

A Survey Of Christian Epistemology

Volume 2 of the series
In Defense of Biblical Christianity
Presbyterian And Reformed Publishing Co.
Phillipsburg, New Jersey 08865
Copyright 1969
By den Dulk Christian Foundation

Preface

The first edition of this syllabus was written in 1932. The title then used was *The Metaphysics of Apologetics*. How ancient and out of date such a title seems to be now.

Was I, perhaps, at that “pre-historic” time unaware of the fact that Hegel had slain the *Alte Metaphysik*? Did I not see the drift toward the positivism of the new day?

The answer is that then, as now, I was convinced that only if one begins with the self-identifying Christ of Reformation theology, can one bring the “facts” of the space-time world into intelligible relation to the “laws” of this world. Science, philosophy and theology find their intelligible contact only on the presupposition of the self-revelation of God in Christ—through Scripture understood properly by the regeneration of the Holy Spirit.

Apologetics had always been unbiblical and therefore inadequate. What needed to be done was to point out that man himself, the subject of knowledge, must interpret himself as the creature of God, as a sinner in the sight of God, and as forgiven through the work of Christ and his Spirit. All men know God, but all men as sinners seek to suppress their knowledge of God. They do this particularly by means of their various philosophical systems. This fact must be pointed out. Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world? It was not till later years that I received much help in my understanding of philosophy from D. H. Th. Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd.

The syllabus is offered in this second edition for the consideration of those who are interested in the spread of the “whole counsel of God.”

Table Of Contents

[Introduction](#)

The subject of a Christian View of Life must be studied historically and systematically in order to understand it comprehensively. If we study it thus we find that we face an ultimate choice between Christian and non-Christian epistemology. Especially because of the modern emphasis on the Immanence of God, it is necessary to become clearly aware of the deep antithesis between the two main types of epistemology.

[Chapter 1](#)

[Epistemological Terminology](#)

A preliminary survey of epistemological terminology brings out that this terminology itself has grown out of a milieu which has colored its connotation. It will not do to speak of the inductive and deductive methods as though theists and non-theists meant the same things when they use these terms. The term induction means one thing for a theist who presupposes God and another thing for a non-theist who does not presuppose God. For a theist induction is the implication into God-centered "facts" by a God-centered mind; for a non-theist it means the implication into self-centered facts by a self-centered mind. The same difference prevails in the case of such terms as analysis and synthesis, correspondence and coherence, objectivity and subjectivity, *a priori* and *a posteriori*, implication and linear inference and transcendental versus syllogistic reasoning. A non-theist uses all these terms univocally, while a theist may use any or all of them analogically.

[Chapter 2](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[A. Greek Epistemology: Its Starting Point](#)

The question we must ask constantly is how anyone has conceived of the relation of the human mind to the divine mind. It is on this point that the greatest difference obtains between the theistic and the non-theistic position. The former cannot think of the human mind as functional at all except when it is in contact with God; the latter presupposes it to be possible that the human mind function normally whether or not God exists. For this reason it is fair and necessary to emphasize the fact that Greek speculation was at the outset antitheistic and not neutral as is often said.

It is necessary too to keep in mind that the long argument about the relation of the finite subject to the finite object is quite subsidiary to the main question of the relation of the finite mind to God.

[Chapter 3](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[B. Greek Epistemology: Its Climax](#)

When due consideration has been given to the differences among Greek thinkers, it may still be said that they present a united front. Accordingly, we study Plato's thought as typical of the Greek position.

There is a special value in studying Greek epistemology since it has not been brought into any contact with Christianity: antitheistic epistemology appears here without intermixture of theistic elements.

Moreover, Plato's views may be taken as a fair sample of all antitheistic speculation to the present day. We may say that Plato first tried to interpret reality in terms of the sense world. Then he tried to interpret reality in terms of the Ideal world. Finally he tried to interpret reality in terms of a mixture of temporal and eternal categories. In this way Plato exhausted the antitheistic possibilities. Modern epistemology presents no more than variations on these themes.

[Chapter 4](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[C. Mediaeval Epistemology: Its Starting Point](#)

As we took Plato for a representative of Greek epistemology, so we may take Augustine for a representative of early Christian epistemology.

We would note that Augustine's thought, though in many ways Platonic, is fundamentally the polar opposite of Plato's thought. Plato assumed that the human mind can function independently of God; Augustine held that man's thought is a thinking of God's thoughts after him. Accordingly, Augustine did not seek to interpret reality by any of the three Platonic methods. He sought rather to give a philosophy of history in terms of the counsel of God. Augustine found in the conception of the Trinity the union of the logical principles of identity and difference, while Plato had sought for the origin of diversity in the sense world.

[Chapter 5](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[D. Mediaeval Epistemology: Its Climax](#)

Instead of developing further the great differences between the two main types of epistemology, Scholasticism attempts to harmonize the Greek and the theistic traditions.

The problem of the "universals" was treated by the Scholastics with an underestimation of the fact that epistemological terminology is not a neutral something. Accordingly, the main question in epistemology, i.e., that of the relation of the finite to the divine mind, was subordinated to the less important question of the relation of the finite mind to finite laws and "facts." The result was that though there was much valuable discussion of details, the main issue between theism and antitheism was not clarified but obscured by Scholasticism. The issue remains obscure in the Roman Catholic church to this day.

[Chapter 6](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[E. Modern Epistemology: Lutheranism](#)

The Reformation as a whole was a great advance in the direction of the clarification of the issue between theism and non-theism. This advance was possible because the theologians of the Reformation period developed Christian doctrine on its subjective side. This helped to bring Christianity into an indissoluble union with theism so that it was seen that the one cannot be defended without the other. This in turn helped to do away

with the distinction between the “that” and the “what” in the field of theistic argument. Slowly it dawned on Christian apologetics that the existence of God must not be separated from the character of God, and the character of God must not be separated from the redemptive plan of God in its objective element, the Scriptures, and in its subjective element, regeneration.

Lutheranism, however, retained some of Scholastic thought and was not able, on that account, to carry the Reformation principle as far as it otherwise would have carried it. In the Lutheran conception of the sacraments the difference between the divine and the human is not clearly seen to be metaphysically absolute. Accordingly, there is in Lutheranism a remnant of impersonalism. The human consciousness is at some points thought of as being surrounded by something else than the personal God.

[Chapter 7](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[F. Modern Epistemology: Arminianism](#)

The impersonalism spoken of in connection with Lutheranism appears more clearly in Arminian epistemology. Its theological position with respect to the human will makes it especially liable to attack from non-theistic epistemology. Instead of developing the Reformation doctrine that the human consciousness cannot function independently of God, Arminianism has to an extent compromised with the enemy on this point. Watson, Miley and Curtis maintain positions which indicate that if one yields on the non-theistic point of the independence of the finite consciousness there is no stopping till one lands in the impersonalism of “personalism.”

[Chapter 8](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[G. Modern Epistemology: Calvinism](#)

In Calvinism the issue between theistic and non-theistic epistemology came to the clearest and fullest expression.

Calvin developed the real Reformation doctrines spoken of above. He recognized clearly that main principle that the finite consciousness must from the outset be set in contact with the consciousness of God. Accordingly, he used the “theistic arguments” more theistically than they had been used before. He did not separate the “what” from the “that.” He took into his purview the absolute God, the absolute Christ, the absolute Scripture and absolute regeneration, and maintained that all of this must be taken or nothing can be taken. He cleared Christian theistic thought from much of the Platonism that clung to it till his time.

[Chapter 9](#)

[Historical Survey](#)

[H. Modern Epistemology: Antitheistic](#)

Modern antitheistic epistemology is but a continuation of the arguments of Plato on the assumptions of Plato.

Descartes founded the whole knowledge scheme upon the independent activity of the finite consciousness in its relation to objects that are independent of God.

Kant maintained that the finite consciousness can have knowledge of the phenomenal world even if it has no knowledge of the noumenal world.

The Pragmatist school has consistently worked out the Kantian principle and has boldly proclaimed the sufficiency of temporal categories for the interpretation of reality.

The Idealist school has been inconsistent on this point, but is built upon the same Kantian presuppositions.

[Chapter 10](#)

[The Starting Point Of Christian Epistemology](#)

[A. The Object Of Knowledge](#)

After the historical survey we come to a more thetical statement. In it we must seek to bring the theistic and the non-theistic positions face to face with one another on the central issue of the relation of the finite consciousness to God.

We may begin the argument by discussing what is involved in the ordinary knowledge transaction of man. Christian theism claims that finite consciousness can know nothing about anything except upon the presupposition of the absolute self-consciousness of God. The non-theistic position holds to the opposite of this.

We try then to show that non-theism has taken its position for granted instead of proving it. In the first place non-theism has done this with respect to the object of knowledge. It has assumed the existence of the objects of knowledge and the possibility of their having a meaning apart from God. Similarly it has taken for granted that error is a natural thing, so that it cannot be said that Scripture is necessary in order that the object of knowledge may appear for what it is.

[Chapter 11](#)

[The Starting Point Of Christian Epistemology](#)

[B. The Subject Of Knowledge: Extreme Antitheism](#)

The main question in dispute between Christians and their opponents comes out most clearly when the subject of knowledge is discussed. It is then that we must give an answer to the question whether the human mind is able in itself to interpret reality.

On this important point we note that the opponents of Christian theism have taken for granted that which they ought to have proved, namely, the independence and therefore the ultimacy of the human mind. We point out this fact in the case of those who have reasoned after the fashion of Plato's first method. Of these we mention especially the "experience" philosophers and theologians. In the second place we point out this fact in the case of those who have reasoned after the fashion of Plato's second method of explaining reality in exclusively logical or eternal categories. B. Russell, J. E. McTaggart and F. H. Bradley may serve as illustrations here. Finally we point out this fact in the case of those who have reasoned after the fashion of Plato's third method of reasoning. Of these Bosanquet is given special consideration because he has more fully than any other worked out the problems of logic and the theory of judgment. It appears that in its most thorough expression antitheism has taken for granted what it should have proved.

[Chapter 12](#)

[The Starting Point Of Christian Epistemology](#)

[C. The Subject Of Knowledge: Milder Antitheism](#)

There is a special reason for fearing what seem to be approaches to a theistic epistemology on the part of those whose philosophy is built upon the Idealist theory of judgment. So the philosophy of A. Seth Pringle-Pattison seems to be more theistic than that of Bosanquet. In reality it is just as antitheistic as that of Bosanquet, inasmuch as the human mind is still thought of as functioning in independence of God.

The same judgment must be passed on the methods of the philosophy of religion schools of modern philosophy. C. C. J. Webb shows that even a great emphasis on personalism does not make one a theist.

Modern psychology is also based upon the antitheistic assumption of the ultimacy of the human mind. The psychology of James Ward proves this claim.

Finally we note that even the strong emphasis upon the personality of God as maintained by such men as A. H. Rashdall, J. Lindsay, J. Royce and E. Hocking cannot place one in the theistic camp if one's philosophy is built upon the assumption of the truth of the antitheistic epistemology.

[Chapter 13](#)

[The Starting Point Of Christian Epistemology](#)

[D. The Subject Of Knowledge: Idealism And Christianity](#)

Having begun the consideration of movements on philosophy that work in the direction of theism, we must now turn to some writers who, though building upon the Idealist system of logic, approach Christianity in the statement of their philosophy.

A. E. Taylor may be taken as an example of those philosophers who try to make room for Christianity upon the basis of the assumed correlativity of time and eternity, but who must necessarily fail because Christianity presupposes the conception of God as self-sufficient.

B. P. Bowne's philosophy may serve to illustrate the fact that if one rejects what seems to be such a minor matter as biblical infallibility, one cannot stop till he has rejected theism as well as Christianity.

[Chapter 14](#)

[The Starting Point Of Christian Epistemology](#)

[E. The Subject-Subject Relation](#)

If it is true that the difference between Christian and antitheistic epistemology is as fundamental as we have contended that it is, and if it is true that the antitheist takes his position for granted at the outset of his investigations, and if it is true that the Christian expects his opponent to do nothing else inasmuch as according to Scripture the "natural man" cannot discern the things of the Spirit, we must ask whether it is then of any use for the Christian to reason with his opponent.

The answer to this question must not be sought by toning down the dilemma as is easily and often done by the assumption that epistemological terminology means the same thing for theists and non-theists alike. The answer must rather be sought in the basic concept of Christian theism, namely, that God is absolute. If God is absolute man must always remain accessible to him. Man's ethical alienation plays upon the background of his metaphysical dependence. God may therefore use our reasoning or our preaching as a way by which he presents himself to those who have assumed his non-existence.

Chapter 15

The Method Of Christian Epistemology

After we have asked the question whether Christians should seek to reason with non-theists, and have answered that question in the affirmative, we must now ask how Christians should argue with the opponents.

Our answer must once more be that the method of reasoning employed must be consistent with and flow out of the position defended. Non-theists always reason univocally. Christians must always reason analogically. They may and must use the same terminology as their opponents, but while using this terminology they cannot afford to forget for a fraction of a second the presupposition of the absolute self-consciousness of God, which alone gives meaning to the terminology they employ.

If this fundamental canon of Christian reasoning be always kept in mind, we can begin reasoning with our opponents at any point in heaven or earth and may for arguments sake present Christian theism as one hypothesis among many, and may for argument's sake place ourselves upon the ground of our opponent in order to see what will happen. In all this it will remain our purpose to seek to reduce the non-theistic position, in whatever form it appears, to an absurdity. In our preaching we say that those who do not accept Christ are lost. Our reasoning can do nothing less.

Chapter 16

A Sample Of Christian Argument

It was useful to seek to apply the method of reasoning discussed in the previous chapters to the various schools of philosophy about us. However, since we have constantly sought to bring out that all forms of antitheistic thinking can be reduced to one, and since the issue is fundamentally that of the acceptance or the rejection of the concept of God, it may suffice to apply the analogical method of reasoning in an argument with those who hold to the "scientific method" of the day. That scientific method is agnostic. It claims to be willing to accept any fact that may appear, but unwilling to start with the idea of God.

Reasoning analogically with this type of thought, we seek to point out that it is psychologically, epistemologically and morally self-contradictory. It is psychologically self-contradictory because it claims to be making no judgment of any sort at the outset of its investigation, while as a matter of fact a universal negative judgment is involved in this effort to make no judgment. It is epistemologically self-contradictory because it starts by rejecting theism on the ground that its conception of the relation of God to the universe involves the contradiction that a God all-glorious can have glory added unto him. By this rejection of God, agnosticism has embraced complete relativism. Yet this relativism must furnish a basis for the rejection of the absolute. Accordingly, the standard of self-contradiction taken for granted by antitheistic thought presupposes the absolute for its operation. Antitheism presupposes theism. One must stand upon the solid ground of theism to be an effective antitheist.

Finally, agnosticism is morally self-contradictory since it pretends to be very humble in its insistence that it makes no sweeping conclusions, while as a matter of fact it has made a universal negative conclusion in total reliance upon itself. The "natural man" is at enmity against God.

Introduction

What we are concerned with in this syllabus is, first of all, a broad survey, and secondly, a method of defense of the Christian philosophy of life. We shall not attempt to give the survey first, and the defense afterward. On the contrary, we shall try to make the defense as we make the survey, and make the survey as we make the defense. We shall have to approach the matter of a Christian world-and-life view from an historical point of view.

Yet after we have dealt with our subject historically, we must deal with it systematically. Only after we have gained a survey of the field by an historical review, are we in a position to deal more systematically with any subject. The real point of the problems of philosophy that confront the human race today cannot be understood if they have not been observed in their growth. The problems of philosophy are today more pointed and more specific than they have ever been. But we cannot deal with the more pointed and the more specific until we have dealt with the more general. On the other hand, our final interest is very definitely in the systematic development of our subject. We do not study history just for the sake of a certain amount of interesting information. As Christians we have a very definite philosophy of history. For us history is the realization of the purposes and plans of the all-sufficient God revealed through Christ in Scripture. And if this is the case we are naturally persuaded that in history lies the best proof of our philosophy of human life. The core of our system of philosophy is our belief in the triune God of Scripture, and in what he has revealed concerning himself and his purposes for man and his world.

1. Divisions Of The Subject

We shall deal with our subject in two main divisions; the first is epistemology, and the second is metaphysics. In these two divisions the various divisions of any system of philosophy can be treated. Every system of philosophy must tell us whether it thinks true knowledge to be possible. Or if a system of philosophy thinks it impossible for man to have a true knowledge of the whole of reality or even of a part of reality, it must give good reasons for thinking so. From these considerations, it follows that if we develop our reasons for believing that a true knowledge of God and, therefore, also of the world, is possible because actually given in Christ, we have in fact given what goes in philosophy under the name of epistemology. It will then be possible to compare the Christian epistemology with any and with all others. And being thus enabled to compare them all, we are in a position and placed before the responsibility of choosing between them. And this choosing can then, in the nature of the case, no longer be a matter of artistic preference. We cannot choose epistemologies as we choose hats. Such would be the case if it had been once for all established that the whole thing is but a matter of taste. But that is exactly what has not been established. That is exactly the point in dispute.

In the second place, every system of philosophy has a theory of metaphysics. The term metaphysics is often used to define a rather narrow discipline in the field of human knowledge. The term is then used in distinction from psychology, physics, etc., to indicate that in metaphysics we deal with the most ultimate concepts of reality only. In

distinction from this narrow use of the term metaphysics, there is a broader use. In that broader sense we employ the term in this syllabus. We mean by metaphysics, then, a complete theory of reality. The mistake should not be made, however, of thinking that we shall attempt to give a detailed philosophy of all branches of human knowledge. On the contrary, as the word metaphysics suggests when used in the narrower sense, we shall have to do only with the most ultimate concepts of human thought. We shall even limit ourselves, almost exclusively, to the concept of God. But the definite understanding will be that our concept of God has specific implications for every branch of human knowledge. Therefore, when we have established our belief in the Christian conception of God, we have, in principle at least, also established our belief in a definite theory of the universe and of man. This point is forgotten again and again in our day. People all too thoughtlessly accept theories of man and of the universe that are altogether out of harmony with their own theory about God. They forget that a Christian conception of God demands a Christian conception of the universe.

It should be noted further that, as in epistemology so in metaphysics, the matter of a choice comes up again. We shall find that the Christian theory of metaphysics is the only one that really takes the matter of metaphysics seriously. For the others it has really become a question of taste. The one takes to one type of thing, and the other takes to another type of thing, they say, and it really does not make much difference which one you hold to. The conviction at the basis of such an attitude must be that it is rationally impossible for man to have any knowledge of ultimate things. It will be necessary for us to insist that our opponents make reasonable to us this claim that man can have no knowledge of ultimate things. Unless they are able to do this they have no right to their attitude of carelessness. So then, we are necessarily led once more into a dialogue.

We may further observe that in these two divisions of epistemology and metaphysics we deal from a philosophical point of view with that which theology deals with from a theological point of view. The six divisions of systematic theology—*theology, anthropology, Christology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and eschatology*—are all included in our theory of reality or metaphysics. Philosophy deals with no concepts that theology does not deal with. It is but a matter of terminology. We emphasize this point because a minister of the gospel should not be in jeopardy every hour lest his theological structure crumble to the ground because of advances in the fields of science and philosophy of which he knows nothing or very little. He should rather realize that in his presentation of biblical truth he has dealt with all the concepts that any human being can possibly deal with. Not as though he can pose as a scientist or a philosopher in the technical sense of the term. It is not necessary for him to be able to do so. He has a right to feel confident that there are no unknown trenches from which the enemy may suddenly pounce upon him. Now this is exactly what may be one of the chief benefits of a course in metaphysics for a theological student. In it he ought to learn that his opponents have exhausted themselves in trying to find a solution for the problems with which he is dealing, and have found no such solution. He ought to see the limits of their thought. He ought to examine the tools with which they labor. He ought to survey the field upon which they operate. If he does this thoroughly he will return with confidence to the propagation of his own position, or if he should feel inclined to reject it, he would at least do it intelligently.

Chapter 1: Epistemological Terminology

1. Revelation

According to Scripture, God has created the “universe.” God has created time and space. God has created all the “facts” of science. God has created the human mind. In this human mind God has laid the laws of thought according to which it is to operate. In the facts of science God has laid the laws of being according to which they function. In other words, the impress of God’s plan is upon his whole creation.

We may characterize this whole situation by saying that the creation of God is a revelation of God. God revealed himself in nature and God also revealed himself in the mind of man. Thus it is impossible for the mind of man to function except in an atmosphere of revelation. And every thought of man when it functioned normally in this atmosphere of revelation would express the truth as laid in the creation by God. We may therefore call a Christian epistemology a revelational epistemology.

2. Analysis And Synthesis

We must now seek to define this revelational epistemology more closely by relating it still more definitely to the conception of him who gives the revelation. The all-important question is what kind of a God reveals himself. Pantheistic thinkers also speak of God revealing himself and might therefore also speak of a revelational epistemology if they desired. But for the sake of clearness, the term revelation should really be reserved for biblical thought. According to this view God has been, and is, eternally self-conscious. There is no fringe of ignorance or darkness in him.

3. Correspondence

It is this concept of a completely self-conscious God that is all-important in epistemology. This appears at once from the implications of such a concept for the fact of human knowledge.

True human knowledge corresponds to the knowledge which God has of himself and his world. Suppose that I am a scientist investigating the life and ways of a cow. What is this cow? I say it is an animal. But that only pushes the question back. What is an animal? To answer that question I must know what life is. But again, to know what life is I must know how it is related to the inorganic world. And so I may and must continue till I reach the borders of the universe. And even when I have reached the borders of the universe, I do not yet know what the cow is. Complete knowledge of what a cow is call be had only by an absolute intelligence, i.e., by one who has, so to speak, the blueprint of the whole universe. But it does not follow from this that the knowledge of the cow that I have is not true as far as it goes. It is true if it corresponds to the knowledge that God has of the cow.

From this presentation of the matter, it is clear that what we mean by correspondence is not what is often meant by it in epistemological literature. In the literature on the

subject, correspondence usually means a correspondence between the idea I have in my mind and the “object out there.” In the struggle between the “realists” and the “subjective idealists” this was the only question in dispute. They were not concerned about the question uppermost in our minds, i.e., whether or not God has to be taken into the correspondence. We may call our position in epistemology a Correspondence Theory of Truth, if only we keep in mind that it is opposed to what has historically been known under that name.

4. Coherence

In opposition to the historical correspondence theory of truth there arose in the Kant-Hegel tradition the so-called Coherence Theory of Truth. The Idealists argued in the way that we have argued above about the cow. They said that true knowledge cannot be obtained by a mere correspondence of an idea of the mind to all object existing apart from the mind. The mind and the object of which it seeks knowledge are parts of one great system of reality and one must have knowledge of the whole of this reality before one has knowledge of any of its parts. Accordingly, the Idealists said that the thing that really counted in knowledge was the coherence of any fact with all other facts. To know the place of a fact in the universe as a whole is to have true knowledge. This position, as we shall see more fully later, approaches, in form, what we are after in our position. Yet it is only in form that it approaches our position. That this is true can be seen from the determining fact that the Absolute to which the Idealist seeks to relate all knowledge is not the completely self-conscious God of Christianity. We cannot prove this point here. We only state it as our conviction here in order to clear the ground. The Absolute of Idealism, we believe, is not really an absolute because he exists as merely correlative to the space-time world. Accordingly there are new facts arising for him as well as for us. God becomes a *primus inter pares*, a One among others. He can no longer be the standard of human knowledge.

It is our contention that only the Christian can obtain real coherence in his thinking. If all of our thoughts about the facts of the universe are correspondence with God’s ideas of these facts, there will naturally be coherence in our thinking because there is a complete coherence in God’s thinking. On the other hand we hold that the Idealistic coherence theory of truth cannot lead to coherence because it omits the source of all coherence, namely, God.

In a way it might be well for us to call our position the Coherence Theory of Truth because we claim to have true coherence. Whether we call our position a correspondence theory or whether we call it a coherence theory, we have in each case to distinguish it sharply from the theories that have historically gone by these names. Accordingly, the determining factor must be a consideration of that which is most fundamental in our theory of correspondence or of coherence. Now this depends upon the question whether we have God’s knowledge in mind first of all, or whether we begin with human knowledge. For God, coherence is the term that comes first. There was coherence in God’s plan before there was any space-time fact to which his knowledge might correspond, or which might correspond to his knowledge. On the other hand, when we think of human knowledge, correspondence is of primary importance. If there is to be true coherence in our knowledge there must be correspondence between our ideas of facts

and God's ideas of these facts. Or rather we should say that our ideas must correspond to God's ideas. Now since we are dealing with opponents who speak of human knowledge almost exclusively, we can perhaps best bring out the distinctiveness of our position by calling it the Correspondence Theory of Truth. An additional reason for this choice is that at the present time the old correspondence theory has pretty well died down, leaving the coherence theory in control of the field. Hence we have the advantage of a different name from the current name, since we are interested in making it clear that we really have a different theory from the current theory.

5. Objectivity

Another term that needs description before we can proceed with our historical survey is that of "objectivity." In ordinary speech we understand by an "object" anything that exists "out there," that is, independently of the human mind. We then claim to have objective knowledge of something if the idea that we have in our minds of that thing corresponds to the thing as it exists independently of the mind. We may have false ideas about a thing. In that case we say that it is only subjective and does not correspond to reality. The controversy between Berkeley and his opponents hinged on the point whether or not there are objects "out there" to which our knowledge corresponds. Berkeley said that to be is to be perceived. He said, therefore, that all knowledge is subjective only. His opponents maintained the contrary. Johnson is said to have tried to refute Berkeley by kicking against a stone.

The coherence theory of truth implied a new conception of objectivity. For it, objectivity no longer was the correspondence of an idea to a certain object supposed to exist in total independence of the mind. For it, objectivity meant a significant reference to the whole system of truth. One would have a true idea of a cow not by having a replica of the cow in one's mind, but by understanding the place of the cow in the universe.

Now it will be readily understood that as far as the form of the matter is concerned the Christian conception of objectivity stands closer to the latter than to the former position. For us, too, the primary question is not that of the out-there-ness of the cow. What we are chiefly concerned about is that our idea of the cow shall correspond to God's idea of the cow. If it does not, our knowledge is false and may be called subjective. But the exact difference between the Idealistic conception of objectivity and ours should be noted. The difference lies just here, that, for the Idealist, the system of reference is found in the Universe inclusive of God and man, while for us, the point of reference is found in God alone.

When therefore we examine the various epistemological views with regard to their "objectivity," we are interested most of all in knowing whether or not these views have sought the knowledge of an object by placing it into its right relation with the self-conscious God. The other questions are interesting enough in themselves but are comparatively speaking not of great importance. Even if one were not anxious about the truth of the matter, it ought still to be plain to him that there can be no more fundamental question in epistemology than the question whether or not facts can be known without reference to God. Suppose for argument's sake that there is such a God. And surely the possibility of it anybody ought to be willing to grant unless he has proved the impossibility of God's existence. Suppose then the existence of God. Then it would be a

fact that every fact would be known truly only with reference to him. If then one did not place a fact into relation with God, he would be in error about the fact under investigation. Or suppose that one would just begin his investigations as a scientist, without even asking whether or not it is necessary to make reference to such a God in his investigations, such a one would be in constant and in fundamental ignorance all the while. And this ignorance would be culpable ignorance, since it is God who gives him life and all good things. It ought to be obvious then that one should settle for himself this most fundamental of all epistemological questions, whether or not God exists. Christ says that as the Son of God, he will come to judge and condemn all those who have not come to the Father by him.

6. Method

Finally we must discuss the question of method. At this stage we are interested only in seeing what sort of method of investigation is involved in Christianity. At the outset it ought to be clearly observed that every system of thought necessarily has a certain method of its own. Usually this fact is overlooked. It is taken for granted that everybody begins in the same way with an examination of the facts, and that the differences between systems come only as a result of such investigations. Yet this is not actually the case. It could not actually be the case. In the first place, this could not be the case with a Christian. His fundamental and determining fact is the fact of God's existence. That is his final conclusion. But that must also be his starting point. If the Christian is right in his final conclusion about God, then he would not even get into touch with any fact unless it were through the medium of God. And since man has, through the fall in Adam, become a sinner, man cannot know and therefore love God except through Christ the Mediator. And it is in Scripture alone that he learns about this Mediator. Scripture is the Word of Christ, the Son of God and Son of man. No sinner knows anything truly except he knows Christ, and no one knows Christ truly unless the Holy Ghost, the Spirit sent by the Father and the Son, regenerates him. If all things must be seen "in God" to be seen truly, one could look ever so long elsewhere without ever seeing a fact as it really is. If I must look through a telescope to see a distant star, I cannot first look at the star to see whether there is a telescope through which alone I could see it. If I must look through a microscope to see a germ, I cannot first look at the germ with the naked eye to see if there is a microscope through which alone I can see it. If it were a question of seeing something with the naked eye and seeing the same object more clearly through a telescope or a microscope, the matter would be different. We may see a landscape dimly with the naked eye and then turn to look at it through a telescope and see it more clearly. But such is not the case with the Christian position. According to it, nothing at all can be known truly of any fact unless it be known through and by way of man's knowledge of God.

But if it be readily granted that a Christian begins with a bias, it will not so readily be granted that his opponents also begin with a bias. Yet this is no less the case. And the reason for this is really the same as that given above in the case of the Christian. We may again illustrate with our telescope analogy. The antitheist is one who has made up his mind in advance that he will never look through a telescope. He maintains steadfast in his conviction that there are some facts that can be known truly without looking through a telescope. This much is implied in the very idea of starting to see whether there is a God.

It will be observed that even to say that there are some facts that can be known without reference to God, is already the very opposite of the Christian position. It is not necessary to say that all facts can be known without reference to God in order to have a fiat denial of the Christian position. The contention of Christianity is exactly that there is not one fact that can be known without God. Hence if anyone avers that there is even one fact that can be known without God, he reasons like a non-Christian. It follows then that such a person in effect rejects the whole of the Christian position, the final conclusions as well as the starting point. And that means that such a person has at the outset taken for granted that there is no God in whom alone “facts” can be known. In other words, such a person has taken for granted that God is at least not such a “fact” that he is related to every other “fact” so that no other fact can be understood without reference to the “fact” of God.

It was needful to make this point that every human being must necessarily begin with a “bias” clear, at this stage, because it is often assumed that the real difference between the traditionally Christian position and the ordinary philosophical and scientific methods exists in the fact that the traditional position alone is prejudiced, while all others are open-minded. It was necessary, too, to emphasize the universality of “prejudice” at this point because it will thus become clear that when the Christian and his opponent use the same terminology they do not mean the same things. Both speak of inductive, deductive and transcendental methods, but each of them presupposes his own starting point, when he uses these terms, and the fact gives these terms a different meaning in each case. It follows from this too that what the Christian is opposing is not these methods, as such, but the anti-Christian presuppositions at the base of them.

7. Knowledge

Which method fits with a certain system of thought depends upon the idea of knowledge a system has. For the Christian system, knowledge consists in understanding the relation of any fact to God as revealed in Scripture. I know a fact truly to the extent that I understand the exact relation such a fact sustains to the plan of God. It is the plan of God that gives any fact meaning in terms of the plan of God. The whole meaning of any fact is exhausted by its position in and relation to the plan of God. This implies that every fact is related to every other fact. God’s plan is a unit. And it is this unity of the plan of God, founded as it is in the very being of God, that gives the unity that we look for between all the finite facts. If one should maintain that one fact can be fully understood without reference to all other facts, he is as much antitheistic as when he should maintain that one fact can be understood without reference to God.

8. Implication

From this conception of knowledge it will appear which method a Christian would naturally be bound to use. That method we may perhaps best designate as the method of implication. What we seek to do in our search for understanding the universe is to work ourselves ever more deeply into the relations that the facts of the universe sustain to God. That is, we seek to implicate ourselves more deeply into a comprehension of God’s plan in and with every fact that we investigate. Suppose that I am a biologist, studying the color of certain frogs. In order to do so, I must seek to know all about flogs in general. I

must have some conception about the species as a whole, before I can intelligently study the individual. Or if I am studying some animal about which no information is available from the records of science, it is still necessary that I have a theory about animal life in general, in order to engage in fruitful research. Thus in starting any investigation the general precedes the particular. No one without any general notion about animal life would ever think of investigating a point of detail. Then when I continue my investigation, I must seek to relate this particular frog to other frogs, then the frogs to other animal life, and then animal life as such to human life, and human life to the conception of God that I have. Now this approach from the bottom to the top, from the particular to the general is the inductive aspect of the method of implication. The greater the amount of detailed study and the more carefully such study is undertaken, the more truly Christian will the method be. It is important to bring out this point in order to help remove the common misunderstanding that Christianity is opposed to factual investigation. That the opponents of Christianity are still seeking to spread this misunderstanding may be seen, for instance, from such a book as that of Stewart G. Cole, *The History of Fundamentalism*. Throughout the book it is stated time and again that the believers in the traditionally Christian position are opposed to the spread of the knowledge of all the facts discovered by science. Now it were a great deal better for Liberalism itself if it were willing to fight openly and admit that the whole fight is one about two mutually opposite philosophies of life, instead of about the hiding or non-hiding of certain facts.

9. Deduction And Induction

Then, corresponding to the inductive aspect of the method of implication is the deductive aspect. We may define this as the control of the general over the particular. Our conception of God controls the investigation of every fact. We are certain, as certain as our conviction of the truth of the entire Christian position, that certain "facts" will never be discovered. One of these, for example, is "the missing link." The term "missing link" we take in its current meaning of a gradual transition from the non-rational to the rational. As such, it is an anti-Christian conception, inasmuch as it implies that the non-rational is more ultimate than the rational. At least the anti-Christian wants to leave the question of the relative ultimacy of the rational to the non-rational an open question, while the Christian can never afford to do this. For the Christian, it is a settled and not an open question. And this difference between the Christian and his opponents comes to the fore in the method of investigation of facts. The anti-Christian holds that any sort of fact may appear. He thinks this to be one of the most important requirements of a truly scientific attitude. On the other hand, the Christian holds that no fact will appear that could disprove the ultimacy of the fact of God, and therefore of what he has revealed of himself and his plan for the world through Christ in the Scriptures. We may illustrate this point by the example of a mathematician who finds that three points are related to one another by the arc of a circle. Then when he proceeds to draw the circle he follows a definitely "prescribed" course, even if he has made no mark on his paper yet. If it is the circle that relates the points, and if the circle exhausts the relation of the points, the mathematician cannot reasonably expect to find other points on a tangent to the circle that are nevertheless related to the points of the circle. Now we may compare the circle of the

mathematician to the Christian concept of God. We hold that the meaning of any one finite fact is exhausted by its relation to the plan of God. Hence this same thing will hold tot any two or three facts. And it follows that no other facts can stand in any possible relation to these facts unless they too are related to this one comprehensible plan of God. In other words, only Christian facts are possible. For any fact to be a fact at all, it must be what Christ in Scripture says it is.

This is the main point in dispute between Christians and non-Christians. The difference between the two does not only appear in the interpretation of facts after they have been found, but even in the question what facts one may expect to find. And it does not go without saying, as is all too often assumed, that the non-Christian is right in looking for any kind of fact. If the Christian position should prove to be right in the end, then the anti-Christian position was wrong, not only at the end, but already at the beginning.

From the description given of the deductive and the inductive aspects of the method of implication, it will now appear that what has historically been known by the deductive and inductive methods are both equally opposed to the Christian method. By the deductive method as exercised, e.g., by the Greeks, was meant that one begins his investigations with the assumption of the truth and ultimacy of certain axioms, such as, for example, that of causal relation. The question whether these axioms rest in God or in the universe was in that case not considered to be of great importance. Not as though the question was not raised. Plato did consider the question whether God was back of the ideas or whether the ideas were back of God. Yet this question was not given the importance that we give to it. We must put the point more strongly. The question was, in effect, given the wrong answer. It was assumed that the true, the beautiful and the good rest in themselves, and that God is subordinate to them. For us the question is all-important. If the axioms on which science depends are thought of as resting in the universe, the opposite of the Christian position is in effect maintained. The only rationality they know of in the universe is then the mind of man. Hence the alternative may be stated by saying that according to the Christian position, the basis of human investigation is in God, while for the antitheistic position the basis of human investigation is in man.

Similarly with the more modern method of induction. What is meant by induction as a method of science is the gathering of facts without reference to any axioms, in order to find to what these facts may lead us. Many scientists claim this method to be the method of science. But we have already seen that the usual assumption underlying this method is the antitheistic one, that there may be any kind of fact. Hence the difference between the prevalent method of science and the method of Christianity is not that the former is interested in finding the facts and is ready to follow the facts wherever they may lead, while the latter is not ready to follow the facts. The difference is rather that the former wants to study the facts without God, while the latter wants to study the facts in the light of the revelation God gives of himself in Christ. Thus the antithesis is once more that between those for whom the final center of reference in knowledge lies in man, and those for whom the final center of reference for knowledge lies in God, as this God speaks in Scripture.

Accordingly, we pay scant attention to the historic quarrel between the apostles of deduction and the apostles of induction. Our quarrel is not with either of them in

particular but with both of them in general. To us the only thing of great significance in this connection is that it is often found to be more difficult to distinguish our method from the deductive method than from the inductive method. But the favorite charge against us is that we are still bound to the past and are therefore employing the deductive method. Our opponents are thoughtlessly identifying our method with the Greek method of deduction. For this reason it is necessary for us to make the difference between these two methods as clear as we can.

From our discussion it will also appear that even the method of implication, as employed by Idealistic philosophy, is quite the opposite of ours. Here especially it is of paramount importance to distinguish clearly. We have purposely chosen the name implication for our method because we believe that it really fits in with the Christian scheme, while it fits in with no other scheme. Hence we must take particular pains to note that the method of implication as advocated especially by B. Bosanquet and other Idealists, is really as fundamentally opposed to our method as is the method of ancient deductivism and of modern inductivism. The difference is once more that we believe the Idealists to have left God out of consideration.

10. A Priori And A Posteriori

Closely related to the terms inductive and deductive are the terms *a posteriori* and *a priori*. The literal meaning of these terms is “from that which follows or is subsequent,” and “from that which is before,” respectively. An *a posteriori* method is one that is practically identical with the empirical or inductive method. The *a priori* method is usually identified with the deductive method. We need only observe that *a priori* reasoning, and *a posteriori* reasoning, are equally anti-Christian, if these terms are understood in their historical sense. As such they contemplate man’s activity in the universe but do not figure with the significance of God above the universe.

11. Transcendental

One more point should be noted on the question of method, namely, that from a certain point of view, the method of implication may also be called a transcendental method. We have already indicated that the Christian method uses neither the inductive nor the deductive method as understood by the opponents of Christianity, but that it has elements of both induction and of deduction in it, if these terms are understood in a Christian sense. Now when these two elements are combined, we have what is meant by a truly transcendental argument. A truly transcendental argument takes any fact of experience which it wishes to investigate, and tries to determine what the presuppositions of such a fact must be, in order to make it what it is. An exclusively deductive argument would take an axiom such as that every cause must have an effect, and reason in a straight line from such an axiom, drawing all manner of conclusions about God and man. A purely inductive argument would begin with any fact and seek in a straight line for a cause of such an effect, and thus perhaps conclude that this universe must have had a cause. Both of these methods have been used, as we shall see, for the defense of Christianity. Yet neither of them could be thoroughly Christian unless they already presupposed God. Any method, as was pointed out above, that does not maintain that not

a single fact can be known unless it be that God gives that fact meaning, is an anti-Christian method. On the other hand, if God is recognized as the only and the final explanation of any and every fact, neither the inductive nor the deductive method can any longer be used to the exclusion of the other. That this is the case can best be realized if we keep in mind that the God we contemplate is an absolute God. Now the only argument for an absolute God that holds water is a transcendental argument. A deductive argument as such leads only from one spot in the universe to another spot in the universe. So also an inductive argument as such can never lead beyond the universe. In either case there is no more than an infinite regression. In both cases it is possible for the smart little girl to ask, "If God made the universe, who made God?" and no answer is forthcoming. This answer is, for instance, a favorite reply of the atheist debater, Clarence Darrow. But if it be said to such opponents of Christianity that, unless there were an absolute God their own questions and doubts would have no meaning at all, there is no argument in return. There lie the issues. It is the firm conviction of every epistemologically self-conscious Christian that no human being can utter a single syllable, whether in negation or in affirmation, unless it were for God's existence. Thus the transcendental argument seeks to discover what sort of foundations the house of human knowledge must have, in order to be what it is. It does not seek to find whether the house has a foundation, but it presupposes that it has one. We hold that the anti-Christian method, whether deductive or inductive, may be compared to a man who would first insist that the statue of William Penn on the city hall of Philadelphia can be intelligently conceived of without the foundation on which it stands, in order afterwards to investigate whether or not this statue really has a foundation.

It should be particularly noted, therefore, that only a system of philosophy that takes the concept of an absolute God seriously can really be said to be employing a transcendental method. A truly transcendent God and a transcendental method go hand in hand. It follows then that if we have been correct in our contention that Hegelian Idealism does not believe in a transcendent God, it has not really used the transcendental method as it claims that it has.

Now at this juncture it may be well to insert a brief discussion of the place of Scripture in all this. The opponent of Christianity will long ago have noticed that we are frankly prejudiced, and that the whole position is "biblicistic." On the other hand, some fundamentalists may have feared that we have been trying to build up a sort of Christian philosophy without the Bible. Now we may say that if such be the case, the opponent of Christianity has sensed the matter correctly. The position we have briefly sought to outline is frankly taken from the Bible. And this applies especially to the central concept of the whole position, viz., the concept of an absolute God. Nowhere else in human literature, we believe, is the concept of an absolute God presented. And this fact is once more intimately related to the fact that nowhere else is there a conception of sin, such as that presented in the Bible. According to the Bible, sin has set man at enmity against God. Consequently it has been man's endeavor to get away from the idea of God, that is, a truly absolute God. And the best way to do this was to substitute the idea of a finite God. And the best way to accomplish this subordinate purpose was to do it by making it appear as though an absolute God were retained. Hence the great insistence on the part of those who are really anti-Christian, that they are Christian.

It thus appears that we must take the Bible, its conception of sin, its conception of Christ, and its conception of God and all that is involved in these concepts together, or take none of them. So also it makes very little difference whether we begin with the notion of an absolute God or with the notion of an absolute Bible. The one is derived from the other. They are together involved in the Christian view of life. Hence we defend all or we defend none. Only one absolute is possible, and only one absolute can speak to us. Hence it must always be the same voice of the same absolute, even though he seems to speak to us at different places. The Bible must be true because it alone speaks of an absolute God. And equally true is it that we believe in an absolute God because the Bible tells us of one.¹

And this brings up the point of circular reasoning. The charge is constantly made that if matters stand thus with Christianity, it has written its own death warrant as far as intelligent men are concerned. Who wishes to make such a simple blunder in elementary logic, as to say that we believe something to be true because it is in the Bible? Our answer to this is briefly that we prefer to reason in a circle to not reasoning at all. We hold it to be true that circular reasoning is the only reasoning that is possible to finite man. The method of implication as outlined above is circular reasoning. Or we may call it spiral reasoning. We must go round and round a thing to see more of its dimensions and to know more about it, in general, unless we are larger than that which we are investigating. Unless we are larger than God we cannot reason about him any other way, than by a transcendental or circular argument. The refusal to admit the necessity of circular reasoning is itself an evident token of opposition to Christianity. Reasoning in a vicious circle is the only alternative to reasoning in a circle as discussed above.

In a rough general way we have in this chapter sought to define the terminology to be used, and have therewith also sought to give something of a preliminary outline of the Christian epistemology. It was necessary that we should do this before entering upon our historical review so that we might have some standard by which to judge of history. For even those who begin with the avowed purpose of letting history produce its own standard, have in reality begun with a philosophy of history, namely, one that maintains that history is in itself apart from God able to produce such a standard. Beside this, it was necessary that we should justify our choice of historical material. We have said that, for us, the question of the place given to the concept of God determines the value of a theory of epistemology. Hence it is this question chiefly that we seek to answer in our historical survey. But our opponents will think such a procedure an evident token of perdition. To them the question of the position is not of primary importance. Accordingly, even this is a controversial point on which one has to take sides at the outset. It is in itself a merit to become aware at the outset of the intensely controversial character of every effort at constructing a life-and-world view.

¹ In some of his recent publications—particularly in his work *De Heilige Schrift*, 1966–1967—Dr. G. C. Berkouwer warns orthodox Christians against having a formal view of Scripture. He stresses the fact that the content of biblical teaching and the idea of the Bible are involved in one another. It is this point that the syllabus made in 1939.

Chapter 2: Historical Survey: A: Greek Epistemology: Its Starting Point

From a general point of view Greek philosophy always remains important. It is there that the human mind has for the first time given systematic expression to its deepest thought. Accordingly, any individual seeking to acquaint himself with an understanding, even of modern philosophy, can well afford to spend a good share of the time at his disposal on Greek philosophy.

From a more definite point of view, Greek philosophy is important to the student of Christian theism.¹ In Greek philosophy, and in Greek philosophy only, has the antitheistic mind fully expressed itself without the intermixture of semi-Christian elements. It is of course true that the most comprehensive expositions of antitheistic thought are found in such modern philosophers as Kant and Hegel. But it remains a fact that in these and in all other writers an influence direct or indirect is felt that is foreign to the genius of antitheistic thought. Hence the pivotal importance of Greek philosophy for our purpose.

Still more important does Greek philosophy become for us if we remember that one of the points of hottest debate between the theist and the antitheist is the question of a starting point. Now it is in Greek philosophy alone that we can observe the way in which all antitheist begins his investigations in the field of epistemology.

We are, moreover, especially fortunate in the fact that Greek speculation came to one grand expression in the philosophy of one or two men, Plato and Aristotle. By common consent no greater minds than these have arisen in the history of the human race. These men have faced all the fundamental questions of epistemology. Thus we may claim to have been fair to the whole antitheistic position if we have carefully investigated what these men have said about the subject. The germs of all future antitheistic thought are found in Plato and Aristotle.

But is it fair to bring the question of a theistic or an antitheistic starting point back to the beginnings of Greek speculation? The commonest fashion of answering this question would be to ask whether the Greeks said anything about theism and antitheism. And this second question might easily be answered in the negative. Yet all will have to agree that it is not necessary for the Greeks to have discussed the problem in the way in which we moderns discuss it in order to have discussed it at all. If only the germs of the question are present, it is fair for us to say that the Greeks had certain ideas about the question. Now there are especially certain assumptions at the basis of Greek speculation that we can point to, and on the basis of which we can determine the answer the Greeks would have given to our question had it been put to them specifically.

It is of special importance to remark that we are of necessity dealing with assumptions when we speak of Greek epistemology. Many would contend that at least the

¹ We now allow the terms theism, Christian theism, and the like to stand as they were used in the "first edition." They then stood for what God in his revelation through Christ in the Scriptures tells about himself and his plan for man and his world.

earlier Greeks did not deal with epistemology but only with the problems of reality, or what we, after Aristotle, call metaphysics. But since every metaphysics has an implicit, if not an explicit, epistemology, it is not unfair to deal with the epistemology of even the earliest Greeks. We may even say that every man educated or not educated has an epistemology implied in his practice.

The specific question that we would ask then, with regard to the early Greeks, is, "How did they conceive of the relation between the human and the divine mind?" And the point of pivotal significance in this question is, which of these two minds, the human or the divine, did the Greeks consider to be the more original and the more ultimate? Could either the divine or the human mind operate efficiently without the other? Could God know any of the facts of the universe without reference to man? Could man know anything about any of the facts of the universe without reference to God? Were they perhaps mutually dependent upon one another? Or were they perhaps mutually independent of one another? Or if there was a dependence of the one upon the other, in which direction was this dependence? Was God dependent on man, and not man on God? Or was man dependent on God, and not God on man?

It should be noted that only if we could answer the last question in the affirmative would we be justified in saying that the Greeks were theistic in their epistemology. The ways of antitheism are many and the way of theism stands all alone and is very narrow. But it would not be necessary for us to find a fully expressed system of theism among the Greeks. We could be satisfied if only the beginnings of theistic speculation were found among them.

The fact is, however, that we cannot even find a germ of true theistic speculation among the Greeks. This may seem to be an extreme statement that requires justification. Hence we must emphasize that we are not denying that there are in Greek thought many references to God and that this God is even thought of as having a sort of independence of the universe; but the important point to observe is that one can nowhere find the conception of God as a self-sufficient and an absolutely independent God. It will of course be urged against this assertion that the very fault of Greek speculation was that it thought of God as too far abstracted from the world. Hence, it may be urged that if all people believed in a transcendent God, it was the Greeks. In answer to this we would say that the transcendence concept of Greek philosophy is, especially in the case of Aristotle, thought of as wholly independent of the universe, and therefore makes the universe almost wholly independent of God. And it is this more than anything else that makes the Greek concept of God basically antitheistic. Or if other interpreters of Greek thought should wish to emphasize the closeness of the relation of the God of the Greeks to the universe of the Greeks, and therefore claim that the God of the Greeks was immanent in as well as transcendent above his creation, our reply is that it remains to be proved that anyone of the Greeks ever thought of the universe as God's creation. The term creation is used, to be sure, but the connotation of the term creation in Greek philosophy is always determined by the fact that the universe is thought of as having an eternal or semi-eternal existence alongside of the existence of God. And if such is the creation concept of Greek thought, it is impossible that the immanence of God in the universe could mean anything else than a sort of identity with the universe. The God of Greek philosophy is either exclusively deistic or exclusively pantheistic.

The transcendence concept of theism is not clearly stated, if it is merely said that God is independent of the world. According to the ordinary use of the word, that would not exclude the possibility that the world would also be independent of God. And it is this dependence of the world upon God that a theist is interested in as much as the independence of God apart from the world. In fact God would not be truly independent of the world unless the world were dependent upon God. No one is absolutely independent unless he alone is independent. There cannot be two absolutely independent beings.

Right here it may be urged that if we stress this point, human language will no longer stand the strain we have put upon it. Independence, we are told, implies independence from someone or from something, and therefore implies the existence of that someone or something. But let us note that this is once more the point in dispute between the theist and the antitheist. No more fundamental difference exists between the two than the question touched upon in this objection. The entire Christian theistic position stands or falls with the concept of the nature of the relation of God to man. It is not our purpose here to argue the truth of the theistic position in detail. But it will help us to understand the starting point of the Greeks if we do not obscure this difference between theism and antitheism. Moreover, it will aid us if we realize that the objection voiced above that human language implies the relativity of God and man is not something that is true as a matter of course, but is an assumption on the part of antitheism that requires justification. It is true that there is a great plausibility in the assumption. It is our everyday experience that if we seek independence, we seek independence from someone or something that actually exists. Hence it is very easy for us to carry over this idea into the field of ultimate metaphysics and take for granted that the same principle must necessarily hold there as it does in our commonest experiences. Yet this cannot be the case. If we maintain that independence from something must always and for all intelligences alike imply the existence of that from which the independence is contemplated, we can at most find place for a God who has always been dependent upon the universe and upon the mind of man. It would mean, consequently, the eternity of the universe and man, or it would mean the temporality of God. The point is that God and man must in such a case always be kept in close relativity to one another. Now we are not for the moment quarreling here with the antitheist about these questions themselves, so much as with his naive attempt to put a sweet capsule about the whole of his position in order to administer it to us at the outset without our being aware of it. If we are to be antitheists, we should be self-conscious antitheists.

The fundamental assumption made by the Greeks is the one just discussed. They are interested in the objective world that is the world of physical objects first of all. They paid very little attention to the question of the subject, that is the human mind, in the early phases of their thought. Thus it may be contended that they did not even have any epistemology and that it is therefore an anachronism to speak of an antitheistic epistemology in their case. Yet in their very study of the objective world as we are accustomed to call it, they took for granted that it was possible for them to know this objective world without knowing whether or not God as creator was beyond the universe. The majority, if not all, of the Pre-Socratics virtually identified God with the universe. The questions studied were those of being and becoming. The assumptions underlying these questions were (a) that all things are at bottom one, (b) that somehow the manifold of experience comes out of the one, i.e., the fact of change is taken for granted: and (c)

that the manifold thus generated from the one is at all times identical with it. Thus if the early Greeks used the term God at all it was practically synonymous with the term universe. And since this is the case, it is clear that the question of the existence of a God as creator of the universe was, in effect, given a negative answer. The Greeks assumed that the human mind could know all and all finite facts that it might ever expect to know without any reference to God as creator. Thus they were unconsciously antitheistic, but antitheistic none the less.

Paul tells us that God as creator is clearly revealed in the world. Calvin lays great stress on this point. No fact in the world can be interpreted truly except it be seen as created by God. The Greeks were among those of whom Paul speaks when he says that they hinder or repress the truth in unrighteousness. The significance of the fact that Greek speculation began with a definitely antitheistic bias cannot be stressed too much because of the common misunderstanding on this score. The usual presentation is that the Greeks naturally began to look around them at the physical universe and to ask questions about it as a child asks questions about any strange or new thing that it sees. Hence, it is argued that no more than you would accuse a child of starting with an antitheistic bias should you accuse the Greeks of beginning with anything but an open mind. Naturally they would begin with the things that were nearest to them, and only afterward could they pass on to the more remote questions of metaphysics. They began with physics and thereupon turned to metaphysics.

These objections, however, are themselves based upon the self-same antitheistic bias noted above. In these objections it is taken for granted that the Greeks may fairly be compared to children who begin to wonder about things around them. But this comparison would be fair only if antitheism were true. The comparison presupposes that the human race was for the first time emerging into self-consciousness in the persons of the Greeks. The comparison takes for granted that the human race had never been in close contact with a God who was nearer to them than the universe. In other words, the comparison takes for granted that the physical facts would naturally be knowable first, and that if God is to be known he must be known later.

But this is exactly the point in dispute. If the theistic view is true, then man was originally as close to God as he was to any physical fact. If theism is true, man once realized that fact that the animals and the trees were known to him because God was known to him. If theism is true, the revelation of the absolute God was everywhere found in the created universe, so that no matter where man would turn, to himself or to nature about him, he would meet God. This is implied in the idea of creation. The idea of creation carries with it a definite view of being and of becoming, the two main questions of Greek philosophy. The idea of creation makes a distinction of being between God and man. Anyone holding to the idea of creation (we speak of temporal and not of logical creation) must also hold to the idea of a God who existed apart from the world and had meaning for himself apart from the world. And this point goes counter to the first assumption of Greek speculation spoken of, that all things are at bottom one. If theism is right, all things are at bottom two, and not one. In the second place, anyone holding to the idea of creation must also hold that the world of becoming cannot be taken for granted as an ultimate with which as a given the human mind must begin its speculation. Being is before becoming and independent of becoming. Thus the creation idea also runs counter to the second and third assumptions of Greek philosophy, that the fact of change should

be taken for granted, and that the manifold generated from the one is all the while identical with the one.

We should add that according to Scripture, God spoke to man at the outset of history. In addition to revealing himself in the facts of the created universe, God revealed himself in Words, telling man about what he should do with the facts of the universe. Since the fall, all men, as fallen in Adam, (Rom 5:12) continue to be responsible for this twofold revelation of God given to man at the beginning of history.

From these considerations it follows that if theism is true the Greeks are not a race of innocent children just beginning to look around in the world. If theism is true, there has been an original monotheism or, as we may now say, an original theism from which the race has fallen away. This truth is usually given no more serious thought than one of the myths of the Greeks. In fact it is usually regarded as being nothing but a myth to which none but the hopeless traditionalists will pay any attention. Even Christians themselves often feel as though this creation story is something they must carry along in order to have the other advantages of theism, but something which in itself is of no importance. For this reason we have sought to point out that the creation idea is an integral part of the Christian theistic system of thought. We accept it because it is in the Bible, and we believe that which is in the Bible to be the only defensible philosophical position. Our opponents have no right to reject the creation story unless they can prove that it is not essential to Christianity or that Christianity is not the only position that makes human predication intelligible. Yet the ordinary textbook on philosophy presents the beginning of Greek speculation as something entirely neutral. But to try to be neutral is to speak against God and his Christ.

1. Neutrality

If the theistic position be defensible it is an impossibility for any human being to be neutral. This is quite readily admitted when a centrally religious question is discussed. We need only recall the words of Jesus, "He that is not against me is for me," to remind ourselves of this fact. When two nations are at war no citizens of either of these two nations can be neutral. It may be reasonable for citizens of a third nation to be neutral, but this cannot be the case for citizens of countries actually at war. We may apply this analogy to the relation between theism and antitheism. Of course the applicability of such an analogy will at once be denied by every redblooded antitheist. But this very fact shows that it is a point in dispute between the two systems of thought, for it is equally true that every redblooded theist will affirm that there is a definite warfare between the two. True, the antitheist may speak of a war and of a clash of opinions, but what he means by war is not to be identified with the theist's conception of war. The antitheist cannot, because of the very doctrines that he holds, consider it a matter of the greatest importance which system of thought one feels inclined to embrace. Certainly for him there are no eternal destinies of men involved. For a Christian theist the entire outlook is different. For him it is as important that men should be theists as that they should be Christians, for the obvious reason that for him a true theism and a true Christianity are identical. Hence a true theist is always a missionary, even when engaged in the most "abstruse" speculations about eternal things. A Christian will engage in no speculation. He has no "metaphysics" as metaphysics is usually understood. He does not even start his thinking with God as his

master-concept in order to deduce his “system” of truth from this master concept. His thinking is always and only an attempt to integrate the various aspects of biblical teaching. In doing so he is deeply conscious of the fact that every “concept” he employs must be limited by every other “concept” he employs, and that therefore his “system” is an effort to restate in his confession the truth as it is in Jesus.

From these considerations it ought to be evident that one cannot take the possibility of neutrality for granted. To be philosophically fair, the antitheist is bound first of all to establish this possibility critically before he proceeds to build upon it. If there is an absolute God, neutrality is out of the question, because in that case every creature is derived from God and is therefore directly responsible to him. And such a God would not feel very kindly disposed to those who ignore him. Even in human relationships it is true that to be ignored is a deeper source of grief to him who is ignored than to be opposed. It follows then that the attempt to be neutral is part of the attempt to be antitheistic. For this reason we have constantly used the term antitheistic instead of nontheistic. To be nontheistic is to be antitheistic. The narrative of the fall of man may illustrate this point. Adam and Eve were true theists at the first. They took God’s interpretation of themselves and of the animals for granted as the true interpretation. Then came the tempter. He presented to Eve another, that is, an antitheistic theory of reality, and asked her to be the judge as to which was the more reasonable for her to accept. And the acceptance of this position of judge constituted the fall of man. That acceptance put the mind of man on an equality with the mind of God. That acceptance also put the mind of the devil on an equality with God. Before Eve could listen to the tempter she had to take for granted that the devil was perhaps a person who knew as much about reality as God knew about it. Before Eve could listen to the tempter, she had to take it for granted that she herself might be such an one as to make it reasonable for her to make a final decision between claims and counter-claims that involved the entire future of her existence. That is, Eve was obliged to postulate an ultimate epistemological pluralism and contingency before she could even proceed to consider the proposition made to her by the devil. Or, otherwise expressed, Eve was compelled to assume the equal ultimacy of the minds of God, of the devil, and of herself. And this surely excluded the exclusive ultimacy of God. This therefore was a denial of God’s absoluteness epistemologically. Thus neutrality was based upon negation. Neutrality is negation.

This negation was bound to issue in a new affirmation of the supremacy of the human mind over the divine mind. Eve did not ask God, let alone her husband, to decide the issue placed before her. When there are claims and counter-claims someone must assume the role of absolute ultimacy. Eve was definitely placed before an “either or” alternative. Of course she would have denied this if you had told her so at the time. She would have resented being placed before any such alternative. She naturally thought that the issue was not irrevocable, but that she could experiment with the Satanic attitude for a while, and if it did not seem to work she could turn back to her old position of theism again. She thought that evil or sin was at the worst a stepping-stone to higher things, and that she could do all the stepping herself. In all this she was quite wrong. Whether she liked it or not she was, as a matter of fact, standing before an exclusive alternative. Only an action proceeding from the bosom of the eternal could place her on the right track again. It was God who had to reinterpret her deed and place it in its true setting in the universe. And this reinterpretation by God was a reversal of the interpretation given by man. Man had to

be brought back to God. This in itself is proof sufficient that the decision on the part of man was antitheistic and not merely nontheistic.

The devil insinuated the idea that an intelligent and decisive interpretation can be made only if reality is purely contingent. God cannot exist and be your creator, for if he did, your choices would be those of a puppet. Don't let the abstract or formal idea of an all-controlling providence of God control your thought. Stand up for your rights as a free person. This was, in effect, Satan's argument.

When Eve listened to the tempter, she therefore not only had to posit an original epistemological pluralism, but also an original metaphysical pluralism. She had to take for granted that as a time created being she could reasonably consider herself to be sufficiently ultimate in her being, so as to warrant an action that was contrary to the will of an eternal being. That is, she not only had to equalize time and eternity, but she had to put time above eternity. It was in time that Satan told her the issue was to be settled. He said that it still remained to be seen whether God's threats would come true. The experimental method was to be employed. Only time could tell. This attitude implied that God was no more than a finite God. If he were thought of as absolute, it would be worse than folly for a creature of time to try out the interpretation of God in the test tube of time. If he were thought of as eternal, such an undertaking was doomed to failure, because in that case history could be nothing but the expression of God's will. And in that case man's humanity would be destroyed.

It is true that this story of man's fall is cast away as a relic of a mythological age by the average student of philosophy. But surely this is unjust. The question is not merely one of the historicity of the book of Genesis. It is that, but it is also more than that. The whole philosophy of theism is involved in it. Anyone rejecting the Genesis narrative must also be prepared to reject the idea of an absolute God. The history includes the philosophy, and the philosophy includes the history. Or we may say that those who reject the Genesis narrative begin their investigation of Greek philosophy with a definite antitheistic bias. It is only because they are themselves not neutral, that they claim the Greeks to have been neutral. It is an example of identification of neutrality with a fundamental antitheistic bias. And as Christian theists we do not at all wonder at this. It is just what we would expect. The fact that present-day antitheistic philosophers seem to be totally unaware of their bias, and constantly insist that their starting point is that of neutrality, is itself the best possible proof of the complete control the bias has of them. In other words, the amazement with which the average student of philosophy or science looks at you if you dare to tell him that, according to your conviction, neutrality is not only undesirable but impossible, is sufficient proof that he has never questioned the reasonableness or the possibility of neutrality. Then the more necessary it is that we challenge this colossal assumption at the outset when it is applied to the study of the Greeks.

2. Evil

It is at this irreducible epistemological level that we must face the question of error as a whole. We have already spoken of it by implication in our discussion of the impossibility of neutrality. But the antitheist will continue to urge that it was natural for the Greeks that they should make mistakes in their investigation, and that we should not

expect them to appear at once with a full-fledged theism. Even if they were to come to the theistic position at the end, they had to find their way and therefore had to be given time.

The assumption at the basis of this objection is that the Greek mind was the normal human mind. Yet this is not the case if the Christian theistic interpretation as a whole is tenable. In that case the Greek mind was a manifestation of the human mind as it has become abnormal through sin. Antitheistic thought identifies sin and finite limitation. It takes for granted that because man is a limited being he could not at once have a satisfactory knowledge of God. Consequently the many mistakes man made in his search for God are not regarded as sinful but as entirely normal. The analogy of the child that is beginning to learn is once more employed. But according to theism there can be no such identification of the finite and the sinful or evil. According to theism original man, though finite, was not sinful. Consequently he had at the outset a true and adequate knowledge of God.² His finite limitations in no way prevented him from having such adequate knowledge. The very possibility of error presupposes the existence of truth.

Now if we have not been in error in stating that this theory of error is involved in the very bedrock of theism, it follows that the responsibility rests upon those who wish to claim a neutral starting point for the Greeks that they first disprove the whole of the theistic position. The theistic theory of evil has something very definite to say about the beginnings of Greek speculation. And that which it has to say ought to be refuted by a reasoned argument, instead of by ridicule and assumption. Until an effort is made in that direction it will not be considered arrogant on our part if we cling to our interpretation of the beginnings of Greek philosophy.

² By adequate we do not mean comprehensive. We mean sufficient for his needs as a creature.

Chapter 3: Historical Survey: B: Greek Epistemology: Its Climax

We have thus far been speaking of the beginnings of Greek philosophy. Under that general heading it was necessary also to look at the questions of neutrality and evil. It remains now to look at the highest development of Greek thought as far as it has bearing upon our subject.

In order to reach our goal, it will not be essential that we review every one of the Greek philosophers in order to see what they have to say on the subject of epistemology. We are not interested in the historical development of Greek epistemology except insofar as it throws light on the highest spot reached by Plato and Aristotle. And of these two philosophers we shall consider Plato rather than, or at least more than, Aristotle. The reason for this is that we are chiefly interested in knowing what the Greek genius has to say on the place of the human mind in the universe, and this may be more easily ascertained from a study of Plato than from a study of Aristotle. And even if we are mistaken on this point, it is of no great moment. No one will gainsay that a study of Plato gives a fair crosscut of Greek thought. An advantage that is certainly gained by taking Plato rather than Aristotle is that Plato has more often been hailed as a forerunner of Christianity than Aristotle has. To be sure, the Roman church has placed Aristotle above Plato, but we shall deal with this claim at a later stage. We are at this point more concerned with such claims as those made by Paul Elmer More to the effect that Plato has furnished the true foundation for Christianity. Prof. More thinks that there is a great difference between the philosophy of Plato and that of Aristotle. The philosophy of Plato, he maintains, stands for a dualism, and as such has much in common with Christianity, while the philosophy of Aristotle ran amuck in an attempt at a unified metaphysics. We shall not attempt to estimate the difference between Plato and Aristotle as found by Prof. More. We have no quarrel with him on his interpretation of Plato. We hold that both Plato and Aristotle stood diametrically opposed to Christianity, and that it is out of the question to speak of Christianity having developed out of either of their philosophies. This does not deny the fact that Greek thought in general and the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle in particular has been of great formal value to Christianity. Nor do we mean to intimate that Christianity has, in many of its exponents, not actually been influenced by the pagan motif. But the genius of Christianity is a reversal of the genius of the Greeks.

It is to Plato's doctrine of the soul that we must turn to find what may be called the high-water mark of Greek epistemological speculation. In it we have before us the ripest fruits of Greek speculation on the place of man's mind in the universe. If anyone should wish to maintain that we should go to the categories of Aristotle instead of to the Platonic doctrine of the soul in order to have a fair sample as well as the high-water mark of Greek speculation on epistemology we have no quarrel with him. Paul Elmer More has already proved the great gulf that lies between Christianity and Aristotelianism. We are now interested in showing that the self-same gulf exists between Christianity and Platonism.

To prepare the ground for an understanding of Plato's doctrine of the soul, we must recall certain general aspects of his philosophy. In the first place we should bear in mind

that all of Plato's predecessors, with the possible exception of Socrates, were materialistic or at least hylozoistic in their conceptions of the human soul.¹

Thales identified the inherent principle of change in nature with the human soul.² Little distinction was made between the soul and the body. Heraclitus does say that thought was the most important attribute of the soul in distinction from the functions of the body. But even so Heraclitus does not distinguish between the soul of the universe around man and the soul within man. They are taken for granted as being of a piece with one another. Even the "nous" of Anaxagoras does not introduce the idea of spirituality. Something must be done, says Adamson, in the way of forming a notion of incorporeality that does not exclude materiality, in order to understand what the early Greeks meant by the soul. It is well to remember this background of Plato. Plato himself did not escape its influence. None of the ancients learned to think of the individual human soul in clear distinction from the material universe as a whole. It is this objective tendency, as it may be called, if "objective" is understood in the popular sense of the term, that makes it so difficult for us moderns who are accustomed to an emphasis on the individual human soul, to understand the position of the Greeks.

In the second place it should be remarked that Greek philosophy as a whole tends to depersonalization and abstraction. Not as though this was consciously the case. It could not have been done consciously because the modern concept of personality was unknown to the Greeks. What is meant is that though there was in the instance of Plato an advance from materiality to spirituality this was itself abstractly understood. One aspect of the universe is thought of as material and the other aspect is thought of as spiritual, and the soul finds its home in the spiritual aspect. But of this spiritual aspect of the universe, the soul is at most an individuation. Paul Elmer More has argued at length that abstraction first set in with Aristotle, but it may be doubted whether he has made his point. It was characteristic of the genius of the Greek mind to run into abstractions. It is inherent in all apostate thought to think abstractly.

A third general remark to be made is that Greek thought in general was intellectualistic. The emotional and volitional aspects of man are given scant attention. The essence of the soul is found in the contemplation of the "Ideas." Plato was firmly convinced that the world of sense is not the most real world. It has its reality, to be sure. But its reality was adequately known through the senses. The more real world was the world of Ideas, and that could not be known through the senses; it had to be known through contemplation by the mind.

It will be found upon careful scrutiny that all three of these characteristics just enumerated (a) a tendency to identification of the human mind with the laws of the universe as a whole, (b) a tendency toward depersonalization and abstraction, and (c) a tendency toward intellectualism, will be found to be characteristic of all non- or antitheistic thought. We shall attempt to point this out at a later stage. And if this opinion is correct it is apparent that it will repay us to see these principles in operation in the case of Plato.

¹ cf. E. Caird, *Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy*; R. K. Gaye, *Platonic Immortality*; Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, etc.

² cf. Aristotle, *De Anima I*, 411, a, 7.

We may now turn to note the development of the Platonic doctrine of the soul in the various dialogues.

The “Symposium” is the first dialogue in which the doctrine of a soul lost in the contemplation of “ideas” is hinted at. In the allegory of Alcestis returning to earth there seems to be an indication of the sort of immortality the ordinary Greek would desire. In reward for the great love shown to her husband, Alcestis is allowed to return to earth from the realm of Hades. It thus appears as though everlasting life upon the earth is the best reward the Greek could think of. But it soon appears that this is impossible, if not undesirable. Immortality, it is thought, must be something else.³ There is a hint of a kind of beings who are in their own natures immortal. Can we think of man as in his own nature immortal? That is then the question asked. We have not been accustomed to do so. But Diotema the inspired—for not even Socrates dares assume responsibility for such a bold view—tells us that there may be some individuals among men who seem to be so entirely different from the ordinary kind of men that they might seem to belong to another race. These are the philosophers. They have all their lives spurned the mere semblances of virtue and have held their eyes on high to study beauty and virtue itself. Immortality upon earth in this world of sense would be a punishment, and not a reward, for a being such as that. Nor would the perpetuation of the species be sufficient. The lover may be satisfied with a particular beauty, but the philosopher must see ideal beauty itself. He already sees it, not now and then, but continually. Yet he longs for the time when nothing will obstruct his vision any more. He seems to realize that his citizenship is in the world of eternal Ideas.

The form of the presentation here is metaphorical, but we can already see the direction in which Plato’s thought is moving. The true nature of man is his soul, and not his body. A dualism is developing. Moreover, the true nature of man is the intellect and not the senses. Only through the intellect can man come into contact with the universals, and these universal Ideas have more reality than the particulars of sense experience. Another dualism is developing. The true function of man’s soul is contemplation of the Ideas, and its highest destiny is separation from the world of sense in order to be wholly absorbed in the contemplation of Ideas.

But Plato is bound to consider more thoroughly the suggestions offered by Diotema. Perhaps Diotema has carried us as with a fiery chariot to heaven while we have forgotten that we are but children of the dust. In the *Phaedrus*, then, Plato seeks to give a definite demonstration of the validity of the idea of immortality. He comes to the conclusion that Diotema was right. It is of the essence of man to be connected with the Ideal world. The soul is considered immortal in its very nature and can for that reason expect immortality in the sense of continued existence.

In the *Phaedo* this line of argument is pursued in still more detail. True knowledge is of universals only, and it is the soul in its intellectual capacity that is fitted to come into contact with this world.

Still we must not draw this argument too sharply. Even in the *Protagoras*, an early dialogue, Plato has made Socrates admit that if virtue is teachable, there must be a stage of learning. And this could not be the case if there is too sharp a separation between the world of sense and the world of Ideas. In that case one either knows or does not know;

³ *Symposium*, 208 A. B.

one is either in contact with the Ideal world and therefore in possession of it as knowledge or one is a poor earthworm and knows nothing at all. Some reality must be given to the world of sense inasmuch as learning seems to be possible. Perhaps the indwelling of the soul in the body is not altogether in vain. Perhaps there is a closer relation between soul and body than we are willing to admit. Perhaps even the fate of both will be the same. At least the incarnation of the soul in the body has some meaning for the world of sense.

The nasty problem why there should be an incarnation of the Ideas at all is not here discussed. The *Cur Deus Homo* problem will meet us again and again. It has been and still is a bone of contention between the two main opposing systems of thought. It is especially charged that theism is here in desperate straits because it believes in an absolute God who was self-sufficient. Such a God could, it is asserted, have no reason for becoming incarnate or for creating any beings that were to exist outside himself, since he was already self-sufficient. We only mention this matter here in order to call attention to the fact that the greatest exponent of Greek thought had no solution to offer when he came to consider this problem. Whether later antitheistic thought has found a solution remains to be seen. Even in Plato's maturest thought as expressed in the *Timaeus*, there is only a faintest suggestion of the idea that it is perhaps the soul's function to bring together two opposing forces in the universe, namely, spirit and matter. And this lack of any notion of reconciliation that at all approaches the Christian idea on that subject corroborates what was said above about the assumption on the part of the Greeks, that the mind of man is naturally sound. It is assumed that there is no reconciliation to be made between God and man. And if there is any reconciliation to be made at all, it is the mind of man that is to do the reconciling. Thus the mind of man does not need any reconciliation to God by God, but it can itself reconcile the physical universe to God. Instead of needing a Mediator, the mind of man sets itself up as mediator if there is to be any mediator at all.

But we must return to the argument developed by Plato. What we have so far reached is that, according to Plato, all soul is immortal. This does not necessarily imply that every soul is immortal. All soul, Plato thinks, is self-moved. And everything that is self-moved is immortal. The human soul is not definitely proved to be immortal, but since it is connected with the cosmic soul as a whole, it may reasonably be expected to be immortal too. For suppose that the human soul should perish. Then there would be no guarantee that the world-soul as a whole would not also perish.

It is of particular importance here to observe that the final basis of the argument is the assumed eternity or at least endlessness of the existence of the universe. Plato nowhere identifies time and eternity, but he does the next thing to it. For all practical purposes his conception of time as "the moving image of eternity" amounts to saying that the eternal and the temporal are equally ultimate aspects of one general Reality. When we say "ultimate" here we do not mean that the temporal and the eternal were equally valuable in the eyes of Plato. Quite the opposite is the case. The eternal is sometimes presented as being the only valuable aspect of reality. But this does not change the fact that, according to Plato, time and eternity are equally underived. Eternity is not derived from time, but neither is time derived from eternity. And this is the fact that makes Plato's position once for all irreconcilable with any consistent interpretation of Christian theism.

We see then that the human soul is looked upon as a part of the temporal universe which is not derived from eternity. In other words, the human mind is not derived from God, and for that reason, as we shall find, is not, in the last analysis, responsible to God. Hence the interpretation of the human mind is really as ultimate as the interpretation of the divine mind. And it would inevitably follow that if then, there should arise a difference of opinion between the human and the divine mind, the human mind would in such a case have to act upon its own judgment, instead of upon the judgment of God. If two are altogether agreed upon a course of action the question of priority need not arise. But as soon as there is a difference of opinion, the question is bound to come up if cooperation is to continue. And if cooperation is not to continue, it must be that separation is possible. And the possibility of separation presupposes once more an original independence.

Starting the argument from the other direction, we can say that the method of reasoning employed by Plato involves an independence on the part of man in order to have any meaning at all. Plato had to assume the underived character of the human mind in order to assume the underived character of the whole of the temporal universe. It really makes very little difference in this connection whether one begins with metaphysics and ends with epistemology, or whether one begins with epistemology and ends with metaphysics. The important thing to observe is that the one is involved in the other. The assumed independence of the universe as a whole leads to, and implies, an original independence on the part of the mind of man. On the other hand, the assumed independence of the human mind leads to and implies an original independence of the universe.

In passing, we would notice that if the Christian theistic position is true, Platonic thought is the logical development of the thought of Eve after she yielded to the temptation of the devil. Eve still had a struggle about the matter whether or not it was wise to assume the equal ultimacy of God, the devil and man. Plato no longer had any qualms of conscience on this question at all. In his time the human race had become so well accustomed to the blindness of antitheism that it took for granted that there never had been any other way of seeing, than with blind eyes. Or if this be considered too strong a statement, and someone should wish to preserve such complete naivete as we have attributed to Plato for the modern scientist, it is well. There is some reason for this. Plato was still willing to attribute some possible meaning to the myths of which the forefathers spoke. Paul Elmer More brings this out very nicely when he says that Plato begins with Rationalism and ends with theology. What he intends to convey to us is that Plato, of course, as a philosopher, begins by assuming that the human mind is capable of meeting the riddles of the universe, but that when man sees more deeply into the limitations of human thought he is willing to listen with some respect to those who claim to have had revelations from the gods. Plato regarded the myths of an original golden era as of only secondary importance, as something to which one might listen after one's own efforts at solution have failed. There might possibly be something to these myths after all. The modern scientist, on the other hand, would of course not so much as listen to the Genesis narrative of man's original contact with God. In this respect Plato was less extremely antitheistic than the modern scientist. Even so, the distance between Eve and Plato was greater than the distance between Plato and the modern scientist. Plato had

reached the stage where antitheistic assumptions were already so deeply ingrained in the human race, that no man of any intelligence questioned them any more.

Our interpretation of Plato may still further be corroborated by the argument followed in the *Phaedo*. As in the “Meno,” so also in the *Phaedo*, the doctrine of “memory-preexistence” is brought into relation with the doctrine of Ideas to indicate that the soul was never temporally created but partakes of the Idea of Life, and for that reason, is immortal. Ten must be considered greater than eight not by reason of two, but by reason of greatness. Thus only can the gradation of the best be satisfied. So Plato’s chief argument is here that the soul partakes of the Idea of life and therefore is immortal. Soul is in intimate relation with Ideas but is not itself an Idea. “The very nature of soul consists in its vision of true realities, the Ideas. The soul is akin with the Ideal realm, and through its intimate connection therewith is immortal.”⁴

A distinct element in the argument is the soul’s relation to the notion of change. There were references to this in some of the dialogues we have discussed. The soul was in all likelihood conceived as a principle of movement prior to the soul as the principle of consciousness in Greek thought. We have, however, purposely reserved the discussion of it to this point because here the two strands of thought are brought into the most intimate connection with one another. Here too it can be most clearly seen what bearing this conception of the soul as the principle of movement has upon the more directly epistemological question of the soul as the principle of consciousness. A quotation from Adamson will bring out our point. He says: “The point at which the connexion with the Ideal realm is made most explicit is expressed by Plato as the relation of the soul and the Idea of life: the soul is relatively to the Idea of life the concrete which participates in the most abstract, in the Idea of life. What is the Idea of life? Nothing I conceive but the abstract essence of change; or if that notion be thought too wide, of spontaneous change.”⁵

⁵ Here we strike the heart of the matter. The Idea of life partakes of the general characteristics of all Ideas, namely, that it is eternal and self-existent. Now of this Idea of life the soul is a concrete manifestation or particularization. The soul “participates” in the Idea of life and is therefore underived. Thus far the argument is that with which we have grown familiar from the previous considerations. The new element added is that the notion of change is taken right into the realm of Ideas. The whole temporal world is conceived as no more than a concrete particularization of the eternal world. Instead of being a creature in a temporal world created by an eternal God, man is made the joint creator with God of the temporal world. But even this does not express the matter with entire correctness. There is really no creation at all. There is only one universe with two aspects: the eternal and the temporal. The eternal somehow expresses itself in the temporal and it is man who goes forth as the temporal appearance of the universe. Those acquainted with theological terminology might compare the doctrine of the council of peace on the part of the Trinity to the teaching of Plato on this score. Theology presents the Father and the Son and the Spirit, the three coeternal persons of the Trinity, as consulting about the problem of incarnation as it comes up in connection with the question of evil. The Father sends the Son. Yet it can with equal propriety be said that the Son goes of his own accord. The Father is no more ultimate than the Son. In Plato’s

⁴ Adamson, *The Development of Greek Philosophy*, p. 116.

⁵ Adamson, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

thought man as such is, as it were, substituted for the second person in the Trinity. Man as ultimate is as God; only it is he that appears in the temporal sphere and seems to be no different from God. What the Chalcedon Creed confesses about the Theanthropos identified with the person of Christ, Plato confesses about the theanthropos identified with generic man. For orthodox Christianity it is Christ who “somehow” combines the eternal and the temporal into a close union without intermixture. In the case of Plato’s thought it is Man who “somehow” combines the eternal and the temporal by way of an admixture.

Let us for a moment look at the threefold difference involved in the last sentence. The first is that between generic man and the Mediator. If mankind as such performs the function of Mediator, it will be impossible for any one man to be the Mediator. In the second place, for Plato eternity and time are intermixed, while for Christian theism the two natures of Christ are said to be without intermixture. The Platonic conception of the relation between eternity and time makes it forever impossible that Christianity should develop out of Platonism, as Mr. More contends that it has. The third difference lies hidden in the word “somehow.” On the surface it would appear that on this point at least Christianity and Platonism agree that both admit a final mystery in their philosophy. But this is not the case. Platonism does and Christianity does not admit a final mystery in its system. That this is a fair statement of the situation may be realized from the consideration that the controlling concept of Christianity is the concept of an absolutely self-conscious God. For such a God there could be no final mystery. When the church in effect professes that in the person of Christ the eternal and the temporal are “somehow” united, it only admits that human knowledge cannot fathom the difficulty involved. The church at the same time affirms that in God the mystery is solved. Platonism on the other hand must maintain that the divine mind as well as the human mind is surrounded with a universe which neither of the two minds has penetrated or can penetrate. Hence the mystery exists equally for God and man. If man finds himself confronted with an insoluble mystery he has no right to appeal to a higher form of intelligence for which this mystery does not exist. We shall see more fully later that here we have touched upon a fundamental difference that is bound to reappear often.

The comparison we have made in the preceding paragraphs between pagan and the Christian doctrines of incarnation may also be extended so as to compare the contrasting notions of authority. Just as Platonism was bound to deny to any one person a distinct position as Mediator, because man as such is considered to be the mediator, so also Platonism is bound, to deny that any one man could ever claim absolute authority for himself. In other words, it was a foregone conclusion that the Greek mind would reject the gospel Paul preached. The first chapter of Corinthians brings out this point. Paul says that the world by its wisdom—that is, by the effort of its own unaided intellect—had not found God. To the Greek mind the gospel was foolishness because it implied that the mind of the “natural man” is radically corrupt. Paul presented the gospel, not as a source of wisdom in coordination with other sources, but as something before which men were to bow as before an absolute authority. The Christ Paul preached was an absolute Christ, and hence the gospel of Christ was an absolute gospel. If the Greek was to accept this gospel of Christ he had to admit that his own wisdom was foolishness. And to do that would imply an entire reversal of his previous mode of thought. Naturally such a reversal of thought could not be effected unless it was effected by God, that is by the Holy Spirit.

But the existence of such a Holy Spirit the Greek would have to deny if true to his own viewpoint. For him the spirit of generic man is holy. At least he could not allow that the spirit of any one man should be absolutely holy while the spirit of all other men was unholy. Thus we see that the Greek mind, because it was operating on the assumption of the correlativity of God and man, would also have to operate on the assumption of a relativistic Christ, a relativistic Gospel, and a relativistic Spirit. The Greek mind was bound to deny the Absolute wherever it might appear. And in this the Greek mind was only typical of the antitheistic mind in general, as will appear more fully in the sequel.

1. The Abstractness Of Antitheistic Reasoning

In the preceding paragraph we have considered the necessary consequences of the relativism inherent in the very bedrock of Greek epistemology. We must now add that an inherently relativistic epistemology is also of necessity and inherently abstract. On the other hand, we believe that the method of implication or the process of transcendental reasoning as employed by Christian theism is of necessity and inherently concrete.

But what is meant by the term abstract? In order to make this clear, we must consider an aspect of the Platonic argument for the immortality of the soul. It will readily be understood that the reasoning employed by Plato is abstract in the sense of the opposite of empirical. We can best bring out this point by briefly reviewing the empirical argument for immortality as developed by Plato. When Socrates is drinking the hemlock cup, his most faithful disciples are with him in prison to discuss the possibility of life after death. They seek to reason on the basis of the facts that they can see about them everywhere. Cebes fears that souls at death may disappear as breath. Yet there is in nature a law of universal compensation. There must, they think, be a return to life, or the world of generation would soon have the same form everywhere and therefore cease to be as it is now in its diversity. But then the more fundamental question comes whether there is any good reason to hold that this world may not cease to exist altogether, or at least cease to exist in its present form of diversity. Socrates and his friends feel that their empirical argument is not necessarily valid unless this changing world has an unchanging background. That is, the validity of exclusively empirical reasoning is questioned.

But perhaps the soul is not dependent upon the body and therefore will not perish with the body. It may be that the soul can take possession of several bodies in succession to one another. Perhaps the soul should not be considered as an effect of the body as a harmony is the effect of playing the lyre. Perhaps the soul is the cause of the body. It will soon be stronger than the body and be likely to outlast the body. But even so the difficulties of an exclusively empirical argument remain. Suppose that the soul should outwear several bodies what empirical proof is there that the soul will not itself be worn out at last? As a weaver may wear out many coats but have his last coat outwear him, so the soul may outwear many bodies but have his last body outwear him. As long as the argument remains empirical, and empirical only, there is not great comfort for Socrates as he is about to drink the hemlock cup.

It was at this juncture that the argument as outlined above, i.e., about the soul's participation in the Idea of life, was introduced. Socrates and his friends felt that something had to be done by way of an attempt to seek a more sure foundation than that afforded by their empirical mode of reasoning. Not that they were ready to discard

empirical reasoning altogether. There must, they felt, be some meaning and significance to the whole of the temporal universe, and therefore there must also be some meaning to the process of reasoning as engaged in by men who are products of this world. On the other hand, they also felt that somehow the soul of man was also a citizen of an eternal realm. Hence the real validity of man's reasoning should perhaps be sought in this fact that man's mind is an eternal mind. For that reason the attempt was made to show that the soul of man participated in the very Idea of life.

But now we are to observe carefully that, according to Plato, altogether different laws obtain in the eternal world of Ideas than in the temporal world of sense. In the sense world there is nothing upon which one can depend. There is no telling but that things may turn into their very opposites. There is no underlying unity that controls and gives meaning to the diversity of the sense world. There is here an ultimate plurality without an equally ultimate unity. It was for this reason that there was no guarantee to be found in empirical reasoning for the immortality of the soul. But in the world of Ideas everything is different. There nothing changes. There we seem to meet with an ultimate unity without an equally ultimate diversity. The soul which partakes of the nature of the Idea of life also partakes of the nature of the unchangeability which is characteristic of the Idea of life, as well as of all other Ideas. Hence things can never change into their opposites. More than that, things can never change at all. In the world of Ideas qualities are absolute.

To which of these two worlds, then, does the soul really belong? Surely it can not belong to both, if the qualities of the Ideal world are summed up in complete unchangeability and the qualities of the sense world are summed up in complete changeability. On the other hand it is equally certain that the soul must belong to both worlds or there would be no unity in its thought.

Plato cannot escape this difficulty and he does not wish to do so. Hence he admits in the end that it might not be so foolish after all to listen to the ancients who claimed to have a revelation of the gods on the subject.

It is not as though Plato has not tried to solve the mystery of the revelation of two worlds that are by definition so absolutely diverse. He tries to solve the difficulty by saying that "concrete things, which, though not in themselves opposed, contain opposites . . ." That is, the concrete phenomena of this world are altogether changeable in themselves and might turn into their very opposites so that we cannot depend upon them. Yet these concrete things somehow carry in them elements of the world of Ideas. To use a crude illustration, we might suppose a cup of water containing pieces of ice. The water in itself is soft and changeable but the ice is hard and dependable. But now suppose one cup of colored water containing a piece of ice that is colored black and another cup of water containing a piece of ice that is white. If these cups of water should be poured into a larger cup when still hot they would soon intermix, but the pieces of ice contained in each cup would not intermix. Now we may compare each cup of water to a concrete sense phenomenon. The clear water would intermix with the colored, and the colored would intermix with the clear. In contrast to this, we may compare the pieces of ice to the elements of Ideas contained in the concrete objects of sense. The pieces of ice would not intermingle. They would resist intermingling. They would insist on keeping their own qualities.

So far all would seem to be quite simple. But the difficulty comes when we remember that the pieces of ice are somehow cut loose from their native realm and are floating in the very adjustable medium called water. And now there are two questions that press for an answer at once. In the first place, we must know why it is that these pieces of ice are floating loose. The question of *Cur Deus Homo* will not down. If the soul participates in the Idea of life and may therefore in all fairness be compared to the piece of ice floating in the water of the temporal world, why did the soul leave its home in glory? This is an entirely fair question to ask, inasmuch as the sense world was thought of as having no meaning apart from the world of Ideas. The sense world was said to have no abiding qualities in it unless it could be shown to be connected with the Ideal world. Hence the whole reason for the appearance of the sense world at all must be found in the Ideal world. And that is as much as to say that the soul ought to be able to tell us why it has become incarnate.

Yet no answer is forthcoming. And the reason for this may be found, we believe, in the fact that Plato did not really hold that the Ideal world had ever existed in complete independence of the sense world. It is no doubt true that Plato held that the sense world never had any meaning apart from the Ideal world, but at bottom he also held that the Ideal world never had any meaning for itself apart from the sense world. We have already seen that for Plato time is the moving image of eternity. The one world is for Plato inconceivable without the other. And if this is the case, it is no marvel that the soul should be unable to answer the question why it has become incarnate. For in this case the soul has always been incarnate in a sense.

This point will be more easily understood if we recall that for Plato there is no possible change of qualities in the Ideal world. This, if taken strictly, would mean that no change could ever take place anywhere. Theologically expressed, it would mean that creation would be impossible. The soul did not really become incarnate, but has always been incarnate in its various incarnations. Thus the sense world must always have existed in independence of the Ideal world or the two must always have existed in mutual dependence upon one another.

The same thought comes to expression if we say that for Plato the only way that time and eternity could come into contact would be by way of an intermixture. Creation or incarnation would be nothing less than essential differentiation. Plato would at one time conceive of the Ideas as immovable, so that incarnation would be impossible. Then again, seeing that incarnation was a fact notwithstanding its theoretical impossibility, he would hold that the eternal had entered into the temporal, so that there was no longer an essential difference between time and eternity. We may once more use the analogy of the ice cubes in the water. At one time Plato would maintain that the ice was the only true reality. You could kick against it and it would be immovable. Nevertheless he says that the water was also real to some extent. If the ice cubes were to maintain their reality and consequent power of resistance, they would require some friction in the medium in which they were operating. Thus it would be impossible not to ascribe some reality to the water in which the ice cubes were floating. And then it was found that virtue is actually teachable, that there is an intermediate stage between the realm of Ideas and the realm of sense. Ice did after all seem to turn into water and water did seem to become ice. And the only explanation could be that they were at bottom constituted of the same material. It was this alone that could explain in any degree the many incarnations of the soul.

Now we have by implication also answered the second question we were going to ask: namely, how is it that these ice cubes, afloat as they are in a strange medium, are able to resist one another at all, as Plato says they do? Plato says, "Nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings, in that to which it is brought."⁶ Why should a little bit of abstract quality cut loose from its eternal moorings in the Ideal world be able to do anything at all? How would the soul be able to accomplish any lasting good and therefore be truly virtuous when everything it did might turn into its very opposite after all the labor had been done? There would be no ground for Ethics or for Knowledge. Plato tried to do the thing the present-day Pragmatists are trying to do and he found it impossible. And yet he too thought that somehow it was taking place.

Now all of these arguments have been brought forth in order to show how Plato exhausted the possibilities of antitheistic thought in the field of epistemology and has utterly failed to find a solution for the problem of knowledge.

In the first place, Plato tried to find a basis for knowledge in the sense world alone. That, he realized, was utterly impossible because there was no unity upon which as a background the diversity of experience might play. On this basis man could not know anything about anything, because the knowledge of a thing as such would have to include a knowledge about its place as well as its past. But we have seen that on a purely empirical ground it was not possible to determine whether or not the soul would be immortal.

In the second place, Plato tried to find knowledge by seeking it in the Ideal world alone. But this attempt, too, he recognized to be a failure. There was, to begin with, trouble in the heavenly realm itself. There seemed to be a fundamental and an underlying unity there in the Idea of the Good. That Idea seemed to rule as king over all the other Ideas. But the question was, by what right did the Idea of Good rule over all the others? Was it because the Idea of the Good was more ultimate? That was out of the question. The other Ideas were just as ultimate and not at all derived from the Idea of the Good. That this is so can be noted from the fact that there were Ideas of mud and hair and filth; that is, there were Ideas of evil things as well as of good things. But since it was of the very nature of all Ideas to be unchangeable and to oppose their opposites, it would certainly be intolerable to contemplate the Idea of the Good as bringing forth the Idea of the Bad. This proves conclusively that there was for Plato a fundamental diversity as well as a fundamental unity in the world of Ideas. And this would offhand seem to be all to the good, inasmuch as that is just what we are looking for in a true theory of Knowledge. But the point is that this very fact that there was a fundamental evil as well as a fundamental good proves that there was really no underlying and controlling unity in the world of Ideas after all. The Idea of the Good was king only in name. It would surely be unable to control its unruly subjects that were just as eternal as itself. Plato's world of Ideas was a house divided against itself.

It would be very questionable whether such a realm of Ideas would be of much service in helping the dwellers upon earth to settle their quarrels. It was unity that was missing in the temporal sphere, and it was to ask for unity that the inhabitants of earth had sent to the realms of Jupiter. But Jupiter had his own quarrels to settle and could send no forces to the earth.

⁶ cf. Jowett's translation of the *Phaedo*, p. 251.

In the third place, therefore, the plenipotentiaries of both earth and heaven decided that since they all had to face the same problems it would be wise to pool their interests and set up an interdenominational federation of churches. In this federation no one was to sacrifice any of his independence, since the council of the federation was to have only advisory power.

The third and last position of Plato mentioned in the preceding paragraph needs some further elucidation, because it represents the high-water mark of Plato's thought and, we believe, has exhausted the possibilities of all antitheistic thought, whether ancient or modern.

This third position of Plato was the result of the recognition that the acceptance of either the first or the second position would involve the acceptance of an abstract method of reasoning, which Plato was most anxious to avoid. It was impossible to approach the whole of truth if one should reason on the basis of empirical facts only. On the other hand, one could never seek to account for the reality of the world of senses (sensuous world), if one would limit his knowledge to the standard of the Ideal world only. These could not be kept separate. And what was most important, Plato had the true insight that unless one could relate the two worlds in one comprehensive scheme of knowledge, one could not expect to know anything about either of the two worlds. He felt that in the human soul the two worlds were somehow united, and one would have to understand this union to understand either the soul itself or anything else.

From this criticism of Plato on his earlier positions, we can learn what is meant by the charge of abstract reasoning. It means the reasoning with inadequate categories. Plato tried to reason with the categories of time when he was reasoning empirically. Then he found that such reasoning could give him no information about that which he was most desirous of knowing, that is, whether Socrates should be immortal. Then he tried reasoning with the categories of eternity. But when he did that, he was unable to account for the temporal world because the categories of eternity would not move and could not create. The reason for this failure is not far to seek. Plato assumed that it was possible for man to reason with the categories of eternity. This is in the nature of the case impossible for a time-conditioned creature such as man finds himself to be. And if this is so, there are only two ways that might be followed. One might conclude that there is no knowledge possible for man at all. The time categories are certainly insufficient to explain even temporal things, let alone eternal. Hence, if he cannot reason with any but temporal categories, his knowledge is useless. The only way then for man to have any knowledge of either temporal or eternal things is for a God to think for us in eternal categories and reveal to us the Measure of truth we can fathom. Thus we hold that Christian theism is the only alternative to skepticism. But Plato in the nature of the case could not see this point. He took for granted that in the soul of man must lie the solution of the mystery of existence. He would not accept the idea that there should be a God who alone could think in eternal categories, but he believed that man could also do that which God could do.

We find the same attitude today in modernism when Dr. Fosdick, e.g., says that he believes in the divinity of Christ but that he believes in the divinity of his mother too. That is, according to Fosdick, both Christ and his mother embody a measure of the principle of love which may be called divine. But in such a presentation the question that at once arises is whether love is temporal or eternal. And if it is said to be eternal, the

whole question as to who can think eternal categories comes up again. If modernism wants to be exclusively empirical, as is often the case, it has not yet outgrown Plato's first position. If Jesus is regarded as a man only, there is no guarantee that the good he embodied will in any sense be realized even if all men should try to follow it. And in such a case, there is not the least reason to expect that all men will follow it. There are still original Ideas of mud and hair and filth, as Plato spoke of them. In other words, if we are to think in exclusively temporal categories, the evil in the universe is as fundamental as the good, and there is no reason to think that the good will penetrate the evil, or if it does, there is at least no hope that the good will conquer the evil.

The preceding paragraph also proves that no man really can think in exclusively temporal categories. If he seeks permanency in any respect, in this instance the permanency of Love, he must try to think in eternal categories. But he is constantly in the difficulty in which Plato found himself when he tried to make eternal categories operative in the temporal sphere. Thus the thinking of modernism resembles the act of a physicist who should try to measure the resistance of two ice cubes in a body of quiet water. There simply would be no game because of wet ground.

But Plato actually faced the difficulties involved in this antitheistic dilemma and tried to find a way out in the third position spoken of above.

The "Parmenides" undertakes a criticism of the notion of the Ideal world in general. Plato asks himself the question how many Ideas or forms can be present in one sensible object. There had to be in man something of the Idea of the Good and at the same time there had to be in man something of the Idea of the Bad, because it was in the soul of man that there was to be unity for the two worlds. But according to the doctrine of the Ideas, the Ideas of the Good and the Bad would have to be absolutely opposed to one another and refuse to live together under the same roof. In other words, the problem of evil remained an insoluble mystery if the doctrines of Ideas were to be accepted.

Moreover, Plato asked whether the whole of different Ideas could be present in one sensuous object. Even if there were no opposition between two Ideas present in one object because of their difference in quality, there would be a difficulty because of their size. The whole of the Idea of the Good would have to be present in each of thousands of sense-objects. But since this was manifestly impossible, the Idea of the Good would have to be cut up in many pieces so that something of the Idea might be present in each object. But if the Idea of the Good were thus cut up, it could no longer furnish the unity that was indispensable for knowledge. In other words, the doctrine of Idea left the problem of the one and the many, and therefore that of creation, unsolved. If the Ideal world was itself an ultimate plurality, it could be of no service in an attempt to explain the plurality of the world we live in.

Still further, if the Ideas were to be divided there would be no end to this process. An Idea would be required for every participation of an Idea in a sensuous object. And this process would have to go on indefinitely. Thus knowledge would be face to face with an infinite regression.

In desperation, Plato asks himself whether we may then think that the Ideas are no more than our thoughts, that is, only subjective. But he finds that this offers no escape. If in such a case the Ideas were to remain in contact with the world of sense and have meaning for it, we would have to conclude that all things think. We would have to hold that all our thought about reality is merely subjective, that is, that there is nothing more to

reality than our subjective thought. Thus knowledge would be reduced to an illusion. On the other hand, if Ideas are no more than thoughts, we might think of them as not having penetrated the whole of reality, in order thus to save ourselves from subjectivism. But in that case there would be an area of reality not in contact with thought at all. There would be an area of reality totally unknown to anyone. And yet this area might have some influence upon the reality that we seem to have knowledge of. Hence we would not even have knowledge of that of which we thought we had knowledge. We would once more be face to face with an infinite regress. Plato says all this by saying that, in this case, there would be unthought thoughts.

He makes a special point of the fact that if we should think of the Ideas as being thoughts only, then knowledge would be as impossible for God as it would be for man. There would be an area of reality that lies beyond God's thought. And Plato feels that that is the worst thing that could happen to any theory of knowledge.

The final conclusion drawn from this renewed investigation of the theory of Ideas is that the fact of knowledge cannot be explained with it. And the reason for this was that the logic employed throughout was too abstract and exclusive. It was impossible to get a set of immovable qualities to explain anything in an inherently moving body such as the temporal universe was. Time and Eternity had been taken at the outset as equally underived. How then could you expect that time should suddenly be able and willing to submit to the ways of eternity? On the other hand, how could you expect that Eternity should suddenly feel at home when taken into the realm of time? Far easier could you bring under one roof an old bachelor and an old maid, both of them accustomed to a life of abstraction from one another, and expect that they would get along in harmony, than get Plato's two worlds together. "If we postulate a One which is only one (as the Megarians did), we can say nothing whatsoever about it. Or if (as the Megarians did also) we identify One with Being we shall have to predicate of it all sorts of incompatible predicates."⁷

For these reasons then, Plato was driven to what we have called his third position. In this third position Plato tries to make the categories of Time and Eternity overlap. Instead of starting with two worlds which had laws of their own which they were loath to modify, Plato now thinks of these two worlds as having always been together somehow. We might perhaps compare this to an early marriage such as has sometimes been effected by parents for their children. If two children were married from the very dawn of their conscious life we might expect that it would be less difficult for them to live together than for a couple that had come to middle age before their marriage. A couple married when young would easily learn to give and take.

Thus Plato tries to make his logic less abstract by thinking of Time and Eternity as always having been together. Time is thought of as the Moving image of Eternity. Thus there will be something of eternity in time and something of time in eternity. Consequently it will not be necessary to make rigidly exclusive demands for the complete unchangeability of the Ideas or for the ultimate changeability of the sensuous world.

The Sophist tells us that in order to save predication we must establish the possibility of false predication. The possibility of negative judgment involves the possibility of positive judgment. To use our analogy once more, it must be possible for husband and

⁷ Burnet, *Part One*, etc., p. 272.

wife to differ on some questions without at once bringing up the matter of divorce. The differences are to play upon the background of a deeper unity. Up to this time the husband had threatened with divorce every time he did not get his way altogether, and the wife had done likewise. From now on they will allow for a certain amount of false predication within the circle of marriage truth.

In fact Plato wishes to emphasize this point very strongly. From now on predication is to have no meaning except upon the basis of the assumed indissolubility of the union between time and eternity. 'Is' and 'is not' are to have no meaning except in a world in which they have equal right and the one can never oust the other completely. Is not does not involve non-existence, but otherness. Our mistake had been that we had thought of married life as a state of unalloyed conjugal felicity. Now we realize how absurd such an idea was. Now we even expect some quarrels. We now hold that differences are natural. There is still a certain amount of independence. Plato speaks of this when he says that not all forms will intermingle but that some forms will intermingle with some forms. Yet, as a whole, harmony is to be effected, if it is to be effected at all, by this intermingling of the forms.

In our criticism of this Platonic logic it is not imperative that we discuss the question to what extent Plato thought this attempt at a solution of the problem of knowledge successful. We may say that Plato felt the problem of knowledge to be unsolved even after this modification of the doctrine of Ideas. He practically says that much when he makes the statement that not all forms will intermingle with all forms. If all forms intermingled with all forms, there would once more be a completely colorless mass. In that case it would be as difficult to make any statement about reality as it would be if all things were immovable as the world of Ideas was formerly thought of as immovable. In either case we would be at the place where the Megarians were, who said that all things were One, and concluded that predication was consequently impossible. And then we would be face to face with the question whether this One were to be thought of as temporal or as eternal. If as eternal, then the whole of temporal reality remained unaccounted for. If as temporal, we could not help but think of an ultimate plurality. Thus an ultimate plurality would mean the same thing as an ultimate unity. And this amounts to saying once more that our predication as a whole is without meaning.

On the other hand, it is difficult to see how Plato could say that some forms would intermingle with some forms, without also saying that all forms would intermingle. Who would prevent the ice cubes from melting altogether, once you allowed that they melted to any extent at all? In other words, if you allow that the categories of eternity and time have always been mutually dependent on one another, there is no stopping till you come to the station called Pragmatism. Surely the resistance that one ice cube was supposed to have over against another ice cube would gradually be reduced till it reached the zero mark.

It is thus that the Platonic argument is seen to be abstract throughout. Plato was glad to admit that his argument was abstract when he was at his first and second positions. But we must now observe that his thought had not lost any of its abstract character even when he maintained his third position. Plato's logic remained an either or affair. An ultimate interdependence of the categories of time and eternity leads to just the same abstraction as that to which an ultimate independence of these categories leads. The reason for this is that an ultimate interdependence eventually amounts to a victory of the one type of

category over the other. Plato could not stop his ice cubes from becoming water unless he would freeze all the water into ice. Or, to use the marriage illustration once more, there was harmony “ever after” because the husband never disputed the wife’s opinions but took them for granted as final authority.

Plato insisted that the Idea of evil was as original as the Idea of the Good. He also insisted that the Idea of plurality, was as original as the Idea of unity. And more than that, he insisted that the Idea of time was as fundamental as the Idea of eternity. This amounted to saying that the Idea of time is as eternal as the Idea of eternity itself. Or it amounts to saying that the Idea of eternity is as temporal as the Idea of Temporality. All of which comes to a complete confusion and stultification of thought. Plato cannot escape the criticism of the third man. If there must be an Idea of man to explain the Socrates who walked in Athens, there must be once more an Idea of the participation of Socrates in the Idea of Socrates, and so on ad infinitum. Plato himself clearly saw this difficulty when he criticized his first and second positions. He has in no way escaped these difficulties in his third position. The Neo-platonists demonstrated this fact when they tried to work out this platonic principle with respect to the Mediator. When they tried to find a Mediator that was to be an intermixture between the unapproachable Eternal and the Temporal they had to continue making more Mediators all the time.

All antitheistic thought has to face the third man argument because all antitheistic thought tries the three ways of Plato in turn, and these three ways are based upon abstract reasoning.

We must now turn to observe the attempt of Christian theism to meet this pagan thinking.

Chapter 4: Historical Survey:

C: Mediaeval Epistemology: Its Starting Point

It is not our purpose to begin the review of the history of Christian epistemology by tracing the material to be found in Scripture. We are interested to know what those who have studied the Scripture have found there.

Moreover, what we found to be the case with Greek epistemology is also the case here, namely, that we shall not find a well developed system of epistemology, but only an epistemology that is implied in the general philosophy of life as held by the fathers of the church.

We shall not attempt to offer a detailed survey of what all the church fathers had to offer on the subject. We shall limit our discussion to the creeds of the church and to the philosophy of St. Augustine. In the creeds of the church we have the authentic opinion of the church. Certain definite epistemological theories are imbedded in these creeds. In addition to that, we are fortunate in the fact that the early church possessed an outstanding orthodox philosopher in the person of Augustine. Origen was a great philosopher too, but cannot fairly be taken as an example of the early Christian position because he was not orthodox. On the other hand, there were great men in the church beside Augustine who were orthodox, but these were theologians rather than philosophers. In addition to this, there is the fact that it has been customary with historians of philosophy to put Augustine in the general idealistic tradition from Plato to Hegel. By challenging this interpretation we shall be face to face with the enemy at once, and no one can say that we have shirked the most difficult and important part of the task.

It is our purpose to show that Augustine's thought was the antithesis of Plato's thought. Instead of thinking of Augustine as a general idealistic philosopher with certain inconsistent orthodox elements in his thinking, we hold that Augustine should be thought of as a Christian theistic philosopher with certain elements of Platonism in his thinking. We would not say Plato and Augustine, but Plato or Augustine.

In order to accomplish the task just now outlined, we can do no better than contrast Augustinian thought with Platonic thought on those points which we have discussed under the epistemology of Plato. We found that Plato tried three ways of reasoning. The first was exclusively empirical. The second was exclusively metempirical. The third was an attempt at a union of the first and the second. In none of these ways of reasoning did Plato overcome the three fundamental assumptions of Greek philosophy. These three assumptions are (a) that all things are at bottom one; (b) that the many have come out of the one, that is, the fact of change; and (c) that all things remain at bottom one even after they have come out of the one.

The result of Platonic thinking was that the assumptions of pre-Socratic thinking were raised to the level of self-consciously adopted first principles. The conclusion of the whole of Greek speculation was that all things are at bottom one. Epistemologically expressed, this amounts to saying that there can be only one type of mind. The human and the divine mind can never differ in any other way than quantitatively. Both the human and the divine mind are limited by the circumstance that they find a situation which is independent of them. The minds of both God and man are placed within a universe that is larger and more original than, or as original as, themselves.

It is these self-consciously adopted first principles of Platonic thought that are rejected by Augustine. We are not asking the question whether Augustine was fully aware of the fact that he had broken with these principles. We are only concerned to prove that it was a fact that he had. The Platonic elements that remained in Augustine's thinking we can very well afford to ignore for the purpose of our argument. Nor are we concerned just now to note the stages of the development in Augustine's thought. We are taking his maturest thought only and contrasting it with the maturest thought of Plato.¹

The question that comes up first of all is the question of Augustine's method of reasoning. Did Augustine reason in the way that Plato did in his first position? We believe he did not. As an illustration of his method of reasoning we may take the classical example of his attempt to obtain certain knowledge about his own existence.² Augustine did not, in his mature works, reason about the existence of himself as Socrates reasoned about the immortality of his soul. Augustine did not separate his self-existence from God's existence. His argument was not, finally, based upon a consideration of what laws he observed in the physical universe around him. He did not ask whether there was a law of compensation observable in the universe that might justify him in his hope that his soul should survive. The physical universe did not have any existence for Augustine except as a creation of God. Hence the laws that he observed in the physical universe could produce no ground for reasoning independently of the plan of God. Thus it was impossible for Augustine, finally, to reason in exclusively empirical or temporal categories.

That Augustine did not reason as Plato did in his first position can also be seen from the fact that he strenuously opposed the sense philosophy of Arnobius and others. In this opposition to the sense philosophy he seems even to go to the extreme of suggesting that the physical world is rather a hindrance than a help to true knowledge. We might even call Augustine a Rationalist if it only be remembered that by that term we would mean to do no more than to indicate that one opposes the principles of pure empiricism.

It is more important to note that in this opposition to the Sensationalists Augustine did not go to the extreme of suggesting that the mind creates its own object. In other words Augustine was not a subjective Idealist. We mention this fact not so much in the interest of establishing that Augustine was a Realist, as in the interest of establishing that Augustine was a Theist. If we merely established that he was a Realist, the question of his theism would still remain open, inasmuch as there have been many Realists who were also antitheists. What we are interested in noting, therefore, is not so much that according to Augustine physical objects existed independently of the human mind, as that both the physical objects and the human mind exist in dependence upon God. "The sensible world is not thought of by him as itself independent of the intelligible. It not only has its source in the intelligible world, but derives its whole support and direction from it; and reflects, after its own fashion, its content."³

Has Augustine then perhaps reasoned as Plato did in his second method of reasoning? This question is of more importance than the first, and is much more difficult to answer,

¹ In the syllabus *Christianity in Conflict*, Vol. 1, the development of Augustine's thought is traced.

² cf. *The City of God*; *The Confessions*; etc.

³ B. B. Warfield, *Studies in Tertulian and Augustine*, p. 142.

it would seem, because it involves the point of Augustine's relation to Plato as far as their conceptions of the Ideal world are concerned. Did not both Plato and Augustine separate the two worlds, the world of sense and the world of Ideas, to God? No more fundamental question can be asked than this: do the Ideas rest in God? If these Ideas are no more than an impersonal congregation or rather summation, the world of Ideas cannot hope permanently to oppose the inroads of Sensationalism. In that case the world of sense cannot be wholly dependent upon the world of Ideas, and is therefore bound to reassert its rights.

It must readily be admitted that there is much in Augustine's writings that would seem to warrant a Platonic interpretation of his theory of knowledge. He speaks often of the Ideal world without bringing in the question of the relation of the Ideas to God. Augustine argues against the Sensationalists as Plato argued, that the human soul has within it innate ideas derived from the Intelligible World. But, as Dr. Warfield remarked, when we have observed that much we are on the way to an understanding of Augustine's theory of knowledge, but we have not yet reached it. The mere reference to an Ideal world is in itself not necessarily anything more than deistic. Such a reference is as a matter of fact deistic unless the world of sensation be conceived of as constantly depending upon the world of Ideas. And even so it is deistic unless that world of Ideas be more than a series of impersonal principles. A series of impersonal principles could never bring forth the world of sensation, so that the world of sensation could really never be dependent upon it. "Augustine, however, was as little deistic as Sensationalistic in his thinking, and necessarily advanced a step further to a truly theistic Intuitionism."⁴

That Augustine was not deistic but theistic, and for that reason differed fundamentally from Plato, can be seen best of all if we note the Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity.⁵ We shall not attempt to trace in what respect Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity differed from that of other church fathers. Suffice it to say that by common consent Augustine developed the doctrine in the line of orthodox Christianity, and that the doctrine forms an integral part of his thinking.

We may contrast this doctrine of the Trinity with Plato's thought by calling attention to the fact that for Augustine the Trinity furnished the basis of the principles of unity and diversity in human knowledge. In other words the Trinity is for Augustine as for all orthodox Christians a conception without which knowledge were impossible to man. That there is plurality which man must seek to relate to some underlying unity, is patent to all men. From the earliest dawn of reflective thinking it has been the effort of man to find unity in multiplicity. But the difficulties that meet one when trying to speculate upon the question of unity and plurality are that if one begins with an ultimate plurality in the world, or we may say by regarding plurality as ultimate, there is no way of ever coming to an equally fundamental unity. On the other hand, if one should begin with the assumption of an ultimate abstract, impersonal unity, one cannot account for the fact of plurality. No system of thought can escape this dilemma. No system of thought has escaped this dilemma. Many systems of thought have denied one of the horns of the dilemma, but all that they have accomplished by doing this is to find relief in the policy of the ostrich.

⁴ Warfield, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

⁵ St. Augustine, on the Trinity, in *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, Ser. 1.3.

What Augustine and all theistic thinkers after him have done is to say that in God, and more specifically in the triune God, lies the solution of this difficulty. Not as though man should be able to understand the solution. On the contrary, man can never hope and should never wish to understand the solution. The reason for this is obvious. If man could understand the solution it would no longer be a solution. Man's thought, apart from God, can in the nature of the case get no farther than an ultimate plurality or to an abstract unity. Even Robinson Crusoe could not forget that there were other people in the world. And if he could have forgotten other people, he could not help but see other objects beside himself. Man could not come to an ultimate unity unless he could come to an absolute originality, and this he cannot do. But the fact that man cannot understand the solution does not imply that he cannot reasonably believe in the existence of the solution.

A corollary from the doctrine of the Trinity is that human knowledge is analogical. Human knowledge must always depend upon divine knowledge. Anything that a human being knows must first have been known to God. Anything a human being knows he knows only because he knows God. For that reason too man can never know anything as well and as exhaustively as God knows it.

The fact that man's knowledge must always remain analogical is applicable to his knowledge of God as well as to his knowledge of the universe. God will never be exhaustively understood in his essence by man. If he were, he would no longer be God. In that case there would be no solution for the problem of knowledge.

A third corollary from the doctrine of the Trinity is that man's knowledge though analogical is nevertheless true. Or to put it more specifically, man's knowledge is true because it is analogical. It is analogical because God's being unites within itself the ultimate unity and the ultimate plurality spoken of above. And it is true because there is such a God who unites this ultimate unity and plurality. Hence we may also say that only analogical knowledge can be true knowledge.

If we turn to a comparison of this Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity with what might correspond to it in Platonic thought, the great contrast between the two men comes out at once. There is nothing in Platonic thought that corresponds to the Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity.

In saying this we do not mean so much that the conception itself is not found, as that the whole drift of Platonic philosophy is inherently opposed to it, so that we can find nothing in Plato's thinking that may even be called an adumbration of the idea of the Trinity.

To prove this point we should ask again where Plato would find the ultimate union of the principle of unity and of diversity. It will be said at once that he too sought it in the Ideal of intelligible world. But this is not really true. For Plato the sense world is not altogether dependent upon the ideal world. Plato has no doctrine of temporal creation. Hence the plurality of the sense world is conceived of as ultimate.

It is of supreme importance to note that this fact of the assumed ultimacy of the sense world makes it impossible for Plato really to seek a solution for the problem of knowledge in the Ideal world. This assumed ultimacy of the sense world includes the human mind, because finite mind can never understand the union of an ultimate unity and diversity. Once you start with the assumption of an ultimate plurality and take as part of that ultimate plurality the sensible universe, you can never after that come to the conception of an ultimate unity.

It is for this reason that Plato never attained to unity in the Ideal world. His trouble was not that he sought an ultimate unity and an ultimate diversity in the Ideal world. His trouble was not that he sought to interpret temporal reality in eternal categories. His trouble was rather that he did not really do these things. Plato and Augustine differ on this most important point—that Augustine did and Plato did not interpret reality in exclusively eternal categories. Plato did have diversity in his Ideal world, but he did not have unity there. His Idea of the Good never acquired supremacy over the other Ideas. We have before noted that this fact comes into bold relief if we recall that Plato struggled with the Ideas of mud and hair and filth, in short, with the Idea of evil which, to his way of thinking, was necessarily as original as the Good. Plato could never come to unity in knowledge, yet he realized that unity was the thing without which knowledge is impossible.

From this discussion it follows that the Augustinian doctrine of the Trinity could not be a development of but had to be a reversal of the Platonic theory of knowledge. Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity is the very axle upon which his entire theory of knowledge turns. One who embraces the doctrine of the Trinity holds that human knowledge is analogical. One who does not embrace the doctrine of the Trinity holds that human knowledge is original. This is true in the case of Plato in spite of his constant emphasis that all knowledge depends upon the soul's relation to the world of Ideas. We have already noted that according to Plato the plurality of the sense world is ultimate, and that therefore the human mind is ultimate. Such a mind could not be satisfied with analogical knowledge. It might recognize a certain superiority in the divine mind, but it could never recognize an absolute originality in the divine mind.

Platonic thought, logically developed, would have to reject the Augustinian principle that human knowledge is true because it is analogical. Platonic thought, because it conceives of the human mind as being original, must reject the notion that the ultimate essence of any aspect of reality should remain forever a mystery for the mind of man. Platonic thought must hold to complete comprehension as the never-to-be-forsaken ideal of human knowledge.

The same point may be further elucidated if we say that Platonic and Augustinian thought have opposing conceptions of Mystery. Augustinian thought holds that there is not and has never been mystery for God. It is this that makes the mystery that has always and that will always surround man not a burden, but a joy, to him. Man can rejoice in the mystery that surrounds himself because he believes that no mystery surrounds God. If mystery should be thought of as surrounding God, then nothing would remain for man but utter despair. A child who knows that his father is a millionaire does not need to have more than a dollar in his hand. The believer can pray with confidence, "Give us this day our daily bread." On the other hand, Platonic thought starts out with the idea that there is mystery surrounding both God and man. Both have a universe surrounding them in which they must seek to find unity. This unity is something which neither God nor man has at the outset of the search. The unity is hidden in the mystery that surrounds them both. This unity is the mystery that surrounds them both. As the search for unity continues, God and man can report to one another what progress, if any, each one has made. If unity is ever to be found it must be found to include the equally original plurality of God and man, of the world of Ideas and the world of sense. Since such a unity can in the nature of the case never be found, the mystery that surrounds man must lead to an ultimate despair.

The difference between Plato and Augustine on this most fundamental point of the position of God in the Ideal world may still more clearly be observed if we notice the argument each one gives for holding to his own position. Plato says that to appeal to the revelation of God is really to give up philosophy altogether. He says that we may ask the oracles of the gods when we have to give up philosophy in despair, but not till then. He would not appeal to what he considered foreign aid until his own efforts were proved useless. And even then he did not really expect any help from the ancients or from the oracles. On the other hand, Augustine is equally convinced that unless human knowledge has the right to appeal to divine knowledge, not as to a foreign something, there will be no knowledge for man. He feels that unless we can appeal to God we may as well give up philosophy. So far from subtracting from certainty of human knowledge, the appeal to divine revelation makes it all the more certain. "The ultimate ground of our certitude becomes our confidence in God. In the last analysis, God is our surety for the validity of our knowledge; and that not merely remotely, as the author of our faculties of knowing, but also immediately as the author of our every act of knowing, and the truth which is known."⁶

It must now be noted that just as the doctrine of the Trinity was an essential part of Augustinian thought and had a determining influence upon his theory of knowledge, so also his doctrine of man's creation in the image of God should be taken into consideration. We have already observed that the creation idea as such places a gulf between the two types of thought under discussion. In line with this more general consideration, it should be observed that according to Augustine man was created in God's image. This doctrine is a natural consequence of the doctrine of the Trinity. A God who carries within himself the ultimate harmony of the principles of unity and diversity could look to no principles beyond himself when creating man. If man was to be created at all, he was bound to be like God in that there would be within his being an analogue of that harmony of the principles of unity and diversity which was found in its fulness in the Trinity. There would be impressed upon man a finite replica of the ideas of God. In this connection Augustine constantly employs the figure of a ring whose device is impressed upon wax. Speaking of man's knowledge of God and of the moral law, Augustine asks the question whence this knowledge has come. His answer is that this knowledge has come by virtue of an impress of God. "Where indeed are these rules written, wherein even the unrighteous recognizes what is righteous, wherein he discerns that he ought to have what he himself has not? Where, then, are they written, unless in the book of that Light which is called Truth, whence every righteous law is copied and transferred (not by migrating to it, but by being as it were impressed upon it) to the heart of the man that worketh righteousness; as the impression from the ring passes into the wax, yet does not leave the ring."⁷ "The care which is taken here to represent the process as a transference of the laws without transfusion of the substance may be said to be the characteristic feature of this passage, as it is of the entire teaching of Augustine on the topic."⁸

On all this Plato teaches quite the opposite. According to Plato, man is not created in the image of God because there is no God sufficiently absolute to create man in his own

⁶ Warfield, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁷ *On the Trinity* 14:25:21.

⁸ Warfield, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

image. In the Platonic story of creation God looks up to Ideas that are next to him and is conditioned by material that is independent of him. Plato's God does not carry within him the ultimate principle of unity and diversity, but he is looking for it. Hence man's knowledge cannot be an impress of God's knowledge. If God did try to impress his knowledge upon man it would naturally be regarded as an imposition by man because he was more or less God's equal. Thus Plato and Augustine stand once more opposed to one another.

Still another aspect of the Augustinian theory of knowledge that brings out the difference between his theory and that of Plato is that, according to Augustine, man's present condition is noetically abnormal. Wax is not always equally receptive to impressions that are made upon it. So the mind of man is by virtue of its creation in the image of God ready and fitted to receive true knowledge but has become unfit to receive true knowledge through man's deflection from the source of knowledge. By virtue of his creation man has truth immediately. But since the Triune God is, in the nature of the case, holy and just, man cannot come into contact with God and receive the truth unless he seeks God *pie, case et diligenter*. "O God," he prays, "whom no one finds who is not fully purged."⁹ Augustine is deeply convinced that no one can have true intellectual knowledge of God unless he is morally in tune with God. And he is equally assured that no one is morally in tune with God unless he has faith. And no one can have faith unless it be given him by the grace of God. Sin is a separation of man from God that, in the nature of the case, cannot be healed except by God himself.

Warfield makes it clear that this view of Augustine does not justify anyone saying that Augustine was a skeptic.¹⁰ Augustine, to be sure, despaired of a sinner in his own strength ever coming to a possession of true knowledge, but he was equally sure that in faith there was a removal of the evil consequences of sin. Hence those that have faith are naturally once more in possession of true knowledge.

For Plato there could be no falling away of man from God since man had never been exclusively responsible to God either intellectually or morally. Moreover, since the Ideas of the Ideal world are not unified, it was quite possible according to Plato, to be morally out of tune with the Idea of the Good, but to have correct intellectual knowledge of the Ideal world in spite of this moral deflection. This point once more harmonizes with the notion that it is possible for man to have knowledge even if there is no God who has absolute knowledge. For the only way in which you could conceive of man not being obliged to accept God's interpretation of evil would be if evil existed in independence of God. And in that case God would not be carrying the ultimate principle of unity within himself. It is thus that Plato's theory of evil corroborates our interpretation of Plato's theory of knowledge.

Now at last we are in a position to answer the question whether in his mature position Augustine reasoned as Plato reasoned, in what we have called his second method of reasoning. After trying in vain in his first empirical argument to establish the immortality of Socrates, Plato turned to the soul's participation in the Idea of life. The Idea of life is unchangeable just because it is an Idea. Hence the soul ought also to be unchangeable unless, forsooth, it carry within itself something of the Idea of evil too. And just what

⁹ quoted by Warfield, *op. cit.*, p. 152; from Sol. 1:3.

¹⁰ cf. his criticism on John Owen's *Evenings With The Sceptics*, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

would happen if that were true, Plato finds it hard to imagine. By his own theory, no Idea can allow the opposite of itself to molest its independence. So then if the soul of Socrates carries within itself something of the Idea of the Good and something of the Idea of evil, uncertainty must remain as to the question of immortality. If Socrates were all bad he would certainly not be immortal. But since Socrates seems to carry elements of both the good and the bad within him, no one can say what will happen to Socrates. The real difficulty here, it will be observed, is once more the assumption of an ultimate plurality without an equally ultimate unity. The opposition of the Ideas to one another is not conceived of as an ethical antithesis between the Good and the evil. The fact that the Ideas are equally ultimate excludes the possibility of an ultimate unity inasmuch as none of the Ideas is totally independent of the world of sense. Notably, the Idea of evil is dependent upon the evil inherent in the world of sense. Hence if the world of Ideas is after all dependent upon the world of sense to some extent, it is impossible to establish the immortality of Socrates upon the basis of the nature of the world of Ideas alone. Thus the second method of reasoning runs into the first, and partakes of all the uncertainty of an exclusively empirical argument.

In contrast to this we can readily comprehend that Augustine did not finally reason in this fashion. In his doctrine of the Trinity lay the guarantee of an equal ultimacy of unity and diversity. He spoke of one God with one absolute self-conscious existence. This excluded the possibility of God's Ideas or plan ever being in any measure dependent upon a temporal plurality. It also excluded the possibility of the existence of an Idea of evil apart from his Being. In short, the idea of an ultimate plurality beyond God's being is excluded. There had to be a plurality as ultimate as the unity, but this plurality would, in the nature of the case, be found within the Being of God. Hence Augustine spoke of the consubstantiality of the three Persons in the Triune God.

From this point of vantage we now realize what the nature of Augustine's reasoning would have to be, and we shall find that it corresponds with that which, especially from his latest works, we know he has employed. Augustine, we know, was almost exclusively engaged in seeking to know God and himself. How then did he know himself? How would he argue for immortality? He would argue that he would naturally be immortal inasmuch as God planned him to be so. He would not believe in the soul's preexistence, since that would imply his participation in the essence of eternity itself. In that case he would be once more a charter member of an original plurality without the Being of God, which conception he, by definition, had excluded. On the other hand, he would be equally sure that the evil within him was not due to the indwelling of something of the eternal Idea of evil. For if evil were eternal it would once more exclude the notion of an ultimate unity. Hence the warfare within him between good and evil was not a tug-of-war affair in which two parties were about equally matched. The principle of evil must be finite and the principle of the good must be infinite. If then he was only identified in purpose with the power of the infinite good, he would not only be immortal, but also be blessed. And even if not identified in purpose with the plans of the infinite, he would still be immortal, but immortal in misery. In either case the unity of God's plan could not be broken. And put once more in philosophical terms, this would mean that Augustine is reasoning in such a way as to make the categories of eternity to be determinative of his thought. His method is all of one piece instead of a mixture, as was the case with Plato. There was not

the least danger that Augustine would at last end with an abstract logical argument as Plato had done.

In the Trinity, Augustine found his Concrete Universal. It is the earmark of what Idealism means by a concrete universal that unity and difference should be equally fundamental. But since Plato never succeeded in making unity and difference equally basic, it is fair to say that Plato's thought remained abstract. He reasoned first on the basis of a physical world which he tried to abstract from the Ideal world. Then he reasoned on the basis of an Ideal world which he tried to abstract from the world of sense. But when he reasoned upon the basis of the sense world, he nevertheless took for granted the existence of the Ideal world with its claims, and when he reasoned in his second method upon the basis of the laws of the Ideal world, he nevertheless took for granted the existence of the world of sense with its claims. He did not have the courage to be either exclusively empirical or exclusively ideational. Hence his reasoning was in each case nothing but a temporary extraction of one aspect from the other aspect. He lacked the courage to abstract God from the sense world to such an extent that he really becomes self-supporting and therewith Concrete.

With respect to this third position of Plato, we have noted that the abstraction of the two worlds was a deistic abstraction. In other words, we may compare the abstraction of the two worlds to the cutting of an apple and the placing of one half upon a high shelf and placing the other upon a table. In his first position Plato tried to reason about the nature of the apple by referring to the half upon the table. In the second method Plato tried to determine the nature of the apple by reasoning about the half that was upon the shell. In each instance, however, he was well aware of the fact that there was another half. Now in the third position, Plato is going to reason by placing the two halves of the apple together again. If this analogy reflects Plato's thought at all, it teaches us that Plato's third position did not differ greatly from his first and second positions. In none of the three positions did Plato deny or escape the three fundamental assumptions of Greek thought spoken of above. In all of Plato's methods he took for granted that all things are at bottom one. Even when he seemed to be abstracting the Ideal world from the sense world so far that they seemed to have nothing to do with one another, Plato was not denying the assumption of an underlying unity of all reality. In his most deistic flights, Plato was pantheistic still. Deism and Pantheism are at bottom one. Plato's two worlds were always thought of as mutually dependent because equally original. Hence the deism of Plato could do nothing but turn into the Pantheism of Plato. It is this that was meant by saying that the three assumptions of pre-Socratic thinking were raised to self-consciously adopted first principles by Plato.

Now the whole doctrine of the Trinity is a fiat denial of these principles of Greek thinking. There was in Augustine's maturest thought neither deism nor pantheism. The world of sense was not thought of as in any sense as original as God. Hence there could be no deistic abstraction of one world from the other because all the principles of interpretation lay in God. There was no need for the categories of eternity to make overtures to the categories of time. The solution of the deepest philosophical difficulties was not to be sought by an intermingling of categories, because that would only increase these difficulties. The solution of the deepest problems was rather to be sought in a reasonable faith that they are solved in God and by God, and therefore are solved for us.

It is not our purpose here to discuss the difficulties that may be said to be involved in this Augustinian theory of knowledge. It was our purpose to make clear the great antithesis that underlay the two types of thought from the very beginning. There are many elements in Augustine's thought that are foreign to his inmost convictions. But these elements do not justify us in giving a Platonic interpretation to Augustine's thought.

What the history of epistemology has taught us thus far is that there is one great struggle going on between two main and mutually exclusive types of thought. The warfare between these two types of thought is not merely an intellectual game but is a moral and religious struggle engaging all the powers of heaven and hell. If Augustinian thought should eventually prove true, there is a living and absolute God who cannot but punish wrong philosophy because it is an expression of an antitheistic spirit. It is Plato or Augustine; it is not Plato and Augustine.

Chapter 5: Historical Survey: D. Mediaeval Epistemology: Its Climax

In placing as much emphasis upon the difference between the genius of Platonic and the genius of Augustinian thought, we have sought to bring into bold relief the schism that separates the two main theories of epistemology. We should now expect perhaps that after Augustine these two opposing systems would turn toward combat at once. But we have already observed that even in Augustine's thought things were not as clear cut as that. It was necessary to show the genuinely theistic framework of his system by cutting away much of the proud flesh of paganism that remained in his thinking. We should therefore rather expect that for some time to come there will still be much intermixture of the antitheistic and the theistic motifs.

It is exactly this that we find to be the case. Church theologians eagerly grasped and tenaciously held on to the remnants of paganism in Augustine's thought, and raised these to great prominence in the system of the Church.

For our immediate purpose we need only turn to Scholasticism and the Mysticism of the Middle Ages to point out this fact. With Scholasticism we come to a well worked out and a detailed epistemology that has characteristics of its own. Moreover, Scholasticism is of particular importance to us because its epistemology is still the official epistemology of the Roman Church.

The claim made by the Roman church is that its system of belief and practice are more completely antithetical to the belief and practice of paganism than the system of Protestantism could be. It will therefore be of particular value for us to study the epistemology of Scholasticism with this claim in mind. Since Modernism is regarded by both orthodox Romanism and orthodox Protestantism to be a revival of paganism, it is of importance to note which of the two, Romanism or Protestantism, may be expected to put up the best opposition to this revival of paganism.

There were two tendencies in scholastic thought that fought with one another for the mastery of the field. There was the Augustinian tendency which prevailed to a large extent in the 11th and 12th centuries. Anselm was largely Augustinian in his thinking.¹ Then there was the Aristotelian tendency at first resented by Abelard. It was this second tendency that gradually gained the upper hand. In the 13th century when Scholasticism was at its height, Aristotelianism was largely in control of the field.

By saying that Aristotelianism was in control of the field, we do not mean that it had replaced Augustinianism altogether. We refer chiefly to the method of investigation employed. Thomas Aquinas, the great master of Scholasticism, tried to defend the truth of the Church doctrines by employing the Aristotelian methods of reasoning. Moreover, Scholasticism, when at its height, did not limit its activity to the defense of church doctrine insofar as these doctrines pertained to salvation, but it also attempted to obtain a comprehensive philosophy of life as a whole.

¹ cf. his *Cur Deus Homo*, *Monologium*, *Proslogium*.

The fact that men turned to Aristotle for a method of theology is already indicative of the fact that they had not yet sensed the depth of the antithesis between the theistic and the antitheistic motif. If the Christian doctrine of the Trinity had really sunk into the consciousness of the teachers of the church it would have been impossible for them to have turned again to the fleshpots of Egypt. But we have already seen that even Augustine did not understand the full bearing of the doctrine of the Trinity for the interpretation of life as a whole. Even Augustine had not dared to say what the Israelites said, i.e., that they would build without the help of the Samaritans. It is not to be marveled at then, that when all the writings of Aristotle became known to the teachers of the church in the 13th century, they were tempted to make much use of them.

It should be carefully noted that our criticism of this procedure does not imply that we hold it to be wrong for the Christian church to make formal use of the categories of thought discovered by Aristotle or any other thinker. On the contrary, we believe that in the Providence of God, Aristotle was raised up of God so that he might serve the church of God by laying at its feet the measures of his brilliant intellect. When Solomon built the temple of God he was instructed to make use of the peculiar skill and the peculiar gifts of the pagan nation that was his neighbor. But this was something quite different than to build together with pagan nations. The Samaritans wanted to help the Jews construct the city and the temple. Hence they were rejected by the true Jews. The Phoenicians merely wanted to bring their treasures to Solomon and let him construct the way he saw fit. Hence they were gladly received by Solomon.

What the Scholastics did was not in imitation of Solomon, but was the acceptance of aid from the Samaritans.

That this criticism of Scholasticism is true can best be seen if we ask ourselves the most pivotal question that can be asked in epistemology: namely, what the idea of the Scholastic was about the human self as far as its dependence upon God as the source of interpretation is concerned. We asked this question about the Greeks and found that the Greeks did not think it necessary to think of the human self as, at the outset, in contact with an absolute God. When we ask what the Scholastics thought about this subject it appears that they were at least vague and uncertain upon this most pivotal point. And this is a right serious matter. No theory that wishes to be called Christian theistic can afford to be uncertain on this point.

To prove that the Scholastics were uncertain on this point, we must call attention first of all to the Scholastic doctrine of the soul. R. Seeberg says of this that the Scholastics accepted bodily the Greek doctrine of the soul.² What Seeberg means by saying that the Scholastics have taken over the entire conception of the soul from the Greeks is that, according to both Greeks and Scholastics, the highest aim of man is knowledge. That is, there is an intellectualism that is characteristic of both. The vital functions of the soul are first the lowest or vegetative function, second the appetitive, and last the cognitive. The latter two, including the whole psychic life proper, are divided into two orders, the sensible and the supra-sensible; we have knowledge of and desire for sensible things.³ The really dangerous thing about this intellectualism of the Scholastics is that it all too

² cf. *Real-Encyklopedie*, Vol. 27, p. 714—"Zunächst wird die ganze griechische Seelenstellung acceptiert."

³ cf. DeWulf, *Scholastic Philosophy*, p. 128.

easily brings with it the gradation idea of reality from which it was born. The reason the Greeks gave for placing the essence of man in the intellect rather than in the will was that the will was always desirous of having sensuous things. And if it be asked why it should be wrong for the will to seek after the things of sense, the answer is that these are inherently evil. On the other hand, the intellect of man seemed to make him an inhabitant of the world of ideas, and basically participant in the Idea of the Good.

It is but fair to ask then, whether we find these elements in Scholastic thinking too. If we do, then the intellectualism of the Scholastics is not merely an emphasis upon the priority of the intellect, an emphasis with which most orthodox Protestants would heartily agree, but rather an indication of the pagan position that knowledge is possible for man apart from the interpretation of God.

A point of great importance in this connection is that the Scholastics did not sense the full epistemological significance of the Christian concept of creation. If they had, they could not have thought of the sense world as to some extent inherently evil. And consequently, they could not have thought of the intellect alone as the really distinguishing characteristic of man. We notice that the Scholastics have clung to the Greek idea rather than to the Christian idea in this respect. They re-introduced, or failed to eliminate, the pagan concept of the two worlds as opposed to one another by the very nature of things. Just as in the time of the judges the Israelites failed to drive out the remnants of the nations that dwelled in their midst, so the Scholastics failed to drive the remnants of paganism out of Christian thought. In both cases the punishment was absorption by paganism to a large extent.

Still further, the Scholastics not only retained or reintroduced the idea of two inherently opposed worlds, but they also retained or reintroduced the obscurity that obtained among the Greeks on the question of God's place in the Ideal world. That the Scholastics had no clear Christian convictions on this matter is apparent from the very fact that they discussed so hotly the question of the universals. One who was truly Augustinian in his thought could not have been so much interested in these questions except for the purpose of ejecting the paganism involved in the asking of them. For one who is truly Augustinian the problem does not exist as far as the mind of God is concerned. By this we mean that when the problem is traced to its lair, it is found to be once more the old problem of the one and the many. In other words, the most significant thing about the doctrine of the universals is that it brings up the question as to the relative ultimacy of unity and plurality for human thought. On this question the believer in the Augustinian position holds that unity and plurality are equally ultimate because both are found in the person of the triune God. Hence, if anyone asks the question about universals in its deepest depth, he is asking the question about the tenability of Christian theism as a whole. He is not asking a question within the Christian theistic camp about which Christians can well afford to differ, but he is asking about the very foundations of Christianity itself.

The same truth may appear still further if we say that the question of the universal and the particular appeared to the Scholastics as a problem to which the human mind should address itself and which it might reasonably expect at some time to be able to solve. If it is true that the solution of the problem of the one and the many lies in the Trinity, it will in the nature of the case never be comprehensible to man. For man to attack this problem at all is an indication that he has to that extent wiped out the distinction between God and

himself. We have sought to bring out this idea when discussing the philosophy of Augustine. There we saw that there are two mutually opposing views of Mystery. The Christian theist holds that there is mystery for him, but that there is no mystery for God. The Christian theist will not try to solve what in the nature of the case must be mysteries for him. If he does, it is an indication that he is no longer satisfied to leave the solution of the problems of the universe to God. If he does, it is an indication that he wants to set up his own mind as the standard of truth. If man undertakes to harmonize the fundamental "antinomies" of thought for himself he has therewith asserted that he does not require God's service for that purpose. All the "antinomies" of human thought, such as the relation of time and eternity, the one and the many, unity and diversity, are involved in the problem of the universals. There are only two possible attitudes that can be taken to these "antinomies." One can say that it is the business of the human mind to solve these "antinomies," and that unless it succeeds in doing so there is no valid knowledge for man. Or one can say that since man is finite, it is clearly not the business of man to seek to solve these "antinomies," and that they must be solved in God or man's thought would be meaningless altogether. We may even go farther and say that antitheistic thought has artificially created these antinomies. If a man would say to himself that unless he can successfully climb city hall he does not see how he can walk the street, we try to point him to the fact that the two accomplishments are not mutually dependent. Thus also it is not necessary for man to be able to solve these antinomies of thought before he can have adequate knowledge for his life.

The Scholastics made the same mistake as the Greeks. Both took for granted that words must be used either simply univocally or simply equivocally. Both took for granted that every predicate used must apply to God in the same way that it applies to man or there can be no meaning in any predication at all. It is possible to produce quotations from Aquinas and the other Scholastics which seem to assert the contrary of this. Aquinas speaks of the necessity of analogical reasoning. But the point is that he is not consistent in this. He constantly reverted to the Greek position that it is reasonable and possible for man to engage in the attempt to solve these antinomies. Moreover, what Aquinas means by analogical reasoning is based upon the Aristotelian notion of analogy of being. This notion implies that the abstract rationality of Parmenides and the abstract diversity of Heraclitus are involved in one another. The Thomistic notion of analogical knowledge is therefore the direct opposite of the idea of analogical knowledge inherent in Augustine's latest thinking. Augustine's notion of analogy presupposes the biblical teachings of the Trinity, of creation, and of redemption, while the Thomistic notion of analogy is built on Aristotelian philosophy and, therefore, excludes these biblical presuppositions.

Still further, we may observe that when the question of the universals is taken in its more proximate sense of referring to the question whether the universal exists prior to the thing of sense, or after the thing of sense, there is a further distinction that must be introduced. Even in this case it is necessary to ask whether we mean that the universal exists prior to the thing for the mind of man, or for the mind of God. It goes without saying that an Augustinian will have to reply that the universal exists prior to the thing as far as the mind of God is concerned. That is but another way of saying that God has created all things according to his eternal counsel. We may ask how it was possible that Christian theists could seriously debate such a question among themselves unless they had a large dose of paganism in their modes of thought. The Scholastics seemed to think

it quite an innocent belief for a Christian to entertain that matter had existed eternally. It even seemed to help when the question of evil was to be discussed.

If we divide the doctrine of universals into three aspects, as we have done, (a) the problem of the one and the many in its most fundamental import, (b) the problem of the existence of any physical fact prior to the plan or apart from the plan of God, and (c) the doctrine of the priority or posteriority of the human mind in its relation to the facts of the universe, it appears that the fight could not well have been about the third aspect exclusively, because that problem was not important enough to raise such a hot dispute, while if it was about the first and the second aspect of the problem, the very discussion of it is already indicative of a lapse from the theistic position.

All this goes to show once more that when we say with Seeberg that the Scholastics took over the Greek position on the doctrine of the soul, it really means that the Scholastics took over much more than some details of psychology. They really took over a large territory of the Greek epistemology as well. In fact they took over the basic methodology of Aristotle. The soul sought once more to effect a harmony between two worlds that were conceived of as existing in independence of one another originally. That is, an ultimate plurality was assumed to exist beyond God. It is for this reason that the Scholastics, when they turned away from empirical methods of argument, as most of them did, fell into the error of reasoning in an abstract fashion upon the characteristics of the Ideal world. In other words, their method often resembled what we have called the second method of Platonic reasoning. And since they failed to find the ultimate unity and diversity in the Trinity, they could not harmonize the inherent difficulties of the Ideal world, and turned finally with Plato to his third method of reasoning, namely, of mixing the categories of time and eternity after all. It is this which we see in the large amount of pantheism that Scholasticism has retained in its general gradation theories.

We have now before us the most fundamental difficulty inherent in all Roman Catholic apologetics. Rome's epistemology is itself so largely pagan that it can never expect to offer a real antithesis to modernism. The human mind is thought of as being able to study facts without necessarily thinking of these facts as derived from God. It is true that more recent Roman writers have tried to develop the Scholastic doctrine so as to make it seem less fair to bring in the charges that we have brought. Thus Fulton J. Sheen says with respect to the question of antinomies which we have discussed, "This analogical predication in virtue of which the created mode of these absolute perfections is predicated of Him is the solution of the so-called antinomies."⁴ Yet at the same time the same writer asserts his indifference to the question of the eternity of the existence of matter. He says: "If the world is eternal, it is eternally insufficient in terms of existence. If the world has always existed, then God has always caused its existence."⁵ But there can be no true analogical reasoning as long as the material universe or anything else that is finite be thought of as existing except as created by God. There is exactly as much reason for holding to the doctrine of creation as there is for holding to the doctrine of providence. If Sheen thinks it necessary to hold that nothing could have existed at any time unless it were upheld by God, it is difficult to see why he should not maintain with equal force that God must have created all things for them to exist at all. Sheen is willing

⁴ cf. F. J. Sheen, *God And Intelligence*.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 226.

to grant the necessity of creation in the case of human minds. He only holds that creation out of nothing need not refer to matter. But in either case, the denial of creation would involve the existence of a fact next to God in some manner of correlativity with him. In that case it could no longer be said that God is self-sufficient or that the whole principle of interpretation lies within the Trinity.

We only mention this in passing to call attention to the fact that though as orthodox Protestants we can most heartily agree with Sheen and others when they criticize the anti-intellectualism of our day, we should be on our guard against taking responsibility for all further specifically Roman Catholic consequences that these writers draw from their conception of the place of the intellect. The Roman Catholic conception of the intellect is today, as it was in the Scholastic period, to a large extent pagan in its origin.

In the preceding section we have tried to bring the Scholastic position into contrast with the full-fledged Christian theistic position. We must now also seek to bring it into contrast with the full-fledged Christian theistic position. This is merely a matter of emphasis, but not, for that reason, unnecessary.

It was but natural that the Scholastics should be insufficiently Christian their epistemology, since they were insufficiently theistic.

In order to comprehend this point we must return once more to the Scholastic doctrine of the soul. It is common knowledge that according to Scholastic teaching the image of God in man is not thought of as forming the very warp and woof of man, but as something that he received in addition to his natural being. The image of God is thought of as a *donum superadditum*. But it is not so commonly realized that the origin of this doctrine lies in the pagan idea of a material universe with an inherent evil in it existing independent of God. With such a world it would be impossible for God to create man perfect as a natural product. Accordingly, God would have to add something to the natural product in order to have some sort of perfection.

From this conception of the image of God in man it follows that the fall of man was not a very serious thing. Man lost the additional something, but really continued to be quite natural and normal after the fall. He was morally the worse for the fall, but intellectually it did not seem to make much difference. Consequently we find that according to Scholastic theory, the intellect of man, even after the entrance of sin into the world, can, by virtue of its integrity, abstract from the universe some notions about God that are true.

And here we must halt to note the complete anti-Augustinianism involved in this position. If it is true that one can not be a full-fledged theist unless one holds that no fact can be interpreted without reference to God, it is still more plainly true that one cannot be completely Christian in his thinking unless he holds that no fact can be understood by a sinner apart from Christ. Without Christ there is no true wisdom about anything, and least of all about God. It should be carefully noted here that we are speaking now of the "natural man." That "natural man," according to the New Testament, is at enmity against God and cannot know God. When we speak of the regenerated man the matter stands quite different. The intellect of the regenerated man can know God and can also show that the only intellectually intelligible position for man to take is that which is presented in Scripture. The Scholastics did not thus distinguish between the intellect of the regenerated and the intellect of the non-regenerated man. Scholasticism just speaks of the intellect in general. We have seen that the mistake made by the Greeks when they studied

anything at all was that they took for granted that they could just speak of mind in general, without asking whether there was any difference between the human and the divine mind. Similarly, the Scholastics have uncritically assumed that it makes no difference whether one speaks of the “natural” or the “regenerated” man.

It is true that Scholasticism freely admitted and maintained that man cannot have knowledge of higher things except by way of the grace of God, but this does not in the least abate the thrust of our criticism. The point in dispute is not whether there is some knowledge that must be acquired by revelation, but whether there is any knowledge that can be acquired without redemptive revelation. We hold it to be definitely anti-Christian to say that any man can have any true knowledge of anything except through the wisdom of Christ.

Our conclusion with respect to Scholastic epistemology as a whole must be that it has not helped forward but has retarded the Augustinian principle. This does not at all mean that Scholasticism has made no advance in details. Nor does it in the least minimize the greatness of the intellectual labor displayed in the movement as a whole. It only means that we cannot turn back to Scholasticism as Rome today is doing, in order to find a solution for the epistemological difficulties of the day. What was most needed since the time of Augustine was a clearer elaboration of the conception of God as the absolutely self-conscious being in whom unity and diversity are equally fundamental, and a corresponding elaboration of the notion of the human mind as a receptively reconstructive agent thinking God’s thoughts after him. Instead of finding this in Scholasticism, we found a reversal to the pagan motif in epistemology. We found (a) the conception of an absolutely self-conscious God toned down once more. This was done (1) by thinking of the world of sense as in some way as original as the world of Ideas, and (2) by thinking of the world of Ideas after the fashion of the Greeks at least to some extent, by not clearly subjecting all the Ideas to the concept of the triune God. We found (b) that in accordance with this view of God and the world, the human mind is once more given much of the independence that it was given by the Greeks. The Scholastics as well as the Greeks argue for the immortality of the soul from the mere fact of its immateriality.

The Israel of God was tired of building alone, and was gradually accepting more aid from the Samaritans that lived on every side. The antithesis between the church and the world was dying out. Before daybreak, how dark the night.

Chapter 6: Historical Survey: E. Modern Epistemology: Lutheranism

Protestant epistemology as a whole may be said to have certain characteristics that distinguish it from Roman Catholic epistemology. These characteristics can all be gathered about the two heads that we have mentioned from time to time, namely, the complete self-consciousness of God and the consequent analogical reasoning on the part of man.

That Protestantism has taken the self-consciousness of God more seriously than Scholasticism has, can be learned from the fact that Protestantism made the Bible central in its thinking. The Protestant doctrine of the Bible is that it is to be the absolute standard of faith and practice for men. All thought is true if it corresponds to the principles contained in the Word of God. The Christian consciousness is not something that stands next to the Bible with a sort of equal authority, but is something that must constantly be tested by the Bible as its absolute standard. In the Bible, Christ speaks with absolute authority to man.

This Protestant doctrine of the Bible does away with the dualism of Scholastic epistemology. It is no longer possible for man to have true knowledge about anything apart from the Bible. And especially is it impossible to have any true knowledge about God apart from the Bible.

In harmony with this doctrine of the Bible, is the Protestant conception of sin. Sin has, according to Protestantism, vitiated the whole of the human personality, his intellect as well as his will. It is for this reason that man must rely on the Scriptures altogether for the true interpretation of all reality. Thus, the fact of redemption is made to count for much more in the case of Protestants than in the case of the Scholastics. All thought must be made captive to the obedience of Christ.

But if it is true that Protestant epistemology is more genuinely Christian than Scholastic epistemology, it follows that Protestant epistemology is also more truly theistic than Scholastic epistemology was. Hence to say that the Bible is the absolute authority for man is also to say that God is the absolute authority for man. It means that the solution for the problem of knowledge is once more left to, the person of the triune God. It is this that faith implies. Protestant faith claims to be "reasonable" because only on the presupposition of God's speaking to man in Scripture can human "reason" function properly. To make every thought captive to the obedience of Christ speaking in Scripture is to reason analogically in the proper sense of the term.

Protestantism has taken the doctrine of creation seriously. Consequently, the dualism of the sense world and the Ideal world is done away with completely. The sense world is not given that shadowy reality from all eternity that it was given by the Scholastics. Hence the sense world will have to be interpreted in terms of the God who created it. For this reason the danger of purely empirical reasoning is done away with once for all. And more than that, for the same reason, the danger of abstract reasoning on the basis of the qualities of the Ideal world is also done away with. The Greeks and the Scholastics after them had given a fictitious reality to the world of sense. After giving an original reality to

the world of sense, it was once for all impossible to obtain the conception of a God in whom the principle of unity and diversity would be equally ultimate. But now that the doctrine of creation out of nothing was restored to theological thought it was also possible to have the conception of the Trinity. Accordingly, when the doctrine of Creation made the method of empirical reasoning unnecessary, it also made the second Platonic method of reasoning from the abstract principles unnecessary. In fact, it made this method impossible.

Finally, the restoration of the doctrine of creation made the third method of reasoning of Plato impossible because it forbade the intermixture of the categories of time and eternity.

If now these suggestions correspond with the truth of the matter, it is in Protestantism, if anywhere, that we will have to look for a complete antithesis to the antitheistic epistemology inherited from the Greeks. Accordingly, we must now turn to the main divisions of Protestant theology to see what they have to offer us on the subject. We naturally turn to Lutheranism first. Yet since the question that is constantly before our minds is which of the Protestant movements has been most faithful to the principles of Protestantism, and which one will offer us the most in the way of a consistently Christian theistic epistemology, it will be useful to discuss Lutheranism by contrasting it with Calvinism.

We must therefore ask what the genius of Lutheranism is and compare this genius of Lutheranism with the genius of Calvinism, always keeping in mind that it is the difference in epistemology that we are looking for.

In seeking the differences in epistemology, it is but natural that we look for them mostly in the various discussions in the field of soteriology. It was in this field that the early Reformers made their most important contributions to theology. We shall constantly have to ask ourselves what the epistemology is that is involved in the answers that are given to the question of the salvation of the human soul. This is the case especially with Luther. He, more so than Calvin, limited his investigations to definitely soteriological doctrines.

How and for what reason does the individual Christian feel himself to be in genuine contact with the Christ, and therefore with God? Whence does the individual Christian have the assurance that he is in possession of the Truth? The Ritschlian doctrine of a subjective satisfaction on these points without an objective foundation has never entered the minds of the Reformers. If they think they have eternal life, it is based upon the presupposition that an absolute God exists and has revealed himself in Christ and in the Scriptures.

Lutheranism did not as fully as Calvinism rid itself of the remnants of Scholasticism. Herzog calls attention to this when he says that Luther's attack was not directed squarely against the paganism that was found in the church of Rome, but against the legalism that was its fruit.

The truth of this may be seen from the Lutheran conception of the image of God in man. In opposition to Rome, all the Reformers held that the image of God was no mere *donum superadditum*, but was inherent in the nature of man and therefore of pivotal significance for knowledge. But Luther, in distinction from Calvin, thought of the image of God in man as existing exclusively in the moral attributes of knowledge, righteousness and holiness. He ignored the conception of the image of God in the wider sense, i.e., as

consisting of man's intellect and will. It should be carefully noted that this conception of the image of God in man as entertained by Luther is a remnant of Scholasticism. We saw that the reason for the Scholastic doctrine of the image of God as a *donum superadditum*, was that the Scholastics had not fully cast out the pagan leaven of an originally existing sense world. Man was in part formed out of this pre-existing material which was refractory. Accordingly, not the whole of man's relationship as a self-conscious being was with the personality of God. In other words, man's relationship to the world about him was not completely mediated through the personality of God. There was a remnant of impersonalism about it all. Similarly, we find that there is a remnant of impersonalism in Lutheran thinking. Luther thinks it possible that God's dealings with man can at some points be below the level of personal dealings. This appears clearly from the fact that according to Luther, the fall of man resulted in his being impotent, in the sense that he was to be treated by God as a stone or a block. In his argument with Erasmus on the bondage of the will, Luther not only argues for man's ethical inability as such, but virtually implies that man's relationship to God after the entrance of sin into his heart has made it necessary for God to deal with man mechanically. Luther's early teaching on predestination verges on the borderline of philosophical determinism. Then too, this same impersonalism appears from the fact that according to Luther, the means of grace, i.e., the Word and the sacraments, work, to some extent, mechanically. This impersonalism that is found in Luther's position can be traced, we believe, to a remainder of the Scholastic notion that there are some vague impersonal principles that have an influence on man's being. A completely Christian theistic epistemology can allow for no impersonalism anywhere along the line of the transactions between God and man.

The same element of impersonalism comes to the fore still more clearly in the fact that historically the semi-determinism of Luther developed into the synergism of Melancthon. This is a very controversial point. The point is not controversial in the sense that it may be doubted whether synergism actually was taught by Melancthon. This point is conceded by all. The point of controversy is whether or not this synergism of Melancthon is to be understood as an advance toward a greater emphasis on a personal relationship between God and man. Speaking of this, Benson says that Melancthon made a great advance toward personalism because he clearly distinguished between God's work in relation to the physical creation and God's work in relation to his rational creatures.¹ This judgment of Benson has a plausibility, but no more than a plausibility. There was, to be sure, in the synergism of Melancthon an emphasis upon the fact that man's intellect and will must be taken into consideration when the relation of God to man is discussed. Luther had almost forgotten this. Yet, when taken in its ultimate effect, synergism does not work in the direction of a greater personalization of the relation between God and man. Synergism takes for granted that there can be no truly personal relation between God and man unless the absoluteness of God be deified in proportion that the freedom of man is maintained. Synergism assumed that an act of man cannot be truly personal unless such an act be unipersonal. By that we mean that

¹ Benson, Fragenach, usw. p. 43: "*Der grosse Fortschritt besteht vor allen darin dass Zwischen dem Verhaltniss des Menschen zur Wirksamkeit Gottes im physischen und dem Verhaltniss des Menschen zur Wirkamkeit Gottes auf den Gebiet des Sittlichen klar und deutlich unterscheiden wird.*"

according to synergism, a personal act of man cannot at the same time, but in a different sense, be a personal act of God. Synergism assumes that either man or God acts personally at a certain time, and at a certain place, but that they cannot act personally simultaneously at the same point of contact. In other words, synergism holds that personal activity on the part of man must always be at the expense of the personal character of that which surrounds him. This might seem to be an innocent matter as far as the universe around us is concerned. Yet the danger is very great, since the depersonalization involved does not limit itself to the material universe. It extends itself logically to God. And even if it does not at once and clearly oppose the personal activity of God, it remains a fact that there is always a tendency in synergism to hold on to some of the remnants of the Greek idea of a universe, in some sense of the term, independent of God. If nowhere else, the synergist at least extracts his own activity from the personal activity of God at some point of time. And just to that extent he has depersonalized God.

It was but natural that the semi-determinism involved in Luther's conception of predestination should turn to something that looked like a greater emphasis on personalism. The human faculties were bound to reassert themselves. But it must be said with equal emphasis that it was but natural that once the reaction came, it was bound to go in the direction of that which merely seemed to be a greater personalism. The "mechanism" of Luther was not really a reaction, but rather a development. There was an element of impersonalism in Luther's position, and that element of impersonalism merely changed its form, in the synergism of Melancthon.

The significance of Luther's conception of the image of God now begins to appear. The epistemological effect of it was that man's knowledge is once more made to depend in some measure upon something other than the personality and self-consciousness of God. There are elements of Platonic Rationalism in Lutheranism. The spectre of an independent sense world looms upon the horizon once more. Lutheranism has not learned to interpret all reality in exclusively eternal categories. Man is given originality at the expense of God.

A further corroboration and development of this charge is found in the Lutheran conception of the person of Christ, and more specifically, in the way the two natures of Christ are thought of. According to Lutheranism, Christ's two natures blend entirely. The human nature as well as the divine is thought of as being present in the elements of the Lord's supper. Krauth goes to great lengths to make clear the exact meaning of the Lutheran view of the presence of Christ in the sacraments. He tells us that Lutheranism never believed in impanation, subpanation or consubstantiation either as (a) local conjunction of two bodies or (b) as commingling of two bodies. The charge that the Lutheran conception of the relation of the two natures violates the notion of the ordinary substance-attribute relation, he says, is not to the point. Now we should be very careful when seeking to state the Lutheran position on the sacraments, because it is to them a matter of great importance. Moreover, Lutherans make much of the importance of their doctrine on this point because they see truly that far-reaching conclusions may and must be drawn from it. Krauth makes bold to assert that the true doctrine of the incarnation and the Trinity stand or fall with the Lutheran doctrine of the sacrament. He says: "To say

that the nature of Christ is personally present without his humanity is to deny that his humanity is part of his personality and the doctrine of the incarnation falls to the dust.”²

From this discussion of Krauth it is clear that we need not take time to speak of the differences involved in the words impanation, subpanation and consubstantiation in order to establish our contention. Krauth does not hesitate to say that according to Lutheran doctrine, the human nature was part of the personality of Christ. In this Lutheranism goes contrary to the Chalcedon creed. In the Chalcedon creed the words “without confusion, without conversion or change” are directed against the Eutychian heresy which taught that there was only one nature in Christ. Now Lutheranism to be sure, asserts two natures in Christ, and therefore cannot be identified with Eutychianism, but it remains fair to say what Dr. Gerhart said that “the Lutheran view is in the line of the ancient Eutychian ...”³ With all the refinements of the terminology employed as, e.g., that Christ is present, not in the natural mode, but in a supernatural mode, it remains a fact that according to the Lutheran position the human can become the divine. And that is the crux of the matter. That is a distinctly dangerous doctrine. That is antitheistic in origin and in tendency. It not only involves, but is, an open avowal in the intermingling of the eternal and the temporal. It is once more in line with the Greek idea of the independent existence of the temporal.

In consonance with this eternizing of the temporal, Schneckenburger speaks of a temporizing of the eternal on the part of Lutheranism. He brings this out in his discussion of the difference between the Reformed and the Lutheran view on the question of the perseverance of the saints. Lutheranism does not believe in the perseverance of the saints, he says. It holds to certainty for the moment, but believes that it is quite possible for a man to be actually saved at one time and actually lost at some later date. This position of Lutheranism he then traces back to its conception of the relation of time and eternity in general. “*Est ist neben dem sittlichen das religio speculative, welche ihre ganze Anschauung vom Verhältnisse des Endlichen und zeitlich Gegenwärtigen zum unendlichen und Ewigen durchzieht. Das Absolute ist selbst dem Prozesse des endlichen Geistes immanent, nicht ein davon in abstracter Bewegungslosigkeit fern bleibendes; darum das unmittelbare Selbstbewusstsein des letzteren ein wahres, sowohl als Bewusstsein der Sünde wie als Bewusstsein der Kindschaft durch die Rechtfertigung. Diese Immanenz des Gotlichen im endlichen Geiste schließt nun in sich die Möglichkeit für denselben, sich in's Gegenteil umzusetzen.*”⁴

Here Schneckenburger, who himself favors the Lutheran position, asserts that according to Lutheranism, the eternal can be temporized and the temporal can be eternized. The infinite enters into the finite and thus gives it reality. When the infinite has really come into the heart of the believer, he is happy and rejoices, but when the infinite withdraws, the salvation has also disappeared and joy is no more. Thus we find that instead of eradicating the leaven of paganism, Lutheranism once more returns with longing eyes to the fleshpots of Egypt. If there was need of anything, there was need of an emphasis upon the absolute distinction between the eternal and the temporal if the

² cf. Krauth, *The Conservative Reformation and Its Theology*, p. 350.

³ quoted by Charles Philip Krauth, *op. cit.*, p. 475.

⁴ cf. *op. cit.*, p. 248.

difficulties of Platonic reasoning were to be avoided. And exactly here we are disappointed in Lutheranism.

Then further we have said that Reformation epistemology was as a whole characterized by a greater emphasis on the necessity of revelation for all human knowledge than Scholasticism had been. But also in this respect we are disappointed in Lutheranism. We saw that one of the weaknesses of Scholasticism was that it had a low view of sin. According to Scholasticism it is possible for the sinner to have some true knowledge of God even apart from redemptive revelation. We should therefore expect that all the Reformers would emphasize the fact that ignorance is largely of sin, and not a mere situation that is due to man's finite character. Yet we find that according to Krauth, "Ignorance is the counterpart to the divine knowledge and wisdom; weakness to divine omnipotence; but sin is set over against the very heart and moral glory of God."⁵ Now we admit that ignorance can in a sense be set in opposition to the knowledge of God. We are finite, and by virtue of that fact, the area of our knowledge must always be limited. But our ignorance insofar as it involves faulty knowledge of God is not due to our finiteness, but is due to our sinfulness. And it is this that Krauth forgets to mention.

It is for these reasons that those who have sought to contrast the genius of Lutheranism with the genius of Calvinism have stated that Calvinism has emphasized the authority of Scripture more than Lutheranism has. Lutheranism has been less insistent than Calvinism on the necessity of special revelation for every sphere of human knowledge, and for that reason too, Lutheranism has been less insistent on the concept of an absolute self-consciousness of God than Calvinism has been.

This fact is of the utmost practical religious significance, not only remotely because a false epistemology is bound to result in a false view of religion, but also immediately for the consciousness of the possession of eternal life. Lutheran writers emphasize the fact that in their communion it is possible to live in joyous possession of the consciousness of God's favor. This is no doubt true, but it is also true that in the Lutheran communion one may lose that joy at any moment of human unfaithfulness. The joy of the Lutheran in this respect may be compared to the joy of a child who is in possession of a newly obtained treasure. This joy is genuine as long as it lasts, but when the possession falls to the floor, the child thinks that it has fallen into the bottomless void, and the consequent sorrow is all the greater. "*De Luthersche leeft als een kind, dat in den lach der vadergunst het oogeblik geniet; de Gereformeerde als een man, in weins bewusten geest de eeuwige glorie Gods haar schynsel werpt.*"⁶ The Lutheran is certain of his salvation when he feels the influx of the divine person of Christ surging in his soul. Then he is actually justified. But at a later time he has actually fallen away, and is no longer justified. This whole procedure reminds us too easily of the rarefaction and condensation of Anaximenes to fit in well with a Christian theistic scheme of thought.

We are very fortunate in this connection that Schneckenburger furnishes us with the most fundamental reason for the entire position of Lutheranism on this matter of the relation of the eternal to the temporal. He does this by placing Reformed theology before the dilemma of making all human morality unreal, or finding a dualism in God. His argument here is identical in form with the common argument against the whole of the

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 379.

⁶ cf. G. Vos, *De Verbondsleer in the Gereformeerde Theologie*, p. 41.

Christian theistic position, namely, that if an absolute God created the universe, we could not think of this universe as having any significance at all. If a bucket is already filled it is impossible to add to it. If God was self-sufficient and all-glorious before he created the world, then the world could not add to God's glory. It is thus that Schneckenburger argues with respect to morality. He says that the Reformed theologians are placed before the dilemma of reducing all moral antitheses that is practically do away with morality, or of placing the duality of moral antitheses in God. This dilemma Lutheranism is said to escape because it does not start with such a sharp separation between the temporal and the eternal as the Reformed position does. Schneckenburger says, "*Indem aber die reformierte Ansicht jene im Prozesse des Werdens ermässigt und ans diesem Verfahren keinesweges uner hebliche Vortheile zieht verfallt sie dem Dilemma, entweder auch den sittlichen Gegensatz zu ermässigen, oder dann ihr zu einem ausserweltlichen Gegensatze in Gott selbst werden zu lassen, also die Gottesidee selbst Dualistisch zu bestimmen, i.e., auseinander zu sprengen, und dem entsprechend wiederum in die Welt einen verdeckten Gegensatz fast manichaischer der Verdemnten und Leligan entladet.*"⁷

In this argument of Schneckenburger's we have not only a revival of the most fundamental question of epistemology, but also a revival of the Scholastic way of dealing with it. The question at issue between theistic and antitheistic epistemology is exactly this—whether or not unity and diversity may be thought of as existing in equal ultimacy in the bosom of the Trinity. True theism says that it does, and antitheism says that it does not. Antitheism says that the source of ultimate plurality lies beyond God. The temptation is ever at hand for theists to fall into antitheistic argumentation at this point. The reason for this temptation is that we have plurality with us, and it seems to be an ultimate something. At any rate, it seems to be the scientific procedure to start with this plurality as something ultimate that we must explain as best we can. But it is forgotten that this is exactly the question in dispute, and that it will not do to take the antitheistic argument for granted as the right answer. Theists themselves forget that they are lending comfort to the enemy if they debate this question among themselves as perfectly debatable. It is debatable with antitheists. With them it is the most important question that could be debated. But it is undebatable among theists because they are already on the antitheistic side the moment they begin debating it. Thus we saw that when the Scholastics reopened the question of the universals in its most fundamental aspect as the question of the locus of the ultimate harmony of the one and the many, they therewith *ipso facto* fell into an antitheistic argument. Thus the very fact that they started the argument among themselves was evidence of their lapse into antitheistic speculation.

Exactly the same thing holds for the argument of Schneckenburger. If he and all Lutherans want to stand on the side of the Protestant position when it comes to the doctrine of creation, as they no doubt do, there is no further justification for them to use this type of argumentation against their brethren of the Reformed persuasion. If they did use it, there would be no good reason for them to expect mercy at the hands of antitheists if they should use that type of argument against the doctrine of creation. The whole of the antitheistic argument is based upon this one assumption that if unity is to be found in experience, it must be found in an intermixture of the categories of time and eternity. The whole of the antitheistic position assumes that words must be used simply univocally or

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 232.

simply equivocally. Or, if they are said to be used analogically, this means that the idea of analogy is a compound of abstract univocism and of abstract equivocism. Accordingly, antitheism says that no real historical antitheses can exist unless they exist in history alone, or if also in eternity, then the same way in eternity that they exist in time. Theism, on the other hand, holds that the solution of the problem of moral antitheses lies in the eternal alone. The problem of moral antitheses is only a greater specification of the general problem of creation. History can have meaning only if the whole of the temporal universe is brought forth by an absolute God. For this reason alone, moral antitheses in history are real and have significance. If one would maintain that only on the supposition of an absolute God can history have any meaning at all, he must with equal insistence maintain that only upon the presupposition of an absolute God can moral antitheses have any significance.

Our answer to the dilemma before which Schneckengerber would place us is that we do not and need not accept the dilemma as a genuine one. On the contrary, the fact that Schneckengerber places us before it puts upon him the obligation to answer all the objections that we have urged against antitheism in general. By placing such a dilemma before us, Schneckengerber has not advanced the cause of Protestantism and Christian theism, but has retarded it. What we needed more than anything else was a clear insight on the part of all Christian theists into this their most fundamental point in order to proceed to other matters. As long as Christian theists are not clear on this issue, there is little hope for progress. Doubt on this question is itself the best and the saddest evidence that Plato and Aristotle have not been outgrown. Doubt on this question is an attempt to do what Plato found impossible of accomplishment, i.e., to find harmony in his third mode of reasoning, the intermingling of the categories.

With this background of Lutheran epistemology we may now turn to an examination of a work that deals with the subject of epistemology directly from a biblical standpoint. The work of Dr. Phil Karl Francke, *Metanoetik* deals with human thought that has been regenerated from sin.

Francke's starting point is 2 Corinthians 5.17: "Therefore if any man be in Christ Jesus, he is a new creature, old things are passed away; behold all things are become new." He speaks accordingly of regenerated thought that is radically changed. This change is designated in the New Testament with the term *metanoein*.

Francke's interest is not in seeking to determine the ethical consequences of regeneration so much as it is in seeking to determine the nature of the "purely noetical" consequences of regeneration.

The three main divisions of the book deal with the necessity, the possibility, and the actuality, respectively, of regenerated thought.

In the first section, the author collects the biblical materials that have bearing on the blinding effects of sin. The author brings out very well the fact that non-regenerated thought seeks at one time to know all reality, and at another time maintains that nothing can be known. "*Einerseits soll es Wahrheit überhaupt nicht erkennen, andererseits umspannen, was hoher als der Himmel, tiefer als die Unterwelt.*" Jb 22.7 ff. This is the point to which we have called attention by saying that antitheistic thought wants to use language univocally or give up the possibility of knowledge altogether. Antitheistic thought will no longer be receptive. "*Es will sich nicht mehr passiv und rezeptiv*

verhalten.”⁸ Accordingly, it loses itself in the artificial fabrication of insoluble antinomies. It refuses any help from God. It will accept nothing but what has come out of the depth of its own wisdom.

The stages throughout which this process of sinful thought comes to its completion are three. The first stage is that of deceit, *apaty*. This deceitfulness of sin may be subdivided into the deceitfulness of philosophy, Colossians 2.8; the deceitfulness of riches, Matthew 13.22; and the deceitfulness of false morality, 2 Thessalonians 2.10. It is this first stage that places the seeds of separation from God in the heart of man. The second stage is that of erring in thought, *plany*. Psalm 95.10 speaks of a people that do always err in their hearts. The same thought is expressed by Isaiah when he says, “All we like sheep have gone astray.” It was this “spirit of error” (1 Jn 4:6) that moved the false prophets of old to oppose the realization of the kingdom of God. Error gives a more external expression to that which lives in the heart through deceit. The third stage is that of stupor, *katanuxis*. This marks the climax of the process of antitheistic thought. To it the wisdom of God is foolishness. It hardens the heart (Rom 11:25). Truth is obnoxious to the victim of the spirit of stupor. It closes the ears to the witnesses of the Truth (Is 9:10). This third stage is often given to men as a punishment for falling into the earlier stages (Rom 1:26–27). In this third stage the first and second stages reach their natural climax. It may therefore be said that the first stage is the determining point of it all. It is not only when matters have come to such a pass as is portrayed in Romans, the first chapter, that God is displeased. Since the third stage is often the result of a punishment of the first and second stages, it follows that in the eyes of the Lord it is the first stage that is already decisive. At first this natural thought will not see and hear, and at last it can not see and hear.⁹

We see then that the picture of the noetic effect of sin as painted by Francke is black enough. Yet we notice too that the Lutheran conception of man’s independence underlies the whole discussion. Man, as it were, starts this whole course of error without any relation to God’s plan. Francke will, of course, grant the doctrine of creation, but he fails to see the full significance of it. He says that God had to respect the freedom he himself had given to his creatures. “*Er muss die ihm schopfungsmässig garantierte Freiheit respektieren.*”¹⁰ And this freedom is interpreted as meaning that man can do anything he pleases without any reference to God. The whole process of deflection is pictured as beyond God’s operation till he sees fit to intervene when things have gone too far.

This independence of man is still more apparent when we come to the second section of the book which deals with the possibility of regenerated thought. After the dark picture given of the position of sinful man, it would certainly seem that only God could take the initiative in the process of restoration if there is to be any. The “natural man” would seem to be so dead that it would require the Holy Spirit to blow into his nostrils the breath of life. We thought we saw the natural man as dead in trespasses and sins, i.e., as a corpse. But we were mistaken. The “corpse” is not a corpse. It breathes and moves. Not only did God have to respect the freedom given at Creation, but even the sinner is given strength to seek for and desires the truth, apart from the operation of the Holy Spirit. Of his own

⁸ p. 14.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 48.

accord he “comes to himself” and reflects upon his lost condition without any help from the Holy Spirit. Not as though the natural man could get out of his predicament without the help of the Spirit. “*Die daemonischen Geister des Irrreals können nur durch Mittel und Kräfte eines überdaemonischen d. I. göttlichen Geistes verbannt werden.*”¹¹ But the sinner seeing his predicament can at least cry for help. There is a longing to get out of the misery and into the truth. Here Francke is unbiblical and pelagianizing in his thought. True, there is in the “natural man” a point of contact for the Spirit. That point of contact lies in man’s being made in the image of God. But man’s “rationality” is itself vitiated by sin, and therefore can in no sense commence operations in the right direction. This “rationality” must be given a new life before it can breathe spiritually, as it is supposed to breathe.

Francke establishes his point, he thinks, by referring to Christ’s promise to the apostles that he would give unto them the Spirit of Truth. He also pictures Paul’s crying for release from his awful conflict with sin as an instance of the natural man seeking light. But these examples only prove the poverty of an argument of this sort. The apostles, with the exception of Judas, were true disciples of Christ, according to his own word. We would naturally expect that they would ask for the Spirit of Truth. And Paul tells us in the immediate context of Romans 7.14, that the new life within him is seeking to throw off the bondage to the remnants of the old man that he finds within himself against his will. Thus Paul thought of himself very definitely as a regenerated man when he uttered that famous cry for relief. So then, the very examples adduced in proof are the best of testimony that the position of Francke is unbiblical. Moreover, if man is really unable to seek God by nature, as Francke himself said that he was, where did this new ability to seek God suddenly come from? Either we must accept the exegesis of Francke in his first section in which he portrays the result of Sill seriously, and reject his second section as in opposition to it, or we must maintain his second section and hold that in his first section he was all the while clinging to a false independence idea. And it would seem fair to choose the second alternative, since Francke is most anxious to reserve for man a freedom as a creature by which he is able to do all manner of things that seem to be beyond God’s control.

Francke’s argument may be called the very opposite of that of Luther in *The Bondage of the Will* Luther proves in great detail that man is by nature unable to do ally good. And we have seen that in many ways the argument of Francke in the first section of his book resembles that argument of Luther. But the swerving from the first to the second position on the part of Francke resembles that which we saw happening when the semi-mechanism or Luther turned soon into the synergism of Melanchthon. In both cases it was really a development rather than a reversal. And it could not be a development if there were not already some germ of the second position found in the first position.

We may say then that in the second section of his book Francke is unfaithful to the redemptive principle as a whole. If one maintains a soteriological theory in which the “natural man” is conceived of as able of his own accord to seek the truth because he has a true insight into his sorrowful condition, one cannot but become antitheistic epistemologically, in the sense that he must think of certain facts as existing in such a way that man can have knowledge of them without having knowledge of the true God. If

¹¹ *Op. cit.* p. 51.

no one can come to the Father but by Christ, and no one can say Christ to be Lord except through the Spirit, it is equally possible or equally impossible for man to come into contact with the Father or the Son or the Spirit. If one maintains that he can approach Christ of his own accord even if he is a sinner, he may as well say that he can approach the Father too. And if one can say that he knows what the fact of sin means without the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit, he may as well say that he can know other facts without reference to God. In fact he may as well say that he can know any and every fact without reference to God. If one fact can be known without reference to God there is no good reason to hold that not all facts can be known without reference to God. When the elephant of naturalism once has his nose in the door, he will not be satisfied until he is all the way in.

At this point we must note another source of the failure on the part of Francke to be consistently Christian theistic. Francke does not have an organic conception of the relation of the Old and the New Testaments. He identifies the desire for the Spirit of Truth as he thinks it exists in the “natural man” with the desire on the part of Old Testament saints for the fulness of the promise of the Shiloh, as given in Genesis 49.10. But such an identification presupposes that these Old Testament saints rather were unbelievers, while we are told that Abraham is the father of the faithful. Hence, his appeal to the Old Testament saints weakens rather than strengthens his position. And his further argument that as this longing for the Shiloh became ever stronger and stronger in the course of the history of the Old Testament, so the longing for the truth on the part of the “natural man” may become constantly stronger, also falls to the ground. “The natural man can learn to wait for the Spirit of Truth.”¹² This view of the natural man as conscious of the end he has in view, that is, of seeking the Truth and then praying for it, is about as far remote from the picture Scripture gives of the “natural man” as it could be. Once start on the decline and there is no stopping. *Facile est descensus in Averno.*

That Francke, in the last analysis, has no very deep conception of sin is further evidenced by the fact that he minimizes original sin. The thought of the “natural man” is not sinful, he says, because it has been born in sin, but because it has in each person actually committed sin. To him the conception of inherited sin is a logical contradiction.¹³ This is an important point epistemologically: Why should original sin be considered a logical contradiction? It can be so considered only if it is taken for granted that personal representation is an impossible conception. We are not now concerned to prove that the principle of personal representation is biblical. That cannot easily be denied by anyone who reads Romans 5.12. “There as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin: and so death passed unto all men, for all that sinned” (Rom 5:12). We are only concerned to show why this representational principle can be denied only on the supposition that a personal act must necessarily be an unipersonal act. One either maintains that human personal thought and action is representative, covenantal thought and action, because man is enveloped at every point by the claims of God; or, one, in effect, maintains that human personal thought and action is autonomous. On this view, ally personal act must be the act of the person as acting alone. It must be unipersonal. An

¹² “*Da natuerliche Denken kann die Kunst lernen, auf den Geist der Wahrheit zu warten. Und wo dieses sich unwillkuerlich zum bitten um denselbed,*” *op. cit.*, p. 56.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

act can be truly personal only if the surroundings of the person be impersonal. To be truly personal on this view, there really should be no more than one person. If there were more than one person, the surroundings would not be entirely impersonal, and to that extent the act would not be fully personal. And this reduces the position to an absurdity, because if there were only one person there could be no personal relationship at all. It were quite legitimate and true to say that the foundation of all personal activity among men must be based upon the personality of one ultimate person, namely, the person of God, if only it be understood that this ultimate personality of God is a triune personality. In the Trinity there is completely personal relationship without residue. And for that reason it may be said that man's actions are all personal too. Man's surroundings are shot through with personality because all things are related to the infinitely personal God. But when we have said that the surroundings of man are really completely personalized, we have also established the fact of the representational principle. All of man's acts must be representational of the acts of God. Even the persons of the Trinity are mutually representational. They are exhaustively representational of one another. Because he is a creature, man must, in his thinking, his feeling and his willing, be representative of God. There is no other way open for him. He could, in the nature of the case, think nothing at all unless he thought God's thoughts after him, and this is representational thinking. Thus man's thought is representative of God's thought, but not exhaustively representative.

The doctrine of original sin is based upon this purely theistic, because purely biblical, concept of representation. Since the whole being of God, if we may in all reverence say so, is built upon the representational plan, it was impossible for God to create except upon the representational plan. This pertains to every individual human being, but it pertains just as well with respect to the race as a whole. If there was to be a personal relationship between finite persons—and none other is conceivable—there would have to be representational relationship. Every act of every finite person affects every act of every finite person that comes after him by virtue of the one general plan of God with respect to the whole of creation. Hence, it could not be otherwise than that the acts of Adam should affect, representationally, every human being that should come after him. We say that it could not be, because we are told in Scripture that this is the case. We are not establishing any possibilities by a line of reasoning that is independent of Scripture.

To reject the doctrine of original sin may therefore be characterized as a concession to the antitheistic idea that the acts of human personalities are surrounded by a universe over which God has no complete control, i.e., all impersonal universe. Thus it comes to pass that the rejection of the doctrine of original sin on the part of Francke is merely another indication and proof that our interpretation of his idea of the "natural man" is correct. If there is an element of antitheistic thinking at one point, it is sure to reappear elsewhere. A suit of clothes usually shows signs of wear at several places simultaneously.

Summing up the whole teaching of Francke on the question of the possibility of renewed thought, we may say that according to him, the possibility of renewal does not lie so much in the fact that the Holy Spirit is all-powerful—though this is a *sine qua non*—as in the fact that the "natural man" is after all quite powerful for good because he always remains a rational creature, and no rational creature is ever quite helpless. Francke has given to man a vicious independence to begin with. *Hinc illae lacrimae!*

Summing up the whole of Lutheran epistemology, as far as we have discussed it, our conclusion can be none other than that Lutheran epistemology has not lived up to its early

promise. There is in Lutheranism a great advance upon the Scholastic position. And that advance is found in every direction. Yet that advance might have been much greater if Lutheranism had the courage to carry the Reformation farther than it did. At some stages of the process Lutheranism speaks as though there were matters that pertain to the welfare of man without affecting the position of God. Lutheranism has not been quite theistic enough in the sense of making God the completely original and exclusively original personality which serves as a foundation for the meaning of every bit of human predicate. Lutheranism has never quite escaped the third method of Platonic reasoning, i. e., in a mixture of eternal and temporal categories.

Chapter 7: Historical Survey: D. Modern Epistemology: Arminianism

There is one point that must have become increasingly clear in the discussion of Scholasticism and Lutheranism, and that is that the development of a consistently Christian theistic epistemology is retarded if the biblical conception of the noetic effects of sin is not accepted at face value. And the reason why Christians often fail to allow the full extent of the noetic influence of sin is that they have assumed that man has powers of such independence that he could never come under the bondage of sin to such an extent as not to do something toward the removal of that bondage. We shall now find that Arminian epistemology is insufficiently Christian theistic, and therefore cannot be expected to carry forward the Reformation motif just because it is weak on its conception of the nature of man and on the nature of the fall of man.

In discussing Arminian epistemology we limit ourselves to a brief review of the works of Watson, Miley, and Curtis. Each of these men may be regarded as fairly representative of a large section of Arminian believers at the time of his writing.

Watson's work is a standard on systematic theology. It is very scholarly, thorough and orthodox. In other words, in Watson we have Arminianism at its best. If we do not find a truly Christian theistic statement of epistemology in Watson, we need not expect to find it elsewhere. We do not expect a detailed discussion of epistemology in a work on systematic theology, but since there are no monographs written by Arminians that deal directly with the subject, it is naturally to works on systematic theology that we turn. Nor are we disappointed. Watson has many sections in his work that deal with epistemological subjects. On this point much more can be found in Watson's *Theological Institutes* than in W. B. Pope's *Compendium of Christian Theology*.

The very first part of Watson's book which deals with the question of revelation is very important for our purpose. Watson naturally asks why it is that revelation should be necessary for man. His answer is that revelation is necessary because the heathen had confused notions of morality, and because the state of religion was everywhere low previous to the coming of revelation. These reasons given for the necessity of revelation would seem to indicate that Watson is speaking of special revelation, because they deal with the state of morals and religion. But it is significant that Watson does not tell us outright whether he is referring to general or to special revelation. Do his arguments about the low state of religion and morality seek to prove the necessity of general revelation too? If that be the case, it would imply that even man as a creature before he had become a sinner was already imperfect, for general revelation, in the nature of the case, has nothing to do with sin. Now we soon find that Watson refers in his discussion of revelation to general as well as to special revelation. He says that the very existence of God must be proved by *a posteriori* arguments, and that even when using these arguments, we are dependent upon the revelation of God.¹

¹ cf. *Institutes*, 1, p. 335.

Before long we learn that it is not doubtful what Watson's fundamental position is on the nature of man and the nature of the fall of man. It is in accordance with Watson's conception of the creation of man and his view of sin that he argues indiscriminately for both kinds of revelation. Says he: "No creature can be absolutely perfect because it is finite, and it would appear from the example of our first parents that an innocent and in its kind a perfect being, is kept from falling only by taking hold on God, and as this is an act, there must be a determination of the will in it, and so when the least tempering with the desire of forbidden gratifications is induced, there is always an enemy at hand to darken the judgment and to accelerate the progress of evil."²

From this citation there are two main points that we learn. We learn that according to Watson, finitude of necessity involves evil. This point is of the utmost importance. It explains at once why Watson reasoned as he did for the necessity of revelation. If evil and finitude necessarily go together, there is no longer any distinction possible between an argument for general and an argument for special revelation. In that case, a human being just because he is a human being needs a Savior. To be sure his fall into open sin at the very outset of the course of history aggravates the seriousness of the situation, but it remains a fact that he would need a Savior even if he had not fallen into this open sin at once. A man that is by virtue of his creation imperfect could not help but go from worse to worse, since there was always an "enemy at hand" to accelerate the process. Thus the incarnation would have been necessary apart from the fact of sin. All the difficulties of pagan thought lurk around the corner here. First and foremost among these difficulties is the spectre of a sense world that is independent of God. If God is the sole creator of the sense world, there is no reason why this sense world can not be inherently perfect. And if this sense world is thought of as independent of God in any sense, we may as well say that it is independent of God in every sense. So we see that if we hold to the idea that finitude of necessity includes evil, we have not solved any question except by making more serious ones. For if we grant independent reality to the sense world, we shall have to try all three of the Platonic methods of reasoning again and find them wanting.

The second point we should note with respect to the quotation from Watson leads to the same conclusions as the first. We refer to what may perhaps be called the most important element in the whole of Arminian theology, or at least the most characteristic element, namely, that man's will and rationality include his ability to change the actual course of events as planned by God. Arminian theology attributes to man such powers as to enable him to do things that were not in the plan of God. That this is a fair way of putting the matter can be seen from the fact that Arminianism definitely maintains that if the choice before which man was placed was to have real significance, it would have to involve two possibilities. Now with respect to these two absolutely ultimate possibilities, it should be observed that as far as God's relation to these possibilities is concerned, there are three and only three ways in which we could think of this relation. We could conceive (a) that it was God's plan that man should not fall into sin. If that is the case, then man clearly did that which was beyond the plan of God. In other words, in that case there are facts that are beyond God's knowledge. Thus God is not the centralizing and unifying factor in human knowledge, and this unity must be found in man where we have seen it can never be found. (b) In the second place, we might conceive that it was within God's

² *Theological Institutes*, Vol. 1, p. 33.

plan that man should fall into sin. In that case, freedom of choice can not be what the Arminian says that it is, because in that case the choice of man was clearly within the plan of God. Finally, (c) we might conceive that both possibilities were within the plan of God. In that case, too, the choice of man falls by definition within the Plan of God. Thus the Arminian is placed before the dilemma of revising his conception of freedom or assuming responsibility for all the difficulties of antitheistic thought that we have discussed before.

If someone should prefer to start with the fact of sin instead of with the plan of God in order to ascertain the relationship between the two, the result would be the same. We may say that sin was or that sin was not within the plan of God. If it was, then the Arminian idea of choice is clearly untenable, inasmuch as choice must then mean something that is consistent with the plan of God. If sin was not in the plan of God, then by definition we have facts that are beyond the control of God, and we are on antitheistic ground.

We cannot but feel that Watson has turned his face in the direction of antitheism when he so strongly emphasizes the independence of man's original powers.

That our conclusion with respect to the dangers of Platonic reasoning is no mere fictitious one appears from Watson's conception of time. Platonic reasoning, we say, rests upon an intermixture of the categories of time and eternity. Or, we may say, Platonic reasoning assumed that all predicates must be used univocally. Now this is exactly what Watson does. He says, "Duration then, as applied to God, is no more than an extension of the idea as applied to ourselves; and to exhort us to conceive of it as something essentially different, is to require us to conceive what is inconceivable."³ We do not maintain that Watson's standpoint here is that of modern philosophy which holds that the space-time continuum is the matrix of all reality, but we do maintain that there is something of the same motif present in Watson's position. His reasoning is a clear instance of reasoning univocally. What is conceivable and what is not conceivable cannot be thus limited by what the human mind can comprehensively grasp. It is true that we cannot understand how time can be real for God without his being subject to time. Yet it is equally true that unless we may conceive of a God who thinks in higher categories than those in which we think, we shall have no harmony for our experience at all. To think of a God who is above time is not to think the inherently inconceivable thought; it is only to think of what is above our comprehension. Thus this very reasoning of Watson about the nature of time only confirms our criticism that there is an antitheistic element in his thinking.

Still further, corroboration of this judgment is found in Watson's discussion of soteriology. We have seen that according to Watson, Adam was by nature imperfect, and had some inclinations to evil. This brings Adam down a good way from the high position in which Scripture puts him. If we as Sinners Can be elevated to some degree without the aid of the Spirit, the fall of man will have become less serious than we have grown accustomed to think of it, and the salvation process will be more easy than it is pictured in the Bible. The thing of utmost importance in this connection is once more the fact that we as sinners have, according to Watson, retained that creaturely independence that, he says, was characteristic of Adam. When the Holy Spirit seeks to save us, he may meet with rebuff. We can, if we desire, reject the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus we are once

³ *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 337.

more face to face with the question spoken of above, whether or not actions occur that are beyond the plan of God. If our faith is within the plan of God, it cannot be the result of the type of freedom that Arminianism desires because it cannot in that case be said that it would have been equally possible for us to disbelieve as to believe. In that case our choices and moral actions in general have genuine significance because they are within the plan of God. On the other hand, if our faith is not within the plan of God, things are by definition happening that are beyond the plan of God, and we are *ipso facto* on antitheistic ground. Moreover, in the latter case we would have the unique situation that faith, which is a thing much desired by God, should be occurring beyond his will and plan. Or again, we may say that our unbelief is either included in the plan of God or it is not. If it is not, we have facts happening beyond God once more. If it is, then unbelief is genuine unbelief because of the fact that it is related to the plan of God.

Every act of every human being must be related to the plan of God or it would have no significance at all. And this holds good of acts of unbelief as well as of acts of belief. Acts of unbelief are even “unthinkable” except in relation to God, inasmuch as they are acts of unbelief against God. To say that that which is against God is beyond God’s plan is to offer to us the whole of the Platonic position with respect to a sense world that exists in independence of God. It is then but fair that we use one or all of Plato’s methods of reasoning. We cannot at one time enjoy the freedom of antitheism, and when we are cornered, turn to the theistic position for comfort.

When Watson describes the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit this independence of man appears again. Watson militates against the idea that Christ’s active obedience is imputed unto us. That conception, he thinks, would violate our freedom and lead to antinomianism. Christ has, according to Watson, done no more than remove the obstacles in the way of our salvation. So we can now either accept or reject the salvation that is offered to us. Not as though the regenerating work of the Spirit is “a change wrought in man—by which the dominion of sin over him is broken, so that with free choice of will he serves God.” Thus, the work of the Holy Spirit as well as the work of Christ is limited to the removal of obstacles. It is thus that at the most critical juncture man’s freedom as autonomous is safeguarded. It is all along the line of contact between God and man assumed that if man’s moral deeds are to be real, the choice before which man is placed must involve the possibility of doing deeds that are beyond God’s plan. To this extent Arminianism has no valid objection to raise against anti-Christian thinking.

A particularly subtle form of false univocal reasoning is found in Arminian thought when just in this connection it is maintained that the very fact that God commands men everywhere to repent implies that they are able to do so because God would never ask men to do things that they cannot do. But to say that God never asks of men that which they cannot do may be taken in a true, and it may be taken in a false, sense. The statement is true in the absolute sense because God once gave man the ability to do what he asked him to do. That man is no longer able to do what he should do is no disproof of the rule. Moreover, to those to whom he comes with the gospel call, he offers at the same time the aid through which man can obey that call. But the statement that God never asks anything of man but what man is able to perform is false, if it is taken to mean that man can, of his own accord, do that which is asked. One cannot, without argument, take the statement to refer to this sort of ability. This sort of ability would fit in with an essentially antitheistic system of thought, but not with an essentially theistic system of thought. Before going on

to Miley we must stop to notice that Watson makes the bold claim for Arminianism that it, better than Calvinism, preserves the biblical doctrine of total depravity. If that were so, all our criticism would fall by the board, since the main thrust of our criticism has been that the difficulties in Watson's position were due to the fact that he failed to sense the epistemological significance of the doctrine of total depravity. Watson says: "The true Arminian, as fully as the Calvinist, admits the doctrine of the total depravity of human nature in consequence of the fall of our first parents."⁴ More than that, Watson holds that the peculiar advantage of Arminianism is that because it recognizes the good that is visible in non-Christian people as being the work of the Spirit, it can maintain the doctrine of total depravity better than the Calvinist can, because the latter system of thought has to explain the good in the non-Christian by the artificial doctrine of common grace.

In reply to this claim of Watson, we need only remark that the very point by which Watson tries to prove that he has carried out the doctrine of total depravity proves that he has really denied it. He says in effect that the good of the regenerate man is distinct in degree only from the good of the non-regenerate man. This is a denial of the necessity of special grace as something that is qualitatively distinct from the deeds of the "natural man." At any rate, it should be remembered in this connection that whatever the work of the Spirit may be in the work of salvation, man can, according to Watson, resist that work, and this is in itself a denial of the doctrine of total depravity. Watson's emphasis on the doctrine of total depravity is a happy inconsistency in the development of Arminian theology. The mainstream of his thinking goes in the opposite direction.

We may now briefly look at Miley's *Systematic Theology*.

In general we can sum up the theology of Miley by saying that he lays still stronger emphasis upon the metaphysical independence of man, and that he tones down the doctrine of total depravity which Watson was still anxious to maintain. The unhappy result of toning down the doctrine of total depravity is that epistemology becomes less Christian, and the unhappy result of emphasizing the metaphysical independence of man is that epistemology becomes less theistic.

Miley brings Adam down from his high position given him in Scripture. Adam, so Miley thinks, lived in a sort of pre-moral childish innocence. Adam's nature "certainly could contain no proper ethical element, such as can arise only from free personal action."⁵ "Mere nature" cannot be the subject of ethical sinfulness and demerit. Adam had a non-ethical and therefore non-meritorious holiness.

What this criticism of Miley really amounts to is that an act to be considered ethical must occur in a vacuum. Or, in other words, according to this view, which is the common Arminian view, an act to be moral or immoral, must take place in a completely impersonal atmosphere. If the surroundings of an act were in any sense personal, that act would no longer be free from some sort of influence and would not, because of that fact, be ethical. Now suppose that there is beside the personality of man the personality of God to be figured with. That God is admittedly there because of the fact that man has been created by him. Such a God will certainly have a large influence on man, if not directly, then indirectly by virtue of his control over the surroundings of man. Thus, man is not

⁴ *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 48.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 409.

free at all, and ethical action could never be set under way. More than that, Miley must admit that man is not only indirectly but also directly under the influence of God by virtue of creation. Man receives his very breath from his Creator. His every power of thought must come from God. How then could man's act be moral if it cannot be moral in the atmosphere of God's providence? So we see that the whole atmosphere of man is surcharged with the personal. We may even say that the very creation of man could be nothing but the creation of a character. Could an absolute God create an ethical act all by itself? This question may mean either of two things. It may mean an ethical act in the sense that Arminianism understands an ethical act; viz., that it be unrelated to any ethical quality. Arminianism would have to believe in the creation of such an act. Arminianism has rebelled against the idea of the creation of an ethical quality. According to Arminianism, the beginning of ethical life would have to be an ethical act, because it holds that to be ethical, the will of man must be exclusively responsible for what is done.

It should be observed that this bit of psychology of Arminianism implies much more than is often realized. One cannot stop at this point of substituting the originality of the ethical act of man for the originality of the ethical quality of man. The question of an ethical standard comes up in this connection. Suppose that the act precedes the quality, What will make the act ethical? Will conformity to the law of God? This will have to be the standard of the act if man is the creature of God. But if the law of God is the standard of the will because man has been created by God, and if the law of God can be the standard of the ethical act only because man is God's creature, then the ethical act is itself created. And if the ethical act is created, it no longer answers to the requirements of Arminian freedom. An ethical act that is created brings exactly the same problems as a quality or character that is created. The arguments of Arminianism against a created quality would apply with equal force to a created act. To be ethical according to the requirements set by Arminianism, an act must be entirely self-originated, and this cannot be the case if the doctrine of creation be maintained. And if the doctrine of creation be denied there is no longer any ethical standard according to which an act might be considered ethical. In other words, according to Arminianism, all act to be ethical should imply the existence of human beings apart from God. Before Arminianism can make its doctrine tenable, it will have to make the whole of the nontheistic system, which holds to the existence of the universe apart from God, tenable too. And if Arminianism does not wish to do this, if it wishes to retain the scriptural doctrine of creation, it cannot with logical justice complain of the doctrine of created qualities. Thus we may say that God could not create an ethical act it, that act is considered ethical only when operating in an untheistic universe. And if, in the second place, we take the question whether God can create an ethical act to mean whether God can create creatures whose deeds are in correspondence with the will of God, the answer must be that he can, but that in that case he can create ethical character too. In fact, then, he has created ethical character.

We have given this much consideration to the matter of the possibility of an original ethical act because right here antitheism lurks around the corner. If one is not willing to bear the reproach of the theistic system at this point, he cannot expect to find the comforts of the theistic system later. The psychology of Arminianism is self-contradictory because it is built upon an attempted combination of theistic and antitheistic principles. According to the antitheistic conception of freedom, an act could not be ethical unless it began in a void. Antitheism does not hesitate to hold that all reality has

come from the void. For an avowed antitheism it is therefore quite consistent to have this sort of theory of the will. That it is utterly impossible to think rationally of an act operating ethically in a void is but a specific form of the general criticism that we have against the whole of the antitheistic system of thought; namely, that it holds bare possibility to precede actuality. The biblical position holds God to be the source of all possibility. But Arminianism has to stand on the side of the antitheists on this score and receive the attack of the theists. Then it must turn about and bear the brunt of the attack of the antitheists against the theistic position of the question of creation.

Thus we see that Miley, even more than Watson, was insistent on giving a false metaphysical independence to man. It is not to be wondered at then, that Miley, more than Watson, toned down the doctrine of sin. The one always accompanies the other. A consistently theistic epistemology must be consistently Christian, and a consistently Christian epistemology must be consistently theistic. If one maintains that there may have been acts that are independent of the plan of God, it is but natural that one should also maintain that there was an original evil that had nothing to do with the plan of God. In Platonic thought the sense world existed in independence of God, and therefore evil is traced to this sense world.

In much the same way we now find Miley thinking of evil as somehow coming into man's thoughts or already being in man as soon as he appeared on earth. According to Miley, Adam's nature was not only unethical to begin with, but there were in him "susceptibilities toward temptation" which, says Miley, "while Adam and Eve were constituted holy in their moral nature, the spontaneous tendencies of which were toward the good, yet in their complete constitution there were susceptibilities toward temptation which might be followed into sinful action."⁶ To be sure, there were moral forces that acted as a restraint upon any tendencies toward evil. But the strength of these forces depended upon proper conditions. These forces, love and fear, might become lax in their duty of restraining evil tendencies. "But love is so operative only when in an active state. This state is conditioned on a proper mental apprehension of God." And now "the constitution of primitive man did not necessitate such a constant apprehension of God. A temporary diversion of thought was possible, and without sin. The temptation led to such a diversion, and so clouded the vision of God as to prevent the practical force of love. In this state, love could no longer counteract the impulses of awakened appetite, and disobedience might follow."⁷ It is clear from the section out of which these quotations are taken that, according to Miley, there were in original man tendencies to evil, and not merely a susceptibility that might furnish a point of contact. If this were not so, there would be nothing for the forces of love and fear of which he speaks to restrain. The whole description Miley gives of the original condition of man looks like a modified form of the Platonic theory of the soul with its good principles trying to keep in check its evil principle.

Still further, the very fact that Miley attempts to give an independent psychological explanation of the origin of evil in the soul of man is indicative of unfaithfulness to the Christian theistic motif. No "psychology" of the origin of evil can be given. If man was created perfect, as according to Scripture he was, there could be no moments in which

⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 434.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 435.

man's intellectual apprehension of God was asleep, as Miley suggests. Nor could there be any watching or restraining necessary of one aspect of man's soul with respect to another aspect of man's soul. Such matters could be thought of only if man were not completely a creature of God. In other words, such matters could be thought of only if there were a sense world independent of God to begin with. If the entrance of evil in man's heart be explained by the fact of man's finitude, this is nothing less than to agree with the contention of the Greeks that evil must be as original as the good. That this is so may be learned from the reasons that are given for holding that finitude of necessity involves evil. There can be no other reason than that God could not create a perfect though finite being. And why should God not be able to create a perfect though finite being? The only answer that can be given is that there are conditions or laws beyond God according to which he must make things if he makes them at all. This means that God is finite. If God is not finite, there is no material and no law on which he is in any sense dependent in the creation of finite beings, and there is no reason to hold that God could not have created morally perfect beings.

In correspondence with Miley's discussion of original man, is his discussion of present man. Man as he exists, even after the entrance of sin, has retained the freedom that he had by creation, and the same power to attend to the good that he had before the fall. It is true that it is more difficult for the sinner to attend to the good than it was for Adam, but he has the power to do it just the same. "The worldly mind can deeply concern itself with heavenly things."⁸ Nor does this ability necessarily depend upon the grace of God. "As for the question of moral freedom, it is indifferent whether this capacity be native or gracious. For the consistency of Scripture Truth it must have been a gracious original."⁹ Thus Adam is brought very close to us and we are brought very close to Adam.

Miley has not left us to infer his position on the matter of original sin, but has devoted a section in his book to the treatment of it. Miley does not hesitate to say that the older Arminian theologians were inconsistent in teaching the doctrine of original sin. Arminius, Fletcher, Watson, Watts, Pope, and Summer, he says, tried in vain to harmonize their teaching of original sin with the leading principles of Arminianism. Speaking of Pope in particular he says, "We thus find in Pope the maintenance of three distinct grounds of common native sinfulness and damnableness. On the ground of a real oneness with Adam and also on the ground of a representative oneness, we share the guilt and deserve the penalty of his sin. The third ground is given in the intrinsic sinfulness of the depravity of nature inherited from Adam. These views can neither be reconciled with each other, nor with the determining principles of Arminianism."¹⁰ Miley's point is that one who really believes in the total depravity of man must also believe in the doctrine of election and reprobation in the Calvinistic sense of these terms. In this judgment Miley is undoubtedly correct. "A common native damnableness is in itself too thoroughly Augustinian for any consistent place in the Arminian system."¹¹ The usual way of seeking to harmonize man's depravity with the principle of free will as entertained by Arminianism has been,

⁸ *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 305.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 511.

¹¹ p. 512.

says Miley, to assert that Christ has died for all men. But this, he rightly holds, does not touch the question. If man is free at one point to do things that are beyond the will and plan of God, there is no reason to think that he has not that freedom at other points. If man has the freedom that Arminianism says he has, he cannot be subject to the sin of Adam. In that case, there could be no connection between the sin of Adam and his posterity inasmuch as there is then no connection between anything. Arminian freedom means freedom to do deeds that are beyond the plan of God, and if any deed is done beyond the plan of God, its results will fly into the void because the deed itself is done in the void. It is no wonder then that since Miley will not forsake his conception of freedom, he finds it necessary to let the old conception of inherited sin go. If we assert a belief in universal guilt but refuse to believe in election and reprobation, we must drop our belief in universal guilt, or at the expense of consistency shun the question of man's merit and take refuge in the goal of universal atonement.

So Miley has succeeded in bringing Adam and the fallen man close together. Neither is altogether holy, and neither is altogether guilty. Hence the need for a distinctly Christian epistemology is practically done away with. Hence Miley's arguments for the necessity of revelation, as was the case with Watson's arguments, do not distinguish between the need for special revelation and the need for general revelation.

When we come to O. A. Curtis's book, *The Christian Faith*, we find that he has still further emphasized the Arminian freedom doctrine and has left behind him all the happy evangelical inconsistencies that still marked the theology of Miley. Curtis seeks to bring Arminian thinking up to date. He acknowledges the influence, among others, of the personalism of Borden P. Bowne. In short, the theology of Curtis may well be called a theological adjustment of philosophical personalism. Now personalism in philosophy is a modification of Hegelian Idealism. And Hegelian Idealism is the logical development of the Kantian creativity theory of thought which in turn is a logical development of the Greek or generally antitheistic theory of human thought.

It should not appear strange, then, that modern Arminian theology has found it easy to adapt itself to an up-to-date form of antitheistic thought such as Boston Personalism is. Albert C. Knudson, dean of the Boston University School of Theology, wrote two articles in *The Christian Advocate* of March 5 and March 12, 1931, in which he tried to show that Methodist theology has been particularly fortunate in adapting itself to modern thought, because from the beginning it was to an extent empiricistic in its method. He interprets the emphasis of early Methodism upon the "primacy of religious experience" as something that was bound to eventuate in a carelessness or a change of emphasis with respect to the traditional doctrines of the church. "The full implications of this position were not worked out by Wesley and the early Methodist theologians, nor have they even yet been fully worked out. But we now see that a much greater modification of the traditional evangelical theology, than the Methodists of a century ago realized."¹² More than that, Knudson tells us not only that this empirical emphasis of early Methodism was bound to modify the old doctrines, but he also tells us to what this modification is bound to lead. "The important thing here, however, is to note that the primacy of religious experience, which may be said to be the basic principle of our church, makes theological finality impossible, and that if we are to be true to this principle, our theology must

¹² p. 292.

continually adapt itself to the changing thought of the world—must, in a word, be progressive.”¹³

It will be recognized that the criticism we have given of the tendencies in Watson and Miley’s theology correspond with the outline given by dean Knudson. The Augustinian element and the Platonic element were grappling for the mastery in the history of Arminian theology. The point Knudson makes is the most important one of the possibility of what he is pleased to call “theological finality.” By that he does not mean and we do not mean that one human being has absolute knowledge or authority. All that is meant is that there is an absolute God who has absolute authority, who has spoken through Christ in Scripture. Arminianism, we have seen, with its false independence concept has attacked this fundamental doctrine of the absoluteness of God and of his revelation through Christ in Scripture. And after that there is one further logical reason why a completely relativistic position should not be taken. Arminian theology, it is no wonder, has become “progressive.” But in still a different way, we can call attention to the fact that Arminianism led, as Knudson says it did, to the empirical method of reasoning very easily. All the difficulties of the Platonic types of reasoning that we have reviewed appear on the scene again.

That all this is found in a well developed form in the theology of Curtis becomes at once apparent if we notice his emphasis upon the independence of the human personality. He says, “Self-decision is the most important feature of the entire personal process for the simple reason that it is the culmination.”¹⁴ No decision that is not the ripest fruition of a completely self-conscious personality can strictly speaking be regarded as moral. The experienced personality, complete self-consciousness alone, can be the basis of moral appeal. Such, in brief, are Curtis’s views on personality. These views, it is evident, are the result of an empirical investigation of the concept of personality as such, whether that personality be human or divine. That is, Curtis has apparently not asked himself the question whether it is possible to reason thus and be true to the theistic principle. Curtis’s method implies that it makes no difference for the determination of the character of human personality whether or not there is an absolute God. Thus Curtis is thoroughly antitheistic to start with.

In the second place, he is equally anti-Christian. This appears from the fact that he considers evil as a natural something. “Man naturally fears the supernatural wherever he finds it, but because he is a free person he can do a greater thing than to create an arbitrary augment, he can master by a venture of trust. This personal venture we call faith.”¹⁵ Thus Curtis reduced sin to the level of auto-suggestion. The need for righteousness of which he speaks has nothing to do with sin but since righteousness is a part of a complete personality it too must be realized in the natural course of the development of personality.

Curtis’s theology as a whole is an instructive example to those who are tempted to think that Personalism in philosophy can furnish a good theistic foundation for Christianity. It is a fact of history that all so-called personalistic philosophers have denied

¹³ p. 292.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 23.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

the orthodox interpretation of Christianity. We have shown why this fact of history is a logical development of an inherent tendency of thought.

Chapter 8: Historical Survey: E. Modern Epistemology: Calvinism

We have seen in the preceding chapters that Protestant epistemology is more truly Christian than Roman Catholic epistemology because it has taken seriously the noetic influence of sin. We have also seen that Lutheran and Arminian epistemology have not been as faithful to the Protestant principle as they might have been. We must now see that the Protestant principle has come to its fullest expression in Calvinism and that Calvinism is therefore more truly Christian than either Lutheranism or Arminianism.

In the second place, we have seen that Protestantism was more truly theistic than Roman Catholicism because Protestantism does not ascribe as much false independence to man as Romanism does. It remains now to observe that Calvinism has been more truly theistic than either Lutheranism or Arminianism because it, better than they, has rid itself of the last vestiges of human independence or autonomy.

One of the reasons why Protestantism was more truly Christian than Romanism is that Protestantism has placed Scripture at the center of its thinking. Now it is in this respect first of all that Calvinism is more Protestant than its sister branches of the Protestant faith. We have noted above that Gobel, Nietzsche and Heppel consider it to be the most important distinguishing feature between Calvinism and Lutheranism that the former emphasized the formal principle of the authority of Scripture, while the latter has emphasized the material principle of justification by faith. This may be too much of an emphasis upon this point of difference, but that the difference exists is plain. It appears perhaps as clearly as anywhere in the fact that the church-government policies of the Calvinistic churches are the only ones that are scrupulously patterned after Scripture. It is only if the "formal" and the "material" principles of Protestantism are taken as supplementative to one another that the Protestant view of Scripture is really seen for what it is. It is only thus that the whole teleology of history as seen by Protestantism is clearly seen to be the opposite of the teleology of history as involved in Platonic-Aristotelian thinking, as this thinking has largely controlled Roman Catholicism.

In the second place, we must note that Calvinism is more truly Christian than Lutheranism because of the emphasis given to the work of the Holy Spirit in the restoration of man to the true knowledge of God. Calvin has been called "the theologian of the Holy Spirit." Calvin more than anyone before him developed the doctrine of the work of the Holy Spirit as indispensable for a true view of man and his world.

The emphasis placed by Calvin upon Scripture and upon the Holy Spirit must be brought in connection with his conception of the noetic influences of sin. And his teaching on this subject cannot be understood unless we have a clear grasp of his conception of the image of God in man. Calvin distinguished between God's image in the narrower and God's image in the wider sense. In the narrower sense, God's image in man is the true knowledge, the true righteousness and the true holiness that man possessed when created by God. In the wider sense, God's image in man is man's rationality and morality. Through sin man lost the image of God in the narrower sense altogether, and retained only vestiges of God's image in the wider sense. This means that man is

spiritually blind but remains a rational nature, and as such is always confronted by the revelation of God about him and within his constitution. God does not deal with man as with a block in the way that Luther thought of it. We must think of man as spiritually blind without denying his personality. His spiritual blindness presupposes his being a covenantal personality. Accordingly, there was no occasion for the development of synergism in Calvinistic thought. There was no danger that man should be given any absolute originality in the field of soteriology. The “natural man” has in his idea changed God into something other than he is, and man cannot, unless the scales be removed from his eyes, know anything truly about God or about anything else. Similarly, Scripture is indispensable for the sinner in order to give to man spectacles through which he can truly see God in the facts round about him or in his own constitution. Even in paradise the revelation of God in nature round about and in nature within man had to be supplemented by God’s direct thought communication to him. But for the sinner, this “super-natural” thought communication must be redemptive.

In addition to the fact that Calvin retains absolute originality for God, we must note that the character of salvation itself is conceived of as in no sense an eternization of man, but as a restoration and development of this original perfection. The work of Christ did not remove anything of the finitude of man; it removed the sin of man. The incarnation was necessary not inasmuch as there is some measure of imperfection inherent in finite creatures, because they are finite, but because man who was perfect and did not need a Savior became a sinner, and for that reason did need a Savior. Hence, Christ’s human nature need not be present in the sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. It will be observed that in this respect Calvin differs widely from Lutheranism as outlined by Krauth, who claimed that the incarnation would fall to the ground unless Christ is present in the sacrament of the Supper, according to his human nature.

The position of Calvin on the matter of revelation also made it possible to do away with the false scholastic distinction between natural and revealed theology. There is no separate natural theology that can do without revelation and acquire true knowledge of God up to a certain extent as the Scholastics taught. Nature can be read aright only by those who allow the light of Scripture to fall upon it.

From the enumeration of these emphases of Calvin, it will become apparent that it is upon the development of these teachings of Calvin that we must depend for a consistent Christian epistemology. Calvin did not mix the categories of the temporal and eternal. He did not succumb to the temptation of giving man a false independence in the work of salvation. Hence he alone of all the Reformers could rid himself of the last remnants of Platonic reasoning.

This is still more apparent if we note in the second place that Calvin’s position was not only more truly Christian, but also more truly theistic than Lutheranism.

Calvin’s theism may best be considered for our purposes under the two headings of the covenant theology and the Trinity. These two are mutually dependent.

The covenant theology of Calvin might have been considered under the discussion of Calvin’s Christianity. Calvin’s soteriology, as well as the other loci of his theology, depends entirely upon his covenant conception. Yet we prefer to discuss Calvin’s covenant theory here because Calvin’s covenant idea goes back to the very foundation of his theism.

It may even be said that Calvin's covenant idea is Theism come to its own. The covenant idea is nothing but the expression of the representational principle consistently applied to all reality. The foundation of the representational principle among men is the fact that the Trinity exists in the form of a mutually exhaustive representation of the three Persons that constitute it. The emphasis should be placed upon the idea of exhaustion. This is important because it brings out the point of the complete equality as far as ultimacy is concerned of the principle of unity and the principle of diversity. This mutual exhaustion of the persons of the Trinity places one before the choice of interpreting reality in exclusively temporal categories or in exclusively eternal categories. The demand of the doctrine of the Trinity, when thus conceived, is that reality be interpreted in exclusively eternal categories inasmuch as the source of diversity lies in the Trinity itself and could never be found in a sense world beyond God. Hence the problem of the one and the many, of the universal and the particular, of being and becoming, of analytical and synthetic reasoning, of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* must be solved by an exclusive reference to the Trinity. The only alternative to this is to assume responsibility for trying to explain the whole of reality in temporal terms, and therefore with man as the ultimate point of reference. Thus man is placed before a clear alternative and there is no longer a temptation to attempt a solution of these problems by seeking intermixtures of the temporal and the eternal.

It was upon this foundation of a truly trinitarian concept that Calvin built his conception of covenant theology. If the Persons of the Trinity are representationally exhaustive of one another, human thought is cast on representational lines too. There would in that case be no other than a completely personalistic atmosphere in which human personality could function. Accordingly, when man faced any fact whatsoever, he would *ipso facto* be face to face with God. It is metaphysically as well as religiously true that man must live and cannot but live *coram deo* always. Even the meeting of one finite personality with another finite personality would not be truly personal if there were an impersonal atmosphere surrounding either or both of these personalities. What makes their meeting completely personal is the fact that the personality of each and of both is surrounded by the personality of God. Hence all personal relationship between finite persons must be mediated through the central personality of God. Hence also every personal relationship among men must be representational of God. Every act of a finite person must in the nature of the case be representational because the only alternative to this is that it should be completely impersonal. We may even say that every act of the infinite personality of God must be representational because the only alternative to it would be that it should be impersonal. The Trinity exists necessarily in the manner that it does. We have seen this to be so because the principles of unity and diversity must be equally original. Accordingly, when we come to the question of the nature of finite personality it is not a handicap to finite personality to think of itself as related in some way to the personality of God. On the contrary, the triune God of Scripture, the internally complete personality of God, is the very condition of its existence. A finite personality could function in none other than a completely personalistic atmosphere, and such an atmosphere can be supplied to him only if his existence depends entirely upon the exhaustive personality of God.

It is not as though we can first think out such a representational system of reality and then happily find that it accords with what Scripture teaches. On the contrary, we learn

the trinitarian view as described from the Scripture, and accept it on the authority of Christ speaking in Scripture. But this being the case, we at the same time realize that it is this biblical position alone that offers an intelligent foundation for the exercise of all of man's functions.

It is in this manner that Calvin conceives of the personality of man. Man is not a metaphysically independent being. Creation is taken seriously. Man does not need for his responsibility a freedom that would enable him to do something beyond the plan of God. And it is not a handicap in spite of which man must make the most of things, this fact that he is within God's universe and operates within God's plan. Calvin is very sure that unless man were operating within God's plan, man would not be operating at all. It is not with apologies that Calvin proposes his doctrine of the will of man, but he sets it forth boldly as the only alternative to complete impersonalism. Calvin was keenly conscious of the fact that covenant theology furnishes the only completely personalistic interpretation of reality. The false striving of Lutheranism and of Arminianism for a personal act that should be unipersonal in the sense of not being surrounded by a completely personalistic atmosphere, Calvin is convinced, would lead, if carried out consistently, to the rejection of the whole Christian theistic scheme of thought. He does not discuss the matter in the exact form in which we discuss it here. His interest was not directly epistemological, but rather religious. And this only shows the more clearly the great significance Calvin attached to the matter of believing and practising a truly representational conception of reality. He was deeply convinced that true religion could thrive upon the basis of a covenant theology alone. Only covenant theology gives all the glory to God, and without giving all the glory to God there is no true religion. Only a truly representational theology will leave all the mysteries of existence, not the least of which is the mystery of evil, to God for their solution.

For proof of the contentions brought forward in the preceding paragraphs, we would briefly refer to Calvin's discussion on (a) the knowledge of God, (b) the doctrine of God, and (c) the doctrine of the Trinity. Dr. Warfield takes up each of these discussions in great detail in his book *Calvin and Calvinism* (Collected Works).

Calvin is insistent that man cannot exist and never has existed apart from a sense of deity. This is his way of saying that man's knowledge of himself and of God comes simultaneously. Warfield says, "If the knowledge of God enters thus into the very idea of humanity and constitutes a law of its being, it follows that it is given in the same act of knowledge by which we know ourselves."¹ Man's existence is never for a moment thought of as apart from the existence of God. The triune God of Scripture is made the presupposition of every human thought. The question whether man knows himself before he knows God is not of importance if only temporal priority is considered. It is the question of ultimate presupposition that is important. Moreover, Calvin was not interested in reasoning about the mere existence of God apart from his nature. Calvin did not separate the what from the that. Says Warfield, "The knowledge of God with which we are natively endowed is therefore more than a bare conviction that God is: it involves, more or less explicated, some understanding of what God is."² There is no abstraction anywhere in Calvin's reasoning about the knowledge of God. There is no artificial

¹ p. 35.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

separation in his thought between natural and revealed theology, between the work of the Spirit and the place of Scripture, between the knowledge of man and the knowledge of God. All these matters are thought of in conjunction with one another when the sinner's knowledge of God is in question. And, because they are thought of in conjunction with one another, the true priority can be placed where it ought to be placed, namely, in the triune personality of God.

Calvin did not consider these proofs in detail. He did not altogether reject them. But the fact that he places all possible emphasis on the fact that man can know nothing unless he knows what he knows on the presupposition of the existence and revelation of the triune God of the Bible, is calculated to destroy the proofs as historically formulated.

Calvin's thought was concrete in the true sense of the word. He did not think that he could know himself first and afterward know God. We have quoted Warfield in order to fortify our interpretation of Calvin in which we brought out that the knowledge of self and the knowledge of God is, according to Calvin, included in one act of thought. It is this that makes Calvin's reasoning truly analogical. It is thus that though Calvin has not discussed the theistic arguments in detail, he has really done a great service in their behalf. He has distinguished by implication if not by expression between a truly theistic and an essentially antitheistic use of these arguments. In this way a definite advance is made in the direction of a consistently Christian theistic epistemology and a consistently theistic apologetics.

In distinction from Calvin's doctrine of the knowledge of God, we must now briefly look at his doctrine of God as a whole, in order to prove still further our contention that Calvin has really made an advance in the direction of a truly Christian theistic epistemology. On this matter we can be brief. All that it concerns us to note in this connection is that Calvin has in turn been charged with being pantheistic and with being deistic in his conception of God. More clearly than anyone before him, Calvin worked out the concepts of the transcendence and the immanence of God. In this way, Calvin has really developed the concept of Theism better than anyone before him. (A. M. Fairbairn is quoted by Warfield as saying, "Calvin was as pure, though not as conscious and consistent a Pantheist as Spinoza.")³ The reason given for such an astounding statement is that Calvin has maintained that God is really the only efficient will in the universe. But this is a simple misstatement of Calvin's teaching inasmuch as Calvin only taught that all things happen according to God's plan. To argue from this that God's will is the only efficient will in the universe is possible only if one takes for granted that an act to be personal must be unipersonal; i.e., in this case, that an act cannot take place according to the plan of God and at the same time be done by an act of man. The truth of the matter is that Spinoza perhaps more than anyone else has emphasized the identity of the universe and God, while Calvin better than anyone before him has kept the universe and God apart. For Calvin, God's transcendence is prior to his immanence. This is but the natural consequence of his teaching that God's existence is self-complete prior to the existence of the universe. It is for this reason that Calvin has been kept from teaching an immanence doctrine that virtually amounts to an identity doctrine. The very fact that Calvin has been characterized as a deist and as a pantheist is indicative of the fact that he took God's transcendence and immanence equally seriously. His was a true theism. In

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 156.

this way Calvin was able to avoid the first method of Platonic reasoning altogether inasmuch as he attributed no false independence to the sense world. Reality would have to be interpreted in eternal categories.

Calvin's theism was not a "mixture" of pantheism, understood as abstract identity of God and the universe, and of deism, understood as abstract separation of God and the world. The mixture of two heresies does not produce truth. Calvin's theism exists in his beginning with the triune God of Scripture as the presupposition of all true human predication.

Then further, we may observe that Calvin's teaching includes a truly theistic conception of the revelation of God's nature to God's will. In this connection it is of importance to note again that Fairbairn has so emphasized Calvin's teaching of the nature of God as practically to identify it with impersonal will, while the common objection to Calvinism has been that it holds to an arbitrary God. Fact is, that for Calvin, God's will is never arbitrary because it is expressive of God's nature, while God's nature is never to be identified with impersonal law because God's nature is never taken in separation from God's will. It is thus that complete personalism and thereafter complete stability are combined. It is thus too that the difficulties Plato faced when he tried his second method of reasoning are overcome. Plato, it will be recalled, tried in his second method of reasoning to interpret all reality in terms of the Ideal world, but failed to do so because he found no harmony in the Ideal world. In the Ideal world there was a difference between the impersonal principles or Ideas and the personal God. Augustine, we have seen, taught that the Ideas are together the plan of God. It was in this way that Augustine found unity in the Ideal world. It was in this way too that Calvin, further explicating the ideas of Augustine, found unity between the will and the nature of God. It was in this way too that Calvin was really able to interpret reality in exclusively eternal categories. Plato was unable to do this because he did not have unity in the Ideal world. Thus it may be said that in the further elaboration that Calvin gave to the Augustinian idea of God, there was an advance in the direction of a truly Christian theistic epistemology.

Finally, we must pause to look more particularly at Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity. We have already said something about his trinitarian concept's furnishing the foundation of his concept of his theology of the covenant. We have also discussed Calvin's doctrine of God in general, of which his doctrine of the Trinity is naturally the expression. Yet it will repay us to look more particularly at Calvin's doctrine of the Trinity because it has a particular bearing upon the question of epistemology.

In his article, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Trinity*, which appears in the volume referred to, Dr. Warfield makes abundantly clear that Calvin has made a definite contribution to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The contribution made consisted in bringing forcibly to the foreground the concept of the consubstantiality of the persons of the Trinity. The Nicene doctrine, to be sure, spoke of the consubstantiality of the persons, but in the thought of the church this had not borne the fruit that it should have borne. Warfield speaks of the contribution made by Calvin in the following words: "That contribution is summed up in his clear, firm and unwavering assertion of the autotheotys of the Son. But his assertion of the autotheotys of the Nicene Fathers came to its full right, and became in its fullest sense the hinge of the doctrine."⁴ At an earlier point Warfield tells us that the

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 184.

reason for the church's failure to live up to the full implication of its Nicene teaching on the subject of the Trinity was "that Nicene orthodoxy preserved in its modes of stating the doctrine of the Trinity some remnants of the conceptions and the phraseology proper to the prolationism of the Logos Christology, and these, although rendered innocuous by the explanations of the Nicene Fathers and practically antiquated since the time of Augustine, still held their place formally and more or less conditioned the thought of men—especially those who held the doctrine of the Trinity in a more or less traditional manner."⁵ In the thought of the church, the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son and the procession of the Spirit had been taken to mean some subordination of essence instead of subordination of personality. Hence Calvin did not hesitate to improve upon the Nicene terminology and added the word "autotheotys" in order to emphasize the fact that the Son as much as the Father is underivative.

Romanists, Lutherans, and Arminians have in turn attacked Calvin's insistence on the aseity of the Son.⁶ The reason for this was that in all three of these groups of thinkers there were remnants of subordinationism. Thus the fact that Lutheranism and Arminianism attacked the strict coordinationism of Calvin is anew a justification of the interpretation we have given when we made the charge that the Lutheran and the Arminian positions failed to keep the temporal and the eternal apart, and to make the triune God of Scripture primary in their thinking.

The epistemological importance of this question becomes at once apparent if we recall that it was exactly a clear insistence on the distinction between the temporal and the eternal that was most needed if we were to have a consistent Christian theistic epistemology. The very foundation of a true epistemology is the complete self-consciousness of God. Now such a complete self-consciousness cannot be effected if there is any remnant of subordinationism in the persons of the Trinity. If there is any subordinationism it implies that God is to that extent no longer the sole interpretative category of all reality. The measure of subordinationism that any system of theology retains in its doctrine of the Trinity is indicative of the measure of paganism in such a theology. Plato's independent sense world looms upon the horizon the moment subordinationism is given any place. At last then a definite move was made in the right direction when the church was called upon to rid itself of the last remnants of subordinationism.

We have seen that Calvin really worked out the Reformation principle much more consistently than either Lutheranism or Arminianism. Calvin restored fully the biblical conception of the sinner, and therefore restored fully the biblical doctrine of man. In the second place Calvin restored the full significance of the biblical doctrine of the Trinity and therewith the biblical conception of the complete self-consciousness of God. Thus on the most pivotal points of epistemology we find that Calvin has led the course of Christian theistic thought back into true channels. It will be on the lines of thought suggested by Calvin that further developments of Christian epistemology may be expected.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁶ cf. Warfield, *op. cit.*, p. 262 f.

Chapter 9: Historical Survey: F. Modern Epistemology: Antitheistic

We have seen that it is really in modern times that the question of epistemology proper has come to the foreground. The ancients busied themselves more with metaphysics than with epistemology. And that it is in modern times that epistemology comes to the foreground is due to the fact that modern thought is more mature than ancient thought. The ancients all too often took knowledge for granted. The modern man studies the possibility of knowledge. It is but natural then that we should expect that it will be in modern times that the full significance of the life and death struggle between the theistic and the antitheistic conceptions of epistemology will appear. We have already seen that it was in the Reformation theology that the theistic motif has been worked out more fully than ever before. Accordingly we must now take a glance at the high spots of modern antitheistic epistemology. We would consider it only insofar as it has a direct bearing upon the relation of the consciousness of man to the consciousness of God.

Descartes, it is well known, attempts to find the rock bottom of certainty for knowledge by proving that it is impossible to doubt the existence of the thought activity of human personality. He thinks he has struck bottom when he says that it would even be impossible for God to deceive him unless he existed. It is thus, from what Descartes thinks to be the immovable foundation of the existence of the human personality, that he builds up his arguments for the existence of the universe around him and for the existence of God.

The important thing to note about this position of Descartes is not that which is usually made so much of, namely, that Descartes has emphatically stressed in distinction from the ancients the independence of man from the universe around him. The important thing is rather that Descartes has emphasized man's independence from God. It is not the subjectivism of Descartes that worries us so much as his antitheism. Only insofar as his subjectivism may be considered an evidence of antitheism need it claim our attention. And we need not analyze that point because the antitheistic character of Descartes' thought is so plain and so pointed and so direct that we need not take the time for more indirect arguments.

We need only for a moment compare the reasoning of Descartes with the reasoning of Calvin in order to note the complete contrast between them. Calvin thought it impossible so much as for an instant to think of the personality of man without thinking of the personality of God. Descartes, on the other hand, makes it the very foundation of his philosophy to think of man first of all and in total independence of his creator. If any should doubt this interpretation, we have only to point to the fact that the whole philosophy of Kant was directed against the very point that Descartes' philosophy was a philosophy of separation. Kant had no use for the theistic arguments as they were based upon Cartesian philosophy because they presupposed the separate existence of man and the universe. It is not too much to say then that Descartes makes man the starting point of his philosophy while Calvin makes God the starting point of his philosophy.

Further corroboration of the correctness of this interpretation lies in the fact that according to Descartes the physical universe operates according to completely mechanistic principles. The point here is not first of all that Descartes has not only denied the creation of the physical universe by God, but that he has denied the providence of God. For purposes of epistemological argument it makes no difference whether a man denies creation and providence or whether he denies providence only. Whether one denies creation alone or providence alone, or whether one denies both makes no difference, because in any event one has thought of facts as at some time or somewhere in independence of God, and that makes such a denial thoroughly antitheistic. It is this point that makes the whole deistic movement that was based upon the philosophy of Descartes so thoroughly antitheistic.

Taking these two points, Descartes' doctrine of man and his doctrine of the physical universe, we can observe that according to Descartes law existed independently of the personality of God. It is sometimes said that the famous dictum of Descartes, *Cogito ergo sum* must not be thought of as a syllogism with the major premise "whatever thinks exists." We must rather think of man's present consciousness as the starting point from which he draws the general conclusion that whatever thinks exists. Now we are not concerned with the correctness of this interpretation. Whichever way we may interpret Descartes, he is thoroughly antitheistic. To conceive of the individual human consciousness as the ultimate starting point on which conclusions are to be based with respect to universal laws, makes man instead of God the source of law. On the other hand, to start with a general law such as "whatever thinks exists," without asking whether such a law exists by itself or is dependent upon God for its existence, does not give that originality to God without which no true theism can exist.

The two lines of thought developed after Descartes are Empiricism and Rationalism. Both may be said to be developments of an aspect of Descartes' position.

Empiricism took its stand deliberately in the ultimacy of the sense world. Thus we can compare Empiricism with the first method of Platonic reasoning. It is not as though the Ideal world is wholly forgotten. The Ideal world is still thought of as existing, but as existing in such separation from the sense world that it is possible for man to start operating from the sense world as an independent entity in order to discover truth. In theology it became customary to think of God as the creator of the universe but to deny him as being the sustainer of the universe up to the very present. The pendulum swing was toward deism.

The fact that Empiricism thought of the universe as independent of God appears still more clearly in the nominalism of Berkeley and Hume. For them the universals are entirely subjective, i.e. they have nothing to do with objects beyond the human mind. Now the antitheistic character of this position appears clearly if we observe that his nominalism is directly opposed to the idea of the plan of God. If a consistent theism is to be maintained there is no fact anywhere that does not carry within it the "universal" of the plan of God. According to theism the relation of the human mind to the objects of the physical universe is mediated through the plan of God. It is then impossible to let the whole truth or falsity of the knowledge of facts beyond the human mind depend upon the so-called subjectivity or objectivity of the universals. To say that knowledge of objective facts is uncertain or untrustworthy because the human mind contributes the categories of

thought is to deny, even if it be only indirectly, the plan of God according to which all facts are related.

We can well understand then that the nominalism of Berkeley developed into the scepticism of Hume. Hume says that the empiricistic position furnishes no *a priori* or valid element for thought. Hume tried to work out the full implication of Descartes' emphasis upon the human mind as the most ultimate foundation for knowledge. He concluded that upon such a basis no knowledge is possible. We cannot help but agree with his conclusions, though not with his premise. The scepticism of Hume is the best reduction to absurdity of the position that takes its start from the human individual. We shall find that later forms of Empiricism have added to the subtlety of the general point of view but that none have added any strength to the position. Hume's thought remains as the simplest proof that if one takes his stand upon the sense world as such there is no knowledge possible of anything. Hume's position works out Plato's first method to the point of obvious absurdity.

Rationalism may be said to have developed the idea of Descartes that reasoning may be conducted according to certain universal principles that hover somewhere in the universe and must be taken for granted as ultimate. Rationalism may be compared to the second method of Platonic reasoning. In his second method of reasoning Plato tried to interpret all reality in terms of certain *a priori* principles. But Rationalism could not escape the necessity of taking a position on the question of the relation of these general principles to the Idea or principle of personality. Eventually one must hold that principles rest in God as ultimate and self-sufficient personality, or one must hold that these principles rest in human personality as ultimate. We have already seen that Plato's failure to face this question resulted in the unhappy consequence that he found no unity in the Ideal world. And this failure to find unity in the Ideal world resulted once more in his inability to interpret the sense world in terms of the Ideal world as he was anxious to do. Similarly, Rationalism as the heir of the Platonic tradition took for granted that these *a priori* principles rested in the human mind as an ultimate. True, they also spoke of God as Plato before them had spoken of God. But the determining point is that in neither case did God receive the place of originality that he needs if he is to be thought of in a truly theistic sense.

It is no wonder then that, as in the case of Hume, the Cartesian principles of the independence of the sense world ran into a blind alley, so in the case of Spinoza the Cartesian principles of reasoning from abstract principles ran aground. As Hume's scepticism was a hasty but simple reduction to absurdity of Empiricism, so Spinoza's pantheism is a hasty and simple reduction to absurdity of Rationalism. Spinoza argued out the concept of substance and found that God and man are but individuations of the general Idea of substance. Thus the abstract principle of rationality was thought of as standing above both God and man.

With respect to both Hume and Spinoza it should be remarked that their reasoning was univocal instead of analogical. In the case of Spinoza this is plain. He simply analyzed the idea of a substance, taking it for granted that the term, if applicable at all, must be applicable in the same way to both God and man. In the case of Hume the univocal character of his reasoning is not so plain. Yet he too takes it for granted that if the human mind cannot produce the universals that are required for knowledge, neither can God. Hume draws a negative conclusion and Spinoza draws a positive conclusion

with respect to the existence of God. But from the theistic point of view the one has exactly as much value as the other. Spinoza's conclusion is in reality as negative as Hume's if we ask whether there be a truly absolute God. One who says that all is God may as well say that nothing is God. Univocal reasoning must always lead to negation. Univocal reasoning is based upon negation. The very presupposition of univocal reasoning is that there is no absolute God. If there were an absolute God it is *ipso facto* out of the question to apply the categories of thought to him in the same way that they are applied to man.

We can perhaps best express the crux of what Kant tried to contribute to the process of antitheistic thought by saying that he represents the third and last method of Platonic reasoning. Plato's last method of reasoning was the result of an attempt to combine his first and second methods of reasoning. Similarly, Empiricism tried to interpret reality in terms of the sense world alone, and Rationalism tried to interpret reality in terms of the world of Ideas alone, while Kant attempted to effect a combination of the two. The form of the problem in this connection is no doubt differently stated in modern times than it was in ancient times, but it is only fair to say that the problem itself remains essentially the same. The only questions of fundamental import that can be asked in epistemology are whether reality is to be interpreted in exclusively temporal categories or in exclusively eternal categories, or in a mixture of the two. These two, we have already had occasion to observe, eventually reduce themselves to two possibilities, namely, whether reality is to be interpreted in eternal or in temporal categories.

If then we are justified in saying that the philosophy of Kant is an attempt to interpret reality in a mixture of eternal and temporal categories, this very fact is indicative of an antitheistic position. No theist can say that reality can be interpreted in an ultimate way except in eternal categories. We saw before that the very fact that the Scholastics tried to solve the "antinomies" of thought between time and eternity was indicative of a lack of a true theistic consciousness. We saw also that the alternative before which Schneckengerber put Calvinism of either accepting the Lutheran view of the intermixture of the temporal and the eternal, or posit a dualism in the divinity itself, is indicative of an insufficient theistic consciousness. Anyone even attempting to interpret reality in a mixture of categories has said in effect that the principles of diversity and unity do not find their ultimate union in God but in a combination of God and the universe. It is true that he has said this to be a possibility only, but to say something to be a possibility is saying a great deal. When one defines possibility he *ipso facto* defines reality. When one opens his mouth about possibility he also opens his mouth about God. God is either the source of possibility or he comes out of bare possibility, or for that matter any other term would have no significance if God were not back of it as the final subject of predication. It is this fundamental basis of theism that is denied if one attempts to interpret reality in a mixture of categories.

That Kant does as a matter of fact try to interpret reality by a mixture of categories is evident from that which forms the very heart of his position, namely, that the union of the *a posteriori* and *a priori* elements of thought are found in the human mind. The specific problem Kant put himself was whether synthetic judgments are *a priori* possible. By synthetic judgments new knowledge is acquired. But Hume seemed to have shown that synthetic judgments are impossible because to pass on to a new fact from an old one or from a known fact to an unknown one requires a connection between these facts, and we

have no guarantee that there is such a connection. Our minds must furnish the connection, and we have no reason to think that our minds can furnish such a connection. On the other hand the rationalists thought they had the necessary connection between the facts with which they were acquainted, but they could not add new facts to their store because there was no guarantee that the new facts would partake of the character of the universal laws. Now what Kant tried to do was to show that both Rationalism and Empiricism had labored under the false delusion that the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements in experience had been separated from one another. He said that in knowledge the human mind, to be sure, furnishes the *a priori* element, but this does not invalidate knowledge. On the contrary, the validation of knowledge lies in the very fact that the mind itself contributes the cement that binds experience together. Man can have genuine scientific knowledge about the world that surrounds him, says Kant, only because the mind itself furnishes "objectivity." The mind of man "creates" objectivity. The former object and the former subject of Rationalism and Empiricism are to be taken into the new subject. Thus we have a transcendental deduction of the categories. By a transcendental deduction of the categories Kant means that the facts of space and time and the relations of thought in general are shown never to have been thought of as separate from one another.

This criticism of Kant on Empiricism and Rationalism was undoubtedly correct as far as his contention that the mind of man and the facts of the universe should never have been separated is concerned. But it is equally true that the more fundamental question still is whether the mind of man should ever have been thought of in separation from the mind of God. How can the human mind know anything about any of the facts of the universe if these facts as well as the mind itself are not related upon the basis of a more fundamental unity in the plan of God? Yet it is exactly Kant's contention that the human mind does have a sphere of knowledge of its own apart from its relation to God and apart from the relation of the facts to God. And this position would not be tenable unless the mind of man were independent of the divine mind in some essential respect. In reality it matters not whether one says that man knows one fact or a thousand facts or all facts apart from God. In all cases he is equally antitheistic. Even to say that one fact is knowable to man directly apart from the relation of both fact and mind to the plan of God is in effect to deny that God is absolutely self-conscious. It is in effect to deny that reality must ultimately and exclusively be interpreted in eternal categories. Even to say that one fact can be known by man apart from God is to deny the representational character of human thought. It would be to claim originality for human thought. As such it would be a denial of the creation of man by God.

It should be observed then that the statement often made that Kant limited the field of knowledge in order to make room for faith is fundamentally mistaken. If Kant's position were to be retained, both knowledge and faith would be destroyed.

Knowledge and faith are not contradictories but complementaries. Kant did not make room for faith, because he destroyed the God on whom alone faith is to be fixed. It is true of course, that Kant spoke of a God as possibly existing. This God, however, could not be more than a finite God, since he at least did not have, or did not need to have, original knowledge of the phenomenal world. Kant thought that man could get along without God in the matter of scientific knowledge. It is thus that the representational principle which we saw to be the heart of the Christian theistic theory of knowledge is set aside. If man knows certain facts whether or not God knows these facts, as would be the case if the

Kantian position were true, man's knowledge would be done away with. Whatever sort of God may remain, on Kant's view, he is not the supreme interpretative category of human experience.

That the Kantian epistemology is the very reverse of Christian theistic epistemology may also be seen from the manner in which Kant has destroyed the validity of the theistic arguments by showing that they cannot bring us beyond the finite realm. This is not a satisfactory way of putting the matter. Kant did, to be sure, destroy the force of the theistic arguments as they had often been employed and are still employed by Christian teachers. Many Christian teachers have employed and still employ the theistic arguments univocally. That is, they reason in direct linear fashion from cause to effect or from effect to cause and reason simply that since every effect must have a cause the universe must have a cause or creator. Now if the arguments are used in this fashion it is true that Kant has destroyed them. It is always possible to ask for the cause of the cause till one faints in an infinite regression. When we say in this naive fashion that God made the world, the little girl will ask us, and ask us justly, who made God.

But when Kant destroyed the univocal use of the arguments he did not destroy the analogical use of them. The true analogical method of reasoning in general is based upon the proposition that human knowledge of anything presupposes God is ultimate self-consciousness as the point of reference for man's knowledge of anything. As Kant maintained that all of the troubles of Empiricism and Rationalism were due to a false separation of the subject and the object of knowledge, so we would maintain that all of the antinomies of antitheistic reasoning are due to a false separation of man from God. If it were not for sin man would never have thought of his knowledge as otherwise than as representative of the knowledge that God has of himself and of man and his world. And as Kant felt assured of the justice of his position because of the fact that no knowledge was actually possible upon either rationalistic or empiricistic basis, we feel assured of the justice of our position because no knowledge is actually obtained upon the Kantian basis. That Kant has no knowledge of facts is clear from the consideration that he has no exhaustive knowledge of his facts. He claimed to have knowledge of the phenomenal world, and theologians have usually been satisfied to let him have that much as long as they were given a free field in the noumenal realm. This was a mistake. We cannot allow that on his principles Kant can have true knowledge even of the phenomenal world. He could not be sure that some fact of the noumenal world, say God, might not influence the facts that he thought he knew in the phenomenal world. Moreover, he was bound to make negative statements about the noumenal world. Take for a moment the phenomenon of Jesus walking on earth. If the orthodox Christian view is correct there was in Jesus a combination of the phenomenal and the noumenal. Yet Kant would have to maintain that Jesus was exclusively phenomenal. Thus he would be denying the contact of the noumenal with the phenomenal. Now Jesus said that those who denied the noumenal in him will one day be condemned to eternal punishment by him. Kant would have to deny that such a thing could ever happen. Yet he said there might be a noumenal world. To be consistent he would therefore have to deny the existence of the noumenal world or he would have to give up his insistence that we can be sure that we have true knowledge of the phenomenal world without reference to the noumenal world.

It is now that we begin to understand that Kant has destroyed the univocal use of the theistic arguments by a univocal argument. He has cast out demons by Beelzebul. But

Beelzebub is himself a creature under the power of God. That is, for Kant's negations with respect to the theistic arguments to have any meaning, the God of Christianity, the God of whom Kant virtually says that he cannot exist, actually does exist. We have seen that to keep up his opposition he would have to maintain the non-existence of the absolute altogether. Kant would have to maintain the self-sufficiency of the phenomenal world. Now it is exactly this that Kant really did when he said that it is possible for man to have knowledge apart from God. His creativity theory of thought demanded such a declaration of independence. But the phenomenal world could not be absolute according to Kant himself because the time element was an inherent ingredient of its constitution. Kant spoke repeatedly of synthetic judgments, i.e., judgments in which new knowledge was added to an already existing system of knowledge. And if it be said that by this he perhaps meant no more than that the knowledge was new for us and not for God, we can reply that knowledge for us is all that Kant considered of importance. He thought that there could be knowledge for us whether or not there was knowledge for God. Thus new knowledge for us, since it could take place in independence of God, would also be new knowledge for God if God knew about it at all. And if it be objected once more that at least the reality about which new knowledge was acquired might not be new, but only the knowledge of it, we reply again that according to Kant the reality that is not in contact with our knowledge is just as good as non-existent. Time itself is subjective. What is new to us is new to God if he knows of it, and it is new in every intelligible sense according to Kant. And if it is new altogether, it cannot be said that one has knowledge of any fact that has preceded this new knowledge. Every old fact will be changed or at least may be changed by this new fact that has floated into our ken. The formulas of mathematics may have to be modified if a new planet is discovered. What I now think to be good moral conduct may be proved to be immoral if the new fact of the judgment should come. On a Kantian basis it is impossible for the *a priori* element of thought to catch up with the *a posteriori* element of thought. And the reason for this is that the *a priori* element must be furnished by the mind of man which is itself a temporally conditioned being, whether one conceives of time as subjective or as objective.

If now we gather up the elements of our contention we may see that (a) for Kant's rejection of the theistic arguments to have any significance they must really be valid for all possible existence and thus be inclusive of the future as well as of the past. In other words Kant needs an absolute in order to make his arguments against the "absolute," called God, effective. Yet (b) in the universe and in the mind of man no such absolute can be found, for the sufficient reason that the synthetic always outruns the analytic if the human mind is to furnish the interpretative category of experience. Accordingly, (c) it is fair to say that Kant has to presuppose the existence of the triune God of Scripture before he can disprove it.

It is thus that Kant has slain univocal arguments for the existence of God by a univocal argument against such arguments, and has at the same time killed all univocal reasoning by showing that all univocal reasoning, including his own, presupposes analogical reasoning. As Samson died when he slew his enemies, so Kant died when he slew his.

The service rendered by Kant to the whole epistemological struggle can scarcely be overestimated. That service may in general be summed up by saying that he has greatly clarified the issue between theistic and antitheistic thinking. Kant taught many a theist to

reason analogically as the inherent principles of his position demanded. We have seen that Calvin reasoned analogically in fact. But Calvin was not first of all a philosopher, and did not work out this method of analogical reasoning in epistemological terminology. Those that came after Kant, however, and would follow out the analogical reasoning as engaged in in principle by Augustine and by Calvin, have the benefit of the greater clearness in the atmosphere that resulted from the Kantian criticism of the theistic arguments. There is no excuse for them if they reason univocally instead of analogically. Kant has done a great service for the theistic arguments by destroying them as they were traditionally used and by bringing out the necessity of using them in their true form.

On the other hand, the greatness of Kant's service in the field of epistemology appears from the fact that Kant has more than anyone before him emphasized the fact that antitheistic reasoning is insistent upon univocal reasoning as the only type of reasoning possible. Kant has made it forever impossible for antitheistic thought to return to any method of Platonic reasoning. Kant has placed the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* so thoroughly in the human mind as ultimate, that he will no longer think of the Ideal world and the sense world in separation from one another. Plato's first method was based upon the idea that the sense world existed apart from the Ideal world, but it was all the while remembered that the Ideal world existed too. Plato's second method was based upon the idea of the independent existence of the Ideal world, but it was all the while remembered that the sense world existed too. Plato's third method tried to combine the two worlds, but it was all the while remembered that they had been or were still existing in independence of one another to some extent. Now with Kant all this is changed. The two worlds are never more to be thought of in separation from one another. There will come after Kant those who think that all reality can be interpreted in the categories of the sense world. But these will make no more reference to the ideal world at all. There will be those who try once more to interpret all reality in terms of the Ideal world. But these will first try to prove the total non-existence of the sense world. Finally, there will be those who try to interpret reality in terms of both the Ideal and the sense world but they will take for granted that these worlds have always existed in mutual dependence.

We may say then that Kant has reduced the three methods of reasoning to one. Kant has found the original sin of all epistemology to be this separation in thought of the two worlds of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, the two worlds of time and eternity: there is only one form of reasoning possible for the antitheists. The only form of reasoning that remains for them is to try to effect a mixture of the categories, and this is in reality a victory for the temporal categories. We have seen that according to Kant the human mind must furnish the only *a priori* element that experience is to receive. Or we might say that God and man together must furnish the *a priori* element. At any rate man must furnish something of the *a priori* element. And since man is a temporal being, the *a priori* that he furnishes will be temporally conditioned and will really be no *a priori* element at all. What Kant's influence has really amounted to is this emphasis upon the exclusive use of temporal categories.

It is but natural then that after Kant, Christian apologists should direct the brunt of their attack upon this basic contention of antitheism that reality can be interpreted in exclusively temporal categories. It is the creativity theory of thought as defended by Kant that has laid it down as a law of Medes and Persians that all reasoning must be univocal and therefore man-centered. It insists that we shall do away with the custom of

distinguishing between divine and human thought. We are to speak of thought as such. Christian apologists should therefore note that if this program of Kant is to be carried out the complete annihilation of all knowledge results, and that this in itself is the best proof that univocal reasoning is false reasoning.

As to post-Kantian antitheistic epistemology, we may now be brief as far as our historical survey is concerned. We may divide post-Kantian antitheistic epistemology into two divisions. There have been those who have inconsistently and there have been those who have consistently worked out the demands of Kant that all reality must be interpreted in exclusively temporal categories. Or we may perhaps better express this idea by saying that there has been a more and a less consistent application of the Kantian principles. Both have good reason for claiming Kant as their father, because Kant was at one time more and at another time less consistent in the application of his own principles. Or rather, Kant was not consistent himself, and for that reason his followers have not been consistent. And the reason why neither Kant nor his followers have been consistent is that a really consistent application of the Kantian principles leads too easily to an obvious *reductio ad absurdum* of the whole antitheistic position.

The modern pragmatic philosophers have more consistently than others tried to eliminate the eternal in their interpretation of reality. They speak of "obsolescence of the eternal." For them the whole conception of knowledge and of truth has nothing to do with the Ideal world. It may be said that in this respect they have followed the tradition of the ancient Sophists and of the Empiricists of the modern day. Yet the difference is that the pragmatist thinkers have much more thoroughly than their forebears learned to forget about the eternal. They are no longer deists. They do not need God for the idea of providence, but neither do they need him for the idea of creation. And for these reasons the pragmatic thinkers do not need God for knowledge. They continue to speak of God, but the God they speak of is a finite God. This God is himself constantly looking for new facts. He may be said to be as scientific as man is scientific, in the sense that he uses hypotheses and theories which he applies to reality that exists independent of him. Thus pragmatism has consistently worked out the Kantian idea that man must furnish his own *a priori*. F. C. S. Schiller has made this point particularly clear in his article, "Axioms as Postulates" in the book *Personal Idealism*. He tells us that what are now considered to be axioms by us, that is the universals of daily thought, were once no more than the postulates of our forefathers. Thus mankind has historically developed his own *a priori* and this is all he needs.

The modern Idealistic philosophers have less consistently worked out the Kantian principle. To be sure, Hegel was in many respects more consistent than Kant. He saw and enunciated clearly that if man can have knowledge of any one fact he must have knowledge of all facts, inasmuch as all facts are interrelated. Of course Hegel did not mean that any one human being or for that matter that all human beings together do know all things or can know all things comprehensively. Yet it is in consonance with his most fundamental contention that, in principle, mankind must be able to know all things to know any one thing. He truly saw that if Kant was right in holding that man can have knowledge of the phenomenal world with no reference to God, then man must also be able to have knowledge of the noumenal world without God. He saw clearly that Kant's creativity theory of thought demanded a more consistent application than Kant himself had given it. If human thought can legislate for the phenomenal sphere it must also be

able to legislate for the noumenal sphere. If anything, Hegel developed still more than Kant the idea that the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* should never be separated, that the Ideal and the sense worlds have always been together, that we should not distinguish between divine and human thought, but speak of thought as such. His *Coherence Notion of Truth* is a further elaboration of Kant's creativity theory of truth. It implies the complete correlativity between divine and human thought. One can just as well say that God needs man for his knowledge as that man needs God for his knowledge.

In principle, then, Hegelian or Idealistic thought in general does not differ from pragmatic thought. They are both elaborations of Kant's creativity theory of thought which has set up the temporal categories as the ultimate standard of all interpretation. The only difference is that Hegel did, while the Pragmatists did not, refer to God or the Ideal world. We shall have occasion to note that Idealistic philosophy is not entitled to this reference to God. This reference is no more than an inconsistency.

It will be impossible to carry on this review of the history of epistemology into the details of all the varieties of Realism and Pragmatism and Idealism that control the philosophical field today. Our hasty sketch can do no more than touch on the high spots. But it should be noted that this is really all that is necessary for the purposes of Christian theistic apologetics. We are not seeking a detailed knowledge of epistemological theories. We are rather interested to note the large comprehensive movements and the few outstanding principles that have shaped the course of the antitheistic argument. But so much as we have given may suffice to place before us the high-water mark of the thought of the day and age in which we live and in which we are called to labor. Having traced the historical development of the thought that faces us as Christians today, we are in a position to do justice to that thought and at the same time be certain that we have met the worst enemy that could lace us. We must engage in a life and death struggle with the enemy as he appears today.

Chapter 10: The Starting Point Of Christian Theistic Epistemology: A: The Object Of Knowledge

Having now come to the end of our brief historical review of the struggle between the two main types of epistemological theory, it remains to gather up the results and attempt to give a systematic statement of the present state of affairs and of what would seem to be the best way of establishing the truth of our position against the modern form of opposition to it.

The first matter that naturally comes up for consideration is once more the question of a starting point. We have already made some preliminary remarks about that question in the second chapter. Our chief interest there was to show that there is a bias involved in the question of epistemology even at the very starting point. We must now set that fact in relation to other questions that center about the general question of a starting point.

Our historical review has brought out the fact that the struggle between Christian theism and its opponent covers the whole field of knowledge. It is not as though we are at the outset dealing with the question of the knowledge of the world about us and that the only point in dispute is whether or not God can be and need be known. We may indeed make the question whether God need be and can be known so inclusive that it coincides with the question whether anything can be known. Christian theism's fundamental contention is just this, that nothing whatsoever can be known unless God can be and is known. And as stated before, by God we mean the triune, self-sufficient God and his revelation of himself to man and his world. In whatever way we put the question then, the important thing to note is this fundamental difference between theism and antitheism on the question of epistemology. There is not a spot in heaven or on earth about which there is no dispute between the two opposing parties. It is this point that can bear much emphasis again and again.

We may perhaps best bring out what seems to be of importance in this connection by showing that both in what is commonly called the object of knowledge and in what is commonly called the subject of knowledge there is a difference of opinion when the question of starting point is under consideration.

By the object of knowledge we understand anything that is spoken of as a "fact." Such facts may be found in any of many realms of investigation. They may belong to the physical world. They may belong to the world of psychology. They may belong to the world of mathematics. They may belong to the world of the "spiritual."

It will be observed at once, however, that about some of these facts the question that must at once be raised is whether they exist, i.e., whether they are really facts. A materialist will at once stop us if we just assume the existence of the spiritual, and tell us that that is exactly the point in dispute, and that we have no right to take it for granted. Or again, suppose that we should talk as though the existence of an absolute God were a question about which there could be no dispute; there is no doubt that all of our antitheistic opponents would at once stop us and say that we should prove instead of take for granted the existence of God.

Yet it is not as though we are merely claiming for ourselves nothing more than we are willing to grant to our opponents. Christianity is not merely the most tenable hypothesis that one can find for the interpretation of the world. Christianity is no hypothesis at all. It is accepted on the authority of the self-attesting Christ of Scripture and at the same time it is the presupposition without which predication is unintelligible.

What our opponents mean by the existence of any "fact" is existence apart from God. That they mean just this is indisputable for the reason that such existence apart from God is *ipso facto* predicated of all "facts" except of the "fact" of God, if the "fact" of God is called a question. For anyone to call the existence of God in question he must at least himself exist, and possibly exist apart from God.

It appears then that the very connotation of the term "existence" is in question. The antitheist maintains that the term existence may be applied as a predicate to any "fact" even if the "fact" of God's existence is not a fact. On the other hand the theist maintains that the term "existence" cannot be applied intelligently to any "fact" unless the "fact" of God's existence is a fact. In other words, the antitheist assumes that we can begin by reasoning univocally, while the theist maintains that we cannot begin otherwise than by reasoning analogically, i.e., on the presupposition of the truth of that which the Scripture says of God.

The contention of the previous paragraph is sometimes granted to a certain degree. Idealist writers on philosophy in general and on morality in particular will often base their very argument on the idea that the full meaning of a predicate applied to any "fact" does not appear till it is seen in its fullest possibilities. So, e.g., A. E. Taylor, in his recent work *The Faith of a Moralist*, argues that the full meaning of morality does not appear unless it is brought into relation with religion and religion brings one into relation with the question of the existence of God. According to Taylor and many others of general theistic inclinations, the question between theism and antitheism is one of a fuller or a poorer connotation of predicates that are to be applied to the "facts" of experience. Meanwhile it is taken for granted by Taylor that there is at least a common denotation with which all must begin. So Taylor speaks constantly of the fact of the life as the ultimate starting point. He seeks to show what the implications of this "fact" of the moral life are, and one of the implications of this "fact" he finds to be the existence of God, but for all that the fundamental error remains that the denotation of the moral life is taken for granted apart from the connotation. It is this that accounts for the seemingly strange phenomenon that though Taylor himself makes much of the necessity of reasoning analogically instead of univocally, he reasons univocally after all. Taylor applies the predicate existence to the "fact" of the moral life without asking whether the moral life can exist at all apart from God. A genuine theism cannot allow that denotation can be thus separated from connotation. If it is true that "in him we live and move and have our being," we cannot start arguing any "fact" as though it might have its being apart from God. It is impossible to separate the that from the what, or denotation from connotation. If the theistic position is true, the that or existence of any finite "fact" depends upon the what or connotation. God has given that fact. If theism is true, connotation and denotation are identical in the case of the personality of God. The what of God is the that of God. It is this that furnishes the foundation for and is the ground of the necessity of analogical reasoning. The only exhaustive alternative to this position is to say that in the case of any finite "fact" its that and its what are independent and need no reference to God at all. To

say that the that of a “fact” is independent of the existence of God but that the what of a “fact” cannot be understood unless reference is made to God, is to try to reason both univocally and analogically at once, and therefore to reason independently of God and his Word.

If then the term “existence” cannot be used carelessly, as though every one who used the term meant the same thing by it, and if it may perhaps have to be used analogically instead of equivocally, the question of nonexistence may also be used differently by different people. The question that is often asked is whether one can think intelligibly of the non-existence of God. These same people will sometimes insist that we cannot intelligibly think of the non-existence of all reality. We are told constantly today that we must take reality for granted and not ask questions about its origin. With respect to this matter of non-existence, it would seem then that four theoretical possibilities are open. There may be those (a) who think it reasonable to doubt the existence of God but unreasonable to think of the non-existence of the universe. There may be those (b) who think it possible to think intelligibly of the non-existence of both God and the universe. There may be those (c) who think it impossible to think intelligibly of the non-existence of either the universe or of God. Finally, there may be those (d) who think it possible to think intelligibly of the nonexistence of the universe but impossible to think intelligibly of the nonexistence of God.

Of these various possibilities it will at once be observed that the acceptance of any of the first three positions puts one on the antitheistic side of the argument. Only the last position is consistent with theism. But it will also be observed that in many instances any one of the first three positions is taken for granted at the beginning of an argument without awareness of the fact that those holding the position have therewith foreclosed to themselves the possibility of arriving at a theistic conclusion. In other words, any one of these three positions is thought to be consistent with the application of a strictly empirical method of research which, it is thought, may lead to any conclusion whatsoever. As illustrative of the first two positions we mention such a popular scientist as James Jeans. He thinks it quite possible to come to a theistic conclusion about the nature of reality after he has dismissed the question of the origin of the universe with a lighthearted remark that we should not worry about such details inasmuch as accidents do happen and so the universe may have come by accident.¹ As illustrative of the third position we may refer to any of the number of anthropologists who are basing their work upon an idealistic background. So C. C. J. Webb, in his book *Problems in the Relation of God and Man*, clearly indicates his agreement with the Idealistic theory of the judgment which contends that parts apart from the whole have no meaning, and synthesis can have no meaning apart from an equally ultimate analysis. At the same time Webb thinks it quite possible to investigate the phenomenon of the moral consciousness according to the ordinary method of scientific empiricism. We may say then that on the one hand Webb thinks it impossible to think intelligibly of the non-existence of either God or the universe, and still wants to study the universe as though totally new things were appearing in it, while on the other hand he thinks it quite possible to start with the antitheistic method of ordinary empiricism and come at last to a theistic position.

¹ *The Mysterious Universe*, pp. 1–10.

Now if it be remembered that Webb's procedure is only typical of the generally Idealistic attitude to the whole question of the possibility of thinking of the non-existence of all reality, it will be seen that we cannot be too careful in giving our assent to arguments put forward by those who seem to come to a generally theistic position but do not get there altogether. We cannot be too careful about asking what the starting point of any one's argument is. It is of the utmost importance that we find our way through the maze of confusion that prevails on this subject.

As a help to clarification of this subject we may perhaps suggest a distinction between an immediate and an ultimate starting point. By an immediate starting point is meant the place where the knowledge of facts must begin. It is of course quite consistent with a theistic position to say that we must start with the "facts" as that term is understood ordinarily. Neither Augustine nor Calvin would have objected to saying that knowledge of self was their immediate and temporary starting point. But when the question of an ultimate starting point is raised the matter is different. In that case Augustine and Calvin would both have to say that their ultimate starting point is God. That is, they could intelligently think of their own non-existence but were unable to think intelligently of God's nonexistence. The difference may perhaps be brought out by the analogy of a diving board. Suppose a diver was standing on the tip of a diving board and that all that he could see of the diving board was the very tip on which he was standing. Suppose further that all that he could see around him was water. Now if he should say that the very spot from which he was about to make his leap is his starting point he might mean either of two things. If we thought of him as unaware of the connection of the point on which he was standing with the foundation on which it rested he would be speaking of that particular spot as the permanent or ultimate starting point. On the other hand, if he were fully aware of the fact that the tip of the diving board is only a tip of a board that rests upon a solid rock under water, he might speak of that tip as a starting point but only as an immediate starting point. The real and ultimate starting point for him would be the foundation on which the whole diving board was resting. Similarly we may say that the question at issue is not that of what is the immediate starting point. All agree that the immediate starting point must be that of our everyday experience and the "facts" that are most close at hand. But the charge we are making against so many Idealists as well as Pragmatists is that they are taking for granted certain temporal "facts" not only as a temporary but as an ultimate starting point. It is this that is involved in the method of Webb just discussed. It is this that is involved, for example, when A. Seth Pringle-Pattison in his book *The Idea of God in Modern Philosophy* tells us that in the first half of the book he is not concerned so much with matters of the world beyond. He tells us that he is dealing in the first section of the book with Appearances only and therefore all that he need do is to take the reality of Appearances for granted. But he has no right to do this, if more than an immediate starting point is intended. And that more than an immediate starting point is intended is apparent from the fact that he thinks it quite possible to make significant statements about the nature of these appearances without so much as taking the noumenal realities into consideration. Yet the very point in question is whether any statement can be made about any appearance at all without reference to the fact of God.

As an interesting and instructive example of the results that follow if one carries through a complete process of reasoning upon the assumption of the independent existence of the "facts" of the universe, we mention the conclusion to which A. E. Taylor

comes with respect to the knowledge of God. Taylor says: "Since the world of creatures actually is a world of becoming, contingency and partial indetermination, if God apprehended it otherwise, God would be Himself the victim of illusion: this so-called knowledge would not be knowledge. A being in possession of all knowledge, of course, knows the incomplete as incomplete, open alternatives as open alternatives. But the point is that, though there might be contingency enough in what such a knower knows, there would be no contingency in the knower himself. He would, for example, know that at this moment of my life there are alternatives between which I can choose: but since he sees all at once, he would also know that I am in the act of choosing one of the alternatives by my choice, and which I am choosing. He would not be taken by surprise when I choose."

² The point of importance in this quotation in this connection is that for Taylor certain "facts" are assumed to exist in such entire independence of God that God must take them just as he finds them. Taylor takes for granted that such qualifications as contingency, completeness or incompleteness, open alternatives, etc., have to be taken as existing in actual application to the facts of the universe in such a way that God's knowledge of these facts must be colored by these qualifications as ultimate. That this is the exact opposite of the truly theistic position which holds that the quality of a fact depends upon its relation to the "plan of God" is at once apparent. True, Taylor thinks he has escaped this difficulty by saying that though there may be contingency in "what such a knower knows, there could be no contingency in the knower himself." This is a simple inconsistency. If the qualifications of "facts" do not depend upon God to begin with, it is difficult to escape the logical conclusion that God depends upon the "facts." If such a word as "contingency" means anything apart from the plan of God or God himself, it is plain that God's being and knowledge are dependent upon independent facts. God's knowledge is then no longer exclusively analytical but is also synthetical. In fine, we are then back upon the old Platonic position of seeking the solution of all epistemological problems in a union of temporal and eternal categories. God would certainly be taken by surprise if the "facts" of the universe bring forth altogether new things.

The discussion of the preceding paragraphs may also serve to make the transition in our consideration of the object of knowledge from the question of the existence of the object of knowledge to that of the good and evil of the object of knowledge, or, as it is called in epistemological language, the question of error. Offhand it would seem that the question of error has nothing to do with the object of knowledge. Error seems to deal only with the knower and not with the object known. The object known seems to be there always and the same and the only reason for error seems to be that the knower does not carefully observe or correctly conclude from his observation. But if the Christian theistic position is true, error is definitely connected with the object of knowledge. According to Scripture the moral evil of man has brought a curse upon "nature" so that it does not really reveal itself in all the glory that it might. In fact, the curse of God rests upon all the facts of the universe. We may bring this whole question to a point by focusing upon the question of physical death in man. We purposely focus the question at this point because in this instance there can be no debate between various interpreters of the biblical position as to the origin of death, as there might be if we took the example of death in the plant or animal world. As to the death of man, all believers in Scripture are agreed that it

² *The Faith of a Moralist*, Series 1, p. 430.

came upon man as the result of sin. Yet the body of man may surely be contemplated as an object of knowledge, that is, as a part of the whole physical universe.

What now, we may ask, is the attitude of most investigators of nature on this question? The answer is that most of them take for granted that there is no connection between natural and moral evil. It is usually not considered to be worth anything more than a smile when one presents the suggestion that the sin of man may have to do with nature's being "red in tooth and claw." The phenomenon of death even in the case of man is contemplated as a natural and normal conclusion to life. Radicals ridicule, and the refined smile, when they read that there are people in Tennessee who pray about the weather.

If we now ask whether this attitude of antitheists is justified, it is plain that it is not. They ought first to justify the contention that "facts" exist in total independence of God. In addition to that, they ought to show that this holds good for all the qualifications of the "facts" as well as for their bare existence. They ought to show that predication has significance upon an antitheistic basis. We are not now contending that such cannot be shown. We are only interested to point out that even on such a question as that of the object of knowledge both as to its existence and as to its qualifications, there is nothing but hostility from the very start between theists and antitheists.

In this connection too we must briefly advert to the question of Scripture. According to the Christian theistic position, we have seen that neither the denotation nor the connotation of a "fact" can be known apart from God. But a part of the qualification of finite "facts" is that evil is found in them. And since God is absolute, evil cannot be ultimate. If it were ultimate it would limit God. Accordingly, evil must have come into the universe by man. Man is therefore a sinner and worthy of separation from God. And this separation will naturally be eternal inasmuch as God is eternal. But we would not know this unless God had told us so. The very nature of sin involves blindness to this very fact. The sinner takes sin to be normal for him. At most he considers himself to be a victim of circumstances. Never will he of his own accord accept responsibility for the entrance of sin into the world. Yet it is for his sin that darkness covers the "facts" or objects of knowledge. As Moses put a veil upon his face so that the children of Israel could not see the glory of God that shone upon his face, so in a sense there is a veil upon nature so that man cannot see it as it is. But now comes the redemptive principle to set matters right. In the objective sphere there is the supreme fact of the incarnation, the death and resurrection of Christ as the Son of God and Son of man, and there is the Scripture as the authoritative interpretation of these facts. By the incarnation and all that it involves in the way of the life and death of Christ, the object of knowledge is redeemed. That is, the object of knowledge is brought into right relationship with God once more. And an aspect of this restoration is that true light is thrown upon it by the Scriptures. The Niagara Falls cannot be seen at night unless there is a powerful searchlight that throws light upon them.

The point of importance to note about this matter of Scripture is that according to the Christian theistic position the Bible is an inherent part of the system of theism as a whole. If man is a totally dependent creature, if this creature has fallen into sin so that the whole of creation has for his sake been subjected to "vanity"; if the "facts" because created by God must ultimately be interpreted by God as to connotation and denotation alike, there must be a Scripture which brings this interpretation of God. But that Scripture must be,

we learn from Scripture itself. Without the Scripture as the word of the self-attesting Christ we would know no fact for what it is, i.e., as set in the only framework in which it can have meaning. It is of the utmost importance that Christians themselves become aware of the exact position of Scripture in their thinking. All too often they carry forth the old Scholastic doctrine that man can know certain facts by the exercise of his reason but that he needs information about other facts by way of revelation. Now if the Christian theistic view is true at all, there is no fact that can be known truly without the revelation of Scripture. Reason and revelation should not be contrasted as two sources of knowledge. It ought to be clearly understood that the "facts" by virtue of their creation by God cannot be known otherwise than by revelation. By virtue of creation the "facts" are themselves a revelation of God. And the revelation of God in the facts of the created world was, from the beginning supplemented by the "supernatural" word revelation of God. Hence if reason is to function fruitfully it must always function upon revelational material. Reason as one "fact" among others is itself a revelation. This much is implied in theism. In addition to this we must maintain that no "fact" can be truly known, now that sin has come into the world, without the special revelation of Scripture, because it is only through Christ and the Scriptures that "facts" are seen as they are, that is, as theistic "facts."

We are interested in all this only to see what bearing it has upon the starting point of knowledge as far as the object of knowledge is concerned. And we must note therefore that on this very point the difference between the theist and the antitheist is very marked. This scarcely needs elaboration since it is a fact of common knowledge that not only avowed antitheists take for granted that one can start an investigation of many "facts" without any reference to Scripture at all. We must analyze still further the theory that we can begin the course of factual investigation without reference to the Bible.

The first argument advanced is that there can be no argument about this. Everybody naturally begins with the "facts," we are told. Would it not be the height of absurdity when the subject under investigation is some form of animal life in the heart of Africa to consult the Bible about information as to that "fact"? Yes, we answer, that would be absurd, but that is not what we mean. We are not speaking of getting definite bits of information about certain definite "facts" of biology or physics. But it will be granted at once that whatever "fact" there may be in the heart of Africa or anywhere else is a part of some great realm of "facts" such as those mentioned. The very purpose of scientific knowledge is to set facts into relation to one another. All the facts of these realms of knowledge have certain qualifications. One characteristic of these facts is that decomposition works among them. Is this a natural something? The antitheist, we have seen, takes for granted that it is a natural something. But we have also seen that he is not entitled to assume this position. It is in Scripture alone that we come to an alternative interpretation of these facts of Africa. It will be necessary for an investigator in Africa to take into consideration this other interpretation that is given to the fact that he is investigating. The Bible tells him that the interpretation that he by himself gives to that "fact" or any other "fact" is quite wrong. The Bible does not claim to offer a rival theory that may or may not be true. It claims to have the ultimate truth about all facts.

Consequently if one launches out upon a tour of investigation without his Bible he has already rejected this claim of the Bible and is duty bound to find a solution for the facts that he is about to investigate or make reasonable the claim that no solution can be

found. Even to say that a solution may be found in the future without reference to the Bible is to put the Bible aside. Now such “solutions” as scientists have come to of late themselves indicate that the “fact” of knowledge itself remains unaccounted for if Scripture is left out of account. James Jeans, for example, says that science has no pronouncement to make about the nature of reality. He holds that no one can say what the nature of reality is. Such a conclusion shows that if one begins investigation of any of knowledge without Scripture he will not come to a theistic position in the end. The argument for the necessity of Scripture is accordingly the same in form and in force as the argument for the necessity of thinking of the “facts” as standing in relation to God at the outset of the investigation. Hence if it is unreasonable to start out an investigation by assuming that the “facts” exist in total independence of God, it is equally unreasonable to start on an investigation without the Bible. The reason for this is that only from Scripture do we know God.

We conclude then that the fact that “everybody” does take it as an obvious thing that we must “begin with the facts” is quite innocent because meaningless, if we signify by that phrase that the locus of investigation is the African jungles, or that the Bible is not a textbook of science. No one claims that one should go to the Bible instead of to Africa. No one claims that the Bible is a textbook on science. All that we claim is that avowed antitheists should tell us why they do not take their Bibles with them to Africa. We cannot rest satisfied with the mere information that they do not take their Bibles. That is interesting biographically and when analyzed as above has epistemological significance, but it does not justify their procedure.

A second reason given for not beginning the investigation of any object of knowledge with the Bible in hand is the contention that such a procedure would be to prejudice the case. It is, for instance, a condition of the Gifford Lectureship that men may not defend any one form of revelation otherwise than by philosophical arguments that do not include an appeal to authority. A. E. Taylor refers to this regulation several times in his Gifford lectures on “The Faith of a Moralist,” in order to show constantly that his argument so far as it involves definitely historical matters, and even matters that pertain exclusively to Christianity, never involves an appeal to authority.

In addition to his anxiety to escape the charge of making an appeal to authority, Taylor holds that the best argument for “revelation” can be made if one is careful not to defend one’s own particular brand of revelation. We quote him at length in order to study a typical argument for the antitheistic starting point. Taylor says: “In historical fact, apologists for the several revelational religions have made an unnecessary complication for themselves, and weakened the defense of revelation as a source of knowledge about God, by yielding too much to the polemical desire of representing their own religion as the only one possessing such knowledge, and its rivals as mere pretenders to a wholly unreal revelation. Thus the apologist for one particular historical religion provides the rejector of all with an argument, by using against his rivals weapons it is easy to turn upon himself. But it is not really truly necessary to defend the reality of revelation as a source of truth in one historical religion by refusing to admit its presence in every other. Since the historical religions do not simply contradict, but also on many points confirm one another, it is more natural as well as more charitable, to recognize that they cannot be summarily dichotomized into one true religion and several false, but that truth, in different measures may be found in all of them. Thus, for example, since Christianity and

Mohammedanism are in conflict on fundamental points, if one of them is the truth, the other cannot be. But this does not justify a Christian controversialist in simply dismissing Mohammed as the 'false prophet,' and his religion as an 'imposture.' That religion, like Christianity, testifies emphatically to the divine unity, as the reality of providence."³

Taylor has given expression to what lives in the hearts of many. Moreover, Taylor's way of stating the argument is very thorough and exhaustive. If we have shown the falsity of it we need not fear that Pragmatists will come with a better argument. Taylor himself is far from being a Pragmatist. He does not even wish to be classed as an objective Idealist. He defends his position as being that of theism. His position justifies us in saying that he seeks to make a close approach to the traditionally theistic position. All the more remarkable, then, is the fact that Taylor should use an argument such as we have quoted.

The first thing that we may note about this argument is that at its conclusion it holds that, for example, Christianity and Mohammedanism may be "in conflict on fundamental points" and yet be in total agreement on other no less fundamental points. He does, to be sure, make the admission in the section that follows our quotation, that from the Christian point of view it would be important to "distinguish carefully between, for example, the truth of the divine unity and distortions of the conception of God in Islam by reckless and one-sided insistence on unity." Yet Taylor's contention clearly is that it may truthfully be said that Christianity and Mohammedanism agree on the fundamental truth of the unity of God, while they differ radically on other fundamental points. This way of putting the matter is good if no more than a popular statement is desired. In a philosophical discussion marked with the care of an acute reasoner it is out of place. Especially is it out of place in one who stands upon the high level of a generally theistic position. It ought to be patent that if there are fundamental differences anywhere between Christianity and Mohammedanism there are fundamental differences everywhere. If there is a real difference of interpretation on the question of any historical fact there must be a difference of the conception of God. Taylor has himself labored to bring out the idea that the full connotation of any historical phenomenon cannot be found without reference to eternal categories. To say then that there may be fundamental differences at one place and fundamental unity at another place is not only to say that one of the two must lack a comprehensive interpretation of all facts, but is really to say that both Christianity and Mohammedanism lack unity of interpretation.

And with this criticism we have also suggested the main weakness of the whole argument of Taylor on this question. The very contention of Christian theism is, as we have seen, that every historical "fact" must be interpreted in the light of the existence of an absolute God. It follows logically that only one historical religion can be the true religion. Any Christian apologist is shirking his duty if he does not say that Mohammed is a false prophet. This is not to indulge in anything uncharitable. Charity has nothing to do with the question. Nor is it to indulge in an easy dichotomizing process. It is, to be sure, to indulge in dichotomizing, but it is the dichotomizing of a Luther before the Diet of Worms. If theism is truly Christian theism, it is true because it is involved in the very concept of theism.

The same argument appears in still another form when, to illustrate from Taylor again, it is said that Christianity has limited itself to statements about faith and morals.

³ *The Faith of a Moralist*, Series 2, p. 95.

Taylor realizes that this does not entirely relieve the situation because, thinking more carefully than the modernist, he sees that faith and morals are inextricably interwoven with simple matters of fact even in the physical realm. Yet even Taylor does think it to be an apologetical advantage to hold to such a limitation. It at least seems to leave room for the study of facts that have nothing to do with faith and morals, so that there is a field in which the Christian and non-Christian stand together on neutral ground. But it ought to be apparent that one need only to carry out Taylor's own suggestion that faith and morals are interwoven with matters in the field of physics to overthrow the argument adduced. The Christian argument for immortality involves, for example, that what seem now to be irrevocable laws of physics will one day be abrogated. Christ speaks of the "regeneration of all things," by which he means the culmination of the redemptive process to the very circumference of the universe. One cannot with a toss of the hand dismiss the "cosmical significance of Christianity," as though this did not imply a radical alteration of the space-time world.⁴

There is no apologetical advantage involved in a limited concept of revelation. On the contrary, there is a great apologetical disadvantage. In fact the apologetical disadvantage involved is so great that it amounts to giving up your argument before you begin to argue. If you allow that any "fact" is, strictly speaking, beyond the field of faith and morals, there are no faith and morals left as far as Christianity is concerned. If there is one fact beyond the field of faith and morals there may be, for all we know, a thousand; and there is no telling whether faith and morals will effect the "regeneration of all things."

The result of the limitation of Christianity to faith and morals may be seen from the quotation that we now proceed to give from Taylor. On the same page on which his distinction just before referred to occurs, he goes on to speak of "historical accidents." He says, "It is a more serious matter that they have often revolted the sensitive conscience, as some of them still continue to revolt it, by making the eternal welfare of men depend on the historical accident of acquaintance even when wholly unavoidable, has been put, in this respect, on a level with deliberate and obstinate rejection of the truth."⁵

This quotation, it will be noted, involves the whole question of the philosophy of history. Are there such things as "historical accidents"? How is one historical or space-time "fact" related to another and to every other space-time fact? This problem may be called the question of the object-object relation. We must have knowledge not only of one object, but we must have knowledge of the relation of this one object to other objects. It is even necessary to say that we do not have knowledge of one "fact" unless we know what its relation to other "facts" implies. "Facts" cannot be said to be known apart from laws. Or we can say particulars cannot be known apart from laws. We shall have to say more of this when we come to the argument against Pragmatism. For the present our only purpose is to consider this thing as far as the starting point of knowledge is concerned. And then it ought to be observed that it will not do to assume that the universals of knowledge are the product of mere accidents. Taylor has again taken for granted what should be proved.

Every fact of history, Calvinism holds, happens according to the secret counsel of God. Using epistemological language we may express this idea by saying that the

⁴ *Faith of a Moralist*, Series 2, p. 51.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, 2, p. 51.

universals that bind the particulars of history, as well as these particulars themselves, have their origin in God. God has created the human race as a race, which means that all are related to one another. We have already had occasion to advert to this point when speaking of the doctrine of total depravity and of covenant theology as taught by Calvin. We then saw how a covenant theology is the only form of theology which gives a completely personalistic interpretation to reality. So we observe again in this connection that if we speak of “historical accidents” when referring to the fact that some men do and some men do not have a knowledge of the gospel, we are assuming that man is placed in an impersonal universe. It will then be impossible to come to a theistic position at the end of our investigation. Thus one has assumed an antitheistic position at the outset of the argument.

Taylor himself suggests the form of the only solution that can be given to the question of why one person comes into contact with the gospel and another does not. He tells us that after all the problem as to why some have and some have not access to the revelation of Christianity may be compared to the question why some have and some have not prosperity in life, and as to this he says, “That problem admits of no solution, except that of Uncle Toby—and St. Paul—that God in His wisdom has disposed it so.” (In a note Taylor quotes Sterne, *Tristram Shandy*, 3, 41: “There is no cause but one, replied my uncle Toby, why one man’s nose is longer than another’s but because that God pleases to have it so—that is Grangousier’s solution, said my father. ‘Tis he, continued my uncle Toby—who makes us all, and frames and puts us together in such forms and proportions, and for such ends as is agreeable to his infinite wisdom.”) Now the thing of importance here is that when it concerns a matter of the length of noses, Taylor thinks uncle Toby and St. Paul’s answer quite sufficient, but when it comes to seriously seeking a solution for the difficult problem of the philosophy of history, he has refuted St. Paul’s solution by stating it. Right here then is a striking instance of the most fundamental difference between a true theism and a false theism. The one does and the other does not accept God as the solution of the mystery of existence. A true theism really means what it says when it claims that reality must be interpreted in exclusively eternal categories.

This quotation of Taylor also enables us to see exactly what we mean by criticizing Taylor’s conception of the historical accident. We have seen to what conclusion he came. The complete rejection of God as the final solution of life’s most baffling mysteries is the thing that he takes for granted as being so much a matter of course that one need not ever argue but only state the point. And this conclusion inevitably follows from the way he began. We saw before that, according to Taylor, if God is to know all things he must know them as contingent. Contingency, according to Taylor, has significance apart from God. So in this instance the historical is given an independent existence first and thereupon the attempt is made to arrive at the existence of God. All this has simply taken for granted the whole of the antitheistic position. It will not do to make a simple dichotomous division between those that do believe in an absolute God and those that do not, and assume that those that do are all wrong before even an argument is begun.

Still more fully does the unfairness of such a type of argument appear if we follow Taylor once more by focussing attention more particularly upon the eternal punishment that, according to orthodox theology, is involved in the “historical accident” of not knowing the Christ. Continuing the argument from where we last considered it, Taylor says, “The alleged moral difficulty only arises when we go on needlessly to complicate

the problem by the assumption that a God of infinite wisdom and goodness penalizes His creatures for not possessing what He has not seen fit to bestow on them; and this assumption, we may fairly say, is obsolete in any form of historical religion which is a live option tot educated Europeans today.”⁶ In a note on this Taylor says that he knows of no Christian communion that teaches that the heathen are lost unless they hear of the gospel. Now Taylor ought to be aware of the fact that he is stating the whole problem in an unfair way as far as the solution offered by the orthodox Christian position is concerned. According to Christian teaching God is not punishing creatures simply for what he has not been pleased to give them. According to Christian teaching God gave to generic man just what he needed. The heathen are therefore, as Paul teaches, not innocent victims of circumstances but haters of God. If this interpretation of the matter is to be rejected it ought to be rejected for good and weighty reasons since the matter is of such infinite importance. It will not do to dispose of the matter by saying that it is no longer a live option for educated people. That may be true, but it may also be true that it ought to be a live option for uneducated and educated alike. The only way in which the Pauline interpretation could be rejected would be to show that the whole doctrine of the interrelationship of the human race is not a fact that is based upon the plan of God. It cannot be assumed to be wrong at the outset of the argument.

Summing up our discussion of the matter of the object of knowledge as far as the starting point is concerned, we enumerate the following points of importance:

A. We may start our process of acquiring knowledge and of discussing whether we have true knowledge with any “fact.” But this is only the immediate or proximate starting point. The real difficulty begins with the question of an ultimate starting point.

1. Here the question is as to what we mean by the existence or denotation of any “fact.” It will not do to take for granted that the term existence can intelligibly be applied to any “fact” if that “fact” is thought of as separated from God. That is just the one point at issue.

2. In the second place, the question of connotation must come up here. Again, it will not do to take for granted that the connotation of a “fact” can be established apart from any reference to God.

The whole contention of the Christian theistic position is that what is called the subject-object relation, that is, the possibility of my having knowledge of any object whatsoever, is unintelligible except upon the presupposition that every subject of knowledge, since subjects are from this point of view also objects, owes its existence and its connotation, in the last analysis, to God. Hence it will not do for antitheists to begin their whole process of reasoning upon the assumption of the falsity of the theistic position. The very contention of theism is that a fact, to be known truly, must be known as a theistic fact. Hence it is manifestly illogical and unfair for the opponents of this position to begin by assuming that facts can be known as antitheistic facts.

B. A similar argument holds with respect to the relation of Scripture to true knowledge. Christian theism holds that without the light of Scripture no fact can be known truly. Hence it will not do for our opponents to throw out this contention at the outset as something which is not a “live option” to an educated person. The argument for

⁶ *Op. cit.*, Series 2, p. 54.

the necessity of Scripture, we have seen, is theistic in the sense that a true theism stands or falls with the position given to Scripture.

C. The second main question considered was the object-object relation. It is the question of nature and history. The contention of Christian theism is that there must be laws in nature and in history, but that these laws have no meaning except upon the presupposition of God that furnishes the binding cement for all the facts of spatial-temporal experience. Accordingly, it will not do for our opponents to assume that nature and history exist and operate independently of God.

Chapter 11: The Starting Point Of Christian Theistic Epistemology: B. The Subject Of Knowledge: Extreme Antitheism

Essentially the same questions that came up with respect to the object of knowledge reappear when the subject of knowledge is to be discussed. There is once more the question of the existence and connotation, there is once more the question of error. Yet there are particular aspects of these questions that demand a separate discussion.

In the first place we would note again the difference between a proximate and an ultimate starting point. This point is of particular importance here because it is even more frequently when the subject of knowledge is discussed than when the object of knowledge is discussed that these two intermingle. And there is in this case a special reason why people have often been deceived. This reason is that some of the outstanding advocates of the Christian theism have begun their researches by a careful analysis of the self. Perhaps the instance that comes to mind first is also the most striking. Augustine's writings in general, and his confessions in particular, abound not only in profound psychological observations but seem to base the argument for the existence of God upon a linear inference from the phenomenon of the soul-life. Accordingly, some writers on philosophy have not sensed the great dissimilarity between Augustine's argument and Descartes' argument. Yet, as was pointed out in the chapter on Augustine, there was in reality as much difference between them as there is between theism and antitheism. But since Augustine himself did not make this fully clear, it is no great wonder that those who from the nature of their whole position can allow for univocal reasoning only should not have observed the difference. The great difference may be expressed by saying that Augustine, Calvin and others of the most consistent theists have taken the human self and reasoned from it as from a proximate starting point, while Descartes and the whole antitheistic tradition in general has reasoned from the self as from an ultimate starting point.

We feel that if this distinction is kept in mind, a more proper emphasis may be given to the argument about the priority and the mutual dependence or independence of the subject and the object of knowledge. In the case of Scottish Realism there is, to say the least, an undue emphasis given to the attempt to establish a realism or independence of the object over against the subject in order to escape the subjective Idealism of Berkeley. Now this question is not devoid of importance. But its importance must be found in the fact that if subjective Idealism cuts the subject loose from the object of knowledge or denies the existence of anything beyond itself, it must, by the same argument, also cut itself loose from God. In other words, subjective Idealism is a particular manifestation of the antitheistic tradition which in ever varying forms asserts the independence of man in opposition to God.

What we are most concerned about in this chapter is whether men take the human self as a proximate or as an ultimate starting point.

It should be noted in passing too that it is in modern philosophy, in distinction from ancient philosophy, that the subject of knowledge is emphasized instead of the object of knowledge. Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* have emphasized the subjective approach to the question of philosophy. Add to this point the fact that it was not really till modern times that the science of psychology has come forth with prodigious claims about being the best road to an understanding of reality, and it will be seen that when we discuss the question of the subject of knowledge we are in the midst of the fray and should be aware of the possible consequences of our every step.

For these reasons the plain man may rejoice in the fact that though there is a veritable jungle of "facts" that are offered by both modern epistemology and psychology, there is really only one simple issue that must be faced everywhere. This point is that mentioned before: Is the human self taken as a proximate or as an ultimate starting point?

But though the issue is simple in itself, this does not mean that it is always easy to detect whether one uses the self merely as a proximate or also as an ultimate starting point. There are many and subtle ways in which men try to introduce, even at the beginning of their discussion, conceptions about the self that cannot legitimately be held except after long and careful argument.

Our question then in this chapter is more particularly whether men should be permitted to begin a course of reasoning on the human self from the basis of the assumption that takes the human self for granted as the ultimate subject of knowledge.

The basic contention of Christian theism with respect to the self is that God is the ultimate subject of knowledge. Man is and can be a subject of knowledge in a derived sense because God is the subject of knowledge in the absolute sense. Theologically expressed, we say that man's knowledge is true because man has been created in the image of God. And for this reason too there can be no dispute about the relative priority of the intellect and the feeling of man. Since the personality of God is a complete unity, so also the personality of man is a unity.

Our contention is that what antitheism has done in all of its history is simply to take for granted that this position cannot be true. It has simply dichotomized the human race into those that have and those that have no intelligence, and has said that the theistic position is no longer a "live option" for educated people today.

We can do no more than indicate a few of the most outstanding forms of this method of procedure.

Our historical survey has attempted to lay the finger upon this sore spot of antitheistic thinking. We have seen that in the case of Plato it was, in the last analysis, the human individual that was put forth as the standard of truth. In modern times Descartes emphasized this very point. In Kant we have the most formidable modern expression of this line of thought. He clinches this thing on modern philosophy and theology.

It is well to pause at this juncture to ask what modern thought has meant by the term subjective. It is historically true that Kant's position was directed against the subjective Idealism that preceded him. It is often said that Kant took the old subject and the old object of knowledge, about which Empiricism and Rationalism fought, into a new subject, the subject of the transcendental ego. And then it is sometimes added that Kant's own position may once more be called subjective because he did not include the noumenal world in his new subject. From this point of view true objectivity is not

reached until Hegelianism included into one great thought system the whole of reality. It was thus that "objective Idealism" was born. For our purposes, it is important to note that we must call any system of thought subjective if it sets up human thought or the human consciousness as the ultimate standard of truth. That is the exact point of difference between theism and antitheism on this score.

It has become quite the vogue to try to escape the scepticism involved in Kant's criticism of the traditional theistic arguments by saying that the aspects of feeling have as much significance as the aspect of intellect. In other words, the unity of personality has been emphasized in modern times and it is thought that therewith room is made for faith. It should be noted, however, that it makes no difference, as far as the issue between theism and antitheism is concerned, whether one depends chiefly upon the human emotions or upon the intellect as a final starting point and standard. Anything human, if it is made the ultimate standard, is clearly antitheistic.

Thus Schleiermacher, the "father of modern theology," bases his whole theology upon a subjective approach of the feeling of dependence.

Thus Ritschl separates science and religion in order to make religion free from the attacks of historical investigation. But the main thing to observe about Ritschl is not that he has separated the human subject from historic fact. This is highly important, to be sure, but it is highly important because by doing: this he also separated the human subject from God. In other words, Ritschl's particular form of subjectivism is sometimes identified with subjectivism as such. It should therefore be kept in mind that one can lay ever so much emphasis upon historical investigation and think truth to be dependent upon history and be as much of a subjectivist, when the large question of theism and antitheism is being discussed, as Ritschl himself.

When writers speak of experience this experience may first of all be contrasted with the intellect. It is thus that some theologians have been writing of it in order to escape the intellectual strictures of Kant. And it is thus that such scientists as J. Arthur Thomson, James Jeans, and Eddington speak of it in order to bring comfort to those who wish to accept the authority of the scientist as final and yet would like to retain a little room for religion. According to these scientists it is possible to have a complete intellectual agnosticism as advocated by Jeans at the conclusion of his book *The Mysterious Universe*, and still retain one's religion intact.

In the second place, when writers talk of experience, they may mean independence of history. Thus the "value judgments" of Ritschl that have become so popular in American pragmatic theology seek to retain the validity of religious experience in independence of biblical criticism. True, Ritschl does want to attach some significance to history, but he wishes, in the last analysis, to retain the independence of the religious subject over against anything that may have occurred in the "objective" sphere.

In the third place, what many writers of more recent times mean by experience is something that does not exclude reference to the intellect, to the object, and to history. What is meant by experience today is the accumulation of the reactions of the human race to the universe as it is. By that we mean that the Biologism of John Dewey has influenced many writers on theology, so that they do not separate the objective and the subjective as was formerly done, but take the knowledge relation as one of the ordinary functions of human life. One can, for instance, observe that the most ardent advocates of experience as the standard of religious truth are, at the same time, interested in historical

investigation. In other words, the whole evolutionary process must be traced in order to understand the present day experience of the race. Similarly too, the distinction between intellect and experience is wiped out. The intellect is now included in the term experience. And the very rigidity of the intellect that the earlier advocates of experience feared, and because of which they excluded it from the term experience itself, is taken away by once more introducing the concept of development. History is invoked in order to show us that what now appears as the hard bones of the intellect once was as flexible as flesh itself. In other words, as a child's bones are flexible at first but become less flexible with age, so also what our fathers considered nothing more than postulates we consider to be petrified axioms.¹

We may see from these varying meanings of the term experience what the assumption of the human self as an ultimate starting point must lead to. It leads to a complete relativism in epistemology and metaphysics. It is impossible to retain the independence of the individual consciousness for long in opposition to the "object" of knowledge. If the self is to be truly independent, reality must be made subject to the constructive function of the self, or the self must be made a part of the object of knowledge. The whole knowledge relation between subject and object of knowledge must be transacted without any reference to God if either the subject or the object of knowledge is thought of as existing by itself to begin with. Then too, it is impossible long to maintain the independence of the individual in opposition to the race and the history of the race. The individual man's knowledge depends upon the knowledge the race has gained. If then the individual's knowledge is to be based upon an independent starting point, it cannot be otherwise than that the whole of human history and the whole of temporal reality exist independently of God. And it is because the Pragmatic philosophers and theologians have seen the force of this that they have not been backward in proclaiming that not only does the object of knowledge exist in independence of God, but the subject of knowledge contributes the whole of the interpretative element of experience. But this also proves that instead of starting with the assumption that the human mind, whether individually or collectively conceived, can be the ultimate starting point of knowledge, the Pragmatic theologian should have given reasons for his procedure.

It may serve a useful purpose to indicate where one may find definite examples of the assumption of the individual consciousness of man as the ultimate starting point of epistemology. One can, to begin with, mention the fact that in many leading universities theology has been replaced by anthropology. Of course the name theology is retained, but the connotation of the term is changed. Instead of holding that theology studies the actual revelation of God to man, it is said that theology must study what man has thought about God. The assumption underlying this conception of theology clearly is that the human mind was independent of God to begin with.

More definitely one may see that the usual method employed by the various schools of the philosophy and psychology of religion assume that the origin of the human consciousness had nothing to do with God. It is a common thing to see men enter upon the investigation of the phenomenon of religion without asking the question whether or not religion can originate from the non-religious but by simply assuming that it can.

¹ cf. F. C. S. Schiller, "Axioms as Postulates," in the book, *Personal Idealism*.

Perhaps the most extreme form of this antitheistic assumption appeared some years ago when it was the fashion to look for religion in the animal world. According to this view it is possible to have religion without having either self-consciousness or God-consciousness. According to this view too, man may be the object of the religious transaction as well as the subject. Thus God is reduced to nothing more than a symbol of the next higher empirical category of spatial-temporal existence.

Thus the explanation of the origin of religion given by F. B. Taylor in his book *Primitive Culture*, namely, animism, and the explanation given by H. Spencer in his book *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, namely, ancestor worship, take for granted that the religious transaction can take place without any reference to God.

The views of M. Muller and Schleiermacher resemble one another in that they both maintain that it is of no consequence whether one believes in a personal God or not as far as religion is concerned.² Our criticism at this point is not that this position is untenable, but that the writers should have justified their belief that it is tenable. This they failed to do. They no doubt do try to justify their position to some extent, but not at the outset of their investigation where, more than anywhere else, it needs justification.

The chief schools of philosophy which furnish the foundation for the work that theologians have done in the field of the philosophy of religion may perhaps be classified as follows:

There is first the openly pragmatic school of thinkers. We use the term pragmatic here in a loose sense in order to include not only the leaders of the school of Pragmatism such as F. C. S. Schiller, James, and Dewey, but all the advocates of the open universe, whatever their specific name. As such we may mention the philosophers of evolution such as Henri Bergson (*Creative Evolution*), S. Alexander (*Space, Time and Deity*), C. Lloyd Morgan (*Emergent Evolution*), R. Wood Sellars (*Evolutionary Naturalism: Principles and Problems of Philosophy*) and others. William James is of special importance in this connection because he writes a book that deals more directly with religious experiences (*Varieties of Religious Experience*). The assumption throughout this book is that religion can really function no matter what its object. In general we can characterize these writers by saying that they openly avow the self-sufficiency of temporal categories and of man's power to interpret reality for himself.

In opposition to the first group mentioned, there is a second group that emphasizes logic rather than time. We call attention to three men of great ingenuity here.

Bertrand Russell is first a great mathematician, and secondly a brilliant philosopher. In his works, *Problems of Philosophy* and *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, there seems to be a desperate effort to find an object of knowledge that shall contain no interpretative material at all, and therefore be altogether given. B. Bosanquet, in criticizing this effort of Russell says: "The hunt for the psychologically primitive is the root of all evil."³ By saying this, Bosanquet means that Russell tried to get at something within human experience that should be absolutely given and therefore objective. Bosanquet criticizes

² "Ob man sich dagegen dies Eine unedliche Wesen als ein personales oder unpersonliches vorstelle ist nach Schleiermacher von untergeordneter Bedeutung; mit beiden Vorstellungen kann die gleiche Innigkeit des religiösen Gefühls verbunden sein." O. Pfleiderer, *Geschichte der Religionsphilosophie*, Vol. 1, p. 307.

³ *Phil. Rev.* 1915: review of Russell's *Our Knowledge of the External World*.

Russell's view because it seeks one aspect of human experience as the only spot where one reaches reality without an intermixture of interpretation. But whatever we may find to be "the psychological primitive," as long as it seeks objectivity by a direct contact with the universe without an equally and more fundamental contact with God, it is thoroughly antitheistic.

On the other hand, Russell as a mathematician is greatly interested in the conception of law, and assumes that law exists in total independence of God. Thus the whole knowledge transaction is analyzed without so much as asking the question whether knowledge is possible without God.⁴

As the chief representative of this second type of thinking, we mention J. E. McTaggart. McTaggart contends that time is unreal. This corresponds roughly to the second position of Plato in which he tried to interpret the whole of reality by an exclusive reference to the Ideal world. It is this motif that McTaggart has worked out more fully than anyone else.⁵

McTaggart has not hesitated to draw the conclusion which, as has been pointed out, it is necessary to draw once one places himself upon this position, namely, that the whole of reality is like a democratic society in which God can at most be a logical universal that binds together equally ultimate particulars. Thus every individual human being is made as original as God.

McTaggart considers his position to be the logical conclusion of the general Idealistic theory of judgment. We cannot now discuss this claim in detail. Suffice it to recall that the heart of the Idealistic theory of judgment may be said to be an insistence on the fact that in every judgment unity and difference must be equally fundamental, and that the difference of which mention is made be identified with the existence of a so-called spatial-temporal world. In order then to make difference as fundamental as unity, McTaggart does not hesitate to say that as far as the knowledge relation is concerned it is necessary to think of man as being as eternal as God.

McTaggart's claim has helped to clarify the atmosphere not a little. It is no longer as easy as it used to be for Idealists to coil up underneath ambiguities in order to continue to appear theistic. They are now before a clear-cut alternative. There are two ways open for them. There is the way of the Pragmatist for whom time reality is quite able to interpret itself without any reference to anything eternal. This would seem to be the most natural and the most logical road for them to take, because it is not easy to do away with the reality of time as McTaggart has tried to do away with it. Yet if they hesitate to go with the Pragmatist they can try to follow the arduous path opened up to them by McTaggart.

The third man we would speak of briefly here is F. H. Bradley. In his essay *Appearance and Reality*, Bradley contends that the whole world of appearance is full of contradiction and therefore cannot be interpreted as being rational. Bradley means that

⁴ cf. B. Russell, *Problems of Philosophy and Scientific Method in Philosophy*. For a criticism of Russell's position, see *Mind*, 1920, p. 414; *International Journal of Ethics*, Jan. 1915, criticism by Broad; *Journal of Phil. Psych. and Sc. Method*, August 19, 1915, criticism by Theodore de Laguna; J. B. Pratt, *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion*.

⁵ *Mind*. N.S.V. 2, 1893, p. 490; *Ibid.*, 1894, p. 190; *Mind*. N.S. 17, 1908, p. 457, and especially the two-volume work *The Nature of Existence*. A. E. Taylor has criticized McTaggart's notion in his work *The Faith of A Moralist*, Vol. 1, p. 112ff.

the human mind cannot see exhaustively, through spatial-temporal reality. He assumes that if the human mind cannot understand the nature of reality exhaustively, it cannot be understood. True, Bradley tells us that “somehow” the contradictions that we see may not be found in the absolute. But this very “somehow” of Bradley’s shows that for him God comes in as a pious afterthought. In Bradley’s thought the conception of God has no functional significance for human knowledge. The human mind is thought of as functioning, though in a negative fashion, upon the world of appearance whether or not God exists. In this respect Bradley resembles Kant. Both have finished the job of knowing as far as the phenomenal world is concerned without reference to God. God is relegated to some vague noumenal realm that forms a sort of marginal twilight addition to the phenomenal real. The fact that according to Kant it is possible, and according to Bradley it is not possible, to have rational knowledge of the world of appearance is not of importance in this connection. The important thing is that both maintain that whatever the human mind says about phenomenal reality it can and does say without reference to God.

In his two-volume work on logic Bradley develops the same view. In this work he develops the Idealistic conception of logic as already adverted to in the case of McTaggart. Bradley points out that analysis and synthesis must be equally fundamental in every predication.⁶ Otherwise expressed, Bradley says that unity and difference must be equally fundamental. Yet he realizes that there is great difficulty in maintaining this contention because it seems that in a temporal world there are always new facts appearing that seem to have no relation to the facts that have preceded them. He says: “This twofold nature of Reality by which it slides away from itself in our distinction, so as there to become a predicate the while all the time it retains in itself, as an ultimate subject, every quality we loosen from and relate to it is, if you please inexplicable.”⁷ So instead of at least considering the historical position of Christian theism that the reason why reality seems for us to have these mutually exclusive characteristics is that we are finite and that, if our knowledge is to have any significance at all it must therefore be based upon the conception of God in whom unity and difference are harmonized, Bradley takes for granted that if unity and difference cannot be harmonized by us it may be said without further qualification that the problem is inexplicable. For Bradley, the ultimate test of truth is what the finite mind can or cannot say about anything. And this is the point in dispute between theism and antitheism.

Joachim, in his book *The Nature of Truth*, in this respect resembles Bradley. After trying his best to see if it is possible to express the nature of reality in exclusively human categories, he tells us that he has “reason to think that there is a fundamental opposition of some kind at the very heart of things.” Again it is taken for granted that if there seems to be fundamental opposition in the heart of things for man there must also exist this fundamental opposition for God.

We now look at some of the writers of a third group of philosophers. This group is more difficult to examine than the first or the second group. In the case of the first group several writers did not hesitate to say outright that they have no need of God for an interpretation of the knowledge transaction. They deem man, though temporally conditioned, quite able to take care of the whole matter. The second group too are willing

⁶ cf. 1, p. 252 ff.; 2, p. 471 ff., 662 ff., 629 ff.

⁷ *Logic*, 2, 620.

to remain in a sceptic attitude if man's knowledge does not suffice for itself. But the group we now discuss (a) do not think that the temporal mind is in itself sufficient, and (b) do not seek to eternize the temporal mind and are not ready to remain in the position of scepticism. They frankly acknowledge the need of God. They try to connect the mind of man and the mind of God. And yet, in acknowledging their need of God, they have not really acknowledged their need of God, and in seeking after God they have not really sought after him. To show this, is a thankless piece of work. In his recent humorous book *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion*, J. B. Pratt presents "Dr. Idealist" as speaking to Socrates and refusing to take Plato at his own word even if he should return from Limbo and say that he was a dualist. Says Dr. Idealist, "My dear Socrates, if a person should come to me representing himself to be Plato and at the same time confessing himself a Dualist, I should thereby know that he was not Plato."⁸ Similarly it will be our task to indicate that often a man may say that he is a theist in the sense that he is willing to admit that the knowledge function of man cannot operate unless God exists, but that he is not really a theist. There is nothing unfair about this. A jury does not take everybody at his word and is not ridiculed because it does not. A jury would be ridiculed if it did take everyone at his word.

The thing that strikes us most of all perhaps when we read writers of the Idealist school is that they not only admit their heed of God, but that they seem to profess a greater need of God than the Christian theist does. Expressed in terms of our comparison between a proximate and an ultimate starting point, it would seem that they, so far from making man the ultimate starting point of knowledge, are not even willing to make him the proximate starting point of knowledge.

This tendency among Idealists to stress the necessity of the existence of God reveals itself in a general acosmic strain. We have observed this in the case of Bradley. For him nothing that is temporal can have reality, or at least genuine reality. The same tendency may be observed in Bosanquet. Bosanquet's whole logic seems to be opposed to the conception of the Pragmatic philosophers that reality is producing essentially new things. One of his most basic contentions is that knowledge requires system, and that there could be no system if reality were nothing but a disconnected series of events. To say anything about anything, the whole of reality must be taken into consideration. "Thus it follows from the nature of implication that every inference involves a judgment based upon the whole of reality, though referring only to a partial system which need not even be actual."⁹ When Bosanquet reasons thus against such men as the Pragmatists and the Italian Idealists, he seems to introduce a sort of gradation into reality. Temporal reality seems to be less real than eternal reality. Bosanquet says we must interpret the lower aspects of reality in terms of the higher. Thus it would seem at first sight that Bosanquet cannot be classed with those who have taken the human mind as the ultimate starting point.

Bosanquet maintains that the human mind itself is nothing independent but that it is only a focus of the Absolute. Thus it seems that on the very question of the existence of the individual human personality, Bosanquet is more theistic than the theist. Bosanquet is strongly opposed to ascribing any independent existence to finite personality. And not only is this the case with the existence of finite personality, but also with the

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁹ *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 55.

interpretative powers of man. Here we reach the crux of the matter. Bosanquet says that such predications as we apply to reality as we know it cannot be applied to absolute reality because in the case of God there cannot be the limitations to which we are subject. Take for example the conception of purpose. Our conception of purpose is, to a large extent, colored by the idea of opposition that we meet. We seek to realize purposes in spite of obstacles. But such, says Bosanquet, cannot be the case with God. Accordingly, we cannot apply the concept of purpose to God. We cannot say that God purposed certain things with respect to the universe.¹⁰ Thus it seems as though on this point Bosanquet is even more insistent than we have been. He very definitely maintains that the interpretation of man is not only far from ultimate, but taken by itself is quite valueless.

The point is of such great importance that we must indicate still further that there thus appears to be complete harmony in Bosanquet's conception of the existence of man and his interpretation of man. It appears that both must be destroyed before we can have true reality and truth. In his book *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* he says that man must completely deny himself before he can come in contact with the truth.¹¹ In this respect Bosanquet agrees with Bradley who expressed the same sentiment by saying, "The unit makes no insistence on its finite or isolable character. It looks, as in religion, from itself and not to itself, and asks nothing better than to be lost in the whole, which is at the same time its own best."¹² Not till the individual loses interest in himself does he feel "the nisus toward the whole." In the same way Bosanquet demands that the human being shall first deny his own categories of interpretations before he can be in contact with absolute or divine categories of interpretation. How then is it possible with any show of reason to maintain that Bosanquet must be classed among those who assume that man's mind is the ultimate starting point?

The first main consideration that must be thought of in this connection is that the whole of Bosanquet's argument against the Pragmatist position must be interpreted in the light of his equally fundamental contention that though the temporal universe is not ultimate in one sense, it is ultimate in another sense. Bosanquet discusses all the problems of philosophy with deepest insight when he is discussing logic. And it is in his logic that we are told that though it is true that analysis must be basic to all knowledge, it is equally true that synthesis is basic to all knowledge. Under pressure of realistic and pragmatic criticism he did not hesitate to say that reality is "inherently synthetic," so that no change from itself is needed at all to account for differences which are novel and creative, with perfect continuity."¹³ In this insistence that the whole of reality is essentially synthetic, Bosanquet has not only given back to the temporal world the reality that he seemed to have denied it. He has done much more than that. By speaking of Reality without making a distinction between eternal and temporal reality and then saying of this Reality that it is inherently synthetic, he has virtually brought the eternal down to the temporal.

The real reason why the completely antitheistic nature of Bosanquet's thought is not always recognized is the fact that there is an ambiguity at the core of his thinking which it is not easy to observe. It is therefore well to regard it carefully.

¹⁰ *The Principle of Individuality and Value*, Lect. 4, p. 122 ff.

¹¹ p. 153 ff.

¹² F. H. Bradley, *Mind*. N.S.V. 19, p. 154.

¹³ *Phil. Rev.* V. 32, 1923, p. 596.

The source of the ambiguity lies in his attempt to analyze the nature of the judgment in a purely univocal fashion. He speaks of the judgment and takes for granted, without critical analysis, that the judgment must reveal the same attributes in the same way in God and in man. This point is of vital importance when the question of method is discussed, but here we indicate the fact in order to bring out the idea that Bosanquet has therewith assumed that man is as ultimate as God. If man were not as ultimate as God, it would not do to proceed as though there were no difference between the two.

Because of this fundamental assumption Bosanquet proceeds to speak of Reality and of the Absolute and of Being in general. The result, naturally, is that he assumes with respect to these subjects that it is not necessary to ask whether it is possible to attribute predicates to them indiscriminately. He assumes that all predication must center directly upon the one mighty subject of Reality or Being or Absolute. In other words he assumes that Reality or Being or the Absolute is the one and only subject of predication. Human personalities are spoken of as being *foci* of the Absolute or mere connections of content. The meaning of the word Reality that most accords with Bosanquet's fundamental contention in logic is that it is the Whole. Whatever ideas as a matter of fact exist, Bosanquet would include in the subject of predication. To it, therefore, must be ascribed somehow evil and good and indifferent predication.

We emphasize this point that the Whole is for Bosanquet the real subject of predication because it can be clearly seen from it how centrally his philosophy strikes at the Christian theistic position. It does away at one stroke with the difference between the eternal and the temporal, God and man. It assumes that unity and difference are not found in the bosom of the Trinity, but in the bosom of the whole of which the temporal universe is already a part.

With respect to the sense world, Bosanquet's position brings us back to the exact place where Plato left us, namely, that it must be taken for granted as being undervived. Like Plato, Bosanquet realizes the difficulties involved in his position and tries to remedy them to some extent by seeking to introduce the gradation motif that Plato had also introduced. Plato called time a moving image of eternity. He was not willing to cede to it as much reality as to eternity itself. Similarly Bosanquet speaks of the lower and the higher aspects of reality. At times he emphasizes this point very much. We have noted the acosmic strain in his thinking. He sometimes speaks of the Absolute as the Beyond. And in correspondence with this he speaks of the things of the time world as though they must be considered as of no value at all. A supreme instance of this is in his contention that the human self must be wholly destroyed in order that the Absolute may have its way in it. But this acosmic strain should not be interpreted as due to anything but an unwilling recognition of the failure of the main contention of his system of thought. It is but natural that anyone who makes the Whole the direct subject of every predication should devise some ways and means by which to avert something of the obvious difficulties that would seek to assert themselves. It is all too clear that we cannot well attribute the predicates white and black to the same immediate subject without reducing human speech to a meaningless series of vocables. Plato felt this difficulty when he did not know what to do with the Ideas of mud and hair and filth. Similarly, Bosanquet has constantly spoken of the Absolute as the ultimate subject of all predication. For the same reason he has spoken of the Absolute as the Beyond. But it should be carefully noted that Bosanquet has therewith not really escaped any of the difficulties involved in his logic. His Beyond and

his ultimate subject of predication always remain an aspect of the whole of Reality. Never, in any of his writings, is the Beyond presented as existing by itself in total independence of the world of sense. The world of sense always remains as the other aspect of the same Whole of Reality. Reality may be very much condensed, so to speak, at the upper end, and be very much rarified at the nether end, but the one never exists without the other.

Bosanquet seeks to represent the Absolute as the place and source of unity, and the sense world as the source of difference in logic. For Bosanquet the temporal is the one and only source of ultimate differentiation. This is quite the opposite of the Christian theistic conception which seeks the ultimate source of differentiation in the persons of the eternal Trinity. No more fundamental difference is conceivable. It hits the heart of the difference between theism and antitheism.

It may be objected that Christian theism too contends that the ultimate subject of every predication is God, because it holds that all things that happen in the temporal realm are related to the counsel of God, and that therefore in this respect Christian theism and the position of Bosanquet would seem to be at one. But it should be observed that the identity is apparent only. Of the Idealist position, it cannot be said that all things historical happen in relation to the counsel of God. It is basic to the whole position that Reality is inherently synthetic as well as inherently analytic. Thus Idealism has not only an open universe, but an open God. Or we may first include the term God in the term Universe or Reality and then say of the Whole reality that it is open. From this we may fairly conclude that Bosanquet cannot make God the ultimate subject of predication. Bosanquet's God is not yet full grown, and what is more, never will be full grown as long as time endures, because time brings absolutely new additions. Idealists would, of course, object at this point that this is not a fair contention because the very foundation of Idealism is that nothing absolutely new happens or that the so-called new is really related to the old. But this is exactly the point also for our contention that Idealism is not entitled to maintaining that nothing absolutely new occurs, because the unity which it seeks to supply is no real unity inasmuch as it is itself inherently temporal.

And if it is true that for Bosanquet the temporal world is underived and is always an aspect of the eternal world, as the eternal world is an aspect of the temporal world, it follows that we must interpret the questions of the existence and the interpretative powers of the human mind in its relation to the existence and the interpretative powers of the divine mind in the light of this general correlativity.

In his book *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, Bosanquet contends that the individual must be completely denied in order to realize its "nisus toward the whole."¹⁴ We noticed that this is an evidence of the general acosmic strain in Bosanquet's thought. But now that we have learned to interpret this whole acosmic strain, not as an evidence of theism but as itself an evidence of antitheism, we also see that this very insistence of Bosanquet on the individual's annihilation is itself an evidence of an assumed ultimacy for the human mind. It was at most an attempt to do what McTaggart has so thoroughly done, that is, to take the human mind up into the divine mind. And if he had been successful in this man would still be at the least as ultimate as God. There would at most be a correlativity between God and man. It may be said that Bosanquet cannot be held to

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 153 ff.

have equated man with God because he has altogether destroyed man. We reply that if it be contended that Bosanquet has totally destroyed man's individuality, he has done so by identifying man with God and finding his reality in God. And if anything, this tells more directly against his position than to say that he has maintained a sort of independence for man. To equate man with God or to identify man with God has exactly the same result as far as epistemology is concerned. In each case God is dethroned from the unique place he occupies in theistic thought.

Most clearly and significantly does this appear if, in conclusion, we discuss the matter of interpretation. We have seen that Bosanquet, perhaps more than any one of the Idealists, has maintained that reality must be interpreted in eternal and not in temporal categories. His insistence on this point corresponds to his insistence that the human individual does not exist apart from the Absolute. But as in that case so in this, we do not strike the heart of his conception of interpretation unless we notice that however much Bosanquet seems to insist that reality must be interpreted in terms of the Absolute, it is also true that man is considered to be a part of this Absolute, and therefore entitled to a vote in the matter. This appears especially in the assumption, already alluded to, namely, that he speaks constantly of thought without asking whether it is necessary to make a distinction between divine and human thought. He takes for granted that human thought is ultimate thought. For that reason it is not possible for Bosanquet to say that God or the Absolute is the ultimate subject of every predication. He cannot do this since he identifies God with the Whole, because in that case the whole of the whole is not in yet. But neither can he do it if he identifies God with the Beyond, because even in that case the sense world must be taken into consideration as an underived something to which predicates of a certain sort must be applied, or from which predicates may at least be thought of as originating.

Summing up the discussion, we would call special attention to the fact that in whatever way one is pleased to interpret the philosophy of Bosanquet, whether in a more pantheistic or in a more general theistic fashion, it remains a fact that for Bosanquet man is not an absolutely derived being and for that reason does not need to and cannot recognize God as the highest category of interpretation. He may, of course, use God as a symbol for what he himself, in independence of God, has thought of as being the chief characteristic of Reality, but God is not for him the ultimate interpreter of Reality. Original reality is for him a larger concept than God. God is not the creator of the universe but is an aspect of the universe. At most he can help man to interpret the universe; he cannot interpret to man in an absolute fashion.

Again the important thing to remember is that this position of Bosanquet is not taken because of any necessity of logic, unless it be a necessity of logic to begin with the assumption of the greater ultimacy of the universe than of God. That Bosanquet has assumed an antitheistic starting point is evident especially from the fact that he never as much as questions the propriety of beginning the examination of a judgment by taking for granted that all thought is essentially equally ultimate. He takes for granted that the ideas of mud and hair and filth are as fundamental as the Ideas of good. In this respect he has not advanced upon the Platonic philosophy. By this assumption he has taken for granted that there is no absolute and that there can be no absolute. If one starts his investigation of any object with the assumption of complete correlativity between God and man, not all

the king's horses and all the king's men will bring one to the position of theism. It is then a foregone conclusion that no absolute will be found.

Chapter 12: The Starting Point Of Christian Theistic Epistemology: C. The Subject Of Knowledge: Milder Antitheism

We have given much time to a discussion of Bosanquet's position because of his controlling influence in later Idealist circles, and because of the fact that his conception of logic underlies much of the later methods of Idealists. Moreover, the acosmic strain in his thinking brings with it a peculiar temptation to think of Bosanquet as one who has given too little instead of too much power to the human mind.

Our investigation of Bosanquet's position, and especially our placing of the acosmic strain in his thinking in the light of the whole of his philosophy, now enables us to estimate aright the reaction that followed against Bosanquet in Idealist circles. This reaction was directed largely against this acosmic strain of his thought. It was a renewed emphasis upon the originality and ultimacy of the human individual against the encroachments upon it by the Absolute of Bosanquet. But we have seen that Bosanquet's Absolute did not really encroach upon the human mind. If anything, it took the human mind unto itself and gave it a constant place at its table as David did with Mephibosheth. This reaction could not be in the interest of giving the human mind more originality than it had in Bosanquet's philosophy. The human mind could not be given more originality than he had given it. He had made it absolute, and more than that no one could do. The only reaction that was possible was one that would rebel against Bosanquet's placing of the individual in too close a connection with the absolute so that he might seem to lose some of his individuality. The analogy would not be a rebellion against taxation without representation, but rebellion against representation that is too far away. The insurgents wanted not only independence, but home rule.

Then further it will be seen that the reaction against Bosanquet's position could not be in the direction of a true theism but only in the direction of something that looked like theism. This is a most significant point. It is often thought that the reaction against Bosanquet was in the interest of a greater emphasis upon a more theistic instead of a more pantheistic approach to the problems of philosophy. The falsity of this contention becomes apparent if it be recognized that an emphasis upon the human mind as the ultimate starting point in philosophy could never be anything of an approach to theism which is interested in nothing so much as in maintaining that not man, but God, is the ultimate starting point in a true epistemology. We are not contending that the reaction against Bosanquet led farther away from the theistic position because it was not really possible to get farther away. Yet in a sense it may be said that the reaction was away from theism because it was really a step in the direction of Pragmatism, which is more outspoken in its opposition to theism than is Idealism. As it is true that Modernism is not inherently any less atheistic than the A.A.A.A. Society but is less outspoken in its atheism, so it is true that Bosanquet's position is not any less antitheistic than Pragmatism, but it is less outspokenly so. And the general reaction to Bosanquet has still

more often been identified with theism than the position Of Bosanquet, so that it is all the more necessary to call attention to the fact that this general theism is as antitheistic as Pragmatism, and may even be said to be a step in the direction of Pragmatism.

The first man we mention under this general group of writers is A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. In his little book *Hegelianism and Personality*, he sounded the bugle call with which to draw men away from the house of Bosanquet. Not as though his position involved a denial of the Idealist conception of logic. At least it was not intended to be a rejection of Idealism, but of the extreme form of Idealism as advocated by Bosanquet. Pringle-Pattison did not wish to maintain that the human individual had any significance apart from the Absolute of Bosanquet, but that it should not be destroyed as Bosanquet had destroyed it. He tells us that he always has believed in the “essential relatedness” of the Absolute and man. He does not advocate a complete pluralism. What he rebelled against, he said, was the reducing of human individuals to “connections of content within the real individual to which they belong.” In his book *The Idea of God in Modern Philosophy*, he deals in the first part with the existence of the so-called world of “Appearances.” In this first part he has little or no need of making reference to the Absolute. This already shows that he has taken this world of Appearances for granted as something ultimate.

Similarly, in a symposium held before the Aristotelian Society on the subject whether individuals have substantive or only adjectival existence, Pringle-Pattison says that the individual seems to be “the only conceivable goal of divine endeavor.”¹ Again, when Bosanquet criticized his view of the individual by saying that on Pringle-Pattison’s basis one must eventually be led to an ultimate Pluralism, the latter did not hesitate to say that Bosanquet should not underestimate “the significance of numerical identity as the basal characteristic of concrete existence.”² He is willing to grant that in themselves individuals are mere abstractions, but he adds that in itself the Absolute is also an abstraction. He says that Bosanquet’s philosophy tends “to reach a formal identity by abstracting from differences on which the very character of the universe as a spiritual cosmos depends.”³

In this philosophy of Pringle-Pattison the term Reality or Being is again taken for granted not only as inclusive of God and man, but as something within which God and man are equally ultimate. If the argument were carried on upon the basis of pure logic the position just outlined would resemble that of McTaggart. In both cases God is reduced to the position of a logical Universal with no existence except in the particulars which he binds together. In *Hegelianism and Personality*, he even spoke of the “Imperviousness” of finite personality. He later saw that this way of stating the matter would lay him open to the charge that his philosophy would end in Pragmatism, and therefore modified the term. He does not want any sort of realism or empiricism because this forgets “the abstraction under which it apprehends the structure of experience.”⁴ According to Pringle-Pattison it is altogether a matter of correlativity. No more than you can think of a husband without a wife or of a wife without a husband, can you think of God without

¹ *Proceedings*, 1917–18, p. 511.

² *Idem.*, p. 512.

³ *Idem.*, p. 522.

⁴ *Proceedings*, 1917–18, p. 484.

man and of man without God. In the field of logic it may then be said that God furnishes the unity and man furnishes the difference.

To this it should be added that those who furnish the difference are temporal beings. It is true that this consideration does not add anything to the inherently antitheistic character of Pringle-Pattison's or any other man's philosophy. Even if the reality of time be denied and man is elevated into eternity itself and put on the level with God, the antitheism is complete. Such a logical correlativity, no less than the temporal correlativity of the Pragmatist, attacks the fundamental contention of theism which says that God is not a correlative to man but has completely independent existence. Yet it is true that when men take the reality of time for granted and take mankind as we see it about us and make it metaphysically as ultimate as God, the completeness of the rejection of the theistic position is still more clearly patent than it is in such logical systems as that of McTaggart. In the latter case there would at least seem to be some meaning in the claim that thus reality is interpreted in exclusively eternal categories. And because we have said that only a true theism really interprets reality in exclusively eternal categories, it might seem as though McTaggart's position were theistic. But this plausibility is altogether excluded in the case of Pringle-Pattison. He makes no such claim of eternity for man as McTaggart does. He frankly equalizes the eternal and the temporal. As Bosanquet said that Reality must be essentially analytic, and at the same time said that it must be essentially synthetic, so Pringle-Pattison says that Concrete Existence, which is only another word for Reality, must be essentially eternal and essentially temporal. And as Bosanquet thought that his demand of an equality of analysis and synthesis was so much a matter of fact that it needed not to be argued but should be taken for granted, so also Pringle-Pattison simply took for granted that the human individual is a charter member of the Universe. Thus the whole antitheistic position is once more taken for granted instead of proved.

We pause here to point out that the assumption of the human consciousness as the ultimate starting point of epistemology is also made by those who have made it their business to engage in the study of the philosophy and history of religion and morality from an Idealist viewpoint. It goes without saying that Pragmatic philosophers such as William James take for granted at the outset of their investigations that there is no absolute religion, as they take for granted that there is no absolute God. This is implied, for instance, in the method of James' *Varieties of Religious Experience*, and in James Bisset Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*, when they proceed as though it is an obvious fact that by an exclusively empirical study of psychology it is possible to ascertain what the true nature of religion is. But in the case of Idealists it would seem fair to say that if they were really taking their Absolute seriously they would also maintain philosophically that there must be an absolute religion, and that this would be an admitted "bias" which they would carry with them to Africa or Australia. When we find therefore that the Idealist makes every effort to prove that he is unbiased in his approach to the questions of the psychology and the history of religion, we take this as an indication that he has really never taken his Absolute seriously.

By way of illustration we may mention C. C. J. Webb's approach to the question of the philosophy of religion. In his book *Problems in the Relation of God and Man*, Webb tells us that he is in full agreement with the Idealist theory of judgment. He says, "That is,

the union of God and man belongs to the very essence of both the one and the other.”⁵ In his later books he continues to hold to this correlativism of God and the Universe. There is the same ambiguity in Webb’s thought that we found in Bosanquet’s thought, namely, that at one time he speaks of the Absolute as the Universe which includes both God and man, and at another time he speaks as though God is quite above and beyond the universe. Accordingly, there is also an ambiguity in his conception of what religion is. On the one hand he tells us that “the statement in which recent philosophers of various schools in this country have concurred that ‘God is not the Absolute’ must, I am sure, if taken seriously, make nonsense of religion.”⁶ Thus it might seem that Webb recognizes the need of a genuine transcendence for true religion. But then again it makes no difference at all to him whether or not God is exalted above the universe. He says, “For I do not think that religion is concerned with the nature of divine self-consciousness except insofar as this may be involved in the reality of our personal relations with God; so long as these are not regarded as figurative or illusory, we have no religious interest in hesitating to confess without reserve that God’s thoughts are not our thoughts nor his ways our ways.”⁷ Here it appears that Webb thinks it possible for the whole religious transaction to take place between two persons who are themselves within a common universe. God, to be sure, ought to be a great deal bigger than we, if he is to be the object of worship, but he need not be beyond the universe. Thus the antitheistic nature of Webb’s thought begins to come to the surface. For theism the nature of the self-consciousness of God is the thing of most fundamental importance, while for Webb this whole question may be relegated to the sphere of secondary matters.

This same point comes to the fore once more when Webb discusses the conception of personality in the case of the Trinity. Speaking of this distinction he says, “But this personal distinction cannot be interpreted as involving a difference in personal character without abolishing that unity behind and through all difference, which is what we primarily have in mind in speaking of the Absolute at all. It could only involve such a difference for those who could accept a genuine pluralism, which would appear in religious form as a thorough going polytheism.”⁸ In this quotation it appears clearly that Webb cannot allow for a God in whom identity and difference are equally fundamental. He fears that if the difference applied by the distinction of the personalities within the Trinity is carried through, pluralism would be the result. Webb is not defending here what the ancient church defended when it opposed the tritheists. The tritheists maintained not only that the personal difference in the Trinity was basic. The church had no objection to saying that. On the contrary the church cannot live unless the distinction of the Persons of the Trinity strikes the very bottom of the Godhead, so to speak. The only alternative to that is that the source of the plurality shall be found beyond the Trinity. But the reason of the opposition to the tritheists was that they denied the fundamental unity of God as being as basic as the personal distinctions. The contention of Webb, on the other hand, is that you cannot do both at once. If you maintain the ultimacy of the personal distinction you have therewith *ipso facto* done away with the possibility of holding to an ultimate unity.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 240.

⁶ *God and Personality*, p. 153.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

The consequence is that the unity in which Webb believes as the very foundation of intelligible speech is reduced to a logical universal in a mass of particulars.

We may speak then of Webb's case, as in the case of many of his fellow Idealists, of three different Gods that they serve at different times and on different occasions. The main God of Idealism is the Whole, Reality, Universe or Being. But since this Whole has two elements in it, namely, unity and difference, it is but to be expected that if the Idealist is persecuted with the charge that his position leads to an open universe he will hasten to identify the object of his veneration with the Beyond. On the other hand, if he is persecuted by the pluralists and is told that his position leads to a denial of the reality of the finite personality, he hastens to show that he did not mean his emphasis upon the Beyond of the principle of unity so seriously. The most basic distinction in reality is that of personality. The God he serves is really a *Primus inter pares*. Meanwhile it should be noted that no matter which of these three Gods the Idealist may at a certain time be serving, he is always equally antitheistic. In every case he has denied the most basic contention of theism, namely, that it is exactly in the Trinity that the principle of unity and the principle of diversity are equally fundamental. It is therefore never possible for a theist to swing back and forth between an emphasis upon the unity and an emphasis upon the diversity in the Godhead.

We have analyzed this new Trinity of Idealism in order to explain the ease with which Idealists are able to adjust themselves to every new mode of thought. In this respect Idealism resembles the Roman Church with its apparently inflexible character and its infinite powers of adaptation. The very acosmic strain of Idealism, we have had occasion to note, is an indication of antitheism. Similarly we can understand the reason why Idealism is able to follow the empirical method completely in the field of the philosophy and the history of religion. Idealism has really no absolute God, and, therefore, need not take the matter of an absolute religion seriously. According to Idealism, reality is inherently synthetic and it is therefore possible that totally new things should arise. Accordingly, truth cannot be absolute, but must grow. In this respect the difference between the Idealist and the Pragmatist seems to have disappeared completely. If in the homeland there is still a certain aloofness, on the mission field the representatives of Idealism and the representatives of Pragmatism have learned to work as brothers side by side. And those whom they are seeking to convert are the theists who still hold to the idol of an absolute God.

What seems to be in some respects a still further emphasis upon an ultimate plurality appears in the philosophy of Lotze and more recently of James Ward and his followers. We single out the philosophy of Ward for a brief discussion because it has the advantage of being more recent. Moreover, as in the preceding section we had occasion while discussing Webb to discuss also the question of the starting point of the schools of the philosophy of religion, so in the case of Ward we can take a side glance at Idealist psychology and observe that it too takes the antitheistic position for granted at the outset. Finally, there is in Ward's case once more an occasion to point out that what seems to be theistic is often very antitheistic. In his book *The Problem of Knowledge*, D. C. Macintosh discusses Ward's position on the question of knowledge under a group of writers which he designates as "Semi-pluralistic theistic idealism."⁹

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 183.

Speaking first of the psychology of Ward, inasmuch as it was in this field that Ward has made his most original contribution to the field of modern thought, and since it is his psychology that one must constantly keep in mind if one would understand his epistemology, we note that the gist of the contribution made by Ward consists of a strong emphasis on the contention that the subject and the object of knowledge and of experience in general must never be thought of as having existed in separation from one another. The subject-object relation, Ward holds, is present in every act of consciousness, however low. Thus the old problem of Empiricism and Rationalism falls away as artificial, he says.

Such an analysis might be understood in a thoroughly theistic sense. As far as the form of Ward's argument is concerned, we believe that he has expressed in modern psychological terminology what has been expressed by the greatest of the theologians in the church, because it is truly biblical. We have had occasion to remark that in the case of Augustine and Calvin the God-consciousness of man was considered as being just as fundamental as his self-consciousness. And in consonance with this position, we believe it to be truly theistic to say that the consciousness of the subject and the object of knowledge are equally original, even when the object of knowledge is not identified with God but is identified with the sense world about us.

However, it is not in this theistic sense that we may interpret the psychology of Ward. What he understands ordinarily by the object of knowledge is not God, either directly or indirectly, either proximately or remotely, but is the world of "facts," i.e., the finite universe. Accordingly, he takes for granted that the whole knowledge transaction is accomplished in the case of man's knowledge of the so-called objective world, without any reference to God at all. The ultimate bond of union between fact and law, between particular and universal, is not furnished ultimately by God but is furnished by man. Ward does not deem it necessary to refer to God at all in his discussion of the relation between the subject and the object of knowledge. He takes for granted that if God is going to have anything to do with the knowledge relation at all he can be summoned at will and at a later date.

By speaking of consciousness per se, Ward does in the field of psychology what Bosanquet does in the field of logic by speaking of thought per se. They assume that the universe is as necessary for God as God is for the universe. And it is apparent that if God is thought of as being nothing but a logical universal, the particulars will be as necessary for his existence as he is for the existence of the particulars. Or again, if God is himself a *primus inter pares* it is to be expected that he will be subject to the same limitations as his brethren. Finally, if God is thought of as the Whole of reality, it goes without saying that for him the subject-object relation is itself God.

Coming to Ward's philosophy, we find that it corroborates our interpretation of his psychology. Here too he starts without God. And he does this not surreptitiously but intentionally. It is his very purpose to show that Idealism can start with the facts of life, and from an investigation of them show that a God is needed for a final interpretation of these facts. He therefore seems to be particularly theistic on two counts. In the first place he seems to be theistic because he emphasizes, together with Pringle-Pattison and others, the distinction between the personality of God and the personality of man. But in addition to this he seems even to introduce the distinction which we have spoken of above between a proximate and an ultimate starting point. He wants, he tells us, merely to start

with a pluralism in order to show that for any ultimate interpretations of reality we cannot do without the conception of God. This makes it more necessary for us to examine whether he has really lived up to this claim.

The first thing to note in this connection is that according to Ward, God has not created man. In his book *The Realm of Ends*, Ward devotes a whole chapter to a discussion of the concept of creation. In this chapter he gives the ordinary Idealistic interpretation to the term creation. Creation, like causation, says Ward in effect, is a category that cannot be applied to the whole of experience because it is a category that is a part of experience. "If the categories of substance and cause are only valid within experience they cannot be applied to experience as a whole. Whatever implications experience may involve, it surely cannot involve that of transcending itself. Such miscalled transcendence, if it have any validity, must really be immanence at bottom."¹⁰ It will be observed that in thus speaking uncritically of the term experience, Ward has taken it to be axiomatic that God's experience and man's experience are to be taken as species under the genus Experience, which includes both. In other words, Ward first starts by including in the term Experience both divine and human experience, and then argues that causality or creation must be an exclusively immanent action of God. It goes without saying that if one first by definition includes the whole of reality within the one term Experience, it is not possible thereafter to think of any transeunt action of God such as creation is according to the theistic conception held to be. It is one thing to maintain that every transeunt act of God must be thought of as presupposing a logically previous immanent act of God, but it is quite another to take for granted that all the acts of God must be exclusively immanentistic.

To say that all the action of God must be exclusively immanentistic, as Ward virtually says, is only another way of saying that the plurality that logic needs or that epistemology needs, is furnished by the facts of the spatial-temporal world. If they are said to be created at all, they must be thought of as the ultimate source of difference in the Whole of Reality. In other words, the position of Ward here agrees with that of Webb discussed before, when he said that diversity cannot be furnished by the personalities of the Trinity but must be furnished by the facts of the sense world. We have the same insistence in the writings of both philosophers, and for that matter in many Idealist philosophers, that God must be reduced to the abstract principle of unity in the universe. The so-called Concrete Universal is not to be identified with the Trinity but is to be identified with God and the universe, together called the Universe. Most clearly does this come out in Ward when he tells us that, "If we attempt to conceive of God apart from the world there is nothing to lead us on to creation."¹¹ In reply we would say that such a God is exactly the kind of God that we need, namely, one of whom we may think without thinking of him as needing creation at all. Anything short of this puts the source of plurality beyond God and *ipso facto* denies the absoluteness of God. But we are not now concerned to indicate how this position of Ward's leads to the destruction of experience as we believe that it does, but we are concerned to observe that for Ward it is so axiomatic that any God that we are to believe in must be thought of as necessarily creating this world, that he deems it the climax of the process of reduction to absurdity when he has shown that a God who is

¹⁰ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. 2, p. 239.

¹¹ *Realm of Ends*, p. 309.

thought of apart from the world would not enable us to see why he has created the world necessarily. Thus antitheism is taken for granted instead of proved.

But we are not limited to the necessity of deducing the conclusions from Ward's position in order to show his complete antitheism. He tells us in so many words that the universe beyond God must be the source of plurality. He says, "In whatever sense you say absolute, in that sense you cannot say many."¹²

Corresponding to the insistence on the part of Ward that God must be reduced to a logical universal in the manifold of the universe, is his insistence that we start all our investigations from the known world of plurality. He tells us that, "it is from the reality of the world that we start."¹³ Or again, "We cannot begin from God and construct the universe."¹⁴ Thus the so-called facts of the universe are taken not as a proximate but as an ultimate starting point. This universe is thought of as having certain characteristics of its own that are ascertainable by man apart from any reference to God. As in the case of A. E. Taylor, who said that unless God knew the world as contingent he would simply be deceived, because it is as a matter of fact contingent, so also Ward thinks it possible for man to ascribe certain qualifications to the sense world and then say that God had better fall in line with these qualifications. Nothing could be more flatly contradictory to a true theism. In fact the contention of theism is that the facts of the universe owe their existence to the predication or interpretation of them by God. Theologically, we express this thought by saying that all things are made according to the counsel of God. In flat contradiction to this, Ward says not only that the universe exists independently of God, but that God must submit to its conditions. He says, "As immanent in this world, God must, it would seem, so far be conceived as subject to its fundamental conditions."¹⁵ Ward plainly teaches that the conditions or laws or universals of the universe are above God. God is to look up to them instead of determining them.

We conclude then that so far from being more theistic than others of his fellow Idealists, Ward is, if possible, more antitheistic. One who starts with a pluralism of Ward's type will also end with a pluralism. It is not merely as a proximate, but decidedly as an ultimate starting point that the human mind is taken. Macintosh suggested by the title of his book that Ward's position was semitheistic. We are forced to maintain that any position that is semi-theistic is completely antitheistic. Ye cannot serve God and Mammon.

We may in passing refer to the words of Hastings Rashdall and James Lindsay. Their philosophy indicates again and with exceptional plainness that if one begins with the assumption of the Idealist theory of judgment it is impossible to arrive at a theistic position afterward.

Lindsay calls one of his main works *A System of Theistic Idealism*. In this work his purpose is to tone down some of the extreme pantheism involved in the writings of such men as T. H. Green, John and Edward Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet. He does this in much the same way that Pringle-Pattison tried to do it, that is, by an emphasis upon the human individual in opposition to the emphasis upon the Absolute. He says, "The

¹² *Realm of Ends*, p. 37.

¹³ *Realm of Ends*, p. 245.

¹⁴ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Vol. 2, p. 120.

¹⁵ *Realm of Ends*, p. 194.

conception of Dr. Bosanquet does not tell us anything about the relation of the one real Individual to man's relative individuality, which is what philosophers want to know, nor does it give us any serviceable conception of man's individuality for this purpose."¹⁶ As to Lindsay's own philosophy, he holds that the relation between God and man is better conceived of if it be first remembered that the sense world is to be thought of as a creation of God's will, and not merely of his nature.¹⁷ Lindsay is very anxious to give his philosophy a theistic color. In the same book, however, Lindsay tells us that he does not want a God who is cosmically independent. Whatever he meant by the creation of the world by the will of God must therefore be understood as operating within a Universe that is larger than both God and man.

Christian theology contends that the whole of the meaning of history is that it glorifies God, and that God has himself created the world for that purpose. Philosophically we express this thought by saying that God is the ultimate subject of every predicate. In opposition to this Lindsay says, "Theistic Idealism is too virile to be troubled with the squeamishness sometimes evidenced by philosophers when nature is viewed as in the old theological sense, as existent primarily for the glory of her Creator, a view that freed the world from the ancient pagan dualism; for that Idealism is too superior to anthropomorphism to think of Deity as a man that he should covet glory—He to Whom nothing can be added."¹⁸ In this manner of stating the relation of God to history, Lindsay has, with a toss of the hand, disposed of the whole theistic contention with respect to God. If history does not exist exclusively for the glory of God, for what then does it exist? The only reply that can be given is that it is self-contained, i.e., that it exists for its own glory. It is very easy for anyone to point out the logical problem involved in the theistic contention that God is self-sufficient, but that nevertheless history has a genuine significance. However, merely to mention the difficulty and therewith to throw overboard the whole theistic position as is done by Lindsay and by many other Idealists, is, in effect, to take the whole antitheistic position for granted. For it is exactly this that theism contends, namely, that the alternative to this view leads to a destruction of predication altogether. The only alternative to holding that history adds to the glory of the all-sufficient God is to say that it adds nothing to anything. What one does if he rejects the theistic position with the lighthearted charge of anthropomorphism is to assume that the human mind is the ultimate starting point of all predication. He then takes for granted that "adding to" must be applied to God in exactly the same way that it is applied to man. In other words, it assumes that all reality must be of one type, which is just the question in dispute between theism and antitheism. It is only a particular manifestation of the practice of Idealist writers to speak of Experience or of thought in general without so much as asking whether one can thus include underived and derived experience as species under one genus. The same sort of thing meets us when we see men write books on the philosophy of religion and in them determine what kind of God they can allow for by asking what the "religious consciousness" will tolerate.¹⁹ Again, the same thing meets us when men write books on morality and tell us what kind of God the

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 444.

¹⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 24, 152, 154.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 299.

¹⁹ cf. Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*.

moral consciousness demands.²⁰ God certainly ought to consider himself very fortunate if he can satisfy man's religious or moral consciousness! So also God will have to adjust himself to our intellectual consciousness and reduce himself to a correlative of the universe if our textbook logic demands it, for fear that something worse may happen to him. One cannot but wonder whether fundamentalist evangelists have altogether escaped this antitheistic leaven when they ask some converts to testify whether Jesus has satisfied them. We do not deem it unfair then to say that Lindsay with all his emphasis on a theistic interpretation of Idealism has only demonstrated that no theistic interpretation can be given to Idealism. His own position is once more built upon a gratuitous assumption of the truth of antitheism.

What we have said with respect to Lindsay holds with equal force in the case of H. Rashdall. He too reacts against the clearly pantheistic implications of the philosophy of Bosanquet and other Idealists, and emphasizes the concept of the will of God as the source of the sense world.²¹ But as was the case with Lindsay, so it is the case with Rashdall, that he conceives of abstract law as existing above both God and man.²² This once more reduces all the creative activity of the will of God to an exclusively immanentistic action. Accordingly, Rashdall tells us that the moral consciousness of man is ultimately responsible not to God, but to the moral law itself, and that this moral law is somehow an aspect of the Universe as a whole. Thus it appears that here, too, not all those who speak of the will of God as the source of creation can be classed as theists. The moral consciousness of man is often taken for granted as being at the outset independent of God.

We come now to brief discussion of Josiah Royce. In his various writings we have another attempt to solve the difficult problem of the relation of the human self to its environment. In fact, in his greatest work Royce undertakes a detailed discussion of this most fundamental question. He has even given a name to this work that at once betrays his absorption with our problem. *The World and the Individual* as a title tells us at once that Royce seeks to give particular attention to the exact place of the self or the human mind in the Universe and therefore in its relation to God. Again we find that as in the case of Pringle-Pattison, Ward and others, so also in the case of Royce there is an attempt to escape some of the pantheistic conclusions that seem to follow so inevitably from absolute Idealism.

In *The World and the Individual*, Royce speaks of four conceptions of being: Realism, Mysticism, Kant's position, and finally his own, which is, generally speaking, that of Hegelian Idealism. The first three conceptions of being are criticized as being unsatisfactory because they are not inclusive enough. Any system of philosophy that wishes to be satisfactory must have a principle of interpretation that is inclusive of the whole of reality. Royce fears that some of his fellow Idealists have gone so far in pressing the necessity of this whole that they have forgotten the equal necessity of maintaining that the human individual is unique. Accordingly, he sets himself the same problem that Pringle-Pattison set himself, that is, of seeing how it is possible to maintain

²⁰ cf., e.g., Newman Smyth, *Christian Ethics*.

²¹ cf. *The Religious Philosophy of Pringle Pattison*, in *Mind*, N.S. 1918, p. 273. *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 34. See also *Good and Evil*, 2 vol.

²² *Contentio Veritatis*, pp. 38, 39.

the uniqueness of the self without taking it out of relation which makes the self possible. He thinks he has found the solution of his problem by thinking of Reality as a self-representative system.

Royce begins his argument in what would seem to be a most hopeful manner. Instead of launching his opposition to the pantheizing tendency of some of the other Idealists by emphasizing the ultimacy of the human personality as Pringle-Pattison and Ward had done, he begins by showing that the Absolute itself must be personal. Self-consciousness is the most central and important conception of theism. It might seem that Royce is herewith putting us on the road to a genuine theism. Let us briefly hear his argument.

Bradley had maintained that selfhood is always and everywhere a self-contradictory notion. Hence his conclusion had been that the Absolute must somehow be above the contradiction of selfhood. This argument, we saw, was based upon the assumption that the human categories are ultimate. What Bradley should have concluded from the “contradictions” that he found in the conception of the self is not that God must be an impersonal reality, but that he must be a higher, an absolute personality. Royce shows that Bradley’s criticisms of the self do not justify him in rejecting the notion of selfhood altogether. He says, “The Absolute, then, is above the Self, and above any form of mere selfhood. The fact that it is thus above selfhood is something not other than experience; but is wholly experience, and is the Absolute Experience itself. In fine then, the Absolute, in Mr. Bradley’s view, knows itself so well—experiences so fully its own nature—that it sees itself to be no self, but to be a self-absorber, ‘self-pervading’ to be sure,²³ and ‘self-existent,’ but aware of itself, in the end, as something in which there is no real self to be aware of. Or, in other words, the Absolute is really aware of itself as being not Reality, but Appearance, just in so far as it is a Self.”²⁴

From this quotation it would seem that Royce has defended the theistic notion of the absolute self-consciousness of God. He can think of no reality behind the self-consciousness of God. But the force of all this drops out when we observe that for Royce the Absolute of which he speaks is not God in distinction from the universe, but is the Universe including God. He speaks of Reality without making any distinction between the reality of God and the reality of the universe. It is of this Whole that he says that it is and must be a self-representative system. This is plain from his insistence that in the self-representative system there must be an endless chain as well as unity. He says, “Hence it is structure, at once One, as a single system, and also an endless *Kette*.”²⁵ Here Royce shows that he conceives of the universe as being ultimate. We see in his thinking the same phenomenon that we met with in the case of Bosanquet when he would at one time insist that reality is essentially analytic, and at another time that reality is essentially synthetic. In logical terms this position amounts to saying that God furnishes the identity and the universe furnishes the difference, and so the Universe as a Whole contains identity in difference and thus seems to meet the requirements of consistent concrete interpretation.

When it comes to Royce’s conception of God he is, accordingly, placed before a trio of options, one of which he must choose. He can identify God with the logical universal

²³ p. 552.

²⁴ *The World and the Individual*, 1, p. 552.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1, p. 553.

in the Universe. He seems to do this when he wants to emphasize God's transcendence and speaks of him as Beyond and above our experience. Secondly, he may identify God with one of the personalities in the Universe. Finally, he may and often does, identify God with the Whole of Reality.

Royce was well aware of the fact that with his idea of an endless *Kette* he laid himself open to the charge that he believed after all in a Pragmatic or open universe. Accordingly, he labored much to make his idea of a self-representative system acceptable. One of the ways in which he tried to do this was to show that in everyday experience we meet with the idea of true infinity. In the number system, he says, the true nature of the series lies not in its cardinal but in its ordinal aspect. True infinity lies not in endlessly following out a series of cardinal numbers to the point of dizziness. It lies in the self-representative power of the root. From such considerations as these Royce concludes, "Thus the nature of the Real can be self-represented in endlessly various ways—and is capable of embodiment—in as many different forms of selfhood, each individual as the nature of the Absolute plan involves. So that our view of the Selfhood of the Absolute, if possible at all, leaves room for various forms of individuality within the one Absolute; and we have a new opening for a possible many in One—an opening whose value we shall have to test in another way in our second series of lectures."²⁶

From such an argument we learn that Royce tests the nature of reality by what the finite mind can comprehend. For him the infinity of God is quite comparable to the infinite concept of modern mathematics. This, a true theism is anxious to deny. God whose infinity we can grasp as we can grasp—if we can grasp—the infinity of mathematics cannot be more than a finite God because the modern mathematics concept of infinity is the product of a finite mind.

What Royce is constantly trying to do is much the same thing that Plato tried to do, that is, give us a membership in the eternal world itself. In order to do this Royce distinguishes between the world of description and the world of appreciation. By the world of description he means the world of law and order, the sense world of Plato or the phenomenal world of Kant. By the world of appreciation he means the Ideal world of Plato or the noumenal world of Kant. Of course Royce does not wish to separate these worlds entirely. That would lead him into a dualism which he is most anxious to avoid. He contends that the world of appreciation is the foundation of the world of description and that we are members of both. As citizens of the heavenly realm of appreciation we partake of the nature of the Absolute and are with him absolutely free and unique. "And as a whole, the world of the self is caused by nothing, is what it is by virtue of its own self-knowledge, is constituted by reflective self-consciousness in and for which it has its own being. It is then through and through a world of Freedom; its own significance is what occasions it thus to express itself. Nothing causes or explains it from without. It is its own excuse for being."²⁷

It appears clearly then that, according to Royce, the finite mind does not derive its existence from God but is itself a member in a self-existent reality. This appears if anything still more definitely in Royce's detailed discussion about the uniqueness of every personality. After trying to show that in his conception of the Universe as a whole

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, 1, p. 546.

²⁷ *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 418.

you are not a mere puppet, Royce says, "You are in God but you are not lost in God." Or again, "I alone amongst all the different beings of the universe, will this act."²⁸ Similarly he said in the first volume, "Here is a multiplicity that is not 'absorbed' or 'Transmuted' but retained by the Absolute. And it is a multiplicity of Individual facts that are still one in the Absolute."²⁹ According to Royce the freedom and the uniqueness of which he speaks with respect to the human individual is something that is just as ultimate as the freedom or the uniqueness of God. Even if Royce at the same time maintains that the divine will also works in us at the time of our greatest uniqueness, that is at the most the working of a logical universal in so many particulars. Flatly contradictory to this conception of the relation of the divine working to the human individual is the conception of Christian theism, which holds that in an Absolute sense all things that come to pass in the universe, whether or not they take place by the action of human personality, are the action of the counsel of God. Accordingly, every act of a finite personality is dependent on an ultimate act of the completely self-conscious God. Man cannot be maintained to be absolutely unique in relation to God. The whole question of man's uniqueness has meaning only if it be kept within the field of comparison with his fellow human beings.

It is interesting to take cognizance of the fact that when it comes to the question of the ultimacy of human personality there are once more the two extremes of pantheism and deism between which antitheistic thought is swinging back and forth. The only way in which Royce seems to be able to avoid the pantheism of Bosanquet involved in the idea that the individual is altogether transmuted when taken up into the Absolute, is to fall into the deistic extreme of saying that man's individuality can be maintained only if he be considered as unique even over against the Absolute.

The conclusions of Royce have been based upon the mere assumption of the correctness of antitheism. The whole assumption of the argument of Royce is that if man cannot explain the relation of himself to God it cannot be explained at all. Thus it is taken for granted that there can be no reality which is higher than temporal reality. In other words, Royce, along with the others so far reviewed, has taken for granted that reality must be interpreted in exclusively temporal categories.

A still more hopeful attempt to come to a really theistic interpretation of reality than the one we have just been considering might seem to be that given us by Ernest Hocking in his book *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. We say "more hopeful," because the point that we have constantly been emphasizing is that in all these systems of philosophy there was no real God-consciousness to begin with, and therefore there was no God-consciousness at the end. In the case of Hocking we find a man who seems to emphasize this very necessity of an original God-consciousness. He tells us that the human self taken by itself is an "irrelevant universal." This is exactly the point we have been trying to make. Our very contention has been that the human self cannot function in any capacity until it is seen as in contact with God. So also Hocking says, "Evil becomes a problem only because the consciousness of the Absolute is there: apart from this fact the colour of evil would be mere contents of experience."³⁰ Thus Hocking points out that for us to ask any intelligent question about reality presupposes the idea of an Absolute.

²⁸ *The World and the Individual*, 2, p. 460 ff.

²⁹ *The World and the Individual*, 1, p. 554.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

Many others were willing to admit that for the final answers to questions it is necessary at the last to introduce the idea of God, but Hocking has gone back of this and has said that even to begin to ask an intelligent question we must presuppose an Absolute.

Putting it in another way, Hocking tells us that no God is found at the level of ideas that is not already found at the level of sensation.³¹ Or again, "The whole tale of Descartes' discovery is not told in the proposition, I exist, knowing. It is rather told in the proposition, I exist, knowing the Absolute, or I exist knowing God."³² It would seem then that in the case of Hocking the God-consciousness has been made genuinely fundamental and that there is nothing of which any theist might wish to complain.

Yet we must complain. We hold that, after all, Hocking has not made the God-consciousness fundamental. In the case of Bosanquet we saw that he insisted that there must be absolute system. We observed his acosmic tendency. We interpreted it as idolatry. Now the insistence of Hocking that the God-consciousness be made fundamental can be taken at face value only if there is no equally fundamental insistence on the originality of the human self-consciousness. But such is exactly the case. Hocking is anxious to be quite empirical in his method of investigation of the religious consciousness. In this respect we have once more an instance similar to that of Webb who started out with a strong Idealistic demand and soon lost himself in complete Empiricism. So also Hocking's position has been called an "Empirical Development of Absolutism."³³ Hocking's Empiricism appears when he describes the origin of the religious consciousness. On this question he takes the ordinary evolutionary view. He tells us that early in life one has to face the grim reality that has produced us and that seems to overwhelm us. Immediately we sense our rights, and "The God-idea thus appears as a postulate of our moral consciousness; an original object of resolve that tends to make itself good in experience."³⁴ We see then that, after all there is a time, according to Hocking, when the moral consciousness functions independently of God. And that time is at the very start. The moral consciousness starts by asserting its rights in a hostile universe and quickly gasps for God. But this is exactly what theism can never allow. It does not help in the least that one brings the God-consciousness down very low, unless it is made basic to the very first act of the human consciousness, whether that be in the field of morals or in the field of knowledge proper. We must conclude then that the whole of the philosophy of Hocking and that of his fellow Idealists is not only built upon an irrelevant universal, but that it is simply taken for granted that this irrelevant universal is the only basis upon which any philosophy can be constructed.

There are, of course, many more modern philosophers that might be discussed. Our purpose was not to give anything like a complete survey, but to give a few samples of what one can find in a general survey of modern antitheistic thought. We have taken these samples from a variety of currents of modern thought, but chiefly from the Idealist tradition because it is there that the substitution of a genuine for a false theism is most easily made. If even such men as Hocking and Royce have begun their philosophical

³¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 201.

³³ D. C. Macintosh in *Phil. Rev.*, 1914, p. 17 ff.

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 147.

speculation upon the basis of one grand assumption of the truth of the antitheistic position, this is certainly true of all the various schools of Pragmatists and Realists.

Chapter 13:

The Starting Point Of Christian Theistic

Epistemology:

D: The Subject Of Knowledge: Idealism And

Christianity

In the two preceding chapters we have attempted to show that the opponents of Christian theism have, when discussing the question of theism, taken the antitheistic viewpoint for granted at the outset of their argument. In this chapter, we shall attempt to show that when the more particular question of Christianity is up for discussion we meet once more with the same phenomenon. Here too the anti-Christian position is taken for granted instead of proved. And it will be specially important to note that those who have rejected theism invariably also reject Christianity, and that those who reject Christianity invariably reject theism. In other words, men reject Christian theism no matter whether they begin with the theistic or with the Christian aspect of that system of thought.

What we shall do in this chapter is to discuss briefly the philosophy of A. E. Taylor in order to show that because he takes the antitheistic position for granted he must also take the anti-Christian position for granted. We shall also take the philosophy of Borden P. Bowne in order to show that because he takes the anti-Christian position for granted he must also take the antitheistic position for granted. The reason for arranging the argument in this way is not that these men have always reasoned exclusively in this way, i.e., Taylor always from antitheism to anti-Christianity and Bowne always from anti-Christianity to antitheism. As a matter of fact, they have not. But this does not matter. We might just as well have turned their names about. We are using them merely as illustrations. The one method of approach may serve to establish the validity of the other. Yet there is an appropriateness in choosing these names and in using them in the way indicated. It goes without saying that we could not well take a Pragmatist in order to show that a rejection of theism involves a rejection of Christianity, or that a rejection of Christianity involves the rejection of theism. Pragmatists have, as a rule, thought it beneath their dignity to discuss Christianity at all. This is in itself an indication that he who is most outspoken in the rejection of theism is also most outspoken in his rejection of Christianity. Yet we are then handicapped because there is no concrete evidence by which we can go. So, for example, the writings of Professor R. W. Sellars indicate that the author deems Christianity's claim about itself worthy of no more serious attention than merely to weave Christianity into the evolutionary process.¹ In a somewhat similar way extreme Idealists dispose of Christianity. Hegel took all the concepts of Christianity such as creation and incarnation, and with a high hand changed their connotation and proceeded to weave them into the dialectic of his philosophical Absolute. In the same way, later Idealists have carelessly tossed Christianity overboard. Some of them, to be sure, when they were in their acosmic strain have spoken of the Supernatural and the Beyond, but as indicated above, even in that case they had changed the connotation of

¹ cf. *Evolutionary Naturalism*.

these terms beyond recognition before they were willing to use them. On the other hand, when less anxious to keep up appearances, they have cast off the shackles of Christianity altogether. As an interesting illustration, we may mention the writings of J. Watson. He has fearlessly criticized Bosanquet when the latter thought it possible to retain the conception of the Beyond in any non-temporal sense. Watson has shown that the most fundamental demand of Bosanquet's own theory of judgment is that there is no Beyond. The reason for this is, says Watson, that Bosanquet has all the while tacitly assumed and has never openly denied that human thought is absolute in principle if not in degree. We have called attention to this at various times by saying that Bosanquet speaks merely of "thought" as such, without distinguishing between divine and human thought. If one holds to the Idealist conception of the judgment, one must give up the idea of a God who is Beyond except in a quantitative sense.² Accordingly, when Watson turns to a more direct discussion of Christianity, he does not hesitate to trim all the conceptions of Christianity till they fit into his Idealistic scheme of reality which can allow for no transcendent God.³ It is for this reason that we turn to those who are regarded as theists in a general sense and who have openly advocated a theism in opposition to Idealism. A special advantage of choosing Bowne is that he may perhaps be called the father of Personalism in America. Many ministers have thought that they could find in his philosophy a sound metaphysical basis for their Christian thought.

Before we enter upon the argument proper, it is necessary to bring out in a general way what the issue is when the matter of Christianity is discussed in relation to the subject of knowledge.

When discussing the object of knowledge we saw that the bone of contention between Christian theists and their opponents was, in the first place, whether the existence of the object of knowledge may be taken for granted apart from God. In the second place, we saw that the question was whether the object of knowledge can be interpreted aright apart from the interpretation of God, which in a sinful world must come through the Christ of the Scriptures.

When discussing the subject of knowledge in its theistic rather than in its Christian aspect, we saw that the main question was once more whether the existence of the subject of knowledge could be taken for granted apart from God, and therefore whether the human subject may be taken for granted as an ultimate starting point of knowledge.

Discussing now the question of the subject of knowledge from its more specifically Christian aspect, the question is more particularly that of Error. Christian theism holds that error is the result of sin. This is to be taken in a general sense. It does not mean that every mistake someone makes in logic is directly traceable to some sin. But it does mean that sin is the source of all evil and therefore of all error in the world. This the "natural man" cannot allow. He has grown so accustomed to the abnormal condition of sin that he actually thinks it is the normal condition. He violently resents the suggestion that his mind is not normal. The condition of the "natural man" is illustrated by the well-known story of the country of the blind. The inhabitants of this country were so accustomed to their blind condition that when someone came to them who could see, they thought that he was a wild visionary. It is this idea that accounts for the fact discussed in the preceding

² *Phil. Rev.*, 1895, p. 353 ff.; pp. 485 ff.; and *Phil. Rev.*, V. 34, p. 440.

³ cf. *Christianity and Idealism and Interpretation of Religious Experience*.

chapters, namely, that antitheistic thinking takes its position for granted. It is this that accounts for the fact that when the “natural mind” turns to examine the phenomena of “regeneration” it takes for granted that it can be explained in naturalistic categories. We see this clearly in James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience*. It is there taken for granted that the object of knowledge can be adequately known, if known at all, without the light of the Scripture.

We cannot now work out the details of the conception of regeneration as far as epistemology is concerned. Nor is this necessary. All that we are here concerned about is that we shall have clearly in mind that the concepts of an absolute God, an absolute Bible, and absolute regeneration go together. The concept of absolute Scripture as a necessity for the illumination of the object of knowledge and of the subject of knowledge go together. It should be noted particularly that if theism is true, that is, if man’s knowledge must, in the nature of the case, be re-interpretation of God’s interpretation, it also follows that only by absolute measures could man who had by sin denied his re-interpretative position, be brought back again. We shall have occasion soon to meet some of the criticisms that are launched against this position. We may turn now to a discussion of Taylor’s position in order to show that his rejection of theism inevitably leads to his rejection of Christianity.

We take for our text the recent Gifford lectures of A. E. Taylor, a two volume work entitled *The Faith of a Moralist*, already referred to. In the first volume the author discusses more directly theistic questions, and in the second volume he discusses questions that pertain more directly to Christianity. In the first volume he has a chapter, “Eternity and Temporality.” It is here that we must look first in order to learn our author’s conception of the relation of God to man.

In this chapter Taylor attaches his reflections to the discussion Plato gives in *The Timaeus* on the relation of the eternal and the temporal. According to Plato, the “world soul,” by which he means the physical universe, is made up of two ingredients, namely, “the same” and “the other.” They are, says Taylor, “just object and event, the eternal and the temporal.”⁴ Taylor holds it to be a fact from which we may begin our reasoning process that this Platonic concept of the relation of the eternal and the temporal is essentially true. He says, “As morality becomes conscious of itself, it is discovered to be always a life of tension between the temporal and the eternal, only possible to a being who is neither simply eternal and abiding, nor simply mutable and temporal, but both at once. The task of living rightly and worthily is just the task of the progressive transmutation of a self which is at first all but wholly mutable, at the mercy of all the gusts of circumstance and impulse, into one which is relatively lifted above change and mutability, or, we might say, as an alternative formula, it is the task of the thorough transfiguration of our interests, the shifting of interest from temporal to non-temporal good.”⁵

In this quotation we have the gist of the matter. We observe three things with regard to it. In the first place Taylor takes it to be a fact that morality is a struggle between the eternal and the temporal in us. About this matter he thinks there can be no dispute. Yet it is exactly this that is in dispute between the theists and non-theists. There is no inherent

⁴ 1, p. 69.

⁵ Vol. 1, p. 70.

logical reason why the theism that comes to expression in the Scripture when it says that original man was a Wholly temporal being with no aspirations whatsoever to become eternal, but with the truly temporal aspirations to do the will of the eternal God, should be considered to be so absurd as not to require refutation. Original man may be conceived as being truly interested in “eternal good” if he seeks to live according to it as a standard which has been given to him. At the same time he could be interested in temporal things. Why should the temporal be thought of as necessarily the source of evil? If the God of Scripture has created it, the temporal is inherently good, and man could seek God in the temporal. According to theism, there was no tension originally between the eternal and the temporal. We hold that the reason for seeking the tension here is that men do not want the tension to be found in the exclusively ethical sphere. If the tension can be reduced to something metaphysical, its seriousness is reduced or taken away and man is no longer responsible for it. For this reason it is but to be expected that the “unregenerated consciousness” shall seek to find the very nature of morality to be a strife between the temporal and the eternal in man.

In the second place, we must observe that the whole antitheistic position is involved in Taylor’s assumption that the nature of morality consists in a tension between the eternal and the temporal. Theism holds that there is no being and can be no being who is a mixture of the ingredients of eternity and temporality. God is eternal and man is temporal, and not even Christ is a mixture of the two. In the incarnation, the church has been anxious to maintain, Christ’s personality remained divine; it was the human nature, not the human person that he assumed.

In the third place, the truth of the anti-Christian position is taken for granted. According to Christianity, the redemption wrought by God is not that of the eternization of man but his restoration and perfection in the temporal sphere. Even the conception of “eternal life” as it is spoken of, especially by the Apostle John, does not in the least blur or annihilate the distinction between the eternity of God and the temporality of man. By eternal life the New Testament means a continuation of man’s temporal existence in a perfect ethical state, while the conception of eternity when applied to God has nothing to do with time. Only God is and remains supra-temporal.

The antitheistic nature of Taylor’s thought appears still further in this conception of morality as the attempt of the temporal to outgrow itself. Taylor thinks that the whole of the temporal is surrounded by an essentially unknown ocean. On this point Taylor has linked his thought to that of T. H. Green who maintained, as Taylor paraphrases it, “that in all moral progress to a better, the driving force is aspiration after a best, of which we can say little more at any stage of the process, than that it lies ahead of us on the same line of advance along which the already achieved progress ...”⁶ In contrast to this, theism holds that the absolute moral ideal is known to God because laid down by God. Hence also the absolute moral ideal was originally known by man because man, being created in the image of God, was by virtue of that fact in possession of the truth in every respect. Moreover, in paradise God spoke to man and indicated to him the nature of his task in relation to the world. Man, to be sure, did not and could not and therefore will not fathom the depth of the eternity of God. But it is not necessary to maintain that man did or can or will fathom God in order to maintain that he was in possession of the absolute

⁶ Vol. 1, p. 71.

truth in the moral sphere. Only the assumption of the Idealistic notion that all reality must be essentially perspicuous to man as well as to God, in other words, only upon the assumption of the essential correlativity of God and man, can one hold that the ethical ideal must, in the nature of the case, always be in the vague and distant future. Idealism finds itself forced to hold, on the one hand, to the essential perspicuity of reality to the mind of man, because it has started out by assuming that the human and the divine minds are on the same plane. On the other hand, Idealism must hold that there is a vague unknown for God as well as for man, because it has taken for granted that the limitations which are in the human mind, inasmuch as it is temporal, are also in the divine mind. The contention of theism in this connection is that no one would be certain that there would be any "Line of Advance" at all, unless there were the certainty of the absolute self-consciousness of God. Hence it will not do for any writer merely to take for granted that there is this vague unknown in the distance, and that there is the definitely known apart from God in the present.

When Taylor discusses *The Meaning and Place of Authority*, he tells us that the basic reason for the rejection of the conception of absolute biblical authority is that Christianity deals with historical phenomena and that it is always impossible to transmit the exact meaning of any historical phenomenon. He says, "In any true account of the concrete and individual reality one must somewhere come upon something of which it can only be said, 'Why this thing should be so, or even just what it is, is more than I can tell, but at all costs it must be recognized that here the thing is.' If this is all we mean by 'irrationality,' we may safely say that historical individuality is the great supreme irrational from which thought can never succeed in getting free."⁷ Taylor takes for granted that historical reality exists in independence of God. If God was to know the temporal universe at all, he must know it as existing independently. Each bit of concrete historical reality is independent of the rationality of God. In contrast to this, theism maintains that every bit of historical reality is what it is because of the prior rationality of God. Taylor again makes the mistake of identifying "irrationality" for us with irrationality for God.

And this brings us to the most pivotal question of the relation of the constructive activity of the human mind in relation to historical fact. The burden of all the arguments against the conception of revelation is that it always requires a subjective element. Taylor tells us that it is impossible to make any intelligible statement "whether about the natural or the supernatural, which shall have as its content the simply objective and given, with no element whatever of the subjective and constructed."⁸ In order to clinch this argument completely, he introduces the question of the authority of our Lord. He points to the church's belief that the soul and the body of Christ are "in the fullest sense of the word," creatures. Still further he reminds us that Christ did many things that are done by creatures only; Christ grew in wisdom and grace with God and man; Christ prayed and felt forsaken. Accordingly, Taylor concludes that, "when a Christian speaks of the adequacy of the Lord's human experience of the supernatural, he must not, I take it, forget that the adequacy meant is still relative to the conditions of creatureliness inseparable from genuine humanity."⁹ That Taylor himself considers this to be the basis

⁷ Vol. 2, p. 212.

⁸ Vol. 2, p. 229.

⁹ Vol. 2, p. 230.

of all his objections to the orthodox conception of revelation is plain from the fact that after giving several of the arguments that are usually brought forward in favor of and against the conception of absolute authority he says, "But the point on which I am personally most concerned to insist is a different one. It is that in immediate apprehension of the supernatural, as in immediate apprehension of the natural, we are dealing with concrete, individual, historical, experiences which resist complete intellectual analysis, at the same time that they demand it. In both cases, no man can communicate what he sees in its totality and individuality."¹⁰

It ought to be apparent from the great emphasis Taylor himself lays upon this point and the momentous conclusions that follow if his point is granted, that we must be very careful here to note the exact implications of his thought. According to Taylor, the object of knowledge is assumed to exist apart from God. In consonance with this and in correspondence with this, Taylor now insists that the subject of knowledge also exists apart from God and that it does its interpretative activity in total independence of God. Taylor takes for granted that man is an ultimate interpreter instead of a derived reinterpreter. He tells us that if there is any interpretative element entering into the reception of the meaning of any objective reality it has therewith lost its absoluteness. He tells us that the interpretative element is subjective. It prevents us from coming into contact with the absolutely given. Here, exactly, theism takes issue. Theism holds that truth, although interpreted and reinterpreted by man, is absolute. According to theism, there is no absolutely given for God either beyond or within God's nature. It goes without saying that the biblical conception of the absolute self-consciousness of God is flatly opposed to any such idea. An attempt to introduce the "given" into the bosom of the Godhead is nothing less than to introduce the pagan notion of an original evil universe into Christian thought. For God the object and the subject of knowledge are identical as far as his own person is concerned. We have seen above that there can be no conception of a vague irrationality enveloping the historical for God. For God history has no surd. But for the same reason human thought must in the nature of the case be reinterpreted. When the human being thinks normally, his interpretation does not introduce an element of subjectivity which vitiates the absoluteness of the truth with which he comes into contact. On the contrary, when man thinks normally he must be in contact with absolute truth. His mind cannot do anything but think God's thoughts after him, and God's thoughts are always absolute. Of course it should be noted that man's thought need not be as comprehensive as God's thought in order to be said to be absolutely true. Taylor has assumed that such must be the case.

On a theistic basis there is no such distinction between an absolutely given for God as Taylor holds that there is. The recreative or reinterpreted activity of the human subject of knowledge does no damage to the absoluteness of the truth with which it comes into contact. In another connection we have called attention to the fact that antitheistic thought takes for granted that for any act to be truly personal it must be unipersonal. That is, any personal action must be surrounded by a completely impersonal universe. Even the most personalistic of antitheistic philosophies such as that of Borden F. Bowne, make this mistake. But theism holds that every finite person is surrounded by a completely personalistic atmosphere. Even if the world immediately around him be "impersonal,"

¹⁰ Vol. 2, p. 224.

this impersonal world derives its meaning from its Creator. Taylor takes for granted that any interpretation must be ultimate interpretation, so that if man gives any interpretation it can be no longer said that God has given ultimate interpretation. Taylor holds that if man inserts any interpretative element the whole matter of interpretations becomes insofar a cooperative affair between God and man. In contrast to this, theism holds that God's ultimate interpretation and man's finite reinterpretation cannot clash. Man's reinterpretation could not function except for God's prior and absolute interpretation.

If we keep this great difference between theism and the position of Taylor in mind we shall be clear in our minds as to what to answer to the various detailed objections that Taylor brings against the orthodox conception of Christianity. These objections center to a large extent upon the conception of absolute authority. Taylor thinks that he had found the really natural and truly scientific attitude to the whole question of authority by saying that religious authority should not be taken in the old sense of being absolute. Religious authority is the authority of the expert. Jesus was the greatest religious expert that ever lived. Accordingly, we ought to attach great weight to his words. Yet, as noted above, we should always be sensible to the fact that his experience of the supernatural was to an extent subjective and constructive, and to that extent is not absolute. Then, naturally, if this position is taken with respect to Jesus it is but to be expected that the Bible will fare no better. In the case of the Bible it is much easier than in the case of Christ to make the theory of expert authority seem reasonable, because the Bible has come to us through many mediaries and requires interpretation over and over again. With respect to the Bible, Taylor brings forth the usual objections such as that the text is corrupt, that there are ambiguous statements, that there are known errors, that even if all this were not so and there were not many and various interpretations of the one authority, the question would still be as to which Bible would have to be accepted. He says, "Moreover, before we can so much as know what Bible it is to which we are appealing since the Bible itself never enumerates its own component parts, we have to go to an extra-Biblical authority to learn what 'books' are part of the infallible Bible, and what are not. (So far the 'Fundamentalists' apparently have shirked the question what is the authority which fixes the canon of Scripture, but it is a question which they must be prepared to face—with curious consequences for Fundamentalism.)"¹¹

We see from the enumeration of these various objections that the one foundation of them all is that which we have discussed above, namely, that according to Taylor there can be no authority which is absolute if the one who receives the message of authority is in any way "constructive," i.e., interpretatively active, in the reception of it. He holds that for absolute authority to exist at all one must first think of experience as standing in sharp metaphysical opposition to it. Accordingly, he represents his own view as overcoming this antithesis. He says, "Or to put it rather differently, what I would suggest is that authority and experience do not stand over against one another in sharp and irreconcilable opposition; authority is the self assertion of the reality of an experience which contains more than any individual experient has succeeded in analyzing out and extricating for himself."¹²

¹¹ Vol. 2, p. 209.

¹² Vol. 2, p. 214.

We have already observed how it is Taylor and not the biblical theist who has set up a false antithesis to begin with. It was he who set up the interpretative activity of the human mind as something independent of the interpretative activity of the divine mind. And if one starts with such a false assumption it is but to be expected that one cannot think of the absolute authority of God over man unless man's mental activity be put to a complete standstill. On the other hand the theistic conception which underlies and forms the foundation of the conception of absolute biblical authority does not entertain a false antithesis to begin with. The very foundation of the concept of biblical authority is that because of God's absolute self-consciousness man's self-conscious activity is always derivative and man's constructive activity operates in the field of God's original constructive activity. Hence absolute authority was man's daily meat and drink when his mind was normal. It was only because of the entrance of sin in the heart of man that it was necessary for this authority of God to come to man in an externally mediated form. But this externally mediated form was necessary because of an ethical and not because of a metaphysical separation between God and man. Accordingly it was necessary that the ethical alienation should be removed in order that the original metaphysical relation should be able to function normally again.

In our defense of the concept of biblical authority, then, it is of the utmost importance that it be brought into relationship with the theistic position that is presupposed by it. So much the argument of Taylor should clearly teach us. It is not till we have shown that the antitheistic assumption of Taylor of an original metaphysical independence of man from God is the source of all the opposition of the idea of biblical authority that we have dealt with these objections in a thorough way. This does not mean that it is of no value to show that particular objections themselves in each case rest upon misunderstanding. But it does mean that the deepest misunderstanding upon which all the objections rest is that of the assumed correlativity of God and man with which antitheistic thought starts upon its way. It is true, in part at least, that Fundamentalism has not always been conscious of this fact. It has sometimes limited its activities to a statement and defense of details without bringing these details into relation with the big issues of metaphysics and epistemology underlying them. But if Taylor's criticism is in a measure justified when we think of Fundamentalism, it is not justified when the historic confessions are taken into consideration. In these confessions the doctrine of biblical authority is not separated from the theistic interpretation of reality. The whole argument about biblical authority would be given a better setting if on the side of the orthodox it were constantly realized that we cannot defend Christianity without in the same breath defending theism, and if on the side of the opponents of Christianity it were realized that in dispensing with Christianity they must also be prepared to sacrifice theism. The orthodox will not see the proper relation between the biblical concept of authority in particular and Christianity in general to the position of theism as a whole, as long as they themselves entertain any of the essentially antitheistic notions about the independence of human thought.

We saw in our historical survey that Lutheran and Arminian epistemology to an extent harbored the false metaphysical dualism that we have now discovered to be the source of the most refined form of opposition to the conception of biblical authority. Hence it is all the more imperative that we realize with ever increasing vividness that it is only an ethical and not a metaphysical situation that makes Scripture necessary. If one begins as, e.g., J. Watson does in his *Theological Institute* by allowing to man some

original interpretative powers as a created being, it is difficult to see how one could afterward attempt to answer the objections of the sort that Taylor has been bringing out. If man is given any original interpretative power to begin with, that is, if man can, in any sense, come into contact with any object of knowledge apart from God, that power can never be taken from him, and if any special revelation should later come to man, it could never be absolute because the interpretative element that man would himself contribute would always introduce the independently contingent.

If one attempts to defend the idea of absolute biblical revelation while he himself stands upon a semi-theistic basis, one will naturally begin to yield to the antitheistic idea that “experience” is the test of truth, without asking what is meant by experience. We can see this in the fact that many good conservative men toy with the words of Coleridge, “The Bible finds men.” This statement may be interpreted theistically, and it may be interpreted antitheistically. As it stands, it is ambiguous. The form of the statement would make one think that the origination has been on the side of God. And if it is interpreted in this way it is of course theistic. However, what Coleridge meant, and what many after him have meant by the phrase, is that the origination lies with man. Man is thought of as the one who must ultimately judge as to what is spiritually most satisfactory for him, and it is this contention that makes the statement ordinarily dangerously antitheistic. It should be clearly understood that if one is to use the phrase in a theistic sense the “me” or the “experient” must be thought of as one who has already been transformed. In other words, only the regenerate can really say that the Bible finds them. To the non-regenerate there is nothing so obnoxious as the surrender the Bible demands of them. If the non-regenerate say that the Bible finds them, it is certain that they have first taken out of the Bible that which makes the Bible what it is, namely, the demand of absolute ethical surrender with which it approaches the “natural man.” Coleridge’s conception comes out of the antitheistic background which thinks God is a symbol, and which reduces Christ to a theologian, as Taylor does also, and reduces the Bible to expert religious opinion.

We may be saved from all this confusion by paying diligent regard to the antitheistic assumption that underlies the objections to biblical authority. If we do this carefully we shall recognize that the complete ethical surrender which the Bible demands of sinful “experience” is possible only because there is no underlying metaphysical separation between God and man. One who holds to an original metaphysical independence of man cannot afterward think of any complete ethical alienation between God and man. Daily experience can teach us this lesson. Only where an original close relation exists is it possible for strong ethical alienation to appear. A divorce is the bitterest alienation among human beings. At least it was. And only because marriages are no longer “made in heaven” is it that divorce has lost its bitter sting. So also if I am originally a creature totally dependent upon God and if I then sin against him, the ethical surrender is possible and imperative if man is to be saved. On the other hand, if I am to begin with a semi-independent being, it is much my own business what I want to do, and though God may have some claim on me and be of a different opinion than I on the question of obedience to him, he cannot demand from me a complete ethical surrender.

Summing up what we may learn from an argument such as that developed by Taylor, we find that the ordinary objections to the idea of an absolute biblical authority have as their foundation an assumed antitheistic metaphysic. If one begins by assuming that bare possibility is the matrix from which time reality has somehow sprung, it is but natural

that one cannot allow for absolute authority, because in that case there is no absolute God. We are aware of the fact that Taylor would not admit that he begins with the assumption of bare possibility as the most ultimate metaphysical category. In his article "Theism," in Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, he definitely tells us that we must either accept the priority of the actual over the potential or be ready to assert that you can intelligibly conceive of the possible non-existence of any reality whatsoever.¹³ Yet this contention is no more than another indication of the acosmic tendency that we found to be prevalent among Idealist thinkers. The conception of the historical as something independent of God is inconsistent with the idea of the priority of the actual over the potential. It is no wonder then that we notice Taylor slowly giving up his idea of God as pure actuality. In the work we have been considering, God is clearly portrayed as dependent upon the universe.

We now reverse this argument and show from the philosophy of B. P. Bowne that if one begins by reasoning against orthodox Christianity one cannot stop till one has also reasoned against theism.

In his book *Studies in Christianity*, Bowne begins with a discussion of The Christian Revelation. He plunges at once into an enumeration of the difficulties connected with the old theories of the Scriptures as an infallible book. His purpose throughout is to rid Christianity of some of the extreme and unreasonable theories such as plenary inspiration, in order to show that there remains a genuine sense in which we may still speak of a Christian revelation. Bowne entertains the common liberal idea that the moral consciousness of man as he is can be taken as the standard of ethical and religious truth.

Bowne's first conclusion with respect to the Bible is that "The Christian revelation, then, is not the Bible, though it is in the Bible."¹⁴ Bowne has here clearly made the choice for the consciousness of man as the standard by which the Scriptures are to be judged. If it be asked what is the standard of the moral consciousness to be, Bowne, as is usual with liberal writers, appeals to the person of Jesus. But this clearly does not help, because we know nothing of Jesus except through the Bible, while if we take the Bible testimony with respect to Jesus we have a Jesus who demands absolute surrender of the moral consciousness to God, to himself, and to the Apostles who spoke in his name, so that we are back again at the place from which we started. If the consciousness of man is taken as the judge of Scripture instead of the Scripture as the judge of the consciousness of man, there is nothing but to go to the limit with this line of reasoning and reduce Christ to a human person and God to a correlative of man. It is this that we see happening in the writings of Bowne. Let us note briefly how Bowne proceeds on this downward path.

Speaking of the heathen he says, "They do not need the Bible considered as a book. They need the Christian way of thinking about God and his purposes concerning man; and they need the Bible only as it helps them to this view."¹⁵ But if this is all the heathen need, there must be someone to interpret to them what the Bible teaches about the Christian way of thinking about God. And this interpreter must, of course, be a liberal. Bowne says, "If the Hindu mind could be swept clean or, all its religious conceptions and their place taken by the ideas of the Lord's Prayer and the Sermon on the Mount, it would

¹³ p. 278.

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

¹⁵ p. 10.

be for India a blessing great beyond all comparison.”¹⁶ By this sort of limitation Bowne thinks he has saved the pagan mind from contact with the artificial and wholly unnecessary notion of the forensic conceptions that Paul entertains about the righteousness of Christ. He thinks the matter has then been lifted to a truly ethical plane.

We are adducing this matter here for no other immediate purpose than to indicate that the moral consciousness is waxing more and more independent of the Scripture as it learns to take out of it what it likes, and to leave what it doesn't like. And it begins to appear pretty definitely what it does not like. It does not like anything in the Bible that speaks explicitly of the necessity of complete ethical self-surrender to Christ and the Scripture as an absolute authority.

It does not take very long before the figure of God begins to appear in a different light. The first glimpses that we get of the new God is that he is “The Almighty Friend and Lover of Men, the Chief of Burden-bearers, and the Leader of all in self-sacrifice.”¹⁷ Thus in the first 25 pages it already appears what Bowne himself regards as involved in the rejection of complete biblical authority. It involves the rejection of the atonement. Man is not a sinner against his Creator, but an unfortunate and helpless creature in an evil universe. It involves secondly the conception of Christ as the wisest of maxim makers instead of as the only begotten of the Father. All that man needs is some advice, and Jesus amply furnishes that. It involves the notion of the finite God who is in a Universe that is greater than both himself and man. Such a God will not call his rational creatures to an account for their sins. They have not really sinned against him. Instead he sets a marvelous example of doing all he can to help others. As the royal monarch he is the first to aid the great drive to relieve the depression that has somewhat fallen upon the universe.

In these few pages then we already find the whole of the quick descent to chaos once the conception of Bible authority is thrown overboard. *Per aspera ad astra* was no doubt Bowne's motto, but *Facilis Descensus ad Averno* has been the result of his effort to improve upon the consistent Christian theistic conception of authority.

Bowne warns against setting up any *a priori* doctrine of inspiration. “What inspiration is must be learned from what it does. We have no *a priori* conception of inspiration from which we can infer its essential nature.”¹⁸ This statement is in line with Bowne's constant emphasis upon the contention that in history lies the test of the truth of any doctrine. In a general way he brings this out by saying, “After all, fruit is the final test; when any religious system has had a people under its influence for ages, it may rightly be judged by its fruits.”¹⁹ He next warns us not to spin out an *a priori* theory of atonement after the fashion of Anselm, but to stay close to the facts. The older theory of substitution he speaks of as “a fictitious haggling with abstract and fictitious justice.”²⁰ Again he says, “How then, are the sins of the world to be taken away? This question in a forensic sense we dismiss altogether as being fictitious.”²¹ From all this we may learn

¹⁶ p. 16.

¹⁷ p. 25.

¹⁸ p. 29.

¹⁹ p. 17.

²⁰ p. 162.

²¹ p. 160.

that what Bowne thinks of as being a false *a priori* argument is any argument that seeks to link up any one or all of the historical phenomena with the conception of an absolute God. If the whole of the truth of Christianity can be tested by the fruits it bears in this life, it is clear that the chief fruit of Christianity, which is that of eternal glory, must be left out of consideration. In that case, the temporal has become the standard of the eternal instead of the eternal the standard of the temporal. Moreover, if the moral consciousness is without qualification held up as the judge of the fruits of Christianity, it follows that the Bible claim to be the judge of the moral consciousness must first be abandoned.

Bowne has virtually embraced a Pragmatist view of history. It is only because of results that we see in the present that the facts of the past have significance for us. All that past facts may serve for, as far as we are concerned, is to be carriers of new ideas. "We must see that the revelation consists essentially in the new ideas concerning God and his will for men, and that all else—the history and the writing—are but means of setting forth and preserving these ideas." Or again, "If Christianity were not a world power, a great spiritual force here and now, its origin would be a matter of profound indifference, and nothing that happened thousands of years ago would ever make it credible to us."²² Now it is true that Bowne denies this. No fact of history is without its influence on other facts of history, because the whole of history is connected by virtue of the plan of God. For Bowne, the supreme fact of history, namely, the incarnation, might conceivably have no effect on later facts of history. In order to entertain such an idea at all one must be prepared to reject *in toto* the biblical concept of Christ as standard at the center of history, as the hub about which all things revolve. The same rejection of the Christ of the Scriptures is involved in Bowne's reduction of every fact of history to a bearer of some new ideas. This conception makes the uniqueness of Christ once for all impossible.

Nothing short of a completely Pragmatic concept of history is involved in the objection which Bowne raises against the idea of absolute biblical authority, on the ground that language is necessarily symbolical. He says, "The nature of language itself makes it impossible that there should be any hard and fast objective interpretation. The necessarily metaphorical nature of all language applying to spiritual relations bars the way."²³ But the physical universe is not something that exists apart from the spiritual. God has laid a relationship between the physical and the spiritual inasmuch as both have their origin and unity in him. It follows from this that the spiritual can be truly though symbolically expressed by images borrowed from the physical. It is this conception that underlies Jesus' use of parabolic teaching. The vine and the branches give metaphorical but truthful expression to the spiritual union between himself and his own, because the physical is created for the purpose of giving expression to the spiritual. We find then that one must first presuppose the antitheistic conception that nature is independent of God, before one can urge the argument that symbolical language is necessarily to an extent untruthful.

The same thing holds with respect to the objection that we cannot today accept the thought patterns of the past. Bowne rejects the whole of the theory of the atonement on the ground that it is couched in the terminology of an age given to legalism and impersonalism. But one cannot urge this objection unless one has first assumed that

²² p. 41, p. 42.

²³ p. 36.

history is a loose stream of disparate elements. Historic Christianity, on the other hand, maintains that history is connected because the whole of it expresses the one grand plan and purpose of God. And if this is true, there is no longer any objection to having one historical fact be determinative for all other historical facts, nor is there then any objection to having one thought pattern express an absolute truth. As a matter of fact, there are then certain thought patterns that can never grow out of date. And of these the legal relationship between God and man is one. The reason for this is that man is a responsible creature. Man is responsible to God who is righteous. And since the thought patterns of God do not change, neither do those of the creatures that are related to him. The whole contention of Bowne and many others that we are today using ethical instead of legal thought patterns is thoroughly false. The very contention of theism is that there can be no truly ethical thought patterns unless they are based upon legal thought patterns. God is man's law-giver. In other words, the antithesis made between the legal and the ethical is an artificial one which is born of an antitheistic motif.

When we look at the chapter Bowne has on Incarnation and Atonement we see still more clearly that there is no stopping short of a complete rejection of theism if one begins to rebel against the idea of a biblical authority.

Bowne needs but one page to refute completely the whole of the Chalcedon Creed. Its statement that Christ has assumed human nature is summarily disposed of by saying, "That nature is not a separate something to be put on like a garment, or joined on by some metaphysical hyphen. It is simply the general law of humanity and if any being should become subject, to that general law he would to that extent assume human nature."²⁴ For the church doctrine of the Christ as a divine person who has assumed a human nature, Bowne, without any argument, substitutes the conception of the Christ as a human person. Now it surely is as clear as can be that here he has exchanged theism for antitheism. If Christ was a human person it means that the divine has merged itself in the human and the eternal has merged itself in the temporal. It is of course very easy to point out the difficulties that are involved in the Chalcedon doctrine as far as its conception of the relation of the eternal and the temporal is concerned. But it would seem that anyone rejecting the position because of these difficulties should substitute some other doctrines less beset with difficulties. And this Bowne does not attempt to do. The only substitute Bowne offers in this book and in his other books is that of a Pragmatist philosophy for which the difference between time and eternity is wiped away.

The same naivete that we notice in Bowne's rejection of the Chalcedon Creed appears again when he gives us his theory of the atonement. We expect that it will be some form of the moral influence theory. That is the only theory that fits with an essentially Pragmatic conception of history. And a moral influence theory of atonement we do find. He disposes of the substitutionary idea with the same ease with which he had disposed of the Chalcedon Creed. He tells the story Coleridge told of a young man who offered to substitute himself for a wayward son. The complete rejection by the mother of any such idea proves conclusively, thinks Bowne, that substitution is out of the question in moral matters. He says, "It shows how odious and abominable are the results when we discuss this doctrine in terms of things and apply them to the relations of moral persons; and also how utterly impossible it is that anyone should ever take another's place in his moral

²⁴ p. 90.

relations.”²⁵ Again we ask what Bowne substitutes for that which he so lightheartedly throws overboard. The only substitute we get for the resubstitutionary theory of atonement is that of a vague moral universe in which there is somehow a large quantity of evil and in which God and Christ are doing their best to help things along. God is the wisest and most powerful of all beings. Naturally we should expect that he would set a good example. In the moral world he that is greatest of all should be the servant of all.²⁶ Having rejected the idea of substitutionary atonement, Bowne goes on to reject the whole of theism. The theory of the moral universe that he proposes for adoption—in which God and man find themselves—is nothing short of the pagan ideas of Plato over again.

In spite of the fact that Bowne has been an ardent advocate of a personalistic philosophy, he has really advocated an impersonalism. The determinative question here is whether the personality of God is thought of as the most ultimate reality. According to Plato, impersonal law is above God. And every system of thought that has in some form or other maintained that there is any reality that is as ultimate as God, has followed Plato in his ultimate impersonalism. This is what Bowne has constantly done. We have seen it in his every argument against absolute authority. He takes for granted that the universe, at least the moral universe, has laws that are above God. He argues exactly as Bosanquet and the other Idealists do when they talk about law in general without asking whether God is the source of law, all the while taking for granted that law is above God. Bowne takes for granted that the moral consciousness of man functions apart from God. In his *Principles of Ethics* he says, “If then in hunting up our genealogical record we should come upon subhuman ancestors of arboreal habits, we should have no occasion, as philosophers, to be startled, or to tremble for the validity of the multiplication table, or for the golden rule.”²⁷ According to Bowne the moral consciousness of man can function even if it is to be placed in a completely impersonal atmosphere. The existence of God is of secondary and not of primary importance for Bowne. “Ethics begins independently but must finally be affected by our metaphysics.”²⁸ And this has been the basis of his attack on the conceptions of biblical authority, the Chalcedon Creed and the substitutionary theory of atonement, namely, that an act to be personal must be unipersonal. He has assumed that constructive activity of the human mind cannot rest upon a more ultimate constructive activity of God or Christ. Thus he has rejected *in toto* the only completely personalistic system of thought that exists, namely, Christian theism, which placed man from the outset in a completely personalistic atmosphere and never for a moment takes him out of this atmosphere.

Finally, we must once more stress the fact that this whole impersonalistic philosophy has been shown to be implied in the rejection of absolute biblical authority. If one is interested in holding to the orthodox theory of atonement, he may well guard himself against the form of argument Bowne adduces against the conception of biblical authority. If one is still interested in maintaining the orthodox doctrine of the divinity of Christ, he may well guard himself against Bowne’s arguments against biblical authority. If one is still interested in maintaining the orthodox conception of God as being back of the

²⁵ p. 138.

²⁶ p. 98.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

²⁸ *Principles of Ethics*, p. 17.

universe instead of being immersed in it, he may well guard himself against Bowne's argument against biblical authority. None of those interested in any of these matters can allow Bowne or anyone else to start with a course of argumentation in which the moral consciousness of man is taken as the final standard of judgment. Bowne's whole system of thought is based upon the assumption that regeneration is nothing at all. He makes the sinner the judge of holy things. Only the Christian does truly know reality.

Chapter 14:

The Starting Point Of Christian Theistic

Epistemology:

E. The Subject-subject Relation

In the preceding chapters in which we have dealt with the starting point of knowledge, there is one thought that has occurred constantly, namely, that antitheistic and anti-Christian writers have at the outset of their argument taken their position for granted. Now if this is true, the question that comes up at once is whether it is then of any use to argue about the Christian theistic position at all with those who are of contrary convictions.

It is this problem that must be discussed under the heading of the subject-subject relation. Before doing so, let us bring afresh to our minds what we have found so far in the matter of the starting point of knowledge. We must do this inasmuch as we come now to the climax of the whole question, and we must have all the factors clearly in mind.

We have so far discussed the question of the object of knowledge. Under that heading we saw that we may speak of the object of knowledge as such and that we must also consider the relation of one object to other objects. And if we consider the relation of one object to another object as they exist simultaneously, we have the question of space. On the other hand, when we consider the object of knowledge in its relation to other objects of knowledge that have existed at an earlier time or will exist at a later time, the whole question of time is up for consideration. The final question, then, when considering the object of knowledge, is whether the spatial-temporal universe exists by itself or whether we must presuppose the existence of God in order to think intelligently of the spatial-temporal world. We found that, according to Christian theism, every individual object of knowledge to be known at all must be known in its relation to God. Then if one spatial object is to be known in its relation to another spatial object, the connection must be thought of as made by God. In other words, the universals of knowledge have their source in God. Similarly, if one object of knowledge is to be known in its relation to other objects of knowledge that have existed or will exist at another period of time, we must think of the connection as being made by the plan of God.

On all these points the antitheist not only took the opposite position, but he took the opposite position for granted as being so obviously the true position that he did not at all need to discuss it. The antitheist took for granted the self-existence of the objects of knowledge to begin with. He speaks of them as the “facts” from which it is obviously necessary that we should begin as from something ultimate, for it is they that need explanation. In the second place, it was taken for granted that if one object of knowledge was to be known in its relation to other objects of knowledge, it is entirely unnecessary to resort to God to furnish the connecting links. These connecting links either exist between the objects themselves so that they are given with the facts, or the human mind furnishes them. In other words, the universals are as ultimate as the facts. They think nobody would dream of the law of self-contradiction as having anything to do with God. They hold this to be so patently absurd as to require no more than ridicule for disproof. Similarly, if one object of knowledge is to be known in its relation to other objects of knowledge that have

occurred or will occur at another time, it is taken for granted that the connection is somehow found between the facts themselves without the necessity of reference to any mind, or if reference to mind is considered necessary, it is at least taken for granted that the human mind can furnish the universal in this case also.

From these assumptions of antitheistic thought it follows that if God is to have any significance for the objects of knowledge at all he must be reduced to one individual object of knowledge among many others. Christian theism on the contrary says that God is the one supreme object of knowledge. He is the most ultimate fact and the most ultimate universal. It is from him that all facts and all universals that we ordinarily deal with derive their meaning.

On the question of the subject of knowledge, we found the same sort of situation. In the first place, Christian theism maintains that the subject of knowledge owes its existence to God. Accordingly, all its interpretative powers are from God and must therefore be reinterpretedative powers. In the second place, when the subject of knowledge is to come into contact with the object of knowledge, the connection is possible only because God has laid it there. In other words, the subject-object relation has its validity via God. Theologically expressed, we say that the validity of human knowledge in general rests upon the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. In addition to this, Christian theism maintains that since sin has come into the world, no subject of knowledge can really come into contact with any object of knowledge, in the sense of interpreting it properly, unless the Scripture give the required light and unless the regeneration by the Spirit give a new power of sight.

In opposition to this, the antitheist holds it to be self-evident that the subject of knowledge exists in its own right and can interpret truly without any reference to God. The "natural man" claims to be able to interpret nature and history properly without the need of any reference to God, to Scripture, or to regeneration.

It follows from this clear-cut difference, a difference that goes to the bottom so that not a single "fact" or "law" is left for neutral territory, that the one group must naturally regard the other as being blind. Accordingly, it is when the question of the subject-subject relation comes up, that this problem as to what one group thinks of the other group, becomes acute. The reason why Christians have not always been alive to this difficulty is that they have not always been consistent in drawing the distinction between the Christian theistic and the antitheistic system of epistemology clearly and fully. All too often they have allowed a hazy fringe to remain when it came to the question of whether unbelievers really know material facts aright. Christianity has all too often been interpreted in a narrowly soteriological fashion. Accordingly, the territory of nature and of history was left vacant for any first comer to occupy. If, however, we take Christianity seriously with its philosophy of nature and of history, it becomes at once apparent that a life and death struggle is set in motion.

It follows then that the question of the subject-subject relation cannot be discussed in peace. There is, of course, a sense in which this can be done. In the first place, when the question of the subject-subject relation is limited to that of one regenerated subject to another regenerated subject the answer is not difficult. In that case, the communication between one subject and another subject is possible through God once more. Taken in the soteriological sense, we say that it is the Holy Spirit who is the agent of communication, and that communication is effected as communion of the saints through the mystic union

with Christ. Taken in a more comprehensive and cosmic sense, this communion does not stop till it has enveloped heaven and earth. There is then a Christian consciousness which is aware of the fact that it alone has the true interpretation of nature and of history. All too often it happens that scientists who are Christians are not aware of this Christian consciousness and, therefore, do not place their labors at the foot of the cross. On the other hand, all too often theologians have been to blame for this neglect on the part of scientists because they have spoken as though Christianity has no direct bearing upon science.

In the second place, there can be a relatively peaceful discussion of the question of the subject-subject relation, if the question is limited to the relation of one unregenerate subject to another unregenerate subject. In that case there may still be many differences on detail such as those between realism and Idealism, but these differences are small in comparison to the great unity with which they all agree that wherever the connecting link between subjects of knowledge may have to be sought, it need not be sought in God.

What we must deal with then is the clash between the two great opposing systems of epistemology. We now ask not how the two should reason together, but whether they should seek to reason together.

For the antitheist, this question is not difficult. For him the only cause of our blindness is that we have been brought up in unfortunate circumstances. It may take quite some time and may often require measures of force as well as of ridicule to force upon us the light that they claim to have. But there is for them no inherent difficulty such as we have with respect to them. With respect to them, we have the conviction that they will not see our point of view till the Holy Spirit pleases to regenerate them. So the question narrows itself down to this, whether we shall, in view of our convictions with respect to the necessity of regeneration, nevertheless continue to reason with unbelievers.

We shall do well to consider briefly the answers that have been given to this question. In the first place, let us note that there has been a large group of Christian theistic writers who have readily answered our question in the affirmative. We need only to recall that the Arminian theologians, whose writings we have had under review, thought it altogether proper and useful to make an intellectual defense of Christianity. In addition to this, we observe that the English-American tradition of Calvinism, strongly as it has been influenced by the method employed in Butler's *Analogy*, has been much concerned about apologetics in all of its writings. The often very sharp distinction made between natural and revealed theology by both Arminians and Calvinists points to a conviction that it is possible to establish at least the truths of natural theology by sheer force of argument, even if it requires faith to accept the truths of revealed theology.

We may perhaps profitably take the brief discussion of Dr. Charles Hodge in his *Systematic Theology* as one of the characteristic ways of reasoning about the place and function of reason in connection with the truths of Christianity.

The first function of reason, he says, is that of the reception of revelation. Revelation is addressed to rational beings. "This is what theologians are accustomed to call the *usus organicus seu instrumentalis, rationis*. About this there can be no dispute."¹

On this question, it would seem that the contention of Dr. Hodge is true enough in itself, but that it should be remembered that there has, as a matter of fact, been much

¹ Vol. 1, p. 50.

dispute even about this function of reason. What is meant by reason here is the intellect. And it is of some significance in an age of anti-intellectualism that we assure ourselves carefully about the relation of the intellect to the other aspects of human personality. There is an anti-Christian mysticism that has discounted the intellect, and there is also a Christian mysticism that has discounted the intellect. Of both of these Hodge speaks at length in other connections. We need only to recall that against non-Christian mysticisms of all sort, Christian theism cannot but maintain that the intellect is an aspect of human personality that can never be ignored when the question of the reception of revelation is considered. We cannot set aside or override the human intellect at any time or anywhere. We believe that to an extent the most recent psychology, with its emphasis upon the conception of organism, is realizing this. At any rate, it is clearly implied in the conception of man as created in the image of God.

It is well, however, to be on our guard against over-emphasis on this matter. Roman Catholic writers naturally rebel against the anti-intellectualism of our day, and accordingly write against it, as for instance, in the case of Fulton J. Sheen. Still it should be remembered that what has shown itself to be a dangerous intellectualism in Roman Catholic epistemology, appears afresh in Sheen's book, *God and Intelligence*. What is meant by a dangerous intellectualism is not a somewhat undue emphasis upon the intellect to the detriment of the emotional or volitional life of human personality. That is not a serious matter. That depends to a large extent upon temperament. What is meant is the setting up of the intellect as something that is in a measure independent of God. This is done in Platonic philosophy. And this has been done historically to some extent by Roman Catholic theologians. And if this is done it is at bottom as great a danger as when the emotional life is set up in independence of God. The important matter is that the whole consciousness of man, whether it be his intellect or his will or his emotion, be thought of as completely reinterpetative.

This leads us to a second remark on the *usus instrumentalis* of the intellect. It should not be forgotten that the revelation of God comes to the whole consciousness of man. It is not the impartation of intellectual truths only that we meet in the Christian revelation. There is a constant danger lurking here. We tend so easily to think of Christianity as a series of intellectual propositions only. But the intellectual element cannot be separated from the factual element. Redemption is a mighty fact that addresses itself to the whole of the human personality. Accordingly, it is impossible to speak of the intellect *per se*, without taking into consideration whether it is the intellect of a regenerated person or of a non-regenerated person. The human intellect, wherever it appears, appears either as an aspect of a Christian personality, or as an aspect of a non-Christian personality.

The Paradox theology is subject to the same criticism to which the position of Sheen is subject, namely, that it is really a shift from one antitheistic position to another antitheistic position. Barth and his school would seem to do away with the *usus instrumentalis* of the intellect altogether. God is said to reveal himself in spite of man's intellect. But, strange to say, in this way Barth has really once more made the human consciousness apart from God, the standard of truth. That this is so may be observed from the fact that Barth's position involves the denial of the traditional conception of the absolute self-consciousness of God. If God is thought of as absolutely self-conscious, man must be thought of as created in his image. And if man is created in God's image, his intellect is certainly finite, so that it cannot be ultimately interpretative, but it is

equally certain the avenue by which revelation must come to man's self-consciousness. One cannot say that the human intellect is paradoxical and mean therewith self-contradictory, unless one surrounds man with complete irrationality. And if man is surrounded by complete irrationality, it is, after all, the human consciousness that sets up shop for itself apart from God.

It appears then that even when we discuss what seems to be such a self-evident matter as the *usus instrumentalis* of the intellect of man, we must be on our guard against (a) all forms of antitheistic anti-intellectualism, and (b) all forms of antitheistic intellectualisms. Then when we are in Christian territory, it is only a matter of the correct psychological emphasis. Only in this case too there is still an epistemological interest, inasmuch as it often happens that a wrong psychological emphasis all too readily lends to, and is already a symptom of, a wrong epistemological emphasis.

The second point raised by Hodge is of more direct significance for our purposes. He says that in addition to the *usus instrumentalis* of the intellect, "Christians concede to reason the *judicium contradictionis*, that is, the prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible. If it is seen to be impossible, no authority and no amount or kind of evidence can impose the obligation to receive it as true."² The importance of this point for the whole of the theology of Hodge can be observed if it be noted that it is this conception of the function of reason that underlies all his refutation of antitheistic and anti-Christian systems of thought. So, for example, when he is combating Materialism, he heads some of the sections of his refutation by such subjects as these: "Materialism contradicts the facts of Consciousness"; "Materialism contradicts the Truths of Reason"; "Materialism inconsistent with the Facts of Experience."³

Now with respect to this matter of the reason as the *judicium contradictionis*, we believe that it is in consonance with the genius of the theology Hodge is setting forth to introduce more clearly the distinctions we have spoken of above, namely, that we must always ask which reason or intellect it is that we are speaking of—that of the regenerate or that of the unregenerate. That this is so can be more easily observed today than it could fifty years ago. It is today more evident than ever before that it is exactly on those most fundamental matters such as possibility and probability that there is the greatest difference of opinion between theists and antitheists. We may take for example the most fundamental matters which Hodge adduces in order to prove that to reason belongs the prerogative of *judicium contradictionis*. He gives us some examples of what reason would naturally regard as impossible, so that revelation could not make us believe it. He says: "That is impossible which involves a contradiction; as, that a thing is and is not; that right is wrong and wrong right. (2) It is impossible that God should do, approve or command what is morally wrong. (3) It is impossible that he should require us to believe that which contradicts any of the laws of belief which he has impressed upon our nature. (4) It is impossible that one truth should contradict another. It is impossible, therefore, that God should reveal anything as true which contradicts any well authenticated truth, whether of intuition, experience, or previous revelation."⁴

² Vol. 1, p. 51.

³ Vol. 1, pp. 276–282.

⁴ Vol. 2, p. 51.

The first one of these matters enumerated by Hodge strikes at the root of the whole contention since it brings up the matter of predication itself. The question is what can be and what cannot be intelligibly said about anything. When we take this question out of its limitation to physical objects where it seems to have such an evident application, we find that there is no more fundamental difference between theism and antitheism than on the matter of predication. Theism holds that all predication presupposes the existence of God as a self-conscious being, while antitheism holds that predication is possible without any reference to God. In fact all non-Christian views, in effect, maintain that man has no freedom to interpret reality properly so long as the God of orthodox Christianity is in absolute control of history. This at once gives to the terms 'is' and 'is not' quite different connotations. For the antitheist these terms play upon the background of bare possibility. Hence the theist must contend that 'is' and 'is not' may very well be reversed upon an antitheistic basis. The theist must contend that the antitheist has, in effect, fundamentally denied the very law of contradiction, inasmuch as the law of contradiction has its foundation in the nature of God. On the other hand, the antitheist from his standpoint will not hesitate to say that the theist has denied the law of contradiction. For him, the belief in an absolutely self-conscious God is tantamount to the rejection of the law of contradiction, inasmuch as such a belief does not place 'is' and 'is not' in a correlative basis. The conception of an absolutely self-conscious God definitely limits the field of the possible to that which is according to the will and nature of God. We saw that the logic of Bosanquet, to use the reasoning of one who has most thoroughly investigated the matter of predication, could not allow for affirmation unless there should be an equally ultimate negation. This position was involved in the metaphysical contention that reality must be both essentially analytic and essentially synthetic. If then there is such a fundamentally exclusive difference of opinion on the question of what the law of contradiction itself is between theists and non-theists, it is quite out of the question to speak of the law of contradiction as something that all men have in common.

To be sure, all men have the law of contradiction in common in the sense that all men, as creatures made in the image of God, cannot but function in a universe that embodies the ordinances of God. But non-Christians do not believe in such a universe. They believe that man is autonomous, that he is surrounded by a world of pure contingent factuality, and that he himself must seek to impose order upon pure factual contingency by means of laws of logic that exist in themselves. Accordingly, the Christian, having opposite views of reality, has opposite views of the nature and function of logic in relation to reality.

In consonance with this we may call attention to the fact that on the question of possibility the same difference of opinion exists that we found on the matter of predication. For the theist, possibility has its source in God, while for the antitheist, God has his source in possibility. Hence, what one will deem most possible, the other will consider altogether impossible.

Similarly, once more with the question of probability. For theism, God is the source of the probable. For antitheism, the probable is the source of God. Hence, what one thinks altogether probable, the other will think altogether improbable.

The reason why these differences do not appear on the surface is that, as a matter of fact, all men are human beings who are created in the image of God. Even the non-regenerate have by virtue of common grace some remnant of what should be though it is

not, the general consciousness of mankind. Accordingly, it happens that there is an incidental agreement on many matters of the moral life. It is in a general sense true that everyone holds murder to be wrong. But the agreement is no more than incidental. A theist holds murder to be wrong because it violates the justice of God. A non-Christian holds murder to be wrong because it is not in the best interest of the human race. According to theism, the idea of justice has its foundation in the nature of God. According to Pragmatism, the idea of justice is a historical development in the consciousness of the race. Accordingly, there is nothing that the two conceptions of justice have in common except the name. "What is morally wrong" is therefore not a phrase into which everybody spontaneously pours the same thought content. The agreement on this matter then between theists and antitheists, in addition to being merely incidental, is also merely formal and abstract. This formal and abstract agreement we expect because man, by virtue of his creation in God's image, cannot be metaphysically alienated from God, however much he may be ethically alienated.

In the second place, we may mention as a reason why these fundamental differences are not easily observed, the fact that the incidental and abstract agreement between theists and antitheists on moral and intellectual matters usually deals with things that are proximate rather than with things that are ultimate. When a theist and an antitheist together look at a cow, it is quite true that they will be in hearty agreement that the cow cannot both be and not be. But let them ask the question of "to be or not to be" about God, and it appears at once that the antitheist says that God once was not and now is. In other words, he believes in accordance with the tenets of his system, in a finite God. And if it then be said that even the antitheist will admit that God cannot both be and not be at this moment, it is true but meaningless, because it is complete abstraction that can be of no influence on life. The real question is whether we can intelligibly think of the non-existence of God. If we maintain that we can, affirmation and negation are lost in a shoreless sea of possibility, so that the law of contradiction does not mean the same thing that it did before.

With this basic distinction between theism and antitheism in mind, we may briefly consider the other matters that Hodge brings up in this connection. "It is impossible that God should do, approve or command what is morally wrong." If this is taken as something more than a mere abstract statement, there is a fundamental difference between theists and antitheists as to what is morally wrong. Antitheism has a relativist theory of morality, while theism has an absolutist theory of morality. The non-Christian can hold that what was once wrong is wrong no more, or that what once was not wrong is now wrong. Now to an extent a theist may allow for differences of circumstances, but the difference between a relativist and an absolutist morality remains. Accordingly, the really important issue cannot be decided by any such thing as a general moral consciousness.

Hodge says further that it is impossible that God should command anything that "contradicts any of the laws of belief which he has impressed upon our nature." That is true for the theist, but as for the antitheist, he does not believe that God has impressed any laws of belief upon our nature. Accordingly, a theist could say of an antitheist that upon his basis anything is possible because our nature may change into the opposite of itself. In other words, upon an antitheistic basis there is no ground for any such thing as a definite nature which contains unchangeable laws. If laws do not change, it is merely a matter of chance.

Still further, the proofs adduced by Hodge in order to establish the *judicium contradictionis* of reason themselves indicate the necessity of introducing the distinction we have made. He tells us that, in the first place, the *judicium contradictionis* is true from the nature of the case. He says, "Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot possibly be true.... We are consequently not only authorized but required to pronounce anathema an apostle or an angel from heaven, who should call upon us to receive as a revelation from God anything absurd or wicked, or inconsistent with the intellectual or moral nature with which he has endowed us."⁵ Now the first statement is no doubt true as it stands. But we have seen that the Christian and the non-Christian have quite different ideas about what is possible. Many a materialist has been so firmly convinced of his position that he thought he would be involved in a contradiction if he should accept the bodily resurrection of Christ. This shows that the abstract statement made can have no indifferent application. In the second place, we have shown that the Christian and the non-Christian have quite the opposite ideas about what is immoral or against our intellectual natures. Many Idealists say outright that it is a contradiction in terms to say that one believes in an absolute God and also believes that the created universe adds to the glory of God. To them this is as manifestly impossible and absurd as it would be to try to add water to a pail that is already filled. Yet a Christian's contention is that this is not a self-contradiction, but something which is merely beyond our understanding. So again we conclude that the law abstractly stated has no application, while if taken concretely, the difference between the regenerate and the non-regenerate consciousness is at once of the utmost importance.

The second reason adduced by Hodge is that Scripture itself tells us that we may not accept the religion of pagans, etc., because the religion of pagans involves absurdities and cannot be true. "Paul does the same thing when he calls upon us to pronounce even an angel accursed, who should teach another gospel."⁶ But plainly Scripture is speaking to the people of God, that is, it addresses itself to the regenerate consciousness when it speaks in this way. Otherwise, the statement of Paul itself would involve a contradiction. Paul could not possibly be speaking to both the regenerate and the non-regenerate consciousness, because these two entertained mutually exclusive gospels. The non-regenerate would have to declare the true gospel anathema, while the regenerate consciousness would have to declare the false gospel anathema. This shows the utter inapplicability of the law of contradiction, abstractly stated. And if the non-regenerate consciousness were told to apply the law of contradiction as they see it to the gospel as they see it, it would mean that they were told to reject the gospel.

Finally Hodge tells us, "The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is confidence in God. We can neither believe nor know anything unless we confide in those laws of belief which God has implanted in our nature. If we can be required to believe what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are broken up."⁷ This statement too is true. Yet it must be understood as applying only to those who are willing to recognize that it is God who has implanted laws of belief in our nature. To be sure, none have any right to destroy the

⁵ Vol. 1, p. 52.

⁶ Vol. 1, p. 52.

⁷ Vol. 1, p. 53.

laws of belief implanted in their nature by God. We believe that, as a matter of fact, God has implanted such laws in man, and that no man has the right to break those laws, just as we believe that no man has the right to sin. But men too often call, and in themselves always do call, the good evil and the evil good. And it is this fact that makes it impossible now to appeal to such a consciousness as a judge of any moral or ultimate intellectual questions, unless this consciousness is regenerated. The foundations have, as a matter of fact, been destroyed as far as sinful man is concerned. Accordingly, the sinner must be placed upon a new foundation before appeal can be made to him as to one fully competent to judge.

Our conclusion, then, can be no other than that if the truth that Hodge wants to bring out is not to be obscured, it is necessary to bring it in relation with the considerations just now advanced. Before we seek to do so we must turn to those who have given due consideration to the distinction between the regenerate and the non-regenerate consciousness, but who have drawn from it the conclusion that it is, therefore, really useless for the regenerate consciousness to reason with the non-regenerate consciousness.

The great exponent of this view is Abraham Kuyper. In his *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology* he has worked out his conception of a two-fold science on the basis of the two-fold consciousness. Now we cannot do more than barely touch upon the view there expounded. The main point is that it brings out strongly the effect of sin upon the consciousness of man. Kuyper tries to show that the non-regenerate man, even when a scientist, is constantly laboring under the prejudices of hatred against God. Accordingly, if man is to see things aright, he must be regenerated. It follows that the non-regenerate cannot understand the regenerate in all their purposes and strivings, and the arguments that seem sound to the regenerate will seem unsound to the non-regenerate, and vice versa. This seems to make argument useless. Accordingly, Kuyper has assigned a very subordinate part of the theological encyclopedia to the apologist. It is but a subdivision of the various branches of theology. And in addition to this he has limited the task of the apologist to that of a negative defense. Speaking of apologetics, he says, “*Ze is niet diatheitisch, want ze bescreyft het Dogma niet, ze is niet thetisch want, want ze stelt het Dogma niet, maar ze is antithetisch, overmits ze haar pleit ten behoeve van het Dogma voert tegenover hetgeen de pseudo-philosophie tegen het Dogma, zyn gronden of gevolgen, overstelt.*”⁸

We see from this quotation that though Kuyper has strongly emphasized the difference between the two types of consciousness, he does deem it possible to defend the Christian system of thought against unbelief in some way. It is not altogether correct then to say that Kuyper has allowed no place for apologetics, unless it be proved that this statement of his is out of harmony with the main contention of his work. In addition to this, it should be observed that, for a correct understanding of Kuyper’s position, it is necessary to keep in mind that for him the apologist is not the only one that deals with the relation of the Christian theistic conception of reality to the antitheistic conception of reality. There is also the Christian philosopher. And to the Christian philosopher a much more important task is assigned than to the apologist. The apologist has, according to Kuyper, nothing to do with the so-called *Prinzipienlehre*. As far as the fundamental principles of knowledge must be discussed and brought into relation with the

⁸ Vol. 3, p. 459.

fundamental principles of the non-regenerate consciousness, that is the task of Christian philosophy. Kuyper says, “*Voorzoover toch deze principia of algemeene onderstellingen op het verband van de Theologie met de algemeene wetenschap betrekking hebben, hooren ze als ontleend aan de Christelyke Philosophie, in de Encyclopaedie thuis.*”⁹ In addition to this he tells us that the task of comparing the true and the false systems of philosophy also is to be done by the Christian philosopher. Speaking again of apologetics he says, “*... maar zoover ze met de philosophie in conflict komt, staat het niet aan haar om de ware philosophie tegen de pseudo-philosophie over te stellen, wyl deze taak aan de Christelyke Philosophie is aangewezen, maar heeft zezich te bepalen tot het verdedigen van haar eigen positie, voorzoover die door de Pseudo-philosophie in theologics wordt aangerand.*”¹⁰

Finally, we should add to this that in another connection Kuyper says that the task of apologetics is not strictly limited to that of a negative defense. He says, “*Niet enkel ter weerlegging van den tegenstander, maar ter wille van de eere der waarheid, en voor haar eigen rust voert ze haar verweer.*” From these quotations it may be learned that if we gather up the work that Kuyper assigns to Christian philosophy and to apologetics, we come to much the same task that the apologist is given in the English speaking tradition of Reformed theology.

Whatever may be said in favor of making a sharp distinction between the work of a Christian philosopher and an apologist, it is in practice impossible for any Christian apologist to limit his task to that assigned to him by Kuyper. In the first place, the borderline between that which is *in theologics* and that which is *in philosophicis* is so thin that it cannot always be discerned with exactitude. It can be no more than a matter of emphasis. In the second place, one cannot be exclusively defensive. One must also to an extent be thetical, especially when it comes to the matter of *Principienlehr*. The diathetical, the thetical and the antithetical can at most be matters of emphasis. But all this does not touch the main point. The main point is that Kuyper has himself appointed to the Christian consciousness the task of reasoning with the non-Christian consciousness. In addition to that he has often been very much engaged in apologetics in his own reasoning. That is, he has constantly tried to set the whole of the Christian theistic conception of life in contrast with the non-theistic conception of life and has pointed out the advantages of the Christian position. But he has spoken of all this as witnessing to the world rather than reasoning with the world. If we keep in mind in this connection that the position of Hodge and Warfield is also glad to recognize the fact that regeneration is necessary if there is to be a genuine reception of the truth, it appears that the difference is perhaps not as great as it is sometimes said to be. The yes of Hodge and Warfield in answer to the question whether it is possible to reason with the non-regenerate consciousness, and the no of Kuyper, have neither of them been unqualified.

Building then upon both of these traditions, we may briefly indicate what would seem to be the most truly Christian theistic way of stating the relation between the two types of consciousness under discussion. Much, however, remains to be done in the way of a Christian psychology and the development of the doctrine of common grace, before any

⁹ Vol. 3, p. 460.

¹⁰ Vol. 3, p. 258.

really adequate statement of the question can be given. We shall attempt to do no more than give a few suggestions.

In the first place, our discussion has brought out that we must clearly recognize the fact of the fundamental difference between the two types of consciousness. If we do not do this we argue in the blue. It does us no good to talk about reason in the abstract. Such a thing does not exist.

Yet we must recognize the truth contained in the contention that there is a general consciousness of man. We can do this first of all by recognizing that there once was such a consciousness. We must go back to the Adamic consciousness as being the fundamentally human consciousness. We speak now of the Adamic consciousness previous to the entrance of sin in the world. As such it was entirely able to judge, for the good reason that it was not ethically alienated from God. Not as though man's original ethical consciousness was able, by and of itself, to judge between right and wrong. Even before the fall man's ethical consciousness needed the instruction directly given it by God's speaking with man. But because of its inherently right attitude toward God and his revelation, man's moral consciousness could judge between right and wrong. The fact that man was a temporal creature did not hinder him from seeing the truth about the relation of God to the universe. It is true that the range of his knowledge never could be as comprehensive as the range of the knowledge of God. But this was not necessary. Validity did not depend upon range. We cannot say then that because man was a finite creature, he could not relate man properly to the existence of God but had to live by revelation from the outset. There is no such contrast between revelation and reasoning in the case of Adam. He could reason soundly just because he reasoned in an atmosphere of revelation. His very mind with its laws was a revelation of God. Accordingly, he would reason analogically and not univocally. He would always be presupposing God in his every intellectual operation. He did not reason from nature or from himself as existing independently, to God as the "first cause." He reasoned as one seeing all things from the beginning for what they are, i.e., dependent upon God.

As entirely dependent upon God metaphysically and as perfect ethically, man, at the beginning of history, recognized that all about him and all within him was revelational of God. Moreover, from the beginning God spoke with man about his handling of the facts of his space-time environment. Accordingly, Adam reasoned within an environment which was exhaustively revelational, and in obedience to a supernatural word revelation that was supplemental to his created environment. At the beginning, therefore, Adam could not start from the facts of the space-time world and ask himself whether or not they were related to God. A child in a home does not ask whether he has a father.

It follows then that because we hold that there once was no ethical alienation between God and the consciousness of man, but perfect harmony, we can now say that the consciousness of man should be perfect too. In other words, we hold that the Christian theistic system is as a matter of fact the truth. Accordingly, to be truly human one must recognize this truth. Just as God continues in the Scriptures to hold before the sinners' eyes the duty of being perfect though man in himself can never be perfect, so it follows that it is the task of the Christian apologist to hold before man the truth, and God's requirement that men should accept the truth, even though he knows that it requires the grace of God for man to see it. There is in this matter nothing else to consider but the command of God.

Since it is upon God's command that the work must be undertaken, it is God's command that gives one the assurance that the work will accomplish its purpose. Looking at matters by themselves, it would be worse than useless to undertake reasoning with unbelievers. But it is the deep conviction of the total depravity of man that makes one throw his whole reliance upon God in all respects, and not the least in this question of reasoning with unbelievers. It is only he who deeply believes in the total depravity of man that can really preach with conviction that his work will not be in vain. Since he is convinced that the ethical alienation has been against God and against nothing else, he also knows that God is able to remove the ethical alienation. He, therefore, trusts that the Holy Spirit to whom, in the economy of redemption, the task has been assigned of convicting the world of judgment, will use the means of rational argumentation to accomplish his task. This hope is not inconsistent with the conception of the immediacy of the work of the Holy Spirit. That immediacy is complete. Our arguments taken by themselves effect nothing, while the Holy Spirit may very well convict without the use of our argument as he may convict without the use of our preaching. Yet because God is himself a completely rational God and has created us in his image, there is every reason to believe that he will make argumentation effective.

Then further it should be remembered in this connection that because man is a creature of God, it is impossible that he should ever be alienated from God metaphysically. He can never actually become the independent being that he thinks he is. Even the king's heart is in the hand of God as the watercourses. We have seen above that it was exactly because of this fact that man is, as a matter of fact, utterly dependent upon God, that a complete ethical alienation could take place. And it is for the same reason that the ethical alienation can be removed. It is this that had entered so deeply into Augustine's soul when he told God to command him anything whatsoever, because it was God who first had to give what he commanded. And God can give what he commands because man has always remained his creature. There is then even in the consciousness of the non-regenerate a formal power of receptivity. It is this that enables him to consider the Christian theistic position and see that it stands squarely over against his own, and demands of him the surrender of his own position.

Still further we should recall that the ethical alienation, though complete and exclusive in principle, is not yet complete in degree. It is this conception of the relatively good in the absolutely evil that underlies the contention of Hodge that there is a general moral consciousness of man that may be trusted in moral matters to some extent. Everybody admits that murder is wrong. Even the non-regenerate admit that. And though this fact must ever be taken in connection with the fundamental difference between the two types of consciousness, it is, taken together with the metaphysical considerations of the preceding paragraph, once more a formal power of receptivity on the part of the non-regenerate by virtue of which he can consider Christianity as a challenge to himself.

If we thought of the non-regenerate consciousness what it thinks of itself, we should not attempt to reason with it. By that we mean that the non-regenerate consciousness thinks itself to be independent of God metaphysically and ethically. If we thought there was any truth in this we could not argue with it, because with a being metaphysically independent, it would not be possible to come into any intellectual or moral contact at all. We hold, then, that though the ethical miracle of regeneration must occur before argumentation can be really effectual, such an ethical miracle will certainly occur. Not as

though we know this with respect to every individual with whom we reason. To hold that would be to deny the free grace of God in connection with the miracle of regeneration. But we do know that it is true, in a general sense, that God will bring sinners to repentance, since the whole work of redemption would fail if he did not. It is thus in this higher unity of the comprehensive plan and purpose of God which rests upon his being, that we must seek the solution of the difficulty encountered when we think of the complete ethical alienation of man from God, and the efforts of the redeemed to reason with those who are not redeemed. The problem is, after all, logically beset with no greater difficulties than is the whole problem of the relation of the absolute consciousness of God to the finite consciousness of man. It is but a subdivision of this more general problem. The completeness of the ethical alienation of man does not make it any more difficult than before for God to come into moral contact with man. If then we only consider our argumentation as an instrument of the Holy Spirit, we may partake of the assurance that God's power is in our work. On the other hand, the moment we begin to think of our work as something that is independent of the Spirit, we have no more right to expect anything from it.

It is not, then, as though the clear recognition of the fundamental ethical difference between the regenerate and the non-regenerate consciousness implies that there is a two-fold truth, or that we must use one type of argument for one type of consciousness and another type of argument for the other type of consciousness. It is exactly the deep conviction that there is metaphysically only one type of consciousness, and that the non-regenerate and the regenerate consciousness are but ethical modifications of this one fundamental metaphysical consciousness, that leads us to reason with unbelievers. And it is exactly because of our deep conviction that God is one and truth is therefore one, that we hold that there is only one type of argument for all men. All that the recognition of the deep ethical difference does is to call attention to this very fact that it is God who must make this one truth effective in the hearts of men. *Magna est veritas et praevalabit!*

We subjoin a brief bibliography of the chief books and articles dealing with this subject, either directly or by implication.

- H. Bavinck 1. *Philosophy of Revelation*
 2. *Christelyke Wetenschap*
 3. *Zekerheid des Geloofs*
 4. *Roeping en Wedergeboorte*
 5. *Dogmatiek, Vol. F*
- A. Kuyper *Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology*
- B. B. Warfield 1. Introduction to Beattie's *Apologetics*
 2. "Apologetics"—article in *Schaff-Herzog*
 3. "Christian Supernaturalism"—*Princeton Theological Review*
 4. *Revelation and Inspiration*—Collected works
 5. *Calvin and Calvinism*
- J. De Witt "Testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Bible"—*Princeton Theological Review*
- W. B. Greene, Jr. 1. "Function of Reason in Christianity"—*Princeton Theological Review*
 2. "Reasonableness of the Vicarious Atonement"—*Princeton Theological Review*
 3. "Metaphysics of Apologetics" (4 articles)—*Princeton Theological Review*
 4. "The Supernatural"—*Princeton Theological Review*

- Griffin 1. "Epistemological Argument for Theism"—*Princeton Theological Review*
2. "Personality the Supreme Category of Philosophy"—*Princeton Theological Review*
- Charles Hodge *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 1
- C. W. Hodge 1. "Finality of the Christian Religion"—*Princeton Theological Review*
2. "Witness of the Holy Spirit to the Bible"—*Princeton Theological Review*
3. "What Is a Miracle?"—*Princeton Theological Review*
- V. Hepp 1. *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti*
2. *Gereformeerde Apologetik*

Chapter 15: The Method Of Christian Theistic Epistemology

Having before us all the factors that enter into the knowledge situation, and having on the basis of them concluded in the preceding chapter that it is necessary to reason with those who believe differently than we do, we must turn to a consideration of the question of how we should reason with them.

In the second chapter we discussed some of the epistemological terms that have bearing upon the question of the method. We must now set that discussion into the more advanced context at which we have arrived. The thing that has gradually shown itself to be of momentous importance is this fact that all reasoning in the field of knowledge must take into consideration the difference between those who accept and those who reject Christian theism. Whatever method we employ will have to figure from the outset with this difference. The question is no longer how I may obtain knowledge of some object with which I come in contact. Nor is it only the question of how I may impart that knowledge to my fellow man in general. The question is rather how I may impart the knowledge that I have to those who by virtue of their opposition have no true knowledge and yet think that they have.

Something of this was brought out when we said that God's knowledge of himself and God's knowledge of the facts of the universe must be the standard of our knowledge. God is completely self-conscious and therefore knows himself and all things analytically. There is in God's thought complete coherence. Keeping this in mind, we may say that if we are to have coherence in our thinking it will have to be a coherence that corresponds to God's coherence. Accordingly, our coherence will never be completely inclusive in the way that God's coherence is completely inclusive. Our coherence will be no more than an analogy of the coherence of God. Yet because it is based upon God's coherence it will be true knowledge. Our coherence can constantly grow in comprehensiveness but it cannot grow in truthfulness. Those that have the least knowledge have true knowledge just as well as those that have the greatest knowledge, if only their knowledge is truly analogical, i.e., based upon the knowledge that God has of himself and of the world.

If this fundamental point is not forgotten, we can speak in the ordinary epistemological language. We may then say that we employ the methods of analysis and synthesis. What we mean by synthesis is not that which Bosanquet means by synthesis when he says that reality is essentially synthetic. Our conception of God maintains the reverse of that. But for us the time series brings forth that which is new for us. Accordingly, we have to synthesize the new facts with the old facts. Then when we have done that we must proceed once more to see what the new facts thus related to the old facts together reveal about God and reality in general. In this respect the process of knowledge is a growth into the truth. For this reason we have spoken of the Christian theistic method as the method of implication into the truth of God. It is reasoning in a spiral fashion rather than in a linear fashion. Accordingly, we have said that we can use the old terms deduction and induction if only we remember that they must be thought of as elements in this one process of implication into the truth of God. If we begin the

course of spiral reasoning at any point in the finite universe, as we must because that is the proximate starting point of all reasoning, we can call the method of implication into the truth of God a transcendental method. That is, we must seek to determine what presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it may be intelligible to us. It is not as though we already know some facts and laws to begin with, irrespective of the existence of God, in order then to reason from such a beginning to further conclusions. It is certainly true that if God has any significance for any object of knowledge at all, the relation of God to that object of knowledge must be taken into consideration from the outset. It is this fact that the transcendental method seeks to recognize.

The charges made against this type of reasoning we must turn upon those who made them. It will be said of this type of reasoning that it introduces the subjective element of belief in God, which all men do not share. Of this we can only say that all men should share that belief, and before the fall of man into sin man did have that belief. Belief in God is the most human attitude conceivable. It is abnormal not to believe in God. We must therefore hold that only the Christian theist has real objectivity, while the others are introducing false prejudices, or subjectivity.

The charge is made that we engage in circular reasoning. Now if it be called circular reasoning when we hold it necessary to presuppose the existence of God, we are not ashamed of it because we are firmly convinced that all forms of reasoning that leave God out of account will end in ruin. Yet we hold that our reasoning cannot fairly be called circular reasoning, because we are not reasoning about and seeking to explain facts by assuming the existence and meaning of certain other facts on the same level of being with the facts we are investigating, and then explaining these facts in turn by the facts with which we began. We are presupposing God, not merely another fact of the universe. If God is to come into contact with us at all it is natural that the initiative must be with him. And this will also apply to the very question about the relation of God to us. Accordingly, it is only on God's own testimony that we can know anything about him.

Even in paradise it was God's verbal self-disclosure, and the disclosure of his will for man's activity in relation to the created cosmos, that was indispensable for man's ability to identify any fact and to relate any fact properly to any other fact. Applying this to the Scripture, it is but natural that we should accept the Scripture testimony about itself. If we did anything else we would not be accepting Scripture as absolute. The only alternative then to bringing in a God who testifies of himself and upon whose testimony we are wholly dependent, is not to bring in God at all. And not to bring in God at all spells nothing but utter ruin for knowledge. In that case knowledge may be said to be reduced to the pass of drawing circles in a void. Hence we must return the charge of circular reasoning to those who made it. On the other hand, we are happy to accept the charge of circular reasoning. Our reasoning frankly depends upon the revelation of God, whose "reasoning" is within the internal-eternal circularity of the three persons of the Trinity. It is only if we frankly depend for the validity of our reasoning upon this internal circular reasoning in the triune God that we can escape trying in vain to reason in circles in a vacuum of pure contingency.

The charge has been made that it is an *a priori* procedure to bring in God at the beginning of the process of knowledge. This too is a charge that acts as a boomerang. *A priori* reasoning is reasoning that does not start with the facts. Now antitheism has

arbitrarily taken for granted that God is not a fact, and that if he is a fact that fact does not have any bearing upon the other facts. This we must hold to be an *a priori* procedure. We hold that the so-called “facts” are wholly unintelligible unless the supreme fact of God be brought into relation with them. We are willing to start with any fact as a proximate starting point, but refuse to admit before the investigation has begun that there can be no such fact as God.

Summing up, we may observe that all the various methods of investigation that have been advanced may be used theistically or they may be used antitheistically, according as God is taken into or is left out of consideration at the outset. Perhaps the best way to bring out this point is to say that antitheistic thinking uses all these methods univocally, while theism uses all these methods analogically. We need not take much time to discuss what is meant by these terms. The meaning may be inferred from our discussion of the starting point of knowledge. There we saw how antitheistic thinking was constantly taking for granted that its position was correct. It did this by taking for granted that the object and the subject of knowledge exist apart from God and can come into fruitful relations with one another without any reference to God. Therewith antitheistic thinking reduced God, if he was later to be taken into consideration at all, to a quantitative addition to man. This quantitative addition may take any of three forms. First, God may be taken as one fact among others. It is this that the first method of Platonic reasoning, that is, the outspokenly empirical method of reasoning, allows for. In the second place, God may be thought of as a logical universal in the particulars. It is this that the second method of Platonic reasoning allows for. In the third place, God may be identified with the Whole of Reality inclusive of both the temporal and the eternal. It is this that the third method of Platonic reasoning allows for. In every case, it is taken for granted that God can, in the nature of the case, be no more than at most a correlative to man.

Since antitheistic thinking takes this univocal method of reasoning to be so evidently the only possible method of reasoning, since univocal reasoning is the reasoning of “the natural man,” which he will not and cannot forsake till he is no longer a “natural man” but a regenerated man, the one thing of importance to remember is that we must set over against this natural man not something that is a little modification of that which he already holds. We must hold before him the necessity of a total reversal of his attitude of mind. It is this that Paul did when he preached the gospel to the wise men of Athens, steeped as they were in Plato and Aristotle. The Christian epistemologists have been all too remiss in fearing to follow Paul’s example boldly. They have feared that they would have no results if they were thus fearless in their approach. Yet if anything would seem to follow from the Christian position as a whole, it is that we could expect no results at all unless bold measures be taken. If the whole head is sick and the whole heart faint, it is not a snuffbox that is needed, but a lively stimulant. If men are dead in their sins and trespasses they are dead epistemologically too, and no demonstration of health will do any good, but only the gift of new life. Accordingly, we must reason in such a way that the Holy Spirit can give life through our reasoning as an avenue.

Our reasoning then must always and everywhere be truly analogical. It matters not whether we are reasoning inductively or deductively, whether we analyze or synthesize, whether we reason in *a priori* or *a posteriori* fashion. If we only reason analogically we are true to our principle and may expect results, and if we do not reason analogically we are not true to our principle and may not expect any results.

The necessity of reasoning analogically is always implied in the theistic conception of God. If God is to be thought of at all as necessary for man's interpretation of the facts or objects of knowledge, he must be thought of as being determinative of the objects of knowledge. In other words, he must then be thought of as the only ultimate interpreter, and man must be thought of as a finite reinterpreter. Since, then, the absolute self-consciousness of God is the final interpreter of all facts, man's knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge. Since all the finite facts exist by virtue of the interpretation of God, man's interpretation of the finite facts is ultimately dependent upon God's interpretation of the facts. Man cannot, except to his own hurt, look at the facts without looking at God's interpretation of the facts. Man's knowledge of the facts is then a reinterpretation of God's interpretation. It is this that is meant by saying that man's knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge.

We must now consider more fully the question how one who has thus become convinced that analogical reasoning is the only type of reasoning that gives us truth at all, must face one who is convinced that univocal reasoning is the only type of reasoning that can possibly bring one into contact with truth.

In the preceding chapter we have seen that the point of contact that we may presuppose is that man, as a matter of fact, never exists in such independence as he thinks he does. He remains accessible to God always. It is this that gives us courage to proceed. And with this conviction we proceed with assurance of success. It is this that gives us courage not to condescend to any form of univocal reasoning.

When we approach the question in this way we should be willing to start anywhere and with any fact that any person we meet is interested in. The very conviction that there is not a single fact that can really be known unless it is interpreted theistically gives us this liberty to start anywhere, as far as a proximate starting point is concerned. If we thought that the fact of God's existence had no significance for physics, we would have to seek to bring our opponents at once into contact with the more specifically religious problem. But that is exactly what we need not do. We can start with any fact at all and challenge "our friends the enemy," to give us an intelligible interpretation of it.

Since the non-theist is so heartily convinced that univocal reasoning is the only possible kind of reasoning, we must ask him to reason univocally for us in order that we may see the consequences. In other words, we believe it to be in harmony with and a part of the process of reasoning analogically with a non-theist that we ask him to show us first what he can do. We may, to be sure, offer to him at once a positive statement of our position. But this he will at once reject as quite out of the question. So we may ask him to give us something better. The reason he gives for rejecting our position is, in the last analysis, that it involves self-contradiction. We see again as an illustration of this charge the rejection of the theistic conception that God is absolute and that he has nevertheless created this world for his glory. This, the non-theist says, is self-contradictory. And it no doubt is, from a non-theistic point of view. But the final question is not whether a statement appears to be contradictory. The final question is in which framework or on which view of reality—the Christian or the non-Christian—the law of contradiction can have application to any fact. The non-Christian rejects the Christian view out of hand as being contradictory. Then when he is asked to furnish a foundation for the law of contradiction, he can offer nothing but the idea of contingency.

What we shall have to do then is to try to reduce our opponent's position to an absurdity. Nothing less will do. Without God, man is completely lost in every respect, epistemologically as well as morally and religiously. But exactly what do we mean by reducing our opponent's position to an absurdity? He thinks he has already reduced our position to an absurdity by the simple expedient just spoken of. But we must point out to him that upon a theistic basis our position is not reduced to an absurdity by indicating the "logical difficulties" involved in the conception of creation. Upon the theistic basis it must be contended that the human categories are but analogical of God's categories, so that it is to be expected that human thought will not be able to comprehend how God shall be absolute and at the same time create the universe for his glory. If taken on the same level of existence, it is no doubt a self-contradiction to say that a thing is full and at the same time is being filled. But it is exactly this point that is in question—whether God is to be thought of as on the same level with man. What the antitheist should have done is to show that even upon a theistic basis our conception of creation involves self-contradiction.

We must therefore give our opponents better treatment than they give us. We must point out to them that univocal reasoning itself leads to self-contradiction, not only from a theistic point of view, but from a non-theistic point of view as well. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we must meet our enemy on their own ground. It is this that we ought to mean when we say that we reason from the impossibility of the contrary. The contrary is impossible only if it is self-contradictory when operating on the basis of its own assumptions. It is this too that we should mean when we say that we are arguing *ad hominem*. We do not really argue *ad hominem* unless we show that someone's position involves self-contradiction, and there is no self-contradiction unless one's reasoning is shown to be directly contradictory of or to lead to conclusions which are contradictory of one's own assumptions.

It will be seen that when we reason *ad hominem* or when we say that we place ourselves upon our opponent's position we are still reasoning analogically. We would not be reasoning analogically if we really placed ourselves upon our opponent's position. Then we would, with him, have to reason univocally, and we would drown with him. We use the figure of drowning in order to suggest what it is that we really do when we say that we are placing ourselves upon someone else's position. We may then compare ourselves to a lifesaver who goes out to save someone from drowning. Such a lifesaver must be bound to the shore to which he wants to rescue the other party. He may depend upon his power to swim, but this very power to swim is an invisible cord that connects him to the shore. Similarly, if we reason when we place ourselves upon our opponents' position, we cannot for a moment do more than argue thus for "argument's sake."

When we reason thus we are not reasoning on the basis of some abstract law of self-contradiction. We have seen that the very question between theists and antitheists is as to the foundation of the law of contradiction. When they criticize our position and think they have reduced it to the place where it falls under the law of self-contradiction, we do not give in to defeat or appeal to irrationality in the name of faith, but we challenge their interpretation of the law of contradiction. We hold that they have falsely assumed that the self-contradictory is to be identified with that which is beyond the comprehension of man. But this takes for granted that human categories are ultimate categories—which is just the thing in question. We must maintain that we have the true conception of the law

of contradiction. According to that conception, only that is self-contradictory which is contradictory to the conception of the absolute self-consciousness of God. If there were in the Trinity such a self-contradiction, there would also be in the matter of God's relation to the world. But, since the Trinity is the conception by which ultimate unity and diversity is brought into equal ultimacy, it is this conception of the Trinity which makes self-contradiction impossible for God and therefore also impossible for man. Complete self-contradiction is possible only in hell, and hell is itself a self-contradiction because it feeds eternally on the negation of an absolute affirmation. Accordingly, we must hold that the position of our opponent has in reality been reduced to self-contradiction when it is shown to be hopelessly opposed to the Christian theistic concept of God. Yet in order to bring this argument as closely to the non-regenerate consciousness as we may, we must seek to show that the non-theist is self-contradictory upon his own assumptions, as well as upon the assumption of the truth of theism, and that he cannot even be self-contradictory upon a non-theistic basis, since if he saw himself to be self-contradictory he would be self-contradictory no longer.

Now when this method of reasoning from the impossibility of the contrary is carried out, there is really nothing more to do. We realize this if we call to mind again that if once it is seen that the conception of God is necessary for the intelligible interpretation of any fact, it will be seen that this is necessary for all facts and for all laws of thought. If one really saw that it is necessary to have God in order to understand the grass that grows outside his window, he would certainly come to a saving knowledge of Christ, and to the knowledge of the absolute authority of the Bible. It is true, we grant that it is not usually in this way that men become true Christian theists, but we put it in this way in order to bring out clearly that the investigation of any fact whatsoever will involve a discussion of the meaning of Christianity as well as of theism, and a sound position taken on the one involves a sound position on the other. It is well to emphasize this fact because there are Fundamentalists who tend to throw overboard all epistemological and metaphysical investigation and say that they will limit their activities to preaching Christ. But we see that they are not really preaching Christ unless they are preaching him for what he wants to be, namely, the Christ of cosmic significance. Nor can they even long retain the soteriological significance of Christ if they forsake his cosmological significance. If one allows that certain facts may be truly known apart from God in Christ, there is no telling where the limit will be. It soon appears that the elephant wants to warm more than his nose. He will soon claim that the truths of the religious consciousness may also be known apart from Christ, and may therefore become the standard of what is to be accepted of the Bible.

In this connection we must also say a word about the contention often made by Christians that we must be positive rather than negative in our presentation of the truth to those who have not yet accepted it. We have no fault to find with this statement if it be correctly understood. We must certainly present the truth of the Christian theistic system constantly, at every point of the argument. But it is clear that if you offer a new wife to one who is perfectly satisfied with the one he has now, you are not likely to be relieved of your burden. In other words, it is the self-sufficiency of the "natural man" that must first be brought under some pressure, before there is any likelihood of his even considering the truth in any serious fashion at all. The parable of the prodigal helps us here. As long as the son was at home there was nothing but a positive argument that was held before

him. But he wanted to go out of the father's house in order to indulge in "riotous living." Not till he was at the swinetrough, not till he saw that he had made a hog of himself and that he could not be a hog because he was a man, did he at all begin to consider the servants of his father who had plenty of bread. The kingdom of God must be built upon the destruction of the enemy. God increases his plagues upon those that "dwell upon the earth" in order to make them think analogically. And though they cry for the mountains and the hills to fall upon them rather than turn to him that chastizes them, yet God continues to increase the weight of his plagues. Now this is more than an analogy. Univocal reasoning is itself a part of the manifestation of sin. Hence it too must be destroyed. And if it is destroyed the natural result is analogical reasoning. And it matters not how far may seem the way, once one reasons analogically one will arrive at the father's house at last. The far country into which the prodigal had gone and where he thought he was beyond the father's control was nevertheless the father's country, and the father was "pulling the strings" there.

It is this, it will be noticed, that leads us to victory. If it were not true that it is the father who "pulls the strings," we would reason in vain. For we need not flatter ourselves that even if the non-theist be shown that his position is self-contradictory in the sense that it contradicts his own assumptions and breaks to pieces his own law of contradiction, he will turn from his ways of himself. Instead, he will conclude that man must remain in such complete irrationality, rather than turn to analogical reasoning. The miracle of regeneration has to occur somewhere, and all that we are arguing for is that we must ask where it is that the Holy Spirit will most likely perform this miracle. And then there can be no doubt but that the likelihood is in favor of that place where the non-theist has to some extent seen the emptiness and vanity of his own position.

Similar to the contention that we must be positive rather than negative in our presentation of the truth to those who believe otherwise than we do, is the statement often made that we must present Christianity as an hypothesis which men are to try in the interpretation of the facts of experience. One form of this contention appears when preachers appeal to men to take Christ because he will satisfy them best. Now it goes without saying that a drunkard cannot be tempted into accepting Christ in this way if it be understood as meaning nothing more than that the drunkard is himself, as he is, to be the judge of what really satisfies him. But it is exactly this that the preacher does not want. He wants the drunkard to allow Jesus to tell him what satisfies him, and if he does, then Jesus will satisfy him. Similarly we may certainly present Christianity as an hypothesis if we do it while reasoning with our opponents in an *ad hominem* fashion, i.e., if we allow him to try what he can make of Christianity as an hypothesis among many by the process of univocal reasoning. He will then soon find that if he is going to accept Christianity he must give up the idea of treating it as an hypothesis and ask forgiveness for having done so. On the other hand, if he continues to regard Christianity as one hypothesis among many, it is a foregone conclusion that he will not accept this hypothesis rather than another. And if he did accept Christianity as the most likely hypothesis, he would not be accepting Christianity, but a substitute for it. To reason about anything as an hypothesis for the explanation of any fact or facts means that there may be other hypotheses that should eventually prove to be true. And if it is conceivable that an interpretation other than God should finally be given for the facts of the universe, then it is also true that these facts are now considered as being apart from God. So then our conclusion must be

that if we present Christian theism as an hypothesis, it must always be done by us as a part of our analogical reasoning process, even if it be at that point where we are reasoning for argument's sake.

Chapter 16: A Sample Of Christian Theistic Argument

What remains to be done is to take a couple samples of antitheistic thought in our day and seek to show roughly in what way the method of reasoning is applicable to them. It is neither possible nor necessary to review in detail all the leading philosophers or philosophical movements of the day. The argument must be the same in principle with all the various forms of antitheistic speculation. All that we shall seek to do is first to take a most extreme form and then a less extreme form of antitheistic thought and to reason briefly with them.

Naturally, the main point in dispute is whether our opponents can get along without God. All of our opponents have said in effect that human categories are ultimate. With respect to all of them we would then ask what happens if they seek to face the more ultimate questions of philosophy on this basis.

We can for convenience divide the forces of the enemy into two camps. There are those who openly say that they can do without God, and there are those who covertly say they can do without God. Those who openly say that they can do without God we shall classify as Pragmatists, and those who covertly say they can do without God we shall classify as Idealists. It should be understood that these terms as we use them are more inclusive than the names would indicate. We use the name Pragmatist to indicate first of all the pragmatic movement in philosophy today, but also all of those who believe in the so-called open universe. Under this class we may therefore mention New Realism, Neorealism, Critical Realism, Pan Objectivism, the ordinary evolutionist, the ordinary scientist depending on the so-called scientific or empirical method of research, whether in the field of physics, biology or psychology, and many others. All of these and many other nuances of modern thought and scientific method have this in common—that they naively take for granted that the “facts” are there as ultimates from which we must begin our research. The object and the subject of knowledge are taken for granted without the question of reference to God. It is assumed, therefore, that human categories are in themselves quite able to interpret reality. This is once more the first method of Platonic reasoning. There may be those among these and similar groups who still speak of God, but what they mean is a finite God, a *primus inter pares*, a one among many. We are not interested in denying that they have some kind of God; we only maintain that they have not God, and are not afraid to say so if one makes plain that by God he means the Christian concept of God.

We must therefore briefly seek to understand what the consequences are if one takes this position to the bitter end. First we should notice, however, that there are all too many who are not willing to accept the responsibility for their epistemological attitude. There are perhaps more epistemological loafers than any other kind. We see them in those who say we cannot be sure about this question of whether the Bible is a revelation of God. We see them in the ordinary medical man who says that he does not wish to be dogmatic, because nobody knows. In Scripture this attitude is exemplified in Ahab’s time when men were taught that Baal and Jehovah were equally valuable. So today many parents are willing to have their children attend Sunday school because they ought to learn something about religion. The religious tolerance that we find Modernism advocating

today is based upon this epistemological indifference and ignorance, rather than upon any broadmindedness. Indifferentists of this sort are hard to deal with. To some extent, it is a matter of temperament. Yet where it is based upon temperament we should attempt to have them see that they may not indulge in any sort of temperament they please. They are rational beings, and should ask themselves questions about the rationale of their temperaments. In such extreme cases the only method that may approach their thought at all is a vigorous testimony to one's own convictions about the truth of Christianity, and specifically its implications with respect to the judgment day. If they are too intellectually lethargic to do any thinking on their own account, if they have so far succeeded in drowning the voice of humanity within them, there seems to be nothing left to do but to testify. In a sense, of course, the whole presentation of the Christian theistic system to those who believe it not is a matter of testimony. But we mean here testimony that is no more than a vigorous statement of one's belief of the truth without expediting any immediate intellectual response. Testimony to such and prayer about such is about all that we can do. It may be that our testimony and our prayer will lead them to begin some intellectual operation of some sort, so that we may begin to reason with them.

In the second place we should notice that there are thousands who do not engage in intellectual consideration of the truth to any great extent, not so much because they are necessarily indifferent to such things by nature as because they are unsuited to it. With respect to these, it is obvious that it would be useless to present the intellectual argument for Christian theism in any subtle and detailed form. Nor is this necessary. A simple presentation of the truth in positive form, and once more largely by way of testimony, may be all that is required. Christianity is not for a few elite intellectualists. Its message is to the simple and to the learned. The argument must therefore be adapted to each one's mental capacity. And it should not be forgotten that the difference between the learned and the unlearned is, after all, very small when it comes to a consideration of ultimate questions. The learned may have many more facts at his disposal and be more skilled in the use of the syllogism, but when it comes to a consideration of the meaning of any one fact or of all facts put together, all this refinement does not bring him very far. Many a man of ordinary intelligence can reason with himself about the reasonableness of thinking of the existence of the facts apart from God, as well as the most learned scholar. To say this is not to disparage scholarship. Scholarship is necessary in its place, but it is not necessary for every man.

In the third place, there are many who are avowed agnostics. These are not intellectually indifferent or unable. On the contrary, they are often very sophisticated. They are the men with a little learning, which is a dangerous thing. They may be experts in the field of medicine and daubers in the field of epistemology. They will tell you that it is patent that nobody knows anything about the origin of matter and of life, and that it is therefore a conceit to say that he does. They therefore think it to be truly humble to say that they do not know. It is this attitude that underlies much of present-day scientific method which wants to limit its investigations to the facts and draw no great conclusions from them about ultimate matters.

This attitude is usually coupled with the felt or stated assurance that, after all, man has no metaphysical need. All that man needs is to get along for his three score years and ten in the environment in which he finds himself. He may wonder what is going to

happen after this life, but he surely need not worry about it because it is certain that he can do nothing about it.

With such as these it would seem that the point we should be most anxious to drive home is that in trying to be agnostic, and in trying to say that they have no need of metaphysics, they have already given one of the two possible answers to every question of epistemology that may be asked. They have, as a matter of fact, said that all the facts—or, in epistemological language, they have said that the object and the subject of knowledge—exist apart from God and are able to get along without God. They think they have said nothing at all about ultimate matters, while as a matter of fact they have in effect said everything that could be said about them, and, we believe, more beside. They have tried to be so modest that they did not dare to make a positive statement about anything ultimate, while they have made a universal negative statement about the most ultimate consideration that faces the mind of man. That this charge is fair is apparent from the consideration of the opposite. Suppose that the object and the subject of knowledge do not exist apart from God. Suppose, in other words, that the Christian theistic conception of philosophy is true. In that case, it is not only possible to know something about ultimate things, but in that case the knowledge of proximate things depends upon the knowledge of ultimate things. In that case, not a single fact can be known unless God is known.

What the present-day agnostic should do then is to make his position reasonable by showing that God does not exist. The burden of the proof is upon him. He claims, of course, that the burden of the proof is upon us when we hold that God exists. Yet this is clearly not the case, since his own position, to be reasonable, must presuppose the non-existence of God. If God does exist, man can know him, for the simple reason that in that case all knowledge depends upon him. Hence an agnostic position must first prove that God does not exist.

From these considerations it follows that agnosticism is completely self-contradictory. And it is self-contradictory not only upon the assumption of the truth of theism, but it is self-contradictory upon the assumption of the truth of antitheism, which is the assumption of agnosticism. It is, in the first place, psychologically self-contradictory upon its own assumptions. Agnosticism wants to hold that it is reasonable to refrain from thorough epistemological speculations because they cannot lead to anything. But in order to assume this attitude, agnosticism has itself made the most tremendous intellectual assertion that could be made about ultimate things. In the second place, agnosticism is epistemologically self-contradictory on its own assumptions because its claim to make no assertion about ultimate reality rests upon a most comprehensive assertion about ultimate reality. This is, of course, the point of pivotal importance. It is hard to make men see that they have, as a matter of fact, in effect made a universal statement about the whole of reality when they think that they have limited their statements to only a few facts in their immediate vicinity. We should attempt to make plain that the alternative is not between saying something about ultimate reality or not saying anything about it, but that the alternative is rather between saying one thing about it or another. Every human being, as a matter of fact, says something about ultimate reality.

It should be noted that those who claim to say nothing about ultimate reality not only do say something about it just as well as everybody else, but they have assumed for

themselves the responsibility of saying one definite thing about ultimate reality. They have assumed the responsibility of excluding God. We have seen again that a God who is to come in afterward is no God at all. Agnosticism cannot say that it is open-minded on the question of the nature of ultimate reality. It is absolutely closed-minded on the subject. It has one view that it cannot, unless its own assumption be denied, exchange for another. It has started with the assumption of the non-existence of God and must end with it. Its so-called open-minded attitude is therefore a closed-minded attitude. The agnostic must be openminded and closed-minded at the same time. And this is not only a psychological self-contradiction, but an epistemological self-contradiction. It amounts to affirmation and denial at the same time. Accordingly, they cancel out one another, if there is cancelation power in them. But the predication of agnosticism cannot be said to have cancelation power unless the whole antitheistic system be first proved true. And the whole position could never be proved true because every fact would have to be in before the agnostic should be willing to make any statement about any other fact, since one fact may influence other facts. Now since clearly no individual agnostic can hope to live till all the facts are in, every individual agnostic must die with an "open" mind and at the same time with a closed mind on the subject of God's existence. On his death bed he must make not one, but two pronouncements. He cannot say science has no pronouncements to make and let it go at that. He must make first a universal negative statement which, we have seen, is involved in his agnostic position. Then he must at the same time be completely open-minded on the question of God's existence. He must say that there cannot be a judgment, and at the same time he must look around the corner for it as the next fact that might, for all his own position allows him to hold, appear. The only way, then, that the agnostic can seek to harmonize his mutually exclusive statements that he finds himself constantly making about ultimate reality is to hold that none of them mean anything because all of them operate in a void. And he could not say anything about the void unless there were something beyond the void. In other words, he cannot argue for the truth of the agnostic or the generally non-theistic position except upon the assumption of the truth of the Christian theistic system.

It is on this wise, then, that we shall have to deal with agnosticism. We can first show that it is self-contradictory since Christian theism is true. Then we must show that it is self-contradictory if antitheism were true. And finally we must show that it would not even have power to show itself self-contradictory upon its own assumption unless theism is true. The antitheistic conception of the self-contradictory presupposes the theistic conception of the self-contradictory for its operation.

Incidentally, we may point out that, in addition to being psychologically and epistemologically self-contradictory, the agnostic is morally self-contradictory. His contention was that he is very humble, and for that reason unwilling to pretend to know anything about ultimate matters. Yet he has by implication made a universal statement about reality. He therefore not only claims to know as much as the theist knows, but he claims to know much more. More than that, he not only claims to know much more than the theist, but he claims to know more than the theist's God. He has boldly set bare possibility above the theist's God and is quite willing to test the consequences of his action. It is thus that the *hubris* of which the Greeks spoke so much, and upon which they invoked the wrath of the gods, appears in new and seeming innocent garb.

Agnosticism of the type criticized is characteristic of all the movements in physics, biology, psychology and philosophy spoken of above. Not all of them are usually spoken of as agnostics, because many of them claim to know about finite things even if they disclaim knowledge of ultimate things. But it is itself a sign of agnosticism not to classify as agnostics not only all who disclaim knowledge about ultimate reality, but also all those who claim to have knowledge about finite matters without having knowledge about God. The assumption of those who say they are not agnostic about finite things, but only about God, is that finite things can be known apart from God. From the Christian theistic point of view, such as claim knowledge of finite things and disclaim knowledge of God are as much agnostics as those who disclaim knowledge of both. This is involved in our argument which showed that to attempt to know a finite object apart from God involves one in self-contradiction upon one's own assumptions.

It may be well, however, to look a little further at the position of those who disclaim agnosticism because they believe they have sufficient knowledge of finite matters without reference to God.

The first thing for us to note is that the argument between the epistemological monists and dualists does not interest us directly. This debate rages in the field of psychology between those who maintain that the human mind is but an aspect of physical reality in general, and those who try to make it very distinct. Whether one be a Behaviorist or a Configurationist or a Hormist does not make a great deal of difference for our purpose. It is not mechanism or Monism as such, nor is it subjectivism or interactionism as such, that we are fighting, but the antitheism of any and all of them. Apologists often make much of the psychology of McDougal, as over against Behaviorism, etc., as valuable for the establishment of the truth of Christianity. Now it is true that if Behaviorism were proved true, Christianity would be disproved, but it is equally true that if McDougal's position were proved, Christianity would be disproved. Nor can it really be said that any one position is fundamentally nearer to theism than another. To be sure, we would not minimize the fact that materialisms of all sorts are more crass forms of opposition to Christianity than all sorts of spiritualism, but this should never blind us to the fact that any who misses a train by a step misses it just as well as he who misses it by a mile. And it is sometimes very difficult to make those who have a position that approaches Christianity in form see that, after all, they do not have Christianity. Accordingly, when we see the same struggle in the field of psychology, we do not rejoice too greatly if the philosophical temper of the time be away from the extreme forms of Materialism and Monism of some years ago. J. B. Pratt in his book *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion*, argues for a dualistic position over against the Idealist, the Pragmatist, the Neorealist, the New Realist, the Behaviorist, and Russell. We can only remark that we must include Pratt himself in the list and then begin our argument against all of them on essentially the same point, that is, that they have taken for granted that the object and the subject of knowledge exist and can come into relation with one another without taking God into consideration. We cannot agree with the attitude taken by Charles Harris that, since there has been a reaction against some of the more extreme forms of materialism, etc., there is now no serious opponent to Christianity in the field of philosophy today. He holds that because the contingency of the universe has become "an accepted

philosophical doctrine” there is not much else to fear.¹ We hold that if it is true that the contingency of the universe is an established philosophic doctrine, then philosophy is as much opposed to Christianity as ever Materialism was, since it then leaves God’s plan out of consideration.

If God is left out of the picture it is up to the human mind to furnish the unity that must bind together the diversity of factual existence. It will not do to think of laws existing somehow apart from the mind. And even if this were possible it would not help matters any, because even these laws would be thought of as independent of God and as just there somehow. In other words, the only alternative to thinking of God as the ultimate source of the unity of human experience as it is furnished by laws or universals is to think that the unity rests in a void. Every object of knowledge must, therefore, be thought of as being surrounded by ultimate irrationality. It is this that is involved in the position A. E. Taylor represents when he constantly avers that there is a surd in everything historical or temporal, that is, in all factual existence. On the other hand, if the more subjective position be taken, it is the human mind that furnishes the universal element of experience, and the human mind must itself be thought of as swimming in a void.

In the second place, it should be noticed that if the object and the subject must both be thought of as somehow being in the void, it is inconceivable that there should be any relation of any sort between them. Aristotle admitted to being baffled at the question of the *infima species*, i.e., the relation of the individual to the lowest universal. There he found ultimate mystery. On the one hand you cannot say that the individual is subsumed under the species entirely, lest there be nothing but species, and the whole individual disappear. On the other hand, you cannot have complete individuality without bringing the individual into relation with others. Aristotle therefore admitted that, as far as he could see, the relation of the individual and species, or the relation of the fact to law, remained a mystery. And since the day of Aristotle there has not been any advance made on this score, because modern philosophy has continued to build upon the same assumption that Greek philosophy built upon, namely, that all things are at bottom one and return unto one. If there is to be any relation between the one and the many, it must be, according to all non-theistic thought, a relation of identity, and if identity is seen to lead to the destruction of knowledge, the diversity that is introduced is thought of as being ultimate. In other words, according to all non-theistic thinking, the facts and the laws that are supposed to bind the facts together into unity are first thought of as existing independently of one another and are afterward patched together. It is taken for granted that the temporal is the ultimate source of diversity. Accordingly, Reality is said to be essentially synthetic. The real starting point is then an ultimate plurality. And an ultimate plurality without an equally ultimate unity will forever remain a plurality. It is this that is especially apparent in all forms of pragmatic thought. There the necessity of having any such ultimate unity is openly denied. And the only way we can meet that contention is to show that by denying ultimate unity they have also denied to themselves the possibility of having a proximate unity. There is no guarantee that the human mind can in any sense know reality that is near unless it knows reality that is far away. For all I know, the next fact that I must adjust to a previous fact is a fatal automobile accident. How then do I

¹ cf. his *Pro Fide*, p. 18.

know that it is not the most pragmatically valuable thing for me to know whether the fact of death does not immediately connect me with another fact, namely, the judgment?

It is clear that upon pragmatic basis, and for that matter upon antitheistic basis in general, there can be no object-object relation, i.e., there can be no philosophy of nature, so that the sciences become impossible, and no philosophy of history, so that the past cannot be brought into relation with the present nor the future with the present. Then there can be no subject-object relation, so that even if it were conceivable that there were such a thing as nature and history, I would be doomed to ignorance of it. In the third place, there can be no subject-subject relation, so that even if there were such a thing as nature and history, and even if I knew about it, I could never speak to anyone else about it. There would be Babylonian confusion.

It should be remembered in this connection that when we say that all non-theistic thought ends in Babylonian confusion, this conclusion is not contradicted by the obvious fact that there are sciences, and that there is philosophy in history, and that there is communication of thought on all these subjects. We grant that all these things are there after a fashion. We maintain, however, and this is in entire harmony with the whole theistic position, that all these things as they are and as far as they are what they ought to be, exist by the common grace of God which has not allowed matters to work themselves out to their logical conclusion on this earth. For this reason, it is entirely consistent for a Christian to take the position that we have taken with respect to the more fundamental question of the relation of the two mutually exclusive life and world views, and at the same time be interested in and cooperate with scientists and historians who are opposed to the theistic system by virtue of the presuppositions. The biblical analogy that serves our purpose here is that of Solomon hiring foreign help for the building of the temple. In the case of the Samaritans who wished to help the Jews rebuild the temple, it was the business of the true Jew to reject the offer. In the case of the Phoenicians, it was the privilege and the duty of the true Jew to accept the service. The difference is simply that in the case of the Samaritans there was an effort to have a voice in the interpretation of the plans of God for his temple. On the other hand, in the case of the Phoenicians there was no such attempt. There it was no more than a case of skilled workmanship. And skilled workmanship is often, by God's common grace, found more abundantly in the camp of the antitheists than in the camp of the theists.

Our conclusion then must be that the various devotees of the open universe, who take for granted that the human mind can furnish all the universals that the facts require, must be regarded as having reduced human experience to an absurdity.

We now turn briefly to a second group of thinkers who, like the first, openly avow that God is unnecessary for the interpretation of experience but who, in distinction from the first, want to interpret reality in eternal instead of in temporal categories. These will be recognized as those who have reasoned after the second Platonic method of reasoning. McTaggart's position may be taken as typical. We have already intimated that there are in modern times very few of this kind of philosopher, because in modern times not only the reality of time, but the ultimacy of time, has been greatly emphasized. Yet it is important to call attention to them because it gives the opportunity to point out that their position as well as that of the outspoken temporalists is one of complete relativity which must lead to the annihilation of human experience.

It will be noted that in the case of McTaggart, too, it makes no difference whether he continues to use the name of God. The question is what he means by the term. And the thing he means by it is a logical universal in the particulars. The God who fits in with a temporalistic position is a finite god; the God who fits in with McTaggart's position is a logical universal. In the first case we have temporal relativity; in this case we have logical correlativity.

The essential difficulty that this position faces is at bottom the same difficulty that the Pragmatist faced, namely, the problem of the relation of the particular to the universal. In a bold effort McTaggart has eternized all the particulars of time in order to satisfy the logical demand for an equal ultimacy of the principles of unity and diversity. In this respect his position is to be preferred to that of Pragmatism, which has become quite insensible to this most fundamental need of human thought. Yet the position of McTaggart remains one in which the principles of unity and diversity are not really made equally ultimate. Even if every human being be eternized as he has been eternized by McTaggart, he is not therewith made as comprehensive as all others and as the universal. McTaggart does not pretend that every individual is as comprehensive as the universal that binds the individuals together. He conceives of ultimate reality as a society of individuals. It will be seen that the conception of the Trinity can in no way be compared to this. And this is so not so much because in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity there are only three persons, but because the persons of the Trinity are thought of as being each of them as comprehensive as the Godhead. It is only thus that unity and diversity are really made equally ultimate. And such a union could not be effected between a logical principle and human individuals, If human individuals are called upon to furnish the ultimate element of diversity in reality, there will be an element of inequality between the principle of unity which is thought of as comprehensive, and the principle of diversity which is not thought of as comprehensive of all reality. And so the problem of the *infima species* faces us once more. In this case one can perhaps have his choice between emphasizing the particulars and landing in an ultimate pluralism, or emphasizing the universal and landing in a stark identity.

In order to relate our argument here to the discussion given on method, we point out that the position of McTaggart results in self-contradiction on his own assumptions, because the difficulties that Plato found have not been overcome. Plato found that if he attempted to explain the world of sense wholly by the world of Ideas he could not account for the Ideas of mud, and hair, and filth. What he meant by this was that he had to find unity among the various Ideas of the Ideal world, and in order to get unity he could not allow good and evil to become equally ultimate. Either the one or the other had to rule. And if he made the one to rule over the other he had once more the problem of gradation on his hands, in order to escape which he had turned to the Ideal world for the explanation of the sense world. If he introduced gradation, unity and diversity would be equally ultimate. On the other hand, if he refused to introduce the gradation idea he would have to make good and evil correlatives of one another, and therewith the one would cancel the other. We have seen how this worked out in the case of the logic of Bosanquet. In his attempt to make analysis and synthesis equally ultimate, he had to attribute white and black at the same time to the same subject in the same way. Plato felt this difficulty and gave up the effort in this line. McTaggart has not solved any of the difficulties but will not give up the effort.

What McTaggart wants to do is to come to an absolute position. For this purpose he seeks to absolutize man as far as possible. But by seeking to absolutize man, he really relativizes God. In his thought we have once more a contradiction similar to that which we found in the Pragmatist's position, namely, that he must at the same time look for the absolute and the relative so that the terms cancel one another. Correlativity is not a solution of the question of the relation of the absolute and the relative, but it is a cutting of the Gordian knot. A complete relativism is once more the result. And whether this relativism be conceived of as a temporal relativism as it is on a Pragmatist basis, or whether it is conceived of on a logical basis makes no difference. Relativism reduces all predication to a colorless mass. There would be no meaning to the conception of the relative if it were not for the previous independent significance of the Absolute. The result then is that the self-contradiction of McTaggart once more presupposes the truth of Christian theism.

Finally, we must consider that group of thinkers who have not openly, but covertly, denied the need of God. We have in mind the Idealist tradition in philosophy as we have briefly reviewed it in some of its exponents in our discussion of the starting point of epistemology. In them we recognize those who have tried to use the third method of Platonic reasoning to solve the problems left unsolved by the first and second methods. The third method was an attempt to bring into closer union the principles of unity and diversity.

This Idealist tradition, we say, has covertly denied the necessity of God. As far as its open statements are concerned, we have already had occasion to note that it makes very strong assertions about the necessity of having an absolute. Yet we saw that as a matter of fact, Idealism took for granted that the human consciousness can function independently of God.

Our argument can be very brief. If it is true that the Idealist has assumed that the human consciousness can function independently of God, his position is open to exactly the same criticism as the position of the Pragmatist.

Suppose then that we take the position of Taylor or of Bowne. By taking them as illustrations we have the advantage that we can include the question of Christianity as well as that of theism. If we can show that those who object to biblical authority cannot stop till they have landed in the Pragmatist camp, it would seem that we have given the best defense of the orthodox Christian position that can be given, inasmuch as it has been pointed out that the Pragmatist position ends in self-contradiction. Our argument, then, is that those who come apparently ever so near the Christian position but stop short of maintaining the fundamental conceptions of an absolute Christ, an absolute Scripture, and regeneration, reduce experience to an absurdity. This will no doubt seem an unnecessarily extreme position. Many are tempted not to be so set on such matters as an absolute Bible. They think they have therewith gained an apologetic advantage for themselves. To be sure, it is true that we should never seek to defend more than it is strictly necessary to defend. But our contention is exactly that it is strictly necessary to defend the absoluteness of Scripture. If one does not defend the absoluteness of Scripture, one cannot defend the absoluteness of Christ or of God. Nor is this closet logic that evaporates before the exigencies of life, as Bowne maintains. The question in each case is clearly that of the relation of the human consciousness to that which stands before it as absolute. We have seen that if the human consciousness be thought of as at one point

functioning independently of the absolute before which it stands, there is no reason to hope against hope that it will function otherwise than independently anywhere else. The whole dispute between theism and antitheism as far as the subject of knowledge is concerned is whether the human consciousness can or cannot function apart from God. If we now conclude that it cannot function apart from God, then when it functions it is wholly reinterpetative in its work. And if then, because of sin, the redemptive work of God is necessary, as according to Christianity it is, it follows that when the human consciousness functions in connection with this redemptive work of God, it must once more be wholly reinterpetative and therefore be wholly submissive to the Absolute interpretation which comes to it. Reasoning in the other direction, we may say that one who will not make his thought reinterpetative in the case of Scripture deceives himself if he thinks that he can nevertheless be reinterpetative of the thought of Christ or of God.

Turning to Taylor or Bowne's argumentation, we say that their argument against the idea of an absolute Scripture was that man must always at some point or other introduce a subjective element. It makes no difference whether that subjective element comes in when there is interpretation, or translation, or canonization, or even when there is reception of revelation; it must come in at one or at several places. Now this argument, we have pointed out, rests upon the antitheistic assumption that the human consciousness can function independently of God to begin with. For this reason, it is impossible for Bowne to stop short of the rejection of the atonement and the incarnation except as he reduced these concepts themselves to the antitheistic level. From all this it follows, then, that Bowne, as well as every Pragmatist, has set up a universal negative on the basis of the independent action of his individual consciousness. Once the human consciousness is thought of as independent of God in its operation anywhere, there is no stopping till all the self-contradictions of Pragmatism rest upon its shoulders.

So then the whole argument between Christian theistic and antitheistic epistemology stands before us. There is much that might still be discussed. It is possible to enter upon a profitable discussion of many details. However, it was our purpose to speak of only the most important matters.

These most important matters were somewhat as follows: first of all, we note the necessity of seeing clearly that Christianity and theism are intricately interwoven. If one is really a theist he cannot stop short of being a Christian, and Christianity cannot build upon any foundation but that of a sound biblical theism. Accordingly, the argument must constantly be for Christian theism as a whole. We cannot separate, except for the sake of emphasis, between an argument for theism and an argument for Christianity. The absoluteness of God and the inspiration of the Bible are involved in one another and one cannot defend the one without defending the other.

In the second place, this whole Christian theistic position must be presented not as something just a little or as a great deal better than other positions, but must be presented as the only system of thought that does not destroy human experience to a meaningless something. This is in accord with the teaching of the Bible that those who do not accept Christ are lost. Accordingly, if Christian theism is defensible at all it must be defensible in this way. And if it is not defensible in this way it is not defensible in any other way, because any other way of defense reduces the uniqueness of Christianity at once. The question is one of "this or nothing."

The argument in favor of Christian theism must therefore seek to prove that if one is not a Christian theist he knows nothing at all as he ought to know anything. The difference is not that all men alike know certain things about the finite universe and that some claim some additional knowledge, while the others do not. On the contrary, the Christian theist must claim that he alone has true knowledge about cows and chickens as well as about God. He does this in no spirit of conceit, because it is a gift of God's grace. Nor does he deny that there is knowledge after a fashion that enables the non-theist to get along after a fashion in the world. This is the gift of God's common grace, and therefore does not change the absoluteness of the distinction made about the knowledge and the ignorance of the theist and the non-theist respectively.

The method of argumentation will accord with the general position taken so far. It will seek to show that antitheistic knowledge is self-contradictory on its own ground, and that its conception of contradiction even presupposes the truth of Christian theism. It must be the method of the impossibility of the contrary, or that of the destruction of the enemy. It must show that univocal reasoning is self-destructive.

Meanwhile, Christian theism has the solemn duty to implicate itself ever more deeply into the truth of God as it is revealed in nature and in Scripture till the end of time. It must become ever more explicit in the formulation of what it sees to be the truth in order that it may not lose its identity as time goes on, but the rather gain in its distinctiveness and therefore in its testimony to the world. *Magna est Veritas et praevalabit.*

1

¹Van Til, Cornelius ; Sigward, Eric H.: *The Works of Cornelius Van Til, 1895-1987.* electronic ed. New York : Labels Army Co., 1997

Appendix

When this syllabus was first completed, a copy was sent to Dr. J. Oliver Buswell, Jr. Dr. Buswell did not agree with the approach presented in it. He was an ardent advocate of the Butler Analogy approach in apologetics. Was not this the approach that was employed by such great men as Charles Hodge, Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, and others? Buswell was certain that all intelligent presentation of the Christian position must cease unless this Butler type of approach to apologetics was maintained.

Buswell said "If your oft-repeated statement is true in regard to the futility of the type of apologetics represented by Dr. Wilson, then knowledge and reason fall to pieces instantly when we begin to talk with an unbeliever."

And what about "common grace"? "Do not your many admissions of the light of intelligence by common grace in lost humanity give plenty of ground for the apologetic method which you exclude?" (From a letter written January 30, 1937.)

My answer to Buswell's criticism is found in the general argument of this syllabus. It is to the effect that a Reformed theology requires a Reformed method of apologetics. The Aquinas-Butler method presupposes that fallen man can and often does give an essentially true interpretation of the world of space-time fact. His interpretation of nature needs, on this view, only to be supplemented by redemptive revelation. And the natural man can, and often does, see the need of such a revelation. Thus he may be, and often is, favorably disposed toward the acceptance of the redemptive revelation of God in Christ when it is presented to him as a fact.

However, Reformed exegetes of Scripture have clearly shown that the natural man represses the truth of God wherever it comes to him. The natural man is not neutral in his attitude toward any form of the revelation of God. He always gives a principally untrue interpretation of all of God's revelation. He does this because he hates God. Accordingly, we labor in vain if we present the facts of God's revelation to him and ask him to admit that, on his own principle, he must admit that they reveal God. We can find no common ground of interpretation with the natural man. He thinks that he knows the facts of the universe in their proper relation to one another without taking God's revelation in Christ into account. The truth is that only he who sees the facts of the world in the light of God's redemptive revelation given through Christ, sees them for what they are. We may use our minds as flashlights with which to discover things, but these flashlights derive all their power of illumination from the sun.

As to common grace, does that bolster the traditional method of apologetic? Not in the least. It restrains the destructive intellectual and spiritual tendency in the natural man and releases in him the creative powers given him by his Creator, so that he may, but in spite of his basic principle, contribute to the progress of human knowledge.

The point of contact for the gospel must not be sought (a) in the true interpretation of any fact by the natural man, nor (b) in common grace which restrains but does not eradicate the hostile attitude of the natural man to God.

Where then is the point of contact to be found? Where Paul says it is to be found, namely, in the fact that all men are created in the image of God. Man may try as he will, but he cannot eradicate this fact or his consciousness of it. His self-consciousness is a creature-consciousness. The prodigal son may always and everywhere act as though he had no father from whom his "substance" comes. Yet he knows he is a "liar" all the time.

So Paul says that, knowing God (*gnontes ton theon*), man wants to hold this knowledge under.

Here, and here alone, is contact in the mind and heart of the natural man for the gospel. The structure of reality as a whole is what Scripture says it is. Man is bound to carry on his interpretation within this structure. The non-believer must be presented positively with the claims of God in Christ for his conversion. This conversion must be a conversion of the whole man. He must learn to see that the reason why any man can think or do anything with respect to anything intelligently and with the proper Spiritual attitude is because by Christ's atoning death and the Holy Spirit's regenerating power he sees and does all things in a wholly different light, to the praise of his Creator-redeemer.

Then if the natural man continues to hold to his own position he is thereby shown that he does so because of his existential antagonism to the truth. He is adding sin upon sin in refusing to submit his thought captive to the obedience of Christ. If he continues in his false view of himself and his world this is, in the last analysis, because God has left him in his sin.

Thus Buswell is quite right when he says that a destructive argument requires a constructive argument. The Reformed method of argument is first constructive. It presents the biblical view positively by showing that all factual and logical discussions by men take place by virtue of the world's being what God in Christ says it is. It then proceeds negatively to show that unless all facts and all logical relations be seen in the light of the Christian framework, all human interpretation fails instantly. It fails instantly in principle. God does continue to uphold all men by his providence and give them good gifts calculated to lead them to repentance, but this does not, as such, change their hearts.

A few separate remarks may be made in reply to some of Buswell's particular objections.

(1) Buswell says: "Logically and metaphysically of course there is a direct path of inference from any fact in the universe to God and to the correct view of that fact as a created fact, but historically no one has ever followed that path, independent of revelation."

My reply is that no sinner has ever reasoned historically from any created fact to the Creator of that fact because he has, in advance of his reasoning about these facts, already placed them in a frame of reference that is exclusive of God. He makes himself, to begin with, the final reference point in all that he says. The more consistent his logical reasoning is, the more certainly will he end up with a finite God which is no God. Buswell's method of apologetics agrees with the natural man on the question of starting point, which assumes that man is not the creature of God. Buswell therefore expects the man to make a leap toward the Creator-god whom he has spurned in his starting point and method.

(2) Buswell says: "Of course I agree that there is no 'succession of moments' in God's essential being, but sometimes you seem to imply that there is no succession of moments in God's consciousness. This must mean one of three things: (1) That God is not conscious of the circumstances in which he has placed us and hence all that the Bible says of the love and care of God is untrue. (2) That the sequence of events in this world is only an illusion. (3) That there is a hopeless actual contradiction in the situation. The word actual is necessary here, I think, for if you categorically state that there is no

succession of moments in the consciousness of God and yet that the Bible is true, the contradiction is far more than merely apparent.”

In this statement Buswell makes an absolute contrast between the “essential being” and the “consciousness” of God. However, the Reformed Confessions, on the basis of Scripture, speak of God as omniscient, all wise, etc. Is there then some “essential being” back of this God of which the Confessions speak? Of such an “essential being” we can know nothing because only God can tell us what he is.

Buswell wants a “succession of moments” in God’s consciousness so that history may have meaning. I hold that in such a case God would be immersed with man his creature in the conditions to which he has made his creature subject and then history would have no meaning.

Taking the position he does on this point will certainly get Buswell onto common ground with the unbeliever, but it will also leave him there.

(3) Buswell says: “Your argument seems to be that since God completely knows himself, therefore he contains within himself no possibilities or potentialities which are not realities and actualities. In our conversation . . . I said erroneously that you taught that knowledge is reality. I had this paragraph in mind. I should have said that this paragraph has meaning for me only on the assumption that God’s knowledge is equal to or the same thing as reality or actuality. Otherwise there could be no such conclusion from the fact that he fully knows himself. This paragraph seems also to imply that the potential is the unknown. Now if I understand your philosophy correctly, you would escape from Spinoza at this point only by what you call a seeming contradiction, but what to me amounts to an actual contradiction. Your logic in this paragraph would drive you straight into a timeless universe, only that you hold that time is actual for the creature but is not actual in the experience of the Creator.”

“It seems to me quite contrary to established usage of words to say that there is no potentiality or possibility in God which is not actual or real. This in common language would mean that God has nothing more to do in time. This conclusion of course would deny the doctrine of providence.”

Buswell wants a god with possibilities and potentialities within himself. Such a view is indistinguishable from the “given element” that Edgar Brightman finds in god. But Brightman is consistent in that he speaks of his god as finite. Buswell continues to think that a god who must still realize himself in part is the God of the Bible.

Buswell cannot distinguish between Reformed theology and the pantheism of Spinoza. The only alternative that he sees to abstract Spinozistic monism is absolute pluralism or temporalism.

His theology on the two points just now discussed fits in with the Butler type of apologetics Buswell defends. Here is where the consistency appears to come in.

(4) Buswell says: “You do not hold, do you, that there is anything in God contrary to our understanding?” The answer is no because at the bottom of everything I discuss in the syllabus is Paul’s teaching that man unavoidably knows God because he is made in the image of God. When I say that God is incomprehensible I mean that God cannot be exhaustively known by his creature. But I also believe that a “finite god” such as Buswell’s various objections seem to presuppose, is incomprehensible to man in the sense of unknowable.

(5) Buswell says: "I cannot find anything in the Bible to deny that complete comprehension is an ideal which God sets before us."

I am not surprised at this, since on your case, Dr. Buswell, God and man are subject to the same temporal limitations. Both must realize potentialities within themselves. Both must strive in unison for ultimate comprehension of all reality. That is their common ideal. And an ideal it must ever remain for both. Or rather, neither can ever see the ideal.

(6) Buswell says: "Are you not historically incorrect in saying that the church has emphasized that Christ was not a human person? In the following paragraph I agree of course that Christ did not lay aside his divine nature, but I cannot read my theology in any such way as to warrant your saying that this requires us to deny that he became a human person and was a divine-human person. He 'was and continueth to be God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever.' He was one person and that one person since the incarnation continues to be a divine person but is also 'man.' I agree of course that the divine and human natures were not intermingled, but I fear that a student would not really see that you emphasize the humanity of Christ's person as clearly as the deity of his person."

Buswell here answers himself by quoting the Confession as saying that Christ, when he became man, continued to be God and man "in two distinct natures and one person forever." Is this "one person" then not divine?

(7) Buswell says: "If there is no potentiality in God, then either (a) he has done everything he ever intends to do, or (b) our experience of sequence in time and space is an illusion, or (c) there is a hopeless contradiction in reality."

Here again Buswell knows no more basic dichotomy than that of abstract logic like that of Spinoza or abstract temporalism like that of the Pragmatist. The Bible has a dichotomy that underlies and relativizes this sort of dichotomy. The Bible makes the eternal, self-existent God the Creator of man as temporally conditioned. It is to be expected that man as temporally conditioned makes such false dichotomies as Buswell makes if he is, to begin with, unwilling to make the Creator-creature distinction basic to all his thought.

At this point again it is his anti-biblical apologetic method that accounts for Buswell's non-biblical view of God. Meaning to oppose rationalism and a priorism of every sort in the interest of the reality and significance of history, Buswell draws God down into history and thus loses all.

There are many more points in Buswell's letter, but the principle ones have been taken up. All his objections spring from a semi-Arminian view of man. For him simple historic Calvinism is virtually identical with pantheism. This has been the stock in trade position of Romanists and Arminians. Their position is unbiblical and for that reason is unable to challenge the unbelief of our age. The burden of proof is upon Buswell to show that his position both in apologetics and in theology does not suffer from the defects of theirs.

2

²Van Til, Cornelius ; Sigward, Eric H.: *The Works of Cornelius Van Til, 1895-1987*.
electronic ed. New York : Labels Army Co., 1997