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ARISTOTLE, KANT, AND THE STOICS: RETHINKING HAPPINESS AND DUTY. By STEPHEN ENGSTROM and JENNIFER WHITING, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Pp ix, 310.

This collection of essays contains revised versions of papers delivered at a conference entitled "Duty, Interest, and Practical Reason: Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics" that was organized by Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting at the University of Pittsburgh in 1994. One of the main aims of the conference was to bring together scholars on Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant to reevaluate the common view that Greek and Kantian ethics represent fundamentally opposed conceptions of ethical theory and the roles of morality and happiness in practical reasoning. According to a common view, the ancients are eudaimonists; they derive or justify the virtues by showing how they contribute to the agent's own *eudaimonia* or happiness. By contrast, Kant sharply criticizes eudaimonism for deriving or justifying morality in terms of happiness. This criticism applies to eudaimonism of all sorts, even Stoic eudaimonism, which is perhaps closer in some respects to Kant's own views, and of which he is somewhat less critical than he is of other forms of eudaimonism. For Kant, moral duty and respect for the moral law must be grounded in reason itself and cannot be made to depend on any independent standard. These and related assumptions about ancient and Kantian ethics have helped structure much contemporary systematic work in ethical theory, as well as common conceptions of these ethical traditions. But this common view has been under reexamination lately; some of the most interesting work in the history of ethics in recent years has been in Greek and Kantian ethics, and much of it challenges one or another aspect of the received view of the ethical theory and moral psychology of Kant or the Greeks. However, with some exceptions, renewed interest and recent work in these two traditions has proceeded in parallel. The conference aimed to correct this, by bringing together some of the most distinguished scholars of ancient and modern ethics to compare and assess the role of moral duty and happiness in the two traditions. Most of the essays have such a comparative assessment as their main theme; but even those that focus more exclusively on one of the traditions contribute indirectly to this comparative assessment.

After a useful introduction by Engstrom and Whiting, the essays are divided into five pairs and topics. John McDowell discusses deliberation and moral development in Aristotle's ethics, while Barbara Herman discusses related themes in Kant's ethics. Terence Irwin explains and critically assesses Kant's criticisms of eudaimonism, while Stephen Engstrom compares Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia* and Kant's conception of the

highest good. Allen Wood examines the different attitudes Aristotle and Kant have toward self-love, whereas Jennifer Whiting defends a Kantian reading of Aristotle's view about the relation between virtue and external goods. Christine Korsgaard compares Kant's claims about the good will and Aristotle's account of virtuous action, while Julia Annas contrasts Aristotelian with Stoic and Kantian views about the role of morality in practical reasoning and the unity of practical reason. John Cooper examines the metaphysical and cosmological basis of Stoic conceptions of virtue and happiness, while Jerome Schneewind compares features of Kantian and Stoic ethics to defend a version of the received view that contrasts Kant's deontology with the teleology inherent in Greek eudaimonism.

McDowell defends an intuitionistic and particularist interpretation of Aristotle's conception of practical reason by attacking what he calls a "blueprint" model as a philistine prejudice. The blueprint model of practical reasoning apparently takes a simple syllogistic form that appeals to exceptionless generalizations: (1) All Fs are forbidden; (2) x is F; (3) hence, avoid x. In defense of his own intuitionistic interpretation, McDowell appeals to Aristotle's well-known remarks about the inexactness of political and ethical sciences, which admit of generalizations that hold only usually or for the most part (for example, *NE* 1094b3–27). We can sympathize with McDowell's rejection of conceptions of practical reasoning that aim for mechanical decision procedures without embracing extreme particularism or intuitionism. For one thing, particularists who eschew generalization have some difficulty explaining how the practically wise person should deliberate about novel or especially perplexing situations, to which her existing sensibility is in some sense inadequate, or how moral education, which involves creation of a moral sensibility, is to proceed. Moreover, we can be skeptical about the possibility of exceptionless normative generalizations without embracing particularism if we understand normative generalizations as containing ineliminable *ceteris paribus* clauses. As long as it is possible to say interesting things in advance (and not merely *post hoc*) about the kinds of situations in which other things are not equal, we can maintain a form of generalism. Indeed, something like this is a plausible view about the nature of generalizations in many contexts. This sort of generalism would secure a kind of uncodifiability that McDowell seems to want and provide a natural explanation of the sort of inexactness Aristotle recognizes in ethics; it would avoid the crudeness of the blueprint model that McDowell castigates without requiring particularism. Indeed, it would allow for informative generalizations that could be used by an agent in deliberating about novel or perplexing cases and could play a role in moral education, thus avoiding some of the difficulties that seem to beset extreme particularism.

Herman continues her efforts at articulating a "kinder and gentler"

Kantian moral psychology in which moral character assigns an important role to nonrational faculties, including emotions and desires. She focuses on the relation between reason and desire. Desire can be what moves us to action, within a Kantian account of moral motivation, provided the desire is reason-responsive. Desires are reason-responsive when their weight, scope, and objects are suitably regulated by an agent's perception of the moral law. Forms of deliberation and character that proceed from reason-responsive desires need not be inimical to virtue.

Kant criticizes all forms of eudaimonism, including Stoic versions, for subordinating morality to inclination and an independent standard (*KpV* 20–28, 35–36, 111–12). In a careful and rewarding discussion of Kant's criticism of eudaimonism and its relation to Reid's assessment of Greek ethics, Irwin argues that Greek eudaimonists did not subordinate morality to inclination, because they treated *eudaimonia* as supplying external or categorical reasons. And because Aristotle and the Stoics viewed virtue as a component of, rather than an instrumental means to, *eudaimonia*, the sense in which they subordinate morality to an independent standard is not obviously problematic. Indeed, Irwin seems to think that the eudaimonist makes room, as Kant does not, for an explanation of why an agent should care about moral demands.¹ But Kant need not appeal to eudaimonism to vindicate the authority of morality if these moral demands are grounded in the capacities of rational agents as such. However, even if eudaimonism is not necessary to vindicate morality's authority, it may help to vindicate its supremacy insofar as it can help reconcile categorical demands to be concerned with one's own rational agency and categorical demands to be concerned with rational agents as such.

Engstrom provides an instructive comparison between Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia* and Kant's conception of the highest good. Despite Kant's criticisms of eudaimonism, Engstrom identifies important similarities in the content of these two conceptions and the role they play in Aristotle's and Kant's ethical theories. Aristotle's account of *eudaimonia* is an account of a final or highest good. Both view the highest good as a complex whole consisting of virtue and other goods, in which virtue is a condition of these other goods having value. In his valuable emphasis on similarities, however, I think Engstrom may underestimate differences. Though virtue is a complete good, for Aristotle, it is not an unconditionally complete good; it is chosen for the sake of *eudaimonia*. Moreover, Aristotle specifies virtue in terms of the human function. But then even if virtue is the controlling ingredient in Aristotle's conception of *eudaimonia*, virtue is

¹Also see Terence Irwin, "Morality and Personality: Kant and Green," in *Self and Nature in Kant's Philosophy*, ed. Allen W. Wood (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984).

posterior in justification to *eudaimonia*, and this appears to violate Kant's strictures on the relation between virtue and the good. Moreover, I think one may wonder whether the value of external goods for Aristotle is, as happiness (*Glückseligkeit*) is for Kant, entirely conditional on virtue. Some external goods seem to contribute constitutively to a complete good independently of their role in virtue (1099b1–7, 1100a6–8, 1100b27), and it's not clear that Aristotle restricts their value to those who lead virtuous lives. (However, Whiting's claims about the *kaloskagathos* go some way toward defending a Kantian reading of Aristotle here.)

Aristotle contrasts vulgar and proper self-love and insists that the virtuous person is the true self-lover (1168b28–34). By contrast, Kant thinks that a will that is determined by the principle of self-love is heteronomous and cannot provide a foundation for morality (*KpV* 34). Wood's essay is a nice examination of the claims about self-worth and human nature on which Kant's reservations about self-love depend.

Whiting explores Aristotle's suggestion in the *Eudemian Ethics* (8.3) that so-called natural goods are intrinsically neither good nor bad, insofar as they can be misused by, and prove harmful to, the nonvirtuous agent. This thesis echoes Socratic claims in Plato's *Euthydemus* (280a–81e) and prefigures Kant's reasons in the *Groundwork* for claiming that a good will is the only thing good without qualification (*G* 393–94). In the course of exploring this thesis, Whiting argues that Aristotle's distinction between the *agathos* (the good person) and the *kaloskagathos* (the fine-and-good person) corresponds to his distinction between natural virtue and authoritative virtue, in which the authoritatively virtuous agent is responsible for his own fate in a way in which the naturally virtuous agent is not.

Korsgaard addresses apparent differences between Aristotle's and Kant's conceptions of moral motivation and virtuous action that are consequent upon apparent differences in their assessments of the naturally sympathetic person. Aristotle may seem to think the naturally sympathetic person could be virtuous, whereas Kant may seem to deny this possibility. But Korsgaard argues that these apparent differences are illusory, because both Aristotle and Kant insist that virtuous actions must be chosen for their own sakes. Kant famously claims that a good will requires not just that an agent conform to duty but that she do so from a sense of duty (*G* 390). An action in conformity with inclination can nonetheless express a good will but only if the agent's choice of actions is suitably regulated by her beliefs about what's morally required. In such cases, it's not that conformity to duty acts as the agent's ultimate aim; it's rather that it serves as a constraint or filter on eligible motivations. Kant focuses on the case of the person who acts from a sense of duty in the absence of supporting inclination or in the presence of recalcitrant inclination, not because she alone has a good will, but because the operation of the sense of duty is especially clear in her

case. According to Korsgaard, Aristotle's position is essentially the same as Kant's. For, according to Aristotle, the virtuous person must choose virtuous actions because they are fine (*kalon*). So there is a sense in which Aristotle, as well as Kant, must say that the person who is beneficent or generous merely from inclination, in a way not regulated by the requirements of virtue, fails to be virtuous. If there is a residual sense in which Aristotle is more inclined to regard the person who is reliably beneficent as generous, it is because, Korsgaard thinks, Aristotle, unlike Kant, treats emotions, such as sympathy, as perceptions of normative reasons. But this is more of a psychological than a normative disagreement. While there is much in Korsgaard's account to agree with, I wonder if she overstates the similarities between Aristotelian and Kantian conceptions of virtue by underestimating their disagreement about the need for affect and inclination within an account of virtue. For whereas Kant may not think that the presence of inclination disqualifies an agent from displaying a good will or that a good will requires contramoral inclination, nonetheless he seems to think that the person in whom a sense of duty must overcome indifference or contrary inclination (the grudging moralist) can and does display a good will (*G* 398). But Aristotle would certainly think that the grudging moralist displays continence, rather than virtue, inasmuch as he thinks that it is the mark of the virtuous person that he does not experience a conflict between the rational and nonrational parts of his soul and that appetite and emotion harmonize with right judgment (1102b14–28). Korsgaard discusses this issue briefly but, I think, underestimates its significance.

Annas explores the distinctive features of Aristotle's relation to Kant in part by seeing how he (Aristotle) differs from the Stoics. Whereas Kant and the Stoics distinguish sharply between moral and nonmoral goods, putting them in effect on separate scales, Aristotle includes both moral and nonmoral goods within *eudaimonia*. Annas suggests that Aristotle's unified conception of value and practical reasoning is less mysterious and closer to common sense. But, she thinks, Aristotle's attempt to preserve *endoxa* comes at a price; once we concede that happiness includes nonmoral goods, it becomes hard to explain the primacy that he assigns to moral virtue within happiness. One might wonder about Annas's contrast between Kant and Aristotle here. If one pays attention to Kant's claims about the role of virtue and happiness within the highest good (*KpV* 110–19) and argues, as Whiting and Engstrom do, that for Aristotle virtue is a condition of the value of external goods, one might suppose that both Aristotle and Kant recognize nonmoral goods as well as moral goods but only such nonmoral goods as are conditioned by moral goods. Moreover, one might wonder whether Aristotle's constraints on *eudaimonia*, introduced in *NE* 1, don't provide some resources for defending his claim about the controlling role of virtue within *eudaimonia*. The function argument

(*NE* 1.7) implies that happiness consists largely in a life of activity expressing one's rational capacities; the life of virtue is such a life, whereas a life of nonmoral goods is not (1099b25–28). Moreover, it seems clear that Aristotle thinks that his requirements that *eudaimonia* be comparatively stable and within our control imply that virtue must be the controlling ingredient in happiness (*NE* 1099b18–20, 1100b1–7, 12–15; *EE* 1215a8–18). Indeed, insofar as Aristotle identifies and individuates virtues in terms of their contribution to the agent's *eudaimonia*, the most pressing question is not so much why virtue is the controlling ingredient in *eudaimonia*, as why familiar other-regarding traits, such as courage, generosity, and justice, are genuine virtues.

Cooper argues that we cannot reach a fair understanding and assessment of what is distinctive about Stoic ethics without appreciating the way in which Stoic ethical views depend upon their views about nature and cosmology. The Stoics identify *eudaimonia* with a life lived in accordance with nature, which they identify with a life lived in accordance with reason or virtue. However, Cooper thinks that this is not just an endorsement of Aristotle's function argument. Stoic beliefs about the rational and benevolent character of nature provide additional assurance that the life of virtue is beneficial. Indeed, the Stoic belief that the world is ordered for the best helps explain their otherwise counterintuitive view that virtue and happiness are identical. For if virtue exhausts happiness, it is hard to see how the demands of virtue could call on us to sacrifice genuine goods. This is a paradoxical view. But it becomes more intelligible if we remember that the Stoics think that nature is ordered for the best and that virtue is a life in accord with nature. For then what might appear to be costs of virtue can be seen to be essential parts of the very best whole. However, I wonder if Stoic theodicy justifies Stoic claims about happiness. For even compensated sacrifices appear still to be sacrifices; yet the Stoics cannot admit that virtue exacts a price, even (as Plato and Aristotle claim) one worth paying. Also, one may wonder whether the agent is always compensated for her sacrifices even if they are elements of the very best whole. Others or even nature as a whole may be better for the agent's sacrifices, but that doesn't imply that they make *her* better off unless we define the good of the part in terms of the good of the whole. I am not sure that Stoic theodicy itself justifies this organic conception of individual happiness.

Schneewind attempts to preserve the contrastive reading of Kant as deontologist and the ancient Greeks as teleologists by criticizing two recent attempts (by Guyer and Herman) to read Kant as appealing to the value of a rational will and by contrasting Kant's appeal to respect for the moral law and Stoic appeal to the perception of natural goods. I am not sure that the distinction between doing something out of respect for the moral law and doing it because it is perceived to be good for a rational agent is clear

or strong enough to justify Schneewind's version of the traditional contrast between the Greeks and Kant.

This collection of essays represents an important and stimulating contribution to the history of ethics. The quality of the essays is consistently high; as a rule, they defend interesting interpretive and systematic claims in resourceful ways, marshal evidence from the texts persuasively, and significantly advance the level of discussion on the topics they address. Though each of the essays repays careful reading, some of them—especially those by Irwin, Engstrom, Wood, Whiting, Korsgaard, Annas, and Cooper—strike me as especially rewarding. Students of Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant will certainly want to study these essays not only for their insights about these figures but also to achieve a better comparative understanding and assessment of these figures. Nor should readership for this book be confined to specialists in the history of ethics; those whose primary interests are in systematic ethics should also read these essays with considerable interest and profit.

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POLITICS: BOOKS VII AND VIII. Clarendon Aristotle Series. By ARISTOTLE. Trans. RICHARD KRAUT. New York: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1997. Pp. x, 229.

Despite its importance both historically and within the Aristotelian corpus, and despite the outpouring of first-rate scholarship on Aristotle in the past thirty years, the *Politics* has received much less attention than it deserves. This situation is, however, beginning to be rectified. The magisterial four-volume nineteenth-century commentary by W. L. Newman has been joined in recent years by numerous new translations as well as commentaries by Richard Robinson with supplementary material by David Keyt on *Politics* III–IV, Trevor Saunders on *Politics* I and II, P. Simpson on the whole of the *Politics*, and in German by E. Schütrumpf on *Politics* I–VI.¹ Richard Kraut's

¹W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*. 4 vols. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1887–92); R. Robinson, *Aristotle Politics Books III and IV*. 2d ed., with a supplementary essay by D. Keyt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1995); E. Schütrumpf, *Aristotles: Politik Buch I* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991); E. Schütrumpf, *Aristotles: Politik Buch II–III* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1991); E. Schütrumpf and Hans-Joachim Gehrke, *Aristotles: Politik Buch IV–VI* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997); P. Simpson, *Aristotle's Politics: A Philosophical Commentary* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); T. Saunders, *Aristotle's Politics Books I and II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 1995).