

CONFIRM: EVALUATING COMPATIBILITY AND RELEVANCE OF CONTROL-FLOW INTEGRITY PROTECTIONS FOR MODERN SOFTWARE

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
Supported in part by:
ONR award N00014-17-2995,
DARPA award FA8750-19- C-0006,
NSF awards #1513704 and #1834215,
and an NSF I/UCRC Award from Lockheed Martin

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Control-Flow Integrity


[M. Abadi, M. Budiu, Ú. Erlingsson, and J. Ligatti; CCS'05.]

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
CFI Research Timeline

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Scalability Gap


CFI Research Papers
(2005-2018)



*Papers containing at least one experiment where at least one **COMPLETE** non-benchmark application for the indicated OS was rewritten & secured

- **Windows/MacOS in mission-critical environments**
 - **“About 75% of control systems are on Windows XP or other nonsupported OSes.”**
–Daryl Haegley, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Energy, Installations and Environment
 - **More than 25% of all government computers currently run an outdated Windows or MacOS operating system.** [BitSight, 6/1/17]
 - **DHS, Coast Guard, and Secret Service currently store top secret information on outdated Windows 2003 servers.** [OIG-18-56, 3/1/08]
 - **Hundreds of satellites run Windows 95 and/or are controlled by Windows Mobile devices.**

Desktop OS Market Share
Top 10 Operating System Vulnerabilities
Exploited by Hackers in 2018



CONFIRM (CONtrol-Flow Integrity Relevance Metrics)

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Problems

- ❑ Compatibility of CFI solutions are under-studied
- ❑ CFI implementations are commonly evaluated in terms of performance and security
- ❑ CPU benchmarks are widely adopted for CFI evaluation

Our solution: CONFIRM

- ❑ A set of 20 systems specifically for CFI compatibility problem identified
- ❑ The first testing suite designed specifically for CFI solutions for CFI evaluation
- ❑ Reevaluation of 12 CFI implementations
 - These CFI implementations pass 53% of CONFIRM's compatibility and security tests
- ❑ Correlation with CPU benchmarks

<https://github.com/SoftwareLanguagesSecurityLab/Confirm>

20 Widespread Classes of CFI Compatibility Problems

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Compatibility Problem	Real-world Software Examples
Function Pointers	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
Callbacks	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
Dynamic Linking	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
Delay-Loading	Adobe Reader, Calculator, Chrome, Firefox, JVM, MS Paint, MS Powerpoint, ...
Exporting/Importing Data Symbols	7-Zip, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, MS Paint, MS Powerpoint, ...
Virtual Functions	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, Notepad, ...
Writable Vtables	programs with UI's based on GTK+ (Linux) or COM (Windows)
Tail Calls	programs compiled with tail-call optimization (e.g., -O2 or /O2)
Switch-Case Statements	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
Returns	almost every benign program
Unmatched Call/Return Pairs	Adobe Reader, Apache, Chrome, Firefox, JVM, MS PowerPoint, Visual Studio, ...
Exceptions	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
Calling Conventions	almost every program has functions
Multithreading	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
TLS Callbacks	Adobe Reader, Chrome, Firefox, MS Paint, TeXstudio, UPX
Position-Independent Code	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
Memory Management	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, MS PowerPoint, ...
JIT Code	Adobe Flash, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, MS PowerPoint, PotPlayer, ...
Self-Unpacking	programs decompressed by self-extractors (e.g., UPX, NSIS)
Runtime API Hooking	Microsoft Office, including MS Excel, MS PowerPoint, etc.

A Compatibility Problem Example — Returns

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
Source Code

```
1 void authenticate() {
2     ...
3     f();
4     authenticated = 1;
5     ...
6 }
7 void print_prompt() {
8     ...
9     f();
10    ...
11 }
12 void f() {
13     ...
14     return;
15 }
```

CFI Hardened Assembly Code

```
1  _authenticate:
2  ...
3  call _f
4  mov [authenticated], 1
5  ...
6  _print_prompt:
7  ...
8  call _f
9  ...
10 _f:
11 ...
12 ret(!is_valid_target([esp]))
13     jmp security_abort
14
```


Another Compatibility Problem Example — Unmatched Call/Return Pairs



20 Widespread Classes of CFI Compatibility Problems

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Compatibility Metric	Real-world Software Examples
Function Pointers	7-Zip, Adobe Reader, Apache, Calculator, Chrome, Dropbox, Firefox, JVM, ...
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Self-Unpacking	programs decompressed by self-extractors (e.g., UPX, NSIS)
Runtime API Hooking	Microsoft Office, including MS Excel, MS PowerPoint, etc.

Cross-Thread Stack-Smashing Attack

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Thread 1 (malicious)

```
1 while (1) {  
2     // smash thread 2's  
3     // return address  
4     *p = 0xDEADBEEF  
5 }
```

Thread 2 (CFI instrumented)

```
1 _f:  
2 ...  
3 if (!is_valid_target([esp]))  
4     jmp security_abort  
5 ret
```



TOCTOU
window

CFI Performance Measurement Problems

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SPEC CPU Benchmark	CFI Solution									Benchmark Correlation
	MCFG	Reins	GCC-VTV	LLVM-CFI	MCFI	π CFI	π CFI (nto)	PathArmor	Lockdown	
perlbench				2.4	5.0	5.0	5.3	15.0	150.0	0.09
bzip2	-0.3	9.2		-0.7	1.0	1.0	0.8	0.0	8.0	-0.12
gcc					4.5	4.5	10.5	9.0	50.0	0.02
mcf	0.5	9.1		3.6	4.5	4.5	1.8	1.0	2.0	-0.39
gobmk	-0.2			0.2	7.0	7.5	11.8	0.0	43.0	-0.09
hmmer	0.7			0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.1	1.0	3.0	0.33
sjeng	3.4			1.6	5.0	5.0	11.9	0.0	80.0	-0.03
h264ref	5.4			5.3	6.0	6.0	8.3	1.0	43.0	-0.09
libquantum				-6.9	0.0	-0.3	-1.0	3.0	5.0	0.51
omnetpp	3.8		5.8		5.0	5.0	18.8			-0.52
astar	0.1		3.6	0.9	3.5	4.0	2.9		17.0	0.92
xalancbmk	5.5		24.0	7.2	7.0	7.0	17.6		118.0	0.94
milc	2.0			0.2	2.0	2.0	1.4	4.0	8.0	0.40
namd	0.1		-0.1	0.1	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	3.0		0.98
dealII	-0.1		0.7	7.9	4.5	4.5	4.4			-0.36
soplex	2.3		0.5	-0.3	-4.0	-4.0	0.9	12.0		0.89
povray	10.8		-0.6	8.9	10.0	10.5	17.4		90.0	0.88
lbm	4.2			-0.2	1.0	1.0	-0.5	0.0	2.0	-0.22
sphinx3	-0.1			-0.8	1.5	1.5	2.4	3.0	8.0	0.31
CONFIRM median	9.51	4.59	33.56	5.19	30.83	-11.10	-11.60	648.01	140.82	0.36

Conclusions

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- ❑ Compatibility of CFI solutions are under-studied
 - Complicated compatibility problems lurking in large COTS software products
- ❑ CFI implementations are commonly evaluated in terms of performance and security using CPU benchmarks.
- ❑ Proposed solution: CONFIRM
 - A set of 20 CFI-relevant compatibility problems
 - The first testing suite designed specifically for CFI solution evaluation
 - Reevaluation of 12 CFI implementations
 - Correlation with SPEC CPU benchmarks
 - <https://github.com/SoftwareLanguagesSecurityLab/Confirm>



THANK YOU

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