

Theoretical frameworks for contemporary deterrence

- Structural realist theory
- Liberal institutionalist theory
- Gramscian hegemonic theory
- State terror theory
- No one theoretical framework adequate

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
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# C.20th shifts from modern war to total war


- · shift from the potential within Clausewitzian war
- · C20 mobilization of national energies
  - mass production, mass politics, mass communications
  - weaponry and social organization bring C20 war close to Clausewitz's "absolute war"
- · necessarily genocidal character of total war
- erosion of rationality of war for states
- · bloc formation erosion of the "external"
- 50 years of the Cold War as "the imaginary war"
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Practices		Sevategie: Goale			
		C Compellence	Determice	R Ressourance	
Ϊ.	Warfighting	CI (HLI)	D1	R1	
ż.	Threats	C2 (HL2)	ID2 (HL3)	R2 (HL3)	
١.	Cooperation	C	D3	R3 (HL4)	
	strategie - HL2: policy CI kustorical strategie - defeat HL3: Police: D	correlate: Korean Wat, or contents use nuclear threats (2, R2	ona to compel enemy to risis behaviour i to compel enemy to set	tie without cleanust	
	strategie HL2: polecy C2 kutorical strategie - defeat HL3: Policy: D kutorical strategie - allies HL4: polecy: R	content: use nuclear weap correlate: Korean Wat, o content: use nuclear threat (2, R2 correlate: Coban missile content: use nuclear threat 3 correlate: SALT, INF nuc	ons to compel enemy to risis behaviour to compel enemy to set orisis, Murual Assured D a to deter enemy aggress lear arms coertrol agress	tic without clearout extruction doctrine ion and to reassure seres	
	strategie HL2: poley CI kutorical strategie HL3: Poley: D kutorical strategie HL4: poley: R kutorical strategie	content: use nuclear weap correlate: Korean Wat, of content use nuclear threat 2, R2 correlate: Cuban missile of content: use nuclear threat 3 correlate: SALT, INF nuc content: adjust nuclear the	ons to compel enemy to ruis behaviour to compel enemy to set orisis, Murual Assured D a to deter enemy aggress lear arms control agore gats to reinsure enemy	tle without clearout letruction doctrine ion and to reassure senss and/or ally	
	strategie HL2: poley CI kutorical strategie HL3: Poley: D kutorical strategie HL4: poley: R kutorical strategie	content: use nuclear weap consistent: Korean Wat, o constant use nuclear threat 12, R2 constant: use nuclear threat 3 constant: use nuclear threat 3 constant: advant nuclear the 5, Pacific Powderkeg, America	ons to compel enemy to ruis behaviour to compel enemy to set orisis, Murual Assured D a to deter enemy aggress lear arms control agore gats to reinsure enemy	tle without clearout letruction doctrine ion and to reassure senss and/or ally	



### Philip Bobbit on the nature of deterrence

"Deterrence is an extraordinarily limited theory that relies on a reasonable but extraordinarily broad assumption. That assumption is that the State will make decisions as a result of balancing the benefits to be achieved by a course of action against the costs incurred in pursuing those benefits by the particular means proposed...

"Military deterrence is a concept that is useful *within* war or the approach to war, once political relations have become so strained that hostilities only await opportunity. It is only because we have lived so long at war [I.e. cold war] that we are inclined to miss this point, and that we have come to think of deterrence as a prominent feature of the international relations of a peacetime regime."

The Shield of Achilles, (2002), p.12

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
## Contemporary forms of nuclear deterrence: bilateral direct deterrence


- US-Russia
- US-China
- US-North Korea
- North Korea South Korea, Japan, China
- US-Iran
- China-Russia
- India-Pakistan
- Israel-Iran, ....

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
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



NATO	Nuclear Elements of NATO Strategy
OTAN	(1)
Key ele	ments:
- NATO	)'s conventional forces alone cannot credibly deter
	ain - for the foreseeable future - mix of nuclear and ntional forces, at minimum sufficient level
- NW e	nsure uncertainty in mind of any aggressor
- They	deter the use of NBC weapons
	nake unique contribution in rendering the risks of sion incalculable and unacceptable
- NW r	emain essential to preserve peace
	Strategy: A View from NATO HQ, 2006, Guy B. Roberts, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy, ATO HQ, April 2006
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


Terrorist or rogue state employment of
WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects against American interests. (paralyze our power)
(e.g., attack on homeland, global markets, or key ally that would generate a state of shock and preclude normal behavior)
Likelihood <sup>*</sup> moderate and increasing <u>Vurberability</u> : unacceptable, single event can alter our way of life
Disruptive
<ul> <li>Competitors employing technology or methods that might counter or cancel our current military advantages. (capsize our power)</li> </ul>
(e.g., technological – bic, cyber, or space war, ultra miniaturization, directed-energy, other – diplomatic blackmail, cultural or economic war)
the second se
ater and dissuade across the challenges

Cold Wa	r Deterrence	21st Century Deterrence
Relatively well-un - Mature strateg	derstood opponent ic relationship	Poorly understood opponents - Nascent strategic relationship
Single opponent (	i.e., Soviet Empire)	Multiple state and non-state opponents
Deterrence is the national strategy	cornerstone of	Deterrence is only one component of our national strategy
Targets to hold at identifiable	risk were easily	Targets to hold at risk are difficult to identify
Deterrence policy retaliation and les	relied primarily on s so on denial	Deterrence policy emphasizes denial as wel as retaliation
Primarily nuclear		Nuclear and non-nuclear
Reliable channels	of communication	Uncertain channels of communication








### Functions of US END in Northeast Asia -Patrick Morgan

- · Protecting ROK from war, via deterrence
- Compensating ROK for not developing nuclear weapons and huge conventional offensive capability
- · Offsetting DPRK's (past) superiority in conventional forces
- Offsetting the DPRK nuclear weapons program
- Helping to reassure Japan US will not "lose" South Korea and threaten its security
- Re-assuring Japan that US would not retreat from NE Asia
- Adding to deterrence of attacks on Japan
  - Partly compensating Japan for not developing nuclear weapons and hence avoid domestic conflict
- Discouraging development of nuclear weapons by Japan, supplementing US • umbrella over Japan
- Adding to American power projection capability in the region; helping secure US access to bases in Korea Nautilus Institute

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### Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management" (Schlesinger report), 2008

- "... a distressing degree of inattention to the role of nuclear weapons among many senior Defense Department military and civilian leaders...[who] may lack the foundation of experience for understanding nuclear deterrence, its psychological content, its political nature, and its military role - which is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons." (Report)
- "We emphasize that deterrence must start at the top, that the services indeed have picked up clues since the end of the Cold War that interest in deterrence at the highest levels of the Defense Department has diminished." (James Schlesinger)

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