

Custodians of a Machine for the Making of Gods Thinking Ecological Restoration with Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari

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Abstract

This essay aims to show that the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari contain concepts that, alongside work already done on the philosophy of ecological restoration, can be used to construct an adequate philosophy that dissolves the false problem of authenticity found in the criticisms of Elliot and Katz. It does this through a philosophy of nature, which constructs an ontological account of ecosystem, and a philosophy of religion, which constructs an ethical defence of ecological restoration.

Introduction: An Aparallel Evolution in an Ecosystem of Thought

Humanity lies groaning, half-crushed under the progress it has made. We lay half-crushed not because our progress has in itself been bad, but because the progress has been made without consideration for the rest of the ecosystem in which we dwell. One powerful way for restoring and fostering an ecological ethics and politics is through the practice of ecological restoration. Yet the ontological and ethical status of ecological restoration is contested by land managers, research scientists, and even by a few philosophers.¹ While land managers and research scientists will continue to negotiate with one another, in the field and on the pages of their journals, there is a relative deficiency of thought given to the philosophical issues of ecological restoration and so there will continue to be disagreements via false problems. The root of these false problems appears to gravitate around questions of authenticity. Specifically in the work of Eric Katz and Robert Elliot there is the sense that human beings participating in nature do nothing but perpetuate artificiality at the cost of authenticity suggesting that nature is

¹ For instance see the recent debate which played out in the journal *Restoration Ecology*. Cabin, Robert J., "Science-Driven Restoration: A Square Grid on a Round Earth?," *Restoration Ecology* 15.1 (2007) and Christian P., Creighton M. Litton, Jarrod M. Thaxton, Susan Cordell, Lisa J. Hadway and Darren R. Sandquist, "Science Driven Restoration: A Candle in a Demon Haunted World-Response to Cabin (2007)," *Restoration Ecology* 15.2 (2007).

at its most authentic when humanity and its artifices are absent.² This way of thinking shows an inadequacy of thought to practice, which is to say that the philosophy of ecological restoration is not sufficient to the practice of ecological restoration. This essay aims to show that the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari contain concepts that, alongside work already done on the philosophy of ecological restoration, can be used to construct an adequate ontological and ethical philosophy that dissolves the false problem of artificiality against authenticity.³

While this essay hopes to show how the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari can be used to construct an adequate philosophy of ecological restoration, there is a need to account for why these three philosophers are used and not others. Deleuze and Guattari's conception of philosophy, owing much to Bergson's metaphilosophy, is stated clearly in their *What is Philosophy?*: "philosophy is the discipline that involves *creating* concepts."⁴ There they also say what philosophy is not: "it is not contemplation, reflection, or communication."⁵ This conception of philosophy, in its positive and negative formulations, is heuristically helpful for navigating through the thicket that is the relationship of philosophy to science. It holds that the relationship between science and philosophy is not a relationship where one is determined by the other, but rather a relationship where both remain autonomous in their production. It also allows the philosopher some realistic humility for the notion that science *needs* philosophy to do science is ridiculous: "[Philosophy] is not reflection, because no one needs philosophy to reflect on anything. Mathematicians, as mathematicians, have never waited for philosophers before reflecting on mathematics, nor artists before reflecting on

² See Katz, Eric, "The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature," *Research in Philosophy and Technology* 12 (1992). and Elliot, Robert, *Faking Nature: The Ethics of Environmental Restoration* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997). We will return to their arguments later. Of course these are but two examples of a whole host of literature, but they suffice to understand the fundamentals of what we are characterizing as a false problem.

³ Attentive readers will notice that this essay does not deal with Guattari's *The Three Ecologies*, trans. Ian Pindar and Paul Sutton (London and New Brunswick, NJ: The Athlone Press, 2000). While this work is very important and marks a very interesting political and philosophical intervention using the resources of ecology, it does so through ideas and concepts already at play in the co-authored works of Deleuze and Guattari. One wishes that Guattari had lived longer as *The Three Ecologies*, published three years before his death, marks but a short engagement with ecology that shows signs of further, more fruitful engagements.

⁴ Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 5.

⁵ Deleuze and Guattari, 6.

painting or music.”⁶ Likewise ecologists have never waited for philosophers before reflecting on ecology, but when they begin to do philosophy, that is when they begin to create concepts, it is important for philosophers to come alongside and assist in the creation of their concepts. At the same time some ecologists will be hesitant to see anything helpful in two philosophies that consider themselves broadly vitalistic. Ecology began caught up in insufficient forms of finalism (also called vitalism) that make it resistant to contemporary vitalist philosophies. In part this is because the wider scientific community from biology to physics has rejected teleological thinking of this kind. However, Bergson’s vitalism, and by extension that of Deleuze and Guattari, is not so simplistically teleological and avoids the main deficiencies of the sort of finalism contemporary ecologists are keen to avoid. The vitalism at work here is a practical and heuristic vitalism, rather than the positivistic vitalism of the 19th Century, and thus stands to point continually to our inability to account fully for the qualitative aspects of life that we nevertheless experience.

To return to the question of why Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari the answer is that there is no necessity in this choice. It’s just as conceivable that a philosopher mainly trained in the German Idealism of Schelling, a phenomenologist in the mould of Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty, or Process philosophers in the tradition of Whitehead could create concepts adequate to the science of ecological restoration, to say nothing of other paths of thought. However, if you conceive of a work of philosophy that takes on a problem from the outside, such as ecological restoration, as something akin to the relationship between an ecosystem and a new species then you see that there it is necessary there be something hospitable about the ecosystem for this new species to construct a niche there. This essay attempts to show that the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari can be such a new species and, furthermore, through their creative thought can improve already existing philosophical efforts to think ecological restoration thereby enriching both ecosystems of thought.

When Bergson’s philosophy of nature refuses to merely denigrate technology and the humanity behind it, while at the same time emphasizing the indissoluble interconnectedness of humanity and nature, he opens immediately to thinking about

⁶ Ibid.

ecological restoration and the challenges it poses to the binary of nature and culture. We see the same spirit when Deleuze remarked that he and Guattari hoped to “produce a sort of philosophy of Nature, now that any distinction between nature and artifice is becoming blurred.”⁷ By combining these trends in their philosophies to the problems in ecological restoration this essay constitutes a becoming-ecological of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari and a becoming-philosophical of the practices of ecological restoration. This becoming-ecological and becoming-philosophical happens in the same process as that of the wasp and the orchid as described by Deleuze and Guattari. There they argue that the wasp and the orchid do not mimic one another, but constitute a stealing of code where the wasp and orchid virtually become the other; a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp.⁸ In their own words Deleuze and Guattari say, “Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. [...] There is neither imitation nor resemblance, only an exploding of two heterogeneous series on the line of flight composed by a common rhizome that can no longer be attributed to or subjugated by anything signifying.”⁹ Re-described this could be stated by saying the wasp and the orchid do not resemble one another, but diverge in their likeness as two species in a common ecosystem. Taking this as our model of methodological immanence this work aims to be an aparallel evolution of philosophy and ecological restoration.

William Jordan III, a practitioner who has turned to the philosophical problems in ecological restoration, is our primary interlocutor from within the discipline. Jordan is both an important practitioner, formally of the University of Wisconsin’s Arboretum in Madison, WI, who helped to found the journal *Ecological Restoration* and the Society for Ecological Restoration, but also one of the most important philosophical voices within ecological restoration itself and so we begin with his definition of ecological restoration before turning to the respective philosophies of nature in Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari. With regard to ecological restoration, we argue, these philosophies provide an ontological account of the concept of ecosystem. Building on this hybrid philosophy of nature we argue that these concepts allow us to think otherwise than the “authentic” ecosystem

⁷ Deleuze, Gilles, *Negotiations, 1972-1990*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) 155.

⁸ See Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) 10-11.

⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, 10.

advocated by “pure nature” detractors of ecological restoration. In our philosophy of nature, indebted to ecology, human culture must be considered within and as part of the wider ecosystem. Jordan’s work largely concerns itself with the relationship of nature and culture in ecological restoration and within his work religious themes are privileged modes of culture. In his work the question of religion stems mainly from questions of value creation, the confrontation with shame and guilt, and the mediation of community through liturgical structures. We foster and connect concepts from Bergson’s and Deleuze/Guattari’s philosophies of religion to Jordan’s work and thus provide an ethical defence of ecological restoration’s creation of value. It is important to give both an ontological account and the ethical defence as the philosophical critiques of ecological restoration build their ethical critique from their ontological assumptions. Using the resources of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari this paper aims to come alongside Jordan to give, in outline, a philosophy adequate to the reality of ecological restoration.

The Duration and Unconscious Memory of the Ecosystem

Ecological restoration has been defined in a number of ways; as being concerned with restoring an ecosystem to a prior state; restoring an ecosystem’s prior conditions; and making nature whole. This notion of wholeness leads some environmental philosophers, as well as some ecologists and practitioners, to think of the ecosystem in terms of a discrete multiplicity, leading to the idea of an ‘authentic ecosystem’ that can never be restored. This is a false problem that may be dissolved by thinking the ecosystem as a qualitative multiplicity which allows for a thinking of authenticity and wholeness freed from pure quantity. By thinking the ecosystem in terms of a qualitative multiplicity we are able to give an ontological account of the relationship between humanity and non-human nature that does not oppose the two, but rather shows that there is no strong ontological difference between the two. This challenges the common sense notion of authenticity as nature without human artifice at play in the philosophical criticisms of ecological restoration.

William R. Jordan III’s poetic definition of ecological restoration shows both its beauty and its need for a rigorous metaphysic: “Ecological restoration is the attempt,

sometimes breathtakingly successful, sometimes less so, to make nature whole.”¹⁰ Later he gives a fuller definition, “I define restoration as everything we do to a landscape or an ecosystem in an ongoing attempt to compensate for novel or ‘outside’ influences on it in such a way that it can continue to behave or can resume behaving *as if* these were not present.”¹¹ This definition is more rigorous than the poetic one, but still involves the question of wholeness. This is illustrated when Jordan writes, “[...] restoration, understood as I am defining it here, is a deliberate attempt to return *all* the features of the system to some historic conditions, defined ecologically and with a studied disregard for human interests.”¹² Everything about this definition revolves around the question of the whole and thus lends itself easily to confusion for the question of success (i.e. what makes restoration a success?) is dependent on what is meant by the whole. But we must risk this confusion for the very question of nature revolves around the question of the whole. Indeed we must ask the question, can nature lack wholeness? Such a question demands philosophy because it violates the methodological strictures of science. Science operates by selection. When we reflect on life it appears at first as chaos. Science “slows down” this chaos, it selects or freezes a section of it, in order to give it some reference from which we can know it. These references are the functions and the elements that constitute them, what Deleuze and Guattari call functives, of everything in the knowable world.¹³ Function is, of course, intimately connected with reductionism and mechanism and science must proceed with these strictures in order to discover the correct referent for a thing’s function. This is not a denigration of science’s methodical strictures, but rather, as many scientists themselves think, a task to think reality more fully by thinking philosophically as well as scientifically. Thus, rather than looking to the function of an ecosystem, we look for its concept and must therefore begin our inquiry into the metaphysics of ecological restoration by looking at the whole.

¹⁰ Jordan III, William R., *The Sunflower Forest: Ecological Restoration and the New Communion with Nature* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2003) 11.

¹¹ Jordan, 22.

¹² Ibid. [Here, as in all quotations unless noted, the emphasis is in the original.]

¹³ See Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 118-133 for a more complete argument.

Deleuze sums up Bergson's philosophy of the virtual and the actual in this succinct sentence, "The Whole is never 'given.'"¹⁴ It is necessary not to merely repeat this to ecological restoration as some kind of slogan lacking real depth and then feel content that we have done philosophy. In truth, the philosophy of ecological restoration, as given voice by Jordan, does not naively go forth thinking that it has somehow completed the restoration of an ecosystem. In actuality one of the more interesting aspects of Jordan's work is an attempt to conceptualize the experience of shame and move past the environmentalist repression of shame by formulating rituals that sublimate shame. Restoration is replete with shame; as Jordan says, "Restoration is shameful [...] because the restoration is never fully successful and never complete".¹⁵ We will return to the question of shame later, but for now it suffices to say that ecological restoration is not naïve concerning the whole. Rather it refocuses the question of the whole by subtracting the whole from completeness or discrete totality. Ecology, in a way that parallels and could augment work being done in metaphysics, differentiates a whole as totality or complete from what is called a holon which is always both a whole and a part.¹⁶

Yet this differentiation needs further development as the question of the whole, whether it be discrete totality or holon, necessarily becomes in ecological restoration a question of success. In March 2002 ecologist Stuart K. Allison took up the question, "When is restoration successful?" in an article for the journal *Ecological Restoration*. The article looks at the tallgrass prairie restoration project at Green Oaks located in west-central Illinois, USA near Knox College.¹⁷ According to Allison the project started there by Paul Shepard had the goal of complete restoration similar to what Jordan saw at the Arboretum in Madison, Wisconsin, "Shepard's goal for the restoration at Green Oaks was similar to that of the prairie restorations at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Arboretum, namely a "complete restoration: the establishment of a group of species in abundances and proportions similar to those in natural communities such that natural

¹⁴ Deleuze, Gilles, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988) 104.

¹⁵ Jordan, 50.

¹⁶ The notion of the holon was coined by Arthur Koestler in his *The Ghost in the Machine* (1968) but is common in ecological literature.

¹⁷ Because, as Jordan says, "it was on the prairies that conservation learned the value of restoration (16)" most of our examples will come from prairie restoration projects.

processes occur.”¹⁸ In Allison’s view the best way to judge whether or not such a restoration has come about is not to compare it with remnant prairies, which are those prairie ecosystems that exist in the cracks of the new non-prairie ecosystem, specifically along railroad tracks or in abandoned lots. Rather, Allison argues, the best way to evaluate the success of a prairie restoration project is by comparing the restored prairie in terms of the percentage of species present in them that also appear in a catalogue of prairie plants present at the time of European settlement.¹⁹

Doing this Allison finds that of the total 297 species of plant listed in the catalogue only 72 of 100 species were present in the Green Oaks restored prairie. This leads Allison to the conclusion that the restoration project has not been successful and that it is unlikely to do so due to the dynamic nature of ecosystems. In fact he reminds us that the original prairie would have changed as well, even without the influence of settlers and modern agriculture.²⁰ This being the case we are left to wonder why comparing the ecosystem to anything shows that it has been successful and Allison himself seems to have a split view of what success would mean: an ecological view of success and a human community view of success. The ecological view of success appears to be unreachable in Allison’s view while the human community view of success is limited to marginally orientating the community around the prairie. At the end of the article the ecologist and the philosopher are left wondering if restoration can ever be successful.

Allison’s article helpfully opens up an important problematic. Presumably Allison, like many scientists, accepts the limitations of science and the basic notion behind holism that reality is ultimately more complex than our models. However, his article opens up the problems that come from trying to think of the success of restoration, which is clearly a question relating to the wholeness of the ecosystem, from purely within the methodological strictures of science. The problem is one relating to the problem of change. For in part when considering an ecosystem we tend rightly to think in terms of space. To the trained eye of an ecologist the world can be divided up according to the

¹⁸ Allison, Stuart K., "When Is a Restoration Successful? Results from a 45-Year-Old Tallgrass Prairie Restoration," *Ecological Restoration* 20.1 (2002): 10.

¹⁹ Allison, 12.

²⁰ Allison, 17.

constituent relationships that form an ecosystem. From the macro world-ecosystem to the micro rhizosphere the ecologist can divide up always keeping in mind the axiom of ecology that everything interacts with and influences everything else in a series of degrees, so that at the level of the rhizosphere the particular micro-organisms that feed off the sloughed plant cells are more relatively important than they would be at the level of the macro ecosystem of the prairie system. When we attempt to consider the notion of the time of the ecosystem this focus on spatialization can lead to confusion and false problems. For only in the intellect and not in experience can we divide up the time of an ecosystem. Allison's recourse to a catalogue of plants is endemic of the appeal to intellect and abstraction, for the catalogue, despite the value of knowing what plants were present, tells us very little ecologically about the relationship between the plants; only that they were there to be recorded. Does it make sense, when we admit that an ecosystem is a dynamic and changing system, to speak of a historical ecosystem related to a certain number of plants? This would appear to posit a different ecosystem, discrete in time, and thus we find ourselves hopelessly cast back and forth in the *aporia* of the one or the many. The concept of duration in the philosophy of Bergson may help us to think more clearly about time and thus the time of the ecosystem. Turning after Bergson to the philosophy of Deleuze we may understand the nature of memory and the past more clearly. By understanding the time of the ecosystem more clearly we may come up with a notion of success, or authenticity, which moves beyond the discrete thinking that always remains a temptation, though not a necessary end, of the methodological strictures of science.

Duration

Bergson's conception of duration is often said to be his most fundamental insight.²¹ And certainly he gives testimony to this fact in a letter written on the 9th of May, 1908 to William James where he explains his parting of ways with the mechanistic philosophy of Herbert Spencer:

²¹ See Jankélévitch, Vladimir, *Henri Bergson*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Quadrige/PUF, 1999) 5-6. Jankélévitch is here making a case against thinking of Bergson's philosophy as an 'ism', in this case 'intuitionism'. Claiming instead that duration is the 'living centre' of his philosophy.

“It was the analysis of the notion of time such as it appears in mechanics, or physics, which revolutionized all my ideas. I realized, to my great amazement, that scientific time has no *duration* [...]. This was the starting point of a series of reflections which led me, step by step, to reject almost all that I had previously accepted, and to completely change my point of view.”²²

But Bergson’s conception of duration is not given once and for all. There is a shift in thinking about duration from his first major work, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, to that of *Creative Evolution*. This ultimately moves from the idea of duration as psychological time to an ontological understanding of duration. But following Henri Gouhier we see this movement as ultimately continuous with itself. According to Gouhier the philosophy of Bergson can be considered a “spiritual realism” in the tradition of French spiritualists like Ravaisson and Lachelier.²³ Gouhier writes, “Thus, in the moment where Bergson poses the problem of liberty, there is in his thought much more than in his book. The reader of *Time and Free Will* has the feeling of being initiated in a new philosophy of spirit: in fact, this one emerges from a philosophy of nature which preceded it and discretely frames it.”²⁴ Gouhier holds that the philosophy of spirit present in *Time and Free Will* is framed by the failure of Spencer’s philosophy of nature and not purely by an interest in psychology.²⁵ Indeed Gouhier is quite forceful that Bergson’s thought is not at all a part of psychology, but that he comes to psychology by way of his philosophy of nature. He says, “the thesis of *Time and Free Will* represents an intermediary stage between a failed philosophy of nature, that of Spencer, and the true philosophy of nature, *Creative Evolution*.”²⁶ So duration may be

²² Bergson, Henri, *Key Writings*, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson and John Mullarkey. *Mélanges* trans. Mellissa McMahon (London and New York: Continuum, 2002) 362-363.

²³ Gouhier, Henri, *Bergson et le Christ des évangiles* (Paris: Le Signe, 1961) 30. Spiritualism in French philosophy does not have the same connotations as it does in English. It shares more in common with non-materialist philosophy of mind than it does with early 20th century esoteric societies. Gouhier tells us that Bergson pursued the dream of a philosophy of spirit which would constitute the interior of a philosophy of nature. In this way Bergson is the fulfilment of the first of two traditions of spiritualism in French philosophy. The first tradition, of Ravaisson and Lachelier, held that spirituality coincides with the interiority of the vital, while the second, inaugurated by Biran and based in anthropology, is defined as subjectivity radically differentiated from vitality (24).

²⁴ Gouhier, 19. [All translations from Gouhier are mine.]

²⁵ Gouhier tells us that it amused Bergson to have his work considered under the title of psychology. “From the outset his work was not at all turned in that direction, but rather towards the philosophy of the sciences of nature (18).”

²⁶ Gouhier, 20.

Bergson's most fundamental insight but it is so because it connects philosophy of spirit to philosophy of nature. Bergson goes beyond his predecessors in that his is a philosophy of nature *and* spirit, at the same time without, as Ravaisson did, determining everything by way of spirit. Gouhier says it thusly, "it is, if we dare to speak of it, spirit which gives the key to nature."²⁷ Philosophy of spirit, in this case understood via the concept of duration, opens up our understanding of nature. However, the concept of duration in Bergson does not lend itself to a simple and clear definition due to its nature being radical heterogeneity. It is necessarily baroque and thus our investigation of it must proceed in fits and starts though in the end it regains consistency with regard to ecological restoration.

When Bergson first conceives of duration it is primarily in terms of the real subjective experience of time as opposed to objective scientific time. To understand this more clearly it is necessary to see that Bergson's is a very idiosyncratic notion of what is subjective. Bergson says, "we apply the term *subjective* to what seems to be completely and adequately known, and the term *objective* to what is known in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it."²⁸ Seeming to know something completely and adequately is to know it qualitatively. Turning to our own experience of time we see evidence of this in the experience of boredom or excitement. The duration of boredom has a different quality of passing than the duration of excitement. In philosophy and science we tend to ignore this experience of time in favor of the objective scientific time since the reduction of time to abstract space is heuristically helpful when attempting to solve mathematical problems.

But it cannot be denied that this, though heuristically helpful in certain situations, is a confusion of the quantitative or extensive with the qualitative or intensive. Bergson spends his first chapter of *Time and Free Will* differentiating the qualitative (intensive) from the quantitative (extensive). We tend, in our reflection upon reality, to think of things in terms of intensity, but there are different kinds of intensity; namely the intensity of a feeling and that of a sensation or an effort.²⁹ Sensations properly so called, and

²⁷ Gouhier, 31.

²⁸ Bergson, Henri, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson, 3rd ed. (London: George Allen & Company, Ltd, 1913) 83-84.

²⁹ Bergson, 7

Bergson means the inner or intensive sensation, are connected to their external cause, even though the intensity of these sensations cannot be defined by the magnitude of their cause.³⁰ Indeed we see that they are connected because as consciousness manifests (for instance in the feeling of joy or hate) it appears to spread and develop into extensity (smile, shaking, clenching, etc.). Extensity and intensity must be connected in a fundamental way for Bergson says that if you eliminate all the organic disturbances (shaking, etc.) from anger you are only left with the idea and can not assign it any intensity.³¹ So, though many critics of Bergson hold that he rejects space or extensity in favor of a merely psychological, and thus not real, notion of time and intensity, we may respond that already in the first chapter of his first major work Bergson connects the extensive and the intensive *at the same time* in reality.

It is quite clear that the ‘organic disturbance’ comes before the idea and even more so that the idea and the action form a whole intensive sensation:

“We [...] maintain that these movements [organic disturbances] form part of the terror itself: by their means the terror becomes an emotion capable of passing through different degrees of intensity. [...] There are also high degrees of joy and sorrow, of desire, aversion and even shame, the height of which will be found to be nothing but the reflex movements begun by the organism and perceived by consciousness.”³²

Bergson seems to be silently invoking an unconscious intuition prior to consciousness. A further quotation will serve to illustrate this: “[...] where emotion has free play, consciousness does not dwell on the details of the accompanying movements, but it does dwell upon them and is concentrated upon them when its object is to conceal them.”³³ Emotion is here located in muscular contractions coordinated by an idea that remains unreflected upon, or unconscious, in this case the unconscious nature of acting. Only when the object of the organism is to conceal sweating, shaking, or any other set of organic disturbances, is the idea then reflected upon in consciousness.

³⁰ Bergson, 20.

³¹ Bergson, 30.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

In consciousness we tend to think in terms of space rather than time. According to Bergson this spatialization is necessarily coextensive with the use of the intellect. He uses the example of number. Number is a synthesis of the one and the many, in that every number is one through unity, but this unity is a sum which covers a multiplicity of parts which can be considered separately.³⁴ Bergson states that while we do indeed count moments of duration rather than points in space, we do so by means of points in space: “We involuntarily fix at a point in space each of the moments which we count, and it is only on this condition that the abstract units come to form a sum. [...] every clear idea of number implies a visual image in space”.³⁵ This is because we conceive of number as a discrete multiplicity that admits of being divisible to an unlimited extent and *ipso facto* as spatialised within homogenous space. But this is not the only way of thinking a multiplicity or unity. Bergson says,

“we must distinguish between the unity which we think of and the unity which we set up as an object after having thought of it [...]. The unit is irreducible while we are thinking it and number is discontinuous while we are building it up: but, as soon as we consider number in its finished state, we objectify it, and it then appears to be divisible to an unlimited extent.”³⁶

Clearly what is at stake here is the difference between two kinds of multiplicities. This problem is more fundamental than that of the one and the many if we are to dissolve false problems. For instance, the problem of freedom as traditionally conceived is a false problem arising from the confusion of these two kinds of multiplicities.³⁷

Prudently the question is asked if this difference between multiplicities is purely psychological or is it a real distinction? In the light of the whole of Bergson’s work it is clear that the two multiplicities are real. However this is by means of a radical thesis that “all consciousness is something”.³⁸ From *Matter and Memory* onwards Bergson extends the notion of duration past mere psychology to an ontological thesis about reality itself.³⁹ In *Matter and Memory* Bergson does not construct a strong dualism between matter and

³⁴ Bergson, 75-76.

³⁵ Bergson, 79.

³⁶ Bergson, 83.

³⁷ Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 19.

³⁸ Deleuze, Gilles, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986) 56.

³⁹ Mullarkey, John, *Bergson and Philosophy* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999) 55-56.

memory because, as John Mullarkey says, “both belong to *durée* in terms of their substance”.⁴⁰ Importantly, if we take duration to act as the substance underlining both matter and memory, we must not confuse memory or matter with space or we risk losing both memory and matter to mere epiphenomenalism.

There is space here for readers to confuse Bergson’s critical remarks about space with a criticism of matter itself. It is thus important to note that Bergson differentiates between extensity and the homogenous space of Newtonian physics. The inadequacy of Newtonian physics shares the errors of our perception more generally. In our perception of the world, or in a more precise sense, our surrounding and immediate environment we tend to think in terms of a discrete multiplicity such that each individual is in itself discontinuous. The real extensity of matter must be distinguished from the abstract form of homogenous space and the homogenous time coextensive with it. The abstract form is useful in terms of action, but lead to insurmountable difficulties when confusing them with real properties of things.⁴¹ What is real is duration, or the continuous process of forming a connected whole.⁴² This is, in part, the Bergsonian ecological reality of duration; duration shows us that there is no clear cut distinction between a thing and its environment.⁴³ At the same time we recognize that in reality there must also be distinct quantities in the ecosystem, but duration as a qualitative multiplicity subsumes quality and quantity by linking them together: “the humblest function of spirit [the qualitative] is to bind together the successive moments of the duration of [quantitative material] things [...] we can conceive an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully developed spirit [...] Each of these successive degrees [...] corresponds to a higher tension of

⁴⁰ Mullarkey, 55.

⁴¹ “Homogenous space and homogeneous time are then neither properties of things nor essential conditions of our faculty of knowledge: they express, in an abstract form, the double work of solidification and of division which we effect on the moving continuity of the real in order to obtain there a fulcrum for our action, in order to fix within it starting points for our operation, in short, to introduce into it real changes. They are the diagrammatic design of our eventual action upon matter.” Bergson, Henri, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991) 211.

⁴² See Chapter 1 of *Matter and Memory* where Bergson shows that perception must be taken as a whole.

⁴³ “That there are, in a sense, multiple objects, that one man is distinct from another man, tree from tree, stone from stone, is an indisputable fact; for each of these beings, each of these things, has characteristic properties and obeys a determined law of evolution. But the separation between a thing and a its environment cannot be absolutely definite and clear-cut; there is a passage by insensible gradations from the one to the other: the close solidarity which binds all the objects of the material universe, the perpetuality of their reciprocal actions and reactions, is sufficient to prove that they have not he precise limits which we attribute to them.” Bergson, 209.

duration”.⁴⁴ The mistake that ecologists must avoid making, and indeed already have the resources to do so, is thinking of the ecosystem as abstract homogenous space correlative to “pure nature”. The process by which quantity can change into quality is important here and we examine it later below, but for now it suffices to note that after *Time and Free Will* Bergson begins to reconcile the stark division implied in that first work.

We may add another baroque element towards understanding duration. If Gouhier is correct in saying *Creative Evolution* represents the true philosophy of nature it would be a deep error to skip over this text with relation to duration. Clearly the concept of duration is not finished being thought by Bergson at the end of *Matter and Memory* as he opens up *Creative Evolution* with yet another description of duration:

“our duration is not merely one instant replacing another; if it were, there would never be anything but the present – no prolonging of the past into the actual, no evolution, no concrete duration. Duration is the continuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and which swells as it advances.”⁴⁵

To illustrate this Bergson employs what is now a rather famous example of sugar water. If one wants mix a glass of sugar and water one must wait until the sugar melts before they can have it.⁴⁶ This waiting is not simply mathematical time because it coincides with impatience, “with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something *thought*, it is something lived. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute.”⁴⁷ This is not to say that the glass, the sugar, the water, and my self are not related, but that *relation itself is absolute and contracted into a whole*.

Duration in this way is then also the environment of differences in kind – nature itself: “The universe *endures*.”⁴⁸ The argument for conceiving of nature in the same way we do of duration comes from an empirical examination of reality. We see immediately in the universe radical change, movement, evolution, difference. As we said above we

⁴⁴ Bergson, 221. See also Mullarkey, 144-146 on the nature of qualitative multiplicity.

⁴⁵ Bergson, Henri, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005) 4.

⁴⁶ Deleuze makes the humorous point that one can always stir the water with a spoon to help the sugar dissolve (*Cinema 1*, 9).

⁴⁷ Bergson, 8.

⁴⁸ Bergson, 9. See also Ansell-Pearson, Keith, *Germinal Life: The Difference and Repetition of Deleuze* (London: Routledge, 1999) 29. Or Deleuze’s statement, “Relations do not belong to objects, but to the whole, on condition that this is not confused with a closed set of objects. [...] through relations, the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively. We can say of duration itself or of time, that it is the whole of relations (Deleuze, 10).”

then try and make sense of this through abstract thought, but the reality of nature itself does not measure or count.⁴⁹ Thinking nature thorough duration and not space allows us to see that the fundamental aspect of nature is change, even if this change may admit of degrees as well as kinds: “*Time is invention or it is nothing at all.*”⁵⁰ Nature, if we are to say it is written at all, is fundamentally written in poetry or drama not in the language of some reified mathematics or physics, but through a mathematics or physics given dramatic form. In fact, it is all too often philosophers who turn mathematics or physics into reified, positivist versions of themselves, whereas Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari attempt to open up the dramatic and poetic in science recognizing that even the lives of famous mathematicians, like Georg Cantor, speak to an underlying drama. As Bergson says in *Matter and Memory* immediate consciousness agrees with the “remotest aspirations” of science.⁵¹ This being the caes, it would appear that an ecosystem understood through duration remains as it was before our investigation of duration – a relational concept and so it would appear that little has been added to what is already found in ecological thought.⁵² How then does duration dissolve false problems and refocus or even answer the true problem?

To answer this question we must turn to the philosophical criticisms of ecological restoration. Before so doing already some will have noticed a glaring problem with Bergson’s thinking in relation to ecological restoration. If Bergson’s concept of duration is explicitly opposed to the notion of spatial thinking how then does it apply to ecology which takes the ecosystem as its determining concept? Though the concept of ecosystem expresses a dynamic holon analogous to Bergson’s conception of a virtual whole that is and remains open, it is still necessarily spatially distinct as it deals with concrete space.

⁴⁹ Bergson, 180.

⁵⁰ Bergson, 282.

⁵¹ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 197. For a detailed and nuanced account of Bergson’s relationship with physics see Čapek, Milič, *Bergson and Modern Physics: A Re-Interpretation and Re-Evaluation* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1971).

⁵² The history of the concept of ecosystem demands that we accept relationality beyond just the living organisms, the biotic community, but extend it to that of the dead and the inorganic or “never-living”. An ecosystem captures the dynamics of communities of the living and the dead as they interact with the never-living so that when energy animates the system there is an exchange of material between the living and the dead. This understanding of ecosystem is faithful to the original formulation by A.G. Tansley in 1935. See Tansley, A. G., “The Use and Abuse of Vegetational Concepts and Terms,” *Ecology* 16.3 (1935): 299-303. I am deeply indebted to Prof. Liam Heneghan of DePaul University’s Institute for Nature and Culture for the notion of the “never-living” and his help in understanding the concept of ecosystem more fully.

But, as shown above, it is not real space that Bergson opposes to duration. Rather it is the abstract homogenous space of Newtonian and Galilean physics that is opposed to duration; the space of discrete multiplicity. Such thinking is what leads us to the false problem of an “authentic ecosystem” that can never be restored. Robert Elliot, one of the respected philosophical voices writing against the possibility of restoration on philosophical grounds, centers his critique on the notion of authenticity.⁵³ For him the value of nature is given in its otherness from human creatures: humanity exhibits production and intentionality, while nature is “wild” and “raw” exhibiting design without intention.⁵⁴ While he does protest against his critics that this does not constitute a hard, realist dualism between humanity and nature it is difficult to see how it can be anything other: while humanity is coextensive with nature in its emergence it breaks continuity with nature through its intentionality. This is a strange kind of two worlds view of nature and humanity that has two levels; a monism of space that becomes a real dualism of substance.

But, though it goes against what Elliot would consider common sense, we have to ask if there is any real reason to believe that nature lacks intentionality. In *Mind-Energy* Bergson provides a convincing argument against the anthropocentric understandings of intentionality and consciousness:

“It is sometimes said that, in ourselves, consciousness is directly connected with a brain, and that we must attribute consciousness to living beings which have a brain and deny it to those which have none. It would be just as though we should say that because in ourselves digestion is directly connected with a stomach, therefore only living beings with a stomach can digest. We should be entirely wrong, for it is not necessary to have a stomach, nor even to have special organs, in order to digest. An amoeba digests, although it is an almost undifferentiated protoplasmic mass. What is true is that in proportion to the complexity and perfection of an organism there is a division of labour; special organs are assigned

⁵³ See Elliot, 74-76. Elliot focuses his argument in this way to attempt to protect restoration against political misuses that would be completely contrary to the spirit restoration is undertaken in. The example is of a mining company representative arguing that a destroyed ecosystem can be ‘replaced’ after the resources have been extracted. Obviously such nefarious and disingenuous appeals to restoration should be strongly resisted.

⁵⁴ Elliot, 59.

special functions; and the faculty of digesting is localized in the stomach, or rather in a general digestive apparatus, which works better because confined to that one function alone. In like manner, consciousness in man is unquestionably connected with the brain: but it by no means follows that a brain is indispensable to consciousness. [...] Theoretically, then, everything living might be conscious. *In principle*, consciousness is co-extensive with life.”⁵⁵

The charge from philosophers of mind would be one of panpsychism, a doctrine that is considered anathema in the current scientific worldview. However Bergson’s is a qualified panpsychism and has an equally important notion of the unconscious:

“It appears to me therefore extremely likely that consciousness, originally immanent in all that lives, is dormant where there is no longer spontaneous movement, and awakens when life tends to free activity. We can verify the law in ourselves. What happens when one of our actions ceases to be spontaneous and becomes automatic? Consciousness departs from it.”⁵⁶

In other words, large swaths of nature, including elements of humanity, persist in an unconscious activity.

In Elliot’s common sense philosophy there is no need to think of nature as anything other than unintentional, lacking all consciousness or unconsciousness, in a word “wild”. But this already has a certain historical configuration in the history of thought and is anything but necessarily coextensive with the experience of nature. Indeed the idea of such a realist separation of cultured humanity apart from wild nature is really a result of thinking in terms of quantitative multiplicity where the value of nature comes from a difference in the number of properties (design without intentionality), while we propose to understand the ecosystem, both as it is damaged and restored, in terms of the whole. Which is to say that the ecosystem must be understood as a qualitative

⁵⁵ Bergson, Henri, *Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays*, trans. H. Wildon Carr (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1920) 7-8.

⁵⁶ Bergson, 11. There have been developments in this tradition of thinking panpsychism that make both arguments for modified, less strong conceptions of panpsychism, as well as those who argue for a stronger notion of panpsychism. For the first see Thomson, Evan, *Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2007) and for the second see Rosenberg, Gregg, *A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World*, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). To give a fuller account of the relationship of panpsychism to ecological thinking one would need to engage with these works. We, however, limit ourselves for the purposes of this essay to Bergson’s account.

multiplicity where the quantitative and qualitative intervention of human persons is understood internally as a difference of degree from the other parts of the ecosystem, from the living and non-living to the never-living. The notion that the value of a natural environment or ecosystem is dependent upon an origin quite distinct from human intervention is flawed in thinking that human intervention is discrete and so we must rethink how value is created.

But, before turning to the problem of value we must answer more adequately the question of what it would mean to make nature whole or, in Jordan's more rigorous definition, as "outsiders" of a certain kind what would it would mean to allow an ecosystem to persist in a historical state as if novel or "outside" influences were not present. To answer this it is helpful to turn to Deleuze's furthering of Bergson's philosophy with regard to memory and the unconscious.

Memory and the Unconscious

Turning to the Deleuzian elements we wish to introduce into this system we must note that Deleuze's Bergsonism is considered strange by some commentators. Even he remarked that "people [...] laugh at me simply for having written on Bergson at all".⁵⁷ A passage from Merleau-Ponty's essay "Bergson in the Making" provides the historical context for why Deleuze's contemporaries found his writings on Bergson so funny:

"The truth is that there are two Bergsonisms. There is that audacious one, when Bergson's philosophy fought and, as Péguy says, fought well. And there is that one after the victory, persuaded in advance about what Bergson took a long time to find, and already provided with concepts while Bergson himself created his own. When Bergsonian insights are identified with the vague cause of spiritualism or some other entity, they lose their bite; they are generalized and minimized. What is left is only a retrospective or external Bergsonism. It found its formulation when Father Sertillanges wrote that in this day the Church would no

⁵⁷ Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 6.

longer put Bergson on the Index; not that it is going back on its judgment in 1913, but because it now knows how Bergson's works turned out."⁵⁸

Quite clearly Deleuze's interest in Bergson stems from the Bergsonism that 'fought well', for he says of those who laugh at him for writing on Bergson, "It simply shows they don't know enough history. They've no idea how much hatred Bergson managed to stir up in the French university system at the outset and how he become the focus for all sorts of crazy and unconventional people right across the spectrum."⁵⁹

Deleuze's turn to Bergson produces a few interesting scholarly insights, especially with regard to Bergson's conception of the virtual and the whole, but compared to other contemporary French commentators like Gouhier or Jankélévitch his work isn't extraordinary.⁶⁰ What is extraordinary is the way he takes Bergson's work and extends it in his own project. As Christian Kerslake tells us, "Deleuze's return to Bergson was a return to aspects in Bergson's theory that fell outside the caricatural view of it as an affirmation of Heraclitean flux or novelty."⁶¹ Kerslake goes on to say Deleuze did not consider duration to be Bergson's most significant contribution to the philosophy of time, but rather his theory of memory. Bergson creates his theory of memory because his concept of duration makes him realize that for things to pass into the past they must be somehow "recorded", otherwise there be nothing known other than the present.⁶² Bergson explains that memory must be something real, a pure past actually existent even as common sense tells us the past passes and is dead and gone; "it may be past, but it is not dead."⁶³ Memory opens itself to the unconscious because most of the past lies outside immediate consciousness and yet nothing is gone.⁶⁴ This is then how Bergson's theory of memory comes to form the basis for Deleuze's understanding of the unconscious. Strange as it may seem to the common sense of the post-Freudian age Deleuze conceived of the unconscious mainly in terms of memory and time rather than sexuality because, "For

⁵⁸ Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, "Bergson in the Making," trans. Richard C. McCleary, *Signs* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964) 182-183.

⁵⁹ Deleuze, 6.

⁶⁰ For specific criticisms of Deleuze's reading see Mullarkey, *passim*.

⁶¹ Kerslake, Christian, *Deleuze and the Unconscious* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007) 7.

⁶² Kerslake, 30.

⁶³ Kerslake, 17-18.

⁶⁴ "Duration is indeed real succession, but it is so only because, more profoundly, it is *virtual coexistence*: the coexistence with itself of all the levels, all the tensions, all the degrees of contraction and relaxation." Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 60.

Deleuze, the notion of the unconscious cannot be adequately treated outside an account of the temporal syntheses that characterize human cognition.”⁶⁵

As Deleuze takes from Bergson, it is not time that is within us as subjectivity or otherwise, but we that are within time.⁶⁶ Thus a temporal synthesis of time is also a synthesis concerning the underlying conditions of our reality and not merely a statement concerning mind. In the second chapter of Deleuze’s first major independent work, *Difference and Repetition*, he develops a philosophy of time by way of three syntheses of time. François Zourabichvili says that the three syntheses of time are three different ways of dwelling in time, or even more succinctly, three different ways of living.⁶⁷ This is a continuation of Bergson’s idea of different durations interacting at different rhythms with one another. Jay Lampert makes the complementary claim that the three syntheses correspond to three syntheses of desire.⁶⁸ Though an investigation of each synthesis of time would be prudent and potentially helpful for thinking ecological restoration, we limit ourselves to the second synthesis of time, that of the past, and its corresponding synthesis of desire.

The first synthesis of time is the passive synthesis of habit which constitutes time as present.⁶⁹ But the nature of the present is to pass. Time in itself cannot escape the present so the question, again, is how it passes. The past cannot be built upon the same synthesis of time as the present if the past is to remain distinct from the present. So there must be another synthesis of time corresponding to the past.⁷⁰ For the sake of our argument here let us accept that Deleuze’s philosophy of time is at the least consistent and plausible enough to move forward from. When he says that memory is the ground of time it is a statement about the immutability of the past. The past, he says, neither passes

⁶⁵ Kerslake, 7.

⁶⁶ “Bergsonism has often been reduced to the following idea: duration is subjective, and constitutes our internal life. And it is true that Bergson had to express himself in this way, at least at the outset. But increasingly, he came to say something quite different: the only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and *it is we who are internal to time*, not the other way around. [...] Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and change.” Deleuze, Gilles, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) 82.

⁶⁷ Zourabichvili, François, *Deleuze: Une philosophie de l'événement*, 2nd ed. (Paris: PUF, 1996) 71.

⁶⁸ Lampert, Jay, *Deleuze and Guattari's Philosophy of History* (London: Continuum, 2006) 60-64.

⁶⁹ On the first synthesis of time see Deleuze, Gilles, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 70-79.

⁷⁰ Deleuze, 79. Deleuze will make a similar argument for why there must be a third synthesis of time relating to the future.

nor comes forth and this is why it is not a dimension of time, but the ground or synthesis of time of which the present and the future are dimensions.⁷¹ Deleuze, again following Bergson, takes this experience of the immutability of the past, of the paradox of a past which we can only say no longer exists and yet is, and comes up with the notion of a transcendental pure past that coexists with present and future. The embodied memory of a human person is facilitated by the brain, but memory itself cannot be found there.⁷² Deleuze's argument for transcendental memory is much like Bergson's argument for panpsychism. When a human person forgets something it is an episode of our empirical memory failing to grasp something seen, heard, smelled, or in any other way sensed a second time. Transcendental memory is implied by empirical memory because otherwise how would we know we have forgotten something. Transcendental memory apprehends "not a contingent past, but the being of the past as such and the past of every time. In this manner, the *forgotten* thing *appears* in person to the memory which essentially apprehends it."⁷³

The three syntheses of time are said to be constitutive of the unconscious.⁷⁴ This is because the ground of each synthesis is the second, that of the past and transcendental memory. The past has a special relationship with the unconscious for, as past, it is the true reality.⁷⁵ The present is not true in the old Platonic sense because it is becoming, but the past is fixed even as it is expanding more and more. The past as unconscious, or everything else in reality other than our empirical consciousness, is reality.⁷⁶ This can be connected with another of Deleuze's findings, this time alongside Guattari, that the unconscious is productive.⁷⁷ The products of the unconscious are desires which are not constituted by lack but are themselves primarily productive. It is this endless producing without a reified product to identify with that forms both the essence of nature and humanity for Deleuze and Guattari. Industry is not a matter of mere utility or humanity

⁷¹ Deleuze, 82.

⁷² This is the argument of the Chapter 1 of Bergson's *Matter and Memory*.

⁷³ Deleuze, 140.

⁷⁴ Deleuze, 114.

⁷⁵ This is again a development from Bergson. See Kerslake, 9 and Lawlor, Leonard, *The Challenge of Bergsonism: Phenomenology, Ontology, Ethics* (London and New York: Continuum, 2003) 32.

⁷⁶ Lampert, 60, 62.

⁷⁷ "The great discovery of psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions of the unconscious." Deleuze, Gilles and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983) 24.

coming out of the nature, but is itself a manifestation of nature as production of and by humankind.⁷⁸ This leads them to the circular formula that industry or production = nature = history. It seems obscure when Deleuze and Guattari say that the ‘unconscious does no more than reproduce itself in itself’⁷⁹, but this becomes less obscure when we remember unconscious = memory which is the ever expanding past. This also helps us to make sense of their claim that the unconscious is the coextensiveness of humankind and nature.⁸⁰ The fact of the unconscious speaks against those philosophies that want to make a real distinction between nature and humanity because the unconscious speaks of a more ordinary coextensiveness than anything like “unintentional design” can lay claim to.

This may all appear quite speculative and esoteric, but it is our contention that it can add distinctly to the thinking of ecological restoration. We are contending that Deleuze is correct in saying there is real ontological weight behind Bergson’s conception of duration and memory and that his extension of this into the theses of a transcendental memory and production = nature = unconscious is fundamentally correct. In part this means that the concept of the ecosystem implicitly calls for a thinking of memory, or pure past, when it accounts for its dynamics. The past may be dead but it is not gone and it is part of the exchange of energy at work in the ecosystem. The practice of ecological restoration can be understood as a machinic assemblage that connects a distinct unconscious ecosystem memory, with all its distinct acts of production, with the desiring-production of a human ecological assemblage. Against Elliot’s value-at-the-origin, this is a value that comes from actualizing a memory as there is no real discrete origin that can be separated out of the flow of the pure past. In Nietzschean terms, as explicated by Deleuze, Elliot represents the ecological neurotic who remains unable to turn a passive memory (the discrete origin as pure virtual artefact in the pure past) into an active memory (the memory actualized into the future by way of the present).⁸¹ While this

⁷⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, 4. See also Holland, Eugene W., *Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999) 54.

⁷⁹ Deleuze and Guattari, 108.

⁸⁰ Deleuze and Guattari, 107.

⁸¹ “Culture endows consciousness with a new faculty which is apparently opposed to the faculty of forgetting: memory. [...] This original memory is no longer a function of the past, but a function of the future. It is not the memory of the sensibility but of the will. [...] It is the faculty of promising, commitment to the future, *memory of the future itself*. Remembering the promise that has been made is not recalling that it was made at a particular past moment, but that one must hold to it at a future moment. This is precisely the selective object of culture: forming a man capable of promising and thus of make use of the future, a

claim, that the concept of ecosystem necessitates a conception and account of the unconscious ecological memory, does not provide an injunction to restoration it does provide a defence of restoration both in terms of the ontology of the concept of ecosystem itself. Against the appeal to the “innocent wild” ecological restoration knows it is not innocent for it holds a memory of the forbidden fruit that made us into living creatures of becoming not content to merely be.

The Custodial Powers of Creative Emotion and the False

The philosophy of nature outlined above breaths forth the axiom that the human is not distinct from nature in any strong ontological sense. The difference between humankind and nature more generally is one of degrees and not of kind. Humanity represents a higher contraction of certain virtualities according to Bergson. Deleuze says it well:

“Duration, Life, is *in principle* memory, in principle consciousness, in principle freedom. ‘In principle’ means virtually. The whole question is knowing under what conditions duration becomes *in fact* consciousness of self, how life *actually* accedes to a memory and freedom of fact. Bergson’s answer is that it is only on the line of Man that the *élan vital* successfully ‘gets through’; man in this sense is ‘the purpose of the entire process of evolution.’ It could be said that in man, and only in man, the actual becomes adequate to the virtual.”⁸²

This is clarified in *Anti-Oedipus* when the unconscious as production is shown to be the coextensiveness of humankind and nature for humanity merely represents a more prolific productive desiring-machine than other aspects of nature. In Bergson creation replaces the word production, but the two are essentially synonyms between the two philosophies as Deleuze sees artistic works as production and Bergson sees industry by way of mechanics as creative.

However, against this seeming optimism of productive creativity, crucial for the resilience of our burgeoning hybrid ecosystem is the question of humanity’s failure.

free and powerful man.” Deleuze, Gilles, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983) 134 [my emphasis]. See also Kerslake, 35.

⁸² Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 106.

Obviously both Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari are not claiming that the *élan vital* has come to an end with man. If anything to varying degrees their respective philosophies are attempts to think beyond the human condition. For Bergson this means overcoming the bias towards utility and spatialization. Such overcoming would release human knowledge of things from its relativity to the fundamental structures of the human mind and recover contact with the real, the fundamental structure of creativity which organizes the world and presses on through increasing divergence.⁸³ For Deleuze and Guattari it means following the principles of connection, heterogeneity, multiplicity, and rupture in order to enter into the perpetual construction and collapse of process that perpetually renews itself beyond the merely human and our needs.⁸⁴ It is possible that philosophies of this sort may assist towards the production of more expressions of life beyond the merely human, even restored expression of life such as degraded ecosystems. As it stands, accepting that humanity is the highest contraction of the virtualities listed above, it nevertheless has failed to actualize adequately the virtual reality of radical openness which is the common element of freedom, memory, consciousness, and life. We need to only read the newspaper to realize that humanity is so much static and so little creativity and life.

Ecologically we have created an imbalance between ourselves and much of the rest of nature as we've actualized the virtual powers of production. For those with the will to attune their attention to this problem two emotions appear especially produced from this: guilt and shame. Returning to Jordan's work thinking through restoration we see that he differentiates these two emotions by holding that guilt is what we do.⁸⁵ Guilt is related to what in common sense is understood as wrong-doing or moral failures, which is to say guilt is connected to what human persons do. Those with eyes to see the damage wrought by human invention on the environment at large may feel guilt to such an extent that they look for ways to counterbalance their moral failing. A kind of economic exchange goes on such that we feel we've participated in justice. The contemporary model for this in relation to the environment is the new secular system of buying indulgences for one's ecological sins. Rather than not driving a car one simply pays extra to 'offset' their carbon footprint. But this is a flawed view of justice, for an eye

⁸³ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, 184-185.

⁸⁴ Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 7-10, 20.

⁸⁵ Jordan, 46.

cannot always be repaid for with an eye, a dollar to the oil company cannot always be repaid with a dollar to an environmental NGO. As Bergson says, ‘Quality must be borne in mind as well as quantity.’⁸⁶

Quality brings us to the second emotion evoked within those who have eyes to see – shame. Jordan, following the work of literary critic Frederick Turner and his anthropologist parents Victor and Edith Turner, says that shame is consciousness of what *we are*. It is worth quoting Jordan at length on this issue:

“[Shame is] a sense of existential unworthiness, the painful emotion a person naturally feels on encountering *any* kind of shortcoming or limitation, beginning with the infant’s discovery that he or she is not omnipotent but is instead one of many others and dependent on those others for every kind of pleasure, of satisfaction, and even for life itself. This shame is inseparable from any experience of relationship for the simple reason that any relationship forces on us an awareness of difference, and therefore of limitation.”⁸⁷

Jordan says that what is distinctive about the West is not its use of shame to control behaviour, but rather the drive to repress shame rather than dealing with it productively.⁸⁸ For Jordan, as evidenced by anthropological findings from indigenous cultures, shame is ultimately productive of rituals that create value in the shameful reality of situations.⁸⁹

Creative Emotion

Eric Katz’s harsh criticism of ecological restoration is predicated on the idea that restoration is just a way of cleaning up a mess already made by humans and cleverly covers over the desire to dominate all of nature that caused the mess in the first place.⁹⁰ Both Katz and Elliot hold that humanity can never clean up the mess completely; the

⁸⁶ Bergson, Henri, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977) 70.

⁸⁷ Jordan, 46-47. It is prudent to note that limitation is not the same as lack.

⁸⁸ Jordan, 47.

⁸⁹ “[...] the first farmers invented ritual sacrifice as a way of dealing productively with the intensification of shame they encountered in the acts of domestication and cultivation”. Jordan, 128.

⁹⁰ “A “restored” nature is an artefact created to meet human satisfactions and interests. Thus, on the most fundamental level, it is an unrecognized manifestation of the insidious dream of the human domination of nature. Once and for all, humanity will demonstrate its mastery of nature by “restoring” and repairing the degraded ecosystems of the biosphere. Cloaked in an environmental consciousness, human power will reign supreme.” Katz, 232.

wounds it has caused can never be healed, because the authenticity of the ecosystem is forever lost. They compare the restored ecosystem to a piece of forged art as if the ecosystem were analogous to a true artistic creation and the restored ecosystem to but an amateur forgery.⁹¹ We have already provided a case against the argument against restoration from an ontological standpoint, but what of an ethical one? Does restoration merely cover over the desire to dominate nature? Of course, as indicated by our description of humanity's position in nature above, we disagree with Katz with regard to the status of technology.⁹² But his essay raises the interesting question of whether restoration is indicative of an open or closed morality; which is to say it raises the question of whether or not restoration is spurred by creative emotion.

Returning to Jordan's notion of shame we see that it is a perfect example of what Bergson calls creative emotion. In Bergson's scheme of what can be understood as the faculties of the human person emotion is distinct from intelligence and instinct. Emotions have, in part, an autonomous existence from intelligence and instinct such that emotion is coextensive with either intelligence or instinct, depending on the situation, but not subordinate to the other term.⁹³ This suggests that action has just as much of an emotional impetus as it does an intellectual or instinctual one. Bergson's description of this in relation to musical emotion is rather powerful:

“We feel, while we listen, as though we could not desire anything else but what the music is suggesting to us, and that that is just as we should naturally and necessarily act did we not refrain from action to listen. Let the music express joy or grief, pity or love, every moment we are what it expresses. Not only ourselves, but many others, nay, all the others, too. When music weeps, all humanity, all nature, weeps with it. In point of fact it does not introduce those feelings into us; it introduces us into them as passers-by are forced into a street dance.”⁹⁴

Emotion is then not a private experience, but a social and political one. Emotion is propulsive of individual action and corporate action and creating the right kind of

⁹¹ Katz, 233.

⁹² The way he passes over so-called ‘artefacts’ made by non-human animals (i.e. a dam produced by a beaver) and those by humans is nothing less than a philosophical delinquency. See Katz, 234.

⁹³ See Deleuze, 110-111.

⁹⁴ Bergson, 40.

emotion can lead to changes in the social and political makeup of relations in a society of which we must add the ecosystem.

This is a somewhat controversial claim, but Bergson holds that it is a mistake, or “excess of intellectualism”, to think that an emotion is just a mere reaction of sensory faculties to a representation in the intellect (as if anything sensory could ever be “mere”). To convince us of his position Bergson invites us to continue considering our experience of musical emotion. Music arouses emotions we know to be well-defined (joy, sorrow, pity, love, anger) and not attached to anything in particular other than the music and the stories it may present. Some may argue that the music did not produce the emotion, but rather we have already experienced this emotion in real life and connected to a discrete object or set of more or less natural circumstances.⁹⁵ The mountain inspires in us awe; we enjoy the shade of the tree; the dark of the forest fear, etc. But each of these emotions tied to non-human nature are finite, tied more to spurning action towards the goal of fulfilling needs: we fear the dark forest because we need to be aware of predators; we take pleasure in the cool waters because we are thirsty.⁹⁶ Thinking that a new creative emotion is actually just a new object tied to these finite non-human natural emotions is an error related to language. Bergson says, “joy and sorrow, pity and love, are words expressing generalities, words which we must call upon to express what music makes us feel, whereas each new musical work brings with it new feelings, which are created by that music and within that music”.⁹⁷

For Bergson it is the historical mystics that best represent a human person acting in creative emotion. Unlike the rest of humanity mystics do not intellectualize their emotions but, “True mystics simply open their souls to the oncoming wave.”⁹⁸ Which is to say that those who best actualize creative emotions do not give us a model of what should be done, which is what moral philosophy of the sort Katz and Elliot does, but simply show us how to affirm the creative emotion.⁹⁹ Unlike the ecological indulgences that the emotion of guilt propagates, where we pay our debt and are done with it, the

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Bergson, 41.

⁹⁷ Bergson, 40.

⁹⁸ Bergson, 99.

⁹⁹ Goodchild, Philip, "Politics and Experience: Bergsonism Beyond Transcendence and Immanence," *Rethinking Philosophy of Religion: Approaches from Continental Philosophy*, ed. Philip Goodchild (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002) 325.

emotion of shame can only be affirmed by the act of restoring.¹⁰⁰ It is like St. Francis who can only turn away from his old godless life of decadence and suffer alongside the poor in response to the feeling of God's love. The question of authenticity cannot be answered ethically in Katz's philosophy because his is a philosophy of essences. The ecosystem was once and it no longer is; what it was is forever changed by the evil propagated upon it such that the ecosystem is forever a site of evil standing against the possibility of forgiveness. This is rightly speaking against a philosophy of existence, or those few who would dare to suggest that restoration will make everything better, finally redeemed once the evil of the past is negated through the ecosystem's successfully restored existence. Philip Goodchild's writings on suffering provide a powerful description of what an ethics of creative emotion strives for beyond both a philosophy of essence and a philosophy of existence,

“Once suffering receives sufficient attention, then its mode of experience is transformed. Although it remains otherwise unchanged, its power of imposing itself upon attention ceases. Suffering can then be left in the past – it becomes an event in a series which constitutes what we are. It becomes a part in the fabric of existence, without continuing to express itself as pain. There is no need to redeem the past. One can even come to love the past, to love one's pain, if at the same time one forgives one's pain. [...] Our bodies and lives are composed of our scars.”¹⁰¹

Shame creates ethical and practical modes of attention to a given ecosystem through the mechanisms of ecological restoration.¹⁰² It affirms the authenticity of the reality of the ecosystem, its wounds and its prior past, as it works for a future of the ecosystem.

In terms of the ethical underpinning of ecological restoration creative emotion provides a valuable concept. However if it is to have efficacy ethics must also open to politics; just as the great mystics founded orders, ecological restoration must have a people or, perhaps better understood, a human and non-human culture. Towards a concept worthy of how ecological restoration can and does foster such a culture we turn

¹⁰⁰ See Jordan, 96-136.

¹⁰¹ Goodchild, Philip, *Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety* (London: Routledge, 2002) 214. The preceding paragraph is also dependent on Goodchild's thought.

¹⁰² See Jordan, 200-201.

to the concept of fabulation which also serves to exchange energy from Bergson to Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy of religion.

Fabulation

Bergson deserves to be amongst the canon of great philosophers of religion because he has gone the furthest in looking at what religion *does* and not what it *is* in the order of transcendence. Rather than reifying religion as some separate sphere cut off from the wider world, his philosophy explicitly connects religion to the political and cultural as well as the natural. He recognizes that there is a religious dimension to politics, as the point is often made, but that in this way religion is used to merely extend human justice to the realm of the divine and expresses nothing religious within religion. Even sophisticated theological discourse on the City of God still takes place on the same plane as the City of Man and in this way is not intuitive, but intellectual.¹⁰³ What Bergson's philosophy of religion aims to do is to enter into the intuitive plane of religion where it is actually experienced.

In Bergson's philosophy religion diverges along two tendencies: static religion and dynamic religion. Our short foray into mysticism above touches on Bergson's understanding of dynamic religion. What defines the other mode of religion, static religion, is fundamentally reactive as Bergson says, "*It is a defensive reaction of nature against what might be depressing for the individual, and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence.*"¹⁰⁴ At the heart of static religion, and this defensive reaction of nature, is fabulation.¹⁰⁵ That is to say, static religion, like the ascetic ideal, names the preserving element of religion *for life*, which also implies that religion is fundamentally connected to the whole of nature. Fabulation is the most active aspect of this mode of religion, but it comes second in the order of functions and is subordinate to this defensive reaction of nature.¹⁰⁶ The argument runs that life has endowed humanity with intelligence

¹⁰³ Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* 98-99.

¹⁰⁴ Bergson, 205.

¹⁰⁵ The English translators of *Two Sources* translate the French *fabulation* as 'myth-making function'. The more standard understanding would be 'storytelling', though it is obvious that Bergson is giving the term a more technical function. I follow the English neologism 'fabulation' common in translations of Deleuze to keep continuity between their thought and because it captures the technical connotation by relating it strongly to fabrication.

¹⁰⁶ Bergson, 125.

to such a degree that it can recognize its own death. This ability to rationalize can run counter to the impetus of life, which is to create more life, in that it can depress the human person. Life then develops fabulation as a second order function of intelligence that resists the excesses or damaging aspects of intelligence.¹⁰⁷

Mullarkey brings our attention to the fundamental connection between trauma and fabulation: “Leafing through the pages of *The Two Sources* on fabulation, one cannot miss its connection with trauma, especially the trauma of excess novelty, that is, novelty or difference beyond our foresight.”¹⁰⁸ This supplements well Jordan’s repeated exhortations and calls to performance, liturgy, play, drama, and other forms of ritual performance and performance art. It is not strange that Jordan would want to integrate these into the practice of ecological restoration, for at the heart of all performance is fabulation and all fabulation is essentially a response to trauma, to finding a way to live with our scars that, at its best, allows us to forgive and love them.¹⁰⁹

Deleuze connects up the question of fabulation to that of a “minority people”. Minority is not connected to a model like a majority is and it is thus form, and not quantity, that defines something as a majority or a minority. A minority people is located in a becoming or a process.¹¹⁰ In terms of ecological restoration the task is not to find a people if this remains purely anthropocentric, but rather to reconceive what the relationship is that constitutes the whole ecosystem as a people, as a becoming-relationship. It can’t happen only through the performing arts, because as Deleuze writes:

“Art is resistance: it resists death, slavery, infamy, shame. But a people can’t worry about art. How is a people created, through what terrible suffering? When a people’s created, it’s through its own resources, but in a way that links up with something in art [...] or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia isn’t the right concept: it’s more a question of a “fabulation” in which a people and art both share.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Bergson, 119.

¹⁰⁸ Mullarkey, John, "Bergson and Religion," *History of the Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Graham Oppy and Nick Trakakis, vol. 5 (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing Limited, Forthcoming) [draft manuscript].

¹⁰⁹ On the connection of all art to fabulation see Bergson, 187.

¹¹⁰ Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 173-174.

¹¹¹ Deleuze, 174.

Clearly there is always a little bit of a lie in restoration, a little falsification because there is creativity. If ecological restoration can connect up its practices to this shared concept of fabulation between the “people” (what we are extending to the wider ecosystem) and the art expressing the fabulation, then it will have gone further politically than any other ecological movement. But this notion of falsity is exactly what the critiques of ecological restoration cling to – the restored ecosystem is false and the original ecosystem was true. What defence is there for the powers of the false when above we argued for a more realist, in terms of temporality, account of restoration?

The Powers of the False

Deleuze and Guattari’s relationship to religion is more complex than usually assumed by commentators. The assumption goes that Deleuze and Guattari are orthodox and pious atheists, unlike Jacques Derrida who, though atheist, flirted with religion by writing on explicitly religious themes and questions. And it is extremely unlikely that we would ever see a book entitled *The Prayers and Tears of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari* and as unlikely that there will be a major turn to Deleuze and Guattari by postmodern or traditional theologians.¹¹² In claiming that Deleuze and Guattari have a philosophy of religion, our goal is not to convert the thought of Deleuze and Guattari to the piety of religious scholars or the particular faiths of the world religions and their theologians. Rather we see that they have a philosophy of religion by locating certain ambiguities in their thinking of religion and that this philosophy of religion can provide insights into the very nature of religion.¹¹³

In a short, rather uncharacteristically uninspired 1989 interview concerning the controversy of the Islamic veil in French schools Deleuze states, “Religions are worth

¹¹² The reference is to John Caputo’s book *The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida*, from which a whole host of theological and religious works on Derrida’s philosophy and deconstruction have taken their model. Of course there does exist one book, a collection of essays, on Deleuze and religion: Bryden, Mary (ed), *Deleuze and Religion*, (New York and London: Routledge, 2002). These essays, with some exceptions, tend not to reflect directly on the question of religion, but rather on questions shared with or in opposition to religion and theology.

¹¹³ Philip Goodchild has done the most to show how Deleuze, both with and without Guattari, has a philosophy of religion. See Goodchild, Philip, "Deleuze and Philosophy of Religion," *Continental Philosophy of Religion*, ed. Morny Joy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, Forthcoming). There is a draft version of this available online at http://www.theologyphilosophycentre.co.uk/papers/Goodchild_DeleuzeandPhilosophy.doc.

much less than the nobility and courage of the atheisms they inspire.”¹¹⁴ Deleuze and Guattari are outright hostile to religion in *What is Philosophy?* where they posit religion as the other of philosophy.¹¹⁵ Yet such an ethic of exclusion contradicts immanence itself, for if the plane of immanence has learnt anything from ‘Christian philosophy’ it is that there are infinite immanent possibilities.¹¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari want to say these infinite immanent possibilities come about by ‘belief in God’ separated from concern with the transcendent existence of God, but this lacks connection to their more fundamental point that when this ‘atheism’ of faith connects up with the earth, rather than projecting itself onto it, then the plane of immanence itself is recharged.¹¹⁷ While attempting to distance themselves from religion they find themselves embracing faith and belief, for there is no sufficient reason why one should go on living. As if they were writing about the current set of ecological crises facing us Deleuze and Guattari write:

“[...] it is possible that the problem now concerns the one who believes in the world, and not even in the existence of the world but in its possibilities of movements and intensities, so as once again to give birth to new modes of existence, closer to animals and rocks. It may be that believing in this world, in this life, becomes our most difficult task, or the task of a mode of existence still to be discovered on our plane of immanence today. This is the empiricist conversion (we have so many reasons not to believe in the human world; we have lost the word, worse than a fiancée or a god). The problem has indeed changed.”¹¹⁸

It is rather stark to say, but the anti-restoration philosophies of Katz and Elliot lose our world. They turn it into something that was once authentic and no longer is. We can repeat and translate Nietzsche’s critique of truth: the true ecosystem does not exist, and if it did would be inaccessible, impossible to describe. The truthful man who wants to describe the true ecosystem and true world wants nothing other than to judge life, seeing

¹¹⁴ Deleuze, Gilles, "A Slippery Slope," trans. Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995*, ed. David Lapoujade (New York and London: Semiotext(e), 2006) 360. Deleuze’s views on the headscarf are lamentably majoritarian in the French context and the interview really lacks the philosophical rigor and caution of his wider work.

¹¹⁵ “Whenever there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in the sky or on earth, there is religion; and there is Philosophy whenever there is immanence, even if it functions as arena for the agon and rivalry.” Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 43.

¹¹⁶ Deleuze and Guattari, 74.

¹¹⁷ Deleuze and Guattari, 74, 92.

¹¹⁸ Deleuze and Guattari, 74-75.

in the ecosystem an evil that he wants, not to heal, but only to stand above it through a higher moral and normative judgment.¹¹⁹ Authenticity is here being tied to a past that never was, since it is an error of the intellect to assume an ecosystem is anything like a painting and not, rather, like a film. Even assuming that the ecosystem has some value because it is connected to a non-human past, this does not lead to authenticity. In a film the piece is authentic even when the sequences are out of chronological order, when it has a ‘false continuity’.¹²⁰ You cannot forge a movie, and if a movie is remade it is not said to be faked, but neither is it true – it simply is another film that can be affirmed or not.¹²¹

But, of course, even Nietzsche asks what is left after we have abolished the true world. “There remain bodies, which are forces, nothing but forces.”¹²² But this quasi-monism of force is not an ontology of violence, but an ontology of affect. The question of the false is a question of affect and the power of false continuity is to affect the human person, even to the point of drawing them into a creative emotion. Following Bergson’s first chapter of *Matter and Memory* we can say that the image is a certain body. Now take an image of an eco-utopia; a place where humanity has not mastered non-human nature, but come to dwell in it and to do so well, even joyfully. Such an image is affective, it can either cause depression at this not being the case or it can cause a more active emotion, some form of hope leading to bodily action. The opposite image has become all too familiar in contemporary culture, the eco-apocalypse. Hollywood films follow upon television series where we are given an image where humanity has failed to dwell in non-human nature. Each image is, strictly speaking, not true and yet each is real because each is affective.

The powers of the false are located in the affectivity of false images and false continuity. If truth has brought humanity to a point where they can no longer live because they have only judgment and not love or even hate, then truth must be resisted by the false. But this false cannot be just any false; this is not to say that everything is equivalent to everything else. A false image or a false time can either be noble or base, good or bad.

¹¹⁹ See Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 137

¹²⁰ Deleuze, 128.

¹²¹ “In short, the forger cannot be reduced to a simple copier, nor to a liar, because what is false is not simply a copy, but already the model. Should we not say, then, that the artist, even Vermeer, even Picasso, is a forger, since he makes a model with appearances, even if the next artist gives the model back to appearances in order to make a new model?” Deleuze, 146.

¹²² Deleuze, 139.

A falsity can foster destruction, entropy, and death (the lies of so many governments, with their new priestly caste of economists) and such a falsity is base, slavish to Mammon and Mars. But a falsity can also be noble, it can create: “According to physicists, noble energy is the kind which is capable of transforming itself”.¹²³ So, though Deleuze aims to be done with judgment, the powers of the false call for immanent evaluation. Though this philosophy is opposed to truth, it is the name of the good and the joyous – in short, it is for life.

Conclusion:

**Nature and Religion on the Same Plane of Immanence,
Or Restoration as Simulacrum**

Jordan’s writings hold a certain intuitional philosophic elegance. Though he has never read Bergson or Deleuze and Guattari, his philosophical reflections shooting forth from some restored rich prairie soil have remarkable affinities. What we have added to his discourse and to the practice of ecological restoration is not a list of proscriptions or judgments, but philosophical allies and concepts from three of this last century’s greatest thinkers. In this concluding section we want to look at the wasp and the orchid together, to see it as nature really is, “in reflexive interaction with all its elements, including ourselves.”¹²⁴

As we have presented them nature and religion come to be on the same plane of immanence – an ecosystem of thought. Nature, the living and the dead, generates the false images of fabulation and religion, the never-living, in an attempt to foster and continue life. Such an ecosystem of thought may or may not be affective for ecological restoration, only by putting it into relation with others can we see that, but I would like to spend some time elucidating directly what has been suggested throughout this essay. The ecosystem of thought presented here can defend or resist the judgment of authenticity and truth present in the critiques of Katz and Elliot because the philosophies of Bergson and Deleuze/Guattari offer concepts of nature and religion, images of the heterogeneous continuity of humanity and nature, which supports authenticity through creation and expose the error of a ‘true ecosystem’.

¹²³ Deleuze, 141.

¹²⁴ Jordan, 123.

Jordan reminds us that the word nature derives from the same root as the Latin *natus*, meaning birth, “which is, after all, the creation of an imperfect copy of an ‘original’”.¹²⁵ All creation is a simulacrum, because it is the actualization in matter what is virtually real in spirit or non-matter, perhaps even naming this the future is appropriate. If Bergson has a theology it is that God is an infinite creativity, not a creator, but the very process that is living, immanent and indefinite within life.¹²⁶ Deleuze and Guattari’s theology is much the same, as they believe in the God of the disjunctive syllogism.¹²⁷ Our creativity is thus like a divinity within us, even if it is a bit of a diabolical God whose image we are crated in the image of. The image of a restored ecosystem, when it restores the relationship between the living, dead, and the never-living, is more than just putting a few plants back in a discrete space. It creates and thus expresses this divinity. This is what Bergson means when he says our planet is a machine for the making of gods. Not that human beings will become like God, knowing good and evil with full control over a true world of our absolute creation, but that human beings have been given, for better or worse, the capability to drive and direct the creative energies of the universe which eternally express this underlying divinity.

If we want to save ourselves, the world, the earth and its future time, we must make the decision to believe in it again. This is not an invitation to repeat the errors and violence of mythology, though that must be risked, but a war cry to discover what the body of the earth can do. Ecological restoration provides practices and challenges to thought that may bring us into such knowledge. Ecological restoration is an expression not of humanity’s desire to conquer and finally control nature. Ecological restoration expresses the human not as king of creation but as an eternal custodian of the machine for the making of gods.¹²⁸

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ “In our eyes, the ultimate end of mysticism is the establishment of a contact, consequently of a partial coincidence, with the creative effort which life itself manifests. This effort is of God, if it is not God himself.” Bergson, 220.

¹²⁷ “God defined as the *Omnitudo realitatis*, from which all secondary realities are derived by a process of division”. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 13. See also Goodchild, 11-12 [draft].

¹²⁸ “Not man as king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible for even the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plus an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe.” Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 4. “Humanity lies groaning, half crushed under the weight of its own progress. They do not sufficiently

realize that their future is in their own hands. Theirs is the task of determining first of all whether they want to go on living or not. Theirs the responsibility, then, for deciding if they want merely to live, or intend to make just the extra effort required for fulfilling, even on our refractory planet, the essential function of the universe, which is a machine for the making of gods.” Bergson, *Two Sources*, 317 [translation modified].