

Classical Subjects Creatively Taught™

RHETORIC Alive!

BOOK 1:
PRINCIPLES OF PERSUASION



PERSUASIVE SPEECH AND WRITING
IN THE TRADITION OF ARISTOTLE
ALYSSAN BARNES, PHD

Dedication:
To Annie, June, and Zoe



Rhetoric Alive! Book 1: Principles of Persuasion

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FOREWORD

The art of rhetoric has had a number of classical defenders, but the choice comes down to two mighty figures when one wants to learn this art: Aristotle or Cicero. For a very long time in the history of the West, educators chose Cicero; in the European cultures of the medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment periods, to study rhetoric was to study Cicero. The Latinate oratory of Roman culture assumed but displaced the Greek rhetoric of Athenian culture—at the least into the nineteenth century, and possibly even into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. And, even though Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* has had a renaissance recently, teachers of the practical language arts still usually follow Cicero. Yet here Alyssan Barnes has chosen Aristotle. How might one defend that choice, and how does the Aristotelian conception of the art of rhetoric provide clues to what one can expect from this book?

Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is a part of his entire canon, a large and varied body of works that explore a rather startling number of subjects of human knowledge. We might not want to agree with John Henry Newman in *The Idea of a University* that Aristotle is “the oracle of nature and of truth,”¹ but he did, more or less, invent what we know about many of the most important subjects of our understanding. One should not end with Aristotle, but one should always start with him. He wrote about the natural sciences, psychology, the language arts (including logic), poetry, rhetoric, ethics, politics, and metaphysics—all the while defining terms and classifying their parts in such a way as to determine their study for millennia. And he did so in a clear, inventive, and even humorous Greek prose, which is a philosophical and literary marvel. To study Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is to study the thought of someone who relates this art of persuasion to the rest of human concerns, the result being that the art is not divorced from other arts and sciences, but enriches and is enriched by them.

By itself, the treatise is simply the best rhetoric that exists. In his *In Defense of Rhetoric*, Brian Vickers makes a remarkable claim: “[Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*] remains the most penetrating analysis of speech in its full individual and social dimension.”² Vickers is right: Aristotle’s treatment is the deepest—that is, the most philosophical—discussion of the art of rhetoric, an art he relates to a large number of other fields in order to fashion a comprehensive, detailed explanation of the fundamental human activity of speech, understood in its most capacious sense as the *logos* that distinguishes us from the other animals and allows us to choose the good, determine the just, and marvel at the noble. Aristotle opens the *Politics* (in Rackham’s Loeb translation) with a vision of the human being as essentially the animal dignified by speech:

1. John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), V.5.

2. Brian Vickers, *In Defense of Rhetoric* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 26.

And why man is a political animal in a greater measure than any bee or any gregarious animal is clear. For nature, as we declare, does nothing without purpose; and man alone of the animals possesses speech. . . . [S]peech is designed to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and therefore also the right and the wrong; for it is the special property of man in distinction from the other animals that he alone has perception of good and bad and right and wrong and the other moral qualities, and it is partnership in these things that makes a household and a city state.³

It is clear from this passage that, when Aristotle thinks of speech or *logos*, one of the forms he has in mind is that of the art of rhetoric. Whether in writing or speaking, Aristotle imagines rhetoric as a social art.

One characteristic of Aristotle's thought that does not receive enough notice is this: He is often only suggestive without being conclusive—and often about the most important questions at hand! That is, much of his thought—and this is especially true of his *Rhetoric*—requires an active interpretation, a reader willing to do a great deal of invention herself to discern what Aristotle did and to supplement that with new thought.

He has found such an interpreter in Alyssan Barnes. *Rhetoric Alive! Book 1* is a highly knowledgeable, comprehensive, and clear Aristotelian treatment of the art of rhetoric, one that is willing to supplement where necessary to see what Aristotle saw about the persuasive in human speech. The virtues of *Rhetoric Alive!* are many, but two are especially prominent: its patient pedagogy, and its detailed and interesting exercises. Barnes is a master teacher, so she knows how to put a sequence of explanations together for a student who does not yet know what she does. As well, Barnes understands that knowing requires doing; to learn an art—what Aristotle calls in several works “the reasoned capacity to make”—one must practice the smaller arts that make up an art. Aristotle says at one point in his *Rhetoric* that the appeal to character (*ethos*) is almost the whole of persuasiveness. Barnes's credibility as interpreter, practitioner, and teacher of the art of rhetoric is trustworthy and admirable. This is a living rhetoric bound to animate the spoken and written suasions of any teacher or student who submits to its instruction. It makes rhetoric *alive!*

—Scott F. Crider, PhD,
Author of *The Office of Assertion: An Art of Rhetoric for the Academic Essay*

3. Aristotle, *Politics*, Rackham's Loeb translation, 1.1.10–11.

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Those who have enriched the text most are my students, especially those at Live Oak Classical School, for they continually teach me about rhetoric, through both my failures and my successes in the classroom. Their insights are peppered throughout the work, and they are the audience I've kept in mind while writing it.

I'm grateful for support from Alison Moffatt and Carolyn Still, who not only have offered me freedom to explore these ideas in the classroom but also have served as model rhetors for the entire school community. Their winsome speech and manifest virtue are genuinely persuasive.

Thanks are due to a few others who may not know the degree to which they have inspired this work: Pat Gordon, Leo Paul de Alvarez, Raymond DiLorenzo, Monica Ashour, Dayspring Brock, and DeAnn Stuart. Likewise, without my mother's support, I never could have completed it.

I first read Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in a graduate course taught by Scott F. Crider at the University of Dallas. Whatever is worthwhile in the pages that follow must be credited largely to Professor Crider, whose insights into rhetoric in general and Aristotle's texts in particular have illuminated this project from its beginning.

Finally, I offer a special and continuing thanks to my three daughters—Annie, June, and Zoe—to whom this book is dedicated.

NOTE TO STUDENT

You may be apprehensive about studying rhetoric from the view of Aristotle. After all, who is he? But be sure of this: Thinking along with Aristotle will offer an understanding of the art of persuasive language *unlike* a typical public speaking or written composition class. You may have imagined a course where you turn off your brain and turn on your charm, learn to gesture and count the times you say “um,” and wrap up by going for the jugular, so to speak, during arguments. But that, my friend, would be sophistry.¹ So whatever is in store for you in this text, it sure beats studying mind-numbing communication charts and humdrum Venn diagrams. Instead, you will encounter firsthand some of the most fundamental and insightful ideas ever uttered about language and communication. It’s no wonder the history of Western philosophy can be seen as one long footnote to the Ancients!² So enjoy the mental exercise—after all, it’s a chiefly human enterprise.



-
1. The term *sophistry* has always had connotations of unethical speech—smooth talk with little substance or concern for truth. As we will learn, the term has a history that can shed light on its contemporary usage.
 2. This is a variation of Alfred North Whitehead’s famous claim, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.” See Whitehead’s *Process and Reality*, ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne, corrected ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 39.

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

Rhetoric's past is a checkered one. The study of it began in Ancient Greece with the wily sophists, foreigners who taught rhetoric as an art of sorts—an art of persuasion with little regard for truth. Their misuse of rhetoric gave the art a bad reputation: To be a rhetor was to be a linguistic trickster, one who used language not to reveal truth but to manipulate and deceive. Such was the near-fatal attack on the sophists by Socrates in the works of Plato. But even in Plato's day, some thinkers—those who recognized the absolute necessity of persuasive speech—refused to cast rhetoric aside where it would be used and abused by charlatans alone. And so, with the help of Aristotle and other like-minded defenders of the art, rhetoric became a central study for many centuries, only gaining in esteem as it passed to the Romans and became the crowning study for the citizen.

The story is, of course, much messier, much more tumultuous and complicated, than any brief introduction could tell. One result of rhetoric's tortuous history is that the art at times appears to have been robbed of its philosophic soul. What remains of rhetoric today is a shell of techniques and figures of speech along with a few sophistic parlor tricks—an area of study pretty much deserving of Socrates's castigation so many centuries ago, that rhetoric is a just a branch of flattery. “Rhetoric” is once again a dirty word.

This text, then, has two purposes. First, it hopes to be a breath of fresh air to the discipline itself, one that would reinvigorate the soul of rhetoric. By reconnecting rhetoric to its philosophic roots, we hope to save rhetoric from ignominy and beckon it back into the sunlight of truth. Second, it offers instruction in the practice of rhetoric. Conscious practice not only helps one grow in the skills of persuasion but also teaches that same person how to more nimbly dodge cheap rhetorical shots by others.

If this project of rhetoric's revival is a daunting one, consider this: Rhetoric is actually nothing new; it's something you use every day. And just as a fish is unaware of water, so are we generally unaware of the world of words and ideas in which we swim. Better to study the art of persuasion, making its practice and distortions less fearsome, not more so. Rhetoric, then, is nothing to be scared of. And the ever-so-common *glossophobia*—anxiety of speaking before a crowd—will also be rendered manageable once under the bridle of reason.

SECTION 1: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1—Rhetoric and the Song of the City

Aristotle, the first true organizer of rhetoric, believed that the ability to speak is what makes humanity unique. And although Aristotle is a philosopher, he is willing to admit that man cannot live by contemplative dialectic alone. Rhetoric is its *antistrophe*, its necessary complement, its harmonic counterpart. Rhetoric is, as he defines it, “*the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.*”¹

SECTION 2: THE THREE RHETORICAL APPEALS²

Chapter 2—*Ethos*: Revealing the Speaker’s Credibility

Does the speaker’s character really matter, so long as the message makes sense and feels right? For Aristotle, the answer is a resounding yes. *Ethos* is paramount; it legitimizes not only the *pathos* being evoked but also the *logos* being appealed to. This chapter focuses on what makes up a speaker’s *ethos*—common sense, moral virtue, and goodwill. One must appear to know what is right, do what is right, and want what is right for one’s audience.

Chapter 3—*Pathos*: Guiding the Audience’s Emotion

Aristotle begins his *Rhetoric* with a castigation of contemporary rhetoric: It is, for one thing, too emotional. But when he goes on to discuss the three rhetorical appeals, he not only dives into the emotions, but also seems to enjoy the dip. The key to his surprising attention to *pathos* is its unique function within rhetoric: It is emotion that propels one to judgment. His charge for the rhetor is to stir emotions appropriate to the situation, thus allowing for persuasion, full and proper.

Chapter 4—*Logos* in the Enthymeme: Abbreviating the Syllogism

Whereas *ethos* resides in the speaker and *pathos* in the audience, *logos* is shared between them. Chapter 4, then, addresses the logical appeal. And it’s in exploring the deductive reasoning of the enthymeme, a verbal syllogism with a missing premise, that we find a fundamental link between philosophy and rhetoric.

Chapter 5—More on *Logos*: Top-Down Versus Bottom-Up Reasoning

Inductive and deductive reasoning are tools of philosophy, but they have counterparts in rhetoric, too. In fact, a wise rhetor is content to utilize a looser form of logic than the philosopher may be. Maxims, examples, comparisons, fables—rhetors ought not shy away from arguments that delight as well as instruct.

SECTION 3: THE FIVE CANONS OF RHETORIC

Chapter 6—Canon One, Invention: Finding Something to Say

Figuring out *what* to say—invention—need not remain the mystery it’s reputed to be. Aristotle offers us the commonplaces, metaphorical locales one can visit in order to find arguments.

1. See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1355b. (See note in chapter 1 regarding the Bekker numbering citation system.)

2. In order to give proper attention to the three rhetorical appeals and to introduce them in a clear fashion, these appeals are the sole focus of section 2. They are, of course, constituents of *invention*, which is the first of the five canons of rhetoric (discussed in section 3).

Chapter 7—Canon Two, Organization: Ordering the Content

A text's division should be, according to Aristotle, short and sweet: State the point and then demonstrate it. He goes on to say that adding an introduction and conclusion is a nice touch. This simple but compelling approach would later evolve into a six-part system of classical organization, handy for almost any rhetorical occasion. Chapter 7 teaches how to compose and divide a speech to achieve the greatest effect, so that the audience isn't lost en route to the persuasive end.

Chapter 8—Canon Three, Style: Choosing the Language

Style is not just icing on the rhetorical cake. It turns out it's really more than that: It is thought put into words. Perhaps more than all the canons of rhetoric, style injects personality into an argument, bringing it to a new level of persuasion. This chapter introduces various aspects of style and explores several figures of speech, considering them as more than mere ornamentation.

Chapter 9—Canon Four, Memory: Storing What's Valuable

It is true that Aristotle doesn't mention memory, but Augustine of Hippo would later devote an entire chapter of his *Confessions* to its exploration. For Augustine, memory means much more than downloading data. Memory is a matter of the soul. On the practical side, rhetors can construct imaginative locales—memory palaces—in which their ideas can be “stored.”

Chapter 10—Canon Five, Delivery: Presenting the Whole

Delivery, Aristotle holds, is a “vulgar matter”—a condescension that must be made because the human is not influenced only by the proofs of *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. But, in another sense, delivery is a natural companion to *ethos*: One should be audible, clear, and pleasant to listen to, or else the entire project of speaking becomes senseless. And while histrionic delivery should be anathema to us in the same way it was to Aristotle, there is yet much to learn in the way of tailoring technique to the message. This chapter focuses on how to use the voice, eye contact, and gestures, as Aristotle says, “neither to offend nor to entertain.”

SECTION 4: THE THREE KINDS OF RHETORIC

Chapter 11—Deliberative Rhetoric: Considering Goods

TIME: *future* ACTION: *urge to do/urge not to do* END: *advantage*

Chapter 11 considers human happiness as defined by Aristotle, and it turns out that his definition is a comprehensive one. In fact, before cataloguing the sundry ways people define happiness, he suggests that happiness might be the guiding principle for every decision a person or a community ever makes. Perhaps this is why Aristotle starts off with deliberative rhetoric, speech that targets the public good.

Chapter 12—Epideictic Rhetoric: Praising the Beautiful

TIME: *present* ACTION: *praise/censure* END: *honor*

Virtue and vice trigger praise and blame. And because different groups play favorites with different virtues, Aristotle, with an eye to the political, shows how epideictic rhetoric can serve a deliberative end. What virtue do you want to see more of? Honor it. The political place of praise and blame is far from trivial; honoring virtues, rather, is another key ingredient of a flourishing community.

Chapter 13—Judicial Rhetoric: Judging the True

TIME: *past* ACTION: *defend/attack* END: *justice*

One of Aristotle's most startling claims is that people act willingly for two reasons and two reasons only: because they want a good or because they want to be pleased. If he's right, that means that rhetors are called to be more than mere prosecutors or defendants; they are to be students of the good and of the pleasurable. Aristotle goes on to discuss wrongdoing, dividing law into two types: the specific and the universal. Specific law is distinct to a people, and universal law, also known as "natural law," is common to all. Students of the *Rhetoric* are urged, then, to consider justice itself—not in just a limited, personal way, but in that far-reaching sense of what is fundamentally right and wrong. In other words, sophistry is no option; a rhetor must be moral.

SECTION 5: RHETORIC GONE WRONG

Chapter 14—Fallacies and Sophistry: Spotting Bad Arguments

Consider this chapter a crash course in logic with a spotlight on the most common fallacies. After a quick look at the three kinds of syllogisms (categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive), we analyze their most frequent imposters. The accompanying class exercise lets you practice spotting those verbal missteps. Common informal fallacies are also introduced.

SECTION 6: A BRIEF CONCLUSION

Chapter 15—Conclusion: The Good Student Speaking Well

After studying all the nitty-gritty of rhetoric and after fleshing out the concepts using workshops and presentations, you'll now have the chance to consider your role as a rhetor, one who uses the ever-so-powerful gift of language. Indeed, to wield the power of the word is a grave yet inescapable responsibility, one for which you should seek to practice wise and virtuous stewardship. This final chapter, we hope, will find you well on the way toward wise and virtuous stewardship.

Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is an ambitious and sweeping project, for he seeks to raise rhetorical discourse to newfangled heights. By shining the gleam of reason onto rhetorical discourse, he hopes to enlighten the entire civic project of speaking, from the rhetors—that is, those who practice the art of rhetoric—to the audience members who hear them. Hence, a rhetor would seek the common good rather than a private one, speech would animate the fullness of the audience members rather than only their passions, and both parties would grow more astute and judicious. The sum effect? A burgeoning civic discourse based upon an ever-increasing alignment with truth.

RHETORIC MAP


In the mind map of rhetoric on the following page, you see the various definitions rhetoric has earned over the years: optimistic ones such as “the study of misunderstanding and its remedies” and not-so-friendly ones such as Plato’s famous comparison of rhetoric to makeup, the quick cosmetic fix that passes off an ugly person as beautiful.

You’ll also find the five so-called canons of rhetoric. Four of those are lifted from Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, but by the time of Cicero, the rhetorical tradition had added a fifth: memory. You can think of the canons as stages in the development of an argument. First generate material—*invention*, or what to say. Then, after developing your speech’s content, comes *organization*, in which you arrange that invention in a coherent and sensible way. *Style* is third, casting the invented and organized material into just the right words. If it’s a speech that you’re working on, then the next step would be to commit it to *memory*. Lastly, the speech or paper must be carefully presented, so *delivery*, whether orally for the former or written for the latter, is the fifth and final canon.

You’ll also notice the three rhetorical appeals of *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos* are technically part of invention. This connection means that appeals to the character of the speaker (*ethos*), the emotional predisposition of the audience (*pathos*), and the reasoned argumentation in words (*logos*) must be drawn from the speech itself. In other words, your character must be established *in the speech*, the audience’s emotion must be guided *by the speech*, and the logic of the arguments must be communicated *through the speech*.

The map also includes the three species of rhetoric: judicial, epideictic, and deliberative. Because they concern the past, present, and future, respectively—and may even line up with the transcendentals of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good—these three species are exhaustive of persuasive discourse.





"The faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion." - Aristotle

"Flattery! Cookery! False makeup!" - Plato

"The study of misunderstanding and its remedies." - I.A. Richards

"Passionate, partisan discourse." - Stanley Fish

"That powerful instrument of error and deceit." - John Locke

Reasons rhetoric is useful

To assist the truth

To persuade when logos alone isn't enough

To see both sides of an argument

To defend one's beliefs

Rhetoric

Definitions

Species

Canons

Invention

time: past • end: justice
place: courtroom

time: present • end: honor
place: funeral or wedding

time: future • end: advantageous
place: Congress

Judicial

Epideictic

Deliberative

Delivery

Memory

Style

Organization

Appeals

pathos

logos

ethos

level

figures of speech

schemes

tropes

low

medium

high

exordium

narratio

partitio

confirmatio

refutatio

peroratio

emotions

inductive (example)

deductive (enthymeme)

eunoia (goodwill)

arête (moral virtue)

phronesis (practical wisdom)

Topics/Commonplaces

Definition

Comparison

Relationship

Circumstance

Testimony

Notes



Notes



SECTION

A Brief Introduction

1

What is it that makes humanity distinct? Is it our intelligence, our power to dominate rationally? Is it the large temporal cortex or the opposable thumbs? Why are we different from, arguably higher than, other animals?

Aristotle has an answer for this: Humanity has speech.¹ Language and its ability to give voice to certain characteristics—for example, right and wrong, the noble and the shameful, or the harmful and the helpful—give birth to culture. With language, then, culture can be built and continually rebuilt, ever evolving and being shaped by the words spoken within it. *Words do things*, and it is this great power that makes them worthy of our study.

Aristotle wrote the first book on **rhetoric**, but of course he was not the first to *practice* rhetoric. Rhetoric is ubiquitous! Where there is language, there is rhetoric; thus, rhetoric had been around long before Aristotle came along to write about it. As far as we know, however, he was the first in the West to create a scientific, comprehensive study of it as an art.

One could also say that Aristotle wrote the *last* book on rhetoric. This is an even grander claim, for surely Cicero, Quintilian,² and great thinkers all the way up to our own day are not to be passed over. Surely, rhetoric continued to develop, and surely, the Greeks didn't figure it *all* out way back in the fourth century BC, right? These are all good points to consider. And yet, there is a sense in which Aristotle's approach to rhetoric, while often challenged, has never once dropped out of sight. All the theorists following Aristotle must wrestle with his ideas. The language he uses and the concepts he introduces are peppered throughout rhetoric's long history. And so one might justly, if hyperbolically, claim that Aristotle—although he has not had the last word on rhetoric—has had the first and the most influential word on the art. His is the word to be reckoned with.



1. For more on this idea, see also Aristotle's *Politics* 1253a.

2. This references Marcus Tullius Cicero, Roman orator, and Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, Roman rhetorician.

Each chapter in this text will begin with an excerpt from Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, an ancient text with plenty of relevance to our day. A student of Plato, **Aristotle** (384–322 BC) was a Greek philosopher whose influence on Western thought—in such areas as ethics, politics, psychology, science, logic, and, of course, rhetoric—is immense. His *Rhetoric* is not an easy read; it is, after all, a collection of his lecture notes that can feel a bit dry and dusty at times. However, this work is largely responsible for our understanding of the field today, and it's important to be radical (from the Latin *radix*, meaning “root”) in our approach to persuasion, going all the way back to rhetoric's roots. You should begin each chapter by reading Aristotle's own words on the topics at hand and then explore those concepts and how they've developed.



¹ (1354a)² Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science.

Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others spontaneously; and everyone will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

...

(1355a) Rhetoric is useful (1) because things that are true and things that are just have a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites, so that if the decisions of judges are not what they ought to be, the defeat must be due to the speakers themselves, and they must be blamed accordingly. Moreover, (2) before some audiences not even the

1. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, hypertextual resource compiled by Lee Honeycutt (online), <http://homepage.cs.uri.edu/courses/fall2007/csc305/Schedule/rhetoric/>. Unless otherwise specified, the translations of *Rhetoric* throughout this book were referenced via this online resource, based on the 1954 translation of W. Rhys Roberts, which was obtained in ASCII text format from Virginia Tech's gopher site of online literary works in the public domain.

2. There is no need to have a particular translation of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. The standard way of referencing Aristotle's works uses the Bekker numbering system, which enables readers to locate passages in different editions. Bekker numbers take the form of up to four numbers to indicate page number, followed by a letter to indicate column (e.g., a, b), and sometimes followed by a line number as well. You will notice these numbers in parentheses in the body text when Aristotle's works are cited.

possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for what we say to produce conviction. For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there are people whom one cannot instruct. Here, then, we must use, as our modes of persuasion and argument, notions possessed by everybody, as we observed in the *Topics* when dealing with the way to handle a popular audience. Further, (3) we must be able to employ persuasion, just as strict reasoning can be employed, on opposite sides of a question, not in order that we may in practice employ it in both ways (for we must not make people believe what is wrong), but in order that we may see clearly what the facts are, and that, if another man argues unfairly, we on our part may be able to confute him. No other of the arts draws opposite conclusions: dialectic and rhetoric alone do this. Both these arts draw opposite conclusions impartially. Nevertheless, the underlying facts do not lend themselves equally well to the contrary views. No; things that are true and things that are better are, by their nature, practically always easier to prove and easier to believe in. (1355b) Again, (4) it is absurd to hold that a man ought to be ashamed of being unable to defend himself with his limbs, but not of being unable to defend himself with speech and reason, when the use of rational speech is more distinctive of a human being than the use of his limbs. And if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech unjustly might do great harm, *that* is a charge which may be made in common against all good things except virtue, and above all against the things that are most useful, as strength, health, wealth, generalship. A man can confer the greatest of benefits by a right use of these, and inflict the greatest of injuries by using them wrongly.

...

(1355b) Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes, arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us.

RHETORIC VERSUS DIALECTIC

In ancient Greek chorals, a *strophe*, or stanza, is echoed and altered in its *antistrophe*, or response—much like a song being sung in harmonic parts. This makes Aristotle's opening definition of rhetoric nothing short of poetic: "Rhetoric is the counterpart [Greek, *antistrophos*] of dialectic." The image we have here, then, is that of dance partners, each working in accord with the other. Or perhaps a better image to carry with us is that of a choir, with the speech of the city—**dialectic** and rhetoric—together producing the song.

What are these two concepts, rhetoric and dialectic, and who sings them? Aristotle says that dialectic aims to test and maintain arguments; it is philosophy's primary tool. In dialectic, one privileges *logos*—that is, reasoned argumentation—in order to hone in on ideas. You can think of it as the mode of an intense philosophical conversation. In theory, the goal of dialectic is not to win the argument, but rather to bring both parties to the truth of things. The word itself, from the Greek *dia* ("across") and *legein* ("to speak"), suggests

the nature of the activity: It is a back-and-forth discussion trying to get to the heart of the matter.

Rhetoric, however, is the art not of philosophy but of persuasion. In this case, we have a different image in mind: not that of the contemplative philosopher, but instead (as just one example) that of the politician. *Influence* is the key word here—rhetoric is aimed at directing people’s decisions. It can exist in less-than-noble forms, such as a slick car salesman convincing a customer to buy a lemon. But it also comes in admirable variations, such as defending those wrongly accused or passing laws that protect people’s rights.




Figure 1. Communication in dialectic and rhetoric.

While they have distinct goals, Aristotle shows that rhetoric and dialectic are not vastly different—not in their beginnings, at least. Both use *endoxa*, or common opinion, as their starting points, and neither has a field of study particular to it. In other words, rhetoric and dialectic can take up any issue under the sun. And everyone, says Aristotle, does a little of both.

But Aristotle is actually not so interested in how dialectic and rhetoric are similar to or different from each other. He’s interested in how they are *counterparts*, or complements. They complement each other—that is, they go well together—because of the way the mind works. According to Aristotle, there is only one power of the intellect, but it can be used in two ways: theoretically and practically.

First is the theoretical intellect, which simply seeks *to know*. The theoretical intellect is abstract and principled. It is the theoretical intellect, then, that rejoices in the knowledge that two plus two equals four, or longs to figure out questions such as “What is justice?” It acts as a no-nonsense umpire who calls strikes and balls, totally unmoved by the cheering and jeering fans in the seats, or by the batter at the plate and the pitcher on the mound.

Take a common example: baking a cake. The theoretical intellect may seek to know the nature of cakes, contemplating what might playfully be called *cakeness*. To explore the nature of cake, one may ask the following questions: *What is the difference between cake and bread? Must cake be sweet? Does bread become cake if it is decorated with icing? Can the term cake be used for any celebratory birthday treat? Is a large cookie served at a birthday a “cookie cake,” or does it remain a large cookie? Is ice cream, when shaped and served at a party, an “ice-cream cake,” or is it still just ice cream?* All of these questions—serious questions about a not-so-serious subject—could be answered by the theoretical intellect. But if your task

Table 1. Contrast between dialectic and rhetoric.

	Starting Point	Appeals	Privileged Means	Participants	Objectives	Telos (purpose)
Dialectic	common opinion (<i>endoxa</i>)	<i>logos</i>	syllogism	one speaking <i>with</i> one	the True the Beautiful the Good	certain knowledge
Rhetoric		<i>ethos</i> <i>pathos</i> <i>logos</i>	enthymeme	one speaking <i>to</i> many	the just the honorable the advantageous	right judgment

is to bake a cake for a friend, then your attempts to answer such questions will be pointless, leaving your real work undone.

So how does one actually bake a cake? Interestingly, for Aristotle, it is also the work of the intellect that helps here, for *knowing* is not the intellect's only function; it also helps one to *do*. The intellect, then, can also be practical. It can come alongside and actively help in the work: It calculates, measures, and plans, all in order to get that cake to the table.




Figure 2. Theoretical and practical powers of the intellect.

Now, you might notice that the theoretical intellect and the practical intellect are rarely exercised simultaneously, which is why people tend to wind up strong in one and weak in the other. Think, for example, of the absentminded professor who is brilliant at quantum physics but cannot match his socks. Considering this, Aristotle does something truly ingenious in calling rhetoric the counterpart of dialectic. He is making the claim that rhetoric is not an exercise of the theoretical intellect; it's actually the exercise of the *practical* intellect. Don't be mistaken! That's no knock against it, not at all. After all, the practical intellect is vital for life on earth. The chair you're sitting on was made by the practical intellect, as were the clothes you are wearing.

But what's the point in sitting in chairs and wearing clothes if you can't contemplate higher things, such as love and beauty and truth? If both the theoretical and the practical intellects are necessary for a flourishing human community—and they are—then so are dialectic and rhetoric.

Because dialectic and rhetoric are parts “sung” by all citizens, we often end up with civic speech akin to bad karaoke. It's also true that some speakers are naturally gifted and a few are just plain lucky. So what about the rest of us, those for whom public speaking is often awkward and almost always nerve-racking? Aristotle offers us hope: We can learn by watching. In other words, we can see what works and what doesn't work for other speakers. We can turn what might be otherwise random or intuitive behavior into principles to be known and used. Rhetoric can become something more than just plain luck: It can become an **art**, a reasoned practice. A scientific analysis of persuasive speech means that the entire project of persuading others—the suspect business of potential **sophistry**, or verbal trickery—is brought into the light of reason. In doing so, we will grow not only in skill as speakers but also in shrewdness as listeners.

WHY BOTHER WITH RHETORIC?

By 350 BC, rhetoric had already earned itself a bad name. The **sophists**, foreigners who taught young Greek men how to persuade and manipulate, had split rhetoric from ethics, using speech as a clever means to any profitable end. And Plato, calling rhetoric mere “flattery,” had divorced it from philosophy. But Aristotle brushes off both the glitz and the grunge from rhetoric and re-establishes it as a necessary, even worthy, topic of study. He analyzes the art of rhetoric and attempts to bring it under the rule of reason.

Reread the excerpt at the beginning of this chapter. You'll notice that Aristotle makes the claim that rhetoric is actually a potential good, and for a

number of reasons. His first argument is made in terms of use and abuse. In the philosophic dialogue *Gorgias*, Socrates accuses rhetoric of making the weak argument appear the stronger. Aristotle turns this attack on its head: Rhetoric can just as easily come to the aid of truth, assisting the truly stronger argument when it appears to be weak!

Aristotle's second argument is that, because one cannot always teach—our poor brains sometimes need a break—rhetoric is necessary, even good. Like dialectic, rhetoric uses *logos* (reason), but it also draws upon the speaker's *ethos* (credibility) and the audience's *pathos* (emotion) in order to persuade. That is, rhetoric recognizes that people make decisions based on factors other than pure reason.

Next, rhetoric can help a speaker understand the issue at hand more fully. In other words, preparation for an argument should involve arguing *both sides* of a case, not in order to choose one's side willy-nilly or for personal gain but rather to better understand all of the ins and outs of the argument.

Finally, Aristotle says that just as someone should be able to defend his body from attack, so too should he be able to defend his beliefs. In fact, the ability to defend yourself only against physical attacks is less than human, for even the beasts do this. For Aristotle, because our distinction is our ability to speak, defending ourselves with words is the higher and nobler art. And our verbal defense is the art of rhetoric.

Table 2. Reasons why rhetoric is useful.

1. To assist the truth
2. To persuade when *logos* alone isn't enough
3. To see both sides of an argument
4. To defend one's beliefs

Another way of saying it is this: Doesn't the truth deserve to be protected? If, in the dealings of the city, a counterfeit wins over the truth, someone is to blame for allowing the truth to go undefended. Aristotle's audience, we should remember, is the aspiring idealist who claims to care about the fate of truth and justice. Aristotle is calling this philosopher to defend truth within the city; Aristotle is calling the good man to become what Quintilian would call the "good man speaking well."

RELYING ON COMMON OPINION

Common sense, as we all know, can be quite a misnomer—sometimes it's not all that common, and sometimes it's not all that sensible. But Aristotle is willing to place his bets on common opinion—what he calls *endoxa*—because, as he says, it's not usually very far off from the truth: "The true and the approximately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth" (1355a). The kind of inexact knowledge "the approximately true" gives us is a good starting point for personal understanding, and it is also a great basis for speaking with an audience. After all, audiences aren't often comprised of logicians and philosophers; they're usually full of ordinary people with conventional beliefs. These conventional beliefs are, by definition, *endoxa*, which can serve as a springboard for making new judgments. By knowing what the audience holds to be true, the **rhetor** can reveal his or her position as the logical deduction of what the audience already believes.



But Aristotle isn't a Pollyanna about common opinion; he knows very well that the thoughts on the street can be contradictory, or even flat-out wrong. The fact that *endoxa* falls short of perfect reliability means that the judicious rhetor must be choosy in opting for one belief over the other. As such, Aristotle's reliance on *endoxa* presupposes a rhetor who seeks real truth outside of its many imperfect and jumbled renderings. Because wisdom is the final goal, the best rhetor is an aspiring philosopher.

DEFINING RHETORIC

Aristotle begins by calling rhetoric the *antitrophos* of dialectic, but he then goes on to define rhetoric more specifically. He defines rhetoric as the “faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.” Let's carefully examine that definition, starting from its end goal and its final term, *persuasion*. Notice that Aristotle does not see rhetoric as a type of force, as if the audience is strong-armed into agreement based on sheer logic or mere emotional pull. Instead, the goal is convincing, something closer to counsel than force.

Moving back to the beginning of Aristotle's definition, we find what might be a surprise. The art of rhetoric, for Aristotle, begins with observation. Aristotle emphasizes that one achieves the end goal of persuasion by first observing, by *seeing*. The rhetor, then, is not a *maker* as much as a *seer*; in this way, the rhetor is akin to the philosopher, who wants to see the truth—in this case, the truth of

*Rhetoric makes
the truth convincing;
sophistry makes
the speaker convincing.*³

which means are available. Rhetoric is, in a way, the discerning of wisdom; it is the power of seeing what ought to be practiced in the moment.

The next key term in Aristotle's definition of rhetoric is *available*. Sometimes, the rhetor will see that she can use certain arguments to persuade a given audience at a particular time, but those same arguments and proofs may not be available in a different context, in a different rhetorical situation. This is one reason why you might use different arguments with your mother than you would with your father to convince each parent to grant you permission to do something: No one makes decisions in exactly the same way and for exactly the same reasons. Plus, reality—as well as the soul of the audience—is not entirely under your control. That is to say, people aren't the only limiting factor; the circumstances at hand can alter, and the rhetorical possibilities will change, too. In the case of trying to convince your mother, say, to allow you to borrow the car, it will matter very much whether you have recently had an accident. Ask her one week, and she may give you an easy yes, but if you get involved in a fender bender, the circumstances will change; you'll have to work much harder for an affirmative.

Aristotle's definition tells us that rhetors should look different from sophists, who at best focus on the here and now, amounting to a shortsighted convincing; at worst, sophists make the weaker argument appear as the stronger one, resulting in manipulation. Rather, the true aim of a good rhetor is to see the rhetorical situation blossom forth in its fullness, with all of its radical contingencies accounted for by the speaker, who helps the audience flourish within the realm of language. In short, rhetoric can help reveal the best goods, and that's a good thing!

The three rhetorical appeals that Aristotle discusses, which will be examined in this book, are *ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*. Aristotle believes *ethos*—the

3. This is a paraphrase of Charles Sears Baldwin, *Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, Interpreted from Representative Works* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 5, 247.

speaker's character—is so important that he calls it, according to one translation, “almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion” (1356a).⁴ One must appear to know what is right, do what is right, and want what is right for one's audience. *Pathos*, the second appeal, concerns the **emotions**, and it can be a real trouble spot for rhetoric because of the potential for manipulation and abuse. By showing that emotions are obedient to reason, Aristotle ties *pathos* to *logos*, healing both the Platonic and Sophistic splits that did such damage to rhetoric proper. Finally, *logos* will be discussed in this text, with special attention given to the enthymeme.

RHETORIC AND THE TRANSCENDENTALS

Before explaining his project, Aristotle offers some comments on the state of rhetoric.⁵ From his rebukes, we can bet that rhetoric looked a lot back then like it does now: overdoses of the emotional appeal, disregard of wisdom, and plenty of suspect speakers. And his audience seems no better off than today's masses, either. Aristotle says that judgments tend to be made based more on “feelings of friendship or hatred or self-interest” (1354b) than on clear-sighted prudence. What we have here, then, is an ancient but surprisingly relevant book. And the fact that it was composed by the man single-handedly responsible for so much of Western philosophy means we can expect an insightful inquiry into civic speech.

Rhetoric is inescapable—it is the speech of the city—and it is also the most available vehicle we have for encountering truth. Hence, rhetorical arguments are often necessary. This is the case especially in matters where certainty escapes us, which, we must admit, is probably most of life. So we must take the art seriously if we are to attempt it at all. Aristotle's task, then, is a noble one: to offer to the city and the

household a way of better understanding their speech. He seeks to bring rhetoric into the domain of reason as much as possible, isolating and distinguishing the three types of civic rhetoric: deliberative (concerning the advantageous), epideictic (/,epi 'diktik/; concerning the honorable), and judicial (concerning the just).⁶ This articulation divides rhetoric into judgments about things that are good, beautiful, and true, respectively. That is, whereas dialectic seeks to understand *the Good, the Beautiful, and the True* in their absolute senses, rhetoric tracks them in their real-world manifestations: those things that are advantageous, honorable, and just. If all rhetorical discourse falls within one or more of these three categories, as Aristotle argues, then this division suggests something about humanity itself: Our desire is for what our tradition calls the **transcendentals**—goodness, beauty, and truth.

4. Translation from George A. Kennedy, *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 38.

5. See Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1354b.

6. See chapter 11 in this book for alternate names for the three species. This text uses George A. Kennedy's translation of *symbolleutikon* (deliberative), *dikanikon* (judicial), and *epideiktikon* (epideictic), as used in *On Rhetoric*.



DISCUSSION TEXT:

*Plato: The Republic (360 BC)*⁷

FOCUS:

Rhetoric and Philosophy

1

This passage contains what may be the most famous allegory for philosophic education in the Western world. Speaking with his friend Glaucon, Socrates likens human reality to a cave in which people look at only the shadows of reality, not reality itself. Escaping the “cave” is the business of philosophy.

BOOK VII

SOCRATES – GLAUCON

SOCRATES. And now let me show in a figure how far our nature is enlightened or unenlightened: Behold! Human beings living in an underground den, which has a mouth open towards the light and reaching all along the den; here they have been from their childhood, and have their legs and necks chained so that they cannot move, and can only see before them, being prevented by the chains from turning round their heads. Above and behind them a fire is blazing at a distance, and between the fire and the prisoners there is a raised way; and you will see, if you look, a low wall built along the way, like the screen which marionette players have in front of them, over which they show the puppets.

GLAUCON. I see.

SOCRATES. And do you see men passing along the wall carrying all sorts of vessels, and statues and figures of animals made of wood and stone and various materials, which appear over the wall? Some of them are talking, others silent.

GLAUCON. You have shown me a strange image, and they are strange prisoners.

SOCRATES. Like ourselves; and they see only their own shadows, or the shadows of one another, which the fire throws on the opposite wall of the cave?

GLAUCON. True; how could they see anything but the shadows if they were never allowed to move their heads?

SOCRATES. And of the objects which are being carried in like manner they would only see the shadows?

GLAUCON. Yes.

SOCRATES. And if they were able to converse with one another, would they not suppose that they were naming what was actually before them?

7. Plato, *Republic*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, provided by The Internet Classics Archive, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/republic.html>. Accessed June 26, 2016.

GLAUCON. Very true.

SOCRATES. And suppose further that the prison had an echo which came from the other side; would they not be sure to fancy when one of the passers-by spoke that the voice which they heard came from the passing shadow?

GLAUCON. No question.

SOCRATES. To them the truth would be literally nothing but the shadows of the images.

GLAUCON. That is certain.

SOCRATES. And now look again, and see what will naturally follow [if] the prisoners are released and disabused of their error. At first, when any of them is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck round and walk and look towards the light, he will suffer sharp pains; the glare will distress him, and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he had seen the shadows; and then conceive someone saying to him, that what he saw before was an illusion, but that now, when he is approaching nearer to being and his eye is turned towards more real existence, he has a clearer vision—what will be his reply? And you may further imagine that his instructor is pointing to the objects as they pass and requiring him to name them—will he not be perplexed? Will he not fancy that the shadows which he formerly saw are truer than the objects which are now shown to him?

GLAUCON. Far truer.

SOCRATES. And if he is compelled to look straight at the light, will he not have a pain in his eyes which will make him turn away and take in the objects of vision which he can see, and which he will conceive to be in reality clearer than the things which are now being shown to him?

GLAUCON. True.

SOCRATES. And suppose once more, that he is reluctantly dragged up a steep and rugged ascent, and held fast until he's forced into the presence of the sun himself, is he not likely to be pained and irritated? When he approaches the light, his eyes will be dazzled, and he will not be able to see anything at all of what are now called realities.

GLAUCON. Not all in a moment.

SOCRATES. He will require to grow accustomed to the sight of the upper world. And first he will see the shadows best, next the reflections of men and other objects in the water, and then the objects themselves; then he will gaze upon the light of the moon and the stars and the spangled heaven; and he will see the sky and the stars by night better than the sun or the light of the sun by day?

GLAUCON. Certainly.

SOCRATES. Last of [all] he will be able to see the sun, and not mere reflections of him in the water, but he will see him in his own proper place, and not in another; and he will contemplate him as he is.

GLAUCON. Certainly.

SOCRATES. He will then proceed to argue that this is he who gives the season and the years, and is the guardian of all that is in the visible world, and in a certain way the cause of all things which he and his fellows have been accustomed to behold?

GLAUCON. Clearly, he would first see the sun and then reason about him.

SOCRATES. And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow-prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?

GLAUCON. Certainly, he would.

SOCRATES. And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,

Better to be the poor servant of a poor master, and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?

GLAUCON. Yes, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this miserable manner.

SOCRATES. Imagine once more . . . , such a one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

GLAUCON. To be sure.

SOCRATES. And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if anyone tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

GLAUCON. No question.

SOCRATES. This entire allegory you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life, must have his eye fixed.

GLAUCON. I agree, as far as I am able to understand you.

SOCRATES. Moreover, you must not wonder that those who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted.

GLAUCON. Yes, very natural.

SOCRATES. And is there anything surprising in one who passes from divine contemplations to the evil state of man, misbehaving himself in a ridiculous manner; if, while his eyes are blinking and before he has become accustomed to the surrounding darkness, he is compelled to fight in courts of law, or in other places, about the images or the shadows of images of justice, and is endeavouring to meet the conceptions of those who have never yet seen absolute justice?

GLAUCON. Anything but surprising.

SOCRATES. Anyone who has common sense will remember that the bewilderments of the eyes are of two kinds, and arise from two causes, either from coming out of the light or from going into the light, which is true of the mind's eye, quite as much as of the bodily eye; and he who remembers this when he sees anyone whose vision is perplexed and weak, will not be too ready to laugh; he will first ask whether that soul of man has come out of the brighter light, and is unable to see because unaccustomed to the dark, or having turned from darkness to the day is dazzled by excess of light. And he will count the one happy in his condition and state of being, and he will pity the other; or, if he have a mind to laugh at the soul which comes from below into the light, there will be more reason in this than in the laugh which greets him who returns from above out of the light into the den.

GLAUCON. That is a very just distinction.

SOCRATES. But then, if I am right, certain professors of education must be wrong when they say that they can put a knowledge into the soul which was not there before, like sight into blind eyes.

GLAUCON. They undoubtedly say this.

SOCRATES. Whereas, our argument shows that the power and capacity of learning exists in the soul already; and that just as the eye was unable to turn from darkness to light without the whole body, so too the instrument of knowledge can only by the movement of the whole soul be turned from the world of becoming into that of being, and learn by degrees to endure the sight of being, and of the brightest and best of being, or in other words, of the good.

GLAUCON. Very true.

SOCRATES. And must there not be some art which will effect conversion in the easiest and quickest manner; not implanting the faculty of sight, for that exists already, but has been turned in the wrong direction, and is looking away from the truth?

GLAUCON. Yes, such an art may be presumed.

SOCRATES. And whereas the other so-called virtues of the soul seem to be akin to bodily qualities, for even when they are not originally innate they can be implanted later by habit and exercise, the [virtue] of wisdom more than anything else contains a divine element which always remains, and by this conversion is rendered useful and profitable; or, on the other hand, hurtful and useless. Did you never observe the narrow intelligence flashing from the keen eye of a clever rogue—how eager he is, how clearly his paltry soul sees the way to his end; he is the reverse of blind, but his keen eyesight is forced into the service of evil, and he is mischievous in proportion to his cleverness.

GLAUCON. Very true.

SOCRATES. But what if there had been a circumcision of such natures in the days of their youth; and they had been severed from those sensual pleasures, such as eating and drinking, which, like leaden weights, were attached to them at their birth, and which drag them down and turn the vision of their

souls upon the things that are below—if, I say, they had been released from these impediments and turned in the opposite direction, the very same faculty in them would have seen the truth as keenly as they see what their eyes are turned to now.

GLAUCON. Very likely.

SOCRATES. Yes; and there is another thing which is likely, or rather a necessary inference from what has preceded, that neither the uneducated and uninformed of the truth, nor yet those who never make an end of their education, will be able ministers of State; not the former, because they have no single aim of duty which is the rule of all their actions, private as well as public; nor the latter, because they will not act at all except upon compulsion, fancying that they are already dwelling apart in the islands of the blest.

GLAUCON. Very true.

SOCRATES. Then, I said, the business of us who are the founders of the State will be to compel the best minds to attain that knowledge which we have already shown to be the greatest of all—they must continue to ascend until they arrive at the good; but when they have ascended and seen enough we must not allow them to do as they do now.

GLAUCON. What do you mean?

SOCRATES. I mean that they remain in the upper world: but this must not be allowed; they must be made to descend again among the prisoners in the den, and partake of their labours and honours, whether they are worth having or not.

GLAUCON. But is not this unjust? Ought we to give them a worse life, when they might have a better?

SOCRATES. You have again forgotten, my friend, the intention of the legislator, who did not aim at making any one class in the State happy above the rest; the happiness was to be in the whole State, and he held the citizens together by persuasion and necessity, making them benefactors of the State, and therefore benefactors of one another; to this end he created them, not to please themselves, but to be his instruments in binding up the State.

GLAUCON. True, I had forgotten.

SOCRATES. Observe, Glaucon, that there will be no injustice in compelling our philosophers to have a care and providence of others; we shall explain to them that in other States, men of their class are not obliged to share in the toils of politics: and this is reasonable, for they grow up at their own sweet will, and the government would rather not have them. Being self-taught, they cannot be expected to show any gratitude for a culture which they have never received. But we have brought you into the world to be rulers of the hive, kings of yourselves and of the other citizens, and have educated you far better and more perfectly than they have been educated, and you are better able to share in the double duty. Wherefore each of you, when his turn comes, must go down to the general underground abode, and get the habit of seeing in the dark. When you have acquired the habit, you will see ten thousand times better than the inhabitants of the den, and you will know what the several images are, and what they represent, because you have seen the beautiful and just and good in their truth.



DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

THE REPUBLIC

1. Socrates says the prisoners are “like ourselves.” How so?

2. At which points are the prisoner’s eyes dazzled and rendered blind? What could be the meaning of this? (Later, when he returns to the cave, he is blinded again. Are the two moments of blindness equally undesirable?)

3. Is it true that truth is sometimes painful? Is it always better to know than not to know?

4. Identify what could be considered “shadows” in the world today.

5. Which is better, the upper world or lower world? (Remember, the chained prisoners never have to experience the pains of ascent!)

6. What is the relationship between the fire and sun?

7. Should the freed prisoner be allowed to remain in the upper world? Is it unjust to force him back into the cave to serve the good of others?

8. Given Socrates's depiction of the cave, what does he seem to think about rhetoric? Where do you see possible analogs for rhetors and rhetoric? For philosophers and philosophy?



WORKSHOP:

Imagining the Cave

1

Draw the cave. Be sure to account for all of the factors—the shadows, the figures, the chains, the fire, the cave opening, the light, and the figures and objects in the upper world. Where would you locate the philosopher? The rhetor? The average citizen?

Then, write the following words within your drawing based upon where you think they belong: rhetoric, dialectic, the just, the advantageous, the honorable, *ethos*, *pathos*, *logos*, syllogism, enthymeme. Where would the transcendentals of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty be located? Write them in, too.

Finally, draw yourself in the scene. Where do you think you are?



WORKSHOP:
Rhetorical Analysis of an Ad

2

Bring in a magazine ad you especially like (or don't like) for rhetorical analysis. How is this ad attempting to persuade the viewer? Is it successful or unsuccessful? Fill out the graphic and questions below to help you dissect and analyze the ad. You will then present the ad to the class and offer an analysis, using the ideas you've generated to explain the rhetorical power of the ad.




Figure 3. Rhetorical analysis diagram.

Rhetor/*Ethos*: How does the ad establish goodwill, moral virtue, or practical wisdom?

Audience/*Pathos*: What emotions is the ad playing on? What desires is it commodifying?

Text/*Logos*: How is reason used to support the persuasion?

Context/*Kairos*⁸: How is the ad appropriate (or not) to this particular moment?

8. *Kairos* means time, but in a special sense. Whereas *chronos* means a specific time, such as a clock might keep record of, *kairos* means the opportune or crucial moment, a time not tied to a particular hour of the day. (Think about jokes, for example. “Comic timing” is all about *kairos*. Falling in love is also more about *kairos* than *chronos*.) Rhetoric is terribly concerned with *kairos* because it is dependent on all of the factors of influence lining up at a crucial moment for full persuasion.




DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. What does this ad reveal about our society's values?

2. What unstated messages are within the ad?

3. What does the ad want the audience to do?

Figure 4. Sample ad. Picture used with permission, courtesy of Habitat for Humanity.





PRESENTATION:

Great Speech Excerpt

SPOTLIGHT

Voice

Choose one of the following excerpts to deliver to the class. Practice it ten times. Pay attention to what *isn't* said in the speech, the common opinions—*endoxa*—that aren't specifically mentioned but are clearly assumed. List those at the bottom of your paper so that you can share them with the class at the end of your speech.

The focus for this speech is on your voice. In fact, those in the audience should close their eyes as you deliver the speech from the front of the room.

Here are three rules to remember as you give the speech:

1. Speak loudly.
2. Speak clearly. To enunciate, you will have to open your mouth wider than you're accustomed to doing, even slightly exaggerating your facial movements.
3. Speak slowly. (Most speakers speed up when they're nervous.) Include at least two dramatic pauses, and mark them in your text at points that deserve emphasis.

QUESTIONS:

1. What lines in the speech can you identify as relating to *logos*? To *ethos*? To *pathos*?

2. Note any *endoxa* appealed to or assumed.

3. Is this speech concerned with justice in a situation, the honor of people/deeds, or the advantageousness of an action? We will discuss the three types of rhetoric later (judicial, epideictic, and deliberative, respectively), but you can probably still identify what is most at stake in this speech. That is, is this speech concerned with passing judgment (judicial), praising and blaming (epideictic), or influencing a future decision (deliberative)?

ALTERNATE ACTIVITY

Record yourself reading your speech, observing the same rules that were provided at the beginning of this presentation exercise. The recording will be played for an audience.

ROMAN EMPRESS THEODORA: “Royal Purple Is the Noblest Shroud” (January 18, AD 532)

Run, or stay and fight? When riots broke out and a new emperor was named by his enemies, the Roman emperor Justinian planned to do the former, but his wife Theodora’s speech persuaded him otherwise. Her courage, in fact, would mean the saving of his empire—they stayed, and the rebels were roundly defeated.

My lords, the present occasion is too serious to allow me to follow the convention that a woman should not speak in a man’s council. Those whose interests are threatened by extreme danger should think only of the wisest course of action, not of conventions.

In my opinion, flight is not the right course, even if it should bring us to safety. It is impossible for a person, having been born into this world, not to die; but for one who has reigned it is intolerable to be a fugitive. May I never be deprived of this purple robe, and may I never see the day when those who meet me do not call me empress.

If you wish to save yourself, my lord, there is no difficulty. We are rich; over there is the sea, and yonder are the ships. Yet reflect for a moment whether, when you have once escaped to a place of security, you would not gladly exchange such safety for death. As for me, I agree with the adage that the royal purple is the noblest shroud.⁹

LOUIS PASTEUR: “The Spirit of Criticism” (November 14, 1888)

. . . ¹⁰ Worship the spirit of criticism. If reduced to itself, it is not an awakener of ideas or a stimulant to great things, but, without it, everything is fallible; it always has the last word. What I am now asking you, and you will ask of your pupils later on, is what is most difficult to an inventor.

It is indeed a hard task, when you believe you have found an important scientific fact and are feverishly anxious to publish it, to constrain yourself for days, weeks, years sometimes, to fight with yourself, to try and ruin your own experiments and only to proclaim your discovery after having exhausted all contrary hypotheses.

9. Quoted in William Safire, *Lend Me Your Ears: Great Speeches in History* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), 37.

10. Many speeches throughout this book are not the original speeches in full; they have been shortened to take into consideration length for memorization, oration, and context.

But when, after so many efforts, you have at last arrived at a certainty, your joy is one of the greatest which can be felt by a human soul, and the thought that you will have contributed to the honour of your country renders that joy still deeper.¹¹

JONATHAN WINTHROP: “A Model of Christian Charity” (1630)

. . . Now the only way to avoid this shipwreck, and to provide for our posterity, is to follow the counsel of Micah, to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly with our God. For this end, we must be knit together, in this work, as one man. We must entertain each other in brotherly affection. We must be willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply of others’ necessities. We must uphold a familiar commerce together in all meekness, gentleness, patience and liberality. We must delight in each other; make others’ conditions our own; rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together, always having before our eyes our commission and community in the work, as members of the same body. So shall we keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace. The Lord will be our God, and delight to dwell among us, as His own people, and will command a blessing upon us in all our ways, so that we shall see much more of His wisdom, power, goodness and truth, than formerly we have been acquainted with. We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies; when He shall make us a praise and glory that men shall say of succeeding plantations, “may the Lord make it like that of New England.” *For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us. . . .*¹²

BEN FRANKLIN: “So Near to Perfection” (September 17, 1787)

Mr. President: —I confess that there are several parts of this Constitution which I do not at present approve, but I am not sure I shall never approve them. For, having lived long, I have experienced many instances of being obliged, by better information or fuller consideration, to change opinions, even on important subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow, the more apt I am to doubt my own judgment, and to pay more respect to the judgment of others.

. . . I doubt, too, whether any other Convention we can obtain may be able to make a better Constitution. For, when you assemble a number of men to have the advantage of their joint wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men, all their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interests, and their selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, sir, to find this system approaching so near to perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our enemies, who are waiting with confidence to hear that our councils are confounded, like those of the builders

11. René Vallery-Radot, *The Life of Pasteur*, trans. R. L. Devonshire (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1923), provided by the Internet Archive, <http://www.archive.org/details/lifepasteur00unkngoog>.

12. John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” 1630, *The Winthrop Society: Praeservare Et Transmittere*, provided by The Winthrop Society, http://winthropsociety.com/doc_charity.php.

of Babel; and that our states are on the point of separation, only to meet hereafter for the purpose of cutting one another's throats. Thus I consent, sir, to this Constitution, because I expect no better, and because I am not sure, that it is not the best.

. . . On the whole, sir, I cannot help expressing a wish that every member of the Convention, who may still have objections to it, would with me, on this occasion, doubt a little of his own infallibility, and to make manifest our unanimity, put his name to this instrument.¹³

LUCY STONE: "A Disappointed Woman" (1855)

From the first years to which my memory stretches, I have been a disappointed woman. When, with my brothers, I reached forth after the sources of knowledge, I was reproved with "It isn't fit for you; it doesn't belong to women." Then there was but one college in the world where women were admitted, and that was in Brazil. I would have found my way there, but by the time I was prepared to go, one was opened in the young State of Ohio—the first in the United States where women and Negroes could enjoy opportunities with white men. I was disappointed when I came to seek a profession worthy an immortal being—every employment was closed to me, except those of the teacher, the seamstress, and the housekeeper. In education, in marriage, in religion, in everything, disappointment is the lot of woman. It shall be the business of my life to deepen this disappointment in every woman's heart until she bows down to it no longer. I wish that women, instead of being walking showcases, instead of begging of their fathers and brothers the latest and gayest new bonnet, would ask of them their rights.¹⁴

SOJOURNER TRUTH: "Ain't I a Woman?" (May 29, 1851)

This speech was delivered at the Women's Convention in Akron, Ohio.

Well, children, where there is so much racket there must be something out of kilter. I think that 'twixt the negroes of the South and the women at the North, all talking about rights, the white men will be in a fix pretty soon. But what's all this here talking about?

That man over there says that women need to be helped into carriages, and lifted over ditches, and to have the best place everywhere. Nobody ever helps me into carriages, or over mud-puddles, or gives me any best place! And ain't I a woman? Look at me! Look at my arm! I have ploughed and planted, and gathered into barns, and no man could head me! And ain't I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain't I a woman? I have borne thirteen children, and seen most all sold

13. *The Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution in the Convention held at Philadelphia in 1787*, with a Diary of the Debates of the Congress of the Confederation as reported by James Madison, revised and newly arranged by Jonathan Elliot, vol. 5, supplement to *Elliot's Debates* (Philadelphia, 1836), http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1909#Elliot_1314-05_5612.

14. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan Brownell Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds., *History of Woman Suffrage*, vol. 1 (Rochester, NY: Fowler and Wells, 1889), 165.

off to slavery, and when I cried out with my mother's grief, none but Jesus heard me! And ain't I a woman?

Then they talk about this thing in the head; what's this they call it? [member of audience whispers, "intellect"] That's it, honey. What's that got to do with women's rights or negroes' rights? If my cup won't hold but a pint, and yours holds a quart, wouldn't you be mean not to let me have my little half measure full?

Then that little man in black there, he says women can't have as much rights as men, 'cause Christ wasn't a woman! Where did your Christ come from? Where did your Christ come from? From God and a woman! Man had nothing to do with Him.

If the first woman God ever made was strong enough to turn the world upside down all alone, these women together ought to be able to turn it back, and get it right side up again! And now they is asking to do it, the men better let them.

Obliged to you for hearing me, and now old Sojourner ain't got nothing more to say.¹⁵

GEORGE BERNARD SHAW: "To the Greatest of Our Contemporaries, Einstein" (October 28, 1930)

Napoleon and other great men were makers of empires, but these eight men whom I am about to mention were makers of universes and their hands were not stained with the blood of their fellow men. I go back 2,500 years and how many can I count in that period? I can count them on the fingers of my two hands.

Pythagoras, Ptolemy, Kepler, Copernicus, Aristotle, Galileo, Newton and Einstein—and I still have two fingers left vacant.

Even among those eight men I must make a distinction. I have called them makers of the universe, but some of them were only repairers. Newton made a universe which lasted for 300 years. Einstein has made a universe, which I suppose you want me to say will never stop, but I don't know how long it will last.

...

What have all of those great men been doing? Each in turn claimed the other was wrong, and now you are expecting me to say that Einstein proved that Newton was wrong. But you forget that when science reached Newton, science came up against that extraordinary Englishman. That had never happened to it before.

...

15. Ibid.

For 300 years we believed in that Newtonian universe as I suppose no system has been believed in before. I know I was educated in it and was brought up to believe in it firmly. Then a young professor came along. He said a lot of things and we called him a blasphemer. He claimed Newton's theory of the apple was wrong.

He said, "Newton did not know what happened to the apple, and I can prove this when the next eclipse comes."

We said: "The next thing you will be doing is questioning the law of gravitation."

The young professor said: "No, I mean no harm to the law of gravitation, but for my part, I can go without it."

"What do you mean, go without it?"

He said: "I can tell you about that afterward."

The world is not a rectilinear world: It is a curvilinear world. The heavenly bodies go in curves because that is the natural way for them to go, and so the whole Newtonian universe crumpled up and was succeeded by the Einstein universe. Here in England, he is a wonderful man.

This man is not challenging the fact of science; he is challenging the action of science. Not only is he challenging the action of science, but the action of science has surrendered to his challenge.

Now ladies and gentlemen, are you ready for the toast? I drink to the greatest of our contemporaries, Einstein.¹⁶

QUEEN ELIZABETH: "I Have the Heart of a King" (1588)

My loving people, we have been persuaded by some, that are careful of our safety, to take heed how we commit ourselves to armed multitudes, for fear of treachery; but [I] assure you, I do not desire to live to distrust my faithful and loving people. Let tyrants fear; I have always so behaved myself that, under God, I have placed my chiefest strength and safeguard in the loyal hearts and good-will of my subjects. And therefore I am come amongst you at this time, not as for my recreation or sport, but being resolved, in the midst and heat of the battle, to live or die amongst you all; to lay down, for my God, and for my kingdom, and for my people, my honour and my blood, even in the dust. I know I have but the body of a weak and feeble woman, but I have the heart of a king, and of a king of England, too; and think foul scorn that Parma or Spain, or any prince of Europe, should dare to invade the borders of my realms: to which, rather than any dishonour should grow by me, I myself will take

16. Michael Holroyd, "Albert Einstein, Universe Maker," *New York Times*, March 13, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/03/14/opinion/albert-einstein-universe-maker.html>.

up arms: I myself will be your general, judge, and rewarder of every one of your virtues in the field. I know already, by your forwardness, that you have deserved rewards and crowns; and we do assure you, on the word of a prince, they shall be duly paid you. In the mean time my lieutenant general shall be in my stead, than whom never prince commanded a more noble and worthy subject; not doubting by your obedience to my general, by your concord in the camp, and your valour in the field, we shall shortly have a famous victory over those enemies of my God, of my kingdom, and of my people.¹⁷

POPE URBAN II: “Enter upon the Road to the Holy Sepulcher” (November 1095)

The First Crusade Speech

O race of Franks, race from across the mountains, race beloved and chosen by God[!] . . .

From the confines of Jerusalem and from the city of Constantinople a grievous report has gone forth and has repeatedly been brought to our ears; namely, that a race from the kingdom of the Persians . . . has violently invaded the lands of those Christians, and has depopulated them by pillage and fire. . . . The kingdom of the Greeks is now dismembered by them, and has been deprived of a territory so vast in extent that it could not be traversed in two months' time.

On whom, therefore, is the labor of avenging these wrongs and of recovering this territory incumbent, if not upon you—you, upon whom, above all others, God has conferred remarkable glory in arms, great courage, bodily activity, and strength to humble the heads of those who resist you? Let the deeds of your ancestors encourage you and incite your minds to manly achievements:—the glory and greatness of King Charlemagne, and of his son Louis, and of your other monarchs. . . . Let the holy sepulcher of our Lord and Saviour . . . especially arouse you. . . . Let none of your possessions retain you, nor solicitude for your family affairs. For this land which you now inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely enough food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage war, and that very many among you perish in [civil] strife.

Let hatred therefore depart from among you, let your quarrels end, let wars cease and controversies slumber. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulcher. . . . Jerusalem is the center of the earth; the land is fruitful above all others, like another paradise of delights. . . . She seeks, therefore, and desires to be liberated and ceases not to implore you to come to her aid. . . . Accordingly, undertake this journey eagerly for the remission of your sins, with the assurance of the reward of imperishable glory in the kingdom of Heaven. . . .

17. David Hume, *The History of England, from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688*, vol. 6 (London: A. Wilson, 1819), 374–375.

When an armed attack is made upon the enemy, let this one cry be raised by all the soldiers of God: “It is the will of God! It is the will of God!” [*Deus vult! Deus vult!*] . . .¹⁸

MAHATMA GANDHI: “I Do Not Ask for Mercy” (March 1922)

. . . I wanted to avoid violence. Non-violence is the first article of my faith. It is also the last article of my creed. But I had to make my choice. I had either to submit to a system which I considered had done an irreparable harm to my country, or incur the risk of the mad fury of my people bursting forth when they understood the truth from my lips. I know that my people have sometimes gone mad. I am deeply sorry for it and I am, therefore, here to submit not to a light penalty but to the highest penalty. I do not ask for mercy. I do not plead any extenuating act. I am here, therefore, to invite and cheerfully submit to the highest penalty that can be inflicted upon me for what in law is a deliberate crime, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen. The only course open to you, the Judge, is, as I am going to say in my statement, either to resign your post, or inflict on me the severest penalty if you believe that the system and law you are assisting to administer are good for the people. I do not expect that kind of conversion. But by the time I have finished with my statement you will have a glimpse of what is raging within my breast to run this maddest risk which a sane man can run.

(He then read out the written statement:) I owe it perhaps to the Indian public and to the public in England, to placate which this prosecution is mainly taken up, that I should explain why from a staunch loyalist and co-operator, I have become an uncompromising disaffectionist and non-co-operator. To the court too I should say why I plead guilty to the charge of promoting disaffection towards the Government established by law in India.¹⁹

WINSTON CHURCHILL: “Iron Curtain” Speech (March 5, 1946)

I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my war-time comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain—and I doubt not here also—towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

18. James Harvey Robinson, *Readings in European History: From the Breaking of the Roman Empire to the Protestant Revolt*, vol. 1 (Boston: Ginn, 1904), 313–15.

19. M. K. Gandhi, *The Voice of Truth*, ed. Shriman Narayan (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Pub. House, 1969), 14–15, provided by Gandhian Institutions – Bombay Sarvodaya Mandal & Gandhi Research Foundation, http://www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/voice_of_truth.pdf.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow. . . .

Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts—and facts they are—this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace.²⁰

JONATHAN EDWARDS: “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God” (1741)

O sinner! [C]onsider the fearful danger you are in: it is a great furnace of wrath, a wide and bottomless pit, full of the fire of wrath, that you are held over in the hand of that God, whose wrath is provoked and incensed as much against you, as against many of the damned in hell. You hang by a slender thread, with the flames of divine wrath flashing about it, and ready every moment to singe it, and burn it asunder; and you have no interest in any Mediator, and nothing to lay hold of to save yourself, nothing to keep off the flames of wrath, nothing of your own, nothing that you ever have done, nothing that you can do, to induce God to spare you one moment. . . .

Oh that you would consider it, whether you be young or old! There is reason to think, that there are many in this congregation now hearing this discourse, that will actually be the subjects of this very misery to all eternity. We know not who they are, or in what seats they sit, or what thoughts they now have. It may be they are now at ease, and hear all these things without much disturbance, and are now flattering themselves that they are not the persons, promising themselves that they shall escape. If we knew that there was one person, and but one, in the whole congregation, that was to be the subject of this misery, what an awful thing would it be to think of! If we knew who it was, what an awful sight would it be to see such a person! . . .

And now you have an extraordinary opportunity, a day wherein Christ has thrown the door of mercy wide open, and stands in calling and crying with a loud voice to poor sinners; a day wherein many are flocking to him, and pressing into the kingdom of God. Many are daily coming from the east, west, north and south; many that were very lately in the same miserable condition that you are in, are now in a happy state, with their hearts filled with

20. Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace,” delivered at Westminster College, Fulton, MO, March 5, 1946, provided by The Churchill Centre, <http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace>.

love to him who has loved them, and washed them from their sins in his own blood, and rejoicing in hope of the glory of God. How awful is it to be left behind at such a day! . . .²¹

FREDERICK DOUGLASS: “That Which Is Inhuman Cannot Be Divine” (July 4, 1852)

Would you have me argue that man is entitled to liberty? That he is the rightful owner of his own body? You have already declared it. Must I argue the wrongfulness of slavery? Is that a question for Republicans? Is it to be settled by the rules of logic and argumentation, as a matter beset with great difficulty, involving a doubtful application of the principle of justice, hard to be understood? How should I look today, in the presence of Americans, dividing and subdividing a discourse, to show that men have a natural right to freedom, speaking of it relatively and positively, negatively and affirmatively? To do so would be to make myself ridiculous, and to offer an insult to your understanding. There is not a man beneath the canopy of heaven who does not know that slavery is wrong for him.

What, am I to argue that it is wrong to make men brutes, to rob them of their liberty, to work them without wages, to keep them ignorant of their relations to their fellow men, to beat them with sticks, to flay their flesh with the lash, to load their limbs with irons, to hunt them with dogs, to sell them at auction, to sunder their families, to knock out their teeth, to burn their flesh, to starve them into obedience and submission to their masters? Must I argue that a system thus marked with blood, and stained with pollution is wrong? No! I will not. I have better employment for my time and strength than such arguments would imply.

What, then, remains to be argued? Is it that slavery is not divine; that God did not establish it; that our doctors of divinity are mistaken? There is blasphemy in the thought. That which is inhuman cannot be divine! Who can reason on such a proposition? They that can, may; I cannot. The time for such argument is past.²²

21. Jonathan Edwards, Henry Rogers, and Sereno Edwards Dwight, *The Works of Jonathan Edwards, A.M.*, ed. Edward Hickman, vol. 2 (London: Ball, Arnold, 1840), 10–11.

22. Molefi Kete Asante and Abu Shardow Abarry, eds., *African Intellectual Heritage: A Book of Sources* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 639.

SECTION

The Three Rhetorical Appeals

2




(1356a) Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak. It is not true, as some writers assume in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes nothing to his power of persuasion; on the contrary, his character may almost be called the most effective means of persuasion he possesses. Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions. Our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile. It is towards producing these effects, as we maintain, that present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts. This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion.

THE RHETORICAL TRIANGLE

In a rhetorical situation, there are three elements: the rhetor, the audience, and the speech. That means there are also three ways to persuade: by making the rhetor convincing (that's *ethos*), by stirring the audience (that's *pathos*), or by highlighting the reasoning of the speech itself (that's *logos*). In other words, you can imagine that each factor houses a different element: *Ethos* resides in the speaker, *pathos* in the audience, and *logos* in the speech. Now, that's painting with a broad brush, but it's a handy way to picture it, nonetheless.

Figure 5.
The rhetorical triangle.



Section 2—The Three Rhetorical Appeals

Now, a true story: A mother wanted her three daughters to eat broccoli for dinner, but all three despised the vegetable. The middle daughter proved to be the easiest case; she trusted, even idolized, her mother, and therefore responded to the request without hesitation or argument. The youngest, a spirited girl, required something different; the trick in her case was to promise a scoop of ice cream to chase the vegetable, and down it went. For the eldest, it was a matter of reasoning—listing the vitamins and health benefits was all it took to convince her to gulp down the nutrient-rich food. These three sisters epitomize the three appeals, the three reasons people would ever change their minds about anything: They trust the speaker (*ethos*), their desires are influenced (*pathos*), or the argument makes sense (*logos*).

As we learned in the last chapter, dialectic attempts to use only one of those three appeals: *logos*. *Ethos* and *pathos*, in fact, have no place in philosophical reasoning toward absolute truths. After all, truth doesn't play favorites based on prestige, nor does truth change based on the audience's feelings about it. But the wise rhetor knows that people are more than mere brains. People make decisions based on things other than pure logic. In fact, if we are being frank about these matters, we must acknowledge that *ethos* and *pathos* are often more influential for the average person than the *logos* of a sound argument. The shrewd speaker, then, knows how to appeal to all three—*ethos*, *pathos*, and *logos*.

CHAPTER 2

ETHOS: REVEALING THE SPEAKER'S CREDIBILITY



(1377b) . . . [T]he orator must not only try to make the argument of his speech demonstrative and worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers, who are to decide, into the right frame of mind.

Particularly in political oratory, but also in lawsuits, it adds much to an orator's influence that his own character should look right and that he should be thought to entertain the right feelings towards his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in just the right frame of mind. That the orator's own character should look right is particularly important in political speaking: that the audience should be in the right frame of mind, in lawsuits. . . .

(1378a) There are three things which inspire confidence in the orator's own character—the three, namely, that induce us to believe a thing apart from any proof of it: good sense, good moral character, and goodwill. False statements and bad advice are due to one or more of the following three causes. Men either form a false opinion through want of good sense; or they form a true opinion, but because of their moral badness do not say what they really think; or finally, they are both sensible and upright, but not well disposed to their hearers, and may fail in consequence to recommend what they know to be the best course. These are the only possible cases. It follows that any one who is thought to have all three of these good qualities will inspire trust in his audience.

PRACTICAL WISDOM, MORAL VIRTUE, AND GOODWILL

Although we might wish that valid logic and sound arguments were the only factors in persuasion, the truth is that the audience is made up of humans, and at some point those humans can get lazy or confused, or they simply may be unable to make the intellectual leap we're steering them toward; because of this, *ethos* becomes crucial. If they trust the speaker, they can be persuaded. And we all unwittingly side with *ethos* all the time, such as when we believe in the power of the atom or trust a person's court testimony or adopt a new fashionable hairdo—it's a blind leap made because we trust the one who says to jump.

If anyone wanted to persuade based on pure logic, it would be the philosopher Aristotle. And yet Aristotle's remarks are extraordinary. *Ethos*, he says, is almost the whole

of persuasion. And he narrows *ethos* down to exactly three things: the speaker’s *phronesis* (practical wisdom), *arête* (moral virtue), and *eunoia* (goodwill). Aristotle insists that any rhetor who wants to be trusted must be seen to possess these three attributes, and with these three, the speaker cannot help but be persuasive.

You may be asking whether there are other characteristics that a speaker could exhibit in order to be seen as trustworthy. And if so, you are asking the right question. At first glance, the recipe does seem rather arbitrary, doesn’t it? What is so important about these three—and only three—ingredients?

Imagine that a classmate, Dan, has asked to borrow your car. A friend since kindergarten, he has always been kind and generous to you, so goodwill is no issue. He’s a morally upright person, too, so you can be sure that he would not use the car to do anything fishy. But his nickname is Daydreamer Dan: He’s distractible and klutzy. Why, then, are you nervous to loan him your car? He lacks common sense, or practical wisdom (*phronesis*), and you’d prefer to have your car back in one piece.

Now imagine another classmate, Mike. He is perfectly well equipped with practical wisdom, and, again, you have no reason to believe that he would ever intentionally bring you harm. The trouble in this case is that you heard Mike was caught shoplifting last semester, and you have the sneaking suspicion that he might get into trouble using your car. The missing component this time is moral virtue, *arête*.

Finally, think of a third classmate, Chip. He is coordinated and levelheaded, full of practical wisdom. He’s also virtuous, the type who always does the right thing. There’s nothing at all wrong with Chip—nothing except that he’s never been especially friendly to you. You don’t feel compelled to loan him your car. Why not? Lack of goodwill (*eunoia*)—you don’t sense that he’s on your side.

All three elements of *ethos* are necessary; when one is missing, persuasion is stunted. What is interesting is that Aristotle spends most of his time discussing goodwill, and for good reason. After all, when friends get together, the conversation flies fast—no one stops to define words or backs up to substantiate a point. But consider something of an opposite experience: facing a lawyer who is prosecuting you. You would suddenly become careful about the words you choose, stopping to define exactly what you mean, scrutinizing what the prosecutor says. You may even become hesitant to speak, lest your words be held against you. The difference in those two scenarios is an important factor in *ethos*: We believe our friends have goodwill toward us, even if they fail in other ways. No tricks up the sleeve, no smoke, and no mirrors—the feeling of goodwill enables us to let down our guards. The lack of it, such as in a case of confronting a prosecutor, results in our guard going up and staying up.

That is, we trust those who are friendly to us. As speakers, then, we must keep in mind these two realities: first, that *ethos* is almost the whole of persuasion; second, that goodwill (*eunoia*) does the heavy lifting when it comes to the establishment of *ethos*. We need to be sure that our care for the audience members—the fact that we want what is best for them—is completely unquestioned.

SAYING WHAT NEEDS TO BE SAID

Rhetors often make the mistake of assuming their credibility before an audience. Bad idea. Aristotle goes so far as to say that one’s *ethos*, rather than existing within the person, is established by the speech itself: “This kind of persuasion, like the others, should be achieved by what the speaker says, not by what people think of his character before he begins to speak.”¹ In other words, you may have

1. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1356a8–10.

a good reputation, but if you don't draw upon it verbally, it just sits by uselessly.

You can easily imagine scenarios Aristotle might have in mind should he be with us today: a star athlete who delivers an award acceptance speech but fails to thank others who have contributed to his success (lack of moral virtue), a US president who rarely mentions concern for the American people (lack of goodwill), an employee who makes a business pitch to his boss without having included a budget (lack of practical wisdom). The opposite is also true. Even the person who, on paper, looks to be a failure in life can turn the rhetorical tables simply by revealing good *ethos* in the speech itself. For example, a convicted felon may seem like a poor choice for talking to young people about avoiding a life of crime. But if he reveals himself as one who has learned from his mistakes and has turned his life around (moral virtue), and he assures them that he speaks to them for their own betterment (goodwill), he'll gain an audience. If his message is also one of clear and useful advice (practical wisdom), then he has all three ingredients and is virtually bound to be persuasive.

Now, drawing upon one's *ethos* is not the same as tooting one's own horn, which ends up—ironically, to be sure—destroying *ethos*, not establishing it. But it does mean that if the speaker has good character, he should reveal that good character. Of course, we would think it unethical for a person of *bad* character to pretend otherwise. Just as bad character deserves to be brought out into the light and seen for what it is, the same is true for good character. That is, one could argue that a speaker who hides her good character is also wrong, for she is withholding from the listeners an important factor in their decision-making. After all, audiences ought to take into account what a virtuous, friendly, and prudent person advises.

In a way, Aristotle's general discussion of *ethos* could seem a little troubling—isn't he just talking about *appearing* to have moral virtue, goodwill, and practical wisdom? That is, can't the speaker merely present himself as a virtuous person without actu-

ally being virtuous? Fair enough. But Aristotle's discussion of *ethos* must be read in light of his entire critique of the sophists. Early on, Aristotle distinguishes the rhetor from the sophist not by ability but by moral choice.² And although Aristotle is quite willing to admit there are corrupt audiences, he is also just as willing to point the finger at the rhetor who refuses to reveal his or her *ethos*, thus failing to persuade others of the truest or most just decision. One must make the effort to appear wise, good, and friendly because—although imposters will feign these qualities—the ideal orator should have them in truth. That is, they are the essential qualities of a credible person. And if orators are unpersuasive because they have not made their good character apparent, then the fault is their own.

Again, we have found ourselves in the messy business of real life. There's no way to know for certain where appearances end and reality begins. But the virtuous rhetor does have an advantage over the sophist: Whereas the moral rhetor needs only to reveal good character he already possesses, the sophist has to hide bad character—and that's much harder to do. Aristotle is reminding us that, because *ethos* is such a powerful persuader, a rhetor needs to be ready to draw upon that cache of rhetorical reserve. In other words, Quintilian's "good man speaking well" is actually responsible for putting his goodness on display.

2. *Ibid.*, 1355b.



DISCUSSION TEXT:

George Washington: “A Faithful Friend to the Army”
(1783)³

FOCUS:

Ethos

1

An anonymous letter had been circulating within the Revolutionary Army, calling for the military to revolt against a Congress that was not paying their wages. In Newburgh, New York, General Washington himself surprised an assembly of officers and personally addressed the conspiracy. The address is said to have ended with a dramatic moment: Washington took from his pocket a letter. Squinting, he then took out a pair of glasses and said this: “Gentlemen, you must pardon me, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in service to my country.” The Newburgh Conspiracy was ended.

CANTONMENT, 15 MARCH, 1783⁴

Gentlemen, by an anonymous summons, an attempt has been made to convene you together. How inconsistent with the rules of propriety, how unmilitary and how subversive of all order and discipline, let the good sense of the army decide.

In the moment of this summons, another anonymous production was sent into circulation, addressed more to the feelings and passions than to the reason and judgment of the army. The author of the piece is entitled to much credit for, the goodness of his pen; and I could wish he had as much credit for the rectitude of his heart; for, as men see through different optics, and are induced by the reflecting faculties of the mind, to use different means to attain the same end, the author of the address should have had more charity than to mark for suspicion the man who should recommend moderation and longer forbearance, or, in other words, who should not think as he thinks, and act as he advises. But he had another plan in view, in which candor and liberality of sentiment, regard to justice and love of country, have no part; and he was right to insinuate the darkest suspicion to effect the blackest design. That the address is drawn with great art, and is designed to answer the most insidious purposes; that it is calculated to impress the mind with an idea of premeditated injustice in the sovereign power of the United States, and rouse all those resentments which must unavoidably flow from such a belief; that the secret mover of this scheme, whoever he may be, intended to



3. Michael Hattem, “Newburgh Conspiracy,” in *George Washington Digital Encyclopedia*, edited by Joseph F. Stoltz III, Mount Vernon Estate, 2012–, <http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/newburgh-conspiracy/>.

4. George Washington, “Newburgh Address: Cantonment, 15 March, 1783,” from Library of Congress, *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789* [pp. 307–310], <http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/peace/newburgh.html>.

take advantage of the passions, while they were warmed by the recollection of past distresses, without giving time for cool deliberative thinking, and that composure of mind which is so necessary to give dignity and stability to measures, is rendered too obvious, by the mode of conducting the business, to need other proof than a reference to the proceeding.

Thus much, gentlemen, I have thought it incumbent on me to observe to you, to shew upon what principles I opposed the irregular and hasty meeting which was proposed to have been held on Tuesday last, and not because I wanted a disposition to give you every opportunity, consistent with your own honor, and the dignity of the army, to make known your grievances. If my conduct heretofore has not evinced to you that I have been a faithful friend to the army, my declaration of it at this time would be equally unavailing and improper. But as I was among the first who embarked in the cause of our common country; as I have never left your side one moment, but when called from you on public duty; as I have been the constant companion and witness of your distresses, and not among the last to feel and acknowledge your merits; as I have ever considered my own military reputation as inseparably connected with that of the army; as my heart has ever expanded with joy, when I have heard its praises, and my indignation has arisen when the mouth of detraction has been opened against it, it can scarcely be supposed, at this late stage of the war, that I am indifferent to its interests. But how are they to be promoted? The way is plain, says the anonymous addresser. “If war continues, remove into the unsettled country; there establish yourselves and leave an ungrateful country to defend itself.”—But who are they to defend? Our wives, our children, our farms and other property which we leave behind us? or, in this state of hostile separation, are we to take the two first (the latter cannot be removed) to perish in a wilderness with hunger, cold and nakedness? “If peace takes place, never sheath your swords,” says he “until you have obtained full and ample justice.” This dreadful alternative of either deserting our country in the extremest hour of her distress, or turning our arms against it, which is the apparent object, unless Congress can be compelled into instant compliance, has something so shocking in it, that humanity revolts at the idea. My God! what can this writer have in view, by recommending such measures? Can he be a friend to the army? Can he be a friend to this country? Rather is he not an insidious foe? Some designing emissary, perhaps, from New York, plotting the ruin of both, by sowing the seeds of discord and separation between the civil and military powers of the continent? and what a compliment does he pay to our understandings, when he recommends measures, in either alternative impracticable in their nature? But, here, gentlemen, I will drop the curtain, because it would be as imprudent in me to assign my reasons for this opinion, as it would be insulting to your conception to suppose



you stood in need of them. A moment's reflection will convince every dispassionate mind of the physical impossibility of carrying either proposal into execution. There might, gentlemen, be an impropriety in my taking notice, in this address to you, of an anonymous production; but the manner in which that performance has been introduced to the army, the effect it was intended to have, together with some other circumstances, will amply justify my observations on the tendency of that writing.

With respect to the advice given by the author, to suspect the man who shall recommend moderate measures and longer forbearance, I spurn it, as every man who regards that liberty and reveres that justice for which we contend, undoubtedly must; for, if men are to be precluded from offering their sentiments on a matter which may involve the most serious and alarming consequences that can invite the consideration of mankind, reason is of no use to us. The freedom of speech may be taken away, and, dumb and silent, we may be led, like sheep, to the slaughter. I cannot, in justice to my own belief, and what I have great reason to conceive is the intention of Congress, conclude this address, without giving it as my decided opinion, that that honorable body entertain exalted sentiments of the services of the army, and from a full conviction of its merits and sufferings, will do it compleat [*sic*] justice: that their endeavours to discover and establish funds for this purpose have been unwearied, and will not cease till they have succeeded, I have not a doubt.

But, like all other large bodies, where there is a variety of different interests to reconcile, their determinations are slow. Why then should we distrust them, and, in consequence of that distrust, adopt measures which may cast a shade over that glory which has been so justly acquired, and tarnish the reputation of an army which is celebrated through all Europe for its fortitude and patriotism? And for what is this done? To bring the object we seek nearer? No, most certainly, in my opinion it will cast it at a greater distance. For myself, and I take no merit in giving the assurance, being induced to it from principles of gratitude, veracity and justice, a grateful sense of the confidence you have ever placed in me, a recollection of the cheerful assistance and prompt obedience I have experienced from you, under every vicissitude of fortune, and the sincere affection I feel for an army I have so long had the honor to command, will oblige me to declare, in this public and solemn manner, that in the attainment of compleat [*sic*] justice for all your toils and dangers, and in the gratification of every wish, so far as may be done consistently with the great duty I owe my country, and those powers we are bound to respect, you may freely command my services to the utmost extent of my abilities.

While I give you these assurances, and pledge myself in the most unequivocal manner, to exert whatever ability I am possessed of in your favour, let me entreat you, gentlemen, on your part, not to take any measures, which, viewed in the calm light of reason, will lessen the dignity, and sully the glory you have hitherto maintained. Let me request you to rely on the plighted faith of your country, and place a full confidence in the purity of the intentions of Congress; that, previous to your dissolution as an army, they will cause all your accounts to be fairly liquidated, as directed in their resolutions which were published to you two days

ago; and that they will adopt the most effectual measures in their power to render ample justice to you for your faithful and meritorious services. And let me conjure you, in the name of our common country, as you value your own sacred honor, as you respect the rights of humanity, and as you regard the military and national character of America, to express your utmost horror and detestation of the man, who wishes, under any specious pretences [*sic*], to overturn the liberties of our country; and who wickedly attempts to open the flood-gates of civil discord, and deluge our rising empire in blood.

By thus determining, and thus acting, you will pursue the plain and direct road to the attainment of your wishes; you will defeat the insidious designs of our enemies, who are compelled to resort from open force to secret artifice. You will give one more distinguished proof of unexampled patriotism and patient virtue, rising superior to the pressure of the most complicated sufferings: and you will, by the dignity of your conduct, afford occasion for posterity to say, when speaking of the glorious example you have exhibited to mankind—“had this day been wanting, the world had never seen the last stage of perfection to which human nature is capable of attaining.”

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

“A FAITHFUL FRIEND TO THE ARMY”

Use the following visual aid to analyze Washington’s speech and to discuss it with the class. Notice that answers may be found to be implicit as well as explicit; for example, you could assume that Washington was speaking not only to the men before him but also, indirectly, to his anonymous “enemy.” Which appeal—*ethos*, *pathos*, or *logos*—predominates?




Figure 6. Rhetorical analysis diagram (see also pg. 17).

1. Find any allusions to *ethos* and *pathos* in the second paragraph of Washington’s speech. Which appeal does Washington accuse the anonymous letter of using, and which does he say it ignores?

2. In what sentence in the second paragraph does Washington point out that the writer of the letter has remained anonymous? How does anonymity immediately render *ethos* questionable?

3. Mark any references in the third paragraph to goodwill. That is, how does Washington demonstrate his friendliness to the men to whom he speaks? How does he make them feel as if he is on their side?

4. In which lines in the third and fourth paragraphs does Washington establish his moral virtue?

5. Washington says this: “Can he be a friend to the army? Can he be a friend to this country? Rather is he not an insidious foe?” Which aspect of *ethos* is he attacking in the writer of the letter?

6. Washington also considers the measures proposed as being “impracticable.” Which aspect of *ethos* is at stake in this charge?

7. Reread the introduction to this speech. Why is it that this comment, “Gentlemen, you must pardon me, for I have not only grown gray but almost blind in service to my country,” would have caused some officers to weep as it did? What bearing does Washington’s comment regarding his spectacles have on his *ethos*?



WORKSHOP:

Just Trust Me!

1

Imagine you have found yourself in one of the following situations. Choose one of the listed scenarios and draft five or more sentences that establish your *ethos* (credibility). You will deliver your response in front of the class.

Remember that *ethos* comprises *phronesis* (practical wisdom), *arête* (moral virtue), and *eunoia* (goodwill). Your situation may call for stressing one of the factors more than the others. Underline phrases that concern *phronesis*, double underline those that concern *arête*, and circle those that concern *eunoia*.

Please note that the focus in this exercise is not on the reasons but, rather, on the establishing of your character. That is, if you were attempting to persuade your parents to buy you a motorcycle, you should not list the reasons why motorcycles are beneficial, such as good gas mileage and lower upkeep costs. You should instead make clear your wisdom, virtue, and goodwill as one who is deserving of such a gift.

Scenario 1: Convince your grandmother to loan you \$100. (It is for a good reason, but you can’t explain why you need the money.)

Scenario 2: You have run out of gas on the highway and are hitchhiking to the nearest gas station. You have flagged down a soccer mom driving a minivan full of kids. Introduce yourself to her and try to get a ride.

Scenario 3: You want an extra day off work. Start a conversation with your boss and ask for the extra day. (You are not allowed to explain why you need the day off.)

Scenario 4: You are late for curfew because a friend needed help. It is a private or embarrassing matter, so you cannot tell your parents the specific reason. Your parents meet you at the door, and they are upset. Convince them that their trust in you should not be rattled.

Scenario 5: You’re at a job interview to be a summer camp counselor at an outdoor sports camp. Introduce yourself to the interviewers.



WORKSHOP:

College Application Essay

2

When you apply for college, you'll likely be required to write essays for your application for admission. Because schools are interested not only in the academic potential of their students but also in their personal qualities, these essay prompts often ask about *ethos*—what kind of character the applicant has. For this assignment, go online to find an essay prompt from a college or university to which you intend to apply.⁵ Respond to one of the prompts in an essay of no more than 650 words. Identify sentences that establish *arête*, *phronesis*, and *eunoia* within your essay.

5. The Common Application is an undergraduate college admission application accepted by over 500 colleges and universities. It includes essay prompts that work very well for this assignment. Search online for the current year's list of Common Application essay prompts.




WORKSHOP:

The Rhetoric of E-Mail

3

When you miss class, you may be tempted to send your teacher an e-mail such as the following:



This would be fine as a message sent from one friend to another, but it doesn’t exhibit much *ethos* when delivered from a student to her teacher.

To practice e-mail etiquette, compose and send an e-mail to your teacher that accomplishes one of the following:

- politely asks for an extension on a major essay,
- apologetically explains why you have been late to class three times this week, or
- politely informs your teacher that you will be absent on Friday and kindly requests the make-up work in advance.

This e-mail will count as a quiz grade. Remember, e-mail is not the same as texting! The tone should be semiformal (not casual). Make sure you identify who you are as well as to whom you’re writing. And do not include any acronyms or emoticons! Pay attention to your punctuation.

Ethos is key: You must establish goodwill, moral virtue, and practical wisdom. Indicate which lines address each factor by noting them in parentheses after the particular sentence that demonstrates the factor.





PRESENTATION:

Great Speech Excerpt

SPOTLIGHT

Voice

Choose a different speech to deliver from the list of great speech excerpts found in the class presentation exercise of chapter 1. Practice it ten times. Like the last presentation, pay close attention to your vocal quality, as the class will be focusing on your voice.

Here are three rules to remember as you give the speech:

1. Speak loudly.
2. Speak clearly. To enunciate, you will have to open your mouth wider than you’re accustomed to doing, even slightly exaggerating your facial movements.
3. Speak slowly. (Most speakers speed up when they’re nervous.) Include at least two dramatic pauses, and mark them in your text at points that deserve emphasis.

QUESTIONS:

1. How does the speech build (or not build) the speaker’s *ethos*?

2. If possible, identify particular lines for each of the aspects you detect—*eunoia* (goodwill), *phronesis* (practical wisdom), and *arête* (moral virtue).

3. Which aspect is most emphasized, and why?

4. Which aspect, if any, seems to be missing?



ALTERNATE ACTIVITY

Record yourself reading your speech, observing the same rules that were provided at the beginning of this presentation exercise. Play back your recording and try to give a fair evaluation of your own vocal presentation.



CHAPTER 3

PATHOS: GUIDING THE AUDIENCE'S EMOTIONS



When people are feeling friendly and placable, they think one sort of thing; when they are feeling angry or hostile, (1378a) they think either something totally different or the same thing with a different intensity: when they feel friendly to the man who comes before them for judgement, they regard him as having done little wrong, if any; when they feel hostile, they take the opposite view. Again, if they are eager for, and have good hopes of, a thing that will be pleasant if it happens, they think that it certainly will happen and be good for them: whereas if they are indifferent or annoyed, they do not think so. . . .

The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover (1) what the state of mind of angry people is, (2) who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and (3) on what grounds they get angry with them. It is not enough to know one or even two of these points; unless we know all three, we shall be unable to arouse anger in any one. The same is true of the other emotions.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE EMOTIONAL APPEAL

Playing on an audience's **emotions** has earned a bad rap, and it's no wonder why. No one likes to feel emotionally manipulated. The sophists of Aristotle's day were notorious for such manipulation, and Aristotle faulted them for it, as should we. But that's not to say that emotions should be ignored altogether. Doing so is not simply impractical; it is also unethical.

Imagine for a moment that your dearest friend died. Sorrow would be quickly at your door, and rightly so. But what if you felt no sorrow? What if you felt nothing at all? A lack of sorrow in the situation would be an inappropriate response; in other words, *your emotions would be wrong*. And recognizing this wrong response illustrates how rhetors can appeal to an audience's emotions in a way that moves them toward what we might call the *truth* of a given experience. So by appealing to emotions that are actually suited to the occasion, rhetors aren't stooping too low; they're helping the audi-

ence to thrive. They’re seeking to align the emotions with reason, to get them in sync. One without the other would split man in half, treating him as either mere intellect or mere emotions. Real virtue, then, is not just a matter of reason trumping emotions—it’s a harmony between the two, and fostering that kind of harmony is the job of the rhetor.

Not only should emotion (*pathos*) be in line with reason (*logos*), but Aristotle hints that both are tied up with what Aristotle called “the most effective means of persuasion” (1356a)¹—the speaker’s credibility (*ethos*). In fact, this section in the text jumps back and forth between the speaker and the audience, suggesting that the way you, as a rhetor, handle your audience’s passions says a lot about your character. Do you fire them up at every turn and fan the flames willy-nilly? Do you speak dispassionately about grave evils, such that the reality of wrongdoing is denied? Both are approaches of the sophist. But if you handle their passions appropriately, if you allay the misguided ones and invoke the apt ones, you are a rhetor in the best sense, a friend to both the audience and the city.

PAIN AND PLEASURE

We might imagine that the ideal rhetorical situation would involve intellect alone, that dealing with emotions is really beneath the dignity of the best kind of speech. But Aristotle recognizes that such a project would be impossible. *Ethos* and *logos*, the other two appeals, may be more venerable, but the pleasure and pain tied to the emotions make *pathos* downright fundamental.

Aristotle’s definition for emotions is this: “all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements [*sic*], and that are also attended by pain or pleasure.” This definition, however elaborate it may seem at first glance, is striking in its insight. It points out that the emotions (Greek pl., *pathē*) are experienced as psychological pain or pleasure and that, as emotions change, they influence our decisions. If a voter is fearful of a tax hike, for example, he votes one way. As his emotions change—he grows confident that taxes will not go up, for example—his judgment alters, and he votes differently. Or just think of your own experience: If you want to ask your parents for a special privilege, such as going to the movies with friends, do you ask them at just any random time, or do you wait until they’re in a good mood? No doubt you pay careful attention to their current state of mind because you know that your chances of getting permission depend on it, at least in part. In the same manner,



1. Kennedy, *On Rhetoric*, 38. Kennedy translates this line as “almost, so to speak, the controlling factor in persuasion.”

rousing or calming an audience's emotion is one way for a rhetor to change the minds and thus affect the decisions of his or her audience.

Although they are not mere bodily sensation nor pure contemplation, the emotions do have a foot in both camps. They are tied to pain and pleasure, but they are tied to those feelings based upon a mental connection. For example, anger is a pain that is based upon a judgment, such as *That man wronged me!* To the extent that the emotions are rash responses, they can be unreasonable. But to the extent that they are logical responses, they can be rational.

RATIONAL PASSIONS?

We all know that our passions can influence our judgments, which is why maxims such as “Never go grocery shopping hungry” are wise advice. In the case of the famished grocery shoppers, the cart ends up full of items that might otherwise never have tempted them; their judgment, that is, has been altered by their passionate craving. But what Aristotle wants to emphasize is that it works the other way around, too: Our minds can influence our emotions. Emotions respond to arguments, and thus one can change the emotions by changing the mind.

Yes, a speaker must recognize not only the emotions of his audience members but also how those emotions can affect their judgment. More importantly, however, the speaker should realize that emotions reside on a *two-way* street. Emotions arise from judgment about *ideas*, and so the speaker who can influence the ideas of his audience can also influence the emotions of that audience. No one wants to face an angry mob, but that anger might be redirected or calmed by a judicious rhetor.




Figure 7. The reciprocal relationship between emotions and mind.



Aristotle points out that the problem with *pathos* is not an *absence* of judgment—after all, passions are roused by particular circumstances—but rather an *inadequacy* of judgment. Such judgment is partial and biased, and it is also rash. Rash decisions are those we make because our passions spur us on to quick judgment. We feel an urgency to make a decision and act. By stirring emotions with a heavy hand, the sophist capitalizes on the way our emotions can push us to make hasty judgments. Aristotle, however, proposes we direct those emotions under the rein of reason.

Aristotle looks at fourteen emotions: anger and calmness, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, kindness and unkindness, pity and indignation, and envy and emulation. Today we might add more emotions (e.g., hope and despair could be options), but his list is especially political; that is, these emotions aren't altogether private but are instead based on social circumstances. Let's just take anger as an example—an emotion that might first strike us as an irrational feeling. But if you look carefully at Aristotle's definition of anger, you'll find that anger is not altogether unreasonable. One grows angry for a reason, at a particular person, and for a particular aim. No one is ever *simply* angry, angry for no reason at all. There is also always a finger pointing *somewhere*, even if it's in the wrong direction. And you'll rarely find anyone angry where a restoration of justice would be impossible.

Such a rational look at a seemingly irrational passion begins to make sense of Aristotle's design: to bring the entire rhetorical project under the watchful eye of reason. And a reasoning analysis is indeed fruitful. If you have a hostile audience, you now have three ways to calm them: Show that the reason is unfounded, the anger misplaced, or the aim impossible.

We have learned, then, that the passions aren't arbitrary, but you'll notice that they are *prejudiced*—they seem to play favorites, and the favorites are always oneself or one's own. Anger, love, pity, fear—

all are roused most vehemently when the occasion strikes close to home. What this means is that a speaker can manipulate the passions both in good and in bad ways. By manipulating the passions to reinforce selfish ends, a speaker can reinforce the blind prejudice that passions naturally have. But by purifying the passions through reason, a speaker can dignify humanity by elevating it above a concentration on one's own, moving it toward a concern for the whole.

In brief, we may say, on the one hand, that the mind can be steered by the passions; on the other hand, the passions can be steered by the mind. The former exercises the emotional muscle; the latter, the mental muscle. By giving a listener the experience of allaying an emotion by finding it unjustified, the rhetor is fortifying the audience's reasonability. Likewise, if the rhetor can rouse an emotion for good cause, that rhetor is actually helping the audience to flourish.

PATHOS AND THE IMAGINATION

Have you ever noticed that great speeches are full of great images? Aristotle calls the power of the image the power of “bringing-before-the-eyes,” a kind of verbal demonstration that can have an effect as powerful as empirical evidence does. In fact, Aristotle’s discussion suggests that one of the great reasons why *pathos* is so powerful is because it is governed by imagery. That is, words that paint graphic pictures more readily stir up *pathos*. Consider the following as an example:

A lawyer friend of mine was hired to defend a large Southern utility against a suit by a small one, and he thought at first that he was doing fine. All of the law seemed to be on his side, and he felt that he had presented his case well. Then the lawyer for the small utility said, speaking to the jury, almost as if incidentally to his legal case, “So now we see what it is. They got us where they want us. They just holding us up with one hand, their good sharp fishin’ knife in the other, and they sayin’, ‘You jes set still, little catfish, we’re *jes* going to *gut* ya.’” At that moment, my friend reports, he knew he had lost the case. “I was in the hands of a genius of metaphor.”²

The imagery here brings to life a scenario before the eyes of the audience, one so powerful that, despite any questions of justice, the case was ostensibly won by it. Notice that the descriptive imagery works along with a metaphor—the small Southern utility is a catfish in the hands of a fisherman—to highlight the victim status that small entities often have in relation to larger ones. “The greatest

thing by far is to have command of metaphor,” says Aristotle,³ and history has proved him correct. From “the Iron Curtain” to “the Cold War” to “glass ceilings,” the image in a good verbal metaphor can shape how we think about reality.



2. Wayne C. Booth and Walter Jost, *The Essential Wayne Booth* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 77–78.

3. Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. S. H. Butcher, section 3, part 22, hypertextual resource compiled by The Internet Classics Archive (online), <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/poetics.3.3.html>.

The metaphor, the image, the story—these tap into the power of “bringing-before-the-eyes,” a kind of verbal demonstration that functions like an empirical one.

By tying *pathos* to *logos*, Aristotle heals the Platonic split, which separated rhetoric from philosophy. By couching *pathos* under *ethos*, he also heals the sophistic split, which separated rhetoric from ethics. In short, Aristotle recognizes that humans can’t always be taught; they are more than mere brains. In fact, because we are composite creatures, the type of speech that targets *all* of our faculties might be the best—or at least the most necessary—speech there is. If so, then rhetoric is good. Not only is it good, it also seems to be “a good” in the Aristotelian sense, for one definition of a good is that which is productive of other goods (1363b). So if rhetoric can help create a better city—which is a good, to be sure—then rhetoric itself is more than a necessary evil. Rather, the art of persuasion can be a true civic good.




Figure 8. Sculpture of a scene from Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar* at the Folger Shakespeare Library in Washington, DC, by sculptor Gregory, 1932. Courtesy of Smallbones, commons.wikimedia.org.

**DISCUSSION TEXT:**

Shakespeare: Julius Caesar, Act 3, Scene 2

FOCUS:

Pathos

1

The Roman leader Caesar has just been assassinated by a group of conspirators that included Brutus, his dear friend. In this scene, the crowds have gathered in the Forum to hear justification for the murder.

SCENE 2. The Forum.

Enter BRUTUS and CASSIUS, and a throng of Citizens

CITIZENS. We will be satisfied; let us be satisfied.

BRUTUS. Then follow me, and give me audience, friends.

Cassius, go you into the other street,

And part the numbers.

Those that will hear me speak, let 'em stay here;

Those that will follow Cassius, go with him;

And public reasons shall be rendered

Of Caesar's death.

FIRST CITIZEN. I will hear Brutus speak.

SECOND CITIZEN. I will hear Cassius; and compare their reasons,

When severally we hear them rendered.

Exit CASSIUS, with some of the Citizens. BRUTUS goes into the pulpit.

THIRD CITIZEN. The noble Brutus is ascended: silence!

BRUTUS. Be patient till the last.

Romans, countrymen, and lovers! hear me for my cause, and be silent, that you may hear: believe me for mine honour, and have respect to mine honour, that

you may believe: censure me in your wisdom, and awake your senses, that you may the better judge.

If there be any in this assembly, any dear friend of Caesar's, to him I say, that Brutus's love to Caesar was no less than his. If then that friend demand why Brutus rose against Caesar, this is my answer:

—Not that I loved Caesar less, but that I loved Rome more. Had you rather Caesar were living and

die all slaves, than that Caesar were dead, to live all free men? As Caesar loved me, I weep for him; as he was fortunate, I rejoice at it; as he was valiant, I honour him: but, as he was ambitious, I slew him. There is tears for his love; joy for his fortune; honour for his valour; and death for his ambition. Who is here so base that would be a bondman? If any, speak; for him have I offended. Who is here so rude that would not be a Roman? If any, speak; for him have I offended. Who is here so vile that will not love his country? If any, speak; for him have I offended. I pause for a reply.

ALL. None, Brutus, none.

BRUTUS. Then none have I offended. I have done no more to Caesar than you shall do to Brutus. The question of his death is enrolled in the Capitol; his glory not extenuated, wherein he was worthy, nor his offences enforced, for which he suffered death.

Enter ANTONY and others, with CAESAR's body

Here comes his body, mourned by Mark Antony: who, though he had no hand in his death, shall receive the benefit of his dying, a place in the commonwealth; as which of you shall not? With this I depart,—that, as I slew my best lover for the good of Rome, I have the same dagger for myself, when it shall please my country to need my death.

ALL. Live, Brutus! live, live!

FIRST CITIZEN. Bring him with triumph home unto his house.

SECOND CITIZEN. Give him a statue with his ancestors.

THIRD CITIZEN. Let him be Caesar.

FOURTH CITIZEN. Caesar's better parts
Shall be crown'd in Brutus.

FIRST CITIZEN. We'll bring him to his house
With shouts and clamours.

BRUTUS. My countrymen,—

SECOND CITIZEN. Peace, silence! Brutus speaks.

FIRST CITIZEN. Peace, ho!

BRUTUS. Good countrymen, let me depart alone,
And, for my sake, stay here with Antony:

Do grace to Caesar's corpse, and grace his speech
Tending to Caesar's glories; which Mark Antony,
By our permission, is allow'd to make.

I do entreat you, not a man depart,
Save I alone, till Antony have spoke.

Exit

FIRST CITIZEN. Stay, ho! and let us hear Mark Antony.

THIRD CITIZEN. Let him go up into the public chair;
We'll hear him. Noble Antony, go up.

ANTONY. For Brutus's sake, I am beholding to you.

Goes into the pulpit

FOURTH CITIZEN. What does he say of Brutus?

THIRD CITIZEN. He says, for Brutus's sake,
He finds himself beholding to us all.

FOURTH CITIZEN. 'Twere best he speak no harm of Brutus here.

FIRST CITIZEN. This Caesar was a tyrant.

THIRD CITIZEN. Nay, that's certain:
We are blest that Rome is rid of him.

SECOND CITIZEN. Peace! let us hear what Antony can say.

ANTONY. You gentle Romans,--

CITIZENS. Peace, ho! let us hear him.

ANTONY. Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears;

I come to bury Caesar, not to praise him.

The evil that men do lives after them;

The good is oft interred with their bones;

So let it be with Caesar. The noble Brutus

Hath told you Caesar was ambitious:

If it were so, it was a grievous fault,

And grievously hath Caesar answer'd it.

Here, under leave of Brutus and the rest--

For Brutus is an honourable man;
So are they all, all honourable men—
Come I to speak in Caesar's funeral.
He was my friend, faithful and just to me:
But Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
He hath brought many captives home to Rome
Whose ransoms did the general coffers fill:
Did this in Caesar seem ambitious?
When that the poor have cried, Caesar hath wept:
Ambition should be made of sterner stuff:
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And Brutus is an honourable man.
You all did see that on the Lupercal
I thrice presented him a kingly crown,
Which he did thrice refuse: was this ambition?
Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
And, sure, he is an honourable man.
I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke,
But here I am to speak what I do know.
You all did love him once, not without cause:
What cause withholds you then, to mourn for him?
O judgment! thou art fled to brutish beasts,
And men have lost their reason. Bear with me;
My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar,
And I must pause till it come back to me.
FIRST CITIZEN. Methinks there is much reason in his sayings.
SECOND CITIZEN. If thou consider rightly of the matter,
Caesar has had great wrong.
THIRD CITIZEN. Has he, masters?
I fear there will a worse come in his place.
FOURTH CITIZEN. Mark'd ye his words? He would not take the crown;
Therefore 'tis certain he was not ambitious.
FIRST CITIZEN. If it be found so, some will dear abide it.
SECOND CITIZEN. Poor soul! his eyes are red as fire with weeping.

THIRD CITIZEN. There's not a nobler man in Rome than Antony.

FOURTH CITIZEN. Now mark him, he begins again to speak.

ANTONY. But yesterday the word of Caesar might
Have stood against the world; now lies he there.

And none so poor to do him reverence.

O masters, if I were disposed to stir

Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,

I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong,

Who, you all know, are honourable men:

I will not do them wrong; I rather choose

To wrong the dead, to wrong myself and you,

Than I will wrong such honourable men.

But here's a parchment with the seal of Caesar;

I found it in his closet, 'tis his will:

Let but the commons hear this testament—

Which, pardon me, I do not mean to read—

And they would go and kiss dead Caesar's wounds

And dip their napkins in his sacred blood,

Yea, beg a hair of him for memory,

And, dying, mention it within their wills,

Bequeathing it as a rich legacy

Unto their issue.

FOURTH CITIZEN. We'll hear the will: read it, Mark Antony.

ALL. The will, the will! we will hear Caesar's will.

ANTONY. Have patience, gentle friends, I must not read it;

It is not meet you know how Caesar loved you.

You are not wood, you are not stones, but men;

And, being men, bearing the will of Caesar,

It will inflame you, it will make you mad:

'Tis good you know not that you are his heirs;

For, if you should, O, what would come of it!

FOURTH CITIZEN. Read the will; we'll hear it, Antony;

You shall read us the will, Caesar's will.

ANTONY. Will you be patient? will you stay awhile?

I have o'ershot myself to tell you of it:

I fear I wrong the honourable men

Whose daggers have stabb'd Caesar; I do fear it.

FOURTH CITIZEN. They were traitors: honourable men!

ALL. The will! the testament!

SECOND CITIZEN. They were villains, murderers: the will! read the will.

ANTONY. You will compel me, then, to read the will?

Then make a ring about the corpse of Caesar,

And let me show you him that made the will.

Shall I descend? and will you give me leave?

SEVERAL CITIZENS. Come down.

SECOND CITIZEN. Descend.

THIRD CITIZEN. You shall have leave.

ANTONY comes down

FOURTH CITIZEN. A ring; stand round.

FIRST CITIZEN. Stand from the hearse, stand from the body.

SECOND CITIZEN. Room for Antony, most noble Antony.

ANTONY. Nay, press not so upon me; stand far off.

SEVERAL CITIZENS. Stand back; room; bear back.

ANTONY. If you have tears, prepare to shed them now.

You all do know this mantle: I remember

The first time ever Caesar put it on;

'Twas on a summer's evening, in his tent,

That day he overcame the Nervii:

Look, in this place ran Cassius's dagger through:

See what a rent the envious Casca made:

Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabb'd;

And as he pluck'd his cursed steel away,

Mark how the blood of Caesar follow'd it,

As rushing out of doors, to be resolved

If Brutus so unkindly knock'd, or no;

For Brutus, as you know, was Caesar's angel:

Judge, O you gods, how dearly Caesar loved him!

This was the most unkindest cut of all;

For when the noble Caesar saw him stab,

Ingratitude, more strong than traitors' arms,

Quite vanquish'd him: then burst his mighty heart;
 And, in his mantle muffling up his face,
 Even at the base of Pompey's statue,
 Which all the while ran blood, great Caesar fell.
 O, what a fall was there, my countrymen!
 Then I, and you, and all of us fell down,
 Whilst bloody treason flourish'd over us.
 O, now you weep; and, I perceive, you feel
 The dint of pity: these are gracious drops.
 Kind souls, what, weep you when you but behold
 Our Caesar's vesture wounded? Look you here,
 Here is himself, marr'd, as you see, with traitors.
FIRST CITIZEN. O piteous spectacle!
SECOND CITIZEN. O noble Caesar!
THIRD CITIZEN. O woful day!
FOURTH CITIZEN. O traitors, villains!
FIRST CITIZEN. O most bloody sight!
SECOND CITIZEN. We will be revenged.
ALL. Revenge! About! Seek! Burn! Fire! Kill! Slay!
 Let not a traitor live!
ANTONY. Stay, countrymen.
FIRST CITIZEN. Peace there! hear the noble Antony.
SECOND CITIZEN. We'll hear him, we'll follow him, we'll die with him.
ANTONY. Good friends, sweet friends, let me not stir you up
 To such a sudden flood of mutiny.
 They that have done this deed are honourable:
 What private griefs they have, alas, I know not,
 That made them do it: they are wise and honourable,
 And will, no doubt, with reasons answer you.
 I come not, friends, to steal away your hearts:
 I am no orator, as Brutus is;
 But, as you know me all, a plain blunt man,
 That love my friend; and that they know full well
 That gave me public leave to speak of him:
 For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,

Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
To stir men's blood: I only speak right on;
I tell you that which you yourselves do know;
Show you sweet Caesar's wounds, poor poor dumb mouths,
And bid them speak for me: but were I Brutus,
And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony
Would ruffle up your spirits and put a tongue
In every wound of Caesar that should move
The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny.

ALL. We'll mutiny.

FIRST CITIZEN. We'll burn the house of Brutus.

THIRD CITIZEN. Away, then! come, seek the conspirators.

ANTONY. Yet hear me, countrymen; yet hear me speak.

ALL. Peace, ho! Hear Antony. Most noble Antony!

ANTONY. Why, friends, you go to do you know not what:

Wherein hath Caesar thus deserved your loves?

Alas, you know not: I must tell you then:

You have forgot the will I told you of.

ALL. Most true. The will! Let's stay and hear the will.

ANTONY. Here is the will, and under Caesar's seal.

To every Roman citizen he gives,

To every several man, seventy-five drachmas.

SECOND CITIZEN. Most noble Caesar! We'll revenge his death.

THIRD CITIZEN. O royal Caesar!

ANTONY. Hear me with patience.

ALL. Peace, ho!

ANTONY. Moreover, he hath left you all his walks,

His private arbours and new-planted orchards,

On this side Tiber; he hath left them you,

And to your heirs for ever, common pleasures,

To walk abroad, and recreate yourselves.

Here was a Caesar! when comes such another?

FIRST CITIZEN. Never, never. Come, away, away!

We'll burn his body in the holy place,

And with the brands fire the traitors' houses.

Take up the body.

SECOND CITIZEN. Go fetch fire.


THIRD CITIZEN. Pluck down benches.

FOURTH CITIZEN. Pluck down forms, windows, any thing.

Exeunt Citizens with the body

ANTONY. Now let it work. Mischief, thou art afoot,

Take thou what course thou wilt!





DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

JULIUS CAESAR

1. How does Antony establish Caesar's *ethos*? What evidence does he use to suggest Caesar has the three Aristotelian aspects of *ethos*—moral virtue (*arête*), practical wisdom (*phronesis*), and/or good-will (*eunoia*)?

2. Mark in the text and then count up any images Brutus uses. Mark and count the images used by Antony. Who uses more and to what effect?

3. How do both men rouse the passions of the crowd? Which does so more wisely?

4. At what points is narrative used? What is the audience's response to it?

5. How does Antony demonstrate the emotion he seeks to evoke in his audience? What emotions does he evoke that he does not personally embody?

6. Why does Antony pretend to have no talent for speaking well?

7. How does Shakespeare demonstrate the danger of *pathos*? Is it dangerous?

8. In a situation similar to this, which would involve so much *pathos*, would you wish to be the first speaker or the last? Why is one position more advantageous?




Figure 9. Rhetorical analysis diagram.



WORKSHOP:

Conjuring the Emotions

One cannot *command* the emotions: “Be sad!” “Be angry!” Instead, one must *conjure* them.

In groups of two, explore the emotion assigned to you by reading what Aristotle has to say about it (see 1378a–1388b). One person must be prepared to give a short definition of the assigned emotion, based on Aristotle’s discussion in the text. He or she should also briefly explain toward whom the emotion is felt as well as what causes it.

Pay careful attention to what Aristotle says in those definitions about images, or mental pictures. For example, the pleasure felt in anger is “because the thoughts dwell upon the act of vengeance, and the images then called up cause pleasure, like the images called up in dreams” (1378b). Shame, too, is a “mental picture of disgrace” (1384a). Again, the emotions are closely tied to the imagination, that faculty of producing and reproducing images.

Then, on pages 68–69 or another sheet of paper, the second person should write a short speech (5–10 sentences) that aims to induce in your classmates the assigned emotion. (Please keep the topics lighthearted; don’t take on political hot-button issues!) Remember, vivid imagery, description, and narrative are key means by which the emotions are stirred. The second person will deliver this speech after the first has explained the emotion itself.



Figure 10. Typical theater masks showing the emotions of happiness and sadness.

	Definition/State of Mind	Toward Whom Is It Felt?	What Causes It?
Anger			
Fear			
Confidence			
Shame			
Pity			
Indignation			
Envy			
Emulation			

On the lines provided, write a short speech (5–10 sentences) that aims to induce in your classmates your assigned emotion.

1. Provoke **anger** in your audience. See Aristotle's *Rhetoric* Book 2, chapter 2 (1378a–1380a) on anger.

2. Instill **fear** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 5 (1382a–1383a).

3. Stimulate **confidence** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 5 (1383a–1383b).

4. Induce **shame** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 6 (1383b–1385a).

5. Engender **pity** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 8 (1385b–1386b).

6. Prompt **indignation** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 9 (1386b–1387b).

7. Produce **envy** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 10 (1387b–1388a).

8. Generate **emulation** in your audience. Book 2, chapter 11 (1388a–1388b).



PRESENTATION:

Poetry Recitation

SPOTLIGHT

Posture

Deliver the following poems or passages with careful attention to *pathos*. What emotions are felt by the speaker? How can you use your volume, rhythm, and pitch to convey those emotions? In this presentation, we will also add attention to posture. Stand up straight—no slumping, rocking, or leg-crossing.

HOLY SONNET 10: DEATH BE NOT PROUD

by John Donne

Death, be not proud, though some have called thee
Mighty and dreadful, for thou art not so;
For those whom thou think'st thou dost overthrow
Die not, poor Death, nor yet canst thou kill me.
From rest and sleep, which but thy pictures be,
Much pleasure; then from thee much more must flow,
And soonest our best men with thee do go,
Rest of their bones, and soul's delivery.
Thou art slave to fate, chance, kings, and desperate men,
And dost with poison, war, and sickness dwell,
And poppy or charms can make us sleep as well
And better than thy stroke; why swell'st thou then?
One short sleep past, we wake eternally
And death shall be no more; Death, thou shalt die.

SONNET 29

by William Shakespeare

When, in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes,
I all alone beweep my outcast state,
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries,
And look upon myself, and curse my fate,
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope,
Featur'd like him, like him with friends possess'd,
Desiring this man's art and that man's scope,
With what I most enjoy contented least;
Yet in these thoughts myself almost despising,
Haply I think on thee, and then my state,
Like to the lark at break of day arising
From sullen earth, sings hymns at heaven's gate;

For thy sweet love remember'd such wealth brings
That then I scorn to change my state with kings.

AURENG-ZEBE, ACT 4, SCENE I

by John Dryden

When I consider life, 'tis all a cheat;
Yet, fooled with hope, men favour the deceit;
Trust on, and think to-morrow will repay:
To-morrow's falser than the former day;
Lies worse; and while it says, we shall be blessed
With some new joys, cuts off what we possessed.
Strange cozenage! none would live past years again,
Yet all hope pleasure in what yet remain;
And, from the dregs of life, think to receive
What the first sprightly running could not give.
I'm tired with waiting for this chemic gold,
Which fools us young, and beggars us when old.

THE WORLD IS TOO MUCH WITH US

by William Wordsworth

The world is too much with us; late and soon,
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;—
Little we see in Nature that is ours;
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!
This Sea that bares her bosom to the moon;
The winds that will be howling at all hours,
And are up-gathered now like sleeping flowers;
For this, for everything, we are out of tune;
It moves us not. Great God! I'd rather be
A Pagan suckled in a creed outworn;
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn;
Have sight of Proteus rising from the sea;
Or hear old Triton blow his wreathèd horn.

SONNET 43

by Elizabeth Barrett Browning

How do I love thee? Let me count the ways.
I love thee to the depth and breadth and height
My soul can reach, when feeling out of sight
For the ends of being and ideal grace.

I love thee to the level of every day's
Most quiet need, by sun and candle-light.
I love thee freely, as men strive for right.
I love thee purely, as they turn from praise.
I love thee with the passion put to use
In my old griefs, and with my childhood's faith.
I love thee with a love I seemed to lose
With my lost saints. I love thee with the breath,
Smiles, tears, of all my life; and, if God choose,
I shall but love thee better after death.

GOD'S GRANDEUR

by Gerard Manley Hopkins

The world is charged with the grandeur of God.
It will flame out, like shining from shook foil;
It gathers to a greatness, like the ooze of oil
Crushed. Why do men then now not reckon his rod?
Generations have trod, have trod, have trod;
And all is seared with trade; bleared, smeared with toil;
And wears man's smudge and shares man's smell: the soil
Is bare now, nor can foot feel, being shod.
And for all this, nature is never spent;
There lives the dearest freshness deep down things;
And though the last lights off the black West went
Oh, morning, at the brown brink eastward, springs—
Because the Holy Ghost over the bent
World broods with warm breast and with ah! bright wings.

THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, ACT 3 SCENE 1

by William Shakespeare

. . . He hath disgraced me, and
hindered me half a million; laughed at my losses,
mocked at my gains, scorned my nation, thwarted my
bargains, cooled my friends, heated mine
enemies; and what's his reason? I am a Jew. Hath
not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with
the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject
to the same diseases, healed by the same means,
warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer, as
a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed?

if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is his humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Christian example? Why, revenge. The villainy you teach me, I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction.

JOB 30:16–26 (NIV)

And now my life ebbs away;
 days of suffering grip me.
 Night pierces my bones;
 my gnawing pains never rest.
 In His great power God becomes like clothing to me;
 He binds me like the neck of my garment.
 He throws me into the mud,
 and I am reduced to dust and ashes.

I cry out to you, God, but you do not answer;
 I stand up, but you merely look at me.
 You turn on me ruthlessly;
 with the might of your hand you attack me.
 You snatch me up and drive me before the wind;
 you toss me about in the storm.
 I know you will bring me down to death,
 to the place appointed for all the living.

Surely no one lays a hand on a broken man
 when he cries for help in his distress.
 Have I not wept for those in trouble?
 Has not my soul grieved for the poor?
 Yet when I hoped for good, evil came;
 when I looked for light, then came darkness.

Consult a poetry anthology for other choices, such as the following:

- “Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night” by Dylan Thomas
- “Hap” by Thomas Hardy
- “When I have Fears That I May Cease to Be” by John Keats
- “Mother to Son” by Langston Hughes
- Psalm 13