

# Cognitive Modeling

## Lecture 12: Bayesian Inference

Sharon Goldwater

School of Informatics  
University of Edinburgh  
sgwater@inf.ed.ac.uk

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## Bayesian Models of Cognition

Much of cognition can be viewed as *prediction* based on data.

- decision-making
- categorization
- causal inference
- word learning
- language processing

Probability theory provides techniques for making *optimal predictions*, so rational analysis approach suggests we use them.

- 1 Background
  - Prediction
  - Bayesian Inference
  - Probability Distributions
- 2 Making Predictions
  - ML estimation
  - MAP estimation
  - Bayesian integration
- 3 Example: Tenenbaum (1999)
  - Concept Learning
  - Psychological Data
  - Bayesian Model

Reading: Griffiths and Yuille (2006).

## Intuitions

Last class we developed some intuitions about Bayesian inference.


- Probabilities reflect degrees of belief.
- In real situations, probabilities are unknown and must be estimated (inferred).
- Estimates depend both on prior beliefs and on observations.
- As more observations accrue, estimates converge to relative frequencies.

Today we will discuss some of the mathematics.

## Distributions

So far, we have discussed *discrete distributions*.

- Sample space  $S$  is finite or countably infinite (integers).
- Distribution is a *probability mass function*, defines probability of RV taking on a particular value.
- Ex:  $P(X = x) = (1 - p)^{x-1}p$  (Geometric distribution):




(Image from <http://eom.springer.de/G/g044230.htm>)

## Distributions

Today we will also see *continuous distributions*.

- Sample space is uncountably infinite (real numbers).
- Distribution is a *probability density function*, defines relative probabilities of different values (sort of).
- Ex:  $p(x) = \lambda e^{-\lambda x}$  (Exponential distribution):



(Image from Wikipedia)

## Discrete vs. Continuous

Discrete distributions:

- $0 \leq P(X = x) \leq 1$  for all  $x \in S$
- $\sum_{x \in S} P(x) = 1$ .
- $P(Y) = \sum_{X_i} P(Y|X_i)P(X_i)$  (Law of Total Prob.)
- $E[X] = \sum_x x \cdot P(X = x)$  (Expectation)

Continuous distributions:

- $p(x) \geq 0$  for all  $x$
- $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} p(x) = 1$ .
- $p(y) = \int p(y|x)p(x)dx$  (Law of Total Prob.)
- $E[X] = \int_x x \cdot p(x)dx$  (Expectation)

## Prediction

Simple inference task: estimate the probability that a particular coin shows heads. Let

- $\theta$ : the probability we are estimating.
- $H$ : hypothesis space (values of  $\theta$  between 0 and 1).
- $D$ : observed data (previous coin flips).
- $n_h, n_t$ : number of heads and tails in  $D$ .

Bayes' Rule tells us:

$$p(\theta|D) = \frac{P(D|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(D)} \propto P(D|\theta)p(\theta)$$

How can we use this?

## Maximum-likelihood Estimation

1. Choose  $\theta$  that makes  $D$  most probable, i.e., ignore  $p(\theta)$ :

$$\hat{\theta} = \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} P(D|\theta)$$

This is the **maximum-likelihood** (ML) estimate of  $\theta$ , and turns out to be equivalent to relative frequencies:

$$\hat{\theta} = \frac{n_h}{n_h + n_t}$$

- Insensitive to sample size, and does not generalize well (overfits).



## Maximum a Posteriori Estimation

2. Choose  $\theta$  that is most probable given  $D$ :

$$\hat{\theta} = \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} P(\theta|D) = \underset{\theta}{\operatorname{argmax}} P(D|\theta)p(\theta)$$

This is the **maximum a posteriori** (MAP) estimate of  $\theta$ , and is equivalent to ML when  $p(\theta)$  is uniform.

- Non-uniform priors can reduce overfitting, but MAP still doesn't account for the shape of  $p(\theta|D)$ :



## Bayesian integration


3. Take the expected value of  $\theta$  instead of maximizing:

$$E[\theta] = \int \theta \frac{P(D|\theta)p(\theta)}{p(D)} d\theta \propto \int \theta P(D|\theta)p(\theta) d\theta$$

This is the **posterior mean**, an average over hypotheses. When prior is uniform, we have

$$E[\theta] = \frac{n_h + 1}{n_h + n_t + 2}$$

- Automatic smoothing effect: unseen events have non-zero probability.
- Non-uniform prior favoring  $\theta = .5$  adds more "pseudo-counts", requires more observations to overcome.



## Concept Learning


Tenenbaum (1999) addresses the question of how people quickly learn new concepts.

- Concepts could be categories (dog, chair) or more vague ("healthy level" for a specific hormone, "ripe" for a pear).
- Generalization: given a small number of positive examples, which other examples are also members of the concept?
- In machine learning, often called **classification**.



## Formalization

Assume that concept  $C$  can be represented as a rectangle in  $n$ -dimensional space (here,  $n = 2$ ):



(Figure from Tenenbaum (1999))

- Dimensions could be levels of cholesterol, insulin; concept is "healthy levels".
- Learner does not know the boundaries of the concept rectangle.
- Given examples  $X = \{x_1 \dots x_n\}$  with  $x_i \in C$ , predict  $p(y \in C|X)$  for new example  $y$ .



## Related Work

Most classification methods/models are *discriminative*:

- Require both positive and negative examples.
- Usually require large numbers of examples.
- Ex: neural networks, decision trees, support vector machines.


Simple early model: MIN (Bruner et al., 1956).

- Works with positive examples only.
- Assumes smallest possible category that contains all observed examples.




## Human Data

- Subjects generalize further when fewer examples are available.
- Subjects generalize further when examples span a larger range.



## Human Data

Findings from Tenenbaum (1999):



## Bayesian Model

- Goal: Given examples  $X = \{x_1 \dots x_n\}$  with  $x_i \in C$ , predict  $p(y \in C|X)$  for new example  $y$ .
- $C$  is a rectangle, so hyp. space  $H$  is all possible rectangles.
- Make prediction by summing over hypotheses:

$$\begin{aligned}
 p(y \in C|X) &= \int p(y \in C|h, X)p(h|X)dh && \text{Tot. Prob.} \\
 &= \int p(y \in C|h)p(h|X)dh && \text{Cond. Indep.} \\
 &\propto \int p(y \in C|h)p(X|h)p(h)dh && \text{Bayes' Rule}
 \end{aligned}$$



## Prior

Tenenbaum (1999) considers two different priors.

- **Uninformative** prior: all rectangles are equally probable.
- Prior based on expected size of rectangles.

Since stimuli are presented on a computer screen, expected size makes sense: rectangles are presumably not larger than screen.



## Likelihood

Assume  $X$  are sampled uniformly at random from  $C$ . Then

$$P(X|h) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{|h|^n} & \text{if } \forall_j, x_j \in h \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$


- Smaller hypotheses have higher likelihood (**size principle**).
- Maximum likelihood chooses smallest  $h$  consistent with  $X$ : equivalent to MIN.




## Model Results

Results from Tenenbaum (1999):

(c) Bayesian model (uninformative prior)



(d) Bayesian model (expected-size prior)



## Discussion

- Model predicts behavior of concept learning from positive examples.
- Captures effects of number of examples and range of examples.
- Best fit uses expected-size prior.
- Suggests that humans make optimal Bayesian predictions.
- Says nothing about mechanisms that might implement inference in the mind.

## Summary

- Many cognitive tasks involve prediction.
- Bayesian techniques for making optimal predictions: use of priors, hypothesis averaging.
- Permits generalization to unseen examples.
- Predicts human behavior in concept learning task.

## References

- Griffiths, Tom L. and Alan Yuille. 2006. A primer on probabilistic inference. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 10(7).
- Tenenbaum, J. 1999. Bayesian modeling of human concept learning. In M. Kearns, S.olla, and D. Cohn, editors, *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 11*. MIT press, Cambridge.