


## Chapter Four Recruitment Continues

### July-August 1861

Sometime in July, the 2nd Regiment of New Mexico Volunteer Infantry also began recruiting. Colonel Miguel Estanislado Pino was appointed commander. Miguel was born in 1821 into a prominent New Mexican merchant family from Galisteo. His parents were Don Pedro Bautista Pino and María Baca. His father had represented New Mexico in the Spanish parliament. During that time, he had written *The Exposition on the Province of New Mexico, 1812*, which was first published in Cádiz, Spain, in that year. Like Manuel Chaves and his brother, Nicholas, Miguel was involved in the Santa Fe conspiracy against the Americans in 1846, but after the plot was discovered they all swore allegiance to the United States. Miguel had served in the New Mexico militia all his life. He was a Captain in St. Vrain's battalion in 1855, a Colonel of a battalion in 1860, and currently was appointed a Colonel of Volunteers by President Lincoln. His brother, Nicolás de Jesús Pino, who was two years older than he, would become Colonel of the 2nd New Mexico Militia. The eldest of the three brothers, Facundo Pino, was at this time the President of the Territorial Council. Miguel Pino selected his old comrade in arms, Manuel A. Chaves, as his second in command with the rank of Lt. Colonel. The Major of the regiment, third in command, was Jesús M. Baca y Salazar who was a good friend of Rafael Chacón. He had given Rafael a sword which he "preserved as a remembrance."<sup>1</sup> Chacón considered him to be a very brave man. On the 1st of August Lt. Col. Chaves reported for duty at the army post in Albuquerque where the regiment was based. He was sworn in by brevet Major N. B. Rossell. Chaves' first assignment would be as commander at Fort Fauntleroy, located at Cubero, sixty miles west of Albuquerque. Because Col. Fauntleroy had turned out to be a Confederate the Fort was officially renamed Fort Lyon. However, the soldiers continued to call it Fauntleroy.<sup>2</sup>



L-R: Manuel A. Chaves, Lt. Colonel; Román A. Baca, Captain Co. E; José D. Sena, Captain Co. B., Candelario Garcia, 1<sup>st</sup> Lt., Co. E; 2nd Regiment

Along with reporting the muster of Manuel Chaves, Major Rossell stated that the people of Albuquerque "are a good deal scared. If we only knew who we could trust, but it seems as if the Devil had possession of so many that it makes me suspicious, and I am by nature just the contrary."<sup>3</sup> Rossell was the man who had written that he wished he were back east and away from the New Mexican people. Certainly, the news regarding the 7th US Infantry had already

<sup>1</sup> Jaqueline Meketa, *Legacy of Honor*, 170.

<sup>2</sup> Marc Simmons, *The Little Lion of the Southwest* (First Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1996), 241, footnote 15.

<sup>3</sup> John P. Wilson, *When the Texans Came* (University of New Mexico Press, 2001), Rossell to Canby 8/1/61, 112.

reached Albuquerque by this time and the people were very uncomfortable with the protection offered by the Regulars. Their discomfort and animated conversations in Spanish could have been interpreted any number of ways by the Americans.

The first eight companies of the Second Regiment were mustered in at Albuquerque while the First Regiment was gathering at Fort Union, but a little lagging behind their progress as the last two companies came more slowly. The first company to enlist was Company A under Captain Manuel A. Pino, possibly a younger relative of Col. Pino. Company B was commanded by Captain José D. Sena, a native of Santa Fe. His father, Don Juan Sena had immigrated to New Mexico from Mexico and had become a merchant trader. His wife was Isabel Cabeza de Baca. Captain Sena, along with the help of Lt. Col. Francisco Perea, quickly raised a company of infantry; most likely they were also men of Santa Fe.<sup>4</sup> Company C reported for duty under the direction of Captain Manuel Baca y Delgado while Company D swore in under Captain Gregorio Otero. Following them, Company E, was commanded by Captain Román Antonio Baca. Baca was Lt. Col. Manuel Chaves' half brother. After Manuel's father died his mother had remarried to Román's father, José Antonio Baca. Often by his older brother's side, Román had risen through the ranks of New Mexico volunteers through personal exploits of bravery and he had been appointed Captain of a company during the Navajo campaign. It was he who had hung the Indian prisoner rather than turn him over to Canby and it was his older brother, Manuel Chaves, who had been present at the time, and Col. Pino had been their overall commander. As this incident had occurred barely six months earlier, it is more than conceivable that Canby had not forgotten nor forgiven it yet. Politically, this put the 2nd Regiment in a difficult position with Col. Canby from the very beginning of its inception. Its leadership had defied him before and he might have thought they would do it again. Canby definitely would keep a close eye on them, watching for defects.

On August 8th, Lt. Col. Manuel Chaves arrived at Fort Fauntleroy and took command of the garrison of three companies of the 2nd Regiment: Companies A (Pino's), B (Sena's), and C (Baca's). Fort Fauntleroy was a very important post as a frontier guard against marauding Navajos. Supplies were kept here to be used for future campaigns against the Navajos when necessary. It also served as a place for trade with the natives and it was the location from which the US Indian agent gave the allotted disbursements to the various Navajo tribes. Therefore, there was a lot of Navajo traffic at this post. Chaves' duty at this time was to maintain (or enforce) Canby's recent peace agreement with them. The other companies of the 2nd Regiment were stationed with Col. Pino at the headquarters in Albuquerque.

Throughout early August, enrollment of the volunteers continued and despite Canby's incessant worrying, volunteer companies were rolling in. So much so that on August 13, 1861, Anderson reported to Chapman at Fort Union that a third regiment of New Mexico volunteers would now begin recruiting: "Sir: I am instructed to inform you that the Governor has appointed José Guadalupe Gallegos of San Miguel, Lt. Colonel, José María Chaves of Abiquiu, Lieut. Colonel, Manuel Baca of Socorro and Joseph Cummings of Santa Fe, Majors of the Regiment of New Mexican Mounted Volunteers."<sup>5</sup>


Strangely enough, none of these three men, Col. José María Chaves, Major Manuel Baca, or Major Joseph Cummings, are listed in the enlistment records for the Third Regiment of volunteers. Possibly this was either a militia unit, or it was the early command structure of the Third Regiment and it was reorganized later. Some of Canby's later remarks seem to support this. José María Chaves was a longtime figure on the frontier and had been a General of New Mexico militia since 1851 and probably prior. Little could be found regarding Major Manuel Baca. Major Joseph Cummings was a professional Santa Fe gambler and a person of 'colorful'

---

<sup>4</sup> Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Esq., Leading Facts of New Mexican History Volume II (The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1912, 388), footnote 314.

<sup>5</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chapman to Anderson 8/13/61, 78.

repute. Later, Cummings would serve as Gen. Carleton's Provost Marshall when his true 'colors' as a self-serving scoundrel would be revealed.<sup>6</sup>



José María Chaves

The next day, on August 14th, Canby again wrote to Governor Gilpin of Colorado asking for the two companies of volunteers, however, the Governor had already complied with that request. He reported back to Canby that he had organized Company A and Company B, each of which had 101 men. The first was under the command of Captain J. P. Slough and the second, Captain Samuel F. Tappan. They had both been ordered to muster at Fort Garland in southern Colorado. Gilpin went on to report that there was in Colorado, "...a strong malignant element essential to be controlled." He also remarked that the state was fairly cut off from its sources of supply, namely, the United States, a supply line that snaked across 800 miles through Indian country. Self-defense was imperative, he declared.<sup>7</sup>

On the 16th Lt. Col. Roberts reported to Canby that Albuquerque had a sizeable garrison there. He now had ten companies: companies F, C and H, of the 7th Infantry, D and F, 5th Infantry; C, G, and K, Mounted Riflemen, D & G, 1st Dragoons; Captain James "Santiago" Hubbell's company of Mounted Volunteers, and the 2nd Regiment's companies of Captains Gregorio Otero, Company D, Ethan W. Eaton, Company F, and Román A. Baca, Company E. Of this number, he reported, "675 are regular troops, in effective condition, and all loyal and true men."<sup>8</sup> Roberts also reported that at least half of his men did not have canteens and he understood that there were none to be had in the department.<sup>9</sup> Many of the volunteers would have crafted their own gourd canteens; others might have used bottles, tied with ropes or leather, anything to hold water.

Also on the 16th of August Canby wrote a long report to General Fremont at Army Headquarters in St. Louis which was to be the HQ for all western operations for the Union Army. He reported that Col. Loring had left the N.M. department and that he had not received any further instructions concerning the Volunteers. He reiterated Indian problems and also re-stated that he believed the Volunteers could not be relied upon "for defense of this Territory, unless supported by a considerable force of regular troops." Then he went on to relate how a superior force of these reliable Regulars had surrendered to a few hundred Confederates and were now, after having been paroled, on their way to Fort Union. He also notes that the headquarters of the 1st Volunteer Regiment was stationed at Fort Union and the 2nd Regiment at Albuquerque. He finished by wondering where the supply train was and whether Army Headquarters wanted to defend this department at all. In light of his lack of instruction it was a fair question. Then he

---

<sup>6</sup> Jacqueline Dorgan Meketa, Legacy of Honor: The Life of Rafael Chacón, a Nineteenth Century New Mexican (University of New Mexico Press, 1986), 192-203.

<sup>7</sup> Twitchell, Leading Facts II, 368-369, footnote 292.

<sup>8</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Canby 8/16/61, 114.

<sup>9</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Canby 8/16/61, 114.

spoke of his supply problems referring to the Department as “destitute...in military resources and supplies of every kind.” There wasn’t enough artillery, remounts for cavalry, draught animals, or ordnance stores. “If it is the intention of the Government to retain this department,” he wrote, “I urgently recommend that the supplies necessary for the efficiency of the troops (regulars or volunteers), and especially those already estimated for, should be furnished as soon as practicable.”<sup>10</sup>

On the 17<sup>th</sup> of August Captain W. R. Shoemaker, commander of the Ordnance Depot at Fort Union, wrote to Col. Canby to report that the stores at his depot amounted to two hundred and seventy thousand dollars worth - which he noted would be a great loss to the Union if the Texans attacked after the Regulars had been sent to the east. He also stated that the New Mexicans would not be able to defend this property without the support of the Regulars. He had Ceran St. Vrain and Christopher Carson sign agreement to the letter. Then he wrote a similar cover letter to Major General J. C. Fremont in St. Louis and enclosed the first letter. To Fremont he wrote, “I know that you are well acquainted with the character of this population, and need only to inform you that the volunteers recently raised here are not composed of the rancheros, or even of the better class of Mexicans, but, on the contrary, for you to see how entirely defenseless the Territory will be if the U.S. Army is withdrawn.”<sup>11</sup>

This was the same Fremont that Kit Carson had guided years ago to California and back. They had become fast friends and Carson visited him as often as he could. Fremont esteemed Carson’s friendship and judgment. He was also the guardian of Carson’s Arapaho Indian daughter, Adeline, daughter of Waa-nibe, Carson’s first wife.<sup>12</sup> Perhaps it was this letter alone that convinced Fremont to allow the remaining Federals to stay in the Territory until the crisis of the Texan invasion had passed. Some people feel that this often-quoted letter is proof that Carson also lacked confidence in the Volunteers. However, we shall see later that this is not at all the case and more likely, Carson simply felt that New Mexico could use all the help it could get.

Fremont was born in Georgia in 1813. His mother moved her two sons and a daughter to Charlestown S.C. where they struggled to get by. The youthful John was described as “brilliant, unpredictable, and egotistical.” At 25 years he became a 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. in the Topographical Engineers. He soon gained a very good reputation. He secretly married Jessie Benton in 1841 because it was against her parent’s wishes. In 1842 he was assigned to map the Oregon Trail with Kit Carson along as a guide. His report of that trip was a bestseller and launched Carson into instant national fame. In 1843-44 Fremont and Carson tried to find a trail through the Rockies. That idea failed and in 1845 Fremont organized a battalion of volunteers to go to California. It was because of this trip that Carson missed the Taos revolt. Later, Fremont had a disastrous expedition without Carson in 1848-49. He moved to California and served as a senator there in 1856. He was now a Major General in the Union Army but he would soon be removed for freeing the slaves in Missouri which caused an uproar in that unstable state.<sup>13</sup>

On the same day, the 17<sup>th</sup>, Chapman reported to St. Vrain that 400 Texans were now in possession of Fort Stanton. However, the actual number was closer to forty than 400. He asked that St. Vrain have Carson send the Utes in that direction to “annoy this party.” He felt that Fort Union was vulnerable at this point and decided to keep the Volunteers “close in hand.”<sup>14</sup> Then he wrote to Lt. Joseph G. Tilford of the US Regiment of Mounted Rifles (Third US Cavalry) that Captain Pfeifer would leave for the Fort Stanton area with a party of Utes. At this point Canby still wasn’t sure if the Confederate invasion would come from Fort Stanton or from the Mesilla

---

<sup>10</sup> Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Canby to St. Louis 8/16/61.

<sup>11</sup> Official Records, Shoemaker to Fremont 8/17/61.

<sup>12</sup> Marc Simmons, Kit Carson and His Three Wives (University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, NM, 2003), page 24; and Twitchell, Leading Facts II.

<sup>13</sup> Story of the American West (Reader’s Digest Association, Pleasantville, NY, 1977), 166-167.

<sup>14</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chapman to St. Vrain 8/16/61, 80.

area. His new plan was to have ten companies of Volunteers, six foot companies of the 2nd Regiment and four mounted independent companies, stationed at Fort Craig with the 1st Volunteer Regiment at Fort Union and he would place a body of Regulars in reserve at midpoint in Albuquerque.<sup>15</sup> That way he could easily reinforce whichever direction was threatened first. He continued to cling to his previous idea to employ the New Mexicans in static positions. While Volunteer foot companies continued to work on the earthworks at both forts, the mounted companies were employed in scouting on the eastern and southeastern plains. And the rumor mill kept grinding them out. Another rumor soon appeared that placed 150 Texans near the Rio Bonito. It was said they had treated the locals badly. This would have been Walker's men at Fort Stanton.<sup>16</sup>

On the 19th of August Canby again expressed his fears to Chapman, "I have not much faith in the disposition of the Mexicans to second us in this matter [the defense of NM] but will do whatever I can to rouse them and put the Territory in the best possible position for defense."<sup>17</sup> Chapman replied the next day that the mounted scouts had reported in. They had found no sign of Texans in the Sierra Gallina area (towards Fort Stanton) and points in between there and Fort Union. He looked forward to Captain Pfeiffer's return with the Utes and he noted that the Volunteers had a better system for getting news than he did. "There appears to be a regular system of expresses between Santa Fe and the volunteer camp here, and I frequently hear news from the volunteer officers some hours, or even a day before it is communicated through the official channels."<sup>18</sup>

The next day Anderson sent out a circular that mounted volunteers were wanted at all locations.<sup>19</sup> Roberts reported to Canby on the same day on affairs at Fort Craig. He wrote that the people in the villages along the Rio Grande would readily fight to defend their communities but they did not want to join the Army in order to defend the forts. They didn't understand why it was necessary to organize in military units. Although volunteers were arriving at the fort in small groups more would undoubtedly join when the harvest season was over. "I am of the opinion that after the crops are secured, the Regiments of Volunteers will be filled up as well as the National Guards."<sup>20</sup>

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of August Captain Pfeiffer and the Utes returned to Fort Union. They found no signs of Texans on the eastern plains. Chapman complained that the number of volunteers out on scout duty would impede the work on the new fort, and he informed Anderson in Santa Fe that the Utes were on their way home because of sickness in the chief's family.<sup>21</sup> Carson and Pfeiffer could not convince them to stay. At this time Chapman was aware that wagon trains containing uniforms for the volunteers had left Fort Leavenworth on the 22nd of July. "That train contains some seventy boxes of clothing &c. for the Volunteers..."<sup>22</sup> To protect the incoming trains Chapman dispatched Lt. Col. Carson in charge of three companies of the 1st Regiment; Pfeiffer's (E), Sena's (F), and Deus's (I); as well as Captain Vigil's Independent Mounted Company. Chapman also organized a hand-picked group of mounted men from the 1st Regiment to leave on the next day to watch the approach from the Pecos River.

About this time the Federal officers noted that the lack of pay among the volunteers was beginning to be a problem and it would continue to get worse unless something was done. It was starting to affect morale. Since the last payroll had been stolen with the group of wagon trains

---

<sup>15</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Anderson to Roberts, 8/17/61, 82.

<sup>16</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Rossell to Anderson 8/19/61, 161.

<sup>17</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Canby to Chapman, 8/19/61, 84.

<sup>18</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chapman to Anderson 8/20/61, 85.

<sup>19</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Anderson circular 8/20/61, 86.

<sup>20</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Canby 8/20/61, 121.

<sup>21</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chapman to Anderson 8/22/61, 88.

<sup>22</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Special Agent E.O. Perrin to Chapman 8/23/61, 89.

that were taken into Mexico, most of the Regulars and none of the Volunteers had been paid. Rumors began to circulate among the New Mexicans that it was not intended that they would ever be paid. Chapman, El Viejo, reported as much from Fort Union. Captain Vigil's Company of Mounted Volunteers had refused to reenlist after their three month hitch was up. "His men have become dissatisfied from a report...that they are not to be paid by the U.S. Govt. from the funds of the Territory." He also noted a significant problem in the distribution of horses among the volunteers. "The men and horses of the Mounted Companies at this post are unequally distributed, some companies having more men than horses and others the reverse."<sup>23</sup> Anderson quickly emphasized that the Volunteers would be paid and the unequal distribution of horses would be rectified by direction of the Chief Quartermaster.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile, Captain Barrientos returned from his patrol to the Fort Stanton vicinity and reported on the conditions at the fort which he had learned from the locals. There were Confederates at Fort Stanton, the rumor had been true. It was a company of 80 men under the command of Captain James Walker. According to the locals they intended on occupying Manzano. It did not seem that they would be reinforced. Barrientos had received this information from a Don Francisco Sanches who was a prisoner of the Confederates for over a week.<sup>25</sup> Captain Saturnino Barrientos' Mounted Independent Company had begun service in early August at Fort Craig for three months duration.

Also on the 24th Major Lynde of the 7<sup>th</sup> US Infantry and several of his officers reached Fort Union, the rest of his command arrived the next day. They encamped on a stream just to the north of the fort. The morning after they had settled in beside the stream that provided them with fresh water it suddenly dried up. Captain J. H. Potter followed it upstream and discovered that Captain Shoemaker had turned it aside to water his cabbage patch. Thus began the Cabbage Patch War. When Potter complained to Chapman the latter said it was not on government property and was therefore out of his jurisdiction. Potter took that to mean that he could take matters in his own hands and placed sentinels to watch the flow of the water. Then Shoemaker complained to Chapman saying he had been watering his garden for the last ten years without dispute. So Chapman negotiated a temporary settlement by which the water took redirections from camp to cabbage patch and etc. Then he sent word to Canby about the problem. Without joining in Chapman's duplicity Canby reminded him that the fort was at the center of an eight mile square and therefore the use of the stream by the men overruled Shoemaker's cabbage patch.<sup>26</sup>

These ill-fated men of the 7th Regiment seemed to have been cursed with water problems. First they were parched in the southern desert between Mesilla and San Augustine Pass, then they played second fiddle to a cabbage patch at Fort Union, and when they finally would set out across the plains bound for the east, many of them would become deranged with thirst and some of them would even drink their own blood. Hopefully, they fared better back 'in the States.'

Meanwhile Lt. Col. Benjamin Roberts had sent twenty men of the Dragoons and Mounted Rifles with Captain Hubbell and his company south from Fort Craig to scout the area around Robledo where the Texans were known to keep their advanced guard. Hubbell found them, about one hundred strong, thirty miles south of Fort Craig. On the 25th Confederate Col. Baylor reported to Confederate Headquarters that Captain Hubbell had been captured with nine of his men.<sup>27</sup> However, the next thing we hear is that Captain Hubbell is chasing the Texans back to Mesilla. Most likely, if the Confederate report is true, his brother Charles rescued him and the

---

<sup>23</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chapman to Anderson 8/24/61, 90.

<sup>24</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Anderson to Chapman 8/25/61, 92.

<sup>25</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Barrientos to Canby 8/24/61, 163.

<sup>26</sup> Chris Emmett, Fort Union and the Winning of the Southwest (University of Oklahoma, 1965), 245-246.

<sup>27</sup> Official Records, Baylor to C.S. HQ 8/25/61.

battle continued. Captain Moore of the 1st Dragoons does not mention any capture of Hubbell in his report but instead states that Hubbell “opened a spirited fire upon their Camp, and seizing a good position, he skirmished with their entire force until daylight, when they abandoned the Camp and returned toward the Laguna.” Upon learning of this, Roberts immediately dispatched two groups of eighty Regulars, one under Captain Moore to reinforce Hubbell and one under Captain Lane to attempt to cut off the Texan retreat. When Moore arrived, he and Hubbell set off after the Texans.<sup>28</sup> The next day, on the 26th Roberts reported that the Texans were not overtaken as they were “well mounted and had extra horses.”<sup>29</sup> As can be seen, Hubbell and his men were not, “more afraid of Texans than they were of death.” The NM Volunteers had fought their first engagement and they had won, with the Texans fleeing as fast as they could back to their base in Mesilla.



Santiago Hubbell  
Captain Ind. Co.

On August 30th the Third New Mexico Regiment began recruitment. This new regiment would consist of mounted volunteers. There was some confusion at the time as to whether this regiment would be called the Third Regiment or the 1st Regiment of Mounted Volunteers. The designation as the Third Regiment eventually won out. This regiment was commanded by Colonel José Guadalupe Gallegos, Lt. Col. José María Valdez, and Major Luis Baca, Later, Major Faustino Baca y Ulibarri. Now there occurred something that fully illustrates the preference of the New Mexicans. Canby couldn't fill out the Second Infantry Regiment and the First still needed some recruits. He thought the New Mexicans were just being totally unpatriotic, but then he called for the Third Regiment to be mounted. It was originally intended to have only four companies but so many men joined that it soon had eight and finally ended up with a full ten...and this occurred in a very short time. Keep in mind that almost half of the First Regiment was mounted and several companies of the Second were unofficially mounted also. Following this, it soon became obvious that another mounted regiment, the Fourth, could also begin recruitment.

On the first day of recruitment Manuel Ortiz reported to Fort Union with a company of forty-eight men from Las Vegas. They became Company A of the 3rd Regiment and Ortiz became the 1st Lt. of the company. Chapman also reported that another thirty men would arrive that afternoon, presumably belonging to the same company.<sup>30</sup> The Third Regiment quickly mustered companies A, B, and C with Captains William Mortimore, Ricardo Branch, and Pedro Sánchez respectively. Records are unclear but the regiment would muster at least somewhere between 900 and 1,000 men. These companies were soon followed by the Regiment's 4th and 5th companies; Company D under Captain Severiana Martínez and Captain José Esquibel with

---

<sup>28</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Anderson 8/24/61, 121.

<sup>29</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Anderson 8/26/61, 124.


<sup>30</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chapman to Anderson 8/30/61, 98.

Company E; soon after by their 6th, Company F under Captain John Brosee and 7th, Captain Juan Sarracino in command of Company G. The final companies were: Company H with Captain Pablo S. Martínez, Company K under Captain Tomas Valencia, and Company L, commanded by Captain Santiago Gonzales.

While the Third Regiment was gathering the recruitment of the 2nd Regiment continued to plod along and by the end of August they had picked up two more companies and their respective captains: Captain Ethan Eaton with Company F and Captain Anastacio Garcia of Company G. At the end of the month or in the first part of September, the eighth company of the 2nd Regiment would also be mustered. They would be designated as Company H under the command of Captain Juan Labadi. The last two companies of the Regiment would come in later. On the 31<sup>st</sup> of August, Captain José María Valdez joined the new Third Regiment. He resigned as Captain of Company A of the 1<sup>st</sup> Regiment to become a Lt. Colonel of the Third, apparently replacing Lt. Col. José María Chaves as second in command. 1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Francisco Gonzales became the new Captain of Company A, 1st Regiment.

### September 1861

September brought New Mexico a change of governors and on the 4th, Governor Henry Connelly was sworn into office. He had been appointed by President Lincoln. It's surprising how much attention the beleaguered Lincoln paid to this far-flung Territory in these dark times. As has been suggested by some historians Lincoln was very interested in the American West. Unlike many governors before him (and after), Connelly took his office very seriously. Col. Canby now had a very firm and active supporter in public office. In his confirmation letter he wrote that he would accept the post noting that he had lived in New Mexico a long time.<sup>31</sup>



Doctor Henry Connelly  
Governor of New Mexico

Henry Connelly had attended medical school at Transylvania University at Lexington Kentucky. He graduated in 1828 and that same year he moved west and became a clerk in a store in Jesús María, Chihuahua, Mexico. By 1830 he had bought the store. He married a Mexican woman (name unknown) in 1838 and she gave him three sons. He brought his family to live in Missouri but his wife died soon after. During this time, Connelly tried to find an alternate trade route from Independence, Missouri, through Texas straight to Chihuahua. He made the trip in a caravan of one hundred men, but it must have been a difficult journey because he never tried it again. In 1842 he formed a business partnership with Edward J. Glasgow. He re-married in this period to Dolores Perea Chaves, the wife of the late Don Mariano Chaves, parents of Maj. J. Francisco Chaves. Connelly built a mercantile store at Peralta near the Chaves family mansion. In 1846, he assisted Governor Armijo in his negotiations with Captain Philip St. George Cook

---


<sup>31</sup> Calvin Horn, New Mexico's Troubled Years: the Story of the Early Territorial Governors (Horn and Wallace, 1963), 93.



and James Magoffin prior to the American invasion. He served on the Territorial Council from 1853-1859.<sup>32</sup> Once in office Connelly moved fast. On September 9<sup>th</sup> he issued a proclamation.

*Citizens of New Mexico, your Territory has been invaded, the integrity of your soil has been attacked, the property of peaceful and industrious citizens has been destroyed or converted to the use of the invaders, and the enemy is already at your doors. You cannot, you must not, hesitate to take up arms in defense of your homes, firesides and families...*<sup>33</sup>

At Fort Craig, on 9/4/61, Col. Roberts wrote to Canby that he wanted to take the Regulars to the grassy open plains east of the mountains to “avoid all the river towns, where the small pox is making its ravages.” He intended to escort a train of equipment to Fort Union while leaving the Volunteers guarding Fort Craig and points south. The small pox and malaria had not reached the fort as of yet, though it was all around it. He reported that he was bringing the extra tents, horse furniture, and everything “not needed by the volunteers,” which could be used by Lynde’s command as they traveled to the east. He was depleting his small arms ordnance at the fort, and his commissary was almost empty but there was a new supply train enroute from Albuquerque. Referring to the disease he wrote, “It is thought crossing the country will do more than the entire pharmacopeia to remove this malaria.”<sup>34</sup>



Lt. Colonel Benjamin Stone Roberts  
NM Military Department

On the 6th of September Captain I. N. Moore of the First Dragoons was ordered to set up an advanced guard at Abo Pass east of Fort Craig to give early warning as to any movements of the Texans in that quarter. Provisions would be sent to sustain them there. Abo Pass is in the Manzano Mountains near the present day town of Mountainair. It was on a route that could have been used by an invasion force coming from the direction Fort Stanton. When the Volunteers were ready they would be sent to relieve the Dragoons.<sup>35</sup> On the 8th Canby notified Army HQ in St. Louis that he would be happy to arm the Coloradan Volunteers but at present he only had enough arms for the New Mexicans. He asked for more supplies to be sent from Fort Leavenworth.<sup>36</sup> Canby must have received his promotion to full Colonel, because he now signed his correspondences as Colonel of the Nineteenth Infantry. The Nineteenth was a new Regular Army unit but it was not deployed in New Mexico. With this correspondence he enclosed a letter

<sup>32</sup> Horn, New Mexico's Troubled Years, 93; and Twitchell, Leading Facts II, 391 footnote 316)

<sup>33</sup> Horn, New Mexico's Troubled Years, 99.

<sup>34</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Canby 9/4/61, 124.

<sup>35</sup> Official Records, Anderson to Moore 9/6/61.

<sup>36</sup> Official Records, Canby to St. Louis 9/8/61.

from Governor Gilpin of the Colorado Territory reporting that the two companies of the 1st Colorado Volunteer infantry had been recruited.

On the 8th Canby also reported to St. Louis that the defensive works at Fort Union were nearly complete and could be turned over to the volunteers in a day or two. Actually work would go on for several more months. He also announced that volunteering had slowed and would be supplemented by martial law. "Governor Connelly will call out the militia of the Territory, and then force the people to do what they seem indisposed to do voluntarily."<sup>37</sup> On the same day, Canby reported to Governor Connelly the requirements needed for the defense of the Territory. Two regiments of Infantry that would enlist for three years and two of Cavalry for terms of six months, would be needed, 3,724 men in all, who would enlist for three years.

*Of this force the regimental organization of the First (Col. St. Vrain's) Regiment of Infantry is completed, but the companies are not yet full." They needed two hundred more men to reach full strength. It will require at least 200 men to bring this regiment up to its maximum organization. In the Second (Colonel Pino's) Regiment only eight companies have been mustered in, and it will require at least 400 men to complete the organization of this regiment. The organization of the cavalry regiments has just commenced, and only one company has been mustered in. Four other companies are reported to be nearly ready, but it will require at least 1,000 men to complete the two regiments, or 1,200 if they are raised to the maximum. In addition to the above force, independent companies of mounted volunteers are called for, but only three have been organized. It is intended to incorporate these companies with the cavalry regiments if the men consent to that extension of their term of service. If they do not, they will be disbanded at the expiration of the present term.*

*To recapitulate, there will be required for the infantry regiments 600 men and for the cavalry regiments 1,000 men: total, 1,600. The necessary expenditure incurred by the Territory in the organization of these regiments will be defrayed by the Government of the United States, and, as the appropriation for this purpose has already been made, there will be but little delay in securing the reimbursements.<sup>38</sup>*

It had only been nine days since the Third Regiment had been authorized to begin recruiting, yet Canby continued his habit viewing the glass as half full. Eventually the wagon trains arrived and clothing was issued to the 1st Volunteer Regiment. Three of the company captains had something to report about that.

*Captain Albert Pfeiffer, Company E: "The clothing supplied by the Commissioner is very bad in quality and will not stand ordinary wear. The camp and garrison equipage is also very poor in quality. There being no prices furnished the uniform is not charged on the roll."*

*Captain Louis Felsenthal, Company G: "The clothing (uniform) which the men received could not be charged on this Muster Roll because we do not know the price of the same. The uniforms received are of a very inferior quality and can not withstand long wearing."*

*Captain Santiago Valdez, Company H: "The clothing supplied by the commissioner is very bad in quality and will not stand ordinary wear. The camp garrison equipage is also very poor in quality. There being no price furnished with the*

---

<sup>37</sup> Official Records, Canby to St. Louis 9/8/61.

<sup>38</sup> Official Records, Canby to Connelly 9/8/61.

*uniform it is not charged. Every man on the roll has received a complete outfit including clothing, blanket, knapsack, canteen and etc.”<sup>39</sup>*

A letter to Carson from Anderson on 8/7/61 states that the Chief Quartermaster would purchase uniforms and send them to Fort Union; and another letter states that these uniforms were provided by a Special Agent named E. O. Perrin, which seems to indicate that all of the clothing for the Volunteers was furnished new and was not surplus.<sup>40</sup> As Mr. Perrin had been contracted to furnish uniforms for the Volunteers any surplus clothing in New Mexico store may have been given to militia units. One clothing list for a private Ruperto Burgorques, a musician with Captain Abréu’s Company C, was found in the archives. The list is dated 7/3/61 which was the date that Company C mustered in. It cannot be determined exactly when Burgorques received his full lot of clothing – but the companies listed above did not remark on upon their clothing until this time period. It’s possible that there were several clothing issues and this list is what he owed money for upon mustering out.

One U.S. Uniform jacket and pants	10.50
1. Fatigue jacket	1.50
1. Uniform hat	---
1. Great coat	9.50
1. Amer. blanket	2.44
2. Mex. Blankets	3.00
2. Pr. Shoes 1/1.50 1/2.20	3.70
2. [blue?] Mex shirts .92	1.85
1. [illegible] shirt	1.46
2 Pr stockings .25	.5
1. Knapsack	1.50
1. Haversack .65 canteen .46	1.11
1. Plate cup knife fork spoon	.32
2 Pr. [illegible] flannel drawers .68	1.36
2 Pr. [illegible] flannel drawers .92	1.85
Total	\$40.59

Francisco P. Abreu

There was no way for the New Mexicans to know it at the time, but poor quality clothing for Volunteers was not unique to New Mexico. All over the nation and on both sides of the conflict, this type of thing was happening in various degrees. In the rush to clothe and equip thousands of volunteers orders were given to contractors who furnished the various items a soldier needed. Some suppliers were conscientious and some were not, and all were trying to make a lot of money. Many regiments found themselves with outdated muskets, cheap equipment, and clothes that fell off their backs. The 1st NM Volunteers seem to have made out better than some, not as well as others – having received a full issue of clothing, but it was of poor quality. Even Col. Canby remarked on it a one point. From this list we can deduce that with some slight variation (Mexican style blankets and shirts and surplus US equipment), the Volunteers looked pretty much like most Civil War Union troops. And we can assume that once the men received their uniforms, the officers tried to keep their men looking as ‘regimental’ as

<sup>39</sup> United States National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 25 – these notations come from the regimental histories that were compiled after the war, but as they are written in the first person, they are presented here as quotes. Special thanks to Tony Campisi for his help with the UNM microfiche records.

<sup>40</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, 74-75 & 89.

possible. In fact, the Confederates at Valverde mistook the First Regiment to be Regulars and their clothing must have contributed to that fact. Based on the amount of money that at least one enlisted man owed upon mustering out, Corporal Juan Chaves of Pfeiffer's Company D, it can be surmised that most of the men only received a basic uniform, probably a fatigue jacket and trousers and full equipment, knapsack, haversack, canteen and tinware. Burgorquez may have received a dress uniform due to his position as a senior sergeant of the regiment.

On the 10th of September Anderson in Santa Fe informed Roberts at Fort Craig that he could not set up an advanced camp yet because, "none of the companies of mounted volunteers that were to have been stationed at the Abo Pass have yet been raised."<sup>41</sup> But he had men soon enough and Captain Saturnino Barrientos with his Independent Mounted Company was sent there on picket duty. On the 16th Barrientos reported that he had captured two men, Tedosio Aragon and Gregorio Montaña, whom he believed were Texan collaborators.<sup>42</sup> Four days later Captain Moore captured another New Mexican in the same area whom he believed was also a Texan collaborator. His name was Pablo Direts [Alderete?].<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, the 2nd Regiment was still garrisoning Fort Fauntleroy, Fort Craig, and Albuquerque, with Lt. Col. Manuel Chaves at Fauntleroy with three of the companies. Now, as stated before, if Manuel Chaves had a fault it was horseracing and it was going to get him into trouble again. The surgeon and sutler of Fort Fauntleroy was one Dr. F. E. Kavanaugh. He had been appointed sutler of the post by virtue of being the owner of a store in nearby Cubero, a small town of about 500 people, and also as post surgeon because he was the only doctor in the area. He was one of only four non-Hispanic inhabitants of the town. He had once served in the Territorial Council and he had been a surgeon in St. Vrain's Battalion in 1855. His origins are unknown except that he was a southerner who had move to New Mexico and lived in Taos for a few years. Apparently his prices as post sutler were very high.<sup>44</sup>



Manuel A. Chaves  
Lt. Colonel  
2<sup>nd</sup> NMVI

Kavanaugh had a fine race horse, a Kentucky thoroughbred. The soldiers had nothing to equal to it but if they did manage win horses in other races Manuel would allow them to sell the new horses to the Army, and if they lost, the post clerk had some juggling to do. It seems that even though they were designated as an infantry regiment many men of the 2nd Regiment had horses. It happened that the Navajos were also avid horse racing gamblers and as they came to the fort regularly to trade and draw rations, they also wanted to give it a go. In a short time they

---

<sup>41</sup> Official Records, Anderson to Roberts 9/10/61.

<sup>42</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Barrientos 9/16/61, 164.

<sup>43</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Moore 9/20/61, 165.

<sup>44</sup> Marc Simmons, The Little Lion of the Southwest (First Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, 1996), 241, footnote 19.

lost a lot of goods to the avaricious Dr. Kavanaugh against that thoroughbred. In the first week of September a delegation of Navajos under Chief Miguelito entered Kavanaugh's store, which also served as a kind of officer's club, and informed Captain José Sena that they wanted to challenge the thoroughbred to a race in the following week. When the day came, two lesser races were run in the morning. Suddenly just as the time for the race neared, 200 fully armed and mounted renegades, known as Ladrones de Chelly (pronounced 'shay'), appeared. Chaves probably should have stopped the racing at that point, but he couldn't resist. In all likelihood, there was no stopping it anyway. The Native's champion turned out to be a sorrell owned by a six-foot four inch tall Navajo called Pistol Bullet. An Indian boy would be his jockey. Lt. Ortiz of Company A would ride Kavanaugh's thoroughbred.<sup>45</sup>

It was the custom in New Mexico at this time that horse races had no starting signal and the jockeys themselves would determine the exact moment to begin the race. They had three false starts when the Native jockey stated that they had not started at the same time. The fourth start was not stopped. Through the dust and the close-packed crowd no one could see clearly what had happened to the Native jockey as it ran off course. Sergeant Nicolás Hodt, the 1st Sgt. of Company C] said, "I could not see the cause of it, but the report was that the Indian's bridle broke."<sup>46</sup> The Navajos took the loss of the race very badly. It had appeared to them that the bridle had been tampered with, and it didn't help any that the New Mexicans celebrated their victory just a bit too much. While Chief Miguelito attempted to calm his people, the Ladrones broke into two groups, one towards the fort and a smaller band towards the post's horse herd that was out to pasture. Some of Miguelito's people, including women and children, followed the first group. The Ladrones and guards opened fire on each other. Manuel sent a platoon to help the horse guards. When it was over he had to report to Canby, whom he knew would not receive it well, especially since his mission was to keep the peace.

*It is with deepest grief that I have to report that about the hour of four o'clock, a large meeting [200 men] of the Navajo Indians [the Chelle Ladrones], were racing their horses about 200 yards in front of the guardhouse. Then they all approached to 100 yards and one attacked a sentinel, trying to take his arms from him. Immediately the Officer of the guard, supported by the whole command fired into them, leaving 12 dead and forty prisoners. At this time, another party of Indians attacked the herd party and their escorts. First Lt. Jose M. Sanchez of Capt. Jose D. Sena's company was sent with 12 mounted and 32 foot recovered all the property except 5 horses volunteers and 1 mule and 2 oxen (US Govt.) without losing a man and capturing 7 of the Indian horses. "I hope you will send me the companies that have to fill the garrison of this Fort as soon as you think proper, as our circumstances require it."<sup>47</sup>*

This was exactly the kind of thing Canby had been waiting for. He began his own investigation into the affair and found some discrepancies in the post books although none of it was incriminating. He decided to abandon the Fort and move the supplies to Cubero.

On September 17th, 1861, Colonel Ceran St. Vrain stepped down from command of the 1st Regiment. He went to his home in Mora to run his mills. His reason for resigning was given as on "account of a multiplicity of private business," which made him unable "to do justice to myself or be efficient in the service."<sup>48</sup> "The real reason, stripped of his vague phrasing, had to do with his physical condition. Nearing 60, overweight, and apoplectic, he was not up to the

---

<sup>45</sup> Simmons, Little Lion, 167-168.

<sup>46</sup> Simmons, Little Lion, 167-168.

<sup>47</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Chaves to Canby 9/13/61, 126.

<sup>48</sup> Emmett, Fort Union, 249.

Herculean demands on mind and body the job required.”<sup>49</sup> St. Vrain owned two mills at this time, one at Talpa, near Ranchos de Taos, and one at Mora. In 1850 he had purchased the millstones called “French buhrstones” in Kansas and brought them to New Mexico, when he began to supply the Army with flour. His first mill at Mora was built out of wood that same year.<sup>50</sup> Throughout the 1850s and up until the present, the US Army had been the greatest promoter of commerce within the Territory, with its constant need of flour, hay, corn, salt, and cattle.<sup>51</sup>

Meanwhile, smallpox and malaria were still ravaging the river towns along the middle Rio Grande. As noted before Lt. Col. Roberts wanted to get the Regulars out into the open country which he said would be better than any doctor or medicine. Writing to Canby again from Fort Craig on the 17<sup>th</sup>, he outlined his proposal to keep the Regulars at the Fort and disperse five companies of Colonel Pino’s 2<sup>nd</sup> Foot Regiment along the river villages to guard his supply line. By doing this escorts would not have to march more than two days and the defense of the river towns would be increased. He lamented, “The habit of Mexican soldiers to have their wives follow the Camp, can in this way be somewhat indulged, as their families can be housed with them, and their general poverty will find relief in sharing the rations of the men.” He believed these measures would increase the flow of volunteers into the ranks and would also allow him to keep the Regulars and the Mounted Volunteers at the Fort, ready for any crisis. Of the latter, he wrote, “They serve exceeding well for scouting and picket duty.”<sup>52</sup>

The Regulars were very happy to receive all the new recruits coming in, inferior though they supposedly were, but every new company that was formed brought additional problems in supply and equipage. Chapman at Fort Union was especially beset by these difficulties. The situation of the inferior equipment and uniforms was aggravating the already strained relations between the Volunteers and the Regulars, and partial issue or no equipment at all was even worse. It is remarkable that the Volunteers endured all the shortages of rations and equipment, clothing and pay, not to mention the racial castigation quite patiently. But things were getting a bit thin in the Third Regiment - even they had limits. When Governor Rencher and his party, including his family, arrived at Fort Union he presented his orders to be furnished with “transportation and the Necessary Camp Equipage....and any other arrangements that may be necessary for the Safety and Comfort of the party.” After Rencher’s party had passed, Assistant Surgeon B.J.D. Irwin also needed an escort of “one non-commissioned officer and eight men to protect him on his journey to Fort Leavenworth.” It was more than Chapman could do since there were “no more kettles on hand.” Company C under Captain Sanches of the Mounted Third Regiment, newly recruited, had only mess pans and one iron pot and the next company to arrive, Company D, had just mustered in from Mora at the Fort and were given only mess pans and axes. On the 20<sup>th</sup> Doctor Irwin and a detail of six mounted Volunteers left for Fort Wise. But the Doctor, noted that “they are very destitute of the proper outfit,” and sent them back to Fort Union.<sup>53</sup> Without pay, and without the necessities of life in the field, with constant derision by the ‘Gringos,’ the volunteers everywhere were beginning to fairly seethe with rage. A very indignant Captain Severiana Martínez, Company D, Third Volunteer Regiment, wrote a scathing letter to his superior Colonel José Gallegos. He had been sent on patrol and he found his destitute men who had been detailed for the escort, straggling back towards Fort Union.

---

<sup>49</sup> Simmons, *Kit Carson and His Three Wives*, 114.

<sup>50</sup> Ray Marchi, *A Brief History of the St. Vrain Mill*, [http://moravalley.com/st\\_vrain\\_mill.htm](http://moravalley.com/st_vrain_mill.htm)

<sup>51</sup> National Park Service, *Fort Union, Chapter Five Fort Union and the Army in New Mexico During the Civil War*; [www.santafetrailresearch.com/fort-union-nm/fu-oliva-5a.html](http://www.santafetrailresearch.com/fort-union-nm/fu-oliva-5a.html)

<sup>52</sup> Wilson, *When the Texans Came*, Roberts to Canby 9/17/61, 128.

<sup>53</sup> Emmett, *Fort Union*, 248.

*I meet Six men of my Company, who by order of old Chapman were dispatched [sic] to the U.S. [with] a certain Doctor, a man of consideration, to whom my men were delivered by the accused [sic - probably meant 'accursed' rather than 'accused'] old man, seeing that they were not in any manner recommended by him [referring to Chapman's apparent dislike for the volunteers], to supply [sic] them with what was necessary to live upon nor on account of their pay, I determined to return them back to my Company. These miserable and unfortunate men with difficulty arrived here with their horses with their provisions behind them, and all this the fault of the old commander, I have referred [sic] to. I suppose he does so believing that we greasers, as they treat us, do not know to distinguish the bad faith with which they [the Anglo officers] conduct themselves in their duty.*

*My Colonel, I pray you, will have the kindness to cause your interpreter to explain to the commander Chapman what I say in this letter. I have met with no accident and will proceed on my march, God willing, with all the regularity possible [sic] to defend and protect the property of the federal government which has been confided under my orders...<sup>54</sup>*

Because most of the correspondences in the Official Records were written by 'Anglo' Officers it is difficult to appreciate what the Volunteers were going through at this time, however, this letter gives us a good idea. They were met with revulsion and condescension wherever they went. Almost everyone referred to the Hispanics as 'Greasers' and 'Coyotes,' even respectable people back in the States.<sup>55</sup> The Anglo volunteers fared better but they were still slighted by association with the 'inferior' people. Even men such as St. Vrain and Kit Carson were not always taken very seriously in their recommendations, as some people sometimes referred to them as having 'too much Injun in them,' or, as having 'gone native.' On the 20<sup>th</sup> of September Kit Carson took over in St. Vrain's stead as commander of the First Regiment. This was formalized by Governor Connelly on October 4<sup>th</sup> when he promoted Kit to Colonel and J. Francisco Chaves to Lt. Colonel.<sup>56</sup> As a result of the vacancies, Captain Arthur Morrison was promoted to Major and José Gutierrez became the Captain of Company B in his place.

By the 22<sup>nd</sup> of September Captain Moore of the 1st Dragoons (1st Cavalry) was reporting in from his camp near Manzano at Abo Pass. He was searching for a good location for a scout camp for the Volunteers in order to post them to watch the eastern and southeastern approaches from the Pecos River and Fort Stanton. Barrientos' company was still in the Manzano area under Moore's guidance. Moore was ordered to send them once again to the vicinity of Fort Stanton.<sup>57</sup> There seems to be some confusion in the correspondences between Captain Moore of the 1st Dragoons and Captain Morris of the Mounted Rifles no doubt because their names were so similar. On the same day, Canby reported to HQ in Saint Louis that recruitment of the Volunteers was proceeding well, "650 volunteers have been mustered into the service since my last report, and I think that six companies of the Fourth Regiment can be raised in this Territory and the remainder can be procured in Colorado." Canby also briefly reported Lt. Col. Chaves' altercation with the Navajos at Fort Fauntleroy.<sup>58</sup> Most of these new recruits would have been members of the Third Regiment.

On September 25<sup>th</sup> Mink's volunteers clashed with the Texans at Cañada Alamosa. This time the Volunteers didn't do so well. Mink had just been sent from Fort Craig to set up an advanced camp there. It seems from the start that Captain Mink did not enjoy a good rapport

---

<sup>54</sup> Official Records, Martínez to Gallegos 9/20/61.

<sup>55</sup> Sister Blandina Segale, At the End of the Santa Fe Trail (Bruce Publishing Company, Milwaukee), 18.

<sup>56</sup> Simmons, Kit Carson and His Three Wives, 114.

<sup>57</sup> Official Records, Chapin to Morris 9/22/61.

<sup>58</sup> Official Records, Canby to St. Louis 9/22/61.

with his men and things quickly disintegrated. He wanted to set up some breastworks for the protection of the camp but some of his men were not very cooperative about that. About 5pm his pickets reported seeing horsemen towards the south. He sent six men towards Laguna who reported back that they were Hubbell's men who were pasturing horses. Knowing that Hubbell was stationed on the east side of the river, Mink took this group to be deserters and he intended to arrest them if he got the chance, thus revealing his attitude towards the Hispanic Volunteers). Later when his pickets reported seeing mounted men again, he assumed they were still Hubbell's men. This was a big mistake. They were two companies of Texans under the command of a Captain Coopwood. Sometime between 2 and 3 in the morning Mink was aroused by a guard who had heard noises from the direction of the town.

He assembled his men and ordered them to saddle the horses, but something stampeded the herd, some said it was a gunshot but Mink did not hear it. He told 8 or 10 men to retrieve the mounts but more than 30 men left after them. As he had already detailed 10 men to guard a wagon train and five more were in the hospital at Fort Craig his company was seriously reduced. He only had about 40 men left in the camp. He was now outnumbered three to one. Then he heard a "terrible Indian yell" from the direction of the town but before he could give any orders he heard a shout that their camp had been located by the enemy, "Here's their camp; give them hell!" Firing broke out and the Texans retreated back to the town. John Morrin, a Union teamster, was wounded in the leg. Mink deduced from the amount of return fire that there were not very many of them and he and a few men went to the edge of town but did not find any Texans there.

When he returned to camp more of his men had skedaddled, probably after the horses. He asked for volunteers to mount and ride into the town with him and Lt. Medina, Sgt. Menett and a few others agreed to go with him. They quickly found out there were far more Texans than he had thought and they retreated back to camp. By daybreak he found he only had ten men left with him. Some Texans had taken a position on a hill to watch the area for any movement they might make and seeing that he was about to be charged by 60 men and could not retreat, he surrendered. Then he found out the Texans actually numbered 114 men. The next day Lt. Medina was wounded by friendly fire from some of Mink's men presumably that had not been captured. This indicates that some of Mink's scattered men were still fighting. Coopwood wrote that he had captured the two officers and 23 enlisted men of Mink's Company.<sup>59</sup> The enlisted men were paroled and sent away but Mink and Medina were held as prisoners. The war was over for them. Confederate Lt. Col. Baylor reported, "Capt. Coopwood with one hundred and eighteen men was ordered up to Fort Craig to reconnoiter, and had an engagement with the enemy, 180 strong, about Fort Thorn [Alamosa], losing two men killed and several wounded, he killing ten or twelve of the enemy."<sup>60</sup> Mink had not reported the loss of the two men killed but it's possible he had not known of any other casualties. At any rate, Captain Morris of the Mounted Rifles (3rd US Cavalry) arrived on the scene with Mounted Rifle companies C, G, and K. He sent word for Captain Hubbell to join him from across the River but Hubbell was out, presumably on patrol, so his brother Charles brought the remainder of the company to help Morris. With one contingent of his men flanking the Texan camp on the right, Morris advanced until both sides opened up a firefight which lasted one hour and forty-two minutes. Then he pulled back to see if he could draw them out of their position but they wouldn't follow, so he made camp in the village.<sup>61</sup> The Texans retreated the next day.

---

<sup>59</sup> Official Records, Coopwood 9/29/61.

<sup>60</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Baylor to Stith 9/28/61, 150.

<sup>61</sup> Official Records, Morris to Selden 9/29/61.





Alexander McRae

Meanwhile, Rossell, the commanding officer in Albuquerque, warned Chapin in Santa Fe that citizens in the Albuquerque area were refusing induction into the New Mexico Militia forces and that the Regulars would have to be ready to apply force as necessary.<sup>62</sup> Chapin had replaced Anderson as acting adjutant for Col. Canby. Alexander McRae at Fort Craig sent Rossell orders to send the two new companies of Volunteers from Albuquerque to Manzano to relieve Captain Moore's company.<sup>63</sup> With replacements on the way, on the 29th of September, Captain Moore left the camp near Manzano and headed for Fort Craig.<sup>64</sup>

Alexander McRae was born in 1829 in Fayetteville, North Carolina to a family that kept a few slaves. He studied at Newark College in Newark, Delaware and was accepted to West Point at seventeen years old. Four years later he joined the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen (RMR) which had been organized during the Mexican War. The Regiment performed very well during the war, but was plagued with desertions in its later years in the western United States, as most of the Regular units were. McRae joined the RMR in 1851 and was sent to serve in western Texas. After a leave of absence he returned to duty at Fort Union, New Mexico, in 1856 and was placed in command of Company E as a lieutenant for the next five years. Then he was transferred to Company F. He was sent east in early 1860 on recruiting duty and returned to New Mexico in September of that year when he was placed in command of Company K, since Captain Walker was away on leave. In January, 1861, he had participated in a battle under the command of Lt. Col. Crittendon against a Comanche-Kiowa coalition which was defeated. In April, 1861, he was sent to assist Alexander Hatch and neighbors in securing a treaty with the Comanches. No doubt, this is the peace referred to earlier. When the Civil War broke out McRae did not resign along with his fellow Southerners. In June he was sent to Fort Stanton as part of the garrison and received confirmation of his promotion to Captain while he was there. When brevet Lt. Col. Roberts shifted his command to Fort Craig in August McRae and his men went with him.<sup>65</sup>

### **October 1861**

On October 1st Confederate Colonel John Baylor reported to HQ that Captain James Walker had captured 48 New Mexican militiamen near Fort Stanton, however the captured unit was not identified. "They were disarmed and released on parole."<sup>66</sup> This unit is a total mystery since none of the Federal officers report this incident. It is possible that it was a local militia. At any rate, Baylor decided to abandon Fort Stanton as his force was spread out too far and Walker was losing too many men to Indians. On October 3 the Mesilla Times reported that the Apaches

---

<sup>62</sup> Official Records, Chapin to Rossell 9/27/61.

<sup>63</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, McRae to Rossell 9/27/61, 129.

<sup>64</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Moore 9/29/61, 167.

<sup>65</sup> Marion Cox Grinstead, Destiny at Valverde: the Life and Death of Alexander McRae (Socorro Historical Society, 1992), 31.

<sup>66</sup> Official Records, Baylor 10/1/61.

in southern New Mexico were on the warpath in a very big way. Messages from Pino Alto and the Rio Mimbres region brought surprising news. The small Apache groups had united as never before and appeared to be bent on the extermination of the foreigners. They were determined enough to attack a town of two or three hundred houses in broad daylight.<sup>67</sup> The Confederates continued to have more trouble from natives than from Yanks.

On a lighter note, on the 4th of October, Lt. Col. Chaves of the 1st Regiment complained that he was required to share his tent with Fr. Damasio Taladrid, the regimental Chaplain. He stated that the officers of the Regiment had only received fifteen tents out of the thirty-two authorized for an infantry regiment. It can be assumed that the enlisted men were no better off at this time. Without a doubt many of them just slept on the open ground. Chaves closed the letter with, "Hoping that the department commander will authorize me to retain this tent for my personal use."<sup>68</sup>

Col. Roberts at Fort Craig had other problems on his hands. On the 5th he wrote to Canby that all his problems at Fort Craig stemmed from drink. He charged that all the problems of the Territory came from the drunkenness of the officers. "If officers daily debauch themselves with whiskey, what can be expected of [the] men?" he lamented. He stated that he had decided to destroy all the whiskey houses near the Fort.<sup>69</sup> Chapman at Fort Union was beginning to encounter drinking problems also. Liquor vendors had moved onto the Army reservation again and started selling booze. Since none of the soldiers had been paid yet it was a good bet that the enlisted men were taking the fort apart, one piece at a time, for trade to the vendors. Col. Roberts also reported that Captains Moore and Mink were still posted with their companies ten miles below Fort Craig. He added that of the five Independent Volunteer companies under his command, they did not average 50 men each (Canby states that Roberts had four companies). Roberts was possibly counting Graydon's company which had not begun recruitment yet. He had Hubbell's, Mink's (what was left of it), Barrientos', Vidal's, and Hatch's, whose company was also just being currently organized. Captain James Graydon was on temporary duty in charge of Mink's men until his own company could be mustered.<sup>70</sup> With Mink and his Lieutenant captured someone had to run the company and luckily, Graydon was available. As it was, Graydon's company would not be ready until the end of October.

Captain Patrick "Paddy" Graydon was born in Lisnakea, Ireland, in 1832. He came to the US in his teens and joined the US Army, 1st Dragoons, as a bugler, arriving in Santa Fe in 1853. He had fair skin, blue eyes, and was about 5' 7" tall. In 1856 Graydon's company was sent to present-day southern Arizona where he served out his term. At the age of twenty-six he left the Army and opened a hotel called Casa Blanca, also known as the United States Boundary Hotel, in Arizona, near Fort Buchanan, 60 miles south of Tucson. His place was run with a good deal of controversy but not too much of it bothered him as he was also the self-proclaimed law in the area. In addition he served as a guide to the troops at Fort Buchanan. When the Dragoons left Fort Buchanan for New Mexico, Graydon went with them. He received a commission as a Captain authorized to recruit an independent company and he quickly mustered 84 Hispanics from Lemitar, New Mexico. Graydon designed his own silk battle-flag, a blue field with a white cross, and each recruit swore to the banner on his knees by "Jesús Cristo y Santa María" to be loyal and true to the Union. In all likelihood most of his recruits did not actually volunteer. Many people consider Graydon to be the most colorful man of the era, a quintessential western, self-made, "tough hombre." And this style of volunteering would have been entirely in keeping with his reputation. But it's also possible that he was more in tune with the cultural systems of

---

<sup>67</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, 150.

<sup>68</sup> National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 22.

<sup>69</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Canby 10/5/61, 130.

<sup>70</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Roberts to Canby 10/5/61, 130.

the Hispanics and knew how to motivate a large number of volunteers quickly, by using influential people to get the volunteers for him.<sup>71</sup>

In view of events in the south, Canby decided to shift more of his forces to the middle reserve point in Albuquerque during October. He ordered that the Regimental Headquarters and four companies of the 1st Volunteer Regiment be sent there – companies I, K, E, & H. However Fort Union did not have enough flour to provision the column so they had to wait for some to arrive from St. Vrain's mill at Mora before they could leave.<sup>72</sup> The flour arrived on October 10th and the companies finally left for Albuquerque on the 15th with Chacón designated as battalion commander. At Algodones a large number of the men somehow located a quantity of alcohol and became drunk. The Regular officers in the group began to fear for their lives and had to hide. Chacón, with the flat of his sword, and the help of his cousins and the rest of his company soon made short work of the carousers. Chacón states that after that the Americans treated him with respect.<sup>73</sup>



Rafael Chacon  
Captain Co. K  
1<sup>st</sup> NMVI

Col. Carson and the Regimental Staff established their Headquarters at Albuquerque on October 19th. At this time he was engaged in gaining recruits to fill out the regiment as well as training the men he had.<sup>74</sup> The remaining companies of the 1st Regiment stayed at Fort Union under the command of Lt. Col. Francisco Chaves, and were still working on the star fort (field works). Chacón says that at this time many officers, Carson and Chacón included, sent for their wives to come live with them at Albuquerque, and he fondly recalled Carson's conduct with his family, how loving he was to his wife and how playful with the children.<sup>75</sup>

Sometime in mid-October the trading company owned by the Spiegelberg Brothers was officially designated as the Sutler for the 1st Regiment at Fort Union. They moved in beside the other Sutler, William H. Moore, who was serving the Regular troops. As the Volunteers had not been paid yet, and the Regulars hadn't seen cash in a year, both Sutlers must have accepted a lot of credit if they did any business at all. Yet, despite regulations to the contrary, somehow liquor was still getting to the troops, some of whom became too drunk to work. Although it was known that others were selling liquor too, the Spiegelberg Brothers were accused of illegally selling it. They responded that their agent on site had been carefully instructed not to sell any liquor to the troops. Chapman replied that he had been doing that anyway, and now he had been ordered to stop. There doesn't seem to have been any further violation from their firm for the rest of the

---

<sup>71</sup> Jerry D. Thompson, Desert Tiger, and the Civil War in the far Southwest (University of Texas at El Paso, 1992).

<sup>72</sup> National Park Service, Fort Union: Chapter Five.

<sup>73</sup> Meketa, Legacy of Honor, 132-133.

<sup>74</sup> Simmons, Kit Carson and His Three Wives, 114.

<sup>75</sup> Meketa, Legacy of Honor, 123.

year.<sup>76</sup> Canby reminded Chapman about the eight mile limit (again) and told him he had authority to clear out the rumrunners. Besides drink, another problem occurring at Fort Union was that the jails were filling up with alleged Confederate sympathizers. Canby suggested that the jail at Mora could also be used and tried to find means to get hearings and trials to move faster.<sup>77</sup>

On October 11th Canby wrote to Governor Gilpin in Colorado that he was disappointed in the lack of recruits in Colorado. He had hoped the Coloradans could have relieved the Regulars at Fort Wise and Fort Garland for duty in New Mexico.<sup>78</sup> It didn't help that Captain Vidal's Independent Company was mustered out on October 12, 1861. On the 13th Canby authorized Captain E. Otis of the 1st Dragoons at Fort Wise to begin to raise his own volunteer companies, two infantry and two cavalry.<sup>79</sup> On the 18th of October Captain Samuel Archer commanding Albuquerque received Deus' and Chacón's companies (Companies I and K respectively, 1st Regiment) at his post. "The oaths of allegiance, which were administered to the above named Officers to-day, will be forwarded by tomorrow's express."<sup>80</sup> He didn't specifically mention Captain Deus himself. Perhaps he was absent at this time.

Deus was having problems with mounts. He states in his memoir that his company had been recruited as cavalry but had been mustered in as infantry. He was considering selling the horses and saddles that he owned in the company but Col. Carson told him not to, as he promised the company would be officially mounted. A man named O. P. Hovey was trying to buy horses for the N.M. Militia and Deus was tempted to take him up on it. But Carson prevailed and kept his promise to Deus.<sup>81</sup> Since these companies of the First Regiment had already been sworn in at Fort Union, the fact that they were sworn in again at Albuquerque indicates the confusion reigning as to the Volunteers. In addition, for some reason, some of Chacón's men had been enlisted for a shorter duration than the rest of the Regiment, for only six months instead of three years. Companies I & K remained at Albuquerque but companies E & H continued south to Lemitar, probably escorting a supply train on its way to Fort Craig.<sup>82</sup> Later, they returned to Fort Union. By the 22nd of October, companies of the 3rd Regiment were being sent out on patrols east and southeast of Fort Union. They were taking over responsibilities previously handled by the 1st Regiment.<sup>83</sup>

On the 23rd Governor Gilpin wrote to Canby that he had his hands full. He believed that the Confederate sympathizers in his Territory could be as many as 7,500 men and were well organized. The rebels had withdrawn for the present to gain strength from Native tribes who could form a formidable foe, and he believed they would soon return in force. Since the land in the eastern part of the Territory had no natural defenses he would require men in numbers to meet them. He also believed they intended to capture Fort Wise and Fort Garland. Thus he would not be able to send aid to New Mexico.<sup>84</sup> Once again battered by bad news, Canby reported to headquarters in St. Louis that nothing had changed since his report on of the 20<sup>th</sup>. Twelve companies of Regulars and eleven of Volunteers were now stationed at Fort Craig. Two of the Cavalry companies had been combined into an artillery battery of four tubes (two 6#, and two 12# howitzers) were soon to be on their way to Fort Craig. Garrisons for Forts Garland and Wise

---

<sup>76</sup> National Park Service, Fort Union: Chapter Five.

<sup>77</sup> National Park Service, Fort Union: Chapter Five.

<sup>78</sup> Official Records, Canby to Gilpin 10/11/61.

<sup>79</sup> Official Records, Canby to Otis 10/13/61.

<sup>80</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Archer to Canby 10/18/61, 131.

<sup>81</sup> Ed. Daniel B. Castello, Captain Charles Deus on the Frontier (written at Deus' dictation - a manuscript memoir located by Tim Kimball in the NMSU Library, MSC 3475, Las Cruces, NM), 27.

<sup>82</sup> National Archives, Compiled Service Records, E522 U5 Roll 22.

<sup>83</sup> Official Records, Nicodemus to Chapman 10/22/61.

<sup>84</sup> Official Records, Gilpin to Canby 10/23/61.

had not yet been furnished by Colorado, and he reported that recruiting was also very slow in New Mexico.<sup>85</sup>

Canby, whose investigation of the events at Fort Fauntleroy had apparently been stalled, was still keeping a close watch on the officers of the 2nd Regiment. On the 30<sup>th</sup> Captain Alexander McRae of the Regulars reported that Colonel Miguel Pino was AOL [absent without leave] in Santa Fe, since he had not gained any new recruits. "That this want of success is due to a lack of exertion on the part of the officers detailed for this duty is plain from the fact that Captain Graydon of the independent Mounted Volunteers, who has just returned here, after an absence of less than eight days, has succeeded in raising sixty men. ...the aggregate of the four volunteer companies [of the 2nd Regiment] is 254..."<sup>86</sup>

Obviously, Pino had not tried Graydon's recruiting methods. Captain James Hubbell's company mustered out the same day. The remainder of Captain John Mink's company had mustered out the day before. Mink could not reenlist but Hubbell proceeded to organize a new company which became Company B of the 5th Mounted Volunteer Regiment. Hubbell's brother Charles would remain with him as his 1st Lt., but his 2nd Lt., Francisco Aragon, decided to go out on his own. He joined the Perea Battalion as a Captain and proceeded to 'recruit' his own company by hiring expressmen. The constables that were combing the countryside provided him with seventy-four 'volunteers.' When the men were delivered those who had rounded them up turned in receipts such as the following:

*The United States to O. P. Hovey, November 13, 1861, For amount paid for Collecting recruits from the 3d Division for Captain Francisco Aragon's Co. as per....vouchers herewith viz: For Amount paid Expressmen, constable, \$68.75. [signed] Francisco Aragon, Capitan, N.M. Militia.*<sup>87</sup>

Men who had not joined the Volunteers or Militia were rounding up those who would. O. P. Hovey had been appointed by Governor Connelly as the commander of all New Mexico Militia with the rank of Major General. His Adjutant was General Clever.<sup>88</sup> As noted before, there wasn't enough money to supply the militia, but it is curious that there was enough to pay to round them up. The Perea Battalion was raised by Colonel Francisco Perea to serve for three months. They were in fact the 3rd New Mexico Militia Division but they are referred to historically as the Perea Battalion. Francisco Perea was a cousin to José Francisco Chaves of the 1st Regiment. He was born in Las Padillas to Juan Perea and Josefa Chaves in 1830. He attended local private schools in his youth and from 1843 to 1845 he studied at a Jesuit college in St. Louis. He received further education in New York City from 1847 to 1849. After that he raised cattle and conducted trade on the Santa Fe Trail. Like his cousin, Francisco, he became a member of the Territorial Council in 1858. He was appointed Colonel by President Lincoln. "...after consultation with his grandfather and with his uncle, José Leandro Perea, became active in his efforts for the Union, visiting many localities in the Territory and urging the people to remain steadfast for the government." During the summer he had helped raise the 2nd Regiment and now he was mustering his own unit at his own expense.<sup>89</sup> Perea's unit recruited almost 500 men in five companies to serve for three months. Besides Aragon, the other four captains in the battalion were Juan de Dias (Dios?) Baca, Francisco Montoya, Augusto del Balle, and John R.

---

<sup>85</sup> Official Records, Canby to St. Louis 10/27/61.

<sup>86</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, McRae 10/30/61, 133.

<sup>87</sup> Emmett, Fort Union, 242.

<sup>88</sup> Ed. Jerry D. Thompson, "The Civil War Diary of Major Charles Emil Wesche," Password Vol. XXXIX, No. 1, 1994, 43.

<sup>89</sup> Twitchell, Leading Facts II, 399, footnote 323.

Hubbell who was probably a relative of James and Charles Hubbell. It appears that recruitment for the militia was so difficult at this point, that men were being pressed into service at gunpoint.



Colonel Francisco Perea

Some things must be said in order to understand why New Mexicans who were ‘dragooned’ into service performed so well once engaged in their duties. They certainly had many opportunities to desert on the lonely frontier, but by and large they didn’t. A few Hispanos deserted but less than Anglo companies on the frontier, whose desertion rates were sometimes as high as 25%. In California some entire companies of US Regulars ran for the gold fields. It is a fact that thousands of New Mexicans showed up willingly, or unwillingly, and stayed on duty despite poor food, hard labor, lonely vigilance, lack of pay, and worse, constant disparagement by the foreigners they were serving. In addition, most of the men knew that their families were hungry and exposed to Indian attacks back home. Americans in the northern states did no better when only small percentages of them enlisted voluntarily and a draft had to be invoked in order to bring the numbers up. Was the American who stood on the docks to find the next pauper just off a boat from Europe in order to pay him to be drafted in his place, any better than a New Mexican peasant who hid in the woods because this war of foreigners didn’t make any sense?

So why, once ‘dragooned,’ did they fight so well under Americans? Why did the New Mexicans respond well to men like James Hubbell, Paddy Graydon, Kit Carson and others, and so poorly to other Anglo leaders? The answer was aptly explained by Kit who said that, “When well officered, their courage is unquestionable.” That went for their loyalty also – loyalty and courage. New Mexicans really appreciated a competent leader who was aggressive and knew what he was doing. What troops ever didn’t. The New Mexicans asked a lot of themselves and in turn they expected even more from their leaders. That’s why bookworms like Canby, Roberts, and Chapman could never gain their respect. To be sure, Canby was personally very brave in battle, but his actions up to this point were not inspiring anyone. He must have appeared terribly confused and indecisive – a man who only wanted to have his men build forts and stand in line for roll call, without pay. A more aggressive man would have retaken Mesilla, Fort Fillmore, Fort Stanton, and Fort Bliss by now. Action would have satisfied many a volunteer. But Canby would not even allow the troops to respond to Indian depredations, and sometimes, to the New Mexicans, they were personal ones. This was a fact that only corroborated what they had learned about him during the previous Navajo campaign. He was a slow and cautious leader. The NM Volunteers knew from experience that such a man would not win peace on this frontier.

Another good question is why did New Mexicans go along with the drafting by agents of the law, and once caught serve so well? Surely the answer goes back to the ancient Hispanic traditions of recruiting for a campaign. It was done by custom and peer pressure. Tio Juan or some relative or neighbor would send a son, vaquero, or peon over to your place to let you know your services were required and if you didn’t want to be at odds with your extended family and neighbors you showed up. If you didn’t want to go you could conveniently be out hunting. The peones, if they didn’t want to be found, would go looking for a lost sheep or out to fetch

firewood, etc. If it was a genuinely urgent need almost everyone would show up, leaving enough peones and younger sons to protect the homesteads and flocks of course. Governor-General Manuel Armijo, whom almost no one respected, had once collected 3,000 men in three days in this way and more were on the way. The simple truth was that New Mexicans loved to go on campaign - the thrill of the hunt, the camaraderie on the trail, the exhilaration of battle and honors it brought to the individual as well as the group. And the plunder that could be captured was more of a sign of bravery and honor rather than just an extension of riches. But these were not just mere trophies for bragging rights. They were proof of the skills needed for survival. Also, as an ancient law, military service was officially expected of every male citizen in lieu of paying taxes. Often it had to be done at great expense to impoverished families who sometimes sold children to pay for the horse and equipment.<sup>90</sup> It was all just part of the game and if you were caught shirking you pretended innocence, went along with it, and did your best, or were shamed when you went home. It was a harsh life but that's the way it was.

The First Militia Regiment, the umbrella organization for the Territorial National Guard had at least three "divisions." This was a New Mexico term and was not used in the regular military sense. They were actually quite small and should have been termed regiments or battalions instead of divisions. The First Militia Division (1st NMMD) was commanded by Colonel Manuel Armijo, either a descendent or namesake of 'His Excellency' Governor-General Armijo. His second in command was Lt. Colonel Diego Archuleta, the son of Juan Andres Archuleta, the Colonel of Militia who had found the Texans at Laguna, NM, in 1841.

Diego Archuleta was born in 1814 in Plaza Alcalde. As a boy he studied under Fr. Martinez in Taos and later, in Durango, Mexico. He intended to become a priest, but after giving up that idea he returned home to New Mexico in 1840 where he was made a Captain of Militia. He had served in the 1841 Texan Invasion crisis as a Captain when he helped Manuel Chaves round up Colonel Cooke. Also in 1841 he married Jesusita Trujillo by whom he had seven children. He was elected as a Deputy to the National Mexican Congress where he served for two years. Returning in 1845 he became a member of the Territorial Congress. At the time of the American Invasion crisis in 1846 he was second in command of the New Mexico forces under Armijo. During the negotiations with the Americans he agreed not to fight them in exchange for land which he never received. In late 1846 and early 1847, although he had helped organized the conspiracies to overthrow the Americans, he escaped capture and was exonerated, and swore allegiance to the United States. In 1857 he became the US Indian Agent to the Utes and Apaches. He and part of the 1st Militia Division would serve at Fort Union. However President Lincoln would soon send him back to his position as Indian Agent, and Governor Connelly would promote him to Brigadier General of the Militia.<sup>91</sup>



Diego Archuleta

---

<sup>90</sup> Don Pedro Baptista Pino, The Exposition on the Province of New Mexico, 1812 (El Rancho de las Golondrinas and the University of New Mexico Press, Santa Fe and Albuquerque, 1995).

<sup>91</sup> Ralph Emerson Twitchell, Military Occupation of New Mexico (Arno Press, New York, 1976), 240-247.

The 2nd Division was led by Colonel Nicolás Pino, older brother of Miguel E. Pino, Colonel of the 2nd Regiment. Nicolás was born in 1819 in Galisteo to parents Don Pedro Bautista Pino and María Baca and had moved to Socorro as a young man where he became a successful merchant like his father. He married Juana Rascon in 1842. Nicolás had begun his militia career with the Americans the same time as Manuel Chaves with Ceran St. Vrain's volunteer company of 1846-47 and he remained active with the militia mostly in the Socorro/Lemitar area. His second in command was Lt. Col. Jesús Maria Baca y Salazar, who was followed by Major Charles Emil Wesche.



L-R: Col. Nicholas Pino, Major Charles Wesche; 2<sup>nd</sup> Militia Division.

Major Wesche was a Prussian by birth, born in 1831, the youngest of twenty-four children. When 18 years old in 1849 he emigrated to Guatemala and Costa Rica where he became successful as a merchant. Eventually he moved to San Francisco and then Durango, Mexico, but he lost most of his wealth during the 1857 revolution. Then he moved to Santa Fe and did quite well. He could speak seven languages, five of them fluently. He became an American citizen and a War Democrat in 1861. The unit included ten medium-sized companies, some of which were infantry, but as of yet they had not been activated.<sup>92</sup>

On the 30th of October Captain Barrientos, still near Manzano, had trouble with Native Americans who were trying to steal horses. He solved the problem almost single-handedly, a fact that he could not help mentioning in his report, adding that the deed “seems to me mere child’s play...” Navajo raiders had stolen most of the horses belonging to Captain Gonzales’ and Captain Sarracino’s companies who had been posted at Abo (near the current village of Mountaineer). Barrientos had chased the thieves with fifty-seven men only two of which were able to keep up with him. Fifty-eight horses were recaptured, one was killed and another injured, and one Native had been killed.<sup>93</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> Thompson, Civil War Diary, 46.

<sup>93</sup> Wilson, When the Texans Came, Barrientos to Canby 10/30/61, 168.