# CARICOM COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY



The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy ("the CT Strategy") was adopted at the Twenty-Ninth Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 26-27 February 2018.

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#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**



The purpose of this Strategy is to reduce the risk of terrorism and associated violent extremism, as well as building resilience to extremist ideology, with a view to ensuring a safe and free CARICOM.

1. Terrorism and associated violent extremism pose direct threats to CARICOM's vision of integrated, inclusive, secure, and prosperous economies reflecting sustainable growth. Today's terrorist and violent extremist organisations utilise modern information and communication technologies (ICTs) as well as globalised trade and travel to extend their reach far beyond their points of origin. As a result, no part of the world is immune from this scourge. Even if not an actual target for terrorist attacks, a country may be the source of terrorists and or terrorist sympathisers who prepare for, provide assistance to, or travel to another country for the purpose of committing a terrorist act. Individuals in one

country may raise funds for or recruit individuals to commit a terrorist attack in the home country or in a third state. A country may also be a transit or rest spot for a terrorist using broken travel techniques to evade detection by law enforcement and security services. It is by such means that some 30,000 individuals from more than 100 countries have been lured to fight for the Islamic State (IS) from 2012 - 2016.1

2. CARICOM States are not immune from violent extremism, the foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon or the global threat of terrorism. Concerns include FTFs returnees and relocators travelling to and from the Region, radicalised terrorist sympathisers in CARICOM States, violent extremists who could be inspired or directed to carry out an attack, the increasing influence of extremist religious leaders, and the growing volume and accessibility of terrorist propaganda on-

The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a grouping of 20 countries: 15 Member States and five Associate Members. It is home to approximately 16 million citizens, 60% of whom are under the age of 30, and from the main ethnic groups of Indigenous Peoples, Africans, Indians, Europeans, Chinese, Portuguese and Javanese. The Community is multi-lingual; with English being the main language of the community complemented by French and Dutch including variations of these, as well as African and Asian expressions.

Stretching from The Bahamas in the north to Suriname and Guyana in South America, CARICOM comprises States that are considered developing countries, with the exception of Belize in Central America, Guyana and Suriname in South America, all Members and Associate Members are island states. While these States are all relatively small, both in terms of population and size, there is also great diversity with regards to geography and population as well as the levels of economic and social development.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See Second report of the Secretary-General on the threat posed by ISIL (Da'esh) to international peace and security and the range of United Nations efforts in support of Member States in countering the threat.

line and via peer-to-peer networks. The CARICOM Region faces the additional challenge posed by the evolving relationship between organised crime groups and violent gangs on the one hand, and terrorist groups and radicalised individuals on the other.

- 3. By the start of 2018, more than 200 individuals from CARICOM States have traveled to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.<sup>2</sup> It is envisaged that FTFs returnees and relocators will pose a particular threat to the Region. The increased frequency of terrorist attacks on soft targets, including public spaces associated with tourism, major events and recreation facilities, globally, are worrisome.
- 4. Terrorism undermines the fundamental values and principles that unite the Region and is one of the most serious attacks on democracy, human rights, the rule of law, good governance and the tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Terrorism poses a serious threat to peace, security, stability and endangers the social fabric and economic development of the region.
- **5.** The Strategy is based on the following principles:
  - I. Respect For Democratic Values.
  - II. Protecting Human Rights And Respecting The Rule Of Law.
  - **III.** Fostering Good Governance.
  - IV. Fostering Mutual Respect And Tolerance Of Different Faiths And Beliefs.

CORE PRINCIPLES			
Respect For Democratic Values	Protecting Human Rights And Respecting The Rule Of Law	Fostering Good Governance	Fostering Mutual Respect And Tolerance Of Different Faiths And Beliefs
Democracy is a platform for inclusive participation, empowerment and accountability. Counter-terrorism measures ought not to serve as pretexts to undermine democracy.	The promotion of human rights and effective counterterrorism policies as non-conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing.	Good governance based on integrity, openness, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, at all levels constitutes an important element for preventing violent extremism and terrorism.	Terrorism ought not to be associated with any religion, nationality, civilisation or ethnic group.

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 $<sup>^2</sup>$  Between 2013 and 2017 more that 200 CARICOM citizens traveled to the conflict zone.

- **6.** The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy confronts terrorism and associated violent extremism through the following five (5) core pillars:
  - I. Preventing Violent Extremism.
  - II. Denying Terrorists the Means and Opportunity to Carry Out Their Activities.
  - III. Disrupting Extremist and Terrorist Activities and Movements in CARICOM.
  - IV. Improving Preparedness and Defences Against Terrorist Attacks
  - V. Responding Effectively to Terrorist Attacks and Promoting a Culture of Resilience.
- 7. As terrorist activities are rarely limited by territorial boundaries, the nature of the multifaceted threat of terrorism necessitates a harmonised regional response. Therefore, a coherent regional approach is critical to successfully complementing current national and global counterterrorism efforts.



#### **CHAPTER 1 - THE THREAT TO CARICOM**

- **8.** The overall terrorist threat to the security of CARICOM States has increased considerably since 2013.<sup>3</sup> While CARICOM States may have unique variations in the manifestation of existing terrorist threats, these threats have the potential to adversely impact all CARICOM States. These terrorist threats are essentially border-less and may take place through legal and illegal movements.
- 9. The main regional concerns relate to the phenomena of FTFs, including their return and relocation to the Region, the increasing influence of extremist religious leaders and radicalised terrorist sympathisers in CARICOM States, violent extremists who could be inspired or directed to carry out an attack, the growing volume and accessibility of terrorists group propaganda on-line and via peer-to-peer networks, and the potential exploitation of the banking system to fund terror networks. Intelligence and other information sources have confirmed that IS, Al-Qaeda, its affiliated organisations, and other terrorist organisations continue to plan terrorist attacks against Western interests. CARICOM States receive a substantial amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the United States of America and Europe, which play a critical role in relation to economic growth and development.
- 10. CARICOM States could be targeted as an intermediate objective to affect the strategic economic interests of the United States of America, Canada and European countries. The significant presence of western interests on our shores, coupled with the Region's porous borders may also increase the risk of a potential terrorist attack in the Caribbean. Furthermore, there remains a continued concern that the Caribbean could be utilised as a transit point for potential terrorists or terrorist organisations.

#### **Foreign Terrorist Fighters Returnees and Relocators**

11. The fact that by the start of 2018 more than 200 individuals from CARICOM States have traveled to conflict zones in Syria and Iraq demonstrates how the Region has been caught up in global terrorism. While the activities of FTFs abroad contribute to instability abroad, attacks in Europe, Africa, and Asia demonstrate the potential threat that they pose when they return<sup>4</sup> to their home or third countries as battle-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Threat level of terrorism has increased since the adoption of the CARICOM Crime and Security Strategy (CCSS) by CARICOM Heads of Government in February 2013. Terrorism is reflected as a Tier Three (3) Threat out of a Four (4) Tier Threat System in the CCSS. The issues of FTFs in particular returning FTFs, the influence of extremist religious leaders, as well as the radicalisation of CARICOM nationals were not perceived as a regional threat in 2013.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Some returnees will travel to their countries of origin or residence. Others may choose to travel to conflict zones in the region and beyond. The flow of returning FTFs entails the risk of spreading the threat posed by individuals loyal to IS to new regions, including CARICOM.

hardened and trained FTFs. The involvement of FTFs in those attacks - whether in plotting, recruiting, facilitating or carrying out the attacks - illustrates the ability of terrorist organisations to mobilise returned FTFs. Returning FTFs' ability to leverage violent extremist networks both at home and abroad make them especially dangerous. Additionally, FTFs relocating from conflict zones to CARICOM now present a considerable threat.

- 12. The motivations of FTFs returnees and relocators are diverse. While some are disillusioned with terrorist practices and life in conflict zones, others may return to their home state or relocate with the aim of carrying out terrorist attacks, assist in transnational recruitment, as well as, facilitating the travel of new FTFs. The relocation of FTFs from the conflict zones to other regions now presents a considerable threat.
- 13. Adding to these concerns are the terrorist networks and cells already in or transiting through the CARICOM Region and others within close proximity to the Caribbean, or those being trained in conflict zones with close ties to CARICOM. While there are currently no specific indications that terrorist networks are preparing attacks in the Region, CARICOM notes with concern that IS has shifted its message and now calls on its sympathisers to "stay at home and carry out attacks", as well as the increasing global geographical dispersal of FTFs. The Region can be used as a meeting ground or training camp or as a safe haven for sleeper cells or terrorist groups.

### Evolving Relationship Between Organised Crime Groups, Violent Gangs and Terrorism

CARICOM expresses strong concern about the increasing links between organised crime groups, violent gangs and terrorism, as highlighted by the financing of the illegal activities of global terrorist groups via the proceeds of illicit trafficking. The unfortunate prevalence of illicit trafficking routes throughout the Caribbean Basin raises the probability that organised crime groups and violent gangs may be enlisted to facilitate the undetected departure and return of foreign terrorist fighters. It also creates the opportunity for collaboration among members, groups and other affiliates in the region.

Globally, it has been recognised that a significant number of foreign terrorist fighters already had criminal backgrounds before turning to terrorism. Six out of the ten attackers in the 2015 Paris attacks had a criminal background, and all six known attackers in the 2016 Brussels bombings had criminal backgrounds. Many of the FTFs from the Region who joined IS, also have a criminal background. The CARICOM Region's high unemployment and underemployment rates, especially among youth, growing poverty with pockets of highly concentrated urban poverty, increased criminality of youth gangs, and feelings of alienation and marginalisation provide a permissive and fertile ground for terrorists and other criminals to exploit.

### The Influence of Extremist Religious Leaders, as well as Radicalised Terrorist Sympathisers in CARICOM

14. There are nationals within a few CARICOM States who are known to promote a violent jihadist message. The influence of extremist religious leaders who promote toxic values, indoctrinate hatred and intolerance or incite support for terrorist groups, is destroying tolerant religious traditions and threatening our democratic order. Their teachings are fueling violent extremism, which significantly contribute to the exodus of foreign terrorist fighters from the Region. The presence of these extremist religious leaders in the Region has harmful and far-reaching consequences for our schools, religious institutions and prisons.

#### **Radicalisation of Homegrown Extremists**

- 15. The Region is increasingly vulnerable to the virulent spread of violent extremist groups, as well as attacks by violent extremists who could be directed, encouraged or merely inspired by the IS and Al-Qaeda ideology and rhetoric. The region exhibits several of the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism ideology and the terrorist groups fuelled by them. Institutional weakness, high levels of unemployment and underemployment, as well as inequality, significant poverty rates and high levels of criminality and low detection rates make the Region susceptible to the infiltration of extremist ideology.
- 16. Online radicalisation presents a primary concern as terrorist groups far from our shores are exploiting religious beliefs in order to incite hatred and violence and to cause division and polarisation in our society. Radicalisation, if not deterred, could result in individuals, or groups committing religiously motivated acts in the Region.

#### **Radicalisation in Prisons**

Prison can act as an incubator for violent extremist ideology, but more importantly, it can act as a positive institution to prevent the spread of extremist views and for the reform and rehabilitation of prisoners, with the aim to reintegrating them successfully into society and reducing the risk of recidivism. Rehabilitation programs within regional prisons must be strengthened and further supported by the respective local communities. This will facilitate reduced rates of recidivism, while increasing the chances of successful reintegration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In August 2017, Jamaica-based Islamic cleric Sheikh Abdullah Al-Faisal was arrested on a provisional warrant under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty after he was accused by US Authorities of engaging in terrorism-related activities, including encouraging individuals to carry out acts of terrorism in the name of the Islamic State and connecting them with other radicalised supporters who were willing - or already in the process - of doing the same in countries around the world. He has been placed on a US blacklist for assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial, material, or technological support for the militant group, ISIS.

#### The Growing Volume and Accessibility of Terrorist Group Propaganda On-Line

- 17. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) such as the internet and social media platforms, are key elements of our society. They promote and facilitate democratic values, commerce, communications, human rights, and vigorous political debate. Unfortunately, terrorists and other criminals have been able to abuse these technologies to advance their agenda, using them for propaganda, incitement to violence, recruitment, financing, and operational planning, unfettered by national borders or other physical boundaries. The CARICOM Region is not immune from this phenomenon. There have been reports of hacking against several government agencies' websites/e-mails, as well as attacks against systems used by private citizens in Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago by persons/groups affiliated with terrorist organisations.<sup>6</sup>
- **18.** The dissemination of terror-attack methodologies and guidance, as well as designs for the building of improvised explosive devices over the Internet and social media is a key concern.

#### The Financing of Terrorism

- 19. Nationals of the Region have been cited in respective national Financial Intelligence Unit [FIU] Reports as suspects involved in terrorism financing. A variety of both legal and illicit activities are utilised to finance terrorist acts. A growing trend has been the increased use of wire transfers. The potential exploitation of the banking system to fund terror networks and the abuse of non-governmental, non-profit and charitable organisations by and for terrorist purposes are key threats to the Region.
- **20.** An increasing source of funding is the exploitation of the internet and social media to attract donations from individuals and legal entities, by misleading users about the true recipients of the funds.
- 21. As counter-financing measures worldwide disrupt already identified flows of financial support, the methods of financing and moving funds will evolve. It is expected that transactions through the regulated financial institutions will be reduced and the use of alternative channels for fund movement will increase such as bulk cash transportation, unlicensed exchange operators (e.g. the hawala system), and cryptographic currencies (e.g. Bitcoin houses). Public-private partnership and research will become more critical as the mechanisms employed by terrorists and their supporters become more sophisticated.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Occurred between 2014 and 2016.

#### **Access to Illicit Firearms**

- **22.** Recent global terrorist attacks have shown recurrent patterns. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) have increasingly become a weapon of choice for carrying out terrorist attacks. This is an alarming and worrisome trend given the availability and proliferation of illegal firearms in the Region. On average, more than 70 percent of homicide victims in CARICOM States are killed by firearms.
- 23. Given the prevailing considerations which have been presented above, an effective counter-terrorism strategy must address limiting access by terrorists and violent extremists to firearms, ammunition, explosives, and related precursors, as well as to precautionary measures to detect and prevent the use by terrorists of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material, as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004).

#### **Vehicles As Weapons of Terror In Crowded Spaces**

Terrorist tactics are continually being adapted. The IS and Al Qaeda have called on followers to use vehicles as weapons. Attacks on crowded places overseas, including New York (October, 2017) Barcelona (August, 2017), London (June, 2017), Stockholm (April, 2017), London (March, 2017), Berlin (December, 2016) and Nice (July, 2016) demonstrate how vehicles can be used by terrorists to horrifying effect.

Vehicle attacks require little organisation, manpower, training, expertise or technological know-how, but can have devastating consequences.

While such attacks have not being carried out in the Region, CARICOM Member States should not believe that they are immune. We need to strengthen our national arrangements in order to help owners and operators better protect crowded places from terrorism.

#### **CARICOM Vital Industries and the Implication of a Terrorist Attack**

#### **Tourism**

24. Tourism plays an important role in CARICOM States and is a key driver of regional sustainable economic growth and a vital contributor to job creation and poverty alleviation. According to the World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) in 2016, travel and tourism contributed 14.9 percent of total GDP in the Caribbean, 13.4 percent of total employment and 12.5 percent of total capital investment. Terrorists have been targeting tourist resorts and destination cities globally. In addition to tragedy or the loss of life, events in Belgium, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, France, Tunisia, and Turkey demonstrate the economic consequences for the travel and tourism industry as these states have all seen a drastic

decrease in visitors following terror attacks, some of which specifically targeted tourists. Following the terrorist attacks on the Bardo Museum in Tunisia in March 2015, the Tourism Ministry reported that there were over 3,000 holiday cancellations, while reservations declined 60 percent. The consequences of a terrorist attack on the Region's tourism industry will disproportionately and profoundly impact the economies of the region, and a terrorist attack in any CARICOM State will negatively impact the tourism industry of all CARICOM States.<sup>7</sup>

#### Oil and Gas Industry

25. In Trinidad and Tobago, oil and gas products play an integral role in the country's economy and is a valuable national asset, accounting for 34.9 percent of the country's GDP.8 Guyana is also poised to become a major oil producer in the Western Hemisphere. Respected industry analysts Wood Mackenzie project up to 450,000 barrels a day by the mid-2020s. Additionally, 12 of the 17 members of the PetroCaribe oil alliance are from CARICOM (excluding, Barbados, Montserrat, and Trinidad and Tobago), and all have significant fuel farms/storage depots. A disabling attack on the oil and gas infrastructure or reserves in Trinidad and Tobago and other states could cripple individual states and affect the entire Region.

#### Critical Infrastructure

- **26.** Critical infrastructure, including communication platforms, air and sea ports and public places are attractive targets for physical or cyber attacks by terrorist groups. Attacks on critical infrastructure which provide essential goods and services as well as revenue, have the potential to cause widespread economic and environmental damage.
- 27. Essential components such as pipelines and power grids are routinely targeted given their economic value. Terrorist attacks on critical infrastructure could significantly disrupt the functioning of the government and private sector alike and cause knock-on effects beyond the infrastructure sector as well as post-disruption economic downturns.

#### **Major Sporting, Cultural and Entertainment Events**

**28.** The Region is host to a number of high profile sporting, cultural and entertainment events such as international cricket competitions, carnivals and music festivals. These events fulfill a number of the criteria that terrorists would like to hit and as a result, they are highly attractive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The Caribbean is also marketed by the Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO) and the Caribbean Hotel and Tourism Association (CHTA) as a single destination entity: "One Sea, One Voice, One Destination".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The country is attracting the attention and investment dollars of some of the biggest oil companies in the world.

targets for terrorists. Attacks against these can result in massive civilian casualties. The attacks in Paris in November 2015 that included an attempt to target the Stade de France and the attack at the Manchester Arena in May 2017 during a music concert, illustrate the increasing threat from terrorism. The threat posed by terrorist groups and their intent to target Western interests, suggest the risk to sporting, cultural and entertainment events is now more significant than in previous decades.

### CHAPTER 2 - CARICOM COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY

- 29. The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy is an opportunity for the Region to enhance existing counter-terrorism systems and to do more together in order to prevent violent extremism and to combat terrorism. The Strategy represents an important milestone in the collective pursuit of CARICOM States toward strengthening the regional response to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, based on a common strategic and operational framework, but also recognizing that CARICOM States have different capabilities to prevent and combat terrorism. Further, it ensures that counter-terrorism measures in one country do not simply displace terrorists to less secure, more hospitable areas in the Region.
- 30. We acknowledge that while improving security, intelligence and information sharing among relevant stakeholders are essential, the structural factors that can lead to violent extremism must also be addressed, including intolerance and political, economic, and social marginalisation, as outlined in the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the associated UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism.
- 31. The Strategy addresses the critical need to implement systematic, preventive measures which directly impact the drivers of violent extremism as well as the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism that terrorist recruiters exploit to persuade others to support their cause. The Strategy pays particular attention to preventing radicalisation, addressing the phenomenon of returning FTFs and working toward their reintegration. Preventing radicalisation includes building a resilient Region in which individuals and communities are able to withstand violent extremist ideologies and challenge those who espouse them.
- **32.** CARICOM States are convinced that countering terrorism and violent extremism requires a cooperative approach at all levels. This Strategy recognises the need for CARICOM States to coordinate among national authorities, among States and to cooperate with relevant international and regional organisations, as well as with the private sector, civil society, and the media, as appropriate.
- 33. The Strategy further recognises the importance of CARICOM States being in compliance with all relevant United Nations Counter-Terrorism Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), in particular UNSC Resolutions 1347, 1540, 2178 9, 2309; and all relevant recommendations of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Resolution 2178 (2014) is focused on the travel of Foreign Terrorist Fighters from their home countries to conflict zones.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF), in-particular FATF recommendations 5 and 6, as critical foundations for success. In this vein, the Strategy will also be compatible with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism of the Organization of American States (OAS/CICTE) Declaration of Renewed Hemispheric Commitment to Enhance Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism and all other relevant and applicable instruments.

- **34.** The Strategy is informed by a number of core principles: promoting democratic values; protecting human rights, respecting the rule of law; fostering good governance; and fostering mutual respect for and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.
- 35. The Strategy consists of <u>five pillars of action</u>: (1) preventing violent extremism; (2) denying terrorists the means and opportunity to carry out their activities; (3) disrupting extremist and terrorist activities and movements in CARICOM; (4) improving preparedness and defences against terrorist attacks and (5) responding effectively to terrorist attacks and promoting a culture of resilience.



**36.** The Strategy builds on CARICOM's established tools, including CARICOM IMPACS Advance Passenger Information System (APIS)<sup>10</sup> and CARICOM counter-terrorism networks which have already played an important part in CARICOM's response to terrorist threats.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The CARICOM APIS is the world's only multilateral system. APIS allows States to effectively verify the possible presence of a foreign terrorist fighter on board an aircraft. On 23 October 2017, the sharing of advance passenger information became mandatory under Annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).

37. The CARICOM Counter-Terrorism Strategy that follows provides the framework for CARICOM counter-terrorism actions, and ensures that counter-terrorism measures in one country do not simply displace terrorists to less secure, more vulnerable areas in the Region. The Strategy will also seek to promote greater regional harmonisation of approaches and build networks between national agencies and where appropriate, develop common approaches to spot and tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism and terrorism.

#### PILLAR 1: PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- 38. The emphasis in this area is on addressing the various social, economic, political and other factors, including exclusion and extremism, which engender conditions for the spread of violent extremism and in which terrorist organisations are able to recruit and win support. CARICOM States will strive to prevent and diminish these factors by engaging with a range of actors including individuals, communities, schools, prisons, plus international partners, and through research to better understand the complexity of the phenomenon, the nature of the terrorist organisations and how to counter them. We note that violent extremism is a multi-faceted problem that requires a comprehensive and interinstitutional approach that is endorsed at all levels including at the community level. Key activities will focus on research to ensure better understanding, address the drivers of radicalisation and needs arising from the threats of violent extremism, prioritise prevention of violent extremism by focusing on root causes and targeting youth. Attention will also be paid to preventing radicalisation in prisons, as well as developing effective disengagement/de-radicalisation programmes.
- **39.** This approach includes programmes and activities to:
  - Implement the UN Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism which recommends a regional and national Plan of Action that addresses the seven focus areas –
    - ✓ dialogue and conflict prevention;
    - ✓ good governance, human rights and the rule of law;
    - ✓ communities; and empowering young people;
    - ✓ gender equality and empowering women;
    - ✓ education, skills development and employment facilitation;
    - ✓ strategic communications, including through the Internet and social media; and
    - ✓ supporting and empowering civil society to challenge violent extremism ideology.

# PILLAR 2: DENYING TERRORISTS THE MEANS AND OPPORTUNITY TO CARRY OUT THEIR ACTIVITIES

- **40.** The emphasis in this area is on depriving extremists and terrorists access to the material, expertise, finance, and other enabling capabilities required to commit terrorist acts. This pillar also includes activities at and within CARICOM borders to deny terrorists the means and opportunities to act within the Region.
- **41.** This approach includes programmes and activities to:
  - Counter the financing of terrorism, reduce access to illegal firearms, strengthen borders and improve the security of our ports of entry.
  - Enact legislation to criminalise terrorism and the financing of terrorism, to provide for the detection, prevention, prosecution, conviction and punishment of terrorist activities and the confiscation, forfeiture and seizure of terrorists' assets and of the facilitators of the financing of terrorism and for related matters.

## PILLAR 3: DISRUPTING EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS IN CARICOM

- 42. The emphasis in this area is on enhancing information and intelligence capabilities, strengthening aerial, land, maritime and cyber domain awareness, stopping violent extremist propaganda as well as advancing coordinated and cooperative relationships between our intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies nationally, regionally and internationally. Information and intelligence sharing concerning the identity of FTFs, returnees, relocators and known terrorist supporters, will remain fundamental.
- **43.** This approach includes programmes and activities to:
  - Maximise the use of the CARICOM regional security framework including IMPACS and its Centres: the Joint Regional Communications Centre (JRCC) and the Regional Intelligence Fusion Centre (RIFC) as well as the Regional Security System (RSS) to facilitate information and intelligence sharing with Member States and our international partners.
  - Strengthen national information and intelligence sharing networks.

## PILLAR 4: IMPROVING PREPAREDNESS AND DEFENCES AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS

- 44. The emphasis in this area is the need to protect critical infrastructure and to strengthen efforts to improve the security and protection of vulnerable targets, such as public places, tourism infrastructure, transportation networks, information systems and sporting and cultural events from terrorist attacks; involving public-private partnership where appropriate.
- **45.** This approach includes programmes and activities to:
  - Protect citizens and critical infrastructure and reduce our vulnerability to attack, including through the improved security of public spaces, transport and critical infrastructure.
  - Develop a culture of cybersecurity in CARICOM through the implementation of the CARICOM Cyber Security and Cybercrime Action Plan.

## PILLAR 5: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO TERRORIST ATTACKS AND PROMOTING A CULTURE OF RESILIENCE

- **46.** The emphasis in this area is to prepare our responders and the community to manage and minimise the consequences of a terrorist attack, by improving capabilities to deal with: the aftermath, the coordination of the response, and the needs of victims if ever a terrorist attack occurs.
- **47.** This approach includes programmes and activities to:
  - Establish mechanisms for national integration and rapid response by all relevant responders to a terrorist incident.
  - Ensure that systems and structures for cooperation between relevant agencies within CARICOM States and in the Region, are established or strengthened.

#### ACCOUNTABILITY, REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION

**48.** CARICOM States will review the Strategy every two years to reflect new and emerging threats and evolving trends of violent extremism and terrorism. An Implementation Review Group shall be established to develop an overview of the review process.

- **49.** The Strategy will also be complemented by a more detailed plan of action, which will allow for detailed progress to be monitored. This will include:
  - I. The development of success indicators linked to the [measures/actions] in the action plan (see annex 1); and
  - II. The development of timeframes linked to the action plan.
- **50.** CARICOM invites individual States to develop national counter-terrorism Plans of Action and/or Strategies reflecting the goals and objectives of the CARICOM Strategy.

### **ANNEX 1: PLAN OF ACTION**

PILLAR	MEASURE/ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY	TIME FRAME
	i Promote dialogue, tolerance and respect, through cross-cultural and interfaith dialogues plus strengthen regional and national capacities for conflict prevention.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	ii Enhance dialogue and understanding toward preventing violent extremism at the political and official level, as well as pursuing political and technical dialogue with Third States, in order to prevent violent extremism and enhance counter-terrorism.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	iii Promote and implement national specific strategic communication programs, including UN Security Council Resolution 2354 (2017) which emphasised the need to counter terrorist narratives.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
1 PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM	iv Conduct detailed research of recruitment to terrorism in specific contexts such as in prisons, in places of worship; on misuse of the internet and media/social media by violent extremists, as well as the factors that drive individuals towards violent extremism and the link between criminality and violent extremism in the Caribbean and other matters, to better understand the phenomenon in the region.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	v Promote and implement measures for preventing violent extremism, and encouraging reintegration and rehabilitation that complies with international standards.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	vi Strengthen the capacity of police, prosecutors, judges, prison officials and other justice actors to address the life cycle of radicalisation to violent extremism in conformity with human rights and the rule of law.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	vii Facilitate intergovernmental communications and cooperation and establishing early warning capacity for the exchange of information on violent extremist activities, including the utilisation of virtual crisis rooms, to support prevention.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	viii Active participation by Member States and CARICOM in international fora relating to violent extremism and terrorism.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	ix Promote social inclusion agendas to reduce the sense of marginalisation and victimisation and encourage Member States to implement appropriate policies such as those toward addressing unemployment.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	x Facilitate and support civil society, youth, and women to engage in prevention and response efforts related to violent extremism.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	xi Effectively address the whole life-cycle of terrorist radicalisation, from prevention to reintegration.	Member States	Ongoing

PILLAR	MEASURE/ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY	TIME FRAME
	i Adopt the CARICOM Arrest Warrant Treaty.	Member States	2018
	ii Extend access to, and where appropriate, integrate into national systems the CARICOM Advance Passenger Information System (APIS).	CARICOM and Member States	2019
	iii Adopt and implement the CARICOM model APIS Bill.	Member States	2018
2	iv Establish a CARICOM Passenger Name Record (PNR) system in support of the APIS to collect passenger and crew data to support the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime.	CARICOM and Member States	2020
DENYING TERRORISTS THE MEANS AND	v Support and implement, in collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the Traveller Identification Programme (TRIP) Strategy	Member States	Ongoing
OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT THEIR	vi Consider participating in the ICAO Public Key Directory (PKD).	Member States	2020
ACTIVITIES	vii Establish the CARICOM Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS)	CARICOM and Member States	2018
	viii Adopt and implement ACIS legislation.	CARICOM and Member States	2019
	ix Strengthen cooperation among border agencies and support greater use of CARICOM and INTERPOL Tools to prevent and combat terrorism.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	x Improve integration and utilisation of financial intelligence with other types of information available, such as that provided by the private sector to national governments, to more effectively disrupt terrorist financing, including through actions related to investigative techniques, evidence gathering and prosecution.	Member States	Ongoing
	xi Consider strengthening the powers of the Financial Intelligence Units and facilitate their enhanced cooperation through the CFATF.	Member States	Ongoing

PILLAR	MEASURE/ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY	TIME FRAME
	Xii Develop model anti-terrorism legislation to criminalise terrorism and the financing of terrorism, to provide for the detection, prevention, prosecution, conviction and punishment of terrorist activities and the confiscation, forfeiture and seizure of terrorists' assets and of the facilitators of the financing of terrorism and for related matters.	CARICOM	2019
	xiii Enact, and where appropriate, review counter- terrorism legislation in view of the evolving threat posed by terrorist groups and individuals.	Member States	Ongoing
	xiv Criminalise the funding, organisation and facilitation of foreign terrorist fighters, not limited to material support, such as the provision of firearms and explosives, shelter, means of transportation, services, assets and goods.	Member States	2019
	xv Consider improvements to the regulation and transparency of legal entities, including charities and alternative remittance systems, which may be used by terrorists to acquire funding for their activities.	Member States	Ongoing
	xvi Enact the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2178, and other UNSC Resolutions on terrorism, as well as other relevant international conventions.	Member States	Ongoing
	xvii Increase national, regional and international cooperation to reduce illegal firearms, including the enactment of the relevant legislation.	Member States	Ongoing
	xviii Take all necessary steps to enhance forensic and ballistic capabilities, in particular strengthening the Regional Integrated Ballistic Information Network (RIBIN), in order to tackle terrorist access to illegal firearms.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	xix Consider strengthening national legislation and controls on the possession, use and transfer of illicit firearms, as well as, the investigation of arms-trafficking networks.	Member States	Ongoing
	xx Continue to implement obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions 2370 (2017) and 1540 (2004) and take effective actions to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery to terrorists.	Member States	Ongoing
	xxi Develop and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures for the protection and control of sensitive materials.	Member States	Ongoing

PILLAR	MEASURE/ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY	TIME FRAME
	i Establish National Points of Contacts for counter- terrorism in order to facilitate information sharing	Member States	2018
	ii Consider increasing the capacity of INTERPOL National Central Bureaus as well as designate a 24 hour/seven days a week point of contact.	Member States	2018
	iii Make full use of the INTERPOL FTFs database and other related databases.	Member States	Ongoing
3 DISRUPTING	iv Establish an INTERPOL Regional Bureau in CARICOM IMPACS to form a link between national police and the INTERPOL global network which will serve as a liaison office.	CARICOM and Member States	2019
EXTREMIST AND TERRORIST MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVITIES IN CARICOM MEMBER STATES	v Establish a mobile CARICOM Information and Intelligence Sharing Network (CISNET) to facilitate real time actionable intelligence.	CARICOM and Member States	2019
	vi Consider advancing programs and projects in biometrics system-based tools for identifying known and suspected terrorists.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	vii Share, where appropriate, information about foreign terrorist fighters and other individual terrorists and terrorist organisations, including biometric and biographic information, in compliance with national and international law to multilateral screening databases, including IMPACS and INTERPOL.	Member States	Ongoing
	xxii Strengthen and/or establish a National Joint Coordination Centre to manage information sharing and intelligence in Member States.	Member States	2019
	xxiii Strengthen the vetting of visa applications to CARICOM by establishing a dedicated Visa Vetting Unit at IMPACS to process visa requests to CARICOM States.	CARICOM and Member States	2019

PILLAR	MEASURE/ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY	TIME FRAME
	i Promote awareness and understanding of the necessary balance between economic and security issues.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	ii Continuously review and, where necessary, improve the security and protection of particularly vulnerable targets, such as critical infrastructure and public places.	Member States	Ongoing
	iii Increase the development of public and private partnerships on protection of critical infrastructure, including Internet, cyber and tourism security, in order to prevent and react in an efficient manner to potential risks and threats to related facilities.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
IMPROVING	iv Develop national plans for protecting critical infrastructure, identifying potential soft targets.	Member States	Ongoing
PREPAREDNESS AND DEFENCES AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS	v Establish a CARICOM Critical Infrastructure Network to facilitate the development and sharing of best practices on the protection of vulnerable sites, public spaces or critical infrastructure that carry importance for their respective States.	CARICOM and Member States	2019
	vi Design and conduct regular preparedness exercises among CARICOM Member States, which takes into consideration varying terrorist scenarios.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	vii Foster a common CARICOM security approach and guidelines for security planning at major events focusing on evaluation, coordination, prevention and risk analysis of major event planning.	CARICOM and Member States	2019
	viii Encourage private sector operatives to strengthen their security.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	ix Strengthen private security operators through enhanced legal or regulatory structures, as well as promote training.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
	x Prepare and regularly update contingency plans to deal with terrorist attacks that may be carried out in CARICOM Member States or against CARICOM representations abroad.	Member States	Ongoing
	xi Promote continuous training in incident management (at all levels, across all levels, preparing individual modules or complete exercises).	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing

PILLAR	MEASURE/ACTIONS	RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITY	TIME FRAME
	i Improve responsiveness and resilience by promoting methods of planning, prevention, crisis management and recovery.	CARICOM and Member States	Ongoing
5 RESPONDING	ii Engender a culture of continuous planning, including doing regular contingency planning through training and education.	Member States	Ongoing
EFFECTIVELY TO TERRORIST	iii Strengthen the criminal justice capacity, cooperation and response to terrorism.	Member States	Ongoing
ATTACKS AND PROMOTING A CULTURE OF RESILIENCE	iv Take appropriate treaty actions:  a. Amend the Mutual Security Assistance Treaty, to include terrorism as a specific offense.  b. Consider an enhanced request procedure for terrorism offenses under CARICOM Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement.	CARICOM and Member States	2019
	v Revise and simplify the present CARICOM Justice Protection Agreement so as to enhance its practicality and effectiveness.	CARICOM and Member States	2019