Asset Prices in An Exchange Economy Robert Lucas

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A metric space is a set S, together with a metric (distance function) ρ : $S \times S \rightarrow R$, such that for all $x, y, z \in S$: a. $\rho(x, y) \ge 0$, with equality if and only if x = y; b. $\rho(x, y) = \rho(y, x)$; and c. $\rho(x, z) \le \rho(x, y) + \rho(y, z)$.

A metric abstracts the four basic properties of Euclidean distance:

- the distance between distinct points is strictly positive;
- the distance from a point to itself is zero;
- distance is symmetric;
- and the triangle inequality holds.

A metric space (S, ρ) is **complete** if every Cauchy sequence in S converges to an element in S.

A sequence $\{x_n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ in S is a Cauchy sequence (satisfies the Cauchy criterion) if for each $\varepsilon > 0$, there exists N_{ε} such that $\rho(x_n, x_m) < \varepsilon$, all $n, m \ge N_{\varepsilon}$.

Let (S, ρ) be a metric space and $T : S \to S$ be a function mapping S into itself. T is a contraction mapping (with modulus β) if for some $\beta \in (0, 1), \ \rho(Tx, Ty) \leq \beta \rho(x, y)$, for all $x, y \in S$.

T is a function mapping: $Tx = 0.3x + 9x^2 + \log(x)$, Tx = 0.3xThe fixed points of T : Tx = x

Example

On a closed interval S = [a, b], with $\rho(x, y) = |x - y|$. Then $T : S \to S$ is a contraction if for some $\beta \in (0, 1)$:

$$\frac{|Tx - Ty|}{|x - y|} \le \beta < 1, \text{ all } x, y \in S \text{ with } x \neq y.$$

Theorem

If (S, ρ) is a complete metric space and $T : S \to S$ is a contraction mapping with modulus β , then a. T has exactly one fixed point v in S, and b. for any $v_0 \in S$, $\rho(T^n v_0, v) \leq \beta^n \rho(v_0, v)$, n = 0, 1, 2, ...

Proof.

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- Choose $v_0 \in S$, and define $\{v_n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ by $v_{n+1} = Tv_n$, so that $v_n = T^n v_0$

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- Choose $v_0 \in S$, and define $\{v_n\}_{n=0}^{\infty}$ by $v_{n+1} = Tv_n$, so that $v_n = T^n v_0$
- By the contraction property of T,

$$ho(v_2, v_1) =
ho(Tv_1, Tv_0) \le eta
ho(v_1, v_0).$$

Continuing by induction, we get

$$\rho(v_{n+1}, v_n) \leq \beta^n \rho(v_1, v_0), \ n = 1, 2, ...$$

Hence, for any m > n,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho(\mathbf{v}_{m}, \mathbf{v}_{n}) &\leq \left[\beta^{m-1} + ... + \beta^{n+1} + \beta^{n}\right] \rho(\mathbf{v}_{1}, \mathbf{v}_{0}) \\ &\leq \frac{\beta^{n}}{1 - \beta} \rho(\mathbf{v}_{1}, \mathbf{v}_{0}). \end{aligned}$$

 $\{v_n\}$ is a Cauchy sequence. Since S is complete, it follows that $v_n \rightarrow v \in S$.

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To show that Tv = v, note that for all n and all $v_0 \in S$,

$$\begin{split} \rho(\mathit{Tv}, v) &\leq \rho(\mathit{Tv}, \mathit{T}^n v_0) + \rho(\mathit{T}^n v_0, v) \\ &\leq \beta \rho(v, \mathit{T}^{n-1} v_0) + \rho(\mathit{T}^n v_0, v). \\ &: \longrightarrow 0 \longrightarrow 0 \text{ as }_{n \to \infty} \end{split}$$

Hence, $\rho(Tv, v) = 0$, or Tv = v.

Note that $T^{n-1}v_0$ converges to v

Finally, we must show that there is no other function $\hat{v} \in S$ satisfying $T \ \hat{v} = \hat{v}$. Suppose to the contrary that $\hat{v} \neq v$ is another solution. Then

$$0 < \mathbf{a} =
ho(\hat{\mathbf{v}},\mathbf{v}) =
ho(T\hat{\mathbf{v}},T\mathbf{v}) \leq eta
ho(\hat{\mathbf{v}},\mathbf{v}) = eta \mathbf{a},$$

which cannot hold, since $\beta < 1$. This proves part (a).

To prove part (b), observe that for any $n \ge 1$,

$$\rho(T^n v_0, v) = \rho(T(T^{n-1} v_0), Tv) \le \beta \rho(T^{n-1} v_0, v),$$

So that (b) follows by induction, $\rho(T^n v_0, v) \leq \beta^n \rho(v_0, v)$.

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$$(Tv)(x) = \sup_{y} [F(x, y) + \beta v(y)]$$

s.t. y feasible given x

- v(x), x is the beginning-of-period state variable
- y is the end-of-period state to be chosen
- $x \in X \subseteq R^{l}$, $y \in X$
- F(x, y) current period return
- Operator T, fixed point Tv = v

(Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, page 54)

Theorem

Let $X \subseteq R^{l}$ and let B(X) be a space of bounded functions $f : X \to R$, with the sup norm. Let $T : B(X) \to B(X)$ be an operator satisfying

- (monotonicity) $f, g \in B(X)$ and $f(x) \leq g(x)$, for all $x \in X$, implies $(Tf)(x) \leq (Tg)(x)$, for all $x \in X$;
- (discounting) there exists some $\beta \in (0,1)$ such that

 $\left[T\left(f+a\right)\right](x) \leq \left(Tf\right)(x) + \beta a$, all $f \in B(X)$, $a \geq 0$, $x \in X$

[Here (f + a)(x) is the function defined by (f + a)(x) = f(x) + a.] Then T is a contraction with modulus β .

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Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction

Proof.

• If $f(x) \leq g(x)$ for all $x \in X$, we write $f \leq g$.

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- For any $f, g \in B(X)$, $f \leq g + ||f g||$.

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- Then properties (a) and (b) imply that

$$Tf \leq T(g + ||f - g||) \leq Tg + \beta ||f - g|$$

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$$Tg \leq Tf + \beta \|f - g\|$$

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• Reversing the roles of f and g gives by the same logic

$$Tg \leq Tf + \beta \|f - g\|$$

• Combining these two inequalities, we find that $\|Tf - Tg\| \le \beta \|f - g\|$, as was to be shown.

(Stokey, Lucas and Prescott 1989, page 62)

Theorem

Let $X \subseteq R^{I}$ and $Y \subseteq R^{m}$, let $f : X \times Y \to R$ be a continuous function, and let $\Gamma : X \to Y$ be a compact-valued and continuous correspondence.

- Then the function $h: X \to R$ defined in (1) is continuous,
- and the correspondence G : X → Y defined in (2) is nonempty, compact-valued, and upper hemi-continuous (u.h.c.).

$$h(x) = \max_{y \in \Gamma(x)} f(x, y) \tag{1}$$

$$G(x) = \{ y \in \Gamma(x) : f(x, y) = h(x) \}$$

$$(2)$$

Theorecital examination of stochastic behavior of equilibrium asset prices

Environment:

- A single good
- Pure exchange
- Identical consumers
- A number of different productive units
- An assest is a claim to all or part of the output of one of these units
- Shock: productivity in each unit fluctuates stochastically through time
 - Equilibrium asset prices will fluctuate as well

• "Fully reflect all available information" (in Fama's term)

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 - Contraction Mapping Operator --- learn and converge

• Representative consumer:

$$E\left\{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty}\beta^{t}U(c_{t})
ight\}$$

 c_t a stochastic process representing consumption of a single good

• *n* distinct productive units, output is perishable

$$0 \leq c_t \leq \sum_{i=1}^n y_{it}$$

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- Production is entirely "exogenous": no resources are utilized
- Output y_t follows a Markov process defined by its transition funciton

$$F(y',y) = \Pr\left\{y_{t+1} \le y' | y_t = y\right\}$$

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(B)

- Ownership in this productive units is determined each period in a competitive stock market
 - Each unit has outstanding one perfectly divisible equity share
 - A share entitles its owner as of the beginning of t to all of the unit's output in period t
 - Shares are traded, after payment of real dividends, at a competitively determined price vector $p_t = (p_{1t}, ... p_{nt})$
 - Let $z_t = (z_{1t}, ..., z_{nt})$ denote a consumer's beginning-of-period share holdings

- All output will be consumed $(c_t = \sum_{i=0}^n y_{it})$
- All shares will be held $(z_t = (1, ..., 1) = \underline{1})$

• The current output vector y_t: summarizes all relevant information on the current and future physical state of the economy

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- Equilibrium should be expressible as some fixed function $p(\cdot)$ of the state of the economy, or $p_t = p(y_t)$ where the i^{th} coordinate $p_i(y_t)$ is the price of a share of unit i when the economy is in the state y_t .

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- Knowledge of the transition function F(y', y) and this function p(y) will suffice to determine the stochastic character of the price process $\{p_t\}$

• A consumer's current consumption and portfolio decisions, c_t and z_{t+1} , depend on his beginning of period portfolio, z_t , the prices he faces, p_t , and the relevant information he possesses on current and future states of the economy, y_t .

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- His behavior can be described by fixed decision rules $c_t = c(z_t, y_t, p_t)$ and $z_{t+1} = z(z_t, y_t, p_t)$

An equilibrium is a continuous function $p(y) : E^{n+} \to E^{n+}$ and a continuous, bounded function $v(z, y) : E^{n+} \times E^{n+} \to R^+$ such that (i)

$$v(z, y) = \max_{c, x} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \int v(x, y') dF(y', y) \right\}$$

subject to

$$c + p(y) \cdot x \leq y \cdot z + p(y) \cdot z, \ c \geq 0, \ 0 \leq x \leq \overline{z},$$

where \bar{z} is a vector with components exceeding one; (ii) for each y, $v(\underline{1}, y)$ is attained by $c = \sum_i y_i$ and $x = \underline{1}$. Condition (i) says that, given the behavior of prices, a consumer allocates his resources y · z + p(y) · z optimally among current consumption c and end-of-period share holdings x

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- Condition (ii) requires that these consumption and portfolio decisions be market clearing

- Since the market is always cleared, the consumer will never be observed except in the state z =<u>1</u>. On the other hand, the consumer has the option to choose security holdings x ≠ 1
- To evaluate these options, he needs to know v(z,y) for all z
- The value v(z, y) will be interpreted as the value of the objective for a consumer who begins in state y with holdings z, and follows an optimum consumption-portfolio policy thereafter

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- Our interest:

The movement of the asset prices

Construction of the equilibrium - propositions

Proposition 1: For each continuous price function $p(\cdot)$ there is a unique, bounded, continuous, nonnegative function v(z, y : p) satisfying (i). For each y, v(z, y : p) is an increasing, concave function of z.

Proof.

Define the operator T on functions v(z, y) such that (i) is equivalent to Tv = v.

$$(Tv)(z,y) = \max_{c,x} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \int v(x,y') dF(y',y) \right\} = v(z,y)$$

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• The domain of T is the nonnegative orthant L^{2n+} of the space L^{2n} of continuous, bounded functions $u: E^{n+} \times E^{n+} \to R$, normed (Norm assigns length to a vector) by

$$\|u\| = \sup_{z, y} |u(z, y)|$$

Proof.

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- Since U(c) is bounded, Tu is bounded, and by the Theorem of Maximum Tu is consitnuous

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- Since U(c) is bounded, Tu is bounded, and by the Theorem of Maximum Tu is consitnuous
- Hence, T is monotone $(u \ge v \text{ implies } Tu \ge Tv)$ and for any constant A, $T(u + a) = Tu + \beta a$.

$$(Tv)(z,y) = \max_{c,x} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \int v(x,y') dF(y',y) \right\}$$

$$c + p(y) \cdot x \le y \cdot z + p(y) \cdot z, \ c \ge 0, \ 0 \le x \le \overline{z}, \ c + p(y) \cdot x \le A$$

$$(Tv)(z,y) = \max_{x} \left\{ U[A - p(y)x] + \beta \int v(x,y') dF(y',y) \right\}$$

Proof.

• Monotonicity: If $u \ge v$ everywhere, the maximum Tu > Tv

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Proof.

- Monotonicity: If $u \ge v$ everywhere, the maximum Tu > Tv
- Discounting: $T(u + a) = Tu + \beta a$

$$(T(v+a))(z,y) = \max_{x} \left\{ U[A-p(y)x] + \beta \int v(x,y')dF(y',y) + \beta a \right\}$$

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Then according to the Blackwell's condition for a contraction mapping, T is a contraction mapping. It follows that Tv = v has a unique solution v in L²ⁿ⁺. Further, lim_{n→∞} Tⁿu = v for any u ∈ L²ⁿ⁺ (ρ(Tⁿv₀, v) ≤ βⁿρ(v₀, v)).

• To prove that v is increasing in z, observe that Tu is an increasing function of z for any u.

$$(Tv)(z, y) = \max_{x} \left\{ U(z(y + p(y)) - p(y)x) + \beta \int v(x, y') dF(y', y) \right\}$$

Since v = Tv, this implies that v is increasing in z.

Proof.

To prove that v is concave in z, we first show that if u(z, y) is concave in z, so is (Tu)(z, y).

• Let z_0 , z_1 be chosen, let $0 \le heta \le 1$

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$$(Tu)(z^{i}, y), i = 0, 1$$

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• Let (c_i, x_i) attain

$$(\mathit{Tu})(\mathit{z}^{i},\mathit{y}), \ i=0,1$$

Now

$$(c^{ heta},x^{ heta})=(heta c^0+(1- heta)c^1, heta x^0+(1- heta)x^1)$$

satisfies

$$c^{\theta} + p(y)x^{\theta} \leq yz^{\theta} + p(y)z^{\theta}$$

so that

$$(Tu)(z^{\theta}, y) \geq U(c^{\theta}) + \beta \int u(x^{\theta}, y') dF(y', y)$$

$$\geq \theta(Tu)(z^{0}, y) + (1 - \theta)(Tu)(z^{1}, y)$$

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using the concavity of U and u.

- Hence (Tu)(z, y) is concave in z for all n = 1, 2, ...
- Then, since $\lim_{n\to\infty} T^n u = v$, v is concave

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Proposition 2 (Envelope theorem)

Proposition 2: If v(z, y; p) is attained at (c, x) with c > 0, then v is differentiable with respect to z at (z, y) and

$$rac{\partial v(z,y;p)}{\partial z_i} = U'(c) \left[y_i + p_i(y)
ight], \quad i=1,...,n$$

Proof.

• Define $f : R^+ \to R^+$ by

$$f(A) = \max_{c,x} \left\{ U(c) + \beta \int v(x,y') dF(y',y) \right\}$$

subject to

$$c + p(y)x \le A$$
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$$c + p(y)x \le A$$
, $c, x \ge 0$

 For each A, f(A) is attained at c(A), x(A) say, and since the maximand is strictly concave in c, c(A) is unique and varies continuously with A.

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Proof.

If c(A) > 0 and if h is sufficiently small, c(A) + h and x(A) are feasible at 'income' A + h

$$f(A+h) \geq U(c(A)+h) + \beta \int v(x(A), y') dF(y', y)$$

= $U(c(A)+h) - U(c(A)) + f(A)$

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= $U(c(A)+h) - U(c(A)) + f(A)$

• c(A+h) - h and x(A+h) are feasible at income A. Thus

$$f(A) \geq U(c(A+h) - h) + \beta \int v(x(A+h), y') dF(y', y) \\ = U(c(A+h) - h) - U(c(A+h)) + f(A+h)$$

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• Combining these inequalities gives

$$U(c(A) + h) - U(c(A)) \leq f(A + h) - f(A)$$

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Image: Image:

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• Dividing by h, letting h
ightarrow 0, and utilizing the continuity of $c(\cdot)$ gives

$$f'(A) = U'(c(A))$$

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• Dividing by h, letting h
ightarrow 0, and utilizing the continuity of $c(\cdot)$ gives

$$f'(A) = U'(c(A))$$

• Now letting A = yz + p(y)z, so that v(z, y; p) = f(A), we obtain $(\partial v/\partial z_i) = f'(A)(\partial A/\partial z_i)$, as was to be shown.

• First order condition

$$U'(c)p_i(y) = \beta \int \frac{\partial v(x, y')}{\partial x_i} dF(y', y)$$
$$c + p(y)x = yz + p(y)z$$

provided c, x > 0

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$$c + p(y)x = yz + p(y)z$$

provided c, x > 0

• If next period's optimum consumption *c1* is also positive, Proposition 2 implies

$$\frac{\partial v(x, y')}{\partial x_i} = U'(c') \left[y'_i + p_i(y') \right]$$

• Now in equilibrium $z = x = \underline{1}$, $c = \sum_j y_j$, and $c' = \sum_j y'_j$

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$$U'\left(\sum_{j} y_{j}\right) p_{i}(y) = \beta \int U'\left(\sum_{j} y_{j}'\right) \left(y_{i}' + p_{i}(y')\right) dF(y', y)$$

for *i* = 1, ..., *n*

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- One may think this equation, loosely, as equating the marginal rate of substitution of current for future consumption to the market rate of transformation, as given in the market rate of return on security *i*
- Mathematically, it is a stochastic Euler equation

Solution of the price function

$$U'\left(\sum_{j} y_{j}\right) p_{i}(y) = \beta \int U'\left(\sum_{j} y_{j}'\right) \left(y_{i}' + p_{i}(y')\right) dF(y', y) \qquad (*)$$

- Since this equation does not involve the particular value function
 v(z, y; p) used in its derivation, it must hold for any equilibrium price
 function
- Conversely, if $p^*(y)$ solves this equation and $v(z, y; p^*)$ is as constructed in Proposition 1, then the pair $(p^*(y), v(z, y; p^*))$ is an equilibrium
- Thus solutions to this equation and equilibrium price functions are coincident

Solution of the price function

Define

$$egin{split} g_i(y) &= eta \int U'\left(\sum_j y'_j
ight)y'_i dF(y',y) \ f_i(y) &= U'\left(\sum_j y_j
ight)p_i(y) \end{split}$$

We have n independent functional equations

$$f_i(y) = g_i(y) + \beta \int f_i(y') dF(y', y)$$

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• If

$$f(y) = g_i(y) + \beta \int f(y') dF(y',y)$$
 have solutions $(f_1(y),...,f_n(y))$

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$$p_i(y) = rac{f_i(y)}{U'\left(\sum_j y_j
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will solve (*), and $p(y) = (p_1(y), ..., p_n(y))$ will be the equilibrium price function

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• If f is any continuous, bounded, nonnegative function on E^{n+} , the function $T_i f : E^{n+} \to R^+$ given by

$$(T_i f)(y) = g_i(y) + \beta \int f(y') dF(y', y)$$

is well-defined and continuous in y

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• Since U is concave and bounded (by B, say) we have for any c:

$$0 = U(0) \leq U(c) + U'(c)(-c) \leq B - cU'(c)$$

So that cU'(c) < B for all c.

• cU'(c) < B, it follows that the functions $g_i(y)$ are bounded,

$$g_i(y) = \beta \int U'\left(\sum_j y'_j\right) y'_i dF(y', y)$$

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• Evidently, solutions to $T_i f = f$ are solutions to $f(y) = g_i(y) + \beta \int f(y') dF(y', y)$

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- The crucial issues are the information content of the current state y (that is, the way F(y', y) varies with y) and the degree of "risk aversion" (the curvature of U)
- Suppose, as first case, that $\{y_t\}$ is a sequence of independent random variables: $F(y',y)=\phi(y')$
- Then g(y) is the constant

$$ar{g} = eta \int y' U'(y') d\phi(y') = eta E \left[y U'(y)
ight]$$

• Calculating f from

$$(Tf)(y) = \bar{g} + \beta \int f(y') d\phi(y')$$
$$(T^2f)(y) = \bar{g} + \beta \left[\bar{g} + \beta \int f(y') d\phi(y') \right]$$

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$$(T^2f)(y) = \bar{g} + \beta \left[\bar{g} + \beta \int f(y') d\phi(y') \right]$$

• We get

$$f(y) = \frac{\bar{g}}{1-\beta}, \ f'(y) = 0$$

• Differentiating

$$p(y) = \frac{f(y)}{U'(y)}$$

gives

$$p'(y) = -\frac{\beta E [yU'(y)] U''(y)}{(1-\beta) [U'(y)]^2} = p(y) \frac{-U''(y)}{U'(y)} > 0$$

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Characterize the price function – one asset

• Rearranging

$$\frac{yp'(y)}{p(y)} = \frac{-yU''(y)}{U'(y)}$$

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• This is the elasticity of price with respect to income is equal to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion

Rearranging

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- This is the elasticity of price with respect to income is equal to the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion
- In a period of high transitory income, then, agents attempt to distribute part of the windfall over future periods (marginal utility decreases), via securities purchases. This attempt is frustrated (since storage is precluded) by an increase in asset prices

• Restrict the stochastic difference equation governing y_t to have its root between zero and one

$$y_{t+1} = \rho y_t + \varepsilon_{t+1} \qquad \rho \in (0, 1)$$

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$$0 < -F_2 < F_1$$

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• Assume that F is differentiable, and that its derivatives F_1 and F_2 satisfy

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• CDF $F(y', y) = \Pr \{y_{t+1} \le y' | y_t = y\}$ $F_1 > 0$ $F_2 < 0$: the higher the y_t , the more likely the higher y_{t+1}

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CDF F(y', y) = Pr {y_{t+1} ≤ y' | y_t = y} F₁ > 0 F₂ < 0: the higher the y_t, the more likely the higher y_{t+1}
Use the change of variable u = F(y', y), and invert to get y' = G(u, y), G₂ = ∂y'/∂y By substitution we take into account that y affects y', u = F(G(u, y), y), completely differentiation gives

$$F_1G_2 + F_2 = 0$$
, $G_2 = -F_2/F_1$

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Lemma

Let F satisfy $0 < -F_2 < F_1$, and let h(y) have a derivative bounded between 0 and $h'_M > 0$. Then

$$0 \leq \frac{d}{dy} \int h(y') dF(y', y) \leq h'_{M}$$

Proof.

 $\frac{d}{dy}\int_0^1 h(y')dF(y',y) = \frac{d}{dy}\int_0^1 h(G(u,y))du = \int_0^1 h'(G)G_2(u,y)du$, the result follows.

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$$(Tf)(y) = g(y) + \beta \int f(y') dF(y', y)$$

$$\frac{d}{dy}(Tf)(y) = g'(y) + \beta \frac{d}{dy} \int f(y') dF(y', y)$$

$$g'(y) = \beta \frac{d}{dy} \int U'(y') y' dF(y', y)$$

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- Let f(y) be the solution to $f(y) = g(y) + \beta \int f(y') dF(y', y)$
- Bounds on the derivative of U'(y)y, or $U''(y)y + U'(y) = U'\left(1 - \left(\frac{-yU''(y)}{U'(y)}\right)\right)$

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- Bounds on the derivative of U'(y)y, or $U''(y)y + U'(y) = U'\left(1 - \left(\frac{-yU''(y)}{U'(y)}\right)\right)$
- Take 0 and \bar{a} as lower and upper bounds on $U^{\prime\prime}(y)y+U^{\prime}(y),$ then apply Lemma 1

$$0 \leq g'(y) \leq \beta \bar{a}$$

$$f'(y) = g'(y) + \beta \frac{d}{dy} \int f(y') dF(y', y)$$

= $g'(y) + \beta \int f'(y') G_2(u, y) dF(y', y)$
= $g'(y) + \beta \int \left[g'(y') + \beta \frac{d}{dy'} \int f(y'') dF(y'', y')\right] G_2(u, y) dF(y', y)$
= $g'(y) + \beta \int g'(y') G_2(u, y) dF(y', y) + ...$
 ≥ 0

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$$\begin{aligned} f'(y) &= g'(y) + \beta \frac{d}{dy} \int f(y') dF(y', y) \\ &= g'(y) + \beta \int f'(y') G_2(u, y) dF(y', y) \\ &\leq g'(y) + \beta \int f'(y') dF(y', y) \quad \text{given } G_2 = \frac{-F_2}{F_1} < 1 \\ &\leq g'(y) + \beta \int \left[g'(y') + \beta \frac{d}{dy'} \int f(y'') dF(y'', y') \right] dF(y', y) \\ &\leq g'(y) + \beta \int g'(y') dF(y', y) + \beta^2 \int \int g'(y'') dF(y'', y') dF(y', y) \\ &\leq \bar{a} + \beta \bar{a} + \beta^2 \bar{a} + \dots \\ &\leq \frac{\beta \bar{a}}{1 - \beta} \end{aligned}$$

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 $p(y) = \frac{f(y)}{U'(y)}$ $p'(y) = \frac{U'(y)f'(y) - f(y)U''(y)}{[U'(y)]^2}$

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 $p(y) = \frac{f(y)}{U'(y)}$ $p'(y) = \frac{U'(y)f'(y) - f(y)U''(y)}{[U'(y)]^2}$

 $\frac{yp'(y)}{p(y)} = \frac{yf'(y)}{f(y)} - \frac{yU''(y)}{U'(y)}$ income effect (+) "information effect" sign of f'(y)

f(y) information about future dividends

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 Depends on our knowledge of the curvature of U It shows how to translate such knowledge into knowledge about asset prices

$$\frac{yp'(y)}{p(y)} = \frac{yf'(y)}{f(y)} - \frac{yU''(y)}{U'(y)}$$

- Depends on our knowledge of the curvature of U It shows how to translate such knowledge into knowledge about asset prices
- Relative risk aversion less than 1, f'(y) > 0, so that the information effect is positive

Thus, new optimistic information on future dividends leads to increased asset prices