DOCTORAL THESIS

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Metaphor and Creativity in British Magazine Advertising

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L I M S

Linguistics in the Midnight Sun

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Metaphor and Creativity
in British Magazine Advertising

Do, do, do, let your heart decide
what you have to do
that's all there is to find
'Cause it takes a fool to remain
sane

Ola Salo, The Ark

Abstract

This thesis is a cognitive linguistic study of the various ways in which conceptual metaphor and related cognitive processes are exploited for creative purposes in advertising texts and accompanying images. The focus is on the elaboration of conventional metaphors and their use as a creative basis, rather than on their mere identification, and although the textual content forms the starting point, significant attention is also paid to the interplay between text and image.

The material consists of advertisements collected from British magazines between the years 1996 and 2002, and is classified into four main categories according to how the metaphorical content is signalled in the advertisement. These categories include polysemous words, idiomatic expressions, metaphorical expressions and metaphor reflected in the combination of text and image. Detailed qualitative analyses of representative advertisements selected from each category are made using tools provided by both conceptual metaphor theory and blending theory, which are seen as complementary theories in line with Grady et al. (1999). Special consideration is given to the roles played by the textual and pictorial components and the complex conceptual structures that are constructed around the metaphorical centre.

Advertisements centred around entrenched cases of metaphor (polysemous words, idiomatic expressions) often rely on puns and ambiguity for their creative effect. This is also the case with less entrenched, but still conventional metaphoric expressions, which also tend to draw on the corresponding non-metaphorical meaning. Apart from the effect of humour or wit, the underlying conventional metaphor is also reactivated and exploited in order to build an argument about the product. The creativity in advertisements where the metaphor is reflected in the combination of text and image, or throughout the text as opposed to an individual word or phrase, typically involves a reconceptualisation of the product. This is achieved by making the product form the target of a novel metaphor, but crucially, this novel metaphor still relies on a conventional metaphor for its construction and interpretation.

Keywords: cognitive linguistics, English, metaphor, metonymy, conceptual blending, advertising, creativity, text-image relations, idioms, polysemy, ambiguity, puns, entrenchment, salience, humour

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I would like to thank the following advertisers for allowing me to reproduce their advertisements:

Plate 4:1: Persil (Richard Holmes, Unilever), Plate 4:2: Financial Times Weekend (Lucy Ellison, Financial Times London), Plate 5:1: Comfort Refresh (Richard Holmes, Unilever), Plate 6:3: Lexus (Bwalya Kangwa, Lexus GB Ltd), Plate 7:2: Canesten Oasis (Juliane Niklaus, Bayer plc.), Plate 7:6: Bausch & Lomb (John Doherty, Visioncare).

The following advertisers have been contacted without receiving a reply, or more than an initial reply:

Plate 4:3: Galaxy (Mars Corporation), Plate 4:5: Cover Girl (Procter & Gamble), Plate 4:6: Garnier Fructis (Garnier), Plate 5:3: Libresse Bodyform (SCA), Plate 5:4: Focus (CIBA Vision Ltd, Plate 6:1: Friskies (Néstle), Plate 6:2 Evian, Plate 7:1: Tampax (Procter & Gamble), Plate 7:3: Minolta, Plate 7:5 Toshiba.

I have not been able to contact the following advertisers:

Plate 4:4: Moulinex, Plate 5:2 Scholl, Plate 6:4 Motilium, Plate 6:5: Heinz Weight Watchers, Plate 7:4: Jacob's.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Metaphor and creativity in advertising

With the arrival of cognitive linguistics almost thirty years ago, and especially the work provided by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), the status of metaphor changed drastically. Within this framework, metaphor is seen as a conceptual process that plays an important part in our structuring and categorisation of the world around us and the reality we perceive and interact with, and as such it is central to the creation of meaning. Metaphor can be found reflected in most of our everyday language and rather than being left behind on the outskirts of linguistic analysis, its ubiquity is made apparent. Much attention has been paid to the role played by metaphor in language in general, but the theory of metaphor has also been applied to the study of literature (e.g. Lakoff & Turner 1989, Gibbs 1994, Goatley 1997) and various types of discourse situations (e.g. Cortazzi & Jin 1999).

Advertising language and the non-linguistic content of the advertising message have over the years received the attention of numerous scholars from a wide range of disciplines. Many works from the late 1970s and early 1980s consist of semiotic analyses influenced by left-wing political ideology and are therefore highly critical of advertising and the consumer society that it feeds upon. Examples of these are Williamson (1978) and Dyer (1982), but there are also linguistic studies at this time that are depreciative of advertising language, among these for example Bolinger (1980) and Hughes (1988). Other works made within a general linguistic framework have a more neutral approach, but few of them devote much time to metaphor, which traditionally was considered to form an insignificant part of language use, confined to the area of rhetoric and seen as violating the rules of language proper. On the few occasions that metaphor is mentioned in these studies, it is usually defined very narrowly and mentioned only briefly.

A number of cognitive linguistic studies of metaphor in advertising have already been made, but there are still important gaps that need to be filled. The most ambitious work so far is Forceville (1996), whose focus is on metaphor reflected pictorially rather than linguistically, although he devotes one section to

examples where one term of the metaphor is reflected in the text and the other term in the image. His theory and terminology is based on Black (1962), whose ideas he convincingly argues are compatible with a cognitive framework. Furthermore, Dąbrowski (2000) identifies four model metaphors and their entailments based on a limited corpus of ads selected from one copy each of three different magazines. His study is limited to the text alone and only goes as far as to categorise a number of conventional metaphors and provide examples of them. In contrast, Ungerer (2000) offers a cognitive linguistic approach to how metaphor and metonymy play a part in advertising at a form of meta-level, by postulating the existence of the metaphor THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A VALUABLE OBJECT and the metonymy GRABBING THE DESIRED OBJECT STANDS FOR DESIRE. In addition, the significance of metaphor and other cognitive tools in advertising is also pointed out by Kövecses (2002:59) and Fauconnier & Turner (2002:65-66).

   This thesis complements previous studies in that it deals with the conventional basis of metaphoric creativity, that is, how conventional mappings are reactivated[1] and elaborated for purposes of attracting attention, creating humour or providing new meaning. The analyses thus go far beyond merely identifying the conventional metaphor reflected in the ads. In addition, the advertised products are in some cases reconceptualised metaphorically, and my attempt here is to examine the various ways in which the novel conceptualisations are built on conventional grounds, rather than to focus on specific products or typical source domains, i.e. what concepts or areas of experience are most often used in order to understand the product or provide it with a certain image. The background assumption is that advertising follows the same cognitive principles as everyday language, but that many processes which are normally unconscious and therefore go largely unnoticed, are in fact highlighted and made more noticeable (Turner 1996:91). The idea that creative language is in essence no different from everyday language is echoed by John Hegarty of the advertising agency Bartle Bogle Hegarty, who is quoted by Aitchison (1999:11):

> Humanity's leapt forward because it was creative; it could think and it could put different thoughts together and come to different conclusions. It's part of

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[1] That is, reactivated in the sense that they are made more visible and are used again as a basis for a more specific and novel conceptual mapping. I do not wish to imply that conceptual metaphors are inactive in our *unconscious* minds. Turner (1996:91) refers to this process in terms of waking up the generic space (see further section 2.3). According to Brône & Feyaerts (in press:32), Jäkel (1997:52ff) talks about this in terms of remotivating an opaque metaphor.

what makes us what we are. It's always odd when people say to me, oh, you're creative, as though you're a different species.

Far from breaking and bending language rules (see e.g. Crystal 1988:132), advertising thus utilises the cognitive potential of language to the full extent, and this thesis investigates some of the ways in which this is achieved.

1.2 Aim and scope

The overall aim of the present work is to supplement previous cognitive linguistic research in the area by providing a detailed qualitative analysis of the creative elaboration of conventional metaphors in British magazine advertising. In particular, the aim is to answer the following three main questions:

- In what ways can the presence of a conventional metaphor be signalled?
- How is it reactivated and used as an input for a creative elaboration?
- What are the effects that result from the creative elaboration of the metaphor?

To be able to account for the intricate conceptual mappings involved in the creative extensions, the analyses rely both on the theory of conceptual metaphor (CMT) and metonymy, as first developed by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), and on the theory of conceptual blending (BT) or conceptual integration as devised by Fauconnier & Turner (1994, 1996, 1998, 2002 etc.). Although the starting point for my investigation is conventional metaphor, it will also be of utmost importance to discuss metonymy here, since metaphorical and metonymical processes are often interrelated and dependent on each other. Conceptual blending is a very general and basic cognitive process that is involved in a variety of conceptual activities, including metaphor, and CMT and BT are understood to be compatible in that they handle different types of processes. While CMT explains conventional systematic correspondences between two conceptual domains, BT accounts for more creative, short-lived and highly context-dependent conceptualisations involving mappings between mental spaces, and it therefore helps us to give a more adequate description of the novel mappings that take place in the creative elaboration of the conventional metaphors. However, the diagrams I include are kept as simple as possible and for the sake of clarity they only illustrate the most important aspects of the analyses, and depending on the nature of the material, some analyses will be more intricate than others.

In some of the ads, both the text and the image are involved in the creative elaboration of the metaphor, and I will address the role played by each component in signalling the creative blend. There is some overlap here with Forceville's verbo-pictorial metaphors (1996:148ff), but the significant difference is that I approach the material from the point of view of conceptual blending. As far as the visual content is concerned, the focus is on how the image relates to the metaphorical content, and not on other features of the layout, e.g. the position of the viewer (cf. Kress & van Leeuwen 1996:139). While the importance of such aspects is recognised, they are not considered relevant to the present investigation.

As far as the creative effect is concerned, it may attract people's attention, create humour, or provide information or some sort of comment about the product. In this respect, and with regard to the theoretical background, my investigation bears some resemblance to the studies of headlines and cartoons made by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press), in that the focus essentially is the same (cf. in press:20), but the analysis is applied to different data. This also means that similarities between advertising and other genres in which text and image work together will be highlighted.

Since this thesis is a qualitative analysis, it is not within its scope to try to determine how frequently metaphor occurs in advertising or in what types of ads it is most likely to occur. The reason for this is first and foremost the fact that metaphor is a graded phenomenon, and merely determining whether a metaphor is present or not is neither sufficient nor particularly interesting. Instead, the aim is to describe what happens in those cases where metaphors *are* involved and no attempt is made to draw any statistical conclusions as to what patterns of creative extension are most frequent.

In addition, it must be emphasised that my aim is to analyse ads in which metaphor and related conceptual processes are reflected in order to find recurrent patterns. It is not my intention to state exactly what features are mapped or which conceptual links are established *each time* a particular blend is deconstructed. I therefore make no claims as to how individual people would interpret the ads, nor am I suggesting that everybody would understand them in exactly the same way. However interesting this aspect might be, it is beyond the scope of my investigation. A satisfactory account would have to be based on the results of carefully designed tests, which involve many practical complications. Instead, I follow the line taken by Steen (1999:59), who states that

> I am dealing with metaphor analysis, not metaphor understanding. Metaphor analysis is a task for the linguist who wishes to describe and explain the

structure and function of language. Metaphor understanding is a cognitive process which is the object of investigation of psycholinguists and discourse psychologists who are conducting behavioral research.

In their analysis of headlines and cartoons, Feyaerts & Brône say that they describe "the optimal (intended) interpretation process" (2002:322), since what is actually projected and whether or not the blend is deconstructed, i.e. understood, depends on many factors, such as situation, context and background knowledge. Similarly, Schroeder (2002:167), has the following to say regarding his analysis of visual communication, including advertising:

> I acknowledge that my image interpretations are one of many – that is what interpretation is all about. Simply because one can generate many interpretations doesn't reduce the usefulness of a carefully considered viewpoint.

In this respect, the analysis of advertising may be compared to the analysis of art, in which background knowledge and training are often essential in order to understand a particular work. For example, Schroeder expresses his frustration at people who claim that Benetton style ads are meaningless, arguing that they contain "substantial semiotic material" (2002:165). Again, parallels may be drawn to surrealistic art, where it is one thing if you have the background knowledge and analytical tools needed to understand it, and quite a different thing if you do not. Still, in either case people may remember the ad or the painting, because of its unconventional, shocking or surreal content. In advertising, however, the message is intended to be understood by as many people as possible.

Finally, this thesis is primarily concerned with the creative metaphorical processes reflected in advertising, and not with particular advertising strategies. While it would be interesting to use different advertising strategies as a starting point and analyse the cognitive processes reflected by them, this is nevertheless beyond the scope of this thesis.

1.3 Material and method

My material consists of ads that were collected from British magazines between the years 1996 and 2002. I have mainly used popular glossy magazines, since these typically have a high content of ads, which also advertise a wide range of products. In addition, they are directed towards a general audience, so that no specialised background knowledge should be needed to interpret them. Another reason for concentrating on popular magazines rather than high-brow magazines is to emphasise the fact that metaphorical and blending processes are inherent in

our cognitive system and there are no special processes involved in understanding metaphor. The ads were selected from both women's and men's magazines, but it should be clearly emphasised that there is no gender perspective to this analysis. The most important reason for using different magazines was to include ads for as large a variety of products and services as possible, and this is also why specific interest magazines occasionally have been used in addition to general interest ones. Since the magazines had to be bought, an important criterion was that they had a high content of ads per copy. Even so, there were copies that still did not yield more than a couple of ads which were deemed to be metaphorical in some way[2]. In addition, one and the same ad was sometimes found in more than one magazine.

Some researchers investigating linguistic aspects of advertising decide in advance exactly what magazines and what specific copies they will use. For instance, this is the method used by Björkvall (2002) in his study of advertising and its model readers. However, this strategy proves more difficult when researching metaphor, because while all ads have typical audiences that they are geared towards, not all ads have metaphorical content. For the purposes of this thesis, collecting ads from a predetermined number of copies of certain magazines might have resulted either in an insufficient number of ads, or ads with a more limited range of creative patterns.

As a first step in the selection procedure, I looked for any ads that displayed metaphorical content, be that in the form of conventional expressions, novel expressions, novel metaphors or any other kind of creative use of conventional metaphors. This resulted in around 400 ads, and the selection was consciously kept wide in order to later determine what types of ads would prove fruitful for a qualitative analysis. Also, when browsing through magazines, it is difficult to quickly decide in what cases there actually is an underlying conventional metaphor present, so the strategy to begin with was to err on the side of being liberal. This posed no difficulty, since there is a documented tendency for researchers to identify more and more metaphors the longer time they spend studying the material (Low 1999:50). As a second step, I then eliminated ads that had a low textual content, with a cut-off point at around 2-3 words, and these ads made up a significant portion of the material collected in the first step. Incidentally, many of these were perfume ads, where the metaphor is reflected in the name of the product (see Vorlat 1985). There are two main reasons for doing

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[2] Note again that my starting point is metaphor, not conceptual blending. It is perfectly possible for blending to be present without metaphor, in ads and elsewhere. Looking for ads that contain conceptual blends of any kind would therefore result in a larger body of material.

this. First, this is a linguistic study, and as a result the focus is naturally on the text. Second, the intention is to complement Forceville's (1996) material, and not to do a repeat study on essentially the same material. I also removed ads that contained a conventional metaphorical expression or a one-shot image metaphor without creative elaborations. Based on the remaining material, I searched for patterns in which a conventional metaphor was reflected and creatively extended, and identified four rough categories that seemed to be of interest for further investigation. Ads that were found to be representative of each category were then selected and analysed in detail.

This type of highly subjective selection procedure is well established within this area of research, and similar ones were also employed by Hermerén (1999), Forceville (1996), Tanaka (1994)[3] and Williamson (1978). According to Low (1999:49), the procedure of unilateral decision, i.e. where the researcher decides what should be included and what should be left out is the one most often used in metaphor identification. Although there inevitably is a certain degree of subjectivity involved in this, whatever disadvantage it constitutes is far outweighed by the obvious advantages. Above all, unilateral decision is much quicker and easier than many other procedures and it allows the researcher to adapt the material to the aim of the project and to use his/her extensive knowledge of the subject area.

It must be pointed out that the four categories I identified, discussed in chapters 4-7, are not completely homogenous and the borders between them are fuzzy, and my aim is therefore to represent different varieties and to include ads for as many different products as possible. The four categories are identified according to the way in which the conventional metaphor is reflected. In language as such, this happens in the form of a polysemous word, an idiomatic expression, or a metaphorical expression (although the image is often of importance for the creative extension). The division is based on a combination of two main criteria, one conceptual and one formal: (i) the level of entrenchment/salience and (ii) whether we are dealing with essentially a word or a more or less fixed phrase. The analysis in chapters 4-6 thus progresses from entrenched words to entrenched phrases to conventional, but less entrenched, phrases. The conventional metaphor may also be reflected in a novel conceptualisation of the product, which is achieved through the combination of text and image. In these ads, discussed in chapter 7, the question of entrenchment is less relevant, since the metaphorical content is not mainly reflected linguistically. However, the ads in 7.4 bear some similarity to the ads in

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[3] This is my assumption, since Tanaka herself makes no comment on her material.

chapter 4, in that they are centred around different senses of a word, but here there is a new conceptualisation involved as well, and this has been an overriding feature when deciding in what chapter to include the different ads.

1.4 Advertising terminology
The advertising terminology will be limited to the following terms:

Headline	Phrase(s) found at the top of an ad.
Caption	Phrases (s) found in close proximity to an image.
Body copy (or copy)	A piece of smaller text, often containing the main information.

1.5 Typographic conventions

Linguistic forms	Italics: *heavy*
Meanings of linguistic forms	Single inverted commas: 'difficult'
References to real-world entities	Ordinary words: difficulties
Quotations	Double inverted commas: "…."
Emphasis	Italics: *target*
Cognitive domains	Small caps: JOURNEY
Mental spaces	Small caps: DRIVING A LEXUS CAR
Conceptual metaphors	Small caps: LIFE IS A JOURNEY
Conceptual metonymies	Small caps: PART FOR WHOLE
Schemas	Initial capital: Container
Elements in mental spaces	Single inverted commas: 'butcher' (Only when making a distinction, otherwise in ordinary words.)

Diagrams:

Correspondences between elements	Straight line: ———
Projection of elements	Curved dotted line: ⌢
Conventional mapping	Straight dotted line: – – – – –

CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

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2.1 Introduction

This thesis is written within the framework of cognitive linguistics, which entered the scene around 30 years ago and has since rapidly developed into a major school of linguistics, with its own association, journal and biennial conferences. Although not an entirely homogenous movement, the shared assumption is summarised in the following way by Barcelona (2002:2):

> …the so-called "language faculty" is just a reflection, in some cases a specialization, of general-purpose cognitive abilities, and is governed by general neural processes. […] there is a continuum between all sorts of cognition (especially body-based cognition, but also cognition acquired on the basis of social and cultural experience) and language, there being little ground for claiming that language, let alone syntax, is a separate "module" in the mind or in the brain.

As a result, no sharp boundaries are recognised between the traditional areas of linguistic study, such as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and even syntax and semantics. The theoretical discussion provided in this chapter is far from exhaustive, but is intended to give an overview of the issues that are of importance for the later analyses. In particular, it will be centred around different types of conceptual processes, because although I take metaphor as a starting point, its use as a basis for creativity cannot be treated without also involving metonymy and conceptual blending. This will be preceded by a condensed account of the general view of language and meaning in cognitive linguistics. The focus here is on general theoretical issues, including basic terminology, which are of importance throughout the analyses, while more specific topics are discussed in relation to the relevant chapters. The only minor exception is polysemy, which is addressed in chapter 4 despite the fact that it is also relevant to the analyses in other chapters, especially chapter 6. The reason is that it ties in with a discussion of ambiguity, which in turn is directly connected to the discussion of puns and humour.

2.2 A cognitive view of language and meaning

As already mentioned, language is not considered to form an autonomous system according to cognitive linguists. This is based on the assumption that there is no God's eye view of reality and that meaning has to be created through human conceptualisation and experience, rather than being the property of words and reflecting an objective reality and truth. This philosophy that the human mind is embodied is labelled experiential realism by Lakoff (1987:xv), and it runs contrary to an objectivist view of the world (cf. Johnson 1987).

Since meaning is understood to be created through our experiences and the interaction with the world around us, as mediated through our bodies and our perceptual system, it follows that categorisation is a key concept in cognitive linguistics. Lakoff (1987) writes:

> Categorization is not a matter to be taken lightly. There is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech. (Lakoff 1987:5)
>
> An understanding of how we categorize is central to any uderstanding of how we think
> and how we function, and therefore central to an understanding of what makes us human. (Lakoff 1987:6)

The process of categorisation is conceptual in nature and largely unconscious. The categories created by this process are not discrete, static and easily defined, but are characterised by fuzzy edges, a dynamic structure and a prototypical distribution of its members[4].

However, the notion that meaning is created through the experiencing individual   must not be confused with the extreme subjectivist standpoint of absolute relativism. The individual mind does not operate in isolation from the culture and society we live in, and there will therefore be some constraints on our mental representations. Langacker (1997:233) writes:

> Far from being detached and autonomous, the mind is identified with aspects of the functioning of the human body, which is fundamentally alike for all indiviuals and thus both creates and delimits a common range of potential experience. Individuals also function in a real world – likewise the same for everyone in basic respects – which shapes and constrains experience and cognitive development. Thus, since abstract conceptions and imagined worlds are ultimately grounded in real-world bodily experience, the products of all minds and even the most diverse cultures are to a certain extent commensurable and mutually accessible.

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[4] For a detailed discussion of categorisation, see e.g. Lakoff (1987) and Taylor (1995).

The experientialist account thus combines aspects of both objectivism and subjectivism, which is summarised by Lakoff & Johnson (1980:228) as follows:

> In summary, we see the experientialist myth as capable of satisfying the real andreasonable concerns that have motivated the myths of both subjectivism and objectivism but without either the objectivist obsession with absolute truth or the subjectivist insistence that imagination is totally unrestricted.

It thus follows that, instead of having clearly defined meanings inherent in themselves, words are understood as representing conceptual categories. These categories include encyclopaedic information, and as a result, meaning is open-ended and naturally fuzzy. Meaning is always dependent on context, and what traditionally are regarded as matters of pragmatics are always relevant to some extent. The traditional distinction between semantics and pragmatics therefore has no place or function in the cognitive framework, and whenever the term semantics is used it should be understood as referring to meaning in general, and not specifically word or sentence meaning. This is summed up by Langacker (1987:154) in the following way:

> The distinction between semantics and pragmatics (or between linguistic knowledge and extralinguistic knowledge) is largely artefactual, and the only viable conception of linguistic semantics is one that avoids such false dichotomies and is consequently **encyclopaedic** in nature. (Langacker 1987:154, his emphasis)

2.3 Metaphor
2.3.1 The basics of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT)

The notion of experiential realism and the view of language as representing our conceptual system is directly linked to the work on metaphor carried out by Lakoff & Johnson (1980)[5]. They put forward the then revolutionary idea that metaphor is a cognitive rather than a linguistic phenomenon, and that the metaphorical expressions we find in language merely reflect the metaphors that exist at a conceptual level. In support of their argument, they presented an analysis of a large number of words and phrases from the English language, which clearly showed the systematicity of metaphorical concepts. For example,

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[5] It should be pointed out that the conceptual theory of metaphor has developed considerably, and is now partly characterised as a neural theory of metaphor, that is, a theory primarily based on neuroscientific evidence rather than purely linguistic analysis (Lakoff & Johnson 1999:47-48).

they demonstrated that the conceptual domain of ARGUMENT is structured in terms of WAR based on linguistic evidence such as the following:

(1) Your claims are *indefensible*.
He *attacked every weak point* in my argument.
His criticisms were *right on target*.
I *demolished* his argument.
If you use that *strategy*, he'll *wipe you out*.

<div align="right">(Lakoff & Johnson 1980:4)</div>

Here, WAR is understood to be the source domain, which is mapped onto the target domain of ARGUMENT. A conceptual mapping is a set of correspondences between elements in the two domains, where the source is a more concrete concept and the target a more abstract one. In this case, mapping knowledge from the domain of WAR onto the domain of ARGUMENTS allows us to reason about one in terms of the other (Lakoff 1993:207). As regards terminology, the conceptual mapping is referred to by the term "metaphor", while the terms and phrases that reflect the conceptual metaphor in language are referred to as "metaphorical expressions". This is an unconventional use of the term metaphor, but a conscious one, since it emphasises the notion that metaphor essentially is a cognitive phenomenon (Lakoff 1993:209).

The conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is far from being an isolated example. In fact, Lakoff & Johnson claim that our conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical and that it not only influences our language, but also our everyday activities and our interaction with other people. In short, they are concepts we live by (1980:3). This can clearly be seen in relation to another metaphor, namely TIME IS MONEY:

(2) You're *wasting* my time.
This gadget will *save* you hours.
I don't *have* the time to *give* you.
How do you *spend* your time these days?
That flat tire *cost* me an hour.
I've *invested* a lot of time in her.
etc.

<div align="right">(Lakoff & Johnson 1980:7-8)</div>

Apart from being reflected in language, this conceptual metaphor is firmly based in our culture and society, where we normally are paid according to how many hours we work.

Lakoff & Johnson (1980) also identify different categories of metaphor, where our first example, ARGUMENT IS WAR is classified as a structural metaphor, i.e. one that structures one concept in terms of another more clearly

delineated concept. Other types of metaphor include orientational metaphors, which are grounded in our physical and cultural experience of spatial relations. For example, the corresponding metaphors CONSCIOUS IS UP and UNCONSCIOUS IS DOWN are based on the fact that people (and many animals for that matter) lie down when they sleep and rise again when they wake up (1980:15). There are also ontological metaphors, which involve the understanding of our experiences of unbounded events. Emotions and ideas are understood as entities or substances, and are grounded in our experience of physical objects (1980:25). An example of such a metaphor is THE MIND IS A MACHINE, which is reflected in linguistic expressions like *My mind just isn't operating today* and *I'm a little rusty today* (1980:27). In addition, there are also image-schema metaphors, which map limited skeletal information from the source onto the target. An example is the In-Out schema, which is metaphorically extended in *I'm out of money*. Image schemas may also be involved in forming other concepts, such as the concept of a JOURNEY, which is partly structured by the Motion schema (Kövecses 2002:37). Metaphorical processes thus allow us to understand abstract categories and concepts via categories and concepts that are more directly grounded in our bodily experiences, which means that essentially the same mechanisms are involved in metaphorical language as in non-metaphorical language.

However, metaphor is a graded phenomenon, and there is a fuzzy area in between clear cases of subcategorisation and clear cases of metaphor. The example provided by Lakoff & Johnson (1980:84) is AN ARGUMENT IS A FIGHT, where it is not entirely clear whether we would consider an argument as a type of fight, i.e. a subcategory, or as being understood in terms of a fight, i.e. metaphor, and where this might vary from person to person and from situation to situation. Lakoff & Johnson (1980:85) therefore assume that there is a continuum between subcategorisation and metaphor, and if it is not clear whether A and B are the same kind of thing or activity, then the relationship A is B falls somewhere in the middle of the continuum.

2.3.2 Background
The view that metaphor essentially is a cognitive tool differs markedly from the traditional view[6], and of course rests on the fundamentally opposing view of the nature of language and meaning held by cognitive linguists, which was discussed in the previous section. Language is traditionally regarded as an autonomous

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[6] I mainly refer to the substitution and comparison views of metaphor, with the interaction view occupying the middle ground between the traditional and the cognitive view.

system, in which words have clearly defined and delineated meanings. These are understood to be properties of the words themselves, and there is no need to access extra-linguistic or encyclopaedic meaning unless in special cases, such as metaphor. Metaphorical language thus represents a deviation from normal everyday language use and is merely seen as a figure of speech, and an issue of pragmatics rather than semantics. This also means that special processes are assumed to be required in order to understand it. Its interpretation is thought to be reached via literal language, which is understood to take priority over metaphorical language (cf. Searle 1979/1993:103). Conventional meaning is included in the semantic properties of a word, so the examples of conceptual metaphor discussed above would not even be considered to be metaphorical. Instead, they would be regarded as instances of so-called "dead" metaphor[7]. The traditional assumption that meaning and truth reside in literal language[8] affects not only the importance attached to metaphor, but also that associated with visual communication. This issue is discussed in more depth in section 7.2.

Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) work was not the first to draw attention to the systematic correspondances between different experiential domains. They were strongly influenced by Reddy's (1979/1993) investigation of the CONDUIT metaphor, which shows how lingustic communication is understood in terms of sending and receiving parcels. Earlier still, the idea that metaphor is linked to understanding and the creation of new insight was presented by Black (1962), a linguist adhering to the interaction view of metaphor, who later on explicitly stated that metaphors are cognitive instruments (Black 1979/1993:39). One of the most striking differences between the two approaches is that the interactionists focus on novel metaphorical expressions, and this is the main reason why Forceville (1996) uses Black's theory as a basis for his analysis of pictorial metaphor in advertising (see further section 3.4). Even so, he understands it to be basically compatible with the cognitive view of language, which Indurkhya (1992:81) claims is "much closer to interactionism than they are willing to admit". Another difference is that, according to the interaction view, the projection of features is bidirectional, which means that it may occur from target to source as well as from source to target. As will become evident in section 2.5, conceptual blending moves away from the notion of unidirectionality, but without embracing bidirectionality. Instead, "it offers a

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[7] In this context, I wish to emphasise again that when I speak of reactivating a metaphor, what I mean is making the conventional and largely unconscious metaphorical mapping more visible again by creating a situation where attention is drawn to it and it is brought back to the surface (see section 2.5).
[8] For more details on what they term the Literal Meaning Theory, see Lakoff & Turner (1989:114ff).

refined version of the unidirectionality thesis" (Barcelona 2000:8), by suggesting that features from the two input spaces are projected onto a third, blended space. The interaction view is rejected by Lakoff & Turner (1989:131-133) and it is partly criticised by Gibbs (1994:239ff) on psycholinguistic grounds.

2.3.3 A closer look at conceptual metaphor

Returning now to the cognitive view, let us take a look at some of the more specific aspects concerning conceptual metaphor. First of all, it must be mentioned that metaphors are sometimes hierarchically organised in relation to each other, with higher-level and lower-level metaphors, or to use different terms, generic-level and specific-level metaphors. Returning to the metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY, it is found at a specific level, together with the metaphor A CAREER IS A JOURNEY. These in turn inherit the structure of the metaphor A PURPOSEUL LIFE IS A JOURNEY, which is found in the middle of the hierarchy, below the event structure metaphor, which occupies the highest position. There is also a cultural aspect to these hierarchies, in that the higher up we get, the more common the metaphor is, and the lower we get, the more limited it is to a specific culture (Lakoff 1993:222-225).

It is important to understand that the mappings between two domains are only partial, and highlight certain aspects of the target. As an example of this, Lakoff & Johnson (1980:52-53) mention the metaphor THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS, in which the foundation and the outer shell of the source domain concept are used to structure the target, while other parts such as corridors and rooms make up the unused part of the metaphor. This partiality is natural and expected, because if the mapping were total, then the two concepts would merge into one and the same and become identical (1980:13). When discussing mappings, a distinction is also made between ontological correspondences and entailments, which are based on epistemic correspondences. Ontological correspondences are correspondences between entities, which in the metaphor ANGER IS FIRE include those between fire and anger, the thing burning and the angry person, the cause of the fire and the cause of the anger, and so on. Epistemic correspondences, on the other hand, are correspondences between knowledge about the source domain and knowledge about the target domain. For example, we know that fire is dangerous to things nearby and that angry people pose a threat to other people (Lakoff 1987:384-389).

The reason why mappings are partial and hence why certain entailments are not possible is explained by the invariance principle[9], which was first introduced by Lakoff (1990), and defined by Lakoff (1993:215) as follows:

> Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive typology (That is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain.

For example, according to the metaphor ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS, reflected in the phrase *to give someone a kick*, we conceive of actions in terms of objects that can be given and received. In the source domain, the objects that are given to somebody continue to exist, usually in the possession of the receiver, but this feature will not be mapped onto the target. This limitation is due to our image-schematic knowledge of actions, more specifically that they only exist while they occur. As a result of this, we do not talk about someone getting a kick and keeping it (Lakoff 1993:216). Another example is provided by Barcelona (2000:4) in relation to the metaphor TIME IS MONEY. In the source domain, it is perfectly possible to give somebody money and then get it back, and not just an equivalent amount, but the very same notes or coins. When talking about time, the corresponding situation is impossible. We can give somebody an hour back, but not the exact same one, such as last Tuesday between two and three o'clock in the afternoon. This constraint again has to do with the basic structure of the target domain, which includes the knowledge that time constantly passes by and that we cannot rewind it.

According to Kövecses (2002:103), a similar limitation holds in relation to the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY. When taking alternative routes in the source domain, we can always change our minds and go back the same way we came if the road turns out to lead to somewhere we do not want to go, or indeed nowhere. The routes in the source domain of JOURNEY correspond to choices in the target domain of LIFE, and here it is not always possible to backtrack, especially if we are dealing with choices that are linked to a certain timespan. For example, if we decide to watch a particular movie at eight o'clock and end up disappointed with it, we cannot go back and choose a different movie at the same time. While this of course is true, this particular example is somewhat problematic. It is clear that the domain of LIFE is closely connected to the domain of TIME, and what limits the mapping in Kövecses's example has more to to with the structure of TIME than with the structure of LIFE. In fact, the idea of

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[9] The invariance principle is sometimes referred to as the invariance hypothesis, cf. e.g. Kövecses (2002:103), Barcelona (2000:4).

going back and choosing a different road is indeed transferred to the target domain in many cases, as is evident from metaphorical expressions such as *I'm not getting anywhere* and *I have to go back and start all over again*. These are possible despite the fact that time cannot stand still and that time cannot be turned back, because in these cases the PROGRESS aspect of LIFE is more involved than the TIME aspect. It is important to note that even though we talk about the target domain as being structured by the source domain, this does not prevent the target from having some basic structure of its own. On the contrary, it has to have some sort of independent structure, because domains without structure would presumably not be recognised as domains at all. It would be like imagining a building without any kind of rudimentary frame – it would not be a building at all but a heap of rubble.

This might seem very logical, but it is worth clarifying, since it forms one of the points of criticism brought forward by advocates of the interaction view. Indurkhya (1992:82-83) claims that the cognitive approach cannot handle similarity-creating metaphors[10], because if the target has independent structure[11], which it must have, then the metaphoric mapping simply consists of matching similarities that are already present. This conclusion is not correct, and his mistake basically lies in assuming that a domain either has a rich structure or no structure at all, but as we have seen there are many variants in between. What is crucial here is that the target domain, like all conceptual domains, has basic or image-schematic structure, but is more abstract and hence less detailed than the source domain. The metaphorical mapping fills in the gaps, as it were, and is needed for us to be able to understand and experience the target. It is therefore possible for similarities to be created despite the fact that the target has independent pre-existing structure. However, these similarities are perceived similarities, i.e. they do not exist objectively, but are "*similarities as experienced by people*" (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:154).

Conceptual metaphors have been proven to be psychologically valid (Gibbs 1994:161ff), and it has also been established that they require no extra processing effort to be understood (Gibbs 1994:232). This runs contrary to the claim made by Sperber & Wilson (1986/1995, 1987), who acknowledge that

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[10] The recognition of similarity-creating metaphors is one of the ways in which the interactionist view differs from the traditional view (substitution or comparison), according to which all similarities are objective (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980:154).
[11] Despite the fact that it was explicitly introduced by Lakoff (1990), Indurkhya does not seem to be familiar with the invariance principle. He states that "the Lakoffian approach has to admit that the target has a structure that is independent of any metaphorical structuring, so that it can be used as a constraint to determine which metaphors work and which ones do not…" (1992:83).

metaphor requires no special interpretive *abilities* or *procedures*, but still consider metaphor to be a form of loose talk that involves more cognitive *effort* to be understood (1986/1995:236-237). They also take the view that there is a larger gap involved between thought and language in the case of metaphorical utterances compared to literal utterances (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995:231-232), which seems to be based on a confusion between what they think is a gap between thought and language with the conceptual leap involved between the source and the target domain of a metaphor. Since a metaphorical mapping is only partial, there is some conceptual distance between the source and the target, i.e. they are not identical. However, the metaphorical language actually reflects the target concept to the same extent as an instance of literal language resembles the domain it relates to. Interestingly enough, Lakoff & Johnson highlight this fact by occasionally, and perhaps confusingly, referring to conventional metaphorical expressions as "literal" (cf. 1980:5). What they mean is that the metaphor is largely unconscious, and the language we use is so conventional that we think of it as being literal (1980:5). Later on, Lakoff (1993:204-205) points out that the use of the term "literal" is somewhat problematic, since it is associated with the traditional theory of metaphor where meanings were understood to be contained in the words themselves, and where metaphor involved an unconventional use of these words. Instead, he suggests we use the term to refer to meanings that are not dependent on a conceptual metaphor, i.e. meanings that are understood directly against one cognitive domain.

2.3.4 Novel metaphor

The type of novel metaphor that is of special interest to proponents of the interaction view is mentioned in Lakoff & Johnson's original work, but is later discussed in more detail by Lakoff & Turner (1989). They argue that creative metaphors are dependent on the conventional system, and that there are various ways in which conventionalised metaphors can be exploited. One such strategy is to extend the metaphor and include aspects that are left out in the original partial mapping. Although we conventionally understand DEATH in terms of SLEEP, we do not map the possibility of dreaming from the source to the target, but this is exactly what Shakespeare does in Hamlet's soliloquy. A conventional metaphor may also be elaborated, which is the case in Horace's reference to death as the "eternal exile of the raft". This expression reflects the conventional metaphor DEATH IS DEPARTURE, but elaborates it by including specific details about the type and means of departure, i.e. exile and raft. It does not add any features, as in the previous example, but instead adds detail. Describing the

departure in terms of exile helps us understand how death is viewed, that is, as something involuntary that is enforced upon us, and the choice of a raft as the mode of transport implies that there is no destination, or in other words, no afterlife (Lakoff & Turner 1989:67-69). Novel metaphorical expressions can also be created based on generic-level metaphors, such as EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, which has the possibility of making non-agents into agents. This process is for example reflected in *Time is a devourer*, and is closely related to personification, which will be discussed in 7.3 (Lakoff & Turner 1989:82). In addition, there is a type of novel metaphor that is not based on the conventional mapping of one conceptual structure onto another, but rather on one mental image being superimposed on another. These metaphors may be contrasted with generic-level metaphors, in that they involve highly specific details rather than gestalt structures. They are therefore referred to as one-shot image metaphors, and a popular example is when we say that a woman's waist is an hourglass, which involves mapping the image of an hourglass onto the image of a woman, fitting the middle of the hourglass to her waist (Lakoff & Turner 1989:89-91). While many one-shot metaphors are found in literature and poetry, it is clear from this example that they also may be conventional. This can be compared to the status of conceptual blends, which are typically associated with creative language use, but may in fact become entrenched and conventional (Fauconnier & Turner 1998:161).

As a result of the focus being placed on conventional metaphorical mappings in the discussion of conceptual metaphor theory, the two terms conventional and conceptual are often used interchangeably, as if they were synonyms. It is therefore important to emphasise that novel metaphors and one-shot image metaphors also are conceptual in nature (Lakoff (1993:229, Gibbs 1994:259, Steen 1999:59), but since the latter are highly specific they do not help us organise our experiences in the same way as a mapping involving a rich source domain such as JOURNEY (Gibbs 1994:259). This means that although an expression such as *He's got a lot of spare tyres around his waist* is conventional, it is not based on a systematic mapping between two domains. Instead, it is the result of one mental image being mapped onto another, and this type of mapping is not involved in our daily reasoning (Lakoff & Turner 1989:91).

The main difference between the novel metaphors discussed in this section and the creative use of conventional metaphor found in my material, is that the latter does not involve novel metaphorical linguistic expressions as such. Instead, it typically, but not in all cases, relies on making a conventional metaphorical language literal and then adding to it. Metaphor and creativity will

therefore be further discussed in relation to conceptual blending (section 2.5) and in relation to novel conceptualisations in ads (section 7.3).

2.4 Metonymy

Although recognised as a conceptual process similar to metaphor, metonymy initially received comparatively little attention, which is illustrated by the fact that Lakoff & Johnson only devote one short chapter to it (1980:35-40). From the late 1990s onwards, however, it has been the object of increasing interest, and its significance is now widely recognised. It is even claimed that metonymy might constitute a more basic cognitive process than metaphor (e.g. Taylor 1995:124, Barcelona 2000b:4, etc.).

Traditionally, metonymy is understood as a figure of speech and is sometimes defined as a subclass of metaphor, since they are both considered to involve the substitution of one term for another[12]. Alternatively, the view is taken that metaphor and metonymy form opposites of one another, and are thought to represent different relations within lexical fields. While metaphor is based on a paradigmatic relationship, where one term replaces another based on similarity, metonymy involves a syntagmatic relationship, in that one term replaces another based on contiguity (cf. Gibbs 1994: 321).

The notion of contiguity is reflected in the cognitive view, in that it generally is understood as a conceptual mapping within one and the same domain. The original definition provided by Lakoff & Johnson (1980:36) is given below.

> Metaphor and metonymy are different *kinds* of processes. Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another, and its primary function is understanding. Metonymy, on the other hand, has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to *stand for* another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves the function of providing understanding.

From this, it follows that apart from the system of conventional metaphor, there is also a system of conventional metonymic mappings, and these are in turn reflected not only in language, but also in the way we think and act. For example, the metonym THE FACE FOR THE PERSON is linguistically refelcted in the following expressions, borrowed from Lakoff & Johnson (1980:37).

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[12] However, as pointed out by Radden & Kövecses (1999:17), traditional rhetoric actually used conceptual notions, such as cause-for-effect, when dealing with metonymy.

(3) She's just a *pretty face*.
There are an *awful lot of faces* out there in the audience.
We neeed some *new faces* around here.

However, it is also apparent in other ways that we conceive of people in terms of their faces. For example, the pictures we keep of our loved ones often show only their faces, and not the rest of their bodies, but are still considered to be adequate representations. If the opposite was the case and the picture only showed the lower half of a persons body, it would be thought of as a mistake and considered strange (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:37). Metonymic mappings also form hierarchies, where one may be derived from the other. In the case of THE FACE FOR THE PERSON, it forms an instantiation of the more general mapping THE PART FOR THE WHOLE.

The referential function of metonymy as emphasised by Lakoff & Johnson (1980:36) is also apparent in the work of Langacker (1993), who treats metonymy as part of the general phenomenon of reference-point constructions. These involve a cognitive process that allows the metonymic expression to pick up one salient entity, which then directs us to another entity that is less accessible. This ability is of importance not only for cognition, but also in terms of communication, in that we can direct the addressee's attention to the relevant target (1993:30). Langacker also discusses metonymy in relation to a phenomenon he labels active zones, and I will return to this in section 4.2 when I discuss polysemy.

Croft (1993:348-349), however, stresses the referential function of metonymy, and suggests that we treat metonymy in terms of domain highlighting, since focus is shifted to a salient aspect of a domain, for example the work of Proust rather than Proust the person in the example *Proust is tough to read*. However, the process of highlighting does not in itself guarantee metonymy, at least if we assume that metonymy has to involve reference to separate entities. This is evident from a sentence such as *This book is heavy*, which clearly highlights the physical aspects of the actual object instead of its informative content[13], but where these two are intrinsically related. Croft (1993:350) therefore concludes that there is a continuum between cases where there clearly are separate entities involved, i.e. metonymy, and cases where vaguer and more closely connected aspects are involved. The latter is referred to by Cruse (1986) as contextual modality, and these phenomena will also be further discussed in section 4.2.

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[13] *This book is heavy* may of course also have a metaphorical reading.

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A very ambitious attempt to formulate a coherent theoretical framework of conceptual metonymy is made by Kövecses & Radden (1998) and Radden & Kövecses (1999), who give the following, slightly adjusted, definition of metonymy:

> Metonymy is a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle, provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same idealized cognitive model. (Radden & Kövecses 1999:21)

As pointed out by Barcelona (2000:33), this definition puts focus on the cognitive role of metonymy, which is more general than its referential function, and allows us to see what different types of metonymy have in common. Another important point made by Radden & Kövecses is that unlike metaphorical mappings, metonymic mappings may be reversed (1999:22). For example, THE WHOLE THING FOR PART OF THE THING, as reflected in the use of America for 'The United States', can be reversed into PART OF THE THING FOR THE WHOLE THING, as in England for 'Great Britain' (1999:31). This metonymy represents the first of the two general configurations they identify:

(i) Whole ICM and its part(s)
(ii) Parts of an ICM

The main difference between the two categories is that the first type of relation typically applies to things and their parts, while the second type concerns the relation between entities within an event, more specifically between relations and participants (1999:30). An example of the latter include CONTAINER FOR CONTENTS as in *The bottle is sour*, when it in fact is the milk inside the bottle that is bad, or the classic example *The kettle is boiling*, when in fact the water inside the kettle is boiling. This metonymy may also be reversed as CONTENTS FOR CONTAINER, as in *The milk tipped over* (1999:41).

Moreover, Kövecses & Radden (1999) investigate the cognitive principles that govern the choice of vehicle in default cases, which they base on Langacker's ideas about relative salience. Since these principles are grounded in our experiences as human beings, how we perceive the world, and how our concepts are linked to the culture we live in, it follows for example that humans take precedence over non-humans, e.g. CONTROLLER FOR CONTROLLED (1999:44-45). However, these principles may be violated for social-communicative reasons or in order to produce a rhetorical effect (1999:52-53). For example, the metonymy PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT, which is listed as non-

reversible by Radden & Kövecses (1999:39), is actually reversed in the Michelin blend discussed in section 2.5.

Despite the fact that metaphor and metonymy are understood as different kinds of processes, the interrelation between the two has long been recognised, starting with the investigation of conceptualisations of anger carried out by Kövecses (1986) and Lakoff (1987:381ff). However, Barcelona (2000:42, 45-49) goes as far as to suggest that all metaphors are metonymically motivated, and that one kind of metonymic motivation involves the constraint imposed by the target domain on the choice of source domain for a metaphorical mapping, or in other words, the invariance principle (cf. Lakoff 1990). Also, since domains are naturally fuzzy, it may be difficult for that reason to determine whether we are dealing with a mapping within one domain or a mapping across two domains. This leads some linguists (e.g. Ruiz de Mendoza 2000:115) to regard the relation between metaphor and metonymy as a continuum, rather than completely separate phenomena[14].

The discussion of metonymy provided in this section cannot be exhaustive, as it has been intended as an introductory overview only. In particular, it has been the purpose to demonstrate how metonymy relates to metaphor, and hence to emphasise that it must not be overlooked in a discussion of metaphor and conceptual blending. The relationship between the different cognitive processes will be made further clear in the next section, when we turn our attention to conceptual blending, which, unlike metaphor and metonymy, deals with mental spaces rather than conceptual domains.

2.5 Conceptual blending

The theory of conceptual blending or integration was originally devised by Fauconnier & Turner (1994) and then developed through numerous articles (Fauconnier & Turner 1996, 1998, 1999, 2003 etc., Turner & Fauconnier 1995, 1999, 2000), with the most comprehensive account to date given in *The Way We Think* (2002). The fundamentals of blending as described below can be found in these and in the works of other scholars in the area, for example Grady et al. (1999), Coulson & Oakley (2000) and Coulson (2001), which the reader is referred to for a more thorough account of the theory than the one provided below[15].

[14] In fact, this runs parallel to the difficulty in distinguishing between metaphor and subcategorisation, which were said to form endpoints on a continuum (see 2.3.1). It would therefore be quite logical to assume the same regarding the relationship between metaphor and metonymy.
[15] The theory of conceptual blending is extremely complex and covers a wide range of linguistic and non-linguistic phenomena. As a result, only the issues that are most

Conceptual blending is described as a general and basic cognitive process that operates in a wide variety of conceptual activities, including categorisation, counterfactual reasoning, analogy, metonymy and metaphor. This means that blending processes are more basic than, and in fact form a prerequisite for, other types of conceptual projection, including metaphor (Fauconnier & Turner 1994:3-4). Compared to the relatively stable and systematic relationship between domains in metaphorical mappings, blending usually involves novel, on-line conceptualisations. Instead of domains, it builds on the notion of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985/1994), which are temporary mental constructs that are more limited and specific than domains[16]. Like domains, mental spaces are internally structured by frames[17] (Fauconnier 1997:12, cf. Fillmore 1985), which represent the activity and event structure in the space, such as the entities that participate in the scenario and the relations that hold between them (Fauconnier & Turner 1998:163). There are typically four mental spaces involved in a blend, namely two input spaces, a generic space and a blended space. Instead of involving unidirectional mappings from one domain to another, selected information is projected from both input spaces to the blended space where it is integrated and where novel structure can emerge. This means that meaning created in the blended space may not necessarily have been projected from the source space alone (see the butcher-as-surgeon example below). It is possible for the two input spaces to be related as source and target, and it is in this respect that the four-space model can be said to subsume the two-domain model in conceptual metaphor theory. The generic space contains structure shared by the two inputs, and thus represents what the two inputs have in common, which is a requirement for them to be involved in the blend in the first place. Not surprisingly, the generic space is often rather abstract, with a structure that is limited to an image-schematic level, including unspecified elements and relations between them. The blended space does not simply involve the combination or mixing of the two inputs, comparable to the contents of two jars being poured into a third, but forms a middle space set up for cognitive purposes. The input spaces are still

relevant to my subsequent analyses will be discussed here. Criticism of the theory can be found in e.g. Gibbs (2000) and Bell (2002). A response to the former is given in the same volume by Coulson & Oakley (2000).

[16] However, in specific cases it might be difficult to decide whether we are dealing with a domain or a mental space. I will assume that there is no sharp distinction between them, and this is also the reason why I use small caps as a notation for both constructs.

[17] Fauconnier (1997:12) seems to make no essential distinction between a schema, an ICM, and a frame, but he appears to associate frames with events, especially verbal ones. However, in a footnote he says that "[f]rames of this kind can be very schematic or more specific, depending on how far we delve into our knowledge base to take into account contextual specifications".

there after the blend has been constructed, so that all four spaces are active at the same time.

Let us illustrate how this works by considering a recurrent example in the literature, namely the metaphorical expression *This surgeon is a butcher* (see figure 2:1 below), which is discussed by for example Grady et al. (1999:103-106). The vital aspect of the meaning of this statement is that the surgeon is incompetent, and this is the very reason why we cannot explain it as the result of a direct mapping from a source domain of BUTCHERY to a target domain of SURGERY. That would have to imply that butchers by definition are incompetent, which is hardly the case. On the contrary, most of them probably do their job to a high standard and some may even be experts, so the notion of incompetence must ultimately rest on a contrast between the two professional categories, which only emerges when elements from the two inputs are projected onto the blended space. The first input space, which corresponds to the source[18], is the BUTCHERY space, which contains two roles, that of butcher and that of commodity, which is played by an animal. The instrument involved is a meat cleaver and the activity takes place in an abattoir. The goal is to cut up and disjoint meat, i.e. ultimately to provide food, and the means of doing this is butchery. In the second input space, the two roles correspond to those of surgeon and patient, the instrument is a scalpel, the location is an operating theatre and the goal is healing by means of surgery. The generic space contains the structure shared by the two inputs, that is, the roles of agent and undergoer, a sharp instrument, a location, and a procedure.

There is a partial projection of features from the two inputs to the blended space. From the source space, we get the role of butcher and the means of butchery, whereas the identity and role of patient, the operating theatre as a location, and the goal of healing are projected. We thus end up with a situation in the blend where a surgeon is trying to heal a patient using the means of butchery, and this clash is what leads us to infer that the surgeon is incompetent. Note again that all four spaces are still active after the blend has been constructed, and that features projected from the inputs to the blend still exist in the inputs. This is what I referred to earlier when stating that blending does not involve pouring the contents of two different jars into a third. The mappings and projections are

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[18] Rather confusingly, some blending theorists posit the target space as the first input and the source space as the second input, for example Grady et al. (1999). It must be assumed that the reason is to maintain the same order as in the corresponding formalised metaphor, which in this case would be SURGERY IS BUTCHERY. I will be consistent in adopting the reverse order, since it feels intuitively more correct for the source to come first. For the purpose of the analysis of the blend, the order has no real significance.

represented by dotted lines in the diagram, while counterpart connections between elements in the two inputs are represented by solid lines. Crucially, these are connections that are established as a result of a matching between the inputs and are not to be understood as projections, since these only occur from the inputs to the blend (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 2002:46-47).

Figure 2:1. The SURGEON-BUTCHER blend.[19]

The notion of incompetence that arises in the surgeon-as-butcher blend is referred to as the emergent structure or content, i.e. meaning or inferences that do not exist in either of the input spaces. Such emergent structure is created

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[19] It must be kept in mind that diagrams like these can never explain the full extent of the conceptual processes that are involved. Cf. Fauconnier & Turner (2002:46): "While this static way of illustrating aspects of conceptual integration is convenient for us, such a diagram is really just a snapshot of an imaginative and complicated process that can involve deactivating previous connections, reframing previous spaces, and other actions. We think of the lines in this diagram […] as corresponding to neural coactivations and bindings".

through three processes, namely composition, completion and elaboration[20]. The first involves the projection of features to the blend, where they may be organised in a way which yields new relations that do not exist in the inputs. Projected elements that form counterparts in the inputs may for example be fused in the blend, as when the identity of the surgeon and the role of the butcher were associated with the same person in the blend. As pointed out by Grady et al. (1999:107), this scenario is not, and need not be, realistic. It is also possible for a frame from a more concrete input space to organise elements from a more abstract one. This happens in an example discussed by Coulson & Oakley (2000:180), which consists of a bumper sticker with the text *My karma ran over my dogma*[21]. Here, an accident frame organises the abstract notions of karma and dogma in such a way that they play the roles of a car and a dog in a scenario where the car runs over the dog. In the process of completion, background information and inferences are recruited to the blend in order to complete the pattern created in the composition process. Less technically, this may be explained as the phase where things fall into place and begin to make sense. This is where the incompetence or even malice of the surgeon is introduced and where we understand that dogma ceases to exist in favour of karma. Finally, elaboration involves an imaginative simulation of the event in the blend. To put it simply, what we do is to take the completed scene and add a twist to it, for example by extending it or applying it to specific circumstances. For example, Coulson & Oakley (2000:180) suggest that we may create a mental image of the Dalai Lama running over the Pope with a Ford Escort as an elaboration of *My karma ran over my dogma*. As a final point, the creation of emergent structure as a result of these three processes is often brought forward as an important characteristic of blending. However, Grady et al. (1999:122) make the following comment in a footnote:

> This is not to say that emergent structure is a necessary feature of conceptual blends: some blends are truth-functionally compositional. However, it is the frequent need to account for emergent structure that motivates BT.

As briefly mentioned before, the presence of emergent structure is also an important feature that distinguishes conceptual blending from conventional

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[20] Unless otherwise indicated, the discussion of these processes is jointly based on Fauconnier & Turner (2002:48), Coulson & Oakley (2000:180) and Grady et al. (1999).
[21] As pointed out by Oakley & Coulson (2000:178), this is also an example of a formal blend, i.e. a blend that is not only conceptual, but is also present at a linguistic level in the phonological similarites between *karma* and *car*, on the one hand, and *dogma* and *dog*, on the other. Formal blends are also discussed in section 4.3.

metaphorical mappings, where all features are directly projected from the source domain.

Furthermore, conceptual blending is guided by a number of optimality principles, which, following Coulson & Oakley (2000:186), include

> (i) the *integration* principle that representations in the blended space can be manipulated as a single unit;
>
> (ii) the *topology* principle that relations in the blend should match the relations of their counterparts in other spaces;
>
> (iii) the web principle that the representations in the blended space should maintain mappings to the input spaces;
>
> (iv) the unpacking principle that, given a blended model, the interpreter should be able to infer the structure in other spaces in the network;
>
> (v) the good reason principle that creates pressure to attribute significance to elements in the blend;
>
> (vi) metonymic tightening that, when metonymically related elements are projected into the blended space, there is pressure to compress the "distance" between them.

However, it is important to note that these optimality principles do not in any sense form basic and necessary requirements for a blend to be possible, but simply formulate the conditions under which a blend works most efficiently. There is often significant interplay and rivalry between these principles, where one may be violated in order for another to be fulfilled, and where the fulfilment of one principle may compensate for the violation of another (Fauconnier & Turner 2002:311). For example, in the idiom *you're digging your own grave*, the topology principle is violated, because while making more and more mistakes may lead to a worsened situation or even a crisis or catastrophe, digging a grave does not bring us closer and closer to death. However, the integration principle and the unpacking principle are fulfilled, the latter by relying on the conventional metaphorical relationship between DEATH and FAILURE (Coulson & Oakley in press:11). A metaphorical blend is thus possible without an analogical relationship. This makes the topology principle different from the invariance principle in the case of metaphorical mappings, since the latter states that the two domains must have shared image-schematic structure. The interaction between various optimality principles is the focus of the study made by Feyaerts & Brône (2002), but not of the present one, and this is another reason why the level of technicality sometimes is kept fairly low.

Conceptual blending networks come in many different shapes and forms (see Fauconnier & Turner 2002:119-135), but due to space limitations I will not delve into the intricacies of these networks. What I will do, however, is to introduce a specific type of blending constellation that Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press)[22] label double grounding[23], since it bears some resemblance to the blending patterns displayed in my material. Double grounding is discussed in relation to headlines and cartoons, and we will start by taking a closer look at an example of the former, which is a headline that reads *U.S. slowdown punctures Michelin profits*[24]. The verb *puncture* reflects the underlying conventional metaphor ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IS INFLATING OR DEFLATING AN OBJECT, which in turn is an instance of a higher-level mapping between VERTICALITY and QUANTITY that results in the metaphors MORE IS UP and LESS IS DOWN. However, this element is also meaningfully linked or grounded in a different input space that represents the Michelin company, whose products are tyres that literally can be punctured. This is what constitutes "double grounding". The blending process involved in this headline is represented in figure 2:2 below. The first and second input spaces correspond to the source and the target of the underlying conventional metaphor, i.e DEFLATING OBJECT and NEGATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, respectively. The third input space is an elaboration of the target space, and represents a more specific instance of negative economic development that applies to the Michelin company in particular. A salient element from the source, i.e 'puncture', is projected onto the blend, where it triggers the conventional metaphorical interpretation. When the blend is unpacked, the additional literal meaning is also activated in connection with the elaborated target, and it is mediated through a metonymic connection between Michelin and its product.

This metonymic link is said to be shortened through metonymic tightening in the blend (Brône & Feyaerts in press:25), which I agree with, but in the diagram they provide in that article, the arrow indicating the metonymic tightening is placed in the elaborated target input. They also claim that 'Michelin' has to be interpreted metonymically *before* any correspondances can be established between the different inputs (in press:26). This activation of the secondary literal

[22] It should be mentioned that the paper (in press) had been presented before the (2002) article was published, and that article also refers back to the unpublished paper. Since it may be assumed that the unpublished paper has been revised since 2002, it is sometimes difficult to know what should be regarded as the latest statement in cases where the two may differ.
[23] As they point out, Fauconnier & Turner (2002:282) talk about this phenomenon in terms of *opportunistic recruitment*.
[24] This example is discussed both in Feyaerts & Brône (2002:328-330) and in Brône & Feyaerts (in press: 22-28), and I will draw on both accounts in my discussion.

meaning through metonymic tightening is described as a structural characteristic of all cases of double grounding.

Figure 2:2. Michelin blend. Based on Feyaerts & Brône (2002:329).

As pointed out by Feyaerts & Brône (2002:334), it is not a straighforward task to decide when a separate elaborated space is involved, or when we are simply dealing with a more detailed specification of one of the elements within a single space. As a result, they state that in instances of double grounding

> the space configuration consists of source and target of a conventional metaphor (inputs 1 and 2) with additionally one or more inputs (contextualization) elaborating at least one of the inputs.

In the case of the headline discussed above, I would like to suggest a slightly different analysis, not only with an elaborated source space in addition to the elaborated target space, but also with additional elements involved and with different counterpart mappings between them (see figure 2:3 below). Beginning with the original input spaces, the 'company' element in the target actually corresponds to an 'object' element in the source space, and the object has to be understood as being filled with a volatile substance of some sort, while the

company instead contains money[25]. In addition, it is only 'deflation' that maps onto 'negative profits', which might also be formulated as 'loss of value'. The cause in the source is 'puncture', or some other means of allowing the substance to escape, and this corresponds to some kind of unspecified 'damage' in the target. It then follows that the puncture or the damage has to be inflicted by some other entity, which in both spaces is left unspecified. In the elaborated source space MICHELIN, 'company' is represented more specifically as 'Michelin', and the amount of money the company has must be specific, but is left unspecified, as is the amount of money lost. The cause of the loss of money is damage to the company's business, which is inflicted by the U.S. slowdown.

Figure 2:3. My version of the Michelin blend.

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[25] The notion of the company being filled with money is a result of the CONTAINER schema being mapped from the source onto the target. This also explains why we talk of damage to a company, as if it were a concrete object.

However, I also claim that there is an elaborated source space involved here, which may be labelled TYRE, and it forms a specific instantiation of an object that can be deflated. In this input space, the substance is specified as air, and deflation corresponds to loss of that air. The cause of this loss is a puncture, which again is inflicted by something unspecified, but which might be a nail or a shard of glass or metal. We can now identify cross-space correspondences between 'Michelin' and 'tyre', 'loss of money' and 'loss of air', 'damage to business' and 'puncture', and finally, 'U.S. slowdown' corresponds to the unspecified agent or instrument. Both 'tyre' and 'puncture' are projected to the blend, where the former merges with 'Michelin' into one and the same element, just like 'butcher' and 'surgeon' did in the blend discussed earlier, but in this case the two elements are metonymically rather than metaphorically related. From the elaborated target, we also get 'loss of money' and 'U.S. slowdown'. The metonymic distance between 'Michelin' and 'puncture' is shortened in the blend, i.e. there is metonymic tightening, since 'puncture' now is introduced into the same frame. In the elaborated target, 'puncture' is only very distantly associated with 'Michelin' through the tyre as the company's product (as indicated by the dotted line). The scene in the blended space may then be elaborated, for example as a cartoon, in which a shard of metal marked as representing the U.S. slowdown punctures a tyre imprinted with the Michelin logo. In addition, if the tyre is attached to a car, the U.S. slowdown could also be seen as slowing down Michelin's economic development, based on the metaphor PROGRESS IS MOTION FORWARD. This may be compared to the cartoon discussed by Fauconnier & Turner (1999:86-88), which comments on a situation in which a newspaper company takes over an automobile company by depicting a car being crushed by a huge printing press. In the two input spaces, the car is in a part-whole relation to the automobile company and the printing press to the newspaper, but in the blended space these relations are shortened to the point where the two respective entities become one and the same. According to Fauconnier & Turner, this demonstrates that "identity is metonymy of zero distance" (1999:88).

When similar patterns occur in my material, they seem to be mirrored, in that it is clear that there is an elaborated source space involved, but sometimes less clear whether there is an elaborated target present as well. I will generally argue in favour of such an elaborated space, and the purpose of my alternative analysis of the Michelin blend is to show that the same solution is sometimes preferable in their analyses. Since my pattern is mirrored, it follows that the actual double grounding effect is often missing, because it is only to be expected that an

element is grounded both in the source of the conventional metaphor and in the elaborated source space. For the double grounding pattern to be completely mirrored in my examples, an element would have to be linked to the elaborated source space and to the *target* of the conventional metaphor. In addition, the elaborated input spaces in the advertising blends are not always as rich as the input spaces in the cartoon and headline blends, and may for example represent a very simple scenario in which mascara weighs heavy on somebody's eyelashes (cf. 4.6.2). This might be one reason why metonymic links like that between the Michelin company and its tyres are less common, although they do occur.

Double grounding in cartoons is discussed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002), and these sometimes include elaborations of both the source and the target space, for example in the case of a poster that critically comments on the situation in the Middle East. It shows the image of a fist clutching a blood-stained Palestinian scarf and is accompanied by the caption *How will Ariel Sharon get this cleaned, then?* (in Dutch). This blend is ultimately based on the metaphor PROBLEM SOLVING IS CLEANING, where the source is elaborated in terms of a WASHING POWDER (COMMERCIAL) and the target in terms of the situation ISRAEL 2002. The elaborated target contains two elements that are represented visually, namely the blood-stained scarf, representing the violence, and the fist, which stands for the Palestinian resistance. In addition, the name Ariel Sharon from the caption also forms an element in this space. Meanwhile, the scarf is also represented in the elaborated source, but more literally as a piece of dirty clothing that needs to be cleaned, and the first name Ariel representing the washing powder brand name. The element that has a double grounding is thus Ariel, which is linked to both inputs, but the scarf can also be meaningfully interpreted against both inputs. Instead of the positive end result associated with getting rid of difficult stains in washing powder commercials, the expected negative result of the Middle East conflict is projected onto the blend (Feyaerts & Brône 2002:323-327).

What this analysis clearly highlights is that blending processes may be reflected in or evoked through either text or image or a combination of the two. In order to be reflected visually, elements must obviously be fairly concrete, as pointed out by Fauconnier & Turner (2002:304), but this does not mean that they cannot metonymically or metaphorically represent more abstract notions. In advertising, the occurrence of visual blends is briefly mentioned by Fauconnier & Turner (1999:407-408) and blends that are partly visual by Fauconnier & Turner (2002:65-67). Moreover, Fauconnier & Turner (1994:17) note that visual

cartoon blends often make a conventional metaphor literal. While the conventional metaphorical expressions in Brône & Feyaerts's (in press) headlines also receive a secondary literal meaning through the process of conceptual blending, this is not achieved with the help of an image. In some of the ads I analyse, however, the image is vital in drawing attention to the non-metaphorical meaning. This makes my examples hybrids in between headlines and cartoons, at least at a formal level. In my material, the example that is most similar to a cartoon is the Tampax ad discussed in section 7.4.1.

Moreover, it must be made clear that, as with conceptual metaphor, blending is an unconscious cognitive process, which can, in most cases, be revealed on technical analysis (Fauconnier & Turner 1994:1, Turner & Fauconnier 1999:397). This, of course, does not mean that the effects are not visible, but that the cognitive operations that help create those effects are not consciously recognised (Fauconnier & Turner 2002:57). In the case of a cartoon or an ad or simply an expression, we understand the blend, but may not realise the complexity of the processes that create it, such as the identification of the two input spaces and the projection of elements to the blend. As summarised by Fauconnier & Turner (2002:56), it is therefore a "false assumption that what is apprehended consciously must be the output of a conscious process".

Let us now return to some of the points made at the beginning of this discussion, where it was claimed that blending processes are more basic than conventional metaphorical mappings between domains. Turner (1996) more specifically argues that conventional metaphorical expressions have arisen through blending processes, but both the generic space and the blended space have become invisible to us in these cases. This is said to happen when projections occur repeatedly, to the point where fixed counterparts are established between two inputs and the vocabulary of the source space is employed by the generic space as well. In combination with conventional blending, we can now end up with what seems like a direct projection between only two spaces. To illustrate this point, Turner compares the phrases *intellectual progress* and *mental journey*. The conceptual projection is the same in both phrases, involving the source space of JOURNEY and the target space of MIND, but the language of the latter phrase is less conventional. This makes the generic and the blended spaces easier to recognise compared to the former phrase, which can be seen as reflecting a direct projection from source to target. It might also seem like an enlarged category (i.e. as a type of progress) rather than a blend (1996:87-90). Similar examples discussed by Turner and Fauconnier (1995:5) include *dolphin-safe* and *red pencil*, which are said to be the result of the same

kind of processes, but where the former strikes us as imaginative and the second as extremely conventional.

The abstract status of the generic space may be seen as problematic, but as Turner points out (1996:86-87) there is ample evidence not only for its existence, but also for its own conceptual structure, despite the fact that it lacks its own vocabulary (Fauconnier & Turner 1994:24). However, as we have just seen, it is sometimes possible to specify the elements in the generic space in some detail. More recently, some scholars, for example Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press), but occasionally also Fauconnier & Turner (2002), have begun to exclude the generic space in their analyses and graphic models,. It can only be speculated as to the reasons behind this practice, but one possibility may be that it is taken for granted, since it is a prerequisite for the blend to be constructed. Also, since there is no direct projection of elements from the generic space to the blended space, it might be considered less relevant. A more critical suggestion would of course be that it is a convenient way of ignoring a problem, if that is what the generic space is considered to be. In my figures, I will exclude the generic space in order to keep the graphic model as simple as possible, but as should be clear by now, this is not intended as a reflection of its existence and importance.

As regards the relation between metaphor theory and blending theory, the position taken here follows that of Grady et al. (1997:120-122), who claim that blending theory and metaphor theory can be seen as complementary in the sense that the former addresses novel, short-lived and often unique cases, whereas the latter focuses on conventional, regular and more stable patterns. Metaphor theory can thus be seen as handling a subset or specific aspect of the type of processes handled by blending theory, which also allows us to see the connection between conventional metaphors and conceptual blending. More importantly, this means that we can explain why novel, creative language use is often based on conventional mappings. They are simply results of blends that rely on conceptual metaphor for their input spaces and then elaborate that material to create a richer blended space (cf. Turner & Fauconnier 1995:187). However, note that blending also is a more general process that may occur without any connection to metaphor. In particular, blends do not necessarily rely on conventional metaphors for their inputs. Also, there are indeed blends that have become conventional, such as the expression *You're digging your own grave*, which was mentioned above. In this respect, blends have much in common with one-shot metaphorical expressions, which may also become entrenched, like for example *He's carrying around a lot of spare tyres.* In brief, though, the relationship

between conventional metaphor and blending can thus be summarised as in figure 2:4 below.

BLENDING PROCESSES	(step 1) →	METAPHOR (conventional)	(step 2) →	BLENDING PROCESSES

Figure 2:4. Blending and metaphor.

Whether we use metaphor theory or blending theory therefore depends on the type of data we are analysing and what type of results we are trying to establish. In the analyses in chapters 4-7, my focus is on the second step, i.e. how conventional metaphors form the input to creative blending processes in advertising. I will therefore take recourse both to CMT and BT as a framework for my analyses, and in connection to these also address issues related to metonymy.

CHAPTER 3
METAPHOR IN ADVERTISING: PREVIOUS STUDIES

3.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the literature on metaphor in advertising in order to demonstrate in greater detail how the present study contributes to this area of research. Due to the interdisciplinary nature of advertising studies and the vast amount of research already carried out, this overview is by no means intended to be exhaustive. Rather, it is a selection concentrating on studies that are relevant to the present one and it includes some of the key works in the field. Several of these studies do not focus specifically on metaphor, and in those cases, it is not my aim to give a complete account of the other aspects they address. Instead, the discussion will centre on their treatment or non-treatment of metaphor. It must be kept in mind that the analyses presented here are made within different theoretical frameworks, and it thus follows that the definitions and perceived importance of metaphor will vary considerably. Although my main concern lies with the studies made within the framework of cognitive linguistics, the non-cognitive studies discussed in sections 3.2 and 3.3 are still important, since the aim is to show not only how this thesis will contribute to and supplement earlier work within the cognitive tradition, but also how cognitive analyses can cover some of the aspects which are not highlighted by more traditional semiotic accounts. In addition, the discussion in section 3.2 will be of value later on in chapters 4-7, where attention is drawn to certain aspects that are shared by semiotics and blending theory. The studies discussed here either deal specifically with metaphor (especially those in section 3.4) or address very general aspects including metaphor. Consequently, researchers concerned with specific aspects other than metaphor, such as the studies made by Goffman (1979) and Millum (1975) on gender in advertising, will not be discussed here. Nor will studies such as the one made by Geis (1982) of the language in television commercials, since my focus is on print advertising.

It should be pointed out that the division made here between semiotic, general linguistic and cognitive linguistic approches must not be seen as absolute or clear-cut. For example, Hermerén (1999) bases his section dealing with the visual content of ads on semiotics, but since his study on the whole is a general

linguistic one, it has been included in section 3.3. Also, since the term "cognitive" may be defined in several different ways, it would be possible to include the discussion of Tanaka (1994) in section 3.4, since she bases her study on Sperber and Wilson's relevance theory (1986, 1995), which is cognitive in the sense that it addresses the way in which human thoughts are communicated. However, the classification of the different studies has been made in accordance with their main theoretical orientation, and "cognitive" should be understood in the sense outlined in chapter 2.

3.2 Semiotic approaches

Williamson (1978) is a critical study of magazine advertising referred to by many other scholars. It is carried out in the area of culture studies and is thus not primarily concerned with the language, but with the ways in which meaning is created in ads. Her aim is to help people understand the ideological workings of the capitalist society by providing a "handbook" for decoding advertisements (1978:9). The ideological theory she formulates is based on the writings of people as diverse as Marx, Freud, Foucault and Lévi-Strauss, whereas the analysis of the structure of the ad itself is based on semiotics in the tradition of Saussure and Barthes. The ad is seen as a sign consisting of a signifier and a signified, but the function of this sign is not only to construct meaning by itself, but to transfer meaning from other systems outside of the ad. These systems, which Williamson labels "referent-systems", are ideological systems that depend on and reflect our society and culture (1978:19).

For the sake of clarity, let us take a closer look at one of the examples she discusses. In an ad for Goodyear tyres, the picture shows a car at the far end of a jetty. The significance of the jetty is to illustrate the grip of the tyres, and thereby the short breaking distance, even after 36,000 miles of driving. However, in addition to this overt message there is also a second meaning involved. A connection is made between the jetty and the tyre, in that both the shape and the outside of the former resembles the latter. This allows meaning to be transferred from one to the other, which in this case means that the strength and safety of the jetty in relation to the surrounding sea is transferred to the tyre. The system of meaning in which jetties are strong and safe exists outside of the ad, and the value represented by the jetty is a form of currency that becomes attached to the advertised product (1978:18-20). Similarly, in an ad for Chanel No. 5, the value of the product is transferred from a system of meaning in which Catherine Deneuve, pictured together with a bottle of the perfume, signifies glamour and beauty (1978:25). According to Williamson, there is also an important difference

here between dennotation and connotation. In the case of the example with the jetty, the denoted message is the overt one, referring to the short breaking distance and the danger involved, i.e. the information that is present in the ad itself and ultimately refers to the product. The connoted message, on the other hand, is the one in which meaning is taken from referent-systems outside the ad, in this case the general knowledge we have about the characteristics of jetties (1978:99). Since these referent systems are determined by the ideology of our society, it follows, according to Williamson, that advertising makes connections which are not there in reality and thereby manages to mislead the audience (1978:102).

There are several problems here when we consider this account in terms of cognitive linguistics (cf. section 2.2). First of all, no distinction would be made between denotation and connotation, since cognitive linguistics rejects the division traditionally made between word meaning and encyclopaedic meaning. The notion that jetties are strong and safe is as much a part of the concept of a jetty as the other aspects regarding length and danger. Second, the idea that there is an objective reality independent of our perception, culture and ideology is also refuted by cognitive linguists, and if there is no such thing as an objective reality then that reality cannot be distorted (Lakoff 1987, Lakoff & Johnson 1999). Both of these aspects are also seen as problematic by Björkvall in relation to socio-semiotics and the postmodern society (2003:30-31). Furthermore, the transfer of meaning from system to system would be seen as an instance of metaphor in cognitive linguistics. The picture of the jetty in the example discussed above is very similar to the pictorially realised metaphors analysed by Forceville (1996) (see further section 3.4 below) and would perhaps be formulated as A TYRE IS A JETTY. This means that certain features, in this case the notions of strength and safety, would be transferred from the source JETTY to the target TYRE.

Like Williamson, Dyer (1982) also sets out to equip readers with the tools needed to understand how ads work. Her criticism of advertising is directed towards the way in which ads manipulate social values and attitudes, instead of providing us with facts about the products. She mentions suggestions that ads have taken over the role previously fulfilled by religion or art, in that ads provide us with stories "through which people can organize their thoughts and experiences and come to make sense of the world they live in" (1982:2). It is interesting here to notice how close this statement is to the one made by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) about metaphor being a matter of "understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (1980:5) and how metaphor even is said to define and structure the world we live in. Given that metaphor is

such a powerful conceptual tool, it is only to be expected that it is widely used in advertising, where one of the main aims clearly is to establish connections between different areas of experience, either for the purpose of transferring features or for creating an effect that attracts attention.

In her analysis of the structure of ads she uses the concepts and methods of semiotics and thus treats advertisements as systems of signs (1982:117ff). For example, she discusses an ad for gold jewellery, in which a man and a woman are about to kiss, and the woman is wearing a gold bracelet that is clearly visible in the foreground. The caption reads *The strongest links are forged in gold*. This is an ad in which gold, the signifier, on one level signifies something that is strong and durable, i.e. a chain made of gold. But on another, deeper level it also signifies the relationship between the two people, which is built on gold and therefore is strong and durable as well. This second meaning, however, is only implied on a fairly unconscious level where we find the link between the signifier (the gold bracelet) and the signified (the relationship). There are thus two systems of meaning involved, one being the world of metals where gold is valued for being precious and strong, and the other our society where a strong and durable relationship (=love) is highly coveted. In this way, ads transfer one meaning we are already aware of to another, new meaning by moving from system to system. The signs of other systems are transferred to the product (1982:124-6). This is of course again similar to the way in which conceptual metaphor maps meaning from one cognitive domain onto another, and especially interesting in this particular example is the way in which metaphor works on several levels at the same time. Metaphors expressed both verbally and visually combine to make up the complex metaphor which structures the message of the ad.

Both Dyer (1982:124ff) and Vestergaard & Schrøder (1985:38ff) discuss different types of signs, such as icons, indices and symbols, but whereas the latter highlight how these are related to the structuralist concepts of metaphor and metonymy, Dyer omits to do so. Instead, metaphor and metonymy are briefly mentioned in relation to syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships (Dyer 1982:127). However, she discusses both figures of speech, as she labels them, in her chapter on the language of advertising, where her grounding in structuralist theories is further made evident. Figurative language is seen as an "unorthodox" use of language or even as using words "incorrectly (semantic mistakes)". It breaks and exploits language rules, whereas literal language is taken to be normal and primary. Admittedly, she does concede that figurative language is used in everyday language as well, but she seems to be under the

impression that this only concerns a few isolated examples of conventionalised phrases (1982:152-3). The main difference, however, between her account of figurative language and the account given by cognitive linguists, is of course that the latter consider metaphor to be a conceptual phenomenon that can be reflected in language, instead of a special, perhaps even incorrect, use of words. The notion that metaphor misleads and persuades is only relevant if we accept that literal language is a true reflection of reality, which is not the case in cognitive linguistics. All language processes involve categorisation to some extent, and that categorisation, like metaphor, is based on the way in which we subjectively perceive the world. The view of metaphor in cognitive linguistics is thus connected with its general approach towards meaning, truth, and objective reality, as described in chapter 2.

According to Dyer, figurative language on the whole is mainly used in rhetoric and poetry, but there is a difference between the poet's and the advertiser's use of it. While the poet seeks to "create an impression, pin-point or sum up a feeling in the interest of an emotional 'truth'", the advertiser's goal is "to paint a falsely glowing picture" (1982:150). Leaving aside the observation that even Dyer herself uses metaphor here, the poet's intentions are clearly thought of as more noble than those of the advertiser, even though both are examples of subjective expression that has been planned and carefully considered. Again, reference is made to the idea of an objective truth, and perhaps the difference in the value of their intentions also has to do with the fact that, unlike the advertiser, the poet is not trying to convince people to part with their money. At any rate, it is obvious that the objections put forward really concern the intentions and morals of the person or people using the language, rather than the language and mode of expression itself. This is one of the main reasons why it is difficult to criticise or defend the social implications of the advertising message within the scope of a linguistics thesis.

Returning to Dyer's treatment of metaphor in advertising, she also discusses metaphor in relation to rhetoric and draws on the theories put forward by Barthes (1964) and Durand (1970). It is argued that "rhetorical figures are never more than formal relations of elements; they vary in substance […] but not neccessarily in form" (1982:158), which means that they can be expressed in images as well as in language. Since rhetorical figures are said to deviate from normal language use and to misrepresent physical reality, it follows that even pictures and images can do this, and Dyer goes on to exemplify how this is achieved in advertising. The examples she gives include rhetorical figures as diverse as similarity, paradox, tautology, ellipsis, ambiguity and substitution,

where the last one includes both visual metaphor and visual metonymy. Abstract concepts such as freshness may be substituted for by a picture of a block of ice in the case of metaphor, and metonymy may be expressed visually when there is a syntagmatic relation between the depicted object and the replaced concept it refers to, for example if the block of ice represents a refrigerator (1982:160-175). However, if we consider metaphor from a cognitive point of view we will also find it reflected in some of the other examples provided by Dyer. In an ad for Sansui hi-fi systems, an enlarged image of a stereo set consisting of several different decks stacked on top of each other is seen next to an ordinary detached house, which in comparison looks tiny. The headline reads *Sansui High Rise Hi-Fi. Way above the common or garden system.* According to Dyer (1982:174), this is a case of visual hyperbole, i.e. exaggeration. Although this can hardly be denied, what is interesting here is not so much the fact that, in the reality that we perceive, houses are generally bigger than sound systems, but the conceptual processes involved in the creation of meaning in this ad, particularly metaphor. Three very persuasive and interrelated conceptual metaphors are found here, namely the orientational metaphors MORE IS UP, GOOD IS UP, and HIGH STATUS IS UP (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980:15-16). These metaphors are realised in several ways in the ad, and the patterns are sometimes fairly complex. The metaphors HIGH STATUS IS UP and GOOD IS UP are evident first of all in the headline, *Way above the common or garden system*, where reference is made to the detached house, which is associated with a middle-class way of life, i.e. is quite ordinary (*common*) and where there is a metonymic link between *garden* and the knowledge we have of detached houses as normally having gardens. The hi-fi system is then *way above* this detached house and everything that is associated with it, in the sense that it is better (GOOD IS UP) and has a higher status (HIGH STATUS IS UP). There is also a link between *High Rise* in relation to the sound system and in relation to high rise tower blocks, which provides an additional twist, since these are usually associated with a much lower standard of living compared to detached houses.

Vestergaard & Schrøder (1985), which was briefly mentioned above, is the last study to be discussed in this section. This is a general introduction to advertising language, based on the work of Barthes (1964) together with the notion of actantial models put forward by Greimas (1966) and Pierce's (1960) classification of different types of signs. The authors are both linguists and hence more weight is given to the actual language here compared to the works of Dyer and Williamson. Although they draw heavily on Williamson in their discussion of ideology in advertising (cf. 1985:141), the criticism is much less pronounced.

The theoretical orientation is nevertheless the same and their view of advertising language is that it is a system of signs that can be decoded if you possess the proper skills. The authors address metaphor and metonymy by observing the relationship between a sign and its object or referent, i.e. what it stands for in the physical world, according to Peirce's definitions of the three different types of relation - iconic, indexical and symbolic (1985:36). In an iconic relation there is a natural or motivated link between sign and object, as for example in the relation between a map and a landscape. In language we usually do not find iconic signs, since one of the basic (structuralistic) linguistic principles is that the physical relation between a word and the concept it denotes is arbitrary. However, according to Vestergaard & Schrøder (1985:38), an iconic relation is found in the actual use of language, more specifically in the use of metaphor, where one word is replaced by another which resembles it in meaning. By contrast, an indexical relation is said to be found in the use of metonymy, where there is a close connection between sign and object, e.g when *Whitehall* is used for 'the British government'. Finally, the symbolic relation is the kind of arbitrary relation we find in language, and it is defined by Vestergaard & Schrøder as a connection between sign and and referent based on convention (1985:39).

As pointed out by both Dyer (1982:175) and Vestergaard & Schrøder (1985:39), the relation between a symbolic sign and its object might originally have been based on some form of connection, which during the course of time has become conventionalised. In cases like these where the symbolic relation was originally an iconic relation, we can in fact compare this type of visual symbol to so-called "dead" metaphors in language. Similarly, an indexical relation may be highly conventionalised to the point that there is no need for the connection to be consciously perceived, thus turning it into a symbol, as in the case of a ring being a symbol for love. This sheds some light on the problematic distinction between symbols and metaphors, with some people claiming that a symbol can be visual, whereas a metaphor is restricted to language. In essence, it all boils down to different views of the nature of language in combination with a difference in terminology. Structuralists see language as a system of elements which are given meaning according to their relation to other elements in that system. Moving beyond language, we instead enter the sphere of semiotics, which includes other media such as images and music. Metaphor and metonymy are figures of speech that come into play in the use of language and are in turn based on the more general semiotic relations of icon, index, and symbols. Because of this, metaphors are by definition limited to language. From a

cognitive point of view, on the other hand, metaphor functions at a conceptual level and involves a mapping of features between different domains of experience, i.e. it is a cognitive process that allows us to experience one thing in terms of another. As such, it is possible for a metaphor to be reflected visually as well as in language. Crucially, this does not mean that structuralists never talk about symbols in relation to a written text. When discussing the green light in *The Great Gatsby*, for example, it would be labelled as a symbol, since it is not a case of figurative language as opposed to literal language. The green light is there in physical reality, as it were, at the end of his dock, so the word or the sign is literal, but this sign in turn points to something else, to which it has no connection.

To conclude the discussion of Vestergaard & Schrøder, let us turn briefly to one of the ads they analyse (1985:50ff). The advertised product here is Dr White's sanitary towels. The picture shows a woman standing next to a man and a boy, facing them sideways, and the headline reads *I came back*. This phrase is ambiguous in the sense that it may be interpreted either as the woman returning to her family (because of the picture) or to Dr White's towels, since the body copy talks about returning to softness and comfort and describes the cotton-wool content of the towel and the fact that it can be flushed down the toilet. The slogan underneath the signature, *Two kinds of comfort*, can be understood on the one hand in relation to the two kinds of comfort associated with the towel and on the other hand in relation to the comfort of family life and the general comfort provided by Dr White's. According to Vestergaard & Schrøder, this ad contains a double visual/verbal metaphor, which they formulate as "towels = safety = family" (1985:52). Although there is undoubtedly some metaphorical mappings at work here, they exist at different levels of the message. A cognitive analysis in terms of blended spaces, would be able to schematically demonstrate the intricate cognitive links established here between FAMILY and SAFETY.

3.3 General linguistic approaches

Cook's (1992) study of advertising language focuses on advertising as a discourse type and makes comparisons between advertising and literature. Although he makes use of some structuralist notions, such as the dichotomy between denotation and connotation, he also criticises semiotic approaches for their lack of interest in the actual use of language, i.e. parole, for the benefit of the underlying system of meaning, i.e. langue. The conclusion he makes is that semiotic "insights are useful but incomplete" (1992:71) and this basic point of criticism is essentially the same as in the present study, although the implications

are somewhat different. Cook focuses on discoursal aspects, i.e. communicative aspects that involve not only the text itself, but also the context. Although these are linked to human cognitive processes, they are not identical to the aspects addressed here. On the contrary, they have more in common with the aims of Tanaka (1994), in that they concern the cognitive aspects of communication, rather than the cognitive processes involved in our conceptualisation of the world around us, such as metaphor, metonymy and blending. However, Cook also questions the division made by Saussure between thought and language, arguing that meaning is created "outside the individual in interaction with others" (1992:65), rather than being contained in a closed system. This insight is shared by cognitive linguists, although formulated in opposite terms. Here, language is described as being embodied and meaning is considered to be based on our experiences of the world around us, i.e. linked internally to the rest of our cognitive system. Meaning in a structuralist theory, on the other hand, would be external, since it is conceived of as being created in the relation between signs in an isolated system.

According to Cook (1992:69-70), one important point that is ignored within the semiotic tradition is that cultural conventions are often involved in our understanding of both icons and indices, and an external knowledge of the world is needed in order to understand them. This knowledge might vary depending on the associations we make in a certain culture or situation, but may also be different from person to person. This brings us forward to another aspect that is criticised, namely the view of language described by Reddy (1979) as the conduit metaphor. In this view, meanings are encoded in words and transmitted from the mind of one person to the mind of another, where it is decoded and understood in exactly the same way as it was intended by the speaker or sender. Cook (1992:65) does not agree:

> A combination of linguistic decoding with non-linguistic knowledge creates an interpretation, perhaps *resembling* the intention of the sender, but by no means *identical* to it. [his emphasis]

In other words, meaning is produced in the interaction between people and cannot be found internal to the words of the text itself.

As regards metaphor, Cook defines metaphor as a sign, "in which one signifier refers to two signifieds by virtue of a shared component in the signifieds" (1992:62). He also addresses the difficulty in distinguishing between metaphor, metonymy, and symbol, and concludes that they often overlap and that the presence of one figure does not exclude the presence of another. In

advertising, Cook points out that metaphor has become "a common and complex feature" (1992:54), including visual representations of it. This is said to be largely due to the nature of contemporary advertising, in which an association is established between the product and some other object, concept, emotion or quality. Cook discusses this process in terms of a "fusion" between two different "spheres", that of the product and that of the other entity (1992:105), and this idea bears a striking resemblance to conceptual blending.

One example of such a fusion is given in an ad for Subaru cars. The headline reads *The Subaru of his and hers,* and it appears against the background of a picture of two cars parked on what seems to be adjacent driveways in front of a fairly large seaside house. One of the cars is bigger than the other and placed further away from the house on a driveway, or possibly a road, which is at a lower level compared to the house. The smaller car is at the same level as the house and closer to it, giving the impression that the smaller car is placed right above the bigger car. The copy, which runs along the right hand side of the ad, begins by repeating the headline and then continuing with the phrase *Or how to keep your marriage on the road.* Throughout the rest of the copy, parallels are drawn between marriage and driving in the description of the two cars. For example, they are portrayed as partners in a relationship, in which the four-wheel drive they share will take them through all kinds of weather. They have different characteristics and qualities, but together they make a perfect match. Cook regards this as a case of a "dead and clichéd metaphor" which has been revived by being reversed (1992:113). Instead of comparing (his word) marriage to driving, the opposite is done here. A fusion is established between the two concepts, so that the descriptions in the copy can apply to either marriage or driving. This metaphor is thus further elaborated, or in Cook's words, it is "multidimensional, for there are many interlocking figurative and literal marriages in both picture and text" (1992:114). These "marriages" are said to be between different members of pairs, such as the two dogs, the two cars, land and sea, front wheels and back wheels, and even between pets and cars. Some of these pairings seem far-fetched, as does the division that Cook makes between male and female components of the ad. For example, the male component "driver" is said to correspond to the female component "car", in the same way as "cars" correspond to "pets", "dog" to "bitch", "road" to "home", and so on. Even the colours in the ad, red and blue, are included in the male-female dichotomy, but surprisingly enough "red" is listed among the male components, while "blue" is considered to be female. There are clearly many examples here of features that do represent the male and female parts of a relationship, but it is

doubtful whether pairs like "dog" and "bitch" should be included among these. For all we know, both dogs in the picture could be bitches.

Although Cook manages to identify many interesting aspects of this complex ad, he nevertheless fails to bring them all together. A cognitive analysis in terms of conceptual metaphor and blended spaces would do just that, and allow us to better understand these intricate relationships between different levels and components of the ad. For example, the metaphorical content is not just evident in the phrase quoted above, but throughout the entire ad. The underlying conceptual metaphor is LOVE IS A JOURNEY, or perhaps more precisely A RELATIONSHIP IS A JOURNEY, which is reflected in the conventional metaphorical expression *to keep a marriage on the road.* The male-female dichotomy is part of the (HETEROSEXUAL) RELATIONSHIP domain, but is mapped onto the two cars in the JOURNEY domain. It is true that the metaphor could be said to be reversed, but it is far from being a complete reversal. Even though the cars are portrayed as two partners in a relationship, it is also the case that a happy relationship between two people is seen in terms of the qualities and compatibility of the two cars. The cars in the JOURNEY domain could perhaps be understood as the target here, in that the four-wheel drive Subaru models are the products promoted by the ad. However, the happy marriage in the RELATIONSHIP domain is an equally valid target, in that this is the argument that the ad builds on, namely that buying these cars will give you a happy marriage. An analysis based on conceptual blending would be able to handle this apparent problem, since it is not limited to only two domains or spaces where features are mapped from one onto the other.

Hermerén (1999) addresses advertising language as a whole, ranging from specific verbal strategies, such as the use of proper names, questions and unspecific comparisons, to the wider context of the communicative situation and the role of advertising in society. Since his linguistic analyses are largely made within a traditional framework, it is not surprising that the attention he devotes to metaphor and metonymy, or rather to what he overtly recognises as involving metaphor and metonymy, is relatively limited.

What is unexpected, though, is the confusing account he gives of his theoretical standpoint and the sometimes contradictory analyses he offers. To begin with, his seems to base his ideas firmly on the comparison view, in stating that metaphor "is language used to make an implicit comparison" (1999:143). This is illustrated by a discussion of a car ad with the headline *Introducing a Sedan with the heart of a lion*, which is said to involve a comparison between a car and a lion, or more specifically between the engine of the car and the heart of a lion. The engine forms the topic of the metaphor, the heart is the vehicle and

the common ground is made up of the attributes shared by the two. Apart from the meanings denoted by the words *lion* and *engine*, he also points to the connoted meaning of the former, thus emphasising the structuralist division between linguistic meaning and encyclopaedic meaning. It is obvious here that metaphor is understood purely as an aspect of language and that metaphorical language is secondary to literal language. In fact, he contends that the very reason why this is a metaphor is not only that it is false in a literal sense (there is no actual lion's heart under the bonnet of the car), but also that the comparison itself is false (1999:144). The same assumption that only when literal language fails to make sense do we have a reason to look for a metaphorical meaning is also made evident in his discussion of an ad for the airline Britannia carrying the slogan *Scheduled services direct to the sun*. Here, he argues that the slogan only makes sense if it is interpreted figuratively, implying that an initial literal reading has to be rejected (1999:147).

What is so surprising, then, is that he suddenly seems to change his mind in favour of a cognitive view by claiming that "[u]sing metaphors means understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another" (1999:145). This is almost identical to the wording offered by Lakoff & Johnson (1980:5), but no reference is given to their work and unfortunately he does not elaborate any further on this statement. It is possible that Hermerén is of the opinion that metaphor involves a certain use of the language, and that when we use language that way, it makes us understand things in a different way. If so, the conclusion would be that language influences thought rather than the other way round, and this is consistent with ideas he expresses elsewhere. Be that as it may, he does indeed refer to Lakoff & Johnson (1980) later on when analysing an ad for Philippine Airlines, which he sees as an instance of the ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE metaphor. In the copy, the service onboard the airline is expressed in terms of the warm, sunny climate of the Philippines, and his argument is as follows:

> Obviously, there is an analogy between the scenery of the Philippines, on the one hand, and the services of Philippine Airlines, on the other. That is, the pleasant qualities of the former are reflected on, and experienced through, the latter. That means that something nonphysical and abstract is conceptualized in terms of something physical and concrete, which is a characteristic of many metaphors and which is clearly demonstrated in this advertisement, where the services of an airline are described in terms of the scenery of the country…(1999:148).

It is immediately clear that there are a number of problems with this analysis. First, he is claiming that the pleasant qualities of the Philippines are experienced

through the airline services, which in cognitive terms would be the same as saying that the target domain is THE PHILIPPINES and the source domain PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, i.e. the PHILIPPINES ARE PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. This does not make sense, since the advertised product would be expected to be the target rather than the source, and in the last lines of the quoted paragraph Hermerén seems to be of this opinion too. It is also difficult to understand what he sees as more abstract – the beauty of the country or the service on board. Intuitively, the beauty of the country would be more abstract and that would again lead us to think of THE PHILIPPINES as the target domain, but if we think of the service onboard as involving friendliness and a relaxing atmosphere then that could also be seen as abstract. Similarly, the beauty of the Philippines in terms of the scenery with blue waters, white sand and coconut trees can also be very concrete. On the whole, the impression is that he is more concerned with the actual language – literal language is concrete and metaphorical language is abstract. At any rate, it is obvious that he is not concerned with metaphor at a conceptual level, despite claiming that conceptualisation is involved, but again, we are never told what he actually means when he says that we understand and experience one thing in terms of something else. He does not share the view of Lakoff & Johnson (1980), but whether this is due to a misunderstanding of their work or if Hermerén is simply creating his own version is not clear. Returning to the ad, the main problem with his analysis is that we are not mainly dealing with two separate domains, but with a metonymic relationship between Philippine Airlines and the Philippines that can be formulated as AIRLINE FOR COUNTRY or specifically PHILIPPINE AIRLINES FOR THE PHILIPPINES. The impression we get is that the airline offers us a piece of the Philippines as soon as we board their plane and that the atmosphere and the services share the characteristics of the country. There is some metaphorical content, but it is limited to FRIENDLINESS understood in terms of SUNSHINE in accordance with the conceptual metaphor CHEERFUL IS SUNNY.

Elsewhere, Hermerén discusses other advertising strategies that are essentially metaphorical in nature, but without recognising the metaphoricity or at least the extent of it. One case in point is personification, which he discusses in relation to a Volvo ad bearing the headline *Volvo cuts the price of parts and eases labour pains*. It is accompanied by an image showing car parts that have been put together to form the shape of a human skeleton, together with a piece of body copy that explains the cheap costs of original Volvo parts and the fact that labour costs are included. Here, Hermerén acknowledges the connection between the animate and the inanimate, although he does not seem to think that we are to

understand one in terms of the other, despite his previously mentioned claim. Instead, he sees it in more concrete terms, claiming that the inanimate (the car parts) have been made into something animate (a human being). This is followed by the somewhat incomprehensible conclusion that "something new has been created, so that the whole is different from and more than its component parts, enabling the consumer to keep his car 'one hundred percent Volvo'" and he then summarises the ad by saying that it "may be seen as a visual form of technobabble" (1999:43). Although he does point out the parallels between the words *parts* and *labour pains* in the headline and the human depicted in the image, but from a cognitive point of view, he completely misses the metaphorical essence of the ad. This is a clear example of the metaphor INANIMATE IS ANIMATE, and more specifically A CAR IS A PERSON or even A VOLVO IS A PERSON. Ultimately, the metaphor is YOUR VOLVO IS YOU, which is further supported by a section at the end of the body copy that says "Your Volvo dealer will tell you the price of any new part you may need". This piece of text fits the image perfectly, in which a person is in fact made up of car parts, and the ad can thus be seen as a rich metaphorical blend between you and your car. Returning to the expression *labour pains* in the headline, this is also the result of a conceptual blend, where one input is linked to the domain of THE HUMAN BODY and the other to the domain of CAR MAINTENANCE. Here, an additional metaphor that perhaps can be formulated as A PROBLEM IS PHYSICAL DISCOMFORT/IRRITATION is also involved, so that the problem associated with the potentiality of additional labour costs is seen in terms of physical pain.

A similar instance of metaphor, although without any visual element, is found in an ad for the Union Bank of Switzerland in which words such as *cacaphony, tune, orchestration*, *instruments* and *conducts* are used metaphorically to describe how financial markets work and how they can be controlled and made to work in our favour. Hermerén does acknowledge the metaphorical content here, but he first and foremost considers this to be an example of how advertising draws on other types of discourse, in this case the language of music. As he rightly points out, drawing on other genres and discourse types is a common strategy in advertising, but according to him this is done because advertisers are aware that many consumers are sceptical towards advertising and they therefore try to disguise it as something else (1999:78-79). While it is certainly true that advertisers sometimes capitalise on public criticism by pretending to be on the same side as the reader, it is doubtful whether it would be possible to completely pawn an ad off as belonging to a different genre. Initially, it might have a positive effect in drawing attention to the ad, but

at some point it would probably have to be recognised as an ad in order to work. A more likely explanation, however, would be that advertisers try to establish a connection between the domain of the product and some other domain which we experience as being positive. In the case of the Union Bank of Switzerland ad, the domain of MUSIC might be more positive in the minds of many people compared to the domain of FINANCE. What is more, the metaphor makes it possible to express the workings of the financial market and the role the bank plays in a limited amount of space, highlighting its positive aspects and downplaying others. Interestingly enough, Hermerén fails to recognise this, despite pointing it out elsewhere (cf 1999:145) and discussing it in relation to an ad for Visine, an allergy medicine (1999:148).

Another study that must be mentioned in this section is Tanaka (1994), which is a comparative pragmatic study of British and Japanese advertising language. Her main aim is to complement earlier semiotic and linguistic studies, which she criticises for paying too much attention to the text itself at the expense of the communicative situation (1994:1). In order to achieve this, she relies on Sperber & Wilson's (1985/1996) relevance theory in her account of advertising language and how understanding advertisements is not simply a matter of decoding a message. She writes:

> The thoughts which are communicated by advertisements seem to be as richly structured as the sentences used to communicate them, and much more so than the systems of signs proposed by semioticians. (1994:4)

Although this follows the basic assumptions made in this study, there are some important differences in how the nature of language is perceived, and this is also what leads to a somewhat different solution to the problem at hand. Instead of applying a cognitive view to the message itself, Tanaka only focuses on the cognitive aspects of the communicative act, while maintaining a fairly traditional view of linguistic meaning. In particular, she draws a clear line both between semantics and pragmatics (1994:7), on the one hand, and word meaning and encyclopaedic meaning on the other (1994:110,129). This runs contrary to the view held by cognitive linguists that meaning is always understood as meaning in context (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:184), and that, at least in my version, semantics and pragmatics may be seen as the two end points of a continuum rather than separate entities (for further discussion see chapter 2).

Tanaka devotes one chapter specifically to metaphor, again basing her view on Sperber & Wilson's (1985/1996) relevance theory, which was briefly mentioned in section 2.3 above. Although not a metaphor theory per se but rather

a theory of communication, they nevertheless discuss metaphor in relation to different types of language use. All types of utterances are seen as representing or resembling a thought, but while literal utterances resemble the thought of the speaker to a very high degree, metaphorical utterances always involve a larger gap between thought and language. It thus follows that there is no sharp dividing line between metaphorical and non-metaphorical utterances, but more to the point, it also means that thoughts are seen as inherently literal (Tanaka 1994:88-89). Again, this goes against the cognitive linguistic view of metaphor, which argues that human thinking is largely metaphorical. In this context, it should also be pointed out that literal utterances are not taken to be the norm for communication. On the contrary, so-called loose utterances, which only resemble the thought of the speaker to some degree, are the most common types of utterances in everyday language, and the quest is always for "optimal relevance, rather than linguistic truth" (1994:34).

In essence, Tanaka considers metaphors to be linguistic devices rather than conceptual tools. She does provide a brief discussion of Lakoff & Johnson (1980), but their ideas are rejected, at least to some extent. In particular, she objects to the claim (supposedly) made by Lakoff & Johnson that language and thought are identical, or in her words that a "linguistic representation" is *identical* to the corresponding "cognitive representation" (1994:85). The feeling here is that this is based on a misconception, since Lakoff & Johnson have never argued, in *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) or elsewhere, that the two are *identical*, but rather that language *reflects* our thoughts. Forceville (1996:95) agrees:

> It is to be noted that Sperber and Wilson's views on metaphor, although not worked out in any detail, have at least one important element in common with Lakoff and Johnson's, namely that *thought and language are not simply identical.*" [my emphasis]

Turning to Tanaka's analyses of metaphor in advertising, these often seem to be too simplified and one-sided. One of the ads she discusses is for the Legal & General insurance company and carries the headline *For vigorous growth, plant your money with us.* The ad includes three pictures, where the first one shows seeds being tipped into the ground from a bag that has umbrellas depicted on it. The second picture shows plants starting to grow, but the plants are furled umbrellas rather than real plants. Finally, in the third picture, we can see a field of open umbrellas. Tanaka's suggestion is that when we are faced with this ad, we search through our encyclopaedic knowledge of the words *growth* and *plant* to "remember that planting something is leaving something in the ground, that planting is followed by yield" (1994:92) and so on, invoking the whole scenario

of planting. This knowledge together with the headline is then assumed to lead to a number of implicatures that she lists, with the strongest of them being the following two:

(a) Leave your money with Legal & General if you want it to increase steadily.
(b) Invest your money with Legal & General if you want a big return.

(Tanaka 1994:93)

The main reason for not using a different headline, *For a big return, invest your money with Legal & General,* is taken to be the additional implicatures that follow from the original metaphorical headline, for example:

(c) Investment with Legal & General will lead to something attractive.

(Tanaka 1994:94)

Further reasons given by Tanaka include the possibility for the advertiser to avoid responsibility, since many of these implicatures are weakly communicated and up to the addressee to recover (1994:94). In addition, she claims not only that metaphors attract and hold the attention of the audience, but also that they take longer to process and that they give "aesthetic pleasure" (1994:105-106).

From a cognitive linguistic point of view, many aspects go missing in this type of analysis. First of all, we often talk about money in terms of plants or vegetation in everyday language, for example in the use of phrases such as *to reap the rewards, seed money, stocks have blossomed, economic growth,* and *a flourishing economy.* This may lead us to posit the conceptual metaphor MONEY IS A PLANT, or perhaps more generally MONEY IS AN ORGANIC THING, which in turn yields INVESTING IS PLANTING. It is not within the scope here to determine whether or not there is enough evidence for the existence of these conceptual metaphors, but at least we can conclude that some form of link exists between the two domains. Moreover, there is no need to go searching for an encyclopaedic meaning of the words *growth* and *plant*, for example that seeds grow into plants, because that knowledge is not separated from the meaning of the word any more than the knowledge that plants are prototypically green, have leaves etc. Rather than giving rise to a set of implicatures, the complexity of this ad is better explained in terms of blending theory, where information from at least three different mental spaces are projected onto the blended space of the ad. Also, in contrast to what seems to be Tanaka's opinion, the creative twist of this ad does not lie in the use of the words *growth* and *plant*, but in the inclusion of the company itself, by means of the company logo, an umbrella. In doing this, a

metonymic link is established between the investment of money (seen in metaphorical terms) and the insurance company.

To conclude, I would like to emphasise that although I have severe reservations regarding many of the claims made by Sperber & Wilson (1985/1996), in particular their ideas concerning metaphor, it is not my intention to completely repudiate relevance theory approaches. If we were to test how different ads are interpreted by different people, that is, according to my account, what domains or spaces are identified, what features are projected and in what contexts, both the notion of strong and weak communication and the idea of relevance to an individual might be of some use in explaining the expected differences. This closely follows Forceville's (1996:96-97) account of how relevance theory complements Black's interaction theory of metaphor, which will be discussed in the next section.

3.4 Cognitive linguistic approaches[26]

Forceville (1996) is the first monograph devoted to metaphor in advertising from a cognitive perspective, although his theory of metaphor is largely based on Black's interaction theory (1962, 1979). His aim is to develop a theory of pictorial metaphor, which presupposes that metaphor is a cognitive phenomenon rather than a linguistic one. As he rightly points out, Black's notion of metaphor is compatible with that of Lakoff & Johnson (1980), both in that Black acknowledges that metaphor is related to thought and in that he sees the two terms of a metaphor as systems, comparable to domains in conceptual metaphor theory. One argument he gives for still using Black's interaction theory is that it is "the most satisfactory", one reason being that it recognises "the importance of metaphor's pragmatics" (1996:4). This bears some resemblance to the standpoint taken by Tanaka (1994), and the differentiation they make between semantics and pragmatics is the same. The theoretical compromise he arrives at for his treatment of metaphor is that it contains a primary subject and a secondary subject, both of which are systems of things, but they also belong to larger systems, which he calls domains. Following Lakoff and Johnson, he refers to these as the source domain and the target domain, but unlike them, he divides

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[26] More recent studies include the one made by Han (2003), who investigates conceptual blending in banner advertising on the Internet, and Kanellou (2003), who examines products aimed at women and how they are conceptualised in terms of sex. Both of these are made by post-graduate students, which, as far as I am aware, also applies to Dąbrowski (2000). However, Kanellou (2003) focuses on gender and cultural aspects, rather than on cognitive linguistic aspects.

their content into a part that is "explicable in terms of a semantic field" and a part that contains encyclopaedic information (1996:35).

Like Black, Forceville is concerned with novel creative examples rather than the cases of entrenched conceptual metaphors that Lakoff and Johnson focus on. He points out that Black's examples of verbal metaphor usually are of the type "Noun A is Noun B", and are in this respect similar to the pictorial metaphors in his own material (1996:29). With conventional metaphorical expressions, he argues, it is not always possible to pick out the primary and second subject, or more precisely the figurative and the literal part. Novel metaphors are different, because although some of them exemplify unused parts of conventional mappings, as argued by Lakoff and Turner (1989), it is Forceville's contention that "metaphors in poetry are by no means always expansions of conventional metaphors" (1996:23). The metaphors he identifies are thus classified according to the pictorial realisation of the two subjects. In MP1s, one of the terms is pictorially present, while both are present in MP2s. Since the focus of this thesis is on the interaction between text and image, rather than with purely pictorial metaphors, we shall in what follows mainly be concerned with the third category that is identified, namely VPMs, or verbo-pictorial metaphors. These are cases in which one term of the metaphor is realised verbally and the other pictorially. Although the difference between the primary subject and the secondary subject in effect is that between the figurative and the literal part of the metaphor, Forceville settles for the terms focus and frame instead, since "it is counterintuitive to talk about the 'literal' part of a picture" (1996:29).

In addition to this categorisation of pictorial metaphors, Forceville also gives a fairly detailed discussion of the communicative situation. This is based on Jakobson's (1960) model of communication (1996:70ff), and special attention is paid to the relation between communicator and addressee. Here, like Tanaka (1994), he relies on Sperber & Wilson's (1986/1995) relevance theory, but unlike her he does not directly adopt their view of metaphor (1996:94). Instead, their insights are used to complement Black's theory by explaining what determines the selection of possible features to be projected from the secondary subject (source) to the primary subject (target). The overall guiding principle is taken to be optimal relevance (to an individual), and in order to achieve this, several aspects have to be taken into consideration, including the context in which the metaphor is uttered and the identities of the communicator and the addressee. Features that would be chosen for projection by most addressees regardless of context may then be seen as strong implicatures, whereas those picked out by only a few may count as weak implicatures (1996:96-97).

Exactly what this may involve can be more clearly illustrated by considering one of the examples he discusses. The ad in question is for Venco liquorice and contains a verbo-pictorial metaphor. The headline *Het zwarte goud* ('black gold') is seen against the background of a picture showing pieces of liquorice. The connection between 'liquorice' and 'black gold' is taken to be a metaphorical one, and 'liquorice' is taken to be the primary subject, since that is the product promoted by the ad. The metaphor is then formulated as LIQUORICE IS GOLD, or to be more exact LIQUORICE IS BLACK GOLD. It then follows that certain features from the secondary subject are to be projected upon the primary subject, and the most obvious feature, the argument goes, is that of 'being valuable'. However, it is also pointed out that the difference between GOLD and LIQUORICE is not merely a question of colour, but in the latter version there is also a possible metaphorical meaning involved, namely that of 'coal'. Although this does not change the relevant feature, 'being valuable', which is projected onto LIQUORICE, it does pose a problem in that coal has certain properties which are not desirable in relation to liquorice, most importantly the fact that it is inedible. According to Forceville, this is where relevance theory comes into play. Judging from the context, in this case the fact that the ad appeared in a trade journal, it is assumed that the addressees are retailers rather than consumers. To them, the property of 'value' is more relevant than that of 'inedibility' (1996: 148-9). Although not explicitly stated, it thus follows that it would be quite possible for someone, who does not have access to the context and who is not a retailer, to interpret it in terms of the liquorice being inedible. However, the very fact that we are dealing with BLACK GOLD instead of COAL, i.e. that the words in the ad are the Dutch equivalents of *black gold* and not *coal*, highlights the value aspect rather than the aspect of inedibility. In the metaphor COAL IS (BLACK) GOLD, it is the property of 'being valuable' that is relevant. This means that even regardless of situational context, the metaphor in the ad is geared towards one interpretation rather than another. Forceville mentions how an attempt is sometimes made to avoid negative associations, but fails to see that a similar effort indeed has been made in his own example. The example he refers to is an advertising slogan for milk, in which the milk was described as 'the white motor' rather than 'the white petrol', presumably in order to avoid negative associations, for example concerning the taste of the milk (1996:149).

Before leaving the discussion of Forceville's work, let us turn to another example of a so-called verbo-pictorial metaphor, which is slightly different from the previous one, in that the ad contains more text. The ad is for a BMW motorbike, and it consists of a large picture of the motorbike with the headline *In*

plaats van verkering ("instead of dating") above it and the text of the body-copy below it. The latter reads as follows (translated by Forceville from the Dutch):

> With a BMW motorbike you know what you've got. And with a date that remains to be seen. Of course dating someone [or: a date] can be very attractive. But so is a BMW motorbike. If, however, you are really looking for a long-lasting relationship, what could be more reliable than a BMW motorbike? A BMW motorbike is what you could call the opposite of a dayfly. For one of its strong points is its life expectancy. It lasts for years. Without ageing quickly. And without maintenance costs. They are machines of almost indestructible quality. Moreover, they are comfortable. The rider controls his machine. And not the other way round. What is noticeable is the sense of peace when you're riding on a BMW. You will discover that you are not the only one who wants to ride on a BMW. That becomes particularly apparent when you find out about the very high trade-in value if you sell it. But that won't happen until much later. First make a test-ride at your BMW dealer's. A date can wait. *BMW makes riding marvellous.* (1996:149-51)

Since Forceville refers to this ad as containing the verbo-pictorial metaphor MOTORBIKE IS GIRLFRIEND, he must suggest that the target domain MOTORBIKE is reflected in the picture and the source domain GIRLFRIEND in the text. This analysis appears to be problematic, since the body-copy, and thus the metaphor, can be understood even without the picture. Moreover, he comments on the fact that the source domain is only mentioned in the first paragraphs of the copy, before the rest of it completely centres on the target domain. This is unusual, he claims, because it would normally be expected that the language should include vocabulary belonging to the source domain, since the target domain is understood in terms of it. Forceville even goes as far as to suggest that the metaphor could be reversed into GIRLFRIEND IS MOTORBIKE, since the last paragraphs could also be seen as describing the girlfriend (1996: 152-3). While I agree that it is difficult to see exactly in what direction the projection of features takes place, the entire problem ceases to exist if we consider this ad in light of the theory of conceptual blending. Since a blend involves the projection of features from at least two input spaces onto a blended space, the inputs only contain corresponding elements and, crucially, no features are mapped from one to the other. Instead, selected information is projected from both input spaces to the blended space, where it is integrated and where novel structure can emerge. The input spaces can, as they are in this case, be related to each other as the source and target domains of a metaphor. The text of the body-copy can then be seen as including features from both domains, or spaces to be more specific. Ultimately, however, the concern of the ad is to sell a motorbike, not a girlfriend,

and this tallies with the fact that metaphorical blends usually make a statement about the target space.

Overall, Forceville's study is very impressive and provides a number of useful insights into the creative uses of metaphor and the various realisations of conceptual metaphors. However, his approach is lacking in two main respects, which I have tried to illustrate in the discussion of the BMW ad. First, the verbo-pictorial metaphors he discusses are far from being the only way in which the text and image of print advertising combine in expressing metaphorical meaning. In particular, it is not always the case that one domain is reflected in the picture and the other in the text. Second, due to the complexity of the material, an analysis involving a mapping of features from one domain to another is not always sufficient when we are dealing with highly creative elaborations of conceptual metaphor. In these cases, blending theory can help us shed more light on the matter at hand.

A much more limited treatment of conceptual metaphor in advertising is given by Dąbrowski (2000), whose concern could be seen as the opposite of that of Forceville, namely how the advertising text is structured by conceptual metaphor. This study examines ads from four different magazines, and results in the identification of four groups of what is labelled model metaphors, i.e. higher-level metaphors that entail all the different metaphors found in the ads. These four groups are:

> Model I: ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE
> Model II: INANIMATE IS ANIMATE
> Model III: METAPHORS BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF SENSES
> Model IV: familiar to describe less familiar
> (Dąbrowski 2000:299)

Most of the metaphors he discusses are conventional ones, such as IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, which is grouped under Model I and, for example, found reflected in an ad for Integra, a skin care product. The copy reads:

> We **put our reputation on these lines**.
> If Integra doesn't soften the signs of ageing within 28 days we'll give you your money back. […] And **we stake our reputation on the fact** that Integra will reduce the appearance of those tell-tale ageing lines. [..] (Dąbrowski 2000:301)

Although he highlights the metaphorical expressions in bold type, very little comment is given as to how the metaphorical expressions function in the ad. Dąbrowski does state that he is only interested in giving "a general categorisation of concepts involving metaphors" (2000:309), but unfortunately,

this means that he misses some of the more interesting aspects of his material. For example, in the ad discussed above, the phrase *We put our reputation on these lines* may be analysed as a case of double grounding[27], since there is a metonymic link here to the domain of the product via the word *lines*. What Dąbrowski does not mention, despite doing so in relation to other examples, is that there is also a second metaphor involved here, namely REPUTATION IS BUILDING and also ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS. Not only does Integra build an argument for its products based on the lines of text in the ad, they also build their business idea on the undesirability of fine lines in people's facial skin. This can be compared to Brône & Feyaerts's (in press) example *U.S. slowdown punctures Michelin's profits,* which was discussed in chapter 2.

Interestingly enough, Dąbrowski also discusses an example which bears some resemblance to Tanaka's example discussed in section 3.3. The ad is for a bank called Pictet, and among the metaphors that Dąbrowski identifies are SAVINGS ARE TREE, BANK'S EXPERIENCE IS SOIL FOR THE TREE and PERIOD OF EXPERIENCE IS RICHNESS OF SOIL (2000:303). According to his description, there is also a drawing of a tree above the copy, and although this example is less creative than Tanaka's, it is clear that they share the same conceptual base. The metaphorical expressions he locates in the copy include:

> (1) The growth of your assets is rooted in two centuries of experience.
> (2) Uniquely qualified to put your assets on a sure path to grow.

It thus seems that many ads are based on conceptual metaphors that are more or less conventional, but the degree to which that metaphor is exploited creatively can vary from ad to ad.

Merely identifying the existence of (conventional) conceptual metaphors in advertising texts like Dąbrowski has done might be a promising start, but in order to understand the full scale of the complexities involved, a much more thorough analysis is required. It is hardly surprising that metaphors like ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE, LIFE IS A JOURNEY and IDEAS ARE OBJECTS are found in advertising texts, since they are rife in language in general. What is interesting is how they are extended and elaborated for creative purposes.

In contrast to the previous two studies, Ungerer (2000) is concerned with metaphors in advertising at a form of meta-level, rather than with specific conceptual metaphors in individual ads. He sets out to describe the general conceptual structure of advertisements by explaining some of the underlying psychological phenomena. The basic motivation for an ad is what Ungerer calls

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[27] For a discussion of double grounding, see section 2.5.

the GRABBING metonymy, which he formulates as GRABBING THE DESIRED OBJECT STANDS FOR DESIRE. This metonymy is said to be grounded in our experiences as babies, when we have a desire to reach for and get hold of all the interesting things we come across. Although this instinct is less pronounced when we are adults, Ungerer argues that it is still active (2000:322), and intuitively this seems to be correct. We only have to consider the way most people behave when browsing around shops, picking up and looking at the objects that interest them. Similarly, when we are shown a new item that someone has bought or a gift that someone has been given, our reaction is to express our admiration and get hold of it. This instinct even causes problems in museums and galleries, where people have to be asked or physically kept from touching the interesting object before them. In advertising, the GRABBING metonymy is claimed to motivate the so-called VALUE metaphor, which is expressed as THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A VALUABLE OBJECT. Ungerer points out that advertising has largely abandoned hard-selling strategies in favour of soft-selling ones, and these often involve establishing some form of connection between the domain of the advertised object and some other domain representing positive qualities, which in turn can be projected onto the product. These connections are by necessity metaphorical, and can all be summarised in terms of the VALUE metaphor. The GRABBING metonymy and the VALUE metaphor are mutually dependent upon each other, because while the former motivates the latter, the latter in turn activates the former (2000:324-5). This means that the urge we have to grab desirable objects is what causes advertisers to portray the products they want to promote as valuable objects. Once they have done so, the urge to grab is activated. This tallies with an overall guideline in advertising circles, AIDA, which stands for Attention-Interest-Desire-Action (2000:324).

However, as Ungerer points out, it is sometimes not enough simply to portray a product as a valuable object by linking it with a positive domain. The conventional VALUE metaphors have been weakened and can no longer manage to attract the attention of potential buyers and to arouse their interest. For this reason, he posits a more general metaphor, THE DESIRED OBJECT IS AN INTERESTING OBJECT, which not only subsumes the traditional value metaphors, but also more innovative metaphors, such as THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A STRANGE OBJECT/MYSTIFYING OBJECT/SHOCKING OBJECT or even A REVOLTING OBJECT. There is thus a whole scale of metaphors available, ranging from VALUE metaphors to INTEREST metaphors to SHOCK metaphors (2000:326). The problem with these innovative metaphors, Ungerer continues, is that they connect the domain of the product with a source domain that no longer has entirely positive

associations. Although it might have a stronger potential of attracting attention and interest, it might not lead to desire and action. Therefore, the metaphor has to be constrained so that only positive features are transferred to the domain of the product. Ungerer discusses this constraint in terms of muting, which is "an *attempt* to impose artificial mapping constraints on innovative metaphors" (2000:329, my emphasis). This muting can be carried out in several different ways, for example by letting the content of the copy modify the way in which the pictorially represented source domain should be interpreted. Whichever way it is done, it is important to stress that this can never be more than an attempt. Advertisers have to take the calculated risk that some potential customers will be put off by the ad.

Let us now turn to a discussion of one of the examples Ungerer provides, in order to illustrate these processes in greater detail. It is a double-spread ad for Volkswagen Passat with the headline and copy on the left-hand side and a picture on the right-hand side. It shows the Volkswagen Passat together with six people wearing white lab coats. They are all very focused on the car, which they seem to be inspecting very carefully. One of them is holding a notepad, one is sitting down in front of the car, one is kneeling on top of it, and yet another one is inside the car, his head sticking out through the sunroof. The last two people are simply standing straight up, looking intently at the car, one from behind it and the other from the front. The headline reads *Obsession*, in large print, and in smaller print underneath *from Laboratoires Volkswagen.* The copy then follows:

> Passat. For a man and a woman. And the kids if they've got any. The look of it. The feel of it. The fully galvanised body with eleven year warranty of it. Volkswagen's designers gave the Passat seven years of undivided attention. So, when BBC Top Gear Magazine said it was 'probably the finest family car in the world', they were deeply offended. 'Probably' indeed. You can get more information about Volkswagen's object of desire by phoning 0800 333 666. Or by spending from £14,500. (Ungerer 2000: 330)

In his analysis of this ad, Ungerer begins by stating that the INTEREST metaphor is expressed visually in the picture and constitutes a variant of the metaphor THE DESIRED OBJECT IS A STRANGE OBJECT (since everybody is looking at it). Because of the word *Laboratoires* in the headline and the white lab coats, the source domain is assumed to be LABORATORY CHECK. While this association may be favourable in terms of attention and interest, he says, it nevertheless has to be muted, since there are many negative aspects that can be transferred from this domain. Ungerer does not go into any detail as to what these undesirable correspondences might be, other than suggesting that it could "put off people who are somehow afraid of scientific methods" (2000:331). The way in which

the muting is carried out is said to be in the use of the word *obsession.* According, to Ungerer, this word will draw the attention away from the negative aspects and instead cause people to focus on the work that has gone into manufacturing the car and how much care and attention has been paid to it (2000:331). Now, let us stop and consider this for a while before returning to his analysis. First, positing LABORATORY CHECK as the source domain is questionable, because it is difficult to see what the metaphor would be in that case (hardly A VW PASSAT IS A LABORATORY CHECK). It seems more natural to suggest that the metaphor reflected in the ad, with the help of both the picture and the text, is A VW PASSAT IS OBSESSION. Ungerer is hinting at this, since he recognises the importance of the word *obsession*, and since he singles it out as the aspect best representing the source domain, but he does not state it explicitly. However, regardless of whether we choose to follow Ungerer's account or the proposal made here, we are still left with the same problem, because OBSESSION does not necessarily involve positive aspects alone. On the contrary, *obsession* is prototypically negative and associated with obsessive or manic behaviour, pedantry, fixations, and so on. Therefore, the claim that the word *obsession* alone and without exception makes us think in positive terms is highly unlikely.

Ungerer further develops this analysis in a later section, where the focus is on the role of metonymies. Here, he notes that both *obsession* and *Laboratoires Garnier* are associated with perfumes, thus constituting metonymies of the type PRODUCER FOR PRODUCT. This in turn makes it possible to use PERFUME as a source domain as well, so that positive aspects can be transferred onto the domain of the VW Passat. In addition, yet another metaphor is mentioned, both in this context and in his initial analysis. This metaphor is reflected in the copy of the ad, and more precisely in the references to men, women, kids and family, and Ungerer formulates it as THE PASSAT IS PEOPLE AND FAMILY (2000:337-8). While it is agreed that *obsession* and *Laboratoires Garnier* form a metonymic link to the domain of PERFUME, the picture is a bit more complex than the one Ungerer paints. First, it is only the term *obsession* that can be associated with the domain of PERFUME, if we want to be precise, because Laboratoires Garnier are manufacturers of hair care products, which is a slightly different domain. "Obsession", however, is the name of a perfume made by Calvin Klein and fits Ungerer's description. Nevertheless, there are some interesting connections to note here. As Ungerer points out, this ad to some extent presupposes that the audience is familiar with the world of beauty products, for example by regularly reading magazines (2000:337). If so, the connection might be made not only between *obsession* and the perfume "Obsession", but also between "Obsession"

and Calvin Klein. Calvin Klein, in turn, is also the manufacturer of another well-known perfume, "CK One", and in an extensive international advertising campaign in the mid-1990s, it was accompanied by the slogan *For a man or a woman*, which is exactly the same as the phrase at the beginning of the copy. In fact, ads are often intertextual in this way, drawing on meaning and references to other ads (Schroeder 2002:30). This part of the ad then has links both to the domain of PERFUME, or perhaps more generally BEAUTY PRODUCTS, and to the domain of THE PASSAT. Furthermore, by assuming that the metaphor is THE PASSAT IS A BEAUTY PRODUCT, we can also see how additional positive features may be transferred, such as the ability to make a person look and feel good. This is also alluded to in the copy in the phrases *The look of it* and *The feel of it*, which might be seen as a link to the domain of HAIR CARE, where we already have Laboratoires Garnier. Therefore, the picture becomes much clearer if we take the overall metaphor to be just THE PASSAT IS A BEAUTY PRODUCT, or perhaps still better if we take CARS and BEAUTY PRODUCTS to be the input spaces of a metaphorical blend. We will return to this ad in chapter 7, where similar examples from my own material are discussed.

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CHAPTER 4
POLYSEMOUS WORDS

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4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the focus will be on ads in which the metaphoric content is centred around and signalled by a polysemous word. From the very start, it must be pointed out that the use of the term "polysemous" is not unproblematic here and has been chosen for want of a more precise and yet economical label. Needless to say, polysemy is a very wide-ranging linguistic phenomenon referring to instances where one phonological form is associated with a number of related senses, and the term would therefore in theory also include the type of conventional metaphorical expressions treated in chapter 6 and even the idiomatic expressions in chapter 5, as long as we consider whole phrases to be candidates for polysemy (cf. Taylor 2003:32). In cognitive linguistics, the range of what is considered to be instances of polysemy is especially wide (cf. Taylor 1995:105, 2003:36), which is a direct result of the overall view of language and meaning within this framework (see sections 2.2 and 4.2). Such a view of polysemy is largely embraced in this thesis, but for the sake of analysis a relatively narrow selection is nevertheless made as to what particular ads are included in this chapter. The theoretical grounds for this division will be examined more closely in section 4.2 below, where polysemy is further discussed in relation to metaphor, ambiguity, entrenchment and salience. In short, this chapter includes ads centred around a polysemous word whose senses are metaphorically related and have come some way in the lexicalisation process, which means they are more or less entrenched. The metaphoric link between the senses is not particularly salient or accessible, which provides an effect when attention is drawn to the non-metaphorical sense. In comparison, the metaphorical expressions in chapter 6 consist of phrases rather than individual words[28], and in some cases even combinations of two shorter phrases, and the metaphor is more transparent. As a result, the effect here rather depends on the associations made between various sets of metaphorical and non‑metaphorical

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[28] The immediate context in which these polysemous words occur is obviously of vital importance, but the crucial difference is that they do not form part of fixed idiomatic phrases as in chapter 5.

meanings. However, the division is far from clear-cut, and some examples could arguably be treated in either chapter. In chapter 5, we are also dealing with phrases, but with fixed idiomatic expressions that have a similar or even deeper level of entrenchment compared to the polysemous words in this chapter. Some of the ads in chapter 7 also include polysemous words, but here the attention is first drawn to an underlying conventional metaphor, which in turn is used as a basis for a novel conceptualisation that allows us to experience the product in terms of something else.

One effect of the creative use of polysemous words is that of humour, more specifically in the form of puns. While puns may be found throughout the ads analysed in this thesis, they appear to be somewhat stronger in relation to the more entrenched and salient metaphorical senses of the polysemous words in 4.5, but also to the idiomatic expressions in chapter 5. The main difference is that the former are centred around a single word, which seems to be the typical case with puns, rather than a phrase. The metaphorical expressions in chapter 6 would then be expected to be involved in weaker puns, but this may vary since the level of entrenchment may be difficult to determine and may also differ from person to person. Also, the two meanings of the expression may be activated simultaneously, rather than one slightly ahead of the other. Although the ads in 7.4 also play with two senses of the same word, the humour in those cases mainly emerges in the clash between the two domains involved in the novel conceptualisation. It is my suggestion that the quality of a pun specifically depends both on the level of entrenchment and on the degree of ambiguity[29] involved in the two senses, which would explain the relative strength of the puns in the this chapters, and especially in the first section. Since puns are based on ambiguity, and ambiguity in turn is linked to polysemy, it makes most sense to include the discussion of puns and ambiguity in this chapter (see section 4.4), but let us keep in mind that it will also be relevant elsewhere. In order to facilitate this discussion, it will be preceded by an account of humour within a cognitive linguistic framework, where conceptual blending is understood to play a significant role (see section 4.3). This basic account will also be relevant to the analyses in chapter 7. Following these theoretical sections, we will then turn to the analyses of the ads in section 4.5.

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[29] As demonstrated in section 4.4, the degree of ambiguity is not in itself a sufficient indicator of the quality of a pun.

4.2 Polysemy in a cognitive linguistic view

Polysemy, in its simplest possible definition, involves one single word with several related senses. In section 2.2, we saw how meaning in cognitive linguistics is understood against conceptual categories with prototypical and non-prototypical members, rather than the absence or presence of semantic features (Langacker 1991:35). In terms of Langacker's network model (see figure 4:1), the different senses of a word correspond to different nodes in the network, and these nodes are related via cognitive links, often in the form of metaphors and metonymies. The model is dynamic, in the sense that new extensions can be made from the prototype. These extensions may in turn build into chains of extensions, leading to a complex category. For each new extension, a schema[30] is abstracted, which Langacker (1987:371) defines in the following way:

> A schema, by contrast, is an abstract characterization that is fully compatible with all the members of the category it defines (so membership is not a matter of degree); it is an integrated structure that embodies the commonality of its members, which are conceptions of greater specificity and detail that elaborate the schema in contrasting ways.

Consequently, as a category expands or widens, it will also extend upwards, creating more and more schematic notions (Langacker 1993:2, 1991:266-267). This also means that the conventional meaning of a word is understood against the entire network and not just the prototype (Langacker 1991:3).


Figure 4:1. Schema, prototype, and extension. The thickness of the lines indicates the level of entrenchment.

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[30] It is important to note that Langacker's notion of a schema is not identical to that of Johnson's (1987) image schema, which he defines as "a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing activites", and these include actions, perceptions, and conceptions (1987:29). This is then the type of schema that structures a domain or a mental space, and is thus closely connected to its topology.

Langacker's network model is on the whole equivalent to Lakoff's radial categories (1987:91) and bears similarities to Taylor's (1995:99) monocentric and polycentric categories, which are also centred around prototypes. However, Taylor rejects the notion of a schema, since he finds it difficult in some cases to imagine one that is general enough to be compatible with all members of a category, and at the same time restrictive enough so as not to include non-members (1995:67). Here, important parallels can be drawn to the criticism mentioned in section 2.5 concerning the existence of a generic space in conceptual blends. As will become apparent later on in this section, I side with Langacker on this issue.

Since metaphor and metonymy often form the basis for meaning extension[31], it naturally follows that whenever we understand different uses of a word against two different domains, as with conventional metaphorical expressions, it is an indication that we are dealing with polysemy (Taylor 1995:100). However, as explicitly mentioned by Lakoff & Johnson (1999:499), this does not mean that polysemy *necessarily* involves metaphor. In addition, many lexical items that are traditionally classified as homonyms are instead seen as polysemous within a cognitive framework (Taylor 1995:109). A case in point would be the polysemy of prepositions, which has been the subject of numerous studies, starting with Brugman's (1981) classic study of *over*. In fact, most cognitive linguists agree that instances of absolute monosemy in the strictest sense are extremely rare and that polysemy is the norm (e.g. Lakoff & Johnson 1999:499, Langacker 1991:235, Taylor 1995:104 etc.). Due to this view of polysemy as ubiquitous, which ties in with the overall encyclopaedic view of meaning within this framework, cognitive linguists have been accused of advocating a "rampant polysemy" (Cuyckens & Zawada (2001:xvii).

The next issue that must be addressed is how to delimit polysemy in relation to both monosemy and homonymy. Starting with the distinction between polysemy and homonymy, Taylor (1995:103) points out that although the interrelation between the different senses is what ultimately distinguishes polysemy from homonymy, there are indeed degrees of relatedness, which may depend on subjective judgement. This is also the opinion held by Langacker

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[31] Importantly, there are traditional linguists who recognise metaphor and metonymy as taking a part in meaning extension. However, they would not consider them to be cognitive processes, but transfers of meaning from one word to another (cf. Lyons 1977:566-567, Palmer 1981:103). So when Johnson (1987:xii) says that traditional linguistic theories cannot accommodate the idea that different senses are linked "by devices of the human imagination, such as metaphor and metonymy", we must place the emphasis on the first half of the quote.

(1991), who sees polysemy as a graded phenomenon, without a clear dichotomy between polysemy and homonymy. Instead, the difference between polysemy and homonymy depends on the nature of the relationship between the different senses in the network, more specifically the degree of cognitive salience, which is understood as a scalar notion. Homonymy forms one of the endpoints on this scale, where the relationship only is that of phonological realisation (1991:267-8). It should perhaps be mentioned here that Lyons (1977:552), a traditionalist, also acknowledges the possibility of graded relatedness and that there might not be a clear cut-off point between polysemy and homonymy, but he offers no explanation as to why this may be the case. Instead, he proposes two ways of avoiding the problem, which is either maximising homonymy or maximising polysemy. Again, cognitive linguists have been accused of doing the latter.

Moreover, the issue of polysemy versus monosemy is often discussed in relation to ambiguity and vagueness, where polysemous words are considered ambiguous and monosemous words vague. For example, Taylor (1995:101) compares the words *pig* and *bird* in the sentences below:

    (1) I don't want to have a pig in the house.
    (2) There's a bird in the garden.

In (1), we are dealing with a polysemous word, since there is ambiguity present as to what is not wanted in the house – a farm animal or a person who eats his food sloppily and voraciously. No such ambiguity is said to be found in (2), where there is only vagueness as to exactly what kind of bird is in the garden, e.g. whether it is a central member of the BIRD category, such as a magpie, or a more peripheral member, such as an ostrich.[32] In addition, there are several tests commonly used to indicate whether a word is polysemous or not[33], for example the anaphoric relationship test used by Langacker (1991:269), repeated in (3) and (4) below:

    (3) Tom has an uncle, and Bill does too.
    (4) Tom has two ears, and Bill does too.

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[32] Although it is clear to us what distinction Taylor is trying to make, the particular example in (2) is not well-chosen, since it is in fact very similar to *pig*, in that *bird* too has a metaphorical and therefore polysemous sense, i.e. 'young woman', particularly someone who is attractive and where there is some kind of love interest. This metaphorical sense is perhaps less transparent than the metaphorical sense associated with *pig* and stylistically and socially more limited in its use, but nevertheless, to many British speakers it would be a possible interpretation. However, if we replace it with *pony*, for example, there should be no confusion.
[33] For more tests, see e.g. Palmer (1981:104ff), Lyons (1977:405,554) etc.

It is possible for Tom's uncle and Bill's uncle in sentence (3) to be of different kinds, i.e. maternal or paternal uncles, which points towards vagueness and monosemy. In (4), on the other hand, they both either have two anatomical protrusions, one on each side of their heads, or they both have two cobs of corn. The anaphoric reference requires the ears to be of the same sort, which indicates ambiguity and thus also polysemy. Langacker also discusses some examples provided by Tuggy (1981)[34], which indicate that it is not always adequate or even possible to make a discrete distinction between cases that exhibit either a single vague sense or multiple ambiguous senses. Consider the following sentence:

(5) Tom is painting, and Bill is too.

If the verb *paint* is polysemous, the painting they do has to be of the same kind for sentence (5) to work, but what would in fact count as the same activity? If one of them is painting a portrait and the other a fence, the activities will probably be deemed too different, but if it is a mural instead of a portrait that is being painted, it might be seen as similar enough to the painting of a fence for the sentence to be acceptable. This would suggest that we are dealing with a word whose sense is both ambiguous and vague at the same time, and which is neither entirely polysemous nor completely monosemous (Langacker 1991:269).

Geeraerts (1993) also questions the very idea that monosemy and polysemy form separate categories that are clearly delineated and where all members have equal status, rather than seeing inconclusive results as problems associated with the various tests themselves. In accordance with these observations, Tuggy (1993) further suggests that polysemy in fact occupies the middle ground on a scale between ambiguity and vagueness, and that the most extreme cases of ambiguity are homonymous rather than polysemous.[35] His argument relies on the Langackerian notions of entrenchment and salience, both with regard to the individual senses and to their shared schema. As illustrated in figure 2, extreme cases of monosemy have a deeply entrenched and highly specific schema, but only marginally entrenched elaborations. The opposite holds for homonymous cases, where the elaborations are deeply entrenched, but share a very abstract and distant schema. Polysemous cases may then exhibit a variety of different combinations in between these two extremes.

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[34] For more examples, see Tuggy (1993).

[35] Tuggy (1993) also refers to Deane (1988), who makes a similar suggestion. Cruse (1986:52) believes that there is a continuum between monosemy and polysemy rather than a dichotomy (see below). In fact, Brisard et al. (2001:262) claim that there is "growing consensus" around the idea of such a continuum.

Figure 4:2. The continuum of ambiguity and vagueness. Based on Tuggy (1993:283) and Steinvall (2002:58). Again, the thickness of the lines indicates the level of entrenchment.

As a central and therefore polysemous example, Tuggy uses the word *paint* in the two senses 'artistic paint', such as painting in watercolours, and 'utilitarian paint', such as painting a fence (see figure 4:2). Here, the thickness of the lines represents the level of entrenchment, indicating that the schema and the elaborations are equally salient. This also means that the phonological representation, or phonological pole, i.e. [peɪnt], is linked to all three and that either one of them can be construed as the prototype. In the monosemous example *aunt*, however, the schema is highly specific and deeply entrenched. The two elaborations are only marginally entrenched and have a weak link to the phonological representation. The shortness of the arrows indicates the close elaborative distance, which means that the level of specificity of the elaborations ('father's sister'/'mother's sister') differs relatively little compared to the level of specificity of the schema ('parent's sister'). The opposite is true in cases of homonymy, such as *bank*, where the elaborations are well entrenched, highly specific and very distant from the abstract schema, which is not linked to the phonological representation (Tuggy 1993:283).

At this point it should also be made clear that the models represented in figure 4:2 above are extremely oversimplified, as Tuggy himself points out (1993:283). For example, many different varieties are possible between the central polysemous case and the two extremes, the level of entrenchment is not always the same for both elaborations, and in fact, there are usually more than two elaborations to begin with. The model presented above is also dynamic, which means that the level of salience may vary, both from person to person and from one occasion to another depending on the context. This means that while entrenched structures are often salient, others may be highlighted by means of contextual factors, so that they too become salient, or that the salience shifts from one structure to another. This kind of variation in salience is obviously synchronic, but it may also occur diachronically. Based on the potential for diachronic change, I would like to suggest an alternative version (see figure 4:3), where vagueness/monosemy is placed at the left of the scale and ambiguity/homonymy at the right, i.e. the order has been inverted compared to Tuggy's original version. This solution seems more logical, since the diachronical movement typically is from monosemy to polysemy to homonymy rather than the other way round (Tuggy 1993:278-279).


Figure 4:3. My version of the continuum.

Based on this scale, we can now return to the caveat expressed in the beginning of the previous section concerning the choice of headline for this chapter. Although I would be prepared to refer to a much wider range of cases occupying the middle ground as polysemous, this chapter only includes examples judged to be located to the right of the centre of the scale, i.e. cases with a higher degree of ambiguity, where the two senses or elaborations are more entrenched than their shared schema, but where the schema is still not as abstract as in cases of homonymy. The reason for making this restriction is based on the way in which the senses of these particular words are exploited creatively in the ads, which is directly linked to the salience of their shared schema and which therefore differs from cases located elsewhere on the continuum. For example, the word *cover* in the Financial Times ad is understood as being located to the right of *paint*, since the schema is less entrenched and not linked to the phonological representation. Both elaborations may be construed as the prototype depending on the context. Thus, in the headline, *cover* is understood as 'deal with/report on', whereas in the accompanying image the sense of physically placing one item over or around another item is highlighted. This example will be discussed in greater detail in section 4.5.2. In addition, items which are located to the left of *cover*, but still to the right of *paint*, such as *heavy* in the Cover Girl ad (see section 4.6.2.), will also be included. In the analyses, I will refer to the former (*cover*) as type I examples and the latter (*heavy*) as type II.

The location of metaphorical expressions on this scale may vary depending on the level of entrenchment of the shared schema and of the elaborations, which again may vary from speaker to speaker and from context to context. In the case of *cover* discussed above, there is clearly a metaphorical link between the two senses, but because of the degree of conventionality and lexicalisation of the elaborations, the basis for this link, i.e. the shared schema, is no longer particularly salient. Novel metaphorical expressions, on the other hand, will typically have a more salient schema and less entrenched elaborations and thus be located further to the left on the scale, but again not as far to the left as *paint*. We will return to this discussion in chapter 6, where metaphorical expressions in ads are analysed.

As far as metonymic expressions are concerned, they may occupy a number of positions along the scale between monosemy and polysemy. Some examples are clearly polysemous, and the separate senses are even listed in dictionaries. These include for example *Whitehall*, which may refer both to the London street and to the government departments located along that street, and *the White*

House, which in a similar fashion either refers to the actual building occupied by the U.S. President or to the President himself and his staff. The potential for ambiguity can be demonstrated by a sentence such as (6), where we cannot know for sure whether the person referred to is in the street or in a government office, and where that difference is quite significant.

(6) She is in Whitehall.

The difference in meaning is not only to do with location, since being in a department probably would imply that she is working there or that she occupies some kind of important position that brings her there, so this interpretation also provides information about her occupation and status.

However, other cases prove to be more problematic. Taylor (1995:124) discusses Cruse's (1986) notion of contextual modulation, which deals with the fact that different aspects of an entity are highlighted in different situations. Langacker (1993, 2000:62-65) treats similar examples in terms of reference-point constructions or active zones, which are basically metonymic processes. An active zone refers to the part of an entity or a concept that is most directly involved in a situation, e.g. the window frame in *He's painting the windows*. It is important to point out that contextual modulation and active zones do not necessarily involve polysemy, but the processes contain what Taylor aptly chooses to call "the seeds of polysemy" (1995:124). In the case of *window*, for example, he provides the following example, in which he claims that there is a zeugmatic effect:

(7) I painted the window while she was standing in it.

Although the opposite may be argued, i.e. that there is no zeugmatic effect, this must not mean that we are dealing with one and the same vague sense. It could also be that we are dealing with different aspects that happen to be compatible, since it is perfectly possible to paint a window while somebody else is standing in it. In fact, *window* has to refer to two different parts or aspects for the sentence to make sense, and a zeugmatic effect would only occur if one and the same aspect were evoked, e.g. the window frame. In tests like these, it is normally assumed that it is impossible for different senses to be co-ordinated by anaphoric reference, but here it works since we are dealing with different senses that are profiled against the same domain. Note also that I am using the terms "sense" and "aspect" interchangeably here. This is done consciously, since they are understood as different manifestations of essentially the same phenomena,

although occurring at different levels of specificity and at different elaborative distances from the schema, and a common term for both would of course be "elaboration".

Furthermore, the fact that we are dealing with different aspects of the same domain is not an argument against polysemy or ambiguity, as we saw in example (6) above. Notice that it is also possible for *window* to be ambiguous, as in the following example:

(8) I painted the window by mistake.

Here, *window* can be interpreted as referring either to the frame itself or to the glass. While smearing paint on the glass pane is typically done by mistake, the frame can also be painted by mistake in a situation where only the surrounding wall or a different window frame was supposed to be painted. We can also see that *window* is not entirely vague if we compare it to *aunt*, which is Tuggy's example of a monosemous and vague word, as in sentence (9) below.

(9) Sheila is my aunt and so is Wilma.

As we saw in (7) above, different specific senses of *window* have to be activated unless we are to encounter a zeugmatic effect, but even though *aunt* may have specific reference either to a maternal aunt or a paternal aunt, both are acceptable at the same time, as are different combinations of the two.

In my opinion, this would lead us to consider *window* as involving elements of both monosemy/vagueness and polysemy/ambiguity, and would be located somewhere in between *aunt* and *paint* on my continuum (see fig. 4:3). Lakoff (1987:417-418), however, considers *window* to be polysemous, with three basic senses referring to the opening in the wall, the frame, and the glass panes, respectively.

Metonymic processes may thus result in expressions of varying degree of polysemy, but on the whole, extensions based on metonymy tend to lead to senses that are more vague/less ambiguous compared to metaphorical extensions, and they would therefore typically be found to the left of metaphorical extensions on my scale. However, simply labelling a word as polysemous or monosemous is of less interest than describing the relations that hold between different senses in as much detail as possible (cf. Langacker 1991:268), which can be achieved if we consider them as forming part of a continuum. This allows us to see the connection between the traditional division into polysemous words with distinct senses, on the one hand, and monosemous

words with variants of one and the same sense, on the other hand, but without having to draw an exact line between the two. Far from simply providing an easy way of getting around a problem, it helps us to better understand and represent the cognitive reality.

To sum up, it is apparent that the relationship between monosemy, polysemy, and homonymy is extremely complex and, needless to say, the discussion here is far from exhaustive. Although there are many interesting issues that warrant further investigation, and yet others that have not been mentioned at all here, this is beyond the scope of this thesis. The main purpose, which I hope has been fulfilled, has been to demonstrate that the advertising examples analysed in this chapter only form a subgroup of the full range of polysemous words and expressions, and that the headline for this chapter is metonymic in nature, in that the whole stands for a subpart. Again, the reason why this subpart has been singled out has to do with the way the senses and the underlying metaphor are exploited creatively, which in turn is connected to the level of entrenchment and salience, and to the elaborative distance of the different senses.

4.3 Humour and conceptual blending[36]

In a cognitive framework, jokes and other types of humour are often brought forward as typical cases where blending processes are highlighted (Fauconnier & Turner 1996:115, Coulson 1996:79)[37]. The occurrence of blended spaces in humour is also discussed by Coulson (in press: 2), who goes as far as to speculate about blending being "an inherent feature of humour". The following familiar joke is one of the examples she discusses:

>   (10) Why did the chicken cross the road?
>   To get to the other side.

According to her account, the first input space contains chickens, which live in barnyards and, like other birds and animals, have instinctive behaviour. In the other input space there are humans who live in cities and behave according to their wishes and intentions. The humour occurs in the blended space, where, due to selective projections from the two input spaces, we find town-dwelling

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[36] A similar account as in 4.3 and 4.4 is given in Lundmark (2003).
[37] Coulson (2001) also analyses humour in terms of the related process of frame-shifting. In the case of advertising puns, however, both frames are present at the same time. Although one frame might be introduced slightly ahead of the other, for example in the head, they are still there to be noticed simultaneously and it is the co-occurrence and tension between the two that causes the humour. There is no reliance on the sudden emergence of a second viewpoint as in other types of jokes, which fail if it is revealed to soon.

chickens with a mind of their own. What constitutes the emergent structure in the blended space is the humorous tension, which is not present in either of the input spaces. However, her analysis misses the fact that the chicken dies, because the phrase *the other side* is ambiguous, in that it may also be understood in the sense of 'heaven'. This still involves a clash between the instinctive behaviour of chickens and the conscious decisions made by people, but the first input space more specifically contains chickens, who run around aimlessly without looking where they are going, and who would be expected to be killed if they were to cross a road. The second input contains people, who usually plan their movements, at least a short moment in advance, and who typically look carefully before crossing the road. In the blended space, we find the expected outcome from the first input, combined with the conscious intention from the second input, and the emergent structure of the blend is therefore that the chicken commits suicide.

The humour in the chicken joke may be compared to the ironic tension found in the blended space in the example from Shakespeare's *King John* (Turner 1996:64-67), the element of stupidity in the blended space which gives rise to humour in the joke about George Bush on third base (Fauconnier & Turner 1994:18), and the notion of incompetence which emerges in the popular example of the surgeon referred to as a butcher (Grady et al. 1997:103-106). Coulson (in press) focuses on analyses of blending in political cartoons. Here, yet another aspect of blending is introduced, namely the possibility for blends to be manifested visually as well as verbally. One political cartoon she discusses has a drawing of Bill Clinton, with lipstick marks around his mouth, saying "Read my lips…". The visual element i.e. the lipstick marks, point to Clinton's affair with Monica Lewinsky and the truth of his account of the relationship, whereas the verbal content is a reference to an earlier unkept promise made by George Bush in relation to taxes (in press:4-5).

The idea that humour involves blended spaces is compatible with earlier semiotic or structuralist theories of humour, but also with work carried out in the area of psychology. Coulson refers to Koestler's (1964) bisociation theory of humour which, according to her, is concerned with humour involving "the unlikely combination of related structures" (in press:2). The same view is held by Nash, who describes humour as involving "the happy confusion of a double vision" (1985:137). Moreover, humour is often seen as crucially relying on the presence of incongruity, and Coulson (in press:2) illustrates this by providing an alternative, non-humorous version of the chicken joke, where there is no clash between the behaviour of people and that of chickens.

> (11) Why did the chicken cross the barnyard?
>   To get some scraps.

Here, there is no incongruity, since chickens do live in barnyards and do eat scraps, and therefore no humour either. These so-called incongruity theories of humour are classified by Attardo as cognitive (as opposed to social or psychoanalytical theories), and are often associated with linguistic theories of humour (1994: 47, 49).

Humour may also be considered in relation to metaphor, and it is Pollio's (1996) view that both "have something to do with split reference; that is, they refer to two different but related images or ideas that take place in proximity to one another" (1996: 248). The difference is taken to depend on whether the boundary between the two items referred to is emphasised or erased. The latter holds in the case of metaphor, where there is a fusion between the two items in order to create a novel perspective or new insight. In humour, on the other hand, the tension cannot be resolved and results in laughter (1996:48, 50-51). One problem with this account is that it seems to give the impression that an utterance is either metaphorical or humorous, but never both at the same time. Perhaps the difference is better thought of as a scale with humour found at one end and metaphor at the other instead of there being a strict boundary. This can better reflect the results of a study by Mawardi (1959), referred to by Pollio (1996: 231), in which people found it difficult to decide what was supposed to be a metaphor and what was supposed to be a joke. However, the idea that metaphor is found at one end of the scale and humour at the other still poses a problem, in that this prevents utterances from simultaneously containing a high degree of metaphoricity and being very funny. Instances like these clearly exist, since Pollio, again referring to Mawardi (1959), reports that laughter often occurred when "a really apt figure of speech summarized the group's current understanding of the problem" (1996:232). Apt figures of speech are taken here to involve novel creative mappings, perhaps even in the form of blends, where the semantic distance between the elements could be quite significant. According to Grady et al. (1997:117), psycholinguistic results indicate that these are the cases where people are most likely to recognise a metaphor, i.e. they contain a high degree of metaphoricity. Yet another problem is that if we see the difference in terms of a scale, it means that an incongruity that is not humorous has to be metaphorical. One way of getting around this problem would be to see Pollio's claims in terms of two scales, one indicating degree of humour and the other indicating degree of metaphoricity. The settings would then represent the extent to which the incongruity is seen as both resolvable and unresolvable

(Pollio's (1996) use of the term) at the same time, since it should be plausible for an utterance to provide new understanding while still involving some unresolvable tension. A single utterance could thus be perceived as both containing a high degree of resolvable incongruity (metaphor) and a high degree of unresolvable incongruity (humour). Returning to the first Mawardi example, the focus could either be on what is perceived as unresolvable tension, which would result in the utterance being interpreted as a joke, or on resolvable tension, which would result in a metaphorical interpretation, but both types of tension could also be perceived at the same time. In that case, it would be quite natural to wonder what the intention of the speaker really was. Attardo also addresses the issue of incongruity (1994:143-144), but in contrast to Pollio he claims that it has to be resolved. However, Attardo's view can essentially be considered compatible with that of Pollio, since he goes on to explain that resolution can be understood in several ways, and his stance is that it does not remove the incongruity, but stays present alongside it, so that "any humorous text will contain an element of incongruity *and* an element of resolution" (1994:144). In other words, it makes it possible to see the cause or the basis of the incongruity and thereby recognising and understanding it, even though it may not be realistic.

4.4 Puns and ambiguity

In accordance with the general account of humour provided above, puns are usually described as two meanings being incongruously combined in one and the same utterance. Due to ambiguity, a conflict arises between the two senses and is then subsequently resolved (Ross 1998:8, Chiaro 1992:34). According to Attardo (1994: 133-136), the two senses of a pun must be present at the same time and be in conflict with each other, although one is usually introduced before the other. The resolution consists of a disambiguation process, in which both the first expected sense and the second hidden sense must be involved. This process can have three different outcomes. The first interpretation can be discarded and the second interpretation kept, the first kept and the second discarded, or the two senses can continue to coexist. If the senses of a pun coexist, different types of connections might hold between them. Referring to Guiraud (1976), Attardo lists four such types, namely those where there is no relation between the senses, those where both senses coexist, those where the second sense forces connotation on the first and those where the first sense forces connotation on the second (1994:136-137). The last three cases can be considered in the light of conceptual blending, where both input spaces can be activated "while we do

cognitive work over them to construct meaning" (Turner 1996:61). Attardo also discusses Heller (1974:271), who touches on the idea that puns might have something to do with conceptual blending:

> The structure of the pun holds implications basic to an *understanding* of many psychological problems and a knowledge of its *dynamic processes* offers important insights into *the nature of reasoning* itself. (Cited by Attardo 1994:141, my emphasis)

This statement brings to mind the characteristics of blends as mental networks handling dynamic on-line processes of meaning construction and blended spaces as sites for cognitive work such as reasoning. Analyses of puns in terms of blending might prove to be the concrete manifestation of Heller's ideas that Attardo (1994:141) dismisses as "optimistic".

Furthermore, Nash (1985:137) defends the pun against accusations that it constitutes a simple and less sophisticated form of humour. He then proceeds to list different types of puns, one of them being pun-metaphors, which he claims are "deliberately sloppy" as opposed to poetic metaphors which are "precise" (1985:146). Pun-metaphors are said to be common in the language of journalism and the following example is provided (Nash 1985:146):

> (12) Council puts brake on progress of cycle path scheme.

It is clear that this example in fact constitutes a metaphorical blend, which at the linguistic level is signalled by the two senses of the word *brake*. The first input space relates to the source FORWARD MOTION and the second input space to the target PROGRESS, elements of which are then projected to and elaborated in the blended space. In fact, this example is identical to the type of headlines discussed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press) in terms of double grounding. The element *brake* is not only linked to the source space structured by FORWARD MOTION, but also to the third input space, COUNCIL AGENDA, which is an elaboration or specific example of the target PROGRESS (see section 2.5).

The worst type of pun, according to Attardo (1994:137-138), is the one where the two senses have nothing in common, following Guiraud's classification. The following example, originally from Pepicello and Green (1983:59), is supplied (Attardo 1994:128):

> (13) Why did the cookie cry?
>   Its mother had been away for so long. [a wafer]

Here, the humour is said to be based on the two senses invoked by *away for* and *a wafer,* respectively, and since these are merely homophones, which can be seen as a type of homonymy, they do not have a shared schema. In fact, it is not even possible to posit an abstract schema like THING, as with $bank_1$ and $bank_2$ in figure 4:2 above, since one is an entity and the other one a state. In terms of blending theory, the weak humour in this example could then be explained as a result of the blend only occurring at the level of formal expression and not conceptually. It is comparable to the example given by Turner & Fauconnier (1995:200), in which the opera title *Amahl and the Night Visitors* is given as a response to a question whether a shopping mall is open at night. In this case, the formal blend takes place between *Amahl* and *a mall*, whereas in example (4) the phrase *away for* is formally blended with *a wafer.* However, we can also see quite clearly that there is a conceptual blend involved as well. As Attardo points out, there is an "impossible match" between cookies and the ability to cry, which means that we have to open up "a possible world where cookies are [+animate] and have the physiological capacity to shed tears" (1994:129). In cognitive linguistic terms, cookies have to be framed as people, similar to the blend in example (1), where chickens were framed as people. The humorous tension in this conceptual blend, although still quite weak and mainly popular with young children (Coulson in press:2), perhaps contributes even more to the overall humorous content than does the formal blend. This is contrary to the account given by Attardo, who claims that readers/hearers who only construct the conceptual blend "would be missing the humorous nature of the text entirely" (1994:129).

To mention an example of this type of formal blending from the world of advertising, let us consider two different versions of an ad for Findus frozen peas, which appeared on billboards in Sweden some years ago. In both versions, the ad contained a large picture of a bag of peas, but in one version the head consisted of the phrase *piece of cake* and in the other the phrase *peace on earth.* Now, the word *peas* is blended with the phrase *piece of cake,* in the first version, and with the phrase *peace on earth* in the second. It is true that the word is not found in the ad in its written form, but it is retrievable from the visual content. Also, among Swedish speakers of English, the distinction in final position between a voiced/lenis consonant in *peas* and a voiceless/fortis consonant in *peace/piece* is often not maintained, thus rendering them homophones. It is clear, however, that there is no conceptual blend at work here between peas on the one hand, and a piece of cake or the state of peace on earth on the other hand. There is no shared schema between the two senses, which means no generic space can

be construed between the two, and as a result there can be no conceptual blend (cf. Turner 1996:87).

It thus seems that the quality of a pun depends on the relation between the two senses involved, and this relation can be understood in terms of the continuum in figure 4:3 above. As demonstrated above, examples located at the far right, i.e. cases of homonymy, result in weak puns, since there is only a very abstract shared schema or maybe none at all. Monosemous words, located at the far left, will not work at all, since we are dealing with vagueness rather than ambiguity, which is a prerequisite when constructing a pun. In the most extreme cases there is only one sense, and in other cases the elaborations are still too vague for a pun to be possible, and importantly, they are not linked to the phonological representation. Accordingly, the best examples are cases of polysemy, where there is a fairly entrenched schema, but also salient elaborations where either one may be construed as the prototype. Since polysemy is a graded phenomenon, it follows that certain instances probably are better than others, and given the dynamicity of the model and the possibility for synchronic variation, what actually works as a pun can vary with context or from person to person. Some idea as to what would constitute the ideal examples might be gleaned from Nerhardt (1977), a psychologist, who bases his model of humour on the traditional view that it involves "a discrepancy between two mental representations" (1977:32). He sees incongruity in humour as involving similarity and dissimilarity in the following way (1977:33):

> When two events are perceived or thought of together or in close succession, each will actualize respective classes […]. If one of the events is perceived as similar to the types in the other event's classes […], they will become reference classes for the former event. If an event in this manner becomes a member of a certain class actualized by another event and at the same time diverges enough in unidimensional similarity from a typical quality in that class, it will be found funny.

Although no mention is made of any existence of more than two events, there are still some parallels between this account and that in which blending is seen as inextricably linked to humour. First of all, the humorous scenario described above can be compared to a blend in that some similarity exists between the two events/spaces, namely that which is present in the generic space. Second, there is also an element of dissimilarity involved, which in Nerhardt's model is represented by a divergence from typical qualities and in blending theory by a clash or tension in the blended space between elements from the two inputs. If there were to be increased similarity, i.e. less divergence, it would correspond to those instances of blending where the source category is extended and the blend

becomes invisible. No humour would be present in this case. Likewise, if there is not enough similarity perceived between the events, one event will not be expected to become a member of a class actualised by the other event in the first place, just like the absence of shared abstract structure will prevent a blend from being constructed, and thereby also preventing humour (cf. Nerhardt 1977:33-34, Turner 1996:87,89). This can be compared to the view held by Ross (1998:8), who says that if we do not think a joke is funny, it either depends on our inability to recognise the ambiguity or on finding the double meaning laboured. In terms of blending theory, this would correspond to an inability to access the second input in the former case, and to the two senses having very little in common (no generic space available) or too much in common (they seem to belong to the same category) in the latter case. It is important to note here that I am talking about blending at two different levels. On the one hand, there is blending at the lexical level of meaning extension (cf. Fauconnier & Turner 2003), where little in common equals homonymy and too much in common equals monosemy. On the other hand, I am talking about blending at the discourse level, involving humour as in the advertising examples. These two levels run parallel in the case of puns.

As a final point, it must be mentioned that although homonyms and homophones are generally expected to form bad puns, there are important exceptions, which are still supported by the theoretical model outlined above. For example, Hermerén (1999:135-136) discusses an ad for Dillons bookstores with the slogan: *Foiled again? Try Dillons*, where he points out that socio-cultural knowledge is required in order to appreciate the pun. However, this knowledge is only said to include the fact that Dillons's main competitor is Foyles, thus creating the partial homophones *foiled* and *Foyles,* which leads Hermerén to draw the conclusion that it is a bad pun, or in his words "a little suspect" (1999:136). However, there is a further connection between *Foyles* and *foil*, which is based on conventional cultural knowledge (cf. Kövecses 2002:207-208) that goes somewhat deeper. To people familiar with Foyles, such as its current customers whom Dillons wants to attract, it is commonly known for being the largest, most well-stocked bookstore or at least for having been so at one point. More unfortunately, it is also notorious for the complete disorganisation of its stock and the confusing maze-like layout of the store itself, where at best you fail to find the book your looking for and at worst you end up getting lost. There is thus a meaningful connection in that your plans to buy the book you are looking for might well be foiled if you go to Foyles instead of Dillons. Recognising this extended link in conventional knowledge further

increases the appreciation of the pun and of the ad. It may be analysed as a type of conceptual blend, but not one that is based on a conventional metaphor. Due to this lack of metaphoric content, examples like these are not included in my material.

4.5 Polysemous words in ads: type I
In this section, I will examine three different ads centred around polysemous words with deeply entrenched, lexicalised senses. These are of the type considered to be located more to the right on the scale between monosemy and homonymy (see fig. 4:3), and, due to a more abstract schema, are expected to result in higher-quality puns compared to the words in the next section. In cases like these, where the metaphorical link between the two senses is less salient, the opacity is exploited to create humorous and surprise effects. Once the metaphorical link has been made more salient, it is also elaborated in order to make a claim about the product. The pictorial content is of considerable importance in this process, since it is instrumental in highlighting the non-metaphorical sense, and hence also the schema (at the lexical level), the source domain of the metaphor responsible for the extended meaning, and the generic space (at the discourse level).

4.5.1. Persil
The first advertisement is for Persil washing powder (see plate 4:1), which shows a person holding a sleeping baby on his or her outstretched arm, with the baby's head resting in the palm of the hand. The baby is wearing a white outfit and appears to be completely relaxed and safe. The headline reads: *Clothes may not be the most important thing in the world* and is accompanied by a second line further down, which reads: *But they get very close to it.* The pun hinges on the polysemous word *close*, which can have at least two different senses, i.e. close in the sense of proximity and close in the sense of similarity, and where the latter sense is based on the conventional mapping SIMILARITY IS PROXIMITY (cf. Taylor 1995:134). Presumably, the two senses are fairly entrenched for most speakers, while their shared schema is relatively vague. It then follows that the underlying metaphorical link is more or less opaque, and in the context of the headline the extended sense of *close* is not immediately recognised as metaphorical. By drawing attention to the literal sense of the word, which is done through the visual content, the schema and the metaphor are highlighted, and once this is achieved it is possible to use it as a creative basis for a metaphorical blend. The physical sense of proximity is also illustrated in the actual spatial relations

Plate 4:1. Persil. *Marie Claire* (December, 2001).

between the different components of the ad, in that the phrase *But they get very close to it* closely follows the outline of the baby's head.

Two input spaces can thus be identified by projecting back elements from the blended space of the ad. In the first input, which is an elaboration of the source domain PROXIMITY of the conventional metaphor, clothes are physically close to a baby. In the second input, which is an elaboration of the target domain SIMILARITY, clothes are not the same as (but similar to) the most important thing (whatever that is) (see figure 4:4).

Figure 4:4. Persil blend.

As pointed out by Feyaerts & Brône (2002:334), it is sometimes difficult to assess whether we are dealing with a source plus an elaboration or with a single source. In this case, it seems plausible that an elaborated target is involved, and that there are counterpart connections to elements in the elaborated source, i.e. the abstract distance between clothes and what is important is linked to the physical distance between the baby and the clothes. In the blended space, the element 'the most important thing' from the target space is then integrated with 'baby' from the source space. A baby being perceived as the most important thing is not only consistent with our shared cultural beliefs, but more importantly, it also provides us with the necessary link that allows us to understand the alleged importance of the washing powder. The rhetorical goal is difficult to dispute, because if clothes are not important then babies are not important.

Moreover, the emergent structure of the blend leads to a further implication, namely that if babies are the most important thing, then it follows that we should be kind to them and take care of them. This is exactly what we learn from the slogan beneath the image of a packet of Persil in the bottom right hand corner of the ad, which reads *Clean, kind, careful*. Presumably, this applies to clothes, but also to babies. In other words, it is linked to the blended space.

The blend is obviously set up for the purpose of reasoning and of arguing the case for the washing powder, but there are also incongruities that may give rise, if not to humour, then at least to something resembling a riddle. One such

incongruity lies in the clash between the two senses of the word *close*, which are activated at the same time in the blended space of the ad. This incongruity is partially resolved in that the schema has been highlighted and the generic space woken up, but it may also remain alongside the resolution. There may also be a perceived incongruity in the connection made between clothes and babies both being linked to the 'the most important thing' in the blend, and even in the image itself, since the way the baby is held clashes with the way sleeping babies normally are held. This last type of incongruity can also be observed in the ad discussed in the next subsection. In terms of resolved and unresolved incongruities and Pollio's discussion of metaphor versus humour (see section 4.3), it is thus possible to focus on both types of incongruity at the same time. The resolved incongruities give rise to an argument that, for the admakers, hopefully leads to persuasion and new understanding, whereas the unresolved incongruities remain as humour or a riddle that attracts attention.

4.5.2 Financial Times Weekend

An ad for *The Financial Times Weekend* constitutes our second example. The image covers the entire background of the ad and shows various objects wrapped in newspaper sheets. We can tell from the pink colour of the paper and the FT logotype that the newspaper that has been used to wrap these items is in fact *The Financial Times Weekend.* The objects include a lobster, a knife, a fork, a bottle of wine or champagne, a steering wheel, a camera, a chair and a watering pot (see plate 4:2). The caption is located in the middle of the ad and reads: *And you thought we only covered business.* This time, the polysemous word is *covered*. In its non-metaphorical physical sense, it designates the act of placing one entity on or around something else or distributing something across the surface of something else, typically hiding it from view. The word also has a metaphorically based sense that involves focusing attention on something, keeping something under observation or including something in an activity, which in the case of journalism more specifically means reporting on various subject areas. The metaphorically extended sense is ultimately based on the higher-level metaphor ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE in connection with the orientational metaphor CONTROL IS UP, but this conventional mapping cannot in itself account for the creative effect achieved in this ad. Instead, the two senses of the word, and especially the visualised incongruity between them, signal the two input spaces of a conceptual blend (see fig. 4:5). The first input space, an elaboration of the CONCRETE source domain, contains a scenario that represents the common practice of wrapping objects in paper to prevent them from

Plate 4:2. Financial Times Weekend. *Decanter* (June, 2000).

chipping or breaking. Typically, this is done to fragile items made of glass or china when moving house or when putting them away in storage. The target space is made up of THE FINANCIAL TIMES and contains as important elements the journalists, the activity of reporting, the subjects they report on and the finished product, i.e. the newspaper or in this case the weekend supplement.

It is important to notice here that the elaborated source space is triggered by the image and the elaborated target space by the text. The metaphorically extended sense of *cover* is more salient, but the metaphorical link is opaque and would not be recognised without the visual trigger. In the blended scene of the ad, news reporting is integrated with the act of covering objects in paper, where the objects are metonymically linked to the subject areas in the target input space. For example, the watering pot is metonymically associated with

gardening, the chair with interior decoration, and the lobster and wine bottle with the area of food and drink, respectively. In addition, the newspaper sheets used to wrap the objects metonymically represent the paper and ultimately its reporters. Since there is no specified agent in the elaborated source space, it is not projected onto the blended space, and the element that performs the role of instrument (paper) is therefore integrated with both the agent (FT) and the instrument (its reporters) from the target space. This is possible since these elements belong to the same frame (cf. Koch 1999:146-147) or domain, i.e. they are contiguously related, and in the blend, the sheets of paper actually stand for the newspaper and its reporters. In fact, many more such relationships are tightened in the blend, for example those between the various objects from the elaborated source and the different subject areas in the target input.

Figure 4:5. FT Weekend blend.

As with the ad discussed in the previous section, this metaphorical blend also serves both a humorous and an informative function, but the humour in this ad is arguably stronger. On the one hand, it is a result of the incongruity between the two senses of *cover*, which is made salient and strengthened by the visual

manifestation. On the other hand, there is also incongruity both with regard to the actual objects and to the way in which they are wrapped. For example, we would not normally expect to find a lobster wrapped in newspaper sheets, let alone one being so neatly wrapped that we can make out every little detail of its anatomy, but rather something like a tea cup wrapped in a less careful way, for example so that we cannot pick it up by the ear. These incongruities remain in the blended space, but are partially resolved or by means of the new information that is created by the integration of the very same elements, i.e. that the weekend supplement also includes articles on a wide range of subjects other than business (cf. Pollio 1994:144). This is achieved by means of metaphorically understanding REPORTING NEWS in terms of WRAPPING OBJECTS, which is not conventional. However, it is ultimately based on the conventional metaphor(s) responsible for extending $cover_2$ from $cover_1$, which has been reactivated by the blend by opening up the generic space and making the shared schema more salient. Again, homonyms or homophones only share an extremely abstract schema, which means no metaphoric link can be highlighted, and in cases where the senses have a highly entrenched schema there will be no surprise effect and therefore weaker humour, since both the schema and the metaphorical link are fairly salient to begin with.

4.5.3 Galaxy Caramel

The last ad of type I is for Galaxy Caramel (see plate 4:3). It consists of a large picture showing a young woman who is sitting on a bus eating a bar of that particular chocolate. She has got her eyes closed and seems to be enjoying it very much. Next to her there is a young man, seemingly naked, but with a newspaper to cover up his private parts. The caption is placed right below the woman's face and reads: *Get wrapped up in…* The phrase is incomplete and ends right next to the Galaxy chocolate bar that she is holding in her hands, implying the full phrase *Get wrapped up in a Galaxy Caramel chocolate bar.*

    The polysemous lexical item here is obviously the phrasal verb[38] *wrapped up*, which has two senses, one that is literal and one that is metaphorical or idiomatic. In the concrete physical sense, an entity is folded in or wound up in something else, according to *Longman* most typically in paper or cloth. One such instance would for example be a person wrapped up in clothes, where *wrap up* would typically be used in the context of keeping warm or being decent, and not

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[38] See section 5.2. for a definition and brief discussion of the idiomaticity of phrasal verbs.

Plate 4:3. Galaxy Caramel. *Cosmopolitan* (July, 2000).

in the context of putting on clothes in general. The metaphorical or idiomatic sense refers to a state of being mentally involved in something, to the point where you are completely engrossed and oblivious to the world around you. Hence the mapping responsible for the extended sense is ultimately the same as in the ad in the previous subsection, namely ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE, but in this case rather more specifically IDEAS/THOUGHTS FEELINGS ARE OBJECTS. According to Kövecses & Szabó (1996), not all phrasal verbs have an idiomatic meaning, and from the present example it is also apparent that one particular phrasal verb can have both idiomatic and non-idiomatic senses. Although only one of the senses here is idiomatic, they are both deeply entrenched and the

schema, while far from abstract, it is not as entrenched as the two elaborations. Again, the way in which the opaque metaphoric link is reactivated and creatively added to may be analysed in terms of a conceptual blend. However, in this particular ad it is doubtful whether the elaborated inputs are metaphorically related as source and target. What is clear, though, is that both new understanding and humour emerge in the integrated scene.

Figure 4:6. Galaxy blend.

Let us take a closer look at the details of this blend (see figure 4:6). The first input corresponds to the source of the conventional metaphor, which is CONCRETE (OBJECTS), while the second input corresponds to the target, that is ABSTRACT (FEELINGS/THOUGHTS/IDEAS). This is the (simplified) metaphorical basis for the extended sense of the phrasal verb. There is an elaborated source space involved, which is an instantiation of the CONCRETE source and provides the more specific scene in which people are wrapped in clothes, or in this case rather a man *not* wearing anything. In addition, there is also an elaborated target space, which represents a woman who is absorbed by or engrossed in the positive feelings and sensations that come from eating chocolate, which, by extension, is how the readers of the ad presumably will be affected if they buy the chocolate.

The main reason why it is suspected that we might not be dealing with a metaphorical relationship between these two inputs is that the woman's enjoyment of the chocolate is not exactly understood in terms of the extent to which the man is (not) wrapped up in clothing. In fact, the level of enjoyment is rather understood in relation to how extraordinary an event the woman

effortlessly manages to ignore while eating the chocolate. However, I will argue that the scene in the elaborated source represents precisely such an extraordinary event, and that the more undressed the man is the higher her level of enjoyment must be in order for her to ignore him. In any case, the integration of these elements in the blend creates an illustration of how engrossed she really is, which inevitably leads to inferences about the quality and the characteristics of the chocolate she is eating. The clash between the two senses of *wrapped up*, which are both active in the integrated space, presents an incongruity, and this is what prompts the unpacking of the blend, together with the unconventional situation in the visual content of the ad.

While the clash between the two senses is partially resolved in the way described above, there is also unresolved tension remaining, in that the two senses are still activated in relation to the different inputs. This tension together with the tension present in the visual scene lead to humour. Even in isolation, the mere situation in which a naked man is sitting on a bus may be perceived as humorous, since it clashes with our expectations and the norms of our society. What adds to the humour in this ad, however, is the situation in the blended space, where the behaviour of the woman clashes with the fact that a naked man is sitting next to her. Crucially, this man also happens to be attractive, which points to a sexual aspect being involved here as well, based on the metaphors LUST IS HUNGER and SEX IS FOOD. In turn, this leads to the implication that Galaxy Caramel is equivalent to or even better than sex, since she chooses the chocolate over the man. In this context where sex is not on the agenda, the phrase *get wrapped up* in its non-metaphorical sense may also be understood as addressed to the man. In advertising, it is very common for products to be presented in terms of sex, and in this case we find the conventional metaphor SEX IS FOOD reversed into FOOD IS SEX or more specifically GALAXY CARAMEL IS SEX. However, this novel metaphor is not based on the conventional mapping responsible for the two senses of the phrasal verb, but exists alongside it in the ad.

It should perhaps also be mentioned that the image schema that provides the topology for the spaces involved in this blend is also reflected in the description of the chocolate bar at the bottom of the ad, where we learn that "Creamy [Galaxy Caramel] [is] surrounded by smooth silky Galaxy chocolate". In addition, the chocolate bar itself is wrapped in paper, which can be seen both in the picture where it is held by the woman, and again at the bottom of the ad.

4.6 Polysemous words in ads: type II

We will now turn our attention to polysemous words whose schema is more salient compared to the type I examples, that is, they are located more to the left on my version of the continuum (see fig. 4:3). It then follows that the metaphoricity will be recognised more easily, and as a result, a much weaker humorous effect will be achieved by highlighting it. Therefore, the focus here is more on exploiting the underlying metaphor in order to build the argument and the message, which is also evident from the increased importance of the body copy compared to the ads in the previous section, where it is limited or lacking altogether. At first glance, the weaker punning or surprise effect might seem to be due to the difference in visual content rather than to the level of entrenchment of the two senses, but I would like to argue that the humour created by the image in those cases works precisely because the senses are deeply entrenched. In the ads analysed in this section, the visual content cannot play the same role, simply because the source domain and the non-metaphorical sense are more accessible to begin with. It is nevertheless possible for the humour to be increased here with the help of an image, but in order to achieve that the image would instead have to elaborate the metaphorical sense or the scene in the blended space. The role played by the visual content in the following examples is clearly less important than in the previous section, and as a matter of fact, the ads would probably be understood even without them. In this respect, and with regard to the level of entrenchment, these ads are similar to many of the ads discussed in chapter 6, which are centred around metaphorical expressions. As already mentioned in section 2.5, the ads discussed here and in sections 6.2 and 6.4 also form the part of my material that, at a formal level, is most similar to the headlines discussed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press), in that we are dealing with a pun involving a literal and a metaphorical sense, and where there is little or no visual support. However, as will be made apparent in the analyses below, the blending patterns displayed in my examples differ somewhat compared to the double grounding blueprint.

4.6.1 Moulinex

The first example we will discuss is an advertisement for Moulinex irons (see plate 4:4). In the upper half of the ad there is a black-and-white picture of a woman leaning against a cushion together with the headline *Usually, ironing leaves me a little flat*. The lower half contains a colour picture showing the Ocealys 300 iron from two different angles accompanied by a piece of copy that explains the characteristics of it. Based on the context of the ad, the word *flat* can

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Plate 4:4. Moulinex. *Marie Claire* (January, 2001).

be interpreted either literally, in the sense of 'smooth' or 'level', or metaphorically, referring to a person who has run out of energy. This second sense, which is illustrated in the picture, is based on more than one conventional metaphorical mapping. First of all, there is the orientational metaphor MORE IS UP, which is an instantiation of the higher-level metaphor QUANTITY IS VERTICALITY. This is then combined with the metaphor PEOPLE ARE BATTERIES, which is metonymically related to the metaphor PEOPLE ARE MACHINES, in that an important part of the machine, i.e. the battery that enables it to function,

stands for the whole machine. The domain of QUANTITY corresponds to the AMOUNT OF ENERGY (in a battery or a person), so when seen in terms of VERTICALITY we come to the conclusion that MORE ENERGY IS UP and LESS ENERGY IS DOWN. In terms of vertical relations, *flat* in its literal sense is obviously associated with DOWN rather than UP, which is why *flat* in its metaphorical sense refers to someone or something having less energy. As a matter of fact, they have probably run out of energy all together, since *flat* implies that the bottom has been reached. Another conventional metaphor that also plays a role here is THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR EMOTIONS, or in this case more specifically THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR ENERGY. This metaphor forms part of the link between PEOPLE and BATTERIES, and allows us to understand energy in terms of a (liquid) substance whose levels go up and down inside our bodies[39]. However, the metaphor that is reactivated here and used as a basis for the creative blend is mainly LESS ENERGY IS DOWN, which is the one we will focus on, while at the same time keeping in mind that this is involves an oversimplification.

Figure 4:7. Moulinex blend.

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[39] The verticality aspect is also related to the fact that if we are rested and full of energy we tend to stand up, whereas if we are tired and worn out we lie down instead. This, in turn, is also linked to the metaphors GOOD IS UP and BAD IS DOWN (cf. Lakoff & Johnson 1980:18).

As in previous examples, the incongruity between the two senses of *flat* highlights the shared schema and makes it more salient, which in turn allows us to activate the conventional metaphor and to unpack the blend (see figure 4:7). The source input thus corresponds to DOWN, and in the elaborated source space, we find a scenario in which the process of ironing takes away creases and makes clothes smooth. Among the elements involved are the activity of ironing, the role of object played by the clothes, and the resulting state of the clothes. In the elaborated target space, based on the more general target input LESS ENERGY, a person has no energy left as a result of having performed an activity, and here the elements include an unspecified activity, the role of the agent who performs this activity, and the resulting state of the agent.

Diverse as these two spaces might seem, they are in fact related as source and target in a highly unconventional mapping according to which the performance of a (tiring) activity is seen in terms of being ironed. The role of agent (the person) is projected from the elaborated target to the blended space and merges with the role of object (the clothes) projected from the elaborated source. In the integrated space, the agent corresponds to the unspecified one in the elaborated source space. Contrary to what we would normally expect, the elaborated target is not related to the advertised product, since the iron in fact is associated with the elaborated source space. This does not mean that the target is not related to the discourse topic, though, because it is important to notice here that the point of this blend is not to make a statement about the Moulinex iron. Instead, it is intended as a comment on what it normally is like to do the ironing, and this is the reason why the elaborated target is associated with physical exhaustion rather than the iron itself. We are thus presented with a problem in the upper half of the ad, i.e. how draining it can be to do the ironing, and the solution to this problem is then provided in the body copy in the lower half of the ad, where it says that the iron is "hard-working" and that "it steams through the ironing in double-quick time". Interestingly enough, there is a similar blend present in this part of the ad, apart from the fact that the first two inputs are metonymically rather than metaphorically related. It occurs in connection with the phrase *steam through*, whose figurative sense relies on the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy, for example in relation to an engine actually driven by steam, where the EFFECT, i.e. FORWARD MOTION, is understood in terms of its CAUSE, i.e. STEAM. When the phrase refers to an agent that is not driven by steam, such as a human being, the metonymy is also linked to the metaphor PEOPLE ARE MACHINES. In this particular example where the agent is an iron, there is instead an additional metonymic mapping involved within the general domain of engines/machines/

appliances, more specifically between those driven by steam and those driven by other means, such as electricity[40]. The CAUSE in this case corresponds to STEAM, while the EFFECT more specifically may be formulated as EFFICIENCY rather than FORWARD MOTION. In the elaborated first input, we find information about the design of the iron, in particular the fact that it has holes through which steam is emitted, while in the elaborated second input, we find elements related to its efficiency (see figure 4:8). In the blended space, the emission of steam thus stands for efficiency, or as the full sentence says in the body copy, "the super-efficient, double-action arrangement of holes means it steams through the ironing in double-quick time". In the integrated scene, *steam* is thus understood literally in relation to the elaborated source, and figuratively in relation both to the conventional metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT and to the novel metonymy that occurs in this particular discourse situation.

One crucial aspect that both the blends in this ad share with instances of double grounding is the fact that only the conventional metaphorical meaning would remain if the ad were for a different product (cf. Brône & Feyaerts in press:28). For example, no literal meaning is accessible in a headline that reads *Usually, washing up leaves me a little flat* or in a piece of body copy where a vacuum cleaner is said to "steam through the vacuuming in double-quick time".

As far as humour is concerned, there is an apparent incongruity between the two senses of *flat* and ultimately between people being flat and clothes being flat, since 'clothes' and 'people' are integrated in the blended space. The humorous tension is relatively weak, but could be further increased if the creative metaphor that emerges from this blend were to be visualised so that a person is seen as being physically flat as a result of having been ironed. For example, an image might depict a situation in which this person is flattened over a huge ironing board by an enormous iron or simply spread out flat on the ground like a cartoon character. This would then constitute an example of what Fauconnier & Turner (1994:16) describe as a "cartoon presentation of impossibly literalized metaphor made strikingly manifest through visual blending". In this case, the degree of humour would drastically increase, since the incongruities would be made more salient. However, it would be more difficult to increase the humour by providing a visual presentation of the (elaborated) source space, as in the type I Galaxy Caramel ad.

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[40] However, it should be noted that the iron is construed as the agent here, implying that it does the work for you, while you yourself "just glide through it". Since this involves a kind of personification, i.e. INANIMATE IS ANIMATE, there is also a metaphorical link between IRONS and PEOPLE.

4.6.2 Cover Girl

This ad is for a mascara made by Cover Girl and it consists of a large picture of a young woman, or perhaps even a girl given the name of the cosmetics company, and bears the headline *COVER GIRL*. There is also a caption, which is found to the left of the picture, almost level with the girl's eyes, and reads *Life can get heavy. Mascara shouldn't* (see plate 4:5).

Plate 4:5. Cover Girl. *Company* (August, 1997).

The polysemous word here is obviously *heavy*, which in its literal sense means that something physically weighs a lot, and in its metaphorical sense that something is difficult. This second sense is based on the conventional metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, which is a specific-level version of ABSTRACT IS

CONCRETE. Both these senses are clearly relevant, the first one in relation to mascara and the second in relation to life, although initially the metaphorical sense is more salient. As a result of the syntax in the caption, though, the same sense appears to be invoked in relation to both life and mascara. Since these are very distant concepts, it leads to an incongruity, which signals the blend and triggers the identification of the two inputs. This is done by highlighting the schema shared by *heavy*$_1$ and *heavy*$_2$, which reactivates the underlying conventional metaphor. It then follows that the first two inputs to the blend, i.e. BURDENS and DIFFICULTIES, correspond to the source and target of the metaphor (see figure 4:8).

Figure 4:8. Cover Girl blend.

The particular burden that is relevant in this context has to do with mascara being thick and heavy on the lashes, and this is the information contained in the elaborated source space. Like in the Moulinex ad in the previous subsection, the discourse topic is not exactly the Cover Girl mascara, but rather the problems that come with many other different brands. These problems, which include difficulties in applying the mascara and an unsatisfactory end result in terms of appearance, form the content of the elaborated target space, since they are more specific instances of the general DIFFICULTIES. When these two inputs are integrated in the blend, we have a situation in which difficulties in life are understood in terms of using mascara that is thick and heavy.

This is obviously not a conventional mapping, and as such it is not necessarily grounded in our experiences in the same way as the underlying metaphor, but in the context of ad it forms an important function, namely that of building the argument in favour of the product. Note that in the integrated space,

both senses of *heavy* are active at the same time and form part of the reasoning and understanding that emerge, rather than simply providing a humorous tension. The point here is that if difficulties are understood as burdens, and mascara that is heavy on the lashes is a specific type of physical burden, it logically follows that if the mascara is not heavy (which is the information given in the body copy concerning Cover Girl Professional), there are no burdens and hence no difficulties in life. Again, we can identify a similarity between this ad and the Moulinex ad, in that a problem is set up and then resolved. The pun or the element of wit found in this ad mainly serves the purpose of attracting attention and signalling the blend, so that the conventional metaphor can be reactivated and elaborated in a non-conventional way to build the message.

Let us now briefly consider this analysis against the background of double grounding (see section 2.5) and examine why this ad does not constitute such an instance. In order to conform to the double grounding blueprint, the blend would have to consist of two inputs that correspond to the source and target of the conventional metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS. So far so good. The target space would then have to be elaborated as COVER GIRL PROFESSIONAL MASCARA and contain all the available information about the product. This information would by definition have to be negative, since it relates to DIFFICULTIES. In the blended space, the important element, 'heavy', would be meaningfully linked both to the conventional metaphor in the original input, and to one particular aspect of the mascara in the elaborated target. As a result, the distance between the source domain and the elaborated target would be tightened, and a humorous effect would emerge as a result of the ambiguity. For this analysis to be correct, however, we would have to imagine a situation in which the mascara actually is thick, heavy and difficult to apply, and that someone comments on this in a witty manner, for example by using the phrase *This Cover Girl mascara is really getting heavy.* In the case of the Cover Girl ad, however, the mascara is not heavy, and we would not expect the advertised product to be associated with difficulties. A double grounding analysis also fails to account for the reasoning that takes place in the blend and does not explain the emergence of the sublime message that the mascara will solve your problems, which implies that the cognitive strategies are somewhat different in my material compared to the headlines discussed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press). This is hardly surprising since the ads in my material argue in favour of various products, while their headlines state facts or summarise current events in a humorous manner. However, as already mentioned in my comments on their analyses in section 2.5, there may be more going on in their examples as well.

4.6.3 Garnier Fructis

In this final analysis of this chapter, we will turn our attention to an ad for Fructis Fortifying Shampoo (see plate 4:6). The headline reads *Increase your pulling power*, and is placed to the left of a picture of a man who is resting his head against his hand, gripping his hair between his fingers. In the bottom left-hand corner, we find the shampoo bottle depicted and next to it the body copy, which explains the benefits of the product, in particular the claim that it will make your hair stronger thanks to all its nourishing contents.

Plate 4:6. Garnier Fructis. *Esquire* (August, 1999).

Two senses of the word *pull* are involved here, i.e. the literal sense of physically moving an entity towards you, and the metaphorical sense of attracting someone in order to have sex. The highest-level metaphor behind this metaphorical meaning is ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE, which yields PSYCHOLOGICAL/ EMOTIONAL FORCES ARE PHYSICAL FORCES and ultimately DESIRES ARE FORCES or SEXUALITY IS A FORCE. What implies the literal sense is the reference to strong hair in the copy together with the slogan at the bottom of the ad, which says *For hair that shines with all its strength*. It is also illustrated in the picture, where it may be understood that the man is pulling at his hair. Meanwhile, the metaphorical sense is present in the headline, an perhaps to some extent signalled through the look in the man's eyes. The co-occurrence of these senses is what triggers the unpacking of the blend, in which the source domain PHYSICAL FORCE is elaborated as PULLING HAIR and the target DESIRE/SEXUALITY as ATTRACTING WOMEN (see figure 4:9).


Figure 4:9. Garnier blend.

In the elaborated source space, the entity 'hair' is affected by the activity 'to pull', and what enables this activity is the quality of the hair, i.e. 'strong', which in turn results from using Garnier Fructis. In contrast, the activity in the elaborated target space is 'to attract' and here the affected element is 'women', but we do not know what the enabling quality is. Crucially, this situation

conforms with our shared socio-cultural knowledge about the difficulties involved in attracting a partner[41]. In the blended space, however, the enabling quality and the affected entity from the elaborated source merge, forming the element 'strong hair', which is understood as the enabling quality for the activity, 'attracting women'. We thus have a situation in the blend where the ability to attract women is understood in terms of having strong and healthy hair, and Garnier Fructis can give you just that. Note, however, that successfully pulling your hair means that the hair stays on your head, while successfully pulling a partner means that he/she comes with you.

Compared to double grounding, it is difficult to see how GARNIER FRUCTIS would constitute an elaboration of the target space DESIRE/SEXUALITY, because although it is implicitly claimed that the shampoo makes it easier to attract women, this is not a fact about the company and the product, but an argument that only emerges in the integrated space. Instead, an underlying conventional metaphor has been reactivated and elaborated in a more specific, non-conventional mapping, involving the elaborated inputs of a conceptual blend. This constellation shares many similarities with double grounding, but is not identical to it.

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[41] Note that in contrast to the other ads in this section, the body copy makes no reference to this elaborated target, only to the elaborated source.

CHAPTER 5
IDIOMATIC EXPRESSIONS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter will be concerned with ads in which metaphor and other conceptual mechanisms are involved in and centred on idiomatic expressions. The idioms can be found in the headline or in the body copy of the ads, and occur in two main patterns, referred to here as extended idioms (section 5.4.) and altered idioms (section 5.5.). The extended idioms are found in their original form, accompanied by an additional piece of text that is either a continuation of or a comment on the idiom, hence the label. This comment or complement provides an elaboration on the idiom itself, sometimes by drawing attention to its literal meaning, as in the following example: *Burn the candle at both ends. Then get rid of the smoke.* In the altered idioms, on the other hand, one lexical item has been replaced in a context where in normal cases it would not be replaced, as in *Don't get your pantyliners in a twist*, or syntactically altered in a way that does not occur in normal use. In short, the main difference is the location of the creative or unexpected surface element – as a complement to the idiom or inside the idiom. However, before turning to the analyses, we need to discuss how to define an idiom (section 5.2.) and how idioms are viewed in cognitive linguistics (section 5.3.).

5.2. What is an idiom?

Although most linguists agree on a general definition of what constitutes an idiom, namely that it contains at least two words and has an overall meaning that cannot be predicted from the meaning of its parts, we are clearly not dealing with descrete groups, but rather with a continuum ranging from complete idiomaticity to non-idiomaticity (Cowie et al. 1993:xii, *LDI*:viii). It is therefore not a straightforward task to decide where to draw the line between different types of expressions and how to categorise different types of idioms. Apart from the issue of semantic opacity or predictability, consideration is also given to the degree of lexical and grammatical variation allowed. One particular difficulty pointed out by Deignan (1999:183-4) is how to separate idioms from conventional metaphorical expressions that occur in more or less fixed collocations. If an

idiom is characterised by having an opaque meaning and being lexically and grammatically fixed, and a non-idiom by having a transparent meaning and being open to lexical and grammatical variation, then what about the grey area in between where we either find expressions that are lexically fixed and transparent at the same time or expressions that are fixed and opaque only to some extent? For example, Deignan discusses the phrase *take a deep breath,* which is lexically and syntactically fixed, making it idiom-like, but has a transparent meaning associated with non-idioms. These are decisions that have to be made not only by researchers but also by makers of dictionaries. In the *Oxford Dictionary of English Idioms,* for example, four different categories of phrases along the scale from idiomaticity to non-idiomaticity are recognised. They include pure idioms, figurative idioms, restricted collocations and open collocations, with the cut-off point for idiomaticity situated in between restricted collocations, which are seen as idioms, and open collocations, which are non-idiomatic. In the former type of expression, one of the words has a figurative sense and this word cannot be replaced by another lexical word or a pronoun. The other word, which occurs in a literal sense, can be replaced, but the choice of substitutes is very limited, hence the label "restricted". In open collocations, both words can be substituted freely and occur in a literal sense. Examples given include *fill the sink*, where both the verb and the noun can be replaced, e.g. *empty/drain the sink* or *fill the basin/bucket*, as opposed to restricted collocations such as *a cardinal error,* where only *error* can be replaced and the choice then stands between *sin, virtue* and *grace* (Cowie et al. 1993:xiii). Obviously, there is also a grey area here between pure idioms such as *kick the bucket* and figurative idioms like *close ranks,* on the one hand, and between figurative idioms and restricted collocations, even though they are all classified as idiomatic. The difference between the first two is that pure idioms, although once figurative, have "petrified", i.e. become lexicalised to the point where the literal meaning is no longer accessible, whereas in the case of figurative idioms it still exists, although perhaps not in everyday use (1993:xii-xiii).

The working definition I use is somewhat stricter than that in the *ODEI*, in that it excludes many of the examples of restricted collocations and even some of the figurative idioms. It relies on both lexical/grammatical fixedness and semantic opacity, but the former will overrule the latter in doubtful cases. This means that proverbs and sayings, such as *beauty is in the eye of the beholder*, and semantically opaque and completely fixed idioms, such as *to get one's knickers in a twist*, are included. Other expressions, for example *bags of taste,* are categorised as conventional metaphorical expressions and will be discussed

in chapter 6. However, it must be emphasised that many idiomatic expressions are indeed metaphorical (see section 5.2. below), despite the division made here between idiomatic expressions and conventional metaphorical expressions. I will consider them a subgroup of conventional metaphorical expressions in line with Kövecses & Szabó (1996:334) and this constitutes the main reason behind their separate treatments. Another reason for treating idioms separately from metaphorical expressions is that the latter are not altered in the same way as the idiomatic expressions. This is hardly surprising, given that a wider lexical variation is allowed there to begin with. Admittedly, there are also similarities between the material featuring idioms and the material containing metaphorical expressions, since the latter are sometimes accompanied by a comment phrase in the same way as the extended idioms. On the whole, cognitive linguists are vague about the distinction between idioms and conventional metaphorical expressions, or do not overtly recognise a distinction at all. For example, *keep a grip, lose the grip, he lost it* etc. are listed as idioms by Lakoff (1987:380-381), but I would categorise those expressions as conventional metaphorical expressions in accordance with the definition outlined above. Although Kövecses & Szabó state that they "do not claim that *all* the metaphorical linguistic expressions based on conceptual metaphors are idioms" (1996:334), they do not provide a discussion of how to separate the two categories of expressions. Traditional linguists feel that it is important to separate idioms from metaphors and other tropes, since they are considered as two completely different phenomena. To cognitive linguists, on the other hand, idioms and conventional metaphorical expressions are found along the same sliding scale, which perhaps makes a discussion of an exact distinction not only difficult, but also less interesting. Phrasal verbs have not been mentioned explicitly so far, but it is generally agreed that they are idiomatic in nature. Most dictionaries, for example the *LDI* and the *ODEI*, acknowledge this, but choose to treat them in separate dictionaries. However, some treat them jointly, e.g. Seidle (1988). Among the cognitivists, Kövecses & Szabó (1996) also include phrasal verbs among idiomatic expressions, but seem to be of the opinion that not all phrasal verbs have an idiomatic meaning. What it means for a phrasal verb to have an idiomatic meaning is not discussed, in the same way as with the distinction between metaphorical linguistic expression and metaphorical idioms mentioned above. Their definition of a phrasal verb is that it consists of a verb followed by a detached adverb, which carries the main stress. They can be used either transitively or intransitively or both. This separates them from prepositional verbs, which are always transitive, and where the verb carries the main stress and

is followed by a preposition. As would be expected, the placement of stress indicates the most important element, i.e. the adverb in the case of phrasal verbs and the verb in the case of prepositional verbs (1996:346). Despite this, I have chosen to include phrasal verbs in chapter 4 together with other more or less entrenched polysemous words, since the few clear cases of phrasal verbs in my material display patterns similar to those, in that they are exploited creatively by drawing attention to the source domain and highlighting the shared schema.

5.3. Idioms in a cognitive linguistic view

In addition to the difficulties involved in the definition and categorisation of idioms, there are also differences in the way cognitive and traditional linguists view the very nature of idioms. Traditional linguists consider them to have a status similar to that of ordinary words, that is, as items of the lexicon with a special meaning that is confined to language alone, without any involvement of our conceptual system or encyclopaedic knowledge. Consequently, their meanings are understood to be completely arbitrary and no connection exists between the meanings of different idioms (Kövecses 2002:199-200). Since idioms are thought to function just like regular words in our mental lexicon, they are not regarded as violating any truth conditions. Any metaphorical content they might have had has been lexicalised or frozen, and they are now "dead" metaphors[42]. Other expressions, which are categorised as metaphors by traditional linguists, are considered to be very much alive and hard at work distorting the truth and misrepresenting reality (Gibbs 1993a:271). However, the notion that idioms are "dead" metaphors has been disproved by cognitive linguists, for example Gibbs (1980, 1986, 1993a, 1993b etc.), Gibbs and O'Brien (1990), and Gibbs et al. (1997). In the cognitive tradition, idioms are instead seen as a product of our conceptual system where domains of experience, rather than individual words, are involved in the process of creation. That is, we make sense of idiomatic expressions using our embodied knowledge of the world around us (Kövecses 2002:201, Kövecses and Szabó 1996:330), and not by associating it with an arbitrary meaning . If idiomatic expressions merely corresponded to a certain meaning in such a way, then the idiom *spill the beans* would have the exact same meaning as its literal paraphrase *reveal the secret*. This turns out not to be the case, however. Since this expression reflects the underlying metaphors THE MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE PHYSICAL ENTITIES[43] and is accompanied by a rich mental image, there are a number of

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[42] For further discussion of so-called "dead" metaphors, see Chapter 2, section 3.
[43] These metaphors form part of Reddy's (1979) conduit metaphor.

entailments involved here that are lacking in the literal paraphrase. These entailments include information about the cause of the revelation, the manner in which the revelation is carried out and the fact that it is unintentional (Gibbs 1993a:272). Moreover, it should be noted that apart from the underlying conceptual metaphors, the different parts of the expression also have metaphorical referents, in that *spill* refers to the act of releasing the information, and *the beans* to the information itself (Lakoff 1987:451, Gibbs 1993a:272-273). We will return to the psychological evidence for these mental images and the way we make sense of idioms later in this section, but let us first take a more detailed look at the conceptual nature of idiomatic expressions.

Lakoff (1987) was (together with Zoltán Kövecses) among the first to draw attention to the systematicity and conceptual basis of idiomatic expressions. What follows below is a summary of his discussion of idioms concerned with anger (1987:381-395)[44], which nicely demonstrates how different idiomatic expressions[45], such as *You make my blood boil*, *He was foaming at the mouth, Try to keep a grip on yourself* and *Don't be a pain in the ass* are connected to each other. Although these expressions seem to be fairly diverse, Lakoff argues that we can still make inferences between them. For example, we know that if someone is being a pain in the ass it can make our blood boil and if someone is foaming at the mouth he might want to try to keep a grip on himself. These inferences are not based on the literal meanings of the idioms, but instead they are connected at a conceptual level via both metaphors, such as ANGER IS HEAT, and various metonymies. The metaphor ANGER IS HEAT ultimately builds on the folk theory of anger, in which the physiological effects of anger are understood to be an increase in body heat, increased blood and muscular pressure, agitation and interference with accurate perception. This gives rise to the metonymy THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION, which is what provides the link between ANGER and HEAT. Example (1) reflects this metaphor when HEAT is applied to fluids and combined with another common metaphor, THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS, which itself is apparent in expressions such as (2) and (3) below.

(1) You make my blood boil.
(2) He was filled with anger.
(3) Try to get your anger out of your system.

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[44] The conceptualisation of anger has been discussed most extensively by Kövecses (1986, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2002).
[45] In Lakoff's definition.

This yields the metaphor ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER, where the body is a container for emotions like anger, and anger is a heated fluid in this container. It thus makes sense that if the anger increases, then the heat of the fluid increases until it, and the person in question, end up boiling (1987:381-383). Moreover, this metaphor can be elaborated with the help of metaphorical entailments, which involve additional knowledge about the source domain being mapped onto the target domain. For example, we know that hot liquids turn into steam at high temperatures, and that the steam creates pressure inside a container, which is why an angry person might have to let some of it out once his or her anger reaches a certain level (!), as in (4) below. Otherwise, the pressure might continue to build until there is an explosion, as in (5).

(4) He's just letting off steam.
(5) When I told him, he just exploded.

This type of correspondence that involves the transfer of additional knowledge is referred to as an epistemic correspondence, whereas ontological correspondences occur between entities themselves in the two domains (1987:386-387)[46]. While pointing out that the distinction between connotation and denotation is not considered useful in cognitive linguistics, Kövecses & Szabó (1996:336) compare the type of meaning involved in epistemic mappings to the knowledge that traditional linguists would describe as connotative, whereas the information contained in ontological mappings corresponds to the denotative aspects of meaning. One such ontological correspondence not explicitly mentioned by Lakoff when discussing the ANGER IS THE HEAT OF A FLUID IN A CONTAINER metaphor, is that the fluid in the container sometimes corresponds to the blood in our bodies, as in (1). This should of course come as no surprise, seeing as the body is conceptualised as a container for emotions and blood is an actual warm fluid. The metaphor ANGER IS HEAT can also be applied to solids, resulting in the metaphor ANGER IS FIRE, as reflected in example (6).

(6) She was doing a slow burn.

Here, the ontological correspondences are that the solid object burning is the angry person and the intensity of the fire is the intensity of the anger. We also know that it is possible for something to burn slowly for a long time and then suddenly be engulfed in flames, resulting in an epistemic transfer of meaning as well.

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[46] For a further discussion of different types of mappings, see section 2.3.1.

There is a link between the folk theory of anger and the folk theory of insanity, in that agitation is seen as a result of both states of being. This gives rise to another metaphor, where the target domain ANGER is instead understood in terms of the source domain INSANITY, as exemplified in (7) below. The same metaphor is also responsible for the meaning change or extension that has taken place in the word *mad*, which originally meant 'crazy', but now also carries the meaning 'angry', especially in American English. When the metaphor combines with the metonymy insane behaviour stands for insanity, the result is a so-called metaphorical metonymy, namely INSANE BEHAVIOUR STANDS FOR ANGER (1987:389-390). This metonymy is exemplified in (8) below.

(7) You're driving me nuts.
(8) He was foaming at the mouth.

Since ANGER is seen in terms of FIRE, which can destroy us and be a threat to people around us, and in terms of insanity, which interferes with our normal functions and behaviour, it is apparent that we conceive of anger as a negative emotion. As such, it constitutes an enemy of sorts that we have to fight back and try to control. This conceptualisation is expressed in terms of the metaphor ANGER IS AN OPPONENT, as can be seen in example (9).

(9) He's wrestling with his anger.

The issue of control is also found in another metaphor, PASSIONS ARE BEASTS INSIDE A PERSON, whereby we mean that inside every civilised person lives a wild animal, which we are supposed to keep under control and not let out. When the passion in question is anger, it is understood as a beast that is dangerous to others around us, and hence ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL (1987:392). One of the examples Lakoff gives is (10) below, although it is not entirely clear why exactly the threat would be to other people or why it is not yet another instance of the previously discussed metaphor ANGER IS AN OPPONENT. In (11), on the other hand, it is more apparent that we are dealing with a dangerous animal.

(10) He lost his grip on his anger.
(11) He has a fierce temper.

While it is obvious in (10) that the notion of control over a dangerous and destructive force that may be conceived of as a beast is involved, the danger is not necessarily directed at people around us, but at ourselves. This is similar to the metaphors ANGER IS HEAT and ANGER IS FIRE, where the angry person

himself is more at danger of being destroyed or consumed than are other people. However, the danger to others is evident in example (12) below, and perhaps even more so in (13). Both expressions reflect the metaphor ANGRY BEHAVIOUR IS AGGRESSIVE ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR, which is a different version of the ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL metaphor.

(12) That ruffled her feathers.
(13) Don't bite my head off!

So far, the metaphors discussed have been concerned with anger that already exists, but there has to be something that causes the anger in the first place. The CAUSE OF ANGER is often understood in terms of PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE, as in (13) below, which is consistent with the idea of an angry person perceiving herself/himself as a victim of something that causes the anger, i.e. an offender.

(14) Don't be a pain in the ass.

According to Lakoff, there is also a connection between this metaphor and the ANGER IS AN OPPONENT and ANGER IS A DANGEROUS ANIMAL metaphors, which involve the idea of a demand and an appetite, respectively, as in (15) and (16) below.

(15) Harry's anger cannot be appeased.
(16) Harry's anger is insatiable.

The goal here is revenge, which ties in with the conceptualisation of an angry person as a victim (1987: 395-396). The anger has been caused by some kind of wrongdoing, metaphorically conceived of as a physical annoyance, and the purpose of the anger, i.e. the opponent or the dangerous animal, is to get even.

A crucial point here, emphasised by Lakoff (1987:448), Kövecses (2002:201) and Kövecses & Szabó (1996:330), is that although idioms are not arbitrary, they are not predictable either. Instead, the relationship between idioms and their meanings is expressed in terms of motivation, which is much weaker than prediction. It stems from cognitive mechanisms such as the metaphors and metonymies discussed above, and provides a link between the various domains of knowledge and the idiomatic meaning. Unlike prediction, motivation is not a blue-print that tells us exactly what idioms to expect and what idioms will be generated based on a specific metaphorical mapping, but it provides the background against which we can make sense of an idiom. This should not be taken to imply that all idioms are understood by every single speaker of English,

only that it seems to be the case that most speakers make some sense out of most idioms. There are also idioms that are understood differently by different people, like the idiom *A rolling stone gathers no moss*, in which the moss can be seen as either a negative or a positive thing, hence resulting in two different morals. However, for some idioms there may be as many as a dozen associated images (Lakoff 1987:451).

The reality of these mental images and underlying conceptual metaphors and metonymies has been empirically verified in many different studies. For instance, Gibbs & O'Brien (1990), discussed by Gibbs (1993a:272-273), asked people to describe their mental images for five groups of idioms, each with similar types of meanings, i.e. meanings to do with concepts such as anger, insanity, revelation and secretiveness. They found that descriptions of images associated with idioms like for example *hit the ceiling* and *flip your lid* turned out to be "remarkably consistent" within the different groups, even though the actual events, flipping lids and hitting ceilings, can be done in many different ways. In addition, the participants were asked questions about the causes, intentionality and manner of action as represented by their mental images. The answers to these questions also showed a high degree of consistency, in that pressure was often seen as the reason behind the events, that the build-up of pressure is difficult to control and that it is released unintentionally. This consistency and the fact that the responses clearly build on the notion of heated fluid in a container speak in favour of a metaphorical basis for idiomatic expressions. Also, it has been demonstrated that idiomatic expressions differ from literal expressions in this respect. In another study mentioned by Gibbs (1993a:273), the mental images people associate with literal expressions turned out to be far more varied than the ones associated with idiomatic expressions, since the meanings of these expressions are not based on metaphorical mappings. This provides further proof in support of the metaphorical basis for idioms, because if they were "dead" metaphors with arbitrary meanings the results would be the same for idiomatic and literal expressions.

People's mental images also reflect the different underlying metaphors in cases where idioms with similar meanings are not based on the same conceptual metaphors. This has been shown by Nayak & Gibbs (1990) in an experiment designed to test people's choice of idioms in particular contexts. The participants were asked to rate the appropriateness of different idioms expressing anger in the context of different stories. The results showed a preference for idioms that reflected the same conceptual metaphor as was found reflected in the text as a whole. For example, *blow your stack* was rated higher in a story in which a

woman's anger was described in terms of heat in a pressurised container, while *bite your head off* received higher appropriate ratings when the anger was described as a dangerous animal (Gibbs 1993a: 274). Similar results emerged from an experiment performed by Gibbs et al. (1997) (see below). It thus follows that not only do we seem to recognise that some idiomatic expressions share the same underlying metaphors, but we are also able to distinguish cases when idioms with similar meanings are based on different underlying metaphors. If these two phrases, *blow your stack* and *bite your head off*, were arbitrarily associated with the meaning "getting angry" without the involvement of conceptual metaphors, as in traditional linguistic theory, then both phrases would have been judged equally suitable.

The psycholinguistic evidence discussed so far has only concerned the metaphorical motivation behind idiomatic expressions and how we make sense of them. Gibbs et al. (1997) take one step further in that they also try to determine the role of metaphor in the immediate production and understanding of idioms, in particular whether it is actually accessed in various on-line contexts. In one experiment, the participants were asked to read stories that ended in an idiomatic expression, a literal paraphrase or an unrelated control sentence. They were then asked to perform a lexical decision task, i.e. decide whether or not a string of letters constituted an English word. This target word was either related or unrelated to the metaphor underlying the idiomatic expression. If the metaphor was accessed during the understanding and processing of the idiom, then the reaction times to the related target word would be faster than to the unrelated target, and the reaction times would also be faster after having read the idiom compared to the literal paraphrases. The results of the experiment confirmed the expected priming effects, indicating that metaphors are indeed accessed on-line. In order to rule out the possibility that these priming effects may have been caused by an association between the related target and the literal meaning of the idiom, e.g. the literal meaning of *He blew his stack*, a control study was carried out that confirmed the results of the initial experiment (1997:143-146). As briefly mentioned above, an additional experiment also showed that different metaphors are accessed in the immediate understanding of idiomatic expressions that are motivated by different metaphors, despite having similar figurative meanings. This was done by letting new participants read the same stories, which now ended in one of two different idiomatic phrases, each based on a different metaphor, but with similar meanings. In the following lexical decision task, the reaction times were again faster to targets that were consistent with the metaphor that motivates the idiom

(1997: 147-149). However, these findings only suggest that metaphors may be accessed in the process of understanding and using idioms, not that this happens automatically. Idiom comprehension might not depend on this, in the sense that metaphors would have to be accessed as a first step in the process of understanding idioms (1997:149).[47]

Finally, it should be mentioned that in addition to metaphor and metonymy, conventional knowledge often plays a major role in motivating idiomatic expressions. For example, the meaning of the expression *to have one's hands full* is based on the conventional knowledge we all share about the hand. We know that if we are holding something in our hands, it is very difficult to use them simultaneously for another activity, and there is also a limit to how many objects we can hold at one and the same time, hence the meaning 'to be busy' (Kövecses 2002:207-208, Kövecses & Szabó 1996:338-339). In the next section, we will begin to take a closer look at idiomatic expressions in advertisements and examine how the underlying metaphors, metonymies and conventional knowledge are involved in the creative process.

5.4. Extended idioms

Three different ads with extended idioms will be analysed here. Extended idioms were described in the introduction as being featured in their original form together with an additional piece of text that somehow makes a comment on the idiom itself. This comment is often fairly concise and occurs in direct proximity to the idiom, either directly preceding or immediately following it. However, if the idiom is found in the body copy, as in the third example here, the comment may be found either in the headline or spread out across both the headline and the rest of the copy.

5.4.1 Comfort Refresh

The first ad to be discussed is for a product by Comfort called Refresh, which is sprayed onto clothes to remove smells, or as the slogan promises, it "puts freshness back into clothes". The entire background of the ad consists of a picture of a woman wearing a dress and a cardigan, but it seems to have been cut in two pieces, with the left half showing her at night in a dark and smoky room, her hair slightly dishevelled and her cardigan flailing open, revealing the straps of her dress. In the right-hand half of the picture it is daytime, she standing in a brightly lit room with a desk and a computer visible in the background. Her hair

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[47] Idiom comprehension is further discussed by for example Cacciari & Tabossi (1993) and Giora (1997).

has been combed and her cardigan is neatly adjusted. The woman is holding a spray bottle of Comfort Refresh in her left hand, spraying its contents towards the smoky left-hand half of the picture. The idiom, *burn the candle at both ends*, is written across the smoky half of the picture, while the comment, *then get rid of the smoke*, is superimposed on the other side (see plate 5:1).


Plate 5:1. Comfort Refresh. *Marie Claire* (May, 2000.)

The idiom is partly motivated by conceptual metaphor(s), but it is also possible that conventional knowledge plays a part in forming mental images, at least for some speakers. According to Kövecses and Szabó (1996:332), the underlying metaphor behind this idiom is ENERGY IS FUEL FOR THE FIRE, but it is unclear exactly what they mean and they fail to give a more detailed analysis. Presumably, if we understand energy in terms of fuel for a fire, it means that we

need energy to keep the fire burning, in this context perhaps the fire of life. My attempt at an explanation would be that if we burn the candle at both ends, i.e. use up too much energy late at night and early in the morning, there will not be enough left. Night-time is when we recuperate and gather more energy, and if that time is cut short there will be no fuel for the fire.

However, is it not possible that some other metaphor is involved as well, one that involves TIME rather than FUEL FOR A FIRE? One very common metaphor we use in order to understand TIME is by seeing it as a PHYSICAL OBJECT (Kövecses 2002:33), sometimes more specifically as a CONTAINER, which we can move in and out of, as in expressions such as *We're well into the century* and *He's like something out of the last century*[48], or as a MOVING OBJECT. In my view, burning the candle at both ends could be partly motivated by this metaphor as well, if we think of a period of time as a bounded entity or slot, that can be shortened at both ends. The candle burning at both ends would then correspond to our night rest being shortened at both ends. Interestingly enough, the reference in this ad is not specifically to the lack of energy that is caused by late nights out and early mornings, but rather it addresses the problems associated with smoky venues and how to feel clean and fresh the next day. The focus is thus not on the short period of rest, but on the short period of time in which you must get your clothes feeling fresh again. What our conventional knowledge tells us, and which could influence our mental images associated with this idiom, is that it is often dark late at night and early in the morning. Being up at these times would therefore require some form of light source, such as a candle, that then would have to be burned at both ends of the day.

Regardless of the exact motivation behind the idiom, it is clear that the element *smoke* in the comment clause is grounded both in the literal meaning of the idiom, according to which a candle is burning, and in the wider situation associated with the metaphorical meaning of the idiom, i.e. the knowledge that late nights are associated with going out to smoky bars or clubs[49], which is information that is partly provided by the picture. Out of context, the idiom would perhaps be difficult to understand, since our attention is drawn to its literal meaning by the comment clause *then get rid of the smoke*. Gibbs et al. (1997), reporting on earlier studies by Gibbs (1980, 1986), point out that "people do not ordinarily process the entire literal meanings of idioms", which often results in a "double-take" when they encounter idioms in a non-metaphorical context (1997:147). This is clearly what has been exploited by the makers of the

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[48] Examples from the Metaphor Homepage at http://cogsci.berkeley.edu/lakoff/.
[49] Note that this ad appeared in May, 2000, i.e. prior to the debate on an all-out ban on public smoking.

ad in question. When reading the idiom *burn the candle at both ends*, we are more likely to access the metaphorical meaning, which is why we might react when we get to the word *smoke*, which triggers the literal meaning. This incongruity draws our attention to the underlying metaphorical mappings, and allows us to access the inputs spaces. The source domain OBJECT/FUEL is elaborated as a candle space, which contains the candle, the process of burning, and the smoke, or perhaps rather soot, that results from it. The target domain TIME/ENERGY is instead elaborated as a NIGHTLIFE space, in which a person stays out late, frequents venues where people smoke cigarettes, and as a result end up with clothes that smell of smoke. In the headline, which may be understood as a conceptual blend, both these spaces are activated at the same time, and a humorous effect is created by the double literal interpretation of the element 'smoke' against both the inputs (see figure 5:1).

Figure 5:1. Comfort Refresh blend.

This makes this example similar to the double grounding constellation proposed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press), and it might also be argued that there is metonymic tightening in the blend, since the smoke stands for the previous night out on town. In that input space, the smoke was one element among others, while in the blend it represents all the others, and in fact forms the evidence that has to be removed.

5.4.2 PNC Tele.com

Let us now turn to an ad for the services of PNC Tele.com, a telecommunications company, which appeared in *GQ* in July 2000. Here, the accompanying phrase precedes the idiom in the headline, and emphasises the metaphorical context rather than turning our attention towards the literal equivalent of the idiom. The headline reads *Make your website work harder. But don't break your balls doing it*, and the body copy says that "there is a painless way to get the best from your website" and goes on to explain what they can do to help you earn money, ending with:

> Pnc Tele.com offers everything you could want for a stress-free, profitable website. For all the benefits, and a free stress ball, get in touch today. You'll sit comfortably with your decision.

The ad also shows five cartoon drawings of different animals, a dog, a chicken, a snake, a beaver and a parrot, some of them performing various activities, such as using a pneumatic drill or talking on a mobile phone. They are all drawn around the image of a blue ball, which makes up either their head or their body or both. In the company logotype, the same blue ball forms the background of the letter *C* in PNC.

   Now, the idiom *don't break your balls* is obviously metaphorical or at least figurative in some respect, but it is difficult to say what the underlying metaphor is. My guess is that the mental image associated with it has to do with the idea of physically exerting oneself to the point where the body, or more precisely a specific part of the male body, starts to break or fall apart. This might be due not only to severe exertion, but also to performing movements that should not be physically possible. In fact, it is not unusual to get a groin strain when performing strenuous activities, and this may also have something to do with the motivation behind the idiom. Making great efforts to achieve something positive, especially to please someone else, is also expressed metaphorically in terms of taking up awkward body postures, as in the expression *bend over backwards*. Taking into account the folk etymology of anger discussed in the previous section, we know that we have shared cultural knowledge about the way we conceptualise our bodies and their functions, presumably including knowledge about their limits. It could be speculated that this type of folk theory is what motivates the idiom *don't break your balls*. According to Kövecses (2002:201), there are idioms without any conceptual motivation at all, such as *to kick the bucket*, meaning 'to die', and although that could hypothetically be the case here, it sounds unconvincing to me.

Returning to the analysis of the ad, the content moves between the MENTAL and PHYSICAL domains, and also between the ABSTRACT and the CONCRETE (see figure 5:2). First, there is the idea of physical exertion, reflected in the use of the idiom, the comment clause (*work harder*), and also by the first line of the copy, "There's a painless way to get the best from your website." The cartoon beaver is also hard at work drilling a hole. The type of exertion that is the topic here, however, is mental exertion. Making your website work harder might exert you mentally if you have a limited knowledge about the web, but it would probably not be physically exhausting. The source domain is thus elaborated as a more specific space that perhaps may be labelled MANUAL LABOUR, and this includes some form of physical exertion, which is involved in a manual labour task (or some other strenuous physical activity), and which results in a groin strain (or some other kind of physical damage). In the elaborated target domain, CREATING A WEBSITE, there is an element of mental exertion, which is involved in building a website, and which may result in stress. In fact, according to the copy, new customers are given a free stress ball, and in the elaborated target, this ball might be broken if the stress gets to serious. Again, we may analyse the headline as a blend, in which both these scenes are active, and where *Don't break your balls* may be interpreted against both inputs. In contrast to 'smoke' in the previous ad, the element 'ball' is not understood in an entirely literal sense against both inputs.

Figure 5:2. PNC Tele.com blend.

However, another important cognitive mechanism also involved in this advertisement is metonymy, which is reflected pictorially in that the blue circle in the company logo gets to stand for the company in the main image, where it forms part of the drawings. Hence, this means that the cartoon animals metonymically represent the company, and it creates an overall effect whereby the company can be seen to be hard at work for you, by making your website work harder, as suggested in the headline, or even building it for you, as suggested in the copy. There is even a metaphorical link between the company and the stress ball, whereby PNC tele.com is understood as a reliever of stress, and this is again based on the metonymic link between the company and the blue circle in the logo. Crucially, these metonymic mappings actually create the solution to the situation in the blend[50], that is, they explain how the company can help us. In fact, the last line of the copy, "You'll sit comfortably with your decision", reflects a person being in a state that we can describe as mental and physical relaxation, which runs contrary to the state that is connected with the initial idiom, *break your balls*. There is also a connection present in their literal equivalents, in that it is more comfortable to sit down if your testicles are intact.

5.4.3 Scholl

The final ad in this section is for Scholl foot odour control, and interestingly enough, it illustrates a creative idea that is similar to the one used in the Volkswagen ad discussed in section 3.4, in that it forms an example of intertextuality in advertising by including elements from another, well-known type of ad for a certain shoe manufacturer, Nike (see plate 5:2). Contrary to what we would expect to find in a Nike ad, a worn and frayed trainer is displayed here together with the slogan *Just smell it*, compared to Nike's *Just do it*. The idiom, which is found in the body copy, also refers to the prices that Nike and presumably other manufacturers of brand label trainers charge for their products. It is immediately followed by the comment clause and reads "You pay through the nose when you buy trainers, so why do the same when you wear them".

Again, it is difficult to determine the exact conceptual motivation behind this idiom, but it is possible that it is connected to the unnaturalness or awkwardness of the literal equivalent of the expression. Since the meaning of the idiom is not only 'to pay too much for something', but also carries the implication that you are somehow tricked, consciously or unconsciously, into agreeing on the price, it might be the element of deception that is associated with the nose rather than the

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[50] If it instead were part of the actual blend, the company would risk being connected to the groin or even the testicles in the elaborated source, which of course is undesirable.

expensive price. This happens in the Swedish idiom *att dra någon vid näsan*, literally "to pull somebody by the nose", which means 'to deceive somebody'. Other idioms in English that include the word *nose* provide no clues, since the ones that are fairly opaque have to do with anger rather than deception, for example *to put somebody's nose out of joint* and *to get up somebody's nose.* Also, the domains of the underlying conceptual metaphor, if there is one, does not necessarily have to involve the nose or other body parts. Remember that the anger idioms above, for example, are based on ANGER IS PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE and/or ANGER IS AN OPPONENT.

Plate 5:2. Scholl. *Company* (August, 1997.)

Even though it is difficult to establish exactly what conceptual metaphors are involved here, we may assume that, at a more general level, we are again dealing with the domains of ABSTRACT and CONCRETE (see figure 5:3). It is apparent that there is an ambiguity between literal and metaphorical readings, as in the previous ads, and that these involve either the situation of wearing trainers that are worn and smelly, which is unpleasant, or the situation of buying brand label trainers, which are expensive. These scenarios then form the elaborated inputs, and may be labelled SMELL and MONETARY TRANSACTION.

Figure 5:3. Scholl blend.

However, it is more difficult to say which space is associated with the CONCRETE source domain, and which space is a more specific instance of the ABSTRACT target domain, because both *pay* and *through the nose* are in themselves ambiguous between literal and metaphorical readings. While *through the nose* is understood literally against the SMELL space, and metaphorically against the MONETARY TRANSACTION space, the opposite holds in the case of *pay*, which is understood literally in relation to the MONETARY TRANSACTION space, and metaphorically against the SMELL space. The domains of abstract and concrete are therefore connected to both the elaborated spaces at the same time, and these are simultaneously active in the blend once the initially non-salient SMELL space has been activated. This is achieved not only through the comment clause, but also with the help of the image. Apart from filling this function, the sorry state of the trainer is yet another aspect of the play on the original Nike

campaign, since it may be seen as a further comment on the quality of the trainer in relation to its price. In addition, the metaphorical interpretation of the expression *having to pay for something* is connected to the notion of suffering or punishment for mistakes, which here may refer to the mistake of buying expensive brand label trainers.

5.5. Altered idioms

Idiomatic expressions that have been altered by having one word replaced by another are much rarer in my material compared to the unchanged extended idioms discussed in the previous section, but this does not make the creative use of the original idiomatic expression and the underlying metaphor any less intriguing. Although I have chosen to refer to these examples as altered idioms, it should be noted that the emphasis is on the adjective rather than the noun, since the resulting phrase might have a literal as well as a metaphorical reading, and depending on which reading is preferred it may no longer be particularly idiomatic. This of course makes them no different from the metaphorical expressions in chapter 6 and the polysemous words in chapter 4, but it is perhaps more apparent here where we are dealing with fixed phrases. The altered idioms differ from the extended idioms, in that they simultaneously activate both the literal and the metaphorical meaning. A total of two examples will be analysed in this section, and we will see that despite advertising fairly different products, the idiomatic expressions in the ads are exploited in similar ways.

5.5.1 Libresse Bodyform

We will begin by discussing an ad for Libresse Bodyform Ultra pantyliners, which appeared in *Cosmopolitan* in July, 1996. The headline, which covers most of the page of the ad, is written in white against a cerise background and reads *don't get your pantyliners in a twist.* The letters that make up the last word are not entirely white, but seem to have been cut out of a photo of a pair of knickers, showing the waistband, the laced edges and the skin of the woman wearing them. The rest of the copy is found in the bottom left hand corner, intersected in the middle by the Libresse Bodyform Ultra logo, and reads as follows (see plate 5:3):

> Relax. Bodyform's Ultra Pantyliner is a revolutionary one-piece design.
> So when you move, it moves with you, and keeps its shape beautifully.
> It's your flexible friend.

Plate 5:3. Libresse Bodyform. *Cosmopolitan* (July, 1996.)

The metaphorical meaning of an idiom is usually more salient than its literal menaing, but because the expected word *knickers* has been replaced by *pantyliners*, both interpretations are simultaneously activated. The literal reading involves the conventional knowledge we (at least women) share about pantyliners, including the qualities that good pantyliners should have and what can go wrong with them, for example that they might lose their shape and fail to

stay in place. This is also addressed in the body copy, which tells us that the Libresse Bodyform pantyliners will follow our moves, i.e. stay in place and keep their shape. The metaphorical interpretation is of course connected to the original idiom: *to get one's knickers in a twist*. This is at least partly motivated by the metaphor THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (Lakoff 1987:395), which involves a scenario in which person or entity (A) physically disturbs or annoys person (B). Person (A) acts incorrectly and is the one at blame, while person (B) is an innocent victim and also the one to get angry. Admittedly, the idiom *to get one's knickers in a twist* differs slightly from this scenario, in that many people would probably understand the anger to be caused by the angry person herself[51], similar to expressions like *don't get yourself in a state* and *stop winding yourself up,* which are based on other metaphors. However, we can explain this if we consider the fact that the knickers are the offender, the incorrect action they undertake is to get in a twist, which in turn causes physical annoyance to the allegedly innocent wearer. But is the wearer really innocent? I would like to argue that it is the wearer of the knickers who ultimately causes them to move about and end up in a twist, which is consistent with the idea that the angry person causes the anger herself, although the knickers are the ones immediately causing the annoyance.

The link between the altered idiom *don't get your pantyliners in a twist* and the original idiom *don't get your knickers in a twist* is provided in three different ways. First, there is an obvious connection between pantyliners and knickers, in that the former are worn inside the latter, which constitutes a general conceptual association that would exist even outside of the context of the ad. In addition, there is also a visual link to the original idiom which is specific to this ad, namely the image of a pair of knickers that spells out the word *twist.* The illustration is a visual version of the linguistic expression *don't get your knickers in a twist* and could be described as a pictorial metaphor (cf. Forceville 1996). It partly builds on an additional conceptual metaphor, STATES ARE LOCATIONS, which is seen reflected in expressions such as *They are in love* (Kövecses 2002:135). Needless to say, the state of being in love is more abstract than the state of being (physically) twisted, but the use of the preposition *in* still indicates that it is conceptualised as a location. This relatively concrete source domain LOCATION is thus cleverly highlighted in the illustration in the ad, where the picture of the knickers is actually located inside the word *twist.* Finally, there is a third and perhaps less conspicuous element present, which links the pantyliner to the same conceptual domain that knickers belong to, namely CLOTHES or

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[51] It would typically be a woman, especially in this context.

FASHION. This is achieved by presenting the pantyliner partly in terms of a piece of clothing in the body copy, in particular by describing it as a "one-piece (ultra-thin) design" and through the phrase "keeps it's shape beautifully", which could also apply to a garment.

Since there is a connection here between the altered idiom and the original idiom, it is conceivable that the underlying metaphor is carried over to the altered version. In the same way as the knickers are understood as offenders, the pantyliners could be construed as a cause of anger if they do not behave like they should. As would be expected, this is not explicitly indicated anywhere in the ad, since admakers probably are reluctant to mention any negative characteristics that might be associated with the product they are trying to sell. However, drawing attention to possible shortcomings in a more implicit manner might be helpful in building the argument in favour of the advertised product by arguing against these.


Figure 5:4. Libresse Bodyform blend.

However, let us return to the original idiom and the conventional metaphor that motivates it, i.e. THE CAUSE OF ANGER IS PHYSICAL ANNOYANCE (see figure 5:4). In this particular case, the source domain may be understood to be elaborated as a more specific scenario in which someone's knickers get into a twist and cause physical annoyance for the wearer, while the target domain is

elaborated as a space in which an offender performs an incorrect action that makes another person angry. In relation to the altered idiom, there are corresponding spaces, but here there is no annoyance and no anger. The second elaborated source space thus contains the pantyliners, which stay in place and lead to comfort, while the second elaborated target space represents a scenario in which a friend performs a correct action that makes another person happy and relaxed.

In contrast to the image associated with *get your knickers in a twist*, the emergent situation we find in the space of this ad is first of all that the pantyliner is our friend. This is explicitly stated in the body copy. As a opposed to an enemy or an offender, it will do what it is supposed to do ("So when you move, it moves with you, and keeps its shape beautifully."), which in turn means that the user, i.e. you, the reader of the ad, will have no reason to get angry or irritated. On the contrary, the pantyliner will make you relax, which is indicated in the copy.

5.4.2 Focus

The next ad to be analysed in this section is one for Focus contact lenses (see plate 5:4). The main part of the ad is taken up by a picture of a woman dressed in a white knitted polo jumper, cuddling a fluffy toy animal that might be a teddy bear. The headline above the picture is written in white against a green background and reads *Comfort is in the eye of the beholder*, a variant form of the idiomatic expression or proverb *Beauty is in the eye of the beholder* (see plate 5:4).

As with the previous ad, the headline is ambiguous and may be interpreted both literally and metaphorically. Again, the fact that the idiom has been altered triggers the otherwise non-salient literal meaning, but perhaps not as strongly as in the previous ad, since *Comfort is in the eye of the beholder* may actually be understood in an entirely metaphorical sense, as opposed to *Don't get your pantyliners in a twist*, where a literal interpretation is inevitably highlighted. Let us start with the original idiom, which is partly motivated by the conceptual metaphor FEELINGS ARE OBJECTS or in this case rather PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS or ABSTRACT NOTIONS are OBJECTS. Being seen in terms of an object is what enables beauty to be located in different places, in this case in the eye of the beholder as opposed to in the face of a woman. Fittingly enough, contact lenses are also objects that are located in the eyes of some beholders, namely those with poor eyesight.

Plate 5:4. Focus. *Marie Claire* (March, 1997)

The source domain OBJECTS is elaborated as a more specific space, which will be referred to as LENSES, and it includes the simple scenario in which lenses are worn or placed in a person's eyes (see figure 5:5). In addition, we can identify two elaborations of the target domain FEELINGS/CHARACTERISTICS, where one may be labelled COMFORT and the other BEAUTY. In the COMFORT space, there is the feeling of comfort, which exists in the opinion of the experiencer, while in the BEAUTY space, there is the characteristic of beauty, which exists in the opinion of the observer. In the altered idiom in the headline,

all these spaces are activated simultaneously, and contribute to the understanding of what it means to use the Focus lenses. Not only will they improve a person's eyesight, they are also comfortable for the wearer and make her/him look good in the eyes of other people.


Figure 5:5. Focus blend.

Moreover, all three input spaces may be understood to be reflected in the image, in particular the COMFORT space, to which the warm jumper and cuddly toy belong, but perhaps also the BEAUTY space, which in that case is reflected in the face of the woman, and possibly also the LENSES space, if we assume that the woman in the ad is wearing them. However, they are also signalled in the text or slogan at the very bottom of the ad, which says "see better", "feel better" and "look better", and these are of course linked to the three different input spaces LENSES, COMFORT, and BEAUTY.

The altered idiom in the headline may also be seen as a comment on the image, which actually illustrates some examples of what comfort may involve, but at the same time asks what it really means for something to be comfortable. Is it wearing a warm jumper and cuddling a fluffy toy as the woman in the picture is doing, or is it something else? That is all up to the beholder, which of course carries a possible negative implication as far as the aim of the ad is concerned. Are the contact lenses really comfortable or is that also, metaphorically, in the eye of the beholder?

CHAPTER 6
METAPHORICAL EXPRESSIONS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter contains analyses of ads that are centred around metaphorical expressions, in the sense that they signal the underlying metaphor and its creative elaboration. As already pointed out, drawing a line between idiomatic expressions and metaphorical expressions is not a straightforward task, since the two do not form separate categories, but are found on a continuum with a varying degree of entrenchment. On the whole, the expressions in this chapter are assumed to be less entrenched, and are also not as fixed as the idiomatic expressions in chapter 5. This is apparent from the fact that a creative effect is achieved if the latter are altered, as we saw in 5.5. Compared to the ads in 4.6 the level of entrenchment is roughly the same, but here we are dealing with phrases rather than separate words. However, the role of the image is the same, in that it is not needed in order to trigger the non-metaphorical meaning. This is not surprising, given that both the literal and the metaphorical meanings are usually activated at the same time in conventional expressions (Giora 1997:191). The metaphorical expressions occur in three main patterns, but there is significant overlap between them. I will refer to the first as ambiguous metaphorical/literal expressions (section 6.2), which is a label that also fits the combined expressions (section 6.4), since they too involve an incongruity between metaphorical and non-metaphorical interpretations. However, in the combined expressions, the interplay between two metaphorical phrases is more apparent, and crucially, there is a tension between positive and negative interpretations, which results in a weak humorous effect. In the ads in section 6.2, there is a punning effect as a result of the tension between elements from the two inputs. The elaborated metaphorical expressions (section 6.3) involve an extension or a more specific novel elaboration of the underlying conventional metaphors for the purpose of creating an argument in favour of the product, rather than achieving a humorous effect.

6.2 Ambiguous metaphorical/literal expressions

The ads in this section include expressions that are ambiguous, in that they may have either a metaphorical or a literal interpretation. Both involve the conventional metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD and ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING, but they are elaborated in different ways. While the Friskies ad in 6.2.1 only contains one metaphorical expression, the Evian ad in 6.2.2 contains two, and therefore bears some resemblance to the ads in 6.3. However, it does not involve an overall clash between a negative and a positive interpretation.

6.2.1 Friskies

The first example to be discussed is an advertisement for Friskies cat food (see plate 6:1), in particular a line of dry cat food called Beta Life Plan. The upper half of the ad contains a picture of a cat's tooth sunk into a piece of cat food together with the headline *Something for you and your cat to chew on.* The lower half of the ad is occupied by the body copy, which contains information about the cat food and especially how it can improve a cat's dental health. Every piece of specific information is introduced by a question, beginning with "Did you know…?". For example, it explains that the cat will be able to bite all the way through a piece of food before it splits, and that the cat will have to chew the Friskies food more carefully than other brands of dry cat food.

The phrase *to chew on* is ambiguous in that it has both the metaphorical meaning 'to consider something', and the non-metaphorical meaning 'to bite into something', which typically is food. In the context of this ad, their shared schema is highlighted and both senses are salient, which leads us to the underlying metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD, which entails CONSIDERING IS CHEWING. This in turn leads us to more specific instances of these domains, which in the case of the domains that make up the source, FOOD and CHEWING, involves an elaborated space containing a cat who eats cat food, typically from a bowl placed on the floor. However, it may also involve a space in which people eat regular food from plates while sitting down at a table. The elaboration of the domains IDEAS and CONSIDERING in the target input instead involves a specific scenario in which a person is considering a certain piece of information. Here, we would not typically assume that the agent role might be played by a cat, although for some it would be a clear possibility, and would in turn involve a personification of the cat. In the blended space (see figure 6:1), we find both the cat and the person as separate entities playing the same role, both performing the activity of chewing, but in different senses. The entity that is subjected to the activity is Friskies, but

in relation to the cat it is more specifically the food itself, while in relation to the person it is the information about the food.

Plate 6:1. Friskies. *She* (July, 2000).

Initially though, there might be some confusion as to what spaces and specific elements are involved in the blend. If only the literal sense of *chew* is made salient to begin with, there will be a definite clash, because both agents, a cat and a person, are involved, and the entity that is the patient or object is one

and the same. This may thus be understood as a situation in which a person is eating cat food, which is absurd and therefore somewhat humorous. However, the elaborated target space is then highlighted through the body copy, and the specific ideas that are considered may be understood as the information provided there. Although the incongruity is partially resolved, the input spaces are still activated and some of the initial incongruity may still remain. This situation could then be elaborated, and even involve elements from the space containing information about people who are eating, if we imagine a scenario in which a cat and a person are sitting on separate chairs on either side of a table. The cat is eating cat food from a plate, but without using cutlery, and the person is reading the back of the Friskies packet as if it were a menu. This scenario could then also be accompanied by the same headline, i.e. *Something for you and your cat to chew on.*

Figure 6:1. Friskies blend.

Despite the fact that one elaborated space may be activated before the other, we are not dealing with frame-shifting (see section 2.5 and 7.3.3), because there is potential for the ambiguous scenario to continue to be active. Also, in typical cases of frame-shifting, the humour occurs in the shift from one scene to another, which may be triggered by a single word, and whereby the elements have to be rearranged according to another frame. This is illustrated by the following example, provided by Coulson (2001:57):

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(1) When I asked the bartender for something cold and full of rum, he recommended his wife.

In this ad, however, the subtle humorous effect arises from the incongruities that are present initially, and, according to my analysis, also continuously in the blend. When the elaborated target space is highlighted, if indeed this happens at a later stage, much of the humour in fact decreases rather than being created, since this constitutes the informative aspect of the ad. The introduction of one space slightly ahead of the other is compatible to what is said to happen in a typical pun, where one sense may be introduced ahead of the other, but where they still continue to exist alongside each other (Attardo 1994:133-136, see also section 4.4). It can also be compared to the situation in the Minolta ad in section 7.3.3, where the BASKETBALL space is introduced ahead of the CAMERA space.

6.2.2 Evian

The next example to be analysed is a double-page ad for Evian mineral water (see plate 6:2). The textual part of the ad consists solely of the two sentences *Transparent with a plastic body. No wonder it goes down well in Hollywood.* These are written in large white letters against a blue background, and they take up more than half of the ad. To the right of the text, there is a picture of a bottle of Evian mineral water.

There is more than one metaphorical expression in this ad, but the one that the ad is centred around is taken to be the phrase *it goes down well*, which reflects the conventional metaphors IDEAS ARE FOOD and ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING. According to these, things that go down well are not only easy to accept, but are also well-liked and popular. However, in the context of this ad, the phrase may also be understood non-metaphorically as referring to the mineral water that is meant to be swallowed. Likewise, while *transparent* in its literal sense refers to the physical qualities of objects, such as the water and the bottle, it metaphorically describes more abstract notions like ideas, arguments, attitudes or people's personalities according to the ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE metaphor. The phrase *a plastic body* is also ambiguous, in that it may literally refer to the plastic bottle that the mineral water comes in, or to a human body with surgical implants, typically a woman's body with artificial breasts. Although not metaphorical, this second meaning is based on a WHOLE/PART metonymy, in that the material that the artificial parts are made of stands for the material that forms the whole body. To be more specific, the material that is used in implants may

not necessarily be plastic, which means that plastic in these cases is also used to stand for other artificial materials[52]. In fact, *plastic* is often used metaphorically to describe something that is unnatural, artificial or otherwise not genuine, for example *a plastic smile* (Longman). The notion that a person can be transparent is also linked to the metaphors A PERSON IS A LAYERED OBJECT and THE BODY IS A CONTAINER (FOR EMOTIONS), and the latter of these may even be involved in the phrase *a plastic body*, if it is understood in a novel metaphorical way as belonging to a person who is transparent.


Plate 6:2. Evian. *Elle* (August, 1999).

With these conventional metaphors as a base, we then get two more specific input spaces, which may be labelled EVIAN and HOLLYWOOD ACTRESS, respectively (see figure 6:2). In the first elaborated input, which we would expect to relate to the metaphorical source(s), we find elements such as the mineral water, the fact that it is contained in a plastic bottle, and the fact that both the bottle and the water are transparent. There is also information relating to the fact that people drink water to quench their thirst, and that this involves the act of swallowing. In the second elaborated input, relating to the targets of the metaphors, we instead find Hollywood actresses or models, whose personalities are transparent, and whose bodies are partly artificial. We also know that this is

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[52] Without digressing too far into the area of plastic surgery, breast implants are often filled with saline, which is a natural substance. However, the implant itself is not.

what is accepted and generally appreciated in Hollywood, at least in a generalised cultural model of what Hollywood is like. Alternatively, this space may represent a different scenario, in which we find stereotypical HOLLYWOOD MOVIES that are transparent, in the sense that the ideas and the message put forward by them are easy to understand. They may also be considered less genuine than independent films, but again, they have qualities that are popular not only in Hollywood, but throughout the Western world. However, this alternative space is not in any sense an elaboration of the target space of the metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER.


Figure 6:2. Evian blend.

If we assume that the HOLLYWOOD MOVIES space is involved, there are cross-space correspondences between the bottle and the movie, between the water inside the bottle and the contents of the movie, and between the plastic material

of the bottle and the shallowness[53] of the movie. Moreover, while the bottle is transparent in that you can physically see through it, the movie is transparent in that it is easy to understand, and the people who drink the water in the source space correspond to the people who like the story of the movie in the target space. If we instead take the elaborated target to be HOLLYWOOD ACTRESS, the cross-space correspondences are not as straightforward. Beginning with the bottle, it corresponds to the actress, whereas the water inside the bottle corresponds to the feelings, emotions and personality of the actress. In addition, the plastic material of the bottle corresponds to the artificial material that parts of the actress's body are made of, but the crucial difference is that while it is the water inside the bottle that is swallowed by the people in the source input, it is not primarily the personal abstract qualities of the actress that people in the target input like, but rather her physical appearance and *lack* of personal depth.

What becomes apparent here is that the mineral water seems to be understood in terms of the actress or the movie rather than the other way round, which would involve a reversal of the underlying metaphors. As in the Tampax ad in 7.3.1, this might be motivated by the personification metaphors INANIMATE IS ANIMATE and OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE, at least as far as the HOLLYWOOD ACTRESS input is concerned. Since OBJECTS forms the target input, the mineral water would be seen as an elaboration of the target rather than the source. It follows that the other metaphors would be reversed in order for OBJECTS to be part of the same input as the related domains CONCRETE, DRINK, SWALLOWING and CONTAINER. Similarly, the source input would include not only PEOPLE, but also ABSTRACT, IDEAS, ACCEPTING and BODY. This is not meant to imply that people are abstract, but simply that ideas, which are held by people, are abstract rather than concrete. In the blend, we then get a situation in which the Evian mineral water is metaphorically understood as a Hollywood actress, and just like her and the movies she stars in, the water is uncomplicated and easy to like. In fact, since Hollywood movies and culture are spread all over the Western world and enjoyed by many people, so is the mineral water (or is hoped to be). In addition to the simple qualities of the water itself, it also comes in a good-looking bottle made of plastic, just like the actress whose attractive body is partially artificial.

As far as the HOLLYWOOD MOVIE space is concerned, it might be difficult to suggest that it is involved in a case of personification, even though it could

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[53] The use of the word *shallowness* here is an illustration of how difficult it is to talk about abstract qualities without using metaphorical language. In fact, shallowness and transparency are linked, in that shallow water typically is transparent, while deep water is opaque, which makes it difficult to see the bottom. It follows that a person or an idea that is deep and complex would not be expected to also be transparent.

arguably be construed as part of the source rather than the target. However, if we take the HOLLYWOOD MOVIE space to in turn form an elaboration of an element in the HOLLYWOOD ACTRESS space, it might be possible. The metaphorical understanding of the mineral water as a Hollywood movie would then run parallel to the account given above, and the qualities of the water would be seen in terms of the qualities of the movie, and so on. Crucially, this would allow the qualities of the content of the mineral water bottle to be projected from the HOLLYWOOD MOVIE space, and the qualities of the physical appearance from the HOLLYWOOD ACTRESS space. This would reflect the focus on the story in the former space, and the focus on looks in the latter. In addition, a movie that lacks depth might have fewer negative associations than a person who lacks depth.

In terms of humour, there is obviously some ambiguity present here, which leads to a punning effect, but the image is not vital in highlighting the non-metaphorical meaning of the ambiguous element[54]. As long as we know that the advertised product is a drink of some sort, both the metaphorical and the non-metaphorical interpretations are expected to be salient. In the blend, the two possible interpretations continue to exist alongside each other, and although some incongruities are resolved in terms of metaphor, others still remain. In particular, the conceptual distance between a bottle of mineral water and a Hollywood actress means that there is bound to be some remaining tension even though many aspects are metaphorically integrated. Like what happens in the Tampax ad in 7.3.1, the tension in the blend could be further elaborated by visually merging these elements. This may be achieved by depicting a bottle in the shape of a woman and with certain female attributes, and in this case unnaturally large breasts, but with a body that is plastic, see-through, and possibly also filled with water. Finally, the ad also forms a sarcastic comment on Hollywood culture, which actually highlights some of the negative aspects touched upon before, and this clashes with the positive comments that we expect to be made in an ad. Clashes between positive and negative expectations were noted earlier, e.g. in the Scholl ad (section 5.4.3), and we will see further examples of this in section 6.4, and in the Bausch & Lomb ad in section 7.5.1.

6.3 Elaborated metaphorical expressions

These ads contain metaphorical expression which are elaborated in order to create an argument in favour of the product. In both cases, the product forms part

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[54] This can be seen in contrast to the Persil ad in 4.5.1, where the image is necessary in drawing attention to the source domain PHYSICAL PROXIMITY.

of the scenario in the elaborated source, and the target space in both cases involves wider aspects of people's lives. The result in the blend is that the function and the effect of the product in the elaborated source is extended to a whole area of a person's life, so that it is seen as the solution to even bigger problems. The underlying conventional metaphor is relatively transparent, and there is no surprise effect or strong incongruity as a result of its remotivation. However, the visual elaboration of the blend in 6.3.2 increases the humorous effect, which would be absent without the image, even though the ad would still be possible to understand.

6.3.1 Lexus

This ad is for a Lexus IS200 car (see plate 6:3), and it bears the headline *SATISFACTION COMES FROM CHOOSING YOUR OWN ROAD IN LIFE. AND STICKING TO IT.* This is followed by a piece of bodycopy, while the lower half of the ad contains an image of the car travelling along a road, seemingly at high speed. The main part of the body copy reads as follows:

> The new Lexus IS200 sports saloon probably isn't the car for the middle-of-the-road conformist. It looks different. It drives differently. It has a 2 litre, straight 6 cylinder, 24 valve VVTi engine, 6 speed manual transmission and double wishbone suspension all round. Inside there's a unique atmosphere courtesy of automatic climate control and 6 CD hi-fi system. So for those of you who know exactly where you're going, your transport has arrived.

The phrase *choosing your own road in life* is a conventional metaphorical expression that reflects the conventional metaphors LIFE IS A JOURNEY and GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS. However, in this ad, the metaphor has been elaborated and extended, by involving more specific instances of the two domains in the form of elaborated input spaces (see figure 6:3). Here, the elaboration of the target space LIFE consists of a situation in life where a person does not conform to norms and expectations, and instead makes individual choices that sets him or her apart from other people, or at least from what is conventional behaviour. In combination with determination and perseverance, this leads to success. Meanwhile, in the elaborated source space, based on JOURNEY, we find a scenario in which there is a main road that most people travel on, but where one person decides to take a smaller side road that no one else uses. This person stays on that road and reaches the intended destination. One crucial element in this space, which does not have a specified counterpart in the elaborated target space, is the Lexus, which provides the actual means of transportation. There is presumably a means by which success is achieved in the

Plate 6:3. Lexus. Esquire (August, 1999).

elaborated target, in the form of a metaphorical vehicle, but we do not know whether this is education, inheritance, or some other opportunity. In the blended space, these counterpart elements merge metaphorically, so that conforming to expectations is staying on the main road, while making individual choices is taking to your own road. Moreover, determination is integrated with the notion of staying on the road, and achieving success is arriving at the desired destination. However, since the means are left unspecified in the elaborated target, the Lexus is projected from the elaborated source space to fill the

corresponding slot in the blend. This means that the emergent structure in the blend is that driving a Lexus equals individuality and leads to a successful life. This is information that is not present in either of the elaborated inputs, but is the result of integration of the elements in the blended space. What is more, the Lexus also offers a comfortable means of achieving satisfaction and success, thanks to the qualities of the car that are listed in the copy.

Figure 6:3. Lexus blend.

It is important to note that the overall mapping that takes place between these two mental scenarios is not conventional, even though they are motivated by a conventional metaphor, since we do not in general consider individual life choices, determination and ensuing satisfaction and success in terms of driving a Lexus on an empty side road to a predetermined destination. At the same time, this is not to imply that conventional mappings always involve entire domains. On the contrary, a particular conventional expression may be structured by a mapping between specific aspects of two domains, and when these mappings are systematic we may talk about the existence of a conventional conceptual metaphor. However, some specific aspects of this blend are of course

conventional, such as the mapping between achieving success and reaching a destination.

Little or no humour at all emerges from the blend in this ad, despite the fact that there is some ambiguity between literal and metaphorical interpretations. This would imply that any incongruities have been resolved and instead been transformed into metaphorical understanding. Although conventional, the metaphorical connection between LIFE and A JOURNEY is easily invoked, and the image hardly plays a role in this process. This is of course similar to the situation in the ads in 4.5, which are centred around less entrenched polysemous words, where the underlying metaphor is also used as a basis for building an argument about the product, rather than creating a humorous effect.

6.3.2 Motilium

This is an ad for Motilium tablets (see plate 6:4), which according to the information on the packet pictured in the bottom right-hand corner gives "[e]ffective relief from fullness, bloating, queasiness, feeling sick and other stomach discomfort after eating". The main part of the ad is taken up by a picture of a food blender with a transparent container, and inside this container there are strings of words, which may be seen as labels, representing various situations, events and obligations in life. These include "Father's Day", "school run", "cancel supper", "pay bills", "drinks party", "breakfast meeting", "working lunch", and "parent's evening", to mention a few examples. At the top of the ad, to the right of the container lid, there is a headline that reads *Life. Have you got the stomach for it?* Below this headline, along the right-hand side of the ad, the body copy explains the symptoms that many people suffer from as a result of stress, what specifically causes these symptoms, and how they can be relieved by taking Motilium tablets.

The phrase *Have you got the stomach for it?* can be interpreted literally as referring to the actual functions of somebody's stomach and whether or not these are affected by different types of food, but it can also be understood metaphorically as whether or not we have the ability to cope with a situation. In this metaphorical interpretation, the expression reflects the generic-level metaphor ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE, and more specifically the metaphor IDEAS ARE FOOD. Although we are dealing with situations here, which might be considered to be concrete rather than abstract, it is important to note that it is not primarily the physical situation itself, but the feelings and emotions that are associated with it, i.e. the effect the situation has on us. This means that the mere thought of it might be too much to handle, which is perhaps reflected more

clearly in an expression such as *I can't stomach the idea of going to another parent's evening* or even *I can't stomach the idea of living the rest of my life like this.* However, even if we do have the actual situation in mind, this too may be conceptualised in terms of more concrete things, according to the metaphor EVENTS ARE OBJECTS or ACTIONS ARE OBJECTS.

Plate 6:4. Motilium. *She* (July, 2000).

In this ad (see figure 6:4 below), the source input CONCRETE/OBJECTS/FOOD is elaborated as a STOMACH TROUBLE space, in which a person eats food, and the food affects the person's stomach and digestive system in a negative way. The discomfort this results in is then relieved by the Motilium tablets. In the

elaborated target space, which may be labelled EVERYDAY STRESSES, a person is exposed to various situations and obligations that particularly affect his or her emotional well-being in a negative way, but no specific solution is suggested to this problem. In the blended space, the elements from the two inputs are merged, so that the obligations or life situation and events from the target are integrated with the food items from the elaborated source. This is pictorially reflected in the picture of the blender, where these specific situations actually make up the food items.

Figure 6:4. Motilium blend.

Also, many of the situations given here actually involve eating, such as "breakfast meeting", "working lunch", and "children's tea", which further reflect the integration between the elements 'food' and 'situation/obligation'. The act of swallowing the food is merged with the mental absorption of the situation we are in, and this of course reflects the metaphor ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING, which is an entailment of the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor. Here, though, the acceptance is forced rather than volitionary. The negative effect of the food on the person's stomach is integrated with the negative effect on his or her general well-being, and this in fact involves a metonymic CAUSE/EFFECT relation, which is physiologically grounded in the fact that emotional stress and strain may result in physical symptoms. Since no specific solution is available from the elaborated

target, the solution to the problems in this blend is provided by the Motilium tablets, which are projected from the elaborated source. This runs parallel to the Lexus ad in the previous section, and the new information that emerges is that the Motilium tablets will cure not only your stomach, but also your life.

The blender fills an important function in this ad, and to begin with, it might seem as if it is projected from the source space, where it would then stand in a distant contiguous relation to the food. However, the blender invokes the Container schema, since it is a container for the food during the preparation stage, and this schema is also active in the two input spaces. In the elaborated source, the person, or more precisely his or her stomach, is a container for the food after it has been eaten, and in the elaborated target, the person's mind is a container for the feelings created by certain situations in life. Moreover, the food in a mixer spins round and round, just like the churning sensation in an upset stomach, and the way in which we metaphorically conceive of thoughts and feelings as spinning round and round in our heads. As in the Evian ad in 6.2.2, we might thus consider positing a separate BLENDER space, which elaborates the original source input FOOD, possibly via the STOMACH TROUBLE space.

Alternatively, the scenario represented by the image could simply be understood as an elaboration of the scene in the blend, because if life situations are metaphorically integrated with food items, it follows that they can go in a blender. This would then mean that the stressful situations we face in life are put in a blender, given to us to eat or drink, and that this results in stomach trouble. Regardless of the preferred analysis, the image plays a vital role in creating the subtle humorous effect that is present in this ad, and it does so by highlighting the incongruities and tension between food items and everyday situations. Crucially, these incongruities actually signal the blend, and lead us to the input spaces. The visualisation of the incongruities may also explain the higher degree of humour in this ad compared to the Lexus ad analysed in 6.3.1, where the image simply portrays the product, without drawing attention to a non-salient literal interpretation or illustrating an elaboration of the blended space.

6.4 Combined metaphorical expressions

In the following ads, a tension is created between literal and metaphorical interpretations as a result of the combination of two metaphorical expressions. This may be compared to the idiomatic expressions in chapter 5, where the same effect was achieved by either extending or altering the phrase. However, the extension of those phrases consists of a literal phrase rather than a metaphorical one, and as mentioned in 6.1, alteration would not have the same effect here

since the expressions are less fixed. Both these ads involve a tension between a positive and a negative interpretation, but the patterns are reversed, so in the first ad, the negative interpretation occurs in relation to the elaborated target, and in the second ad, it occurs in relation to the elaborated source.

6.4.1 Vaseline Intensive Care

This ad, which appeared in *Elle* in August, 1999, is for a skin lotion from Vaseline Intensive care. The middle section of the ad is occupied by a picture of a man who is leaning against some kind of surface, resting his head in his hand. He has his shirt off, and a woman is standing behind him with both her hands on his left shoulder, as if massaging him. She is very close to him, and has a smile on her face. Above this picture, there is a headline that reads *IT'S ALWAYS NICE TO RUB IT IN WHEN SOMEONE'S FEELING A BIT ROUGH*. The body copy at the bottom of the ad elaborates this statement in the following way:

> Particularly as Vaseline Intensive Care just melts into skin in seconds instead of leaving you sliding around like a greased eel for ten minutes. And what could be more soothing when you've had a bit of a rough day than feeling those special skincare ingredients in Vaseline Intensive Care getting right under your skin? Putting the moisture back in. Especially if someone else is rubbing it in. End result? Skin that feels healthy, deep down. So if you want your skin (or someone else's for that matter) to feel a lot perkier, take Vaseline Intensive Care of it.

There is an incongruity present in the salient metaphorical interpretation of the headline, according to which someone is feeling tired, exhausted or perhaps even ill, and someone else wants to make it worse. This is clearly not what we would be expected to do, let alone enjoying it at the same time. The word *rough* also has a metaphorical interpretation, and is similar to *smooth* in the Tampax ad in 7.3.1., which was explained partly in terms of the metaphor HUMAN PROPERTIES ARE THE PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS. As Kövecses points out, these properties that are mapped onto human beings often come in pairs, such as hard-soft, warm-cold, and sharp-dull (Kövecses 2002:126). Since both the concrete surface qualities of an object and more abstract qualities of a human being can be described as smooth, they can then also be described as rough. This also means that a mapping between PHYSICAL QUALITIES and ABSTRACT QUALITIES is involved. The phrase *rub it in* might possibly be a result of the isolated phrase *to rub salt on somebody's wounds*, but it may also be connected to the metaphor FEELINGS ARE OBJECTS. If so, it is also a result of the metaphor THE BODY IS A CONTAINER FOR THE EMOTIONS, and feelings are thus objects or entities that can

get inside of us, and in this case they are held there and also emphasised by somebody else.

Figure 6:5. Vaseline blend.

In any case, the incongruites in the headline lead us to the underlying conventional metaphors, where the source space has to do with PHYSICAL QUALITIES/PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS/OBJECTS, and is elaborated as a specific situation in which the surface of someone's skin is dry and rough, and where lotion is rubbed onto it to alleviate the dryness and make it smooth. The target space involves HUMAN PROPERTIES/ABSTRACT QUALITIES/FEELINGS, and is elaborated as a scenario in which a person is in a negative state, and someone else is emphasising that feeling in order to make it worse. In the blended space (see figure 6.5), both these scenarios are active at the same time, but the positive intention is projected from the elaborated source, rather than the negative intention from the elaborated target, because the feeling in the blended space is understood as positive, since it has merged with the lotion. In unpacking the blend, the initial incongruity is thus partially resolved and the advertised product is understood as positive in two ways, i.e. in that it makes our skin smooth and and also makes us feel better in general. This is reflected in the phrase *getting right under your skin* in the copy, which metaphorically refers to feelings getting inside your body and affecting you. However, this phrase is usually associated

with negative feelings such as irritation, but according to the copy, the skin feels "a lot perkier", so again the initial positive-negative clash is highlighted.

Although the initial incongruity is partially resolved by the projection of the positive intention from the LOTION space, the negative-positive clash still remains and creates a slightly humorous effect. Instead of being the result of incongruities between specific elements in the two scenarios, it has to do with the more general clash between positive and negative intentions.

6.4.2 Heinz Weight Watchers

This is a double-page ad for a range of low fat Weight Watchers frozen desserts from Heinz (see plate 6:5), where the first half of the ad consists of a picture of the Raspberry Swirl variety served in a cup and decorated with fresh raspberries. The second half carries the headline *Bags of taste without the handles*, and further down three cartons containing the different varieties of the dessert are pictured in connection with the body copy. This mainly describes the Raspberry Swirl variety, but also mentions the low calory content of all the desserts, and the fact that there are other types of desserts as well, for example cheesecakes. However, it begins and ends with the following:

> Love handles, spare tyres…Whatever you choose to call them, you certainly don't want them. ….
> … From now on a lover of desserts needn't look like one.

The completely metaphorical interpretation of the expression *Bags of taste without the handles*, which initially may be presumed to be salient, refers to the fact that the desserts are rich in taste, but will not make you gain weight. This makes them different from typical desserts, which are rich in taste as a result of containing a fair amount of sugar and fat, which makes people overweight. The headline is metaphorical in two respects, the first relating to the phrase *bags of taste.* In order for something abstract like a taste to be carried in a bag, it has to be understood in terms of a concrete object according to the generic-level metaphor ABSTRACT ENTITIES ARE PHYSICAL ENTITIES. Having several bags of physical objects means that there are many of them, and this aspect is then projected onto the target, resulting in the meaning that the dessert has a lot of taste.

The word *handles* is also metaphorical, especially in the phrase *love handles* in the copy, but triggers a literal interpretation in connection with *bags*, since bags and handles are contiguously related in the concrete space. Instead of reflecting a conventional metaphorical mapping between two domains, *handles*

is a perfect example of conventional metaphorical language based on a conceptual one-shot image metaphor. Here, the conventional image of two handles is mapped onto the image of the relatively small areas of fatty tissue on both sides of a person's back right above the hipbone, where a partner's hands might be placed during love making. This is also the case with *spare tyres* in the copy, where the image of a spare tyre is mapped onto the image of a fatty bulge around a person's stomach.

Plate 6:5. Heinz Weight Watchers. *Cosmopolitan* (July, 1996).

The source input PHYSICAL ENTITIES is then elaborated as the more specific space BAGS, in which bags are filled with physical objects, whereas the ABSTRACT ENTITIES input is elaborated as a DESSERT space that contains the desserts, which are full of taste (see figure 6:6 below). As regards the one-shot metaphor, a set of prototypical or at least conventional handles are found in the elaborated source space, where they are attached to the bag. In the elaborated target space, the handles would correspond to excess fat on a person, but since there is only little fat in the dessert, the person is slim. Whereas it is desirable for a bag to have handles, since it means that it can fulfil its purpose of being carried, it is not desirable for a person to have excess fat, because it might effect his/her physical function. In this respect, the bag in the elaborated source would

be expected to correspond to the person in the elaborated target, but this would then imply that the person is full of taste, since the bag is full of objects.

Figure 6:6. Heinz Weight Watchers blend.

However, as we have already seen, it is rather the dessert that is full of taste, but the dessert eventually ends up inside the person, so there is a clear link between the two. As is made clear by this, there is no straightforward analogy between the elements in the two inputs, and parts of different schemas seem to be involved at the same time. For example, the handles may also be understood to correspond to the lack of fat in the dessert, because just like the handles form an important part of the bag, so does the low fat content form an important aspect of the dessert. Also, the presence of the handles does not prevent objects to be placed in the bag, just like the low fat content does not prevent the dessert from having plenty of taste. This correspondence between the handles and the low fat content would then suggest that they have corresponding effects, which would be fulfilling the purpose of being carried and no excess fat in a person's body, respectively. Again, we have a situation in which one element in the

elaborated source may be understood to correspond to two different elements in the elaborated target, depending on which frame or schema is invoked[55].

In the blend[56], we find both the bags from the elaborated source and the dessert from the elaborated target, but while the handles are projected from the BAG space, the actual absence (in terms of the fat) is projected from the DESSERT space, rather than the presence (in terms of the handles) from the elaborated source space. This means that there are no handles and no fat present here. The two different purposes are also projected to the blend, where the purpose of being carried clashes with the absence of handles, but where the purpose of staying in good health is compatible with the low fat content.

As in the Vaseline Intensive Care ad in the previous section, the effect of humour in this ad results from the clash between the negative and the positive situation in the blend, but here the negative interpretation occurs in relation to the source rather than the target. This is not surprising, since the advertised product is connected to the DESSERT space. Again, the literal meaning is triggered by the combination of the two expressions *bags of taste* and *handles*, instead of being highlighted by the image, as in 4.5. These incongruities not only give rise to humour, they are also what signals the blend and prompts us to unpack it.

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[55] An alternative analysis with two elaborated target spaces is perhaps also possible. These inputs would then correspond to the two typical DESSERT scenarios, one in which the dessert is high in fat and rich in taste, and another in which the dessert is low in fat and poor in taste.

[56] The elements 'low fat' and 'dessert' are placed within brackets in the blended space in figure 6:6 in order to indicate that they are reflected in the copy rather than the headline.

CHAPTER 7
NOVEL CONCEPTUALISATIONS

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7.1 Introduction

In the ads analysed in this chapter, the advertised products are conceptualised in terms of something else, for example something animate or even human. As can be expected, these conceptualisations are novel rather than conventional, since their purpose is to provide a new understanding about the product or at least to give rise to new associations, but nevertheless, they still rest on conventional grounds. This makes them slightly different from the metaphor A VW PASSAT IS A BEAUTY PRODUCT in the ad discussed by Ungerer (2000:330-332, see section 3.4), which has no conventional basis. The ads in this chapter differ from the ones in chapter 4-6, in that the metaphor is not mainly signalled by a specific word or phrase, but also in the combination of text and image (7.3-7.4) or throughout the text (7.5). While it is true that some of the ads do include a polysemous word, the crucial difference is that the underlying metaphor is used as a basis for a novel conceptualisation, which allows us to understand and experience the product in terms of something else. Of course, this also gives us information about the product or arguments in favour of it, but the crucial difference is that the product itself forms the target space in the novel mapping. These ads are similar to those analysed by Forceville (1996) in that respect, and this also explains the choice of the term conceptualisation instead of metaphor in the headline. As we have just seen, novel metaphors or other types of novel mappings come into play in some of the ads in chapter 4 as well, but in those cases the product itself is not reconceptualised[57]. Although the Evian ad in 6.2.2 does involve elements of personification, it is still discussed in chapter 6, since it is clearly centered around a metaphorical expression. This forms yet another example of the complex nature of my material and how any attempt at categorisation into chapters is bound to result in a partial overlap.

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[57] The metaphor GALAXY CARAMEL IS SEX in the Galaxy Caramel ad in section 4.5.3 is not directly based on the reactivated conventional metaphor, and it is not the main metaphor around which the ad is centred.

In terms of humour, the incongruity in these ads primarily emerges in the often visualised clash between the two domains involved in the novel conceptualisation, and is not solely dependent on the ambiguity of a polysemous word as in a prototypical pun. The interplay between text and image makes the ads in 7.3 and 7.4 similar to Forceville's (1996) examples, especially his verbo-pictorial metaphors, and to the cartoons analysed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002), Brône & Feyaerts (in press), Coulson (in press) and Bergen (2004). It therefore makes sense to include a discussion of text-image relations and the importance of visual communication (see section 7.2) and how these aspects can be linked to cognitive meachanisms such as blending. However, this is not to imply that the visual content only is important in this chapter. On the contrary, there are several parallels between the ads analysed here and those in section 4.5, and as demonstrated there, the images in those ads are vital in drawing attention to the non-metaphorical sense of the polysemous word.

7.2 Text and image

One of the most famous accounts of the relation between text and image in advertising is that given by the French semiologist Roland Barthes (1977/1964), who has already been mentioned in the discussion of structuralist approaches to advertising language (see section 3.2). Although his account is not compatible with a cognitive view of language in many respects, for example in his insistence on a distinction between denoted and connoted meanings, there are still some aspects that are useful in this type of discussion, at least as points of departure. According to Barthes, the text has two basic functions in relation to the image, namely those of anchoring and relaying. In its anchoring function, the text constrains or guides the identification and interpretation of the infinitely polysemous images. It is thus understood as having a limiting effect, in that it prevents the reader from reaching the wrong conclusions as a result of the open-ended meaning potential of the image. For example, he discusses an ad for d'Arcy preserves, in which a few fruits are shown scattered around a ladder. This image is accompanied by a caption that reads *as if from our own garden*, which is said to guide our interpretation away from a negative one, e.g. something to do with a poor harvest, to a more favourable one that contradicts the artificiality often associated with tinned foods. In Barthes's own words (1977/1964:40), this limiting or repressive nature of the text is summarised as follows:

> The text is indeed the creator's (and hence society's) right of inspection over the image; anchorage is a control, bearing a responsibility – in the face of the projective power of pictures – for the use of the message.

This anchoring function is regarded as more common, especially in advertising, compared to the relaying function, which involves a complementary relationship between the text and the image. Here, the text contributes information of its own, instead of merely selecting or highlighting the relevant information present in the image, and the two components thus join forces in expressing the message. It is claimed that relay seldom occurs in relation to static, isolated images, but is usually found in cartoons, comic strips and films (1977/1964:41).

In Forceville's opinion (1996:72-73), this view is too simple when applied to modern advertising, where the pictorial content has an increasing significance, and where it is indeed possible for the image to anchor the text instead of the other way around. This is said to happen in cases where the language is ambiguous and the image is needed to "solve the riddle" (1996:73). The fact that there is often an important interplay between text and image leads Forceville to the conclusion that they complement each other, which means that relay is just as important as anchoring when it comes to advertising[58]. Even so, he still finds the notion of text anchoring images useful, at least as far as his own pictorial metaphors are concerned, where some form of verbal content often is said to be required (1996:74). However, he also points out that pictorial elements are not necessarily dependent on textual elements for their interpretation, since it is possible for them to be anchored by other pictorial elements. This means that any contextual elements may serve an anchoring function (1996:77). As an example of the complex interplay between text and image, let us again return to the Galaxy ad in 4.5.3. Here, we do not find a simple case of the text anchoring the image, because the phrase *get wrapped up* is ambiguous in itself. Also, the visual content does not completely rely on the caption for its interpretation, since it is perfectly possible to understand that the woman is engrossed in eating the chocolate, to the point where she does not even notice the naked man. Instead, the text and the image collaborate in reactivating the underlying metaphor and building the message.

Forceville obviously acknowledges the importance of visual communication, since his book explicitly deals with pictorial metaphors. The use of the term metaphor in relation to pictures may, at least traditionally, be seen as problematic, but as already mentioned in 3.4, he argues that if metaphor is a conceptual phenomenon, then it can be manifested in pictures as well as in language (1996:1). What makes it difficult to analyse pictures, he says, is that no equivalent to a grammar is available for visual communication, even though

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[58] Forceville (1996:72) claims that Barthes's view has to be modified to allow for a combination of anchoring and relay, but there is in fact no need for this, because Barthes himself does admit that these two functions can co-exist (1977/1964:41).

Pateman (1980), who he cites, suggests that there may be a visual syntax of sorts, but one that is less sophisticated compared to the syntax of language. Nevertheless, his conclusion is that "modern, visually-oriented society has considerably increased our ability to 'read' pictures" (1996:73), and it is clear that things have changed somewhat since Barthes in 1964 said that "it is not very accurate to talk of a civilization of the image – we are still, and more than ever, a civilization of writing" (1977/1964:38).

In the same year as Forceville's book was published, Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) more specifically addressed the notion of a visual grammar in a society where the importance of visual communication steadily increases. Their account is ultimately based on Barthes, but they distance themselves from the idea that images always are dependent on text for their interpretation, since their aim is to take visual communication more seriously than has previously been done. They agree with Forceville that anchorage is no longer the main function of the text in relation to the image, and argue that although the images and the text are connected, they both have independent structure (1996:16-17). However, they are careful to point out that visual communication and linguistic communication are not supposed to be understood as equivalent or identical. Rather, both visual structures and linguistic structures express meaning but in different ways. They write:

> The meanings which can be realized in language and in visual communication overlap in part, that is, some things can be expressed both visually and verbally; and in part they diverge – some things can be 'said' only visually, others only verbally. But even when something can be 'said' both visually and verbally *the way in which* it will be said is different. (1996:2, their emphasis)

As an example of how some meanings are expressed visually and others verbally, they mention advertising, where potentially controversial content is more likely to be expressed in the picture (1996:18), which is apparent in the Tampax ad in section 7.4.1. Behind this practice is of course the traditional assumption that meaning can be formulated in terms of truth conditions, and that truth is associated with language and not with pictures. As a result, advertisers cannot be held responsible for content that is signalled visually. This is echoed in the statement made by Sperber & Wilson (1986:175) that all non-verbal communication is weak communication, and thus the responsibility of the addressee rather than the communicator. There is a clear implication here that images do not have the same status as language, and the idea that visual content somehow is inferior to textual content is also commented on by Schroeder

(2002), who feels that the visual aspect of marketing has been neglected and that it ought to be studied in relation to art historical issues (2002:16). This connection to art is also acknowledged by Forceville (1996:ch 3).

While meaning communicated by images is often less precise compared to meaning communicated by language, the opposite may also hold. For example, the very reason why we use graphic figures to accompany texts is that they manage to capture things that are difficult to explain by using language, and this does not necessarily involve depiction. Compare for example the different thickness of lines as a means of expressing the level of entrenchment and elaborative distance in figure 4:3, which lucidly expresses a very abstract notion. In addition, even in cases where an image is less precise than the text, this is not automatically a negative aspect, because it also means that it is richer than the text and carries more information. In turn, this can be compared to metaphor, which often manages to say more than literal language, simply because it is richer. The crucial point I am making here is that images provide a *different* way of expressing meaning, but not necessarily an *inferior* one. Again, the reason why I use language as a starting point is simply the fact that this is a linguistic study, and is not meant to imply that the text is always more *important* than the image.

Despite the fact that visual communication is understood to be different from linguistic communication, Kress & van Leeuwen (1996) are heavily influenced by Halliday's (1978) view of language as a social semiotic, which they see as a means of moving away from the structuralist way of thinking (1996:viii). Their use of linguistic theories is justified by the following claim (1996:17):

> We take the view that language and visual communication both realize the same more fundamental and far-reaching systems of meaning that constitute our cultures, but that each does so by means of its own specific forms, and independently.

This basic idea about visual and linguistic communication forms a bridge between the semiological view put forward by Barthes and the analyses made here, where features of metaphor and elements of conceptual blends are assumed to be reflected either in the text or the image. In fact, they understand an advertisement as a semiotic unit, where

> …the verbal text becomes just one of the elements integrated by the codes of information value, salience and framing, and reading is not necessarily linear, wholly or in part, but may go from centre to margin, or in circular fashion, or vertically etc. (1996:185)

Needless to say, the double grounding analyses of cartoons made by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press) are also compatible with this idea, since they too are based on the theory of conceptual blending, where visual and verbal components are considered equally important and are understood to reflect the same cognitive mechanisms. Also, from a general cognitive linguistic point of view, it is perfectly possible for meaning to be expressed through images as well as language. If meaning is conceptual in nature and created in the link beteen a semantic pole and a phonological pole, it would also make sense to assume that the latter may be replaced by a visual pole, as it were.

7.3 Novel conceptualisations in text and image centered around a single word

As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the ads that are analysed in this section are centred around a polysemous and therefore ambiguous word, whose senses are metaphorically related. Unlike the ads in chapter 4, the underlying metaphor is used as a basis for a novel conceptualisation, instead of only being exploited in order to comment on or build an argument in favour of the product. This difference can be illustrated by comparing the FT Weekend ad in section 4.5.2 to the Canesten Oasis ad in section 7.3.2. In the case of the former, the polysemous word *cover* reactivates the underlying metaphor and allows us to create a metaphorical blend in which REPORTING NEWS is understood in terms of WRAPPING OBJECTS, from which new information about the newspaper supplement emerges. Crucially, the novel mapping does not have the advertised product as its target space, but rather an activity that is closely associated with it, and we are thus not invited to understand the paper itself in terms of something else. In the case of the latter, the polysemous word *burning* opens up the metaphor PAIN IS FIRE, which forms the conventional ground that enables the creation of the novel metaphor CANESTEN OASIS IS A FIRE EXTINGUISHER. Again, it must be emphasised that the distinction between the ads discussed in the different chapters is not clear-cut, and there are cases that are difficult to categorise. A case in point is the Minolta ad in section 7.3.3, which bears some similarity to the FT Weekend ad, since the elaborated target space involves an activity that is associated with the product, i.e. TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS. However, there is also a clear metaphorical connection between the camera and the basketball, which to a larger extent may be seen as a reconceptualisation in terms of something else, compared to the metonymic connection between a newspaper company and paper in the FT Weekend ad. The Minolta ad also differs from the

other two ads discussed in this section, in that it is largely based on an underlying conventional metaphor that is not associated with the two senses of the polysemous word *possession*.

7.3.1 Tampax

Let us first turn to an advertisement for Tampax tampons (plate 7:1), where the main image shares some similarities with a cartoon drawing. It shows a tampon with certain human qualities, such as a face and two arms, and is accompanied by a caption which reads *A real smoothy*. Being a smoothy involves a set of personal characteristics, such as being polite, confident, relaxed, able to persuade, but at the same time often insincere. The meaning of the word *smoothy* is therefore metaphorical, and reflects the generic-level metaphor ABSTRACT IS CONCRETE and more specifically HUMAN PROPERTIES ARE THE PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS (cf. Kövecses 2002:126), according to which personal characteristics are understood in terms of physical qualities of objects. The choice of *smooth* as a vehicle, i.e. the reason why we understand the personal characteristics listed above in terms of physical smoothness rather than some other physical quality, may be motivated by the metaphors PROGRESS IS FORWARD MOTION and DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS (TO MOTION), which form part of a whole system of metaphorical mappings that is referred to as the Event Structure metaphor (Lakoff 1993:220-222, Kövecses 2002:134-138). As we saw in chapter 2, LIFE IS A JOURNEY is a more specific instance of this general metaphor, and it then follows that an easy life without any difficulties is understood in terms of a journey without any obstacles, as in the expressions *he glides through life* and *she had a smooth journey through life*. Now, from our experience of physical objects, we also know that smooth objects do not easily get stuck, and that the smoother an object is, the easier it is to get it through a narrow passage or to move it along a surface. Accordingly, people described as being smooth manage to persuade others and get what they want, or in terms of the metaphor GOALS ARE DESTINATIONS, they manage *to get their own way* and *to get where they want to go*. However, people who are smooth do not necessarily succeed at everything they do in life, not even in the more limited area of their love life, so the event in question has to be limited to a sexual conquest or an event that involves persuasion of some other kind.

The non-metaphorical sense of *smooth*, or what it would entail to physically be a *smoothy*, is alluded to in the body copy, which is located below the drawing of the animated tampon and consists of the following piece of text:

With a sleek silky outfit and a tapered tip its suave touch never fails to impress. Girls, you've been warned: it's a real smoothy.

There is clearly a certain degree of ambiguity here, since "a sleek, silky outfit" could either refer to the outer layer of the tampon or to the clothes worn by a well-dressed man, but it is the non-metaphorical sense of *smooth* that is relevant in both cases.


Plate 7:1. Tampax. *Elle*, August 1999.

In this ad, we are thus dealing with a situation that on the one hand involves a tampon that is physically smooth and, on the other hand, a man who is smooth in the sense that he possesses certain personal qualities. In the cartoon-like drawing, the tampon is portrayed as a man, or at least as a human being, which

would lead us to suspect that we are dealing with a metaphorical blend, where one of the inputs has to do with the tampon and the other input with the man. Deciding which input serves as source and which input serves as target appears to be somewhat problematic, though, because in the metaphorical mapping behind the two different senses of *smooth*, the target is HUMAN PROPERTIES, which would make the space representing the qualities and actions of a seductive man an elaboration of the target space rather than the source space. However, the point of the blend is not to say something about a man, but about a tampon, and this would mean that the space containing information about the physically smooth tampon in fact forms the elaborated target. The problem that then arises is that this space is connected to the source of the conventional metaphor, i.e. PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS. In order for this to work, we would have to assume that the source and target of the metaphor have been reversed, which may happen in metonymic mappings under certain conditions, but typically not in metaphorical ones (see section 2.4). Coulson (1996: 75ff) observes that it is possible for the source to be the topic of a metaphorical blend, which could have been seen as an easy solution to this problem, but in her discussion of the Menendez Brothers Virus, the virus in the target is understood in terms of the crime in the source, even though the source is the topic of the blend. What I would like to suggest instead is that the metaphor HUMAN PROPERTIES ARE THE PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS in fact has been reversed, and that this is motivated by two factors. First, there is another metaphor involved that has to do with the personification of the tampon, namely INANIMATE IS ANIMATE, which may also be formulated as OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE or, in the context of advertising, ITEMS TO SELL ARE PEOPLE (Kövecses 2002:59). Since the target is INANIMATE/ OBJECTS, it suddenly makes sense for the tampon space to be an elaboration of that target, and it is also logical that the source of the previous metaphor, PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS, becomes associated with it. Similarly, since the source of the additional metaphor is PEOPLE, there is a natural motivation for the target of the original metaphor, HUMAN PROPERTIES, to be associated with the source instead (see figure 7:1 below). Second, since metonymic mappings may be reversed for rhetorical purposes, what is there to say that the same cannot happen with metaphorical mappings, provided that there is a clear motivation for doing so? In fact, the mapping from humans to non-humans in the personification metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE operates in the opposite direction in metaphors such as PEOPLE ARE MACHINES, PEOPLE ARE PLANTS, and PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS. Metaphors like these form part of another system, which relates to

what Lakoff & Turner (1989) call The Great Chain of Being[59]. This chain basically consists of a hierarchy, where humans are found at the top, followed by animals, plants, complex objects and natural physical things. With the help of the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, the different schemas that characterise the concepts at the different levels in the hierarchy are linked through their shared generic-level structure, and according to Lakoff & Turner (1989:172), this

> allows us to comprehend general human character traits in terms of well-understood nonhuman attributes; and, conversely, it allows us to comprehend less well-understood aspects of the nature of animals and objects in terms of better-understood human characteristics.

It is thus possible to understand one level in terms of another, and the process does not necessarily have to move from a higher level to a lower level, but can equally well occur in the opposite direction (Kövecses 2002:126-127). Although this is not exactly the same as claiming that a mapping between specific domains may be reversed, it shows that, in principle, mappings may occur in more than one general direction. If this is possible in relation to The Great Chain of Being, then it must be at least hypothetically possible in relation to other mappings. As regards the reversal of HUMAN PROPERTIES ARE THE PROPERTIES OF INANIMATE THINGS, this is actually supported by Lakoff & Turner (1989) in the above quote.

Following this slight digression, let us now return to the metaphorical blend in the Tampax ad (see figure 7:1). The elaborated target space includes information about the tampon and its physical characteristics, including its functional relation to women, which is of a non-sexual nature. The corresponding elements and relations in the elaborated source are the man and his personal qualities, including his relation to women, which is sexual. Purely physically speaking, it is only one specific part of the man whose function in relation to women runs parallel to that of the tampon, namely his sexual organ. In the elaborated source space, there is only a distant metonymic connection to this aspect, and it does not fill a slot in the organising frame or schema. Both the man from the elaborated source and the tampon from the elaborated target are projected onto the blend, where they merge into the same role. Since the physical relation between the tampon and a woman's body is the same as that between the male sexual organ and a woman's body, it follows that the metonymic relationship in the elaborated source is tightened in the blend, where the man becomes identical to the tampon, and thus to his sexual organ. In fact, the animated tampon in the cartoon drawing has certain phallic qualities.

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[59] For a detailed account of The Great Chain of Being, see Lakoff & Turner (1989:ch 4).

ABSTRACT — CONCRETE

HUMAN — PROPERTIES
PROPERTIES — OF PHYSICAL
OBJECTS

PEOPLE — OBJECTS

SEDUCTIVE MAN   TAMPON

man — tampon
smooth – impressive,   smooth – physically
persuasive, insincere.
physical relation — physical relation
(sexual)   (non-sexual)
women   women
outcome:
success
   (male sexual organ)

                                                BLEND

man/tampon/male sexual organ
smooth
physical relation (non-sexual)
women
outcome: success

Figure 7:1. Tampax blend.

Moreover, both senses of *smooth* are active in the blend, but as far as the metaphorical sense is concerned, only some aspects are projected onto the blend, namely the abilities of a smooth man to impress and persuade, but not necessarily the fact that he may be insincere[60]. These attributes are pictorially, and as a result metonymically, represented by the rose in the personified tampon's mouth and by the big smile on his/its face. They are also reflected in the body copy, where the "sleek silky outfit" may be one aspect that makes the man impressive, together with his "suave touch" and the fact that he "never fails to impress". As mentioned earlier, the physical qualities of the tampon are also reflected by the reference to "a sleek silky outfit", and by the description of "a

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[60] Despite the apparent negativity, this element may serve a rhetorical function in the ad, since it is connected to the irresistability of the tampon - "Girls, you've been warned". We know it may be insincere, but the appeal is so great that we give in to it anyway, and in addition, this may be seen as a comment on advertising as well, whose function is to persuade and impress.

tapered tip", which also applies to the male sexual organ in the elaborated source space and to the personified tampon in the blend. The physical relationship that is relevant in the blend is a non-sexual one, and it is hence projected from the elaborated target, but the expected success of the smooth man in persuading women is projected from the elaborated source. New understanding and new information is thus created in the blend, in that women find the physical smoothness of the tampon attractive and are persuaded to buy it. This end result is not present in the elaborated target, but is projected from the elaborated source. In addition, a humorous effect is created in the blend by the clash between a man and a tampon, and between the non-sexual function of the tampon and the seductive, Casanova-like qualities of the personified tampon. Since the metaphorical meaning of the word *smoothy* is deeply entrenched, a significant punning effect is also created in relation to the unexpected literal meaning.

The emergent structure in the blended space is elaborated by visual means in this ad, which illustrates the importance of pictorial elements in addition to textual information. In particular, the visual components add to the humour by emphasising the clashes that occur in the blended space. In contrast to the analyses made by Forceville (1996), it cannot be claimed here that one term, i.e. one domain, of the metaphor is reflected in the text and the other in the image, or even that both terms are reflected separately in the image. Even if we take Forceville's use of "term" to roughly correspond to what I consider to be a mental space, it is still not possible to make discrete separations. The two inputs TAMPON and SEDUCTIVE MAN are reflected both in the text and the image, and it is easier to isolate specific elements as pictorially or verbally reflected than entire spaces. Unlike the ads in 4.5, the image on the whole does not draw attention to the literal sense of *smooth*, but rather emphasises the metaphorical sense.

Finally, let me briefly mention two other ads that are also centred around the ambiguity of *smoothy/smooth* in order to further illustrate the difference in the creative use of the conventional metaphor between this ad and those in chapter 4. The first one is an ad for Bourjois lipsticks, which shows a picture of a lipstick whose top has been removed and is placed right next to it. A young woman, who is represented as a drawing rather than a picture, is sitting on the lipstick top with her head turned towards the lipstick, and the caption directly above her reads *I always fall for the smooth ones.* As in the Tampax ad, the lipstick is personified and understood in terms of a seductive man, and the underlying metaphors have been exploited in a similar way. However, there is less elaboration involved

here, because the lipstick is not visually portrayed as a man, and as a result, the degree of humour is presumably lower. The second ad is for Lynx razors, and here there is no personification involved, which makes it more similar to the ads in chapter 4. It consists of a large picture of a young man, who is wearing a shirt and a tie. He is holding his hand behind his neck as if to provide support and has a look of surprise and astonishment on his face, which has a number of red kiss marks around the mouth and on the cheek, close to the ear. There is no caption, but the first line of the copy reads *Man, are you smooth*. In this ad, there is no reversal of the underlying metaphor, because there is no motivation for it. The target domain of the metaphor is HUMAN PROPERTIES, and the elaborated target space has to do with the personal qualities of a man. The advertised product, the Lynx razor, is in no way personified or conceptualised in terms of something else. The creative use of the metaphor is to build an argument in favour of the razor, by claiming that the smooth qualities that attract women correspond to the physical smoothness of a man's facial skin. Since that smoothness is a result of using Lynx razors, they are also framed in the blend as the reason behind the success with women. As in the Garnier Fructis ad (see 4.6.3), for example, the main topic is not the product itself, but how to attract women, a process in which the product is given a vital role through the integration of elements in the blend.

7.3.2 Canesten Oasis

This advertisement is for a cystitis remedy from Canesten called Oasis (see plate 7:2). The picture takes up most of the ad and shows a fire extinguisher, which carries the label for Canesten Oasis and the logo of the pharmaceutical company Bayer that owns the brand. Below the label, and in larger letters than in the rest of the text, it says *FIRE EXTINGUISHER*, and then in slightly smaller letters, *FOR RELIEF FROM CYSTITIS*. The pictorially illustrated instructions for use further down on the right hand side of the container apply to the medicine, and so does the information provided to the left of them. Finally, at the bottom of the ad, there is a caption that reads *Canesten. For burning cystitis*. This last line, and in particular the word *burning*, is of course metaphorical, and reflects the metaphor PAIN IS HEAT (FROM FIRE), which is one of many metaphors in which STATES or EMOTIONS are understood in terms of HEAT or FIRE (see e.g. Kövecses 2002:112-116). The most well-documented among these is probably ANGER IS HEAT, which was mentioned in 2.4 as an example of a metaphor with a metonymic basis. This metonymic basis is grounded in the folk theory of anger, whereby anger is understood to result in certain physiological effects, such as increased body heat, redness in the face, and agitation. In turn, it gives rise to the

general metonymy THE PHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR AN EMOTION, which is a more specific instance of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. As far as the ANGER IS HEAT metaphor is concerned, the source domain corresponds to the vehicle of the underlying, and even more specific, metonymy BODY HEAT FOR ANGER (Lakoff 1987:381-383, Kövecses 2002:156).

Canesten. For burning cystitis

Plate 7:2. Canesten Oasis. *Cosmopolitan* (August, 2000).

In the case of the metaphor in this ad, PAIN IS HEAT (FROM FIRE), there seems to be a similar metonymic basis, but it has to do with localised heat rather than general body heat, since the experienced physiological effect is limited to the painful area. This is connected to the metaphor PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL STATES ARE ENTITIES WITHIN A PERSON, which for example is reflected in the

sentence *He has a pain in his shoulder* (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:50). This also applies to illnesses, which can be understood as entities occupying our bodies, but depending on the type of illness, the effect may be more or less localised. Also, in addition to being conceptualised as fire, pain can be understood in terms of the effect caused by a sharp instrument, as in *a stabbing pain* or *a piercing pain*, which is even more localised to a specific part of the body.

Returning now to the use of this conventional metaphor as a creative basis in this ad, we have one input that corresponds to the source domain HEAT and one that corresponds to the target domain PAIN (see figure 7:2).


Figure 7:2. Canesten Oasis blend.

The target space is then elaborated as a specific instance of pain, namely that caused by cystitis, and this space also includes the exact location of the pain to the bladder and urinary tract, and the fact that it can be treated with medicine. The source domain is also elaborated as a concrete situation in which something is on fire and where the fire produces heat, but there is no specification as to what is on fire. What we do know is that the fire is small enough to be put out with the help of a fire extinguisher. However, there is also a second elaborated source space that involves the situation in a desert, where the sun produces heat and makes everything hot and dry. Here, the sun cannot be made to disappear, but we can get relief by entering an oasis, which provides shade and a cool place

to rest. In the blend, the unwanted effect is a burning sensation, which is projected from both the elaborated source spaces, and includes the aspect of dryness from the DESERT space. This effect is caused by cystitis that is projected from the elaborated target, together with the affected entity, i.e. a person, and more specifically his or her bladder and urinary tract. The relief is provided by a fire extinguisher, which is projected from the SMALL FIRE space onto the blend, where it merges with the medicine from the CYSTITIS space and the oasis from the DESERT space. This merger is clearly illustrated by the picture in the ad, in which these three elements form part of the same entity, and where the fire extinguisher is realised visually, the medicine textually in the instructions, and the oasis in the label. We thus end up with a situation in which a person suffers from burning cystitis and puts it out using the Canesten Oasis fire extinguisher. The integration of the oasis element from the DESERT space adds an additional quality to the cystitis remedy, namely the cooling and refreshing aspect that stands in contrast to the dryness of the desert, i.e the irritation and discomfort of cystitis. This means that a number of novel metaphorical mappings are created within this blending network. Most importantly, the advertised product is conceptualised in terms of a fire extinguisher, resulting in a metaphor that may be formulated as CANESTEN OASIS IS A FIRE EXTINGUISHER. In turn, this presupposes the metaphorical mapping CYSTITIS IS A FIRE, which has a metonymic connection of the CAUSE/EFFECT type to the conventional metaphor PAIN IS HEAT. Moreover, the brand name itself is metaphorical, in that CANESTEN IS AN OASIS that gives relief from the metaphorical notion that CYSTITIS IS A DESERT.

We have already touched briefly on the relationship between text and image, but it is worthwhile to have a closer look at some of the details. On the whole, it is clear that there are some elements in this blending network that are realised linguistically and others that are realised visually, and some that are realised in both ways. For example, the fire extinguisher is mainly present in the image, but is also reflected in the text on the actual container. This is similar to the oasis that is present in the brand name, but also metonymically realised in the visual component of the label, which depicts blue waves, and water drops or air bubbles in the water. Interestingly enough, the fire extinguisher from the FIRE space is also reflected in the design and layout of the text and images on the red container, whereas the actual content of that text and those images reflects the medicine in the CYSTITIS space. The text-image relation in the Volkswagen Passat ad discussed by Ungerer (2000:330-332, see section 3.4) is reminiscent of this, in that the source space, A PERFUME/BEAUTY PRODUCT (AD), is reflected in

the layout and typeface of the ad, as well as in the structure of the copy, whereas the linguistic content reflects the target domain, i.e. A CAR (AD). However, while similarities are found in the relation between text and image and in the fact that the product is conceptualised in terms of something else, the Volkswagen Passat ad, as already noted, is not based on an underlying conventional metaphor.

Finally, there is of course a humorous aspect to this ad as well, which occurs as a result of the incongruity between medicine and a fire extinguisher, and the absurd situation in which a fire extinguisher is understood to be able to relieve the discomfort caused by cystitis. Again, the humour would increase if the scenario in the blended space were to be further elaborated in a way that visually illustrates a person actually attempting to use a fire extinguisher for that purpose. However, the fire extinguisher itself creates a humorous effect, since it helps us identify the underlying source domain, by forming a metonymic link to it, and it thus has a similar function compared to that of the images in the ads in 4.5. As in the ad in the previous section, the metaphorical sense of *burning* is fairly entrenched, and drawing attention to its literal sense creates a similar punning effect.

7.3.3 Minolta

The next advertisement is for Minolta's Dynax 404si camera, which features a monochrome picture of two boys playing basketball in a street outside what appears to be apartment buildings (see plate 7:3). Just below this picture, there is a caption that reads *Possession. Without it you'll never get the shot*. At the bottom of the ad, there is a small picture of the camera and the following piece of copy:

> You're carrying the Dynax 404si. The smallest 35mm AF SLR in the world. You spot a moment. Select the programme mode. Raise the Dynax 404si to your eye. The Autofocus and unique Honeycomb Pattern Metering Exposure System locks on. You grab the shot. Job done. In the can. The dynax 404si. If you haven't got it, you'll never get it.

The word *possession* is ambiguous here, in that it may refer to being in control of the basketball or to having ownership of the camera, and this, together with the two pictures, is what leads us to the elaborated input spaces. Unlike the previous two ads, however, the underlying conventional metaphor, LIFE IS A SPORTING GAME (cf. Kövecses 2002:31), is not involved in the relationship between the two senses of *possession*, but is reflected in conventional metaphorical expressions, such as *to get a shot* in the caption and *in the can* in the body copy. While at first sight the metaphor POSSESSING IS HOLDING might

be understood to be involved in the two senses of *possession*, it seems more likely that possession in the sense of controlling the ball in a sports game has been extended from 'holding' as a prototypical aspect of POSSESSION. This is apparent in the behaviour and attitude of young children, who conceive of things they hold as being theirs. On this view, we are not dealing with separate domains, and the two senses are the result of a WHOLE-PART metonymy rather than a metaphor.

Plate 7:3. Minolta. *Esquire* (July, 2000).

More limited areas of life may be understood in terms of specific sports, which then gives rise to lower-level metaphors. For example, Gibbs (1994:140-141) mentions that the opposition between the two American political parties often is conceptualised in terms of sports events like a baseball game or a game of American football, where the two parties are seen as teams, or in terms of a boxing match, where the parties are represented by their candidates. In addition, sexual relationships are sometimes understood in terms of sports, as in *playing mattress hockey* (Gibbs 1994:302) or when we talk about *scoring* or *getting to third base*. In the ad analysed here, the conventional metaphor LIFE IS A SPORTING GAME forms the basis for a creative elaboration involving even more specific instances of the two domains, namely PLAYING BASKETBALL and TAKING PHOTOGRAPHS (see figure 7:3). Importantly, the BASKETBALL space only includes the limited scenario in which a person is in control of the ball, seizes the opportunity, aims, shoots, scores, and wins.


Figure 7:3. Minolta blend.

The presence of an opponent is implied by the notion of holding or being in control of the ball, and is also reflected in the picture, but we are not dealing

with an entire game played on a court between two teams with five members each, in which goals count as points, and where there are rules to be followed, a referee present to monitor this, and so on. Similarly, the PHOTOGRAPH space is also limited to the moment a picture is taken, and does not include the process of developing or printing photos, for example. The basketball in the elaborated source space corresponds to the camera in the elaborated target, but only in their mutual role as instruments in the acts of making a shot and taking a photograph, respectively. While the spaces share roughly the same topology or schema, in which there is an instrument, but also a source, a goal, and a trajectory between the two, the difference is that the basketball actually moves along that trajectory into the net, whereas the camera stays in one place. In fact, if an entity is understood to move, it is rather the goal, i.e. the picture, that is transferred into the camera by pressing a button. This means that it is not specifically the camera that is conceptualised as a basketball, but the activity involving the camera is understood in terms of an activity involving the basketball. In both inputs, there is a person whose relation to the instrument is either that of holding or controlling the ball in the BASKETBALL space, or owning the camera in the PHOTOGRAPH space. Furthermore, the act of making a shot corresponds to pressing a button on the camers, and the aim of scoring a goal corresponds to the aim of capturing the image.

Although the BASKETBALL space is introduced slightly ahead of the PHOTOGRAPH space as a result of the salience of the larger picture and its placement at the top of the ad, we are not dealing with a complete shift from one frame to the other as soon as the second space is introduced. Rather, both spaces are active at the same time, which is clearly illustrated in the body copy. This can be seen in contrast to typical cases of frame-shifting, for example in the following joke, discussed by Coulson (2001:49):

> (1) By the time Mary had her fourteenth child, she ran out of names to call her husband.

Here, the word *husband* triggers the sudden change from a frame that involves naming children, to another frame that deals with the negative aspects of carrying and giving birth to children and the husband's role in this process. Based on this new framing, *names* is reinterpreted as 'insults' and the initial interpretation is abandoned altogether (Coulson 2001:49). In the Minolta ad, however, there is a metaphorical relation between the BASKETBALL space and the PHOTOGRAPH space, which also indicates their simultaneous presence. In the blended space, the baseball and the camera are merged into one entity, referred

to by *it* in *without it you'll never get the shot*, and the first *it* in *If you haven't got it, you'll never get it.* The second *it* refers both to the shot at the basket and the snapping of the picture, which means that the two acts are also fused. However, the procedure for doing this is projected from the target, since there is no suggestion that the camera should be thrown anywhere, despite its association with the basketball. What is projected from the elaborated source, though, is the element of a competition and the implication that you win when you score, or get the ball *in the can*. This has no equivalent in the elaborated target and leads to emergent structure in the blend, where the Minolta camera is understood as enabling you to get better pictures, or even the best pictures, compared to people who choose other cameras. Despite the fact that the competition element is brought in from the basketball space, the actual way in which you come into possession of the camera is projected from the target. We are supposed to buy the camera, not take it from someone else as you would do with the ball in a basketball game.

Apart from the information or argument that is created as a result of this blend, there is also a surprise effect in the slightly later introduction of the photograph space, although the two spaces then continue to exist alongside each other. This can be compared to what happens in a pun, where one sense may be activated ahead of the other, but where both remain and where there are elements both of incongruity and of resolution. In this ad, the punning effect occurs in connection with the word *possess* and its two related senses. The humorous effect may of course increase if elements other than the ones assumed above are introduced to the blend. For example, if the procedure from the basketball space were to be projected onto the blend, then the camera would end up being framed as something that gets thrown into a basket. This would imply that the camera is rubbish and would clash strongly with what is expected from an advertising message.

Returning to the importance of the two images in signalling the input spaces, and especially the larger picture in signalling the elaborated source, it should be pointed out that there is a clear difference here compared to Forceville's pictorial metaphors in which both terms of the metaphor are reflected in the image (1996:126ff). Apart from the fact that there are two separate pictures here, the metaphorical blend created in this ad is also dependent on the textual content in the body copy, which in turn is dependent on the visual content. This combination of the two media emphasises the point made in section 7.2 that text and image express meaning in different ways, but one is not inferior or secondary to the other. Another aspect involved in this ad is that of seizing the

moment, which is relevant in both inputs. If you fail to do this, you miss the chance to score in the BASKETBALL space, and the opportunity to get the perfect picture in the photograph space. In fact, if you manage to seize the moment it automatically follows that you get the perfect picture, which is not necessarily parallelled in the basket ball space, where you can spot the opportunity to score, but still miss. This of course has to do with the difference as regards the process, which was discussed above. As far as the main picture is concerned, it may also be understood as the actual shot or picture that you manage to get if you possess the camera, which would mean that the picture is exactly what *the shot* in the caption refers to. This is a dynamic picture, and the fast movement of the two boys running down the street and the ball bouncing again reinforces the importance of capturing the moment. It requires not only the possession of the Minolta camera, but also that you are holding it in your hand, just like seizing the opportunity to shoot for a goal in basketball requires that the ball is in your control.

7.4 Novel conceptualisations in text and image
The ads discussed in this section involve a novel conceptualisation of the advertised product, but they are not centred around a polysemous word in the same way as the ads in 7.3. Instead, the underlying metaphor and its creative elaboration are reflected in the combination of text and image, and both the image and the text are metaphorical in isolation, i.e. they both reflect the source and the target. This sets them apart from the Minolta ad in 7.3.3, but makes them similar to the Tampax ad in 7.3.1 and the Canesten Oasis ad in 7.3.2. Even though there is a high degree of metaphoricity in the visual content, the ads are still different from Forceville's pictorial metaphors (1996:126ff), in that the metaphor is not only expressed in the picture, but also in the headline and body copy. More specifically, some elements are reflected visually, others verbally, and some both visually and verbally. The verbal manifestation is not essential for the understanding of the image, but it adds richness and structure to the metaphorical blend. As with the Tampax ad in 7.3.1, these ads involve personification, or at least novel conceptualisations based on the generic-level metaphor INANIMATE IS ANIMATE.

7.4.1 Jacob's
This is a double-page ad for Jacob's crackers, which features a large picture of four crackers with different toppings together with the caption *YOU CAN WEAR ANYTHING WHEN YOU'RE CRACKERS* (see plate 7:4). The crackers in the

picture are angled in a diamond shape and are arranged two-and-two, one above the other, so that one cracker forms the upper part and the other forms the lower part of the body of a woman-like figure. On one of the two upper crackers, egg halves or egg slices form the shape of a woman's breasts, and on the other, a diagonally sliced strawberry resembles the hourglass shape of a woman's upper body, with whipped cream or cream cheese representing a frilly neckline. The toppings on the two lower crackers are arranged to look like skirts, and consist of asparagus spears and what looks like salami on one cracker, and smoked salmon and chives on top of a slice of mango on the other. In the background, at a lower level, there are drawings of people in an audience, some of them taking notes and others taking photographs using cameras with large objective lenses. The headline, which is located to the right of the picture, reads *THE SUMMER COLLECTION FROM JACOB'S*, and is followed by a piece of body copy that says the following:

> Strawberry reds and fresh greens are all the rage this season. Perfect accessories include cream cheese, mango, eggs and salad dressing. And don't they look chic? Then again, when you're a supermodel, you can wear anything.


Plate 7:4. Jacob's. *Marie Claire* (July, 1996).

In this ad, the advertised product is clearly personified, which reflects the conventional metaphors INANIMATE IS ANIMATE and OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE (see figure 7:4). The inanimate objects in question are obviously CRACKERS, which forms an elaboration of the target space. It contains information about different types of foods that can be eaten together with the crackers or even be placed directly on the crackers as toppings, and these include strawberries, cream cheese, mango, eggs, and so on. Some of these foods, particularly strawberries, are strongly associated with summer. The crackers and the toppings are for sale and are both meant to be consumed, so the most important aspect is how tasty and delicious they are. In the novel conceptualisation, the crackers are not understood as people in general, but more specifically as supermodels showing the latest fashion on the catwalk in front of an audience. This means that the source domain PEOPLE is elaborated as SUPERMODELS, and includes the knowledge that both clothes and accessories are involved, that colours go in and out of fashion, and that the fashion houses present new collections at regular intervals according to the seasons. We also know that the clothes are for sale and that the most important criteria for prospective buyers is their appearance, style and associated status. What is more, the prospective buyers correspond to a very small portion of society, and the haute couture that is shown on the catwalk is not representative of the clothes worn by the general public. In addition, we also know that supermodels are extremely thin, and that thin people are thought to look good in anything they wear.

The topology of the SUPERMODEL space is projected onto the blend, which means that we have a similar catwalk scenario here, but instead of supermodels wearing clothes we find crackers with different toppings projected from the elaborated target. The schematic information concerning the relation between the clothes and the supermodel is also carried over from the elaborated source space, so that the crackers are understood as actually wearing the toppings. The "strawberry reds and fresh greens" mentioned in the body copy correspond both to the seasonal colours of the clothes in the elaborated source space, and to the colours of the seasonal foods in the elaborated target. The accessories are projected from the supermodel space, together with the idea of a summer collection and the notions of looking chic and being able to wear anything. In deconstructing the blend, the last two elements then imply that the crackers in the elaborated target taste great and that they can be combined with any toppings or trimmings. In addition, the fact that supermodels are slim may be carried over to the crackers, so that they too are understood to be slim. In this case, AN EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy would be involved, since the crackers are slim in

the sense that they are healthy and make the person who eats them slim. This might not necessarily be true, but since it is never overtly mentioned in the textual component of the ad, it is possible to deny that this interpretation was intended.


Figure 7:4. Jacob's blend.

Although the metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE is conventional, and in the context of advertising often occurs as ITEMS TO SELL ARE PEOPLE (Kövecses 2002:59), we might not expect this metaphor to be activated when the advertised product is something that we eat. In the present ad, this means that it would be possible to imply that we either eat or buy people, since the crackers are understood in terms of supermodels, and this would of course be unacceptable. However, since the typology or schema is projected from the elaborated source rather than the elaborated target, the focus is not on the supermodels/crackers, but rather on the clothes/foods, and this is also reflected in the fact that the

equivalents of heads are missing in the picture. In the catwalk scenario, the clothes are of interest and not the models themselves, and this is carried over into the blend, despite the fact that the crackers are the advertised items. This makes the clash weaker, since we are simply dealing with different types of consumption, i.e. buying and eating (food) and just buying (clothes). However, even if we were to understand the crackers as people that we are supposed to eat, this might create a humorous effect rather than a negative interpretation. In addition, the word *crackers* in the caption is ambiguous, since it may also be understood in the sense of 'crazy', and this has relevance in relation to the elaborated source input, where the outfits shown on the catwalk often are perceived as ridiculous and absurd. Again, the focus is on the unconventional and highly creative choice of clothes or toppings, and not on the supermodels and crackers themselves.

The conceptualisation of food in terms of fashion also occurs elsewhere, for example in a series of ads for Hellmann's salad dressings that were published in the summer of 1999, where different plates of food are accompanied by headlines that reflect the domain of FASHION. For example, a plate of seafood with a cup of Thousand Island dressing bears the headline *Cocktail Dress*[61], a salad bowl with flowers and reduced calorie Garlic & Herb dressing on top carries the headline *Summer Dress*[62], while a plate of green salad or spinach leaves sprinkled with reduced calorie Thousand Island dressing has the headline *Skimpy Dress*[63]. This is also the case in an ad for Sacla's Pastagusto pasta sauces with the headline *To find out what the best dressed pasta is wearing in Milan, put the two together*[64]. Here, *the two* refers to the two parts of the ad, which is divided in half and featured on separate pages, but also to the pasta and the sauce that are shown in the two pictures. In fact, in everyday language, we may also talk about *food fashion* or about *food trends*, and in serious restaurants, the presentation and aesthetic aspects of a dish are almost as important as the taste of the food.

7.4.2 Toshiba

The second ad in this section is for a projection TV from Toshiba (see plate 7:5). It carries the headline MAN'S BEST-EST FRIEND, and the picture below it shows a large TV placed in a soft and fluffy dog's basket, which appears to be larger than such baskets normally are. There is a remote control on the front edge

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[61] *She*, June 1999.
[62] *She*, August 1999.
[63] *Living etc.*, June 1999.
[64] *Marie Claire*, July 1996.

of the basket, and on the floor to the right, there is a chewing bone. At the very bottom of the ad, there is a slogan that says *It's that kind of love*, and the body copy above it reads

> The most obedient thing you'll ever own. Your Toshiba HDTV-compatible projection TV with the Power Focus™ HD 6-element lens system and new I.D.S.C. II Scan conversion technology. Oh yeah, and it'll fetch anything you want to see with the touch of a button.

Plate 7:5. Toshiba. *Maxim* (November, 2000).

This ad is ultimately based on the conventional metaphor INANIMATE IS ANIMATE, but involves a more specific and novel conceptualisation in which the TV is understood in terms of a DOG. The source input DOG is metonymically signalled by the visual presence of some of the accessories that are associated with a dog, i.e. the basket and the chewing bone, but also by the epithet *man's best friend*. Here though, the non-standard form *best-est* is used, which emphasises the superlative form and thus also the qualities of the friend. The information in this input then includes the dog and its status as a friend and companion, but also as a possession, since dogs typically are owned by the people they live with. We also know that dogs often sleep in baskets and like to chew on bones. Moreover, dogs interact with their owners and can learn to obey commands to perform certain tasks, such as fetching things. In the target input TV, the elements of course include the TV itself, which provides entertainment and possibly companionship, in the sense that the viewer gets one-way visual and audio contact with other people. The entertainment comes in the form of programmes broadcast by various TV networks, and the TV receives these as signals. Its typical place is in the living room, and it is possible to switch between different channels by pressing the buttons on a remote control.

In the blended space (see figure 7:5), the TV and the dog metaphorically merge into one and the same element, but is not so much an object anymore, but primarily a friend and companion, which are features projected from the elaborated source space DOG. The fact that it is owned by a person is projected from both inputs, and its placement simultaneously corresponds both to that in the DOG and the TV space, in that it is placed in a basket against a wall in what seems to be a living room. We also learn from the body copy that it is obedient and will fetch things, which are elements projected from the source. However, the actual things it fetches are TV programmes, which are projected from the target, together with the form of command used, i.e. the touch of a button. While there are cross-space correspondences between the bone and the remote control in their roles as accessories, there is no correspondence in terms of function, since the bone is not used to control the dog in the same way as the remote is used to control the function of the TV. Indirectly though, the bone may be understood as an incentive for the dog to be obedient, in that it may be given as a reward. The notion of obedience in the blend gives rise to the inference that the TV is reliable in terms of its function, which is not an element that is included in the elaborated target space. There is also metonymic tightening in the blend, since the distant connection between the TV and the actual people to whom it

provides partial access is shortened, and the TV actually becomes a living thing and a friend that we can physically interact with.


Figure 7:5. Toshiba blend.

The reason why the TV is conceptualised as a dog instead of a person might be connected to the fact that it is also understood to be a possession that is obedient and carries out orders. If we were to base the novel conceptualisation on the more specific metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE instead of the generic-level INANIMATE IS ANIMATE, it would be difficult to include these notions. In a friendship between two people, one person is not owned by the other and does not follow the orders of the other person, but in a friendship between a person and a dog, this is the typical situation. In Forceville's (1996:149-153) MOTORBIKE IS GIRLFRIEND ad, the emphasis is not on ownership and obedience, but on the qualities of the motorbike and the relationship a person has to it, and it is therefore possible to base it on the metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE. A similar

situation holds in the Bausch & Lomb ad in 7.5.1, where the metaphor is also exploited for the purpose of humour.

Conceptualising products as friends or people that we have sympathy for is common in advertising, and Kövecses (2002:59) even suggests metaphors like A WASHING POWDER IS A FRIEND. However, something closely related to the advertised product may also be portrayed as a friend, rather than the product itself, and I will briefly mention two ads where this happens. The first example is an ad for Comfort fabric softener[65], where the pictorial content shows an animated female doll made of fabric, who has her eyes closed and is smelling her wrist, as if she were trying out a new perfume. The headline reads *FINE FRAGRANCES FOR YOUR CLOTHES FROM COMFORT.* Here, the metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE is elaborated more specifically as CLOTHES ARE PEOPLE, which leads to the entailment that A FABRIC SOFTENER IS A PERFUME. In addition, if our clothes are understood not only as people but as friends, it follows that we are expected to be nice to them and buy them presents, such as a bottle of perfume/fabric softener. Similarly, in an ad for Persil biological tablets[66] with something called "crease release", the headline says *Give your iron an easy life.* In the picture below this, two irons with arms, legs and faces are shown sitting on a blanket underneath a tree having a picnic. The copy explains how the tablets make the ironing easier, and ends with *Good news for you. Good news for your iron.* In this example, we find the elaboration IRONS ARE PEOPLE, with the implication that they are also our friends and that we should treat them well. At the same time, the metonymic link between irons and people doing the ironing is tightened here, which means that being nice to your iron also means being nice to yourself. In both these examples, the personfied object is not the product, and this strategy of course eliminates any associations that might otherwise be made to people as commodities that can be bought and sold.

7.5 Novel conceptualisations mainly in the text

In this final section, we will take a look at one ad in which the product is personified, but where the image plays a less significant role compared to the text. This text-image relationship makes it similar to, for example, the Lexus ad in 6.3.1, but the crucial difference is that we are dealing with a novel conceptualisation of the product here. In the Lexus ad, the car is not understood in terms of something else, but the underlying conventional metaphor is extended in order to make a claim about the product. In addition, the

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[65] *She*, May 2002.
[66] *She*, May 2002.

conventional metaphor in the Lexus ad is reflected in a conventional metaphorical expression, which is then extended, whereas here, the metaphor is reflected throughout the text in a more subtle way. As in the other ads in this chapter, the humour is primarily a result of incongruities between what is the expected behaviour or practice in the two input spaces.

7.5.1 Bausch & Lomb

This is an ad for Bausch & Lomb disposable contact lenses (see plate 7:6), in which the picture shows a man from the waist and up. He is not wearing any clothes and has his hand placed on his head, as if he is sliding his fingers through his hair. The caption, which is placed at shoulder level, reads *It's finishing with them I always find difficult.*

Plate 7:6. Bausch & Lomb ad. *Company*, August 1997.

Although not metaphorical, this sentence is still ambiguous and may refer either to girlfriends, which would perhaps be the expected interpretation in a neutral context, or to contact lenses, which are the advertised product in this ad. This leads us to the two input spaces, CONTACT LENSES and GIRLFRIENDS, which are more specific instances of the two domains in the OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE metaphor (see figure 7:6). The elements in the elaborated source space, GIRLFRIENDS, include the relationship between a man and his girlfriend, the fact that it is based on love and attraction, and the default assumption that the girlfriend possesses attractive features in the eyes of the man. Moreover, a girlfriend is someone you see on a regular basis and have formed an attachment to, and finishing the relationship would therefore be difficult. In the elaborated target space, LENSES, the relationship is based on necessity due to poor eye sight. The lenses are changed on a regular basis, and the attractive features they possess are limited to purely functional aspects. No attachment is formed to the lenses, so it is easy to throw them away.


Figure 7:6. Bausch & Lomb blend.

In the blended space, the relationship to the lenses is based on love, and the attractive qualities they possess are projected both from the GIRLFRIENDS space

and from the LENSES space. The lenses are disposable and have to be changed regularly, but as a result of their attractive features, chances are you will get attached to them and find it difficult to throw them away. Hence, the appeal in the slogan at the bottom of the ad: *Don't get too attached.* Apart from this argument created in favour of the lenses, this ad clearly has some humorous aspects as well. The encouragement not to get too attached is an accepted and even expected attitude in relation to the lenses, but not in relation to girlfriends, where the objective is for the relationship to last as long as possible. Also, the lack of emotion would imply that the girlfriends are seen as objects rather than people. The opposite holds if we consider the caption, *It's finishing with them I always find difficult*, which is unexpected in reference to the lenses, but fits the frame in the GIRLFRIENDS input, perhaps with exception of the implication that there is a steady stream of girlfriends in his life. In a different ad from the same campaign[67], the person in the ad is a woman, and the caption reads *I use them then I chuck them*, and the same slogan appears at the bottom of the ad. Here, both phrases clash with the expected scenario in what would be a BOYFRIEND input, since there is no element of attachment or love present. However, if we take the source input to be MEN in general, who women have more or less serious relationships with, then the statement in the caption conforms to that scenario. Still, this would involve a woman regarding men as objects, which is a reversal of the stereotypical situation in modern society, and creates yet another potentially humorous clash.

Finally, I would like to return again to Forceville's MOTORBIKE IS GIRLFRIEND ad (1996:149-153, see also section 3.4) for a brief comparison. The creative elaboration of the metaphor in his ad is almost identical in structure to the Bausch & Lomb ad analysed here, in that it is based on the metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE, and involves two specific instances of these domains. However, while Forceville understands one domain or term to be reflected in the image and the other in the text, I would consider both to be reflected mainly in the text. Only one element in my example, the man, is reflected in the image, and this entity is present in both the GIRLFRIENDS input and the LENSES input. In Forceville's example, the pictorially represented motorbike does indeed signal the source input, but additional information in this space is also triggered by the textual content of the ad. As already mentioned, it is in fact possible to understand this ad without the presence of the image, since the motorbike is mentioned throughout the copy. Another observation made by Forceville (1996:152) is that the body copy contains explicit references to the target rather

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[67] This ad is part of Kanellou's (2003) material.

than the source, i.e. the motorbike in his ad and the lenses in my ad, which he considers somewhat surprising given the fact that metaphor involves understanding the target in terms of the source. In my opinion, the explicit references are not all that is relevant here, and on closer inspection, we can see that the source input is indeed signalled throughout the text at the same time, for example in the mentioning of "life expectancy", "ageing", "costs" and "you're not the only one". Similarly, in the Bausch & Lomb ad, the explicit reference is to the lenses, but the mentioning of "love", "on a regular basis", "attractive features" and "difficult letting them go" still reflects the source space.

CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In this final chapter, I will give a summary of the analyses in chapters 4-7 and point to some of the general conclusions that can be made. I will begin by addressing each chapter in turn, focussing on the way in which the metaphor is signalled, how it is reactivated and elaborated, and what the creative effects are, which includes the emergence of a new understanding and humour. These points form the answers to the three research questions listed in chapter 1. In relation to this, the interplay between text and image will also be addressed, since it plays an important role. An overall comparison of the analyses in the different chapters will also be made, in order to establish whether there are any general similarities. In connection to this, I will briefly comment on the theoretical tools used here, and compare my analyses to those made by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press) in relation to cartoons and newspaper headlines. Finally, I will then offer some suggestions for further research.

The division of the material into chapters was made according to formal criteria, that is, the way in which the metaphoric content is reflected in the ad. This may either be in language alone, more specifically in the form of polysemous words, idiomatic expressions, metaphorical expressions, or more generally in the text and image combined. There is also a natural succession here starting from words, moving to phrases, and finally arriving at a higher text-image level. In terms of entrenchment, the polysemous words have entrenched senses without a salient schema, which also holds for the idiomatic expressions, while the metaphorical expressions are less entrenched and have a more salient schema. In addition, the metaphorical senses of the idiomatic expressions are usually more entrenched than the corresponding literal senses, and therefore also more salient. As regards the text-image metaphors in chapter 7, the notion of entrenchment is only relevant in relation to the ads in 7.5, which include polysemous words like the ones in chapter 4.

Starting with chapter 4, the polysemous words were divided into two main types according to the assumed level of entrenchment, where type I words have more entrenched senses with an opaque schema, i.e. a non-salient metaphorical link, and type II words have less entrenched senses with a more transparent schema, i.e. a metaphorical link that is more accessible. In the case of ads with type I polysemous words (section 4.5), a humorous effect in the form of a pun is

created by drawing attention to the non-salient sense and thereby to the opaque metaphoric link between the two senses. This is usually achieved with the help of the image, and the underlying metaphor is then elaborated as two more specific input spaces, resulting in a non-conventional mapping that makes a claim about the advertised product. For example, in the Financial Times Weekend ad (section 4.5.2), the non-salient literal meaning of the word *cover* is highlighted by the image showing objects physically covered in newspaper sheets, and the underlying metaphor is then elaborated so that reporting news is understood in terms of wrapping objects. Here, humour is also created by the incongruities that occur in the blended space and are visualised in the image. In the case of the ads containing type II polysemous words (section 4.6), the schema shared by the two senses is more salient, and as with conventional metaphorical expressions, both senses are activated simultaneously. There is thus a weaker punning effect in these ads, and what is achieved by exploiting the underlying metaphor is primarily the creation of an argument in favour of the product. Since the two senses are easily activated, despite the fact that the metaphorical sense is initially more salient, the image does not play the same role as in the ads in section 4.5. This is for example apparent in the Cover Girl ad (section 4.6.2), where the activation of the two senses of the word *heavy* draws attention to the underlying conventional metaphor DIFFICULTIES ARE BURDENS, but where this is achieved without the help of the image, which shows the face of a young woman, presumably wearing the Cover Girl mascara. The underlying metaphor is then more elaborated as a novel mapping, in which difficulties in life are more specifically understood in terms of using mascara that is thick and heavy.

   In the ads in chapter 5, the literal meaning of the idiomatic expressions is triggered by either extending or altering the idiom. Since the metaphorical meaning may be assumed to be more salient, it is available slightly ahead of the literal meaning in the case of extended idioms, while in the case of altered idioms, the two meanings are simultaneously activated. This makes them similar to the less entrenched metaphorical expressions in chapter 6, where both meanings are equally salient, for example in the Friskies ad (section 6.2.1). The activation of the literal meaning signals the underlying metaphor, which is elaborated into two or more specific input scenarios. In the blended space, these scenarios are integrated, which either results in a claim about the product, as in the Libresse ad (section 5.5.1) or presents a problematic scenario that the product can alleviate, as in the Comfort Refresh ad (section 5.4.1). However, it must be pointed out that the distinction between the two variants is not sharp, and they

may co-occur. In the extended ads, the punning effect is deemed to be slightly stronger due to the surprise effect created by the secondary literal interpretation. The image plays some part in signalling one of the elaborated input spaces, usually the source, for example in the Scholl ad (section 5.4.3) where the worn and frayed trainer reflects the SMELL space. Meanwhile, in the Focus Daily ad (section 5.5.2), the picture of the woman wearing the warm polo jumper and cuddling a fluffy toy reflects one of the elaborated targets, namely COMFORT. Even so, due to the fact that we are dealing with fixed phrases, an alteration of it goes a long way to highlight the literal meaning. This is apparent in the Libresse ad (section 5.5.1), which would be understood without the fragmentary image of a pair of knickers.

The metaphorical expressions in chapter 6 occur in three main patterns: ambiguous expressions (section 6.2), elaborated expressions (section 6.3) and combined expressions (section 6.4). There is some overlap between the ambiguous and the combined expressions (section 6.4), which is not surprising, since all metaphorical expressions are potentially ambiguous. Both the literal and the metaphorical meaning are activated at the same time, and again the underlying metaphor forms the basis of two more specific input spaces. Again, since both interpretations are equally salient, there is no surprise effect as a result of a non-salient meaning being highlighted, and there is not much tension between the two senses themselves, due to their relatively transparent schema. The humour that is created is therefore either the result of a clash between specific elements from the two elaborated inputs, as in the Evian ad (section 6.2.2) or a clash between positive and negative associations, as in the Vaseline Intensive Care ad and the Heinz Weight Watchers ad (sections 6.4.1 and 6.4.2). In the case of the elaborated metaphorical expressions (section 6.3), there may be no humour present at all, as in the Lexus ad (section 6.3.1) where the underlying conventional metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY has been elaborated more specifically in terms of success and individuality, on the one hand, and driving a Lexus, on the other. Instead of resulting in clashes between elements in the blend, new understanding is created in order to make an argument about the product. Such an argument is also made in the Motilium ad (section 6.3.2), but at the same time some clashes do occur, more specifically between food items and life situations, and these are then elaborated visually, which results in some degree of humour. The image thus plays an important role in this ad, while in many of the other ads in this chapter it merely illustrates the product.

The ads in chapter 7 involve a novel conceptualisation of the advertised product, that is, the product is portrayed as something else. This sometimes

involves personification, for example in the Tampax ad (section 7.3.1), where the tampon is understood in terms of a smooth man, in the Jacob's ad (section 7.4.1), in which the crackers are portrayed as supermodels on the catwalk, and in the Bausch & Lomb ad (section 7.5.1), in which lenses are understood as girlfriends. In the ads in 7.3, a polysemous word of the same type as in 4.5 is involved, and the non-salient sense is triggered with the help of the image. The crucial difference, though, is that the underlying metaphor is elaborated so that the product actually forms the target space of a novel conceptualisation. For example, in the Tampax ad, the salient meaning of *a smoothy* is metaphorical, but the tampon in the image also draws our attention to the literal sense of the word *smooth*, and in the Canesten ad (section 7.3.2), the fire extinguisher in the image triggers the literal meaning of *burning*. The underlying metaphor is then elaborated in the form of more specific input spaces, creating blends in which the tampon is a seductive man and the cystitis remedy a fire extinguisher, and simultaneously an oasis. In fact, the image visualises the situation in the blended space, and leads to a greater degree of humour. This can be compared to the ads in section 7.4, where similar blends are identified and visualised, but without the involvement of a polysemous word. The situation in the Minolta ad (section 7.3.3) is different, because the main image involves the non-prototypical sense of *possession*, and reflects the source domain SPORTING GAME, while attention then is drawn to the non-salient prototypical sense of possession, and the target domain LIFE. Importantly, this underlying conventional metaphor does not form the link between the two senses of *possession*, and what is more, the image only reflects the elaborated source space, and not the scene in the blended space, as in the two previous ads in the same section. This means that while there is a weak pun present in this ad, the humour is not as strong as in the Tampax ad and the Canesten ad. The main effect of the Minolta ad is therefore the emergent argument in favour of the product, while in the other ads discussed above, the blend results in a significant degree of humour, as well as a positive claim about the product. Finally, the Bausch & Lomb ad (section 7.5.1) forms an example of how a novel conceptualisation can be achieved through the text alone, where references are made both to lenses and to girlfriends, which then form the elaborated inputs of the underlying conventional personification metaphor OBJECTS ARE PEOPLE. This metaphor is of course also involved in the other ads where the product is personified, and in the Tampax ad it actually causes the reversal of the other conventional metaphors that are involved. It should also be mentioned that part of what causes the humour in all the ads in chapter 7 is the incongruity between expected and unexpected behaviour, such as curing cystitis

with a fire extinguisher or placing a TV in a dog basket and giving it a chewing bone.

To sum up, the creative elaboration of a conventional metaphor may on the one hand result in new understanding of some sort, either in the form of a claim made about the advertised product, a problem that may be solved by the product, or even a novel conceptualisation of the product. On the other hand, it may also involve humour, often in the form of a pun that occurs when attention is drawn to a non-salient sense of a polysemous word, an idiomatic expression, or a metaphorical expression, which then leads to ambiguity and tension. The degree of humour is deemed to be higher the more entrenched the two senses or interpretations are, and the more opaque the metaphorical link between them is. However, humour may also result from the tension between elements in the blended space, and a visual elaboration of the scene in the blend may highlight the unresolvable incongruity and therefore lead to a stronger humorous effect. However, it must be emphasised that the relative degree of humour is difficult to establish without psychological tests, especially since we are dealing with examples where, on the whole, the humour is relatively weak, and where the differences are very subtle.

As regards the relationship between text and image, it is clear that the image often plays an important role in triggering non-salient interpretations, which is apparent in the ads in section 4.5. The image may also represent the scene in one of the inputs, which for example happens in the Minolta ad (section 7.3.3), where the BASKETBALL space is reflected visually. In this respect, the text-image relation is similar to that in Forceville's (1996) verbo-pictorial metaphors. However, the image may also visualise the scene in the blended space and when this happens, some elements are reflected in the image, others in the text, and some may even be reflected in both, leading to a much more complex inter-relation between the two.

Although some of the analyses put forward in this thesis may not be considered prototypical blends, conceptual metaphor theory and blending theory are still the best available analytical tools for describing the complex creative processes that take place in these ads. Compared to double grounding, the main pattern in my material is mirrored, because while there is always an elaborated target in the examples discussed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press), there is typically no question that we are dealing with an elaborated source space in my material. However, in my analyses, it has been argued that there is an elaborated target involved as well, and that this is also the

case in some of the examples discussed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press).

As a result of this mirrored pattern, the actual double grounding aspect, which I understand to be the fact that an element in the blend may be interpreted literally against both the source of the conventional metaphor and an entity that stands in a fairly distant relation to the elaborated target, is often lacking in the ads analysed here. What I mean is that it is not surprising that the same element is found both in the original source input and in the elaborated source, whereas in the cases of double grounding analysed by Feyaerts & Brône (2002) and Brône & Feyaerts (in press), it is less expected that we should find one and the same literal element both in the source of the conventional metaphor and in the elaborated target. However, the Comfort Refresh ad in section 5.4.1 does seem to involve double grounding, since the element of 'smoke' is understood both against the elaborated source space and the elaborated target space. Also, whereas it forms an integral part of the elaborated source CANDLE, it is more distantly related to the elaborated target space NIGHTLIFE. Whether or not we are dealing with a metonymic relation in the blend is less obvious here, but arguably we could understand the smell of smoke on our clothes as standing for the previous night on town. Despite these differences, what the double grounding constellation and many of my examples have in common is that we are essentially dealing with the activation of a conventional metaphor for creative purposes. In my material, this may be done by either highlighting the non-salient literal meaning of a metaphorical expression, or by triggering the metaphor through the combination of text and image, or by doing both at the same time.

In short, what the ads I have analysed in this thesis all have in common is that some initial ambiguity or incongruity attracts the attention of the reader, and that the underlying metaphor is then triggered, leading to a novel mapping involving elaborations of the original metaphor. This may either result in a new understanding of the product or in a humorous effect, or both. Rather than abusing language, this shows how advertising cleverly exploits the way language works and the cognitive processes on which it is built.

Prospects for further research

- For various reasons, the scope of this thesis had to be limited, and the results have therefore not been complemented by informant tests or psychological tests. There are several aspects of my analyses that would benefit from such tests, in particular the validity of the arguments that are suggested to emerge in the blended space. However, since the degree of blending may differ from person to person (Turner 1996:92) depending on aspects such as context and background knowledge, the results would not be expected to be conclusive. Even so, it would be interesting to find out to what extent the suggested input spaces are identified and what features are most likely to be projected in relation to individual ads.

- The presence and degree of humour also have to be confirmed by means of tests, and since humour is thought to be linked to the notions of entrenchment and salience, these aspects would also have to be taken into consideration, especially since they too may vary in different contexts and also from person to person.

- It would also be of interest to investigate in more detail the role played by the image in relation to humour. It has been shown that a visual elaboration of the blended space, or sometimes simply an illustration of it, seems to drastically increase the degree of humour. My hypothesis is that the image highlights the unresolved incongruites, which otherwise may be less salient compared to the resolved incongruities that form the argument of the ad.

- As briefly mentioned in chapter 1, it may also be potentially fruitful to use various advertising strategies, as formulated in the advertising literature, as a starting point for an analysis of the various cognitive processes involved in them, which would also mean that the scope would not be limited to metaphor.

- More in-depth studies of essentially the same phenomena as in this thesis could for example include an analysis of different ads from one and the same campaign, in which the creative opportunities have been exploited differently in different ads, but where they all share the same conventional basis, as in the brief example discussed in relation to the Bausch & Lomb

ad in section 7.5.1. Other examples include the Libresse ad in section 5.5.1, which is one of at least two variants in which idiomatic phrases are used creatively.

- Closely connected to the above point would be a study of recurrent themes, such as personification. What types of products are personified and what limitations are there? We saw for example in the Jacob's ad (section 7.4.1) that products may be personified even if they are meant to be eaten. In that particular case, it was suggested that the novel conceptualisation works because the focus is on the clothes worn by people rather than the people themselves, but what is the situation in other cases? Is it possible for just any product to be personified? We saw in the Toshiba ad (section 7.4.2) that the advertised product is portrayed as an animate being, but as a dog rather than a person, and it was argued that personification would not work due to the notions of ownership and control. Presumably, this relates not only to the product itself, but to what specific qualities are meant to be projected from the PEOPLE space in question.

- Another alternative would be to identify what different products are conceptualised by means of a specific source domain, and conversely, to identify what specific source domains are used for a certain type of product. Incidentally, this is also where gender differences might be expected to be found in connection to metaphor, in the sense that association with certain source domains might be thought to appeal more to women than to men, for example. However, my hypothesis would be that most differences are the result of the actual product that is advertised, and that gender differences have more to do with what products are used.

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