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POLITENESS AS A CONVERSATIONAL STRATEGY
IN THREE HEMINGWAY SHORT STORIES

THESIS

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CHAPTER I

Hemingway's Dialogue and the Texts of Politeness and Literature

Any full-length study and many short studies of Ernest Hemingway's work are likely to contain high praise for Hemingway's handling of dialogue. Philip Young writes, "Almost singlehanded he vitalized the writing of dialogue" (17, p. 203). By way of contrast to Hemingway's lean style, H.E. Bates notes that the nineteenth-century "novel had staggered along under the weight of a colossal convention of fancy mechanics in the matter of dialogue." That convention included making explicit the interior states of characters by authorial comment or overt performatives such as "He said haltingly, angrily, tenderly, softly . . ." (2, p. 74). Bates argues that Hemingway was the first to defy that convention. He did it with "his own ability to imply, by the choice, association, and order of the words, whether a character was feeling and speaking with anger, regret, desperation, tenderness, quickly or slowly, ironically or bitterly" (2, p. 75). All of this means that Hemingway's narrators have relatively little to say. Not only are Hemingway's narrators perceived as tight-lipped; just as frequently, critics comment on the verbal brevity of his

characters. Ann Drummond notes, "The writing is terse, and the apparent simplicity is deceptive. His characters, too, are understated, terse, and--to the undiscerning eye--deceptively simple" (7, p. 248). Richard Bridgman says that in writing dialogue Hemingway "economized so that the very briefest statements were forced to bear his meaning, to be his meaning in fact" (3, p. 226). Thus, it appears that one of the most admirable qualities of Hemingway's dialogue, as well as narration, is its terseness.

In general, terseness can often lead to vagueness or ambiguity. Hemingway's dialogue is no exception to this general rule. Bridgman comments, "Unlike the highly specific narrative, his dialogue is often vague, ambiguous, indirect" (3, p. 228). The same charges of vagueness, ambiguity, and indirectness are often leveled at Henry James' dialogue, as well as narrative. Some critics recognize an explicit similarity between Hemingway's and James' techniques for dialogue. Bridgman notes that Hemingway's and James' "characters normally talk around, or below, or above, or beside their real subject" (3, p. 227). Carlos Baker refers to this technique as "the hovering subject." Baker's comments on this technique in James (and by implication Hemingway) are worth quoting at length since, as I will argue below, Baker is unusual in his attempt at a rigorous analysis of how Hemingway's and James' characters talk vaguely, ambiguously, or indirectly:

James often establishes the subject of a conversation by hint and allusion rather than overt statement. At other times he introduces the subject briefly (often it is a single word at the end of a sentence) and then conducts the dialogue by reference to it, while it hovers, helicopter-like, over the surface of the conversation. In either instance the neuter pronoun it, or its unuttered equivalent, is the index to what is being talked about. It is the apex of a pyramid whose base is the dialogue, and the real subject is the star at which the apex points (1, p. 185, footnote 32).

I have argued elsewhere (12) that in The Ambassadors James uses this linguistically cohesive device of pronominal reference (especially it) in the sometimes incoherent dialogue of Louis Lambert Strether to show his "innocence." In particular, Strether's inability, or unwillingness, to maintain a cohesive conversation with Maria Gostrey early in the novel reveals his innocence and consequent need for maturity. And Heather Hardy and I have shown (13) that Hemingway's use of pronominal reference (especially it to refer to the unuttered abortion) in the dialogue of "Hills Like White Elephants" helps to reflect, at once, the enormity of the imposition on the woman that the abortion represents and the inability of the man and the woman to come to any resolution of their fundamentally different ways of thinking about life and death.

Literary critics are not usually linguists also; they should not be expected to approach literature in the same technical way that linguists approach language. But because of the very nature of their subject matter, literary critics

must be eclectic, sometimes drawing on their knowledge of history, psychology, art--in effect, anything that finds its way into a literary text, including anything that relates to the way writers write and readers interpret literary texts. In particular, the relatively non-technical linguistic tools of conversational analysis can help to make more explicit and rigorous the sometimes impressionistic claims made about Hemingway's dialogue. One can read that Hemingway's dialogue is "terse," "economical," "deceptively simple," and "ambiguous" only so many times before these judgments become banalities devoid of meaning. One should ask, instead, what is going on linguistically in the dialogue that is felt by readers to be terse, economical, deceptively simple, and ambiguous and how what is going on linguistically contributes to character development and theme.

To answer these questions fully is to answer how literary dialogue itself means. Obviously, I do not intend to answer this question fully here. To do so would be to present a fullblown theory of literary dialogue. However, I do think that the dynamics of the literary network of author, text, and reader, justify an approach to the text that emphasizes the rules underlying real-life conversation. In writing a dialogue, for instance, the author, consciously or unconsciously, relies on, among other things, rules of conversation that he can expect his audience to know. Thus, he can have a character speak in such a way that his words

create his character, as they are read by the reader. Intent and effect have some correlation then by virtue of knowledge of conversational rules shared by author and reader, even though, in large part, this knowledge is not subject to conscious reflection by either author or reader. The rules of conversation, like the rules of language, are mostly subconscious habits of production and understanding, but their subconscious nature does not preclude their being thought of as shared knowledge since we can speak of "knowing" how to maintain a conversation just as we speak of "knowing" how to speak a language. Discussing the effect that shared knowledge of social discourse has on the reader, Jonathan Culler writes, "When a character in a novel performs an action, the reader can give it meaning by drawing upon this fund of human knowledge which establishes connections between action and motive, behaviour and personality" (6, pp. 142-43).

This connection between real-world knowledge and reader competence raises the question of the difference between "ordinary" and "literary" language. In this analysis I am, obviously, assuming that there is much less difference between the two than is often assumed. The tools of conversational analysis used in this study were developed from analyses of real-life conversation and for analyses of real-life conversation. It is sometimes argued that to deny that there are any great differences between "ordinary" and

"literary" language is to imply that there is no real value in literary studies since if there were no differences, to know ordinary language would be, essentially, to know literary language. We all realize that a knowledge of ordinary language does not assure a knowledge of literary language. As Culler says in a summary of the argument against the identification of ordinary language with literary language, "it is, alas, only too clear that knowledge of a language and a certain experience of the world do not suffice to make someone a perceptive and competent reader" (6, p. 121). The usual conclusion is that there is, therefore, a fundamental difference between ordinary and literary language. Literature does consist of something in addition to ordinary language, but that something resides not in the text but in the reader. It is an attitude, and as such, in the final analysis, it does not even reside in the author. Without a reader's "literary attitude" towards a text, there would be no literature. As Stanley Fish argues, literature

is language around which we have drawn a frame, a frame that indicates a decision to regard with a particular self-consciousness the resources language has always possessed. . . . What characterizes literature then is not formal properties, but an attitude--always within our power to assume--toward properties that belong by constitutive right to language. . . . Literature is still a category, but it is an open category, not definable by fictionality, or by a disregard of propositional truth, or by a statistical predominance of tropes and figure, but simply by what we decide to put into it. The difference lies not in the language, but in ourselves (8, p. 52).

Part of this attitude is certainly a hypersensitivity to the "resources" of language. And one of these resources is a user's ability to relate a particular text to other texts. Culler argues that a text can be read only in relation to other texts, which provide a frame for the judgment of a text. He says that "intersubjectivity--the shared knowledge which is applied in reading--is a function of these other texts." Culler's argument may sound like a standard call for genre study. It is that, but it is more too. As he says, a literary text's "relation to other texts of a genre or to certain expectations about fictional worlds is a phenomenon of the same type . . . as its relation to the interpersonal world of ordinary discourse" (6, p. 139). This thesis is concerned with the relation between the text of Hemingway's dialogue and the text of that interpersonal world, that is, the text of real-life conversation. Thus, I will examine a very small part of how a text of literary dialogue means.

But it is not enough to limit the topic even this far since the text of the interpersonal world, or real-life conversation, is a large one, too large to be explicated in a lifetime. I will, therefore, concentrate on one conversational strategy--politeness--which seems to be responsible for much of the terseness, economy, deceptive simplicity, and ambiguity of Hemingway's dialogue.

As I indicated earlier, most commentators on Hemingway's dialogue mention its terseness, economy, deceptive simplicity, and ambiguity. Not all critics have stopped with a simple caricature of Hemingway's dialogue. Some, like Sheldon Grebstein, attempt to find communicative strategy in it. Grebstein argues that the banality of Hemingway's dialogue is "a ruse to mask the underlying meaning, as in life we use set phrases and stock responses for protective cover until we are securely positioned for authentic communication" (9, p. 98). The only objection I have to Grebstein's comment is the implication that "set phrases" and "stock responses," however "protective" they might be, are not "authentic communication." Critics have generally recognized that even "meaningless talk" in Hemingway's work has meaning. Bridgman argues that Hemingway "recognized that in spoken banalities lay much of the inchoate drama of human life, and as we read his dialogue, we are always looking through it to meaning" (3, p. 227). The man in "Hills Like White Elephants" speaks hardly anything but set phrases and stock responses, which are often meant to mask his real meaning. But we know that he is trying to communicate something terribly important to the girl when he says rather predictably, "'You don't have to be afraid [of an abortion]. I've known lots of people that have done it'" (14, p. 275). Also, when a Hemingway character does not speak set phrases and stock responses we,

as well as the other characters, know that something noteworthy is being communicated. In "The Sea Change," when the woman asks the man if he does not really believe she loves him, he does not answer with a predictable hedge like "Well, I guess so," or "I'm not really sure." Instead, he challenges her with "'Why don't you prove it?'" Revealing the unexpected nature of the man's challenge, the woman responds, "'You didn't use to be that way. You never asked me to prove anything. That isn't polite'" (14, p. 398). Both the man in "Hills Like White Elephants" and the man in "The Sea Change" are attempting to persuade their respective companions to do something that is obviously anathema to the women's wishes. In "Hills Like White Elephants," the man wants the woman to have an abortion. The woman wants to have her child. In "The Sea Change," the man wants the woman to stay with him. The woman wants to leave him for her lesbian lover. It seems perfectly natural for the man in "Hills Like White Elephants" to attempt to ease the woman's fears and then commit the bandwagon fallacy, while on the face of it, it seems that the man in "The Sea Change" threatens the woman in asking her to prove that she loves him. In short, the man in "Hills Like White Elephants" is being polite while the man in "The Sea Change," as the woman indicates, is being impolite, although each is using perfectly rational strategies for achieving his goals given his respective situation. When trying to convince someone

to submit to an enormous physical imposition, as is involved in talking a woman into having an abortion, it is strategic and polite to attempt to convince her that you are concerned about her fears and to make the imposition appear smaller than it actually is. Thus, one says that there is nothing to be afraid of and that many people have submitted to the imposition. But it seems impolite to confront a woman with a request to prove her love. This is not only a direct imposition on the woman's time and energy but also an implicit challenge of her honesty if she has just said that she loves you. The man in "The Sea Change" may be impolite, but he is rationally impolite in that the woman's departure seems so immanent and fixed that he has not the time to be polite. Of course, he challenges her veracity for a strategic purpose also. He hopes that she will defend her word by staying with him.

The sense in which I am using the word polite is obviously not restricted to the sense of "Yes, Sir," "No, Sir," "Please," and "Thank you." As we have just seen, politeness is a complex text of strategies that oil the machinery of interpersonal relationships. We will see later that critics have not been blind to the existence of politeness strategies in Hemingway's dialogue, although those who have mentioned his use of these strategies have been just as impressionistic in their comments as most of those who talk of Hemingway's terseness, economy, deceptive

simplicity, and ambiguity. As I have noted, I will show that many of these qualities of Hemingway's dialogue are direct results of his use of politeness strategies.

In order to talk systematically about the interpersonal text of politeness strategies in Hemingway's dialogue, I will use various findings of those linguists who work in the field of discourse analysis. My major tool will be Penelope Brown's and Stephen Levinson's 1978 "Universals in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena," which explicates at length the politeness text. Brown and Levinson are concerned with how politeness is linguistically encoded in real-life conversation and how the linguistic realizations of the politeness code reveal the dynamics of interpersonal relationships. They argue that politeness strategies are used by a speaker when there is a potential face-threatening act. That is, when a speaker wants something (goods, services, attention, promises, etc.) from a hearer, then the hearer's face is threatened (4, pp. 63-64). There are two basic types of face-threatening acts:

[1] Those acts that primarily threaten the addressee's (H's) negative-face want, by indicating (potentially) that the speaker (S) does not intend to avoid impeding H's freedom of action [2] Those acts that threaten the positive-face want, by indicating (potentially) that the speaker does not care about the addressee's feelings, wants, etc.--that in some important respect he doesn't want H's wants . . . (4, pp. 70-71).

Thus, the two types of face are labeled "negative" and "positive." Politeness strategies differ according to

whether the hearer's negative or positive face is threatened, though they may often merge. The man in "Hills Like White Elephants" addresses his companion's negative face and positive face by telling her that he knows lots of people that have had abortions. One implication is that if the man knows lots of "'people'" that have had abortions, then an abortion cannot be an enormous imposition on negative face. Otherwise, "'lots of people'" would not have submitted themselves to the imposition of abortion. The man also addresses the woman's positive face in trying to ease her fears of the abortion by implying that "'lots of people'" have safely had abortions, but as we will see later, the assuaging of fear of the physical consequences of the abortion is not one of her positive-face concerns. In fact, she never expresses, directly or indirectly, any fear of the actual abortion. Her fear is that the abortion will prolong the sterile existence that she and the man lead by traveling on trains and simply looking at things instead of participating in the productive life that is symbolized by the fertile side of the valley. The man's misreading of the woman's positive-face concerns contributes both to the characterization of him as selfish and terrified of losing his sterile way of life, which as we will see allows him to deny his own mortality, and to the theme that such a sterile existence leads to an undesirable isolation from love and life itself.

As I indicated earlier, the assumption of a tacit knowledge of conversational rules and strategies shared by author and reader allows the author to make his characters speak in such a way as to reveal themselves. The reader may interpret these revelations as part of the literary effect if he puts, as Fish argues, a literary frame around the text, that is, if he decides "to regard with a particular self-consciousness the resources language has always possessed" (8, p. 52). More specifically, the reader must interpret, in our case, the text of dialogue with reference to the text of politeness. The synthesis of those texts is interpreted with respect to the literary expectations that a reader has when he places the literary frame around a text.

The most important of those expectations about a literary text are that the text will have a theme and that its characters will have some depth and substance, that is, "characterization." One of the conversational maxims that H. Paul Grice argues is operant in any real-life conversation is the Maxim of Relation, which demands that speakers make their contributions to a conversation relevant to the conversational topic (10). Malcolm Coulthard comments that readers, in a metaphorical conversation with a text, doubly apply Grice's Maxim of Relation to literary conversations, in which they expect "that utterances are not simply relevant to the current topic, but also to the development of theme or characterization" (5, p. 171). The

thesis of this paper is that the reader's synthesis of the text of Hemingway's dialogue and the text of politeness strategies--which is only one text, or set of rules, governing real-life conversations--leads to inferences about characterization and theme in the literary text. Using Brown and Levinson's detailed analysis of the realizations of and motivations for politeness strategies and what can be determined about characterization and theme from Hemingway's narration, I will show how the use of politeness strategies in Hemingway's dialogue helps reinforce and even create characterization and theme. In a very real sense, this will also be a test of the potential for the literary application of Brown and Levinson's analysis of politeness strategies in real-life conversation.

The origin and primary application of most work on politeness have been in linguistics, sociology, and anthropology. One of Brown and Levinson's main goals is "to draw the attention of social scientists to the richness and complexity of the assumptions and inferences upon the basis of which humans understand and cooperate with one another" (4, p. 61). Others who have written on politeness, while they may be less theoretical and complete than Brown and Levinson, have shown more directly that the analysis of politeness in real-life contexts reveals the delicacy of linguistic interaction. Greta Little argues that politeness phenomena are strategic in the courtroom for the reason that

most of the persuasion in that context is of an indirect kind that mainly consists of questions. Little says that some of the examples of politeness she found displayed toward witnesses by lawyers were intended not for the witnesses but for the juries. It appears that lawyers want to give juries the impression that witnesses are human beings with free will who will not be abused if they open their mouths to speak. Politeness in particular stages of the trial may have special strategic purposes. Little writes, "The 'thank you' after cross examination may be a gesture of politeness, but it may also be interpreted as a sign that the witness was helpful to the opposition" (15, p. 364).

To my knowledge, there have been published only two studies that use Brown and Levinson's analysis of politeness to explicate literature. Michael Hancher shows how Alice in her trip through Wonderland uses and misuses politeness strategies. Hancher analyzes, among many other passages, the exchange in which the Caterpillar boldly tells Alice that her recitation of "You Are Old, Father William" "is not said right" and Alice "timidly" answers, "'Not quite right, I'm afraid . . . some of the words have got altered.'" Hancher comments, "Alice's response . . . includes two quantity hedges ('quite' and 'some') and a deleted-agent passive-voice impersonalization strategy ('have got altered'), all of which mitigate the threat her

concession poses to her positive face" (11, p. 179). Alice in Wonderland contains so many examples of politeness strategies that Hancher is tempted to call it a "linguistic-politeness book." He argues that although Alice is unusual in its heavy reliance on politeness strategies, "it is not unusual in the extent to which it shows characters defining, negotiating, and renegotiating their social identities in subtly adjusted verbal interaction" (11, pp. 181-82). As significant as Hancher's analysis is, it does not indicate how the use of politeness strategies contributes to theme and/or characterization. That is, his analysis does not make the connection between the synthesis of the dialogue and politeness strategies and the text of literature. A linguistic analysis of a literary text must make that connection or it is not literary criticism. Karen Wadman's analysis of politeness strategies in some of George Herbert's poems directed to God makes that connection. Wadman writes, "Herbert attempts to redefine his relationship with God, to modify it via his reminders of Christ's suffering for man." Wadman points out that Herbert's changing relationship is reflected in those poems to God by negative politeness strategies in the opening stanzas, to show the distance between Herbert and God, and by positive politeness strategies in the concluding stanzas, to show the closer relationship after Herbert reminds God that Christ changed God's wrathful relationship with man to

one of mercy. Thus, Herbert's use of politeness strategies supports his theme that Christ made it possible for man to have a close relationship with God (16, p. 105). As penetrating as Wadman's analysis is, the limitations of the study are obvious. There are only two interactants in the poems--three if Christ is counted as separate from God--and only one of those interactants actually speaks.

I have chosen Hemingway's dialogue for this study for two specific reasons. As I have said, Hemingway's dialogue has been much praised but little studied. I hope to make explicit some of what makes Hemingway's dialogue as excellent as it is. The second reason is that Hemingway's dialogue makes an excellent test case for the literary importance of politeness phenomena. Sheldon Grebstein argues that Hemingway "almost always avoids direct exposition of theme, didactic description or discussion of character, and authorial commentary upon action and motive" (9, p. 2). In Hemingway's fiction, a great share of theme and character development lies in the dialogue. But Hemingway's characters never explain character or thematic development. They reveal it in their actions and terse conversations with one another. We would expect that if politeness phenomena were superfluous to communicative strategy, they would not occur in the lean, hard, terse dialogue of the frequently gruff characters of Ernest Hemingway's fiction. That Hemingway's dialogue is full of

examples of politeness phenomena is an indication of the importance of politeness in interpersonal communication and thus in literature that does not explain itself but instead allows its characters to reveal themselves and their situations to us.

I have limited myself to a detailed discussion of the dialogue in three of Hemingway's short stories because an effective analysis of politeness demands some degree of thoroughness of exposition, a thoroughness that takes a surprising amount of space. What I will be trying to do is to sketch the submerged seven-eighths of Hemingway's iceberg by examining very closely the eighth that is exposed. The three stories were chosen not for their popularity with critics but because of the relative prominence in them of politeness phenomena in determining and contributing to theme and characterization. The stories that I have chosen are "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife," "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber," and "Hills Like White Elephants." I will from time to time mention politeness phenomena from other Hemingway short stories in order to reinforce my arguments. My next chapter is a detailed presentation of Brown and Levinson's discussion of the systematics of politeness phenomena so that I can avoid having to present their argument piecemeal throughout the paper. At the end of that chapter, I will justify my choice for analysis of the three stories named above and will indicate how each

will be coherently analyzed in terms of both theme and politeness phenomena in the remaining chapters of this thesis.

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CHAPTER II

Brown and Levinson's Politeness Strategies

As I indicated in Chapter I, politeness strategies are frequently used when a speaker or hearer's face is in danger. Brown and Levinson's Model Person--a hypothetical standard language user--has positive face (that related to personality demands and feelings of self-worth) and negative face (that related to a desire not to be imposed upon) (1, p. 68). Examples of potential face-threatening acts are criticism, contempt, ridicule, contradictions, challenges (all damaging the hearer's positive face), and orders, requests, warnings, dares (all damaging the hearer's negative face) (1, p. 71).

There are four basic super-strategies available to the speaker committing a face-threatening act (1, pp. 73-76). The first three super-strategies have in common that they are all "on record." If the speaker goes "on record" in committing the face-threatening act, there is no ambiguity about his intentions. One very general way to commit a face-threatening act is to go on record without redressive action (Strategy 1), which is the clearest and most unambiguous strategy available. In Hemingway's "The Killers," Al uses Strategy 1 when he tells George, "'Shut up

. . . . You talk too goddam much'" (2, p. 283). Al's intentions to stop George from revealing too much information about their motives for killing Ole Andreson are unambiguous, and he makes no effort to protect George's positive or negative face. Al issues the order to shut up--an imposition on George's negative face--and criticizes him for talking too much--a threat to George's positive face. If a face-threatening act is done on-record with redressive action, the speaker makes concessions to the hearer's positive and/or negative face, although his intentions are still unambiguous. With positive politeness (Strategy 2), the speaker shows that he respects the hearer's positive face; the speaker may indicate that his wants and needs are the same as those of the hearer, thereby implying that those wants and needs are worthwhile. The girl in "The Sea Change" practices this strategy when she promises the man several times that she will come back to him after she goes to her lesbian lover (2, p. 400). With negative politeness (Strategy 3), the speaker tries to minimize the intrusion that the face-threatening act poses for the hearer. In doing this, the speaker is torn between wanting to go off record to avoid imposing on the hearer and going on record to make it clear that he is paying attention to the hearer's face needs. Brown and Levinson write, "A compromise is reached in conventionalized indirectness, for whatever the indirect mechanism used to do [a face-threatening act], once

fully conventionalized as a way of doing that [face-threatening act] it is no longer off record." "Can you pass the salt?" is an example of conventional indirectness in that although it is indirect it is still an unambiguous request. If the speaker goes off record (Strategy 4), there is ambiguity about what his intentions are in doing a disguised face-threatening act. Off-record strategies include metaphor and irony, rhetorical questions, understatement, tautology, ambiguity, ellipsis. The following passage from Hemingway's "A Simple Enquiry" includes several examples of the off-record strategies of being ambiguous and using ellipsis. The major, who is obliquely quizing Pinin, his servant, on his possible homosexuality, speaks first:

"And you are quite sure that you love a girl?"

"I am sure."

"And," the major looked at him quickly, "that you are not corrupt?"

"I don't know what you mean, corrupt."

"All right," the major said. "You needn't be superior."

Pinin looked at the floor. The major looked at his brown face, down and up him, and at his hands. Then he went on, not smiling, "And you don't really want--" the major paused. Pinin looked at the floor (2, p. 329).

Assuming that Pinin actually knows what the major is getting at, we see that Pinin exploits the major's off-record strategy in pretending that he does not understand the meaning of the word "corrupt." Ambiguous off-record strategies protect both the speaker's and the hearer's

faces, but there is potential for the hearer to ignore the face-threatening act completely, leaving the speaker in an uncertain position, as is revealed by the major's wondering to himself whether the "little devil" lied to him (2, p. 330).

There is a fifth strategy for avoiding damage of the hearer's face, but it is not a strategy for doing a face-threatening act because the strategy is simply not to do the face-threatening act. By not doing the face-threatening act, the speaker avoids any damage or threat of damage to the hearer's face, but he also fails to communicate (1, pp. 76-77). Because of this failure of communication, Strategy 5 will not be considered further.

The circumstances that influence the choice of strategies involve (1) the social distance between the speaker and hearer, (2) the relative power of the speaker and the hearer over one another, and (3) the ranking of impositions in the culture of the speaker and hearer (1, p. 79). The weightiness of a particular face-threatening act is "computed" by adding all three of the above variables together. The social distance between the speaker and hearer is a function of "the frequency of interaction and the kinds of material or non-material goods (including face) exchanged between [the speaker] and [hearer]" (1, p. 82). Those who exchange positive face (e.g. friends) are closer socially than those who exchange negative face (e.g.

strangers). Power "is the degree to which [the hearer] can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of [the speaker's] plans and self-evaluation" (1, p. 82). If the hearer has a high degree of power over the speaker, say in the instance of an employer-employee relation, the speaker is likely to use a great deal of negative politeness, otherwise known as deference. Rank "is a culturally and situationally defined ranking of impositions by the degree to which they are considered to interfere with an agent's wants of self-determination or of approval (his negative- and positive-face wants)" (1, p. 82). Abortion, for example, was potentially a much larger face-threatening act in the 1920's, the fictional time of "Hills Like White Elephants," than it is today. This fact, as we will see, has implications in a reading of the story.

Brown and Levinson argue that the weightier the face-threatening act the higher will be the number of the strategy chosen to deal with it. Strategy 1 (on record, without redressive action, baldly) should be chosen to deal with a small face-threatening act. Strategy 4 (off record) should be chosen to deal with a large face-threatening act. It is important to realize that social distance, power, and rank do not have absolute values. Brown and Levinson argue that these variables have values that are relevant to politeness strategies "only to the extent that the actors think it is mutual knowledge between them" That is,

these factors have no objective values within the framework of politeness, only relative values assigned by the mutual assumptions of the conversational participants (1, pp. 78-79).

Choice of strategy does not depend alone on the weightiness of the face-threatening act, but on an integration of a weighting of the risk of the act and of the a priori payoffs of using a particular strategy. Three a priori payoffs are clarity, satisfaction of the hearer's positive face, and satisfaction of the hearer's negative face. The most clarity is gained by using Strategy 1 (on record, minus redress) and decreases as the number of the strategy rises to 4 (off record). Greatest satisfaction of the hearer's positive face is achieved through Strategy 2 (on record, plus redress, positive politeness) and least through Strategy 4. Greatest satisfaction of the hearer's negative face is achieved through Strategy 4 and least through Strategy 2 (1, p. 80). There are strategic reasons for not overreacting to face-threatening acts by going off record with all of them. Brown and Levinson comment that a speaker normally will not use the strategy of least risk--off-record Strategy 4--with all face-threatening acts for two reasons, the second of which is more important than the first. First, the use of Strategy 4 prevents full clarity and attention to the hearer's positive face, both of which are sometimes desirable. Second, its use might suggest to

the hearer that the values for social distance, power, and rank of imposition, either singly or in some combination, are higher than they really are (1, p. 88).

Generally, the choice of a particular politeness strategy will accurately reflect the estimated weightiness of a face-threatening act, which, as we have seen, is arrived at by the addition of social distance, power, and rank of imposition. Consider the following example from Brown and Levinson:

- (1) I'm awfully sorry to bother you and I wouldn't but I'm in an awful fix, so I wondered if by any chance . . .

This, of course, would be perceived as a preface to a very weighty face-threatening act, but as Brown and Levinson comment, it is ambiguous whether social distance, power, and/or rank of imposition is high. It may be that it is mutually known that distance and power values are small, in which case it would be assumed that the imposition is a very great one. But consider the effect of preceding the face-threatening act with (2):

- (2) Look, Harry, you're a friend, so . . .

In (2), low social distance value is explicitly claimed. In (3), high power value and low rank value are claimed:

- (3) Excuse me, ^{Sir,} Officer, ^{I'm sorry to bother you}
^{Your Excellency,}
 but I wonder if you could just possibly do me a
 small favour . . . (1, pp. 86-87)

It is normally the case that in Hemingway's stories, the relative value of distance, power, and rank are made clear by context, but when a character uses a strategy that does not accurately reflect the assumed values of this triad, we make judgments that contribute to characterization. For example, if the power value is known to be low, but a speaker encodes a high power value, we assume that the speaker feels himself to be powerless. Similar judgments are made when a character incorrectly estimates distance and rank values.

In the dynamics of politeness phenomena, there is ample room for manipulation of any or all of the elements of the triad. In other words, a speaker may try to re-rank social distance, power, rank of imposition or all three through his use of politeness strategies. For example, he may pretend that the rank of the imposition is small even though both speaker and hearer know that it is large, as in the following example, which uses the strategy of being optimistic (not hedging with something like "You wouldn't want to . . . would you?"):

(4) Hey, Harry, how about lending me your new car! If Harry decides that neither distance nor power is being manipulated and still lends the speaker his new car, the speaker has successfully re-ranked the imposition. Power may be re-ranked if the speaker goes bald-on-record with his face-threatening act, provided the hearer does not take offence (1, p. 233):

(5) Lend me your new car.

As Brown and Levinson put it, by using this strategy, the speaker implies that he does not "have to worry about threatening the addressee's face, as he is in a situation of power over him such that his [the speaker's] face cannot be easily damaged by [the hearer]." Again, if the hearer does not challenge the speaker, the speaker has successfully redefined his position with respect to power over the hearer. Distance may be re-ranked by using on-record strategies also, as in (5) (1, p. 234). I have given here only a slight hint of the possibilities for redefining or manipulating each of the elements of the triad. As we will see in the analyses of Hemingway's short stories, most of the use of politeness strategies is not directed primarily to doing face-threatening acts but to maintaining or redefining the interpersonal relationships between the characters. Brown and Levinson write,

Interactants, in any situation where the possibility of change in their social relationship exists, are constantly assessing the current 'score'--the mutual knowledge assessments of [social distance] and [power], for example--and may make minute adjustments at any point in order to re-establish a satisfactory balance or to move the interaction in the desired direction towards greater closeness or greater distance (1, p. 236).

There are several output strategies for the four super-strategies that are discussed above. I will not enumerate them here, but wait to discuss them when they are needed in the analyses of Hemingway's stories. In the analyses of the

stories themselves, I will assume the explicit knowledge of politeness phenomena that I have discussed in this chapter, especially the interaction of politeness strategies and the triad of social distance, power, and rank of imposition. Each of the three stories that I have chosen for extended analysis is dominated by one of these three elements. In "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife," social distance, that between Doctor Adams and Dick Boulton and that between Adams and his wife, seems to be the most manipulated element. Power, that of killing and psychological domination, is the element most sought after in "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber." And in "Hills Like White Elephants," the rank of the imposition, that of abortion and birth, is the element that motivates most of the politeness strategies used. The element that dominates each of these stories is intimately related to the major theme of its respective story. The theme of isolation that is evident in "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife" is much the result of the foregrounding of concern with social distance. Power is naturally related to the theme of bravery or spurious bravery in "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber." And the rank of the impositions birth and abortion provides the impetus for characterization that reveals the theme that a fear of death leads to a fear of life--birth--and a willingness to buy release from the threat of death with the sacrifice--abortion--of that which reminds one of one's own

mortality. Simply because one element of the triad seems to dominate in each of the stories does not mean that the other two are not important. It is often true that in manipulating one element, the speaker manipulates the other two elements. In Chapter III, I will show how it is that the manipulation of politeness phenomenon helps remove Dr. Adams' hypocritical face of honesty.

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CHAPTER III

The Face of Honesty in "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife"

In "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife," the strategic politeness lies in the main character's attempting to protect or repair his own positive face during and after an episode that shows him to be a thief, a liar, and a coward. The attacks on his positive face are rendered with the use of politeness strategies also, though the effect of their use is often irony instead of what we would normally call politeness. Approximately halfway through the story, we have the following narrative paragraph:

Dick Boulton looked at the doctor. Dick was a big man. He knew how big a man he was. He liked to get into fights. He was happy. Eddy and Billy Tabeshaw leaned on their canthooks and looked at the doctor. The doctor chewed the beard on his lower lip and looked at Dick Boulton. Then he turned away and walked up the hill to the cottage. They could see from his back how angry he was. They all watched him walk up the hill and go inside the cottage (7, p. 101).

When Dick Boulton looks at Doctor Adams, Boulton is happy. Doctor Adams, however, is angry when he looks at Boulton and cannot express it in his face, or at least the narrator does not tell us that anger is visible on Adams' face. The doctor only chews on his beard, which in context seems a nervous reaction to powerlessness. After Boulton and Adams

finish talking, it is apparently only from Adams' back as he walks away that the other characters can tell how angry he is. Just prior to this narrative, Dick Boulton, the half-breed, severely damages the doctor's positive face by strongly implying that the doctor is a thief, a liar, and a coward. "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife" is not about the doctor's "stealing" the drift logs. The story is about how the doctor reacts to being called a thief, a liar, and a coward. As Stephen Fox argues, "Since there can be no question of the doctor's at least partial improbity, the story must be intended to focus on his reaction to the charge rather than on the charge itself" (4, p. 20). In fact, it is the doctor's reaction to Boulton and his lying to his wife about the confrontation with Boulton that prove him a thief, liar, and coward. In all of his lying and cowardly reactions, Doctor Adams uses politeness strategies to preserve his own face, a face that he presents as characterized by honesty. He fails because no one else is interested in helping him preserve that face, not the half-breed Boulton, who refuses to be bullied by a hypocritical white man, not his wife, who treats him like a child trying to lie his way out of being caught with his hand in the cookie jar.

The successful maintenance of both positive and negative face is a joint venture "based on the mutual vulnerability of face." Brown and Levinson reason that

"since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others' faces, it is in general in every participant's best interest to maintain each other's face . . ." (3, p. 66). Exposing someone as a hypocritical thief is a face-threatening act of great magnitude, both to the person who is exposed and to the person who does the exposing since, as Brown and Levinson argue, retaliation is to be expected when one is forced to defend one's own face. Presumably, the social distance between Adams, the white doctor, and Boulton, the half-breed manual laborer, is great, and we would guess that power is asymmetrically weighted in Adams' favor. Thus, in threatening the doctor's positive face, Boulton simultaneously puts his own in great danger. Why does Boulton, with great social distance between himself and Adams and with relatively little power, not only commit the face-threatening act but do it on-record? It could be, as Adams explains to his wife, that Boulton owes Adams "'a lot of money for pulling his squaw through pneumonia'" and "'wanted a row so he wouldn't have to take it out in work'" (7, p. 102). But as Fox points out, the Doctor's assessment of Boulton's motives is suspect since the Doctor has already shown himself in his rationalizations about the drift logs to be capable of deception (4, p. 22). Or it could be, as the narrator comments, that Boulton simply "was very lazy" or that he "liked to get in fights" (7, pp. 100-01). Or it

could be that Boulton is hostile to Adams because of some complex socioeconomic injustice. In short, Boulton's motives are unknown and open only to speculation. What is clear is that as a half-breed, Boulton is "a mutation of the civilized and the elemental camps" (4, p. 21). He is civilized enough to understand the doctor's rationalizations, but he is elemental enough to challenge the social relationship that supports such rationalizations. Brown and Levinson would argue that Boulton fails to help maintain Adams' positive face. And as Fox says of Adams' decision to regard as fact the possibility that the logs could be driftwood, "such linguistic hypocrisy cannot be exercised without the cooperation of all parties involved, and Boulton flatly refuses to assist" (4, p. 20). He refuses to maintain the doctor's face and in challenging it manipulates primarily social distance but also power. Thus, whatever reasons Boulton may consciously have for threatening the doctor's face, the result of this threat is a reranking of two of the very social variables that make it a dangerous thing for him to do.

Using Brown and Levinson's analysis of politeness phenomena, we can see specifically how it is that Boulton goes about challenging Adams' face of honesty. The following block of conversation, minus some narration, contains the whole of Boulton's challenge and Adams' immediate response to that challenge:

- (1) "Well, Doc," he said, "that's a nice lot of timber you've stolen."
 (2) "Don't talk that way, Dick," the doctor said.
 (3) "It's driftwood."
 (4) Eddy and Billy Tabeshaw had rocked the log out of the wet sand and rolled it toward the water.
 (5) "Put it right in," Dick Boulton shouted.
 (6) "What are you doing that for?" asked the doctor.
 (7) "Wash it off. (8) Clean off the sand on account of the saw. (9) I want to see who it belongs to," Dick said.
-
- (10) "It belongs to White and McNally," he said, standing up and brushing off his trousers knees.
 (11) The doctor was very uncomfortable.
 (12) "You'd better not saw it up then, Dick," he said, shortly.
 (13) "Don't get huffy, Doc," said Dick. (14) "Don't get huffy. (15) I don't care who you steal from. (16) It's none of my business."
 (17) "If you think the logs are stolen, leave them alone and take your tools back to the camp," the doctor said. (18) His face was red.
 (19) "Don't go off at half cock, Doc," Dick said.
 (20) He spat tobacco juice on the log. (21) It slid off, thinning in the water. (22) "You know they're stolen as well as I do. (23) It don't make any difference to me."
 (24) "All right. (25) If you think the logs are stolen, take your stuff and get out."
 (26) "Now, Doc---"
 (27) "Take your stuff and get out."
 (28) "Listen, Doc."
 (29) "If you call me Doc once again, I'll knock your eye teeth down your throat."
 (30) "Oh, no, you won't, Doc" (7:100-01).

In this block of conversation, Boulton threatens Adams' positive face nine times. Brown and Levinson say that among the ways a speaker may threaten the positive face of a hearer are insults, reprimands, contradictions, and challenges. These acts intrinsically threaten positive face by indicating that the speaker either has a negative opinion of the hearer's positive face or simply does not care about

the hearer's positive face (3, pp. 70-72). Boulton insults Adams by implicitly calling him a thief in (1, 9, 10, 15, 22). Boulton reprimands Adams in (13, 14, 19) for getting angry at being called a thief. And he contradicts as well as challenges him in (30) when he refuses to be threatened physically by the "'Doc.'"

Boulton's insults and reprimands are all delivered with an ironic use of positive and negative politeness to which Adams responds as politely as he can until he loses control of his emotions in (29) and threatens to knock Boulton's eye teeth down his throat. In (1), Boulton presumptuously uses positive-politeness Strategy 4--USE IN-GROUP IDENTITY MARKERS--when he addresses Adams as "'Doc.'". Also in (1) he uses positive-politeness Strategy 1--NOTICE, ATTEND TO THE HEARER (HIS INTERESTS, WANTS, NEEDS, GOODS)--when he says that the doctor has a "'nice lot of timber.'". This is all very nice, friendly, and polite. These two positive-politeness strategies are output strategies for the super-strategy on-record with redressive attention to positive face (3, pp. 108-17). As I indicated in Chapter II, the use of positive-politeness strategies indicates a low value for social distance, like that between friends. Doctor Adams will later take offence at Boulton's attempts to lessen the social distance between them by the use of such positive-politeness strategies. In addition to two politeness strategies, (1) contains the face-threatening act as an

embedded clause claiming that the "'Doc'" stole that "'nice'" timber. Boulton's putting his accusation in an embedded clause is a subtle use of presupposition manipulation. To see what is presupposed in (1), we merely have to negate the entire sentence: "It is not the case that 'that's a nice lot of timber you've stolen.'" Even in the negated sentence, it is still asserted that the doctor stole the timber. That which is still asserted after the negation of the entire sentence is the presupposed part. Ann Weiser argues that it is very difficult to object to presuppositions. If a hearer stops long enough to object, he "breaks the flow" of the conversation (10, p. 727). If Adams had contradicted Boulton in (2) with something like, "The timber is not stolen," the conversation would not have halted, but a flow undesirable to the doctor would have been established. The recognized topic would have been whether the timber was stolen or not. This topic would be a threat to the doctor's positive face, which is heavily characterized here by concerns with maintaining a facade of honesty. Instead of pointedly saying he did not steal the timber, the doctor in (2) orders Boulton not to talk like that, which is a bald, on-record threat both to Boulton's negative face because it attempts to interfere with his freedom of action, here his freedom of speech, and to his positive face because it indicates disapproval. Adams contradicts Boulton in (3) by redefining "'timber you've

stolen'" as "'driftwood.'" As a bald on-record contradiction, (3) is a further insult to Boulton's positive face. By redefining "'timber'" as "'driftwood,'" the doctor avoids for the moment directly addressing the face-damaging topic of whether the timber is stolen or not. Both (2) and (3) are attempts to maintain the "linguistic hypocrisy" that Fox mentions (4, p. 20). As the employer of the half-breed Boulton, Adams would expect to have great power over him and thus be able to impose his will, or view of the "'timber,'" on him. The bald on-record command and contradiction are strategically reasonable in view of Adams' assessment of social distance and power, but his redefining "'timber'" as "'driftwood'" is a realization of output positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT. This use of Strategy 5 is meant to protect Adams' own positive face in the presence of the threat of the dangerous topic "stolen timber." Brown and Levinson (3, pp. 117-18) indicate that one of the specific realizations of Strategy 5 is the seeking of safe topics. Driftwood is a safe topic to a man accused of theft; stolen timber is not.

Boulton refuses to allow the doctor the power over him to impose the redefinition of the timber as "'driftwood.'" When Adams asks Boulton in (6) why the log is being put in the water, Boulton in (8) offers the explanation that he wants to clean off the sand so that the saw will not be damaged. Then in (9) for no reason other than to challenge

further the doctor's view and thereby threaten his positive face, Boulton says that he wants to see who the log belongs to. The presupposition of the embedded clause is that it belongs to someone. And since Adams has already told him that it is driftwood, the implications are that Adams has been lying and is a thief. These implications are generated by the violation of what is known as Grice's Maxim of Relevance. H. Paul Grice has observed that the following, entitled the "Cooperative Principle," is the major rule for successful conversation: "Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged." One of Grice's four maxims, which, if followed, ensure that the Cooperative Principle is adhered to, is the Maxim of Relation, which is simply "Be relevant." Boulton's statement in (9) that he wants to wash the sand off the log so that he can see who it belongs to is a violation of Grice's Maxim of Relation in that it is irrelevant to talk about finding out who is the owner of the timber if it is "'driftwood,'" as Adams redefined it in (3). First, "'driftwood'" has no owner. In irrelevantly suggesting that the timber has an owner, Boulton generates the implication that Adams has lied. Second, once the driftwood is found, the finder becomes the owner. In irrelevantly explaining that he is washing off the sand to find out who the owner is, Boulton generates the

implication that Adams, who implicitly claims ownership of the timber on his land by defining it as driftwood, is a thief who has stolen timber that is not driftwood. When one of Grice's four maxims is not observed, that is, when the speaker makes an inappropriate utterance, the hearer must invoke a "conversational implicature" on the assumption, in spite of appearances to the contrary, that the speaker is adhering to the Cooperative Principle. In other words, the hearer must interpret the inappropriate utterance so that it is somehow meaningful (6, pp. 43-46). As I indicated above, the implications, or implicatures, generated here in the reader, and presumably in Adams, Billy Tabeshaw, and Eddy Boulton are that the doctor is a liar and that he has stolen the timber. Boulton's violation of the Maxim of Relevance is an off-record strategy because there is potential ambiguity as to what his meaning is. Brown and Levinson argue that off-record strategies provide the speaker a way out of taking responsibility for his statements because he can insist that his intended meaning was not what the hearer interpreted it to be. They also say that off-record strategies provide greatest satisfaction to the hearer's negative face because the hearer can choose not to interpret the statement in the way in which it was intended (3, pp. 216-18). Boulton's violation of the Relevance Maxim is a realization of the output off-record Strategy 3: PRESUPPOSE (3, p. 222). Boulton's presupposition in (9) that the log

belongs to someone is not relevant to the doctor's statement in (3) that the timber is "'driftwood.'" In (10) Boulton repeats the presupposition of (9), that the timber belongs to someone, and adds the names of the real owners, thereby himself making relevant the second presupposition of (9), that the timber belongs to someone other than the doctor.

In (11) we are told that Adams is "very uncomfortable." Obviously, he is uncomfortable because his positive face has just been severely damaged. He has been shown to be a liar and a thief. We might assume that in his uncomfortable state he is trying to think of some way to repair the damage that has been done to his face of honesty. He attempts that repair in (12) when he suggests to Boulton that it is best not to saw the timber up if it belongs to White and McNally, implying that he does not want the timber if it actually belongs to someone else. In doing this, he gives attention to Boulton's positive face in that he assumes that Boulton would not want to participate in stealing someone else's property either. All of this is done with the use of positive-politeness Strategy 6: AVOID DISAGREEMENT. In particular, by using the word then, the Doctor uses what Brown and Levinson call "pseudo-agreement," a specific form of Strategy 6. Using then as a "conclusory marker" is "an indication that the speaker is drawing a conclusion to a line of reasoning carried out cooperatively with the addressee" (3, pp. 118-20). That is, Adams exploits the

off-record ambiguous irrelevance of Boulton's (9) by pretending that he has just been informed by Boulton, to his surprise, that the timber belongs to someone else. Of course, this manipulation is transparent, and the Doctor cannot control his anger and embarrassment completely, as is revealed by his saying (12) "shortly." If Boulton's only goal were to get out of work owed to Adams, he could leave at this point, since the Doctor has invented another "fiction"--that neither of them is dishonest enough to steal someone else's property--so that both of their positive faces can be saved. That is, in (12) Adams creates the fiction of a positive face of honesty for Boulton as well as himself in an effort to save his own face. This may be an attempt to create for both of them similar faces that Boulton will be more interested in maintaining.

Boulton is not simply lazy. In (13) and (14), he further damages the doctor's positive face by reprimanding him, telling him not to get "'huffy.'" Note that in (13) Boulton again ironically uses positive-politeness Strategy 4--USE IN-GROUP IDENTITY MARKERS--in calling Adams "'Doc.'" He is still asserting that the social distance value is small. In (15) Boulton deliberately misinterprets the doctor's (12) by implying that the doctor thinks that because the log belongs to White and McNally Boulton does not want to saw it up. In doing this, Boulton rejects Adams' attention to his positive face in (12). He then says

in (16) that it is none of his business, eliding the presupposed embedded clause of (15)--"who you steal from." The embedded clause of (15)--"who you steal from"--like that of (1), presupposes that Adams stole the logs. (15) and (16) indicate that Boulton will accept Adams' position of power over him as an employer. But the significant implication is that he will not allow that power to be so defined that the doctor can command, although implicitly, that Boulton participate in what he perceives to be a lie. That is, he will allow Adams to impose his will on him only if Adams is honest with him.

Boulton never says that he will not do the work if the logs are stolen. But in (17) the doctor assumes that this is so in order to save his own face when he tells Boulton to leave if he thinks the logs are stolen. He implies that Boulton's presuppositions that the logs are stolen are the opinion of Boulton only when he says, "'If you think'" This is a specific realization of negative-politeness Strategy 7: IMPERSONALIZE THE SPEAKER AND HEARER (3, pp. 195-211). Through the use of Strategy 7, Adams impersonalizes himself and thereby distances himself from Boulton and Boulton's point of view. That the doctor's attempt to save face here is not fully successful is indicated in (18) by his red face, which certainly registers embarrassment as well as anger. If Boulton's goal here were only to avoid participating in a hypocritical theft, Adams'

(17) would allow him a safe way out. However, Boulton has the power to expose not only the lie but the social arrangement that makes the lie possible.

If Boulton were to leave after (17), he would allow the doctor the power to deprive him of employment simply because he has a different view of the status of the logs. Boulton has no choice but to continue fighting for the power to force the doctor to admit that he steals timber. In (19) he reprimands Adams again, using the in-group identity marker "'Doc.'" In (20) and (21) we see Boulton insult the doctor's positive face by spitting tobacco juice on what he claims to be his property. In (22) Boulton asserts that the doctor is aware of the validity of the presupposition that the logs are stolen, something that Adams implicitly denied in (17) by distancing himself from Boulton's presuppositions through the use of negative politeness. By saying explicitly that Adams knows as well as he does that the logs are stolen, Boulton destroys the distance that the doctor sought to establish with (17). In (23) Boulton again implies that he is willing to cut them up because it does not matter to him that they are stolen. The doctor uses pseudo-agreement--positive-politeness Strategy 6: AVOID DISAGREEMENT--again in (24), as he did in (12), with "'All right'" in an attempt to maintain positive face, and he again uses in (25) the IMPERSONALIZATION of Strategy 7 that he used in (17). By the repetition of strategies that have

not worked with Boulton in the past, Adams shows himself here to have lost all control of the conversation.

Boulton begins to argue again in (26). In (27) Adams abandons positive-politeness strategies and goes bald, on-record with a command that Boulton leave. Boulton tries to argue again in (28), but the doctor has used all available arguments. All have failed him. In (29) Adams explicitly threatens Boulton with violence, which as Brown and Levinson argue, is a threat to positive face (3, p. 71). Adams appears to take particular offence at Boulton's use of positive-politeness Strategy 4: USE IN-GROUP IDENTITY MARKERS. Brown and Levinson comment that the use of such familiar terms "may insult [the hearer] by implying that [social distance] or [the hearer's power] is smaller than it is" (3, p. 235). This is certainly part of the reason that Boulton's use of "'Doc'" irritates Adams, but because Boulton has used "'Doc'" when he contradicted, challenged, insulted, and reprimanded the doctor, the term has become ironically polite, implying the opposite of what it normally signifies. Brown and Levinson report that the use of "my good man" in England is perceived as abusive. They argue that "such degradation may come about through the exploitative use of highly valued forms to convey insult-- that is, through ironic politeness" (3, p. 235). In any case, the facade of politeness falls completely in (30) when Boulton defies the doctor's threat, contradicts him, and implicitly threatens him.

In this passage of conversation, we have seen the doctor's complete inability to maintain his positive face at the expense of the face of the half-breed Boulton. In Adams' reactions to the threats to his positive face lies the revelation of his character. He seeks to maintain a lie at all costs. He cannot even order Boulton to cut the logs up because to do so before Boulton admits that the logs are driftwood would be to admit implicitly that he is stealing the logs. We will see him attempt to maintain his positive face with his wife and fail in that also.

The following passage, from which I have omitted some narration, occurs after the doctor walks up to his cottage in anger:

- (31) "Aren't you going back to work, dear?" asked the doctor's wife from the room where she was lying with the blinds drawn.
- (32) "No!"
- (33) "Was anything the matter?"
- (34) "I had a row with Dick Boulton."
- (35) "Oh," said his wife. (36) "I hope you didn't lose your temper, Henry."
- (37) "No," said the doctor.
- (38) "Remember, that he who ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city," said his wife. . . .
- (39) Her husband did not answer. (40) He was sitting on his bed now, cleaning a shotgun. (41) He pushed the magazine full of the heavy yellow shells and pumped them out again. (42) They were scattered on the bed.
- (43) "Henry," his wife called. (44) Then paused a moment. (45) "Henry!"
- (46) "Yes," the doctor said.
- (47) "You didn't say anything to Boulton to anger him, did you?"
- (48) "No," said the doctor.
- (49) "What was the trouble about, dear?"
- (50) "Nothing much."
- (51) "Tell me, Henry. (52) Please don't try and keep

anything from me. (53) What was the trouble about?"

- (54) "Well, Dick owes me a lot of money for pulling his squaw through pneumonia and I guess he wanted a row so he wouldn't have to take it out in work" (7, pp. 101-02).

In this block of conversation, the doctor's wife repeatedly threatens the doctor's positive and negative face with enquiries about what happened in his exchange with Boulton. Her very intrusions on his solitude as well as her question in (31) as to whether he is going back to work threaten his negative face, and her expressions of suspicion that he lost his temper, her lecture on Christian temperance in (38), and her expression of suspicion in (52) that he would keep things from her, thereby indicating that the doctor has no privacy at all, threaten his positive face. Jackson Benson believes that Mrs. Adams' tone in scolding the doctor and in expressing suspicions that he started the trouble "reduces the doctor's status to that of a little boy" (2, p. 101). The feeling we get that the doctor has been reduced to a little boy is a result of his wife's so blatantly and successfully threatening his negative and positive face. Mrs. Adams clearly has more power than Mr. Adams in the sense in which it is important to choice of politeness strategies. Note her insistence in (43) and (45) that her husband respond to her lecture to him. But what most reveals the power Mrs. Adams has over Mr. Adams is her use of what are known as "adjacency pairs," which in this

case take the simple form of questions, such as those in (33, 47, 49, 53). Adjacency pairs are conversational exchanges in which the second member of the pair is predetermined by the utterance of the first, as the doctor's answers are in (34, 48, 50, 54). Adams can answer the questions in any way he wishes, but he must answer the questions, giving Mrs. Adams the power to choose the topic of conversation. As Emanuel Schegloff and Harvey Sacks point out, adjacency pairs are a means by which a person can force another to speak to him about a topic that he himself selects (9, pp. 295-97). And as Esther Goody argues, a question "compels, requires, may even demand, a response. It is this fact which leads to questions often carrying a strong command message" (5, p. 23). Brown and Levinson list "requests for personal information" among those acts that "intrinsically threaten both negative and positive face" (3, p. 72). The only concession Mrs. Adams makes to her husband's positive face in this passage is the use of positive-politeness Strategy 4--USE IN-GROUP IDENTITY MARKERS--in (31) and (49) when she adds the vocative "'dear'" to her questions. But just as Boulton's use of "'Doc'" takes on offensive ironic overtones when he uses it in his contradictions, challenges, insults, and reprimands, Mrs. Adams' use of "'dear,'" when she scolds and questions her husband, ironically takes on a tone she might more appropriately use with a child rather than with her husband.

The clearest narrative image of the powerlessness of the doctor occurs in (40-42) as he sits pumping shotgun shells out of a gun onto a bed in a room next to the dark room in which his wife lies in bed impatiently waiting for him to respond to her suggestion that he learn to rule his spirit.

Chaman Nahal argues that after his confrontation with Boulton, Adams "has now to live with the new awareness of himself, an awareness forced on him by a seemingly trivial incident" (8, p. 91). I do not believe that the doctor has any new awareness of himself because the dialogue he has with his wife as well as the conclusion of the story indicate that he does not learn anything from the conversation with Boulton. He lies to Boulton. Then he lies to his wife. In (54), Adams gives his version of the "'row'" with Boulton. We have no indication from the narrator that Adams' assessment of Boulton's motives, that he wanted to get out of work owed the doctor, is accurate. We don't even know that Boulton owes the doctor. We are told only that Adams "hired the Indians" to cut up the logs (7, p. 98). As Aerol Arnold puts it, "by attributing motives to Dick, Dr. Adams again tries to save face." Arnold says that "the central idea of the story is that a man must face the truth and tell it" (1). The doctor fails to tell the truth to both Boulton and his wife. It may be questionable whether or not Adams' explanation of Boulton's motives is dishonest rationalization, but it is clear that

the doctor lies when he tells his wife in (37) that he did not lose his temper. Adams' assessment of Boulton's motives as an explanation for the trouble is a convenient fiction of the sort the doctor creates about the "'driftwood.'" Both are intended to protect his own positive face, the first to hide his thievery and the second his short temper as well as his thievery. The following is the remainder of the conversation between Adams and his wife:

- (55) "Dear, I don't think, I really don't think that any one would really do a thing like that."
- (56) "No?" the doctor said.
- (57) "No. (58) I can't really believe that any one would do a thing of that sort intentionally."
- (59) The doctor stood up and put the shotgun in the corner behind the dresser.
- (60) "Are you going out, dear?" his wife said.
- (61) "I think I'll go for a walk," the doctor said.
- (62) "If you see Nick, dear, will you tell him his mother wants to see him?" his wife said.
- (63) The doctor went out on the porch. (64) The screen door slammed behind him. (65) He heard his wife catch her breath when the door slammed.
- (66) "Sorry," he said, outside her window with the blinds drawn.
- (67) "It's all right, dear," she said (7:102-03).

In (55, 57, 58) the doctor's wife contradicts him and thereby threatens his positive face. She does use positive-politeness Strategies 4--USE IN-GROUP IDENTITY MARKERS--and 6--AVOID DISAGREEMENT--in an attempt to lessen the severity of that threat. She uses the in-group marker "'dear'" in all of her addresses to her husband in this conversation, but "'dear'" has the ironic overtones here that it does in (31, 49) above. In (55, 58) Mrs. Adams hedges her statements--another realization of Strategy 6: AVOID

DISAGREEMENT--by expressing them as opinions: "'I don't think,'" "'I really don't think,'" and "'I can't really believe'" (3, pp. 121-22). We note that the doctor's wife does not explicitly call him a liar. She denies his presupposition--that someone would deliberately start an argument to get out of work. This, I believe, is also a realization of Strategy 6--AVOID DISAGREEMENT although Brown and Levinson do not mention presupposition denial as a realization of Strategy 6. To deny presuppositions is to assert that the speaker is, at worst, misinformed or misguided--unless the presupposition is a face-threatening act itself, as when Boulton presupposes that the logs are stolen. This is one reason that the doctor sounds almost as if he is correcting a misinformed Boulton when he says "'Don't talk that way It's driftwood.'"

Just as the doctor fails to maintain his lie with Boulton, he is unable to do so with his wife. He seems powerless even to assert his own reasonable presupposition that people will manipulate others for their own purposes. If we see the slammed screen door as an impotent expression of anger at the power of the doctor's wife, it is a nice counterpart to the Boultons' and Tabeshaw's seeing only from the doctor's back how angry he is as he walks away from the powerful Dick Boulton. We note that in (66) the doctor must APOLOGIZE (negative-politeness Strategy 6) (3, pp. 192-95) when he intrudes upon his wife's negative face by allowing

the screen door to slam, even though she has just intruded on his negative face by asking him in (62) to tell their son that she wants to see him. She was to command the attention of Nick as well, until as Arnold puts it, the doctor "spites" her by letting Nick go with him (1).

As is evident throughout this chapter, the dynamics of politeness phenomena reveal much about the characterization of Doctor Adams, Mrs. Adams, and Dick Boulton. Doctor Adams seeks at all costs to maintain a facade of honesty. In response to Boulton's accusations, he repeatedly attempts to construct fictions that he is too honest to steal timber. First he attempts a redefinition of the timber as driftwood. Then he creates the fiction that neither he nor Boulton would want to steal timber, at the same time giving Boulton a way out of the work. Then he creates the fiction that only Boulton thinks it is stolen. Then he must order Boulton off his land. The social distance between Adams and Boulton prevents Adams from good naturedly admitting that he conveniently assumes that the timber will not be retrieved by the company of White and McNally. Boulton, we might guess, resents the social relationship that allows him to be used by the hypocritical doctor. So he repeatedly challenges the doctor's positive face with the face-threatening act of implying that the doctor is a liar and a thief. Of course, he often does this with ironic use of positive-politeness strategies, which mocks the social

distance that the doctor seeks to preserve. Mrs. Adams' power over her husband is the most remarkable element of their relationship, but we might also see in their psychological isolation from one another, the ironic counterpart to the doctor's desired social isolation from Boulton, a social isolation that gives him great power. There is great distance between Adams and his wife, but it is his wife who is in power. She sees through the fiction of his assessment of Boulton's motives just as easily as Boulton sees through the doctor's face of honesty. It is ironic that Mrs. Adams' quotation of Proverbs 16:32 truly is applicable to the doctor's lack of power. If the doctor could rule his spirit, that is, if he were honest with Boulton, his wife, and himself, he would have great power. But he is not honest. Powerless to impose his will on either Boulton or his wife, the great white doctor has no recourse except childishly to spite his wife by running off into the woods with their son to hunt the great black squirrel, without a gun.

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CHAPTER IV

The Face of Bravery in "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber"

As I pointed out in Chapter III, halfway through "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife," Dick and Eddy Boulton and Billy Tabeshaw literally stare at Doctor Adams' damaged face. Dick, Eddy, and Billy look at the doctor as the doctor looks at Boulton and nervously chews his beard. At that point, the doctor's face has been irreparably damaged, and there is nothing for him to do but turn his back and walk away, as he does. "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" begins with the sentence, "It was now lunch time and they were all sitting under the double green fly of the dining tent pretending that nothing had happened" (3, p. 3). The two scenes in question both occur dramatically halfway through their respective stories. They both reveal the crisis of damaged face. In one, the characters can do nothing but look at one another; in the other, they pretend that the face-damaging act did not happen. Doctor Adams goes on to attempt to save what face he can in his conversation with his wife. Francis Macomber must attempt the much more difficult task of salvaging his positive face in interaction with the very people who saw it damaged and who, to a limited extent, helped damage it.

In the opening scenes of "The Short Happy Life," readers are presented with Macomber, his wife, and Robert Wilson all being excessively polite to one another as they sit under the fly of the dining tent. In a seeming show of solidarity, they all decide to have the same drink:

- (1) "I'll have a gimlet," Robert Wilson told him.
- (2) "I'll have a gimlet too. (3) I need something," Macomber's wife said.
- (4) "I suppose it's the thing to do," Macomber agreed.
- (5) "Tell him to make three gimlets" (3, p. 3).

Macomber's response to Wilson and his wife's ordering the same drink is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18), despite the fact that it is not clear yet to readers new to this story that there is any significance in this little ritual of agreement.

Likewise, a reader new to this story might ask himself what it is that Macomber, his wife, and Wilson are pretending did not happen, especially since "Macomber had, half an hour before, been carried to his tent from the edge of the camp in triumph . . ." (3, p. 3). Readers see more positive politeness in the following statement addressed to Macomber shortly after they decide to drink gimlets:

- (6) "You've got your lion," Robert Wilson said to him, "and a damned fine one too" (3, p. 4).

Wilson's (6) is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 2: EXAGGERATE (INTEREST, APPROVAL, SYMPATHY WITH THE HEARER) (1, pp. 109-11), although here again readers do not yet know that Wilson is exaggerating his approval of what they will soon perceive as the cowardly Macomber.

As in the scene in "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife," in which Adams, the Boultons, and Tabeshaw exchange looks, the opening scene of "The Short Happy Life" contains an unusually large number of references to the act of looking, although here it seems only Macomber's wife is doing the looking. After Wilson tells Macomber that he got a "'damned fine'" lion,

- (7) Mrs. Macomber looked at Wilson quickly. . . .
 (8) "He is a good lion, isn't he?" Macomber said.
 (9) His wife looked at him now. (10) She looked at both these men as though she had never seen them before.
 (11) One, Wilson, the white hunter, she knew she had never truly seen before. . . . (12) He smiled at her now and she looked away from his face . . . and back to his red face again. . . .
 (13) "Well, here's to the lion," Robert Wilson said.
 (14) He smiled at her again and, not smiling, she looked curiously at her husband (3, p. 4).

Readers are then told that Francis Macomber, among other things, "kept himself very fit, was good at court games, had a number of big-game fishing records, and had just shown himself, very publicly, to be a coward" (3, p. 4). Remember that in (6) Wilson says to Macomber, "'You've got your lion . . .,'" explicitly and falsely asserting that Macomber is the one who "'got'" the lion. In (8) Macomber agrees that the lion is a fine one, but omits any reference to the person who actually killed the lion. Macomber's (8) is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18). Specifically he maintains the safe topic of the lion itself, avoiding the dangerous topic

of who killed it. In (13) Wilson also uses Strategy 5, apparently happy to go along with the safe topic and ignore the dangerous one. Wilson's and Francis' use of positive politeness here is meant to protect not only their faces, but also Margot's, since everyone involved in the hunting incident that morning has a damaged face through embarrassment, though Francis, of course, sustained the most damage.

Macomber, by running from the charging, wounded lion, in full view of the gunbearers, Wilson, and his wife, severely damages his own positive face. Brown and Levinson list "self-humiliation" as one of the many ways that the speaker may damage his own face (1, p. 73). This is what Macomber, his wife, and Wilson are all trying to pretend did not happen. We may assume that they are all still in a state of emotional shock as they sit under the fly of the dining tent only thirty minutes after the incident. Because readers are presented first with the reactions to Macomber's humiliation rather than the act that precipitated it, I believe that the reactions to the already committed act are of central importance to the theme and characterization of the story, just as the interest in "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife" lies not in whether Adams truly stole the logs, but in his reactions to Boulton's and his wife's attacks on his positive face in suggesting that he is a liar, a thief, and a coward. Consequently, my analysis here

will be concerned mainly with the scenes leading from lunch after the hunting incident up to the next morning, when they all go out on the fateful hunt for buffalo.

The issue of this story is power. As I pointed out in Chapter II, the definition of power in terms of strategic politeness "is the degree to which [the hearer] can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of [the speaker's] plans and self-evaluation" (1, p. 82). It is consistently the case in this story that Francis has very low power, even though he tries very hard to construct, or reconstruct his own positive face. The trouble is that he attempts to reconstruct it always in the mold that someone else provides for him, revealing a lack of power to impose his own evaluation of his face on others. Since Margot and Wilson are the only other major characters in the story, Francis must choose between Margot's evaluation of his face and Wilson's evaluation of his face. Of course, this forced choice often brings Margot and Wilson into direct conflict with one another over the fate of the powerless Francis. Margot's evaluation of him is that he is a coward and will never be otherwise. One motivation for her holding this view and fighting to impose it on Francis himself is, of course, that if Francis is a coward he will be much less likely to leave her for a younger woman. Wilson's evaluation is that he is a coward but can be a brave man if he follows Wilson's own creed for bravery.

Wilson and Margot see the trouble with the other's view of Francis, but they do not see the fault with their own individual views and the problems that those views cause. Remember, for example, that the damage to Macomber's face does not stop with his own cowardly act. In reacting to her husband's cowardice, Margaret damages Francis' face further by flirting with Wilson, kissing him in front of Francis, and finally going to bed with him.

Macomber damaged his face in the presence of Wilson and Margot, but he seems more worried about the status of his face in his wife's eyes. It is primarily Margot who is the audience for the repair of Francis' face. This is why we are told that Margot spends so much time "looking" at Wilson and Macomber and why Wilson and Macomber are described from her point of view. It is particularly important that we are told by the narrator that Macomber showed himself to be a coward immediately after the narrator tells us that Margaret "looked curiously at her husband." She gave her husband this look in response to Wilson's saying "'Well, here's to the lion'" (3, p. 4). It is as if she cannot believe the twisted psychodrama that is happening before her eyes. Significantly, after Macomber was carried to his tent in triumph by those who did not witness his cowardice, Margot "did not speak to him when she came in and he left the tent at once to wash his face and hands . . ." (3, p. 3). She judges Macomber in not speaking to him, and he "at once"

accepts this judgment of his face and literally goes to wash it. Hemingway stresses again and again that the important audience for Francis' attempts to repair his face is his wife. Margot, in her refusing to accept Francis' reconstructed positive face, which is based on lies and false masculinity, holds great power over both Francis and Wilson. Wilson also holds power over Francis, so much in fact that Francis finally acts out a script according to what Wilson considers bravery, but only in order to save face with his wife.

In an attempt to repair his face in the eyes of his wife, Francis often calls on Wilson's help, even though Margot and Wilson are rivals fighting for their own view of Francis' face. Late in the afternoon of the same day in which he runs from the lion, Macomber asks Wilson whether they might find buffalo to hunt the next day. He has a particular reason for wanting to find buffalo--to repair his positive face in his wife's eyes:

(15) "I'd like to clear away that lion business,"
 Macomber said. (16) "It's not very pleasant to
 have your wife see you do something like
 that" (3, p. 11).

Generally, Macomber freely admits to Wilson that his positive face is damaged for good reason. He admits to Wilson that he "'bolted like a rabbit'" (3, p. 7). But just like Dr. Adams, Macomber attempts to construct a fiction for himself that lessens the severity of his damaged face.

Immediately after the narrator tells readers that Macomber "had just shown himself very publicly, to be a coward," the following interchange occurs in which first Macomber speaks to Wilson:

- (17) "Here's to the lion," he said. (18) "I can't ever thank you for what you did."
 (19) Margaret, his wife, looked away from him and back to Wilson.
 (20) "Let's not talk about the lion," she said.
 (21) Wilson looked over at her without smiling and now she smiled at him (3, p. 5).

Macomber's (17) is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT. Brown and Levinson argue that agreement may be "stressed by repeating part or all of what the preceding speaker has said, in a conversation" (1, p. 117). The last statement made before Macomber's (17) was Wilson's "'Well, here's to the lion'" (3, p. 4), quoted as sentence (13) above. Then in (18) Macomber uses negative-politeness Strategy 10: GO ON RECORD AS INCURRING A DEBT (1, p. 215). Macomber's first attempt at a fiction that will save his face is to pretend that Wilson's negative face was damaged in shooting the lion. It is not true that, as John J. Seydow (6, p. 35) argues, Macomber is "apologetic and grateful to Wilson for finishing off the lion" By expressing thanks to Wilson, Macomber is really attempting to divert attention from his own damaged positive face. Readers are told in (19) that Margaret looks away from her husband and at Wilson. She is obviously embarrassed at her husband's weak attempt to save face and prevents further

damage by suggesting in (20), primarily to Wilson since she is looking at him, that they not talk about the lion. She prevents Wilson from participating in Macomber's fiction. This is only the first of her many successful and significant frustrations of Francis' attempts to save his face by lying, that is by constructing face-saving fictions. In (21) her smile reflects this triumph. Earlier when Wilson had first toasted the lion, he smiled while she did not; see (14) above. Margot does not like the topic of the lion. Throughout the story she attempts to squash it when it comes up. I believe that she recognizes lion-talk as part of Wilson's strategy to get Francis to believe that his cowardly act can be forgotten by concentrating on the lion and the hopes of acting bravely in the future.

Margaret Macomber functions in this story just as Mrs. Adams does in "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife." They both refuse to allow their husbands to lie in order to save face, and they both have the power to do so. "The Short Happy Life" is complicated by the addition of Wilson, who attempts to aid in the construction of a lie that will save Macomber's positive face, and by the fact that because Margot's face is damaged along with her husband's when Francis runs like a coward, she lacks the absolute power that Mrs. Adams has over her husband. The following passage shows very clearly the workings of these complicating factors:

- (22) "You know you have a very red face, Mr. Wilson," she told him and smiled again.
- (23) "Drink," said Wilson.
- (24) "I don't think so," she said. (25) "Francis drinks a great deal, but his face is never red."
- (26) "It's red today," Macomber tried a joke.
- (27) "No," said Margaret. (28) "It's mine that's red today. (29) But Mr. Wilson's is always red."
- (30) "Must be racial," said Wilson. (31) "I say, you wouldn't like to drop my beauty as a topic, would you?"
- (32) "I've just started on it."
- (33) "Let's chuck it," said Wilson.
- (34) "Conversation is going to be so difficult," Margaret said.
- (35) "Don't be silly, Margot," her husband said.
- (36) "No difficulty," Wilson said. (37) "Got a damn fine lion."
- (38) Margot looked at them both and they both saw that she was going to cry (3, p. 5).

In (22) Margot brings up the face-threatening topic of Wilson's red face, a feature she commented on after she kissed him in the car just after Macomber bolted (3, p. 21). This is a threat both to Wilson, who offers a rational explanation in (23), and Macomber, who makes a joke at his own expense in (26). In (24) Margot uses positive-politeness Strategy 6: AVOID DISAGREEMENT (1, pp. 118-22) hedging her contradiction of Wilson. The word red has metaphorical associations--off-record Strategy 9: USE METAPHORS (1, pp. 227-28)--when Margot implies in (25) that although Francis drinks, he is never brave and attractive like the red-faced Mr. Wilson. In (27) Margot contradicts her husband without redress to positive politeness and then insults him further in (28) by implying that she has cause to be embarrassed by his behavior and in (29) by again bringing up the face-

threatening topic of Wilson's red face. In (31) Wilson uses negative-politeness Strategies 2: QUESTION and 3: BE PESSIMISTIC (1, pp. 150-81) in an attempt to get Margot to "'drop'" the dangerous "'topic'" of his beauty. Margot implicitly refuses in (32). Then in (33) Wilson abandons attention to Margot's negative face, concerned as he is with getting her to drop the topic, and uses positive-politeness Strategy 12: INCLUDE BOTH SPEAKER AND HEARER IN THE ACTIVITY in a successful attempt to drop the dangerous topic (1, pp. 132-33). In (34) Margot makes the perceptive comment that conversation is going to be difficult. The reason it is difficult is that Macomber's damaged face must be dealt with and that Wilson and Margot do not agree on how to deal with it. In (36-37) Wilson asserts that conversation is not difficult; all they have to do is stay with the safe topic of the "'damn fine lion,'" using positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18). In (38) readers see Margot reacting again with incredulous stares and, this time, tears to Wilson's attempt to save face by talking about the lion. See again (14) above where the topic is established against her will and (20-21) where it appears that she has defeated the topic. After looking at the two men in (38) Margot says, "'I wish it hadn't happened. Oh, I wish it hadn't happened.'" She then runs off to her tent crying (3, p. 5).

In a sense, Margot's running off in tears is a small victory for Wilson in that he now has Francis to himself and can work on instilling in him his own brand of face-saving chauvinism. The following is the ensuing conversation between Wilson and Francis:

- (39) "Women upset," said Wilson to the tall man.
 (40) "Amounts to nothing. (41) Strain on the nerves and one thing'n another."
 (42) "No," said Macomber. (43) "I suppose that I rate that for the rest of my life now."
 (44) "Nonsense. (45) Let's have a spot of the giant killer," said Wilson. (46) "Forget the whole thing. (47) Nothing to it anyway."
 (48) "We might try," said Macomber. (49) "I won't forget what you did for me though."
 (50) "Nothing," said Wilson. (51) "All nonsense" (3, pp. 5-6).

In (39-41) Wilson provides Macomber with the convenient fiction that Margot's breakdown is due to her being a woman and as such being prone to strained nerves and "'one thing'n another.'" But because Margot has such power over her husband, in (42-43) Macomber rejects this fiction and further humbles his positive face by indicating that he deserves to have his wife ashamed of him, not only now, but for the rest of his life. In (44-47) Wilson encourages Macomber to accept the fiction that his cowardly act can be forgotten. Later, the narrator lets us know Wilson's real thoughts on the subject of forgetting: "But, of course, you couldn't. The morning had been about as bad as they come" (3, p. 8). Wilson's attempts to create fictions to save Macomber's face are realizations of positive-politeness

Strategy 1: NOTICE, ATTEND TO THE HEARER (HIS INTERESTS, WANTS, NEEDS, GOODS) (1, pp. 108-09). In (48) Macomber indicates that he accepts Wilson's second fiction, hinting that it might take some effort on both their parts to forget it. And in (49) he tries to forget about it in the only way he knows. He pretends again that Wilson's negative face was damaged in killing the lion. Wilson accepts Macomber's fiction in (50) using the second half of negative-politeness Strategy 10: GO ON RECORD AS INCURRING A DEBT, OR AS NOT INDEBTING THE HEARER (1, p. 215). To realize the magnitude of the fiction that Wilson and Macomber create here, remember that Wilson not only shot Macomber's lion but was kissed by his wife. Wilson actually knows that Macomber's cowardly act cannot be forgotten. The only solution he knows is for Macomber to pretend that it is forgotten and go out and kill something else equally dangerous. That it is not forgotten is indicated by the narrator's comment in the very next paragraph that they "avoided one another's eyes while the boys set the table for lunch" (3, p. 6).

In the conversation that follows in the continued absence of Margot, Wilson makes undiplomatic implicit references to the bravery of the servants, who would rather take a beating than pay fines for infractions. Wilson attempts to correct his faux pas with an equally indelicate remark: "'We all take a beating every day, you know, one way or another'" (3, p. 6). Macomber's response, including the the conversation that develops out of his response, follows:

- (52) "Yes, we take a beating," said Macomber, still not looking at him.
- (53) "I'm awfully sorry about that lion business. (54) It doesn't have to go any further, does it? (55) I mean no one will hear about it, will they?"
- (56) "You mean will I tell it at the Mathaiga Club?" (57) Wilson looked at him now coldly. . . . (58) "No," said Wilson. (59) "I'm a professional hunter. (60) We never talk about our clients. (61) You can be quite easy on that. (62) It's supposed to be bad form to ask us not to talk though."
- (63) ". (64) "I'm sorry," Macomber said (65) "I'm sorry I didn't realize that. (65) There are lots of things I don't know" (3, pp. 6-7).

In (52) Macomber accepts the unintended threat to his positive face in Wilson's faux pas. Readers know that Wilson's indelicate remarks to Macomber here are simply social gaffs, rather than malicious barbs, because the narrator tells us that Wilson "felt embarrassed at asking" whether Macomber would rather take a "'good birching'" or lose his pay. Then after Wilson ineffectually tries to make Macomber feel better by using the metaphor, "'We all take a beating every day,'" Hemingway writes of Wilson, "'Good god,' he thought. 'I am a diplomat, aren't I?'" In accepting the unintended threat, Macomber recognizes that Wilson used off-record Strategy 9: USE METAPHORS (1, pp. 227-28) to attempt to lessen the threat posed to his face in bringing up, although indirectly, the subject of bravery. In (53) Macomber uses negative-politeness Strategy 6: APOLOGIZE (1, pp. 192-95), indicating that he realizes that his loss of face was a threat to the face of all those

witnessing the act. And as if to prove his point, Macomber intrudes on Wilson's negative face in (54) and (55) by asking him not to talk about his cowardly act. He does this by using positive-politeness Strategy 11: BE OPTIMISTIC; negative-politeness Strategy 7: IMPERSONALIZE THE SPEAKER AND HEARER; and off-record Strategy 1: GIVE HINTS (1, pp. 131-32;195-211;218-20). Macomber uses off-record Strategy 1 in not explicitly asking or telling Wilson not to talk about his cowardly act. In (54-55) he merely raises the issue. He uses negative-politeness Strategy 7 in not referring to himself or Wilson except in (55) when he uses "I" in his clarification of (54). And he uses positive-politeness Strategy 11 in asserting, "'It doesn't have to go any further'" and "'no one will hear about it.'" Brown and Levinson argue that optimistic assertions of face-threatening acts may imply that the speaker and hearer are cooperating to such an extent that what is asserted can be taken for granted. A tag question, like Macomber uses for (54) and (55), may blunt the presumptuous nature of such optimistic assertions (1, pp. 131-32). Macomber's (54-55) is another indication that he is too concerned with others' evaluations of his positive face, even to the point of endangering it further by asking someone not to reveal the damage already done.

Wilson's response in (56) indicates that he takes offense at Macomber's implication that he might spread the

news of Macomber's cowardice. Wilson's (56) takes Macomber's off-record (54) and (55) and puts them on-record. We may assume that Wilson is also angered by Macomber's inability to drop the matter of his cowardice with the lion. The narrator tells us after Wilson's (62),

He had decided now that to break would be much easier. . . . He would see them through the safari on a very formal basis--what was it the French called it? Distinguished consideration--and it would be a damn sight easier than having to go through this emotional trash. He'd insult him and make a good clean break (3, p. 7).

Wilson's insult to Macomber is contained in (58-62). In those lines, Wilson creates social distance between himself and Macomber, implying that his professionalism precludes his talking about Macomber's cowardly act. Earlier both Wilson and Macomber act as if Wilson's respect for Macomber's positive face inhibits his talking. We are told in (57) that Wilson looks at Macomber "coldly" after Macomber indirectly asks him not to talk. The narrator tells us above why Wilson decides to create this extra social distance--to halt the use of positive-politeness strategies. He is tired of "emotional trash," making necessary the use of positive politeness to soothe the disturbed egos of Margot and Francis, and would therefore prefer to conduct the remainder of the safari "on a very formal basis." In (62) Wilson, in effect, tells Macomber that he has intruded on his negative face by inappropriately asking him not to talk. In (63) and (64), Macomber uses

negative-politeness Strategy 6: APOLOGIZE (1, pp. 192-95). And also in (64) he uses positive-politeness Strategy 13: GIVE REASONS (1, pp. 133-34). Brown and Levinson write that "giving reasons is a way of implying 'I can help you' or 'you can help me' and, assuming cooperation, a way of showing what help is needed . . ." (1, p. 133). By saying that there are "'lots of things'" he doesn't know, Macomber, at once, offers a reason for his transgression and asks for help from his "guide," Wilson. It is an indication of Wilson's lack of perceptivity that he apparently does not receive the intended message of Macomber's excuse.

Hemingway writes, "He was all ready to break it off quickly and neatly and here the beggar was apologizing after he had just insulted him. He made one more attempt" (3, p. 7).

That attempt is as follows:

- (66) "Don't worry about me talking," he said. (67) "I have a living to make. (68) You know in Africa no woman ever misses her lion and no white man ever bolts."
 (69) "I bolted like a rabbit," Macomber said.
 (70) Now what in hell were you going to do about a man who talked like that, Wilson wondered.

 (71) "Maybe I can fix it up on buffalo," he said.
 (72) "We're after them next, aren't we?"
 (73) "In the morning if you like," Wilson told him.
 (74) Perhaps he had been wrong. (75) This was certainly the way to take it. (76) You most certainly could not tell a damned thing about an American. (77) He was all for Macomber again (3, pp. 7-8).

In (66-67) Wilson again asserts that he has a job to do implying the same thing that he did in (58-61), that there

is now social distance between them and he will hold his mouth not because he cares for Macomber's positive face but because of the social distance. In (68) Wilson uses off-record Strategy 8: BE IRONIC (1, pp. 226-27) to insult Macomber as the only white man who would bolt, missing his lion, something even a woman would not do. Wilson's (68) is a violation of Grice's Maxim of Quality (2, p. 46) since it is an obvious falsehood and thus generates the implicature that Macomber did bolt and that no matter how much they hide it his cowardice can never be forgotten. In (69) Macomber indicates that he accepts Wilson's judgments of him. And in (70) Wilson's thought reflects the hopelessness of dealing with a person who accepts totally and without complaint the judgments of others. His cry for help in (63-65) having failed, Macomber in (71-72) talks the only language Wilson understands--killing--hoping that Wilson will guide him along some new path of death to courage. (73-77) show Wilson taking the bait, but his inane generalization about Americans reveals that he does not yet understand Macomber, as he does not understand his own hypocritical bravery that allows him to hunt buffalo with the use of cars.

Immediately after the conversation above between Francis and Wilson, Margot returns refreshed from her tent. That Francis has not escaped from the judgment of Margot is indicated by the conversation that follows upon her return:

- (78) "How is the beautiful red-faced Mr. Wilson?
 (79) Are you feeling better, Francis, my pearl?"

- (80) "Oh, much," said Macomber.
 (81) "I've dropped the whole thing," she said, sitting down at the table. (82) "What importance is there to whether Francis is any good at killing lions?"
 (83) That's not his trade. (84) That's Mr. Wilson's trade. (85) Mr. Wilson is really very impressive killing anything. (86) You do kill anything, don't you?"
 (87) "Oh, anything," said Wilson. (88) "Simply anything" (3, p. 8).

In (78) Margot broaches again the dangerous topic of Wilson's red face, this time making it even more threatening to both Francis and Wilson by calling him "'beautiful.'" Then in (79) Margot ironically calls Francis her "'pearl'" setting up a metaphorical contrast between the paleness of the pearl and the redness of Wilson. Her (79) is at once a realization of off-record Strategies 8: BE IRONIC and 9: USE METAPHORS (1, pp. 226-227), both violations of Grice's Maxim of Quality (2, p. 46), generating the implicature that Francis is not her pearl because he is not like the beautiful red-faced Mr. Wilson. In (80) Francis ignores the implicatures, although it is inconceivable that he does not receive them. Thus, he accepts his wife's estimation of his worth in not challenging her off-record insults to his positive face. In (81-84) Margot makes excuses for Francis' running from the lion saying that it is not his trade. This is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 1: NOTICE, ATTEND TO THE HEARER. Brown and Levinson indicate that this sort of notice of the face-threatening act is one way that the speaker can let the hearer know that she is not

embarrassed by the face-threatening act (1, pp. 108-09). This seems to be quite a change from (28) where Margot says that she has a red face. She may seem to have dropped the matter of Francis' cowardice, but the off-record strategies of (78-79) prove that she has not dropped the matter of her attraction to Wilson rather than her husband. In (85-86) Margot again abuses Francis' positive face by flirting with Wilson using off-record Strategy: USE METAPHORS (1, pp. 227-28), violating Grice's Maxim of Quality (2, p. 46), since Wilson does not kill literally anything; but he does go on to "'kill'" Margot that night when she comes to his tent. In (87-88) Wilson shows that he receives the implicature, using the same metaphor.

Simply because Wilson flirts with Margot does not mean that he is willing to turn Francis over to her completely. In fact, he realizes that he has a formidable foe in Margot. When she walks from her tent to join Wilson and Francis for the conversation above, Wilson thinks of her beauty, but also of her intelligence. Hemingway writes, "She had a very perfect oval face, so perfect that you expected her to be stupid. But she wasn't stupid, Wilson thought, no, not stupid" (3, p. 8). In the following conversation, in which Wilson speaks first, Wilson battles Margot for control of Francis:

- (89) "We're going after buff in the morning," he told her."
- (90) "I'm coming," she said.
- (91) "No, you're not."

- (92) "Oh, yes, I am. (93) Mayn't I, Francis?"
 (94) "Why not stay in camp?"
 (95) "Not for anything," she said. (96) "I wouldn't miss something like today for anything."
 (97) "We'll put on another show for you tommorrow," Francis Macomber said.
 (98) "You're not coming," Wilson said.
 (99) "You're very mistaken," she told him. (100) "And I want so to see you perform again. (101) You were lovely this morning. (102) That is if blowing things' heads off is lovely" (3, pp. 8-9).

In (89), Wilson tells Margot that he and Francis are going hunting buffalo in the morning. In (91) he goes bald, on-record with a face-threatening contradiction, saying that she cannot come with them. He knows the damage that would be done to Macomber's confidence with Margot there to watch every move he makes. In (94) after Margot appeals to her husband, Francis uses positive-politeness Strategy 13: ASK FOR REASONS in an attempt to keep her from going with them (1, pp. 133-34). And in (96) Margot uses off-record Strategy 5: OVERSTATE (224-25) violating Grice's Maxim of Quantity, which states that one should not say more or less than is necessary (2, p. 45). By saying that she would not miss the hunt for anything, she implies that it was pleasurable for her to see her husband disgraced. In (97) Francis indicates that he again accepts Margot's evaluation of his positive face, offering to put on another show of his cowardice for her. He is simply a plaything for her, meant to amuse her by his ineptitude. In (98) Wilson attempts again to control Margot by telling her that she is not

coming. It is particularly significant that he is so blunt immediately after Francis shows himself to be willing to humble himself before a person who states that she takes joy in watching his humiliation. In (100-02) Margot goes off-record with Strategy 8: BE IRONIC (1, pp. 226-27) violating the Maxim of Quality (2, p. 46) to generate the implicature that blowing things' heads off is not lovely at all.

Very soon after Margot's insult to Wilson, she says again,

- (103) "You don't know how I look forward to tomorrow."
 (104) "That's eland he's offering you," Wilson said.
 (105) "They're the big cowy things that jump like hares, aren't they?"
 (106) "I suppose that describes them," Wilson said.
 (107) "It's very good meat," Macomber said.
 (108) "Did you shoot it, Francis?" she asked.
 (109) "Yes."
 (110) "They're not dangerous, are they?"
 (111) "Only if they fall on you." Wilson told her.
 (112) "I'm so glad."
 (113) "Why not let up on the bitchery just a little, Margot," Macomber said
 (114) "I suppose I could," she said, "since you put it so prettily."
 (115) "Tonight we'll have champagne for the lion," Wilson said. (116) "It's a bit too hot at noon."
 (117) "Oh, the lion," Margot said. (118) "I'd forgotten the lion!"

 (119) "Have some more eland," he said to her politely (3, pp. 9-10).

In (103) Margot repeats her off-record strategy of (96) above. In (104) Wilson uses positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18) by bringing up what he thinks to be the safe topic of the eland. He probably does this to save Francis' positive face from any further damage. In

(105) Margot questions whether eland are the "'cowy things that jump like hares,'" using two words in her description that are potentially damaging in their significance in context. (105) could very well be a realization of off-record Strategy 2: GIVE ASSOCIATION CLUES (1, pp. 220-21) intended to evoke Francis' cowardice once again. Cows are not very dangerous; neither are hares. And the diminutive suffix--the high, front, unrounded vowel--added to cow makes the eland seem even less dangerous. Wilson's answer in (106) is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 6: AVOID DISAGREEMENT in that he hedges his agreement with her (1, pp. 118-22). He dislikes her description, but he does not want a fight over it, fearing further damage to Francis' positive face. Francis' (107) is a realization of Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18), meant to buttress Wilson's avoidance of a dangerous topic. In (108) Margot regains control by using an adjacency pair, here a question, to force the conversation back to Francis and what he shot or did not shoot. As I pointed out in Chapter III, adjacency pairs are interchanges in which the second member of the pair is predetermined by the first (5, pp. 295-97). Francis may answer "yes" or "no," but he must address the dangerous topic. (110) is another attempt by Margot to bring up, this time more directly, the topic of danger and bravery. In (111) Wilson attempts to divert attention from the topic by joking, a realization of positive-politeness

Strategy 8: JOKE (1, pp. 129-30). Then in (112), Margot uses off-record Strategy 4: UNDERSTATE (1, pp. 222-24), violating the Maxim of Quantity (2, p. 45) to generate the implicature that she is really worried not about danger but rather about Francis' bravery, hoping that it was not strained in shooting the eland. In (113) Francis gets off one of his few good lines in this story. He uses negative-politeness Strategy 2: QUESTION, HEDGE (1, pp. 150-77) to get Margot to let up on the bitchery, threatening her positive face. The threat to her positive-face is actually rendered with the use of presupposition manipulation since it is presupposed in (113) that Margot is engaging in bitchery. In (114) Margot acknowledges Francis' deft use of politeness, agreeing to stop. Then in (115), thinking probably that Francis is on the road to recovery, since he has just put Margot in her place, Wilson brings up again the dangerous topic of the lion, dangerous that is, for Margot because of his attitude that Francis' cowardice can be forgotten. In (117-18) Margot reacts by using off-record Strategy 8: BE IRONIC (1, pp. 226-27), violating the Maxim of Quality (2, p. 46) since she certainly could not have forgotten about the lion. The generated implicature is, of course, that the matter of the lion cannot be forgotten, especially Francis' cowardice. To counter Margot's attack, Wilson again uses in (119) positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18), bringing up what he insists

is the safe topic of the eland. Hemingway acknowledges the politeness of Wilson's response to Margot's bitchery by saying that Wilson said it "politely."

Late that same afternoon, Wilson and Francis go out to shoot impala without Margot, and Francis makes a good shot. Wilson tells him, "'You shoot like that and you'll have no trouble.'" Then Francis brings up the subject of having his wife see him act cowardly and expresses hope that he can set things right with the buffalo. See (15-16) above. Wilson's response is as follows:

(120) I should think it would be even more unpleasant to do it, Wilson thought, wife or no wife, or to talk about it having done it. (121) But he said, "I wouldn't think about that any more. (122) Any one could be upset by his first lion. (123) That's all over" (3, p. 11).

Wilson may not realize it, but he knows the real solution to Macomber's problem. That is, just as in (120) Wilson knows that what is really unpleasant is to have acted cowardly, he must also know that the real challenge is to come to terms with oneself after having done a cowardly thing. Macomber's problem is that he is too worried about what his wife thinks of him. Wilson thinks the right thoughts, but he lacks either the courage or the insight to pass on to Macomber what little he knows about integrity. Wilson's integrity seems sensitive only to gross violations of some sort of manly code of behavior, in spite of his professed "standards" in shooting. Thus, he obviously

disapproves of Macomber's cowardice but thinks nothing of illegally hunting buffalo with the aid of a car. The narrator's "But" in (121) underscores Wilson's saying something different from what he thinks. Wilson's (121-23) is a realization of positive-politeness Strategy 1: NOTICE, ATTEND TO THE HEARER (1, pp. 108-09). Again, the problem is that Wilson never really addresses Macomber's fears, either glossing over them with politeness strategies or asserting that a good aim is the solution to the problem.

In the following passage, readers see for the first time in the story Francis and Margot talking alone to one another. Margot has just returned from the double size cot of Francis' "guide," the red-faced Robert Wilson:

- (124) "Where have you been?"
 (125) "I just went out to get a breath of air."
 (126) "You did, like hell."
 (127) "What do you want me to say, darling?"
 (128) "Where have you been?"
 (129) "Out to get a breath of air."
 (130) "That's a new name for it. (131) You are a bitch."
 (132) "Well, you're a coward."
 (133) "All right," he said. (134) "What of it?"
 (135) "Nothing as far as I'm concerned. (136) But please let's not talk, darling, because I'm very sleepy" (3, pp. 22-23).

In (125) Margot uses positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18) in using the safe topic of getting air, not sex. In (126) Francis calls her a liar. In (127) Margot implies that she has used the most diplomatic way of telling the truth that she knows. In (129) she repeats (125) since Francis has been so foolish as to ask the

obvious again. In (130) Francis acknowledges that he understands Margot's use of politeness strategies and in (131) goes bald, on-record with a threat to her positive face. In (132) she states what she has been thinking all day, and in (133) Francis again accepts Margot's estimation of his positive face. In (135) Margot indicates that she cares so little for Francis that it makes no difference to her that he is a coward and in (136) shows that she has nothing further to say.

The next morning Wilson and Francis hunt the buffalo, and Francis seems to have at last become a man in recklessly pursuing the buffalo. The narrator tells us that as Francis and Wilson are waiting to go in for the wounded buffalo, "Macomber's face was shining." The next paragraph reads,

His wife said nothing and eyed him strangely. She was sitting far back in the seat and Macomber was sitting forward talking to Wilson who turned sideways talking over the back of the front seat (3, p. 32).

Margot has lost control of Francis here, but Francis is not his own man. This is revealed not only by his participating in the hunt of the buffalos from the car, pretending with Wilson that it was sporting to do so, but also by the symbolic gesture of closeness revealed in the paragraph above. Remember that after Wilson killed Francis' lion for him, Margo was in Francis' position leaning forward to kiss Wilson, who was turned sideways. The problem is that, as

Seydow writes, "What Francis acts out in confronting the charging buffalo is not his code and not Hemingway's code but what he thinks is Wilson's code" (6, p. 39). Seydow (6), as well as J.F. Kobler (4), contends that there is no real change in Macomber. Instead, what we see in him is the excited state resulting from the combination of anger with Wilson and success in illegally chasing buffalo in a car. He is ineffectual to the end, shooting too high on the buffalo's head until Margot accidentally shoots him. Kobler argues that if Margot had not killed Francis, he would have gone on to disgrace himself again as a coward, possibly by running from the buffalo since he still had time to bolt. By killing him she has helped him to save face and to die full of illusions (4, p. 66), one of which must be that he is finally in control of his own integrity, that is, of his own face. Hemingway wanted to be sure that we saw it as an illusion. Seydow writes, "what better way for Hemingway to objectify Francis' forsaking of his rational faculties than to have his head blown off" (6, p. 40). It is not his rational faculties that he forsook, but the control of his own positive face. When Margot goes to her dead husband lying face down on the ground, Wilson tells her that she had best not turn Francis over. She has, of course, blown his face off.

I have tried to show that Francis puts himself into a situation in which he could get killed precisely because he

does not control his own positive face. By pathetically and dangerously imitating the hypocritical hunter, the red-faced Mr. Wilson, Francis attempts to construct a face of bravery to keep his wife, who believes and hopes that he will always be a coward, from leaving him. His lack of control of his positive face is revealed in everything from his constructing the fiction that Wilson's negative face was damaged in killing the lion; to Wilson's using positive politeness strategies to wrongly convince him that the damage done to his face can be easily forgotten, or repaired; to his allowing Margot to insult his face with the use of off-record politeness strategies. That politeness is of central concern in the story is, I believe, revealed in Hemingway's ending the story with Wilson stopping his tormenting of Margot when she begs him to stop with the word please. Wilson says, "'Please is much better. Now I'll stop'" (3, p. 37). The implication is that the world will go on for both Wilson and Margot much as it has in the past, with that little disturbance about Francis' death being smoothed over by the use of politeness.

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CHAPTER V

The Face of Love in "Hills Like White Elephants"

Hemingway's "Hills Like White Elephants," which takes the form of a dialogue between a man and a woman arguing about whether the woman will have an abortion, is one of those pieces of literature that seem almost to have been written for conversational analysis. A systematic approach to the dialogue of the story is called for not only because, as J. F. Kobler points out, "sixty percent of the 1,445 words . . . are in dialogue," (6, p. 248) but also because of the puzzling fact that critics have come to diametrically opposed views about the eventual outcome of the story. Richard N. Lid writes that after the forty-minute conversation "the matter of the abortion has been irrevocably settled The man's will is stronger, and he is to have his way" (8, pp. 404, 406). But Kobler maintains that the woman's I feel fine "means that she feels fine in her pregnancy and intends to remain in that condition for her normal term" (7, p. 7). Heather Hardy and I have argued elsewhere that the appropriate contextualization for the interpretation of the discourse in "Hills Like White Elephants" lies in an understanding of the

metaphors that are central to the story and to the lives of the characters and that this contextualization leads one to the conclusion that the woman does leave the man and have her child (4). The academic battle over the ultimate fate of the couple's relationship and their unborn child is certainly an interesting and valid one. But this study will stop just short of arguing whether the man or the woman "wins" his/her own battle. Instead, I will follow to the end the man and woman's conversation as their politeness strategies reflect two people vying for power and struggling with the psychological distance between them as they discuss the enormously threatening choices between life and death, love and isolation. The shifting power and distance between the man and the woman show how critics can come to opposed views about the eventual outcome of the story.

In "Hills Like White Elephants," the woman primarily uses negative-politeness strategies, including off-record strategies, since the child and the intimate relationship she wants are potential impositions on the man's freedom of action--his desire to travel around Europe on a train simply looking at things and trying new drinks. To the man, the child would be unwanted extra baggage, and intimacy would demand that he spend part of his isolated emotional self in his relationship with the woman. The woman must also use positive-politeness strategies in order to repair damage she does to the man's positive face in indicating that she does

not want what he wants. The man uses positive-politeness strategies since he must convince the woman he has her personal interests at heart in order to persuade her to have an abortion, which not only is clearly undesirable to her but also was illegal, and therefore dangerous, in Spain in the 1920's, the fictional time of the story. The man uses negative-politeness strategies when speaking of the abortion itself, which is a literal imposition on the woman's physical freedom of action. It will be seen that the man's use of politeness is designed to present a face to the woman that represents his love and concern for her, in spite of the fact that what he wants is contrary to her wishes, contrary to common notions of love, and even potentially dangerous to the woman's health. And just as Boulton and Mrs. Adams see through Doctor Adams' face of honesty and Margaret sees through Francis' face of bravery, the woman sees through the man's face of love to what lies beneath his strategic use of politeness.

The remainder of this analysis will consist of taking relevant utterances by conversational stages, which will facilitate cross reference, and analyzing them in terms of negative- and positive-politeness strategies. The setting for the story is a train station in the valley of the Ebro, where the man and the woman, sitting at a bar table outside the station while they wait for a train that will take them to Madrid, decide to drink beer and order two from the

waitress. The woman's first strategic use of negative politeness begins Stage A:

STAGE A

W:(1) "They look like white elephants," she said.

M:(2) "I've never seen one," the man drank his beer.

W:(3) "No, you wouldn't have."

M:(4) "I might have," the man said. (5) "Just because you say I wouldn't have doesn't prove anything" (5, p. 273).

Stage A is separated from the very first conversational interchange, during which the man and woman decide to drink beer, by narration that provides the context for the woman's statement in (1). We are told that the woman is looking across a country which is "brown and dry" at a line of hills which are "white in the sun" (5, p. 273). In saying, "'They look like white elephants,'" the woman introduces the major image of "Hills Like White Elephants," but the statement is much more significant in its relation to the woman's strategic politeness. The man replies, "'I've never seen one,'" an explicitly literal reaction to the woman's simile. Because of the man's reaction, readers suspect that the simile carries an unpleasant interpersonal meaning, what I more specifically call in this study a threat to positive and/or negative face. Indeed, if the woman's simile is an attempt to introduce the world of nature into their conversation, the man's reaction is meaningful because in his rejection of the unborn child, he necessarily rejects nature, a representation of the natural process of birth and death. The rejection of the woman's simile is also a

rejection of intimacy since, as Ted Cohen argues, the understanding of metaphor requires that the hearer adopt the point of view of the speaker (2). Thus, the interpersonal message, or face-threatening act, in her simile is not only that she wants to bring the world of nature into their life together so that the man might accept her pregnancy and the child but also that she wants the man to come closer to her on an interpersonal level. Both of these needs of the woman are what I will more clearly show later to be potential impositions on the man's physical freedom of action.

Readers know that because the man and woman are later in their conversation able to use it as a cohesive device to refer to abortion without the referent being explicitly stated, they have certainly argued about the possible abortion at least once before. Therefore, knowing the man's abhorrence of the idea of having a child and probably suspecting that he doesn't want to be intimate with her, the woman chooses to go off record with a simile, which Brown and Levinson recognize as a violation of Grice's Maxim of Manner, one of whose commands is, "Avoid obscurity of expression" (3, p. 46). Brown and Levinson provide for the use of this violation in their off-record Strategy 11: BE AMBIGUOUS (1, p. 219). The woman's simile in (2) can also be seen as a use of off-record Strategy 2: GIVE ASSOCIATION CLUES. Brown and Levinson argue that the speaker may give clues associated either by mutual experience or by knowledge

with the act required of the hearer (1, pp. 220-21). Here the metaphorical associations of hills with nature and white elephants with the unwanted child are what threaten the man. Where the utterance falls within the general strategy of going off record is not as important as the fact that the simile is an off-record strategy, intended to give maximum attention to the man's negative face. Because it is an off-record strategy, the man has the options of ignoring the implicature of the simile or reacting meaningfully to it.

In his response, "'I've never seen one,'" the man violates Grice's Maxim of Relation (3, p. 46), indicating both that he rejects the woman's simile and that he is not yet pursuing his positive-politeness strategies. One of the strategies for which a violation of the Maxim of Relation is a realization is off-record Strategy 3: PRESUPPOSE. As Brown and Levinson recognize, "An utterance can be almost wholly relevant in context, and yet violate the Relevance Maxim just at the level of its presuppositions" (1, p. 222). The man's response in (2) might be superficially relevant to the remark that the hills look like white elephants, but it is irrelevant to the woman's generated implicatures that she wants to introduce the world of nature into their lives and that she wants the man to come closer to her on an interpersonal level. In response to the woman's implicatures, the man's (2) is irrelevant because it is not important that he have seen white elephants before in order

to profit from the simile. The man chooses to be irrelevant in (2) because, above all, he does not want the woman to believe that he is interested in nature and intimacy, that is, interested in the woman's real concerns. In fact, the implicature of (2) is that he is definitely not interested in nature or intimacy. The man's retreat from the woman is further emphasized by the narrator's stylistically marked comment, "the man drank his beer," in place of a more usual performative phrase such as "he said." This gesture, then, implies that instead of looking up at the hills and replying or looking up at the woman and replying, the man makes the comment into his beer. The man has successfully retreated from intimacy and nature through exploiting off-record politeness.

The woman responds in (3) to the man's (2) with "'No, you wouldn't have,'" which is also a violation of Grice's Maxim of Relation (3, p. 46). It is a violation of relevance because it is of no importance that the man has never literally seen a white elephant. Again, this violation is an off-record attempt (Strategy 1: GIVE HINTS) (1, pp. 218-220) by the woman to tell the man that he is too literal-minded and isolated, both from nature and her, to appreciate the simile that she has just used. The woman is, however, being relevant to her own metaphoric statement about white elephants. As can be seen in the man's responses of (4-5), in which he contradicts the woman's (3)

and uses the childish argument that "saying doesn't make it so," he probably receives the intended implicature of (3), although in his very literal interpretation of the implicature, that he might not have traveled widely enough to have seen a white elephant (or something to that effect), he seems to be pretending that he did not.

Following what I label "Stage A" is a long passage of conversation in which the woman tries to repair the damage that she has just done to the man's positive face. She does this mainly by using Brown and Levinson's positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, pp. 117-18). Specifically, the woman, through the use of deferential questioning, steers the conversation back to what is for the man a safe topic--drinking. She asks the man what the meaning of a advertisement printed in Spanish is, asks him if they can try the drink advertised, Anis del Toro, and asks him if Anis is good with water (5, pp. 273-74). But just when it seems that the man and the woman have settled back into their comfortable, but emotionally empty, routine of looking at things and trying new drinks, the woman complains that the Anis they have ordered tastes like licorice. She is interested in repairing the man's positive face in order to have him more agreeable to her own wishes, not in order to give in to the man's way of life. What I am calling Stage B begins with the woman's complaint:

STAGE B

W:(1) "It tastes like licorice," the girl said and put the glass down.

- M:(2) "That's the way with everything."
 W:(3) "Yes," said the girl. (4) "Everything tastes of licorice. (5) Especially all the things you've waited so long for, like absinthe."
 M:(6) "Oh, cut it out."
 W:(7) "You started it," the girl said. (8) "I was being amused. (9) I was having a fine time" (5, p. 274).

The woman's comment in (1) and the putting down of her drink help signal her dissatisfaction with their life of simply looking at things and trying new drinks. In (2) the man overreacts to the innocuous referential meaning of the woman's complaint about the taste of Anis in (1), implying that the woman is dissatisfied with "'everything'" they do and is never happy. This is, of course, exactly what the interpersonal message of the woman's (1) is. In (3-5) the woman takes tastes of licorice as the anaphoric reference for that in the man's (2), making a metaphoric comment about what is for her their disappointing life together. One of the things she might have been waiting so long for is her pregnancy, which ideally should have brought the man and the woman closer together but has made them bitter towards one another. The assertion that everything tastes of licorice is literally false and is therefore a violation of Grice's Maxim of Quality, which basically states that a cooperative interactant does not say anything that is false or for which he does not possess adequate evidence (3, pp. 43-46). The woman's violation of Grice's Maxim of Quality is a use of off-record Strategy 9: USE METAPHORS (1, pp. 227-28). The

man rejects the woman's off-record implicature with the graceless, "'Oh, cut it out.'" The woman's response in (7), "'You started it,'" can refer only to the man's initial rejection of the woman's simile in Stage A. In (8-9), she asserts that she was trying to be amused and have a fine time, two goals which should appeal to the man, and which do. As is evident below, he either misses or ignores the criticism of the woman's (7). Stage C below demonstrates that the woman has not yet given up her goals in favor of simply being amused and having a fine time:

STAGE C

M:(1) "Well, let's try and have a fine time."

W:(2) "All right. (3) I was trying. (4) I said the mountains looked like white elephants. (5) Wasn't that bright?"

M:(6) "That was bright."

W:(7) "I wanted to try this new drink. (8) That's all we do, isn't it--look at things and try new drinks."

M:(9) "I guess so" (5, p. 274).

Having failed so far in her use of both negative- and positive-politeness strategies, the woman now turns to a very manipulative use of positive-politeness Strategy 5--SEEK AGREEMENT--in preparation for a reintroduction of off-record politeness strategies. I have already pointed out that one of the specific realizations of positive-politeness Strategy 5 is the use of safe topics (1, p. 117). The woman must somehow eventually force the man not only to talk about a dangerous topic but also to agree with her--if she is to persuade him that their life-style is undesirable. In (8-9)

of STAGE B, the woman introduces the safe topic of "'being amused'" and "'having a fine time.'" In (1) of STAGE C, the man can do nothing but agree to what must seem to him a welcome relief from the dangerous topic of the woman's dissatisfaction. In (2) the woman appears to agree with the man's suggestion in (1) that they "'try and have a fine time,'" but (3) indicates that she rejects the presupposition of (1), that she, at least, was not trying to have a fine time. In (4) the woman implies with the reintroduction of the simile of Stage A that creative language and nature are part of trying to have a fine time. Then in (5) she uses the first of two "adjacency pairs." As I mentioned in Chapter III in which I showed Mrs. Adams using them in her conversation with her husband, adjacency pairs are conversational exchanges in which the second member of the pair is predetermined by the utterance of the first (9, pp. 295-97). Thus, in (5) the woman forces the man to agree that talking about nature in metaphorical terms is "'bright'" and in (8) forces the man to agree that all they do is "'look at things and try new drinks.'" In effect, she proposes a solution before stating the problem. The man's responses in (6) and (9)--token agreement and hedged agreement respectively, which are both realizations of positive-politeness Strategy 6: AVOID DISAGREEMENT (1, pp. 118-22) and which therefore balance the woman's use of Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT--indicate that the man is in a

weakened position, which the woman strategically should take advantage of, as she does in Stage D:

STAGE D

W:(1) "They're lovely hills," she said. (2) "They don't really look like white elephants.

(3) I just meant the coloring of their skin through the trees."

M:(4) "Should we have another drink?"

W:(5) "All right."

M:(6) "The beer's nice and cool," the man said.

W:(7) "It's lovely," the girl said (5, p. 274).

In (1-3) the woman again reintroduces the simile of Stage A, but having learned from the man's rejection of it earlier, she here gives further deference to man's negative face by using the second part of negative-politeness Strategy 2: QUESTION, HEDGE (1, pp. 150-77). It is as if she is also asking the man to help her clarify the simile. In (3) she elaborates the simile by introducing the specifics of the coloring of the hills, but she does this in such a way that the hills become the elephants. Hills do not have skin, but elephants do. With the introduction of the topic of the color of the skin, the woman seems to be expanding the metaphor. Lewis E. Weeks, Jr. suggests that the hills might be associated with the image of a recumbent nude female "with her distended belly virtually bursting with life and with her breasts, engorged by the approaching birth, making a trinity of white hills" (10, p. 76). If the man avoids the hills and the woman's simile because they suggest something like this, his extreme reactions,

especially in (4) of this stage, to the woman's attempts to use this simile for the basis of a conversation become more reasonable. The man has learned something from the woman's steering the conversation to a safer topic following Stage A. In (4) the man blatantly violates Grice's Maxim of Relation (3, p. 46) to generate the implicature that he does not intend to talk about hills being like white elephants, no matter how much the woman hedges the simile, or how much "the coloring of their skin through the trees" might suggest it. This violation of the Maxim of Relation is a realization of off-record Strategy 1: GIVE HINTS (1, pp. 218-20). That is, in rejecting the woman's simile once again and in doing so by irrelevantly suggesting that they have another drink, the man gives a strong hint that what he is interested in is drinking, not nature, not children, not intimacy. In (5) and (7) the woman weakly agrees to the man's question and assertion in (4) and (6), as he did to her questions in Stage C. Note that the man's question in (4) is the first member of an adjacency pair. That is, the man copies the woman's manipulative use in Stage C of positive-politeness Strategy 5: SEEK AGREEMENT (1, p. 117). It can be argued that the woman's (7) is meant by her to be ironic and is a violation of Grice's Maxim of Quality since it is the opposite of what she believes (3, p. 46). She has just in (1) of Stage D described the hills as "lovely." If the woman truly intends (7) to be ironic, it is a

realization of off-record Strategy 8: BE IRONIC (1, pp. 226-27). The man either does not perceive the irony, whether intended or not, or does not admit that he perceives it. The intended implicatures would be that the beer is not lovely and that the man is so insensitive that he values beer more than nature or the woman's feelings. Of course, off-record strategies, because of their essential ambiguity, allow the hearer to ignore them, if he wishes. In the following stage, the man introduces almost explicitly the extremely face-threatening topic of the abortion. Either through duplicity or stupidity, he chooses to act as if the woman is in a weakened position in their argument.

STAGE E

M:(1) "It's really an awfully simple operation, Jig," the man said. (2) "It's not really an operation at all."

W:(3) The girl looked at the ground the table legs rested on.

M:(4) "I know you wouldn't mind it, Jig. (5) It's really not anything. (6) It's just to let the air in."

W:(7) The girl did not say anything.

M:(8) "I'll go with you and I'll stay with you all the time. (9) They just let the air in and then it's all perfectly natural" (5, p. 275).

In Stage E lies the man's most concentrated use of negative and positive politeness strategies in "Hills Like White Elephants." Here the two types of strategy intermix because, first, the abortion is a severe imposition on the woman's negative face and, second, in order to convince the woman to have an abortion, the man must convince her that he respects her positive face, that he wants only what is best

for her. Underlying the whole of Stage E is the man's manipulative use of positive-politeness Strategy 9: ASSERT OR PRESUPPOSE THE SPEAKER'S KNOWLEDGE OF AND CONCERN FOR THE HEARER'S WANTS (1, p. 130). That is, underlying the man's argument is his assumption that the woman is concerned about the physical danger of the abortion. This is, of course, one good reason for saying that the man's arguments are unsuccessful. In fact, the woman never mentions or alludes to any fear of the operation itself. Her concern is always with the emotional aftermath. In any case, the man's two uses in (1, 4) of the woman's pet name, "Jig," are realizations of positive-politeness Strategy 4: USE IN-GROUP IDENTITY MARKERS (1, pp. 112-17). His offer in (8) to go with her and stay with her all the time are realizations of positive-politeness Strategies 10--OFFER, PROMISE--and 12--INCLUDE BOTH THE SPEAKER AND THE HEARER IN THE ACTIVITY (1, pp. 130; 132-33). Perhaps the man feels obliged to use three different positive-politeness strategies because he senses that the woman is beginning to realize that he doesn't really care about her positive face at all. That is, he must somehow make up for rejecting her attempts at communication through simile. But in a very real sense, the man must pay particular attention to positive face in order to convince the woman that he has her best interests at heart in suggesting that she get an abortion.

The man's use of negative politeness in this stage is equally strong. His statements addressed to negative face are all realizations of negative-politeness Strategy 4: MINIMIZE THE IMPOSITION (1, pp. 181-83). Note, however, that because the man assumes that the woman is worried about the physical danger of the abortion, all of these negative-politeness strategies are based ultimately on positive-politeness Strategy 9: ASSERT OR PRESUPPOSE THE SPEAKER'S KNOWLEDGE OF AND CONCERN FOR THE HEARER'S WANTS (1, p. 130). The man assumes, rightly but for the wrong reasons, that the abortion would be a severe imposition on the woman's negative face. But he wants it to appear to be less of an imposition. Thus, in (1) the man says that the abortion is "really an awfully simple operation," using three modifiers to lessen the negative connotations of the word operation, a word that in its lack of specificity carries fewer negative associations than abortion. Then in (2), realizing that even the phrase "really an awfully simple operation" may have too many negative connotations, he says, "It's not really an operation at all." And finally in (5) he says, "It's really not anything." In (4) he assures her that she wouldn't mind it. And in (6) and (9) he describes the abortion as something as harmless and "natural" as letting the "air" in.

Following Stage E is a passage in which the woman questions whether the abortion will really make them happy,

as they were before, according to the assertions of the man. The man tells the woman, "I wouldn't have you do it if you didn't want to." This, of course, is an on-record claim that the man will not damage the woman's negative or positive face. This passage concludes with the man telling the woman that the abortion is "perfectly simple" (5, p. 275). Stage F shows the man continuing with politeness strategies while the woman seems almost to abandon them:

Stage F

- W:(1) "And you really want to?"
 M:(2) "I think it's the best thing to do. (3) But I don't want you to do it if you don't really want to."
 W:(4) "And if I do it you'll be happy and things will be like they were and you'll love me?"
 M:(5) "I love you now. (6) You know I love you."
 W:(7) "I know. (8) But if I do it, then it will be nice again if I say things are like white elephants, and you'll like it?"
 M:(9) "I'll love it. (10) I love it now but I just can't think about it. (11) You know how I get when I worry."
 W:(12) "If I do it you won't ever worry?"
 M:(13) "I won't worry about that because it's perfectly simple."
 W:(14) "Then I'll do it. (15) Because I don't care about me."
 M:(16) "What do you mean?"
 W:(17) "I don't care about me."
 M:(18) "Well, I care about you."
 W:(19) "Oh yes. (20) But I don't care about me. (21) And I'll do it and then everything will be fine."
 M:(22) "I don't want you to do it if you feel that way" (5, pp. 275-76).

The woman begins Stage F by asking the man in (1) whether he really wants her to have the abortion. Notice that by asking, "And you really want to?" the woman includes the man in the process. In (2) the man neatly

avoids responsibility and gives further attention to the woman's negative face by using negative politeness Strategy 8: STATE THE FACE-THREATENING ACT AS A GENERAL RULE (1, pp. 211-12). And then in (3) he hedges the face-threatening act of (2) with the use of the second part of negative-politeness Strategy 2: QUESTION, HEDGE (1, pp. 150-77), asserting again that he does not want her to do it if she does not want to, which both gives the woman the option not to do the act and further removes him from responsibility in the abortion.

Probably now realizing that the man does not intend to agree to her having the child, the woman turns her attention entirely to her other goal--having a closer relationship with the man. But she has temporarily given up using politeness strategies. In (4) the woman pointedly asks the man whether if she has the abortion things will be like they were, presumably before her pregnancy. She also asks whether he will love her. This is a direct contradiction of negative-politeness Strategy 10: GO ON RECORD AS INCURRING A DEBT, OR AS NOT INDEBTING THE HEARER (1, pp. 215-16). That is, the woman seems to imply that if she is willing to have her negative face imposed upon by the abortion, the man should at least be willing to give up some of his psychological distance and pay some genuine attention to her positive-face wants. In (5) the man cleverly ignores her real question by asserting that he loves her now, using

positive-politeness Strategy 1: NOTICE, ATTEND TO THE HEARER (HIS INTERESTS, WANTS, NEEDS, GOODS) (1, pp. 108-09). Not satisfied with the man's response, the woman in (8) again violates negative-politeness Strategy 10 by asking whether he will like it again when she uses figurative language. In (9) the man promises that he will, using positive-politeness Strategy 10: OFFER, PROMISE (1, p. 130). But he then makes an excuse for himself in (10-11) by asserting that he is too worried now to think about it. Again in (12) the woman insists on getting the terms straight. But this time she uses off-record Strategy 2: GIVE ASSOCIATION CLUES. She asks him whether he will "worry" if she has the abortion. That is, she asks him whether they will be able to communicate on a more intimate level than is now possible. The word worry functions here euphemistically for the man's refusing intimacy with the woman. Brown and Levinson recognize that the use of euphemism is one realization of off-record Strategy 2 (1, pp. 220-21). In (13) the man sidesteps the issue, again by asserting that he won't worry about the abortion "because it's perfectly simple." As he escapes the woman's implicatures in Stage A and Stage D with the use of a violation of Grice's Maxim of Relation (3, p. 46), so he here too escapes the woman's uncomfortable questioning with a violation of Grice's Maxim of Relation, irrelevantly implying in (13) that the woman was in (12) asking him whether he will worry about the abortion. Again,

as in Stage A, this violation of Grice's Maxim of Relation is the realization of off-record Strategy 3: PRESUPPOSE (1, p. 222). The man's remark in (13) is superficially relevant to the surface meaning of worry but is irrelevant at the level of presuppositions, that is, at the level at which the word euphemistically stands for the man's refusing intimacy with the woman. The woman perceives the absurdity of the man's statement and the futility of trying to get any real promises from him. In (14) and (15) she agrees to have the abortion, saying that she doesn't care about herself. In (14-15) she is using off-record Strategy 8: BE IRONIC (1, pp. 226-27), which results from violating Grice's Quality Maxim, saying something which she knows to be false (3, p. 46). Thus, after having realized in Stage E that the man does not intend to agree to having the child, she further realizes in Stage F that the man doesn't care about her positive face at all. She finally sees through his face of love. Her violation of the Quality Maxim is a desperate attempt to get the man to realize that the abortion involves considerable cost to her, both physically and psychologically. This stage ends with the man returning in (22) to another on-record claim that he will not damage the woman's negative or positive face by making her have an abortion that she does not want to have. Instead of recognizing the immense cost to the woman, the man returns to what the woman must perceive as a dishonest claim, that

he would not force her to do anything she does not want to do, since the man has made it perfectly clear, unintentionally, that he respects neither the woman's positive face nor her negative face.

Between the end of this stage and the end of the story, the woman pointedly contradicts seven of the man's assertions, a clear indication that she realizes that at this stage of the conversation she will not reach her original goals through using politeness strategies. That the woman has given up on the conversation and that the man mistakenly or perhaps desperately believes that it is still alive is indicated in Stage G:

Stage G

W:(1) "Would you do something for me now?"

M:(2) "I'd do anything for you."

W:(3) "Would you please please please please please please please please stop talking?" (5, p. 277)

In (1) the woman appears to be asking for a debt from the man. The man appears eager, using the first part of negative-politeness Strategy 10: GO ON RECORD AS INCURRING A DEBT, OR AS NOT INDEBTING THE HEARER (1, pp. 215-16). And then in (3) the woman uses the first part of negative-politeness Strategy 2--QUESTION, HEDGE (1, pp. 150-77)--not in order to get the man to promise to agree to her having the child or to promise to be more intimately involved with her but to stop talking, a clear indication that the woman believes the case to be hopeless.

The story ends with the woman saying, "I feel fine

. . . . There's nothing wrong with me. I feel fine'" (5, p. 278). Whether this statement is an indication that the man has won the argument and that the woman will therefore have the abortion or whether the woman will leave the man and have her child is left unanswered here. In the final analysis, there is no way to tell whether the woman stays with the man and has the abortion, or leaves the man and has her child, or any number of other possibilities. I believe the reason that critics have come to opposing views of the outcome of the story is that throughout the story neither the man nor the woman consistently has the upper hand in their relationship. At one point the woman may appear to capitulate to the man's desires, but at another she is fighting for her own desires with her obviously superior conversational skills. The only thing that is abundantly clear is that the woman sees through the man's hypocritical face of love. The story ends with the woman asserting that she feels fine. One can either see this as a final capitulation or the ironic interlude to a conversation that is not over yet.

As an interesting note on structure, consider the following exchange, the very first in the story and immediately preceding the woman's remark in (1) in Stage A that the hills look like white elephants:

- W:(1) "What should we drink?" the girl asked. . . .
 M:(2) "It's pretty hot," the man said.
 W:(3) "Let's drink beer."
 M:(4) "Dos cervezas," the man said into the curtain (5:273).

This bit of conversation is uneventful in itself, seemingly hardly worth recording. But why did Hemingway include it as part of the tip of the iceberg that he allowed to show? He could have started the story with the man and the woman already having decided to drink beer and with two beers already sitting in front of them. It is conventional politeness with the woman asking what they should drink, the man contributing in the decision with the observation that it is hot, and the woman suggesting that they both drink beer with the man quickly concurring. This conventional politeness provides sharp contrast to the immediately following exchange in which the woman offers a simile and the man refuses to communicate with her on her terms. The conclusion that readers reach is that the calm evident in the opening exchange is superficial and that below it are much hostility and threatened feelings. There is no real transition between the opening exchange and Stage A. The abortion and the man and woman's relationship are on their minds even as they order the beer. The superficial politeness of the opening exchange sets the stage for the strategic politeness that follows and dominates the remainder of the story.

Just as the central issue of "The Doctor and the Doctor's Wife" is social distance and the central issue in "The Short Happy Life of Francis Macomber" is power, in "Hills Like White Elephants" most of the politeness

strategies are addressed to the impositions themselves. Power and social distance are, of course, at stake also, but this story is about the requirements of love, the demands that intimacy and life make on one. It is absolutely clear, and even obvious, that love, children, and intimacy put extreme demands on those that wish to have them. The fact that the woman must use both negative and positive politeness strategies when speaking of these things to the man demonstrates that she recognizes this cost. But this story also demonstrates the cost of isolation from love, children, intimacy. The cost is death, not only as it is symbolized by the potential abortion that the man so desperately wants the woman to have but also as it is suggested by the death of the man's integrity, which is revealed in his dishonest use of negative- and positive-politeness strategies to attempt to convince the woman, and presumably himself, that he really does care for the woman, even though he consistently refuses intimacy and is willing to buy his freedom with the death of their unborn child and the potential death of the woman he claims he loves.

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CHAPTER VI

Interpretive Implications of Politeness Theory

This study of politeness strategies in Hemingway's dialogue has made explicit some of the linguistic devices responsible for Hemingway's style, which has variously been characterized as terse, economic, deceptively simple, and ambiguous. As we have seen, Hemingway's characters are far from being uncommunicative. Even when, as in Doctor Adams' case, they seem unresponsive, their very unresponsiveness communicates, both to readers and to the other characters. It is from Doctor Adams' back that Dick Boulton, his son, and Billy Tabeshaw could tell how angry he was as he walked up the hill after his confrontation with Boulton. What seems to me to be responsible for much of the perceived gruffness of Hemingway's characters is that many of them are in a position of having to respond to very face-threatening situations. Doctor Adams must try to preserve the face of honesty and bravery against the presumptuous attacks of Dick Boulton and against the domestic threat of his wife. Francis Macomber must try to preserve the face of bravery against the threat of his own cowardice and Margaret's subsequent infidelity, and the man in "Hills Like White Elephants" must maintain his freedom against the imposition

of love and commitment. The woman in "The Sea Change" tells the man that he is not very polite when he asks her to prove her love for him (12, p. 398). The characters in the three stories examined in detail do not seem very polite either, but they are. They are strategically polite in the sense that they use various interactional strategies to lessen, or increase, a face-threatening act. They only appear impolite because of the enormous threats that they respond to or pose to others. Normally, the only "polite" thing to do about dishonesty, cowardness, and selfishness is to ignore them. But that is the prerogative only of the stranger, not of the wife, the lover. Even Dick Boulton, who seems most impolite by our normal standards, is at least strategically impolite. Only relative strangers in Hemingway's fiction appear polite to us or to his narrators. In "In Another Country," the wounded men, who are essentially strangers to one another, "were all very polite and interested in what was the matter, and sat in the machines that were to make so much difference." The narrator writes, "We were all a little detached, and there was nothing that held us together except that we met every afternoon at the hospital." He writes further, "The boys at first were very polite about my medals and asked me what I had done to get them" (12, pp. 267-69). And as a simultaneous counterpoint to the argument the man and woman are having in the bar in "The Sea Change" we have

the following polite exchange between the barman and some other customers:

"James," one of the clients addressed the barman, "you're looking very well."

"You're looking very well yourself," the barman said.

"Old James," the other client said. "You're fatter, James."

"It's terrible," the barman said, "the way I put it on."

"Don't neglect to insert the brandy, James," the first client said.

"No, sir," said the barman. "Trust me."

The two at the bar looked over at the two at the table, then looked back at the barman again. Towards the barman was the comfortable direction (12, p. 399).

We note that it is the barman who responds to the man's final statement that he is a changed man with the polite but insensitive "'You look very well, sir, You must have had a very good summer'" (12, p. 401).

Without the buffer of politeness strategies, Hemingway's characters would indeed fit their caricature. They would have no options, given their face-threatening situations, other than either to fight physically or to endure in stoic silence. Thus, Bugs in "The Battler" addresses both Nick and Ad Francis as "Mister" and uses mostly deferential questions when addressing them, but he controls the periodically dangerous Ad with his politeness. He tells "'Mister Adams'" at the end of the story, "'If you don't mind I wish you'd sort of pull out. I don't like to not be hospitable, but it might disturb him back again to see you'" (12, p. 138). Many critics have recognized politeness in Hemingway. Joseph De Falco says that Bugs

"controls the situation at all times, in spite of his deferential treatment of both Francis and Nick" (6, p. 77). And it is as if William B. Bache recognizes in Bug's knocking unconscious the violent Ad the physical counterpart of politeness strategies when he notices that "to subdue the irresponsible Ad, Bugs uses a brutal blackjack softened by a civilized handkerchief" (1). Politeness strategies allow Hemingway's characters to attempt to redress face-threatening acts and to redefine or define themselves with respect to the other characters. We have seen Dick Boulton redefining his subservient relation to Dr. Adams, Dr. Adams trying to maintain his dignity, Francis Macomber attempting to gain some courage, and the man and the woman in "Hills Like White Elephants" each trying to reach respective goals, all with the help of politeness strategies.

Obviously, one of the things I hope to have shown indirectly and secondarily in this thesis is that the characters in at least the three Hemingway short stories examined in detail do not fit the stereotype of the Hemingway character as an inarticulate barbarian with a tenuous, at best, relationship to society. To the charge that Hemingway has no social or economic relevance, Robert Penn Warren counters, "A man does not only have to live with other men in terms of economic and political arrangements; he has to live with them in terms of moral arrangements, and he has to live with himself, he has to define himself"

(18, p. 27). As we have seen, one way to define, or redefine one's self, is through the use of politeness strategies. It is true that Doctor Adams, Francis Macomber, and the man in "Hills Like White Elephants" do fail to maintain their respective social fictions, but at least Dick Boulton, Margaret Macomber, and Jig maintain some sort of dignity and self-worth. Nor do I believe, as Richard Chase does, that we know Hemingway's characters by what they are at heart, not presumably by what they are in society. He argues that their hearts are "not shown to us, except superficially by their differences in manners, because the decorum they display is their personal way of living what they believe in or doing what they are fated to do" (4, p. 160). This may be true of the Nick Adams in "Big Two Hearted River," but it is an inaccurate portrait of any of the characters in the three stories examined at length here.

Given that I have chosen in this thesis a somewhat unorthodox approach to a literary text, not to mention Hemingway's literary text, it is perhaps incumbent on me to take the trouble to examine the interpretive implications of using politeness theory on a literary text, that is, using on a literary text a linguistic analysis that was developed from an examination of "real-life" language. In his article "Pragmatics in Wonderland," Hancher refers to what he calls "conversational politics, which is more usually called the theory of linguistic politeness" as "the most inclusive

pragmatic science of all" (10, p. 175). There is nothing in this statement of Hancher's that I explicitly disagree with, yet there is much implicit in the term pragmatic science that is potentially misleading to the reader. Above all, I do not intend in this thesis to recommend politeness theory as a new method for the interpretation of literature. There are two reasons for this. First, politeness theory is not equally applicable to all pieces of literature. Indeed, there are some pieces for which it is entirely inappropriate. For instance, to attempt to apply it to "Big Two-Hearted River" would be an exercise in futility. What is requisite for its application is the presence of at least two people and the threatening of the negative or positive face of one of those people. In that respect, even "The Old Man at the Bridge" is inappropriate because even though politeness strategies are used in the story, they are not the focus of the story. The main character of the story is not fully "engaged" in talking with the narrator. "'I was taking care of animals,' he said dully, but no longer to me. 'I was only taking care of animals'" (12, p. 80).

The second reason why I think it wrong to see politeness theory providing a new method of interpretation for literary texts is that I see interpretation itself as a hermeneutical undertaking, by which I mean that interpretation involves a participation of the reader in the text itself so that any hope of objectivity, which is

implicit in the term method, is lost. Hans-Georg Gadamer writes "Language is not an instrumental setup, a tool, that we apply, but the element in which we live and which we can never objectify to the extent that it ceases to surround us" (9, p. 50). Politeness strategies are part of that unconscious store of language which hardly any speaker is ever consciously aware of. This follows also for authors. It is not perhaps even accurate to speak of authors consciously using politeness strategies for characterization and thematic development. If to be a speaking human being is to have these strategies in one's speech, then to be an author is to have these strategies in one's writing. If we can say that language is being, then politeness strategies are part of being. As Gadamer says of the effort to explicate grammar, "A really gigantic achievement of abstraction is required of everyone who will bring the grammar of his native language to explicit consciousness" (8, p. 65).

The explication of politeness strategies is not unlike the explication of grammar. In fact, politeness strategies are part of the grammar of our language. That we may have difficulty seeing this is due to our false notions of what a grammar is or does. Grammar is normally considered, since Chomsky's 1957 Syntactic Structures, to be a set of abstract rules transforming basic sentences into more complex ones (5). This notion of grammar reveals a basic

misunderstanding of language as some sort of cryptic code that must be operated on by abstruse rules to yield the underlying meaning. All of this is only a thinly disguised version of the Saussurian sign. Wittgenstein, of the same positivist mind as Chomsky, subscribes to this view, as is shown in his metaphor of language as disguising clothing for underlying thought: "from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized" (19, p. 63). This mistrust of the form of language can, of course, be traced back to Plato. In The Sophist, Plato goes to great lengths to prove that although we can speak of the world in meaningful ways, language often misleads us into making false statements. That is, we can make statements that do not partake of the ideal forms and that are therefore false statements (16). Plato's mistrust of language seems much more fundamental than that of Wittgenstein, but it is only an early version of the modern scientific dualistic mistrust of language engendered by Saussure's notion of the sign. The only difference is that modern linguists have given up the notion of the ideal forms, although not of the ideal grammar. Saussure excluded from the sign both semantics and phonetic form. All that was left was the signified--concepts (without a semantics to link the concepts in meaningful ways)--and the signifier--an

ideal memory trace of phonetic form (17). Given this history of the notion of the sign--the dominant linguistic concept since Saussure--it is not hard to see how anything above the barely manageable sentence would be excluded as too unreliable to reflect any unified underlying signified. As Heidegger said of the traditional grammarians' terms such as present indicative, perfect, imperative, so may we say of terms of the modern schools of structuralist linguistics: "In the barren and spiritless doctrine of the schools, these formal concepts and terms of grammar have become totally uncomprehended and incomprehensible shells" (11, p. 53)

Instead of a static system of sign relations, I propose that language consists of several dynamic systems of behavior rooted in both thought and material substance--phonic or graphic, for instance. There is no separation of the signifier from the signified. Both are one. Internal language, because it has a different substance from external language, is a different language, just as phonic language is different from graphic language, though all may be sufficiently similar to make it difficult to see the differences. And indeed, those differences may be of no consequence at times, as I have assumed in this exploration of politeness strategies in Hemingway's short stories. Again, there is no underlying thought separate from the language which expresses it. They are the same. As Ernst Cassirer notes when he asserts that it is "irrelevant" to

speculate about a reality separate from language, "Thus the special symbolic forms are not imitations, but organs of reality, since it is solely by their agency that anything real becomes an object for intellectual apprehension, and as such is made visible to us" (3, p. 8).

It might be argued that the possibility of translation proves the separation of the signifier from the signified. The truth is that there is no such thing as translation, if we mean by translation the production of a passage in one language that is the exact equivalent of a passage in another language. This can be shown even with the notion of language as a system of static signs. All signs derive at least part of their signification from the signs with which they are in combination. Thus the word from in the sentence "I came from Montana" does not signify the same as the same word in "I worked from Tuesday until Thursday." Granted, the difference in signification is small, but consider the vastly magnified difference when whole sentences are involved in different languages. And when translation is attempted, we do not translate from the signifier of one language to the signified of another. In the terminology of the sign, we may only translate from the signifier to the signifier. In Derridian terminology, this is called "supplementation." Derrida's signifier does not represent a signified. "Rather, it is substituted for another signifier, for another type of signifier that maintains another

relation with the deficient presence, one more highly valued by virtue of the play of difference" (7, p. 89).

It is true that the workings of grammar, both of the sentence and of politeness strategies, are not normally available to us for conscious reflection. Who can actually tell us why we sometimes say "I gave the letter to Bill" and sometimes, "I gave Bill the letter." But because we do not know how or why we construct sentences the way we do does not prove that what we do is different from what we mean. To explicate the difference between the two sentences above would be simply to paraphrase them and then possibly offer some hypothesis about the generalized meaning of "dative shifting." To know the meaning of these sentences is to use them in everyday discourse. Wittgenstein writes, "The silent adjustments to understand colloquial language are enormously complicated" (19, p. 63). Colloquial language is enormously complicated, but it takes no "adjustments" to understand it. It is the vehicle of our being. It would be no less foolish to assert that we must adjust to being warm-blooded mammals, no matter how much agony this reality, along with language, may cause us.

Politeness is a hermeneutical text, and as such, it participates in Heideggerian being. As I indicated in Chapter II, a speaker's choice of politeness strategies is based on three social factors: the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, the relative power of the

hearer/speaker over the other, and the rank of the imposition of the face-threatening act. As reflections of these factors, the language of politeness strategies places the speaker/hearer within a social relationship. Politeness strategies, more than most other forms of language, reflect what Maurice Merleau-Ponty stresses as the function of language--to get things done in a social world, one of which is to affirm one's self. The self is a product of interaction, primarily through language, with others (14). In fact, Derrida argues that Husserl's notion that we can know the self without others is nonsense and that language itself depends upon the existence of others. How else, he asks, can there be any meaning to the term "I," since anyone can use the term referring to himself or herself. The self, like the "I" or "you," is defined in relation to others (7). It is in this specific sense that politeness strategies are really no different from language in general, since everything from pronouns, to ellipsis, to jokes, to stroking the ego of someone you wish something from is a social product. Although Heidegger's (11) sense of the self is not primarily social but personal, we can see in the struggling of the main characters in the three Hemingway stories the very struggle of the self to be, to bring about Heideggerian being. That is, in all these stories there is the struggle to bring about unconcealment. There is, for instance, the unconcealment of Dr. Adams' duplicity and cowardice, of

Macomber's cowardice and failure to understand true courage, and of the woman's life metaphor in "Hills Like White Elephants." As Richard W. Lid writes of the communicative predicament that many of Hemingway's characters find themselves in, "To say truly what is felt is to undergo more pain than it is possible to endure. The struggle for words is painful. And yet, no matter the cost, speech is also the only possible relief from pain--even if, as becomes apparent, the result of speaking must mean more pain" (13, p. 402). Thus, Dr. Adams might have just accepted Boulton's remarks, but he could not; Macomber might have just accepted that he was shown publicly to be a coward, but he could not; and the woman in "Hills Like White Elephants" might have just accepted her fate in a sterile relationship with the man, but she could not. Each failed, but each tried. Each causes himself or herself pain by talking, by bringing about unconcealedness, but that is better than enduring in silence, without social meaning.

It has long been recognized that an understanding of a phenomenon closely related to politeness strategies is indispensable in writing as well as interpreting texts. Laurence Ferrine speculates that this phenomenon--tone--may be more important in determining the meaning of a text than a knowledge of the literal content (15, p. 389). If tone is the attitude of the writer towards the subject matter about which he is writing, then politeness strategies reveal the

speaker's attitude towards himself in relation to the hearer. It has also long been recognized that Hemingway demands that his readers participate in the determination of the tone of his texts. H. E. Bates argues that the intonation and emotion in a Hemingway story lie only in the "abrupt and casual arrangement of the words." He comments that "Hemingway asked nothing except the cooperation of the reader in the job of capturing these intonations and emotions" (2, p. 75). Gadamer, who argues that "the being of the interpreter pertains intrinsically to the being of what is to be interpreted," states the case for hermeneutics: "Whoever wants to understand something already brings along something that anticipatorily joins him with what he wants to understand--a sustaining agreement." This "sustaining agreement" is a knowledge of the rules of the game for the particular issue at stake (9, p. 136). One of the games that people play is politeness. Hemingway knew those rules. Readers must know those rules to read him well.

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