



**Woodrow Wilson
International Center
for Scholars**

**Lee H. Hamilton,
Director**

**BOARD OF
TRUSTEES:**

Joseph A. Cari, Jr.,
Chairman
Steven Alan
Bennett,
Vice Chairman

**EX OFFICIO
MEMBERS**

:

The Secretary of
State Colin Powell,
The Librarian of
Congress James H.
Billington,
The Archivist of
the United States
John W. Carlin,
The Chariman of
the National
Endowment for the
Humanities
William R. Ferris,
The Secretary of
the Smithsonian
Institution
Lawrence M.
Small,
The Secretary of
Education Roderick
R. Paige,
The Secretary of
Health & Human
Services Tommy
G. Thompson

Documents on the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

e-Dossier No. 4

Cold War International History Project

**Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars**

Washington, D.C.

November 2001



**Christian F.
Ostermann,
Director**

**ADVISORY
COMMITTEE:**

Dr. William
Taubman
(Amherst College)
Chairman

Dr. Michael
Beschloss
(Historian, Author)

Dr. James
Billington
(Librarian of
Congress)

Dr. Warren I.
Cohen
(University of
Maryland-
Baltimore)

Dr. John Lewis
Gaddis
(Yale University)

Dr. James G.
Hershberg
(The George
Washington
University)

Dr. Samuel F.
Wells, Jr.
(Woodrow Wilson
Center)

Dr. Sharon
Wolchick
(The George
Washington
University)



COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Editor's Note:

The following documents from Russian and (East) German archives on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were previously published by the Cold War International History Project. They are re-published in this CWIHP e-Dossier for the convenience of interested readers. (Interested readers may also download individual documents after searching CWIHP's "Virtual Archive" (see link on the frontpage of the CWIHP website). This CWIHP e-Dossier is only available online. Please note that the page numbers refer to the pages in this dossier.

Future CWIHP e-dossiers will feature previously unpublished materials on the war in Afghanistan from the former Soviet bloc archives.



The Soviet Union and Afghanistan – CWIHP *BULLETIN* Documents

Bulletin 3

Soviet Policy in Afghanistan, 1979: A Grim Assessment Pg. 8 - 10

Bulletin 4

From Hesitation to Intervention: Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979 Pg. 12 - 13

Record of Meeting of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO, D.F.USTINOV and
B.N.PONOMAREV with N.M.TARAKI Pg. 13 - 15

Record of Conversation Brezhnev-Taraki, 20 March 1979 Pg. 15 - 16

Soviet Helicopters to Afghanistan, April 1979 Pg. 16 - 17

Bulletin 8/9

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 1 February 1980, with telegrams to Soviet Ambassador
To West Germany (Willy Brandt) and Finnish Socialist Democratic leader K. Sorsa (not printed) Pg. 20 - 23

Concerning the situation in "A": New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan
by Odd Arne Westad Pg. 18 - 22

Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry
"About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA," 31 May 1978 (notes) Pg. 28

Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 June 1978 Pg. 29

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan
A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 July 1978 Pg. 29

Information from CPSU CC to GDR leader Erich Honecker, 13 October 1978 Pg. 29 - 31

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 7 January 1979 Pg. 31

Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan, 17-19 March 1979 Pg. 31 - 40

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 18 March 1979 Pg. 40

Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin
and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979 Pg. 40 - 41

Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow, 20 March 1979 Pg. 41 - 45

Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Session on Afghanistan, 22 March 1979 Pg. 45 - 46



| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979 | Pg. 46 |
| Report of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14 April 1979 (excerpt) | Pg. 46 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision and Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in Afghanistan, 24 May 1979 | Pg. 47 |
| Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 9 June 1979 | Pg. 47 |
| Gromyko -Andropov -Ustinov -Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on the Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979 | Pg. 47 - 48 |
| Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 10 July 1979 | Pg. 48 |
| Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul, 19-20 July 1979 (excerpts) Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and H. Amin, 21 July 1979 | Pg. 48 |
| Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 11 August 1979 | Pg. 48 - 49 |
| Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii during visit to Afghanistan, 25 August 1979 | Pg. 49 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 13 September 1979 (excerpts) | Pg. 49 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision 15 September 1979, with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun | Pg. 49 - 50 |
| Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in Kabul, 15 September 1979 | Pg. 50 |
| Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader E. Honecker, 16 September 1979 | Pg. 50 |
| Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979 | Pg. 51 |
| Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih, New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt) | Pg. 51 |
| Information from the CC CPSU to GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979 | Pg. 51 |
| Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker summit in East Berlin 4 October 1979 (excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan) | Pg. 51 - 52 |
| Information of KGB USSR to CC CPSU International Department, 10 October 1979 | Pg. 52 |
| Gromyko -Andropov -Ustinov -Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC, 29 October 1979 | Pg. 52 - 53 |
| Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and Amin, 3 November 1979 | Pg. 53 |



| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Report to CPSU CC on Mission to Afghanistan of Deputy Defense Minister Army -Gen. I. G. Pavlovskii, 5 November 1979 | Pg. 53 |
| Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan F.A. Tabeev and H. Amin 6 December 1979 Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 6 December 1979 | Pg. 53 |
| Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979] | Pg. 54 |
| Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report on Events in Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979 dated 31 December 1979 | Pg. 55 - 56 |
| Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shad Mohammad Dost 4 January 1980 | Pg. 56 - 57 |
| CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17 January 1980 (excerpt) | Pg. 57 - 58 |
| CPSU CC Politburo decision, 17 January 1980 | Pg. 58 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 28 January 1980, with Report by Gromyko -Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev, 27 January 1980 | Pg. 58 - 60 |
| Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talks with Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980 | Pg. 60 |
| CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 7 February 1980 (excerpt) | Pg. 60 - 61 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 7 February 1980 | Pg. 61 - 62 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980 with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro | Pg. 62 - 65 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 10 April 1980 with report by Gromyko -Andropov-Ustinov-Zagladin, 7 April 1980 | Pg. 65 - 67 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 8 May 1980, with Politburo Commission Report 6 May 1980, and Approved Cable to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul | Pg. 67 - 69 |
| CPSU CC Politburo decisions, 19 June 1980 | Pg. 69 |
| Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, 21 June 1980 | Pg. 69 - 70 |
| CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980 (excerpt) | Pg. 70 - 71 |
| Information from the CC CPSU to Erich Honecker, 18 July 1980 | Pg. 71 |
| Report by Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov to CPSU CC "Foreign Interference" in Afghanistan, 2 October 1980 | Pg. 71 - 72 |
| CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 10 March 1983 | Pg. 72 - 73 |



COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------|
| CPSU CC Politburo Transcript (excerpt), 20 March 1986 | Pg. 73 |
| CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 13 November 1986 | Pg. 73 - 74 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision of 24 January 1989, with attached report of 23 January 1989 | Pg. 75 - 79 |
| CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov-Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov | Pg. 79 |

FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES

ARCHIVAL RESEARCH IN MOSCOW: Progress and Pitfalls

by Mark Kramer

The British writer and literary critic Lytton Strachey once remarked that “ignorance is the first requisite of the historian — ignorance, which simplifies and clarifies, which selects and omits.”¹ By this criterion, historians studying the Soviet Union were remarkably lucky until very recently. Unlike scholars of American politics and foreign policy, who had the daunting task each year of poring through thousands of newly declassified documents, specialists on the Soviet Union normally were forced to go about their work without reading a single item from the Soviet archives. Soviet authorities exercised tight control over all official documents and archival repositories, and no procedures were in place to release any of these materials to the public. For nearly 75 years, the information available about Soviet policy-making was so sparse that Western scholars often had to rely exclusively on published sources, supplemented by a few interviews.

Now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, several of the key Soviet archives have finally been opened — if only on a limited and sporadic basis — for scholarly research. This development has brought both benefits and drawbacks. The focus here will be mainly on the drawbacks, but that does not mean the benefits have been negligible. As recently as three to four years ago, the notion that Western and Russian scholars would be permitted to examine sensitive postwar documents in the archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry or the Central Committee of the

continued on page 18

NEW FINDINGS ON THE KOREAN WAR

Translation and Commentary by Kathryn Weathersby

While the opening of Soviet archives brought high expectations for quick answers to long-standing questions about the Cold War, those of us working in the Soviet archives have found that they are like other historical collections; individual documents contain only fragments of the information we seek. It is only after laboriously sifting through a great and varied mass of records that we can begin to piece together even one part of the intricate story of the Cold War.

Occasionally, however, we come upon a single document that directly answers a major question. The document excerpted below, “On the Korean

War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Negotiations,” is one such find. It is a survey of Soviet and Chinese involvement in the Korean War that was compiled in 1966 by so far unidentified members of the staff of the Soviet Foreign Ministry archive. The apparent purpose of this internal history was to provide background information for the small group of Soviet officials who were at that time engaged in discussions with the People’s Republic of China and North Vietnam over possible Soviet assistance to the Viet Cong in their war with the United States.¹ This document thus tells us something about Soviet atti-

continued on page 14

Soviet Foreign Policy During the Cold War:

A DOCUMENTARY SAMPLER

On 12-15 January 1993, in the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences building in Moscow, the Cold War International History Project sponsored the first scholarly conference on Cold War history to be based on newly available archival sources in the former Soviet Union. CWIHP organized the conference in collaboration with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its Russian acronym), which houses the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central Committee. Over four days Russian and American scholars presented roughly three dozen papers, on topics ranging from the Cold War’s origins to the Sino-Soviet split to the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the superpower crises over Suez, Berlin, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba. (Several of these papers have since been published by CWIHP in revised form as Working Papers—by Hope Harrison and Vladislav Zubok on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-62, and by Kathryn Weathersby on Soviet policy and the origins of the Korean War, 1945-50—and more are slated to appear as working papers and in a forthcoming edited volume.)

An essential precondition to the holding of the conference was a written agreement by SCCD that all participants, whether Russian or foreign, would receive equal access to released materials, that all materials released for the conference would be made available to the world scholarly community, and that “no restric-

continued on page 55

INSIDE:

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
| Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Part 2) | 2 |
| Russian Foreign Ministry Archives | 26, 27 |
| Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Exchange | 40, 41 |
| Warsaw Pact Planning: A Response | 51 |
| Update | 70 |

questions, prepares the agenda and materials for consideration by the National Security Council under the chairmanship of the President (this organ under Nixon began to work regularly, meeting no more rarely than once or twice a week). As recognized by Nixon himself, at my last meeting with him, Kissinger every week “pesters” him (that is, meets with him) significantly more often than any other aide.

Judging by my personal observations and compared with, for example, the relation of President Johnson with his aide [Walt] Rostow, I can say that Kissinger conducts himself much more freely than his predecessors in the presence of the President: one feels the certain confidence of a man who has won for himself a solid position at the White House (at the State Department they say directly that if “Henry”—Kissinger’s first name—speaks against that or some other proposal, then Nixon will most probably reject it).

Kissinger himself, though he is a smart and erudite person, is at the same time extremely vain and in conversations with me, especially during a private lunch (we have established a pretty good personal relationship), not averse to boasting about his influence. During our last conversation he, for example, without any excessive humility, announced that in all of Washington “only two people can answer precisely at any given moment about the position of the USA on this or that question: these are President Nixon and he, Kissinger.” Regarding this he suggested to me that if it is necessary to precisely define something really important “for the correct understanding in Moscow of Nixon’s policy on a concrete question,” I should quietly appeal directly to him.

I should say that he himself readily welcomes the Soviet Ambassador or visits us in the Embassy for a private conversation immediately following a request from our side. He himself often takes the initiative to arrange such meetings. Evidently, he also cites all this as a confidential channel of communication with the Soviet side in order to strengthen his own personal position with Nixon. In this connection I should mention that Kissinger holds under his own personal control all communication of members of his staff with our Embassy personnel, and sternly requires that all such conversations are reported directly to him, and if he considers it necessary, that he himself report to the President. Most recently, his tendency to limit the number of such communications and subsume them all into the flow of his personal contacts with the Soviet Ambassador has been noticeable.

Evidently, it would be expedient over time to more and more actively develop and use the channel with Kissinger in order to influence and through him drive home directly to President Nixon our points of view on various important questions, especially in situations where a certain delicacy is called for or where any sort of public-

ity is undesirable, which is often not possible to achieve when acting through the State Department. It goes without saying that we will as always have to handle routine and official matters, especially those where it is necessary to fix our position, through ordinary diplomatic channels. Secretary of State Rogers has noticeably begun to gather strength and operate more actively in the area of American foreign policy, leaning on the wide apparatus of the State Department and Foreign Service. And all the same, it is necessary to take into account that Kissinger’s influence on the formulation of Nixon’s foreign policy course, judging by all our observations and information in our possession, for now remains commanding.

A. DOBRYNIN

(Source: SCCD, F. 5, Op. 61, D. 558, LI. 92-105.)

**Document Six:
Soviet Policy in Afghanistan, 1979:
A Grim Assessment**

The following CPSU Central Committee document, dated 1 April 1979 and signed by Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitrii Ustinov, KGB chief Yurii Andropov, and CC International Department head Boris Ponomarev, provides a strikingly candid assessment of the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan that the Soviet Politburo confronted in spring 1979. The report attributes the increasing success of the Islamic opposition (i.e., the Afghan Mujaheddin) to the “miscalculations and mistakes” of the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) regime that seized power following the April 1978 “revolution.” The PDPA’s draconian social measures and “unjustified repression” are cited as key factors responsible for the alienation of the army (“which still remains the main basis for the regime”) and the general populace. The document reveals that the Soviet leadership has earlier rebuffed a PDPA request for direct military support in response to fighting in the provincial city of Herat and correctly predicts “the serious political consequences which would have followed if the Soviet side had granted their request....”

Nevertheless, despite these cautionary words, seven months later the Soviet Government did approve direct military intervention in Afghanistan to enforce the continuation of communist rule in Kabul. (For a detailed analysis of Soviet policy in Afghanistan in 1978-79, using newly available CPSU CC materials, see the forthcoming article by Odd Arne Westad of the Norwegian Nobel Institute in the February 1994 issue of International History Review.) Introduction by Robert S. Litwak, Woodrow Wilson Inter-

national Center for Scholars; translation by Loren Utkin; document provided by Mark Kramer.

* * * * *

[The report was found attached to the following cover memorandum:]

Return within 3 days *Proletariat of the world*
to the CC CPSS *unite!*
(General department, First sector)

**Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL PAPERS

No P149/XIU

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov,
Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev,
Pusakov, Baibakov, Skachkov, Zamiatin.

Memorandum on protocol no. 149 of the
meeting of the Politburo (CC CPSU) on April
12, 1979

Our future policy in connection with the situation
in Afghanistan.

Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov,
Ponomarev are in agreement with the consider-
ations on the given question, which are laid out in
the memorandum (enclosed).

SECRETARY OF THE CC [Central Committee]

[The report is appended:]

In reference to point XIU of protocol no. 149

Top secret
SPECIAL PAPERS

CC CPSU

In accordance with the 3/18/79 request we are reporting an analysis of the reasons for the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which have recently worsened and our thoughts about our possible further steps in helping the leadership of DRA strengthen its position and stabilize the situation in the country.

Last April’s revolution in Afghanistan occurred in an economically weak, backward feudal country with primitive economic forms and limited domestic resources. The old regime left a great variety of social, economic, and political problems.

In the conditions of a severe class struggle, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan appeared on one pole, representing the interests

of the working class, facing the forces expressing the interests of the gentry-feudal class, the bourgeoisie, and the most reactionary part of the clergy on the other.

The Afghan reactionary forces are very skillfully taking advantage of the almost complete illiteracy of the population, complex international and intertribal conflicts, religious fanaticism and nationalism.

Subversive actions, sabotage and the resistance of the overthrown class of exploiters are deepening the economic problems, lowering industrial and agricultural output, as well as hampering business activity, raising prices and reducing the influx of revenue into the state budget. The actions of reactionary forces, which are at present headed by Muslim leaders, who rely on the "Muslim Brothers" organization, have banded together on the basis of their common negative relation to the new order in separatist and nationalist groupings and in the pro-Maoist organization "Shoalee Javid."

The reactionary forces have consolidated somewhat recently after overcoming the confusion following the rapid and rather unexpected victory of the April revolution. They have started to change the forms of struggle, shifting from covert subversive actions to open armed forms of activity. They were able not only to regroup within the country but also to build wide connections with imperialist and clerical groups abroad, which supply them with active propaganda support as well as money and weapons. The tactic of the enemies of the revolution is to widen the front of the struggle, to force the government to disperse its forces across different regions of the country.

Reactionary forces use slogans of extreme anticommunism and antisovietism. Their main political goal is the overthrow of the revolutionary democratic order and the creation of a "free Islamic republic" in Afghanistan.

The program of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan anticipates the implementation of wide political and social-economic reforms in the interests of the working people. But this program is just beginning to be realized and therefore only a small portion of the population has felt the advantages of the new order and its progressive character. The new authorities must overcome centuries of backwardness of the country, remove difficulties, and solve problems. This requires time as well as a thoroughly planned and well calculated approach. The leaders of democratic Afghanistan have to create a new state apparatus, reorganize and strengthen the army, and gather practical experience in building a state and party.

The weak side of the people's authority is the fact that it has not yet established a firm basis of support in the provincial and urban administrative political organs through which the working people would be involved in the management

of the state from the center and particularly from distant areas.

The new authority is experiencing serious problems because of its relationship with the clergy and opposition tribal leaders which are the most influential forces in Afghanistan. The resolution of this problem, which requires circumspection and a careful approach, has not yet been found and both forces continue to be dangerous opponents of the present regime. They play a major role in the counterrevolutionary struggle. The situation in Iran and the spark of religious fanaticism all around the Muslim East was the underlying cause of the activation of the struggle against the government of Afghanistan.

The difficulties which the leadership of DRA faces are growing more complex because the PDPA has not yet become a mass political organization. The best workers and poorest peasants are becoming involved very slowly. The party is still unable to attract the layers of society which could accept the revolutionary aspects of the revolution: the intelligentsia, white-collar employees, the small bourgeoisie, and lowest layers of the clergy.

The party itself split following the April revolution and weakened its position, influence, and prestige. PDPA continues to be not only small in number but also has been weakened seriously by the internal struggle between the "Khalq" and "Parcham" groups. The most popular leaders of the "Parcham" group were either physically destroyed or purged from the party, army, and state apparatus. Some of them found themselves abroad as political refugees. This situation has hurt the party's remaining "Parcham" members. The people have demonstrated fear, suspicion, and distrust of the PDPA leadership. Rapid changes in the leaders of important administrative units in the center as well as the periphery and constant changes in the army have made the situation even worse.

The enemies of the revolution are acting not only from within the country but from abroad, especially from Pakistan and Iran where many of the opponents of the new order have emigrated. According to our sources, Western special services, particularly American and Chinese agencies, are involved in the organization of the struggle against the government inside the country. They have taken advantage of the fact that Afghanistan's borders with Pakistan and Iran are practically open. Not only subversive and terrorist groups, but also large armed bands are sent across those borders.

The internal and external counterrevolutionary forces are trying to use not only the objective difficulties of the new order, but also the miscalculations and mistakes of the Afghan leadership. It is known that following the victory in the April revolution, extreme measures and unjustified repression were often allowed in solving both internal party and government problems. There were

cases of financial corruption, as well as violence towards arrested persons during investigations.

The dissatisfaction with unjustified repression affected the army, which still remains the main basis for the regime. This makes the counterrevolutionary task of dictating the system not only from within the country but also from abroad significantly easier. Many commanders feel uncertain and fear arrest after witnessing their colleagues' arrest and disappearance. These fears were confirmed by events in Herat, where not only a large portion of the population but also some army units, on their commanders' orders, sided with the counterrevolution.

The Herat events also revealed the weakness of the political, agitational, and propagandistic work of the PDPA among the people. The destabilizing activities of the enemies of the new system, including the reactionary clergy, are much more active and widespread than the work of the party.

The Soviet leadership has many times given recommendations and advice to the leaders of the DRA, and on a very high level. They have pointed to their mistakes and excesses. But the Afghan leaders, displaying their political inflexibility and inexperience, rarely heeded such advice.

The insufficient political experience of the DRA leaders was apparent during the conflict in Herat, where they displayed a lack of understanding of the serious political consequences which would have followed if the Soviet side had granted their request to call in Soviet troops.

It is clear that due to the internal nature of the antigovernmental opposition, the use of Soviet troops in repressing the Afghan counterrevolution would seriously damage the international authority of the USSR and would set back the process of disarmament. In addition, the use of Soviet troops would reveal the weakness of the Taraki government and would widen the scope of the counterrevolution both domestically and abroad, bringing the attack of antigovernmental forces to a much higher level. The fact that the government was able to suppress the rebellion in Herat with its own forces should hold back the counterrevolution and demonstrate the relative strength of the new system.

Therefore, our decision to refrain from satisfying the request of the leadership of DRA to send Soviet military units to Afghanistan was correct and this policy should be continued further because the possibility of new rebellions against the government cannot be excluded.

Of course, we should continue to do anything we can to assist the leadership of Afghanistan with their struggle against counterrevolution and in their stabilization of the situation of the country. We have to help the government strengthen its influence and to lead the people along the path of socialist reform.

The Soviet Union has been providing active

political support to the new government, as well as widespread economic and military assistance and has been participating in the training of skilled personnel from the first days following the victory of the April revolution. Large numbers of advisers and specialists were sent to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan government to assist in solving the problems faced by the DRA leadership.

Taking into account the recent additional decisions, in order to continue this work it is necessary:

1. To continue to support the leadership of the DRA in improving the combat efficiency and political awareness of the Afghan army, ensuring its loyalty and dedication to the revolutionary leadership, and in strengthening and improving the efficiency of the security organs, including the border patrol.

It should be noted that in connection with the latest events, large amounts of arms and military technology have been sent and an additional amount will be sent into Afghanistan. In addition, the training of military specialists for the armed forces of the DRA has been expanded in military academies in Afghanistan itself as well as in the Soviet Union. It should be emphasized that modern and effective mastering of the supplied weapons and technology is essential. The same applies to aid provided to the security organs.

2. As much as is possible, to examine and solve problems connected with provided economic assistance to Afghanistan, especially that which would accelerate and strengthen the political position of the revolutionary-democratic regime in the country. To advise the Afghan leadership on developing the principal sectors of the economy which would strengthen the productive capacity of the country, resolve social problems, and provide employment to the population.

3. In contacts with the leadership of the DRA at all levels to always emphasize the importance of widening the political base which supports the party and the government. The importance of the consecutive implementation of the planned reforms, such as land reform, should be instilled in the leaders of the DRA. This has to be done carefully, devoting essential attention to the political and ideological side of reform. For example, the peasants should be convinced that they are getting the land only because of the revolution and will lose it if they will not protect the revolutionary authority. Similar explanations should be made in cases of other socio-economic reforms.

To widen the political base of the PDPA, the Afghan leadership should be made to understand that it is essential to gradually create electoral organs, yet, of course, the leading role of the party should be maintained and strengthened in the state and political structure of the country.

They should also understand that it is advisable to develop and enact a constitution which will secure the democratic rights of the people and regulate the activity of the state organs.

4. It should be emphasized to the Afghan leadership that as the party ranks grow numerically, it is crucial to maintain the unity of the party leadership and membership. They should also be reminded about the advisability of collective decision-making on the most important issues along party and state lines. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the leadership of DRA should be given practical assistance in establishing the party organization, spreading mass information, and preparing party and state cadres.

5. To continue to draw the attention of the Afghan leadership to the necessity of carrying out appropriate work among the Muslim clergy of the country in order to fractionalize it and reduce the influence of reactionary Muslim leaders on the people. This influence could be diminished by encouraging religious freedom and demonstrating that the new power does not persecute the clergy as a class, but only punishes those who act against the revolutionary system.

6. The DRA leaders should be convinced of the necessity of the introduction and strict observance of law and order, based on revolutionary legality, as well as the necessity of a more reasonable approach to the use of repressive measures. This does not mean, however, that repressive measures should not be used against true infidels or those who engage in active counterrevolutionary activity. A person's fate should not be decided on the basis of circumstantial and unverifiable evidence, or verdict by two- and three-man commissions, without a true investigation and trial. This applies both to party and military cadres.

7. Considering the importance of personal contacts in communicating our views and thoughts on the above questions to the DRA leadership, visits on various levels should be practiced on a more regular basis in order to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

8. To continue, along official diplomatic and special channels, to work against the interference of other countries, particular neighboring ones, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

9. To help Afghan friends conduct political work among the people, including radio propaganda, which due to the high percentage of illiteracy plays a special role in Afghanistan.

In our propaganda concerning Afghanistan, the traditional friendship and wide base of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries should be emphasized. This relationship not only exists today, but will continue to develop in the future. The achievements in socio-economic development of the Central Asian republics during the Soviet period should be described in a wide and clearly understandable manner; these republics should be used as an example to demon-

strate the falsity of assertions concerning repression of religious expression, the Muslim faith included.

10. To periodically inform brother socialist countries about our steps in aiding the leadership of DRA in stabilizing the situation in the country, thereby orienting them to render similar political and material support of Afghanistan.

Concrete proposals on the above positions, as well as any other measures, will be included as needed.

Please review these materials.

A. Gromyko. Y. Andropov. D. Ustinov. B. Ponomarev.

April 1, 1979
No 279/gs
No 25-S-576

(Source: SCCD, Fond 89, perechen [list] 14, dokument 28.)

IREX

The International Research & Exchanges Board (IREX) operates a variety of grant-giving programs to support scholarly research in, travel to, academic exchanges with, and archival and bibliographical cooperation and collaboration with, the countries of the former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (including the former GDR and the former Yugoslavia) and Eurasia (including Mongolia). For further information on details of the programs and how to apply contact:

Ann E. Robertson
Public Information Manager
International Research & Exchanges
Board
1616 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Tel.: (202) 628-8188
FAX: (202) 628-8189
BITNET: irex@gwuvm
Telex: 403775 IRE UD
Internet: irex@gwuvm.gwu.edu

SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY

SOURCES FOR STALIN AND THE BOMB

by David Holloway

For historians of the Cold War, the Soviet nuclear weapons program is a topic of obvious importance. The nuclear arms race was a central element in the Cold War, and much of the historiography of American Cold War policy has focused on nuclear weapons—on the decisions to build them, and on their role in foreign policy and military strategy. But American policy is only one part of the history of the Cold War. Comparable studies of Soviet nuclear policy are needed for a full understanding of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear competition, which dominated world politics for more than 40 years. This note reviews briefly some of the main sources I used for my *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

An extensive literature on Soviet nuclear policy was published in the West during the Cold War. This dealt

primarily with two topics: the structure and development of Soviet nuclear forces, and Soviet thinking about nuclear war and the role of nuclear weapons in war. Some of these works retain considerable value, but the range of issues they could examine was necessarily limited.¹ They were based primarily on data published by the U.S. government about Soviet nuclear weapons systems and on the statements of Soviet leaders about nuclear weapons, as well as on Soviet publications about foreign policy and military strategy, operational art, and tactics. It was not possible to analyze Soviet policy in terms of the interplay of individuals, institutions, and circumstances. The way in which we understood Soviet nuclear policy was therefore very different from the way in which we could think about Ameri-

continued on page 2

BOHR, THE BOMB, AND SOVIET ATOMIC ESPIONAGE:

Ex-KGB officer Pavel Sudoplatov sparked a controversy when he alleged in his memoirs that Nobel-winning physicist Niels Bohr passed atomic secrets to Moscow. Now the original 1945 KGB report on the espionage approach to Bohr, sent by secret police chief Lavrenti Beria to Joseph Stalin, has surfaced. What does it say, and what does it mean? See pages 50-59.

Soviet Cold War Military Strategy: Using Declassified History

by William Burr

“The history of the Soviet strategic program is at the same time a history of U.S. perceptions.”¹ So wrote a team of historians and political scientists in a once highly classified Pentagon history of the Cold War strategic arms race. The authors were describing an important problem: so long as primary sources were unavailable, academic and government analysts interested in explaining Soviet military policy had to resort to “inferences drawn by long chains of logic” to interpret the scattered data available to

continued on page 9

INSIDE:

| | |
|-------------------------------------|----|
| SOVIET SCIENCE SOURCES | 2 |
| MOSCOW'S BIGGEST BOMB | 3 |
| STALIN'S SECRET ORDER | 5 |
| RESPONSE: KOREAN WAR ORIGINS | 21 |
| KGB VS. CIA | 22 |
| GERMANY & THE COLD WAR: | |
| CWIHP CONFERENCE REPORT | 34 |
| EAST GERMAN ARCHIVES | 34 |
| MYSTERIES OF TIUL'PANOV | 34 |
| GDR ORAL HISTORY | 35 |
| KHRUSHCHEV'S 1958 ULTIMATUM | 35 |
| SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND THE BOMB | |
| ASSESSING SPY STORIES | 50 |
| THE REPORT TO STALIN | 50 |
| WHO USED WHOM? | 51 |
| DOCUMENTS: MORE SOVIET TRANSLATIONS | 60 |
| RUSSIAN ARCHIVES NEWS | 86 |
| UPDATE | 90 |

Nuclear Weapons after Stalin's Death: Moscow Enters the H-Bomb Age

by Yuri Smirnov and Vladislav Zubok

By the time Stalin died, on 5 March 1953, the Soviet Union had become a nuclear power whose army was preparing to receive, in several months, its first atomic weapons.¹ The task set by Stalin, to liquidate the U.S. atomic monopoly and to develop the Soviets' own nuclear arsenal, was “overfulfilled” on 12 August 1953, when the USSR successfully tested the world's first transportable hydrogen bomb. The work on this bomb had been in progress since 1948, and Stalin failed by only five months to live to see his triumph.²

continued on page 14

military advantage, as a result of which the general strategic balance would be changed to the advantage of the USSR. The NSC pointed out that the means of forward basing could be a subject for discussion during negotiations between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Countries on the question of balanced limitation of armed forces in Europe.

According to certain information, one of the variants studied by the NSC provides for the American side to put forward a proposal to simultaneously "freeze" the existing number of Soviet intermediate and medium range missiles and the American means of forward basing if, due to great differences in points of view on means of forward basing, the negotiations will come to a dead end and appear to be under threat of breakdown.

Through unofficial channels the Americans inform us that Nixon's government, while "sincerely wishing" to achieve concrete results during the negotiations, at the same time "can't wait endlessly" and is interested in achieving an agreement with the USSR by the end of 1971, because the beginning of the electoral campaign will make it difficult for him to bargain with the USSR. But the intent of these statements, it seems, is to influence the position of the USSR during the negotiations. According to existing information, Kissinger in a private talk said that from a political point of view it may be more beneficial for Nixon if the agreement with the USSR were to be achieved closer to the presidential elections. According to a statement by the American representative to the Disarmament Committee in Geneva, the USA is ready to conduct at least three more rounds (the present one included) of negotiations, striving first of all to get the agreement of the USSR on limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, not being sure that they will manage to obtain the agreement of the USSR on a complex accord on the limitation of ABM systems and strategic offensive weapons on terms acceptable to the U.S., the Americans might put forward a proposal for partial agreement. Most probably it would be a proposal to limit ABM deployment to the "Safeguard" system for the USA and an ABM system around Moscow for the USSR.

And if American attempts to obtain a separate, favorable to them, agreement on ABM systems fail, they would prefer just to conclude a treaty on measures for reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and USSR.

CC CPSU is informed.

Head of the State Security Committee

[signature] ANDROPOV

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 63, D. 193, Ll. 33-

38.)

VI. From Hesitation to Intervention: Soviet Decisions on Afghanistan, 1979

Despite the declassification of numerous high-level Soviet documents, the precise reasons behind the USSR's massive, ill-fated military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 remain murky. If anything, the unveiling over the past few years of records of internal Kremlin deliberations and Soviet-Afghan exchanges in the months prior to the intervention have in some ways intensified the mystery, because they demonstrate that Soviet leaders, including CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev, were keenly aware that the direct introduction of outside military forces for use against the Kabul government's opponents would be a political catastrophe, incurring bitter resentment among the Afghan people and handing a propaganda victory to Soviet opponents around the world. Yet, ultimately, the decision to go ahead with the intervention was taken anyway. (Two English-language accounts of the run-up to the invasion that make extensive use of the new Soviet documentation are Odd Arne Westad, "Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979," International History Review 16 (Feb. 1994), 49-69; and Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1994), 977-1075.)

The documents below offer some indication of the apprehension Soviet leaders felt about sending military forces in the spring of 1979, as well as of the secretiveness surrounding the actual decision to intervene when it was finally made. The first documents concern a visit to Moscow in March 1979 by Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammad Taraki, whose communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) had come to power in the bloody April 1978 coup or revolution (the term depends on who tells the story) that overthrew the non-aligned Daoud government. Since then, his regime had faced rising internal opposition—from Islamic activists who resented the imposition of atheistic and modernistic ideas, from fiercely independent tribes who disliked increasing centralization, and, after the dissolution of a short-lived alliance, from the PDPA's own

"Parcham" faction, which Taraki's more militant "Khalq" faction had methodically purged from the government.

Taraki's hastily-arranged trip to Moscow had been occasioned by the most serious outbreak yet to threaten his rule, a violent rebellion in the Afghan city of Herat that broke out in mid-March which saw the defection of army units and the killing of Soviet advisers and Khalq officials. CPSU CC Politburo records show that from the outset of the uprising, Soviet leaders considered, yet rejected, urgent telephone appeals from Taraki and his powerful deputy, Hafizullah Amin, to send in Soviet military forces to help the evidently shaky Afghan army suppress the spreading revolt. During a Politburo meeting "About the Exacerbation of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Our Possible Moves" on March 17, when the situation in Herat appeared grave, the discussion seemed to focus on the unacceptability of allowing the government's opponents to get the upper hand, as the following comments by Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and Prime Minister Alexei N. Kosygin indicated:

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear—we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won't have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree—we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we've already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force....

Yet, on March 18, as the Politburo continued to deliberate, a consensus emerged, led by KGB chairman Andropov, against direct Soviet military intervention. Even Gromyko, despite his admonition only a day before that Afghanistan must not be surrendered, gave an impassioned, indeed prescient warning against dispatching troops.

ANDROPOV. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever type of situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, but that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a

risk....

GROMYKO. I fully support Comrade Andropov's proposal to exclude a measure as the introduction of our troops into Afghanistan. The [Afghan] army there is unreliable. Thus our army if it enters Afghanistan will be an aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a [socialist] revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of a détente in international tensions, arms reductions, and much more—all that would be thrown back. Of course, this will be a nice gift for China. All the nonaligned countries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expected from such an action. There will no longer be any question of a meeting of Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] with [U.S. President Jimmy] Carter, and the visit of [French President Valéry] Giscard d'Estaing at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, battle of one group of the population against another....

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite [Taraki] here and tell him, that we will increase our assistance to you, but we cannot introduce troops, since they would be fighting not against the army, which in essence has gone over to the adversary or is just sitting and waiting it out, but against the people. There would be huge minus for us. A whole bouquet of countries would quickly come out against us. And there are no pluses for us at all....

GROMYKO. ...We would be throwing away everything which we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotiations which would fly by the wayside, there would be no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political act), there would be no meeting of Leonid Il'ich with Carter, and it is very doubtful that Giscard d'Estang would come to visit us, and our relations with Western countries, particularly the FRG, would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act as the introduction of troops....

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 25, Dok. 1, "Zasedaniye Politbyuro TsK KPSS 17 marta 1979 goda" ["Meeting of the Politburo of the CC

of the CPSU, March 17 [and 18 and 19], 1979], "Ob obostrenii obstanovki v Demokraticheskoi Respublike Afganistan i nashikh vozmozhnykh merakh" ["On the Aggravation of the Situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and On Our Possible Measures"], translations by Mark H. Doctoroff, CWIHP; see also Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, rev. ed., pp. 992-93.)

On March 20, Taraki traveled to Moscow to plead in person with Soviet leaders for renewed economic and military support to overcome the Afghan government's domestic enemies. The records of the ensuing conversations make clear that the prime question on the agenda was Kabul's request for external military intervention. Prior to seeing Brezhnev, Taraki met first with Prime Minister Kosygin, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov, and Politburo member Boris N. Ponomarev. Buoyed by reports that troops loyal to him were regaining control in Herat, Taraki listened as Kosygin explained the Politburo's decision—vowing eternal Soviet-Afghan friendship and enhanced Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military aid, but urging the Afghans to be self-reliant when it came to actual fighting (using an eerily ironic example). Introductions by Jim Hershberg, CWIHP director; translations below by Danny Rozas; documents provided by Mark Kramer, Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, and Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

* * * * *

Distributed to the members
and candidate members
of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Subject to return
(General office, 1st sector)

No. P499

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF MEETING^s
of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO,
D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV with
N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979

A.N. KOSYGIN. The Politburo has entrusted us to discuss with you all questions which you believe necessitate an exchange of opinions. As

I have already mentioned to you, your meeting with L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first word should be given to you, but since one important question from your side has already been raised, I would like to first set forth our opinion, and then we will attentively hear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the friendship between Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional, dictated by some temporary viewpoints, but calculated for ages. We have given and will continue to give you assistance in the fight against all enemies which act against you at the present time and against those enemies with which you may clash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situation which has developed in your country, we looked for ways to assist you which would best serve the interests of our friendship and your relations with other countries. There may be various ways of solving the problems which have developed in your country, but the best way is that which would preserve the authority of your government among the people, not spoil relations between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and not injure the international prestige of your country. We must not allow the situation to seem as if you were not able to deal with your own problems and invited foreign troops to assist you. I would like to use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people withstood a difficult war with the USA and are now fighting against Chinese aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. They only need to be genuinely united, and created into new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin already to create new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at the given time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the present situation. One only needs to deal with the matter correctly. Let's take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy would quickly entrench itself there, that the city would become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the military town in Herat where the mutinous part of the 17th infantry division is located, after air-bombardment strikes has been taken by a battalion of [paratroops?] supported by tanks from Kandahar. Troops loyal to the government are strengthening and evolving success.

Our assignment for the current time period as we see it is to defend you from various interna-

tional complications. We will give you assistance with all available means—ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel for use of the most modern types of weapons and military machinery, which we are sending you. But the deployment of our forces in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately alarm the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multipronged consequences. This, in effect, would be a conflict not only with the imperialist countries, but also a conflict with one's own people. Our mutual enemies are just waiting for the moment when soviet forces appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy on Afghan territory military groups hostile to you. I would again like to underline that the question of deploying our forces has been examined by us from every direction; we carefully studied all aspects of this action and came to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve, but would worsen. One cannot deny that our troops would have to fight not only with foreign aggressors, but also with a certain number of your people. And a people does not forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be vindicated.

With direct Soviet military intervention ruled out, Kosygin and Taraki go on to discuss diplomatic and political steps to bolster Kabul, particularly in regard to neighboring countries. Kosygin notes that Moscow sent notes to Iran and Pakistan to warn them "in all seriousness not to meddle" in Afghan affairs, and had received a promise to respect Afghan sovereignty and only deliver humanitarian aid to refugees from Pakistani leader Mohammed Zia ul-Haq—a commitment Taraki finds hard to credit, since he blames Zia for "creating camps" to arm guerrillas against his rule. "We are not so naive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq," replies Kosygin, "but whatever the case may be, the statement has been made and it is binding." The implications of a recent Iranian order to expel foreign workers are also discussed, with Taraki speculating that exceptions may be made for American helicopter specialists and Kosygin noting that "it is possible that we may have more specialists in Iran than do the Americans." Taraki expresses concern that a mass influx of Afghan workers expelled from Iran might include rebel sympathizers. Though he insists that "the majority of people remain on our side" and that "We are doing

everything [possible] to rule the country not by force of arms, but by revolutionary-democratic means," Taraki then shifts the conversation to requests for additional military supplies, probing again for the possibility of Soviet (or other foreign socialist) combatants to use them:

N.M. TARAKI. I wanted to touch on the question of the needs of the Afghan army. We would like to receive armored helicopters, an additional number of armored transports and military infantry vehicles, as well as modern means of communication. Also, maintenance personnel would be of great help to us.

D.F. USTINOV. It seems that we are talking about MI-24 helicopters, which have bullet-proof armor. We will give you 6 such helicopters during June-July and 6 more in the fourth quarter of this year.

N.M. TARAKI. We have great need for these helicopters, and it would be good if they arrived together with pilots.

A.N. KOSYGIN. We can send you maintenance specialists, which would take care of these helicopters at the airport, but, of course, not battle crews. We have already spoken about the matter.

D.F. USTINOV. You must prepare your own pilots. We are training your officers, and we can expedite their release.

N.M. TARAKI. Perhaps we can get helicopter pilots from Hanoi or some other country, for example, Cuba?

A.N. KOSYGIN. As I have already said earlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnam a great deal, but they never asked us to send them our pilots. They only asked for technical specialists. We are training 400 Afghan officers. Choose the people you need, and we will expedite their training.

N.M. TARAKI. We would very much like the delivery of helicopters to be expedited. We have a great need for them.

D.F. USTINOV. But, at the same time, you must worry about pilots for these helicopters.

N.M. TARAKI. Of course we will do that. If we cannot find them in our country, then we will look elsewhere. The world is big. If you do not agree with that, then we will search for pilots from among the Afghans studying with you, but we need trustworthy people, and among the Afghan officers who we sent to study in the Soviet Union earlier there are many "Muslim brothers" and Chinese sympathizers.

D.F. USTINOV. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 [are] helicopter pilots.

N.M. TARAKI. Good. However, the problem is that we don't know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud's regime, members of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the pro-Chinese

"Shoalee Javid" organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out. *Promised an assortment of free military assistance—not only helicopters but reconnaissance vehicles, anti-aircraft units, troop transports, technical advisers, and training—Taraki bargains for increased shipments of free wheat, pleading poverty, poor harvests due to land confiscations, and abrogations by Turkey and Pakistan of promised deals. Kosygin, bargaining hard, notes that the Afghans lack the capacity to transport deliveries of wheat beyond what the Soviets were offering, and that since Kabul was "ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money." He suggests giving the available funds to Moscow, which could then purchase American wheat and transfer it to Afghanistan: "Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat." Taraki then requests that Moscow build for Kabul a 1000-kilowatt radio station, "which would allow us to broadcast propaganda throughout the world. Our radio station is weak. While any slanderous declaration of some religious leader is spread throughout the world through foreign organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our radio station remains almost unheard." Ponomarev counters that "We are taking energetic measures to spread propaganda about the successes of the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan]," for instance reprinting Taraki's speech in Pravda and broadcasting it to Moslem countries, and offers to send a "specialist in propaganda." Kosygin defers the radio request for further study. Then the question of military advisers crops up again, and Taraki once more seeks an opening to secure Moscow's support for using foreign pilots and tank operators, to the obvious irritation of Kosygin, who not only rebuffs the idea sharply but issues a pointed warning to Taraki to act more judiciously toward his own advisers:*

D.F. USTINOV. Concerning additional shipments of military machinery, a need will arise for additional military specialists and advisers.

N.M. TARAKI. If you believe that such a need exists, then, of course, we will accept them. But won't you allow us, after all, to use pilots and tank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N. KOSYGIN. When referring to our military specialists, we mean mechanics who service military machinery. I cannot understand why the question of pilots and tank operators keeps coming up. This is a completely unex-

pected question for us. And I believe that it is unlikely that socialist countries will agree to this. The question of sending people who would sit in your tanks and shoot at your people—this is a very pointed political question.

N.M. TARAKI. We will see how we can use those Afghani soldiers who were sent to study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you to accept for training those people who we will select ourselves.

D.F. USTINOV. We will, of course, accept them for training.

A.N. KOSYGIN. To sum up this conversation, we can ascertain that there remains the question of the construction of a powerful radio station. There remains also the question of expediting the deliveries of military technology. You, as we understand, will select helicopter pilots from the officers training with us. If you have any other requests or desires, you may inform us through the Soviet ambassador and the chief military adviser. We will carefully review them, and will react accordingly.

We will continue to use political means to defend the DRA from its imperialist aggressors. Our press will also support the DRA.

We think it important that within your country you should work to widen the social support of your regime, draw people over to your side, insure that nothing will alienate the people from the government. And finally, not as a matter of discussion but as a wish, I would like to express my ideas on the importance of a very careful and cautious approach towards your staff. One should take care of one's staff and have an individual approach towards it. Have a thorough and good understanding with each person before hanging any labels on them.

The meeting breaks up after Kosygin assures an obviously disappointed Taraki that Moscow would reconsider its stand against sending troops should Afghanistan be subjected to foreign aggression:

A.N. KOSYGIN. If an armed invasion of your country takes place, then it will be a completely different situation. But right now we are doing everything to insure that such an invasion does not occur. And I think that we will be able to achieve this.

N.M. TARAKI. I pose this question because China is persistently pushing the Pakistanis against us.

A.N. KOSYGIN. When aggression takes place, then a completely different situation arises. The Chinese were convinced of this through the example of Vietnam and are biting their elbows now, so to speak. As for Afghanistan, we have already taken measures to guard it from aggression. I have already said that we have sent corresponding messages to the president of Pakistan, [Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah]

Khomeini, and the prime minister of Iran.

N.M. TARAKI. Must I tell the members of our Politburo that the Soviet Union will give the DRA only political support and other aid?

A.N. KOSYGIN. Yes, both political support and extensive assistance in the line of military and other shipments. This is the decision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev will tell you about this during the meeting with you, which will start in 10 min[utes]. I think that you will return to Afghanistan confident of our support, confident of your own actions.

21.III.79.

AK-786ss

30 copies

21.III.79.

x) This record has not been seen by the participants

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 26.)

Taraki is then ushered into Brezhnev's Kremlin office. The Soviet leader uses the occasion not only to reaffirm the decision against dispatching troops—a decision, he stresses, that should be kept strictly secret—but to preach to Taraki the importance of widening the base of the government's support among the Afghan people through political and economic means, and of taking a more moderate attitude toward the military, the clergy, and others in order to lessen fears of persecution. He also expresses mystification at the "abnormal" situation of open borders between Afghanistan and its neighbors given the infiltration of armed rebels. Taraki's response—essentially defending his present approach—could not have satisfied his Moscow interlocutors.

Subject to return to CC CPSU
(General Office, 1st sector)

No. P486

Distributed to the members
and candidate members
of the Politburo of CC CPSU

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF CONVERSATION^x

of L.I. Brezhnev with N.M. Taraki

20 March 1979

Also present: comr[ade]s. A.N. Kosygin,

A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov and B.N. Ponomarev.

L.I. BREZHNEV. Over the last few days we have been watching with alarm the development of events in Afghanistan. From what you said in conversation with our comrades, it seems the Afghan friends are gravely alarmed as well.

We must take steps to correct the situation that has developed and eliminate the threat to the new order in the DRA. And not only eliminate the threat, but also work to strengthen the gains of the April revolution.

As we see it, it is very important to widen the base which supports the leadership of the party and the country. First of all, of great importance here is the unity of your party, mutual trust, and ideological-political solidarity throughout its ranks from top to bottom.

It is worth thinking about creating a single national front under the aegis of the People's democratic party of Afghanistan as the recognized leader of the people. Such a front could include already existing socio-political organizations and be supported by groups of workers, peasants, petty and middle bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and students, youth, and progressive women. Its purpose would be to consolidate anti-imperialist and national patriotic forces against domestic and foreign reactionaries. It could also serve in the political upbringing of the population.

In rural areas it would be expedient to organize poverty committees consisting of propertyless and petty peasants and metayers [sharecroppers] to repel feudalists and capitalist landowners.

And, of course, everything must be done so that the army is staunchly on the side of the people's revolutionary government.

It is important that the commanding ranks in the army feel assured of the stability of their positions. One cannot expect much from an army when commanding cadres are frequently replaced. This is even more true if the cadre changes are accompanied by arrests. Many commanders, seeing their colleagues arrested and disappearing, begin to feel unsure of their own future.

All of this does not mean that repressive measures should not be taken with regard to those who have serious evidence of untrustworthiness to the revolutionary government. But this weapon is very sharp and must be used with the utmost caution.

As for the events in Herat, the normalization of the situation in this city would have a positive influence on the situation of the country as a whole and would have a chilling effect on circles ill disposed towards the revolutionary government.

It seems that the work carried out by the various types of enemies of the new order, including the reactionary clergy, to undermine the new order is much more active and on a greater scale

than the political work of the government representatives in the area. This point is of exceptional importance not only in Herat, but in the rest of the country as well.

Appropriate work must be done with the clergy in order to split their ranks; this could well be achieved by getting at least apart of the clergy, if not to actually support the government openly, then to at least not speak out against it. This could be best of all achieved by showing that the new government is not trying to persecute the leaders and representatives of the clergy, but only those who speak out against the revolutionary government.

And now for the question of the possibility of deploying soviet military forces in Afghanistan. We examined this question from every angle, weighed it carefully, and, I will tell you frankly: this should not be done. This would only play into the hands of the enemies—yours and ours. You already had a more detailed discussion of this question with our comrades.

Obviously, to announce publicly—either for us or for you—that we are not intent on doing this is, for understandable reasons, not advisable.

We will give you all necessary political support. Already, we are addressing Pakistan and Iran with strong warnings not to interfere in the internal matters of Afghanistan.

It would be well if soviet economic aid, especially things like the delivery of 100 thousand tons of wheat and the increase in the price of natural gas supplied [exported] by Afghanistan, were made known to the Afghan people in the necessary manner, using the means of mass information. This is of foremost importance in strengthening the position of the Afghan government.

The arms and military technology that we are additionally supplying you with will increase the strength of the Afghan army. However, this will only be true if the arms are placed in trustworthy hands and not in the hands of the enemy.

As you have asked, we have sent you numerous advisers and specialists both in military and other matters. You have working for you 500 generals and officers. If necessary, we can send an additional number of party workers, as well as 150-200 officers.

One more question: how do you explain the fact that, despite the complications in the situation and the deployment of a thousand armed people from Iran and Pakistan, your borders with these countries were, in effect, open, and it seems even now are not closed? This is an abnormal situation, and, in our opinion, it should be fixed.

Finally, I would like to emphasize once more that in the current situation the most important factor will be the ability to draw greater circles of the population to your side through political and economic means. It is important to also re-examine the arsenal of methods utilized and eliminate those that may cause legitimate alarm in people and give them a desire to protest.

N.M. TARAKI. With regard to creating a single national front in Afghanistan, I would like to say that it essentially exists in the shape of party, komsomol, trade unions and other mass public organizations, which function under the leadership of the People's democratic party of Afghanistan. However, it cannot yet firmly establish itself in the socio-political life of Afghanistan because of its economic backwardness and as yet insufficient level of political development in a certain part of the population.

However, under the current situation the leadership of the country cannot avoid the use of extreme measures when dealing with accomplices of international imperialism and reactionism. The repressive measures taken against ranks of representatives of the clergy, Maoists, and other persons partaking in open combat against the new people's government are completely in accordance with the law and no one turns to persecution without lawfully establishing the guilt of the accused.

The Afghan people do not want war with Iran and Pakistan, but if war does break out, then it will not be to their advantage—the Pashtuns and Baluchis would be on the side of Afghanistan. I would like to point out that the present government of Pakistan, and not without the help of China, is trying to play an important role in the incitement of anti-Afghan elements, including Afghanis showing up in Pakistan. Our party and government are trying to react calmly to these aspirations on the part of Pakistan and not worsen the relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The question of closing our borders with Iran and Pakistan is rather difficult. We are unable to do this because of the absence of the necessary means. Besides, the closing of the Afghan-Pakistan border would create discontent among Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns and Baluchis who maintain close family ties, and in the final result would significantly damage the prestige of the current government in Afghanistan.

30 copies.
21.III.79. [21 March 1979]

x) This record has not been seen by the participants.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 25.)

Moscow's dissatisfaction with the Afghan leadership and its handling of events and concern with its lack of support among the Afghan people was evident in a 1 April 1979 special report for the Politburo prepared after Taraki's visit by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev and reprinted in the previous issue of the Cold War

International History Project Bulletin (*Issue 3, pp. 67-69*). *That report reaffirmed the correctness of the Soviet refusal to send military forces to repress the "counter-revolution." But despite the repression of the Herat rebellion the anti-government activity persisted and so did Kabul's desire for direct Soviet military support. Shortly after his return to Kabul, Taraki was replaced as prime minister by his Khalq deputy, Hafizullah Amin. In April, Amin reiterated the now familiar appeal to Moscow for Soviet helicopter pilots for use against rebel forces, eliciting the following Politburo response, together with the instructions sent to the chief Soviet military adviser in Kabul for transmission to Amin.*

* * * * *

Proletariat of all countries, unite!

Subject to return in the course of 3 days
to CC CPSU (General office, 1st sector)
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FILE

P150/93

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol #150 of the CC CPSU
Politburo session
from 21 April 1979

On the inexpediency of the participation of soviet military helicopter crews in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the proposal on this question submitted in the memorandum by the Ministry of Defense on 18 April 1979, #318/3/0430.
2. To ratify the draft of instructions to the chief military adviser in the DRA (attached).

SECRETARY of CC

* * * * *

[attached] to article 93 protocol # 150

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

KABUL

TO CHIEF MILITARY ADVISER

Inform the Prime-Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan H. Amin that the request to send 15-20 military helicopters with soviet crews has been delivered to the Soviet government.

Tell him that the Afghan government has already been given explanations on the inexpediency of direct participation of soviet military sub-units in the suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in the DRA, as such actions would be used by the enemies of the Afghan revolution and foreign hostile forces in order to falsify soviet international aid to Afghanistan and to carry out anti-governmental and anti-soviet propaganda among the Afghan population.

Emphasize that during March-April of this year, the DRA has already been sent 25 military helicopters which are equipped with 5-10 complete sets of combat ammunition.

Convince H. Amin that existing combat helicopters with Afghan crews are capable, along with subdivisions of land-based forces and combat aircraft, of solving the problems of suppressing counter-revolutionary actions.

Work out for the Afghan command the necessary recommendations pertaining to this question.

(Source: TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 28.)

Yet between May and December 1979, the situation continued to deteriorate, and for reasons that are still not entirely clear, Moscow changed its mind about sending troops. Why the turnabout? Several potential explanations exist. One factor was undoubtedly the grave internal situation in Afghanistan, which Moscow viewed with growing concern, receiving reports from a parade of special emissaries sent to urge Kabul to modify and moderate its course. While blaming outside countries (Iran, Pakistan, China, the United States) for exacerbating the situation, Soviet leaders recognized deep problems with the Afghan leadership itself, and rumors arose that Moscow was angling to replace the Khalqi Taraki-Amin regime with one headed by Babrak Karmal, head of the Parcham faction. Mutinies and rebel attacks continued, and Moscow began to increase its security presence in the country, though still short of sending military forces. In September-October 1979, tensions between Taraki and Amin and their supporters exploded into open warfare, ending with Amin in control and Taraki dead—a result clearly contrary to the Kremlin's wishes. Surface cooperation between Kabul

and Moscow continued, with Amin even requesting the dispatch of Soviet troops. But Soviet leaders were privately convinced of Amin's "insincerity and duplicity" (the quotation is from a report for a Politburo meeting of 31 October 1979, cited in Trud (Moscow), 23 June 1992, and Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, rev. ed., 1011) and his inability to successfully contain the rebel insurgency, and may well have begun plotting to remove him—although much remains unclear about this period, as it is for the few months immediately preceding the intervention that the fewest internal Soviet documents have so far become available. Still, even the likely defeat of the clearly unpopular government would not alter the reasons why Moscow had rejected intervention the previous spring—so what else had changed? One possibility concerns the continuing growth of Islamic fundamentalism in the region, and most importantly the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, which had deposed the Shah after a quarter-century in power and installed in his place a theocracy dominated by the Ayatollah Khomeini. In their 1 April 1979 report to the Politburo, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev had pointed to the "situation in Iran and the spark of religious fanaticism all around the Muslim East" as the "underlying cause" of the anti-Kabul agitation. Moscow may well have also feared the spread of religious zeal into the mostly-Moslem Central Asian republics of the USSR itself—a latent threat that would not become evident to the rest of the world for another decade to come. Since the spring, the fundamentalist tide had only become stronger, with Islamic radicals taking firmer control of the Iranian revolution (and seizing the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in November), sparking unrest in Saudi Arabia, and calling for a jihad against other Arab regimes and against both superpowers. These developments related to the larger question of the changed international context since the spring's decision against non-intervention. Although Brezhnev and Carter had met in Vienna in June 1979 to sign a SALT II treaty, US-Soviet ties had been sinking ever since, with acrimony stirred by the "Cuban brigade" brouhaha later that summer—the flap, regarded by Moscow as a provocation, over the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba that U.S. intelligence had lost track of—and by the failure of the Senate to ratify, or even vote on the ratification of,

the SALT II treaty. The concerns Gromyko had expressed in March about the negative international repercussions of a Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan were, in fact, no less valid, but he and other Soviet leaders may have come to feel that there was less to be lost in that sphere anyway—that détente was already effectively dead. Finally, still to be resolved is the argument advanced by some analysts that U.S. irresolution in responding to the Iranian Revolution and the capture of the U.S. Embassy in November 1979 emboldened Moscow to advance toward its purported goal of a warm-water port in the Persian Gulf. If anything, however, the weight of the evidence in the documents that have become available suggest that Moscow's considerations were more influenced by fear of losing Afghanistan to Islamic radicalism than by hopes of using the country as a military springboard to dominate the region.

Still, it must be emphasized that the archival documents that have become available so far do not permit a clear reconstruction of Soviet decision-making in late 1979. Further evidence, particularly Politburo transcripts, may reside in the Russian Presidential Archives. But the closest document to a "smoking gun" for the intervention that has emerged is a memorandum dated 12 December 1979, apparently in Chernenko's handwriting. Six days earlier, the Politburo had approved sending a 500-man "Spetsnaz" (military intelligence special unit) force to Afghanistan. And now, the Politburo subgroup of Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko (Ponomarev was absent), together with Chernenko, obtained Brezhnev's signed consent to implement the agreed-upon measures leading to the deployment of 50-75,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan later that month, and (using the "Spetsnaz" force mentioned above) to the killing of Amin and his replacement by Babrak Karmal as Afghan leader and head of the PDPA. That a full CPSU CC Politburo meeting was not held to approve the invasion until it had taken place, and that the memorandum was hand-written to avoid informing typists, phrased euphemistically to avoid explicit reference to troops, or even to Afghanistan ("A"), reflect the secrecy with which the fateful step ultimately came about. More Russian documents on the Afghan events will appear in future issues of the CWIHP Bulletin.

NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON

*The Cold War in the Third World
and the
Collapse of Détente in the 1970s*

In January 1976, during several days of negotiations in Moscow with Kremlin leaders, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger pleaded for a Soviet gesture to ease the superpower confrontation in Angola, where the USSR's airlift of military equipment and Cuban troops had allowed the leftist government in Luanda to withstand an assault by guerrilla forces backed by South Africa. The action could do "irreparable damage" to detente, Kissinger warned, undermining supporters of that policy (above all Kissinger himself) in the United States. And that would be a "tragedy" since neither Moscow nor Washington had any significant interests in Angola, and "Five years from now it will make no difference."

According to recently declassified transcripts of the talks, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko rebuffed the American's increasingly plaintive entreaties with the curt response that any complaints should be taken up with Havana, since the Cuban intervention was the result of decisions made between two sovereign states, Angola and Cuba, and the USSR could not speak for them. At a Friday morning session with Gromyko at the Foreign Ministry's Tolstoi House, Kissinger finally gave up, wistfully calling it "a pity that this has come to pass when many opportunities existed for two great powers to settle this in a far-sighted way."

"It wouldn't be the first time in history," he rued, "that events that no one can explain afterwards give rise to consequences out of proportion to their intrinsic significance."

Five years later, détente had indeed collapsed, in large measure due to a series of superpower conflicts in the Third World—over Angola, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, and Afghanistan, among other locations—and another U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., confronted another communist interlocutor in an even more

secretive setting. This time, in the fall of 1981, at the height of the public hostility between the Reagan Administration and Fidel Castro's Cuba, Haig was clandestinely meeting the Cuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, in a Mexico City suburb. And one key subject for debate was a review of recent history: How had Cuba become involved in Africa, and why did U.S.-Cuban relations begin to "go very poorly" in 1975-76 and continue to deteriorate thereafter? (The record of that meeting remains classified in U.S. and Cuban archives, but the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* in this issue publishes a translated transcript obtained from the Russian archives.)

While Haig, repeating charges made during the Carter Administration, insisted that Cuba had acted as a Soviet proxy or puppet by intervening in Angola and the Horn of Africa, Rodriguez maintained just as stoutly that Havana had acted independently, out of its own interests, albeit (especially in the latter case) in coordination with Moscow; if anything, he declared, far from Moscow pulling the strings, it had been Castro, not Brezhnev, who had been the most ardent advocate of sending military support to revolutionary leaders in Africa.

"The outward geopolitical character of these events is completely at odds with the essence of the true facts . . . History will bring all of this to light," Rodriguez is quoted as telling Haig, adding: "One fine day, all of this will come to light. You can believe me or not, but some day this will be common knowledge."

That "fine day" has not quite arrived—much remains classified or hidden in archives and memories on all sides of the events—but with this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*, it has come palpably closer.

continued on page 4

***FOR IMPORTANT SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION, SEE INSIDE BACK COVER (P. 421) !!!**

***VISIT THE CWIHP WEBSITE:**
<http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive/cwihp>

ALSO IN THIS ISSUE:
*** MORE NEW EVIDENCE ON THE COLD WAR IN ASIA**
*** MORE RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS**

*** NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET DECISION-MAKING AND THE 1956 POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CRISES**
*** RESEARCH NOTES—SOVIET NUCLEAR HISTORY**

TABLE OF CONTENTS

New Evidence on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente in the 1970s

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Editor's Introduction..... | 1 |
| <i>New Evidence on the Cold War in Southern Africa</i> | |
| Havana's Policy in Africa, 1959-76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives, by Piero Gleijeses..... | 5 |
| Fidel Castro's 1977 Southern Africa Tour: A Report to Honecker..... | 8 |
| Moscow and the Angolan Crisis: A New Pattern of Intervention, by Odd Arne Westad..... | 21 |
| Soviet Documents on Angola and Southern Africa, 1975-1979..... | 32 |
| <i>Anatomy of a Third World Cold War Crisis: New East-bloc Evidence on the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978</i> | |
| Introduction, by James G. Hershberg..... | 38 |
| The Horn, the Cold War, and New Documents from the Former East-bloc: An Ethiopian View, by Ermias Abebe..... | 40 |
| Moscow, Mengistu, and the Horn: Difficult Choices for the Kremlin, by Paul B. Henze..... | 45 |
| East Germany and the Horn Crisis: Documents on SED <i>Afrikapolitik</i> , by Christian F. Ostermann..... | 47 |
| Russian and East German Documents on the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978..... | 50 |
| <i>U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980: New Russian & East German Documents</i> | |
| Introduction, by James G. Hershberg..... | 103 |
| Russian and East German Documents..... | 104 |
| <i>New Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan</i> | |
| Concerning the Situation in "A": New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan, by Odd Arne Westad..... | 128 |
| The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives..... | 133 |
| <i>U.S.-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-1981: New Evidence from Communist Archives</i> | |
| Introduction, by James G. Hershberg..... | 185 |
| Russian and East German Documents..... | 186 |
| Cuba as Superpower: Havana and Moscow, 1979, by Jorge I. Dominguez..... | 216 |
| A "Moment of Rapprochement": The Haig-Rodriguez Secret Talks, by Peter Kornbluh..... | 217 |
| <u>More New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia</u> | |
| Introduction, by James G. Hershberg..... | 220 |
| More on Mao in Moscow, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950..... | 223 |
| Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1950, by Odd Arne Westad..... | 224 |
| Translated Russian and Chinese Documents on Mao Zedong's Visit to Moscow, December 1949-February 1950..... | 226 |
| The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply, by Shen Zhihua..... | 237 |
| Stalin, Mao, Kim and Korean War Origins, 1950: A Russian Documentary Discrepancy, by Dieter Heinzig..... | 240 |
| Khrushchev vs. Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Split, by William Taubman..... | 243 |
| A New "Cult of Personality": Suslov's Secret Report on Mao, Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet Tensions, December 1959..... | 244 |
| A Crucial Step toward the Sino-Soviet Schism: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China, July 1960, by Chen Jian..... | 246 |
| The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives, by M.Y. Prozumenshikov..... | 251 |
| New East-bloc Documents on the Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959 & 1962..... | 258 |
| <u>More New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis</u> | |
| More New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives, by James G. Hershberg..... | 270 |
| More on Bobby and the Cuban Missile Crisis, by James G. Hershberg..... | 274 |
| Russian Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis..... | 278 |
| The Mikoyan-Castro Talks, 4-5 November 1962: The Cuban Version..... | 320 |
| The "Lessons" of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations, by Mark Kramer..... | 348 |
| <u>Special Feature: New Evidence on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises</u> | |
| Conferences in Budapest, Potsdam Spotlight Cold War Flashpoints..... | 355 |
| Togliatti on Nagy, 30 October 1956: Missing Cable Found..... | 357 |
| New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, by Mark Kramer..... | 358 |
| The "Malin Notes" on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956, translated and annotated by Mark Kramer..... | 385 |
| <u>Research Notes</u> | |
| The Russian Nuclear Declassification Project: Setting up the A-Bomb Effort, 1946, by G.A. Goncharov, N.I. Komov, and A.S. Stepanov..... | 410 |
| Khrushchev's 1960 Troop Cut: New Russian Evidence, by Vladislav M. Zubok..... | 416 |

tions with the USA. The negotiations were, frankly speaking, very difficult and this not only because of their intensity. The largest difficulties were connected with the nature of the questions with which we dealt, with the differences, yes, even with direct contrasts between our views.

As you know, it is not our habit to avoid difficult questions. The Middle East, South-east Asia, the situation in Southern Africa, the relationship between the USA and China - on all these questions I explained our basic point of view. With great determination I conveyed to Carter our opinion on the wrong theses of American propaganda with respect to the "Soviet threat" as well as with respect to the "violation of human rights" in the Socialist countries. Carter's situation, as the recent rearrangement in Washington proved, is not easy. A bitter battle over the coming into force [ratification] of the SALT II-Treaty is now being waged. If the treaty failed in the Senate, this would be, I think, a political catastrophe for Carter. But it would also be an extremely severe blow to the international prestige of the USA.

You will of course understand that, by and large, the prospect of the failure of the treaty is not desirable for us. But even in such a case, we will probably not lose politically because then the entire world will recognize who is consistently seeking disarmament and who is working in the opposite direction. But we all should try - in the framework of our means - to make sure this important matter will have a different end.

And now to the European matters. Here obviously much depends on proceeding with our initiatives in the field of disarmament which we have taken at the meeting of the [Warsaw Pact] Political Consultative Committee in Moscow and later at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in Budapest.

The reaction to our proposal has been a bit vague. The NATO countries seem to have acknowledged the positive direction of the efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries but an audible "yes" was not to be heard. It is good that currently the necessary link is being established at the level of foreign ministries between the European conference on military detente as proposed by us and the European meeting [of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] in Madrid in 1980.

If our proposal on the conclusion of a

treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as other kinds of arms is accepted, it would, I must say, constitute a tremendous advantage for the cause of detente. By the way, I have also talked about this with Carter. We have proposed to him a declaration to the effect that both sides would forego the first use of either nuclear or conventional arms against the other side or its allies. Initially Carter declared that he would agree and said that one could try to arrange for an agreeable formula. But later the Americans put on the reverse gear. But one has to understand that after all we wrestled six years over the conclusion of SALT II.

The Chinese problem still demands greatest attention.

The nature of Chinese foreign policy revealed itself in China's aggression against Vietnam. The Chinese are now negotiating with the Vietnamese comrades but they are conducting the negotiations in a way that it becomes obvious that they do not want a normalization of relations but Vietnam's capitulation. Moreover, there is a real danger of new Chinese provocations against Vietnam. One has to take that seriously. This obliges all of us, of course, not to weaken in the slightest manner our support and our help for the Vietnamese people as well as for the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. There are more than enough problems and extremely difficult problems. Let's take the "refugee" matter. The enemies of Vietnam have undertaken everything in order to make use of this problem to create a bad image of Vietnamese policy. To be sure, they did not manage to turn the Geneva conference into a trial of Vietnam. But obviously the matter cannot be put to rest. The Vietnamese friends are facing a great political and propagandistic job. We all have to support them in this task.

Now briefly on our imminent negotiations with the Chinese about which you have learned from the newspapers. One cannot expect quick progress in the Soviet-Chinese dialogue. The negotiations with China will require great patience, circumspection, and exact calculation of each of our steps.

That having been said, I think it is important for all of us not to relent in our opposition against China's policy which runs counter to the cause of peace and international security.

A few words on the Middle East. The fact that the question of prolonging the terms

for the presence of UN special forces on the Sinai Peninsula does not appear any more on the agenda of the Security Council undoubtedly constitutes a success for our common line. Hence the attempts to bless Israel's separate agreement with Egypt directly with the authority of the UN failed. And that was exactly what Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washington persistently tried to achieve. But now the UN special troops have to be withdrawn.

With respect to international questions, Erich, I would like to briefly touch upon the situation in Africa.

Recently we have had quite active contacts with representatives of the progressive African states. To generalize these talks and the observations made by our comrades, and our CC comrades as well, the task of politically strengthening the independent African countries is still in the forefront. But the problem of our economic relations with these states is already posed in its fullest extent. It is important and valuable that we vigorously oppose colonialism and racism. But the task which we have to meet together has larger dimensions. It is necessary to involve the African countries to a larger degree in cooperation with us in the economic field. This will be of advantage to us as well as the Africans. Your trip through a number of African countries, Erich, proved very useful. We highly appreciate your efforts in support of the progressive forces in Africa.

[concluding remarks]

Honecker: [report on domestic Issues]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 JIV 2/201/1313; document obtained and translated by C.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive); copy on file at the Archive.]

Document 10: CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 1 February 1980, with telegrams to Soviet Ambassador to West Germany (for Willy Brandt) and Finnish Social Democratic leader K. Sorsa (not printed)

Proletariats of all countries, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRALCOMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P182/2

To Comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Pel'she, Ponomarev,

Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov

Extract from protocol No. 182 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 1 February 1980

Re: Information for the Chairman of the Sotzintern [Socialist International] W. Brandt and the Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa.

1. Confirm the text of a telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment 1).

2. Confirm the text of information for transmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE
Attachments to No. 300s

[attachment 1]

Re: Item 2, Protocol No. 182

SECRET
Attachment 1

BONN

TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet personally with W. Brandt, tell him that you are authorized to communicate certain views on the international situation that has developed, and expound on the following text.

Recently, especially in connection with decisions of the December session of the NATO Council, events have transpired that have sharply complicated the international situation.

It is possible that we do not share the same views on everything. One way or another, under present circumstances, precise and first hand information about assessments and intentions becomes especially necessary. The important thing is to find a common language on the issue that has already been the topic of our mutual preoccupation for many years - how to support the aim of strengthening international security.

Our general assessment of, and our position on, the current international situation, are known to you from the responses of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to questions put forward by the newspaper "Pravda," published on January 13 of this year. That document reflects the principled position of the Central Committee of the CPSU, from which

we shall proceed.

We would like to communicate to you our viewpoint on several concrete issues.

The "Carter Doctrine." The general assessment of it by the Soviet side is set forth in the leading article of the newspaper "Pravda" dated January 29 of this year. In our view, the platform articulated in the American President's speech, with which you are familiar, expresses in a concentrated form the course of the present American administration, which was not just adopted today, in connection with the events in Afghanistan. This course had already emerged a long time ago.

Fact No. One. At the May 1978 special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, the urgent issues relating to disarmament were discussed, in connection with which the comprehensive program of actions proposed by the Soviet Union occupied the center of attention.

However, during the very same period of days, in Washington, a session of the NATO Council at the highest level adopted a "long term program" of acceleration in armaments, calculated over a period of ten to fifteen years. At the same time, President Carter proclaimed a doctrine of global actions by NATO, expanding the "sphere of responsibility" of that military bloc into widening regions, significantly exceeding the framework stipulated in the agreement that created the North Atlantic Bloc. In the application of this plan, NATO has appropriated to itself the right to interfere militarily, particularly in Africa (recalling the events of Zaire). Finally, at the same time, American official powers for the first time openly proclaimed a tie between their interests, the interests of NATO, and the interests of the Chinese Government, which, as is known, blatantly undermines the policy of detente.

Fact No. Two. A little more than half a year ago, Carter signed the SALT II Agreement and spoke of its great significance for the cause of peace and security. However, in the last year, the American administration has essentially ruined the chances for ratification of the agreement.

Fact No. Three. In the autumn of this year, the American government has undertaken active measures to organize a provocative outcry concerning "Soviet forces in Cuba." This Cuban "mini-crisis" has been

necessary in order to whip up military fears and further propagate the myth about a "Soviet threat," to complicate the process for ratification of SALT II and to justify new military measures aimed at the reinforcement of the hegemonic and imperialistic aspirations of the USA. This was a distinctive rehearsal for that which is presently being perpetrated in connection with the events in Afghanistan.

Fact No. Four. In October and November of last year, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put forward a comprehensive program to advance the cause of military detente in Europe, called for immediate negotiations, and the Soviet Union also undertook unilateral steps, with which you are familiar, aimed at the lessening of military confrontation in Europe.

The USSR has adamantly called for the institution of negotiations for the reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe prior to the adoption of a decision on new American missiles.

And what was the response of the USA? The American administration literally untied the hands of its confederates and set about in such a way that the December session of the NATO Council adopted a decision to produce and deploy in Western Europe new nuclear missile armaments, representing a substantial increase in the already existing American arms deployed at the frontline and aimed at the Soviet Union.

Fact No. Five. Immediately following the NATO session and despite the voices resonating there about intentions to strive for a reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe, President Carter is pushing through Congress a five year program of automatic (that is, irrespective of any changes in the international situation) build-up in the arms race.

Fact No. Six. Already this year, citing the events in Afghanistan, President Carter is embarking upon full blown measures to curtail Soviet-American relations and even to apply so-called economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The SALT II Agreement has been withdrawn from consideration and its ratification has been postponed for an indefinite period.

On the heels of this the "Carter Doctrine" is proclaimed.

In it is a summary of the measures undertaken by the American administration in recent time to escalate the arms race and in-

flame international tensions. We are talking about efforts to resurrect the doctrines from the days of the Cold War - "containment" and "rolling back" of Socialism, and "brinkmanship."

During meetings with the working group of the Sotzintern [Socialist International] in Moscow, the issue was discussed as to where the policy of President Carter is leading. Now, that is fully apparent. We are literally talking about the destruction of that which was achieved in the last ten years, accomplished by men of good will, including the Social Democrats.

Under these circumstances it is mandatory to reaffirm the policy of detente in international tensions. Great significance adheres in pronouncements to the effect that it is now important to "preserve cool heads and continue the process of negotiations," that "hysteria must not substitute for rational policy," and that "it is necessary to beware of ill-conceived and hypertrophied [sic] reactions which do not conform to the reality of events and which, in their entirety, could lead to an even worse situation."

Our position is to seriously, responsibly, and adamantly adhere to the principles of peaceful co-existence, and to everything positive in the development of normalized, mutually advantageous relations between governments that was achieved in the process of detente.

Events in Afghanistan. We would request you to examine them without the prejudice and hysteria characteristic of the Carter Administration.

We think it would be useful to bring the following information to your attention.

The facts establish that only a short time after the April revolution of 1978, an intense "undeclared war" was instigated against Afghanistan. Bands of mercenaries, financed with money from the CIA and Beijing, have literally terrorized the civilian population of that country. Pakistan has become the principal staging ground for this war. Here, more than twenty bases and fifty support points have been created, at which terrorist and military detachments are trained under the direction of American, Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors. In just the period between July 1978 until November 1979, the training of not less than 15,000 individuals was carried out there. They are equipped with American and Chinese weapons and then dispatched into the

territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, they do not conceal their aim - to liquidate the April revolution, to reinstate the previous anti-popular order, to convert Afghanistan into a staging ground for aggression against the USSR, with which that country has a 2,000 kilometer border.

These plans were carried out by the previous leader of Afghanistan, H. Amin, sustained, as the facts attest, in large part by the CIA. Having entered into a contract with emigre leaders, he prepared a counter-revolutionary coup and carried out acts of repression against genuine patriots on an unprecedented scale. After seizing power, Amin physically destroyed H. M. Taraki, president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a veteran soldier against Afghan despotism. The government of Afghanistan, led by B. Karmal, turned once again to the Soviet Union for help, as Taraki had done.

Responding to the request of the Afghan government for help in the struggle against interventionist activity directed by Washington and Beijing, we acted in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Friendship, Neighborly Relations and Cooperation, concluded in 1978. Our assistance is also fully in accord with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, providing for the right of any government to collective self-defense, that is, the right to appeal to any other country for help in defending against aggression. And in the case of Afghanistan - and we want to emphasize this once more - there was and continues to be external aggression, the form of which, as defined by the 29th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, consists of "the sending of armed bands, groups or regular forces or mercenaries by a government or in the name of a government, which carry out acts in the application of military force against another government."

In fulfillment of our treaty commitments, we were obligated to defend the national sovereignty of Afghanistan against external aggression. Moreover, we were unable to stand by idly, in view of the fact that the USA is attempting (with the assistance of China) to create a new and dangerous military-strategic staging ground on our southern border.

We would like to emphasize that our actions in no way affect the legitimate national interests of the United States or any

other government. We have never had and do not have any expansionist plans in relation to Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan. We reject as a malicious lie any talk that our goal is to expand into the "third world" or toward sources of oil. As soon as the reasons have dissipated which caused the Afghan government to address us with a request for the dispatch of Soviet forces, they will be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

At the present time, the military intervention by Washington and Beijing in the affairs of Afghanistan has by no means come to a halt. Washington is openly accelerating the delivery of arms to the so-called insurgents. As illustrated by the visit of the minister of foreign affairs for the PRC, Huang Hua, Beijing does not lag behind Washington. Huang Hua assured the ring-leader of the mercenaries that China will also henceforth render them assistance and support "without any limitations."

Washington and Beijing are also attempting to enlist several Arab states in their aggressive actions against Afghanistan (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others). In this fashion, Washington and Beijing are specifically following a course designed to create a hotbed of international tension in the Middle East.

At the same time a profusion of unmitigated nonsense is being voiced about some kind of occupation by us in Afghanistan or about a usurpation of that country's sovereign rights by the Soviet Union. Every one who is in Afghanistan these days, including correspondents from the Western information services, acknowledges that circumstances are normalizing there. The new Afghan leadership, headed by Babrak Karmal, is pursuing a rational and sober policy, attempting to eliminate the remnants of the policies of H. Amin, and to reinstate democratic freedoms. All political detainees, representatives of the intelligentsia and the clergy have been released from prison. Relations are improving with the nomadic population, the Muslim clergy, although, speaking candidly, the situation in the south-east and eastern provinces, where terrorists are operating, remains tense.

The Afghan government has declared - and has confirmed by means of practical measures - its firm intention to pursue a policy of international peace and friendship and a policy of non-alignment. It is undertaking all measures toward the establishment

of normalized relations with neighboring states based on principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Such is the truth about Afghanistan.

Our position on the decisions of the December session of the NATO Council. You are already aware of our principal assessment of its results. Here are several additional observations.

As you are aware, the Soviet Union has warned more than once, that if NATO in December implements its decision, then it will knock the ground out from underneath negotiations and destroy their basis. Our agreement to negotiations in the face of the NATO decision would mean conducting them as to the reduction only of Soviet defensive capacity at the same time as the United States is carrying out, in full stride, preparations for new nuclear missile systems.

In the communique from the session of the NATO Council, the condition was laid down in the harshest of terms that negotiations shall be conducted only in regard to American and Soviet tactical nuclear intermediate land based missile systems. Excluded from these proposed "negotiations," and to be preserved inviolable, are all of the other means of front line deployment belonging to the USA, and the nuclear arsenals of other Western European countries, that is to say, everything in respect to which the Soviet intermediate range forces serve as a counterbalance. They are demanding of the Soviet Union a sharp reduction in its existing defensive forces with a simultaneous preservation of the entire existing powerful NATO nuclear potential, aimed against the USSR and its allies.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his recent interview with the newspaper Pravda, stated that "the present position of the NATO countries renders negotiations on this question impossible." At the same time, Comrade Brezhnev emphasized that "we are for negotiations, but honest and co-equal ones which conform to the principal of parity in security."

Our long term intentions

It is apparent that Carter and Brzezinski are gambling on the prospect of intimidating the USSR, on the isolation of our country, and on the creation of difficulties wher-

ever possible. This policy is doomed to failure, because it is impossible to intimidate the USSR or to shake its determination.

In this complicated situation, the leadership of the CPSU does not intend to adopt a policy of "fighting fire with fire." We shall henceforth exhibit a maximum degree of cool-headedness and reasonable judgment. We shall do everything possible to prevent the Carter administration from drawing us into confrontation and undermining detente. We shall not engage, as the American administration is doing, in impulsive acts which can only intensify the situation and play into the hands of the proponents of the "Cold War."

The American side, forgetting the elementary principals of restraint and prudence, is conducting a policy leading to the destruction of all the inter-governmental ties which were constructed with such difficulty during the past years. Moreover, and this can no longer be doubted, the Carter administration is striving to spoil the relations of the West European countries with the Soviet Union, and is demanding support from them for its dangerous line, i.e., that they subject themselves to that policy which Washington considers necessary.

A great deal that is positive and constructive could be achieved in connection with the meetings that have taken place in Madrid by the conference on issues of European security and cooperation, as well as on the path to implementation of the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries concerning the conduct of a conference on military detente and disarmament.

In a word, despite all the gravity of the developing international situation, we believe that there is a possibility of bringing to a halt the dangerous development toward which the present administration in Washington is pushing.

The entirety of these circumstances demands joint efforts from all who value the cause of peace and detente.

In Moscow, the meetings with you in the Soviet Union are fondly recalled, and it is believed that they were useful.

If Mr. Brandt should request a text, deliver it to him, translated into German. [a similar telegram was approved to be sent to Sorsa (not printed)—ed.]

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 4; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.]

EUROPE IN THE COLD WAR

Call for Contacts: from the European Project Group "Europe in the Cold War"

A group of European historians has recently taken an initiative in setting up a project to reappraise the Cold War in Europe from 1943-1989.

We believe that, now that the archives in Moscow and in several Eastern European countries are increasingly being opened to scholars, this is a timely and important opportunity to examine the realities of the Cold War and its impact on the countries of Western and Eastern Europe.

We have set up a long-term research project on the subject, which will involve at least seven Euro-international conferences. It is hoped that the proceedings of each conference will be edited and published as a series of books. The first conference, on "The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943-1948," took place in Florence in June 1996. The second conference, on the period from the Berlin Crisis to the death of Stalin, is to be held in Paris in the autumn of 1998.

We are interested in building our contacts with historians of the Cold War in Europe and especially those from Russia and Eastern Europe. Those with inquiries, suggestions, or contributions may contact any of the following members of the Steering Committee:

ITALY (Co-ordinating Centre):

Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo/Prof. Antonio Varsori, Dipartimento Di Studi Sullo Stato, Università Degli Studio Di Firenze, fax: 0039-55-2345486

BRITAIN:

Dr. Saki Dockrill/Dr. D.B.G. Heuser, Department of War Studies, King's College, London, fax: 0044-171-873-2026.

FRANCE:

Prof. Georges-Henri Soutou, Ecole Doctorale Mondes contemporaines, Université de Paris, IV-Sorbonne, fax: 0033-1-404-62588.

GERMANY:

Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, Essen, fax: 0049-201-460674

Prof. Dr. Klaus Schwabe, Historisches Institut, RWTH, Aachen, fax: 0049-241-8888357.

USA:

Prof. Vojtech Mastny, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., fax: 001-49-357-4439

Concerning the situation in “A”: **New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan**

by Odd Arne Westad

In the winter of 1994-95, as Russian tanks and planes were pounding the Chechen capital of Grozny into rubble, I felt a painful, almost menacing, sense of *déjà vu*. I had just returned from Moscow where I had been conducting interviews and collecting documents for a book on Soviet-era interventions, and I was struck by how rhetorically and structurally similar the Chechen operation was to the invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). At the heart of all of these interventions was an inability within the Soviet (or Russian) leadership to communicate effectively and to reach settlements once a conflict had reached a certain level. In terms of personalities, all of them were directed against former “allies”: Imre Nagy, Alexander Dubcek, Hafizullah Amin, and Dzhokar Dudaiev had little in common beyond having spent most of their lives serving a Communist party. In all four cases it seems like it was the broken trust, the sense of betrayal and ingratitude, which propelled the men in the Kremlin past initial doubts and hesitations up to the moment when someone said, “Go!”

From what we know, the Kremlin processes of decision-making on foreign policy crises have stayed remarkably intact since the Bolshevik revolution. Although the degree of absolute centralization on such issues has differed—from the one-man rule of Stalin, Gorbachev, and (when healthy, at least) Yeltsin to the small collectives of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras—the number of people actually involved in preparing and making essential foreign policy decisions has remained extremely limited. As in most bureaucra-

cies, the men at the second level spend most of their time trying to second-guess what their bosses really want in terms of alternatives and conclusions. Add to this the paranoia and fear bred by an authoritarian political system, and the result is a distorted, dysfunctional decision-making process, in which essential commodities like time, information, and trust are even scarcer than in the West.

The most immediate parallel to the Chechen crisis was of course the intervention in Afghanistan. In both cases, the final decision to commit troops was made by an ailing and isolated leader; reports on conversations with Boris Yeltsin from late 1994 through late 1996 sounded remarkably similar to conversations with Leonid Brezhnev during the period surrounding the decision to invade Afghanistan fifteen years earlier. Their political attention span and field of vision much reduced, both tended to view decisions in strongly personalized terms. To Brezhnev, Amin was the “dirty fellow” who usurped power by killing President Nur Mohammed Taraki just days after the president had been embraced by Brezhnev in Moscow. To Yeltsin, Dudaiev was a “scoundrel” who tried to blackmail him and challenged his manly courage. Neither could be permitted to remain if the self-image of the ailing Kremlin leader was to stay intact.

Around the sickly heads of state, factional politics flourished, with institutional rivalries particularly strong. During both crises the heads of the military and security institutions drove events—in 1979 and 1994 it was the defense ministers, Dmitri Ustinov and Pavel Grachev, who made the final push for intervention. Because of departmental jealousies, in operational terms

both interventions consisted of two separate plans—one political and one military—which, at the last moment, were merged to form one operation, more substantial and therefore more difficult to manage. Since nobody in Moscow could define exactly who the enemy was, massive force became a useful drug against the painful search for political and military precision.

In the fall of 1995, a group of scholars and former Soviet and American officials with special knowledge of the Afghanistan intervention and its effect on Soviet-American relations gathered for a three-day meeting in the Norwegian village of Lysebu, outside Oslo.¹ Among the participants on the American side were Carter Administration veterans Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence; William Odom and Gary Sick, assistants to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on Soviet and Near Eastern affairs, respectively; and Marshall Shulman, then Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance’s main adviser on the Soviet Union. On the Russian side sat several key survivors of the Brezhnev era, led by former ambassador to the United States Anatolii F. Dobrynin and Gen. Valentin Varennikov, then Commander of Soviet ground forces. There were also some lesser known faces: Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, former head of KGB foreign intelligence (and in the late 1970s head of the KGB station in Teheran), and Karen Brutents, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU).

The conference was the latest in a series of such gatherings of former Soviet and American officials to explore the reasons behind the collapse of su-

perpower detente in the mid-1970s, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. They were organized as part of the “Carter-Brezhnev Project,” spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project’s efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American, Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University; the Cold War International History Project, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; and the Institute for General History, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Prior to the Afghanistan session, which took place in Lysebu on 17-20 September 1995, the Carter-Brezhnev Project had organized two other major oral history conferences on the events of the late 1970s: on SALT II and the growth of U.S.-Soviet distrust, held at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, on 6-9 May 1994; and on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, on 23-26 March 1995. For each conference, a briefing book was prepared by the National Security Archive with support from CWIHP and other Project affiliates, containing declassified U.S. documents and English translations of documents obtained from Russian (and East German) archives, including those of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the former CC CPSU.² Many of these translations appear in this *Bulletin*.

In the case of the Afghanistan-related documents printed below, the translations include, for the most part, materials declassified by Russian authorities as part of Fond 89, a collection prepared for the Russian Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992 and now stored at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in Moscow; translations of these documents—most of which were obtained and provided to CWIHP by Mark Kramer (Harvard Univer-

sity)—were commissioned by CWIHP. (CWIHP also expresses thanks to Raymond L. Garthoff and Selig Harrison for providing copies of Russian documents on Afghanistan.) Other materials were gathered and translated as a result of research by the present author and for the Lysebu conference. In addition to the documents published in this issue of the *Bulletin*, my summary of Soviet decision-making on Afghanistan from early October to mid-December 1979 is based on the transcript of the Nobel Symposium of Afghanistan and conversations with former senior Soviet officials at that meeting.

The Lysebu meeting’s aim was to retrace the final steps of Soviet decision-making on the Afghanistan intervention and to investigate the U.S. response. The method is known as critical oral history: groups of former policymakers query each other on motives, issues, and actions, prodded by groups of scholars using newly declassified documents. As in previous meetings of this kind—for instance the series of conferences held in 1987-1992 on the Cuban Missile Crisis³—more than history was up for discussion. “Lessons” and relevance for today’s leaders were on everybody’s mind and the conversations were filled with “presentisms.” In this conference, if someone had suddenly replaced “Afghanistan” with “Chechnya” or some possible site for future Russian interventions, I do not think that the core issues of the conversation would have changed much.

In retrospect, the Afghanistan intervention stands as an avoidable tragedy, a tragedy in which the final script was ordained by perceptions, personalities, and ideology far more than “interests” and “strategies.” Although substantial resistance to the invasion plans emerged within the Soviet hierarchy, the real story is how easily this opposition could be overcome by a tiny group of people at the pinnacle of power.⁴

The documents published in this *Bulletin* show how the Soviet leaders gradually increased their commitment to the Afghan Communist party (the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, or PDPA) after the Communist

coup in April 1978 (the “Saur [April] Revolution”). In spite of their misgivings about the lapses and limitations of the Afghan Communist leaders, the members of the Soviet Politburo could not bring themselves to give up on the building of socialism in a neighboring country. As the political and military predicament of the Kabul regime deepened, Soviet advisers came to substitute for the “revolutionary masses” and the “Afghan Communists,” keeping the regime going while the “progressive strata” had time to develop. In the process, institutional and personal links were forged between Soviets and Afghans, increasing the Kremlin’s sense of commitment as well as the Kabul leadership’s ability to avail themselves of Moscow’s resources.⁵

As seen from Moscow, the developments in Iran in the winter of 1978-79 suddenly increased the importance of the Afghan revolution. The rise of the Islamic radicals in Teheran took the Soviets by surprise and created political instability in the region, forcing the Kremlin to devote more attention to the situation along the USSR’s southern borders. The overthrow of the Shah presented both opportunities and dangers to the Soviet leadership: Many of those reporting to the Kremlin on Iranian and Afghan affairs expected the Iranian Communists to gradually strengthen their position. But at the same time, Washington’s “loss” of Iran alerted the Politburo for the first time to the possibility—however remote—that the Americans would attempt to replace their lost positions there with fresh outposts in Afghanistan.⁶

When the introduction of Soviet troops was first discussed in March 1979, after a rebellion had broken out against the Communist regime in Western Afghanistan (and particularly in the major city of Herat), the Kremlin leaders hesitantly concluded that “in no case will we go forward with a deployment of troops in Afghanistan.” Politburo members Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and CC Secretary Andrei Kirilenko, who until the end opposed a Soviet invasion, argued that the Afghan Communists themselves were to blame for the rebellion. “We gave [them] ev-

everything,” Kirilenko told the Politburo. “And what has come of it? Nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and told us that we also executed people in Lenin’s time. You see what kind of Marxists we have found.”⁷

It was President Taraki’s murder by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin in October 1979—shortly after he had stopped off in Moscow for a cordial meeting with Brezhnev on his way back from a non-aligned summit meeting in Havana—which set the Soviets on the course to intervention. In light of past Soviet support for Taraki, the KGB suspected Amin of planning what Shebarshin called “doing a Sadat on us”: a wholesale defection from the Soviet camp and an alignment with the United States—as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had done earlier in the 1970s—which would allow the Americans to place “their control and intelligence centers close to our most sensitive borders.” The KGB closely monitored Amin’s meetings with U.S. officials in Kabul in late October, believing that Washington was eyeing a replacement for its lost electronic intelligence collection posts in northern Iran.⁸

Although no political orders had yet been issued concerning a possible intervention, the military chiefs of staff in late October 1979 began preparations and some training for such a mission. These orders reflected the increased concern of Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov over the Afghan issue, and his sense that proposing an intervention might soon become politically acceptable to his colleagues. In the not-too-subtle game of who would succeed Brezhnev—which by late 1979 was in full swing in the Politburo—a premium was being placed on both caution and enterprise: “Recklessness” or “being a Napoleon” were potentially deadly epithets to hurl at a politically ambitious Defense Minister, while “forcefulness” and “looking after our interests” could be used as arguments in his favor.

Ustinov’s colleague, collaborator, and sometime rival, KGB chief Yuri Andropov, also started leaning toward military intervention in late 1979. The KGB had overseen several Soviet bids

since the summer to remove Amin from the Afghan leadership, including two assassination attempts. None of these efforts had succeeded, a fact which cannot have pleased the ambitious Andropov and may have weakened his political position. In late November, after Amin had demanded the replacement of Soviet ambassador to Kabul A.M. Puzanov, Andropov and Ustinov decided that the only way to resolve the Afghan issue was the combination of a Soviet military intervention and the physical elimination of Hafizullah Amin. Amin’s persistent calls for increased USSR military aid, including Soviet troops, emboldened them and made it easier for them to present their suggestions to the Politburo.

The increasing strains in East-West relations—including in the essential field of arms control—over the last months of 1979 may also have influenced Andropov and Ustinov’s decision, and certainly made it easier for them to convince some of their colleagues. The long-awaited Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna in June 1979 had, despite the signing of a SALT II treaty, failed to generate much momentum toward an improvement in ties between Washington and Moscow. Moreover, the NATO decision that fall to deploy a new class of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe and the increasing reluctance of the US Senate to ratify the SALT II pact removed the concerns of some Politburo-members over the effects a Soviet intervention might have on detente. As one of the Soviet conference participants put it in Oslo, “by winter of 1979 detente was, for most purposes, already dead.” The bleak outlooks on the diplomatic front helped carry the day with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who at the best of times was a somewhat pusillanimous participant in Soviet high politics, opposing intervention in March only after being sure which way the wind was blowing in the Politburo discussions.

The KGB and Defense Ministry heads had two remaining obstacles to overcome in their determination to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. First, they had to narrow the field of participants in the decision-making process to an

absolute minimum, to make sure that the decision was not delayed by the formal submission of reports from various departments and ministries to the Politburo. In this effort, they were assisted by ideology chief Mikhail Suslov and Brezhnev’s chief adviser on foreign policy, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov. Brutents, the deputy head of the CPSU CC International Department, told the Lysebu meeting that in early December 1979, as he was preparing a report on the issue of a potential Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, he got a telephone call from Alexandrov-Agentov. “First, he asked me what I was doing. When I told him, he asked, ‘And what exactly are you writing there?’ When I told him that I was going to write a negative opinion, he said: ‘So, do you suggest that we should give Afghanistan to the Americans?’ And he immediately ended the conversation.” Brutents’ report was not in the materials prepared for the Politburo members at the climactic meetings.

The last obstacle on the path to intervention was winning over, or at least neutralizing, those Politburo members, such as Kosygin and Kirilenko, who throughout the crisis had vocally opposed the idea of sending in Soviet troops. Ustinov and Andropov realized that the only way to ensure that a proposal for intervention would carry the day in the Politburo was to convince Brezhnev of the need to strike fast. The party head—by nature cautious and circumspect on international issues—was persuaded by arguments closely tied to his personal status on the world stage. Gen. Aleksandr Liakhovskii told the Lysebu meeting that after Amin’s coup, “Brezhnev’s attitude to the entire issue had changed. He could not forgive Amin, because Brezhnev had personally assured Taraki that he would be able to help him. And then they disregarded Brezhnev completely and murdered Taraki. Brezhnev used to say, ‘how should the world be able to believe what Brezhnev says, if his words do not count in Afghanistan?’”

Andropov’s remarkable personal and handwritten letter to Brezhnev in early December—read aloud by Dobrynin to the Lysebu conference

from notes he had taken in the Russian Presidential Archives—summed up the case for intervention. According to the KGB chief, Amin was conducting “behind-the-scenes activities which may mean his political reorientation to the West.” In addition, Andropov told the chronically ill and enfeebled leader, Amin “attacks Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists.” But Andropov dangled before Brezhnev a possible remedy for his Afghan troubles: A group of anti-Amin Afghan Communists, mostly belonging to the minority Parcham faction, who had been living under KGB tutelage in exile, had, “without changing their plans for an uprising, appealed to us for assistance, including military assistance if needed.” Although Andropov evidently still felt unwilling to ask Brezhnev directly and explicitly to support sending in Soviet troops, his letter made the case for such an intervention, the framework of which was already being discussed between the KGB head and the defense minister.

Although agreeing with Andropov concerning the political purpose of the use of Soviet troops, Defense Minister Ustinov was not willing to accept a limited operation along the lines recommended by the KGB head. Varennikov, who headed operational planning in the General Staff, told the Lysebu meeting that Ustinov wanted 75,000 troops for the operation for two main reasons: First, he wanted to make sure that the toppling of Amin’s regime could be carried out smoothly, even if some of the Afghan army groups in Kabul decided to resist. Second, he believed that Soviet forces should be used to guard Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and Iran, thereby preventing outside support for the Afghan Islamic guerrillas. On December 6, Andropov accepted Ustinov’s plan.

Around noon on December 8, the two met with Brezhnev and Gromyko in the general secretary’s office in the Kremlin. In addition to the concerns Andropov had raised with Brezhnev earlier, he and Ustinov now added the strategic situation. Meeting two days after West Germany had given its vital support for NATO’s two-track missile-

deployment decision, states one informed Russian account, “Ustinov and Andropov cited dangers to the southern borders of the Soviet Union and a possibility of American short-range missiles being deployed in Afghanistan and aimed at strategic objects in Kazakhstan, Siberia, and elsewhere.”⁹ Brezhnev accepted the outlined plan for an intervention which the heads of the military and the KGB presented to him.

Right after seeing Brezhnev, Ustinov and Andropov met with the head of the General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, in the Walnut Room, a small meeting room adjacent to the hall where the Politburo usually sat. The two informed Ogarkov of their conversation with Brezhnev. Ogarkov—who together with his deputies Gen. Varennikov and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev had earlier warned Ustinov against an intervention—once again listed his reasons why Soviet troops should not be sent in. Ustinov overruled him, and in the evening called a meeting of the senior staff of the Defense Ministry and told them to implement preparations for the intervention. The decision to send in troops was certain to come, Ustinov said.

On December 12, the Politburo met and formally ratified the proposal to intervene. Gromyko chaired the meeting, after having co-signed the proposal together with Ustinov and Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko wrote out, by hand, a short protocol accepting the proposal—entitled “Concerning the Situation in ‘A’”—and had all Politburo members present sign their names diagonally across the text. Kosygin, who almost certainly would have opposed an intervention, was not present. Kirilenko signed after some hesitation. Brezhnev, who entered the room after the brief discussion was finished, added his name, in quivering handwriting, at the bottom of the page.¹⁰

Two days later, the General Staff operative team, headed by Marshal Akhromeyev, was in place in Termez, Uzbekistan (USSR), near the Afghan border. A group from the operational team arrived at Bagram airforce base outside Kabul on December 18.

The main operation started at 3 pm

sharp on Christmas Day: airborne troops from the 103rd and 105th air divisions landed in Kabul and in Shindand in western Afghanistan, and units from the 5th and 108th motorized rifle divisions crossed the border at Kushka and at Termez. Just before nightfall on December 27, Soviet paratroopers, assisted by two KGB special units, attacked Amin’s residence at Duraleman Palace, and, after overcoming stiff resistance from the Palace Guards, summarily executed the president and several of his closest aides. It was—we were told in Lysebu by the men who devised it—a well-organized and successful operation, in which all the “strategic objectives” were reached on time.

The intervention in Afghanistan was the start of a war of almost unlimited destruction, leaving more than one million Afghans dead or wounded and almost four million driven into exile. For the Soviets the war became a death-knell, signalling Moscow’s international isolation, its leadership’s inconsistency and fragmentation, and its public’s growing disbelief in the purpose and direction of Soviet rule. By the time its forces left in early 1989, the Soviet regime was crumbling; two years later it was gone. The Afghan War was not only the first war which the Soviet Union lost: It was the last war it fought.

The post-December 1979 documents included in the *Bulletin* show the slow and painful road which the Soviet leaders travelled toward realizing the failure of their Afghan venture. Already after Andropov’s visit to Kabul in late January 1980, the Politburo understood that the troops would have to stay in Afghanistan for the indefinite future. Almost immediately, Moscow started to seek a political settlement as an alternative to war. Gromyko and Andropov seem to have been at the forefront in this cautious and awkward examination of the possibilities for getting the Soviet troops out.

As the documents show, the Politburo members just could not make up their minds as to what constituted Soviet minimum demands for a troop withdrawal. Brezhnev’s letter to Fidel Castro on Afghanistan in March 1980 demonstrates that Soviet expectations

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989: Documents from the Russian and East German Archives

Frequently used abbreviations:

APRF = Archive of the President, Russian Federation
 CC = Central Committee
 Com. = Comrade
 CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 DRA = Democratic Republic of Afghanistan
 GKEHS = State Committee for Economic Cooperations
 MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 PDPA = People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
 SAPMO = Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Berlin)
 TsKhSD = Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow

Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry, "About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA," 31 May 1978 (notes)

It is noted that the "basic preconditions" for the overthrow of [Mohammed] Daoud in April 1978 "flowed from the objective domestic political and economic development of the country after 1973." Daoud expressed the interests and class position of bourgeois landowners and rightist nationalist forces, and therefore was not capable of carrying out a reformation "in the interests of the broad laboring masses," primarily agricultural reform.

In conditions of a worsening economic situation in the country and Daoud's departure from the programmatic declaration of 1973, which led to "a constant growth in the dissatisfaction of broad strata of the population," Daoud huddled ever more closely with the "domestic reaction," which was supported by the "reactionary Islamic regimes" and by "American imperialism," and followed a course toward the "strengthening . . . of a regime of personal power."

This led to an "abrupt sharpening of

the contradictions between the Daoud regime and its class supporters and the fundamental interests of the working masses, the voice of which is the PDPA."

Daoud's order to arrest the PDPA facilitated the fall of his regime.

The Taraki government's program (declaration of 9 May 1978) is worked out on the basis of the PDPA program of 1966. The main task, is providing for the interests of the working population on the basis of fundamental *perestroika* of the social-economic structures of society, and "the liquidation of the influence of neocolonialism and imperialism."

In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on April 29, Taraki said that "Afghanistan, following Marxism-Leninism, will set off on the path of building socialism and will belong to the socialist camp," but it is necessary to conduct that line "carefully" and of his true goals the PDPA will inform the people "later."

In foreign policy the DRA is oriented toward the Non-Aligned movement, but it will give its priority to cooperation with the USSR.

About the reaction of the West: the overthrow of Daoud was "a total surprise," and in the press of the Western and "reactionary Moslem countries" a "campaign of falsehoods" was deployed against the new government.

At the same time, "according to information which we have" the embassies of the USA and other Western countries received instructions to search out all means to hold on in Afghanistan, including promises to provide economic assistance.

The Afghan leadership "is not showing haste" in concluding economic agreements with the West, "proceeding from an intention to reorient its foreign economic relations primarily towards the USSR and the socialist camp."

The measures which have been undertaken by the new government in the month it has been in power bear witness to its "firm intention" gradually to create the preconditions "for Afghanistan's transition to the socialist path of development."

The coming to power of the PDPA and its actions "were met with approval by the peoples' masses." At the same time the "internal reaction, while so far not deciding on an open demonstration," is activating "underground efforts" (propaganda, the dropping in of weapons, and diversionary groups which are being prepared in Pakistan).

The friction between the Khalq and Parcham factions is having a negative influence.

The main point of disagreement is government posts. The representatives of Khalq, especially in the army, are dissatisfied with the naming of Parcham representatives to a number of leadership posts. The leader of Parcham, B[abrak]. Karmal, in his turn, objected to the the widening of the Revolutionary Council for the benefit of military officers. The Ambassador and "advisors on Party relations" in conversations with the new leadership stressed the necessity of "overcoming the tensions" and "strengthening the unity" of the leadership and the party. As a result, on 24 May 1978 the Politburo of the CC PDPA made a decision to eliminate the names Khalq and Parcham and to affirm the unity of the PDPA.

The Afghans asked the USSR to send a "large group of advisors and consultants" to work in the state apparatus, and also to help in putting together a five year plan. The USSR has "favorably" resolved these issues.

This will facilitate "the growth of sympathy for the USSR, the further fortifying and strengthening of our positions in Afghanistan."

Conclusions: The situation in the country "overall is stabilizing more and more," the government is controlling all its regions and is taking measures "to cut off...the demonstrations of the domestic reaction."

The most important factor for the further strengthening of the new power will be the achievement of unity in the leadership of the PDPA and the government. But "the tension so far has not totally been cleared away." The embassy jointly with a group of Party advisors is undertaking measures to overcome the disagreements in the Af-

ghan leadership.

[Source: Based on notes taken by Odd Arne Westad on materials at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 75, delo (d.) 1179, listy (ll.) 2-17.]

Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 June 1978

The meeting took place in connection with the arrival in Kabul of a group of [Soviet] Party advisors headed by V.I. Kharazov.

[The Ambassador] informed N.M. Taraki about the arrival in Kabul on July 27 of the first group of Soviet advisors for work in the Afghan ministries and departments.

[...] Further Taraki requested that only the Soviet Ambassador and V.I. Kharazov remain and said that B. Karmal had arrived, and wants to express a number of thoughts.

Coming into the office, B. Karmal said the following.

Recently more frequently it has been heard that there is no unity in the PDPA. This, without doubt, reflects negatively on the Party itself, on the state apparatus, the army, the revolution, on the prestige of the Soviet Union and might lead to difficult consequences. People are different, and this distinction might be used for provocative goals. Unfortunately, our position (the Parchams) in the Party, state apparatus, and army is subject to a number of provocations. But insofar as I am sure that the Party, state and army, under the leadership of N.M. Taraki and [First Deputy Prime Minister] H[afizullah]. Amin, with the great assistance of the Soviet Union, are building socialism in Afghanistan, then, feeling a debt to the revolution, I do not intend to create problems, so that neither a friend nor an enemy can take advantage of my situation. Regarding the June 17 decision of the CC PDPA Politburo to send a number of comrades to foreign countries as ambassadors, I and N.A. Noor . . . also consider it useful to go abroad as ambassadors or under the pretext of medical treatment, so as not to give grounds for provocations against noble and honest people. In such a way, N.M. Taraki and H. Amin may be able to fulfill the mentioned program. Unfortunately, said B. Karmal, I have no possibility either in the

Party or in the army to defend my thesis — it is difficult to fulfill the May 24 resolution of the Party on unity and the directives of the Politburo, they remain paper, nothing more.

[. . .] Further, B. Karmal in a condition of extreme excitement said the following.

In both the Party and in the government I occupy the second post after N.M. Taraki. Despite this, I do not know what is going on in the country — they have isolated me, I am not engaged in either domestic or foreign policy issues, I live as if in a gilded cage. For me, as a communist, this is a heavy tragedy. In the presence of N.M. Taraki, PDPA Politburo member H. Amin said that to provide unity it is necessary to carry out extremely decisive measures. N.M. Taraki really wants unity. However, for this to happen, thousands of honest communists in Afghanistan will be subject to terror, persecutions, their names will be slandered. I myself live under the threat that they will subject me to persecution. In conclusion, B. Karmal declared that the matter is moving towards a split in the Party, everything is moving into the hands of the government and army.

N.M. Taraki declared decisively that all issues in the ruling organs of the PDPA are decided on the basis of democratic centralism, and nobody threatens anyone. There is no split in the Party, unity is being strengthened, although certain people are demonstrating against it. If someone moves against the revolution and the unity of the Party, then there will be a purge of the Party. There is no terror, however, if it will be reckoned that this or some other person presents a danger for the revolution, then decisive measures of punishment may be applied to him, right up to capital punishment.

On this N.M. Taraki interrupted the conversation and let it be known that he does not wish to continue the discussion with B. Karmal. B. Karmal said good-bye and left.

Remaining with N.M. Taraki, [the Ambassador and Kharazov] once again noted the necessity of taking into account when making some or other appointments the political resonance and consequences which they might prompt. They stressed that enemies must not be given grounds for using similar issues for their own goals.

N.M. Taraki said that the Party is united and its unity is becoming ever stronger, but as to those who will demonstrate against

unity “we will crush them as if with a steamroller [*proidemsia zheleznyim katkom*]. Such measures will only strengthen the Party.”

Sent to Kozyrev, C.P., Ponomarev, B.N....

[Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 22-27.]

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 July 1978

[The Ambassador] also said that the observations expressed by the leadership of the DRA about the necessity for effective defense of the airspace of the DRA had been attentively studied in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and the necessary measures had been worked out for use in the event that there should appear a danger to the DRA from the air. In addition, with this goal in mind the delivery of an additional quantity of anti-aircraft installations for the present and future years had been reviewed. The deliveries of weapons will be fixed in an agreement, for the signing of which, according to the agreement, a delegation headed by Major-General V.E. Kuznetsov is arriving today.

Taraki informed the Ambassador about the situation in the country and about his meeting on July 13-14 with the Deputy Secretary of State of the USA D[avid D]. Newsom.

In the conversation with me, said N.M. Taraki, the Deputy Secretary of State spoke about the USA government’s concern about the one-sided orientation in the foreign policy of the DRA and the chill in Afghan-American relations.

D. Newsom asked a provocative question — what actions will the government of the DRA take in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union.

N.M. Taraki pointed out the inappropriateness of a question like that.

[Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 36-40.]

Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader Erich Honecker, 13 October 1978

Highly confidential

According to the instructions of CC

CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo CC CPSU secretary comr. B.N. Ponomarev was in Kabul from 25 to 27 September of this year, to meet with the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) to discuss certain pressing questions concerning the unfolding political situation in that country and questions regarding Soviet-Afghan relations. Meetings took place with the general secretary of CC PDPA, chairman of the Revolutionary Soviet, prime minister of DRA comr. Nur Taraki and member of the Politburo, secretary of CC PDPA, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the DRA comrade Hafizullah Amin.

The main objective of the trip was to put a stop to the mass repressions which have taken on increasing proportions following the revolution in Afghanistan, including repressions against the "Parcham" faction, which took part in the overthrow of the despotic regime.

During the meetings special emphasis was placed by our side on questions concerning the unjustified repressions in the DRA. In addition, it was pointed out that we are doing this out of our brotherly concern for the fate of the Afghan revolution, especially since certain aspects of the unfolding events in Afghanistan directly affect the Soviet Union and CPSU.

First to recognize the new state of things in Afghanistan, the USSR demonstrated its solidarity with Afghanistan in front of the whole world. This position was again authoritatively affirmed in L.I. Brezhnev's speech in Baku. It is widely known that we are in every way assisting and supporting the new government. Under these conditions, hostile propaganda within Afghanistan itself as well as outside its borders is currently being aimed at showing that any events in Afghanistan - especially the negative aspects of these events - are connected to the direct or indirect participation by the Soviet Union.

The attention of the Afghan leadership was focused on the fact that in recent times repressions have taken on mass proportions, are being carried out without regard to law, and are directed not only at class enemies of the new regime ("Moslem Brothers," supporters of the monarchy, etc.), but also at persons who could be used for revolutionary interests; that brings out discontent

among the populace, undermines the authority of the revolutionary government and leads to the weakening of the new regime.

Our ideas were attentively heard out, but with visible tension. Without disputing them directly, the Afghan leaders tried to justify their policy by accusing Parchamists (members of the "Parcham" faction who, together with the "Khalq" faction, organized the unification of the PDPA in 1977) of anti-government activities.

Even before the revolution we did not trust "Parcham," said N. Taraki, and the union with the Parchamists was strictly a formality. They took almost no part in the armed uprising. But following the victory of the revolution the leader of the Parchamists B. Karmal demanded that the top ministerial and departmental positions be divided equally. He laid claim to playing the leading role in building the party, declaring: "You have the army; give us the party." In addition, when their demands were not met, they threatened to start an uprising. Under the given circumstances, said N. Taraki and A. Amin, there was but one choice: either them, or us.

Besides, N. Taraki was trying to show, the measures being taken against the leading activists of "Parcham" did not exhibit any negative influence on people's sentiments. The Afghan people support the new regime and the Khalqist leadership of the PDPA. The PDPA leadership, Revolutionary Council, and DRA government, said N. Taraki, understand completely the apprehensions of the CC CPSU, but assure [it] that the latest events in the country do not interfere with the advancement of the Afghan revolution and the strengthening of the people's democratic regime.

Considerable attention was paid by our side to questions of party expansion and improvement of the ability of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to govern the nation and the populace. Emphasis was also placed on the importance of creating and strengthening the party throughout all of the country's territories, on the adoption of prompt measures to normalize the activities of party organs from top to bottom, on organizing agencies of the people's government, and on focusing increased attention on economic problems. The people must experience concrete results of the revolution in their own lives. That is why the improvement of people's lives should be the

primary focus of the new government.

From our side it was continuously stressed that right now the primary objective should be to strengthen the people's democratic regime, adopting a measured and flexible policy to isolate the counter-revolution from the people, to deprive it of the opportunity to take advantage of the backwardness of the masses. In the short time since the establishment of the new government, large enterprises have already been set up to serve the interests of the people. Along with this, enormous constructive opportunities opened up by the Afghan revolution are still waiting to be discovered and put to practical use.

During the meetings, the Afghan representatives also touched on the question of Afghan relations with imperialist countries. Imperialism, said N. Taraki, places in front of us every kind of obstacle, including the use of "soft" methods. Westerners and Americans are clearly trying to exploit aid in order to force us to steer away from the chosen path. At the present time we are have no intention of spoiling our relations with the West, though we understand that their offers are not entirely unselfish. From our side it was emphasized that in dealing with the West one should not allow oneself to be lured into a trap.

Concerning the China question, N. Taraki unreservedly condemned the Maoist leadership and its actions, noting that the leaders of China have closed ranks with the enemies of communism. The PDPA has purged Maoist elements from the army and the state apparatus.

The meetings with N. Taraki and H. Amin left the impression that the persecution of Parchamists is primarily the result of factional infighting and personal hostilities. In addition, the Afghan leadership is clearly underestimating the negative influence that the repressions are having on the overall situation in the country and on sentiments within the army and the party.

The discussions were marked by an air of comradeship. All in all, [it was] a warm welcome by the Afghan leadership; their attentive attitude towards the opinions of the CC CPSU and readiness to discuss with us the most delicate questions is an indication of the importance they place on the friendship with Soviet Union and socialist countries. Taraki asked to relay to the CC CPSU that "Afghanistan will always stand next to

Soviet Union, aligned together with the other socialist countries.”

The CC CPSU submits that Afghanistan will heed our judgment in their continued activities, although, it seems, this will only be demonstrated by their actions in the future. Incoming information indicates an abatement in repressions in the country and the beginning of the process of partial rehabilitation of party functionaries from the “Parcham” faction.

CC CPSU

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575; obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]*

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision on
Afghanistan, 7 January 1979**

Proletariat of all countries, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FILE

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Ryabov, Skachkov, Serbin, and Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol # 137 of the CC CPSU Politburo session from 7 January 1979

The question of the Ministry of defense and the State committee of the USSR on foreign economic ties.

1. Approve a draft of orders from the USSR Council of Ministers on this question (attached).

2. Ratify the attached draft of instructions for the soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

SECRETARY of CC
13-af

[attached] to article 27 protocol # 137

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE
Draft

USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
INSTRUCTIONS

from January 1979

Moscow, Kremlin

1. In connection with the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and with the partial changes of instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers from 20 November 1978, # 2473, give assent to the distribution of expenditures related to the dispatching of Soviet specialists, at the expense of the Soviet side, for work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Instruct GKEhS to propose to the Afghan side that it provide, at its own expense, for Soviet specialists and interpreters dispatched to work in the armed forces of Afghanistan and furnish them with living quarters with necessary equipment, transport for official purposes, and medical service.

2. Expenditures related to the dispatching of Soviet specialists to Afghanistan in accordance with present instructions must be made: in Soviet rubles from the account appropriated by the state budget of the USSR for the rendering of free assistance to foreign governments, and in foreign currency from the account appropriated by the currency plan of GKEhS.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers
A.Kosygin
14-ri

[attached] to article 27 protocol # 137

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

KABUL
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Spec.# 978. Visit H. Amin or another individual ordered to receive you, and, referring to the instructions, inform him that the request of the Afghan side concerning the realization of deliveries of goods for the general use of the armed forces, in accordance with the guidelines governing the shipment of special equipment through GKEhS, as well as the dispatching, at Soviet expense, of specialists for work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has been carefully examined.

Say that the Government of the USSR, based on the friendly relations between our countries, is rendering assistance, with very favorable conditions, aimed at reinforcing

the Afghan military. Special equipment and extra parts are shipped to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 25 percent of cost on a 10-year loan with 2 percent yearly interest. It should be noted that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is in a more favorable situation when compared to other friendly countries receiving aid.

Explain that according to our existing rules, the shipment of general civilian equipment, including auto-transport, and civilian airplanes and helicopters, is exclusively a matter of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and conditions governing commercial trade, irrespective of whether this equipment is used in the armed forces or other departments.

Further, say that the Soviet government has made the decision to grant the Afghan request that the dispatching of all specialists for work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan be made at the expense of the Soviet side.

Telegraph the execution [of the orders].

[Source: *TsKhSD, f. 89, perechen (per.) 14, dokument (dok.) 24; document provided by Mark Kramer (Harvard University); translation by Daniel Rozas.*]

**Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo
Discussions on Afghanistan,
17-19 March 1979**

TOP SECRET
ONLY COPY
WORKING TRANSCRIPT

MEETING OF THE POLITBURO
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION

17 March 1979

Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV, Presiding
In attendance: Y.V. ANDROPOV, A.A. GROMYKO, A.N. KOSYGIN, A.Y. PELSHE, K.U. CHERNENKO, D.F. USTINOV, P.N. DEMICHEV, B.N. PONOMAREV, M.S. SOLOMENTZEV, N. A.TIKHONOV, I.V. KAPITONOV, V.I. DOLGIKH, M.V. ZIMYANIN, K.V. RUSAKOV, M.S. GORBACHEV

Re: Deterioration of Conditions in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and

Possible Responses From Our Side

KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] has asked us to commence our Politburo session today at this unseasonable hour, and he will then join us tomorrow, in order to discuss the circumstances that have emerged in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation is urgent. Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov today have put together some proposals which have been completed and are now in front of you. Let us consider this matter closely and determine what measures we ought to take, what actions should be undertaken. Perhaps we should hear first from Comrade Gromyko.

GROMYKO. Judging by the most recent communications that we have received from Afghanistan in the form of encrypted cables, as well as by telephone conferences with our chief military advisor Comrade [Lt.-Gen. L.N.] Gorelov and temporary charge d'affaires Comrade Alekseev, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated sharply, the center of the disturbance at this time being the town of Herat. There, as we know from previous cables, the 17th division of the Afghan army was stationed, and had restored order, but now we have received news that this division has essentially collapsed. An artillery regiment and one infantry regiment comprising that division have gone over to the side of the insurgents. Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having infiltrated from the territory of Pakistan, trained and armed not only with the participation of Pakistani forces but also of China, the United States of America, and Iran, are committing atrocities in Herat. The insurgents infiltrating into the territory of Herat Province from Pakistan and Iran have joined forces with a domestic counter-revolution. The latter is especially comprised by religious fanatics. The leaders of the reactionary masses are also linked in large part with the religious figures.

The number of insurgents is difficult to determine, but our comrades tell us that they are thousands, literally thousands.

Significantly, it should be noted that I had a conversation this morning at 11:00 with Amin — Taraki's deputy who is the minister of foreign affairs — and he did not express the slightest alarm about the situation in Afghanistan, and on the contrary, with Olympian tranquility, he said that the situa-

tion was not all that complicated, that the army was in control of everything, and so forth. In a word, he expressed the opinion that their position was under control.

KIRILENKO. In short, judging from the report of Amin, the leadership of Afghanistan is not experiencing the slightest anxiety in connection with these events.

GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even said that the situation in Afghanistan is just fine. He said that not a single incident of insubordination by a governor had been reported, that is, that all of the governors were on the side of the lawful government. Whereas in reality, according to the reports of our comrades, the situation in Herat and in a number of other places is alarming, and the insurgents are in control there.

As far as Kabul is concerned, the situation there is basically calm. The borders of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran are closed, or more accurately, semi-closed. A large number of Afghans, formerly working in Iran, have been expelled from Iran and, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied, and many of them have also joined up with the insurgents.

The measures that we have drawn out for the aid of Afghanistan are set forth in the proposals that you have in front of you. I should add that we have appropriated an additional 10 million rubles to Afghanistan in hard currency for the protection of the border.

Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, is the principal place from which the terrorists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it would appear to follow that the leadership of Afghanistan should send a letter of protest to Pakistan or issue a declaration; in a word, to come out with some kind of written statement. However, the Afghan leadership has not done that. To be sure, it looks very strange.

I asked Amin, what kind of actions do you consider necessary from our side? I told him what kind of aid we might be able to render. But he had no other requests, he simply responded that he had a very optimistic appraisal of the circumstances in Afghanistan, that the help you have given will stand us in good stead, and that all of the provinces are safely under the control of lawful forces. I asked him, don't you expect any problems from neighboring governments or a domestic counter-revolution, and so forth? Amin answered firmly that no, there are no

threats to the regime. In conclusion, he conveyed his greetings to the members of the Politburo, and personally to L.I. Brezhnev. And thus was my discussion today with Amin.

After a short time, approximately two or three hours, we received news from our comrades that chaos had erupted in Herat. One regiment, as I already indicated an artillery one, fired on its own troops, and part of the second regiment went over to the insurgents. Consequently, only a portion of the 17th division, which is guarding Herat, remains loyal to the Government. Our comrades also tell us that tomorrow and the next day, new masses of insurgents, trained on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, may invade.

About a half hour later, we again received news from our comrades that Comrade Taraki had summoned the chief military advisor Comrade Gorelov and charge d'affaires Alekseev. And what did they discuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealed to the Soviet Union for help in the form of military equipment, ammunition, and rations, that which is envisioned in the documents which we have presented for consideration by the Politburo. As far as military equipment is concerned, Taraki said, almost in passing, that perhaps ground and air support would be required. This must be understood to mean that the deployment of our forces is required, both land and air forces.

In my opinion, we must proceed from a fundamental proposition in considering the question of aid to Afghanistan, namely: under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan. For 60 years now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy. Of course, it is one thing to apply extreme measures if the Afghan army is on the side of the people, and an entirely different matter, if the army does not support the lawful government. And finally, third, if the army is against the government and, as a result, against our forces, then the matter will be complicated indeed. As we understand from Comrades Gorelov and Alekseev, the mood among the leadership, including Comrade Taraki, is not particularly out of sorts.

USTINOV. Comrade Gorelov, our chief military advisor, was with Taraki along with Comrade Alekseev, our charge

d'affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke with Comrade Gorelov by telephone, and he said that the leadership of Afghanistan is worried about the state of affairs, and that matters in the province of Herat are particularly bad, as well as in the province of Pakti. The bad part is that the division which is supposed to be guarding Herat has turned out to be ineffective, and the commander of the division at this time is located on the airstrip, more to the point, he is seeking refuge there and, obviously, he is no longer commanding the actions of any regiments remaining loyal to the government. Bear in mind that tomorrow (March 18), operational groups will be deployed into Herat.

We advised Comrade Taraki to redeploy several forces into the regions where the insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, responded that this would be difficult inasmuch as there is unrest in other places as well. In short, they are expecting a major response from the USSR, in the form of both land and air forces.

ANDROPOV. They are hoping that we will attack the insurgents.

KIRILENKO. The question arises, whom will our troops be fighting against if we send them there[?] Against the insurgents? Or have they been joined by a large number of religious fundamentalists, that is, Muslims, and among them large numbers of ordinary people? Thus, we will be required to wage war in significant part against the people.

KOSYGIN. What is the army like in Afghanistan—how many divisions are there?

USTINOV. The army in Afghanistan has 10 divisions, including more than 100 thousand soldiers.

ANDROPOV. Our operational data tells us that about three thousand insurgents are being directed into Afghanistan from Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious fanatics from among the people.

KIRILENKO. If there is a popular uprising, then, besides those persons coming from Pakistan and Iran, who for the most part consist of terrorists and insurgents, the masses against whom our troops are engaged will include ordinary people of Afghanistan. Although it is true that they are religious worshippers, followers of Islam.

GROMYKO. The relationship between the supporters of the government and the insurgents is still very unclear. Events

in Herat, judging from everything, have unfolded violently, because over a thousand people have been killed. But even there the situation is unclear enough.

ANDROPOV. Of course, the insurgents coming into the territory of Afghanistan will be joined first of all by those who would rebel and solicit the Afghan people to their own side.

KOSYGIN. In my view, the draft decision under consideration must be substantially amended. First of all, we must not delay the supply of armaments until April but must give everything now, without delay, in March. That is the first thing.

Secondly, we must somehow give moral support to the leadership of Afghanistan, and I would suggest implementation of the following measures: inform Taraki that we are raising the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles per thousand cubic meters. That will make it possible to cover the expenses that they will incur in connection with the acquisition of arms and other materials by a rise in prices. It is necessary in my opinion to give Afghanistan these arms free of charge and not require any 25 percent assessment.

ALL. Agreed.

KOSYGIN. And third, we are slated to supply 75 thousand tons of bread. I think we should reexamine that and supply Afghanistan with 100 thousand tons. These are the measures that it seems to me ought to be added to the draft of the decision and, in that fashion, we would lend moral assistance to the Afghan leadership. We must put up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all, we have lived side by side for 60 years. Of course, while there is a difficult struggle with the Iranians, Pakistanis, and Chinese, nevertheless Iran will lend assistance to Afghanistan—it has the means to do so, all the more so since they are like-minded religiously. This must be borne in mind. Pakistan will also take such measures. There is nothing you can say about the Chinese. Consequently, I believe that we must adopt the fraternal decision seriously to assist the Afghan leadership. I have already spoken on the subject of payments, to talk more of that is unnecessary, and moreover, as here written, in freely convertible hard currency. Whatever freely convertible currency they may have, we are not going to receive any of it in any event.

USTINOV. Everything that is de-

scribed in the draft declaration in connection with the supply of arms to Afghanistan, all of that is being done, shipments and deliveries of this equipment are already taking place. Unfortunately, I do not know whether we will be able to supply everything before April; that is going to be very difficult. I would request that we adopt the decision in connection with the supply of arms that is set forth here. As far as concerns payment for the arms, I would delete that.

KOSYGIN. All the same, we must dispatch everything, literally beginning tomorrow.

USTINOV. Fine, we are doing that, and we will ensure that all of these things are shipped by tomorrow.

KIRILENKO. Let us authorize Comrade Kosygin to implement those amendments to the draft of the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which we have before us, as relates to those points which we have discussed. Tomorrow he will present the document to us in final draft.

KOSYGIN. Absolutely. I will come here tomorrow morning and do everything.

KIRILENKO. We must undertake measures to ensure that all of the military supplies are sent in March.

KOSYGIN. And if, as Comrade Ustinov has pointed out, it is impossible to ship everything completely in March, then perhaps, a second portion can remain for April, but let that portion be insignificantly small.

I also want to raise another question: whatever you may say, Amin and Taraki alike are concealing from us the true state of affairs. We still don't know exactly what is happening in Afghanistan. What is their assessment of the situation? After all, they continue to paint the picture in a cheerful light, whereas in reality, we can see what is happening there. They are good people, that is apparent, but all the same they are concealing a great deal from us. What is the reason for this, that is hard to say. In my view we must decide this question with the ambassador, Andrey Andreevich [Gromyko], as soon as possible. Although as a practical matter he is not authorized, and he doesn't do what is required of him.

In addition, I would consider it necessary to send an additional number of qualified military specialists, and let them find out what is happening with the army.

Moreover, I would consider it necessary to adopt a more comprehensive political decision. Perhaps the draft of such a political decision can be prepared by our comrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign Department of the KGB. It is clear that Iran, China, and Pakistan will come out against Afghanistan, and do everything within their power and means to contravene the lawful government and discredit its actions. It is exactly here that our political support of Taraki and his government is necessary. And of course, Carter will also come out against the leadership of Afghanistan.

With whom will it be necessary for us to fight in the event it becomes necessary to deploy troops - who will it be that rises against the present leadership of Afghanistan? They are all Mohammedans, people of one belief, and their faith is sufficiently strong that they can close ranks on that basis. It seems to me that we must speak to Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that they have permitted to occur during this time. In reality, even up to the present time, they have continued to execute people that do not agree with them; they have killed almost all of the leaders - not only the top leaders, but also those of the middle ranks - of the "Parcham" party. Of course, it will now be difficult to formulate a political document - to do that our comrades will be required to work, as I have already said, for a period of three days.

USTINOV. That is all correct, what Aleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] says, this must be done as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. The documents must be prepared immediately.

KOSYGIN. I don't think that we should pressure the Afghan government to request a deployment of forces from us. Let them create their own special units, which could be redeployed to the more difficult regions in order to quell the insurgents.

USTINOV. In my view we must not, under any circumstances, mix our forces with the Afghan forces, in the event that we send them there.

KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own military forces, work up a statement relating to them, and send it by special messenger.

USTINOV. We have prepared two options in respect to military action. Under the first one, we would, in the course of a

single day, deploy into Afghanistan the 105th airborne division and redeploy the infantry-motorized regiment into Kabul; toward the border we would place the 68th motorized division; and the 5th motor artillery division would be located at the border. Under this scenario, we would be ready for the deployment of forces within three days. But we must adopt the political decision that we have been talking about here.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Ustinov has correctly stated the issue; we must come out against the insurgents. And in the political document this must be clearly and pointedly stated.

In addition to that, we must bear upon Taraki; if we are already talking about the deployment of forces, then the question must be considered thoroughly. We cannot deploy troops without a request from the government of Afghanistan, and we must convey this to Comrade Taraki. And this must be directly stated in a conference between Comrade Kosygin and Taraki. In addition to this, Taraki must be instructed to change his tactics. Executions, torture and so forth cannot be applied on a massive scale. Religious questions, the relationship with religious communities, with religion generally and with religious leaders take on special meaning for them. This is a major policy issue. And here Taraki must ensure, with all decisiveness, that no illicit measures whatsoever are undertaken by them.

The documents must be prepared no later than tomorrow. We will consult with Leonid Ilych as to how we can best accomplish this.

USTINOV. We have a second option which has also been prepared. This one deals with the deployment of two divisions into Afghanistan.

ANDROPOV. We need to adopt the draft of the decision which we have examined today, accounting for those changes and amendments which have been discussed. As far as the political decision is concerned, that also must be immediately prepared, because bands are streaming in from Pakistan.

PONOMAREV. We should send around 500 persons into Afghanistan in the capacity as advisors and specialists. These comrades must all know what to do.

ANDROPOV. Around Herat there are 20 thousand civilians who have taken part in the rebellion. As far as negotiations with Taraki are concerned, we must get on with

it. But I think it is best for Comrade Kosygin to speak with Taraki.

ALL. Agreed. It is better for Comrade Kosygin to speak with him.

ANDROPOV. We must finalize the political statement, bearing in mind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but that in spite of that, under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.

PONOMAREV. Unfortunately, there is much that we do not know about Afghanistan. It seems to me that, in the discussion with Taraki, all these questions must be raised, and in particular, let him explain the state of affairs with the army and in the country generally. After all, they have a 100,000-man army and with the assistance of our advisors, there is much that the army can do. Otherwise, 20 thousand insurgents are going to achieve a victory. Above all, it will be necessary to accomplish everything that is necessary with the forces of the Afghan army, and only later, if and when the necessity truly arises, to deploy our own forces.

KOSYGIN. In my view it is necessary to send arms, but only if we are convinced that they will not fall into the hands of the insurgents. If their army collapses, then it follows that those arms will be claimed by the insurgents. Then the question will arise as to how we will respond in the view of world public opinion. All this will have to be justified, that is, if we are really going to deploy our forces, then we must marshal all of the appropriate arguments and explain everything in detail. Perhaps one of our responsible comrades should travel to Afghanistan in order to understand the local conditions in greater detail. Perhaps Comrade Ustinov or Comrade Ogarkov.

USTINOV. The situation in Afghanistan is worsening. We ought to speak now, it seems to me, about political measures that we have not yet undertaken. And, on the other hand, we must fully exploit the capability of the Afghan army. It seems to me there is no point in me going to Afghanistan; I have doubts about that. Perhaps some member of the government should go.

KOSYGIN. You must go there nonetheless, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov]. The point is that we are sending into Afghanistan a large volume of armaments, and it is necessary that they remain in the hands of the revolutionary masses. We have about 550 advisors in Afghanistan, and they must

be apprised of the state of affairs in the military.

USTINOV. Even if one of us goes to Afghanistan, still nobody is going to learn anything in just a couple of days.

GROMYKO. I think that negotiations with Taraki should be undertaken by A.N. Kosygin or D.F. Ustinov, and more likely, in the end, by Comrade Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. Before speaking with Taraki, it will be necessary for me to get approval from Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev]. I will speak with Leonid Ilych tomorrow and then talk to Taraki.

ANDROPOV. And the essence of our decisions here today must be communicated to Leonid Ilych in detail.

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear - we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won't have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree - we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we've already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force.

GROMYKO. I want to emphasize again the main thing, which we must consider thoroughly, and that is to come up with an answer as to how we will react in the event of a critical situation. Taraki is already speaking of alarm, whereas Amin to date has expressed an optimistic attitude. In a word, as you can see, the Afghan leadership, in my view, has incorrectly assessed the state of affairs in the army and in the country generally.

PONOMAREV. The Afghan army achieved a revolutionary coup d'état, and I would think that under skillful leadership from the government, it could hold to its own position in defense of the country.

KIRILENKO. The problem is that many of the commanders in the army have been imprisoned and executed. This has resulted in a major negative impact on the army.

GROMYKO. One of our principal tasks is to strengthen the army; that is the main link. Our entire orientation must fo-

cus on the political leadership of the country and the army. And all the same, we have to acknowledge that the Afghan leadership is concealing a great deal from us. For some reason they do not want to be open with us. This is very unfortunate.

ANDROPOV. It seems to me that we ought to inform the socialist countries of these measures.

KIRILENKO. We have spoken at length, Comrades, and our opinions are clear; let us come to a conclusion.

1. Comrade Kosygin shall be authorized to clarify the document which has been presented to us, to add to it the supply of 100 thousand tons of bread, an increase in the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles, and to remove the language about a percentage, and hard currency, etc.

2. Comrade Kosygin shall be authorized to communicate with Comrade Taraki, to ascertain how they evaluate the situation in Afghanistan and what is necessary from us. In this discussion with Taraki, Comrade Kosygin shall be guided by the exchange of opinion that has taken place here in the Politburo.

3. The third point that we have discussed here consists of authorizing Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev to prepare a political document dealing with an exchange of opinions regarding our policy in connection with Afghanistan.

4. We must appeal to Pakistan, through our channels in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the Pakistani government not allow any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

5. I think that we should accede to the proposal of Comrade Ustinov in connection with assistance to the Afghan army in overcoming the difficulties that it has encountered by means of the forces of our military units.

6. To send into Afghanistan our best military specialists, through our channels with the Ministry of Defense, as well as through the KGB, for a detailed explication of the circumstances prevailing in the Afghan army and in Afghanistan generally.

7. Our draft of the decision must contain a provision for the preparation of materials that expose the interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan on the part of Pakistan, Iran, the USA, and China, and for publication of those materials through third

countries.

8. Comrades Ponomarev and Zamyatin shall be authorized to prepare materials relating to the intervention of Pakistan, the USA, Iran, China and other countries in Afghanistan and to dispatch such material to the press as it becomes available.

9. We must think carefully about how we will respond to the accusations that will be leveled against the USSR by other countries, when we are charged with aggression and so forth.

10. The Ministry of Defense shall be permitted to deploy two divisions on the border between the USSR and Afghanistan.

And finally, as has been suggested here, it will be necessary for us to inform the socialist countries of those measures which we have adopted.

Are there any other proposals, Comrades?

ALL. It's all been covered.

KIRILENKO. I will now attempt to make contact with Comrade Chernenko and communicate our proposals to him.

ALL. Agreed. [Recess.]

KIRILENKO. I have just spoken with Comrade Chernenko. He believes that the proposals set forth here are correct, and he will attempt to inform Leonid Ilych about them.

Let us adjourn this session for today. [Session adjourned.]

[March 18 Session:]

KIRILENKO. Yesterday we agreed that Comrade A.N. Kosygin should communicate with Comrade Taraki. Let us listen to Comrade A.N. Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. As we agreed, yesterday I made contact with Comrade Taraki twice by telephone. [Ed. note: See transcript of Kosygin-Taraki telephone conversation below.] He informed me that on the streets of Herat, the insurgent soldiers were fraternizing with those who support the government. The situation in that town is very complex. If, in the words of Comrade Taraki, the Soviet Union does not lend its assistance at this time, we will not hold out.

Further, Comrade Taraki said that Iran and Pakistan are supplying arms to the insurgents, and that, at the time, Afghans were returning from Iran, but it turned out that they were not Afghans but rather soldiers of the Iranian army dressed in Afghan cloth-

ing. And they stirred up agitation and insurrection. Consequently, in a number of provinces of Afghanistan, and especially in the town of Herat, events have unfolded that bring with them a most serious danger. Comrade Taraki said further that the issue could be resolved in a single day. If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished.

I then put the question to him: in Afghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army, not all of which is situated in Herat; there is only the one 17th division there. Could it really be impossible to form several divisions and deploy them to Herat in order to assist the supporters of the government? Comrade Taraki responded that several divisions were being formed, but that until they were formed, there would be no garrisons loyal to the government in Herat.

In that connection they would like to receive reinforcements in the form of tanks and armored cars for the infantry. I then asked him, will you be able to muster enough tank crews to place the tanks into action? He responded that they have no tank crews, and therefore he requested that we dispatch Tajiks to serve as crews for tanks and armored cars, dressed in Afghan uniforms, and send them here. I then stated again, Comrade Taraki, there is no way you will conceal the fact that our military personnel are taking part in battle operations; this fact will be immediately uncovered, and press correspondents will broadcast to the whole world that Soviet tanks are engaged in a military conflict in Afghanistan.

I also asked Comrade Taraki what was the population of Kabul. In response he told me that the population was 1 million 200 thousand. I then asked him, would it really be impossible for you to form part of a division from the population of Kabul to assist the various provinces, to equip them and, in like fashion, to arm them? To that he responded that there was nobody to train them. I then said to him, how is it possible, given how many people were trained in the military academic academies in the Soviet Union, given how many of the old military cadres have come out on the side of the government, that there is now nobody to do the training? How then, I asked him, can we support you? Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government. In Kabul we have no workers, only craftsmen.

And the conversation again turned to Herat, and he said that if Herat falls, then the revolution is doomed. And on the contrary, if it holds out, then survival of the revolution is assured. In his opinion, the army is reliable, and they are depending on it. However, uprisings have emerged throughout the entire country, and the army is too small to be able to pacify the insurgents everywhere. Your assistance is required, Comrade Taraki again declared.

As far as Kabul is concerned, there, it is obvious from the telegrams we received today, the situation is basically the same as in Iran: manifestos are circulating, and crowds of people are massing. Large numbers of persons are flowing into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, equipped with Iranian and Chinese armaments.

KIRILENKO. In Herat the 17th division numbers 9 thousand men. Can it really be that they are all in a state of inaction or have gone over to the side of the government's opponents?

KOSYGIN. According to our data, the artillery and one infantry regiment have gone over, although not entirely, and the rest continue to support the government.

USTINOV. As far as the Tajiks are concerned, we don't have separate [deleted]

KOSYGIN. An anti-aircraft battalion located in Herat has also gone over to the side of the rebels.

USTINOV. Amin, when I talked to him, also requested the deployment of forces to Herat to quell the insurgents.

KOSYGIN. Comrade Taraki reports that half of the division located in Herat has gone over to the side of the rebels. The remaining portion, he thinks, also will not support the government.

USTINOV. The Afghan revolution has encountered major difficulties along its way, Amin said in his conversation with me, and its survival now depends totally on the Soviet Union.

What is the problem? Why is this happening? The problem is that the leadership of Afghanistan did not sufficiently appreciate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. It is under the banner of Islam that the soldiers are turning against the government, and an absolute majority, perhaps only with rare exceptions, are believers. There is your reason why they are asking us to help drive back the attacks of the insurgents in Herat. Amin said, albeit somewhat uncertainly, that

there is support for the army. And again, like Comrade Taraki, he appealed for assistance.

KIRILENKO. It follows that they have no guarantee in respect to their own army. They are depending on only one outcome, namely, on our tanks and armored cars.

KOSYGIN. We must, obviously, in adopting such a determination in respect to assistance, seriously think through the consequences that will flow from this. The matter is really very serious.

ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have considered all these issues in depth and arrived at the conclusion that we must consider very, very seriously, the question of whose cause we will be supporting if we deploy forces into Afghanistan. It's completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we ought to instruct our ambassador, Comrade Vinogradov, to go to Prime Minister of Iran [Mehdi] Bazargan and inform him that interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan cannot be tolerated.

GROMYKO. I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan. The army there is unreliable. Thus our army, when it arrives in Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of détente, arms reduction, and much more - all that would be thrown back. China, of course, would be given a nice present. All the nonaligned countries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expected from such an action. There will no longer be any question of a meeting of Leonid Ilych with

Carter, and the visit of [French President] Giscard d'Estang at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle of one group of the population against another. Incidentally, the Afghans haven't officially addressed us on bringing in troops.

In a word, we now find ourselves in a situation where the leadership of the country, as a result of the serious mistakes it has allowed to occur, has ended up not on the high ground, not in command of the necessary support from the people.

KIRILENKO. Yesterday in Afghanistan the situation was different, and we were inclined toward the conclusion that we ought, perhaps, to deploy some number of military detachments. Today the situation is different, and the discussion here quite correctly has already taken a somewhat different course, namely, we are all adhering to the position that there is no basis whatsoever for the deployment of forces.

ANDROPOV. Yesterday, when we discussed this issue, the Afghans were not talking about the deployment of troops; today the situation there has changed. In Herat, not just one regiment has gone over to the side of the rebellion but the whole division. As we can see from yesterday's discussion with Amin, the people do not support the government of Taraki. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armored cars can't save anything. I think that we should say to Taraki bluntly that we support all their actions and will render the kind of support that we agreed upon yesterday and today, but that in no case will we go forward with a deployment of troops into Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite him here and tell him that we will increase our assistance to you, but we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting not against the army, which in essence has gone

over to the adversary or is just sitting and waiting it out, but against the people. There would be huge minuses for us. A whole contingent of countries would quickly come out against us. And there are no pluses for us at all.

ANDROPOV. We should state directly to Comrade Taraki that we will support you with all measures and means except for the deployment of troops.

KOSYGIN. We should invite him here and tell him that we will support you with all means and measures but we will not deploy troops.

KIRILENKO. The government of Afghanistan itself has done nothing to secure the situation. And it has a 100 thousand man army at that. What has it done? What good has it accomplished? Essentially nothing. And after all, Comrades, we gave very, very good support to Afghanistan.

ALL. Agreed.

KIRILENKO. We gave it everything. And what has come of it? It has come to nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and even spoke to us of their own justification, as though we also executed people during the time of Lenin. So you see what kind of Marxists we have found.

The situation has changed since yesterday. Yesterday, as I already said, we were unanimous as to the rendering of military aid, but we carefully discussed the matter, considered various options, searched for different ways, other than the deployment of troops. I believe that we should present our point of view of Leonid Ilych, invite Comrade Taraki to Moscow and tell him about everything that we have agreed on.

Maybe it is true we should send special declarations to [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini and Bazargan in Iran and Pakistan?

ANDROPOV. We should invite Comrade Taraki here.

KOSYGIN. I think we should consult with Leonid Ilych and send a plane to Kabul today.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Kosygin needs to speak with Comrade Taraki. If he wants to come to Moscow and not remain in Tashkent, then perhaps Leonid Ilych will see him.

GROMYKO. I think it would be better for us to prepare a political document after the discussion with Comrade Taraki.

ANDROPOV. We have to begin publishing articles about Pakistan and its support for the insurgents.

USTINOV. I assume we will continue with the aid measures that we agreed on yesterday.

ALL. Agreed.

USTINOV. The only thing is that we must rule out the possibility of deploying troops.

KOSYGIN. In short, we are not changing anything in connection with aid to Afghanistan except the deployment of troops. They themselves will relate more responsibly to the determination of questions concerning the government's management of affairs. And if we do everything for them, defend their revolution, then what remains for them? Nothing. We have 24 advisors in Herat. We should pull them out.

ZAMYATIN. As far as the supply of propaganda is concerned in connection with this undertaking, we have articles prepared about Afghanistan. We also have articles prepared about Pakistan and the assistance rendered to the Afghan insurgents by China. We must get these articles to press today.

ALL. Agreed.

CHERNENKO. Comrades, we must decide who will invite Comrade Taraki.

KIRILENKO. This should be done by Comrade A.N. Kosygin. Let him make the call and invite him to come to Moscow or Tashkent, whichever he prefers.

[With this the session of March 18 was adjourned.]

[March 19 session:]

BREZHNEV. Comrades, since the beginning of the events that have unfolded in Afghanistan, I have been informed about them. I have been informed about the discussions of Comrade A. A. Gromyko with Amin, of Comrade D. F. Ustinov also with Amin, about the latest events that have taken place there in the course of yesterday, and in that connection about the discussion of Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Comrade Taraki.

I have signed documents authorizing the delivery of additional supplies of special materials, including military property and armaments, and also dealing with the issue of a number of measures having a political and organizational character, and authorizing Comrade A.N. Kosygin to com-

municate with Comrade Taraki, and to brief our press and other media outlets in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In a word, all of the measures that were set forth in the draft decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU submitted on Saturday, all of the measures that have been adopted in the course of Saturday and Sunday, in my view, are entirely correct.

The question was raised as to the immediate participation of our troops in the conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. In my view the Politburo has correctly determined that the time is not right for us to become entangled in that war.

We must explain to Comrade Taraki and our other Afghan comrades, that we can help them with everything that is necessary for the conduct of all activities in the country. But the involvement of our forces in Afghanistan would harm not only us, but first of all them. Accordingly, it would appear that we ought now to hear the report of Comrades A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, Y.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, and with that conclude this phase of the adoption of measures which were necessary to implement in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan.

GROMYKO. We must discuss today the very acute question concerning the situation in Afghanistan. We have closely followed the developing events in that country and have given instructions to our embassy personnel, advisors and so forth. We have systematically, I would say, very regularly, in the course of the day, received comprehensive information from our representatives in Afghanistan.

What do we have as of today? In an array of provinces in Afghanistan, first and foremost in Herat, there has been an uprising of insurgents. Where did they come from? They were dispatched from the territory of Iran and Pakistan. These are all elements hostile to the government of Comrade Taraki. In order to conceal their deployment into Afghanistan, they were dressed in Afghan uniforms, and in numbers amounting to several tens of thousands they appeared in Herat, instigated this insurrection, and we unexpectedly began to receive reports about the events in Herat. There is one government division located there, which was supposed to maintain public order. But as a result of the fact that part of the government forces went over to the

side of the insurgents, shooting broke out and there were many casualties; more than a thousand were killed.

I discussed all aspects of the situation in Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But I must say candidly that his assessment was somehow rather relaxed. We were under the impression conveyed by his assessment, and then suddenly the mood of Amin changed for the worse, and he himself began to speak about the fact that the entire division located in Herat had gone over to the side of the insurgents. At the height of the events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov] spoke with Amin, who bluntly expressed the view that the USSR should deploy troops in Herat. It begins to look like a detective novel, how superciliously the Afghan leadership posits such serious questions.

After that, Comrade A. N. Kosygin spoke with Comrade Taraki, who told him that the situation in Afghanistan was bad, and he also requested a deployment of troops to Herat. The border of Afghanistan, both with Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advisors promptly articulated a series of proposals, but they didn't listen to them.

Today we have received reports indicating that the situation in Herat is not all that bad: two regiments remain loyal to the government after all. Where lies the truth, I can't say, but these are the reports we have gotten.

We may assume with full justification that all these events, not only in Afghanistan but in the neighboring governments, including those in China, are being directed by the hand of the USA. China, Pakistan, and Iran are playing a role here that is not at all far behind.

There are several heartening notes in the fact that in Kabul, yesterday, a massive demonstration took place in support of the government. But all the same the government position in Afghanistan is not in control as it ought to be.

Naturally, we cannot avoid the need to confront the questions relating to the situation in Afghanistan. But I believe that we will have to adhere to our line, our policy, and follow our course with a view to all of the peculiarities. If, for example, we take upon ourselves the risk of deploying troops, we will obtain not as many pluses as minuses. To this time we still don't know how

the Afghan army will behave. And if it does not support our measures or remains neutral, then it will turn out that we have used our forces to occupy Afghanistan. In doing this we will create for ourselves an incredibly difficult complication in our foreign policy. We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotiations would fly by the wayside, there would be no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political priority), there would be no meeting of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it is very doubtful that Giscard d'Estang would come to visit us, and our relations with Western countries, particularly the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act as the deployment of troops (Parenthetically, it is entirely incomprehensible to us why Afghanistan has been so indulgent with Pakistan, which is obviously engaged in intervention against Afghanistan. Yesterday the government of Afghanistan published a proclamation, but it was not sufficiently strident.)

We are rendering major aid to Afghanistan. How the government of Afghanistan will conduct itself henceforth is difficult to predict; determining the situation there is also problematic. However, there is no basis whatsoever to conclude that all is lost there. I believe that if the Afghan government can find in itself the strength to coordinate its actions properly, then matters might turn out there for the best.

KOSYGIN. I had the opportunity to speak with Comrade Taraki yesterday on two occasions. He says that everything there is falling apart and that we must send troops, that the situation is the same in all of Afghanistan as it is in Herat. He says that if we lose Herat, then everything will fall. Pakistan, in his opinion, is sending a large number of men, dressed in Afghan uniforms. According to his data, 4,000 such persons have been dispatched. There are 500 men situated on the airfield in Herat at this time. I asked him, who in Herat is on your side? Comrade Taraki responded that in essence the entire population there has fallen under the influence of the religious fundamentalists. He said that there are 200-250 persons there who are organizing the entire thing. I asked him, are there any workers there? He

said, that there are about two thousand workers. I asked him what, in your opinion, are the prospects for Herat? He said to me bluntly that Herat will fall tomorrow, but that it is holding on for the time being.

They are talking about forming new units and sending them to Herat. In the opinion of Comrade Taraki, all who have gathered from the ranks of those dissatisfied with the new regime will then unite and set out for Kabul, and that will be the end of his government. Again he requested assistance from our troops. I said that I could not answer his request at this time. I said that we were intensively studying the question, and that we would deliberate and then respond.

As you can see, the discussion with Comrade Taraki yielded no constructive results whatsoever. He spoke of the fall of Herat and requested a deployment of our troops. I asked him what was required from our side in order to combine political measures with those of a military character. Taraki then said to me, you should place Afghan insignias on your planes and tanks, and let them move on Herat from across the border. I then said that this would be direct aggression on the part of the USSR against Afghanistan.

I asked him, can you muster soldiers and special drivers for tanks and armored cars from the ranks of the Afghans? He said that this could be done, but only a very few.

I told him of our decision to render comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, to send an additional number of advisors and specialists.

Naturally, we must preserve Afghanistan as an allied government. In addition, it would appear that we must appeal to Pakistan with a warning that intervention against Afghanistan is intolerable. The same measure must be taken in respect to Iran. The message must be directed to Khomeini and to Bazargan. We must also come out with a similar document in respect to Iran.

It would be good if the borders with Pakistan and Iran could be closed.

It seems to me that it would make sense to take the further step of sending a good ambassador to Afghanistan. From the discussion with Comrade Taraki I learned that he doesn't even know to whom the government should turn. A great political task is necessary there, and only in that event can we save Afghanistan as an ally.

BREZHNEV. Letters to Pakistan and

Iran must be sent today.

USTINOV. Amin spoke with me yesterday morning. Having consulted beforehand with Leonid Ilych, I told him about the massive aid that we are turning out and will continue to render. Amin said that the Soviet Union is our closest and principal friend. He then started to lament about the fact that Pakistan and Iran are sending large numbers of saboteurs that are being trained on the territory of Pakistan by Chinese advisors, being equipped with Chinese arms, and are then being sent across the border into Afghanistan.

There is strong opposition in Afghanistan on the part of the feudal lords.

He then turned the discussion to Herat and, just like Taraki, asked us to send tanks. I told him about the aid that we had determined to give Afghanistan in the form of a supply of armaments. He said that such aid was helpful, but what they really need is for us to send tanks.

BREZHNEV. Their army is falling apart, and we are supposed to wage the war for them.

USTINOV. We have a large number of advisors in the Afghan army, as well as interpreters. I told Amin that we can send an additional number of interpreters.

Getting to the heart of the matter, in Afghanistan there is basically no information, no ties between Kabul and Herat. There is a single small electric power station there, and consequently the insurgent elements, having deserted the government, are heading into the mountains.

The situation in Herat today is somewhat better. It is calm in the city. Technical assistance, of course, will be necessary for us to send. We will send a great deal of it. We are forming two divisions in the Turkestan military district, and one division in the Central Asian military district. We have three regiments that could arrive in Afghanistan in literally three hours. But I am saying this, of course, only to emphasize our state of readiness. Like the rest of my Comrades, I do not support the idea of deploying troops to Afghanistan. I would request permission that we conduct tactical exercises on the border with Afghanistan and to form regiments and divisions.

I must say that the Afghan leadership is poorly handling very many matters, and that working under such conditions is very difficult for our advisors.

ANDROPOV. The first question that must be decided concerns the difficulty of the situation. In addition to that the situation is increasingly unreliable. Just what exactly is going on in Afghanistan? It has to do with the leadership. The leadership does not recognize the forces which support it, and on which it could depend. Today, for example, a rather substantial demonstration took place in Kabul and Herat, but the leadership did not exploit these massive measures to the necessary extent. Educational efforts have been poorly managed not only in the army but among the population generally. They execute their political opponents. Nobody listens to the radio because transmissions are very weak. It will be necessary for us to assist them with mobile telecommunications facilities.

Amin has essentially had all of the power in his hands, but only yesterday did they ratify a new director of government security and a chief of state. This is the way to achieve some broadening of the political base among the leadership.

On our part, we have advisors there under the direction of the chief advisor for party policy Comrade Veselov. In my opinion he is not up to the task and is coping badly with the situation. It might be better if we were to send there some comrade from the Central Committee apparatus. There are many advisors there. There are advisors in KGB channels, also in large numbers.

I think that as far as the deployment of troops is concerned, it would not behoove us to make such a determination. To deploy our troops would mean to wage war against the people, to crush the people, to shoot at the people. We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.

PONOMAREV. We have 460 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union. These are all prepared officer cadres; they could be sent into Afghanistan.

OGARKOV. The Afghans have appealed to us with a request to speed up the training of 160 officers.

USTINOV. We have to speak with Comrade Taraki about getting those people sent there and using them as officer cadres.

KAPITONOV. As far as our chief advisor on party policy Comrade Veselov is concerned, he is a good man. He served as the Central Committee inspector with us, and more recently worked as the second

secretary to the Bashkirskii general party committee. He is a young and energetic comrade.

USTINOV. Our party advisors are not sufficiently qualified and there are very few of them, in all, it seems to me, five men, but the work has to be done very quickly.

KAPITONOV. That's right, we really do have only five men there under the direction of Comrade Veselov. But we are right now selecting a number of additional comrades and will send them there.

BREZHNEV. I think that we should approve the measures that have been worked out in the course of these few days.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. It follows that the appropriate comrades should be authorized to carry them out aggressively and if new questions arise in connection with Afghanistan, to submit them to the Politburo.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. Accordingly, we are adopting the decision:

To bring Comrade Taraki here tomorrow, March 20.

Discussions will be conducted by Comrades A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, and D. F. Ustinov, and then I will see him.

ALL. Very well.

With this the session was adjourned.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, 12-25; document provided by M. Kramer (Harvard University); translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 18 March 1979

Proletariats of all countries, unite!
Subject to return within 3 days to the CC CPSU (General Department, 1st Sector) Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET
SPECIAL FILE

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC

CPSU Politburo session of
18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political and organizational nature regarding the sharpening of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Assign Com. Kosygin, A.N. to negotiate by telephone with Com. N.M. Taraki about the possibility of a meeting with him in Moscow or Tashkent.

CC SECRETARY

3-zm mk

[new document]

Proletariats of all countries, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political and organizational nature regarding the sharpening of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Special file.
2. In relation to the sharpening of the situation in the DRA, consider expedient the acceptance of a political document which reveals the reasons for the sharpening of the situation in Afghanistan, and defines our possible steps in providing assistance to the leadership of the DRA in the stabilization of the the situation in the country.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev to prepare a draft resolution on that issue, taking into account the exchange of opinions which took place at the meeting the the CC Politburo.

3. Assign Coms. Ponomarev, Zimianin and Zamiatin to prepare materials for publication in the press, transmission by television and radio, which unmask the interfer-

ence of the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As soon as these materials are ready, send them to press.

4. Assign the MFA USSR and the CC CPSU International department to prepare a draft of an appeal to the governments of Iran and Pakistan about the inadmissibility of preparing diversionist and terroristic acts on the territories of Iran and Pakistan, sending diversionist groups onto the territory of Afghanistan, and intervention in the internal affairs of the DRA.

5. Assign the KGB USSR and the CC CPSU Department of foreign political propaganda to prepare and send to third countries materials about the interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China, and other countries.

SECRETARY CC

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 3 op. 82, d. 137, ll. 121-123; obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979

Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

Taraki: The situation is bad and getting worse.

Kosygin: Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, the petty bourgeoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?

Taraki: There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans - follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by this.

Kosygin: Are there many workers there?

Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

Kosygin: What are the prospects?

Taraki: We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

Kosygin: Do you not have the forces to rout them?

Taraki: I wish it were the case.

Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-

als on this issue?

Taraki: We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

Kosygin: It is a very complex matter.

Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working against us, according to the same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the revolution.

Kosygin: The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance.

Kosygin: We must hold consultations on this issue. Do you not have connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

Taraki: Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kushka and from the direction of Kabul. In our view, no one will be any the wiser. They will think these are Government troops.

Kosygin: I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

Taraki: I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

Taraki: Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

Kosygin: Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

Taraki: The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students,

and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

Kosygin: We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. We have also decided to deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from \$21 per cubic meter to \$37.

Taraki: That is very good, but let us talk of Herat. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is anything to go by, it is clear that it is easy to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

Kosygin: You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but, irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you.

Taraki: Send us infantry fighting vehicles by air.

Kosygin: Do you have anyone to drive them?

Taraki: We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles.

Kosygin: Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the language.

Taraki: Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language—Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Kosygin: I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

[The first page has a hand-written footnote: At the Central Committee Politburo's sitting on 19 March, Comrade Kosygin read the transcript of these conversations in the presence of Central Committee secretaries.]

[Source: *Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian*, "Special File" program,

14 July 1992, as translated in *FBIS-SOV-92-138* (17 July 1992), pp. 30-31.]

Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow, 20 March 1979

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

RECORD OF MEETING^X

of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO,
D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV
with N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979

A.N.Kosygin. The Politburo has entrusted us with discussing with you all questions which you think necessitate an exchange of opinions. As I have already mentioned to you, your meeting with L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first word should be given to you, but since one important question from your side has already been raised, I would like to first set forth our opinion, and then we will attentively hear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the friendship between Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional, dictated by some temporary viewpoints, but calculated for ages. We have given and will continue to give you assistance in the fight against all enemies which act against you at the present time and against those enemies with which you may clash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situation which has developed in your country, we looked for ways to assist you which would best serve the interests of our friendship and your relations with other countries. There may be various ways of solving the problems which have developed in your country, but the best way is that which would preserve the authority of your government in the eyes of the people, not spoil relations between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and not injure the international prestige of your country. We must not allow the situation to seem as if you were not able to deal with your own problems and invited foreign troops to assist you. I would like to use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people withstood a difficult war with the USA and are now fighting against Chinese

aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. One only needs to unify them and create new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin creating new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at this time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the current situation. One need only deal with it correctly. Let's take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy had firmly entrenched itself there, that the city had become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize control of the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the military town in Herat, the location of the mutinous section of the 17th infantry division, has been taken by a battalion of paratroopers supported by tanks from Kandahar, following air-strikes. Troops loyal to the government are securing and further taking advantage of this success.

In our opinion, our assignment for the current time period is to defend you from various international complications. We will give you assistance with all available means - ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel in the operation of the most modern types of weapons and military machinery which we are sending you. The deployment of our forces in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately arouse the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multipronged consequences. This, in effect, would be a conflict not only with imperialist countries, but also a conflict with one's own people. Our mutual enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet forces appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy on Afghan territory military formations hostile to you. I would again like to underline that the question of deploying our forces has been examined by us from every direction; we carefully studied all aspects of this ac-

tion and came to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve, but would worsen. One cannot deny that our troops would have to fight not only with foreign aggressors, but also with a certain number of your people. And people do not forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be vindicated.

We have come to the conclusion that in the given period, the most effective support that we could give you would be through methods of our political influence on neighboring countries and through the rendering of extensive and manifold assistance. This way would accomplish much more than through the deployment of our troops. We are deeply convinced that we can overcome the enemy using the political means being undertaken both by your side and by our side. We have already discussed with you that Afghanistan should work towards good relations with Iran, Pakistan and India by eliminating any pretexts they may have for meddling in your affairs. As for us, today we are sending two documents to the leaders of Iran and Pakistan, in which we tell them with all seriousness not to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan. We are taking care of this matter ourselves, without drawing you into it. These are, in essence, the thoughts which we wanted to share with you openly, as comrades.

N.M.Taraki. I am very grateful to you for the detailed account of the position of the Soviet government on the question which I wanted to discuss. I also speak forthrightly and openly, as your friend. We in Afghanistan also believe that emerging problems should first be dealt with through political means, and that military actions must be auxiliary in nature. In the political arena, we have taken a number of steps and are convinced that the majority of the people remain on our side. Within a day after my appearance on the radio where I explained the nature of events in Herat, throughout the country there took place 102 demonstrations, the participants of which carried placards condemning Khomeini and his minions. This convinced us that our internal enemies are not so numerous. We were also happy to hear the news that a segment of our armed forces, taking part in the mutiny, had put down their arms.

On my part, I also want to emphasize

that the relations between our countries are more than just routine diplomatic exchanges. They are based on a class foundation and on mutual ideology and politics. In our country, as in yours, the government belongs to the working class and to the peasants, who wrested it from the hands of the aristocracy and the feudalists. Our revolution has provoked a malicious reaction from our class enemies. The revolutionary reorganization undertaken by us - liberation of peasants from dependency to landlords and feudalists resulting from debt, redistribution of land to landless peasants, and other measures - have secured the authority of our government among the people of Afghanistan, and have had a positive response from the people of Pakistan and Iran. This has driven fear into the reactionary forces of these countries, which have increased their subversive activities against our country, intensified slanderous propaganda, and begun to send terrorist gangs into our territory. They began their propaganda against us by proclaiming us apostates of Islam. Then they began to accuse us of all other mortal sins. The Pakistani propaganda perverted the measures undertaken by us towards social liberation of women, whom we gave a dignified position in society. When we set to work on land reform, the ruling circles in Pakistan, seeing its revolutionary influence on their people, crossed over to the politics of sabotage and subversive activities against us. The rulers of Pakistan were very frightened by the demonstrations that rolled across the country, protesting under banners "Long live the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan!" and "Long live Taraki!" Our country was not only being infiltrated by members of "the Moslem brotherhood" who had fled the country after the revolution, but also by entire subdivisions, dressed in Afghan military uniforms, which are involved in subversive activities and sabotage. After my visit to Soviet Union and the signing of a very important Treaty between our countries, the American imperialists and other reactionaries became strongly antagonistic against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. They understood that Afghanistan had been finally lost by the West. Through their means of mass information the USA, Pakistan, and Iran spread all sorts of slanderous material defaming us. It is in the close friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union that one finds the main rea-

son for anti-Afghan activity of imperialists and reactionaries.

Today we spoke with you concerning the fact that Afghanistan should maintain good ties with Pakistan, Iran, and India. This will be difficult to achieve, as Iran, and especially Pakistan, don't want friendship with us.

A.N. Kosygin. A statement has just been received from [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul-Haq, in which he notes that events in Afghanistan are the internal matter of that state and that Pakistan will not interfere in them. This statement also notes that the government of Pakistan will only deliver humanitarian aid to the 35 thou. refugees from Afghanistan as long as their activities do not undermine relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

N.M. Taraki. They only speak of humanitarianism, but are themselves creating camps to train commandos against us.

A.N. Kosygin. We are not so naive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq, but whatever the case may be, the statement has been made and it is binding.

B.N. Ponomarev. It seems that the statement of Zia-ul-Haq is Pakistan's reaction to the story in the newspaper "Pravda."

A.N. Kosygin. Clearly Pakistan has become worried. They have felt the pressure from not only your side, but also from ours.

N.M. Taraki. The article in "Pravda," analyzing the schemes against the DRA, was published exactly at the right time. This article has made a deep impression on our neighbors. I, of course, agree with you that it necessary to take active political steps, and that war is a very risky proposition. It would be superfluous to delve into the question of why the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Americans, and the Chinese are undertaking such active steps to undermine us. I would only like to emphasize that we have been and will continue to remain friends, and that we shall never be as close to anyone as we are with you. We have learned and continue to learn from Lenin. We are well aware of Lenin's instructions on how to build relations with neighboring countries. We strive towards good relations with neighbors, but we are hindered by the Americans who are trying to increase tensions by undermining progressive governments. They have acted thus against the young Soviet republic in the past, and are now continuing to act thus against

Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen. We are resisting these schemes, and are doing everything to rule the country not by the force of arms, but by winning the people's respect through revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interest of the working people. For this we have already spent 200 bln. afghani. The people can tell who is their friend and who is their enemy. Having seen that propaganda against our government has not found a broad response from the Afghan people, the spiritual leaders have changed tactics and have begun to shout that Afghanistan has become pro-Soviet, pro-communist, that there are now 10 thousand Soviet people in the country who are bossing everyone around.

To sum up, I would like to say that we are worried by the possibility of infiltrators being sent across from Iran and Pakistan, though, of course, your verbal confrontation with the leaders of Pakistan and Iran will be very useful, and will have a sobering effect on them.

A.N. Kosygin. Some more news. The Iranian government has issued a directive ordering all foreign workers to leave the country by April 21 and for foreign specialists to leave by June 21. As for specialists deemed highly important for the Iranian economy, their cases will be dealt with on an individual basis.

N.M. Taraki. This remark most likely is directed towards the Americans. We have information that the Iranian government has already returned to the country American specialists who have been working there on helicopter assembly.

A.N. Kosygin. Yes, we have heard about it as well, but it is possible that we may have more specialists in Iran than do the Americans. If there arises the question of our specialists leaving, then a large metallurgical factory as well as other important enterprises in Iran will be unable to function. And how many Afghans are working in Iran?

N.M. Taraki. No less than 200 thousand people. They moved to Iran 5-6 years ago, during the regime of Daoud and even earlier. If they are going to be expelled, then under the guise of Afghan workers there will be guerillas coming as well, since it is very difficult to determine who is Iranian and who is Afghan from one's appearance. I wanted to touch on the question of the needs of the Afghan army. We would like to re-

ceive armored helicopters, an additional number of armored transports and military infantry vehicles, as well as modern means of communication. Also, maintenance personnel would be of great help to us.

D.F. Ustinov. It seems that we are talking about MI-24 helicopters, which have bullet-proof armor. We will give you 6 such helicopters during June-July and 6 more in the fourth quarter of this year. Perhaps we will be able to move up the timetable for deliveries.

N.M. Taraki. We have great need for these helicopters, and it would be good if they arrived together with pilots.

A.N. Kosygin. We can send you maintenance specialists, which would take care of these helicopters at the airport, but, of course, not battle crews. We have already spoken about the matter.

D.F. Ustinov. You must prepare your own pilots. We are training your officers, and we can expedite their release.

N.M. Taraki. Perhaps we can get helicopter pilots from Hanoi or some other country, for example, Cuba?

A.N. Kosygin. As I have already said earlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnam a great deal, but they never asked us to send them our pilots. They only asked for technical specialists. We are training 400 Afghan officers. Choose the people you need, and we will expedite their training.

N.M. Taraki. We would very much like the delivery of helicopters to be expedited. We have a great need for them.

A.N. Kosygin. We will further examine your request, and, if possible, will expedite the shipment of helicopters.

D.F. Ustinov. But, at the same time, you must worry about pilots for these helicopters.

N.M. Taraki. Of course we will do that. If we cannot find them in our country, then we will look elsewhere. The world is big. If you do not agree with that, then we will search for pilots from among the Afghans studying in your country, but we need trustworthy people, and among the Afghan officers whom we sent to study in the Soviet Union earlier there are many "Muslim brothers" and Chinese sympathizers.

A.N. Kosygin. Of course, you need to sort this out with the people we are training. We can send the "Moslem brothers" back, and we can make early graduation of those people whom you trust.

D.F. Ustinov. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 - helicopter pilots. We will send you, through the chief military advisor in Afghanistan general Gorelov, the list of graduates, by their specialization.

N.M.Taraki. Good. We will do that. However, the problem is that we don't know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud's regime, members of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the pro-Chinese "Shoal-i-Jawid" organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out.

A.N.Kosygin. You seem to raise questions about the deliveries of military machinery with regard to the resolution which we made known in Kabul yesterday evening. In this resolution we speak of large military deliveries, of the delivery of 100 thou. tons of wheat, and of the price increase of Afghan natural gas from 24 to 37 dollars per 1000 m³. Are you familiar with this document?

N.M.Taraki. No. It seems that they did not manage to brief me on it.

A.N.Kosygin. Most likely this document arrived in Kabul before your departure to Moscow. Here are the decisions that the document contains: in March of this year you will be sent additionally and without charge 33 pcs. of BMP-1, 5 pcs. of MI-25, 8 pcs. of MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. of BTR-60pb, 25 pcs. of armored reconnaissance vehicles, 50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units, and an anti-aircraft unit "Strela" [Arrow]. On March 18 we already sent 4 MI-8 helicopters, and on March 21 you will receive 4 more helicopters. All of this is delivered to you without charge.

N.M.Taraki. Thank you for such great help. In Kabul I will acquaint myself in greater depth with this document. Right now I would like to say that 100 thou. tons of wheat is not enough for us. This fall we will not be able to reap the entire harvest because the landlords whose land was confiscated did not sow it, and in a few places the crops were destroyed.

A.N.Kosygin. You will receive 100 thousand tons of wheat at the rate that you can transport it from the border to the country. It seems that you will have difficulties with the transport of wheat because, judging from what transport specialists told us,

your transfer stations can only handle 15 thousand tons of wheat per month. While the 100 thou. tons are processed, we will think about what to do in the future.

N.M.Taraki. Earlier, Pakistan promised to sell us 200 thou. tons, but then recanted on its promise. Turkey also declined to deliver 70 thou. tons. We need at least another 300 thou. tons of wheat.

A.N.Kosygin. Since you were ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money? We can buy wheat from the Americans and transfer it to Afghanistan. For example, 200 thou. tons of wheat would cost 25 mln. rubles (40 mln. dollars).

N.M.Taraki. It will be difficult for us to find such a sum.

A.N.Kosygin. Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat.

N.M.Taraki. If we are unable to find the means, then we will ask for your help with wheat. We would also like to receive a deferment of payment on your loans and on their interest. Our military budget is planned with the hope that such a deferment will be given.

A.N.Kosygin. With the free delivery of military technology we have already given you significant help for your military budget. We will further think about that so as to provide you certain deferral of payments on the credits. We will review the issue and will inform you of what can be done with regards to this question.

N.M.Taraki. We also need a large radio station, which would allow us to broadcast propaganda throughout the world. Our radio station is weak. While any slanderous declaration of some religious leader is spread throughout the world through foreign organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our radio station remains almost unheard.

B.N.Ponomarev. We are taking energetic measures to spread propaganda about the successes of the DRA. We already spoke about the article in "Pravda." Today's edition contains your speech. It will be broadcast by radio to Iran, Pakistan and other countries. In this way we are helping compensate for the weakness of your radio station.

N.M.Taraki. Your help with propaganda is very valuable to us, but we would like for the world to hear our own voice. That's why we ask you to help us build a 1000 [kilowatts] radio station.

A.N.Kosygin. We will study this question, but, as far as I know, building a radio station requires a considerable amount of time.

B.N.Ponomarev. We will send you a specialist in propaganda. You may relate to him your ideas on how to secure a large propaganda support through socialist countries.

D.F.Ustinov. Concerning additional shipments of military machinery, a need will arise for additional military specialists and advisors.

N.M.Taraki. If you believe that such a need exists, then, of course, we will accept them. But won't you allow us, after all, to use pilots and tank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N.Kosygin. When referring to our military specialists, we mean mechanics who service military machinery. I cannot understand why the question of pilots and tank operators keeps coming up. This is a completely unexpected question for us. And I believe that it is unlikely that socialist countries will agree to this. The question of sending people who would sit in your tanks and shoot at your people - this is a very a pointed political question.

N.M.Taraki. We will see how we can use those Afghan soldiers who were sent to study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you to accept for training those people who we will select ourselves.

D.F.Ustinov. We will, of course, accept them for training.

A.N.Kosygin. To sum up this conversation, we can ascertain that there remains the question of the construction of a powerful radio station. There remains also the question of expediting the deliveries of military technology. You, as we understand, will select helicopter pilots from the officers training with us. If you have any other requests or desires, you may inform us through the Soviet ambassador and the chief military advisor. We will carefully review them, and will react accordingly.

We have also agreed to take political measures in defense of DRA from imperialists and plots of the reactionaries. We will continue to exert political influence on them. Our press will also provide continuous support for the DRA.

We think it important that within your country you should work to widen the social support of your regime, draw people over to your side, insure that nothing will

alienate the people from the government. And finally, not as a matter of discussion but as a wish, I would like to express my ideas on the importance of a very careful and cautious approach towards your staff. One should take care of one's staff and have an individual approach towards it. Have a thorough and good understanding with each person before hanging any labels on them.

N.M.Taraki. Are we talking about officers and generals?

A.N. Kosygin. And about officers, and about generals, and about political figures. But I repeat, I am saying this not for discussion, I am only expressing our wish.

N.M. Taraki. We try to be solicitous of our cadres. However, the Herat events have shown that "Moslem brothers" have penetrated into our midst, but we don't hang labels on those who are truly with us.

A.N. Kosygin. We aren't making any kind of claims about you. We are simply saying that mistakes in cadre policy are very expensive. We have experienced this ourselves. In Stalin's time, many of our officers were put in jail. And when the war broke out, Stalin was forced to send them to the front. These people showed themselves to be true heroes. Many of them rose to high rank. We are not interfering in your internal affairs, but we want to express our opinion regarding the necessity of behaving solicitously toward cadres.

N.M. Taraki. As far as I have understood from this conversation, you are rendering and will render us assistance, but you are not giving us a guarantee against aggression.

A.N. Kosygin. We have not discussed the question with you from this angle. We have been speaking about what are now the most effective means for the political defense of your country. You should not understand us as saying that we will leave you to the winds of fate.

N.M. Taraki. There are three types of support - political, economic, and military. Two kinds of assistance you are already giving us, but how will you act if there is an attack on our territory from without[?]

A.N.Kosygin. If an armed invasion of your country takes place, then it will be a completely different situation. But right now we are doing everything to insure that such an invasion does not occur. And I think that we will be able to achieve this.

N.M.Taraki. I pose this question be-

cause China is persistently pushing Pakistan against us.

A.N.Kosygin. When aggression takes place, then a completely different situation arises. The Chinese became convinced of this through the example of Vietnam and are wringing their hands now, so to speak. As for Afghanistan, we have already taken measures to guard it from aggression. I have already said that we have sent corresponding messages to the president of Pakistan, Khomeini, and the prime-minister of Iran.

N.M.Taraki. The members of our Politburo are aware of my visit to Moscow. Upon arriving in Kabul I will have to inform them of the results of our meetings. Must I tell them that the Soviet Union will give the DRA only political support and other aid?

A.N.Kosygin. Yes, both political support and extensive assistance in the line of military and other shipments. This is the decision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev will tell you about this during the meeting with you, which will start in 10 min. I think that you will return to Afghanistan confident of our support, confident of your own actions.

N.M.Taraki. Expresses great [appreciation] for the conversation that took place and thanks for the great assistance that is being provided to Afghanistan during this critical moment.

Interpreted by the graduate student of the Diplomatic Academy of MFA USSR, comrade Kozin V.P., transcribed by the adviser of the Middle East Department of MFA USSR comrade Gavrilov S.P.

21.III.79.
AK-786ss
30 copies
21.III.79.

[^xThis record has not been seen by the participants.]

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 26; provided by M. Kramer; translation by D. Rozas with assistance of K. Weathersby.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of the Russian transcript of the 20 March 1979 meeting in Moscow of Brezhnev with Taraki immediately after the above meeting, see *CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994)*, pp. 73-74.]

Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Session on Afghanistan, 22 March 1979

Top Secret

Only copy

Working transcript

SESSION OF POLITBURO OF CC CPSU 22 March 1979

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.

In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Iu.V.; Gromyko, A.A.; Kosygin, A.N.; Pelshe, A.Ia.; Ustinov, D.F.; Chernenko, K.U.; Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Tikhonov, N.A.; Kapitonov, I.V.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Zimianin, M.V.; Rusakov, K.V.; Gorbachev, M.S.

I. Regarding the issue of the situation in Afghanistan

BREZHNEV. We reviewed the fundamental issues about measures to assist Afghanistan at the last meeting of the Politburo on Monday, and the measures envisaged by our decision are being realized in practice.

The situation in Afghanistan is pretty complicated. Now the affair seems to have improved.

GROMYKO. But all the same the situation continues to remain complicated.

BREZHNEV. We will continue to proceed for our common position which we determined at the last meeting of the Politburo, and we will not change anything which we noted regarding assistance to Afghanistan. As we viewed it from the very beginning, our actions in relation to the situation in Afghanistan were entirely correct.

Comrade Taraki arrived in Moscow in a somewhat excited condition, but during the discussions he gradually cheered up and towards the end he behaved calmly and sensibly.

In my conversation with Comrade Taraki I said that the main thing now is political work among the masses and with particular stress I repeated this. I said that the Afghan leadership should pay its main attention to the broadening of the base among which it conducts revolutionary re-education. Here the activity of the People's Democratic Party and its ideo-political cohesion has primary significance.

Taking into account that the Afghan leadership has made not a few mistakes regarding repressions, in the conversation attention was paid to the fact that primarily political and economic means should play the main role in attracting broad strata of the population to support the current regime. I directly said to Comrade Taraki that repressions are a sharp weapon and it must be applied extremely and extremely cautiously, and only in the case when there are serious legal grounds for it.

Comrade Taraki was told about the decisions which we made in support of Afghanistan both in the international plane and in the area of bilateral cooperation. At the same time it was directly declared that we consider the introduction of Soviet military detachments inexpedient, insofar as in the current situation this would only play into the hands of our common enemy.

Comrade Taraki thanked us for receiving him in Moscow and accepted the thoughts which had been expressed to him with understanding. He assured me that the Afghan leadership is doing everything so as to continue the development of the country along a revolutionary path.

Overall I believe that the conversations were useful. Demonstrating solidarity with the Afghan revolution and our faith in the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation, we at the same time warned the Afghan leadership about the danger of extremism and the underestimation of mass political work, and oriented him towards conducting a more well-considered and thought-out course.

As was reported to me, Comrade Taraki remained very satisfied with the discussions in Moscow and left in a good mood.

Perhaps, the participants in the discussion will add something to what was said above?

KOSYGIN. I accompanied Comrade Taraki to the airfield. He thanked the Politburo [and] Leonid Il'ich for the nice reception and for the favorable attitude towards Afghanistan. The new year, by the way, has begun by their calendar. They celebrated it here. Comrade Taraki said that he had not expected that over such a short time it would be possible to decide so many questions, to conduct such a broad consideration of all the problems which so greatly interest the Afghan leadership.

About equipment, Comrade Taraki expressed a request that measures be accepted

regarding an improvement in radio transmissions to Afghanistan, and in particular, asked for a more powerful transmitter.

CHERNENKO. Proposals about that have been received.

KOSYGIN. I said that were are reviewing that issue attentively.

ZAMIATIN. Yesterday that issue was reviewed by the Ministry of Communications and Gosteleradio [State Television and Radio]. Comrades Talyzin and Lapin submitted proposals which are entirely acceptable. The issue is how to redirect a booster transmitter with a strength of 1000 kilowatts which is located close to Dushanbe near the border with Afghanistan. This transmitter is sufficient for the entire territory of Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Herat for all intents and purposes is now in the hands of the government.

ZAMIATIN, CHERNENKO say that in Herat the situation is more normal now.

ZAMIATIN. The radio transmissions will be conducted, of course, in the Afghan language.

BREZHNEV. In conclusion, Comrade Taraki thanked us for the reception which was shown him and for the solutions to the issues which we announced to him. I think that it would be possible to:

1. Approve the conversations which we had with Comrade Taraki.

2. Agree with the proposals of Comrades Lapin and Talyzin regarding the organization of the radio relay to Afghanistan, and also to make a corresponding notation in the nature of an instruction regarding the creation of a more powerful transmitter.

ANDROPOV. That is a very good measure.

The proposal is accepted.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 2; document provided by M. Kramer; translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979

Taraki informs [Puzanov] about his conversations on high-frequency radio with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Ponomarev. The Soviet leadership has made a decision "to provide political and military assistance to the DRA in the event of ag-

gression from Iran, Pakistan," and other countries, to speed up the delivery of weapons by air, postpone the expiration of credits, present 100,000 tons of grain to the DRA, and raise the price of Afghan natural gas bought by the USSR. Taraki gives thanks for the USSR declaration to Iran and Pakistan with the condemnation of interference in the domestic affairs of the DRA.

[Source: *Notes by O.A. Westad in TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 29-30.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of a report to the CPSU CC Politburo on the Afghan situation by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev, dated 1 April 1979 and approved by the Politburo on 12 April 1979, see CWIHP Bulletin 3 (Fall 1993), 67-69.]

Report of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14 April 1979 (excerpt)

Moscow

Urgent. Secret

...I was invited to see Com. Amin, who, at the behest of N.M. Taraki, requested that we send to Kabul some 15-20 combat helicopters with ammunition and Soviet crews so that, if the situation in the outlying and central regions deteriorates, they can be used against bands of rebels and terrorists who are being infiltrated from Pakistan.

In this regard, assurance was provided that the arrival in Kabul and the use of Soviet crews will be kept secret....

L. Gorelov
14 April 1979

INSTRUCTIONS: This should not be done. [Marshal and Chief of Staff] N. V. Ogarkov

[Source: B. V. Gromov, Ogranichennyi kontingent (*Moscow: Progress/Kultura*, 1994), p. 78; translated by Mark Kramer.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of a CPSU CC Politburo decision dated 21 April 1979 rejecting the above-mentioned request from Amin that Moscow send Soviet helicopter crews to participate in the fighting, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), pp. 74-75.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision and
Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in
Afghanistan, 24 May 1979**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P152/159

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Baibakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin, Smirtiukov

Extract from protocol No. 152 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 24 May 1979

About Providing Supplementary Military Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Approve the draft instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers on this issue (attached).

2. Assign Gosplan USSR and the Ministry of Foreign Trade to review within weeks the request for the delivery to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of 1500 automobiles and to submit a proposal on this issue.

3. Affirm the text of the instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (attached)

CC SECRETARY

[attachment:]

Re: Point 159 Prot. No. 152

Top Secret

SPECIAL FILE

To KABUL

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the instruction, inform him that the Afghan leadership's request about the provision of supplementary military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been attentively reviewed.

Say that in Moscow they share the concern of the Afghan leadership in relation to the activation of counter-revolutionary activity by the reactionary forces in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership, guided by a

strong desire to provide further international assistance in order to stabilize the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has taken a decision to deliver to Afghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free-of-charge, special property in the sum of 53 million rubles, including 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which 50 will represent an expedited delivery), 48 thousand machine guns, around 1000 grenade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, and also to send in the form of an expedited delivery in June-July 1979 medicines and medical equipment in the sum of 50 thousand rubles. In terms of immediate assistance in May of this year, 100 incendiary tanks and 160 single-use bomb cassettes. The delivery of gas bombs with a non-toxic poison gas is not considered possible.

As far as the request of the Afghan side for the dispatch to the DRA of helicopters and transport planes with Soviet crews and a possible landing of our parachute troops in Kabul is concerned, the question of using Soviet military units was considered in much detail and from all points of view during Comrade M. Taraki's visit to Moscow in March of this year. Such actions, we are deeply convinced, are fraught with great complexities not only in the domestic political, but also in the foreign policy sphere, which no doubt would be used by hostile forces first of all to the detriment of the interests of the DRA and the consolidation of the victory of the April revolution.

Telegraph upon execution.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 30, ll. 1-3; provided by M. Kramer; translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 9 June 1979

Puzanov reports the USSR's demarche to Islamabad about the inadmissibility of anti-Afghan activity from the territory of Pakistan, and about Zia-ul-Haq's response about the Pakistanis' readiness to clear away the tension and to meet with Taraki at any time.

Puzanov puts forth his observations, that during such a meeting, in exchange for the DRA's obligation to support Pakistan upon its entry into the Non-Aligned Movement, it might be possible to get from it a

written agreement on a ban on Afghan refugees engaging in political activities, and the ceasing of propaganda among the Pushtu tribes and an end to the sending of armed groups into Afghanistan.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 47-51.]

**Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-
Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on the
Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979**

Top Secret
Special File

To the CC CPSU

. . . Difficulties in the coming-into-being of the DRA have a primarily objective character. They are related to the economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, the weakness of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These difficulties are becoming more intense, however, as the result of subjective reasons: In the Party and the government a collegial leadership is lacking, all power in fact is concentrated in the hands of N.M. Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality. . . .

The main support of the Afghan government in the struggle with counter-revolution continues to be the army. Recently, security forces, border troops, and newly-created self defense forces have begun to take a more active part in this struggle. However, broad strata of the population are involved in the struggle with reaction only insufficiently, the consequence of which is that the measures which the DRA government has taken to stabilize the situation have been not very effective

Regarding this information, the MFA USSR, KGB USSR, Ministry of Defense and International Department of the CC CPSU consider it expedient to:

. . . 3. To assist the main military advisor, send to Afghanistan an experienced general and a group of officers to work directly among the troops (in the divisions and regiments). . . .

4. To provide security and defense for the Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram airfield, send to the DRA, with the agreement of the Afghan side, a parachute battalion

disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov,
B. Ponomarev

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that this the recommendations made in this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Resolution No. P, 156/XI.]*

Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 10 July 1979

The conversation is about the negotiations with Pakistan. Puzanov "spoke approvingly" about the steps the Afghans had taken to open a dialogue with Pakistan. The Ambassador noted that "the Pakistanis must not be given grounds for breaking the dialogue."

Taraki warned that Pakistan "is leading things toward a break in the negotiations"...

Puzanov: "in any case the Afghan side must demonstrate reasonable restraint; if the Pakistanis set out to break off the negotiations, let the blame for that fall entirely on them."

About Iran: It is impossible to evaluate the situation in that country unidimensionally, "in the country leftist forces are operating." He advises that a friendly step should be taken in relation to Iran, analogous to the one made in relation to Pakistan.

Taraki "expressed satisfaction over the arrival and deployment in Bagram of the Soviet special group." He would like also to confer with the Soviet comrades about measures to strengthen the border defenses.

[Source: notes by O. A. Westad of document in *TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d.1044, ll. 47-51.*]

Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul, 19-20 July 1979 (excerpts)

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

. . . Taraki, and Amin as well, repeatedly returned to the issue of the widening of the Soviet military presence in the country. They put forth the issue of introducing approximately two [Soviet] divisions to the DRA in the event of emergency circumstances "at the request of the legal government of Afghanistan."

In regard to this pronouncement of the Afghan leadership it was declared that the Soviet Union cannot do that.

Ponomarev

7.19.1979

* * * * *

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

On July 19 a second meeting with N.M. Taraki took place . . . Taraki once again returned to the issue of the strengthening of military support from the side of the Soviet Union, saying in that regard that in the event of the outbreak of an emergency situation the landing of a parachute division could play a decisive role in crushing the manifestation of counter-revolutionary forces.

In response, our position was put forth once again, emphasizing that the Soviet Union cannot take such measures.

Ponomarev

7.20.1979

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 87.*]

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and H. Amin, 21 July 1979

Amin transmitted a request to send to Afghanistan 8-10 helicopters with Soviet crews in connection with the decommissioning of the MI-24s which they have.

[The Soviet Ambassador] told H. Amin

that as the Soviet leaders had said repeatedly, and as B.N. Ponomarev had stressed during the most recent meetings in Kabul, the Soviet side cannot embark on the participation of Soviet personnel in combat operations.

Later on Amin provided information about the situation in the country. He lamented that he does not have the authority to run military affairs, and that Taraki, who is concentrating the leadership in his own hands, cannot to a sufficient extent control the execution of commands. The Soviet Ambassador responded that per the experience of the Great Patriotic War it would be possible to create for operational leadership an extraordinary group of 5-6 people, including Amin, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Chiefs of the Sarandoy and State Security. It is necessary to find a form which, on the one hand, preserves Taraki's authority, and from the other, facilitates an improvement in operational leadership. Amin agreed.

A ciphered telegram containing the contents of the conversation was sent to Ustinov and Ponomarev.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at *TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045, ll. 94-97.*]

Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 11 August 1979

On August 11 a conversation with Amin took place at his request. During the meeting special attention was paid to the request for the arrival of Soviet sub-units in the DRA.

H. Amin convincingly asked me to inform the Soviet leadership about the necessity of quickly dispatching Soviet sub-units to Kabul. He repeated several times that "the arrival of Soviet troops will significantly raise our moral spirit, will inspire even greater confidence and calm."

Further he said, "It is possible that the Soviet leaders worry that their adversaries in the world will view that as interference in the domestic affairs of the DRA. But I assure you that we are a sovereign and independent state and solve all our problems independently. Your troops will not participate in combat actions. They will be used

only in moments that are critical for us. I think that we will need the Soviet sub-units until spring.”

08.12.79 Gorelov

[Source: As cited in *Znamya*, no. 4, 1991, from the Archives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.]

Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, during visit to Afghanistan, 25 August 1979

On August 25, together with the main military advisor [Gorelov], I met with Amin.

Amin once again raised the issue of the introduction of our forces into Kabul, which, in his opinion, would free one of the two divisions of the Kabul garrison for the struggle with the rebels.

I responded to Amin that the introduction of our troops might lead to the complication of the military-political situation and the strengthening of American assistance to the rebels.

Pavlovskii

08.25.79

Resolution of USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov: “Submit to the CC CPSU.”

[Source: As cited in *Znamya*, no. 4, 1991, from the Archives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 13 September 1979 (excerpts)

CPSU CC Politburo meeting of 13 September 1979

Ratified the following directive to the ambassador in Kabul:

First. The ambassador has been commissioned to meet with Taraki and Amin and urgently express the hope that they will both demonstrate a sense of responsibility to the revolution. In the name of saving the revolution, they must come together and act in concord from a position of unanimity. A rift in the leadership would be fatal to the revolutionary cause and the Afghan people.

If Amin does not consent to a joint meeting with Taraki, then, with Taraki's agreement, visit Amin separately and con-

vey to him the same message.

Second. Guide yourself by the fact that we cannot take it upon ourselves to arrest Amin with our own battalion force, since this would be a direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and would have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, this is practically unfeasible.

(Note: the second part of the telegram, in addition to ambassador [A.M.] Puzanov, was also sent to [Ivan] Pavlovski, [B.S.] Ivanov, and [L.N.] Gorelov.)

[Source: *APRF*, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by Odd Arne Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 13 September 1979, with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Central Committee

Top Secret

No. P168/5

To: Coms. Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, Pel'she, Romanov, Suslov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masherov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, Tikhonov, Shevardnadze, Gorbachev, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov

Extract from Protocol No. 168 of the CPSU CC Politburo Session on 15 September 1979

On the Situation in Afghanistan

Agree with the recommendations expressed in the note from Coms. A. A. Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, and S. K. Tsvigun on 15 September 1979, No. 793/gS (attached).

CC Secretary

Re: Point 6 of Prot. No. 168

Top Secret

CPSU CC

According to information coming in from all channels about the situation in the

leadership of Afghanistan, events in recent days have developed along the following lines.

Upon returning from Havana, Taraki was given an ultimatum by Amin demanding that the officials closest to Taraki—the minister of internal affairs, [Aslam] Watanjar, the minister of communications, [Syed] Gulabzoy, the minister of border affairs, [Sherjan] Mazdooryar, and the chief of the security organs, [Asadullah] Sarwari—be dismissed and punished on the pretext that these officials were involved in an “imperialist conspiracy” against Amin.

Taraki's attempts to persuade Amin to drop his demands and normalize the situation in the leadership were of no avail. All evidence indicates that Amin used Taraki's absence to lay the groundwork for ensuring that all real power, including supervision of the army and state security organs, was concentrated in Amin's own hands.

Having discerned this turn of events, Taraki evidently was about to remove Amin from the leadership, but he displayed indecisiveness and hesitation, and it is possible that he lacked sufficient forces to carry out his intention.

The CPSU CC Politburo's appeal calling on Taraki and Amin to join forces in the name of the revolution and to present an outwardly unified position was received positively by them and others, but even so, Amin continued actively preparing to achieve his aims and Taraki, as before, was indecisive and was clearly unable to put an end to Amin's activities. As a result, all the levers of real power by now are essentially in Amin's hands. He controls the leadership of the armed forces, the state security organs, and the internal affairs organs.

In the process, Amin has completely isolated Taraki through the use of force; there is no access to him at all, even for our representatives.

By having seized, in particular, on the episode involving an exchange of gunfire in Taraki's residence, which killed two people, including Amin's bodyguard, Amin has explicitly demanded that Taraki relinquish all his posts.

According to recent information, which was picked up by our representatives during a conversation with Amin, a plenum of the PDPA CC is supposed to be convened on 16 September. Taraki will be advised to give up all his posts voluntarily on the

grounds of ill health, and even if he does not agree, a decision to this effect will be adopted.

Amin has ignored the repeated appeals of our comrades warning him that such a step might have dire consequences both for the party and for the country.

In these circumstances, our position at this stage should be along the following lines.

First. Considering the real state of affairs as it has now developed, we must not refuse to deal with Amin and the leadership headed by him. At the same time, we must do everything we can to restrain him from carrying out repressions against Taraki's supporters. We should use our contacts with Amin to get a definitive clarification of his political outlook and intentions.

Second. Our military advisers assigned to the Afghan forces, and also our advisers to the state security organs and internal affairs ministry, should remain in place, carrying out their direct functions connected with the preparation and conduct of combat operations against rebel formations, but without taking any part, of course, in repressive measures against people who have fallen into Amin's disfavor in the event that army units are ordered to carry out such measures.

Third. Shipments of Soviet weapons and military equipment to Afghanistan should be curtailed somewhat, being limited mainly to supplies of spare parts and ammunition needed for combat operations against the rebels.

Fourth. We should appeal to Amin and express our view that if Taraki is removed from his posts, there is no need to exact repressive measures against him or to carry out any sort of trial.

Fifth. On the matter of how the Soviet press organs should treat the ongoing events in Kabul, it would be advisable to limit coverage in coming days to purely factual material, reporting it calmly without expressing any kind of assessments of the situation or commentaries.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko D. Ustinov S. Tsvigun

15 September 1979

No. 793/gs

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, ll. 72-

75; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 95-97), intro. G.N. Sevastionov.*]

**Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister
Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in
Kabul, 15 September 1979**

To Soviet Representatives in Kabul

1. It is acknowledged to be expedient, considering the real state of affairs as it is developing in Afghanistan, not to refuse to deal with H. Amin and the leadership which he heads. In this regard it is necessary to use all means to restrain H. Amin from repressions of supporters of N. Taraki and other people who are not pleasing to him, who are not enemies of the revolution. At the same time it is necessary to use contacts with H. Amin for further discerning his political personnel and intentions.

2. It is also acknowledged to be expedient for our military advisers who are attached to the Afghan forces, and also the advisors in the organs of security and internal affairs, to remain at their posts. They should fulfill their immediate functions connected with the preparation and conduct of military actions against rebel formations and other counter-revolutionary forces. They, it goes with saying, should not play any part in repressive measures against people who are not pleasing to H. Amin in the event that detachments and sub-units to which our advisors are attached are involved in these actions.

A. Gromyko

09.15.1979

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 98.*]

**Information from CC CPSU to GDR
leader E. Honecker, 16 September 1979**

Highly Confidential

16.9.79

In connection with the well-known events in Afghanistan, we would like to inform our friends on several aspects of the development of events in that country.

Already for some time now, there has been conflict and disagreement in the party

and government leadership in Afghanistan, in connection with Amin's effort to remove all persons close to Taraki by concentrating in his hands all real power, including the command of the army.

In the last few days the situation among the leadership of Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated and the conflict has taken on an open and highly charged character. Amin, alleging that during Taraki's trip to the conference in Havana a number of individuals in the Afghan leadership attempted to discredit him, Amin, demanded their dismissal and punishment.

Taraki's efforts to convince Amin to withdraw his demands and normalize the situation obviously were not successful. Amin, though he did verbally voice his support for Taraki, took a number of steps to isolate Taraki almost by use of force.

In connection with the latest events, a few days ago we urgently appealed to Taraki and Amin, in the name of the CC CPSU Politburo and L.I. Brezhnev personally, with an urgent call to unite and in the name of saving the revolution act in concord and with unity. We warned them directly that a split in the leadership would be disastrous and that it would be immediately taken advantage of by internal counter-revolution and foreign enemies of Afghanistan. We called on the leaders of Afghanistan to demonstrate a high degree of responsibility to the revolution.

Both Taraki and Amin at the time welcomed positively our appeal. However, in actuality, judging by incoming intelligence, Amin continued his activities to realize his plans, while Taraki demonstrated a high degree of indecisiveness in suppressing these activities. You know today's results. The near removal of Taraki from government is unlikely to have relieved tension, given that he continues to enjoy the support of a certain segment of members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. All in all, the situation continues to be highly tense, and right now it is difficult to say in which direction events will lead. We, on our part, continue to follow the situation carefully.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575 provided by V. Zubok (*National Security Archive*); translated from Russian by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

**Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC
Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979**

Brezhnev reported on the situation in Afghanistan: "Events developed so swiftly that essentially there was little opportunity for us, here in Moscow, to somehow interfere in them... Right now our mission is to determine our further actions, so as to preserve our positions in Afghanistan and to secure our influence there.

"We should assume that the Soviet-Afghan relations will not sustain some sort of major changes, and, it seems, will continue in their previous course. Amin will be pushed toward this by the current situation and by the difficulties which the Afghan government will face for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue to be interested in receiving from the USSR military, economic and other aid, and possibly even in increased amounts.

"Evidently, Amin will continue to follow at least outwardly the recommendations we gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our] job will be difficult and delicate."

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

**Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and
Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih,
New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)**

A.A.Gromyko: What is the USA reaction to the latest developments in Afghanistan? We are under the impression that the Americans are still wavering and cannot come to a definite conclusion. Apparently, they have not worked out any specific evaluations. In our discussions with them—I already met once with Secretary of State [Cyrus R.] Vance—they have not touched upon this question.

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by D. Rozas.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to
GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979**

Highly Confidential

As we have informed you earlier, already for some time now there have been conflicts and disagreements in the party and government leadership in Afghanistan. These were not disagreements over major issues - the question is essentially in the rivalry and the struggle for power between supporters of Taraki and Amin.

After Taraki's return from his visit to Havana and Moscow, the situation of the Afghan government became even more difficult. Amin sharply increased his activities, trying to dismiss Taraki and those close to him and concentrate all real power in his hands, including the control of the army. Despite our persistent calls for both sides to act in concord, in the interests of defending and strengthening the revolution's achievements and not to exacerbate the situation, neither side took any appropriate measures to reinstate unity.

Taking advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and his inability to take any swift and effective measures, Amin in the end dismissed him from government, replaced the chief administrators of the security and internal affairs organs, and commenced to purge the top ranks of the army. Of course, one cannot be uncritical of many of Amin's methods and activities, in particular his extreme lust for power, ruthlessness in his relations with former colleagues, forming opinions and making decisions singlehandedly. However, it is impossible to ignore the currently existing situation, and we must deal with the new leadership in Afghanistan.

Following his rise to power, Amin made a number of statements from which it follows that he intends to continue the course of expanding the revolution, on strengthening cooperation with the Soviet Union and socialist collaboration. Around him there are a number of honest people, real revolutionaries who support the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and are favorably inclined towards Soviet Union, having received their education in our country. We believe that Soviet-Afghan relations, just as Afghanistan's relations with other socialist countries, will not undergo some sort of momentous change. Amin will be pushed towards this by the current situation and difficulties which the Afghan regime will have

to confront for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue as before to be interested in receiving economic and other types of material assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries.

We think that work will have to be done with Amin, and that this work will be substantial, rather difficult and delicate. As you know, we sent Amin a congratulatory telegram (though without unnecessary praises and overtures). In the future we will continue to examine positively requests from the Afghan government to render them this or that concrete assistance in developing the country and in its fight against counter-revolution. At the same time, our representatives on location will continue to try to influence Amin, in order to avert repressions against Taraki and his circle and in general to prevent various excesses on the part of Amin.

We will continue to follow carefully Amin's activities, observing whether he is keeping his promises and will act as events dictate.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; obtained by V. Zubok; translation from Russian by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

**Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker
summit in East Berlin, 4 October 1979
(excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan)**

BREZHNEV: [...]

Now briefly on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. - Tendencies of a not particularly positive character have lately surfaced in Iran. The Islamic leaders have begun to persecute the progressive forces. They ruthlessly suppress the activities of national minorities. In addition, they try to blame us for the instigation of activities.

Our initiatives with regard to the development of good neighborly relations with Iran are currently not gaining any practical results in Tehran. We know all that.

But we also understand something else: The Iranian Revolution has undercut the military alliance between Iran and the USA. With respect to a number of international problems, particularly with respect to the Middle East, Iran is now taking anti-imperialist positions. Imperialism tries to regain its influence in the region. We are trying to counter these efforts. We are patiently working with the current Iranian leadership and

moving them to develop cooperation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on the latest events in Afghanistan. Supplementing this, I would like to say the following: We have given Afghanistan more than a little economic support. We have sent our advisers there, civilian as well as military, and have supplied them with significant amounts of weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has improved. In some provinces, however, military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA, and from China. In addition, there are tensions within the Afghani leadership. Our efforts were directed to contribute to the unity of the Afghani leadership and not allow for divisions to happen. But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin did this even though he was held as Taraki's friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover in Moscow on his way from Havana where the Conference of the Non-Alignment Movement took place. I met him and advised him to take measures to stabilize the situation in his country and among other things begin with the work on a constitution and to keep up revolutionary lawfulness, etc. We now see that Amin is implementing what I told Taraki.

Frankly, we are not pleased by all of Amin's methods and actions. He is very power-driven. In the past he repeatedly revealed disproportionate harshness. But with regard to his basic political platform, he has decidedly confirmed to the course of further development of the Revolution, of furthering cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community.

It is a fact that many of Amin's followers and partisans are honorable people who are faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and take a good attitude towards us.

By taking into consideration the actual situation, we will continue to support Afghanistan and give it a variety of support and help it in its fight against foreign aggression and the domestic counterrevolution. [. . .]

[Source: SAPMO (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/

1342; obtained and translated from German by C. Ostermann.]

**Information of KGB USSR to CC
CPSU International Department,
10 October 1979**

The Leadership of Iran on the External
Security of the Country

According to KGB information, in August in Teheran a secret meeting was held with the participation of representatives of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, the Intelligence and Operational Administrations of the General Staff, Gendarme and Police Administrations of the General Staff and the Staff of the "Corps of Defenders of the Revolution," with the goal of studying issues which touch on the security of Iran. It was noted that the USSR and the USA, which have their own interests in this region, are worried about the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. It is presumed that the USA might resort to a direct military threat and realization of a blockade. But in the event that Iran will not take sharp steps which hurt the USA, and will obstruct the penetration of the Soviets, this will ease the position of the USA.

Evaluating the policy of the USSR in relation to the Iranian regime, the participants in the meeting came to the conclusion that insofar as strengthening the Islamic republic will lead to a weakening of the position of the regime in Afghanistan, exert a certain influence on the Moslem republics in the USSR and will be "a brake in the path of penetration of Communism in the region," the Soviet Union "will not turn away from the ideological struggle and efforts to put into power in Iran a leftist government." It was stressed that with the aim of weakening the Islamic regime the USSR might organize "provocational" activity among Irani Kurds, Azeris, Turkmen, Baluchis, support leftist forces, create economic difficulties, resort to a military threat on the basis of the [Soviet-Iranian] agreement of 1921.

It was noted that Afghanistan is not in any condition to undertake military actions against Iran. However, border conflicts are not excluded. In addition, Afghanistan is in need of economic assistance from Iran, which might soften its position.

The positions of Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were also analyzed.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1355, ll. 17-20.]

**Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-
Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC,
29 October 1979**

Top Secret
Special File

To the CC CPSU

The situation in Afghanistan following the events of September 13-16 of this year, as the result of which Taraki was removed from power and then physically destroyed, remains extremely complicated.

In the efforts to strengthen Amin in power, along with such superficial gestures like the beginning of the reworking of the draft of the constitution and the liberation of some of the people who had been arrested earlier, in fact the scale of repressions in the Party, army, state apparatus and civic organizations has widened. . . .

According to information which we have, at the present time the execution of a group of Politburo members (Zeray, Misak, Pandzhshiri) who are subject to fictitious accusations of "anti-Party and counter-revolutionary activity," is planned. At the plenum of the CC PDPA which took place recently, Amin introduced into the ruling organs of the Party people who are more devoted to him, including a number of his relatives. . . .

Recently there have been noted signs of the fact that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to conduct a more "balanced policy" in relation to the Western powers. It is known, in particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are coming to a conclusion about the possibility of a change in the political line of Afghanistan in a direction which is pleasing to Washington.

Taking account of this and starting from the necessity of doing everything possible not to allow the victory of counter-revolution in Afghanistan or the political re-orientation of H. Amin towards the West, it is considered expedient to hew to the following line:

1. Continue to work actively with Amin and overall with the current leadership of the the PDPA and the DRA, not giving Amin grounds to believe that we don't

trust him and don't wish to deal with him. Use the contacts with Amin to assert appropriate influence and simultaneously to further expose his true intentions....

Upon the availability of facts bearing witness to the beginning of a turn by H. Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introduce supplemental proposals about measures from our side.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov,
D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

29 October 1979

[Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 102.*]

Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and Amin, 3 November 1979

The Soviet Ambassador reported the readiness of the Soviet leadership to receive Amin. He also informed [Amin] of Moscow's satisfaction about the measures of the Afghan leadership in the area of Party and State building. Further, Amin spoke about the situation in the country. The Soviet Ambassador in his turn informed [Amin] of the agreement of the Soviet leadership to send a Soviet specialist to Herat to take down the drilling installation.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Report to CPSU CC on Mission to Afghanistan of Deputy Defense Minister Army-Gen. I. G. Pavlovskii, 5 November 1979

Top Secret
CPSU CC

On the Results of the Mission of the USSR Deputy Defense Minister, Army-General I. G. Pavlovskii, in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

In accordance with the CPSU CC's Decree No. P163/62 of 15 August 1979, the USSR deputy defense minister, Army-General I. G. Pavlovskii, and a group of generals and officers were in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from 17 August to 22

October with the aim of [1] reviewing the state of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan and the organization and methods of their combat operations against the rebels, [2] providing on-site assistance to the Afghan commanders in dealing with these questions; and [3] preparing recommendations for the further strengthening of the combat capabilities of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan.

The work of Com. I. G. Pavlovskii's group in providing assistance to the Afghan military command was carried out in strict accordance with the CPSU CC's decision and with instructions issued by the USSR minister of defense, taking account of the military-political situation in the country and also the political and organizational measures implemented within the Afghan army by the DRA leadership.

On all matters that they studied, recommendations were devised and transmitted personally by Com. I. G. Pavlovskii to H. Amin, offering them as proposals for the further strengthening of the Afghan armed forces.

The provision of comprehensive practical assistance by our side to the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan enabled them to make a transition between August and October. Rather than continuing to rely on a passive defense and faltering operations by small units against the rebels, they were able to launch coordinated and active operations by larger groupings. This allowed them to gain the initiative in combat and to destroy the most dangerous forces of counterrevolution in the provinces of Paktia, Ghazni, Parvan, Bamian, and several other areas.

To prepare the troops for these actions, tactical exercises with live fire were held, and combat operations were conducted to resolve specific tasks. Soviet generals and officers provided direct assistance in working out the plans for operations and in carrying them out. This experience in preparing and conducting operations taught the Afghan commanders, staffs, and political organs the methods and means of organization for undertaking active combat operations in mountainous regions. Help was provided to the Main Political Directorate in organizing party-political work among the troops according to the different categories of servicemen, so that they could be mobilized for the active pursuit of combat objec-

tives. Taking account of the combat operations, drafts were also prepared of documents providing basic guidelines for the organization of combat and operational preparations.

Despite these efforts to increase the combat capability of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan, a number of questions are still unresolved.

Military regulations that were codified with help from Soviet advisers have not been instilled in the People's Armed Forces, and they have no impact on the practical life of the troops. The commanders, staffs, political organs, and party organizations do not always coordinate their work in resolving tasks among the troops. Staffs at all levels, including the General Staff, have still not become a central, directing organ in the daily life of large and small units and in the troops' combat activity.

Political work in the Afghan army, especially with the officer corps, is still not conducted concretely or effectively enough. The combat morale and fighting elan of the troops, the state of military discipline, and the army's willingness to act are still low.

During the final conversation with H. Amin, M. Yakub, and M. Ekbal, Com. I. G. Pavlovskii once again directed their attention to the unresolved problems and our recommendations for solving them. At the end of the discussion, H. Amin said: "We are taking all measures to ensure that your recommendations are fulfilled, and we will always work in coordination with Soviet advisers and specialists. Our friendship is unwavering." Then he expressed the hope that Soviet military advisers would be assigned to every battalion of the Afghan armed forces. In conclusion, H. Amin thanked the delegation for providing help and requested that they transmit warm greetings and personal thanks to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and also to Comrades A.N. Kosygin, D.F. Ustinov, Yu.V. Andropov, and A.A. Gromyko, as well as all the other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

Overall, the group of generals and officers headed by the USSR deputy defense minister, Army-General I.G. Pavlovskii, fulfilled the tasks assigned to them.

Reported for informational purposes.

D. Ustinov

5 November 1979

No. 318/3/00945

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 149, ll. 120-122; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in *Russian in Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996*, pp. 91-99 (document on 97-98), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan F.A. Tabeev and H. Amin, 6 December 1979

The conversation concerned Amin's journey to Moscow. Amin made reference to the agreement of the Soviet leaders, transmitted by Puzanov, and expressed concern that he not be late. Further he spoke about the necessity of thinking about the agreement on issues of inter-Party cooperation for the upcoming 2-3 years in relation to the end of the term of action for the plan of inter-Party relations between the PDPA and the CPSU for 1979.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 6 December 1979

Top Secret
Special File

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov,
Gromyko, Suslov, Ustionov

Extract From Protocol No. 176 of
the Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo of
6 December 1979

About the dispatch of a special detachment to Afghanistan

Agree with the proposal on this issue set forth in the note of the KGB USSR and the Ministry of Defense of 4 December 1979. No. 312/2/0073 (attached).

CC SECRETARY L. BREZHNEV

[attachment]

Top Secret
Special File

To the CC CPSU

The Chairman of the Revolutionary

Council, General Secretary of the CC PDPA, and Prime Minister of the DRA H. Amin recently has insistently been raising the issue of the necessity of sending to Kabul of a motorized rifle battalion for defense of his residence.

Taking account of the situation as it has developed and the request, H. Amin considers it expedient to sent to Afghanistan the detachment of the GRU of the General Staff which has been prepared for these goals, with a complement of about 500 men, in a uniform which does not reveal its belonging to the the Armed Forces of the USSR. The possibility of sending this detachment to the DRA was envisioned by the decision of the CC CPSU Politburo of 06.29.79 No. P 156/IX.

Regarding the fact that issues related to the sending of the detachment to Kabul have been agreed with the Afghan side, we propose that it is possible to drop it in on airplanes of military transport aviation during the first half of December of this year. Com. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement.

Iu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov

No. 312/2/0073
4 December 1979

[Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995)*, p. 107.]

Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979]

1. After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan began to undertake an undesirable turn for us. The situation in the party, the army and the government apparatus has become more acute, as they were essentially destroyed as a result of the mass repressions carried out by Amin.

At the same time, alarming information started to arrive about Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and to adopt a "policy of neutrality." Closed meetings in which attacks were made against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our head-

quarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomatic circles in Kabul are widely talking of Amin's differences with Moscow and his possible anti-Soviet steps.

All this has created, on the one hand, the danger of losing the gains made by the April [1978] revolution (the scale of insurgent attacks will increase by spring) within the country, while on the other hand - the threat to our positions in Afghanistan (right now there is no guarantee that Amin, in order to protect his personal power, will not shift to the West). [There has been] a growth of anti-Soviet sentiments within the population.

2. Recently we were contacted by group of Afghan communists abroad. In the course of our contact with Babrak [Karmal] and [Asadullah] Sarwari, it became clear (and they informed us of this) that they have worked out a plan for opposing Amin and creating new party and state organs. But Amin, as a preventive measure, has begun mass arrests of "suspect persons" (300 people have been shot).

In these conditions, Babrak and Sarwari, without changing their plans of opposition, have raised the question of possible assistance, in case of need, including military.

We have two battalions stationed in Kabul and there is the capability of rendering such assistance. It appears that this is entirely sufficient for a successful operation. But, as a precautionary measure in the event of unforeseen complications, it would be wise to have a military group close to the border. In case of the deployment of military forces we could at the same time decide various questions pertaining to the liquidation of gangs.

The implementation of the given operation would allow us to decide the question of defending the gains of the April revolution, establishing Leninist principals in the party and state leadership of Afghanistan, and securing our positions in this country.

[Source: *APRF*, from notes taken by A. F. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Nobel Institute; trans. for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

[Ed. note: For a translation and facsimile of the handwritten document (12 December 1979) entitled "On the Situation in 'A',"

recording the Soviet decision to approve the military intervention in Afghanistan, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), p. 76.]

**Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-
Ponomarev Report on Events in
Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979,
dated 31 December 1979**

Top Secret

CC CPSU

Regarding events in Afghanistan
during 27-28 December 1979

After a coup-d'etat and the murder of the CC PDPA General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Amin in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated and taken on crisis proportions.

H. Amin has established a regime of personal dictatorship in the country, effectively reducing the CC PDPA and the Revolutionary Council to the status of entirely nominal organs. The top leadership positions within the party and the state were filled with appointees bearing family ties or maintaining personal loyalties to H. Amin. Many members from the ranks of the CC PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and the Afghan government were expelled and arrested. Repression and physical annihilation were for the most part directed towards active participants in the April revolution, persons openly sympathetic to the USSR, those defending the Leninist norms of intra-party life. H. Amin deceived the party and the people with his announcements that the Soviet Union had supposedly approved of Taraki's expulsion from party and government.

By direct order of H. Amin, fabricated rumors were deliberately spread throughout the DRA, smearing the Soviet Union and casting a shadow on the activities of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan, who had been restricted in their efforts to maintain contact with Afghan representatives.

At the same time, efforts were made to mend relations with America as a part of the "more balanced foreign policy strategy" adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a series of confidential meetings with the American charge d'affaires in Kabul. The DRA government began to create favorable condi-

tions for the operation of the American cultural center; under H. Amin's directive, the DRA special services have ceased operations against the American embassy.

H. Amin attempted to buttress his position by reaching a compromise with leaders of internal counter-revolution. Through trusted persons he engaged in contact with leaders of the Moslem fundamentalist opposition.

The scale of political repression was taking on increasingly mass proportions. Just during the period following the events of September, more than 600 members of the PDPA, military personnel and other persons suspected of anti-Amin sentiments were executed without trial or investigation. In effect, the objective was to liquidate the party.

All this, in conjunction with objective difficulties and conditions specific to Afghanistan, put the progress of the revolutionary process in extremely difficult circumstances and energized the counter-revolutionary forces which have effectively established their control in many of the country's provinces. Using external support, which has taken on increasingly far-reaching proportions under Amin, they strived to bring about radical change in the country's military-political situation and liquidate the revolutionary gains.

Dictatorial methods of running the country, repressions, mass executions, and disregard for legal norms have produced widespread discontent in the country. In the capital numerous leaflets began to appear, exposing the anti-people nature of the current regime and containing calls for unity in the struggle with "H. Amin's clique." Discontent also spread to the army. A significant number of officers have expressed dismay at the domination of H. Amin's incompetent henchmen. In essence, a broad anti-Amin front was formed in the country.

Expressing alarm over the fate of the revolution and the independence of the country, and reacting keenly to the rise of anti-Amin sentiments in Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak and Asadulla Sarwari, both living abroad as emigres, have undertaken to unite all anti-Amin groups in the country and abroad, in order to save the motherland and the revolution. In addition, the currently underground group "Parcham," under the leadership of an illegal CC, has carried out significant work to rally all progressive

forces, including Taraki supporters from the former "Khalq" group.

All earlier disagreements were eliminated and the previously existing schism in the PDPA has been liquidated. Khalqists (represented by Sarwari) and Parchamists (represented by Babrak) have announced the final unification of the party. Babrak was elected leader of the new party center, and Sarwari - his deputy.

In this extremely difficult situation, which has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our national security, it has become necessary to render additional military assistance to Afghanistan, especially since such requests had been made by the previous administration in DRA. In accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, a decision has been made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan.

Riding the wave of patriotic sentiments that have engaged fairly large numbers of the Afghan population in connection with the deployment of Soviet forces which was carried out in strict accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, the forces opposing H. Amin organized an armed operation which resulted in the overthrow of H. Amin's regime. This operation has received broad support from the working masses, the intelligentsia, significant sections of the Afghan army, and the state apparatus, all of which welcomed the formation of a new administration of the DRA and the PDPA.

The new government and Revolutionary Council have been formed on a broad and representative basis, with the inclusion of representatives from former "Parcham" and "Khalq" factions, military representatives, and non-party members.

In its program agenda announcements, the new leadership vowed to fight for the complete victory of the national-democratic, anti-feudalistic, anti-imperialistic revolution, and to defend Afghan independence and sovereignty. In matters of foreign policy, they pledged to strengthen in every possible way the friendship and cooperation with the USSR. Taking into account the mistakes of the previous regime, the new leadership, in the practical application of its policies, is intent on giving serious consideration to broad democratization of social life and ensuring a law-abiding society, wid-

ening the social base and strengthening the state throughout the country, and maintaining a flexible policy with regards to religion, tribes and ethnic minorities.

One of the first steps that has captured the attention of Afghan society was the release of a large number of political prisoners, which include prominent political and military activists. Many of them (Kadyr, Keshtmand, Rafi, and others) have actively and enthusiastically joined in the work of the new Revolutionary Council and the government.

Broad masses of people met the announcement of the overthrow of H. Amin's regime with unconcealed joy and express their eagerness to support the new administration's program. The commanders of all key formations and units of the Afghan army have already announced their support of the new leadership of the party and the government. Relations with Soviet soldiers and specialists continue to remain friendly overall. The situation in the country is normalizing.

In Kabul's political circles it is noted that the Babrak government, evidently, must overcome significant difficulties, inherited by him from the previous regime, in establishing order in domestic politics and economy; however, they express hope that PDPA, with USSR's help, will be able to solve these problems. Babrak can be described as one of the more theoretically equipped leaders of PDPA, who soberly and objectively evaluates the situation in Afghanistan; he was always distinguished by his sincere sympathies for the Soviet Union, and commanded respect within party masses and the country at large. In this regard, the conviction can be expressed that the new leadership of DRA will find effective ways to stabilize completely the country's situation.

| | |
|--------------|--------------|
| [signature] | [signature] |
| Yu. Andropov | A. Gromyko |
| [signature] | [signature] |
| D. Ustinov | B. Ponomarev |

31 December 1979
No. 2519-A

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 10; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister

Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shad Mohammad Dost, 4 January 1980

No. P27

Top Secret

SUMMARY

RECORD OF MAIN CONTENTS OF THE MEETING OF A.A.GROMYKO WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DRA, Sh.M.DOST
4 January 1980

A.A.Gromyko welcomed Sh.M.Dost as a representative of the new Afghanistan; informed him of the latest reports from the USSR representative at the UN, O.A. Troyanovsky.

Sh.M.Dost. The situation in Afghanistan remains difficult. The rebels were able to capture a number of the country's provinces, for example, Kunduz, Tokhar, Samangan, and Badakhshan. However, with the help of the Soviet Union, the armed forces of DRA were able to push the counter-revolutionaries out from the mentioned provinces. In the northern part of the country they continue to hold only the administrative center of Badakhshan-Faizabad.

During meetings of the CC PDPA Politburo, the Revolutionary Council and the government of DRA, Babrak Karmal, continually stresses the necessity to carefully pay attention to the friendly and timely advice and wishes coming from the Soviet leaders.

Of great importance are Soviet recommendations concerning the expediency of sending messages in the name of Babrak Karmal to Khomeini and Zia-ul-Haq (they are being prepared right now), as well as the organization of meetings between the chairman of the Revolutionary Council and ambassadors from Iraq, India, and other nonaligned countries with the aim of explaining the meaning of events that took place in Afghanistan and to actively influence them to take a positive attitude towards Afghan affairs.

There was also a press conference by B. Karmal for foreign journalists which took place on the evening of January 3.

The conference was successful, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA has ordered all ambassadors in foreign countries to give out visas to any foreign journalists interested in visiting Afghanistan.

A.A.Gromyko. I would like to share a few thoughts about the current situation in the Security Council as well as the character of your appearance at the upcoming session.

You, comrade minister, have every reason to appear as the accuser - not as the accused. It seems there are enough facts for this.

It is necessary to emphasize that the deployment of a limited military contingent in Afghanistan has been undertaken by the Soviet Union as a response to repeated appeals by the DRA to the government of USSR. These requests had been voiced earlier by Taraki during his visit to Moscow and by Amin.

It would also be useful to remind the participants at the Security Council of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The change in the leadership of Afghanistan is solely the internal matter of Afghanistan. The representatives of Western countries, Thatcher in particular, are trying to draw a correlation between the change in the Afghan leadership and the deployment of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. However, one should emphasize that there is no relationship here. This is purely coincidental.

I can confidentially inform you that we have evidence that Saudi Arabia intends to get six countries bordering it to break off diplomatic ties with the DRA.

As you have requested, we have prepared for you a number of materials, in particular concerning American military bases.

These materials will be sent to New York along with V.S. Safronchuk who is going there to assist you as you have requested earlier.

When you are assaulted [with questions] concerning the deployment of a Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, you can parry this by exposing the aggressive politics of the USA. In Cuba, the USA, despite the constant demands of the Cuban government and people, continues to maintain its military base in Guantanamo. This is an example of open and rude interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

Concerning contacts with Safronchuk and your conversations with him, it is desirable to use discretion and certain caution during conversations in New York, especially inside premises. Meetings and exchanges of opinion can be realized in turn

on the premises of the Soviet representatives to the U.N. or in the buildings of the Soviet consulate-general. It is desirable not to advertise that Safronchuk arrived in New York to render you assistance. Officially, he is going in the capacity of a member of the Soviet delegation to the session of the GA [General A of the UN, which, as is known, is still carrying on its work.

Sh.M.Dost. Should I say something regarding China, and, if so, in what capacity?

A.A.Gromyko. In the case that rude accusations and various kinds of insinuations are leveled in the direction of Afghanistan, it will be necessary to respond with a decisive rebuff. However, in the course of the Security Council session it is hardly necessary to dwell on China, as in such an event the Chinese representative would be happy to hear it. Do not create an advertisement for the Chinese, but certainly do give a rebuff.

Sh.M.Dost. Concerning the propaganda campaigns carried on by the USA and other Western countries on "human rights," shouldn't I speak at length about the fact that after the 27th of December in Afghanistan, the new leadership of DRA has freed all political prisoners, regardless of class, religion, language, tribe or ethnicity, or political views[?] We can, right now, invite to Afghanistan representatives from any country and show them that our jails are empty.

A.A.Gromyko. This is a very wise and important measure on the part of the government of DRA. You should certainly speak about it in detail.

7.I.80.

020/gs

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 36; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

**CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17
January 1980 (excerpt)**

[handwritten] P179

Top Secret

Only copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF CC
CPSU POLIT BURO
17 January 1980

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko, K.Y., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I.

8. Re: The Issue of the Situation in
Afghanistan

BREZHNEV. You remember, Comrades, that several months ago in relation to events in Afghanistan we assigned a Commission made up of Comrades Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to inform the Politburo, and if necessary, to prepare corresponding documents and submit them to the Politburo.

I will say that that Commission did its work well. Most recently a whole range of resolutions were accepted and corresponding measures were implemented.

It seems to me that the situation in Afghanistan is still far from the time when it will not require daily observation and the acceptance of corresponding operational measures. Therefore, it seems to me that it is not necessary to create any sort of new commission; instead, we will assign the very same Commission to continue its work in the same spirit as it conducted it up until now.

Will there be any objections to that proposal? No.

Then we will consider that the Politburo Commission will act, with its former membership.

GROMYKO. In the leadership of Afghanistan, a consolidation of forces is going on. The often appeal to us for advice. We give it. They make proclamations. There are no essential changes in the military situation. But it also has not worsened. This is a very important element. The Army supports the leadership of Afghanistan.

The international situation around Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worse. The ruckus, which has unfolded particularly broadly in the USA, has also assumed a somewhat weakened form. In NATO there is no unity regarding measures toward the Soviet Union. In any case the Western countries — in particular, FRG, Italy, Turkey, and

other countries — did not follow the Americans, are not in agreement with the sanctions which the USA is applying.

The General Assembly session ended. Many delegates spoke over the three days. But it is necessary to say, that of the 104 delegations which voted for the resolution, many voted without soul, 48 countries abstained and voted against. That is a full one third. In such a way, the Americans managed to lump together the reactionary regimes and to force them to vote for the resolution.

I think that there will be some kind of momentum in the American press, and in the press of other countries. But at the same time, countries like Argentina and Brazil do not agree with the the Americans, for example, on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. Canada too.

BREZHNEV. Vance came out against the participation of the USA in the Olympic Games.

GROMYKO. Yes, Vance, it's true, did express such a thought unofficially. But on all types of measures the English are very complacent. Giscard d'Estaing sent a message. It is better. An Islamic conference is meeting in Islamabad. K. Babrak appealed to us for advice, whether he should go to the conference. We advised him that it is best not to go outside the borders of the country.

ANDROPOV. In the last ten days in Afghanistan all the organs of party and state leadership were created; even a procurator was named. The Afghan leaders have started more bravely to [missing one or more lines. —trans]. There is one great difficulty in their work — there are many various groups. Despite it all, the difference between the Parcham and the Khalq is still noticeable. Of course, it is necessary to carefully follow the state of affairs in the party and achieve, in accord with our recommendation, unity. They considered the letter of the CC CPSU in the Politburo and at the CC PDPA plenum, and they prepared corresponding directives for the primary party organizations.

The tribes play a big role there. It is very important to win them over to the party's side. Three very imposing tribes announced their support for the Babrak regime. Babrak is doing great work regarding the strengthening of unity. In particular, there are definite shifts in relation to

work with religious officials.

USTINOV reports in detail the military situation in various areas of Afghan territory; he says: overall, the military situation is basically satisfactory, there are now significantly fewer hotbeds of resistance by the rebels.

PONOMAREV speaks about the type of measures which have been taken regarding the creation of the party and the strengthening of unity. He reports that yesterday a group of our advisers consisting of 16 people, with Com. Grekov, L.I. at the head of it, was sent to Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal listens very attentively to the advice of our comrades. The leadership of the party now has a backbone.

BREZHNEV. There is a proposal to accept for consideration the information of Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev on this issue.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to continue their work on the review and preparation of materials connected with the situation in Afghanistan. Submit to the Politburo issues which require a decision.

ALL. Agreed.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 31, 42-44; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

**CPSU CC Politburo decision,
17 January 1980**

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET
UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

#P179/USH

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev.

Excerpt from Protocol #179 of the
Politburo CC CPSU session of
17 January 1980

On the situation in Afghanistan.

1. To take into consideration the information presented by Comrades A.A. Gromyko, Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev on this question.

2. To entrust Comrades A.A. Gromyko,

Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev with continuing their work on analyzing and preparing materials related to the situation in Afghanistan.

All questions that need to be considered should be submitted to the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 174, l. 117.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision,
28 January 1980, with Report by
Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-
Ponomarev, 27 January 1980**

TOP SECRET

No.P181/34

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov.

Extract from protocol No. 181 of the CC
CPSU Politburo session of
28 January 1980

About further measures to provide for the
national interests of the USSR in relation to
the events in Afghanistan

Agree on the whole with the considerations which are put forth in the attached note of Comrades Gromyko, A.A., Andropov, Iu.V., Ustinov, D.F., Ponomarev, B.N.

The MFA USSR, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB USSR, and the International Department of the CC CPSU are to be guided by these considerations in working out and implementing practical measures on Afghanistan.

CC SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point 34 Protocol No. 181

Top Secret
Special File

To the CC CPSU

About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to the events in Afghanistan

The provision by the USSR of many-sided, including military, assistance to Afghanistan and the coming to power of the government of Babrak Karmal created the necessary conditions for the stabilization of the situation in the DRA and put an end to certain tendencies in the development of the situation in the Middle East which are dangerous for us.

Along with this the development of events bears witness to the fact that the USA, its allies, and the PRC have set themselves the goal of using to the maximum extent the events in Afghanistan to intensify the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and to justify long-term foreign policy acts which are hostile to the Soviet Union and directed at changing the balance of power in their favor. Providing increasing assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution, the West and the PRC are counting on the fact that they will succeed in inspiring an extended conflict in Afghanistan, as the result of which, they believe, the Soviet Union will get tied up in that country, which will negatively reflect on the international prestige and influence of the USSR.

In the future as well, the necessity of providing for the broad foreign policy interests and the security of the USSR will demand the preservation of the offensive nature of the measures which we undertake in relation to the Afghan events. In working out and conducting them, we would suggest that it is expedient to be guided by the following.

- Henceforth, in relations with the USA, to maintain a firm line in international affairs in opposition to the Carter Administration's provocative steps. Despite the fact that Washington will in the future continue to initiate an anti-Soviet campaign and will strive to impart a coordinated character to the actions of its allies, to realise our countermeasures proceeding from the inexpedience of complicating the entire complex of multi-level relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

- To intensify our influence on the positions of various NATO allies of the USA, particularly on France and the FRG, to the greatest possible extent using in our interests the differences which have been revealed between them and the USA in the approach to the choice of measures in response to the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

- Keeping in mind that the events in Afghanistan are being used by the USA and the PRC as a convenient pretext for a further rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis, to plan long-term measures to complicate relations between Washington and Beijing in the context of the development of relations within the bounds of the so-called triple alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan.

- To consider with the leadership of Communist and working class parties of capitalist and developing countries the issue of the deployment of a broad campaign in support of the Afghan revolution and brotherly assistance to the DRA from the Soviet Union. In addition, through unofficial means to undertake measures to attract to this campaign other mass organizations, organs of the press, etc.

- In the Non-Aligned movement, using the resources of Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and also the countries belonging to the progressive wing of the Non-Aligned Movement, to inspire statements of support for the Afghan government and to avert possible attempts by the West and China to provoke the Movement to condemn the actions of the Soviet Union, to isolate Afghanistan and to use the developing situation to weaken the progressive wing in the Non-Aligned movement.

- To concentrate the main efforts in opposition to the hostile activity of the USA and its allies regarding the Islamic countries of the Middle and Near East, particularly Pakistan and Iran, and also such influential countries of Asia as India. To actively oppose Washington's policy of knocking together a united front of the West and certain Moslem countries, and of reorienting Islamic fanaticism on an anti-Soviet course.

Proceeding from the fact that the USA and China are most actively trying to use Pakistan and that the most important bases of the Afghan bandit formations are located on the territory of that country, constantly exert a restraining influence on the regime of Zia ul-Haq, including via special channels, and to push him to accept measures to limit the actions of the rebels from Pakistani territory.

- Bring into life measures directed at the preservation of the anti-imperialist, primarily anti-American, elements in the foreign policy of Iran, insofar as the continuation of the crisis in Iran-American relations limits the potential possibilities of the

Khomeini regime to inspire anti-government uprisings on Moslem grounds in Afghanistan.

- Taking into account that the possibilities of the West and China to achieve their strategic goals in Afghanistan are weakened by the absence of a well-organized and influential political opposition to the people's power, direct serious attention to conducting measures, including those of a special nature, to demoralize organizations of Afghan immigrants and discredit their leaders.

- In relation to the U.N. General Assembly's consideration of the so-called "Afghan question," to activate work on unmasking the anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan machinations of the USA, its allies, and China, and also on the neutralization of the consequences of those actions which are unfavorable to the USSR and the DRA.

- While conducting foreign policy and propagandistic measures, to use even more widely the thesis that the Soviet Union's provision of military assistance to Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation from the USA's provocative efforts, which have already been undertaken over the course of a long time, to achieve unilateral military advantages in regions which are strategically important to the USSR.

In relation to the difficult domestic political and economic situation in the DRA, along with the intensification of anti-Soviet moods which are taking place among part of the Afghan population as the result of the criminal activity of H. Amin and his circle, a certain period of time evidently will be required for the normalization of the situation in Afghanistan itself.

The consolidation of people's power in the country during the coming years and the stabilization of the domestic political and economic situation in Afghanistan will to a great extent depend on the extent to which there will manage to be provided true unity in the ranks of the Party and the unification of all progressive and national patriotic forces in the framework of a united front.

Taking this into account, provide help and all-around support to the leadership of PDPA in the realization of the goals of the April [1978] revolution and in the fulfillment of our recommendations on the key issues of Party and state construction and the development of the economy, the fundamental proposals of which may be

summed up as follows:

- The consistent implementation in Party life and Party construction of the line about the unity of the Party which has been recommended to the Afghan comrades in the appeals of the CC CPSU to the leadership of the PDPA. The identification and isolation, both in the center and in local regions, of people who may oppose that line, so that they will not be able to exert a demoralizing influence in the Party.

- The utilization of the experience of a range of socialist countries (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and others) in the resolution of the issue of the creation of a genuinely representative broad front of left and democratic organizations headed by the PDPA. The strengthening of the influence of the Party on Afghan youth, especially among the student body, the creation, in assistance to the Komsomol, of a range of sport, cultural, and other organizations.

- The utmost consolidation and development of the DRA's progressive socio-political foundations, the acceleration in the working out and acceptance of a new constitution, the creation of opportunities for representatives of tribes and national minorities to participate with full rights in the work of the Dzhirg and local councils.

- The establishment of contacts and the conducting of negotiations with the leaders and elders of the most warlike tribes in the DRA and the search for ways to achieve the quickest compromise on conditions for their ceasing the anti-government struggle. Realization of a line on a gradual attack on the position of the tribal reaction, the showing of flexibility and a differentiated approach to various tribes and socio-economic strata.

- The working out of a long-term plan of work with the Moslem clergy which envisions attracting moderate Moslem leaders to cooperate with the authorities, the isolation of representatives of reactionary clerical circles, the establishment of contacts with the Shiite clergy, the inadmissibility of any form (including economic) of discrimination against Shiites.

- The setting up of normal economic life in the country, and, in particular, the improvement of the material basis for workers in the city and village. The provision of a balanced, mutually beneficial cooperation between the state and private sectors. The presentation of broader possibilities in the area of domestic and foreign trade, and also

in the production sphere for the middle and especially the petit bourgeoisie while maintaining state control.

Besides this, from our side:

- To work with the leadership of the PDPA to realize its foreign policy program and to work out further steps to consolidate the foreign policy position of Afghanistan.

- To provide all-around practical assistance in military construction, keeping in mind the quickest creation of a militarily prepared, organized and equipped people's army. Facilitate the consolidation of the PDPA's position among the command staff, and also the intensification of training of the army in the spirit of devotion to the people's power of Afghanistan.

- Keeping in mind the complex tasks which the special services of Afghanistan must resolve, speed up fulfillment of the program to provide assistance via all channels of work of the organs of state security, internal affairs, and people's militias, both in the center and in the local regions.

- Taking into account that in the spring of 1980 in Afghanistan a further activation of the insurgent movement may take place, and also having in mind the well-known historic and national particularities of the Afghans, conduct consultations with the Ministry of Defense and the government of the DRA and conclude appropriate agreements which define the status and legal position of the Soviet military contingents for the whole period of their presence in Afghanistan.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov
D. Ustinov B. Ponomarev

27 January 1980

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 3; provided by M. Kramer.]

Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talks with Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980

Top Secret
Special folder

CC CPSU

Concerning the discussions with the Afghan leaders.

In accordance with the assignment (#PI80/XP), I held discussions with General Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA B. Karmal, and also with Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council A. Sawari, with Minister of the Interior S.M. Gulyabzoy, Minister of Communications M.A. Vatandjar, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA, Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPAN.A. Nur, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA S.M. Zeray, and Member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA Major-General A. Kadyr in Kabul on January 31-February 1 (notes on the conversations are attached).

During our conversation B. Karmal handed me, for deliverance to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the text of the letter of the Central Committee of PDPA to party organizations concerning the issues of party unity (attached).

During my stay in Kabul I had conversations with Soviet Ambassador to DRA Comrade F.A. Tabeev, and with the head of the group of our party advisers Comrade L.I. Grekov, who raised several questions concerning our economic and party cooperation with Afghanistan. The questions are reflected in the appendices.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Comrade [Sharif] Rashidov, with whom I had a conversation during my stop in Tashkent on my way to Kabul, believes that considering the increase in the amounts of cargo shipped between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan it is necessary for the central ministries to take measures to put an end to falling behind the schedule in the construction of the joint bridge crossing on Amu Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton (memo attached) and also to speed up the process of consideration of his proposal on organizing an independent branch of the Central Asian Railroad in Termez that he presented to the Ministry of Transportation.

It would be advisable to request that concerned departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other bureaus examine the questions raised by Comrades Sh. R. Rashidov, F.A. Tabeev, and L.I. Grekov and submit their proposals in this regard in the general order.

Y.V. Andropov

5 February 1980
#271-A

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 3-4; appendices not printed.]

CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 7 February 1980 (excerpt)

Top Secret
Only copy
Working Transcript

MEETING OF CC
CPSU POLITBURO

7 February 1980

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.
Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Kapitono, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Rusakov, K.V.

3. About Com. Andropov's conversations with the Afghan leaders about certain issues of Soviet-Afghan cooperation

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov, Iu.V. traveled to Afghanistan in accord with the Politburo's decision. Let us listen to Com. Andropov.

ANDROPOV. I distributed a detailed description of the conversations which I had with the Afghan leaders, therefore I think that there is no need to make a detailed report. But all the same I would like to make special note of several issues.

First of all it is necessary to note directly that the situation in Afghanistan is stabilizing now. This is evident from all the data. In the conversation which I had with Com. Karmal, he cited in great detail what has been done in the month since the removal of Amin from power. Although the situation in the country does continue to be complex, and demands the most urgent and pressing measures aimed at its stabilization, the main thing is that now the leadership of Afghanistan understands its fundamental tasks and is doing everything possible so that the situation really does stabilize.

In my conversation, I particularly

stressed the necessity of establishing genuine party unity, heightening of the military readiness of the army, strengthening relations of the party and government with the masses, instituting normal economic life in the country and activating the foreign policy activities of Afghanistan in accordance with the demands of the situation. So, I concentrated on these basic tasks, about which there is plenty of material in the transcript of the conversations. Therefore, it seems to me, there is no need to develop it in detail.

Further, I had conversations with A. Sarwari, S. Gulabzoi, and M. Vatandzhar. Sarwari, as you know is the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister of the DRA, Gulabzoi is minister of internal affairs, and Vatandzhar is Minister of Communications. All these comrades play major roles in the leadership of Afghanistan. Therefore, it was very important to me to find out how these comrades imagine the affairs to themselves, especially in view of the fact that several of them belong to a different group (as is well known, in the PDPA there are two groups, the Khalq and the Parcham). The task is to liquidate this rift so that they and others feel themselves members of one unified party. I told them directly that by using their influence they could make a heavy contribution to the unification of the party.

I also spoke with them in detail about all the other questions. In particular, I paid attention to strengthening the organs of state power, and the army, and particularly to conducting major work among the tribes so as to attract the people to the side of the party and to strengthen the unity of the people with the party, so that the people would believe in the party's ideals. A great deal was said about all these issues, and I should note that all these comrades correctly understand the tasks in this regard.

Then I had a conversation with the member of the Politburo of the CC PDPA, and secretary of the CC PDPA, chairman of the organizational commission of the CC, Nur Ahmed Nur, member of the Politburo CC PDPA S. Zeray, and member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the PDPA, General Kadyr. With them, besides all the issue I raised in the previous conversations, such as strengthening the party and consolidation of the unity of Afghan communists, I stressed as well the necessity of a quick correction of all the shortcomings and

mistakes which had been tolerated earlier. I stressed the necessity of more fully using the breathing space which they have in order to liquidate the contradictions which had arisen inside the party and in the country. I particularly pointed to the correct distribution of responsibilities among the members of the Politburo, and the conscientious fulfillment of his responsibilities by every comrade.

In the conversations much attention was paid to strengthening the army and teaching it attack maneuvers, and its mastering of the technology which has been delivered in sufficient quantity. In the CC Politburo a guidance for action for all military and civilian members of the PDPA was accepted. I have to say that it is a good guidance; it without doubt will help in strengthening the unity of the party and raising the level of its defense preparedness.

Our ambassador and other representatives in the DRA presented several issues of assistance to Afghanistan, including most prominently the construction of an oil refinery. Regarding this, there is an agreement made in 1972. Its capability was set to be 100 thousand tons per year. Now the Afghans request that its capability be increased to 500 thousand tons.

The second issue concerned the development of power engineering on the basis of a common scheme of power generation and supply for the northern regions of Afghanistan. Then they posed the issue of construction of a mining and ore-concentrating combine at the base of the Ainak copper deposit. They also posed such issues as the construction of a transit bridge across the river Amdaryu and complex of installations on the Afghan [river] bank, and the reconstruction of the Kabul house building combine. These are essentially the issues about which I wanted to speak.

USTINOV. Iurii Vladimirovich has made a very thorough report about his journey to Afghanistan. But I want to say that we must speak very carefully regarding a withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. I think about a year will be needed, maybe even a year and a half, [before] which the situation in Afghanistan has not stabilized, and before that we can not even think about a withdrawal of troops, otherwise we may incur much unpleasantness.

BREZHNEV. I believe that we even need to increase the contingent of forces in

Afghanistan somewhat.

GROMYKO. It seems to me that we need to look ahead a little. Within some time, it goes without saying that forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan, insofar as they now are introduced at the request of the Afghan leadership and in accordance with the agreement. Let's say that hostile propaganda from China, Pakistan, etc. will stop. Can we in this event speak about a full withdrawal of forces without getting anything in return[?]. It seems to me that it would make sense to think about the kind of agreed obligations to set between the sides when it will happen that it will be possible to withdraw the forces. We will not have a full guarantee, I think, that some sort of hostile forces will not further attack Afghanistan. Therefore we have to provide for the full security of Afghanistan.

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov's visit to Afghanistan was taken at the request of Babrak Karmal. The conversations and consultations which Iurii Vladimirovich had were very useful and substantive. I think that it makes sense to approve the conversations conducted by Com. Andropov, and to accept the draft of the resolution which he presented.

ALL. Correct.

It is accepted.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 73, 77-80; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on
Afghanistan, 7 February 1980**

COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET
UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

#Pl 82/S h.

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rashidov—full text; Baibakov, Sosnov, Skachkov—#3, 4 ; Pavlovski—#5.

Excerpt from Protocol #182 of the Politburo CC CPSU session of 7 February 1980

On Comrade Y.V. Andropov's discussions with the leaders of Afghanistan concerning some aspects of Soviet-Afghani cooperation.

1. To approve the discussions that Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chairman of the KGB USSR Comrade Y.V. Andropov held with the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on some aspects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation.

2. To ask the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit proposals on the issues of party co-operation mentioned in the discussions with Comrade B. Karmal and with other Afghani leaders, and also relating to the issues raised by the head of the group of the party advisers of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Grekov, to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

3. To entrust the State Committee on Economic Cooperation (SCEC) and the Ministry of Transport Construction to examine the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on speeding up the construction work on the joint bridge crossing on the Amu Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton, and to take necessary measures to increase the speed of work of the Soviet construction organizations. Also, to submit in the regular order proposals on construction of the structure on the Afghan bank (a transfer base) on the conditions of the general contract.

4. To entrust the Gosplan of the USSR and the SCEC with participation of relevant ministries and bureaus to examine the considerations presented by the Soviet Embassy in Kabul on speeding up the construction of the oil-processing plant, power stations and electric power lines according to the "Plan of the electricity supply to the Northern regions of Afghanistan," of the mining and processing group of enterprises on the copper deposits site in Aynak, and of the reconstruction of the housing construction groups of enterprises in Kabul.

5. The Ministry of Transportation should speed up the consideration of the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on setting up an independent branch of the Central Asian Railroad with the terminal in Termez.

6. To entrust the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan to think out the question of the new relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan under the treaty, having in mind the realization of this idea at corresponding time, and

taking into account the further development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 1-2.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980, with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro

TOP SECRET

No.P187/33

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 10 March 1980

About our further foreign policy line in relation to Afghanistan and about a response to F. Castro's appeal

1. Approve the considerations contained in the note of Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rakhmanin of 10 March 1980 (attached).

2. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment 1).

3. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul (attachment 2).

CC SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point 33, Protocol No. 187

Top Secret

To the CC CPSU

In accord with the instruction of 28 February of this year (P185/I) and in connection with F. Castro to L.I. Brezhnev (telegram from Havana No. 167), we report the following considerations.

Upon the determination of our further foreign policy steps on issues which concern Afghanistan, including taking account of F. Castro's proposal that Cuba provide its good offices to organize negotiations

between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems to be necessary to take into account the following points.

The situation in Afghanistan and around it continues to remain complicated. Although the new measures which have been undertaken by the Afghan leadership inside the country and in the international arena are facilitating the stabilization of the situation in the country and the consolidation of the international position of the DRA, this process is going slowly. The combat readiness of the Afghan forces for the time being remains low. The actions of the foreign and domestic counter-revolution are continuing, dependent on the material, military, and political support from the USA, China, Pakistan, and from a range of other Moslem countries with reactionary regimes as well.

Judging by everything, a successful resolution of the internal problems and the consolidation of the new structure in Afghanistan will demand not a small amount of effort and time, for the length of which the Soviet forces there will remain the basic stabilizing factor standing in opposition to the further expansion of the activity of domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces.

Along with this, in the interests of creating more favorable conditions for the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, it might also make sense to use the apparent interest in efforts to find a political solution to that issue which has begun to appear in Western and in Non-Aligned countries under the influence of our firmness on the Afghan issue. It is important, however, to direct the conduct of those searches in an appropriate way, to fill it with contents that are advantageous to us, in counterweight to the efforts of the Western countries, disguised as [seeking] a political settlement, to achieve simply a rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan so as to change the regime which exists there now.

In this regard, the thought expressed by F. Castro, that Cuba, in its capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned movement, would propose an initiative to make its good offices available in the matter of organizing negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, might turn out to be useful.

Accordingly, in L.I. Brezhnev's response to F. Castro it will be expedient to express our favorable attitude to his idea

about the provision by Cuba of its good offices in setting up negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors and in working out corresponding guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. In this regard it is necessary, of course, to arrange with F. Castro that he from his side and we from our own should talk over this idea with B. Karmal. It is also necessary to explain to F. Castro our approach to a possible political settlement and in this regard the complexity of the Afghan events, so that Castro realistically evaluates the situation and does not feed on illusions of a simple and quick achievement of a settlement.

Keeping in mind the task of providing favorable conditions for the stabilization of the situation inside Afghanistan and the necessity for the world to get used to the new situation in that country and the Soviet Union's role there, our approach to a political settlement of the Afghan situation could harmonize both the initial and more long-range tasks. In this regard, the transition to a final resolution of the more long-term tasks would depend on the resolution of the initial tasks, so it is possible to constantly bring influence to bear on that process.

In its general appearance the outline of a political settlement could consist of a complex of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and its neighbors, above all Pakistan, and systems of corresponding guarantees from the USSR, USA, and certain other states, each of which should be acceptable both to Afghanistan and to the opposing side.

The first task should become the start of consultations between Afghanistan and its neighbors aimed at a normalization of their relations. In this regard, continue to try to ensure that the neighbor-countries of Afghanistan, and also the United States and other countries involved in anti-Afghan activities, from the very beginning of the political settlement process, undertake practical measures which would bear witness to the cessation of their interference, including military, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Directly link this demand with a possibility of the positive development of the process of political settlement.

As far as the concrete content of the agreements which could be worked out between Afghanistan and its neighbors is concerned, in them, besides the consolidation of the general principals concerning respect for the sovereignty and readiness to develop

relations on the basis of principles of good neighborliness and non-interference in each others' internal affairs, obligations should be fixed about the cessation of armed and any other hostile activity from the territory of those countries against each other, and also about the problem of refugees from Afghanistan. In particular, a ban on the enlistment and the use of refugees in underground activity against the DRA and the liquidation of refugee camps located directly on the border with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan, and the resettlement of those of them who do not wish to return in remote regions of Pakistan and Iran could be discussed. In the final stage of the realization of such measures on the territory of Pakistan and possibly of Iran too, it would be possible to envision some form of verification with the participation of Afghanistan.

In the process of working out such bilateral agreements, evidently, there will arise the issue of mutual respect for the current borders between the participating states in the agreement, keeping in mind that Pakistan will strive to secure Afghanistan's recognition of the Durand Line. Historically, this issue is a complicated one for Iran. Its final settlement is directly connected to the development of the situation in Afghanistan itself and around it. Correspondingly, it would be inexpedient for the government of the DRA to prematurely—even before the true position of Pakistan will become clear—commit itself with a declaration about its readiness to recognize the Durand Line. According to tactical considerations, it is more advantageous for the Afghans to use this issue to receive from Pakistan maximal concessions on questions in which it holds an interest.

The negotiations aimed at the working out of concrete agreements should be conducted directly between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also between Afghanistan and Iran. This, on the one hand, would strengthen the position of the government of the DRA, and on the other would exclude the "internationalization" of a political resolution of the Afghan issue, which is undesirable for us. The role of Cuba in its capacity as chairman of the Non-Aligned movement would consist of getting the bilateral negotiations started with the agreement of the participants and in a certain influence on their conduct through its provi-

sion of good offices, but not in the replacement of the direct negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors.

Agreements which are achieved in the course of these negotiations would be backed by appropriate guarantees, in the first place from the USSR and the USA, but also from certain other countries from among those which would be acceptable both to Afghanistan and to the other side. Posing the issue in this way would allow Afghanistan to deflect, say, the candidacy of China.

Now it would be premature to determine the detailed content of the guarantees and the exact make-up of the participants, insofar as this will depend both on the contents of the agreements themselves and on the development of the situation. The main point of the guarantees should be that the countries which provide the guarantees will respect them and by their own authority will fortify the bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. The USA must accept as well the obligation not to conduct any sort of underground activities, including those from the territory of third countries, against Afghanistan and its government.

In the context of considering the guarantees it might be possible to pose as well the issue of the growth of the USA's military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean both in terms of the threat to the security of the Soviet Union which that would create, and also from the point of view of the incompatibility of such actions with the task of stabilizing the situation in the Middle East.

During the consideration of both the guarantees and the overall problem of a political settlement, it makes sense to conduct the matter so that the governments of the participating states clearly understand that issues which touch on the system which exists in Afghanistan must not in any way be the subject of negotiations. In the same way it must be clear that issues which concern Afghanistan must not be considered and decided beyond the government of the DRA or without its participation.

Drafts of L.I. Brezhnev's response to F. Castro and our appeal in this regard to B. Karmal have been prepared taking into account the considerations which have been put forth above.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov D. Ustinov
B. Ponomarev O. Rakhmanin

10 March 1980

[attachment 1]

To the clause 33 of the Protocol No. 187

Top Secret
Supplement I
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY [*Vne ocheredi*]

HAVANA
SOVIET AMBASSADOR
Copy:KABUL - SOV[iet]AMBASSADOR
(for orientation)

Pay a visit to F. Castro and transmit him the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev:

“TO FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CC
OF THE COM[MUNIST] PARTY OF
CUBA, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE
STATE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC
OF CUBA

Comrade Fidel CASTRO RUZ

Dear comrade Fidel,

Regarding your letter, I would like to report that we agree in general with its estimate of the existing situation in the world and [with] your assessment that the Afghan issue is being artificially blown up by imperialist forces to cover their encroachments against detente, peace, sovereignty, and independent development of peoples. Events in Afghanistan, beyond any doubt, do not provide the real cause of the present-day aggravation of the international situation. Without these events, imperialism would find some other pretext to aggravate the situation in the world. To this testify the steps taken by the United States even before the recent events in Afghanistan and out of any relation to them.

We are convinced, however, that a coordinated and firm policy of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other fraternal countries is a guarantee that socialism, in the final analysis, will prevail in the interest of peace and of defusing the present situation, which was created by the actions of the most aggressive circles of imperialism.

We and our Cuban friends hold a unanimous opinion on the present correlation of

forces in the Non-Aligned Movement. With regret one has to state that many among the non-aligned countries have recently fallen under the influence of a campaign that is inimical to the cause of social progress.

We fully understand the present predicament of Cuba in the Non-Aligned Movement in the status of its chairman and we value even higher [Cuban] efforts to prevent the misuse of this Movement's authority against the interests of socialism.

I believe, Fidel, you should know in detail the situation inside Afghanistan. I must tell you straightforwardly that it remains complicated and tense. Domestic and external counterrevolution, supported by material, military, and political aid from the USA, China, Pakistan and a number of other Muslim countries ruled by reactionary regimes, have intensified their subversive activities. A realistic estimate of the situation tells that some time will pass before the Afghan revolution becomes irreversible and its political and social gains become firm. It is therefore not a coincidence that the imperialists and their fellow-travellers [*pripeshniki*] persist in attempting, one way or another, to compel the immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

However, when some people in the West became convinced of our firmness, they began to take an interest in the search for political solutions of the problem connected with Afghanistan. However, behind this lies visibly the same quest, achievement by political means of the same goals - a change of the existing regime in the DRA. Western countries blatantly ignore the government of B. Karmal and attempt to conduct affairs concerning Afghanistan behind the back of the government of the DRA and without its participation. This approach to political settlement, of course, should be categorically rejected.

On our side, we stand for a political settlement, but for a real settlement, aimed first and foremost at the liquidation of the causes that brought about the existing situation, i.e. at effective and guaranteed termination of aggression and all other forms of interference into the affairs of Afghanistan; [we also stand] for a settlement that ensures the sovereignty [and] independence of Afghanistan and further a consolidation of the gains of the Afghan revolution. It is obvious that the questions related to the existing

order in Afghanistan, [and to] the composition of its government, cannot by in any way a subject of negotiations. Equally must it be clear that the issues concerning Afghanistan cannot be discussed and decided on behalf of [i.e., without-trans.] the government of the DRA. We understand that there is a unity of opinions with you on this issue, and that precisely these motives dictated your initiative regarding Cuba's assistance in starting up talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It is known that the government of the DRA stated very clearly its intention to maintain relations of peace and friendship with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan. Cuban assistance in the form of goodwill service in establishing this kind of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors could, in our view, be useful. By the way, in our opinion the term “goodwill services” is more applicable here than “mediation.”

Of course, we will need a thorough coordination, first of all with the Afghan leadership, on the course of actions. It is important to prevent a substitution of some kind of international actions for direct negotiations between the existing government of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is the goal of the authors of various plans that are being nurtured today in the West, who do not want to deal with the existing Afghan leadership. It seems inadvisable to us to have any degree of involvement on the part the General Secretary of the U.N in these affairs. This, among other aspects, would unavoidably be linked to the well-known anti-Afghan resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As to the question about a possibility of assisting Cuba in its goodwill services on the part of some other countries, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, this could probably be tackled later with a view to the developing situation; now this question should rather be left aside.

It seems to us that, in starting talks with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then, probably, also with Iran, we should from the very beginning keep our eyes on the goal of developing a complex of agreements among [those countries], agreements that, in addition to general principles of respect of sovereignty, development of good-neighborly relations, and non-involvement into the internal affairs of each other, would also contain clear and specific commitments to a

cessation of hostilities and any other hostile activity conducted from the territory of these countries against each other and to the settlement of the issue of refugees from Afghanistan. In particular, we should demand a ban on recruitment and use of refugees for subversive activity against the DRA and [demand the] liquidation of refugee camps in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan and resettlement of those among them who would not wish to return, to central areas of Pakistan and Iran.

Bilateral agreements that might be achieved in the course of such negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors could be supported by appropriate guarantees from, first of all, the USSR and the United States, and other states, each of whom would be acceptable for Afghanistan as well as for the opposite side.

Such is in general terms a scheme of political settlement as we see it. Obviously, its realisation will demand considerable effort and time, considering that the imperialist and other reactionary circles will put obstacles in the way. Therefore we have no illusions as to a possibility of fast movement towards this solution.

So much for the considerations that we wanted to share with you, dear Fidel, in response to your letter. As a practical matter, we stand on the point that your idea [about the mediation initiative] must be discussed in advance with B. Karmal. On our side we also will approach him on this subject and, judging what his reaction could be, we expect to continue to discuss with you the issues concerning realisation of your initiative. We also expect to hear your opinion concerning the considerations that we have laid out.

You are right, Fidel, in pointing that in the existing situation Cuba has a chance to move to a more active policy within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement in defense of peace and international security. This is all the more important, since the imperialist forces are striving to see in Afghanistan the only cause of aggravation of international tension, to divert attention from their dangerous activities aimed at the subversion of detente, to weaken the struggle of people for their rights.

In conclusion I would like to send you and the members of the leadership of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba warm-

est regards and best wishes from myself and from all our comrades.

With comradely welcome,

L. BREZHNEV

10 March 1980".

Inform upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 5; documents provided by M. Kramer and Raymond L. Garthoff; translations by Carter-Brezhnev Project (report) and Vladislav M. Zubok (Brezhnev to Castro).]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 10 April 1980, with report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Zagladin, 7 April 1980

Top Secret

#P191/IV

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimyanin, Arkhipov, Zamyatin.

Excerpt from Protocol #191 of the Politburo CC CPSU session of 10 April 1980

Concerning our further policy on issues related to Afghanistan

To approve the considerations on this issue submitted by the Politburo CC CPSU Commission on Afghanistan (memo attached).

The Commission should continue monitoring the development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it closely, and solve the emerging problems as they arise according to the considerations stated in the memo, submitting relevant proposals to the Central Committee of the CPSU as necessary.

The Departments of the Central Committee upon consulting the Commission should carry out a coordinated propaganda policy on the basis of the considerations stated in the memo, and guide the central organs of the press, radio, and television accordingly.

Secretary of the CC

[attachment:]

To #IV of Protocol #191

Top Secret
CC CPSU

We are presenting some considerations concerning our further steps in relation to the situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Situation in Afghanistan and the role of the Soviet troops.

1. The development of the situation in Afghanistan after the introduction of the limited contingent of the Soviet troops in December 1979 confirms our assessment that it was a timely and a correct action. It undermined the plans to overthrow the revolutionary regime in DRA and prevented the emergence of a new hotbed of military threat on the Southern borders of the Soviet Union. It put an end to Amin's adventuristic policy line, which led to the goals and objectives of the April [1978] revolution being discredited, to abandoning cooperation with the Soviet Union, and to establishing close ties with the West. The cadres of the People's Democratic party, the army, and the administrative apparatus loyal to the revolution had been saved from physical execution. Gradually the conditions for active participation in the revolutionary movement of both the former groups "Parcham" and "Khalq," along with other representatives of patriotic and national-democratic forces, are being created.

The new leadership of the DRA headed by B. Karmal with comprehensive assistance from the Soviet Union in general correctly outlined the tasks related to internal normalization, the organization of military resistance to the internal and external counterrevolution, for overcoming the harmful consequences of the Amin regime, and for achieving a relationship of trust with the tribes and other strata of the population, and began to work on practical solutions to those problems.

2. At the same time the situation in Afghanistan remains complicated and tense. The class struggle, represented in armed counterrevolutionary insurrections, encouraged and actively supported from abroad, is occurring in the circumstances where a genuine unity of the PDPA is still absent,

where the state and party apparatus is weak in terms of organization and ideology, which is reflected in the practical non-existence of local government organs, where financial and economic difficulties are mounting, and where the combat readiness of the Afghan armed forces and the people's militia is still insufficient. The efforts that had been undertaken notwithstanding, such important political problems as establishing relations with Muslim clergy, tribal leaders, and middle and petit bourgeoisie have not yet been solved. The agrarian reform has not been completed, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country.

3. The Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan provide decisive assistance in establishing control over the situation in the country. Together with the Afghan armed forces they have successfully carried out operations for elimination of armed rebel formations in several provinces of the country. As a result of those operations, the organized armed forces of the counterrevolution have suffered substantial losses, and thus the military threat to the existence of the new regime has been significantly reduced.

These are all reasons to believe that after the military operations planned for the immediate future are completed, there will be a relatively long period during which, even with support from abroad, the counterrevolutionary forces would probably be unable to carry out any large-scale military actions. Such a prognosis is supported by the fact that already now the counterrevolutionaries have had to change their tactics; they are mostly engaging in terrorist acts and small group actions. At the same time they are putting their stakes on economic sabotage, disruption of transportation and food supplies, arousing religious, nationalist, and anti-Soviet feelings, [and] animosity toward the government and its undertakings. However, one should not exclude the possibility of the counterrevolution making an effort to organize massive uprisings in certain provinces of the country.

4. In these circumstances the need for carrying out consistent and purposeful measures for achieving a genuine ideological, political, and organizational unity in the ranks of the PDPA, and for strengthening its influence in the country, for unifying all national-patriotic forces, for creating an effective apparatus of local government, for

improving the combat readiness of the army, the state security forces, and the people's militia, for solving the primary economic tasks, and for improving the work with tribal leaders, assumes the primary importance.

5. Meanwhile our troops in Afghanistan will have to continue to carry out their tasks of defending the revolutionary regime in the DRA, defending the country from external threats, including sealing off the borders of the country together with the Afghan forces, ensuring the safety of the major centers and communications, and also building up and strengthening the combat readiness of the Afghan armed forces. Only when the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and the situation around the country improves, and only upon a request of the DRA leadership, may we consider the question of the eventual withdrawal of our troops from the DRA.

Situation around Afghanistan and the relevant objectives.

The development of the situation around Afghanistan has recently been characterized by a certain stratification of the forces hostile to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union.

1. The United States and China continue to hold to a hard line aimed at changing the political regime in Afghanistan and at the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Other countries exhibit a certain readiness to search for compromise solutions for a political settlement in the existing situation, even though those solutions, as a rule, are unacceptable.

Thus, in contradiction to the USA position, the majority of the Western European countries do not demand the withdrawal of the Soviet troops as a preliminary condition for any settlement, but consider it a part of the process of such a settlement. Gradually the understanding emerges that there could not be any resolution of the Afghan question without accepting the fact that Afghanistan, being the Soviet Union's immediate neighbor, is a part of the zone of Soviet special interests. Our decisively negative reaction to the absolutely hopeless plan of "neutralization" of Afghanistan proposed by the British, and aimed at the change of the Afghan political regime by removing its current leadership, definitely encouraged this evolution in the positions of the Western European countries.

2. A tendency to abandon the initial

positions of sharp condemnation of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan by some of the countries that held such positions before is emerging among the members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Their positions are changing toward searching for such a settlement that would allow Afghanistan to maintain its status as a nonaligned country. This is the line taken by India, which is concerned about a possibility of Pakistan's rearmament with the assistance of the USA and China, and about the buildup of the USA military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf.

The government of Pakistan has recently been showing some signs of unwillingness to follow the USA policy on the Afghan question blindly. One such sign was the willingness to receive the Cuban Foreign Minister as a representative of the state chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement in Islamabad. Although the Cuban initiative of offering good offices for bilateral negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the goal of normalization of their relations so far did not produce any concrete results, such steps would be expedient in the future, and this is exactly what the Cubans are going to do, using their contacts with many nonaligned countries.

3. At the same time, it would be advisable for us to maintain our contacts with the countries that express interest in searching for a political settlement of the Afghan situation. During such meetings we should continue to consistently develop the idea that the basis of any political settlement should be a complete and guaranteed cessation of all aggressive actions and all forms of subversive activities and interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

During our meetings with representatives of Western European and other countries it is important, as always, to point out that the questions concerning the current regime in Afghanistan, the composition of the government and the like, could under no conditions be a subject of negotiations; and that any questions whatsoever concerning Afghanistan could not be discussed or resolved without the DRA government, without its current leadership.

4. Concerning the possible set of issues for discussion in connection with the Afghan settlement, besides the question of real guarantees of non-renewal of armed and foreign interference in the internal affairs

of Afghanistan, we should raise such questions as the reduction of the USA military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf, the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and the liquidation of foreign military bases there—all this against the USA efforts to limit the discussion to Afghanistan itself. Raising those questions would allow us to put pressure on the Americans and to influence the negotiating process for our benefit. Besides, it would permit us to increase the number of countries that view our position on Afghanistan favorably, or at least with understanding.

5. It is advisable to work on the question of encouraging other countries of the socialist commonwealth to take a more active part in providing Afghanistan with assistance in political, economic, and other spheres. This question needs special consideration.

6. Therefore, our policy in the questions of an Afghan settlement should be aimed at, first, helping decrease the tension which was created by the West in connection with the introduction of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan; secondly, at creating more favorable external conditions for internal consolidation of the revolution in the DRA, and for making the revolutionary changes irreversible; and thirdly, at creating conditions for the future eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, when it would be justified by the political and military situation in the country and in the region in general.

7. We should begin with the assumption that at certain point in time we could sign a new treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, which would make it clear for everyone that we are ready to ensure the defense of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, of its socio-economic and political regime from all forms of external aggression. This question could be discussed in the future taking into account the development of the situation, but it needs to be solved positively. Those who inspire the aggression against Afghanistan will not have reasons for objections against a defensively-oriented treaty of the kind that the USA has with dozens of countries.

Such a treaty will not mean that Afghanistan loses its status of a nonaligned country. One just needs to be reminded that Pakistan has been accepted into the non-

aligned movement regardless of the existence of the American-Pakistani agreement of 1959, according to which the USA considers it to be “vitally important for national goals and for general peace to preserve the independence and the territorial integrity of Pakistan,” and pledges to take “necessary measures including the use of armed forces” in a situation of aggression against Pakistan and upon the request of the Pakistani government.

In relation to this, it would be expedient for Afghanistan not only to maintain, but also to strengthen its role in the Non-aligned Movement, using it for building up its contacts with other non-aligned countries.

8. It is assumed that realization of the considerations mentioned above will require a close and constant coordination of actions between the Soviet Union and the DRA leadership on all aspects. Our rich experience of relations with new Afghanistan will help ensure such coordination.

We are requesting your consideration.

A. Gromyko Y. Andropov D. Ustinov
V. Zagladin

7 April 1980
#0304/gs

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 9-17;
translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 8 May 1980, with Politburo Commission Report, 6 May 1980, and Approved Cable to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul

Proletarians of the world, unite!
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

No. P[olitburo session] 195/[Issue] XYIII

For comrades Brezhnev, Kossygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Russakov, Zamyatin, Smirnyukov

Excerpt from the Protocol no. 195 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU from 8 May 1980.

On the proposals for political settlement

concerning Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the considerations on this issue laid out in the memorandum of the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan on 6 May 1980 (attached)

2. To approve the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Kabul (attachment 1) and the Soviet ambassador in Havana (attachment 2) [not printed--ed.]

SECRETARY OF CC

[attachment]

To the point XYII of the Protocol no. 195

Secret

CC CPSU

In accordance to the decision of 10 March 1980 (Pyongyang 187/33) a common line has been worked out with the leadership of the DRA on the issue of a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. It was assumed in doing this, that later, particularly taking into account the implementation of the Cuban initiative of goodwill services and the overall development of the situation around Afghanistan, it will be possible to return to a more specific definition of a foundation where one could start in bringing about a political settlement.

At the present time it is advisable to recommend to the Afghan leadership to step forward with an across-the-board program of political settlement stemming from the scheme of principles which has been agreed upon earlier. Such a step would make it easier to influence the developing situation around Afghanistan in a direction favorable for Afghanistan and the USSR. It would also promote the international stature of the government of B. Karmal.

It is advisable to inform F. Castro of our recommendations to B. Karmal concerning the promotion of such a program, since the Cuban comrades need to take these recommendations into account while implementing their initiative of setting up talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Submitting for consideration,

A. Gromyko Yu. Andropov D. Ustinov
B. Ponomarev

6 May 1980
no. 391/gs

[attachment 1]

Concerning point XVII of the
Protocol no. 195

Secret
Attachment 1

KABUL
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a visit to B. Karmal and, referring to the order, give him the following information.

As has become known, it has been agreed in the course of the exchange of opinions with the Afghan leadership regarding the mission of goodwill services by Cuba to continue joint coordination on the issues concerning the promotion of the idea of political settlement.

The analysis of the situation reveals that at the present moment there is an ongoing divergence of approaches of various countries towards Afghanistan and what happens around it.

On one side, the USA, China, and a number of other states continue their hostile subversive activity against Afghanistan, actively strive to counteract consolidation of positions of the government of the DRA inside the country and on the international arena. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Cuba's initiative to set up a dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan evoked a sharp negative reaction in those countries.

On the other side, the reaction of some other countries, particularly Arab states of the Steadfastness Front [against Israel-ed.], to the declaration of the government of the DRA in favor of a political settlement, to the clarifications made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh.M. Dost during his recent trip, and also to the useful efforts undertaken by Cuba concerning the mission of goodwill services, all this definitely indicates the emergence of more realistic trends. By the way, the mission of goodwill services of Cuba turned out to be undoubtedly useful for at least one reason: it became clear today who really stands for a political settlement and who would prefer to limit oneself to talks on this subject in order to mask the continuing interference into the affairs of Afghanistan.

All this testifies to the necessity of further and more intense efforts to promote the

idea of a political settlement, to fill it with content corresponding with our joint interests. These interests, as we believe, will be well served if the Afghan government would promote an across-the-board program of political settlement, which would become a logical follow-up and specific development of the repeated declarations of the DRA about its readiness to normalize relations with Pakistan and Iran.

It is absolutely clear that realization of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, [and] between Afghanistan and Iran, constitute an obligatory key element of a political settlement. It is no coincidence, that this principled position is consciously ignored in all kinds of Western plans, based on the intention to internationalize the Afghan issue and to resolve it without the participation of the government of the DRA and against the interests of Afghan people.

The advancement of an across-the-board program of settlement by the Afghan government would be, in our opinion, very timely today also from in view of exercising appropriate influence on the position of the countries, participants of the next session of the Ministers of foreign affairs of the Islamic states, forthcoming in May of this year.

If our Afghan friends share this opinion, [they] could publish in the immediate future a Declaration of the government of the DRA, where, in the introductory part they would formulate in a comprehensive program some specific proposals concerning a political settlement.

The introductory part of the Declaration may point out that Afghan people, by proclaiming in April 1978 a national democratic revolution, made its final choice and set itself upon the path of construction of a new society in the country, based on principles of equality and fairness, while preserving its Islamic character and respecting historic and national tradition, the society that excludes exploitation of man by man. [The Afghan people] would like to build a new life for itself under peaceful conditions, developing friendly and cooperative relations with all its neighbors, with Muslim countries [and] all other states. However, it confronted brutal interference, including by military force, into its internal affairs, on the part of the imperialist and other reactionary forces.

To underline, that the people of Afghanistan is full of determination to defend the freedom and independence of its Motherland, its right to define for itself a social-political order under which it would like to live.

Then one could formulate the following specific postulates of the program of political settlement itself.

Affirming that in accordance to the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the international affairs of the DRA are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and on the policy of positive and active non-alignment, the government of the DRA declares its intention to achieve a political settlement to ensure complete and guaranteed cessation of aggressive actions against Afghanistan, subversive acts and any other forms of interference from outside into its internal affairs, to liquidate the existing tension in the area and to overcome the differences through peaceful means, by means of negotiations. To this end:

1) The government of the DRA proposes to the governments of Pakistan and Iran to hold Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian negotiations, having in mind the development of bilateral agreements about normalization of relations. Such agreements might contain commonly accepted articles concerning mutual respect for sovereignty, readiness to develop relations on the basis of principles of good neighborliness and non-interference into internal affairs, and might include specific commitments to suppress military and any other hostile activity from their territory against each other.

2) The government of the DRA appeals again to the Afghans who temporarily stay, for different reasons, on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, to return to the Motherland. It confirms that they would be respected and their liberties and personal protection would be guaranteed, and they would be able to choose freely their place of residence and type of occupation. The government of the DRA appeals to the authorities in Pakistan and Iran to assist the free return of the aforementioned persons to Afghanistan. However, if any part of those Afghans prefers to stay [abroad], then the questions concerning their presence must also be discussed during bilateral negotiations with a view to achieving appropriate agreements.

3) Upon achieving mutually satisfac-

tory solutions to the problems indicated in points 1 and 2, and upon normalization on this basis of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors, the government of the DRA would be ready to examine other issues of bilateral relations, including those that had long been a bone of contention.

4) Proposing to hold bilateral negotiations with Pakistan and Iran without any preliminary conditions, the government of the DRA firmly stands on the view that these negotiations are incompatible with the continuation of hostile activity against Afghanistan. Correspondingly, from the very beginning of the process of political settlement, one should pass practical measures convincingly testifying to the effecting of a cessation of military and any other kind of interference into the affairs of Afghanistan on the part of all states involved in such interference.

5) The government of the DRA considers that, besides a complex of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, [and] Afghanistan and Iran, another constituent part of political settlement must be appropriate political guarantees of some other states that would be acceptable both for Afghanistan, and for all other participants of bilateral agreements. Among those, in the DRA's opinion, should be the Soviet Union and the United States. The chief meaning of the guarantees must reside in the fact that the countries-guarantors will respect themselves and by their authority will support bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. As to the guarantees on the part of the USA, they must include a clearly stated pledge not to conduct any kind of subversive activity against Afghanistan, including from the territory of third countries.

6) The government of the DRA declares that the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet limited military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan should be resolved in the context of a political settlement. The cessation and the guaranteed non-resumption of military incursions and any other forms of interference into internal affairs of Afghanistan would remove the causes that made Afghanistan turn to the USSR with the request to introduce the aforementioned contingent into its territory. Specifically, the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will depend on resolution of the issue of effective guarantees to bilat-

eral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran.

7) The government of the DRA favors taking into account, in the process of political settlement, military-political activity in the area of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf by the states that do not belong to this region. While sharing the concern of other states regarding the build-up of the military presence of the USA in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the government of the DRA supports a proposal to turn this area into a zone of peace, to liquidate foreign military bases there, and to carry out other measures to reduce tension and increase security.

While putting forward proposals on a political settlement, the government of the DRA once again with all determination declares, that the questions bearing on the interests of Afghanistan cannot be discussed much less resolved without the participation of the government of the DRA and alongside it. At the same time the Afghan government considers as helpful the efforts of other states that favor a start of negotiations. In this regard it welcomes and supports the initiative taken by the Republic of Cuba in its capacity of chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to offer its goodwill services.

The government of the DRA expects, that the specific program of political settlement that it offers will meet adequate understanding, first of all, on the part of Pakistan and Iran, and will allow [them] to move in practical way to such a settlement through negotiations.

In the end tell B. Karmal that simultaneously with the proposal of the program of political settlement it would be good to take measures for its broad dissemination using the channels of media, as well as through Afghan embassies abroad and foreign missions in Kabul.

On our side, we will give to this initiative of Afghanistan the required political, diplomatic, and propagandist support.

Report upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 8; provided by M. Kramer; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

**CPSU CC Politburo decisions,
19 June 1980**

TOP SECRET

No. P200/Vi

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, Pelshe, Romanov, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliiev, Gorbachev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Mash-erov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, Shevardnadze, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Savinkin, Smirtyukov.

Extract from protocol No. 200 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 19 June 1980

Measures on Afghanistan.

1. To approve Comrade Brezhnev's proposals on the immediate measures on Afghanistan.

To proceed with the assumption that the Soviet Union will continue to provide political, military, and economic assistance to Afghanistan in order to help ensure the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, to strengthen the people's democratic regime and the leading role of the People's Democratic Party.

2. To consider expedient to withdraw several military units whose presence in Afghanistan now is not necessary.

To charge the Ministry of Defense of the USSR to make a decision on the number and composition of the troops to be withdrawn and on the time frame and the order of their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

To charge Comrade Iu. V. Andropov to coordinate the issues concerning the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan with B. Karmal.

3. To use the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan as leverage for demanding that Pakistan and Iran cease their hostile actions against the DRA and to stop sending interventions from their territory into Afghanistan.

Politburo CC CPSU

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 101-102; translation by Sveta Savranskaya.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to
Erich Honecker, 21 June 1980**

21.06.80

Confidential

Following the traditions established in the relationship between our parties, we would like confidentially to inform you of the following.

At one time we sent you information on the deployment of a limited Soviet military contingent in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the time we informed you that this action was taken as a result of numerous requests by the Afghan government in connection with a sharp increase in imperialist aggression, primarily by the USA, as well as by China, using formations of Afghan counterrevolutionary bandits who are entrenched in Pakistan and Iran.

Given the current situation the CC CPSU, taking into account the fact that the interventionists have been dealt a serious blow and that with respect to this there is no longer a need for the presence of the entire initial military contingent deployed in Afghanistan, has deemed it expedient to withdraw several military units, the presence of which is not critical at this time. This measure is being carried out with the complete agreement of the Afghan government.

Of course, if the intervention directed against the progressive achievements of the Afghan people, against independence and the territorial integrity of DRA continues, or worse still, increases, then all necessary measures will be taken not only to strengthen the Afghan armed forces, but also our military contingent in Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of several Soviet military units from Afghanistan rests on the fact that Soviet Union will continue to render political, military and economic support to Afghanistan, with the aim of maintaining the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, buttressing the people's democratic regime and the fundamental role of the People's Democratic Party.

We intend to use the withdrawal of several Soviet military units from Afghanistan in order to secure from Pakistan and Iran the cessation of hostile activities against the DRA and the smuggling of interventionists into Afghanistan from their territories. We reckon that our friends will follow the same course.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, JIV 2/202, A. 575; obtained by V. Zubok.]

CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980
(excerpt)

PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE
OF THE CPSU
23 JUNE 1980

Sverdlovsk Hall, 11:00 a.m.

[. . .] **Brezhnev:** Not a day goes by when Washington has not tried to revive the spirit of the "Cold War," to heat up militarist passions. Any grounds are used for this, real or imagined.

One example of this is Afghanistan. The ruling circles of the USA, and of China as well, stop at nothing, including armed aggression, in trying to keep the Afghans from building a new life in accord with the ideals of the revolution of liberation of April 1978. And when we helped our neighbor Afghanistan, at the request of its government, to give a rebuff to aggression, to beat back the attacks of bandit formations which operate primarily from the territory of Pakistan, then Washington and Beijing raised an unprecedented racket. Of what did they accuse the Soviet Union[?]: of a yearning to break out to warm waters, and an intention to make a grab for foreign oil. And the whole thing was that their plans to draw Afghanistan into the orbit of imperialist policy and to create a threat to our country from the south crashed to the ground.

In the Soviet act of assistance to Afghanistan there is not a grain of avarice. We had no choice other than the sending of troops. And the events confirmed that it was the only correct choice. (Continued applause).

[. . .] **Gromyko:** [. . .] Given all that was achieved by the fraternal countries in the international arena, especially in the 1970s, in the struggle for detente and peace, we note something else: the general situation in the world has grown more complicated, tension has grown, above all in our relations with the United States. The question arises: what is the reason for this?

The opponents of detente do not trouble themselves even with a minimal dose of objectivity in explaining the reasons for such a situation. They are building their policy on deception of the peoples. Imperialist policy and deception of the peoples are

indivisible. From all corners they announce that the Soviet Union has supposedly changed its policy and by its own actions threatens the West and its interests. In every way they exaggerate in this regard the Afghan events, they cast it in a false light. In pursuit of these goals they break all their former records of trickery, lies, and evil puffery.

Acting on the true course of events, the Soviet Union directly casts back in the face of the officials of the imperialist states facts like the acceptance by the USA and NATO, in demonstrative form, of the decision to increase sharply their military budgets, to abruptly whip up the arms race, to deploy new American intermediate range weapons in Western Europe, to make ready the strike ["rapid development"-ed.] force in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

To all this, to all of our well-founded accusations against the NATO bloc, they can raise no objection. And how can they object, if all this happened when the so-called Afghan issue was not even mentioned.

. . . Comrades, for our actions in Afghanistan, for the fact that we fulfilled our obligation to international solidarity in relations to revolutionary Afghanistan, for the fact that the aggressor already has received a solid rebuff, the Soviet Union does not intend to make any excuses to anyone, and the inspirers of aggression against the Afghan state are beginning to feel that. Those should ask for pardon who organized and stand behind the aggression against Afghanistan, who concocted the criminal plans in relation to that country, the independent existence and security of which have a direct relation to the security of the Soviet Union. We accuse the organizers of the aggression against Afghanistan and demand that that aggression be stopped. (Applause).

Of course, it would be premature to believe that the complexity in relation to Afghanistan is already behind us. The external enemies of Afghanistan and the domestic reactionary forces will still make themselves known. But the matter is now on the correct path. Afghanistan will not return to the past. Our Party and our people can be sure of that. (Applause).

For us now, as Leonid Il'ich announced, there is no need to have in Afghanistan a military contingent even of the size which it was when it was introduced. But if the situation demands it, we at any

time will be able to strengthen our contingent, so as to reliably work together to provide for the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

The possibility of reaching at an appropriate time a Treaty of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which would clearly demonstrate the resolve of both countries not to allow any encroachment from without on the independence and integrity of the Afghan state, deserves serious attention.

... We have proposed and propose that Washington be led in our mutual relations by the principles of equality, equal security, mutual advantage, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. In a single word, we have built and are ready in the future to build our relations with the USA on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Declaring our readiness to maintain normal relations with the USA, we proceed from the fact that hostility between the two powers is not only unwise, but also dangerous. At the same time we more than once have warned the Americans, that they should take into account the lawful interests of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union will not permit anyone to trample on those interests. Many of you, evidently, have in your memory how during the terms of office of various Presidents throughout the post-war period, American policy rocked from side to side. It cost the Soviet Union considerable effort to lead the USA to an acknowledgement of the single reliable basis of our relations—a policy of peaceful coexistence.

Now the American administration has once again begun to veer wildly. The underlying cause of the current break in Soviet-American relations is Washington's attempt to do whatever it takes to achieve military superiority over us.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 40; provided by M. Kramer.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to
Erich Honecker, 18 July 1980**

18/7/80
Confidential

DISPATCH

The other day, the President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq addressed us with a proposal on holding talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran under the mediation of the Soviet Union. The goal of these talks should be, in his words, the normalization of bilateral relations, the preservation of Afghanistan's status as independent and friendly to the Soviet Union and the assurance of a guarantee not to interfere in its internal affairs.

In the opinion of Zia-ul-Haq, such a meeting could take place in Moscow during the second half of August of this year, first on the level of Foreign Ministers, and then on the level of national and government leaders. The President of Pakistan announced that so far he has not discussed this idea of his with the government of Iran, but he expressed confidence that Iran will lend his support.

From the very beginning we were not sure of the seriousness of Zia-ul-Haq's intentions. Nevertheless, after consulting with the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, we decided to express, in principle, a positive regard to his proposal.

However, following this, as we suspected, Pakistan essentially went back on their word. Under the guise of additional "explanations" of their proposal they started to put forth completely unacceptable preconditions for these talks.

First of all, Pakistan directly and rudely declares the "unacceptability" of Babrak Karmal as the head of the Afghan government and that he must be replaced by someone else. Secondly, Pakistan declares that it will continue to act on the basis of Pakistan's obligations stemming from the decisions made by the Conference of Islamic Nations. Thirdly, despite Zia-ul-Haq's earlier conviction that Iran will support his proposal for direct talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan is distancing itself from that as well.

Obviously we have no intention to continue the dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of their current position, which constitutes a particularly rude interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

[Source: *SAPMO*, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; document provided by V. M. Zubok.]

**Report by Soviet Defense Minister
Ustinov to CPSU CC on "Foreign**

**Interference" in Afghanistan,
2 October 1980**

Secret

CPSU CC

**On Foreign Interference in the Internal
Affairs of the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)**

Following the victory of the revolution in Afghanistan, the USA and its allies in NATO, as well as China, Pakistan, Iran, and several reactionary Arab countries, launched subversive actions against the DRA, and these actions were greatly stepped up once Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan.

The USA and its allies are training, equipping, and sending into DRA territory armed formations of the Afghan counter-revolution, the activity of which, thanks to help from outside, has become the main factor destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. The most serious actions against the DRA are being launched from the territory of Pakistan, where armed detachments of Afghan reactionaries are being trained at 42 sites. In total, over 60,000 rebels, including more than 50,000 who have been infiltrated into DRA territory, have been trained in Pakistan in 1980 with help from American, Chinese, Pakistani, and Egyptian instructors.

The Iranian leadership is openly supporting the Afghan reactionaries. There are 13 training camps on Iranian territory for the Afghan rebels. Some 5,000 people have been trained at these sites, including nearly 3,000 who have been sent into Afghanistan.

American instructors are taking an active part in the training of rebels on the territory of Pakistan. These instructors have come mainly from the Washington-based "International Police Academy" and the Texas-based school of subversion. In March and April of this year alone, the USA sent 100 instructors through Karachi into the regions of Pakistan bordering on the DRA. Some of these instructors directly organized the operations of rebel units on the territory of Afghanistan.

The USA is providing shipments of weapons to the Afghan rebels mainly through third countries (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). The direct supply of weapons to the Afghan rebels in Pakistan is carried out via transport assets of the Pakistani ground

and border forces, and also through the national transport corporation.

The Carter administration is seeking to unite the Afghan counterrevolution, promising its leaders that if they unite, they will receive unlimited help in the form of weapons and money. The USA chief of mission in Pakistan, B. King, said this during a meeting this past March with the secretary of Pakistan's defense ministry, Lieutenant-General D. Khan. The USA consulates in Peshawar and Karachi are working to unite the scattered groups of the Afghan counterrevolution. An "Afghan section" that has been created in the USA consulate in Karachi is supervising rebel operations and providing them with weapons and equipment.

The American authorities are also investigating actions by anti-Afghan emigre groups in the United States itself. With the direct participation of the CIA, the "Association of American Aid to Afghan Refugees," the "National Liberation Front of Afghanistan," the "Unity Council," and the "Committee for Solidarity in Organizing the Liberation of Afghanistan" have been set up in the USA. These organizations have been given the task of coordinating the actions of anti-Afghan forces abroad and of providing financial aid to armed detachments of the Afghan counterrevolution.

The American CIA has devised special recommendations "for the use of religious movements and groups in the struggle against the spread of Communist influence." In accordance with these recommendations, agents from the American special services in Pakistan are carrying out vigorous work among the Pushtun and Beluga tribes, provoking them to carry out anti-government acts in Afghanistan.

Foreign interference in the DRA's internal affairs, above all by the USA, is thwarting efforts to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

Reported for informational purposes.

D. Ustinov

2 October 1980

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 177, ll. 84-86; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia* 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 98-99), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript

(excerpt), 10 March 1983

SESSION OF THE CC
CPSU POLITBURO
10 March 1983

Chairman: comr. ANDROPOV Yu.V.

Present: comrs. Aliev G.A., Gorbachev M.S., Gromyko A.A., Pel'she A. Ya., Tikhonov N.A., Chernenko K.U., Demichev P.N., Dolgikh V.I., Kuznetsov V.V., Solomentsev M.S., Kapitonov I.V., and Ryzhkov N.I.

[...] 6. On the situation in Afghanistan and additional measures towards its improvement.

GROMYKO. In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo, a group of high-ranking party, soviet, military and production management officials traveled to Afghanistan. This group put in some good work there. They put together a set of proposals for the further stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. We examined these proposals during meetings of the CC Politburo Commission on Afghanistan. These proposals contain problems that must be decided in the immediate future by both the Afghan and the Soviet sides. Financially speaking, this will cost approximately 300 mln. rubles in the course of three years. This is a large, yet minimum sum, and it seems that we should make this expenditure.

On the whole, the situation in Afghanistan is, as you know, difficult. Lately, certain elements of consolidation have been examined, but the process of consolidation is moving slowly. The number of gangs [rebel groups] is not decreasing. The enemy is not laying down its weapons. The negotiations with Pakistan in Geneva are moving slowly and with difficulty. This is why we must do everything to find a mutually acceptable political settlement. In advance, it can already be said that this process will be a lengthy one. There are questions which must be discussed separately. One should only keep in mind that for now we cannot give Pakistan consent on concrete time periods for the withdrawal of our troops from the country. We must exercise caution here. Yes, the situation is stabilizing. It is good that the Afghan army has grown to 140 thousand. But the main trouble is that the central authorities have not yet

reached the countryside: [they] rarely interact with the masses, about one third of the districts is not under the control of the central authority, and one can feel the fragility of the state government.

In closing, I would like to say that evidently we need to take the steps which are outlined in the recommendations given to you for examination. It seems that it will be necessary to hold a meeting with Karmal and a group of leading officials of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan sometime in April. It seems that it would also be expedient for Yu. V. Andropov to meet personally with Babrak Karmal.

TIKHONOV. When speaking of 300 mln. rubles, this refers to free assistance.

ANDROPOV. You remember how arduously and cautiously we decided the question of deploying troops in Afghanistan. L.I. Brezhnev insisted on a roll call vote by the members of the Politburo. The question was examined in the CC Plenum.

In deciding the Afghan problem we must proceed from existing realities. What do you want? This is a feudal country where tribes have always been in charge of their territories, and the central authority was far from always able to reach each Kishlak [an Afghan district]. The problem is not in Pakistan's position. We are fighting against American imperialism which well understands that in this part of international politics it has lost its positions. That is why we cannot back off.

Miracles don't happen. Sometimes we are angry at the Afghans because they act illogically and work slowly. But let us remember our fight with *basmatchism* [banditry]. Why, back then, almost the entire Red Army was concentrated in Central Asia, yet the fight with *basmatchi* continued up until the mid-1930's. And so in our relations with Afghanistan there must be both demands and understanding.

As concerns the recommendations of the Commission, are they not a little imposing with exact instructions as to what should be done by the Afghan side and by ours?

GROMYKO. Of course we will work to complete the recommendations.

ANDROPOV. Yes, so that it should be a political document. It must be much more flexible.

PONOMAREV. We will complete these materials.

ANDROPOV. Evidently we do need

these talks with Karmal. It will probably be advantageous to hold them in two rounds; moreover, my discussion with Karmal should be organized last.

KUZNETSOV, TIKHONOV, GORBACHEV. That's right.

ANDROPOV. Then, perhaps we will make the following decision: To agree with the findings reported by the Politburo Commission on Afghanistan and accept the expediency of holding discussions with B. Karmal and a group of other leading officials of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in March-April of this year. At the same time we can ratify the draft resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on giving additional economic assistance to the Afghan Republic.

The resolution is approved.

7. On the Afghan-Pakistan negotiations on the questions of political settlement

ANDROPOV. It seems that the question is clear.

GROMYKO. The Afghans, of course, must be given materials which would give them the ability to prepare well for the negotiations.

PONOMAREV. They very much need these materials.

ANDROPOV. Then let us approve the resolution.

The resolution is approved.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89 per. 42, dok. 51; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

CPSU CC Politburo Transcript (excerpt), 20 March 1986

Top Secret
Only copy
(Draft)

SESSION OF CC CPSU POLITBURO
20 March 1986

Chairing: com. GORBACHEV M.S.

Attending: com Aliev G.A., Gromyko A.A., Zaikov L.N., Ligachev E.K., Ryzhkov N.I., Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov, V.M., Dolgikh V.I., Eltsin B.N., Yeltsin B.N., Sokolov S.L., Talyzin N.B., Biryukova A.P., Zimianin M.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov V.P., Razumovskii G.P., Yakovlev A.N.

GORBACHEV: Before we start discussing the issues on the agenda, I would like to inform you on some questions.

A troubling cable has arrived from Aden. They want to shoot 50 people there. I think we should issue an appeal, pointing out that the main thing today is unity. And the actions of this kind can aggravate internal strife.

GROMYKO: Right

GORBACHEV: Let Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev], Viktor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] and the MFA prepare the necessary instruction.

LIGACHEV: The Bulgarians refused to receive Muhammed.

GORBACHEV: We should not dramatize it. They have to face certain difficulties, too, regarding this question.

According to information from confidential channels, [East German leader Erich] Honecker let himself speak in a way that testifies to his misunderstanding of our point of view about Socialist self-government of people, that socialism itself is a self-government.

[pages missing-ed.]

GORBACHEV (reads a memorandum on Afghanistan). This is a strict party document. The situation is quite dramatic. B. Karmal is very much down in terms of health and in terms of psychological disposition. He began to pit leaders against each other.

SOLOMENTSEV: A correct position.

CHEBRIKOV: Karmal tells himself that he cannot cope with his functions (he reads a cable).

GROMYKO: One could instruct Mikhail Sergeevich to speak with him.

[Source: f. 89, per. 36, d. 18; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by V.M. Zubok.]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 13 November 1986

Top Secret
Only Copy
Working Draft

MEETING OF CC CPSU POLITBURO
13 November 1986

Chaired by comr. GORBACHEV M.S.

Also present: comrs. Vorotnikov V.I., Gromyko A.A., Zaikov L.N., Ryzhkov N.I., Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov V.M., Shevardnadze Eh.A., Demichev P.N., Dolgikh V.I., Yeltsin B.N., Talyzin N.V., Biryukova A.P., Dobrynin A.F., Zimyanin M.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov V.P., Razumovskii G.P., Kapitonov I.V.

[...] 11. On [former Afghan king] Zakhir Shah.

GORBACHEV. Have all comrades familiarized themselves with the memorandum from comrs. Chebrikov V.M., Shevardnadze Eh. A., Sokolov S.L., and Dobrynin A.F.?

POLITBURO MEMBERS. Yes, we have.

GORBACHEV. Then let us exchange opinions. I have an intuition that we should not waste time. Najib needs our support. He objectively evaluates the situation and understands the difficulty of the existing problems. He believes that the activation of measures directed towards national reconciliation, strengthening of the union with the peasantry, and consolidation of political leadership of the party and the country is a pressing task.

Karmal is stalling. [translator's note: Gorbachev here uses an idiomatic Russian expression—"Karmal vydelyvnet Krendelya"—which literally means, "Karmal is walking like a pretzel." The expression, derived from a term for the weaving and unsteady gait of a drunkard, in this case signifies Gorbachev's assertion that Karmal is not behaving in a straightforward manner.]

We have been fighting in Afghanistan for already six years. If the approach is not changed, we will continue to fight for another 20-30 years. This would cast a shadow on our abilities to affect the evolution of the situation. Our military should be told that they are learning badly from this war. What, can it be that there is no room for our General Staff to maneuver? In general, we have not selected the keys to resolving this problem. What, are we going to fight endlessly, as a testimony that our troops are not able to deal with the situation? We need to finish this process as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. It is necessary to establish a strategic target. Too long ago we spoke on the fact that it is necessary to close off the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan

and Iran. Experience has shown that we were unable to do this in view of the difficult terrain of the area and the existence of hundreds of passes in the mountains. Today it is necessary to precisely say that the strategic assignment concludes with the carrying of the problem towards ending the war.

GORBACHEV. It is necessary to include in the resolution the importance of ending the war in the course of one year - at maximum two years.

GROMYKO. It should be concluded so Afghanistan becomes a neutral country. Apparently, on our part there was an underestimation of difficulties, when we agreed with the Afghan government to give them our military support. The social conditions in Afghanistan made the resolution of the problem in a short amount of time impossible. We did not receive domestic support there. In the Afghan army the number of conscripts equals the number of deserters.

From the point of view of evaluating the domestic situation in Afghanistan, we can sign under practically everything that Najib suggests. But we should not sharply cut off Karmal, as he serves as a symbol to his people. A meeting of our representatives with him should be held. It is also necessary to try keep him on the general track; to cut him off would not be the best scenario. It is more expedient to preserve [his relations] with us.

Najib recommends a rather wide spectrum of steps. They deserve attention. One path is to draw in the peasant masses on the way of supporting the government power; another - negotiations with Islamic parties and organizations inside Afghanistan and beyond its borders, which are ready to compromise; third path - relations with the former king. I think that we should not spurn them. This should be done possibly in a combination other than proposed by Najib. Right now a more concrete stage of discussion with him concerning these questions is needed. A certain plan of actions is necessary. Here, it seems, our participation is needed, in particular, through the course of our contacts with Pakistan.

Concerning the Americans, they are not interested in the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. On the contrary, it is to their advantage for the war to drag out.

GORBACHEV. That's right.

GROMYKO. It should be considered how to link India into the settlement. A de-

lay in the resolution of these problems does not increase our opportunities for settlement. Right now the situation is worse than half a year ago. In one word, it is necessary to more actively pursue a political settlement. Our people will breathe a deep sigh if we undertake steps in that direction.

Our strategic goal is to make Afghanistan neutral, not to allow it to go over to the enemy camp. Of course it is important to also preserve that which is possible in the social arena. But most important - to stop the war.

I would agree that it is necessary to limit this to a period of one-two years.

SOLOMENTSEV. It would be good to complete a political settlement for the 70th anniversary of [the 1917] October [Revolution].

GROMYKO. It is difficult to talk about such a period of time.

CHEBRIKOV. On this question many decisions have been made. Much energy has been put in. But, unfortunately, the situation, both in Afghanistan and around it, continues to remain difficult. I support the proposal of Mikhail Serge'evich [Gorbachev] that it is necessary to live up and push the problem towards a logical conclusion. Indeed, we posed the question of closing the border. Andrei Andre'evich [Gromyko] is partly right, speaking about the difficulties of such a closing, due to the geographic and other conditions. But partly the failure in the closing is also tied to the fact that not everything was done that could have been. Right now the enemy is changing its tactics. He is going underground. It is necessary to look for the means to a political solution of the problem. The military path for the past six years has not given us a solution.

What should have been done? First of all, it was necessary to receive Najib in Moscow. He has never visited us. It is possible that Karmal's conduct can be in some way explained by the fact that as of now we have yet to invite Najib to come here. There have been telephone conversations with him through intermediaries, but that's not [enough]. A direct conversation is necessary. It could clear up a great deal. It is important not to put off such a conversation; a day or two should be found for the purpose.

Another important question - the question of cadres.

GORBACHEV. Who is preventing him from solving the cadre questions?

CHEBRIKOV. Well, each of us, a little bit. Such was the case with Dost, with the minister of defense, with supplementing the membership of the CC PDPA Politburo.

GORBACHEV. I thought that we gave Dost agreement on deciding these questions.

CHEBRIKOV. Then why is nothing being decided? We speak less about Afghanistan than we do about where will Dost work and where will the minister of defense be sent. Then it is necessary to give instructions to comr. Kryuchkov who is now in Kabul, not to avoid these questions in meetings with Najib, but to tell him directly that he must decide them as he finds necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE. Right now we are reaping the fruit of un-thought-out decisions of the past. Recently, much has been done to settle the situation in Afghanistan and around it. Najib has taken up leadership. He needs practical support, otherwise we will bear the political costs. It is necessary to state precisely the period of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. You, Mikhail Serge'evich, said it correctly - two years. But neither our, nor Afghan comrades have mastered the questions of the functioning of the government without our troops.

After the trip to India, it would be expedient to invite Najib to Moscow. We must regard Afghanistan as an independent country and entrust Najib to make decisions independently. He wants to create a headquarters for the military command. Why should we hinder him?

I expressed hesitation concerning the replacement of Dost, as he is an experienced diplomat and has a wide cultural horizon. But nevertheless, if the first secretary of the PDPA believes that it is necessary to replace him, then we must give him the liberty to make the decision.

Arguments are being made as to who must accomplish the closing off of the borders - the army or state security organs? And this question must be decided by Najib, not by us.

Bearing in mind the prospects for future development in relations with Afghanistan, it is important to put stress on economic cooperation. Without this, our foundations there will be difficult in the future.

I support the proposition of Victor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] on the importance of meeting with Najib.

GORBACHEV. We can give corresponding instructions to comr. Kryuchkov.

SHEVARDNADZE. Both comr. Kryuchkov and comr. Vorontsov are good people, but their discussions cannot replace meeting with the General Secretary.

GORBACHEV. Here, probably, Akhrome'ev S.F. hears about the organization of a headquarters for the military command of DRA and smiles. Would these headquarters really command our troops?

DOBRYNIN. We must give liberty to Najib. Two questions arise here. First—the idea of national reconciliation, and second—the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

Karmal must be removed. But we must remember that through national reconciliation, not a single member of the CC PDPA Politburo supports Najib. There is no concept of such reconciliation.

GORBACHEV. The concept of settlement exists—we have established that—but in practice the problem is being resolved. Sergei Fedorovich, perhaps you will solve it?

AKHROME'EV [USSR dep. minister of defense]. No, it will not be possible to solve it.

DOBRYNIN. The question of the concept has not become the most important for the Afghan government. I come out in favor of receiving Najib in Moscow. Right now a message could be given to comr. Kryuchkov about the meeting with Najib. Let him tell Najib that he himself should make the decision concerning Dost, Karmal, but that this must be done without stirring up factionalism.

AKHROME'EV. Military actions in Afghanistan will soon be seven years old. There is no single piece of land in this country which has not been occupied by a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority of the territory remains in the hands of rebels. The government of Afghanistan has at its disposal a significant military force: 160 thousand people in the army, 115 thousand - in Tsarando and 20 thousand - in state security organs. There is no single military problem that has arisen and that has not been solved, and yet there is still no result. The whole problem is in the fact that military results are not followed up by political [actions]. At the center there is authority; in the provinces there is not. We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but on occupied

territory we cannot establish authority. We have lost the battle for the Afghan people. The government is supported by a minority of the population. Our army has fought for five years. It is now in a position to maintain the situation on the level that it exists now. But under such conditions the war will continue for a long time.

50 thousand Soviet soldiers are stationed to close off the border, but they are not in the position to close off all passages where cargo is transferred across the border. I repeat that we can maintain the situation at the current level, but we need to look for a way out and resolve the question, as Andrei Adre'evich [Gromyko] has said. We must go to Pakistan.

GORBACHEV. Why do you hinder Najib?

AKHROME'EV. He should not be building headquarters, but a state committee on defense. We allow him to make cadre changes.

VORONTSOV. A few words to continue the thought, just expressed by comr. Akhrome'ev S.F. Afghanistan is a peasant country (80 percent of the population are peasants). But it is exactly they who have least benefitted from the revolution. Over eight years of the revolution agricultural production has increased by only 7 percent, and the standard of living of peasants remains at pre-revolutionary levels.

By the acknowledgment of comr. Najib himself and a member of Politburo, comr. Zeray, in a conversation with me, the party "has still not reached the peasantry," land-water reform has turned out unsuccessful and has not been realized (now comr. Najib has already taken up to review from a more stability-of-life oriented perspective), the peasant has not received significant material benefit from the revolution. Even right now, in the words of comr. Zeray, when there are only 5 mln. people out of a population of 18 mln. under the control of the government (moreover, 3 mln. of them live in the cities and only 2 mln. in the country - this is no more the 300-400 thou. families), the party and the government have not inherited from the previous government precise plans on how to quickly raise the standard of living of these 300-400 thousand peasant households which are under the sphere of influence of the government.

By the declaration of the member of the Politburo responsible for the economy

and agriculture, comr. Zeray, "because of various reasons, the status of peasants in the government zone is in certain ways worse than in regions of counter-revolutionary activity." To the question of how this can be explained, comr. Zeray told me that "the regions under the control of the counter-revolution are better supplied with goods of first necessity (these goods are shipped there by contraband from Pakistan). A similar situation exists in Khost, Uruzgan, and other border regions. Sometimes a paradoxical situation arises when the peasants in regions under our control, said comr. Zeray, receive goods not from us, but from zones of gang-formation." Urgent measures are needed in this most important question - the improvement of the situation of peasants in the government zone.

Many members of PDPA leadership are without initiative, and have gotten used to waiting for recommendations from our advisors and have become sort of armless. It seems that our advisors in the beginning frequently "struck them on the arms."

Such is not comr. Najib. He creates the impression of a talented and decisive person. He must be given the opportunity to make decisions himself, only looking to make sure that because of his [inexperience] he does not amuse himself with secondary details. And he must have the opportunity to himself create his own "command" [or team].

GORBACHEV. In October of last year [1985] in a Politburo meeting we determined upon a course of settling the Afghan question. The goal which we raised was to expedite the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan and simultaneously ensure a friendly Afghanistan for us. It was projected that this should be realized through a combination of military and political measures. But there is no movement in either of these directions. The strengthening of the military position of the Afghan government has not taken place. National consolidation has not been ensured mainly because comr. Karmal continued to hope to sit in Kabul under our assistance. It was also said that we fettered the actions of the Afghan government.

All in all, up until now the projected concept has been badly realized. But the problem is not in the concept itself, but in its realization. We must operate more actively, and with this guide ourselves with

two questions. First of all, in the course of two years effect the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. In 1987 withdraw 50 percent of our troops, and in the following [year] - another 50 percent. Second of all, we must pursue a widening of the social base of the regime, taking into account the realistic arrangement of political forces. In connection with this, it is necessary to meet with comr. Najib, and, possibly, even with other members of the CC PDPA Politburo.

We must start talks with Pakistan. Most importantly, [we must make sure] that the Americans don't get into Afghanistan. But I think that Americans will not go into Afghanistan militarily.

AKHROME'EV. They are not going to go into Afghanistan with armed forces.

DOBRYNIN. One can agree with USA on this question.

GORBACHEV. We must give instructions to comr. Kryuchkov to meet with Najib and give him an invitation to visit the Soviet Union on an official visit in December 1986.

It is necessary to also tell comr. Najib that he should make key decisions himself.

Entrust comrs. Shevardnadze Eh.A. (roll-call), Chebrikov V.M., Sokolov S.L., Dobrynin A.F., Talyzin N.V., and Murakhovsky V.S., taking into account the discussion which took place in Politburo meetings, to coordinate, make operative decisions, and make necessary proposals on solving the Afghan question and settling the situation around Afghanistan.

POLITBURO MEMBERS. We agree.

The resolution is passed.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 16; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision of
24 January 1989, with attached report
of 23 January 1989**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Central Committee

Top Secret
Special File

No. P146

To Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Iazov, Murakhovsky, Kriuchkov

Excerpt from Protocol No. 146 of the meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 24 January 1989

Question of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs USSR, Ministry of Defense USSR, Committee of State Security USSR

To agree with the understandings set forth in the note of Comrades Shevardnadze E.A., Yazov D.T., and Kryuchkov V.A. of 23 January 1989 (attached)

Secretary CC

[attached] to article VI protocol #146

Top Secret
SPECIAL FILE

CC CPSU

On the measures pertaining to the
impending withdrawal of Soviet forces
from Afghanistan

In the difficult situation characterizing the state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can increasingly feel the inner tension stemming from the impending withdrawal of the remaining units of Soviet troops. The attention of the regime and the forces of the opposition is totally focused on 15 February, when, in accordance with the Geneva accords, the term of stay of our military contingent must end. In addition, the given timetable for Kabul is even more constraining, as the last Soviet military units must leave the Afghan capital in the beginning of February.

Practically throughout the entire country, military engagements between the government forces and the opposition continue to take place, in the course of which the government has essentially been able to maintain its positions, although with the help of Soviet aviation. The enemy has thus been unable to capture Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Kandahar. However, everyone understands that the main battle is still ahead. Currently the opposition has even decreased its military activity somewhat, saving up its forces for the coming period. Comr. Najibullah believes that it is intent on expanding its activities simultaneously in several key directions after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

It should be emphasized that the Afghan comrades are seriously worried as to how the situation will turn out. In general, their resolve to resist the enemy is strengthening; they are taking a number of emergency measures and trying to arrange more rationally the forces that are available. To a certain extent, the Afghan comrades are counting on the continuation of their contacts with a fairly significant number of commanding officers within armed detachments of the enemy, on the strong disagreements which continue to exist within the opposition, and on the incompatibility of some of its leading political groups, in particular the "Islamic Association of Afghanistan" ([Burhanuddin] Rabbani) and the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" ([Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar). Armed clashes between detachments of these and other opposition groups are not just continuing, but are taking on wider proportions as well.

The president is even closely examining such a possibility as declaring martial law or taking other extraordinary measures in the country, thinking that this may facilitate the adoption and execution of difficult decisions in the critical period ahead. At first he was leaning towards implementing martial law in our presence, but in the course of the discussions with him that have taken place, he arrived at the conclusion that this would best be done after the Soviet forces have left Afghanistan.

The Afghan comrades express their understanding of the decision to withdraw Soviet forces and affirm it once again, but, in conjunction with this, having soberly assessed the situation, point out that they cannot manage completely without our military assistance. Such assistance, in their opinion, could be rendered in forms different from today's and on a limited scale, but, nevertheless, would be a serious support both practically and psychologically. The Afghan comrades believe that if, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the opposition is unable to capture the principal centers in a swoop, then the Peshawar "alliance of seven" and the Teheran "union of eight" will have to enter into negotiations with Kabul to work out the future government arrangement in Afghanistan, which they steadfastly refuse to do at this time. The most important thing, emphasize the Afghan friends, is to hold out for at least the first three-four months after the departure of the Soviet

forces, after which the situation may gradually begin to shift to their advantage. Such an opinion is borne out by some remarks made by representatives of the opposition, in the course of contacts with Soviet representatives in Islamabad. By these remarks it was implied that if the government of Najibullah holds out, they will re-examine their current position of not recognizing it in the capacity of a negotiating partner.

In the given situation there arise for us a number of difficult elements. On the one hand, our departure from decisions, which have been made and announced, to complete the withdrawal of our forces on 15 February may cause us extremely undesirable complications in the international arena. On the other hand, there is no assurance that shortly after our departure there will not arise a very serious danger to the regime that, throughout the world, is associated with us. Especially since the opposition, during the decisive period, may well manage to coordinate its actions for a given time, which is what the American and Pakistani military circles have been persistently urging them to do. Certain apprehensions also arise due to the fact that there is still no real unity within the PDPA, and factional, tribal, and other disagreements remain. Impulsiveness and memories of past "injustices" are transparent in the thinking of some Afghan leaders. Feeble, to say the least, are the actions of prime minister M.H. Sharq and many ministers in his cabinet.

A most serious factor remains the fact that violations of the Geneva accords by Islamabad have acquired not just an open, but a flagrant character. Pakistani borderguards are directly participating in military operations on Afghan territory. Bombardments of bordering regions of Afghanistan are taking place, arms flow continuously, and armed bands are crossing over from Pakistan. As before, the headquarters of the Afghan opposition parties, their training centers and bases continue to function unimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. All of this is done by inertia [concerning policies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is unlikely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a position to change the situation in the near future.

Both we and Afghanistan have been continuously, in a decisive manner, and citing concrete facts, condemning and continue to condemn such actions of the Pakistani government. Such a line is meant to be con-

tinued also in the future, including in the UN Security Council as well as in contacts with the Pakistani government itself.

1. The chief question on which depends the continuing evolution of the situation boils down to this: will the government be able to maintain Kabul and other large cities in the country, though above all the capital? The situation in Kabul is difficult; indeed, the main problems are not even military, but economic. It is very clear that the opposition plans to organize an economic blockade of Kabul, close off its supply of foodstuffs and petroleum products, and provoke discontent and even direct insurgence of the populace. Already, such a blockade is virtually being carried out by the forces of the opposition in the form of highway robberies and intimidation and bribery of drivers of Afghan ground-based freight vehicles destined towards Kabul. It should be pointed out that the present complications with flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabul are to a significant degree related to the fact that the directive to inflict defeat on Ahmad Shah, whose detachments present the greatest threat to the road between Kabul and Hairaton, was not carried out when the time was ripe.

At the present time, just the monthly requirement of flour in Kabul is around 15 thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tons of flour were delivered by Soviet motor and air transport. However, it is imperative to have stored provisions for at least 2-3 months, which would be controlled by the President and which would give the Afghan friends the possibility of feeling secure in this matter.

Since such large stores can be created only with the help of motor transport, we are talking about getting flour and other foodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul highway. In the words of comr. Najibullah, if the road remains functionally secured until May, the survival of the regime is guaranteed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will not be able to secure the normal functioning of the road without our help. We must proceed from the fact that a break in the functioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway cannot be allowed. In addition, special attention will have to be paid to the most vulnerable section of the highway, which is the Salang pass with its more than three kilometer-long tunnel.

In preparation for the delivery of such

assistance it is necessary, during the remaining time, to intensify through all channels the condemnation of the actions of the opposition, which is obstructing the delivery of foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Afghan cities; moreover, one should lay stress not on the fate of the present government, but on the situation of the population of these cities, which is seriously suffering as a result of such barbarous actions.

In principle, it is possible to consider the following scenarios:

First scenario. Citing the difficult situation of the civilian population, leave one division, i.e. approximately 12 thou. people, on the Hairaton-Kabul highway. The given scenario is hardly desirable, as a question may arise at the UN that we did not completely withdraw our forces. Despite the fact that Pakistan is not fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva accords, one may assume that the majority of countries in the UN would not support us because, for many, the question of the military is at the crux of the problem.

Second scenario. Citing the threat of starvation in Kabul and other cities, appeal to the UN to urgently provide a shipment of foodstuffs and petroleum products to the cities and send the UN troops to maintain the highway in operation. Until the arrival of the UN forces, leave our military subdivisions in these positions to carry out strictly humanitarian functions - provide the population with foodstuffs and petroleum products. In conjunction with this, affirm that the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent has taken place. Announce that, after the arrival of the UN forces, our subdivisions will immediately return to the Soviet Union.

However, this scenario is practically unfeasible, since the deployment of UN forces requires a decision of the Security Council, on which we cannot depend.

Third scenario. Withdraw all troops by 15 February, as planned; affirm this in the international arena with pronouncements by the governments of USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan. Then, under the request of the Afghan government with which it will appeal to the countries of the world, begin the escort of convoys of civilian cargo with the apportionment of Soviet military units for their defense. The escort of such convoys could start within approximately two weeks after the withdrawal of Soviet

troops. Prior to this time, create a widespread general opinion with condemnations of the actions of the opposition, which is sentencing the population of Afghan cities to death from starvation. With the backdrop of such general opinion the escort of convoys by our units would appear to be a naturally humanitarian step. In addition, under this scenario, a number of sections of the road would have to be surmounted with a fight each time.

Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost all Soviet troops by February 15. Officially affirm the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent in a corresponding statement. But, under the pretext of transferring some posts on the Afghan Side of the Hairaton-Kabul highway, leave Soviet units in some of the more important points, including in the Salang pass. Avoid creating much noise, on our part, about this action; note only that this is but a small number of Soviet military personnel who were slightly delayed by the fact that the Afghan side has not yet taken over from them the stated posts. After some time, as in the third scenario, begin escorting convoys to Kabul under our military protection.

Under all these scenarios we can begin with the fact that these operations would be undertaken by our regular units, but they must be formed on a volunteer basis, primarily from among military personnel who are serving out their duties in Afghanistan or those that have served their term and are now in Soviet Union. In conjunction with this, offer a salary of 800-1000 rubles per month, partially in Afghan currency, for the rank-and-file and significantly increase the officers' salaries as well.

Give international observers the right - and announce this widely - to verify whether we are actually escorting civilian goods. In the nearest future, talks should be held with the UN Special coordinator of humanitarian and economic assistance programs Aga Khan with the aim of using these programs and the mechanism of the Special coordinator in order to counteract the extremists' plans to stifle Kabul and other large Afghan cities with an economic blockade.

In the talks with Aga Khan it should be suggested that UN convoys of foodstuffs, petroleum products, and medical supplies go not only through Pakistan, but, to a significant extent, through Soviet Union.

In all of the four enumerated scenarios it is intended that at least an insignificant number of Soviet troops is to be left behind after 15 February 1989.

There still remains to be examined yet another, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces are withdrawn completely before 15 February, but we give the Afghan Side additional assistance, including financial, in the organization of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabul highway using their own forces, up to the point of completely providing for these Afghan units for a determined time-period, though, undoubtedly, this would be tied to considerable difficulties, especially in ensuring a dependable convoy escort.

As for the Kabul airport, keeping in mind its importance, it is expedient to have there, with the conclusion of corresponding agreements with the Afghan Side, our own control tower staff, numbering up to 100 people.

2. From the side of the Afghan government a question has been raised concerning the continuation of air assaults and bombardments of the armed opposition forces carried out by Soviet aviation from our territory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The difficulty of this question is being explained to the Afghan comrades; they are being advised to think about how to make better use of the capabilities of their own aviation under the new circumstances. On the whole, our explanations have been received with understanding, but, at the same time, they say that in some of the more critical situations, the use of Soviet aviation may be simply indispensable. It appears that this question cannot be examined without taking into account all the internal and external factors.

3. The Afghan Side assigns serious significance to having at its disposal such powerful types of weapons as the R-300 rockets and batteries of "Hurricane" multi-rocket launchers. These questions evidently require a differentiated approach to this or another type of weapon, but the general line should be directed, inasmuch as is possible, towards a more complete satisfaction of Afghan requests. It should be kept in mind that the very fact of possessing such types of weapons would strongly reinforce our friends psychologically and give them confidence in their forces. Taking this into account, batteries of "Hurricane" have already been set up in the Special Guards and the

RA [Republic of Afghanistan] army. The R-300 rocket batteries, which are currently with the Soviet military contingent, may also be transferred to the Afghan Side after modifying them to an export model and after the preparation of Afghan personnel for use and maintenance of these units, which should be quickly carried out on our territory.

4. It would be expedient to positively decide the question concerning the use of the USSR border force capacities in the Afghan border zone, keeping in mind, however that the Soviet mobile border groups currently stationed there will not remain.

5. Lately, we have been doing quite a bit to give the Afghan friends economic assistance in accordance with exactly those difficulties that Afghanistan is in. This assistance, despite all kinds of difficulties with which both we and the Afghans met during its shipment and distribution, has without a doubt averted numerous undesirable turns in the situation's development.

Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty of the Afghan situation, we must once again very carefully re-examine the current economic processes which are of the utmost importance to its internal political situation. We must determine what can be done additionally to improve the Afghan economy which is in a critical state and, in effect, on the brink of ruin; we must give operational assistance to solve the acute problems which are arising, in particular through the shipments of foodstuffs and goods of first necessity to Kabul and various provinces of the country, including Badakhshan.

6. In conjunction with all these measures, it is necessary, as before, to continue giving the Afghan Side assistance in ironing out relations with the opposition in Pakistan, Iran, and Western Europe. We must pay attention to every nuance of the opposition's mood to catch the more suitable moments when we can use the necessary influence to split it, separating the "moderates" from the extremists. In particular, right now it is important to support the mission of the representative of the Secretary-General of the UN B. Sevan who has agreed to work towards the creation of a consulting panel for resolving the future government structure of Afghanistan.

Through our diplomatic channels, it will be necessary to take continuing steps in our work with all countries which are in one way or another connected to the con-

flict in Afghanistan.

Special attention should be paid towards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Side, using the upcoming talks involving the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Islamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even more goal-oriented propaganda work concerning Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of developments in the Afghan situation must be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of particular importance will be the securing of propaganda concerning the decision to introduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such is taken by President Najibullah.

E. Shevardnadze V. Chebrikov

A. Yakovlev D. Yazov V. Murakhovskii
V. Kryuchkov

23 January 1989

#65/OS

20 copies

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 4; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision,
13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov-
Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov**

Proletarians of the World, Unite!

Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P158/6

To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov, Pavlov A., Falin

Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on 13 May 1989

On additional measures to influence the
Afghan situation

1. To agree with considerations of com. Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., Yazov D.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in the memorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached)

2. For the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Committee on State Security [KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to take necessary measures for realization of the proposals in

the memorandum.

3. For the State commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the military-industrial questions, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR together with corresponding ministries and agencies to decide urgently on the possibility of an increase of delivery of R-17 missiles and their combat divisions to Afghanistan [in the amount of] up to 10-12 units per day and to take appropriate measures for that.

SECRETARY OF CC

To point 6 of Protocol no. 158

Top Secret

CC CPSU

On additional measures to influence
the Afghan situation

During the almost three months since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the armed forces of the Republic manage to oppose the opposition supported by Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia. However, the enemy, who realises that its plans to overthrow the government of Najibullah may be in danger, does everything to increase its military pressure. It focuses on the seizure of Jalalabad in order to set up its "transitional government" and to lay siege to Kabul.

In view of preparations for a new massive assault on Jalalabad with a large involvement of the Pakistanis, all the way to the sending of Army formations camouflaged as "Malishi," we published a Declaration of the MFA USSR and undertook other measures of a preventive nature, including ones in covert channels.

Taking into account this development, it would be advisable to carry out a number of measures to bolster the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and to exert a constraining influence on the Afghan opposition and Pakistan.

1. Of special importance in the current situation is a constant display of powerful impact on the enemy by combat fire, its further intensification, the use of the most effective types of weaponry. In this regard, we should search for additional reserves to accelerate delivery of armaments and ammunitions into Afghanistan, particularly the

armament like R-17 missiles, air-defense equipment, and others.

2. The question about conducting bombing raids by Soviet aviation from the territory of the USSR requires additional study.

3. We should continue demonstrative relocations of our aircraft from Soviet airfields near the border with Afghanistan, having in mind that these relocations should be done without any camouflage so that they could be observed by the Pakistanis and the opposition. [We should] continue further the flights of the Soviet military reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of Jalalabad and Khost, possibly at lower altitudes, with the aim of obtaining aero-photographic data about military concentrations of the enemy.

4. With regard to the idea of Najibullah about sending foreign volunteers to Afghanistan to render assistance to the government of the Republic in the repulsing of aggression, there is nothing to object to, if the Afghan friends do this kind of work with a number of countries, particularly Muslim ones.

5. It is decided that we will continue a constant political-diplomatic campaign with the aim of influencing [public opinion] on the Afghan issue in the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and also insofar as one can use the capabilities of India, the Non-Aligned Movement. In particular, the Afghan theme will continue to be a focus in Soviet-American contacts. It is advisable to accept the proposal of Saudi Arabia to play a mediator's role between us and the Afghan opposition. We have in mind to take into account the anti-Afghan line of Pakistan in developing bilateral ties with this country.

L. Zaikov E. Shevardnadze D. Yazov
V. Kryuchkov

12 May 1989

no. 390/os

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 35; trans. by Vladislav M. Zubok.]