

Cloud Security Through Threat Modeling

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Key Points

- Introduction
- Threat Model Primer
- Assessing Threats
- Mitigating Threats
- Sample Threat Model Exercise
- Conclusions and Questions




INTRODUCTION





Everything as a Service

FLEXIBLE
AUTHENTICATION
METHODS

MANAGED
APP INTEGRATIONS
Service Providers (SPs)



HOSTED/CLOUD SERVICE
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs)




How can security weigh-in with real risks?



Cloud Security Wisdom

This wisdom is captured best here:



Cloud Security Wisdom

What Is It?





Figure 5—Mapping the Cloud Model to the Security Control & Compliance



Modeling Risks Programmatically



Developing Threat Models

- Structured approach
- Repeatable way to identify attack surfaces (i.e. risk)
- Develop mitigations and acceptance criteria
- Can be applied to anything—even Cloud environments



Threat Modeling Cloud Environments

DOMAIN 10 //
APPLICATION SECURITY



Threat analysis guidance provided in this domain

10.6 Recommendations

10.6.2 Risk Analysis Recommendations

- Risk analysis of the applications for security and privacy (confidentiality, integrity and availability) are undertaken, and **threat models** should be built and maintained.
- Risks from the perspective of development and deployment in the cloud should be analyzed and related **threat models** maintained.

...good thinking, now let's talk about how to create threat models



THREAT MODEL PRIMER



Why Threat Model?

- Threat modeling is not just for code
 - Anything can be Threat Modeled
 - Output will drive risk analysis and business decisions
- Implementing in the Cloud is still code
 - Deploying and managing servers is all software
 - It has driven the rise of Dev-Ops personnel



When to Threat Model

- Not a one time event
- Adding or removing assets/components
 - It is never too late!
- What you need to know before you start
 - What are you building?
 - What needs to be protected?
- You can be too early, especially on new projects



Threat Modeling Tools

- The tool used is less important than the data recorded
- Using a tool already? Keep doing so!
- Whiteboards are a favorite
 - Do not forget longer term retention
- Data Flow Diagrams



Assessment and Identifying Threats

- Identify Data Assets
 - Determine Each Assets Relative Value
- Identify Actors and Data Asset Visibility
 - Internal Personnel
 - CSP Personnel
 - Government?



Assessment and Identifying Threats

- Data Flow Diagram
- Identify Points of Trust Boundaries
 - Points at which control changes
- Identify Points of Vulnerability
- Know Where Your Data Is
 - To the best of your visibility



ASSESSING THREATS



CSP Responsibilities–IaaS

- Hardware Layer
- Network Layer (IDS, DDoS, Guest Instances)
- Instance Access Control Rules



CSP Responsibilities–PaaS

- Hardware Layer
- Operating System Layer
- Network Layer
 - May not be inherited from IaaS
- Access Control Rules



CSP Responsibilities–SaaS

- All asset integrity and visibility is dependent upon the CSP regardless of service



CSP Threats–IaaS

- Data Visibility
 - Government requests
 - May be able to be mitigated
- Network Traffic Shaping and Manipulation
- Hypervisor Trust



CSP Threats–PaaS

- IaaS threats included
- Like a Managed Service Provider
 - Shared Root/Admin
- Less control over data
 - Depends on nature of PaaS
- Data Storage vs. Application Hosting
- Depends on how the data is used



CSP Threats–SaaS

- IaaS and PaaS threats included
- No guaranteed control over data
 - CSP must be completely trusted



MITIGATING THREATS



Mitigating CSP Threats–IaaS

- Data Storage
 - Storage location
 - Encryption and key management control
 - Avoid using ephemeral disks
- Authentication and Authorization
 - Use your own system whenever possible



Mitigating CSP Threats–IaaS

- Data transit
 - Encryption with your own certificates if possible
 - Pass through load balancers instead of terminating connections there
 - Includes administration
- Network segmentation and firewalls, if available



Mitigating CSP Threats–PaaS

- Monitor all access, regardless of who
 - It might not be a critical event—but then again, it might
- Use encrypted transit with your certificates/keys
 - Be careful where you store the private keys
- Encrypt before storing
- Log where possible



Mitigating CSP Threats–SaaS

- There is no control
- Deleted vs. non-visible
- Legal might help



The Fun Part: Multiple Services

- Most Cloud implementations use multiple services
- Data Flow Diagrams show their worth
- It is necessary to break the components down
 - Take each service on its own merit
 - They might not be from the same CSP
 - Could be a good thing



SAMPLE THREAT MODEL EXERCISE




Exercise: CSP Service Definition

ACME Cloud Data Storage

1. Web UI supplied to customers to manage users and access
2. RESTful API service to post and retrieve data in custom XML protocol
3. Underlying data storage architecture undisclosed to customers



Exercise: Data Flow Diagram



Exercise: Identifying Assets

Asset

User ID

User Name

User Account #

User CC #

Account Rep ID



Classification

Company Public

Company Confidential

Company Public

Secret Confidential

Company Confidential



Exercise: Identifying Actors

Actors

Anonymous


Account Rep

Account Manager

Account Administrator

CSP Personnel

CSP Customers



Classification

Anyone not authenticated

Authenticated account representative

Account representative managers

Controls account rep & managers access

CSP employees and administrators

Other customers using similar interfaces



Exercise: Identifying Threats

Threat

Data accessed or modified without authorization

Account credentials exposed or modified

Service not available

Operating System Access



Potential Actors

Anonymous, CSP employees, CSP administrators, other CSP customers, other account representatives

All potential users—not credential owner

All users

Anonymous, CSP administrators



Exercise: Identifying the Attack Surface

Threat

Data accessed or modified without authorization

Account credentials exposed or modified

Service not available

Operating System access



Attack Surface

Web Application/Service Flaw (XSS, CSRF, SQLi), Malware on System, Hypervisor Compromised, Command Injection

Web Application/Service Flaw (SQLi), Malware on System, Hypervisor Compromised, Command Injection

Required Systems offline, Firewall/Router misconfiguration, DDOS, IPS, WAF

Malicious CSP Admin, Hypervisor Compromised, Web Application Flaw (Command Injection, SQLi)



Exercise: Mitigate or Accept

Threat

Data accessed or modified
without authorization

Account credentials
exposed or modified



Potential Mitigation

Encrypt data at rest
Improve access groups
Find new CSP
Accept threat

Enforce use of HTTPS
Contract CSP to improve service
Find new CSP
Enforce use of IAM layer
or service provider



Exercise: Mitigate or Accept

Threat

Service is not available

Operating System access



Potential Mitigation

Onsite backup
Caching
Separate DR compute region
Multiple AZs or CSPs

Patching
Consistent Access Control
Enforcement
Change CSPs
Operating System Hardening



CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS



Conclusions

- Risk vs. Reward
 - Identify risk to minimize it
 - Increase reward—leverage CSPs that work
- Cloud Projects will involve discrete backend services
 - Lots of API interaction at SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS levels
 - Focus on permissions, authentication, and authorizations
- Leverage legal contracts and compliance assurances



Questions



Thank You!

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