# CONDUCTING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOPHISTICATED MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

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DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

19990909 338

## REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22	1202-4302, and to the Office of Hamagement		
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave bla	2. REPORT DATE 4 June 1999	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES Master's Thesis, 7 Aug 98	COVERED - 4 Jun 99
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE CONDUCTING PSYCHOLOG IN SOPHISTICATED MEDIA	GICAL OPERATIONS ENVIRONMENTS	5. FUN	iding numbers
6. AUTHOR(S) STEPHEN C. LARSEN, MAJ,	USA		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. Army Command and General Graduate Degree Programs I Reynolds Avenue, Bell Hall, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1	eral Staff College Room 123		FORMING ORGANIZATION ORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING A	AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(I	ES) 10. SPC AG	DNSORING / MONITORING ENCY REPORT NUMBER
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		<b>%</b> >	
technology and administrative/O	Government agencies and their operational use, 4 June 1999. OHQS, CAC & Ft Leavenworth,	contractors; critical ther requests for this	STRIBUTION CODE
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14. SUBJECT TERMS Psychological Operations, PSYO Bosniz-Herzegovina, leaflets, te	OP, product development, target levision, radio	audience analysis, marketing,	15. NUMBER OF PAGES 115 16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
····		1	12012001120

## MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

#### **ABSTRACT**

CONDUCTING PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOPHISTICATED MEDIA ENVIRONMENTS by MAJ Stephen C. Larsen, USA, 116 pages.

This study investigates doctrine, education, and training improvements necessary to produce effective psychological operations audio, visual, and audiovisual products in sophisticated media environments.

Current ongoing operations such as that in Bosnia-Herzegovina cause psychological operations (PSYOP) personnel to affect behavioral modification in target audiences accustomed to very sophisticated media. The quality and sophistication of PSYOP products must be competitive with those other media in order to gain and hold the attention of the target audience.

Recent PSYOP experience is mostly third world, targeting audiences accustomed to the most basic and unsophisticated media. Current doctrine, education and training, supports the conduct of PSYOP targeting audiences accustomed to relatively unsophisticated media.

This thesis emphasizes proper target audience analysis and product development appropriate to sophisticated media environments. Particular attention is given to graphic design and television product development.

#### **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to the following persons for their invaluable support. The members of the thesis committee were enthusiastic and provided clear and consistent guidance. Two exceptional psychological operations officers, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Seidl, United States Army, and Major Steven Collins, United States Army, provided much operational background information and constructive criticism. Staff Sergeant Jeffrey Burton, United States Army, provided numerous examples of products for analysis. Ms. Helen Davis proofread the draft and together with Ms. Karen Brightwell kept the author on schedule and in compliance with established writing norms. And special thanks goes to the author's dear wife, Catherine Larsen, who provided encouragement and love in completing this project.

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#### **ABBREVIATIONS**

ARRC Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

BPSE brigade PSYOP support element

C2W command and control warfare

CA Civil Affairs

CINC commander in chief

CPSE corps PSYOP support element

DPSE division PSYOP support element

DV digital video

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

G2 general staff section, or officer, for intelligence

G3 general staff section, or officer, for operations

GIE global information environment

GIF graphic interface file

HTML hypertext markup language

HTTP hypertext transfer protocol

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IFOR NATO Peace Implementation Force

IO information operations

INFOSYS information systems

IW information warfare

JIB joint information bureau

JIC joint information center

JPEG (or JPG) joint photographic expert group

JPOTF joint PSYOP task force

JTF joint task force

MIE military information environment

NAC North Atlantic Council

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCA National Command Authorities

NGO non-governmental organization

OPINFO operational information

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PA Public Affairs

P/AWS product/action worksheet

PC personal computer

PDC product development center

PDS product development section

PDWS product development workstation

POAS PSYOP Automated System

POB PSYOP battalion

POG PSYOP group

PPS plans and programs section

**PSYACTS** psychological actions

**PSYOP** 

Psychological Operations

PVO

private voluntary organization

**SFOR** 

**NATO Stabilization Force** 

**SWC** 

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and

School

TAAWS

target audience analysis worksheet

TES

testing and evaluation section

TPB

tactical PSYOP battalion

TPC

tactical PSYOP company

TPD

tactical PSYOP detachment

**TPDD** 

tactical PSYOP development detachment

TPT

tactical PSYOP team

UN

**United Nations** 

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USEUCOM

United States European Command

**USACAPOC** 

United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations

Command

**USAJFKSWCS** 

United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and

School

**USASOC** 

United States Army Special Operations Command

USIA

United States Information Agency

USIS

United States Information Service

**USSOCOM** 

United States Special Operations Command

#### CHAPTER 1

#### INTRODUCTION

## Background and Research Question

It is often said that information is power. This is not true. Information is currency with which we may buy behavior. It is in the interest of United States military forces to obtain foreign population behaviors favorable to United States national objectives. This simplifies operations overseas. To do so, military forces must provide information desirable to foreign target audiences so that these audiences will adopt new behaviors in exchange for this information.

This thesis will serve as a planning guide for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) personnel. This thesis describes techniques and procedures beyond that found in United States Army doctrinal manuals.

Our military forces are operating more routinely in sophisticated media environments and must compete with organizations experienced in the development and projection of information through sophisticated media. This thesis may prove useful to PSYOP personnel inexperienced or unfamiliar with such environments.

For the purposes of this thesis, sophisticated media environments are called "first world" environments.

In order to achieve United States national objectives outside the United States,

United States military forces must often modify the behavior of the people living there.

As many civilian marketing agencies know, we can modify the behavior of target audiences by providing information suggesting or directing new behavior. Marketers do

so by giving the target audience a convincing reason to modify their behavior. This study suggests an approach to achieve successful changes in target audience behavior favorable to United States national objectives through the use of multi-media products.

Doctrinally, PSYOP personnel must overcome two significant challenges to produce effective products that change behavior. First, PSYOP personnel refine United States national objectives into supporting psychological objectives. This focuses PSYOP effort and integrates PSYOP into the supported unit's plan. As part of this refinement, PSYOP personnel identify appropriate audiences to target. Second, PSYOP personnel must analyze the target audience properly. PSYOP personnel do this by identifying audience perceived or real needs. This is the target audience vulnerability that PSYOP personnel exploit. PSYOP personnel exploit this vulnerability by persuading or directing a target audience to satisfy the need by adopting the new behavior. 

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Ongoing United States military operations in Bosnia provide the impetus for this thesis. PSYOP personnel established operations in Bosnia in December 1995. PSYOP personnel began providing information using a weekly television program, daily radio programs, a weekly newspaper with a peak circulation of 100,000 copies, a monthly news magazine, countless handbills and posters, all broadcast or printed in three dialects of Serbo-Croatian in two different alphabets.<sup>2</sup> The audiences in the former Yugoslavia are accustomed to very sophisticated media such as European satellite television programming. At that time, PSYOP personnel were experienced in conducting operations in countries where there exists little media sophistication if any media at all. Recent PSYOP experience included support to military operations in Iraq, Haiti, and Somalia, among others. PSYOP personnel in Bosnia had to develop techniques and

procedures applicable to European audiences. Doctrinal manuals were quickly discarded as too general.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the research question is: What doctrine, education, and training improvements are necessary to produce effective PSYOP products changing foreign first-world target audience behavior favorable to United States national objectives?

Supporting questions include:

- 1. What resources are available to PSYOP personnel in order to gather intelligence?
- 2. What techniques can PSYOP personnel use to best conduct Target Audience Analysis?
- 3. What techniques can PSYOP personnel use to best develop multi-media products?
- 4. How should PSYOP personnel select media appropriate to the target audience?
- 5. How should PSYOP personnel produce the selected media?
- 6. What techniques should PSYOP personnel use to disseminate products?

## **Assumptions**

First-world governments will continue to collapse resulting in internal armed conflict and the potential for armed conflict.

First-world countries will sustain great suffering due to natural and man-made disasters.

First-world population groups experiencing armed conflict or disaster will not behave in ways consistent with United States national objectives. In response to these behaviors, the United States will deploy military personnel to conduct PSYOP in first-world countries.

PSYOP will continue to be Joint and Combined in nature.

The United States Army PSYOP force structure will not change in the foreseeable future. The 4th PSYOP Group will continue to be the only active United States Army PSYOP group and the 2d and 7th PSYOP Groups will be the only United States Army Reserve PSYOP groups.

PSYOP training will not change significantly in the foreseeable future.

#### Limitations

This study will not discuss information regarding currently ongoing operations as a matter of operational security.

Two major PSYOP doctrinal manuals, FM 33-1 *Psychological Operations* and FM 33-1-1 *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures* are currently under revision. The drafts for both manuals will be released shortly after this thesis will be published. Neither draft is currently available for review.

This thesis will not discuss classified information.

This study will discuss recent military operations in Bosnia during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. This study will not discuss any information that may, in the opinion of the author, affect the operational security of current operations in Bosnia.

#### Anticipated problems

This study will make use of examples of actual PSYOP visual products such as handbills and posters. Due to size constraints, the original format of the product will be modified for inclusion. The visual impact of the product will therefore be diminished.

### Significance of the study

This study will apply doctrinal principles to operations in first world environments. This thesis will apply civilian marketing techniques to solve military problems. This can help PSYOP personnel prepare for the challenges of first world operations.

This study may aid in the understanding of PSYOP principles and procedures.

This thesis may aid in the development of future doctrine.

This study will address techniques to quickly design and produce products appropriate to first world audiences focused on behavior modification.

This study will present simplified methods to quickly and accurately analyze a first world target audience.

This study will suggest a method to abbreviate the necessary but clumsy product approval process.

This study will suggest a simplified method to synchronize the development and disseminate different media product types projecting the same information. This will simplify coordinating the efforts of television, radio, and print product developers so that the products have a consistent theme and reach the target audience simultaneously with maximum impact.

This study will specifically address television product development and radio product dissemination.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993).

<sup>2</sup>Colonel William Hunter, United States Army, comments made during his assumption of command of the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 1996.

<sup>3</sup>Author's experience as the first PSYOP Product Development Center Chief in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, January 1996.

#### CHAPTER 2

#### LITERATURE REVIEW

Current United States Army PSYOP doctrinal manuals are outdated. These manuals reflect United States Army PSYOP support to military operations in third world environments. PSYOP typically supported operations in many third world countries for the past few decades. PSYOP personnel now conduct operations more frequently in first world environments. These operations include operations not discussed in detail in the doctrinal manuals. These operations include support to agencies other than military. For example, PSYOP works closely with State Department officials in Central and South America as part of the "War on Drugs". PSYOP supported military and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) officials after Hurricane Andrew struck Florida. PSYOP personnel are currently conducting peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. PSYOP personnel are increasing public awareness of landmine hazards in Cambodia and elsewhere.

Other United States government agencies will request PSYOP personnel support. The State Department disseminates United States Government information through a subordinate organization called the United States Information Agency (USIA). USIA operating in United States embassies overseas is known as the United States Information Service (USIS). As State Department budgets dwindle and USIA operations decline, cash-strapped ambassadors more frequently request PSYOP augmentation to their USIS teams overseas. PSYOP doctrine does not address staff integration with agencies outside the United States military.

Currently, PSYOP personnel are operating in Bosnia under NATO authority in direct contravention of National Security Decision Directive 130 (NSDD 130). This presidential directive states that PSYOP must serve under United States government control. But in Bosnia, PSYOP personnel are operating under NATO control. Since the United States is a NATO member, members of the Department of Defense Joint Staff (J-39) are coordinating exceptions and amending joint doctrine. Recognizing the slowness of doctrinal evolution, MAJ Glenn James, chief of PSYOP Doctrine Branch at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (SWC), Fort Bragg, traveled to Bosnia in August, 1998 to make an assessment of the state of doctrine compared to current mission requirements. His after action report included the following remarks regarding the lack of doctrine.

- There is no doctrine, which addresses the conduct of combined POTF [PSYOP Task Force] or CJICTF [Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force] operations. PSYOP can not function IAW JP 3-53 [Joint Publication 3-53, Psychological Operations] because the product is not a US product and the operation is not US...
- ...NSDD 130 which precludes foreign control over the approval of US PSYOP products do [sic] not apply.

One of the problems in updating doctrine is lack of resources, especially funding.

Major James continues in his after-action review, "... there are no resources...and there is a definite need to know who will be the bill payer."

The United States Army trains U.S and allied PSYOP personnel at SWC. The unit responsible for this doctrinal training is the PSYOP Detachment, B Company, 3d Special Warfare Training Battalion. That detachment conducts two doctrinal operational PSYOP courses, the nine-week 37F Psychological Operations Specialist Advanced Individual Training Course, called "37F AIT," for enlisted soldiers, and the five-week

Psychological Operations Officer Course, called "POOC." They also teach a third course for staff planning at Joint Staff level in existing and emerging joint doctrine, the two-week Joint Psychological Operations Staff Planners Course, commonly called "The Joint Course." There is no "PSYOP Officer Advanced Course" to train field grade officers. The preponderance of doctrinal instruction in the first two existing courses comes from two dated United States Army manuals, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations*, and FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*. These two manuals are easily accessible by PSYOP personnel. These two manuals are the foundation for the conduct of U.S Army PSYOP and both 37F AIT and POOC teach from them. It is this author's experience that FM 33-1-1 is the best single document that describes in detail the conduct of PSYOP in general terms and that most PSYOP personnel use this document exclusively.

This field manual (FM) sets forth techniques and procedures for implementing United States (United States) Army psychological operations (PSYOP) doctrine contained in FM 33-1. It provides general guidance for commanders and planners who must consider the impact of military operations on various target audiences. It also provides guidance for PSYOP personnel preparing operational elements for commitment. It describes procedures for carrying out PSYOP programs in support of other military operations. PSYOP commanders and trainers should use it with the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to plan and conduct training.<sup>2</sup>

As such, it is the source document from which United States Army personnel conduct PSYOP. It lacks the specificity valuable to PSYOP personnel working in first world environments.

To conduct PSYOP, PSYOP personnel use doctrinal processes that ultimately result in changed attitudes and behaviors of target audiences favorable to United States national objectives. PSYOP is conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

FM 33-1-1, chapter 3, describes the over-arching "PSYOP Cycle and Planning Procedures." The PSYOP cycle consists of three phases: assessing, planning, and executing. This is a continuous cycle "designed to carry the mission from conception through execution and follow-up assessment."

As part of the PSYOP Cycle, PSYOP personnel apply the six-part "PSYOP Process". The parts are Intelligence Gathering, Target Audience Analysis, Product Development, Media Selection, Media Production, and Dissemination.<sup>4</sup>

United States Army PSYOP units task organize to conduct operations. The task organization is based upon the situation. The newly formed PSYOP organization for operations in Florida following a hurricane will therefore be much different than the PSYOP organization formed to support humanitarian assistance operations in Rwanda. The newly formed organization normally includes a Product Development Center (PDC). FM 33-1-1 describes the typical organization of the PDC.

Generally, a PDC has four functional sections: Plans and Programs Section (PPS), Target Audience Analysis Section (TAAS), Testing and Evaluation Section (TES), [and] Product Development Section (PDS).

The initial six months of the Bosnia experience, December 1995 through June 1996, required changes to this doctrinal organization due to the complexity of the mission and the widely varied media selected for product development. In fact, at one point during the mission, there were three mutually supporting PDCs under one PSYOP headquarters supporting the mission, one in Stuttgart, Germany, one in Zagreb, Croatia, and a third in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Never before had PSYOP intended to develop and disseminate television, radio, newspaper, handbill, poster, leaflet, news magazine, youth magazine, and novelty item products during one mission

simultaneously.<sup>5</sup> FM 33-1-1 is silent with respect to complex PSYOP organizations working from separate locations. And there is no document that captures the PSYOP capabilities of allied nations with whom United States PSYOP personnel may be working. This thesis will refer to the writings of Major Steven Collins who has since written papers describing the situation at that time and suggesting techniques beyond the scope of FM 33-1-1 addressing FM 33-1-1's shortcomings. As of this writing, Major Collins' suggestions have not been captured in doctrinal writings.

Doctrinally, PSYOP does not work in a vacuum but as an integral part of a larger United States government organization. Historically, PSYOP worked for a larger military organization. PSYOP will continue to support a larger organization but not necessarily a United States military one. This thesis will present procedures that are applicable to supporting a larger organization whether it be a major military theater command, a tactical military unit, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or even a United States country team<sup>6</sup> overseas. It is possible that United States Army PSYOP personnel will be subordinate to foreign military authority. For example, this authority may be United Nations (UN) command or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) command in the Balkans.

In any event, it is imperative for the subordinate PSYOP organization to analyze the objectives of the supported organization and design a campaign that supports these objectives.<sup>7</sup> FM 33-1-1 does not address PSYOP planning integration with organizations other than United States military organizations. Although FM 33-1-1 is silent with respect to application of PSYOP to other organizations, Major Collins' writings address this.

There is no single doctrinal document commanders can use to focus their staff or sections during the mission analysis process that addresses unique resource requirements. Upon receipt of a mission, the PSYOP unit commander focuses his staff when conducting PSYOP campaign planning. The commander's staff seeks to determine the mission requirements, the resources available and whether there are any resource shortfalls in meeting these mission requirements. Without this focus, the staff may not know what questions to ask or information to research determine whether there exist any resource shortfalls. This focus is particularly critical when the mission is unique to the unit or the unit has little time to plan. There are unique resource requirements in locations accustomed to sophisticated media. There is no document that the staff can use to narrow the scope of its preliminary research. This thesis will assist and guide the staff.

Intelligence gathering is the next step in the PSYOP process. This step supports target audience analysis. FM 33-1-1, chapter 5 addresses intelligence gathering methods.

One method to obtain information suggested:

PSYOP personnel may use the Foreign Publication Procurement Program (FPPP) to obtain foreign newspapers, magazines, and books from all over the world. Any country with a United States Embassy or Consulate is involved in the FPPP and can provide information on how to obtain these resources.<sup>8</sup>

It is the author's experience that this method and the others are impractical, too slow, and archaic. And doctrine makes no mention of new information technologies such as the Internet. This thesis will discuss faster sources of timely information useful in first world environments.

The information gathering effort supports the next step, target audience analysis.

Probably the most difficult aspect of PSYOP is proper target audience analysis (TAA).

All PSYOP products are dependent upon this. If done improperly, no behavioral modification may occur. In Major James after action review, he writes that the commander of Second Brigade, First Armored Division stated that "PSYOP messages were bland, ineffective, and not properly targeted to the local population". Civilian commercial marketing uses techniques and procedures similar to PSYOP TAA. This thesis will apply marketing principles for PSYOP uses to address TAA shortcomings experienced by Second Brigade, First Armored Division. As explained in FM 33-1-1, chapter 6, proper TAA identifies a target audience weakness, either perceived or real, that PSYOP personnel may exploit to obtain a new target audience attitude or behavior. PSYOP personnel trade information for behavior. Information becomes a currency of sorts to buy this new behavior. Proper TAA identifies the specific information PSYOP personnel will provide to the target audience to obtain the new attitude or behavior. This information is called the "theme" and directs or persuades the target audience to adopt the new attitude or behavior. Proper TAA also identifies appropriate media such as audio, visual or audiovisual. Media selection is based upon what media will reach the target audience and what media the target audience will best understand. Proper TAA identifies appropriate symbols to help convey these messages. Proper TAA identifies measurable criteria that PSYOP personnel can use to evaluate the effectiveness of the products. These criteria are called "impact indicators". A failure in any of these areas may result in a failed product. That in turn may negatively impact the supported unit and its ability to achieve its objectives. Although FM 33-1-1 discusses procedures, it does so very generally and provides no examples. Commercial marketing texts are replete with

proven techniques and examples and this thesis will study and apply these techniques to anticipated PSYOP situations.

FM 33-1-1 describes each part of the TAA process in detail but gives no examples to use as a model for the entire process. PSYOP personnel are forced to learn the process in its entirety only by experience. For the benefit of the reader without such experience, a simplified example might look like this: there is an outbreak of Cholera at a refugee center in the fields of a third-world country. A detachment of PSYOP personnel arrives on the scene and begins to work for the local IRC. The local IRC official reports that refugees are using a local water source to relieve themselves and wants them to use field latrines rather than the water sources. The PSYOP leaders form a Product Development Center (PDC). The leader and an assistant act as the Plans and Programs Section (PPS) to assign responsibilities, provide focus and guidance. The PPS directs the PDC to begin work on the Cholera problem. The Target Audience Analysis Section (TAAS) of the Product Development Center (PDC) begins TAA and discovers that the target audience is fearful of Cholera but does not understand that human waste contaminating water sources will result in Cholera problems. The TAAS also finds that few members of the target audience are literate but enjoy full color graphic cartoons on posters and handbills. The TAAS suggests using cartoons that direct people to use latrines and avoid the water sources. The TAAS records its findings on a Target Audience Analysis Worksheet (TAAWS) and sends the TAAWS to the Product Development Section (PDS) to begin work on prototype poster and handbill products. The PDS uses a Product/Action Worksheet (P/AWS) as a kind of work order to develop its cartoon-like handbill and poster prototypes. Once the prototypes are complete the PDS passes them to the Testing

and Evaluation Section (TES). The TES exposes a sample of the target audience to the prototypes for evaluation. The TES reports to the PDS that the prototypes are effective. The PDS then coordinates for full-scale production. The PPS then coordinates for dissemination. The TES monitors the reaction of the target audience to the products and confirms that the products cause the target audience to avoid the water sources and use the latrines. The TES reports that IRC illness reports are declining. The TES observes the target audience as it adopts the new behavior. Likewise, the IRC recognizes the new behavior, the Cholera outbreak subsides, and the PPS ends the mission.

The next step in the PSYOP process is product development. Developing products requires a great degree of artistic skill, graphic design experience, and cultural awareness. A culturally aesthetic product is the result of the synthesis of all three. An effective product is the result of an aesthetic product accepted by the target audience and acted upon by the target audience as intended by the product developer. As described in the example above, the PDC develops prototype products based upon TAA. These products may be audio, visual or audiovisual in format. An example of an audio product may be a 30-second radio announcement. An example of a visual product may be a poster or handbill. An example of an audiovisual product may be a five-minute television news spot. FM 33-1-1 covers this subject over the course of chapters 7-10. Sadly, there is no doctrinal instruction to show how to actually design a poster, handbill, leaflet, radio program, television program, coloring book, comic book, etc. No instruction or guidance regarding the graphic design of visual products or acceptable norms for radio or television scripts. Nor is there is a single example of what a product might look like, an example radio or TV script nor any description whatsoever of a

graphic design for a handbill, poster, leaflet, coloring book, comic book, etc. This thesis will address this.

PSYOP personnel must be able to communicate a message to an audience of another culture in their language so that the message is easily understandable and conveys the intended message. FM 33-1-1 says little about communicating to audiences of another culture. This is critically important to PSYOP success. There is little discussion in FM 33-1-1 regarding cultural acceptability of PSYOP products. PSYOP is similar to international marketing in that both PSYOP and international marketing attempt to provide information that causes a foreign target audience to adopt a new behavior. In the case of marketing, the new behavior is buying the product. It is as critical for PSYOP personnel to understand the target audience culturally before designing products. This is particularly true when selecting audio, visual, or audiovisual symbols to help convey the message. Marketing journals and publications are replete with international marketing disasters because the marketer failed to understand the target audience culturally. This thesis will analyze marketing experience for possible PSYOP application.

Unlike marketing, the measure of PSYOP success is not in sales. But like marketing, it is imperative that the PSYOP objective be measurable. Only when PSYOP products are tested and evaluated can effectiveness be determined. The effectiveness becomes mission success. FM 33-1-1, chapter 11, describes this principle generally but gives no useful examples for complex environments. Major James made specific mention of a failure to assess the effectiveness of PSYOP using measurable impact indicators in Bosnia: "There are a lot of products that are being produced; however,

commanders do not know if they are effective. Is success to be equated with the number of products produced and disseminated or the actions that are elicited in response to PSYOP products?" Doctrinally, the answer to Major James' question is that success is to be equated by the actions elicited in response to PSYOP products. FM 33-1-1 does not address techniques to measure the impact of sophisticated media products. This thesis will address this.

The next two steps in the PSYOP process are Media Selection and Media Production. FM 33-1-1 does a good job explaining how to identify proper media. Media selection is based entirely on target audience accessibility. If the target audience can only be reached by radio, for example, then the PSYOP products must be radio products. But doctrinal description of media production is quite vague. There is nothing in doctrine that describes how to produce a radio program. There is nothing in doctrine to show how to produce a television program. There is nothing to show how to layout a graphic product. There are no equipment descriptions or lists, no tape type descriptions, no comparisons of various tape recording qualities by type. The staff should at least understand that these complexities exist and doctrine should point to where the staff may find this information. This thesis will address this.

The last step in the doctrinal PSYOP process is dissemination. FM 33-1-1 describes dissemination techniques for leaflets, radio broadcasting and loudspeaker operations in terms too general to be useful in sophisticated media environments. There is nothing that describes techniques for disseminating television tapes to civilian commercial television stations. FM 33-1-1 states "PSYOP personnel should broadcast on HN [host nation] equipment in a FID [foreign internal defense] situation." But PSYOP

conducts radio broadcasts in many other situations. There is nothing that describes the necessity for actually negotiating broadcast airtime, either radio or television. Nor is there any information regarding funding. This information comes from the many varied experiences of PSYOP personnel and the experiences of commercial marketing. These experiences are invaluable to those who have not solved funding, format, or design problems. And this information is critical to the staff when planning for missions and time is short. This thesis will address these issues.

As stated in the first chapter, the research question is: "What is the process necessary to produce effective PSYOP products changing foreign first-world target audience behavior and attitude favorable to United States national objectives?" Clearly the answer is the PSYOP process as stated in FM 33-1-1 but with modification and much greater specificity. This thesis identifies these specifics, provides the commander's staff the ability to focus, and results in suggestions to improve the effectiveness of PSYOP.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne), United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, *Program of Instruction*, 37F AIT and POOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1996.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), v.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Ibid., 3-1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Ibid., 3-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Colonel William Hunter, United States Army, comments made during his assumption of command of the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 1996.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The United States Country Team is the staff of a United States embassy overseas and consists of many United States governmental organizations' representatives under the direction of the United States ambassador.

<sup>7</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 4-1.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., 5-9.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 11-9.

#### CHAPTER 3

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

As stated in the first chapter, the research question is: What is the process necessary to produce effective PSYOP products changing foreign first-world target audience behavior and attitude favorable to United States national objectives? The previous chapter analyzed the doctrinal United States Army PSYOP process as stated in FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures*. The analysis determined that the doctrinal process is unsatisfactory when applied to sophisticated media environments. The previous chapter analyzed each step of the doctrinal process in turn and identified some specific weaknesses for each process step. This thesis will suggest amendments to the process to meet those needs.

The research conducted will identify these specifics, step by step, ultimately resulting in an amended process appropriate to sophisticated media environments.

Intelligence gathering is the first step in the PSYOP process. This thesis will research available information systems and intelligence gathering architectures to obtain information quickly. This research will determine possible sources of information useful and available to PSYOP personnel in sophisticated media environments.

This thesis will identify basic psychological principles applicable to target audience analysis beyond what is stated in doctrine. Research will identify principles of behavior modification found in common Psychology texts. As an application of these Psychology principles, this thesis will focus on practice-proven civilian commercial

marketing techniques commonly used to identify a target audience then modify its behavior as found in common marketing texts.

PSYOP soldiers receive no graphic design training but are required to develop graphic products designed to achieve target audience behavioral changes. This thesis will identify simple, practice-proven, common graphic design principles applicable to PSYOP in sophisticated media environments. Research will focus in civilian, commercial graphic design texts.

This thesis will identify specific characteristics of sophisticated media not found in doctrine. This refines media selection in sophisticated media environments. Research will focus on the characteristics of television, Internet, newspaper, and radio commercial advertising as found in marketing texts and Internet commentary.

This thesis will identify requirements and characteristics of product production applicable to sophisticated media environments. This thesis will provide a discussion of radio and television program and tape production not found in doctrine.

This thesis will identify common principles of television and radio program dissemination not found in doctrine. It will suggest techniques to negotiate broadcast contracts to secure commercial radio and television program airtime. Research will focus on civilian, commercial marketing techniques found in common marketing texts.

The thesis conclusion will suggest a modified process useful to PSYOP personnel operating in sophisticated media environments and to those personnel developing new doctrine reflecting new PSYOP roles and missions in environments of ever-increasing media sophistication.

#### **CHAPTER 4**

#### **ANALYSIS**

#### Mission Analysis and Integration

PSYOP forces are supporting missions not predicted by doctrine. This presents a host of integration problems for PSYOP planners, proponencies, and executors who must now coordinate efforts with other United States Government agencies. And while supporting these varied missions working with other United States Government Agencies, it is predictable that these agencies will expect quality PSYOP personnel and units capable of operating in sophisticated media environments.

Under the scrutiny of a very responsive, high technology world news media, given the volatile, unstable, and ambiguous environment in which armed forces can find themselves, the actions of field forces have a greater chance than ever before of affecting subsequent strategic decisions made at higher levels. The pressure on field commanders to "get it right the first time" is demonstrably greater than ever. <sup>1</sup>

As noted in chapter 2, there are significant doctrinal voids regarding integration and cooperation with other United States Government agencies. In order to properly achieve the objectives of the United States Government, all agencies must make a coordinated effort, being mutually supporting and complimentary. "PSYOP at the strategic level suffers from a lack of coordination with other USG agencies disseminating information to foreign audiences (e.g.: Radio Marti, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, etc.)[sic]. This can lead to, at best, a somewhat uncoordinated effort in various regions around the world where the USG's information dissemination power is not used to its fullest advantage."<sup>2</sup>

PSYOP personnel must be prepared for operations closely coordinated with other United States Government agencies. Before PSYOP personnel can begin any process to achieve behavior changes in target audiences PSYOP personnel must be integrated into the supported unit. As of this writing, there is no doctrinal guide for PSYOP personnel in preparing for these operations. But in the absence of doctrine, the American soldier adapts. During the first six months of the Bosnia mission, PSYOP personnel successfully integrated PSYOP support to the United Nations (UN), the International Red Cross (IRC) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) among others.

NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and General George Joulwan, CINCEUR/SACEUR [Commander in Chief Europe/Supreme Allied Commander Europe], outlined in their D+120 (18 April 1996) guidance that IFOR had to shift gears and more fully assist the civilian agencies—particularly OHR [Office of Humanitarian Relief] and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the agency responsible for overseeing the elections in Bosnia.

PSYOP anticipated this change in focus and had already shifted its emphasis to support civilian agencies. PSYOP news reporters interviewed Ambassador Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE's mission in Bosnia, Soren Peter-Jensen, (head of UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] in Bosnia), and many other high ranking civilians. The POTF HQ [PSYOP task force headquarters] also developed hundreds of other electronic media and print PSYOP products to support the civilian agencies in Bosnia.<sup>3</sup>

This effort proved it was not only possible to support varied organizations other than United States military but that the basic doctrinal principles of FM 33-1-1 could be applied to achieve the objectives of these other organizations. However, the application was painful, slow and required great innovation. "Into this environment of extremely sophisticated perception management where the target audience was well educated, media savvy, and already the product of more than three years of elaborate propaganda bombardment, the US PSYOP effort began."

The James trip report discusses the difficulties facing PSYOP planners challenged with the integration of PSYOP forces into organizations other than United States military forces: "There is no doctrine, which addresses the conduct of combined [PSYOP Task Force] or [Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force] operations. PSYOP can not function [in accordance with] JP 3-53 [joint operations publication 3-53, 

\*Psychological Operations\*] because the product is not a US product and the operation is not US."5

Integration can be legally significant. United States National Security Decision

Directive 130 (NSDD 130) dated March 1984 restricts authority over United States

PSYOP forces. As it now exists in ongoing operations such as those in Bosnia, it may be more likely in the future that United States PSYOP forces will operate outside the authority of the United States Government. Major James explained in his report how a transfer of such authority occurred in Bosnia and may occur in the future.

There are many problems associated with conducting combined operations that are issues within themselves: language barriers, equipment and software incompatibility, intelligence links, unilateral actions, parochialism, lack of understanding of PDC operations, integrating PDC functions, etc... Transfer of authority (TOA) to NATO was approved and subsequently transferred to SFOR [NATO Stabilization Force]. This transfer of authority is not as important as in the past when the CJICTF was US led and fear of foreign control over US PSYOP products was a problem. That is no longer the case since this is a NATO led CJICTF. This is not an issue since the SFOR commander is US with final approval authority over all CJICTF [combined joint information campaign task force] PSYOP products. "Because the POTF is combined [composed of forces from more than one nation], the product is not a US product and therefore NSDD 130 which precludes foreign control over the approval of US PSYOP products do not apply. This relationship will not affect the function of US PSYOP.

Changes in doctrine come with associated financial costs. Some organization must pay for the development of the new doctrine. Major James reported how this

challenge surfaced for United States European Command (EUCOM) and after careful consideration made a recommendation to resolve the issue for Europe in the future.

Observation: EUCOM [European Command] and SOCEUR [Special Operations Command Europe] have agreed that SOCEUR has proponency for PSYOP; however, there are no resources attached to this new relationship and there is a definite need to know who will be the bill payer.

Recommendation: Expedite the assessment and develop additional manning to support peacetime planning and mobilization of PSYOP forces during deployments. USSOCOM [United States Special Operations Command] should allocate resources to the SOCs [Special Operations Commands] to assume the additional responsibilities. EUCOM must create PSYOP billets on its staff to support its planning.

Staff planners must also have realistic expectations for PSYOP. PSYOP is an integral part of the supported organization's plan. Together with other elements and forces of the organization, PSYOP can be effective. PSYOP alone accomplishes little. PSYOP projects the message of the supported organization. PSYOP is dependent upon the credibility and truthfulness of the message. Civilian marketers, like PSYOP, have behavioral modification objectives. PSYOP planners can learn from the extensive experience of marketers to draw realistic expectations based upon the message.

Don't expect to solve your company's problems through your marketing program. If the product is flawed from the customer's perspective, then the best thing you can do as a marketer is to present your evidence and encourage the company to improve the product. Marketing can't make a dog win a horse race, so don't let others in your company try to tell you otherwise.<sup>6</sup>

The Dayton Peace Accords required certain areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina to come under the control of different ethnic authorities. During the first few months of the Bosnia mission, the NATO peace implementation force, IFOR, attempted to convince Serbs living in certain Sarajevo suburbs to stay after control of those suburbs was turned

over to Muslim authorities. IFOR turned to US Army PSYOP to convey the message to the Serbs.

PSYOP played a central role in attempting to get the Serbs to stay. Many thought the Serbs would stay if they simply knew the details of the plan for the transfer of control and were aware of the requirement under the GFAP<sup>7</sup> for the rights of all citizens, regardless of ethnicity, to be safeguarded. The failure to convince the Serbs to remain was blamed to some degree on "ineffective PSYOP." However, the hollowness of the *policy* was really the culprit.<sup>8</sup>

Staff integration and supervision of PSYOP is very important. PSYOP may not be the only information projector in the supported organization and all information programs must be coordinated to preserve credibility. In a large operation, other information players may include Public Affairs, United States Information Agency (called United States Information Service overseas), United Nations, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, etc. In complex operations such as Bosnia, information operations staff organization was something developed as the mission developed. Major Collins describes the structure in his 1998 paper and provides an assessment of its success.

Until October 1997, command and control of PSYOP in Bosnia was a very convoluted affair. Admiral (USN) Leighton Smith (IFOR Commander until July 1996), delegated much of the day-to-day PSYOP approval authority to his Land Component Commander, the ARRC [Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] Commander, LTG [Lieutenant General] (UKA) [United Kingdom Army] Sir Michael Walker. Walker became the approval authority for all tactical PSYOP products (loudspeaker messages, handbills, etc.). Operational PSYOP products, those products disseminated simultaneously throughout the entire country (PSYOP newspaper, radio, and television), were approved first by the ARRC and then by IFOR Command Group (with the final approval by the IFOR Chief of Staff—LTG (USA) William Carter).

Although some PSYOP personnel chaffed under the ARRC control, in reality, Walker was a godsend for the early PSYOP campaign. Articulate, accessible, and fully cognizant of the importance of PSYOP in Bosnia, he provided very skilled direction. He placed the coordination of the Public Affairs (PA) and PSYOP effort in the hands of the ARRC field artillery officer, COL

(UKA) Tim Wilton. Wilton was able to provide needed coordination between Information Operation (IO) assets while avoiding the temptation to exert command and control.

Nearly every morning Walker chaired an Information Coordination Group meeting with the Deputy ARRC Commander, Wilton, a G3 [operations section] representative, a G2 [intelligence section] representative, the ARRC PA Officer, a Civil Affairs representative, the Legal Advisor, the Political Advisor, and a PSYOP representative. In these short 15-20 minute meetings, the participants discussed short-term IO [information operations] actions (primarily PSYOP and PA), and Walker issued guidance on what 'spin' to use. In addition, weekly "Perception Group" meetings, chaired by Wilton, and a "Joint Information Coordination Committee" meetings, chaired by the IFOR PA Officer, CAPT (USN) Mark Van Dyke, were held to coordinate long-term IO planning.

### **Intelligence Gathering**

Intelligence gathering is the first step in the PSYOP process. There are information systems and intelligence gathering architectures to obtain information quickly. As stated in Chapter 2, doctrine suggests slow and archaic methods to obtain information such as requesting foreign periodicals through the United States Embassy or Consulate. "PSYOP personnel may use the Foreign Publication Procurement Program (FPPP) to obtain foreign newspapers, magazines, and books from all over the world. Any country with a United States Embassy or Consulate is involved in the FPPP and can provide information on how to obtain these resources."

Doctrine makes no mention of valuable information technologies such as the Internet to gather relevant information quickly. The following example illustrates the point.

As of this writing, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is under intense international political pressure and NATO military bombings to resolve a crisis in the Serbian province of Kosovo. PSYOP personnel are participating in this effort. PSYOP

personnel gathering information about the official Serbian perspective as recorded in official Serbian state-run media can simply obtain that information in seconds using any one of a number of commercially available Internet search engines. Just such a search using the popular *Excite* search engine from a personal computer using the common *Netscape* Internet software found this web address, <a href="http://www.serbia-info.com">http://www.serbia-info.com</a>. From this site, PSYOP personnel would find the following statement describing the importance of Kosovo as perceived by the Serbians within a few minutes.

We must bear in mind the fact that Kosovo and Metohija is the centre [sic] of Serbian State and Church, the source of Serbian spirituality, culture, state and religious consciousness of the Serbian people. What Jerusalem represents to the Jews, London to the Englishmen, Notre Dame to the Frenchmen, Moscow to the Russian people, Pec and Prizren represent to the Serbian people. 11

This is the official state-run Serbian information page. It contains recent interviews with President Milosevic and various state-sponsored Serbian Orthodox Church officials.

Predictably, this web page is a propaganda vehicle and as such very useful to PSYOP personnel.

Information technologies such as Internet access from a personal computer provide fast research capability to PSYOP personnel. Information for PSYOP purposes must be timely to be useful. PSYOP personnel must therefore gather and evaluate this information quickly. Internet access is a valuable asset for fast information gathering.

Today, crises occur literally overnight with reactive military deployments happening within hours. PSYOP personnel require immediate access to information, not a lesson on how to travel to a foreign embassy to apply for permission and State Department funding to buy a newspaper. FM 33-1-1 goes on to state, "The PSYOP battalion S2 [intelligence officer] receives all incoming items and distributes them

according to need." This does not work in practice because the PSYOP battalion S2 normally does not deploy. The S2 is supporting many subordinate units deployed to different regions supporting different missions simultaneously. The S2 would have no understanding of what to request and who actually needed the materials being a continent or more away from the deployed PSYOP soldiers. Furthermore, the materials may be written in a foreign language and it is unlikely the S2, being a soldier trained in intelligence not linguistics, would have the ability to translate the documents. Even if the S2 obtained relevant information, translated it, understood it, could make a reasonable assessment as to whom actually needed it and then disseminated it to the right party, it may take days or weeks to arrive in the TAAS of the PDC for analysis.

SWC provides the same one-hour block of intelligence gathering instruction to both 37F AIT enlisted students and POOC officer students. This class, entitled "Intelligence for PSYOP," does nothing more than explain how intelligence specialists assigned to United States Army PSYOP units conduct intelligence gathering. 12

But SWC does expose the students to a far more valuable information-gathering technology in its class entitled "Psychological Operations Automated System" called "POAS". POAS is a communication system based upon personal computers with modems much like the Internet and used like the Internet for PSYOP and Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers. POAS gives deployed PSYOP and CA soldiers with telephones immediate access to commercial databases, highly specialized and capable regional analysts, a PSYOP database with sample PSYOP products, and much more. The class text and handouts clearly show how this system may be used. But only those who have had experience with POAS or have been a 37F AIT or POOC student would even know

of this systems existence. The wealth of information accessible through POAS and even the Internet is literally limitless. The point of this is not that the Internet or POAS should be the doctrinal information gathering tools, rather, that PSYOP personnel must make use of whatever information gathering tools are available including information technologies such as the Internet and POAS.

## Target Audience Analysis

The doctrinal process called Target Audience Analysis (TAA) has steps of its own. The first step is identifying or defining the target audience. Next is defining a new measurable behavior for the target audience consistent with U.S objectives. This new measurable behavior is called the PSYOP objective. Next is revealing physical conditions adversely affecting the target audience. Next is determining the psychological stress caused by the adverse physical condition. This psychological stress or weakness can be stated in terms of a need or want in the target audience. Doctrine calls this the "vulnerability" and it is what the PSYOP message will exploit. Next is an evaluation of target audience effectiveness. This can best be described as an assessment of the willingness of the target audience to achieve the PSYOP objective. Next is developing the message exploiting the weakness. Normally, the message persuades or directs the target audience to adopt the new behavior by suggesting that doing so will satisfy the target audience need or want. This is the buying of behavior using information as currency. Next is selecting symbols recognizable to the target audience to help convey the message. Next is the accessibility assessment, or, the evaluation of media to determine what will best reach the target audience. Next is the identification of

indicators suggesting the success or failure of the PSYOP effort. And last are remarks stating any related programs. 13

To illustrate the process, consider the following hypothetical example. In late 1995 and early 1996, thousands of Serbian soldiers reinforcing Serb soldiers surrounded Sarajevo. Their presence was destabilizing to say the least. The target audience is the Serbian soldiers around Sarajevo. IFOR determined that these Serbians should leave Bosnia and return home to Serbia. The PSYOP objective is to persuade Serbian soldiers to leave Bosnia and return home to Serbia. PSYOP soldiers discovered from Belgrade newspapers that while these Serbian fighting age males were away from their Serbian homes, the crime rate in Serbia skyrocketed. This is the physical condition, the "stressor". Serbian soldiers in Bosnia were fearful for their families and property at home in Serbia. This is the psychological condition based upon the physical condition. This is the target audience vulnerability ripe for exploitation. PSYOP soldiers determined that Serbian soldiers were highly willing to return home and protect their families. PSYOP soldiers devised a message that said, "Serbian soldiers, the war is over now go home and protect your families and property from criminals." PSYOP soldiers selected various visual and audio symbols to convey this message in printed and radio products. These symbols included images and sounds of criminals breaking into homes occupied by terrified housewives and children. PSYOP soldiers coordinated with intelligence personnel to monitor Serbian troop withdrawal. PSYOP personnel then used the target audience analysis to develop products using the symbols combined with the stated message as either overprinted text or accompanying narration. Product dissemination followed shortly afterwards. Intelligence personnel reported that Serbian

soldiers were leaving the Sarajevo area and PSYOP soldiers declared the program successful.<sup>14</sup>

From this example, it is clear that a thorough target audience analysis is not an end unto itself. PSYOP personnel use a thorough target audience analysis to develop print, audio, and audio visual information products. Therefore, the target audience analysis process should be designed toward this end. Components of the TAA should be designed so that a graphic artist or otherwise graphically trained personnel may develop a product prototype without any other information or required research. In this way, the target audience analyst must conduct research from the product development perspective. This frees the graphic artist from research responsibilities and focuses him or her solely on graphic design.

Knowing that in practice PSYOP personnel must often design graphic products without the assistance of trained graphic artists, where can PSYOP personnel obtain some basic skills in graphic design? Who has the experience and technical ability to design a printed product such as a handbill, newspaper advertisement or poster designed to achieve behavior changes in target audiences? Who has the ability to produce a radio or television program designed to achieve behavior changes in target audiences?

Fortunately for PSYOP personnel, there are basic psychological and graphic and audio design principles applicable to target audience analysis beyond what is stated in doctrine. PSYOP personnel often remark that there are many similarities between the techniques of PSYOP and the techniques of commercial marketing. On occasion, PSYOP personnel have argued that marketing techniques must be taught to PSYOP personnel.

PSYOP training must also take advantage of sophisticated marketing, advertising, and polling techniques available in the private sector. The PSYOPer of the future must be adept at cross-cultural communications, the use of local infrastructural media resources, multi-media marketing techniques and planning, and must be familiar with the use of polling and focus groups in order to produce objective and empirically sound measures of effectiveness. 15

Civilian commercial marketing in the first world identifies audiences and targets them for behavior modification using techniques similar to those of PSYOP. Best of all, civilian commercial marketing has extensive experience with sophisticated media. "Marketing's purpose is to reach customers and compel them to purchase, use, and repurchase your product [Italics original]." These techniques are fully applicable to first world audiences. These techniques are proven effective as evidenced by the enormous sums of money corporations spend on marketing and exhaustive research.

PSYOP doctrine directs PSYOP personnel to use worksheets in the process.

Doctrinally, target audience analysis is recorded on a Target Audience Analysis

Worksheet (TAAWS). FM 33-1-1, chapter 4 contains an example shown in figure 1.<sup>17</sup>

The TAAWS is a useful tool for capturing the key parts of the target audience analysis.

But it can be improved to make use of new technologies and be more useful to the graphic artist.

Given that force structure is limited and mission frequency is increasing, PSYOP personnel must devise techniques to accomplish PSYOP process steps with as few personnel as possible. Information technologies such as electronic mail (email) may help. Graphic workstations used in product development are expensive, sensitive to environmental conditions, and fragile.

	TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS I	WORK SHEET
National Objective	Supported Unit Mession	PSYOP Mission
Target Audience		
and an unitarity	PSYOP Objective	
Conditions		
		Effectiveness
Vulnerabilities		
1.	Thomas & Symbols  1. A.	Susceptibility
	<b>B</b> .	1.A.
	<b>G</b> .	8. C.
2.	2. A.	
	<b>B</b> .	. 2.A. B.
	C.	в. С.
		<b>U</b> .
3.	3.A.	3. A.
	8.	B.
	C.	<b>c</b> .
Accessibility		
mpact indicators	·	

THIS IS A SAMPLE OR SUGGESTED FORMAT.

Figure 1. Doctrinal Target Audience Analysis Worksheet (TAAWS). From FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures, 4-6.

The ability to conduct target audience analysis at a remote location then transmit it electronically to a central location for product development preserves resources and personnel. The cumbersome and simplistic doctrinal TAAWS example does not lend itself toward easy electronic transmission other than by fax. Nor is it easily updated electronically once it is completed. But if completed in a common word processing format such as a Microsoft Word file, it can be sent electronically as an email attachment. In the near future, it will be possible for a pool of trained and experienced graphic, audio

or audio-visual artists to create a prototype from the emailed TAAWS. They then transmit the prototype back to the field electronically where it is downloaded, printed or applied to audio or television tape then tested for effectiveness. What is currently lacking is the ability to send very large electronic files reliably.

The TAAWS can be improved substantively also. It is the author's experience that the doctrinal TAAWS does not contain enough information to be used to create prototype products by someone other than the person who filled the TAAWS out. The doctrinal TAAWS is simply too general. And most importantly it ignores the principles of good graphic design. What is needed is a form of TAAWS that can be transmitted by email and contains sufficient information that someone not familiar with the specific TAA can develop a product prototype from it.

Marketers define their target audiences much the way stated in PSYOP doctrine.

A target market segment comes first from recognizing that different groups, or segments, of the market have different needs and wants. Kids versus adults. And heavy users of fast food versus light users. Each of these distinctions cuts up the population into groups. Add the distinctions together and you have a two-dimensional segmentation of your market. But in order to work, your method must do one thing well: it must bring together people who share a common perspective on the product and the need that product fills. 18

Doctrinal Target Audience Analysis identifies vulnerabilities PSYOP personnel can exploit. Identification of target audience needs is vital. Civilian marketing also looks for vulnerabilities based upon audience needs.

So your first and most important strategic task is to think hard about what customers may need and want. Because if you can meet their needs and wants, and do it so well that they are pleasantly surprised and your competitors are disgusted, then your marketing story will be a happy one.<sup>19</sup>

It is important to note that there is a practical difference between needs and wants.

By satisfying both needs and wants simultaneously, PSYOP personnel can attack the target audience on two levels much like successful marketers do.

Someone once said that our wants are many but our needs are few. And that saying contains considerable wisdom. You can probably count the basic needs of a human being on the fingers of both hands: food, shelter, love, achievement, respect, fun, and so forth. We have many and varied wants, but they can all be thought of as expressions of basic needs. I may want a good pizza for lunch, whereas I wanted a sandwich yesterday. But both are expressions of my underlying needs for food and pleasure.

And while I do want a good piece of pizza, I don't have to have it. Pizza is not a fundamental need. I won't die without it. If I can't find pizza, I'll try something else. Customers are flexible about how they satisfy their wants – as long as they manage to take care of those basic underlying needs.

And so you, as a marketer, must think about your product offering on both levels. What basic needs does your product compete to satisfy – and how well does it satisfy them? Also, what specific want does your product satisfy, and how well does it compete with alternating ways of satisfying that want?<sup>20</sup>

To properly exploit the needs and wants of the target audience, PSYOP personnel must convince the target audience that by adopting the new behavior will meet those needs and wants. The target audience will only act if the target audience sees that adopting the new behavior is in its best interest. Marketers understand this clearly.

... customers usually couldn't care less about you and your company. All they care about is their own needs and wants – the selfish brutes! – and somehow you have to convince them that buying, using, and repurchasing your product is in *their* best interest.<sup>21</sup>

The target audience may be reluctant to adopt the new behavior simply because the author of the message appears to them to be foreign. Marketers have a similar challenge in that the target audience will be naturally suspicious of anyone not appearing to be a member of the target audience.

...behaviors are difficult to influence, even when you have a well-designed marketing program...You need to enter into any marketing project or decision

with a proper sense of humility. Consumers have their own priorities and opinions. In general, they are deeply suspicious of the marketer's intentions. They know that marketers want to make the sale and that the sale may not be in the *customer's* best interests. Even if your company sells a good, service, or other product that is truly the best thing since sliced bread, so many other charlatans are out there muddying the water that getting a nibble will still be tough.<sup>22</sup>

To help identify needs, PSYOP personnel must evaluate needs and wants much as marketers do. The key is to identify obvious needs and wants.

Rethink the underlying need you address. Is this need clear and real – and is it stated in the kind of words and thoughts that appeal naturally to customers? For example, a great many parents have fought with their children over toothbrushing, and been frustrated that the kids resisted this basic hygiene behavior. Yet nobody thought to define the problem as poor-tasting toothpaste until Tom of Maine, Colgate, and a few other companies adopted this problem definition in the last decade or so. Somebody had to have an idea—one that, once told to others, seems perfectly natural and obvious. <sup>23</sup>

PSYOP personnel must carefully consider the message to be conveyed to the target audience. PSYOP personnel must decide whether to base the appeal upon logic or emotion in forming a message that addresses needs and wants. Marketers also are faced with this choice.

You face a choice in any marketing communications: Should you build your appeal and communication strategy around a strong claim, backed by irrefutable evidence? Or, in contrast, should you make an emotional appeal that "feels" right to the customer, but lacks hard evidence? The reason that you may have to make this choice is that we all make decisions on both ways. People usually make an emotional decision about who they want to marry, but they usually make rational decisions about what jobs to search for and which employment options to accept.<sup>24</sup>

The answer from marketing is that it depends on the nature of the message, whether the message itself results in addressing emotional needs or physical needs.

As stated earlier, truthfulness is important. Once the target audience believes that the message is false, or worse, that the message is a liar, the target audience will

dismiss the message outright. Conversely, if the target audience discovers that the messages are true and the messengers are truthful, PSYOP personnel will be credible sources of information in the eyes of the target audience. Marketers agree.

You won't convince significant numbers of customers that these facts are true of your product or service, unless they really are.<sup>25</sup>
Marketing can convince people of an obvious truth. At worst, it often fails to even accomplish this feat. Marketing certainly does not have the power to make lies come true.<sup>26</sup>

When constructing the message, there are some principles that are proven true over time. These include:

Invite attention, early in the auditory message or at a conspicuous place in the visual message, to a...need.

Try to establish an atmosphere of authenticity and authority.

Try to establish an atmosphere of consistency.

When possible, try to establish targets for identification, emulation, and love.

Try to arouse emotion where it will be to your benefit. Repeat - with variations.<sup>27</sup>

Marketers use a "headline" in advertisements. This is a terse statement normally in large type boldly displayed. "The main purpose of the headline is to gain the reader's attention and make him stop long enough to notice and start reading your ad." This attention-getting technique is useful to PSYOP since PSYOP products must also gain the reader's attention. Using clever phrases helps but PSYOP personnel must be aware that clever phrases may be difficult to translate, even among dialects of the same language.

Constructing the message in a foreign language is fraught with difficulties.

PSYOP personnel must construct the message in a way that is easily understandable by the target audience. This requires an extensive understanding of the culture of the target audience.

An individual's language is, of course, the product of the culture in which he was raised. More importantly for psywar purposes, language is a tool for getting along with the world, and the meanings that a language conveys depends on the kinds of problems encountered and solved in the recipient's culture.<sup>29</sup>

As Americans, United States Army PSYOP personnel are susceptible to the cultural biases of their own culture. This can lead to phrases that are not understandable when translated into a foreign language. The person who tries to communicate with a person of another language will almost inevitably use some constructions of words that do not mean what he wants them to mean.<sup>30</sup>

This has caused some laughable errors in enemy propaganda targeting U.S soldiers. Consider the following example from a Japanese leaflet in World War II: "It is advisable in such cases to take full protective measures by use of condoms, protective medicines, etc.: better still to hold intercourse only with wives, virgins or women of respective character." [Italics mine]<sup>31</sup>

And this oddly worded example of a North Korean leaflet from the Korean War: "Cast aside all anxieties! Do not hesitate to surrender to the People's Army! You will then be able to meet again your comrades who have come before you, and soon return to your sweet home."

There are examples of enemy propaganda targeting U.S soldiers that contain culturally awkward text coupled with crude graphics. The Iraqi leaflets shown in figure 2 highlight the extremely poor quality of some foreign products. Notice the text was printed using a crude computer program giving the leaflet a cheap quality. The Arabic text detracts from the credibility of the leaflet.




Figure 2. Two Iraqi leaflets targeting U.S soldiers during Operation Desert Shield. From "Iraq's Psychological Warfare Campaign", <a href="http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/iraqprop.html">http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/iraqprop.html</a>, accessed 2 February 1999.

The very awkward wording of the North Vietnamese leaflet shown below in figure 3 targeting United States soldiers during the Vietnam War is similar not only in its cultural clumsiness but in its extremely poor quality. Poorly designed United States PSYOP products will appear similarly awkward to foreign audiences. The solution to this problem is to have indigenous personnel make the translations. This is even true when targeting audiences who speak a different dialect of English.

In all psywar operations that involve different languages, but especially when the language of the target country is dissimilar grammatically to English (or other Western tongues), it is important to have genuine experts in the language on hand-not to assure an accurate word-for-word translation of the English message the [PSYOP] writer turns out but rather to assure adequate communication of the idea intended.<sup>33</sup>

- 1--- American servicemen will not fight in the war against the South Vietnamese people and serve as cannon-fodder for U.S monopoly capitalists.
- 2—American servicemen shall not take the risk of lighting a dirty, long-term and dangerous war with no way out waged by the American imperialists in South Vict-Nam: Refuse to go to the front and press for your evacuation from South Vict-Nam
- 3— Say no to terror and massacre against the South Violnomeso people 1
- 4—American servicemen, true to the tradition of liberty and democracy of their people, shall never support the dictatorial regime of Ký Thiệu agent of U.S monopoly capital.

Figure 3. North Vietnamese leaflet targeting United States soldiers. From "North Vietnamese Leaflets", <a href="http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/nviet1.html">http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/nviet1.html</a>, accessed 2 February 1999.

Civilian commercial marketing is not foolproof despite the tremendous experience and education level of marketers. PSYOP soldiers have much to learn from well-publicized marketing mistakes yet this area is silent in Army doctrine. For example, a German candy company recently began marketing Mentos candies in the United States. The television advertisements looked and sounded foreign. The marketing campaign was unsuccessful because the America audience rejected the advertisements. Nissan recently suffered in auto sales in the United States after the introduction of a series of television advertisements that included an Asian man as a symbol for Nissan. American audiences rejected the commercials as "foreign" and sales fell. At the same time, sales for Saturn automobiles soared after the introduction of a series of commercials highlighting safety

features and showing common Americans pleased with these new features. And translation errors can be catastrophic to a marketing or PSYOP campaign. Chevrolet suffered a disastrous marketing campaign for the Chevy Nova in South America.

"No- va" in Spanish translates roughly as "does not go." And sales for the Chevy Nova went nowhere. The Bata Shoe Company's logo is a stylized picture of three bells. When Bata sandals arrived for the first time in Bangladesh, Muslim fundamentalist leaders thought the picture looked too much like the Arabic characters for Allah and incited riots. Fifty people were injured during the protests. If highly educated and experienced marketers representing very large marketing firms with vast resources can suffer these types of reactions so can modestly trained and under-equipped United States PSYOP soldiers.

FM 33-1-1 explains very clearly the process to select a media to reach the target audience. The key to media selection is simply to determine the media best able to reach the target audience. There are other important questions to consider when selecting the best media.

The planner typically asks a certain group of questions in selecting the media for his campaign. Among these are:

"Which media are prominent in the target audience's focus of attention?"

"To which of these media does the United States have access?"

"Which of the possible media are most suitable to the purposes of the message?"

"Which media can be used with least danger to friends within the target country?"

"How can the United States use media so as to reach the largest percentage of the target [audience]?"<sup>36</sup>

Another question to consider is simply, what media will be the most credible?

Television offers a distinct advantage here. "People tend to believe what they see on

video as positive proof."<sup>37</sup> And Walter Lippman wrote in 1922, "Moving pictures seem utterly real."<sup>38</sup>

PSYOP personnel must evaluate new information technologies besides radio, TV, and printed media, such as telephone, the Internet, electronic mail (email), or even fax. "Actually, of course, any channel by which man communicates to man may be a medium for psywar. The number of media available to a psywar planning officer are likely limited as much by his ingenuity as by his facilities." 39

## Printed Product Development and Graphic Design

PSYOP soldiers receive no graphic design training. This makes PSYOP personnel acting as graphic artists little more than enthusiastic amateurs. Civilian commercial marketers make extensive use of graphic artists. Marketers also warn against exactly what PSYOP units do daily: attempt to design graphic products with no training or experience. Target audiences accustomed to sophisticated media will dismiss these products as amateurish and the message as not credible. Computer technology makes graphic design tempting because of its simplicity. This should only be done for simple products under a limited budget. Marketers warn that professional quality graphic design is best left to professionally trained graphic artists.

Let me first warn you that I cannot show you how to be a good designer or artist in a few paragraphs I'm devoting to the topic. You will need to work with artists unless you are one yourself. Gaining the technical skills and design sense to do something as simple as an illustrated brochure takes a long time, let alone more complex tasks like a four-color ad, a package design, or a television spot. But still, you may find yourself having to take on some of the smaller design tasks in your marketing department or business. A catalog sheet, brochure, store window display, or other visual design may have to be done right now, without the budget

for a creative agency or graphic designer. And the modern computer can put considerable design power into the amateur's hands.<sup>40</sup>

Presumably, trained military graphic artists and radio and television specialists from the media production battalion, 3rd PSYOP Battalion, would accompany other PSYOP soldiers and perform product development. But this only happens on rare occasions. This single battalion has few available personnel. In the absence of trained graphic artists, it is this author's experience that PSYOP soldiers typically tend to make simple products using a "cut-and-paste" approach using simple presentation software clipart such as that found with Microsoft PowerPoint. The problem with this is that the target audience in the first world is accustomed to seeing sophisticated, professionally designed graphic work made using advanced software such as Corel Draw designed on a state-of-the-art Macintosh-based graphics workstation. Products designed by amateurs on a personal computer just do not compare in quality.

But I must warn you that most of the homemade designing I see coming off of people's desktop computers and laser printers stinks. The results are a waste of the paper they're printed on, an insult to the customer, and an embarrassment to the profession of marketing. Doing the design work yourself is now technically easy, but if you don't know much about design, you can get in more trouble, more quickly, with the new technologies.<sup>41</sup>

Additionally, clip art found on American software looks culturally American.

The non-American target audience identifies it as American (culturally foreign and therefore alien or worse, colonial) who then reject it as foreign propaganda.

Realistically, graphic artists will not be available, at least at the beginning of a mission.

PSYOP personnel must therefore either be familiar with basic graphic design principles or be prepared to contract the graphic work to indigenous graphic artists.

## Text and Graphics

Before deciding on the specific text or graphics, PSYOP personnel must try to visualize the general layout of the product. Ideally, all of the parts of the product including headline, body text, and graphics combine to form an ad that is inviting and pleasing to view or read.

One key point to keep in mind is that your ad should have a "focal point" – a central, dominant, visual element that draws the reader's eye to the page. This is usually the headline or the visual...Keep in mind that when there are two or more equally prominent visuals competing for the eye's attention, readers become confused and don't know where to enter your ad and start reading. Always make one element larger and more prominent than the others. 42

The target audience analyst must provide the graphic artist with text and suggested graphic symbols that are mutually supportive yet independently understood. The target audience must be able to understand the entire message by text *or* by graphic images. In this way, the target audience will understand the message if illiterate or from a distance beyond that where the text can be read. And above all, it must be simple.

To be good, writing would have to communicate its point succinctly and simply enough to avoid losing the audience...And yet much of the writing is [bad]:

It fails to come to the point.

It uses passive sentences (where you can't tell who's doing what).<sup>43</sup>

Text is best reinforced with graphic designs. The final design must have text and graphics that are consistent.

Ultimately, you have to accept the reality that people first encounter your marketing communication as design. We "look at" ads, displays, packaging, and other visual communications. And if they appeal to us on the design level, we may choose to become more involved. To actually read or listen to the ads.

But the words are wasted unless the design draws the audience to them.

And so you must learn to think of words in your message as a designer does, which is very different from the writer's perspective. How do the words look on the page? Do the words have enough contrast and visual interest to draw the reader to them? Do the words work with the other design elements to form

appealing patterns and to draw the viewer into a focal point? The designer views print as just one more element on the design palate. And that makes the design perspective the "final word" on any marketing communication. If the ad doesn't work from the visual perspective (or a musical perspective for radio ads), then the words are wasted.<sup>44</sup>

Graphic symbols help convey the message. The target audience must understand the graphic symbols to represent the message as the messenger intended. "One can easily imagine the difficulty of conveying the idea of an atom bomb to a cultural group that has no concept of either an atom or bomb."

Chinese characters pose a special problem when translating technical or scientific meanings. When American PSYOP personnel first tried translating the term "atomic bomb" into Chinese during the Korean War, the translators came up with the term "U-metal" for uranium. There was no character in Chinese for uranium. The translators attempted to create a new symbolic character by "cutting and pasting" existing characters. The Chinese identified the newly created symbol to mean "metal boy". The intended message was totally lost on the target audience. <sup>46</sup>

The lesson here is that it is best to select graphic images already recognizable to the target audience. Never attempt to create a new symbol. These selected symbols should have only one meaning. The target audience analyst should make symbol selection not the graphic artist. The target audience analyst must find these already existing symbols since the graphic artist will have no training or understanding of the target audience.

There are psychological reasons for positioning and colors in design. This is the psychological basis for the principles of design. Graphic artists design products to gain and hold viewer attention. PSYOP personnel should understand the psychological

reasons visual products gain peoples' attention. Once understood, PSYOP personnel may use these principles when designing visual PSYOP products such as posters, handbills, etc. The most important principle is the "figure-background relationship." This describes the theory that the human mind perceives only one part of an image as the principle figure, all else is perceived as background.

The larger of two areas tends to be seen as the ground, the smaller the figure. Designers of successful book jackets and advertisements make use of this knowledge by placing a relatively small amount of type on a relatively large background. In psywar terms, this means the chances of getting attention are being squandered – other things being equal – when a leaflet is nearly all text and graphic, or when a poster does not make ample white space to contrast with the message.<sup>47</sup>

Once the figure-background principle is understood, PSYOP personnel must understand how to properly develop the figure. Important considerations in designing the figure include simplicity, closed design, and clear type.

A complete and closed design is more readily seen as figure...For psywar, this means, other things being equal, that representational pictures are more likely to gain attention than abstract ones; simple closed layouts in a poster are more likely to be seen as figure than less simple, cluttered ones; clear type is more likely to be seen as figure than dull or broken type.<sup>48</sup>

Color is also very important in terms of gaining attention. Not only color but dark areas and contrasting light areas.

The brighter of two areas tends to be perceived as the figure... attention goes to the brighter area, so that a leaflet's or poster's chances of getting attention can often be much improved by putting a spot of bright color into the display.

Some colors are more effective than others in making one part of an area stand out as figure. Color will ordinarily attract attention away from black and white, as many experiments with advertising have shown, and some colors will attract attention from other colors. For example, an orange picture or sketch will be more likely to be seen than a blue one. In other words, the psywar operator can get attention by contrasting carefully selected colors.

What colors have the highest attention getting value? [Experimentation yielded definite results.] The results indicate that orange was seen most

frequently (21 percent of the time), with red, blue, black, green, yellow, violet, and gray following in that order.

What <u>combinations</u> of colors attract attention best?...The results indicate that of 11 combinations the most effective were (in order) blue on white, black on yellow, green on white, and black on white. The least effective were orange on white and red on green."<sup>49</sup>

During the early months of 1996, Lieutenant Colonel Michael Furlong traveled to Washington D.C. and met with DC Comics representatives to develop a *Superman* comic book promoting mine-awareness among Bosnian youth. To Bosnian youth, *Superman* was a well-known and recognizable symbol of protection and assistance, albeit an American one. DC Comics produced a mine-awareness comic book (figure 4), posters and coloring books.

Using the principles of design stated above, an evaluation of the *Superman* cover indicates that the cover meets all the principles perfectly. Note that professional graphic artists employed by DC Comics designed this cover. The three human figures are lighter than the dark blue background. The child in most danger is wearing an orange sweater over a yellow collared shirt. The other child is also wearing orange. Orange is the most attention-getting color. The positioning of figures directs the viewer to the landmine at the bottom of the page. The landmine has significant black areas and is placed in a yellow surround making it more noticeable. The yellow surround makes it the lightest figure. Black on yellow is the second-most attention getting color combination. The layout and colors of this cover follows the principles described earlier. This cover gains the attention of the audience and contributes to the success of the comic book as a PSYOP product.



Figure 4. The cover of an English version of the mine-awareness *Superman* comic book. From archives of PSYOP Detachment, B Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, obtained 5 December 1998.

This comic book, the cover of which is shown in figure 4, and its associated posters and coloring-books were very popular with Bosnian youth. Later, the International Red Cross reported the mine-related injury rate for youth decreased in areas these products were disseminated. PSYOP personnel involved considered these products some of the most successful products designed in Bosnia.

The Superman comic book cover prepared by professional graphic artists is greatly superior to the PSYOP-produced handbill disseminated in Haiti shown in figure 5. The Haiti handbill is not simple, has no closed design, and contains unclear type. The graphics are crude. It is unclear what is the figure and what is the background. Most importantly, the message fails to direct specific behavior. The target audience is simply told to nurture the seeds of democracy. Without a clear message directing a clear behavior, it is unlikely the target audience will adopt an intended behavioral change. Nor will it be easy for PSYOP personnel to measure the effects since nurturing the seeds of democracy is not quantifiable.

Sadly, this example is not unique. The archives of the PSYOP Detachment, 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School contain examples of many poorly designed products. These examples indicate that PSYOP personnel pay no attention to principles of design or principles of psychology. Neither the text nor the graphics direct or persuade the audience to achieve a new behavior. The text does not support the graphics nor do the graphics support the text. The target audience then is unable to achieve the intended behavior since the product fails to convey the message.




Figure 5. PSYOP-designed handbill disseminated in Haiti. From archives of PSYOP Detachment, B Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, obtained 5 December 1998.

#### Radio

Radio has been a favorite PSYOP media since World War II. Radio has distinct advantages over other media. It is inexpensive. Radio tapes are simple to produce and require little equipment or technical skill, and radio reaches large numbers of people using little power.

[Radio] remains the quickest and most dependable way to get messages into any country where there are receivers. It can jump border controls and iron curtains. It does not require mediation between communicator and receiver by any third party (for example, the man who drops leaflets from a plane, the man who tacks up posters, the secondary communicator who reads a leaflet aloud to illiterates). It is the swiftest of all media. Because of its speed, and because of the entertainment it furnishes at low cost is vastly popular with a wide variety of audiences, and psywar by radio can thus hope for access to many kinds of homes. 50

One of the most effective forces in radio is the human voice. The human voice can portray great emotion. The target audience can discern the gender and age of the speaker. "The human voice, to be sure, gives a personal quality to the messages broadcast and lends itself to persuasion."

PSYOP personnel should use indigenous persons to conduct the actual broadcasts. This tends to establish credibility with the target audience. But, PSYOP personnel must constantly check the accuracy of the broadcasts of indigenous personnel. The message the broadcaster actually broadcasts may in fact be deliberately opposed to the PSYOP message intended. One of the most significant radio propaganda personalities to do this was "Tokyo Rose" shown in figure 6 as she appeared during World War Two. As an American trapped in Japan, she was forced to work for Japan's Radio Tokyo during World War II. As a loyal American, she sabotaged her radio broadcasts without the knowledge of her Japanese superiors.

She was probably the most listened-to disc jockey in history, yet hardly anyone remembers her as such today, in spite of, or perhaps because of, the lingering infamous legend surrounding her. Brought up by her immigrant Methodist parents to think of herself as an American, Iva Ikuko Toguri (1916 - ), a first generation Japanese-American ("Nisei") was forced to broadcast propaganda for Japan during World War II, after her native U.S. abandoned her there mere days before the Pearl Harbor attack, and despite her continual efforts throughout the war to return home.

Chosen out of the NHK/Radio Tokyo typing pool to be a disc jockey by the very Allied POW's being beaten and starved into writing her shows, she became an adept at sabotage of her own broadcasts, trained to read and eventually write her segments of "The Zero Hour" the way the POW saboteurs intended, while helping to keep these soldiers alive at mortal personal risk with food, medicine, clothing and hope during her almost daily visits to their cells. Though employed to broadcast pro-japanese [sic] propaganda, her outspoken support of the Allies off-mike (while cleverly concealing it within her message and delivery on-air) resulted in numerous arguments and even fist fights at work, and continual harrasment [sic] at home and elsewhere. She literally cheered in the streets as U.S. Gen. Doolittle's Raiders flew over Tokyo, and cheered yet again when the first American B-29's appeared over Tokyo in the fall of '44 (the first one was a BR-29 reconnaissance craft named "Tokyo Rose"). 51



Figure 6. Iva Ikuko Toguri (1916-), "Tokyo Rose". From "EarthStation 1's Radio Propaganda Page", <a href="http://www.earthstation1.simplenet.com/Tokyo\_Rose.html">http://www.earthstation1.simplenet.com/Tokyo\_Rose.html</a>, accessed 2 February 1999.

PSYOP personnel must be mindful of the possibility that translators and interpreters may interject their own feelings, beliefs, and agendas as Tokyo Rose did.

Whenever possible, translations must be checked using another translator or other independent means. This technique also precludes possible unintended errors in meaning or grammar.

By contrast, a genuinely notorious enemy radio personality of World War II was American-born Mildred Gillars, "Axis Sally." Her voice intonation made her popular with American soldier audiences. Her attractive voice coupled with her caring messages concerned for the welfare of American soldiers made her particularly effective at instilling fear.

Most GIs agreed that Gillars had a sultry, sexy voice that came over the radio loud and clear. Like her counterpart in the Pacific, Tokyo Rose, she liked to tease and taunt the soldiers about their wives and sweethearts back in the States. "Hi fellows," she would say. "I'm afraid you're yearning plenty for someone else. But I just wonder if she isn't running around with the 4-Fs way back home."

She would get the names, serial numbers and hometowns of captured and wounded GIs and voice concern about what would happen to them, in broadcasts that could be heard in the United States. "Well I suppose he'll get along all right," she would say. "The doctors don't seem... I don't know... only time will tell, you see." At sign-off time she would tease her listeners some more, telling them, "I've got a heavy date waiting for me."

Perhaps Sally's most famous broadcast, and the one that would eventually get her convicted of treason, was a play titled Vision of Invasion that went out over the airwaves on May 11, 1944. It was beamed to American troops in England awaiting the D-Day invasion of Normandy, as well as to the home folks in America. Gillars played the role of an American mother who dreamed that her soldier son, a member of the invasion forces, died aboard a burning ship in the attempt to cross the English Channel. The play had a realistic quality to it, sound effects simulating the moans and cries of the wounded as they were raked with gunfire from the beaches. Over the battle action sound effects, an announcer's voice intoned, "The D of D-Day stands for doom...disaster...death...defeat... Dunkerque or Dieppe [sic]." Adelbert Houben, a high official of the German Broadcasting Service, would testify at Axis Sally's trial that her broadcast was intended to prevent the invasion by frightening the Americans with grisly forecasts of staggering casualties. <sup>52</sup>

When completing a TAAWS, PSYOP personnel should therefore describe how the voice should sound, the gender, the age, and the intonation.

In designing radio programs, there are time-proven marketing conventions.

If you don't have the attention of the listener within five seconds, you've failed.

Consider all the radio tools available: a voice alone or several voices, background music or foreground jingle, and sound effects in great abundance...

Use simple straightforward sentences. Try the ad out on a ten-year-old. If he doesn't understand it, it's too complicated. 53

PSYOP personnel should consider including these "radio tools" and annotating them on the TAAWS. The inclusion of intonation is very important in conveying the intended message and builds upon the natural strength of radio: emotion. A good broadcaster can disguise his or her voice to meet intended gender and age. But intonation must be achieved. Additionally, PSYOP personnel should try the testing measure suggested above to ensure simplicity.

## **Television Product Development**

The use of audio-visual symbols in television is extremely powerful. Television has the combined impact of sight and sound. Together, they can create powerful images that invoke forceful emotions.

Imagine the following: A kid is playing tennis against a backboard when a dog runs up and steals the ball. The ball, bright yellow and fuzzy, overflows the dog's mouth as the camera zooms in to show the ball and mouth, filling the TV screen.

This visual image is simple. But it communicates a lot. Like how much fun kids, dogs, have when playing with tennis balls. And the image offers drama – how does the kid feel when the dog takes the ball? How does the dog feel when he gets the ball? Most of all, it reminds us that tennis is good fun for everyone, regardless of skill level, age, or even species!

This visual image is at the heart of a television spot from the U.S. Tennis Association to promote the sport of tennis. This spot illustrates the power of a good visual image or sequence of images to capture attention, tell an interesting story, and communicate a point.

And the spot also illustrates a key to successful visuals – that they focus on one strong, relevant image. In this case, the image is the tennis ball, proudly framed in the dog's jaws. In your case, well, the image can be anything – as long as that thing is visually compelling, easily recognizable, and relevant to your appeal.<sup>54</sup>

Marketing uses eight principles to develop a good television commercial.

- 1. Entertaining. A commercial that entertains is memorable.
- 2. Clear. The viewer understands the message immediately.
- 3. Visual. The viewer can see the message.
- 4. High quality. The quality of the commercial reflects the quality of the product. If your commercial is in poor quality and obviously cheap, people who see it will assume the product being sold is just as shoddy.
- 5. Truthful. A commercial full of obvious exaggerations will backfire on you.
- 6. Contains a call to action. Instruct the viewer to do something with the information you have just given him...
- 7. Filled with content, not just special effects. Special effects get attention but content sells the product.
- 8. Use actors or voiceovers that inspire confidence.<sup>55</sup>

Others have suggested techniques based upon psychological principles. Some of

these techniques are designed to persuade a target audience.

Vivid images (e.g., video) are more convincing when the communicator has high credibility and the message is simple.

Case studies or examples are more persuasive than statistical facts.

Communicators are perceived as credible if they seem *safe* [Italics original] (kind, friendly, and just), *qualified* (trained, experienced, and informed), and *dynamic* (bold, active, and energetic).

Film (or video) messages are markedly effective (and preferred to less vivid media) in teaching factual knowledge, are accepted as accurate, and are not perceived as propaganda.

Emotional (fear inducing) appeals are persuasive when they are truly frightful, suggest effective actions to reduce the fear-arousing threat, and the recipients believe that they are able to perform the suggested action.<sup>56</sup>

# Characteristics and Costs of Sophisticated Media

There are specific characteristics of sophisticated media not found in doctrine.

This refines media selection in sophisticated media environments. PSYOP personnel must consider the costs of developing and producing sophisticated media, particularly the costs of production using many different standards and recording formats.

We must therefore turn to commercial media production found in the country within which we are operating for format requirement information and to 3d PSYOP Battalion technicians who are familiar with regional recording requirements. But it can be too late if we turn to these resources for a crisis occurring now. The staff must be able to obtain this information immediately if the staff is not already fully trained in media production techniques.

For example, doctrine says nothing about VHS cassette tape being the poorest quality audiovisual tape recording technology. Nor that the next higher quality is Hi-8. And certainly not that the highest quality is Beta-SP the commercial industry standard for Europe and the United States. Only film surpasses Beta-SP in terms of image and sound quality. The nor does doctrine describe recording formats throughout the world. The recording format in the United States is NTSC and in most of Europe the format is PAL. The format in France is SECAM. The recording format describes how the image and sound is magnetically recorded on the tape. Different recording formats are not compatible or interchangeable. So to be competitive for an audience in Europe outside of France, PSYOP must produce its television products on Beta-SP tapes in PAL format. Each Beta-SP tape costs about \$20. A Beta-SP camera costs as much as \$20,000 and the lens may cost another \$30,000. But the camera records directly to a Beta-SP tape in only

one format: NTSC, PAL, or SECAM. This requires a PSYOP unit to own or lease equipment of the proper format for use in the proper location. Add editing machines and Beta-SP recorders (\$25,000 each also in differing recording formats) and television can get very expensive very quickly.<sup>58</sup>

The target audience analyst should determine the standard of tape (Beta-SP, Hi-8, VHS), the video tape recording format (NTSC, PAL, SECAM for example), and should record this information on the TAAWS.

During the first months of the Bosnia mission, the PSYOP task force commander wisely determined that poor quality television programs would jeopardize the credibility of the PSYOP effort. He hired Irishwoman Karen Coleman, an experienced ex-British Broadcasting Company television producer to ensure that programs would be of a quality consistent with European broadcast standards. She insisted upon hiring experienced civilian videographers (camerapersons) and using what was then state-of-the-art video equipment. This included purchasing very expensive Sony Beta-SP cameras and recorders in the European PAL recording format using the 3d PSYOP Battalion's AVID digital non-linear editor. <sup>59</sup> She reported that the standard Hi-8 cameras and recorders and the "Video Toaster" organic PSYOP equipment would create tapes too poor to broadcast.

One of the quickest, most effective ways to poorly position your [PSYOP unit] is to make a stupid, poorly written, badly produced commercial. While we've all gotten a laugh from pompous car salesmen or unctuous infomercial stars, the fact is these ads usually don't work. And the damage they do in terms of positioning is incalculable. Here's our guerrilla advice: You wouldn't perform surgery on yourself – don't write, or direct, or edit your own TV ads. 61

Since the cost of such equipment is prohibitive and the technology is steadily improving, a method to obtain this equipment cost-effectively must be identified. Major Steven Collins suggests a simple solution: "PSYOP must consider the use of off-the-shelf technology and leasing as the preferred method of procurement." 62

Despite the very high costs of television production, PSYOP may have to use television because television may be the only way to reach the target audience. So PSYOP personnel must know something about television as well as other complex media such as radio. And PSYOP units must have access to this sophisticated equipment and either have or have access to personnel trained in its use.

The technology exists to capture and create video programs using personal computers rather than very expensive standard video editing equipment. In Bosnia, soldiers of the 3<sup>rd</sup> PSYOP Battalion use the "AVID" non-linear computer-based video editor. The AVID is based on an Apple Macintosh Quadra 950 desktop computer coupled to Sony Beta-SP videotape recorders. But AVID is not the only computer-based editor.

Thanks to digital video (DV) camcorders and PCs [personal computers] with IEEE 1394 (FireWire) connections, you can now capture high-resolution video with your PC, edit it, add titles and transitions, and write it back out to DV or standard VHS videotape. All this is *non-linear editing*, meaning you can jump to any point in the tape (because it [the footage] is now stored on the hard drive. 63

With the proper PC equipment and connections, PSYOP personnel can now compose video programs without relying on complex editing equipment or editing suites.

The simplicity that PCs afford PSYOP is clear.

Here's how it works: You shoot videos just as you always have. Then you come back to the house or office, you can play back what you've shot on any TV with

composite or S-Video connections or any PC with a 1394 connection – found on only a handful of systems from Compaq and Sony. <sup>64</sup>

The editing itself still takes a great deal of time.

The results are great, but the time it takes to edit the tape is significant, even when you're past the learning curve. The non-linear nature of disk-based video saves time but not a lot. Figure at least 2 hours for each hour of tape for minimal editing, and as much as 10 hours if you have visions of grandeur.<sup>65</sup>

And storing video footage electronically requires a huge amount of hard drive space.

Home editing will also be more attractive when standard hard disks are 100GB, not 10GB; when MPEG-2 encoders are standard on PCs (MPEG-2 is the encoding method used on DVDs [digital video discs]), giving you high quality storage with fewer space constraints; when every PC can create CDs [compact discs]— or better yet, DVDs that can be played on home AV [audio-visual] devices that have IEEE 1394 connections (coming within the year).

In the very near future it may be practical to obtain video footage and send it electronically. The technology to do so exists today but is as yet impractical given the huge space requirements for digital image storage ands slow digital transmission speeds.

#### **Product Production**

There are requirements and characteristics of product production applicable to sophisticated media environments not found in doctrine. The media production capabilities of PSYOP units are limited at best. Although the 3d PSYOP Battalion has deployable Heidelburg printing presses, the actual availability and cost of deploying these heavy assets may prove prohibitive.

Generally, in the first world it may be best to let contracts to civilian printers. The objective is to print on a paper quality and in a format to which the target audience is accustomed. A better quality will appear foreign to the target audience and a poorer

quality will look cheap. The best way to ensure products are of a quality consistent with what the target audience is used to is to contract a local printer to print the products using common local paper stocks and inks. The target audience analyst must research these material characteristics and include them in the TAAWS.

The product should be designed to have a definite service life. One way to control service life is to control paper quality. Should PSYOP personnel desire a very long product life, plastic may be a better choice than paper. Newsprint is paper of the least quality and shortest service life. Knowing that the product will eventually wear out, it is better to take that fact into consideration and design its service life to end when the life of the message ends. "Every product category—the general grouping of competitive products to which your product belongs (be it good, service, idea, or person), has a limited life."

PSYOP leaflets are well-known, proven and trusted information products.

Dropped from aircraft in flight, leaflets separate from each other in the air and gently flutter to the ground literally on top of the target audience. Leaflets can be packaged in boxes dropped from slow-moving aircraft such as the UH-60 helicopters (figure 7) or the C-130 Hercules. In environments posing a risk to slow-moving aircraft, leaflets can be packaged in "leaflet bombs" dropped from high-performance aircraft such as F-16 Falcons or B-52 bombers. FM 33-1-1, appendix G shows packaging procedures.

Figure 8 shows the particularly historic Nazi leaflet called "Autumn, the Leaves are Falling" dropped on French civilians by *Luftwaffe* aircraft in the opening days of World War Two in Europe. This leaflet was designed to terrorize French civilians.




Figure 7. Leaflet drop from a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter. From "Psychological Operations/Warfare Leaflets", from http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/leaflet2.html; Internet, accessed 2 February 1999.



Figure 8. Nazi Leaflet, "Autumn, the Leaves are Falling". From <sup>1</sup>"Autumn, the Leaves are Falling", available from <a href="http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/nazi.html">http://www.pipeline.com/~psywarrior/nazi.html</a>; Internet; accessed on 2 April 1999

However, there are drawbacks to using leaflets. These include enemy countermeasures and suitability for use in mined areas. There are historical examples of enemy countermeasures. "The chief defense against leaflets dropped from an airplane or delivered by artillery is to establish a penalty for picking them up and/or reading them." 68

A technique to overcome this defense is to disguise the leaflet as something commonly found on the person of members of the target audience. During Operation Desert Shield, surrender leaflets were printed on one side of the paper and Iraqi money was printed on the other. When folded, the leaflet appeared as common Iraqi *Dinars* as shown in figure 9. Any Iraqi soldier obtaining a leaflet was able to fold the leaflet and hide it in his wallet with any other money he was carrying. Even if enemy leaders conducted searches to find hidden leaflets, these searches occupied the scarce and valuable time of enemy leaders who would otherwise be performing other more valuable and relevant duties such as preparing defenses.

Clearly, PSYOP personnel must have access to sophisticated printing media to reproduce products of banknote quality appearance. Access may be through contracting civilian printing companies to perform the printing or using the Heidelburg presses of the 3d PSYOP Battalion. PSYOP personnel must consider the security implications of civilian PSYOP product production before contracting. In the event that carrying a product puts the target audience at risk, the target audience analyst should make a recommendation as to the means to disguise the product on the TAAWS and the TAAWS should prompt the target audience analyst to do so.



# Above:

\*The 16th Infantry Division will be bombed tomorrow. Leave this location now and save yourselves.\*

"Leaflets had a signifigant impact on soldiers deserting. Most desertions were caused by radio reports of B-52 bombinas..."

-An Iraal General

# Below:

"We have already informed you of our promise to bomb the 16th Infantry Division. We kept our promise and bombed them yesterday. Beware. We will repeat this bombing tomorrow... Now the choice is yours. Either stay and face death or accept the invitation of the Joint Forces to protect your lives."

سبق ان اخبرناكم بعزمنا على قصف الفرقة السادسة عشر (١٦) المشاة ولقد حافظنا على هذا الوعد وتم قصفها بالامس احذوا المداروا التصف مرة اخرى غدا .... الان اصبح الخيار لكم اما البقاء ومواجهة الموت او قبول دعوة القوات المشتركة للحفاظ على حياتكم

Figure 9. Examples of two leaflets disguised as currency (front side). From "Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War", 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, [ca. 1992].



Figure 9. Leaflet disguised as currency (reverse side). From "Leaflets of the Persian Gulf War", 4th Psychological Operations Group, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, [ca. 1992].

The target audience analyst should consider the environment in which leaflets will be disseminated. For example, airdropping leaflets into mined areas will put the target audience at risk when the audience attempts to recover the leaflets. This is especially critical when targeting children or other audiences not likely to recognize the risk.

Many products are best disseminated by hand. This has the advantage of conducting face-to-face PSYOP while disseminating products. Care must be given when selecting the disseminators. In some circumstances, it may be best to have indigenous persons conduct the actual dissemination. Indigenous persons are often better accepted by the target audience. The disseminators may be translators working for PSYOP who have an understanding of the intended message as it was developed in English and also have an understanding of related products and overall PSYOP objectives (see figure 10). These translators may then conduct face-to-face PSYOP from a well-informed perspective. The end result is enhanced credibility with the target audience.



Figure 10. Hasan Redzovic, interpreter for the Psychological Operations section at Camp Bedrock, Bosnia, disseminates a youth-targeted PSYOP product called *Mirko Magazine* to Bosnian children in January 1998. From "Magazines to promote peace", *Talon Online Magazine*, available from <a href="http://www.tfeagle/army.mil/talon/jan16/story12.html">http://www.tfeagle/army.mil/talon/jan16/story12.html</a>; Internet; accessed on 14 November 1998.

# Television and Radio Product Dissemination

There are common marketing principles of television and radio program dissemination not found in doctrine. This includes techniques to negotiate broadcast contracts to secure commercial radio and television program airtime.

Marketing products via television and radio is difficult because many media venues are saturated. Programs reach already disinterested audiences. Marketers know that target audience members may be disinterested in any message from any source.

Most of the time, customers couldn't care less about you and your products. The customer is usually a disinterested participant in your marketing program. You must communicate with and motivate people who are very busy thinking about anything *but* your message.<sup>69</sup>

Even if the target audience is interested, PSYOP personnel have another challenge to overcome: media competition. This is sometimes called "noise".

The problem of noise combines with the lack of attention on the part of the customer to make marketing communications more difficult than any other form of communication, except perhaps efforts to communicate with other species. In fact, I'd rather have the job of teaching chimpanzees to use sign language than the job of convincing millions of consumers to switch their laundry detergent.<sup>70</sup>

PSYOP experienced little noise in the past. The future may not be so easy. Many media venues will compete with PSYOP for target audience attention.

In the past this [noise] was not important because PSYOP could often expect to deploy to an area of operation and dominate the local means of information delivery either because of the lack or destruction of indigenous media, or the rules of engagement allowed radio and television to be jammed and taken off the air. Also, until recently, "neutral" competitors to PSYOP (e.g.: CNN, the UK's SkyNews, Germany's Nachrichten Television—NTV, etc.) were not as ubiquitous in conflict areas, nor had they the capability to instantaneously transmit worldwide. In the future, it seems unlikely that military PSYOP will ever be able to fully dominate local media venues it had in the past. 71

Radio product dissemination involves locating the right host-nation radio stations.

The target audience analyst must include specific dissemination instructions identifying the radio station(s) by name and record this information on the TAAWS.

Radio is one of the best ways to reach a highly targeted market, but you have to make sure you have to make sure you are advertising on the right station. Do your research to pinpoint the stations in your market whose listeners most closely resemble your [target audience].

TAAWS remarks should also include the appropriate broadcasting times and repetition frequency.

Repetition is even more important on radio than anywhere else. Because listeners tune in and out, do errands, drive through tunnels, and occasionally stop paying attention, you need to repeat yourself several times."<sup>72</sup>

When negotiating for broadcast time, radio can be expensive. There is a useful technique to reduce airtime costs.

Radio is the ultimate remnant space medium. Offer to pay the station for any unsold time during the day. Whenever the station has a couple of unsold minutes, they will run your [program] for a small fee. You get low cost exposure and the station gets a little something for the time that would have gone unsold.<sup>73</sup>

Television impact is valuable to PSYOP personnel in environments where audiences are accustomed to it. Marketers have exploited this media since its first widespread use in the 1950s. But television production is enormously expensive. And contracting for airtime using host-nation television stations can also be extremely expensive. This is especially true when buying broadcast time during the peak audience viewing period know as "prime-time". Consequently, many television commercials are short, lasting just 15 seconds.

In the dim and distant 1950s when most commercials were little movies lasting a leisurely 60 seconds, you could buy a prime-time minute for an estimated \$15,000. A generation or so later, it had shrunk to 30 seconds for \$15,000. The length of today's commercials is still mainly 30 seconds, but now that golden half-minute is selling for as much as \$400,000, the quarter-minute is coming on fast. Practically nonexistent a few years ago, the 15-second package of the future already accounts for a third of all network commercials.<sup>74</sup>

This is not to suggest that PSYOP personnel should produce and market a PSYOP television product costing \$400,000. It does show that PSYOP's time and media competitors regularly do spend \$400,000 for a 15-second commercial.<sup>75</sup>

Although television can be very expensive, it does not have to be. "Although in 1993 the average TV spot cost \$179,000 to produce, great TV commercials can be produced for well under \$5000." "If you explore the opportunities on cable networks

and local non-affiliated stations, you'll find that you can buy a minute of TV advertising for as little as \$100."<sup>77</sup>

In circumstances similar to that currently existing in Kosovo, allied military forces may have attacked state-run media transmitters and broadcast facilities destroying any useful host-nation broadcast capability but left intact the ability of the population to receive transmissions. PSYOP personnel must be able to transmit using available military broadcast assets in order to reach target audiences. The United States Air Force has an aerial broadcast platform capable of broadcasting television and radio programming. It is called "Commando Solo." The 193d Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard, operates six of these EC-130E Hercules aircraft from Harrisburg, Pennsylvania as an Air Force PSYOP asset. Figure 11 shows an EC-130E of the 193d Special Operations Wing in flight. These aircraft were used for television broadcasts for the first time during Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in December 1989. This program was highly successful.

In addition to AM radio broadcasts, initial PSYOP activities involved TV broadcast of prepackaged materials from the 193d SOG's [Special Operations Group, Commando Solo] aircraft...These broadcasts – all in Spanish – notified the Panamanian population of U.S. intent and advised how to avoid accidentally becoming a casualty. (These were the "mysterious" broadcasts which puzzled some of the U.S. media in Panama.)<sup>78</sup>

PSYOP planners may consider using this asset in unique situations where the capabilities and characteristics of aerial broadcast are advantageous. The TAAWS should record the recommendation.




Figure 11. EC-130E "Commando Solo" of the 193d Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Air National Guard. From "USAF Special Operations EC-130 Rivet Rider 'Commando Solo'." Available at <a href="http://www.specialoperations.com/solo.html">http://www.specialoperations.com/solo.html</a>; Internet, accessed on 12 November 1998.

# **Testing Products**

Doctrine specifies testing products. Once the determination is made to seriously conduct testing, the question becomes who should conduct the testing? Major James included a testing recommendation in his Bosnia trip report. His recommendation is consistent with and reinforces doctrine: "Recommendation: Testing and evaluation must be conducted to ascertain the effectiveness of PSYOP products. Therefore, contract host nation personnel from each ethnic group to test and evaluate all PSYOP."

Experience in Bosnia confirms that testing is critical to the success of a PSYOP product. Product prototypes must be pre-tested and later post-tested to determine if the product is achieving the PSYOP objective. Major James reported that extensive testing resulted in a very successful German-designed PSYOP product targeting Bosnian youth. The product is a monthly youth magazine entitled *Mirko*. Figure 13 shows an Englishedition *Mirko* cover from 1996.<sup>79</sup>

The new German [PSYOP] commander supported the SFOR [NATO Stabilization-Force] commander with a successful information campaign centered on a magazine (MRCKO) [sic] that was developed after months of testing and evaluation. His goal is to do the same level of testing and evaluation with all PSYOP products.

PSYOP personnel assess the effectiveness of PSYOP products and plan to use measurable criteria to do so. For example, to measure the effectiveness of a mine-awareness program, PSYOP personnel may contact the International Committee of the Red Cross who may provide civilian casualty figures. One possible indicator of effectiveness is how much the target audience values the product. Determining how much the target audience values a product is best done by direct target audience feedback obtained during dissemination. Feedback from members of the target audience may be as simple as the comments from thirteen-year-old Milena Atanasijevic, "This is the second magazine I've gotten. I've still got the first one. My brother loves it, too." Figure 12 shows a similarly happy teenager who has just received a copy of *Mirko* at a sporting event. Note that this dissemination occurred at a public location typically frequented by members of the target audience.




Figure 12. An excited Bosnian teenager is happy to have a copy of *Mirko Magazine* disseminated at a sporting event. From "Magazines to promote peace", *Talon On-line Magazine*, available from <a href="http://www.tfeagle/army.mil/talon/jan16/story12.html">http://www.tfeagle/army.mil/talon/jan16/story12.html</a>; Internet; accessed on 14 November 1998.

Testing television products can be tricky since the initial testing will have to be done from a tape rather than a printed product or radio broadcast. But there are four techniques to help ensure success.

- 1. Watch it with the sound turned off. Can you still figure out who [sic] it is for and how to respond?
- 2. Show it to a room full of 12-year-olds [sic]. Do they stop talking long enough to watch it? Then ask them what it was about.
- 3. Watch the commercial twenty times in a row. Is it so abrasive you become angry?
- 4. Watch just the first half or just the second half of the commercial. Do you still understand what's being sold?<sup>80</sup>



Figure 13. Cover of an English edition of the German-designed monthly magazine *Mirko* targeting Bosnian youth. From archives of PSYOP Detachment, B Company, 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 5 December 1998.

⁴Ibid.

<sup>5</sup>Glenn, James A., Trip report, "Memorandum for Chief, PSYOP Training & Doctrine Division (LTC Milam); Subject: Operation JOINT FORGE (OJF) PSYOP Assessment", 31 August 1998, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

<sup>6</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 20-21.

<sup>7</sup>"General Framework Agreement for Peace", actual title of what is commonly referred to as the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement.

<sup>8</sup>Major Steven Collins, "A War of Words: The Media Clash in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Impact of US Army PSYOP", 8 June, 1998. He stated in his footnote, "The author handed out the first handbill produced by the PSYOP forces outlining the transfer process. It was hoped this handbill would encourage Serbs to stay. In reality, as was expressed by many Serbs, it merely gave a timetable of when they should leave the suburbs."

<sup>9</sup>Major Collins' original footnote reads, "These meetings were a model of efficiency and utility. Walker decided to 'pay-the-price' and gave IO his undivided attention for the first 20 minutes of every day. The 'sound bites' that came from Walker extemporaneously were often used verbatim in the daily IFOR news conferences."

<sup>10</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 5-9.

<sup>11</sup>Serbia Info News, "Kosmet - centre of Serbian state and religion for centuries", [on-line]; available from <a href="http://www.serbia-info.com/news">http://www.serbia-info.com/news</a>; Internet; accessed on 7 February 1999.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars", Parameters, Autumn 1994: 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Steven Collins, "Psychological Operations – Ready for the 21st Century?", 13 April 1998.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Steven Collins, "A War of Words: The Media Clash in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Impact of US Army PSYOP", 8 June 1998.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Program of Instruction, PSYOP Officer Course and PSYOP Specialist Course.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), Chapter 6.

<sup>14</sup>This account is a hypothetical representation of a real PSYOP program developed conceptually in late January 1995 in Sarajevo but not executed due to reasons of timing and rapidly changing conditions. It is used here because of its descriptive value.

<sup>15</sup>Steven Collins, "Psychological Operations – Ready for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?", 13 April 1998.

<sup>16</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 20.

<sup>17</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, *Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 4-6.

<sup>18</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 49.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., 29.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., 20.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., 53-54.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid., 20.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>Wilbur Schramm, et al, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare", (Chevy Chase, MD, John's Hopkins University, 5 January 1953, declassified 23 May 1988), 261-264.

<sup>28</sup>Robert W. Bly, *On Target Advertising...Ads That Sell*, [on-line]; available from <a href="http://smartbiz.com/sbs/arts/bly65.htm">http://smartbiz.com/sbs/arts/bly65.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 14 November 1998.

<sup>29</sup>Wilbur Schramm, et al, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare", (Chevy Chase, MD, John's Hopkins University, 5 January 1953, declassified 23 May 1988), 63.

30Tbid.

31 Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., 63-64.

<sup>34</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 32.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., 31-32

<sup>36</sup>Wilbur Schramm, et al, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare", (Chevy Chase, MD, John's Hopkins University, 5 January 1953, declassified 23 May 1988), 254-255.

<sup>37</sup>Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars", Parameters, Autumn 1994: 41.

38 Ibid.

<sup>39</sup>Wilbur Schramm, et al, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare", (Chevy Chase, MD, John's Hopkins University, 5 January 1953, declassified 23 May 1988), 246.

<sup>40</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 87.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid., 87-88.

<sup>42</sup>Robert W. Bly, *On Target Advertising...Ads That Sell*, [on-line]; available from <a href="http://smartbiz.com/sbs/arts/bly65.htm">http://smartbiz.com/sbs/arts/bly65.htm</a>; Internet; accessed 14 November 1998.

<sup>43</sup> Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 86.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., 88.

<sup>45</sup>Wilbur Schramm, et al, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare", (Chevy Chase, MD, John's Hopkins University, 5 January 1953, declassified 23 May 1988), 63.

46 Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., 38.

48Ibid.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., 39.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 249.

<sup>51</sup>Earthstation I's Radio Propaganda Page, internet: http://www.earthstation1.simplenet.com/Tokyo\_Rose.html.

<sup>52</sup>Dale P. Harper, American-born Axis Sally made Propaganda Broadcasts for Radio Berlin, [on-line]; available from internet: <a href="http://www.thehistorynet.com/WorldWarII/articles/1195\_text.htm">http://www.thehistorynet.com/WorldWarII/articles/1195\_text.htm</a>; Internet: accessed on 2 April 1999.

<sup>53</sup>Jay Levinson & Seth Godin, *The Guerrilla Marketing Handbook*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 76.

<sup>54</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 87.

<sup>55</sup>Jay Levinson & Seth Godin, *The Guerrilla Marketing Handbook*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 80-81.

<sup>56</sup>Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars", Parameters, Autumn 1994: 40.

<sup>57</sup>Former British Broadcasting producer Karen Coleman reported this to the commander of the CJIICTF during initial production meetings in January, 1996. She became the first IFOR PSYOP television section producer and insisted upon obtaining Beta-SP cameras and recording equipment. Her insistence proved correct as the three major Sarajevan/Pale television stations, *Radio-Televisia Bosna-Herzegovina*, *Srpska Radio-Televisia*, and *Studio 99*, refused to broadcast on anything other than Beta-SP. Beta-SP should not be confused with Beta-Max.

<sup>58</sup>This author served as the first PSYOP television section chief for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia and had the responsibility of establishing the first PSYOP television operations for a European audience. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) commanders and fund managers were stunned when the costs of conducting television operations became clear.

<sup>59</sup>The AVID is a computer-based video editor built around an Apple Macintosh Quadra 950 processor driving dual 21" monitors connected to videotape recorders. It is expandable to include format converters, etc. The AVID records raw footage videotape digitally onto multiple external 9GB hard drives. Editor personnel use powerful software to edit the digitized footage. The final edited product is then recorded back to videotape. Being non-linear, editing can occur at any point within the program without having to rerecord earlier portions.

<sup>60</sup>The Video Toaster is a Commodore-based computer linear editor. Very powerful despite its age, its greatest drawback is its linear format meaning that any

editing done at any point within the video program requires any previous footage to be re-edited also.

<sup>61</sup>Jay Levinson & Seth Godin, *The Guerrilla Marketing Handbook*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 83.

<sup>62</sup>Steven Collins, "Psychological Operations – Ready for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?", 13 April 1998.

<sup>63</sup>Bill Howard, "Lights! Camera! Time Sink!", PC Magazine, 23 March 1999: 97.

<sup>64</sup>Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

<sup>67</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 40.

<sup>68</sup>Wilbur Schramm, et al, "The Nature of Psychological Warfare", (Chevy Chase, MD, John's Hopkins University, 5 January 1953, declassified 23 May 1988), 250.

<sup>69</sup>Alexander Haim, *Marketing for Dummies*, (Foster City, CA, IDG Books Worldwide, Inc., 1997), 21.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid., 22.

<sup>71</sup>Steven Collins, "Psychological Operations – Ready for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?", 13 April 1998.

<sup>72</sup>Jay Levinson & Seth Godin, *The Guerrilla Marketing Handbook*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 76.

<sup>73</sup>Ibid., 75.

<sup>74</sup>John Pfieffer, "Six months and half a million dollars, all for 15 seconds", *Smithsonian*, October 1987: 135.

<sup>75</sup>Radio-Televisia Bosna-Herzegovina's managing director, Amila Omersoftic, initially demanded IFOR pay 1000 Deutsche Marks (approximately \$650) per minute of airtime during prime-time broadcasts in March 1996.

<sup>76</sup>Jay Levinson & Seth Godin, *The Guerrilla Marketing Handbook*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 82.

<sup>77</sup>Ibid., 80.

<sup>78</sup>Directorate of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs, J9, *Psychological Operations in Panama During Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty*, (MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, United States Special Operations Command, March 1994), 11.

<sup>79</sup>"Mirko" is a common Slavic masculine name derived from the word for peace, "mir".

<sup>80</sup>Jay Levinson & Seth Godin, *The Guerrilla Marketing Handbook*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1994), 81.

#### CHAPTER 5

# CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis identifies PSYOP doctrinal, educational, and training weaknesses jeopardizing the development of effective PSYOP products in sophisticated media environments. But more than that, this chapter makes specific recommendations for improvement in doctrine, education, and training. Specific doctrinal, education, and training recommendations are stated below. Further study may refine additional specific education and training objectives appropriate to sophisticated media environments.

# Recommended Doctrine Improvements

United States Special Operations Command should allocate resources to more fully develop doctrine and assist regional commands in peacetime planning. In Europe, Special Operations Command Europe is the proponency for PSYOP and should coordinate this effort. United States European Command should create additional staff positions for PSYOP planning. The United States John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School Department of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) is the United States Army PSYOP doctrinal proponent. DOTD is currently revising FM 33-1 and FM 33-1-1. That office should promote doctrine that supports staff integration with civilian agencies and effective product development as recommended below.

# Doctrinal Inclusion of PSYOP Support to Civilian Agencies

PSYOP personnel will support civilian agencies. FM 31-1-1, chapter 2 must be amended to reflect this inevitability and describe techniques for integrating PSYOP forces into civilian agency staffs during operations other than military operations. For example, chapter 2 could describe optimal integration with United States Information Agency operations and provide historical examples of such integration with the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

# Legal Issues Relevant to PSYOP

FM 33-1 should describe PSYOP relevant legal restrictions. At the very least, doctrine should identify the employment restrictions stated in National Security Decision Directive 130 and the financial restrictions placed upon government "propaganda" stated in Title 10 United States Code. The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group should amend the *Legal Aspects of U.S. Army PSYOP* class (Program of Instruction File Number 5953) to include the above named legally restrictive documents.

## Establishing Reasonable Expectations

FM 33-1-1, chapter 2 should direct PSYOP staff planners to assist commanders in establishing reasonable expectations for PSYOP based upon an analysis of the supported policy, program or operation. FM 33-1-1, chapter 2 should clarify establishing reasonable expectations based upon the ability to achieve measurable PSYOP objectives.

# Staff Organization and PSYOP Supervision

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) must formalize staff organization and PSYOP supervision. USSOCOM can do this by policy or by amending FM 33-1-1, chapter 4. The staff organization developed by Lieutenant General (United Kingdom Army) Sir Michael Walker as described in Chapter 4 could be used as a model.

# Intelligence Gathering

FM 33-1-1, chapter 5 must promote innovative intelligence gathering to include information technologies such as the Internet. Doctrine should also focus on detailed target audience analysis as the objective of proper intelligence gathering. Chapter 5 should describe the PSYOP Automated System.

PSYOP groups should require PSYOP battalion S2 personnel to attend the PSYOP Officer Course.

## **Modified PSYOP Process**

The PSYOP Process can be improved to better support integration and product development in sophisticated media environments. As stated earlier, the current doctrinal PSYOP process is general and unsophisticated in terms of integration and product development. It is therefore suitable for unsophisticated media environments. The process must be flexible enough to consider supporting units and organizations outside the United States military and suitable for use in sophisticated media environments such as Europe. The process must be refined in detail and more focused toward product development. Product development must be detailed enough to produce suitable products

to gain the target audience attention in a sophisticated media environment. They must be competitive with other messages in a media-saturated environment. Most importantly, the products must be effective, that is, they must result in the desired behavioral effect. In order to accomplish this, basic graphic design must be taught to PSYOP soldiers. This can best be accomplished by including marketing and advertising techniques as described in Chapter 4 in the program of instruction for PSYOP officer and enlisted courses. The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group should amend *Introduction to Psychological Operations* class (Program of Instruction File Number 3720) to teach a more specific PSYOP Process.

# A Target Audience Analysis Worksheet Focused on Product Development

This author proposes a new TAAWS shown in appendix A. PSYOP personnel relatively unfamiliar with a given target audience analysis must be able to develop suitable, competitive, and effective products. The information PSYOP personnel require to produce a product prototype must originate in a complete and accurate Target Audience Analysis Worksheet (TAAWS). The current TAAWS is not product development oriented. It fails to discuss relevant design characteristics or drive media selection. Therefore, a new TAAWS format is needed.

The target audience analyst should be the sole researcher. The analyst must have some understanding of product development. The analyst must analyze the target audience from the perspective not only of the target audience but also from that of the product developer.

As a physical environment changes, so will the associated psychological conditions. The accuracy of the analysis will then change over time as well. The new TAAWS includes the date the TAAWS was completed and when the information should be reviewed for changes.

The new TAAWS format clearly shows each important physical condition and the associated resulting psychological condition. Physical environmental conditions cause stress in target audiences. In effect, each physical condition will cause a stressful psychological condition in the target audience. This psychological condition, normally a strong emotion, is the need or "vulnerability" PSYOP personnel may exploit. PSYOP personnel can suggest or direct a behavior to the target audience and explain that by adopting the new behavior the target audience will satisfy its need. It is important to understand the relationship between the physical condition and the psychological condition in order to derive the message that will address the need.

The new TAAWS clearly states the message intended for use in the products.

The new TAAWS should calls this the "message" rather than the "theme" as was the case with the old TAAWS in the interest of clarity. The message should be derived from the target audience need. The message should tell the target audience what to do and why.

This drives the target audience to exactly the desired behavior and states what the target audience will receive in return for adopting the new behavior.

Symbols, audio, visual, and audiovisual help convey the message. The new TAAWS clearly shows the visual, audio, and audio-visual symbols to be used to convey each message, not just describe them.

In any given target audience analysis, there may be more than one message that will achieve a change in target audience behavior. Therefore there must be some means to orient the product developer as to which message and products to develop first. The target audience analyst can focus the product developer's efforts by evaluating the susceptibility of the target audience to each message then comparing susceptibilities. By evaluating each message and its associated symbols by its susceptibility, the target audience analyst assigns each message a priority. For example, the analyst judges the target audience to be highly susceptible to Message 1, but only moderately susceptible (stated as "medium" on the TAAWS) to Message 2. The product developer would begin designing products using Message 1 first. Each message must be compared against the others and given a unique evaluation. No message can have the same evaluation or the purpose of evaluating susceptibilities is lost.

The new TAAWS includes phrases, words, and symbols to avoid. Normally PSYOP personnel will gain and maintain credibility with a target audience by not offending the target audience in the products or using culturally incorrect words and phrases. There are phrases, words, and symbols that will be offensive or appear incorrect to the target audience. The target audience analyst should make this known to the product developer. The target audience analyst should state these on the TAAWS. The new TAAWS has a place for this to prompt the analyst to do so.

The new TAAWS includes a section for product development notes. Notes should include the appearance of persons in the products, background music, and recording formats for TV and radio products. Additionally, the target audience analyst should describe the format of the prototype to be used to obtain product production and

dissemination approval. For example, the language of the product approval authority would be important.

The target audience analyst should also determine the best method to access the target audience and include detailed dissemination notes. The new TAAWS has a place for these notes.

And finally, the new TAAWS is in a common word processing format easily transmitted electronically such as a Microsoft Word document. This format also supports easy editing and updating. The PSYOP analyst can scan unique and unusual examples of symbols as a "JPEG" or "GIF" file and insert them directly onto the worksheet for transmission. It might also by archived on the Internet as an "HTML" file.

By accomplishing all of the above, the product developer is freed from analysis and accessibility research burdens and can be focused on design and layout.

# A Product/Action Worksheet Based upon Graphic Design Principles

PSYOP personnel should resist the natural tendency to design products when trained graphic artists, especially indigenous artists, are readily available by contract.

This includes radio broadcast personnel and television videographers. Only those who have significant training and experience should tackle complex product design.

There are simply two options to obtain trained and experienced personnel: hire them by contract or send PSYOP personnel to civilian graphic, radio, and television schools to obtain the necessary training. Over time, experience will accrue as a matter of further operational experience.

The reality is that trained and experienced personnel will rarely be available when needed. Therefore, PSYOP personnel must be prepared to act as graphic artists and television and radio program developers. PSYOP development tools such as worksheets must prompt these artistic laypersons to accomplish reasonably competitive product design and development. The current doctrinal tool is the Product/Action Worksheet.

The Product/Action Worksheet (P/AWS) is nothing more than a written workorder for a product. The product developer uses the P/AWS as the basis for the design of
the product. The current doctrinal P/AWS is generic to audio, visual, and audiovisual
product design. The doctrinal P/AWS format as found in FM 33-1-1 is shown in figure
13 and is intended to be used by PSYOP personnel as a guide. Note that the doctrinal
P/AWS fails to prompt the product developer to describe details pertinent to developing
products in sophisticated media environments as described in chapter 4. It is intended to
be used to design audio, visual, or audiovisual products and is therefore very general.
Without specificity, the doctrinal P/AWS leaves too much for interpretation and does not
support specific product development. It fails to reflect the complexity of proper product
development nor is appropriate to a specific media such as television or radio.

Product development is complex in sophisticated media environments. This is because products are complex in sophisticated media environments. A better P/AWS is one that has a format that is either focused on product development or is focused on action development. Therefore, there should be a distinctive Product Worksheet and a distinctive Action Worksheet.

The current P/AWS appears sufficient as an Action Worksheet planning tool.

However, it is unsatisfactory as a planning tool for products. Proposed product worksheets appear in the appendixes.

	PRODUCT/ACTION WORK	(SHEET
Halkurial Objective	Supported Link Mission	PSYOP MISSION
Targot Alaborico	PSYOP Objective	
Themes enti Syntols		
Product Concept		
Dissentiation		
tions: livicators		
Addist Programs	Арриона	
	THIS IS A SAMPLE OR SUGGES	TED FORMAT.

Figure 14. Doctrinal Product/Action Worksheet. From FM 33-1-1, 4-9.

This author proposes a new media-specific P/AWS, called a product worksheet, shown in appendixes B and C.

The new Product Worksheet is media specific since designing different media products is done differently. The new Product Worksheet prompts the product developer to form the design based upon the design principles described in chapter 4. The product developer who follows the new Product Worksheet format will better address each design principle. It also serves as a means by which a supervisor may more easily check the developer's work.

The new Product Worksheet is in a format easily edited, modified, and transmitted electronically. It is similar to the TAAWS above so that the product developer could "cut and paste" much of the relevant analysis onto the Product Worksheet. The example format shown in the appendixes is derived from the TAAWS shown above. Where the TAAWS may have multiple messages, the Product Worksheet focuses on only one message. The product developer beginning with the message rated with the highest susceptibility. The product developer then chooses graphic symbols appropriate for a graphic product. The product developer extracts other relevant product development information from the TAAWS and ignores irrelevant information.

## **Education Improvements**

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group should amend the *Target Audience Analysis Process* class (Program of Instruction File Number 3153) to include the information presented in here and in chapter 4.

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group should amend the *Visual Product* 

Development class (Program of Instruction File Number 3932) to focus specifically on graphic design principles for graphic products. They should also rename the class Graphic Design Principles. The class should include the proposed graphic product worksheet shown in appendix B.

The United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School's 3d Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Training Group should amend Audio-visual Product Development class (Program of Instruction File Number 3245) to focus specifically on television product design. They should also rename the class Television Product Development. The class should include the proposed television product worksheet shown in appendix C.

# Training Improvements

Major Nicholas Swayne of the 6th PSYOP Battalion initiated a program whereby selected deserving soldiers participated in a "training with industry" program. These soldiers were assigned to marketing firms for a period of six months to gain marketing experience then returned to their PSYOP units. The United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) at Fort Bragg should expand and continue this valuable program.

Individual PSYOP units must conduct routine graphic design training. Innovative unit trainers may schedule subject matter experts from civilian design firms to assist in such training. PSYOP units should conduct graphic design training based upon civilian marketing texts.

## **Summary**

These conclusions and recommendations better address the complex requirements for PSYOP in sophisticated media environments. They help focus PSYOP personnel on staff integration and sophisticated product development. PSYOP personnel must be capable of producing products as sophisticated as advertisements to which the target audience is accustomed. Competition for target audience attention in sophisticated media environments is fierce. PSYOP products must gain the target audience's attention and maintain that attention long enough to convey the PSYOP message. Improving doctrine, education and training will increase the ability of PSYOP personnel to develop effective PSYOP products. By developing PSYOP products consistent with the techniques and procedures described above PSYOP will be more successful in sophisticated media environments.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Although FM 33-1-1 defines susceptibility as "the *ability* [author's Italics] of the target audience to achieve the PSYOP objective", a better definition would be "the ability and *willingness* of the target audience to achieve the PSYOP objective". FM 33-1-1 uses the refusal of Japanese soldiers on Saipan to surrender at the end of World War II as an example of susceptibility. But this very example shows that although the Japanese soldiers were quite physically *able* to surrender, they were *unwilling* to do so.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and Procedures (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 4-9.

## APPENDIX A

# PROPOSED TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET (TAAWS)

The following author-designed TAAWS supports a more detailed and specific PSYOP process and is product development oriented. This form may prove more useful to PSYOP personnel operating in remote sophisticated media environments and to those personnel developing new doctrine reflecting new PSYOP roles and missions in environments of ever-increasing media sophistication.

#### TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS WORKSHEET

Analysis by: CJIICTF (JPOTF) TAAS

Approved by: Larsen, Stephen C, CPT, PDC Chief

Date: 15 Feb 96 Review on: 15 Mar 96

<u>National Objective</u>: The United States conducts peace implementation missions in support of NATO peace implementation forces (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

#### **Supported Unit(s) Mission:**

- 1. IFOR conducts peace implementation missions to separate the former warring factions imposing a peaceful environment within the former Yugoslavia. IFOR acts to protect non-combatants, ensure force protection, and enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).
- 2. The United Nations (UN) conducts operations to return the former Yugoslavia to a state of normalcy including operations to protect persons from the effects of land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), coordinate reconstruction efforts and humanitarian assistance.
- 3. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conducts operations to hold national elections, assure human rights, and enforce arms reduction compliance.
- 4. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague (ICTY) promotes the apprehension and prosecution of persons indicted for war crimes, the protection of mass-murder sites, and the preservation of evidence which may be used at trial.

**PSYOP Mission**: US PSYOP assets deploy to Germany, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and task-organize to form one CJPOTF, one CPSE, and three DPSEs.

1. All PSYOP assets conduct an information campaign promoting peace implementation efforts, force protection, protection of non-combatants, and DPA enforcement.

- 2. CJPOTF provides UN program and product support promoting mine- and UXO-awareness and humanitarian assistance.
- 3. CJPOTF provides Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) voter education, election, human rights, and arms control program and product support.
- 4. CJPOTF provides audio-visual support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to promoted the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes.

Target Audience: School-age children of Sarajevo.

**PSYOP Objective**: Reduce the rate of mine- and UXO-related injuries and deaths of children.

Physical Conditions	Associated Target Audience Need	
Sarajevans endured isolation, injury and death during 42 months of sniping and shelling.	Resolve isolation and helplessness	
2. All factions used faulty munitions and landmines; UXO and mines fill the city killing or maiming 2 children per day	Resolve fear of injury and death	
3. Children become entrapped in a mined areas and do not know extraction procedures	Resolve fear of entrapment in a minefield	
4. Children were sheltered in basements thus have little mine awareness	Resolve fear of unrecognized hazards	

**Effectiveness:** High due to the willingness of the target audience to avoid injury and death.

Message	Symbols	Susceptibility
1. Don't touch mines/UXO	o statement: "don't touch mines" o image of missing child (blacked out) o story of child hurt by mines/UXO o image of child with missing limb o images of mines/UXO o sounds of mines/UXO exploding o images of children at play wearing brightly colored clothing contrasted with o admission of parental responsibility o images of mined area o images of UXO in proximity to	High in conjunction with mine identification theme
2. Know these mines	children playing o description and images of mines/UXO o sounds of mines/UXO exploding o admission of parental responsibility o images of mined area o images of UXO in proximity to children playing	Medium(+) due to dryness of subject; requires CA education program

3. Instructions on how to safely exit a minefield	o images of extraction techniques o description of extraction techniques	Medium(-) due to dryness of subject; requires CA education program
4. First aid for mine/UXO injuries	o images of first aid techniques o first aid instructions o images of typical mine injuries (tasteful)	Low due to complexity; requires CA education program; probably ineffective with younger children

#### Phrases/Words/Symbols to Avoid:

- 1. Sarajevans strongly oppose images of suffering
- 2. Sarajevans react negatively to the term PSYOP but positively towards the terms "news" and "information"
- 3. Sarajevans react negatively to the introductory word "attention" due to previous use by Nazis. Better to use "notice" or "important".

## **Product Development Notes:**

- Appearance of persons in products
- a. Children wear brightly colored clothing. The people desire to show they have overcome the effects of war with dignity and in high spirits.
- b. Ethnic groups within the population are physically indistinguishable. Viewers will be unable to distinguish ethnicity of persons due to all ethnicities being descended from the same three ethnic tribes.
- 2. Background Music:
  - a. Irish music groups are popular. Sarajevans sympathize with Northern Ireland.
  - b. Techno is popular in Sarajevo among teens.
  - c. American Rap is also very popular.

3.	Recording format for TV			
	[] NTSC [x	] PAL	[] SECAM	
	[x] Beta SP	[] Hi-8	[] VHS	

- 4. Product Approval Prototype notes:
  - a. Language for product approval prototype: English
  - b. TV tape format
    [x] NTSC [] PAL [] SECAM
    [] Beta SP [] Hi-8 [x] VHS

#### Accessibility

- 1. TV 88% most effective; 88% of children watch television; most homes have satellite TV which provides news and information from outside the city
  - a. Republica Srpska state-run Srpska Radio-Televizia (CPT in Cyrillic) is popular due to extensive sports programming; CPT uses PAL Beta-SP tapes. Manager is Marica Lalovic located in Pale. Subtitling and narration is in the Cyrillic Belgrade Serbo-Croatian dialect. Tel 453 278 or 783 815 [Ptarmagan 6834, MAJ Pickles at IFOR PIO Pale]. CPT plays cartoons from 1600-1800 daily.

- b. Bosnian Federation state-run Televizia Bosna-Herzegovina (TVBiH) is popular with Muslim children due to war-time news programming; TVBiH uses PAL Beta-SP tapes. Manager is Amila Omersoftic located on Sniper Alley. Subtitling and narration is in the Latinic Bosniak Serbo-Croatian dialect. Tel 462 777. TVBiH plays cartoons from 1600-1800 daily.
- c. Independent station "Studio 99" is popular with Sarajevan teens due to its reputation of anti-authority programming. Manager is Adil Kulenovic located next to the US Embassy. Subtitling and narration is Latinic Bosniak. Tel 664 550/505/506. Studio 99 plays a children's news program from 1600-1630 daily.
- 2. Radio 75% next most effective; 75% of children listen to radio; Radio IFOR is most popular with children due to its current rock format. Various local "mom and pop" stations exist. Format is cassette tape; normal bias, CrO2 or metal; dialect dependent upon the ethnicity of station management.
- 3. Printed products posted at kiosks or given to children in schools
- 4. Loudspeakers do not use. Sarajevans view loudspeakers as an intrusive "Nazi" technique
- 5. Face-to-face effective at play areas, schools as they open, other kid "hangouts"

#### **Impact Indicators**

50% decrease of mine/UXO-related injuries and deaths within 4 weeks as reported by the Red Cross

## APPENDIX B

#### PROPOSED GRAPHIC PRODUCT WORKSHEET

Below is an author-designed example of a completed Graphic Product Worksheet.

This example is derived from the Target Audience Analysis Worksheet shown in appendix A. The actual worksheet would be saved as a template in a common word processing program format such as Microsoft Word.

Product No

## **GRAPHIC PRODUCT WORKSHEET**

Analysis by: CJIICTF (JPOTF) PDS, SPC Gabriel Schuyler

Approved by: Larsen, Stephen C, CPT, PDC Chief

Date: 15 Feb 96

<u>National Objective</u>: The United States conducts peace implementation missions in support of NATO peace implementation forces (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

## Supported Unit(s) Mission:

- 1. IFOR conducts peace implementation missions to separate the former warring factions imposing a peaceful environment within the former Yugoslavia. IFOR acts to protect non-combatants, ensure force protection, and enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).
- 2. The United Nations (UN) conducts operations to return the former Yugoslavia to a state of normalcy including operations to protect persons from the effects of land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), coordinate reconstruction efforts and humanitarian assistance.
- 3. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conducts operations to hold national elections, assure human rights, and enforce arms reduction compliance.
- 4. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague (ICTY) promotes the apprehension and prosecution of persons indicted for war crimes, the protection of mass-murder sites, and the preservation of evidence which may be used at trial.

**PSYOP Mission**: US PSYOP assets deploy to Germany, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and task-organize to form one CJPOTF, one CPSE, and three DPSEs.

- 1. All PSYOP assets conduct an information campaign promoting peace implementation efforts, force protection, protection of non-combatants, and DPA enforcement.
- CJPOTF provides UN program and product support promoting mine- and UXO-awareness and humanitarian assistance.

- 3. CJPOTF provides Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) voter education, election, human rights, and arms control program and product support.
- 4. CJPOTF provides audio-visual support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to promoted the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes.

Target Audience: School-age children of Sarajevo.

PSYOP Objective: Reduce the rate of mine- and UXO-related injuries and deaths of children.

Message	Symbols
1. Don't touch mines/UXO	o statement: "don't touch mines" o image of child with missing limb o images of children at play wearing brightly colored clothing contrasted with o story of child hurt by mines/UXO

<u>Product Concept</u>: Poster made from digital photo(s) showing a youth with missing leg forlornly watching other same-aged youth play soccer. Text appears above focal point centered.

Size and stock: A3, heavy grade card stock

#### **Product Development Notes:**

<u>Focal point</u>: Figure and headline. Headline reads "Playing with mines is no game" in bold yellow text with black border.

Figure: Youth with missing limb, seen from behind to conceal identity.

Colors: red or orange lightly colored sweat or sports pants; light blue shirt

Background: Soccer field seen from slightly above with youth playing a soccer game

Colors: green or dirt-brown field; other players wearing soccer shirt, shorts and socks darker than the figure but lighter than the field. Change colors digitally to enhance focal point as necessary.

**Product Approval Language**: English

**Dissemination:** 20,000 to each MND disseminated by tactical PSYOP elements

- a.
- b.
- MND North: Belgrade Serb and Zagreb Croatian printed front-to-back MND Southwest: Mostar Bosniak and Belgrade Serb printed front-to-back MND Southeast: Sarajevo Bosniak and Belgrade Serb printed front-to-back C.

<u>Impact Indicators</u>
50% decrease of mine/UXO-related injuries and deaths within 4 weeks as reported by the Red Cross

#### APPENDIX C

#### PROPOSED TELEVISION PRODUCT WORKSHEET

Below is an author-designed example of a completed Television Product
Worksheet. The actual worksheet would be saved as a template in a common word
processing program format such as Microsoft Word.

This completed proposed Television Product Worksheet example for a 5-minute television spot is derived from the proposed TAAWS shown in appendix A.

This format has television product design-specific information prompting the product developer to identify such items as tape format type, recording format type, background music, etc. As with the Graphic Product Worksheet example above, the TAAWS may have multiple messages, but the Television Product Worksheet focuses on only one message. The product developer beginning with the message rated with the highest susceptibility. The product developer then chooses audio-visual symbols appropriate for a television product combining the impact of sight and sound. The product developer extracts other relevant product development information from the TAAWS and ignores irrelevant information. Notice that each respective Product Worksheet contains the same header information. Although each Product Worksheet directs product development of different media, each product is mutually supporting and complementary because each is refined from the same product development-based TAAWS accomplishing the same PSYOP objective.

#### **TELEVISION PRODUCT WORKSHEET**

Analysis by: CJIICTF (JPOTF) PDS, SPC Mary Miller Approved by: Larsen, Stephen C, CPT, PDC Chief

Date: 15 Feb 96

<u>National Objective</u>: The United States conducts peace implementation missions in support of NATO peace implementation forces (IFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

## Supported Unit(s) Mission:

- 1. IFOR conducts peace implementation missions to separate the former warring factions imposing a peaceful environment within the former Yugoslavia. IFOR acts to protect non-combatants, ensure force protection, and enforce the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA).
- 2. The United Nations (UN) conducts operations to return the former Yugoslavia to a state of normalcy including operations to protect persons from the effects of land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), coordinate reconstruction efforts and humanitarian assistance.
- 3. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conducts operations to hold national elections, assure human rights, and enforce arms reduction compliance.
- 4. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at The Hague (ICTY) promotes the apprehension and prosecution of persons indicted for war crimes, the protection of mass-murder sites, and the preservation of evidence which may be used at trial.

<u>PSYOP Mission</u>: US PSYOP assets deploy to Germany, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and task-organize to form one CJPOTF, one CPSE, and three DPSEs.

- 1. All PSYOP assets conduct an information campaign promoting peace implementation efforts, force protection, protection of non-combatants, and DPA enforcement.
- 2. CJPOTF provides UN program and product support promoting mine- and UXO-awareness and humanitarian assistance.
- 3. CJPOTF provides Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) voter education, election, human rights, and arms control program and product support.
- 4. CJPOTF provides audio-visual support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to promoted the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes.

Target Audience: School-age children of Sarajevo.

**PSYOP Objective**: Reduce the rate of mine- and UXO-related injuries and deaths of children.

Message	Symbols
1. Don't touch mines/UXO	o statement: "don't touch mines"
	o image of child with missing
	limb
	o images of children at play
	wearing brightly colored clothing

o story of child hurt by
mines/UXO
o images of mines/UXO
o sounds of mines/UXO
exploding
o images of children at play
wearing brightly colored clothing
contrasted with
o admission of parental
responsibility
o images of mined area
o images of UXO in proximity to
children playing

<u>Product Concept</u>: TV spot, 5 minutes in length. Child tells story of how he/she was injured by UXO or mine while playing and warns other children not to touch mines or UXO.

The child's story telling is the background narration for video footage showing images of children playing, mines or UXO, mines or UXO near children playing, and finally the image of the child as he/she states, "Don't touch mines". The video footage reflects what the child is describing. As the child describes him/herself playing, the video footage shows children playing. As the child describes the mine/UXO, the video footage shows a mine or UXO. As the child describes the location and proximity of mines and UXO to the play site, video footage shows mines or UXO with children playing in the background.

Final image is of child clearly injured but not in anguish stating words to the effect, "Don't touch mines."

## **Product Development Notes:**

- 1. Appearance of persons in products
  - a. Children wear brightly colored clothing. The people desire to show they have overcome the effects of war with dignity and in high spirits.
  - b. Ethnic groups within the population are physically indistinguishable. Viewers will be unable to distinguish ethnicity of persons due to all ethnicities being descended from the same three ethnic tribes.
- 2. Background Music: Subdued or melancholy music by "The Cranberries" or other pop Irish music group.
- 3. Recording format
  - a. Prototype

[] NTSC [x] PAL [] SECAM

[x] Beta SP [] Hi-8 [] VHS

- b. Product Approval:
  - 1) Language: English
  - 2) TV tape format

[x] NTSC [] PAL [] SECAM [] Beta SP [] Hi-8 [x] VHS

#### **Dissemination:** One tape to the following stations.

- Republica Srpska state-run Srpska Radio-Televizia (CPT in Cyrillic) is popular due to extensive sports
  programming; CPT uses PAL Beta-SP tapes. Manager is Marica Lalovic located in Pale. Subtitling
  and narration is in the Cyrillic Belgrade Serbo-Croatian dialect. Tel 453 278 or 783 815 [Ptarmagan
  6834, MAJ Pickles at IFOR PIO Pale]. CPT plays cartoons from 1600-1800 daily.
- Bosnian Federation state-run Televizia Bosna-Herzegovina (TVBiH) is popular with Muslim children
  due to war-time news programming; TVBiH uses PAL Beta-SP tapes. Manager is Amila Omersoftic
  located on Sniper Alley. Subtitling and narration is in the Latinic Bosniak Serbo-Croatian dialect. Tel
  462 777. TVBiH plays cartoons from 1600-1800 daily.
- 3. Independent station "Studio 99" is popular with Sarajevan teens due to its reputation of anti-authority programming. Manager is Adil Kulenovic located next to the US Embassy. Subtitling and narration is Latinic Bosniak. Tel 664 550/505/506. Studio 99 plays a children's news program from 1600-1630 daily.

### **Impact Indicators**

50% decrease of mine/UXO-related injuries and deaths within 4 weeks as reported by the Red Cross

## **GLOSSARY**

- Brigade PSYOP Support Element (BPSE): the tactical PSYOP detachment, normally commanded by a major, supporting a maneuver brigade. The command support relationship is normally "attached". This term is falling out of favor with the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group.
- Civil Affairs (CA): "[the establishment, maintenance, influence or exploitation of] relations among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace in the [area of operations] to facilitate military operations."
- Combatant command: "Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10,
  United States Code, Section 164, which flows from the NCA [National Command
  Authority] and is exercised only by commanders of unified and specified
  combatant commands."<sup>2</sup>
- Command and Control Warfare (C2W): "...the warfighting application of IW [Information Operations] in military operations."<sup>3</sup>
- Consolidation PSYOP: "Psychological operations conducted in foreign areas inhabited by an enemy or potentially hostile populace and occupied by U.S. forces or in which U.S. forces are based, to result ultimate in behaviors by the foreign populace that support U.S. objectives in the area."
- Corps PSYOP Support Element (CPSE): the tactical PSYOP battalion headquarters providing support to a corps. This term is falling out of favor with the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group.
- Country team: "Senior members of U.S. Government agencies assigned to a U.S. diplomatic mission overseas and subject to the direction or supervision of the Chief, U.S. Mission (ambassador)."
- Division PSYOP Support Element (DPSE): the tactical PSYOP company headquarters providing support to a division. The command support relationship is normally "attached". This term is falling out of favor with the 4<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group
- Exploitation: "...taking full advantage of any information which comes to hand for...military operational purposes."
- Global Information Environment (GIE): "All individuals, organizations, or systems most of which are outside the control of the military or National Command Authorities, that collect, process, and disseminate information to national and international audiences."

- Hackers: unauthorized users of information systems (INFOSYS).
- Information Age: current era beginning about 1986 with the advent of the personal computer and the emergence of the Internet.
- Information dominance: "The degree of information superiority that allows the possessor to use information systems and capabilities to achieve an operational advantage in a conflict or to control the situation in operations short of war, while denying those capabilities to the adversary."
- Information Operations (IO): "Continuous military operations within the MIE that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations; IO include interacting with the GIE and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities."
- Information Systems (INFOSYS): "[Those means which] collect, process, and disseminate information relating to current and future operations." 10
- Information Warfare (IW): "Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks."

  11
- Internet: "a collective term used to describe an interconnection of world-wide computer networks. Operating on the Internet are a variety of computer services such as email, UseNet newsgroups, FTP [File Transfer Protocol], Telnet, Gopher, and the World Wide Web." 12
- Joint operations: "Operations carried on by two or more of the armed forces of the United States (Army, Navy, Air Force)." 13
- Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF): the PSYOP organization usually composed of the headquarters element of a regionally oriented PSYOP battalion and various media production sections task organized for a specific mission. The JPOTF normally supports a Joint Task Force (JTF) and provides operational and tactical level PSYOP planning and development.
- Key communicator: "An individual to whom the target audience turns most often for an analysis or interpretation of information or events." 14
- Military Information Environment (MIE): "The environment contained within the GIE [Global Information Environment], consisting of information systems (INFOSYS) and organizations friendly and adversary, military and nonmilitary, that support,

- enable, or significantly influence a specific military operation."15
- National Command Authorities (NCA): "The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors." 16
- Nonstate groups: groups not associated with a particular state ranging from drug cartels to social activists.<sup>17</sup>
- Operational Information (OPINFO): German term for psychological operations.
- Product: "Any visual, audio, or audio-visual item generated and disseminated in support of a PSYOP program." 18
- Product development center (PDC): "That [non-TOE] organization within the operations element of a PSYOP battalion or company in which programs of products or actions are developed." 19
- Propaganda: "A systematic projection of distorted or half-truthful information designed to persuade a body of people to support or adopt a particular opinion, attitude or course of action."<sup>20</sup>
- Psychological actions (PSYACTs): "Activities conducted for their psychological impact."<sup>21</sup>
- Psychological Operations (PSYOP): "Operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign target audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives."<sup>22</sup>
- PSYOP campaign: "A series of PSYOP programs conducted at the theater level to achieve short- and mid-term objectives in support of the CINC's goals."<sup>23</sup>
- PSYOP objective: "A statement of a measured response that reflects the desired attitude or behavior change of a selected foreign target audience as a result of psychological operations."<sup>24</sup>
- PSYOP personnel: military personnel trained in the use of PSYOP.
- PSYOP program: "A sequential, coordinated presentation of a series of actions and/or products to achieve a specific PSYOP objective."<sup>25</sup>
- Public Affairs (PA): "Department of Defense and Army policy [requiring] Army commanders to provide open and independent coverage by the news media as the standard means of providing the American public information about the

employment and capabilities of their armed forces."<sup>26</sup> "The objective of PA is to ensure military operations are put in the proper context for an external audience, as well as to keep soldiers informed and protected from the effects of enemy propaganda and disinformation or sources of disinformation/rumor."<sup>27</sup>

Relevant Information: "Information drawn from the military information environment that significantly impacts, contributes to, or is related to the execution of the operational mission at hand." 28

Theme: "A theme is a subject, topic, or line of persuasion used to achieve a psychological objective." 29

Vulnerability: "Manifestation of an unsatisfactory or perceived need in an individual or a target audience." 30

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office August 1996), 2-5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office August 1996), 2-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 January 1998), 157.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 1996), 1-2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Ibid., 1-9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Ibid., 2-3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Ibid., 2-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Ibid., 2-2.

<sup>12</sup>Mark R. Brown, Netscape Navigator 3 Starter Kit (Indianapolis, Indiana: Que Corporation, 1996), 8.

<sup>13</sup>Department of the Army, AR 310-25, *Dictionary of United States Army Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 21 May 1986).

<sup>14</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-9.

<sup>15</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office August 1996), 1-4.

<sup>16</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 12 January 1998), 291.

<sup>17</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office August 1996), 1-7.

<sup>18</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-10.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Funk & Wagnalls Standard Desk Dictionary (New York, New York: Funk & Wagnalls Publishing Co., 1980), 530.

<sup>21</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-10.

<sup>22</sup>Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-53, *Joint Psychological Operations Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 10 July 1996), v.

<sup>23</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-10.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid., Glossary-11.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Department of the Army, FM 100-6, *Information Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office August 1996), 1-13.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., 3-0.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., 4-0.

<sup>29</sup>Department of the Army, FM 33-1, *Psychological Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 18 February 1993), Glossary-12.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

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