

They are less frequently achievement oriented, and morally and intellectually less autonomous. They are more conservative on matters of social and religious morality. In the field of public policy, he reports, Catholics tend to be more "welfare" oriented than Protestants, and they give less support to civil rights.¹²

In the dimensions covered in our survey, there is some slight support for Lenski's thesis that Catholics are more traditional than Protestants, yet the differences are so small as to be negligible. Far more important is the finding that in the three of our countries where both denominations are present in substantial numbers — the United States, Britain, and Germany — Protestants and Catholics have similar structural political orientations. In other words, the two denominations do not constitute political subcultures in the structural sense of the term. Certainly in all three countries there is a strong relation between denominational and party preference. And had our study included public policy, morality, and value questions, then greater differences would probably have come to light.

Other demographic characteristics, such as age, region, and city size have been treated only in specific contexts in our study. We are unable to treat them more systematically because of the priorities of our research design. We were concerned primarily with national rather than subcultural patterns, and with attitudes toward the political system rather than public policy. Investigation of the phenomena of political subcultures and of their relationship to demographic characteristics requires a research design of its own.

¹² Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, Garden City, New York, 1961, chaps. 4 and 8.

CHAPTER XIII

The Civic Culture and Democratic Stability

THUS FAR WE have concentrated upon one aspect of political systems: that which we call political culture. The bulk of this book has dealt with the similarities and differences in the patterns of political attitudes found in the five nations. We have attempted to describe these similarities and differences as well as to explain them; to relate political attitudes to the structure of politics and to general attitudes toward people and society. In all this the political culture has been the focus of our attention. When other aspects of the political system have been brought into the discussion, it has usually been because of their impact on the political culture. But an important question remains to be dealt with: what is the impact of a political culture on the political system of which it is a part?

The five nations we have studied are democracies, though quite different from one another in their characteristics and their political histories. We shall therefore consider the way in which political culture affects democratic government; more specifically, we shall ask how far it goes toward creating and maintaining stable and effective democracy. Is there a democratic political culture — a pattern of political attitudes that fosters democratic stability, that in some way "fits" the democratic political sys-

tem? To answer this question we must look at the political culture in the two relatively stable and successful democracies, Great Britain and the United States. As we have said, the political cultures of these two nations approximate the civic culture. This pattern of political attitudes differs in some respects from the "rationality-activist" model, or the model of political culture which, according to the norms of democratic ideology, would be found in a successful democracy. Civics texts would have us believe that the problem facing the citizen in a democracy is, to quote the title of a recent book in the field, *How to Be an Active Citizen*.¹ According to this rationality-activist view, a successful democracy requires that citizens be involved and active in politics, informed about politics, and influential. Furthermore, when they make decisions, particularly the important decision of how to cast their vote, they must make them on the basis of careful evaluation of evidence and careful weighing of alternatives. The passive citizen, the nonvoter, the poorly informed or apathetic citizen — all indicate a weak democracy. This view of democratic citizenship stresses activity, involvement, rationality. To use the terminology we have developed, it stresses the role of the participant and says little about the role of the subject or parochial.

Recent studies of political behavior call the rationality-activist model into question, for it is becoming clear that citizens in democracies rarely live up to this model. They are not well informed, not deeply involved, not particularly active; and the process by which they come to their voting decision is anything but a process of rational calculation.² Nor does this model accurately represent the civic culture we have found in Britain and the United States. It is true — and this point is both substantively important as well as indicative of the usefulness of comparative data — that the informed, involved, rational, and active citizen is more frequently found in the

¹ Paul Douglass and Alice McMahon, *How to Be an Active Citizen*, Gainesville, Fla., 1960.

² See, for instance, Berelson *et al.*, *Voting*, chap. XIV; Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, chap. X, and Julian L. Woodward and Elmo Roper, "Political Activity of American Citizens," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (1950), pp. 872-85.

successful than in the unsuccessful democracies. The characteristics of the rationality-activist model of democratic citizenship are indeed components of the civic culture; but the point to be stressed here is that they are only *part* of that culture.

The civic culture is a mixed political culture. In it many individuals are active in politics, but there are also many who take the more passive role of subject. More important, even among those performing the active political role of the citizen, the roles of subject and parochial have not been displaced. The participant role has been added to the subject and parochial roles. This means that the active citizen maintains his traditional, nonpolitical ties, as well as his more passive political role as a subject. It is true that the rationality-activist model of the citizen does not imply that participant orientations replace subject and parochial ones; but by not mentioning the latter two roles explicitly, it does imply that they are irrelevant to the democratic political culture.

Actually, these two orientations do more than persist: they play an important part in the civic culture. In the first place, the parochial and subject orientations modify the intensity of the individual's political involvement and activity. Political activity is but one part of the citizen's concerns, and usually not a very important part at that. The maintenance of other orientations limits the extent of his commitment to political activity and keeps politics, as it were, in its place. Furthermore, not only do the parochial and subject orientations persist side by side with the participant orientations, but they penetrate and modify the participant orientations. Primary affiliations, for instance, are important in the patterns of citizen influence. In addition, a diffuse set of social attitudes and interpersonal attitudes tends to affect the content of the political attitudes — to make them less intense and divisive. Penetrated by primary group orientations and by general social and interpersonal attitudes, political attitudes are not solely the results of articulated principle and rational calculation.

How can we explain the discrepancy between the ideals of the rationality-activist model and the patterns of political

attitudes we actually find, even in the more stable and successful democracies? One possible explanation, and the one most often found in the literature on civic education, is that this discrepancy is evidence for the malfunctioning of democracy. Insofar as people do not live up to the ideal of the active citizen, democracy is a failure. If one believes that the realities of political life should be molded to fit one's theories of politics, such an explanation is satisfactory. But if one holds to the view that theories of politics should be drawn from the realities of political life — a somewhat easier and probably more useful task — then this explanation of the gap between the rationality-activist model and democratic realities is less acceptable. From the latter point of view, one would probably argue that the gap exists because the standards have been set unreasonably high. Given the complexity of political affairs, given the other demands made upon an individual's time, and given the difficulty of obtaining information necessary for making rational political decisions, it is no wonder that the ordinary citizen is not the ideal citizen. In the light of an individual's nonpolitical interests, it might be quite irrational to invest in political activity the time and effort needed to live up to the rationality-activist model. It may just not be worth it to be that good a citizen.

But though a completely activist political culture may be a utopian ideal, there may be other, more significant reasons why an intricately mixed civic culture is found in the more successful democracies. The civic culture, which sometimes contains apparently contradictory political attitudes, seems to be particularly appropriate for democratic political systems, for they, too, are mixtures of contradictions. Harry Eckstein has suggested that a democratic political system requires a blending of apparent contradictions — he calls them “balanced disparities” — if it is to function effectively. On the one hand, a democratic government must govern; it must have power and leadership and make decisions. On the other hand, it must be responsible to its citizens. For if democracy means anything, it means that in some way governmental elites must respond to the desires and demands of citizens. The need to maintain this sort of balance between governmental power

and governmental responsiveness, as well as the need to maintain other balances that derive from the power/responsiveness balance — balances between consensus and cleavage, between affectivity and affective neutrality — helps explain the way in which the more mixed patterns of political attitudes associated with the civic culture are appropriate to a democratic political system.³

Power and Responsiveness. The maintenance of a proper balance between governmental power and governmental responsiveness represents one of the most important and difficult tasks of a democracy. Unless there is some control of governmental elites by nonelites, it is hard to consider a political system democratic. On the other hand, nonelites cannot themselves rule. If a political system is to be effective — if it is to be able to initiate and carry out policies, adjust to new situations, meet internal and external challenges — there must be mechanisms whereby governmental officials are endowed with the power to make authoritative decisions. The tensions produced by the need to pursue the opposing goals of governmental power and governmental responsiveness become most apparent in times of crisis. Wars, for instance (hot or cold), have often shifted the balance so far in the direction of governmental power and authority as to cause concern about the preservation of democratic responsiveness. Yet if the balance is not so shifted, it is argued that democratic governments may succumb to external challenges.

Crises bring to the fore the problem of maintaining an adequate balance, but the problem exists in the day-to-day running of a democracy. How can a governmental system be constructed so that a balance is maintained between power and responsiveness? As E. E. Schattschneider has put it, “The

³ The contradictory demands placed upon democratic political systems have been stressed in some as yet unpublished lectures by Professor Harry Eckstein, upon which this chapter draws. The authors are grateful for the opportunity to see his notes on this subject. That democratic systems are called upon to pursue apparently opposing goals is also stressed in Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIV, and in Parsons, “Voting and the Equilibrium of the American Political System,” in Burdick and Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior*, Glencoe, Ill., 1959.

problem is not how 180 million Aristotles can run a democracy, but how we can organize a community of 180 million ordinary people so that it remains sensitive to their needs. This is a problem of *leadership, organization, alternatives, and systems of responsibility and confidence.*"⁴ In trying to resolve this problem, political scientists have usually spoken in terms of the structure of electoral conflict. An electoral system, designed to turn power over to a particular elite for a limited period of time, can achieve a balance between power and responsiveness: the elites obtain power, yet this power is limited by the periodic elections themselves, by the concern for future elections during the interelection period, and by a variety of other formal and informal checks. For a system of this sort to work, there must obviously be more than one party (or at least some competing elite group with the potentiality of gaining power) to make the choice among elites meaningful; and at the same time there must be some mechanism whereby an elite group can exercise effective power—perhaps by the giving of all power to the victorious party in a two-party system, or by the formation of workable coalitions among a group of parties. Most of the debate on the most appropriate electoral system for a democracy (proportional representation, single member districts, or some mixed form) has revolved around two questions: how to maximize the competing goals of power and responsiveness, and how to decide which goal deserves greater stress.⁵ There has also been much concern over the proper organization of political parties to maximize both of these goals. This concern clearly motivated the members of the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties, when, in their report, they called for a political party system that is ". . . democratic, responsible, and effective—a system that is accountable to

⁴ E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, New York, 1960, p. 138. Italics in original.

⁵ On this continuing debate, see, among others, Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, *Voting in Democracies*, London, 1955; F. A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy*, South Bend, Ind., 1941, and M. Duverger, *Political Parties*, London, 1954.

the public, respects and expresses differences of opinion, and is able to cope with the great problems of modern government."⁶

The tension between power and responsiveness can be managed to some extent by the structure of partisan conflict. But our main interest is in the relationship between this tension and political culture, particularly the civic culture. Can the set of attitudes held by citizens help to maintain the delicate balance between the contradictory demands placed on a democratic system? This concentration upon the political attitudes of ordinary citizens does not imply a rejection of the important role of political structures or of elite attitudes and behavior. These are important as well, and we shall return to them below when we consider the way in which the attitudes of ordinary citizens and of elites interact.

The tension between governmental power and responsiveness has a parallel in the conflicting demands made upon the citizens of a democratic system. Certain things are demanded of the ordinary citizen if elites are to be responsive to him: the ordinary citizen must express his point of view so that elites can know what he wants; he must be involved in politics so that he will know and care whether or not elites are being responsive, and he must be influential so as to enforce responsive behavior by the elites. In other words, elite responsiveness requires that the ordinary citizen act according to the rationality-activist model of citizenship. But if the alternate pole of elite power is to be achieved, quite contradictory attitudes and behavior are to be expected of the ordinary man. If elites are to be powerful and make authoritative decisions, then the involvement, activity, and influence of the ordinary man must be limited. The ordinary citizen must turn power over to elites and let them rule. The need for elite power requires that the ordinary citizen be relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites. Thus the democratic citizen is called on to pursue contradictory goals; he

⁶ "Toward a More Responsible Two Party System," a report of the Committee on Political Parties, of the American Political Science Association, *American Political Science Review*, XLIV (1950), Special Supplement, p. 17.

must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential.⁷

NORMS, PERCEPTIONS, AND ACTIVITY

The data presented in this book suggest some ways in which these conflicting demands might be managed. The crucial cases for our analysis are clearly Britain and the United States, for if there is some pattern of attitudes that can allow this tension to be managed, one might expect it to act most effectively within the relatively more stable democracies. It is in these two nations that we found the closest approximation to the civic culture. Our data suggest that in two broad ways the civic culture maintains the citizen's active-influential role as well as his more passive role: on the one hand, there is in the society a *distribution* of individuals who pursue one or the other of the conflicting citizen goals; on the other hand, certain *inconsistencies in the attitudes of an individual* make it possible for him to pursue these seemingly conflicting goals at the same time. Let us first consider the inconsistencies within the individual.

As our survey showed, there exists a gap between the *actual political behavior* of our respondents, on the one hand, and their *perceptions of their capacities to act* and their *obligations to act*, on the other. Respondents in Britain and the

⁷ It should be clear that the tension described here is not the same as that between the obligations of the citizen and the obligations of the subject, as discussed in Chapter I. There we dealt with the fact that the democratic citizen has a set of role expectations within the input structure of the political system. He is expected to participate in some ways in decisions. At the same time he has "subject" obligations toward the output aspects of the political system. He is expected to abide by decisions once they are made. This mixture, too, is part of the civic culture. But the tension described in this section is not between an individual's role in relation to the input structure (i.e., as citizen) and his role in relation to the output structure (i.e., as subject) — a tension that at least in theory appears fairly easy to resolve. Rather, the tension described here is between two modes of relating to the input structures. The citizen has both to be influential and to affect the course of policy; at the same time he must be noninfluential and allow political elites to make decisions independently. Thus the tension we are describing lies within the role of citizen.

United States manifest high frequencies of what we have called subjective political competence. As reported in Chapter VI, a large proportion considers itself able to influence the decisions of the local government, and a substantial, though not quite as large, proportion feels the same way about the activities of the national government. Yet this high estimation of one's competence as an influential citizen is certainly not matched by actual political behavior. In the first place, only a small proportion of those respondents who say they could influence the government report that they have ever attempted such influence. And even if those who think they could influence governmental decisions were to attempt to do so — which is unlikely — they would almost certainly not have the success that they believe they would have. It is clearly an exaggeration when 40 per cent of American respondents or 24 per cent of the British say that there is some likelihood that an attempt of theirs to influence the national legislature would be successful.

A similar gap exists between the sense of obligation to participate in political life and actual participation. As reported in Chapter V, a much higher proportion of respondents says that the ordinary man has some obligation to participate in the affairs of his local community than in fact does participate; and again the pattern is clearest in the United States and Britain. As one respondent, quoted in Chapter V, put it, "I'm saying what [one] ought to do, not what I do." And there is evidence that this position is far from rare. Certainly, the sense of obligation to take some part in one's community affairs is not matched by the importance attributed to such activity by respondents. The proportion saying that one has such obligations is in each nation much larger than the proportion that, when asked to report on its free-time activities, reports participation in *community affairs*. Fifty-one per cent of the American respondents report that the ordinary man ought to take some active part in the affairs of his community. But when asked what they do in their free time, only about 10 per cent of the American respondents mention such activities. And when Gillespie and Allport asked a somewhat

differently phrased question of youth in the United States, only about one in five said that he expected community participation to be a source of satisfaction.⁸ This suggests that though there is a widespread norm that one ought to participate within the community, active participation is far from the most significant activity to most people. It is not what most people do in their spare time, nor is it the major source of satisfaction, joy, and excitement.

These two gaps — between a high perception of potential influence and a lower level of actual influence, and between a high frequency of expressed obligation to participate and the actual importance and amount of participation — help explain how a democratic political culture can act to maintain a balance between governmental elite power and governmental elite responsiveness (or its complement, a balance between nonelite activity and influence and nonelite passivity and noninfluence). The comparative infrequency of political participation, its relative lack of importance for the individual, and the objective weakness of the ordinary man allow governmental elites to act. The inactivity of the ordinary man and his inability to influence decisions help provide the power that governmental elites need if they are to make decisions. But this maximizes only one of the contradictory goals of a democratic system. The power of the elites must be kept in check. The citizen's opposite role, as an active and influential enforcer of the responsiveness of elites, is maintained by his strong commitment to the norm of active citizenship, as well as by his perception that he can be an influential citizen. This may be in part a myth, for it involves a set of norms of participation and perceptions of ability to influence that are not quite matched by actual political behavior. Yet the very fact that citizens hold to this myth — that they see themselves as influential and as obligated to take an active role — creates a potentiality of citizen influence and activity. The subjectively competent citizen, as was pointed out in Chapter VI, has not necessarily attempted to influence the government, but he is *more likely* to have made such attempts

⁸ James M. Gillespie and Gordon W. Allport, *Youth's Outlook on the Future*, New York, 1955, p. 57.

than is the citizen who does not consider himself competent.⁹

A citizen within the civic culture has, then, a reserve of influence. He is not constantly involved in politics, he does not actively oversee the behavior of political decision makers. But he does have the potential to act if there is need. This reserve of influence — influence potential that is inactive and uncommitted to the political system — was best illustrated by the data, presented in Chapter VI, on the ability of citizens to create political structures in time of need. The citizen is not a constant political actor. He is rarely active in political groups. But he thinks that he can mobilize his ordinary social environment, if necessary, for political use. He is not the active citizen: he is the potentially active citizen.

Yet the intermittent and potential character of the citizen's political activity and involvement depends upon steadier, more persistent types of political behavior. By living in a civic culture, the ordinary man is more likely than he would be otherwise to maintain a steady and high rate of exposure to political communications, to be a member of an organization, and to engage in informal political discussion. These activities do not in themselves indicate an active participation in the decision-making process of a society; but they do make such participation more possible. They prepare the individual for intervention in the political system; and more important perhaps, they create a political environment in which citizen involvement and participation are more feasible.

We have been saying that inconsistencies within attitudes and inconsistencies between attitudes and behavior, rather than the one-sided attitudes of the rationality-activist model, can maintain the tension between citizen activity and citizen passivity. But now we must ask whether these inconsistencies cause instability in the civic culture. Much of the recent theorizing about attitude formation emphasizes the strain toward consistency or consonance among the beliefs, attitudes, and behavior of an individual; there now exists a large body of data to support the theory that cognitive inconsistencies will produce a stress toward the reduction of those inconsisten-

⁹ On the importance of the democratic myth, see, V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, New York, 1961, p. 547.

cies.¹⁰ But as we have seen, the balance between citizen influence and citizen passivity *depends upon the inconsistencies* between political norms and perceptions, on the one hand, and political behavior, on the other. This inconsistency, however, creates no undue strain within the citizen; for politics, as much of our data suggest and as the data from many other studies confirm, is not the uppermost problem in his mind. Compared with other concerns, politics is usually invested with relatively little affect or involvement. Thus inconsistencies among attitudes or between attitudes and behavior can be more easily tolerated, for they can be overlooked or ignored. As Rosenberg and Abelson have put it, “. . . potential imbalance will remain undiscovered by an individual unless he is motivated to think about the topic and in fact does so.”¹¹ Because politics has little importance for them, few citizens are motivated to think about their influence or their political activities.

That politics has relatively little importance for citizens is an important part of the mechanism by which the set of inconsistent political orientations keeps political elites in check, without checking them so tightly as to make them ineffective. For the balance of inconsistent orientations would be more difficult to maintain if the issues of politics were always considered important by the citizens. If issues arise that individuals consider important, or if some relatively severe dissatisfaction with government occurs, the individual will be motivated to think about the topic and thus will be under greater pressure to resolve the inconsistency — to make attitudes and behavior consonant with each other. One way he may do this is to bring his behavior into line with norms and

¹⁰ Some of the important literature developing this theory includes: Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, Evanston, Ill., 1957; F. Heider, *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*, New York, 1958; C. E. Osgood, C. J. Suci, and P. H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning*, Urbana, Ill., 1957, and M. J. Rosenberg *et al.*, *Attitude Organization and Change*, New Haven, Conn., 1960. See also the special issue of the *Public Opinion Quarterly* on attitude change, XXIV (Summer 1960), especially the articles by Zajonc, Cohen, Rosenberg, and Osgood.

¹¹ Milton J. Rosenberg and Robert F. Abelson, “Analysis of Cognitive Balancing,” in Rosenberg *et al.*, *op. cit.*, chap. IV, p. 121.

perceptions by becoming politically active. Thus the inconsistency between attitudes and behavior acts as a latent or potential source of political influence and activity.

To say that the civic culture maintains the balance between power and responsibility suggests a further point about democratic politics. It suggests why unresolved political issues of great importance eventually create instability in a democratic political system. The balance between activity and passivity can be maintained only if the issues of politics are relatively mild. If politics becomes intense, and if it remains intense because of some salient issue, the inconsistency between attitude and behavior will become unstable. But any relatively permanent resolution of the inconsistency is likely to have unfortunate consequences. If behavior is brought into line with attitudes, the amount of attempted control of elites by nonelites will create governmental ineffectiveness and instability. On the other hand, if attitudes change to match behavior, the resulting sense of impotence and noninvolvement will have damaging consequences for the democratic quality of the political system.

However, this does not suggest that all important issues damage a democratic political system. It is only when issues become intense and remain intense that the system may be made unstable.¹² If significant issues arise only sporadically

¹² It is important to stress the term *issues* used in this connection. Not all salient political events are issues, i.e., points of dispute. This model applies best to those political disputes in which individuals are involved and have relatively specific demands that they would like satisfied by the government. The content of some political events may be so distant from the individual that, though he may consider the events important, he is in no position to formulate demands relevant to them; thus even if the issue is significant, he will exert less pressure on political elites than he would on other issues. (Warren Miller has found that there is a closer relationship between the views of constituents and their Congressmen on such subjects as civil rights and welfare than on foreign policy. The relatively greater distance of foreign policy issues from the ordinary man might explain this. See Miller, “Policy Preferences of Congressional Candidates and Constituents,” paper delivered at the meetings of the American Political Science Association, September 1961.)

Some political crises that are not issues — i.e., not subjects of disputes among the citizens of a nation or between the citizens and the elites — may

and if the government is able to respond to the demands stimulated by these issues, an equilibrium can be maintained between citizen influence and government influence. In ordinary times, citizens are relatively uninterested in what governmental decisions makers do, and the latter have the freedom to act as they see fit. However, if an issue becomes prominent, citizen demands on officials will increase. If officials can respond to these demands, the importance of politics will fall again and politics will return to normal. Furthermore, these cycles of citizen involvement, elite response, and citizen withdrawal may tend to reinforce the balance of opposites needed for democracy. Within each cycle, the citizen's perception of his own influence is reinforced; at the same time the system adjusts to new demands and thereby manifests its effectiveness. And the system may become generally more stable through the loyalty engendered by participation and effective performance.¹³

These cycles of involvement are an important way of maintaining the balanced inconsistencies between activity and passivity. If the constant involvement and activity associated with salient issues would eventually make the maintenance of the balance difficult, so, too, would the complete absence of involvement and activity. The balance can be maintained over time only if the gap between activity and passivity is not too wide. If the belief in one's political competence is not reinforced occasionally, it is likely to fade. Or, if the belief is maintained in a purely ritual manner, it will not represent

lead to an increased involvement in political affairs that is not coupled with increased demands for influence over decisions. Wars, for instance, may unite a population behind the elites and, by triggering off feelings of loyalty, lead to demands for strong leadership rather than for chances to participate in decisions. This type of situation may have unstabilizing consequences for democracy, although the consequences will be different from those spelled out above. In this case, the stress on loyalty and the demand for strong leadership may lead to a reduction of citizen control over governmental elites.

¹³ For an example of such a cyclical pattern of disinterest-involvement-influence-withdrawal, see William K. Muir, Jr., *Defending the "Hill" Against Metal Houses*, 1955, cited in Dahl, *Who Governs?* chap. XVI. See Dahl, chap. XXVIII, for a general discussion relevant to our argument.

potential influence or be a check on decision makers. This, perhaps, is what characterizes the "aspirational" political competence observable in Mexico. Mexican respondents manifest relatively high levels of subjective political competence, especially in comparison to their very low levels of "administrative" competence, exposure to communications, and the like. Furthermore, they quite frequently mention group-forming strategies. But as we have seen, their sense of competence is not matched by experience in political action. There is a gap between the subjective perception of competence and actual political behavior, as there is in the United States and Britain. But the gap is much wider. In the United States, for instance, 33 per cent of those respondents who say they believe they can influence the local government have actually tried to do so, as have 18 per cent of the British local competents. But among the Mexican local competents, only 9 per cent report such experience. Thus the perception-behavior gap may be so wide as to make difficult the performance of the dual functions of furthering citizen control and maintaining citizen passivity. For the democratic "myth" to be an effective political force, it cannot be pure myth. It must be an idealization of real behavioral patterns. Where, as perhaps in Mexico, it has very little relation to reality, it cannot function as part of a balanced civic culture.¹⁴

We have so far dealt with the way in which activity and passivity may be balanced within the individual citizen. But this balance is maintained, not merely by the set of attitudes individuals have, but by the distribution of attitudes among different types of political actors in a system: some individuals believe that they are competent and some do not; some individuals are active and some are not. This variation in beliefs and activity among individuals also helps enforce the power-responsiveness balance. This can be seen if we consider the

¹⁴ If the ordinary man's belief in his competence is to be reinforced, it may not be necessary for him to be personally involved in successful influence activity vis-à-vis the government. It may be enough simply that he be aware of others engaged in such activity. But the likelihood that an individual will see others attempting to influence the government will naturally depend upon how frequently people make such attempts.

equilibrium mechanism described above: an issue becomes salient, activity rises, and balance is restored by a governmental response that reduces the salience of the issue. One reason that an increasingly prominent issue and the consequent rise in political activity are kept from straining the political system is that the prominence of the issue rarely increases for all citizens at once. Rather, it is particular groups that show a rise in political activity, while the rest of the citizens remain inactive. In this way the amount of citizen activity at any one point in time is not so great as to strain the system.

The above discussion is based upon our data on the attitudes of ordinary citizens. But if a mechanism such as the one we postulate is to work, the attitudes of elites must complement those of nonelites. The decision maker must believe in the democratic myth — that ordinary citizens ought to participate in politics and that they are in fact influential. If the decision maker accepts this view of the role of the ordinary citizen, his own decisions serve to maintain the balance between governmental power and responsiveness. On the one hand, he is free to act as he thinks best because the ordinary citizen is not pounding on his door with demands for action. He is insulated by the inactivity of the ordinary man. But if he shares the belief in the influence potential of the ordinary man, his freedom to act is limited by the fact that he believes there *will* be pounding on his door if he does not act in ways that are responsive. Furthermore, if he shares the view that the ordinary man ought to participate in decisions, he is under pressure to act responsively because he believes that such citizen influence is legitimate and justified. Though our data cannot demonstrate this, there is reason to believe that political elites share the political culture of the nonelite; that in a society with a civic culture they, as well as nonelites, hold the attitudes associated with it.¹⁵ Elites are, after all, part of the same political system and exposed to

¹⁵ Yet there are important ways in which elites differ from the general population in their political attitudes; see chap. I, p. 27. Further, there are probably differences in autonomy between British and American political elites; see below for some comments on these differences.

many of the same political socialization processes as are non-elite. And studies have shown that political and community leaders, as well as those of higher social status, are more likely than those of lower status to accept the norms of democracy.¹⁶

The consideration of elite attitudes suggests another mechanism whereby elite responsiveness can be enforced while the activity and involvement of the ordinary citizen remain low. The pattern of citizen influence is not always, or even predominantly, one of stimulus (the citizen or group of citizens make a demand) followed by response (the governmental elite acts to satisfy the demand). Rather, the well-known "law of anticipated reactions" may operate here. A good deal of citizen influence over governmental elites may entail no activity or even conscious intent of citizens. On the contrary, elites may anticipate possible demands and activities and act in response to what they anticipate. They act responsively, not because citizens are actively making demands, but in order to keep them from becoming active.¹⁷

Within the civic culture, then, the individual is not necessarily the rational, active citizen. His pattern of activity is more mixed and tempered. In this way he can combine some measure of competence, involvement, and activity with pas-

¹⁶ Relevant here are our data on the effect of educational differences on the differences in attitudes among respondents. Also relevant is the finding in Samuel Stouffer's, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, New York, 1955, to the effect that community leaders are more tolerant and more accepting of democratic norms than are nonleaders. Several studies of German public opinion support this general finding. See, for instance, Erich Reigrotski, *Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik*, Part 2, and *Basic Orientation and Political Thinking of West German Youth and Their Leaders*, DIVO Institute Frankfurt am Main-Bad Godesberg, 1956.

Political leaders in democracies must express agreement with the democratic myth in public. Of course, much of this may be lip service. But the requirement that they give public support to this set of beliefs also puts pressure on them to accept the beliefs — unless hypocrisy is a conscious value among political elites. As the studies in cognitive dissonance have shown, the requirement that an individual make a certain kind of public declaration creates pressures to change his private beliefs in that direction. See Rosenberg *et al.*, *op. cit.*, and Festinger, *op. cit.*

¹⁷ See Chapter VII for a discussion of "anticipatory" and other forms of influence.

passivity and noninvolvement. Furthermore, his relationship with the government is not a purely rational one, for it includes adherence—his and the decision maker's—to what we have called the democratic myth of citizen competence. And this myth has significant consequences. For one thing, it is not pure myth: the belief in the influence potential of the average man has some truth to it and does indicate real behavioral potential. And whether true or not, the myth is believed.

THE MANAGEMENT OF AFFECT

We have discussed the way in which the civic culture balances involvement and activity with indifference and passivity. But the balance achieved by the civic culture goes further. Not only must involvement and activity be balanced by a measure of their opposites, but the *type* of political involvement and activity must itself be balanced. In particular, there appears to be a need for a balanced affective orientation to politics; or rather, there must be a balance between instrumental and affective orientations to politics. Politics must not be so instrumental and pragmatic that participants lose all emotional involvement in it. On the other hand, the level of affective orientation to politics ought not to become too intense.

There are several reasons why this balance, rather than a maximization of either pragmatism or passion, is needed in an effective democracy. In the first place, political commitment, if it is to be dependable, cannot be completely unemotional. Loyalty to a political system, if it is based on purely pragmatic considerations of the effectiveness of that system, represents, as Lipset has suggested, a rather unstable basis of loyalty, for it is too closely dependent upon system performance.¹⁸ If it is to remain stable in the long run, the system requires a form of political commitment based upon more general attachment to the political system—a commitment we have called "system affect." Furthermore, as Eckstein suggests, a purely pragmatic and unemotional political involvement implies a politics of opportunism; a politics that will

¹⁸ Lipset, *Political Man*, pp. 77-83.

probably lead to cynicism.¹⁹ On the other hand, if an affective commitment to politics or to a particular political group is too intense, this can have unfortunate consequences for a democracy. In the first place, an intense emotional involvement in politics endangers the balance between activity and passivity, for that balance depends on the low salience of politics. Second, such intense involvement tends to "raise the stakes" of politics: to foster the sort of mass, messianic movements that lead to democratic instability.²⁰ Furthermore, the consequences can be harmful whether the commitment is to the system as a whole and the incumbent elites or only to particular subgroups in society. It is clear that intense commitment to particular political parties or groups can produce an unstabilizing level of fragmentation in the system. But even an intense commitment to the political system and to the incumbent elites is likely to have harmful effects. If citizens are to maintain some control over political elites, their loyalty to the system and to the elites must not be complete and unquestioning. Furthermore, the civic culture implies the maintenance of the more traditional parochial roles along with the role of citizen. The preservation of a sphere of activity that is outside of politics is important if one is to have the balanced participation of the civic culture.²¹

Participation in politics, this suggests, ought to be neither purely instrumental nor purely affective. The political par-

¹⁹ Eckstein uses as an example of this the politics of *Trasformismo* of pre-World War I Italy. See his *Theory of Stable Democracy*, p. 33.

²⁰ See Kornhauser, *op. cit.*

²¹ This helps explain the way in which nonissue crises—that is, political events which, though considered important and salient by the population, do not involve citizen demands for influence over governmental decisions—may destroy the balance of the civic culture. It was suggested in note 11 that they destroy the balance by increasing demands for leadership and therefore shifting the balance away from elite responsiveness. Crises of this sort may upset the balance of the civic culture in another way: by increasing the amount of loyalty to the system to such a high level that it is considered "unpatriotic" to question the actions of elites. When this stage is reached, democracy is obviously in danger. Furthermore, a crisis such as a war may destroy the balance within the civic culture between the parochial and the citizen roles. Too much of life—including the non-political sphere of relations—may become political.

ticipant ought to receive both instrumental and emotional gratifications from his participation. And this balanced involvement in politics again appears to characterize the civic culture in the two more successful democracies. As discussed in Chapter VIII, in the United States and Britain the more the respondent considers himself capable of participating in politics, the more likely he is to receive affective satisfaction from the political system and to evaluate positively the instrumental performance of that system. In contrast, the other three nations show patterns of unbalanced participation. In Germany and Italy the sense of ability to participate is accompanied by a higher evaluation of the instrumental effectiveness of the system but not by a deeper general commitment. In Mexico the opposite is true: sense of participation is accompanied by greater pride in the system but not a higher evaluation of its performance. In Italy and Germany, commitment to the political system is largely pragmatic, and is based on little emotional commitment. In Mexico there may be an unrealistic attachment to symbols, coupled with the absence of a belief in instrumental rewards of politics.

CONSENSUS AND CLEAVAGE

Our data suggest another way in which the political cultures of the more successful democracies are characterized by a balanced type of commitment. As was reported at various places throughout this volume, respondents in the United States and Britain more frequently than respondents in the other three nations express pride in their political system and feel satisfaction when voting. They are more likely to report interest in politics and actually to discuss politics. And they are more likely to report some emotional involvement in political campaigns. All these indicate a comparatively high level of political involvement. Yet the political involvement in these two countries is tempered in intensity by its subordination to a more general, overarching set of social values. As the data in Chapter IX suggest, attitudes of interpersonal trust and cooperation are more frequent in the United States and Britain than in the other nations. More important, these general social attitudes penetrate into the realm of politics. The role of social

trust and cooperativeness as a component of the civic culture cannot be overemphasized. It is, in a sense, a generalized resource that keeps a democratic polity operating. Constitution makers have designed formal structures of politics that attempt to enforce trustworthy behavior, but without these attitudes of trust, such institutions may mean little. Social trust facilitates political cooperation among the citizens in these nations, and without it democratic politics is impossible. It probably also enters into a citizen's relation with political elites. We argued earlier that the maintenance of elite power was essential in a democracy. We would now add that the sense of trust in the political elite—the belief that they are not alien and extractive forces, but part of the same political community—makes citizens willing to turn power over to them.

Furthermore, these general social attitudes temper the extent to which emotional commitment to a particular political subgroup leads to political fragmentation. This general set of social attitudes, this sense of community over and above political differences, keeps the affective attachments to political groups from challenging the stability of the system. Furthermore, it acts as a buffer between the individual and the political system, and thereby reduces the "availability" (in Kornhauser's use of the word) of the ordinary citizen for involvement in unstabilizing mass movements.²² These norms—particularly those which say that political criteria are not to be applied to all situations—place a limit on politics. They indicate that certain social relationships are not to be dominated by political considerations. And in this way they allow the individual to maintain a certain degree of independence from the political system.

This brings us to a further balance that must be maintained within a democratic political system: that between consensus and cleavage.²³ Without some meaningfully structured cleavage in society, it is hard to see how democratic politics can operate. If democracy involves at some point a choice among alternatives, the choice must be about some-

²² *The Politics of Mass Society*, chap. 2.

²³ The significance of this balance is also stressed by Eckstein, Berelson, and Parsons. See the references in note 3 above.

thing. If there were no cleavage, if people did not combine into meaningfully opposed political groupings, this would suggest ". . . a community in which politics was of no real importance to the community,"²⁴ and one in which the alternation of political elites meant little. Too much agreement would mitigate against the enforcement of elite responsiveness. Yet if cleavage went too far, ". . . a democratic society . . . would probably be in danger of its existence. The issues of politics would cut so deeply, be so keenly felt, and, especially, be so fully reinforced by other social identifications of the electorate . . ." as to threaten democracy.²⁵ There must be what Parsons has called a "limited polarization" of society.²⁶ If there is no consensus within society, there can be little potentiality for the peaceful resolution of political differences that is associated with the democratic process. If, for instance, the incumbent elite considered the opposition elite too threatening, it is unlikely that the incumbents would allow a peaceful competition for elite position.

This balance between consensus and cleavage is managed within the civic culture by a mechanism similar to the one that managed the balance between activity and passivity; that is, an inconsistency between norms and behavior. This is illustrated by the data presented on attitudes toward primary group membership and partisan affiliation (reported in Chapters V and X). On the one hand, as all studies of voting behavior indicate, primary groups tend to be homogeneous in the partisan sense; families, friendship groups, workplace groups tend to be composed of people of like political views. And, what may be more important evidence for their partisan homogeneity, if there is some heterogeneity of political views within the group, there will be pressure toward attitude change to produce homogeneity.²⁷ This homogeneity attests

²⁴ Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Parsons, in Burdick and Brodbeck, eds., *American Voting Behavior*, p. 92.

²⁷ This homogeneity is partly due to the fact that members of a primary group tend to share similar social characteristics that affect their vote. They tend to be members of the same class, residential area, and so forth.

to the existence of cleavage in the political system. If partisan affiliation were not closely correlated with primary group affiliations, it is hard to see how there could be any basis for meaningful political competition, for partisan affiliation would then be unimportant as well as unrelated to basic social groupings in society. On the other hand, the cleavage produced by this correlation between primary group affiliation and partisan affiliation is tempered in the United States and Britain by the consensual norm (discussed in Chapters IV and IX) that one's primary group *ought not* to be politicized. Though one's most intimate associates tend to be of like political affiliation (and if they are not, there will be pressure for attitudes to change until they are), this cleavage is balanced by a general social norm that places some relationships (in theory, if not in practice) above politics. Again, the civic culture allows a balance between apparently contradictory demands through the mixture of a set of norms (that primary groups be nonpartisan) and actual behavior (that primary groups are indeed homogeneous in the partisan sense) that are themselves in contradiction one with the other.

This is but one example of the way in which the civic culture manages cleavage in society. In general, this management of cleavage is accomplished by subordinating conflicts on the political level to some higher, overarching attitudes of solidarity, whether these attitudes be the norms associated with the "rules of the democratic game" or the belief that there exists within the society a supraparty solidarity based on nonpartisan criteria.²⁸

This balance, furthermore, must be maintained on the elite as well as the citizen level. Though our data are not relevant here, it is quite likely that similar mechanisms operate on the elite level as well. The elaborate formal and informal rules of etiquette in the legislatures of Britain and the

But even when these characteristics are held constant, the political composition of the primary group has a strong residual effect on the individual's political attitudes; see Berelson *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-93 and 137-38; and Herbert McCloskey and Harold E. Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty," *American Political Science Review*, LIII (1960), pp. 757-76.

²⁸ See Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

United States, for example, foster and indeed require friendly relations (or at least friendly words) between the supporters of the opposing parties. And this tempers the intensity of partisanship. It is not that partisanship is destroyed as a significant force; rather, it is kept in its place by more general norms of social relationships.

In sum, the most striking characteristic of the civic culture as it has been described in this volume is its mixed quality. It is a mixture in the first place of parochial, subject, and citizen orientations. The orientation of the parochial to primary relationships, the passive political orientation of the subject, the activity of the citizen, all merge within the civic culture. The result is a set of political orientations that are managed or balanced. There is political activity, but not so much as to destroy governmental authority; there is involvement and commitment, but they are moderated; there is political cleavage, but it is held in check. Above all, the political orientations that make up the civic culture are closely related to general social and interpersonal orientations. Within the civic culture the norms of interpersonal relationships, of general trust and confidence in one's social environment, penetrate political attitudes and temper them. The mixture of attitudes found in the civic culture, we have argued in this chapter, "fits" the democratic political system. It is, in a number of ways, particularly appropriate for the mixed political system that is democracy.

POLITICAL CULTURE AND STABLE DEMOCRACY

That the civic culture is appropriate for maintaining a stable and effective democratic political process can best be appreciated if we consider the impact of deviations from this model. We can begin by considering again the United States and Britain. We have argued that these two nations most closely approximate the model of the civic culture, but that in important respects they differ from each other in the way in which they approximate the model. Both nations achieve a balance of the active and passive roles of the citizen, but whereas in the United States the balance appears to be weighted somewhat in the direction of the active, participant

pole, in Britain it tends somewhat in the direction of the subject, deferential pole. Although in the United States the development of participant orientations has tended to overshadow the subject role, in Britain strong subject orientations have persisted despite the development of more active participant orientations. Though the British citizen became an active participant, he did not lose his respect for the independent authority of government to the extent that this occurred in the United States.

The kind of balance between active and passive orientations is in turn reflected in the way in which the political system balances governmental power and governmental responsiveness. In Britain the persisting deferential and subject orientations foster the development of strong and effective governments and the maintenance of an efficient and independent administrative structure. Americans, on the other hand, tend to be uneasy with a powerful government—and their uneasiness is reflected in the institutional structures of government as well as in the strain of immobility that often pervades the American political process. On the other hand, one can argue that the balance in Britain is tilted too far in the opposite direction. It is possible that deference to political elites can go too far, and that the strongly hierarchical patterns in British politics—patterns that have often been criticized as limiting the extent of democracy in that nation—result from a balance weighted too heavily in the direction of the subject and deferential roles.

In comparison with Great Britain and the United States, Germany, Italy, and Mexico have relatively lower levels of social and interpersonal trust. More important, what social trust there is does not penetrate into political relationships, which tend to represent a separate and autonomous realm of attitudes. The absence of general social attitudes that penetrate the political realm inhibits the ability of citizens to cooperate with each other in their relations with the government. Thus their ability to influence the government in time of need—in particular, their ability to create *ad hoc* political structures for this purpose—is limited. Furthermore, their lack of ability to cooperate politically reflects a more general inabil-

ity to enter political bargains, to collaborate, and to aggregate interests. The society divides up into closed and relatively hostile camps; or to use our terminology, the balance between consensus and cleavage appears to be heavily weighted toward the latter. In these three nations, and especially in the first two, where the pattern of fragmentation coincides with partisan affiliation, the political culture seems to be unbalanced in the direction of political cleavage. This is not to argue that Germany and Italy may not be moving toward a reduction of political fragmentation. Certainly in Germany the current political party system represents a much lower level of fragmentation and interparty hostility than existed under the Weimar Republic. But at present the balance appears to lie in the direction of cleavage rather than consensus, and this in turn affects the operation of the political system.

Perhaps the most significant deviations from the civic culture occur in the political participation and commitment in these three nations. In the ideal civic culture the activity and involvement of the citizen are balanced by a measure of passivity and noninvolvement. Similarly, the commitment itself is balanced, combining a commitment to the actual operation and performance of the government as well as to the political system *per se*. But in Germany, Italy, and Mexico, there are important deviations from these ideal patterns, and the deviations differ from one country to another.

In Germany a passive subject orientation persists and has not yet been balanced by a participant orientation. Our German respondents appear more at ease in dealing with the output side of governmental activity, where government becomes administration rather than politics. Political activity tends to be more formal than informal — exposure to mass media, voting, formal but inactive membership in voluntary associations. Within these dimensions the activity levels are high, but they are not matched in frequency by more informal political discussions or group-forming influence strategies. Furthermore, the commitment to the system is heavily oriented to the output of the system. Those who consider themselves competent to participate in political decisions are more likely to be satisfied with governmental output, but

their more general attachment to the system, or what we call system affect, is not likely to be any higher. And in general, though the satisfaction with governmental operations is relatively high, the attachment to the system is much lower. In Germany, then, the balance of the political culture is weighted in the direction of the subject role and of passive forms of participation. The government is viewed largely as an agency of administration. And the attachment to the political system is closely related to the ability of the government to satisfy pragmatic needs.

The response patterns in Italy are similar to those in Germany in certain important respects. As in Germany, the type of commitment to the political system is closely related to governmental output without being balanced by system affect. But Italian response patterns differ from the German, for the sense of subject allegiance is not present. If the German does not fully participate as an influential citizen in the input side of government, he does consider himself capable of acting effectively as a subject within an administrative context. The Italian, on the other hand, is more likely to be thoroughly alienated both as participant and as subject.

In some respects the Mexican political culture represents the most interesting imbalanced pattern of commitment and involvement. In this country the role of allegiant subject is least well developed. The Mexicans are more alienated from governmental output than are respondents in any of the other four nations — especially in terms of administrative output. Yet this alienation does not involve the more consistent pattern of alienation found in Italy. There is a relatively high level of system affect, especially connected with the symbols of the Mexican Revolution. Furthermore, there is a participant orientation toward the input side of the political system. But the type of participant orientation is what we have called an aspirational one. The level of subjective political competence is relatively high, but is unmatched by performance. This gap between perceived ability to influence the government and actual experience with such influence is also a feature of the civic culture, but the gap in Mexico is much wider than in the United States and Britain. And the relatively high level of political in-

formation, exposure to mass media and political communications upon which the American and British sense of political competence rest is also missing in Mexico. In Mexico, therefore, the balance between subject and participant orientations is heavily weighted in the direction of the participant. And the orientation to participation is not a balance of aspiration and performance where the former supports the latter, as in the civic culture; instead, it is a concentration on aspiration in which the performance remains unfulfilled.

Germany, Italy, and Mexico deviate from the civic culture in three different ways, but in each country the deviations create a political culture incongruent with an effective and stable democratic political system. In Germany the lack of commitment to the political system that is relatively independent of system output suggests that the stability of the system may be in doubt if the level of output becomes less satisfactory. There is little capital of "system affect" to draw upon if governmental performance should weaken. Furthermore, weakness of the participant role in Germany, especially the lack of an informal participatory culture, suggests that too much reliance is placed upon hierarchical leadership. Though the formal political institutions of democracy exist in Germany and though there is a well-developed political infrastructure — a system of political parties and pressure groups — the underlying set of political attitudes that would regulate the operation of these institutions in a democratic direction is missing.

In Mexico relatively high levels of system affect are coupled with a lack of experience with political input and an almost total rejection of political output. But the aspirational aspect of the Mexican political culture suggests a potentiality for a civic culture, for the orientation to participation is present. But if the German political system lacks the capital of system affect that might allow it to weather crises, the Mexican system may be described as living off its capital of system affect. Unless the output performance of the system can match the aspirations of the citizens (and what is relevant is not the objective level of output, but the evaluation of its adequacy by the citizens), then the Mexican pattern, too, may have within it the seeds of instability.

Italy suggests an even higher level of instability. Though Germany and Mexico have some of the components of the civic culture, Italy lacks both the passive output satisfaction of the Germans and the aspirational input satisfaction of the Mexicans. The potential for the development of a civic culture would appear lowest here.

These considerations ought not to be taken as predictions of the future of the three political systems. We are spelling out differing potentialities, but we have concentrated on too narrow an aspect of the political system to allow prediction. To a considerable extent the future of these nations will be affected by the nature of their political cultures, but other factors will also have important consequences. International events, which have been outside our purview, will certainly have significant effects both on the political cultures of these nations and on their performance and stability. The future of German democracy rests in part on tendencies within the political culture, but it rests as well on the resolution of the East-West conflict; and Italy's political future is not unaffected by these tensions. And certainly since the advent of Castroism in Cuba, the impact of the external environment upon Mexico's political culture and structure has become especially important. The political cultures of these nations will play important roles in mediating these external impacts, but the weight of these impacts make it difficult for us, as students of political culture, to predict the future.

THE SOURCES OF THE CIVIC CULTURE

This study began with a concern for understanding the development of political democracy. Our concern was occasioned by the large number of nations in which the realization of such a political system is an overt yet difficult goal. We refer, not only to the new nations of the world, but to many older nations that have for a long time been attempting to create a stable pattern of democratic institutions. The statesmen who attempt to create political democracy often concentrate upon the creation of a formal set of democratic governmental institutions and the writing of a constitution. Or they may concentrate upon the formation of a political

party to stimulate the participation of the masses. But the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process — upon the political culture. Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim.

The civic culture appears to be particularly appropriate for a democratic political system. It is not the only form of democratic political culture, but it seems to be the one most congruent with a stable, democratic system. It may therefore be useful to consider how it is transmitted from generation to generation. The first point that may be made is that it is not taught, in any complete sense of the term, in the schools. Civics training in the United States stresses a kind of citizen behavior that is closer to the rationality-activist model than to the civic culture. This is an important component of the civic culture, but it is only one component. In Great Britain, where there is also a close approximation of the civic culture, there is relatively little explicit attempt to inculcate either the pattern of norms and behavior associated with the civic culture or the pattern associated with the rationality-activist model. There is little explicit philosophy concerning what makes a "good British subject" and how children ought to be trained for their role as citizens. The point is not that the explicit training in the schools plays no role in the creation of a civic culture; it is, rather, that it may play only a minor role.

That the civic culture is not transmitted solely by explicit indoctrination is not surprising. Its attitudes and behavior combine in a complicated, subtle way; it is a culture that is characterized to some extent by inconsistencies and the balancing of opposites. One important component of the civic culture is the set of attitudes concerning confidence in other people — a diffuse, partially inconsistent pattern that does not lend itself readily to explicit teaching. How, then, can it be transmitted from generation to generation?

Our consideration of political socialization in Chapter XI suggests an answer. The civic culture is transmitted by a com-

plex process that includes training in many social institutions — family, peer group, school, work place, as well as in the political system itself. Furthermore, the types of experience within these institutions vary. Individuals learn political orientations through intentional teaching, as in a school civics class; but they also learn through overtly political experiences that are not intended to be lessons in politics, as when the child overhears parents discussing politics or when he observes the action of the political system. Or the training in political orientations may be neither explicit nor political in content, as when the individual learns about authority from participating in authority structures in the family or the school or when he learns about the trustworthiness of others from his early contact with adults.

So broad a pattern of political socialization provides an excellent way to inculcate the subtleties that comprise the civic culture. Insofar as some of the teaching is implicit, inconsistencies among orientations can be passed on without recognition. And insofar as many types of political training occur simultaneously, one may learn different aspects of the political culture from different sources. This kind of learning can minimize the strain that might result if orientations toward activity and passivity (to take one example of the opposing political attitudes of the civic culture) were introduced from a single source. Thus through his own participation in family and school and through the manifest teaching of the norms of political participation, the child may learn to expect opportunities to participate in decisions. Yet at the same time, his exposure to the necessarily hierarchical patterns of authority in family and school will temper this expectation of mastery over his political environment. Similarly, what he learns in civics textbooks about the need for political activity and for a politics of idealism will be tempered by what he observes of the actual political behavior and attitudes of adults. And this mixed set of orientations developed in childhood will be further modified by later, direct experiences with politics. His expectations and norms about participation will interact with the opportunities that the political system offers for participation, with the importance he

himself places on particular issues, and with the demands that other roles place upon him.

A major part of political socialization, then, involves direct exposure to the civic culture and the democratic polity themselves. In this way each new generation absorbs the civic culture through exposure to the political attitudes and behavior of the preceding generation.

The preceding discussion, on the problem of transferring the civic culture from generation to generation, applies mostly to those nations where the civic culture already exists. But this is not the problem of the new nations. If a civic culture is to be created in these nations, it must be newly created. How can this be done? Such a question takes us well beyond the scope of our data, yet the characteristics of the civic culture and the political histories of the nations in which it has developed suggest two points. First, the civic culture emerged in the West as a result of a gradual political development—relatively crisis-free, untroubled, and unforced. Second, it developed by fusion: new patterns of attitudes did not replace old ones, but merged with them.

The reasons why this pattern of historical development facilitated the emergence of a civic culture are clear. It is a political culture of moderation. In it there is awareness of political issues, yet such issues are not the most salient for the ordinary man; there is involvement in politics, but the involvement is not intense. These political attitudes can only appear, one can argue, where political development has been relatively untroubled; where the stakes of politics are high enough to involve more and more people in the political process, but not so high as to force them to enter into politics as if into a battle to protect their interests from dangerous adversaries.

Less obvious, but also implied by the nature of the civic culture, are the reasons why it developed by fusion. For it is a mixed culture, combining parochial, subject, and participant orientations. Its development must be one in which the newer orientations to political participation merge with the older two orientations but do not replace them.

There are, as we have seen, two aspects to this fusion. On the one hand, the orientations associated with the diffuse patterns of traditional authority are not completely replaced by the newer, more differentiated patterns of political orientation. And second, the more active role of participant does not replace the more passive roles of parochial and the subject. The result is the type of civic culture found in the United States and Britain, where the political system is permeated by diffuse and general social values. For this permeation to continue, the development of a modern polity, with its functional, specific political units and its structured form of political competition, must not take place in a way that will shake the original community. These older orientations must be carried on into the modern system.

Similarly, the development of political democracy, with the spread of opportunities for the ordinary man to participate in the political decision-making process, cannot completely destroy the subject orientation to politics if there is to be a civic culture. The new way of making political decisions through participation of citizens does not so much replace the old mode of governmental operations as supplement it. In this way the blend of activity and passivity that characterizes the civic culture can be created.

THE FUTURE OF THE CIVIC CULTURE

This gradual, fusalional growth of the civic culture has generally occurred in a political system whose problems have been spread over time. A variety of new groups have wanted entry into full participation, but not all groups at once. Major social issues have had to be resolved, but at different times. This gradualness of political change characterizes British and, to a lesser extent, American political history. The problem in the new nations of the world is that such gradualness is not possible. There is great demand for participation in politics from many who were only recently parochials. Tremendous problems of social change must be faced all at once. And what may be most crucial: the very acts of creating national boundaries and national identity

must go on at the same time. A slow political development may foster a civic culture, but what the new nations of the world lack is the time for this gradual development.

These new nations are seeking to accomplish in a brief period of time what took centuries to consummate in the West. Is it possible to find substitutes for this gradual and fusal process of political change? There is no clear answer to this question, and one can only speculate. If our study has taught us anything, it is that there is no simple formula for the development of a political culture conducive to the maintenance of democracy. However, several conclusions do emerge that have a bearing on this problem.

The most obvious substitute for time would be education. Our data have shown education to be the most important determinant of political attitudes; and it is also the most manipulatable. The great advantage of education is that skills that may take years to develop for the first time can be passed on much more easily once there are some who possess them. Education, as our data have shown, can develop a number of the major components of the civic culture. It can train individuals in the skills of political participation. They can be taught how to gather information; they can be brought into contact with the mass media; they can learn the formal structure of politics, as well as the importance of governmental and political institutions. And it is possible to communicate through education the explicit norms of democratic participation and responsibility.

But our data also show that education can create only some of the components of the civic culture. The schools can teach the cognitive skills connected with participation, but can they teach the underlying social attitudes that are an important component of the civic culture? Can education teach social trust and confidence? Can it foster the permeation of the political process by these social attitudes? And can the curious mixture of activity and passivity, involvement and indifference, of parochial, subject, and participant orientations be communicated through formal education? Our analysis of the relationship between the socialization processes and the creation of a civic culture suggests that formal education may

not adequately substitute for time in the creation of these other components of the civic culture.

One way of supplementing formal education might be to develop other channels of political socialization. As was suggested above, the very existence of a large number of channels of political socialization fosters the inculcation of the mixed pattern of attitudes of the civic culture. It increases the variety of political orientations that can be transmitted. More important, experience with a multitude of socializing agencies can train the individual to deal with varied roles at the same time — to schedule and balance his political orientations. And this ability to handle numerous roles is a major component of the civic culture. Some important socializing agencies are the family, the work place, and voluntary associations. Perhaps as these institutions change and develop in the new nations, the channels of socialization for the civic culture will broaden. As the family becomes more participant and open to the political process — and our data suggest that this is a function of modernization — new opportunities to foster civic attitudes may develop. Similarly, occupational changes that accompany industrialization, as well as the development of a structure of voluntary associations, may increase the channels of socialization.

But even the opening of these new channels may not be enough for the development of a civic culture. Such channels may foster attitudes toward participation, but their importance in the creation of social trust and affective commitment to the system is more questionable. If these socializing agencies are in a fragmented political system, for example, the affect developed might be one of alienation, and the interpersonal trust might not be translatable into politically relevant trust. What is required is a process by which individuals can come to develop a sense of common political identity; an identity that implies common affective commitment to the political system, as well as a sense of identity with one's fellow citizens. Participation and cognitive skills are not enough to create a political community in which one trusts and can cooperate politically with one's fellow citizens, and in which one's attachment to the political system is deep and affective.

The problem, then, is to develop, along with the participation skills that schools and other socializing agencies can foster, affective commitment to the political system and a sense of political community. How this might come about is suggested if we consider for a moment the patterns of political culture in Germany and Mexico, two nations that are particularly relevant here. In Germany we find a high level of political cognition. What is missing is system affect and a sense of ability to cooperate with one's fellow citizens. In Mexico we find the educational and cognitive components weaker, but there is system affect and a highly developed sense of identity as Mexicans. And this sense of identity is accompanied by a sense of ability to cooperate politically—or at least the aspiration for such cooperation. Mexico lacks the developed educational system that produces the high levels of cognitive political skills in Germany, but it has what Germany lacks to produce a high level of system affect. Mexico has had a symbolic, unifying event: the Mexican Revolution. This revolution, as we have argued, is the crucial event in the development of the Mexican political culture, for it created a sense of national identity and a commitment to the political system that permeates almost all strata of the society.

If a new nation is to create a civic culture, it needs both the unifying symbols and system affect that the Mexican Revolution has provided, as well as the cognitive skills that exist in Germany. There must be a symbolic event, or a symbolic, charismatic leader, or some other means of creating commitment and unity at the symbolic level. But also important are expanding educational opportunity, experiences in industrial contexts, and exposure to the media of communication, to political parties, and voluntary associations. Governmental performance, too, has a crucial effect on the growth of a civic culture. As the German and Mexican cases illustrate, the development of stable political commitment may hinge upon the ability of the political system, especially in its formative stages, to produce output that satisfies the expectations of the members of the system. Only in this way can a stable and balanced commitment to the system be created and maintained.

Stated in these terms, the difficulties confronting efforts to

create effective democratic processes and the orientations necessary to sustain them in the developing areas may appear to be insurmountable. What seems to be called for is the simultaneous development of a sense of national identity, subject and participant competence, social trust, and civic cooperativeness. The resources available to the elites of the new nations are scarce, and there are limits on the capacity of these societies to assimilate these resources rapidly and effectively. Other goals compete for the same resources. We cannot properly sit in judgment of those leaders who concentrate their resources on the development of social overhead capital, industrialization, and agricultural improvement, and who suppress disruptive movements or fail to cultivate democratic tendencies. Nor can we properly condemn those who, when confronted with the enormous range and pressure of the problems of modernization, are unable to make the necessary painful choices and thus permit their societies and political processes to drift into chaos. Few Western statesmen have ever been called upon to cope with such a range of issues and choices all at once.

What our study enables us to argue is that *any* approach to modernization has within it some of the seeds of the civic culture. Any set of modernizing priorities will place heavy stress on education; and rising levels of education will create some of the components of a civic culture. Thus an imaginative approach to education may serve to increase its civic dividends. The probability is also high that any approach to modernization will tend to enlarge the urban-industrial sector of the society. And we know that the urban-industrial family and occupations have within them civic potentialities. Broadly speaking, we can say that these core processes of modernization—education and industrialization—create a democratic opportunity; the problem then becomes, what *other* investments of energy, resources, and imagination can consolidate these tendencies and potentialities, and what are their relative costs?

The answers to these questions are not readily available. It is only in recent decades that political science has turned its attention to a realistic and serious analysis of the nature of

democratic and other types of political process. We are only beginning to develop a theory of political systems and political change that might be of use to democratic statesmen in the new nations. What we have done in this book is to spell out methodically the mixture of attitudes that support a democratic system. If it can create a more sober and informed appreciation of the nature and complexity of the problems of democratization, it will have served its purpose.

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