

Cyber-Activism and the Islamic Salafi Movement in Indonesia

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Declaration

I declare that this thesis is my own account of my research. It contains as its main content work which has not previously been submitted for a degree at any tertiary education institution.

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Abstract

Prevailing studies of Islamic activism and the internet tend to evaluate the significance (or insignificance) of the internet for an Islamic movement as a unified whole, ignoring intra-movement heterogeneity and internal dynamics. By contrast, this study offers a pluralistic vision of Islamic activism, identifying separate streams or groups of a particular theological tradition within Islam. It therefore analyses the relevance of the internet for such Islamic groups in a more nuanced and variegated manner. To this end, drawing on resource mobilization theory, it analyses internet use by the Salafi movement with a specific focus of Salafists in Indonesia. It identifies resource inequality among different Salafi groups as accounting for intra-movement difference and the varied significance of the internet for groups within the Salafi movement. The study demonstrates that although each Salafi group adopted the internet as a new important resource for their social, religious, and organizational interests, groups did not actually mobilize it for this purpose in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi groups tended to mobilize the internet more actively than the resource-rich ones. Different access to resources among Salafi groups contributed to these different levels of actual mobilization of the internet by the Salafi groups. Accordingly, the significance of the internet is not uniform across the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Rather, each Salafi group's use of the internet was influenced by offline factors and particularly access to other organizational resources. Therefore, this study argues that the significance of the internet for Islamic movements is not uniform, but rather diverges due to intra-movement complexities and dynamics including internal fragmentation and the differential state of intra-movement organizational resources. The significance of the internet as a resource for an Islamic movement thus varies enormously across intra-movement factions or groups depending on access to other resources.

Keywords

Islamic Movements, Salafism, Internet, Salafi Groups, Indonesia, Resources, Internet Significance

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Transliteration and Indonesian Names

For the transliteration of Arabic words, this thesis uses the system of Arabic transliteration adopted by the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, New Edition, with the following exceptions: 1) no line under th, kh, dh, sh, gh; 2) j instead of dj, q instead of ڤ. The article *al* is never assimilated (so, for example, *al-shams*, not *ash-shams*). The tā' marbūṭa is not transliterated, except when followed by a vowel; it is then rendered *t* (so, for example, *rabbat al-bayt*). Transliterated words are rendered in italics each time they appear. The Indonesian personal names and terms are rendered according to their original spellings.

Chapter One

Introduction

Islamic Cyber Activism Studies

The revolution in Information and Communication Technology has significantly transformed the face of the Muslim world over the last two decades. Indeed, according to Bunt (2006:153), the explosion of new media, particularly the internet, in Muslim countries has given rise to an “Islamic information revolution” and has particularly increased internet use by Islamic movement activists in cyberspace, which Bunt (2006:161) refers to as “cyber Islamic activism”. Various Islamic social movements have passionately embraced the internet technologies that provide the movement’s actors with opportunities that have not been previously available through traditional media. The actors in these Islamic social movements utilize the internet as a new, important resource to pursue their goals of social change.

Scholars from various disciplines such as media and communication, sociology, political science and security studies have studied this use of the internet by a range of Islamic social and political movements. Many of their studies explore the significance or insignificance of this new medium for contemporary Islamic movements. However, the prevailing accounts tend to conceptualize this significance or insignificance of the internet by treating Islamic movements as monolithic entities. Implicit in this literature is the assumption that Islamic movements are homogeneous and coherent units. This is problematic because this literature fails to address the reality that Islamic movements are highly differentiated. They consist of diverse organizational

aspects like constituency and resources, and even have differing interpretations of ideology that influences the extent of the significance of the internet for these movements.

Thus, the prevailing studies on Islamic activism and the internet can be divided into two categories: studies that argue for the full significance of the internet for Islamic movements; and others that argue for only limited significance of the new medium for Islamic movements. In spite of their different arguments, both tend to present the Islamic movement under study as a unified, monolithic unit which results in the analyst's failure to identify the varied significance of the internet for the movement.

Full Significance of the Internet for Islamic Activism

Initially most evident were those scholars of Islamic cyber activism who believe that the internet plays crucial roles in the rise and success of contemporary Islamic activism. Many of these cyber-enthusiasts examine the issues of terrorism and Islamic politics from the perspective of security studies focusing on the significant roles of the internet for Muslim terrorist and radical groups. The strategic interests in the global "War on Terror" may have contributed to these scholars' and security analysts' serious attention to the relationship between new media and terrorism and Islamic politics in the Muslim world and some Western countries where Islam is a minority religion.

Whine (1999), for example, argues that internet technologies provide a new arena for Islamist political extremists and terrorist movements to operate and enhance their networks and communication capability amongst themselves and between themselves and the outside world. Through their websites, Muslim fundamentalist groups and Muslim extremist organizations formed an imagined community functioning within and beyond the nation state. They communicated a local and global identity, justified their movement to sceptics and enemies, and

glorified their actions (Khatib 2003; Janbek 2009 and 2011). In this regard, many authors focussed on how Al Qaeda and its computer-savvy actors utilized the internet as an integral part of their strategy to promote violent jihadism, recruit new members, and organize actions within and beyond the nation state (*e.g.*, Hoffman 2006; Brachman 2006; Michael 2009; and Keene 2011). As the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) made a shocking rise in global arena in the mid-2014, scholars and observers have presented detailed information and analyses of the historical development, organization, ideology and operations of this violent group (*e.g.* Cockburn 2015; Weiss and Hassan 2015; Stern and Berger 2015; Lister 2015; Filiu 2015; McCants; Atwan 2015; and Takaoka 2016). Many of them studied ISIS media strategy, focussing their analysis on how the group employs internet-based social media like Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and internet forums and media sharing platforms like Youtube as essential tools for their global outreach (Bowyer 2015; Atwan 2015; Arnaboldi and Vidino 2015; Klausen 2015; Berger and Morgan 2015; Farwell 2015; Behr *et al* 2015; and Blaker 2015). Some analysed the use of websites and online games for propaganda purposes (*e.g.* Lombardi 2015). All these studies argue that the internet has played a crucial role in the success of ISIS in creating 'cyber jihad' and 'digital caliphate' aimed at disseminating their violent ideology, recruiting new local and foreign fighters, and inspiring and inciting terrorist attacks around the world.

Other scholars have focused on the role of internet technologies, particularly social media like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, in the emergence and success of social activism during the Arab Spring that led to the fall of some authoritarian regimes in the Middle East in 2010 and 2011 (*e.g.*, Douai 2013; El-Nawawy and Khamis 2012, 2013; Khamis and Vaughn 2011; Kuebler 2011; Root 2012; Stepanova 2011; Schroeder *et al.* 2012; Root 2012; and Aouragh 2012). These cyber-enthusiasts argue that social media allowed activists during the

Arab Spring to develop new tactics for turning individualized, localized and communal dissent into movements with shared grievances and consciousness for collective action (Howard and Hussain 2011). Digital media during the Arab Spring played crucial roles never seen before in the success of social movements (Howard and Hussain 2013). Lim (2012) affirms that social movements during the Egyptian revolution, such as Kefaya, the April 6th Youth and We Are All Khaled Said, used social media to develop networks and connections between activists, and increase the ability of opposition leaders to reach a global audience. Social media provided opposition leaders with a means for shaping repertoires of action, framing issues, spreading unifying symbols and turning online activism into offline protests. Similarly, Eltantawy and Wiest (2011) argue that social media had a significant impact on the success of the Egyptian uprisings that brought about the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the country's authoritarian ruler.

Studies also have been undertaken to examine how internet plays key roles for marginalized groups in Muslim countries. These studies suggested that this new medium has become a new tool for spreading a sense of community and collective identity, organizing collective action, creating less-confined space for the exchange of ideas, and establishing networks among women activists and opposition groups in the Middle East. Agarwal, Lim and Wigand (2012), for example, analyse how Saudi women who established Women's Right-to-Drive Campaigns undertook collective actions through the internet against a ban on woman driving enforced by the Saudi kingdom on the grounds of "Sharia law". Chraibi (2011) argues that the Saudi women's denouncement of the ban on woman driving created an online "power play" between the Saudi religious authorities (who supported and gave religious legitimacy to the ban), the Saudi government and women's associations.

Moreover, other studies examine the use of the internet by opposition groups and political dissidents in non-democratic Muslim countries in the face of governments' efforts to maintain the *status quo* and control resistance against repressive regimes. Exploring the use of the global flow of information by Saudi opposition groups, Fandy (1999:147) observes that "Saudi opposition may be virtual, but the dialectic of the local and the global is real, not virtual". Teitelbaum (2002) studies the internet use by the Saudi opposition groups abroad in the face of the Saudi authorities' efforts to harness the new media technology for modernization and business purposes, but to prevent it from undermining the kingdom's authoritarian rule and conservative form of Islam. In Iran, the increasing penetration of internet technologies into everyday life facilitated the emergence of political opposition against the Iranian government after the contested 2009 presidential elections known as the "Twitter Revolution" and the "Green Movement". Some scholars argue that cyberspace provides the opposition movement actors with a social space where their imaginaries of self, resistance and power form bonds of interactivity (Rahimi 2011). This helped the political opposition groups and ordinary people to challenge the Iranian government's monopoly of information and opened a global public sphere for Iranians around the world (Sohrabi-Haghighat 2011).

Limited Significance of the Internet for Islamic Activism

Other scholars, however, reject sweeping claims about the crucial roles of the internet for contemporary Islamic activism. Aday *et al.* (2012), for example, point out that enthusiasm for a social media-centric understanding of the Arab uprisings risks exaggerating the importance of the internet and blinding the public to other important causal factors or influential actors that led to the success of social protests during the Arab Spring. They assert that the role of new media in this Arab revolution should not be dismissed because it may have

played an important, but limited role. Wilson and Dunn (2011) suggest that social media use was not dominant in the social movements and protests during the Egyptian revolution of January and February 2011, but social media might have played an important role in connecting and motivating actors and participants. Likewise, Douai (2013) who focuses on how Twitter was used during the Egyptian revolution, asserts that “the seeds of change in the Arab Spring are both technological and human”.

Other scholars of this strand criticize cyber-enthusiasts, arguing that the role of internet as an emancipating technology in the Iranian experience is not fully proven. Golkar (2011), for example, found that while the internet helped the Green Movement activists increase their capacity to mobilize and challenge government legitimacy, the new medium also enabled the Iranian authorities to increase their political control by creating a sense of fear among people, identifying and suppressing dissidents, and intensifying the presence of military and paramilitary forces in cyberspace.

Furthermore, some scholars totally reject the sweeping claims about the full significance of the internet for contemporary social activism in Muslim countries. Cyber-sceptics argue that internet technologies like Twitter were not crucial factors in the success of the Arab uprisings. Malcolm Gladwell, for example, believes that “revolutions were driven primarily by traditional forms of political organization and motivated by familiar grievances. Revolutions and protests have happened for centuries without being updated in real-time on Twitter” (Gladwell 2010 in Aday 2012:4; Gladwell 2010).

The Gap in the Prevailing Studies

The prevailing studies noted above have certainly provided important insights into understanding the role and impact of the global rise of cyberspace on Islamic activism. However, there is a general trend in such literature to

conceptualise the significance or insignificance of the internet for Islamic activism in a unified perspective by treating Islamic movements under study as monolithic entities. Accordingly, prior studies tend to present unitary findings regarding roles of the internet for monolithic Islamic movements. In their attempt to explain the crucial roles or limited roles of the internet for Islamic activism, most studies portray an Islamic movement under study as a homogeneous unit represented by single leaders, unitary ideology and unified constituents. Thus, when these studies argue for the significance of the internet for an Islamic social movement in this way, they tend to overlook the variations within an Islamic movement in terms of resources, constituencies, ideological streams, practice and institutions. The Islamic movement is often presented as a homogeneous and coherent entity whose internal dynamics and changing nature are often unquestioned.

This unitary approach to the relationship between Islamic movements and the internet is problematic at least in two ways. First, it fails to read accurately the nature of contemporary Islamic movements. Just like social movements in general, Islamic movements are in reality far from unitary or monolithic entities. They are in fact dynamic entities with many faces, being in constant flow and motion. Islamic movements are differentiated by “dispersed emotions, ideas and activities ... whose activities, actors and constituencies were quite different in character and function, and detached from one another, although they often followed each other’s news and influenced one another” (Bayat 2005:899-900).

Second, it is primarily problematic because regarding Islamic movements as monolithic entities hinders an adequate understanding of the nuances of the internet’s significance for Islamic movements. In fact, the significance or insignificance of the internet for an Islamic movement is influenced by intra-movement difference, complexity and dynamics. Reducing the movement into a

unified entity may prevent us from explaining and better understanding the nuanced roles and relevance of the internet for contemporary Islamic activism.

What seems to be missing from the existing literature is an analysis of the significance of the internet for Islamic activism which takes into account intra-Islamic movement heterogeneity and dynamics. In fact, the literature fails to address adequately the issues of diverse constituents, groups, orientations, and resources within Islamic movements and how such factors influence the extent of the significance of new media technologies like the internet for Islamic activism.

In addition, the prevailing literature has predominantly focused on cyber Islamic activism in the Middle East. Consequently, it has not incorporated studies of other Islamic societies into the debate or addressed adequately the richness and complexity of the interaction between the internet and Islamic movements in other societies. Questions about the internet and Islamic movements in non-Arab countries remain relatively under-explored and little understood. This may be due to an assumption among some scholars, both Muslims and non-Muslims, and the public, which is articulated by media, that Islam is primarily manifested in the Arab world and Muslims are synonymous with Arab people. Non-Arab Muslims, who in fact constitute the majority of Muslims in the world, are often overlooked because they are considered to be on the periphery compared to the Middle East, which is traditionally regarded as 'the centre of the Muslim world' from the Orientalist perspective. This overlooking may be part of a broader "disregard of the Muslim world in East and Southeast Asia" (Ho 2010:64) or "*Ummah* in the East" (Sevea 2007 in Ho 2010: 64). In fact, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world and Southeast Asian Muslims represent the majority of the global Muslim population. Yet the work has been undertaken on cyber-Islamic activism in Southeast Asia

has been focussed predominantly on Islamic radical groups and internet (*e.g.* Bräuchler 2003 and 2004; Lim 2005; and Hui 2010).

There is a need to internationalize studies of cyber-Islamic activism by expanding their scope of study beyond the Arab world and Muslim minorities in Western countries. Studies on the internet and Islam also need to examine questions about cyber-Islamic activism in the so-called 'periphery of the Muslim world' such as Southeast Asia. This is an important attempt to better understand the variety of ways the internet works within various Muslim societies.

Research on cyber Islamic activism also requires an extension of the subject of inquiry beyond its traditional focus, namely terrorism, radicalism and political Islam. To understand cyber Islam better requires more studies on the internet and Islamic activism over wider geographical areas, languages and cultural contexts addressing a broad range of issues beyond the Middle East and Arabic-English languages. For example, as Indonesian is the language of the largest Muslim country, the Indonesian cyber-Islamic environment deserves serious scholarly attention.

Research Questions and Argument

There is clearly a gap in the literature that this study can help address. In this regard, this study offers a pluralistic, fragmented vision of Islamic activism because it can help uncover the nuanced relevance of the internet for Islamic groups. To this end, it analyses internet use by the Salafi movement with a specific focus of Salafists in Indonesia by attempting to present an aspect of the movement that accounts for intra-movement differences and its implications for the varied significance of the internet for the movement. In this context, using resource mobilization theory, it suggests that resources constitute a crucial organizational aspect that defines the variations within the Salafi movement, which significantly influence the varying relevance of the internet for the

movement. This study, therefore, does not attempt to address a comparison between the internet and other media as tools or facilities for dealing with problems facing Salafists. Rather, it analyses how internet use and the internet significance were influenced by internal dynamics within the Salafi movement, particularly its intra-movement resource variations.

To pursue this goal, this study examines the significance of the internet for the Salafi movement in Indonesia by asking the following questions: Why did the Salafi factions embrace the internet as a new important resource? How did they actually mobilize the adopted internet to sustain their movement and achieve their social-religious change goals? What was the implication of this actual use of the internet for the Salafi factions?

Suggesting that there is a close relationship between Islamic movements' use of the internet and their resources as exemplified by the case of the Salafi movement in Indonesia, this study argues that the significance of the internet for Islamic movements is not uniform, but varied due to intra-movement complexities and dynamics including internal-fragmentation and the differential state of intra-movement organizational resources. The significance of the internet for an Islamic movement is mediated by intra-movement dynamics and differences such as constituent groups and organizational resources. In essence, the internet has enhanced the local and global presence of less well-resourced Salafi factions more than the well-resourced ones. The more resources to which a Salafi faction has access, the less it uses the internet or benefits from it. The less resources to which a Salafi faction controls, the more it mobilizes the internet and the more significance the internet has for mobilization purposes.

Focus of the Study

Salafism is chosen as the focus of this study because it is a good example of a dynamic and differentiated contemporary Islamic movement characterized by

intra-movement fragmentation in terms of ideology, constituency, and organizational resources. It is one of Islam's fastest growing transnational movements spreading beyond its country of birth, Saudi Arabia, and the Middle East to Europe, North America, East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Yet, as it spreads worldwide, Salafism is not a unified, monolithic movement as it divides into factions that are involved in intra-Salafi struggle over how Salafi doctrines are interpreted and applied by its supporters. It is a movement with fragmented faces and different voices, leaders, and organizations.

Salafism also presents an interesting depiction of Islam's contemporary religious movements. Although it is theologically ultra-conservative, Salafism confidently adopts the internet and is adept at taking advantage of this new media technology. Yet, it is a puritanical-scripturalist religious movement with literal understandings and strict application of religious texts. Its presence on the internet is highly visible, ranging from Arabic websites of literalist Salafi religious authorities (*'ulamā*) in Saudi Arabia, English websites of the Salafi leaders in UK, to mailing lists operated by Salafi supporters in Southeast Asia. The internet is gradually being assimilated into the home, office and daily routines of the proponents and followers of the transnational Salafi movement.

Indonesia is an appropriate place for investigating aspects of internet use by Islamic movements outside the Middle East and Western countries because of its large online user base. Over the past 10 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the use of the internet among Indonesians. With a population of 250 million, in 2014, Indonesia was the 4th top internet country in Asia with 71 million users and an internet penetration rate of 28 percent (<http://www.internetworldstats.com>). It was estimated that, with its dynamic future growth, Indonesia's internet market will have reached the internet user base of 149 million users by the end of 2015 (<http://redwing-asia.com/market-data/market-data-internet/>). In the case of the Salafi movement, the presence of

its supporters in the online environment is demonstrated in hundreds of Salafi websites, blogs, internet forums, and online businesses written in the Indonesian language, operated by Salafi leaders or learning centres, and followed by Salafi supporters. Ironically, however, although Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world and a large online user base, it receives little scholarly attention regarding how Islamic groups and movements, including Salafism, harness new media technologies like the internet. The existing studies on cyber Islam in Indonesia have mainly focussed on terrorism and Islamic radicalism (*e.g.*, Hasan 2006; Lim 2005; Hui 2010; and Bräuchler 2003 and 2004) so that other significant issues remain unexplored and little understood.

In addition, in regard to research on global Salafism, numerous studies have been devoted to analysing this contemporary transnational Islamic movement, particularly after 9/11. Most of these studies are general in scope including Salafism together with other Islamic movements in the Middle East, Europe and North America (*e.g.*, Teitelbaum 2000; Fandi 2001; Roy 2002; Al-Rasheed 2002; and Commins 2006). A significant contribution to the emerging scholarly literature on global Salafism is a collection of studies edited by Roel Meijer (2009). However, much of this research is concerned with the relationship between Salafism, terrorism and radicalism using a security studies approach as the dominant framework (*e.g.*, Amghar 2007; Hegghammer 2006; Hasan 2006; and Lia 2007). Consequently, other important issues related to this global Islamic movement have remained under-examined and unexplained. For example, research about Salafism and new media has been largely neglected with the exception of Carmen Becker's works on Dutch and German Salafists' internet forums that focus on religious knowledge practices and rituals (2009 and 2011).

Thus, Salafism, an ultra-conservative, fast growing, but fragmented global movement in contemporary Islam which proliferates in the country with the largest Muslim population outside the Middle East and extensively employs internet technology, undoubtedly deserves scholarly attention. This raises questions of why and how Salafi factions adopt and adapt the internet and what happens when the internet enters the Salafists' daily routines and activities or as Michel de Certeau (1984:31 in Bakardjieva 2005:6) asked: "What do they make of what they "absorb", receive and pay for? What do they do with it?" Studying the internet use by different Salafi factions in Indonesia is an important attempt to better understand what makes new media technology meaningful and significant for Islamic social movements outside the Arab world and Muslim minorities in the West.

I limit the scope of this study to Indonesian Salafi websites, namely those that are (insofar as can be ascertained) set up and maintained by Indonesian proponents and followers of Salafism, and written in the Indonesian language. Most of these websites are operated by Indonesian Salafists in Indonesia, while a few are maintained by Indonesian Salafi supporters who are living or studying in some Middle Eastern countries. Websites are more widely used by Indonesian Salafists than other internet applications. The Salafi presence in the online environment is more visible and accessible in websites than in internet forums, for example, which are normally closed groups. This may be attributed to the ability of websites to reach and be accessed by a wider audience in cyberspace, a characteristic that serves best the Salafists' main purpose of propagating Salafism or *da'wah Salafiyah* as they call for online communities. Websites, then, are the most visible gate through which to access and understand Salafi engagement and their appropriation of the internet.

Resource Mobilization Theory: A Theoretical Framework

This study requires a theoretical framework suited to the task above, hence the attempt by some scholars like Wiktorowicz, ed. (2004) and Bayat (2005) to bring social movement theories to the realm of Islamic activism is taken up here. However, it then extends the use of social movement theory to explain cyber Islamic activism, which most scholars who apply social movement theory to the study of Islamic activism have so far failed to address.

To this end, this study applies resource mobilization theory (RMT) to the analysis of internet usage by the proponents of Salafism in Indonesia. This theory is useful in explaining the adoption and usage of the internet as a new important resource by Salafi actors in Indonesia in their mobilization process. Drawing on this theory, this study examines the relationship between the internet and variations or dynamics within the Salafi movement in Indonesia. It particularly analyses the internet usage by Salafi factions in Indonesia and their intra-movement resource differences.

This particular theory on the origins and growth of social movements developed during the 1970s in reaction to traditional social-psychological analysis of social movements as a new generation of social movement scholars attempted to explain the rise, development and effects of social movement of the 1960s in a new perspective (Jenkins 1983; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1988; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; and Edwards and Gillham 2013). Social movement theories which are characterized by a social-psychological approach, such as relative deprivation theory, mass society theory and collective behaviour theory, tended to focus on personality traits, grievances, disillusionment and ideology as factors that influence and contribute to the emergence and development of social movements. These theories largely view participation in social movement as deviant and irrational behaviour, and social movement participants are often considered isolated, alienated and irrational individuals (Flynn 2011:117).

Resource mobilization theory, however, rejected these assumptions of the social-psychological approach to social movements. Based on their studies of social movements in 1960s such as civil rights, student, anti-nuclear and environmental movements, resource mobilization theorists offered an alternative approach to the study of social movements by emphasizing organizational, economic and political variables that actually play major roles in the formation and development of social movements (Flynn 2011:117-118). These scholars sought to explain how often marginalized, but rational, social movement actors mobilized effectively to achieve their desired goals of social change (Edwards and Gillham 2013; Freeman 1975; Gamson 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984; Zald and McCarthy 1987; Staggenborg 1988; and Tarrow 1994). Contrary to collective behaviour theory that views movement participants as irrational, resource mobilization theory argues that movement activists and participants are normal and rational decision-makers (Calhoun 1992 in Huang 2009).¹

A number of issues, however, have challenged the dominance of resource mobilization theory. The emphasis on materialist aspects has diverted resource mobilization theory from fully recognizing the importance of other factors like ideology and identities in the process of movement formation and development. The theory has therefore been criticized for its exclusive focus on centralized social movement organizations at the expense of decentralized social movement communities. It also pays no attention to the importance of collective identity and personal motivation in explaining the emergence and development of social

¹There are alternative theories and approaches other than RMT to social psychological explanations of social movements. These include Marxist and neo-Marxist work that understands the origins of social movements in relation to capitalist dynamics. For recent Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives on social movements, see *e.g.*, Colin Barker *et al.* (2013) *Marxism and Social Movements*, Leiden and Boston: Brill. It is not my intention here, however, to discuss these alternatives to social-psychological approaches to social movements. Instead I want to emphasize the suitability of RMT to the questions about why and how Salafism embraced and mobilized the internet as a new resource for the Salafi factions.

movements (Buechler 1993 in Flynn 2011:119). This focus on large scale analysis has led resource mobilization theory to discount micro-level processes of individual motivation, personal and cultural change (Jenkins 1983 in Flynn 2011:119). Furthermore, resource mobilization theory has been criticized for its overemphasis on the importance of outside resources and its inability to adequately explain social movements with fairly limited resources and those that are established by small or minority groups (Jenkins 1983; Shin 1994; and Walsh 1981 in Eltantawy and Wiest 2011:1209).

Notwithstanding the above theoretical shortfalls, resource mobilization theory has much to offer in attempts to understand Islamic activism in a contemporary context. This includes Islamic movements and their increasing engagement with information and communication technologies in recent years in their attempts to sustain activities after their formation phase. In particular, aspects of resource mobilization theory are potentially applicable to a study into the relationship between Salafism and internet technology. In what follows, I will describe some fundamentals of resource mobilization theory and their possible application to explaining the case of Salafism and the internet.

Resources and the Formation of Social Movements

According to traditional theories of social movements based on a social-psychological approach, social movements form from grievances and discontent resulting from social and political change. By contrast, resource mobilization theory considers that it is not sufficient to turn to grievances to explain how social movements form and develop. While grievances are necessary for the rise of movements, they are secondary because they are “relatively constant, deriving from structural conflicts of interest built into social institutions” (Jenkins 1983:530). Resource mobilization theory’s central contention is that “while grievances are ubiquitous, movements are not” (Wiktorowicz 2004:10).

So, resource mobilization theorists argue for intermediary variables that significantly influence the personal discontent such that it is organized into collective action. For this purpose, they turn to organizational factors and infrastructures for the explanation of the emergence and development of social movements (Walsh 1981:2). These organizational factors and infrastructures include resources that are available to a social movement. Basically, resource mobilization theory holds that resources are critical for social movements. The availability of resources, especially cadres and organizing facilities, is the major factor in the formation of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973 and 1977 in Jenkins 1983). Resources may vary among social movements in terms of size and type, but the availability of applicable resources and the ability of the movement actors to utilize them effectively determine the formation and development of their movement. Through resource mobilization theory, scholars attempt to explain the rise and development of social movements, including their success and failure, by emphasizing the importance of resource availability. They explain how social movements mobilize resources, internal or external, to achieve their goals (Jenkins 1983).

Therefore, resource mobilization theorists argue that social movements form because of “the long-term changes in group resources, organization, and opportunities for collective action” (Flynn 2011:114; Jenkins 1983:531). This claim has received strong support from studies of public interest movements such as environmental, anti-nuclear, consumer-safety and civil rights movements. The majority of these movements were formed by public-minded and energetic entrepreneurs, rather than those motivated by personal grievances and discontent (Jenkins 1983; Flynn 2011).

Resources and Mobilization Process

Furthermore, resource mobilization theory is concerned with the action of social actors after their movement has been established. When a social movement organization is formed, its actors and architects adopt a variety of strategies about structure and forms of collective action in an attempt to sustain their movement and achieve their goals. From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, this phase primarily involves mobilization. Mobilization is “a process by which a group secures collective control over the resources needed for collective actions” (Jenkins 1983:532). It refers to “a process by which a group goes from being a passive collection of individuals to an active participant in public life” (Tilly 1978:69 in Huang 2009:94). In this process, social movement groups examine the resources they have access to and control prior to mobilization efforts, determine their strategies to use these resources, gain new resources and direct them towards social change, and look at the extent to which potential participants can increase the pool of resources (Flynn 2011; Jenkins 1983).

Mobilization is aimed at persuading people to support and join a social movement utilizing material and non-material means. To achieve this, social movement actors are involved in undertaking two tasks: consensus mobilization and action mobilization. Consensus mobilization refers to a process through which a social movement attempts to spread its beliefs and gain support for its cause and goals (Klandermans 1984 in Huang 2009:94). In this process, using resources available to them, the movement actors attempt to manage the promotional strategies, deal with opposition, and form collective goods.

In addition, social movement actors are engaged in action mobilization. This refers to a process by which social actors and architects solicit active participation. Using the available resources, they develop strategies to motivate others to join their movement, make them see the benefits of participation and finally turn them into active participants (Flynn 2011; Klandermans 1984).

A major issue in this mobilization process is the movement actors' decisions about "mobilizing technologies", which is defined as "sets of knowledge about ways of accumulating the resources necessary for production technologies", which refer to "sets of knowledge about ways of achieving goals, such as lobbying, demonstrations, strikes or attending a public hearing" (Oliver and Marwell 1992:255). Mobilizing technologies here include sets of tools, techniques, crafts and methods of organization chosen and utilized in the mobilization efforts of turning bystanders (individuals who watch from the sidelines) into adherents (those who share a social movement's set of preferences for social change), and ultimately into constituents (individuals who contribute resources to help a movement to mobilize) (Edwards and Gillham 2013; Edwards 2007 and 2011).

Resource Inequality and Resource Typology

In spite of the importance of resources for the initiation and continuation of social movements, resources are varied within and among social movements. Accordingly, resource mobilization theory argues that resource inequality exists within and among social movements. Access and control of resources vary among the proponents of a social movement as well as from one social movement to another. Not all social movements have access to the same types and size of resources. The same is true for various groups within a given social movement (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:118).

This resource inequality is linked, first, to spatial variation of resource distribution. Resources crucial to social movements tend to be concentrated in core areas and to be scarce in peripheral ones. In the context of a state, movements tend to emerge and develop in urban and metropolitan areas rather than in rural ones because a wide range of resources salient to the movement are more readily accessible to potential activists in the former areas than in the

latter ones (MacCarthy *et al.* 1988 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:119). A similar case is found among nations. Movements in wealthy industrial democratic countries develop at a faster rate than those in developing authoritarian countries (Smith and Wiest 2003 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:119).

In addition, resource disparity within and among social movements has to do with varied ability of social movements to meet specific criteria set by resource redistributors. As resource redistributors, states provide resources such as monetary resources and technical assistance to social movement organizations or groups that meet specific terms and agree to operate within government guidelines (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:121). States generally determine to what extent they redistribute resources to social movements according to their policy and national interests. The US government, for example, redistributes quite extensive resources to environmental activists, but provides virtually nothing to peace activists and other groups that wish to influence US foreign policy (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:122). A similar dynamic operates with resource redistribution by organizations. Philanthropic foundations provide funds and legitimacy for movements that meet standards of organizational structure and social change purpose set by the foundations. Religious organizations are more likely to redistribute financial, moral and human resources to the movements for economic and social justice and anti-war activists (Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:123). As a result, social movement actors who are able and, more importantly, willing to meet the criteria set by resource redistributors are more likely to have more opportunities to apply and be given grants and other necessary resources.

Such differences in turn exert substantial impact on movement variations in terms of type and size of resources within and among social movements. In this regard, social movements can be divided at least into two categories:

Resource-rich movements and resource-poor ones. Within a social movement, groups or factions can have different control and access to resources, creating a division between well-resourced and less well-resourced groups.

The notion of resource inequality within social movements and among them requires an understanding of what resources may commonly be accessible to social movement actors. In spite of its importance in the analysis of social movements, the concept of resources remained poorly defined in the early 1980s. Gamson, *et al.* (1982 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:125) viewed the concept of resources as “one of the most primitive and unspecified terms in the theoretical vocabulary of social movement analysts”. Even in the mid-1990s Cress and Snow (1996:1090 in Edwards and MacCarthy 2004:125) still believed that “little progress had been made in explicating resources conceptually or anchoring them empirically”. In response to this, Edwards and MacCarthy (2004), Edwards (2007), and Edwards and Gillham (2013) attempted to explicate resources more systematically and comprehensively drawing upon social movement scholarship by developing a typology of social movement resources. For this reason, in what follows, I will describe five types of social movement resources drawing upon their typology of resources: moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources.

Moral Resources

Moral resources refer to a type of resource that originates from outside of a social movement and is given by an external source recognized to possess them. These include legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, integrity and celebrity (Snow 1979; Cress and Snow 1996 in Edwards and McCarthy 2004). Social movements that closely meet the mainstream or institutionalized expectations gain more moral legitimacy resources than those that fit these expectations poorly. Celebrity endorsement of an issue campaign can generate

public attention, increase media coverage and attract resource providers. Similarly, the receipt of awards or certification from credible bodies (like the Nobel Peace Prize) by movement activists provides a social movement with more support, integrity and legitimacy. However, because moral resources are derived from outside of a movement, outsiders who bestow these resources can also withdraw them from the movements such as through public acts of renunciation or backstage by spreading word informally to interested parties. Hence, in spite of their importance for mobilization purposes, moral resources are less accessible and proprietary than other types of resources (Edwards and Gillham 2013:3; Edwards 2007:3903-3904; Edwards and McCarthy 2004:125-126).

Cultural Resources

This type of resource refers to artefacts and cultural products including conceptual tools, specialized knowledge and strategic know-how about how to carry out specific tasks like running a meeting, producing a protest event, establishing an organization, accessing new resources and utilizing new media. Different from moral resources, cultural resources are more widely available, accessible and independent from favourable judgments of those outside a movement. These cultural resources are important in that they help movements sustain their continuity and increase their capacity for collective action (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:126; Edwards 2007:3904; Edwards and Gillham 2013:1098-1099).

Human Resources

Human resources are resources that are inherent in individuals who typically have control over the use of these resources. Through participation, this type of resource is more tangible and accessible to a social movement than the above

resource types. These include resources like experience, skills, expertise, labour and leadership. The use-value of these resources depends on any social movement's needs and particular situation. For example, the expertise of a prominent scientist or the participation of a celebrated social figure has little more to offer than a fresh information technology graduate when a social movement needs to fix the problems with its website or a high-school intern when the movement needs to distribute fliers (Edwards and McCarthy 2004: 127-128; Edwards 2007:3904; Edwards and Gillham 2013:1099). By contrast, an environmental movement could make greater use of a prominent scientist to give authority to its cause.

Material Resources

This type of resource refers to financial and physical capital such as money, office space, equipment, property and supplies. Material resources gain the most attention because they are generally more proprietary and tangible than any other resource types. Perhaps, money is considered the most important resource because it can be utilized in a variety of ways to meet the movement's needs and purposes (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:128; Edwards 2007:3904-3905; Edwards and Gillham 2013:1099).

Social-Organizational Resources

This resource type generally refers to three forms of resources: infrastructure, social networks and organizations. Organizational infrastructures are public goods that social movements need to facilitate the smooth functioning of everyday activities including the internet (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:127; Edwards 2007:3904; Edwards and Gillham 2013:1099). The resource form of social networks and organizations indicates the ability of a social movement to establish linkage and alliance with other groups or movements within local and

global societies. Access to these resources can vary among social movements indicating the existing inequalities among movements and groups in their ability to garner and utilize important resources for mobilization. Social movement organizations often form coalitions with other movements to overcome problems with resource insufficiency.

Resource Mobilization Theory and the Case of Salafism and Internet

It should be stated here that this study is not about the emergence or formation of the Salafi movement. Rather, it is concerned with how different Salafi factions have mobilized after their movement formed. The analysis of this issue, I argue, will benefit from resource mobilization theory's approach to the study of tasks of mobilization like the ones undertaken by Salafi actors. Drawing on this theory, this study examines actions taken by Salafi factions to mobilize available resources that involve embracing internet technology as a new important resource in their mobilization efforts to advance their agenda and pursue their goals of creating 'true Muslims' according to their perception of 'true Islam' based on the Salafi ideology. It analyses the Salafi internet use to uncover the significance of the internet for Salafism, asking why the Salafi factions embraced the internet as a mobilizing technology and how they actually employed the adopted internet. In what follows, I briefly describe the application of the fundamentals or insights from resource mobilization theory to the case of Salafism and its internet use to show that the theory can shed important light on intra-Islamic movement dynamics and how these influence the significance of the internet they embrace.

The case of Salafism and its internet use, the focus of this study, can be fruitfully examined particularly through the above notions of resource inequality and mobilization process in order to adequately deal with the issue of the internet's significance for contemporary Islamic activism. Departing from the

resource mobilization theory fundamental of resource inequality, I examine the state of resources within Salafism to uncover resource variations and limitations among the Salafi proponents that result in fragmentation that divides them into well-resourced and poorly resourced groups.

Then, drawing on the concept of the mobilization process, I explain that resource inequality among Islamic movements in Indonesia encouraged the Salafi factions to mobilize new resources for the continuation and development of their movement. Realizing their lack of resources compared to other established Islamic groups and movements in Indonesia, the Salafi factions were motivated to overcome their lack of resources. They were involved in the process of mobilization in that they attempted to gain new resources, secure control over them, adopt various strategies of using them, and direct them towards social change goals. In this effort, they found the internet available and acceptable as a new, important resource for mobilization purposes and used it as a coping strategy to deal with their lack of resources, making the new medium one of the Salafists' mobilizing technologies. Here, resource mobilization theory basically helps better understand how Salafi factions are able to cope with prevailing patterns of resource inequality and limitation in their attempts to pursue social change goals.

Next, I show that resource variation also exists within Salafism in that Salafi factions have different access to resources and this intra-Salafi resource fragmentation influences the significance of the adopted internet for the Salafi movement. The intra-Salafi resource variation influences the extent to which Salafi factions mobilize the adopted internet as a new resource. The well-resourced Salafi faction employed the internet less than the less well-resourced ones. Perhaps, on the one hand, a feeling of self-sufficiency within the well-resourced group has caused its low usage of the internet. On the other hand, realizing their lack of resources, the less well-resourced ones were motivated to

mobilize the internet more as a new, important resource, as a coping strategy to overcome their lack of resources. Although all Salafi factions took the same decision to adopt the internet and developed the same religious legitimacy of the internet as an acceptable resource, they differed in their actual mobilization of the internet due to their different access to, and control of, offline resources. As a consequence, this in turn has created varied, not uniform, significance of the internet for Salafism.

Methodology

Sources of Information

This study uses a qualitative case study method, which is a useful tool for developing a deep understanding about a particular case, its features and its impacts (Stake 2005). The richness of data gathered through this method was required to explain the relationship between the internet and Salafism in Indonesia. Information required for this study was obtained through online investigation that involved crawling websites (Garrido and Halavais 2003) for samples of Indonesian Salafi websites using search engines, tracing hyperlinks from each website to create a snowballed sample, and collecting materials from the selected Salafi websites for themes, topics and tones related to the research questions. This was used particularly to gather data related to the question of how the Salafi factions actually utilize the internet as a resource for mobilization process.

The websites used in this study were collected through the top search engine Google, which was voted “Most Outstanding Search Engine” and ranked as the preferred search engine by www.searchenginewatch.com (Castle and Lee 2008:110-111). As this study focuses on the Salafi movement in Indonesia, related keywords including “Salafi Indonesia” and “Salafy Indonesia” were used

to generate the sample of Salafi websites for the purposes of this study. Using these search terms, over 4 million results were yielded by the Google search engine. Another search engine, Yahoo, and a web information and traffic website, Alexa, were also used to see whether there was a significant difference in the results yielded by these search engines and the web information website. The result showed that recorded Salafi websites were relatively the same among these search engines and the web information website.

Due to a large number of records generated by using the terms “Salafi Indonesia” and “Salafy Indonesia”, only the first 200 websites were selected for examination. Websites were selected for inclusion in this study if they associated themselves with Salafism, were written in the Indonesian language, and were (to the best of my ability to determine) administered by Indonesians, either living in Indonesia or abroad, who support and promote Salafism. Due to its loose organizational structure, rather than being unified in terms of website representation, the Salafi movement in Indonesia, just as in other countries, is represented by a variety of web presence; it is a movement with many websites. During this selection, I found a Salafi start page (salafi.ws) very useful because it provided a directory of Indonesian Salafi websites and their links with local and global Salafi websites. Based on this, I developed a list of Salafi websites for observation. Overall, 60 websites met the requirements and were examined for content and structure. Then, I conducted an online investigation of these websites and collected data by archiving web contents and features for five months. In total, around 1700 relevant postings and articles were collected and archived from the selected websites.²

In addition, this study is based on in-depth interviews with the proponents of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. These interviews were aimed

²Given the nature of websites, it cannot be guaranteed that the websites selected for this study remain active now; some might have closed or become inactive since the data collection for this dissertation was finished.

at investigating why Salafists are engaging with the internet and, more specifically, answering questions about the Salafi discourse of the internet that justify their uses of the internet, an important issue which was left unanswered by online investigation of Salafi websites.

I attempted to interview Salafi leaders or senior individuals, who were also recognized as supervisors of Indonesian Salafi websites, from three Salafi factions who were identified from the selected Salafi websites. Interviewing these leaders was necessary for they were the representative voices of Salafism in Indonesia. I also interviewed administrators of the Salafi websites as I wanted to gain views from ordinary Salafists who are professionally committed to the use of technology so that the data collected were diverse and reliable in nature. Interviews were successfully conducted with Salafi leaders and administrators from two Salafi factions (Yemenists and Harakists), but not so with the third group (Violent Jihadists) due to the closed nature of their organization. In total, personal interviews were conducted with 35 leading Salafi figures and web administrators.

The interviews were conducted in cities considered to be the centres of Salafi dissemination in Indonesia or where the presence of the Salafi movement with strong engagement with the internet could be identified. To maintain diversity of participants and gain representative views, I took the geographical division between Java and outer Java into consideration. So, the interviews took place in a number of cities in Java (Jakarta; Bogor, Bekasi, and Bandung in West Java; Yogyakarta; Salatiga, Solo, and Sleman in Central Java; Gresik and Jember in East Java) along with Balikpapan and Bontang in East Kalimantan; and Makassar in South Sulawesi.

The cities were selected because they were identified as having a greater Salafi presence than other cities or rural areas. Cities, rather than rural areas, were chosen because the Salafi movement attracts a greater urban following and

has more access to financial and human resources to utilize the internet in cities. An average of two interviews with two or four respondents was conducted in each city.

Most of these interviews took place in the Salafi learning centres, while a few occurred in the interviewees' houses or public places. Interviews averaged about one hour in length. In most cases, a single individual participated in a single interview while in some interviews two or three participants were interviewed on a single occasion.

The participants in this study could be considered to be in a young and productive period of their lives. They ranged in age from 27 to 41, with those in their 30s constituting the majority or 57% of the total respondents. The interviewees come from a range of ethnic backgrounds. The highest proportion of the participants (38%) was Javanese. Others were identified as Sundanese (seven participants), Makassarese (six participants), Betawi, Minang and Bugis (one participant for each). No female Salafists were interviewed for this study. This is because, according to the Salafi teachings, women do not participate in public life, hold strategic positions in the Salafi movement, meet a man, or go out without a religiously-endorsed guardian (*mahram*).

Analysis

The interviews were transcribed and subjected to a grounded and textual analysis for qualitative evaluation (Lindlof and Taylor 2002; Berger 2000). In transcribing the interviews, I have reproduced the original language in Indonesian as closely as possible to the spoken words.

Analysis involved developing categories and themes to which the collected data were coded in accordance with research questions. Relevant collected data in the form of web articles, postings and interviews transcripts were analysed for topic, tone of arguments, and type of response. Units of analysis were the Salafi websites and interview transcripts. The method

involved textual analysis of the collected data to uncover the agency of Salafists in the relationship between religion and the internet technology, and the Salafi discourses of the internet. In this study, text comprises the Salafi websites--in the form of web articles and postings--and interview transcripts.

The analysis involved the first step of initial reading or a “long preliminary soak” (Hall 1975; Hall 1975 in Fursich 2009) of the collected data to develop a general sense of the web contents and interview transcripts. The next step was to develop categories of the Salafi use and narratives of the internet to answer the research questions. Then, I reread the data and placed them into one of the defined categories. When a posting or interview transcript reflected two or more categories, I placed it into a category based on its most appropriate content.

These analytical stages used the original web contents and interview transcripts in Indonesian. When quotations from the interviews and web contents are presented in this thesis, they have been translated into grammatically correct English. To maintain anonymity, the names of all interviewees have been changed and pseudonyms are used throughout this study.

Thesis Overview

This study is structured as follows. After this Introduction, Chapter Two introduces Salafism by describing its shared doctrines, goals, emergence and development in Indonesia. It argues that intra-movement contention divides the proponents of the Salafi movement in Indonesia into three factions, which provides the foundation for understanding the motivations for different Salafi factions to utilize the internet as a new resource for mobilization purposes.

The next two chapters examine the question why Salafists embraced the internet. Chapter Three highlights limitations and variations in resources available to Salafi factions and how they attempted to overcome this. This state of Salafi resources created intra-Salafi resource inequality dividing the proponents of Salafism into well-resourced and poorly-resourced groups. It argues that lack of resources has motivated Salafi factions to embrace the internet as a new, important resource for collective action.

Chapter Four looks at how Salafi factions defined and interpreted the internet as a new adopted resource in a communal discourse inspired and supported with references to religious texts. It suggests that Salafi factions legitimised and heralded the internet as a new resource of collective action through narratives informed and guided by Islamic texts and Salafi world views. Together these chapters argue that Salafi factions were encouraged by the same motive of overcoming the lack of resources and the shared narratives of the internet in their decision to embrace this new mode of communication technology as a new, important resource for mobilization purposes.

The later chapters of this study analyse how the Salafi factions with different access to resources actually mobilized the adopted internet as a new resource for collective action. For this purpose, certain types of internet use by the Salafi factions were identified, enabling the development of a typology of internet mobilization salient to the Salafi movement. Chapter Five analyses a strategy adopted by Salafi factions with varied access to resources to mobilize their websites, as instrumental resources for constructing and promoting the ideology of Salafism. This ideology includes the view of Salaf supremacy as a perfect model of understanding and practicing Islam, and other common Salafi doctrines. It is argued that although all Salafi factions have adopted the internet as a new resource for constructing the ideology of Salafism, they did not actually mobilize it for this purpose in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi

factions (Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists) tended to mobilize the internet to construct the ideology of Salafism more actively than the relatively resource-rich one (Haraki Salafists).

Chapter Six examines how the Salafi factions in Indonesia have mobilized their websites as resources for setting boundaries in an attempt to assert the right to sacred authority and guardianship of 'pure Islam'. It shows that poorly-resourced Salafi factions, as represented by Yemeni Salafists, mobilized the internet as an instrumental resource for setting boundaries more actively than the well-resourced Haraki Salafi faction.

Chapter Seven analyses the Salafi strategy of internet use for building networks through link creation. It presents the typology of links created by the Salafi factions in Indonesia and explores factors that might have influenced the linking practices among the Salafi factions. The chapter suggests that the resource-poor Salafi faction (Yemeni Salafists) mobilized the internet to create more links than the resource-rich one (Haraki Salafists).

Chapter Eight looks at the last identified strategy of Salafi factions to use the internet adoption as a coping strategy to deal with the lack of resources as manifested in their mobilization of the web for responding to current issues. It shows that the relatively less well-resourced Salafi factions (Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists) employed their websites more actively to respond to current issues than the well-resource one (Haraki Salafists).

Together these chapters argue that Salafi factions' actual use of the internet varies due to each group's differential access to offline resources. Salafi factions with limited access to resources were engaged more actively in mobilizing the internet as a new important resource for achieving their movement's purposes and interests than the Salafi factions with a good access to resources. The presence of the internet was relatively minimal in the actual mobilization by the well-resourced Salafi faction, providing it with few

opportunities for constructing ideology, setting boundaries, establishing networks, and responding to current issues. By contrast, the internet has played a significant role in providing the less well-resourced groups with a platform where they were able to articulate their ideology, set boundaries, build linkage, and respond to current issues to a wider audience.

Lastly, Chapter Nine, the conclusion to this thesis, returns to the assessment of the nature and extent of the internet significance for Islamic activism with special reference to Salafism in Indonesia. It lends support to the main argument that the significance of the internet for Salafism was not uniform, but rather differentiated due to intra-Salafi factionalism and differential access to resources. Actual mobilization of the internet among the Salafi factions was closely related to the offline contexts where it operated, namely the state of the groups' resources. The internet might have partially influenced and facilitated the Salafi movement in the contemporary Muslim world. Nevertheless, the rise and development of Salafism can be traced in cyberspace. The different ways the Salafi factions have used the internet have intensified national and global attention to the cause and ideas of Salafism. Thus, the emergence and development of Salafism cannot be fully understood without reference to this new media technology. Regardless of its varied significance, the internet cannot be ignored in any attempts to understand the contemporary development of the Salafi movement.

Chapter Two

Salafism in Indonesia: Spread, but Fragmented

Salafism is one of the prominent Islamic movements in contemporary Indonesia that (re)-emerged after the fall of the authoritarian rule of Suharto and his New Order regime in 1998. Its origin and expansion are linked to global Salafi *da`wah* (calling or propagation) that originated from Saudi Arabia and then spread worldwide in both Muslim countries in Africa and Asia, and non-Muslims countries in Europe, North America and Australia. This chapter examines the political opportunity structures that gave rise to Salafism in Indonesia and the social basis of its proponents. More importantly, it identifies fragmentation within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, which characterizes its contemporary development, as a foundation to understand how and why different Salafi factions embraced the internet.

Salafism as a Global Islamic Movement

Salafism (Arabic: *al-Salafiyyah*) is a global Islamic movement which aims to implement the 'pure' teachings of Islam as prescribed in the Qur'an and the Prophet Muhammad's tradition (*Sunnah*) according to the understanding and practice of *al-Salaf al-Ṣālih* (the Pious Predecessors) by claiming to reject any external influences and human involvement in the interpretation of religious texts.¹ To achieve this, it calls for a strict following in the footsteps of the

¹Contemporary Salafism should not be confused with Islamic modernism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries pioneered and associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh (d.1905) and Rashid Ridha (d. 1935), which was also referred as 'Salafiyyah'. For further discussion, see Lauzière (2010). For an excellent scholarly work that brings together scholars of different disciplines and approaches to global Salafism, see Roel Meijer (ed.) (2009a).

Salaf as the best reference and model for understanding and practicing Islam in modern life.

The proponents of Salafism identify themselves as, and are proud to be, “Salafists” (Arabic: *al-Salafīyyun*), the followers of *al-Salaf al-Ṣālih*. For them, the term “Salaf” or “al-Salaf al-Ṣālih” refers to the first three Muslim generations in early Islam, namely the Prophet Muhammad’s Companions (*Aṣhāb al-Nabīy*), the Followers of the Prophet (*al-Tābiʿīn*), and the Followers of the Followers of the Prophet (*Atbāʿu al-Tābiʿīn*). These three generations were considered to be the purest Muslims as they were directly guided by the Prophet Muhammad. This self-ascription is based on the belief that their understanding and practice of Islam is in complete accord with the method of the Salaf (*manhaj al-salaf*). `Abd al-`Azīz ibn Bāz, one of the main authorities of global Salafism, said that Salafi ideology is “derived from the Qur’an, the Sunnah and Consensus (*ijmāʿ*) which govern the method of acquiring *dīn* (religion) and understanding the Qur’an and Sunnah according to the principles agreed upon by the righteous predecessors (*salaf*)” (cited in Duderija 2011:54). Due to this strong emphasis on the Salaf as the only model of understanding and practicing Islam, Salafism is referred to as a movement of “return to the forefathers” (Marshallsay 2004).

The Salafists also claim to be the inheritors of the pre-modern Ahl al-Hadīth (People of the Prophet Muhammad’s Tradition). In their view, Ahl al-Hadīth was the only school of thought and Muslim group that remained faithful to the ‘pure’ teachings of Islam as prescribed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah and hence it was considered the saved sect (*al-firqat al-manṣūrah*). They base their claim on a *hadīth* (a report of the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad) in which the Prophet Muhammad was reported to have said that there would always be a group of his people who remain committed to the truth –a group that is identified by the Salafists as the Ahl al-Hadīth (Duderija 2011). By claiming to be following in the footsteps of Ahl al-Hadīth, the proponents of the Salafi movement assert that they are the

guardians of the 'pure' Islam in the modern period. For this reason, as Jahroni (2004) points out, Salafism is more than a movement to purify Islam; it is an ideology that is committed to fight against any ideas and practices that are not in accordance with written religious texts as its proponents understand them.

Salafism and Wahhabism

The origin and spread of global Salafism cannot be separated from Wahhabism (*Wahhabiyyah*), an official Islamic school of thought (*madhhab*) of Saudi Arabia. The term "salafism" is, therefore, used to refer to intellectual hybrids that developed from Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s and thereafter (Lacroix 2009:62). Though the Wahhabists in early 20th century had referred to themselves as Salafists, the term Salafism was not associated with Wahhabism until the 1970s. Through social and political processes, the proponents of Wahhabism co-opted the language and symbolism of Salafism so that in the 1970s Wahhabism and Salafism became practically identical and interchangeable (El-Fadl 2003:57, 74).

The co-optation or takeover of the Salafi epithets by the Saudi-backed Wahhabi proponents has made some scholars conceive of Salafism as identical to Wahhabism in its contemporary development. Noorhaidi Hasan (2007 and 2009), for example, conceptualizes Salafism "as a form of reconstituted Wahhabism". This view is supported by the fact that the proliferation of Wahhabism in the world has been fully backed by the Saudi government using the banner of *da`wah Salafiyyah* (the propagation of Salafism). This use is not only because the Wahhabists turn to the Salaf as a perfect model, but also because it is politically convenient to adopt the term "Salafism" as the term "Wahhabism" has developed a pejorative connotation among Muslims (Hasan 2007; El-Fadl 2003; and Duderija 2007). Modern Salafism spread when Wahhabism as a *Salafi* strand was endowed with financial resources and aligned with Saudi Arabia's policy of seeking local

and regional legitimacy as well as its hegemonic interests to expand beyond its small and local original base in the desert of Hejaz (Hashem 2006).

The conception that Salafism is reconstituted Wahhabism can also be found in the fact that the proponents of this movement are determined to spread the thoughts of pre-20th century authorities of Wahhabism, namely Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, Muhammad ibn al-Qayyim al-Jauziyyah, and Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb, as well as contemporary Wahhabi authorities such as the grand Mufti of Saudi `Abd al-Azīz ibn Bāz and Muhammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albani (Hasan 2007). In addition, contemporary Salafism shares the same methodology of the interpretation of religious texts and basic doctrines with Wahhabism that spread across the Muslim world under the banner of Salafi epithets (Duderija 2007). This blending of Wahhabi ideas and the belief in the supremacy of the Salaf as a perfect model has brought about the birth of what Abou El-Fadl calls “Salafabism”, a “supremacist puritanical orientation” that was made by the Saudi religious authorities hand in hand with political authorities “as a primary mode of responding to the challenge of modernity” (2003: 43).

Major Authorities

Within the global Salafi movement, the most influential authorities are the Middle Eastern Muslim scholars (*‘ulamā’*) with Saudi nationality or who are Saudi-educated at university level, many of whom gained PhDs in Islamic sciences from Saudi universities. These include Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albani (d. 1999), `Abd al-`Azīz ibn Bāz (d. 1999), Muhammad ibn Ṣālih al-`Uthaymīn (d. 2001), Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādī`i (d. 2001), Rābi’ ibn Hādī al-Madkhali (b. 1931), Yahya’ al-Hājūri, and Ṣālih al-Fawzān. The dominance of Saudi Arabian or Saudi-educated religious scholars asserts the centrality of Saudi Arabia as the birthplace of Salafism. As the main representatives of the Salafi movement, these religious scholars became the major references to whom

Salafi leaders and ordinary followers in the Muslim world turn for guidance and advice in their lives.

Outside the Middle East, leading personalities of Salafism in Western countries, such as Jamal Zarabozo and Bilal Philips (Duderija 2011), primarily become the mouthpiece of these Middle Eastern Salafi authorities, translating their messages for the Salafi followers in the West. In Indonesia, most of the Salafi leaders are graduates of Saudi and Yemeni universities, particularly Medina Islamic University, or informal Islamic religious learning institutions (*ma`had*) including Dār al-Hadīth in Dammaj. These include Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz, Yusuf Baisa, Jafar Umar Thalib, Ayip Syafrudin, Luqman Baabduh and Muhammad Umar Sewed (Hasan 2007 and 2009). Compared to locally trained Salafi leaders, these Saudi and Yemeni Eastern graduates commonly enjoy more authority and recognition from their followers due to their highly-esteemed learning in Mecca or Medina, the two holy cities of Islam. Yet, all the Salafi leaders and followers in Indonesia regard the Saudi and Yemeni Salafi authorities as the major, and, often, the only references in learning and preaching Salafi ideas among Indonesian Muslims.

The Middle Eastern Salafi authorities write treatises on Salafi ideas exclusively in Arabic. However, this is not a major barrier for Salafi followers from non-Arabic speaking countries who seek to understand the messages of these Salafi scholars. Non-Arab Salafi leaders and sympathizers have attempted to translate the works of these Middle Eastern Salafi authorities into local languages. For this purpose, in Western countries, they have established publishing houses, including Tarbiyyah Publications in Toronto, Invitation to Islam and Al-Khilafat Publications in London, and Salafi Publications and Maktabah Darussalam in Birmingham. Mobilizing information and communication technologies, they have created websites such as www.salafipublications.com, www.tarbiyyahbookstore.com, <http://sunna.com>, www.salaf.com, and www.fatwa-online.com (Duderija 2011). Individual Salafi authorities' websites have also been established by

the Salafi supporters, such as www.binbaz.com (on the works of `Abd al `Azīz ibn Bāz), www.rabee.net (on the works of Rābi ibn Hādi al-Madkhali), and www.ibnothaimeen.com (on the works of Muhammad ibn al-`Uthaymīn) (Duderija 2011). In Indonesia, to spread the Salafi messages, Salafi proponents published Salafi journals such as *Majalah An-Nashihah* in Makassar, *Majalah Asy-Syariah* in Sleman, and *Majalah As-Salam* in Depok. They also established publishing houses such as Pustaka Qaulan Sadida in Malang, Al-Atsary in Bogor, and Pustaka Al-Rayyan in Solo and created hundreds of Salafi websites such as www.salafy.or.id, <http://www.darussalaf.com>, and <http://asysyariah.com>.

Transnationalization of Salafism

The transnationalization of Salafism, its spread to Muslim and non-Muslim countries beyond Saudi Arabia as its country of birth, has to do with the absence of strong counter-forces against Salafism and a crisis of religious authorities within mainstream Muslim society. The leaders of the established Muslim institutions and Muslim civil society have lost their authority in the face of growing demands of contemporary Muslim society, particularly Muslim youth. They have failed to counter the growth of Salafism in an appropriate way. In the words of Adraoui (2009:375), the spread of Salafism is due to the “loss of authority of counter-forces in the religious market” within the Muslim *ummah*.

The global spread of Salafism has also been made possible by the long tradition of the student-scholar relationship in Muslim countries. After their return to their countries of origin, graduates of the Middle East universities or informal learning institutions, particularly in Saudi Arabia, maintain their networks with the religious scholars with whom they studied. In doing so, these graduates are committed to spreading Salafism by lecturing, translating, and publishing the works of their teachers. The Middle East learning institutions also play an important role in this process of Salafi

exportation. The Islamic University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, for example, is actively involved in the global dissemination of Salafism, including in Western countries (Lacroix 2009:70-79).

In addition, the financial support provided by some Middle East countries has accelerated the export of Salafism. Saudi Arabia has made the dissemination of Salafism in the Muslim world one of its main foreign policies in order to maintain its central position in the Muslim world as well as to counter the effect of the Iranian revolution on the political domination of Saudi family. To achieve this, Saudi Arabia, together with Kuwait, has provided Salafi followers around the world with considerable financial support through their charitable and *da'wah* organizations such as Al-Haramayn Foundation and Jamiyyah Ihya al Turath (Noorhaidi 2005, 2007, 2009; and Haykel 2009).

Finally, communication and information technologies have opened up opportunities, as well as challenges, for the proponents of Salafism to propagate their ideas. Within the last decade, the internet has played a crucial role in facilitating the spread of Salafism globally. While keeping the old media as a means of dissemination, contemporary Salafists employ the internet to further propagate Salafi thoughts and maintain linkage among Salafi supporters. Through this, as Paz (2009:26) argues, they have established open universities of Salafism and created virtual communities of Salafi *ikhwan* (brothers).

The Rise of Salafism in Indonesia

In the Indonesian archipelago, the emergence of Salafism is closely connected with three external changes that enhanced Salafism's opportunity to organize and mobilize: a post-Iranian Islamic revolution change in Saudi's foreign policy, the *Reformasi* movement in 1998, and social changes within Muslim society resulting from the contradictions of economic development.

Iranian Revolution and Saudi Arabia's Obsession

The first notable change in the political opportunity structures for Salafism came with the Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. The success of this revolution particularly posed a serious challenge to Saudi Arabia in that it could provide all Islamists with a model for the establishment of the ideal Islamic state that they had long sought, which, in turn could possibly wipe out the Saudi monarchy. As a response, Saudi Arabia contained the growing impact of the Iranian revolution by intensifying its political and religious influences over the Muslim world through various aid programs and the spread of its Wahhabism under the banner of Salafi *da'wah* (Noorhaidi 2005:31).

In Indonesia, this attempt began with the Saudi government's support for DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia [Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation]), an Islamic missionary organization established in the 1970s by former leaders of Masyumi party.² The DDII's anti-Shiite campaign was in line with this Saudi government's policy of containing the global effect of the Islamic revolution in Iran whose official state religion is Shi'a Islam and whose population was around 90% Shi'ites. As a result, it benefitted from the Saudi government's generous financial support through Islamic charitable organizations such as Hai'at al-Ighathat al-Islamiyyat al-'Alamiyyah (International Islamic Relief Organization), al-Majlis al-'Alami li al-Masajid (World Council of Mosques), Lajnat al-Birr al-Islami (Committee of Islamic Charity) and al Nadwat al-'Alamiyyat li al-Shabab (World Assembly of Muslim Youth) (Hasan 2007). With this considerable financial support, DDII was well equipped to realize projects such as construction of mosques,

²Founded in 1945, Masyumi (Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia; Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations) was the largest Islamic party during Indonesia's Liberal Democracy Era, which included Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama. It won the second place in the 1955 election, gaining around 20% of popular vote and 57 seats in parliament. Due its involvement in the PRRI rebellion against Sukarno in 1958, Masyumi was banned in 1960. See *e.g.* Lucius (2003).

orphanages, hospitals, *madrrasah* (Islamic schools), distribution of free copies of the Qur'an and Islamic books, and training of preachers who were then sent to remote transmigration areas (Hakiem and Linrung 1997 in Hasan 2007:88).

The DDII activities had significant impact on the increase of Islamic propagation among Indonesian Muslims, especially in triggering Islamic activism on university campuses (Noorhaidi 2005:36). These activities provided Saudi Arabia with opportunities to strengthen its politico-religious influences among Indonesian Muslims. With this aim, the Saudi government established LIPIA (Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab [Institute of Islamic Knowledge and Arabic Language]) in Jakarta in 1980. As it is directly linked with Imam Muhammad ibn Sa'ud Islamic University of Riyadh, the LIPIA director, a position that is normally held by an individual of Saudi nationality, is appointed by the university. Lecturers are recruited from Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries as well as from Indonesia. LIPIA is actively engaged in introducing Wahhabism, the official school of Islamic thought of Saudi Arabia, to its students through the nature of the syllabus as well as to wider communities through distribution of free books in line with politico-religious interests of the Saudi government, such as the works of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb, the founder of Wahhabism, to hundreds of Islamic educational institutions and religious organization (Hasan 2007:89-90).

In addition, the Saudi government's foreign policy of maintaining its political interests was intensified through scholarships provided to talented LIPIA students and those from wider Islamic educational institutions and organizations to pursue further studies of Islamic knowledge at Saudi universities. Around 30 LIPIA graduates receive grants each year to pursue further studies in Saudi Arabia, particularly at Imam Muhammad ibn Sa'ud University and Medina Islamic University (Hasan 2008:251; Hasan 2010:683).

These scholarships have attracted many Indonesian Muslims as the opportunity to study in the country of the birth of Islam constitutes a privilege and a source of great pride (Hasan 2007). For many centuries, Mecca and Medina in Saudi Arabia and Cairo in Egypt have been the major destinations for Indonesians who want to study traditional Islamic knowledge creating the scholar-student networks between the Malay-Indonesia archipelago and the Middle East (Azra 2004). As a result, since the opening of LIPIA, the number of Indonesians students at Saudi universities has increased significantly from year to year and this in turn helped intensify the influence of Saudi and Salafi ideology among Indonesian Muslims.

The return of such students to their country in 1980s was especially important to the emergence of Salafism in Indonesia. Having studied Salafi-Wahhabi ideas, these graduates were committed to the Islamic revivalism calling for a return to a 'pure' Islam as understood and practiced by the Pious Ancestors. To them, the decline of the Muslim *ummah* (global community) was attributed to Muslims –including Indonesian Muslims– not understanding and implementing Islam in correct ways as prescribed and exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslim generations. These Saudi graduates were obsessed with the purification of Indonesian Islam from what they considered un-Islamic beliefs and practices that had contaminated the purity of Islam. Not only did they apply Salafi ideas in their lives; they also attempted systematically to mobilize people to join their Salafi *da'wah* activities (Hasan 2007).

The early 1990s witnessed the fruitful efforts of the Saudi graduates to spread Salafism in Indonesia. These early Salafi preachers succeeded in attracting followers who were mainly students of universities in Central Java and Yogyakarta. Their activities were seen initially at mosques located at universities in Yogyakarta, Solo and Semarang. Then, after another cohort of Saudi graduates returned home (such as Jafar Umar Thalib, Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Yusuf Baisa, Muhammad Yusuf Harun, Abdul Hakim Abdat,

and Muhammad Zaitun Rusmin) Salafism quickly spread to other cities in Java including Cirebon, Bandung and Jakarta as well in outer Java cities such Makassar, South Sulawesi, and Balikpapan, East Kalimantan (Noorhaidi 2005: 44-48).

In addition to leaders' and followers' commitment to Salafi propagation, the establishment of Salafi foundations played a key role in intensifying the spread of Salafi ideology among Indonesian Muslims, particularly urban youth and university students. These include Al-Majlis al-Turath al-Islami, Al-Sunnah, Al-Sofwah, Al Huda, Nida al-Sunnah, Lajnat al-Khayriyyah al-Musharakah, and Wahdah Islamiyyah. To support their projects, these foundations received considerable financial support mainly from Saudi and Kuwait charitable organizations including al-Muassassat al-Haramayn al-Khayriyyah (Haramayn Charity Foundation) and al-Jam'iyat Ihya al-Turath al-Islami (Society for Reviving Islamic Heritage) (Hasan 2007:91-92).

Reformasi in 1998

The second change in the political opportunity structure for Salafism in Indonesia was the Reformasi movement in 1998. Political change in 1998 that led to the fall of Suharto and his New Order regime, which was known as the Reformasi movement, following his regime's failure in overcoming Asian economic crisis in 1997 created a new political landscape in the form of a post-authoritarian state. This has provided Islamic activists with opportunities to (re)emerge and develop in ways that were previously restricted by the state. Taking benefit from the dynamics of this new socio-political life, such Islamic activists made use of the new freedom and opportunities to organize and consolidate their power to pursue their interests and aspirations.

As a result, the post-Suharto regime Indonesia has witnessed the rise of Islamic activism by various Muslim groups with diverse ideological and social backgrounds. Some Islamic groups are part of transnational Islamic

movements such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Liberation Party), Jama'ah Tabligh (Community of Islamic Propagation) and Ikhwanul Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood). Others are home-grown ones including Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (the Assembly of Indonesian Jihad Fighters), Forum Komunikasi Ahlul Sunnah wal Jamaah (Communication Forum of the Followers of the Prophetic Tradition and Muslim Community) with Laskar Jihad (Jihad Troopers) as its paramilitary wing, Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders' Front) and Laskar Jundullah (God's Soldiers).

These Islamic groups enjoyed the relative absence of state control over civil spaces, particularly over Islam as the religion of majority. Suharto had viewed Islam as a principal source of inspiration and identity that could be mobilized by its adherents to challenge his rule. As a result, he attempted to control Islam by undermining its political expression in public life and using Islam for his political purposes (Effendy 2004). This can be seen, for example, in the ban on political parties whose ideology was based on Islam and the regulation of political parties that forced all parties with Islamic backgrounds to fuse under one party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (the United Party of Development). But, this policy of containing Islam ceased when Suharto and his New Order regime collapsed in 1998. The state lost its powerful control of socio-political life and was forced to relax policies that had controlled civil spaces.

It was in this context that Salafism began to (re)emerge and develop. It became one of the fastest-growing contemporary Islamic movements in post-Suharto Indonesia. Salafi identities and activities that had previously operated in semi-clandestine ways became more visible and public. This experience of the Salafists, as well as that of other Islamic groups, in the post-authoritarian Indonesia confirms the assumption among sociologists that social movements are primarily found in democratic societies that permit heterogeneity and tolerate dissent (Robinson 1988:554).

Social Transformation of Muslim Society and Contradictions of Development

An important change in the political opportunity structures for Salafism in Indonesia came about with the social transformation of Muslim society as a result of the contradictions of economic development. As state projects of mass education and economic development have expanded in most parts of Indonesia since Suharto's New Order era, many young Muslim villagers had to move to cities or towns to pursue higher levels of education due to the absence of high schools, colleges and universities in many rural areas. Living in a new, alien environment quite different from their rural experience presented challenges for these young Muslims, including harsh competition for education and jobs. Many of these new lower middle class youth were educated, but found themselves constrained within lower levels of socio-economic and political structures. These young Muslims remained on the margins of society though they had attained relatively high levels of education and employment. They found their social position was only slightly better than that of the mass of urban poor. Their material conditions of life could be quite unstable, a condition that was quite contradictory to their aspirations. These Muslim youth had generally no formal or extensive religious education since their childhood, but rather were educated in 'secular' schools and universities.

In this context, certain interpretations of Islam appeared attractive to these newly urbanized Muslim youth, providing them with an alternative framework to understand their society and place within it as well as answers to their grievances. In short, social transformations linked to modernization in contemporary Indonesia affecting a newly urbanized middle class provided a social base for Islamic activism, including Salafism.

Salafism offered these new Muslim lower middle classes an alternative community and justified their alienation from the society that surrounded them through doctrines of submitting only to God and fighting all forms of deviation from the 'true' Islam. It also provided such newly

urbanized Muslims with a new and holy identity and pride which significantly changed their lives, as they claimed, from individuals who lived on the fringe of society to the “the saved ones” (*al-ṭāifat al-nājiyat*) and “the victorious group” (*al-ṭāifat al-mansūrat*) who were rewarded with a sense of sacred mission and identity. This case is supported by the experience of Muslim minority migrants in the West. For Salafists in France, for example, the community of Salafi brothers has replaced the secular and alien French nation and the Salafi way of life has supplanted secular and un-Islamic Western culture. Instead of integrating into the national society, through Salafism these alienated Muslim migrants attempt to separate themselves from a society they regard as sinful and establish boundaries between “us” and “them” as they claimed to be reborn with a new identity of “super Muslims” who were superior to the rest of society (Adraoui 2009:367-373).

Moreover, Salafism was appealing to certain groups of these newly urbanized Muslim youth for they found it providing answers to their economic problems. It promised economic success by providing recruits and followers with economic networks among Salafi brothers. It was common for Salafists to establish businesses, mostly small and medium ones, to support each other financially. Like orthodox Jewish communities in US or Canada, the Salafists in Indonesia and elsewhere lived a separate life from the broader society setting up small businesses such as clothing and bookshops. Through their entrepreneurship, Salafists adopted economic values of money making and taking advantage of economic relations with people outside the Salafi movement regardless of their political and religious affiliation. This economic relationship was the only aspect in which the Salafists were allowed to maintain connection with secular societies and non-Salafi communities (Adraoui 2009:374-375). Here, Salafism provided these Muslim youth with opportunities to live a devout life, not only for the hereafter but also in this world. Economic success was regarded as a reward from God and

a sign that one has been saved and rewarded with wealth for joining Salafism as the true path.

Social Basis of Salafism in Indonesia

According to Hadiz (2014:133-135), Islamic populism in Indonesia mobilizes a cross-class constituency in an attempt to pursue power and to control the state and its resources. Such Islamic populism generally finds support among middle class, urban poor and petty bourgeoisie. In the 1950s, the Masyumi, for example, attracted support from old petty bourgeoisie based in small trade and manufacturing until it was banned by President Sukarno in 1960 because some of its leaders were involved in separatist rebellions and because of its opposition to the left-leaning policies of Sukarno. In the 1980s and 1990s, the ideas of former Masyumi leaders continued to attract members of the urban poor and educated middle class (Hadiz and Teik 2011:471). Similarly, the proponents of radical Islamist groups in Solo, Central Java, and militia-type groups in other cities after the fall of the Suharto in 1998 came from diverse social backgrounds. Their leading figures were school teachers, small businessmen in textiles, and former activists of HMI (Islamic Students Association). None of them received formal religious training in *pesantren*. Most rank-and-file in these groups were irregularly employed street toughs and were not activists within existing Muslim organizations (Hadiz 2011:28-31).

Salafism is no exception. Like Islamic movements in general, it is essentially a phenomenon of modern society in that it was born and developed in urban areas, usually capital cities in Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Sumatra. It has attracted strong support in urban areas in an attempt to pursue social Islamization and social change goals. During the authoritarian rule of Suharto regime in the 1980s, Salafism was a semi-clandestine movement that operated mostly on urban campuses. After the fall of New

Order in 1998, it proliferated openly, broadening its appeal base and gaining support from a cross-class constituency comprising urban poor, middle class, and petty bourgeoisie.

Thus, the constituency of Salafism comprises of a mixture of urban and newly or partially urbanized groups; the middle and lower middle classes; students and dropouts of secular schools, universities and traditional Islamic educational institutions.³ The leaders and intellectual vanguards of Salafism have their roots in modern societies. They are generally urban educated middle class that has played a key role in initiating and organizing broad-based support in an attempt to create a society of 'true Muslims' based on 'true path' of Salaf. They are the direct product of economic development and the growth of educational institutions, no matter how uncertain and problematic their economic circumstances may be at times.

While the rank-and-file Salafists generally did not come from a strong religious educational background as noted above, these Salafi leaders had different elementary and secondary educational backgrounds; some went to secular middle and high schools, while other studied at religious ones. The majority, however, received formal training in religious knowledge at Islamic universities or traditional learning institutions in the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia and Yemen, or Saudi-funded Islamic colleges in Indonesia such as Jakarta-based LIPIA (Institute of Islamic Knowledge and Arabic Language). Few graduated from national, state-run Islamic universities or institutes (UIN [State Islamic University] and IAIN [State Institute of Islamic Studies]) which were long established at various capital cities in Java, Kalimantan, Sumatra and Sulawesi.

The cadres of Salafism are often young (in their twenties and thirties), distinctly urbanized (mostly in capital cities), and well educated (university students and graduates), at ease using modern technology, but precariously employed. The majority originated from rural areas or from families that

³See Noorhaidi (2005, especially Chapter V).

were recently urbanized. Some came from families related to modernist and puritanical Islamic organizations, while others came from those of nominal Muslims with syncretic backgrounds that incorporated local customs, Hinduism and Buddhism or might be categorised as *abangan* according to Clifford Geertz's typology of Javanese society (Geertz 1960). To these young, urbanized and educated individuals, Salafism provided concepts of a 'true' Islam, of being 'true' Muslims, and of social justice that provided them with an explanation for their relative marginality and offered a framework of endorsed actions and responses.

Students were a core component of this broad social base of Salafism, having access to a modern, secular education and living in urban areas. Although some Salafi followers are high school students, the majority are students or graduates of secular universities often enrolled in technical fields or natural sciences such as engineering, physics and medicine. As noted above, generally they have not received formal training in religious education at state-run Islamic schools (Madrasah Aliyah Negeri) and universities (UIN and IAIN) or at traditional Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*).

Other components of cross-class alliance that gave rise to Salafism were found in petty urban traders and merchants based such as in textile, housing, and herbal medicine. A local businessman sympathetic to the Salafi ideas may donate a piece of land or building blocks to a particular Salafi *madrasah*, become its regular donor, and serve as its protector against resistance from the surrounding community (Hasan 2010:697). Salafism also found support among the new urban poor and middle class like lower-ranked officials and civil servants whose aspirations had grown because of their access to education and economic development.

Fragmentation within the Salafi Movement in Indonesia

Salafists share common doctrines such as *tawhīd* (belief in the One God), Sunnah (obligation of practicing the Prophet Muhammad's tradition), *al-*

walā' wa al-barā` (alliance and disavowal), and the danger of *bid'ah* (religious innovations). They are also broadly united by the idea of return to an 'authentic' Islam based on the Salaf's understanding and practice as the only solution to social, economic and political problems facing the contemporary global Muslim societies (*ummah*).⁴

However, Salafism is not a monolithic, unified movement as it tends to fragment over internal division and contradictions in doctrine and action that have significantly characterized its development in Indonesia. As it has proliferated in various cities and regions in Indonesia, its proponents are facing challenges and differ in their analysis and strategies to meet such challenges.

Roots of the Internal Division

The internal divisions within the Salafi movement have to do with ambivalent doctrines adopted from Wahhabism. Salafi factions interpreted these doctrines in different ways. Certain groups radicalised the doctrines after having escaped the state control of the Saudi Kingdom and official religious establishment known as the Committee of Senior Religious Scholars (*Ha'iat al-kibar al-'ulamā`*).

First, intra-movement division is rooted in Salafism's doctrinal ambivalence in that the Salafists call for a strict return to the Qur'an and Sunnah as the only solution to issues facing contemporary Muslims, while they in fact adhere to the Hanbali School of Islamic jurisprudence⁵ and its scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) and Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb (1703-1792). Even Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albani (d. 1999),⁶ one of the prominent authorities of contemporary Salafism, realised this contradiction

⁴For further information on the common Salafi doctrines and approaches, see Noorhaidi (2005 Chapter V); Wiktorowicz (2006:208-214); and Duderija (2011 Chapter 2).

⁵Hanbaliyyah or Hanabilah is one of big four schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), which advocates a very strict and conservative approach to religious texts, particularly on questions about theology. It is attributed to Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855), developed and institutionalised by his disciples to be Hanbaliyyah School of Law (*Madhhab*). See, for example, Al-Matroudi (2006).

⁶For analysis on Al-Albani's influence on modern Salafism, see Lacroix (2009a).

when he pointed out that Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhāb, the founder of Wahhabism from which modern Salafism takes sources, was not a true Salafi because he actually followed the Hanbali School (Meijer 2009b:9). His self-criticism sparked controversy among the Salafi followers and has created a stream of Salafism that claims to be the pure form of Salafism, radicalises the doctrine of *hizbiyyah* (partisanship), and readily accuses other Salafi factions of breaching the Salaf way.

The second source of the internal conflict is the doctrine of *al-walā` wa al-barā`* (alliance and disavowal). It not only regulates the relationship between Muslims and non-believers, but also between Salafists and non-Salafists. Through this doctrine, the Salafists are called upon to distance themselves from Muslims who do not follow Salafism by showing hatred and enmity toward them. The doctrine has been radicalised by some Salafi leaders who apply it not only against outsiders but also insiders, such as other Salafi proponents who are regarded as having deviated from the Salaf system. In its extreme form, this doctrine provides an ideological basis for Juhayman al-Utaybi (d. 1980), who led the occupation of the Masjid al-Harām (Grand Mosque) in Mecca in 1979, to assert that Muslims should renounce the rulers including the Saudi government that makes alliances with non-believers. It provides the basis also for Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to declare the Saudi state to be 'non-believing' (*takfīr*) for its close relations with the West (Meijer 2009b:10).⁷

Thirdly, the internal tension lies in the Salafi doctrine and practice of *hisbah*, commanding right and forbidding wrong (*al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*). This doctrine is interpreted in different ways by various Salafi leaders. Some understand it as an instruction to apply strict moral codes on individuals and society, and correct what are considered religious deviations such as the commemoration of the Prophet Muhammad's birthday (*mawlid*) and communal prayers and Qur'anic recital on certain days after

⁷For further analysis on how the doctrine of *al-walā` wa al-barā`* has been radicalized, see Wagemakers (2009).

one's death (*tahlilan* and *tawassul*). Others interpret it more radically by openly correcting rulers and even declaring them to be *kafir* (disbelievers) for their deviation from Islamic values or unwillingness to apply Islamic law.⁸

In addition to doctrinal ambiguity, political issues become sources of intra-Salafi fragmentation. This is clearly seen in the Salafi movement's encounter with politics, as is evident in the case of the Saudi government's decision to allow the US to station its troops on holy soil during the Gulf War in 1990. A group of Salafi authorities linked to the Saudi's official religious establishment issued a *fatwa*⁹ approving the kingdom's decision as necessary to defend the country from the enemy's invasion. This *fatwa* was certainly not popular among the Saudi people and sparked strong criticism from Muhammad al-Surūr and his politically oriented Salafi followers who accused those who supported the Saudi's decision of being ignorant of contemporary politics and current affairs so that their *fatwa* was invalid. Another Salafi faction went further by declaring that a ruler who makes an alliance with Islam's enemies is a *kafir* (disbeliever) and any political action to replace such a ruler with a true Muslim ruler was necessary, by resorting to violent means if necessary (Noorhaidi 2005; Hasan 2007; Wiktorowicz 2006).

Lastly, another factor that contributes to the fragmentation of Salafism is interaction with local issues when Salafism goes global. Local circumstances clearly have contributed to the growth of Salafism. Yet, they also have hampered its development. Global Salafism is able to make inroads when local structures or nationalist movements have failed and society becomes individualised. However, when society still strongly embraces local beliefs and practices, and local socio-political institutions are successful in

⁸For further information about Salafi understanding and practice of *hisbah*, see Meijer (2009c).

⁹*Fatwa* is a legal opinion or ruling on a particular case issued by a recognized *'alim* (Islamic religious scholar) or an institution which consists of some Islamic religious scholars (*'ulamā*) such as Majelis Ulama Indonesia. *Fatwa* is generally considered non-binding for all Muslims. See Masud, *et al.* (1996).

fulfilling what communities expect, transnational Salafism is unable to take root (Meijer 2009b).

When Salafism becomes more global, it becomes more diverse, contradictory and fragmented in its local expressions. Encounters with local beliefs and practices have created different currents of Salafism. In Egypt, Jama'a Islamiyya has mixed Salafism with the thought of Sayyid Qutb (Qutbism) and Muhammad al-Surūr in Saudi Arabia has blended Salafism with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Iraq, Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi has created an ideology that combines political and jihadi Salafism and Arab nationalism. Some proponents of Salafism in India have even attempted to merge Salafism with Sufism, one of its main enemies (Meijer 2009b).

Typology of Salafi Factions in Indonesia

As highlighted above, internal division is evident within the Salafi movement in Indonesia. However, it is not easy to make clear cut distinctions between the Salafi factions because they overlap, share the same creed, practice the same strict rituals, and adopt the same dress code. In addition, the Salafists deny the existence of division or conflict within Salafism in Indonesia, and instead claim that they are united in terms of thought and practice. They even refuse to identify Salafism as a movement (*harakah*), a term which is often used by their detractors and analysts. To them, labelling Salafism as a movement or organization with structures or formal leadership is contradictory with their doctrine of *anti-hizbiyyah* (partisanship). They prefer to refer to Salafism simply as a *manhaj*, which is understood as a true path and correct way of understanding and practicing Islam for Muslims according to the Salaf.

Nevertheless, a close examination of, for example, its presence on the internet, reveals that factionalism is palpable within the Salafi movement in Indonesia. The proponents of the movement are divided into several factions.

A faction is “an identifiable subgroup within a movement that is opposed to other movement subgroups” (Zald and McCarthy in Benford 1993:681). A Salafi faction, then, is an identifiable subgroup within the Salafi movement that is opposed to other movement subgroups.

In identifying this factionalism, I took into consideration the local nature of Salafi development in Indonesia, rather than simply following Wiktorowicz’s often-quoted typology of Middle Eastern Salafism (Wiktorowicz 2006), in which he classifies the Salafists into three factions: purists, politicians and jihadis. However, I do not think Wiktorowicz’s typology is an adequate classification for the contemporary Salafi movement, in particular his third category: jihadi Salafists. It assumes that only the first faction (purists) is concerned with the purity of Islam and only the third category (jihadis) is engaged in *jihād*. All Salafists, in fact, share the belief in the necessity for purification of Islam, particularly the main doctrine of *tawhīd* from un-Islamic elements, and in the religious obligation of *jihād*, though they may differ in the interpretation of what *jihād* is and in the practice of how and when *jihād* should be implemented.

Likewise, I do not simply follow Hasan’s typology that classifies Indonesian Salafi proponents into two factions: “Sururis” who are regarded to be deviant faction as they are influenced by the ideas of Muhammad al-Surūr and “Non-Sururis” who claim to be consistent with the ‘authentic’ nature of apolitical Salafism (Hasan 2007). In his other works, Hasan (2009 and 2010) uses different labels to refer these factions: “Yemeni Salafi” and “Haraki Salafi” respectively. The Haraki label is also used to designate Yemeni Salafists’ rivals in general who are associated with political activism. However, I think Hasan’s typology is incomplete because it fails to include the radical-violent stream of Salafism, which is evident in contemporary Islamic activism in Indonesia.

Therefore, I identify three factions that are involved in the internal conflict within the Salafi movement in Indonesia: Yemeni Salafists, Haraki

Salafists, and Violent Jihadi Salafists. The first faction represents mainstream Salafism, while the latter two factions are considered to be dissident Salafi factions with Violent Jihadists as the smallest, but most infamous faction.

This factionalism within the Salafi movement in Indonesia became publicly known when debate emerged regarding the influence of Sururiyyah incited by Jafar Umar Thalib¹⁰, one of the most famous Salafi personalities. Thalib accused Abu Nida, a pioneering figure of Salafi propagation, and his colleagues of being followers and sympathisers of Muhammad al-Surūr, the key figure in a politically-inclined stream of Salafism, who criticised the Saudi government and Saudi official religious institutions following their approval of the stationing of US troops in Saudi Arabia to protect the kingdom from Saddam Hussein's invasion in 1990 (Hasan 2010). This implies that Thalib considered Abu Nida and his cohort to have deviated from the true Salafi system, an accusation that was certainly rejected by Abu Nida and his supporters. Undoubtedly, this Sururiyyah issue exposed the open division within the Salafi movement in Indonesia.

Yemeni Salafists

This Salafi faction is derogatorily labelled as “Yemeni Salafists” (Salafi Yamani) by its detractors because of its strong student-scholar network and ideological connection with Salafism in Yemen. Most leading figures and preachers (*dā'i*; plural: *du'at*) of this faction pursued Salafi knowledge at the Salafi learning institutions in Yemen, primarily the Salafi *madrassa* of Dar al-Hadīth in Dammaj, or follow the ideas of Salafi authorities in Yemen. Its most prominent leader, Ja'far Umar Thalib, studied with Muqbil al-Wādi'i,¹¹ a Salafi authority who held the honorific title “Muhaddith al-Yaman” (the expert in the prophetic tradition in Yemen), in the early 1990s (Hasan 2002:153). Thalib also sent his students to these Salafi *madrassa* to study Islamic

¹⁰For the biography of Jafar Umar Thalib, see Noorhaidi (2009).

¹¹On the role of Muqbil al Wadi'i in the development of Salafism in Yemen, see Haykel (2002).

knowledge with Yemeni Salafi authorities including al-Wādi'i and his prominent students, Abū 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Hājūri and Abū Hasan 'Ali 'Abd al-Hamīd (Hasan 2010:695). After their return, they maintained their relationship with their former Yemeni teacher-mentors by spreading their ideas, asking for *fatwa* when they had complex issues at home, and inviting them to give lectures in Indonesia. This labelling, in fact, is not entirely appropriate because this Salafi faction also turn for reference to other Salafi authorities from other Middle Eastern countries such as Naṣir al-Dīn al-Albani from Syria, and Zayd Muhammad al-Madkhali, Rābi al-Madkhali, 'Abd al-Razzāq al 'Abbād, and Muhammad Aman al-Jami from Saudi Arabia (Hasan 2010:695; Hasan 2009:177). Despite this, the term 'Yemeni Salafists' is used in this dissertation to characterise those mainstream Salafists, whose practice is substantially influenced by such Yemeni associations.

Like the proponents of Salafism in general, the Yemeni Salafists are minority compared to traditional Muslim majority in Indonesia. The actual number of the Yemeni Salafists cannot be accurately estimated because there is no system of registered membership and they are not easy to penetrate for they live in enclave and tight-knit communities in urban areas and city outskirts in Java, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and Sumatra. However, their presence is visible and their growth is evident around campus mosques of 'secular' universities or in religious lectures held in local mosques. They can be recognized from their outward appearance: men wear Saudi or Pakistani/Afghan dress style with calve-length trousers and white or black cap, grow beards and shave their moustaches, while women wear long and loose *jalabiyya*, normally black or dark brown, that covers the whole body, with a long headscarf and *cadar* (face veil; burqa).

The emergence of Yemeni Salafists was closely connected with Jam'aah Ihya' al-Sunnah (Community for Reviving the Prophetic Tradition), a Salafi community and *madrassa*, which was established and led by Ja'far Umar Thalib in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, in 1994. The students who had finished their

studies from this *madrasa* as well as those who had returned from studies at Salafi *madrasa* in Yemen were encouraged by Thalib to organize Salafi propagation in various urban and rural areas in Indonesia (Hasan 2010:696). This new generation of Salafi preachers founded their own Salafi *madrasa* or *pesantren* to support their Salafi *da'wah* activities. Yemeni Salafi *madrasa* and *pesantren* flourished in many cities including Bekasi, Cirebon, Solo, Yogyakarta, Lombok, Makassar, Balikpapan, and Pekanbaru. As a result, this created a strong network of Ihya' al-Sunnah and Yemeni Salafists who were connected with Jafar Umar Thalib as the main mentor. In its development, this network played a very important role in the proliferation of Yemeni Salafism in many cities in Indonesia (Hasan 2005 and 2010).

However, the central role of Ja'far Umar Thalib began to diminish when he decided to bring his followers in the Ihya al-Sunnah network around Indonesia to wage armed *jihād* in Maluku (Moluccas), the eastern islands of Indonesia, supporting Muslims against Christians in communal conflict that broke out from 1999 until 2000.¹² In January 2000, he established FKAWJ (Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama'ah; Communication Forum of the Followers of Prophet's Tradition and Community) with Laskar Jihad as its paramilitary wing.¹³ He then mobilised thousands of his Salafi followers and sympathisers and trained them as *jihād* volunteers without approval from President Abdurrahman Wahid, a legitimate ruler whose permission should be sought before jihad can be conducted according to the Salafi doctrine (Hasan 2009).

Thalib's decisions not only attracted criticism from other Salafi factions, who accused him of conducting political activism, an issue that he previously condemned, but also incited tensions with his fellow Yemeni Salafists. His deputies and high-ranked officers of the FKWAJ and Laskar

¹²For further information and analysis on these communal conflicts in Maluku, see, for example, Yanuarti (2004) and Wilson (2008).

¹³For a comprehensive study of the rise, development and fall of Laskar Jihad, see Hasan (2006).

Jihad began to doubt Thalib's consistency in following the Salafi teachings and question the sincerity of his intention in mobilising his Salafi followers to fight *jihād* in Maluku. As part of his strategy he met members of the Indonesian political and military elite and even appeared on television, a worldly distraction that is forbidden according to the Salafi doctrine. These political manoeuvres prompted them to withdraw their support for Thalib's *jihād* in Maluku and, in a national meeting in Makassar, they sent a petition to him to disband the FKAWJ and Laskar Jihad. They believed that Thalib had involved them in political practices, which contradicts the Salafi doctrine, and they claimed to be victims of his political manipulation. After Laskar Jihad was disbanded in October 2002, the Yemeni Salafists asked for a *fatwa* on Thalib's political manoeuvres from Rābi' al-Madkhali, a Salafi authority in Saudi Arabia, who then stated that Thalib was no longer considered a true Salafi. After this, they abandoned Thalib (Hasan 2009:185).

Consequently, this distrust of Thalib's consistency and sincerity brought about the demise of Thalib's Ihya' al-Sunnah community for he lost his students who moved to other Salafi communities in Solo, Central Java, such as Minhaj al-Sunnah and Ibn Taymiyya Salafi learning centres. Thalib attempted to revive his Ihya al Sunnah without much success (Hasan 2010:703).

More importantly, this intra-factional rift gave rise to a new leadership within the Yemeni Salafi faction with Muhammad Umar as-Sewed, the leading figure of Dhiyaus Sunnah *pesantren* in Cirebon, and Qomar Suaidi of Al-Atsariyyah *pesantren* in Temanggung, as its leading figures (Hasan 2009:185). Other leaders include Luqman Ba'abduh, the director of Pesantren As-Salafy in Jember; Abu Hamzah Yusuf of Adhwa' al-Salaf *pesantren* in Bandung; Abu Mundzir Dzul Akmal of Ta'zhim al-Sunnah *pesantren* in Riau; Dzulqarnain, the director of As-Sunnah *pesantren* in Makassar; and Abu Karimah Asykari of Ibn al-Qoyyim *pesantren* in Balikpapan. Under this new leadership, Yemeni Salafists have attempted to

return to the 'true Salafi way' by focusing on Salafi propagation (*da`wah salafiyyah*) and avoiding political activities. In spite of losing strong figures like Ja'far Umar Thalib, Yemeni Salafism continues to proliferate and remains vocal in its harsh criticism of other Salafi protagonists and other Muslim groups who the Yemeni Salafists consider to have deviated from the Salaf way.

Ideologically, the Yemeni faction constitutes mainstream Salafism that follows Wahhabism's strict and literal interpretation of *aqidah* (creed) and religious texts, avoids politics, and separates itself from broader society by living in an enclave and tight-knit community. Its proponents claim to be the only true bearers of *da`wah salafiyyah*, who call for the 'true' understanding and practicing of Islam according to the Salaf. Consequently, they tend to vilify other factions as the bearers of *da`wah hizbiyyah*, those who advocate for a party, group or school of thought, rather than the Salaf. They belong to what Sadek Hamid (2009) calls "Super Salafis" because of their self-righteousness and claim to be pure and unadulterated Salafists.

Perhaps, what clearly distinguishes the Yemeni Salafi faction from other factions is its attitude towards politics. In terms of politics, Yemeni Salafists adopt a passive stance arguing that any forms of open political activities and organization, whether violent or non-violent, are religiously prohibited because they can bring about social-political disorder and division among Muslims (*fitnah*). To them, obedience to Muslim rulers, even the unjust ones, is religiously ordered. Instead of paying serious attention to Muslims' political affairs, the Yemeni Salafists are obsessed with purification of beliefs and rituals, application of strict practice, even trivial ones such as growing beards, and condemning of those who are considered to have deviated from 'the true Islam' according to the Salaf system (Haykel 2009:49).

Yemeni Salafists claim that purifying contemporary Muslims from un-Islamic deviations (*tasfiyyah*) and educating them with true Islam according

the Salaf system (*tarbiyyah*) must be a high priority. This re-islamization of modern Muslims according to the Salaf method, or what I call 'Salafization', necessitates avoidance of politics. The Yemeni Salafists are reluctant to discuss politics, let alone be involved in political activities. They contend that Muslims should focus on *da'wah* and avoid politics because any political activities will concentrate their thought and energy on achieving political interests rather than on educating society about true Islam and purifying them from religiously forbidden beliefs and practice (*bid'ah*). Before he set up Laskar Jihad, Ja'far Umar Thalib believed that politics had caused bloody conflict among Muslims and the political idea of the revival of Islamic caliphate would cause Muslims to focus their minds and energies on political interests (Hasan 2002:155).

Consequently, this apoliticism prompts Yemeni Salafists to argue that personal purification and educating Muslims through Salafi *da'wah* are much more important than the establishment of an Islamic state or a global Islamic caliphate (*khilāfah*). As represented by Thalib's Ihya al-Sunnah community, they believe that application of Islamic laws by individuals is much more important than political attempts to establish an Islamic state (Hasan 2002: 155). Creating Islamic individuals, families and societies according to the Salaf system has priority over involvement in political activities, such as the establishment of Islamic parties aimed at reviving an Islamic caliphate. In dealing with the rulers, according to Yemeni Salafists, Muslims should not oppose, rebel, or overtly criticise their ruler, no matter how unjust or repressive the ruler. They must obey their legitimate ruler as long as they are not commanded to contravene Islamic law and teachings. They are only allowed to give advice behind the scene, for example by sending letters, to prevent social-political chaos that may disadvantage Muslims.

Unlike most Islamic reformist currents, Yemeni Salafism characterizes what Olivier Roy (1996) calls "neofundamentalism", an Islamic movement that began to emerge in the mid-1980s in the Muslim world.

Neofundamentalism spread partly as a response to the failure of political Islam that aspires to apply Islamic law and create an idealised Muslim society and Islamic state through political actions and revolutionary strategies. To some extent, Yemeni Salafism is like PERSIS (Persatuan Islam), an Islamic revival organization founded in 1923,¹⁴ that pays no attention to social and political activities and focuses more on strict application of Islamic teachings in personal and societal life. PERSIS struggles to purify Indonesian Muslims' beliefs and rituals from what it considers as reprehensible religious innovations, a practice that is in line with Saudi-sponsored Wahhabism (van Bruinessen 2002:125-126).

Given this firm apolitical attitude, it is not surprising that Yemeni Salafists strongly criticise other Salafi individuals and groups as well as other Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir, which incline toward politics or aspire to make Indonesia an Islamic state. They particularly condemn activists associated with Jama'ah Islamiyyah, an underground violent Islamic organization widely believed to be involved in terrorism in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, whose members included Imam Samudra and other Bali bombings perpetrators. They label the proponents of Islamism that openly criticise legitimate rulers and rebel against them "neo-Kharijites", the contemporary followers of Khawarij, a rebellious group in the first century of Islam.

Haraki Salafists

The proponents of this faction do not identify themselves or like to be identified to be "Haraki Salafists". Rather, they just prefer to be identified as "Salafists" arguing for the unity of all Salafi proponents. The label "Haraki Salafists" (Salafi Haraki) comes from their critics, particularly the Yemeni Salafists. They are also pejoratively labelled with other epithets by their detractors such as Sururists (the supporters of Muhammad al-Surūr),

¹⁴On PERSIS, see Federspiel (2001).

Sahwists (the supporters of Saudi's Sahwah movement), Neo-Kharijites (contemporary followers of Khawarij, a rebellious group in the early Islam) and Qutbists (the followers of Sayyid Qutb, an ideologue of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement).

Criticising Yemenis' apoliticism, the Haraki faction attempts to combine Salafi doctrines with the Muslim Brotherhood's activism, which resulted in a hybrid of Salafism that views activism (*harakah*) as an important medium to realise its religious goals. So, the proponents of this faction advocate political activism, primarily in non-violent ways, in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. They are referred to as *haraki* (activist) Salafists by their opponents due to their political consciousness and activism adopted from the Muslim Brotherhood.

This tendency towards politics manifests in various forms of activism ranging from managing Salafism as an organised movement and showing interest in political issues to involvement in political activities. 'Abd al-Khāliq, one of the leading personalities within global Haraki Salafism, believes that Salafists should organize in order to gain political power and influence. As a result, this version of Salafism is also referred to as "organised Salafism" (*al-salafiyyat al-tanzhīmiyyat*) (Haykel 2009:48).

The Haraki faction consists of covert Harakists, those who profess quietism, but act politically while condemning the open political involvement as religiously forbidden according to the doctrine of *hizbiyyah*, and open Harakists, namely Salafists who are openly active in politics and call for political reform. In general, the Haraki Salafi faction represents what Wiktorowicz (2006) calls "the politicos", the more politically minded Salafi scholars and proponents.

As seen in the writings of Safar al-Hawali, "the locus classicus" of the politico Salafists, Haraki Salafists are engaged in *takfīr*, declaring Muslims who do not observe obligatory acts required by faith and Muslim rulers who do not apply Islamic law to be disbelievers. They label those who support or

tolerate such regime “Murjiists”, the followers of Murjiah, a group of Muslims in the early centuries of Islam and a school of theology, which is regarded to have deviated from the ‘true’ Salaf way (Haykel 2009).

The leading ideologues of Haraki Salafism are Muhammad al-Surūr, a Syrian who had lived in Saudi before he was expelled from the country in 1974, re-established in Kuwait before leaving for UK, and has been living in Jordan since 2004;¹⁵ Salman al-‘Awdah and Safar al-Hawali, two prominent figures of post-Gulf War Saudi Islamic dissent; and ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Abd al Khaliq, an Egyptian who graduated from Medina Islamic University and a prominent figure in a charity and Salafi *da’wah* organization known as Jam’iyyat Ihya’ al-Turath al-Islami (Association for Reviving the Islamic Heritage in Kuwait) (Haykel 2009:48).

In Indonesia, a hybrid made up of Salafism and activism occurred when Salafists and Ikhwanists (the Muslim Brotherhood activists) formed a coalition during the authoritarian regime of Suharto in 1980s and 1990s. They organized joint study groups and activities on university campuses under the slogan *Aqidah Salaf, Manhaj Ikhwan* (Salafi creed, Muslim Brotherhood’s method) (Hasan 2009:179). This attempt attracted strong criticism from other Salafi factions, particularly from the Yemeni Salafists.

Haraki Salafism in Indonesia is not easily identified because its proponents do not use the self-descriptor ‘Haraki’, and only claim to be Salafists. Some even refuse to identify themselves as Salafists so that the size of this faction cannot be accurately estimated. This reluctance may be related to Indonesia’s campaign against terrorism, which has created uneasiness within this faction as well as the Salafi community in general. They have become the target of suspicion, police interrogation and intelligence force surveillance so that they opt to keep a low profile and refrain from overt political activism.

¹⁵On biography of Muhammad al-Surur, see Lacroix (2009b).

Nevertheless, among other ways the presence of Haraki Salafists can be recognized through the financial support they receive to fund their activities. To support their activities and establish foundations and learning centres, these Salafists receive donations from local supporters and sympathisers. However, a large proportion of their financial sources, at least those allocated for infrastructure like school buildings and mosques, comes from Middle Eastern charitable organizations, some of which are affiliated with leading personalities of Middle Eastern politico-Salafism. These donors include Jami'iyat Ihya' al-Turath, a Kuwaiti-based charity and Salafi *da'wah* foundation with 'Abd al-Rahman 'Abd al-Khaliq as its director, a critic of the Saudi Mufti Ibn Baz and supporter of Muhammad al-Surur, a prominent leader of global politico-Salafism. Through this Arabian financial support, the Haraki Salafists have been able to maintain and expand their *pesantren* and *madrasa* with better building, facilities, management, and relatively generous salaries for staff members (Noorhaidi 2005). By contrast, most *pesantren* and *madrasa* linked to Ja'far Umar Thalib and Yemeni Salafi network look poor and ill-managed because of a lack of financial support from Arabian donors. They have stagnated, with students relocating to other *pesantren* after the dissolution of Laskar Jihad in 2002, when Thalib lost his leadership of Indonesia's Salafism due to the growing distrust of his consistency and sincerity in following the Salafi system as explained above (Hasan 2010).

The leading personalities of Haraki Salafists, many of whom graduated from Saudi Arabian universities, include Ja'far Thalib's rivals such as Abu Nida, the prominent figure of Bin Baz Salafi foundation in Yogyakarta; Ahmad Faiz, the prominent figure of Imam al Bukhari Salafi *pesantren* in Solo; Yusuf Baisa, the director of Al-Irsyad organisation; Kholid Syamhudi of Ibn Abbas Salafi learning centre in Sragen (Hasan 2009 and 2010); Abu Qotadah and Abdul Hakim Abdat of Al Sofwah foundation; Abdul Qodir Jawwaz of Minhajus Sunnah *pesantren* in Bogor; Abu Haidar, the prominent figure of

Ihya al Sunnah foundation in Bandung; and Zaitun Rusmin, the founder of Wahdah Islamiyyah Salafi organization in Makassar.

One of the prominent Haraki Salafi organizations is Wahdah Islamiyyah (Islamic Unity) with its central office in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The development of Wahdah Islamiyyah cannot be separated from Zaitun Rusmin, its current leading figure. After he returned from his study at Medina Islamic University in 1995, Rusmin founded Wahdah Islamiyyah with a strong commitment to the purification of Islam and Muslims from un-Islamic influence, such as Sufism, according to the Salaf *manhaj*. In doing this, he received financial support from some Middle Eastern charity organizations such as al-Mu'assasat al-Ḥaramayn al-Khayriyyat, Jam'iyyat Ihyā' al-Turāth and Jam'iyyat Dar al-Birr. He took advantage of political changes in post-Suharto Indonesia to strengthen Wahdah Islamiyyah's influence and make it the driving force of the Salafi movement in South Sulawesi (Jurdi 2006 in Nisa 2012; ICG 2003).

Violent Jihadi Salafists

Discontented with Yemeni Salafists' apoliticism and lack of interest and skills in contemporary politics, a faction of Salafists emerged who understood Salafi doctrines in a highly politicised way and interpreted *jihad* as warfare or violence, which they believed provided the only solution to the problems facing the Muslim world. This has resulted in the emergence of the faction of Violent Jihadi Salafists. Considering the modern world corrupt and un-Islamic, this faction calls for violent action against the existing rulers in the Muslim countries who refuse to implement Islamic law as well as countries or groups regarded as the enemies of Islam. They aspire to establish an Islamic state at individual country level and an Islamic caliphate as a unitary state for Muslims at global level. Gaining political power through any efficient means is considered a religious obligation and an important vehicle for realizing and implementing God's law. Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda-inspired

groups are the quintessential example of this Salafi faction in today's Islamist movements.

The Violent Jihadi Salafi faction appears to be the smallest, but the most noticeable and infamous subgroup of the Salafi movement due to their violent action and extensive media coverage. The proponents of this Salafi faction live in a highly closed community and many operate clandestinely. A substantial number of studies have been conducted to uncover the ideology and practice of the jihadi Salafists in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries.¹⁶

Contrary to Yemeni Salafists, the Violent Jihadi Salafists are not only concerned with the purification of creed and rituals while separating themselves from broad society and avoiding politics, but also concentrate on the analysis of political reality, reject the current world as corrupt, and seek to change it according to their idealised vision. Inspired by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), the ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood, they analyse political reality and formulate strategies and practises to change it by highly politicising and radicalising the Salafi doctrines. Their ideologues, such as Yusuf al-'Uyairi,¹⁷ combine a highly politicised interpretation of the doctrines of *tawhīd*, *al-walā` wa al-barā`* and *hisbah* with an analysis of reality of contemporary politics leading to the understanding of violent jihad as a strategy, thus, producing "a revolutionary Salafi praxis" (Meijer 2009b:25). The radicalised Salafi doctrines and the Muslim Brotherhood's political ideology combined with the political background of its proponents produce the Violent Jihadi Salafi movement.

The proponents of Violent Jihadi Salafism include individuals or groups who had contact with Al-Qaeda and *mujahidin* during the Afghan war in the 1980s and early 1990s or who are inspired by Al-Qaeda leaders such as Osama bin Laden and revolutionary Salafi ideologues such as Abu

¹⁶See, for example, Hegghammer (2009); Paz (2009); Lia (2009); and Egerton (2011).

¹⁷For analysis of Yusuf al-'Uyairi and his revolutionary Salafism, see Meijer (2007 and 2008).

Muhammad al- Maqdisi and Abu Mus'ab Zarqawi. In the mid-1980s, hundreds of Indonesian recruits were sent to Afghanistan to fight with Afghan *mujahidin* against Soviet invasion as part of non-Afghan *mujahidin* recruitment, which was channelled and funded by Saudi-funded agencies such as Rabithat al-'Ālam al-Islami (The Muslim World League).¹⁸ After the Afghan war ended, these Indonesian Afghan war veterans¹⁹ returned home and were, and are still, committed to continue political *jihād* in their homeland. Upon their return, they established local and regional *jihadi* groups and networks which primarily operate independently though they share *jihād* ideology with Salafi revolutionaries and receive financial support from global *jihād* organizations such as Al-Qaeda.

The notorious figures of this Violent *Jihadi* Salafi faction include the members of Jama'ah Islamiyyah which is believed to operate in Southeast Asia; the perpetrators of Bali bombings, notably Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufroon and Amrozi; and the proponents of Laskar Jundullah in Makassar with Agus Dwikarna as its leading figure.

In his book *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I Fight against Terrorists) (2004), Imam Samudra, who was sentenced to death in 2003 and executed in 2008 by a firing squad along with Amrozi and Ali Ghufroon, claims to be a true Salafi who truly defends Islam and Muslims from what he regarded as "the real international terrorists, America" (Samudra 2004). He regards other Salafists as Salafi imposters for their unwillingness to fight *jihād*, and supporting or

¹⁸Some sources mention around 3000 Indonesian recruits, which is too high according to ICG (2003), trained in Afghanistan in 1980s through Saudi-linked organizations in Indonesia such as Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation), whose founder was Muhammad Natsir, the vice chairman of the Muslim World League at that time (ICG 2003).

¹⁹In fact, most Indonesian recruits sent to the Afghan war did not actually go to frontlines and take part in fighting; they were sent to the service centres to provide logistical support, spent most of their time learning religious instructions, which mainly focused on strict Salafi-Wahhabi teachings, training combat strategies in *mujahidin* camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and building training facilities such dormitories and kitchens. It is reported that Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan *mujahidin* commander, repeatedly told the non-Afghan recruits that they should return to their countries after finishing their training and services and well-prepared for *jihād*, rather than die in Afghanistan (ICG 2003).

being indifferent toward their corrupt Muslim rulers. In response, the Yemeni Salafi faction published articles and books counter-attacking Samudra's book. In his book *Mereka Adalah Teroris* (They are Terrorists) (2005), Luqman Baabduh, Ja'far Thalib's deputy in the dissolved Laskar Jihad, strongly criticises Samudra for deviating from the Salaf way in his understanding of *jihad*. He regards Samudra and those who inspired him as terrorists, not *mujahid* (fighters in the name of God).

Supported by Muchtar Daeng Lao and Syawal Yasin, Agus Dwikarna separated from Wahdah Islamiyyah under the leadership of Zaitun Rusmin and established Laskar Jundullah (Brigade of God's Soldiers) in 1999 (ICG 2003). The background to the split was a differing analysis of the conflict in Maluku that raged during 1999-2000. The Rusmin faction believed that the conflict was between *kafir* (infidels), namely the Maluku Christians, and *mushrik* (idolators), the Maluku Muslims who were regarded as having deviated from the true Islam. By contrast, the Dwikarna faction argued that waging *jihad* in defence of Muslims is a religious obligation for *mujahidin* in spite of the impurity of the Muslims' creed and practice. To realise this, Dwikarna founded Laskar Jundullah, a militia separated from Wahdah Islamiyyah and an official security arm of KPPSI (Komite Perjuangan Penegakan Syariat Islam; Committee of Struggle for Implementation of Islamic Sharia), an organization that encourages the implementation of Islamic law in Sulawesi. The Laskar Jundullah was infamous for its members' involvement in the Makassar bombings on 5 December 2002, which wrecked a McDonald's restaurant and a car showroom, and killed three people. These cases indicate that the violent Salafi factions share the same ideology, learn from the same Salafi revolutionaries, and may cooperate with each other, but they operate independently and are not united under a single leadership.

The Violent Jihadi Salafists, as pioneered by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and Yusuf al-'Uyairi, were among the first Islamist groups who embraced the internet to create what Reuven Paz (2009) calls "the Open

University for jihad studies” and establish a “virtual community” of brothers who are concerned with, and dedicate their lives to, global jihad. Their presence in Indonesian cyberspace can be seen in some websites that consistently support jihad and promote the implementation of an Islamic law and the establishment of Islamic state such as Almuhajirun (<http://almuhajirun.net>), Arrahmah (www.arahmah.com), and Voice of al-Islam (www.voa-islam.com).

It is worth noting here that the factionalism within the Salafi movement should not be regarded as rigid. Rather, it is like a “sliding scale” in that the Salafi tendency can be expanded from quietist-apolitical stance to an active-political, even violent one (Meijer 2009b). Leaders’ personalities and interests, doctrinal ambiguities, social-political change and radicalization play a key role in this intra-movement dynamics. The proponents of apolitical Salafism that mainly focus on spreading the ideology of Salafism (*da’wah*) can get actively involved in political activities, even violent jihadi activities, when certain Salafi doctrines, particularly *al-walā` wa al-barā`* (loyalty and disavowal) and *hisbah* (commanding right and forbidding wrong) are expanded and radicalised by their leaders in response to socio-political changes. Similarly, politically oriented Salafists can transform into violent jihadists when they highly politicise and radicalise these doctrines. The proponents of Salafism, particularly those who are apolitical with the focus on *da’wah*, are like a dormant volcano; they can transform into a political group or explode violently when political changes and leaders’ personalities encourage this.

This transformation or tension from the ideal of focusing on Salafi *da’wah* and the temptations of politics is best exemplified by the case of Ja’far Umar Thalib above. In the early years of his involvement in Salafism at the end of 1980s and early 1990s, Thalib focused on Salafi *da’wah* activities and held an apolitical stance. But, he then turned to political activities by establishing FKWAJ with Laskar Jihad as its paramilitary wing and mobilised

his followers and supporters to wage *jihad* in Maluku when communal conflict broke out there in 1999-2000. To give religious legitimacy of his action, Thalib sought for *fatwa* from Salafi authorities in Saudi Arabia, ignoring the orders of Indonesian government under President Abdurrahman Wahid (Noorhaidi 2005).

This tension or ambiguity is also apparent in the case of Yemeni Salafism's Middle Eastern authority, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, Ja'far Umar Thalib's teacher and a leading authority of global apolitical Salafism. Muqbil al-Wadi'i publicly maintained an apolitical stance and condemned groups that overtly involved in politics such as the Sahwa movement in Saudi Arabia. But, in fact, he worked with the Yemeni government to repress groups such as the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood and Zaydis, two groups considered to have deviated from the true Islam and seen as the enemies of Salafism (Haykel 2009:49).

Moreover, this phenomenon in fact can be traced back to the attitude of Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792), one of the main authorities of apolitical-purist Salafism. In the mid-18th century, the founder of the Saudi dynasty, Muhammad ibn Saud (d. 1765), sealed a pact with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Nejd. He agreed to grant Ibn Abd al-Wahhab protection, support his teachings and guaranteed him control over religious matters. In return, Ibn Saud was acknowledged as political leader of the Muslim community. This alliance helped the Saudi family expand its political influence and territories and, at the same time, provided a political vehicle for spreading Muhammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhab's puritanical religious ideas, which remain the religious basis of Saudi Arabia today (Al-Rasheed 2002:16-18).

From another perspective, the apolitical Salafists are actually involved in politics in the form of promoting political quietism through which they silently support the authority of the ruling government and condemn any rebellious action in order to maintain social and political order. Quietism,

then, is not a permanent feature of the Yemeni Salafi faction. The proponents of this faction are not pacifists either. Rather, they can be best characterised as “obedience-minded people” who are ready to engage in activism if they are religiously ordered by their leader or ruler to do so (Haykel 2009:49). This is in contrast with Jamaah Tablig *da’wah* movement, for example, which remains the adopter of quietism and focuses on peaceful *da’wah* activities because they believe that the true solution lies in strengthening one’s faith and in returning to God.²⁰

Conclusion

The chapter has provided an introduction to Salafism in Indonesia as one of the fastest-growing Islamic movements in post-authoritarian Indonesia. It has pointed out that the rise and expansion of the Salafi movement in Indonesia is closely connected with the following notable changes in the political opportunity structures: the intensification of Saudi Arabia’s religious and political influences in the Muslim countries in an attempt to contain the impact of Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979; the Reformasi movement in 1998 that led to the fall of the authoritarian rule of Suharto and his New Order regime; and social transformations of Muslim societies including urbanization, which resulted from the contradictions of economic development in Indonesia.

In its attempt to pursue its goals, the Salafi movement in Indonesia developed a cross-class constituency. Its broad social base comprises of a mixture of urban, newly or partially urbanized, the middle class and lower middle class, and small businessmen with students or graduates of secular schools and universities as the core component.

Particularly, this chapter has shown that Salafism in Indonesia is not a unified movement as it is characterized with internal fragmentation over ‘true’ representatives of Salafi ideology. Intra-doctrinal ambiguity and

²⁰On Jamaah Tabligh (Tablighi Jamaat), see Masud (2000).

different ways of responding to current socio-political issues contributed to this intra-Salafi division. Three factions can be identified from this internal conflict: Yemeni Salafists, who represent the mainstream Salafism, primarily focus on propagation and avoid politics; Haraki Salafists who are politically-minded, but are basically engaged in non-violent political activism; and Violent Jihadi Salafists who highly politicize and radicalise the Salafi doctrines and are engaged in *jihad* as warfare and violent actions. The latter two factions constitute the dissent Salafists.

As it developed in the era of the revolution of information and communication technology, the Salafi movement embraced the internet as a new, important resource. However, each Salafi faction mobilizes the internet to present and articulate its own version of Salafism, and analyse the contemporary state of Muslim societies. This certainly has raised questions: What is the significance of the internet for the Salafi movement? Why did the Salafi factions embrace the internet as a new resource? And how and to what ends did they actually mobilize the adopted internet? The following two chapters attempt to answer these questions.

Chapter Three

Internet Adoption and Salafi Resources

The Salafi factions in Indonesia have embraced the internet and integrated it as a new acceptable resource into their socio-religious practices. They use various internet applications including websites, weblogs, emailing lists, internet forums, and online business. Their presence in cyberspace is seen in hundreds of these applications written in Indonesian, operated by Salafi individuals or organizations, accessed and followed by Salafi adherents and activists. This poses a basic, but important question: Why have the Salafists embraced the internet as a useful and acceptable resource, despite it being a product of Western secularist economy and society? Most observers generally turn to the specific nature and characteristics of the internet to answer this question focusing on the issues of what this new media technology can and will do. This perspective, focussing on the medium, suggests that individuals and groups use the internet because, among other factors, it is faster, cheaper, and has wider outreach than 'old' media technologies such as print and TV broadcast.

It is argued here, however, that significant answers to this key question are to be found by looking at the *users*, and what they can or cannot do with the internet. This user-centred perspective suggests that the harnessing of the internet is influenced by user-related issues including the extent to which users have access to resources pertinent to distinguishing and promoting particular theological positions. The argument here is that a lack of applicable resources has encouraged and motivated the Salafi factions to adopt the internet as a new important resource that is in line with their organizational goals of promoting Salafi ideology to a wider audience.

As explained in the introductory chapter, resource mobilization theory (RMT) argues that although the availability of applicable resources – such as legitimacy, celebrity, networks, labour, skills, money and buildings – is crucial to the initiation and continuation of a social movement, the presence of these resources and their potential to be mobilized varies among social movements. Therefore, resource inequality is palpable among social movements and within a social movement in that different component groups have varying degrees of access to types and amount of resources. Some are well-resourced, while others are poorly resourced. RMT is helpful here as it is “at root aimed at better understanding how groups are able to overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in their efforts to pursue social change goals” (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:118). Drawing on this insight, this chapter highlights limitations and variations in resources available to Salafi factions and how they attempted to overcome this. It suggests that a lack of resources applicable to the struggle with competing theologies of Islam has motivated the Salafi factions to mobilize the internet as a new resource for collective action. The Salafi factions have used new opportunities and facilities provided by the internet to realize their organizational needs and ideological purposes. In particular, Salafi factions’ adoption and mobilization of the internet constitutes a new resource for *da’wah Salafiyyah*, promoting Salafi ideas to a wider audience.

Resources of the Salafi Factions

Drawing closely on the typology of resources developed by Edwards and McCarthy (2004) as described in the introductory chapter, the following is an examination of the nature of the various resources at the disposal of Salafi factions and how this relates to their adoption of the internet. As has been outlined in the previous chapter, Salafism is divided into three Salafi factions that are spread across various cities in Indonesia with each Salafi faction consisting of a network of Salafi communities located in different areas. The

following investigation was focused on one selected Salafi community from each of the three factions, which collectively represent the range of different Salafi factions in Indonesia. Thus, case studies have been selected from each of the three previously identified factions of Indonesian Salafism, namely Adhwa'us Salaf of the Yemeni Salafi faction, Imam Bukhari of the Haraki Salafi faction, and Arrahmah of Violent Jihadi Salafi faction.

Adhwa'us Salaf is a Yemeni Salafi community that is located in eastern Bandung, West Java province. It is named after the community's modest traditional learning centre (*ma'had*), which provides lectures on Salafi views and functions as a boarding house for students. It is situated in a local neighbourhood, but appears detached from it. Most of constituents and students, aged teens to adults, are not local people, coming from outside the centre's neighbourhood through personal or informal networks of the Yemeni Salafists. The community leaders and a number of active participants live in a separate community in a local housing compound close to their community learning centre, while other adherents live outside, only going to the centre to attend the movement activities such as religious lectures, study circles, and prayers. The number of Adhwa'us Salaf community membership is estimated to be around one hundred people.

Imam Bukhari is a community of Haraki Salafists named after its Islamic boarding school. Located in Solo, Central Java province, it is a successful Salafi community with access to modern facilities including permanent school buildings and a large mosque. Like Salafi communities in general, Imam Bukhari is located in a local neighbourhood, but not strongly attached to it. Most active participants, teachers and students come from outside the local neighbourhood, but live inside the community. Compared to other Salafi communities, it is a large Salafi community comprised of students, teaching staff, and *ma'had* organizers numbering around eight hundred people.

The last community chosen as a focus of analysis is Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism. Unlike the other two communities, it was named after its active news website that strongly promotes jihadism (www.arahmah.com). In addition to updating and maintaining the website, its activities are centred in a local community mosque, which was established by the residents of a local housing compound in South Tangerang, Banten province, but is controlled by the Arrahmah community. Of these chosen communities, Arrahmah is the smallest community numbering a few dozen people.

Moral Resources

Moral resources refer to legitimacy, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity (Snow 1979; Cress and Snow 1996; Edwards and McCarthy 2004). These resources generally come from outside a movement as they are given by an external source such as a public figure and a prestigious institution recognized to possess them. Gaining moral resources is a difficult task because this type of resource is less accessible and proprietary than other resources. Even once these resources are bestowed on a social movement, the external source that possesses them can retract them (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:126).

My study found that there were no public figures, either local or national, that showed their ideological or financial support to Adhwa'us Salaf of the Yemeni Salafi faction. No established Islamic organizations in Indonesia publicly supported its ideology and particular interpretation of Islam. There was no presence of a celebrity at religious lectures or any other activities organized by Adhwa'us Salaf community. The external support that Adhwa'us Salaf gains might be 'a good relationship' with local security officers who let the community freely carry out its socio-religious activities, due to its apolitical stance and opposition to terrorism.¹ A fact that some of

¹Interview with Hamdi, an administrator of Adhwa'us Salafi website and a committee member of Adhwa'us Salaf *ma'had*, Bandung, 10 August 2010.

its leaders studied Salafism at Dar al-Hadith, a leading Salafi 'university' in Dammaj, Yemen, also provided legitimacy for this Yemeni Salafi faction.

In spite of the relative absence of external moral resources, Adhwa'us Salaf was not without moral resources at all. But, it obtained most moral resources from an internal source, namely its members' strong belief and commitment to Salaf ideology (*manhaj al-salaf*). This provided them with a strong moral resource to live and spread a life of 'true Islam' according to the Salaf in 'un-Islamic' contemporary society.

The state of Adhwa'us Salaf's moral resources was comparable to that of Imam Bukhari community of Haraki Salafism. Like Adhwa'us Salaf, the Imam Bukhari community gained no access to external moral resources in the form of support and legitimacy from public figures or celebrities. Yet, its receipt of grants from international Salafi-oriented charitable institutions in the Middle East, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, served as a source of important legitimacy for the community. The most important source of moral resource for Imam Bukhari community was also internal rather than external, namely its strong belief in ideology of Salaf supremacy and sacred duty to spread it among Muslim societies, and supportive networks with other communities of Haraki Salafism.

Likewise, the lack of external moral resources was also experienced by Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism. Because of the community's radical interpretation of jihad, no well-known personalities or organizations have provided the community with moral support. Security concerns might have prevented them from publicly showing their support to the community. Again, like the other two Salaf communities above, their strong belief in Jihadi Salafism and networks with the supporting communities have served as important sources of moral resources for the Arrahmah community.

In short, all three Salafi factions suffered from the lack of moral resources in that they had limited access to legitimacy from prestigious organizations or well-known public figures. Moral resources available to

them did not come from external sources, but rather from internal ones, namely strong belief and commitment of each faction's adherents to the ideology of Salaf supremacy.

Cultural Resources

Cultural resources are cultural products or artefacts that are widely known, though not universally available or evenly distributed. These include conceptual tools and specific knowledge about how to carry out discrete tasks such as organizing a meeting, enacting a protest, establishing an organization and utilising media. Different from moral resources, cultural resources are widely available, accessible for use, but less proprietary. Yet, not everyone possesses these special competencies and knowledge so that gaining access to this type of resource is of value to a social movement or group (Edwards 2007:3904).

The Adhwa'us Salaf community of the Yemeni Salafi faction generally had access to this type of resource through its active participants who are mostly educated. Many of them graduated from universities, while others finished high school. This was clearly seen in their ability to organize a meeting and recruit volunteers to fight for Muslims in the Maluku conflict in 1999-2000, in which Adhwa'us Salaf was one of the points of volunteer recruitment.² The community's access to these resources was also proven in its efforts to accomplish scheduled religious lectures (daily, weekly, and monthly) in the community's learning centre or places outside the centre collectively organized with other Yemeni communities. Furthermore, the access to these resources was identified in the ability of the community's active participants to utilize media for propagation purposes like establishing and maintaining the Adhwa'us Salaf website (<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id>).

Similarly, these cultural resources were available to the Imam Bukhari community of Haraki Salafism. The community had access to conceptual tools, knowledge and skills of carrying out its activities and utilising

²Interview with Hamdi, Bandung, 10 August 2010.

information and communication technologies such as radio and internet. All this was due to the availability of another type of resource to the community, namely human resources whose number was relatively larger than other Salafi factions and many of whom are university graduates (as will be explored later in this chapter). Similar cultural resources were accessible to Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism although the number of its participants and constituents is the smallest among the Salafi factions selected for analysis.

All Salafi factions gained access to cultural resources in the form of conceptual tools, skills and knowledge of how to accomplish their tasks and programs. Although their number varied, the constituents contributed to the each faction's access to this type of resource. This was also due to the characteristic of cultural resources as publicly available resources.

Social-Organizational Resources

There are three kinds of socio-organizational resources: infrastructure, network, and organization. Equivalent to public goods for a society such as roads, infrastructure refers to physical resources that facilitate the everyday operation and functioning of a movement. Network and organizational resources include linkages and relationships with other groups that a social movement is able to establish either within or outside the movement (Edwards and Gilham 2013:4).

The Adhwa'us Salaf was a Yemeni Salafi community with a modest learning centre. It had no access to various organizational infrastructures that facilitated the smooth functioning of daily activities. The learning-teaching activities, which are mostly conducted in the form of face-to-face lectures, were not supported by modern technologies like computers and projectors. Instead, computers and access to internet were only available to the Yemeni active participants at home, particularly those appointed organizing committee members of the learning centre, whose jobs, among other tasks, include establishing and maintaining the community's website for the purpose of Salafi propagation.

The Adhwa'us Salaf community had access to social networks with external organizations, but this was mostly limited to other communities of Yemeni Salafism in Indonesia and related Salafists in the Middle East. The community's strongest network was informal and personal networks between its members with other Yemeni Salaf communities, which in turn, among others, supplied new students to study at the community's learning centre. This type of network was also manifested in the teacher-student relationship which the Adhwa'us Salaf leaders maintain after their return from their studies with Salafi religious scholars (*'ulamā'*) in Yemen.

Quite a similar state of social-organizational resources characterised the Arrahmah community of Jihadi Salafism. The community had access to information technologies including computers and the internet, the crucial organizational infrastructure that facilitates its main activity of operating and updating its online news portal. As for Adhwa'us Salaf, Arrahmah's most developed social-organizational resource involved its networks with local and global communities and organizations that shared the same ideology of jihadism, which in turn provided it with moral and, probably, financial resources. However, it had relatively little access to other resources in the form of social movement organizations except *majlis ta'lim* (religious learning and lecture 'hall') for committed followers and adherents.

By contrast, my study of the Imam Bukhari community of Haraki Salafism revealed that it had more social-organizational resources than the other two Salafi communities. The community's active participants had access to organizational infrastructures that help the smooth functioning of day-to-day tasks and programs including computers and an internet connection that are available at the community's main office. Other organizational resources available to the community included social movement organizations such as school buildings, a mosque, a medical clinic, security services, and a publishing house. Like the above two communities, the Imam Bukhari community gained access to informal

networks with other local Haraki Salafi communities and learning centres (*ma'had*) and with former teachers in the Middle East. But, unlike the above communities, the Imam Bukhari developed a formal network and cooperation with Salafi-oriented universities such as International Madinah University in Saudi Arabia and its branch in Malaysia. The graduates of the Imam Bukhari *ma'had* had opportunities and access to pursue higher Islamic education at this university.

Such a pattern of available resources was not unique to this Imam Bukhari community. Another Haraki Salafi community, Al-Irsyad Tengeran, located in Semarang, Central Java, generally shares the same access to social-organizational resources. Networks with the Middle Eastern charitable organizations and learning institutions may have contributed to their access to more social-organization resources than other communities of Yemeni and Jihadi Salafism.

Thus, we can draw two themes from the above. First, Yemeni and Violent Jihadi factions lack access to crucial organizational infrastructures, but have good access to informal and personal networks with communities and individuals who share the same Salafi ideology as seen, among others, in their web links. Second, by contrast, the Haraki faction is better off in that it gains not only access to social networks with those who share the same ideology, but also appropriate organizational public goods or infrastructures.

Human Resources

Human resources are more tangible than other types of resources above. This type of resource refers to capabilities that inhere in human individuals including labour, skills, expertise, experience and leadership. Since individuals have a proprietary control over their resources, a movement or social movement organization needs their participation and co-operation to make their resources accessible and usable to its specific needs and interests. The ability of social movement actors to aggregate human resources will determine what types and amount of resources a social movement can gain

and the degree to which skilled individuals can be deployed for the movement. Yet, once new participants are recruited, to what extent the availability of their human resources can enhance mobilization depends on how these resources fit a movement's or group's needs. For example, the presence of a famous politician may have little more to offer than a high school intern when a social movement organization needs to recruit volunteers to distribute fliers (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:127).

Perhaps human resources were the most accessible type of resources for the Adhwa'us Salaf community of Yemeni Salafism. These resources were gained through the presence of the community's teachers, students, leaders, active participants, and adherents. Yet, as a total number of the community members were around one hundred people, the Adhwa'us Salaf community gained relatively small access to this labour resource. It was considered a small community compared to the communities of the Haraki Salafi faction like Imam Bukhari, and was vastly smaller than other established Islamic organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama, whose membership is estimated to be tens of millions.

Nevertheless, the Adhwa'us Salaf community obtained good access to skills and expertise. The Adhwa'us Salaf community was proud to have teachers and leaders whose expertise in Salafism was highly recognized as they had studied with leading Salafi authorities in the Salafi learning centres in Salafi-exporting countries like Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Those who gained Islamic knowledge in such Middle Eastern countries were still highly appreciated among Salafist as well as Muslims in Indonesia in general. For example, the presence as a teacher-leader of Abu Yasir, who graduated from a leading Salafi centre in Dammaj, Yemen, provided the Adhwa'us Salaf community with access to expertise and knowledge about Yemeni Salafism.

The Adhwa'us Salaf also gained access to skilled active participants. Many of them graduated from universities with various skills and knowledge of technical fields ranging from information and communication technology

to medicine and engineering. They were responsible for the daily operation of the community learning centre and accomplishment of other activities related to the Salafi propagation. They were aware of the importance of technology and, in particular, the use of information technologies including computers, mobile phones, and the internet. In addition, the Adhwa'us Salaf had access to potential resources of labour, skills and expertise from its committed adherents. These adherents had different educational backgrounds including high school graduates, university students and university graduates. Their occupational backgrounds also varied, ranging from small business entrepreneurs to civil servants and employees at private companies.

Likewise, Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism was a community with a few dozen adherents making it the smallest community of Salafists discussed here. Some adherents were local residents of a housing complex in South Tangerang, Banten province, where the community's mosque was located, while others came from outside the housing. This means that it had a limited access to labour and its constituency. The community's strength, however, actually lies in the adherents' militancy in their belief in the ideology of Jihadi Salafism and their commitment to implement it in personal and socio-political life in the society or country where they live. As in the cases of the above two communities, these active participants provided the Arrahmah community with skills and expertise required to carry out its activities including promoting the ideas of Jihadi Salafism. Yet they differed from the others in that they were spirited and militant young activists equipped with skills of how to access and utilize information and communication technologies like the internet. These were crucial skills in creating and maintaining the community's online news magazine (www.arahmah.com) dedicated to Jihadism that required daily updating and maintenance. It was through this website operated by skilled active participants that Arrahmah became a well-known community of Jihadi Salafism in Indonesia.

By contrast, the Imam Bukhari of Haraki Salafism had many constituents, making it the largest Salafi community discussed here. Its constituency included around eight hundred people consisting of students, their parents, and other active participants and adherents. As a result, this Haraki Salafi community had access to potential sources of a large amount of labour, skills, expertise, and money required for pursuing its social-religious goals.

Most Imam Bukhari teachers or leaders held bachelor degrees from Islamic higher education institutions in the Middle East or graduated from 'secular' universities, then went to informal Islamic learning institutions in Indonesia (*pesantren*) or in the Middle East (*ma'had*). Similarly, many active participants or those who were in charge of the day-to-day operations of the boarding school graduated from universities or high schools. They were tech-savvy and aware of the importance of information and communication technologies like mobile phones and the internet. Consequently, these educated people provided Imam Bukhari with access to skills and expertise crucial to carry out its activities. In short, the Haraki Salafi faction had the greatest access to human resources among the three Salafi factions in terms of labour, skills, and expertise crucial to the faction's continuity.

The issue of human resources was the first point where resource inequality and lack among Salafi factions was evident. The Yemeni Salafi faction had more access to labour and constituencies than the Violent Jihadi faction, although human skills and expertise needed to carry out activities were available to both of them. But, the Haraki Salafi faction had the best access to both a large number of adherents and human skills and expertise among the Salafi factions.

Material Resources

This kind of resource warrants close attention because it is generally the most tangible and proprietary of the resource types. It refers to two forms of resources: financial capital and physical capital. Financial capital includes

money, which is likely the most transferable of the resource types. Physical capital refers to office space, property, equipment, and supplies (Edwards and McCarthy 2004:128).

Regarding this resource, Adhwa'us Salaf was a Salafi community with limited financial capital. Its main source of financial capital came from donations given by individual constituents and supporters. The adherents, constituents, and even students who stayed at the community's boarding house were not asked to pay regular organizational dues, but they felt religiously obliged to participate financially by giving *infaq* and *shadaqah* (charities) in accordance with their financial abilities. For a small community like Adhwa'us Salaf, these individual donations played a significant role in accomplishing routine activities like paying electricity bills and maintenance of the learning centre. Sometimes, Adhwa'us Salaf obtained donations from its constituents and supporters in response to appeals for particular events it organizes. It was also quite common for the constituents and supporters to give money personally to the community leaders.

Furthermore, Adhwa'us Salaf had no access to grants from state agents and institutions, from either the local or central government. It was likely that the face of Islam promoted by this community, which was different from that informally supported by the government through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, prevented their access to state funds. The willingness to be a self-resilient community, free from state control, also contributed to this Yemeni Salafi community's lack of access to the state-related grants.

Though it had an ideological relationship with global Salafi authorities in Yemen, Adhwa'us Salaf received no financial grants from foreign donors including Salafi-oriented charitable organizations in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia or their representatives in Indonesia. This can be explained by the fact that these Middle Eastern donors have been quite selective in providing financial support to the Salafi proponents in Indonesia. So far most grants given to the Salafi movement in Indonesia came from Salafi-oriented charitable

organizations in Kuwait that tended to support the Haraki Salafi faction. The fact that Adhwa'us Salaf is a community of the Yemeni Salafist faction, which is to some extent in conflict with other Salafi factions like the Harakists, may explain the absence of access to financial resources, at least in large amounts, from Kuwaiti-based charitable organizations like Jam'iyyah Ihyā` al Turās.

Consequently, this lack of financial resources caused Adhwa'us Salaf to suffer from poor physical resources. Perhaps the most significant material resource for this Yemeni Salafi community was a modest multi-purpose building. Located on a piece of land donated by individual constituents and supporters, this building was used for prayers, a students' boarding house (*pondok santri*), and religious lecture hall (*majlis ta'lim*). Attached to the building was a room with modest furniture purposed as an office. Other property resources available to the Adhwa'us Salaf community included some rooms made from bamboo, built next to the multi-purpose building, provided for teachers and senior students.

This was quite similar to other Yemeni Salafi communities such as As-Sunnah, in Makassar, South Sulawesi province, whose material resources included a half-finished mosque and three small modest dormitories; Ma'had Ibnu Taymiyyah in Solo, Central Java province, which is located in a closed compound, with a modest mosque which functions as the centre of activities including learning and teaching Islamic knowledge, a small office, and a poorly equipped dormitory; Ihya al-Sunnah in Kaliurang, Yogyakarta province, with a simple mosque and two cramped student boarding houses with walls made of bamboo and floors covered with plastic mats (Hasan 2008:258; 2010:690) built on a site of around 300 square metres; Minhaj al-Sunnah in Magelang, Central Java, with a modest mosque which was also used as a centre of learning and teaching activities and the corners were occupied by students as their dormitory (Hasan 2008:258; 2010:690); and Al-Madinah in Boyolali, Central Java, with an extremely limited facility of a

simple mosque which serves as the place of learning and teaching and a dormitory of less than twenty students (Hasan 2010:691; 2008:258).

Likewise, Arrahmah of Jihadi Salafism had limited access to financial resources. It mostly relied on donations from the readers of its news website, adherents and sympathizers to fund its activities and jihad campaign. On its website, Arrahmah called for readers to donate money needed for the web maintenance and other regular expenses. In addition to some national bank accounts, readers or adherents can send money to Arrahmah via PayPal.

In regard to property resources, perhaps the most accessible resource to the Arrahmah community was a local mosque located in a housing compound in South Tangerang, Banten province, where the members lived. The mosque played an important role in the development of the community as it became the community activity centre functioning, among other purposes, as a religious lecture hall (*majlis ta'lim*) where its leaders taught their adherents general Islamic teachings and their particular interpretations of jihad. The mosque was established by the local residents of the housing compound, but then the committed adherents of Arrahmah, who mostly came from outside the compound, succeeded in taking control and making it a centre for promoting jihadism.

By contrast, the Imam Bukhari community of Haraki Salafism in Solo, Central Java, enjoyed good access to material resources to support its activities. As seen in inscriptions on the walls of some building units that bear the names of their foreign donors, the community gained financial support from Saudi and Kuwaiti-based Salafi propagation and charitable organizations, at least during its emergence and early development, aimed at establishing basic organizational infrastructures. Imam Bukhari also received more financial resources from students' parents and committed adherents including school fees and voluntary contributions (*infaq* and *shadaqah*). In its attempt to maintain its credibility and transparency, it often published a financial report on its website.

The Imam Bukhari community occupied a two hectare piece of land and had access to properties that facilitated the smooth functioning of its tasks and programs. Unlike the other Salaf communities, Imam Bukhari had a spacious and clean office, which was equipped with a small library, computer and the internet. Other resources available to this Haraki Salafi community included school buildings, a library, a large two storey mosque, student boarding houses, and housing facilities for its teachers or leaders, which looked modern and were of permanent construction.

This was similar to the conditions of Bin Baz community which occupied one hectare of land in Bantul, Yogyakarta. It looked prosperous with permanent buildings including schools for kindergarten, elementary and primary students, a mosque, an office, a dormitory and teachers' housing facilities. Like the Imam Bukhari, the Bin Baz had received financial support from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait donors as demonstrated by plaques on the walls of its buildings that bear the names of its Middle Eastern donors (Hasan 2010:699; 2008:257).

This type of material resource was another point where resource inequality could be clearly identified within Salafi movement in Indonesia. Both Yemeni and Jihadi factions had limited access to financial support and property, relying on donations and charities from their adherents and participants to carry out their activities. By contrast, the Haraki faction gained much better access to material resources as it had appropriate physical facilities and receives donations from adherents and grants from ideologically linked external organizations.

Lack of Resources and the Adoption of Internet

The above investigation of Salafi resources reveals that the state of Salafi resources was mainly characterized by a lack of resources and resource inequality among the Salafi factions. All Salafi factions (Yemenists, Harakists and Violent Jihadists) lacked access to moral resources including legitimacy

and support bestowed by external sources. This might be due to the nature of Salafism as an uncompromising Islamic movement in moderate Muslim society in Indonesia, to which public figures or established organizations might be reluctant to provide open support. But, the three Salafi factions had the same access to cultural resources including skills and knowledge about carrying out specific tasks and programs which are publicly available.

In other types of resources, the Salafi factions had different access to types and amount of resources. The Yemeni Salafi faction had limited access to social-organizational, human, and material resources. The Violent Jihadi Salafi faction also lacked the same resources. But, the Yemeni Salafi faction was slightly better than the Jihadi Salafi faction in that it had access to a larger constituency. This lack of resources might have become a constraint on Yemeni and Jihadi factions' development, but it also afforded the factions independence from co-optation and control by external groups, including financial donors.

By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction gained more access to tangible resources. It had good access to social-organizational resources (infrastructure and social network), human resources (labour, skilled participants, expertise of teachers-leaders), and material resources (money and physical facilities).

Overall, the Haraki Salafists were the best-resourced Salafi faction, while the Violent Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources. Nevertheless, the Salafi factions generally had limited access to resources when situated within the broader landscape of Islamic movements or organizations in Indonesia. They were poorly resourced, particularly in terms of external legitimacy, organizational infrastructure, and constituency, compared to major Muslim organizations in Indonesia like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, whose membership includes tens of millions of people.

Undoubtedly, the Salafi factions were aware of this lack of resources that could hinder the advancement of their movements and therefore have

attempted to overcome it. They attempted to find new resources that could be mobilized to further their goals. In this context, they realized that information and communication technologies were important organizational infrastructures which modern social movements could harness. Therefore, the Salafi factions, including the resourceful Haraki Salafi faction, decided to turn to the internet as a new resource for mobilization.

In particular, the Salafi factions argued for the adoption of the internet as a new resource for promoting and spreading Salafism to a wider audience. The Haraki Salafi faction believed that technological modernization should be appreciated by utilizing its benefits, though the faction recognised the potential harmful effects of the technology. Indeed, information and communication technology such as the internet could be used to greatly benefit religious interests. A Haraki Salafi leader said:

According to Islam, basically, anything that has been developed in the era of modernity, like technology, transportation and telecommunication, is permitted. Thank God, now, we have many facilities, including the internet. The internet is a technology; it is a facility just like other technologies. I think there is no problem using it as long as it is used for good purposes like spreading Islamic values for the readers [of the articles on the websites].³

Considering the fact that the number of internet users in Indonesia has increased significantly within recent years, as access to the internet is getting easier and relatively affordable, the Haraki Salafists stressed the internet is increasingly an integral part of their strategies of ideological and organizational development. They perceived that using the internet was a necessary strategy in order to stay up-to-date with modernity and advanced technological developments. Using the internet was considered an urgent way to keep informed with the “outer world” and contemporary issues. As a Haraki Salafi web administrator argued: “Indeed, the internet is urgent for this era. I mean, in this modern era when technology develops rapidly, it is

³Interview with Ustadh Hadi, Bogor, 14 October 2010.

regrettable when one does not know the internet; he will not know the outer world.”⁴

Similarly, the Yemeni Salafi faction emphasized the need to embrace the internet, arguing that the new media technology had offered more possibilities and advantages than old media. The internet provided flexibilities and portability so people with access to this new media could use it anytime and anywhere. Through internet access, the users were able to acquire a wide range of information and share knowledge without spending a lot of money or even leaving their homes. Consequently, the Yemeni Salafists pointed out that the Salafi presence on the internet was necessary in order to provide a wider audience of internet users with information about Salafism.⁵

This is also echoed by the Jihadi Salafi faction. Through its news portal, www.annah.com, for example, the Jihadi faction declared that it used the internet as medium for providing “balanced information’ about Islam and Muslims, a space of “intellectual and spiritual struggle” to establish a better world, and a facility for spreading Islam in accordance with the Pious Predecessors (*al-Salaf al-Ṣālih*) (<http://www.annah.com/about>).

In other words, the internet adoption was a strategy and choice to overcome the Salafi factions’ lack of resources crucial for pursuing their movement’s goals. They generally perceived that the internet was a part of worldly affairs, which could be used as a new important resource in the light of Islamic norms and values. They believed that the internet was a useful medium for their movement’s purposes, particularly as a modern means of Salafi promotion to a wider audience. This positive view of the internet was related to the Salafists’ attitude toward modernity, that Islamic values are compatible with modernity.

Our activity, among others, is to try to put the originality of Islam and modernization in harmony. I mean, we are not anti-modern people; we attempt to benefit from modernization, but we also try to avoid its

⁴Interview with Ishak, Bogor, 14 October 2010.

⁵Interview with Ustadh Muhammad, Bogor, 13 October 2010.

disadvantages. The internet is inseparable from the activity of modern societies. If we are anti-internet, we will be restricted. So, we use the internet, while keeping its disadvantages to a minimum.⁶

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the Salafi adoption of the internet was closely related to the Salafi factions' evaluation of how best to bolster or consolidate their organizational resources. The findings reveal that the state of resources among the Salafi factions was characterized by a general lack of suitable resources for collective action. However, different Salafi factions varied in their access to resources crucial for collective action. Indeed, lack of resources and inequality were noted among all three factions. This condition created a rationale for embracing this new mobilizational resource for pursuing the Salafi movement's socio-religious goals. In their attempt to overcome the lack of, or to extend their, organizational resources, the Salafi factions turned to the internet to enhance collective action and reach a wider audience.

However, since Salafism is a religious movement, theological rationales also loom large in legitimating such engagement. Consequently, references to religious tradition and religious texts have been integral to efforts by Salafists to embrace this technology as an important resource for achieving their goals. It is this aspect that is taken up in the next chapter.

⁶Interview with Ustadh Sadik, Makassar, 26 October 2010.

Chapter Four

Salafi Framing of the Internet

To better understand why the Salafi factions embraced the internet, this chapter examines further attempts by the Salafi factions to overcome their lack of resources. It particularly investigates how the Salafi factions defined and interpreted the internet as a new resource in a communal discourse inspired and supported with references to religious texts. The chapter argues that Salafi factions legitimised and heralded the internet as a new resource of collective action through narratives informed and guided by Islamic texts and Salafi world views.

The Salafi factions needed to do more than simply justify their use of the internet as compensating for their lack of resources, as explained in the previous chapter. They required a theological legitimacy in order to engage fully with the internet as a new chosen resource. For this purpose, they turned to their religious tradition to give a sacred legitimacy for their embrace of the internet. The Salafi factions, therefore, framed this new media technology in a set of particular narratives in order to integrate it into their world view and socio-religious practices. In doing so, they used a set of resources of ideology, beliefs, tradition and history as a “cultural toolkit” (Benford and Snow 2000:629) to create a communal discourse on the internet to justify their embrace of this technology and validate their particular engagement with it. This involved a process of defining meaning so that internet use or non-use could be integrated into the Salafi factions’ needs and purposes.

This interpretive work is an important step in the process of meaning making in that the Salafi factions redefine and reinterpret the internet through the creation of narratives of the internet to fit into their world view

and ideology. This communal discourse on internet is informed and guided by selected religious texts and Salafi ideology (*manhaj al-salaf*) lived out by the Salafists so that this new resource is given religious legitimacy and can be integrated into their daily socio-religious practices.

A Double-Edged Sword

The Salafi communal discourse on the internet is strongly characterized by the metaphor of a double-edged sword to determine the applicability of the internet as a new resource. The Yemeni Salafi faction stressed that the internet is like a sword, which can be useful or harmful and has good and bad effects; it can be used for good or evil, by good or bad people, in accordance with their purposes. The internet is useful and good as long as it is used for goodness and religious interests such as for Salafi propagation (*da'wah*) purposes. A leader of the Yemeni Salafi faction explained:

Speaking about contemporary issues, we found that our '*ulamā*' regard the internet as a double-edged sword. It can be used for good or bad. The internet is permissible on the condition it is used for *da'wah* purposes and positive things. Do we have to walk while we have transportation facilities? It is a virtue if we use the internet and the facilities it offers, so our *da'wah* can reach many people. But, we are not allowed to turn a blind eye to the negative impacts the internet creates.¹

The Haraki Salafists shared this metaphor and advised users to be 'smart' in using the internet in order to benefit from this technology and avoid its disadvantages.² A Haraki Salafi leader said:

In our opinion, the internet is a double-edged weapon; it has useful and harmful sides, negative and positive edges. So far we have used its positive side. It is like television. It is about how we benefit from its positive sides. For example, we use the internet for doing *da'wah* and writing articles [on Salafism]... And we see and hear that a number of people converted to Islam by virtue of the internet.³

¹Interview with Ustadh Ahmadi, Bekasi, 13 October 2010.

²Interview with Ustadh Satrio, Yogyakarta, 6 October 2010.

³Interview with Ustadh Muhammad, Gresik, 20 October 2010.

The Salafi factions presented the internet as an acceptable new resource through the narrative of *halāl* (religiously permitted) internet. Yet, they also framed it to be a potentially unacceptable technology through the narrative of *harām* (religiously forbidden) internet by highlighting the internet's 'dangerous' aspects in which its use could be in conflict with Salafi teachings and way of life. These two kinds of internet narratives play an important role in the Salafists' engagement with the new medium because they guide the Salafi actors and adherents on how to talk, perceive, and use or not use it for the purpose of the Salafi movement. In practice, these narratives aim to direct a religiously justified pattern of use in the Salafists' mobilization of the new resource.⁴

Halāl Internet

The Salafi factions developed the narratives of *halāl* internet with the aim of justifying this new medium as a new acceptable resource. This was illustrated by their perception of the importance of internet for contemporary Muslim societies. They believed that technological modernization should be welcomed by maximizing its benefits and avoiding its harmful effects in the light of religious values and purposes. Although it had no precedence in the era of Prophet Muhammad and his companions, information technology like the internet could be used for religious interests and purposes.

According to Haraki Salafists, embracing the internet was necessary to keep abreast with the development of the "outer world" and contemporary

⁴In regard to the Salafi factions' framing of the internet, I had difficulty gaining access to interview the proponents of Salafi Jihadism due to the nature of their organization as closed communities highly suspicious of non-members. So, the examination of Salafi factions' narratives of the internet is mostly based on two Salafi factions, namely the Yemeni Salafists and the Haraki Salafists. Nevertheless, I assume that the Violent Jihadists generally share the two groups' perception of the internet as seen in its extensive use of its online news website.

issues.⁵ They argued that this new media technology has offered more advantages and possibilities than old media. The internet provides flexibility and portability so people with access to this new media can acquire a wide range of information about Salafism in efficient and cheap ways. A Haraki Salafist, who worked for a Salafi foundation, stated:

The internet is comfortable to use. It can be used anytime, anywhere. So, busy office workers can access our website anytime, anywhere. This access to the internet has helped people understand Salafism and opened their mind to accept Salafi *da'wah*.⁶

This Haraki Salafists' positive view of the internet can be explained in terms of an attempt to reconcile and harmonise modernity with Islam's origins. A Haraki Salafi leader who graduated from Medina University in Saudi Arabia argued:

Our activity, among others, is to try to put the originality of Islam and modernization in harmony. I mean, we are not anti-modern people; we attempt to benefit from modernization, but we also try to avoid its disadvantages. The internet is inseparable from modern societies. If we are anti-internet, we will be restricted. So, we use the internet, while keeping its disadvantages to a minimum.⁷

Likewise, Yemeni Salafists perceived the internet as having more advantages than offline media in that it provides users with cheap and practical ways of gaining knowledge. A Yemeni Salafi leader said:

In addition, the internet has more advantages than other offline mass media; readers (the internet users) do not need to buy or spend their money gaining knowledge, or leave their house to know about religious issues. So, compared to the other offline media of *da'wah*, the internet has special advantages.⁸

Accordingly, the Yemeni Salafists pointed out that it was necessary for them to have a presence on the internet in order to provide a wider audience of internet users with information about Salafism. As a Yemeni Salafi leader

⁵Interview with Musa, Bogor, 14 October 2010.

⁶Interview with Budiyanto, Solo, 19 October 2010.

⁷Interview with Ustadh Sadik, Makassar, 26 October 2010.

⁸Interview with Ustadh Ahmadi, Bekasi, 13 October 2010.

argued “I think the internet is more important than other media because it attracts more people to visit our website than face-to-face religious learning methods”.⁹

Internet as *Sarana*

The dominant narrative of the *halal* internet the Salafi factions developed was that the internet is a *sarana* (facility). The Salafists regarded the internet as a facility, which is believed to be inherently neutral and value-free so that it can be used for any purposes, good or bad. As an instrument, the internet can be utilised as long as its usage and effects are not in breach of Islamic values and teachings as understood by Salafists.

According to Haraki Salafi faction, the internet is a useful facility for religious purposes, particularly as a modern means of propagation (*da'wah*) of Salafi ideology to a wider audience. They perceived that the internet is a part of worldly affairs which can be used in light of Islamic norms and values. A young Haraki Salafi leader stated:

According to Islam, basically, anything that has been developed in the era of modernity, like technology, transportation and telecommunication, is permitted. Thank God, now, we have many facilities, including the internet. The internet is a technology; it is a facility just like other technologies. I think there is no problem using it as long as it is used for good purposes like spreading Islamic values for the readers [of the articles on the websites].¹⁰

For the Haraki Salafists, the internet is not only a permissible technology, but also a compulsory means for advancing the Salafi propagation. A Haraki leader argued:

We have to explain that the internet, radio, and any communication media are *sarana* (facilities). And basically, all kinds of facilities are permissible as long as they are not in contradiction with [religious values] or create negative consequences or cause more disadvantages than advantages. In line with this, it can be said today, the internet is a

⁹Interview with Ustadh Ahmadi, Bekasi, 13 October 2010.

¹⁰Interview with Ustadh Hadi, Bogor, 14 October 2010.

necessary means for developing *da'wah*. If we do not use it, we will lose its benefits, which are actually useful for *da'wah* purposes.¹¹

This view is confirmed by Salafi web administrators who argued that the internet is a necessary means for contemporary Muslims because it has advantages including its ability to reach a wider audience in different places so that it can be mobilized for *da'wah* purposes.¹² Due to its important role in global communication, the internet was considered an effective medium for spreading information about Islam and Salafi views to a wider audience.¹³

Accordingly, the Salafi factions emphasized the good sides of the internet as a new useful resource for advancing their ideology and movement. The Yemeni Salafists reported that the internet is a modern tool that is useful for propagating Salafi ideas as it opens more possibilities for people to know about and join Salafism. They perceived that the internet has more advantages than print media such as the Salafi magazines that they publish monthly.¹⁴ They argued that the internet is an efficient medium by which the *da'wah* Salaf can reach a wider audience as it is not limited to time and space: it is fast, cheap, and can be done and accessed anywhere and anytime.¹⁵

The Yemeni Salafists also regarded the internet as a new resource for gaining learning materials and references including books and articles on Salafism, to which the Salafi leaders consult for teaching and sermon materials. They referred to the websites created by, or dedicated to, the '*ulamā*' of Salafism in the Middle East. These websites are highly appreciated as important resources from which they are able to download articles, *fatwa* and books written by Salafi '*ulamā*' for *da'wah* purposes. The internet, then, has equipped Salafi preachers with necessary knowledge and skills for

¹¹Interview with Ustadh Sadik, Makassar, 26 October 2010.

¹²Interview with Fadil, Makassar, 23 October 2010).

¹³Interview with Karim, Makassar, 23 October 2010).

¹⁴In addition to books, Salafi factions in Indonesia published magazines and bulletins including *As-Syariah*, *As-Sunnah*, *An-Nashihah*, and *Al-Furqon*; some of them have online edition.

¹⁵Interview with Yadhika, Bontang, 26 October 2010.

propagating Salafism. A Yemeni Salafi leader who studied with Yahya al-Hājūri, a prominent Salafi leader in Yemen, said:

The Salafi '*ulamā*' in Saudi Arabia and Yemen established their own websites. We have benefited from these websites; they are not only important as a means of doing the Salafi *da'wah* to *ummah*, but also beneficial for us, the Salafi preachers, the *da'wah* activists. These websites provide us with literature, references, in the form of books and articles, written by Salafi '*ulamā*', either in Arabic or Indonesian. The Salafi preachers are equipped with these resources, which can be consulted easily when needed. Through advanced technologies, such as mobile phones, we are able to access these resources anytime. Praise to God, this makes it easy for us. We, the preachers, have benefited from them. We just click "search" for books on religious knowledge, then they appear before us. We then select books that we want. That is how the internet benefits us.¹⁶

This narrative is also echoed by the Haraki Salafists. They contended that the internet has become an alternative medium for learning religious (Salafi) knowledge since the expansion of the internet into a wider Indonesian society in the 2000s. Traditionally held in mosques, *pengajian* (religious learning) can now be organized through the internet by using such avenues as Skype and streaming radio. By visiting the websites of local or the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities, those who feel uncomfortable or have a limited time to come to a religious learning centre are now able to read and download the learning materials.¹⁷

The Haraki Salafists also believed that the internet is a tool for correcting 'misunderstandings' about Salafism. With access to the Salafi websites, users can ask questions about any issues related to Salafism so that existing misunderstandings and poor representation of "true Salafism" can be resolved.

Through the internet, people can understand what the Salafi *da'wah* is. Undeniably, there are people who are new to Salafism and misunderstand the Salafi *da'wah* and there are those who attempt to damage the reputation of Salafism by presenting its image as a hardline *da'wah*. With the presence of the internet, we are able to

¹⁶Interview with Ustadh Syafii, Bontang, 26 October 2010.

¹⁷Interview with Dedi, Bantul, 6 October 2010.

restore the broken image of the Salafi *da'wah*; that the Salafi *da'wah* is not an extreme or rigid *da'wah*.¹⁸

Internet as a value-free tool

Another common Salafi narrative of *halāl internet*, is the idea the internet is a neutral or value-free tool. This deals with the issues about values associated with this new media technology. This included the issue that the internet was invented and developed by non-Muslims in the West, particularly those in the United States of America, whose values and way of life are different from those of Muslims. Regarding this issue, the Salafi factions believed that there is no problem with the use of products made by non-Muslims provided the products are considered religiously lawful. For them, the internet is just like other technologies invented by non-Muslims such as cars or mobile phones. As explained above, the internet is then considered a tool, which is value-free and can be used by everyone, including the Salafists for their social-religious needs and purposes. What really concerned the Salafists was how to take advantage of the internet for pursuing their movement's goals and avoid the aspects of the internet that are harmful to morality and Islam such as pornography and un-Islamic content.

In this context, most proponents of both Haraki Salafism and Yemeni Salafism categorized the internet as part of *mu'āmalah*, an Islamic teaching on interaction and transaction among human beings. Based on this teaching, they argued that human interaction and transaction is not only religiously permitted among Muslims, but also between Muslims and non-Muslims. Hence, they emphasised that Muslims are allowed to have *mu'āmalah* with disbelievers such as doing business with them and using their products considered lawful according to Islamic teachings. According to these Salafists, it is true that the internet was created by disbelievers, but it does not mean Muslims are prevented from using the technology because it constitutes a

¹⁸Interview with Ustadh Wahyu, Sleman, 7 October 2010.

part of worldly matters and human interaction in which Muslim can participate under the guidance of Islamic values.

To support this, Yemeni Salafists referred to the prophetic stories that the prophet Muhammad did business with the Jews and Christians, including the report that he pawned his armour to a Jew in Medina. A Yemeni Salafi leader who spent four years in Yeman studying with leading Salafi authorities explained:

With respect to *mu'āmalah*, trade and the use of the non-Muslims' products, the Messenger of God (Muhammad) did business transactions with the Jews and Christians of his time. So, it is not prohibited [for Muslims] to use [the products made by non-Muslims] provided they are *halāl*. In regard to the internet, it is allowed to use it based on the evidence that Prophet had business with a Jew.¹⁹

Similarly, Haraki Salafists shared this view as one of their leader argued:

We do not have a problem with products made by Americans or disbelievers. The internet is a technology; it is a worldly affair. The users are responsible for avoiding negative aspects of the internet and are obliged to add positive content to it so that it can be properly used.²⁰

Furthermore, the Salafi factions did not perceive internet use as against *tashabbuh*, a doctrine that Muslims are forbidden to imitate and follow particular ways of life of non-Muslims. According to Haraki Salafists, the internet is a matter of worldly affairs, not a matter of *aqīdah* (fundamental creed) in which Muslims are forbidden to imitate other religions' beliefs and traditions. This argument reinforced the notion that the internet is neutral and value-free regardless of the fact that it was created and produced by non-Muslims. Again, Muslims are allowed to use the technology for their own purposes and needs in ways that are permitted by the Islamic teachings.²¹

¹⁹Interview with Ustadh Arafat, Bandung, 3 September 2010.

²⁰Interview with Ustadh Satrio, Yogyakarta, 5 October 2010.

²¹Interview with Ustadh Hadi, Bogor, 14 October 2010.

To correct the misinterpretation of the doctrine of *tashabbuh*, the Yemeni Salafists interpreted *tashabbuh* as observing a typical way of life or belief lived by a religious faction other than Muslims. Muslims are prohibited from imitating or doing this because it is considered an affirmation of other religious communities' way of life and may jeopardise the purity of Islam according to the Salafi ideology. Yemeni Salafists argue it is true that in its initial development the internet was created and used by American non-Muslims, but now it has been used and developed by anyone in the world, including Muslim societies. As it no longer belongs to a particular people or community, Muslims are allowed to utilise the internet for their own benefits.²²

Harām Internet

Although they recognized the usefulness of the internet as a resource of Salafi propagation, the Salafi factions also developed narratives of religiously forbidden (*harām*) internet. In these narratives, they framed the internet as a danger to the purity of Islam and a threat toward Muslims' morality. They particularly referred to what they considered un-Islamic use and content of this media technology. The forms of *harām* internet, they identified, include immoral content such as pornography, ideas regarded as destructive to Islamic faith, and harsh criticism and 'attack' from those regarded as the enemies of Salafism.

Internet as Threat

The common Salafi narrative of *harām* internet was that the internet is a dangerous medium in that users can use it to spread ideologies that have the potential to destroy Islam and Muslims such as those of Jaringan Islam Liberal (the Liberal Islam Network), which attack Salafism through web

²²Interview with Ustadh Iskandar, Makassar, 25 October 2010.

content that vilifies the ‘true’ Salafi ideology, and engages in *ma’shiyat* (forbidden things according to Islamic values).

As I explained, the internet is a technology with unlimited freedom. People can view many things that have the potential to distort our fundamental faith and ideology. For example, in Indonesia, Jaringan Islam Liberal spreads its liberal ideas that have the potential to destroy the Muslims’ faith. The internet is also used for spreading *shirk* (idolatry), which also destroys our faith. Moreover, the internet has the potential to distort *akhlāq* (Islamic morality), for example, through pornographic contents.²³

This was echoed by Yemeni Salafists who pointed to the same internet threats. A leader of the Yemeni Salafi faction emphasized:

It is obvious that technological development does not always create a positive impact; it has disadvantages. This is also true for the internet. In particular, the internet can be used by anyone, believers and disbelievers, bad and good people. Here, the internet is a battlefield between good and evil. So, we are concerned with the use of the internet by those who intend to distort the Muslims’ faith and morality. The internet, and particularly websites, is a challenge to religion (Islam).²⁴

In dealing with these internet dangers, the Salafi factions advocated some measures, ranging from providing religious guidance for users to the censorship of internet content by the government. Yet, they believed that using the internet in responsible and clever ways is the best protection against the threats and danger resulting from un-Islamic use and content on the internet. A Haraki Salafi leader stressed:

We have been welcoming of the internet in a clever way. We use the internet to its maximum benefit. We should not maintain antipathy toward the internet. But, we also do not need to be euphoric. Otherwise, we can get trapped by the internet’s disadvantages like some cases of Facebook users who did not use the internet in smart ways.²⁵

²³Interview with Ustadh Wahyu, Sleman, 7 October 2010.

²⁴Interview with Ustadh Syafii, Bontang, 26 October 2010.

²⁵Interview with Ustadh Sadik, Makassar, 25 October 2010.

Other Haraki Salafists proposed some practical measures including avoiding placing a computer in a closed room.

Faith and fear of God guide one's use of the internet. There are some ways to prevent access to dangerous websites. First, use the internet moderately. Do not spend most of your time using the internet. This is wrong. Second, do not put your computer in a quiet place, but rather in a busy place, so that the user will feel uncomfortable accessing 'dangerous' websites. The devil easily seduces a man in solitude.²⁶

It should be noted that in spite of their recognition of the internet's advantages, the Salafi factions did not regard the internet as a new resource that could replace traditional means of religious learning. They believed that *majlis ta'lim* (venues including a mosque where face-to-face religious learning is conducted) and other face-to-face religious gatherings are still the most important media for transferring and gaining religious knowledge. According to Yemeni Salafists, *majlis ta'lim* remains advantageous in that it provides religious knowledge seekers with spiritual benefits which the internet is unable to give its users. For example, by attending a *majlis ta'lim*, one will have opportunities to have *silaturrahim* (maintaining "family bonds" among Muslims), one of the highly rewarded virtues in Islam. The internet, therefore, is regarded as complementary to the traditional media of religious learning and mission.

Since the beginning, we have asserted that the establishment of our website was not aimed at replacing *majlis ta'lim*. Rather, it was just an important alternative or complementary to *majlis ta'lim*. We do not allow followers to learn religious knowledge from only the internet. So, *majlis ta'lim* is still the best means for gaining religious knowledge because not only is going to *majlis ta'lim* religiously rewarding, but it also provides an opportunity to maintain relationships among fellow Muslims.²⁷

The Salafists also believed that by attending a *majlis ta'lim* one will have a teacher who explains a subject of Islamic knowledge thoroughly so

²⁶Interview with Abdullah, Gresik, 20 October 2010.

²⁷Interview with Ustadh Ahmadi, Bekasi, 13 October 2012.

that the listener will gain a “ripe knowledge of Islam”. Studying Islam without an instructor, such as by only reading books or articles on the internet, can cause learners to misunderstand “true” Islamic knowledge and prevent them from gaining *barakah* (God’s blessings), a spiritual reward believed to be given to those who attend *majlis ta’lim*.²⁸

Correspondingly, the Haraki Salafists pointed out that to some extent the internet is limited in that it is unable to assist Salafi activists to preach Salafi ideas in remote areas and proselytise marginalized groups such as prisoners without internet access. In these cases, they argued, *majlis ta’lim* and face-to-face religious lectures are the best media to deliver Salafi teachings.

We can download data and books on religious knowledge from the internet. However, we do not find on the internet someone who is able to explain those to us; to whom we can ask about those books; we often do not know who the authors are. The internet can reach people anywhere, including those in their private rooms. But, there are places that have no access to the internet and we have to come in person to reach them, such as prisons. We go to prisons every Friday to teach prisoners what Islam is. Our friends go to a remote area in Gunung Kidul (a district in south-eastern Yogyakarta province) that has no access to the internet. There are places where face-to-face *da’wah* is a more effective medium than the internet.²⁹

Religious Legitimacy of the Internet

To fully understand this Salafi framing of the internet, it is necessary to consider Salafi tradition of religious texts by investigating particular ideological beliefs that underlie their narratives of the internet. My interviews revealed that the Salafi factions went beyond the idea of the internet simply as a useful tool; their narratives imply a religious mandate for the use of the internet. To understand more precisely the nature of this religious legitimacy requires an investigation of the Salafi religious beliefs

²⁸Interview with Ustadh Syafii, Bontang, 26 October 2010.

²⁹Interview with Dedi, Bantul, 7 October 2010.

that provide the Salafists with a theological foundation for their engagement with internet. In this context, uncovering *dalīl* (evidence) from the Qur'an, *hadith* (the Prophet Muhammad's sayings and practices) and other Islamic resources that allow Muslims to use the technology, particularly internet, becomes indispensable.

Internet Use as Non-Worship Act

The Salafi factions affirmed that there are no Qur'anic verses or *hadith* texts that explicitly or specifically talk about the use of media technologies including the internet. Yet, they turned to some Islamic principles, which were derived from the Qur'an, *hadith* and *ushūl al-fiqh* (the principles of Islamic jurisprudence), believed to give religious legitimacy to their engagement with the internet. First of all, both Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists based their decision to mobilize the internet as a resource on a principle that God has created everything on the earth for human beings so that everybody is allowed to use and take benefit from them in accordance with divine law. This, they said, includes technologies like the internet. To support this, the Haraki Salafi leaders quoted a Qur'anic verse: "It is He Who has created for you all that is in the earth" (Al-Baqarah: 29) and a *hadith* that says: "You know best your own worldly affairs (*antum a'lam bi umūri dunyākum*)".³⁰

The same religious texts were referred to by the Yemeni Salafists to religiously justify their internet adoption. A Yemeni Salafi teacher said:

Everything on earth is permitted for use, except the things where there is evidence from our religion to declare it as forbidden. This is based on a Qur'anic verse: "It is He who has created for you all things in the earth". The words "created for you" indicate that we can use what has been created in the earth for us. This is evidence from the Qur'an that all worldly affairs are permitted until we find evidence that says they are forbidden. In the Bukhari's collection of valid *hadith*,

³⁰Interviews with Ustadh Badrudin, Bandung, 3 August 2010 and Abdullah, Gresik, 12 October 2010.

the Prophet said: “You know best your own worldly affairs”. This shows us that he granted us permission to deal with worldly affairs. We can use positive aspects of a thing. When there is a revelation that forbids it, we stop using it.³¹

It is interesting that the main concern for the Salafi factions was not what *dalīl* (evidence) allows Muslims to use the internet for, but rather what *dalīl* forbids Muslims from using it. When there are no religious texts that forbid certain issues, it is permissible for Muslims to engage with them in light of universal Islamic values and principles. A Haraki Salafi leader explained:

Instead of questioning whether *dalīl* allows the use of the internet, we are concerned with the issue of what *dalīl* forbids. As long as there is no such *dalīl*, we can use it because it is a facility that has to do with *mu’amalah* (human interaction). *Da’wah* is a ritual and religious activity, but means for doing *da’wah* can be anything provided it is not in breach of Islamic law. Some people say that there is something wrong with the internet. We say, yes, there is something wrong too with the telephone, radio and television. But, this does not mean that we cannot use them when we say there is a problem with them. Otherwise, there will be no communication media that we can use. We cannot direct the Muslim *ummah* to this narrow-mindedness. Instead, we see there is no prohibition against the internet. It is an effective means for providing *da’wah* information. So, today *‘ulama*, Islamic organizations, with some exceptions, use the internet.³²

In this sense, the Salafi factions referred to the principles of Islamic jurisprudence to support the permissibility of internet use for their religious purposes. The Haraki Salafists supported their arguments by making reference to *al-aṣl fī al-ashyā` al-ibāhah illa mā warada `an al-tashrī tahrīmuḥ*, a principle that everything related to acts of non-worship is permissible except those things that Islamic law clearly prohibits them. Based on this principle, a Haraki Salafi leader argued that the use of the internet is

³¹Interviews with Ustadh Ahmadi, Bekasi, 13 October 2010.

³²Interview with Ustadh Sadik, Makassar, 26 October 2010.

permitted because it is a non-ritual activity against which there has been no religious prohibition provided it is used according to Islamic values.³³

The Yemeni Salafists did the same, quoting another principle of Islamic jurisprudence *lil wasāil hukm al-maqāṣid*, which means the ruling of instruments is subject to what they are intended to be and the intention of their users. They explained that the internet is a *waṣīlah* (instrument) that is basically *halāl*, religiously permitted to be used by Muslims provided it is to do good things according to Islamic teachings. Yet, it can be *harām*, religiously forbidden, if it is used for doing things that breach religious values and ethical norms such as for viewing pornography.

The Prophet Muhammad climbed to a higher ground to call Muslims for *ṣalat* (prayers) because there was no loud speaker in his time. Today we use a loudspeaker to call people for *ṣalat*. This is permissible. Rulings on instruments are determined by their usage. If an instrument is used for good, it will be a good; it is bad when used for doing evil. If the internet is used as a medium for facilitating *da'wah*, it is permissible.³⁴

Internet as God's Gift

Furthermore, to provide religious legitimacy to their internet use, the Salafi factions went beyond the idea of the internet as *waṣīlah* (instrument); they even took the view that the internet is a gift from God (*ni'mah*). This implies a religious mandate to use the internet for good according to Islamic values and for religious missions. The Haraki Salafists explained:

This (the internet) is a gift from Allah, which we have to use for good. Just like the radio and the microphone, it is an instrument. When we use it for good, it is permitted and even recommended.³⁵

Similarly, the Yemeni Salafists said:

So, we view the internet as a gift from God given to human beings. We make use of it for good. We are aware of the fact that the internet can

³³Interview with Ustadh Hadi, Bogor, 14 October 2010.

³⁴Interview with Ustadh Arafat, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

³⁵Interview with Ustadh Abdullah, Gresik, 12 October 2010.

be used for doing bad. Through the internet, we can call people to return to the truth or at least make them interested in it. That is the reason why we have engaged with the internet.³⁶

It is worth noting that the same religious basis of their acceptance of the internet caused the Salafi factions to respect human creativity and intellectual rights related to this technology. They reported that they are against software piracy so that they do not use pirated computer software, particularly operating systems. They maintained that using pirated computer software is disrespectful towards humans' hard work. Instead, they use open source software or genuine copyrighted products.

Islam highly respects humans' work on worldly affairs. Therefore, in regard to the internet, we are against software piracy. We use Linux, instead of pirated Windows, which are commonly used in this country. There is a "Linuxisation" process here [in our Salafi learning centre]. Our web admin uses genuine Windows software.³⁷

The above Salafi narratives of the internet suggest that while the internet is a global information and communication medium, it operates within the confine of local and particular values and ethics shared by its users. Through their narratives of the internet, the Salafi factions developed "a prescriptive discourse" (Campbell 2010, 137) on the technology, framing it as a valuable tool that supports their ideology, core values and practices. In such communal discourse, though they disagree on some issues (as discussed in Chapter Two), the Salafi factions shared the same narratives of the internet. Notwithstanding some variations over when the internet can be a religiously and morally forbidden medium, the Salafi factions have largely shared positive ideas about the internet as a new resource for propagating Salafism (*da'wah salafiyyah*).

Emphasizing the instrumental nature and functional utility of the internet, the Salafi factions in Indonesia have developed narratives of *halāl* internet with full references to religious texts of the Qur'an, *hadith*, and

³⁶Interview with Ustadh Iskandar, Makassar, 23 October 2010.

³⁷Interview with Syahdan, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

Islamic jurisprudence principles. They framed this new media technology as not only acceptable but also a valuable instrument which is inherently neutral so that it can be used in light of their religious values and organizational purposes including dissemination of the ideology of Salaf supremacy for a wider audience. The same holds true when they attempt to frame narratives of *harām* internet. Drawing on certain Islamic texts, the Salafis have warned Muslims of the potential dangers and actual threats of un-Islamic internet use to what they consider 'pure Islam'.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the Salafi embrace of the internet is closely and explicitly linked with the Salafi religious world view and ideology. To embrace the internet fully as a new resource, the Salafi factions needed more than an organisational justification as explained in the previous chapter. As religious text-based and oriented factions, the Salafists sought to claim theocratic legitimacy for their internet use through a communal discourse of the internet with strong references to religious texts. This provided the proponents of the Salafi factions with a framework of how to perceive and utilize the internet, and more importantly a religious legitimacy for their adoption and mobilization of the new medium as an acceptable new resource for promoting Salafi ideology.

These narratives demonstrate that religious ideology plays a key role in Salafi factions' adoption of the internet. Religious values and tradition provide a theological foundation for the Salafists' responses to the introduction of the internet into their socio-religious practices. Since religious texts play a central role in formulating their ideology and guiding their practice, the Salafists depend heavily on the Qur'anic texts, *hadith*, and the Salafi '*ulama* in giving legitimacy to the internet use. Not only do the Salafists impute neutrality to the internet, but they also regard it as God's gift,

legitimising their mobilization of the medium for their religious needs and purposes. At this point, we see a spiritually-rich engagement with the internet technology, which distinguishes religious users like the Salafists from non-religious ones, such as a football club or a corporation, for example.

The Salafi framing of the internet suggests that the Salafi factions are not passive receivers or blind rejecters of the internet. Their engagement with the internet involves processes of negotiation with opportunities opened by the internet in light of Salafi ideology and beliefs. Given such specific motivations, the Salafi factions are involved in a technological practice in which they attempt to religiously shape the meaning and purpose of the internet.

As a whole, this chapter and the previous one have addressed the question of why the Salafi factions embraced the internet, by examining the connection between the Salafi factions' internet adoption, their resource availability, and their religious framing of the internet. Both argue that lack of resources combined and supported with theological legitimacy have encouraged and motivated the Salafi factions to adopt the internet as a new important resource that is in line with their organizational goals of promoting Salafi ideology to a wider audience.

This begs important questions. How have the Salafi factions actually mobilized the internet as a new resource? Is their shared positive attitude toward the internet reflected in their actual mobilization of new medium? The next four chapters aim to answer these very questions.

Chapter Five

Constructing the Ideology of Salafism Online

Having discussed *why* the Salafi factions have embraced the internet in the previous chapters, this study now addresses *how* these factions actually mobilized this newly adopted resource. Salafists claimed that they used the internet to accomplish the religious obligation of *da'wah salafiyyah*, namely propagating Salafism to a wider audience. How did they actually mobilize this new resource to achieve this goal? To answer this question, this chapter and the following three chapters examine how Salafi factions with different access to resources mobilized the internet for collective action. To this end, certain types of internet use by the Salafi factions are identified, enabling the development of a typology of internet mobilization salient to the Salafi movement. Most importantly, these chapters demonstrate that the internet has varied and differentiated significance for the different factions of the Salafi movement by showing that the less well-resourced Salafi factions mobilize the internet more than those with good access to resources.

This chapter initially begins by identifying and describing the type of Salafi use of the internet as an instrumental resource for constructing and promoting the ideology of Salafism as a collective identity. This ideology includes the view of Salafi supremacy as a perfect model of understanding and practicing Islam, in addition to other common Salafi doctrines. Second, the chapter analyses the linkage between the Salafi factions' actual mobilization of websites for constructing and promoting the ideology of Salafism and the state of resources among the factions, highlighting the possible implications of this internet use for the Salafi factions. It is argued that, although all Salafi factions adopted the internet as a new resource for

constructing the ideology of Salafism, they did not actually mobilize it for this purpose in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi factions tended to mobilize the internet to construct the ideology of Salafism more actively than the relatively resource-rich ones. The different states of resources among the Salafi factions contributed to this varied actual mobilization of the internet by the factions.

In this chapter, I confine my analysis to the way the Salafi factions mobilized the internet to spread and promote the ideology of Salafism because ideology, just as for other movements in general, plays a core role in the rise and development of Salafism, and is thus, deserving of serious attention. Hence, though they present information which would be valuable for future scholars to analyse, other promotional uses of websites such as announcements and promotions of the activities of Salafi foundations, were not regarded as pertinent to the line of analysis of this thesis.

The analysis of this Salafi use of the internet to promote ideology was mainly based on texts in the form of articles posted on Salafi websites. This has to do the fact that Salafi websites are generally text-based as Salafists tend to avoid the usage of images and visuals in their websites, particularly those of living creatures, since these would be considered religiously forbidden. The analysis, then, was based on, and supported with, textual quotes from web articles and interviews, instead of visual texture and imagery.

Drawing on the framing process theory (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 1988), this chapter examines the extent to which Salafi factions with different access to resources used websites to construct the collective identity of the Salafi ideology. The chapter does this by identifying diagnostic (that is, what the problem is), prognostic (how to address the problem) and motivational (why the problem should be addressed) framing tasks in regard to ideational views and beliefs of Salafism. Oliver and Johnston (2000), for example, have argued for the use of the framing concept

in the analysis of ideology. They suggest that ideology is a system of beliefs that underlies framed events and views, whereas a frame represents ideological content put into practice in attempts to interpret an event (Oliver and Johnson 2000). When extended to media texts, the concept of frames helps explain the integration of factors related to discourse, ideology and material power (Budarick and King 2008). It can be used to investigate the way the news workers interpret an event and frame it discursively in the media product (Gitlin 1980 in Budarick and King 2008).

Within the context of the internet and the Salafi movement in Indonesia, the Salafi websites provide texts which can be analysed to determine the movement's framing of its religious ideology. In the analysis which follows, articles and postings from selected Salafi websites were analysed in order to identify how each of the Salafi factions used the web for ideological construction and promotion. Those websites included for analysis were selected based on their content dealing with the ideas of Salaf method (*manhaj al-salaf*) and common Salafi doctrines including *tawhīd*, *sunnah*, *bid'ah*, and *al-walā` wa al-barā`*, which refer to the construct of Salafism as a religious ideology. This will reveal the extent to which each Salafi faction mobilizes its websites as new important resources to construct and promote its religious ideology on the World Wide Web, according to that faction's access to resources.

Salafi Interpretation of the Eclipse of the Muslim World: A Diagnostic Framing

In pursuing their goals, Islamic movement activists are commonly involved in the identification of problems facing the Muslim *ummah* (global Muslim society) and their causes. They attempt to provide answers to the questions "What's wrong with the Muslim *ummah*?" and "Who or what to blame?" or "Who is responsible for problems facing the Muslim *ummah*?" This diagnostic rhetoric fills the works and commentaries of Islamic movement leaders and

supporters. They attempted to diagnose the eclipse of Islamic civilization over the last three centuries by providing answers to what exactly is happening in the social and political life of Muslim societies, and why they experience this misfortune.

This attempt constitutes a diagnostic framing. It refers to a process in which social movement activists uncover and describe an event, an aspect of socio-political life or a system of government as problematic so that it is in need of solution, change or transformation. After problems are diagnosed, the next task entails attributing blame and responsibility (Benford and Snow 2000:615-616).

Accordingly, as a contemporary Islamic movement, Salafism founded its ideology on the realities of Muslim societies in the contemporary world. The Salafi ideology, then, is a form of the Salafists' responses to social, economic, political and religious problems facing the contemporary Muslim *ummah*. Diagnosing these problems, the Salafists believed that a variety of factors have caused the socio-political-religious problems experienced by Muslim societies. These include internal factors that have to do with what the Salafists regarded as un-Islamic beliefs and practices long adopted by the Muslim *ummah*, such as reprehensible religious innovation (*bid'ah*), blind imitation of the long established schools of thought (*taqlid*), and the involvement of human desire and intellect in understanding and practicing religious texts. External factors were also thought to have contributed to contemporary Muslims' socio-religious problems including Western civilization and its by-products such as rationalism, secularism, feminism and democracy.

What is Wrong with the Muslim Ummah?

The Yemeni Salafists used the internet to express their views on the challenges and problems facing the contemporary Muslim *ummah*. Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists situated these challenges and problems

in the context of the global eclipse of Islamic civilization experienced by the Muslim world. They diagnosed the problems as multi-dimensional crises endured by global Muslim communities, rather than as a sectoral or partial misfortune. These crises have caused Muslims not only to lose their glory in the form of religious, political and scientific dominance they achieved in the early centuries of Islam until the Middle Ages, but also to fall under the domination of the unbelievers (the West) over the last three centuries.

As to what it was about these multi-dimensional crises that brought about the eclipse of the Islamic world, the diagnosis proposed by the Yemeni Salafi faction and projected through its websites was that these are moral and faith crises rooted in religious and moral degradation. These crises have made Muslims vulnerable to the attacks of external un-Islamic ideologies and practices such as liberalism and internal ones like Shiism. Luqman Ba'abduh, a prominent leader of Yemeni Salafi faction, explained:

Today, Islam is experiencing various forms of crisis. The Muslim *ummah* is experiencing religious degradation so that many Muslims do not observe prayers. The morality of Muslim youth is no longer guided by Islam; they tend to follow and imitate the unbelievers. Muslims are also undergoing faith degradation. Many anti-Islamic creeds are emerging; Shiites openly propagate their evil; books on communism are freely sold in bookstores; and liberalism is being actively disseminated among the Muslim youth. It is difficult to block this. All this has done damage to the Muslim *ummah*.¹

For the Yemeni Salafists, this religious degradation was manifested in the fact that although quantitatively their population is large, Muslims are qualitatively ignorant of their own religion. Rather than holding to 'the true Islam', the majority of contemporary Muslims practice *bid'ah* (reprehensible religious innovations) and get involved in beliefs and practices of *shirk* (deification or worship of anyone or anyone other than the One God; polytheism), both regarded as capital sins in Salafi Islam. A Yemeni leader

¹"Memahami dan Mengamalkan Islam secara Kaffah", <http://mimbarsunnah.org/Memahami-Dan-Mengamalkan-Islam-Secara-Kaffah-1>, accessed 1 May 2010.

said: “It is true that the total population of Muslims in the world is huge. But, we regret that the majority of Muslims do not understand the Islam that was brought by the Prophet [Muhammad] and disseminated by his companions”.²

Due to their ignorance of the principles of understanding and observing Islamic teachings, contemporary Muslims were regarded as having fallen to *taqlīd*, the practice of following blindly the rulings of their religious leaders or scholars of Islamic law schools. The practice of *taqlīd* does not require Muslims to know the scriptural bases of the edicts or opinions issued by religious leaders. As a result, in the view of the Yemeni Salafists, Muslims were ignorant of ‘the true Islam’ which is derived from divine sources (the Qur’an and Sunnah) and they were involved in internal conflicts and sectarianism. Abu Hamzah argued:

Since they are ignorant of the principles of the correct understanding and practice of Islam, many Muslims have fallen into the vicious circle of *taqlīd* and sectarianism. They prioritise the words of their teachers, leaders, or schools of law, rather than the Qur’an, the Sunnah and the Salaf understandings.³

In addition, the Yemeni Salafi faction identified problems facing contemporary Muslim societies to be due to an economic crisis with poverty as its main form. As Luqman Ba’abduh said: “People complain about their economic life. We see more and more economic difficulties in the life of the Muslim *ummah*. We see these problems everyday”.⁴

The Yemeni Salafists offered a further diagnosis on their websites that the real crisis was disunity within the Muslim *ummah*, which resulted in conflict and even enmity among Muslims as each faction claims it has the truth and condemns other factions. The Yemeni Salafists believed that this internal division was consistent with the Prophet Muhammad’s prophecy

²<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/pelipur-lara-di-tengah-keterasingan.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

³<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/04/17/pergolakan-taqlid-dalam-sorotan-bagian-pertama/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

⁴<http://mimbarsunnah.org/Memahami-Dan-Mengamalkan-Islam-Secara-Kaffah-1>, accessed 1 May 2010.

that Muslims after his death would split into seventy three groups, from which only one faction is saved, namely those who follow his tradition and that of his Companions. Abu Rosyid asserted:

We witness an undeniable phenomenon that the Muslim *ummah* has divided into many groups and sects. The Messenger of God [Muhammad] foretold that his *ummah* would split into seventy three groups who would enter Hell except one, namely a faction that follows the Messenger of God and his Companions. If these groups were asked, each faction will answer that they keep a steadfast grip on the Qur'an and Sunnah. However, we see that these groups contradict each other, in enmity one to another, split, and are not united within a single method.⁵

Addressing the same problems facing the Muslim *ummah*, the Jihadi Salafi faction maintained that these were closely related to an identity crisis. Through its websites, the faction pointed out that Muslims have lost their 'Islamic identities' as they turned to 'un-Islamic identities' promoted by the enemies of Islam and targeted at young Muslim generations. Western ideologies and cultures such as secularism were the most often quoted 'un-Islamic identities' embraced by contemporary Muslim generations. The Arrahmah community wrote:

Current Muslim generations have lost their true identities as they become the victims of bad ideologies. They are like a tall tree with branches that reach the sky, but without strong roots in the ground. They do not have the power to overcome the turbulence facing them. The Muslim majority's way of life is not the way guided by Islam. As a result, their fate is similar to those who lie about their religion.⁶

For the Jihadi Salafists, this identity crisis brought about other crises facing the Muslim world. These include the plight of Muslim *ummah*, the decadence of Islamic civilization and the loss of Islamic domination in the world.⁷

⁵http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=289, accessed 21 April 2010.

⁶<http://www.arahmah.com/kajian-islam/propaganda-menjauhkan-islam-dari-kaum-muslimin.html#sthash.CfVfDHgz.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014.

⁷<http://www.arahmah.com/read/2011/25/17018-ustadz-abu-jibriel-menelusuri-sebab-sebab-kemuliaan-dan-kehinaan-umat-islam.html>, accessed 22 July 2014.

In regard to the problems facing contemporary Muslim societies, the Haraki Salafi faction shared the same diagnosis of multi-dimensional crises facing the Muslim *ummah* as the Yemeni faction. Yet, the proponents of this Salafi faction did not mobilize their websites to elaborate on these issues. They just added that these Muslim world crises took the form of natural disasters and environmental destruction. The Haraki Salafists believed that these were divine punishments because Muslims had breached God's laws. Worldwide natural disasters and life difficulties were regarded as a consequence of human negligence of God's straight path. They said:

All this is an undisputable rebellion against God's command and prohibitions, which has resulted in His anger. Due to this, punishments have come: floods, earthquakes, tornados, landslides, fires, volcanic eruptions, airplane crashes, etc. [God said]: "Corruption has appeared throughout the land and sea by [reason of] what the hands of people have earned so He [Allah] may let them taste part of [the consequence of] what they have done that perhaps they will return [to righteousness] (Qur'an 30: 41).⁸

Who to Blame?

The next step of diagnostic framing of the problems confronting the Muslim world involved finding causes of the identified problems. The Salafi factions attempted to answer the question what and who is to blame or is responsible for the problems. Unlike most Islamist movements, the Salafi factions developed an inward-looking approach to finding answers to this question. They generally did not point their fingers at external powers such as USA or the West as the primary sources of Muslims' grievances. Rather, the Salafi factions adopted a self-critical approach and focused more on internal factors. For them, there was no one to blame for the misery of Muslims except Muslims themselves.

⁸<http://www.hasmi.org/dakwah-titian-kebangkitan.html>, accessed 13 July 2010.

On this issue, the Yemeni Salafists believed that the eclipse of the Muslim world and the multi-dimensional crises explained above were due to one single cause: Muslims have abandoned 'the true path of Islam'.

Indeed, the Muslim *ummah* are at a crossroad. They live in misery in ways that the history of Islam has never witnessed before. Many crises and disasters come and go, befalling Muslims. All this is because Muslims today are weak and do not observe God's law. Consequently, we see that many Muslims now have lost their countries and wealth; they live in fear, are confused, and in shock.⁹

The Yemeni Salafists emphasized that the decline of the Muslim world in the last three centuries was attributed to Muslims' deviation from 'true Islamic teachings and values'. Muslims were considered to have ignored the teachings of the Qur'an and the prophetic tradition (Sunnah) as seen in the widespread practice of forbidden religious innovations (*bid'ah*) and the practice of deification or worship of anyone or anyone other than the One God (*shirk*). The Yemeni Salafists believed these practices contaminated the purity of Islam and prevented Muslims from accessing the true messages of Islam, which provide true guidance in dealing with the problems and challenges of modernity. In other words, they believed that ignoring the messages of Islam as prescribed in the Qur'an and Sunnah has caused the Muslim *ummah* to lose the ability to deal with challenges of modernity and unbelievers. For them, too much love of worldly affairs and material wealth is the main cause of Muslims' ignorance of the true Islam. They said:

All this is caused by the Muslims' lack of attention to their religion and the prophetic traditions. They do not pay serious attention anymore to pursuing religious knowledge because they are too busy with the worldly businesses that keep them away from their religion. They are no longer interested in attending religious learning circles. As a result, religion [Islam] and the prophetic tradition appear strange and alien to them.¹⁰

⁹<http://assunnah-qatar.com/manhaj-artikel-198/618-islam-awalnya-asing-dan-akan-kembali-dalam-keadaan-asing.html>, accessed 3 June 2010.

¹⁰<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/aqidah/potret-umat-di-akhir-zaman.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

In regard to this issue, Jihadi Salafi faction believed that ‘the enemies of Islam’ –often referred as Jews, Christians and the West in general– have played a role in attempts to destroy Islam and Muslims. Through their media and cultural propaganda, these enemies were regarded as having attempted to keep Muslims away from ‘the true Islam’, to lead them to embrace ideologies other than Islam, and to reject the implementation of Islamic law.

Look at the way people live; many of them are morally decadent, drug users, gamblers and prostitutes. All this happens because people reject Islamic law and prefer secular laws in their attempt to overcome their problems. Unfortunately, the majority of Muslim people have become opportunists and weak targets of un-Islamic ideologies... As a result, many people claim to be Muslims, but in fact they have lost their Islamic identities and reject Islamic law. It is a fact that the enemies of Islam have always made every effort to put out the light of Islam.¹¹

Nevertheless, Jihadi Salafists generally recognized that the real causes of the eclipse of the Muslim world had much more to do with internal conditions within the contemporary Muslim community. Like the other two Salafi factions, they believed that the enemies of Islam would have no effect on Muslims if Muslims truly embraced Islam. Muslims should blame themselves for their loss of religious, political, economic and scientific dominance over the world.

Jihadi Salafists stressed that the Muslim *ummah* have lost their religious and political domination of the world because they have left the guidance of the Qur’an and the prophetic tradition behind and, instead, followed their sectarian leaders,¹² had weak faith in their own religion, had inadequate knowledge of it, and decline to live a life under its laws. The Arrahmah community reported:

Ustadz Abu Jibriel (the community leader) emphasized that the unfortunate conditions facing the Muslim community, namely humiliation and backwardness, are not because they are a small

¹¹<http://www.arahmah.com/kajian-islam/propaganda-menjauhkan-islam-dari-kaum-muslimin.html#sthash.CfVfDHgz.dpuf> accessed 22 July 2014.

¹²<http://www.arahmah.com/kajian-islam/sebab-utama-kehancuran-umat-beragama-karena-para-ulama-mengubah-ajaran-allah-dan-rasul-nya.html>, accessed 22 July 2014.

population, but rather because they are weak in faith, ignorant of Islam and unwilling to implement Islamic law... He pointed out that their fading faith in Islam, ignorance, limited knowledge of Islam, moral degradation within Muslim society, corrupt leaders, and cowardly mentality are causes of the eclipse of Islam.¹³

Haraki Salafists echoed similar self-criticism. They specifically explained in their websites that the decline of the Muslim *ummah* was closely linked to the fact that Muslims have neglected *tawhīd* (the belief in the One God), the very core of Islam, by which the Prophet Muhammad began and ended his calling to Islam. A Haraki Salafi community claimed:

It is a fact that Muslims have slumped because they suffer from a spiritual degradation: they have strayed from the straight path particularly *tawhīd*, whereas *tawhīd* is the main guidance and foundation of everything. They are right if their *tawhīd* is right. And if their *tawhīd* is not correct, they will be doomed. *Tawhīd* is the first and the last teaching of Islam that the Prophet Muhammad taught. It is the foundation of a great success.¹⁴

For Haraki Salafists, Muslims' abandonment of 'the true path of Islam' was manifested in their incorrect understanding of their religion. Sectarian and political interests, rather than Islam's interests, have prevented Muslims from gaining the correct knowledge of Islam in accordance with the ways of the Prophet and the Salaf. Ahmad Fais remarked:

The real problem is that Muslims are divided into partisan groups so that their views are influenced by their faction and sectarian interests. What is right or wrong is determined by these partisan interests. This is because Muslims do not understand their religion properly; they have abandoned Islam.¹⁵

Haraki Salafists claimed that this lack of correct knowledge of Islam resulted from the fact that most Muslims did not learn Islam from experts in Islam, namely the Salafi '*ulamā*', but rather from popular mass media

¹³<http://www.arrassmah.com/read/2011/25/17018-ustadz-abu-jibriel-menelusuri-sebab-sebab-kemuliaan-dan-kehinaan-umat-islam.html>, accessed 22 July 2014.

¹⁴<http://www.hasmi.org/kemurnian-tauhid-ruh-penggerak-kebangkitan-sejati.html>, accessed 13 July 2010.

¹⁵<http://www.almanhaj.or.id/content/2142/slash/0>, accessed 21 June 2010.

preachers, like Islamic televangelists, who were considered not to have adequate knowledge and understanding of Islam. Contemporary Muslims no longer paid respect to '*ulamā*', and even humiliate them. Consequently, since Muslims were no longer aware of the true Islam, they were vulnerable to division and conflict among themselves.¹⁶

Furthermore, in this diagnostic framing, Haraki Salafists developed a narrative that problems facing the contemporary Muslim *ummah* were caused by the Muslims' sin of leaving and ignoring God's laws and messages as prescribed in the Qur'an and the prophetic tradition. Hence, the plight of the Muslim *ummah* was considered to be a divine punishment for their sins. As a Haraki Salafi leader emphasized:

Therefore, it is more appropriate to identify the disease that has destroyed the Muslim *ummah* and makes them weak to be our own sins. Lots of evidence from the Qur'an indicates this, such as this: "Why [is it that] when a [single] disaster struck you [on the day of Uhud], although you had struck [the enemy in the battle of Badr] with one twice as great, you said, "From where is this?" Say, "It is from yourselves [due to your sin]" (Qur'an 3: 165).¹⁷

Based on this self-critical diagnostic framing, it is worth noting that Haraki Salafists criticized other Islamic movements that often blamed the unbelievers' conspiracy for the problems confronting the Muslim *ummah*. A Yogyakarta-based Haraki Salafi leader argued:

Some people said that the root of the problems facing the Muslim *ummah* is the conspiracy of Islam's enemies, namely the unbelievers, and their victory over Muslims. They offered a solution that [Muslims] must make themselves busy with the unbelievers' strategies and thoughts. Let us analyse this using our two sources of guidance, namely the Qur'an and the Sunnah. The Qur'an says: "If you are patient and fear Allah, their plot will not harm you at all" (Quran 3:120). This verse clearly shows that if we truly fear Allah, the conspiracy of enemies is not a threat at all.¹⁸

¹⁶<http://www.almanhaj.or.id/content/735/slash/0>, accessed 22 June 2010.

¹⁷<http://ustadzaris.com/solusi-dari-problema-umat-islam>, accessed 2 June 2010.

¹⁸<http://ustadzaris.com/solusi-dari-problema-umat-islam>, accessed 2 June 2010.

As a consequence, Haraki Salafists were convinced that contemporary Muslims were not entitled to victory because they did not meet the required criteria set by God, namely having true faith in God, observing His laws and doing righteous deeds. Instead, as a punishment, God let the unbelievers gain victory over the Muslim world.

The current [Muslim] generations do not meet requirements to achieve victory so that Allah allows no victory for them. They are humiliated in their own countries and their dignity is trampled by the unbelievers and deviant people. The unbelievers have led some Muslim countries into the ideology of communism and others into Christianity. Bait al-Maqdis [Jerusalem] has been seized by the Zionists, the killers of the prophets, and the damned as mentioned in the Qur'an.¹⁹

Based on the above narrative prevalent in the Salafi factions' use of websites examined here, it is clear that there was an ideological homogeneity within the Salafi movement in terms of diagnostic framing of the challenges facing the contemporary Muslim world. The Salafi factions utilised websites to construct the ideology of Salafism by, first, framing problems and challenges facing the Muslim *ummah*. They had a common diagnosis that these problems and challenges were multi-dimensional crises --social, political, religious, and environmental-- that have caused the decline of the Muslim world over the past three centuries. The causes of these crises were closely related to the Muslims' ignorance and abandonment of the 'true Islam'. The Salafi factions used their websites to promote an inward-looking approach to their identification of the problems occurring within the Muslim *ummah* and their causes. They did not view the external factors like the conspiracy of unbelievers against Muslims as the most responsible for the problems facing the Muslim world. Rather, they perceived that crises and misfortune of contemporary Muslims should have resulted from their own sins of ignoring 'the true messages' of the Qur'an and Sunnah. In other words,

¹⁹http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=112:-mungkinkah-kaum-muslimin-akan-berjaya-&catid=48:manhaj&Itemid=98, accessed 28 June 2010.

in fact Muslims were responsible for the eclipse of the Islamic world and they should have blamed themselves for all crises facing them.

Salafism as a Solution: A Prognostic Framing

For the Salafists, diagnostic framing alone was not enough for a comprehensive analysis of problems facing the Muslim *ummah* as it did not translate into a solution and plan of action. Therefore, they then conducted the next framing task, namely prognostic framing to answer the question “How should the problem be resolved?” or “What is to be done?” This task stipulates specific remedies and solutions for the identified problems in the process of diagnostic framing, and proposes tactics for achieving goals (Benford and Snow 2000:616).

In response to the above-diagnosed problems of the Muslim world, the Salafi factions used their websites to call for a return to the ‘pure Islam’ as the only solution to these problems of contemporary Muslims. Their prognostic answer to those problems was unequivocal: return to the ‘pure Islam’ whose true messages ironically have been abandoned by contemporary Muslims. For them, the rhetoric of “coming back to the pure Islam” requires re-Islamizing Muslims, having true faith and observing righteous deeds as prescribed in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In order to regain religious and political victory, as the first Muslim generations achieved, the contemporary Muslim *ummah* must meet these requirements.

Is it possible for Muslims to achieve victory and glory? The answer is found in the Qur’an 24:55 that to regain victory and glory, we must meet the required criteria: believing in Allah and doing righteous deeds... This includes keeping our creed in the true path and practicing rituals in line with the Prophet’s tradition.²⁰

As to how to realize such a project, the Salafi factions emphatically turned to *manhaj al-salaf* (the Salaf method) as the best and only way to

²⁰http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=112:-mungkinkah-kaum-muslimin-akan-berjaya-&catid=48:manhaj&Itemid=98, accessed 28 June 2010.

come back to 'the pure Islam'. The Haraki Salafi faction argued through its websites that the Salaf method was the only solution that will lead Muslims to the 'pure Islam' because Haraki Salafists regarded it was the true way of the Prophet Muhammad and his righteous Companions in understanding and observing Islam which all Muslims must follow in order to revive Muslim societies. A Haraki Salafi community website stressed:

The only solution [to the problems facing the Muslim world] is to follow *al-Salaf al-Ṣālih* (the Pious Predecessors) in our attempts to change, reform, and revive the Muslim *ummah*. Imam Malik (a great scholar in the second century of Islam) said: "The Muslim *ummah* will not have a good ending unless they follow *al-Salaf al-Ṣālih*.²¹

In particular, Haraki Salafists believed that following the *manhaj al-salaf* was a solution to disunity within the Muslim *ummah*.²² They argued that the Salaf way was a uniting entity for it calls all Muslim factions to come to a single way of understanding and practicing Islam as best exemplified by the Salaf. They believed that propagating the Salafi ideas (*da'wah salafiyyah*) would unite Muslim factions into a single global Muslim community because it called them to come back to the 'pure Islam' as practiced by the Pious Predecessors. As a Haraki Salafi leader said:

As the only true Islamic method (*manhaj*), Salafism is a uniting system, not a divisive one. The Salafi *da'wah* (proselytization) calls for unity, not division, among the Muslim *ummah*...[because] it calls for the purification of Islam from the stains of *shirk* (polytheism), *bid'ah* (heresy) and other deviations, as well as the implementation of pure Islamic teachings. [By doing this], Muslims will be united and freed from sectarian fanaticism, and more importantly from God's punishment.²³

To put this solution into practice to answer problems confronting the Muslim world, Haraki Salafists explained that Muslims should have begun

²¹<http://www.hasmi.org/kemurnian-tauhid-ruh-penggerak-kebangkitan-sejati.html>, accessed 13 July 2010.

²²<http://assunnah-qatar.com/manhaj-artikel-198/114-mari-mengenal-manhaj-salaf.html>, accessed 3 June 2010.

²³ <http://www.almanhaj.or.id/content/2142/slash/0>, accessed 21 June 2010.

with learning Islam thoroughly by following the ways of Prophet Muhammad, his Companions and the Salafi '*ulamā*'. They criticised those who claim to be the followers of Salaf, but were actually Salafi imposters. To support this, they referred to the Qur'anic texts (*e.g.* Qur'an 6:153) and the Prophetic sayings, which they interpreted as indicating that Muslims must follow the Salaf in their attempt to understand and practice Islam. A Haraki Salafi community website argued:

We are obliged to understand Islam in line with true understanding set by our prophet, his companions and our *al-Salaf al-Ṣālih* (Pious Predecessors). We must do this in order to follow God's straight path.²⁴

The next steps involved, according to Haraki Salafists, implementing exactly what Muslims have learned; they were not allowed to add to, or deduct from what has been ordered and written in the religious texts. This should be implemented as one's personal efforts, family obligation and social responsibilities. In addition, a return to the 'pure Islam' requires Muslims to practise *da'wah*, calling people, both Muslims and non-Muslims, to Islam using the Salafi methods of understanding and practices. Calling people to Islam through Salafism was regarded by Salafis as a personal duty of every Muslim.²⁵

Consequently, Haraki Salafists believed, once Muslims have had understood and implemented the 'pure Islam', they would achieve the promised glory and victory over their enemies. They claimed:

This [return to Islam in line with the Salaf method] is the only way we can fight back and free our seized lands. We deserve glory from Allah once we have returned and saved our religion.²⁶

²⁴http://www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatanalisa&parent_id=40&parent_section=an003&idjudul=39, accessed 10 June 2010.

²⁵http://www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatanalisa&parent_id=40&parent_section=an003&idjudul=39, accessed 10 June 2010.

²⁶http://www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatanalisa&parent_id=40&parent_section=an003&idjudul=39, accessed 10 June 2010.

As they returned to the authentic Islam through the *manhaj al-salaf*, Haraki Salafists believed, Muslims in the world would be united in a single creed (*aqidah*) and untainted religious practices (*'ibadah*). The Muslim *ummah* would seize social and political power to overcome their problems, challenge the dominating power of the non-believers, establish global Islamic societies, and finally regain glory (religious and political dominance and leading roles in science) all over the world. Islamic societies and a caliphate (*khilafah*; Islamic global state) were regarded as the only logical consequence of the comprehensive observing of the 'true Islam'. A Haraki Salafi community asserted:

True Islamic societies and *khilafah* (Islamic global state) can only be achieved by those who are committed to 'pure Islam', have understood Islam, and are fully dedicated to realise [its teachings] in comprehensive ways.²⁷

The Yemeni Salafi faction through its websites also confirmed this belief in the return to 'true Islam' according to the *manhaj al-salaf* as the only remedy for the problems facing the Muslim *ummah*. In more detail, referring to the scriptural texts particularly the Qur'an 24:55, Yemeni Salafis claimed that once Muslims have followed God's law, held the true faith in God and done righteous deeds according to the Salafi method, they would be rewarded in the following ways. First, Muslims would be given power over other social-religious communities in the world in the form of an Islamic caliphate. Second, Islam would be a victorious religion, for none would dare to humiliate Islam, the Prophet Muhammad, and Muslims. Finally, Muslims would have a prosperous and harmonious life, free from fear, poverty and misery. When Muslims truly observe all divine orders and prohibitions, they

²⁷<http://www.hasmi.org/kebangkitan-islam-dengan-kembali-kepada-kemurnian.html>, accessed 13 July 2010.

would receive blessing, guidance, and the promised heaven, and everything on the earth would be provided and blessed for them.²⁸

Similarly, through its websites, the Jihadi Salafi faction promoted that the only remedy for the global crises facing the Muslim *ummah* was a return to the 'true Islam' through the *manhaj al-salaf*. The proponents of this faction argued that in order to claim victory over the world, Muslims must follow the Qur'an and Sunnah according to the practice and understanding of the Salaf, not that of faction leaders or recent religious leaders. To maintain the purity of Islam as the only answer to the problems of the Muslim world, they argued for the application of *lā mazhabiyyah* (the rejection of the intellectual-speculative heritage of Islamic schools of thought) and *lā hizbiyyah* (tendency towards any particular sectarian group or faction) in their attempt to understand and strictly implement the Qur'an and Sunnah. The Arrahmah community website said:

The Messenger of God (Muhammad) guaranteed that Muslim groups that always obey the Qur'an and Sunnah and set themselves free from the influences of sectarianism and sectarian schools of thought will always exist till the Day of Judgement although they are regarded as strangers by their fellow Muslims.²⁹

Furthermore, Jihadi Salafists specifically pointed out on their websites that implementing Islamic law according to the Salaf was a perfect solution for Muslims to overcome the global problems of the Muslim world and regain the glory of Islam. For this purpose, they asserted that every Muslim was obliged to implement the Islamic law in his or her personal and social life.

If Muslims truly obey Islamic law just like God's chosen servants (the prophet's companions) did, Islam will stand and Muslims will reclaim victory. The only solution to achieve glory is implementing Islamic law...Why must there be Islamic law? This is a question that is always raised by disbelievers, liberals and secular people. The answer is because Islamic law is perfect so that it can answer all problems in the

²⁸<http://mimbarsunnah.org/memahami-dan-mengamalkan-islam-secara-kaffah-1>, accessed 1 May 2010.

²⁹<http://www.arahmah.com/kajian-islam/sebab-utama-kehancuran-umat-beragama-karena-para-ulama-mengubah-ajaran-allah-dan-rasul-nya.html>, accessed 22 July 2014.

world and it is a solution to global issues which other ways of life cannot provide...It is a personal obligation for every believer to implement Islamic law in any conditions. Islam as a movement requires Muslims to actively propagate its teachings.³⁰

After claiming that return to the 'true Islam' according to the views and practice of the Salaf was the only solution to overcome the decline of the Muslim world, the Salafi factions attempted to strengthen their argument by mobilizing their websites as resources for providing further information about the *manhaj al-salaf*. This includes the use of their websites to explain some common Salafi doctrines such as *tauḥīd*, *sunnah*, *bid'ah*, and *al-walā` wa al-barā`*. In this context, the relevant issue was whether the Salafi factions equally mobilized their websites as resources for spreading further information about the *manhaj al-salaf* method to a wider audience as a logical consequence of their belief in Salafism as the solution to crucial problems facing the Muslim world. It is important to understand why a particular Salafi faction was more elaborate and assertive in promoting the ideology of Salafism as the prescribed solution to global crises of the Muslim world on its websites.

Tawḥīd

One may expect that the Salafi factions mobilized their websites extensively for spreading *tawḥīd*, one of the most important doctrines of Salafism. Yet, in fact the factions' use of websites as resources for spreading this doctrine was varied. Haraki Salafists's use of websites for this purpose was limited in that they provided little information about *tawḥīd* on their websites. For example, through limited articles posted on its website, a Haraki Salafi community only described the basic meaning of the doctrine and claimed that *tawḥīd* was a foundation of everything and the only guide to the straight path. This community emphasized that true observance of *tawḥīd* was the only

³⁰<http://www.arahmah.com/rubrik/prinsip-prinsip-meraih-kemenangan-dan-pertolongan-allah-dalam-penegakan-syariat.html>, accessed 22 July 2014.

condition of the revival of the Muslim world. Only if they strictly maintained the purity of *tawhīd*, would Muslims solve the problems facing them and achieve victory over other religious communities.³¹

By contrast, other two Salafi factions provided quite detailed information about *tawhīd* on their websites. Quoting certain Qur'anic verses to support their interpretation of *tawhīd*, Yemeni Salafists described that *tawhīd* was an essence of all prophets' messages including those of the Prophet Muhammad. They also referred to the classic Salafi '*ulamā*' like Ibn al-Qayyim and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb to support their belief that *tawhīd* was the fundamental creed on which Muslims should base their beliefs and practices. They asserted that glory could only be regained by contemporary Muslims if they truly observed *tawhīd* and avoided *shirk*, any acts and beliefs that can contaminate the purity of *tawhīd* like associating Allah with anything or anyone.³²

In the same way, Jihadi Salafists described in more detail the meaning and importance of *tawhīd* on their websites. They argued that *tawhīd* was expressed in the Islamic creed of *Lā ilāh illa Allāh* (There is no god but Allah). The terms *Lā ilāh* (no god) means rejection and liberation from any false deity, and *illa Allāh* (but Allah) refers to a clear declaration that Allah is the only true God who must be worshipped. *Tawhīd*, then, is a creed that Allah is the only God who deserves loyalty, obedience and love of all creatures and, consequently, any deviation and distortion from this divine law will result in the unforgivable capital sin of *shirk*.³³ Allah is also the only Legislator whose

³¹"Kemurnian Tauhid: Ruh Penggerak Kebangkitan Sejati", <http://www.hasmi.org/kemurnian-tauhid-ruh-penggerak-kebangkitan-sejati.html>, accessed 13 July 2010.

³²"Tauhid, Inti Dakwah para Rasul", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=150, accessed 18 April 2010.

³³"Makna Dua Kalimat Syahadat", <http://www.voaislam.com/read/aqidah/2013/01/14/22743/makna-dua-kalimat-syahadat/#sthash.hgzQLwGU.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014; "Tafsiran "Tauhid" dan Syahadat "Laa ilaha illa Allah", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/08/14/517-tafsiran-tauhid-dan-syahadat-laa-ilaha-illa-allah.html#sthash.k8XOvFyF.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014; "Takut Kepada Syirik", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/08/14/515-takut-kepada-syirik.html#sthash.X56yCYLa.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014.

laws regulate all His creatures including human beings. Any attempts to follow and apply man-made laws will distort this very foundation of Islam and, therefore, must be rejected.³⁴ Thus, *tawhīd*, Jihadi Salafists believed, is the very core of Islam and a necessary condition, without which God cannot accept all beliefs and righteous practices.³⁵

Sunnah

The variation of the website use for providing information about Salafi doctrines was also identified in the Salafi factions' description of *Sunnah*. The Yemeni Salafi faction mobilized websites better than the other two Salafi factions to spread the Salafi doctrine of *Sunnah*. Through their websites, Yemeni Salafists described the meaning of *Sunnah* as the legacy and tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions in the form of their sayings, deeds and decisions compiled in the collections of *hadith*. Quoting certain Qur'anic verses and the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, Yemeni Salafists emphasized the obligation of strictly holding and practicing the *Sunnah* because it is the second source of Islam after the Qur'an.³⁶

Yemeni Salafists used their websites to stress the need to revive the *Sunnah* within contemporary Muslim society as many Muslims have abandoned the *Sunnah* resulting in the *Sunnah* becoming poorly understood and applied. They also attempted to defend the *Sunnah* from the attacks and criticism of anti-*Sunnah* factions and those who belittle or do not pay serious attention to it. They even considered those who belittle the *Sunnah* to be apostates.³⁷ To support their claim, Yemeni Salafists referred extensively to certain Qur'anic texts, the Prophet Muhammad's words, and the opinion of

³⁴"Makna Tauhid Hakimiyyah", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/10/10/520-makna-tauhid-hakimiyyah.html#sthash.YQF2f9BV.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014.

³⁵"Tauhid adalah syarat diterimanya amal shaleh", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/08/12/751-tauhid-adalah-syarat-diterimanya-amal-shaleh.html#sthash.hpMkkVgf.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014.

³⁶*E.g.* "Berpegang Al Quran and As Sunnah, Mengikuti Salafus Shalih", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=579, accessed 20 April 2010.

³⁷*E.g.* "Kufurnya Orang yang Mengejek Sunnah Nabi", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=731, accessed 20 April 2010.

the Salafi religious authorities, who (according to their interpretation) ordered Muslims to strictly obey and practice the Sunnah.³⁸

Bid'ah

The belief in the religious obligation of strict application of Qur'anic and Sunnahic texts has led the Salafi factions to emphasize a religious obligation of avoidance and condemnation of *bid'ah*, any beliefs and acts regarded as having no textual basis in the Qur'an or the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions. Nevertheless, the Salafi factions did not show the same enthusiasm in using their websites for promoting this common doctrine. Haraki Salafists wrote a few articles on the meaning of *bid'ah* and condemnation of the people of *bid'ah* (*ahl al-bid'ah*). But, they did not elaborate to provide examples and connect to realities in contemporary society.³⁹

On the other hand, other Salafi factions were adept in using their websites, publishing many articles on the prohibition of *bid'ah*. Through their websites, Yemeni Salafists condemned those who practice *bid'ah* by characterizing them as the haters of both the Sunnah and the '*ulamā*' who support Sunnah. Such people were regarded by Yemeni Salafists as more dangerous than Muslims who commit capital sins.⁴⁰ Furthermore, Yemeni

³⁸"Menghidupkan Sunnah Nabi yang Kian Terasing", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=793>, accessed 2 April 2010; "Kesudahan bagi Para Penentang Nabi", <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=74>, accessed 25 April 2010; "Menghidupkan Sunnah Nabi yang Kian Terasing", <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=71#more-71>, accessed 25 April 2010; "Beberapa Atsar Ulama Salaf dalam Menentang Penyelisih Sunnah (Bag.1)", http://salafybpp.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70:beberapa-atsar-ulama-salaf-dalam-menentang-penyelisih-sunnah--bag1&catid=3:manhaj&Itemid=18, accessed 3 May 2010.

³⁹"Semua Bid'ah itu Sesat (1)", <http://www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatkhutbah&id=217>, accessed 10 June 2010; "Semua Bid'ah itu Sesat (2)", <http://www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatkhutbah&id=218>, accessed 10 June 2010.

⁴⁰*E.g.*, "Ahli Bid'ah Lebih Jahat Dari Orang Yang Fasiq", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=594, accessed 20 April 2010; "Jeleknya Ahli Ahwa' dan Ahli Bid'ah", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=586, accessed 20 April 2010;

Salafists described how to treat people who engage in *bid'ah*. Quoting their Salafi authorities, the Yemeni Salafists suggested that 'true Muslims' should disassociate from the people of *bid'ah*, condemn their action, expose their error to the public, insult and disregard them, and never come to the religious learning activities or lectures organized or given by them.⁴¹

Similarly, Jihadi Salafists utilized their websites to elaborate their condemnation of *bid'ah* and the people of *bid'ah* by identifying forbidden innovations commonly practiced within contemporary Muslim society. They claimed that many popular rituals among Muslim society were forbidden religious innovations that have tainted the purity of Islam such as *tawassul* (saying a prayer to Allah on behalf of, and for, others) and certain rituals during the middle of Sha'ban (the month before the fasting month of Ramadhan).⁴² Moreover, they condemned popular festivals or cultural expression of Muslims' religiosity, which they regarded as having no basis in Islamic scripture or the practices of the Prophet Muhammad, the Salaf and the Salafi '*ulamā*'. These include the celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (*maulid al- nabi*), celebration of the Islamic New Year in

and "Melecehkan Ulama, Ciri Ahli Bid'ah, Yahudi & Ahli Kitab", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=868, accessed 20 April 2010.

⁴¹See, e.g., "Bahayanya Duduk, Bergaul, Berjalan Bersama Ahli Bid'ah", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=587, accessed 20 April 2010; "Bukanlah Ghibah Menceritakan Keadaan Sebenarnya si Ahli Bid'ah", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=598, accessed 20 April 2010; "Hinakan dan Rendahkan Ahli Bid'ah", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=592, accessed 20 April 2010; "Mentahdzir muftadi adalah suatu keharusan?", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=260, accessed 23 April 2010; "Syar'inya Meninggalkan Majelis Tokoh Tertentu Ahli Bid'ah", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=589, accessed 20 April 2010; "Perkataan Ulama Salaf dalam Mencela Bid'ah", <http://al-atsariyyah.com/?p=1522>, accessed 1 May 2010.

⁴²"Amal-amal Bid'ah Populer di Bulan Sya'ban", <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/tsaqofah/2014/06/05/30781/amalamal-bidah-popular-di-bulan-syaban/#sthash.X8a1ZUFY.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014; "Amalan Dhaif!! Merayakan Malam Nishfu Sya'ban dan Puasa Pada Siangnya", <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/tsaqofah/2013/06/23/25327/amalan-dhaif-merayakan-malam-nishfu-syaban-dan-puasa-pada-siangnya/#sthash.csjx79MW.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014; "Tawassul Bid'ah dan Tawassul yang Disyariatkan", <http://www.Arrahmah.com/read/2008/01/27/1529-tawassul-bidah-dan-tawassul-yang-disyariatkan.html#sthash.KYPpndaU.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014.

Muharram (the first month of Islamic calendar), and *ruwatan* (a spiritual procession among Javanese people aimed at removing bad luck).⁴³

Al-Walā` wa al-Barā`

All Salafi factions share the importance of the doctrine of *al-walā` wa al-barā`* (alliance and disavowal). It might have been assumed that each faction would have described this doctrine extensively on its websites. Yet, the Haraki Salafi faction did not provide adequate information about this Salafi doctrine.

By contrast, the other Salafi factions used their websites extensively to describe the doctrine of *al-walā` wa al-barā`*. Explaining the meaning of the doctrine, Yemeni Salafists argued that 'true Muslims' must observe *al-walā`*, namely to love, assist, establish alliances, observe loyalty, and live only with their fellow Muslims. At the same time, they believed, Muslims also must practice *al-barā`*, namely to hate, disassociate, and express enmity towards non-believers and *mushrikun*, Muslims who do *shirk*.⁴⁴

To support their view of the importance of *al-walā` wa al-barā`*, Yemeni Salafists quoted Saudi Salafi authorities such as Ṣālih al-Fauzān on their websites. They argued that this doctrine was a fundamental creed in Islam so that Muslims were religiously obliged to observe this creed faithfully based on Qura'nic and Sunnahic religious texts. A Muslim must love, help and be loyal to his or her fellow Muslims, especially those who strictly observe *tawhīd*, and must also express hatred and oppose non-believers as well as Muslims who abandon the purity of *tawhīd*.⁴⁵

⁴³"4 Argument Pendukung Peringatan Maulid & Bantahannya", <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/ibadah/2014/01/13/28627/4-argument-pendukung-peringatan-maulid-bantahannya/#sthash.DdKvw87j.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014; "Empat Kekeliruan Menyambut Muharram", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/12/07/10182-empat-kekeliruan-menyambut-muharam.html#sthash.wDKEJPVU.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014; "Ruwatan: Cara syirik Untuk Keselamatan", <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/aqidah/2013/01/10/22700/ruwatan-cara-syirik-untuk-keselamatan/#sthash.Ynno0QGx.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014.

⁴⁴See, e.g., "Loyalitas dan Kebencian yang Disyariatkan Islam (I)", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=327, accessed 21 April 2010.

⁴⁵"Al Wala' Wal Bara' Sebuah Keharusan", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=134, accessed 21 April 2010; "Loyalitas dan Kebencian yang Disyariatkan Islam (I)",

The doctrine of *al-walā` wa al-barā`*, Yemeni Salafists explained on their websites, had some implications that Muslims must avoid. These include the prohibition against imitating non-Muslims' way of life including dress code, living in a non-Muslim country while refusing to migrate to an Islamic country, travelling to a non-Muslim country on holiday, asking non-believers for help, appointing them to a position that deals with Muslim affairs, making them close friends and partners regarding deliberation in Muslim affairs, and using their calendar system, instead of the Islamic one.⁴⁶

Jihadi Salafists explained the implication of the *al-walā` wa al-barā`* doctrine in more detail on their websites. They attempted to develop the ethics of interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims with references to Qur'anic and Sunnahic texts, according to their method of interpretation. They emphasized that Muslims were forbidden to imitate and live a life of non-Muslim culture because this act was regarded as an act of imitating non-Muslims (*tashabbuh*).⁴⁷ Muslims were also prohibited from participating in rituals and religious celebrations of non-Muslims as it was regarded as recognition of the truth of religions other than Islam. This includes the prohibition of saying 'Merry Christmas' to Christians, celebrating New Year's Eve, speaking the languages of non-Muslims, and participating in the activities aimed at protecting rituals of other religions from disorder and possible attacks (such as the Nahdlatul Ulama Youth Movement, Anshor's, protection of churches during Christmas and New Year celebrations).⁴⁸

http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=327, accessed 21 April 2010.

⁴⁶ "Loyalitas dan Kebencian yang disyariatkan Islam (II)"

http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=328, accessed 21 April 2010;

"Loyalitas dan Kebencian yang disyariatkan Islam (III)",

http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=407, accessed 21 April 2010;

"Loyalitas dan Kebencian yang disyariatkan Islam (IV),"

http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=408, accessed 21 April 2010.

⁴⁷E.g., "Ikut-ikutan Budaya Kafir Kelak Diusir dari Telaga Nabi," <http://www.voaislam.com/read/aqidah/2013/12/27/28374/ikutikutan-budaya-kafir-kelak-diusir-dari-telaga-nabi/#sthash.jSpuZwPi.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014.

⁴⁸E.g., "Fenomena Interaksi Bahasa di Kalangan Kaum Muslim di Luar Negeri",

<http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/30/527-fenomena-interaksi-bahasa-di-kalangan-kaum-muslim-di-luar-negeri.html#sthash.7PVVQeZB.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014;

"Haram Merayakan Natal & Tahun Baru",

Yet, Jihadi Salafists argued that such ethics also included doing justice and helping non-Muslims who show no enmity and do not attack Muslims such as providing charity for those in need. Muslims were also allowed to have relationships with non-Muslims in terms of general affairs of human interaction like business and social interaction.⁴⁹

The above findings show that although they shared the idea of Salafism as the solution to the problems and challenges facing the Muslim *ummah*, the Salafi factions did not utilize their websites equally as resources to spread Salafi doctrines. Haraki Salafists' use of websites as resources for providing information about, and spreading, the Salafi doctrines was quite limited. They dedicated most of their websites to providing information about their foundations and learning centres. Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists, by contrast, mobilized their websites more actively than Haraki Salafists as resources for elaborating the ideology of Salafism to a wider audience online.

Religious Obligation, Salaf as the Best Model, Divine Rewards and Punishment: A Motivational Framing

<http://www.annah.com/read/2010/12/22/10375-haram-merayakan-natal-tahun-baru2.html#sthash.mD4KP8Ye.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014; "Ikut Serta Bersama Orang-orang Kafir dalam Hari-hari Raya Mereka", <http://www.annah.com/read/2007/06/26/535-ikut-serta-bersama-orang-orang-kafir-dalam-hari-hari-raya-mereka.html#sthash.eec2spQu.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014; "Ini Dalilnya Seorang Muslim Haram Ikut Mengamankan Perayaan Natal", <http://www.voaislam.com/read/aqidah/2013/12/24/28310/ini-dalilnya-muslim-haram-ikut-mengamankan-perayaan-natal/#sthash.pHnlkBU4.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014; "Merayakan Valentine's Day Bukan Hanya Maksiat, Tapi Bisa Murtad", <http://www.voaislam.com/read/aqidah/2013/02/13/23226/merayakan-valentines-day-bukan-hanya-maksiat-tapi-bisa-murtad/#sthash.jvrWV7Cu.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014.

⁴⁹"Etika terhadap Orang Kafir," <http://www.annah.com/kajian-islam/etika-terhadap-orang-kafir.html#sthash.2HqiJVJN.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014; "Pondasi dan Kode Etik Pergaulan Muslim dengan Non Muslim," <http://www.annah.com/read/2008/07/14/2033-pondasi-dan-kode-etik-pergaulan-muslim-dengan-non-muslim.html#sthash.RF78T3j6.dpuf>, accessed 22 July 2014.

The above diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks were not enough for the Salafists to solve the problem of action mobilization. These framing tasks had insufficient power to mobilize the Salafi movement's adherents. Those who supported the diagnostic and prognostic framing works should be activated to do what has been prescribed. Herein lies the importance of the third framing task conceptualized as "motivational framing". This framing aims to provide "a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative collective action, including the construction of appropriate vocabularies of motive" (Benford and Snow 2000, 617). This motivational framing involves the construction of "vocabularies of motive" by which movement supporters are instigated to move and overcome fear or risk associated with collective action (Snow and Byrd 2007, 128).

My examination of the Salafi factions' websites revealed the significance of motivational framing for the Salafi movement. An identification of the problems that contributed to the decline of the Muslim world and their causes was not sufficient to activate the Salafi followers or sympathizers to dedicate their lives to the realization of the Salafi ideology. How was a strong commitment to the Salafi way developed and put into action? The answer, I argue, lies in the motivational framing developed by the Salafi leaders and *'ulamā'*.

However, it was only the Yemeni Salafi faction that extensively utilized websites as resources of such motivational framing. The other Haraki and Jihadi Salafi factions either did not use their websites, or used them very little, to establish motivational framing of Salafism as the only solution to the diagnosed problems of the Muslim world. What follows, therefore, is focussed on how the Yemeni faction mobilized their websites to construct vocabularies of motive.

Religious Obligation

Through its websites, the Yemeni Salafi faction framed the call to 'return to the pure Islam' *via* Salafism as a religious obligation for every Muslim by

making extensive references to religious texts, which they interpreted to support their point of view, as well as to selected '*ulamā*' of the past. The Yemeni Salafi actors claimed that since following the ways of the Salaf in understanding and practicing Islam was scripturally ordered, strictly adhering to the Salaf method was a religious obligation for every Muslim in order to overcome problems facing the Muslim *ummah*. As one Yemeni Salafi preacher said:

It is compulsory for every Muslim man and woman to follow the way of the Salafi '*ulamā*' in terms of all religious issues. The evidence of this obligation can be found in the Qur'an, the Sunnah and *ijmā'* (consensus) of '*ulamā*' over many generations... It is impossible for us to understand the Qur'an and the Sunnah without the *manhaj al-salaf*. It is impossible for those of the current generations to throw away the *manhaj al-salaf* while they claim to take [religious knowledge] directly from the Qur'an and the Sunnah. This [abandoning the Salaf] is an error, which divides the Muslims and ceases the connection between the later generations and the first generations (the Salaf).⁵⁰

Another Yemeni Salafi preacher declared that following the Salaf method was a religious duty for Muslims because it was the only way to implement and revive the tradition of the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions (*ashāb al-nabiy*). He warned: "We are obliged to follow the Salaf and make them our guides in our devotion to Allah. This is not a negotiable issue".⁵¹

Salaf is the Best and Only Model

However, the vocabulary of religious obligation was not always sufficient to stimulate people to engage fully in Salafism as the only solution to the problems confronting the Muslim world. Hence, Yemeni Salafists utilized their websites to develop other vocabularies of motivational framing. These include the exaltation of the Salaf and the followers of the Salaf as they were

⁵⁰<http://akhwat.web.id/muslimah-salafiyah/aqidah-manhaj/kewajiban-mengikuti-manhaj-salaf/>, accessed 31 May 2010.

⁵¹<http://www.assalafy.org/Mahad/?P=71#More-71>, accessed 25 April 2010.

regarded as possessing a special status and highly respected characteristics among the Muslim majority. This was expressed in the depiction of the Salaf as the most knowledgeable about the Qur'an and the tradition of Prophet Muhammad. Their understanding and practice of Islam were unquestionable because they lived during the Prophet's era, learned, and observed Islam under his direct guidance. To love the Salaf constitutes a part of faith in God and to ignore the Salaf means a sign of hypocrisy and rebellion against Islam.

Specifically, Yemeni Salafists attempted to build the positive images of the Prophet Muhammad's Companions on their websites. This was a strategic attempt to secure the important position of the Companions as the core generation of the Salaf. In doing so, they used their websites to exalt the Companions as the best Muslim generation and at the same time refuted any discrediting features and criticism of them. For example, the Companions were depicted as the best interpreters of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, who understood and implemented Islam best, because they had direct guidance from the Prophet Muhammad. As a consequence, the degree to which one follows the Companions determines the degree of one's faith in God and love of the Salaf. Yemeni Salafists said on one website:

The evidence from the Qur'an clearly shows us that to love the Prophet's Companions constitutes an unseparated part of faith in Allah... To love them expresses your faith; your hatred of them indicates that you are hypocrites.... So, it is a religious obligation for all Muslims to love the Prophet's Companions based on clear evidence from the Qur'an.⁵²

Therefore, it was a religious duty for contemporary Muslims to turn to the Salaf and make them the only model and guide in understanding and practicing the Qur'an and the Sunnah, and dealing with the problems of the Muslim *ummah*. Yemeni Salafists argued on one website:

Our question is: who has the best and truest understanding of the Qur'an and the Sunnah, so that we are not allowed to go against them?

⁵²<http://assunnah-qatar.com/manhaj-artikel-198/114-mari-mengenal-manhaj-salaf.html>, accessed 3 June 2010.

The answer is the Prophet's Companions. They understood best the Qur'an and the Sunnah because they lived in a period when God revealed His messages to the Prophet. Therefore, we are obliged to follow their guidance.⁵³

Subsequently, Yemeni Salafists believed that those who followed the Salaf were also of special status. They depicted the Salaf followers as the saved ones and those who rejected or ignored the Salaf as belonging to the doomed groups that would be burnt in Hell. As one Yemeni Salafi leader claimed:

Those who follow the Prophet's way of life will be saved from Hell. The Prophet said: "The Jews will split into 71 sects; only one faction will enter Paradise, while the rest will go to Hell. The Christians will split into 72 sects; only one sect will enter Paradise, while the rest will go to Hell. My people [Muslims] will split into 73 groups; one faction will enter Paradise and the rest will go to Hell. A Companion asked: "O the Messenger of God, who are those people who will enter Paradise?" He answered: "They are those who follow my way and that of my Companions."⁵⁴

Divine Rewards and Punishment

In addition, Yemeni Salafists developed a motivational framing in the form of vocabularies of divine rewards or punishment awaiting those who truly embraced or rejected Salafism. In their view, the true Salafis would be rewarded with honours from God such as eternal pleasure in the afterlife and the Prophet's intercession (*shafa'at al-nabiy*).⁵⁵ They would also be rewarded with God's promised paradise. One Yemeni Salafi leader said:

The carriers of the truth have no fear. [They keep committed to follow the Salaf] though it is hard as if they hold a burning fire. But, their faith and patience will take them to an honoured pleasurable place, promised

⁵³<http://assunnah-qatar.com/manhaj-artikel-198/116-as-salaf-as-shalih-rujukan-dalam-memahami-al-quran-dan-as-sunnah.html>, accessed 3 June 2010.

⁵⁴<http://muslim.or.id/manhaj/mengenal-salaf-dan-salafi.html>, accessed 28 May 2010.

⁵⁵<http://muslim.or.id/manhaj/manfaat-dan-keutamaan-mengikuti-manhaj-metode-pemahaman-salaf.html>, accessed 29 May 2010.

by God. God said: “Enter paradise; you and your spouses will be delighted”.⁵⁶

Yemeni Salafists also framed what was considered to be a higher reward than ascent to Paradise. Those who remained steadfast in the Salafi way would be rewarded with God’s favour and eventually achieve the highest reward of all, namely “meeting God” and “seeing His face”. As a Yemeni Salafi leader remarked:

Allah said: “For those who have done good deeds, (Paradise) is the best reward and extra (seeing Allah’s face) (the Qur’an 10:26). From this verse we see clearly how honourable and beneficial following the *manhaj al-salaf* is. The sweetness of faith, the perfect love and longing to see Allah are main results of perfectly knowing Him, which is only achieved through understanding His name and attributes in line with the correct method of understanding, namely the method of the people of the Prophet’s tradition or the Salaf way.⁵⁷

Moreover, Yemeni Salafists framed a narrative of divine punishment on their websites to reinforce the obligation of adhering to Salafism for contemporary Muslims. This included a threat that those who ignored the Salafi way would be going astray in this world and entering Hell in the afterlife as a punishment for their evil deeds. A Yemeni Salafi leader asserted:

It is a religious obligation to follow them (the Salaf) in understanding God’s religion as revealed in the Qur’an or the Sunnah. God warned that those who do not follow the Salaf way will enter into Hell, the worst place to return to.⁵⁸

Salafi Resources and the Mobilization of the Internet for Constructing the Ideology of Salafism

Based on the findings above, there was evidence that Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists mobilized their websites for constructing and promoting the

⁵⁶<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/03/07/bagai-menggenggam-bara-api/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

⁵⁷<http://muslim.or.id/manhaj/manfaat-dan-keutamaan-mengikuti-manhaj-metode-pemahaman-salaf.html>, accessed 29 May 2010.

⁵⁸<http://www.almanhaj.or.id/content/1826/slash/0>, accessed 21 June 2010.

ideology of Salafism more than Haraki Salafists as seen in all three framing tasks: identifying the key problems that contributed to the eclipse of the Muslim world, offering solutions to the diagnosed problems, and providing motivational vocabularies to move the followers into action. This does not mean that Yemeni Salafists or Jihadi Salafists were more skilful in using websites as resources for constructing and promoting the Salafi ideology to a wider audience than Haraki Salafists. Rather, the point being stressed here is that the Yemeni Salafi faction harnessed the internet for constructing its ideology online to a greater degree than the other two factions.

This finding can be explained by looking at the close connection between the Salafi factions' use of the internet and the differential state of resources among them. As explained in Chapter Three, Salafism in Indonesia was characterized by internal resource inequality among its different factions. The Yemeni Salafi faction had limited access to important types of resources including moral, socio-organizational, human, and material resources. They particularly suffered from the lack of constituency, physical facilities, organizational infrastructure, money, and legitimacy, which in turn contributed to their extensive mobilization of websites for constructing their ideology online. This resulted from the 'ultra-conservative' nature of Salafism that the Yemeni Salafists promoted in Indonesia that, in turn, hindered individuals or organizations from providing support to their movement. To deal with their limited access to these resources, the resource-poor Yemeni Salafists adopted the internet to achieve their ends, regarding it as one of a limited range of resources available to them (for they had limited numbers of –albeit skilled– activists, and organizational infrastructure like computers and internet connections).

Since they were highly motivated to overcome the disadvantage of their lack of other resources and were aware of the internet's potential and advantages, the under-resourced Yemeni Salafists maximised their websites as new resources for constructing and promoting their ideology of Salafism

to a wider audience (as described above). I argue that the realizing of self-insufficiency of resources including constituency, organizational facilities, money, and legitimacy contributed to the Yemeni Salafists' extensive use of websites for constructing and promoting the Salafi ideology online. By doing this, they used the internet as a coping strategy to deal with their lack of resources in an attempt to enhance their movement's capacity. A Yemeni Salafi web administrator said:

Since the internet is allowed for religious use for the purpose of good, , we attempt to use our website as effectively as possible for the purpose of *da'wah salafiyyah* (spreading Salafi ideas). In this era, the internet is a new important tool of our *da'wah*. Amidst our limited facilities and infrastructure, as you see, the use of the internet in the forms of website or radio online has provided us with a positive alternative resource so that we are able to reach a wider audience.⁵⁹

A similar lack of resources motivated the Jihadi Salafists, as the smallest of the three Salafi factions under study in this study, to embrace the internet and maximize its use. The Jihadi Salafi faction suffered from a limited access to legitimacy, solidarity and celebrity support which were acquired from outside the faction (moral resources), organizational infrastructure and network (social-organizational resources), money and physical facilities (material resources), and constituency and labour (human resources). The nature of the Jihadi Salafists' movement that promoted violent jihadi ideology contributed to this lack of resource. This caused individuals or organizations unwilling, at least openly, to provide the support needed to realize the Jihadi Salafi ideals.

Using limited resources at hand in the form of skilled and committed active participants, and organizational infrastructure like computers and internet connections, the less well-resourced Jihadi Salafists adopted the internet and mobilized it as a new resource to cope with their lack of other resources. This internet mobilization was manifested in their extensive use of

⁵⁹Interview with Hamdi, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

websites as a means for constructing and promoting their ideology of Salafism as described above.

By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction had good access to most of the types of resources salient to its movement, making it the best-resourced faction among the three Salafi factions under study. Like the Yemeni and Jihadi Salafi factions, the Haraki Salafi faction had good access to conceptual tools, skills and knowledge that were publicly available, but limited access to legitimacy, solidarity and celebrity support which were normally acquired from external sources. However, it had much better access than the other two factions to the resources that enhanced its movement's capacity including money and buildings, a large constituency, labour and leadership, and appropriate organizational infrastructures and network. This good access to the various types of resources was largely due to the 'moderate' version of Salafism that Haraki Salafis promoted, which has been relatively successful in attracting support from individuals or organizations that shared the same Salafi ideals.

While having this good access to such resources, the Haraki Salafi faction still recognised the strategic benefit of embracing the new media technology as a new resource for promotional purposes. Nevertheless, the Haraki Salafists did not actually mobilize the adopted internet as effectively as the Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists did. As seen above, their use of their websites for promoting and constructing their diagnoses of the problems and challenges facing the contemporary Muslim societies was limited. This, I contend, was closely related to the feeling of resource sufficiency which in turn discouraged the resource-rich Haraki Salafists from maximising their website use for constructing and promoting their Salafi ideology online. Instead, the Haraki Salafists seemed to be content with the use of their websites for informational purposes about their learning institutions and foundations. A Haraki Salafi web administrator said:

We use the internet mainly as a medium to share information about our *ma'had* (boarding learning centre) for the parents or potential parents

of our students or anyone who is interested in studying here. Praise to God, we have facilities such as networks of parents of nearly one thousand students, regular *da'wah* activities, *As-Sunnah* magazine, and a radio network (Radio Rodja) that we use to develop our *da'wah salafiyyah* and reach a wider audience. So far, we only use our website for informational purposes such as the announcement of new student admission and financial reports.⁶⁰

As to what extent this mobilization of the internet impacted on the Salafi factions, the internet has not so far fully compensated for the Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists' lack of constituency, physical facilities, money and legitimacy. Their mobilization of the internet has had insufficient impact to solve these big challenges. Nevertheless, their attempts were not completely without success. Yemeni Salafists reported that new students came to their learning centres after visiting the Yemeni Salafi websites. A committee member of Adhwaus Salaf Salafi learning centre in Bandung, for example, reported that some new students from Sumatra initially found out about the learning centre on reading articles on the Salafi views on its website. He added that a new mosque, separated from the single, main building of the learning centre, was being built with money and materials from its supporters who often visited the centre's website.⁶¹ The same was true for As-Sunnah Yemeni Salafi learning centre in Makassar. In addition to personal networks, new students found the centre and decided to study Salafism there after they accessed its website promoting the Salafi ideology.⁶² So, the Yemeni Salafists acquired new recruits and new physical facilities, albeit relatively modest in scope, due to their use of websites for constructing and promoting the ideology of Salafism online.

It was difficult to assess precisely the impact of internet mobilization for constructing the Salafi ideology on Jihadi Salafists due to the closed and rather secretive nature of their organization. However, to some extent its impact could be seen in the fact that their websites were active and able to be

⁶⁰Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

⁶¹Interview with Hamdi, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

⁶²Interview with Ustadh Iskandar, Makassar, 24 October 2010.

maintained and updated daily. For example, Arramah.com was, and remained active, publishing news and current issues and promoting its Jihadi Salafi views, even when its chief editor and founder, Muhammad Jibriel, was arrested and put in jail for five years due to his involvement in the bomb attacks on JW Marriot and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta in 2009. I contend that the website kept running as it continued to receive labour support from committed activists, old and new, and financial support from its readers and sympathizers, with this support being mobilised, among other ways, by their visits to the website that consistently promoted Jihadi Salafi ideology.

By contrast, as a well-resourced Salafi faction, the Haraki Salafists did not seem to benefit particularly from their minimal use of the internet for constructing their Salafi ideology online. Their disinterest did not enhance their capacity to attract legitimacy for their ideology from external established Islamic organizations or support from well-known public figures. However, it did not decrease their existing resources including followers, active participants, and financial resources.

Such evidence demonstrates that the internet has had varied significance for the different Salafi factions. It played a significant role in constructing and promoting the Salafi ideology for the two under-resourced Salafi factions, Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists. But, the new media technology has been relatively insignificant for constructing the ideology of Salafism for the well-resourced Haraki Salafists. The different levels of access to resources among the Salafi factions contributed to this varied significance of the internet for the proponents of the Salafi movement in Indonesia.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown the Salafi factions employed the internet as a resource of ideological mobilization, namely for constructing and asserting the ideology of Salafism. The centrality of this religious ideology was clearly seen in the Salafi factions' making of *manhaj al-salaf* a key ingredient and

element of their web content. This suggests that religious ideology played a key role in the ways the proponents of the Salafi movement used the internet technology and that ideological propagation constitutes the main mission of their web use.

Most importantly, this chapter has demonstrated that, although all Salafi factions claimed they used the internet for spreading and promoting Salafism to a wider audience, they did not actually utilize this new resource for this purpose to the same degree. It has shown that Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists mobilized the internet as a resource for constructing the ideology of Salafism more actively than Haraki Salafists.

This tendency has been shown to be closely related to the different states of resource availability among the Salafi factions. Yemeni Salafists were a faction with limited access to resources salient to their movement's capacity such as legitimacy and celebrity, labour and constituency, buildings, and money. The Jihadi Salafists were in a similar position. The 'ultra conservative' nature of its Salafi ideology has resulted in the Yemeni Salafi faction having limited access to these resources. The radical-violent version of Salafism has had a limiting effect on the Jihadi Salafi faction's access to resources. Haraki Salafists, by contrast, had good access to most types of resources, making it the best-resourced faction of the three Salafi factions under study. Its 'moderate' version of Salafi ideology has contributed to the Haraki Salafi faction's success in attracting various types of resources necessary for its development.

Realizing that they had limited access to resources and being aware of the potential of the internet, the less well-resourced Yemeni and Jihadi Salafi factions were motivated to use websites as instrumental resources for promoting and constructing their ideology of Salafism in an attempt to sustain and continue their movement. Therefore, both factions mobilized their websites to describe in more detail the ideology of Salafism than did the resource-rich Haraki Salafists. By contrast, the Harakists' sense of self-

sufficiency meant this resource-rich faction regarded the internet as less central in its mobilization, particularly with regard to constructing the ideology of Salafi as a collective identity. In fact, the proponents of the Haraki Salafi faction dedicated most of their websites to providing information about their foundations and learning centres.

Thus, this chapter has demonstrated that the significance of the internet, and the particular tasks to which it is put, was not uniform across the Salafi movement. Rather, it varied across the different Salafi factions for each faction's use of the internet was influenced by factors such as their access to other resources.

Having now analysed the Salafi use of the internet for framing and constructing the ideology of Salafism, the following chapter examines the Salafi factions' internet mobilization focussing on the factions' setting of boundaries online to secure their right to sacred authority.

Chapter Six

Setting Boundaries Online

After constructing the ideology of Salafism as a collective identity in cyberspace (as discussed in the previous chapter), the Salafi factions sought to secure their claim of religious authority. To achieve this, they set boundaries to distinguish between ‘good us’ and ‘evil other’ or, more specifically, between ‘true Salafists’ and ‘Salafi imposters’.

In doing so, the Salafi factions developed an act of “othering”. First coined as a systematic theoretical concept by G. C. Spivak (1985), “othering” refers to a “process of differentiation and demarcation, by which the line is drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’ -between the less and the more powerful- and through which social distance is established and maintained” (Lister 2000 in Jensen 2011:65). It does not evolve around the fascination of the other, but rather around the belief that the other is always the other because it is inferior (Jensen 2011:65). The act of othering defines the faction that is othered as “morally and/or intellectually inferior” (Schwalbe *et al.*, 2000:423 in Jensen 2011:65) and is “reduced to stereotypical characters and are ultimately dehumanized” (Riggins 1997:9; Lister 2004:102 in Jensen 2011:65).

This chapter examines how the Salafi factions in Indonesia mobilized their websites as resources for setting boundaries in their attempt to assert the right to sacred authority and guardianship of ‘pure Islam’. Echoing findings in the previous chapter, it argues that the internet had a varied significance for different factions within the Salafi movement. It shows that less well-resourced Salafi factions mobilized the web as an instrumental resource for setting boundaries more actively than the well-resourced faction as a result of variation in access to resource among them.

This chapter describes how different Salafi factions used websites to set boundaries in an attempt to assert sacred authority. Then, it explains what might have influenced a particular pattern of internet use for setting boundaries among the Salafi factions. Lastly, the chapter briefly portrays the implication of this internet practice for different Salafi factions.

The Salafi Factions' Web Use for Othering Practice

The Salafi websites were laden with the polarization between 'us' and 'them' which has resulted in online othering contests among the supporters of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. My examination of these websites revealed that in this act of othering the Salafi factions used vilification and exaltation as key strategies. However, findings show that these factions did not mobilize their websites as resources for employing these othering strategies in equal ways due to resource variation among them.

Vilification of 'the Other'

First of all, the act of othering within the Salafi movement in Indonesia was characterised by the strategy of *jarh*. Derived from the term *al jarh wa al-ta'dil* (vilification and exaltation) within the conventions of criticism of the prophetic tradition (*naqd al-hadis*), *jarh* was used by a Salafi faction to vilify, discredit and excommunicate other Salafi factions or individuals accused of breaching or abandoning the principles and teachings of Salafi way (*manhaj*). In this online act of vilification, the Salafi factions employed the following tactics: name-calling and character assassination.

Name-Calling

Name-calling refers to "the use of labels to connect an individual or faction to a negative symbol, event, or phenomenon, often in an attempt to produce visceral responses that erode the target's ability to assert credibility" (Wiktorowicz 2004:165). Through their websites, the Salafi factions were

engaged in the practice of name-calling online in their vilification of those considered the opponents of Salafism and Salafi imposters.

The Haraki Salafists' Online Name-Calling

The Heirs of Kharijism

The well-resourced Haraki Salafists used the epithet of “the heirs of Kharijism” to label those who considered to have violated the true Salaf teachings. Kharijites (*Khawarij*) refer to the first rebellious Muslim group which emerged in the early Islam against the fourth Caliph Ali ibn Abi Thalib and then became a branch of Islamic theology that promoted a radical literal interpretation and violent implementation of Islamic teachings (see Timani 2008). Through this name-calling, the Haraki Salafists commonly targeted the violent Jihadi Salafists. Quoting Muhammad al-Utsaimin, a prominent Salafi leader of Saudi Arabia, they claimed that Jihadists who often condemn the ruler of a Muslim country as disbeliever (*takfir*) and attempt to topple him from his power are the heirs of Khariji ideology of the early Islam. They called these Jihadists “contemporary Kharijites” who misinterpret and misuse the Islamic teaching of *takfir* for their own interests, and maintain that their *takfir* practice does not meet the criteria required by the Salaf way.¹

Nevertheless, as far as this name-calling practice was concerned, the Haraki Salafists did not mobilize their websites to employ other labels or epithets targeted at other Salafi factions. As will be explained in the next section, perhaps good access to various kinds of resources has contributed to Haraki Salafists' reluctance to use the web as a medium for name-calling.

The Yemeni Salafists' Online Name-Calling

¹“Merekalah Ahli Waris Khawarij”, <http://ustadzaris.com/merekalah-ahli-waris-khawarij>, accessed 2 June 2010.

In contrast to the Haraki Salafi faction, the less well-resourced Salafi factions, as represented by the Yemeni Salafists, employed their websites extensively to denigrate other Salafi factions or other Muslim factions considered to have breached the 'true Islam'. Their name-calling practice was mostly manifested in the labelling of the Haraki Salafists and Jihadi Salafists with epithets derived and connected to certain disreputable Muslim groups and organizations. By using this tactic, the Yemeni Salafists challenged these two factions' values and activities and questioned their motivation for joining Salafism. This name-calling had very negative connotations for the other two Salafi factions.

Surūrists and Turāsists

A range of common derogatory names that the Yemeni Salafists levelled at 'the other' include the epithet "Surūriyyah" (Surūrism). The Yemeni Salafists created this term to refer to ideas associated with Muhammad al-Surūr, the prominent leader of Al-Muntada al-Islami, a reformed Salafi faction based in London, which had close contact with the Haraki Salafi faction in Indonesia. They dubbed the followers and sympathizers of Muhammad al-Surūr as "Surūrists" (*Surūriy*; plural: *Surūriyyun*). The term "Surūriyyah" connotes a polar reflection of Salafism. As Abu Hamzah said, the differences between Surūriyyah and Salafism do not lie in the different ways they both interpret religious texts, but rather in the issue of ideology and fundamental principles.²

This labelling was intended to discredit the Haraki Yemeni faction by connecting it to negative characteristics associated with al-Surūr and his faction. For the Yemeni Salafists, al-Surūr and his followers (Surūrists) including those who joined the Haraki Salafi faction were not fully committed to the Salafi way. For example, al-Surūr and the Surūrists were believed to have embraced the Salafi understanding of the divine attributes and human

²<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

predestination, but adopted the views of al Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood; a transnational Islamic movement which is based in Egypt and has spread worldwide) regarding *takfir*, condemning someone or ruler as *kafir* (disbeliever) if he did not implement Islamic laws.³

The Surūrists label was also associated with Khawarij (Kharijites). Within online Salafi othering, the Yemeni Salafists dubbed the Surūrists “the Khawarij of this era” or “neo-Khawarij”. They believed that both Surūrists and Khawarij share the view that it was permissible to rebel against a ruler considered to have breached Islamic laws and to declare a Muslim guilty of a capital sin to be a *kafir*. A Yemeni Salafi leader stressed:

It is clear to me that I must call them (the Surūrists) “the Khawarij of this era”. This is because they support *al-khurūj* (rebellion against rulers) as we understand from their words. In fact, they also share the same thoughts as the Khawarij with respect to declaring the major sinners as disbelievers.⁴

The online label of “Surūrists” was also targeted at other Haraki Salafi protagonists who established Al-Sofwah foundation in Jakarta and those who had contacts with it. The Yemeni Salafi faction believed that this foundation had a close relationship with two foreign charitable foundations, namely London-based Al-Muntada foundation led by Muhammad al-Surūr and Kuwait-based Jum’iyyah Ihya al-Turās with Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq as its prominent leader. Al-Sofwah allegedly received financial support from these two foreign charitable foundations and has been intellectually and ideologically influenced by these foundations’ leading personalities such as Salman al-‘Audah and Aidl al-Qarny, in addition to al-Surūr and Abd al-Khaliq. Umar Sewed, a leading Yemeni Salafi figure, explained:

What Syaikh Rabi said has now materialised. What Al-Muntada/Al-Sofwah has done in Indonesia is similar with what Al-Muntada of London did. This can be seen in the evidence I saw myself or heard in confidence that (1) they disseminate Al-Bayan magazine which is published by Al-Muntada London founded by Muhammad al-Surūr;

³www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=338, accessed 21 April 2010.

⁴<http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=233>, accessed 15 April 2010.

and (2) they disseminate Al-Muntada books written by Surūri figures such as Salman al-‘Audah, ‘Aidl al-Qarny, etc.⁵

Due to this financial and intellectual connection, the founder of Al-Sofwah was dubbed a “Surūrist” in this online intra-Salafi othering. Again Sewed remarked:

In regard to the founder of Al-Sofwa Foundation, Muhammad Khalaf, please listen to the testimony of Sheikh Abu Abdirrahman ibn Umar ibn Mar’i who knew him personally in Saudi Arabia... (In fact) our Salafi brothers in the city of al Qasim told us that he is one of those who have a close connection with Salman al-‘Audah. He is a Surūri in his *manhaj* because he has a close relationship with al-‘Audah and his followers.⁶

The connection between the Haraki Salafists and the Ihya al-Turās foundation was indicated in the financial aid received by the former to build the Salafi learning centres and mosques and to publish magazines and works by the Ihya al-Turās-connected Salafi scholars in Indonesia. This has created the Ihya al-Turās network in Indonesia that includes Yogyakarta-based Majelis At-Turas Al-Islamy foundation, with Abu Nida as its prominent leader, which runs Jamilurrahman *ma’had* (religious learning centre) and Bin Baaz Islamic Centre; Imam Bukhari *ma’had* in Solo, Central Java, led by Ahmad Fais and Kholid Samhudi; and Al Furqon *ma’had* which operates in Gresik, East Java, with Aunur Rafiq as its leading figure. This financial and intellectual connection has led the Yemeni Salafists to label these foundations and individuals who get involved in this network as “Turāsists”, that is, the followers or sympathizers of the Ihya al Turās charitable foundation.

Hizbists

Another common epithet used by the Yemeni Salafi faction in the name-calling tactic through its websites was “Hizbist” (*hizbiy*; plural: *hizbiyyun*), which means one who is inclined to *hizbiyyah*, associating oneself with a

⁵http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=251, accessed 15 April 2010.

⁶http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=251, accessed 15 April 2010.

group, political party or school of thought in understanding and practicing Islam. From the perspective of Salafi ideology, *hizbiyyah* is a reprehensible religious innovation (*bid'ah*; heresy) which every Muslim has to avoid. Once one fails to do so, he or she commits sin and should be called a *mubtadi'* (a reprehensible religious innovator; a heretic).

Applying the Hizbist label to other Salafi factions was intended to impugn the reputation of these factions in that Yemeni Salafists associate these factions with an impure understanding and misguided practice of Islam. For example, the Yemeni Salafists quoted a fatwa by a Middle Eastern Salafi scholar, Sheikh Yahya, who commented on Sholeh Suaidi, an Indonesian Haraki Salafi preacher:

He (Sholeh Suaidi) is a Hizbist, an evil fanatic. By God, it is enough [to identify him as a Hizbist] by his words. He is a Hizbist, who is burnt out and confused. It is compulsory to warn people of his propagation activities so they are aware of his dangerous ideas... By God, it is a disaster. So, it is compulsory to purify [Islam from *hizbiyyah*] and warn [Muslims of it].⁷

This name-calling was also applied to the Haraki Salafists who were associated with the Ihya al-Turas foundation, such as Abu Nida, Aunur Rafiq and Ahmas Faiz, to whom the Yemeni Salafists labelled “the defenders of *hizbiyyah*”. Abdul Mu'thi al-Maidani, a Yemeni Salafi preacher, pointed out: “In regard to Abu Nida, Aunur Rafiq, Ahmad Faiz and their followers, they have not changed from the beginning in defending their *hizbiyyah*”.⁸

Ikhwanists and Qutbists

The Yemeni Salafi othering on the web also included the label “Ikhwanists”. This was used to associate the Haraki Salafi faction with the supporters and followers of Egypt-based al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun movement. From the Yemeni Salafi perspective, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun represents movements and ideologies that transgress the Salaf way of Islamic understanding and

⁷http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=662, accessed 23 April 2010.

⁸www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=512, accessed 20 March 2010.

practice and, consequently, deviate from the 'pure Islam'. Hence, declaring them "Ikhwanists" was another attempt to impose negative characteristics on the Haraki Salafi faction.⁹

Another label, "Qutbists", was also used by the Yemeni Salafists to associate the Haraki Salafists with the ideologue of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966). For the Yemeni Salafists, the influence of Qutb's ideas (Qutbiyyah), rather than that of Salafi "*ulamā`*", was clearly seen in the ways the Ihya al-Turas adopted the al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun's ideas and practice of organization and politics. As Abu Karimah Jamal pointed out: "In addition, they (those of Ihya al Turas) are influenced by al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in terms of organizational issues, *hizbiyyah*, and democracy."¹⁰

In some cases, these three labels, Qutbiyyah, Hizbiyyah, and Sururiyyah, were levelled at the same time at certain followers of Haraki Salafism such as those who joined or were associated with the Wahdah Islamiyyah foundation, which was based in Makassar, South Sulawesi. The Yemeni Salafists excluded the proponents of the Wahdah Islamiyyah from the circle of the true followers of the Salaf way due to their deviation from the ways of people of the prophetic tradition (*Ahl al-Sunnah*). A *fatwa* was issued to declare that the organization has gone astray from the 'true path':

In regard to the organization or foundation named Wahdah Islamiyyah, I view that they belong to the people of Hizbiyyah, Qutbiyyah and Sururiyyah who are in contradiction with the ways of Ahl al Sunnah wal Jamaah (people of the prophetic tradition and community). They follow the ways of these misguided groups in regard to their ideas of the permissibility of staging demonstrations and general elections... and Sayyid Qutb's *tauhid hakimiyyah* (the oneness of God sovereignty).¹¹

⁹As seen in the Yemeni Salafists' name-calling of Abduh Zulfidar as an "ikhwanist" when the latter attacked Luqman Baabduh, a prominent Indonesia's Yemeni Salafi leader, <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=451>, accessed 3 April 2010.

¹⁰www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1132, accessed 20 April 2010.

¹¹<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/fatwa-kesesatan-jamaah-yayasan-ormas-wahdah-islamiyah.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

Kharijists

The Yemeni Salafi faction's online name-calling practice also targeted the Jihadi Salafi faction. The most common label was "Kharijists". Like the Haraki Salafists, the Yemeni Salafists particularly levelled this label at the Bali bombing perpetrators and other bombers in Indonesia. According to them, the Bali bombers were heavily influenced by the ideology of *takfir*, a belief that governments of Muslim countries that do not fully implement Islamic law and teachings are declared as disbelievers (*kafir*) against whom rebellion is a religious obligation according to the Kharijites. In his book *Aku Melawan Teroris* (I Fight Against Terrorists, 2004), Imam Samudra, one of the Bali bombing actors, even claimed that after the fall of Ottoman Islamic caliphate in 1924 the world has returned to the age of ignorance (*jahiliyyah*), the time before the prophethood of Muhammad, when people were not guided by God's law.

Rejecting Samudra's claim, Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain, a prominent Yemeni Salafi figure in South Sulawesi, stressed that Samudra was misguided by Khariji doctrines. He said:

We found that Imam Samudra held the Khariji doctrines. He said in his book: "...When the Ottoman Islamic caliphate collapsed, the world returned to the age of ignorance..." Look, this sentence indicated that the whole world, in general, returned to the age of ignorance... If so, it implies that there has not been Islam and Muslims in this world. Undoubtedly, this is a doctrine of *takfir* that has been promoted by a number of ideologues of underground movements through the slogans "the ignorance of the 20th century", "the age of ignorance", etc.¹²

In the perspective of the Yemeni Salafists, since the Bali bombing actors subscribed to the Khariji doctrines, they adopted the practice of the Kharijites in the early growth of Islam: that is, terrorism. Luqman Baabduh, another leading Yemeni Salafi leader, argued:

¹²Al Ustadz Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain, "Akar Kesesatan Pelaku Terorisme", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1520, accessed 18 April 2010.

Indeed, they (the Kharijites and their followers like the Bali bombing actors) always create chaos, disorder and destruction over the world. This is terrorism. Therefore, Kharijites are terrorists and terrorists are Kharijites; both are identical.¹³

Character Assassination

Another tactic of vilification of 'the other' used by the Salafi factions in their online othering was character assassination. This refers to a deliberate attempt to destroy the reputation, character, and credibility of a person, group, or institution (see Shiraev and Icks, 2014). This character assassination involved maligning, misrepresentation, and accusation of 'the other'.

The Haraki Salafists' Online Character Assassination

Men who Exceed the Limits

In response to the Yemeni Salafists' name-calling, the Haraki Salafists used the web to malign the Yemeni Salafists as "men who are fond of exceeding the limits" (*ghuluw*) in regard to their responses to other Salafi factions who have different views of an issue, a person or an institution. They viewed the Yemeni Salafists aggressively vilifying any Salafi leader, foundation or organization that the Yemeni Salafi faction believed to be Sururists. This excessive stance, the Haraki Salafists argued, resulted in fragmentation and enmity among the Salafi activists in Indonesia.¹⁴ They considered this Yemeni Salafists' attitude to be un-Salafi because Sheikh al-Albani, one of global Salafi authorities, allowed Salafists to socialise, study with, and take benefit from Sururists.

¹³Al Ustadz Luqman bin Muhammad Ba'abduh, "Mereka Adalah Teroris - Bantahan atas Teroris", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1016, accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁴"Nasehat Syeikh Rabi': Ahli Sunnah Berpecah?" <http://ustadzaris.com/naehat-syeikh-rabi-ahli-sunnah-berpecah>, accessed 2 June 2010.

Sheikh al-Albani allowed (the Salafists) in certain conditions to make friends with and benefit from the Sururists, such as studying religious lessons with them. If a religious teacher is only accused of being a Sururi, while he is in fact not, is it appropriate to totally ban people from studying with him? Please think about it carefully, my brothers! Look at how a *fatwa* of a knowledgeable person is different from that by who pretends to be a knowledgeable one. Indeed, we will find the primacy of the knowledgeable over the pretenders.¹⁵

The Haraki Salafists also regarded the Yemeni Salafists as engaging in 'extremism' for their easy condemnation of other Salafists who allegedly transgress the Salaf way as heretics (*ahl al-bid'ah*) or fanatics in a particular group or school of thought (*hizbiyyun*). The Haraki Salafists regarded this behaviour as contrary to the statement of Abd al-Aziz al-Rais, a main Salafi religious scholar in Saudi Arabia, that the act of excluding a Muslim from the people of the prophetic tradition (*ahl al-sunnah*) and declaring him or her as a heretic is not a simple issue as it requires complicated requirements. The Haraki Salafists even suggested that Yemeni Salafists declared people to be heretics and fanatics simply over a conflict among Salafists who run different foundations, studied with different teachers or read different Salafi magazines.¹⁶ Furthermore, they asserted that the Yemeni Salafists' exaggerated accusations, contradicted the view of Ibn al-Qayyim, a religious authority of the 14th century to whom contemporary Salafists often refer to, who permitted cooperation with polytheists, heretics, sinners, rebels, even disbelievers for the purpose of commanding good, forbidding wrong and observing God's order.¹⁷

Men who Misinterpret Religious Texts

Through their websites, the Haraki Salafists also vilified the Jihadi Salafi faction by characterising them as "men who had limited knowledge of the

¹⁵"Mempertanyakan "Ngaji dengan Sururi",

<http://ustadzaris.com/mempertanyakan-ngaji-dengan-sururi>, accessed 2 June 2010.

¹⁶"Bukan Salafi Karena Beda Guru Ngaji?!!",

<http://ustadzaris.com/bukan-salafi-karena-beda-guru-ngaji>, accessed 2 June 2010.

¹⁷"Tidak Lagi Salafi Karena Kerja Sama Dengan Hizbi?", <http://ustadzaris.com/tidak-lagi-salafi-karena-kerja-sama-dengan-hizbi>, accessed 2 June 2010.

method of understanding Islamic texts so that they misinterpreted them”. Like the Kharijites in the early Islam, the Jihadi Salafists interpreted Islamic texts based on their own personal desire, not on the Salaf method of understanding the Quran and Sunnah. Their understanding of jihad as warfare and violence targeted at non-Muslims, for instance, resulted from their method of interpretation that treats Quranic and Sunnahic texts on jihad as isolated verses, rather than as comprehensive and inter-connected ones. Consequently, their understanding of jihad was in conflict with fundamental teachings of Islam on respecting the lives of non-Muslims and humanity.¹⁸

Destroyers of the Face of Islam

As a result, the Haraki Salafists characterised the Jihadi Salafists as “the destroyers of the image of Islam and Muslims”. Their action, which was inspired by their misguided method of Qur’anic and Sunnahic interpretation in the form of violence and terror, brought damage to Islam, Muslims, and the world.

Indeed, they have brought more harm than good to Islam and Muslims. Their actions have created bad images of Islam before the Western people and others! What have they achieved? Have the disbelievers got closer to Islam or kept away from Islam? Muslims themselves kept away from this faction that has created terror. And Islam has nothing to do with it.¹⁹

The Haraki Salafists regarded the Jihadi Salafists as having caused Islam to become a scapegoat for any terror or radical action in Indonesia and

¹⁸“Kiat Mengatasi Terorisme di Tengah Kaum Muslimin”, http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80:kiat-mengatasi-terorisme-di-tengah-kaum-muslimin&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, accessed 28 June 2010; <http://www.wahdah.or.id/>, accessed 11 June 2010.

¹⁹“Bermula dari Pengkafiran, Berujung Pengeboman”, http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=98, accessed 28 June 2010; “16 Kesalahan Aksi Pengeboman”, http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81:16-kesalahan-aksi-pengeboman&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, accessed 28 June 2010.

worldwide due to their use of Islamic symbolism and attributes in their terrorist acts. Islam has been seen as identical with terrorism and has been accused of being a religion of violence. As a consequence, Islamic proselytization has been monitored and its activists have experienced difficulties in spreading 'the true messages of Islam'.²⁰

Outlawed Underground Activists

Lastly, the Haraki Salafists utilized their website to portray the Jihadi Salafists as misguided underground activists. The Salafi '*ulamā*' such as Muqbil al-Wadi'i permitted the activists of Islamic propagation to undertake underground activities only if they are under the following conditions: they live among the enemies of Islam; the ruling government suppresses their activities; they run their underground activities and organization according to the Quranic and Sunnahic teachings. However, the Jihadi Salafists run underground activities that do not meet the above requirements for they live in a peaceful country Indonesia whose government provides them with full freedom to promote Islam and proselytise.²¹

The Yemeni Salafists' Online Character Assassination

Men of No Principles and Ideology

In response to the Haraki Salafists, the Yemeni Salafists employed a range of common forms of online character assassination including maligning. They regarded the Haraki Salafists as "men who did not pay attention to the importance of method (*manhaj*) in understanding and practicing Islam". The Haraki Salafists were depicted as uncommitted men who adopted the ideology of Salafism in some issues, but followed other ideologies such that of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in other cases. As Abu Hamzah Yusuf comments on those labelled as "Surūrists":

²⁰<http://www.wahdah.or.id/>, accessed 11 June 2010.

²¹"Gerakah Bawah Tanah", <http://ustadzaris.com/gerakah-bawah-tanah>, accessed 2 June 2010.

Sururiyyah does not pay attention to the importance of Salaf *manhaj* as an ideology. For the supporters of Sururiyyah, it (Salafi *manhaj* as an ideology) is not important. It is clear that this view is close to that of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. Hence, preachers or anyone who do not pay, or lack attention to this issue are affiliated with Sururi thoughts.²²

Hence, the Yemeni Salafists maligned the Haraki Salafists as men of inconsistent ideology or “men of mixed methods” (*manhaj sana-sini*), and “men with no principles” regarded as a misguided faction. The Yemeni Salafists quoted a fatwa by a Middle Eastern Salafi religious authority on the Ihya al-Turās foundation:

Similarly, the Ihya al-Turās adopted mixed principles; some of them follow the *manhaj* of Jamaah Tabligh, while others join Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, Surūrists, Salman Audah, and spread their recorded lectures...Ihya al-Turās is an organization with inconsistencies, sometimes it is against al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Sayyid Qutb, and Muhammad ibn Surur, [but] it praises Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, Safar Hawali and those who are against the Salaf and the Salafi *dakwah*.²³

The Yemeni Salafists characterized some leading figures of the Haraki faction as being ignorant of ‘true religious ideology’. Abdul Hakim Abdat, for example, was blatantly maligned as a person who was ignorant of *manhaj* when he was said to be unable to distinguish the way of Salaf from that of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun and other ‘misguiding’ ideologies.²⁴

Therefore, for the Yemeni Salafists, the difference between themselves and the Haraki faction was ideological in nature. They regarded the Haraki Salafists as ‘the other’ who were ideologically different from themselves. They believed that their online othering practice was not driven by personal or material interests, but rather by ideological ones. The Yemeni Salafists characterized their vilification and criticism of the Haraki Salafi faction and

²²<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

²³www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=339, accessed 21 April 2010.

²⁴<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

'misguided' others as an ideological conflict. Abu Hamzah Yusuf, for example, asserted that his contention with Abu Qotadah of the Ihya al-Turās network was an ideological dispute, not a personal or wealth-related issue.²⁵

Men with No Respect for 'Ulamā`

The online character assassination conducted by the Yemeni Salafists also included characterising the Haraki Salafi faction as having no respect toward the Salafi 'ulamā` and teachers. For example, the leader of the Ihya al-Turās foundation, `Abd al-Rahmān `Abd al-Khāliq, was portrayed on the Yemeni Salafists' websites as having insulted his former Salafi teachers. This was related to `Abd al-Khāliq's criticism of a *fatwa* issued by the Saudi Salafi 'ulamā` in which they supported the kingdom's policy of inviting the US troops to combat Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1991.²⁶

The same applies when the Yemeni Salafists depicted on their websites the Salafi preachers of the Haraki-inclined Ihya al-Turās network in Indonesia. They claimed that Abdul Hakim Abdat and Abu Qotadah of Jakarta-based Al- Sofwah foundation and Abu Nida of Majelis al-Turas al-Islami foundation have degraded the respected Salafi 'ulamā` when they ignored a *fatwa* on the Ihya al- Turas. Abu Hamzah Yusuf, a Bandung-based Salafi leader, said:

When we told them that our 'ulamā` have warned them of the Ihya al-Turas and asked them not to cooperate with them. They replied: "Sheikh Muqbil or Sheikh Rabi is not the only 'ulamā` we have". This implies that they defame and discredit these 'ulamā` ...Is this the Salafi way? Certainly, it is not. We cannot accept their statements.²⁷

Men whose Hearts and Ears Have Died

²⁵<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

²⁶ www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1115, accessed 25 April 2010.

²⁷<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists claimed that individuals who are affiliated with the Ihya al-Turās foundation have been blinded by their adherence to *hizbiyyah* so that they refused to accept truth. Abu Nida, a Salafi leader of the Ihya al-Turās foundation in Yogyakarta, for example, was characterised as a man whose ears and heart had died so there was no use giving him advice and warning of the danger of reprehensible religious innovation. He was also accused of expelling from his circle some ‘true Salafists’ who attempted to give him advice and warnings. Abdurrahman Wonosari announced: “Indeed, his heart and ears have been locked so that he rejected to return to truth and take benefit from the warnings [we gave]”.²⁸

Such online character assassination was not only levelled at individuals, but also at organizations or individuals who allegedly had association with Hizbi-Sururi faction. The Wahdah Islamiyah, for instance, was maligned as an organization that refused to accept truth so that the Yemeni Salafists felt it was useless to maintain dialogue with its supporters. Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain argues:

Who does not want to do dialogue? Who does not want to debate? Clear? Debate is fine and permissible. But, we view there is no use to have a debate with them (Wahdah Islamiyyah)...The problem is that they do not want to accept truth, so there is no benefit from sitting together with them. God willing, we are open to dialogue if we can take benefit from it.²⁹

According to the Yemeni Salafists, the Wahdah Islamiyyah supporters’ refusal of truth and their hatred of the Yemeni Salafi fellows who had given them advice were driven by their unconditional love for this organization, which was, in the Yemeni Salafists’ eyes, the religiously forbidden innovation of *hizbiyyah*. Abu Abdillah Sofyan said: “Maybe their love for organization named Wahdah Islamiyyah is so deep that it is hard for them to accept

²⁸www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=510, accessed 22 April 2010.

²⁹<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/kenapa-ustadz-salafy-tidak-mau-dialog-dengan-wahdah-islamiyah.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

criticism. This has led them to overlook and hate those who attempt to give them advice”.³⁰

Trouble Makers

Aware of the division within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, the Yemeni Salafists claimed that this internal rift resulted from financial support provided by the Sururiyah-connected Middle East charitable foundations to Indonesian Salafists. Therefore, on their websites, the Yemeni Salafists depicted the Haraki Salafists as troublemakers, who caused this rift among Indonesian Salafists. They believed that the financial support provided by the Ihya al-Turās network had fragmented the Salafi movement. In this sense, they viewed the Ihya al-Turās network’s charitable works as much more dangerous than its ideas in that the network’s financial support jeopardised the sustainability of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Abdurrahman Wonosari said:

The Ihya al-Turās and Abd al Rahman Abd al-Khaliq have succeeded to make rifts and divisions among Salafists in Indonesia. Abd al-Khaliq was scolded by the ‘*ulamā*’ and was called as a *mubtadi*’ (a heretic). Sheikh Muqbil ibn Hadi asserted that, in fact, Abd al-Khaliq and his Ihya al-Turās do not divide the Salafists with their ideas, but rather with their wealth.³¹

Leaving True Salafism for Material Gains

The Yemeni Salafists accused the other ‘misguided’ Salafi factions of having left the true Salafi way for material gains, particularly financial support from the Middle East charitable foundations like the Ihya al-Turas foundation. Abu Nida and his allies were regarded as having refused to join the ‘true Salafists’ because they were influenced by the financial support received from the Ihya al-Turās.³²

³⁰<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/jawaban-ilmiah-terhadap-silsilah-pembelaan-wahdah-islamiah-bag-1.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

³¹www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=510, accessed 25 April 2010.

³²www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=510, accessed 25 April 2010.

This accusation was also levelled at the Wahdah Islamiyah foundation. Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists accused the Wahdah activists of pretending to be Salafists in order to get financial aid from the Middle Eastern charitable foundations. They wrote:

They claimed they are Salafists, but I need to explain that they did so in order to get money [from the Middle East donors]. I really know their actual deeds. They invited people from overseas, such as Saudi Arabia, and said: “We are Salafists. Teach us *tauhid*”. However, their religious teachers vilified and discredited the Saudi government as I heard from their recorded tapes. If there was money, they spoke nicely, but if there was no money, they discredited and defamed [the Saudi government].³³

Such online maligning that the Haraki Salafi faction was deviating because of financial inducements was also levelled at some of its leading preachers like Yazid Jawwaz of the Indonesian Council of Islamic Propagation (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia [DDII]),³⁴ Abu Nida of Majelis Ihya al-Turas Yogyakarta,³⁵ and Abdurrahman Tamimi of Surabaya-based Al-Irsyad organization.³⁶

Hypocrites and Liars

The Yemeni Salafi faction also accused other Salafi factions of being hypocrites and liars. The Yemeni Salafists regarded the Wahdah Islamiyyah organization, for example, as pretenders, those who claimed to be Salafists “only on their lips”, not in their hearts and their practice. Though it shared the Salafi *'aqidah* (creed) with the Yemeni Salafists, the Wahdah Islamiyyah has been accused of breaking the principles of the Salafi ideology by getting

³³<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/katanya-salafy-melarang-demonstrasi-lalu-kenapa-wahdah-salafy-melakukannya.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

³⁴<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010

³⁵ www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=512, accessed 20 April 2010.

³⁶ www.salafy.or.id/salafy/php?menu=detil&id_artikel=824, accessed 20 April 2010.

involved in 'un-Salaf politics,' such as vilifying the ruling government, staging demonstrations and openly criticising the government.³⁷

Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists stressed that the proponents of Haraki Salafism like the Al-Sofwah foundation have fooled the Muslim *ummah* by claiming to be Salafists and preachers of Salafism. The Yemeni Salafists claimed they had evidence of Al-Sofwah's lies and hypocrisy including their relationship with non-Salafi radical factions such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Al-Mukmin network. Abu Hamzah Yusuf testified that the Al Sofwah foundation supported Ba'asyir's *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) with financial aid and book donations. He stated:

I still remember, when I was in Ngruki, Al Sofwah gave [Al Mukmin *pesantren*] financial aid for building a library and its book collection. We know what the Ngruki *manhaj* is. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir received support from Al Sofwah. This is undisputable evidence. It is ironic in that they call people to Salafism, [as they established a relationship with non-Salafists like Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and his religious school]. They actually have fooled the *ummah*.³⁸

Moreover, in response to the criticism of their strict and rigid understanding and practice of Salafism, the Yemeni Salafists accused their critics of manipulating the Salaf '*ulamā*'s works for their own interests. On their websites, they claimed that Abduh Zulfidar of Pustaka Al-Kautsar publishing house, for instance, had lied about *Rifqan Ahl al-Sunnah bi Ahl al-Sunnah*, a book by Sheikh 'Abd al-Muhsin, a prominent Salafi authority in the Middle East, to which Salafists often make reference. Zulfidar has been said to have misread the book when he said that Sheikh 'Abd al-Muhsin had admonished the Yemeni Salafists in regard to their strict and rigid ways of Islamic propagation. Refuting this, the Yemeni Salafists asserted that Zulfidar attempted to attack and divide the Salafi movement.³⁹

³⁷ <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/renungan-agar-tidak-berpikir-picik-jawaban-untuk-al-akh-ihsan-zainuddin.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

³⁸ <http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id/2010/02/11/da%E2%80%99wah-hizbiyyah-sururiyyah/>, accessed 26 April 2010.

³⁹ <http://www.merekaadalahteroris.com/mat/?p=26#more-26>, accessed 22 May 2010.

Salafi Imposters

For the Yemeni Salafists, the Haraki Salafi faction has tarnished the purity of the Salaf way and this was enough to exclude them from the circle of ‘true followers of Salafi ideology’. Therefore, the Yemeni Salafi websites were highly judgemental of the Haraki Salafists. For example, the Yemeni Salafists declared that the proponents of the Ihya al-Turas foundation were “the Salafi imposters”. They quoted Abu ‘Abd Allah Khālīd al-Dhahawī, one of the Salafi authorities from Kuwait, who used to give religious lectures in Indonesia:

The Ihya al-Turās transgressed the straight path of *Ahl al-Sunnah* because (1) in regard to the loyalty to the rulers, they did the forbidden *baiat* [oath of allegiance]; (2) they invited Sururists-Hizbists to give lectures; (3) they did not help Salafists, but rather divided them through financial aids and material gains, and did not respect the ‘*ulamā*’ of *Ahl al-Sunnah*.⁴⁰

The same verdict was also given to Wahdah Islamiyyah, another Haraki-inspired organization. By citing a fatwa by Shaikh Rābi’ of Yemen, the Yemeni Salafists declared that Zaitun Rusmin, the leader of Wahdah Islamiyyah organization, was misguided and, therefore, was excluded from the People of the Prophetic Tradition (*Ahl al-Sunnah*) and declared him to be “non-Salafist” because they believed he had committed serious violations of the Salafi way when he publicly criticized the ruling government and persuaded people to stage open protests.⁴¹

As it was no longer considered to belong to the People of the Prophetic Tradition, the Wahdah Islamiyyah organization was condemned as heretical, whose followers belong to the doomed groups that will be punished by God in Hell. The Yemeni Salafists asserted that Muslims should be warned of the danger this organization posed for the Islamic creed. To

⁴⁰ www.darussalaf.or.id, accessed 15 April 2010.

⁴¹ <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/fatwa-kesesatan-jama%E2%80%99ah-yayasan-ormas-wahdah-islamiah-bag-3.html>, accessed 28 April 2010; <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/katanya-salafy-melarang-demonstrasi-lalu-kenapa-wahdah-salafy-melakukannya.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

support this, Abu Abdillah Sofyan referred to a Middle Eastern Salafi authority, Salih al-Fauzan:

Shaikh Salih al-Fauzan was asked: “Can the existing Muslim groups be included in the doomed 72 groups [which were mentioned in a Prophet Muhammad’s saying]?” He answered: “Yes. Every Muslim who is in breach with Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamaah either with respect to Islamic mission, or creed or faith, then he will belong to one of the doomed 72 groups, be punished by God, and deserve to be discredited in accordance with his deviations... There have been groups that deviate from the Quran and the Sunnah. Those who join these groups are considered heretics (*mubtadi*)’.⁴²

Enemies of the Salafi *da’wah*

Furthermore, the Yemeni Salafists declared that those who had breached the Salafi way or had been sympathetic towards groups or factions who were against true Salafism like al-Surūr and his allies were declared enemies of the Salafi *da’wah*. For this reason, Al-Sofwah foundation was considered as one of the main enemies of the Salaf *da’wah* in Indonesia. As Umar as Sewed said:

I still remember what Shaikh Rābi’ told me, when I asked him about the Al-Muntada foundation (which later changed to Al-Sofwah): “If the foundation (Al-Sofwah) is similar to the Al-Muntada that is located in London, then it will be the main enemy of the Salafi mission in Indonesia” he said.⁴³

Unsurprisingly, the strict and literal adherence to the Salafi way has led the Yemeni Salafists to vilify anyone who, they believed, deviates from the Salaf way, including the early flag bearers of Salafism who had contributed to the early development and spread of Salafism in Indonesia. They included Jafar Umar Thalib with whom most current Salafi leaders studied in the late of 1980s and early 1990s. The Yemeni Salafists believed that he had breached ‘the true path of Salafism’ when they found that he formed relationships with politicians, military officers and those considered as “Ikhwanists”, “Surūrists”

⁴² <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/jawaban-ilmiah-terhadap-silsilah-pembelaan-wahdah-islamiyah-bag-1.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

⁴³ http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=251, accessed 25 April 2010.

or heretics. In their view, Jafar Thalib had left Salafism and refused to take advice from the Salafi authorities from whom they sought a fatwa on Jafar's case.⁴⁴ Qomar ZA, a Salafi preacher, depicted Jafar's deviation from the Salaf way:

He (Jafar Thalib) has changed a lot. Now, he visits not only the places and events he condemned before, but also new places and events such as Arifin Ilham's Majlis Zikir, Refleksi Satu Hati of priests and monks, the inauguration of Tawwabın *pesantren* initiated by Habib Riziq Shihab, Abu Bakar Baasyir's Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia, and Isra Mi'raj (the Prophet Muhammad's ascent to Heaven) commemoration.⁴⁵

Narrow-Minded and Ignorant People

In addition, the Yemeni Salafists utilized their websites to denigrate violent Jihadi Salafists. The Jihadi Salafists were characterised as lacking comprehensive religious knowledge so that their actions were not based on knowledge, but on emotion and misinformed understandings. They were misguided by the ideology and doctrines of Kharijites, which have flourished through translation among Islamic activists in Indonesia. Luqman Baabduh wrote:

All this resulted from the misguiding ideology of Kharijites, which has been revived by ideologues such Hasan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, al-Maududi, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, and others, promoted by Dr. Safar al-Hawali, Salman al-Audah, Usamah bin Laden, Aiman al-Zawahiri, and others, and then translated into Indonesian and spread in this country. Indeed, this misguiding ideology has been developing among Islamic activists whose activities and religious observance are only based on enthusiasms and emotion, without true knowledge gained from the Quran and Sunnah as understood and implemented by the prophet Muhammad.⁴⁶

⁴⁴www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=510, accessed 25 April 2010.

⁴⁵http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=664, accessed 25 April 2010.

⁴⁶Al Ustadz Luqman bin Muhammad Ba'abduh, "Mereka Adalah Teroris - Bantahan atas Teroris", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1016, accessed 20 April 2010.

The Yemeni Salafists regarded those involved in Bali bombings as narrow-minded young Muslims who were fooled by deceiving organizations, irresponsible writings and misguiding *fatwa*, on the basis of which they spread terror and destruction in the world in the name of jihad.⁴⁷ The Yemeni Salafists vilified Imam Samudra, one of the infamous trio Bali bombing perpetrators, as being ignorant of Islamic teachings on jihad and martyrdom. They believed Samudra's statements and actions in regard to Bali bombings as written in his book *Aku Melawan Teroris* (2004) indicated his ignorance, misunderstanding, and falsehoods about Islam.⁴⁸

Men who Dishonour 'Ulamā'

Furthermore, the Yemeni Salafist websites characterized the Jihadi Salafi faction as dishonouring 'ulamā'. This was a Khariji character, which led to their error in understanding and practicing Islam in that they believed that they were able to interpret and implement Islamic religious texts without reference and consultation to religious scholars. Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain stressed that Imam Samudra held this Khariji character:

One of the characteristics of Kharijites, which has become a source of misguidance experienced by a number of Muslim groups...is the dishonouring of religious scholars and claiming that they are better than religious scholars. Other misguided groups also share this character. They believe that they have sufficient ability to draw conclusions about religious issues from religious texts without paying attention to religious scholars before them. Indeed, it is a disaster falling on Imam Samudra when he adopted this method and character as seen in his book.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Al Ustadz Abu Hamzah Al-Atsary, "Menyikapi Bom Bali 2 - Terorisme itu Sesat", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1010, accessed 20 April 2010.

⁴⁸Al Ustadz Luqman bin Muhammad Ba'abduh, "Mereka Adalah Teroris - Bantahan atas Teroris", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1016, accessed 20 April 2010; Al Ustadz Abu Hamzah Yusuf, "Membongkar pemikiran sang begawan teroris (2)", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=879, accessed 20 April 2010; Al Ustadz Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain, "Adakah Bom Syahid Dalam Islam?", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=426>, accessed 3 April 2010.

⁴⁹Al Ustadz Abu Muhammad Dzulqarnain, "Akar Kesesatan Pelaku Terorisme", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1520, accessed 18 April 2010.

Destroyers of the Images of Islam, Muslims and Salafists

Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists also characterized the Jihadi Salafists as the destroyers of the image of Islam before global non-Muslim communities. They maintained that Muslim terrorists' attacks upon USA on 9 September 2001 in the name of *jihad* had devastating implications for Islam. These acts resulted in Islam being accused of being a religion of terror and violence. Muslims living in Western countries were also affected in that they had to face the enmity and hatred these terrorist acts triggered.⁵⁰ They said:

The attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon was a really shocking tragedy that caused disbelievers in the West and other similar groups to give Islam an epithet of "religion of terror" and "blood-thirsty religion"! This is an evil accusation. Indeed, it is inappropriate to relate Islam with terrorism because both are contradictory to each other.⁵¹

Due to the destructive implication of their terror, the bombers and ideologues were regarded as criminals disguised as Muslims. The Yemeni Salafists quoted Muqbil al-Wadii who commented on Osama bin Laden: "I free myself before God from bin Laden's error and misguidance. He is a criminal and disaster to the Muslim global community. What he did was a crime".⁵²

The Yemeni Salafists particularly depicted the Violent Jihadists as the destroyers of Salafism. Because the terrorists wear Salafi-style garb, grow beards, have their wives wear *cadar* (face-veil; Arabic: *niqāb*), and claim to be Salafists, their behaviour has led non-Muslims and non-Salafi Muslims to equate terrorism with Salafism. For the Yemeni Salafists, the Bali bombers

⁵⁰"Sikap Ulamā Besar Yaman Asy-Syaikh Muqbil Bin Hadi Al-Wadi'i rahimahullah Terhadap Usamah bin Laden (Pimpinan Al-Qaeda, Gerakan Terorisme - Khawarij International)", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1591>, accessed 6 April 2010.

⁵¹"Ketika Islam Dikambinghitamkan", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=904>, accessed 2 April 2010.

⁵²"Syaikh Muqbil rahimahullah menentang Usamah bin Ladin cs," http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1531, accessed 18 April 2010.

have tarnished the purity of Salafi ideology and way of life through their Salafi-like outer appearance and claim to be the followers of Salafi ideology.

Muslims have to keep an outer appearance like that (Salafi dress style and appearance). However, the terrorists have tainted this great characteristic of Muslims as they also wear this Salafi outer appearance. This has caused Muslims themselves to be unwilling to have this Islamic outer appearance because they believe that it is the terrorists' outer appearance. Indeed, the Khariji terrorists have tarnished every aspect of Islam.⁵³

Heretics

The Yemeni Salafists used their websites to articulate their verdict upon the Jihadi Salafists. Having found that the Jihadi Salafists' beliefs and actions deviated from the Salafi way in spite of their claim to be Salafists, the Yemeni Salafists declared that the Jihadists were not Salafists, but heretics disguised as Salafists. Imam Samudra, for instance, was not a Salafist though he claimed to be a follower of the Salaf way and the Salafi *'ulamā'* as he wrote in his book.

In his book *Aku Melawan Teroris*, Imam Samudra claimed to be a follower of the Righteous Predecessors' way and all his actions were supported by the Salafi *'ulamā'*. He mentioned a number of religious authorities believed as the Salafi *'ulamā'* such as Salman al-Audah, Dr. Safar al-Hawali, Dr. Aiman al-Zawahiri, Sulaiman Abu Ghait, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, Usamah bin Laden, and Maulani Mullah Umar. He called them "fighter-*'ulamā'*" (*'ulamā'-mujahid*). Actually, those figures Samudra mentioned above do not follow the Salafi way. Their life histories show that they do not live the Salafi way... They have nothing to do with the *'ulamā'* of ahl al-sunnah. People know that they are adherents of the ideologies of Qutbism (Qutbiyyah), Sururism (Sururiyyah), and Kharijism (Kharijiyyah). Shaikh Rabi', Shaikh al-Albani and Shaikh Muqbil have witnessed that the figures mentioned are not Salafi *'ulamā'*. Shaikh Muqbil commented on Usama bin Laden: "I disassociate from bin Laden. He is evil and a disaster for Muslim communities".⁵⁴

⁵³"Menyikapi Cap Teroris Atas Salafy", <http://mimbarsunnah.org/menyikapi-cap-teroris-atas-salafy>, accessed 1 May 2010.

⁵⁴Al Ustadz Abu Hamzah Yusuf, "Membongkar pemikiran sang begawan teroris (I)",

Terrorists, Not *Mujahid*

Yemeni Salafist websites announced that, despite their claim, those involved in Bali bombings were not *mujahid* (holy warriors), but rather terrorists as their actions did not meet Islamic requirements of holy war while, after the execution of the Bali bomber trio (Imam Samudra, Mukhlas and Amrozi) in 2008, their followers declared they were *shuhadā`* (martyrs). The Yemeni Salafists quoted a *fatwa* by Shaikh 'Ubaid al-Jabiriy, a Salafi authority in Medinah, Saudi Arabia:

Nobody declares that they were *shuhadā`* (martyrs) except two kinds of people: First, the ignorant people who do not have an understanding of Sunnah to distinguish between guidance and misguidance, between truth and evil, between prophetic tradition and heresy; and second, the followers of evil desire and the misguided people who deviate from the prophetic tradition. They conducted demonstration and condemn the ruling government, but praised the misguided Kharijites.⁵⁵

In regard to the perpetrators of Jakarta JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotel bombings in 2003, the Yemeni Salafists also rendered the same verdict. Qomar ZA said:

Is it true that they were welcomed by *bidadari* (fairies in Paradise) after their bodies exploded in pieces in those suicide bombings? Not at all! How can you say they were martyrs when they conducted a capital sin of suicide? We cannot judge them before Allah judges them. We are only able to judge them based on their physical appearance. We are

http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=878, accessed 20 April 2010;

“‘Aku Melawan Teroris” Sebuah Kedustaan atas Nama ‘Ulamā` Ahlussunnah”,

http://www.asyariah.com/print.php?id_online=246, accessed 16 April 2010.

⁵⁵“Amrozi cs, Mati Syahidkah?”,

http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1371, accessed 18 April 2010;

<http://darussunnah.or.id/materi-khusus/amrozi-cs-mati-syahidkah/>, accessed 17 April

2010; <http://mimbarsunnah.org/amrozi-cs-mati-syahidkah>, accessed 1 May 2010.

forbidden to ensure that someone is a martyr with all consequences he or she deserves.⁵⁶

Death Sentence

Then, the Yemeni Salafists announced a final verdict. Since the bombers were terrorists guilty of major crimes, killings and massive destruction, they deserve the death sentence. To support this, they quoted a *fatwa* by the Saudi Arabia Assembly of Senior 'Ulamā' that consists of recognized Salafi authorities:

...Whosoever is proven according to Islamic laws to have conducted terror and destruction on the earth which resulted in security problems and the loss of lives and personal and public property such as mosques, schools, hospitals, factories... he or she is sentenced to death based on Quranic verses...⁵⁷

Jihadi Salafists' Online Character Assassination

Anti-Jihad

In response to the other Salafi factions' strong criticism, the Jihadi Salafists did not directly vilify them, but rather discredited certain Salafists factions in the Middle East who have ideological connection with such factions in Indonesia. For example, they characterized the Salafists who follow Shaikh Rābi' al-Madkhali of Saudi Arabia, or "Madkhali Salafists" as they called them, as an anti-jihadists due to their strong criticism of jihadists such as Al-Qaeda, Jabha Nusra in Syria and Daulah Islamiyyah in Syria and Iraq and their support for the Saudi government's policy of cooperation with the US in combating these violent Jihadist factions. Rābi' al-Madkhali is one of the

⁵⁶Al Ustadz Qomar ZA, "Menyikapi Aksi-aksi Teroris Khawarij", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1511, accessed 18 April 2010; <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=346>, accessed 25 April 2010; "Jangan Gampang Memvonis Mati Syahid!", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1365, accessed 18 April 2010; "Jangan Gampang Memvonis Mati Syahid!", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1320>, accessed 2 April 2010.
⁵⁷"Hukuman Bagi Pelaku Terorisme dalam Syari'at Islam", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=738>, accessed 6 April 2010.

Middle Eastern Salafi authorities to whom the Yemeni Salafi faction in Indonesia refers and asks for guidance. By discrediting the “Madkhali Salafists” in Saudi Arabia as anti-jihadists, the Jihadi Salafi faction in Indonesia aimed to similarly discredit those Yemeni Salafists in Indonesia whom they also labelled “Madkhali Salafists”.⁵⁸

Misinterpreting the Doctrine of *Takfīr*

The Jihadi Salafists also used their websites to characterize their opponents as ignorant of the doctrine of *takfīr*. They did not deny this doctrine, but argued that their opponents have misunderstood it. In doing so, they retold an interrogation story of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a prominent ideologue among the Jihadists, by an officer of Jordan General Intelligence Directorate who asked him about *takfīr*. Quoting al-Maqdisi, they claimed that *takfīr* was not an act of declaring a Muslim as a disbeliever, but rather declaring those who cause Muslims to be disbelievers as disbelievers and making every effort to prevent Muslims from being disbelievers. They asserted that by enacting a man-made constitution and law the government of a Muslim country forces its people to be disbelievers. It is at this point the Jihadi Salafists believed that they had to observe a religious obligation of *takfīr*, namely making every effort to prevent Muslims from falling into disbelief the ruler created.⁵⁹

Fake Salafists

Moreover, having characterized the “Madkhali Salafists” or Yemeni Salafists in Indonesia as an anti-jihadi faction due to their full support for the ruling government of Saudi Arabia, the Jihadi Salafists decreed that such people were an anti-Salafi faction. They claimed that Yemeni Salafists appeared to be Salafists when they attacked heretics and Shiites, but they were actually more dangerous to the “true Salafists” than Shiites, Jews and Christians.

⁵⁸“Jangan Terkesan Salafi Pro Saudi”, <http://almuhajirun.net/jangan-terkesan-salafi-pro-saudi/#more-3495>, accessed 26 August 2013.

⁵⁹“Dialog antara Pembela Tauhid & Anshar Toghut, Siapakah Takfiri?”, <http://www.voa-islam.com/read/aqidah/2014/01/01/28442/dialog-antara-pembela-tauhid-anshar-toghut-siapakah-takfiri/#sthash.ppnFLdub.dpbs>, accessed 23 July 2014.

They are similar to Salafists in terms of their anti-heresy and anti-Shiites stance. As you see, Madkhali Salafists fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan and were pro Khattab in Chechnya, but they turned to be anti-jihadists facing US troops in Iraq and Saudi Arabia because their master ordered them to do so. Then, they turned to be anti-Salafists and anti-Al Qaeda...Beware of these people and refrain from being impressed by them because they are more dangerous to the true Salafists than Shiites, Jews and Christians.⁶⁰

Exaltation of 'Us'

In addition to the above explained vilification (*jarh*), the Salafi factions employed the strategy of exaltation (*ta'dīl*) in their online othering practice. Through this strategy, a Salafi faction attempted to create the positive attributes and characteristics of itself.

Nevertheless, it appeared that the well-resourced Haraki Salafists were not engaged in the online practice of self-exaltation following their vilification and discreditation of 'the other'. They were much more interested in utilizing their websites as instrumental resources for spreading information about their foundations and their activities. This reluctance was probably related to their confidence in having good access to resources so that they did not consider the internet to be particularly important as a tool to gain new resources (as will be explained later). The same was true for the Jihadi Salafists. However, their lack of enthusiasm in using the web for exalting themselves was in all likelihood overwhelmed by their strong emphasis on campaigning for jihadism as seen in their mobilization of websites for posting jihadi-related articles and news.

By contrast, the less well-resourced Yemeni Salafi faction used their websites to portray themselves as the vanguard of the purity of Islam, the true adherents of the Salaf way, and men of pure heart. It claimed to be the true followers of the Salafi '*ulamā*', who are mostly from Yemen and Saudi

⁶⁰"Jangan Terkesan Salafi Pro Saudi", <http://almuhajirun.net/jangan-terkesan-salafi-pro-saudi/#more-3495>, accessed 26 August 2013.

Arabia such as Shaikh Rābi' al-Madkhali and Sheikh Abd al-Aziz bin Baz, and regarded them as the most credible and authoritative *'ulamā'* within contemporary Salafism to whom the Muslim *ummah* must refer for guidance.

The Yemeni Salafists' Online Self-Exaltation

Most Knowledgeable Faction about Islam

The Yemeni Salafists used their websites in an attempt to demonstrate that they were more knowledgeable about Islamic teachings and doctrines than other Salafi factions. They believed that they were guided by 'true religious knowledge' (*'ilm*) in understanding and practising Islam, and that this knowledge keeps them on the path of 'true Islam'. It was this 'true knowledge', they believed, that distinguished them from misguided Salafists like the Ihya al-Turas community of Haraki Salafi faction. The Yemeni Salafists claimed that their understanding and observance of Islam was based on 'true knowledge', while the people of Ihya al-Turas were ignorant of such true teachings.⁶¹

Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafists also claimed that they had a profound knowledge of Islamic law and Arabic. They believed this enabled them to distinguish good from evil and helped them identify which behaviour was acceptable and which breached the Salafi way, a judgement that the misguided other was incapable of making. A Yemeni Salafi leader asserted: "Those who have thorough knowledge of Islamic law and Arabic are able to distinguish acceptable things from unacceptable ones and the beneficial ones from those of no value".⁶²

Men of Pure Heart

In addition, the Yemeni Salafists depicted themselves as men of pure heart on their websites. They argued that they were not motivated by worldly interests and financial gains in their attempts to discredit the Haraki Salafi

⁶¹www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=510, accessed 21 April 2010.

⁶²http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1113, accessed 20 April 2010.

faction and others who they considered had breached the 'true Salafi way'. The Yemeni Salafists stressed: "We do not want your mosque. We do not want your money. Allah sustains us so we do not need such things. And we do not want your aid".⁶³

Rather, the Yemeni Salafists claimed that their act of rebuking those who violate the Salaf way was driven by their love for fellow Salafists, their pure intentions, their desire for a united Salafi movement, and to serve God. In their perspective, vilification was permitted for the purpose of correcting those vilified and reminding them of their errors and deviation from what they believed to be the true path of understanding and implementing Islam. The Yemeni Salafists argued:

Look at the people of the prophetic tradition! They do not arbitrarily say that this institution is *hizbi* or someone is *hizbi* because the issue of vilification and exaltation (*al-jarh wa al-ta'dil*) should not be motivated by personal desires, but by the intention of providing advice. Religion is advice. With our love for our brothers, we expect them to be united. Unfortunately, this attempt is regarded as spreading the seeds of enmity. The issue of *al-jarh wa al-ta'dil* is misunderstood as the forbidden act of revealing one's disgrace (*ghibah*).⁶⁴

To give legitimacy to their online othering practice, the Yemeni Salafists referred to Salafi religious authorities in the Middle East. These Salafi '*ulamā*' included Abd al-Azīz ibn Bāz (d. 1999), Muhammad al-Utsaimīn (d. 2001), Nāshir al-Din al-Albani (d.1999), Muqbil al-Wadī'i (d. 2001), Rabi' al-Madkhali (b. 1931), and Salih al-Fauzan (b. 1933). The Yemeni Salafists not only used the tactic of quoting their *fatwa*, but also asking them for *fatwa* on issues confronting the Indonesian Salafists.

For example, to support his criticism of Indonesia's Haraki-inspired Ihya al-Turas network for allegedly breaching the Salafi way, Abu Karimah

⁶³ www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=263, accessed 20 April 2012.

⁶⁴ www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=arsip&cat_id=2&start=150, accessed 12 February 2004.

Askari, a Yemeni Salafi leader, referred to a *fatwa* by Sheikh Muhammad al Madkhali on Kuwaiti-based Ihya al-Turās foundation who declared that:

I swear by God that the Ihya al Turās was not established on the basis of the *manhaj al-salaf*. By God, it was based on the Ikhwan al-Muslimun's *manhaj*. Its members are hypocrites. It is a [religiously forbidden] *hizbi* organization. They conduct [a religiously forbidden] *bai'at* (oath of allegiance) named in disguise as an agreement or "loyalty to those in charge". Wherever they go, to the Muslim countries or non-Muslim ones, you will find them dividing (the supporters) of the Salafi mission.⁶⁵

A similar pattern could be seen in the Yemeni Salafi othering of the Haraki-inclined Wahdah Islamiyyah foundation. To support his labelling of the Wahdah Islamiyyah as a disreputed organization, Abu Abdillah Sofyan quoted a *fatwa* by Shaikh Salih al-Fauzan on the groups or factions that have allegedly violated the true way of Ahl al-Sunnah. Shaikh al-Fauzan regarded Wahdah Islamiyyah as to belong to the doomed groups and factions who deserved to be vilified and punished because it breached the Prophetic Tradition.⁶⁶

In some instances, the Indonesian Yemeni Salafists approached Middle Eastern Salafi authorities directly with a request for *fatwa*. This was undertaken either in-person or in mediated ways such as making phone calls and sending letters to a Salafi scholar in the Middle East. In the case of asking for a *fatwa* in-person, a *fatwa* seeker (*mustafti*) went to the Middle East to see a Salafi scholar and asked him about a particular issue.

For example, Abdul Muthi al-Maidani, a Yemeni Salafi preacher and director of Yogyakarta-based Yemeni Salafi religious learning who went to Yemen for study, asked Shaikh Yahya al-Hājūri and Shaikh Muqbil for *fatwa* on the case of some Indonesian Salafi figures considered to be in breach of the Salaf way such as Abu Nida, Ainur Rafiq, Sholeh Suaidi and Yazid

⁶⁵www.salafy.or.id, accessed 20 April 2010.

⁶⁶<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/jawaban-ilmiah-terhadap-silsilah-pembelaan-wahdah-islamiah-bag-1.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

Jawwaz.⁶⁷ In his attempt to seek *fatwa* on ‘the misguided’ Abu Nida, Abdul Muthi went to see Shaikh Muqbil. He said:

We told [Shaikh Muqbil] what we know about Abu Nida. He answered: “This man is a Hizbi because he is seeking material gains or a Hizbi fanatic because of his ignorance. Looking at reality, the first one is more appropriate to be used to label people like Abu Nida”. I am telling this statement to assert that the Salafi brothers, particularly those who are in Yogyakarta, to be careful with the Ihya al-Turas foundation.⁶⁸

Some Yemeni Salafists went in person to ask for a *fatwa* on allegedly misguided Salafi factions. For example, a Yemeni Salafi went to see Shaikh Rabī’ in Yemen and asked for his *fatwa* on the Wahdah Islamiyyah organization. A Salafi website reported Sheikh Rabi’s response to this *fatwa* seeker, saying that: “The Wahdah Islamiyyah is a Qutbiyyah and Sururiyyah organization, whose *manhaj* is in contradiction with that of Ahl al-Sunnah (Salafi way)”.⁶⁹

In other stances, such *fatwa* seekers used communication technologies. For example, Usamah Mahri telephoned Sheikh Rabi’ and asked for his *fatwa* on the case of Jafar Umar Thalib, a prominent early Salafi preacher. As Qomar ZA said:

One day Ustadz Usamah Mahri telephoned Shaikh Rabī’ al-Madkhali asking about the case Jafar Thalib who went to the Dzikir (remembrance of God) sessions of Arifin Ilham. Shaikh Rabī’ replied: “If what you said is correct, that he attended the Maulid [the Prophet’s birthday commemoration] and joined the politicians, you did not leave him, but rather he has left you (Ahl al-Sunnah; Salafists) and the Salaf *manhaj*.⁷⁰

⁶⁷http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=661 accessed 23 April 2010; http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=662, accessed 23 April 2010.

⁶⁸www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=512, accessed 23 April 2010.

⁶⁹<http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/manhaj/fatwa-kesesatan-jamaah-yayasan-ormas-wahdah-islamiyah.html>, accessed 28 April 2010.

⁷⁰http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=664, accessed 23 April 2010.

Internet Use for Boundary Setting and Resource Differentials among the Salafi Factions

The findings above show that the Yemeni Salafi faction was very engaged in the act of vilification of 'the other' and exaltation of itself by mobilizing its websites to set boundaries between 'us', 'the true Salafists', and 'them', 'the Salafi imposters'. By contrast, other Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafists and Haraki Salafists, employed these othering tactics only rarely on their websites. The Haraki Salafists used their websites the least in such othering practice. This particular pattern of the internet use for boundary setting is a consequence of each Salafi faction's availability (or unavailability) of offline resources.

As explained in Chapter Three, the Haraki Salafi faction had the best access to offline resources among the Salafi factions. It had good access to most types of resources including cultural, social-organizational, material and human resources, while lacking only moral resources. Perhaps this resource advantage made the Haraki Salafists less enthusiastic to optimise the internet as a tool to gain new resources though they were aware of the advantages of the internet. Therefore, while they used their websites to set boundaries in their attempt to assert Salafi religious authority, they did not engage in such behaviour excessively. They were confident that they had acquired religious authority as seen in their achievement of most types of resources so that they felt it was not necessary to fully mobilize the internet as a tool for setting boundaries among the Salafi factions in order to claim and assert Salafi religious authority among Salafi followers in Indonesia.

By contrast, the Yemeni Salafi faction had little access to offline resources; they had the best access only to cultural resources in the form of knowledge, skills and other cultural artefacts publicly available, while they lacked or had only limited access to other types of resources such as moral (legitimacy and celebrity), socio-organizational (network and infrastructure), material (fund and physical facilities), and human resources (labour,

followers and leadership). This situation in turn encouraged the Yemeni Salafists to overcome this resource shortage by using any means available to them. In this context, they found the internet a useful tool to assert religious authority by mobilizing their websites for setting boundaries between 'us'/'true Salafists' and 'the other'/'Salafi imposters'. By doing this, they particularly expected to gain moral resources in the form of recognition and legitimacy from *ummah* as the authoritative Salafi faction in Indonesia. For this purpose, using their websites extensively for othering practice as described above was a necessary attempt by the Yemeni Salafists to overcome their lack of moral resources (legitimacy and recognition from *ummah* in Indonesia).

The Jihadi Salafists faced the same challenge, lacking most types of resources except for cultural resources. However, this did not encourage them to use the web extensively to set boundaries and pursue othering practice online. Perhaps, their strong self-confidence in the truth of their ideology and full faith in their jihadism as the only true ideology might have made the Jihadi Salafists ignore the potential of the internet as a resource for asserting religious authority. Therefore, they considered the internet less useful in setting boundaries in their attempt to assert and claim the Salafi religious authority among Salafis in Indonesia.

Implications for the Salafi Factions

The internet has been a significant tool for the Yemeni Salafists to set boundaries between 'good/us' and 'evil/other' in their attempt to overcome their lack of resources. However, despite this, this internet use had limited benefit for them. The Yemeni Salafists' extensive use of the web to vilify the other and exalt their own selves has increased the number of followers who studied in its learning centre and raised donations to fund its *da'wah* activities. But, this increase was limited and was not solely as a result of this

kind of web use. Rather, personal networks and family relationships contributed significantly to this increase in human and material resources. A Yemeni Salafi leader said:

Indeed, there have been more new students, coming from some provinces in Indonesia, who are learning in our *ma'had*. I heard that some students were motivated to study here after reading our articles on our website that show the errors of those who claimed to be Salafists. They believed that we follow the true Salaf way [which encouraged them to come here]. All praises are upon God, we also received donations from *ikhwan* (brothers) who support our *dakwah* activities. However, in general, I believe that the students came here to study because they were informed by their colleagues or sent by their parents who have joined our Salaf way before. And they gave us their support and donations because they truly believe in the truth of our Salaf way.⁷¹

In addition, their web use for setting boundaries has not made the Yemeni Salafists gain significant moral resources in the forms of legitimacy from prominent Islamic organizations or support from well-known public figures. A Yemeni Salafi leader said:

So far, we have not received support from local or national public figures or Islamic organizations. We actually do not need their support. God willing, our *dakwah* Salafiyyah will grow with God's support and help, rather than theirs.⁷²

Consequently, the Yemeni Salafists' aggressive use of the web to set boundaries through online othering practice was not sufficient to achieve their goal of being acknowledged as the most authoritative Salafi faction in Indonesia. The Yemeni Salafi faction has remained less well-resourced than the Haraki Salafi faction in terms of religious authority, the number of followers and leaders, financial support, infrastructure and networks. As a result, this web use has not significantly generated new resources for the Yemeni Salafi faction to resolve the resource gap between it and the well-resourced Haraki Salafists.

⁷¹Interview with Ustadh Arafat, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

⁷²Interview with Ustadh Iskandar, Makassar, 22 October 2010.

Perhaps, the only significant implication was that their extensive use of the web to set boundaries, in which the rhetoric of the saved sect was strongly emphasized, has bolstered the self-confidence of the Yemeni Salafi followers that they were the true Salafists in Indonesia. A Yemeni Salafi leader said:

We do not care whether what we publish on our website has benefitted us or not. We are only concerned with delivering the true knowledge and the truth according to the Salaf way. People have a right to discuss what we say on our websites. By revealing their mistakes through our website, we become more certain and committed to our Salaf way.⁷³

Similarly, the Haraki Salafists' limited use of the web for setting boundaries, due to their good access to various other resources, appears to have had no actual implication for the Haraki Salafists. This web use neither generated new resources nor reduced the resources at hand. A Haraki Salafi teacher said:

Our limited use or disinterest in using our website for publishing articles on the error and ignorance of those who claim to be Salafists has not affected our *da'wah* activities. The number of students has not decreased from year to year; instead, it is increasing. Our religious lectures are attended by a large audience, comprised of students and their parents, as well as local community members who live near our *ma'had*.⁷⁴

The Haraki Salafists' disinterest in employing their web to set boundaries has also not significantly hindered its supporters or sympathizers giving financial or material support for their *dakwah* activities. A Haraki Salafi web administrator said:

We have not been affected by our minimal use of our website and its articles to criticise or attack other Salafi factions. Parents still send their children to study here in our *ma'had* and sympathizers give

⁷³Interview with Ustadh Syafii, Bontang, 26 October 2010.

⁷⁴Interview with Ustadh Sadiq, Makassar, 22 October 2010.

donation for our *da'wah* purposes. We are still able to fund our activities here.⁷⁵

The little use of the web to set boundaries between 'real Salafists' and 'Salafi imposters' has not made the Haraki Salafi faction lose its prominence as the biggest Salafi faction and leading Salafi religious authority, at least among their committed followers, in Indonesia. As one Haraki leader argued, the availability or unavailability of legitimacy from public figures or credible Islamic organizations had nothing to do with the extent to which the faction employed their websites to set boundaries and it has not affected the Haraki Salafists' daily Salafi *dakwah* activities.⁷⁶

Likewise, their limited use of the web to set boundaries appears to have had no actual implication for the Jihadi Salafists. This web usage neither generated new resources for the Jihadi Salafists nor caused them to lose any resources at hand. They were still able to conduct their religious study circles and their website continued to operate. Their limited use of the web to set boundaries may have failed to strengthen their Salafi authority among other Salafists in Indonesia, but it did not fail to re-affirm their religious authority among their committed Jihadists followers.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that different Salafi factions in Indonesia used the internet as a resource for setting boundaries between 'us'/'true Salafists' and 'them'/'Salafi imposters' by conducting hostile intra-othering practice in their attempt to sustain their movement and assert sacred authority. Their claims to be the vanguards of 'authentic Islam' and their method of strict literalism and anti-intellectualism contributed to the Salafists' hostility to 'the misguided' other, including 'misguided' insiders.

⁷⁵Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

⁷⁶Interview with Ustadh Sadiq, Makassar, 23 October 2010, and with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

However, the Salafi factions differed in the degree to which they were engaged in this internet use. The Yemeni Salafi faction was engaged in mobilizing their websites as instrumental resources for vilifying Salafi factions and individuals considered 'the other'. They optimised the tactics of vilification in this online practice of othering including name-calling, character assassination and verdict giving, which were targeted at the Haraki Salafists and Jihadi Salafists. By contrast, the Haraki Salafi and Jihadi Salafi factions only partially used their websites as resources for boundary setting. The Haraki Salafists partly employed the tactic of character assassination, while practicing very limited use of name-calling and verdict giving tactics levelled at the Yemeni and Jihadi Salafi factions. The same is true for the Jihadi Salafists who targeted their vilification at the Yemeni Salafists.

The Yemeni Salafi faction was also fully engaged in mobilizing their websites as resources for self-exaltation, another strategy of othering. The proponents of this faction attempted to portray themselves as 'the true Salafists' with ideal attributes and characteristics of 'the true followers' of the Prophet Muhammad, his companions and Salaf '*ulamā*'. By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction and Jihadi Salafi faction did not utilize their websites for this self-exaltation strategy of othering.

This variation in web use was closely related to the resource difference among the Salafi factions. The Salafi factions with limited access to fundamental resources, as exemplified by the Yemeni Salafists, was motivated to mobilize the internet as a new instrumental resource for boundary setting between 'us'/'true Salafists' and 'them'/'Salafi imposters' in their attempt to overcome their lack of resources. By contrast, being confident as they had good access to various types of resources, the Haraki Salafists were less enthusiastic about online othering to assert their guardianship of Salafism.

The Salafi factions with limited access to crucial resources have mobilized the internet for setting boundary between 'us' and 'them' more

extensively than the well-resourced factions. The limited access to fundamental resources has encouraged and motivated the poorly resourced Salafi factions like the Yemeni Salafists to optimise online boundary setting to sustain their movement. This varied use of the internet to set boundaries has demonstrated varied significance of this internet use for different Salafi factions and has resulted in varied implication of this for them.

Chapter Seven

Creating Links on Salafi Websites

In addition to the use of the internet to construct the movement's ideology and set boundaries (as explained in the last two chapters), the Salafi movement mobilized the new media to create links with like-minded individuals or organizations with shared ideological background. In creating these linkages, the Salafi factions reflected their local and global connections as well as their ideological affiliation. This chapter examines the pattern of links created on the Salafi factions' websites and their usage, to understand the links' significance for different Salafi factions.

First, the chapter briefly describes links and factors influencing link formation. Second, it presents the typology of links created by the Salafi factions in Indonesia. Third, it analyses how the Salafi factions actually used the links in order to show what purposes Salafi links could serve, and examines what factors influenced their linking practices. Lastly, the chapter discusses the significance of links by explaining why these linking practices occurred from the perspective of resource mobilization theory. In support of the overall argument that the internet has varied significance for Islamic movements, the chapter argues that the significance of link creation varied across the Salafi factions due to variation in social-organizational resources among different Salafi factions as well as because of the particular nature of Salafi ideology adopted by each Salafi faction. Particularly, it shows that instead of establishing strategic linkages aimed at organizing collaborative alliances for collective action, the Salafi factions used links as resources simply for identifying, recognizing and endorsing a group's or individual's

website based on factors related to content of the target web and attributes of the target web producers.

Links, Linking Practice and Networks

The web is a 'small world' in that it is composed of social networks created and maintained by its actors in cyberspace (Bjorneborn 2004; Park and Thelwall 2008). Social actors can associate in cyberspace through interconnections among their websites (Bealieu 2005 in Park and Thelwall 2008). All this can be recognized through link formation on their websites. In this context, 'link' or 'hyperlink' refers to a word (or a number of words) or picture in a document or web page, normally highlighted, that can be clicked, or simply hovered over, in order to go to another place in the same web page, a different document, another web page or another website.

Links created on a website indicate that website's connection with other websites (the linked ones) and thus a relationship with the linked websites' creators. Foot *et al.* (2003) argue that "links represent relationships between producers of web materials" (that is, web pages). Links also demonstrate recognition among website actors involved in linking practice (Rogers and Marres 2000 in Foot *et al.* 2003). Thus, links reveal connections and recognition among websites and social networks among their actors in cyberspace. By social networks I mean "a set of people (or organizations or other social entities) connected by a set of social relationships such as friendship, co-working or information exchange" (Garton *et al.* 1997). Network building, then, refers to any attempts by an individual, group or other social entities to connect or recognize another individual, group or other social entities based on the same set of social relationships including ideology.

The networking potential of the internet is especially true in the political use of the new media by social movements and political activists.

Activists not only use the internet as a tool for disseminating information and constructing collective identities, but also mobilize it as a resource for creating social networks through links. The Zapatista movement in Mexico, for example, used the internet to establish online networks with like-minded movements and supporters that were global and free from government control (Garrido and Halavais 2003). Political actors create links to related websites of parties, peer politicians, and media in order to increase the information value of their websites and show their shared missions, activities and ideology (Park *et al.* 2004 and 2005). For marginalized political actors like those in Singapore, links help them not only to establish communal structures and set boundaries in cyberspace, but also to connect with one another in order to enhance their organizational strength and capacity (Soon and Kluser 2005).

Link studies have been concerned with what influences individuals or groups to create links to another person's or group's website. As Park and Thelwall (2003) have elaborated, individuals or groups making the links are motivated by a desire to recommend or endorse the linked website and this desire to maintain cooperative alliances influences link formations. Yet, hostile relations rather than cooperative alliances can also motivate link creation as seen in satirical political websites, where linking to other websites is intended as sarcastic and negative criticism (Sunstein 2001 in Park and Thelwall 2003).

According to Park and Thelwall (2008:688-689), factors contributing to link creation can be divided into two categories: target website contents and target website producer attributes. First, linking activities within a website are motivated by variables related to characteristics of the linked website content. They include credibility, content diversity, subject or topic similarity, search engine inclusion and ranking of a target website. Link creation motivation is attributed to the authority of the linked website as

well as its content relevance. The number of links incoming to a website may indicate the credibility and reputation of the site.

In addition, link creation is influenced by factors related to the attributes of a target website producer, namely an individual, a group or an institution that runs or controls the linked website's establishment, content, day-to-day operation and maintenance. Linking activities are influenced by aspects related to the linked website producer, which are shared by the linking website producer. These include such aspects as party affiliation, language, collaboration, and ideological affinity. The social, economic, political and ideological aspects of the relationship between the linking website producer and the linked website producer play a crucial role in linking activities among websites.

Typology of the Salafi Movement's Links

Of 60 Salafi movement websites selected for this study, 20 websites had links. The Yemeni Salafi faction had 16 linking websites and the Haraki Salafi faction had 4 sites with links. The Jihadi Salafi faction, however, had no websites with links (Figures 1 and 4). Therefore, the following analysis is focused on the linking practices of the Yemeni Salafists and Haraki Salafists who represented the resource-poor and resource-rich Salafi factions respectively. The issue of why the Jihadi Salafi faction created no links will be discussed in the final part of this chapter together with the discussion on the linking practices of the other two Salafi factions.

In what follows, in order to analyse the types of the Salafi faction's online linkages, I present a statistical overview of the typology of Salafi links based on geographical location of linked website producers and the content of linked websites. This is relevant to demonstrate that different Salafi factions created different types and number of links; that the less well-resourced Salafi faction created more types of links than well-resourced

Salafi faction. As will be explained in the next section, this indicates that creating linkages online had a varied significance for different Salafi factions.

Local and Global Links

All links created by the Salafi factions were “out-links”, which can be defined as links from a given website to another website (Bjorneborn and Ingwersen 2004 in Park and Thelwal 2008:691). Based on the (apparent) geographical location of the target or linked-to website producers, the Salafi movement’s links may be categorized into two types: local and global links. By local links I mean linkages to the websites of Indonesian Salafi followers, religious authorities (*‘ulamā’*), communities and institutions. It is important to clarify that this categorisation of ‘local’ refers to Indonesia-related *content*, regardless of the actual physical *location* of the website server, which in most cases appeared to be located and hosted inside Indonesia, but in some cases may have been outside of Indonesia. These local links navigated visitors to websites that appeared to be created by Indonesian Salafi communities or individuals and were written in Indonesian language. Besides such local sites, the Salafi factions established linkages to non-Indonesian, overseas Salafi religious authorities, communities and organizations through global links. These global links were target websites that appeared to be hosted outside Indonesia, established by non-Indonesian Salafi individuals and organizations, and which were written in languages other than Indonesian, especially Arabic and English.

Through their websites, the Yemeni Salafi faction created 207 local links to show its connection with like-minded Salafi individuals, groups and institutions in Indonesia. The website with the largest number of links was Al-Ilmu (<http://al-ilmu.web.id>) with 134 local out-links, followed by Darussalaf (www.darussalaf.or.id) with 30 out-links and Al-Atsariyyah (www.al-atsariyyah.com) with 15 out-links in the second and third place respectively. Two online Yemeni Salafi journals, *An-Nashihah* ([203](http://an-</p></div><div data-bbox=)

nashihah.com) and *Asy-Syariah* (www.asysyariah.com), each created the least number of local links with only three out-links.

The Yemeni Salafi faction created 35 links to global target sites established by individuals and organizations with the same ideological affinity in the Middle East and Europe. Only half of linking Yemeni Salafi websites (eight websites) established such a linkage to global target sites. The Darussalaf Salafi learning centre (www.darussalaf.or.id) contained the most global links connecting to 23 primary Salafi information sites and Salafi authorities in the Middle East and Europe.¹ In total, the Yemeni Salafi faction created 242 links to establish a network with sites of local and global Salafi individuals, organizations and religious authorities.

By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction established linkages to 102 local target sites, which equates to only half of the local links created by the Yemeni Salafi faction. Of four Haraki Salafi sites with links, Atturots Foundation (www.atturots.or.id) created the most links, connecting to 65 local target sites, followed by Wahdah Islamiyyah (www.wahdah.or.id) and Hasmi (www.hasmi.org) with 31 and 9 local links respectively. Meanwhile, Imam Bukhari Salafi Boarding School established the least networks with only three local target sites. This shows that around 60% of the Haraki Salafi local links were created by a single website (www.atturots.or.id).

However, the Haraki Salafi faction had more links to global sites than the Yemeni Salafi faction with the total of 87 and 35 links respectively. Of this number of links, the Yemeni Salafi faction prioritised Arabic websites of Salafi organizations and religious authorities (68 links) above those in English (19 links). Interestingly, of the selected Haraki Salafi websites, only one (www.atturots.or.id) established this global linkage so that all Haraki Salafi global links (87 global links) were on this single Haraki Salafi site.

¹The remaining linking Yemeni Salafi websites had no global links: <http://an-nashihah.com>, <http://al-ilmu.biz>, <http://akhwat.or.id>, <http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id>, <http://al-ilmu.web.id>, www.asy-syariah.com, www.darel-salam.com, and www.salafy.or.id.

Overall, the findings show that the Haraki Salafi faction established less linkages than the Yemeni Salafi faction. The Haraki Salafis created 189 links to local and global websites, while the Yemeni Salafis formed 242 links to local and global sites (Table 1).

Content-Based Salafi Link Categories

Based on the content of the linked websites, links created by the Salafi movement have been divided into eight categories; Salafi information and teachings; religious authorities (*'ulamā'*); learning institutions; online business; online publications; online radio; audio and television; online communities; and Salafi women (Tables 2, 3 and 4).

The Yemeni Salafi faction created more links to websites of Salafi information and teachings than the Haraki Salafi faction with 179 links and 58 links respectively. It also established more links to other types of target sites: online business, online publications, online communities and Salafi women. The Yemeni Salafi faction had more links to online business sites (6 links) than the Haraki group (1 link). The Yemeni Salafists created more links (12) to online publication sites than the Haraki group (8 links). They also had more link types than the Haraki Salafi followers relating to online communities (3 links and 1 link respectively) and Salafi women (7 and 4 links respectively) (Tables 2 and 3).

However, the Haraki Salafists created more links than the Yemeni Salafists in three particular categories: religious authorities, learning institutions, and online radio and television. The Haraki Salafists built more links to the sites of Salafi religious authorities than the Yemeni Salafis with 74 and 22 links respectively. They also established more links (36) to sites of Salafi learning institutions or foundations than the Yemeni group (9 links). In addition, the Haraki Salafi faction created slightly more connections with online radio and television sites than did the Yemeni Salafi faction (Tables 2 and 3).

In summary, the Yemeni Salafi faction had more links than the Haraki Salafi faction in five of the eight categories (namely information and teachings, online business, online publications, online communities, and Salafi women). It created more links than the Haraki Salafi faction with a total of 242 links and 189 links respectively (see Table 5).

Salafi Linking Practice

Drawing on the link studies referred to in the opening sections of this chapter which focus on the motives and factors (target website contents and attributes of target website producers) influencing the Salafi linking practices outlined above, this section examines how these Salafi factions actually *used* the links they created on their websites. Significantly, I found that there was no strategic link creation aimed at organizing collaborative alliances for collective action. Rather, the Salafi factions mobilized the links as resources simply for identifying, recognizing and endorsing a group or individual's website based on factors related to content of the target web and attributes of the target web producers such as credibility, subject or topic similarity, organizational affiliation and ideological affinity of a linked website.

Recognizing Sites Considered Credible

The Salafi factions created links as a means of demonstrating what they considered credible Salafi websites. The credibility of content of a target website was an important factor in determining whether the group endorsed the website or not through a linkage. The contents of a linked website were credible, meaning ideologically correct, if they were in accordance with the teachings of the Salaf, with references to the Salafi '*ulamā*' recognized by Salafists and in line with their interests and purposes.

This credibility was a required criterion for the Yemeni Salafi faction to create a link in its website as recognition and endorsement of a target website of a Salafi individual or organization. For example, a community of

Yemeni Salafists created links on its website, www.salafy.or.id (which was one of the Yemeni Salafi websites that included the most links), to recognize and endorse ten websites because their contents, ranging from general Salafi ideas to the issue of terrorism, were considered correct in the light of the Yemeni Salafi faction's 'ulamā', its ideology and interests.² As its web administrator stated:

We only included links to websites which (we consider) are in accordance with the true *manhaj al-salaf* (Salaf method). We, for example, provide them as references for our articles related to actual issues here. Our *ustadh* (teacher) warned us not to publish articles without their permission and references to 'true' Salaf sources.³

The same is true for the Haraki Salafi faction. The Imam Bukhari Salafi Boarding School (<http://bukhari.or.id>), for instance, established links to recognize and endorse three websites whose contents were considered correct based on the ideology and interests of the Haraki Salafi faction.⁴ This was illustrated by the fact that the first two websites were online versions of the Imam Bukhari's monthly print magazine *As-Sunnah*, while the last one was an online radio station operated by the proponents of Haraki Salafism in Indonesia (Radio Rodja).

Endorsing Websites with Shared Subjects and Topics

The Salafi factions created web links to endorse sites that shared the same subjects and topics. This included not only shared general ideas of Salafism, but more importantly also topics which were specific to each Salafi faction. For example, strong criticism of violent jihadism (as seen in the bombings in Bali and Jakarta the 2000s) was one common topic shared by the Yemeni Salafists. This shared interest would have motivated Ahlussunnah Jakarta

²The Yemeni site www.salafy.or.id had links to the following ten websites: Ahlussunnah Jakarta, Anti Teroris, As Salafy, An-Nashihah, Darus Salaf, Asy-Syariah, Darussunnah, PP Ibnul Qoyyim, Mereka Adalah Teroris, and Thullabul Ilmiy.

³ Interview with Mahdi, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

⁴<http://bukhari.or.id> created links to the following websites: Majalah As-Sunnah (<http://majalah-assunnah.com>), Majalah Digital As-Sunnah (<http://ebook.majalah-assunnah.com>), and Radio Rodja (www.radiorodja.com).

(www.ahlussunah-jakarta.com) to endorse other websites as 'true Salafi websites' through links including *Majalah Asy-Syariah* (www.asy-syariah.com), Darussalaf (www.darussalaf.or.id) and As-Salafy (www.salafy.or.id) whose contents were concerned with the same issue. Another common topic was the issue of Sururiyyah, an allegedly deviant stream of Salafism which was attributed by the Yemeni Salafists to Muhammad al-Surūr and his followers (see Chapter Two). The Yemeni Salafi website www.salafy.or.id was so concerned with this issue that it created links to websites that published similar content, such as www.darussalaf.or.id, www.asy-syariah.com, and <http://thullabul-ilmiy.com>.

The Haraki Salafi faction also created links recognising and endorsing sites with shared content. One of the common topics among the proponents of this group was rejection of Shi'ism as part of Islam. Their websites were laden with anti-Shi'i ideas. This was manifested in their links to sites that promoted the same anti-Sh'i sentiment. For example, Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (www.atturots.or.id), the Haraki Salafi website which had the most links, established links to at least two websites (Hakekat Syi'ah Imamiyah, <http://hakekat.com>, and Gen Syi'ah, www.gensyiah.com) that shared the same rejection of Shi'ism.

Identifying with Affiliated Groups and Individuals' Websites

Furthermore, links were used to identify with Salafi individuals or organizations' websites based on attributes of the target web producers. In this respect, three dominant attributes of a target web producer could be identified as influencing the Salafi factions to use links: group affiliation, ideological affinity and authority.

The Salafi factions used links to identify with one another based on group affiliation, namely organizational or group relationship which motivated the Salafi factions to create links to particular websites. It was common among the proponents of Salafism to set up organizations to achieve their goals such as an Islamic boarding school, an educational foundation or a

publishing house. Within the Yemeni Salafi faction, websites established by a Yemeni Salafi foundation created links as tools to identify with one another. This intra-organizational identification linking practice was exemplified by *An-Nashihah* magazine (<http://an-nashihah.com>); it was established by As-Sunnah foundation in Makassar and created links to identify two other websites established by the same foundation: www.dzulqarnain.com, a website of its leader, and Radio Online An-Nashihah (attached to <http://an-nashihah.com>).

This group affiliation-based identification link use was also manifest within the Haraki Salafi faction. Wahdah Islamiyah (www.wahdah.or.id) used links created on its website to identify with 31 websites of its affiliated regional branches.⁵ Harakah Sunniyyah Untuk Masyarakat Islami (www.hasmi.org) linked to nine websites affiliated to this organization.⁶ Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (www.atturots.or.id) created links to identify with six affiliated websites.⁷ Lastly, Imam Bukhari Salafi Boarding School

⁵www.wahdah.or.id created links to the following 31 affiliated websites: <http://www.belajarislam.com/>, <http://darulabr.org/>, <http://wahdahbandung.or.id/>, stibanks.net (expired when accessed 30 Sep 2014), <http://wahdah-banggai.blogspot.com/>, <http://wahdahmakassar.org/>, <http://www.lmdppwi.com/> (not active when accessed 29 Oct 2014), <http://ww34.suarawahdah.com/> (not active when accessed 29 Oct 2014), <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://smawahdah.sch.id/>, <http://alumnistiba-mks.blogspot.com/>, <http://markazassunnah.blogspot.com/>, <http://www.wahdahbaus.co.nr/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://www.alinshof.com/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://www.wahdahmuna.blogspot.com/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://wahdah-sinjai.blogspot.com/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://www.wahdahsidrap.com/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://wahdahmaros.blogspot.com/>, <http://wahdahpulauburu.blogspot.com/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://www.wahdah-belopa.blogspot.com/>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, <http://wahdah.or.id/#>, and <http://forummuslimahda'wahkampus.blogspot.com/>.

⁶www.hasmi.org had links to 9 affiliated websites: www.beasiswapendidikanislam.com, www.hasmi-islamicschool.com, <http://elsunnah.wordpress.com>, <http://bukusaku.net>, <http://ipmipeduli.org>, <http://minyakzaitunruqyah.com>, <http://hasmidepok.org>, <http://ww2.maktabahaliman.com>, and <http://pembangunanmasjid.wordpress.com>.

⁷www.atturots.or.id had links to the following six websites of intra-organizational affiliation: www.atturots.or.id/islamic-centre-bin-baaz.html, www.atturots.or.id/jamilurrahman-as-salafy.html, www.atturots.or.id/lajnah-da'wah.html, www.atturots.or.id/rs-at-turots.html, www.atturots.or.id/lajnah-fisik.html, and www.atturots.or.id/penerbitan.html.

(<http://bukhari.or.id>) established links to identify with two affiliated websites.⁸

Endorsing Websites with Shared Ideology

The Yemeni Salafi faction created links on its websites recognizing and endorsing websites of individuals or organizations that had shared Yemeni Salafi views and beliefs. For example, Adhwaus Salaf (<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id>), which was established and run by a Yemeni Salafi learning centre in Bandung, created links to recognize and endorse five websites which were produced and administered by individuals or organizations that had common Yemeni Salafi beliefs and ideas.⁹ Thullabul Ilmy (<http://thullabul-ilmiy>) had similar links.¹⁰

This ideological affinity-based endorsement link creation was also manifest among Haraki Salafi websites. The site www.atturots.or.id, which was established by a Haraki Salafi foundation in Yogyakarta, endorsed through websites which were administered by individuals or foundations of Haraki Salafism such as Ma'had Imam Bukhari in Solo (<http://bukhari.or.id>), Ma'had 'Ali Al-Irsyad in Surabaya (<http://mahad.info>), Madrasah Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal in Semarang (<http://binhambal.wordpress.com>), Ma'had Al-Furqon in Gresik (<http://alfurqon.co.id>), Ustadz Kholid Syamhudi (www.ustadzkholid.com), Ustadz Aris Munandar (<http://ustadzaris.com>) and Ustadz Abu Haidar (www.abuhaidar.web.id).

Recognizing Websites with Authoritative Sources

⁸<http://bukhari.or.id> had links to two affiliated websites: <http://majalah-assunnah.com> and <http://ebook.majalah-assunnah.com>.

⁹<http://adhwaus-salaf.or.id> created links to these Yemeni Salafi websites: www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com, <http://al-atsariyyah.com>, www.assalafy.org, www.asysyariah.com, and www.salafy.or.id.

¹⁰<http://thullabul-ilmiy.or.id> built networks through links to the following Yemeni Salafi websites: <http://almakassari.com>, <http://an-nashihah.com>, www.assalafy.org, www.asysyariah.com, <http://darussunnah.or.id>, <http://thullabul-ilmiy.or.id/blog/audio>, <http://mimbarislami.or.id>, <http://salafy.or.id>, and <http://tazhimussunnah.com>.

Lastly, the Salafi factions used links as recognition of the authority of target websites. This was related to the religious authority of the linked web supervisors or administrators. A Yemeni Salafi community created links to websites which were published or endorsed by Yemeni Salafi '*ulamā*', 'the learned men' who were believed to have authority to speak about and for Yemeni Salafism. This linking practice indicated that the community regarded the linked website and its producers as the authoritative sources of Yemeni Salafism. The linked websites included those of global and local Yemeni Salafi authorities. Ahlussunnah Makassar (www.almakassari.com), for example, established links to recognize and endorse the websites of some Yemeni Salafi '*ulamā*' in the Middle East (Muqbil ibn Hādī al-Wādī'i and Rabī ibn Hādī al-Madkhali) as well as those of Yemeni Salafi leaders in Indonesia (Abdul Mu'thi al Maidany, Dzulqarnain, and Sofyan Chalid Ruray).¹¹ However, due to the strong influence of the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities within the Salafi movement, some websites like Ma'had Ibnul Qoyyim (<http://salafybpp.com>) only linked to the websites of Yemeni and Saudi Salafi authorities.¹²

This religious authority-based recognition linking practice was also seen in the Haraki Salafi faction. Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (www.atturots.or.id), the Haraki Salafi foundation with the most links (87 global and 65 local), best illustrated this linking practice among the Haraki Salafists. Of its 87 global links, 65 were to websites of overseas Salafi personalities recognized and endorsed as the authoritative Salafi '*ulamā*' in

¹¹Ahlussunnah Makassar (www.almakassari.com) created links to the websites of the Yemeni global and local authorities: Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, <http://muqbel.net>; Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, <http://rabee.net>; <http://almiadani.net> (Ustadz Abdul Mu'thi al-Maidany), <http://dzulqarnain.net> (Ustadz Dzulqarnain), and <http://sufyanruray.info> (Ustadz Sofyan Chalid Ruray).

¹²Mahad Ibnul Qoyyim (www.salafybpp.com) created links to the websites of the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities: Abd al-Aziz bin Baaz, Abd al-Muhsin al-Abbad, Ahmad bin Yahya al-Najmi, Lajnah Daimah, Muhammad bin Salih al-Utsaimin, Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, Rabi bin Hadi al-Madkhali, and Ulama Yaman.

the Middle East and Europe.¹³ As with the Yemeni Salafi faction, the centrality of the Middle Eastern Salafi authorities has made the Haraki Salafi faction create fewer links to local Salafi authorities with only 8 links to the websites administered or supervised by Indonesian Salafi leaders. These were Ustadh Kholid Syamhudi (www.ustadzkholid.com), Ustadh Muhammad Abduh Tuasikal (<http://rumaysho.wordpress.com>), Ustadh Basweidan (<http://basweidan.wordpress.com>), Ustadh Abdullah Roy (<http://tanyajawabagamaislam.wordpress.com>), Ustadh Aris Munandar (<http://ustadzaris.com>), Ustadh Abu Haidar (www.abuhaidar.web.id), and Ustadh Abu Zubair (<http://abuzubair.net>).

¹³Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (www.atturots.or.id) had links to 65 sites of global Salafi authorities: Abd al-Azhim Badawy (www.ibnbadawy.net), Abd al-Aziz Alu Syaikh (www.sahab.ws/5600/news/3399.html), Abd al Aziz al Rajihi (www.sh-rajhi.com), Abd al Aziz al Rayyis (www.islamancient.com), Abd al Aziz bin Baz (www.ibnbaz.org), Abd al Aziz al Bura'i (www.alburaie.com), Abd al Muhsin Abbad (www.alabad.jeeran.com), Abd al Muhsin Ubaikan (www.obaykan.com), Abd al Qadir al Arnauth (www.alarnaut.com), Abd Allah al Fauzan (www.alfuzan.islamlight.net), Abd Allah al Zhafiri (www.sahab.ws/6111), Abd Allah Jibrin (www.ibn-jebreen.com), Abd al Razzaq Afifi (www.afify.com), Abd al Salam Barjas (www.burjes.com), Abu Abd al Muiz Firkuz (www.ferkous.com), Abu Ashim al Ghamidi (www.abouassim.net), Abu Bakr al-Mishri (www.abu-bakr.com), Abu Islam Salih Taha (www.abuislam.net), Abu Malik al Juhanni (<http://abumalik.net>), Abu Umar al Utaibi (www.otiby.net), Ahmad Yahya Najmi (<http://njza.net>), Ali Hasan al Halabi (www.alhalaby.com), Ali Rida (www.albaidha.net), Ali Yahya al Haddadi (www.haddady.com), Alwi al Saqqaf (www.dorar.net), Hisyam al Arifi (www.aqsasalafi.com), Imam al Ajurri (www.ajurry.com), Khalid al Muslih (www.almosleh.com), Lajnah Daimah (www.alifta.com), M. Ismail Muqaddam (www.m-ismail.com), M. Abd Allah al Imam (www.sh-emam.com), M. al Hamud al Najdi (www.al-athary.net), M. Aman al Jami (www.aljami.net), M. Ibrahim al Hamd (<http://toislam.net>), M. Khalifah Tamimi (www.mediou.org), Majdi Arafat (www.magdiarafat.com), Masyaikh Sudan (www.marsed.org), Masyhur Hasan Salman (www.mashhoor.net), Muhammad al Magrawi (<http://magrawi.net>), Muhammad al Uthaimin (www.ibnothaimeen.com), Muhammad Musa Nashr (www.m-alnaser.com), Muhammad Said Ruslan (www.rslan.com), Mustafa al Adawi (<http://aladawy.info>), Nashir al Barrak (<http://albarak.islamlight.net>), Nashir al Din al Albani (www.alalbany.net), Rabi al Madkhali (www.rabee.net), Sa'ad al-Hushayin (www.saad-alhusayen.com), Said Abd al Azhim (www.al-fath.net), Salim al Ajmi (<http://sahab.ws/3250>), Salim Ied al Hilali (<http://islamfuture.net>), Salih al Fauzan (www.alfawzan.ws), Salih al Suhaimi (www.assuhaimi.com), Salih Saad al Suhaimi (<http://sahab.ws/4435>), Sultan al Ied (www.sahab.ws/3147), Taqiy al Din al Hilali (www.alhilali.net), Ulama Yaman (www.olamayemen.com), Wahid Abd Salam Baly (www.waheedbaly.com), Yahya al Hajuri (www.sh-yahia.net), Abd al Rauf Shakir (www.islamlecture.com), Dr. Bilal Philips (<http://bilalphilips.com>), Dr. Salih al Salih (www.understand-islam.net), Jalal Abu Alrub (www.islamlife.com/news.php), Nadir Ahmad (www.examinethetruth.com), and Umm Junayd (<http://ummjunayd.info>).

Thus, it can be said that the Salafi factions used links simply as tools for recognizing, endorsing, and identifying websites considered credible, authoritative Salafi sources according to shared ideological views. In other words, Salafi linking practice was focused on the creation of recognition, endorsement and identification links, rather than strategic ones for building the network or communication for collective action. An administrator of a Haraki Salafi website reported:

We don't use the internet to build networks or strengthen communication with other Salafi brothers in Indonesia and overseas. We simply use it for *da'wah* (Islamic propagation) purposes. Links or contact addresses provided on our website were simply used by users to ask questions [about Salafism] or to subscribe to our magazine *As-Sunnah*.¹⁴

This linking practice was also confirmed by the Yemeni Salafi faction, with an activist in the Yemeni Salafi community saying:

We included credible links on our website so visitors can access the further true Salafi sources. We created the links as facilities for introducing real Salafi websites to visitors who are interested in enhancing their knowledge [of Salafism].¹⁵

In spite of limited use of links above, the links do reveal nodes of Salafi networks or connections with like-minded individuals and groups. They expose the connections between the Indonesian Salafi websites, particularly those of the Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists, with other Salafi websites, which were identified, recognized, and endorsed as allies.

Significance of Links: Resources and Salafi Linking Practice

The types of links and patterns of link use described above indicate that the Salafi factions created links differently although they actually used them for the same purposes. Significantly, the Yemeni Salafi faction mobilized its websites to create more links to the websites of like-minded individuals and

¹⁴Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

¹⁵Interview with Mahdi, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

groups than the Haraki Salafi faction. The Jihadi Salafi faction, however, created no links on its websites. This demonstrates that the Salafi factions had different linking practices as the significance of such links varied between the three groups.

To uncover why this linking practice and varied significance occurred, it is necessary to examine the context within which the Salafi factions operated and how this relates to their online practices. This context refers to two aspects of the Salafi factions: organizational resources and the nature of ideology adopted by a Salafi faction.

Organizational Resources

First, the context refers to offline organizational resources, which were particularly evident in the cases of Yemeni and Haraki factions. The Salafi factions considered organizational networks important resources for their movement's capacity and continuity. This was manifested not only in their building of offline organizational networks, but also in asserting those networks online. They created links on their websites as way of asserting networks with individuals, communities or organizations with the same ideology and purposes.

However, each Salafi faction actually formed different types and number of links as described above because each Salafi faction had different needs. This difference in linkages can be traced back to the groups' disparity in access to offline organizational resources. The linking practice of these Salafi factions reflected the state of their offline network resources. As explained in Chapter Two, although they shared the same aim in promoting Salafism in Indonesia, the Salafi factions had different access to organizational resources as instrumental facilities for achieving their goals.

Among the Salafi factions, the Haraki Salafi faction had the best access to organizational resources in the form of networks. It maintained a good connection with a large number of organizations and individuals of the same ideological affinity. It was a kind of reformed Salafi stream that was able to

adapt and respond to current socio-political change. This has made the followers of Haraki Salafism relatively open to building relationships with wider members of local and global Muslim communities, though they still hold fast the Salafi teachings.

The Haraki Salafi faction established educational networks among local learning centres and foundations of the same Haraki Salafi ideology. This was manifested, among other ways, in the form of local teachers' exchange and students' input. It was common among the Haraki Salafi foundations or learning institutions to exchange teachers among themselves. An *ustadh* (teacher) of one Haraki Salafi learning institution could be assigned, at the same time, to teach at one or more other learning institutions. For example, apart from their learning centre, some teachers of Al-Irsyad Salafi Boarding School in Semarang conducted teaching duties at Imam Bukhari Boarding School in Solo. It was also not uncommon that a Haraki Salafi community sent its children to study Salafism at a Haraki Salafi learning institution which was endorsed by its Salafi teacher. In turn, that Haraki Salafi learning centre might recommend another learning centre to potential students of a Haraki Salafi community or family.

Besides, the Haraki Salafi faction had access to the global educational network through cooperation with some Islamic universities in the Middle East. In some cases, some Haraki Salafi learning institutions had agreements for teachers'/lecturers' and students' exchange with some Saudi universities. The Makassar-based Wahdah Islamiyyah organization, for instance, selected and sent its students to study at Medinah Islamic University in Saudi Arabia, and received teachers or lecturers from the same university to teach at its learning centres. The same human resource exchange was also true for Al-Irsyad Salafi Boarding School in Semarang.

Moreover, the Haraki Salafists had a good relationship with global Salafi-oriented charity organizations in the Middle East with which they established financial networks to support their activities and programs in

Indonesia. These included the well-known Kuwaiti-based Jam'iyat Ihyā` al-Turas and Saudi-based Al-Haramayn Foundation. Both provided the Haraki Salafists with financial or material aid to set up foundations, schools, mosques and learning institutions. At the local level, certain established Haraki Salafi foundations were assigned to channel the aid to the Haraki Salafi followers in other parts of Indonesia to support their programs and activities. This has created local networks of Haraki Salafists based on financial sources, such as Yogyakarta-based Al-Turas network and Jakarta-based Al-Sofwah network as the local representatives of the Islamic charity organizations in Saudi and Kuwait.

The Haraki Salafi faction especially had a strong social network among its communities, learning centres and foundations. This provided its adherents with group solidarity to support each other. The Islamic doctrine of *ukhuwwah* (brotherhood), teacher-student relationship, and economic advantages, among others, have contributed to this strong bond within the Salafi faction.

Consequently, with such good access to offline social-organizational networks, the Haraki Salafi faction did not consider it necessary to mobilize their websites to demonstrate and assert such networks online. The Haraki Salafists seemed to be confident and content with what they had access to, so that it had little incentive to create numerous links on their websites to establish online networks with individuals or organizations of the same ideological affiliation. Though some of them formed online links on their websites, most of the Haraki Salafi communities did not need to maximise their website linkages as new resources for expressing and asserting their network resources online.

The Yemeni Salafi faction, on the other hand, had less access to social-organizational resources in the form of networks. It had comparatively limited networks with local and global groups, institutions and individuals in Indonesia, the Middle East and West. Perhaps this was due to its very strict

understanding of the Salafi doctrines that made its followers refrain from connecting with individuals, groups and organizations that they regarded to have violated the *manhaj al-salaf*, 'the true way' of understanding and practicing Islam.

The Yemeni Salafists established educational networks in the form of teachers' exchange among their learning centres. Like the Haraki Salafi faction, it was common among the Yemeni Salafi communities to support each other by sending and receiving teachers or mentors assigned to teach at one or more learning centres. Adhwaus Salaf in Bandung, for example, organized lectures given by an *ustadh* of Ihya al Sunnah Salafi learning centre in Tasikmalaya, Jawa Barat, or Ibnul Qoyyim learning centre in Balikpapan, Kalimantan Timur. At another opportunity, it sent its *ustadh* to teach at one or more Yemeni learning centres in Bandung or other cities in Indonesia. The Yemeni Salafists also conducted a kind of students' exchange. A Salafi learning centre might admit students who were sent by another learning centre. A Yemeni Salafi family might send its children to study at a Salafi learning centre which was recommended by its Salafi *ustadh* or Salafi congregation.

However, unlike the Haraki Salafi faction, the Yemeni Salafi faction had limited access to global educational networks. Generally, it had no formal agreement with universities in the Middle East to receive lecturers to teach at its learning centres or send its selected students to study at such universities. Perhaps, the only global educational network to which the Yemeni Salafi faction had access was its strong educational relationship with informal Salafi learning centres in Dammaj, Yemen. Most Yemeni Salafi leaders in Indonesia studied with the Salafi '*ulamā*' at these learning centres such as Dar al-Hadis. It was regarded by them as a privilege for these graduates and the Yemeni Salafi *pesantren* to send its students to study at these centres. On some occasions, certain Yemeni Salafi learning centres organized lectures given by the '*ulamā*' of these Yemeni learning centres.

Furthermore, compared to the Haraki Salafi faction, the Yemeni Salafi faction had limited access to Islamic aid organizations and charity groups in the Middle East, especially Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the strong supporters of the global Salafism. This was because the Yemeni Salafists believed that the Islamic aid organizations in these countries (such as Jam'iyat Ihya` al-Turas of Kuwait) were not true Salafi supporters. The Yemeni Salafists, then, refrained from, or were at least very cautious in, receiving or asking for aid from these organizations. This has resulted in the lack of strong financial networks and resources among Yemeni Salafi followers to support their activities and programs. They mostly financed their *da'wah* activities by themselves or through donations from local sympathizers. With such limited financial sources, Yemeni Salafists were only able to build humble and facility-poor learning centres and foundations.

Nevertheless, the Yemeni Salafi faction had a strong bond among its followers and learning centres. Perhaps, this intra-Yemeni connection was the best social network to which the group had access. Apart from the belief in Islamic brotherhood among the Yemeni Salafists, the self-awareness of being a new and still small Islamic movement in Indonesia motivated the Yemeni Salafi followers to maintain strong group solidarity by living in a separated community, helping each other, and running business among the community members. This social network and strong belief in Salafi ideology has played a crucial role in the Salafi movement's survival, even growth, in contemporary Indonesia.

Therefore, given the above limited access to organizational networks, the Yemeni Salafi faction attempted to increase its movement's capacity and maintain solidarity among its followers. The Yemeni Salafi followers believed that it was necessary to mobilize the internet to demonstrate and assert their existing, though limited networks, regarding the new media as a new important resource for the movement's continuity and development. To overcome their lack of offline networks, Yemeni Salafists showed and

asserted their existing linkage to local and global individuals and groups with the same ideological affiliation through creation of a lot of links on their websites described above. Limited access to offline organizational networks encouraged the Yemeni Salafists to mobilize websites as new important resources for exposing and asserting their offline networks through links.

The Nature of the Salafi Factions' Ideology

To understand better the varied significance of linking practice among the Salafi factions, it is necessary to look at another aspect of the context in which the linking practice operated: the nature of the Salafi factions' ideology involved in this link formation. This was particularly seen in the case of Jihadi Salafi faction. The fact that the Jihadi Salafi faction created no links on its sites was more closely related to its nature as a hard-line group than its lack of social-organizational resources.

As a hard-line-violent group, Jihadi Salafists mostly operated underground, lived in a tightly closed community, were always on high alert, and were highly suspicious of foreigners in an attempt to protect themselves and their networks. The group made every effort to protect itself and its allies to ensure the movement's continuity and development.

In fact, Jihadi Salafists did not completely lack organizational resources. They had access to educational networks, though limited to the form of informal student-teacher relationships. They were also able to establish financial support networks, though limited to underground ones from individual and group donors, local or global, who secretly supported their cause. In addition, like other Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafists had access to social networks among its followers, the best organizational network which was available to them. However, they generally concealed these offline networks from the public to protect their movement, those involved in the networks, and themselves, from any potential and actual dangers.

The Jihadi group adopted the same strategy in its online network practice. They created no links on their websites because they wanted to avoid revealing their networks to protect their movement's continuity from any external threats that could jeopardise or destroy it. Creating links was risky for the Jihadi Salafis because it might reveal their networks and allies. To be a strict Salafi in a country with a moderate Muslim majority means to live a life in a small and tightly-knit community for survival and growth. This becomes much harder when a person opts to be a violent jihadi Salafi. To be a violent jihadi Salafi means to join a group highly protective of itself and its movement. This was manifest, among other ways, in the group refraining from establishing networks through link formation on its websites.

Looking at these two offline aspects of the Salafi movement, it is clear that there was a strong relationship between the Salafi factions' offline resources, especially networks, and their online responses in the form of link formation. Different access to offline network resources has caused different responses to online network expression through links. As a result, the Salafi factions created different patterns of links on their websites and perceived the significance of links differently.

The prevalence of some link types reveals something about the state of resources among the Salafi factions in Indonesia and its relationship with their linking practice. The above findings indicate that the Yemeni Salafi faction created more local links than the Haraki Salafi faction (207 and 102 links respectively). However, the Haraki Salafi faction established more global links than the Yemeni Salafi faction (87 and 35 links respectively). This pattern of links clearly reflects the state of the Salafi faction's network resources. The prevalence of local links over global ones in the Yemeni Salafi faction's linking practice reveals that the Yemeni Salafi faction lacked access to offline global networks, especially with educational institutions and Islamic charitable organizations in the Middle East, as explained above. To overcome this, instead of attempting to increase their global networks, the

Yemeni Salafists opted to focus on maintaining and asserting local networks to which they had good access in order to strengthen their movement's capacity. The same holds true for the Haraki Salafi faction. The dominance of global links in its linking behaviour reflects its good access to offline global networks with Salafi organizations, institutions and individuals in the Middle East. The Haraki Salafi followers needed to show and maintain these global networks through link creation on their websites.

Furthermore, the relationship between resources and linking practice was manifested in the links to the websites of learning institutions and online businesses. The Haraki Salafists had significantly more links to learning institutions than the Yemeni Salafists (36 links and 1 link respectively). This indicates that the Haraki Salafi faction had good access to local and global financial resources with which it was able to establish many Salafi learning institutions and foundations. By contrast, the figures reveal the Yemeni Salafists had limited access to financial resources which hindered them from building sufficient learning institutions. By creating links on their websites, both groups intended to assert their relationships, and maintain their networks, with these institutions and foundations, irrespective of the number of offline learning institutions each was able to establish.

This financial resource difference was also reflected in the type of online business links the different Salafi factions created. The Yemeni Salafists established more links to online businesses than the Haraki Salafists. To overcome their limited access to financial resources, the Yemeni Salafists run businesses, including online shops, to support their needs and *da'wah* activities. The larger number of out links to online shops they created indicates their greater need for access to financial resources and their attempts to establish business contact and maintain relationships among the Yemeni Salafi business community. By contrast, perhaps being content with their good access to financial resources as explained above, the Haraki Salafists did not need to establish many businesses to sustain their programs

and needs. The very low number of links to online businesses on their sites reflects the financial sufficiency of the Haraki Salafists' existing networks.

In sum, link formation had a varied significance for different Salafi factions due to the variation of their offline contexts. Resource disparity and self-protection have given rise to link variation among the Salafi factions. Good offline access to resources influenced Haraki Salafists to create few links on their websites, making links less significant for them. Being a less well-resourced Salafi faction might have encouraged Yemeni Salafists to create many links on their websites, indicating the significance of link creation for them. The need to protect itself and its offline networks led the Jihadi Salafists to refrain from establishing links on its websites; for them such links were insignificant.

Implications of Salafi Linking Practice

The Yemeni Salafi faction's extensive link creation may create the impression that they were a large and solid Salafi faction with a lot of followers and that they were well-connected with a lot of social networks. Their extensive local links might be particularly beneficial to Yemeni Salafists, contributing to their self-image of being 'true Salafists' resisting so-called 'Salafi imposters' (as explained in the previous chapter).

However, it seems that extensive link creation has not substantially benefitted the Yemeni Salafi faction, or enabled it to close the gap in resource mobilization between it and other Salafi factions. There was no report during my interviews that link creation contributed to the increase of network resources offline or other types of resources within the Yemeni Salafi faction. My observation of Yemeni Salafi learning centres also showed that there was no increase in the mobilization of financial, infrastructure and other types of resources that might have resulted from their linking practice online. The Yemeni Salafists remained less well-resourced than the Haraki Salafists.

The fact that the Haraki Salafi faction created fewer links than the Yemeni Salafi faction might have had an online impact, in that Haraki Salafists appeared less cohesive and less networked than other Salafi factions. Haraki Salafists' fewer local links, compared to those of Yemeni Salafists, might have created the impression that Haraki Salafists received limited support from, and had limited networks among, Indonesian Muslims. Moreover, their extensive global links might have given viewers the impression that Haraki Salafists promoted ideas of Islam which were imported from abroad, and are therefore alien to the form of Islam long held by the majority of Muslims in Indonesia.

However, there was no indication given in my interviews that the Haraki Salafi faction felt it had been disadvantaged because of its relatively sparse links on its websites. My interviews with representatives of this Salafi faction gave the strong impression that the absence of web links had no negative impact upon the group's offline linkages and other resources enjoyed by the Haraki Salafists, who remain the Salafi faction with the best access to resources.

In the case of the Jihadi Salafi faction, the absence of links on its websites might have indicated that the group had no networks and received no support from like-minded Muslims in Indonesia and overseas. But, this can be misleading because factors like the nature of Jihadi Salafi ideology and self-protection would have played an important role in discouraging Jihadi Salafists from creating links on their websites (as explained the previous section). The actual impact of this absence of links on the Jihadi Salafi faction could not be determined as I had great difficulty in getting access to its followers for interviews or observation. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the absence of links would have any negative impact for the Jihadi Salafi faction in that it has not influenced the group's offline resources, keeping it the Salafi faction with the least resources.

Overall, linking practice has not actually altered the existing level of resources among different Salafi factions. It simply reproduced, rather than closed, the gap in resource mobilization, particularly network resources, among the Salafi factions. Haraki Salafists remained the group with the most access to resources, while Yemeni Salafists were less well-resourced, and Jihadi Salafists the least resourced. Nevertheless, this linking practice was not without significance for different Salafi factions. As explained in the above section, the significance of the links lies in their role as a tool for identifying with one another, endorsing and recognizing like-minded individuals and groups' websites, and demonstrating and asserting the existing offline linkages no matter how small or large they are.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that links had varied significance for different Salafi factions due to different offline contexts in which Salafi linking practices operated. Differences in resources and the nature of particular Salafi ideology adopted by a Salafi faction caused the Salafi factions to approach the creation of links on their websites differently although Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists used the created links for similar purposes (namely identification, recognition and endorsement of like-minded individuals and groups' websites considered credible and authoritative as Salafi sources). Links played a more significant role for Yemeni Salafists than Haraki Salafists, but they played no role for Jihadi Salafists.

The resource-poor Salafi Yemeni group mobilized their websites more to create many links compared to the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction. Having good access to various social-organizational resources most likely made the Haraki Salafi faction content with the offline linkages and networks it had, so that it was less motivated to create many links on its websites to maximise the internet as a new resource for networking purposes. By contrast, being aware of its limited access to offline organizational networks,

the resource-poor Yemeni Salafi faction saw an advantage in creating many links in order to optimise the internet as a new important resource for exposing and asserting the existing connection they had online, and perhaps, establishing more networks. This strategy may contribute to the impression that it was a solid, 'true Salafi faction' with a lot of support. The Jihadi Salafi faction created no links on the web due to the nature of its ideology and strategy as a hard line group which wanted to protect its networks and allies from any threats that might endanger it.

Importantly, the Salafi use of links merely reproduced rather than altered differences in the capacity of resource mobilization among different Salafi factions. The many links created by Yemeni Salafists on their websites did not translate into a closing of the resource gap with the Haraki Salafi faction. The absence of links on Jihadi Salafi websites also contributed to this online reproduction of differences in resource mobilization among the Salafi factions.

Links did not necessarily mean there were collaborations or cooperative alliances for collective action between Salafi factions and individuals or groups associated with different websites. Rather, for these factions, links merely served the linking Salafi factions as facilities to identify with, recognize and endorse one another based on credibility, authority and ideological affinity of the linked websites. In other words, Salafi linking practice merely created recognition and identification links instead of strategic ones which were aimed at organizing collective action among like-minded Salafi factions or individuals.

Table 1 Salafi Movement's Local and Global Links (Summary)

Types of Links	Yemeni Salafi Faction	Haraki Salafi Faction	Jihadi Salafi Faction
Local Links	207	102	0
Global Links	35	87	0
Total	242	189	0

Table 2 Categories of Yemeni Salafi Faction's Links Based on Target Web Content (Total: 242 links)

Information and Teachings	Religious Authorities	Learning Institutions	Online Publications	Online Radio/TV and Audio	Online Business	Online Communities	Salafi Women
Salafy	Abdul Mu'thi Al-Maidany	Darussalaf	Asyariah.com	Audio Salaf	Al-ilmu.com	Salafi Indonesia	Ummu Zakariya
Darel-salam	Dzulqarnain	Assalafy	Akhwat.web.id	Muslim Audio	Kiosherbal.com	Artikel Salafy	Almuslimah
Al-ilmu.web.id	Sofyan Ruray	Darussunnah	Akhwat.or.id	Mp3islami.freever	Islami.web.id	Thullabul-ilmiy	Muslimah-salafiyah
Ahlussunnah- jakarta	Muhammad-assewed	Adhwaus-salaf	Penerbit.al-ilmu	Radio Syiar Sunnah	Toko Online al Atsariyyah		Ummuamar88
An-Nashihah	Ulamasunnah	Sitd-aba	An-Nashihah	Tasjilat al Atsariyyah			Akhwatsalafiyah
Al-atsariyyah	Ibn Baaz	Salafybpp	Salafi Publications	Muslim-audio			Hanifatunnisa
Ibnulqoyyim	Al-Wadii	Al-Ihsan Gowa		Dunludngaji			Ummfulanah
Merekaadalahteroris	Al-Abbad	Madrasah Salaf		Ihsan-tasjilat			
Al-ilmu.biz	Al-Najmi	Islam Academy		SalafiTalk			
Ahlussunnah-bangka	Lajnah Daimah			Tasjilatashaafie			
Alistiqomah	Al-Uthaimin			Tasjilatjember			

Itishom	Al-Madkhali			Tasjilat			
Mimbarsunnah.org	Ulama Yaman						
Almakassari	Al-Albani						
Jihadbukankenistaan	Al-Fauzan						
Tazhimussunnah	Al-Bura'i						
Thullabulilmiy	Sheikh al-Imam						
Tsabat	Al-Hajuri						
Islamiarticles	Faqih al-Zaman						
Mimbarislami	Muhaddits al-Ashr						
Kajian online	Mujaddid al-Yaman						
Jihad Kemuliaan							
Syar Tauhid							
Google Salaf Engine 1							
Google Salaf Engine 2							
Al Hujjah							
As Sunnah Makassar							
Atsar al Salaf Samarinda							
Al-Ilmu.web.id							
Al-ilmu.info							
Mimbarislami							
Qurancomplex							
My.opera.com.infodammaj							
Al-Islam.com							
Assunnah Promo Web1							
Assunnah Promo Web2							
Assunnah Promo Web3							
Salafy Indonesia Promo web							
Salafi Indonesia promo web							

Sunnah promo web							
Salafy Online promo web							
Salafi Indonesia promo web							
Assunnah promo web							
Salafy.ws							
Salafyonline.com							
Andakaji.blogspot.com							
Ahlussunnah Kaltim							
Dokter Pengobatan Nabawi							
Syiar Sunnah							
Al-Ilmu.net							
Darulilmi							
Salafy.co.cc							
Ishaqabuhafsh.wordpress							
Salafypomalaa							
Ahlussunnah-wonosobo							
Ahlussunnah-banjarnegara							
Hanif019							
Agungriksana							
Abuannisa							
Angsa-rea							
Akhpaiman							
Yangmudayangsalafy							
Fodkas							
ilmoe.com							
Iqroqiroati							
Dhiyaussunnah.890m							
Abusaid							

Fadeonhorizon							
Ammarharits							
Sunnisalafi							
Ahluluahwa							
Alfata18							
Abulizz							
Pakisbintaro							
Infosalafy							
Renggap							
Salafiindo							
63129.multiply.com							
Ikhwanmuslim							
Dwinoviyanto							
Pentasatrya							
Muwahiid							
Kajian4semua							
Subarkah							
Abu-mohammad							
Salafuna							
Salafiyin							
Assalafi							
Sunniy							
Najiyah							
Blogsalafi							
Mumtazanas							
Almaidany							
Abufadhil							
Aswj							
Salafysalatiga							
Abasalma							
Tazhim-assunnah							
Anakmuslim							

Algozely							
Salafy.iwebland							
Ahlussunnah.web.id							
Salafyblogs							
Menikahsunnah							
Kolomsalafy							
Haulasyiah							
Abu-saad							
Antosalafy							
Elha							
Ghuroba 110							
Alatsar							
Wiramandiri							
Atsary							
Abdurrahmanmoslem							
Abdurrahman							
Alwasithiyyah							
Ashthy							
Alhujjah.wordpress.com							
Ahlulhadits							
Rijalwannab							
Fadhyoke							
Alhasanah08							
Almujahadah							
Jalansunnah							
Kaahil							
Aththaifah							
Firqatunnajiyah							
Ashaby							
Problemamuslim							
Abusalafy01 130							
Belajarislam							

Aththaifahmansurah							
Muhammadreza							
Assunnahmadiun							
Alklateniy							
Kajiansalafyui							
Mimbarsunnah.co.cc							
Alghurobanunukan							
Darus-sunnah							
Islamic-therapy							
Tauhiddansyirik							
Jaziraharab							
Rumahbelajaribnuabbas							
Salafiyiin							
Salafykediri							
Anakampah							
Ruanghakim							
Kautsarku							
Aris-at							
Syahruramadhan							
Adaapadim							
Islamy.darussalam							
Cahayasalaf							
Yony23							
Assamarindy							
Mimbarsunnah.co.cc							
Maktabahsunnah							
Salafiyunm							
Alistiqomah.web.id							
Rizkytulus.salafy.ws							
Muslim-sinjai							
Muslimuny.ilmoe							
Sahab al-Salafiyah							

Sahab.net							
Salafi Durus							
Troid Canada							
Wahhaby Myth							
As-Salafy							
Al-Baseerah							
Islam for Kids							
Fatwa Online							
Assalafi.com							
Fatwa Islam							
Salaf							
Al Quran Online							
Islamic Knowledge							
Download Centre							
Download Kitab Arab							
Salafi Villa							
Al-Ilmu.us							
179	22	9	6	12	4	3	7

Table 3 Categories of Haraki Salafi Faction's Links Based on Target Web Content (Total: 189 links)

Information and Teachings	Religious Authorities	Learning Institutions	Online Business	Online Publications	Online Radio/Audio/TV	Online Communities	Salafi Women
Almanhaj	Khalid Syamhudi	Yayasan Dar el-Iman Padang	Pengusaha Muslim	Majalah Nikah	Ngaji Online	Forum Assunnah	Muslimah.or.id
Darus Sunnah	Aris Munandar	Mahad Imam Bukhari Solo		Majalah El-Fata	Radio Rodja		Ummu Salma
Fatwa Ulama	Abdul Tuasikal	Mahad Al-Irsyad Surabaya		Majalah Assaliim	Hang Batam		Lembaga Muslimah Pusat
Forum Studi Unand	Abu Ali	Madrasah Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal		Buletin At-Tauhid	Radio Muslim		Forum Muslimah Da'wah Kampus
Manhaj.or.id	Basweidan	Mahad Al-Furqon		Majalah Assunnah	Radio Ar-Royyan		
Perpustakaan Islam	Abdullah Roy	HASMI Islamic School		Digital Assunnah	Ahsan TV		
Salafi Starter Page	Abu Haidar	HASMI Depok		Pustaka At-Turots	Wahdah Radio		
Villa Baitullah	Abu Zubair	Wahdah Yogya		Majalah Al-Ashalah			
Hakekat Syiah Imamiyah	Markaz Al-Albani	Wahdah Gorontalo					
Google Assunnah	Abdul Azhim Badawi	Wahdah Bandung					
Tarbiyah	Abdul Azizi Alu	Mahad Ali Al-					

Singapore	Sheikh	Wahdah					
Assunnah (feed situs)	Abdul Aziz ar-Rajihi	Wahdah Lubuk Banggai					
Kajian.net	Abdul Aziz ar-Rayyis	Wahdah Makassar					
Gen Syiah	Abdul Aziz bin Baaz	YPWI					
Jilbab	Abdul Aziz Bura'i	SMA IT Wahdah					
Jadwal Kajian	Abdul Muhsin Al Abbad	Alumni STIBA					
Info Kajian Muslim	Abdul Muhsin Ubaikan	Markaz Sunnah					
Konsultasi Syariah	Abdul Qodir al Arnauth	Wahdah Bau-bau					
Soal Jawab Muslim.or.id	Abdullah al Fauzan	Wahdah Soppeng					
Abu Salma	Abdullah al Zafiri	Wahdah Gowa					
Salafy ITB	Abdullah Jibrin	Wahdah Muna					
Assunnah.web.id	Abdur Razaq Afifi	Wahdah Sinjai					
Abu Faris	Abdus Salam Barjas	Wahdah Sidrap					
Bambang Wahono	Abdu Abdil Muiz Firkuz	Wahdah Palopo					
Salafiyun Unpad	Abu Ashim al Ghamidi	Wahdah Maros					
Syababussunnah	Abu Bakr al Mishri	Wahdah Pulau Buru					
Abu Muslih	Abu Islam Salih Taha	Wahdah Bulukumba					
Beasiswa Pendidikan Islam	Abu Malik al Juhanni	Wahdah Belopa					
EL-Sunnah	Abu Umar al	Wahdah Limboto					

	Utaibi						
IPMI Pemuda	Ahmad Yahya Najmi	Wahdah Jeneponto					
Zaitun Ruqyah	Ali Hasan al Halabi	Wahdah Enrekang					
Maktabah al-Iman	Ali Ridha	Islamic Centre Bin Baz					
Pembangunan Mesjid	Ali Yahya al Haddadi	Jamilurrahman As-Salafy					
Ikhwah Madinah	Alwi as Saqqof	Lajnah Da'wah					
Ahlul Hadits wal Atsar	Hisyam al Arifi	Rumah Sakit At-Turots					
Al-Menhaj	Imam al Ajurri	Lajna Sarana Fisik					
Maktabah Misyaktul Islamiyyah	Kholid al Muslih						
Maktabah Ruhul Islam	Lajnah Daimah						
Maktabah Sahab Salafiyyah	M.Ismail Muqodaam						
Maktabah Shayidul Fawaid	M.Abdillah al Imam						
Multaqo Salafiyyah	M. al Hammud al Najdi						
Muntadiyat al-Barq	M.Arnab al Jami						
Ahlul Hadeeth	M. Ibrahim al Hamd						
Al-Baseerah	M. Khalifah Tamimi						
Al Ibanah	Majdi Arafat						
Al Muflihoon	Masyaikh Sudan						

Call to Islam	Masyhur Hasan Salman						
Darul Ihsan	Muhammad al Magrawi						
Darul Kitab wal Hikmah	Muhammad al Usaimin						
Fatwa Online	M. Musa Nashr						
Islamic Knowledge	M. Aid Ruslan						
Madeenah	Muqbil bin Hadi						
Riyadus Salihin	Mustofa al Adawi						
Salafi Manhaj	Mashir al Barrak						
Islam Download	Nashir al Din al al Albani						
Al Inshof	Rabi al Madkhali						
Markaz Quran	Sa'ad al Hushayin						
Bursa Ukhuwah	Said Abdul Azhim						
	Salim al Ajmi						
	Salim Ied al Hilali						
	Shalih al Fauzan						
	Shalih as Suhaimi						
	Sulthan al Ied						
	Taqiyudin al Hilali						
	Ulama Yaman						
	Wahid Salam Bali						
	Yahya al Hajuri						
	Abdur Rauf Shakur						
	Albani Centre						
	Bilal Philips						
	Salih as Salih						
	Jalal Abu Alrub						

	Nadir Ahmad						
	Ummu Junayd						
58	74	36	1	8	7	1	4

Table 4 Categories of Jihadi Salafi Faction's Links Based on Target Web Content

Information and Teachings	Religious Authorities	Learning Institutions	Online Business	Online Publications	Online Radio/Audio/TV	Online Communities	Salafi Women
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5 Salafi Movement's Categories of Links Based on Target Web Content (Summary)

Salafi Factions	Information and Teachings	Religious Authorities	Learning Institutions	Online Business	Online Publications	Online Radio/Audio/TV	Online Communities	Salafi Women	Total
Yemeni Salafists	179	22	9	6	12	4	3	7	242
Haraki Salafists	58	74	36	1	8	7	1	4	189
Jihadi Jihadists	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Chapter Eight

Responding to Current Issues Online

The internet has become an important new resource for social movements because it provides communication opportunities that are not offered by mainstream media. The internet can serve as an alternative form of media, bypassing mainstream media gatekeepers or repressive governments to enable social movement actors to communicate directly with their constituents and a wider audience (Bennet and Iyengar 2008; Thorson 2008; Bennet 2003a; Bennet 2003b; Boyd 2003). Drawing on alternative media scholarship (Downing 2001 and 2003; Rodriguez 2001), Stein (2009:753) argues that through its combination of greater speed, lesser expense, wider geographical reach and relative freedom from centralized gatekeepers, the internet allows social movements to provide alternative information about their perspectives on issues to their particular target groups. Thus, the internet can play a role in countering misinformation and disinformation in the mainstream media, disrupting prevalent perspectives and offering alternative ones.¹

While the above notion of the internet's role is useful, a key question is: what is the ultimate goal of using the internet to provide alternative information about issues? Social actors are not satisfied by simply using the internet to provide alternative information, for their ultimate purpose is the continuation of their movement.

¹There are of course qualifications to this portrayal of the technical power of internet to bypass official gatekeepers. Garry Rodan (1998), for example, in his analysis of the internet policy in Singapore argues that "a central feature of the Singapore strategy on internet control is the attempt to bring this medium under the same tight regimen as other electronic and nonelectronic media" (p. 88). The same government control is found in the cases of the internet in China. See, in particular, Tai (2007); Tsui (2003); Wu (1996); and Cullen and Choi (1999).

While previous chapters have examined particular aspects of the Salafi factions' use of the internet as a response to their level of resources, this chapter deals with their use of the internet to respond to current issues. It examines how the Salafi factions, as social movement actors, mobilized the internet to respond to current issues by providing alternative information and/or their perspectives on those issues. It will show that their use of the internet is generally a coping strategy to deal with the lack of resources they face in attempting to sustain their movement. However, the Salafi factions' actual use of the internet to respond and provide alternative information about current issues varied due to each group's differential access to offline resources. In doing so, the chapter first identifies the types of current issues to which the Salafists respond and describes the way they used websites to respond to these current issues; second, it explains why Salafi factions mobilized the web in different ways; and lastly, the chapter evaluates the extent to which this use of the internet has impacted upon resource mobilization among different Salafi factions.

Types of Issues and Salafi Responses Online

The Salafi factions used their websites to publish articles on a wide range of current issues. Each Salafi faction paid attention to what was happening in its society, its country, and the world. An analysis of the issues covered on their websites reveals that the Salafi factions responded to two types of current issues: local and global ones. The local issues were actual events that had occurred or were occurring in Indonesia, and problems facing Islam and Muslims in Indonesia. The global current issues consisted of events related to the interests of Islam and Muslims in countries other than Indonesia, in other regions and around the world.

Local Issues

Salafi factions responded to local issues by publishing articles on their websites on issues or actual events they believed to be related to the

interests of Islam and Muslims in Indonesia. Most of the articles and postings on these local issues were self-published by the Salafi factions. The writers or posters were Salafi leaders and teachers (*ustadh*) or Salafi web administrators who published the articles with the approval of their supervisors, who were normally their Salafi leaders or teachers.

Through their websites, Haraki Salafists, the group with the best access to resources within the Salafi movement in Indonesia, addressed key local issues they regarded to be in the interests of Indonesian Muslims. However, of the 12 selected Haraki Salafi websites, only three published articles on local issues (www.wahdah.or.id, www.hasmi.org, and <http://al-irsyad.org>). In total, Haraki Salafists published only ten articles on local issues (Table 1). The Haraki Salafists did not maximise the potential of the web as a resource for providing information about these local issues. They not only responded to fewer issues, but also published fewer articles on them. Of the ten articles on the selected websites, three were about *jilbab* (Muslim women's head coverings), two were on the role of Muslim Arabs in Indonesia, and the rest of the articles were the Haraki Salafists' responses to local issues related to Western ideas of secularism, democracy and pluralism, state surveillance of Muslim preachers, current condition of Muslims in Indonesia, and Sunni-Shi'ite dialogue. Almost all articles and postings on these local issues were authored by members of the websites' sponsoring group.

On the other hand, Yemeni Salafists, who were less well-resourced than the Haraki Salafists, utilized the web extensively as a resource for providing information about local issues. There were more Yemeni Salafi websites –14 in the sample selected– that responded to local current issues, with all such articles authored by members of the group. They were concerned with eleven issues including the Bali bombings and other bombings in Indonesia, the impact of the Aceh tsunami, 'misguided' Islamic groups, shamanism, environment issues, and the spread of pirated computer

software. In total, around 40 articles were published by the Yemeni Salafi faction responding to these local issues, with the majority about the Bali bombings and other terrorists' attacks in Indonesia (Table 2).

Furthermore, the least well-resourced Salafi faction, Jihadi Salafists, employed its websites much more extensively to respond to local current issues than the previous two Salafi factions. Arrahmah community (www.arahmah.com), for example, published more articles and postings, which were mostly self-published ones, in its responses to 67 issues in Indonesia.² The most frequently discussed issues included jihadism, jihadi groups and jihadi media, sectarian and religious conflicts in Poso, Central Sulawesi, the infamous group Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders Front), minority Muslim groups, George Bush's visit to Indonesia, and natural disasters. As a jihadi-oriented Salafi website, Arrahmah was mobilized mostly for publishing articles and providing this group's perspective on jihad-related issues. In total, it published around 180 articles responding to local issues (Table 3).

This shows that although all Salafi factions used the web to respond to local current issues, in practice they varied in the extent to which they mobilized the internet technology for this. Haraki Salafists employed the web to only a small degree to provide information about, and respond to, local current affairs, while Yemeni Salafists mobilized the web much more to respond to local issues. But, Jihadi Salafists optimised the web significantly more than either of the other two Salafi factions for this purpose.

Global Issues

In addition, the Salafi movement used the internet as a medium for responding to global current issues. They were not only aware of current

²There were four Salafi Jihadi communities with four jihadi websites selected for this study (<http://almuhajirun.net>, <http://al-mustaqbal.net>, www.arahmah.com and www.voa-islam.com). Due to the large number of the articles they published on their websites as each maintained their websites daily in the form of online magazines and online news portals, I confined the analysis on one community with one active website, namely www.arahmah.com, which I believe to be representative of the Jihadi Salafi faction.

events happening in their home country, but also of events taking place, or problems facing Muslims, in countries and societies in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and other parts of the world. Articles related to these global issues were posted on their websites.

In the same way they responded to local issues, Haraki Salafists employed the web to a lesser extent for providing information about global issues. They published only around 20 articles in total in their responses to nine global issues. These included the issues of terrorism, the decline of the Muslim world, Israel-Palestine conflicts, Valentine's Day, US-led invasion of Iraq, Islamophobia, football World Cup, two movies (*2012* and *Fitna*) and global warming (Table 1).

By contrast, the Yemeni Salafi faction provided more articles on a larger range of global current issues on its websites. Yemeni Salafists responded to around thirty global current socio-political affairs including the issues of Israel-Palestinian conflicts, terrorism, Christmas and Valentine's Day, and suicide bombings. In total, in their responses to current global issues, the Yemeni Salafi faction provided their web readers with 140 self-published articles (Table 2).

Compared to the two previous Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafi faction went further by publishing many more articles responding to global issues. Jihadi Salafists also responded to a wider range of global issues with around 90 issues related to Muslim interests in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. The Arrahmah community published around 800 articles responding to these global issues. The Israel-Palestinian conflict was on the top of the Jihadi Salafists' list of most prominent global issues with 129 articles published on this. It is then followed by other issues involving jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda and Taliban, the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, Islam in the West, US-Iraq relations, and US-led invasion of Iraq (Table 3).

These findings were consistent with those regarding the Salafi factions' responses to local current issues noted above. Just as they published

few articles on global current issues, the Haraki Salafists also used their websites rarely to provide alternative information about these issues, with the Yemeni Salafists much more active in responding to global current issues. But, Jihadi Salafists mobilized the web more than Yemeni Salafists, making them the group that responded most extensively on their websites to global current issues.

However, there was one common trend among the Salafi factions in that each group responded to global issues more than to local ones (Table 4). For the well-resourced Haraki Salafists, 65% of articles on current issues on their websites were in response to global issues and only 34% in response to local issues. The same balance was true for the less well-resourced Salafi factions. Through its website, the Yemeni Salafi faction provided its website readers with 140 articles on current global issues and only 37 articles on local issues. That is around 80% of the total number of articles on current affairs published by the Yemeni Salafists' are responses to current global issues with only 20% to local issues.

Jihadi Salafists also reflected the same trend. Of their total of almost one thousand articles, around 800 (or about 82%) were on global issues and only 180 (or 18%) were on local issues. These figures show that, of the three Salafi factions, the Jihadi Salafists were most responsive to current global issues.

These findings demonstrated that the different Salafi factions adopted similar strategies to use the web to respond to current issues, but they varied in its actual mobilization. The Salafi factions with limited access to resources (Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists) mobilized the internet more than the faction which had good access to other resources (Haraki Salafists) to respond to current issues (see Table 5).

The well-resourced Haraki Salafi faction responded to both local and global current issues less than the poorly resourced groups, the Yemeni Salafists and Jihadi Salafists. Of all articles published by all Salafi factions, the

Haraki Salafi faction published only around 4% of all articles on local current issues and around 2% of all articles on current global issues. In total, the Haraki Salafists provided their readers with the lowest percentage (2.4%) of all articles published by all Salafi factions (around 1200 articles) in their responses to current local and global issues (Table 5).

By contrast, the resource-poor Yemeni Salafi faction published more with 16% of all articles on local issues and 14% of all articles on global issues published by different Salafi factions. Generally, it responded to current issues more than the Haraki Salafi faction, providing 15% of all articles on local and global current issues published by all Salafi factions (Table 5).

The similar pattern of web use was seen in the case of the other resource-poor Salafi faction, Jihadi Salafists. They responded to current issues the most among the Salafi factions, publishing 79% of all articles on local current issues and 84% of all articles on global issues published by all Salafi factions. In total, the Jihadi Salafi faction provided the highest percentage (82%) of all articles on local and global issues published by different Salafi factions (Table 5).

Internet Responses to Issues and Resource Variation among the Salafi factions

The above pattern of Salafi factions' web use certainly raises a question: why did different Salafi factions mobilise the web to respond to current issues in different degrees? As has been demonstrated, the answer can be found in the fact the Salafi factions varied in their access to resources. The use of the web to respond to current issues was closely linked to resource variation among the Salafi factions resulting in a pattern of internet use whereby the less a Salafi faction had access to resources, the more extensively it mobilized the web to respond to current issues. Thus, a Salafi faction's use of the internet to respond to current issues was a coping strategy to deal with its lack of certain resources.

This is particularly identified in the Salafi factions' use of websites to provide alternative information about particular issues to that published by mainstream media in Indonesia (as will be described below). In fact, the Salafi factions varied in terms of the frequency of articles published on their websites to respond to these issues. In some cases, a Salafi faction published many articles on certain issues, but gave little attention to other issues. Other Salafi factions, in other cases, published few articles or did not publish at all to respond to particular issues. From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, this choice or selection is not without purpose. This indicates that certain issues were chosen because they reflected the interests of the Salafi factions. The group felt it needed to respond appropriately to particular issues, while regarding other issues as of little or no concern. This internet practice not only indicated the importance of the selected issues, but more importantly also provided opportunities for a Salafi faction to express its perspectives about the issues in its attempt to deal with its lack of certain resources.

We now examine the specific issues deemed important to particular groups, to analyse what this indicates about each Salafi faction.

Key Issues for the Haraki Salafi Faction

Highlighted Local Issues

Within the Haraki Salafi faction, the local issues to which it responded the most included the controversial statement by the president of Islamic party PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera) regarding *jilbab* (Muslim women's head covering), Sunni-Shi'ite relation, and the roles of Arab countries for Indonesia.

Tifatul Sembiring, the president of PKS, stated that the issue of the *jilbab* should not be taken seriously because it was just a piece of cloth, and whether one's wife wore a *jilbab* or not would not necessarily enable one to

solve economic, educational and health problems.³ Through its websites, Wahdah Islamiyyah (WI), the Haraki Salafi subgroup most responsive to current issues, published a press release to respond to Tifatul's statement. According to its deputy chairman, Ikhwan Abdul Jalil, WI condemned the president of PKS for his statement because the *jilbab* was more than just a piece of cloth; it constituted a religious issue and wearing it was an observance of God's teaching and order. He further asked Tifatul to clarify his statement; otherwise Tifatul and his party would lose votes from WI and other Muslim groups in Indonesia in the 2009 general election.⁴

Furthermore, the Haraki Salafists' attempts to counter what this group saw as misunderstanding and misinformation about Islam and Muslims was evident in their response to the role of Arab people in Indonesia. Ruhut Sitompul, a politician of the ruling party, Partai Demokrat, and a member of campaign team for Susilo Yudhoyono-Boediono in the 2009 presidential election, claimed that, compared to US and other western countries, Arab nations did not provide aid to assist the development of Indonesia.

In response, Wahdah Islamiyyah published articles declaring that Ruhut was unaware of the history of Arab countries' support for the Indonesian struggle for independence from Western (Dutch) imperialism, for they were the first countries that recognized Indonesian independence in 1945. Ruhut was also considered ignorant of Arab countries' substantial contribution to Indonesia's economic development through *dana hibah* (grants and endowments) when US and other Western countries were unwilling to provide these. Therefore, WI proposed that Ruhut be suspended

³The context of Tifatul's statement was a presidential campaign in 2009 when PKS supported Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, whose wife does not wear *jilbab*, to run for presidency for the second term. For Tifatul Sembiring's statement on *jilbab*, see *Tempo*, edition 1-7 June 2009, p. 29;

<http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2009/06/01/LU/mbm.20090601.LU130490.id.html>

⁴"Wahdah Islamiyah Sesalkan Pernyataan Presiden PKS"; "Soal Jilbab, Wahdah Kecam Presiden PKS"; and "Wahdah Minta Klarifikasi Presiden PKS tentang "Selembur Kain Saja kok Dirisaukan"", www.wahdah.or.id, accessed 11 June 2010.

from membership of SBY-Boediono presidential campaign team because he had offended an ethnic group (Arabs in Indonesia) and its religion (Islam).⁵

For the Haraki Salafists, their raising of the above issues demonstrated their will to counter misinformation about Islam. They believed the wearing of a *jilbab* was an obligation for Muslim women based on Islamic texts. Counterattacking those who criticize and oppose the *jilbab* was regarded by the Haraki Salafists as a religious obligation. By doing this, the Haraki Salafists wanted to show their web visitors that they were the guardians of the 'true' teachings of Islam.

The Haraki Salafists felt obliged to refute Ruhut's statement partly because they had strong intellectual and financial relations with some Arab countries in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, regarded as the centre of Islam. By rejecting Ruhut's statement, the Haraki Salafi faction presented themselves as defenders of the centre of Islam and in solidarity with the global Muslim community.

This attempt was also seen in their responses to the issues of Sunni-Shi'ite relations and democracy.⁶ By claiming that Shi'ites violate Islam, and by even considering them to be non-Muslims, and by regarding democracy as contrary to Islamic teachings, the Haraki Salafists presented themselves as the protectors of 'true' Islam from any un-Islamic ideas and behaviours.

What is more important here is the significance of responding to these issues as a coping strategy to deal with the Haraki Salafists' lack of resources. By raising these issues on its websites and claiming to be the protectors of 'true' Islam and the defenders of the centre of Islam, the Haraki Salafi faction sought to attract more resources to overcome their relative lack of resources. As has been explained in the Chapter Four, in fact, compared to other Salafi factions, the Haraki Salafists had much better access to various

⁵"Surat Pernyataan Sikap Wahdah Islamiyah tentang Pernyataan Ruhut Sitompul"; "Wahdah Islamiyah Kecam Ruhut Sitompul", www.wahdah.or.id, accessed 11 June 2010.

⁶"Kaum Muslimin di Antara Inkubasi Sekularisme dan Doktrin Demokrasi"; "Tanggapan Pemberitaan di Fajar dan Pemuatan Hasil Tanggapan", www.wahdah.or.id, accessed 11 June 2010.

kinds of resources, and they only suffered from the lack of moral resources. By presenting themselves as the guardians of Islamic teachings and the defenders of the centre of Islam through their strong responses to these local issues noted above, the Haraki Salafists sought to compensate for this lack of moral resources. In this way, they sought indirectly to attract visitors to their websites, to provide their group with more legitimacy, solidarity and sympathetic support, on the basis of their efforts to protect the purity of Islam from any un-Islamic elements and to defend the centre of Islam and *ummah* solidarity.

Nevertheless, looking at the low number of articles on local current issues on its websites (only 7 local issues with 10 articles on them in total), the Haraki Salafi faction did not optimise the internet to respond to current issues as a strategy to overcome their lack of resources. As explained in the Chapter Four, the Haraki Salafi faction had greater access to various salient resources than other two Salafi factions. Because they were confident of being self-sufficient in offline resources, Haraki Salafists felt less pressure to optimise their online presence to respond to local issues.

Global Issues that Attracted Most Responses

The above pattern was also identified in the Haraki Salafists' responses to global issues. The global issues to which they most often responded included terrorism conducted by those claimed to be Muslims in the name of *jihad*, the films *2012* and *Fitna*, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The issue of terrorism in the name of Islam tops the list of global issues on the Haraki Salafi websites. From the perspective of Haraki Salafists, the attacks and bombings like those conducted by Al Qaeda were not a holy war for a Divine cause, but rather terrorism. Quoting the *fatwa* of Ha'iat Kibar al-'Ulamā` (Commission of Senior Religious Authorities) of Saudi Arabia, they took the view that this terrorism is rooted in un-Islamic doctrines, particularly *takfir*, a doctrine that says that a Muslim or a Muslim ruler is declared to be *kafir* (disbeliever) when he is in breach of Islamic law and

teachings, which was developed by Sayyid Qutb, the ideologue of al Ikhwan al-Muslimun.⁷

Therefore, with references to various Quranic verses and the Prophet Muhammad's sayings (*hadis*), the Haraki Salafists concluded with a *hukm* (judgement) that terrorism is not in line with Islam as it is a gross sinful act conducted by misled Muslims and its consequences bring about enmity among people and damage to Muslims and mankind.⁸ To solve terrorism, they proposed, Muslims who are involved in terrorism should be brought back to the true understanding of Islam according to the way of Salaf. This can be achieved through dialogue and counselling between those misled Muslims and Muslim religious authorities who are well-known for their thorough knowledge of Islam and their respected attitudes.⁹

This Haraki Salafists' self-presentation as the guardians of the purity of Islam was also seen in their response to two films, *2012* and *Fitna*. Released in 2009, *2012* is a Hollywood science fiction disaster movie that portrays the catastrophic events of the Day of Judgement happening in the year 2012 with references to Mayan Long Count calendar. According to Haraki Salafists, the movie is misleading because it contradicts the Islamic belief that the Day of Judgment is only known to Allah, and that even His messenger, Muhammad, had no knowledge when it will come. So, the film

⁷"Bermula dari Pengkafiran, Berujung Pengeboman", http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Itemid=98, accessed 28 June 2010; "Siapa Sebenarnya Pembangkit Radikalisme dan Terorisme Modern di Tengah Umat Islam?", http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79:siapa-sebenarnya-pembangkit-radikalisme-dan-terorisme-modern-di-tengah-umat-islam&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, accessed 28 June 2010.

⁸"16 Kesalahan Aksi Pengeboman", http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=81:16-kesalahan-aksi-pengeboman&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, 28jun10; "Buang Bom kok Sembarangan", www.ustadzaris.com/buang-bom-kok-sembarangan/, accessed 2 June 2010.

⁹"Kiat Mengatasi Terorisme di Tengah Kaum Muslimin", http://majalah-assunnah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=80:kiat-mengatasi-terorisme-di-tengah-kaum-muslimin&catid=47:mabhats&Itemid=97, accessed 28 June 2010.

was regarded dangerous as it can taint or even destroy the purity of Muslim viewers' faith.¹⁰

Fitna is a short film uploaded on the internet in 2008 and produced by Geert Wilders of the Dutch ultra-right Party for Freedom (PVV). It depicts the Quran as comparable to Hitler's *Mein Kampf* as it is considered a source of terrorism and violence, which should be banned. Wahdah Islamiyyah regarded *Fitna* as an Islamophobic movie produced by an anti-Islam provocateur who promotes blasphemy and humiliation of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad and Muslims. They regarded the film as showing Wilders' ignorance of Islam and, more importantly, his fear of the fast spread of Islam in the West.¹¹

The last global current issue that evokes most frequent responses from the Haraki Salafis was the Israel-Palestinian conflict. For Haraki Salafists, Israeli military aggression in Palestine is a form of Jewish enmity and hatred of Islam and Muslims. Quoting some Quranic verses, they argued that it is a religious conflict in which Jews have attempted, and will continue, to destroy Islam and Muslims. Any UN resolutions supported by the US and other Western countries to ease the conflict have failed because they were considered unfair as they often accommodate the interests of Israel, but ignore those of the Palestinian people. Haraki Salafist regarded this as evidence that Israel and its allies, particularly the US, are united to destroy Islam and Muslims.

Therefore, the Haraki Salafists pointed out, Indonesian Muslims must make every effort to fight against Israel through providing financial and material assistance, labour, or at least saying prayers for the victory of Muslims and the defeat of Israel.¹² They also saw jihad as a solution to the

¹⁰"2012...Kiamat', <http://www.pesantrenalirsyad.org/artikel/detil/14>, accessed 12 July 2010.

¹¹"Fitna, Bukan Sekedar Film", <http://wahdah.or.id/2008/04/fitna-bukan-sekedar-film/>, accessed 11 June 2010.

¹²'Di Balik Agresi Militer Israel ke Palestina and Libanon', www.wahdah.or.id, accessed 11 June 2010.

Israel-Palestinian conflict. But, they preferred jihad in the form of humanitarian aid, such as health services, medicines, and financial aid that can be used by Palestinian Muslims to meet their needs in the field, rather than involvement in military or combative actions.¹³

Through such responses to current global issues, the Haraki Salafi faction showed its web visitors, that it was concerned about efforts of those it regarded as the enemies of Islam to destroy Islam and Muslims. As with their responses to local issues noted above, Haraki Salafists presented themselves as the defenders of Islam and the global Muslim *ummah* and the guardians of the purity of Islam and Muslim faith. By doing so, they attempted to attract more sympathetic support and legitimacy for their movement in order to overcome their lack of moral resources.

As with their responses to local issues noted above, however, Haraki Salafists attempts to use the internet to compensate for their lack of moral resources were not evident in their web responses to global issues. They did not optimise the web to provide alternative information about global current affairs (in total, only 11 issues with 20 articles about these). Again, self-confidence and feelings of sufficiency resulting from having better access to other kinds of resources have contributed to Haraki Salafists' low use of the web to respond to current issues, as a strategy to cope with their lack of moral resources.

Key Issues for Yemeni Salafists

By contrast, using the internet to respond to current issues as a coping strategy to deal with lack of resources was more clearly seen in the web practice of the Yemeni Salafi faction. Yemeni Salafists published more articles on current local and global issues than Haraki Salafists.

Highlighted Local Issues

¹³"Ingin Berjihad ke Palestine", <http://www.alsofwah.or.id/index.php?pilih=lihatkonsultasi&id=82>, accessed 10 June 2010.

Within the Yemeni Salafi faction, the local issues to which it frequently responded included bombings in Indonesia in the 2000s, popular shamanism, and the so-called 'misguided' Muslim groups.

Regarding the bombings in Indonesia in the 2000s such as Bali bombings, Makassar bombings, Marriot Hotel and Ritz-Carlton Hotel bombings, Yemeni Salafists published 20 articles on their websites. With references to Quranic verses and the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, the Yemeni Salafists argued that theologically the bombings contradicted the teachings and values of Islam, the religion of love and justice for the universe. Contrary to the claims of the perpetrators, these bombings were not *jihad*, but rather crimes and terrorising of humanity, because such behaviour did not meet the required conditions of true *jihad*.¹⁴ The perpetrators were not *mujahid* (holy warriors), neither are they *shahid* (martyrs) if they die in these actions.¹⁵

Socio-politically, Yemeni Salafists argued, these terrorist acts have greatly disadvantaged Islam, Muslims and all mankind. The bombings have damaged the reputation of Islam and Muslims, caused rebellion and disloyalty to legitimate rulers, killed innocent people, and created corruption and disorder in the world.¹⁶ So, these acts were terrorism, which is

¹⁴"Peledakan demi Peledakan...Inikah Jihad?", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1535, accessed 18 April 2010; "Jangan Buang Bom Sembarang Tempat!", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1516, accessed 18 April 2010; <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1516>, accessed 5 April 2010; "Sikap Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah-Salafiyin terhadap Berbagai Aksi Terorisme-Khawarij", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1568>, accessed 2 April 2010; "Nordin N Stop", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1586>, accessed 2 April 2010.

¹⁵"Amrozi cs, Mati Syahidkah?", <http://darussunnah.or.id/materi-khusus/amrozi-cs-mati-syahidkah/>, accessed 17 April 2010; "Adakah Bom Syahid dalam Islam?", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=426>, accessed 3 April 2010; "Jangan Gampang Memvonis Mati Syahid!", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1320>, accessed 2 April 2010.

¹⁶"Dampak Negatif Aksi Terorisme", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1521, accessed 18 April 2010.

theologically, socially and politically wrong.¹⁷ Yemeni Salafits asserted that Muslims must eradicate the spread of terrorism masquerading as *jihad* by spreading true Islam as exemplified by the Salaf.¹⁸

Another common current issue raised by the Yemenis was local paranormal practices and shamanism that received quite wide media programming and advertising in the second half of the 2000s. Known as *orang pintar* ('smart people'), some figures enjoyed popularity and wide media coverage as 'celebrity paranormal practitioners and magicians' such as Gendeng Pamungkas, Mama Lauren, Joko Bodo, and *Dukun Cilik* ('Little Shaman') Ponari.

Yemeni Salafists warned Indonesian Muslims of the danger of these un-Islamic practices to the purity of Islam and their faith. According to them, these extensive interests in paranormal practices, sorcery and shamanism indicated that the Indonesian Muslim *ummah* was at the crossroad, with Muslims experiencing disorientation in their life and losing their ability to distinguish right from wrong and good from evil.¹⁹ With references to Islamic texts that prohibit sorcery and shamanism, Yemeni Salafists argued that the paranormal and shamanic practices were *shirk*, a forbidden belief and practice of associating the One God with creatures, and a breach of the core Islamic teaching of *tawhid* (the oneness of God). So, Yemeni Salafists considered the paranormal practitioners and shamans *kafir* (disbelievers)

¹⁷"Minyikapi Bom Bali 2- Terrorisme itu Sesat", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1010, accessed 20 April 2010.

¹⁸"Menyikapi Aksi-aksi Teroris Khawarij", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1511, accessed 18 April 2010; <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1556>, accessed 2 April 2010.

¹⁹"Orang Pintar", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=996>, accessed 1 April 2010; <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/aqidah/orang-pintar.html>, accessed 28 April 2010; <http://www.islamarticles.net/2009/11/ramalan-mama-lauren.html>, accessed 8 May 2010; "Muslim Indonesia di Persimpangan Jalan?!", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1409>, accessed 1 April 2010; "Dukun Ponari dan Fenomena Batu Petir", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1411>, accessed 1 April 2010.

and Muslims who visit them for advice or consultations commit a capital sin and, to some extent, are also considered *kafir*.²⁰

In addition, the Yemeni Salafi faction's effort to be the protectors of the purity of Islam was seen in its strong criticism of those it considered deviant Islamic groups such as Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah in Yogyakarta. Yemeni Salafists regarded the followers of Al-Qiyadah al-Islamiyah as straying from true Islam because they believe in a last messenger of God other than Muhammad (whom Muslims believe to be the last messenger of God), ignore the Prophet Muhammad's tradition, and only follow and interpret the Quran based on their own way of interpretation, not that of the Salaf.²¹

The above quite extensive responses to selected local current issues indicate that the Yemeni Salafi faction attempted more than the Haraki Salafi faction to assert before its web visitors and the Muslim *ummah* in general that Yemeni Salafists were the true guardians of Islamic teachings and Muslim faith, who were truly concerned with protecting the purity of Islam and Muslim faith from un-Islamic thoughts and behaviours.

More importantly, by doing so Yemeni Salafists attempted more actively than Haraki Salafists to use the internet to respond to local issues as a coping strategy to overcome their lack of resources. As explained in Chapter Four, the Yemeni Salafi faction had less access to some kinds of resources salient to its movement than the Haraki Salafi faction, suffering from the lack of moral, human, material and social-organizational resources. Through such

²⁰"Kafirnya Dukun dan Tukang Sihir", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=942>, accessed 1 April 2010; "Waspada Kesyirikan di Balik Ramalan Mama Lauren", <http://www.islamarticles.net/2009/11/ramalan-mama-lauren.html>, accessed 8 May 2010.

²¹"Memberangus Paham Nabi Palsu", <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/aqidah/memberangus-paham-nabi-palsu.html>, accessed 28 April 2010; <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1022>, accessed 1 April 2010; "Tafsir Al-Quran Gaya Rasul Baru (Membongkar Kesesatan Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah)", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=827>, accessed 15 April 2010; "Rasul Baru Itu Al-Masih Al-Maw'ud (Sesatnya Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah)", http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=1220, accessed 18 April 2010; http://www.asyariah.com/syariah.php?menu=detil&id_online=560, accessed 18 April 2010.

responses to the local issues, they employed the internet as a tool for generating more resources. In particular, they attempted to attract more legitimacy, solidarity, sympathetic support and even celebrity support. This was an attempt to manage with limited moral resources, new recruits and followers as they were short of human resources and financial support, to deal with their lack of material resources, and networks to cope with the lack of social-organizational resources.

The Most Significant Global Issues for Yemeni Salafists

Furthermore, Yemeni Salafists' attempt to use the internet to cope with their lack of resources was clearly manifested in their responses to global issues. Some global issues occupied their attention significantly so they published many articles about them on their websites. These included the Israel-Palestinian conflict, global terrorism, and the celebration of Christmas and Valentine's Day.

The Israel-Palestinian conflict was the global issue to which Yemeni Salafists gave most attention, with around 40 articles from the total of 140 articles published on global issues on their websites. To show the devastating impact of Israeli occupation on Palestinian Muslims, Yemeni Salafists called the Israel-Palestinian conflict "the tragedy of Palestine", "the tragedy of Gaza" and "the great tragedy of the Muslim *ummah*".²² They emphasized that the conflict is not merely a political struggle, but rather a religious conflict because both sides are motivated and fuelled by religious goals. Motivated by their religious beliefs, Israelis attempt to displace Palestinian Muslims from their homeland and claim it as their promised land. The Palestinian Muslims

²²"Tragedi Palestina", <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=299>, accessed 26 April 2010; <http://darussunnah.or.id/artikel-islam/manhaj/sikap-dan-kewajiban-umat-islam-terhadap-tragedi-palestina/print/>, accessed 17 April 2010; "Bimbingan dalam Menyikapi Berbagai Peristiwa Penting dan Tragedi Besar yang Menimpa Kaum Muslimim", <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=314#more-314>, accessed 25 April 2010.

and Muslims in other countries are also motivated by their religious beliefs to wage war against the Israeli occupation of Palestine.²³

Responding to this tragedy, Yemeni Salafists asserted that Muslims are obliged to defend their Palestinian Muslim brothers according to the Salafi ways.²⁴ Muslim countries and Muslim individuals must make every effort to fight against Israeli Jews or hold peace talks with them if necessary.²⁵ However, Yemeni Salafists believed the best support for Palestine is praying for Palestinians, followed by sending them material and financial support through legal and authorized channels.²⁶ They did not recommend campaigning for a boycott against Israeli products or staging demonstration because Muslims can be trapped in the practice of democracy, which, they believe, was created by Jews and therefore needs to be rejected by Muslims. The only permissible boycott of Israel is fighting against all thoughts and ideas originated and created by Jews, as such ideas are regarded as much more dangerous than Israeli manufactured goods.²⁷

Yemeni Salafists also provided extensive responses to another global issue, namely global terrorism conducted in the name of Islam and *jihad* for the cause of Allah. They published around twenty articles on terrorism on their websites. Responding to the 9/11 New York attacks, for example, they emphasized that from the perspective of Islamic doctrines the attacks were

²³“Krisis Palestina bukan Konflik Agama?”, <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1372>, accessed 6 April 2010.

²⁴“Bimbingan Islam dalam Menyikapi Tragedi Palestina”, <http://mimbarsunnah.org/bimbingan-islam-dalam-menyikapi-tragedi-palestina>, accessed 1 May 2010; <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=300#more-30>, accessed 1 May 2010.

²⁵“Kewajiban Ummat Islam dalam Menghadapi Krisis di Palestina”, http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=289, accessed 27 April 2010.

²⁶“Fatwa-Sikap & Kewajiban Ummat Islam atas Tragedi Palestina”, <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1374>, accessed 6 April 2010; <http://mimbarsunnah.org/sikap-kewajiban-ummat-islam-atas-tragedi-palestina>, accessed 1 May 2010; http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=294, accessed 27 April 2010; <http://darussunnah.or.id/artikel-islam/manhaj/sikap-dan-kewajiban-umat-islam-terhadap-tragedi-palestina/print/>, accessed 17 April 2010.

²⁷“Boikot Produk Israel”, <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=485>, accessed 25 April 2010; <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=799>, accessed 2 April 2010; “Berdemonstrasi untuk Palestina”, http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=291, accessed 27 April 2010.

not allowed by Islam, and not in line with the Islamic principles. The perpetrators were not *mujahid* and their actions were not *jihad* because they did not follow the rules of *jihad* as prescribed by the Quran and the Prophet Muhammad's tradition, such as the prohibition of killing non-combatant persons, old people, children and women, and destroying houses and trees. Rather, they were simply terrorist groups, suicide bombers and the followers of evil who masqueraded as Muslims.²⁸

Through their websites, Yemeni Salafists also asserted that the 9/11 attackers were not true Muslims because their action caused Muslims living in the West to receive unjust treatment, death threats, and to have to flee their homes seeking safety.²⁹ More importantly, they have damaged the reputation of Islam and Islamic proselytization, making Islam a scapegoat anytime a terror attack occurs.³⁰

The last most common global issue taken up by the Yemeni Salafists was the celebration of Christmas and Valentine's Day. These Salafists were primarily concerned with the growing number of Muslim youth in both Muslim and non-Muslim countries who are taking part in celebrating these two non-Islamic festivals.

Through thirteen articles published on their websites, Yemeni Salafists pointed out that Muslims are prohibited from participating in the

²⁸"Fatwa-fatwa Seputar Peristiwa 11 September (1)", <http://jihadbukankenistaan.com/terorisme/fatwa-fatwa-seputar-peristiwa-11-september-2001-1.html>, accessed 8 May 2010;

"Fatwa-fatwa Seputar Peristiwa 11 September (2)", <http://jihadbukankenistaan.com/terorisme/fatwa-fatwa-seputar-peristiwa-11-september-2001-2.html>, accessed 8 May 2010;

"Fatwa-fatwa Seputar Peristiwa 11 September (3)", <http://jihadbukankenistaan.com/terorisme/fatwa-fatwa-seputar-peristiwa-11-september-2001-3.html>, accessed 8 May 2010; "Bomber Atas Nama Jihad Pengikut-Pengikut Setan", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=1600>, accessed 6 April 2010.

"Fatwa-fatwa Seputar Peristiwa Seputar Peristiwa 11 September (4)", <http://jihadbukankenistaan.com/terorisme/fatwa-fatwa-seputar-peristiwa-11-september-2001-4.html>, accessed 8 May 2010.

²⁹"Fatwa-fatwa Seputar Peristiwa 11 September 2001 (5)", <http://jihadbukankenistaan.com/terorisme/fatwa-fatwa-seputar-peristiwa-11-september-2001-5.html>, accessed 8 May 2010.

³⁰"Ketika Islam Dikambinghitamkan", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=904>, accessed 2 April 2010.

celebrations of Christmas and Valentine's Day in any form including saying congratulations to Christians. With extensive references to global Salafi authorities such as Al- Lajnat al-Dā'imah li al-Buhūṣ al-'Ilmiyyat wa al-Iftā' (The Permanent Committee for Scientific Studies and Religious Consultation) of Saudi Arabia, Yemeni Salafists argued that Muslims are only allowed to celebrate two annual festival days as prescribed in the Prophet Muhammad's tradition and the Salaf way: Ied al-Fitr (a festival day after the fasting month of Ramadan) and Ied al-Adha (a festival day on the 9th day of the Hajj month of Dzulhijjah). Any other festival days are considered *bid'ah* (heretic practices) so that Muslims are forbidden to celebrate or take part in them.

In addition, Yemeni Salafists pointed out that celebrating or taking part in Christmas and Valentine's Day and other non-Muslim festivals is regarded as doing *tashabbuh* (imitating and following non-Muslim ways of life) and *al-wala'* (loyalty and loving) of non-Muslims, both of which are forbidden according to Salafi ideology. Therefore, they urged Muslims to maintain 'true' Islamic teachings by avoiding the celebration of Christmas, Valentine's Day and other non-Muslims' festival days.³¹ By taking this stance, Yemeni Salafists aimed to protect the purity of Islam and Muslim faith and behaviours from any ideas and practices coming from Jews and Christians.

³¹See e.g., "Hukum Perayaan Hari Kasih Sayang (Valentine Day)", http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=299, accessed 27 April 2010; "Menyorot Perayaan Valentine Day", <http://almakassari.com/artikel-islam/aqidah/menyorot-perayaan-valentine-days.html>, accessed 28 April 2010; "Hari Kasih atau Valentine dalam Tinjauan Syariat", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=85>, accessed 7 April 2010; "Seputar Perayaan Natal", <http://al-atsariyyah.com/?p=1432>, accessed 30 April 2010; "Menyikapi Perayaan Natal", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=495>, accessed 7 April 2010; <http://darussunnah.or.id/materi-khusus/menyikapi-perayaan-natal/>, accessed 17 April 2010; http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=833, accessed 17 April 2010; "Hukum Menyambut hari Natal/Non-Muslim & Tahun Baru", <http://www.darussalaf.or.id/myprint.php?id=488>, accessed 7 April 2010; http://www.salafy.or.id/salafy.php?menu=detil&id_artikel=384, accessed 7 April 2010; "Hukum Memenuhi Undangan Perayaan Natal", http://www.ahlussunnah-jakarta.com/artikel_detil.php?id=276, accessed 27 April 2010; "Hukum Turut Serta dalam Perayaan Natal dan Tahun Baru", <http://www.assalafy.org/mahad/?p=288#more-288>, accessed 25 April 2010.

Again, the above extensive responses to the global current issues served as evidence that Yemeni Salafists employed the web more actively than Haraki Salafists to deal with their lack of moral, human, financial, social-organizational resources. By providing their perspectives of the issues through the publication of a lot of articles on their websites, Yemeni Salafists presented themselves as the defenders of global Muslims and the protectors of the purity of Islam and Muslim faith from the propaganda of the enemies of Islam and any un-Islamic ideas and practices. As with their responses to local issues noted above, they attempted to attract their web visitors to give them more legitimacy, sympathetic support, and celebrity (moral resources), new members and skills (human resources), financial and physical capital (material resources), and networks (social-organizational resources).

Key Issues for Jihadi Salafists

Using the internet to deal with a lack of resources was more evident in the Jihadi Salafi faction's mobilization of the web to respond to current issues. Jihadi Salafists published around 180 articles on local issues and around 800 articles on global issues making them by far the most responsive Salafi faction to issues relevant to the Salafi movement in Indonesia.

The Most Concerning Local Issues

The local issues to which the Jihadi Salafi faction most frequently responded included the cases of Indonesian jihadists. Providing around 30 articles on the issue of local *jihadism* on its website, Arrahmah emphasized that Muslims who were arrested or killed by Indonesia's special anti-terrorist police force, which is known as Densus 88, are not terrorists, but rather *mujahid* (jihadists) who fight for Islam and defend Muslims against their enemies.³²

³²"Kejanggalan Penanganan Kasus Jihad Aceh", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/10/27/9677-kejanggalan-penanganan-kasus-jihad-aceh.html#sthash.T20lry9u.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Teroris Aceh Disidangkan, Dakwaan Jaksa Ngawur dan Tidak Jelas",

The Jihadi Salafists' position on the issue of violent jihad is in stark contrast to the stance of both the Yemeni and Hiraki Salafists discussed above. Arrahmah supported jihadi figures for their 'sincere struggles' for the application of Islamic law and the promotion of Islamic teachings in Indonesia. It praised those who were imprisoned or killed by Densus 88 as *shahid* (martyrs) including Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who was accused of being the leader of the terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, the three Bali bombers who were executed in 2008, and Dulmatin who was shot dead by Densus 88 in Tangerang in 2010.³³ Jihadi Salafists' support for the local jihadists was also articulated in their articles condemning Densus 88 for its allegedly excessive arrests and uncontrolled killing of jihadists. They even urged the Indonesian government to dissolve Densus 88 and reported the

<http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/10/01/9347-teroris-aceh-disidangkan-dakwaan-jaksa-ngawur-dan-tidak-jelas.html#sthash.CGJSO7ck.dpuf>, accessed 19 Oct 2010; "Malam Keprihatinan Penangkapan Ba'asyir Digelar JAT Solo", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/08/13/8727-malam-keprihatinan-penangkapan-baasyir-digelar-jat-solo.html#sthash.fingeTsW.dpuf>, accessed 19 Oct 2010; "Komisi III DPR Segera Bentuk Panja Ustadz Abu Bakar Ba'asyir", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/09/01/8985-komisi-iii-dpr-segera-bentuk-panja-ustadz-abu-bakar-baasyir.html#sthash.YxD7hqLD.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Wawancara Eksklusif dengan Ustadzah Paridah Abbas (Istri Syekh Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron)", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/10/27/2526-wawancara-eksklusif-dengan-ustadzah-parida-abbas-istri-syekh-mukhlas-alias.html#sthash.iPGJb4xw.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010.

³³"Ba'asyir: Mengapa Jasad Dulmatin Wangi?", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/03/13/7182-baasyir-mengapa-jasad-dulmatin-wangi.html#sthash.EtZ4JoBx.dpuf>, accessed 18 October 2010; "Umat Islam Solo Sambut Jenazah Sang Muallaf Yuki Wantoro sebagai Mujahid", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/10/01/9346-umat-islam-solo-sambut-jenazah-sang-muallaf-yuki-wantoro-sebagai-mujahid.html#sthash.6N7tjuH.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Sidang ke -12 M Jibriel, Terdakwa M Jibriel: Saya Merasa Didzolimi!", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/05/13/7820-sidang-ke-12-m-jibriel-terdakwa-m-jibriel-saya-merasa-didzolimi.html#sthash.WZQUUV1p.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Mengenang Buku Goresan Pena Trio Mujahid", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/01/01/6465-mengenang-buku-goresan-pena-trio-mujahid.html#sthash.AmzR1AzC.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; "Long Journey of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in Conspiracy Flows", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/08/13/8719-long-journey-of-abu-bakar-baasyir-in-conspiracy-flows.html#sthash.UR2T2nFx.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010.

special force's allegedly breach of human rights of jihadists to the National Commission of Human Rights.³⁴

Through these extensive responses, Jihadi Salafists asserted that they defend those they regard as defenders of Islam and Muslim. It was at this point that Jihadi Salafists differed from the other two Salafi factions. They did not limit themselves in their identification of who the 'true' holy fighters are. For them, those who fight for Islam and Muslims against the enemies of Islam, which are commonly identified to be the US and its allies, Jews and Christians, both in Muslim or non-Muslim countries, are considered to be jihadists. They identified those seen by Haraki Salafists and Yemeni Salafists as terrorist groups such as the three Bali bombers (discussed above) to be "the true jihadists".

The Poso conflict was another local issue to which Jihadi Salafists most frequently responded in an attempt to create a perception that they were the protectors of the true defenders of Islam and Muslims. By way of background, the Poso conflict was a socio-religious conflict between Muslims and Christians in the town of Poso, Sulawesi Tengah, which broke out in 2000 and continued till 2007.³⁵ Through many news articles on its websites, Arrahmah contended that Muslims in Poso were victims of the attacks and killings conducted by Poso Christians. In response to these attacks, they argued, Poso Muslims fought Christians to defend their lives, property and religion. Therefore, Arrahmah strongly criticized the Indonesian police force,

³⁴"Ustadz Ba'asyir: Densus 88 Antiteror Layak Dibubarkan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/24/639-ustadz-baasyir-densus-88-antiteror-layak-dibubarkan.html#sthash.1NpjYk0L.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010; "Densus 88 Diadukan ke Komnas HAM", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/05/27/7954-densus-88-diadukan-ke-komnas-ham.html#sthash.I2DEFj6M.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; "Sholat Taraweh dan Qunut Nazilah Melaknat Densus 88 di Solo", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/08/27/8921-sholat-taraweh-dan-qunut-nazilah-melaknat-densus-88-di-solo.html#sthash.FToEHlux.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Pemuda Islam Kota Solo Beraksi Lagi, 'Bubarkan Densus 88'", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/06/01/7993-pemuda-islam-kota-solo-beraksi-lagi-bubarkan-densus-88.html#sthash.fq2BI1BF.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010.

³⁵For further information about Poso conflicts, see Amidhan, *et al.* (2005); Tito Karnavian, *et al.* (2008); and Graham Brown, *et al.* (2005).

particularly Densus 88, for unjustly treating Poso Muslims as terrorists, and arresting their leaders.³⁶

Jihadi Salafists took a similar stance on Front Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders' Front), a hard line Muslim organization that claims to defend Islam and Muslim interests. Through its web articles, Arrahmah depicted FPI as the guardian of Muslim *ummah* faith and morality as seen in its protest against the Indonesian edition of *Playboy* and a seminar on and by a group of Indonesian gays, and its attacks of those who support religious pluralism and Muslim minority groups like Ahmadiyah and Shi'ites. Arrahmah regarded the leaders of Front Pembela Islam like Munarman to be the defenders of Islam and Muslims, who bravely forbid wrong and fight against immorality.³⁷

³⁶"Merenung tentang Poso", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/02/09/650-merenung-tentang-poso.html>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Polisi Diminta Hentikan Sementara Operasi di Poso", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/17/635-polisi-diminta-hentikan-sementara-operasi-di-poso.html#sthash.TzXkHduq.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010; "Polisi Dinilai Berlebihan dalam Tangani Konflik Poso", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/24/640-polisi-dinilai-berlebihan-dalam-tangani-konflik-poso.html#sthash.rtiQibHL.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010; "TPM Temukan Aparat Salah Sasaran pada Kasus Poso", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/30/647-tpm-temukan-aparat-salah-sasaran-pada-kasus-poso.html#sthash.iDXS9tCA.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010; "Sekjen FUI: Kasus Poso Bukan Cuma Kasus DPO", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/29/646-sekjen-fui-kasus-poso-bukan-cuma-kasus-dpo.html#sthash.2Zz9sflG.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010; "Tim Investigasi Poso: DPO Mengaku Diperlakukan Buruk oleh Aparat", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/25/644-tim-investigasi-poso-dpo-mengaku-diperlakukan-buruk-oleh-aparat.html#sthash.ztD9FLDk.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010.

³⁷"Pengacara Munarman Pertanyakan Proses Hukum Aktivis AKKBB", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/07/01/2001-pengacara-munarman-pertanyakan-proses-hukum-aktivis-akkbb.html#sthash.QXVe2Rfc.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Bukti Foto: Panitia AKKBB Todongkan Senjata ke FPI", Kapolri: AKKBB Sendiri yang Cari Masalah", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/06/13/1946-kapolri-akkbb-sendiri-yang-cari-masalah.html>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Umi Fadlun: Dokumen Pornografi di Rumah Habib Rizieq Barang Bukti Kasus Pornografi", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/09/13/2238-umi-fadlun-dokumen-pornografi-di-rumah-habib-rizieq-barang-bukti-kasus-porn.html#sthash.9kuOMGKY.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Akibat Reaksi FPI, Sidang Kasus 'Playboy' Ditunda", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/19/165-akibat-reaksi-fpi-sidang-kasus-playboy-ditunda.html#sthash.fq2gqzGM.dpuf>, accessed 14 October 2010; "FPI Minta Peserta Konferensi Gay Keluar dari Hotel", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/03/27/7330-fpi>

These extensive positive web responses to local jihadists created an image of the Jihadi Salafists as strong defenders of Islam and Muslims. By presenting themselves to be assertive protectors of the fighters for Islam and Muslims, Jihadi Salafists implicitly attempted to generate more new resources in the form of web visitors to sustain their movement.

As explained in Chapter Four, Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources among the Salafi factions in Indonesia. They lacked virtually any access to any types of resources except cultural resources. Strategically, by massively responding to these local issues to create the impression of themselves as the defenders of 'true' jihadists, Jihadi Salafists seemed to compensate for this lack of resources. Through this internet practice, they tacitly attempted to generate more solidarity, sympathetic support and legitimacy to overcome their lack of moral resources, attract more labour and supporters to overcome their lack of human resources, establish new networks and infrastructures to deal with their lack of social-organizational resources, and financial and physical capital to deal with their lack of material resources.

Jihadi Salafists' Key Global Issues

Moreover, Jihadi Salafists' attempt to use the internet as a strategy to cope with the lack of resources was reflected in their mobilization of the web to respond to current global issues. As mentioned, Arrahmah, for example, published around 800 articles on global issues. The most prominent issues included the Israel-Palestinian conflict about which Arrahmah published

[minta-peserta-konferensi-gay-keluar-dari-hotel.html#sthash.X30MBMJU.dpuf](#), accessed 18 October 2010.

around 130 articles. Through these articles, Arrahmah took the view that Palestinians are the fighters for Palestinian independence from the Israeli occupation. The Israeli government and people, who receive strong support from other Western countries, particularly the US, were seen as ruthless aggressors that occupy Palestinians' land and displace the Palestinians from their homeland for Jewish settlements.³⁸ Palestinian Muslims were depicted as the victims of inhumane treatment by the Israeli government and of brutal attacks by Israeli military forces equipped with far more sophisticated modern weaponry than is available to Palestinian fighters.³⁹

³⁸See *e.g.* "Israel Akan Bangun 50.000 Unit Perumahan Baru di Al Quds", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/03/13/7183-israel-akan-bangun-50-000-unit-perumahan-baru-di-al-quds.html#sthash.cDyYwDVP.dpuf>, accessed 18 October 2010; "Israel Akan Terus Bangun Pemukiman Besar-besaran di Tepi Barat", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/10/01/5789-israel-akan-terus-bangun-pemukiman-besar-besaran-di-tepi-barat.html#sthash.hhIRJzsv.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; "Penduduk Israel: Kami Menduduki Karena Perintah Tuhan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/06/01/4439-penduduk-israel-kami-menduduki-karena-perintah-tuhan.html#sthash.hRfZVQzR.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Penduduk Ekstrem Israel Serang Perumahan Palestine di Hebron", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/07/13/4987-penduduk-ekstrim-israel-kembali-bakar-ladang-milik-muslim-palestina.html#sthash.VfhrdsMt.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Hari Kedua, Bulldoser Zionis Lanjutkan Penghancuran Maghariba", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/02/08/123-hari-kedua-bulldoser-zionis-lanjutkan-penghancuran-maghariba.html>, accessed 15 October 2010.

³⁹See *e.g.*, "Israel Bunuh 660 Orang Palestina Selama 2006", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/12/29/224-israel-bunuh-660-orang-palestina-selama-2006.html#sthash.dRV9rWxi.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Pasukan Israel Tak Henti Bunuhi Warga Palestina", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/12/27/6412-pasukan-israel-tak-henti-bunuh-warga-palestina.html#sthash.8nWj1YA2.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; "Israel Kembali Serang Sekolah PBB di Gaza", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/01/17/3089-israel-kembali-serang-sekolah-pbb-di-gaza.html#sthash.u4wk00Y0.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Israel Serbu Tepi Barat, Tangkapi Warga Sipil", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/07/27/5137-israel-serbu-tepi-barat-tangkapi-warga-sipil.html#sthash.59PTSy4L.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Serangan Udara Israel Bantai Ibu dan 5 anaknya di al Buraij", : <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/01/17/3088-serangan-udara-israel-bantai-ibu-dan-5-anaknya-di-al-buraij.html#sthash.1KvyABQV.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Tel Aviv: Pembunuhan Warga Gaza Merupakan 'Kewajiban'", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/08/01/5201-tel-aviv-pembunuhan-warga-gaza-merupakan-kewajiban.html#sthash.ljVcP8UE.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010.

Jihadi Salafists viewed the Israel-Palestinian conflict as not simply a political conflict, but also a religious one. They regarded the Palestinian fighters as true jihadists who wage *jihad* defending their faith, homeland, homes and Muslim compatriots from Israeli military and political attacks. To maintain support for Palestine, Arrahmah often depicted Palestinian fighters as victorious over Israel soldiers by providing news articles on the success of Palestinian *mujahid* in killing Israeli soldiers such as through suicide bombings, and Israel's difficulties in defeating Palestinian forces.⁴⁰

The Jihadi Salafists responded similarly to global jihadists, namely Muslims who make every effort including violence and bombings to fight for Islam anywhere in the world. Publishing around 120 articles on this issue on its website, Arrahmah believed that such fighters are sincere jihadists who struggle only to defend true Islam and the interests of Muslim *ummah* from enemies intent on destroying Islam and Muslims. It viewed these fighters not as terrorists, but rather *mujahid*, God's fighters who guard Islam and Muslims from enemies, and *shahid*, martyrs who died for their religion and Muslim brothers and sisters.⁴¹

⁴⁰See e.g., "Tel Aviv Keteter, Roket Al Qassam Terus Menghujani Target Israel", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/25/288-tel-aviv-keteter-roket-al-qassam-terus-menghujani-target-israel.html#sthash.fbfZ8Tz9.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Akademisi Palestina: Pejuang Palestina Semakin Kuat dalam Menghadapi Agresi Zionis Israel", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/01/01/2930-akademisi-palestina-pejuang-palestina-semakin-kuat-dalam-menghadapi-agresi.html#sthash.oYm4ZggK.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Intifadhah ke-7, Israel Prediksi Kekuatan Perlawanan Kian Besar", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/10/03/325-intifadhah-masuki-tahun-ke-7-israel-prediksi-kekuatan-perlawanan-kian-besar.html#sthash.XFP4y0HF.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2014; "Israel Akui Aksi Militernya Tak Berdaya Hentikan Perlawanan Palestina", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/12/13/1372-israel-akui-aksi-militernya-tak-berdaya-hentikan-perlawanan-palestina.html#sthash.rUkNLxri.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010; and "Israel Kalangkabut, 50 Roket Hujani Sederot dan Sekitarnya", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/12/13/1371-israel-kalangkabut-50-roket-hujani-sederot-dan-sekitarnya.html#sthash.XYtLEtIX.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010.

⁴¹"Mengenal Fatimah Najjar, Pelaku Bom Syahid Paling Tua", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/27/286-mengenal-fathimah-najjar-pelaku-bom-syahid-paling-tua.html#sthash.HiYY25Xx.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Personality: Mulla Dadullah (Shaheed insya Allah)", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/03/13/1658-personality-mulla-dadullah-shaheed->

To familiarize its web visitors with these jihadists, Arrahmah published many profiles of jihad personalities who fought against enemies in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Chechnya, Thailand, the Philippine, Western countries and elsewhere. These included prominent figures such as Usamah ibn Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and some suicide bombers.⁴² To give religious legitimacy on the act of the jihadists, Arrahmah also published articles on the jihad ideology such as the importance of jihad, *istishadiyyah* (martyrdom) and even *irhab* (terrorism) along with quotations from the Quran and Hadis texts, accompanied by the Jihadi Salafi interpretation of these.⁴³

[insha-allah.html#sthash.vUYGLRlf.dpuf](#), accessed 15 October 2010; "Selamat Jalan Syaikh Abu Laits al Liby Rahimahullah", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/02/01/1555-selamat-jalan-syaikh-abu-laits-al-liby-rahimahullah.html#sthash.kcYtdQZQ.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010.

⁴²"Al Qaidah Serukan Jihad untuk Bebaskan Tanah Palestine", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/12/21/241-al-qaidah-serukan-jihad-untuk-bebaskan-tanah-palestina.html#sthash.7FTsV4fa.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Syaikh Dr. Abdullah Azzam", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/565-syaikh-dr-abdullah-azzam.html#sthash.sbGfjCdQ.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2010; "Syaikh Hamuud bin 'Uqla Asy-Syu'aiby", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/369-syaikh-hamuud-bin-uqla-asy-syuaiby.html#sthash.VrjQPHvT.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2010; "Syaikh Mujahid Abu Mus'ab Az Zarqawi", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/12/10/570-syaikh-mujahid-abu-musab-az-zarqawi.html#sthash.8laXYkHA.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Syaikh Usamah bin Ladin", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/569-syaikh-usamah-bin-ladin.html#sthash.egVB9KVn.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2010; and "Dr. Ayman Azh Zhawahiri", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/07/564-dr-aiman-azh-zhawahiri.html#sthash.4NxyG8Qr.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2010.

⁴³"Risalah Terakhir Abu Dujanah Al-Khurosany rahimahullah", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/03/01/7069-risalah-terakhir-abu-dujanah-al-khurosany-rahimahullah.html#sthash.NaOoHwBo.dpuf>, accessed 18 October 2010; "Al-Amaliyyat al-Istisyhadiyyah (Aksi Syahid)", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/12/04/485-al-amaliyyat-al-istisyhadiyyah-aksi-syahid.html#sthash.V5VNL6UY.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Al-Irhaab (Terrorisme) dalam Pandangan Salaf", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/12/26/486-al-irhaab-terorisme-dalam-pandangan-salaf.html#sthash.V6OnA3Bn.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Fiqh Jihad Kontemporer", : <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/24/483-fiqh-jihad-kontemporer.html#sthash.H2bfGllr.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; and "Pembagian Jenis Syahid", : <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/11/01/480-pembagian-jenis-syahid.html#sthash.0wKcdNrl.dpuf> accessed 9 October 2014.

Through their websites, Jihadi Salafists also presented the success stories of the jihadi fighters in killing their enemies in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and some countries in Africa.⁴⁴ In addition, jihadists were depicted as the victims of their enemies' attacks and torture when they were arrested and imprisoned.⁴⁵

A similar pattern of web use was also evident in Jihadi Salafists' responses to the US-led invasion of Afghanistan, the third most prominent global current issue for the Jihadi Salafists. Arrahmah published around 80 articles on this issue on its website, depicting the Afghanistan people as the victims of the US and its allies' invasion of their country. It presented stories of the killing of innocent Afghanistan people by US troops or their allies, and

⁴⁴"Di Sini, Semua Orang Senang dengan Taliban", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/04/27/4036-di-sini-semua-orang-senang-dengan-taliban.html#sthash.9W8Te2hJ.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Pejuang Taliban Rebut Kota Afganistan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/02/05/135-pejuang-taliban-rebut-kota-afganistan.html>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Mujahidin Daulah Islam Iraq Membunuh 57 Tentara AS di Diyala", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/09/13/969-mujahidin-daulah-islam-iraq-membunuh-57-tentara-as-di-diyala.html#sthash.XJT6h1bc.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Jihad Pakistan Mengguncang Dunia", : <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/04/27/4035-jihad-pakistan-mengguncang-dunia.html#sthash.kgFumT6B.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Shabaab al-Mujahidin "Membanjiri" Kota-kota di Somalia", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/01/27/3195-shabaab-al-mujahidin-membanjiri-kota-kota-di-somalia.html#sthash.2iirbgHQ.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; and "Mujahidin Berhasil Membunuh dan Melukai 5 Tentara Boneka di Chechnya", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/04/01/7385-mujahidin-berhasil-membunuh-dan-melukai-5-tentara-boneka-di-chechnya.html#sthash.5lyOUGgh.dpuf>, accessed 18 October 2010.

⁴⁵"Arab Saudi Tangkap Lima Orang Jihadis Internet", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/09/13/2237-arab-saudi-tangkap-lima-orang-jihadis-internet.html#sthash.m6D0LHkS.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Ulama Penentang AS Ditembak di Depan Masjid", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/10/01/1077-ulama-penentang-as-ditembak-di-depan-masjid.html#sthash.xb5nYkab.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010; "Aparat Thailand Tembak Pemimpin Muslim", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2007/01/04/206-aparat-thailand-tembak-pemimpin-muslim.html>, accessed 12 October 10; "Ulama Arab Saudi Ditangkap Karena Serukan untuk Serang Israel", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/01/01/2929-ulama-arab-saudi-ditangkap-karena-serukan-untuk-serang-israel.html#sthash.1ci0L1cZ.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "Kesehatan Omar Abdurrahman di Penjara AS Dikabarkan Kritis", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2006/12/20/247-kesehatan-omar-abdurrahman-di-penjara-as-dikabarkan-kritis.html#sthash.8GEhL3f4.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010.

the difficulties and misery they experienced resulting from the US and its allies' attacks.⁴⁶ At the same time, Arrahmah provided stories of the failure of the US and its allies' military operation in Afghanistan. Arrahmah projected the image that rather than being defeated, the Afghan *mujahid* (Taliban) drew strength from the situation, enabling them to kill many of US or its allies' troops and destroy their military facilities.⁴⁷

⁴⁶"Tentara Salibis AS Tembak Ribuan Penduduk Afgan yang Melakukan Unjuk Rasa di Depan Basis Bagram", : <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/08/27/8924-tentara-salibis-as-tembak-ribuan-penduduk-afghan-yang-melakukan-unjuk-rasa.html#sthash.kf6Fp3ua.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Lagi, Serangan Udara Brutal AS Tewaskan Puluhan Sipil Afghanistan", : <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/07/01/4849-lagi-serangan-udara-brutal-as-tewaskan-puluhan-sipil-afghanistan.html#sthash.s425I38h.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010; "25 Sipil Afghan Gugur dalam Sebuah Serangan Udara yang Menargetkan Masjid", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/10/27/9668-25-sipil-afghan-gugur-dalam-sebuah-serangan-udara-yang-menargetkan-masjid.html#sthash.KfTaOMWt.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Kematian Sipil Afgan Meningkat 24 Persen", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/08/01/5209-kematian-sipil-afghan-meningkat-24-persen.html#sthash.SunyZRWH.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; "Dalam Dua Hari, AS Bunuh 97 Sipil Afghan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/05/27/4373-dalam-dua-hari-as-bunuh-97-sipil-afghan.html#sthash.2zFewZHI.dpuf>, accessed 16 October 2010.

⁴⁷"McChrystal: Waktunya Berbalik Arah", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/01/13/6589-mcchrystal-waktunya-berbalik-arrah.html#sthash.5ryGDOrw.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; "Petraeus: Momen Sulit Yang Harus Dihadapi di Selatan Afghanistan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/05/01/7712-petraeus-momen-sulit-yang-harus-dihadapi-di-selatan-afghanistan.html#sthash.DTHZgwad.dpuf>, accessed 19 October 2010; "Petraeus: Perang Afghan Kurang Sumber Daya". <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2010/09/01/9001-petraeus-perang-afghan-kurang-sumber-daya.html#sthash.8lc6a4Tv.dpuf>, accessed 10 October 2010; "Stanley Konfirmasikan Kegagalan Strategi AS di Afghanistan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2009/09/01/5523-stanley-konfirmasikan-kegagalan-strategi-as-di-afghanistan.html#sthash.uOTM7168.dpuf>, accessed 17 October 2010; and "Sebanyak 2216 Tentara Kafir Asing Tewas pada Tahun 2007 di Afghanistan", <http://www.arahmah.com/read/2008/01/01/1438-sebanyak-2216-tentara-kafir-asing-tewas-pada-tahun-2007-di-afghanistan.html#sthash.q28lQAVk.dpuf>, accessed 15 October 2010.

Consistent with their responses to local issues noted above, Jihadi Salafists attempted to establish the image that they were the defenders of global jihadists through their extensive responses to global issues. They showed their web visitors that they truly defended Palestinian people and fighters who were struggling against Israel and support jihadists around the world like the Taliban in Afghanistan who fight against the enemies of Islam depicted as including the US and its allies.

This online self-representation provided Jihadi Salafists with opportunities to compensate for their limited access to resources noted before. By assertively presenting an online self-image as the defenders of those who protect Islam and Muslims around the world, they indirectly attempted to attract new resources, at least from their web visitors. Through this internet use, Jihadi Salafists sought to cultivate more solidarity, sympathy, legitimacy, and even celebrity support, to compensate for their lack of moral resources; new followers, leaders and labour, which is useful to overcome their lack of human resources; more financial and physical capital to deal with their lack of material resources; and new social networks, infrastructures and organizations to cope with their lack of social-organizational resources.

Implications for the Salafi Factions

The important issue here is the extent to which the different Salafi factions were advantaged by this particular form of internet use. In keeping with their harnessing of the internet as explained in the last three chapters, limited use of the internet to respond to current issues seemed to have insignificant implications for Haraki Salafists. It did not generate new resources for the Haraki Salafists yet, nor has it diminished their ability to maintain their existing resources. This is because their main purpose of using the internet as a medium was to inform their web visitors, particularly parents or potential

parents of students, about their learning institutions. They were not pressured to generate new resources through web mobilization such as soliciting donation for their organizational purposes. As a Salafist of a Haraki Salafi learning centre said:

We only use the internet to provide our web visitors with information about the Salaf way and our *ma'had*, especially our students' parents, such as information about student admissions and other announcements related to our *ma'had*. We do not use it to solicit donations or ask for aid and so on.⁴⁸

Due to this, Haraki Salafists saw no benefit in publishing articles on current issues on their websites. Instead, by publishing links to other websites they recommended such news websites believed to be trustworthy, based on true Salafi way, to their fellow Salafists for credible Islamic news. A Haraki Salafi leader argued:

We also post news about Muslims in Indonesia and foreign countries like Afghanistan on our website. However, we do not do it very often because there are many websites on news in the Muslim world that are in accordance with Salafi way. So, we or *jama'ah* (community members) only need to visit these websites for information about current issues.⁴⁹

Moreover, the above limited use of the internet did not significantly impact upon the Haraki Salafists' existing resources, with the consequence that the Haraki Salafists remain the Salafi faction with the best access to resources. Students, teachers and administrative staff members of Haraki learning centres kept organizing their religious education. A Haraki Salafi web administrator further said:

I have not seen any impact affecting us, which might have resulted from our limited use of the web for posting news on current issues. Our *ma'had* (learning institution) operates as usual. This is because, as I said, we only use the internet to provide information about our *ma'had* and its activities.⁵⁰

⁴⁸Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

⁴⁹Interview with Ustadh Sadiq, Makassar, 24 October 2010.

⁵⁰Interview with Abu Yusrin, Surakarta, 19 October 2010.

By contrast, the quite extensive use of the web to respond to current issues had significant impact upon the Yemeni Salafi faction's state of resources. It enabled Yemeni Salafists to gain more human resources, particularly new students and sympathizers, and material ones in the form of donations, regardless of how small they were. A Yemeni Salafi teacher reported that some new students were stimulated to study more about Salafism at his learning centre as a consequence of first reading articles published on its website. They believed that counter-information and comments provided on the website on current issues, such as on terrorists who claimed to be jihadist, were more convincing because they were based on the true Islamic teaching. Some new sympathizers were said to have donated money and a piece of land to the learning centre after frequently visiting the Yemenis' website. As a Yemeni Salafi teacher said:

Thank God, we just admitted new students who said that they were interested in deepening their knowledge about the true Salafi way at our *ma'had* after they read our articles on the error of terrorists in Indonesia such as Nurdin M. Top. Some new *jamaah* (community members) claimed that they provided financial support to fulfil the needs of our *ma'had* after they visited our website. But, this is not that often the case.⁵¹

In addition, this Yemeni Salafists' web use resulted in an increase in the number of students learning in the Salafi *pesantren*. For example, As-Sunnah *ma'had* in Makassar attributed to its internet presence a significant increase in student enrolments when this field study was conducted. A leader of As-Sunnah claimed:

We have just admitted new students from Sumatera. They said that they were interested in studying here after they read articles on our website that explained current issues like bombings and terrorist attacks according to the true Salaf way. Thank God, the number of students has increased from around twenty to fifty students within the last three years.⁵²

⁵¹Interview with Ustadh Arafat, Bandung, 4 September 2010.

⁵²Interview with Ustadh Iskandar, Makassar, 24 October 2010.

All this indicates that web use for responding to current issues resulted in increased resource mobilization within the Yemeni Salafi faction. However, such increases were not powerful enough to close the resource gap between the Yemeni Salafi faction and the Haraki Salafi faction. Though they received increased human and financial resources through this web use, Yemeni Salafists remained less resourced than Haraki Salafists.

The claim that, as a result of the Jihadi Salafists' optimised internet use to respond to current issues, they have consequently benefited from this strategy cannot be substantiated with concrete evidence due to the difficulty in gaining access to this closed and hardline Salafi faction. Nevertheless, some preliminary analysis on this issue can be suggested here based on observational data. That extensive web use to respond to current issues has benefitted Jihadi Salafists can be extrapolated from the fact that their websites remain active in providing updates every day. This is only possible with continuous financial and human resources that support day-to-day maintenance and operation of their websites. The fact that the Arrahmah community is able to maintain an active website, for example, may indicate that it receives resources in the form of financial support as well as human resources from its visitors, sympathizers and followers. Without such continuous support, particularly money needed to pay operational and technical expenses and web hosting fees, the website would not be able to operate daily. While it was not possible to determine the specific amounts donated, the website includes an appeal soliciting donations from visitors and a statement by the web administrator that all money it receives is used to keep the website active in the service of Islam and Muslims.⁵³

In addition, the positive impact of the web use to respond to current issues may be evident in the fact that the followers of Jihadi Salafism are still

⁵³"Donasi", <http://www.arahmah.com/donation> accessed 26 August 2013.

able to sustain their activities. They could only maintain their activities with financial, human and other kinds of resources, which may be attracted by their extensive use of the internet to provide information and counter-information on current issues based on their Jihadi Salafi ideology.

Thus, web responses to current issues appear to be a significant tool for Jihadi Salafists to generate support, at least to maintain their daily activities and keep their websites updated. But, as with the Yemeni Salafists, this internet use appears unable to overcome the Jihadi Salafists' fundamental lack of resources, or to close the resource gap with the best resourced Haraki Salafists.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the significance of the internet diverges among the Salafi factions due to resource variation among them. Salafi factions employed websites to publish articles on both local and global issues considered important for the interests of Islam and Muslims in their attempt to sustain their movements. Through these web articles, they maintain the relevance of their websites, keep their readers updated with new stories, and communicate their perspectives on local and global issues facing Islam and Muslims in general and the Salafi followers in particular. By doing so, they created for the web visitors and Muslim *ummah* a self-image that they are the guardians of the 'true' Islam and the defenders of the 'true' protectors of Islam and Muslims. Through this internet practice, in turn, they expected to generate new resources to counter their lack of resources.

However, the Salafi factions differed in their actual mobilization of the web to respond to current issues. Haraki Salafists did not optimise web use to respond to current issues; Yemeni Salafists used the web extensively to respond to current issues; and Jihadi Salafists optimised the web the most to respond to current issues.

This variation in web use to respond to current issues was closely linked to the Salafi factions' variation in access to offline resources. The extent to which the web was used was influenced by the level of resources to which a Salafi faction had access. This intra-movement resource difference among the Salafists sheds light on why some Salafi factions mobilized the internet to respond to current issues as a coping strategy to deal with lack of resources and why others did not. As Haraki Salafists had the best access to resources among the Salafi factions, they felt confident and self-sufficient, with no pressure to optimise the web to respond to current issues. By contrast, because they had limited access to various types of resources, Yemeni Salafists felt the need to mobilize their web use extensively to respond to current issues in their attempt to compensate for their lack of resources. Furthermore, as Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources, they placed a high level of importance on using their websites to respond to current issues as a strategy to overcome this lack of resources. The less resources to which a Salafi faction had access, the more extensively it mobilized the internet to respond to current issues. Different degrees of access to offline resources created different degrees of need to mobilize the internet to respond to current issues.

Accordingly, this varied use of web has different implications for the Salafi factions. Haraki Salafists' limited use of the web has not generated new resources, nor has it decreased their existing resources. It has not altered the resource mobilization within Haraki Salafists, keeping them a Salafi faction with the best access to resources. Thus, this web use shows that the internet has played an insignificant role for the Haraki Salafi faction in changing its resource mobilization.

By contrast, extensive web use for responding to current issues has enabled the Yemeni Salafi faction to generate valuable, although still limited, new human and material resources. Likewise, it can be suggested that as they mobilized the web most to publish articles on current issues on a daily basis,

Jihadi Salafists were at least able to generate the ongoing financial and human resources needed to operate their websites and carry out their activities. Thus, web use for responding to current issues was beneficial for less well-resourced Yemeni and Jihadi Salafists. Nevertheless, this internet practice was not powerful enough to overcome their lack of resources and close the resource gap with Haraki Salafi faction.

Indeed, the significance of the internet was not uniform for Salafi factions. For the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction, the internet was not a significant tool to generate new resources, nor did their limited use of it diminish their existing resources. However, the less well-resourced Yemeni Salafists considered that their internet use was an important tool to generate new resources, particularly material and human ones. For the Jihadi Salafists, the internet enabled them to respond on a daily basis to current issues, maintaining and sustaining their movement, despite limited resources.

Table 1 Types of the Current Issues to which the Haraki Salafi Faction Responded

Local Issues	Frequency	Global Issues	Frequency
Jilbab	3	Terrorism	5
Arabs' roles	2	Decline of the Muslim world	2
Secularism and democracy	1	Israel and Palestine	2
Pluralism	1	Valentine's day	2
Surveillance of preachers	1	Iraq, US-led invasion	1
Indonesian Muslims	1	Islamic new year celebration	1
Sunni-Shiah dialogue	1	Islamophobia	1
		Football World Cup	1
		2012 Movie	1
		<i>Fitna</i> Movie by Wilders	1
		Global warming	1
Total	10		19

Table 2 Types of the Current Issues to which the Yemeni Salafi Faction Responded

Local Issues	Frequency	Global Issues	Frequency
Aceh Tsunami	2	Afghanistan and Chechnya	1
Al Qiyadah al Islamiyah	4	The prophet cartoon	3
Ponari	5	Decline of Muslim world	6
Mama Lauren	1	Demonstration	2
Go Green	1	Earthquake	1
Mother's Day	1	Suicide bombings	10
Pirated software	3	Evolution theory	2
Bali bombings	10	Family planning	1
Nordin M Top	4	Christmas and Valentine's day	13
Makassar bombings	3	Christian calendar	1
Marriot and Ritz-Carlton bombings	3	Syeikh Rabi's letter to Pope	1
		Iraq, US -led invasion	1
		Islamic banking	1
		New Year celebration	2
		Israel and Lebanon	5
		Israel and Palestine Conflict	40
		Israel	2
		Lesbianism	1
		Life insurance	1
		TV	3
		Doraemon	2
		2012 movie	5
		Polygamy	1
		Smoking	8
		Mobile phone	4
		Internet	1
		Terrorism	17

		9/11 attacks	5
Total	37		140

Table 3 Typology of the Current Issues to which the Jihadi Salafi Faction Responded

Local Issues	Frequency	Global Issues	Frequency
Polygamy	5	Islamophobia	4
Forest fire	1	The Prophet cartoon	7
Dangdut singer	1	Israel and Palestine conflict	129
Poso conflict	11	Afghanistan, US-led invasion	79
Bali bombings	4	Disaster	3
Jihadists	26	Israel	5
Bush visit to Indonesia	6	Hacking	8
Liberals	3	Cola	1
Christianization	3	Hizbullah	1
Corruption	1	Ikhwan al Muslimun	1
Densus 88	7	Iran	4
Economic issues	4	Iraq, US-led invasion	34
Formalin	1	Islam and Christianity	8
Front Pembela Islam	9	Islam and Judaism	1
Islamic law	4	Islam in the west	54
Kompas and Tibo	1	Islamic economy	1
TV programs during Ramadan	2	Islamic thought	2
Warnet and Terrorism	1	Jihadi leaders	33
Anti-tax on Facebook	1	Turkish archaeologist on jilbab	1
Celebrity gossips on TV	1	Lebanon	1
Prita and OMNI hospital	1	Media	14
TV and KPI	1	Muslim minority	29
German TV	1	Russian spy	1
Minority groups	8	Salman Rusdi	1
Plane crash	1	Suicide bombing	1
War on terror	2	Death of Benazir Bhutto	1
Bird flu	1	Terrorism	12
Condom	1	US and Hizbullah	1
Dedi Mulyadi's Religious blasphemy	1	US and Iran	16
Democracy	2	US and Palestine	1
Benefits of fasting	1	US and Iraq	47
Halal vaccine	2	US and Middle East	4
Muhammadiyah and Singapore	1	US and Pakistan	24
Pornography bill	2	US and Hamas	1
The death of Suharto	1	US and Africa	1
Al Qiyadah al Islamiyyah	2	US and Somalia	5
Ponari	1	US and Greece	1
Ulama, not Scientists	1	Women	3
Buol conflict	1	Jihadi groups	78
Century bank scandal	1	Al Qaidah	7
Crimes	1	Taliban	36

Disaster	5	Bangladesh	1
DPR	1	Christianity	7
Energy	1	Decline of the Muslim world	2
Repentance of the ESQ founder	1	Democracy	1
Swine Flu	1	Contraception	1
Gender	1	Feminism	1
Gus Dur	3	Holocaust	2
Hacking	1	Iran and Israel	1
Halal food	3	Israel and Lebanon	1
Indonesia and Palestine	3	Jihadism	27
Instant noodles	1	Jordan	1
Death of a Jemaat HKBP member	1	Malaysia	1
Islamic politics	1	Khilafah	1
Islamophobia	2	Middle East	1
Indonesia and Israel	2	Palestine	1
Jihad media	3	Identity theft	1
Jihadism	9	Science	1
Jilbab	1	Smoking	2
Quran Memorizers	1	Yemen	1
Pornography	2	Technology	16
Religious freedom	1	War on terror	13
SBY impeachment	1	US and Syria	2
Suicide	1	Obama	7
Technology	5	Bush	2
Terrorism	3	US	10
Obama	1	Fast food	1
		Pakistan	22
		Salafists	1
		Aljazair	1
		India	2
		UN peacekeeping troops	1
		Swine Flu	1
		Israel and Sudan	1
		ICG	1
		Somalia	6
		UK	1
		UK and Sudan	1
		US and China	1
		US and Phillipine	1
		US and Israel	2
		US and Russia	1
		Iraq and Afghanistan	1
		Call for prayers in Egypt	1
		Electronic rubbish	1
		Israel and Turkey	1
		Minority in the west	1
		Red Cross	1
		Russia and Afghanistan	2
		Chechnya	1
		Russia and India	1
		Tajikistan	1
		UK and Yemen	2

		US and Indonesia	1
		US and Yemen	1
		US and Wikileaks	2
Total	180		818

Table 4 Percentage of Local and Global Issues to which Salafi Factions Responded

Salafi Factions	Articles on Local Issues	% Local Issues	Articles on Global Issues	% Global Issues	Total Articles
Haraki Salafists	10	34.4	19	65.5	29
Yemeni Salafists	37	20.9	140	79.1	177
Jihadi Salafists	180	18.0	818	82	998
Total	227		977		1204

Table 5 Current Issues to which the Salafi Factions Responded (Summary)

Salafi Factions	Local Issues	% of Total Local Issues	Global Issues	% Total Global Issues	Total Local & Global Issues	% Total Local and Global Issues
Haraki Salafists	10	4.4	19	1.9	29	2.4
Yemeni Salafists	37	16.3	140	14.3	177	14.7
Jihadi Salafists	180	79.2	818	83.7	998	82.9
Total	227	100	977	100	1204	100

Note: The number indicates the frequency and total of articles or postings the Salafi factions published on the relevant type of current issues

Chapter Nine

Conclusion

The explosion of new media, particularly the internet, has transformed the face of the Muslim world over the last two decades, stimulating increased internet use by Islamic movements, in what is popularly known as Islamic cyber-activism. Many Islamic movements have passionately adopted the internet and mobilised it as a new important resource to pursue their social, religious and political goals. Accordingly, many scholars have studied this phenomenon by exploring the significance (or insignificance) of the new medium for contemporary Islamic movements. Their studies have provided important insights into understanding the role and implication of the global phenomenon of cyberspace on Islamic activism.

However, the prevailing accounts have tended to evaluate the significance of the internet for an Islamic movement as a unified whole, ignoring intra-movement heterogeneity and internal dynamics, even schisms. Implicit in this literature is the assumption that an Islamic movement is a homogeneous and coherent unit. These studies on Islamic activism and the internet can be categorized into two streams: studies that argue the internet is extremely significant for Islamic movements; and others that argue it is of only limited significance for such movements. In spite of their different arguments, both tend to present the Islamic movement under study as a uniform, undifferentiated entity whose internet dynamics and changing nature are often unquestioned.

In their attempt to explain the crucial or limited roles of the internet for Islamic activism, most previous studies portray an Islamic movement under study as a homogeneous unit represented by a single leader, with a unitary ideology and unified constituents. Accordingly, when these studies

argue for the significance of the internet for an Islamic social movement, they conclude the new media has an undifferentiated significance for a unified Islamic movement.

This un-nuanced approach to the relationship between Islamic movements and the internet is problematic at least in two ways. First, it fails to read accurately the nature of contemporary Islamic movements as it overlooks the variations within each movement in terms of resources, constituencies, ideological streams, practice and institutions. Just like social movements in general, Islamic movements are in reality far from unitary or monolithic entities. Rather, they are dynamic entities with many faces, being in constant flow and motion. Second, it is primarily problematic because regarding Islamic movements as uniformed entities hinders an adequate understanding of the various mediations of the internet's significance for contemporary Islamic movements. In fact, the degree of significance of the internet for an Islamic movement is influenced by intra-movement difference, complexity and dynamics.

Furthermore, the prevailing literature has predominantly focused on Islamic cyber-activism in the Middle East. Consequently, questions about the richness and complexity of the interaction between the internet and Islamic movements in non-Arab countries remain relatively under-explored and little understood. The dominant focus among scholars, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, and the public, which is articulated by media, is on the manifestation of Islam in the Arab world. Non-Arab Muslims, who in fact constitute the majority of Muslims in the world, are often overlooked as on the periphery of the Muslim world, compared to the Middle East, which is traditionally regarded as 'the centre of the Muslim world' from the Orientalist perspective (Chapter One).

The Study's Findings

This study has attempted to fill a gap within the literature by offering a pluralistic vision of Islamic activism by uncovering the variable relevance of the internet for Islamic groups. It has taken into account intra-movement heterogeneity and dynamics, particularly the issues of diverse constituents and resources, which influence the extent of the significance of the internet for Islamic activism. It has also internationalised studies of Islamic cyber-activism by expanding their scope of study beyond the Arab world.

To this end, it has analysed internet use by the Salafi movement with a specific focus on Indonesia, analysing intra-movement difference and the varied significance of the internet for the movement. In this context, using resource mobilizational theory, it has found that resources constitute a crucial organizational aspect that defines the variations within the Salafi movement, which significantly influence the varying relevance of the internet for Salafists. It has sought to answer these key questions: Why did the Salafi factions embrace the internet as a new important resource? How did they actually mobilize the internet to sustain their movement and achieve their social-religious goals? What was the implication of this actual use of the internet for the Salafi factions?

This study has revealed the Salafi movement is not uniform, with fragmentation over a true representation of Salafi ideology palpable among its proponents. Intra-doctrinal ambiguity and different ways of responding to current socio-political issues contributed to these intra-Salafi divisions. Three factions were identified from this internal conflict: Yemeni Salafists, who represent mainstream Salafism, primarily focus on propagation and avoid politics; Haraki Salafists who are politically-minded, but are basically engaged in non-violent political activism; and Violent Jihadi Salafists who highly politicize and radicalise the Salafi doctrines and are engaged in *jihad* as warfare and violent actions (Chapter Two). As a whole, the Salafists do not constitute a terrorist or violent group. The majority are non-violent and non-political. Only the smallest Salafi faction is inclined to violence and terrorism.

This study has attempted to understand *why* the various Salafi factions have embraced the internet as a new important resource. Factions within the Salafi movement have differential access to resources and varying capacities for collective action. The Haraki Salafists were the best-resourced Salafi faction, while the Jihadi Salafists had the least access to resources. The Salafists as a whole generally had limited access to resources when situated within the landscape of Islamic movements or organizations in Indonesia. They were poorly resourced, particularly in terms of external legitimacy, organizational infrastructure, and constituency (Chapter Three).

This condition created a rationale for embracing the internet as a new mobilization resource for pursuing the Salafi movement's socio-religious goals. In their attempt to compensate for the limits of their organizational resources, the Salafi factions turned to the internet to enhance collective action and reach a wider audience. The Salafi factions embraced the internet and integrated it as a new acceptable resource into their socio-religious practices. Their presence in cyberspace is seen in various internet technologies, particularly websites, which are operated by Salafi individuals or organizations, and accessed and followed by Salafi adherents and activists. In this context, this study has argued for moving beyond the medium-centred perspective that stresses technological advantages of the internet for its users. Rather, it has pointed out that the Salafi embrace of the internet was influenced by user-related issues, particularly the extent to which the Salafi factions have access to resources. Salafi adoption of the internet was closely related to the Salafi factions' evaluation of how best to bolster or consolidate their organizational resources (Chapter Three).

Since Salafism is a religious movement, theological rationales also loom large in legitimating its engagement with the internet. To embrace fully the internet as a new resource, the Salafi factions needed more than an organisational justification in the form of lack of resources, but also theological legitimacy. For this purpose, they turned to Islamic texts and

manhaj al-salaf (the Salaf method) to give a sacred legitimacy for their embrace of the internet and to integrate it into their daily social and religious practices. They, therefore, framed this new media technology in a communal discourse of the internet. Interestingly, all Salafi factions generally shared a positive attitude towards the internet with strong references to Qur'anic verses and hadis texts, which were interpreted according to their world view, and *Salafi 'ulama*. Not only did these factions impute neutrality to the internet, but they also regarded it as God's gift in order to mobilize the medium for their religious needs and purposes. At this point, the Salafi framing of the internet shows that the Salafi factions were not passive receivers or blind rejecters of the technology. Their engagement with the internet involved a negotiation with opportunities opened by this new medium in articulation with Salafi ideology and beliefs. Thus, the above lack of resources combined and supported with this theological legitimacy encouraged and motivated the Salafi factions to adopt the internet as an important new resource that supports their organizational goals of promoting Salafi ideology to a wider audience (Chapter Four).

This study also analysed *how* they actually mobilized this newly adopted resource for collective action. It identified the types of internet use by the Salafi factions, enabling the development of a typology of internet mobilization salient to the Salafi movement, described the main nature of this typology, and explained the nature of such Salafi internet usage.

First, the Salafi factions employed the internet as a resource for ideological mobilization, namely for constructing, asserting and promoting the ideology of Salafism to a wider audience. The centrality of this religious ideology was clearly seen in the Salafi factions' making of *manhaj al-salaf* a key ingredient and element of their web contents. This shows that religious ideology played a key role in the ways the proponents of the Salafi movement used the internet technology and that ideological propagation constitutes the main mission of their web use. However, although all Salafi factions used the

internet to spread and promote Salafism to a wider audience, they did not actually utilize this new resource for this purpose to identical degrees. Yemeni Salafists and Violent Jihadi Salafists mobilized the internet as a resource for constructing the ideology of Salafism more actively than Haraki Salafists (Chapter Five).

Second, the different Salafi factions used the internet as a resource to set boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, or between ‘true Salafists’ and ‘Salafi imposters’, by conducting hostile intra-‘othering’ practices in their attempt to sustain their movement and assert sacred authority. Their claims to be the vanguards of ‘authentic Islam’ and their strict literalism and anti-intellectualism as methods of understanding Islamic texts contributed to the Salafists’ hostility towards ‘the misguided’ other, including ‘misguided’ Salafists from other Salafi factions (Chapter Six).

However, the Salafi factions differed in the degree to which they were engaged in this practice of mobilizing their websites as instrumental resources for vilifying Salafi factions and individuals considered ‘the other’. Yemeni Salafists fully employed the tactics of vilification in this online practice of othering, including name-calling, character assassination, and verdict giving, which were targeted at the Haraki Salafists and the Violent Jihadi Salafists. By contrast, the Haraki Salafi faction and the Violent Jihadi Salafi faction were less active in utilizing their websites as resources to set boundaries. Haraki Salafists partly employed the tactic of character assassination, while practicing a very limited use of name-calling and verdict giving tactics levelled at the Yemeni and the Violent Jihadi Salafi factions. The same was true for Violent Jihadi Salafists who practiced vilification, which was targeted at the Yemeni Salafists.

The Yemeni Salafi faction was also fully engaged in mobilizing their websites as resources to practice self-exaltation, another strategy of othering. The proponents of this faction attempted to portray themselves as ‘the true Salafists’ with ideal attributes and characteristics of ‘the true followers’ of the

Prophet Muhammad, his companions and Salaf '*ulamā*'. On the contrary, the Haraki Salafi faction and Jihadi Salafi faction did not utilize their websites for practicing online self-exaltation strategy of othering (Chapter Six).

Third, the Salafi factions mobilized the internet to create local and global links with like-minded individuals or organizations. In creating these linkages, each Salafi faction reflected its local and global connections as well as its ideological affiliation. Instead of establishing strategic linkages aimed at organizing collaborative alliances for collective action, the Salafi factions used links as resources simply to identify, recognize and endorse the websites of like-minded Salafi factions and individuals based on factors related to content of the target web and attributes of the target web producers such as credibility, authority and ideological affinity of the linked websites. Yet, the Salafi factions mobilized their websites to create these linkages in different ways. The resource-poor Yemeni Salafi faction mobilized their websites to create many more links than the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction. The Jihadi Salafi faction created no links on its websites (Chapter Seven).

Fourth and lastly, the Salafi factions mobilized the internet to respond to current issues by providing alternative information and their perspectives on those issues. Each Salafi faction employed websites to publish articles on both local and global issues considered important for the interests of Islam and Muslims in their attempt to sustain their movements. Through these web articles, they maintained the relevance of their websites, kept their readers updated with new stories, and communicated their perspectives on local and global issues facing Islam and Muslims in general and the Salafi followers in particular. By doing so, they created for the web visitors and Muslim *ummah* a self-image that they were the guardians of the 'true' Islam and the defenders of 'true' Muslims. However, each Salafi faction varied in its actual mobilization of the web for responding to current issues. Haraki Salafists did not optimise web use to respond to current issues; Yemeni Salafists used the

web extensively to respond to current issues; and Violent Jihadi Salafists optimised the web the most to respond to current issues (Chapter Eight).

The above findings have revealed that although each Salafi faction adopted the internet as a new important resource to achieve their religious, social, and organizational interests, the factions did not actually mobilize it for these purposes in similar ways or degrees. The resource-poor Salafi factions (Yemeni Salafi and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions) tended to mobilize the internet more actively than the resource-rich ones (Haraki Salafi faction).

This variation of internet use was closely related to the different states of resource availability among the Salafi factions. This intra-movement resource difference among the Salafists sheds light on why some Salafi factions mobilized the internet as a coping strategy to deal with lack of resources and why others did not. Realizing that they had limited access to resources (moral and cultural resources) and being aware of the potential of the internet, the less well-resourced Yemeni and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions were motivated to use the new medium to overcome their lack of resources and sustain their movement. By contrast, as they had good access to various types of resources (moral, cultural, social-organizational, material and human resources), the Haraki Salafi faction felt confident and self-sufficient, with little pressure to optimise the internet as a new resource to pursue its social and religious purposes. Therefore, the resource-poor Yemeni Salafists and Violent Jihadi Salafists factions mobilized their websites more extensively than the resource-rich Haraki Salafists in order to fully engage in online practices of promoting the ideology of Salafism, setting boundaries between 'us'/'true Salafists' and 'them'/'Salafi imposters', creating linkages, and responding to local and global issues.

This study has also tried to analyse *the implication* of the above internet use for the Salafi factions. The varied use of web among the Salafi factions had resulted in different implications for each faction. Haraki Salafists' limited use of the web did not generate new resources, nor did it

decrease their existing resources. It has not altered the resource mobilization within Haraki Salafists; they remain the Salafi faction with the best access to resources.

By contrast, the extensive web use to promote the ideology of Salaf supremacy, set boundaries, create linkages and respond to current issues enabled the Yemeni Salafi faction to generate valuable, though still limited, new resources, particularly human and material ones. Likewise, as they mobilized the web most to publish articles on current issues on a daily basis, Violent Jihadi Salafists were at least able to generate the ongoing financial and human resources needed to operate their websites and carry out their activities.

Nevertheless, these impacts were not powerful enough to overcome the Yemeni Salafi and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions' lack of resources and close the resource gap with the Haraki Salafi faction. The Salafi factions' use of the web merely reproduced, rather than altered differences in the capacity of resource mobilization among the factions, maintaining resource inequality among them. The many links created by Yemeni Salafists on their websites, for example, did not translate into a closing of the gap with the Haraki Salafi faction in their ability to mobilize more resources. The absence of links on Jihadi Salafi websites also contributed to this online reproduction of differences in resource mobilization among the Salafi factions.

In addition, this study has shown that the above internet uses had varied significance for different Salafi factions. All Salafi factions adopted the internet and developed the shared narratives of the new media, but they differed in the issue of how they actually mobilized the adopted new media due to their differences in resource availability. Accordingly, the significance of the internet is not uniform across the Salafi movement in Indonesia. Rather, each Salafi faction's use of the internet was influenced by offline factors and particularly access to other organizational resources.

Thus, the internet enhanced more the presence of less well-resourced Salafi factions in cyberspace than that of the well-resourced faction. For the resource-rich Haraki Salafi faction, the internet was not a significant tool to generate new resources, nor did their limited use of it diminish their existing resources. But, the less well-resourced Yemeni Salafists considered their internet use an important tool to generate new resources, particularly material and human ones. For the Jihadi Salafists, the internet enabled them to respond on a daily basis to current issues, maintaining and sustaining their movement, despite limited resources.

For the poorly-resourced the Yemeni Salafi and Violent Jihadi Salafi factions, the internet adoption was a coping strategy to deal with their lack of moral, material, human, and social-organizational resources and sustain their movements. However, for the well-resourced Haraki Salafi faction, the internet adoption was not really a strategy to deal with the lack of resources and to survive, but rather as a kind of additional, peripheral means to maintain the movement. Then, the internet was a helpful tool for resource-poor Yemeni Salafists and Violent Jihadi Salafists to sustain their movement, but it was not powerful enough to close the resource inequality between these two and the resource-rich Haraki Salafists.

There are some general points to be made here. Rather than thinking about an Islamic movement as a unified entity, this study has sought to understand it in the reality, as a diverse, even fragmented unit, in terms of constituency and resource availability and not just ideology.

Analysis of internet use and its significance for Islamic activism cannot be isolated from intra-movement dynamics and differences. In order to understand better the significance of the internet for Islamic activism, there is need to analyse the intra-movement dynamics within an Islamic movement, identifying internal schisms and different access to resources among the contending factions, and demonstrating how these influence the internet's significance for the movement's actors and proponents.

Based on its analysis of the Salafi movement in Indonesia and its usage of websites through online observation and interviews with Salafi leaders and web administrators, this study has argued that the significance of the internet for this Islamic movement is not uniform, but is rather dependent upon intra-movement complexities and dynamics including internal fragmentation and the differential state of intra-movement organizational resources. The significance of the internet as a resource for an Islamic movement thus varies enormously across intra-movement factions depending on access to other resources. Analysing the different state of resources among the Salafi proponents sheds light on why some Salafi factions mobilize the internet as a coping strategy and others do not. As exemplified by different Salafi factions, the more resources an Islamic group had access to, the less it used the internet and gained its benefits; the less resources an Islamic group had access to, the more it mobilized the internet to sustain its movement.

This study suggests that the significance and consequences of the internet cannot be understood by treating it in isolation from offline contexts of its users. Here, it fits into current studies of religion and the internet, which Heidi Campbell (2011) calls “the third wave of research on online religious community” that “moves towards opening up the investigation from just mapping life online to considering how online-offline interaction and integration point towards findings about life in an information-dominated culture” (p. 240-241).

Moreover, global macro approaches to internet studies have tended to emphasize the uniqueness of the internet and what the internet can and will do, and conversely largely ignored the role of the actors, the netizens. By contrast, this study contributes to that stream of studies of the internet and society where the actions of users, rather than their tool (the internet), are the primary focus. It adopts a user-perspective to the understanding of the relation between the internet and users (society), following works by

Bakardjiva (2005) and Hill and Sen (2008). The issue of agency is therefore central to this study as it focuses on what the users can and will do with the opportunities opened up by the internet.

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