Co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union

LET4CAP
Law Enforcement Training for Capacity Building

IRAQ

Downloadable Country Booklet
DL. 2.5
(Version 1.2)

Dissemination level: PU

Let4Cap

Grant Contract no.: HOME/ 2015/ISFP/AG/LETX/8753
Start date: 01/11/2016

Duration: 33 months

Dissemination Level	
PU: Public	X
PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission)	
RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission)	

Revision history

Rev.	**Date**	**Author**	**Notes**
1.0	18/05/2018	Ce.S.I.	Overall structure and first draft
1.1	25/06/2018	Ce.S.I.	Second draft
1.2	30/11/2018	Ce.S.I.	Final version

LET4CAP_WorkpackageNumber 2 Deliverable_2.5 VER

WorkpackageNumber	2
Deliverable	Deliverable 2.5 Downloadable country booklets
VER	1.2

IRAQ

Country Information Package

This Country Information Package
has been prepared by

Lorenzo Marinone
Ce.S.I. – Centre for International Studies

Within the framework of LET4CAP and with the financial support to the Internal Security Fund of the EU

LET4CAP aims to contribute to more *consistent* and *efficient* assistance in law enforcement capacity building to third countries. The Project consists in the design and provision of training interventions drawn on the experience of the partners and fine-tuned after a piloting and consolidation phase.

Table of contents

1. Country Profile

1.1 Country in Brief

Source: University of Texas Libraries

Formal Name: Republic of Iraq
Previous formal names: The Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq
Population: 39,192,111 (July 2017 estimates)
Term for Citizens: Iraqis

Area (sq km): 438,317 sq km (169,235 sq miles)
Capital City: Baghdad
Independence: 3 October 1932 (from the United Kingdom)

1.2 Modern and Contemporary History of Iraq

Early history

Modern day Iraq encompasses ancient Mesopotamia, one of the most important cradles of civilizations in the region together with the Levant and the Nile valley. The name “Mesopotamia” comes from ancient Greek meaning “between the rivers”, a reference to river Tigris and Euphrates that for much of their course run through Iraq. Home to settlements of Neanderthal culture since 65000 BC, since then Mesopotamia has been inhabited continuously throughout the prehistoric era. Starting from 4000 BC different civilizations have developed in the territory of Mesopotamia, characterized by profound diversity of organization and social stratification, territorial extension and cultural development. With the emergence of the Sumerian civilization (4500-1900 BC) a dense network of city states developed, the first systems of writing (cuneiform writing engraved on clay tablets), organized religion and bureaucracy appeared. Sumerian civilization is responsible for inventions destined to profoundly affect the history of mankind like the wheel, and for giving fundamental impulse to disciplines such as mathematics, astronomy, astrology, law and medicine.

From the third millennium BC the civilizations of the Akkads, Assyrians and Hittites developed on a large part of Mesopotamia, often creating innovative syntheses with the Sumerian civilization. In this period the contacts with the other civilizations of the region multiplied, in particular towards the Levant, both with commercial and cultural exchanges, and with expansionist campaigns that proceeded with alternating events. The frequent migrations, invasions and political upheavals that took place up to 600 BC made Mesopotamia a very rich ethnic, religious and cultural mosaic, which in large part is still a characteristic feature of modern Iraq.

In the centuries between the 7th BC and the 3rd AD Mesopotamia lost its traditional centrality in the region and became subject to invasion by stronger neighboring empires. In the 6th century BC, Cyrus the Great of neighboring Persia subsumed Mesopotamia into the Achaemenid Empire for nearly two centuries. In the late 4th century BC, Alexander the Great conquered the region, putting it under the Hellenistic Seleucid rule for over two centuries. The region was then conquered by the Parthians from Persia during the 2nd century BC, whose empire was finally crushed by the Sassanid dynasty in the 3rd century AD. The region was thus a province of the Sassanid Empire for over four centuries, and became the battle ground between the Sassanid Empire on the one hand, and Roman and Byzantine Empire on the other hand.

The Arab conquest

The military campaigns launched by Sassanids and Byzantines contributed decisively to weakening both empires and paving the way for the subsequent rapid expansion by the Arab troops. The Arab conquest of Persia led to the end of the Sasanian Empire in 651 AD and established Islam in Iraq. Under the Umayyad dynasty, at the height of just over a century of offensive, the caliphate reached its maximum expansion, stretching from the heart of the Iberian peninsula to the west, through North Africa and the Levant, to the Indus valley to the east. The Muslim conquest was followed by mass immigration of Arabs from eastern Arabia. Instead of dispersing and settling in the country, these new arrivals established two new cities in the south. In parallel, in the north of the country the city of Mosul began to emerge as one of the most important urban centers in the area.

During the first few decades of the Arab conquest, Iraq became the theater of some of the clashes for the succession at the summit of the caliphate which sanctioned the division between Sunnis and Shiites, the latter being headed by Ali's current, the cousin and son-in- law of prophet Muhammad who ruled as the 4th caliph. In 680 Ali's son Husayn arrived in Iraq from Medina, hoping that the people of Kufa would support him in his bid for succession. Husayn's small group of followers was massacred at the battle of Kerbala. The report and memory of this event soon assumed a foundational value and became a highly symbolic source of inspiration that is still absolutely central to Shiite rituality. In the past centuries the city of Kerbala and Ali's tomb at nearby Najaf have become important centers of Shiite pilgrimage that are still greatly revered today.

With the transition from the Umayyad dynasty to the Abbasid dynasty beginning in 750, the center of gravity of the Islamic caliphate moved from Syria to Iraq. Under the Abbasids, the capital of the caliphate was first moved to Kufa, near Najaf, and then to the new capital Baghdad, founded in 762 by the Caliph Mansour. The Abbasids relied on the bureaucratic structure inherited from the Persian Empire, were supporters of integration policies towards non-Arab-Islamic ethnic-religious components and laid the foundations for a period of renaissance of science, the arts and culture in general. Known as the "Golden Age of Islam", this period extends from the 8th century, starting with the reign of Caliph Harun al-Rashid, to the siege and looting of Baghdad due to the invasion of the Mongols in 1258, during which the capital was put to fire and sword. Baghdad was again besieged and sacked in 1401 by Timur, a warlord of Mongol descent from Central Asia, who dealt it a blow from which it did not recover until modern times.

Ottoman Iraq

After relatively short periods of domination by two Turkmen tribal confederations, the Kara Koyunlu and the Ak Koyunlu (1410-1508) and by the Persian Shiite Safavid dynasty (1508-1534), Iraq came under Ottoman domination for nearly four centuries. While the upper parts of the country were already conquered in 1514 by sultan Selim I, who took control of Mosul and the Kurdish-inhabited northern region east of the Tigris after the battle of Chaldiran, central and southern Iraq was incorporated in the empire only in 1534 after the defeat of the Safavid local governors by sultan Suleyman the Magnificent. As a result of the Ottoman conquest, Iraq underwent complete geopolitical reorientation westward, toward the Ottoman lands in Syria and Anatolia, that resulted in closer commercial and cultural ties with the eyalet (province) of Diyarbakir, in today south-eastern Turkey.

Iraq was at that time more an administrative entity and a border Ottoman province with no clear boundaries to the east and south, than a unitary and cohesive territory from the political, social, economic point of view. Ottoman Iraq was in fact divided in three distinct provinces: Mosul in the north, Baghdad in the centre, Basra in the south. While the former was primarily inhabited by Kurds and other non-Arab population, Baghdad and Basra were predominantly Arab-speaking territories. As far as religious and sectarian distribution is concerned, the centre-north was overwhelmingly Sunni with non-Muslim communities (mainly Assyrian Christians and Jews) to be found in urban centers and Mosul province, while Basra and southern marshes were uniformly Shiite. This distribution has endured with few significant changes until nowadays.

The Ottoman rule, in Iraq as in many other parts of the empire, did not respond to a tendency of assimilation nor, much less, to a strong presence of the central authority. On the contrary, the Sublime Porte limited itself to sending some Janissary garrisons in the main cities, and appointing local governors, judges and

some of the top positions in the bureaucracy of the eyalet, leaving ample room for maneuvering to those landowners and traders who, even before the Ottoman conquest, represented the actual ruling class of the region. As a result, with the weakening of the Ottoman central institutions during the 17th century, various local potentates emerged throughout Iraq, often expressing individual families or specific tribal realities. In some cases, these new local potentates tried to increase their autonomy from Constantinople through tactical alliances with neighboring Safavids. The Basra region, linked from the commercial and religious point of view much more to Persia and the Persian Gulf than to the rest of the country or to the Ottoman Empire, tried several times to carve out larger spaces of autonomy by interacting with European colonial powers interested in exploitation of new trade routes, such as the British, the Dutch and the Portuguese. The greater or lesser attention of the Sublime Porte for the degree of obedience of the Iraqi local governors changed continuously according to the availability of troops, which could be sent to the most turbulent areas only when not indispensable in carrying out military campaigns on the European continent or elsewhere. The attempt to stabilize this peripheral region through diplomacy gave conflicting results. Only in 1639 the treaty of Qasr-e Shirin brought an end to 150 years of intermittent warfare between the Ottomans and Ṣafavids and established a boundary between the two empires that remained unchanged into modern times. But this was not enough to put an end to the turbulence that crossed the Iraqi territory, perpetually affected by riots, riots and raids both in the northern Kurd and in the southern regions, nor to effectively strengthen Ottoman rule over Iraq. The further weakening of the Ottoman central authorities became particularly visible during the years 1747-1831, when Iraq was ruled by a Mamluk dynasty of Georgian origin. Mamluks obtained autonomy from the Ottoman Porte, suppressed tribal revolts, curbed the power of the Janissaries, and introduced to the tentative program of modernization of economy and military.

During the first half of the 19th century, Constantinople undertook an ambitious comprehensive reform program of the empire that had profound repercussions also on its more remote provinces such as Iraq. In an effort to regularize and increase tax revenues and make the bureaucratic machine more efficient, the Ottomans reduced the autonomy granted to the provinces of the empire, restored a strong central government-dependent authority and started several structural reforms (agrarian and public administration reform). Within a few decades, the most powerful ruling families in northern Iraq, such as the Jaliles of Mosul and the Baban of Sulaymaniyya, were brought back into the orbit of the Sublime Porte, while in parallel the power of the religious class of the southern cities of Kerbala and Najaf was greatly reduced. The direct and indirect consequences of the reforms had the effect of creating new interests and social groups, some of which were directly involved in the reform process, while others decided to take an active role when they saw their status threatened. In general, the effect of the reforms caused a profound and lasting transformation of both social relations and the relationship between the inhabitants of the region and the new state machine. However, this did not translate into the disappearance of the local potentates, who on the contrary were able to take advantage of the ways in which some reforms were introduced, especially the agrarian reform, to increase their power both towards the population and the public administration. In fact, within these new power relations were channeled the social, tribal and religious dynamics that had previously regulated relations between the different social classes. For many of those great landowners who managed to increase their properties through the agrarian reform, the state apparatus and public services turned from an alien body that unfairly impose taxes, that must be opposed by force, as was previously perceived, into a sort of ally in the collection of taxes from the sharecroppers, as well as a nucleus of power with which to assert their growing influence in order to obtain favors, privileges and exemptions. With the consequent growth of social inequalities and the emergence of a new, compact ruling elite, the military career within the context of the army reform became one of the main social elevators, if not the only one. So many Iraqis opted for a military career that, by the end of the 19th century, they formed the most numerous group of Arab officers in the Ottoman army. Most were Sunnites from modest families, educated in military schools set up in Baghdad and other provinces cities by the Ottoman government. Among these were some of the personalities that would become central to the history of Iraq in the aftermath of the First World War, such as Nuri al-Said and Yasin al-Hashimi. As secular reforms were implemented and the role of the state expanded in the 19th century, Iraqi religious notables and officeholders suffered a relative loss of status, influence, and wealth. Meanwhile, Ottoman civil administrators and army officers, virtually all of whom were Sunnites, came to constitute a political élite that carried over into post-1918 Iraq.

The British mandate

During World War I, the Ottoman empire sided with Germany and the Central Powers. Iraq was invaded as soon as 1914 by a British expeditionary force. The intent of the British was both to safeguard their lines of communication and supply with India, and to protect their commercial and oil interests in the region, which with the start of operations of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the early years of 20th century had concentrated in the quadrant of the Persian Gulf and would have had to expand with explorations not only in the Basra area, but also in the provinces of Baghdad and Mosul. British army marched into Baghdad on March 11, 1917. An administration staffed largely by British and Indian officials replaced the Ottoman provincial government in occupied Iraq, but Mosul remained in Ottoman hands until after the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918), which brought an end to the war in the Middle East. British army didn't stop and entered the city of Mosul two weeks later, after the surrender of the Ottomans and virtually unopposed. The ownership of Mosul Province became an international issue that found an arrangement only in 1926 following the intervention of the League of Nations, which definitively assigned the region to Iraq.

On 11 November 1920, Iraq became a League of Nations under British control with the name "State of Iraq". Modern Iraq was from the beginning an artificial creature of the British Foreign Office, since it consisted in the union of the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, and derived largely from the division into areas of Middle East influence decided by Paris and London as early as 1916 with the Sykes-Picot agreement. In this way, Great Britain merged into one state three administrative units that did not have strong political, social, cultural, commercial and religious ties between them, also separating them from those areas where they had traditionally gravitated as the Levant and the Southeast of the Anatolian peninsula. Due to the emergence of strong Arab nationalist sentiments in the entire region at the end of the war, which had in Faysal the symbol of hoped Arab unity and were expanding with popular revolts from Syria to Iraq, Britain was forced to find a mediation with both nationalist demands and with the other mandating power in the region, France. The compromise was identified in the offer of the throne of Iraq in Faysal, in exchange for the renunciation of claims on Damascus (which was part of the orbit of French influence) and on the creation of a single Arab state in the Middle East. Even in order to minimize friction with the local population and avoid dangerous destabilization of the country, London finally opted for a form of indirect control over

Iraq, although extremely pervasive. In fact, although the mandate had been formally replaced by a treaty of alliance between the UK and Iraq as early as 1922, the British continued to maintain a profound influence both in matters of foreign policy and on the economy and some judicial issues. In addition, Britain continued to maintain a dense network of advisers within the Iraqi administration, which was largely chosen by London among Sunni Arab elites from the region for appointments to government and ministry offices.
The Organic Law, as the constitution was called, went into effect right after it was signed by the king in March 1925. It provided for a constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary government, and a bicameral legislature. With the approval of the Constitution, several political organizations established in previous years became protagonists of public life and carried forward an agenda focused essentially on achieving total independence from the British. In 1929 Britain notified Iraq that the mandate would be terminated in 1932. A new government was formed, headed by General Nuri al-Said, who helped in achieving Iraq's independence. A new treaty of independence was negotiated. Even though carefully worded, it still provided for a total alignment of Iraq with British foreign policy and granted to London the maintenance of some military bases on the national territory.

The Iraqi kingdom after Faysal
Internal dissension soon developed, fueled by the death of Faysal (1933) and the inexperience of his successor King Ghazi. This situation gave political leaders an opportunity to compete for power, often using rather unorthodox methods like press attacks, palace intrigues, incitement of tribal uprisings or incidents that would cause cabinet dissension. At the same time, the appeal to the army increased to pressure the governments and force them to resign, a trend that led the military to become one of the main powerbrokers in Iraq's internal politics since 1936. Despite political instability, material progress continued during King Ghazi's short reign. Oil had been discovered near Kirkuk in 1927, and, by the outbreak of World War II, oil revenue had begun to play an important role in domestic spending.
On 1 April 1941, former Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gaylani staged a coup d'état with the support of the army and overthrew the government. The UK invaded Iraq for fear that the Rashid Ali government might cut oil supplies to Western nations because of his links to the Axis powers and forced him to accept an armistice in May. Nuri al-Said was reinstated as head of government during the war and a military occupation was put in place. After the war, Iraq maintained close relations with Great Britain. On the one hand, it gained full sovereignty over British military bases and more room for maneuver on various issues, although with regard to foreign policy the alignment between the two countries was maintained almost unchanged, as evidenced by the signing of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 (together with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan) for the purpose of containing the Soviet Union. Political instability and the numerous tensions within the ruling class that had characterized past decades remained a fundamental coordinate of post-war Iraqi politics, with the old ruling class reluctant to grant spaces and shares of power to new generations of politicians and increasingly more perched on the defense of its own interests. The failure of younger civilians to obtain power aroused the concern of some young military officers. Because they were forbidden by military discipline to participate in politics, they began to organize in small groups, known as the Free Officers, and to lay down revolutionary plans, increasingly widening their sympathizers among the population. The officers worked in cells, and the identities of the participants were kept secret. Only the Central Organization, which supplied the movement's leadership, was known to all the Free Officers. The Central Organization was composed of 14 officers, headed by Abd al-Karim Qasim, the group's highest-ranking member, who spearheaded the organization's efforts together with his close collaborator Abd al-Salam Arif.

The 1958 revolution and the rise of Baath
Qasim and Arif staged a coup d'état on July 14, 1958, killing king Faysal II and Nuri al-Said, proclaiming the republic and controlling the country through military rule. Qasim, head of the revolutionary force, formed a cabinet, over which he presided, and appointed himself commander of the national forces. He also assumed the portfolio of defense minister and appointed Arif minister of the interior and deputy commander of the national forces. A Council of Sovereignty, composed of three persons, was to act as head of state with extensive executive and legislative powers. Despite this new state structure, however, power remained firmly in the hands of Qasim alone, who could enjoy the support of the army.
Not even the coup brought Iraq political stability, which, in fact, had been lacking for most of the monarchy years. In fact, already in the early stages of the revolution emerged more and more evident frictions between Qasim and Arif - the first proponent of a purely nationalist agenda, the latter favorable to a pushed pan-Arabism - and between Qasim and some of its supporters. After just a few years since the revolution, Qasim found himself increasingly isolated and weak. In 1963, after surviving several attacks on his life, Qasim was ousted by another coup, orchestrated by a part of the army along with the Iraqi branch of the Baath party, an advocate of Arab nationalism.
While the army preferred not to go directly into politics, the Baath immediately assumed the leadership of the country by entrusting the presidency to Arif. A National Council for Revolutionary Command (NCRC), composed of civilian and military leaders, was established to assume legislative and executive powers. President Arif, whose powers initially had been restricted by the Baath leaders, rallied the military forces to his side. In November 1963 he placed the leaders of the Baath Party under arrest and took control, becoming, in both fact and name, the real ruler of the country, and pushing a more pronounced socialist agenda by nationalizing banks and the main industries. Arif died suddenly in a helicopter crash in April 1966, paving the way for an accentuation of the existing tensions both within the Baath party, and between politics and the army, both within the armed forces themselves.

The 1968 revolution and the Kurdish uprisings
In July 1968 the government was overthrown by the army, with some assistance from civilian Baath party activists. President Arif was ousted on 17 July and some prominent baathist figures took power. In fact, al-Bakr was the then Baath party's Iraqi branch's Secretary General, and some years before the coup had appointed his cousin, Saddam Hussein, to be the party cell's deputy leader. In the coup's aftermath, al-Bakr was elected Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and President; he was later appointed Prime Minister. Saddam, the Baath party's deputy, became Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and Vice President, and was responsible for Iraq's security services. The coup brought to power not only the hard core of the Baath party, but above all a series of figures that had some important characteristics in common: they were all army officers and came mostly from the Arab-Sunni provinces of north-western Iraq, whose clans, tribal networks and groupings had long been the most important recruitment area of the army. The dual nature of the new political class, which had risen to power with the 1968 coup, once again caused frictions and tensions that could only be resolved by the purge (this time without bloodshed) of the leaders of the defeated faction. The two

prominent figures of the army that had facilitated the Baathists in their ascent were removed from the country and removed from their previous positions: Colonel Abd al-Razzaq al-Nayif was removed from military intelligence and Colonel Ibrahim Abd al-Rahman al-Daud lost control of the Republican Guard. The same fate in the following years touched a large number of prominent members of the new regime, especially belonging to the Baath, whose progressive purge increased the grip of control over the party, the state and the main centers of power by al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein.

For the two leaders al-Bakr and Saddam, therefore, the Baath party was just an extension of their personal power, managed through a vast array of protection devices that they controlled. In fact, Bakr and Saddam strengthened and refined a now traditional tendency of Iraqi politics, that of governing through more or less extensive patronage networks and of managing public affairs in a personalistic way, with the aim of securing the material resources necessary for feed certain networks of contacts, affiliations and patronage. As a result, the top positions of the state were soon occupied by a cohesive power group whose roots sank mainly in the Tikrit region and in the tribal grouping of the Albu Nasir. In fact, an interim Constitution was issued in September 1968. It outlined a presidential system composed of the RCC, the cabinet, and the National Assembly. Until the National Assembly was called, the RCC exercised both executive and legislative powers and, occasionally, judicial powers as well. After November 1969, with few exceptions, RCC members were elected or nominated out of the Baath party local branch. In this way the civilian party - *de facto* led by Vice President Saddam - was able to eventually remove all army officers from power and maintain control.

As Bakr and Saddam strengthened their internal grip on the state, the Kurdish uprisings resumed in the North. Desiring to achieve greater autonomy in Iraq, with the ultimate prospect of achieving genuine independence, the Iraqi Kurds had fought against Baghdad since the end of the First World War, achieving some ephemeral victories but retaining the ability to destabilize some regions of the country and resist the intervention of the Iraqi armed forces. The historic leader of the Iraqi Kurds was Mustafa Barzani, head of the powerful homonymous clan, who had hegemonized the Kurdish political and military scene since the 1940s, leading some offensives and giving life to the ephemeral experience of the Republic of Mahabad in 1946, a Kurdish state embryo created briefly across the border in Iran, taking advantage of the chaos following the end of the Second World War. One of the strengths of the Kurdish uprisings – a population that was distributed between Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria - had always been the ability to move in a fluid system of alliances with neighboring powers, particularly Iran. In this sense, the Kurdish problem for Baghdad also consisted of a proxy war with Iran. Thus, exploiting the deterioration of relations between Iraq and Iran in the aftermath of the 1968 coup (due to a border dispute over the Shatt al-Arab river), Barzani launched a new offensive against the Baghdad forces in March 1969. Bakr and Saddam's reaction was immediate and twofold: while on the one hand it proceeded with military expeditions against the Kurdish forces perched on the mountains of the north, in parallel was kept open a negotiating channel with both Barzani, and with the other powerful Kurdish family of the Talabani. The secret talks, led by Saddam, led to a Manifesto made public in 1970, with which Baghdad made important concessions to the Kurds. The central authorities took note of the existence of a distinct Kurdish national identity and of their own language. The Manifesto also envisaged greater representation to the Kurds in the central institutions, a census, and wide administrative autonomy at local level. Eventually, a Kurdish autonomous region was established in the three predominantly Kurdish governorates of Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaymaniyya. However, the lack of concrete steps in the following months led Barzani to resume contacts with Iran, in anticipation of a future resumption of hostilities with Baghdad. Hostilities resumed in 1974 and the Kurds initially enjoyed the support of the Shah of Iran, which intended to use it as an instrument of pressure on Baghdad for the border dispute along the Shatt al-Arab. However, Barzani's forces went to an early defeat because Teheran and Baghdad reached an agreement (the Algiers Accords) in 1975 and the Iraqi government took full control of Iraqi Kurdistan. The agreement was also instrumental to improve relations with Arab countries, that had reached a nadir because of Iraqi stark rivalry with a champion of Arab nationalism such as the Egyptian President Nasser, the numerous attempts to replace Egypt as a leading country in the Arab world (that especially compromised relations with Syria), and fears by traditionally conservative powers in the Gulf that Baathist Iraq could inspire revolutionary activities in their countries.

The rise of Saddam Hussein and the Iraq-Iran war

From the early 1970s Saddam was widely recognized as the power behind President al-Bakr, who after 1977 was little more than a figurehead. Saddam reached this position through his leadership of the internal security apparatus and the creation of a new Presidential Guard, whose members were mostly members of the Albu Nasir and allied tribes. Through the personalistic and unscrupulous use of these state apparatus, Saddam first succeeded in silencing any opposition to the regime, and then in ousting or eliminating all those internal party figures who could represent a potential threat to his leadership. On July 16, 1979, the eve of the anniversary of the revolution of 1968, al-Bakr was forced to resign and was placed under house arrest by Saddam's men. Saddam immediately succeeded him as president, chairman of the RCC, secretary-general of the party, and commander in chief of the armed forces. Moreover, just weeks after his rise to the presidency, Saddam denounced a conspiracy to oust him from power led by prominent members of the RCC, that were eventually tried and executed. In this way, Saddam further concentrated power in his own hands and made clear that he would not tolerate any internal dissent.

In 1979 the Shah of Iran was overthrown by revolutionary forces and a new Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini was installed. The regime change in Teheran deeply contributed to sour relations with Iraq. In fact, Saddam feared that the Iranian proclamations regarding the export of the revolution abroad could induce the strong Iraqi Shiite component to engage in greater political activism and to revolt against Baghdad, destabilizing the country. The Baath government was highly sensitive to the Islamic threat, not merely because it was a secular regime but because the ruling elite, despite some earnest efforts at enfranchisement, consisted mainly of Sunni Arabs. On the whole, Shiites remained aloof from the regime.

In fact, mass pro-Khomeini manifestations and guerrilla activities they began to take place regularly, especially in the south of the country, and were encouraged by the Iraqi Shiite cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. The regime reacted by killing and jailing dozens of thousands of people and by executing al-Sadr in 1980. Sadr’s Dawa party was outlawed and its members fled to Iran, where they continued their activities and later founded the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an umbrella group for those who opposed Baathist regime, led by Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim. At this juncture, Saddam saw in the growing international isolation of Iran and in the chaotic phase of transition to the new regime, which had weakened the Tehran army sharply, favorable conditions for shifting in his favor the balance of power with Iran. In September 1980 Iraqi army staged a ground invasion of Iran in what Saddam thought would be a blitz war that would have induced a new regime change in Teheran, put the Arab-populated Iranian Khuzestan province

under some form of Iraqi tutelage and provided Iraq with hegemonic power in the Gulf. The war lasted for eight years, until 1988, due to the strenuous resistance opposed by the Iranian forces. Not only did they block Iraq's advance in their territory, but they launched a series of counteroffers at the mouth of Shatt al-Arab in 1982, succeeding in freeing Khorramshahr, occupying the Fao Peninsula and directly threatening the city of Basra.
In July 1987 the UN Security Council had unanimously passed Resolution 598, urging Iraq and Iran to accept a cease-fire, withdraw their forces to internationally recognized boundaries, and settle their frontier disputes by negotiations held under UN auspices. Diplomacy failed due to the Iranian attempt to open a second front in northern Iraq, exploiting the Iraqi Kurdish forces present in the area. This attempt was defused by Saddam with harsh repression and the use of chemical weapons on the civilian population, as in the case of the bombing of the Kurdish village of Halabja. By mid 1988, Iraq succeeded in launching a new counter-offensive to the south, penetrating Iranian territory. This led Tehran to accept the terms of UN resolution 598, which officially entered into force on 20 August. The conflict did not produce significant changes in the border between the two countries nor did it bring any of Saddam's goals. But the war had devastated large portions of the territory of both countries and had cost hundreds of thousands of lives.

The First Gulf war
Immediately after the end of the conflict with Iran, Saddam started an intensive program of rearmament and increased the assertiveness of his foreign policy, threatening both Israel and some neighboring Arab countries on several occasions. In a context in which the low oil price and the absence of reconstruction aid promised by the Gulf countries increased the difficulties of Iraq, Saddam renewed the historical claims of sovereignty over Kuwait. Saddam believed that an invasion of Kuwait and the control of its oil infrastructure would solve Iraq's urgent need of cash. Moreover, given the decline of the Soviet Union, the Iraqis assumed that the United States would not see an occupation of Kuwait as a Soviet bid to control the Persian Gulf. On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. On the same day, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion and demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal. On August 6 the Security Council passed Resolution 661, imposing economic sanctions against Iraq that consisted of a wide-ranging trade embargo. On August 8 Iraq declared Kuwait to be its 19th province.
The United States promptly replied by promoting a 28-member coalition, including some Middle Eastern states, and allocating coalition troops to Saudi Arabia. The coalition began air operations on January 17 and on February 24 commenced at full-scale ground offensive on all fronts. The Iraqi military crumbled quickly and capitulated after a week of fighting on the ground, but the offensive stopped short of ousting Saddam. The defeat compelled Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and accept the Security Council resolutions. The Iraqi defeat led the Shiite and Kurdish components to rise up against Baghdad, respectively in the south and north of the country. Saddam's reaction against the Shiites was violent and undisputed. The regime allegedly killed scores of prominent Shiite religious and political leaders and arrested and imprisoned thousands of others whom they accused of sedition. It also drained marshes in the south where the bulk of Shiite forces was located. On the contrary, the Kurds could count on Western support. In April 1991 the United States, Britain and France established a safe area on Iraqi Kurdistan and prevented Saddam's forces from conducting operations in the region. In fact, Kurdish areas became from that moment on an autonomous region, *de facto* separated from the rest of the country. The government of the region was divided between Massud Barzani's Democratic Party of Kurdistan and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
In April 1991 the Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which made lifting the embargo conditional on Iraq's accepting the demarcation of the Iraq-Kuwait border, surrendering all its weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and destroying the ability to create such weapons. Because the Iraqi population was in dire need of humanitarian aid and the UN embargo was deeply affecting the country's resilience, the UN Security Council passed a pair of resolutions establishing what came to be called the oil-for-food program, in which Iraq, under UN supervision, could sell a set amount of oil in order to purchase food, medicine, and other necessities. However, due to the resistance of the Iraqi leadership, the program only became operational in 1996. Meanwhile, Saddam continued to obstruct the work of the UN commission committed to inspection and verification of Iraq's compliance with UN resolution on WMD.

The Second Gulf war and its aftermath
In an international situation strongly influenced by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, at the insistence of the United States, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002, demanding that Iraq readmit inspectors and comply with all previous resolutions. Iraq eventually agreed to readmit inspectors, but the inspections led to inconclusive results and fueled a strong debate in the International community about the degree of Iraq's cooperation, during which the US and the UK took the most hawkish stances, not playing down the possibility of a military intervention. On March 17, 2003, the United States and its allies declared an end to negotiations, and on March 20, without legitimacy from a UN resolution, the newly created 46-member "Coalition of the Willing" launched an air campaign (dubbed by the US "Operation Iraqi Freedom"), followed by a ground invasion from the south that soon curbed the disorganized resistance of the Iraqi armed forces and resulted in the complete collapse of the Baathist regime. The pretext for the invasion was that Iraq had not abandoned its weapons of mass destruction program, in violation of UN Resolution 687. This claim was based on documents provided by the CIA and the British government, and were later found to be unreliable. Four of the coalition members contributed troops to the invasion force (US, UK, Australia and Poland), while an additional 37 countries provided some number of troops to support military operations after the invasion was complete. Baghdad was occupied on April 9 and US President Bush declared the end of combat operations on May 1. On December 13, Saddam surrendered to U.S. troops when he was found hiding near Tikrit, and other major figures from the regime were tracked down and arrested.
In May 2003 the US, as the occupying power, installed a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by American diplomat Paul Bremer that acted as a caretaker administration in the country. The primary goal of the CPA was to maintain security and rebuild Iraq's badly damaged and deteriorated infrastructure. The first decisions of the CPA had a profound impact on the country and proved decisive in triggering a long-lasting, large-scale insurgency, fueling tensions between the different components of the country and removing the prospect of rapid stabilization and pacification. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1: De-Baathification of Iraqi Society declared the Baath party dissolved and established that no party member, from the leadership to the lowest levels, could hold any role in the public administration in the future. Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2: Dissolution of Entities signed by Coalition Provisional Authority on 23 May 2003, disbanded the Iraqi military, security, and intelligence infrastructure of Saddam. These decisions resulted in tens of thousands of Iraqis facing the prospect not only of being unable to play any role within the state

apparatus, but also and above all of not having any guarantee about their future and that of their families, since the public sector constituted their only source of income. Furthermore, such orders fueled the perception of coalition forces as illegitimate occupiers to a large part of the population.

Early insurgent activities and the Sunni Awakening (2003-2008)

The first insurgent activities took place immediately after the collapse of the old regime. The Iraqi insurgency, which still lasts today after going through different phases and internal changes, has been composed from the beginning by several souls, each driven by partly divergent motivations but all united by the objective of fighting against the occupying forces and, later, the Iraqi security forces perceived as collaborators of the coalition forces. One of the fundamental components of the Iraqi insurgency is the former members of the Baath party and the old state apparatus of the Saddam era. Already in May 2003 the US military noticed a gradually increase of attacks on US troops in various regions of the so-called "Sunni Triangle", especially in Baghdad and in the regions around Fallujah and Tikrit. Coalition forces engaged in extensive counterinsurgency operations.

Resistance to US-led forces would not for long be confined to the Sunni regions of Iraq. Over the 2003-2004 period, Shiite dissatisfaction with the occupation, especially among the urban poor, had been gradually increasing, leading to the rise of a second, distinct set of insurgent activities in Iraq. Shiites perceived the coalition failed in delivering its promises and were just as much dissatisfied with a foreign occupation as the Sunnis. Under the lead of Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and its Mahdi Army, Shiite insurgents targeted coalition forces and contested the nascent US-trained Iraqi security forces for the control of territory. Muqtada's forces managed to take control of most of the southern cities and opposed the counter-offensive launched by the coalition. The Shiite insurgence of the Mahdi army lasted alternately until 2008, when this was dissolved and Muqtada multiplied his efforts to increase his influence on the country through politics.

The third component of the Iraqi insurgency is represented by al-Qaeda. Since 2004, groups of jihadists under the command of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi began to engage in clashes with the occupation forces and to carry out attacks. After formally swearing loyalty to Osama bin Laden to obtain funding and increase his recruitment capacity in Iraq and abroad, Zarqawi, now leading al-Qaeda in Iraq, proceeded in parallel with attacks on the forces of coalition and to the main Shiite urban centers. The main strongholds of AQI were located in the western Sunni province of Anbar, and particularly in the cities of Falluja and Ramadi, and in the environs of the city of Mosul, to the north. Over the years, Zarqawi and his successors could count on the willingness of the Syrian authorities, which allowed the use of the Middle Euphrates valley, between Albu Kamal and Raqqa, as a logistical background for AQI. Moreover, AQI proved to be skilled in knowing how to co-opt the grievances of the Sunni components and to mobilize them for their cause, also emphasizing the sectarian aspect of the struggle through a rhetoric strongly opposed to the Shiites. Zarqawi was killed in June 2006 by a US strike, but AQI survived and led the country into a bloody civil war from 2006 to 2008. In fact, in February 2006 AQI bombed one of the holiest sites in Shia Islam, the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra. This set off a wave of Shia reprisals against Sunnis followed by Sunni counterattacks. The conflict soon escalated over the next several months.

The escalation was faced by the US with a two-fold strategy designed by General Petraeus. On the one hand, since 2007 the US increased the number of its troops in Iraq in order to provide security to Baghdad and took full control of Anbar province. On the other hand, Petraeus incentivized the Sunni Awakening, a movement in which Sunni tribesmen from Anbar who had formerly fought against US troops eventually realigned themselves to help counter other insurgents, particularly those affiliated with al-Qaeda in Iraq. The confluence of these factors hit hard AQI, which since 2008 significantly reduced the attacks, but was able to avoid the definitive collapse thanks to the preservation of its leadership and its own collegial structure, based on an organ called the Shura Council.

Relevant political developments (2003-2010)

On June 28, 2004 the Iraqi Interim Government led by Iyad Allawi took the place of the Coalition Provisional Authority, though the US retained significant *de facto* power in the country. On January 30, 2005, general elections were successfully held for Iraq's new 275-member Transitional National Assembly. A draft constitution was approved by a national referendum in October 2005. It shaped the new Iraq as a democratic, federal, representative, parliamentary republic. Sunni Arabs voted overwhelmingly against the new constitution, fearing that it would make them a perpetual minority. The emergence of torture and abuse by American forces in the Abu Ghraib prison further contributed to increasing the disenchantment of the Sunnis towards Iraqi politics and the role of foreign forces in the country. Article 140 of the Constitution provided for a peaceful resolution of controversies between Baghdad and the Kurdish region about the status of disputed territories in the north of the country, in particular regarding the future of the oil-rich Kirkuk. In a general election on December 15, 2005 the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) gained the most seats but not enough to call a government. After four months of political wrangling, Nuri al-Maliki of the Shiite Dawa party formed a coalition government that included both Arabs and Kurds. Saddam was executed on order of an Iraqi court on December 30, 2006. In November 2008 an agreement that determined a timetable for the final withdrawal of US forces was approved by the Iraqi parliament. In February 2009 US President Obama announced that US combat forces would be withdrawn from Iraq by December 2011. On June 30, 2009, US forces turned security responsibilities over to Iraqi forces. The second Iraqi parliamentary elections were held in 2010. Former Prime Minister Allawi won the relative majority of the votes, but not enough to form a new government alone. Results were contested by Maliki. In November 2010, after an eight-month political stalemate, Iraq's major political parties entered a power-sharing agreement that paved the way for a national unity government. Maliki retained the position of Prime Minister and was made acting head of the most sensitive Ministries (Defense, Interior, National Security) whose assignment to a specific political force risked prematurely terminating the legislature.

The rise of Daesh

During his second term, Maliki was accused of carrying out sectarian policies aimed at weakening the Sunni presence in the institutions and security services and suppressing protests and demonstrations of dissent by this component of the population. Just days after the US withdrawal on December 15, 2011, an arrest warrant was issued for Tariq al-Hashimi, the Sunni vice president, for having allegedly commanded a death squad during the war. Between late 2012 and mid 2013, Maliki gave orders to suppress protests against his government that had broken out in the predominantly Sunni provinces of Anbar, Nineveh, and Salahuddin. This aggravated sectarian tensions and led to the increase of insurgent attacks for the first time since 2008. During 2013 the remnants of AQI (which by that time changed its name in Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIL), taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, found fertile ground to mend relationships with that tribal Sunni landscape that was progressively marginalized. Moreover, ISIL -

also known by the Arabic acronym Daesh - succeeded in strengthening itself thanks to a tactical alliance with those former Ba'athists who had constituted one of the main pillars of the first phase of the Iraqi insurgency. By late 2013 Daesh had begun to pose a serious challenge to the Iraqi government's control in western and northern areas of the country. In early 2014 Daesh took full control of the city of Fallujah, and occupied parts of the capital of Anbar, Ramadi. In June 2014, Daesh offensives reached a critical point. The attack on Mosul showed all the weakness of the Iraqi armed forces and security, which left the city within hours, while entire divisions of the army dissolved without fighting. After conquering Mosul, the second city of Iraq, Daesh continued to launch offensives to the south in the direction of Tikrit and Baghdad, arriving almost close to the capital. At the same time, Daesh launched attacks on Kurdish forces in the north, both near Mount Sinjar near the border with Syria, and towards the Kurdish capital Arbil.

On August 8 the United States began to launch limited air strikes against Daesh to prevent it from advancing farther into Kurdish territory. Despite the Shiite coalition led by Maliki having won the elections held in April 2014, the growing pressure from the international community led the Premier to step aside and leave office to his party colleague Haider al-Abadi. US spearheaded the military efforts against Daesh and in late 2014 was created the Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR), an international task force composed of US military forces and personnel from over 30 countries, aimed at degrading and ultimately destroying Daesh. The coalition's military effort stopped Daesh's offensives, avoiding the definitive collapse of the state.

At the same time, ground operations saw the participation of a large number of Iraqi militias, known by the collective name of Hashd al-Shabi (Popular Mobilization Forces), formed by almost all-Shiite volunteers after the appeal launched by one of the most respected Iraqi Shia religious leaders, Ayatollah al-Sistani, in June 2014. These militias are formally part of the chain of command and control of the Iraqi armed forces, but in reality some of its most organized and effective components enjoy wide autonomy spaces and are led by former members of the Mahdi Army who maintain contacts with Iran's Pasdaran.

Starting in 2015, Daesh gradually began to lose ground. The Kurdish forces also participated in the operations. Taking advantage of the disbanding of the Iraqi army, the Kurdish peshmerga occupied the entire territory disputed with Baghdad during their counter-offenses against Daesh. The jihadist group has lost control of the last urban centers in 2017, with the defeat in Mosul (July) and the removal from the Syrian-Iraqi border in the Anbar province (November). Although driven from the main urban centers and destroyed as a territorial entity, Daesh has not been definitively defeated. In fact, since the end of 2017 there have been growing attacks on Iraqi security forces, especially in the provinces of Salahuddin and Diyala, with typical guerrilla warfare tactics. In addition, Daesh sleeper cells still maintain a presence in cities like Mosul. In November 2018, Daesh detonated a car bomb near a restaurant in central Mosul, in the first attack of this kind since it lost control of the city the previous year.

On September 25, 2017, the government of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region has called a referendum on independence from Iraq. Barzani's attempt was to capitalize on the political level the credit gained with the military commitment against Daesh and thus turn in his favor the long-standing problem of the disputed territories, albeit with a strictly one-sided manner. Turnout was reported to be 72.83% with 92.73% voting in favor of independence from Iraq. However, the Iraqi forces reacted with a brief offensive launched on October 15, during which in a few days they managed to oust the Kurdish forces from most of the disputed territories, especially from the city of Kirkuk. The defeat led Barzani to resign as President of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region on November 1. In the following months, the Abadi government renegotiated in more favorable terms to Baghdad the devolution of part of the state budget to Kurdistan.

On September 30th, the Kurdistan region voted for the renewal of its Parliament in Erbil. The ruling KDP came first, winning 45 seats. PUK was second with 21 seats won. Together, the two parties could secure a majority in the 111-seat Kurdish Parliament. All other parties lost seats or maintained their share of votes.

New parliamentary elections took place on 12 May 2018. They were originally scheduled in September 2017 but were postponed by six months due to the then ongoing war against Daesh, that at the time still controlled some parts of Iraqi territory. Despite many concerns about security, during the election day no attacks were registered throughout the country. Still, turnout was very low, emphasizing both security concerns and a growing sense of disenchantment towards politics. Definitive turnout was slightly under 45%, almost 18% down compared with 2014 elections. The relative majority of seats was won by the Sairoon Coalition led by the Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Sadr secured 54 seats, while Amiri's Fatah Alliance won 47 seats. The outgoing Prime Minister Abadi's Nasr List came third, totalling just 42 seats, but succeeded in distancing his main rival Maliki, who won just 25 seats (down from 92 seats in 2014). Hakim's Hikma lost about one third of its seats with 19 members of party elected. Allawi's al-Wataniya and Barzani's PDK results stood unchanged with 21 and 25 seats respectively. Nujayfi's Muttahidoon and Rasul Ali's PUK were weakened as well, respectively gaining only 14 seats (23 in 2014) and 18 seats (21 in last election). Many voter fraud were reported, especially regarding alleged sabotage of electronic voting devices. In Kirkuk province, many Kurdish parties accused PUK officials of widespread voter intimidation and vote rigging. The Iraqi Parliament ordered a manual recount of the results on 6 June 2018, adding a layer of uncertainty regarding the vote overall outcome, but eventually it didn't altered the balance of power in the Parliament.

Negotiations for the formation of the government were long and thorny. The main reason is the extreme fragmentation of the Shia political bloc, that has managed to secure the majority of the votes. Once hegemonized by Dawa party, this bloc repeatedly split apart during the last decade. Thus, during the latest elections no Shia political group was able to secure enough votes and form a government without its rivals. Furthermore, negotiations were complicated by the open wound of the referendum for the independence of Kurdistan held in 2017, and the traditional distrust of Sunni parties towards Shia groups. Efforts to mediate led by prominent Shia cleric Ali Sistani were crucial to ease tensions between the biggest Shia parties, namely Sadr's Sairoon and Amiri's Fatah. Thanks to Sistani's efforts and under growing international pressure, in September 2018 Iraqi institutions managed to take concrete steps in overcoming the stalemate.

The deadlock was first broken with the election of Mohammed al-Halbousi, a Sunni, as parliament speaker. A former governor of Anbar province, Halbousi won 169 votes in a secret ballot conducted at the September 15th session of the 329-seat assembly. His election clearly showed that a majority could be found in Parliament. This triggered further developments. On October 2nd, the Parliament elected Barham Salih, a Kurd, as President of the Republic, to whom the Constitution assigns the task of conferring the task to the new Prime Minister. Within just two hours, Salih nominated Adil Abdul Mahdi as Prime Minister.

Mahdi is a former deputy of ISCI and is widely considered as a compromise between Sadr and Amiri. Mahdi detailed his agenda for the next four years in a 122-page document. It includes ambitious policies to develop the country, resolve strained ties

between Erbil and Baghdad, boost the economy, reduce poverty, and restore peace and stability. Main areas of focus for the coming four years are security, the economy, government services and infrastructure, and administrative reforms.

By the end of October, Mahdi was sworn in, but with just 14 ministers and not the entire cabinet. Thamir Ghadhban was elected Minister of Oil; Fuad Hussein was approved as Minister of Finance; Naim al-Rubaye was approved as Communication Minster; Mohammed Ali al-Hakeem was elected Minister of Foreign Affairs; Saleh al-Hassani was approved as Minister of Agriculture; Bangin Rekani was elected Minister of Housing and Reconstruction; Alaa al-Alwani was elected Minister of Health; Abdullah Luaibi was approved as Transport Minister; Ahmed Riyadh was elected Minister of Youth and Sports; Bassem al-Rubaye was elected Minister of Labour and Social Affairs; Luay al-Khatteeb was elected Minister of Electricity; Mohammed Hashim was approved for the Ministry of Trade; Jamal al-Adili was elected Minister of Water Resources; Salih Abdullah Jabouri was elected as Minister of Industry. Interior and Defence Ministers were not immediately appointed due to the sensitivity of the choice, and a lack of consensus between Sadr and Amiri. While the government has been formed, it is not entirely clear which majority will support it in the Parliament, as parties have repeatedly granted and withdrawn support to Mahdi in autumn 2018.

.

1.3 Geography

Location: Iraq is located in the Middle East, in south-western Asia. It is bordered by Iran to the East, by Turkey and Syria to the North, by Syria and Jordan to the West, and by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf to the South.

Area: Iraq's total area is approximately 438,317 square kilometres 6,220 square kilometres.

Land Boundaries: Iraq is bordered by Iran (1,599 km), by Jordan (179 km), by Kuwait (254 km), Saudi Arabia (811 km), Syria (599 km), and Turkey (367 km). The total length of their borders is 3,809 km.

Length of Coastline: Iraq's length of coastline is 58 km.

Maritime Claims: Iraq's territorial sea extends 12 nautical miles in the Persian Gulf. Continental shelf boundaries are not specified.

Topography: Iraq's territory is mostly occupied by broad plains. The area West of the Euphrates is mainly desert; reedy marshes can be found along Iranian border in the South, with large flooded areas; borders with Iran and Turkey are characterised by range of mountains.

Natural Resources: Iraq main natural resources are petroleum, natural gas, phosphates and sulphur.

Land Use: Around 18% of Iraq consists of agricultural land, of which 8.4% arable land, 0.5% permanent crops and 9.2% permanent pasture.

Environmental Factors: Iraq's most pressing environmental issues are desertification, soil degradation and erosion. The marsh areas in the south, east of the city of Nassiriya, have experienced a dramatic degradation following government water control projects that drained most of the region. Development of Tigris and Euphrates river systems for agricultural purposes is contingent upon agreements with upstream riparian Turkey.

1.4 Territorial and Administrative Units

Iraq is a federal republic with varying degrees of decentralization. The country is divided administratively in 18 governorates, or *muhafazah* in Arabic. Before 1976 they were called *liwa*. Under the 2005 constitution, two or more governorates can jointly form a region with larger autonomy in certain domain such as the management of oil reveues and a separated, regional government. In 2005 three Kurdish-majority governorates in the north formed the Kurdistan Region (Duhok, Arbil, Sulaimaniya). The exact demarcation line between the Kurdistan Region and the rest of the country is disputed. Article 140 of the Constitution indicates a series of steps to resolve the dispute peacefully. In June 2013, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) recognized Halabja as its fourth province, and in January 2014 the Iraqi government recognized it as the country's 19th governorate, pending final approval by the parliament, which has not yet materialized. Halabja is a split from Sulaimaniya governorate. Governorates are further subdivided into districts (*qadhas*). Districts can consist of several sub-districts (*nawahi*).

List of Iraq governorates:

- Al Anbar
- Arbil
- Babil
- Baghdad
- Basra
- Dhi Qar
- Diyala
- Dohuk
- (Halabja)
- Kerbala
- Kirkuk
- Maysan
- Muthanna
- Najaf
- Nineveh
- Al Qadisiyyah
- Salahuddin
- Sulaimaniya
- Wasit



Source: UN

1.5 Population

According to 2017 estimates, Iraq has a population of 39,192,111. Population living in urban areas is around 70% of the total, the biggest cities being Baghdad, Mosul, Arbil, Basra, Sulaimaniya, Najaf. The population density is of 82.7 inhabitants for square kilometre, or 214.2 per square mile. The country has a population growth of 2.55%, the life expectancy at birth being 74.9 years (72.6 for males, 77.2 for females). According to 2017 estimates, the birth rate is 30.4 births/1,000 population, while the fertility rate is respectively 4 children born/woman. The infant mortality rate is 37.5 deaths/1,000 live births.



Source: UN OCHA

1.6 Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion

Ethnic Groups

From the 1960s to early 2000s the Baathist government adopted a policy of Arabization (*ta'rib*), mainly but not exclusively towards the northern region, aimed at changing the demographic and ethnic balance of the mostly Kurdish-inhabited region and undermine Kurdish uprisings. This policy consisted of forced displacement, cultural Arabization of virtually all Iraqis ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities (not only Kurds but also Yazidis, Shabaks, Mandeans, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmen).

Updated official data about the ethnic composition of the country are not available. Latest data originate from government estimates in 1987, when the last census was carried out. Baathist policies at that time deeply affected the results. For example, Yazidis were forced to register as Arabs. 1987 estimates put the number of Arabs at 75-80%, the Kurds being some 15-20%. A further 5% is collectively indicated as minorities. This group includes Turkmen, Yezidis, Shabaks, Kaka'i, bedouins, Roma, Assyrian, Circassian, Sabaean-Mandaean, Persians (Ajam), Afro-Iraqis.

Afro-Iraqis are Iraqis of largely African descent and live mostly in the south, around the city of Basra. They were deported centuries ago from the African continent (specifically from the Easrtern coast, known as Swahili coast, and Zanzibar) as slaves and worked mainly in sugarcane plantations.

Iraq had a historical Jewish community, with slightly more than 150,000 people living in the country at the end of World War II. Nearly ¾ of them reached the new-born state of Israel during 1950-2 with the help of Mossad (Operation Ezra and Nehemiah), while others fled on their own. Today Jews still living in Iraq are estimated to be few dozens.

A small number of Armenians are found predominantly in Baghdad and in pockets throughout the north.

Languages

More than ¾ of Iraqis speak Arabic, which is the official language, in one of its several major dialects. These dialects are generally mutually intelligible, but significant differences exist within the country and in some cases can make mutual understanding complicated.

Arabic is also widely spoken and understood among the Kurdish population, whose mother tongue is Kurdish in one of its two main dialects spoken in the region (Kurmanji in Dohuk governorate and some mountainous areas along the border with Turkey; Sorani – much closer to Farsi – in Arbil and Sulaimaniya governorates). Under the Arabization policies, both spoken and written Kurdish was forbidden, as well as other languages used by minorities such as Aramaic-speaking Chaldeans, Mandaic-speaking Sabeans, or Turkish, Turkmen, Azerbaijanian, and Syriac spoken by smaller ethnic groups. English is generally understood in commerce but not widely understood over the country.

Religion

Iraq is a predominantly Muslim country (95-98%, Shia being 64-69% and Sunni 29-34%). Southern governorates are mostly Shia, while Al Anbar and Nineveh are overwhelmingly Sunni. Other governorates in the centre are generally mixed. Kurds are mostly Sunni with a strong influx from Sufism, but along the border with Iran in Diyala governorate there is a sizeable minority of Shia Muslim Kurds (Feylis).

Christians are the largest religious minority (around 1%), which includes Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Assyrian Church of the East. In the last decades the number of Christians in Iraq has constantly declined. According to 1987 estimates they were 8-8.5% of the total population; in 2013 they may have declined to around 1.3% or 450,000 people, down from 5.5-6% in 2003. After 2013 and the rise of the Islamic State (Daesh), they are widely thought to have further declined.

Shabaks and Kaka'is practice respectively Shabakism and Yarsanism, two syncretic religions with elements of Islam, Christianity and Yezidism, and Mithraic roots. Yezidism practiced by Yazidi is also a syncretic religion that draws from Islam and Zoroastrism.



Iraq's ethnic composition map. Source: Columbia University



Iraq's religious composition map. Source: Columbia University

1.7 Health

The Iraqi government expenditure on health amounted in 2014 to 5.5% of GDP, the per capita expenditure being of 667$. Iraq has a physician density of 0.85 physicians/1,000 population and a hospital bed density of 1.4 beds/1,000 population. According to 2015 UN figures, more than 85% of the population has access to improved drinking water resources and improved sanitation facilities.



Source: WHO

1.8 Education and Literacy

According to UNESCO figures, around 43% of Iraqis aged 15 and older are literate. Figures for adult over 65 show a literacy rate of 63.93%. More than 92% of Iraqis attended primary school, while more than 53% attended secondary school, according to last UNESCO figures available (2007). There are no reliable data about government expenditure on education.







	TOTAL	MALE	FEMALE	
Literacy rate (%)				
15-24 years	52.32	57.01	48.64	(2013)
15 years and older	43.68	53.01	37.96	(2013)
65 years and older	20.38	31.05	14.25	(2013)

Source: UNESCO Institute for statistics

1.9 Country Economy

The state of the Iraqi economy has been profoundly influenced by decades of conflict, which have drained essential resources to the development of the country, have caused the vast destruction of many essential infrastructures (road system, electricity grid) and have devastated many urban areas of the country. The First Gulf war destroyed as much as 90% of Iraq's power generating and distribution systems, and it never fully recovered its capacities. The difficulties caused by the war with Iran (1980-88), the two Gulf conflicts (1991 and 2003) and the high levels of violence and insurgency following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime, are coupled with the direct and indirect effects of international sanctions. The embargo has strongly influenced the ability of institutions to allocate resources, as well as impacting dramatically on the civilian population. In the year following the First Gulf War, GDP dropped to less than one-fourth of its previous level. It was not until the Iraqi government implemented the UN's oil-for-food program in 1997 that Iraq's GDP again began to experience positive annual growth.

Thus, post-2003 Iraq inherited a long series of challenges, which continue to put the national economy to the test today. The efforts of the international community to finance the reconstruction of the country and to reduce the huge public debt, accumulated due to the huge military expenses incurred at the time of Saddam, have in fact had few of the desired effects. In this period, the reconstruction proceeded unequally in the different regions of the country. The Kurdish majority north, thanks to greater stability and better security conditions, experienced a short period of real economic boom driven by oil revenues and the building sector. In contrast, the rest of Iraq faced serious problems, including a high rate of inflation; an oil sector hampered by a shortage of replacement parts, antiquated production methods, and outdated technology; a high rate of unemployment; a seriously deteriorated infrastructure; and a private sector inexperienced in modern market practices. Starting from 2008-9, in parallel with the decrease in the level of violence, the economy slowly regained strength, with lower inflation, the return of hydrocarbon production to pre-war levels, and the beneficial effects of some reforms approved by the government. However, rampant corruption, insufficient essential services., and skilled labour shortages continue to affect Iraqi economy.

As one of the five most oil-rich countries in the world, Iraq's largely state-run economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides roughly 90% of government revenue and 80% of foreign exchange earnings, and is a major determinant of the economy's fortunes. In April 2018, Baghdad approved an increase in Iraq's crude oil production capacity to as much as 6.5 million bpd (barrel per day) by 2022. As of early 2018, production capacity is just below 5 million barrels and production rates are around 4.4 million bpd (as per its OPEC quota agreed in November 2016).

Iraq's GDP growth slowed to 1.1% in 2017, a marked decline compared to the previous two years. The Iraqi Government received its third tranche of funding from its 2016 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with the IMF in August 2017 (which amounts to a total of about $5.34 billion), which is intended to stabilize its finances by encouraging improved fiscal management, needed economic reform, and expenditure reduction.

According to an April 2018 document by the World Bank, overall Iraqi GDP growth is projected to return to a positive 2.5% in 2018. The poverty rate increased from 18.9% in 2012 to an estimated 22.5% in 2014. Labor market statistics point to a further deterioration of the poverty situation. Labor force participation rate of youth (ages 15-24) has dropped markedly since the onset of the crisis in 2014, from 32.5 % to 27.4%. Unemployment increased particularly for individuals from the poorest households, youth, and those in the prime working age (ages 25-49). The unemployment rate is about twice as high in the governorates most affected by Daesh-related violence and displacement compared to the rest of the country (21.1% versus 11.2%), especially among the young and the uneducated.

The stability of Iraq and the prospects for economic recovery remain deeply dependent on foreign aid. In late 2017 Iraq received more than $1.4 billion in financing from international lenders, part of which was generated by issuing a $1 billion bond for reconstruction and rehabilitation in areas liberated from Daesh. An international conference of donors for the reconstruction of Iraq held in Kuwait in early 2018 only raised $30 billion instead of the $88-100 billion that the Iraqi government put as the minimum threshold needed.

2. Political and Security Context

2.1 The Constitution of Iraq

The current Constitution of Iraq came into force on 15 October 2005 and was drawn up following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime. The US-led coalition installed a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as soon as May 2003. The CPA was also mandated to oversee the creation of a new constitution. In March 2004, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), a provisional constitution, was signed by the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), which was instated by the CPA. Authority was officially transferred to the IGC from the CPA in June 2004 and the TAL became law upon the transfer of power from the CPA to the Iraqi government.

Beyond this temporary and preliminary transition, the actual constituent phase began in January 2005, when the Iraqi population elected the Iraqi transitional National Assembly. A committee composed of 55 members of the Iraqi transitional National Assembly was charged with drafting the new permanent constitution. The timing of the entire constituent phase was accelerated by the explicit will of the United States, which imposed a timetable of a few months to complete this delicate passage. This had an important impact on the clarity of the constitutional charter. In fact, in order to meet the deadline, the timing of the discussion has been accelerated and in many cases a sufficiently broad consensus has not been reached for the formulation of the articles that does not leave any doubts about interpretation. Many provisions remain inactive pending the enactment of laws regulating their implementation.

Moreover, the elections for the constituent assembly were boycotted by most of the Sunni electorate, which in this way intended to express the fear of being marginalized within the new institutional set-up of the state. This led to the under-representation of the Sunnis in the constituent phase, which in turn was one of the elements that helped fuel the growing sense of disillusionment of this part of the citizens that still lasts. A special committee with the task of proposing amendments to the Constitution, created in 2006 with the specific purpose of correcting later defects and shortcomings of the card, did not actually lead to any actual change.

In particular, two central issues remained unresolved. In the first place, the approval of an Oil Law, that would divide the competences between the central government and the regional institutions, avoiding dangerous overlaps. Specifically, this law should have clarified whether the central government or the region had the right to issue exploration permits and sign oil-production contracts. In the second place, the implementation of Constitutional Article 140 on the disputed territory of Kirkuk. The article called for the holding of a referendum in Kirkuk, to allow its inhabitants to decide whether the city should be annexed to the Kurdish region. The referendum was initially planned for 15 November 2007,but was repeatedly delayed and ultimately never took place.

The constitution of 2005 vests the executive power in the Prime Minister and its Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister is responsible for the general policy of the State and is the commander in chief of the armed forces. He appoints the Council of Ministers and has the right to dismiss the ministers with the consent of the Council of Representatives. The President has largely symbolic executive powers, being the head of the state but not of the government.

The legislative power rests with Iraqi parliament. Formally, the parliament is composed of two chambers, the Council of Representatives and the Federal Council. However, only the former has been set up and is functioning, while the latter *de facto* does not exist and the law regulating its creation has never been enacted. The Council of Representatives enacts laws, elects the president, the prime minister and the parliament speaker; it may issue a vote of no-confidence in any of the cabinet ministers with an absolute majority, and can force the government to resign by withdrawing confidence after receiving a request from either the president or one-fifth of the Council of Representatives.

2.2 Elections

Parliamentary elections, 2014

The third post-2003 Iraqi parliamentary elections were held on April 30, 2014. The vote took place in a deteriorated political and security environment. Iraq institutions didn't hold control over the whole territory, especially in some key political provinces such as Anbar, Nineveh and Diyala. Threat of spillover from the war in Syria was at highest levels. Sunni disillusion toward the state and the Iraqi authorities was again skyrocketing after the short parenthesis of the Anbar Awakening. Security was deteriorating once again in different part of the country, as Daesh and Iraqi insurgent groups were trying to undermine the political process and the former was directly threatening the capital.

Governorates were used as constituencies, the electoral system being a form of proportional representation. The counting system – a modified version of the Sainte-Laguë method – was adopted after a ruling by the Supreme Court of Iraq. A deal between major political groups before the elections provided one additional seat for each of the Iraqi Kurdish provinces, including Arbil, Sulaymaniya, and Dohuk, raising the total number of seat in parliament to 328. 8 seats were reserved for minorities at the national level (5 for Assyrians, one each for Yazidis, Shabaks, and Mandeans).

According to official data provided by the Independent High Electoral Commission, turnout was 62%. Former Prime Minister Maliki won the relative majority of the seats with his State of Law coalition, a mostly Shiite alliance built around the Dawa party. State of Law coalition obtained 92 seats and 24.14% of votes. The Ahrar bloc, supported by prominent Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, came in second with 34 seats and 7.05% of the votes, while Ammar al-Hakim's Shia movement al-Muwatin won 7.55% of the votes but obtained only 29 seats. Al-Nujayfi's Sunni political coalition Muttahidoon won 23 seats and 5.23% of the votes.

There was no voting in a third of the western province of Anbar, where Sunni tribesmen and militants linked to Daesh controlled the city of Falluja and parts of Ramadi.

Since no single alliance won an absolute majority in the Council of Representatives, negotiations over the formation of a new coalition government were needed. Maliki's bid to be sworn in as Prime Minister for a third term was highly contested by other parties because of the policies implemented in previous years, widely perceived as discriminatory. The course of the consultations was dramatically influenced by the conquest of Mosul by Daesh in June and by the collapse of part of the Iraqi army and security forces. Given the gravity of the emergency and the need to immediately provide a strong reaction, the international community (and in particular the United States) exerted strong pressure on Maliki, in order to induce him to renounce the role of Prime Minister and allow the country to get out of the political impasse. The first session of the new parliament began on 1 July. President Masum asked Haider al-Abadi from Dawa party to form a government on 11 August. The government was formed on 8 September with most parties being part of the new government. 35 ministers were approved, with the defense and interior ministries not yet filled. On 18 October 2014, the Iraq parliament named Khaled al-Obaidi, a member of parliament's Sunni Arab al-Wataniyah bloc as defense minister, and Mohammed Al-Ghabban, a member of the Shiite Badr bloc, as interior minister.

Independence referendum for Iraqi Kurdistan, 2017

On 25 September 2017, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities held a highly controversial referendum on the independence of Kurdistan from the rest of Iraq. The popular consultation was finally announced on June 7 in a unilateral way. In fact, the federal government authorities did not recognize the legitimacy of the referendum and repeatedly asked Arbil to suspend the vote to find a political agreement that would satisfy the Kurdish demands for greater autonomy. The referendum was strongly supported by the then President of KRG Masoud Barzani, who intended to capitalize on the political level the credit acquired from the international community during the fight in Daesh, during which the Kurdish peshmerga fighters played a major role. Moreover, Barzani saw the referendum as an opportunity to declare somewhat *de jure* his control over the disputed territories *de facto* controlled by Kurdish forces. In fact, the referendum was held in the three Kurdish governorates in the north (Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniya) and also in the disputed territories. The ballot question was "Do you want the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdistani areas outside the region's administration to become an independent state?".

According to Kurdish authorities, the "yes" won with 92.73% of the votes and a turnout of slightly more than 72%. Not all Kurdish political parties agreed with the timing of the referendum. While Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) pushed for holding the vote, Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Gorran movement and other smaller parties were skeptical. In any case, in the imminence of the vote these parties have also formally given their support to the referendum, while clearly showing that the motivation of this decision was linked to the fear of losing consensus among the Kurdish population, whose nationalist sentiment is traditionally strong.

Most of the international community condemned the referendum. Israel was one of the few states or entities that supported the vote. Both Iraqi federal government and neighbouring states (Iran, Turkey) announced a joint response. Ankara and Teheran closed border crossing with Iraqi Kurdistan and started joint military drills with Iraq. On October 15, Iraqi forces launched an offensive to retake Kirkuk. Kurdish forces were divided between those loyal to KDP and those loyal to the PUK, with the former keeping their positions in the governorate and the latter withdrawing in agreement with the Iraqi forces. Thus, with KDP forces clearly outnumbered, in just a span of days federal authorities succeeded in reasserting control over virtually all of the disputed territories. On October 25, Kurdish authorities offered to temporarily "freeze" the outcome of the referendum on order to start negotiations with Baghdad. On November 1, President Barzani resigned without a designated successor nor an election planned. Much of the presidency's powers were transferred to the Prime Minister, Nechirwan Barzani (nephew of Masoud), who has since been negotiating with Baghdad.

Parliamentary elections, 2018

New parliamentary elections were held on May 12, 2018. In addition to the 8 seats reserved for minorities, the Council of Representatives voted on 11 February 2018 to add an extra seat for minorities, in the Wasit Governorate for Feyli Kurds, making the total number of parliamentarians equal to 329. Electoral and counting systems are the same as the previous election in 2014.

Prime Minister Abadi has split from his former party, the Dawa, and founded the Victory Alliance (Nasr), an umbrella group through which he had been able to drain members of parliament from the ranks of Dawa. Maliki leads the State of Law Coalition. Among other Shia-majority parties that compete in the elections, there are Muqtada al-Sadr's Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform (Sairoun), and the Fatah Alliance created by Hadi al-Ameri, a Popular Mobilization Forces front leader and chair of Badr Organization. Former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi competes with the al-Wataniya coalition and al-Nujayfi with the Muttahidoon alliance.

With the lowest turnout in the post-Saddam era (44,52%), the vote didn't provide the country with a clear parliamentary majority. Sadr's Sairoon won a plurality with 54 seats, while the rival Fatah Alliance led by Amiri won 47 seats. Outgoing Prime Minister Abadi's list, Nasr, won just 42 seats, while former Prime Minister Maliki's State of Law coalition collapsed to just 25 seats from 92 in 2014. KDP and the al-Wataniya coalition confirmed their shares, with 25 and 21 seats respectively. Other parties lost seats: al-Hakim's al-Hikma won just 19 seats (29 in 2014), PUK won 18 seats, al-Nujaifi coalition won 11 seats.

Kurdistan Region parliamentary elections, 2018

New parliamentary elections were held on September 30, 2018, after being postponed several times in previous years. Tensions between major Kurdish parties KDP and PUK and widespread claims of vote fraud characterized the elections.

The ruling KDP came first, winning 45 seats (gained 7 seats) and 43,6% of votes. PUK was second with 21 seats won (gained 3 seats) and 20,3% of votes. Together, the two parties could secure a majority in the 111-seat Kurdish Parliament, as they traditionally managed to do in the past. All other parties lost seats or maintained their share of votes. Formerly second party represented in the Parliament, Gorran halved its MPs to 12 (12,1%). New Generation Movement, a new party, won 7,4% of votes and 8 seats.

Final results were announced on October 21, 2018 by the Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission (IHERC), but in a quite unconventional manner. In fact, while four of the nine Kurdistan Regional Government commissioners rejected the results, five commissioners (affiliated with the KDP and the PUK) rushed to pass the vote's final results and announced them in a midnight press conference in Erbil. The four objecting commissioners, who are linked to the three main Kurdish opposition parties, issued a statement saying that the results of the election are not to be considered final and complete. As of mid November 2018, negotiations to form a new government had not yet started.

2014 parliamentary elections

	GROUP	NUMBER	VOTE COUNT	NUMBER OF SEATS
1.	State of Law Coalition (Nouri al-Maliki)	277	3,141,835	92
2.	Al Muwatin Coalition (Ammar al-Hakim)	273	982,003	29
3.	Al Ahrar Coalition (Muqtada Al-Sadr)	214	917,589	28
4.	KDP	213	852,198	19
5.	PUK	266	789,519	19
6.	Al Wataniyya Coalition (Ayad Allawi)	239	686,017	21
7.	Muttahidoon (Usama al-Nujaifi)	259	680,690	23
8.	Gorran	234	451,858	9
9.	Al Arabiya Coalition (Salih al-Motlaq)	255	315,858	10
10.	Al-Fadhila and Independent Elite Coalition	219	211,257	6
11.	National Reform Alliance (Al Jaafari)	205	192,763	6
12.	Nineveh Kurdistan Alliance	243	185,804	6
13.	Kurdistan Islamic Union	274	165,856	4
14.	Diala is Our Identity Coalition	246	159,605	5
15.	Iraq Coalition	262	153,672	5
16.	Kurdistan Islamic Group	237	137,504	3
17.	Elites Movement	251	116,268	3
18.	Civil Democratic Alliance	232	112,563	3
19.	National Partnership Gathering	269	110,933	3
20.	National Nineveh Alliance	227	79,071	3
21.	Kirkuk Turkmen Front List	280	71,492	2
22.	Iraqi Loyalty Coalition	211	67,796	2
23.	Competences and People Gathering	230	67,084	2
24.	Kurdistani Peace List	258	61,807	2
25.	Anbar Loyalty Coalition	271	58,994	3
26.	Iraq Sons Unity	233	46,627	2
27.	National Alliance of Salahaddin	249	46,039	1
28.	Independent Civil Alternative Coalition	209	41,090	1
29.	Kirkuk Arab Coalition	242	38,328	1
30.	Karama	286	36,288	1
31.	Al-Sadiqoun Bloc	218	36,026	1
32.	Equitable State Movement	202	31,973	1
33.	Islamic Dawa Party – Iraq Organisation	261	27,515	1
34.	National Coalition in Salahaddin	222	26,910	1
35.	Solidarity in Iraq	283	26,013	1
36.	Al Rafidain List	300	24,353	2
37.	Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council	302	23,781	2
38.	Khalas Coalition	254	18,229	1
39.	Yazidi Movement for Reform and Progress	291	14,910	1
40.	National Warkaa' List	299	12,626	1
41.	Hareth Shanshal Sunaid al-Harithi (Independent)	295	7,194	1
42.	Shabak Ahrar Council	293	3,375	1
	TOTAL		11,231,313	328

Source: Orsam

2018 Iraq parliamentary elections

Table 1. Key Winners of the Iraqi Parliamentary Elections 2018

Party	Leadership	Seats
Saairun Coalition	Muqtada al-Sadr	54
Fateh Coalition	Hadi al-Ameri	47
Victory Alliance	Haider al-Abadi	42
State of Law Coalition	Nouri al-Maliki	25
KDP	Masoud Barzani	25
National Coalition	Ayad Allawi	21
National Wisdom Movement	Ammar al-Hakim	19
PUK	Kosrat Rasul Ali	18
Iraqi Decision Alliance	Osama al-Nujaifi	11



Source: LSE Middle East Center

2.3 Political Parties

Victory Alliance (Nasr)

Founded December 14, 2017, Nasr is the political platform with which Prime Minister Abadi competes in the general election 2018. Built around the figure of Abadi, this alliance represents the Premier's attempt to get away from the cumbersome figure of Maliki and to drain consents from Dawa party and the State of Law coalition, of which Abadi himself was one of the leading representatives until 2017. In part, this attempt seems to have succeeded, as dozens of parliamentarians elected in the Dawa party ranks have been candidates with Nasr as independent. However, Nasr wanted to be above all a first embryo of a broader alliance, able to gather transversal consensus in the Iraqi political landscape. In this sense, Abadi's attempt seems to have succeeded only partially. In fact, at the beginning of January 2018 several parties left the coalition, deciding to compete alone or in alliance with other formations in the May elections. These include the Fatah Alliance of Hadi al-Ameri, the Sadrist movement, and the Wisdom Movement of Ammar al-Hakim.

State of Law Coalition (Itilaf Dawlat al-Qanun)

It is an Iraqi political coalition formed for the Iraqi governorate elections held in 2009 by the then Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, of the Islamic Dawa Party. The coalition was the parliamentary pillar of the last Maliki government (2010-14) and the Abadi government (2014-2018). It is the main Shiite political bloc by number of representatives in the parliament.

The main party in the coalition is the Dawa party. Dawa was founded in 1957 and from the beginning had a clear religious inspiration, in opposition to the pan-Arabism and secular nationalism widespread in those years throughout the Arab world. Among his main points of reference was the Shia cleric Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr. During the years of the Baath and the era of Saddam Hussein, the Dawa party was severely repressed and outlawed, while its leadership was forced to find refuge in Iran. Thanks to its network of affiliates, widespread especially in the southern regions of Iraq, the party has fomented several outbreak movements until 2003.

Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform (Sairoun)

The Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform is an Iraqi electoral coalition formed to contest the 2018 general election. The main components are the Sadrist movement and the Iraqi Communist Party. The greatest political weight in the coalition rests with the Sadrist Movement.

The Sadrist Movement was established in 2003, after the fall of the Saddam regime. The Sadr family had long been an important part of the Shia resistance to the Saddam regime as well as a leading family among religious scholars. Moqtada's father, Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, was assassinated on Saddam Hussein's orders in 1999. Since then, Moqtada has led an underground movement that established control over parts of southern Iraq and some neighborhoods in Baghdad since 2004. The Sadrist Movement has long remained a mixture of political party, underground organization, and armed group (earlier the Mahdi Army, currently the Peace Brigades or Saraya al-Salam). It retains a strong appeal among the poor, disenfranchised urban population in the suburbs of Baghdad, where is located its main stronghold of Sadr City. Since 2015, the Sadrist Movement has been campaigning against corruption, strongly critical of the Abadi government, which has fueled massive protests in the streets of Baghdad.

Logo of the Badr Organization, part of the Fatah Alliance

Fatah Alliance

The Fatah Alliance is a political coalition formed to contest the 2018 general election. The main components are former groups involved in the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces), including the Badr Organization, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah and Kata'ib al-Imam Ali. In order to be able to compete in the elections in compliance with the law, towards the end of 2017 these armed groups created their related political entities. An exception is the Badr Organization, which has had an armed wing and a political arm for decades. Fatah is led by Hadi Al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr Organization.

Muttahidoon

The coalition was formed in 2012 and represents one of the most important Sunni political entities. It is led by Usama and Atheel al-Nujayfi. In 2018 elections, Muttahidoon runs in alliance with the Sunni businessman Khamis al-Khanjar under the banner of the larger al-Qarar al-Iraqi coalition.

National Coalition (Al-Wataniya)

It is led by Iyad Allawi. It is comprised of non-sectarian liberal forces. This bloc has always enjoyed broad support from Sunnis. In 2010, the coalition received a majority of seats. In the May 2018 elections, Allawi is allied with Salim al-Jabouri, head of the National Rally for Reform, and Saleh al-Mutlaq, leader of the Arab Front for Dialogue, as well as with Kurdish blocs and figures.

Homeland (Nishtiman)

It is the newly established coalition between several Kurdish parties, including the Coalition for Democracy and Justice, Gorran Movement, and Islamic Group of Kurdistan. It was formed in the aftermath of the failed referendum for independence of September 2017, in opposition to traditional leading Kurdish parties Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Gorran's Yousif Mohammed, the former speaker of the Kurdish regional parliament, has been named the head of Nishtiman in January 2018.

Kurdistan Democratic Party

One of the main Kurdish parties in Iraq, It was founded in Mahabad, Iran in 1946 by longtime Iraqi Kurdish leader and warrior Mustafa Barzani. His son Masoud led the party from the 1970s to 2017, when he was forced to resign as President of the Kurdistan Regional Government following the failed referendum for independence. KDP is a liberal, Kurdish nationalist party with good ties with Turkey. After Masoud's resignation, a creeping

rivalry has emerged between Nechirwan and Masrour Barzani, respectively the nephew and the son of Masoud.

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

Founded by Jalal Talabani in 1975 as a splinter group from KDP, the PUK is one of the main Kurdish political parties in Iraq. It enjoys wide support from the easternmost part of the Kurdish region, especially in Sulaimaniya governorate. After the failed referendum of September 2017 and the death of Talabani, the party leadership is deeply divided. Kosrat Rasul Ali is the current Secretary General of the PUK.

Wisdom Movement (Al-Hikma)

The Wisdom Movement is a political party born in July 2017 as a splinter group from the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). It is led by Ammar al-Hakim, who was previously the leader of ISCI and comes from a prominent religious Shiite family.

Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq

Previously known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the party was founded in 1982 by Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim and its political support comes from Iraq's Shia Muslim community. It led the revolt against Saddam's regime from Iran together with the Dawa party. It first established the Badr Organization as its armed wing.

2.4 Key Political Leaders

Haidar al-Abadi

Abadi joined the Dawa Party in 1967 and became a member of the party's executive leadership in 1979. After many years of exile in the UK, Abadi returned to Iraq after the fall of Saddam. He served as Minister of Communications in 2003-4, and served as Prime Minister's Advisor in 2005. He was first elected as a member of the Iraqi Parliament in the December 2005 parliamentary election and chaired the parliamentary committee for Economy, Investment and Reconstruction. In August 2014 he was sworn in as Prime Minister. During his tenure, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces Abadi led the fight against Daesh. Furthermore, its political action has focused on economic reforms and the fight against corruption. He managed the integration of the Popular Mobilization Forces within the Armed Forces, which is still underway.

Nouri al-Maliki

He was Prime Minister of Iraq between 2006 and 2014, while also keeping ad interim some key ministers such as the Interior and the Defense between 2010 and 2014. He led the Dawa party from 2007 to 2014, when he was succeeded by Abadi.

He fled the country in 1979 because of the repression of his party and lived between Iran and Syria. Despite Dawa's Islamist roots, Maliki sought to position himself as a strong and unifying leader in post-Saddam Iraq after coming to power in 2006. However, since the 2010 elections Maliki has been accused of abandoning a consensus-building strategy in favour of concentrating power among his mostly Shia allies. He has also become more closely allied with Iran over issues such as the conflict in Syria. During his first mandate as Prime Minister, he led the fight against the Mahdi Army Shiite revolt in the south and the insurgency in the centre-north. On 8 September 2014, during approval of the new government led by Abadi, Maliki was named one of the three vice presidents, a prestigious albeit largely ceremonial post.

Muqtada al-Sadr

An Iraqi Shia cleric who stems from a prominent religious family, Muqtada's background won him a wide support among many of Iraq's impoverished Shia Muslims. His power base rests in the network of Shia charitable institutions founded by his father, the Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr who was killed in 1999. His notoriety and the role that Muqtada was able to carve out in post-Saddam era have fueled a rivalry with some of the country's major Shiite religious institutions, notably the Grand Ayatollah Sistani. A staunch opponent of the US-led coalition in the 2000s, he led the insurgency of the Mahdi Army in the south managing to take control of main urban centres for some periods, while also having a central role in the coalition government. By 2008 he gave up armed struggle and restricted his activities to politics. During the last years he appears to have lost much of his political weight, but still he retains a wide potential for popular mobilization.

Ammar al-Hakim
An Iraqi cleric who led the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq between 2009 and 2017, al-Hakim comes from a prominent religious family. He is the the grandson of Muhsin al-Hakim, who led the Iraqi Marja' from 1961. Born in Najaf in 1971, he fled to Iran in 1979 with his father to escape the Baathist repression. In 2003 he established the al-Hakim Foundation, one of the largest civil society organizations in Iraq.

Hadi al-Ameri
Former Iraqi Minister of Transportation and the head of the Badr Organization, he fought with the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq war. After the fall of Saddam, he managed to maintain a hybrid and dual profile, combining the commitment in politics to the role of military leader of the Badr Organization. Ameri maintains deep links with the Iranian Pasdaran and, specifically, with the head of the Quds Force Qassem Soleimani. Together with other Shiite militias such as Asaib Ahl al-Haqq and Kataib Hezbollah, the armed wing of Badr Organization is the backbone of the Popular Mobilization Forces.

Iyad Allawi
Born in 1945, Allawi was a member of Iraqi Baath party in his youth before breaking ties from the organization and flee in exile to London in the 1970s. He then became a staunch opponent of the regime, co-founding in 1991 the opposition Iraqi National Accord. He has held top-level institutional positions, including Prime Minister and Vice-President.

Usama al-Nujayfi
One of the three Vice-Presidents under the Abadi government, Nujayfi is the highest ranking Sunni politician in the country. Head of the moderate Sunni al-Hadba party, after the 2010 elections, which he contested as part of the cross-sectarian Iraqiyya bloc, which became the largest parliamentary force, Nujayfi was elected Speaker of the Council of Representatives. He is widely seen as one of the staunchest adversary of Maliki. He has repeatedly supported the creation of a Sunni federal region.

2.5 Media Landscape and Civil Society

Media Landscape

The Iraqi media landscape has changed profoundly over the past two decades. Under the Saddam regime, the media were placed under strict control of the Baath party. In post-2003 Iraq, there has been a rapid liberalization of the media landscape, with the emergence of hundreds of outlets. By 2004, over 200 newspapers had begun publishing, in addition to around 80 radio stations and 20 television channels. The 2005 Constitution enshrined media freedom. However, the era of the regime left visible signs above all on the public perception of the media universe, to a large extent still perceived as a mere propaganda tool. Furthermore, the post-2003 period was characterized by a dramatic increase in violence and sectarian rhetoric, which was inevitably reflected - if not fuelled - by the behaviour of a large part of the media. These two factors allow us to understand why the current media landscape of Iraq is characterized by the proliferation of media outlets, but in most cases related to individual parties, movements, or even narrow political circles or individual political figures, who tend to use them as their personal megaphone. In fact, government-owned TV and radio stations are operated by the publicly funded Iraqi Media Network, while private broadcast media are mostly linked to political, ethnic, or religious groups. Several factors contribute to curbing the emergence of independent journalism, including: a deeply polarized political climate; close links between media outlets and political class; a political and security context not appealing to investors and the consequent stagnation of the advertising market, whose revenues are essential to guarantee a greater degree of independence for outlets and journalists; the lack of specialized educational and professional paths; scarce guarantees provided by the contracts.

The most important Iraqi media entities are the public broadcaster, the Iraqi Media Network (IMN), and the Communications and Media Commission (CMC, the Iraqi media regulator, which is independent from government). Since the formation of the transitional government, both their boards have become increasingly staffed with political protégés, thus partially restoring political control over the media. In this way, between 2006 and 2014, then Prime Minister Maliki significantly increased control over the Iraqi media. During the Abadi government, the attention of the executive was mainly focused on the fight against Daesh, leaving a possible media reform in the background.

This picture is only partially modified by the growing possibility of accessing the Internet. According to estimates by the International Telecommunication Union, in 2002 only 0.1% of Iraqis had access to the web, and again in 2010 the percentage did not rise above 1.1%. In 2010s Iraq progressively filled the gap that separated it from the rest of the Arab world. In 2011, the Dubai Press Club-Deloitte Arab Media Outlook estimated that broadband penetration reached as little as 0.1% of the Iraqi population. Yet, according to BBC Monitoring, Internet penetration has grown significantly quickly between 2014 and 2016. In 2016, Internetlivestats.com has detected 4.9 million Iraqi Internet users, around 13 percent of the population. The BBG-Gallup 2016 joint research has also found that the number of Iraqi Internet users is on a rise due to better mobile network coverage. Mobile penetration was already assessed to cover 87 percent of the population in 2011, according to the Arab Media Outlook. To a certain extent, the spread of the Internet and greater access to the web have nevertheless supported the emergence of some examples of independent journalism, citizen journalism, and have allowed a greater room for manoeuvre to civil society organizations.

A Journalist Protection Law was approved in 2012, qualifying a journalist as “any individual practicing a full-time journalism job". In this way, however, citizen journalists, bloggers and part-time journalists remain excluded. The law stipulates forms of compensation for death and injury, while protecting journalists from being arrested or interrogated without a warrant and without alerting their employers. However, the application of this law still remains deficient, also due to some passages vaguely phrased and widely subject to interpretation. Moreover, the Iraqi media are still regulated by some laws dating back to the Baath regime, such as the 1968 Publications Law, that prescribes up to seven years in prison for insulting the government, and the 1969 penal code that criminalizes defamation and insult.

According to the Freedom of the Press 2017 report by Freedom House, Iraq’s status is ‘not free’.

Civil Society

During the Baath regime era, there was essentially no independent civil society within Iraq. Soon after the fall of Saddam, thousands of new non-governmental organizations were established and registered under Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 45 on Non-Governmental Organizations (2003). On January 25, 2010, when the Iraqi Council of Representatives voted to approve a new Law on Non-Governmental Organizations (Law 12 of 2010). The law eases restrictions on foreign funding and affiliation with foreign organizations, limits the state’s ability to reject registration applications and to carry out audits and internal inspections, removes criminal penalties, and creates a judicial check on the state’s ability to suspend an NGO.

The federal government has a NGOs Directorate (General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers), while Kurdistan Regional Government has a NGOs Department (General Secretariat of the Kurdistan Regional Government Council of Ministers). As of March 2018, the federal NGOs Directorate reported that it had registered 3,471 NGOs, while in Kurdistan the number of registered NGOs is approximately 4,100.

In the first years after 2003, most NGOs focused their activities on humanitarian aid. In the short term, however, the NGOs have begun to address an increasing number of issues, including human rights, democratic development, elections and constitutional reform. A non-negligible number of NGOs deals specifically with issues concerning ethnic-religious minorities. With the escalation of the war in Syria and the emergence of the threat of Daesh humanitarian needs have re-catalyzed the efforts of civil society.

One of the most established Iraqi civil society entities is the Iraq Civil Society Solidarity Initiative (ICSSI). Founded in 2003, ICSSI is a coalition of Iraqi and international civil society organizations.

2.6 Security Sector

The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) include the traditional security forces such as the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Air Force, the Iraqi Navy, the Counter-Terrorism Service, the Federal Police, the Iraqi Police Service, the Department of Border Enforcement and Coast Guard, the various Facilities Protection Service and Oilfield Police units, and the Popular Mobilization Forces.

The rise of Daesh has had important consequences over Iraqi army and security forces countrywide. The rapid takeover of cities such as Ramadi and Fallujah, in the western province of Anbar, had already signalled the weakness of the Iraqi security forces between 2013 and 2014 and had highlighted their difficulties in exercising effective control. on the whole national territory, especially in the Sunni majority regions. These criticalities emerged incontrovertibly in the aftermath of Daesh's conquest of Mosul in June 2014. Entire divisions of the Iraqi army dissolved without a fight as part of the security forces plunged into chaos. Thus, both the most rooted weaknesses and the manner in which the Daesh struggle was conducted between 2014 and 2017 have played an important role in shaping the current capabilities and consistency of the Iraqi security sector.

The inability to respond to the threat by the security forces has highlighted the spread of corruption, especially in the form of so-called 'ghost soldiers'. An investigation conducted by the government has revealed in December 2014 the existence of around 50,000 ‘ghost soldiers’ in the Iraqi army, whose names were fictitiously appearing on official lists due to the intervention of corrupt officers, who took bribes not to report the absence of personnel and receiving, in exchange, a percentage of the state salary of these soldiers. The 'ghost soldiers' phenomenon also partly affects the Iraqi security forces. Despite the reform attempts so far outlined by the Abadi government, this phenomenon is still present and contributes to eroding law and order.

Because of the urgent need to counter Daesh, most of the Iraqi security apparatus reconstruction efforts have so far been concentrated on a few specific units. In particular, from the second half of 2017 the greatest attention was given to the reconstruction of the Iraqi Special Operations Forces, commonly known as the Golden Division, since its high-profile role in wresting back territory from Daesh resulted in the loss of around 40% of its human and military resources. Although Daesh has been substantially defeated as a territorial entity and no longer has control of any urban centre, the jihadist organization has not been completely defeated and, indeed, continues to have the capacity to carry out attacks against institutions, security forces and high-value targets, activate sleeping cells in several cities, manning fake checkpoints, and carry out hit-and-run attacks especially in the provinces of Diyala, Salahuddin, Nineveh and Anbar. In this sense, the reconstitution of an Iraqi security apparatus able to maintain the respect of law and order, to deter potential attacks and to allow a rapid return to normality in the territories recently freed from Daesh is an absolute priority for the stabilization of the country.

Beyond the fight against the remnants of Daesh, another pressing security issue is the threat posed by militias, criminal gangs, and armed tribes in Basra. Since the withdrawal of local army forces in 2014, the province has witnessed intense tribal feuding, with fighters using rocket-propelled grenades and mortars at the edge of major oil fields. Some Basra militias have also begun to steal oil. In addition, the offensive on Kirkuk and the disputed territories in the aftermath of the independence referendum of the Kurdistan region represents an important security challenge. Federal forces re-established a military presence in late 2017, but there is a lack of clear and efficient joint security mechanisms with the Kurdish forces in those ethnically mixed areas whose status is still disputed according to the Constitution.

Events related to the failed referendum have also had an impact on shaping the current security landscape in the Kurdistan region. In fact, the offensive carried out by the Baghdad forces has exacerbated the tensions - which date back to the early 1990s - between the various components of both the Kurdish security forces and the Peshmerga. Following the Kurdish civil war (1994-97), the entire security apparatus continued to be divided between units loyal to KDP and to the PUK. Since the federal forces offensive on Kirkuk was successful thanks to close agreements with part of the units loyal to the PUK, this resulted in freezing the attempts of reunification and in undermining any mutual trust between competing units and their respective political referents.

Finally, the fight against Daesh has had the unintended effect of arming and training security forces that often operate outside formal institutions. Following Daesh's takeover of Mosul, the Ayatollah Sistani appealed for volunteers to join the fight against the jihadist organization. This resulted in tens of thousands of volunteers who were armed, trained and sent to the front or, in many cases, ordered to patrolling and securing liberated areas. These volunteers have swelled the ranks of the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi, PMF; also known as Popular Mobilization Units or PMU), an umbrella group that includes tens of militias, and constitute in all respects a security apparatus parallel to the official one. From 2017 the PMFs are nominally part of the official command and control chain and respond directly to the Prime Minister. However, the exact degree of control exercised by the government is rather labile, and these militias tend to respond more to individual political exponents, warlords or foreign entities than to federal authorities. The salaries of the PMF are paid by the central government, but also in this case the problem of the "ghost soldiers" has been repeated, since the PMF have on their payrolls about 150,000 men, half of which are estimated to be fictitious. The federal budget covers the salaries of 110,000 men of the PMF. The current head of the PMF is Falih al-Fayyadh, who is also head and advisor of the National Security Council chaired by Prime Minister Abadi. A vaguely worded November 2016 law passed by Iraqi parliament stipulated the PMF will be an independent military institution within the security forces. This law has also become one of the main obstacles to dissolving the PMF and integrating its fighters. In March 2018, Prime Minister Abadi issued a decree formalizing the inclusion of PMF in the country’s security forces. PMF members are granted many of the same rights as members the military. They will be given equivalent salaries to those members of the military under the Ministry of Defense’s control, will be subject to the laws of military service, and will gain access to military institutes and colleges.

	Late 2009		May 2014		Jan 2015		Jan 2016	
	Brigade equiva-lents	**Frontline on-duty strength**	**Brigade equivalents**	**Frontline on-duty strength**	**Brigade equivalents** *1	**Frontline on-duty strength**	**Brigade equivalents**	**Frontline on-duty strength**
Iraqi Army	55	151,250	55	110,000	36	54,000	54	81,000
Federal Police	30	82,500	30	60,000	24	36,000	25	37,000
Counter-Terror-ism Service	3	8,250	3	*2 7,250	3	4,500	4	*3 8,500
Bodyguard units	5	13,750	5	13,750	5	*4 13,750	2	7,000
Border forces	15	41,250	15	30,000	9	13,500	9	13,500
Total ISF	**108**	**297,000**	**108**	**221,000**	**77**	**121,750**	**87**	**147,000**
PMU			Unknown quantity operating in unofficial militia role 8		15	Approx 22,500	15	Approx 22,500
Non-PMU Shia volunteers *5					Approx 12,000	8	Approx 12,000	
Sunni PMU / Tribal Security Forces					2	Approx 3,000	3	Approx 6,000 *6
Total ISF plus Hashd					**102**	***7 159,250**	**113**	**187,500**
KRG security forces	47	94,000	47	94,000	54	108,000	54	108,000

Source: M. Knights, 'The future of Iraq Armed Forces', Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies, March 2016

3. Law enforcement structures and actors

3.1 The Police

The Iraqi law enforcement sector has been almost completely rebuilt under the Coalition Provisional Authority, its successors and has been largely shaped by the US-led efforts to stabilize the country after the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Insurgent threats, sectarianism, the proliferation of paramilitary entities and militias, and the rise of Daesh have all contributed to undermine its efficiency. Competing loyalties and frequently overlapping duties within different Iraqi security forces complete a picture characterized by profound uncertainty, which makes it particularly difficult to complete the security sector reform currently under discussion.

In recent years, the Abadi government has focused mainly on combating corruption in Iraqi security forces, in an attempt to increase its efficiency and to obtain a precise picture of the real situation on which to intervene through a reform process. In 2016 the Iraqi parliament approved a draft law to recreate a National Guard. The draft law has raised disputes between political parties, and parliament has not yet set a date to take further action.

Between late 2016 and early 2018, the Abadi government has formally included the paramilitary groups and the militias that make up the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the official chain of command. However, the PMF refused to have their fighters incorporated into the command chain of the traditional state armed forces, which legally fall under the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Interior, and they now depend directly from the Prime Minister office. In this way, PMF have become an institutionalized but largely autonomous force, fundamentally altering Iraq's security architecture and challenging Baghdad's command structure and monopoly over legitimate violence. Many PMF units retain *de facto* police duties, thus resulting in overlapping with Iraqi police service and Iraqi federal police.

Iraqi police service

The Iraqi police service is the uniformed police force responsible for the enforcement of civil law and falls under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. It is a uniformed organisation tasked with the general patrol of Iraq's cities and incident response, enforce the rule of law and provide local security. The force is organized largely into provincial police forces.

Each provincial police force has Patrol, Station, Traffic and Highway Patrol branches. The Patrol Police answer calls for assistance, take suspects into custody and deliver them to Police Stations for subsequent holding or release. The Station Police compile and maintain crime reports, respond to requests for assistance from the public and assist Investigative Judges in criminal cases. The Traffic Police have duties such as directing traffic, enforcing traffic laws, registering vehicles, and issuing driver's licenses. Provinces also have Highway Patrol Police who patrol the major highways, provide law enforcement and internal security along Iraq's highways.

Iraqi federal police

The Federal police is a deployable gendarmerie under the Ministry of Interior. Its capabilities fall on the spectrum between an Iraqi army unit and the local police. Federal police units possess anti-tank rockets, Humvees, Infantry Fighting Vehicles such as Russian BMP-2s, and pickup trucks outfitted with heavy weapons. They are recruited at the provincial level but forward deploy outside of their home provinces. Federal police has participated in the fight against Daesh, often alongside PMF units.

.



Iraqi federal police: order of battle. Source: ISW, 'Iraqi security forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle', December 2017

Provincial Emergency Police Battalions

Emergency Police Battalions are localized combat formations of local police tied to provincial police commands that fall under the leadership of the federal police. They are not intended to mobilize like the federal police, and most often remain in the area in which formed. They are only forward deployed in unique circumstances, the most common being the allocation of southern provinces' emergency battalions to pilgrimage routes or sites, such as the al-Askari Shrine in Samarra. Emergency Police Battalions near the frontlines have limited combat capabilities and are most frequently used to hold rather than to clear territory.

Zerevani

Zerevani is the militarized gendarmerie force operating in the Iraqi Kurdistan. Although it nominally falls under the control of the Kurdish Ministry of Interior, Zerevani members are for all intents and purposes actual Peshmerga forces. Zerevani is internally split between units loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party and units loyal to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (the latter have been renamed Emergency Force). Zerevani often operates outside a clear chain of command.

3.2 Other security forces

Counter Terrorism Services
The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) is a force attached to the Council of Ministers. It exists outside the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior. The CTS reports directly to the Prime Minister. The Iraqi security forces utilize the CTS as an elite light infantry force to spearhead its most important operations, including defense of the Green Zone in Baghdad and major clearing operations. It had as many as 13,000 members prior to Daesh's capture of Mosul.
The CTS is comprised of three Iraqi Special Operation Forces units that are not geographically bound, the most effective being first, known also as the Golden Division.

Presidential Brigades
The Presidential Brigades are nominally assigned for the protection of Iraq's President, who is customarily a Sunni Kurd from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Party under the Iraqi political quota system. They are predominantly Kurdish units that technically operate under the Ministry of Defence. They also have some responsibilities for securing parts of Baghdad, especially during Shi'a pilgrimages. They are not readily available for forward deployment.

Prime Minister's Special Forces Division
The Prime Minister's SFD is responsible for security in Baghdad's Green Zone and for protecting the Prime Minister; it answers to the Ministry of Defence. Its primary role is as a bodyguard unit. SFD units accompany senior Iraqi government officials, including the Prime Minister or the Minister of Interior. The SFD is not likely manned as a full division, however, it possesses some advanced capabilities and armoured vehicles.

Emergency Response Division (ERD)
The ERD (sometimes referred to as the Rapid Response Division or Emergency Response Brigades) is a mobile special operations force under Ministry of Interior control. It was formed with the intention of consolidating into the Iraqi Special Operations Forces after the liberation of Mosul from ISIS. It operates mostly in Anbar province, Baghdad area, and Salahuddin province.

Border Guards Command
The Border Guards are a motorized infantry force attached to the Ministry of Interior. They oversee Iraq's ports of entry and its borders from watchtowers and border forts. Border Guards in Iraqi Kurdistan are responsive to the Kurdistan Regional Government, not the central Ministry of Interior.

Facilities Protection Service (FPS) and Oil Police
Iraq's FPS forces are essentially security guards protecting critical infrastructure, such as electricity stations, power lines, railways, government offices, and other infrastructure. They fall nominally under the Ministry of Interior but respond more regularly to the ministry whose facilities they protect. The FPS generally have limited manoeuvre and firepower. The Iraqi Oil Police are more capable than the other FPS forces and have slightly better equipment. They are motorized units attached to the Ministry of Oil and responsible for the protection of the country's oil fields. Oil police in Kirkuk and Iraqi Kurdistan are responsive to the Kurdistan Regional Government, not the Ministry of Oil or the Ministry of Interior.

Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS)
Founded by Coalition Provisional Authority Order number 69 in 2004, INIS is Iraq's intelligence agency tasked to collect intelligence and perform intelligence activities with regard to threats to the national security of Iraq, terrorism, insurgency, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics production and trafficking, organized crime, espionage and other acts threatening to the country.

Asaysh
Asayish is the Kurdish security organization and the primary intelligence agency operating in the Kurdistan region in Iraq. It acts under the command of the Kurdish National Assembly and the Kurdistan Regional Government and holds jurisdiction over major crimes like smuggling, espionage, and terrorism. After the Kurdish civil war (1994-97), both KDP and PUK, the main Kurdish political parties, established separate Asaysh bodies. The Azhanci Parastini Asayishi Haremi Kurdistan, or simply Parastin, is a product of the KDP, while the Dazgay Zanyari, or simply Zanyari, is the product of the PUK. The parallel development of these organizations has not been reconciled.

3.3 The judiciary

Iraq's judicial system includes the Higher Judicial Council, the Supreme Court, the federal Court of Cassation, the Public Prosecution Department, the Judiciary Oversight Commission, the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, the Central Criminal Court, and other federal courts that are regulated in accordance with the law. The constitution only regulates the Higher Juridical Council and the Supreme Federal Court. As per article 84 of the constitution, the Judicial authority is independent; all the courts, at any level, shall assume this authority and issue decisions in accordance with the law.

The Higher Judicial Council is the administrative body that manages and supervises the affairs of the federal judiciary, and supervise the federal judiciary and prosecution system. It also nominates the Chief Justice and members of the Federal Court of Cassation, the Chief Public Prosecutor, and the Chief Justice of the Judiciary Oversight Commission, (all appointments depends on the Council of Representatives' approval).

The Federal Supreme Court is a Constitutional Court mandated with overseeing the constitutionality of laws and regulations in effect; settling matters that arise from the application of the federal laws; settling disputes that arise between the federal government and local administrations at all levels. Therefore, it acts as a final court of appeals. A 2005 law currently guides de facto the Federal Supreme Court's work, since it was never approved by a two-thirds majority in the Iraqi Parliament.

Like other institutional bodies and state apparatus of Iraq, the judicial system is also affected by increasing levels of corruption, which undermine its credibility in the eyes of citizens, fueling the sense of disillusionment with the ability of politics to provide an answer to the most pressing problems of the country. During his term, Prime Minister Abadi sought to reform the judiciary as early as 2015, but with little to no success. The package of reforms announced in August 2015 tackled mainly corruption. Reforms called for the creation of a committee of judges known for their integrity tasked with investigating and prosecuting corrupt officials, including in the judiciary. It also called for the courts to come up with their own program to improve their work, and asked that corruption cases be expedited. The entire reform package was buried just two months later, in November 2015, under pressure from the Parliament. Earlier that year, a draft reform of the Federal Supreme Court was discussed in Parliament but failed to pass three times. Premier Abadi's reform project failed despite the support of a leading figure in the Iraqi Shiite clergy such as Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani.

As of 2017, Iraq was ranked as 169th out 180 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Corruption is common practice in both public and private sector. Among the factors affecting the spread of corruption in the country there is a deeply entrenched patronage network and political interference. Public officials in many cases engage in corruption with impunity. Bribery and giving gifts to get things done are widespread practices in Iraq, despite being illegal. Corruption is also influencing authorities' willingness to respect court orders: Interior Ministry and Justice Ministry employees often extorted bribes from detainees to release them even if the courts had already accorded them the right to be released.

The structure of the Kurdistan Regional court and judicial system closely follows that of the Federal judiciary.

4. Migrations and Human Rights Issues

4.1 Internal and International Migration

The humanitarian and displacement situation in Iraq is one of the most severe and fragile crisis in the world. The phenomenon of internally displaced persons has its roots in the decades of Saddam Hussein's era, but it has received a decisive push from 2003 to today, when the various waves of violence that have hit the country have resulted in as many waves of displacement. The process of fragmentation of the social fabric of Iraq, the increasing ethnic-sectarian tensions, the phenomena of insurgence and jihadist violence have been and still are the main drivers of displacement. So, the current crisis is not only the result of the rise of Daesh in Iraq, but it is a complex and stratified phenomenon, with respect to which the consequences of the creation of the so-called "caliphate" are only the last layer, which is added to the previous ones and makes worse the overall situation. Besides, in recent years Iraq has also been a destination country, hosting refugees from Syria since the beginning of the conflict.

The current crisis began already in the first few months of 2014, when Daesh obtained control of vast portions of territory in the southwestern province of Anbar. During 2014, violence in the Anbar alone displaced 550,000 people. By October 2015, there were already 3.2 million IDPs in Iraq. The Anwar and Nineveh governorates host 60 per cent of people in need and are the epicentre of the crisis. After capturing Mosul, Nineveh's largest city, ISIL went on to take the town of Sinjar, 120 kilometres away from Mosul, and enslaved thousands of Yazidi females for sex, kidnapped thousands of young Yazidi males for training to become fighters, and displaced 200,000 Yazidis. If the northern Kurdish provinces have been a safe haven especially for forcibly displaced people from minorities, since the Kurdish region is relatively safer than the rest of the country, such a great influx of displaced people put a severe strain on the capability of the region to cope with the humanitarian disaster and deeply affected Kurdistan's resiliency. Added to these difficulties are growing tensions related to the political use of ethnic and religious minorities by the Kurdish authorities. In fact, although Daesh was defeated militarily as early as the end of 2017, these displaced people are unable to obtain permits to return to their villages of origin, which are located mostly in the territories disputed between Arbil and Baghdad.

According to UN OCHA figures, the number of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Iraq peaked twice in recent years, the first time in Autumn 2016 when it reached 3.3 million people before dropping slightly, and the second time in June 2017 when it peaked again reaching 3.35 million IDPs driven by the then ongoing Mosul offensive. Since then the number of IDPs has been decreasing.

Despite the overall scale of return (4 million IDPs as of September 2018, counting all waves), return rates appear to be levelling out: nearly half of all returns took place in 2017; just 18% of IDPs have returned in 2018. As of November 2018, more than 1.9 million IDPs remain displaced, of which over half have been displaced for more than three years. A significant majority of IDPs (71%) reside outside of camps, mostly within the Kurdistan Region and Ninewa. While humanitarians are able to reach approximately 94% of in-camp IDPs, they are reaching only 10% of people outside of camp settings.

4.2 Human Rights Situation

Universal and regional human rights instruments ratified

Iraq is a party to most core international human rights instruments: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), but Iraq has not signed the first optional protocol giving the right to individual petition to the Human Rights Committee, nor the second optional protocol aimed at the elimination of the death penalty; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW); Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CED); the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in armed conflict (CRC-OPAC); the Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography (OPSC). Iraq approved the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam at the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 1990, the original Arab Charter for Human Rights in 1994 and the revised version prepared by the Arab League at its Summit in Tunisia in May 2004 but it did not ratify the latter. Iraq is not a party nor it has signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

Rights to life, liberty, security and physical integrity

Although major military operations concluded in late 2017, the humanitarian crisis in Iraq is far from over. The toll of four years of intensive combat on Iraq's civilian population has been enormous. Although major efforts are being made by the Government of Iraq and Kurdistan Regional Government to incentivize and facilitate returns, many vulnerable families are unable to return without assistance, and ethnic tension and significant explosive hazard contamination is preventing returns in some locations. Besides, communities in former Daesh-controlled territory have often taken actions of collective punishment against families of suspected Daesh members, displacing them and destroying their property with the complicity of government forces.

The situation is made even more complex and volatile due to the presence of dozens of paramilitary militias in different regions of the country. These armed groups are mostly attributable to the People's Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella group that includes militias formed on an often-voluntary basis, which have a deeper and deeper territorial control than that of the federal authorities. Although the PMF have been institutionalized and officially included in the chain of command of the Iraqi security forces, many of these armed groups still retain a very broad degree of autonomy and they consequently tend to operate outside the law.

In certain areas such as the Anbar, Nineveh, Diyala and Salahuddin governorates, Daesh is still a threat and has the capabilities to carry out attacks and targeted killings against civilians.

Arbitrary and illegal detention and enforced disappearances

According to prominent international human rights organizations, thousands of men and boys considered to be of fighting age (roughly 15 to 65) fleeing territories controlled by Daesh were subjected to security screenings by Iraqi security forces, Kurdish forces and paramilitary militias at temporary reception sites or in makeshift detention facilities. Men suspected of affiliation with Daesh are held for days or months, often in harsh conditions, or transferred onward. Iraqi forces, Kurdish forces and paramilitary militias, including the PMF, arrested thousands more alleged "terrorism" suspects without judicial warrant from their homes, checkpoints and camps for internally displaced people. Men and boys suspected of being members of Daesh are allegedly subjected to enforced disappearance in facilities controlled by the Iraqi Ministries of the Interior and Defence, the KRG and in secret detention centres.

Accountability for Human Rights Violations

In response to allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes committed by Iraqi forces and pro-government militias – such as torture, extrajudicial execution and enforced disappearance – the Iraqi authorities established committees to evaluate the available evidence and launch investigations. Such committees consistently failed to release any findings publicly or to communicate their findings.

On 21 September the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution aimed at ensuring accountability for war crimes, human rights abuses and genocide committed by Daesh in the country. The resolution established an investigation team to support Iraq's authorities. The team consist of both international and domestic experts who will work with an initial mandate of two years. However, international human rights organizations complained that the resolution failed to include any provisions to ensure accountability for crimes committed by Iraqi forces, paramilitary militias such as the PMU, the US-led coalition, and others.

Religious Freedom

The Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief and practice for Muslims, Christians, Yazidis, and Sabaean-Mandeans, Islam being the official religion of the state. Nonetheless, international human rights groups claim the government failed to investigate and prosecute ethno-sectarian crimes, including those carried out by armed groups in areas liberated from Daesh, and accuse federal authorities of continuing to use the antiterrorism law as a pretence for detaining Sunnis and others without access to timely due

process. In certain areas, IDPs belonging to religious minorities (mainly Yazidis and Christians) report harassments and abuses by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Peshmerga and Asayish (internal security) forces.

Death Penalty

Iraq has long had one of the highest rates of executions in the world, ranked number four after China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Iraqi law permits the death penalty against adults for a range of crimes, including offenses under the counterterrorism law. In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the KRG implemented a de facto moratorium on the death penalty in 2008, substantially banning it.

According to international human rights groups, in 2017 scores of people were sentenced to death by courts after unfair trials and executed by hanging in Iraq. In January 2017, dozens of men were hanged for their alleged role in the killing of 1,700 Shiite cadets at Speicher military camp near Tikrit in 2014. The men, whose confessions were extracted under allegations of torture, were convicted following trials that international human rights groups claim were deeply flawed and hasty.

5. The UN and Iraq

The United Nations have been actively involved in the events that followed the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Security Council Resolution 1483 (S/RES/1483), passed on May 22, 2003, determined that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts and the development of institutions in Iraq. It welcomed the resumption of humanitarian efforts and the appointment of a Special Adviser by the Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Besides, it recognized the US-UK coalition's responsibilities under applicable international law as occupying powers; recognized the creation of a transitional governing council of Iraqis; and removed all sanctions against Iraq that were placed upon the former regime of Saddam Hussein, thus terminating the Oil-For-Food program which was established by the UN in 1995.

In August 2003, UN resolution 1500 established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), tasked with supporting national development efforts on political, electoral, and humanitarian levels. The Mission has been on the ground ever since, and its role was greatly expanded in 2007 with the adoption of Resolution 1770.

The United Nations, especially thanks to the work of the Special Envoy Vieira De Mello, has therefore played a fundamental role in Iraq regarding the sending and distribution of humanitarian aid, the re-establishment of relations between the various components of the country and the efforts to contain and defuse the potential growth of ethno-sectarian tensions. Precisely because of the role that the UN has been able to carve out in the country, its structures and representatives in Iraq have been targeted by insurgents and jihadist groups as early as summer 2003. In August 2003, just few days after UNAMI was formally established, a suicide car bomb attack targeted the Canal Hotel where the UN was headquartered, killing more than 20 people including Vieira De Mello. The attack was later claimed by Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad led by al-Zarqawi. After the attack, the UN withdrew as many as 600 personnel from the country. Amid deteriorating conditions in 2007, the UN worked to progressively increase its presence in Iraq and continued to expand its operations throughout the country.

UN Iraq is composed of UNAMI and the United Nations Country Team, which regroups the 20 UN agencies, funds and programmes currently operating in Iraq.

The following UN agencies, funds and programmes are active in Iraq:

- ESCWA, The Economic Commission for Western Asia
- FAO, Food & Agriculture Organization
- ILO, International Labour Organization
- IOM, International Organization for Migration
- OCHA, United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- OHCHR, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
- UNHCR, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
- UNICEF, UN Children’s Fund
- UNDP, UN Development Programme
- UNESCO, UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UN Women, UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
- UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
- UNEP, UN Environment Programme
- UN-HABITAT, UN Human Settlements Programme
- UNIDO, UN Industrial Development Organization
- UNOPS, UN Office for Project Services
- UNFPA, UN Population Fund
- WFP, World Food Programme
- WHO, World Health Organization

The UN country team aims to provide coherent and coordinated assistance delivery in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and help the Government of Iraq to meet its various obligations. These include the Millennium Declarations and the Millennium Development Goals and International Treaties to which Iraq is signatory. A top priority for UN team in Iraq is the protection of targeted and vulnerable groups including Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, returnees, minorities, children, youth and women.

In July 2017, UNAMI mandate was extended until July 2018. It includes: to advise, support and assist the Government of Iraq in advancing their inclusive, political dialogue and national reconciliation; development of processes for holding elections and referenda; constitutional review and the implementation of constitutional provisions; development of processes acceptable to the Government of Iraq to resolve disputed internal boundaries; facilitating regional dialogue, including on issues of border security, energy, and refugees; planning, funding and implementing reintegration programmes for former members of illegal armed groups; initial planning for the conduct of a comprehensive census.

UNAMI is also mandated to promote, support, and facilitate, in collaboration with the Government of Iraq the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance and the safe, orderly, and voluntary return, as appropriate; the implementation of the International Compact with Iraq, including coordination with donors and international financial institutions; the coordination and implementation of programmes to improve Iraq’s capacity to provide essential services for its people and continue active donor coordination of critical reconstruction and assistance programmes through the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). UNAMI is also tasked with promoting economic reform, capacity-building and the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organizations and, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and international financial institutions.

5.1 The UN and the fight against Daesh

The UN involvement in the fight against Daesh is part of a wider, international multifaceted effort. Since they materialized in a massive way in 2014, the efforts of the International Community have not had a common direction, but on the contrary they have been the expression of different political interests and sensibilities, often in conflict with each other.

Several international coalitions have emerged. The Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) was formed following a September 2014 NATO summit in Wales and a December 2014 NATO summit in Brussels. It is US-led and included originally 59 states. Besides the military efforts, mainly in Iraq, the Global Coalition tackles Daesh as a global threat through several working groups, each one addressing specific issues: the Counter-Finance Working Group (CIFG), the Foreign Terrorist Fighter Working Group (FTF WG), the Communications Working Group (seeks to contest the information space in which Daesh operates to ensure its ideological defeat), the Working Group on Stabilization. The Russia–Syria–Iran–Iraq coalition (RSII coalition) is headquartered in Damascus and Baghdad and was formed in September 2015, following Russia's direct military involvement in Syria. It acts mainly as a joint intelligence-sharing cooperation mechanism. The US launched Operation Inherent Resolve in June 2014, conducting military campaigns in both Iraq and Syria. The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC) is a 41-member Saudi-led military effort headquartered in Riyadh. These coalitions' areas of operation and memberships are sometimes overlapping and they widely lack a coordination mechanism.

Given this context, the UN did not assume a global coordination role, but intervened with *ad hoc*, cross-cutting measures. The UN efforts against Daesh fall within the wider framework of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 to enhance national, regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. It was last reviewed in July 2016, taking into account the rise of Daesh. The first issue address by the UN has been tackling the flux of foreign fighters to Iraq and Syria. UN Security Council resolution 2170 (approved on August 15, 2014) condemned the recruitment by ISIS and al-Nusra of foreign fighters, while resolution 2178 (September 24, 2014) expanded the counter-terrorism framework by imposing obligations on member states to respond to the threat of foreign terrorist fighters. In order to counter Daesh's financing, the UN passed resolution 2199 on February 12, 2015, that addressed Daesh and the Syrian al-Qaeda-affiliate al-Nusra's illicit funding via oil exports, traffic of cultural heritage, ransom payments and external donations. Resolution 2249, passed on November 20, 2015 and drafted by France in the aftermath of Paris attacks, called for member states to take all necessary measures on the territory under the control of Daesh to prevent terrorist acts committed by Daesh and other Al-Qaida affiliates. Resolution 2379 (September 21, 2017) established an investigative team tasked with collecting, storing and preserving evidence of Daesh crimes in Iraq, following a request by the Iraqi government. The works of the team is widely seen as potentially conducive to supporting and enhancing Iraqi government's efforts in stabilization, national reconciliation, especially in the liberated territories, and instrumental in defusing ethno-sectarian tensions that may arise.

6. The EU – Iraq Relations

6.1 A long-term partnership

Relations between Iraq and the EU have progressed rapidly since the fall of Saddam Hussein and embrace various fields, from trade to development cooperation, from support to Iraqi institutions to the European contribution to the stabilization of the country in the context of the fight against Daesh. Since 2014, the EU has increased its commitment to supporting the Iraqi authorities in the reconstruction phase and in tackling the underlying political, social and economic drivers of instability. In a number of occasions, the EU has reiterated its steadfast support for Iraq's unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its firm and active commitment to the preservation of the multi-ethnic, multireligious and multi-confessional nature of Iraqi society, including the protection of its minority groups. On the eve of the referendum for independence announced by Iraqi Kurdistan authorities and held on September 25, 2017, the EU recognized that there are outstanding issues between Arbil and Baghdad and that they need to be resolved, but called for a mutually agreed solution and denounced any unilateral action as counterproductive.

The EU-Iraq relationship is based on two bilateral agreements: the Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation, signed in 2010, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 2012. They both aim to support Iraq's reform and development and its integration into the wider international community.

The Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation creates a framework for improving and developing energy relations between the EU and Iraq. It covers such issues as Iraq's energy policy, securing energy supplies, renewable energy, energy efficiency and improving technological, scientific and industrial cooperation. The EU regards Iraq as a natural energy partner, both as a producer of oil and gas and as a transit country for hydrocarbon resources from the Middle East and the Gulf to the EU. Moreover, due to the country economy's relevant dependence on hydrocarbons, the distribution of oil and gas revenues in Iraq is deemed a key to ensure stability and defuse regional and ethno-sectarian tensions.

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is the main tool for the EU's support to Iraq, and it's the first ever contractual relationship between the EU and Iraq. It provides a legal framework for improving ties and cooperation in a wide range of areas. These include political issues, counter-terrorism, trade, human rights, health, education and the environment. It also provides preferential elements and substantial market access to EU companies, namely in public procurement (the same treatment that national companies get), services and establishment and investment in Iraq.

Within this framework, EU has continued to expand and deepen its support for Iraq, especially with the escalation of the crisis due to the repercussions of the conflict in Syria on the country and the rise of Daesh. Favouring and promoting a multilateral approach, the EU co-chaired the International Conference for Reconstruction of Iraq which was held in Kuwait on 12 -14 February 2018. The three-day event mobilized nearly $30 billion of additional international support to the country following Daesh's territorial defeat in 2017. The conference focused on the physical and human dimensions of reconstruction (infrastructure, private investment) and societal issues such as humanitarian needs, social protection, good governance and accountability. The EU announced an additional 400 million euros from its budget - on top of EU Member States' support - for humanitarian aid, early recovery, stabilisation, reconstruction and longer-term sustainable development. Its pillars and areas of intervention are:

- Preserving the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, as well as its ethnic and religious diversity
- Strengthening the Iraqi political system by supporting Iraqi efforts to establish a balanced, inclusive accountable and democratic system of government
- Supporting the Iraqi authorities in delivering humanitarian aid, support for early recovery, stabilisation, development and reconstruction
- Promoting sustainable, knowledge-based and inclusive economic growth and job creation
- Promoting an effective and independent justice system and ensuring accountability
- Establishing a migration dialogue with Iraq
- Supporting Iraq's good relations with all its neighbours

The EU's last strategy relating to Iraq was adopted in March 2015 as part of the EU regional strategy for Syria and Iraq, as well as the Daesh threat. This review aims to fine-tune the strategy with evolving situation on the ground, thus moving beyond the territorial struggle against Daesh.

Trade

The EU's trade relations with Iraq are governed by the EU-Iraq Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The EU is Iraq's second-biggest trade partner behind China. In 2015, the EU accounts for 18,4% of the total Iraqi trade, compared to 20,9% for China, 11,9% for India, 10,6% for Syria, 10,0% for Turkey, and 7,5% for South Korea. Total bilateral trade between the EU and Iraq amounted to over €13,9 billion in 2016. EU imports from Iraq were worth €10,3 billion in 2016. Oil imports represented €10,3 billion, up to 99.7% of all EU imports from Iraq. The EU exported €3,5 billion worth of goods to Iraq in 2016. EU exports to Iraq are dominated by machinery and transport equipment (€1,6 billion, 45,9%), chemicals (€0,6 billion, 18,8%), and food (€0,3 billion,11,0%).

Iraq is not a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), though it requested WTO accession in September 2004. The EU supports Iraq's accession to the WTO and believes that WTO membership will enhance structural reform in the country and reintegration into the multilateral trading system.



Source: Eurostat, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113405.pdf

6.2 EU response to the Iraqi crisis

The EU has led the international humanitarian and development efforts for the Iraq crisis, providing some €650million of funding overall in the period 2014-2017, in order to respond to the humanitarian crisis and support the stability and development in the country. In 2017 alone, the EU's overall support to Iraq reached more that €200 million between humanitarian or immediate crisis response, and longer term resilience and development needs.

EU total humanitarian assistance in Iraq since 2014 amounts to €370 million. In 2017, the EU provided €82.5 million to Iraq in humanitarian aid. This includes daily, lifesaving provision of protection support, water, shelter, food and emergency medical assistance. The EU has specifically focused its emergency humanitarian response in Mosul, Tel Afar, Hawija and West Anbar and has provided vital support to displaced persons and conflict affected populations in newly retaken areas.

Longer term actions are funded via the EU Development Cooperation Instrument. For the period 2014-2017, the total EU development assistance to Iraq amounted to €124.4 million. This amount was topped up in 2017 with €60.4 million towards stabilisation and demining and further actions are being prepared. EU development cooperation with Iraq focusses mainly on three sectors: good governance, stabilisation, primary and secondary education and sustainable energy. EU work on stabilising liberated areas in Iraq focuses on demining, in coordination with the UN, support to the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and support to early recovery and resilience of the local population. The EU leads the counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) action of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and is one of the main donors to decontaminate areas recovered from Daesh alongside the state members' contribution. Moreover, the EU delegation in Iraq chairs the Global Coalition's sub-working group on explosive hazard mitigation.

Since 2003, the European Commission has been the third largest development partner of Iraq, after the US and Japan. This has concerned longer-term issues than the humanitarian aid, specifically support for the electoral process, human rights and the rule of law, and the development of Iraqi civil society organisations and basic services. The European Commission is one of 25 members of the donor committee of the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), which is put into effect by the UN and the World Bank. The IRFFI was set up to direct the support for reconstruction and development in Iraq.

Support to security sector

The EU has been supporting the security sector and the rule of law in Iraq with over €16 million. The EU funds the training of local police in areas liberated from Daesh, which is carried out by the Italian gendarmerie force, the Carabinieri. The EU is also boosting the pre-deployment capacity of the police in Iraq (project POTRAI) by increasing the number of Iraqi police trained and effectively deployed in recovered areas by scaling up the number of trainers, and improving the protection of the Iraqi Police when handling Improvised Explosive Devices (IED). The EU is also working to improve the interoperability of Iraqi security services and support to criminal justice.

In late 2017, the EU launched a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to support security sector reform in Iraq, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM). EUAM was officially launched on 16 October 2017 and deployed in November 2017. On 15 October 2018, the EU Council extended the mandate of the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) Iraq until 17 April 2020. The new mandate's budget is now up to € 64.8 million, allowing the Mission to expand its advisory activities with more staff.

6.3 EU Advisory Mission to Iraq (EUAM)

In late 2017, the EU launched a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) mission to support security sector reform in Iraq, the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM). EUAM was officially launched on 16 October 2017 and deployed in November 2017. The mission was launched to respond to the request for advice and assistance by the Iraqi government. EUAM has an initial mandate for one year.

The mandate of the mission is to provide advice and assistance in priority work areas responding to the needs of the relevant authorities. The main aim is to facilitate consultations with Iraqi officials for the purpose of implementing Iraq's national security strategy and the civilian aspects of Security Sector Reform Programme (SSRP), led by the Office of the Iraqi National Security Advisor. Iraq's national security strategy aims at strengthening the main state institutions, in particular with regard to sectors involved in various ways in guaranteeing security and peace in the post-conflict phase. Furthermore, the strategy focusses on preventing the increase in tensions and instabilities that could reignite the conflict by strengthening the respect of the rule of law by all the institutional bodies. In order to do so, Iraq's national security strategy outlines and prioritizes a number of threats to national security, including terrorism, corruption, political instability and ethnic and sectarian polarisation.

The EU mission, therefore, is structured in such a way that it can act in accordance with the priorities outlined by the national strategy, which the CSDP mission will help to address. A team of about 35 EU experts is deployed to provide strategic advice and assistance and to work closely with relevant Ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior, and all relevant Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs). For example, the EU mission supports the Iraqi Ministry of Interior to help enhance knowledge of the Ministry's current policy situation, and identify gaps or overlaps in order to fine-tune its activities with the reforms currently underway or envisaged. Thus, EUAM helps Iraqi authorities to identify opportunities to revise not only its existing policies, but also to reconsider design approaches as well as implementation procedures and requirements.

The mission is also mandated to analyse, assess and identify opportunities for potential further EU engagement in support of the needs of the Security Sector Reform in Iraq in the long term. With respect to this, EUAM is tasked to map ongoing activities in support of the civilian security sector, including border security, and to identify lessons learned and potential gaps. The mission seeks also to improve coordination on actions by the EU and its member states on the ground, especially regarding involvement in security arena.

Specifically, EUAM Iraq is tasked to support the National Counter-Terrorism Committee in the implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in identifying the sub-strategies and action plans for its implementation. It is also tasked to support the Planning Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior to plan the institutional reforms of the department, including police services, as part of the implementation of the National Security Strategy. Moreover, EUAM Iraq is tasked to contribute to the drafting of a national strategy against organised crime led by the Department of Organised Crime of the Ministry of Interior. Finally, the mission is tasked to ensure that actions to combat organised crime include the fight against illegal migration, trafficking in weapons and drugs, cybercrime and illicit trafficking and destruction of cultural goods. With respect to the latter, EUAM actions are carried out in close coordination with relevant actors on the ground, in particular with Unesco and the Global Coalition.

7. Other regional organisations and Iraq

7.1 Arab League and Iraq

Iraq is a founding member of the Arab League. The 2003 Iraq War split the Arab League, as it did in the Gulf War of 1990-91. Several Gulf states (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain) supported or did not publicly object to the US-led military deployments ahead of the war. Several others, including Syria and the Palestinian Authority, were deeply opposed to the war. However, in September 2003, five months after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Arab League extended diplomatic recognition to the interim Iraqi government and a delegation from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led by Minister Zebari, regained Iraq's seat at the 120th Session of the Arab League in Cairo.

In post-2003, relations between Iraq and the Arab League were affected by the ups and downs with the bloc of states led by Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, in 2005 the Arab League was a party to the so-called “Neighboring Countries” process, which was designed as an international diplomatic and political effort to help Baghdad rebuild its regional and international relations. The process included also the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the Group of Eight countries, the UN, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the European Commission. On the other hand, the expansion of Iran's influence in Iraq, facilitated by Shia-controlled executives who have ruled Baghdad since 2005, is often considered the main reason behind the cyclical souring of relations between the League and Iraq. Over his terms as Prime Minister, Maliki initially attempted to maintain an independent foreign policy, balancing close ties to Tehran with good relations with Washington, Ankara and other Arab states. In fact, Baghdad even sought to reclaim a central role for itself in the Arab world by hosting the Arab League meeting, first scheduled for 2011 but postponed and finally held in late March 2012.

Nonetheless, Iraq-Arab League relations were again jeopardized by the outbreak and spread of the conflict in Syria, with Baghdad moderately supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while the Arab League suspended Syria and supported rebel forces. The Syrian crisis has polarized the region and pushed Baghdad into a position of virtual hostility with much of the Arab world.

On the eve of the Kurdistan referendum on independence held on September 25, 2017, the Arab League council unanimously adopted a resolution that condemned it. In March 2018, Egypt hosted a conference in support of Iraq’s reconstruction under the auspices of the Arab League, which followed the donors conference held in Kuwait the previous month.

7.2 OPEC and Iraq

Iraq is a founding member of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). As a major global producer and exporter of oil&gas, Iraq participated actively in the OPEC oil embargo in early 70s. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq sought to pressure OPEC to end overproduction and to send oil prices higher, in order to help OPEC members financially and to accelerate rebuilding from the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War.

In 2016, OPEC and non-OPEC oil producer states reached a deal to cut their oil production by 1.2 million barrels per day in order to raise global prices. In that year, OPEC nations produced 33.7 million barrels of oil per day, total. Under the deal, they brought their production down to 32.5 million barrels per day, with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, UAE, and Kuwait making the biggest cuts. A compromise was reached in order to ease relations with Iraq and Iran, as both countries sought to increase production in order to increase revenues. In the OPEC/non-OPEC production restriction deal, Iraq agreed to cut 210,000 barrels per day (bpd) off its October 2016 level and cap production at 4.351 million bpd. According to OPEC's figures to measure compliance, Iraq has never actually complied 100 percent with its commitment. For the whole of 2017, Iraq's average production was 4.445 million bpd. Concerned with slipping compliance, OPEC held a meeting with some of the producers in early August 2017 and cited its members Iraq and the UAE, as well as non-OPEC signatories to the deal Kazakhstan and Malaysia, as laggards in compliance. In January 2018, Iraqi Oil Minister al-Luaibi announced that Iraq will comply with the OPEC-led deal on reducing output, even though Baghdad is working to increase its oil export capacity from the north and south of the country.

8. Other Practical Info

8.1 Local Customs Cultural Awareness

Iraqis live in a country that has been extremely troubled by decades of wars, attacks and political turmoil. Past experiences have contributed in shaping an attitude prone to fatalism, while presenting Iraqis with the need to adapt themselves to constantly changing circumstances, rules, laws. The influence of religion is strong and is part of everyday life for most of the population, although with significant differences between the various components of Iraqi people. The attachment and pride for their traditions as a whole is particularly present in the communities of ethnic-religious minorities.

Social Etiquette

a) Meeting Etiquette

The most common greeting is the handshake coupled with eye contact and a smile, while repeating your name. A handshake and kisses on each cheek is common in most situations. The number of kisses may vary depending on the relationships and area of the country one is in. Two, three, or four kisses on alternating cheeks is most common. In greetings between men and women, a handshake can be accepted, but in more conservative environments a simple nod is recommended. It's best to wait for the woman to initiate if it all.

The standard Arabic greeting is "as-salaamu alaikum" ("peace be with you"), to which the response is "wa alaikum salaam" ("and peace be unto you"). It can be used also in the Kurdish region, in alternative with "rojbash" ("good afternoon", but it can be used at any time during the day), "ser chava ser sera" ("hello", informal), "merhaba" ("hello") and "silav" ("hello").

Iraqi names – as standard Arab names – are often comprised of:

- First name, which is the person's given name. It is not unusual for Iraqis to refer to others using only the first name, even in formal situations or together with someone's title.
- Middle name(s), which can be both a second or third name or a patronymic. Middle names can be preceded by "al-" ("belonging to") or "bin" / "bint" ("son of" / "daughter of").
- Last name, which is the family name.
- In certain situations, a person can be referred to by using the name of his or her son / daughter preceded by "abu" ("father of") or "umm" ("mother of"). Women do not take their husband's name in marriage.

b) Gift Giving Etiquette

If you are invited to an Iraqi's home, bring a box of cookies, pastries or a box of chocolates. A fruit basket is also appreciated. If a man must give a gift to a woman, he should say that it is from his wife, mother, sister, or some other female relation. A small gift for the children is always a good touch. Gifts are given with two hands and are generally not opened when received. Be aware that giving very expensive items can be misinterpreted as bribery.

c) Dining Etiquette

Iraqis have a strong culture of hospitality. If you are invited to a home, check to see if you should remove shoes. Iraqi table manners are relatively formal. If the meal is on the floor, sit cross-legged or kneel on one knee. Never let your feet touch the food mat and use the right hand for eating and drinking. It is considered polite to leave some food on your plate when you have finished eating.

It is polite to accept everything offered. If you refuse something, the host may see it as a token protest made out of politeness and will therefore insist that you receive what is given instead of accepting your refusal. You will likely be served second or even third servings. It is a great gesture to eat more servings, so it is best serve yourself less initially so you have more room to eat another serving. If you honestly would not like anymore food, the best way to refuse a serving is to place your hand over your heart and give your thanks whilst saying you are full and the host provided greatly.

Business Etiquette and Protocol

a) Meeting and Greeting

Iraqi businesspeople are relatively formal in their business dealings. The most common business greeting is the handshake with direct eye contact. Handshakes can be rather prolonged; try not to be the first person to remove your hand. Greet the host of the meeting first. From there, you are expected to greet everyone in the room individually, even if the group is large. Greet in order of oldest to youngest, or go from the left of the room to the right. It is better to have one side of your business card translated into Arabic. Use the right hand only to receive a business card as the left hand is considered unclean. Do not put one's card away immediately, but regard it carefully first and then place it before you on the table until everyone is seated. Do not write on a card unless directed to do so. Use the right hand only when presenting a business card, making sure that the writing is facing the other person. The visitor, not the host, is the one who ends the meeting.

b) Communication Style

The need to save face and protect honour means that showing emotions is seen negatively. Displays of anger should be avoided. If you must show disapproval it is always best to do so in a one-to-one, quietly and with tact. It is important you always keep your word, so do not make a promise or guarantee unless you can keep it. If you want to show a commitment to something but do not want to make caste iron assurances then employ terms such as "I will do my best," "We will see," or the local term "insha-Allah" (God willing).

c) Business Meetings

Allow social conversation to pass before mentioning business. Rushing through this discussion or trying to begin the agenda prematurely can make you seem too forceful. While still acquainting yourself with each other, you can expect Iraqis to take a relatively blunt and probing approach in asking about your company and its intentions. Negotiations can take a long

time and meetings may be interrupted by a prayer session. Meeting schedules are not very rigid.

8.2 Medical Travel Recommendations for Iraq

Medical facilities are limited. In the event of serious accident or illness, an evacuation by air ambulance may be required. Make sure you have adequate travel health insurance and accessible funds to cover the cost of any medical treatment abroad and repatriation. There was an outbreak of avian influenza (bird flu) among birds and poultry in Iraq at the end of 2017 but the risk to humans is believed to be very low.

Recommended Vaccinations:

- Rabies
- Polio;
- Cholera
- Tetanus;
- Tubercolosis
- Hepatitis A; B
- Typhoid.

Diarrhoea

Diseases from food and water are the leading cause of illness in travellers. Prevention consists mainly in: “Boil it, wash it, peel it, cook it... or forget it”. Follow these tips for safe eating and drinking:

- wash your hands often with soap and water, especially before eating. If soap and water are not available, use an alcohol-based hand gel (with at least 60% alcohol);
- drink only bottled or boiled water, or carbonated drinks in cans or bottles. Avoid tap water, fountain drinks, and ice cubes;
- make sure food is fully cooked; avoid eating fruits and vegetables unless they have been peeled or cooked.

Most episodes are self-limiting, clear up within 48 to 72 hours and do not require treatment with antibiotics. The primary goal of treating any form of diarrhoea (viral, bacterial, parasitic or non-infectious) is preventing dehydration or appropriately re-hydrating persons presenting with dehydration.

In particular:

- oral re-hydration solutions (ORS) or similar solutions should be used for re-hydration and absorbed in small, frequent volumes;
- an age-appropriate unrestricted diet is recommended as soon as dehydration is corrected;
- no routine laboratory tests or medications are recommended;
- anti-motility agents such as Loperamid should be considered only for adult patients who do not have a fever or bloody diarrhoea; anti-motility agents may reduce diarrhea output and cramps, but do not accelerate cure.

Road Traffic Accidents

Remember to:

1. wear your safety belt;
2. follow the local customs and laws regarding pedestrian safety and vehicle speed;
3. obey the rules of the road;
4. use helmets on bicycles and motorbikes;
5. avoid boarding an overloaded bus or mini-bus;
6. if not familiar with driving in Iraq, hire a trustworthy local driver;
7. do not drink and drive.

8.3 Other Travel Info

Time
Standard Time is 3 hours ahead Greenwich Mean Time (GMT+3). Baghdad currently observes Arabia Standard Time (AST) all year. Daylight Saving Time is no longer in use.

Money
The official currency of Iraq is the Iraqi Dinar (ID). 1 Iraqi Dinar = 20 dirhams = 1,000 fils. Notes are in denomination of ID 25,000 / 10,000 / 5,000 / 1,000 / 500 / 250 / 50. US Dollars and Euros are the easiest currency to exchange in Iraq. ATMs are rare in Iraq. Your best bet is to look for them in large cities and community places. Outside of cities you should make sure you have sufficient cash in local currency.

Climate
Iraqi climate can be described as mostly desert with subtropical influence. Winters are usually mild to cool while summers are generally dry, hot, and cloudless. Northern mountainous regions along Iranian and Turkish borders experience cold winters with occasionally heavy snows that melt in early spring, sometimes causing extensive flooding in central and southern Iraq. Summer temperatures average above 40 °C (104 °F) for most of the country and frequently exceed 48 °C (118.4 °F). Winter temperatures are around 15 to 19 °C (59.0 to 66.2 °F) during the day, with night-time lows 2 to 5 °C (35.6 to 41.0 °F). Precipitation is low; most places receive less than 250 mm (9.8 in) annually, with maximum rainfall occurring during the winter months. Rainfall during the summer is extremely rare, except in the far north of the country.

8.4 Radio Transmissions

The radio is not a secure means of communication as it can be listened to by practically anyone. It is useful to establish a set of simple code words, which should be known by everyone in the network. In no case should military information be transmitted.

Basic Rules
Discipline: listen before transmitting. Brevity: be brief and to the point. Rhythm: use short complete phrases that make sense. Speed: not too fast, not too slow. Volume: don't shout. Preparation: know what you are going to say before transmitting.

Prior to transmission
a. Check the power source and cables to ensure there is a power supply.
b. Check the antenna and cables ensuring a tight and correct connection to the radio set.
c. Connect the audio accessories and check the functioning of switches.

Transmitting
a. Make your message brief but precise.
b. Break the message into sensible passages with pauses between.
c. Make sure no-one else is transmitting at the same time.
d. When transmitting maintain a high standard of articulation, normal rhythm and moderate volume. Do not shout. Hold the microphone close to your mouth.
e. Avoid excessive calling and unofficial voice procedure.

Four Golden Rules
Clarity; Brevity; Security; Simplicity.

Respect these rules; your radios may be the only link to the outside world. Don't interfere with radios unless you are a trained technician. Don't use the radio like a telephone, keep transmissions short. Organize your thinking and your message before transmitting. Security matters are best dealt with by using simple code words; likewise when dealing with sensitive issues.

Procedure Words
A proword is a word or phrase, which has been given a special meaning in order to speed up the handling of messages. The only authorised prowords are listed below:

Prowords explanation:
BREAK
I now indicate a separation of the text from other portions of the message.
CORRECT
You are correct, or what you have transmitted is correct.
CORRECTION
I have made an error in this transmission. I will continue from the last correct word.
I SAY AGAIN
I am repeating my transmission again.
MESSAGE
A message follows: prepare to copy or record it.
MORE TO FOLLOW
The transmitting station has additional traffic for the receiving station.
OUT
This is the end of my transmission to you and no answer is required.
OVER
This is the end of my transmission to you and a response is expected. Go ahead transmit.
READ BACK
Repeat this entire transmission back to me exactly as received.
ROGER
I have received your last transmission satisfactorily.
SPEAK SLOWER
You are speaking too fast. Please speak slower.
STAND-BY
Do not transmit until contacted: I need extra time.
THIS IS

Give call sign, i.e. “Delta one”.
WAIT
I must pause for a few seconds, please wait.
WAIT OUT
I must pause longer than a few seconds, I will return.
WILCO
I have received your signal, understand it, and will comply (do not use roger and wilco together).
WRONG
Your last transmission was incorrect the correct version was ...

Phonetics
The international phonetic alphabet listed below shall be used. Numerals shall be transmitted digit by digit except round figures such as hundreds and thousands.

Examples:
Message examples:
To give you confidence, make sure you practise using the radio before you find yourself in urgent need of using it. An example of the kind of language you must learn to use is shown right. It is an example of a radio check:

Call
Five - Two, Five - Two, this is Hotel – Three - Niner, Hotel – Three - Niner. Radio check. Over.

Reply
Hotel – Three - Niner, from Five - Two. I read you loud and clear. Over.

Call
Five - Two from Hotel – Three - Niner. Loud and clear. Over.

Reply
From Five-Two. Roger. Out.

What to do in an emergency

Call for help as follows:
emergency. emergency. emergency.
Five-two five-two. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. emergency. do you copy? over. (Note: emergency is repeated three times).
Wait for response and then proceed. For a lesser degree of urgency, use the word “security” instead of “emergency”. Any station hearing an “emergency” or “security” call, should immediately stop transmitting and listen out. If you need to interrupt another radio conversation wait for a pause (immediately after you hear “over”); call: break. break. this is hotel-three-niner, hotel-three-niner. I have an emergency. please stand by.
Pause transmission and listen to ensure the other communication has ceased, then proceed with emergency call.

12 wun too;
44 fo-wer fo-wer;
90 niner zero;
136 wun three six;
500 fi-yiv hundred;
7000 seven thousand;
16000 wun six thousand;
1278 wun too seven ate;
19A wun niner alfa

CHARACTER	*MORSE CODE*	*TELEPHONY*	*PHONIC (PRONUNCIATION)*
A	• —	Alfa	(AL-FAH)
B	— • • •	Bravo	(BRAH-VOH)
C	— • — •	Charlie	(CHAR-LEE) or (SHAR-LEE)
D	— • •	Delta	(DELL-TAH)
E	•	Echo	(ECK-OH)
F	• • — •	Foxtrot	(FOKS-TROT)
G	— — •	Golf	(GOLF)
H	• • • •	Hotel	(HOH-TEL)
I	• •	India	(IN-DEE-AH)
J	• — — —	Juliett	(JEW-LEE-ETT)
K	— • —	Kilo	(KEY-LOH)
L	• — • •	Lima	(LEE-MAH)
M	— —	Mike	(MIKE)
N	— •	November	(NO-VEM-BER)
O	— — —	Oscar	(OSS-CAH)
P	• — — •	Papa	(PAH-PAH)
Q	— — • —	Quebec	(KEH-BECK)
R	• — •	Romeo	(ROW-ME-OH)
S	• • •	Sierra	(SEE-AIR-RAH)
T	—	Tango	(TANG-GO)
U	• • —	Uniform	(YOU-NEE-FORM) or (OO-NEE-FORM)
V	• • • —	Victor	(VIK-TAH)
W	• — —	Whiskey	(WISS-KEY)
X	— • • —	Xray	(ECKS-RAY)
Y	— • — —	Yankee	(YANG-KEY)
Z	— — • •	Zulu	(ZOO-LOO)
1	• — — — —	One	(WUN)
2	• • — — —	Two	(TOO)
3	• • • — —	Three	(TREE)
4	• • • • —	Four	(FOW-ER)
5	• • • • •	Five	(FIFE)
6	— • • • •	Six	(SIX)
7	— — • • •	Seven	(SEV-EN)
8	— — — • •	Eight	(AIT)
9	— — — — •	Nine	(NIN-ER)
0	— — — — —	Zero	(ZEE-RO)

9. Useful contacts

Emergencies
In case of emergency in Iraq, call the following emergency numbers:

Fire – 115
Police – 104
Ambulance – 122

Iraqi police and emergency services are still generally below Western European and US standards in terms of training, responsiveness, and effectiveness. Visitors to Iraq should note that Iraqi law enforcement and emergency response officials generally do not speak English, and translators are generally not readily available.

Embassies

Embassy of the Republic of Bulgaria in Iraq
Chief: Mr. Krasimir Velchev
Chargé d'Affaires
Address:
Phone: 00964 1 7764002; 00964 1 7764003; 00964 780 923 7587
Fax:
Email: embassy.baghdad@mfa.bg

Embassy of the Republic of Croatia in Iraq
Chief: Ivan Jurić
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Al Jadryah,Ha Al Jamie, Quarter 913, Street 45, House 14 Baghdad
Phone: (+964) 770 368 9183
Fax:
Email: crobagdad@gmail.com
Website:

Embassy of the Czech Republic in Iraq
Chief: Jan Vyčítal
Ambassador
Address: Hay Al-Mansour Dijlaschool 601/11/37 P.O. Box 27124 Baghdad
Phone: +964 790 191 2411
Fax:
Email: baghdad@embassy.mzv.cz
Website: https://www.mzv.cz/baghdad/en/index.html

Embassy of the Kingdom of Denmark in Iraq
Chief:
Address: Al Kindi Street, Baghdad 215, Iraq
Phone: +964 783 097 3732 ; +964 (0) 790 194 0847
Fax:
Email: bgwamb@um.dk
Website:

Consulate of the Kingdom of Denmark in Erbil
Chief: Dara Jalil Al-Kahyat
Consul
Address: Al-Khayat Compound, opposite of Erbil Court – Erbil
Phone: +9647507517073
Fax:
Email: dara.alkhayat@yahoo.com
Website: http://irak.um.dk/

Embassy of the French Republic in Iraq
Chief: Bruno Aubert
Ambassador
Address: Abu Nawas (Emplacement 102, rue 55, n°7) Bagdad
Phone: + 00964 (0) 1 719 60 61; + 00964 (0) 1 719 60 62; 01 719 60 61; 01 719 60 62
Fax:
Email: cad.bagdad-amba@diplomatie.gouv.fr
Website: https://iq.ambafrance.org

Consulate of the French Republic in Erbil
Chief: Dominique Mas
Consul general
Address: 33, Salaheddine street - Erbil (Hawler)
Phone: +964.750.816.10.00
Fax:
Email: consulat.erbil-fslt@diplomatie.gouv.fr
Website: https://iq.ambafrance.org/-Consulat-General-de-France-a-Erbil-

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Iraq
Chief: Dr. Cyrill Nunn
Ambassador
Address: Str. 3 House 53 Mahala 609, Hay Al-Mansour - Bagdad/Irak
Phone: +964 7901922526
Fax: +49 2281767071
Email :
Website: https://irak.diplo.de

Consulate of the Federal Republic of Germany in Erbil
Chief: Kurt Stoeckl-Stillfried
Consul
Address: Erbil, Ainkawa Road, opp. Abu Shahab City
Phone: 07510126287; 07503663731
Fax:
Email: info.germanyerb@vfshelpline.com
Website: https://irak.diplo.de/iq-de/vertretungen/generalkonsulat1

Embassy of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Iraq

Chief: Mr Jonathan Wilks CMG
Ambassador
Address: British Embassy Baghdad - International Zone - Baghdad
Phone: +44(0)1908 516666
Fax:
Email: Baghdad.consularenquiries@fco.gov.uk
Website: https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/british-embassy-baghdad

Consulate of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in Erbil
Chief:
Address: BFPO 5425 - Erbil - Iraq
Phone: +44(0)1908 516666
Fax:
Email: enquiries.erbil@fco.gov.uk
Website: https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/british-consulate-general-erbil

Embassy of the Hellenic Republic in Iraq
Chief: Dionyssios Kyvetos
Ambassador
Address: Iraq, Baghdad, Al-Mansour, Section 609, Street 4, House 2
Phone:(00964) 7801372165, 7722609949, 7903642046
Fax: +30 2103681717
Email: gremb.bag@mfa.gr
Website: https://www.mfa.gr/missionsabroad/en/iraq.html

Embassy of Hungary in Iraq
Chief: Tibor Szatmári
Ambassador
Address: British Embassy Compound - International Zone - Baghdad - Iraq
Phone: (+964) 780 927 1105
Fax:
Email: mission.bgd@mfa.gov.hu
Website:

Embassy of the Italian Republic in Iraq
Chief: Bruno Antonio Pasquino
Ambassador
Address: FOB Fernandez (Tigris Compound), West Wing - Villa
Phone: 009647505010505 / 009647505010606
Fax:
Email: ambasciata.baghdad@esteri.it
Website: https://ambbaghdad.esteri.it/ambasciata_baghdad/it/

Consulate of the Italian Republic in Erbil
Chief: Serena Muroni
Address: Gulan Street (262) UB Plaza Building, 1st floor - Bakhtiyary, 48640 Arbil Iraq
Phone: 00964-66-2101990 - 00964-66-2101992
Fax:
Email:
Website: https://conserbil.esteri.it/consolato_erbil/it/

Embassy of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Iraq
Chief: Matthijs Wolters
Ambassador
Address: Street 15, Al Kindy Area - Internationale Zone - Bagdad
Phone: +96417782571 - +96417760680
Fax:
Email: bag@minbuza.nl
Website: https://www.nederlandwereldwijd.nl/landen/irak

Consulate of the Kingdom of Netherlands in Erbil
Chief: Janet Alberda
Consul
Address: 3rd Floor Ster Tower - Gulan Street - Erbil
Phone: +964 (0) 751 501 9756, +964 (0) 66 224 6739
Fax:
Email: erb@minbuza.nl
Website: https://www.nederlandwereldwijd.nl/landen/irak/over-ons/consulaat-generaal-in-erbil

Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Iraq
Chief: Ms. Beata Pęksa
Ambassador
Address: c/o British Embassy Baghdad - International Zone - Baghdad
Phone: (+964) 780 905 10 68
Fax:
Email: bagdad.amb.sekretariat@msz.gov.pl - polembirq@yahoo.com
Website: http://www.bagdad.msz.gov.pl/en/

Embassy of Romania in Iraq
Chief: Mr. Iacob Prada
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Address: Arassat Al-Hindia Street, Hay Babel Mahalla 929, Zuqaq 31, Nr. 452/A, Baghdad, P.O.Box 2571
Phone: +964 1 7782860; +964 1 7782904
Fax: +964 1 7787553
Email: bagdad@mae.ro

Website: https://www.mae.ro/en/romanian-missions/3195

Embassy of the Kingdom of Spain in Iraq
Chief: Hansi Escobar
Ambassador
Address: Hay Al Mansur, Distrito 609, Calle 3, Casa nº 55, PO.Box 2072 - Bagdad, Irak
Phone: (+964) 790 675 6906
Fax:
Email: emb.bagdad@maec.es
Website: http://www.exteriores.gob.es/embajadas/bagdad/es/Paginas/inicio.aspx

Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden in Iraq

Chief: Annika Molin Hellgren
Ambassador
Address: Al-Alwiyah Post Office - Al-Salhiya - Baghdad
Phone: (+964) 78-01 987 450 / 2
Fax:
Email: ambassaden.bagdad@gov.se
Website: https://www.swedenabroad.se/baghdad/

Delegation of the European Union
Chief: Ramon Blecua
Head of Delegation
Address:
Phone:
Email: Delegation-iraq@eeas.europa.eu
Website: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq_en

International Organisations

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Office in Iraq
Chief:
Address: British Embassy, International Zone - Baghdad
Phone: +964 07801964557
Fax: (+38 044) 490-66-70
Email: mziade@worldbank.org
Website: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/iraq

International Monetary Fund Resident Representative Office in Iraq
Chief: Marwa Alnasaa
Resident Representative
Address: Dr. N. Abu-Aishan Bld. Floor #2 - 1 Saeed Al Mofti St. - Swifiyah Amman 11185, Jordan
Phone: (962) 6-5861598
Fax: (962) 6-5861572
Email: MALNasaa@imf.org
Website: http://www.imf.org/en/Countries/ResRep/IRQ

International Organization for Migration Mission in Iraq (IOM)
Chief: Mr. Gerard Karl Waite
Chief of Mission
Address: UNAMI Compound (Diwan 2), International Zone - Baghdad
Phone: +3908 3105 2600; Ext. 5857 & 5928
Fax:
Email: iomiraq@iom.int
Website: http://iomiraq.net/

United Nations Office in Iraq
Chief: Ján Kubiš
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq
Address:
Phone:
Fax:
Email: unami-information@un.org
Website: http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?lang=en

Sources

Country Profile

Country in Brief
- CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

Modern and Contemporary History of Iraq
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/
- BBC, www.bbc.com

Geography
- Encyclopaedia Britannica https://www.britannica.com/
- CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

Territorial and Administrative Units
- Indexmundi, https://www.indexmundi.com/iraq/administrative_divisions.html

Population
- CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

Ethnic Groups, Languages, Religion
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/
- Minority Rights Group International, http://minorityrights.org/country/iraq/

Health
- World Health Organisation, http://www.who.int/en/

Education and literacy
- UNESCO, https://en.unesco.org/

Country Economy
- Economist Intelligence Unit, http://www.eiu.com/home.aspx
- World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/

Political and Security Context

The Constitution of Iraq
- Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/

Elections
- BBC, http://www.bbc.com
- Independent High Electoral Commission , http://www.ihec.iq/en/
- Kurdistan's Independent High Elections and Referendum Commission, http://www.khec.krd/

Political Parties
- BBC, www.bbc.com
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org
- Niqash, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/

Key Political Leaders
- BBC, www.bbc.com
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://carnegieendowment.org
- Niqash, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/
- The Guardian, www.theguardian.com

Media Landscape and Civil Society
- Media Landscapes, https://medialandscapes.org
- Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org
- Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
- Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/
- The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/iraq.html

Law Enforcement Structures and Actors

The Police
- Ministry of Internal Affairs, https://moi.gov.iq/
- Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/
- Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar.org/
- Washington Institute, http://washingtoninstitute.org

Other Security Forces
- Institute for the Study of War, http://www.understandingwar.org/
- Washington Institute, http://washingtoninstitute.org

The Judiciary
- Iraq's Higher Judicial Council, http://www.iraqja.org/
- Supreme Court of Iraq, https://www.hjc.iq/indexpc.php
- Global Justice Project: Iraq, http://gjpi.org/

Migrations and Human Rights issues

Internal and International Migration
- IDMC, http://www.internal-displacement.org/
- Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/
- Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
- UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/
- UN OCHA, https://www.unocha.org/iraq

Human Rights Situation
- Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/pages/home.aspx
- Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/
- Amnesty International, https://www.amnesty.org/en/

Security Sector
- BBC, www.bbc.com
- UNDP, http://www.iq.undp.org

The UN and Iraq

The UN and the fight against Daesh
- UN, https://www.un.org/

The EU – Iraq Relations

- EU, https://europa.eu/
- Delegation of the European Union to Iraq, 'Iraq and the EU', http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/index_en.htm
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/

EU Advisory Mission in support of Security Sector Reform in Iraq EUAM Iraq
- EUAM Iraq, https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/euam-iraq_en

Arab League and Iraq

- Arab League, http://www.lasportal.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx

OPEC and Iraq

- OPEC, http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/

Travel Advice & Other Practical Info

- Government of the United Kingdom, https://www.gov.uk/
- Cultural Atlas, https://culturalatlas.sbs.com.au

Useful contacts

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/

Bibliography

Arab League and Iraq

Arab League, http://www.lasportal.org/Pages/Welcome.aspx
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 'Iraq's Tangled Foreign Interests and Relations', http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/12/24/iraq-s-tangled-foreign-interests-and-relations-pub-54010
Xinhuanet, 'Arab League rejects Iraq's Kurdish independence referendum', http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-09/14/c_136607440.htm

Civil society

The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, 'Civic Freedom Monitor: Iraq', http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/iraq.html

Constitutional Law

Constitution of Iraq, Text provided by the Iraqi authorities, available at: https://web.archive.org/web/20161128152712/http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf

Economics

The Economist Intelligence Unit, 'Iraq', http://country.eiu.com/Iraq/ArticleList/Analysis/Economy
World Bank, 'Iraq', https://data.worldbank.org/country/iraq

Education

UNESCO, 'Iraq, http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/iq

Elections

BBC, 'Iraq elections: Maliki's State of Law 'wins most seats'', 19 May 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27474518
IHEC, 'Parliamentary elections 2018', http://www.ihec.iq/en/index.php/news/4430-parliamentary-election-2018.html
IHEC, 'Parliamentary elections 2014', http://www.ihec.iq/en/index.php/parlimentary_election_2014.html
KHEC, 'Referendum results', http://www.khec.krd/pdf/173082892017_english%202.pdf
ORSAM, 'The 2014 Elections, Isis Operations And The Future Of Iraq', June 2014, http://www.orsam.org.tr/files/Raporlar/rapor190/190eng.pdf
ISW, 'Iraq's 2014 National Elections', April 2014, http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/AhmedAliIraqElections.pdf

EU and Iraq

Overview
Delegation of the European Union to Iraq, 'Iraq and the EU', http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iraq/index_en.htm

Memorandum of Understanding on Energy Cooperation
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2010_01_18_iraq_mou_en.pdf

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22012A0731(01)&qid=1459426532262&from=EN

EU strategy for Iraq
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/32406/st05285en18.pdf

EUAM Iraq
https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/euam-iraq_en

Health

World Health Organisation, 'Iraq Health Profile', http://www.who.int/countries/irq/en/
World Health Organisation, 'Iraq: WHO Statistical Profile', http://www.who.int/gho/countries/irq.pdf?ua=1

Human Rights

Minority Rights Group International, http://minorityrights.org/country/iraq/
IDMC, 'Iraq', http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq
IOM, 'Iraq IDPs crisis', http://iomiraq.net/issues-focus/iraq-idp-crisis
UNHCR, 'Iraq emergency', http://www.unhcr.org/iraq-emergency.html
UN OCHA, 'Iraq: Humanitarian bulletin, February 2018', https://www.unocha.org/iraq
Amnesty International, 'Iraq 2017/2018', https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/report-iraq/
Human Rights Watch, 'Iraq : events of 2017', https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/iraq
UN, 'Security Council approves probe into ISIL's alleged war crimes in Iraq', https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/566012-security-council-approves-probe-isils-alleged-war-crimes-iraq

Law Enforcement

Small wars journal, 'The Iraqi Kurdish Security Apparatus: Vulnerability and Structure', http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-iraqi-kurdish-security-apparatus-vulnerability-and-structure
ISW, 'Iraqi security forces and Popular Mobilization Forces: orders of battle', http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Iraq%20-%20ISF%20PMF%20Orders%20of%20Battle_0_0.pdf
CSIS, 'Shaping Iraq's security forces', https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/140612_Shaping_Iraq_Security_Forces.pdf
Al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies, 'The future of Iraq's Armed Forces', https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/The-future.pdf
Reuters, 'Iraq's top Shi'ite cleric calls for reforms to start with judiciary', https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-reforms-idUSKCN0QJ1GC20150814
Associated Press, 'Iraqi court strikes down key element of PM's reform package', https://www.apnews.com/37ced3cc18bb43d9bd99b88e101d8e5d
Global Justice Project: Iraq, http://gjpi.org/

Media landscape

Media Landscapes, 'Iraq', https://medialandscapes.org/country/iraq
Freedom House, 'Freedom of the Press 2017: Iraq', https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/iraq

OPEC and Iraq

OPEC, 'Iraq facts and figures', http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/164.htm
Reuters, 'OPEC, non-OPEC agree first global oil pact since 2001', https://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting/opec-non-opec-agree-first-global-oil-pact-since-2001-idUSKBN13Z0J8
Reuters, 'Iraq to comply with OPEC deal despite oil export capacity rise - minister', https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-iraq-oil-opec/iraq-to-comply-with-opec-deal-despite-oil-export-capacity-rise-minister-idUKKBN1FI1IQ

Political Parties

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Iraq’s status quo election’http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/75488
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Iraq’s new statesman’, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/76244?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Abadi struggle to maintain election narratives’, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76111
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, ‘Kurdistan politics at a crossroads’, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/76195
Institute for the Study of War, ‘2018 Iraqi election updates’, http://www.understandingwar.org/2018-iraqi-election-updates
Niqash, ‘Election coverage: Iraq votes 2018’, http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/5839/

Political Leaders

BBC, ‘Iraq profile - leaders’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14544543
BBC, ‘Profile: Nouri Maliki’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-11733715
BBC, ‘Profile: Moqtada Sadr’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12135160
BBC, ‘Profile: Iyad Allawi’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3757923.stm
Wikipedia, ‘Ammar al-Hakim’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ammar_al-Hakim
Wikipedia, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muqtada_al-Sadr
Wikipedia, ‘Hadi al-Amiri’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hadi_Al-Amiri
Wikipedia, ‘Ayad Allawi’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayad_Allawi
Wikipedia, ‘Osama al-Nujayfi’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osama_al-Nujaifi
Wikipedia, ‘Nouri al-Maliki’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nouri_al-Maliki
Wikipedia, ‘Haider al-Abadi’, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Haider_al-Abadi

Recent History

Charles Tripp, ‘A history of Iraq’, Cambridge University Press 2007
David McDowall, ‘A modern history of the Kurds’, I.B.Tauris 2004
William Cleveland, ‘A history of modern middle east’, Westview Press 2012
Phebe Marr, ‘The modern history of Iraq’, Routledge 2017
Vali Nasr, ‘The Shia revival’, W. W. Norton & Company 2007
Joby Warrick, ‘Balck flags: the rise of ISIS’, Anchor 2016
Michael Weiss, Hassan Hassan, ‘ISIS: inside the army of terror’, Regan Arts 2015
Patrick Cockburn, ‘The rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the new Sunni revolution’, Verso 2015
Patrick Cockburn, ‘The occupation: war and resistance in Iraq’, Verso 2007
Patrick Cockburn, ‘Muqtada al-Sadr and the battle for the future of Iraq’, Scribner 2008
Peter Sluglett, ‘Iraq since 1958: from revolution to dictatorship’, I.B.Tauris 2001
Jean-Charles Brisard, ‘Zarqawi: the new face of al-Qaeda’, Other press 2005
Thomas Ricks, ‘Fiasco. The American adventure in Iraq 2003-2005’, Penguin Books 2007
Renad Mansour, ‘The Sunni predicament in Iraq’, Carnegie, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_59_Mansour_Sunni_Final.pdf
Harith al-Qarawee, ‘Iraq’s sectarian crisis’, Carnegie, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/iraq_sectarian_crisis.pdf
International Crisis Group, ‘Post-ISIS Iraq: a gathering storm’, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/26Oct2017%20Post-ISIS%20Iraq%20-%20A%20Gathering%20Storm.pdf
International Crisis Group, ‘Make or break: Iraq’s Sunni and the state’, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/make-or-break-iraq-s-sunnis-and-state
Reuters, 'Iraqi court rules Kurdish independence vote unconstitutional', https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds/iraqi-court-rules-kurdish-independence-vote-unconstitutional-idUSKBN1DK0Q6
Reuters, 'Iraqi PM declares victory over Islamic State in Mosul', https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul/iraqi-pm-declares-victory-over-islamic-state-in-mosul-idUSKBN19V105
BBC, ‘Iraq reforms: Parliament backs PM Haider al-Abadi's plan’, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33861080

Security Sector

Reuters, ‘Iraq's Shi'ite militias formally inducted into security forces’, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-militias/iraqs-shiite-militias-formally-inducted-into-security-forces-idUSKCN1GK354
Washington Institute, ‘Strengthening the Iraqi Security Forces’, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/strengthening-the-iraqi-security-forces
International Crisis Group, ‘Post-ISIS Iraq: A Gathering Storm’, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/post-isis-iraq-gathering-storm
Washington Post, ‘Iraq’s elite special forces struggle to regroup after bloody fight for Mosul’, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/07/21/iraqs-elite-special-forces-struggle-to-regroup-after-bloody-fight-for-mosul/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.00536d2a56d6
Clingendael, ‘Iraq beyond ‘Mosul’: avoiding the next conflict’, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-12/Meeting_summary_'Iraq_beyond_Mosul'.pdf
Institute for the Study of War, ‘Iraqi security forces and popular mobilization forces: orders of battle’, http://www.understandingwar.org/report/iraqi-security-forces-and-popular-mobilization-forces-orders-battle-0

United Nations and Iraq

Source: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/iraq/

Selected Security Council Resolutions

22 MAY 2003 S/RES/1483
This resolution recognized the US and the UK as occupying powers under international law, with legitimate authority in Iraq. Removed economic sanctions imposed during the Gulf War.

14 AUGUST 2003 S/RES/1500
This resolution created the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq as a special representative of the UN Secretary General. Extended by resolutions 1557, 1619, and 1700.

15 AUGUST 2014 S/RES/2170
This resolution condemned the recruitment by ISIS and al-Nusra of foreign fighters and listed six individuals affiliated with those groups under the 1267/1989 Al-Qaida sanctions regime.

24 SEPTEMBER 2014 S/RES/2178
This resolution expanded the counter-terrorism framework by imposing obligations on member states to respond to the threat of foreign terrorist fighters.

12 FEBRUARY 2015 S/RES/2199
This resolution was on ISIS and Al-Nusra’s illicit funding via oil exports, traffic of cultural heritage, ransom payments and external donations.

20 NOVEMBER 2015 S/RES/2249
This resolution called for member states to take all necessary measures on the territory under the control of ISIS to prevent terrorist acts committed by ISIS and other Al-Qaida affiliates.

21 SEPTEMBER 2017 S/RES/2379
This resolution established an investigative team tasked with collecting, storing and preserving evidence of ISIL crimes in Iraq.

Online References

Ministry of Internal Affairs, https://moi.gov.iq/
Iraq’s Higher Judicial Council, http://www.iraqja.org/
Supreme Court of Iraq, https://www.hjc.iq/indexpc.php
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iraq, http://www.mofa.gov.iq/en/
Ministry of Justice of Iraq, https://www.moj.gov.iq/

EUAM Iraq:

https://eeas.europa.eu/csdp-missions-operations/euam-iraq_enEuropean Commission: www.ec.europa.eu
European Council: www.european-council.europa.eu
Council of the European Union: www.consilium.europa.eu
European Union External Action Service: www.eeas.europa.eu
EuropeAid: www.ec.europa.eu/europeaid/

United Nations: www.un.org
United Nations Security Council: www.un.org/en/sc/
United Nations General Assembly: www.un.org/en/ga/
Unitesd Nations Assistance Mission to Iraq, http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?lang=en
United Nations Development Programme: www.undp.or g
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization: www.unesco.org
United Nations Children's Fund: www.unesco.org

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: www.ohchr.org
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees: www.unhcr.org

Amnesty International: www.amnesty.org
Human Rights Watch: www.hrw.org

International Organisation for Migration: www.iom.int
WorldBank: www.worldbank.org
International Monetary Fund: www.imf.org

Library of Congress: www.loc.gov/
BBC: www.bbc.co.uk

Annex

UN Security Council Resolution 2379 – S/RES/2379 (2017)

S/RES/2379 (2017)
Security Council Distr.: General 21 September 2017
Resolution 2379 (2017)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 8052nd meeting, on 21 September 2017

The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1325 (2000), 1368 (2001), 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005), 1894 (2009), 2106 (2013), 2150 (2014), 2170 (2014), 2178 (2014), 2199 (2015), 2242 (2015), 2249 (2015), 2253 (2015), 2322 (2016), 2331 (2016), 2341 (2017), 2347 (2017), 2354 (2017), 2367 (2017), 2368 (2017), 2370 (2017) and its relevant presidential statements,
Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and unity of Iraq, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
Recalling that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da'esh) constitutes a global threat to international peace and security through its terrorist acts, its violent extremist ideology, its continued gross, systematic and widespread attacks directed against civilians, its violations of international humanitarian law and abuses of human rights, particularly those committed against women and children, and including those motivated by religious or ethnic grounds, and its recruitment and training of foreign terrorist fighters whose threat affects all regions and Member States,
Condemning the commission of acts by ISIL (Da'esh) involving murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, suicide bombings, enslavement, sale into or otherwise forced marriage, trafficking in persons, rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence, recruitment and use of children, attacks on critical infrastructure, as well as its destruction of cultural heritage, including archaeological sites, and trafficking of cultural property,
Further recognizing that the commission of such acts which may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide, is part of the ideology and strategic objectives of ISIL (Da'esh), and used by ISIL (Da'esh) as a tactic of terrorism, and that holding ISIL (Da'esh) members accountable, particularly those who bear the greatest responsibility, including in terms of leadership, which can include regional or mid-level commanders, and the ordering and commission of crimes, will further expose this, and could assist in countering terrorism and violent extremism which can be conducive to terrorism, including by stemming financing and the continued flow of international recruits to the terrorist group ISIL (Da'esh),
Welcoming the considerable efforts of the Government of Iraq to defeat ISIL (Da'esh), and its letter to the Secretary-General and Security Council dated 9 August 2017 calling for the assistance of the international community to ensure that members of ISIL (Da'esh) are held accountable for their crimes in Iraq, including where those may amount to crimes against humanity (S/2017/710),
1. Reiterates its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, violations and abuses of international human rights law, and acts of terrorism, and expresses its determination that, having united to defeat the terrorist group ISIL (Da'esh), those responsible in this group for such acts, including those that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, must be held accountable;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to establish an Investigative Team, headed by a Special Adviser, to support domestic efforts to hold ISIL (Da'esh) accountable by collecting, preserving, and storing evidence in Iraq of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide committed by the terrorist group ISIL (Da'esh) in Iraq, to the highest possible standards, which should be addressed by the Terms of Reference referred to in paragraph 4, to ensure the broadest possible use before national courts, and complementing investigations being carried out by the Iraqi authorities, or investigations carried out by authorities in third countries at their request;
3. Underlines that the Special Adviser, while avoiding duplication of effort with other relevant United Nations bodies, will also promote throughout the world, accountability for acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed by ISIL (Da'esh), and work with survivors, in a manner consistent with relevant national laws, to ensure their interests in achieving accountability for ISIL (Da'esh) are fully recognized;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, for its approval, within 60 days, Terms of Reference acceptable to the Government of Iraq in order to ensure the Team can fulfil its mandate, and consistent with this resolution, in particular paragraph 6, regarding the operation of the Investigative Team in Iraq;
5. Underscores that the Investigative Team shall operate with full respect for the sovereignty of Iraq and its jurisdiction over crimes committed in its territory, and that the Team's Terms of Reference shall specify that Iraqi investigative judges, and other criminal experts, including experienced members of the prosecution services, will be appointed to the Team to work on an equal footing alongside international experts, and further underscores that evidence of crimes collected and stored by the Team in Iraq should be for eventual use in fair and independent criminal proceedings, consistent with applicable international law, conducted by competent national-level courts, with the relevant Iraqi authorities as the primary intended recipient as specified in the Terms of Reference, and with any other uses to be determined in agreement with the Government of Iraq on a case by case basis;
6. Emphasizes that the Team should be impartial, independent, and credible and should act consistent with the Terms of Reference which set out the framework in which the Team will operate, the Charter of the United Nations and United Nations best practice, and relevant international law including international human rights law;
7. Requests that, after the Security Council has approved the Terms of Reference that are acceptable to the Government of Iraq, the Secretary-General undertake without delay the steps, measures, and arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and full functioning of the Team, in accordance with the Terms of Reference, and notify it when the Team begins its work;
8. Underlines that the Team should ensure its Iraqi members benefit from international expertise on the Team, and make every effort to share knowledge and technical assistance with Iraq;
9. Encourages Member States, and regional and intergovernmental organizations, to provide appropriate legal assistance and capacity building to the Government of Iraq in order to strengthen its courts and judicial system;
10. Calls on all other States to cooperate with the Team including through mutual arrangements on legal assistance, where necessary and appropriate, and in particular to provide it with any relevant information as appropriate they may possess pertaining to its mandate under this resolution;
11. Underlines that another Member State in whose territory ISIL (Da'esh) has committed acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, may request the Team to collect evidence of such acts, but only with the approval of the Security Council which may request the Secretary-General to submit separate Terms of Reference with regards to the operation of the Team in that State;
12. Requests the Team to cooperate, as appropriate, and consistent with its investigative functions in paragraph 2, with the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) and 2368 (2017) and with any other relevant monitoring bodies, and to work with other United Nations bodies within their respective mandates;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, as a supplement to financing as an expense of the Organization, a trust fund to receive voluntary contributions to implement this resolution;
14. Calls on States, and regional and intergovernmental organizations, to contribute funds, equipment and services to the Team including the offer of expert personnel in support of the implementation of this resolution;
15. Requests the Special Adviser to complete the first report of the Team's activities, within 90 days of the date on which it commences its activities, as notified by the Secretary-General, and to complete subsequent reports every 180 days thereafter, and requests the Special Adviser to present these reports to the Security Council;
16. Decides to review the mandate of the Special Adviser and Team after a period of two years, with any further extension to be decided at the request of the Government of Iraq, or any other government that has requested the Team to collect evidence of acts that may amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide, committed by ISIL (Da'esh) in its territory;
17. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.