## KKORN FERRY

## Corporate Board Governance and Director Compensation in Canada


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## Table of contents

The Surveyed Companies ..... 2
Special Report: Counting the Hours ..... 6
Board Independence ..... 20
Board Composition ..... 28
Board Size ..... 40
Board Assessments, Director Selection and Director Development ..... 44
Meetings and Attendance ..... 52
Board Committees ..... 56
Director Compensation ..... 60
Board Chair Compensation ..... 68
Lead Director Compensation ..... 72
Committee Chair Compensation ..... 74
Committee Member Compensation ..... 80
Stock-Based Compensation ..... 84
Director Share Ownership ..... 89
Company Data ..... 93
Endnotes ..... 102
Korn Ferry ..... 105
Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates ..... 107

## The Surveyed Companies



## The Most Comprehensive Canadian Governance Study

We are pleased to present the most comprehensive review of public issuer governance data available in Canada. This twenty-second annual report examines governance in Canadian companies and includes our special report, Counting The Hours: How Time Consuming Is It To Be A Canadian Director? Our commitment is to provide directors and trustees with accurate and relevant Canadian data across a wide spectrum.

# The data is collected from publicly traded companies that were on one or more of the following lists: 

* The Financial Post Top 210 (June 2014)
* The Report on Business Top 205 (July 2014)
* The S\&P/TSX Composite Index (at any time during 2013)
- We draw data from annual reports, management proxy circulars and annual information forms for fiscal year-ends in late 2013, or the first few months of 2014. All references to "2013" data include data for year-ends in early 2014.
- All figures reported in United States dollars have been converted to Canadian dollars at an exchange rate of 1.03 , which was the average exchange rate for 2013.
- All fractions have been rounded off to the nearest whole number, thus all totals do not add up to exactly 100\%.
- Where this report uses comparative U.S. data, it is drawn from:
* 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the National Association of Corporate Directors with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners. The study is based on 1,400 companies across 24 industries that filed a proxy statement or other financial statement with director compensation information for the fiscal year ending between Feb. 1, 2012 and Jan. 31, 2013.
* 2014-2015 NACD Public Company Governance Survey, a publication of the National Association of Corporate Directors. This report is based on insights from 1,013 public company responses.


## Breakdown of Research Sample by Assets and Industry Group

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | <500M | 500M to 1B | 1B to 5B | >5B | ALL | Percent** |
| Consumer Discretionary | 3 | 5 | 15 | 9 | 32 | 11\% |
| Consumer Staple | 1 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 11 | 4\% |
| Energy | 6 | 5 | 36 | 21 | 68 | 23\% |
| Financials | 2 | 1 | 19 | 37 | 59 | 20\% |
| Health Care | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1\% |
| Industrials | 3 | 8 | 15 | 6 | 32 | 11\% |
| Information Technology | 4 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 12 | 4\% |
| Materials | 9 | 20 | 25 | 13 | 67 | 22\% |
| Telecommunication Services | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1\% |
| Utilities | 0 | 0 | 6 | 6 | 12 | 4\% |
| All | 28 | 42 | 126 | 104 | 300 | 101\% |
| Percent* | 9\% | 14\% | 42\% | 35\% | 100\% |  |

* Asset group as a percentage of total ** Industry group as a percentage of total



## Terminology and Standards Used Throughout this Report

## Size

Most tables in this report compare results between companies within asset groups. The short forms " $M$ " for millions of dollars and "B" for billions of dollars are used in the tables. For easier comparison in the narrative sections of the report, company sizes are reported as follows:

Micro = companies with assets of less than $\$ 500$ million
Small = companies with assets between $\$ 500$ million and $\$ 1$ billion
Medium = companies with assets between $\$ 1$ billion and $\$ 5$ billion
Large = companies with assets over \$5 billion

## Comparisons

Where tables present data by year, the data is given for 2013, 2012 and 2004, or the first year we began tracking the particular subject. This allows readers to compare between the two most recent years, and also to see how the subject has changed over time.

## Regulatory Documents

Where we use "CSA disclosure requirements", we are referring to the Canadian Securities Administrators' National Instrument 58-101, Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices.

Where we use "CSA governance guidelines", we are referring to the Canadian Securities Administrators’ National Policy 58-201, Corporate Governance Guidelines.

## Independent Directors

Where we refer to directors as "independent", we are basing the categorization on the company's assignment of the term to individual directors under the definition in the CSA disclosure requirements.

## Directors and Trustees

With the inclusion of income trusts, our sample contains organizations with both directors and trustees. For the sake of brevity in this document, where we refer to "director", we are referring to both directors and trustees.

Types of Organizations
Where we use "company" we are referring to any member of the research sample as a whole, which could be either an equity or an income trust.

## Income Trust Names

In some cases, income trusts presented governance data for a board other than its own board of trustees (e.g., for the board of an "Administrator" or "Manager"). The name cited is always the name we have drawn from one of the three sources we used to compile the research sample.

## Retainers

Whenever the term "retainer" is used alone, it refers to whatever combination of cash and shares is paid to directors by the company as a retainer for services, unless we refer specifically to the "cash portion of a retainer" or the "share portion of a retainer".

## Compensation based on Shares, Trust Units and Equivalents

Where we discuss compensation in the form of shares, trust units, deferred share units, etc., we use "shares" unless referring to one specific type of compensation in this group. This does not include compensation in the form of stock or trust options.

## Special Report: Counting The Hours: How Time Consuming Is It To Be A Canadian Director?

Korn/Ferry and Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates surveyed 120 Board Chairs, Directors and CEOs to produce this special report, which can be found on pages 6 to 19. Respondents were either personally interviewed or completed an on-line survey.

## Counting the Hours: How Time Consuming Is It To Be A Canadian Director?



A
fter more than twenty years of studying Canadian board practices, including fourteen years of in-depth surveys on focused governance issues', one of our key observations is how significantly the roles of the board, committees, board and committee chairs, and the individual director have changed:

- directors have taken on a much more proactive and engaged oversight role in areas such as strategic planning, risk management and succession planning;
- governance practices have evolved from early relatively simple questionaires to in-depth analysis of each area, in an effort to ensure board effectiveness; and
- the regulatory environment is more demanding across sectors.

All of these changes have had an impact on the time that a director spends fulfilling his or her board responsibilities.

The increase in time commitment has been well documented in the United States, where the National Association of Corporate Directors has tracked this topic in its annual "Public Company Governance Survey" for several years. It shows that the average annual time commitment for a U.S. director has grown from 190 hours in 2005 to 236 hours in $2013^{3}$. That is a $24 \%$ increase in eight years!

There were no similar Canadian statistics; however, from our regular discussions with directors, we knew that the average time commitment for Canadian directors was also increasing. We just didn't know by how much.

The purpose of our focused survey this year is to shed light on the time demands of a Canadian director. In the spring of 2014, we surveyed 120 directors across Canada about their experiences and opinions with regard to the time commitment required of a director today. We hope that this will serve as a benchmark for further Canadian study and comparison in future years.

We approached this survey from a narrow, but deep, perspective. The process was comprehensive, with most of the 120 directors participating in personal interviews. We asked them to examine all of their board activities and try to be as accurate as possible as they estimated how they devoted their time to their board roles.

The interviews were revealing. Many directors were stunned when they started counting the hours. It was clear that, while directors "knew" that they were putting in more time for all of their boards, they had not actually tallied the number of hours, nor included the range of activities that they engage in as a directors. The outcome was almost always higher than they had imagined.

## Average Time a Director Spends per Board in Canada


> "This was an eye opener. Yes it is a lot of work and it has become more and more noticeable, but I had not actually counted hours. Once calculated, it was a lot more time than I realized, much more than I would have estimated."

[^0]
## 25\%

of those directors have said the issue regularly arises and remains a concern.

## Directors of the Larger Companies Put in the Longest Hours.



[^1]From our discussions with directors, we believe that the correlation between company size and director time relates to a number of factors. As companies grow, their operations become more complex and the geographic reach becomes more global. This generally results in more employees, more complex operations, and more regulatory issues. These all translate into an increased number of directors with a broader range of experiences, more committees, more preparation time for board and committee meetings, and more travel and director education for directors.

## Time Demands are Greater if you are a Board or Committee Chair



Survey Participants by Role on the Board and Average Hours for Primary Board

It is not surprising to see that the board chair spends nearly 73 hours or 9 more days per year than a director with no leadership responsibilities. The board chair has an enormous impact on the effectiveness of a board.

What was revealing was that the time demand on committee chairs was brushing up against those of board chairs. Although we believe that this is a relatively new development over the past five years, it is consistent with the directors' perspectives during our interviews and with our own interaction with boards across Canada. The demand on committee chairs is also apparent in that they are seeing the most increase in time commitment: $69 \%$ of committee chairs reported that their time commitment is trending upward, compared to $53 \%$ of board chairs and $37 \%$ of directors with no leadership role.

More boards are setting committee meetings sequentially the day before the Board meeting, and many invite the whole board to attend all committee meetings. Those companies following this practice often tell us that it helps directors prepare for the board dinner that is held the evening of the committee meetings, and makes these dinners and the subsequent board meeting much more productive. Sequential committee meetings help streamline the Board meeting on the following day, as committee reports can be more concise and all directors have a clear understanding of the issues that were discussed and the recommendations being made.

Most directors are quite pragmatic about the increased workload; they note that today's director has a very different role from that of ten or fifteen years ago and that board compensation has risen in step with the workload.
"I think there has been a big shift over the past 10 years. There are very high expectations for directors. Directors need to add value and at the same time provide effective oversight. It's a tough role to play."

## Canada vs United States



Canadian boards often look south of the border for a comparison. The National Association of Corporate Directors ${ }^{11}$ reported an average annual time commitment of 236 hours for a U.S. director in 2013. The NACD surveyed 1,019 directors, a much larger sample group, so a precise comparison to our Canadian cohort is difficult. Nevertheless, there is a strong indication that Canadian directors spend roughly 8 days more than their U.S. counterparts at their director responsibilities. One of the directors we surveyed provided her perspective:
"U.S. boards are less concerned with government controls and regulation. They are much more customer driven. Canadian boards are very concerned about social license, reputation and community."
" I think U.S. boards achieve some time efficiency by combining the roles of board chair and CEO."

[^2]
## Time Demands Makes filling Director, Board Chair and Committee Chair Roles More Challenging

Only $32 \%$ of directors told us that they were given an estimate of the time commitment when they joined their boards, and of this group, $56 \%$ found the estimate accurate and $44 \%$ found it too low. However, they note that boards today are now much more upfront with potential nominees to the board about the time commitment.
"I am concerned that financial institutions will have an increasing challenge to fill board vacancies due to the high workload that comes with our regulatory demands."
"Potential directors must understand that it is serious and time consuming. Don't take it on if you are not prepared for the work."

Twenty percent of directors told us that they have turned down the role of chair, or committee chair on their boards because the projected time commitment was too high.
"I turned down the Board Chair role because it can be close to a full time job, which would mean giving up my other boards."


Talent, Culture and Leadership

Directors frequently pointed out that the calibre of their fellow directors and the board chair, and the overall culture of the board has an enormous impact on their individual time commitments.
"In my experience, board and committee chairs influence time requirements for directors. More industry and subject knowledge at the committee chair level leads to more precise and effective materials and much more efficient meetings."
"Keeping board members engaged and passionate is critical."
"When directors are new or ineffective, directors' time commitment increases. We recently had a replacement of $75 \%$ of the board. Prior to this time, most directors had served an average of 8 years. Experienced, long-term directors are much more efficient, even though the new directors bring fresh perspectives."
"We have effective, efficient board chair leadership. This is very important for us to stay on track and focused."


A large majority (82\%) of directors rank the board chair as the most important person for ensuring the effective use of directors' time. They are more divided on who is second in importance with regard to ensuring effective use of directors' time, with $42 \%$ placing the committee chairs in second place and $37 \%$ the CEO.

Directors also noted the importance of the talent on the senior executive team, and the relationship between that team and the board.

- The quality of talent at the executive level has a direct correlation with board productivity.
- The board chair or committee chair can influence, but the CEO is responsible for putting information together and getting the right people in place to talk to issues.
- The CEO and the board have to be very explicit with each other about what they need from each other.


## What Issues are Driving Up Director Time Commitments?

Directors have assumed a much more proactive role in providing oversight of corporate results, strategy, risks, operational performance, CEO and executive performance and compensation, and management succession planning. Management, the board and shareholders expect directors to provide value, and to utilize the skills and experience they bring to the board to assist the company in setting and achieving both long and short-term objectives.

Directors are engaged in evaluating the performance of the board, board and committee chairs, committees and individual directors and are more directly engaged with shareholders. Directors participate in more training and development activities, not only on governance issues, but particularly around their understanding of the industry, the competitive environment and other factors that impact corporate performance. They spend time at company operation sites throughout the world.

The regulatory environment is more demanding, especially for financial institutions, and requires companies to provide much more detail around the processes the board implements in undertaking its responsibilities.

We asked directors which issues were increasing the demand on their time.


## Director comments included the following:

"We spend much more time on strategy. We have become more involved in the development of the strategic plan as opposed to simply endorsing one presented by management. We spend more time discussing and debating performance against strategy at nearly every board meeting."
"You need to ask the question - why are we looking at this? What value can the board provide? Why are we looking at this now? If the board does not directly require oversight of an issue, or add real value, the agenda item should be removed."
"You can look into things like the efficiency of the material provided to the board pre-meeting as well as focusing some issues primarily to committees; however the time demanded by boards is increasing because more issues come on to the agenda such as risk management, succession planning and environmental focus. These issues require time, thought and knowledge."

## What are Boards Doing to Make the Best Use of Directors' Time?

When we asked directors what measures their boards have taken towards making more effective use of directors' time, the overwhelming leader, reported by $80 \%$ of directors, was tighter executive summaries and board packages. Another $49 \%$ report that board materials are being distributed earlier.

"All materials are prepared in the context of 'what is the board being asked to do' and 'why is the information included?' If it is not critical, it is moved to the appendix. At times, volume is a necessary evil but it is the exception here. More focus on value adding instead of wading through a lot of extraneous information."
"An effort on quality of pre-meeting materials continues to improve things. Well-prepared and focused information is key so the meetings can focus on discussion, not presentation."

"It really is helpful to have it easily accessible and to be able to review past board materials through online access."
"With the increased use of electronic transmission of board material, management tends to send volumes of information to the board. It is too easy to "dump" superfluous materials in the site and that way they can't be criticized for not supplying all the information."
"I find the board portal more difficult to use in that it takes more time and doesn't allow for flipping back and forth between documents."

## The most frequently reported measures being used to make more effective use of directors' time (note: some directors reported more than one method)


"We still run our meetings in the same time block as 10 years ago while we have tripled in size and complexity. We have had to become very efficient at using our time."
"We have maxed out the efficiency gains from technology (portal, ipads, etc.). We have made more progress recently with consent agendas and tighter management summaries."
"These measures have been helpful, but the key is not sacrificing the core for the sake of speed and efficiency. This is the responsibility of the Chair."
"These measures have made a bit of a difference but not huge. How the Chair and CEO work together really determines how you spend your time."
"The primary effect has been to minimize the continued growth of time demands, but not to reduce them."

We also asked directors what else they would change, if they could, to make better use of their time. The most frequent responses (by $26 \%$ of directors) were about focusing their time on where they can provide the most strategic value, and less on operational and regulatory issues.


We need to devote more time to developing the strategic plan and ensure that all decisions are tied back to supporting the strategic direction agreed upon. It is when a corporation strays from the plan (or they consciously adjust the plan and adopt a revised one) that the board bogs down attempting to deal with activities that were not anticipated and/or are not core to the business."
"More effective reporting on operations would reduce the time spent on this topic and make more time for areas where we can be of more value."

Despite the fact that 80\% of directors already find that their boards are improving the quality and timing of the material they receive, $15 \%$ still noted that they would like to see more improvement.
"We need better material with more concise and clear takeaways."

Twelve percent of directors believe that improved agenda development and meeting logistics will help to make better use of their time.
"I continue to press for tighter meetings and holding to those schedules."
"We need to focus on a well-developed agenda; there is too much drift in meetings."
"Work with management on how to communicate effectively to the board, to use executive summaries better, and to highlight the "so what" factor for directors."

## External Forces: Regulators and Major or Activist Shareholders



Regulators and major or activist shareholders can greatly increase a board's workload. This has become a fact of life in modern board governance, and it is not going to go away. Directors tell us that the best way to deal with standard, ongoing regulatory issues is to make the regulatory compliance aspect of the board's work as systematic as possible without losing oversight.

Directors also find that addressing shareholder issues and unusual regulatory issues is best done through effective transparency and communication.
"Major shareholders, primarily pension fund managers, are demanding more and more from boards. This isn't going to change or decrease, you just have to find a way to do it efficiently and work at the relationship with them."
"Shareholder activism is requiring more director time for issues like say on pay. This means less time on targeted issues."

## Moving Forward - Less Time, or More Effective Use of Time?

Some important conclusions came out of our discussions with directors this year:

- the time demand is noticeably heavier than in the past, but, in many cases, directors are accepting it as part of the role of an engaged, modern board; and
- directors seem less concerned about decreasing their time commitment than


This was notably a small, but very in-depth, study. We had the opportunity to sit down and really discuss and dissect how directors spend their time. Through this process we found that many directors were quite surprised about how the hours added up.

Few directors today expect a directorship to be an undemanding, part-time retirement role; they are ready and prepared to put in the time and the work, and they expect to make a valuable contribution. They are there to add value, and boards that are not efficient and effective with directors' time risk losing out in the competition for talent at the boardroom table.

Based on our discussions with directors and our experience in working with boards, we recommend that boards periodically assess how their directors are spending their time and determine whether changes need to be made.

## Boards should consider:

- Does your board focus attention on board composition, education and leadership?

Board and committee chairs have a huge impact on directors' time through setting the agendas and approving information packages. Directors need to be informed and educated enough on the industry to be able to assess what is and isn't needed, and they need an effective relationship with management in order to communicate what the board or committee does and doesn't need.

Director education for the full board also affects time demands. While varied perspectives are important around the table, ultimately every director needs an in-depth understanding of the industry and environment in order to make informed decisions. The less they understand, the more time it will take to get to a decision.

Boards are also re-considering their numbers. After an effort to pare down board size from the high teens and twenties that were common ten to twenty years ago, boards are now looking at whether they now have enough directors to manage the workload. If directors need to take on more than two committee memberships, it might be time to consider growing the board to spread out the workload.


- Are the operational and regulatory issues that must be addressed by the board as efficient and streamlined as possible while still allowing for effective oversight?

This is an area where an efficient process can address much of the material and a solid, trusting relationship with senior management can assure the board that they will be informed of unusual items that need more attention.

Consent agendas can be very helpful here, but several factors need to be in place to use them effectively. Directors need to be well-informed about the issues and they need to be able to trust that they have all necessary information needed.

- Is your board making the most effective and efficient use of technology available for boards?

Simply defaulting to using technology like portals and iPads for everything isn't always the answer. Spend some time determining your needs and what is available. Directors discussed the various portal products on the market and generally commented that some have a better user interface and features than others. Make sure you are using what is best for your board, and not just assuming any technology will automatically make things more efficient, and that your directors will know how to use the technology to its fullest benefit.


- Is compensation commensurate with the time commitment?

We generally heard that board compensation is in line with the workload, and this is an important factor in them accepting the workload and responsibility. This does not mean that compensation is the primary driver for attracting and retaining talent on the board; only $3 \%$ of directors rated compensation as the most important factor in how they value their board membership, and only $38 \%$ rated it within the top three factors. However, few would join or remain with a board with a significant workload and/or inefficient use of director time and a compensation package that lags behind the norm, especially in this competitive environment for board talent.

- Does your board need to pare down the time commitment, or make better use of it?

There were fewer complaints about the increased time commitment when directors felt their board and management team respected and valued directors' time and contribution. If the workload on your board has become an issue, find out where the problems are and don't just assume you can solve the issue by cutting a few hours with more efficiencies.

- What is your board's relationship with management?

Ensuring the company has the most effective management team in place is absolutely key to achieving corporate success. A by-product is the effect it has on director workload. Maintaining a strong, trusting relationship with the board goes a long way towards making effective use of directors' time.

- If time is increasing, is it an ongoing or temporary issue?

Directors told us that there are always going to be big issues that will drive up the workload, sometimes for up to a few years. Things like mergers and


## Board Independence



## Key Findings

Canadian boards have largely adopted the standards for independent boards and independent board leadership introduced by the CSA governance guidelines in 2005, and these standards remain a consistent aspect of their governance practices:

- $92 \%$ to $94 \%$ of boards have reported a majority of independent directors since boards first began reporting independence in 2005.
- Independent board leadership on Canadian boards has grown steadily from 80\% in 2005 to 89\% in 2013.
- $97 \%$ of Canadian boards hold meetings of independent directors only, which has grown from $79 \%$ when the CSA guidelines were introduced in 2005.
- For the past four years, 94\% of boards had a majority of independent directors. This percentage has stayed relatively stable at between $92 \%$ and 94\% since boards first began reporting independence in 2005.
- Medium and Large companies have been the most consistent with maintaining a majority of independent directors. In these categories, the percentage has remained between $92 \%$ and $97 \%$ since 2005 , while Small and Micro companies have fluctuated between $84 \%$ and $97 \%$.



## Boards Without a Majority of Independent Directors

| Barrick Gold Corporation | Great-West Lifeco Inc. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Bell Aliant Inc. | Harvest Operations Corp. |
| BMTC Group Inc. | IGM Financial Inc. |
| BRP Inc. | Linamar Corporation |
| China Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd. | Winpak Ltd. |
| Genworth MI Canada Inc. |  |

## Independent Director Meetings



Meetings of only Independent Directors

| Average |  | $A L L$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ |
|  | 2012 | $\mathbf{7}$ |
| Median | 2005 | 6 |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ |
|  | 2012 | $\mathbf{7}$ |
|  | 2005 | 5 |

## Inside Directors



## Independent Board Leadership

- The CSA governance guidelines state that board chairs should be independent directors, and where this is not appropriate, the board should appoint an independent lead director. For the past three years, 89\% of boards had some form of independent leadership.

Percentage of Boards with Independent Leadership*

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | TB to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | Al/ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{7 9 \%}$ | $88 \%$ | $93 \%$ | $89 \%$ | $89 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 5}$ | $78 \%$ | $71 \%$ | $84 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $80 \%$ |

* An independent board chair and/or independent lead director
- The manner in which boards establish independent leadership has remained relatively stable since reporting on independence began in 2005. During this period:
* Between 51\% and 58\% have had an independent chair.
* Between 29\% and 36\% have had a lead director.
- At companies with no independent chair, 76\% had a lead director in 2013:
* $84 \%$ boards with an executive (inside) chair had a lead director, compared to 80\% in 2012; and
* 73\% of boards with a non-executive, non-independent chair had a lead director, compared to 74\% in 2012.
- In 2013, $10 \%$ of boards had no independent leadership. Of this group:
* 37\% had a combined CEO/chair;
* $15 \%$ had an executive chair;
* $41 \%$ had an outside but non-independent chair; and
* 4\% had no chair.

Independent Board Leadership

| Independent Chair Only | $A L L$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{5 4 \%}$ |
| Independent Chair and Lead Director | 2012 | $53 \%$ |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ |
| Non-Independent Chair and Lead Director | 2012 | $3 \%$ |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 3 \%}$ |
| Lead Director Only | 2012 | $32 \%$ |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $<\mathbf{1 \%}$ |
|  | 2012 | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ |



## Board Chairs

- Canadian boards have widely adopted the practice of separating the board chair and chief executive officer. Over the last four years, the percentage of boards that separate the two roles appears to have leveled off at 85\% to 86\%, after steadily climbing from 48\% in 1993.


Percentage of Boards That Have Separated the Board Chair and CEO

|  | Micro |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | Small | Medium | Large |  |
|  | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{9 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 6 \%}$ |
| 2012 | $84 \%$ | $86 \%$ | $86 \%$ | $84 \%$ | $85 \%$ |
| 2004 | $63 \%$ | $72 \%$ | $72 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $71 \%$ |

## Board Chairs

| Independent Chair | 2013 | 56\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 2012 | 56\% |
|  | 2005 | 51\% |
| Non-Executive, Not Independent | 2013 | 18\% |
|  | 2012 | 16\% |
|  | 2005 | 17\% |
| Combined Chair/CEO | 2013 | 14\% |
|  | 2012 | 15\% |
|  | 2005 | 19\% |
| Executive Chair | 2013 | 10\% |
|  | 2012 | 12\% |
|  | 2005 | 12\% |
| No Board Chair | 2013 | 1\% |
|  | 2012 | 2\% |
|  | 2005 | 2\% |



## Lead Directors



Thirty-six percent of Canadian boards had a lead director in 2013, compared to $51 \%$ in the United States ${ }^{2}$. These boards cover a variety of leadership situations and breakdown as follows:

* $38 \%$ were at boards with an outside, non-independent board chair
* 30\% were at boards with a combined board chair and chief executive officer
* $25 \%$ were at boards with an executive board chair
* $6 \%$ were at boards with an independent board chair
* $1 \%$ were at boards with no board chair


## Board Composition



## Key Findings

The director cohort in Canada is slowly getting older:

- The average and median age of directors has been 63 for the last two years, compared to 61 in 2004.
- Thirteen percent of directors were aged 50 or under in 2004 compared to $8 \%$ in 2013.

As boards struggle with how best to manage their composition and plan for their succession, some are adopting the use of director term limits and/or retirement age to force board renewal. While disclosure of these items is not mandatory, we are finding more boards reporting their use.

- In 2013, 11\% of boards reported a term limit for directors, compared to 4\% in 2010.
- In 2013, 28\% of boards reported having a retirement age for directors, compared to 25\% in 2010.

Other boards find uses of tools like retirement age or term limits impede their ability to carefully plan for ideal composition and specify that they do not use these tools:

- In 2013, 29\% of boards stated that they do not have a director retirement age.
- In 2013, 15\% of boards stated that they do not have director term limits.

In 2013, 59\% of boards had at least one female director, which is an increase of 4\% over last year and is the highest percentage we have seen in this category since we have tracked this information.

## Director Information



- The trend towards extensive and transparent governance disclosure continues to grow with more boards going beyond minimum requirements in providing information about individual directors. In 2013, 85\% of boards exceeded the CSA minimum requirements for disclosure about individual directors, compared to $84 \%$ in 2012 and $77 \%$ in 2011.
- In 2013, 44\% of companies included information on their directors' areas of expertise, compared to $40 \%$ last year. Additionally, $48 \%$ of companies included a director skills matrix in their proxy circular, compared to 40\% last year.
- Of the directors in our surveyed boards this year, $19 \%$ were newly-elected. Of these newly-elected directors:
* $18 \%$ were female directors,
* $25 \%$ were international directors (resident outside of Canada),
* 43\% had a financial background,
* $23 \%$ were active CEOs,
* $46 \%$ had a CEO background (including the active CEOs), and
* $42 \%$ were active C-suite executives (including the active CEOs).
- Companies are now required to disclose whether they have adopted a majority voting policy. If they have not, they are required to explain their practices for electing directors.
* Eighty-five percent of companies disclosed a majority voting policy for fiscal year 2013, compared to 78\% in 2012.
* Three percent of companies indicated that they have not adopted a majority voting policy because they have a controlling shareholder.


## Director Age



- Disclosure of each director's age remains a common, though not mandatory, practice. In 2013, $75 \%$ of boards disclosed their directors' ages, compared to $72 \%$ in 2012 and $63 \%$ in 2004.
- The average age of directors is slowly getting older. In 2013 and 2012, the average and median age of directors was 63, while in 2004, the average and median age was 61.
- Eight percent of directors were aged 50 or under in 2013, compared to $13 \%$ in 2004, while $92 \%$ were aged 51 or older in 2013, compared to $87 \%$ in 2004.
- In the United States, the median age of directors at the Top 200 companies was $64 .{ }^{3}$


## Director Age Distribution

|  |  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| 40 and younger | 2013 | 0 | <1\% | 1\% | <1\% | 1\% |
|  | 2012 | 1\% | <1\% | 1\% | <1\% | 1\% |
|  | 2004 | 2\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| 41 to 50 | 2013 | 5\% | 8\% | 8\% | 6\% | 7\% |
|  | 2012 | 8\% | 6\% | 8\% | 6\% | 7\% |
|  | 2004 | 18\% | 15\% | 10\% | 9\% | 12\% |
| 51 to 60 | 2013 | 43\% | 32\% | 35\% | 27\% | 31\% |
|  | 2012 | 36\% | 35\% | 33\% | 29\% | 31\% |
|  | 2004 | 31\% | 29\% | 30\% | 25\% | 28\% |
| 61 to 70 | 2013 | 36\% | 38\% | 39\% | 47\% | 42\% |
|  | 2012 | 38\% | 41\% | 40\% | 48\% | 44\% |
|  | 2004 | 32\% | 38\% | 43\% | 51\% | 43\% |
| 71 and older | 2013 | 16\% | 21\% | 17\% | 19\% | 19\% |
|  | 2012 | 17\% | 18\% | 17\% | 17\% | 17\% |
|  | 2004 | 16\% | 16\% | 17\% | 14\% | 16\% |

## Retirement Age and Term Limits



- With a growing acknowledgement that board composition has an enormous impact on their effectiveness, boards are seeking tools and approaches to supplement their composition and succession planning practices. Two of the most controversial are director retirement ages and term limits; some claim that they ensure board renewal that might not happen otherwise, while others claim that they can artificially remove valuable and contributing directors before it is appropriate to do so.
- Proponents for these methods say that they allow boards to plan well in advance for succession and renewal without the difficulty of asking a director to step down. Those that reject the practices believe that renewal will occur through director assessment practices (and acting on the results of those assessments), commitment to careful evaluation of the board's current and future needs against its composition and a willingness to sometimes make difficult decisions and ask a director to step down from the board.
- While disclosure has been voluntary up to this point, this will change in the next year as the securities regulators in most provinces have adopted new disclosure requirements including:


## Director Term Limits and Other Mechanisms of Board Renewal

Disclose whether or not the issuer has adopted term limits for the directors on its board or other mechanisms of board renewal and, if so, include a description of those director term limits or other mechanisms of board renewal. If the issuer has not adopted director term limits or other mechanisms of board renewal, disclose why it has not done so. ${ }^{4}$


- In 2013, 57\% of boards either disclosed a retirement age or specifically stated that they did not have one. This is the highest level of reporting we have seen on this topic, which is not a mandatory disclosure item. In 2012, 54\% of companies disclosed whether they had a director retirement policy, which is well up from 24\% in 2005.
- In the United States, 52\% of directors reported that their board has an age limit. ${ }^{5}$
- Of the companies that specified a retirement age, $70 \%$ indicated that the retirement age could be extended or waived at the discretion of the board and/or one of the board committees.
- In the United States, 83\% of the boards at the Top 200 companies disclose that they have a retirement age for directors, with the 50th percentile retirement age being 72. ${ }^{6}$

Prevalence of Retirement Age Practices

|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Micro } \\ & <500 \mathrm{M} \end{aligned}$ | Small 500M to 1B | Medium <br> 1B to 5B | $\begin{gathered} \text { Large } \\ >5 B \end{gathered}$ | ALL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Retirement Age | 2013 | 4\% | 19\% | 26\% | 41\% | 28\% |
|  | 2012 | 6\% | 16\% | 19\% | 47\% | 26\% |
| Waiver Possible* | 2013 | 100\% | 50\% | 76\% | 70\% | 70\% |
|  | 2012 | 100\% | 50\% | 64\% | 69\% | 66\% |
| No Retirement Age | 2013 | 14\% | 7\% | 35\% | 35\% | 29\% |
|  | 2012 | 15\% | 10\% | 37\% | 29\% | 27\% |
| No Disclosure | 2013 | 82\% | 74\% | 39\% | 24\% | 43\% |
|  | 2012 | 79\% | 75\% | 43\% | 24\% | 46\% |

[^3][^4]
## Director Retirement Ages

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2005 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Retirement from the board at age 70 | $\mathbf{8 \%}$ | $10 \%$ | $9 \%$ |
| Retirement from the board at age 71 | $<\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $<1 \%$ | $<1 \%$ |
| Retirement from the board at age 72 | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 \%}$ |
| Retirement from the board at age 73 | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $1 \%$ | 0 |
| Retirement from the board at age 75 | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 \%}$ |
| Formal Policy, age not specified | $\mathbf{< 1 \%}$ | $<1 \%$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ |
| Specify there is no director retirement age | $\mathbf{2 9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 7 \%}$ | $5 \%$ |
| Combined retirement age/term limit | $\mathbf{7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 \%}$ |
| No disclosure | $\mathbf{4 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{4 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 6 \%}$ |

- Use of term limits is a slowly growing practice. In 2013, 11\% of boards reported a term limit for directors, compared to 8\% in 2012 and 6\% in 2011.
- In the United States, 8\% of directors reported that their board has a term limit. ${ }^{7}$
- Fifteen percent of boards specified that they do not use term limits.
- Term limits range between seven and 20 years. The most common is a 15 -year term, with $53 \%$ of all companies with a term limit at this level. In the United States, the most frequent term limits are eight years or less, reported by $25 \%$ of directors on boards with a term limit, and 10 years, selected by $26 \%$ of directors on boards with a ten year term limit. ${ }^{8}$
- Sixty-two percent of boards with a term limit stated that it may be waived.
- In 2013, 62\% of boards with a term limit also had a retirement age. Many use a combination of the two to allow for a flexible approach to board renewal.

[^5]
## Gender

- Due to a growing concern about board diversity from a variety of stakeholders, the securities regulatory authorities in most provinces have approved new disclosure requirements. Starting in 2015, issuers in these jurisdictions will need to add these items to their governance disclosure:


## Policies Regarding the Representation of Women on the Board

(a) Disclose whether the issuer has adopted a written policy relating to the identification and nomination of women directors. If the issuer has not adopted such a policy, disclose why it has not done so.
(b) If an issuer has adopted a policy referred to in (a), disclose the following in respect of the policy:
(i) a short summary of its objectives and key provisions,
(ii) the measures taken to ensure that the policy has been effectively implemented,
(iii) annual and cumulative progress by the issuer in achieving the objectives of the policy, and
(iv) whether and, if so, how the board or its nominating committee measures the effectiveness of the policy.

## Consideration of the Representation of Women in the Director Identification and Selection Process

Disclose whether and, if so, how the board or nominating committee considers the level of representation of women on the board in identifying and nominating candidates for election or re-election to the board. If the issuer does not consider the level of representation of women on the board in identifying and nominating candidates for election or re-election to the board, disclose the issuer's reasons for not doing so.


[^6]
## Consideration Given to the Representation of Women in Executive Officer Appointments

Disclose whether and, if so, how the issuer considers the level of representation of women in executive officer positions when making executive officer appointments. If the issuer does not consider the level of representation of women in executive officer positions when making executive officer appointments, disclose the issuer's reasons for not doing so.

## Issuer's Targets Regarding the Representation of Women on the Board and in Executive Officer Positions

(a) For purposes of this Item, a "target" means a number or percentage, or a range of numbers or percentages, adopted by the issuer of women on the issuer's board or in executive officer positions of the issuer by a specific date.
(b) Disclose whether the issuer has adopted a target regarding women on the issuer's board. If the issuer has not adopted a target, disclose why it has not done so.
(c) Disclose whether the issuer has adopted a target regarding women in executive officer positions of the issuer. If the issuer has not adopted a target, disclose why it has not done so.
(d) If the issuer has adopted a target referred to in either (b) or (c), disclose:
(i) the target, and
(ii) the annual and cumulative progress of the issuer in achieving the target.

BOARD
DIRECTORS
H

EXECUTIVE OFFICERS

## Number of Women on the Board and in Executive Officer Positions

(a) Disclose the number and proportion (in percentage terms) of directors on the issuer's board who are women.
(b) Disclose the number and proportion (in percentage terms) of executive officers of the issuer, including all major subsidiaries of the issuer, who are women.

- Some boards, knowing the new disclosure rules were on the way, began expanding their reporting on diversity issues with their 2014 proxy circulars. MTS stated that it did so because,

The Board also understands that there are increasingly socially responsible investors who are using nonfinancial measures, including considering diversity statistics as a screen for potential investments. Accordingly, the Company has decided to pre-emptively comply with the proposed Ontario Securities Commission "comply or explain" rules. ${ }^{10}$


- In 2013, 29\% of boards addressed gender specifically when discussing their practices regarding board diversity, compared to $18 \%$ in 2012 and 15\% in 2011.
- In 2013, women comprised $12 \%$ of the directors of the boards we studied. This is an increase of $1 \%$ over last year and is the highest level we have seen since we began tracking this information 20 years ago.
- In 2013, 59\% of boards had at least one female director, which is an increase of $4 \%$ over last year and is the highest percentage we have seen in this category since we have tracked this information.
- Nineteen percent of boards have two female directors, which is the highest percentage we have seen in this category. Thirteen percent of boards had three or more female directors, a slight increase from $12 \%$ one year earlier.
- In the United States, $98 \%$ of the Top 200 companies had at least female director, and $83 \%$ had at least two female directors. ${ }^{11}$

10 Manitoba Telecom Services Inc., Management Information Circular, March 24, 2014
$11 \quad$ 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners.

Boards with at Least One Female Director

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | $500 M$ to 1B | 1B to 5B | $>5 B$ | ALL |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{5 9 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{2 4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ | $52 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $55 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 9 \%}$ | $61 \%$ | $81 \%$ | $50 \%$ |



Boards with at Least One Female Director, By Industry

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Consumer Discretionary | $\mathbf{8 4 \%}$ | $87 \%$ | $68 \%$ |
| Consumer Staple | $\mathbf{9 1 \%}$ | $100 \%$ | $83 \%$ |
| Energy | $\mathbf{4 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 6 \%}$ | $40 \%$ |
| Financials | $\mathbf{6 9 \%}$ | $63 \%$ | $50 \%$ |
| Industrials | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $80 \%$ | $21 \%$ |
| Information Technology | $\mathbf{5 9 \%}$ | $52 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
| Materials | $\mathbf{5 0 \%}$ | $50 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 6 \%}$ |
| Telecommunication Services | $\mathbf{4 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{4 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{4 3 \%}$ |
| Utilities | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ | $83 \%$ |
| ALL | $\mathbf{9 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 0 \%}$ |

Female Directors

| Number of Female Directors | Percentage of Boards |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| $\mathbf{2}$ | $\mathbf{2 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ | $30 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{3}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 \%}$ | $18 \%$ | $13 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 \%}$ | $5 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 \%}$ | $1 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{6}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ | $<1 \%$ |



## Boards with More Than One Female Director

Two Female Directors

| Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited | Husky Energy Inc. |
| :---: | :---: |
| Agrium Inc. | Imperial Oil Limited |
| Aimia Inc. | Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. |
| Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. | Lassonde Industries Inc. |
| ATCO Ltd. | Loblaw Companies Limited |
| BCE Inc. | Major Drilling Group International Inc. |
| Bell Aliant Inc. | Methanex Corporation |
| Blackberry Limited | Metro Inc. |
| Bonavista Energy Corporation | Nordion Inc. |
| Brookfield Asset Management Inc. | North West Company Inc., |
| CAE Inc. | Northland Power Inc. |
| Cameco Corporation | Power Corporation of Canada |
| Canadian National Railway Company | Power Financial Corporation |
| Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited | RioCan Real Estate Investment Trust |
| Canadian Western Bank | Russel Metals Inc. |
| Catamaran Corporation | Shaw Communications Inc. |
| Celestica Inc. | ShawCor Ltd. |
| CGI Group Inc. | Sherritt International Corporation |
| Chartwell Retirement Residences | Stantec Inc. |
| Cineplex Inc. | Stella-Jones Inc. |
| Cogeco Cable Inc. | Suncor Energy Inc. |
| COGECO Inc. | Talisman Energy Inc. |
| Davis + Henderson Corporation | Teck Resources Limited |
| Dundee Industrial REIT | Thomson Reuters Corporation |
| Enbridge Inc. | Toromont Industries Ltd. |
| First Capital Realty Inc. | TransAlta Renewables Inc. |
| George Weston Limited | Veresen Inc. |
| Goldcorp Inc. | Westport Innovations Inc. |
| Great-West Lifeco Inc. | Yellow Media Limited |

Three Female Directors

| Atlatsa Resources Corporation | Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. |
| :--- | :--- |
| Bombardier Inc. | Open Text Corporation |
| Cascades Inc. | Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. |
| Cominar Real Estate Investment Trust | Quebecor Inc. |
| Empire Company Limited | SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. |
| EnCana Corporation | Tim Hortons Inc. |
| Equitable Group Inc. | TMX Group Limited |
| Home Capital Group Inc. | TransAlta Corporation |
| Industrial Alliance Insurance \&Financial Services Inc. | TransCanada Corporation |
| Kinross Gold Corporation | Transcontinental Inc. |

Four Female Directors

| Bank of Montreal | Intact Financial Corporation |
| :--- | :--- |
| Bank of Nova Scotia | National Bank of Canada |
| Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce | Rogers Communications Inc. |
| Canadian Pacific Railway Limited | Saputo Inc. |
| Canadian Utilities Limited | Sun Life Financial Inc. |
| Emera Inc. |  |

Five Female Directors

| Corus Entertainment Inc. | Royal Bank of Canada |
| :--- | :--- |
| Laurentian Bank of Canada | Toronto-Dominion Bank |
| Manulife Financial Corporation | Turquoise Hill Resources Ltd. |

## Six Female Directors

Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc.

## Board Size



## Key Findings

Canadian boards have averaged nine members for nine years, after averaging 10 members for the eight years prior.

Most boards fall into the 6 to 9 member range, with $60 \%$ in that category for the past two years, up from 54\% in 2011 and 51\% in 2004.

We do not anticipate that corporate boards will get much smaller, as they are increasingly using committees to provide a focus on their various areas of responsibility and need enough directors to fill those committees without overloading them.


- The average and median board size have both been at nine since 2005. In the United States, the average board size is also nine members. ${ }^{12}$
- There has been little change in average board size across all asset categories over the past few years. In each category, the average has remained the same or fluctuated by a single digit since 2003. We do not anticipate that corporate boards will get much smaller, as they are increasingly using committees to provide a focus on their various areas of responsibility and need enough directors to fill those committees without overloading them.
- In 2013, the smallest board had 4 directors and the largest had 19.
- Most boards fall into the six to nine member range, with $60 \%$ in that category for the past two years, up from 54\% in 2011 and 51\% in 2004.


Average Number of Board Members

|  | Micro <br> $<500 M$ | Small <br> $500 M$ to $7 B$ | Medium <br> $1 B$ to $5 B$ | Large <br> $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ | $\mathbf{7}$ | $\mathbf{9}$ | $\mathbf{1 1}$ | $\mathbf{9}$ |
| 2012 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 12 | 9 |
| 2004 | 8 | 8 | 10 | 13 | 10 |

Percentage of Boards in Board Size Categories

| Board Size |  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| 5 or less | 2013 | 11\% | 12\% | 3\% | 1\% | 4\% |
|  | 2012 | 15\% | 4\% | 4\% | 1\% | 4\% |
|  | 2004 | 11\% | 2\% | 0 | 1\% | 4\% |
| 6 to 9 | 2013 | 86\% | 86\% | 70\% | 31\% | 60\% |
|  | 2012 | 82\% | 90\% | 72\% | 26\% | 60\% |
|  | 2004 | 73\% | 70\% | 46\% | 11\% | 51\% |
| 10 to 12 | 2013 | 4\% | 2\% | 21\% | 36\% | 22\% |
|  | 2012 | 3\% | 6\% | 17\% | 36\% | 20\% |
|  | 2004 | 15\% | 28\% | 35\% | 35\% | 28\% |
| 13 to 15 | 2013 | 0 | 0 | 6\% | 21\% | 10\% |
|  | 2012 | 0 | 0 | 8\% | 27\% | 12\% |
|  | 2004 | 1\% | 0 | 18\% | 32\% | 13\% |
| 16 to 19 | 2013 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12\% | 4\% |
|  | 2012 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10\% | 3\% |
|  | 2004 | 0 | 0 | 1\% | 18\% | 4\% |
| 20+ | 2013 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | 2012 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
|  | 2004 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1\% | 1\% |

2013 Percentage of Boards in Board Size Categories


## Largest Boards

| 19 directors | Great-West Lifeco Inc. |
| :--- | :--- |
| 18 directors | Royal Bank of Canada |
| 17 directors | Empire Company Limited |
|  | IGM Financial Inc. |
|  | Rogers Communications Inc. |
|  | TMX Group Limited |
|  | Brookfield Asset Management Inc. |
|  | Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce |
|  | Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited |
|  | Manulife Financial Corporation |
|  | National Bank of Canada |
|  | Shaw Communications Inc. |

## Board Assessments, Director Selection and Director Development



## Key Findings

Boards are overwhelmingly recognizing the importance of evaluation, succession planning and director development for board effectiveness:

- More boards are reporting assessment processes than ever before; 94\% have a board assessment, 94\% have committee assessment and $90 \%$ have an individual director assessment.
- Boards are increasingly disclosing the use of a skills and background matrix in their director selection process; 54\% reported that they used this tool in 2013 compared to 49\% last year.
- For the first time since we began reporting on director development, 100\% of companies have provided some detail on both their orientation and education practices.

Percentage of Boards with Assessment Process

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Board Assessment | $\mathbf{9 4 \%}$ | $92 \%$ | $88 \%$ |
| Committee Assessment | $\mathbf{9 4 \%}$ | $89 \%$ | $81 \%$ |
| Individual Director Assessment | $\mathbf{9 0 \%}$ | $89 \%$ | $\mathbf{7 6 \%}$ |

Percentage of Boards with Assessment Process, by Company Size

| Assessment Type |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Micro } \\ & <500 \mathrm{M} \end{aligned}$ | Small 500M to $1 B$ | Medium 1B to 5B | $\begin{gathered} \text { Large } \\ >5 B \end{gathered}$ | ALL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Board | 2013 | 75\% | 86\% | 96\% | 99\% | 94\% |
|  | 2012 | 77\% | 84\% | 96\% | 97\% | 92\% |
| Committee | 2013 | 78\% | 86\% | 94\% | 100\% | 94\% |
|  | 2012 | 71\% | 80\% | 92\% | 96\% | 89\% |
| Director | 2013 | 61\% | 81\% | 94\% | 96\% | 90\% |
|  | 2012 | 71\% | 86\% | 91\% | 95\% | 89\% |

## Assessment Practices

- We saw the highest prevalence of boards with assessment processes in all categories this year.
- The bigger a company is, the more likely the board is to have a full board, committee or individual assessment process. While reporting Board Chair evaluation processes is not mandatory, it is also tied to company size. Of the boards that report a chair assessment practice, $47 \%$ are at Large companies and 40\% are at Medium companies.
- It has become apparent, both through data collection for this Review and


Report on Chair Assessment Practice our work with boards, that there is a steady increase in evaluating the board chair or lead director, and committee chairs as part of a board's approach to assessment. We believe this stems from two factors; first, a recognition of the value to the board of a well planned and implemented evaluation process, and a recognition of the importance of leadership on boards as their work becomes more complex. As noted in our Special Report, "Counting the Hours", $82 \%$ of directors believe the greatest responsibility for ensuring effective use of their time lies with the board chair, and $42 \%$ believe that committee chairs fall second in line for this responsibility.

- Board Chair and Lead Director Assessment

We saw a decline in reporting of board chair and lead director assessment practices this year. However, as this is not mandatory disclosure; it unclear whether there is a decline in these practices, or in boards reporting them.

* In 2013, 37\% of boards with a non-executive chair reported a chair assessment, compared with $40 \%, 39 \%$ and $36 \%$ respectively in the previous three years.
* In 2013, 10\% of boards with lead directors reported that they assessed the lead director's performance, compared with $14 \%, 8 \%$ and $7 \%$ in the previous three years.
- Full Board Assessments
* In 2013, $94 \%$ of companies had a board assessment process, which is the highest occurrence of board assessments since we began tracking this item. In the United States, $87 \%$ of directors reported that their board conducted a full board evaluation. ${ }^{13}$
- Committee Assessments
* In 2013, $94 \%$ of companies had a committee assessment process, which is the highest occurrence of committee assessments since we began tracking this item. In the United States, $77 \%$ of directors reported that their board conducted a committee evaluation. ${ }^{14}$
* In 2013, 24\% of boards with a committee assessment process in place stated that it included an assessment of each committee chair, down from $26 \%$ in 2012. Committee chair assessment is not a mandatory reporting item, so it is unclear whether there is a decline in this practice, or in boards that describe it when disclosing their committee


INDIVIDUAL DIRECTOR ASSESSMENT assessment practice.

Individual Director Assessment

* In 2013, 90\% of boards assessed individual directors, which is the highest occurrence of individual director assessment since we began tracking this item. In the United States, 42\% of directors reported that their board conducted an individual director evaluation. ${ }^{15}$
- Assessment Methodology
* Of those companies that conducted a full board, committee or individual assessment in 2013, between $86 \%$ and $87 \%$ described the process they used. Between $81 \%$ and $87 \%$ of companies have disclosed their assessment methodology for the past five years.
* At the many boards we work with, we observe changes in approach periodically as boards use the assessment method that best suits their current composition and environment, and this holds true with this year's results. After seeing growth in the practice of using a combined interview and questionnaire approach in board assessments for several years, in 2013 we saw resurgence in the use of questionnaires only and decline in use of the combined approach.
* There is also fluctuation in the use of peer evaluation, which can be a controversial tool for individual evaluation, especially for boards with little experience in evaluating themselves, or at boards with relatively high or recent turnover in their directors. Of the boards that described their individual director assessment process, $39 \%$ used a peer evaluation. This was identical to last year and compares to 44\% in 2011 and $40 \%$ in 2010.

Prevalence of Board Assessment Methodologies*

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Questionnaire Only | $\mathbf{6 3 \%}$ | $56 \%$ | $72 \%$ |
| Individual Meetings Only | $\mathbf{4 \%}$ | $6 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Questionnaire and Individual Meetings | $\mathbf{2 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 \%}$ |

* Percentage of boards with board assessment process that report methodology.


## Changes in Assessment Practices

- Approach
* When boards first began to implement evaluations about 20 years ago, the practice was often a check box questionnaire that was a necessary exercise in order to disclose compliance with this governance practice. Since then, and especially so in the last three to five years, more and more boards that we work with are recognizing the value of assessment to their overall effectiveness and putting much more effort into making sure they are making the most of this exercise. These days, a modern board evaluation tool is the one that elicits thoughtful responses that lead to improved board, committee and director effectiveness for a particular board, in a particular manner.
* The first step in the evaluation process is no longer distributing the annual questionnaire, but rather making a decision regarding what is the most effective way to evaluate this board at this time. Boards are recognizing that their present environment and situation needs to be considered before deciding on process; a board that has a recent influx of several new directors, or one that has been going through internal strife, or one that is operating well and has several years of solidly positive evaluations behind them all have different evaluation needs. Determining the best approach for the year in question is rapidly becoming the first step in the process.
- Questionnaires
* While questionnaires can still add value and are entirely appropriate
in some circumstances, many directors are tired of them and it is
increasingly difficult to get good quality information from them,
especially at highly effective boards with a great deal of experience
in board assessment practices.
* Where questionnaires are used, they are often assessed annually to
make sure they are relevant.
- Individual Meetings
* While we saw a small decline in reporting of boards using individual meetings to interview directors, we are actually seeing an increase in this approach among the boards we work with. They can be used in a wide variety of situations as either a sole focus or an enhancement to a questionnaire or facilitated group discussion.
* A skilled interviewer is the best way to delve into structural and behavioral issues, both of which have an enormous effect on board, and ultimately corporate performance. Behavioural issues are often the issues that the directors judge to be most important. A good interviewer can learn much from the level of intensity and enthusiasm with which directors express their points of view. The interviewer can be internal, usually the board chair or governance committee chair, or an external expert. Regardless, the interviewer should have extensive governance experience and knowledge to be able to draw out information and perspective that directors may be reluctant to discuss or unsure of how to address.
* The interview process often includes members of executive management that regularly interact with the board, and have a genuine perspective of how the board operates. While this can be a sensitive task, management's viewpoint on the board's effectiveness and operations can provide a great deal of value to the board.
- Assessment Results
* One of the most important elements of a board assessment is what happens with the results of the process. If the process occurs, but results are simply reported and filed away, the company can duly report its process was completed, however it is not gaining the most value from the process.
* The best evaluation processes lead to a set of measurable goals or an action plan along with a follow-up date set to assess the board, committee or director's progress in the area. With the increased sensitivities to all shareholders and potential shareholders, and regulators, following up on evaluation results is not just good practice but essential in today's board environment. It not only creates a culture at the board of continuous improvement, but also frequently results in improvement in board effectiveness and board/management relations.


## Director Selection

- In 2013, 54\% of boards identified the use of a skills and background matrix in their director selection process, compared to $49 \%$ in 2012 and 42\% in 2011.
- In addition to reporting that they use a matrix, many Boards provide a matrix in their proxy circulars to provide shareholders and regulators with a descriptive picture of board composition. This non-mandatory practice fluctuates, with 49\% publishing a matrix in 2013, compared to $40 \%$ in 2012 and $55 \%$ in 2011. There is has been steady growth in the practice over the past three years at Large, Medium and Small companies, while the fluctuation has occurred at Micro companies.



## Director Development

- In addition to using the matrix to assess the board composition against its current and future needs, many boards plan for the future with the use of an "evergreen" list that identifies potential directors. In 2013, 25\% of boards reported using this tool, compared to $32 \%$ for previous three years. This is a non-mandatory reporting item, so it is not clear whether this practice is decreasing or fewer boards are disclosing it. However, in our experience, we are seeing boards not only creating these lists, but also reaching out and developing relationships with individuals who may be potential nominees in the near and long term.
- The CSA disclosure rules require issuers to describe what measures, if any, a board takes to provide orientation and continuing education for its directors.
- For the first time since we began reporting on director development, $100 \%$ of companies have provided some detail on both their orientation and education practices.
- As we have seen in other aspects of disclosure, boards are providing more than just minimum disclosure regarding how they develop their directors. Twenty-one percent of boards provided what we would consider to be a comprehensive description of their continuing education practices, and 5\% provided a comprehensive description of their new director orientation practices. Examples of comprehensive disclosure include:

USING EVERGREEN LIST


2013


201220112010

## Agrium Inc. ${ }^{16}$

- develops and maintains an evergreen list of continuing education topics, which is periodically discussed with the Board members. This list includes topics of interest relating to the Corporation's businesses, operations and strategy, regulatory developments, compliance initiatives, as well as international geopolitical and economic reviews,
- specifies which directors have completed the Director's Education Program developed by the Institute of Corporate Directors,
- states that it has adopted formal external continuing education guidelines for its directors pursuant to which the Board explicitly encourages, and the Corporation provides funding for, the directors to attend external forums, conferences and education programs in order to maintain and update their knowledge of its industry, its regulatory environment, and other topical areas of interest to enhance their continuing development as directors and stewards of the Corporation, and
- provides a table identifying the date of the education sessions, the topic, the presenter and names of attendees.


## Bank of Montreal ${ }^{17}$

- implements an online director education program consisting of five core topic pillars: (1) financial industry (economic services and landscape created by the global management of money); (2) business of banking (the function and work of banks and banking within that landscape); (3) risk (how actions or activities could lead to a loss or an undesirable business outcome); (4) regulatory (how the rules and legislation are created, and enforced in terms of outlining responsibility and/or limiting duties); and (5) products \& services (the things developed for and delivered to its customers, and the customers of other financial institutions), and provided a table of the specific topics provided under each pillar in 2013 and the target audience, and
- provides a table identifying the date of the education sessions, the topic, the presenter and the target audience (board or specific committee).


## Meetings and Attendance



## Key Findings

The overall board meeting attendance rate is $97 \%$, with $81 \%$ of directors having a perfect attendance record.

Attendance is even better at committee meetings where the average attendance is $98 \%$ and $88 \%$ of members have perfect attendance.

The average number of board meetings has stayed relatively constant, at either nine or ten per year since 1997.

In 2013, 45\% of companies had between 7 and 10 meetings per year.
Twenty-seven percent of companies had between 4 and 6 meetings per year.

## Attendance Records

All
Committee
Meetings

- Ninety-eight percent of boards provided board meeting attendance records for each director.
- In 2013, 88\% of boards studied disclosed committee meeting attendance for some or all board committees. This compares to $85 \%$ last year and $84 \%$ in the year prior.
- Directors generally maintain a strong attendance rate at board meetings, with $81 \%$ attending all board meetings. Another 17\% attend between 75\% and $99 \%$ of board meetings. In 2005, when boards were first required to report attendance rates, $68 \%$ of directors had a $100 \%$ attendance rate, and $28 \%$ had an attendance rate between $75 \%$ and $99 \%$.
- Committee meetings are even better attended, with $88 \%$ of directors attending $100 \%$ of committee meetings and an overall committee attendance rate of $98 \%$.


## Board and Committee Meeting Attendance

| Board Meetings | 2013 | 2012 | 2005 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average Board Meeting Attendance Rate | $\mathbf{9 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ |
| Percentage of Directors with 100\% Attendance Rate at Board Meetings | $\mathbf{8 1 \%}$ | $80 \%$ | $68 \%$ |
| Percentage of Directors with 75\% to 99\% Attendance Rate at Board Meetings | $\mathbf{1 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 8 \%}$ |
| Committee Meetings | $\mathbf{9 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 6 \%}$ |
| Average Committee Meeting Attendance Rate | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 8 \%}$ |
| Percentage of Directors with 100\% Attendance Rate at Committee Meetings | $\mathbf{8 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 8 \%}$ |
| Percentage of Directors with 75\% to 99\% Attendance Rate at <br> Committee Meetings |  |  |  |

## Board Meetings

- Ninety-nine percent of boards reported the number of board meetings held.
- The average number of board meetings held for the past two years was 9 and the median was 8. In the United States, the median number of board meetings at the Top 200 companies was $8 .{ }^{18}$
- In 2013, 45\% of companies had between 7 and 10 meetings per year. Twenty-seven percent of companies had between 4 and 6 meetings per year.

[^7]Board Meetings Held

|  | Average | Median | Range | Companies <br> Reporting |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{9}$ | $\mathbf{8}$ | $\mathbf{3}$ to $\mathbf{3 4}$ | $\mathbf{9 9 \%}$ |
| 2012 | 9 | 8 | 1 to $\mathbf{2 8}$ | $\mathbf{9 8 \%}$ |
| 2004 | 9 | 8 | $\mathbf{3}$ to $\mathbf{3 4}$ | $\mathbf{7 6 \%}$ |

Board Meeting Frequency Distribution*

| Number of Meetings |  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| 3 or fewer | 2013 | 4\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | <1\% |
|  | 2012 | 3\% | 0 | 1\% | 0 | 1\% |
|  | 2004 | 2\% | 5\% | 0 | 0 | 1\% |
| 4 to 6 | 2013 | 46\% | 29\% | 34\% | 14\% | 27\% |
|  | 2012 | 24\% | 24\% | 23\% | 14\% | 20\% |
|  | 2004 | 50\% | 38\% | 27\% | 18\% | 31\% |
| 7 to 10 | 2013 | 31\% | 34\% | 46\% | 51\% | 45\% |
|  | 2012 | 41\% | 44\% | 54\% | 57\% | 52\% |
|  | 2004 | 38\% | 24\% | 49\% | 47\% | 42\% |
| 11 to 15 | 2013 | 19\% | 27\% | 16\% | 25\% | 21\% |
|  | 2012 | 24\% | 30\% | 16\% | 20\% | 21\% |
|  | 2004 | 5\% | 24\% | 19\% | 28\% | 20\% |
| 16 to 20 | 2013 | 0 | 7\% | 2\% | 10\% | 5\% |
|  | 2012 | 7\% | 2\% | 4\% | 7\% | 5\% |
|  | 2004 | 2\% | 7\% | 5\% | 2\% | 4\% |
| 21 or more | 2013 | 0 | 2\% | 2\% | 0 | 1\% |
|  | 2012 | 0 | 0 | 2\% | 2\% | 1\% |
|  | 2004 | 2\% | 2\% | 0 | 5\% | 2\% |

* Percentages are based only on those boards that disclosed meeting frequency.


## Committee Meetings

- Audit and compensation committees averaged five meetings in 2013, compared to an average of four meetings for governance committees.

- The major board committees on Canadian boards tend to meet less frequently than their U.S. ${ }^{19}$ counterparts across most company sizes:
* The median number of audit committee meetings at Canadian boards was four in the Micro, Small and Medium categories, and five at Large companies. The median number of U.S. audit committee meetings was six at Micro and Small boards, eight at Medium and Large companies, and nine at the Top 200 companies.
* The median number of compensation committee meetings at Canadian boards was two in the Micro category, four at Small and Medium companies, and five at Large companies. The median number of U.S. compensation committee meetings was five at Micro, Small and Medium companies, and six at Large and Top 200 companies.
* The median number of governance committee meetings at Canadian boards was two in the Micro category, three at Small and Medium companies and four at Large companies. The median number of U.S. governance committee meetings was three at Micro companies and four in all other categories.

Committee Meetings Held by Major Committees
Average Median Range Boards Reporting*

| Audit Committee |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{2}$ to $\mathbf{2 2}$ | $\mathbf{9 3 \%}$ |  |  |
| 2012 | 5 | 5 | 3 to 21 | $89 \%$ |  |  |
| 2004 | 6 | 5 | 0 to 16 | $77 \%$ |  |  |
| Compensation/HR Committee |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{5}$ | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ to 18 | $\mathbf{9 4 \%}$ |  |  |
| 2012 | 5 | 5 | 1 to 15 | $90 \%$ |  |  |
| 2004 | 5 | 4 | 0 to 15 | $\mathbf{7 8 \%}$ |  |  |
| Governance Committee |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{4}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ to 14 | $\mathbf{9 5 \%}$ |  |  |
| 2012 | 4 | 3 | 1 to 9 | $90 \%$ |  |  |
| 2004 | 4 | 3 | 0 to 15 | $\mathbf{7 7 \%}$ |  |  |

* Percent of boards with the named committee type.

[^8]
## Board Committees



## Key Findings

For the past nine years, boards have averaged four committees each.

The most prevalent committee types are audit, compensation and governance, which occur respectively on 100\%, 98\% and 93\% of boards, and environment/ safety, which occurs on $40 \%$ of all boards.

In 2013, 95\% of independent directors had at least one committee membership.
Independent directors averaged two committees each and non-independent directors averaged one committee each if they were outside directors or zero committees each if they were inside directors.

## Board Committees



- For the ninth year in a row, boards have averaged four committees each. The most prevalent committee types are audit, compensation and governance, all of which occur on 93\% or more of all boards, and environment/safety, which occurs on $40 \%$ of all boards.
- In 2013, $16 \%$ of boards had a risk committee, which is the highest incidence of this committee we have seen.

Number of Board Committees

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{4}$ | 4 | 3 |
| Median | $\mathbf{4}$ | 4 | 3 |
| Range | $\mathbf{1}$ to $\mathbf{7}$ | 1 to $\mathbf{7}$ | 1 to 7 |

Average Number of Committees, by Asset Size

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large | ALL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B |  |
| 2013 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| 2012 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 |
| 2004 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 4 | 3 |

## Percentage of Boards with Types of Committees

|  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\pi}{\partial} \\ & \underset{\sim}{\tau} \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \frac{\rightharpoonup}{0} \\ & \frac{0}{0} \\ & \frac{D}{0} \\ & U \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & 0 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{0}{ \pm} \\ & \underset{\sim}{U} \\ & \stackrel{\otimes}{凶} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \underset{\sim}{U} \\ & \underset{\sim}{0} \\ & \underset{i}{1} \end{aligned}$ |  |  | $\stackrel{ᄃ}{0}$ <br> 0 <br> 0 <br> 0 |  | $\frac{\stackrel{y}{n}}{2}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oे } \\ & \text { O} \\ & \text { O} \\ & \text { C } \\ & \text { © } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Micro <br> <500 M | 2013 | 100\% | 96\% | 0 | 89\% | 28\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 14\% | 0 | 7\% | 4\% | 0 | 0 |
|  | 2012 | 100\% | 97\% | 0 | 88\% | 44\% | 0 | 3\% | 0 | 15\% | 0 | 20\% | 3\% | 3\% | 12\% |
|  | 2004 | 100\% | 88\% | 0 | 80\% | 15\% | 10\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% | 2\% | 4\% | 2\% | 1\% | 1\% |
| Small 500M - 1B | 2013 | 100\% | 98\% | 2\% | 88\% | 43\% | 5\% | 14\% | 5\% | 10\% | 2\% | 10\% | 12\% | 2\% | 14\% |
|  | 2012 | 100\% | 96\% | 0 | 88\% | 43\% | 2\% | 6\% | 6\% | 10\% | 2\% | 12\% | 4\% | 0 | 8\% |
|  | 2004 | 100\% | 94\% | 0 | 94\% | 26\% | 8\% | 4\% | 2\% | 0 | 4\% | 2\% | 0 | 0 | 2\% |
| Medium$1 B-5 B$ | 2013 | 100\% | 98\% | 0 | 92\% | 43\% | 7\% | 4\% | 6\% | 3\% | 1\% | 17\% | 8\% | 1\% | 3\% |
|  | 2012 | 100\% | 99\% | 0 | 93\% | 37\% | 5\% | 3\% | 10\% | 4\% | 4\% | 12\% | 6\% | 3\% | 3\% |
|  | 2004 | 100\% | 98\% | 1\% | 94\% | 27\% | 13\% | 4\% | 4\% | 4\% | 12\% | 3\% | 9\% | 3\% | 0 |
| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Large } \\ & >5 B \end{aligned}$ | 2013 | 100\% | 98\% | 9\% | 97\% | 39\% | 9\% | 10\% | 13\% | 6\% | 12\% | 14\% | 32\% | 3\% | 1\% |
|  | 2012 | 100\% | 99\% | 11\% | 97\% | 43\% | 12\% | 11\% | 11\% | 6\% | 11\% | 16\% | 32\% | 2\% | 0 |
|  | 2004 | 100\% | 97\% | 13\% | 90\% | 40\% | 27\% | 4\% | 6\% | 0 | 26\% | 8\% | 29\% | 3\% | 0 |
| ALL | 2013 | 100\% | 98\% | 3\% | 93\% | 40\% | 7\% | 7\% | 8\% | 6\% | 5\% | 14\% | 16\% | 2\% | 4\% |
|  | 2012 | 100\% | 98\% | 4\% | 93\% | 41\% | 6\% | 6\% | 8\% | 7\% | 5\% | 15\% | 14\% | 2\% | 4\% |
|  | 2004 | 100\% | 94\% | 3\% | 89\% | 26\% | 14\% | 6\% | 3\% | 2\% | 10\% | 4\% | 9\% | 2\% | <1\% |

[^9]
## Committee Membership

- In 2013, 95\% of independent directors had at least one committee membership.


Independent Directors averaged 2 committees each

-     - 
- Of the independent directors that had no committee memberships, $36 \%$ were board chairs and $33 \%$ had been on the board for a year or less.
- Overall, directors in 2013 averaged two committee memberships. Independent directors averaged two committees each and non-independent directors averaged one committee each if they were outside directors or zero committees each if they were inside directors.
- In 2013, 48\% of independent directors sat on two committees.

Since 2005 , between $44 \%$ and $49 \%$ of independent directors have held two committee memberships.

- For the past two years, $16 \%$ of outside, non-independent directors sat on two committees compared to $10 \%$ over the two prior years.

Non-Independent/Outside
Directors averaged
1 committee each

## Percentage of Directors with Committee Memberships

| Number of Committee | Percentage of Independent Directors |  | Percentage of NonIndependent (Inside) Directors |  | Percentage of NonIndependent (Outside) Directors |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Memberships | 2013 | 2012 | 2013 | 2012 | 2013 | 2012 |
| 0 | 5\% | 5\% | 74\% | 73\% | 46\% | 46\% |
| 1 | 28\% | 28\% | 21\% | 22\% | 32\% | 32\% |
| 2 | 48\% | 48\% | 4\% | 4\% | 16\% | 16\% |
| 3 | 14\% | 15\% | 1\% | 1\% | 3\% | 2\% |
| 4 | 3\% | 3\% | 0 | 0 | 4\% | 4\% |
| 5 | 1\% | 1\% | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

## Director Compensation



## Key Findings

In 2013, $34 \%$ of companies chose a retainer-only option of paying their directors. Of these companies, $74 \%$ were Medium and Large companies, and 26\% were Micro and Small companies.

Twenty percent of companies that pay only a board retainer paid a retainer valued at over \$175,000, compared to 11\% in 2012 and $9 \%$ in 2011.

There is a steadily growing gap between average retainers depending upon whether they include a mandatory portion in shares or share equivalents. The average retainer that included shares or share equivalents in 2013 was $130 \%$ higher in value than the average retainer that was cash-only or had a voluntary portion in shares or share equivalents. This compares to a differential of $124 \%$ in 2012, 120\% in 2011 and 103\% in 2010.

The median retainer at companies that do not pay a meeting fee was \$100,000, and the median retainer at companies that do pay a meeting fee was \$89,224. In the United States, the combined medians for cash retainer and full value share compensation at the Top 200 companies was US\$218,500. ${ }^{20}$

## Introduction

- In order to thoroughly account for the compensation paid to directors, we combine the cash amounts with values of shares, trust units or share/ trust unit equivalents such as deferred share units. We refer collectively to all compensation in the form of shares, trust units or share/trust unit equivalents as "shares" or "share compensation".
- Where a board has not given a cash value of share equivalents, we have calculated based on the number of shares awarded and the fiscal year-end closing price.
- We have not estimated the value of stock options. However, we do report on the number of boards that grant stock options to directors in the "Stock-Based Compensation" section, which begins on page 84.


## How are Directors Compensated?


paying directors with only an annual retainer

- After year-to-year steady growth in the practice of paying directors with only an annual retainer, there was a slight decrease in this practice in 2013, going down from $36 \%$ in 2012 to $34 \%$. Large and Medium companies continue to primarily use this approach, with $74 \%$ paying only retainers, compared to $26 \%$ of Micro and Small companies.
- Despite the slight decrease in the practice of paying directors only with a retainer, average compensation grew much higher in this category than at boards that paid meeting fees. The average retainer grew by $18 \%$ at companies that paid only a retainer, compared to $8 \%$ at those that also paid a meeting fee, and the average meeting fee at these companies was $3 \%$ lower than in 2012.
- In 2013 only one company, Leon's Furniture Limited, paid directors with a meeting fee only, and that fee was $\$ 7,500$ per meeting.
- There is a steadily growing gap between average retainers depending upon whether they include a mandatory portion in shares or share equivalents. The average retainer that included shares or share equivalents in 2013 was 130\% higher in value than the average retainer that was cash-only or had a voluntary portion in shares or share equivalents. This compares to a differential of $124 \%$ in $2012,120 \%$ in 2011 and 103\% in 2010.

Forms of Compensation

|  |  | Percent of Boards | Average Retainer | Average Meeting Fee |
| :--- | :---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| Retainer Only | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{3 4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 1 9 , 8 1 6}$ |  |
|  | 2012 | $36 \%$ | $\$ 101,698$ |  |
| Meeting Fee Only | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $<\mathbf{1 \%}$ |  | $\mathbf{\$ 7 , 5 0 0}$ |
|  | 2012 | $1 \%$ |  | $\$ 3,767$ |
| Retainer and Meeting Fee | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{6 4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 9 5 , 2 6 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 5 7 5}$ |
|  | 2012 | $63 \%$ | $\$ 88,122$ | $\$ 1,626$ |
| Stock Options Only | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ |  |  |
|  | 2012 | $<1 \%$ |  |  |

Average and Median Board Retainers, Including Cash and Shares


## Annual Retainers

- Due to the prevalence of companies that compensate with only a retainer, we separate those that do and do not pay meeting fees in addition to the retainer in our company size tables, to provide a clearer basis of


Companies paying a board retainer only valued at over \$175,000

- In 2013, 20\% of companies that pay a board retainer only paid a retainer valued at over \$175,000, compared to $11 \%$ in 2012 and $9 \%$ in 2011.
- The median retainer at companies that do not pay a meeting fee was $\$ 100,000$, and the median retainer at companies that do pay a meeting fee was $\$ 89,224$. In the United States, the combined medians for cash retainer and full value share compensation at the Top 200 companies was US $\$ 218,500 .{ }^{21}$
- As we noted in our Special Report, "Counting the Hours", directors have reported a noticeable increase in time commitment in recent years. At least one board, The Toronto-Dominion Bank, is citing an increase in time commitment as part of the rationale for an increase in board compensation in 2014. In its Proxy Circular dated February 20, 2014, they state:

Overseeing the bank's affairs has become significantly more complex over the past few years. The bank has completed a number of significant transactions that have expanded its U.S. footprint and the scope of its operations, as well as increased both the complexity of the bank and intensity of regulatory oversight and scrutiny. As a result of these transactions, as well as organic growth, the bank's total assets and revenue have increased by approximately $53 \%$ and $86 \%$, respectively, over the past six years. In addition, bank regulators and supervisory authorities in both Canada and the United States have significantly increased the expectations they have of the boards of financial institutions, including the bank, over the past decade and particularly since the 2008 financial crisis.

These factors have led to significant increases in the workload and responsibility placed on our directors. For example, the materials that directors must read in advance of board and committee meetings discuss more complex issues in more detail than was the case only a few years ago. In addition, the directors now spend more time preparing for board and committee meetings and attend a greater number of education and training sessions to continue to be effective in their roles (for details, please refer to the "Director Nominees - Continuing Education of Directors" section of this circular). In addition, since 2008, a number of the bank's directors sit on more board committees and therefore, on average, attend a greater number of meetings.


In addition, directors in a leadership role on the board have seen a significant increase in their workload as a result of a substantial increase in the number of meetings that the chairman and committee chairs now attend with regulators and supervisors, as well as with other stakeholders. The chairman and committee chairs are expected to proactively engage with the bank's regulators to engender trust and confidence in the quality of the board's governance and effective oversight of the bank, as well as to clarify expectations, seek guidance, and discuss issues. These directors are also expected to be prepared to speak in-depth about the bank and its operations during these meetings. As a result of these increasing expectations, the chairman and committee chairs must now spend a greater amount of time preparing for and attending meetings with regulators and supervisory authorities, including by reviewing additional materials and meeting more frequently with management.

In light of these factors, in 2013 the corporate governance committee reviewed in depth whether director compensation reflected the enhanced workload and responsibility of the bank's directors.

Annual Board Retainer at Companies that Do Not Pay a Board Meeting Fee

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 1 1 9 , 8 1 6}$ | $\$ 101,698$ | $\$ 57,177$ |
| Median | $\$ 100,000$ | $\$ 87,580$ | $\$ 40,000$ |
| Range | $\$ 11, \mathbf{0 0 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 5 4 0 , 0 0 5}$ | $\$ 6,250$ to $\$ 509,871$ | $\$ 12,000$ to $\$ 195,000$ |

Annual Board Retainer at Companies that Also Pay a Board Meeting Fee

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 9 5 , 2 6 4}$ | $\$ 88,122$ | $\$ 38,912$ |
| Median | $\mathbf{\$ 8 9 , 2 2 4}$ | $\$ 80,000$ | $\$ 25,000$ |
| Range | $\mathbf{\$ 1 5 , 4 5 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 2 7 9 , 6 7 5}$ | $\$ 12,000$ to | $\$ 283,725$ |

Average Annual Board Retainer at Companies that Do Not Pay a Board Meeting Fee

|  | Micro | Small |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | Medium | Large |  |  |
|  | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 7 2 , 7 9 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 8 7 , 4 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 9 9 , 3 9 5}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 7 6 , 8 9 1}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 1 9 , 8 1 6}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\$ 42,732$ | $\$ 63,429$ | $\$ 87,297$ | $\$ 171,356$ | $\$ 101,698$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\$ 27,836$ | $\$ 48,300$ | $\$ 48,238$ | $\$ 112,034$ | $\$ 57,177$ |

Average Annual Board Retainer at Companies that Also Pay a Board Meeting Fee

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| 2013 | \$52,093 | \$69,538 | \$87,629 | \$122,538 | \$95,264 |
| 2012 | \$56,868 | \$55,921 | \$79,086 | \$118,462 | \$88,122 |
| 2004 | \$18,693 | \$25,040 | \$39,713 | \$77,379 | \$38,912 |

Retainer Distribution

|  | Companies that Pay a Board Retainer |  | Companies that Pay Both a Board |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Only, No Board Meeting Fee |  | Retainer and Board Meeting Fee |
| \$25,000 or less | 2013 | 4\% | 8\% |
|  | 2012 | 10\% | 10\% |
| \$25,001 to \$75,000 | 2013 | 30\% | 37\% |
|  | 2012 | 34\% | 39\% |
| \$75,001 to \$125,000 | 2013 | 28\% | 29\% |
|  | 2012 | 27\% | 29\% |
| \$125,001 to \$175,000 | 2013 | 17\% | 18\% |
|  | 2012 | 18\% | 15\% |
| over \$175,000 | 2013 | 20\% | 8\% |
|  | 2012 | 11\% | 6\% |

Largest Board Retainers at Companies that Do Not Pay a Board Meeting Fee

|  | Total | Cash Portion | Share Based Portion* |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp. | $\$ 540,005^{1}$ | $\$ 51,500^{1}$ | $\$ 488,505$ |
| Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. | $\$ 463,500^{1}$ | $\$ 77,250^{1}$ | $\$ 386,250^{1}$ |
| Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited | $\$ 275,630$ | $\$ 224,700$ | $\$ 50,930$ |
| Catamaran Corporation | $\$ 264,968^{1}$ | $\$ 77,250^{1}$ | $\$ 187,718^{1}$ |
| InterOil Corporation | $\$ 257,500^{1}$ | $\$ 51,500^{1}$ | $\$ 206,000^{1}$ |
| Enbridge Inc. | $\$ 235,000$ | $\$ 176,250$ | $\$ 58,750$ |
| Open Text Corporation | $\$ 211,186^{1}$ | $\$ 51,500^{1}$ | $\$ 159,686^{1}$ |
| Kinross Gold Corporation | $\$ 210,000$ | $\$ 105,000$ | $\$ 105,000$ |

* Where share values have not been provided, the value of shares has been calculated based on the number of shares awarded in fiscal 2013 and the fiscal year end closing share price.
1 Reported in U.S. dollars. The average exchange rate for 2013 was \$1.03.


## Largest Board Retainers at Companies that Also Pay a Board Meeting Fee

|  | Total | Cash Portion | Share Based Portion* |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Cenovus Energy Inc. | $\$ 279,675$ | $\$ 30,000$ | $\$ 249,675$ |
| Crescent Point Energy Corp. | $\$ 269,969$ | $\$ 30,000$ | $\$ 239,969$ |
| Bonavista Energy Corporation | $\$ 262,000$ | $\$ 55,000$ | $\$ 207,000$ |
| Onex Corporation | $\$ 247,200^{1}$ | $\$ 51,500^{1}$ | $\$ 195,700^{1}$ |
| Suncor Energy Inc. | $\$ 238,499$ | $\$ 50,000$ | $\$ 188,499$ |
| EnCana Corporation | $\$ 226,600$ | $\$ 30,000$ | $\$ 196,600$ |
| Turquoise Hill Resources Ltd. | $\$ 217,189$ | $\$ 100,000$ | $\$ 117,189^{1}$ |
| Eldorado Gold Corporation | $\$ 210,000$ | $\$ 105,000$ | $\$ 105,000$ |
| Silver Wheaton Corp. | $\$ 209,881$ | $\$ 75,000$ | $\$ 134,881$ |
| Goldcorp Inc. | $\$ 206,180^{1}$ | $\$ 103,000{ }^{1}$ | $\$ 103,180$ |
| Talisman Energy Inc. | $\$ 200,000$ | $\$ 50,000$ | $\$ 150,000$ |

* Where share values have not been provided, the value of shares has been calculated based on the number of shares awarded in fiscal 2013 and the fiscal year end closing share price.
1 Reported in U.S. dollars. The average exchange rate for 2013 was \$1.03.


## Board Meeting Fees

- The average board meeting fee in 2013 was $\$ 1,606$, a $3 \%$ decrease over the average board meeting fee of $\$ 1,648$ in 2012. There has been little change in meeting fees over recent years, with the annual averages fluctuating between $\$ 1,417$ and $\$ 1,648$ since 2003.


## Average Board Meeting Fee

|  | Micro <br> $<500 M$ | Small <br> $500 M$ | Medium $1 B$ | TB to $5 B$ | Large <br>  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 3 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 5 1 7}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 5 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 4 5}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 0 6}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\$ 1,473$ | $\$ 1,620$ | $\$ 1,592$ | $\$ 1,767$ | $\$ 1,648$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\$ 1,341$ | $\$ 1,342$ | $\$ 1,501$ | $\$ 1,614$ | $\$ 1,451$ |

## Board Chair Compensation



## Key Findings

The 2013 average non-executive chair retainer of $\$ 244,726$ was $3 \%$ higher than in 2012, following a $4 \%$ increase last year and a $5 \%$ increase the previous year. The median non-executive chair retainer of $\$ 223,400$ in 2013 was an $11 \%$ increase over the 2012 median of \$210,000.

The average non-executive chair retainer that included shares or share equivalents in 2013 was 44\% higher in value than one that was cash-only or had only a voluntary portion in shares or share equivalents. This compares to a differential of $54 \%$ last year and $60 \%$ the year prior.

## Introduction

- All compensation in this section represents non-executive board chairs. Executive Chair compensation is not included due to the low number of executive chairs included in our sample and the high variability in compensation for executive chairs.


## Non-Executive Chairs

- The 2013 average non-executive chair retainer of $\$ 244,726$ was $3 \%$ higher than in 2012, following a $4 \%$ increase last year and a $5 \%$ increase the previous year. The median non-executive chair retainer of $\$ 223,400$ in 2013 was an 11\% increase over the 2012 median of \$210,000.
- Sixty-nine percent of the non-executive chairs that did not receive a retainer were non-independent chairs. All of the independent chairs that did not receive compensation for this role were in either the energy or materials industry sectors.
- Ninety-five percent of companies with an independent chair paid a premium retainer to their board chair, compared to $86 \%$ of the Top 200 companies in the United States with an independent chair. ${ }^{22}$
- As with director retainers, non-executive chair retainers are bigger when there is a mandatory portion in shares or share equivalents. The average non-executive chair retainer that included shares or share equivalents in 2013 was $44 \%$ higher in value than one that was cash-only or had only a voluntary portion in shares or share equivalents. This compares to a differential of $54 \%$ last year and $60 \%$ the year prior.



## Canada



USA

Independent chair
paid a premium
retainer

Non-Executive Chair Retainer

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 2 4 4 , 7 2 6}$ | $\$ 238,392$ | $\$ 171,024$ |
| Median | $\mathbf{\$ 2 2 3 , 4 0 0}$ | $\$ 210,000$ | $\$ 130,00$ |
| Range | $\mathbf{\$ 2 5 , 0 0 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 1 0 3 , 1 8 0}$ | $\$ 43,000$ to $\$ 1,132,405$ | $\$ 2,500$ to $\$ 1,345,500$ |

Average Annual Non-Executive Chair Retainer

|  | Micro <br>  <br> $<500 M$ | Small <br> $500 M$ to $1 B$ | Medium | TB to $5 B$ | Large <br> $>5 B$ | ALL |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 1 4 , 9 2 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 7 5 , 2 4 6}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 0 8 , 5 7 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 4 8 , 1 5 7}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 4 4 , 7 2 6}$ |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\$ 122,116$ | $\$ 147,058$ | $\$ 200,540$ | $\$ 343,895$ | $\$ 238,392$ |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\$ 64,941$ | $\$ 102,803$ | $\$ 149,938$ | $\$ 312,950$ | $\$ 171,024$ |  |

Average and Median Non-Executive Chair Retainers, Including Cash and Shares

|  | Mandatory Shares in Retainer | No Mandatory Shares in Retainer |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Average | Median | Average | Median |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 7 9 , 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 7 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 9 3 , 0 7 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 3 5 , 0 0 0}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\$ 281,087$ | $\$ 255,000$ | $\$ 182,990$ | $\$ 132,676$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 6}$ | $\$ 251,241$ | $\$ 232,500$ | $\$ 129,460$ | $\$ 95,000$ |

## Largest Non-Executive Board Chair Retainers

|  | Total | Cash Portion | Share Based Portion* |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Goldcorp Inc. | $\$ 1,103,180$ | $\$ 1,000,000$ | $\$ 103,180$ |
| Teck Resources Limited | $\$ 660,019$ | $\$ 360,000$ | $\$ 300,019$ |
| Bombardier Inc. | $\$ 618,000^{1}$ | $\$ 618,000^{1}$ |  |
| Thomson Reuters Corporation | $\$ 618,000^{1}$ | $\$ 618,000^{1}$ |  |
| Turquoise Hill Resources Ltd. | $\$ 542,936$ | $\$ 250,000$ | $\$ 292,936^{1}$ |
| Suncor Energy Inc. | $\$ 540,574$ | $\$ 250,000$ | $\$ 290,574$ |
| Magna International Inc. | $\$ 515,000^{1}$ | $\$ 206,000^{1}$ | $\$ 309,000^{1}$ |
| RioCan REIT | $\$ 503,836$ | $\$ 175,000$ | $\$ 328,836$ |
| Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited | $\$ 500,330$ | $\$ 449,400$ | $\$ 50,930$ |
| Dundee Corporation | $\$ 500,000$ | $\$ 500,000$ |  |
| RONA Inc. | $\$ 500,000$ | $\$ 500,000$ | $\$ 500,000$ |
| Saputo Inc. | $\$ 500,000$ | $\$ 200,000$ | $\$ 300,000$ |
| Talisman Energy Inc. | $\$ 500,000$ |  |  |

* Where share values have not been provided, the value of shares has been calculated based on the number of shares awarded in fiscal 2013 and the fiscal year end closing share price.
1 Reported in U.S. dollars. The average exchange rate for 2013 was \$1.03.


## Non-Executive Board Chair Retainer Distribution*

|  |  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | 1B to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| \$50,000 or less | 2013 | 17\% | 3\% | 2\% | 0 | 3\% |
|  | 2012 | 9\% | 8\% | 1\% | 0 | 3\% |
| \$50,001 to \$150,000 | 2013 | 43\% | 33\% | 29\% | 10\% | 25\% |
|  | 2012 | 59\% | 44\% | 30\% | 5\% | 26\% |
| \$150,001 to \$250,000 | 2013 | 17\% | 24\% | 32\% | 13\% | 23\% |
|  | 2012 | 4\% | 18\% | 39\% | 22\% | 26\% |
| \$250,001 to \$350,000 | 2013 | 0 | 15\% | 21\% | 29\% | 20\% |
|  | 2012 | 4\% | 5\% | 17\% | 31\% | 19\% |
| over \$350,000 | 2013 | 4\% | 0 | 5\% | 38\% | 16\% |
|  | 2012 | 0 | 2\% | 5\% | 35\% | 15\% |
| No Retainer | 2013 | 17\% | 24\% | 11\% | 9\% | 13\% |
|  | 2012 | 23\% | 23\% | 8\% | 6\% | 12\% |

[^10]
## Lead Director Compensation



## Key Findings

$79 \%$ of boards with a lead director paid an additional fee to the lead director.

Bigger companies are more likely to pay a lead director premium.
In 2013, there was a 6\% increase in the average lead director retainer, following a 2\% decrease in 2012.

2013 median lead
director retainer


- Bigger companies are more likely to pay a lead director retainer. Ninety-one percent of Large companies paid a premium to their lead directors versus 64\% of Small companies.
- Of the companies with a lead director that do not pay a premium retainer for this role, $50 \%$ have an outside, non-independent chair; $36 \%$ have a combined chair/CEO; 9\% have an executive chair, and 4\% have no chair or an independent chair.
- We continue to see volatility in lead director compensation, which we believe is related to this often being a transitional role rather than a permanent board leadership structure. In 2013, there was a $6 \%$ increase in the average lead director retainer, following single digit decreases for two years, which came after a 10\% increase in 2010.
- The median lead director retainer of $\$ 25,375$ was a $2 \%$ increase over the previous two years.

Lead Director Additional Retainer*, Including Cash and Shares

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 3 6 , 6 8 5}$ | $\$ 34,714$ | $\$ 30,002$ |
| Median | $\mathbf{\$ 2 5 , 3 7 5}$ | $\$ 25,000$ | $\$ 19,171$ |
| Range | $\mathbf{\$ 2 , 5 0 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 1 5 4 , 5 0 0}$ | $\$ 2,500$ to $\mathbf{\$ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 2,600$ to $\$ 195,000$ |

* Additional to Director Retainer


## Average Annual Lead Director Additional Retainer* Including Cash and Shares

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 7 , 5 2 5}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 4 , 8 8 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 3 , 4 5 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 4 8 , 0 1 6}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 6 , 6 8 5}$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 19,313$ | $\$ 24,125$ | $\$ 30,218$ | $\$ 45,091$ | $\$ 34,714$ |
| 2004 | $\$ 10,471$ | $\$ 18,714$ | $\$ 36,046$ | $\$ 35,500$ | $\$ 30,002$ |

[^11][^12]
## Committee Chair Compensation



## Key Findings

92\% of companies paid a committee chair retainer that was higher than the committee member retainer. This compares to $91 \%$ in 2012 and $81 \%$ in 2004. In the United States, $96 \%$ of the Top 200 companies pay a committee chair retainer. ${ }^{24}$

Sixty-one percent of companies have an average committee chair retainer in the \$5,001 to \$10,000 range.

The biggest increase in the practice of paying a committee chair retainer was at Micro companies; in 2013 86\% paid a committee chair retainer, compared to 76\% in 2012. However, despite an increase in frequency of the practice, the average committee chair retainer in 2013 was 10\% lower than in 2012.

82\% of companies paid a higher retainer to audit committee chairs than other committee chairs.

## Committee Chair Retainer

2013 average
committee
chair retainer


- In 2013, 92\% of companies paid a committee chair retainer that was higher than the committee member retainer. This compares to $91 \%$ in 2012 and $81 \%$ in 2004. In the United States, $96 \%$ of the Top 200 companies pay a committee chair retainer. ${ }^{25}$
- The biggest growth in the practice of paying a committee chair retainer was at Micro companies; in 2013 86\% paid a committee chair retainer, compared to $76 \%$ in 2012. However, despite an increase in frequency of the practice, the average committee chair retainer in 2013 was 10\% lower than in 2012.
- In 2013, the average committee chair retainer was $1 \%$ higher than the previous year. This compares to a $4 \%$ increase in the two prior years.
- Sixty-one percent of companies have an average committee chair retainer in the \$5,001 to \$10,000 range.

Committee Chair Retainer

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 1 5 , 3 9 9}$ | $\$ 15,204$ | $\$ 10,462$ |
| Median | $\mathbf{\$ 1 2 , 9 3 8}$ | $\$ 12,500$ | $\$ 6,500$ |
| Range | $\mathbf{\$ 2 , 5 0 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 7 5 , 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 2,500$ to $\mathbf{\$ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 750$ to $\$ 250,000$ |

Average Annual Committee Chair Retainer

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 0 , 2 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 3 , 0 7 8}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 3 , 7 3 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 8 , 6 8 2}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 5 , 3 9 9}$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 11,097$ | $\$ 12,273$ | $\$ 13,460$ | $\$ 18,712$ | $\$ 15,204$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\$ 5,637$ | $\$ 7,109$ | $\$ 9,305$ | $\$ 17,508$ | $\$ 10,462$ |

## Committee Chair Retainer Distribution*

|  |  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| \$5,000 or less | 2013 | 42\% | 16\% | 22\% | 14\% | 20\% |
|  | 2012 | 46\% | 28\% | 24\% | 15\% | 23\% |
| \$5,001 to \$10,000 | 2013 | 62\% | 68\% | 67\% | 52\% | 61\% |
|  | 2012 | 69\% | 77\% | 74\% | 59\% | 68\% |
| \$10,001 to \$15,000 | 2013 | 62\% | 62\% | 58\% | 48\% | 55\% |
|  | 2012 | 46\% | 51\% | 56\% | 48\% | 51\% |
| \$15,001 to 20,000 | 2013 | 12\% | 27\% | 29\% | 37\% | 30\% |
|  | 2012 | 8\% | 30\% | 24\% | 38\% | 28\% |
| \$20,001 to \$25,000 | 2013 | 12\% | 3\% | 7\% | 31\% | 16\% |
|  | 2012 | 4\% | 7\% | 8\% | 24\% | 14\% |
| Over \$25,000 | 2013 | 0 | 8\% | 10\% | 31\% | 17\% |
|  | 2012 | 4\% | 5\% | 10\% | 25\% | 14\% |
| No Committee Chair Retainer | 2013 | 14\% | 12\% | 12\% | 1\% | 8\% |
|  | 2012 | 24\% | 16\% | 10\% | 1\% | 9\% |

* Percentage of companies in each asset category that have a committee chair retainer in each dollar value category. Totals are more than $100 \%$ because many boards have several different levels of committee chair retainers that span different dollar value categories.


## Differential Committee Chair Retainers

- The practice of paying different retainers to chairs of different committees has become commonplace:

* Audit committee chairs remain the most likely to be paid a premium. In 2013, $82 \%$ of companies paid a higher retainer to audit committee chairs than other committee chairs. This compares to $83 \%$ in 2012 and 51\% in 2004.
* Paying a premium to compensation committee chairs is a growing practice. In 2013, 27\% of boards with a compensation committee paid a higher retainer to that committee chair than some other committees, compared to $24 \%$ last year, 22\% in 2011 and 13\% in 2010.
- In 2013, the average premium audit committee chair retainer was $54 \%$ higher than the non-audit chair retainer. For the previous three years, the differential was $56 \%$.
- In 2013, there was a $1 \%$ increase in the average premium audit committee chair retainer over 2012 and this follows increases over the previous years of $4 \%, 5 \%$ and $1 \%$ consecutively.
- In the United States, the median audit committee chair retainer is US\$20,000. ${ }^{26}$


## Average Premium Audit Committee and Non-Audit* Committee Chair Retainer

|  | Percentage that Pay a <br> Premium Audit Committee <br> Chair Retainer | Average Audit Committee <br> Chair Retainer at Companies <br> that Pay a Premium | Average Non-Audit <br> Chair Retainer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 9 , 5 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 2 , 6 5 1}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{8 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 9 , 2 5 0}$ | $\$ 12,344$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $51 \%$ | $\$ 14,391$ | $\$ 8,006$ |

* "Non-Audit" includes audit committees at those companies that do not pay a premium for audit committee membership.

Average Premium Audit Committee and Non-Audit* Committee Chair Retainer, By Board Size

|  | Percentage of Asset Group <br> that Pay a Premium <br> Audit Committee <br> Chair Retainer | Average Audit <br> Committee Chair <br> Retainer at Companies <br> that Pay a Premium | Average Non-Audit <br> Committee Chair <br> Retainer |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Micro <500M | $75 \%$ | $\$ 12,983$ | $\$ 7,968$ |
| Small 500M - 1B | $83 \%$ | $\$ 16,357$ | $\$ 10,687$ |
| Medium 1B - 5B | $77 \%$ | $\$ 18,240$ | $\$ 10,537$ |
| Large >5B | $90 \%$ | $\$ 23,441$ | $\$ 15,851$ |
| ALL | $82 \%$ | $\$ 19,506$ | $\$ 12,651$ |

* "Non-Audit" includes audit committees at those companies that do not pay a premium for audit committee membership.

Premium Audit Committee Chair Retainer vs. Non-Audit* Committee Chair Retainer

|  |  | Audit Committee | Non-Audit Committee |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average | 2013 | \$19,506 | \$12,651 |
|  | 2012 | \$19,250 | \$12,344 |
|  | 2004 | \$14,391 | \$8,006 |
| Median | 2013 | \$15,450 | 10,000 |
|  | 2012 | \$15,000 | \$10,000 |
|  | 2004 | \$10,000 | \$5,000 |
| Range | 2013 | \$5,000 to \$75,000 | \$2,500 to \$75,000 |
|  | 2012 | \$5,000 to \$75,000 | \$2,500 to \$250,000 |
|  | 2004 | \$750 to \$225,000 | \$1,000 to \$250,000 |

* "Non-Audit" includes audit committees at those companies that do not pay a premium for audit committee membership.


## Committee Chair Meeting Fee

- Fewer boards (2\%) paid a higher meeting fee to committee chairs than to committee members in 2013. This is a decrease from 4\% over the previous three years and 5\% over the four years prior. It is not surprising, as trends in recent years have moved more towards compensating with retainers than meeting fees.
- The average committee chair meeting fee in 2013 was $\$ 2,386$ compared to \$2,519 in 2012.


Average committee chair meeting fee

## Committee Member Compensation



## Key Findings

In 2013, the average committee member retainer of \$6,680 was $2 \%$ higher than 2012.
$76 \%$ of boards paid a meeting fee for all committees, but a retainer only to the audit committee; and 18\% paid audit committee members a retainer (with no meeting fee) and did not pay any fees to other committee members.

## Committee Member Retainer



- In 2013, the average committee member retainer of $\$ 6,680$ was $2 \%$ higher than 2012. In the previous year, there was a $12 \%$ increase, and in the three prior years, average committee members remained relatively stable with annual decreases of $1 \%$ or less.
- Of the companies that paid committee member compensation, 36\% paid both a retainer and meeting fee. The percentage of companies paying both a retainer and meeting fee has been relatively stable between $34 \%$ and $36 \%$ over the past ten years.
- The percentage of companies paying a retainer only to committee members increased to $18 \%$ in 2013, compared with $8 \%$ to $15 \%$ in the ten years prior.


## Committee Member Retainer

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 6 , 6 8 0}$ | $\$ 6,540$ | $\$ 4,571$ |
| Median | $\mathbf{\$ 5 , 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 5,000$ | $\$ 3,875$ |
| Range | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 0 5 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 3 7 , 5 0 0}$ | $\$ 1,050$ to $\mathbf{\$ 3 7 , 5 0 0}$ | $\$ 1,000$ to $\mathbf{\$ 3 2 , 5 0 0}$ |

## Average Committee Member Retainer

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 5 , 2 4 2}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 , 9 1 2}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 , 4 9 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 , 9 3 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 6 , 6 8 0}$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 6,231$ | $\$ 6,185$ | $\$ 6,310$ | $\$ 6,836$ | $\$ 6,540$ |
| 2004 | $\$ 3,081$ | $\$ 3,500$ | $\$ 4,328$ | $\$ 6,030$ | $\$ 4,571$ |

## Committee Member Meeting Fee

- In 2013, the average committee meeting fee increased by less than $1 \%$ over the 2012 average. Over the previous seven years, the annual increase in committee meeting fees ranged between less than $1 \%$ and $4 \%$.
- In 2013, 8\% of companies that paid committee meeting fees paid a higher meeting fee to audit committee members compared with $11 \%$ to $12 \%$ in the three years prior.


## Committee Member Meeting Fees

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :---: |
| Average | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 0 2}$ | $\$ 1,594$ | $\$ 1,366$ |
| Median | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 5 0 0}$ | $\$ 1,500$ | $\$ 1,300$ |
| Range | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 0 0 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 3 , 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 500$ to $\$ 4,000$ | $\$ 200$ to $\$ 3,250$ |

Average Committee Member Meeting Fee

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 3 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 4 3 9}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 2 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 9 1}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 6 0 2}$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 1,348$ | $\$ 1,399$ | $\$ 1,614$ | $\$ 1,729$ | $\$ 1,594$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $\$ 1,081$ | $\$ 1,293$ | $\$ 1,467$ | $\$ 1,631$ | $\$ 1,366$ |

## Audit Committee Member Retainer

- In 2013, 26\% of companies paid a higher committee retainer for audit committee members than for other committees, compared to $25 \%$ in the two years prior and 15\%in 2004.
- The average audit committee retainer was $42 \%$ higher than the average committee member retainer for other committees or at companies that did not pay a premium for audit committee membership. This compares to $45 \%$ in 2012 and $48 \%$ in 2004.
- In the United States, the median audit committee retainer was US\$10,000. ${ }^{27}$

Audit Committee Premium Compared With Non-Audit* Committee

|  |  | Audit Committee | Non-Audit Committee |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average | 2013 | \$8,265 | \$5,816 |
|  | 2012 | \$8,151 | \$5,626 |
|  | 2004 | \$5,950 | \$4,027 |
| Median | 2013 | \$6,000 | \$5,000 |
|  | 2012 | \$6,000 | \$5,000 |
|  | 2004 | \$5,000 | \$3,000 |
| Range | 2013 | \$2,000 to \$37,500 | \$1,050 to \$25,750 |
|  | 2012 | \$2,000 to \$37,500 | \$1,050 to \$25,000 |
|  | 2004 | \$1,500 to \$20,410 | \$1,000 to \$32,500 |

[^13][^14]How Are Committee Members Compensated?

- Committee member compensation tends to be quite varied, with some boards providing different amounts for different types of committees, or paying a board retainer intended to include compensation for committee service, but no specific amounts for committee service.
- In 2013, $82 \%$ of companies paid some form of committee member compensation to their directors.
- Six percent of companies provided compensation for some, but not all committees. Of these companies:
* $76 \%$ paid a meeting fee for all committees, but a retainer only to the audit committee;
* $6 \%$ paid a meeting fee only, and only to audit committee members;
* $18 \%$ paid only a retainer, and only to audit committee members.

Breakdown of Compensation Method for Committee Members

| Meeting Fee only | $33 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Retainer and Meeting Fee | $28 \%$ |
| Retainer Only | $14 \%$ |
| Stock Options only | $1 \%$ |
| Compensation for some, but not all, Committee Types | $6 \%$ |
| No Specific Committee Member Compensation | $18 \%$ |

## Stock-Based Compensation



## Key Findings

Use of share equivalents has reached an all-time high with $69 \%$ of companies using them in 2013, up from 64\% in 2012 and $47 \%$ in 2004.

There was a significant reduction in the number of companies providing directors with stock options or trust unit rights. In 2013, only $15 \%$ of companies issued stock options compared to 24\% in 2012.

The bigger the company, the more likely it is to have both mandatory and optional share compensation for directors. In 2013, 59\% of Large companies used this method, compared to 14\% at Micro companies.

## Introduction

- We consider a company to have stock-based compensation when, during the year in question, directors receive at least one of stock or trust unit options, shares or trust units, or "share equivalents" (typically a form of deferred share or trust units).
- We consider a company to have stock option compensation for directors in 2013 when options were actually granted to directors during the fiscal year.


## Forms of Stock-Based Compensation


stock-based compensation for directors

- In 2013, 83\% of companies used some form of stock-based compensation for directors, compared to $85 \%$ in 2012 and $75 \%$ in 2004. This is the second year in a row that we have seen a slight decrease in value in this category since 2007. Small companies had the biggest decrease, from $78 \%$ in 2012 to $69 \%$ in 2013.
- Use of share equivalents has reached an all-time high with $69 \%$ of companies using them in 2013, up from 64\% in 2012 and 47\% in 2004. Bigger companies are more likely to compensate directors with share equivalents; $89 \%$ of Large companies used them, compared to $66 \%$ of Medium, $48 \%$ of Small and $43 \%$ of Micro companies.
- This year, there was a significant reduction in the number of companies providing directors with stock options or trust unit rights. In 2013, only $15 \%$ of companies issued stock options compared to $24 \%$ in 2012 and a fluctuation in this percentage between $20 \%$ and $26 \%$ over the previous four years. The bigger the company, the less likely it is to compensate directors with stock options or trust unit rights. The biggest users were Micro companies at $39 \%$ and Small companies at $31 \%$, compared to $15 \%$ of Medium companies and $3 \%$ of Large companies.
- In the United States, director compensation includes full-value shares at $97 \%$ of the Top 200 companies and stock options at $18 \%$. ${ }^{28}$

Percentage of Companies with a Stock Component in Director Compensation

|  | Micro | Small |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $<500 M$ | Medium | Large |  |  |
|  | $500 M$ to $1 B$ | $1 B$ to $5 B$ | $>5 B$ | $A L L$ |  |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{8 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 3 \%}$ |
| 2012 | $79 \%$ | $78 \%$ | $83 \%$ | $93 \%$ | $85 \%$ |
| 2004 | $60 \%$ | $66 \%$ | $82 \%$ | $94 \%$ | $75 \%$ |

Percentage of Companies with Various Types of Stock-Based Director Compensation

|  | Shares/Trust | Stock Options/ | Share |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Units | Trust Unit Rights | Equivalents | None |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ | $\mathbf{1 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{6 9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 7 \%}$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 1 2}$ | $12 \%$ | $24 \%$ | $64 \%$ | $15 \%$ |
| $\mathbf{2 0 0 4}$ | $15 \%$ | $\mathbf{2 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{4 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 \%}$ |

Totals are more than $100 \%$ because some companies provide more than one form of stock-based compensation

Usage of Stock Components in Director Compensation, by Company Size

|  |  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| Shares/Trust Units | 2013 | 4\% | 7\% | 10\% | 18\% | 12\% |
|  | 2012 | 3\% | 2\% | 9\% | 22\% | 12\% |
| Stock Options/ <br> Trust Unit Rights | 2013 | 39\% | 31\% | 15\% | 3\% | 15\% |
|  | 2012 | 53\% | 51\% | 19\% | 6\% | 24\% |
| Share Equivalents | 2013 | 43\% | 48\% | 66\% | 89\% | 69\% |
|  | 2012 | 24\% | 65\% | 65\% | 88\% | 64\% |
| None | 2013 | 18\% | 31\% | 20\% | 8\% | 17\% |
|  | 2012 | 21\% | 22\% | 17\% | 7\% | 15\% |

## Mandatory vs. Voluntary Compensation in Shares or Share Equivalents


compensation to
directors in shares or
share equivalents

- The most common way of providing share compensation to directors is to make a portion of compensation in shares or share equivalents mandatory, and to allow an option to take a further portion in the same manner. In 2013, 41\% of boards chose this method, compared to $38 \%$ in 2012 and $24 \%$ in 2004.
- The bigger the company, the more likely it is to have both mandatory and optional share compensation for directors. In 2013, 59\% of Large companies used this method, compared to $14 \%$ at Micro companies.
- Fifty-five percent of companies that compensate directors with only a retainer require directors to take all or part of the retainer in shares or share equivalents, compared to $62 \%$ of boards that also pay a meeting fee.

Percentage of Companies with Compensation in Shares or Share Equivalents

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Option to take all or part of compensation in shares or share equivalents | $\mathbf{1 5 \%}$ | $15 \%$ | $19 \%$ |
| Must take all or part of compensation in shares or share equivalents, <br> no option of taking a further portion in the same manner | $\mathbf{1 7 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| At least a portion of compensation must be in share or share equivalents | $\mathbf{4 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 4 \%}$ |

Percentage of Companies with Compensation in Share or Share Equivalents, by Asset Size

|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Micro } \\ & <500 \mathrm{M} \end{aligned}$ | Small 500M to $1 B$ | Medium <br> 1B to 5B | $\begin{gathered} \text { Large } \\ >5 B \end{gathered}$ | ALL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Option to take all or part of compensation in shares or share equivalents | 14\% | 10\% | 17\% | 15\% | 15\% |
| Must take all or part of compensation in shares or share equivalents, no option of taking a further portion in the same manner | 18\% | 19\% | 16\% | 17\% | 17\% |
| At least a portion of compensation must be in share or share equivalents | 14\% | 24\% | 39\% | 59\% | 41\% |

Compensation Summary

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| Director Retainer, No Meeting Fee | 2013 | \$72,799 | \$87,473 | \$99,395 | \$176,891 | \$119,816 |
|  | 2012 | \$42,732 | \$63,429 | \$87,297 | \$171,356 | \$101,698 |
|  | 2004 | \$27,836 | \$48,300 | \$48,238 | \$112,034 | \$57,177 |
| Director Retainer, With Meeting Fee | 2013 | \$52,093 | \$69,538 | \$87,629 | \$122,538 | \$95,264 |
|  | 2012 | \$56,868 | \$55,921 | \$79,086 | \$118,462 | \$88,122 |
|  | 2004 | \$18,693 | \$25,040 | \$39,713 | \$77,379 | \$38,912 |
| Board Meeting | 2013 | \$1,329 | \$1,517 | \$1,653 | \$1,645 | \$1,606 |
|  | 2012 | \$1,473 | \$1,620 | \$1,592 | \$1,767 | \$1,648 |
|  | 2004 | \$1,341 | \$1,342 | \$1,501 | \$1,614 | \$1,451 |
| Non-Exec Chair Retainer | 2013 | \$114,920 | \$175,246 | \$208,573 | \$348,157 | \$244,726 |
|  | 2012 | \$122,116 | \$147,058 | \$200,540 | \$343,895 | \$238,392 |
|  | 2004 | \$64,941 | \$102,803 | \$149,938 | \$312,950 | \$171,024 |
| Committee Chair Retainer | 2013 | \$10,209 | \$13,078 | \$13,730 | \$18,682 | \$15,399 |
|  | 2012 | \$11,097 | \$12,273 | \$13,460 | \$18,712 | \$15,204 |
|  | 2004 | \$5,637 | \$7,109 | \$9,305 | \$17,508 | \$10,462 |
| Committee Member Retainer | 2013 | \$5,242 | \$6,912 | \$6,494 | \$6,934 | \$6,680 |
|  | 2012 | \$6,231 | \$6,185 | \$6,310 | \$6,836 | \$6,540 |
|  | 2004 | \$3,081 | \$3,500 | \$4,328 | \$6,030 | \$4,571 |
| Committee Member Meeting | 2013 | \$1,324 | \$1,439 | \$1,623 | \$1,691 | \$1,602 |
|  | 2012 | \$1,348 | \$1,399 | \$1,614 | \$1,729 | \$1,594 |
|  | 2004 | \$1,081 | \$1,293 | \$1,467 | \$1,631 | \$1,366 |
| Telephone Meeting* | 2013 | \$566 | \$753 | \$898 | \$895 | \$848 |
|  | 2012 | \$1,433 | \$895 | \$863 | \$882 | \$912 |
|  | 2004 | \$620 | \$601 | \$795 | \$761 | \$696 |

$5 \%$ of boards stated that their in-person and telephone meeting fees were the same in 2013.

## Director Share Ownership



## Key Findings

We are beginning to see boards require directors to hold shares for a period of time after they terminate their board membership.

82\% of companies had a shareholding guideline for directors in 2013.
The most common way to define mandatory shareholding limits are as a dollar value, either explicitly or as a multiple of the value of the director retainer. With some minor fluctuations over the years, both of these methods have increased in popularity to a combined 90\% in 2013, from a combined 70\% in 2004.

The practice of setting share ownership guidelines with a specific number of shares has declined from $28 \%$ in 2004 down to $9 \%$ in 2013. Half of the companies that use this approach are Large companies and $30 \%$ are Medium companies.

## Director Shareholding

- In 2013, 96\% of directors owned and/or controlled shares in the companies on whose boards they sit. This category has fluctuated between $94 \%$ and $96 \%$ for the last six years, before which it rose steadily from $87 \%$ in 2002.
- Of those directors that did not own and/or control shares in 2013, 44\% had been on their boards for less than one year.

Percentage of Directors Who Own and/or Control Shares Or Share Equivalents in the Companies on Whose Boards They Sit

|  | Micro | Small | Medium | Large | ALL |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | <500M | 500M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B |  |
| 2013 | 88\% | 92\% | 96\% | 98\% | 96\% |
| 2012 | 90\% | 91\% | 97\% | 97\% | 96\% |
| 2004 | 82\% | 88\% | 93\% | 96\% | 90\% |

## Director Shareholding Guidelines

- When director compensation includes a mandatory portion in deferred share units that must be held as long as the director remains on the board, we consider this to be an implicit director shareholding guideline.

boards with an explicit shareholding guideline
- In 2012, the percentage of boards with an explicit shareholding guideline increased to $76 \%$ from $74 \%$ in 2012 , and up from $45 \%$ in 2004 . If we include implicit shareholding guidelines as well, $82 \%$ of companies had a guideline in 2013. These are the highest levels of shareholding guidelines we have seen since we began tracking this information.
- The bigger the company, the more likely the board is to have a shareholding guideline, either implicit or explicit. In 2013, 96\% of Large companies required directors to hold shares, compared to $57 \%$ of Micro companies. However, the lack of a guideline is not preventing many directors at smaller boards from holding shares - 88\% of directors at Micro companies own shares in the company.
- Some companies are beginning to implement a requirement that directors hold their shares for a certain amount of time after retiring from the board:
* Argonaut Gold Inc. requires that all shares issued during the course of being a director must be held for at least two years or six months after the director leaves the Board, whichever is sooner.
* BMTC Group Inc. requires directors to hold their shares for two years after retirement from the Board.
* Transforce Inc. directors must hold at least $50 \%$ of their shares for a period of six months following the termination of service as a director.
* Canadian Pacific Railway Limited implemented a policy for 2014 that requires directors to hold shares for one year after retirement.
- In the United States, $85 \%$ of the Top 200 companies have some form of shareholding guideline. ${ }^{29}$

Percentage of Boards with a Director Shareholding Guideline

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Specified guideline only | $76 \%$ | $74 \%$ | $45 \%$ |
| Including mandatory deferred share units that must <br> be held until the director leaves the board | $82 \%$ | $79 \%$ | $53 \%$ |

Percentage of Boards with a Director Shareholding Guideline, by Asset Size

|  |  | Micro |  | Medium | Large |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | <500M | 500 M to 1B | $1 B$ to 5B | >5B | ALL |
| Specified guideline only | 2013 | 46\% | 52\% | 74\% | 95\% | 76\% |
|  | 2012 | 38\% | 47\% | 80\% | 92\% | 74\% |
|  | 2004 | 9\% | 38\% | 64\% | 76\% | 45\% |
| Including mandatory deferred share units that must be held until the director leaves the board | 2013 | 57\% | 62\% | 82\% | 96\% | 82\% |
|  | 2012 | 44\% | 53\% | 85\% | 96\% | 79\% |
|  | 2004 | 16\% | 44\% | 72\% | 85\% | 53\% |

## Value of Shareholding Guidelines

- The most common way to define mandatory shareholding limits are as a dollar value, either explicitly or as a multiple of the value of the director retainer. With some minor fluctuations over the years, both of these methods have increased in popularity to a combined $90 \%$ in 2013, from a combined 70\% in 2004.
- The practice of setting share ownership guidelines with a specific number of shares has declined from $28 \%$ in 2004 down to $9 \%$ in 2013. Half of the companies that use this approach are Large companies and $30 \%$ are Medium companies.
- In the United States, a multiple of the director retainer is the most prevalent form of share ownership guideline, with $64 \%$ of the Top 200 companies using this format. However, practices in the United States differ from those in Canada in that the second most common format is based on a number of shares (16\% of the Top 200 companies, compared to $9 \%$ in Canada), and a specific dollar value is the basis of only $9 \%$ of guidelines at Top 200 companies, compared to 14\% in Canada. ${ }^{30}$
- The overall share ownership guidelines value continues to increase. In 2013, the median shareholding guideline value was $\$ 266,600$, compared to $\$ 232,500$ in 2012 and $\$ 150,000$ in 2004.

Types of Director Share Ownership Guidelines, Shown as a Percentage of all Companies With a Specific Director Share Ownership Guideline

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Dollar Value Equal to a multiple of the annual director retainer | $\mathbf{7 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{7 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{4 8 \%}$ |
| Specific dollar value | $\mathbf{1 4 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 2 \%}$ |
| Specific number of shares or share units | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 0 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 8 \%}$ |
| Highest of two of the variables listed above | $\mathbf{< 1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ |
| Multiple of annual retainer plus another item | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{0}$ |

## Breakdown of Director Shareholding Guidelines Stated as a Dollar Value Equal to a Multiple of the Annual Director Retainer

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Equal to the retainer value | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $4 \%$ | $3 \%$ |
| Two times the retainer value | $\mathbf{8 \%}$ | $10 \%$ | $6 \%$ |
| Two and a half times the retainer value | $\mathbf{0}$ | $1 \%$ | 0 |
| Three times the retainer value | $\mathbf{6 6 \%}$ | $58 \%$ | $41 \%$ |
| Four times the retainer value | $\mathbf{6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{8 \%}$ | $\mathbf{9 \%}$ |
| Five times the retainer value | $\mathbf{1 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 5 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 4 \%}$ |
| Six times the retainer value | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ | $5 \%$ |
| Eight times the retainer value | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{1 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 \%}$ |

[^15]
## Value* of Director Share Ownership Guidelines

|  | 2013 | 2012 | 2004 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Average value | $\mathbf{\$ 3 1 2 , 8 4 9}$ | $\$ 283,819$ | $\$ 172,277$ |
| Median value | $\mathbf{\$ 2 6 6 , 6 0 0}$ | $\$ 232,500$ | $\$ 150,000$ |
| Range of values | $\mathbf{\$ 3 6 , 8 8 0}$ to $\mathbf{\$ 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0}$ | $\$ 16,860$ to $\$ 2,000,000$ | $\$ 30,000$ to $\$ 625,800$ |

* Where a guideline specified a number of shares or share units, a value was calculated based on the fiscal year-end closing price of the share. If a company had more than one class of share and did not specify one class in the shareholding guideline, the calculation was based on the class of share with the lower year-end closing price. Where a guideline specified a value equal to a multiple of the annual retainer, the value was calculated using the retainer amount for 2013.


## Company Data

The following pages contain data collected from annual reports, management proxy circulars and annual information forms regarding fiscal year-ends in late 2013 and early 2014. It is in alphabetical order by company name.

Any additional explanation required for entries is detailed in the Company Data Endnotes on pages 102 to 104.

Stock compensation is an increasingly important part of director compensation. It is represented in the Appendix as follows:

- Req'd: " $X$ " in this column indicates that directors must take all or some of their compensation in either shares or share equivalents.
- Elect: " $X$ " in this column indicates that directors can elect to take all or some of their cash compensation in the form of shares or share equivalents.
- Options: Values of stock options are not stated, however we do indicate which companies granted stock options to directors in fiscal 2013.

| Company Name | Trust | Assets (000's) | *Board Leadership | Number of Directors | Number of Independent Directors | Number of Female Directors | Average Term Served (years) | **Director <br> Shareholding Guideline? | NonExecutive Chair Retainer | Board Retainer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Advantage Oil and Gas Ltd. |  | 1,765,244 | IC | 5 | 4 | 0 | 9 |  | 200,000 | 100,000 |
| Aecon Group Inc. |  | 1,993,586 | CC, LD | 9 | 8 | 1 | 12 | Yes |  | 75,000 |
| AGF Management Limited |  | 1,617,873 | CC, LD | 8 | 5 | 1 | 13 | Yes |  | 60,000 |
| Agnico-Eagle Mines Limited |  | 5,108,140 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 12 | 11 | 2 | 10 | Yes | 500,330 ${ }^{25}$ | 275,630 ${ }^{25}$ |
| Agrium Inc. |  | 16,456,310 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 13 | 11 | 2 | 7 | Yes | 375,950 ${ }^{1}$ | 185,400 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Aimia Inc. |  | 5,338,596 | IC | 10 | 9 | 2 | 6 | Yes | $326,920{ }^{24}$ | 74,524 ${ }^{24}$ |
| Air Canada |  | 9,470,000 | IC | 10 | 9 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 350,000 | 150,000 |
| Alacer Gold Corp. |  | 733,520 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 4 | 2 | 0 | 4 | Yes | 309,000 | 149,350 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Alamos Gold Inc. |  | 924,969 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 275,868 | 167,639 |
| Alaris Royalty Corp. |  | 480,729 | IC | 6 | 5 | 1 | 5 | Yes | $158,938{ }^{69}$ | 127,150 ${ }^{69}$ |
| Algonquin Power \& Utilities Corp. |  | 3,472,557 | IC | 6 | 3 | 0 | 4 | Yes | 150,000 | 60,000 |
| Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. |  | 10,861,350 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 10 | 6 | 2 | 14 | Yes | 229,500 | 75,000 |
| Allied Properties Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 3,500,609 | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 8 | Yes | 74,993 ${ }^{66}$ | 52,497 ${ }^{66}$ |
| AltaGas Ltd. |  | 7,281,303 | CC, LD | 9 | 8 | 1 | 7 | Yes |  | $147,864{ }^{16}$ |
| ARC Resources Ltd. |  | 5,736,000 | IC | 10 | 8 | 1 | 7 | Yes | 386,296 | $148,815^{30}$ |
| Argonaut Gold Inc. |  | 970,784 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 3 | Yes | 128,838 ${ }^{1}$ | 60,124 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Artis Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 5,042,037 | IC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 7 | Yes | 110,000 | 50,000 |
| ATCO Ltd. |  | 16,010,000 | NIC, LD | 10 | 6 | 2 | 13 | Yes |  | 165,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Athabasca Oil Corporation |  | 4,342,325 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 6 |  |  | 35,000 |
| Atlantic Power Corporation |  | 3,496,850 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 6 | 5 | 1 | 7 | Yes | $97,850{ }^{1,84}$ | 61,800 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Atlatsa Resources Corporation |  | 773,629 | NIC, LD | 6 | 4 | 3 | 6 |  |  | 45,000 |
| ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc. |  | 778,384 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 165,000 | $120,000{ }^{4}$ |
| AuRico Gold Inc. |  | 2,536,280 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 3 | Yes | $340,000{ }^{83}$ | $170,000^{83}$ |
| Avigilon Corporation |  | 188,939 | CC, LD | 6 | 4 | 0 | 5 |  |  |  |
| B2Gold Corp. |  | 2,379,018 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 4 |  | 125,000 | 40,000 |
| Badger Daylighting Ltd. |  | 333,898 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 11 | Yes | 78,000 | 58,000 |
| Bank of Montreal |  | 537,299,000 | IC | 13 | 12 | 4 | 7 | Yes | 350,000 | 175,000 ${ }^{111}$ |
| Bank of Nova Scotia |  | 743,788,000 | IC | 15 | 13 | 4 | 9 | Yes | 350,000 | 120,000 |
| Bankers Petroleum Ltd. |  | 1,037,362 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 7 |  | 115,000 | 80,000 |
| Banro Corporation |  | 846,694 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 9 |  |  | 36,050 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Barrick Gold Corporation |  | 38,571,440 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 11 | 5 | 1 | 14 | Yes |  | 206,000 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Baytex Energy Corp. |  | 2,698,334 | NIC, LD | 9 | 7 | 1 | 9 | Yes |  | 139,892 |
| BCE Inc. |  | 45,384,000 | IC | 15 | 14 | 2 | 5 | Yes | 362,375 | $175,000{ }^{43}$ |
| Bell Aliant Inc. |  | 3,386,200 | NIC, LD | 9 | 3 | 2 | 7 | Yes |  | 145,000 |
| Bellatrix Exploration Ltd. |  | 1,555,180 | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 8 | Yes | 230,000 ${ }^{74}$ | $140,000{ }^{74}$ |
| Birchcliff Energy Ltd. |  | 1,586,531 | IC | 4 | 3 | 0 | 7 |  |  | 70,000 |
| Black Diamond Group Limited |  | 674,863 | NIC, LD | 7 | 4 | 0 | 4 |  |  | 35,000 |
| Blackberry Limited |  | 7,778,560 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 7 | 6 | 2 | 1 | Yes |  | 200,000 |
| Blackpearl Resources Inc. |  | 652,216 | IC | 5 | 4 | 0 | 5 | Yes |  | 40,000 |
| BMTC Group Inc. |  | 306,296 | CC, LD | 9 | 4 | 1 | 15 | Yes |  | 75,000 |
| Boardwalk Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 5,925,683 | CC, LD | 6 | 5 | 1 | 8 | Yes |  | 25,000 ${ }^{98}$ |
| Bombardier Inc. |  | 30,243,890 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 15 | 10 | 3 | 13 | Yes | 618,000 ${ }^{1}$ | 154,500 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Bonavista Energy Corporation |  | 4,235,626 | NIC, LD | 10 | 7 | 2 | 10 | Yes |  | 262,000 ${ }^{72}$ |
| Bonterra Energy Corp. |  | 1,000,531 | CC | 6 | 4 | 0 | 16 |  |  | $11,000^{73}$ |
| Brookfield Asset Management Inc. |  | 116,127,000 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 16 | 11 | 2 | 11 | Yes | 425,187 ${ }^{1}$ | 154,500 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Brookfield Canada Office Properties | X | 5,608,800 | NIC | 7 | 4 | 1 | 2 |  |  | 103,000 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Brookfield Office Properties Inc. |  | 31,817,730 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 11 | 6 | 0 | 6 | Yes |  | 103,000 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Brookfield Residential Properties Inc. |  | 3,444,074 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 6 | 1 | 2 | Yes | 154,432 | 77,216 |
| BRP Inc. |  | 1,951,200 | NIC | 13 | 6 | 1 | 6 | Yes |  | 112,500 ${ }^{4}$ |
| CAE Inc. |  | 4,236,700 | IC | 10 | 9 | 2 | 6 | Yes | 285,000 | 130,000 |
| Calfrac Well Services Ltd. |  | 1,869,931 | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 7 | Yes | 392,100 | 141,050 |
| Calloway Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 7,071,332 |  | 7 | 4 | 0 | 7 | Yes |  | $35,000{ }^{42}$ |
| Cameco Corporation |  | 8,039,317 | IC | 12 | 10 | 2 | 9 | Yes | 340,000 | $140,000{ }^{4}$ |
| Canadian Apartment Properties Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 5,558,934 | IC,LD | 8 | 7 | 1 | 9 | Yes | $75,000^{90}$ | $55,000^{90}$ |
| Canadian Energy Services \& Technology Corp. |  | 807,319 | IC | 9 | 6 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 135,005 ${ }^{64}$ | 120,005 ${ }^{64}$ |
| Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce |  | 398,389,000 | IC | 16 | 15 | 4 | 7 | Yes | 375,000 | 110,000 |
| Canadian National Railway Company |  | 30,163,000 | IC | 13 | 12 | 2 | 12 | Yes | 474,615 ${ }^{1}$ | 190,958 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Canadian Natural Resources Limited |  | 51,754,000 | NIC, LD | 12 | 9 | 1 | 10 | Yes |  | 183,227 |
| Canadian Oil Sands Limited |  | 10,190,000 | IC | 11 | 10 | 1 | 8 | Yes | 345,500 | 155,000 |
| Canadian Pacific Railway Limited |  | 17,060,000 | IC | 14 | 13 | 4 | 2 | Yes | $350,000{ }^{114}$ | 200,000 ${ }^{4,114}$ |

CC = combined CEO/Chair, IC = Independent Chair, NIC = Non-Executive, Non-Independent Chair, EC = Executive Chair, LD = Lead Director (if blank, there is no Board Chair or Lead Director)
** Includes guidelines to hold any type of shares or share units. Non-bold are specific guidelines. Bold are implicit shareholding policies where directors receive a mandatory portion of their compensation in share units, and those share units must be held as long as the directors is a member of that board.

All amounts include cash and the value of shares and/or share units.


| Company Name | Trust | Assets (000's) | *Board Leadership | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Number } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Directors } \end{aligned}$ | ```Number of Independent Directors``` | Number of Female Directors | Average Term Served (years) | **Director Shareholding Guideline? | NonExecutive Chair Retainer | Board Retainer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Canadian Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 3,717,242 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 6 | Yes | $102,000{ }^{53}$ | 50,000 ${ }^{53}$ |
| Canadian Tire Corporation, Limited |  | 13,630,000 | IC | 16 | 12 | 2 | 9 | Yes | 344,000 | 120,000 |
| Canadian Utilities Limited |  | 15,051,000 | CC, LD | 13 | 9 | 4 | 11 | Yes |  | 165,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Canadian Western Bank |  | 18,520,260 | IC | 14 | 13 | 2 | 12 | Yes | 180,000 | 80,000 |
| Canexus Corporation |  | 1,148,925 | IC | 7 | 6 | 1 | 6 | Yes | 189,500 | 96,600 |
| Canfor Corporation |  | 2,693,300 | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 13 | Yes | 225,000 | 75,000 |
| Capital Power Corporation |  | 5,219,000 | IC | 11 | 9 | 1 | 3 | Yes | 285,000 | 115,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Capstone Mining Corp. |  | 1,964,707 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 7 | 1 | 5 | Yes | 250,000 | $150,000{ }^{91}$ |
| Cascades Inc. |  | 3,831,000 | NIC, LD | 12 | 8 | 3 | 19 | Yes |  | 53,589 |
| Catamaran Corporation |  | 8,235,635 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 9 | 8 | 2 | 3 | Yes |  | 264,968 ${ }^{1,27}$ |
| CCL Industries Inc. |  | 2,401,648 | NIC, LD | 9 | 6 | 0 | 11 | Yes |  | 84,442 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Celestica Inc. |  | 2,718,067 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 7 | 2 | 5 | Yes | 319,300 ${ }^{1}$ | 190,550 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Cenovus Energy Inc. |  | 25,224,000 | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 499,675 | 279,675 |
| Centerra Gold Inc. |  | 1,738,294 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 11 | 6 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 310,000 | 140,000 |
| CGI Group Inc. |  | 10,879,272 | NIC, LD | 14 | 10 | 2 | 12 | Yes |  | 90,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Chartwell Retirement Residences | X | 2,837,962 | IC | 8 | 7 | 2 | 8 | Yes | $92,008^{51}$ | 44,508 ${ }^{51}$ |
| China Gold International Resources Corp. Ltd. |  | 2,285,056 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 9 | 4 | 0 | 5 |  |  | 36,000 |
| Chorus Aviation Inc. |  | 976,925 | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 5 | Yes | $150,000{ }^{50}$ | 95,000 ${ }^{50}$ |
| CI Financial Corp. |  | 3,093,969 | NIC, LD | 12 | 10 | 1 | 10 | Yes |  | 92,500 |
| Cineplex Inc. |  | 1,591,378 | IC | 10 | 9 | 2 | 4 | Yes | 110,000 | 70,000 |
| Clarke Inc. |  | 298,387 | IC | 5 | 4 | 0 | 4 |  | 30,000 | 25,000 |
| Cogeco Cable Inc. |  | 5,253,097 | IC | 8 | 7 | 2 | 11 | Yes | 112,500 | $40,000{ }^{9}$ |
| COGECO Inc. |  | 5,452,513 | IC | 8 | 7 | 2 | 11 | Yes | 112,500 | $40,000{ }^{128}$ |
| Colabor Group Inc. |  | 467,800 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 2 |  | 60,000 | 30,000 |
| Cominar Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 5,997,330 | IC | 9 | 7 | 3 | 9 | Yes | 85,000 | 30,000 |
| Constellation Software Inc. |  | 1,583,835 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 8 | 5 | 0 | 6 | Yes |  | 61,800 1,88 |
| Corsa Coal Corp. |  | 208,806 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 |  |  | $15,450{ }^{1}$ |
| Corus Entertainment Inc. |  | 2,192,600 | NIC, LD | 10 | 7 | 5 | 11 | Yes |  | $65,000{ }^{13,14}$ |
| Cott Corporation |  | 1,468,883 ${ }^{1}$ | IC,LD | 11 | 10 | 1 | 7 | Yes | 269,860 ${ }^{1}$ | $166,860{ }^{1,4}$ |
| Crescent Point Energy Corp. |  | 12,736,793 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 10 | Yes | 384,966 ${ }^{33}$ | 269,969 ${ }^{33}$ |
| Crew Energy Inc. |  | 1,843,027 | IC | 5 | 4 | 0 | 8 | Yes | $52,166^{87}$ | $40,534{ }^{87}$ |
| Crombie Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 3,345,165 | NIC, LD | 12 | 8 | 1 | 6 | Yes | 85,000 | 52,500 |
| Davis + Henderson Corporation |  | 2,913,817 | IC | 7 | 6 | 2 | 8 | Yes | 147,100 | 82,275 ${ }^{110}$ |
| Descartes Systems Group Inc., The |  | 354,811 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 6 | 6 | 0 | 6 | Yes | 118,450 ${ }^{1}$ | 87,550 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Detour Gold Corporation |  | 2,554,678 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 9 | 7 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 275,000 | $100,000{ }^{107}$ |
| Dollarama Inc. |  | 1,566,780 | CC, LD | 9 | 6 | 0 | 6 | Yes |  | 50,000 |
| Dominion Diamond Corporation |  | 2,373,790 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 7 | 6 | 1 | 5 | Yes |  | 80,000 |
| Dorel Industries Inc. |  | 2,513,162 ${ }^{1}$ | LD | 9 | 5 | 1 | 17 | Yes |  | 85,000 |
| DREAM Unlimited Corp. |  | 1,095,578 | IC | 7 | 6 | 1 | 0 |  | 291,667 | 20,417 |
| Dundee Corporation |  | 3,005,896 | NIC, LD | 15 | 8 | 0 | 10 | Yes | $500,000{ }^{95}$ | 65,000 |
| Dundee Industrial Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 1,589,805 | IC | 8 | 7 | 2 | 1 | Yes | 191,100 | 91,660 |
| Dundee International Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 2,558,674 | IC | 8 | 5 | 1 | 2 | Yes | 188,320 | 91,240 |
| Dundee Precious Metals Inc. |  | 1,017,416 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 13 | 9 | 1 | 11 | Yes |  | 120,000 |
| Dundee Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 7,124,943 | NIC, LD | 10 | 7 | 1 | 10 | Yes | $307,700{ }^{94}$ | 147,620 ${ }^{94}$ |
| E-L Financial Corporation Limited |  | 15,885,492 | CC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 11 |  |  | 21,320 |
| Eldorado Gold Corporation |  | 7,452,300 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 8 | Yes | 305,000 | 210,000 |
| Element Financial Corporation |  | 3,454,653 | CC, LD | 9 | 7 | 0 | 2 | Yes |  | 90,000 |
| Emera Inc. |  | 8,876,800 | IC | 11 | 10 | 4 | 5 | Yes | 220,000 | 75,000 |
| Empire Company Limited |  | 12,238,000 | IC | 17 | 10 | 3 | 15 | Yes | 300,000 | 90,000 |
| Enbridge Inc. |  | 57,568,000 | IC | 12 | 11 | 2 | 9 | Yes | 495,000 ${ }^{4}$ | 235,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Enbridge Income Fund Holdings Inc. |  | 1,346,926 | IC | 6 | 5 | 1 | 3 |  | 95,000 ${ }^{92}$ | 65,000 ${ }^{92}$ |
| EnCana Corporation |  | 18,177,440 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 10 | 9 | 3 | 6 | Yes | 446,600 | 226,600 |
| Endeavour Silver Corp. |  | 356,2361 | IC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 7 | Yes | 50,000 | 30,000 |
| Enerflex Ltd. |  | 1,416,079 | IC | 8 | 7 | 1 | 2 | Yes | 240,000 | 110,000 |
| Enerplus Corporation |  | 3,681,799 | IC | 12 | 11 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 270,000 ${ }^{34}$ | $157,500{ }^{34}$ |
| Ensign Energy Services Inc. |  | 3,387,678 | NIC, LD | 9 | 6 | 1 | 16 | Yes |  | 130,000 |
| Equitable Group Inc. |  | 11,816,453 | IC | 11 | 10 | 3 | 5 | Yes | 87,500 | 50,000 |
| Evertz Technologies Limited |  | 401,280 | NIC | 5 | 3 | 0 | 11 |  |  | 20,000 |
| Extendicare Inc. |  | 1,849,088 | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 14 | Yes | 135,000 | 35,000 |
| Fairfax Financial Holdings Limited |  | 37,037,564 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 7 | 6 | 0 | 9 | Yes |  | 75,000 |
| Finning International Inc. |  | 5,057,568 | IC | 11 | 10 | 1 | 6 | Yes | 325,000 | 130,000 |

[^16]Includes guidelines to hold any type of shares or share units. Non-bold are specific guidelines. Bold are implicit shareholding policies where directors receive a mandatory portion of their compensation in share units, and those share units must be held as long as the directors is a member of that board.

All amounts include cash and the value of shares and/or share units.


| Company Name | Trust | Assets (000's) | *Board Leadership | $\begin{gathered} \text { Number } \\ \text { of } \\ \text { Directors } \end{gathered}$ |  |  | Average Term Served (years) | **Director Shareholding Guideline? | Non- <br> Executive Chair Retainer | Board Retainer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| First Capital Realty Inc. |  | 7,596,255 | NIC, LD | 9 | 7 | 2 | 10 | Yes |  | 72,780 |
| First Majestic Silver Corp. |  | 880,600 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 11 | Yes | 220,000 ${ }^{46}$ | 130,000 ${ }^{46}$ |
| First National Financial Corporation |  | 20,569,217 | CC | 7 | 5 | 1 | 6 |  |  | 25,000 |
| First Quantum Minerals Ltd. |  | 15,935,336 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 9 | 6 | 0 | 9 | Yes |  | 144,200 ${ }^{1}$ |
| FirstService Corporation |  | 1,486,816 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 15 | Yes | 127,500 ${ }^{18}$ | $75,000^{18}$ |
| Fortis Inc. |  | 17,908,000 | IC | 10 | 9 | 1 | 8 | Yes | 290,000 | 145,000 |
| Fortress Paper Ltd. |  | 581,844 | CC, LD | 5 | 4 | 0 | 4 | Yes |  | 42,000 |
| Fortuna Silver Mines Inc. |  | 311,2811 | NIC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 6 | Yes | 164,843 ${ }^{1}$ | 118,493 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Franco-Nevada Corporation |  | 3,136,247 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 90,000 | 45,000 |
| Freehold Royalties Ltd. |  | 427,865 | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 9 | Yes | 110,000 | 70,000 |
| Gabriel Resources Ltd. |  | 658,308 | IC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 4 |  | 110,000 | 60,000 |
| Genivar Inc. |  | 1,859,900 | NIC, LD | 7 | 5 | 1 | 4 |  | 161,220 | 95,000 |
| Genworth MI Canada Inc. |  | 5,691,187 | CC, LD | 9 | 4 | 0 | 3 | Yes |  | 65,500 |
| George Weston Limited |  | 24,622,000 | NIC, LD | 12 | 8 | 2 | 10 | Yes |  | 100,000 |
| Gibson Energy Inc. |  | 3,049,382 | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 2 | Yes | 67,500 ${ }^{52}$ | $57,500^{52}$ |
| Gildan Activewear Inc. |  | 2,105,011 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 10 | Yes | 283,250 ${ }^{1}$ | 144,200 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Gluskin Sheff + Associates Inc. |  | 129,706 | NIC, LD | 9 | 6 | 0 | 12 | Yes |  | 50,000 |
| Goldcorp Inc. |  | 30,450,920 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 10 | 8 | 2 | 6 | Yes | 1,103,180 ${ }^{115}$ | 206,180 ${ }^{1,115}$ |
| Granite Real Estate Investment Trust | x | 2,468,633 | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 2 | Yes | 300,000 | 125,000 |
| Great Canadian Gaming Corporation |  | 915,700 | IC | 9 | 7 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 187,500 | 100,000 |
| Great-West Lifeco Inc. |  | 325,905,000 | NIC | 19 | 9 | 2 | 8 | Yes | 200,000 | 100,000 |
| H\&R Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 13,583,027 | IC | 5 | 4 | 0 | 16 | Yes | 67,500 | 45,000 |
| Harvest Operations Corp. |  | 5,289,900 | NIC | 8 | 3 | 0 | 1 |  |  | $32,000{ }^{126}$ |
| Heroux-Devtek Inc. |  | 513,967 | IC | 7 | 6 | 1 | 11 | Yes | 60,508 | $42,258{ }^{135}$ |
| Home Capital Group Inc. |  | 20,075,850 | IC | 10 | 9 | 3 | 10 | Yes | 170,000 | 90,000 |
| Horizon North Logistics Inc. |  | 471,115 | IC | 8 | 6 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 64,000 | 54,000 |
| HudBay Minerals Inc. |  | 3,843,986 | IC | 10 | 8 | 1 | 3 | Yes | 335,000 | 100,000 |
| Hudson's Bay Company |  | 7,927,000 | CC, LD | 9 | 5 | 1 | 2 | Yes |  | 140,000 |
| Husky Energy Inc. |  | 36,904,000 | NIC | 15 | 9 | 2 | 9 | Yes |  | 120,000 |
| lamgold Corporation |  | 4,316,112 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 10 | 9 | 0 | 9 | Yes | 325,000 | 138,670 |
| IGM Financial Inc. |  | 12,880,169 | NIC | 17 | 7 | 1 | 12 | Yes | 175,000 | 75,000 |
| IMAX Corporation |  | 495,579 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC | 10 | 8 | 0 | 10 | Yes | 396,555 ${ }^{1,137}$ | 180,238 ${ }^{1,137}$ |
| Imperial Oil Limited |  | 37,218,000 | CC | 7 | 5 | 2 | 6 | Yes |  | 201,780 ${ }^{19}$ |
| Industrial Alliance Insurance and Financial Services Inc. |  | 44,030,000 | IC | 14 | 13 | 3 | 11 | Yes | 200,000 | 45,000 |
| Information Services Corporation |  | 108,101 | IC | 9 | 9 | 1 | 1 |  | 50,000 | 25,000 |
| Innergex Renewable Energy Inc. |  | 2,377,074 | IC | 7 | 6 | 1 | 10 | Yes | 129,000 | 43,000 |
| Intact Financial Corporation |  | 19,774,000 | IC | 11 | 10 | 4 | 8 | Yes | 275,000 | 90,000 |
| Inter Pipeline Ltd. |  | 7,657,700 | NIC, LD | 7 | 5 | 0 | 7 | Yes |  | 125,000 ${ }^{41}$ |
| InterOil Corporation |  | 1,344,972 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 397,580 ${ }^{1,103,104}$ | 257,500 ${ }^{1,03}$ |
| Intertape Polymer Group Inc. |  | 479,155 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 0 | 4 | Yes | 92,700 ${ }^{1}$ | 30,900 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Ithaca Energy Inc. |  | 2,038,048 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 5 |  | 104,735 | 96,679 ${ }^{\text {100,010 }}$ |
| Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. |  | 1,164,600 | NIC | 13 | 7 | 6 | 18 | Yes | 429,434 | 50,000 |
| Just Energy Group Inc. |  | 1,642,650 | NIC, LD | 10 | 7 | 1 | 6 | Yes |  | 65,000 |
| Keyera Corp. |  | 3,051,065 | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 7 | Yes | 330,000 | 115,000 |
| Kinross Gold Corporation |  | 10,595,301 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 12 | 11 | 3 | 8 | Yes | 445,000 | 210,000 |
| Kirkland Lake Gold Inc. |  | 409,385 | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 2 | 5 |  |  | 24,000 |
| Labrador Iron Ore Royalty Corporation |  | 775,632 | IC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 13 |  | 50,000 | 25,000 |
| Lassonde Industries Inc. |  | 796,849 | CC | 9 | 5 | 2 | 14 |  |  | 30,000 |
| Laurentian Bank of Canada |  | 33,925,680 | IC | 13 | 12 | 5 | 6 | Yes | 200,000 | 85,000 |
| Legacy Oil + Gas Inc. |  | 2,708,276 | IC | 6 | 4 | 0 | 4 |  |  |  |
| Leon's Furniture Limited |  | 1,682,174 | NIC | 8 | 5 | 1 | 19 |  |  |  |
| Lightstream Resources Ltd. |  | 5,139,302 | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 4 | Yes | $80,000^{56}$ | 50,000 ${ }^{56}$ |
| Linamar Corporation |  | 2,629,091 | NIC | 5 | 2 | 1 | 22 | Yes |  | 31,500 |
| Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. |  | 2,937,1811 | IC | 12 | 10 | 1 | 10 | Yes | $156,5600^{1,132}$ | 103,000 ${ }^{1,132}$ |
| Loblaw Companies Limited |  | 20,759,000 | NIC, LD | 14 | 10 | 2 | 6 | Yes |  | 100,000 |
| Lucara Diamond Corp. |  | 254,604 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 6 | 4 | 1 | 5 | Yes | 35,000 | 30,000 |
| Lundin Mining Corporation |  | 4,564,970 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 8 | 6 | 0 | 10 |  | 200,000 | 90,000 |
| MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. |  | 2,584,207 | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 10 | Yes | 191,250 | 85,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Magellan Aerospace Corporation |  | 791,910 | NIC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 17 |  |  | 66,000 |
| Magna International Inc. |  | 18,529,700 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 515,000 ${ }^{1}$ | 154,500 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Mainstreet Equity Corp. |  | 1,164,441 |  | 6 | 3 | 0 | 9 |  |  | 25,000 |

[^17]EC = Executive Chair, LD = Lead Director (if blank, there is no Board Chair or Lead Director)

[^18]All amounts include cash and the value of shares and/or share units.


[^19]| Company Name | Trust | Assets (000's) | *Board Leadership | Number of Directors | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Number } \\ & \text { of } \\ & \text { Independent } \\ & \text { Directors } \end{aligned}$ | Number of Female Directors | Average Term Served (years) | **Director Shareholding Guideline? | NonExecutive Chair Retainer | Board Retainer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Major Drilling Group International Inc. |  | 591,724 | IC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 8 | Yes | 135,000 | 45,000 |
| Manitoba Telecom Services Inc. |  | 2,682,400 | IC | 10 | 9 | 3 | 10 | Yes | 275,000 ${ }^{49}$ | 120,000 ${ }^{49}$ |
| Manulife Financial Corporation |  | 513,628,000 | IC | 16 | 15 | 5 | 5 | Yes | 350,000 | 110,000 |
| Maple Leaf Foods Inc. |  | 3,599,092 | IC | 10 | 8 | 1 | 8 | Yes | 240,000 | 120,000 |
| Martinrea International Inc. |  | 1,924,831 | NIC, LD | 6 | 4 | 0 | 10 | Yes |  | 75,000 |
| MEG Energy Corp. |  | 9,447,741 | CC, LD | 8 | 6 | 0 | 8 | Yes |  | $170,046{ }^{58}$ |
| Melcor Developments Ltd. |  | 1,727,933 | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 1 | 19 |  |  | 20,000 |
| Methanex Corporation |  | 4,236,899 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 11 | 9 | 2 | 8 | Yes | 327,255 ${ }^{26}$ | 158,170 ${ }^{26}$ |
| Metro Inc. |  | 5,061,500 | NIC, LD | 14 | 11 | 2 | 10 | Yes | 317,952 | 65,000 |
| Morguard Corporation |  | 5,452,995 | CC, LD | 6 | 4 | 0 | 10 | Yes |  | 25,000 |
| Morguard Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 2,942,799 | NIC | 7 | 4 | 0 | 10 |  | 60,000 | 22,000 |
| Mullen Group Ltd. |  | 1,587,609 | CC, LD | 7 | 4 | 0 | 10 |  |  | 50,000 |
| National Bank of Canada |  | 188,204,000 | IC | 16 | 14 | 4 | 8 | Yes | 290,000 | 90,000 |
| Nevsun Resources Ltd. |  | 896,986 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 5 | 4 | 0 | 14 | Yes | 220,169 | 184,142 |
| New Gold Inc. |  | 4,324,970 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 0 | 4 | Yes |  | 100,000 |
| Niko Resources Ltd. |  | 1,014,129 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 6 | Yes | 96,777 | 50,000 |
| Norbord Inc. |  | 1,299,860 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 10 | 9 | 1 | 12 | Yes | 115,000 | 55,000 |
| Nordion Inc. |  | 635,562 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 4 | Yes | 250,000 | 90,000 |
| North American Energy Partners Inc. |  | 445,641 | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 6 | Yes | 165,000 | 110,000 |
| North West Company Inc., The |  | 670,512 | IC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 6 | Yes | 200,000 | 75,000 |
| Northern Property Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 1,516,822 | IC | 7 | 6 | 1 | 9 | Yes | 60,000 | 35,000 |
| Northland Power Inc. |  | 3,040,020 | NIC, LD | 6 | 4 | 2 | 5 |  | 250,000 | 30,000 |
| NovaGold Resources Inc. |  | 596,046 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 11 | 7 | 1 | 7 | Yes | 70,658 ${ }^{1}$ | 34,608 ${ }^{1}$ |
| NuVista Energy Ltd. |  | 905,711 | IC,LD | 8 | 7 | 0 | 6 | Yes |  | 40,000 |
| OceanaGold Corporation |  | 923,731 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 7 | 4 | 0 | 4 |  | 184,555 ${ }^{1}$ | 92,372 ${ }^{1,61}$ |
| Onex Corporation |  | 37,973,010 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 10 | 7 | 1 | 16 | Yes |  | 247,200 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Open Text Corporation |  | 4,036,197 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 9 | 6 | 3 | 10 | Yes |  | 211,186 ${ }^{1,122}$ |
| Pacific Rubiales Energy Corp. |  | 11,546,176 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 12 | 8 | 0 | 4 | Yes |  | 540,005 ${ }^{1,121}$ |
| Pan American Silver Corp. |  | 2,850,480 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 7 | Yes | $120,000{ }^{59}$ | 90,000 |
| Paramount Resources Ltd. |  | 2,447,803 | CC, LD | 10 | 6 | 1 | 17 | Yes |  | 20,000 |
| Parkland Fuel Corporation |  | 1,262,324 | IC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 9 | Yes | 205,000 | 85,000 |
| Pason Systems Inc. |  | 445,876 | NIC, LD | 7 | 5 | 0 | 8 | Yes | 207,000 | 132,000 |
| Pembina Pipeline Corporation |  | 9,142,000 | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 6 | Yes | 235,000 ${ }^{105}$ | 120,000 ${ }^{105}$ |
| Pengrowth Energy Corporation |  | 6,633,200 | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 7 | Yes | 195,000 | 110,000 |
| Penn West Petroleum Ltd. |  | 12,644,000 | IC | 10 | 9 | 1 | 4 | Yes | 300,000 | 125,000 |
| Petroamerica Oil Corp. |  | 219,566 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC | 5 | 3 | 0 | 4 |  |  |  |
| Peyto Exploration \& Development Corp. |  | 2,555,156 | IC | 7 | 4 | 0 | 7 | Yes | 144,385 | 101,810 |
| Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan Inc. |  | 18,496,740 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 13 | 11 | 3 | 9 | Yes | 412,000 ${ }^{1}$ | 206,000 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Power Corporation of Canada |  | 345,005,000 | NIC | 11 | 7 | 2 | 12 | Yes |  | 100,000 |
| Power Financial Corporation |  | 341,711,000 | NIC | 12 | 8 | 2 | 15 | Yes |  | 100,000 |
| Precision Drilling Corporation |  | 4,579,123 | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 5 | Yes | 230,000 | 135,000 |
| Premier Gold Mines Limited |  | 408,492 | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 0 | 5 |  |  | 36,000 |
| Pretium Resources Inc. |  | 726,261 | CC, LD | 6 | 4 | 0 | 2 |  |  | 25,000 |
| Progressive Waste Solutions Ltd. |  | 3,494,347 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 6 | 5 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 255,000 | 155,000 |
| Quebecor Inc. |  | 9,016,400 | IC | 9 | 7 | 3 | 9 | Yes | 310,000 | 57,500 ${ }^{63}$ |
| Raging River Exploration Inc. |  | 550,746 | CC, LD | 5 | 4 | 0 | 2 |  |  |  |
| Reitmans (Canada) Limited |  | 589,939 | CC, LD | 9 | 7 | 0 | 16 |  |  | 50,000 |
| Richelieu Hardware Ltd. |  | 356,325 | IC | 8 | 7 | 1 | 10 | Yes | 90,000 | 36,000 |
| Rio Alto Mining Limited |  | 367,314 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 5 | 0 | 3 |  | 103,000 ${ }^{1}$ | 59,736 ${ }^{1}$ |
| RioCan Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 13,530,000 | IC | 9 | 6 | 2 | 11 | Yes | $503,836{ }^{116}$ | $149,612^{116}$ |
| Ritchie Bros. Auctioneers Inc. |  | 1,197,164 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 7 | 1 | 7 | Yes | 247,200 ${ }^{1}$ | 103,000 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Rogers Communications Inc. |  | 23,601,000 | NIC, LD | 17 | 10 | 4 | 12 | Yes | 449,000 | 145,000 |
| RONA Inc. |  | 2,342,536 | IC | 13 | 11 | 1 | 2 | Yes | 500,000 | 53,000 |
| Royal Bank of Canada |  | 860,819,000 | IC | 18 | 17 | 5 | 9 | Yes | 460,000 | 185,000 |
| Rubicon Minerals Corporation |  | 480,263 | NIC, LD | 8 | 6 | 0 | 6 |  | 125,000 | 35,000 |
| Russel Metals Inc. |  | 1,817,800 | IC | 10 | 9 | 2 | 7 | Yes | 185,000 | 80,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Saputo Inc. |  | 6,356,892 | NIC, LD | 11 | 9 | 4 | 9 | Yes | 500,000 | 166,380 |
| Savanna Energy Services Corp. |  | 1,391,602 | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 6 | Yes | 175,000 | 125,000 |
| Sears Canada Inc. |  | 2,392,300 | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 1 | 4 |  | 250,000 | 100,000 |
| Secure Energy Services Inc. |  | 1,039,725 | CC, LD | 7 | 5 | 0 | 4 | Yes |  | 81,000 |

CC = combined CEO/Chair, IC = Independent Chair, NIC = Non-Executive, Non-Independent Chair, EC = Executive Chair, LD = Lead Director (if blank, there is no Board Chair or Lead Director)
** Includes guidelines to hold any type of shares or share units. Non-bold are specific guidelines. Bold are implicit shareholding policies where directors receive a mandatory portion of their compensation in share units, and those share units must be held as long as the directors is a member of that board.

All amounts include cash and the value of shares and/or share units.


| Company Name | Trust | Assets (000's) | *Board Leadership | Number of Directors | Number of Independent Directors | Number of Female Directors | Average Term Served (years) | **Director <br> Shareholding Guideline? | NonExecutive Chair Retainer | Board Retainer |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Semafo Inc. |  | 584,572 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 7 | 5 | 0 | 5 | Yes |  | 30,000 |
| Senvest Capital Inc. |  | 1,424,147 | CC | 6 | 3 | 0 | 30 |  |  | 47,000 |
| Shaw Communications Inc. |  | 12,732,000 | NIC, LD | 16 | 12 | 2 | 13 | Yes |  | 145,640 ${ }^{4}$ |
| ShawCor Ltd. |  | 1,651,928 | IC | 11 | 10 | 2 | 9 | Yes | 300,000 | 120,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Sherritt International Corporation |  | 6,457,800 | IC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 3 | Yes | $360,000{ }^{131}$ | $180,000{ }^{131}$ |
| Sierra Wireless Inc. |  | 527,360 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 6 | 5 | 1 | 10 | Yes | 145,485 ${ }^{1,136}$ | 119,735 ${ }^{1,136}$ |
| Silver Standard Resources Inc. |  | 1,226,978 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 4 | Yes | 250,000 | 125,000 |
| Silver Wheaton Corp. |  | 4,521,539 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 9 | 8 | 1 | 6 | Yes | $344,828{ }^{106}$ | 209,881 ${ }^{106}$ |
| Silvercorp Metals Inc. |  | 481,338 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 7 | 5 | 0 | 7 |  |  | 41,250 |
| SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. |  | 11,772,625 | IC | 12 | 11 | 3 | 4 | Yes | 336,500 | 141,000 |
| Stantec Inc. |  | 1,668,178 | IC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 6 | Yes | 221,800 | 146,800 |
| Stella-Jones Inc. |  | 1,071,923 | NIC, LD | 9 | 5 | 2 | 13 |  | 200,000 | 90,000 |
| Sun Life Financial Inc. |  | 109,531,000 | IC | 13 | 12 | 4 | 5 | Yes | 390,000 | 120,000 |
| Suncor Energy Inc. |  | 78,315,000 | IC | 12 | 11 | 2 | 8 | Yes | 540,574 | 238,499 |
| Superior Plus Corp. |  | 2,141,100 | NIC, LD | 10 | 8 | 1 | 11 | Yes | 237,500 | 95,000 |
| Surge Energy Inc. |  | 1,376,725 | CC | 7 | 4 | 0 | 3 | Yes |  | 149,386 ${ }^{102}$ |
| Tahoe Resources Inc. |  | 909,833 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 7 | 1 | 3 | Yes | 255,400 | 185,400 |
| Talisman Energy Inc. |  | 19,735,830 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 14 | 12 | 2 | 3 | Yes | 500,000 | 200,000 |
| Taseko Mines Limited |  | 970,228 | NIC, LD | 9 | 5 | 0 | 12 | Yes |  | $158,000{ }^{78}$ |
| Teck Resources Limited |  | 36,183,000 | NIC, LD | 14 | 11 | 2 | 11 | Yes | 660,019 ${ }^{125}$ | $160,006{ }^{125}$ |
| TELUS Corporation |  | 21,556,000 | IC | 13 | 12 | 1 | 10 | Yes | 460,000 | 172,500 |
| Tembec Inc. |  | 1,021,000 | IC | 11 | 9 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 320,000 | 115,000 |
| Teranga Gold Corporation |  | 643,131 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 6 | 3 | 0 | 3 |  |  | 40,000 |
| Thompson Creek Metals Company Inc. |  | 3,178,065 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 7 | 6 | 1 | 5 | Yes |  | 119,492 ${ }^{1,71}$ |
| Thomson Reuters Corporation |  | 33,412,170 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC, LD | 13 | 9 | 2 | 9 | Yes | 618,000 ${ }^{1}$ | 206,000 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Tim Hortons Inc. |  | 2,433,823 | NIC, LD | 11 | 9 | 3 | 5 | Yes | 150,000 | 90,000 |
| TMX Group Limited |  | 16,495,500 | IC | 17 | 11 | 3 | 1 | Yes | 275,000 | 80,000 |
| Torex Gold Resources Inc. |  | 605,333 | IC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 4 | Yes |  | 50,000 |
| Toromont Industries Ltd. |  | 1,030,555 | NIC, LD | 9 | 7 | 2 | 13 | Yes | 212,500 | 108,000 |
| Toronto-Dominion Bank |  | 862,532,000 | IC | 14 | 13 | 5 | 8 | Yes | 400,000 | $185,000{ }^{19}$ |
| Tourmaline Oil Corp. |  | 4,696,471 | CC, LD | 11 | 7 | 0 | 3 | Yes |  |  |
| TransAlta Corporation |  | 9,783,000 | IC | 11 | 10 | 3 | 6 | Yes | 279,382 | 89,224 |
| TransAlta Renewables Inc. |  | 2,013,638 | IC | 6 | 3 | 2 | 0 |  | 45,473 | 32,145 |
| Transat A.T. Inc. |  | 1,290,073 | CC, LD | 10 | 7 | 1 | 13 | Yes |  | 50,000 |
| TransCanada Corporation |  | 53,898,000 | IC | 11 | 10 | 3 | 5 | Yes | 440,000 | 170,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Transcontinental Inc. |  | 1,859,300 | NIC, LD | 14 | 9 | 3 | 10 | Yes |  | 45,000 |
| TransForce Inc. |  | 2,064,602 | CC, LD | 8 | 7 | 0 | 7 | Yes |  | 70,000 |
| Transglobe Energy Corporation |  | 696,074 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 11 | Yes | 86,000 | 71,000 |
| Trican Well Service Ltd. |  | 2,413,647 | NIC, LD | 9 | 6 | 0 | 9 | Yes | 90,000 ${ }^{54}$ | 35,000 ${ }^{54}$ |
| Trilogy Energy Corp. |  | 1,546,729 | NIC, LD | 8 | 5 | 0 | 8 | Yes | 25,000 | 20,000 ${ }^{40}$ |
| Trinidad Drilling Ltd. |  | 1,827,496 | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 5 | Yes | 165,000 | 120,000 |
| True North Apartment Real Estate Investment Trust | X | 532,132 | NIC, LD | 7 | 5 | 0 | 1 |  |  | 25,000 |
| Turquoise Hill Resources Ltd. |  | 8,853,562 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 11 | 6 | 5 | 1 | Yes | 542,936 | 217,189 |
| Uni-Select Inc. |  | 1,242,068 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 10 | 7 | 1 | 5 | Yes | 250,000 | 60,000 |
| Valeant Pharmaceuticals International Inc. |  | 28,809,920 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 11 | 9 | 1 | 3 | Yes |  | $463,500{ }^{1,124}$ |
| Veresen Inc. |  | 2,973,400 | IC | 8 | 7 | 2 | 5 | Yes | 180,000 | 110,000 ${ }^{4}$ |
| Vermilion Energy Inc. |  | 3,708,719 | IC | 8 | 7 | 0 | 11 | Yes | 262,020 ${ }^{99}$ | $167,306{ }^{99}$ |
| Wajax Corporation |  | 676,953 | IC | 9 | 8 | 0 | 9 | Yes | 200,000 | 70,000 |
| West Fraser Timber Co. Ltd. |  | 3,104,000 | NIC, LD | 9 | 6 | 1 | 12 | Yes |  | 125,000 |
| Western Forest Products Inc. |  | 670,500 | NIC, LD | 7 | 4 | 0 | 6 |  | 80,000 | 50,000 |
| WestJet Airlines Ltd. |  | 4,143,463 | IC | 13 | 11 | 1 | 8 | Yes | 120,000 | 60,000 |
| Westport Innovations Inc. |  | 506,4211 | IC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 7 | Yes | $307,175{ }^{1,80}$ | 209,703 ${ }^{1,80}$ |
| Westshore Terminals Investment Corporation |  | 632,994 | CC | 7 | 5 | 0 | 8 |  |  | 50,000 |
| Whitecap Resources Inc. |  | 2,052,829 | CC | 7 | 6 | 0 | 3 | Yes |  | 117,520 ${ }^{79}$ |
| Wi-LAN Inc. |  | 347,317 ${ }^{1}$ | IC | 8 | 6 | 0 | 6 | Yes | 85,000 | 40,000 |
| Winpak Ltd. |  | 734,600 ${ }^{1}$ | NIC | 6 | 2 | 0 | 14 |  | 145,000 | 58,000 |
| Yamana Gold Inc. |  | 11,753,038 ${ }^{1}$ | CC, LD | 10 | 9 | 0 | 7 | Yes |  | 180,250 ${ }^{1}$ |
| Yellow Media Limited |  | 1,794,034 | CC | 9 | 8 | 2 | 2 | Yes | $280,000{ }^{134}$ | $133,587{ }^{134}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

CC = combined CEO/Chair, IC = Independent Chair, NIC = Non-Executive, Non-Independent Chair, EC = Executive Chair, LD = Lead Director (if blank, there is no Board Chair or Lead Director)
** Includes guidelines to hold any type of shares or share units. Non-bold are specific guidelines. Bold are implicit
shareholding policies where directors receive a mandatory portion of their compensation in share units, shareholding policies where directors receive a mandatory portion of their compensation in share units, and those share units must be held as long as the directors is a member of that board.

All amounts include cash and the value of shares and/or share units.


[^20]
## 2 Audit Committee.

3 Audit and Risk Management Committee.
4 Directors not resident in Canada are paid in U.S. dollars.
5 Compensation Committee.
6 Human Resources Committee.
7 Corporate Governance and Public Policy Committee.
8 Human Resources and Compensation Committee.
9 A Director who serves on the boards of both COGECO and the Corporation receives a lesser annual retainer from each entity in the amount of \$25,000.

10 Governance Committee.
11 Strategic Opportunities Committee.
12 Risk Management Committee.
13 This amount includes the \$40,000 board retainer and the \$25,000 fixed annual fee for board/committee meeting attendance.

14 Directors can elect to receive up to $100 \%$ of their annual retainer and attendance fees paid in the form of DSUs. Directors may receive up to $25 \%$ of the value of their portion of their annual board retainer they elect to be paid in DSUs in the form of additional DSUs, an incentive put in place by the company to promote increased DSU ownership.

15 Audit and Finance Committee.
$16 \$ 102,864$ of this amount represents the value of restricted units awarded to directors in 2013. The RU's vest equally over a three year period.

17 Per annum fixed compensation for a director sitting on more than one committee, with the exception of the Chairman of the Board.

18 Each director is entitled to elect at the beginning of each fiscal year, to receive, as an annual retainer: $\$ 75,000$ payable in cash; or $\$ 40,000$ payable in cash and a grant of 5,000 options.

19 Annual retainer includes compensation for serving on one committee.

20 Directors who serve on more than one committee receive this amount.

21 Attendance fees are paid per day of meetings, regardless of whether a director attends more than one meeting in a single day.

24 Directors also receive Aeroplan Program membership privileges and a discretionary travel award of up to $\$ 20,000$ per year on STAR Alliance carriers. Directors can elect yearly to receive the discretionary travel award of \$20,000 in DSUs.
$25 \$ 152,790$ of this amount ( $\$ 254,650$ in the case of the Chair) represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013. If a director meets the minimum shareholding guideline, he or she can elect to receive cash in lieu of a portion of the RSUs to be granted, subject to receipt of a minimum annual grant of 1,000 RSUs. RSUs vest on the third anniversary of the grant date.
$\$ 118,170$ of this amount ( $\$ 177,255$ in the case of the Chair) reflects the long term incentive received by directors in 2013; directors can elect to receive their LTI in the from of RSUs (which vest at the end of 2 years) or in the form of DSUs.

7 \$187,718 of this amount represents the value of RSUs granted in 2013; RSUs vest in half increments annually on each grant date anniversary.

Governance and Compensation Committee.
Management Resources and Compensation Committee. their annual total Board and Committee retainer. The additional amount that directors received in 2013 ranged between $\$ 93,815$ and $\$ 132,830$. For purposes of reporting we have included \$93,815 in this amount.
$33 \$ 139,971$ of this amount ( $\$ 189,968$ in the case of the Chair) represents the value of DSUs awarded to directors in 2013; $\$ 99,998$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest and are paid out in three equal tranches on the anniversary date of the date of grant each year for three years.

34 This includes an annual meeting fee of $\$ 25,000$ for all board and committee meetings attended in 2013.

40 In addition to this amount, in 2013 directors received cash payments under the Cash Bonus Plan; amounts ranged between \$21,930 and \$29,070.

41 \$75,000 of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013. RSUs vest equally over a three year period.

42 Trustees can elect up to $100 \%$ of their fees to be paid in the form of DSUs in lieu of cash. Calloway will then match that amount such that the Trustee will, subject to certain vesting conditions, receive deferred units equal in value to two times the amount of the fees that the Trustee elected to have placed in the deferred unit plan.
43 This retainer is paid to directors who serve on two committees of the board; $\$ 160,000$ is paid to directors who sit on only one committee of the board.
44 Pension Committee.

46 Directors also receive $\$ 2,000$ for expenses incurred and $\$ 2,000$ for education expenses.

47 Funding Committee.
48 The Lead Director retainer is inclusive of the fee for chairing one committee (Governance Committee).

49 Each director also receives a cash allowance of \$7,200 per annum for the purpose of assisting the Directors to acquire telecommunications services, and other related products and services.

50 Non-executive directors also receive an annual grant of travel reward miles.

51 Directors are entitled to elect to receive part or all of their fees in the form of DSUs. Chartwell matches all deferred units earned on a one-for-one basis.
$52 \$ 22,500$ of this amount represents the value of PSU's awarded to directors in 2013. Performance units cliff vest at the end of a three year term.
$53 \$ 20,000$ of this amount represents a monetary amount paid to trustees. Trustees are strongly encouraged to use the proceeds towards the purchase of CREIT units.

54 In addition to this amount, directors received an annual bonus in the amount of $\$ 100,000$ ( $\$ 130,000$ in the case of the Chair).

55 Reserves Committee.
56 In addition to this amount, directors received share based awards consisting of DCS and Incentive Shares. Amounts varied and are not included here.

57 Human Resources, Compensation and Pension Committee.
$58 \$ 130,046$ of this amount represents the value of share-based awards received by directors in 2013, either in the form of DSUs or RSUs. RSUs vest equally over a three year period.

59 Chair also received reimbursable expenses of approximately $\$ 125,000$ to cover the administrative costs of running the Chairman's office.

60 Audit and Corporate Governance Committee.
61 The Company paid its directors amounts ranging between $\$ 92,372$ and $\$ 114,505$; breakdown of fees was not provided. For calculation purposes we have included \$92,372

62 This amount is paid to directors for being a member of one committee of the board; a maximum of $\$ 15,000$ is paid for being a member of more than one committee.

63 In addition to this amount, directors receive an annual lump sum payment of $\$ 14,000$ for meeting attendance; this was put in place in July 2013. Prior to this, directors were paid $\$ 2,000$ per meeting ( $\$ 3,000$ for audit committee meetings).
$64 \$ 100,005$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013. RSUs vest as to one-third on each of the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of grant.

65 Meeting fees were paid at a rate of $\$ 1,000$ to $\$ 3,000$ per meeting, dependent upon the location of the meeting and whether it was attended in person, by teleconference, or by way of email correspondence.
$66 \$ 7,497$ of this amount (\$14,993 in the case of the Chair) represents the value of RSUs granted to directors in 2013. RSUs vest as to one-third on each of the three anniversaries following the date of grant.

67 Technical and Sustainability Committee.
68 Compensation, Governance and Nominating Committee.
69 This amount represents the value of RSUs granted to directors in 2013. The amount granted to directors under the RSU plan is equal to the number of RSUs that vest each year for each non-employee director. Such additional RSUs vest at the end of 3 years following the date of grant.

70 In October 2013, the Lead Director became the Chair of the Board. The Lead Director received this amount for 2013; going forward, the retainer for the Chair is US\$80K.
$71 \$ 57,692$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest over a three year period.
$72 \$ 207,000$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest equally over a three year period.

73 Each director received total cash compensation that ranged in value between $\$ 11,000$ and $\$ 13,000$.

74 In addition, directors are eligible to claim health, medical, dental and wellness expenses for themselves and their spouses up to a maximum of $\$ 20,000$ per annum per director pursuant to Health Care and Wellness Spending Accounts established for each director.

75 The additional retainer fee paid to the Lead Director is reduced by any amounts paid to such Lead Director for acting as the Chair of another committee, such that the maximum amount of additional retainer paid to an individual director is $\$ 20,000$.

## Governance and Nominating Committee.

Compensation and Benefits Committee.
78 In 2013,each director received a grant of \$108,000 in DSUs or RSUs, or a cash payment in lieu of, at their discretion (included in this amount). If the election is made to receive cash, the after-tax value of the cash payment will be required to be allocated by the director toward the purchase of common shares of the Company until share ownership guidelines are met.
$79 \$ 87,520$ of this amount represents the value of performance based awards given to directors in 2013; performance awards vest three years from the grant date.
$80 \$ 153,053$ of this amount ( $\$ 193,875$ ) in the case of the Chair) represents the value of share-based awards given to directors in $2013 ; 50 \%$ of the awards vest immediately.

81 Paid to directors attending meetings in person away from their place of residence.
82 Committee chairs do not receive a committee member retainer for membership on the Corporate Governance Committee but receive a member retainer for other committee assignments. Any non-committee chair appointed to the Corporate Governance Committee receives a committee member retainer.

83 Directors were paid in a combination of cash, DSUs and RSUs. $\$ 30,000$ of this amount reflects the value of DSUs awarded and $\$ 70,000$ of this amount reflects the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013. The Chair received \$70,000 DSUs and \$120,000 RSUs.

84 A portion of the Chair retainer includes the fee for acting as Chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee.
$85 \$ 800$ is paid per meeting for routine administrative matters where the nature of the discussion is brief.

86 Committee meeting per day.
$87 \$ 30,534$ of this amount (\$42.166 in the case of the Chair) represents the value of restricted awards and performance awards that were given to directors in 2013. The awards are paid out in equal installments on the first, second and third anniversaries of the date of grant.

88 Fees are payable to directors in cash; however, at least the after tax portion and up to the entire amount of such fees must then be used by the directors to purchase common shares on the open market. The common shares are required to be held in escrow for an average of four years.

89 This amount is paid to one director who chairs all the board committees.

90 Each trustee is entitled to elect to receive up to $100 \%$ of his board compensation in the form of deferred units, in lieu of cash, which such amount shall be matched by the Trust.
$91 \$ 65,000$ of this amount is the annual cash retainer that each director is paid; $\$ 10,000$ is an aggregate amount paid as a result of additional board meetings in 2013.

92 Directors of Enbridge Income Fund Holdings Inc. are also directors of Enbridge Commercial Trust (ECT). Directors are not compensated by Enbridge Income Fund Holdings; rather, their compensation, and what is shown here, is paid directly by ECT.

93 Meeting attendance fee for initial meeting each quarter is $\$ 3,000$. Attendance fees for attendance at REIT Trustee meetings are capped at eight meetings annually for each REIT Trustee. Attendance fees for attendance at Compensation and Governance Committee meetings are capped at two meetings annually for each REIT Trustee. No compensation or meeting attendance fee is paid in connection with the Nominating Committee.

94 Directors were awarded deferred trust units as part of their compensation in 2013. DTUs granted to directors ranged in value from $\$ 112,620$ to $\$ 150,160$ (we have included $\$ 112,620$ for our calculations). The chair received DTUs valuing $\$ 187,700$. DTUs vest equally over a five year period.

95 In addition to this amount, the Chair received a \$12,000 travel allowance and a \$50,000 matching contribution under the Company's share purchase plan.

96 Executive Committee.
97 Conduct Review Committee.
98 Each Trustee may elect to receive between $60 \%$ and $100 \%$ of the annual retainer paid, together with committee fees, attendance fees, additional fees and retainers to committee chairs in the form of deferred units in lieu of cash, provided that Boardwalk shall match the elected amount for each participant such that the number of deferred units issued to each participant shall be equal in value to two times the elected amount.
$99 \$ 142,306$ of this amount (\$177,020 in the case of the Chair) represents the value of performance based shares awarded to directors in 2013. Share awards vest on April 1 of the third year after they were granted.

100 Directors received committee retainers ranging between $\$ 24,170$ and $\$ 56,396$ depending on which committees a director was a member or chair of. $\$ 24,170$ has been included here for calculation purposes.

101 In addition to this amount, directors received a bonus of $\$ 16,113$ in connection with an acquisition that took place in 2013.

102 \$113,386 of this amount represents the value of RSAs awarded to directors in 2013. RSAs vest as to one-third per year for a period of three years from the date of grant.

103 \$206,000 of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013. RSUs vest the day prior to the next annual shareholders meeting.

104 The Chair of Interoil acted as Interim CEO from May 1 - July 10, 2013. Amounts paid to the Chair in this executive capacity have not been included in this amount.
$105 \$ 85,000$ of this amount (\$100,000 in the case of the Chair) represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; the RSUs vest on December 31, 2015.
$106 \$ 134,881$ of this amount ( $\$ 194,828$ in the case of the Chair) represents the value of restricted share rights awarded to directors in 2013.

107 In 2013, directors received \$150,000 of equity compensation comprised of $\$ 50,000$ in DSUs, $\$ 50,000$ in stock options and $\$ 50,000$ in DSUs and/or stock options as elected by the director. $\$ 50,000$ in DSUs has been included here for calculation purposes.

108 In 2013, the Lead Director received $\$ 225,000$ in equity compensation comprised of \$50,000 in DSUs, \$50,000 in stock options and $\$ 125,000$ in DSUs and/or stock options as elected by the Lead Director but subject to an overall maximum limit on stock options of $\$ 100,000$. $\$ 75,000$ in DSUs has been included here for calculation purposes.

109 This fee is paid to Directors who serve on more than one committee.
110 Directors receive DSU awards amounting to 30\% of the total annual fees they have earned during the year. In 2013, award amounts ranged between $\$ 19,275$ and $\$ 24,900$. For calculation purposes, we have included $\$ 19,275$.

111 Retainer fee includes membership on two committees.
112 Fee for each additional committee membership in excess of two.
113 For each board meeting in excess of five per year, directors receive \$2,000; for each committee meeting in excess of five per year, directors receive $\$ 1,500$.

114 Effective July 1, 2013, the board adopted a flat fee structure for director compensation comprised entirely of DSUs with a one-year hold period.
$115 \$ 103,180$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013.
$116 \$ 109,612$ of this amount ( $\$ 328,836$ in the case of the Chair) represents the value of REUs granted to directors in 2013; REUs vest three years from the date of issue.

117 Directors are paid an annual fee of $\$ 20,000$ for membership on all board committees. Chairs receive an additional \$10,000 per year.

118 Directors were not paid a fee for attending board and committee meetings for each of the eight regularly scheduled meetings; however, they were eligible to receive a fee of $\$ 2,000$ per board or committee meeting occurring on any other day.
$119 \$ 91,780$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013. RSUs vest as to $50 \%$ three years from the date of grant and the remaining 50\% on the seventh anniversary of the grant date.

120 This amount is a per diem fee provided such meetings were not held on the same day as a board meeting.

121 Directors were awarded DSUs as part of their compensation in 2013 with amounts ranging between $\$ 437,005$ and $\$ 544,993$; for calculation purposes, we have included \$437,005.

122 In 2013, directors received DSU grants; amounts ranged between $\$ 159,686$ and $\$ 243,009$; for calculation purposes, $\$ 159,686$ has been included in this amount.

123 Talent and Compensation Committee.
$124 \$ 386,250$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest and are deliverable on the first anniversary of the grant date, unless the director elects to defer issuance until the director's separation.

125 \$100,006 of this amount (\$300,019 in the case of the Chair) represents the share based component of the director's annual compensation; directors may elect to receive this in either DSUs or RSUs. DSUs vest immediately whereas RSUs vest on the earlier of December 20 in the second calendar year immediately following the grant or the date the individual ceases to be a director of the Corporation.

126 Independent directors are also eligible to receive an annual cash bonus of $\$ 10,000$ which is not performance-based.

127 \$78,535 of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest over three years in equal amounts on the anniversary date of the date of grant.

128 A Director who serves on the boards of both Cogeco Cable and the Corporation receives a lesser annual retainer from each entity in the amount of $\$ 25,000$.

129 This amount is paid to directors for attending a one-day scheduled board meeting in person. $\$ 1500$ is paid for each unscheduled board meeting attended or board meetings attended by conference call in excess of two hours.

130 This amount is paid for Compensation, Audit and Governance committee meetings.

131 Plus a payment of $\$ 150,000$ in recognition of the "Helms-Burton" legislation in the United States.
$132 \$ 51,500$ of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest in annual installments over three years following the date of grant.

133 This amount is paid for meetings that are more than two hours in duration. $\$ 750$ is paid for meeting that are two hours or less in duration.

134 In addition to this amount, each director was awarded a one-time deferred share unit grant of \$75,000 for serving on the Board upon the date of adoption of the new director compensation structure, or thereafter, upon election to the board.

135 Directors receive retainers and meeting fees; however, break down of compensation was not provided. Total fees received by each director ranged between $\$ 27,252$ and $\$ 48,500$. For calculation purposes, we have included $\$ 27,252$ as well as \$15,006 DSU award amount.

136 \$78,535 of this amount represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest over three years in equal amounts on the anniversary date of the date of grant.
$137 \$ 124,988$ of this amount (\$170,005 in the case of the Chair) represents the value of RSUs awarded to directors in 2013; RSUs vest on the date of grant.

138 Committee members who served on both the Governance and Nominating Committees are paid one retainer covering both committees.

139 This amount is paid to the individual who is the Chair of both the Governance and Management Resources and Compensation Committees.

140 The Lead Director is also the Chair of the Audit and Pension Committees and receives this additional amount for all of those roles.

## Korn Ferry

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## Korn Ferry Canada's Board Services Practice

Korn Ferry's Global Board Services team fields a core group of Board search specialists who focus their practice activity on recruiting directors for corporations. They are supported by senior professionals across the firm who provide in-depth local knowledge about current and "next generation" director candidates.

In Canada, the Korn Ferry Board Services Practice assists companies in the identification, qualification and attraction of directors from Canada, the United States and elsewhere around the world.
It is Korn Ferry's mission to ensure its clients recruit Board members who have the ability and time to make a substantial contribution, and who have a strong track record of achievement.

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## Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates

Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates (POCA) specializes in board effectiveness in the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates is a pioneer in governance consulting in Canada. Since 1992, POCA has provided board governance advice to organizations in a wide range of industries throughout Canada, including assignments with federal and provincial crown corporations.

Patrick O'Callaghan and Monique Steensma have been the primary authors of the annual Governance and Compensation Report since 1992, including this year's Special Survey Report - Counting The Hours: How Time Consuming Is It To Be A Canadian Director?

## Patrick O’Callaghan and Associates Board Effectiveness Advisory Services

- Working with boards to develop and implement practical, actionable and effective board, board chair, committee, committee chair, and individual director performance evaluations.
- Advising boards, committees and board chairs on current governance issues and challenges.
- Defining and clarifying board roles and responsibilities that focus on optimizing the value and responsibilities of the board.
- Mediation and support at boards dealing with unproductive conflict or tension.
- Working with boards of merging organizations ensuring an effective transition and integration.
- Specialized governance research and frequent speaking engagements.
- Developing and delivering custom seminars and reports on current and or challenging governance issues.
- In partnership with Korn Ferry, annually reviewing the proxy circulars of the largest 300 companies in Canada.
- In partnership with Korn Ferry, providing director search and board composition strategy advice.

Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates has maintained a strong commitment to board governance research. In addition to the research undertaken on governance practices and director compensation for this annual report, Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates, in partnership with Korn Ferry, has, since 2001, annually conducted a focused review of a significant and emerging governance issue.

## Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates Board Effectiveness Advisory Services (continued)

This research involves at least 100, and often up to 200, face-to-face interviews with directors throughout Canada. Focused report topics have included:

2014 Counting the Hours: How Time Consuming Is It To Be A Canadian Director?
2013 The Impact of Social Media on Boards and Directors Today
2012 Improving the Board Composition and Director Selection Process
2011 Retirement Age and Term Policies - A new Focus
2010 The Challenge of Individual Director Evaluation
2009 Board Chair Succession Planning
2008 Behavioral competencies of an Effective Director
2007 The Board's Role in Executive Compensation
2006 Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards
2005 The Board's Role in CEO Succession Planning
2004 How Boards Add Value - The CEO Perspective
2003 Is there a Shortage of Qualified Canadian Directors?
2002 Board and Individual Director Evaluation
2001 The Role of the Board Chair in Canadian Companies

Patrick O'Callaghan is a frequent speaker and seminar leader on corporate governance issues. He has first-hand experience as a director of public and private Canadian corporations and several not-for-profit organizations. He has served as a member of the Directors Advisory Group of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Advisory Committee on Senior Level Retention and Compensation for the Treasury Board of Canada. Mr. O'Callaghan was the Founder and past Board Chair of Women On Board, which was acquired in 2013 by Catalyst Inc., the world's leading nonprofit organization with a mission to expand opportunities for women and is dedicated to creating more inclusive workplaces where employees representing every dimension of diversity can thrive. Mr. O'Callaghan sits on the Advisory Council for Catalyst's Corporate Board Services.

## Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates

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[^0]:    Corporate Governance and Director Compensation in Canada, Patrick O'Callaghan and Associates and Korn Ferry, Annual Reviews from 1993 to 2014 The 2013-2014 NACD Public Company Governance Survey data is from 1,019 survey responses.
    Assumes 8 hour day
    Assumes 40 hour week and 5 working days per week

[^1]:    * Survey Participants by Company Asset Size and Average Hours for Primary Board

[^2]:    Assumes 8 hour day
    Assumes 40 hour week and 5 working days per week
    Assumes 4 weeks per month
    O 2013-2014 NACD Public Compay Governance Survey, published by the National Association of Corporate Directors.

[^3]:    * Percentage of those boards that have a retirement age for directors.

[^4]:    4 Multilateral CSA Notice of Amendments to National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, Canadian Securities Administrators, October 15, 2014.

    5 2014-2015 NACD Public Company Governance Survey, published by the National Association of Corporate Directors.
    $6 \quad$ 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners

[^5]:    7 2014-2015 NACD Public Company Governance Survey, published by the National Association of Corporate Directors.
    $8 \quad$ 2014-2015 NACD Public Company Governance Survey, published by the National Association of Corporate Directors

[^6]:    9 Multilateral CSA Notice of Amendments to National Instrument 58-101 Disclosure of Corporate Governance Practices, Canadian Securities Administrators, October 15, 2014.

[^7]:    18
    2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners.

[^8]:    19 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners.

[^9]:    "Governance" includes combined Governance and Nominating Committees. The "Nominating" column refers to stand-alone Nominating Committees, or Nominating Committees combined with a committee other than Governance.

[^10]:    * Percentages are of boards with a non-executive chair.

[^11]:    * Additional to Director Retainer

[^12]:    ${ }^{23}$ 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners.

[^13]:    * "Non-Audit" includes audit committees at those companies that do not pay a premium for audit committee membership.

[^14]:    27 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners.

[^15]:    30 2013-2014 Director Compensation Report, published by the NACD with data from the 2013 Director Compensation Survey by Pearl Meyer \& Partners.

[^16]:    CC = combined CEO/Chair, IC = Independent Chair, NIC = Non-Executive, Non-Independent Chair, EC = Executive Chair, LD = Lead Director (if blank, there is no Board Chair or Lead Director)

[^17]:    CC = combined CEO/Chair, IC = Independent Chair, NIC = Non-Executive, Non-Independent Chair,

[^18]:    ** Includes guidelines to hold any type of shares or share units. Non-bold are specific guidelines. Bold are implicit shareholding policies where directors receive a mandatory portion of their compensation in share units, and those share units must be held as long as the directors is a member of that board.

[^19]:    Stock Component: "Options" indicates if directors received stock options. "Req'd" indicates if directors are required to take all or a portion of their compensation
    in shares or share equivalents. "Elect" indicates if directors may choose to take all or a portion of their compensation in shares or share equivalents.

[^20]:    Stock Component: "Options" indicates if directors received stock options. "Req'd" indicates if directors are required to take all or a portion of their compensation
    in shares or share equivalents. "Elect" indicates if directors may choose to take all or a portion of their compensation in shares or share equivalents.

