes its source from a state's responsibility to protect the welfare of its citizens. In case of a state's failure to protect its citizens or the remove sovereign rights, external actors have responsibility and right to intervene in humanitarian emergencies.<sup>21</sup>

### ***The communitarian approach***

Communitarianism views the community, morality and the state synonymously. Toni Erskine, suggests that the association of ethical stances with classical realist assumptions signifies that this state-centric variation might also be labeled as "communitarian realism" in order to distinguish it from its usage in the literature of political theory.<sup>22</sup> This approach makes explicit the values and norms shared by communities rather than focusing objective laws of morality and justice. Communitarian Michael Walzer explains the difference between fashioning for oneself "an objective and universal standpoint" and interpreting a world of meanings that we share with our fellow citizens of the world.<sup>23</sup> He argues that the humans have only minimum moral obligations since they have only a minimum community.<sup>24</sup>

On the other hand, communitarians argue that communities or nations have intrinsic value. For Walzer, governments can only forfeit their sovereignty when they enslave and massacre

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<sup>19</sup> Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls*, (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1989); Brian M. Barry, *Justice as Impartiality*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). On the other hand, some scholars have different assumptions about the Rawlsian idea. For instance, Peter Sutch consider Rawls's approach as fitted to communitarian understanding. Sutch employs the concept "developmental communitarianism" as the signifier of the works of Rawls, Mervyn Frost and Michael Walzer. Peter Sutch, *Ethics, Justice and International Relations: Constructing an International Community*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2001), 8.

<sup>20</sup>Richard Beardsworth, *Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 13.

<sup>21</sup>Simon Caney, "Human rights and the rights of states: Terry Nardin on nonintervention", *International Political Science Review* 18, no.1, (January 1997): 27-37; Fernando R. Tesón, "The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention", in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Humanitarian Intervention Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 92.

<sup>22</sup>Toni Erskine, "Locating Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Agency in International Relations", in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 83-86; Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theories Discipline and Diversity*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 43.

<sup>23</sup>Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), .xiv.

<sup>24</sup> Martin Griffiths (ed.), *Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics*, (London: Routledge, 2005), 107.

their own people.<sup>25</sup> For communitarians, human identity is embedded in community. Critics of the communitarian approach argue that this stance gives priority to fellow citizens of a state rather than all the world citizens considering the “outsiders” as having reduced moral standing.<sup>26</sup> Communitarians argue that the standards of justice must be found in forms of life and traditions of particular societies and thus can change from context to context. They also contend that talking of pre-political rights makes no sense since rights are meaningful only when there are institutions bearing requisite duties.<sup>27</sup>

## **2.Setting the normative scene in Turkish foreign policy on the cosmopolitanism/communitarianism divide**

Having outlined the theoretical framework above the paper will now examine the evolution of the normative stance within the contemporary Turkish foreign policy against ethical and international justice-related challenges. Here it must be reminded that a state’s ethical approach to international affairs can be neither entirely communitarian or cosmopolitan in rhetoric and practice. Whether states overwhelmingly side with communitarianism or cosmopolitanism in their responses to international crisis might change depending on their national interests, the degree of their geographical closeness to the regions of the unfolding crisis, the emerging international conditions, as well as on their leaders’s moral worldviews. Considering that values, norms and ethical rhetoric of states are an intrinsic part of their national interests and can hardly be dissociated from their practical concerns and interests, this study arguably advances that a value-laden and ethical rhetoric has increasingly permeated Turkish foreign policy making in recent years and this necessitates theoretically approaching to the current Turkish foreign policy in a normative way and particularly from the perspective of the useful communitarianism/cosmopolitanism distinction. In order to understand the rise of cosmopolitanism in today’s Turkey’s foreign policy discourse and to a lesser extent in its foreign policy actions, it is of paramount importance to understand initially why, how and the degree to which Turkey’s foreign policy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century has been more dominantly associated with communitarianism than cosmopolitanism in support of global ethics and justice.

### **2.1. Making sense of Turkish foreign policy in terms of ethics and morality: A brief retrospective analysis**

Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 state-centric communitarian approaches have predominantly influenced Turkish foreign policy. This dominant communitarian understanding of international relations seemed to have well fitted to the country’s ideological stance taking its source from its pro-Western Cold War commitments and NATO membership and to Turkish foreign policy’s realist credentials. In this period it would not be incorrect to say that Ankara’s emphasis upon security/securitization and its democratic deficit did not create a fertile ground for an individual-based cosmopolitan foreign policy. In addition, the Turkish state has long been authoritarian by nature and showed the signs of a repressive state, for instance, during periods of military rule, in human abuses against political dissenters, and in international justice related issues. In all these instances the interests of the state have had precedence over the civilain interests. Furthermore, Turkey between 1960 and 1990 was marked by economic crisis and its chronic democratic shortcomings, which made it difficult

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<sup>25</sup> Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, 87.

<sup>26</sup>Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith ( eds.), *International Relations Theories*, 43.

<sup>27</sup> Tesòn , “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention”, 100.

for scholars and liberal politicians to address the ethical component of Turkey's domestic politics and international engagements.

Indeed, until the 1990s Turkish foreign policy identity has also been constructed upon a communitarian understanding of international society. Turkish foreign policy tradition has so far assumed that international society is divided neatly into nation-states.<sup>28</sup> Successive Turkish governments have long prioritized the interests of the Turkish state over democracy at home and abroad. Furthermore, Turkey's restrictions on freedom of speech, individual liberty, its human right violations, and limitations on the rule of law have long prevented the emergence of a democratic culture in the country. The Cold War era, accompanied with Turkey's own securitization policies both at home and abroad<sup>29</sup>, have informed a realist approach to world politics associated with a communitarian worldview which one might expect to contradict with a liberal-cosmopolitan understanding.

Still, since the late 1980s there emerged in Turkey a more liberal approach to international relations, especially under the tenure of Turgut Özal government, and Turkey's active involvement in the first United States led Gulf War (1991) can also be seen as a sign of its willingness to participate in international institutions and processes. Of course, Turkey's Iraqi War decision was not only motivated by liberal and cosmopolitan concerns per se, but by its own national and regional interests. The 1990s were marked by the rise of the 'Kurdish problem' which added new complexities to Turkey's democratic shortcomings and this limited Turkish leaders' commitment to democracy.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 the country has actively played a role in international institutions, above all the United Nations and in maintaining international peace. Another sign of Turkey's communitarian past is that despite the adoption of a universalist rhetoric in its foreign policy, in fact, an inward-looking patriotism – that celebrates a defensive security understanding informed by a strong commitment to territorial integrity of the state and indivisible unity of the nation<sup>30</sup> – has prevented past Turkish leaders from engaging in cosmopolitanism on the ground. Generally speaking during the Cold War era, Turkey's Western-oriented security policies also favored moral relativism, rather than universal morality, and this made the likelihood of an ethical foreign policy problematic for Turkey. The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a third country associated with the respect of state sovereignty drew the lines of the Turkish foreign policy tradition in the Cold War—and was guided by a delicate balance between moral values and the imperatives of national interest. This last point is exemplified by Turkey's quest for a just and equitable solution for the Cyprus problem since the 1970s. In other words, Turkey's call for justice in the resolution of the Cyprus problem and for official recognition of Northern Cyprus by the international society made it possible for Turkish foreign policy to adopt a moral stance, albeit subordinated to its communitarian approach to international affairs.

The end of the Cold War changed Turkey's dominant communitarian approach to ethics and justice. The ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia, the emergence of independent states in the former Soviet sphere, and the first and second wars in Iraq all influenced the way Turkish foreign

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<sup>28</sup> Murat Yeşiltaş, "The Transformation of Geopolitical Vision in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Turkish Studies* 4, no.14, ( December 2013): 662-664; İbrahim Kalın, "Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework, Values and Mechanism," *International Journal LXVII*, no. 1 (2011): 11-12.

<sup>29</sup> Bulent Aras and Rabia Karakyapolat, "From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran," *Security Dialogue* 39, no.5 ( October 2008): 495-515.

<sup>30</sup> Yeşiltaş, "The Transformation of Geopolitical Vision," 662.



policy interpreted ethics and international justice. In this respect, with the two successive crises in Bosnia and Kosova, ethics and international obligations come to the fore in Turkish foreign policy discourse and practice. However, in the 1990s it was still too early to identify a rise of cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy. This was mainly due to the country's domestic problems, for instance, successive economic crisis, the rise of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), political instability caused by fragile coalition governments, corruption and human right violations. These domestic problems hindered an ethical debate in the domestic politics.

## **2.2 The rise of cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy in the 2000s**

The European Union (EU) in 1999 awarded Turkey 'official status of candidature' —and this might be seen as the starting point for the grounding of a 'narrow' cosmopolitanism in the country's foreign policy. The adoption of a series of EU reforms brought the universal values and norms – individual liberties, democracy, human rights and the rule of law – to the fore in the country's political agenda. The incorporation of universal values into Turkish politics was accompanied by a gradual liberal turn in Turkish foreign policy, and a slow and somehow limited movement towards the cosmopolitan direction. However, Turkey's approach to international affairs in the first decade of the 21st century is not purely cosmopolitan in content. In fact, it entails both communitarianism with cosmopolitan and universalist claims and cosmopolitanism with some particularist and communitarian commitments. The coexistence of cosmopolitan and communitarian practices certainly causes some tensions in Turkey's regional policies, especially towards some of its neighbors. On the other hand, Turkey's moral understanding on the recent regional crisis in the Middle East does not totally exclude national interests which are supplemented by a value-driven conception of its engagement both with its neighbors and the world. This clearly shows the dualism in Turkey's cosmopolitan foreign policy approach which may even hide, at the discursive level, what can be seen as communitarian on the ground.

### *The DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition period ( 1999-2002)*

The first years of the 2000s, especially under Ismail Cem (Foreign Minister of the DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government from 1999 to 2002) were marked by an increasing number of normative commitments in Turkish foreign policy, especially after the official candidate status to the EU had been granted to Turkey. Both as a part and consequence of Turkey's rapid Europeanization process between 1999 and 2002, universal values started to come to the fore in Turkish foreign policy, and this partially gave way to the development of a limited liberal-cosmopolitan understanding in global ethics and justice in the country's foreign policy. In this regard, Ismail Cem's tenure as Foreign Minister was also characterized by Turkey's attachment to multilateralism,<sup>31</sup> liberal-cosmopolitan values, as well as a stronger emphasis upon democracy and human rights in foreign policy. However, it can hardly be argued that the first years of the 21st century have been characterized by a real cosmopolitan engagement by the Turkish government, but rather by strong communitarian practices.

### *The AKP's first and second mandates ( respectively 2002-2007 and 2007-2011)*

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<sup>31</sup> Yeşiltaş, "The Transformation of Geopolitical Vision," 669.

The first years of the AKP government mandate (2002 to 2007) clearly represents a communitarianism/cosmopolitanism duality or coexistence in terms of global ethics. The response of the Turkish government to September 11, 2001, the United States led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can be seen as a mix of communitarian and cosmopolitanist stances. After 9/11 Turkey's diplomatic efforts to avoid a war in Iraq<sup>32</sup> can not solely be interpreted on the basis of its national and regional interests, but also on moral and ethical basis. However, since the war in Afghanistan was based on a wider international consensus to remove Al-Qaida, and thus legitimately justified in the minds of many people, its ethical dimensions were not problematic for Turkish policy-makers and consequently, it did not lead to any moral debates in terms of foreign policy.

The second mandate of the AKP government (2007 to 2011) brought significant changes to Turkey's foreign policy, geopolitical and security understanding. This is displayed by the centrality of normative and ethical issues in both foreign policy discourses and actions of Turkish leaders. Then Foreign Minister, current Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's value-based liberal approach to international relations, the premises of a multidirectional foreign policy as part of his 'Strategic Depth Doctrine' and his "nuanced" civilisational approach calling dialogue between civilisations and cultures<sup>33</sup> played a role in the intertwining of ethical and normative issues in Turkish foreign policy. Turkey's international mediation roles in the Israeli-Palestinian and Syrian-Israeli conflicts, in Somalia, and in the Bosnia and Herzegovina-Serbia-Turkey trilateral dialogue, as well as its engagement with Brazil in the Iranian nuclear affair (through the signature of a Turkey-Brazil-Iran nuclear fuel swap agreement) in 2010 also seem to have fostered Ankara's ethical approach to world affairs and its commitment to peacebuilding and international justice.<sup>34</sup> Clearly, the agency of Turkish leaders plays a critical role in the rise of cosmopolitanism as a discourse and approach in Turkish foreign policy.

#### *The AKP's third mandate ( 2011-onwards)*

Another ethically-driven attempt by Turkish foreign policy to "do good" abroad can be seen in Turkey's new African opening informed by a development aid assistance policy directed by Turkey's aid agency, TIKA showing the civilian premises of Turkish foreign policy. In this sense, Turkey's development cooperation with African countries may be seen as a cosmopolitan engagement drawn upon universality rather than particularity that sets aside self-interest in favour of "enlightened interests". So, it might be fair to say that Turkey's development aid to Sub-Saharan Africa and the North African countries comes close to the cosmopolitan approach and implicitly holds that "the good" might work symbiotically with states' foreign policy interests. As a consequence Turkey has channelled in recent years considerable resources, education funds and foreign scholarships in this region. At the opening of the Sectoral Assessment Meeting on African Strategies in 2013 then Foreign Minister, current Prime Minister Davutoğlu underlined national self-interest with aid assistance: "*Turkey's policy towards Africa is not only based on carrying out its own national*

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<sup>32</sup> Ali Balcı and Murat Yeşiltaş, "Turkey's New Middle East Policy: The Case of the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Iraq's Neighboring Countries," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no.4 (Summer 2006):18-37.

<sup>33</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Medeniyetlerin Ben İdrakı," *Divan İlmi Araştırmalar Dergisi* 2, no.3 ( 1997):1-53; Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik, Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu ( Strategic Dept)*, ( İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001)

<sup>34</sup> Bulent Aras, "Turkey's rise in the Greater Middle East: peace-building in the periphery," *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 11, no. 1 (March 2009): 29-41.

*strategy and demonstrating its economic and political weight, but also incorporates dealing with the problems of the people of Africa and sharing their fate.*"<sup>35</sup>

Aside Turkish government's "humanitarian diplomacy" in Africa, with its cosmopolitan flavour, is the emergence of a more "expanding" cosmopolitanist foreign policy discourse and practice, for example, in Ankara's response to the 'Arab Spring' revolts from late 2010 onwards. The Arab Spring's first two years (between 2011 and 2012) did not effect Turkish foreign policy as much as events which occurred between 2013 and 2014. In these latter years Turkey encountered security challenges on its Syrian border. Ankara's rupture with Damascus since August 2011 and its support for the opposition forces in Syria has impacted not only the general contours of its foreign policy but also its domestic politics. The domestic critics generally focused upon the inability of the Turkish foreign policy in striking a right balance between ethics and national interests.<sup>36</sup> For some observers Turkey's strong ethical stance towards the Egyptian coup in June 2013 and the Syrian civilian war led to the jeopardizing of the country's own national interests and the marginalizing of its foreign policy among some of its Western allies.<sup>37</sup>

In light of the above debate, are the ethical norms of Turkish foreign policy derived from and justified in terms of an absolute cosmopolitanism or of a cosmopolitanism with restricted communitarian demands for its fellow citizens or of communitarianism with some cosmopolitanist claims? How does the concept of international justice relate to present-day Turkish foreign policy in its quest for a more just and equal international order? In line with these questions, the next section will look at the implementation of Turkey's cosmopolitan engagement on the ground, with a special focus on its response to the Syrian civilian war.

#### **4. Decrypting Turkey's "cosmopolitan" engagements in the Syrian crisis: A three-layered analysis**

This section attempts to understand how and to what extent Turkey's dealing with the Syrian crisis is underpinned by a cosmopolitan worldview to *global ethics, international justice-order juxtaposition* and *world (or global) citizenship-global governance*. This study will enable us to better understand Turkey's foreign policy practices in contexts other than power politics, for instance, involving global ethics, justice-order, and notions of world citizenship-global governance.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the way Turkey approaches ethics, justice and world governance, both discursively and practically, sheds light on its mix of cosmopolitanist and communitarian engagements in the current Syrian crisis.

#### ***Global ethics***

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<sup>35</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Foreign Minister Davutoğlu "From past to present Turkey and Africa maintain close relations, common perspective and bonds of friendship," [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu\\_from-past-to-present-turkey-and-africa-maintain-close-relations\\_common-perspective-and-bonds-of-f.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu_from-past-to-present-turkey-and-africa-maintain-close-relations_common-perspective-and-bonds-of-f.en.mfa) (accessed 10 June 2014). Please also see the comments relating to 'mediation' and shared 'values' by Ahmet Davutoğlu "Foreign Minister Davutoğlu "Turkey will continue to be the voice of peace'," Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Turkey, 12 April 2013, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/foreign-minister-davutoglu-turkey-will-continue-to-be-the-voice-of-peace.en.mfa> (accessed 26 May 2014); Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Mediation: Critical Reflections From the Field," *Middle East Policy* 20, no. 1 (Spring 2013), <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-s-mediation-critical-reflections-from-the-field.en.mfa> (accessed 2 June 2014) and <http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/turkeys-mediation-critical-reflections-field> (accessed 15 June 2014).

<sup>36</sup> Emel Parlar Dal, "Assessing Turkey's 'Normative' Power in the MENA region: New Dynamics and their Limitations," *Turkish Studies* 14, no.4 (December 2013):724.

<sup>37</sup> See Ziya Onis, "Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Regional Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East," *Mediterranean Politics*, DOI:10.1080/13629395.2013.868392 (2014): 1-17.

<sup>38</sup> Mervyn Frost, *Global Ethics*, (Routledge, 2009), 19.

Ethics is concerned with the organization of social rights and duties. By thinking and acting in an ethical manner the individual, community, and state presupposes the 'other' has reciprocal rights and duties. Global conflicts are in fact evidence of the absence of an overarching ethical consensus in the international community. What is puzzling with regards to the global or international ethics is that it refers to a rather shallow understanding of the role of ethics in international affairs. Here it must be noted that it exists in two ways: thin or thick ethics.<sup>39</sup> The thin ethical dimension suggests that since the world affairs are governed by sovereign states and in power relations, there are many different ethical systems in time and space which compete with each other— "*there is no agreed-upon overarching ethic or at the very best a very limited ethical consensus that may be used to sort out the differences between them; and that ethical choices are a personal matter.*"<sup>40</sup> In contrast to this "thin" view, the "thick" ethical dimension suggests that there exists a substantial ethicality between people leading to an overarching ethical consensus in regards to international conflicts.<sup>41</sup>

Building upon this distinction, one can argue that Turkey's position vis-a-vis the Syrian crisis points to a thick ethical understanding of international affairs. It is important to remind ourselves that Turkish decision-makers preferred taking side with the Syrian opposition after breaking off all its ties with Bashar El-Asad government in August 2011—because he did not keep his promise given to Ankara to allow for democratic elections without excluding the opposition and making further reforms in the country. In fact, Turkey's ethical commitment in managing the Syrian conflict can be seen in its open support for the demonstrators seeking political reform in the country, while at the same time it puts pressure upon Damascus for a gradual transition of political power. Turkey's thick ethical commitment to the Syrian crisis also comes about as a result of its assumption about the emergence of a consensus among its allies and its Arab neighbours, based upon common institutions and diplomacy and in the framework of international law. Turkey's diplomatic efforts at the Geneva I and Geneva II Conferences and in its diplomatic engagement with regional organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) shows that it supports diplomatic means for any transition in Syria. This can be seen as a result of its ethical stance towards the Syrian affair, which has had a negative impact upon its domestic economy.<sup>42</sup> Today Turkey shelters in its refugee camps more than 900,000 Syrian refugees. This is evidence that Turkey has become one of the countries most impacted by the deepening Syrian crisis. Once again this is evidence of the Turkish government's support for individual rights rather than the state sovereignty making a clear example of its global ethical choice. Still, Turkey's freezing its ties with Syria led to a significant decrease in Turkish-Syrian trade which had progressed considerably from \$824 billion in 2003 to \$ 2,272 billion in 2010.<sup>43</sup> Trade was increasing between Turkey and Syria,<sup>44</sup> especially after the signature of

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.,2-18.

<sup>40</sup>Ibid., 12, 14.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid. ,13.

<sup>42</sup> Emel Parlar Dal, " Assessing Turkey's 'Normative' Power", 724.

<sup>43</sup> " Turkey-Syria Economic and Trade Relations", Republics of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey\\_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-syria.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-syria.en.mfa) ( accessed 20 May 2014)

<sup>44</sup> Damla Aras, "The Syrian Uprising Turkish-Syrian Relations Go Downhill", *Middle East Quarterly* 19, no.2, (Spring 2012): 45.

Turkey-Syria Association Agreement in 2004 which would later be suspended on the 6 December 2011.<sup>45</sup>

Ankara's engagement with Damascus during the initial phases of the civil war, for instance, in finding a common ground between Damascus and the opposition, and in pushing the former for further democratic reforms, also proves Turkey's diplomatic preference.<sup>46</sup> In this case, we can say Turkey's policy regarding the Syrian crisis is predominantly derived from a universal morality and humanitarianism-based cosmopolitan ethical language, but without neglecting the country's national interests and its own set of values based on communitarianism. This also shows how Turkey's cosmopolitanist foreign policy discourse with regards Syria is also embedded in the framework of communitarianism.

### ***International justice/order juxtaposition***

As suggested by Andrew Hurrell and Terry Macdonald<sup>47</sup> the paradigm of international justice is of concern in the broader field of contemporary normative political theory. Considering cosmopolitanism and communitarianism as theories of global justice, Hurrell and MacDonald make a distinction between them by looking at whether duties of justice apply among all individuals (cosmopolitans) or they apply only within sovereign states (communitarians).<sup>48</sup> Regarding the egalitarian character of global justice, as the second point of distinction between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, the former claim that the egalitarian distributive principles of global justice should apply on a global basis. Conversely, communitarians argue that the egalitarian principles of justice are "*a requirement of justice within liberal-democratic nation-states.*"<sup>49</sup>

In the light of these two different views about global justice, it can be argued that Turkey's actual Syrian policy seems to be closer to the former than the latter, in both terms of rhetoric and practice. Indeed, from the beginning of the revolt in Syria and until their rupture with Assad government in August 2011, the Turkish government engaged with the Assad government, and lobbied for egalitarian distributive justice for all Syrians. The Turkish government also supported a reformist and democratic agenda favoring individual rights rather than the authoritarian rule. In this sense, Turkey's initial position towards the Syrian crisis included variants of both communitarian and cosmopolitan approaches. After the rupture in relations, and Turkey's open support to the Syrian oppositional forces, and its active diplomatic engagement within regional and international institutions for solution in Syria led to shaping of a more expansive understanding of global justice among Turkish foreign policy decision-makers. Turkey's emphasize on global justice came with its strong

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<sup>45</sup> "Turkey-Syria Association Agreement", Ministry of Economy of Republic of Turkey, <http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=tradeagreements&bolum=fta&country=SY&region=0> ( accessed 12 Juin 2014)

<sup>46</sup> Şaban Kardaş, "Turkey's Syria Policy: The Challenge of Coalition Building," *GMF Series on Turkey Analysis*, 17 February 2012, 1.

<sup>47</sup> Andrew Hurrell and Terry Macdonald, "Ethics and Norms in International Relations", in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons ( eds.), *Handbook of International Relations*, (London: Sage Publications, 2013) , 62.

<sup>48</sup> The cosmopolitan and communitarian positions are also distinguished by their different views about intervention, the conditions of intervention, the egalitarian nature of global justice. While cosmopolitans consider individual autonomy as a value that needs protection in an international context, and through interventionist means, if necessary. Communitarians tolerate the requirements of different cultures and different political systems, and have been more resistant to interventionism. Ibid.,62.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.,62.

criticism of the global governance organizations because of their ineffectiveness in distributing justice for all.

Prior to assessing Turkey's response to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government, it is necessary to explain the protection of the Syrian people within the framework of Turkey's "Friends of Syria" initiative—a broad international coalition composed of more than 90 countries. The initiative is intended to send a strong message to the Assad regime that it would no longer be seen as the legitimate representative of Syria and that the opposition should be recognized as the new government. This initiative which initially had some success, also sought to prove that the Assad's government was incapable of fulfilling its responsibilities under international law, and to remind the international community of its responsibility to protect the Syrian people.<sup>50</sup> Davutoglu at the 67th United Nations General Assembly in September 2012 said:

*"If we cannot regard the rights of a person in Syria, Palestine, Somalia, Afghanistan and Rakhine region and other places, as equal as of our own, how can we talk about freedom and justice? If fundamental human rights are sacrificed for the sake of power politics, and become negotiable and even alienable in talks among a few nations in the UN Security Council, how are we to achieve universal human rights and security?"*<sup>51</sup>

In reference to Syria he asked: *"And if it is not the United Nations, who is to lead? If it is not us, then who will shoulder the responsibility to protect the innocent civilians?"*<sup>52</sup> Similarly, in his co-authored article with Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina Zlatko Lagumdžija published in Washington Post in 2<sup>nd</sup> August 2013 Davutoglu stresses that *"If the responsibility to protect does not apply to Syria, where does it apply?"*<sup>53</sup> Needless to say, all these statements highlight the rise of a cosmopolitan discourse to global justice within Turkish foreign policy.

This cosmopolitan approach of Turkey to global justice has become more accentuated and apparent following the Ghouta chemical weapons attack of August 2013. As an ally of the Syrian opposition, Davutoglu made Turkey's position clear in the Turkish daily newspaper *Milliyet*: *"If a coalition is formed against Syria in this process, Turkey will take part in it."*<sup>54</sup> He added *"We always place priority on acting upon a U.N. resolution and together with the international community."*<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, despite the intentions of a coalition led by the US, the United Kingdom and France against the Syrian regime – including a threat of launching limited and targeted air strikes on this country — a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution for UN sanctioned military intervention was blocked by Russia and China. This was followed by an American-Russian deal on putting Syria's chemical weapons under international control which also forced Syria ratify the treaty to join the Organization for the

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<sup>50</sup> Cenap Çakmak, "Turkey and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Syria," *Bilgesam Analysis/Middle East*, n.1123, (21 March 2014):1-3.

<sup>51</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Address by Mr. Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey at the 67th United Nations General Assembly, New York", *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, 28 September 2012, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-mr\\_-ahmet-davutoglu\\_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-at-the-67th-united-nations-general-assembly\\_-28-september.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-mr_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey-at-the-67th-united-nations-general-assembly_-28-september.en.mfa) (accessed 11 Jun 2014).

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ahmet Davutoglu and Zlatko Lagumdžija, "Syria shows we still don't mean 'never again,'" *The Washington Post*, 2 August 2013.

<sup>54</sup> "Coalition in making for Syria intervention", *Hurriyet Daily News*, 26 August 2013, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/coalition-in-making-for-syria-intervention.aspx?pageID=238&nID=53233&NewsCatID=338> (accessed 30 April 2014).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Then came the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2118 on 27 September 2013 formulated to eliminate Syrian chemical weapons, which was cautiously welcomed by the Turkish government. As stressed by the former Turkish President Abdullah Gül, Turkey will appreciate more than most the complete and verifiable destruction of these weapons as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 2118: “*Turkey hopes that the process, starting in Syria, will be the first step for a regional security structure that will eliminate all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.*”<sup>56</sup> Despite welcoming the deal, Davutoglu raised his concerns about the Syrian regime’s possible tactic to gain time and stressed that the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons does not eliminate the need for an urgent solution to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.<sup>57</sup> In a joint news conference with his Canadian counterpart John Baird, Davutoğlu said that the international community remained indifferent to the violence perpetrated by the Syrian regime. Davutoğlu added that the UN’s inaction is the most important factor in the increasing violence in Syria.<sup>58</sup>

As seen clearly in the statements of Turkish leaders, after the Syrian chemical weapons crisis Turkey’s quest for global justice for the ongoing humanitarian crisis gradually turned, to some extent, to a criticism of the existing international order and of the U.N. Davutoglu said: “*The international system, unfortunately, in charge of—the UN especially—in charge of keeping peace and stability in international order, is not providing quick answers to the questions and crisis which are the threats to the international system.*” Similarly, in his speech at the General Debate of the 68th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2012, he pointed that inaction by the Security Council only emboldens aggressive regimes: “*we need a Security Council which is truly democratic, representative, effective, and accountable.*” Then Prime Minister, current Turkish president Erdogan’s criticism was damning: “*the world is bigger than the ‘five’*” (the UNSC). He says: “*a world that is stuck between the opinions of five permanent members cannot be a fair one.*” All these statements by Turkish decision-makers evidently show the evolution of a new normative agenda in Turkish foreign policy—where quest for global justice and order criticism are interlinked and also associated with a strengthening cosmopolitan stance to international relations to a greater extent at the rhetorical level than at the practical level.

### ***World ( or global) citizenship and global governance***

Cosmopolitanism is also concerned with the social and political expression of global citizenship. And whether or not a country is politically engaged in diverse international contexts and gets involved in many institutional international networks, including NGO’s and global civil society organizations determines the degree to which its citizens share universal ethical codes and values. Furthermore, engagement also affects attitudes, identities and laws pertaining to the individual vis-a-vis the state.

Here the question to be asked centres upon the extent to which the notion of global citizenship and global governance has influenced Turkey’s policy on the Syrian civil war. In this regard, it seems quite clear that Davutoglu’s understanding of ‘global’ refers to the interconnectedness of the international system in terms of politics, economics and culture. This

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<sup>56</sup> “Turkey calls for elimination of WMDs from Middle East,” *Today’s Zaman*, 1 November 2013, <http://www.sundayszaman.com/news-330391-turkey-calls-for-elimination-of-wmds-from-middle-east.html> (accessed 7 Jun 2014).

<sup>57</sup> “Turkey: Geneva deal on chemical weapons not end of Syrian crisis,” *Today’s Zaman*, 16 September 2013, [http://www.zaman.com.tr/todays-zaman\\_turkey-geneva-deal-on-chemical-weapons-not-end-of-syrian-crisis\\_2136216.html](http://www.zaman.com.tr/todays-zaman_turkey-geneva-deal-on-chemical-weapons-not-end-of-syrian-crisis_2136216.html) (accessed 28 May 2014).

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

approach to the ‘global’ is informed by two new discourses: a new geopolitical discourse and an intra-civilizational one.<sup>59</sup> The concept of nation-state paradigm was transformed from strong territorial and fixed meaning to transnational character.<sup>60</sup> In the new geopolitical imagination the ethno-secular nation state model is transcended by an emerging cosmopolitan model; arguably a more just and virtuous societal model.<sup>61</sup> Another discursive example of the rise of cosmopolitan thought among the Turkish foreign policy is outlined by Davutoğlu:

*“Our principle should be achieving inclusivity and outreach across a global world. One should think that the security of a child in Somalia is as important as that of one’s own child or that of the children in Slovenia, Brazil and elsewhere.”*<sup>62</sup>

In addition to that, Davutoglu’s assessment of world citizenship and governance, rejects (Samuel) Huntingtonian theories of inevitable civilizational conflict. He chooses to focus on the interactions between civilisations, that *“contribute to the emergence of a genuine global culture in which convergence and pluralism coexist and interact in exciting ways.”*<sup>63</sup>

In line of these arguments, it may well be mooted that Turkey’s Syrian policy is an illustrative case in point. Turkey’s call to the international community for help in ending the humanitarian tragedy in Syria indicate how it prioritizes multilateralism and ‘global responsibilities’ for itself and other nation-states. Turkey’s dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis also contains some strong references to Turkish leaders’ global governance and world citizenship understanding. As noted above on several occasions the AKP elites and other Turkish observers criticized the silence and the failure of the international community in providing an effective humanitarian response to the Syrian refugee tragedy—which has affected Syria’s four neighbours, namely Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. In this vein, what Davutoğlu said about the duty of the international community towards Syrian refugees<sup>64</sup> and in providing assistance to Syrians in their country<sup>65</sup> is illustrative of the rise of a cosmopolitanist discourse in Turkish foreign policy. Indeed, Davutoglu reminds that Turkey’s *“spending for the Syrians in Turkey from the national budget is around 2 billion US Dollars, whereas the combined value of bilateral as well as multilateral contributions is 133 million*

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<sup>59</sup> Emel Parlar Dal, “The transformation of Turkey’s relations with the Middle East: Illusion or Awakening?”, *Turkish Studies* 13, no.2, (June 2012), 245-267; Murat Yeşiltaş, “The Transformation of Geopolitical Vision,” 661-687.

<sup>60</sup> Yeşiltaş, “The Transformation of Geopolitical Vision,” 662-666, 669, 678.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 678; İbrahim Kalın, “Türkiye’nin Çoğulculuk Meselesi ( Turkey’s pluralism problem), ” *Dergah* 18, no.214 (December 2007): 1–3.

<sup>62</sup> Ahmet Davutoglu, “Global Governance”, *SAM ( Center for Strategic Research), Vision Papers*, no.2, March 2012, 4-5. [http://sam.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/vision\\_paper\\_ing\\_02.pdf](http://sam.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/vision_paper_ing_02.pdf). ( accessed 2 Juin 2014).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>64</sup> The number of Syrians taking refuge in Turkey has reached 1.05 million with no peaceful end in sight to the civil war-torn country, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Beşir Atalay said on June 19. Atalay added that a total of 22 camps in Turkey were hosting 218,632 refugees, with some camps hosting as many as 35,000-40,000 individuals. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/number-of-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-exceeds-one-million.aspx?pageID=238&nID=68034&NewsCatID=341> ( accessed 19 Juin 2014)

<sup>65</sup> The total value of the aid channeled to Syria at the zero point of the border is in the range of 200 million US Dollars in addition to 2 billion Dollars Turkey has already spent for Syrians in Turkey. [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-h\\_e\\_-ahmet-davutoglu\\_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey\\_-at-the-high-level-segment-meeting-during-the-64th-excom.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-h_e_-ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-at-the-high-level-segment-meeting-during-the-64th-excom.en.mfa).( accessed 1 Juin 2014)



*US Dollars.*”<sup>66</sup>In addition to that, the total value of the aid channalled to Syria is in the range of 200 million US Dollars which has evidently made Turkey the leading donor.

It can be claimed that Turkish leaders’ discursive foreign policy vis-a-vis the Syrian crisis is a political and social expression of global citizenship or in other terms, in the sense of membership of the global community ruled by universal rights and international law. Additionally, as mentioned above, Turkey’s criticism of the UN’s decision making mechanisms is embedded in its understanding of global governance fit for the 21st century. However, despite its universalist claims in terms of global citizenship, justice and ethics Turkey’s regime change-centered Syrian policy, on the contrary, has become counterproductive and misconceived in the sense that it has not been given wider acceptance and practically supported by some of its Western allies and its neighbors in the Middle East and thus, could not lead to significant changes in the existing political picture of the Syrian crisis.

## **Conclusion**

In today’s world political environment it is no longer possible to dismiss the universal as an abstract moral principle. Clearly a universal standpoint is required to establish a model of world citizenship, to regulate international socio-political interactions, and to construct principles and the institutions of the international community. Assessing the ethics of a foreign policy is a complex process since the ethical and moral commitments of each state vary depending upon the changing domestic, regional and international conditions, as well as interests and the choices of the leadership. This paper attempted to overcome the difficulties in explaining the impact of ethics and the morality on Turkish foreign policy through the use of a normative IR theory approach, particularly of its cosmopolitanism-communitarianism distinction. The analysis of Turkish foreign policy from the perspective of this divide invited a closer examination of the contours and limits of Turkish foreign policy in terms of ethical and moral issues.

The nature of the community that Turkey was embedded since the Republican era ( 1923) and its authoritarian style of democracy prioritizing state over individuals did not favour any ethical rethinking of Turkish foreign policy. Domestic Turkish politics between 1923 and 1999 was heavily influenced by national-republican ideals and notbaly a strong centralised state. The Republican era, Cold War years and the 1990s were far from creating an appropriate ground in Turkey for an alternative (cosmopolitan) moral stance in world affairs. As this paper has shown, policy changes started to shift in general in the 2000s, and especially because of the Europeanization and liberalisation of Turkish foreign policy. The efforts of the Turkish foreign policy decision-makers to go beyond the nation-state and security-based traditions with the deployment of an alternative multidirectional and inter-civilisational/cultural approach has also led to the rise of an ethical and value-based foreign policy discourse over the last decade. This has certainly helped the flourishing of some cosmopolitan ideas alongside communitarian ones in Turkish foreign policy. However, it must be kept in mind that the rise of cosmopolitanism in foreign policy discourse and to a lesser extent in foreign policy practices does not necessarily exclude and disappear the existing communitarian tendencies in Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, Turkey’s Middle

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<sup>66</sup> Ahmet Davutoğlu, Address by H.E. "Ahmet Davutoğlu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, at the High Level Segment Meeting During the 64th Excom Meeting of UNHCR Geneva", Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 September 2013, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-h\\_e\\_ahmet-davutoglu\\_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey\\_-at-the-high-level-segment-meeting-during-the-64th-excom.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/address-by-h_e_ahmet-davutoglu_-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-turkey_-at-the-high-level-segment-meeting-during-the-64th-excom.en.mfa). ( accessed 17 Jun 2014)

Eastern policy in general and its regime change policy in Syria in particular can be conceived as a reflection of a reconciling form of cosmopolitanism-communitarianism. On the other hand, Turkey's rupture with the Assadi regime and its clearly siding with the anti-Assad opponents have been centered around a ethical, value-laden and liberal-cosmopolitan discourse that is not considered legitimate by some of its neighbors and some political and intellectual circles in Turkey who harshly criticize Turkey's Syrian foreign policy. Despite Turkish leaders' invocation of global ethics, justice and cosmopolitanism in Syrian crisis, their out-break with the traditional Turkish foreign policy principle, -non-involvement in the affairs of third countries-, has led to some opposition to its policies both inside and outside the country. Turkey's strong cosmopolitan foreign policy discourse has also been seen by some milieus as a reflect and consequence of Turkey's assertive foreign policy activism in the Middle East aiming to build a new regional community under its own leadership. In the view of some Turks, Turkey's regime change and open border policy in Syria carry a high risk of jeopardizing Turkey's own national security and of deteriorating its international and regional accountability and credibility. This provides a clear illustration of the fact that unless the ethics and justice-based values are shared and seen legitimate by most of the public opinion, the policies that evoke their name will not gain wide acceptance.

A closer look at the orientation and responses of Turkish foreign policy with regards to the recent crisis in the Middle East, as well as its new engagement with the African region, also highlight the problems and tensions associated with the cosmopolitanism/communitarianism dichotomy. The cosmopolitan discourse of Turkish foreign policy in the case of the Syrian crisis – and in the context of the heated debates on a possible limited military intervention against Syria – could not find an equal moral stance either at the UN level or among some of its Western allies. In this regard, it seems clear that cosmopolitanism requires consensus at a global level and institutionalization of international ethics so that responses to humanitarian crises can be tackled appropriately.

Turkey's rising cosmopolitan foreign policy discourse in recent years, accompanied by its democratic dilemmas at home reflect both the resistance to change and demands for change to the existing international order. In fact, the rise of cosmopolitanism in Turkish foreign policy discourse, along with the ambiguities and dilemmas that it entails, might be seen as a positive step towards a more 'liberal' foreign policy if it could have gained sufficient legitimacy and acceptance in the eyes of both Turkish and foreign public opinions based on the values drawn on to justify policies. This new liberal foreign policy of Turkey seems to favor universalism over particularism, and shows that the country is willing to implement its duties and obligations towards human rights and international law.

Analysis of Turkey's normative foreign policy shows some clear signs of a cosmopolitanist turn mostly in rhetoric and to a lesser extent in practice. However, Turkey's liberal-cosmopolitan approach to global ethics and justice does not refute the moral significance of particularist ties and obligations to its compatriots inside and outside Turkey. From this perspective, it can be seen as both a dual approach embracing cosmopolitanism and communitarianism at the same time and an accommodating approach with communitarian claims. In this respect, the current Turkish foreign policy and its responses to the regional crisis constitute a proper case reflecting both cosmopolitanism-communitarian dichotomy of normative IR theory and its quest for a middle ground. In an ever changing and volatile international community, this paper also shows the development of a solidarist understanding of international society in Turkish foreign policy and the Turkish government's approach to the changing international order which is based on the idea of the existence of multiple modernities and numerous post-Western orientations. However, an inward looking to Turkish

politics could make the contradictions of Turkey's increasing cosmopolitan approach appear more clearly, especially at the domestic level. The rise of some authoritarianist tendencies in Turkish domestic political scene in recent years, especially with the Gezi Park protests in June 2013 gave some contradictory signals to the outside world about the extent to which actual Turkish government is attached to and has internalized universal liberal norms such as democracy, human rights and rule of law on the international stage.