Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution

Version 1.0

**Joint Staff, J-7
Joint and Coalition Warfighting
Suffolk, Virginia**

9 September 2011

MESSAGE TO JOINT WARFIGHTERS

As the Joint Staff J-7 continues to interact with the combatant commands and Services, we recognize that there is very little "how to" doctrinal guidance on planning and executing assessments. Consequently, we have developed this pre-doctrinal handbook to help joint force commanders and their staffs understand the scope and importance of assessment and provide information and guidance on its process; best practices; planning, and execution. This handbook was written to provide needed detail to military planners and is based on extensive lessons learned and best practices gained throughout the joint environment.

Assessment is a key component of joint operation planning as described in keystone documents in the joint publication series, and outlines the basic process for conducting assessment. However, these joint publications contain considerable top-level discussion of assessment and lack the level of detail needed by staffs tasked to conduct assessment. This handbook describes detailed procedures that can be used to measure progress in achieving desired results.

This handbook is descriptive, not prescriptive. It is offered as a practical method for assessing the planning and execution of joint operations. Joint force commander's around the world routinely conduct assessment as a part of their day-to-day battle rhythms, and numerous headquarters have used the procedures described in this handbook during exercises and operations.

We hope this handbook stimulates the joint community's thinking about how to address assessments. We encourage you to use the information in this handbook and provide feedback to help us capture value-added ideas for incorporation in emerging joint doctrine, training, and professional military education.

FREDERICK S. RUDESHEIM
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Director, J-7, Joint Staff,
Joint and Coalition Warfighting

PREFACE

1. Scope

This handbook provides an understanding of the processes and procedures being employed by joint force commanders and their staffs to plan and execute assessment activities. It provides fundamental principles, techniques, and considerations related to assessment that are being employed in the field and are evolving toward incorporation in joint doctrine. Furthermore, this handbook supplements doctrinal publications by providing detailed guidance to conduct effects assessment, task assessment, and deficiency analysis.

2. Purpose

This handbook provides users with a pre-doctrinal reference describing how to conduct assessment execution and planning. Its primary purpose is to improve the US military's assessment process through educating the user on basics, best practices, and processes.

3. Content

This handbook complements and expands upon the overarching concepts and principles that have been incorporated into keystone joint doctrinal publications, to include joint publications 3-0, *Joint Operations*; 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*; and 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*. It supports requirements of joint operation planning and offers techniques and procedures currently used in the field. It is intended as a reference for joint forces conducting assessment as an element of a joint operation.

4. Development

This handbook was developed based on observations at combatant commands as well as joint task force staffs. It was developed in close coordination with, and used significant input from, both civilian and military subject matter experts. Assessment is a collaborative effort between the joint force, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. As such, this handbook addresses the necessity for an inclusive assessment process and effort at every level. It also presents some assessment resources developed by other stakeholders and currently in use throughout the world.

5. Application

This handbook is not approved joint doctrine, but is a non-authoritative supplement to current extremely limited, documentation on the assessment process. This publication is primarily intended for use by combatant command or joint force headquarters personnel responsible for assessment at the strategic theater, and/or operational level.

6. Contact Information

Comments and suggestions on this important topic are welcomed. Points of contact regarding this handbook are Mr. Michael McGonagle, 757-836-9883 DSN 668-9883, michael.mcgonagle@jecc.ustranscom.mil; Mr. Marc Halyard, 757-203-5508, DSN 668-5508, marc.halyard@hr.js.mil; and Mr. Walter Ledford, 757-203-6155, DSN 668-6155, walter.ledford.ctr@hr.js.mil.

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- **Complements and supplements extant joint doctrine for conducting planning and conducting assessment**

- **Describes the assessment process in terms consistent across all levels (theater-strategic, operational, and tactical)**

- **Addresses relationship of assessment activities across multiple levels**

- **Describes assessment process and related components**

- **Addresses the need for balanced use of qualitative and quantitative indicators**

- **Introduces several different assessment frameworks used by interagency and multinational partners**

- **Provides detailed description of how to develop an assessment plan**

- **Describes development of staff assessments during execution and their relationship to overall assessment**

Assessment Overview

Assessment is a commander-centric process.

Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders, will continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of the operation toward the desired end state in the time frame desired. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments, thus ensuring the operation remains focused on accomplishing the mission. Assessment is applicable across the range of military operations. It offers perspective and insight, and provides the opportunity for self-correction, adaptation, and thoughtful results-oriented learning.

The purpose of assessment is to support the commander's decision making.

Assessment is a key component of the commander's decision cycle, helping to determine the results of tactical actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing potential recommendations for the refinement of future plans. Assessments provide the commander with the current state of the operational environment, the progress of the campaign or operation, and

recommendations to account for discrepancies between the actual and predicted progress. Commanders then compare the assessment against their vision and intent and adjust operations to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.

There are three fundamental issues that any assessment must address: where are we, so what and why, and what's next.

First, assessment must determine "where we are." The assessment process must examine the data received and determine, in relation to the desired effects, the current status of the operation and the operational environment. This is the most basic and fundamental question that assessment must answer. The second fundamental issue that assessment must address is "so what and why" (i.e., what does the data mean and what is its significance)? To answer this question, the assessment team will examine the measure of effectiveness indicators, both individually and in relation to each other. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, assessment must begin to address the "what's next?" Assessment must combine the analysis of the "where we are" and the "so what" and develop thoughtful, logical guidance for the command's planning efforts.

Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations.

Assessments are interrelated and interdependent. Although each level of assessment may have a specific focus and a unique battle rhythm, together they form a hierarchical structure in which the conduct of one level of assessment is crucial to the success of the next. Theater-strategic and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state, while tactical-level assessment primarily focuses on task accomplishment.

Assessment Process

The Assessment Process

The assessment process entails three distinct tasks: continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the operations; evaluating the operation against measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) to determine progress relative to the mission, objectives, and end states; and developing recommendations/guidance for improvement.

Combine Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators

Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation based) and qualitative (opinion based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to assessment. A balanced judgment for any assessment identifies the information on which to concentrate. Amassing statistics

is easy. Determining which actions imply success proves far more difficult due to dynamic interactions among friendly forces, adaptable enemies, populations, and other aspects of the operational environment such as economics and culture. This is especially true of operations that require assessing the actions intended to change human behavior, such as deception or stability operations. Using both quantitative and qualitative indicators reduces the likelihood and impact of the skewed perspective that results from an overreliance on either expert opinion or direct observation.

Incorporate Formal and Informal Methods

Assessment may be formal or informal; the appropriate level of formality depends entirely on the situation. As part of their planning guidance, commanders address the level of detail they desire for assessing an upcoming operation. In protracted stability operations, commanders may desire a formal assessment plan, an assessment working group, and standard reports. Subordinate units use these tools to assess local or provincial governance, economics, essential services, or the state of security. In fast-paced offensive or defensive operations or in an austere theater of operations, a formal assessment may prove impractical. To assess progress in those cases, commanders rely more on reports and assessments from subordinate commanders, the common operational picture, operation updates, assessment briefings from the staff, and their personal observations.

Assessment Components

Measures and Indicators

The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives, and ultimately the end state. MOEs help answer questions like: "are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?" MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: "was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?" Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

Developing Measures of Effectiveness and Indicators

The development of MOEs and indicators for desired and undesired effects can commence immediately after the identification of desired and undesired effects while MOPs and task metric development is normally

conducted concurrent with or shortly following the course of action development phase of the joint operation planning process. The intent in developing MOEs and their associated indicators is to build an accurate baseline model for determining whether joint and supporting agency actions are driving target systems toward or away from exhibiting the desired effects. As strategic and operational level effects are seldom attained or exhibited instantaneously, MOEs provide a framework for conducting trend analysis of system behavior or capability changes that occur over time, based on the observation of specific, discrete indicators.

Develop Indicator Threshold Criteria

The development of indicator thresholds begins immediately following MOE/indicator development. The development of criteria during planning is important because it establishes a consistent baseline for assessment trend analysis and reduces subjectivity on the part of designated indicator reporting agencies. The establishment of assessment thresholds is particularly important when a change in assessment status for an effect or MOE is tied to a specific decision point, such as phase transition.

Developing The Assessment Plan

Developing The Assessment Plan

Developing the assessment plan is a continuous process that is refined throughout all planning phases and will not be completed until the operation plan/operation order is approved and published. The building of an assessment plan, including the development of collection requirements, normally begins during mission analysis after identification of the initial desired and undesired effects. This identification process, which is supported by the development during the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) of a systems perspective of the operational environment, will often continue through COA development and selection. Expertise from outside organizations, agencies, or external centers of excellence is desired, but may also extend assessment plan development timelines.

Incorporation into Plans and Orders

Incorporating the assessment plan into the appropriate plans and/or orders is the recommended mechanism for providing guidance and direction to subordinate organizations or requests for key external stakeholder assistance and support. Desired and undesired effects are most effectively communicated in the main body of the

base plan or order and may be repeated in the Operations annex. The assessment plan may be included as an appendix to the Operations annex, or alternatively, in the Reports annex and should provide a detailed matrix of the MOEs associated with the identified desired effects as well as subordinate indicators. The assessment plan should identify reporting responsibilities for specific MOE and indicators.

Staff Assessments During Execution

Staff Assessments During Execution

As part of the overall assessment, the staff assessment attempts to measure the progress towards or away from the achievement of desired conditions. It should begin as soon as information concerning MOPs, MOEs, and associated indicators are received. While variations exist, staff assessment is conducted in three distinct phases: **effects assessment, task assessment**, and, if needed, **deficiency analysis**.

Effects Assessment

Effects assessment assesses those desired effects required to affect friendly and adversary behavior and capability to conduct and/or continue operations and/or actions. Effects assessment is broader than task assessment and at the operational level supports the determination of the achievement of objectives through the detailed assessment of the associated effects. Effects provide an important linkage or bridge between the overarching objectives and the tasks that are employed to create the effects to accomplish them.

Task Assessment

Task assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks. Assessment of results at the tactical level also helps commanders determine operational and strategic level progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels. Combat assessment is an example of task assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions.

Deficiency Analysis

Deficiency analysis is conducted when progress toward achieving objectives and attaining the end state is deemed

insufficient. Deficiency analysis consists of a structured, conditions-based process intended to validate that the staff assessment is accurate, refine the collection requirements (when required), and conduct task and node-action analysis in order to provide initial guidance to planners for follow-on branch/sequel development or task plan/operation order refinement.

Operational Implications

Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine should address considerations related to assessment. Joint doctrine should continue to expand current guidance and discussion on how to integrate interagency and multinational assessment processes and procedures, particularly in stability and counterinsurgency type operations. The primary publication for discussion of assessment in joint publications will transition from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations,* to JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* during the 2011 revision cycle, with a significant increase in content for JP 5-0 over the current discussion. Other joint doctrine publications with significant input and/or content concerning assessment include JPs 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment,* 3-07*, Stability Operations,* 3-08*, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations,* 3-33*, Joint Task Force Headquarters,* and 3-60*, Joint Targeting.* Numerous other joint publications have assessment-related information included.

Training

Training on assessment should be conducted for any Service or joint organizations that are planned to conduct this activity. Whether this training is joint or Service-provided will depend on who owns the specific capability. Both Service and joint training should encompass relevant aspects of operations with interorganizational partners, since their support to isolated units could be essential to mission accomplishment.

Leadership and Education

The focus of leader development efforts regarding assessment should remain consistent with the current trend of developing innovative and adaptive leaders who can respond effectively to a wide variety of circumstances. Developing assessment plans and determining MOPs and MOEs is both an art and science that the Services must address more directly and earlier in the development of commissioned and non-commissioned leaders.

CHAPTER I
ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

> *"Assessment helps the commander ensure that the broad operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders."*
>
> **Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design**
> **US Joint Forces Command**
> **6 October 2009**

1. General

a. **Assessment is a commander-centric process**. It is an integral part of any operation's planning and execution, fulfilling the critical and necessary requirement for self-examination and analysis through the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and the progress of an operation. **Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, along with interagency and multinational partners and other stakeholders, will continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of the operation toward the desired end state in the time frame desired**. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments, thus ensuring the operation remains focused on accomplishing the mission. Assessment is applicable across the range of military operations. It offers perspective and insight, and provides the opportunity for self-correction, adaptation, and thoughtful results-oriented learning.

b. Current doctrine publications contain some discussion of assessment, mostly at an overview level without a great deal of specific guidance. For example, Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning Process*, discusses the "what and why" of assessment but the details of the "how" are mostly left to the practitioners to develop. This handbook offers a practical method that commanders and staffs can use as a starting point to develop the "how" in order to assess operations.

> **Key Term**
>
> **Assessment**: 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

c. Assessment is nothing new. Commanders have always attempted to understand the status of a mission or task and then modify force employment to seize initiative from the enemy. Assessment of our modern operations in a complex environment is exceedingly difficult. The things the commander is trying to achieve at the operational level are often more difficult to measure and determine the success of, compared to the tactical level, which is why assessment at the operational and strategic levels is often considered more art than science.

d.   The overall assessment is composed of the commander's personal assessment, the staff assessment, and other assessments/inputs. The focus of this handbook is on the development of the staff assessment as both a quantitative and qualitative product. The other components of the overall assessment may include formal and informal assessment results from subordinate and supporting units and agencies, including multinational and interagency partners. Additionally, The commander's personal assessment will often be shaped by a number of venues, including battlefield circulation, key leader engagements, discussions with other military and civilian leaders, and the commander's "sense" of the progress of the operation or campaign. While there is no set formula or process for developing subjective assessment components, they are necessary to temper the staff assessment with what Clausewitz referred to as the commander's *coup d'oeil* or intuition.

e.   Commanders and staffs should attempt to maintain a balance between quantitative and qualitative measures in assessment. Measuring progress in military operations is a difficult and often subjective process, particularly in counterinsurgency and stability operations. To avoid this problem, and because they are more comfortable with objective results, staffs have a tendency to favor quantitative measures. As such, there is a danger of over-engineering the assessment process. Staffs often develop extensive quantifiable assessments that do not always logically or clearly support a commander's requirement nor assist him in developing guidance and intent. Commanders and staffs should use caution to avoid confusing "measuring activity" with "measuring progress."   In many cases, quantitative indicators should only serve as a starting point for commanders' and staffs' subjective assessments based on observation and experience.

f.   Fundamental to assessments are analyses about progress in designated mission areas, as measured against the expected progress in those mission areas. These analyses allow the commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made in operations and serve as a catalyst for future planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment.

2.   The Purpose of Assessment in Joint Operations

a.   **The purpose of assessment is to support the commander's decision making**. Assessment is a key component of the commander's decision cycle (see Figure I-1), helping to determine the results of tactical actions in the context of overall mission objectives and providing potential recommendations for the refinement of future plans. Assessments provide the commander with the current state of the operational environment, the progress of the campaign or operation, and recommendations to account for discrepancies between the actual and predicted progress. Commanders then compare the assessment against their vision and intent and adjust operations to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved.   Assessment of the operational environment and the progress of operations are continuous. Normally, the update to the Commander is periodic unless a problem is detected.

Figure I-1. Assessment and the Commander's Decision Cycle

b.   A key function of assessment is to facilitate a deeper ,shared understanding of how the operation is progressing between the commander, staff, and other stakeholders. Regardless of the level or periodicity of the assessment process, formal staff assessments will typically be provided to the commander. These staff assessments, along with other assessment sources such as higher headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders combine with the commander's personal assessment to provide an overall assessment and help inform the commander's guidance and decisions (see Figure I-2). Based on the overall assessment, the commander will provide guidance to the staff to stay the current course with regards to operations, to reprioritize missions or tasks, or to redirect resources or the allocation of forces to achieve overall mission objectives. The commander may also provide additional guidance and intent to subordinates in the form of fragmentary orders and/or may request additional support or provide recommendations for additional diplomatic, informational, military, or economic (DIME) actions from key stakeholders or external partners. The commander can also direct the development of a new operational approach or plan if the assessment reveals significant flaws with the current approach or plan.

Figure I-2. Notional Overall Assessment Composition.

c. There are three fundamental issues that any assessment must address: where are we, so what, and what's next.

(1) First, assessment must determine "where we are." The assessment process must examine the data received and determine, in relation to the desired effects, the current status of the operation and the operational environment. This is the most basic and fundamental question that assessment must answer. For the assessment process discussed in this handbook, the first step in answering this question should be relatively straight forward because it will be based on the assessment model developed in planning. The measures of effectiveness (MOE), MOE indicators, and associated criteria that were developed in the assessment planning process will drive the metrics-based status of the effects. This forms the objective foundation for the cross-functional assessment team who apply their collective judgment, experience and understanding of the operational environment to derive an informed subjective interpretation of the data. It is at this point in the assessment process that "science" first meets operational "art." Where the quantitative and qualitative assessment of the data converges, the actual status of desired and undesired effects is determined.

(2) The second fundamental issue that assessment must address is "so what" (i.e., what does the data mean and what is its significance)? To answer this question, the assessment team will examine the MOE indicators, both individually and in relation to

each other. This is actually the first part of the deficiency analysis process. If a given effect is not being achieved or achieved in accordance with a desired timeline, the assessment team must examine the underlying data elements (MOE and MOE indicators) to determine the potential or suspected reason for the deficiency. The shortfall may be in the execution of the collection plan, in the actions selected to achieve the desired effect(s), or due to other environmental factors. Regardless, the story the data is telling must be determined. A detailed examination and analysis of the indicator data may reveal where these shortfalls are occurring or areas where actions may be applied to more successfully achieve the desired effect(s). For example, one of possibly multiple reasons that the effect *"Host Nation provides basic human services"* is not being achieved, might be related to a measurable decrease in the availability of electricity in a key urban area (MOE: Increase/decrease in the availability of electricity in key urban areas). One indicator might be reporting that the number of total kilowatt hours of electricity being produced at a particular servicing power plant is relatively high or stable. A second indicator, however, may indicate that transmission line failures for that urban area are increasing thus negatively impacting the overall availability of electricity (MOE) and the provision of basic human services (effect). Further examination of additional MOE, indicators or other intelligence information may suggest whether the transmission line failures are the result of equipment malfunctions, poor maintenance procedures, or attacks by local insurgent or criminal groups. Regardless of the answer in this particular example, the second fundamental requirement for assessment should be clear. A status report without a detailed examination of the data is of marginal value to the commander. Assessment needs to answer the "so what."

(3) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, assessment must begin to address the "what's next?" Assessment must combine the analysis of the "where we are" and the "so what" and develop thoughtful, logical guidance for the command's planning efforts. This guidance should not take the form of specific or detailing courses of action, but rather it should identify potential opportunities, areas to exploit, or ways ahead that the joint planning group (JPG) or operations planning team (OPT) can leverage to initiate follow-on plan refinement and the development of additional courses of action to present to the commander. The recommendations that emerge from the assessment process are, therefore, a hand-off from the assessment team to plans and complete one rotation of the commander's decision cycle. The final recommendations that are ultimately developed by the JPG/OPT are typically provided to the commander in the form of a decision brief. In an observed best practice, some commands introduce the decision brief with a formal presentation from the assessment team to serve as a scene setter for the planning staff's recommendations. Alternatively, the formal assessment can be presented to the commander in a separate forum in order to receive his thoughts and direction regarding the assessment's conclusions and planning recommendations. The commander can use this presentation as a vehicle to provide additional planning guidance for the follow-on effort conducted by the JPG/OPT. Regardless of the method chosen to conduct the exchange between assessment and plans, it is of critical importance that re-integration occurs with planner involvement in the assessment process and assessor participation in follow-on planning.

Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, assessment is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited.

U.S. Army Field Manual 5-0
The Operations Process

d. Predicting outcomes in complex environments is problematic at best. Conditions change, adversaries adapt, missions shift and objectives evolve. Consequently, the headquarters should periodically revalidate their developed objectives, effects, and MOEs. As environmental conditions, political considerations and operational realities collectively influence the successful accomplishment of developed objectives, the commander and his staff must necessarily review the underlying assumptions and conditions that provided the foundation for their development.

3. Understanding Assessment Terminology

a. One of the more difficult tasks in assessment is understanding the terminology that supports it. Other than the basic discussion of the assessment process in joint and Service doctrine, the subcomponents of the process are not specifically addressed in either JP 3-0 or 5-0. As such, the various Service components and combatant commands currently use a number of different assessment constructs. For the purposes of this publication, the following framework will be used when discussing assessment, regardless of the level (national/theater-strategic, operational, or tactical) being discussed. While the focus at the various levels may differ slightly, the overall structure remains unchanged.

(1) Consistent with the discussion found in joint doctrine, the assessment process consists of ***monitoring, evaluating, and directing/recommending***. See Chapter II, "The Assessment Process," for additional information.

Key Terms

Measure of Effectiveness: A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (JP 3-0)

Measure of Performance: A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)

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(2) The staff assessment components consist of objectives, effects, tasks, MOEs, measures of performance (MOPs), and indicators. See Chapter III, Assessment Components" for further discussion.

(3) The staff assessment framework consists of effects assessment, task assessment, and deficiency analysis. Each of these is further discussed in Chapter V, "Staff Assessments During Execution."

b. The use of these terms and the construct discussed in this handbook is neither authoritative nor prescriptive. They merely represent a common set of references that should be generic enough to encompass the wide variety of assessment structures and terms already in use throughout the joint force. As assessment continues to mature and the processes are further refined and incorporated into joint and Service doctrine, a common set of terms and processes should ultimately ensue.

4. Assessment Levels

a. Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. These assessments are interrelated and interdependent. Although each level of assessment may have a specific focus and a unique battle rhythm, together they form a hierarchical structure in which the conduct of one level of assessment is crucial to the success of the next (see Figure I-3). Theater-strategic and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state, while tactical-level assessment primarily focuses on task accomplishment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. This properly focuses assessment and collection at each level, reduces redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.

b. Typically, the level or frequency at which assessment occurs should be relative to the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed. Tactical level headquarters routinely conduct task assessments using MOPs and may look at MOEs in relation to the assigned or derived effects which support the higher headquarters. These assessments normally occur relatively frequently and are a focus area with the current operations staff area. Operational level headquarters and theater-strategic headquarters tend to focus most of their assessment efforts on effects assessment, and the overall progress to achieve the objectives and end state. Because the assessment process needs to support the commander's decision cycle, the frequency of formal assessments must match the pace of campaign execution.

Figure I-3. Assessment Interaction

5. Use of Effects

a.   As an element of operational design, effects are often used to help harmonize the application of the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military or economic actions [DIME]) in campaigns and operations. In essence, effects are used as a mechanism to achieve better unity of effort across military, interagency, and multinational operations. Effects collectively describe the changes to conditions that support or inhibit progress toward an objective.

b.   Effects are derived from objectives and define a physical and/or behavioral change to a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. In general, assessment attempts to measure change to the system "state." Change to that state occurs through the application of DIME actions, preferably by friendly actors, but also those of neutral and/or adversary actors. Effects, therefore, have an important relationship to both the objectives of a mission and to the tactical tasks that are employed to accomplish them. One of the key attributes of effects is that they provide an important linkage between tasks and objectives, clarify the relationship between objectives and tasks, and help the joint force commander (JFC) and staffs establish conditions for achieving objectives.

c.   Assessment supports the determination of the accomplishment or non-accomplishment of objectives through the detailed study and understanding of changes to the operational environment. This is usually done by determining the status of objectives and effects. It attempts to answer the question of "are we doing the right things?" by measuring changes to the physical states or behaviors of the systems associated with the effects under examination. Assessment attempts to measure change (positive or negative system changes) through the use of MOEs that are relevant, measurable, responsive, and resourced.

6.   Organization

a.   Assessment planning is normally the responsibility of the JPG/OPT. It is supported by the baseline systems perspective of the operational environment and includes the development of MOEs and indicators. Some commands have delegated specific responsibilities for MOE and indicator development to an assessment team or assessment working group (AWG), organized within the JPG/OPT under the direction of a specifically designated assessment planner. In either case, intelligence and subject matter expertise will be essential to selecting the proper MOE, indicators, and associated criteria levels relative to the desired effects.

b.   During execution, a range of cross-functional expertise is required to analyze indicator data reports, determine assessment component status, and, where required, conduct deficiency analysis to generate the overall assessment. For example, effects assessment begins as soon as reports against designated indicators are received. Assessment responsibilities are normally assigned to a cross-functional assessment cell (AC), operating under the direction of a specifically designated representative of either the command's J-3 or J-5 and often designated as the assessment supervisor. The AC may operate either full-time or convene periodically, depending upon the level of effort required for a given operation.

See Appendix B, "Joint Task Force Assessment Working Group Composition and Responsibilities," for more information.

7.   Intelligence Support to Assessment

a.   Intelligence support to assessment is continuous throughout planning and execution. The J-2, through the combatant command (CCMD) joint intelligence operations center (JIOC), helps the commander by assessing adversary capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions, and monitoring numerous other aspects of the operational environment that can influence the outcome of operations. The J-2 also helps the commander and staffs decide which aspects of the operational environment to measure and how to measure them to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Intelligence personnel use the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) to provide commanders and their staffs with a detailed understanding of the adversary and other aspects of the operational environment.

b.   Starting in mission analysis, the J-2 supports the JFC's decision-making process through the JIPOE. JIPOE is particularly valuable in identifying and developing MOE indicators to identify changes in adversary system behavior, capabilities, or the operational environment. Intelligence collection personnel, as well as analysts, are particularly important to the assessment team. Their expertise, particularly if applied early on, can provide insight into whether proposed effects, MOEs, and indicators are measurable, observable, and relevant, and responsive.

c.   Intelligence support to execution-phase assessments is equally important as its support in the planning phase. Assessment begins as soon as intelligence generated in support of MOEs and indicators is received. Based on the collection plan, many indicators will be observable through technical or human intelligence disciplines. These inputs will usually be provided by the JIOC/joint intelligence support element (JISE) or through its representatives to the assessment team. Several commands conducting assessment in joint exercises have benefited from establishing a formal agenda for their assessment team, opening with a current intelligence summary, then moving to a review of the status of effects. The assessment team normally focuses on achieving consensus of the status of each effect and its associated MOE(s) individually. Where additional intelligence indicates that this assessment may be invalid, the effect and/or MOE(s) are discussed until an agreement is reached on the current assessment status.

> *Throughout the operations process, commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the area of operations. Primary tools for assessing progress of the operation include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, and reframing criteria.*
>
> **US Army Field Manual 5-0**
> **The Operations Process**

8.   Assessment Relationships Across Multiple Levels

The assessment process works best when supported and supporting plans and their assessments link and relate to each other. As indicated in Figure I-3, each successive level of assessment is linked to the previous level, either receiving guidance and direction or providing required information. For instance, the tactical-level assessment plan should delineate how it links to or supports the operational-level assessment plan. Similarly, the operational-level assessment plan should delineate the relationship and mechanisms (e.g. tasks and guidance to subordinate organizations, etc.) by which tactical-level assessment data can be gathered and synthesized into the operational-level assessment.

CHAPTER II
ASSESSMENT PROCESS

> *"Assessment has to be based on metrics that make sense. Otherwise, you'll be drawing conclusions that are incorrect."*
>
> **LTG P. Chiarelli**
> **Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq**
> **November 2005**

1. General

a.   Assessment and learning enable incremental improvements to the commander's operational approach and the campaign or operations plan. The aim is to understand the problem and develop effective actions to address it. These actions may be a military activity—or may involve military actions in support of nonmilitary activities. Once JFCs understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished to succeed, they should identify the means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. This feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent adjustment.

b.   The assessment process entails three distinct tasks: continuously monitoring the situation and the progress of the operations; evaluating the operation against MOEs and MOPs to determine progress relative to the mission, objectives, and end states; and developing recommendations/guidance for improvement. Effective assessment requires criteria for evaluating the degree of success in accomplishing the mission.

   (1) **A *MOE* is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, an objective, or the creation of an effect**. **It measures the relevance of actions being performed**.

   (2) **A *MOP* is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment**.

c.   Many aspects of operations are quantifiable. Examples include movement rates, fuel consumption and weapons effects. While not easy, assessing physical aspects of joint operations can be straightforward. However, the dynamic interaction among friendly forces, adaptable adversaries, and populations make assessing many aspects of operations difficult. For example, assessing the results of planned actions to change a group of people to support their central government is very challenging. As planners assess complex human behaviors like this, they draw on multiple sources across the operational environment, including both analytical and subjective measures which support a more informed assessment.

d.   Just as JFCs devote time and staff resources to planning, they must also provide guidance on "*what to assess*" and "*to what level of detail*." Depending on the situation

and the echelon of command, assessment may require a detailed process including a formal assessment plan with dedicated assessment cell or element. Alternatively, it may be an informal process that relies more on the intuition of the joint force commander, subordinate commanders, and staffs.

e.   When assessing operations, JFCs and staffs should avoid excessive analysis.. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action occurs should be the level at which such activity is assessed. This focuses assessment at each level and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.

2.   The Assessment Process

a.   Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities (see Figure II-1):

(1) **Monitoring** the current situation to collect relevant information.

(2) **Evaluating** progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.

(3) **Recommending or directing** action for improvement.

Figure II-1. Assessment Process.

b.   **Monitoring**

(1) *Monitoring* **is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation**. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the commander's intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor execution or adjustment decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

(2) During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the facts are still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect their operations.

(3) Commander's critical information requirements and decision points focus the staff's monitoring activities and prioritize the unit's collection efforts. Information requirements concerning the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations are identified and assigned priorities by the J-2 through intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) synchronization. The J-3 staff uses friendly reports to coordinate other assessment-related information requirements. To prevent duplicated collection efforts, information requirements associated with assessing the operation are integrated into both the ISR plan and friendly force information requirements by the J-3.

(4) Staffs monitor and collect information from the common operational picture and friendly reports. This information includes operational and intelligence summaries from subordinate, higher, and adjacent headquarters and communications and reports from liaison teams. The staff also identifies information sources outside military channels and monitors their reports. These other channels might include products from civilian, host-nation, and other agencies. Staffs apply information management principles to facilitate getting this information to the right people at the right time.

(5) Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Each staff section maintains a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the commander's intent. In their running estimates, staff sections use this new information, updated facts, and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.

c.   **Evaluating**

(1) The staff analyzes relevant information collected through monitoring to evaluate the operation's progress. *Evaluating* **is using criteria to judge progress toward desired conditions and determining why the current degree of progress exists.** Evaluation is the heart of the assessment process where most of the analysis occurs. Evaluation helps commanders determine what is working, determine what is not working, and gain insights into how to better accomplish the mission.

(2) Criteria in the form of MOEs and MOPs aid in determining progress toward performing tasks, achieving objectives, and attaining end state conditions. MOEs help determine if a task is achieving its intended results. MOPs help determine if a task is completed properly. MOEs and MOPs are simply criteria—they do not represent the assessment itself. MOEs and MOPs require relevant information in the form of indicators for evaluation.

(3) MOEs measure changes in conditions, both positive and negative, to help answer the question, "*are we doing the right things?*" MOEs are used at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to assess the impact of military operations and measure changes in the operational environment, changes in system behavior, or changes to adversary capabilities. MOEs are based on observable or collectable indicators. Several indicators may make up an MOE, just like several MOEs may assist in assessing progress toward the achievement of an objective or regression toward a potential crisis or branch plan execution. Indicators provide evidence that a certain condition exists or certain results have or have not been attained, and enable decision makers to direct changes to ongoing operations to ensure the mission remains focused on the end state. MOE assessment is implicit in the continuous nature of the JIPOE process. Upon the collection of indicators, JIPOE analysts can compare the baseline intelligence estimate used to inform the plan against the current situation to measure changes. MOEs are commonly found and tracked in formal assessment plans. Examples of MOEs for the objective, "provide a safe and secure environment" may include:

(a) Decrease in insurgent activity.

(b) Increase in reporting of insurgent activity to host-nation security forces.

(c) Decrease in civilian injuries involving mines and unexploded ordinance.

(d) Attitude/opinion/behavioral changes in selected populations.

(e) Changes in media portrayal of events

(4) On the other hand, MOPs help answer questions such as, "*was the action taken?*" or "*were the tasks completed to standard?*" A MOP confirms or denies that a task has been properly performed. MOPs are commonly found and tracked at all levels in execution matrixes. MOPs are also heavily used to evaluate training. MOPs help to answer the question, "*are we doing things right*?"\

(5) In general, operations consist of a series of collective tasks sequenced in time, space, and purpose to accomplish missions. Current operations cells use MOPs in execution matrixes and running estimates to track completed tasks. Evaluating task accomplishment using MOPs is relatively straightforward and often results in a *yes* or *no* answer. Examples of MOPs include:

(a) Route X cleared.

(b) Generators delivered, are operational, and secured at villages A, B, and C.

(c) $15,000 spent for schoolhouse completion.

(d) Aerial dissemination of 60,000 military information support leaflets over Village D.

(e) Completed 15 media engagements.

(f) Sent 35 press releases.

(6) In the assessment process, an ***indicator*** is an item of information that provides insight into MOEs or MOPs. While indicators used to perform MOE analysis inform changes to operational environment, system behavior, or adversary capabilities, they are linked to the indicators associated with adversary courses of action (COAs). Similarly, indicators used to inform MOP evaluations should consider the friendly force capabilities required to perform assigned tasks. This consideration enhances the nexus between MOPs and friendly force information requirements to enable decision makers to direct changes in resources. The J-2 uses indicators to shape the collection effort as part of ISR synchronization. Indicators take the form of reports from subordinates, surveys and polls, and information requirements. Indicators help to answer the question, "***What is the current status of this MOE or MOP***?" A single indicator can inform multiple MOPs and/or MOEs. Examples of indicators for the MOE, "*Decrease in insurgent activity*" are:

(a) Number of hostile actions per area each week.

(b) Number of munitions caches found per area each week.

(7) **On a cautionary note, do not try to link MOPs with MOEs**. Doing things right does not necessarily mean you are doing the right things. MOPs and MOEs look at different things. MOEs and their supporting indicators measure the operational environment without regard for the MOPs and tasks. Within the assessment process, MOEs and MOPs are only looked at together during deficiency analysis. Lessons learned indicate that trying to build a linkage between MOP and MOE is a proven waste of time for staffs.

(8) **Evaluation includes analysis of why progress is or is not being made according to the plan**. Commanders and staffs propose and consider possible causes. In particular, the question of whether changes in the situation can be attributed to friendly actions should be addressed. Subject matter experts, both internal and external to the staff, are consulted on whether the correct underlying causes for specific changes in the

situation have been identified. Assumptions identified in the planning process are challenged to determine if they are still valid.

(9) **A key aspect of evaluation is determining variances** — the difference between the actual situation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at the time or event. Based on the significance of the variances, the staff makes recommendations to the commander on how to adjust operations to accomplish the mission more effectively (see Figure II-2).

(10) Evaluating also includes considering whether the desired conditions have changed, are no longer achievable, or are not achievable through the current operational approach. This is done by continually challenging the key assumptions made when developing the operational approach and subsequent plan. When a key assumption is invalidated, adjustments, up to an including developing a new plan, may be in order.

Figure II-2. Evaluating Variances

d. **Recommending or Directing Action**

(1) Monitoring and evaluating are critical activities; however, the assessment process is incomplete without recommending or directing action. Assessment may diagnose problems, but unless it also results in recommended adjustments, its use to the commander is limited.

(2) Based on the evaluation of progress, the staff brainstorms possible improvements to the plan and makes preliminary judgments about the relative merit of those changes. Assessment diagnoses threats, suggests improvements to effectiveness, and reveals opportunities. Staff members identify those changes possessing sufficient merit and provide them as recommendations to the commander or make adjustments within their delegated authority. Recommendations to the commander range from continuing the operation as planned, executing a branch, or making unanticipated adjustments. Making adjustments includes assigning new tasks to subordinates, reprioritizing support, adjusting the ISR plan, and significantly modifying the course of action. Commanders integrate recommendations from the staff, subordinate commanders, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders with their personal assessment. Commanders then decide if and how to modify the operation to better accomplish the mission.

3. Combine Quantitative and Qualitative Indicators

a. Effective assessment incorporates both quantitative (observation based) and qualitative (opinion based) indicators. Human judgment is integral to assessment. A key aspect of any assessment is the degree to which it relies upon human judgment and the degree to which it relies upon direct observation and mathematical rigor. Rigor offsets the inevitable bias, while human judgment focuses rigor and processes on intangibles that are often key to success. The appropriate balance depends on the situation—particularly the nature of the operation and available resources for assessment—but rarely lies at the ends of the scale.

b. A balanced judgment for any assessment identifies the information on which to concentrate. Amassing statistics is easy. Determining which actions imply success proves far more difficult due to dynamic interactions among friendly forces, adaptable enemies, populations, and other aspects of the operational environment such as economics and culture. This is especially true of operations that require assessing the actions intended to change human behavior, such as deception or stability operations. Using both quantitative and qualitative indicators reduces the likelihood and impact of the skewed perspective that results from an overreliance on either expert opinion or direct observation.

c. **Quantitative Indicators**

(1) In assessment, a quantitative indicator is an observation-based (objective) item of information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. Someone observes an event and counts it. For example, the individual tally of the monthly gallons of diesel provided to host-nation security forces by a unit or the monthly number of tips provided to a tips hotline. Then the commander or staff collects that number.

(2) Some human judgment is inevitably a factor even when dealing with quantitative indicators. Choosing which quantitative indicators to collect requires significant human judgment prior to collection. During collection, the choice of sources,

methods, and standards for observing and reporting the events also require judgment. After collection, the commander or staff decides whether to use the number as an indicator in a formal assessment plan and for which MOEs or MOPs.

(3) Normally, quantitative indicators prove less biased than qualitative indicators. In general, numbers based on observations are impartial (assuming that the events in question were observed and reported accurately). Often, however, these indicators are less readily available than qualitative indicators and more difficult to select correctly. This is because the judgment aspect of which indicators validly inform the MOE is already factored into qualitative indicators to a degree. Experts factor in all considerations they believe are relevant to answering questions. However, this does not occur inherently with quantitative indicators. The information in quantitative indicators is less refined and requires greater judgment to handle appropriately than information in qualitative indicators.

(4) Public opinion polling can be easily miscategorized. It often provides an important source of information in prolonged stability operations. Results of a rigorously collected and statistically valid public opinion poll are quantitative, not qualitative. Polls take a mathematically rigorous approach to answering the question of what people really think; they do not offer opinions on whether the people are correct.

(5) While the results of scientifically conducted polls are quantitative, human judgment is involved in designing a poll. Decisions must be made on what questions to ask, how to word the questions, how to translate the questions, how to select the sample, how to choose interviewers, what training to give interviewers, and what mathematical techniques to use for getting a sample of the population.

d. **Qualitative Indicators**

(1) In assessment, a qualitative indicator is an opinion-based (subjective) item of information that provides insight into a MOE or MOP. A high degree of human judgment is involved when collecting qualitative indicators. Qualitative indicators are themselves opinions, not just observed opinions of others such as polls. For example, the division commander estimates the effectiveness of the host-nation forces on a scale of 1 to 5. Sources of qualitative indicators include subject matter experts' opinions and judgments as well as subordinate commanders' summaries of the situation.

(2) Qualitative indicators can account for real-world complexities that cannot be feasibly measured using quantitative indicators. Qualitative indicators are also more readily available; commanders often have access to staff principals, key leaders, and other subject matter experts from whom to garner opinions. In some cases, the only available indicator for a particular MOE or MOP is an expert opinion. For example, determining changes in the size and number of enemy sanctuaries may prove impossible without asking local commanders, partners, and stakeholders. Without large amounts of objective data, subjective indicators can be used to give a relatively informed picture.

However, subjective measures have a higher risk of bias. Human opinion is capable of spectacular insight but also vulnerable to hidden assumptions that may prove false.

(3) Differentiating between quantitative and qualitative indicators is useful but signifies a major tendency rather than a sharp distinction in practice.

(a) Quantitative indicators often require a degree of judgment in their collection. For example, determining the number of mortar attacks in a given area over a given period requires judgment in categorizing attacks as mortar attacks. A different delivery system could have been used, or an improvised explosive device could have been mistaken for a mortar attack. The attack could also have landed on a boundary, requiring a decision on whether to count it.

(b) Similarly, qualitative indicators always have some basis in observed and counted events. The same indicator may be quantitative or qualitative depending on the collection mechanism. For example, the indicator may measure a change in market activity for village X. If a Soldier observes and tracks the number of exchanges, then the indicator is quantitative. If the battalion commander answers that question in a mandated monthly report based on a gut feel, then the indicator is qualitative.

4. Incorporate Formal and Informal Methods

a. Assessment may be formal or informal; the appropriate level of formality depends entirely on the situation. As part of their planning guidance, commanders address the level of detail they desire for assessing an upcoming operation. In protracted stability operations, commanders may desire a formal assessment plan, an assessment working group, and standard reports. Subordinate units use these tools to assess local or provincial governance, economics, essential services, or the state of security. In fast-paced offensive or defensive operations or in an austere theater of operations, a formal assessment may prove impractical. To assess progress in those cases, commanders rely more on reports and assessments from subordinate commanders, the common operational picture, operation updates, assessment briefings from the staff, and their personal observations. The principles in this chapter apply to formal and informal assessment methods.

b. A common informal assessment method is the after action review (AAR). Leaders use the AAR to assess unit performance in training and throughout an operation. Leaders at all echelons conduct AARs to generate candid, professional unit evaluations that include specific recommendations for improving unit performance.

c. Collecting, assembling, and analyzing information takes time and resources. Commanders balance time and resources for assessment just as they do for planning, preparation, and execution. To help achieve this balance, commanders and staffs should ask the following questions:

(1) What will be assessed and to what detail?

(2) How will a particular task, objective, end state condition, or assumption be assessed? What MOEs and MOPs will be used?

(3) What information requirements (indicators) are needed to support a particular assessment?

(4) Who on the staff has primary responsibility for assessing a particular area? What is the collection plan?

d. Commanders must be careful, however, not to over assess. Staffs at all levels can easily get bogged down in developing formal assessment procedures for numerous tasks and objectives. Additional numerous reports, questions, and information requirements from higher headquarters can smother subordinate commanders and their staffs. Often standard reports, operational and intelligence summaries, and updates by subordinate commanders suffice. Higher echelons should not ask for something that the lower echelon does not need for its own purposes.

> *"A common mistake many leaders make is to allow themselves to become too engrossed in the details, too fascinated by the tactical aspects of the enterprise. This is understandable since whether it is security matters or sales of a particular product, the ultimate terminal transaction—or tactical level of execution in military parlance—all tend to be more exciting and draw us in. The toughest job for the leader, then, is to trust in the strategy, trust in subordinate leaders, and trust the sensors to do their jobs to report the right information; in so doing, they should be able to stay out of the thicket of tactical execution."*
>
> **ADM James G. Stavridis**
> **Partnership for the Americas**
> **November 2010**

5. Use Caution When Establishing Cause and Effect

a. Establishing cause and effect is sometimes difficult, but it is crucial to effective assessment. Sometimes, establishing causality between actions and their effects can be relatively straightforward, such as in observing a bomb destroy a bridge. In other instances, especially regarding changes in human behavior, attitudes, and perception, establishing links between cause and effect proves difficult. Commanders and staffs must guard against drawing erroneous conclusions in these instances.

b. Understanding how cause and effect works requires careful consideration and shrewd judgment. Even when two variables seem to be correlated, commanders must still make assumptions to establish which one is cause and which one is effect. In fact, both may be caused by a third unnoticed variable. Commanders clearly acknowledge all assumptions made in establishing causes and effects. The payoff for correctly identifying the links between causes and effects is effective and smart recommendations. Commanders and staffs are well-advised to devote the time, effort, and energy needed to properly uncover connections between causes and effects. Assumptions made in

establishing cause and effect must be recorded explicitly and challenged periodically to ensure they are still valid.

c.   In its simplest form, an effect is a result, outcome, or consequence of an action. Direct effects are the immediate, first-order consequences of a military action unaltered by intervening events. They are usually immediate and easily recognizable. For example, an enemy command and control center destroyed by friendly artillery or a terrorist network courier captured by a direct-action mission. Establishing the link between cause and effect in the physical domains is usually straightforward, as is assessing progress.

d.   It is often difficult to establish a link or correlation that clearly identifies actions that produce effects beyond the physical domains. The relationship between action taken (cause) and nonphysical effects may be coincidental. Then the occurrence of an effect is either purely accidental or perhaps caused by the correlation of two or more actions executed to achieve the effect. For example, friendly forces can successfully engage enemy formations with fire and maneuver at the same time as MISO. MISO might urge enemy soldiers to surrender. If both these events occur at the same time, then correlating an increase in surrendering soldiers to MISO will be difficult. As another example, friendly forces may attempt to decrease population support for an insurgency in a particular city. To accomplish this task, the unit facilitates the reconstruction of the city's power grid, assists the local authorities in establishing a terrorist tips hotline, establishes a civil-military operations center, and conducts lethal operations against high-payoff targets within the insurgency. Identifying the relative impact of each of these activities is extremely challenging but is critical for allocating resources smartly to accomplish the mission. Unrecognized influences completely invisible to assessors can also cause changes unforeseen or attributed inaccurately to actions of the force.

e.   Furthermore, because commanders synchronize actions across the warfighting functions to achieve an objective or obtain an end state condition, the cumulative effect of these actions may make the impact of any individual task indistinguishable. Careful consideration and judgment are required, particularly when asserting cause-and-effect relationships in stability operations.

6.   Consider Operations Research/Systems Analysis Support

a.   Some headquarters, particularly those at the theater-strategic and operational level, may include a dedicated core group of analysts that specializes in operations research/systems analysis (ORSA), formal assessment plans, and various assessment products. ORSA-trained personnel use quantitative and qualitative analysis and are adept at problem solving, identifying risk, and communicating results and recommendations. ORSA techniques can help to allocate scarce resources, and to prepare, plan, analyze, and assess operations.

b.   If available, ORSA-trained personnel can enhance the assessment process. They can provide valuable insight and continuity in the development of the assessment plan by

helping the staff link actions and tasks to appropriate and available forms of measurement. ORSA-trained personnel can also assist planners in developing the assessment metrics (e.g. effects, measures of effectiveness (MOEs), measures of performance (MOPs) and indicators).

c. Effective assessment of tasks, effects, and campaigns require regular collaboration with staff elements within the command—vertically with higher or lower commands and horizontally across interagency and multinational partners. ORSA-trained personnel can help ensure assessment metrics are nested with both higher and lower command, alleviating a possible breakdown of the assessment process. Additionally, while developing the collection plan, ORSA-trained personnel may identify data already collected by lower-command echelons and other agencies. This prevents duplicative data collection efforts and decreases the burden on responsible organizations.

7. Other Assessment Frameworks

a. Interagency assessments often provide greater insight into the non-combat operations conducted in theater (e.g., US Agency for International Development [USAID] reconstruction projects, Department of State political activities and counter-drug activities.)

b. Surveys, projects or other open-source documents often provide data for the assessment process. These types of documents may serve as a way to verify military analysis and results.

c. Incorporating the assessments conducted by intergovernmental organizations or multinational partners can provide greater fidelity to the assessment process. For example, in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, ORSA personnel at Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan worked with ORSA personnel of the International Security Assistance Force throughout the assessment process. Often the host nation is a resource for the assessment process as well.

d. **Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)**

(1) The ICAF is a framework that can be used to help people from different US Government (USG) departments and agencies work together to reach a shared understanding of a country's conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. This assessment will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in your country or region.

(2) ICAF teams are situation-specific and should include department/agency representatives with relevant technical or country expertise. ICAF teams are often co-led by the Conflict Prevention division of US Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and USAID's Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) because people in those offices have conflict assessment expertise, but anytime two or more departments/agencies want to

conduct an ICAF, they may do so. Unless they have conflict assessment experience, however, they should request assistance from S/CRS Conflict Prevention or USAID CMM.

(3) An ICAF allows an interagency team to identify potential entry points for future USG efforts in conflict prevention and conflict transformation, but it does not make direct recommendations for program design. That is the role of the sectoral assessment. Use of sectoral assessments is consonant with use of ICAF in the following ways:

(a) Results from sectoral assessments performed in the past provide data that is fed into the ICAF;

(b) During a situation assessment, the results of an ICAF identify sectors most critically in need of an in-depth sectoral assessment prior to planning; or

(c) After an ICAF is conducted and a plan has been created, sectoral assessments are conducted to assist in the design of programs.

(4) When members of the interagency perform a conflict/instability assessment together, they reach a shared understanding of the conflict dynamics. The ICAF has been developed by the interagency community and has interagency acceptance. Using the ICAF, members of an interagency team are able to focus their discussion on the conflict they are analyzing and avoid being caught up in a disagreement on the process they are using to analyze the conflict.

(5) The USG departments/agencies most likely to participate in the use of the ICAF are agencies with responsibilities for planning or programming foreign assistance funds or other international engagements. However, on occasion, USG agencies implementing domestic programs may have technical or country expertise to contribute to an ICAF even if they do not have international programs.

For more information, see Appendix D and Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework *at: http://www.crs.state.gov/shortcut.cfm/C6WW.*

e. **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)**

(1) The **MPICE framework** is a catalog of metrics and a process for using these metrics to measure the progress of stabilization and reconstruction missions in conflict environments. MPICE metrics measure the conditions that support *viable peace.* This peace is achieved when the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve disputes peacefully overtakes the powerful motives and means for continued violent conflict. When this state is achieved, external intervention forces can begin to hand over stability efforts to domestic institutions.

(2) MPICE includes about 800 generic, quantitative outcome metrics that measure *institutional capacities and drivers of conflict* in five sectors: safe and secure

environment, political moderation and stable democracy, rule of law, sustainable economy, and social well-being. This comprehensive set of outcome metrics (measures of effectiveness) enables planners to assess mission progress in an objective, systematic, and holistic way.

(3) Development of MPICE was sponsored by the Department of Defense, United States Institute of Peace, U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies in cooperation with multinational, non-governmental organization (NGO), and academic partners.

For more information on MPICE, see http://www.stottlerhenke.com/mpice/#.

f. **District Stability Framework (DSF)**

(1) The District Stability Framework (DSF) is a methodology designed for use by both military and civilian personnel to identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming. It is employed to gather information using the following lenses: operational environment, cultural environment, local perceptions, and stability/instability dynamics. This information then helps identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust programming targeted at diminishing the causes of instability or conflict.

(2) The DSF has four major components: gaining situational awareness (from the four lenses of data mentioned above); analyzing that data; designing effective programming based on that analysis; and monitoring and evaluating programming.

(3) USAID conducts training for deploying personnel on DSF. Wherever possible, USAID seeks to raise awareness of development and conflict mitigation and to help preempt these issues before military and civilian personnel are sent into hostile areas in reaction to them.

Refer to http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/ma/dsf.html *for more information.*

g. **The Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool (CJSART)**

(1) A fundamental and vital component of rule of law development is instituting a vigorous and impartial criminal justice sector. Proficiency in how to effectively use and measure this foreign assistance, however, continues to develop accompanied by the requirement to organize complex efforts into transferable knowledge for all of USG policy makers and implementers.

(2) CJSART is designed to assist policy makers and program managers prioritize and administer host nation criminal justice sectors needing assistance. Once the assistance programs are under way, the CJSART is a systematic tool designed to measure

progress and accomplishments against standardized benchmarks. Used in its entirety, the CJSART holistically examines a country's laws, judicial institutions, law enforcement organizations, border security, and corrections systems as well as a country's adherence to international rule of law standards such as bilateral and multilateral treaties.

For more information on CJSART or request a copy, contact the US Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, at (202) 647-5171.

h. **Democracy and Governance (DG) Assessment**

(1) *Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development* provides a framework for constructing donor, in particular USAID, democracy and governance strategies. The framework guides a political analysis of the country, leads to program choices, and incorporates what researchers and practitioners have learned from comparative experience. While every country is unique in some manner, there are important commonalities. This is what makes anthropology or comparative political science possible. Most countries have political systems with elements and basic construction that resemble at least some other countries.

(2) Donors, such as USAID, have found that political issues are as important to a country's development as other issues such as health and economic growth and that many developmental plans have floundered on political shoals. In particular, donors believe that support for democracy should be part of their development assistance both because it is good in itself and because it best supports the developmental effort. Host countries also agree, at least officially, since most have signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements that include elements of democracy. The strategic assessment framework is designed to help define a country-appropriate program to assist in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. As such, it is useful in developing strategies that address the core democracy and governance problem(s) in a country and that identify primary influences and rules of particular institutional arenas.

i. **Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF).**

(1) In response to a request by DOD and building on work done by CMM and the Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Military Affairs, USAID created the Tactical Conflict Assessment Framework. Adapted by the US Army as the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF), it is a standardized diagnostic tool designed for use by both military and civilian personnel. It is employed to gather information from local inhabitants to identify the causes of instability or conflict in tactical areas of operation. This information helps identify, prioritize, monitor, evaluate, and adjust civil-military programming targeted at diminishing the causes of instability or conflict. The TCAPF has four major components:

(a) Identifying causes of instability/conflict

(b) The local context

(c) Gathering information

(d) Designing effective programming

(2) The TCAPF training also includes a detailed case study based on a real situation in a West African area in which trainees are tasked with identifying the causes of instability in the country and designing effective programs to mitigate them.

For further discussion on other assessment frameworks, see Appendix D for a discussion of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, Appendix E for information on the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework, and Appendix F for information on the NATO Operations Assessment Handbook.

CHAPTER III
ASSESSMENT COMPONENTS

> *"Within the commander's decision cycle, assessment is the determination of the effect of operations as they relate to overall mission accomplishment. Fundamental to assessment are judgments about progress in designated mission areas as measured against the expected progress in those same mission areas. These judgments allow the commander and the staff to determine where adjustments must be made to operations and serve as a catalyst for planning. Ultimately, assessment allows the commander and staff to keep pace with a constantly evolving situation while staying focused on mission accomplishment"*
>
> **Naval Warfare Publication 3-32,**
> ***Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War***

1. General

a. Commanders and subordinates should continuously assess the current situation and the progress of the overall operation and compare it with the current operational approach, current mission, and the commander's intent to ensure concept of operations to ensure the operation being conducted is maintaining alignment with the desired end state and objectives. In other words, "**Are we on plan or not**?" This chapter describes a generic framework for the assessment, its components and their interaction, and their applicability to the different assessment levels.

b. As discussed in chapter I, assessment involves the interaction of end states, objectives, effects, and tasks at each level in a basic framework (see Figure III-1). Webster's defines framework as "a basic conceptual structure or structural frame" or, more simply, "how do the pieces fit together?" While the focus may change at each level of assessment, the basic structure is fairly well understood, "conduct <u>tasks</u> to create <u>effects</u> to achieve <u>objectives</u> to attain <u>end states</u>."

c. Completing this basic structure are the MOEs, MOPs, and associated indicators discussed in chapter II. Effects and tasks are two distinct but equally critical components within the assessment structure (see Figure III-2). They each consist of a multilevel hierarchical structure comprised of individual supporting elements that are developed and assessed in unique and separate constructs. When developed, the two components form their own hierarchical model.

Figure III-1. Assessment Interaction

2.   Objectives and Effects

a.   **An objective is a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every military operation should be directed**. Once the military end state is understood and termination criteria are established, operational design continues with development of strategic and operational military objectives. Joint operation planning integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC's objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished.

(1) **Objectives prescribe friendly goals**. They constitute the aim of military and are necessarily linked to national objectives (simply described as "what we want to accomplish"). Military objectives are one of the most important considerations in joint operation planning. **They specify what must be accomplished and provide the basis for describing desired effects**.

(2) **Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach the end state**. These are usually expressed in military, diplomatic, economic, and informational terms and help define and clarify what military planners must do to support the achievement of the national strategic end state.

Figure III-2. Notional Assessment Structure

       (3) Objectives tie accomplishment of tactical tasks to attainment of the end state.

    b. **An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect**. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective **Throughout this publication, the term "effects" is intended to mean both** *desired* **and** *undesired* **effects unless otherwise specified.**

       (1) There are four primary considerations for writing a desired effect statement**.**

          (a) Each desired effect should link directly to one or more objectives

          (b) The effect should be measurable

          (c) The statement should not specify ways and means for accomplishment

          (d) The effect should be distinguishable from the objective it supports as a condition for success, not as another objective or a task.

(2) The proximate cause of effects in interactively complex situations can be difficult to predict. Even direct effects in these situations can be more difficult to create, predict, and measure, particularly when they relate to moral and cognitive issues (such as religion and the "mind of the adversary" respectively). Indirect effects in these situations often are difficult to foresee. **Indirect effects often can be unintended and undesired since there will always be gaps in our understanding of the operational environment**. Commanders and planners must appreciate that unpredictable third-party actions, unintended consequences of friendly operations, subordinate initiative and creativity, and the fog and friction of conflict will contribute to an uncertain operational environment.

(3) The use of effects in planning can help commanders and staff determine the tasks required to achieve objectives and use other elements of operational design more effectively by clarifying the relationships between centers of gravity (COGs), lines of operation (LOOs) and/or lines of effort, decisive points, and termination criteria. This linkage allows for efficient use of desired effects in planning. The commander and planners continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout the joint operation planning. Monitoring progress toward attaining desired effects and avoiding undesired effects continues throughout execution.

For more information on objectives and effects, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

3. Measures and Indicators

a. **The assessment process uses MOPs to evaluate task performance and MOEs to determine progress of operations toward achieving objectives, and ultimately the end state**. MOEs help answer questions like: "are we doing the right things, are our actions producing the desired effects, or are alternative actions required?" MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment. MOPs help answer questions like: "was the action taken, were the tasks completed to standard, or how much effort was involved?" Well-devised measures can help the commanders and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects (see Figure III-3).

(1) **MOEs assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment**. They measure the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect; they do not measure task performance. These measures typically are more subjective than MOPs. Some examples include:

(a) Perception among identity group members that loss of power (e.g., to other identity groups) will eliminate the prospect of regaining power in the future.

ASSESSMENT MEASURES AND INDICATORS

MOE	MOP	Indicator
Answers the question, "*Are we doing the right things?*"	Answers the question, "*Are we doing things right?*"	Answers the question, "*What is the status of this MOE or MOP?*"
Measures purpose accomplishment	Measures task completion	Measures the data inputs to inform MOEs and MOPs
No hierarchical relationship to MOPs	No hierarchical relationship to MOEs	Subordinate to MOEs and MOPs
Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans	Often formally tracked in execution matrices	Often formally tracked in formal assessment plans
Typically challenging to choose the correct ones	Typically simple to choose the correct ones	Typically as challenging to choose as the supported MOE or MOP

MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance

Figure III-3. Assessment Measures and Indicators

      (b) Dispute resolution mechanisms exist and are being used to clarify or resolve remaining vital issues among parties to the conflict.

      (c) Percent of military-aged population that expresses an inclination to support or join a violent faction (by identity group).

      (d) Degree to which members of formerly warring factions and competing identity groups can travel freely in areas controlled by their rivals.

      (e) Detainees/prisoners are subjected to torture, cruel, or inhuman treatment, beatings or psychological pressures (by identity group).

      (f) Safe and sustainable return of displaced persons and refugees to former neighborhoods.

      (g) Estimated percentage of gross domestic product accounted for by illicit economic transactions.

      (h) Level of public satisfaction with electrical power delivery (by identity group and region).

(i)   Perception that ethnic identity polarizes society (by identity group).

(j)   Perception of heads of households that, under normal conditions, they are able to meet their food needs either by growing foodstuffs/raising livestock or purchasing food on the market.

(2) **MOPs**.   They are generally quantitative, but also can apply qualitative attributes to task accomplishment. MOPs are used in most aspects of combat assessment, since it typically seeks specific, quantitative data or a direct observation of an event to determine accomplishment of tactical tasks. But MOPs have relevance for noncombat operations as well (e.g., tons of relief supplies delivered or noncombatants evacuated). MOPs also can be used to measure operational and strategic tasks, but the type of measurement may not be as precise or as easy to observe.

b.   The assessment process and related measures should be **relevant, measurable, responsive,** and **resourced** so there is no false impression of accomplishment. Quantitative measures can be helpful in this regard.

(1) **Relevant**.   MOPs and MOEs should be relevant to the task, effect, operation, the operational environment, the end state, and the commander's decisions. This criterion helps avoid collecting and analyzing information that is of no value to a specific operation. It also helps ensure efficiency by eliminating redundant efforts.

(2) **Measurable**. Assessment measures should have qualitative or quantitative standards they can be measured against. To effectively measure change, a baseline measurement should be established prior to execution to facilitate accurate assessment throughout the operation. Both MOPs and MOEs can be quantitative or qualitative in nature, but meaningful quantitative measures are preferred because they are less susceptible to subjective interpretation.

(3) **Responsive**. Assessment processes should detect situation changes quickly enough to enable effective response by the staff and timely decisions by the commander. The JFC and staff should consider the time required for an action or actions to produce desired results within the operational environment and develop indicators that can respond accordingly. Many actions directed by the JFC require time to implement and may take even longer to produce a measurable result.

(4) **Resourced**.   To be effective, assessment must be adequately resourced. Staffs should ensure resource requirements for data collection efforts and analysis are built into plans and monitored. Effective assessment can help avoid both duplication of tasks and unnecessary actions, which in turn can help preserve combat power.

WHY METRICS MATTER

"To end this insurgency and achieve peace, we may need more than just extra troops, new resources and a new campaign plan: as General McChrystal has emphasized, we need a new operational culture. Organizations manage what

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they measure, and they measure what their leaders tell them to report on. Thus, one key way for a leadership team to shift an organization's focus is to change reporting requirements and the associated measures of performance and effectiveness...

Metrics must be meaningful to multiple audiences, including NATO commanders, intelligence and operations staffs, political leaders, members of Parliament and Congress in troop-contributing nations, academic analysts, journalists and – most importantly – ordinary Afghans and people around the world."

Dr. David Kilcullen
Measuring Progress In Afghanistan
Kabul, December 2009

c.   Commanders and staffs derive relevant assessment measures during the planning process and reevaluate them continuously throughout preparation and execution. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis, refine these measures in the JFC's planning guidance and in commander's and staff's estimates, war game the measures during COA development, and include MOEs and MOPs in the approved plan or order. An integrated data collection management plan is critical to the success of the assessment process, and should encompass all available tactical, theater, and national intelligence sources.

d.   Just as tactical tasks relate to operational- and strategic-level tasks, effects, and objectives, there is a relationship between assessment measures. By monitoring available information and using MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools during planning, preparation, and execution, commanders and staffs determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state, and modify the plan as required. Well-devised MOPs and MOEs, supported by effective information management, help the commanders and staffs understand the linkage between specific tasks, the desired effects, and the JFC's objectives and end state.

4.   Developing Measures of Performance

a.   Tasks are evaluated through the development and application of subordinate measurable elements, known as MOPs. MOPs are hierarchically linked to the tasks and provide a means to determine the completion or the accomplishment status of assign tasks.

b.   Typically, MOPs are developed and assessed at the component level for military tasks or at the agency or organizational level for non-military tasks. Since operational level assessment is primarily focused on the assessment of effects, operational level staffs should not be directive or prescriptive in terms of MOP development. The military components or non-military agencies responsible for conducting tasks to change systems behavior shoulder the responsibility for developing appropriate and relevant MOPs. Further, it is generally at the component or agency level where the required knowledge,

experience, and expertise for determining and selecting specific MOPs relative to the assigned task(s) reside.

c. Like MOEs, MOPs should demonstrate particular characteristics. They are tied to tasks and task assessment, therefore, they should be appropriate to the assigned task or set of related tasks. They should be measurable and are generally focused on the immediate results of tactical actions. They are designed to answer whether a task or related set of tasks was conducted or conducted successfully, whether it/they need to be conducted again, whether the tasked organizations are "doing things right." Depending on the type of DIME action employed, MOP may measure the delivery of lethal fires on a key node, the capture or killing of a high value individual, the issuance of a diplomatic demarche, informal contact with tribal or local leaders, the level of completion of a set of tasks related to security operations or the level of progress regarding completion of economic recovery programs. For some tasks, the MOPs are relatively simple; yes or no. (e.g., Was the target hit? Was the demarche issued?) For other tasks, the MOPs may more complex. (e.g., What percentage of tribal leaders have been contacted or engaged? What percentage of security operations or economic recovery programs has successfully been completed?) In instances where the tasks are more complex or are grouped together as a collection of related tasks (i.e., the completion of security operations or economic recovery programs) several individual and distinct milestones may need to be employed as MOP criteria. Ultimately, however, MOPs are used to determine the status of tasks, LOOs, or operations, activities, and actions, conducted to achieve behavioral changes (effects) in adversary or neutral systems.

d. One source available to develop task performance measures is the universal joint task list (UJTL) or Service-specific task lists to develop task performance measures. Forces can use the these lists as a baseline to develop mission tasks and corresponding measures. Applied to the tasks, purposes and conditions present at the time of planning, these task lists can facilitate MOP creation. Measures of performance developed from these lists can be modified as appropriate to the particular operation. As COAs are developed and analyzed during the planning process, the tasks and purposes of subordinate commands are identified to determine what their mission essential tasks may be for mission success. For example, an OPT identifies a task during COA development to isolate the operational area with the purpose of decreasing threat effectiveness (by constraining the threat's ability to resupply). The OPT further develops this COA during COA analysis (wargaming).

e. Upon completion of the baseline system of system analysis or upon completion of course of action development and selection, the JPG/OPT updates the operation plan (OPLAN)/operation order (OPORD) to reflect the resource assigned to each action (the identification of resources may be limited to identification at the component or interagency level). For each resulting action, the tasked resource (command or agency) then develops MOP for assessing its progress in completing assigned actions against key nodes, and identifies collection requirements for assessing MOP. For military task assessment, MOP status is normally maintained by the designated organization until required for effect-to-task comparison, although periodic reports for other purposes (e.g.,

branch/sequel development) may be required by the CCMD or joint task force (JTF) headquarters. Reporting responsibilities for nonmilitary tasks are coordinated between the CCMD/JTF and applicable interagency and multinational representatives.

f.   With respect to the non-military actions coordination may need to occur between the CCMD/JTF staff and the State Department representatives or applicable American Embassy staff to ensure visibility on diplomatic actions associated with the establishment of key public Ministries or Departments. Similarly, coordination may need to occur with the Treasury Department, Embassy staff, or USAID to gain insight into actions associated with the administration of humanitarian aid or economic development packages. In many cases, this coordination will occur through the CCMD staff or through the joint interagency coordination group. In other cases, the JTF staff may have been authorized more direct access.

g.   MOP status is normally reported in a summary format (stoplight, gumball, or thermograph/bar chart) as "RED," "AMBER," or "GREEN." MOP status may be based on percentage of planned activity completed, attainment of specific milestones, battle damage assessment reports, or combat assessments. For assessment and deficiency analysis purposes, MOP status should reflect action accomplishment status, with an assessment of "GREEN" reserved for completion of the action. Commands which have experimented with using multiple criteria for MOP status reports (i.e., defining "GREEN" as "action completed and/or on schedule") have experienced delays in determining or interpreting the basis for MOP status reports, resulting in a difficult and at times confusing deficiency analysis process. Some commands have used "RED" to indicate an action is off-plan or unsuccessful; "AMBER" to indicate a task is on plan, but not yet completed; and "GREEN" to indicate an action that is complete. This type of rating scheme allows the component to tell the higher headquarters commander "I am RED. I can't do what I am supposed to do and need help." When told that by a component, the commander either accepts the risk, changes the parameters, or reallocates assets to assist the component in completing the MOP in a way that supports the overall task they were given.

5.   Developing Measures of Effectiveness and Indicators

a.   The development of MOEs and indicators for desired and undesired effects can commence immediately after the identification of desired and undesired effects while MOPs and task metric development is normally conducted concurrent with or shortly following the course of action development phase of the JOPP. Since the intent of the MOE and indicators is to build an assessment model rather than a COA, the development of MOEs and indicators is not dependent upon which key nodes are selected for action. While MOPs are normally developed by the tasked component or resource, development of MOEs and their associated indicators and assessment criteria is typically the responsibility of the JPG/ OPT, or, when established, the assessment team. The intent in developing MOEs and their associated indicators is to build an accurate baseline model for determining whether joint and supporting agency actions are driving target systems toward or away from exhibiting the desired effects. As strategic and operational level

effects are seldom attained or exhibited instantaneously, MOEs provide a framework for conducting trend analysis of system behavior or capability changes that occur over time, based on the observation of specific, discrete indicators.

b. In developing MOEs and indicators for effects, the assessment team relies heavily upon the expertise of J-5/J-3 planners, ISR planners, J-2 personnel and JIPOE analysts, interagency and multinational representatives, and other subject matter experts to ensure that MOEs and indicators for a particular effect are observable and will provide a reliable assessment. Where possible, the assessment team associates nodes with specific indicators in order to focus ISR planning and collection efforts. Additional information required for indicator criteria development that is not available through collaboration is submitted as a request for information. Upon completion of MOE and indicator development, appropriate indicators are provided to the ISR planner, who coordinates with the JIOC to align these indicators against the specific ISR assets or disciplines that will be tasked. Reporting responsibilities and periodicities are then established by the JTF J-2/JISE and CCMD J-2/JIOC and promulgated in a collection plan or OPORD annex.

c. MOEs and initial/draft indicators are developed for each effect individually. The following procedures are not prescriptive and should be tailored for individual command requirements and time constraints. Several commands have found it useful to convene a small, ad hoc working group to develop a draft set of MOEs and indicators for review by the more inclusive, formally established assessment team. See Figure III-4 for an outline of the process steps.

(1) **Step 1: Analyze the Desired Effect**. Prior to developing MOE, the assessment team analyzes the desired effect to ensure there is a common understanding of the desired/undesired behavior or capability the effect describes, and how the desired/undesired behavior or capability would likely be exhibited by the specific target system (particularly if the effect is phase-specific). A common understanding of intent is critical to ensuring that the associated MOE reflect activities that, when analyzed, will accurately depict effect attainment status during plan development or OPORD execution. References that may assist in analyzing the effect include the detailed effect description, red team summaries, and political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) system summaries. If the effect is deemed unclear after assessment team review (ambiguous wording, description of dual-behaviors, etc.), the assessment team recommends modifications to the JPG/OPT.

MEASURE of EFFECTIVENESS DEVELOPMENT

- Step 1: Analyze the desired effect
- Step 2: Brainstorm measures of effectiveness (MOEs)
- Step 3: Evaluate MOEs
- Step 4: Develop MOE indicators
- Step 5: Evaluate MOE indicators
- Step 6: Rank MOEs
- Step 7: Reverse order review
- Step 8: Weight MOEs

Figure III-4. Measure of Effectiveness Development

(2) **Step 2: Brainstorm MOEs**. When a common understanding of the effect's intent is gained, MOE development begins. "Brainstorming" is one method which may be used. In this step, the assessment team focuses on identifying types of activity that could potentially provide information that would be useful in assessing the status of the effect. During this step, suggestions are not reviewed for quality and all suggestions are considered. Most commonly, the assessment team lead assigns one working group member as a scribe, who transcribes all suggestions onto a whiteboard or butcher-block pad (if the session is in a physical setting without electronic capability) or on a projected display (for virtual collaborative sessions). Common syntax , such as "increase/decrease in [activity]," should be used with each activity where possible. One technique some commands have found useful is to follow an initial ad hoc brainstorming session with a round-robin solicitation of system specific suggestions for each PMESII area and each warfare discipline/functional area (i.e., maritime, air, etc.). Use of this technique mitigates the risk of deception by ensuring that a broad range of system activities are considered when assessing the effect during OPLAN/OPORD execution.

(3) **Step 3: Evaluate MOEs**. After step 2 is complete, each potential MOE is individually evaluated for grammar, clarity, relation to the effect, and propriety (i.e., for phase-specific effects, is the activity identified by the MOEs likely to be conducted during the phase in question). During this step, some MOEs may be reclassified as potential indicators or combined with other suggested MOEs. MOEs deemed unsuitable are re-worded or discarded. Upon completion of individual MOE evaluation, the refined

MOEs are evaluated as a group against the effect. The assessment team must reach consensus that, given information is available for each of the refined MOEs, the refined MOEs as a group would allow for an accurate assessment of the effect. If the MOEs are deemed insufficient, additional MOEs must be developed, or the effect must be refined or discarded.

> *Assessment encompasses all efforts to evaluate effects and gauge progress toward accomplishment of effects and objectives. It also helps evaluate requirements for future action. It seeks to answer two questions: "How is the conflict going?" and "what needs to be done next?" Contrary to many common depictions and descriptions, assessment is not really a separate stage of planning or tasking processes. Rather, it is interleaved throughout planning and execution and is integral to them, since it works together with planning to determine future courses of action and is conducted in large part during execution.*
>
> **Air Force Doctrine Document 2**

(4) **Step 4: Develop MOE Indicators**. In this step, indicators are developed for those MOEs refined in step 3. Considering each MOE individually, the assessment team identifies specific discrete indicators that would allow an assessment as to the level of activity described by the MOE under consideration (for example, indicators for an MOE of "increase/decrease in out-of-cycle military activity" may include "aircraft sortie rates", "force deployment status", etc.). Indicators must be measurable (at least potentially, subject to later confirmation by collection analysts), directly related to the activity identified by the MOE, and appropriate given knowledge of the target system or systems. Additionally, indicators must provide data that would indicate a change in MOE in sufficient time for the assessment to be of use for the commander's decision cycle. At the operational level, some effects may be created only over a lengthy period of time, and changes in data for the most reliable associated indicators may only be measured sporadically or very gradually. In these cases, consideration should be given to developing or identifying additional indicators that, while perhaps less reliable, may provide more timely interim changes. Where possible, MOEs should be tied to specific nodes to assist in collection planning. As during step 2, some commands have found it useful to follow an initial ad hoc brainstorming session with a round-robin solicitation of system specific suggestions for each PMESII area, each warfare discipline/functional area, and inter-agency representatives. If no measurable indicators can be identified that would provide an accurate assessment of the change in condition identified by the MOE (considering the attributes of the target system being assessed), the MOE under consideration is discarded. One source for assistance in developing MOEs and indicators is the United States Institute for Peace's *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)*, which provides good examples of MOEs and indicators that have been vetted by the interagency, cover all five sectors of stability operations, and address both drivers of conflict and institutional performance in dealing with them.

(5) **Step 5: Evaluate MOE Indicators**. Following indicator development, indicators are evaluated as a group. During group indicator evaluation, the assessment team must reach consensus that, given information is available for each of the refined

indicators, the indicators as a group would allow for an accurate assessment of the MOE. If the indicators are deemed insufficient, additional indicators must be developed, or the MOE must be refined or discarded.

(6) **Step 6: Rank MOEs**. The next step in the MOE development process is to rank the MOEs for the effect under consideration in preparation for MOE reverse order review.   Preferably, MOEs for a given effect are assessed against a common set of independent criteria, then ranked based upon the results of that assessment (commonly used criteria include observable, timely, and level of direct relationship to the effect).

(7) **Step 7: Reverse Order Review**. Having ranked the MOEs, the final step in developing MOEs is to conduct a reverse order review to ensure that only those MOEs that are actually required (with an acceptable level of risk) to assess the effect are utilized in the effect assessment model, both to streamline the effect assessment process and to conserve ISR resources. In this step, the lowest ranking MOE is temporarily discarded; the assessment team then evaluates the remaining MOEs against the effect.   If the assessment team reaches consensus that the remaining MOEs as a group would allow for an accurate assessment of the effect and that use of the remaining MOEs alone would not present an unacceptable level of risk of deception, the lowest ranked MOE is discarded. This process is repeated with each remaining MOE until the assessment team determines that all remaining MOEs are required.

(8) **Step 8: Weight MOEs**. In order to complete MOE development, the MOEs require weighting criteria. When this occurs, the MOEs are weighed against each other based on their relative importance in assessing the associated effect.   The assignment of weight may be based on a subjective informed analysis of the selected MOE (i.e., a given MOE is considered to be of greater significance than another), or it may be based on a more precise knowledge of the system under assessment. In the absence of either a subjective or objective basis to apply weighting criteria, all MOEs for a given effect may be weighted equally. Upon completion of this step, indicator criteria development begins.

For an example of MOE and MOE indicator development, see Appendix C, "Measure of Effectiveness and Indicator Development."

6.   Develop Indicator Threshold Criteria

a.   The development of indicator thresholds begins immediately following MOE/indicator development. The development of criteria during planning is important because it establishes a consistent baseline for assessment trend analysis and reduces subjectivity on the part of designated indicator reporting agencies. The establishment of assessment thresholds is particularly important when a change in assessment status for an effect or MOE is tied to a specific decision point, such as phase transition. Planners must ensure that designated assessment thresholds support the commander's intent and that assessment criteria will result in information being provided to the commander with sufficient fidelity to allow for an informed decision.

b. Development of MOE indicator criteria requires significant input from intelligence analysts, subject matter experts (SMEs), operations planners, and collection managers. Because the development of indicator criteria can be time consuming, the process should begin during mission analysis but will probably continue well into the COA development step of JOPP. The indicator criteria development process is conducted for each MOE. See Figure III-5 for an outline of the criteria development process.

INDICATOR THRESHOLD DEVELOPMENT

- Step 1: Review indicators
- Step 2: Determine assessment thresholds
- Step 3: Rank indicators
- Step 4: Review in reverse order
- Step 5: Weight indicators
- Step 6: Repeat process for remaining measures of effectiveness
- Step 7: Pass results to collection manager
- Step 8: Populate assessment model

Figure III-5. Indicator Threshold Development

(1) **Step 1: Review Indicators**. The initial step in the threshold development process is to ensure that the MOE under consideration clearly identifies the activity that is being measured. When a common understanding of the MOE is gained, the indicators can be better developed to support the MOE. They are reviewed individually to ensure that they are measurable and are directly related to the MOE. The indicators are then reviewed to ensure that they are relevant, responsive, and can be efficiently resourced. Indicators are not considered measurable is data will not be available at their required periodicities. They should also collectively provide sufficient coverage of the MOE under consideration and there is sufficient cross-verification of indicators to ensure accuracy and validity and to reduce risk of manipulation (friendly or adversary). If the indicators are insufficient to allow for MOE status determination, additional indicators must be developed, or the MOE must be refined or discarded.

(2) **Step 2: Determine Reporting Thresholds**

(a) Having refined the indicators, each indicator is examined individually to establish the type of data to be reported and the thresholds for indicator data reports. Data types typically fall into one of three categories:

<u>1.</u> Quantitative data (i.e., "Average daily hours of electricity" or "number of aircraft sorties per day");

<u>2.</u> Event based data (specific occurrence of an event, i.e., "establishment of diplomatic relations" or "participation in negotiations");

<u>3.</u> Qualitative data (i.e., "low/medium/high level of available health care" or "low/medium/high level of military exercise activity").

(b) Following establishment of a data report type for an indicator, establish reporting thresholds (RED, RED/AMBER, AMBER, AMBER/GREEN, GREEN, etc.) against the range of data expected during execution, to establish initial reporting criteria. For quantitative data reports, thresholds are usually assigned based on a deviation from an historic baseline that constitutes a "normal" or "acceptable" condition or state. For instance, in the example regarding the average daily hours of electricity, a GREEN threshold could be established as equaling 16 hours a day of electricity or greater. AMBER could be established as 8 to 15 hours of electricity per day, while a RED threshold could be established as any amount less than 8 hours a day. Exact thresholds may be based on historic norms, or on information of "acceptability" based on cultural systems analysis.

(c) Where baseline information is unavailable during the assessment team session, the assessment team should table the assignment of thresholds for that indicator pending further research by intelligence personnel or SMEs. For qualitative data types, particular care should be taken to ensure that sufficient definition is given to threshold criteria to allow for consistency between reports over time. As an example, defining thresholds for an indicator of "availability of health care", or "military exercise activity" as "LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH" with no amplifying guidance may introduce excessive subjectivity into the reporting process and result in the same data being reported as LOW and MEDIUM on successive reports.

(3) **Step 3: Rank Indicators**. Following the designation of data types and thresholds, rank the indicators in preparation for a reverse order quality assurance review. Preferably, indicators are evaluated against a common set of independent criteria, then ranked based upon the results of that evaluation. These criteria, as spelled out in JP 5-0 are: relevance (to the MOE, effect, objective), measurability, responsiveness, and ability to be resourced.

(4) **Step 4: Review in Reverse Order**. Having ranked the indicators, conduct a reverse order review to ensure that only those indicators that are actually required (with an acceptable level of risk) to assess the MOE are tasked for collection. As with the reverse order MOE review, the lowest ranking indicator is temporarily discarded; the assessment team then evaluates the remaining indicators against the MOE. If the assessment team reaches consensus that the remaining indicators as a group would allow for an accurate assessment of the MOE and that use of the remaining indicators would not present an unacceptable level of risk of deception, the lowest ranked indicator is discarded. This process is repeated with each successive indicator until the assessment team determines that all remaining indicators are required.

(5) **Step 5: Weight Indicators**. In preparation for populating the assessment model and data management tool to be used during assessment execution, the assessment team weights the indicators against each other based on their relative importance in assessing MOE thresholds. The assignment of weights is a subjective process; as the data reports during the assessment process provide only a starting point for analysis by the assessment cell; all indicators for a given MOE may be equally weighted barring any obvious difference in importance.

(6) **Step 6: Repeat Process for Remaining MOE**. The indicator criteria development process is conducted for each MOE individually; as the process is completed for an MOE, it is repeated for each successive MOE.

(7) **Step 7: Pass Results to the Collection Manager**. Upon completion of MOE/indicator planning, indicators developed by the assessment team are provided to the ISR Planner, who coordinates with the JTF J-2/JISE/JIOC to include indicators in the collection plan and align specific ISR or collection assets against them, as appropriate. **Not all indicators will require the collection manager to apply assets against them as part of the collection plan.**

(8) **Step 8: Populate Assessment Model**. Some commands have successfully employed standard spreadsheets formatted with embedded macros as a means to store assessment parameters and capture assessment-related data. Others have used software support applications to facilitate assessment planning and execution. Regardless of the mechanism, the assessment model should be completed and populated prior to the start of operations.

7. Considerations

"The volume of information itself becomes a form of friction, precipitating confusion, lengthening decision times, and diminishing predictive awareness. Some of this can be mitigated by comprehensive intelligence and assessment planning before operations begin."

Air Force Doctrine Document 2

Although these procedures include a methodology to inhibit the unnecessary and unproductive development of excessive MOE and associated indicators, there is a potential tendency toward MOE and indicator proliferation. Should a large number of MOE and indicators become a part of the assessment plan, effective data analysis will be a challenge and the focus on the actual mission effects and objectives may become lost. In these instances, the staff may be overwhelmed with the amount of data being measured, with the end result that the assessment becomes a casualty of the process. In other words, if the staff is measuring everything, they may find themselves assessing nothing. For operational level planning purposes, eight to twelve effects are a realistic baseline to support the direction of DIME actions and the assessment. Additionally, four to six MOEs per effect and four to six indicators per MOE have proven to be a successful framework to support the assessment process. However, the actual number of effects, MOE and indicators should be based on the mission objectives and mission requirements and not preconceived restrictions.

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CHAPTER IV
DEVELOPING THE ASSESSMENT PLAN

> *"A critical element of the commander's planning guidance is determining which formal assessment plans to develop. An assessment plan focused on the end state often works well. It is also possible, and may be desirable, to develop an entire formal assessment plan for an intermediate objective, a named operation subordinate to the base operation plan, or a named operation focused solely on a single line of operations or geographic area. The time, resources, and added complexity involved in generating a formal assessment plan strictly limit the number of such efforts."*
>
> **US Army Field Manual 5-0, *The Operations Process*,**
> **March 2010**

1. General

a. Planning for assessment begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it in order to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. Commanders and their staffs use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs and/or lines of effort. Early and continuous involvement of assessment planners in joint operation planning helps to ensure assessment is relevant to the plan (see Appendix C, "Assessment Development During The Joint Operation Planning Process").

b. Friendly, adversary, and neutral DIME actions in the operational environment can significantly impact military planning and execution. Assessment can help to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate overflight and access agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet US objectives, and/or an international incident. Many of the organizations with which coordination is needed may be outside the JFC's authority. Accordingly, the JFC should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations—such as interagency elements from the Department of State or the Department of Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other combatant commands—to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

c. Developing the assessment plan is a continuous process that is refined throughout all planning phases and will not be completed until the OPLAN/OPORD is approved and published. The building of an assessment plan, including the development of collection requirements, normally begins during mission analysis after identification of the initial desired and undesired effects (see Figure IV-1). This identification process, which is supported by the development during JIPOE of a systems perspective of the

operational environment, will often continue through COA development and selection. Expertise from outside organizations, agencies, or external centers of excellence is desired, but may also extend assessment plan development timelines.

Figure IV-1. Mission Analysis

d.   Normally, the responsibility for MOE development should be retained within the organization responsible for assessing the status of the desired/undesired effects and their related objectives.

> *"There has been a long-standing need for "measures of effectiveness" focused on diplomatic, military, and development efforts in places prone to or emerging from conflict. Traditionally, U.S. government (USG) agencies have tended to measure outputs, such as the number of schools built, miles of roads paved, or numbers of police trained. Outputs, however, measure what we do but not what we achieve. Outcomes (also referred to as impacts or effects within USG organizations) indicate the success or failure of programs and strategies since they seek to measure the attainment of goals that reinforce stability and self-sustaining peace."*
>
> **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE)**
> **United States Institute of Peace Press**
> **June 2010**

For additional information on mission analysis, course of action development and selection, or other formal steps of the joint operation planning process, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

2.   Assessment Plan Development Steps

a.   Commanders and staffs develop assessment plans during planning using the six steps identified in Figure IV-2.   Once commanders and their staffs develop the assessment plan, they apply the assessment process of monitor, evaluate, and recommend or direct continuously throughout the remainder of joint operation planning and/or execution.

ASSESSMENT PLAN STEPS

Step 1 – Gather tools and assessment data.

Step 2 – Understand current and desired conditions.

Step 3 – Develop assessment measures and potential indicators.

Step 4 – Develop the collection plan.

Step 5 – Assign responsibilities for conducting analysis and generating recommendations.

Step 6 – Identify feedback mechanisms.

Figure IV-2. Assessment Plan Steps

b.   **Step 1 – Gather Tools and Assessment Data**. Joint operation planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. **At the strategic level, that authority—the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)—initiates planning by deciding to develop military options**. The *Guidance for Employment of the Force, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*, and related strategic guidance documents (when applicable) serve as the primary guidance to begin deliberate planning. CCDRs and other commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher

authority. Additionally, analyses of developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS initiating military planning through a warning order or other planning directive. Military options normally are developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the commander may act within approved authorities and rules of engagement (ROE) in an immediate crisis. Staffs begin updating their running estimates and gather the tools necessary for mission analysis and continued planning. Specific tools and information gathered regarding assessment include, but are not limited to:

(1) The higher headquarters' plan or order, including the assessment annex if available.

(2) If replacing a unit, any current assessments and assessment products.

(3) Relevant assessment products (classified or open-source) produced by civilian and military organizations.

(4) The identification of potential data sources, including academic institutions and civilian subject matter experts.

c. **Step 2 – Understand Current and Required Conditions**

(1) Fundamentally, assessment is about measuring progress toward the desired end state, composed of a set of required conditions. Staffs compare current conditions in the operational area against the required conditions. Mission analysis, JIPOE, and component-level intelligence preparation of the battlefield help develop an understanding of the current situation. The commander and staff identify the required conditions and key underlying assumptions for an operation during joint operation planning.

(2) Understanding current and required conditions requires explicitly acknowledging the underlying assumptions. Assumptions identified during planning are continually challenged during the evaluation phase of the assessment process. If the assumptions are subsequently disproven, then reframing the problem may be appropriate.

(3) Following mission analysis, commanders issue their initial commander's intent, planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements. The end state in the initial commander's intent describes the required conditions the commander wants to achieve. The staff section charged with responsibility for the assessment plan identifies each specific desired condition mentioned in the commander's intent. These individual required conditions focus the overall assessment of the operation. Monitoring focuses on the corresponding conditions in the current situation. If the conditions that define the end state change during the planning process, the staff updates these changes for the assessment plan.

(4) To measure progress effectively, the staff identifies both the current situation and the desired end state. For example, the commander provides the end state condition "Essential services restored to prehostility levels." The staff develops a plan to obtain indicators of this condition. These indicators also identify the current and prehostility levels of essential services across the area of operations. By taking these two actions, the staff establishes a mechanism to assess progress toward this required condition.

d. **Step 3 – Develop Assessment Measures and Potential Indicators**

(1) A formal assessment plan has a hierarchical structure—known as the assessment framework—that begins with end state conditions, followed by MOEs, and finally indicators. Commanders broadly describe the operation's end state in their commander's intent. Specific required conditions are then identified from the commander's intent. Each condition is measured by MOEs. The MOEs are in turn informed by indicators.

(2) A formal assessment plan focuses on measuring changes in the situation and whether required conditions are being attained while continually monitoring and evaluating assumptions to validate or invalidate them. MOEs are the measures used to do this. Normally, MOPs are not part of formal assessment plans. MOPs are developed and tracked by the current operations integration cell and in individual staff sections' running estimates. However, occasionally specific tasks are assessed as part of the assessment plan using the following hierarchical structure: tasks, MOPs, and MOP indicators. Formal, detailed assessments of task completion tend to be the exception rather than the rule.

e. **Step 4 – Develop the Collection Plan**. Each indicator represents an information requirement. In some instances, these information requirements are fed into the ISR synchronization process and tasked to ISR assets. In other instances, reports in the unit standing operating procedures may suffice. If not, the unit may develop a new report. The information requirement may be collected from organizations external to the unit. For example, a host nation's central bank may publish a consumer price index for that nation. The source for each indicator is identified in the assessment plan along with the staff member who collects that information. Assessment information requirements compete with other information requirements for resources. When an information requirement is not resourced, staffs cannot collect the associated indicator and must remove it from the plan. Adjustments are then made to the assessment framework to ensure that the MOE or MOP is properly worded.

f. **Step 5 – Assign Responsibilities for Conducting Analysis and Generating Recommendations**. In addition to assigning responsibility for collection, members of the staff are assigned responsibility for analyzing assessment data and developing recommendations. For example, the intelligence officer leads the assessment of enemy forces. The engineer leads the effort on assessing infrastructure development. The civil affairs operations officer leads assessment concerning the progress of local and provincial

governments. The chief of staff aggressively requires staff principals and subject matter experts to participate in processing the formal assessment and in generating smart, actionable recommendations.

g. **Step 6 – Identify Feedback Mechanisms**

(1) A formal assessment with meaningful recommendations never heard by the appropriate decision maker wastes time and energy. The assessment plan identifies the who, what, when, where, and why of that presentation. Feedback leading up to and following that presentation is discussed as well. Feedback might include which assessment working groups are required and how to act and follow up on recommendations.

(2) In units with an assessment cell, both the assessment cell and the appropriate staff principal present their findings to the commander. The assessment cell presents the assessment framework with current values and discusses key trends observed. Any relevant insights from the statistical analysis of the information are presented. Then the staff principal either agrees or disagrees with the values provided in the formal model and discusses relevant insights and factors not considered or not explicit in the model. The staff principal then provides meaningful, actionable recommendations based on the assessment.

3. Incorporation into Plans and Orders

Incorporating the assessment plan into the appropriate plans and/or orders is the recommended mechanism for providing guidance and direction to subordinate organizations or requests for key external stakeholder assistance and support. Desired and undesired effects are most effectively communicated in the main body of the base plan or order and may be repeated in the Operations annex (Annex C). The assessment plan may be included as an appendix to the Operations annex, or alternatively, in the Reports annex and should provide a detailed matrix of the MOEs associated with the identified desired effects as well as subordinate indicators (see Figure IV-3 for an example). Effect description, if not included in the base order, should be included as well. Criteria for the establishment of MOE and indicator status thresholds (i.e., "good and bad" or "positive , negative, or no change") should also be identified along with any weighing requirements applied to individual MOE or indicators. The assessment plan should identify reporting responsibilities for specific MOE and indicators. Although not formally included in the assessment plan, approved MOE indicators also should form a key element of the collection plan detailed in the Intelligence Annex (Annex B). Changes to MOEs and/or MOE indicators or associated criteria are directed by fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) and may be referenced on the supported command's webpage (if developed).

EXAMPLE EFFECT / MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS / INDICATOR MATRIX

Effect 1: Country X forces are not postured for offensive operations	
MOE 1-1: Country X ground forces assembled for deployment	
I1-1-1: Number of troops embarked on amphibious ships	
I1-1-2: Number of airborne troops assembled near aircraft	
I1-1-3: Has leave been cancelled for military personnel?	Y / N
MOE 1-2: Country X air forces preparation for offensive operations	
I1-2-1: Number of attack aircraft deployed to FOL	
I1-2-2: Number of fighter aircraft deployed to FOL	
I1-2-3: Number of TBMs deployed to launch areas	
I1-2-4: Number of ISR sorties flown in or near the JOA	
I1-2-5: Number of LRA sorties flown in or near JOA	
I1-2-6: Number of aerial refueling tankers deployed to FOL	
MOE 1-3: Country X air forces preparation for offensive operations	
I1-3-1: Number of SAGs operating in or near JOA	
I1-3-2: Are amphibious ships loaded or being prepared to embark ground forces?	Y / N
I1-3-3: Number of submarines _not_ in port or undergoing repair	

Legend

FOL   forward operating location   JOA   joint operations area
I   indicator   LRA   long-range aviation
ISR   intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance   TBM   theater ballistic missile

Figure IV-3. Example of Effect/Measure of Effectiveness/indicator Matrix

4.   Organization

a.   Developing the assessment plan should be the work of a cross-functional and collaborative assessment team. Participation in assessment planning is required from all elements of the operational staff, including joint planners and operations personnel. Assessment planning efforts require a broad range of expertise to identify desired and undesired effects, to develop the MOEs and associated indicators required to build the assessment plan, and to develop the associated collection requirements that support assessment. No assessment plan should ever be considered a static construct; the plan will continue to be validated, refined, and adjusted during subsequent joint operation planning and execution.

b.   Developing an assessment plan is normally the responsibility of a JPG/OPT. However, several commands have delegated specific responsibilities for MOE and indicator development to an AC or other designated assessment team, typically organized within the JPG/OPT under the direction of a designated assessment planner. Regardless of whether an AC is established, assessment planning must include cross-functional representation (to include expertise from other interagency and multinational partners). The particular importance of intelligence staff participation should be clear. The JIPOE process assists in the identification of desired and undesired effects and the development of related MOEs by analyzing adversary COAs, COGs , key nodes and links, and other

significant aspects of the operational environment. Intelligence and analytic expertise is essential in selecting the proper MOEs, indicators, and associated criteria levels relative to the desired effects. Additionally, if the required expertise is not resident within the command or joint force, requests for information and/or outreach to interagency and multinational partners or centers of excellence may be required. Intelligence support and expertise will also be critical to ensure that assessment indicators are a part of the command's collection plan.

c.   Responsibilities for conducting assessments are normally assigned to an AC (or similar assessment-focused staff element), operating under the direction of a specifically designated representative of either the command's J-3 or J-5 and often designated as the assessment supervisor. The AC may operate either full-time or convene periodically, depending upon the level of effort required for a given operation.

(1) The AC must be sufficient in size to coordinate efforts and manage information in developing staff assessments, but not so large that it takes on the entirety of the assessment function with the increased tendency to develop additional burdensome reporting requirements to independently build a stovepiped assessment.

(2) Proper placement of the AC is also important, and should take into account appropriate staff oversight and integration with the entire staff. Observations indicate the potential for the AC to take on the focus of the particular staff directorate with which it is associated. For example, if it resides in the J-2, it could have more of an intelligence collection or enemy focus, in J-3 an operational execution focus, and in J-5 a plans focus. Likewise, if it is directly subordinate to the COS, it may not have sufficient principal staff oversight. However, the most prevalent location observed for the AC (or similar) is within the joint force's J-5, with clear direction that assessment is a staff-wide function.

d.   Responsibilities of the AC typically include the initial collation and analysis of indicator data, the evaluation of the collected data in terms of effects status (including initiation of the deficiency analysis process where appropriate), and development of potential recommendations for the JPG/OPT. AC core membership normally includes an ISR planner and/or collection manager, intelligence planner, political-military planner, functional area planners, information operations planner, interagency staff representatives, and special technical operations planner(s). Additional members of the AC may include JIPOE analysts, representatives from subordinate and supporting headquarter staffs, and representatives from interorganizational partners, as needed.

e.   Assessment works best when supported and supporting plans and their assessments link and relate to each other. Coordination during planning between the planning staffs at various levels, to include interorganizational partners, to link and relate assessment plans will improve relevance and streamline analysis during plan execution.

CHAPTER V
STAFF ASSESSMENTS DURING EXECUTION

> *"If you know the enemy and know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete."*
>
> **Sun Tzu**

1. General

a.   As part of the overall assessment (see Figure V-1), the staff assessment attempts to measure the progress towards or away from the achievement of desired conditions. It should begin as soon as information concerning MOPs, MOEs, and associated indicators are received. Assessment may even begin prior to the execution of planned tasks, in order to validate indicator criteria thresholds and to develop baselines for trend analysis when joint tasks are initiated. For example, if an identified indicator is related to the average daily hours of electrical power available in key host nation urban areas, baseline data collection should begin during the pre-execution phase to provide better granularity and fidelity to post-execution assessments.

Figure V-1. Notional Overall Assessment Composition

b.   While variations exist, staff assessment is conducted in three distinct phases: effects assessment, task assessment, and, if needed, deficiency analysis (see Figure V-2). This chapter will explore each phase and their relationships.

Figure V-2. Staff Assessment

c.   In effects assessment, the focus is on the achievement of desired conditions through the continuous monitoring of specific and pre-determined MOEs. It is through the application of MOEs that the joint force determines whether it is actually "doing the right things" to achieve objectives.

d.   The primary distinction between effects assessment and task assessment is the deliberate application of hierarchical and objective metrics to form the basis for establishing the state or status of the assessment. MOEs and their indicators become the foundation of the effects assessment process, grounding the analysis in an objective and measurable framework that does not preclude a subjective interpretation of the data, but rather, provides a solid, consistent and pre-determined baseline from which the staff and commander can apply experience and informed judgment to their subjective interpretation of the results.

2.   Assessment Periodicity

Assessment should begin as soon as intelligence or other collection assets are available to report against designated indicators. The **periodicity** of staff assessments

should be determined by the commander's decision cycle. During high tempo operations, staff assessments may be required on a more frequent basis – weekly or even daily. In most instances, however, changes to operational level effects will not be realized immediately. Normally, during operations where broad strategic, theater-strategic, or operational effects are under consideration (and where significant near-term changes in system status are not anticipated), formal staff assessments may be conducted on a monthly or bi-monthly basis. In other cases, a quarterly or semiannual assessment cycle may be more appropriate. Regardless of the actual periodicity of the staff assessments, the AC or team should monitor indicators, MOEs and MOPs, and effects on a determined frequency and bring any significant positive or negative change to the attention of the Commander immediately. Ultimately, staff assessments should be conducted as frequently as is required to provide the JPG/OPT and the commander with actionable information that will drive planning and decisions.

> *"Because the assessment process needs to support the commander's decision cycle, the frequency of formal assessments needs to match the pace of campaign execution. In places where we are conducting sustained operations, formal effects assessments normally occur monthly, and drive future operations activities. In faster paced operations, this might occur more often. Theater-strategic headquarters normally focus on campaign assessment answering 'are we accomplishing the mission' (achieving our objectives), and occur quarterly or semi-annually. We see joint headquarters recognizing this differentiation, and focusing their efforts on the appropriate assessments, at the right frequency, while minimizing redundant assessment workloads on subordinate headquarters."*
>
> **GEN (Ret) Gary Luck, et al**
> **Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science Best Practices**
> **The Move toward Coherently Integrated Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations**

3. Effects Assessment

a. Effects assessment assesses those desired effects required to affect friendly and adversary behavior and capability to conduct and/or continue operations and/or actions. Effects assessment is broader than task assessment and at the operational level supports the determination of the achievement of objectives through the detailed assessment of the associated effects. Effects provide an important linkage or bridge between the overarching objectives and the tasks that are employed to create the effects to accomplish them. The goal of effects assessment is, therefore, to determine whether the application of the instruments of national power are making progress toward achievement of the desired conditions in the operational environment.

b. Upon receipt of indicator data, assessment personnel prepare for the staff-officer level AC (or similar) review and/or formal assessment board by reviewing the data and producing MOE summary reports and a draft assessment summary. The draft assessment summary (see Figure V-3) serves as the baseline for review by the plenary AC, which

meets at a periodicity specified by the J-3/J-5 and is led by the AC chief or other designated assessment lead.

Figure V-3. Example Assessment Summary

c.   Several commands conducting assessment in joint exercises have benefited by establishing a formal agenda for the AC meeting, opening with a current intelligence summary, then moving to a review of the status of the desired and undesired effects. The AC meeting and assessment board (if held separately) normally focus on achieving consensus on the status of each effect by reviewing each effect and its associated MOEs individually. Where consensus is reached that the criteria-based assessment provided by the assessment model accurately reflects the status of the effect under consideration, the meeting moves to the next effect. Where additional or mitigating intelligence indicates that the criteria-based assessment may be invalid, the effect and/or MOE are discussed until consensus is reached on the correct assessment status. Due to time constraints, a review of individual indicators is normally conducted in the plenary AC meeting or board by exception only. Individual indicators are normally reviewed when significant status changes have occurred, when there is information that merits deviating from the criteria-based assessment status, or when there are significant reporting gaps that might impact the reliability of MOE and operational assessments. During this phase, detailed notes must be kept, both for follow-on development of the commander's assessment summary, and, in the case of reporting shortfalls, for deficiency analysis. Commands have

benefited by assigning a confidence level for each assessed effect to reflect the fidelity and currency of the data used for the assessment.

4. Task Assessment

a.   Following assessment of the status of the desired and undesired effects, the AC or team verifies the status of tasks assigned to supporting/functional commanders and agencies to achieve the desired effects.   If task status was provided to assessment personnel prior to the formal AC meeting, discussion of individual tasks may be conducted by exception.

b.   Task assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment.   The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems.   Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks.   Assessment of results at the tactical level also helps commanders determine operational and strategic level progress, so JFCs must have a comprehensive, integrated assessment plan that links assessment activities and measures at all levels.

c.   Combat assessment is an example of task assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions.   Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process *(see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting).*

d.   Task assessment intersects effects assessment where there is a failure to achieve, or a failure to make progress achieving, a desired effect in accordance with the required timeline(s) designated by the plan.   It is at this juncture that task assessment becomes critical to the effects assessment.   Assessment personnel attempt to determine why sufficient or timely progress is not occurring.   In this scenario, the task assessment becomes a key element of the analysis and an effect-to-task comparison is conducted for the effects in question to determine if task accomplishment deficiencies are a potential factor in the non-achievement of the desired effect(s).

5. Deficiency Analysis

a.   Deficiency analysis is conducted when progress toward achieving objectives and attaining the end state is deemed insufficient.   Deficiency analysis consists of a structured, conditions-based process intended to validate that the staff assessment is accurate, refine the collection requirements (when required), and conduct task and node-action analysis in order to provide initial guidance to planners for follow-on branch/sequel development or task plan/OPORD refinement.   The deficiency analysis process involves both the AC or team and the assessment board, and is normally conducted for each effect individually upon completion of the effect-to-task comparison.

b. The first effort in deficiency analysis is the comparison of the assessed status of desired effects to the completion status of the associated joint tasks and/or actions. Normally using effect-to-task summary charts developed by assessment personnel in preparation for the formal assessment board, the AC notes discrepancies between the status of the completed tasks and the status of the associated effect. Figure V-4 illustrates an example effect-to-task display.

Figure V-4. Example Effects-to-Task Summary

(1) Where a discrepancy exists (i.e., a desired effect is assessed as RED even though all associated tasks and actions intended to attain the effect are GREEN), the AC must reach consensus as to whether the discrepancy is due to an expected time lag between task/action completion and a reflection of change in indicator status, or if the tasks/actions are not achieving the intended results.

(2) As consensus is reached, effect-to-task/action mismatches are noted for investigation during deficiency analysis and follow-on branch/sequel development and/or plan refinement.

c. **Step One – MOE Indicator Analysis**. When the AC detects a mismatch between task/action completion status and the anticipated attainment status for an effect, the AC begins the deficiency analysis process by reviewing the associated MOE indicator data. The review should ensure that the reported data is timely and of sufficient fidelity

to support a high level of confidence in the assessment of the effect (MOE indicator analysis steps are summarized in figure V-5). Where indicator data has not been received, collection managers work with the JIOC/JISE to re-task collection assets against the MOE indicator requirement. Where re-tasking is not feasible, the collection manager works with AC personnel to identify alternate MOE indicators. If the AC reaches consensus that the assessment of the effect is based on accurate and adequate MOE indicator data, the AC shifts its focus to task analysis.

MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS INDICATOR ANALYSIS MATRIX

Step	Description	Working Group	Output	Next Provider
One –A	Analyze indicators	AC	N/A	AC
Condition	Sufficient data	AC	Proceed to Step Two	AC
Condition	Insufficient data	AC	Proceed to Step One-B	AC
One-B	Insufficient data	AC	Proceed to Step One-B Sub-step	AC
Sub-step	Verify collection	AC	Tasking	ISR CM
Condition	Not-in-place / Initiate tasking	AC	Tasking	ISR CM
Condition	In-place / Check feasibility	AC	Tasking and next Sub-step	ISR CM
Sub-step	Re-task or reemphasis	AC	Tasking	ISR CM
Condition	Tasking-feasible	AC	Tasking	ISR CM
Condition	Tasking – not feasible	AC	Recommendation: new indicators	JPG

Legend
AC assessment cell
CM collection manager
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JPG joint planning group

Figure V-5. Measure of Effectiveness Indicator Analysis Matrix

d. **Step Two – Task Analysis**. With the effects status verified, the AC verifies the status of the tasks and underlying actions against key nodes associated with the effect under consideration. The AC, working with the supported commander for the task, verifies that tasks and actions have actually been completed and that sufficient time has elapsed for changes to be reflected in the indicators. The verified status for effects and tasks is passed from the AC to the assessment board (if established) and JPG, who must determine whether the OPLAN/OPORD should continue uninterrupted or whether additional/alternate actions against key nodes are required. Task analysis steps are summarized in figure V-6.

TASK ANALYSIS MATRIX

Step	Description	Working Group	Output	Next Provider
Two–A	Examine tasks	AC	N/A	AC
Condition	Tasks incomplete	AC	N/A	AC
Condition	Tasks completed	AC	Proceed to Step Two-B	JPG
Two-B	Alternative tasks	JPG	N/A	JPG
Condition	Alternative tasks – available	JPG	Tasking	JPG
Condition	Alternative tasks – not available	JPG	Proceed to Step Three	JPG

Legend
AC   assessment cell
JPG joint planning group
N/A not applicable

Figure V-6. Task Analysis Matrix

e.   **Step Three – Effect-Node Analysis**. In this step, often conducted concurrently with step two, the AC/JPG works closely with the intelligence planners to verify that key nodes associated with desired effects remain valid and to identify additional nodes for action (or possibly new effects) where required. The output of this process is a set of recommendations for branch/sequel planning and plan refinement.

6.   Assessment Summary Development

Following the formal AC or team meeting, assessment personnel finalize the assessment summary for review by the formal assessment board (if established) and commander. While the specific format of the assessment summary varies, at a minimum the effects summary display should include the effect title, current assessment status, previous assessment status, and confidence level (see Figure V-7). Commands have successfully employed locally-developed summary displays, posted to a command web-site with hyperlinks to more detailed effects-to-task display.

Figure V-7. Sample Assessment Summary

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CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

> *"U.S. military power today is unsurpassed on the land and sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace. The individual Services have evolved capabilities and competencies to maximize their effectiveness in their respective domains. Even more important, the ability to integrate these diverse capabilities into a joint whole that is greater than the sum of the Service parts is an unassailable American strategic advantage."*
>
> **Admiral M.G. Mullen**
> **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
> **Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, January 2009**

1.   General

a.   Conducting value-added assessment continues to pose challenges for commanders and staffs. These have been mitigated to some extent over time by improvements related to the areas of **d**octrine, **o**rganizations, **t**raining, **m**ateriel, **l**eadership, **p**ersonnel, and **f**acilities (DOTMLPF). However, there remains significant room for improvement in some of these areas.

b.   As the joint force leverages assessment either by design or necessity, the joint community must invest in DOTMLPF solutions that reduce the risk inherent in widely dispersed employment of forces and provide additional capabilities to these units as required to accomplish their mission. The following paragraphs describe operational implications in each of the DOTMLPF areas (except for facilities and materiel, which have no identified implications).

2.   Doctrine

a.   As this handbook describes, the assessment of joint operations applies to all commanders and staff at every level, including Service/functional components, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. Many of these organizations and agencies will conduct separate assessments, feeding the appropriate results to other organizations both horizontally and vertically. Therefore, Service capstone doctrine should address considerations related to how their organizations will conduct and support assessment requirements. Lower-level Service manuals can expand on capstone doctrine to provide the detailed considerations, tactics, techniques, and procedures relevant to conducting assessments.

b.   Joint doctrine should address considerations related to assessment conducted by supporting Service and functional components and interagency and multinational partners with joint capabilities beyond those organizations capabilities. Joint doctrine should continue to expand current guidance and discussion on how to integrate interagency and multinational assessment processes and procedures, particularly in stability and counterinsurgency type operations.

c.   The primary publication for discussion of assessment in joint publications will transition from JP 3-0, *Joint Operations,* to JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning,* during the 2011 revision cycle, with a significant increase in content for JP 5-0 over the current discussion.   Other joint doctrine publications with significant input and/or content concerning assessment include JPs 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment,* 3-07*, Stability Operations,* 3-08*, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations,* 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters,* and 3-60*, Joint Targeting.* Numerous other joint publications have assessment-related information included.

3.   Organization

Combatant command and their associated Service component headquarters are typically robust enough to conduct assessment. However, subordinate units such as JTFs and their Service/functional components may have a reduced capability to conduct assessments, depending on horizontal and vertical support requirements for assessment input and/or output products. The vertical and horizontal integration and synchronization of assessment efforts should help to minimize duplicative efforts between organizations.

4.   Training

a.   Training for support to assessment should be balanced between time spent on joint, individual, unit, and leader training during pre-deployment, deployment, and post deployment training periods. Joint considerations related to these operations should be included in joint training events and instruction by training elements such as Joint Coalition Warfighting deployable joint training teams and Joint Enabling Capabilities Command deployable teams.

b.   Training on assessment should be conducted for any Service or joint organizations that are planned to conduct this activity. Whether this training is joint or Service-provided will depend on who owns the specific capability. Both Service and joint training should encompass relevant aspects of operations with interorganizational partners, since their support to isolated units could be essential to mission accomplishment..

5.   Leadership and Education

a.   This is one of the most important capability development efforts for leaders and staff elements at every level. The focus of leader development efforts regarding assessment should remain consistent with the current trend of developing innovative and adaptive leaders who can respond effectively to a wide variety of circumstances.

b.   Pushing responsibility and authority to increasingly lower levels requires trust and confidence between leaders and subordinates. Particularly important is how leaders provide commander's guidance and commander's intent, and "visualize the operational

environment" as they relate to assessment. Developing assessment plans and determining MOPs and MOEs is both an art and science that the Services must address more directly and earlier in the development of commissioned and non-commissioned leaders. The Services are ultimately responsible for developing their senior and junior leaders, but the following ideas could be helpful from a joint perspective. Specifically:

(1) Pursue greater participation by interagency personnel in professional military education schools.

(2) Facilitate knowledge sharing and development of adaptability-related skills.

(3) Incorporate assessment requirements in decision-making exercises.

6. Personnel

The training, leadership, and education paragraphs have addressed important initiatives related to personnel. However, the most difficult challenge for the joint community and Services might be one of recruiting, screening, and selecting junior leaders who can develop effective assessment plans and guidance, and have the patience required to conduct assessment in current environments and in circumstances where the military may be in a supporting role to non-military agencies and organizations.

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APPENDIX A
REFRAMING

Annex   A   Failure to Reframe the Problem: The Beirut Intervention to the
            Marine Barracks Bombing, 1983
        B   Reframing: The South East Asia Lake, Ocean, River, Delta
            Strategy, 1968-69

 "Periodic validation of the basis of assessments – objectives, effects, and actions: We noted earlier that we can't predict outcomes in the complex environment we operate in today. Likewise, we don't always initially develop the precise objectives, effects, or actions necessary to achieve the desired outcomes. We've seen joint headquarters periodically revalidate their developed objectives, effects, measures of effectiveness (MOE), and measures of performance (MOP) based on this observation. This is different from the assessment process discussed to now. It is a review of our basis for operations, our assumptions, and our systems perspective. Like the assessment process discussed above, this review / validation is also conducted at different levels and different frequencies. Obviously, revalidation of the objectives occur at the level at which they were developed – normally the theater-strategic or above level. Review of the desired and undesired effects primarily occurs at the operational level, while review of MOE and MOP to determine if we are measuring the correct trends and actions and using the correct metrics occur at the operational and tactical level. These reviews / revalidations keep the units on course by taking into account both higher level direction, adversary actions, and other changes in the security environment."

GEN (Ret) Gary Luck
Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science
Best Practices The Move toward Coherently Integrated Joint, Interagency, and
Multinational Operations

1. Reframing

a.   Reframing is restarting the Design process after discarding the hypotheses or theories which defined either or both the environmental frame or the problem frame. The commander can reactively or proactively reframe. A decision to reframe occurs when changes in the operational environment render the operational approach no longer feasible, acceptable, or suitable in the context of higher policy, orders, guidance, or directives. The commander may base this decision on the Design Concept failing to meet objectives or effects, MOE and indicators no longer providing valid information during the ongoing assessment, having achieved unanticipated success, or when a condition in the operational environment can no longer be explained. The commander may reframe proactively when environmental changes indicate a direction that may need a modified operational approach. This decision is linked to an assessment strategy created earlier in design to monitor future operational environments that would require a unique operational approach. During reframing the commander and his design team must challenge their shared understanding of the current operational environment, the problem, and the operational approach. By consciously and critically selecting the framework of theories and assumptions that help to structure the construct of reality, reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limitations of any single perspective. The ability to learn relies on one's ability to recognize changes as they occur.

b.   Reframing may be equally important in the wake of success. By its very nature, success transforms the environment and affects its tendencies, potentials, and tensions. Organizations are strongly motivated to reflect and reframe following failure, but they

tend to neglect reflection and reframing following successful actions. To guard against complacency, the commander and design team practice design during planning and execution. They must question their current understanding and reframe as the environment changes and they gain new knowledge.

c. Once the commander decides to reframe some or all of the operational environment, the problem set, or the operational approach, the commander issues updated planning guidance to the staff. The staff then conducts planning. This planning may be abbreviated or extensive. The outcome of planning may cause the commander to modify or abandon the current operational approach by issuing a FRAGORD or new OPORD. The commander may also decide to hold the results of planning in abeyance to allow more time for the environment to react to the current plan and operational approach. Additional assistance with reframing may be found in the Deputy Director J-7 Joint and Coalition Warfighting *Commander's Handbook for Operational Design.*

2. Determining Reframing Requirements

a. This assessment helps the commander measure the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities to ensure that the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, or orders. If the current approach is failing to meet these criteria, as may be indicated by assessment of the MOE and associated indicators (remember MOE and indicators represent the desired operational environment) through the steps of assessment to include deficiency analysis or if aspects of the operational environment or problem change significantly, the commander may decide to begin a *reframing* effort that could cause small adjustments to current operations or a significant reorientation with new objectives and organizational realignments. Generally, the decision to reframe can be triggered by factors such as the following:

(1) An assessment challenges the commander's and staff's understanding of the operational environment, existing problem, or relevance of the operational approach;

(2) A scheduled periodic review shows a problem;

(3) Failure to make required progress;

(4) Key assumptions or hypotheses prove invalid;

(5) Unanticipated success; and

(6) A major event causes "catastrophic change" in the environment.

b. Because the environment is always changing and evolving, the commander's understanding must also evolve. However, commanders and staffs must guard against becoming so fixated on the need for remaining open to reframing that it becomes an excuse for indecisiveness. Steadfastness, not obstinacy, remains a virtue. Collaboration

during reframing provides the freedom to operate beyond the limits of any single perspective. In a complex system, conditions will change because forces and actors will continuously act on the system. Recognizing and anticipating these changes is fundamental to design and essential to an organization's ability to learn and adapt.

ANNEX A TO APPENDIX A
FAILURE TO REFRAME THE PROBLEM:
The Beirut Intervention to the Marine Barracks Bombing, 1983

The Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon commenced on 6 June 1982 and was designed to remove the threat of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) operating in the area, pushing them 40 kilometers north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. The U.S., French, and Italians responded by sending in the Multi-National Force (MNF) of peacekeepers into Beirut in August and September, evacuating over 14,000 PLO combatants out of the country to Tunisia, Yemen, Jordan, and Syria. On 8 September, the newly-elected, Israeli-supported Christian Phalangist President of Lebanon was assassinated by a member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. The next day the Israelis moved into West Beirut. Despite assurances by the Americans to the PLO leadership that refugees there would be safeguarded, Israeli-backed Lebanese Christian Phalangists massacred over 800 civilians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps on 16 September. Not only was this a human tragedy, it was a profound embarrassment for the United States.

The MNF divided Beirut into three zones—the French had the northern part of the city, the Italians got the middle, and the U.S. the southern zone, which included the large Beirut International Airport (BIA) undergoing construction improvements. 32 Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) received its orders to "establish a presence" in the US. MNF Zone, intermingled with civilians operating and upgrading the BIA. The idea was for the Marines to allow as much "normalcy" as possible in their peacekeeping role. The biggest problem facing the Marines was what the Israelis were doing in their assigned zone. While the operating guidance was to ignore them lest it appear that the U.S. was taking their side, from a practical standpoint this was difficult to execute. In October 1982, 32 MAU was relieved in place by 24 MAU.

The mission directive for 24 MAU stated: "establish [an] environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces [LAF] to carry out its responsibilities in the Beirut area, and [to] be prepared to protect U.S. forces and conduct retrograde and withdrawal operations from the area." The international MNF commanders agreed on patrolling into Christian East Beirut to create the impression among the Muslims that the force was indeed impartial and not allied to the Israeli and Christian Phalangist side. The MAU commander decided to do more "to permit the LAF to carry out its responsibilities" by putting his idle Marines to work training them.[1]

24 MAU was relieved in place by 22 MAU. On 18 April, 1983, an explosive-laden pickup truck detonated within the American Embassy compound in Beirut, killing over 60 people. The Iranian-backed Hezbollah claimed credit for the attack. The MAU commander was shot at in his helicopter on 5 May. The next day, Druse artillery shot at the USS FAIRFAX COUNTY at sea performing logistical support, and two rounds hit the Marine beach. Nobody was hurt.[2]

On 17 May, President Ronald Reagan announced on television that, "The MNF went…to help the new government of Lebanon maintain order until it can organize its military and its police to assume control of its borders and its own internal security." To many, this meant the MNF—and particularly the American component—was no longer impartial peacekeepers. They were on the side of the Christian Phalangist government. In this atmosphere, 24 MAU would relieve 22 MAU later that month. While there were disturbing signs of growing anti-Americanism in Muslim neighborhoods, it wasn't until the Israelis pulled out of much of Beirut—particularly the Shouf Massif hills--on 28 August that the situation began to dramatically change. Local Muslim militia warlords, long suppressed by the Israeli Defense Force, had free rein to take on the hated LAF.[3]

It was then that the Marines and LAF within the BIA and outlying checkpoints began to take sporadic fire over the next two days—small arms at first, but then mortar fire. The 22 MAU commander, Colonel Tim Geraghty, authorized illumination fired by Marine artillery over suspected Muslim Druze militia firing positions on the Shouf, but when indirect fire continued against BIA, he ordered high explosive rounds against them. On 4 September, Druze rockets, artillery, and mortar shells began raining into BIA and a company of Marines collocated with an LAF armored force were taken under heavy fire. No supporting arms were made available and the parent Marine battalion was restricted in providing any by the ROE and the need not to "take sides."[4]

The MAU Commander was put into a dilemma. His guidance to maintain a neutral posture, treating all parties equally, didn't square with the Presidential television statement to support the Lebanese government and help the LAF. The restrictions on the force employed for self-defense only meant that the factions manipulated the US MNF contingent to make it appear weak, indecisive, and irrelevant.

On 9 September, an Lebanese general requested U.S. support through State Department channels for an LAF unit fighting in the Shouf town of Suq-al-Gharb. Colonel Geraghty initially refused to assist as he thought it would compromise whatever shred of neutrality the MNF was trying to maintain. The mission also did not conform to guidance given to him through Defense Department channels. He was also acutely aware of the 600 medium and heavy artillery tubes the Druze had amassed on the Shouf that could hit his Marines at BIA. In his 10 September situation report to U.S. SIXTH FLEET, Geraghty surmised:

> "The worsening military and political situation in Lebanon this week has pulled the MAU deeper and deeper in to more frequent and direct military action. Our increasing number of casualties has removed any semblance of neutrality and has put us into direct retaliation against those who have fired on us….I am concerned…that the end does not appear to be in sight and I perceive that the involvement in the Lebanese internal struggle has exceeded our original mandate."[5]

The MAU Commander resisted a great deal of pressure from President Reagan's Special Ambassador and other senior leaders. Despite this, on 19 September the militias

received Syrian-supplied tank support to take Suq-al-Gharb; Geraghty's LAF counterpart pleaded to him directly for help. Geraghty judged the request as fitting Defense Department guidance regarding such support. He authorized naval gunfire, breaking up the attack on the LAF at Suq-al-Gharb. Muslim militias shortly redoubled indirect fire and other attacks on U.S., Italian, and French MNF targets. The French retaliated by striking artillery behind Syrian lines on 24 September.[6]

Negotiators publicized a cease-fire between the Lebanese Government and Syria on 26 September, a day after the USS NEW JERSEY came on station in the waters off Beirut. That same day, the Iranians ordered its representative in the Syrian capital to "take spectacular action against the American Marines," a communication intercepted by the U.S. National Security Agency but not told to the MAU for another month.[7] BIA was repaired and open for business again on the 30th. But during the latter week of 10 October, families were seen leaving their homes around BIA. Accuracy of sniper fire coming from these areas increased and new fighters appeared, assumed to be the Islamic Amal--Iranians trained in Syria. On 15 and 16 October, the Amal militia warriors opened fire in strength against the MAU and LAF at BIA, but requested a cease-fire after the Marines effectively responded.

On 18 October, the Defense Department announced that the Rules of Engagement would be reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the White House simultaneously released a story that President Reagan was looking into loosening restrictions on Marine snipers. Over the next few days, the National Security Council reviewed a SecDef proposal to withdraw the U.S. MNF contingent from Beirut immediately. But the suggestion was dropped and never forwarded to the President for a decision. Colonel Geraghty, aware of hopes in many quarters regarding the national reconciliation talks at the end of October in Geneva, worried about militia "baiting" tactics. His 20 October SITREP to COMSIXTHFLT read:

> "The recent series of direct attacks against USMNF Personnel, as well as the French and Italians, signal yet another change of tactics by the extremists in this very unpredictable milieu….the tactics the extremists have resorted to…are very difficult to counter, and unless we remain ever mindful of our role, could easily provoke an inappropriate response which could seriously jeopardize our position and the cease fire as well….An inappropriate response to any provocative act will destroy our credibility and place us in even greater danger. I shall continue to respond as we have in the past….we will continue to maintain our vigilance."[8]

At 0622 on Sunday morning, 23 October, 1983, the Battalion Landing Team headquarters building within the BIA complex was destroyed by a suicide bomber driving a construction truck common to the local area with 6 tons of explosives. 241 were killed in what was later termed the largest non-nuclear explosion witnessed on earth.[9] As with the American Embassy bombing, Hezbollah was responsible. Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia observed, "A nation cannot wear two hats, one being that of a peacekeeping force and the other being that of taking sides with one of the warring factions."[10]

On 18 November, 22 MAU relieved 24 MAU, a week after Syrian SAM-5s shot at Navy reconnaissance aircraft flying over the Shouf. Hostilities continued between the MNF and the Muslim militias and Syrians, continuing what had been an undeclared war. President Reagan announced on 8 February, 1984 that the Marines would leave Beirut but remain aboard ships offshore. On 17 February, 1984, the Lebanese President revoked the peace accord with Israel signed in May; ten days later the last MAU Marines at BIA back-loaded aboard ship. The last MAU Marines at the new U.S. Embassy compound departed in August; a suicide truck bomb attack against the diplomatic facility on 20 September, 1984 killed eight.[11]

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[1] Eric Hammel, *The Root: The Marines in Beirut, August 1983-February 1984* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1985) 52-59.

[2] Ibid, 76-81.

[3] Ibid, 82-117.

[4] Ibid, 146-195.

[5] Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, USMC (Ret.), *Peacekeepers At War: Beirut 1983—The Marine Commander Tells His Story* (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2009), 68.

[6] Hammel, 211-224.

[7] Geraghty, 77.

[8] Ibid, 88.

[9] Hammel, 303.

[10] Michael Petit, *Peacekeepers At War: A Marine's Account of the Beirut Catastrophe* (Boston: Faber and Faber, Publishers, 1986), 201.

[11] Hammel, 421-426.

ANNEX B TO APPENDIX A
REFRAMING:
The South East Asia Lake, Ocean, River, Delta Strategy, 1968-69

When the U.S. committed to the Vietnam War in force, the U.S. Navy was soon employed in a coastal interdiction campaign (Task Force 115, OPERATION MARKET TIME) to prevent the movement of communist supplies into and around the Republic of Vietnam (RVN—South Vietnam). Before long, the Navy cast its eyes into the Mekong Delta where the Viet Cong had established a stronghold of support. According to some, 75% of the population there was under the influence of the communists. A more tangible indicator of Viet Cong success, the diversion of the rice harvest, showed that in 1965 through 1966, the output of rice from the Delta had fallen by about 25%. 30,000 regular troops and 50,000 guerrillas were estimated to be operating in the Delta, and the three-division RVN army force along with the Regional Forces and Popular Forces were unable to stop them.[1]

On 18 December, 1965, the Navy created Task Force 116 to conduct OPERATION GAME WARDEN to patrol the inland Delta waterways and deny the communists waterborne supply routes. River Patrol Boats (PBRs) had to be procured and crews trained; it wasn't until 8 May, 1966, that the first patrols were mounted.[2] At first the enemy eluded the few boats that were used. But as the Task Force grew and patrols became more frequent, the Viet Cong employed close-range ambushes instead. PBR crews learned quickly that the best way to beat these tactics were to pre-empt them by mounting their own ambushes first. A "Huey" helicopter squadron was formed in April 1967 but then had too few aircraft to respond to all requests for assistance across the breadth of the Delta by 1968.

Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) naval Special Forces were assigned to reinforce GAME WARDEN in improving intelligence on communist activities beginning in February 1966. But this was not going to be enough, so the U.S.--despite the reluctance of the Saigon government--created the Mobile Riverine Force (MRF—Task Force 117), bringing in a brigade of the U.S. 9th Infantry Division in 1967. This unit would operate from the water in armored landing craft and have specialized fire support afloat, to include assigned artillery battalions.[3] And while RVN forces were involved in MRF operations, the U.S. was clearly in the lead conducting riverine "search and destroy" operations.

When it came, the 1968 Tet offensive was defeated in the Delta as it was all over South Vietnam. Despite favorable metrics on communist infiltration and supply detections and successful boardings, the Viet Cong were still in control of major portions of the Delta and still could mount waterborne transfers of troops and equipment. To Navy CAPT Robert S. Salzer, commander of the Riverine Assault Force, methods employed so far just weren't working and could never work. A new understanding of the problem and a new approach was necessary. He summed it up this way:

"In an oriental country against an irregular force, what our tactic had to be was to force the enemy to come to us, because he had the knowledge of the terrain, the knowledge of the people. He had many advantages and we were relatively clumsy at ferreting him out. How then, I kept postulating, do you make the enemy come to you? The answer is you must, when he is an enemy depending on an external source of supplies, choke off the supplies. And you must have many small units … engage in that activity; also, you must keep rapid reaction forces poised and ready for the enemy main force comes in and tries to tangle with the little guys.

Where were his supplies coming from? At one time it was claimed they were coming from the sea, but that turned out wrong. Others were claiming, and intelligence people said they had hard evidence, that they were coming into Cambodia and down the trail and then down through the Ca Mau Peninsula around certain canal networks, and our intelligence people said they had them pretty well identified. What I wanted to do was set up multiple, integrated interdiction barriers with small river units, with troops associated with them, setting up ambush patrols along these areas. The Viet Cong were pretty well canalized for a variety of reasons as to their routes and I figured we might have a 20 percent probability at any one barrier. Therefore, we had to set a pack of barriers. We needed multiple layers of interdiction patrol, such as in "blue water" ASW [Anti-Submarine Warfare]."[4]

The new three-star naval commander in Vietnam, VADM Elmo Zumwalt, was—at 47—the youngest commander of his rank in the Navy. And he was eager for innovative ideas and listened to Salzer. Within weeks of his arrival in-country, Zumwalt pitched Salzer's ideas up the chain of command in the autumn of 1968. The new strategy was far different than what had been done before. SEALORDS had three goals: (1) choke off communist infiltration and supply routes into the Delta; (2) exercise continuous control over the cross-Delta waterways and canals; and (3) get into the communist stronghold of the Ca Mau peninsula. The means would be a joint and coalition effort. The ways would be using water and air mobility to establish control over the land area of the Mekong Delta. Unlike anywhere else in Vietnam, a front line would be behind it, prosperity was growing.[5] As Salzer had predicted, the communists—faced with losing supplies and infiltration routes--indeed "came to us." More communist personnel, documents, and equipment were captured. The number of enemy-initiated firefights significantly increased. Casualties among the SEALORDS forces also rose dramatically, but so did the enemy's; estimates averaged about 30 communists lost for every friendly, occasionally reaching over a 100:1 ratio.[6] Salzer explained the reason for the success of SEALORDS this way:

"…the VC were set on avoiding contact; and that was a fairly easy task against "search and destroy" tactics with multi-battalion units complete with artillery support plowing through the paddy. It appeared to us that the best chance of bringing the enemy into the open was to imperil his primary objective of resupply and reinforcement by multiple interdiction barriers athwart his lines of

communications to the Delta. No single interdiction barrier had much chance of imposing significant attrition in view of the availability of alternate rivers and streams. But a series of such barriers maintained by combined river, ground, and air forces might have brought the VC to the point where they had to use sizable units to break through. Then with ready-reaction (air-mobile battalions) the enemy could be engaged on our terms—a "bait and destroy" tactic."[7]

Salzer was promoted to flag rank and eventually served as the senior naval commander in Vietnam in 1971, retiring as a VADM from his last tour as Commander, Amphibious Forces Pacific. Zumwalt would be selected from his Vietnam tour to be the Chief of Naval Operations, even though he had never held a numbered fleet command, until then considered to be a prerequisite to hold the office.

[1] John Forbes and Robert Williams, *Riverine Force: The Illustrated History of The Vietnam War, Volume 8* (New York: Bantam Books), 51.

[2] Ibid, 66.

[3] Ibid, 83.

[4] CDR R. L. Schreadly, USN (Ret.), *From the Rivers to the Sea* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 149.

[5] Forbes and Williams, 153-154.

[6] Thomas J. Cutler, *Brown Water, Black Berets* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 334.

[7] Ibid, 336

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APPENDIX B
JOINT TASK FORCE ASSESSMENT CELL
COMPOSITION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General

The procedures provided in this appendix provide a starting point designed to refresh previous instruction or experience, or to serve as a planning template when compelled by mission requirements. Although this appendix refers to the assessment cell, the discussion can be applied to assessment teams, assessment working groups, or other similar organizations as appropriate.

2. Purpose

This information is provided to facilitate participation in joint task force (JTF) operations. It may be adapted to non-JTF missions where assessment plays a role.

3. Assessment Cell During Planning

a. **Inputs**:

(1) During JTF planning - approved commander's objectives from the joint planning group (JPG).

(2) During JTF execution - assessment analysis and conclusions.

b. **Purpose**:

(1) During planning: develop desired/undesired effects, measures of effectiveness (MOEs); MOE indicators, and indicator criteria.

(2) During JTF execution: provide general planning recommendations to JPG based on assessment feedback.

c. **Lead**: assessment planner or designated planner

d. **Location/Time**: Per Battle Rhythm

(1) During JTF planning, the assessment team will synchronize with JPG battle rhythm.

(2) During execution, assessment team will synchronize with assessment cell and JPG battle rhythms.

e. **Time of Delivery**: As prescribed in Battle Rhythm

f. **Membership**:

    (1) Designated JTF planner or assessor (assessment team lead)

    (2) JTF J-2/intelligence planner

    (3) JTF collection manager

    (4 JTF J-5/J-3 planner

    (5) JTF civil affairs planner

    (6) JTF information operations planner

    (7) JTF political/military affairs planner

    (8) JTF medical affairs planner

    (9) JTF cultural advisor

    (10) JTF logistics planner

    (11) JTF SJA representative

    (12) CCDR J-code representatives

    (13) Component planners

    (14) Interagency partner representatives

    (15) Multinational partner representatives

    (16) JIPOE analysts (if appropriate)

g. **AC Responsibilities**:

    (1) Manage assessment team battle rhythm.

    (2) Develop desired effects in support of JFC's objectives.

    (3) Identify potential undesired effects.

    (4) Develop MOEs for desired effects.

    (5) Develop MOEs for undesired effects.

(6)   Develop MOE indicators for desired and undesired effects.

(7)   Determine indicator criteria and assessment thresholds.

(8)   Identify information shortfalls for indicator criteria and associated assessment thresholds to JTF request for information manager or J-2 (as appropriate).

(9)   Provide indicator-based collection requirements to JTF collection manager or J-2 (as appropriate).

(10) Designate/identify MOE indicator reporting responsibilities.

(11) During JTF planning, designate assessment-related tool or database and input relevant effect, MOEs, MOE indicators, and criteria information.

(12) Draft assessment appendix/annex to JTF plans and orders (as appropriate).

(13) During JTF execution phase, provide general planning recommendations to JPG based on assessment feedback and/or conclusions (i.e., complete deficiency analysis).

(14) During JTF execution phase, modify, update or revise effects, MOEs, MOE indicators, and/or indicator criteria as appropriate or required based on current operations.

3.   Assessment Working Group During Execution

   a.   **Input**:

(1) Pre-execution - approved effects, MOEs, MOE indicators, criteria from assessment team.

(2) During JTF execution - reporting data for designated indicator criteria.

   b.   **Purpose**: Conduct assessment and analysis regarding the creation of JTF effects and achievement of objectives/end states.   Provide initial assessment-based recommendations for future planning.

   c.   **Lead**: Designated assessment lead (J-3, J-35, J-2)

   d.   **Location/Time**: Weekly or per battle rhythm. During execution, AC will synchronize with Assessment Board .

   e.   **Time of Delivery**: As prescribed in battle rhythm

   f.   **Membership**:

(1) Designated JTF assessment lead

(2) JTF J-2 representative

(3) Joint intelligence support element (JISE) representative (if appropriate)

(4) JTF collection manager

(5) JTF J-3/J-35 representative

(6) JTF civil affairs officer

(7) JTF information operations officer

(8) JTF political/military affairs officer

(9) JTF medical affairs officer

(10) JTF SJA representative

(11) JTF cultural advisor

(12) JTF logistics representative

(13) Interagency partner representatives

(14) Multinational partner representatives

(15) CCDR J-code representatives

(16) Component representatives

(17) JIPOE analysts (if appropriate)

g. **Responsibilities of Assessment Working Group**:

(1) Manage assessment team/team battle rhythm.

(2) Manage Assessment-related tool or database data entry requirements.

(3) Conduct metric-based assessment of JTF effects.

(4) Conduct detailed analysis of assessment data (i.e., initiate deficiency analysis).

(5) Identify areas for collection emphasis based on indicator data shortfalls.

(6) Conduct comparison between effect status and component-provided task status/assessment.

(7) Determine key assessment-derived conclusions and provide general planning recommendations to assessment team based on assessment conclusions.

(8) Provide recommendations for MOE, MOE indicators, and criteria revision to assessment team.

(9) Support assessment board, as required.

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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT DEVELOPMENT DURING THE
JOINT OPERATION PLANNING PROCESS

CCDR Objectives (end states)

Consider HHQ assessment efforts.
List:
- CCMD effects
- CCMD MOEs / MOPs
- CCMD indicators

The number of effects established should be manageable and consistent with CCMD effects

Initiate

Commander / Staff Estimates

JTF Mission Analysis

- **Identify and develop** JTF effects in addition to supporting CCMD effort
- **Initiate** MOE / MOP development

COA Development

- **Refine** effects, MOE, and indicators
- **Synchronize** with LOO, CCIR, and DP

Vet MOPs through subordinates

COA Analysis / Comparison / Approval

Analysis: Analyze each COA from as assessment perspective.
MOPs: Finalize MOPs for assigned tasks.
Refinement: Continue to refine effects, MOE, and indicators.
Indicators: Develop MOE indicators to assist in measuring progress.
Record wargaming from specific area perspective
Mission success probability. Estimate the likelihood of accomplishing objectives/ specified tasks given the available and capabilities

Plan / Order Development

CONOPS development. Integrate assessment methodology into CONOPS
Synch with other products. Synchronize assessment plan with DP, DSM, and CCIRs.
Integrate support tools. To track status of tasking to subordinate forces
Draft inputs to HHQ assessment use (should be nested)
Coordinate. Provide components required inputs both to/from the JTF
Synchronize MOPs with subordinate tasks to ensure alignment of assessment plans
Crosswalk the plan or order. Ensure that base order includes conditions/effects (per phase) in Operations paragraph

Legend
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander critical information requirement
CCMD combatant command
COA course of action
DP decision point
DSM decision support matrix
HHQ higher headquarters
JTF joint task force
LOO line of operation
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance

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APPENDIX D
INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW

Editor's Note: The primary source of information in this appendix is JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*. Minor changes were made to conform to joint doctrine and formatting requirements.

1. Overview

a.   Addressing the causes and consequences of weak and failed states has become an urgent priority for the USG. Conflict both contributes to and results from state fragility. To effectively prevent or resolve violent conflict, the USG needs tools and approaches that enable coordination of US diplomatic, development, and military efforts in support of local institutions and organizations/individuals seeking to resolve their disputes peacefully.

b.   A first step toward a more effective and coordinated response to help states prevent, mitigate, and recover from violent conflict is the development of shared understanding among USG agencies about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. Achieving this shared understanding of the dynamics of a particular crisis requires both a joint interagency process for conducting the assessment and a common conceptual framework to guide the collection and analysis of information. The ICAF is a tool that enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively.   It supports USG interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization.

2. Purpose

a.   Using the ICAF can facilitate a shared understanding across relevant USG departments and agencies of the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict within a country that informs US policy and planning decisions. (Note: agencies will be used in this appendix in place of departments and agencies.) It may also include steps to establish a strategic baseline against which USG engagement can be evaluated. It is available for use by any USG agency to supplement interagency planning.

b.   The ICAF draws on existing methodologies for assessing conflict currently in use by various USG agencies as well as IGOs and NGOs. It is not intended to duplicate existing independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the IC. Rather, it builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework through which USG agencies can leverage and share the knowledge from their own assessments to establish a common interagency perspective.

c.   The ICAF is distinct from early warning and other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and describe conditions that lead to outbreaks of instability or violent conflict.   The ICAF builds upon their results by assisting an interagency team to understand why such conditions may exist and how to best engage to

transform them. The ICAF draws on social science expertise to lay out a process by which an interagency team will identify societal and situational dynamics known to increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict. In addition, the ICAF provides a shared, strategic snapshot of the conflict against which future progress can be measured.

3.   When to Use the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a.   An ICAF should be part of the first step in any interagency planning process. It can help to inform the establishment of USG goals, design or reshape activities, implement or revise programs, or reallocate resources. The interagency planning process within which an ICAF is performed determines who initiates and participates in an ICAF, the time and place for conducting an ICAF, the type of product needed and how the product will be used, and the level of classification required.

b.   Whenever the ICAF is used, all of its analytical steps should be completed. However, the nature and scope of the information collected and assessed may be constrained by time, security classification, or access to the field.

c.   The ICAF is a flexible, scalable interagency tool suitable for use in:

(1)   Engagement and conflict prevention planning.

(2)   USG R&S contingency planning.

(3)   USG R&S crisis response planning.

d.   **Engagement/conflict prevention planning** may include, but is not limited to: embassy preparation for National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) Section 1207 funding; request by an embassy or combatant command for interagency assistance in understanding and planning to leverage US interests in fragile or at-risk countries; development of the CCDRs' TCP; development of country assistance strategies or mission strategic plans; designing interagency prevention efforts for countries listed on State Failure Watchlists and Early Warning Systems. In an engagement or conflict prevention effort, there normally will be sufficient time and a sufficiently permissive environment to allow a full-scale assessment such as a several day Washington, DC-based tabletop and several weeks of an in-country verification assessment.

e.   **Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingency Planning**. The ICAF provides relevant background concerning existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The ICAF should be a robust element of contingency planning by providing critical information for the situation analysis. A several-day-long Washington, DC-based tabletop and/or an in-country verification assessment might prove useful when conducting an ICAF as part of this planning process. Additional information on R&S contingency planning can be found in the following S/CRS documents: *Triggering Mechanisms for 'Whole-of-Government' Planning for Reconstruction,*

Stabilization and Conflict Transformation and *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.*

 f. **Reconstruction and Stabilization Crisis Response Planning**. The ICAF provides critical information for the initial step of whole-of-government planning, the situation analysis. The ICAF may be updated as more information and better access become available to inform the policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation planning steps of the ICAF. When used for crisis response, the ICAF might be a Washington, DC-based tabletop assessment that could be accomplished in as little as one and one-half days or, with longer lead-times to the crisis, could take place over several weeks with conversations back and forth between Washington and any USG field presence. For additional information on R&S crisis response planning, see *Triggering Mechanisms for 'Whole-of-Government' Planning for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation* and *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.*

4. Roles and Responsibilities

 a. The process within which an ICAF is used determines which agencies and individuals should serve on the team and in what capacities they should serve. For example, an established country team may use the ICAF to inform country assistance strategy development, or USAID and S/CRS may co-lead an interagency team to assist in developing a NDAA Section 1207 request. In whole-of-government crisis response under the IMS for R&S, an ICAF normally will be part of the strategic planning process led by the CRSG Secretariat. The ICAF might also be used with a key bilateral partner as part of collaborative planning. The agency/individual responsible for managing the overall planning process is responsible for proposing the ICAF and requesting necessary agency participation.

 b. Participants in an ICAF assessment should include the broadest possible representation of USG agencies with expertise and/or interest in a given situation. An ideal interagency field team would represent diverse skill sets and bring together the collective knowledge of USG agencies. Participants would at a minimum include relevant: regional bureaus, sectoral experts, intelligence analysts, and social science or conflict specialists. When used as part of the planning processes outlined in *Principles of the USG Planning Framework,* the team will normally include members of the strategic planning team. This team could be expanded as needed to include local stakeholders and international partner representatives.

 c. Members of the interagency team are responsible for providing all relevant information held by their respective agencies to the team for inclusion in the analysis, including past assessments and related analyses. These representatives should also be able to reach back to their agencies to seek further information to fill critical information gaps identified by the ICAF.

5. The Elements of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

a. The ICAF can be used by the full range of USG agencies at any planning level. Conducting an ICAF might be an iterative process with initial results built upon as the USG engagement expands. For example, an ICAF done in Washington at the start of a crisis might be enhanced later by a more in-depth examination in-country. The level of detail into which the ICAF goes will depend upon the conflict and type of USG engagement.

b. The two major components of the ICAF are the conflict diagnosis and the segue into planning.

6. Conflict Diagnosis

a. Using the conceptual framework for diagnosing a conflict (see Figure D-1), the interagency team will deliver a product that describes the **context; core grievances and social/institutional resilience; drivers/mitigators of conflict; and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict**.


Figure D-1. Conceptual Framework for Diagnosing a Conflict

(1) **Context**. The team should evaluate and outline key contextual issues of the conflict environment. Context does not cause conflict but describes often long-standing conditions resistant to change. Context may create preconditions for conflict by reinforcing fault lines between communities or contribute to pressures making violence appear as a more attractive means for advancing one's interests. Context can shape perceptions of identity groups and be used to manipulate and mobilize constituencies. Context may include environmental conditions, poverty, recent history of conflict, youth bulge, or conflict-ridden region.

(2) **Core Grievances and Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience**. The team should understand, agree upon, and communicate the concepts of core grievance and sources of social/institutional resilience and describe them within the specific situation being assessed.

(a) **Core Grievance**. The perception, by various groups in a society, that their needs for physical security, livelihood, interests, or values are threatened by one or more other groups and/or social institutions.

(b) **Sources of Social/Institutional Resilience**. The perception, by various groups in a society, that social relationships, structures, or processes are in place and able to provide dispute resolution and meet basic needs through nonviolent means.

(3) **Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors**. The team should understand and outline drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and enumerate those identified within the specific situation being assessed.

(a) Drivers of conflict refers to the dynamic situation resulting from the mobilization of social groups around core grievances. Core grievances can be understood as the potential energy of conflict. Key individuals translate that potential energy into active drivers of conflict.

(b) Mitigating factors describe the dynamic situation resulting from the mobilization of social groups around sources of social/institutional resilience. Mitigating factors can be understood as the actions produced when key individuals mobilize the potential energy of social and institutional resilience.

(4) **Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity.** The team should specify opportunities for increasing and decreasing conflict as defined here and describe those expected in the near-term, and where possible, in the longer-term.

(a) Windows of vulnerability are moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally change the balance of political or economic power. Elections, devolution of power, and legislative changes are examples of possible windows of vulnerability. Key individuals/organizations may seize on these moments to magnify the drivers of conflict.

(b) Windows of opportunity are moments when over-arching identities become more important than sub-group identities, for example, when a natural disaster impacts multiple groups and requires a unified response. These occasions may present openings for USG efforts to provide additional support for a conflict's mitigating factors.

b. **Conflict Diagnosis Steps**. To determine the preceding elements of the conflict dynamic, the designated interagency conflict assessment team (ICAT) should follow a series of analytical steps.

(1) **Step 1: Establish Context**. All ICAF steps begin with acknowledging the context within which the conflict arises. This is depicted (see Figure D-1) by placing each analytical task within a larger circle labeled "Context." The arrows going in and out of the concentric circles, the rectangle, and the triangle remind the analyst that context affects and is affected by each of the other components.

(2) **Step 2: Understand Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience**. Interacting with Context in Step 1 are the concentric circles labeled "Identity Groups," "Societal Patterns" and "Institutional Performance" (see Figure D-1). In Step 2, the ICAT:

(a) Describes identity groups that believe others threaten their identity, security, or livelihood. Identity groups are groups of people that identify with each other, often on the basis of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them (e.g., ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity, or socioeconomic status). Identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups' interests, needs, and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity, security, or other fundamental interests.

(b) Articulates how societal patterns reinforce perceived deprivation, blame, and intergroup cleavages and/or how they promote comity and peaceful resolution of intergroup disputes. Societal patterns associated with conflict reinforce group cleavages, for example: elitism, exclusion, corruption/rent-seeking, chronic state capacity deficits (e.g., systematic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, ungoverned space), and unmet expectations (e.g., lack of a peace dividend, land tenure issues, disillusionment, and alienation). Impacts of societal patterns often include negative economic consequences for disadvantaged groups.

(c) Explains how poor or good institutional performance aggravates or contributes to the resolution of conflict. Institutional performance considers formal (e.g., governments, legal systems, religious organizations, public schools, security forces, banks and economic institutions) and informal (e.g., traditional mechanisms for resolving disputes, family, clan/tribe, armed groups, and patrimonialism) social structures to see whether they are performing poorly or well and whether they contribute to conflict and instability or manage or mitigate it. In assessing institutional performance, it is important to distinguish between outcomes and perceptions. Institutional outcomes are results that

can be measured objectively; perceptions are the evaluative judgments of those outcomes. Understanding how outcomes are perceived by various groups within a society, especially in terms of their perceived effectiveness and legitimacy, is an important component of conflict diagnosis.

(d) The ICAT completes Step 2 by listing **Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience**.

(3) **Step 3: Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors**. In Step 3 of the analysis, the ICAT identifies key individuals/groups that are central to producing, perpetuating, or profoundly changing the societal patterns or institutional performance identified in Step 2. The ICAT should identify whether they are motivated to mobilize constituencies toward inflaming or mitigating violent conflict and what means are at their disposal. To perform the analysis in Step 3, the ICAT:

(a) Identifies:

1. WHO. People, organizations, or groups who, because of their leadership abilities and/or power (e.g., political position, moral authority, charisma, money, weapons):

a. Have an impact on societal patterns/institutional performance.

b. Are able to shape perceptions and actions and mobilize people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience.

c. Are able to provide the means (money, weapons, information) to support others who are mobilizing people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience.

2. WHERE. Look for key individuals in leadership positions in governing, social or professional organizations or networks (either within or external to a state or territory), including private business, religious organizations, government positions (including police forces, judicial system, and military), informal and illicit power structures, media, and academic institutions.

3. WHAT and HOW. Understand key individuals' motivations and means by describing:

a. What motivates them to exert influence on each of the political, economic, social and security systems in a country or area.

b. How they exert influence (e.g., leadership capacity, moral authority, personal charisma, money, access to resources or weapons, networks or connections).

(b) Determines key individuals':

1. Objectives that promote violence or promote peaceful alternatives.

2. Means and resources available to accomplish those objectives, including:

a. Capacity for violence/intimidation.

b. Financial resources (including taxes, "protection" fees, support from external individuals/groups).

c. Valuable primary commodities (e.g., labor, information, forest products, minerals, high value crops).

d. Control of media outlets.

e. Mass support.

(c) Using the information generated on key individuals/groups, the ICAT draft brief narrative statements describing "why" and "how" they mobilize constituencies around **core grievances** and, separately, around **sources of social and institutional resilience.** Each statement relating to core grievances becomes an entry in the list of drivers of conflict, and each relating to sources of social and institutional resilience becomes an entry in the list of mitigating factors.

(d) The ICAT completes Step 3 of the analysis by listing the **drivers of conflict** and, separately, the **mitigating factors** by the strength of their impact on the conflict.

(4) **Step 4: Describe Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity.** "Windows" are moments in time when events or occasions provoke negative or positive changes in the status quo. In Step 4, the ICAT:

(a) Identifies potential situations that could contribute to an increase in violent conflict. **Windows of vulnerability** are potential situations that could trigger escalation of conflict (e.g., by contributing to confirmation of the perceptions underlying core grievances) and often result from large-scale responses to an increase of uncertainty during elections or following an assassination, an exclusion of parties from important events such as negotiations or elections, or attempts to marginalize disgruntled followers.

(b) Identifies potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability. **Windows of opportunity** describe the potential situations that could enable significant progress toward stable peace (e.g., through conditions where core grievances can be reconciled and sources of social and institutional resilience can be bolstered) such as those where overarching identities

become important to disputing groups, where natural disasters impact multiple identity groups and externalities require a unified response or a key leader driving the conflict is killed.

(c) The ICAT completes Step 4 by considering **windows of vulnerability** and **windows of opportunity** and prioritizing **drivers and mitigating factors** identified in Step 3. The ICAT uses the list of prioritized drivers and mitigating factors as the basis for its findings whether those findings are: priorities for the whole-of-government assistance working group setting parameters for a DOS Office of Foreign Assistance country assistance strategy; recommendations to a country team preparing an application for NDAA Section 1207 funding; or recommendations to a whole-of-government R&S crisis response planning or R&S contingency planning team.

7. Segue into Planning

a.   When an ICAF is undertaken to support R&S crisis response planning or R&S contingency planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into situation analysis and policy formulation steps of the planning process in *Principles of the USG Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization and Conflict Transformation.*

b.   When an ICAF is undertaken to support interagency engagement or conflict prevention planning, after completing the diagnosis, the ICAT begins preplanning activities. During the segue into these types of planning, the ICAT maps existing diplomatic and programmatic activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors to identify gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics, it is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or value of any program or initiative.   The ICAT uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for USG activities.

c.   **Steps for Engagement and Conflict Prevention Planning**

(1) Specify current USG activities (listing USG agencies present in the country and the nature and scope of their efforts).

(a) Identify the impact of these efforts on drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.

(b) Identify efforts that target similar outcomes and coordination mechanisms in place.

(2) Specify current efforts of non-USG participants, including bilateral agencies, multi-lateral agencies, NGOs, the private sector, and local entities.

(a) Identify the impact of the efforts on the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.

(b) Identify efforts that target similar outcomes (including USG efforts) and coordinating mechanisms in place.

(3) Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors not sufficiently addressed by existing efforts (i.e., gaps).

(4) Specify challenges to addressing the gaps.

(5) Referring to windows of vulnerability, describe risks associated with failure to address the gaps.

(6) Referring to windows of opportunity, describe opportunities to address the gaps.

d. The ICAT draws on the information generated in segue into planning to determine potential entry points for USG efforts. The description of these entry points should explain how the dynamics outlined in the ICAF diagnosis may be susceptible to outside influence.

APPENDIX E
TACTICAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FRAMEWORK

NOTE: The following information is excerpted from FM 3-07, *Stability Operations.* Except for formatting, the information presented is identical to FM 3-07.

1.   General

To increase the effectiveness of stability operations, the U.S. Agency for International Development created the tactical conflict assessment and planning framework (TCAPF). The TCAPF was designed to assist commanders and their staffs identify the causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability at the tactical level (provincial or local). The TCAPF should be used to create local stabilization plans and provide data for the ICAF, which has a strategic and operational-level (country or regional) focus.

2   Conceptual Framework

a.   The TCAPF is based on the following four premises:

(1) Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the host nation to mitigate these factors.

(2) Assessment is necessary for targeted and strategic engagement.

(3) The population is the best source for identifying the causes of instability.

(4) Measures of effectiveness are the only true measure of success.

b.   **Instability**. Instability results when the factors fostering instability overwhelm the ability of the host nation to mitigate these factors. To understand why there is instability or determine the risk of instability, the following factors must be understood: grievances, key actors' motivations and means, and windows of vulnerability.

(1) Grievances are factors that can foster instability. They are based on a groups' perception that other groups or institutions are threatening its interests. Examples include ethnic or religious tensions, political repression, population pressures, and competition over natural resources. Greed can also foster instability. Some groups and individuals gain power and wealth from instability. Drug lords and insurgents fall in this category.

(2) Key actors' motivations and means are ways key actors transform grievances into widespread instability. Although there can be many grievances, they do not foster instability unless key actors with both the motivation and the means to translate these grievances into widespread instability emerge. Transforming grievances into

widespread violence requires a dedicated leadership, organizational capacity, money, and weapons. If a group lacks these resources, it will not be able to foster widespread instability. Means and motivations are the critical variables that determine whether grievances become causes of instability.

(3) Windows of vulnerability are situations that can trigger widespread instability. Even when grievances and means are present, widespread instability is unlikely unless a window of vulnerability exists that links grievances to means and motivations. Potential windows of vulnerability include an invasion, highly contested elections, natural disasters, the death of a key leader, and economic shocks.

(4) Even if grievances, means, and vulnerabilities exist, instability is not inevitable. For each of these factors, there are parallel mitigating forces: resiliencies, key actors' motivations and means, and windows of opportunity.

(5) Resiliencies are the processes, relationships, and institutions that can reduce the effects of grievances. Examples include community organizations, and accessible, legitimate judicial structures. Key actors' motivations and means are ways key actors leverage resiliencies to counter instability. Just as certain key actors have the motivation and means to create instability, other actors have the motivation and the means to rally people around nonviolent procedures to address grievances. An example could be a local imam advocating peaceful coexistence among opposing tribes. Windows of opportunity are situations or events that can strengthen resiliencies. For example, the tsunami that devastated the instable Indonesian province of Aceh provided an opportunity for rebels and government forces to work together peacefully. This led to a peace agreement and increased stability.

(6) While understanding these factors is crucial to understanding stability, they do not exist in a vacuum. Therefore, their presence or absence must be understood within the context of a given environment. Context refers to longstanding conditions that do not change easily or quickly. Examples include geography, demography, natural resources, history, as well as regional and international factors. Contextual factors do not necessarily cause instability, but they can contribute to the grievances or provide the means that foster instability. For example, although poverty alone does not foster conflict, poverty linked to illegitimate government institutions, a growing gap between rich and poor, and access to a global arms market can combine to foster instability. Instability occurs when the causes of instability overwhelm societal or governmental ability to mitigate it.

c. **Assessment**

(1) Assessment is necessary for targeted engagement. Since most stability operations occur in less developed countries, there will always be a long list of needs and wants, such as schools, roads, and health care, within an operational area. Given a chronic shortage of USG personnel and resources, effective stability operations require an ability to identify and prioritize local sources of instability and stability. They also

require the prioritization of interventions based on their importance in diminishing those sources of instability or building on sources of stability. For example, if village elders want more water, but water is not fostering instability (because fighting between farmers and pastoralists over land is the cause), then digging a well will not stabilize the area. In some cases, wells have been dug based on the assumption that stability will result from fulfilling a local want. However, ensuring both farmers and pastoralists have access to water will help stabilize the area only if they were fighting over water. Understanding the causal relationship between needs, wants, and stability is crucial. In some cases, they are directly related; in others, they are not. Used correctly, the TCAPF, triangulated with data obtained from other sources, will help establish whether there is a causal relationship.

(2) Understanding the difference between symptoms and causes is another key aspect of stability. Too often, interventions target the symptoms of instability rather than identifying and targeting the underlying causes. While there is always a strong temptation to achieve quick results, this often equates to satisfying a superficial request that does not reduce the underlying causes of instability and, in some cases, actually increases instability.

(3) For example, an assessment identified a need to reopen a local school in Afghanistan. The prevailing logic held that addressing this need would increase support for the government while decreasing support for antigovernment forces. When international forces reopened the school, however, antigovernment forces coerced the school administrator to leave under threat of death, forcing the school to close. A subsequent investigation revealed that the local populace harbored antigovernment sentiments because host-nation police tasked with providing security for the school established a checkpoint nearby and demanded bribes for passage into the village. The local populace perceived the school, which drew the attention of corrupt host-nation police, as the source of their troubles. Rather than improve government support by reopening the school, the act instead caused resentment since it exposed the local populace to abuse from the police. This in turn resulted in increased support for antigovernment forces, which were perceived as protecting the interests of the local populace. While the assessment identified a need to reopen the school, the act did not address a cause of instability. At best, it addressed a possible symptom of instability and served only to bring the true cause of instability closer to the affected population.

d. **The Population**. The population is the best source for identifying the causes of instability. Since stability operations focus on the local populace, it is imperative to identify and prioritize what the population perceives as the causes of instability. To identify the causes of instability, the TCAPF uses the local populace to identify and prioritize the problems in the area. This is accomplished by asking four simple, standardized questions.

e. **Measures of Effectiveness**. A measure of effectiveness is the only true gauge of success. Too often, the terms "output" and "effect" are used interchangeably among civilian agencies. However, they measure very different aspects of task performance.

While "outputs" indicate task performance, "effects" measure the effectiveness of activities against a predetermined objective. Measures of effectiveness are crucial for determining the success or failure of stability tasks. (See Chapter III, "Assessment Components," for a detailed discussion of the relationship between among assessment, measures of performance, and measures of effectiveness.)

3. The Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework Process

a. The TCAPF consistently maintains focus on the local populace. Organizations using the TCAPF follow a continuous cycle of *see-understand-act-measure*. The TCAPF includes four distinct, but interrelated activities: collection, analysis, design, and evaluation.

b. **Collection**. Collecting information on the causes of instability within an operational area is a two-step process.

(1) The first step uses the following four questions to draw critical information from the local populace:

(a) **Has the population of the village changed in the last twelve months**? Understanding population movement is crucial to understanding the operational environment. Population movement often provides a good indicator of changes in relative stability. People usually move when deprived of security or social well-being. The sudden arrival of dislocated civilians can produce a destabilizing effect if the operational area lacks sufficient capacity to absorb them or if there is local opposition to their presence.

(b) **What are the greatest problems facing the village**? Providing the local populace with a means to express problems helps to prioritize and focus activities appropriately. The local populace is able to identify their own problem areas, thus avoiding mistaken assumptions by the intervening forces. This procedure does not solicit needs and wants, but empowers the people to take ownership of the overall process.

(c) **Who is trusted to resolve problems**? Identifying the individuals or institutions most trusted to resolve local issues is critical to understanding perceptions and loyalties. Responses may include the host-nation government, a local warlord, international forces, a religious leader, or other authority figure. This question also provides an indication of the level of support for the host-nation government, a key component of stability. This often serves as a measure of effectiveness for stability tasks. It also identifies key informants who may assist with vetting or help to develop messages to support information engagement activities.

(d) **What should be done first to help the village**? Encouraging the local populace to prioritize their problems helps to affirm ownership. Their responses form the basis for local projects and programs.

(2) A central facet of the collection effort is determining the relationship between the symptoms and cause of the basic problem; understanding why a symptom exists is essential to addressing the cause. For example, an assessment completed in Afghanistan identified a lack of security as the main problem within a specific operational area. Analysis indicated this was due a shortage of host-nation security forces in the local area and an additional detachment of local police was assigned to the area. However, the assessment failed to identify the relationship between the symptom and cause of the problem. Thus, the implemented solution addressed the symptom, while the actual cause remained unaddressed. A subsequent assessment revealed that the local police were actually the cause of the insecurity: it was common practice for them to demand bribes from the local populace while discriminating against members of rival clans in the area. By addressing the symptom of the problem rather than the cause, the implemented solution actually exacerbated the problem instead of resolving it.

(3) The second step of collection involves conducting targeted interviews with key local stakeholders, such traditional leaders, government officials, business leaders, and prominent citizens. These interviews serve two purposes. First, targeted interviews act as a control mechanism in the collection effort. If the answers provided by key stakeholders match the responses from the local populace, it is likely the individual understands the causes of instability and may be relied upon to support the assessment effort. However, if the answers do not match those of the local populace, that individual may be either an uninformed stakeholder or possibly part of the problem. Second, targeted interviews provide more detail on the causes of instability while helping determine how best to address those causes and measure progress toward that end.

(4) Information obtained during collection is assembled in a formatted TCAPF spreadsheet. This allows the information to be easily grouped and quantified to identify and prioritize the most important concerns of the population.

   c. **Analysis**. During analysis, the information gained through collection is compiled in a graphical display (see figure E-1). This display helps identify the main concerns of the population and serves a reference point for targeted questioning. The TCAPF data is combined with input from other staff sections and other sources of information—such as intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities. All this input is used to create a prioritized list of the causes of instability and sources of resiliency that guide the conduct of stability operations.

Figure E-1. Analyzing Causes of Instability

d. **Design**

(1) The design effort is informed through analysis, the results of which are used to create a tactical stability matrix for each of the causes of instability (see Figure E-2). After identifying the causes of instability and sources of resiliency, a program of activities is designed to address them. Three key factors guide program design, which ensures program activities:

(a) Increase support for the host-nation government.

(b) Decrease support for antigovernment forces.

(c) Build host-nation capacity across each of the stability sectors.

(2) The tactical stability matrix and program activities form the basis for planning within an operational area. The plan targets the least stable areas and ensures instability is contained. It is nested within the higher headquarters plan and details how specific stability tasks will be integrated and synchronized at the tactical level. The TCAPF data is collated at each echelon to develop or validate assessments performed by subordinate elements.

TACTICAL STABILITY MATRIX

Grievance	Causes (Perceptions)	Causes (Systemic)	Objective	Impact Indicators	Monitoring Methods
Police abuse the situation	Police extort bribes	Police are not paid on time	Increase popular support for the police	Increased popular support	TCAPF or public surveys
	Police do not serve the people	Police are not accountable		More actionable intelligence to police from population	Truck driver surveys
	Police are untrustworthy	Police are not representative of the local populace			Numerous illegal checkpoints
	Police use the law to help themselves	Local police are largely autonomous		Increased positive police interaction	Increased sustained police presence
	There is no control over the police	Police include many former military members		Adequate police presence	

TCAPF tactical conflict assessment and planning framework

Figure E-2. Tactical Stability Matrix

e. **Evaluation**

(1) The TCAPF provides a comprehensive means of evaluating success in addressing the sources of instability. Through measures of effectiveness, analysts gauge progress toward improving stability while diminishing the sources of instability. Measures of effectiveness are vital to evaluating the success of program activities in changing the state of the operational environment envisioned during the design effort.

(2) While evaluation is critical to measuring the effectiveness of activities in fostering stability, it also helps to ensure the views of the population are tracked, compared, measured, and displayed over time. Since these results are objective, they cannot be altered by interviewer or analyst bias. This creates a continuous narrative that significantly increases situational awareness.

f. **Best Practices and Lessons Learned**. Capturing and implementing best practices and lessons learned is fundamental to adaptive organizations. This behavior is essential in stability operations, where the ability to learn and adapt is often the difference between success and failure. The TCAPF leverages this ability to overcome the dynamics of the human dimension, where uncertainty, chance, and friction are the norm. Examples of best practices and lessons learned gained through recent experience include the following:

(1) Activities and projects are products that foster a process to change behavior or perceptions. Indicators and measures of effectiveness identify whether change has occurred or is occurring.

(2) Perceptions of the local populace provide the best means to gauge the impact of program activities.

(3) Indicators provide insight into measures of effectiveness by revealing whether positive progress is being achieved by program activities.

(4) "Good deeds" cannot substitute for effectively targeted program activities; the best information engagement effort is successful programming that meets the needs of the local populace.

(5) Intervention activities should:

(a) Respond to priority issues of the local populace.

(b) Focus effort on critical crosscutting activities.

(c) Establish anticorruption measures early in the stability operation.

(d) Identify and support key actors early to set the conditions for subsequent collaboration.

(6) Intervention activities should not:

(a) Mistake "good deeds" for effective action.

(b) Initiate projects not designed as program activities.

(c) Attempt to impose "Western" standards.

(d) Focus on quantity over quality.

4. Summary

The TCAPF has been successfully implemented in practice to identify, prioritize, and target the causes of instability in a measurable and immediately accessible manner. Since it maximizes the use of assets in the field and gauges the effectiveness of activities in time and space, it is an important tool for conducting successful stability operations.

APPENDIX F
SELECTED EXCERPTS FROM THE NATO
OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK

NOTE: The following are selected excerpts from the proposed North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operations Assessment Handbook. Similar to this handbook, the NATO handbook carries the following disclaimer: "This handbook covers the fundamentals of Operations Assessment in NATO, and must be viewed as a pre-doctrinal document for informing commanders and staff officers on the current understanding of Operations Assessment principles, procedures and techniques." Readers are encouraged to read the entire NATO handbook in order to understand the assessment construct and terms they are likely to encounter in NATO-led operations. Except for paragraph and figure numbering, the text and formatting from the original document is retained as much as possible.

Introduction

> **Operations Assessment[1]**
>
> In this handbook, the term *Operations Assessment* is to be understood as the function that enables the <u>measurement of progress and results</u> of operations in a military context, and the subsequent development of conclusions and recommendations that <u>support decision making</u>.

Background

Operations, whether military-led, conducted by coalitions or alliances such as NATO; or civilian-led, such as disaster relief conducted by charitable or international organisations, or other entities, take place in dynamic environments where changes in the political, economic, social, military, infrastructure and information domains are constantly happening. All organisations involved need to have a feedback process in order to determine the effectiveness of their operations and make recommendations for changes; NATO is no exception.

In NATO, this feedback process is called 'Operations Assessment[1]' and is critical to inform on progress being made in creating desired effects and achievement of objectives, which in turn allows for adjustments to be made to the plan, and for the decision making of military and political leadership to be informed. Operations Assessment provides an important input in the knowledge development process, which builds up and maintains a holistic understanding of the situation and operating environment. Operations Assessment can only provide indications of trends in a system's behaviour given certain actions. Thus, success in operations still heavily relies on a commander's intuition, experience and judgement.

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[1] **Important Note**: In late 2010, the decision was made to change the formal name of this function from *Assessment* to *Operations Assessment* in order to avoid confusion with other existing uses of "assessment" in NATO. This handbook uses both terms interchangeably; however, as within the context of this document no confusion should arise.

Military Operations

Military Operations are conducted using four major interdependent functions: Knowledge Development, Planning, Execution, and Operations Assessment.

Knowledge Development (KD)[2]

KD is a continuous, adaptive and networked activity carried out at all levels of command to provide commanders and staffs with a shared, comprehensive understanding of complex situations, including the interrelationship of different political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII) domains. It enables the commander and staff to better understand the possible effects of military, political, economic and civil actions on different systems and actors within the engagement space. It supports decision making throughout the different phases of an operation. The KD process provides a shared knowledge base of operationally-relevant material.

KD addresses the critical requirement to develop a greater understanding of complex problems by exploiting information and knowledge from a wide range of sources. This process helps to determine the most appropriate responses and enables the effective use of military and non-military means. In order to develop improved understanding of such complex problems, KD includes a "systems" approach to analysis to compliment other methods of analysis. A systems approach to analysis contributes to a more holistic view of the engagement space as well as the operational environment and supplements other, more traditional analysis techniques. It focuses on collecting and analysing information about the various systems and actors related to the problem, as well as the interrelationship of their different sub-systems and system elements in order to develop the knowledge required to support decisions regarding the most appropriate response.

KD is critical during planning of operations, but has a strong link to operational execution and Operations Assessment. Initial development of the Operations Assessment process will be dependent upon the systems analysis and contents of the knowledge base produced by the KD process, in addition to other sources. The products produced from the Operations Assessment process will add to the understanding of the operational environment and this information will be fed back into the knowledge base. KD and Operations Assessment processes will be interdependent by the virtue of their common linkages to the knowledge base.

Planning

Planning is a logical sequence of cognitive processes and associated procedures undertaken by commanders and staffs to analyse a situation, deduce mission requirements and determine the best method for accomplishing tasks in order to achieve desired military objectives and ultimately, in the case of NATO, the end-state. Based on the knowledge of centres of gravity and key system vulnerabilities gained through analysis of

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[2] Description adapted from the Bi-SC KD Concept (12 Aug 2008) and the BiSC KD Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (v0.79, 25 Feb 2010).

the engagement space in KD, planners will produce a hierarchy of actions to be performed and results to be achieved (e.g. effects, objectives) that are expected to attain that end-state. Planners will also identify the military forces and capabilities required to carry out the operation, and plan for their deployment and employment.

Operations Assessment has a critical linkage to Planning: planners and assessors work collaboratively to determine that the tasks and results defined in the plan are measurable, and a component of the plan must consider the resources and actions necessary to perform the Operations Assessment. The primary purpose of Operations Assessment is to support decision making by providing the necessary information to adapt a plan based on the results from execution. It is vital to note that although planning assumes causality, it needs to be adapted as the situation unfolds.

Execution

Once planning elements are developed, (e.g. Objectives, Effects) and supporting Tasks/Actions are planned, sequenced, and resourced, the plan can be executed. 'Operations execution' refers to overall processes and techniques of leading and managing an operation. Execution requires the command and control of military forces and interaction with other non-military means to conduct integrated, coordinated or synchronised actions that create desired effects.

Although the leadership and management of operations may vary greatly depending on the situation, scale and personnel, a common component is the necessity for ongoing feedback on the progress of tasks and the achievement of results. Operations plans are not presumed to be foolproof; during their execution they will require continuous assessment-informed adjustments. Continuous Assessment is an essential element of plan execution.

Operations Assessment

The purpose of Operations Assessment is to support the decision making in three areas:

1. Operations Assessment determines the progress of plan execution (actions / tasks).

2. Operations Assessment determines the effectiveness of those executed actions by measuring the achievement of results (effects, objectives, and the end-state).

3. Operations Assessment draws conclusions about past situations, and in some cases makes forward-looking estimates about future trends, and makes recommendations; e.g. to move on to the next phase of the plan or to make adjustments to the plan based on these conclusions.

Restating this in theoretical systems terminology, Operations Assessment evaluates current system states, and then compares them with previous system states and desired, future states. Without this, it would be impossible to determine whether resources are

being used effectively, progress is being made and when the end-state is likely to be – or is actually – achieved.

Operations Assessment is closely linked with the KD function, which is responsible for determining the initial system state during planning and maintaining the ongoing knowledge of the engagement space during execution. Operations Assessment uses the information and knowledge from KD to design the metrics of measurement, and KD uses the results from Operations Assessment to update systems analysis and input in the knowledge base.

Operations Assessment can be applied to specific operations, events or topics either within or outside the military plan. A broader application of Operations Assessment considers an overall military campaign. Operations Assessment may consider a range of timescales from short-term changes to long-term change over years. There are many ways in which the responsibility for the level and timescale of Operations Assessment can be divided, depending on the particular context, the level of command and the needs of the Commander.

At any level and any timescale, in general, there are two types of Operations Assessment that will be undertaken typically during an operation: 'historic' and 'predictive'[3]. 'Historic' Assessment during an operation provides the Commander with an evaluation of completion of actions, and progress toward the desired Effects and achievements of Decisive Points, Objective(s), and ultimately the End-State. This Assessment utilises historical data to identify trends up to and including the current state. 'Predictive' assessment builds on the historic assessment and helps extrapolate current trends to the future, thus identifying potential opportunities and risks for the Commander. In addition to past events, predictive assessment is based on known future events, plans, intentions, actions and assumptions to develop a forecast of the future situation.

In some circumstances, Operations Assessment may track the activities of other actors, such as IOs/NGOs [*international organizations/nongovernmental organizations*], and data produced regularly by these organisations. Whether intentional or not, the activities of non-military organisations may create effects in the military domain and vice-versa. Where necessary, Operations Assessment must attempt to identify the status of these effects.

The Operations Assessment Process

The Operations Assessment process involves four major steps:

    a. Designing the assessment and support to planning;

    b. Developing the data collection plan;

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[3] 'Predictive' implies that Assessments make useful estimates of trends for the purposes of planning, based on previous history, current intentions and a number of assumptions. A legitimate question that may illustrate the need for predictive assessment is: *based on our current rate of equipping and training nations X's forces, what will be their strength in 1 year?*

c. Data collection and treatment; and

d. Analysis, interpretation and recommendations.

Each of these steps will be described in subsequent chapters of this handbook. Note: Throughout this document, the term "Assessment Staff" is used. "Assessment Staff" are those individuals in a HQ performing an Assessment role.

What is Assessment in the Military?

Measuring progress

Measures of Performance (MOP) give an indication of the extent of progress in execution of the plan (Are the actions being executed as planned?)

Measuring results

Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) give an indication of the success of the plan and results achieved (Are we on track to achieve the intended new system state within the planned timescale?).

Improving planning

The process of determining how to measure an effect or objective enhances conceptual understanding and leads to better designed plans and more insightful objectives

Supporting decision making

Assessment conclusions and recommendations feed adjustments into the plan and give an evidential basis for decision making. At the strategic level, Assessment may measure progress and results of activities, situations and organisations outside of NATO military plans, for the purpose of strategic decision making.

Supporting management of resources

Assessment results and recommendations allow a more informed allocation of resources and / or funds to those areas that need it most.

Increasing knowledge

Assessment produces significant material for the identification of best practices, and for the historical study of operations contributing to the development of lessons learned

A means to motivate

Assessment involves the setting of targets, and gives the commander specific and measurable targets at which to aim the efforts of his staff and forces, and to confirm and celebrate success when achieved, or highlight and deal with failures. This may be useful for public information and media briefing purposes.

Operations Assessment in NATO

Operations Assessment at the Operational and Tactical Level Rationale

The primary focus at the operational and tactical levels of command is the execution of the military campaign and the achievement of objectives, effects and decisive points, defined in the plan. The campaign is planned by the Operational Planning Group (OPG) and assessed by the Assessment Branch/Cell.

Plans will need continual adjustment, based on the circumstances of the operation, to be effective. The primary purpose of Operations Assessment at the operational and tactical levels is to increase the effectiveness of the execution of military operations. By continually monitoring and analysing the implementation of actions and accomplishment of decisive points, effects and objectives, the intention of Operations Assessment is to guide the commander in making evidence-based adjustments to the plan being executed. Operations Assessment aims to provide confirmation of the plan design, by demonstrating that the planned actions are indeed creating the desired results, and to improve understanding of the workings of the engagement space. Operations Assessment also plays an important role in providing situational awareness relative to the plan[4].

> **Joint Operations Assessment**
>
> The overall assessment process conducted at the operational level that answers the question: "Are we accomplishing the military mission?" It consists of campaign assessment and operational assessment.

Definitions

Operations Assessment at the operational level, more often called the 'Joint' level in NATO can be divided into two areas: Campaign Assessment and Operational Assessment.

Campaign Assessment

Campaign Assessment is the continuous monitoring and assessment of all effects and objectives specified in the operational level military plan (campaign). Furthermore, the assessment of desired and undesired effects across all the PMESII domains will be considered, where they impact significantly on the operational level military plan, or where they are explicitly stated in the military plan. It seeks to answer the question: "Are

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[4] Paragraph adapted from: Williams & Morris (2009). The development of theory-driven evaluation in the military: Theory on the front-line. *American Journal of Evaluation, 30*(1), 62-79.

we accomplishing the military mission by creating all the effects and achieving the objectives?[5]"

Its assessments are the basis for periodic assessment reports and input to the Joint Effect Management Branch and the Joint Plans Branch resulting in a recommendation to the Commander to develop Direction & Guidance to amplify/modify the campaign/OPLAN. The Campaign Assessment Section contains the ability to design, craft and manage the Measure of Progress/Measure of Effectiveness (MOP/MOE) tools as an intellectual focal point for the development of Campaign Assessment.

Operational Assessment

Operational Assessment is a short to mid-term review of Decisive Points leading towards Effects along particular Lines of Operation, and the Assessment of any special events or situations that may arise outside of the standing military plan.

This process supports Campaign Assessment by validating current operations, feeding the commander's decision cycle and recommending modifications/changes through FRAGOs or the need to initiate a new Joint Coordination Order.

At operational level, the process is based on the overall analysis of metrics measuring progress of planned actions (MOP) and achievement of planned decisive points, effects and objectives (MOE), for the whole military mission.

At the tactical level, the focus is on measuring the achievement of planned actions, tasks or activities using MOP, for each particular component. In some special cases, the tactical level may measure the achievement of decisive points and effects using MOE.

For each operation, duties and responsibilities may be shared and exchanged between levels, which will be defined in the Assessment annexes of plans.

Roles and Responsibilities

Joint Assessment Branch

At the Operational level, the Commander of the Joint HQ owns the operational level Assessment. The Joint Assessment Branch takes responsibility for development of the assessment annex in the OPLAN, and the conduct of assessments during execution. At the operational level, assessment personnel in the JAB have the following specific responsibilities:

    a. Act as the focal point for Assessment development in their respective HQ, including the contribution to doctrine development

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[5] It may be that the operational plan has to contain effects in the economic, political or social domains, in the local or regional context, that are outside of the military mission. The strategic level will retain the theatre-wide / international assessment of P_SEII domains.

b. Work with the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG) during development and revision of the OPLAN

c. Consider the tactical level assessments received from their subordinate commands and other areas of NATO

d. Produce the operational level assessments on ongoing military operations considering the tactical level assessments

e. Contribute to Strategic Assessments as required

Tactical Level

At the Tactical level, the Commander owns the tactical level Assessment. The Assessment Staff take responsibility for development of the assessment annexes in the OPLAN if required, and the conduct of assessments during execution. At the tactical level, assessment staff have the following specific responsibilities:

a. Act as the focal point for Assessment development in their respective HQ, including the contribution to doctrine development

b. Work with the Operations Planning Group (OPG) during development and revision of the OPLAN

c. Consider the tactical level assessments received from their subordinate commands and other areas of NATO

d. Produce the tactical level assessments on ongoing military operations considering the assessments of their subordinate commands

e. Contribute to Operational Level Assessments as required

Assessment Process at the Operational and Tactical Level

It is essential that Assessment personnel are involved in the early stages of the decision cycle of Plan, Execute, Monitor, and Assess. The early intervention of Assessment personnel in the decision cycle ensures that the plan is measureable from the very beginning.

Members of the Joint Assessment Branch are an integral part of the JOPG and support the planning in the different syndicates. The syndicate developing the Operational Design must contain JAB expertise. The Operational Design is the key reference document for the plan and assessment process. The Operational Design consists of operational objectives nested within the strategic objectives, related operational effects and decisive points. The operational objectives, effects and decisive points form the basis for the development of the Assessment Annex.

In order to achieve an overall coherent Assessment Plan, the assessment development must be conducted as a top down approach throughout all levels of command. Consequently, the assessment products at strategic level, especially the Strategic Design with its objectives and effects, and the strategic assessment annex must be taken into consideration at the Operational Level.

Both the planning process and the development of assessment products are interdependent. They both must be derived from the Operational Design. It should be a key goal of the JAB to develop the Assessment Annex in parallel whilst the JOPG finalises the rest of the OPLAN.

When the main body of the OPLAN is drafted, the Assessment Annex must be developed using the expertise of all JOPG areas. The development of MOEs can be given to the relevant SME or subordinate command to ensure maximum validity and coherence. The interdisciplinary development of the Assessment Annex will ensure that the plan is measurable in execution and discrepancies between the plan and reality can be discovered and recommendations for plan adjustment identified.

During execution, periodic meetings of the Assessment Working Group ensure that the plan is on the correct track or identify and provide recommendations for plan adjustments to the Commander. The Assessment Working Group (AWG) must have an interdisciplinary make-up in order to maintain coherence.

Beyond the AWG, interactions with the Knowledge Centre provide key data and analysis for the JAB. In turn, the JAB provides feedback into the Knowledge Development process helping ensure a common perspective.

The AWG will provide the appropriate data for the Assessment Board briefing to the Commander. The Assessment Board is the formal forum to seek Commander's endorsement of the assessment provided. The Assessment Board should culminate in a recommendation to the Commander.

The assessment products, such as the assessment brief to the Commander, will be the initiation of potential staff actions and plan adjustments (e.g. FRAGO, Joint Coordination Order, development of branches and sequels, plan review) and adjustments of the Assessment Annex if required.

Conclusions – Assessment at the Operational and Tactical Level

It is key to recognise that assessments at all levels are not isolated, but need to be considered in a holistic way in order to understand the whole theatre of operations and beyond.

Care must be taken to ensure that Assessment is not done simply to satisfy itself. Assessment is done to monitor and validate the plan during execution and be a significant part of the decision making process. Without assessment, decision makers will find it more difficult to get the appropriate feedback (plan-execute-monitor-assess).

A common understanding of assessment requirements and procedures throughout all levels of command is to be achieved and continuously maintained via appropriate assessment liaison structure, information exchange, meetings and exercises. Assessment is a Headquarters responsibility.

Assessment Design and Support to Planning

Causality: A Cautionary Note

Assessment is about measuring execution of implemented military actions and the effectiveness – or results – of those actions. By carefully designing metrics to allow activity (MOP) and results (MOE) to be measured, and then collecting data, Assessment staff will compare the completion of actions with the level of achievement of results. It may be tempting or seem appropriate to assume that when all associated actions are complete, the effect must be created; or when all effects are created, the objective is attained; or when all objectives are attained, the end-state must therefore be reached. Completion of all assigned actions may not lead to creation of the desired effect for many reasons: unknown or unaccounted for actors in the theatre; an unknown linkage with a different system causing an adverse (unwanted) impact; or perhaps not all required actions were identified in the original plan.

In general, avoid the temptation to assume causality[6]. Rather than trying to identify and demonstrate how changes in the environment can be "attributed" to particular actions (implying causal relations), it may be more constructive to talk about how activities might or might not have *contributed* to the creation of effects or objectives. The use of words like "correlation" and "contribution" are much more in line with the realities of what can be accomplished by planning and assessment staffs. Current thinking in academia on statistical theory and assessment of complex programs is of the view that causality is extremely challenging to infer, in all but the simplest of cases[7].

Software Tools

In NATO, there is one software tool which is under development to support Assessment; the Campaign Assessment Tool (CAT). CAT is part of the Tools for Operations Planning Functional Area Services (TOPFAS) tool suite and is designed to support the measurement of progress towards the planned end-state through measures of effectiveness and performance. It allows assessment planning, metric data collection and reporting as well as statistical data analysis including causality and trend analyses. Findings are fed back for future planning. In addition, several off the shelf commercial software tools may be used to ease analysis; including but not limited to, software for statistical analysis and spreadsheets.

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[6] Adapted from "Assessing Progress in Military Operations: Recommendations for Improvement", produced by United States Joint Forces Command for Multinational Experiment 6. (Version 0.5, 24 July 2009).

[7] See, for example, Sobel, M. E. (2000), Causal Inference in the Social Sciences. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 95(450), 647-651. Posovac, E., & Carey, R. (2007). *Program Evaluation: Methods and cases* (7th ed.).

Analysis, Interpretation and Recommendations

Revalidation of Assumptions, Metrics, and Targets

Assessment of Effect vs. Action

Planning and Assessment Staff make assumptions during the Planning process – ranging from expected adversary behaviour to force availability and transportation timelines. One of the key roles of the Assessment Process is to periodically revisit these assumptions. Part of the analytical process is comparison or analysis of Effect status and related Action status. Without assuming causality, this Effect/Action analysis can give a rough estimate of assumptions. Four broad cases may be defined:

Case 1: Effect On Track, Action On Track

In this instance, the planned Effect is on track to be achieved as and when expected, and all planned actions are being accomplished. Continue monitoring plan execution. However, it is worth considering that something other than the planned actions may actually be achieving the effect.

Case 2: Effect On Track, Action Not On Track

In this instance, the chosen MOE indicate that the Effect is on track to be achieved, but the corresponding MOP indicate that some required Actions are not being accomplished as planned. Possible reasons may include:

- Invalid choice of MOP: the real status of the action is not being captured.
- Invalid assumptions regarding Actions to create Effect: something in the Engagement Space has created a change, but not the Actions.
- Invalid allocation of resources: less Action than planned was required to create the Effect. This may also be a poor choice of MOP targets.
- Invalid choice of MOE: the real system state is not being captured

Case 3: Effect Not On Track, Action On Track

In this instance, although planned actions are being accomplished, the desired Effect is not on track to be achieved. Possible reasons may include:

- Invalid assumptions regarding needed Actions required to create the Effect: Insufficient actions are being accomplished (lack of resources or poor choice of MOP targets), or not all of the correct actions are happening because the chosen Actions do not lead to the desired Effect.
- Presence of an unknown actor: the influence of an unknown or unexpected actor(s) is causing a negative influence on the system element, and is overriding the influence caused by own Actions

- Own force Actions are creating unintended and/or undesired effects that are counteracting the intended, desired effect
- Invalid choice of MOE: the correct system element is not being measured. This may also be a poor choice of MOE target.
- An unforeseen time lag exists: conditions for the Effect have been created, but the Effect is not apparent yet.

Case 4: Effect Not On Track, Action Not On Track

In this instance, the desired Effect is not being achieved, and the planned actions are not being accomplished. Possible reasons include, amongst others, those listed in Cases 2 and 3. In all cases the Assessment Staff must make a detailed analysis of the situation and recommend possible courses of action to the Planning and Execution Staff. In some cases, revision of the Assessment Plan may be required.

Assessment of Other Planning Elements

The same assessment process can be applied to the higher level plan elements. Again, without assuming causality it is possible in a qualitative judgement to compare the status of planning elements within the hierarchy of the operational design. Comparison of the four cases as listed above will determine whether the creation of that system state is achieved or on track, or that changes to the plan are required.

Unintended Effects

An important part of Assessment is the study of unintended consequences. Unintended Effects, which may be desired or undesired, must be the subject of study and analysis. Issues raised in this study must be identified and measured – it is key to recognize when Unintended Effects are influencing the Engagement Space.

Targets

Targets may shift as phases of the operation change, or as ongoing analysis of an existing MOE or MOP demonstrates that the initial target is not accurate or when changing priorities or phases make a different target more appropriate. In any case, the Commander must be involved in target changes.

Reasons to Reconsider the Assessment Plan

The Assessment Plan is an integral part of the overall Operational Plan. As such, if anything in the Operational Plan changes, the Assessment Plan must be verified to ensure it remains current. Possible reasons for change may include, but are not limited to:

- Changes in political guidance or command direction
- Unplanned or unforeseen changes in the Engagement Space
- Transitions between phases of the operation

- Changes in the validity of the planning assumptions

The Data Collection Matrix is part of the Assessment Plan; certain assumptions are made about the availability of data during the planning process. During execution of the assessment process, problems may arise due to:

- Poor quality data
- Unreliable data or unreliable/inconsistent collection
- Data appears or is proved inaccurate
- Gaps appear in data, perhaps caused by non-availability

These are all reasons to revisit the Assessment Plan, and may lead to selection of different data collection techniques or different MOP/MOE.

Release of Assessment Results

In all cases, Command approval is required to release any Assessment Results outside of the procedures established in the OPLAN.

Civilian Methods in Assessment

Purpose and Scope

In any operation, there will most likely be non-hostile, non-military actors in the field such as government aid, development and diplomatic agencies, international organisations (IO), non-governmental organisations (NGO), and private commercial organisations. Many of these organisations conduct activities very similar to Assessment; however, they generally use different terminologies and methods.

As part of the overall philosophy outlined for NATO's contribution to a Comprehensive Approach, it is prudent for NATO Assessment staff to gain awareness of civilian Assessment terminologies and methods, in order that collaborative work with non-NATO organisations can occur, and so that NATO Assessment staff can make use of civilian Assessment reports.

The purpose of this Chapter is to outline the basics of Assessment approaches used by key non-NATO civilian actors and to compare approaches.

Non-NATO Civilian Actors and the Civilian Sector

The Civilian Sector

Based on the proposition that many operations are inherently multi-dimensional, inclusive of multiple actors and multiple lines of operation, it is recommended that military commanders and staffs make a concerted effort to learn more about the

operations, operating principles, and cultures of those non-military actors who NATO is likely to encounter or work with in the field.

The purpose of this section is to briefly describe the civilian sectors commonly encountered on operations. Note, this section is not intended to be exhaustive, but instead it represents the knowledge of the authors at the time of writing and is intended to give only an indication.

There is much commonality between the ways that the military community and the **international development community** approach analysis, planning, implementation and assessment of progress. International development work focuses on long-term and equitable economic growth, global health, agriculture and trade, democracy and governance, conflict management, humanitarian assistance, and many other factors. Creating and building sustainable, host-nation owned capabilities is a primary goal of much international development work. Organisations such as the World Bank, the United Nations Development Group, the European Commission and national development agencies, such as the US Agency for International Development, are informative places to look in order to learn more about the international development community. Further, many universities offer degree programs in international development.

Peace operations comprise peacekeeping – the provision of temporary post conflict security by internationally mandated forces – and peacebuilding – those efforts undertaken by the international community to help a war-torn society create a self-sustaining peace [8]. This multi-faceted community of interest includes military organisations, but tends to be oriented towards much more than just military principles and objectives. Some guiding principles of **peacekeeping** operations include consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality in dealings with the parties to the conflict (not be confused with neutrality or inactivity), and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate[9]. Other success factors include legitimacy, credibility and local ownership[10].

Peacebuilding has become an overarching term for an entire range of actions designed to contribute to building a culture of peace and can include activities such as the promotion of a culture of justice, truth and reconciliation, capacity building and promotion of good governance, supporting reform of security and justice institutions and socioeconomic development[11]. For more information, see the documents footnoted below and their originating organisation's websites (www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko and www.oecd.org/dac). Also, organisations such as the US Institute of Peace (www.usip.org) and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (www.peaceoperations.org) publish extensively on the topic of Peace Operations.

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[8] The Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington DC, http://www.stimson.org/fopo/programhome.cfm

[9] United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Principles and Guidelines, 2008, adapted

[10] Ibid.

[11] OECD/DAC Guidance for Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities, 2007

Humanitarian assistance is the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies[12]. The provision of humanitarian aid is driven by several fundamental principles including:

- respecting and promoting the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights,
- allocating humanitarian funding in proportion to needs,
- ensuring, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response,
- strengthening the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, and
- providing humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development[13]
- "Do No Harm"[14]

More information can be found at the websites of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent (www.icrc.org), the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (www.ochaonline.un.org), international non-governmental organisations such as World Vision, and Oxfam International, and national government agencies such as the US Agency for International Development.

The Civilian Sector and Assessment

Within the humanitarian aid and development community, the function of Assessment is generally known by the term **monitoring and evaluation**. Many of the major IOs, NGOs, and government agencies have well established monitoring and evaluation processes, and many have entire departments within their organisations to deal with this task. Although there is a broad spectrum of terminologies and process within the civilian monitoring and evaluation community, there have been some attempts to standardise approaches by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

The DAC is an international forum of 24 countries where donor governments and multilateral organisations – such as the World Bank and the United Nations – come together to help partner countries reduce poverty and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. The DAC issues analysis and guidance in key areas of development and forges ties with other policy communities to co-ordinate efforts. Its members also work together through peer review to assess each others' aid policies and their implementation so as to promote good practice. The DAC's objective is to be the definitive source of statistics on official development assistance (ODA).

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[12] www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org

[13] Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship, endorsed at the International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship, 17 June 2003.

[14] Anderson, Mary B., Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, 1999

In 1991 the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD set out broad principles for the evaluation process for DAC members[15]. These principles were refined into five criteria that have been widely used in the evaluation of development initiatives – efficiency, effectiveness, impact, sustainability and relevance. Subsequently the criteria were adapted for evaluation of complex emergencies[16], becoming a set of seven criteria: relevance/appropriateness, connectedness, coherence, coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, and impact. The DAC criteria are intended to be a comprehensive and complementary set of measures.

Using the DAC frameworks, many major IOs and NGOs developed monitoring and evaluation frameworks. It is recommended that military assessment staff become familiar with the OECD-DAC documents and the terminology employed. The OECD-DAC published a terminology guide, available on the website (www.oecd.org).

Civilian Approaches to Assessment[17]

What NATO terms "Assessment" is akin to the civilian practice of "Monitoring and Evaluation" (M&E). Civilian research, literature and practice in the field with regard to M&E offer many lessons for military assessment practitioners. The following definitions are generally accepted by the civilian community:

> **Monitoring**: A continuous function that uses a systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and primary stakeholders of an intervention with information regarding the use of allocated funds, the extent of progress, the likely achievement of objectives and the obstacles that stand in the way of improved performance.

In general, monitoring is an activity that is used to answer questions such as:

- What happened?
- What is happening?
- When did it happen?
- Where did it happen?

Evaluation, on the other hand, tends to be a function that is more oriented towards answering questions such as:

- Why did things happen? / Why did things not happen?
- How did things happen?

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[15] OECD-DAC (2000) DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance. Paris: OECD.

[16] OECD-DAC (1999) Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies. Paris: OECD.

[17] Adapted from USJFCOM (2010). Assessment of Progress in Military Operations: Considerations, Methodologies, and Capabilities, version 2.0. Produced as part of the MNE 6 concept development and experimentation campaign.

Evaluation: The process of determining merit, worth or value of an activity, policy or program. It consists of the systematic and objective assessment of an on-going or completed project, program or policy, its design, implementation and results. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of objectives, development efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. An evaluation should provide information that is credible and useful, enabling the incorporation of lessons learned into the decision-making process of both

Some similarities and differences between M&E are highlighted in Figure F-1 below[18]:

MONITORING VERSUS EVALUATION

Monitoring	Evaluation
Continuous or periodic	Episodic, ad hoc
Program objectives taken as given	Program objectives assessed in relation to higher-level goals or to the development problem to be solved
Pre-defined indicators of progress assumed to be appropriate	Validity and relevance of pre-defined indicators open to question
Tracks progress against a small number of pre-defined indicators	Deals with a wide range of issues
Focuses on intended results	Identifies both unintended and intended results
Quantitative and qualitative methods	Qualitative and quantitative methods
Data routinely collected	Multiple sources of data
Does not answer causal questions	Provides answers to causal questions
Usually an internal management function	Often done by external evaluators and often initiated by external agents

Figure F-1. Monitoring Versus Evaluation

Key terms associated with monitoring and evaluation include:

- Input: The financial, human, and material resources used for the development intervention.

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[18] Source: Swedish International Development Agency, (2007) www.sida.se.

- Activity: Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilised to produce specific outputs.
- Output: The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.
- Outcome: The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.
- Impact: Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.[19]

As mentioned above, monitoring is normally an ongoing function, while evaluation is more episodic. The basic fundamentals of when monitoring and evaluation tasks should occur are shown in Figure F-2.


Figure F-2. Relative Timing of Project Design, Implementation, Monitoring, and Evaluation Tasks

As demonstrated in the graphic above, monitoring and evaluation are both functions that are meant to be fully integrated into a design, planning, management/execution and assessment cycle. One example of this kind of end-to-end process model that may be of

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[19] Ibid.

use for military application is the World Bank's 10 Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System (2004). The overview graphic (Figure F-3) from that model is shown here:

Figure F-3. World Bank's 10 Steps to a Results-Based Monitoring and Evaluation System

There are many different types of monitoring and many different types of evaluation, all designed to suit specific needs. In addition to the documents that have already been referenced in previous recommendations, some documents, organisations and websites related to this topic include:

- Church, Cheyanne and Rogers, Mark, Designing for Results: Integrating Monitoring and Evaluation in Conflict Transformation Programs, 2006
- USAID, Monitoring and Evaluation in Post-Conflict Settings, 2006
- Social Impact Toolkit on Monitoring and Evaluating Fragile States and Peace building Programs
- World Bank Independent Evaluation Group, www.worldbank.org/oed
- OECD/DAC Network on Development Evaluation www.oecd.org
- USAID EvalWeb, www.evalweb.usaid.gov
- USAID Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS Documents
  - o Preparing a Performance Management Plan
  - o Selecting Performance Indicators
  - o Establishing Performance Targets
- Monitoring and Evaluation News, www.mande.co.uk
- The Measure Project, www.cpc.unc.edu/measure

- Collaborative Learning Projects, Reflecting on Peace Practice Project, www.conflictsensitivity.org/files/publib/Reflecting_on_Peace_Practice.pdf

APPENDIX G
MEASURING PROGRESS IN CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

1. General

The **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) framework** is a catalog of metrics and a process for using these metrics to measure the progress of stabilization and reconstruction missions in conflict environments. MPICE metrics measure the conditions that support *viable peace* (see Figure G-1). This peace is achieved when the capacity of domestic institutions to resolve disputes peacefully overtakes the powerful motives and means for continued violent conflict. When this state is achieved, external intervention forces can begin to hand over stability efforts to domestic institutions.


Figure G-1. Metrics

2. Framework

a.   MPICE includes about 800 generic, quantitative outcome metrics that measure *institutional capacities and drivers of conflict* in five sectors: safe and secure environment, political moderation and stable democracy, rule of law, sustainable economy, and social well-being (see Figure G-2). This comprehensive set of outcome

metrics (measures of effectiveness) enables planners to assess mission progress in an objective, systematic, and holistic way.

b.   Development of MPICE was sponsored by the Department of Defense, United States Institute of Peace, US Agency for International Development (USAID), Department of State, and other U.S. government agencies in cooperation with multinational, non-governmental organization (NGO), and academic partners.


Figure G-2. Institutional Capacities and Drivers of Conflict

3.   Training System

a.   The **MPICE Training System** is a computer-based training system that teaches facts, concepts, process steps, analytical skills, and strategies needed to use the MPICE framework effectively (see Figure G-3). The yellow boxes show the three main steps when using MPICE. *Tailoring metrics* includes selecting and adapting the generic metrics and then red-teaming them, so they satisfy information needs and are appropriate for the mission and operational environment. Methodologies for *collecting data* include quantitative data, survey/polling data, expert knowledge, and content analysis. *Analyzing data* includes weighting metrics, detecting data patterns and trends, and generating and evaluating causal explanations.

b.   The training system also teaches cultural considerations, framing effects of question wording, sampling error and bias, and working with experts. The system uses a variety of instructional methods including direct presentation of facts and concepts, examples and anecdotes, interactive graphics, exercises, and scenarios.


Figure G-3. Steps for Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments

c.   **The MPICE Training System is available for use by U.S. Government personnel at no cost**.   You can **access MPICE Training** over the Web at: http://www.stottlerhenke.com/mpice.

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APPENDIX H
REFERENCES

The following are references for assessment:

1. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

2. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*.

3. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

4. JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*.

5. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

6. Field Manual (FM) 5-0, *The Operations Process*.

7. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*.

8. General James N. Mattis, Commander, USJFCOM, Memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command, "Vision for a Joint Approach to Operational Design", 6 October 2009.

9. USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, A Common Perspective, November 2006, "Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science," General (Ret) Gary Luck.

10. USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Profile Series Pamphlet 10, *Design in Military Operations A Primer for Joint Warfighters,* 20 September 2010.

11. Joint Advanced Warfighting School, *Operational Art and Campaigning Primer*.

12. *Campaign Planning Handbook, AY10,* Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, U.S. Army War College.

13. Center For Army Lessons Learned, *Assessments and Measures of Effectiveness in Stability Operations Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures*, May 2010.

14. Center for Army Analysis, *ORSA Handbook for the Senior Commander,* March 2008.

15. *Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) A Metrics Framework for Assessing Conflict Transformation and Stabilization, version 2.0. June 2010,* Mr. Michael Dziedzic, US Institute for Peace, Dr. Barbara Sotirin, US Army Corps of Engineers, COL John Agoglia, US Army Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute.

16. US Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, *Field Operations Guide for Disaster Assessment and Response.*

17. Department of State, Operations, OPA Planning Cell, PRT Assessments, *Planning and Assessment User Guide*.

18. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Tool, Version 3.0, May 2009.*

GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAR	after action report
AC	assessment cell
AWG	assessment working group
CCDR	combatant commander
CCMD	combatant command
CJSART	Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool
COA	course of action
COG	center of gravity
DIME	diplomatic, informational, military, economic
DOTMLPF	doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities
FRAGORD	fragmentary order
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICAT	Interagency Conflict Assessment Team
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
JFC	joint force commander
JIPOE	joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment
JIOC	joint intelligence operations center
JISE	joint intelligence support element
JOPP	joint operation planning process
JP	joint publication
JPG	joint planning group
JTF	joint task force
KD	knowledge development
LOO	line of operation
MISO	military information support operations
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance
MPICE	Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act

OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPT operational planning team

ROE rules of engagement
R&S reconstruction and stabilization

S/CRS Department of State Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SME subject matter expert

US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States government
USJFCOM United States Joint Forces Command
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 1-02. SOURCE JP 3-0)

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing joint force capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. 3. Analysis of the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or planned intelligence activity. 4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics of present or prospective employees or "agents." (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

base plan. In the context of joint operation planning level 2 planning detail, a type of operation plan that describes the concept of operations, major forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or time-phased force and deployment data. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

branch. 1. A subdivision of any organization. 2. A geographically separate unit of an activity, which performs all or part of the primary functions of the parent activity on a smaller scale. Unlike an annex, a branch is not merely an overflow addition. 3. An arm or service of the Army. 4. The contingency options built into the base plan. A branch is used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

campaign. A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

campaign plan. A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called **COG**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the

Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. Also called **CCMD**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called **CCDR**. See also combatant command. (JP 1-02)

combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called **CA**. (JP 1-02)

commander's intent. A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called **commander's concept** or **CONOPS**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

concept plan. In the context of joint operation planning level 3 planning detail, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called **CONPLAN**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

contingency. A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

contingency operation. A military operation that is either designated by the SecDef as a contingency operation or becomes a contingency operation as a matter of law (title 10, United States Code, section 101[a][13]. It is a military operation that: a. is designated by the SecDef as an operation in which members of the Armed Forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing force; or b. is created by definition of law. Under Title 10 United States Code, Section 101 [a][13][B], a contingency operations exists if a military operation results in the (1) call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under certain enumerated statutes (Title 10, United States Code, Sections 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12305, 12406, or 331-335); and (2) the call-up to (or retention on) active duty of members of the uniformed Services under other (non-enumerated) statutes during war or national

emergency declared by the President or Congress. See also contingency; operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase and the course-of- action determination steps of the joint operation planning process. Also called **COA**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

crisis action planning. One of the two types of joint operation planning. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process involving the time-sensitive development of joint operation plans and operation orders for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of assigned and allocated forces and resources in response to an imminent crisis. Crisis action planning is based on the actual circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs. Also called **CAP**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

deliberate planning. The Adaptive Planning and Execution System planning activities that routinely occur in non-crisis situations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

deficiency analysis.   A step within the assessment process in which assessed inadequacies in the attainment of desired effects are examined at the MOE, indicator and MOP level.   (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or consequence of an action. 3. A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

fires. The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-09)

fragmentary order. An abbreviated form of an operation order issued as needed after an operation order to change or modify that order or to execute a branch or sequel to that order. Also called **FRAGORD**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, military information support operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called **IO**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: Secretary of Defense Memorandum 12401-10)

instruments of national power. All of the means available to the government in its pursuit of national objectives. They are expressed as diplomatic, economic, informational and military. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

integration. 1. In force projection, the synchronized transfer of units into an operational commander's force prior to mission execution. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. 3. In photography, a process by which the average radar picture seen on several scans of the time base may be obtained on a print, or the process by which several photographic images are combined into a single image. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called **ISR**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a common objective. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant

command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the joint force commander's decision making process. It is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential courses of action. Also called **JIPOE**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01.3)

joint intelligence operations center. An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. Also called **JIOC**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-0)

joint intelligence support element. A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called **JISE**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 2-01)

joint interagency coordination group. An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called **JIACG**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-08)

joint operation planning. Planning activities associated joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises. Joint operation planning includes planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

joint operation planning process. An orderly, analytical process that consists of a logical set of steps to analyze a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative courses of action against criteria of success and each other; select the best course of action; and produce a joint operation plan or order. Also called **JOPP** (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

joint operations. A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

joint planning group. A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called **JPG**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

line of operations. 1. A logical line that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and purpose with an objective(s). 2. A physical line that defines the interior or exterior orientation of the force in relation to the enemy or that connects actions on nodes and/or decisive points related in time and space to an objective(s). Also called **LOO**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes. 2. In communications, a general term used to indicate the existence of communications facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a coastal or transit route, which links any two or more routes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

measure of effectiveness. A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. Also called **MOE**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

measure of performance. A criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called **MOP**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. (JP 3-0) 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 3-30) (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement requirement is originated, processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-17) 2. In communications and computer systems, the physical location that provides terminating, switching, and gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP 6-0) 3. An element of a system that represents a person, place, or physical thing. (JP 3-0) (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-17)

objective. 1. The clearly defined, decisive, and attainable goal toward which every operation is directed. 2. The specific target of the action taken (for example, a definite terrain feature, the seizure or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan, or, an enemy force or capability without regard to terrain features). (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

operation. 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

operational art. 1. A series of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. (JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

operational level of war. The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas.JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

operation order. A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. Also called OPORD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

operation plan. 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. Also called **OPLAN**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

phase. In joint operation planning, a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 5-0)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements forming a unified whole. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering commander's objectives, operational requirements, capabilities, and limitations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-60)

task assessment. Measures the completion or accomplishment of tasks, or a set of tasks, through the use of measures of performance. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)

theater. The geographical area for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the geographic combatant commander for the conduct or support of specific military operations. Multiple theaters of operations normally will be geographically separate and focused on different missions. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Also called **TO**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

theater of war. Defined by the Secretary of Defense or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander's entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 3-0)

unified command. A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, that is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called **unified combatant command**. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

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