

# A Study on the Link between Corruption and the Causes of Migration and Forced Displacement



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# **A Study on the Link between Corruption and the Causes of Migration and Forced Displacement**

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## Abbreviations

<b>AQIM</b>	Al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb
<b>CIA</b>	Central Intelligence Agency
<b>DFID</b>	Department For International Development
<b>DIIS</b>	Danish Institute for International Studies
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>EPDC</b>	Education Policy and Data Centre
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>GCA</b>	Government-Controlled Area
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GIZ</b>	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
<b>HRW</b>	Human Rights Watch
<b>ICRC</b>	International Committee of the Red Cross
<b>IDMC</b>	International Displacement Monitoring Centre
<b>IDP</b>	Internally Displaced People
<b>IIE</b>	Institute for International Education
<b>ILO</b>	International Labour Organization
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IOM</b>	International Organization for Migration
<b>IRIN</b>	Integrated Regional Information Networks
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organization
<b>MPI</b>	Migration Policy Institute
<b>OAG</b>	Office of the Auditor General

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<b>ODIHR</b>	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
<b>OECD</b>	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<b>OHCHR</b>	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
<b>OSCE</b>	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
<b>PPP</b>	Purchasing Power Parity
<b>STWR</b>	Share The World's Resources
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UN DESA</b>	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UNESCO</b>	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
<b>UNFPA</b>	United Nations Population Fund
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
<b>UNODC</b>	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
<b>UNTFHS</b>	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
<b>UNU-EHS</b>	United Nations University – Institute for Environment and Human Security
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>USD</b>	United States Dollar
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WFP</b>	World Food Programme
<b>WHO</b>	World Health Organization

## Executive Summary

The aim of the present study is to develop a theoretical framework explaining the links between corruption and migration, including various forms of migration such as forced and voluntary migration as well as forced displacement. This framework is suitable to be applied to different country contexts. It identifies how corruption impacts human security and thereby directly or indirectly leads to migration and displacement, develops research hypotheses and gives recommendations for addressing corruption as a cause of migration and displacement.

Both migration and corruption are multi-faceted complex phenomena, which need to be examined in more detail before exploring the relationship between corruption, migration and forced displacement. This study uses a broad understanding of corruption explicitly including discussions about nepotism, patronage networks and political corruption rather than focusing solely on bureaucratic corruption. It focuses on the ways in which these different types of corruption threaten aspects of human security and thereby indirectly lead to migration. The framework also considers different forms of voluntary and forced migration as well as forced displacement to show a comprehensive picture.

The second part of the report applies the theoretical framework to two case studies, Mali and Ukraine, to investigate in more detail what role corruption can play as a driver for migration and displacement. These case studies were selected as they offer a broad picture of different reasons for migration, variation in levels and types of corruption as well as socio-demographic factors. Mali is chosen as a case study because it is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with endemic corruption in the public and private sector. In addition, it is a migrant sending country, in which migration as a livelihood strategy has been employed for centuries and therefore can be seen as a norm rather than an exception. Recent political developments and the outbreak of conflict in which corruption and human security issues played an important part, make Mali a particularly interesting case study also for internal and forced displacement. Ukraine is equally interesting as corruption is a problem on all levels of the state. Corruption is among the highest in Europe and citizens have created major protest movements against corrupt governments twice in the last decade (the 'Orange Revolution' and 'Euromaidan'). Ukraine also sees significant migration movements to Europe and Russia including more than 300,000 international refugees in 2015 (World Bank, 2016) and about 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (World Bank, 2016) as a result of the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine. Relevant data for both case studies is gathered using semi-structured expert interviews.

The research for this report identified only weak direct links of corruption as a push-factor for voluntary migration. As corruption is understood as a strong indicator that the overall state system is not functioning, people might consider migrating because they are generally tired of the system. This is in line with other research showing that general life dissatisfaction can motivate migration. The indirect links between corruption and voluntary and forced migration and forced displacement are found to be much stronger. All dimensions of human security can be strongly affected by corruption and therefore lead to migration and displacement. The effect of corruption on lack of (good) employment opportunities and on aid resources have been identified as the most prominent links to the decision to migrate in both Mali and Ukraine. High-level corruption, in particular nepotism and patronage systems, which tie economic and political elites closely together are identified as the most damaging types of corruption. The exact linkages are extremely case specific and require a deep understanding of the roots and types of corruption prominent in the country. Both the case of Mali and Ukraine show that there are even sub-national differences in the role corruption plays in shaping migration aspirations. It is therefore crucial not to generalise across different cases.

## 1. Introduction

Table 1: Top 10 Migrant Countries of Origin<sup>1</sup>

Country of Origin	Number of Migrants	2015 Corruption Perception Index Rank
India	15 575 724	76
Mexico	12 339 062	95
Russian Federation	10 576 766	119
China	9 546 065	83
Bangladesh	7 205 410	139
Pakistan	5 935 193	117
Ukraine	5 825 745	130
Philippines	5 316 320	95
Syrian Arab Republic	5 011 509	154

Recently, attention has been brought to the question of how corruption could act as a push-factor for migration and a driver for forced displacement<sup>2</sup>. Looking at the top ten countries of origin for migrants it is notable that they all share very high levels of corruption. Yet, research on the nexus between corruption and migration is still in its infancy. Until now, only a few studies have been conducted analysing the impact of migrants and remittances on home country corruption (Abdih, Chami, Dagher, & Montiel, 2012; Berdiev, Kim, & Chang, 2013; Ferreras, 2013; Ivlevs & King, 2014). While it is often mentioned as an afterthought, the body of research on corruption as a push-factor for migration and a driver of forced displacement is extremely small. While there are some initial studies that indicate that corruption has direct and indirect effects on peoples' decision to migrate (e.g. Carling, Paasche and Siegel, 2015), a comprehensive study on the role corruption plays as a driver does not exist.

This study sets out to develop a theoretical framework explaining the links between corruption and forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement, which can be applied to different country contexts. It identifies how corruption impacts human security and thereby directly or indirectly leads to migration.

<sup>1</sup> International Migrants in this data have been equated with the foreign-born population, where this information is available. In countries where refugees are not included in the population census estimates of the UNHCR and the UNWRA were added to the migrant stocks. (UN DESA, 2015 Documentation)

<sup>2</sup> For the purpose of this report, forced displacement is defined as conflict-induced forced migration. See section 2 for more detailed information on the most important concepts used in this report.

The theoretical framework is based on the following research questions and sub-questions:

1. Are there linkages between corruption and migration, including displacement, and in which ways does corruption contribute to the creation of threats to human security and diminishing economic and political prospects and other causes for migration?
  - Which types of corruption have an impact on migration, including forced displacement?
  - How does corruption affect different sectors and institutions as a driver of migration and forced displacement?
  - How are different types of migration affected by corruption?
  - How are men and women affected differently by corruption?
2. How can the connection between corruption and migration/forced displacement be theorised and understood?

Both migration and corruption are multi-faceted complex phenomena, which need to be examined in more detail before exploring the relationship between corruption and forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement.

Corruption is most commonly defined as '[t]he abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain' (Norad, 2008, p.11). For the purpose of this paper it also needs to be understood broadly. It is important to explicitly include discussions about patronage networks and political corruption rather than focusing solely on bureaucratic corruption (Johnston, 2005) to get a comprehensive picture. In addition, analysing how corruption affects different sectors and institutions will help to achieve a better understanding of the risks corruption poses. This paper looks at migration, including forced displacement and other forms of migration, to really develop a comprehensive framework. Furthermore, it is crucial to also take into account background characteristics of migrants such as educational level and gender as migration outcomes have been shown to differ based on these characteristics (Cooray and Schneider, 2014; Boehm and Sierra, 2015).

The second part of the report will look at two case studies, Mali and Ukraine, to investigate in more detail what role corruption plays as a push-factor for migration and a driver for forced displacement. These case studies were selected as they offer a broad picture of different reasons for migration, variation in levels of corruption as well as socio-demographic factors. This allows for a test of different aspects of the theoretical framework. Mali is chosen as a case study because it is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with endemic corruption in the public and private sector. In addition, it is a migrant sending country, in which migration as a livelihood strategy has been employed for centuries and therefore can be seen as a norm rather than an exception. Recent political developments and the outbreak of conflict in which corruption and human security issues played an important part, and which led to international and internal forced displacement make Mali a particularly interesting case study. Ukraine is equally interesting as corruption is a problem in all layers of the state and corruption levels are among the highest in Europe. Citizens have also created major protest movements against corrupt governments twice in the last decade ('Orange Revolution' and 'Euromaidan'). Ukraine has furthermore seen significant migration movements to Europe and Russia including more than 300,000 international refugees by 2015 and about 1.7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) (World Bank, 2016) as a result of the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: First, it defines relevant concepts including corruption, migration, forced displacement and human security. Second, it explains the methodology used to identify relevant literature for developing the theoretical framework and applying it to the country case studies of Ukraine and Mali. Third, it sums up how human security aspects can influence the development of migration aspirations and cause forced displacement. Fourth, the paper describes what is known about the relationship between corruption, migration and forced displacement and builds on this by developing a framework explaining how corruption directly and indirectly affects different forms of migration using a human security approach. Finally, it formulates research hypotheses. The second part of the report presents case studies of Ukraine and Mali to analyse the role corruption plays there in the decision to migrate or as a trigger for forced displacement and test some of the hypothesis formulated in Part I.



## 2. Mapping the Conceptual Terrain: Corruption and Migration



### Spotlight 1: The Cost of Corruption

According to the most recent Bribery Barometer in the last year an estimated 75 million people have paid bribes in Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>3</sup>, 1 in 3 people in the Middle East and North Africa have paid a bribe to receive access to basic services<sup>4</sup> and 1 in 3 citizens in Europe and Central Asia consider corruption as their country's biggest challenge<sup>5</sup>. Yet, how can one measure the enormous costs of corruption?

Corruption is an act that by definition takes place in hiding and therefore accurate measurements are impossible to find. Yet, different estimates show the dramatic impact corruption has on the economy of countries. According to a study by UNODC and the World Bank (2007) \$20-\$40 billion per year are estimated to be spent on bribes to public officials a year in developing and transition economies. This is equal to 20-40% of Official Development Assistance (ODA). Another study by the Center of Strategic and International Studies estimates that in 105 developing countries (22% of Global GDP) private sector corruption costs over \$500 billion in 2012 (Hameed & Magpile, 2014, p. 3). While the exact number is still undetermined there is agreement that corruption diverts large sums of money from the economy that could be used for investment and development.

### 2.1. Corruption - what do we mean?

Corruption is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. "The abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain" (Norad, 2008, p.11) is considered the most appropriate definition of corruption in the context of development cooperation. While we follow this definition there are several issues that the researcher has to keep in mind. The first question, which is raised repeatedly, especially when discussing corruption in non-Western societies, is whose standards and morals apply to this definition. As Lancaster and Montinola (2001) explain this definition is problematic because it assumes agreement on an underlying ideal state, which in reality is not the case.

3 [http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption\\_in\\_africa\\_75\\_million\\_people\\_pay\\_bribes](http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_in_africa_75_million_people_pay_bribes)

4 [http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/50\\_million\\_people\\_in\\_the\\_middle\\_east\\_and\\_north\\_africa\\_paid\\_bribes\\_last\\_year](http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/50_million_people_in_the_middle_east_and_north_africa_paid_bribes_last_year)

5 [https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/governments\\_are\\_doing\\_a\\_poor\\_job\\_at\\_fighting\\_corruption\\_across\\_europe](https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/governments_are_doing_a_poor_job_at_fighting_corruption_across_europe)

The countries which will be researched in connection to migration and corruption are not only in different parts of the world and different stages of development they also have a vast array of local and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organizations working in the countries, whose perceptions of what is corruption and what are legitimate acts will often differ significantly from those of the local population (Cheng & Zaum, 2008). In addition, many times there is not even a consensus among the local population of what defines the duties of public office (Philp, 2008). All this leads to potential problems with survey and interview results (Johnsøn & Mason, 2013), especially when comparing across different countries and populations. This has to be kept in mind when analysing the results of the case studies.

A further problem is that definitions of corruption (as do most indices) often consider corruption equivalent to the issue of bribery (and extortion) but do not include other issues such as nepotism, patronage, official theft, fraud, and conflict of interests problems and focus on bureaucratic corruption over political corruption (Johnston, 2005). In countries with large migration flows, the latter are immensely important aspects of corruption and should not be excluded from the analysis. Therefore, this project adheres to a wide definition of corruption including different types of corruption. The types of corruption should include traditional concepts such as bribery and nepotism but also more recently discovered phenomenon such as sexual extortion ('sextortion') (Transparency International, 2016b) which especially female migrants face frequently. In this context it is important to note that the reward for corruption, i.e. the 'personal gain' does not have to be monetary (Bayley, 1966) it can also include for instance benefits for group members or political parties. For an overview of different forms of corruption see Table 2. Corrupt acts usually require two parties and Davis (2004) adds an additional differentiation by looking at the willingness of the parties involved in the corrupt act. According to him, the interaction can be one of three things, a willing cooperation between bribe payer and receiver, a forceful extraction of bribes, or a bribe payer anticipating future benefits. One additional element for the interpretation of findings especially regarding police and judicial corruption must be that it can include both receiving bribes from those that should be facing punishment as well as extorting payments from the innocent (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2008). A further distinction is the question of political (grand) and bureaucratic corruption. Where political corruption involves the highest political decision makers and bureaucratic corruption involves the policy implementation level (J. Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Søreide, & Sissener, 2000). This differentiation is important not only for the understanding of linkages but also for the possibility of measuring corrupt acts.

In corruption research there is an ongoing discussion on how to measure something that by definition takes place in hiding. Different objective measures of corruption have been used, for example conviction rates (e.g. Fiorino, Galli, & Petrarca, 2012; Hill, 2003) or press reports (e.g. Rehren, 1996). These measures have not become very popular as they are mostly unsystematic and therefore create great validity and reliability problems (Morris, 2008, p. 390). The most commonly used measures are still subjective measures such as the perceived level of corruption, which is usually assessed by foreign experts (Svensson, 2003) (for instance the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International), or measures of corruption participation (Morris, 2008, p. 390). The advantages and deficits of different measurements of corruption data have been thoroughly discussed in the literature (see for instance Kis-Katos & Schulze, 2013; Sequeira, 2012), but no consensus on the optimal measurement has been reached. The most important message seems to be that researchers need to be aware of the shortcomings of the measurement they are using and aspire for a coherent measurement. Authors using corruption data should point out the shortcomings of the data, yet as Blackburn et al. (2010) argue since all the major indices do not only show a high correlation with each other but also with the key economic variables the existing measures can be considered reliable. To test the relationship between corruption and migration, one will (at least initially) have to rely on people's perception of corruption. In parti-

cular when attempting to identify direct links it seems to be the most useful information as research aims to determine if people leave because of their perceived exposure to corruption. To understand the indirect links, other measures might be preferable. One problem may arise here when many of the linkages depend on nepotism or patronage networks (so called grand corruption) which are even harder to measure than bribe payments (Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015).<sup>6</sup>

Table 2: Types of Corruption

Type of Corruption	Definition	Group of Terms
Bribery	Payment (in money or kind) that is given or taken in a corrupt relationship	Kickbacks, gratuities, "commercial arrangements, baksheesh, sweeteners, pay-offs, speed- or grease money
Embezzlement	Theft of resources by people who are put to administer it	Straddling, official theft
Fraud	Economic crime that involves some kind of trickery, swindle or deceit	Involvement in illegal trade networks, counterfeit, racketing, forgery, smuggling
Extortion	Money and other resources extracted by the use of coercion, violence or the threats to use force	Blackmail, protection or security money, informal taxation, sextortion (sexual extortion)
Favouritism	Mechanism of power abuse implying 'privatisation' and a highly biased distribution of state resources.	Cronyism, nepotism, clientelism, bias, patronage


Source: adapted from Andvig et al. (2001, p. 8ff)

<sup>6</sup> For detailed reviews of the literature on corruption we refer to (J. Andvig, Fjeldstad, Amundsen, Søreide, & Sissener, 2000; Kis-Katos & Schulze, 2013; Lambsdorff & Schulze, 2015; Olken & Pande, 2012)

## 2.2. The concept of human security

This paper uses a human security framework to explore the linkages between migration, forced displacement and corruption. Human security seems a useful concept since threats to human security can lead to migration. In addition, these threats can often be exacerbated by corruption.

Figure 1: The Human Security Concept



There are various attempts to define human security (Newman, 2010). This paper applies the broad definition as introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report because it offers the most comprehensive starting framework to better understand the link between corruption and forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement. The 1994 Human Development Report emphasises the need for security to be defined in a broader and people-based sense rather than in terms of the nation state and hard security concepts. This does not necessarily imply that human and state security are in conflict (Newman, 2010). Human security relates to the “legitimate concerns of ordinary people” (UNDP, 1994, p.22) and is comprised of seven components, which may overlap and are heavily interlinked, namely economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Table of Content). A variety of issues can threaten the security of an individual in any of these dimensions. Table 3 not only defines the individual components of human security but also identifies a non-exhaustive list of possible threats to the human security of an individual. For instance, unemployment is regarded as a threat to economic security because not being employed might lead to the individual not having a basic income.

Table 3: The seven components of human security and its threats as defined by UNDP (1994)

Component	Definition	Threats to human security dimensions
Economic security	"Economic security requires an assured basic income-usually from productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some publicly financed safety net" (United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1994, p. 25).	Unemployment, poverty, wage inequality, lack of social security, limited access to education, poor educational institutions
Food security	"Food security means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food" (UNDP, 1994, p.27).	No access to food and water, poverty, poor distribution of food
Health security	"Health security is defined as the activities required, both proactive and reactive, to minimize vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the collective [and individual] health of populations" (WHO, 2007, p.IX)	No access to health care and doctors, diseases, epidemics and pandemics, HIV/Aids
Environment security	Environment security implies that "human beings live in a healthy physical environment" (UNDP, 1994, p.28).	Environmental degradation, floods, droughts, hurricanes, man-made disasters (pollution, radiology)
Personal security	Personal security implies that human beings are secure from violence (UNDP, 1994).	Physical torture, war, ethnic tension, crime, street violence, rape, domestic violence, child abuse, threats to self (e.g. suicide and drugs)
Community security	Security of communities, including families, racial and ethnic groups, includes that communities are free to live up to their respective customs and traditions. This also implies that their values, customs and traditions are passed on to younger generations preventing that they become extinct (UNDP, 1994).	Discrimination, oppression, ethnic rivalry/conflict, modernisation, assimilation, globalisation,
Political security	"People should be able to live in a society that honours their basic human rights" (UNDP, 1994, p.32).	Political repression, human rights abuses, limited civic freedoms

Source: UNDP (1994)

UNDP (1994) argues that human security “is more easily defined through its absence than its presence” (p.23). Human security and the threats to it show four essential characteristics: they are universal, interdependent, people-centred and require early prevention mechanisms. Loss of human security can be “a slow, silent process – or an abrupt, loud emergency” (p.23), it can be a result of human behaviour or action, nature or a combination of both. In times of globalisation, threats may spill beyond national borders, making human security a global concept. Common examples of threats to global human security are for instance terrorism, drug- and human- trafficking. The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) identifies governments, international organisations, regional organisations, civil society and community-based actor as responsible for supporting human security (UNTFHS, n.d.).

The concept of human security is criticised for being analytically weak. Since any threat to life can be considered a threat to human security, the concept appears meaningless and impossible to manage (Newman, 2010). Proponents of the broad human security concept consider this debate trivial since the notion of human security is to “improve the lives of those who are perilously insecure” (Newman, 2010, p. 83).

This paper uses the broad concept of human security despite or even because of its all-encompassing nature. As will be explained in section 4, the existing literature has identified various threats to human security as push-factors of migration and a driver of forced displacement. At the same time, many of these threats can be exacerbated through corrupt practices as section 5.2 will discuss in detail. Applying the concept of human security therefore allows the researchers to build a theoretical framework explaining the linkages between corruption and voluntary and forced migration and forced displacement in a comprehensive and structured way.

### 2.3. Migration<sup>7</sup> – the background

Migration involves “the movement of a person or a group of persons either across an international border, or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people whatever its length, composition or causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification” (IOM, 2011). A glossary of key terms and definition can be found in Annex II - Glossary of Migration Key Terms.

In 2015, 3.3 per cent of the world’s population lived outside their home countries (UNFPA, n.d.). Despite the common assumption that migration is increasing, the share of migrants compared to the world’s total population has been relatively stable over decades (Carling & Talleraas, 2016; Castles et al. 2014). The majority of migrants are labour migrants and come from developing countries. The ILO (2015) estimates that in 2013 150 million of 232 million international migrants were migrant workers. There is no data available indicating the share of permanent and temporary migrants, since migration intentions often change during the process, which makes it hard to predict the final outcome. One can assume that most migrants move temporarily for the following three reasons. First, the majority of labour migration policies are designed to meet temporary labour shortages. Second, sending countries often encourage the return of labour migrants. Third, many migrants themselves only intend to migrate for a limited amount of time to improve their own as well as their families’ living standards and then return (Castles et al, 2014). In 2015, remittances amounted to \$581.6 billion,

7 In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014).

of which \$431.6 billion (74.2 %) were sent to developing countries (World Bank, 2016a). This sum exceeds official development assistance (ODA) by more than the threefold and shows how important remittances are as a capital source for developing countries (OECD, 2006). It is unclear to what extent these numbers reflect actual remittance flows since they capture formal transfers only and do not capture remittances transferred through informal channels.

In an attempt to simplify the complexities of migration, different migrant groups can be identified even though there can be a fine line between them. First, one differentiates between regular and irregular migrants. Irregular migrants are those lacking legal status and are also referred to as undocumented, illegal or clandestine migrants. For instance, this lack of legal status can be a consequence of illegally entering the transit or destination country or visa expiration (IOM, 2011). Hence, what might have begun as regular migration can turn into irregular migration and vice versa. According to IOM (2010) estimates, irregular migration accounts for approximately 10 – 15 per cent of total migration flows in 2010. Due to the nature of this form of migration, it is however difficult to determine the actual number of irregular migrants worldwide.

Second, a distinction needs to be made between voluntary and forced migration. Voluntary migrants are those who make a decision to move mainly for increased opportunities and according to their own preferences (IOM, 2011), e.g. to find better work somewhere else. In contrast, forced migrants have to leave their homes due to circumstances beyond their control. While recent academic debates question the adequacy of distinguishing between voluntary and forced migration (Carling & Talleraas, 2016) partly because “voluntary migrants also face constraints and [...] many forced migrants do have a certain level of agency” (Castles et al, 2014, p.221) the distinction is essential for policy makers and development agencies to get a clear and nuanced understanding of the reasons why people migrate and to formulate adequate policy responses.

Forced migration has three pillars in the academic debate: disaster-induced displacement, development-induced displacement and conflict-induced/forced displacement (Castles, 2003; Castles et al., 2014). Disaster-induced displacement is the result of environmental changes (e.g. deforestation, land degradation and global warming), natural disasters (e.g. floods) and manmade disasters (e.g. chemical spills) (e.g. Bose & Lundstrom, 2014; Saha, 2015). Development-induced displacement forces populations to move due to policies or projects which “supposedly enhance ‘development’<sup>8</sup>. One example are large scale infrastructure programs, e.g. dams, which force communities to be resettled, often without adequate compensation and less international attention (Robinson, 2003). Conflict-induced/forced displacement is caused by “direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution” (Gutsche & Cannizzio-Marcus, 2016, p.1). This definition is in line with the 1951 Refugee Convention. For the remainder of this document the term ‘forced migration’ is used when referring to disaster- and development-induced displacement, while the term ‘forced displacement’ refers to conflict-induced displacement only.

For this report, we argue that forced displacement needs to be considered separately from forced migration for two reasons: For one, the sheer number of people who have been forcibly displaced worldwide due to violence and conflict calls for a thorough understanding of the causes for displacement. In 2015, more than 65 million individuals have been forcefully displaced, which are the highest numbers since World War II (UNHCR, 2016). Secondly this form of displacement relates to different legal statuses<sup>9</sup>, which has consequences for the rights and obligations of migrants and (receiving) countries and therefore consequences for foreign policy and development cooperation. Hence, this paper recognises

8 <http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm>

9 This discussion refers to the official legal status of refugees and asylum seekers. See Annex II for definitions

that the different forms of migration and forced displacement entail different shades of voluntariness even though the lines can be blurred, yet to develop a good understanding of the causes of migration in connection to corruption the separation in voluntary and forced migration and forced displacement is essential. Accordingly, this report follows the differentiation of three forms of migration: voluntary migration, forced migration and forced displacement.

The question of why people chose to leave their homes is not a new one. Since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, scholars are trying to find explanations for the migration phenomenon which resulted in the formulation of various migration theories. Existing migration theories equally apply to different forms of migration and should be treated as complements and not as rivals since migration is a complex phenomenon and commonly assumed to be the consequence of a variety of factors (Castles et al., 2014). Migration is assumed to occur when the benefits of migration exceed the costs, which holds for both voluntary and forced migration (Melander et al., 2007). Traditional migration theories focus on economic factors in explaining migration patterns (e.g. supply and demand of labour, income differentials, etc.). In contrast, more recent approaches also take into account softer factors such as the quality of place and broader lifestyle considerations (e.g. culture, leisure, climate and living environment). While traditional theories consider migration a consequence of structural conditions in which the individual appears rather passive, more recent theories acknowledge the agency of migrants who actively take the decision to move (Castles et al., 2014).

Newer approaches to migration theory seem to combine these approaches by dividing the migration process into several stages showing that migration intentions are not to be confused with actual migration behaviour (see Figure 2). These approaches see migration (including to different extents voluntary, forced, regular and irregular migration) as a product of the motivation to migrate, the so-called migration aspiration, and the ability to actually do so. Hence, structural conditions and agency both play a role in these models. In the first step, the motivation to migrate develops. It is assumed to result from a desire for change due to a feeling of discontent about the individual's life situation as a consequence of unsatisfying conditions and lack of prospects, also known as push-factors<sup>10</sup>. Common examples for such unsatisfying conditions refer to economic, social and political conditions (Carling & Talleraas, 2016).


Migration is by no means considered the only possibility to realise the desired change. Individuals could just as well opt for other ways to improve their respective situation for instance by trying to actively change the dissatisfying conditions in the home country. If migration aspirations become reality, depends on the individual's access to factors enabling the actual movement, which forms the second part of the migration process. Factors enabling migration are for instance financial, human and social capital and the available migration infrastructure consisting for instance of brokers, smugglers, migration policies, means of transport and communication. Even if enabling factors are available, this does not imply that migrants will successfully reach their destination (Carling & Talleraas, 2016).

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10 Push-pull models are part of functionalist migration theories. In a nutshell, they identify relevant factors "which are assumed to push people out of places of origin and pull them into destination places" (Castles et al, 2014, p.28).



Figure 2: Mechanisms Leading to Migration



Source: Carling & Talleraas (2016)

Addressing push-factors causing migration aspirations, such as underdevelopment, poverty and environmental factors, shields a hidden assumption that migration can be stopped (Bakewell, 2008). However, theoretical and empirical studies on the so-called migration-development nexus demonstrate that the relationship between migration and development is reciprocal and that therefore development may also facilitate migration (De Haas, 2012). For instance, increased development associated with an increase in financial and human capital, which are both enabling factors for migration. Additionally, a well-managed migration process that is based on a free, voluntary and well informed decision to migrate is seen as profitable for both sending as well as receiving countries and therefore should not be stopped.

As discussed above, people facing forced migration and forced displacement often are considered to have a very limited option for choice, which is why the model presented above does not seem applicable. Yet, the migration process has multiple stages. Even if the decision to leave has been forced on people by circumstances beyond their control such as war, conflict or environmental disasters, they still have decisions to make, such as where to go, how to get there (paths and means) and also can result in different outcomes.

Corruption can arguably play a role in all stages of the migration and forced displacement process and certainly impacts the migration-development nexus. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to analyse all of them. Since one aim of this paper is to better understand corruption as a push-factor for migration and driver of forced displacement, it focuses on the first part of the migration process and the role corruption plays in developing migration aspirations and as a driver for forced migration and displacement. Analysing the influence of corruption on the remaining stages could be subject to future research.

## 3. Methodology

### 3.1. Part I – Theoretical framework

The creation of a theoretical framework establishing the linkages between corruption and forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement is based on a systematic literature review and a call for references through the researchers' various available distribution channels. It surveys the ways in which corruption contributes to the creation of threats of human security and how these threats lead to voluntary or forced migration or forced displacement.

To identify literature, a systematic primary search for literature using the Maastricht University Library search engine and Google Scholar<sup>11</sup> has been conducted. A table providing the search terms, which were first used to guide the literature search in a systematic way can be found in Annex I. In a second step, the same search was conducted using the term bribery in place of corruption. Third, other forms of corruption such as extortion, patronage and nepotism were randomly included into the search. As the third search led to the same results as previous ones, it was eventually discontinued. The search was limited to the first 50 articles per search term identified by the different search engines and excluded books.

The key thematic areas include ways in which corruption contributes to decreased human security including decreased economic and political security. Additionally, other linkages between corruption and forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement that do not fall within these two categories are included, based on the results of the literature review. The 1,505 articles and sources identified through the primary search were added to a systematic database of resources. Based on this, the authors selected relevant articles to be analysed in more detail in a secondary search. Sources were included into the secondary search when the title included words related to migration *and* corruption, including synonyms and specific forms of migration and corruption. In addition, sources investigating linkages between either migration and aspects of human security or corruption and aspects of human security were integrated into the secondary search, on which the theoretical framework is based.

### 3.2. Part II – Case studies

The second part of this paper applies the theoretical framework to the country case studies of Ukraine and Mali using a qualitative methodology. Relevant data on both countries is gathered through desk research and expert interviews.

Documents reviewed as part of the desk research include academic articles, grey literature (including reports published by governmental and non-governmental organisation), reports by investigative journalists, news articles, as well as legal and policy documents. It is noteworthy that the availability of relevant sources differed per case study. In the case of Ukraine, a limited number of academic articles already explored the links between corruption and forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement from the country, while no such sources could be found for Mali. For both countries additional research was required.

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11 <http://scholar.google.com/>

To overcome these shortcomings of the existing literature and in an attempt to fill the knowledge gaps, 24 semi-structured expert interviews have been conducted between November 28, 2016 and December 15, 2016. Interview partners include academics, as well as representatives of international organisations, government organisations, NGOs and think tanks working in relevant fields related to corruption, migration, and human security in general or in Ukraine or Mali specifically. They were selected based on desk research, the research team's networks, and snowball sampling. All interviewees could choose to remain anonymous if they preferred (a list of interview partners can be found in Annex III). All interviews were conducted remotely by means of Skype or telephone using an interview guide (see Annex IV) based on the desk research and theoretical framework. The interviews have been analysed and incorporated into the report. Due to the sensitivity of the topic and the complicated political situation in both case study countries no direct quotes are attributed to interview partners. Interviews have been assigned random numbers to ensure the interviewees' anonymity.

Conducting interviews was subject to several limitations: first, the timing of the interviews, which were conducted at the end of the year, a period that is very busy for all possible interview partners. This is mirrored by the response rate: While the research team had contacted more than 90 possible interviewees, only 24 interviewees were conducted. Many of the contacted experts did not respond to the interview request at all. In addition, there were technical limitations to conducting interviews. Particularly in the case of Mali, there were some occasions in which it was not possible to conduct scheduled interviews due to insufficient internet and telephone connections. In such cases the research team tried to draw on having the questionnaire filled in by the interviewee in writing, which was successful in two cases only. This is attributed to a lack of time on parts of the interviewees at the end of the year. As many experts have acknowledged the importance of the topic, the research team recommends further studies, sometime in the future, on the links between corruption and migration in Ukraine and Mali. Interviewees would be less occupied and interviews could be conducted over a longer period, leaving more room for flexibility. In addition, doing field work in the country would be more effective in the case of Mali compared to remote interviews.

## 4. Human Insecurity as Cause of Migration and Forced Displacement

Threats to human security are often reasons for migration. If channels for regular migration including labour migration are not available, individuals can be compelled to migrate through irregular channels, including smuggling, putting their security at risk. In many cases, they are, therefore, vulnerable to becoming victims of human trafficking, bonded labour or to work under conditions that do not comply with human and worker rights (Castles et al, 2014, p.199).

The relationship between migration and human security is reciprocal. This paper focuses on threats to human security as push-factors of forced and voluntary migration and causes of forced displacement because it aims to better understand what motivates individuals to leave their homes and what role corruption plays in this context. Discussing human insecurities as consequences of migration are beyond the scope of this report and therefore not discussed here.

The following sections explain in what ways the individual components of human security can be understood as push-factors for migration and causes of forced displacement. Often it is hard to distinguish between individual components and therefore difficult to determine which insecurity eventually leads to the migration decision. This is because the separation of economic, social, cultural and political causes of migration poses a challenge (Castles et al, 2014). The individual components of human security and their threats have been defined in the previous chapter and are therefore not repeated here.



### Spotlight 2: Economic Migration

According to ILO estimates, 72.7 per cent of migrants worldwide who are of working age participate in the labour force (ILO, 2015). This implies that the largest share of migrants move for economic reasons.

During the academic year 2014/2015 974,926 international students were enrolled in US higher education institutions, 496,000 in UK higher education institutions, and 235,000 in German higher education institutions, accounting for approximately 5, 21 and 9 per cent of the total student population respectively. A large share of international students in each of the countries comes from developing countries such as China and India (IIE, 2016).

### 4.1. Economic security and migration

Lack of economic security is recognized as one of the main motivations for (voluntary) migration worldwide. Traditional migration theories consider economic aspects like income and employment inequalities the main determinants of voluntary migration, which is supported by many empirical studies confirming this idea (Liebig and Souza-Posa, 2004; Radnitz, 2006, Ngoman and Ismail, 2013). This is even true for cases in which other factors seem to be more obvious in explaining migration at first sight (Neumayer, 2005; Radnitz, 2006; Rowlands, 1999; Shrestha and Bhandari, 2007; Warner et al, 2010; Alscher, 2011; Afifi, 2010). A possible explanation for this is that in almost all cases threats to other dimensions of human security affect the economic well-being of individuals, which ultimately leads to migration.

In addition, empirical evidence suggests that poverty is among the main motivations for migration while at the same time constraining it since individuals cannot afford to migrate (Bergh et al, 2015; Raleigh, 2011; De Haas, 2012). In addition, poverty is correlated with higher rates of human trafficking (Bales, 2011). Raleigh (2011) points out that the “ability to migrate is based on the opportunities to do so; those with fewer assets and lower incomes are often unable to migrate” (p.589). Hence, financial and social capital are prerequisites for realising migration aspirations. Economic security is assumed to play a greater role in explaining voluntary migration.

Another aspect that is linked to economic security is education as better education is associated with increased career, income, and employment opportunities. Human capital theory stresses that migration decisions are not only based on financial, but also non-financial considerations with education being one of them (Sjaastad, 1962; Rhaguram, 2013). Not having access to education or low quality of educational institutions can lead to migration, particularly in the case of students, graduates, professionals and researchers (Chappell and Glennie, 2010). In many cases this involves migration from developing to developed countries where education is perceived as superior (Rafi and Lewis, 2013; Beech, 2014; Hercog and Van De Laar, 2016; Kóu and Bailey, 2014; Perkins and Neumayer, 2014).

Forced migration in the form of development induced displacement is also a threat to an individual's or a community's economic security. With all positive intentions development interventions can result in displacement as “development is fundamentally about reorganizing space” (Vandergaast, 2003. P.47). These projects can have two effects a) people “having to be resettled to make way for the project and b) [...] secondary effects of the project on people's livelihoods even in the new lands that they settle in” (Caspary, 2007,p.71). Often times compensation is not adequate or effective (Cernea, 2000), the resettlement can lead to ‘social impoverishment’ (Cernea, 1995a), and a lack of access to community services, employment and traditional livelihoods (Robinson, 2003). Development induced displacement therefore often has an impact on economic security that leads to further migration aspirations.

## 4.2. Political security, forced displacement and migration

Besides economic insecurities threats to political security and political repression, including the denial of human rights, are considered push-factors for migration and drivers of forced displacement. (Castles et al, 2014; Neumayer, 2005). According to Raleigh (2011), “political instability is the most persistent correlate to forced migration” (p.84). Moreover, it plays a significant role in explaining skilled migration from developing countries (Ngoma and Ismail, 2013). Similarly, Bergh et al (2015) point out that the quality, effectiveness and transparency of institutions affect migration flows.

Women’s rights are one specific aspect of human rights. Naghsh Nejad and Young (2014) establish a significant nonlinear relationship between female migration and women’s rights including a lack of economic, political and social rights, which is in line with other studies (Naghsh Nejad, 2013; Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015).

Exploring the links between governance and migration, Rowlands (1999) shows that governance affects migration. In particular, he detects a strong relationship between levels of corruption and migration as well as a weaker relationship between civic freedom and migration. In countries with limited civic freedom, migration increases with increasing liberalisation, while in countries with high levels of civic freedom, migration decreases with even more liberalisation.

## 4.3. Personal security, forced displacement and migration

Apart from economic security “perhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for people as their security from physical violence [, which is ...] increasingly threatened by sudden, unpredictable violence” (UNDP, 1994, p.30). Threats to personal security are main triggers of forced displacement.



### Spotlight 3: Personal Security and Migration

In 2015 there were more than 65 million forcibly displaced people worldwide with Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia being the top three countries of origin and Turkey, Pakistan and Lebanon being the top three hosting countries. These are the largest numbers since WWII (UNHCR, 2016).

Many studies identify conflicts as key determinants of migration, forced displacement, human trafficking and smuggling (Bales, 2011; Davenport et al 2003; Neumayer, 2005; Melander and Öberg, 2006; Moore and Shellman, 2004; Raleigh, 2011; Weiner, 1996). It is noteworthy that even in severe violent conflicts large parts of the population do not migrate despite all risks (Engel and Ib’anez, 2007; Williams, 2009). This can for instance be explained by individuals’ unwillingness to move considering the costs of migration (Williams, 2009) or by their inability to realise migration aspirations due to poverty (Raleigh, 2011). Migration in conflict situation depends on background characteristics such as economic, legal and social status as well as educational levels (Moore and Shellman, 2004; Raleigh, 2011; Williams, 2009). Williams (2009) puts emphasis on the fact that even in conflict situations, individuals consider the costs of migration and literally bet “their lives against their livelihoods” (p.93).

#### 4.4. Community security, forced displacement and migration

Having discussed the link between personal and political security and migration, one also needs to think about community security. Community security can be threatened by ethnic and religious differences, which can lead to violent conflict if they escalate and can therefore be considered drivers of forced displacement (Castles et al, 2014). Community security can also be threatened in case of political marginalisation, which is associated with economic disadvantages of the minority group and therefore leads to emigration (Neumayer, 2005; Radnitz, 2006). The literature examining community security as a driver for migration is scarce. There is, however, a big overlap with personal security, which is why implications for personal security aspects can also be referred to community security. Persecution of a particular social group in a state is an essential factor for community insecurity is more likely to lead to forced displacement and one of the reasons for which individuals can be granted refugee status based on the 1951 Geneva Convention.

#### 4.5. Environment security, forced displacement and migration



##### Spotlight 4: Environment Security and Migration

In 2014 more than 19.3 million people were displaced by disaster in 100 countries. 86.5% of people were displaced in Asia, 8.3% in the Americas and 4% in Oceania. Since 2008 an average of 26.4 million have been displaced by disasters each year. This is equivalent to roughly one person every second.<sup>5</sup> The consequences of climate change are expected to increase this number dramatically. Current estimates on future environmentally induced migration range from 25 million to 1 billion, with 200 million being cited most often (IOM, 2016).

Studying the linkages between environmental (in)security and migration is a rather recent phenomenon. Environmental insecurity can but does not necessarily increase various forms of migration in direct and indirect ways (Bates, 2002; Warner et al, 2010; Goría 1998; Gray and Bilsborrow, 2013, McGregor, 1994, Jonsson, 2010; Entwisle et al, 2016; Matthew, 2001; Vivekananda et al, 2014). The magnitude of this effect remains unclear. While some scholars find that environmental factors are key in explaining certain migration flows (Shrestha and Bhandari, 2007; Afifi, 2011; Barnett and Adger, 2007; Giori et al, 2014; Banerjee, Gerlitz and Hoermann, 2011), others argue that it plays only a secondary role (Goría, 1998; Warner et al, 2010). Environmental security is directly linked to economic security, particularly in developing countries where work and livelihoods of individuals depend on natural resources (Shrestha and Bhandari, 2007; Warner et al, 2010; Alscher, 2011; Afifi, 2010). For this reason, Afifi (2010) introduced the term “environmentally induced economic migration” (p.116). There is no data indicating how many environmentally induced economic migrants exist. It is clear, however, that numbers are increasing (IOM, 2016).

Disaster induced displacement is one of the main reasons for forced migration. Especially in poorer areas, where mitigation efforts are often absent or insufficient, climate change will have dramatic effects and will likely lead to large population displacements (Reuveny, 2007)<sup>12</sup>. Yet, more detailed information is still needed on how different “environmental stressors affect migration processes” (Renaud, et al. 2011, p. e24)

12 For an overview of climate change, environmental degradation and migration see Piguet (2010)

In addition, environmental insecurity can lead to violent conflict over resources threatening individuals' personal security and consequently leading to forced displacement (Barnett, 2003; Barnett and Adger, 2007). "Between 1965 and 1990 alone, 73 civil wars over resources occurred in which more than a thousand people a year died, and at least 18 international conflicts have been triggered by competition for resources since then. Many analysts also maintain that securing key resource interests was a key factor justifying intervention in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, as well as the invasion of Iraq in 2003" (STWR, 2014). Hence, the lack of environment security can contribute to the escalation of violent conflicts, which in turn lead to forced displacement.

On a different note, man-made environmental insecurities such as nuclear disasters and pollution have an impact on migration. As a consequence of the worst nuclear accidents to date, Chernobyl in the former Soviet Union in 1986, more than 300,000 individuals were displaced (UN News Centre, 2011).

#### 4.6. Food security, forced displacement and migration



##### Spotlight 5: Food Security

According to the World Food Programme (2016), 795 million people worldwide are food insecure, implying that more than 11 per cent of the world's population cannot lead a healthy and active life due to food insecurity. "Hunger and malnutrition are in fact the number one risk to health worldwide – greater than AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis combined" (WFP, 2016).

In many parts of the world, particularly in developing countries, food security remains a problem (Baro and Deubel, 2006). According to the World Food Programme, most hungry people live in Asia, while in Sub-Saharan Africa the share of hungry people compared to the total population is the highest (WFP, 2016b). One needs to distinguish between food security shocks and chronic food insecurity (Crush, 2013). Most often food insecurity results from droughts or conflicts (Baro and Deubel, 2006; Corbett, 1988; CARE International and UNU-EHS, 2014, Figueiredo Pereira de Faria et al, 2016).

Depending on the context, individuals apply various coping strategies including temporary or permanent migration (Baro and Deubel, 2006; Corbett 1988; CARE International and UNU-EHS, 2014, Crush, 2013; Figueiredo Pereira de Faria et al, 2016, Le Manach et al, 2012; Sherman, 2015; Murali and Afifi, 2013). Temporary labour migration of different household members is a common strategy for self-insurance against food insecurity (Crush, 2013, Corbett, 1988, Ellis, 2003). There is no data available on how many migrants leave their home for this reason. Permanent migration or "distress migration" as response to food insecurity seems to be the last resort, when other coping strategies have failed (Corbett, 1988; Le Manach, 2012).

In addition, it is noteworthy that food insecurity can also arise as a consequence of migration (Crush, 2013; Pendleton, Crush and Nickanor, 2014; Doocy et al, 2011). Several authors point out that migrants can have difficulties in accessing food in urban contexts (Crush, 2013; Pendleton, Crush and Nickanor, 2014).



### 4.7. Health security and migration

Having discussed the relationships between migration and environment security as well as food security respectively, it seems obvious that health issues, which can emerge for instance from environment and food insecurities, are push-factors for migration too. Malnutrition as a consequence of food insecurity and consequences of environment insecurity can be seen as a health risks (Baro and Deubel, 2006; Corbett, 1988; McMichael et al, 2012). Some studies point to the fact that migration can actually lead to improved health outcomes (McMichael et al, 2012; Stillman et al, 2009). Giles and Mu (2007) find that Chinese adults are more likely to become labour migrants when their parents are sick. In addition, Rowlands (1999) detects a negative relationship between access to doctors and migration. Moreover, there's a phenomenon of mobility for better access to or more affordable health care, so-called cross-border care options. An example for this are US citizens going to Mexico for medical treatments because of lower costs (Miller-Thayer, 2010). Health insecurity is overall more likely to lead to voluntary migration.

### 4.8. Summary

All in all, threats to human security can, but do not necessarily have to, lead to various forms of migration including temporary and permanent migration, regular and irregular migration, as well as forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement. The description of the individual components and their effects on migration flows shows that all of them are highly related. In developing countries particularly various human insecurities come together, putting their populations at risks and increasing the likelihood of migration and forced displacement (Raleigh, 2011). The literature review highlights that threats to food, health, environment, personal, community and political securities ultimately affect individuals' economic security. Therefore, economic insecurity is often identified as a main factor influencing the migration decision even though other factors play a role as well (Radnitz, 2006; Rowlands, 1999; Shrestha and Bhandari, 2007; Warner et al, 2010; Alscher, 2011; Afifi, 2010). In addition, it is crucial to always consider the context of the specific situation when interpreting the relationship between human security and migration and forced displacement (Alscher, 2011; Jonsson, 2010; De Haan et al, 2010). Besides, migration outcomes can vary depending on various background variables, including age, gender, educational level and socioeconomic status (Castles et al, 2014).

Keeping in mind that in 2015 only 3.3 per cent of the world's population lived outside their home countries (UNFPA, n.d.), it seems that most individuals if possible prefer to remain living in their home regions despite all risks, disadvantages and lack of opportunities (De Haas, 2014; Engel and Ibáñez, 2007; Williams, 2009). This is referred to as "voluntary immobility" (De Haas, 2014, p.26) or the "home preference" (De Haas, 2011, p.21). This phenomenon explains why migration rates are considerably low considering world-wide inequalities and risks to human security. It should not be confused with "involuntary immobility" (Carling & Talleraas, 2016, p.10), a situation in which individuals have migration aspirations but do not have the means to realise those. This applies for a considerably large part of the world's population. According to Gallup research, 15 per cent of the adult population has permanent international migration aspirations (Esipova, Ray & Srinivasan, 2011).

## 5. Is Corruption an Underestimated Driver of Migration and Forced Displacement?

As section 4 shows, a vast array of push- and pull-factors for migration (De Haas, 2007) and causes for forced displacement have been identified over the years. Considering the importance of political and economic factors among those push-factors (Hatton & Williamson, 2003), it is surprising that institutional quality has only recently come more to the centre of attention. Karemera et al. (2000) find that economic and civil freedom in the home country impact migration to the US and Nejad and Young (2015) argue that both low and highly-skilled migrants find higher economic freedoms in the destination country attractive, which also confirms earlier findings by Ashby (2010). Another aspect of institutions that has recently been included in the study of push-factors is gender equality (Baudassé & Bazillier, 2014), discrimination against women in social institutions (Ferrant & Tuccio, 2015) and the provision of women's rights (Naghsh Nejad, 2012). Yet, while it is an essential aspect of the study of institutions, there is still very little explicit research on the relationship between corruption, forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement. The role corruption can play as a cause of migration is likely multi-layered. While there can be a direct link, for instance people migrating because of their experience with or opposition to corruption, many ways corruption leads to migration and forced displacement are likely more indirect. This section will first discuss the scarce existing literature on the relationship between corruption and migration and secondly will develop a first analytical framework displaying the direct and indirect ways corruption can be a driver of migration and cause of forced displacement.

### 5.1. Corruption and migration – what do we know?<sup>13</sup>

Only few scholars until now have considered the relationship between corruption and migration in more detail and their research can be broadly divided into three parts: First, it examines how corruption influences the decision of individuals to migrate. Second, it analyses how corruption facilitates (irregular) migration, including human trafficking and smuggling. Third, several studies investigate how migration and the sending of remittances influences levels of corruption in the country of origin. The following sections briefly summarise the most important findings regarding all three strands of the existing literature to provide a comprehensive picture of what we know about the relationship between corruption and migration. In doing so, it focuses on corruption as driver of migration and forced displacement, the focus of this report.

Looking at the first strand of literature, which examines how corruption influences the migration decision, several studies find that perceived and actually experienced corruption leads to migration in general and to highly-skilled migration in particular (Ahmad & Arjumand, 2015; Ariu & Squicciarini, 2013; Clausen, Kraay, & Nyiri, 2011; Cooray & Schneider, 2015; Dimant, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2013; Lapshyna, 2014; Morano Foadi, 2006; Poprawe, 2015; Rowlands, 1999; Schneider, 2015; Wheatland, 2015). This is because corruption affects the deterioration of institutions, the confidence in public institutions, economic security and opportunities, and the general quality of life. It is assumed that highly-skilled individuals are more likely to migrate compared to other groups because corruption diminishes the returns to education (Ariu & Squicciarini, 2013; Dimant et al., 2013; Schneider, 2015). Migration flows of highly-skilled individuals increase with increasing levels of

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<sup>13</sup> A comprehensive overview of existing studies analysing the relationship between corruption and (irregular) migration can be found in Annex III.

corruption (Schneider, 2015). Conversely, in the case of less skilled individuals with middle and low income, the effect of corruption diminishes once a certain level of corruption is reached. A possible explanation for this is that above a certain level of corruption the inequality differences get so high that these individuals cannot afford to migrate (Cooray and Schneider, 2015; Schneider, 2015). As discussed earlier, migration occurs when the benefits of migration exceed the costs. Corruption puts an additional financial burden on people which lowers their return on labour in the home country and therefore directly incentivizes them to move to lower corruption countries (Poprawe, 2015). Corruption does not only affect migration flows from developing but also from developed countries such as Italy (Foadi, 2006). Brain drain may have severe consequences for the development of origin countries and can lead to a vicious circle of corruption and emigration (Ahmad and Arjumand, 2016; Ariu and Squicciarini, 2013; Lapshyna, 2014, Schneider, 2015; Yusuf, 2012).

The second important strand of existing literature views corruption as direct facilitator of (irregular) migration and explores the linkages between corruption, human trafficking and smuggling. Empirical evidence shows that corruption is correlated with organised crime, including human trafficking as well as smuggling (Bales, 2011; Carling, 2006; Richards, 2004; Rusev, 2013; Shelley, 2014; Skrivankova et al, 2011; Turbibile, 2011; Uddin, 2014; UNODC, 2011). Human trafficking is defined as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation [... including] the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UNODC, 2004, Annex II). Corruption directly facilitates human trafficking and increases risks for migrant workers by threatening their human security (Richards, 2004; Rusev, 2013; Shelley, 2014, Uddin, 2014). Women and girls are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims (Castles et al, 2014). Mahmoud and Trebesch (2010) find that the risk of becoming a victim of human trafficking in regions with large (irregular) emigration rates including human smuggling.

Human trafficking and smuggling are often confused but are distinctly different. The latter is defined as “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (UNODC, 2004). Hence, the person is willing to participate in the irregular migration process (Shelley, 2014). Persons who make use of the services of smugglers can be both voluntary and forced migrants who are unable to move to the destination country legally (Castles et al, 2014). Nevertheless, both smuggling and trafficking directly depend on corrupt practices guaranteeing the success of the irregular migration process. It may include bribing “travel agencies, border guards, customs officials, consular officers and other diplomatic personal (Shelley, 2014). According to Rusev (2013), border guard corruption depends on power, type and size of border crossing points, the age of officials and income. In many cases the distinction between smuggling and trafficking is blurred since victims of trafficking are assumed to have a limited amount of agency, while clients of smugglers can be exploited as well. Both human smuggling and trafficking are assumed to increase with stricter migration policies and border controls as do fees for smugglers (Castles et al, 2014). In order to reduce trafficking and smuggling in human beings it is not only important to reduce corruption in origin, but also in transit and destination countries (Bales, 2011; Rusev, 2013; Shelley, 2014). In addition, more legal channels for migration need to be developed and migration pressures reduced (Carling, 2016).

The third strand of literature discusses the effect of migration from countries with high levels of corruption on both the origin and destination country. Studies find that effects depend on cultural norms, law enforcement and time spent in the host country (Barr & Serra, 2010; Fisman & Miguel, 2007). Empirical evidence suggests that migrants from countries with high levels of corruption are more likely to be apprehended than others (Buzurukov and Lee, 2014). In addition, Dimant, Krieger and Redlin (2015) find that migration from corrupt countries increases corruption levels of the host country. Hence, not only individuals but also corrupt (and possibly other illegal) practices seem to migrate.

Regarding the effect of migration on the country of origin, empirical evidence suggests that international migration decreases levels of corruption in the country of origin (Batista & Vicente, 2011; Beine & Sekkat, 2013; Ferreras, 2013; Mahmoud, Rapoport, Steinmayr & Trebesch, 2014). International migration increases the demand for improved political accountability (Batista and Vicente, 2011) and the quality of institutions (Beine and Sekkat, 2013). Mahmoud et al. (2014) find that migration from Moldova to Western Europe for instance decreases migrants' tolerance regarding corruption. In addition, they try to persuade friends and family members still living in Moldova not to use corrupt practices and support political parties, which intend to fight corruption. Ferreras (2013) finds that receiving tertiary education abroad in less corrupt countries reduces corruption in the home country of the student. This is in line with Spilimbergo's (2009) finding that students educated abroad in democratic countries foster democracy in the home countries. In contrast, corruption levels can increase if students are not sent abroad for tertiary education as a consequence of isolation. The effect of international migration on corruption levels in the home country depends on the quality of governance in the host country and the skill level of the migrant (Batista & Vicente, 2011; Beine & Sekkat, 2011). The effect of international migration is, however, not necessarily positive. Li and McHale (2006) for instance identify that emigration has a positive effect on political institutions but a negative effect on economic institutions.

Finally, it is important to look at the effect of remittances on corruption levels in the home country. Abdih et al. (2012) argue that remittance receipt lowers institutional quality, including control of corruption and Berdiev et al. (2013) confirm that remittance receipt leads to higher corruption levels especially in non-OECD countries. In contrast, a study on Mexico finds that remittance receipt leads to higher government accountability and lower corruption levels in the receiving country (Tyburski, 2012). In a follow up study on multiple countries, Tyburski (2014) confirms this finding and stresses that the effect depends on characteristics of the home country, such as regime type and institutional quality. Ivlevs and King (2014) identify that remittance receivers are more likely to be asked for bribes but at the same time having family members abroad reduces the likelihood to actually having to pay a bribe.

Having reviewed the existing literature on the links between corruption, migration and forced displacement, it becomes clear that it is a highly complex and versatile relationship that requires further investigation. This study contributes to the existing literature by identifying how corruption serves as a direct and indirect push-factor for voluntary and forced migration and driver of forced displacement. As discussed earlier, human insecurities can lead to migration and forced displacement. For the remainder of this section, the impact of corruption on the seven components of human security and possible ways in which corruption can thereby directly and indirectly lead to migration and forced displacement are discussed. It is beyond the scope of this research to study how corruption facilitates (irregular) migration and how international migration and remittances influence corruption levels in both the home and host country.

## 5.2. Corruption as a push-factor for migration and driver of forced displacement: developing a conceptual framework

This review of the literature indicates that there are links between corruption, migration and forced displacement; however, until now there has been no attempt to create a comprehensive framework on the role corruption plays as a push-factor for voluntary and forced migration and as a cause of forced displacement. This section presents a first framework encompassing different ways in which corruption can be a driver of the decision to migrate or a cause of forced displacement.

The framework is based on two main aspects: First, it uses the human security concept, an approach which puts the individual at the centre of analysis, but also includes societal and household factors in the reasoning (section ). Since including micro, meso and macro factors is an essential aspect for understanding an individual's decision to migrate (Castles et al., 2014) and the reasons for forced displacement this is a useful tool. Secondly, the effects of corruption on an individual can be direct and indirect. A direct effect can be any event where an individual is directly participating in a corrupt act, from being asked to pay a bribe to receive a government service to sexual extortion. However, equally important are the indirect effects corruption can have, since a corrupt act does not only affect the parties involved but "its externalities usually *indirectly* affect third parties, including the general population, taxpayers, specific professions, or communities" (Boehm & Sierra, 2015, p. 2). Therefore, we also need to analyse the role of corruption as a driver of migration and forced displacement from two perspectives: direct and indirect. It is important to keep in mind that this framework is mapping all possible ways in which corruption can be a push factor of migration or a driver of forced displacement. To determine which of the pathways is applicable for a specific context further research is needed.

### 5.2.1. Corruption and migration – direct links

Only a small fraction of the already scarce literature indicates corruption as a direct push-factor of migration. As a direct driver, some initial large n-studies confirm that higher levels of corruption in a country increase the likelihood of labour migration: Cooray & Schneider's (2015) find that the highly-skilled are more likely to leave countries with higher levels of corruption and similarly Poprawe (2015) finds corruption to be a direct push-factor for migration. Focusing on the case study of Ukraine, Lapshyna (2014) also confirms that corruption is a driver of migration desires to lower corruption countries.

Yet, these studies also argue that the exact relationship is not clear and that while corruption itself can be a strong push-factor for migration it is also necessary to have a more thorough understanding of the underlying mechanisms and the indirect ways that corruption can push people to migrate. Unfortunately, existing data is not sufficient to determining if and which role corruption itself plays in the migration decision. No surveys or qualitative studies have been conducted until now to ask to what extent corruption played a role in the decision to migrate, therefore voluntary migration. The expert interviews conducted for this report also exposed some doubt if corruption as a direct push-factor for migration plays a big role. As one expert put it: "Corruption is an enabling factor for people to leave. Corruption is an enabling factor for economic decline, it is an enabling factor for conflict and you can even say it is an enabling factor for climate change - but very few people say 'I have had it with this corruption stuff I will pack my bags and leave [...]' (interview 17). Yet some possible examples were identified which should be explored in more detail in future research: One example that came up as a possible direct linkage during multiple interviews was 'tiredness of the unfair system'. Some people

might make the final decision to migrate because they are fed up with the system that treats them unfairly and corruption can be one of the indicators that people connect to an unfair system. Another reason that corruption might be a direct push-factor for migration that has been suggested is for small business owners. Here the burden of corruption might become so large that they see no other possibility than leaving the country. Yet, all interviewees agreed that corruption only in rare cases should be considered a direct driver of voluntary migration, but it plays a large role when looking at the indirect causes for migration and forced displacement.

### 5.2.2. Corruption and migration – indirect links

To get an understanding of the possible indirect ways in which corruption might lead to the decision to migrate or cause forced displacement, the following sections will first review the literature on the impact of corruption on the seven human security dimensions. Then these findings will be linked to the drivers of migration and forced displacement identified in section 4. The impact of corruption will be mapped for each dimension and in a last step will be put together in a comprehensive framework. Each section includes a graphical representation of the main ways in which corruption impacts the decision to migrate or cause forced displacement as well as an overview over the most frequently found types of corruption for each human security dimension. The graphical representation is used to show relationships but the arrows should not be read as implying a positive or negative impact. Often it is not possible to make this distinction as the relationship depends on numerous other factors and can change over time. Migration for the framework is divided into voluntary and forced migration and forced displacement. However, often this distinction is not easy to make, e.g. while the existence of gender based violence in the society can lead to migration aspirations, a certain level of institutionalized violence against a group has to be reached to be a reason for forced displacement. Since the level of certain factors depends on the specific country context, the framework refers to “all migration”, i.e. depending on country context the factor can result in different forms of migration: forced and voluntary migration or forced displacement. The list of types of corruption is not exhaustive. They can be a guide for future case studies in identifying possible pathways. Where possible, the framework also indicates whether the factors are more likely to lead to voluntary migration or forced displacement although it is important to note that in most cases it can equally lead to both. This framework should be understood as a tool to create more in-depth country studies or larger scale data collections to show the precise links between corruption and migration.

#### 5.2.2.1. Corruption and economic security

Economic security is a multi-layered issue depending on many micro and macro level factors and corruption has been shown to have an impact on many of them. One of the first strands of corruption literature focused on the question of corruption and economic growth. Economic growth, usually measured in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is closely linked to overall development of a country. While economic growth can have negative externalities, it has been linked closely to poverty reduction, higher employment and other human development indicators (DFID, 2008). The discussion about the impact of corruption on economic growth develops around the ‘grease or sand the wheels’ debate (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). While some scholars argue that corruption can ‘grease the wheels’ of business (Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Leys, 1965; Méon & Weill, 2010) and therefore have a positive effect on economic growth, others find it to have a clear negative effect (Mauro, 1995; Ugur & Dasgupta, 2011). Even though there are indications that in some instances corruption might have a positive impact on growth, the majority of the literature agrees that corruption overall has a negative effect (Campos, Dimova, & Saleh, 2010; d’Agostino, Dunne, & Pieroni, 2016; Ugur, 2014). Research has



also shown that there are a multitude of mediating factors which affect the relationship of corruption and economic growth, which need to be examined to gain a clear picture of the economic situation of a country. One such important factor is institutions. The quality of state institutions as well as social arrangements, have a large direct impact on economic growth (Rodrik, 2004, pp.11ff). At the same time, the quality of institutions also impacts the effect of corruption. Therefore, De Vaal and Ebben (2011) point out that corruption can have a positive or negative effect on economic growth, depending on the current institutional setting and simply removing corruption without other institutional reforms might alter the 'web of formal and informal institutions' and therefore have a negative effect on economic growth (p.109). Mo (2001) on the other hand argues that corruption impacts economic growth via the channel of political instability, where corruption leads to lower political stability and lower political stability in return leads to less economic growth. Additionally, corruption has also been shown to be a transmission channel for other factors influencing the rule of law and therefore economic growth. Haggard and Tiede (2011) identify four causal mechanisms through which the rule of law (or lack thereof) influences economic growth: security of person, security of property and enforcement of contracts, checks on government and checks on corruption and government capture (p. 673). Annex IV gives a graphical overview over the relationship between corruption and economic growth. Which factors are most prominent in each country depends on the country context. Many countries with high levels of corruption will experience a mix of all of the factors, but with varying degrees and consequences. The lack of functioning state institutions and bureaucratic oversight can for example lead to a decreased ability of the state to collect taxes (Tanzi & Davoodi, 2000) and therefore a lack of public investment, which in return leads to lower economic growth (Gupta & Ogada, 2016). The impact of corruption on economic growth, including all the intermediary channels is a crucial factor in assessing the relationship between corruption and migration. While the lack of economic growth itself does not directly lead to the decision to migrate, a country's economic growth can play a major role as a push-factor for migration. This is also a good example to show the complicated relationship of the different factors discussed in this framework. Poor economic growth leads, among other things to a decrease in development levels and increased unemployment, which in turn are closely linked to the decision to migrate (GIZ, 2013). At the same time increases in the levels of development and economic growth have also been linked to increases in the desire to migrate (de Haas, 2012). This difficult causal relationship illustrates why the framework shows relationships without indicating if the impact is positive or negative. The precise relationship needs to be further explored using new data and country case studies.

A crucial relationship for development is the impact of corruption on income inequality and poverty. Many studies show that corruption does lead to higher inequality (Apergis, Dincer, & Payne, 2009; Foellmi & Oechslin, 2007; Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002; Uslaner, 2008) and also disproportionately affects the poor, by taking up a larger share of their income (Hunt & Laszlo, 2012; Justesen & Bjørnskov, 2014) and decreasing spending on public services (Gupta, Davoodi, & Tiongson, 2000), social expenditures (Croix & Delavallade, 2008; Delavallade, 2006) and also diverts funds away from projects and infrastructure that would help the poor (Lovei & McKechnie, 2000). As funds get diverted to projects that provide more opportunity to collect and hide bribes, such as big infrastructure projects (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), systems such as social security are underfunded.

Social security entails that states redistribute resources "across ages, classes, occupations and genders" (Lynch, 2004, p. 1) in the form of social programmes, including for example unemployment benefits and pensions. These programmes usually have very high monetary value (van Stolk & Tesliuc, 2010) and are therefore an 'interesting target' for corruption and leave those most vulnerable without protection. This lack of safety network is hypothesized to be a push-factor for migration, where family members leave to earn money abroad and remit it home (Ivakhnyuk, 2008).

Social security is not the only public good that cannot be properly provided within a corrupt system (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). Another sector that suffers tremendously from this distortion is education, both quality of and access to education. Education, however, is an essential aspect of economic security as it impacts both employment opportunities and future income. Corruption in the education sector is unfortunately not a rare phenomenon and plays a role on different levels, such as entrance exams and admission, raising grades, receiving government benefits and research falsification<sup>14</sup>. Corruption also lowers government spending in the education sector (Mauro, 1998). Using the case of Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson (2005) support this argument and show that implementing transparency measures, decreased the amount of funds diverted to private pockets and increased student enrolment and learning in Uganda. This does not only hamper educational success but corruption in the education sector also has a negative impact on the overall economic situation of the country. It lowers the quality of education, which in return lowers economic growth and decreases the economic rates of return to higher education (Heyneman, 2011, p. 19). A particularly problematic aspect of corruption in the education sector is ‘sextortion’ or the demanding of sexual favours, which makes school attendance especially difficult for girls (Leach, Dunne, & Salvi, 2014). Few studies have also taken into consideration the role that corruption plays in people moving abroad for education. Rębisz and Silkora (2016) found that one reason for Ukrainian students to leave the country to study abroad was the high level of corruption in Ukraine. Heyneman (2011) sums up why corruption in the education sector is especially problematic: “Systemic education corruption (that which is beyond a few individuals ‘behaving badly’) must be of concern because, more so than corruption in the police, customs service, or other areas, it contains both immoral and illegal elements, involves minors or young people, and damages the ability of education to serve a public good, most notably the selection of future leaders on fair and impartial basis [...]” (p.13). Some studies also indicate that corruption is among the factors that prevent students to return home upon the completion of their studies (Hazen & Alberts, 2006). Interviewees confirmed that corruption in the education sector is a major driver for young people to leave, both because the quality is low and because they cannot get access. They also agreed that this is an important factor since many are hesitant to return even upon completion of their studies and therefore corruption in the education sector is important to include into the analysis.

One of the most essential aspects of economic security is the role of employment. Research agrees that the poor will often not benefit from economic growth if they are not able to participate in functioning labour markets (Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009). In many developing countries, informal employment<sup>15</sup> or the shadow economy (Schneider, 2005)<sup>16</sup> is an essential part of creating employment (Dutta, Kar, & Roy, 2011), yet the effects of informal employment on the individual and society as a whole are often negative (Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009). The informal sector offers mixed benefits for workers, while some might see better opportunities than they would in the formal sector, for others it is a last resort to avoid unemployment (Günther & Launov, 2012) and often workers are facing precarious working conditions with “various risks – health, safety at work, loss of earnings – without adequate protection” (Jütting & de Laiglesia, 2009, p. 18). The informal sector is also closely linked to poverty, where participants in the informal sector are on average poorer and the lack of social protection makes the situation even more perilous (Timofeyev, 2012). Therefore, people might search for better employment opportunities and an escape from poverty by migrating. The thought that there is a connection between corruption and informality is not novel (e.g. Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Loba-

<sup>14</sup> For a detailed overview of types and perpetrators of education corruption see Heyneman (2011) and Heyneman et al. (2008)

<sup>15</sup> Informal employment entails both, informal employment in the informal sectors and informal employment in the formal sector (Hussmanns, 2004)

<sup>16</sup> For a more detailed survey see e.g. Schneider and Enste (2013)




ton, 2000; Johnson, Kaufmann, & Zoido-Lobaton, 1998). While the exact links have not finally been determined, research suggests that “corruption and informality complement each other and are jointly determined by several firm level as well as economy level variables” (Mishra & Ray, 2010, p. 22). Corruption can lead to the growth of the informal sector as costs of doing business in the formal sector (Dutta et al., 2011) as well as the time needed to set up businesses (Svensson, 2005) are increased through bribes that have to be paid to for example bureaucrats and regulators. Employment is not just affected in the shadow economy but also in the formal sectors. As discussed jobs are lost in the informal sector because firms move into the informal sector. Yet, also without this development corruption can negatively affect employment opportunities. Nepotism and patronage networks can exclude qualified individuals from employment both in the public and private sector. Nepotism in the private sector has not received wide spread attention in the academic debate, yet anecdotal evidence indicates that “nepotism is a well-established part of business culture” (Mulgan, 2000). Looking at the case of China, Wang (2013) finds that the lack or loss of a network can lead to significant earning losses. Another example is discussed by Foadi (2006), who finds that corruption (especially patronage and nepotism) are considered especially burdensome in Italian academia and leads to many academics searching for jobs outside of Italy. Nepotism and patronage are much better researched in the public sector and are a common concern in many bureaucracies. A lack of meritocratic recruitment has two effects on the economic security of individuals. First, it reduces the chances of qualified individuals to get employed. Second, it has drastic consequences for societal factors overall. Bureaucracies without meritocratic recruitment tend to have higher overall levels of corruption (Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2011) and overall worse bureaucratic performance (Rauch & Evans, 2000). This impacts not only service delivery, which as we discuss above influences education, poverty levels and inequality but also overall economic growth.

Large development interventions are especially prone to corruption (e.g. Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998): they are large enough to hide corrupt acts; they are unique enough to make estimates difficult; the involvement of government allows for discretion; many actors are involved and each of them allows for corrupt interactions; and the complexity of the projects allows to hide bribes, to only name a few (Locatelli et al., 2017, p.257). These projects, despite all their potential, can also often have negative social side-effects, where people have to be resettled and the new land that they are settled on often does not offer the same livelihood opportunities as the old home (Caspary, 2007). At the same time, as discussed above, weak bureaucratic structures allow public servants to use their discretion for their personal benefit: this might lead to incentives to execute more development interventions, regardless if they are useful or not. Additionally, money intended to compensate (forcibly) displaced populations can be skimmed through corruption and further decreases the economic security of the populations. While the immediate effects of development induced displacement are considered less serious than disaster induced or forced displacement, its outcomes are generally less reversible (Terminski, 2012). The loss of livelihoods and community people face as a consequence of disaster and development induced displacement is therefore almost always permanent and can lead to migration aspirations in the short and long term.

Overall the impact of corruption on economic security is multi-layered and very complex. At the same time, economic security is one of the major push-factors for migration. This research has identified several indirect effects of corruption on migration for economic reasons. The framework below shows the most prominent channels. These channels can vary in country contexts. As the expert interviews conducted for this report show, there are different ways through which corruption can lead to unemployment. One example could be that in many rural areas, money for infrastructure projects gets diverted into private pockets. The lack of infrastructure then leads to lack of trade and employment opportunities and which in return pushes people to migrate to find jobs elsewhere. Another example

could be that the cost of doing business in a region is so high because of the expected bribe payments for sustaining a business that entrepreneurs decide that they can no longer run their business and look for jobs elsewhere. The exact connections need to be considered in the individual country context. The framework presented below can be a tool to start this analysis.

Figure 3: Indirect Links between Corruption and Economic Security<sup>17</sup>



Many different forms of corruption can play a role in the economic security of an individual and again, which one is the most important for the decision to migrate is context specific. However, what this table shows, is that corruption at all levels can play a crucial role in decreasing economic security. This table should be understood as a starting point to analyse and identify different forms of corruption which play a role in the country studies.

<sup>17</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.

Table 4: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Economic Security

Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Education <sup>18</sup>	Bribery	Bribes payed for access to schools and universities
	Fraud	Paper and diploma mills
	Extortion	Sexual extortion for grades and promotion
	Favouritism	Recruitment based on friendship/group membership
	Embezzlement	Education funds diverted for personal gain
Employment	Nepotism/Patronage	Candidates are selected because of family/group ties rather than merit
	Bribery	Bribery and extortion drives businesses in the informal sector
	Extortion	
Social Security	Fraud	Money is stolen/diverted from the social programs
	Bribery	People without eligibility are granted benefits
	Clientelism/Patronage	Politicians gain support by benefiting certain groups
Bureaucratic Quality	Bribery	Benefits go to those who do not deserve it/those who deserve benefits have to pay an extra fee
	Nepotism/Patronage	Civil servants are not hired on merit/ services are provided to family and ethnic groups
	Fraud	Funds are diverted from public services to private interests

<sup>18</sup> Taken from Hallak and Poisson (Hallak & Poisson, 2007, p. 58)

### 5.2.2.2. Corruption and political security

Political security contains different aspects such as the level of democratic participation, protections against state repression and protection of human rights.

An integral part of political security and democratic processes is the participation of all groups in the process (OSCE/ODIHR, 2007). Corruption does not only subvert democratic checks and balances (McMillan & Zoido, 2004), but also hinders the political participation in a democratic environment. Corruption in electoral process has also been shown to be a serious problem and election fraud often results in violence (e.g. Kenya in 2007; Durojaye, 2010). Corruption is often rampant in young democracies, where politicians are seen as not credible and “high targeted spending, high rent seeking, and low levels of non-targeted good provision” are the norm (Keefer, 2007, p. 820). If the selection of leaders is not done based on merit but through other criteria such as corrupt acts, this can lead to significant economic losses (Klitgaard, 1986; Piñera & Selowsky, 1981) as discussed in section 5.2.2.1 for bureaucrats.

Bjarnegård (2013) further points out that clientelism itself severely restricts the political participation for different groups in the society (p.8). One very essential group is the participation of women. There is no shortage of empirical evidence finding that greater gender equality is associated with various desirable social outcomes. For example, giving women basic rights and entitlements has significant positive effects on economic development (Byrne, 1995, 1996; Sen, 2001). Researches find that societies with more equality and female political representation tend to have better human rights protection (Melander, 2005) and are less likely to engage in interstate (Caprioli, 2000; Caprioli & Boyer, 2001; Tessler & Warriner, 1997) and intrastate (Caprioli, 2005) violence. Both the lack of human rights protection and conflict are triggers of forced displacement.

A second aspect of political security that plays an important role is state legitimacy. In the context of migration this is an essential element as lack of state legitimacy is often linked directly to the emergence of violent conflict, one of the main causes of forced displacement.

State legitimacy plays an important role in the likelihood of conflict. Wimmer, Cederman and Min (2009) for example find that a high degree of ethnic exclusion, lowers political legitimacy of the state and therefore increases the probability of conflict. Corruption itself has also been shown to undermine the legitimacy of the government (Rose-Ackerman, 1996) and undermining the legitimacy of the state, may of itself also encourage citizens towards rebellion (Clausen et al., 2011), e.g. the ‘rose revolution’ in Georgia which has been strongly influenced by corruption allegations against the incumbent regime. In general four sources of state legitimacy can be identified: *input* or process as agreement upon procedures and law, *output* as the capacity to deliver services, *shared beliefs* and *international legitimacy* as the commonality of assumptions underpinning formal and informal structures and the state’s perception abroad (OECD, 2010).

Corruption and the continued popular legitimacy of the state can co-exist, they are not antithetical, as Dix, Hussmann and Walton (2012) exemplify in Liberia, Nepal and Columbia. However, Poskitt and Dufranc (2011) surveying the Balkans, Philippines and Zimbabwe using desk research and qualitative purposive samples found patronage accepted as the norm and corruption to buy off otherwise disaffected groups widely tolerated. Through access to patronage political elites and entrepreneurs determine the state’s de facto legitimacy by the extent to which they support and/or control it and it is when available rents, from whatever source, dry up that break-down occurs (Orre & Mathisen, 2008). When this is calibrated with levels of endemic social violence, the likelihood of recurring conflict is likely to increase because corruption often pre-dates and contributes to the initial conflict (Le Billon, 2008). Unless corruption is tackled at the peace-building stage, corrupt elites become entrenched, only exacerbating popular unrest.

Where action against corruption has been a platform for support in any movement of liberation but followed by non-application of anti-corruption laws (Le Billon, 2008) populist disenchantment can destabilize the regime. However, operating 'zero tolerance' strategies in fragile states is also seen as impractical, unrealistic and hypocritical (Orre & Mathisen, 2008) and likely to lead to renewal of conflict.

When power has not been entrusted by the entire population, including countries where 'democratic' elections have been held but manipulated to maintain elites in power, state legitimacy is inevitably compromised (Orre & Mathisen, 2008). Using Côte d'Ivoire as its example the DIIS Policy Brief explains how, when rents and spoils decreased, the neo-patrimonial system was no longer able to deliver to patronage receivers and consequently failed. External, non-culpable explanations may be offered, such as sanctions rather than predatory corruption as posing the threat to state survival, as in Zimbabwe (DiJohn, 2010; Poskitt & Dufranc, 2011).

Unless a governance system can be constructed that controls corruption, long-term legitimacy cannot be assured and recurring conflict will become endemic (Galtung & Tisné, 2009). Less corruption should build a stronger peace and less likelihood of degeneration into (re-)occurrence of conflict (Le Billon, 2008). Citing Afghanistan, Bosnia, Mozambique and Nicaragua, Orre and Mathisen (2008) demonstrate how, unless action is taken, corrupt elites may merely entrench themselves, establishing quasi-legitimate predatory structures that siphon funds. Both, Spector (2012) focusing on the case of Afghanistan and the OECD (2010) in a more general analysis come to the same conclusion, that aid donors in fragile states require a more pragmatic, sensitive and realistic assessment both of populist legitimacy and the relationship of contending elites with the state.

Furthermore, political participation of women is directly linked to state legitimacy, as a state can only have legitimacy if all groups are included in the political process (Thomas, 2005). In democracies both men and women perceive the government to be more democratically legitimate if a sufficient number of women is represented, since the proper representation of disadvantaged groups indicates that majority can trust their interests to be properly heard as well (Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). Yet, clientelistic networks in the political process keep women from participating and therefore have a negative effect on the well-being of citizens and state legitimacy.

In fragile states created from within colonially imposed arbitrary boundaries, clan or tribal affiliations may be opportunistically transmuted into corruption (Johnston, 2010), but the key to continued legitimacy is *output* driven. It is the extent to which the state is able to deliver long-term services, including law to the majority of its people, and in the short term to satisfy the demands of key position oligarchs.

In cases where states are so fragile, they can no longer deliver law. Alternative providers such as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Taliban in Afghanistan may step into the vacuum, increasing likelihood that conflict in form of civil war will recur. Alternatively, co-opting traditional power sources to the state but without deepening its dependence on patronage – corruption – is an extremely complex and difficult process, which the OECD Report (2010) terms *grounded legitimacy*, citing the Kgolala in Botswana and elders in Somaliland as examples helping to maintain stability.

In some instances, elites who dominate the country may have no vested interest in maintaining the state's legitimacy because it is not the source of their patronage and strengthening it could risk compromising their status and rents. Where funds are available, through control of exportable natural resources or collusion in external donor fund dissemination, the state has little value for them and so good governance leading to enhanced legitimacy is not wanted (Grindle, 2011).

However, as Orre and Mathisen (2008) acknowledge, failing to address the corruption issue enables corrupt elites to entrench themselves within the mechanisms of the state using it for their own ends,


compromising its governance and undermining its legitimacy for the population at large. Populist movements driven initially by an anti-corruption agenda, or co-opting this to political and/or religious movements (Anderson, 2011), have also required the state's military agency to defect from the regime and to shift its support to the popular, anti-corruption movement as in the 'Arab Spring' in Tunisia and Egypt (Lutterbeck, 2013). It may be possible to overthrow the regime, but a subsequent failure to 'deliver' generates cynicism and conflict within what had been, heretofore relatively stable states. Farzanegan and Witthun (2016) add an interesting nuance to the relationship of corruption and political stability. They find that corruption has an especially detrimental effect on political stability when the level of youth population is high. Lack of state legitimacy can lead to violent conflict and forced displacement or different levels of political instability. While certain levels of political instability might still be merely grounds for dissatisfaction and therefore voluntary migration, political instability escalating into violent conflict can lead to forced displacement.

In the context of political security, we must also take a look at the state institutions that are in charge of ensuring security of the people, the police. Policing is an essential cornerstone of democratic governance and police corruption undermines the trust in state institutions, can violate the state's monopoly of violence and decreases the protection of rights (Transparency International UK, 2012). The police is also the very institution that is supposed to control corruption (Seligson, 2006) and which citizens turn to with safety concerns (Marenin, 1996), which makes its behaviour even more important. This institutional importance and specific properties of police work warrant a closer look at what police corruption entails. Police corruption is defined as "an officer knowingly doing or not doing something that is against his or her duty for some form of financial or material gain or promise of such gain" (Punch, 2009, p. 18). Police work is inherently an ethical issue where the line between corrupt and non-corrupt behaviour is sometimes difficult to draw and depends largely on circumstances and the nature of the observed conduct (Newburn, 2015). Conduct can be corrupt even if it is not illegal and sometimes illegal means might be employed to achieve legitimate outcomes (Punch, 1985). For the purpose of this paper, we follow Kleinig's (1996) definition where "[p]olice officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private or departmental/divisional advantage" (p.166).<sup>19</sup> For police corruption it is especially obvious that it encompasses both receiving bribes from those that should be facing punishment as well as extorting payments from the innocent (J. C. Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2008). Police corruption can be related to migration in several ways. For one it can be a push-factor for voluntary migration. As discussed above, repeated interactions with corrupt officials such as police officers can lead to a feeling of unfairness of the system, which might lead to people deciding to look for opportunities in other countries. In its worse form corruption can also lead to forced displacement. When human rights are not protected and police violence is rampant people can be forced to leave because of danger to life and limb. This can be especially the case when police corruption and brutality target specific groups such as political opposition or religious, sexual and ethnic minorities. Also some forms of corruption, such as sexual extortion can force victims to leave the country. Closely linked is the problem of corruption in the judicial sector, which violates the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of people (Kumar, 2005, p. 418). The independence of the judiciary is the most fundamental cornerstone of the rule of law and corruption directly obstructs this independence (Dakolias & Thachuk, 2000). Gathii (2009) argues that poor and marginalized groups are especially vulnerable as they are most often denied access to a fair judicial system and safeguarding their basic rights is not in the (monetary) interest of a corrupt judiciary. Corruption therefore has an effect on the human rights protection of individuals and may lead to state sponsored violence, both factors, which are causes of forced displacement.

<sup>19</sup> For a more detailed discussion of definitional issues of police corruption see Newburn (2015), Punch (2009) and Kutnjak Ivkovic (2005)

The political security dimension plays an important role as a driver for migration and forced displacement. Most importantly, corruption frequently leads to political instability and a lack of protection of human rights, which are essential causes of forced displacement. Again, the framework here will have to be adapted to specific country contexts to determine more nuanced channels and different levels of political instability and state sponsored violence.

Figure 4: Indirect Links between Corruption and Political Security<sup>20</sup>



<sup>20</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.



Table 5: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Political Security

Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Police/Judiciary	Bribery	Bribing to avoid punishment; lack of access to judicial system
	Extortion	Extorting 'protection money'
Political Instability	Nepotism/Patronage	Elite networks control the state
	Elite Capture	Elite group dominates the state and abuses resources for their own gain.
	Fraud	State resources/resource rents are diverted for private gains
Political Participation	Clientelism/ Patronage	Women/minorities are excluded from political networks

### 5.2.2.3. Corruption and personal security

Lack of personal security, and especially fear of violence, is one of the most important causes of forced displacement. This includes violence from conflict, organized crime as well as state sponsored violence.

As discussed in section 5.2.2.2, political instability is one major cause of conflict and therefore considered a driver of forced displacement. Yet, this is not the only mechanism through which corruption can fuel violence from conflict. Corruption is also closely linked to arms trafficking. While there are different ways through which arms can enter the illicit trade<sup>21</sup>, one of the most important is corrupt officials who allow exports from or through a country that would normally be illegal or who sell government stockpiles that are not properly secured (Stohl, 2005). These actions are also directly linked to other organized crime activity, such as illicit narcotics trade and human trafficking where government officials have to be bribed to successfully traffic across the border (Holmes, 2010; Shelley, 2012). These criminal activities are also often intertwined with terrorist activities (both funding and weapons trade) (Shelley, 2004).

In addition, state agencies can be more actively involved in these criminal activities through so called 'state-sponsored protection rackets'<sup>22</sup>, which are complicated arrangements between law enforcement agencies and criminal groups to hide and/or protect criminal activity. These arrangements do not always lead to violence (Snyder & Duran-Martinez, 2009), but of course have negative effects on the personal security of citizens as they are exposed to criminal activity and cannot rely on the protection of the police. This type of corruption can also lead to giving criminal groups more authority. As the Small Arms Survey (2010) notes: "When officials in leadership positions or the armed forces conspire with gangs- whether through corruption or political opportunism – the gang becomes something other than a traditional gang. Indeed, the provenance of their small arms is a useful test of whether a

21 Stohl (2005) identifies 9 ways, the others are: violation of sanctions or embargos, lacking stockpile security, plundering of arsenals during periods of instability, arms are lost from government stockpiles, soldiers sell weapons, theft from legitimate owners, tax domestic laws, organizations produce their own weapons.

22 „[I]nformal institutions, through which public officials refrain from enforcing the law or, alternatively, enforce it selectively against the rivals of a criminal organization, in exchange for a share for the profits generated by the organization“ (Snyder & Duran-Martinez, 2009, p. 254).



group is a gang, a militia, a paramilitary organization, or something else. Patronage makes them similar to organizations such as many Afghan militias or the Colombian paramilitaries – semi-autonomous groups with connections to crime and the state [...]” (p.115).

State sponsored violence is another serious impediment for personal security. Groups in countries with corrupt police departments are often using torture as a way to extort money from citizens (Bohara, Mitchell, Nepal, & Raheem, 2008). Gilinskiy (2011) argues that torture can also be encouraged to increase the number of solved cases to give appearance of a more successful law enforcement agency. Again, citizens are even more vulnerable to this kind of violence during conflict, where Bohara et al.(2008) find that high levels of corruption and high level of state torture are often linked. This kind of violence will often lead to forced displacement, especially of political opposition or religious, ethnic or sexual minorities.

As discussed in section 5.2.2.2 police and judicial corruption are prominent in many countries and have detrimental effects. Even though research until now is sparse on the topic, we hypothesize that these are also linked to violence, not only through extortion but also by allowing for torture and hindering the prosecution of gendered violence.

Another important element of personal security that concerns mostly forced migrants and forcedly displaced individuals is humanitarian assistance. While humanitarian assistance is designed to alleviate suffering caused by among other things war and violence, corruption can prevent it from being effective. This can lead to further displacement of people because they do not get the help they need. Humanitarian assistance, often in the context of fragile and post-conflict situations, is an integral part of addressing various human insecurities and is not peculiar to a specific security dimension. The following remarks therefore equally apply to other human security dimensions such as environment, food and health security. Despite arguably noble intentions, corruption is as much an issue within humanitarian assistance as within any other industry and therefore humanitarian assistance is not always able to improve the personal, environment, health and food security of the individual. What makes humanitarian assistance particularly vulnerable to corrupt practices are its unique characteristics and unique contexts in which it is performed. This is also why it can be abused in many different ways, including different sectors, support functions and stages of the programme cycle (Ewins, Harvey, Savage, and Jacobs, 2006; Maxwell et al., 2008; Transparency International, 2016a).

Before defining different forms of corrupt practices in various areas of humanitarian assistance, it is important to better understand the unique character of humanitarian assistance. First, humanitarian assistance is required in fragile contexts including most often natural disasters or war and conflict in complex political environments. It is therefore important for aid agencies to act fast and quickly produce results because often human lives are in danger and donors as well as the media put additional pressure on aid agencies (Maxwell et al., 2008; Transparency International, 2016a). Adequate responses usually require an extensive scale-up of ongoing programmes, including financial and human resources. Taking action is further complicated because in emergency situations normal services and infrastructure are damaged or even completely destroyed. This oftentimes involves a weak rule of law, lack of transparency and accountability as well as asymmetric distribution of power and resources (Maxwell et al., 2008; Transparency International, 2016a). Furthermore, it has been established that humanitarian assistance is required in “disproportionately more corrupt countries” (Maxwell et al., 2008, p. 9). What makes this situation even more difficult for aid agencies is unfamiliarity with the local environment in which assistance is required, including cultural and social norms, values, standards and practices (Maxwell et al., 2008; Transparency International, 2016a). Locals may have a different understanding of corruption and even view certain corrupt practices as normal or appropriate (Ewins et al., 2006; Maxwell et al., 2008).

Hence, humanitarian assistance can be seen as a balancing act between quick action and control of correct practices, including the prevention of corruption. Its presence increases the opportunities and motivations for corrupt practices for instance as survival strategies (Maxwell et al., 2008).

It is therefore not surprising that the existing literature on corruption and humanitarian assistance identifies a number of different financial and non-financial forms of corruption, including bribery, extortion, patronage, nepotism, favouritism, cronyism and sextortion (Willitts-King and Harvey, 2005). It is important to note that the risks of corrupt practices depend on the context and needs to be analysed on a case by case basis even though similarities across different cases exist. Corruption risks may depend on the type of emergency, organizational characteristics of aid agencies (e.g. size, funding source, accountability mechanisms, human resources, familiarity with the local context and perceptions of beneficiaries), partner organisations, host governments and multi-level governance structures (to see how different contexts can lead to different effects of corruption, see for example a case study on Uganda (Bailey, 2008) and Afghanistan (Savage, Delesgues, Martinand Ulfat, 2007)


Corruption can occur in all programme sectors, including food and nutrition; water and sanitation; construction and shelter; cash transfer systems; health care and refugee and IDP camps and is therefore related to various aspects of human security. Particularly the management of the latter provides countless opportunities for corruption. Among these are access to camps, accommodating or reuniting family members and allowing temporary leave and subsequent return. It is both likely that officials request bribes and that refugees offer them for the implementation of regulations and/or for allowing non-compliance. In addition, corruption in the context of refugee camps may be used for food distribution, resettlement to third countries and non-investigation of domestic violence (Ewins, 2006).

Programme support functions vulnerable to corruption involve financial management, procurement, human resources, transport and asset management, and logistics and supply chain management (Ewins et al., 2006; Maxwell et al., 2008; Transparency International, 2016).

It has been identified that all parts of the programme cycle are at risk of corruption, including needs assessment; fund-raising; resource allocation; selection of partners; coordination among partners and other actors; as well as monitoring, evaluation and closure of programmes. According to Bailey (2008) the most problematic area is the targeting and registering of beneficiaries.

Costs of corruption can be devastating because hampering the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance programmes goes beyond mere economic losses, but may actually mean loss of human lives (Maxwell et al, 2008). Furthermore, corruption affects the quality and quantity of aid resources, increases costs of goods and services, and puts the reputation of aid agencies at risks (Maxwell et al., 2008; Transparency International, 2016a). This is also an area where more research from a gender perspective is needed. Women might be more vulnerable to sexual and other extortion and their physical security can be severely endangered.

Figure 5: Indirect Links between Corruption and Personal Security<sup>23</sup>



<sup>23</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.

Table 6: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Personal Security

Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Conflict	Nepotism/Patronage	Resources are diverted from certain groups
	Bribery	Border officials are bribed for arms smuggling
State Sponsored Violence	Extortion	Police uses (threats) of torture
Criminal Activity/Terrorism	Bribery	Officials are bribed to smuggle arms/drugs/humans
Gendered violence	Bribery	Law enforcement is bribed to not follow up on cases
	Sextortion	Women are extorted for sexual favours

#### 5.2.2.4. Corruption and community security

Ethnic and religious minorities often face threats to their community security. As discussed in sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 corruption can lead to marginalization of these groups both in the economic and political sphere. Existing economic networks often benefit a selected few or a certain ethnic or religious group and not society at large (Fisman, 2001) and corruption in the education and employment sector lead to even more economic and social inequality. This ethnic or religious discrimination and inequality can be considered as a push-factor for migration.



#### Spotlight 6: Corruption and Minorities

Roma in Ukraine still face discrimination in many different areas and still face violence. Access to health care and education is often difficult or the services are of lower quality and registration procedures can be difficult to obtain (OSCE/ODIHR, 2014). The problems are often exacerbated by corruption. As interviewees noted, Roma are especially vulnerable to be extorted to receive government services. Many Roma have also been displaced by the conflict in Ukraine which makes them even more vulnerable to discrimination and extortion. Such large-scale community insecurity can eventually lead to migration.

As previously discussed, this large inequality also leads to political instability as groups feel disadvantaged and are more likely to engage in violence and political upheaval. While in early studies the focus was mostly on income inequality (Alesina & Perotti, 1996), which could by itself not explain the emergence of conflict, the shift to a focus on horizontal inequality<sup>24</sup> (social, economic and other inequality) proves as a good predictor of social conflict (Gubler & Selway, 2012; Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014; Østby, 2008). In the context of community security, a focus must be on ethnic divisions.


<sup>24</sup> For a discussion of horizontal inequality see e.g. Stewart (Stewart, 2009)

Neudorfer and Theuerkauf (2014) find that corruption significantly increases the risk of ethnic conflict. They link this finding to the exclusiveness of ethnic networks, and the incentives in high corruption societies to secure benefits for the own ethnic group. The resulting violence from ethnic strifes can be identified as a push-factor for migration and trigger of forced displacement.

Corruption has also been linked to the facilitation of terrorism by weakening the defence sector because of the diversion of funds, bribery of law enforcement agencies and facilitating terrorism financing (OECD, 2016). Terrorism creates political instability (Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008), which as discussed in section 5.2.2.3 is a push-factor of migration but terrorism itself has also been clearly linked to emigration especially of the highly-skilled (Dreher, Krieger, & Meierrieks, 2011). State and non-state terrorism can also be a cause of forced displacement, when the level of terrorist activity gets too high that levels of violence reach similar levels as during active conflict (Schmid, 2016).

Corruption increases the possibilities for marginalization of certain societal groups and therefore also plays an important role in pushing people to migrate.

Figure 6: Indirect Links between Corruption and Community Security<sup>25</sup>



<sup>25</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.

Table 7: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Community Security

Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Ethnic/religious discrimination	Elite capture	Elite group diverts public funds for personal gain away from certain ethnic or religious group
Ethnic conflict <sup>26</sup>	Nepotism/Patronage	Elite networks control the state
	Elite Capture	Elite group dominates the state and abuses resources for their own gain.
	Fraud	State resources/resource rents are diverted for private gains
Terrorism	Bribery	Bribing border officials to smuggle goods and persons
	Bribery/extortion	Bribing or extorting law enforcement officials to avoid prosecution.

#### 5.2.2.5. Corruption and environmental security

Corruption has a clearly negative effect on environmental policy enforcement (Robbins, 2000) and stringency (Damania, Fredriksson, & List, 2003; López & Mitra, 2000; Pellegrini & Gerlagh, 2006). As all policies, environmental policies require oversight by bureaucrats. Therefore, these policies might lose effectiveness if the bureaucracy is very corrupt (Damania, 2002). This often leads to environmental degradation, which in turn affects the livelihoods of people. It is important to note that corruption also leads to higher death tolls of natural disasters (Kahn, 2005).


The use of natural resources in a country is severely impacted by corruption. For example, corruption is directly linked to illegal logging (Smith, Obidzinski, Subarudi, & Suramenggala, 2003), which leads to overexploitation of natural resources (Casson & Obidzinski, 2002) and impacts not only biodiversity but also the living environment. Illegal logging has also been linked to floods, landslides and forest fires. This overexploitation of natural resources and the resulting natural or man-made disasters such as oil or chemical spills are a major reason for forced migration worldwide.

The land sector is also often impacted by corruption, which does not only risk environmental security, but is at the same time closely linked to economic and food security. Bribery makes the transfer of land very costly and hampers the possibilities of protection of land (Transparency International, 2011). Also, disputes over land fuelled by nepotism and patronage can lead to conflicts between different (ethnic) groups. Conflict over resources has long been a major cause of instability across the world (Humphreys, 2005) and increasingly potential conflicts over fundamental resources such as water become a major concern (e.g. Jury & Vaux Jr., 2007) and a potential for forced displacement. As discussed in previous sections, corruption and bribery are also linked to pollution, where businesses can bribe their way out of environmental and safety standards. This has been supported by research analysis, where, for instance Welsch (2004) finds that the effect of corruption on the level of pollution is particularly strong in low income countries.

<sup>26</sup> Identical to forms of corruption leading to political instability

While corruption hampers environmental security, it will not always lead to migration. Yet, with increasing pollution, natural disasters and conflict over resources, other human security dimensions will also be affected, which will likely lead to migration. A factor where corruption plays a huge role in environmental disasters is disaster preparation. Funds that should be used for protection and preparation are funnelled into private pockets. “The millions of lives devastated by disasters is more often a consequence of bad man-made structures and policies, than the forces of mother nature”, said Jan Egeland (2015), Secretary General of NRC. “A flood is not in itself a disaster, the catastrophic consequences happen when people are neither prepared nor protected when it hits”.<sup>27</sup> Therefore, even if the disaster itself does not lead to migration, the lack of preparedness, which is often caused by corruption, will.

Figure 7: Indirect Links between Corruption and Environmental Security<sup>28</sup>



27 <http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201507-globalEstimates-2015/20150706-GE-2015Press-release-FINAL-v1.pdf>

28 In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.

Table 8: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Environmental Security


Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Environmental Degradation	Bribery	Avoiding environmental standards
	Fraud	Appropriating public resources for private gain
Resource Use	Nepotism	Appointing group members to oversight positions
	Bribery	Overfishing/illegal logging
	Fraud	Diverting funds for environmental protection to private pockets.

#### 5.2.2.6. Corruption and food security

Food security is a fundamental part of human security that is closely linked with other human security dimensions. It is rooted in “combinations of political instability, environmental marginality and economic powerlessness” (Vogel & Smith, 2002, p. 316). The paper has already discussed how political stability and economic security can be threatened by corruption and this has severe consequences on food security, both due to conflict and loss of economic income. Corruption has been clearly linked to malnutrition, where conflict and droughts take the livelihood of the poorest and has been identified among the most important factors that prevent proper policy responses to food shortages (Bain et al., 2013; Pulfrey, 2006). Once again society’s poorest suffer most from distortions in public service delivery. Repeatedly government corruption proves to be one of the major obstacles to food aid distribution including humanitarian assistance (Lee, 2004) (For a more detailed discussion on humanitarian assistance see section 4.3).

Lack of food security will often lead to migration. If it is not possible to move entire families, frequently one member will move to help out through remittance transfers (Pingali, Alinovi, & Sutton, 2005).



Figure 8: Indirect Links between Corruption and Food Security<sup>29</sup>

29 In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3

Table 9: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Food Security

Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Food	Fraud	Services get distorted for private gain
	Bribery	Food supply gets delivered to other people than those who it is aimed at
Humanitarian Assistance <sup>30</sup>	Nepotism/Patronage	Benefiting own group rather than most vulnerable
	Fraud	Fake NGO's fundraising

### 5.2.2.7. Corruption and health security



#### Spotlight 7: Corruption, Ebola and Migration

A recent example for a health crisis that led to migration is the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa in 2014, killing over 11000 people<sup>31</sup>. Corruption in the health sector in the years prior weakened the health care system and eroded the populations' trust in the system. Once Ebola broke out corruption also slowed down the response of the governments and reduced the ability to contain the disease (Dupuy & Divjak, 2015). In Sierra Leone, for example, one third of the Ebola budget has been mismanaged<sup>32</sup>. Even though there are no official numbers indicating the extent to which Ebola caused migration, the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (2014) identifies five patterns of displacement as result of the Ebola crisis: fleeing from the disease; fleeing from quarantine; fleeing in search for better health care; fleeing eviction and prejudices; and fleeing violence and rights abuses by security forces.

Corruption in the health sector can have a detrimental effect not only on the individual's but population health as a whole and can also be partially responsible for larger pandemics and the inability to control them. This in return can lead to major movement of people fleeing in search of better health.

While health security is not one of the main causes of migration it still should not be neglected as a possible root cause. A country's level of corruption is overall linked to lower levels of life expectancy, higher rates of child mortality and other health measures such as the subjective health feeling (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2011). Corruption overall increases the cost of health care as citizens have to pay an extra charge, when they need to bribe health care providers (Gupta et al., 2000) and as discussed in previous section, corruption in the bureaucracy funnels funds towards private gain away from public services such as health care facilities, equipment, supplies and personnel (Gathii, 2009, p. 174).

<sup>30</sup> For more information see also (Willitts-King & Harvey, 2005, p. 20)

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/case-counts.html>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/16/ebola-sierra-leone-budget-report>, <http://www.auditservice.gov.sl/report/assl-report-on-ebola-funds-management-may-oct-2014.pdf>

Savedoff and Hussmann (2006) identify several reasons why the health care sector is particularly vulnerable: uncertainty (about who gets sick and with what illness and what treatments are available), asymmetric information and a wide array of actors spread out over the whole country. As identified in section 4.7, having sick relatives is considered a push-factor for migration. Other health risks like malnutrition and humanitarian assistance have already been discussed in the section 5.2.2.3 on personal security.

One fundamental area of health security is access to clean water and sanitation, which would be one of the “most effective means to improve public health and save lives” (Montgomery & Elimelech, 2007, p. 17). Yet, many people in developing countries still do not have sufficient access to water. “The main problem in providing people with safer water is not a lack of technical solutions (dams, sewages, water cleaning stations, etc.) or natural supply of clean water. Instead the problem lies mostly in dysfunctional administrative institutions” (Holmberg & Rothstein, 2011, p. 533). As we have discussed with other public services, such as education or social security, corruption prevents delivery of clean water to those who need it (Davis, 2004). The water sector is particularly vulnerable to corrupt practices as it usually is a monopoly with management being often the sole responsibility of public authorities (Feuerstein et al., 2013). Its impact on society is dangerous since there is no substitute for water and people heavily depend on water services for drinking, sanitation, food, agriculture and energy (Feuerstein et al., 2013; Zinnbauer & Dobson, 2008). Transparency International dedicated its 2008 Global Corruption Report to the issue and emphasizes that fighting corruption in the water sector has become more urgent as it affects “economic and human development, the destruction of vital ecosystems, and the fuelling of social tension or even conflict over this essential resource” (Feuerstein et al., 2013, p. xxiii). One should stress that especially poor households suffer from this as “corruption significantly increases the cost of services” (Feuerstein et al., 2013) and deprives them of their already limited financial income. This can be considered a violation of the human right to water and negatively affects the services delivered, in terms of both quality and quantity. In addition, estimates suggest that the financial impact of corruption in the water sector is particularly high, which implies that a huge amount of money that should help for instance to improve the water infrastructure is lost. Furthermore, clientelism may prevent to allocate resources based on the peoples’ needs when it comes to improving water infrastructure for instance through building dams. Moreover, corruption in the water sector can negatively impact the environment, increase environmental degradation and increase pollution, for instance when thinking of illegal permits for discharging wastewater or excessive abstraction and use of water. Corruption, hence, undermines laws and regulations to protect the environment. These aspects increase the vulnerability of local populations even more (Feuerstein et al., 2013; Zinnbauer & Dobson, 2008). Increased environmental pollution (see section 5.2.2.5) is also related to corruption and leads to grave health risks.

Figure 9: Indirect Links between Corruption and Health Security<sup>33</sup>




Table 10: Most Frequent Types of Corruption Affecting Health Security

Area	Forms of Corruption	Example
Health care	Bribery	Extra charge for healthcare
	Fraud	Funds are diverted from the healthcare system towards private pockets
Water	Bribery	Officials in charge of oversight are bribed
	Fraud/Embezzlement	Funds for water infrastructure are diverted to private pockets


<sup>33</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.

<sup>34</sup> For a more detailed overview see Vian (2008, p. 85)

## 6. Theoretical framework explaining corruption as cause of migration and forced displacement – summary and research hypotheses

The theoretical framework shows how corruption can impact all areas of human security and therefore has many potential pathways to affect the development of migration aspirations and forced displacement. While the exact effects of corruption are highly context specific (e.g. Svensson, 2005; Xin & Rudel, 2004), this framework maps the indirect links corruption can have on voluntary and forced migration and forced displacement. The framework should be understood as a tool to analyse the link of corruption on migration for specific country contexts. As discussed, all aspects of human security are highly interconnected, and rarely will one single factor, independent of others create threats to human security and ultimately lead to migration and forced displacement.

Figure 10: Framework: The Indirect Effect of Corruption on Migration and Displacement<sup>35</sup>



<sup>35</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). All migration is used when the type of migration changes depending on level or context. The framework depicts the form of migration which is most frequently associated with the causal factor. For more information check section 2.3.

This framework maps some of the most important impacts of corruption on the decision to migrate. As research on this area progresses additional links can be added. The theoretical framework needs to be applied to different cases to test it empirically and to fill the theory with more concrete facts and data.

As shown above, research on the role corruption plays as cause of migration and displacement is still in its infancy. The framework developed in this paper should be used to analyse the relationship in more detail. To give a guide for future research the following research hypotheses have been formulated based on the framework and the discussions in the previous sections. This list includes hypotheses that can and will be tested with country case studies as well as those that need larger data collection efforts to be confirmed or rejected.

### **H1: Corruption can be a direct push-factor for voluntary migration.**

Interviews suggest that some people might decide to migrate because they are fed up with systemic corruption or principally oppose corrupt practices. This hypothesis needs to be tested in more detail as existing data cannot be used to answer this question. We suggest that this hypothesis will be best tested with interviews and/or surveys with migrants and those considering migration to examine what role corruption plays in their decision.

#### **H1.1: Corruption can be a direct push-factor for migration when one of the parties feels victimized by the corrupt act.**

One essential element for the interpretation of findings regarding corruption is the assessment of the nature of the relationship of the people involved in it (Bohn, 2013). Seligson (2002, 2006) argues that if the system would be fair and efficient there would be no option of offering or taking a bribe and that therefore one should always speak of victimization. However, this is not always the case, as Bohn (2013) argues studies have shown that often people actively seek out possibilities to corrupt officials to benefit from it (Heradstveit, 2001; You & Khagram, 2005). For police corruption this is especially obvious as it encompasses both receiving bribes from those that should be facing punishment as well as extorting payments from the innocent (J. C. Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2008). We hypothesize that only people who feel directly victimized by corruption will decide to migrate because of corruption.

### **H2: Corruption can be an indirect cause of forced and voluntary migration and forced displacement.**

The effects of corruption affect people even if they are not directly participating in corrupt acts. We therefore argue that many indirect effects of corruption play a role regarding migration and displacement. Using human security dimensions the framework suggests different pathways through which corruption will be a cause of migration and forced displacement. The previous sections have shown how human insecurities can lead to migration and how corruption can exacerbate human insecurities, thereby increasing migration flows. The final decision to migrate can be based on a combination of different threats to human security, while many of these will be strongly influenced by corruption.

### **H3: The effect of corruption on migration and displacement depends on the specific type of corruption.**

It is important to differentiate between different types of corruption such as bribery, fraud, extortion, embezzlement, nepotism, patronage and favouritism because their (direct or indirect) effect on migration and forced displacement can differ.

#### **H3.1. Systemic high-level corruption is an important indirect push-factor of migration.**

Systemic high-level corruption erodes state legitimacy and trust in the government. Continued exposure to corruption at all levels of the state can lead to a general tiredness of the system and therefore lead to migration aspirations.

### **H4: The effect of corruption on migration and displacement depends on the country context.**

The effect of corruption on migration needs to be analysed on a case by case basis as it is hypothesised that it can vary depending on the country context. It is possible that in certain countries with considerably high levels of corruption the effect on migration is relatively low when the impact is not felt negatively or large groups of people benefit from it. At the same time it might be that corruption is so rampant that people do not have any means left to migrate. It is therefore difficult to generalise the effect of corruption on migration across countries.

#### **H4.1. The effect of corruption on migration and displacement depends on the regime type.**

Tyburnski (2014) has shown that the relation between remittances and corruption and corruption levels depend on regime type. For instance, democratic governments are assumed to be less corrupt since the risk of political punishment is greater. Therefore, we hypothesise that the effect of corruption on migration depends on the regime type, implying that the effect of corruption on migration in democracies is less compared to the effect of corruption in autocratic regimes.

#### **H4.2. The effect of corruption on migration and displacement increases with decreasing institutional strength.**

High levels of corruption are often associated with weak institutions, which are limited in enforcing anti-corruption measures. Therefore, we hypothesise that the effect of corruption on migration depends on the strength of a country's institutions. More specifically, we expect the effect to increase with decreasing institutional strength because anti-corruption measures as well as measures to guarantee human security cannot be implemented effectively, which in turn is assumed to lead to migration aspirations.

The theoretical framework needs to be applied to a number of case studies to test the research hypotheses. Ideally, this should be done by using mixed methods, including qualitative and quantitative ones. In the second part of this report, the theoretical framework is applied to the cases of Mali and Ukraine. The effect of corruption on human security, migration and forced displacement is expected to differ since the country contexts differ significantly from each other.

## Part 2 – Case Studies

### 7. Case Study: Mali

#### 7.1. Introduction

The role corruption can play as a push-factor for migration and driver of displacement is still an understudied field and only few studies have considered corruption as a direct or indirect push-factor for voluntary migration. Part I of this study developed a framework to investigate corruption as a cause of voluntary and forced migration and forced displacement using a human security approach<sup>36</sup>. This part of the study applies the theoretical framework to the case of Mali in order to explore the links between corruption and migration and forced displacement in more detail. Specifically, it looks at forced displacement due to ongoing security issues in the country. The case study examines which forms of corruption are most prevalent and which sectors and institutions are mostly affected by corruption. Mali is an interesting case study for various reasons. Mali is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world, with endemic corruption in the public and private sector. In addition, it is a migrant sending country, in which migration as a livelihood strategy has been employed for centuries and therefore can be seen as a norm rather than an exception. Recent political developments and the outbreak of conflict in which corruption and human security issues played an important part (see spotlight 8) and led to an increase in forced displacement, make Mali a particularly interesting case study also for forced displacement.

This case study applies a qualitative methodology. Relevant data on both countries is gathered through desk research and expert interviews. Documents reviewed as part of the desk research include academic articles, grey literature (including reports published by governmental and non-governmental organisation), reports by investigative journalists, news articles, as well as legal and policy documents. It is noteworthy that the availability of relevant sources differed per case study. To complement the desk research, nine semi-structured expert interviews have been conducted between December 5, 2016 and December 15, 2016. Interview partners include academics, as well as representatives of international organisations, government organisations, NGOs and think tanks working in relevant fields related to corruption, migration, forced displacement and human security in general, in West Africa or in Mali specifically. They were selected based on the desk research, the research team's networks, and snowball sampling (a list of interview partners can be found in Annex III). All interviews were conducted remotely by means of Skype or telephone. The questionnaire (see Annex IV) is based on the desk research and theoretical framework. The interviews have been analysed and incorporated into the report. Due to the sensitivity of the topic interview partners are not quoted directly.

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36 In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). For more information check section 2.3.



Conducting interviews was subject to several limitations: first, the timing of the interviews, which were conducted at the end of the year, a period that is very busy for all possible interview partners. This is mirrored by the low response rate of 25 percent. In addition, there were technical limitations. In some cases, it was not possible to conduct scheduled interviews due to insufficient Internet and telephone connections.

This country study is structured as follows: first, it briefly provides background information including key facts on the country. Second, the corruption, migration and displacement situations in Mali are explored, including historical developments as well as an outline of the current situation, legislation and trends. Third, it applies the theoretical framework to the context of Mali, thereby exploring the relationship between corruption, migration and forced displacement in Mali using a human security approach. Fourth, it tests the hypotheses formulated during the first part of the study. Finally, it concludes and provides policy recommendations to address corruption as an indirect cause of migration and forced displacement.

## 7.2. Background information

Figure 11: Map of Mali



Source: CIA World Factbook (2016)

The Republic of Mali is a landlocked country in the West of Africa. In 2015, it had a population of almost 17.6 million, of which 39.9 per cent lived in urban areas. Its capital and at the same time largest city is Bamako with more than 2.5 million inhabitants.

The 2015 Human Development Report ranks Mali 179th of 188 countries, putting it in the low human development category. Mali is among the poorest countries in the world and has difficulties to improve its economic performance due to “physical insecurity, high population growth, corruption, weak infrastructure, and low levels of human capital” (CIA World Factbook, 2016, n.d.). Labour and exports heavily depend on the agricultural sector. Estimates suggest that Mali experiences increasing unemployment, from 8.1 per cent in 2014 to 30.0 per cent in 2015 (CIA World Factbook, 2016). In addition, a large part of the population is living below the national poverty line: most recent data from 2009 estimate that 43.5 per cent of the population lived in poverty (World Bank, 2016). Most of the poor Malian people live in rural areas where social services are hard to obtain and aid is difficult to access (UNDP, 2015). Official development assistance forms the most important source of financial capital, followed by personal remittance incomes.

Table 11: Development Indicators for Mali

Indicator	Mali
Surface Area, sq km <sup>b</sup>	1,240,192
Population (2015), millions <sup>b</sup>	17.6
Urban population (2015), % of total <sup>a</sup>	39.9
Human Development Index (2015) <sup>c</sup>	0.419
Country Rank, out of 188	179
Life expectancy at birth (2014) <sup>b</sup>	58.0
Unemployment (2015), % of labour force <sup>a</sup>	30.0
Poverty Headcount Ratio (2009), % of population <sup>b</sup>	43.6
GDP per capita (2015), USD <sup>b</sup>	744.3
Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2015), millions USD <sup>b</sup>	152.9
Official Development Assistance (net inflows, 2014), millions USD <sup>b</sup>	1,233.6
Personal Remittances Received (2015), millions USD <sup>b</sup>	894.5

Sources: <sup>a</sup>CIA World Factbook (2016); <sup>b</sup>World Bank (2016); <sup>c</sup>UNDP (2015)

In the 19th century Mali was colonized by the French. Following independence in 1959 Mali suffered from economic decline, droughts, rebellions and a military coup finally leading to a military dictatorship, which was ended in 1991 during the so-called March Revolution. This marked the beginning of Mali's democratic period. As a consequence of the Libyan Civil War in 2011, former Malian emigrants especially armed Tuareg returned to the north of Mali leading to the escalation of tensions which were present for decades already in 2012. Rebellions eventually led to the expulsion of the Malian military from the northern regions (Tombouctou, Kidal and Gao) and Islamic militant groups taking control

of the region. French military intervention upon the Malian government's request improved the situation. In June 2015, an internationally-mediated peace accord giving the Tuareg more autonomy over northern Mali was signed. However, the region remains fragile (Bøås & Torheim, 2013; CIA World Factbook, 2016; UNHCR, 2016a) Bøås and Torheim (2013) argue that "the events of 2012 unmasked Mali. What had been presented as showcase of democracy, good governance, and peace and reconciliation proved to be a mask for institutional weakness, mismanagement and the collusion between regional and national 'big man' interests that showed little if any respect for human security and development" (p.1290).

### 7.3. Corruption in Mali

#### 7.3.1. History

Corruption in Mali is endemic. The country has a "troubled past of mismanagement, corruption and abuse of Power" (Bøås & Torheim, 2013, p.1280). Some interviewees argue that certain forms of corruption are seen as normal and part of the Malian culture. Roots of corruption can be traced back to the time when Mali gained its independence in 1960. Since then the country has been very fragile due to dictatorships and weak governance. In addition, it has been periodically shaken by military coups, Tuareg rebellions, and droughts. As explained by spotlight 8 below, corruption also plays a part in explaining various Tuareg rebellions in Mali as well as the outbreak of the crisis in 2012 (Bøås, 2012; Bøås & Torheim, 2013, p.1280; Reitano & Shaw, 2015). Mali is a fragile, post-conflict state that remains vulnerable to political instability and conflict (USAID, 2015). It is still in transition after the state failure. The state administration has not yet reached all areas of the country. It is uncertain to state whether or not the current reforms will lead to improved governance.

#### 7.3.2. Current situation and trends

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index ranked Mali 95th out of 167 countries in 2015, at a value of 35/100 (Transparency International, 2015). However, this considerably "low ranking may not fully convey the degree to which corruption is rampant in Mali" (Washington, 2016, n.d.). Corruption in Mali covers all aspects of life. Existing literature and interviews show that there is hardly any sector or institution that can be excluded from this. As corruption assessments prove difficult based on objective counts, measures of perception or anti-corruption mechanisms are frequently used, providing results for Mali as displayed in the following tables and Annex

Corruption<sup>37</sup> is a systemic problem in Mali. Malians experience corruption especially among police officers, with 35 per cent of respondents indicating that they have paid a bribe, given a gift or done a service for police officers (Transparency International, 2015). Half of all respondents think that ordinary people can make a difference in fighting corruption, while a bit more than half of all respondents (56 %) believe that the government is not fighting corruption. The latter is confirmed by the interviews.

<sup>37</sup> "The abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain" (Norad, 2008, p.11) is considered the most appropriate definition of corruption in the context of development cooperation. The concept can be distinguished in political, grand or high-level corruption, which "involves political decision-makers" who abuse their political power for personal gain, and bureaucratic, petty or low-level corruption taking place in public administration (Amundsen, 1999).

Table 12: Global Corruption Barometer 2015 Mali

Indicator	Statistic
% of respondents reporting that the level of corruption in Mali has increased	0.30
% of respondents reporting to have paid a bribe, give a gift, or did a service for:	0.18
Public schools	0.07
Public hospitals	0.08
ID, voter's card, permit	0.22
Utilities	0.10
Police	0.35
% of respondents who state the government is NOT fighting corruption	0.56
% of respondents who think ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption	0.50

Sources: Transparency International (2015)

Table 13 shows that among respondents of the 2015 Global Corruption Barometer, the largest part (70%) perceives business executives as corrupt, followed by judges and magistrates (56%) and the police (53%). Traditional and religious leaders are perceived to be the least involved in corruption (13 %).

Table 13: Corruption in various institutions, Global Corruption Barometer 2015 Mali

Institutions	% of respondents who feel that [institutions] is involved in corruption
Business executives	0,70
Judges and magistrates	0,56
Police	0,53
Tax officials	0,46
Public sector average	0,45
Local councillors	0,44
Government officials	0,43
Members of Parliament	0,36
Traditional leaders	0,13
Religious leaders	0,13
President/Prime Minister	0.35

Sources: Transparency International (2015)

It is striking that perceptions of Malians and the content of the existing literature as well as outcomes of the interviews conducted do not seem to match. While perception indices indicate that the country is not doing too bad, interviews and the existing literature draw a more negative picture. A possible explanation for this is that Malians possibly do not perceive all forms of corruption as corruption because they are embedded in the all aspects of life. One interviewee put forward that the Malian population is “illiterate in terms of citizenry” which means that they do not know about their rights and obligations.

Interviewees identify bribery, embezzlement and nepotism as the most problematic forms of corruption. One should note that also many other forms of corruption are relevant in the case of Mali.

### Bribery

Bribery can occur in all aspects of life, for instance during routine administrative procedures including processes related to migration management (e.g. visa applications), when accessing social services and health care, when making contracts, carrying out investment projects, in public procurement, and many other occasions (US AID, 2014d; interviews). An important aspect that was mentioned by several interviewees is that the tax system is eroded because Malians bribe tax officials to not pay taxes. This lack of tax income also has negative development effects for the country.

### Nepotism

Nepotism is another form of corruption that has frequently been reported by interviewees as being particularly problematic in the case of Mali especially with regard to employment and the provision of social services. It can therefore directly and indirectly lead to voluntary migration. One interviewee states that “there are parts in Mali that do not even see nepotism as corruption [...] but a way of life”. Clientelism, favouritism and patronage play a similar role. According to one interviewee, the Malian population is not always able to distinguish between these different forms of corruption. Interviews could not establish a link between nepotism, violent conflict and forced migration.

### Embezzlement

Mali heavily depends on foreign aid as source of capital. In 2014, Mali was among the top 25 receiving countries of official development assistance and aid, with inflows of more than USD 1.2 billion (World Bank, 2016). Yet, the situation in the country does not seem to improve as aid does not always reach its targets, which is true particularly for the northern regions (IRIN, 2013). Indeed, there is evidence for embezzlement. For instance, the Auditor General announced in 2013 “that USD 100 million of public funds were embezzled, within 17 government entities, representing only 2 per cent of public entities” (US AID, 2014d, n.d.). Hence, one can assume that in reality even larger amounts of public resources are lost due to embezzlement. Embezzlement has been mentioned by most interviewees as one of the most common and problematic forms of corruption in Mali. An example that particularly attracted attention internationally is the scandal around the presidential aircraft purchased in 2014, where it was neither clear where the funding came from nor whether the purchase was really necessary (The Guardian, 2014). As a consequence, international donors blocked funding in order to sanction the government behaviour.

### Fight against corruption

Corruption is prohibited under the Malian penal code (US AID, 2014d) and the country follows a national anti-corruption strategy. International donors have supported the Malian government for many years; however, little progress has been made. In 2004, the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) has been introduced. The Auditor General is responsible for monitoring the performance and quality of public services and bodies and their regularity and fairness regarding revenue and expenditure as well as the evaluation of public policies. Indeed, several cases of political corruption have been identified and persecuted since the establishment of the OAG. Still, “[t]here is a general perception among the populace that while prosecution of minor economic crimes is routine, official corruption, particularly at the higher levels, goes largely unpunished” (US AID, 2014d, n.d.). This is confirmed by interviews stating that one institution to control corruption is simply not enough and that control mechanisms are insufficient.

An issue that was brought up by several interviewees are the apparent empty promises of the current president who had pledged to fight corruption. Interviewees generally agree that not much has happened even though 2014 had been declared the “Year of the fight against corruption”. Democratic interpellations have been introduced and are held every December 10 (World Law Day), where citizens have the opportunity to challenge the Malian government on any issue that has not been solved. At least one of our interviewees held a speech on this occasion. In addition, it has been made possible for citizens to file complaints against the Malian government on issues such as corruption. However, this measure is not considered very effective since according to interviewees it is not in the nature of the Malian people to bring their fellow human beings into trouble. Hence, there is a need for additional steps to be taken against corruption in Mali.

There are also efforts to fight corruption from NGOs. In particular, the work of Transparency International Mali is noteworthy. The organisation works on strengthening capacities of citizens, local and regional authorities, civil society organizations, political groups and parties, traditional, customary and religious authorities, the media and investigative journalists regarding corruption, transparency, integrity and good governance.

## 7.4. Migration and forced displacement in Mali

### 7.4.1. History

In Mali and West Africa in general, migratory movements, including seasonal and circular migration, have a centuries-old history and can be regarded a norm rather than an exception (Sauvain-Dugerdil, 2013). A joke commonly made by Malians, which underlines these traditions is that it was not Christopher Columbus, but a Malian who discovered America (interviews). Migration in Mali is key to lives, livelihoods and risk management in particular for nomads and pastoralists (De Haan, Brock and Coulibaly, 2002; IOM, 2013). Historically speaking, Mali is primarily a sending country (IOM, 2013). Among the most prominent push-factors explaining forced and voluntary migration flows from Mali and West Africa are insecurity, vulnerability, and droughts. Droughts are associated with an increase in temporary short-distance migration (Findley, 1994; Sauvain-Dugerdil, 2013). Recent conflicts in the North of the country and ongoing security issues are the main drivers of forced displacement. One should keep in mind, that migration is determined by an interplay of various complex factors (Castles et al. 2014; De Haan et al, 2002; interviews). Therefore, one should not regard migrants as passive individuals of their environment, but as agents applying a certain strategy. In addition, migration patterns are assumed to be influenced by household structures as well as resources and opportunities which are determined by local institutions (De Haan et al., 2002).

### 7.4.2. Current situation and trends

Mali remains primarily a sending country<sup>38</sup>. In 2015, 1,005,607 Malians resided abroad, with almost 90 per cent living in Africa, mainly Sub-Saharan Africa and the remaining 10 per cent living in developed countries (UN DESA, 2015). Of the ten most popular destination countries of Malian migrants all are in Africa, with the exception of France (see Table 3). France is the fourth most prominent destination country, which can be explained by colonial ties and the official language being French in both France and Mali. The fact that many Malians live in other Member States of ECOWAS is not surprising since ECOWAS citizens have the right to free movement within the region (Carling, 2016). According to the Malian government, numbers of Malian nationals living abroad are much higher: “[They] often [refer] to a figure of 4 to 4.5 million nationals abroad (between 25% and 30% of the total population), including 3.5 million in Africa and 2 to 2.5 million on Côte d’Ivoire alone” (UN, 2015, p.223). However, these numbers do not seem reliable (UN, 2015). According to IOM (2013) the main drivers of migration in Mali are economic and environmental factors. Main causes of forced displacement are conflicts and disputes (IOM, 2013). Voluntary international and rural-urban migration is most common among the parts of the population that are financially and socially better off (Sauvain-Dugerdil, 2013). This does not imply that this group of Malians cannot be forcibly displaced. In some cultural traditions in Mali, young men have to migrate as a rite of passage, before they are allowed to marry. During their time abroad they would build a sense of worth, and make enough money, to be able to settle in Mali upon return (Ballo, 2009). Also many Malian students go abroad. In 2006, 10 per cent of Malians enrolled in higher education were studying abroad. The numbers have doubled in comparison to Malians studying abroad in 2000 (IOM, 2013).

Table 14: Top 10 destinations of Malians in 2015

Destination country	Malian migrant stock	Share of Malians abroad
Côte d’Ivoire*	356,019	35.4
Nigeria*	160,967	16.0
Niger*	84,640	8.4
France	75,555	7.5
Guinea*	61,197	6.1
Mauritania	56,557	5.6
Burkina Faso*	43,815	4.3
Gabon	35,709	3.6
Congo	33,918	3.4
Senegal*	32,930	3.3
Total	941,307	93.6

\*Member States of ECOWAS

Sources: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015)

<sup>38</sup> Since Mali is mainly a sending and transit country, immigration to Mali is not discussed in this report.

In remote parts of Mali, youth migration, including female migration, increased since the 1990s, arguably becoming a norm. “[It] is part of a global trend toward modernization, characterized by giving up traditional clothing and handicraft and [...] by a fundamental shift towards individualization [affecting] intergenerational relationships and question[ing] traditional power systems and social institutions” (Sauvain-Dugerdil, 2013, p.172). This is an important indicator for this is the growing female responsibility for their family’s well-being in the light of diminished natural resources. Young men primarily migrate for economic reasons and young women in most cases migrate get to know the world outside their villages. While the community perceives male migration as useful as they bring back goods which everyone can benefit from (e.g., bikes), female migration is considered less useful since they bring back goods regarded as concerning the “female realm, for example kitchen tools” (Sauvain-Dugerdil, 2013, p.171). For young women, migration provides an opportunity for increased autonomy, at least for as long as they are away, because their everyday lives do not seem to change upon return. There is evidence suggesting that female migration is increasingly motivated by economic reasons as well (Sauvain-Dugerdil, 2013).

### Irregular migration


Mali is not only a sending country of migrants but also a prominent transit country for irregular migrants from other African countries who intend to cross the Sahara and whose primary destination is Europe (Carling, 2012; Rhipito, 2015). It is therefore important to discuss irregular migration here, despite the fact that most Malians move regularly within ECOWAS. One reason for this is that Mali is a member of ECOWAS, where often irregular migration starts “under the provision for free movement” (Carling, 2016). On their journey migrants frequently pass the Malian capital Bamako, in which “smuggling plays a marginal role” (Carling, 2016, p.29). The Malian city of Gao in contrast is virtually an irregular migration hub, which becomes increasingly important (Bøås, 2012). Its economy largely depends on human smuggling (Carling, 2016; Smith, 2015). For numerous irregular migrants from Mali, Congo, Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria and other countries (Bøås, 2012) “Gao is the last point of relatively safety before a six-day truck journey through the desert” (Smith, 2015, n.d.). Estimates suggest that around 900 irregular migrants per month travel through Gao, which arguably offers “one of the cheapest and shortest desert crossings” (Smith, 2015, n.d.). Other important Malian cities for the smuggling and trafficking business are Kigali, Tessalit and Menaka (Rhipito, 2015). It is not clear how many migrants die on their journeys or become victims of human trafficking or other forms of exploitation. What is known, however, are the various dangers of crossing the Sahara (Carling, 2016). Many irregular migrants who then actually make it to Europe, do apply for asylum. However, the majority of asylum applications from Western Africa are rejected and migrants consequently return to their home countries or remain residing in the destination country illegally (Carling, 2016; Frontex, 2016). Figure 12 provides an overview of the most important routes for various forms of smuggling and trafficking in human beings, drugs, arms and other goods, underlining the strategic importance of Mali for such movements.

### Persons of concern

The 2012 conflict in the north of Mali led to the forced displacement of more than 450,000 Malians, including more than 300,000 IDPs (UNHCR, n.d.). By the end of 2016, the number of persons of concern in Mali had decreased significantly. According to UNHCR (2016a) there were still 134,814 Malian Refugees and 36,690 IDPs (see Figure 2), while a large proportion of refugees (56,729) and IDPs (474,231) had returned to their homes. Most registered Malian refugees live in refugee camps close to the Malian border in neighbouring countries such as Niger (60,792), Mauritania (41,798) and Burkina Faso (32,224) (UNHCR, 2016a).




Figure 12: Trans-Sahara Trafficking



Source: Norwegian Center For Global Analysis, 2015

Figure 13: Refugees, Returnees and IDPs in Mali (as of September 30, 2016)



Source: UNHCR, 2016a

## 7.5. Corruption, human security, migration and displacement in Mali – Applying the theoretical framework

The following section applies the earlier developed theoretical framework on the direct and indirect links between corruption, migration and forced displacement, using a human security approach, to the case of Mali. Given that the existing literature on corruption, migration and forced displacement in Mali is scarce, the case study is mainly based on studies analysing Tuareg migration and rebellions in the region, reports by international organisations and NGOs, news articles and eight expert interviews. Most interviewees see indirect links between corruption, migration and forced displacement, and to a limited extent also direct links. Others argue that corruption is not sufficient in explaining migration and forced displacement from Mali and that its contributions are limited and that one should see migration aspirations as the product of many different factors.

### 7.5.1. Corruption as direct cause of migration and displacement

There are no studies analysing corruption as a direct push-factor for migration or driver of forced displacement in the case of Mali. According to anecdotal evidence, however, extortion by bandits and armed force which is common in the north of Mali partly explains why the numbers of Malian refugees in Niger rose even after the signing of the peace agreement in 2015 and why migrants are afraid to return to their homes (Dobbs, 2015). In addition, one interviewee describes Mali as a captured state, which in his view can be regarded as a form of corruption being a direct push-factor. Transparency International defines state capture as “[a] situation where powerful individuals, institutions, companies or groups within or outside a country use corruption to influence a nation’s policies, legal environment and economy to benefit their own private interests” (Transparency International, n.d.). State capture is associated with economic and social costs related to the provision of public goods, which are key for the development of the market economy (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann, 2003). Due to its nature it is difficult to find evidence for state capture. However, since various forms of corruption seem endemic to Mali and West Africa in general (Atuobi, 2007), state capture might indeed be an issue directly leading to migration. More research is necessary to establish whether or not Mali is a captured state and what direct impact this has on migration. Finally, one can argue that high levels of corruption within migration management can lead directly to irregular migration since not all potential migrants can afford to pay extra fees or bribes to obtain required travel documents and are therefore forced to move irregularly (Interviews).

### 7.5.2. Corruption as indirect cause of migration and displacement

Although the literature on the indirect relationship between migration, forced displacement and corruption in the case of Mali is scarce, inferences can be drawn between corruption, migration, displacement and all seven human security dimensions, especially the economic, personal and political dimension. Above all, dependency on foreign aid and embezzlement of such resources prevents necessary investments to improve the overall human security. This is true particularly for the northern part of the country.

#### 7.5.2.1. Economic security

Economic factors are among the main drivers of Malian migration (IOM, 2013). The theoretical framework applied here distinguishes between income, employment and education as the most important factors in relation to economic security. According to Diarra (2012) “[t]he high rate of corruption

in governmental services and the incapability of the government to address the basic social needs such as education, [...] and employment have created a general lack of trust in National Institutions” (p.22). It is therefore that many Malians seek opportunities abroad. Interviewees confirm that necessary investments are not being made.

### Income

Mali is among the poorest countries in the world and migration from Mali in many cases is a response to (chronic) poverty (Findley, 2004; Di Bartolomeo, Fakhoury & Perrin, 2010; IOM, 2013). Hence, economic insecurities play an important part in explaining Malian migration. Table 15 summarises relevant indicators of economic security.

Table 15: Indicators of Economic Security


Indicator	Statistic
<b>Employment</b>	
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (2014) <sup>a</sup>	60.7
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) <sup>b</sup>	30.0
<b>Income</b>	
GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) <sup>a</sup>	7,915.87 (2015)
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) <sup>a</sup>	7,810 (2015)
Average salary <sup>b</sup>	UAH 4,934 (2016); approximately USD 197
<b>Education</b>	
Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure (2014)	18.2
Government expenditure per tertiary student as % of GDP per capita (2012)	141.1

Sources: <sup>a</sup>World Bank (2016); <sup>b</sup>CIA World Factbook (2016); Table 15 summarises relevant indicators of economic security.

Interviews confirm that Malians look for a better (economic) future abroad. Despite overall declining rates of poverty in the country, 43.6 per cent of the population still lives below the national poverty line (World Bank, 2016). According to several interviewees the embezzlement of aid resources intended to reduce poverty partly explains why poverty remains among the main drivers of migration. Figure 4 shows the development of GDP, which grew from USD 2.68 billion in 1990 to USD 13.1 billion in 2015 at an average annual growth rate of 6.66 per cent (World Bank, 2016). According to the World Bank Global Economic Prospects (2016) GDP is expected to continue growing, however, at a slower pace. Similarly, GDP per capita grew significantly from USD 316.9 in 1990 to USD 744.3 in 2015. According to IMF (2015) estimates, corruption seriously impacts the Malian GDP level costing the country between 0.6 and 1.1 per cent of GDP per year. It is estimated that between 2007, when the country’s performance in controlling corruption was best, and 2013 the costs of corruption accounted for USD 85 million. If corruption controls had not deteriorated after 2007, the 2013 real GDP level could have been 2.7 per cent higher. If Mali’s performance in controlling corruption had “continued to improve along the trajectory it was following in the early 2000s, its corruption levels would have

reached the global average by 2013” (IMF, 2015, p.22), implying that real GDP would have been 4.6 per cent higher in 2013. According to these estimates, the costs of corruption for Mali account for more than USD 150 million between 2007 and 2013 (IMF, 2015). This shows that corruption impacts the Malian economy severely.

Figure 14: Developments of GDP and GDP per Capita



Another issue raised during interviews is the difficulty in accessing land, particularly for the younger and female population. As in many other aspects of daily life, it is likely that individuals are requested to pay bribes when trying to acquire land or that priority is given to family and friends. One interviewee also reported that officials sold the same plot to several people to gain more money. Access to land is one factor determining the wealth and income of the Malian population whose livelihoods largely depend on natural resources and agriculture. Households holding more land are usually better off (US AID, 2010; interviews). Hence, not having access to land can seriously affect the economic security of young Malians eventually leading to poverty and the motivation to migrate (interviews).

### Employment

In 2015, unemployment rates were estimated to be as high as 30 per cent (CIA World Factbook, 2016), and are assumed to affect the economic security of the Malian youth especially (Findley, 2004; Mali's News, 2016). Due to the high (youth) unemployment rates there are calls for introducing unemployment benefits, which so far do not exist (Mali's News, 2016). Having problems in finding employment in Mali is a second economic factor explaining international migration and why many migrants abroad are not willing to return to Mali (IOM, 2013; Laroze-Barrit, 2016; Michal & Absalon, 2016). Several interviewees argued that unemployment frequently leads to irregular migration because channels for regular migration are not available to the individual. Another factor that might play a role in this is the large informal sector. Additionally, unemployment makes individuals vulnerable to recruitment from armed groups (interview 1), which can fuel further conflict and therefore lead to forced displacement.

Interviewees report that in order to get a job in the public or private sector in Mali, one needs to have the right contacts. Hence, nepotism, clientelism and favouritism seriously affect the economic security of individuals in Mali and indirectly lead to migration. One interviewee even identified this as the most important issue causing migration motivations. This is confirmed by a study conducted by Dougnon et al. (2013) which stresses that “many young people and their parents find that [...] state institutions [...] are plagued by nepotism and clientelism” (p.27, translated by the author).




If one does not have the right contacts, another possibility to find a job is to “buy” contacts (interviews). Furthermore, bribes might be requested in order for individuals to participate in a recruitment test (interviews 1 & 7). In other cases, it is reported that recruiters demand a part of the employee’s salary to actually recruit them (interview 7). Not being able to find a job leads to frustration among the Malian population, particularly among younger generations. Levels of frustration are particularly high among the more educated, who despite having invested in education, cannot find work. In 2000, the emigration rate of the tertiary educated accounted for more than 14 per cent (World Bank, 2016). This considerably high numbers might be an indication that economic insecurity in Mali exacerbated by different forms of corruption particularly affect the highly-skilled, who are generally assumed to be more mobile. Unfortunately, more recent data is not available. There is a need to further back up this assumption with research. Beyond this nepotism, favouritism and clientelism are problematic because they prevent the recruitment of the most competent person for the job. Incompetent agents are more likely to continue with corrupt practices. This might explain why governance cannot be improved and a vicious circle develops (interviews). Furthermore, an interviewee reported that it is difficult for young Malians to start their own business because of a lack of funding opportunities. Arguably, it is necessary to pay bribes in order to obtain the necessary funding as bribes are considered relevant regarding the provision of any services in general. In addition, it is possible that potential entrepreneurs with the right contacts receive the necessary seed capital. Migration has been identified as a strategy to overcome such capital constraints. By accumulating capital abroad, individuals have more means to start their own business upon return (Dustmann & Kirchkamp (2002).

### Education

According to UNICEF (2009), “[t]he Government of Mali is committed to providing access to quality education for all children” (n.d.). Still, there are significant gender gaps (UNICEF, 2009). For instance, in 2015, 28.7 per cent of the male population older than 25 had at least completed primary education, compared to 16.1 per cent of the female population. Similarly, 16.2 and 8.9 per cent of the male population above 25 respectively had at least completed lower or upper secondary education, compared to only 7.3 and 3.5 per cent of the female population above 25 (World Bank, 2016). In addition, there are discrepancies between rural and urban areas (UNICEF, 2009). Access to education has been found to play a role in rural to urban migration (IOM, 2013). Human Rights Watch claims (2016a) that endemic corruption impacts access to education, which is in line with perceptions of interviewees, who argue that access to education depends on networks, status and financial resources. A 2009 study of the Education Policy and Data Centre (EPDC) indicates, however, that the dependency of school attendance on wealth declined significantly in Mali between 1990 and 2006. As figure 15 shows enrolment rates in primary and secondary education steadily increased since 1990, with enrolment rates in primary education being higher than enrolment rates in secondary education (World Bank, 2016). As a consequence of the 2012 conflict, enrolment rates in primary education dropped since children living in the northern parts of Mali did not have access to schools. This arguably makes them vulnerable to recruitment of extremist groups (Global Education Cluster, 2012). In fact, there is evidence that armed groups in the north did recruit child soldiers (HRW, 2015). Such recruitment can further fuel conflicts since it guarantees a continued supply of combatants and is therefore related to forced displacement. Hence, lack of access to education due to a combination of corruption and conflict can lead to forced displacement.


Figure 15: Enrolment Rates in Primary and Secondary Education, 1990-2014



Source: World Bank, 2016

Fraud and bribery are common at Malian universities, where “degrees [are] awarded in exchange for cash” (Diarra, 2014, n.d.). An interviewee reported that marks cannot only be bought with money, but also sexually. He called this acquisition “sexually transmitted marks”. Since this is known among employers, graduates from Malian universities have difficulties in finding employment. In addition, students need to study under unacceptable conditions including infrastructure problems such as overcrowded class rooms with insufficient and broken furnishings. Investments into the education sector fail to address these issues due to mismanagement of funds (Diarra, 2014). Figure 16 shows that between 2010 and 2014, the Malian government spent between 16.5 (2010) and 22.4 (2012) per cent of its total expenditure on education, with the smallest share (on average 21 %) of total government expenditure on education being invested in tertiary education. While in 2010 the largest share (53.8 %) was invested in secondary education, the government equally invested in primary and secondary education between 2011 and 2013. In 2014, with 43.2 per cent of total government expenditure on education, primary education was the priority (World Bank, 2016).

Figure 16: Government Expenditure on Education



Source: World Bank, 2016

Limited investments in education leading to unacceptable conditions and widespread corruption within the education system explain why many students migrate to study abroad mainly because national university degrees are less accepted since they were assumed to have been bought (interviews). At the same time the enrolment of international students at Malian higher education is considerably low. The number of Malians studying abroad is ten times higher than the number of internationals studying in Mali (UNESCO, 2012). The top five countries for Malian students studying abroad are France, the US, Saudi Arabia, Niger and Cuba (see Table 15). Another reason that might encourage Malians to study abroad is the fact that it is a way to build networks between Malians studying abroad. This might be helpful in finding employment upon return to the country since, as already mentioned nepotism, favouritism and clientelism play an important role in this (interview 2).

Another problem regarding corruption and education is according to interviewees that due to nepotism and favouritism unqualified teachers might be recruited, which severely affects the quality of education.

Table 16: Tertiary students by destination (2013)

Top 5 countries or areas of destination	Total
France	2,130
United States of America	472
Saudi Arabia	330
Niger	208
Cuba	106
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,246</b>

Source: UNESCO (2012)



### 7.5.2.2. Personal security

In Mali the personal security of the population very much depends on the region in which they live. In particular, in the northern regions individuals are vulnerable to threats of personal security as a consequence of the 2012 conflict and remaining tensions. One should note, however, that the tensions moved towards the centre of the country at the end of 2015 and the beginning of 2016 (Human Rights Watch, 2016b). Also in the rest of the country, the personal security is threatened due to the malfunctioning of law enforcement institutions.

#### Conflict

Conflict is the main threat to personal security and at the same time among the most important factors explaining forced displacement. Corruption plays a role in explaining conflicts and rebellions in Mali and therefore indirectly affects the personal security of the Malian population and indirectly leads to forced displacement. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion for instance is seen as a result of the Tuareg population feeling politically, socially and economically marginalised because they are not properly represented by national and local governments and because of the embezzlement of aid resources intended for the north of Mali where most Tuareg live (Bøås, 2012; Bøås and Torheim, 2013; Benjaminsen, 2008; Jalali, 2013; Reitano and Shaw, 2015). The conflict taking place in northern Mali led to the (temporary) displacement of more than 450,000 Malians, including more than 300,000 IDPs (UNHCR, n.d.). Today, there are still more than 135,000 Malians living in exile as a consequence of the 2012 rebellion and continued insecurity despite a peace agreement signed in June 2015 (UNHCR, 2016c). Additionally, in the northern regions, personal security is threatened in particular through violence, terrorism, extremism, banditry, and kidnapping, which is why people do not return to their homes and even continue to flee (Dobbs, 2015; HRW, 2015; interviews).

#### Law enforcement

The malfunctioning of the judiciary has been reported by several interviewees and reports as a threat to personal security and a possible contribution in developing migration aspirations (US AID, 2014b; Chêne, 2008). According to Washington (2016) “[t]he lines between law enforcement and criminal activity are blurred” (n.d.). An example for this is the case of Baba Ould Cheikh, who was the major of the small city of Tarkint and a rather influential person in the northern regions. During the 1990s, he had served as a hostage mediator for the former Malian president on several occasions. In hindsight, his success in these mediations can arguably be attributed to his close relationship with Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is suspected that he “benefited monetarily from the kidnapping of westerners” (Washington, 2015, n.d.). In 2013, Baba Ould Cheikh was arrested and charged for several crimes including “drug trafficking, sedition, terrorism and crimes against internal security of state” (Washington, 2016, n.d.). While in this case justice eventually has been served, interviewees report that in many cases individuals suspected of corruption are not always brought before court or adequately sanctioned. Embezzlement of public funds for instance is persecuted in only in very few cases (US AID, 2014d). At the other extreme, it is reported that there are cases in which people are arrested and brought before court despite being innocent because of mistakes of law enforcement institutions (interview 3).

According to the US Department of State low-level police corruption is endemic in Mali. It seems common for instance for police officers to request bribes from road users (US Department of State, 2015). This is reflected by results of the Global Corruption Barometer 2015, which show that 53 per cent and 56 per cent believe that the police and judges and magistrates respectively are involved in corruption. The only group which are perceived as more corrupt are business executives. One interviewee

reported that in order to understand why individuals such as police officers engage in corrupt practises. He emphasised that they might do this because their salaries are so low that they have to find ways to generate additional income to provide for their families.

According to interviews conducted with Malians living in the north by Human Rights Watch in 2015, business men and truck drivers are “forced to pay money at checkpoints manned by armed groups and, to a lesser extent, government security forces” (HRW, 2015, n.d.). Extortion by armed groups is reported to be “more systematic and organized” (HRW, 2015, n.d.), while extortion by police officers and soldiers “was more informal” (HRW, 2015, n.d.). Interviewees paid in order to prevent being beaten or detained, and to not lose time.

Interviewees can imagine that Malians might get tired of the weak law enforcement and the constant requests for bribes and therefore consider migration. There is a need for further research on this.

### 7.5.5.3. Political security

Both the existing literature and interviewees describe the Malian government as weak and corrupt (US AID, 2014b, interviews). This affects the political security of Malians and their trust in the government. In addition, the Malian population is disappointed by the current government and their president Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (frequently referred to as IBK), who had promised to fight corruption, but does not seem to take sufficient action (Interviews 3,4; Africa News, 2016). Instead the government has been involved in more corruptions scandals “many of which link directly to the President himself, to the extent that the IMF, World Bank and EU were forced to suspend budget support” (Reitano and Shaw, 2015, p.vii) further eroding trust. A lack of trust in the government might motivate Malians to migrate.

Another issue related to political security is that large parts of the Malian population do not feel properly represented by local and the national government mostly consisting of elites. In addition, they are largely “excluded from political decision-making” (US AID, 2014b, p.V). This is particularly true for the Tuareg population, but also for other communities (US AID, 2014b; Reitano and Shaw, 2015).

The 2012 conflict affected the political security of Malians in various ways, for instance by increasing human rights abuses, including the abuse of women’s rights (US AID, 2014b). Abuses of human rights and women’s right can motivate migration and forced displacement (Castles et al, 2014; Neumayer, 2005).

Mali is known as a patriarchal system in which women’s rights are always an issue (see Table 17). For instance, child marriage is known to be prevalent in Mali although it is not legal (World Bank, 2016; Malé & Wodon, 2016). It is “associated with lower wealth, lower education levels, and higher labour force participation” (Malé & Wodon, 2016, p.4) and girls and women who marry early are vulnerable to become victims of emotional, physical and sexual violence (Nasrullah, Zakar & Zakar, 2014) as well as even human trafficking (Ghosh, 2011; Raj, Gomez & Silverman, 2009). Child marriage can be facilitated through corruption, for instance by bribing officials (Human Rights Watch, 2015b). Domestic violence is another issue in Mali and there are no laws against it (World Bank, 2016). In 2013, 26.6 per cent of females reported to have experienced physical and/or sexual violence during the past year (World Bank, 2016). A large share of Malian women even believes that their husbands are justified in beating them for the following reasons: for refusing sex with him (58.9%); for arguing with him (58.4%); for going out without telling him (55.0%); for neglecting the children (48.7%); or for burning the food (26.3%) (World Bank, 2016). Moreover, female genital mutilation is very prevalent. In 2013, 91.4 per cent of women between 15 and 49 reported to “have gone through partial or total removal of female external genitalia or other injury to the female genital organs for cultural or other non-ther-

apeutic reasons” (World Bank, 2016, n.d.). As a consequence of the 2012 conflict, gender-based violence has increased including public and collective rape, which have hardly been persecuted (US AID, 2014a, n.d.; IOM, 2013). Women’s rights abuses do not only affect the political security dimension, but also the economic, personal and health dimension.

Although the Malian constitution does include a clause on non-discrimination based on gender (World Bank, 2016), women’s rights remain an issue that is related to political security. The Gender Development Index indicates that Mali is among the countries with the lowest HDI achievements between men and women with an “absolute deviation from gender parity of more than 10 per cent” (UNDP, 2015, p.223). Few women are involved in politics in general and in recent peace negotiations. World Bank (2016) data indicates that the share of women in parliament was at 8.8 per cent in 2016 and that it had declined during recent years. In 2015, it was proposed to pass a law that would reserve a third of the seats in parliament to women (Diarra, 2015). The law was adopted in December 2015 (interview 9).

Women are likely to be subject to different forms of corruption, such as sexual exploitation. Since women in Mali are even poorer than men, they might not be able to pay bribes and therefore need to find alternatives. These are not necessarily sexual favours, but could involve other services, for instance “doing the laundry for the military” (interview 7).

There is evidence that gender-based violence and abuse of women’s rights are associated with female migration and displacement (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2016; Naghsh Nejad, 2013; Ferrant and Tuccio, 2015). There is, however, no data indicating to what extent gender-based violence facilitated through corruption explains female Malian migration. Female migrants account for almost 50 per cent of the international Malian migrant stock. This percentage has been stable since 1990 (UN DESA, 2015).

Table 17: Social Institutions and Gender Index Mali

Indicator	Value	Category
Gender Index	0.5164	Very High
Discriminatory Family Code	0.8309	Very High
Legal Age of Marriage	0.75	
Early Marriage	0.53	
Parental Authority During Marriage	1	
Parental Authority After Divorce	1	
Inheritance Rights for Widows	0.5	
Inheritance Rights for Daughters	0.5	
Restricted Physical Integrity	1	Very High
Attitudes Towards Violence Against Women	0.87	
Prevalence of Domestic Violence	1	
Laws Addressing Rape	0.5	
Laws Addressing Sexual Harassment	0.5	
Female Genital Mutilation	0.89	
Reproductive Autonomy	0.28	
Son Bias	0.3048	High
Missing Women	0.25	
Fertility Preferences	0.52	
Restricted Resources and Assets	0.4076	Medium
Secure Access to Land	0.5	
Secure Access to Non-Land Assets	0.5	
Access to Financial Services	0	
Restricted Civil Liberties	0.7953	Very High
Access to Public Space	0.5	
Political Quotas	1	
Political Participation	0.1	

Source: UNESCO (2012)

#### 7.5.2.4. Community security

Community insecurity in combination with other factors led to the 2012 conflict, which increased (temporary) international and internal displacement (Interviews, UNHCR, 2016b). In particular, Tuareg communities feel marginalized and wish to secede from the country (interviews; Bøås, 2012; Bøås & Torheim, 2013; Reitano & Shaw, 2015). This situation is exacerbated because aid resources intended for regions in which Tuareg live often do not reach their targets, because of embezzlement (Bøås, 2012; Reitano & Shaw, 2015; interviews). This has been confirmed by several interviewees. Political marginalization, which is the case for many Malians who are not part of the elite, also threatens community security. As this is associated with economic disadvantages of the minority group it can lead to (Neumayer, 2005; Radnitz, 2006). Moreover, there are inter- and intra-community conflicts, which at the same time affect the personal security of the individual community members and could therefore lead to migration or even forced displacement (interview 8).



### Spotlight 8: Tuareg Rebellions – A Sum of Human Insecurity, Corruption and Migration

Mali has experienced several Tuareg rebellions during the last decades, which show that the relationship between corruption, human security and migration can be more complex than the simplified theoretical framework applied here imply. Several Tuareg rebellions resulted from a mix of community, political, environmental and economic insecurities and threatened the personal security of the Malian population. Community insecurity can be seen as a cause of the rebellions because the Tuaregs feel marginalized. Political insecurity plays a role because Tuaregs do not feel represented in the Malian government. One should note that the Tuareg population is divided within itself and that Tuaregs in government usually belong to elites that do not represent the ordinary Tuareg. Environmental insecurity is crucial due to the fact that Tuareg are particularly vulnerable to droughts, which are recurring challenges in the north where most Tuareg live. At the same time, Tuaregs are especially dependent on the environment due to their agricultural and pastoralist activities. Hence, droughts also affect their economic security. These four human security dimensions are further impacted by corrupt practices of the Malian government, mainly embezzlement of aid resources targeted towards the northern regions of the country. A prominent example for these is the so-called “drought castles”, which were built during the 1980s with aid resources in wealthier parts of Bamako. Since large parts of aid resources intended to improve the human security situation of populations living in the north never reached their destination, Tuaregs felt even more marginalized socially and politically (community and political security), while their environmental and economic insecurity worsened as they do not receive aid. In particular, the latter led to the migration of many young Tuareg men to Algeria and Libya during the 1980s. Feelings of anger caused by various insecurities and exacerbated through corrupt practices and exposure to revolutionary movements in the destination country eventually led to rebellions during the 1990s and in 2012. Tuareg rebellions again impact the human security of all individuals living in Mali, mainly personal security, which again leads to migration (Bøås, 2012; Bøås and Torheim, 2013; Benjaminsen, 2008; Jalali, 2013). In other words, corruption does not only exacerbate human insecurities but also cause them by triggering conflicts, which again lead to forced displacement of civilians on both sides of the conflict. The 2012 conflict in the north of Mali led to the migration of more than 450,000 Malians, including more than 300,000 IDPs (UNHCR, n.d.). Today there are still more than 135,000 Malians living in exile as a consequence of the 2012 rebellion and continued insecurity despite a peace agreement signed in 2015 (UNHCR, 2016c).

#### 7.5.2.5. Environment security

People in Mali have been living with the desert for centuries. Migration has been a common strategy to deal with environmental insecurity and is therefore nothing new (interviews; IOM, 2013). However, evidence suggests that the increasing desertification and the advance of the Sahara, threatens livelihoods of individuals living in the northern parts of the country. In fact, Mali annually loses 8 per cent of its GDP because of land degradation (World Bank, 2014). Due to embezzlement of resources actually intended for the creation of alternative livelihoods, migration from the northern parts of the country to Algeria and Libya increase. Most interviewees agree that environmental security is important in the context of Mali and in understanding migration. Climate change leading to increasing temperatures, more sporadic rainfall, and desertification increases the vulnerability of northern Malians towards poverty and food insecurity (World Food Programme, 2016) and can therefore influence migration aspirations.

#### 7.5.2.6. Food security

In general, food security is an issue in Mali, although there are times and regions in which it is less of a problem and times in which it is more problematic (WFP, 2016; interviews). According to the World Food Programme (WFP) (2016) 24 per cent of Malian households are “moderately to severely food insecure”, with those living in the northern regions being particularly vulnerable. Food insecurity impacts the health of the Malian population. Around one third of children below the age of five is stunted as a consequence of malnutrition, which can affect children’s “physical and cognitive development” (WFP, 2016, n.d.) Food insecurities in Mali are usually consequences of droughts and therefore linked to environment security (interview 4). As a consequence of the 2012 conflict, food security, in particular access to safe drinking water, was an issue for IDPs in northern Mali, who relied on the help of humanitarian institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, 2013).

#### 7.5.2.7. Health security

Human Rights Watch claims (2016a) that endemic corruption impacts access to health in Mali. Health security is an issue in Mali because the government fails to provide basic health-related needs (Diarra, 2012) and many doctors prefer working in private clinics over working in public clinics as they can earn extra money there. Hence, many hospitals lack equipment and qualified staff (interview 3). Ordinary Malians cannot afford the treatment of private clinics. In addition, health workers and administrators in both public and private clinics charge extra fees for certain medications and treatments. An example for a serious case of embezzlement within the health sector is the scandal around the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, which had invested USD 120 million in Mali, of which roughly one third was embezzled by government officials (Harmon, 2014). As a consequence, “[s]everal high ranking Ministry of Health officials were prosecuted, and the Minister of Health resigned” (USAID, 2014d). Eventually, the prosecuted officials were acquitted “due to a lack of evidence” (USAID, 2014d, n.d.).

Table 18: Health Security Factors

Indicator	Statistic
<b>Physical health</b>	
Life expectancy at births, (years) <sup>1</sup>	58.0
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people) <sup>2</sup> :	57.0
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births) <sup>2</sup> :	587.0
Mortality rate infant (per 100,000 live births) <sup>2</sup> :	114.7
Mortality rate under 5 (per 100,000 live births) <sup>2</sup> :	74.5
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49) <sup>2</sup> :	1.3
Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49) <sup>3</sup> :	26.0
<b>Health care system</b>	
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people) <sup>4</sup> :	0.4
Physicians (per 1,000 people) <sup>4</sup> :	0.1
Out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of total expenditure on health) <sup>1</sup> :	47.7
Health expenditure per capita, (current US\$) <sup>1</sup> :	47.8

World Bank (2016); <sup>1</sup>2015; <sup>2</sup>2014; <sup>3</sup>2013; <sup>4</sup>2010

## 7.6. Summary

Endemic corruption in Mali affects all human security dimensions and can therefore indirectly motivate migration or cause forced displacement. This can be said despite the fact that Mali is a very diverse country, which makes it generally difficult to draw generalisations. In addition, corruption affecting one dimension can also have negative impacts on others, which underlines the complexities of mechanisms. An important example for this in the context of Mali is how various insecurities of the Tuareg population exacerbated through several forms of corruption explain the outbreak of numerous rebellions over time and also the most recent conflict. These crises again affect the human security dimensions of the remaining parts of the Malian population, leading to a vicious circle of corruption, human insecurities and displacement. While most interviewees certainly confirmed the assumptions of the theoretical framework developed in part I of this study, it is nevertheless necessary to collect more evidence on this. A possible way forward is to ask migrants about what motivated their migration aspirations to really establish the direct and indirect links between corruption and migration or displacement. Furthermore, the mechanisms causing corruption in the first place need to be analysed to implement effective anti-corruption measures.

One interviewee stressed that something definitely needs to change in Mali because otherwise the country may collapse, which may spill over to neighbouring countries. Such events might have severe consequences on migration and forced displacement flows from West Africa to Europe which were of limited relevance so far but are expected to rise dramatically. The expected migration and forced displacement flows would also affect neighbouring countries tremendously. Intervention in Mali therefore needs to have a long-term focus and has to involve Malians to secure stability in the whole region. In fact, Malians need to have a clear stake in change and to be part of the change if it is to be sustainable.

## Case Studies

### 8. Case Study: Ukraine

#### 8.1. Introduction

The role corruption can play as a push-factor for migration and cause of forced displacement is still an understudied field and only few studies have considered corruption as a direct or indirect push-factor for voluntary migration. Part I of this study developed a framework to investigate corruption as a driver of migration and forced displacement using the seven human security dimensions.<sup>39</sup> This case study of Ukraine will utilize this framework to map the potential links between corruption and migration and forced displacement in the country. The case will take a closer look at which forms of corruption are most prominent and which sectors are most affected by corruption in Ukraine. Ukraine is an interesting case study for several reasons. Corruption is a problem in every aspect of life in Ukraine and among the highest in Europe, e.g. 38% of households state that they had to pay a bribe to access basic services (Pring, 2016) and citizens have created major protest movements against the corrupt government twice in the last decade ('Orange Revolution' and 'Euromaidan'). Ukraine also sees significant migration movements. In 2015, 905,200 Ukrainians were living in the EU and in 2014-2015 about 700,000 Ukrainian citizens were working abroad (IOM Ukraine, 2016b, p. 11f). This makes Ukraine a fitting case study to research the possibility of corruption as a push-factor for migration and cause of forced displacement.

This case study applies the theoretical framework to the context of Ukraine using a qualitative methodology. Relevant data is gathered through desk research and expert interviews. Documents reviewed as part of the desk research include academic articles, grey literature (including reports published by governmental and non-governmental organisation), reports by investigative journalists, news articles, as well as legal and policy documents. To complement the desk research, 15 semi-structured expert interviews have been conducted between December 5, 2016 and December 15, 2016. Interview partners include academics, as well as representatives of international organisations, government organisations, NGOs and think tanks working in relevant fields related to corruption, migration, and human security in general, or in Ukraine specifically. They were selected based on desk research, the research team's networks, and snowball sampling (a list of interview partners can be found in Annex III). All interviews were conducted remotely by means of Skype or telephone. The questionnaire (see Annex IV) is based on desk research and the theoretical framework. The interviews have been analysed and incorporated into the report. Due to the sensitivity of the topic interview partners are not quoted directly. The main limitation to conducting interviews was the timing of the interviews, which were conducted at the end of the year, a period that is very busy for all possible interview partners. This is mirrored by the low response rate of 25 percent.

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<sup>39</sup> In this report, voluntary migrants are those that choose to move according to their own preferences. Forced migrants on the other hand have no choice but to leave their home, due to disaster- and development- induced displacement. Forced displacement is the result of direct danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (IOM, 2011, Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016 and Castles et al, 2014). For more information check section 2.3.



This country study is structured as follows: first, it briefly provides background information including key facts on the country. Second, both the corruption and migration situation in Ukraine are explored, including historical developments as well as an outline of the current situation, legislation and trends. Third, it applies the theoretical framework to the context of Ukraine, thereby exploring the relationship between corruption and migration and forced displacement in Ukraine based on a human security approach. Fourth, it tests the hypotheses formulated during the first part of the study. Finally, it concludes and provides policy recommendations to address corruption as an indirect cause of migration.

## 8.2. Background information

Figure 17: Map of Ukraine including Crimea



Source: CIA World Factbook (2016)

Ukraine, located in Eastern Europe, bordering Russia in the East has faced much political and economic turmoil since its independence in 1991. A new democratic constitution and a new currency were introduced in 1996. Historically Ukraine has been divided into an eastern part, which is traditionally closer to the Russian Federation and the western part, which is predominantly Ukrainian speaking and linked closely to Europe (Bedzir, 2001). Much of the heavy industry of Ukraine is located in the eastern part of the country. Ukraine since its independence has seen significant political turmoil. Following the elections in late 2004, the so-called Orange Revolution incited by suspicions of rigged presidential elections challenged the current government. Despite Viktor Yanukovich, the government-backed candidate, being indicated as the winner based on voting counts, Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as president in 2005. Yushchenko was recognised in the West for his fight against corruption, but was unpopular among powerful Ukrainian businessmen for his measures. During his presidency Ukraine's constitution was changed (2006), limiting the power of the president and transferring it to the parliament. However, this change was annulled by the constitutional court in 2010. In 2010, Viktor Yanukovich won the presidential election. The 2008 global financial crisis hit Ukraine's steel industry and export market, leading to a sharp decline in the value of the Ukrainian currency. As the Ukrainian government decided to halt its plan of signing the EU association agreement in 2013 in favour of closer ties with Russia, a series of demonstrations and civil unrest followed, the so-called Euro-maidan. The protesters argued that the government was corrupt, unaccountable and following Russian

leads. Major police brutality and other human rights violation further fuelled the protest. As a result, an interim government took over in February 2014. In March 2014, Russia annexed the Crimea peninsula, an act that is heavily criticized by Western states and the UN. It has led to heavy fighting which is still ongoing between Ukrainian and separatist forces, as several negotiated cease fires have failed. In May 2014, businessman Petro Poroshenko won the presidential elections (BBC, 2015).

Today Ukraine has a population of 45 million (2015) of which 70 per cent live in urban areas. The population has grown at negative rates since 1994 (World Bank, 2016). One tenth of Ukraine's population classified as migrants and roughly 1.5 million refugees and other people of concern to UNHCR resided in Ukraine in 2015.

Ukraine has an official unemployment rate of about 9 per cent; however, this does not take into consideration the large number of unregistered unemployed or underemployed citizens (World Factbook, 2016).

Table 19: Development Indicators for Ukraine

Indicator	Mali
Surface Area, sq km <sup>b</sup>	603,500 (including Crimea)
Population (2015), millions <sup>b</sup>	45,1
Urban population (2015), % of total <sup>a</sup>	69,7
Human Development Index (2015) <sup>c</sup> Country Rank, out of 188	0.747 81
Life expectancy at birth (2014) <sup>b</sup>	71.19
Unemployment (2015), % of labour force <sup>a</sup>	9.3
GDP per capita (2015), USD <sup>b</sup>	7,915.87
Foreign Direct Investment (net inflows, 2015), millions USD <sup>b</sup>	3,050
Official Development Assistance (net inflows, 2014), millions USD <sup>b</sup>	1,404
Personal Remittances Received (2015), millions USD <sup>b</sup>	5,845

Sources: <sup>a</sup>CIA World Factbook (2016); <sup>b</sup>World Bank (2016); <sup>c</sup>UNDP (2015)

## 8.3. Corruption in Ukraine

### 8.3.1. History

The prevalence of corruption in Ukraine is often seen to be rooted in its history as part of the Soviet Union. According to USAID (2015), Soviet legacy plays a large part in determining the state-society relations operating in Ukraine today. While corruption is not a concept unique to post-Soviet societies the extent to which it is "widespread, systemic, and conducted by the state itself" (Darden, 2001, p. 70) is noteworthy in this part of the world. During Soviet times, political loyalty to the state was

rewarded, while political opposition, freedom of speech and civic engagement were restrained. The strict economic structures existing in the Soviet Union were seen as a hindrance by people, and thus frequently circumvented. Bribes were common, however, mostly in the form of material gifts rather than cash. When transitioning from the Soviet socialist system to capitalism in the 1990s, corruption practices were reinforced. Mass privatization of state assets produced a new elite built on Soviet power. In addition, new democratic state structures were built on weak foundations favouring the powerful, to the detriment of accountability, transparency and rule of law. Thus, anti-corruption mechanisms were weak to non-existent and corruption practices became even more entrenched in society. People started to demand and pay favours by means of cash exchanges and corruption continued to be seen as the solution to one's problems, rather than a problem itself. Nowadays, studies show how civilians have accepted state corruption and arbitrary rule of law and have written off any ideal of meritocracy (USAID, 2015).

### 8.3.2. Current situation and trends

Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index ranked Ukraine 130<sup>th</sup> out of 167 countries in 2015, at a value of 27/100 (Transparency International, 2015). Health, education and law enforcement sectors are among the most corrupt sectors of Ukraine according to various corruption assessments (Transparency International, 2013; USAID, 2015). The interview partners agreed that the health sector and education are the sectors where people are most directly faced with corruption in everyday life, yet they also agreed that every layer of the Ukrainian system is affected by corruption. As corruption assessments prove difficult based on objective counts, measures of perception or anti-corruption mechanisms are frequently used, providing results for Ukraine as displayed in Annex VIII.

"The abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gain" (Norad, 2008, p.11) is considered the most appropriate definition of corruption in the context of development cooperation. The concept can be distinguished in political, grand or high-level corruption, which involves political decision-makers who abuse their political power for personal gain, and bureaucratic, petty or low-level corruption taking place in public administration (Amundsen, 1999). According to a 2011 National Integrity System Assessment for Ukraine, the country experiences corruption as a systemic problem. Despite the Euro-maidan 'anti-corruption' movement and the following political changes, corruption is still a systemic challenge in the country. "If you want to be born someone needs to pay a bribe to the doctor", one of our interviewees stated (interview 16), "Any part of life in Ukraine is affected by corruption and it goes from the bottom all the way to the top". Society displays a high tolerance for corruption practices (Toro Creative Union – Transparency International National Contact Ukraine, 2011) and stakeholder interviews confirm that most people do not only accept corruption as a normal part of life but also do not mind to use it if it makes things faster. As one interviewee pointed out, "as long as you benefit from corruption you don't mind it. If it makes you get things you do not deserve or makes services faster, you are happy to pay. Only if you feel like a victim of corruption does it become a problem" (interview 19). At the same time, there is also an acute awareness in the population about corruption. New state offices such as the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine<sup>40</sup> have been tasked with investigating corruption cases and news media and civil society organisations are active in reporting on political corruption<sup>41</sup>, yet the judicial system fails to follow up on these findings and, according to all interviewees, frustration is great among many people. The additional question that arises is to what

<sup>40</sup> <https://nabu.gov.ua/en>

<sup>41</sup> E.g. <http://antac.org.ua/en/analytics/austrian-banks-used-in-alleged-laundering-funds-in-big-amounts-from-ukrainian-insolvent-banks/>

extent the improvements in the uncovering of corruption cases combined with the lack of prosecution adds to a feeling of ‘increased corruption’ even though actual levels of corruption have decreased or remained the same (interviews).

Low-level corruption is especially prominent in the health sector which was also confirmed in the stakeholder interviews. USAID (2015) found the medical system, the police, the education system and the license sector to be most affected by low-level corruption (Table 20).

Table 20: Low-level Corruption in Ukraine per Sector (2015)

Sector	In what context does corruption appear most?
Medical system	24%
With police	18%
Education system	14%
Licenses	14%
With judges	8%
Everywhere	7%
Utilities	3%
Taxes	3%
Real Estate/Land	3%
Customs	2%

Source: USAID (2015)

According to USAID (2015), low-level corruption in Ukraine displays a certain typology including four categories for bribes. Firstly, they identify market compensation bribes, bribes which are used to compensate for failures of the market. The most common market failure here are low salaries which often are not sufficient to live and therefore are compensated for with bribes. These bribes are most common in the health care sector, where they occur informally, and the education sector, in which they are often formally integrated into the system. USAID (2015) describes bribes in these instances as a regressive tax, which disproportionately affects poorer people. Despite this, the organisation finds that most people find market compensation bribes acceptable based on the dilemma that education and health personnel find themselves in due to the very low salaries paid to them. This illustrates the high level of tolerance for corruption among the Ukrainian people. A second category of bribes is that of exhortation or responsibility avoidance bribes, which most commonly occurs in law enforcement, involving the police or judges. A third category is termed bureaucratic roadblock bribes aiming at facilitating or circumventing bureaucratic processes that would otherwise be time-costly or very complex. These bribes for instance involve licensing, real estate or land, and customs, but can also occur in education or the judicial system. Lastly, bribes to gain socio-economic advantages are paid in most sectors. They are used to obtain contracts, get employed in the public sector, or to obtain academic degrees, especially those leading to substantial career advancement such as in medicine or law (USAID, 2015). This finding has also been confirmed by the stakeholder interviews and again it shows the complexity of

the corruption system in the country. Many of the experts agreed that especially low-level corruption is sustained not only because there are enough people demanding bribes but also because large parts of the population see ‘facilitation payments’ as an easy and legitimate way to have a way around existing rules, getting things that they are not entitled to and gaining access to certain things. This makes clear that a cultural change is needed.

USAID (2015) sees the reasons for widespread low-level corruption in the established vicious circle which denotes public sector service delivery (see Figure 18). Insufficient state budgets lead to poor service delivery and small salaries, incentivising not only professionals to demand bribes but also citizens to pay to improve the services they obtain, be it time or price reduction, or responsibility avoidance. This was confirmed by all stakeholder interviews.

Figure 18: Vicious Cycle of Corruption in Ukraine



Source: USAID (2015) p.15

One sphere where corruption has been successfully fought in Ukraine is the patrol police, which was perceived as highly corrupt and known for its brutality. One major reason of the Euromaidan protests was the high level of police violence not just against protestors but all citizens (interviews). Corruption had been rampant in the police force and trust in police fairness was “catastrophically low” (Hough, Jackson, & Bradford, 2014). In 2015, after pressure from protestors and international actors, dramatic police reform took place where large numbers of new police officers were hired, including many women and old officers were let go or had to go through the new hiring process (Peacock & Corder, 2016). All interview partners agree that the police reform was very successful in eliminating police corruption in the patrol police. The trust in police has increased and many seem to be happy with the outcomes of the reforms (Vlasov, 2015). Yet some remained critical of the overall effect: “People tell me they would rather have corrupt police than what they have now. The new police officers don’t

know how to do police work. They are not corrupt but they are also not competent” one interviewee stated (interview 13). Additionally, the question remains if these changes are sustainable if they are not accompanied by changes in the top levels of law enforcement, judiciary and politics (Marat, 2015).

This high-level corruption has been identified as a fundamental problem in the Ukrainian system (interviews). The National Integrity System Assessment undertaken in Ukraine in 2011 identified several weak and strong pillars. Among the weakest pillars are political parties, the business sector and the public sector, which are affected by limited functional capacities and weak governance structures. Five years later, despite reforms the country is still dominated by high-level corruption (interviews). The close ties between political and business elites dominate the country and leave plenty of room for nepotism and embezzlement at the highest level. The party system in Ukraine is still very much ‘person based’ rather than ideology based and the legal frameworks are still insufficient. Rules for transparency are often inexistent and political parties are easily captured by oligarchs representing their interests. Values of donations are not restricted by law and party-independent candidature is not permitted. In addition, the business sector suffers from weak regulation facilitating the abuse of government offices. Politicians are frequently involved in the business sector either directly or via their private network, strengthening patronage systems (Toro Creative Union – Transparency International National Contact in Ukraine, 2011; Interviews). Oligarchic structures still play a large role in the Ukrainian state (Halling & Stewart, 2016), which will be discussed in more detail in section Corruption and Political Security 5.2.2.2.

Despite the Euromaidan protests, which have largely been identified as anti-corruption protests, both low and high-level corruption are still rampant and it remains to be seen how new agencies tasked with can challenge the existing system.

## 8.4. Migration in Ukraine

### 8.4.1. History

Ukraine has a long history of migration movements, before and after independence, which can be broadly separated into four waves (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016).

#### First Wave: Late 19<sup>th</sup> century – 1914

Migration in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century up to 1914 is mainly attributed to economic motives. Migration occurred from western Ukraine, a region then belonging to the Austrian-Hungarian Empire, to the US, Canada and Latin America due to a lack of land and widespread poverty. It is estimated that about 10% of western Ukraine’s population left for these countries during this timeframe (Malynovska, 2006). Populations in eastern parts of Ukraine, then belonging to the Russian Empire, experienced large resettlements as measures countering their poverty. They were resettled to regions of the Empire where land was abundant (Malynovska, 2006, Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016).

#### Second Wave: Inter War Period

As a result of the failed national revolution 1917-1920, Ukraine was incorporated into the Soviet Union and received its name Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This period was mainly marked by political emigration as well as resettlement programs. In the decade following the failed revolution, many of its participants left Ukraine (Malynovska, 2006). The direction of migration was similar as during the first wave (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016). Precise data about migration during Soviet times is difficult to obtain as it was highly suppressed (Vollmer & Malynovska, 2016).

### Third Wave: Post World War II

During World War II, Soviet oppression of Ukraine resistance led to large-scale deportations of members of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as well as ethnic minorities, in whose process 450,000 ethnic Germans, over 200,000 Crimean Tartars, and Poles, Bulgarians, Armenians, and Greeks were deported. In addition, the Soviet Regime governing Ukraine between 1920 and 1991 operated large-scale resettlement programmes of populations that were moved between Soviet states. One of the reasons was the regime's aim to create a supranational Soviet people by means of mixing its multinational populations. Another was the attempt to satisfy the Union's labour market needs. In addition, emigration to states outside the Soviet Union was restricted. Thus during times of the Soviet regime, migration occurred mainly internally (Malynovska, 2006).

### Fourth Wave- post Soviet Era

Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, immigration to Ukraine as well as emigration increased. Populations that had been resettled during Soviet times repatriated in large numbers and regional conflicts of the late 1990s resulted in refugee flows entering Ukraine. As the new Ukrainian government relaxed its migration policies and abolished exit restrictions in the early 1990s, populations that had been resettled to Ukraine began to migrate back to their regions of origin and labour migration to Western states set in. Moreover, Ukraine has evolved as a country of transit for irregular migration (Malynovska, 2006). The combination of liberalisation of exit regulations and dramatic economic downturn lead to a spike in emigration especially from the traditionally poorer Western parts of the country (Bedzir, 2001). This wave is different from the first three waves as it is not mainly politically driven but rather "economic and social in nature" (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016, p. 3). Since 2014, Ukraine has experienced large-scale forced migration movements induced by the conflict between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian armed forces.

## 8.4.2. Current situation and trends

### 8.4.2.1. Ukrainians abroad

In 2015, 5,852,745 Ukrainians resided abroad, of which 88 per cent had migrated to developed regions (United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). The migration corridor Ukraine-Russia represents the second largest one in the world (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). Ukrainians are mostly found in countries in the region, but also in the US and some western European countries, as the following table illustrates. Ukrainians also are "the largest post-USSR migratory movements to the EU" (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016, p. 1).

Table 21: Top 10 Destinations of Ukrainians by Highest Migrant Stock in 2015

Destination country	Ukrainian migrant stock
Russian Federation	3,269,992
United States	345,783
Kazakhstan	338,002
Belarus	225,734
Germany	261,147
Italy	222,241
Poland	206,518
Israel	135,112
Uzbekistan	124,602
Czech Republic	97,474

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015)

### Labour migration

The ILO (2012) labour migration survey found that between 2010 and 2012 3.4 per cent of Ukraine's population was part of the process of labour migration, either working or searching for employment abroad. At 98.2 per cent, a large majority of them was in employment abroad, while only 1.2 per cent was searching for employment (IOM, n.d.). Labour migration from Ukraine is a largely circular phenomenon. According to IOM (2011), 37 per cent of Ukrainian labour migrants migrate temporarily and only 16.2 per cent have a permanent residence in their host country. On average, labour migrants stayed abroad for five months going on three trips (ILO, 2012). In 2014-2015, about 700,000 Ukrainians were working abroad (IOM Ukraine, 2016). Unfortunately, due to methodological and time difference the two surveys do not lend themselves for comparisons or trends.

Figure 19: Estimates of Ukrainian Migrant Workers (2014-2015)




Source: (IOM Ukraine, 2016, p. 13)



The amount of travels and length of stay is mostly determined by the destination country, as monetary- and time-cost of travelling varies. Ukrainians from the western regions participate in external labour migration more actively, with 12.9 per cent of the working age population leaving in 2007-2008. The population of northern regions is least involved at 1.7 per cent (UCSR & SSCU, 2009). Labour migration took place mainly to Russia and European nations, as displayed in the following table.


Figure 20: Destinations of Ukrainian Labour Migrants (2014-2015)



Source: IOM Ukraine (2016)

It is important to note that the host countries offer different labour markets to Ukrainians and thus attract labour migrants with varying socio-demographic and socio-economic characteristics. The 2008 Modular Population Survey of Labour Migration Issues found that the Italian labour market mostly offers jobs in caregiving household services to Ukrainians, causing a higher share of female Ukrainians to reside in Italy. In Spain, on the other hand, mostly male migrants are involved in the country's construction and tourist service sector (MPI, 2013). These factors also prompt varying age characteristics to materialise. Male migrants are on average younger, mostly migrating before they are 50, as they work in physically demanding occupations, while the share of female migrants in higher age groups is higher than that of males (MPI, 2013). In general, Ukrainian migrants are occupied in a variety of sectors, as displayed in the following table.

Figure 21: Sectors of Employment of the Ukrainian Migrant Workers Abroad (2014-2015)



Source: IOM Ukraine (2016, p.14)

Regarding education, Ukrainian labour migrants' educational attainment is generally lower than that of the Ukrainian labour force. Migrants have followed an average of 11.8 years of schooling and 13.5 per cent of them have a higher education degree, while non-migrants have completed 15.3 years with 23.3 per cent qualified at tertiary level (MPI, 2013). A 2007-2008 survey identified labour migration flows by education level as can be seen in the Table 22.


Table 22: Education Level of Ukrainian Labour Migrants Compared to the Employed Ukrainian Population, 2007-2008

Education level	Employed population of Ukraine	Labour migrants
Basic secondary or primary education	9.9%	9.8%
Secondary education	43.2%	59.0%
Basic higher or incomplete higher education	23.7%	17.3%
Completed higher education	23.2%	13.9%

Source: UCSR & SSCU (2009)

There are clear gender differences in the sectors that migrant workers are engaged in, which then is also reflected in the destination countries.

Figure 22: Sector of Employment in Destination Country by Gender (2014-2017)



Source: IOM Ukraine (2016a)

Table 23: Country of Destination, by Gender and Level of Education

Country	Total number of labour migrants	Women	Men	Labour migrants by level of education			
				Completed higher education	Basic higher or uncompleted higher education	Secondary education	Basic secondary or primary education
<b>Total</b>	1,476,100	484,800	991,300	13.9%	17.3%	59.0%	9.8%
Russian Federation	710,300	30.0%	57.0%	12.8%	16.7%	58.5%	12.0%
Italy	198,300	25.1%	7.7%	18.5%	19.2%	56.5%	5.8%
Czech Republic	175,100	10.5%	12.5%	7.3%	8.0%	77.0%	7.7%
Poland	118,00	10.6%	6.7%	5.8%	22.1%	63.3%	8.8%
Hungary	47,000	2.7%	3.4%	7.9%	39.1%	41.9%	11.1%
Spain	40,000	3.8%	2.2%	19.8%	25.2%	48.0%	7.0%
Portugal	39,000	3.3%	2.3%	6.9%	15.6%	70.3%	7.2%
Other countries	148,300	14.0%	8.2%	29.0%	16.6%	45.3%	9.1%

Source: UCSR &amp; SSCU (2009)

In addition, irregular migration from Ukraine is not uncommon. UCSR and SSCU (2009) found that 23.2 per cent of migrants in 2007-2008 were without official status working abroad, while according to MPI (2013) two out of three migrants were irregular in 2008. Often, the irregular status is linked to insecure employment statuses, as regular employment is a prerequisite to obtain residence permits or work visas. Insecure employment statuses in certain sectors add to the precarious situation of Ukrainian migrants. While they are provided with written contracts in transport (83.7%) and industry (70.6%), contract provision is far less common among household servants (16.1%), in trade (31.5%) and construction (32.7%). Informal positions in the household sector held by Ukrainian women are commonly rotated within networks, as one person leaves the position and passes it on to relatives or friends (Maroukis, Iglicka & Gmaj, 2011).

As interviewees pointed out that here is a gender difference in destination countries: while more men go to the Russian Federation and Poland as manual labour, in e.g. construction. More women go to places like Portugal or Italy to work as household aids and nannies.

### Migration due to conflict

Ukrainians have been increasingly seeking asylum abroad due to the ongoing conflict in the country (Duevell & Lapshyna, 2015). Duevell & Lapshyna (2015), however, express a concern for inflation of figures of refugees and asylum seekers. They consider the statistics to be politicised by Russia trying to blame Ukraine for the conflict, and to be used by irregular Ukrainian migrants to regularise their situation by applying for asylum. Based on existing networks, western Ukrainians mostly leave for the EU, while eastern Ukrainians migrate to the Russian Federation (NoVisa, 2015).

Table 24: Ukrainian Refugees and Asylum Seekers

Indicator	Statistic	
Ukrainian asylum seekers	total <sup>a</sup>	1,481,377 (September 2016)
	in Russian Federation	1,154,212
	in Belarus	148,549
Ukrainian refugees <sup>b</sup>	2015	318,786
	2013	5,172

<sup>a</sup> UNHCR (2016); <sup>b</sup> World Bank (2016)

### 8.4.2.2. Migrants in Ukraine

According to United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015), 4,834,898 foreign-born migrants resided in Ukraine in 2015, while the Ministry of Interior only recorded 313,000 foreign nationals in 2001 (Migration Policy Institute, 2013), and just above 100,000 foreign citizens registered in 2010 (IOM, 2011). This discrepancy stems from the repatriation movements that took place after 1991, which saw ethnic Ukrainians born abroad return to Ukraine, who acquired citizenship of the new Ukrainian state. In addition, statelessness is a prevailing problem in Ukraine, as many people were left without citizenship after the dissolution of the USSR. Stateless persons are classified as non-status migrants, and estimates lay at more than 84,000 in 2001 (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). Moreover, Ukraine has been established as a major transit country for migrants aimed at reach-

ing western European countries since 1991. It has operated open border policies with Commonwealth of Independent States countries and has facilitated border crossings to western European states (Migration Policy Institute, 2013). The transit migration flows are mostly comprised of irregular migration and human trafficking and include Ukraine as part of the Central and Eastern European route leading to the Schengen area. As Ukraine has become a border country to the Schengen area with the expansion of the EU, it has in recent years also developed into a destination country for irregular migrants, who fail to enter the Schengen area (Hoffmann & Reichel, 2011).

Table 25: Top 10 Origin Countries of Migrants in Ukraine by Highest Migrant Stock in 2015

Origin country	Migrants in Ukraine
Russian Federation	3,276,758
Belarus	245,534
Kazakhstan	222,245
Uzbekistan	219,814
Moldova	149,745
Azerbaijan	82,299
Georgia	64,399
Armenia	47,307
Tajikistan	29,367
Kyrgyzstan	26,729

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015)

Table 26: Refugees and IDPs in Ukraine


Origin country	Migrants in Ukraine
Refugee population in Ukraine <sup>a</sup>	3,219 (2014)
Internal displacement, conflict <sup>b</sup>	1,714,000 (2016)
Tajikistan	29,367
Kyrgyzstan	26,729

<sup>a</sup> World Bank (2016); <sup>b</sup> Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (2016)

### Internally displaced persons

Recent displacement in Ukraine has occurred in two waves. The first one took place in advance of the Crimean referendum to join Russia in March 2014, while the second one followed Russia's annexation of Crimea. Among the largest groups being forcibly displaced are Pro-Ukraine activists, journalists, government officials and the Muslim ethnic minority of Crimean Tatars (NoVisa, 2015). In 2016, the World Bank (2016) counted 1,714,000 persons internally displaced due to conflict in Ukraine. At 800,000 to 1 million, most IDPs have relocated to government-controlled areas (GCAs). Those who have remained displaced in non-GCAs regularly cross the contact line. IDPs in Ukraine experience various reasons for their forced relocation. Crimeans for instance mainly flee from persecution, while people from the Donbas region relocate due to threats to their physical security. The choice of destination regions mostly depends on personal ties, the opportunity for secure housing as well as economic opportunities present (OSCE, 2016). OSCE (2016) found that humanitarian assistance is mainly carried out by civil society organisations like churches and NGOs.

Integration of IDPs into their host community is increasingly difficult due to shifting attitudes towards displaced persons in the communities. While they had been welcomed with understanding at the beginning of the conflict, feelings have shifted to indifference or frustration. OSCE research (2016) among IDPs has found that integration is perceived easier for women, as people share the perception that men should be fighting instead of fleeing conflict. Nevertheless, many households have been transformed into female-headed households, as husbands stayed in conflict regions to work or fight, or died in conflict. Study participants also mentioned that they anticipate reintegration into their home regions to be problematic, because they fear to be perceived as traitors by those who stayed behind. Durable solutions for IDP integration are mostly inaccessible. OSCE (2016) reports that IDPs lack adequate housing while residences in collective centres are unsustainable; land allocation is problematic and socio-economic security inaccessible. IDPs report that they have difficulties accessing employment opportunities, they experience frequent skills mismatching and they receive less money for the same job than locals. Both host communities and IDPs also suffer from rising rental and utility prices. IDPs also perceive the process of registering as IDPs as long and complex and complain about differential levels of benefits handed out in different regions of Ukraine. In addition, persons who registered as IDPs in non-GCAs experience significant difficulties in obtaining certificates and accessing social benefits when they relocate to GCAs. IDPs residing in non-GCAs are unable to access social benefits completely, as those are only provided by the government in recognised GCAs. Moreover, while registered IDPs can obtain social benefits, they lack access to other services and rights, such as voting rights. In the October/November 2015 elections, IDPs were unable to vote as this would have required re-registration, which would result in a loss of IDP status (OSCE, 2016).



Source: Duevell & Lapshyna (2015)

## 8.5. Relationship between corruption and migration in Ukraine

In order to get a detailed overview over the impact of corruption as a push-factor of migration and trigger of forced displacement in Ukraine, the following section uses the framework of section 5.2 to showcase the different possible connections in Ukraine.

### 8.5.1. Corruption as a direct cause of migration and displacement

A few studies have investigated the link between corruption and voluntary migration in Ukraine. Lapshyna (2014) found that perceptions of higher levels of corruption lead to an increased likelihood of 1.5 times for Ukrainians to aspire to migrate to Europe in 2011-2012. Utilizing the same data set Düvell and Lapshyna (2015) found that more than 80 per cent of survey respondents perceived high levels of corruption in Ukraine and almost half aspired to migrate. According to the authors, political instability and widespread corruption were the main motivators for Ukrainians to migrate to Europe before the Euromaidan protests. Similarly, Bilan et al. (2012) found strong correlations between the perceived level of corruption in Ukraine and Ukrainians' desire to relocate abroad. As Ukrainians perceive corruption to be low in Europe and the performance of politicians to be high, and have contrary impressions of Ukraine, Europe emerges as a destination for those dissatisfied with the situation in Ukraine. Yet, all these articles agree that much more research is needed to determine if corruption really is a direct push-factor for voluntary migration. Asked what they see as the direct link of corrup-

tion and migration most of our interview partners referred to some form of tiredness of the system. Many people perceive the playing field in Ukraine to be extremely unfair and corruption is one major contributor to this feeling. This can be one way people develop migration aspirations directly due to corruption. Another example that was mentioned is that many small business owners cannot sustain their livelihoods without getting involved in corruption on a regular basis (to get permits, bribe state inspectors etc.). Some of these business people might see corruption as such a major obstacle to their entrepreneurial achievements that they decide to leave and try their luck somewhere else. Overall, however, stakeholders, who were interviewed for this project, unanimously agreed that corruption does not play a major role as a direct push-factor but is crucial as an indirect factor leading to migration aspirations. “People engage in corruption as an alternative to taxation. So, in many places at least at the administrative level, corruption allows people to deal with the government easier. When it gets too far when it becomes a predatory state, when it comes to the point that the local leaders are extorting them and frightening them then it becomes a mobilizer for people to leave” (interview 16).

### 8.5.2. Corruption as indirect cause of migration and displacement

While these studies investigated the direct link between voluntary migration and corruption, others have pointed out the relationship between human insecurity and forced displacement. Jaroszewicz (2014) identifies political insecurity, in terms of unfair trial verdicts, harassment by the judicial system and public order bodies as main motivators for refugee applications of Ukrainians abroad. However, she also notes that the political situation and corruption in Ukraine alone would not have led to an increase in out-migration, but that the main driver of migration or forced displacement movements in recent years has been conflict, and thus personal security. Corruption also contributes to economic insecurity in Ukraine, which presents another main reason for Ukrainians to leave the country. IOM (2016) identifies economic drivers as the main reasons for Ukrainians who try to escape poverty and unemployment migrating. In addition, they find poor quality of life, scarce opportunities for professional development as main motives of migration and note a direct influence of corruption and crime on migration motives. Lapshyna (2014) encounters unfavourable business conditions as drivers of migration and notes that political reasons play a minor role in migration aspirations, but economic ones act as main reasons. Bilan et al. (2012) find that the state of education and medical services drive people out of Ukraine and attract them to Europe. This is confirmed by Timmerman et al. (2014) whose study asserts that Ukrainians associate corruption with lacking access to employment, health care and education, motivating them to migrate to the EU, where they perceive the conditions to be more favourable. Emigration rates are high among Ukraine’s highly educated, as a study by Kurochka and Polkovnychenko (2015) found. A lack of economic security, the crisis of Ukraine’s academic and science sector and the wish to improve their skills drives them out of the country.

Educational attainment in general is found to influence one’s decision to migrate. According to Duevell and Lapshyna (2015) migration aspirations are particularly high among persons in middle-and senior management positions, for which 80 per cent responded that they would want to leave Ukraine due to the political and economic situation. They also note that student migration, especially to Poland, has considerably increased in past years due to the fragile state of the Ukrainian higher education sector.

Lapshyna and Duevell (2015) sum up these indications of what contributes to migration of Ukrainians in their study on life satisfaction and corruption, based on a 2010-2013 survey conducted in Ukraine. They found that respondents are dissatisfied with poverty (82.3%), corruption (80.3%), employment opportunities (75.5%), politicians (74.6%) and health care (69.7%). A regression analysis indicates



that life dissatisfaction and 15 years or more of education have a significant effect on the aspiration to migrate. The authors also note that return is often unlikely and if return has occurred especially highly-skilled returnees express a motivation to re-migrate. Moreover, return is perceived as risky, partly because a successful re-integration is determined by the extent of one's networks and one's willingness to engage in corrupt practices again.

### 8.5.2.1. Economic security

The lack of economic security has been identified as the single most important migration factor in Ukraine by all interviewees. The theoretical framework applied here distinguishes between income, employment and education as the most important factors in relation to economic security.


Economic security of Ukraine's population has suffered from the ongoing conflict in the eastern regions of the country. While average salaries have remained constant, prices for food and utilities have increased heavily since 2014 (OHCHR, 2016). In particular, IDPs are economically and socially marginalised. They experience significant difficulties in finding employment and securing social benefits they are entitled to. Similarly, hosting communities suffer from an influx of IDPs, who have to be cared for, as well as being provided with housing and employment. Increasingly, employers refuse to give employment to IDPs and former soldiers, as they are often too old to be trained or cannot guarantee they can stay in the region (OHCHR, 2016). In addition, Ukraine's educational facilities are often of poor quality, suffering from underfunding and corruption (Osipian, 2015). Institutions lack significant resources and teachers are paid and perform poorly. Still, a tertiary degree is seen as essential to obtaining a job in Ukrainian society, thus driving up student demand for degrees. The result are institutions acting as 'degree mills', that fail to sufficiently prepare students while handing out degrees on paper, as the European Commission describes them (European Commission, n.d.).

Table 27: Indicators of Economic Security

Indicator	Statistic
<b>Employment</b>	
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) <sup>a</sup>	55 (2014)
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) <sup>b</sup>	7.7 (2014)
<b>Income</b>	
GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) <sup>a</sup>	7,915.87 (2015)
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) <sup>a</sup>	7,810 (2015)
Average salary <sup>b</sup>	UAH 4,934 (2016); approximately USD 197
<b>Education</b>	
Expenditure on education as % of total government expenditure	7,915.87 (2015)
Government expenditure per tertiary student as % of GDP per capita	7,810 (2015)

Sources: <sup>a</sup>World Bank (2016); <sup>b</sup>OHCHR (2016);

The GDP growth rate shows the instability of the overall economy since independence and shows a high depression in the economy and the GDP per capita also indicates that the Ukrainian economy is currently facing a severe downturn (Figure 24).



Source: ??

In their 2006 assessment of corruption in Ukraine, USAID (2006) states that corruption represents “one of the top problems threatening economic growth and democratic development” (p.iv), a situation that has not changed since then (Legvold, 2014). Corruption on the high level mostly serves the purpose of gaining or maintaining control over economic activities and power, with disastrous consequences for the effective functioning of the economy (Leipnik & Kyrychenko, 2013). The Ukrainian neo-patrimonial system is one of the main mechanisms through which control is established, disrupting economic efficiency. Elite networks, represented in currently 3 to 12 oligarch groups, occupy key positions in the economic and the political sphere to reinforce their control. In particular, sectors of metallurgy, agriculture, banking, finance, energy, airlines, solar energy, pharmaceuticals, retail trade, pipe industry, construction and import of goods are controlled by these groups. As favours are exchanged and resources are redirected among these networks, economic activity is severely distorted from efficient levels. State tenders in construction for instance are rarely given to the best bidder, but automatically assigned to members of the network (Leitner, Meissner & Martyna-David, 2015).

These actions are possible due to institutional ambiguity, and a lack of rule enforcement and transparency. Regulations for interactions between politics and business are inexistent or not enforced and institutions fail to protect key economic functions (Leipnik & Kyrychenko, 2013). Instead, corruption takes over to reduce economic cost and regulate business relations. The resulting uncertainty and insecurity in all economic sectors reduce state revenue, increase social inequality, and undermine internal

and external investment flows (Fedirko, 2013).

Moreover, corruption hinders institutional restructuring and investment. It makes improvement of institutional and economic capacities difficult, as possibilities for economic reform and strengthening of institutional systems are blocked (USAID, 2015). In addition, IOM (2016) found that migrants abroad are very reluctant to productively invest in business in Ukraine, as they fear that corruption will divert their investment.

As discussed in section 5.2.2.1, corruption also severely interferes with one's employment and educational opportunities threatening one's economic security. Corruption dictates labour market processes, hindering people from finding secure employment and obtaining a stable income. In the educational sector, degrees are conferred based on bribes, providing the best educational opportunities to those who can pay most.

"The problem is not necessarily to find a job, but it the problem is to find a well paid job. One that actually pays enough to sustain your family. This is especially true for skilled labour – they can't find these jobs and then they leave" one interviewee (interview 15) noted. The connection to corruption was also made clear. One major obstacle is nepotism. One reason that our interviewees identified as hindering people's chances of employment is that there is no good system to transfer information from employer to employee. Information is usually given through personal relations. There are exceptions, e.g. multi-national companies, but especially outside the capital this information is only available from one person to another. Therefore, if you do not have the right contacts, you can often not apply for a job because you do not even hear about it. Another problem was identified with the oligarchical structures that still dominate the country. As one interviewee put it "oligarchs still control certain industries or regional industries and they use the politicians for their benefit. In particular, in the industrial regions, where people depend on these jobs because they are the only jobs. (...) The same is true in agriculture – farmers are dependent on big agricultural companies. The very basic jobs are very low paid, so they depend on these companies. (...) Many people cannot be farmers on their own so they have to either rent their land out or are dependent on renting the means of production from the agricultural companies" (interview 15). These close ties between business and politics are a major problem for the economic situation and the employment chances for individuals.

### 8.5.2.2. Personal security

#### Conflict

Conflicts are the main threat to personal security and at the same time among the most important factors explaining forced displacement. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine poses serious threats to the population's personal security. According to OHCHR (2016), the conflict has produced 31,814 casualties between mid-April 2014 and mid-August 2016. The numbers amount to 9,578 persons killed and 22,236 injured as a direct consequence of the conflict. The number of civilians, who have died due to secondary effects of the conflict, such as lack of food, medical care of water, remains unknown. The reasons for fleeing of course always also depend on personal circumstances, yet a recent OSCEE study found common motivations among the IDPs in Ukraine: "[a]mongst Crimean IDPs, flight from persecution was the prevailing factor, while for the majority of Donbas IDPs physical security was the primary concern" (OSCEE, 2016, p.5f).

Crimes rates in Ukraine have increased since the start of the conflict. Rates in the capital Kyiv increased by 20 per cent in 2015 in comparison to the previous year. This is especially due to illegal weapons-related crimes. Low-level terrorism targeting Ukrainian government buildings is continuously reported, but mostly results in property damage only (RISC OSAC, 2016). The conflict in eastern

Ukraine has mostly lead to internal displacement and less to international migration. Many of the IDPs remain in the areas close to the conflict zone and there is regular movement back and forth between the occupied areas and Ukraine-proper. Yet there has also been an increase in asylum seekers in other European countries from the conflict affected areas which are often rejected from asylum because they are considered to be able to stay safely in the conflict free parts of Ukraine (Szczepanik & Tylec, 2016).

#### Law Enforcement and judiciary

While the patrol police has made great strides in becoming corruption free, corruption is still rampant in the rest of the judiciary system. The judicial system is not independent from the political system and lacks transparency and accountability. This is not just a problem for potential investors (e.g. Interfax-Ukraine, 2016), but also erodes the trust in the state as a whole. Additionally, it hampers the anti-corruption efforts that have been ongoing. While the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, NGOs and the press have uncovered many corruption cases the judiciary does not prosecute them. According to one expert, it is not a problem that there are no people that would be good and fair judges, but that the system is so dependent on the political sphere that “either you make the right decisions and have a job, or you are excluded from the system” (interview 12). The overall sentiment is that justice in Ukraine is only for those who can afford it. As one expert stated: “Everyone knows that you can get out of murder if you have money. Justice is not for all-justice is only for those who have money. If you are a poor man stealing a bicycle you are much more likely to go to jail than a rich man embezzlement of \$1 million” (interview 15). While judicial reform is ongoing it is extremely slow, starting from the top and only in a few years, will affect all layers of the judicial system (Olszański, 2016). This is problematic for several reasons, for one prosecutions of corruption and criminals will have to wait until a sufficient amount of the justice system has been reformed. In the meantime, frustration over corruption in the population is likely to grow as can already be seen (interviews) and the faith in the anti-corruption institutions is likely to sink as no apparent success is visible.

#### 8.5.2.3. Political security

While the government has in recent months implemented institutional reforms to protect and enforce human rights, it has continued to ignore key areas of civilian protection. The constitutional amendments of June 2, 2016 strengthened the independence of the judiciary. Nevertheless, both the government and armed forces fail to sufficiently protect civilians and their rights. Humanitarian law is disregarded by all armed groups in the conflict, as civilians and soldiers are subjected to a deprivation of their liberty, torture, and inhumane and degrading treatment. This lack of human rights protection can lead to forced displacement. Neither rebel groups nor the government manage or are willing to provide the population in conflict-affected areas with basic services and necessary humanitarian aid. They severely limit the fundamental freedoms to assemble, associate and express one’s opinion and fail to provide IDPs with the social benefits they are entitled to. According to an OHCHR survey (2016), 85 per cent of IDPs in GCAs and 97 per cent in non-GCAs do not have access to their social entitlements. In addition, the structure of the social entitlements law is discriminatory towards IDPs as a group and limits their freedom of movement. Moreover, the government fails to hold those responsible accountable for human rights abuses, being either not willing or incapable to do so (OHCHR, 2016).

Again, the extreme close ties of business and politics were a major concern to many stakeholders. “About half the seats in the parliament are bought”, one interviewee noted, “businessmen give a politician money to pay for his election and then he owes them favours” (interview 21). This close relationship makes reforms difficult and unlikely and explains why people are fed up with the system.

Gender equality remains an issue in Ukraine with respect to politics, economics and violence. While Ukraine recognises key international commitments for the protection of women's rights, problems remain in their implementation and enforcement (UN Ukraine, 2016).



“Ukrainian society is very biased on its own therefore the political system reflects the state of society. We have very few women in the top political leadership. There is clearly a glass ceiling [...] Women are more vulnerable [to corruption] because we have a post-soviet situation where women are providers for the family, mostly raise the kids by themselves (not economically).

They depend a lot on the men [economically]. Plus, because they take care of the household they might be affected more by low-level bribery”  
(interview 14)

In politics, women are dramatically underrepresented. While 53.8 per cent of the Ukrainian population is female, only 12 per cent of parliamentarians and 10.5 per cent of cabinet ministers are women. Economically, women earn considerably less than men and occupy lower positions. Women's average wage is 77.6 per cent that of men and 87 per cent of women do not know that wage inequality represents a violation of their rights (UN Ukraine, n.d.). They more frequently occupy low-paid economic jobs and have very limited access to top-management positions (UN Ukraine, 2016). More women might therefore choose to look for employment opportunities elsewhere, this can be especially the case for highly-skilled women. Every year, 90,000 cases of violence against women are registered. In part, due to a lack of trust in the system, only 1 in 4 women who survive domestic violence seek assistance from the law enforcement or legal system (UN Ukraine, n.d.). Gender-based violence and discrimination are even enhanced due to the conflict. In particular, female-headed households experience frequent problems in exercising their economic and social rights, gaining access to employment, medical care, accommodation and social services and benefits (UN Ukraine, 2016). Lack of right protection and access to justice can therefore also incentivise women to leave Ukraine to find employment.

Table 28: Social Institutions and Gender Index Ukraine

Indicator	Value	Category
Gender Index	0.075	Low
Discriminatory Family Code	0.0414	Very Low
Legal Age of Marriage	0	
Early Marriage	0.07	
Parental Authority During Marriage	0	
Parental Authority After Divorce	0	
Inheritance Rights for Widows	0	
Inheritance Rights for Daughters	0	
Restricted Physical Integrity	0.1517	Low
Attitudes Towards Violence Against Women	0.22	
Prevalence of Domestic Violence	0.13	
Laws Addressing Rape	0.5	
Laws Addressing Sexual Harassment	0.5	
Female Genital Mutilation	0	
Reproductive Autonomy	0.1	
Son Bias	0.243	High
Missing Women	0.25	
Fertility Preferences	0.51	
Restricted Resources and Assets	0	Very Low
Secure Access to Land	0	
Secure Access to Non-Land Assets	0	
Access to Financial Services	0	
Restricted Civil Liberties	0.5399	High
Access to Public Space	0	
Political Quotas	1	
Political Participation	0.09	

Source: OECD (2016)

One of the major problems identified in the political security is the dominance of oligarchic structures in Ukraine. Despite pledges of the post-Euromaidan government to get rid of this system nothing much has changed. Halling and Stewart (2016) identify three strategies through which oligarchs influence the political sphere. Oligarchs secure funding and political support for politicians, who in return make sure that the oligarchs have the desired environment to make economic profits. These forms of nepotism go through the entirety of the state apparatus and are almost impossible to circumvent (interviews). The second strategy is that oligarchs repeatedly get involved in politics themselves. And last but not least they control large parts of the mass media in Ukraine (Halling & Stewart, 2016). This hampers competition in the economic sphere but also makes employees dependant on very few employers in many regions, which means that the wages can be kept low. As discussed in the previous section this is one of the main reasons to lead to migration. This tight relationship is also problematic as it creates a lack of political will in the political and economic elites to change existing corrupt systems.

#### 8.5.2.4. Community security

Ukraine's civil war demonstrates the cleavages that exist in the country's society between different language, cultural and religious groups. Communities are formed among Russian and Ukrainian speakers in the east and west respectively and in recent years these distinctions have resulted in open hostilities threatening community security (Wade, 2015).

For the Crimean Tartars, the conflict has resulted in recognition of their culture. The Ukrainian government acknowledged their sympathy towards the Tartars after the Russian annexation of the peninsula, while Russia has given equal status to their language in an attempt to convince the community of Russia's righteous actions. The Crimean Tartars have long experienced problems trying to preserve their culture and language and carry out their religion, representing a minority group in Ukraine (Rainsford, 2015).

Little information is available how corruption endangers community security in Ukraine, however, interview partners suspected that some communities, like the Roma are especially vulnerable to corruption in e.g. the education, health and security sector. More research is needed in this field.

#### 8.5.2.5. Environment security

Agliardi, Pinar and Stengos (2015) calculated an environmental degradation index outcome for Ukraine in 2005. With a result of 0.0395, they confirmed that Ukraine experiences relatively low levels of environmental degradation. Sustainable Security (2015), an Oxford Research Project, has found that the current conflict has had disastrous consequences for the environment, including civilian health risks and long-term damage to environmental assets. Damage to industrial property has caused accidental releases of pollutants, errant electricity and water supply has seen industries shift to more environmentally unfriendly technologies and releases of gases from ventilation systems of coalmines. Next to water and air pollution, the environment is suffering from disposed chemicals and weapons' remnants. They pose not only a threat to the environment but also to human health.

Corruption in Ukraine often hinders environmental policies and investments. Only at the beginning of this year was the Ukrainian environmental minister fired along with two of his senior officers due to embezzlement of funds. They are said to have given out state tenders related to Kyoto protocol investments to fraudulent companies (Szabo, 2016).

Disaster-induced migration has not been identified as a major problem by the literature and the interviewees, yet, considering long term environmental effects of the conflict and oligarchic and corrupt business actors involved in large development interventions an assessment for the potential for natural or manmade disasters seems necessary.

Table 29: Environmental Factors

Indicator	Statistic
Access to electricity (% of population)	3,219 (2014)
Access to non-solid fuel (% of population)	1,714,000 (2016)
Annual freshwater withdrawals, total (% of internal resources)	29,367
Arable land (% of land area)	26,729
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)	3,219 (2014)
Energy intensity level of primary energy (MJ/\$2011 PPP GDP)	1,714,000 (2016)
PM2.5 air pollution, population exposed to levels exceeding WHO guideline value (% of total)	29,367
Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption)	26,729

Source: World Bank (2016)

#### 8.5.2.6. Food security

According to the World Food Programme (2016), 1.1 million people are affected by food insecurity in Ukraine, among which are 160,000 IDPs in GCAs. Food insecurity is at critical levels especially among female-headed households and for elderly persons. While social benefits represented the main income source for 56 per cent of households in summer 2016, 60 per cent of households spent more than half of their available budget on food alone, as food prices have risen since the beginning of the conflict. A food basket cost 56 per cent more in March 2016 compared to March 2014. Vulnerable households often resort to buying food on credit, selling assets, spending their savings or saving on health expenditure in order to be able to buy sufficient food for household members. Relying on own food production is increasingly difficult due to the damaged infrastructure. Still, rural areas experiences higher levels of food consumption as food production is easier for them than for urban households. While food insecurity levels are still high, they have been decreasing since March 2015 (WFP, 2016).

Table 30: Food Insecurity by Region, April–May 2016

Region/Population group	% of the population that is food insecure	% of the population suffering from inadequate food consumption levels
Total interviewed households	19%	24%
Luhansk Non-GCA	34.4%	43.1%
Luhansk Buffer Zone	18.3%	44.8%
Donetsk Non-GCA	18%	22%
Donetsk GCA	14.8%	-
IDPs	19%	-

Source: WFP (2016)



The Global Food Security Index ranked Ukraine 63th out of 113 countries in June 2016, with a score of 55.2/100. Among the main challenges Ukraine faces regarding food are corruption, public expenditure on agricultural research and development, and limited gross domestic product per capita (US\$ PPP). While food quality and safety have been rated at acceptable levels for Ukraine, food affordability and availability are the main aspects that are still considered very problematic (The Economist Group, 2016).

Water access for households and public facilities is problematic in regions affected by the conflict. In 2015, 96.2 per cent of the population had access to improved water sources, with 97.8 per cent of the rural population and 95.5 per cent of the urban population (World Bank, 2016).

According to the Global Food Security Index, Ukraine's major challenges in attaining food security are corruption and income (The Economist Group, 2016). Corruption can distort the availability of food and artificially reduces peoples' income, either by hindering them to obtain secure income or by forcing them to increase their expenditure on other assets, leaving less for food.

### 8.5.2.7. Health security

Like other spheres of human security, health security suffers under the conflict situation. Armed groups utilize medical facilities for military purposes, necessitating civilians to travel long distances to reach the next available facility. In non-GCAs and in the proximity of checkpoints along the contact line, medical institutions often lack running water as well as sanitary facilities. In addition, medical staff has often left the region or are unable to reach their workplace due to ongoing fighting, making healthcare unavailable for the civilians that have remained (OHCHR, 2016). While technically, access to improved water sources exists for every citizen in Ukraine, OECD (2011) found that drinking water provision is highly unsatisfactory. Not only does water pollution represent a major problem, but health standards of water quality and pipelines are unsatisfactory. In regions where public pipelines do not exist, the population often sources their drinking water from contaminated wells. OECD (2011) estimates, that 50 to 80 per cent of the water-supply and sewerage system are damaged posing severe health risks to the Ukrainian population.

Table 31: Health Security Factors

Indicator	Statistic
<b>Physical health</b>	
Life expectancy at births	71.19 years (2014)
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people):	94 (2015)
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 live births):	24 (2015)
Mortality rate infant (per 100,000 live births):	7.7 (2015)
Mortality rate under 5 (per 1,000 live births)	9.0 (2015)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49):	0.9 (2015)
Unmet need for contraception (% of married women ages 15-49)	4.9% (2012)
<b>Health care system</b>	
Nurses and midwives (per 1,000 people):	7.67 (2013)
Physicians (per 1,000 people):	3.543 (2013)
Out-of-pocket health expenditure (% of total expenditure on health):	46.215 (2014)
Health expenditure per capita, PPP (2011 constant international \$):	584.236 (2014)

Source: World Bank (2016)

The increased costs of health services due to corruption constitute a significant barrier to the equal access of health services by the Ukrainian population, and thus to their health security (Lekhan et al., 2015).

Corruption in the health sector is a daily fact in Ukraine and impacts especially the poor because they cannot afford to go to private hospitals. Often medication is very expensive so if there are family members that are sick it might be necessary to get money from abroad. A second reason that corruption in the health factor leads to migration aspirations in Ukraine is that it leads to overall life dissatisfaction, which in turn has been linked to migration (Lapshyna & Düvell, 2015)

## 8.6. Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine

The Ukrainian government has very limited capacities to cope with the amount of IDPs in the country and to provide them with what they need. Instead, civil society groups take over to assist IDPs. Corruption mostly affects the movement regulations for IDPs. Since January 2015, IDPs are required to obtain passes to exit conflict areas. The process of obtaining these passes is not only complicated and can take up to three months, but is also frequently used as an opportunity for officials to enrich themselves. This increases the barriers to free movement even further, which is especially problematic as the Ukrainian government decided to discontinue social services in non-GCAs as of November 2014 (OHCHR, 2015; Atlantic Council, 2015, interviews).

In addition, the government and its police forces are perceived as very corrupt by the general population and the IDP population. For this reason, self-defence groups have formed in conflict regions to protect the IDP population there as the government's ability to fulfil this task is perceived to be limited (OSCE, 2015).

The interviews also revealed that IDPs are especially vulnerable to corruption. From the registration process where they have to bribe officials or landlords to be able to register for services, to other government services, IDPs face even more corrupt practices than the average Ukrainian. One example that was frequently given by the interviewees is the access to state services. "People can only get certain services in their place of residence. Here lies also on area where corruption can play a role. People will for example pay off an official to ignore that they are not really living there, they pay a landlord to let them register etc. to be able to collect social services" (interview 13). Many IDPs also frequently return to their homes in Eastern Ukraine, to cross the border they often need to pay bribes on both sides of the border (interviewees). Often landlords are hesitant to rent places to IDPs as they are expected to be "less reliable and often landlords – and employers by the way- just expect them to disappear again and return home. Therefore, they ask for extra fees –so bribes- to rent a place to an IDP" (interview 13).

Another problem is also that employers are often hesitant to hire them, because they are expected to leave soon and are assumed to be less reliable. This is especially the case for single mothers who are considered unreliable because they might have to take time off to care for children. The vulnerability of IDPs to corruption needs to be further explored.

### 8.7. Summary

Corruption, especially high-level political corruption plays a major role in Ukraine and leads to many outcomes that have been shown to lead to the decision to migrate and in some instances to forced displacement. All human security dimensions are affected by endemic corruption. While at first glance the impact on the economic sphere and especially employment chances is the most important, interviews revealed many push-factors for migration also in the other human security dimensions. This should be explored in more detail in future studies.

## 9. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Corruption as a push-factor for migration and driver for forced displacement only recently came to the forefront of the academic and policy debate. First studies indicate that corruption can act as a push-factor for voluntary migration but this report is the first comprehensive framework mapping both direct and indirect ways corruption can play a role in explaining migration including forced displacement. The research for this report identified weak direct links of corruption as a push-factor for voluntary migration.

Corruption is understood as a strong indicator that the overall state system is not functioning. Expert interviews found that people might consider migrating because they are ‘tired of the existing system and being treated unfairly’ as a way corruption directly impacts the decision to migrate. This is in line with research that shows that general life dissatisfaction is a push-factor for migration (Otrachshenko & Popova, 2014).

The evidence that corruption is an indirect push-factor for migration and driver of forced displacement is much stronger. Using the seven human security dimensions the first part of this report develops a framework mapping the possible ways in which corruption might indirectly shape migration aspirations and lead to displacement. It shows that all dimensions of human security can be strongly affected by corruption but as the expert interviews and case studies confirm, it seems that the impact of corruption on economic security is the strongest link. The effect of corruption on lack of (good) employment opportunities and on aid resources have been identified as the most prominent links to the decision to migrate in both Mali and Ukraine. The case studies and the expert interviews also identify high-level corruption, in particular nepotism and patronage systems, which tie economic and political elites closely together, as the most damaging types of corruption. As one interviewee put it:



“Grand corruption that deprives countries of resources needed for development is actually the most damaging type of corruption which leads people to seek opportunities somewhere else. So, in the first instance they migrate from rural under-developed parts of the country to try their luck in the cities. However, because of levels of competition coupled with high levels of bribes, they quickly realise that their condition is actually worse in the cities. They are left with little choices and thus resort to leaving their countries.”  
(interview 10)

The exact linkages are extremely case specific and require a deep understanding of the roots and types of corruption prominent in the country. Both the case of Mali and Ukraine show that there are even sub-national differences in the role corruption plays in shaping migration aspirations and causes of displacement. It is therefore crucial not to generalise across different cases.

The case studies illustrate that corruption is endemic in both Mali and Ukraine and that it is spread through all aspects of life – although Transparency International estimates that corruption is less of a problem in Mali (Mali is ranked 95th and Ukraine 130th of 167 countries in the 2015 Corruption Perception Index). This is surprising since based on expert interviews corruption seems to be equally problematic in both countries and prevalent forms of corruption include both petty and grand corruption. Despite efforts to address corruption, the issue remains a problem in Mali and Ukraine, where corruption affects all human security dimensions and can therefore be seen as indirectly contributing

to migration aspirations and in some instances forced displacement. Both case studies showed that economic and personal security are affected most by corruption. Both countries are mainly migrant sending countries and the majority of people migrate due to economic reasons or are displaced by ongoing conflicts. Most Malian and Ukrainian migrants stay within the same region.

## **Recommendations to address corruption as a push-factor for migration and a driver of forced displacement**

As already emphasised, one should be careful in formulating general recommendations since measures to be taken against corruption as push-factor for migration and causes of forced displacement differ significantly across cases and even between different regions within a single country. The purpose of this report has been to develop a framework which can be used for further research and analysis of the topic. The existing data on corruption and migration, however, is not sufficient to test the framework on a universal scale. To develop a better understanding of the link of corruption and migration decisions and more precise and effective entry points for the German Development Cooperation further research is essential. Therefore, we refrain from giving general policy recommendations and focus on policy recommendations for the two case studies, Mali and Ukraine.

### **Recommendations for Mali**

#### **1. Support institutions specifically created to combat corruption**

As the analysis shows, several institutions were created specifically to fight against corruption such as the Auditor General, who is responsible for monitoring the performance and quality of public services and bodies and their regularity and fairness regarding revenue and expenditure as well as the evaluation of public policies. Since the work of the Auditor General and other institutions is not always perceived as effective, sustainable or sufficient, they might require the support of external actors such as development organisations to implement their respective tasks. The focus should be on preventing government corruption, including the embezzlement of aid resources to make sure that foreign money actually reaches its targets and can contribute to the development of the country and the well-being of the Malian people.

#### **2. Support law enforcement/support judicial and penitentiary reform**

The reforms underway since January 2014 acknowledge the need to fight corruption. The reform “must be accompanied by steps to establish the basis for building a genuine legal and institutional arsenal of fight against [corruption]” (interview 8), which may require the support of external actors such as development organisations to ensure that it is in line with the Malian Constitution and the tasks of institutions specifically created to combat corruption. It is important that the existing laws are implemented properly and that people who engage in corrupt practices are persecuted.

#### **3. Support livelihoods**

Several interviewees identified low salaries of state official combined with high costs of living as a cause of high levels of corruption in Mali. At the same time, migration is a strategy to deal with livelihood risks. It is therefore advisable to increase the salaries of state agents so that they can sustain themselves and do not need to rely on corrupt practices and bribes to provide for their families. Livelihood interventions therefore seem advisable.

#### 4. Support fair recruitment system

The study shows that the recruitment system in Mali is characterised by nepotism, patronage, favouritism and clientelism. It is therefore important to support the establishment of a fair recruitment system that ensures that the best candidate is hired. Currently interviewees emphasized that this does not seem to be the case which is why many (highly-skilled) Malians are unemployed or underemployed which can be a reason for them to migrate. In addition, the system promotes the survival of corrupt practices since those individuals who would be less likely to support corruption are not hired leading to a vicious circle.

#### 5. Support awareness among Malian population

Interviewees also stressed that large parts of the Malian population are not aware of their rights and obligations, implying a “low literacy in terms of citizenry” (interview 5). In order to break the vicious cycle of corruption it is therefore important to educate the Malian population about their rights and obligations and the disadvantages of corrupt behaviour. This could be done for instance by supporting Malian organisations already working on this issue, such as Transparency International Mali, which aims at raising media awareness inter alia for the promotion of good governance and the fight against corruption.

### Policy recommendations for Ukraine

#### 1. Support speedy justice reform

A fundamental reform of the justice system has been identified by the majority of interviewees as one of the most pressing issues in the country. The justice system is perceived as one of the most corrupt and least trusted sectors in the country. While reforms have been initiated, at the current speed these will not be completed for a long time. The justice sector at the moment is too closely tied to the political and economic elites and not independent. This does not only impede the access to justice for citizens but it also hinders the success of anti-corruption reforms. While new national anti-corruption initiatives, such as the anti-corruption bureau investigate successfully, there are no prosecutions to follow up those cases. This is frustrating for the population and decreases overall trust in the government substantially. The same is true for the successful police reform, where the positive attitude towards the police can only be sustained when criminals also get convicted and cannot buy their way out of justice. Therefore, supporting the justice sector reform is an essential part of the fight against corruption.

#### 2. Support reform and strengthening of the political party system

Second, it is necessary to reform and strengthen the political party system. Currently the connection between political and economic elites is extremely close and nepotism is rampant. Lack of clear party financing rules support this development since many politicians will have to borrow money from e.g. oligarchs to run a campaign and then owe them favours once they are in office. To avoid these conflicts of interest party and election financing needs to be reformed. While the link to migration is not direct, the high-level corruption has been shown to have negative economic consequences which in return often lead to increases in migration.

### 3. Support regional transparency initiatives

Civil society, anti-corruption initiatives and media are very strong in the capital Kiev and in some of the bigger cities, however, there are very few of these organizations working in the regions. This means that regional politician and businessmen are less likely to be held accountable and voters are not informed about the processes of the local government.



“We need more regional coverage – not just in Kiev. People in the regions know about the ministers in the capital but there is not enough independent regional media. Anti-corruption work in the regions can be very difficult. There is lack of support of independent media in the regions. Not just media coverage but in general having monitoring in the region. Then in the long run people would be better informed about what and who they vote for” (interview 20).

### 4. Support fair and transparent recruitment system

One major factor that was repeatedly mentioned in the interviews as a push-factor for migration is that the problem for Ukrainians is often not that they cannot find a job in Ukraine, it is that they cannot find a well-paid job and/or a job in their field. One of the reasons is that with the exception of some big multinational companies, companies do not publicly advertise job openings. Rather the majority of jobs is announced through personal connections, which means that people who do not have the proper connections cannot find an adequate job. Creating a more transparent system of advertising open positions can be of benefit for both the employers and the employees as it allows the most qualified candidate to be matched with the job.

### 5. Include anti-corruption initiatives in job creation programs and cutting of red tape

Job creation programs are often treated separately from anti-corruption reform efforts. As the research in this case study shows, the two are however closely linked. Therefore, more concrete anti-corruption measures should be included in employment programs. This can, also include things as reducing red tape and the resulting economic burden for businesses which has often been mentioned as a reason for corruption.

## Recommendations for further research

The exact linkages between corruption and migration do need further exploration, which holds for both cases. This report therefore not only identifies potential entry points for Development Cooperation to tackle corruption-related causes for migration, including displacement, but also areas for further research.

### 1. Collect more data

One of the major challenges when exploring the nexus of corruption and migration is the lack of quantitative and qualitative data. To truly explain the role corruption plays future research and data collection is unavoidable.

#### 1.1. Collect more data on the corruption-migration-displacement nexus

While this study shows that experts see corruption as one factor influencing the development of migration aspirations and an underlying cause of forced displacement, it is clear that more concrete data needs to be collected regarding the issue at hand that goes beyond the experiences and perceptions of experts working in the field. In particular, quantitative data is needed to provide more evidence for how corruption directly or indirectly leads to migration decisions. One possibility for doing so is to conduct migrant surveys which examine what impact corruption, including different forms of corruption, has on the individual human security dimensions and in forming the migration decision. There is furthermore a need for more in-depth analyses of the impact of corruption on the individual human security dimensions. Fieldwork in different places, perhaps including focus groups with the local population in areas of high emigration, should also be conducted to not only get a better understanding of the individual migrants' decisions but the overall situation in the country in regards to corruption.

#### 1.2. Collect data regarding different forms of corruption

This study identified a lack of data regarding different forms of corruption. In most cases, academics and organisations only refer to corruption in general and do not distinguish between different forms of corruption such as bribery, extortion, embezzlement and nepotism. The interviews for this study have identified nepotism and high-level political corruption as one of the major challenges in both countries, yet only anecdotal information is available about these forms of corruption. There is therefore a need to collect more data on the prevalence of this different forms of corruption and to determine their costs.

#### 1.3. Compare how corruption in different levels of governance affect voluntary migration

Much of the decision to migrate is impacted by the local environment of the person. One should therefore distinguish between different levels of governance when assessing the effect of corruption on migration, particularly focusing on local governance and development initiatives, as they arguably impact the individual most.



#### 1.4. Corruption indices

During the course of this research, it was found that corruption indices can serve as a useful basis for an initial assessment of the levels of corruption. However, as the case of Mali shows they do not always seem realistic. While Mali does not rank too bad in various corruption indices, experts describe the corruption situation in the country as very severe. A possible explanation for this is that corruption indices usually measure perceptions of citizens. In cases such as Mali where corruption seems to be embedded in the country's culture and where low education and literacy levels among the population persist, this can impact the results of corruption indices since people simply do not know better. This can make comparisons across countries more difficult, which is exacerbated by the fact that data on different countries are not collected and published simultaneously. For instance, the latest data available for Ukraine is from 2013, while the latest data available for Mali is from 2015. Not only is corruption measured in different points of time in the case of Ukraine and Mali, but also the questions asked differ significantly, making comparisons extremely hard. It might be useful to further develop corruption indices and address these shortcomings.

#### 2. Address corruption in the discussion of migration and development

The issue of corruption needs to be included into discussions regarding the migration-development nexus. Corrupt practices, especially the embezzlement of aid resources, may impede the success of development initiatives which are aimed at addressing migration pressures. Similarly, there is a need to explore how migration affects the development of the home country as there is an assumption that those who do not tolerate corruption are more likely to leave. One needs to establish whether their out-migration negatively affects corruption-levels in the home country leading to a deadlock or positively impacts corruption levels through social remittances.

### 2.1. Remittances and corruption

It would be interesting to further explore the links between remittances and corruption to be able to answer the question whether or not remittance receivers pay more bribes and whether or not they are more likely to be extorted. This is important since migration and remittances are meant to make the family better off but if they are being more targeted for bribes, this (at least partially) negates the beneficial effect of migration.

### 2.2. Corruption as facilitator of migration

This study has focused on the possible ways in which corruption directly or indirectly influences the development of migration aspirations. Beyond this it is necessary to further explore how corruption facilitates the migration process. From obtaining legal or false travel documents, to bribing border guards and paying smugglers corruption seems to be important in facilitating migration. This relationship and the exact costs should be subject to future research.

### 2.3. Effects of corruption on migrants in transit and upon arrival

Corruption is not just a facilitator of migration. Migrants are especially vulnerable to corruption during transit and upon arrival in camps or destination countries. Obtaining health services and registering are just two examples where migrants might be faced with high levels of corruption. More research is needed to explore how corruption affects migrants during their journey and upon arrival and how this affects their health, safety and overall well-being.

### 2.4. Corruption as an impediment to return

Corruption in the home country might also be a reason for migrants not to return or invest in their home countries. Corruption could be seen as an impediment to success in the home country. It will be especially interesting if students who leave for education abroad consider the level of corruption as a reason to not return back home. Establishing a business can also be especially difficult for returnees because of corrupt practices. This is a field that should be explored further.

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## Annex I – Search terms used to guide the structured literature review by thematic area

Thematic Area	Search Terms
<p>Linkages between corruption and decreased human security</p>	<p>Corruption and human security, corruption and organized crime, corruption and disappearance, corruption and human rights, corruption and good governance, corruption and health, corruption and criminal violence, corruption and resources, corruption and environment, corruption and food security, corruption and discrimination, corruption and gender, corruption and human trafficking, corruption and smuggling, corruption and inequality, corruption and sexual (abuse/favors), corruption and minorities,</p>
<p>Linkages between corruption and fragility</p>	<p>Corruption and stability, corruption and armed conflict, corruption and legitimacy, corruption and state capacity, corruption and fragility, corruption and peacebuilding;</p>
<p>Linkages between corruption and decreased economic security</p>	<p>Corruption and income security, corruption and job security, corruption and education, corruption and skill, corruption and labor market, migration and economic security; corruption and economic growth; corruption and poverty, remittances and corruption, remittances and institutions, corruption and human displacement; remittances and extortion, remittances and governance, meritocracy and migration</p>
<p>Linkages between corruption and decreased political security</p>	<p>Corruption and elections, corruption and regime type, corruption and political participation, quality of governance and migration; women's rights and migration, migration and institutions; corruption and civil society, corruption and political security, migration and quality of government, gender inequality and migration, corruption and institutions</p>
<p>Additional causes of corruption-related human displacement</p>	<p>Corruption and migration, remittances and corruption, remittances and institutions, corruption and human displacement; remittances and extortion, remittances and governance, meritocracy and migration</p>



## Annex II – Glossary of Migration Key Terms

<b>Asylum Seekers</b>	“Asylum seekers are people who have crossed an international border in search of protection, but whose claims for refugee status have not yet been decided” (Castles et al, 2014, p.222). Procedures for asylum applications can take a long time. Marginalisation can be a consequence of not having a clear legal status.
<b>Circular Migration</b>	Circular migration involves the “fluid and continuous movement of people between countries, including temporary and long-term migration” (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Environmental and Disaster Displacees</b>	This category of migrants includes individuals who are displaced as a consequence of threats environmental security in particular. Examples of such threats are “environmental change (desertification, deforestation, land degradation, rising sea levels), natural disasters (floods, volcanoes, landslides, earthquakes) and man-made disasters (industrial accidents, radioactivity)” (Castles et al, 2014, p.223). As will be discussed later, the impact of environmental factors on migration flows is controversial and often difficult to distinguish from other components of human security (Castles et al, 223).
<b>Forced Displacement</b>	Forced displacement refers to the situation of persons who are forced to leave or flee their homes due to danger to life and limb as a result of human rights violations, war, violence and persecution (Gutsche & Cannizzo-Marcus, 2016)
<b>Highly-Skilled Migration</b>	Migrants “who have achieved at least tertiary education” (UNU Jargon Buster) are considered highly-skilled migrants. Highly-skilled migration is often related to brain drain of the origin country, which implies a “substantial depletion of skills resources” (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Human Smuggling</b>	Human smuggling is defined as “procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” (UNODC, 2004, Annex III). What distinguishes it from human trafficking is that migrants participate voluntarily in the migration process.
<b>Human Trafficking</b>	Human trafficking is defined as the “recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation [... including] the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs” (UNODC, 2004, Annex II).
<b>Internal Migration</b>	Internal migration is a “movement of people from one area of a country to another for the purpose or with the effect of establishing a new residence. This migration may be temporary or permanent. Internal migrants move but remain within their country of origin (e.g. rural to urban migration)” (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Internally Displaced Persons</b>	According to the International Displacement Monitoring Centre (2011) IDPs are defined as individuals who “have been forced to flee their homes because their lives were in danger, but unlike refugees they have not crossed an international border. Many IDPs remain exposed to [human security threats] during their displacement” (p.9).
<b>International Migration</b>	International migration is a movement “across international borders for a purpose other than short-term visits” (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Irregular Migration</b>	Irregular migrants are “persons who, owing to illegal entry or expiry of their visa, lack legal status in a transit or host country. The term applies to migrants who infringe on a country’s admission rules and any other person not authorised to remain in the host country (also called clandestine/illegal/undocumented migrant or migrant in an irregular situation)” (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Labour Migration</b>	Individuals who move within their country or between countries for the purpose of employment are considered labour migrants (IOM, 2015).



<b>Long-Term Migration</b>	"A long-term migrant is a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year, so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence" (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Low-Skilled Migration</b>	Low-skilled migrants are "migrants who have achieved no higher than middle-secondary education" (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Migration</b>	Migration involves "the movement of a person or a group of persons either across an international border, or within a state. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people whatever its length, composition or causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification" (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Permanent Migration</b>	Permanent migration is the "movement of persons to a country other than that of their usual residence with the intention of making the country of destination their permanent residence" (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Temporary Migration</b>	A temporary or short-term migrant "is a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least three months but less than a year except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends or relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage" (IOM, 2015, n.d.).
<b>Refugees</b>	Article 1 of the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as an individual who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it." In other words, refugee status can be obtained in response to human security threats in general and personal, community and political security threats in particular.
<b>Remittances</b>	Remittances are "Monies earned or acquired by non-nationals that are transferred back to their country of origin" (IOM, 2015, n.d.).

## Annex III – List of Interviewed Experts<sup>42</sup>

Name	Country	Organization Name
Veronique Barbelet	Mali	Overseas Development Institute
Morten Bøås	Mali	Norwegian Institute for International Affairs
Donald Bowser	Ukraine	UNDP Ukraine
Richard Danziger	General	IOM Regional Office for Western and Central Africa
Expert	Mali	Norwegian Refugee Council
Expert	Ukraine	International Development Organization
Andriy Garbuza	Ukraine	GIZ Ukraine
Igor Gotsyk	Ukraine	European Business Association
Samuel Kaninda	Mali	Transparency International West Africa
Kateryna Kulchytska	Ukraine	Europe without Barriers Civic Initiative
Oksana Kuziakiv	Ukraine	The Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting
Stanislav Liachinskiy	Ukraine	International Renaissance Foundation
François Menguelé	Mali	GIZ Mali
Abdoulaye Sall	Mali	Transparency International Mali
Tetiana Shevchuk	Ukraine	Anti-Corruption Action Center
Oleksandra Slobodian	Ukraine	CEDOS
Iryna Solonenko	Ukraine	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik e.V.
Yegor Stadny	Ukraine	CEDOS
Oleksii Sydorчук	Ukraine	Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation
Njoya Tikum	Mali	UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa
Saloum Traoré	Mali	Amnesty International Mali
Chantal Uwimana	General	Transparency International
Siebrich Visser	Mali	Human Security Collective
Olga Zhmurko	Ukraine	International Renaissance Foundation

42 In alphabetical order. Interview numbers in the text have been randomly assigned.

## Annex IV – Interview Questionnaire

1. **Could you please introduce yourself briefly and what is your function at the organisation that you currently work for?**

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2. **What is the situation of corruption like in Mali/Ukraine?**

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- a. Which institutions and sectors are most/least affected?
- b. Which are the most common forms of corruption in the country?
- c. Are there reforms/developments that we should be aware of?

3. **In your work how do you encounter corruption?**

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4. **What is the situation of migration like in Mali/Ukraine?**

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- a. Regular and irregular migration?
- b. Which are the most common reasons for people to migrate?
- c. Are there any developments that we should be aware of?

5. **We are researching if corruption is a push-factor for migration. In your opinion – does corruption make people want to leave the country?**

---

- a. What kind of corruption?
- b. In what circumstances?
- c. Do you agree that it might be a direct push-factor?
- d. Do you have examples?

6. **We think that corruption might affect the human security situation of people. Can you give us your insights into the general human security situation in Mali/Ukraine?**

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- a. Economic security
- b. Personal security
- c. Political security
- d. Community security
- e. Health security
- f. Environment security
- g. Food security



7. We think that the connection between corruption and migration might be indirect. We look at the different human security dimensions that can be impacted by corruption and then lead to migration. How do you see these connections in Mali/Ukraine (or your country of expertise)?
- 
- a. Economic security
  - b. Personal security
  - c. Political security
  - d. Community security
  - e. Health security
  - f. Environment security
  - g. Food security
8. Are women affected differently? If yes, how?
- 
- a. Which spheres in your opinion especially affect women?
  - b. Which types of corruption affect women especially?
9. To what extent does a lack of human security caused by corruption lead to migration in Mali/Ukraine?
- 
10. Can you identify best practices for the fight against corruption?
- 
11. Can you identify best practices for the fight against irregular migration?
- 
12. In your view, what needs to be done to address corruption as a cause of (irregular) migration effectively?
- 
13. Is there anything important you would like to add, that I might have missed during this interview regarding this topic?
- 



## Annex V –Key Studies on Corruption and Migration

### 1. Corruption as Push-factor for Migration

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Ahmad & Arjumand (2016)	Impact of corruption on GDP per capita through international migration: an empirical investigation	An attempt has been made to examine the impact of corruption on GDP per capita through a migration channel for a sample of 94 developed and developing countries from 1996 to 2010 using cross section and panel data estimation techniques. Our results show that corruption reduces GDP per capita through a migration channel after controlling for other variables. Our analysis suggests that if emigration is increasing due to rampant corruption, this would not have any significant macroeconomic impact on GDP per capita. Therefore, governments of these economies must revisit their policies and control corruption.	What are the effects of corruption on GDP per capita via the migration channel?	Corruption induces people to shift their resources from productive activities to rent seeking activities. This process compels people either to emigrate (brain drain) or become corrupt (brain in drain). Corruption reduces GDP per capita through the migration channel.
Ariu & Squicciarini (2013)	The Balance of Brains: Corruption and High Skilled Migration	In a mobile labor market, a high emigration rate of high skilled workers is not necessarily a problem, if counterbalanced by a high immigration rate. However, some countries experience a net gain of high skilled while others a net loss. Corruption is part of the explanation, acting through two different channels: first, it pushes skilled natives to virtuous countries, where they can find a job based on meritocratic criteria; second, it discourages the entry of foreign talents, which would hardly have access to string-pulling recommendations. This might induce a prolonged loss in human capital and vanish investments in education.	Does corruption determine the migration decisions of high skilled workers and thus net migration flows?	Corruption partly explains a prolonged loss in human capital of a country: first, it pushes skilled natives to leave; second, it discourages the entry of foreign talents.

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Bergh, Mirkina & Nilsson (2015)	Pushed by Poverty or by Institutions? Determinants of Global Migration Flows	<p>The existing literature on determinants of migration flows typically claims that income differences across countries should be a pushing factor for people's movement. We suggest that institutional quality is a better proxy for the factors that trigger migration. People may well want to stay in or move to relatively poor countries if institutions are good, partly because good institutions have an intrinsic value for people and partly because good institutions may be a sign of future economic growth. In contrast, low income and absolute poverty work both as push-factors and as credit constraints, so that people may want to leave, but few can afford to migrate when poverty is high. We test our hypotheses using new data on bilateral migration flows from Abel and Sander (2014), the Worldwide Governance Indicators and the World Bank data on headcount poverty, using a migration gravity model with a spatial specification. Controlling for both source and destination income levels, we find that institutional quality matters significantly for migration. Poor institutions act as a push-factor, while absolute poverty in a country of origin limits migration. We also find that omitting spatial factors biases the effect of institutions upwards.</p>	<p>This paper analyzes global migration flows to examine whether people tend to leave countries with low institutional quality in favor of countries with better institutions, as well as the role of absolute poverty.</p>	<p>Institutional quality matters significantly for migration; Poor institutions act as a push-factor, while absolute poverty in a country of origin limits migration; omitting spatial factors biases the effect of institutions upwards; control of corruption as pull-factor.</p>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
<p>Carling, Paasche, &amp; Siegel (2015)</p>	<p>Finding Connections: The Nexus between Migration and Corruption</p>	<p>Not available.</p>	<p>What are the connections between corruption and migration?</p>	<p>The article identifies 10 specific ways in which corruption shapes migration or vice versa: 1. Corruption Facilitates Illegal Migration; 2. Corruption Enables Humanitarian Protection; 3. Corruption Impedes the Development Benefits of Migration; 4. Corruption Stimulates Migration Desires; 5. Corruption Promotes the Transnational Ties of Elites; 6. Corruption Discourages Return Migration; 7. Social Remittances Reduce Corruption; 8. Migration Upends Corrupt Social Structures; 9. Migration Sustains Corruption; 10. Corruption Undermines Assistance to Migrants</p>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Clausen, Kraay & Nyiri (2011)	Corruption and Confidence in Public Institutions: Evidence from a Global Survey.	Well-functioning institutions matter for economic development. In order to operate effectively, public institutions must also inspire confidence in those they serve. We use data from the Gallup World Poll, a unique and very large global household survey, to document a quantitatively large and statistically significant negative correlation between corruption and confidence in public institutions. This suggests an important indirect channel through which corruption can inhibit development: by eroding confidence in public institutions. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls for country and respondent-level characteristics. Moreover we show how it can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting at least in part a causal effect from corruption to confidence. Finally, we provide evidence that individuals with low confidence in institutions exhibit low levels of political participation, show increased tolerance for violent means to achieve political ends, and have a greater desire to "vote with their feet" through emigration	What is the role of corruption in undermining confidence in public institutions?	Corruption has a negative effect on confidence in public institutions. Individuals with low confidence in institutions exhibit low levels of political participation, show increased tolerance for violent means to achieve political ends, and have a greater desire to "vote with their feet" through emigration.



Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Cooray & Schneider (2014)	Does Corruption Promote Emigration? An Empirical Examination	This paper empirically investigates the relationship between corruption and the emigration of those with high, medium and low levels of educational attainment. The empirical results indicate that as corruption increases the emigration rate of those with high levels of educational attainment also increases. The emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, however, increases at initial levels of corruption and then decreases beyond a certain point. Splitting the sample by income inequality suggests that increased inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. The policy conclusion is, that government actions should focus on controlling corruption, which in turn would lead to funds being channeled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which would reduce emigration.	What is impact of corruption on high, medium and low skilled migration? Are there potential nonlinearities in the relationship between corruption and emigration? Does corruption have the same effect on the emigration of those with different levels of educational attainment? Does the effect of corruption on emigration depend on the level of income inequality?	As corruption increases the emigration rate of those with high levels of educational attainment also increases. The emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, however, increases at initial levels of corruption and then decreases beyond a certain point. Increased income inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. The policy conclusion is, that government actions should focus on controlling corruption, which in turn would lead to funds being channeled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which would reduce emigration.
Dimant, Krieger & Meierrieks (2013)	The effect of corruption on migration, 1985–2000	We examine the influence of corruption on migration for 111 countries between 1985 and 2000. Robust evidence indicates that corruption is among the push-factors of migration, especially fueling skilled migration. We argue that corruption tends to diminish the returns to education, which is particularly relevant to the better educated.	What is the impact of corruption on migration? Does migration influence the migration decision? Does the influence differ depending on the educational level of the (potential) migrant?	Robust evidence indicates that corruption is among the push-factors of migration, especially fueling skilled migration. Corruption diminishes the returns to education.

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Foadi (2006)	Key Issues and Causes of the Italian Brain Drain	<p>Scientific migration is a highly debated issue in Italy. Evidence of its actuality can be found in newspaper articles, television programmes as well as academic essays. There is a clear-cut use of the expression 'brain drain' rather than of the more modern terms 'brain circulation' or 'brain exchange', generally adopted to describe scientific flows in other European economies. To assess the causes of the Italian exodus of talent, this article uses a comparative approach to research key issues characterizing Italian scientific migration. More specifically, it aligns media descriptions of the phenomenon with the voices echoed by respondents interviewed in a study on mobility and excellence in science careers (the MOBEX project). This makes possible the systematic extraction of key issues of Italian scientific migration. A comparison between media accounts and migrant scientists' narratives gives a clear picture of the nature of such outflow. Similarities and differences between these two social agents further enrich the analysis.</p>	<p>What are the key issues characterizing Italian scientific migration, in a comparative perspective between media accounts and migrant scientists' views?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Even if Italy is among the most industrialized countries in the world, the notion of 'brain drain' can still be applied to it</li> <li>2. Pull-factors include meritocracy, fair recruitment systems abroad, as well as greater investments in research in other countries, better salaries and opportunities abroad (push-factors: the respective opposite). The author finds that corruption, nepotism, bureaucracy and networking are the most essential push-factors (baron culture or system of patronage)</li> </ol>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Lapshyna (2014)	Corruption as a driver of migration aspirations: the case of Ukraine	This paper explores the corruption- migration aspirations nexus in Ukraine. The article demonstrates that corruption continues to pervade all levels of Ukraine's political and socio-economic system, and provides evidence from the findings of EUMAGINE project. The study reveals robust evidence that apart from the traditional migration driver – income differentials between source and destination countries – corruption is also a driver of migration aspirations. In summary, our analysis draws attention to the fact that Ukraine does not only suffer from a broad variety of negative externalities, diverse institutional inefficiencies and structural problems, but may also lose – as a consequence of the negative socio- economic and political effects of corruption – the human capital necessary for sustainable economic development.	Investigate the role of corruption as a driver of migration aspirations in Ukraine.	The findings support the theoretical suggestions that individuals respond to a deterioration of socio-economic and politico-institutional conditions – induced by corruption – by, among other options, leaving the country and migrating to a better place, where corruption is less rampant
Poprawe (2015)	On the relationship between corruption and migration: empirical evidence for a gravity model of migration	This paper shows the relationship between corruption and migration. In particular, countries with much corruption are shown to encourage emigration and discourage immigration because they provide worse and unpredictable economic conditions, more insecurity, and a lower quality of life. This hypothesis is confirmed empirically with a cross-sectional dataset with bilateral migration data covering 230 countries. Well-known implications of the gravity model are confirmed here: larger populations, a common language and a common border increase migration, while distance between two countries decreases migration. Furthermore, education, GDP per capita, inflation in the destination country, as well as corruption and education in the origin country can robustly explain migration. Corruption thus appears to be a push-factor of migration.	Does corruption effect migration?	Corruption is a push-factor for migration because of its negative effect on the economy. Differences in corruption in different economies result in migration. The results hold not only for perceived corruption but also for measures of experienced corruption

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Schneider (2015)	Does corruption promote emigration?	Not available.	Does corruption promote emigration?	Corruption increases emigration among workers at all education levels by eroding living conditions. But different levels of corruption have different effects on workers of different skill levels. At low levels of corruption, medium- and low-skilled workers leave, but once corruption reaches a certain threshold, this emigration slows. Among highly-skilled and highly educated workers, however, emigration rises with corruption. The emigration of highly-educated workers, in particular, reduces a country's growth prospects and can lead to a vicious cycle. Thus, reducing the level of corruption should be a major goal of governments.
Wheatland (2015)	Literature review: corruption as a driver for migration.	Not available.	What are the ways in which corruption leads to scarcity of economic opportunities, and to a lack of human security, which pushes people to flee their home countries?	Corruption as driver of migration and facilitator of illegal migration

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Yusuf (2012)	Receiving from the Attic: 'High Value' Migration and Complicity for Underdevelopment and Corruption in the Global South	Through a focus on the UK's 'High Value Migrants' programme, this article directs attention to how commercial migration laws and policies of developed countries could negatively affect the global South. Drawing mainly on insights from criminology and development studies, it investigates how the commercial migration laws and policies, specifically the aspects that deal with encouraging or attracting 'high-value' foreign entrepreneurs and investors, make the state potentially complicit in corruption and underdevelopment in the global South. There is an important need to address the implicated migration laws and policies as a critical and integral part of international efforts to combat corruption and promote peace and development in the global South. Reform of such laws and policies is in the long-term interest of all stakeholders.	How does/can commercial migration laws and policies of OECD countries impact the global south negatively?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. – OECD country's (e.g. Australia, UK and Canada) anti-corruption rhetoric not substantiated by migration laws and policies that favor applicants with high investment potential; lack of regulation on the source of funds of high value migrants promote corruption in the developing countries of the global South.</li> <li>2. – Migration policies like the high value migrant programme constitute a higher level of complicity in corruption in the global south since they potentially facilitate legitimation through integration of illicit funds from corrupt PEPs.</li> </ol>

## 2. Corruption as Facilitator of (Irregular) Migration

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Bales (2011)	What Predicts Human Trafficking?	If the international community has achieved agreement on the definition of human trafficking, we still have only a partial understanding of what drives it. We know that poverty and vulnerability represent 'push-factors' and that employment opportunity presents an important 'pull-factor.' But which of these factors is the most important? The regression analysis of 76 variables undertaken here confirms that corruption, poverty, conflict, and the 'pull' factor of opportunity are all significant predictors of trafficking. Some of the most obvious strategies for slowing trafficking, on the basis of this analysis, would include those activities known to reduce 'push' factors, such as measures to reduce governmental corruption in both origin and destination countries, population control measures, especially poverty reduction, and tackling international inequalities in wealth. International financial institutions should give incentives to programmes for land reform, education and training, and health care, rather than promulgate 'austerity' requirements that undermine such programmes.	What are the strongest predictors of trafficking FROM a country on the global scale? - What are the strongest predictors of trafficking TO a country on the global scale?	Corruption, poverty, conflict and the pull-factor of opportunity are all significant predictors of trafficking. 1. Corruption is found to be the most important predictor of trafficking 2. Corruption is a more important explanatory factor of trafficking from a country than to a country 3. One important way to reduce trafficking is to reduce corruption in origin and destination country
Carling (2006)	Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking from Nigeria to Europe	Not available.	Regarding corruption: Which role does corruption play in regard to migration, human smuggling and trafficking from Nigeria to Europe?	1. Nigeria culture can be described as "patron-client culture," which favours corruption and benefits organized criminal groups 2. Asylum applications are facilitated by false documents obtained by means of corruption and allegedly forged newspaper articles resulting from bribing journalists or editors were discovered 3. Corruption is one of the factors that hinder investment of remittances in Nigeria

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
<p>Carling, Paasche, &amp; Siegel (2015)</p>	<p>Finding Connections: The Nexus between Migration and Corruption</p>	<p>Not available.</p>	<p>What are the connections between corruption and migration?</p>	<p>The article identifies 10 specific ways in which corruption shapes migration or vice versa: 1. Corruption Facilitates Illegal Migration; 2. Corruption Enables Humanitarian Protection; 3. Corruption Impedes the Development Benefits of Migration; 4. Corruption Stimulates Migration Desires; 5. Corruption Promotes the Transnational Ties of Elites; 6. Corruption Discourages Return Migration; 7. Social Remittances Reduce Corruption; 8. Migration Opens Corrupt Social Structures; 9. Migration Sustains Corruption; 10. Corruption Undermines Assistance to Migrants</p>
<p>Mahmoud &amp; Trebesch (2010)</p>	<p>The economics of human trafficking and labour migration: Micro-evidence from Eastern Europe</p>	<p>Human trafficking is a humanitarian problem of global scale, but quantitative research on the issue barely exists. This paper is the first attempt to analyze the economics of human trafficking and labour migration based on micro data, using unique household surveys from Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. We find that individual trafficking risks are much higher in regions with large emigration flows. The reasons are lower recruitment costs for traffickers in emigration areas and, to a less extent, more negative self-selection into migration. Our results also indicate that illegal migration increases trafficking risks and that better information, e.g. through awareness campaigns, might be an effective strategy to reduce the crime. These findings may help policymakers to better target antitrafficking efforts.</p>	<p>What are the drivers of human trafficking?</p>	<p>We find that individual trafficking risks are much higher in regions with large emigration flows due to lower recruitment costs for traffickers in emigration areas and more negative self-selection into migration. Moreover, illegal migration increases trafficking risks. Better information, e.g. through awareness campaigns, might be an effective strategy to reduce the crime.</p>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Richards (2004)	The Trafficking of Migrant Workers: What are the Links between Labour Trafficking and Corruption	<p>Trafficking in human beings, including the trafficking of persons for migrant labour exploitation is a violation of human rights. Yet what is often neglected in deliberations on the situation of trafficked migrant workers is the existence of the overarching discourse of universal human rights protecting all workers, regardless of situation, exploitation, or legal status. International human rights standards do offer protection to migrant workers that ought to be more widely applied. Yet there remains reluctance by states to offer trafficked migrant workers little more than scant protection for fundamental rights.</p> <p>Attempting to locate and describe the subject of labour trafficking is currently conducted at the peril of simplifying the issues to a few basic and inadequate descriptions. While it is speculated that the worker subjected to labour trafficking is multifaceted, distinct features are largely unknown. The limitations in drawing conclusions are primarily due to a lack of data on the number and circumstances of trafficked migrant workers.</p> <p>This paper will also analyse how and where corruption oils the wheels of trafficking networks. It is suggested that a symbiotic relationship between corruption and trafficking exists, a relationship that both increases risks for migrant workers and facilitates the processes of trafficking of people for labour exploitation. Consequently it should be crucial that any analysis of labour trafficking allocates significant resources to identifying the particulars of a possible relationship between trafficking and corruption. However, to the detriment of holistic strategies to understand and combat labour trafficking, corruption is yet to be named and targeted in most anti- trafficking statistical research or policy studies.</p>	<p>What are the Links Between Labour Trafficking and Corruption?</p>	<p>It is suggested that a symbiotic relationship between corruption and trafficking exists, a relationship that both increases risks for migrant workers and facilitates the processes of trafficking of people for labour exploitation. Consequently it should be crucial that any analysis of labour trafficking allocates significant resources to identifying the particulars of a possible relationship between trafficking and corruption.</p>



Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Rusev (2013)	Human Trafficking, Border Security and Related Corruption in the EU	Not available.	What is the relevant academic and policy research on the subject of corruption? And: What are the mechanisms of corruption and the principal anti-corruption measures targeting them in the public security sector (focus on border control institutions)?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Corruption is a precondition for human trafficking and is used by organized criminal groups at all stages of the trafficking process in origin and destination countries.</li> <li>2. The greatest corruption pressure in Europe arises on its Eastern and Southern borders</li> <li>3. Risk factors to border guard corruption are power of border controls, type of border configuration, the size of border crossing points, young officials and greater income disparities.</li> </ol>
Shelley (2014)	Human Smuggling and Trafficking into Europe	Not available.	The research was commissioned by the Transatlantic Council on Migration, an initiative of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI), for its eighth plenary meeting in June 2012, held in Washington, DC with the theme "Curbing the Influence of 'Bad Actors' in International Migration". It served as one of the reports that informed the Council's discussions.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. - Corruption is deeply connected to the problem of human trafficking in Europe because travel agencies, border guards, customs officials, consular officers, and other diplomatic personnel must be bribed or extorted for trafficking to be successful</li> <li>2. - The high levels of corruption in transit countries greatly facilitate the movement of people</li> <li>3. - Officials in embassies of Western European countries are also engaged in corruption</li> </ol>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
<p><a href="#">Skrivankova, Dell, Larson, Adomeit &amp; Albert (2011)</a></p>	<p>The Role of Corruption in Trafficking in Persons</p>	<p>Trafficking in persons and corruption are closely linked criminal activities, whose interrelation is frequently referred to in international fora<sup>1</sup>. Yet, the correlation between the two phenomena, and the actual impact of corruption on trafficking in persons, are generally neglected in the development and implementation of anti-human trafficking policies and measures. This lack of attention may substantially undermine initiatives to combat trafficking in persons and prevent the customization of responses as needed. Only after recognizing the existence and the effects of corruption in the context of human trafficking, can the challenges posed by it be met. It is thus important to examine how corruption plays a role in human trafficking and actually contributes to the growth of the phenomenon.</p> <p>This paper seeks to outline patterns of corruption in trafficking in persons; provide a description of relevant international legal instruments and outline some practical guidance on what can be done to address the issue of corruption in human trafficking.</p> <p>In an attempt to keep its scope within reasonable limits, the paper focuses mostly on corruption of public officials, and in particular of law enforcement and criminal justice actors.</p>	<p>This paper seeks to outline patterns of corruption in trafficking in persons; provide a description of relevant international legal instruments and outline some practical guidance on what can be done to address the issue of corruption in human trafficking. It focuses on public officials.</p>	<p>The paper provides a general overview on the issue of human trafficking and corruption. It first defines both issues and the link between them. In addition, it provides an overview of related problems, patterns, and outcomes. It then identifies international legal instruments (UN Conventions) as well as corresponding and complementing provisions of UNCAC, UNTOC and the Protocols. Finally, it formulates 15 recommendations on how to further improve the situation.</p>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Turbibille (2011)	Silver over the border: US law enforcement corruption on the Southwest Border	<p>US national security is seriously challenged by the more visible appearance of American law enforcement and security corruption among organizations charged with policing and protecting the US – Mexican border. A burgeoning number of allegations, criminal investigations, indictments, and convictions directed against US law enforcement personnel calls into question the fundamental integrity of US border security forces and leadership, as well as the willingness or capability of key agencies and their executive branch leadership to effect reforms. For the United States, such law enforcement and other official US Government corruption acts like corrosive acid on the legitimacy of these institutions and upon domestic and allied trust in their integrity and competence.</p>	To what extent is US law enforcement on the South West border affected by corruption?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. – Corruption enables and facilitates smuggling of undocumented aliens, drugs and weapons</li> <li>2. – Corruption occurs in federal agencies engaged in border security; state and local police jurisdictions; judicial entities charged with enforcing laws; military personnel assigned to support local authorities; and local/state political office-holders among others</li> <li>3. – Corruption negatively impacts the legitimacy of US border agencies and officials, it erodes the national and international trust in their work and threatens the security of American and Mexican security personnel and civilians</li> </ol>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Uddin (2014)	Human Trafficking in South Asia: Issues of Corruption and Human Security	<p>This paper addresses the situation of human trafficking in South Asia, particularly in India, Bangladesh and Nepal. It argues that the focus on trafficking either as an issue of illegal migration or prostitution still dominates the discourse of trafficking in these countries, which prioritizes state security over human security and does not adequately address the root causes of trafficking and the insecurity of trafficked individuals. The root causes or vulnerability factors of trafficking such as structural inequality, culturally sanctioned practices, poverty or economic insecurity, organ trade, bonded labor, gender violence, which are further exacerbated by corruption, have remained unrecognized in academic and policy areas. This paper argues that emphasis needs to be given to such underlying root causes, particularly to corruption that fuels human trafficking and threatens human security of the trafficked persons in South Asian countries. Accordingly, it provides policy recommendations to address and deal with the problem.</p>	<p>What is the inter-relationship among corruption, human trafficking and human security, which has been given little or no attention until recently?</p>	<p>Emphasis needs to be given to underlying root causes of human trafficking, particularly to corruption that fuels human trafficking and threatens human security of the trafficked persons in South Asian countries.</p>

### 3. Effect of International Migration and Remittances on Corruption Levels in the Home and Host Country

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Abdih, Chami, Dagher & Montiel (2012)	Remittances and Institutions: Are Remittances a Curse?	This paper addresses the complex and overlooked relationship between the receipt of workers' remittances and institutional quality in the recipient country. Using a simple model, we show how an increase in remittance inflows can lead to deterioration of institutional quality—specifically, to an increase in the share of funds diverted by the government for its own purposes. In a cross section of 111 countries we empirically verify this proposition and find that a higher ratio of remittances to GDP leads to lower indices of control of corruption, government effectiveness, and rule of law, even after controlling for potential reverse causality.	Do remittance flows also generate adverse effects on the quality of institutions in countries that receive these flows?	Remittances inflows may have adverse effects on domestic institutional quality – specifically, on the quality of domestic governance. This is because when households receive remittances, the government finds it less costly to free ride on the households and their emigrant relatives and divert resources for its own purposes. Hence, access to remittances makes government corruption less costly for domestic households, which is why the government engages in more corruption.
Batista & Vicente (2011)	Do Migrants Improve Governance at Home? Evidence from a Voting Experiment	Can international migration promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability? A behavioral measure of the population's desire for better governance was designed to examine this question. A postcard was distributed to households promising that if enough postcards were mailed back, results from a survey module on perceived corruption would be published in the national media. Data from a tailored household survey were used to examine the determinants of this behavioral measure of demand for political accountability (undertaking the costly action of mailing the postcard) and to isolate the positive effect of international emigration using locality-level variation. The estimated effects are robust to the use of instrumental variables, including past migration and macro shocks in the destination countries. The estimated effects can be attributed mainly to migrants who emigrated to countries with better governance, especially migrants who return home. JEL codes: F22, O12, O15, O43, P16 Keywords: international migration, governance, political accountability, institutions, effects of emigration in origin countries, household survey, Cape Verde, sub-Saharan Africa.	Can international migration promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability?	The findings point to an overall positive impact of international migration on the demand for improved political accountability (related to corruption) in the country of origin. In particular, the results emphasize the importance of the migration destination country: the impacts are stronger for migration to countries with better governance. The impacts are also stronger for return migrants than for current migrants, who can only indirectly influence their relationship networks in the home country.

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Beine & Sekkat (2013)	Skilled migration and the transfer of institutional norms	We examine two impacts of international emigration on the evolution of the institutions in the origin countries. The first impact concerns the influence of emigration per se (i.e. people who left the country can voice more or less from abroad). The second impact relates to the transfer of the norms of the host country to the home country. The existence of both impacts is confirmed using different indicators of institutional quality. The effects appear stronger when skilled emigration is considered. The main conclusions are robust to alternative econometric methods and to the use of subsamples involving developing countries only.	i) What is the impact of international migration on the quality of institutions in the sending country? ii) Is the level of education of emigrants important for such an impact to take place? and iii) Does a change in the quality of institution in the home country depend on their quality in the host country i.e. is there a transfer of norms?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o Both skilled and unskilled migration have an impact on the quality of home country's institutions, but the impact of skilled migrants is higher</li> <li>o Impact is positive for both groups, except for one case: skilled migrants have a negative impact on the home countries "voice and accountability"; this is due to exit/voice model: skilled emigration reduces the voicing capability at home which weakens pressures in favour of institutional improvement. Potential voicing from abroad does not compensate for the loss in domestic capacity to voice</li> <li>o Impact takes place either way, but higher impact with skilled migration</li> <li>o Evidence for positive and significant effect of host country institutional quality on home country institutional quality, especially with skilled migrants</li> </ul>
Berdiev, Kim, & Chang (2013)	Remittances and corruption	We examine the effect of remittances on corruption using panel data for 111 countries over the period of 1986–2010. We find that remittances increase corruption, especially in non-OECD countries.	What is the relationship between access to remittances and tolerance of rent-seeking behaviour.?	remittances increase corruption, especially in non-OECD countries; GDP per capita growth significantly increases corruption. One possible explanation is that when people are poverty-stricken, there is nothing much to extract through corruptive behaviour. As income rises, there is more to gain, and, thus, greater incentive for corruption. the effect of FDI on corruption is insignificant.

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Buzurukov & Lee (2014)	The impact of corruption on apprehension level of immigrants: A study of the United States immigration	This paper demonstrates the effect of country level corruption on illicit behavior of individuals in a foreign country. The empirical research investigates the probability of individuals being apprehended overseas due to the influence of corrupt environment in their home countries. Using cross-sectional data for empirical analysis from 104 different countries over the period of 2009– 2011, the authors focused on finding how people from various countries act and behave differently while stationing outside of their home countries. Their findings reveal some evidences that individuals coming to the United States from corruption-ridden countries are more likely to be apprehended than individuals from less corrupt countries are.	Are the people from corruption-ridden countries more likely to be involved in illegal practices due to the country's corruption level where illegal practices as bribery is a common way of life? Or? Are the people from less corrupt countries less likely to be involved in illegal practices due to somehow absence of corrupt practices within the country?	Their findings reveal some evidences that individuals coming to the United States from corruption-ridden countries are more likely to be apprehended than individuals from less corrupt countries are. For example, if El Salvador (CI=65) reduces the corruption level to that of Saudi Arabia (CI=55), the average number of apprehended Salvadorians in the United States could be reduced to about 89 people.
Carling, Paasche, & Siegel (2015)	Finding Connections: The Nexus between Migration and Corruption	Not available.	What are the connections between corruption and migration?	The article identifies 10 specific ways in which corruption shapes migration or vice versa: 1. Corruption Facilitates Illegal Migration; 2. Corruption Enables Humanitarian Protection; 3. Corruption Impedes the Development Benefits of Migration; 4. Corruption Stimulates Migration Desires; 5. Corruption Promotes the Transnational Ties of Elites; 6. Corruption Discourages Return Migration; 7. Social Remittances Reduce Corruption; 8. Migration Opens Corrupt Social Structures; 9. Migration Sustains Corruption; 10. Corruption Undermines Assistance to Migrants

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Dimant, Krieger & Redlin (2014)	A Crook is a Crook... But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption	This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984–2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation methods using Fixed Effects (FE) and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country's corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the socio-economic implications associated with migration flows.	What are the underlying effects of corruption flows on the destination country and what are the distinct channels through which corruption may migrate?	a) the effect of general migration on the corruption level in the destination country is insignificant b) immigration from high corruption countries 'boosts' corruption in the destination country. They argue that the fear that immigration might also lead to an inflow of corruption is justified.



Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Ferrerias (2013)	Corruption and Foreign Education	Not available.	What is the impact of foreign-educated individuals on levels of corruption in their home countries?	<p>Living abroad and being exposed to less corrupt environments give students the opportunity to reduce the levels of corruption in their home countries: 1. – foreign education in less corrupt countries reduces corruption in the home country; 2. – When the corruption difference between the sending and the host country is zero, the effect that sending students abroad is negative. The author hypothesizes that this is because students might be encouraged to behave in the same way as the officials/businessmen in their home countries, and in the case of very corrupt countries, this perpetuates corruption and worsens the conditions. In addition, this could be a result of the impact of “brain drain”, as the country might suffer from a slow-down in the potential for development and economic growth and an increase in the chances for corruption. 3. – not sending any students abroad results in an increase in corruption in the sending country. The author hypothesizes that this is a result of isolation from the world economy, globalization and progress. 4. – the effect of sending students to receive tertiary education abroad on corruption is relatively immediate given the insignificance in most of the variables in the lagged regressions and the potential for a reversal in educational values.</p>


Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Ivlevs & King (2014)	Emigration, Remittances and Corruption Experience of Those Staying Behind	We examine the effects of emigration and remittances on the corruption experience of migrant household members staying in the countries of origin. We hypothesize that the effects of emigration on corruption can be both positive (via migrant value transfer) and negative (via misuse of monetary remittances). Using Gallup Balkan Monitor survey data in instrumental variable analysis, we find that migrant households are more likely to face bribe situations and be asked for bribes by public officials. At the same time, having relatives abroad reduces the probability of actually paying a bribe. This beneficial effect is offset by receiving monetary remittances.	Does the value system absorbed by migrants in their host country affect the incidence of corruption among the migrant's relatives in the country of origin? If so, how?	Migrant households are more likely to face bribe situations and be asked for bribes by public officials. At the same time, having relatives abroad reduces the probability of actually paying a bribe. This beneficial effect is offset by receiving monetary remittances.
Mahmoud, Rapoport, Stainmayr & Trebesch (2014)	The Effect of Labor Migration on the Diffusion of Democracy: Evidence from a Former Soviet Republic	Migration contributes to the circulation of goods, knowledge, and ideas. Using community and individual-level data from Moldova, we show that the emigration wave that started in the late 1990s strongly affected electoral outcomes and political preferences in Moldova during the following decade and was eventually instrumental in bringing down the last ruling Communist government in Europe. Our results are suggestive of information transmission and cultural diffusion channels. Identification relies on the quasi-experimental context studied and on the differential effects arising from the fact that emigration was directed both to more democratic Western Europe and to less democratic Russia.	What is the effect of labor migration on political outcomes at home?	The main result is a strong and robust effect of migration patterns on electoral preferences and outcomes. In addition, the paper finds suggestive evidence that the effect of emigration works through information transmission and cultural diffusion channels; Corruption was one of the main political issues mentioned by the interviewees. Migrants told us that living in Western Europe had made them less likely to tolerate corruption and that they had encouraged their peers in Moldova not to pay bribes and to support parties with an anti-corruption agenda instead.

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Sultan (1993)	Bureaucratic corruption as a consequence of the Gulf migration: The case of North Yemen	Sizable migration of workers from North Yemen to other Gulf nations, beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, produced a large influx of funds into the nation in the form of workers' remittances. This produced a general rise in living standards and improved balance-of-payment statistics, but also greatly increased corruption as poorly-paid officials struggled to make a living in the inflated economy and private parties sought to circumvent economic regulations. Reform efforts met with apathy or even violence, and corruption eventually reached systematic if not systemic levels. Many Yemeni migrants have recently been repatriated in the wake of the Gulf War. Whether or not this will reduce corruption depends upon many factors, such as the activities of the nation's increasingly independent press and the successful exploitation of oil and gas reserves.	How does the process of the Gulf migration reversion affect the state of bureaucratic corruption in North Yemen?	<p>1. – Initial migration from North Yemen to the richer Gulf countries and the remittances as a result of this resulted in increased rates of inflation and a growing demand for goods and property. This consequently reduced the real wages of bureaucrats in relation to those receiving remittances and those working in the private sector, who satisfied the internal increase in demand for goods and services. The bureaucratic expansion as a result of the influx of foreign exchange through developmental programmes also caused an expansion of low-paid bureaucrats who resort to corrupt practices in order to ameliorate their pay.</p> <p>2. – The return migration in 1989 due to repatriation from neighbouring Gulf states and the union with South Yemen resulted in inflation due to the sudden influx of savings and money from abroad. The increased urbanization and its consequent demand for bureaucratic services created more opportunities for governmental exploitation by bureaucrats. This is reinforced by the political history of low policing and punishment of corrupt behaviour by the government. Moreover, allowing corruption is also a means by which the central government can afford not to increase the salary of bureaucrats during times of inflation.</p>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Tyburski (2014)	Curse or Cure? Remittances and Corruption in the Developing World	<p>This dissertation examines the relationship between migrant remittances, money earned by migrant workers and sent back home, and corruption. Remittances total more \$400 billion US a year, making them an important capital flow with understudied political consequences. Some scholarship argues that remittances increase corruption by allowing governments to reduce their provision of public goods and redistribute wealth to political supporters as private goods. In contrast, I argue that the relationship between remittances and corruption varies by regime type. Remittances will likely aggravate corruption in authoritarian regimes where governments require smaller supporting coalitions and may be more likely to view remittances as an opportunity to increase political patronage. Moreover, the costs of political activity are higher for remittance recipients in authoritarian regimes, and their probability of influencing corruption is lower. Remittances may help mitigate corruption, especially in democratic regimes. Democratic institutions require larger coalitions while lowering the costs of participation. I test the plausibility of my theory using cross-province level studies of Mexico and India-- two of the largest remittance-receiving states. Results from these cases do suggest that remittances associate with reductions in corruption while controlling for other socioeconomic and political causes. A third, cross-national study tests the theory's generality. Empirical analyses of panel data from 127 developing states between 2000 and 2010 generally support my expectations. This research advances social science by refining theoretical implications of migrant remittances while providing an empirical account of their political importance. Moreover, it guides future projects to focus on the factors that make remittances a curse in some states and a cure in others.</p>	What is the relation between remittances and corruption?	<p>Remittances do influence corruption, but shows that the relationship varies considerably between states.</p> <p>Institutions explain much of this variation by shaping political incentives for leaders, migrants, and recipients. Leaders in closed regimes tend to successfully leverage remittances for their own political benefit, but remittances associate with better corruption control in more democratic regimes.</p> <p>Other state characteristics also play an appreciable role. HLM can help account for this complexity, and should continue to be a useful tool for political - economy research using panel data.</p> <p>As remittances continue to grow in volume, it will be important for research to avoid the temptation of making unidirectional assertions about their political effects.</p>

Author(s) and Year	Title	Abstract	Research Question or Aim	Main Findings
Tyburski (2012)	The Resource Curse Reversed? Remittances and Corruption in Mexico	Do remittances increase corruption in recipient states? Previous research suggests that remittances allow governments to maintain policies that create corrupt state–society relations. In contrast, this paper argues that remittances mitigate corruption by increasing government accountability and providing other incentives to reform. Using data from Mexico in 2001–2007, this study shows that corruption trended downward in states receiving larger remittance sums, after controlling for political competition, divided government, and market openness. The results are robust to instrumental variable analysis testing for potential endogeneity between corruption and migration. These findings bring attention to remittances as an exogenous resource for reform minded groups and suggest that they may operate as the converse of the resource curse.	Do remittances increase corruption in the recipient state?	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. – Remittances change the structural conditions that support corrupt state–society relations by improving government accountability and providing incentives to initiate corruption reform.</li> <li>2. – Remittances change the structural incentives supporting corruption because they flow to a dispersed group that bears the costs of corruption and that can therefore seek to reform through political activity.</li> <li>3. – Remittances increase government accountability to dispersed interest groups and provide top–down incentives to reduce corruption.</li> <li>4. – The Mexican's government has changed its orientation towards the diaspora: they earned a voice and significant leverage in national politics.</li> </ol>

## Annex VI - Corruption and Economic Growth



Source: Gupta and Ogada (2016, p. 6)

## Annex VII – Key Facts Mali

Indicator	Statistic
<b>GENERAL</b>	
Region <sup>1</sup>	Western Africa
Total area, in sq km <sup>a</sup>	1,240,192
Capital city <sup>a</sup>	Bamako
Population (2015) <sup>b</sup>	17,599,694
Capital (2015) <sup>a</sup>	2,515,000
Urban population (2015) <sup>a</sup>	39.9%
<b>ECONOMY</b>	
GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	2,428
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	2,36
National currency (2016) <sup>c</sup>	CFA (Communaute Financiere Africaine) Franc (XOF)
Official exchange rate (XOF per US\$, period average) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	591.45
Unemployment (% of labour force) (2015) <sup>a</sup>	0,3
<b>Demography</b>	
<b>Age structure (2016 est.)<sup>a</sup></b>	
0-14 years	47.27%
15-24 years	19.19%
25-54 years	26.82%
55-64 years	3.76%
65 years and over	2.95%
Age dependency ratio (% of working population) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	1001,84
Median age (2016 est.) <sup>a</sup>	42782
Population growth rate (2015) <sup>b</sup>	29,62
Birth rate (2016 est.) <sup>a</sup>	44.4/1,000 population
Death rate (2016 est.) <sup>a</sup>	14.7/1,000 population
Life expectancy at birth (total) (2016 est.) <sup>a</sup>	55.8 years
Sex ratio, total (male(s)/female) (2016 est.) <sup>a</sup>	0.95
<b>SOCIETY</b>	
Ethnic groups (2012-13 est.) <sup>a</sup>	Bambara 34.1%
	Fulani (Peul) 14.7%
	Sarakole 10.8%
	Senufo 10.5%
	Dogon 8.9%
	Malinke 8.7%
	Bobo 2.9%
	Songhai 1.6%

Indicator	Statistic
	Tuareg 0.9%
	Other Malian 6.1%
	From member of Economic Community of West African States 0.3%
	Other 0.4%
Languages (2009 est.) <sup>a</sup>	French (official)
	Bambara 46.3%
	Peul/Foulfoulbe 9.4%
	Dogon 7.2%
	Maraka/Soninke 6.4%
	Malinke 5.6%
	Sonrhai/Djerma 5.6%
	Minianka 4.3%
	Tamacheq 3.5%
	Senoufo 2.6%
	Bobo 2.1%
	Unspecified 0.7%
	Other 6.3%
Religions (2009 est.) <sup>a</sup>	Muslim 94.8%
	Christian 2.4%
	Animist 2%
	None 0.5%
	Unspecified 0.3%
Administrative divisions (2016) <sup>a</sup>	8 regions
	1 district
<b>EDUCATION</b>	
Adult literacy rat, 15+, both sexes (%) (2015 est) <sup>a</sup>	38.7%
School life expectancy, both sexes (primary to tertiary education (2011) <sup>a</sup>	8 years
<b>MIGRATION</b>	
Net migration (2012) <sup>b</sup>	302,449
International migrant stock (2015) <sup>c</sup>	1,005,607
% of total population	42921
Refugees and others of concern to UNHCR (mid-2015)	148,309
Internationally Displaced People (IDP) (2016) <sup>d</sup>	49,883
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population) (2000) <sup>b</sup>	14814
Personal remittances, received (current US\$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	894 billion
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	6828
Average transaction costs of remittances (%) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	45413

Source: <sup>a</sup> CIA World Factbook (2016); <sup>b</sup> World Bank (2016); <sup>c</sup> UN Data (2016); <sup>d</sup> IOM (2016); <sup>e</sup> UN DESA (2016)



## Annex VIII – Key Facts Ukraine

Indicator	Statistic
<b>GENERAL</b>	
Region <sup>a</sup>	Eastern Europe
Total area, in sq km <sup>a</sup>	603,500 (including Crimea)
Capital city <sup>a</sup>	Kyiv
Population (2015) <sup>b</sup>	45,198,200
Capital (2015) <sup>a</sup>	2,942,000
Urban population (2015) <sup>a</sup>	69.7%
<b>ECONOMY</b>	
GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	7,915.87
GNI per capita, PPP (current international \$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	7,810
National currency (2015) <sup>a</sup>	Hryvnia (UAH)
Official exchange rate (LCU per US\$, period average) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	21.58
Unemployment (% of labour force) (2014) <sup>a</sup>	9.3
<b>DEMOGRAPHY</b>	
Age structure (2016 est.) <sup>c</sup>	
0-14 years	15.51%
15-24 years	10.3%
25-54 years	44.47%
55-64 years	13.68%
65 years and over	16.05%
Age dependency ratio (% of working population) (2015) <sup>b,23</sup>	43.34
Median age (2016 est.) <sup>c</sup>	40.4 years
Population growth rate (2010-2015) <sup>a</sup>	-0.4 (including Crimea)
Birth rate (2014) <sup>b</sup>	10.8/1,000 population
Death rate (2014) <sup>b</sup>	14.7/1,000 population
Life expectancy at birth (total) (2014) <sup>b</sup>	71.19 years
Sex ratio, total (male(s)/female) (2016 est.) <sup>c</sup>	0.5

Indicator	Statistic
<b>SOCIETY</b>	
Ethnic groups (2001 est.) <sup>c</sup>	Ukrainian 77.8%, Russian 17.3%, Belarusian 0.6%, Moldovan 0.5%, Crimean Tatar 0.5%, Bulgarian 0.4%, Hungarian 0.3%, Romanian 0.3%, Polish 0.3%, Jewish 0.2%, other 1.8%
Languages (2001 est.) <sup>c</sup>	Ukrainian (official) 67.5%, Russian (regional language) 29.6%, other (includes small Crimean Tatar-, Moldavian, - and Hungarian-speaking minorities) 2.9%
Religions (2013 est.) <sup>c</sup>	Orthodox (two thirds), Ukrainian Greek Catholic (8-10%), Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim (less than 1%), Jewish (less than 1%)
Administrative divisions	24 provinces (singular: oblast), 1 autonomous republic (Crimea), 2 municipalities with oblast status
<b>EDUCATION</b>	
Adult literacy rate, 15+, both sexes (%) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	99.76
Gross enrolment ratio, primary, both sexes (%) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	103.92
<b>MIGRATION</b>	
Net migration (2012) <sup>b</sup>	195,000
International migrant stock (mid-2015) <sup>a</sup>	4,834,900
% of total population	10.8
Refugees and others of concern to UNHCR (mid-2015) <sup>a</sup>	1,426,580
Emigration rate of tertiary educated (% of total tertiary educated population) (2000) <sup>b</sup>	4.35
Personal remittances, received (current US\$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	5.845 billion
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	6.45
Personal remittances, paid (current US\$) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	627,000,000
Average transaction costs of remittances (%) (2015) <sup>b</sup>	4.85

<sup>a</sup> UN Data (2016); <sup>b</sup> World Bank (2016); <sup>c</sup> CIA World Factbook (2016)

## Annex IX – Corruption Indicators Mali

### Global Corruption Barometer 2015 Mali

Indicator	Statistic
% of respondents reporting that the level of corruption in Mali has increased	0,30
% of respondents reporting to have paid a bribe, give a gift, or did a service for:	0,18
Public schools	0,07
Public hospitals	0,08
ID, voter's card, permit	0,22
Utilities	0,1
Police	0,35
courts	*
% of respondents who state the government is NOT fighting corruption	0,56
% of respondents who think ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption	0,5

### Corruption in various institutions, Global Corruption Barometer 2015 Mali

Institutions	% of respondents who feel that [institutions] is involved in corruption
President/Prime minister	0,35
Members of Parliament	0,36
Government officials	0,43
Local councilors	0,44
Police	0,53
Tax officials	0,46
Judges and magistrates	0,56
Traditional leaders	0,13
Religious leaders	0,13
Business executives	0,7
Public sector average	0,45

### Global Integrity Report 2016

Theme	Score (0 weak to 100 strong)
Transparency & Accountability	55
Rule of Law	64
Accountability	61
Elections	65
Public Management	63
Civil Service Integrity	42
Access to information & Openness	37

## Annex X – Corruption Indicators Ukraine

### Global Corruption Barometer 2013<sup>43</sup> Ukraine

Indicator	Ukraine
% of respondents reporting that the level of corruption has increased	59%
% of respondents reporting to have a paid bribes in the past year	37%
To the police	49%
To medical & health services	41%
To education services	33%
To land services	25%
To registry and permit services	22%
To the judiciary	21%
To tax revenue	18%
To utilities	6%
% of respondents admitting that personal contacts are important/very important to get things done in the public sector	82%
% of respondents believing that the government is either largely or entirely run by a few big entities acting in their own self interest	84%
% of respondents agreeing/strongly agreeing that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption	29%
% of respondents believing that government actions against corruption are ineffective	80%
% of respondents saying they would NOT report an incident of corruption	74%
Because it would not make a difference	63%
Because I am afraid of the consequences	24%

Source: Transparency International (2013)

<sup>43</sup> Data for The Global Corruption Barometer report 2015/2016 for Europe, including Ukraine, has not been published yet.

Corruption in various public sectors, Global Corruption Barometer 2013<sup>44</sup> Ukraine

Sector	% of respondents who feel that [sector] is extremely corrupt	Corruption value (not corrupt : 1 – extremely corrupt: 5)
Judiciary	87%	4.5
Police	84%	4.4
Public offices/civil services	82%	4.3
Medical and health issues	77%	4.2
Parliament/legislature	77%	4.2
Political parties	74%	4.1
Education system	69%	4.0
Business/private sector	65%	3.9
Military	52%	3.5
Media	48%	3.4
NGOs	42%	3.2
Religious bodies	37%	3.0

Source: Transparency International (2013)

<sup>44</sup> Data for The Global Corruption Barometer report 2015/2016 for Europe, including Ukraine, has not been published yet.

Governance and anti-corruption, Global Integrity Report<sup>45</sup>, 2011

Theme	Score (0 weak to 100 strong)
Non-Governmental Organizations, Public Information and Media	68
Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations	60
Media's Ability to Report on Corruption	63
Public Requests for Government Information	81
ELECTIONS	67
Voting and Party Formation	83
Election Integrity	84
Political Financing Transparency	32
Government Conflicts of interest Safeguards and checks and Balances	60
Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Executive Branch	64
Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Legislative Branch	53
Conflicts of Interest Safeguards & Checks and Balances: Judicial Branch	59
Budget Process Oversight & Transparency	63
Public Administration and professionalism	54
Civil Service: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Political Independence	49
Whistle-blowing Protections	17
Government Procurement: Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest Safeguards	78
Privatization of Public Administrative Functions: Transparency, Fairness, and Conflicts of Interest Safeguards	71
Government Oversight and controls	74
National Ombudsman	73
Supreme Audit Institution	81
Taxes and Customs: Fairness and Capacity	75
Oversight of State-Owned Enterprises	75
Business Licensing and Regulation	67
Anti-corruption Legal framework, judicial impartiality, and Law enforcement professionalism	59
Anti-Corruption Law	100
Anti-Corruption Agency or Equivalent Mechanisms	24
Judicial Independence, Fairness, and Citizens Access to Justice	58
Law Enforcement: Conflicts of Interest Safeguards and Professionalism	54

Source: Global Integrity (2011)

45 The Global Integrity Report measures governance and anti-corruption mechanisms at the national level through independent research generating quantitative and qualitative data. The report assesses a country's anti-corruption framework using more than 300 indicators. A full set of indicators and scores for Ukraine can be obtained using the following link: <https://www.globalintegrity.org/downloads/> The last available report for Ukraine is from 2011

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