**Data Codebook, STATA Code, and Supplemental Material
for Quantitative Analysis of Contemporary Era
in Chapters 7, 8, and 12 of:**

Cathie Jo Martin and Duane Swank, *The Political
Construction of Business Interests: Coordination, Growth, and Equity*.
(Cambridge University Press, 2012)

Data Set: MartinSwank contemporary data.xls

Section 1: Analysis associated with Table 8.1:
Data Set: MartinSwank contemporary data.xls

      The first set of variables pertain to the data for the analysis of active labor policy spending and income support for current workers in Table 8.1 in Martin and Swank (2012). The STATA code for the core estimating equations is:

xtpcse almpsp lg1deind lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib lg1employerorg lg1medvoter avleftc avtcdemc coid1 coid2 coid3 coid4 coid5 coid6 coid7 coid8 coid9 coid10 coid11 coid12 coid13 coid14 coid15 coid16 coid17, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse wasocwelf lg1deind lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib lg1macrocorp lg1medvoter avleftc avtcdemc coid1 coid2 coid3 coid4 coid5 coid6 coid7 coid8 coid9 coid10 coid11 coid12 coid13 coid14 coid15 coid16 coid17, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

Note: Precise definitions of variable and/or components of complex variables as well as data sources are given in subsequent sections below and in text of book.

year	1955 to 2005 (Note: several series do not begin until the 1960s or 1970s; many data series end before 2005.)
coid	Country identifier: 1 for Australia, 2 for Austria, 3 for Belgium, 4 for Canada, 5 for Denmark, 6 for Finland, 7 for France, 8 for West Germany, 9 for Ireland, 10 for Italy, 11 for Japan, 12 for Netherlands, 13 for New Zealand, 14 for Norway, 15 for Sweden, 16 for Switzerland, 17 for the United Kingdom, 18 for the United States, 19 for Greece, 20 for Portugal, and 21 for Spain.
almpsp	Active labor market spending as a percent of GDP.
wasocwelf	Additive index of Scruggs' score of unemployment insurance generosity (benefit levels, entitlement rights, and coverage) and sickness insurance generosity. (See below and book text)
avleftc	Mean of percentage of cabinet portfolios held by left parties at t-1, t-2, t-3.
avtcdemc	Mean of percentage of cabinet portfolios held by all Christian Democratic parties at t-1, t-2, t-3.
lg1deind	One year lag of index of deindustrialization,
lg1rgdpch	One year lag of real GDP per capita in international prices.
lg1open	One year lag of trade openness.

lg1caplib   One year lag of Quinn's index of liberalization of capital controls.

1g1unemp   One year lag of unemployment.

lg1employerorgn   One year lag of index of employers' organization.

lg1medvoter   One year lag of ideological position of median voter.

coid1 ... 17   Country dummy variables where numeric designation corresponds to coid code
              above (Australia through United Kingdom).

Section 2. Analysis associated with Table 7.2.
Data Set: MartinSwank contemporary data.xls

        Variables required for this analysis (in addition to those above) are supplied next in the
data set. The STATA code required for estimation of the core models in Table 7.2 is:

All countries as described in text:

xtpcse employerorg lg1aunmem lg1deind lg1medvoter lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1prorep lg1feder lg1statecapacity lg1neffpar avleftc avtcdemc if year > 1973 & year < 2003,
correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse macrocorp lg1deind lg1medvoter lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib lg1prorep
lg1feder lg1statecapacity lg1neffpar avleftc avtcdemc if coid < 19 & year > 1973 & year < 2003,
correlation(ar1) pairwise;

xtpcse macrocorp lg1macrocorp lg1deind lg1medvoter lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1prorep lg1feder lg1statecapacity lg1neffpar avleftc avtcdemc if coid < 19 & year > 1973 &
year < 2003, pairwise;

CMEs only as listed in the text:

xtpcse employerorg lg1aunmem lg1deind lg1medvoter lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1prorep lg1feder lg1statecapacity lg1neffpar avleftc avtcdemc if cme==1 & year > 1973 &
year < 2003, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse macrocorp lg1deind lg1medvoter lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib lg1prorep
lg1feder lg1statecapacity lg1neffpar avleftc avtcdemc if cme==1 & year > 1973 & year < 2003,
correlation(ar1) pairwise;

xtpcse macrocorp lg1macrocorp lg1deind lg1medvoter lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1prorep lg1feder lg1statecapacity lg1neffpar avleftc avtcdemc if cme==1 & year > 1973 & year
< 2003, pairwise;

employerorg   Index of employer organization.

macrocorp   Index of macrocorporatism as described in book.

seccoord   Index of sector coordination as defined in book.

lg1prorep   One year lag of measure of proportional representation.

lg1feder   One year lag of measure of federalism.

lg1neffpar   One year lag of number of effective parliamentary parties.

lg1statecapacity   One year lag of index of state capacity.

lg1unmem   One year lag of union density.

Section 3. Analysis in Table 12.4.
Data Set: MartinSwank contemporary data.xls

        Additional variables required for Table estimation of models of 12.4 are given below. The STATA code for the four models is:

xtpcse earn5010   lg1deind lg1pcrgdpch lg1open lg1caplib lg1macrocorp lg1cumleft lg1cumtcdem if coid<19 & year<2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse involpt lg1deind lg1pcrgdpch lg1open lg1caplib lg1macrocorp lg1cumleft lg1cumtcdem coid2 coid3 coid5 coid6 coid7 coid8 coid10 coid11 coid12 coid14 if cme==1 & year <2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse ltunem12 lg1deind lg1pcrgdpch lg1open lg1caplib lg1macrocorp lg1cumleft lg1cumtcdem coid2 coid3 coid5 coid6 coid7 coid8 coid10 coid11 coid12 coid14 if cme==1 & year <2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse tmpempl lg1deind lg1pcrgdpch lg1open lg1caplib lg1macrocorp lg1cumleft lg1cumtcdem coid2 coid3 coid5 coid6 coid7 coid8 coid10 coid11 coid12 coid14 if cme==1 & year <2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

tmpempl   Temporary contract employment.

earn5010   Ratio of earnings of worker at 50th to worker at 10th percentile.

involpt   Involuntary part-time employment.

ltunem12   Long-term unemployment (percent of unemployed out of work for 12 months or more.

involpt   Involuntary part-time unemployment.

lg1cumleft   One year lag of cumulative years of left government.

lg1cumtcdem One year lag of cumulative years of Christian Democratic government.

Section 4. Analysis in Table 12.5.
Data Set: MartinSwank contemporary data.xls

      Additional required variables for analyses in Table 12.5 are given below. The STATA Code for estimating core Table 12.5 models is (where year74 ... year 01 are 1974 to 2001year dummies and):

xtpcse pcrgdpch lg1rgdpch lg1inflate lg1employerorg worldgrowop year74 year75 year76 year77 year78 year79 year80 year81 year82 year83 year84 year85 year86 year87 year88 year89 year90 year91 year92 year93 year94 year95 year96 year97 year98 year99 year00 year01 if coid < 19 & year >1973 & year < 2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse pcrgdpch lg1rgdpch lg1inflate lg1employerorg lg1employerorgsq worldgrowop year74 year75 year76 year77 year78 year79 year80 year81 year82 year83 year84 year85 year86 year87 year88 year89 year90 year91 year92 year93 year94 year95 year96 year97 year98 year99 year00 year01 if coid < 19 & year >1973 & year < 2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse pcrgdpch lg1rgdpch lg1inflate lg1macrocorp worldgrowop year74 year75 year76 year77 year78 year79 year80 year81 year82 year83 year84 year85 year86 year87 year88 year89 year90 year91 year92 year93 year94 year95 year96 year97 year98 year99 year00 year01 if coid < 19 & year >1973 & year < 2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse pcrgdpch lg1rgdpch lg1inflate lg1macrocorp lg1macrocorpsq worldgrowop year74 year75 year76 year77 year78 year79 year80 year81 year82 year83 year84 year85 year86 year87 year88 year89 year90 year91 year92 year93 year94 year95 year96 year97 year98 year99 year00 year01 if coid < 19 & year >1973 & year < 2004, correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

lg1inflate   One year lag of inflation rate.

worldgrowop World demand (one year lag of mean of growth rates in all other advanced democracies weighted by the level of trade openness)

pcrgdpch   Percentage change in real per capita GDP (international prices).

Section 5. Supplemental Variables for Preceding Analyses in Sections 1 to 4.
Data Set: MartinSwank contemporary data.xls

   Variables listed below are components of composite variables/indices listed above (e.g., components of macrocorporatism, state capacity and so forth). See supplemental material below for further descriptions and data sources.

unionorg Index of union organization (standard score index of union density powers of largest central peak association; and labor integration in national policy making)

cenbar   Level of collective bargaining.

aunmem Union density.

conp1...4 Union peak association powers (see below).

labpolm Labor integration in the policy process.

empfed   Presence of national peak association of employers.

emppow   Powers of peak employers' federation (see below).

emppolm Extent of employer integration in the national policy process.

pursup   Degree of long-term linkage between purchasers and suppliers.

comfrm   Degree of cooperation between competitive firms for collective business goods.

invfrm   Degree of long-term linkages between finance-producers.

labmanc Extent of labor-management cooperation on employment and other issues.

trecgdp   Total government revenues as a percent of GDP.

govempte Government employment as a percent of total employment.

pop1564 Working age population (1000s).

cvempa   Civilian employment in primary sector (1000s).

cvempi   Civilian employment in industrial sector (1000s).

leftc   Left party cabinet share of total cabinet portfolios.

tcdemc   Total Christian Democratic parties (center and right CD parties) cabinet share.

flfp   Female labor force participation rate.

Section 6. Analysis associated with Table 12. 3

Data Set: MartinSwank redistribution data.xls

        This data set consists of variables that have been defined above (and are lagged as defined in the text of the book); the only additional variables are the redistribution variable and its components - pre- and post-fisc GINIs for working-age household income – and the one-year lag of sector coordination. Only country years that have Luxembourg Income Study data on income redistribution are used as discussed in the text.

        The STATA code for the core analyses associated with Table 12.3 is:

```
xtpcse waredistriba lg1earn9050   lg1deind lg1flfp lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1employerorg  avleftc avtcdemc , correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse waredistriba lg1earn9050   lg1deind lg1flfp lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1macrocorp  avleftc avtcdemc , correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse waredistriba lg1earn9050   lg1deind lg1flfp lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1employerorg lg1unionorg  avleftc avtcdemc , correlation(ar1) pairwise ;

xtpcse waredistriba lg1earn9050   lg1deind lg1flfp lg1rgdpch lg1unemp lg1open lg1caplib
lg1macrocorp  lg1seccoord avleftc avtcdemc , correlation(ar1) pairwise ;
```

where waredistriba = $((\text{disinc25p} - \text{privinc25p})/\text{privinc25p}) \times 100$

disinc25p   Gini index for distribution of disposable income across working-age households (age 25-59 head).

privinc25p   Gini index for distribution of private income across working-age households.

lg1seccoord   One-year lag of index of sector coordination (standard score index of pursup, comfrm, invfrm, and labmanc as defined above).

CONTEMPORARY ANCILLARY MATERIAL:
DATA AND SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS FOR
CHAPTERS 7 THROUGH 12

CONTEMPORARY ANCILLARY MATERIAL

CONTENTS

Overview

Variable Characteristics, Descriptions, and Data Sources

Supplemental Analysis for Chapters 7, 8, and 12

OVERVIEW

In the following sections, we provide details on variable measurement and data sources as we as extensive supplemental analysis for quantitative work presented in Chapters 7, 8, and 12. Supplemental analysis includes tests of robustness of findings presented in the book and tests of additional hypotheses introduced in the text. We also discuss a variety a methodological issues in our quantitative analysis not fully covered in the book's chapters. (References used in this appendix are listed here unless used elsewhere in the book; for material also cited in the text, full references are provided in the book's bibliography.)

As to measurement issues for variables listed below, we discuss many well-known problems in the text or make reference to core work in the literature. For some measurement issues, however, we rely on reader familiarity (and the willingness of the reader to consult the general literature). For instance, we do not discuss at any length here

or in the text controversies about the best data sources and operationalizations for income inequality. For inequality and many other variables, we use "best practices" (e.g., GINI indices of Luxembourg Income Study data). For other variables, some limitations exist on cross-national comparability of standard measures (e.g., the OECD and International Labor Organization data on public employment). When non-trivial measurement error is likely, we use multiple indicators of core causal factors and present multiple tests.

VARIABLE CHARACTERISTICS, DESCRIPTIONS, AND DATA SOURCES

Part I: Public Sector, Redistribution, Social Policy and Inequality/Labor Market Dualism: Details and Data Sources

Active Labor Market Policy: Total ALMP spending as a percent of GDP. Source: OECD (2006) *Social Expenditures Data Base*, CD Rom. Paris: OECD.

Social Protection of Workers: Index of unemployment and sickness insurance income replacement rates, benefit entitlements (e.g., qualification period, waiting days, duration), and population coverage rates. Source: Lyle Scruggs and James Allen, "The Comparative Welfare State Entitlements Data Set."

State Capacity. Standard score index of public sector employment as a percent of total employment and general government revenues as a percent of GDP. Sources: Total and government employment. Sources: *OECD Economic Outlook Database* (No.82); For Australia, Austria, Switzerland, and New Zealand, all or part of series from *OECD Historical Statistics* and ILO, Public employment data series. Total tax revenues: OECD, *Revenue Statistics of Member Countries*. Paris: OECD, various years. Country GDP. Source: OECD, National Accounts. Paris OECD, various years.

GINI Indices for Market and Post-Tax/Transfer Income Distribution of Working-Age Households. Absolute and percentage changes from pre- to post-fisc GINI. Source: GINI's computed by Vincent Mahler, Department of Political Science, Loyola University from Luxembourg Income Study data; see Mahler and Jesuit (2006).

Part-Time and Fixed Term Employment: Percentage of total employees in part-time or fixed-term contract work; percentage of total employees in involuntary part-time work. Source: OECD, *Employment Outlook* (selected numbers); OECD Employment Data Base.

50/10 Wage Ratio: Ratio of 50th percentile to 10th percentile (full-time equivalent) earner. Source: OECD Earnings Data Base.

Low Wage Employment: percentage of workers below one-half median income. OECD Earnings Data Base.

Part II: Political Data: Details and Data Sources.

Party Government. We measure Left and Christian Democratic government control in three ways: for some parts of the analysis, we use average shares of cabinet portfolios held by these party groups in the three preceding years; for other stages of analyses, we use either cumulative shares from 1950, or for a time-invariant version, 1950-1975 cumulative years of government control by Left and Christian Democratic parties. Sources: Left and

Christian democratic party cabinet portfolios as a percent of all portfolios: (for portfolios): Eric Browne and John Dreijmanis, *Government Coalitions in Western Democracies*, (Longman, 1982); *Keesings Contemporary Archives* (selected years). Sources for Classification: (1) Francis Castles and Peter Mair, "Left_Right Political Scales: Some 'Expert' Judgments," *European Journal of Political Research* 12 (1984): 73_88. (2) *Political Handbook of the World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, selected years.) (3) Country-specific sources as well as Mackie and Rose's *International Almanac of Electoral History*, 2nd Edition, and "Political Data" updates in annual issues of *European Journal of Political Research*.

Median Voter/Ideological Position: Kim-Fording estimate of the left-right voter ideology of median voter based on party manifesto data and electoral choice. Source: 1945-2003 data supplied by HeeMin Kim, Department of Political Science, Florida State University. See Kim and Fording (1998; 2003).

Median Voter/Economic Position: 90/50 and 50/10 Ratios, or ratios of 90 (50th) percentile to 50th (10th) percentiles (full-time equivalent) earner. Source: OECD Earnings Data Base.

Employers' Organization: standard score index of presence of national employers' federation, the peak federation's powers over members (i.e., appointment power, veto power over collective bargains and lockouts, own conflict funds), and policy-process integration of employers in (e.g., boards, commissions). Sources: for presence and powers of national peak assications, Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein, and Peter Lange, "Union Centralization Among Advanced Industrial Societies" (electronic data base at www.shelly.polisci.ucla.edu/data); for incorporation of employers and unions into corporatist policy making forums, 1970 to 1997 data are from Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittle 2001, with updates by the authors.

Macro-corporatism: standard-score index of employer organization , union organization (index of union density, union peak association power, as for employers, and policy-process integration of labor), and the level of collective bargaining. Sources: for union and employer peak association presence and powers, and for bargaining centralization, Miriam Golden, Michael Wallerstein, and Peter Lange, "Union Centralization Among Advanced Industrial Societies" (electronic data base at www.shelly.polisci.ucla.edu/data). For incorporation of unions (and employers) into corporatist policy making forums, 1970 to 1997 data are from Traxler, Blaschke, and Kittle 2001, with updates by the authors. For Union Density: For union membership, Jelle Visser, "Trade Union Membership Database," Typescript, Sociology of Organizations Research Unit, Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam, March, 1992; "Unionization Trends Revisited," Centre for Research of European Societies and Industrial Relations (CESAR), Research Paper 1996/2, February 1996 (and updates provide to the authors by Bernhard Ebbinghaus).

Sector coordination: standard-score index of long-term finance-producer relations, long-term purchaser-supplier relations, labor-management cooperation at firm level,

enterprise cooperation for collective business goos. Source: Hicks-Kenworthy data base as described in Alex Hicks and Lane Kenworthy, "Cooperation and Political Economic Performance in Affluent Democratic Capitalism," *American Journal of Sociology* 6 (May 1998): 1631-72, and updated by authors for 1994 to 2002.

Proportionality: measured as an ordinal scale of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system (0.0 = disportional, 1.0 = semi-proportional, and 2.0 = proportional). Lijphart (1999) and country specific sources for updates to 2000s.

The number of effective legislative parties: $1/\sum p_i^2$, where p is the proportion of seats for the i-th party. Source for seats: Mackie and Rose's *International Almanac of Electoral History*, 2nd Edition, and "updates" as noted above for party data..

Federalism: measured as an 1.0 to 5.0 ordinal scale (1.0 = unity and centralized, 2.0 = unity and decentralized, 3.0 = semi-federal, 4 federal and centralized, 5.0 = federal and decentralized. Lijphart (1999) and country specific sources for updates to 2000s.

Institutional Veto Points. Standard Score index of federalism, bicameralism, presidentialism, strength of judicial review and use of referendums. Sources: Lijphart (1999) and country specific sources for updates to 2000s.

Part III: International Variables:

Index of restrictions on capital flows: 0 to 100 index of the degree of liberalization of controls on transnational flows capital movements. Source: Dennis Quinn, School of Business, Georgetown University. See Dennis Quinn and Carla Inclan, "The Origins of Financial Openness." *American Journal of Political Science* 41 (July, 1997): 777-813.

Foreign Direct Investment. Total inflows and outflows (unless analysis stipulates inflows or outflows only) of FDI as a percent of GDP. Source: OECD, *Foreign Direct Investment in OECD Countries*; IMF, *Balance of Payments Statistics*; GDP in US dollars from OECD, *National Accounts*.

Trade Openness: Exports and imports of goods and services in millions (billions for Italy and Japan) of national currency units: Source: OECD, *National Accounts of OECD Member Countries*. Paris: OECD, various years.

Part IV: Socioeconomic Data:

De-industrialization as 100 minus industrial and agricultural employment as a percentage of the working age population (and lag this one year). Source: component parts from OECD, *Labor Force Statistics*. (Paris: OECD, various years).

Dependent Population: Total population minus population 16 to 64 as a percent of

total population. Source: OECD, *Labor Force Statistics*. (Paris: OECD, various years).

Unemployment/Long-term Unemployment Rates. percent of the civilian labor force unemployed and percent of all unemployed out of work for 12 or more months. Source: OECD, *Labor Force Statistics*. (Paris: OECD, various years).

Female Labor Force Participation Rates. Percent of working-age (16-64) females in formal labor market. Source: OECD, *Labor Force Statistics*. (Paris: OECD, various years).

Real per capita GDP in constant international prices: Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, *Penn World Table Version 6.3*, Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009.

SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS: CHAPTER 7

In Ancillary Table 7.1, we provide jackknifed tests of the robustness of our findings on the causes of 1974-2002 variations in employers' organization and macro-corporatism across 18 nations. To compute "jackknifed" estimates, we delete one nation (i) at a time and estimate 18 17-country equations. The mean of these 18 new coefficient estimates becomes the jackknifed coefficient for each variable and the standard deviation of these 18 17-country estimates becomes the standard error. We also substitute cumulative years in government of social and Christian democratic parties for the short-term measures used in the text (average percentage of cabinet portfolios for the last three years). This latter set of tests is particularly important as it allows us to assess (1) long-term impacts of collectivist and communitarian parties on cooperative institutions suggest by Walter Korpi, Alexander Hicks, Harold Wilensky and others,[1] and (2) the persistence or absence of impacts of political institutions on cooperation in the presence of long-term patterns of partisan government.

As the table reveals, our final models of employers' organization and macro-corporatism are highly robust to deletions of individual countries (e.g, potential outliers that unduly influence estimated coefficients and significance levels). This holds systematically for theoretically central variables (proportionality, number of effective parties, federalism, state capacity, and party variables) as well as control variables. As to long-term partisan effects, the third column in each set of columns provides clear evidence that long-term patterns of partisan government are important: both social and Christian

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[1] Korpi 2006; Hicks no date; Wilensky 2002.

democratic governance bolsters coordination in the post-industrial era, with the substantive impact of social democracy being two to three times the magnitude of the effect of Christian democracy. Moreover, with the exception of state capacity in employers' organization model, the political institutional variables all remain significant in the presence of long-term party measures. The anomaly of state capacity suggests that while state capacity has important direct effects on macro-corporatist cooperation between labor, employers, and the state, it does not, by itself, buoy employers' organization. This is generally consistent with our theoretical arguments that link state capacity to coordination.

In Ancillary Table 7.2, we display the full model of determinants of state capacity and offer tests of robustness and, again, long-term partisan impacts. As in the case of coordination, our findings seem to be highly robust to deletions of individual countries. In addition, the model of long-term partisan impacts behaves as expected. That is, our theory argues that proportionality and federalism have long-term, indirect effects coordination (in addition to their direct effects) because they influence state capacity, itself a positive influence on the maintenance of cooperation institutions. For proportionality, the core mechanism linking electoral systems and state capacity is the strong, positive impact of PR on social democratic governance and, in turn, social democratic government's effect on state capacity. In fact, that is actually what our findings – a large positive impact on state capacity of Left Government and, in the presence of social democracy, an insignificant coefficient for proportionality – indicate. (Federalism continues to exert a negative influence on state capacity in the long-term partisan model.)

Finally, for both coordination and state capacity models, we assessed our models

with a Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) estimator (not reported). We did so primarily because we desired to assess our core findings in the presence of controls of unmodeled unit (country) effects. As the same time, as we note in the text, it is difficult if not impossible to obtain good estimates of the effects of largely time-invariant factors (e.g., PR and federalism) in the presence of country "fixed effects." FEVD, developed by Thomas Plümper and Vera Troeger, offers one possible solution to this problem.[2] In short, as Nathaniel Beck has recently pointed out, FEVD is equivalent to estimating parameters with OLS for effects of time variant variables on some dependent variable in the presence of full fixed effects. Coefficients for unit effects are then regressed on time-invariant variables and the resulting coefficients for time-invariant variables become the estimates for the time-invariant factors on the focal dependent variable.[3]

Findings from FEVD estimation of our basic models for employers' organization, macro-corporatism, and state capacity (available from the authors) reaffirmed significant effects for core political institutional variables and, for nearly all cases, time variant factors. (Estimation of these models also produced equation R-squares of .90-plus along with substantively very similar individual coefficients.) We do not, however, wish to rely on this technique beyond perusal as another secondary check on the robustness of our findings. First, it constrains variables to either solely time variant or invariant categories (where, for instance, cross-national variation in predominately time varying factors is not utilized). Second, and most important, econometricians question a variety of properties of the FEVD

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[2] Plümper and Troeger 2007.

[3] Nathaniel Beck. 2011. "Of Fixed Effects and Time In-Variant Variables." *Political Analysis* 19 (No. 2): 119-122

estimator including the realism of several of its assumptions.[4]

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[4] For instance, see William Greene's and Breusch, Ward, Nguyen, and Kompas's multiple contributions to the symposium on FEVD in *Political Analysis* 19 (No. 2).

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Ancillary Table 7.1. The Underpinnings of Employers' Organization and Macro-Corporatism in Post-industrial Capitalism, 1974-2002. Robustness and Alternative Specifications.

Variables	Employers' Organization			Macro-corporatism		
	Basic	Jackknife	Cumulative Party Govt	Basic	Jackknife	Cumulative Party Govt
Politics & Institutions						
Proportionality $_{t-1}$	.0703*** (.0234)	.0770*** (.0298)	.0335* (.0.222)	.2515*** (.0458)	.2530*** (.0433)	.1787*** (.0449)
Number of Effective Parties $_{t-1}$	.0259*** (.0078)	.0259*** (.0064)	.0203*** (.0069)	.0504*** (.0171)	.0505*** (.0062)	.0516*** (.0175)
Federalism $_{t-1}$	-.1323*** (.0199)	-.1351*** (.0281)	-.1287*** (.0171)	-.0523*** (.0211)	-.0511** (.0218)	-.0423** (.0199)
State Capacity $_{t-1}$	.0961*** (.0374)	.0990*** (.0200)	-.0094 (.0380)	.3133*** (.0362)	.3143*** (.0235)	.1273** (.0636)
Left Government $_{mean, t-1 to t-3}$	.0009*** (.0003)	.0010*** (.0002)	---	.0022*** (.0007)	.0022*** (.0002)	---
Christian Democratic Government $_{mean, t-1 to t-3}$	.0017*** (.0005)	.0017*** (.0006)	---	.0039*** (.0011)	.0038*** (.0005)	---
Left Government $_{cum from 1950 to t-1}$	---	---	.0302*** (.0056)	---	---	.0301*** (.0062)
Christian Democratic Government $_{cum to t-1}$	---	---	.0169*** (.0024)	---	---	.0120*** (.0034)
Median Voter $_{t-1}$	.0007 (.0008)	.0008** (.0004)	.0008 (.0008)	-.0001 (.0018)	.0000 (.0009)	.0005 (.0017)
Post-industrialization						
Union Density $_{t-1}$	.0104*** (.0018)	.0102*** (.0013)	.0075*** (.0019)	---	---	---
De-industrialization $_{t-1}$	-.0046 (.0041)	-.0047** (.0025)	-.0052* (.0034)	-.0177*** (.0057)	-.0181*** (.0050)	-.0148*** (.0055)
Trade Openness $_{t-1}$	.0007 (.0006)	.0011 (.0020)	.0001 (.0005)	.0022** (.0011)	.0022*** (.0006)	.0019** (.0011
Capital Market Liberalization $_{t-1}$	-.0015*** (.0007)	-.0015*** (.0003)	-.0017*** (.0007)	-.0086*** (.0022)	-.0084*** (.0009)	-.0080*** (.0022
Business Cycle						
Unemployment $_{t-1}$	-.0085** (.0041)	-.0082*** (.0023)	-.0103*** (.0038)	-.0069 (.0085)	-.0068** (.0037)	-.0052 (.0087)

Per Capita Real GDP $_{t-1}$	.0037 (.0036)	.0044 (.0035)	-.0125*** (.0039)	.0048 (.0079)	.0050* (.0031)	-.0119 (.0079)
Constant	.0278	.0953	.2802	1.4527	1.4618	1.2871
R^2	.3292	---	.3933	.4261	---	.4221
N	494	---	494	493	---	493

Models of columns I and III, and IV and VI, are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors; models of columns II and V are based on jackknifed coefficients which are described in the text above.

* probability < .10
** probability < .05
*** probability < .01

Ancillary Table 7.2. The Impact of Political Institutions on the Development of State Capacity 1974-2002:

Variables	Basic Model	Jackknifed Model	Cum Party Govt.
Politics & Institutions			
Proportionality $_{t-1}$	.0401** (.0023)	.0426** (.0179)	-.0228 (.0240)
Federalism $_{t-1}$	-.1250*** (.0196)	-.1261*** (.0251)	-.0474** (.0215)
Left Government $_{t-3\ to\ t-1}$	.0010** (.0004)	.0010*** (.0003)	---
Christian Democratic Government $_{t-3\ to\ t-1}$	.0002 (.0008)	.0007 (.0025)	---
Left Government $_{cum\ from\ 1950\ to\ t-1}$	---	---	.0620*** (.0042
Christian Democratic Government $_{cum\ from\ 1950\ to\ t-1}$	---	---	-.0071* (.0037)
Median Voter $_{t-1}$	.0023* (.0016)	.0023*** (.0003)	.0017* (.0011)
Economic Structure - Change			
Dependent Population $_{t-1}$	.0001 (.0004)	.0016 (.0064)	.0003 (.0003)
Unemployment $_{t-1}$	.0237*** (.0060)	.0239*** (.0021)	.0152*** (.0054)
Trade Openness $_{t-1}$	.0002 (.0009)	.0002 (.0010)	-.0008 (.0010)
Capital Market Liberalization $_{t-1}$	.0005 (.0015)	.0005* (.0003)	.0005 (.0012)
Per Capita Real GDP $_{t-1}$	.0201*** (.0069)	.0203*** (.0039)	-.0110* (.0069)
Economic Growth Rate $_{t-1}$	-.0065*** (.0022)	-.0065*** (.0005)	-.0034** (.0018)
Constant	-.8449	-.6952	-.7189
R^2	.1734	---	.4183
N	502	---	502

Models of columns I and III are estimated with Ordinary Least Squares with panel correct standard errors. * probability < .10 ** probability < .05 *** probability < .01

SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSIS FOR CHAPTER 8

We display 1980s and 2000s levels and changes in ALMP and social protection for

workers in Ancillary Table 8.1. In Ancillary Table 8.2 we offer tests of the simultaneous

effects of employers' organization and union organization on ALMP and social protection as

well as the impacts of macro-corporatist institutions (substituted here for employers'

organization that anchors the main models of the text). Ancillary Tables 8.3 and 8. 4 report

jackknife tests for robustness and tests of additional hypotheses for direct effects of PR,

federalism, veto points, and voter turnout on ALMP and on social protection.

With regard to the findings of Table 8.2, two results depart somewhat from

expectations. For social protection, employers' organization becomes insignificant in the

presence of (the highly significant) union organization factor. While this is not completely

inconsistent with our theory, which emphasizes the important of employers to ALMP, it

does raise questions about the role of employers' organization on levels of social supports

for working-age families. One possibility to keep in mind is that the employer and union

variables in these equations have high R-square deletes (R-squares of regressions of

employer and union organization on other variables in the models) in excess of .80. That is,

high multicollinearity raises the question of whether it is possible to get reasonable

estimates of employer and union organization's simultaneous impacts on policies.

The second result in Table 8.2 of note is that the interaction of macro-corporatism

and deindustrialization is marginally significant in the ALMP equation (prob = .11). The

mediation of deindustrialization's impacts on social protection by macro-corporatism is,

however, very clear with a highly significant coefficient for the macro-corporatism and

deindustrialization interaction.

With respect to Tables 8.3 and 8.4, our findings for determinants of ALMP and social protection are highly robust to deletions of individual countries and the addition of supplemental variables. Tests of supplemental hypotheses indicate that federalism and veto points may constrain the development of ALMP and that voter turnout may positively bolster levels of social protection for current workers. Given that these additional factors do not have consistent and clearly significant effects across both policy areas, we consider the findings as suggestive and do not draw firm conclusions on their relevance.

Ancillary Table 8.1. Change and Continuity in ALMP Spending and Social Protection, 1980-2002

Country	ALMP		Social Protection	
	Early 1980s	Early 2000s	Early 1980s	Early 2000s
Relatively High Macro-corporatism				
Norway	.6	.8	25.6	26.3
Denmark	.8	1.7	22.2	21.0
Sweden	1.6	1.6	23.1	22.7
Belgium	1.3	1.2	20.3	20.3
Finland	1.0	1.1	16.1	17.9
Austria	.3	.6	17.0	16.6
Moderate Macro-corporatism				
Italy	.2	.5	10.4	12.6
Germany	.7	1.2	20.1	18.8
Ireland	1.4	.9	15.2	14.2
Netherlands	.7	1.1	23.6	21.4
Australia	.4	.4	7.2	7.7
Relatively Low Macro-corporatism				
Switzerland	.1	.6	20.8	12.8
Japan	.2	.3	10.6	11.3
France	.6	1.3	16.6	16.3
New Zealand	.8	.5	9.6	8.2
United Kingdom	.7	.4	9.7	11.5
Canada	.4	.4	13.1	9.0
United States	.1	.2	8.9	9.0

The table displays 1981-1985 and 1998-2002 means for the policy dimensions. See above for details on variable measurement and sources.

Ancillary Table 8.2. The Determinants of ALMP and Social Protection in the Postindustrial Era: Supplemental Tests of Union Power and Macro-corporatism

	ALMP			Social Protection		
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Employers' Organization	.4761** (.1983)	---	---	.0855 (.3279)	---	---
Labor Organization	-.1050 (.0904	---	---	1.2981** (.3903)	---	---
Macro-corporatism	---	.0778* (.0520)	-.7200 (.6778)	---	.2469* (.1825)	-5.6851** (1.942)
Macro-corporatism × Deindustrialization	---	---	.0102[a] (.0085	---	---	.0777** (.0261
Median Voter (Ideological Position)	-.0048** (.0019)	-.0041** (.0020)	-.0040** (.0020)	.0139** (.0067)	.0140** (.0069)	.0144** (.0067)
Left Party Government	.0005 (.0006)	.0003 (.0006)	.0003 (.0006)	.0019 (.0021)	.0027 (.0022)	.0027 (.0021)
Christian Democratic Party Government	.0000 (.0013)	-.0001 (.0014)	-.0002 (.0014)	-.0002 (.0049)	-.0018 (.0050)	-.0019 (.0051)
Deindustrialization	.0088 (.0139)	.0038 (.0137)	.0033 (.0135)	.0756** (.0283)	.0662** (.02800	.1354** (.0440)
Trade Openness	-.0028* (.0019)	-.0028* (.0019)	-.0029* (.0019)	-.0021 (.0076)	-.0015 (.0078)	-.0019 (.0078)
Capital Mobility	.0047** (.0017)	.0051** (.0018)	.0047** (.0019)	-.0020 (.0071)	-.0034 (.0072)	-.0079 (.0071)
Unemployment	.0268** (.0120)	.0250** (.0118)	.2423** (.0118)	-.0114 (.0306)	-.0067 (.0315)	-.0637** (.0373)
Per capita Real GDP	.0036 (.0076)	.0037 (.0077)	.0044 (.0077)	.0687** (.0290)	.0629** (.0302)	.0330 (.0322)
Intercept	-.2210	-.5707	-.4631	2.11393	1.6640	-1.8121
R^2	.6275	.5740	.5710	.8825	.8780	.8647
Number Observations	391	391	391	501	501	501

The models are estimated with 1973 (1980/1985) to 2003 annual data from 18 nations by Prais-Winston (AR1) regression with panel correct standard errors; nation fixed effects are included (not reported). The table reports OLS regression coefficients with panel correct standard errors.
*indicates significance at the .10 level   ** indicates significance at the .05 level or below.

Ancillary Table 8.3. The Determinants of ALMP Spending in the Postindustrial Era: Tests of Supplemental Hypotheses and Robustness.

	Basic	Jackknife	PR	Federalism	Veto Points	Voter Turnout
Employers' Organization	.4144** (.1670)	.4153** (.0363)	.4172** (.1614)	.4174** (.1644)	.4188** (.1647)	.3831** (.1686)
Proportional Representation	---	---	-.0316 (.0309)	---	---	---
Federalism	---	---	---	-.0477* (.0370)	---	---
Veto Points	---	---	---	---	-.1980* (.1526)	---
Voter Turnout	---	---	---	---	---	-.0029 (.0040)
Median Voter (Ideological Position)	-.0047** (.0019)	-.0047** (.0007)	-.0049** (.0019)	-.0047** (.0019)	-.0047** (.0019)	-.0038** (.0020)
Left Party Government	.0004 (.0006)	.0004** (.0001)	.0003 (.0006)	.0004 (.0006)	.0004 (.0006)	.0006 (.0006)
Christian Democratic Party Government	.0001 (.0013)	.0001 (.0013)	-.0001 (.0013)	-.0001 (.0013)	-.0001 (.0013)	-.0001 (.0015)
Deindustrialization	.0120 (.0133)	.0117** (.0060)	.0129 (.0131)	.0125 (.0132)	.0127 (.0133)	.0115 (.0138)
Trade Openness	-.0029* (.0019)	-.0029** (.0004)	-.0034** (.0019)	-.0031** (.0019)	-.0030* (.0019)	-.0049** (.0027)
Capital Mobility	.0046** (.0018)	.0047** (.0006)	.0019** (.0017)	.0047** (.0018)	.0048** (.0018)	.0051** (.0018)
Unemployment	.0247** (.0117)	.0246** (.0034)	.0242** (.0116)	.0248** (.0116)	.0248** (.0116)	.0277** (.0118)
Per capita Real GDP	.0034 (.0075)	.0024 (.0033)	.0036 (.0074)	.0041 (.0074)	.0039 (.0074)	.0063 (.0082)
Intercept	-.4566	-.4736	-.5244	-.2684	-.1688	-.4469
R^2	.6210	---	.6541	.6333	.6307	.6801
Number Observations	392	---	393	393	392	342

The models of column I is estimated with 1971-2002 annual data from 18 nations by Prais-Winston (AR1) regression with panel correct standard errors; nation fixed effects are included (not reported).

*indicates significance at the .10 level   ** .05 level or below.

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Ancillary Table 8.4. The Determinants of Social Protection in the Postindustrial Era: Tests of Supplemental Hypotheses and Robustness.

	Basic	Jackknife	PR	Federalism	Veto Points	Voter Turnout
Employers' Organization	.5041* (.3189)	.5124** (.1001)	.5034* (.3201)	.5004* (.3198)	.5037* (.3191)	.5327** (.2911)
Proportional Representation	----	---	-.0294 (.1443)	--	---	---
Federalism	---	---	---	-.1822 (.1800)	---	---
Veto Points	---	---	---	---	.0168 (.6060)	---
Voter Turnout	---	---	---	---	---	.0268** (.0163)
Median Voter (Ideological Position)	.0133** (.0068)	.0133** (.0020)	.0133** (.0068)	.0133** (.0068)	.0133** (.0068)	.0124** (.0068)
Left Party Government	.0029* (.0022)	.0028** (.0007)	.0029* (.0020)	.0030* (.0021)	.0029* (.0022)	.0035* (.0022)
Christian Democratic Party Government	-.0010 (.0050)	-.0009 (.0020)	-.0010 (.0051)	-.0010 (.0051)	-.0010 (.0051)	-.0005 (.0051)
Deindustrialization	.0643** (.0271)	.0643** (.0250)	.0645** (.0272)	.0642** (.0271)	.0643** (.02710	.0662** (.0267)
Trade Openness	-.0012 (.0071)	-.0011 (.0037)	-.0013 (.0077)	-.0014 (.0077)	-.0012 (.0078)	-.0011 (.0081)
Capital Mobility	-.0043 (.0070)	-.0044** (.0023)	-.0042 (.0071)	-.0042 (.0071)	-.0043 (.0071)	-.0045 (.0072)
Unemployment	.5041* (.3190)	-.0081 (.0214)	-.0056 (.0312)	-.0043 (.0312)	-.0056 (.0315)	.0007 (.309)
Per capita Real GDP	.0628** (.0299)	.0572** (.0212)	.0627** (.0298)	.0642** (.0299)	.0628** (.0801)	.0656** (.0328)
Intercept	2.5606	2.9234	2.5461	3.412	2.5332	1.0261
R^2	.8723	---	.8728	.8726	.8723	.8706
Number Observations	501	---	501	501	501	486

The models are estimated with 1971-2002 annual data from 18 nations by Prais-Winston (AR1) regression with panel correct standard errors; nation fixed effects are included (not reported).

*indicates significance at the .10 level   ** .05 level or below.

Supplemental Analysis for Chapter 12.

In Ancillary Table 12.1, we report tests of supplementary hypotheses that suggest direct redistributive impacts of PR, federalism, veto points, and voter turnout as well as a test of Lupa and Pontusson's hypothesis about the redistributive role of the closeness of the median and low income voter.[5] Federalism and veto points have marginally significant, negative effects on state redistribution. The closeness of median and low income voters is negatively related to redistribution: as the distance of median and low income voters declines, state redistribution increases.

Ancillary Table 12.2 presents a number of tests of the robustness of our findings on the determinants of redistribution. Tests for alternative measures of the median voter as well as tests for robustness in lagged dependent variable models, in models that use alternative estimates of standard errors, and in jackknife models all confirm the positive impact of macro-corporatism on redistribution (and other key findings from Chapter 12).

We also wish to highlight the results in column I where the dependent variable is operationalized as the *percentage change between pre- and post-fisc GINI indices* of working-age family income inequality (rather than absolute change). Results in column I (and re-estimations for all models from Chapter 12 with the percentage change measure) are virtually identical to our results with absolute change between pre- and post-fisc GINI indices.[6]

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[5] Lupa and Pontusson 2011.

[6] Kenworthy and Pontusson argue that absolute change between pre- and post-fisc GINIs is a more interpretable measure of redistribution and less susceptible to distortions. Kenworthy and Pontusson 2001. For instance, they argue that in tests for partisan impacts on percentage change measures of redistribution, left governments may be associated with lower pre-fisc

Finally, Table 12.3 completes our assessment of the impact of coordination on labor market inequalities and dualism. As the table illustrates, macro-corporatism suppresses two additional features of dualism and inequality in private markets. It is negatively associated with both the percentage of earners working below one-half the median wage and the magnitude of inequality of (working-age) family market income.

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inequality and, hence, artifactualy with large percentage changes in pre- and post-fisc GINIs that come from low pre-fisc inequality. Iversen argues, however, that absolute change measures will automatically produce more redistribution when pre-fisc inequality increases without any changes in policy. Iversen 2009. We present our results in the text with the absolute measure but estimate all models with both absolute and percentage change. The choice of measure makes no difference to our results.

Ancillary Table 12.1. The Determinants of Government Income Redistribution: Supplemental Tests

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Macro-corporatism	2.8416** (.4149)	2.6740** (.6485)	2.5312** (.4670)	2.6021** (.4245)	2.6876** (.4252)	2.0114** (.8372)
Proportional Representation	---	.2057 (.4925)	---	---	---	---
Federalism	---	---	-.2509* (.1638)	---	---	---
Veto Points	---	---	---	-.6308* (.3839)	---	---
Voter Turnout	---	---	---	---	.0025 (.0041)	---
Median-Low Income Voter (50-10 Ratio)	---	---	---	---	---	-3.1235* (1.9336)
Median Voter (90-50 Wage Ratio)	6.5622** (2.2021)	6.2760** (1.8807)	5.6059** (1.9449)	6.9148** (1.9047)	6.8260** (2.1770)	5.3857** (2.0095)
Left Party Government	.0007 (.0069)	.0008 (.0076)	.0018 (.0075)	.0024 (.0076)	.0038 (.0080)	-.0016 (.0068)
Christian Democratic Party Government	.0069 (.0131)	.0044 (.0132)	.0094 (.0116	.0079 (.0113)	.0093 (.0136)	.0013 (.0103)
Deindustrialization	.5304** (.0880)	.5372** (.0699)	.4925** (.0747)	.4844** (.0777)	.4781** (.0862)	.5314** (.0804)
Trade Openness	.0040 (.0147)	.0009 (.0135)	.0003 (.0139)	-.0015 (.0145)	.0087 (.0126)	-.0034 (.0133)
Capital Mobility	.0198 (.0232)	.0176 (.0260)	.0213 (.0224)	.0183 (.0224)	.0230 (.0223)	.0308* (.0230)
Unemployment	.2095** (.1074)	.2139** (.1012)	.2176** (.1008)	.2337** (.1017)	.2355** (.1111)	.1963** (.1022)
Female Labor Force Participation	.1688** (.0289)	.1629** (.0332)	.1459** (.0345)	.1361** (.0382)	.1742** (.0341)	.1461** (.0315)
Per capita Real GDP	-.3812** (.0605)	-.3811** (.0447)	-.3398** (.0522)	-.3273** (.0579)	-.3762** (.0954)	-.3842** (.0453)
Intercept	-47.6825	-47.1772	-41.8245	-43.7283	-45.7523	-39.3072
R^2	.8185	.8038	.8107	.8092	.8091	.8136
Number Observations	57	57	57	57	55	57

The models are estimated with 1971-2002 annual data from 18 nations by Prais-Winston (AR1) regression with panel correct standard errors; * indicates significance at the .10 level ** significant at the .05 level or below.

Ancillary Table 12.2. The Determinants of Government Income Redistribution: Robustness Tests.

	I	II	III	IV	V
Macro-corporatism	9.1863**	2.5790**	1.9473**	2.8354**	2.8046**
	(1.1926)	(.3693)	(.3252)	(.3252)	(.1714)
Median Voter (90-50 Wage Ratio)	16.5262**	---	.2817	6.4132**	6.3415**
	(4.9657)		(1.5677)	(2.3353)	(1.0700)
Median Voter (GINI Pre-fisc Family Income)	---	31.6559**	---	---	---
		(5.9681)			
Left Party Government	-.0029	-.0006	-.0109	.0009	.0008
	(.0184)	(.0059)	(.0069)	(.0067)	(.0023)
Christian Democratic Party Government	-.0049	-.0015	.0149**	.0056	.0064*
	(.0304)	(.0094)	(.0089)	(.0087)	(.0042)
Deindustrialization	1.0900**	.3091**	.4262**	.5169**	.5190**
	(.2063)	(.0677)	(.1960)	(.0790)	(.0464)
Trade Openness	.0413	.0076	-.0287**	.0035	.0041
	(.0379)	(.0108)	(.0143)	(.0198)	(.0086)
Capital Mobility	.0594	.0245	-.0001	.0234	.0221**
	(.0638)	(.0215)	(.0296)	(.0267)	(.0094)
Unemployment	.3757	.1843**	.1834**	.2136**	.2142**
	(.3118)	(.1012)	(.1022)	(.0700)	(.0386)
Female Labor Force Participation	.4489**	.1356	.1540**	.1627**	.1635**
	(.0813)	(.0271)	(.0328)	(.0262)	(.0137)
Per capita Real GDP	-.9869**	-.3106**	-.2347**	-.3788	-.3787**
	(.1358)	(.0401)	(.0521)	(.0553)	(.0320)
Redistribution $_{t-1}$	---	---	.3326**	---	---
			(.0554)		
Intercept	-100.2948	-30.3859	-29.4412	-46.3468	-46.2062
R^2	.8163	.8449	.8874	.8016	---
Number Observations	57	58	46	57	---

Column I reports results for the basic model for the percentage change in the Pre- to post-fisc GINI; II reports the basic model with the GINI for median family private income; III reports the results with a lagged endogenous variable specification. IV displays the results with the Huber-White robust standard errors estimation. V reports the jackknife estimates of parameter effects (see text). *indicates significance at the .10 level

** indicates significance at the .05 level or below.

Ancillary Table 12.3. The Determinants of Market Income Inequality in the Post-Industrial Era: Low Income Earners and Family Income Market Income Distribution

	% Low Earners	Family Market Income
Macro-corporatism	-1.4891**	-1.3888**
	(.3628)	(.4592)
Left Party Government	-.2791**	.0004
	(.0377)	(.0091)
Christian Democratic Government	-.1805**	.0108
	(.0409)	(.0138)
Deindustrialization	-.0470	.6340**
	(.0369)	(.0954)
Trade Openness	-.0031	-.0669**
	(.0074)	(.0140)
Capital Mobility	.0429**	.0206
	(.0157)	(.0281)
Growth Rate in Per Capita Real GDP	.0494*	.0152
	(.0280)	(.0213)
Intercept	18.3140	-11.3860
R^2	.6505	.6684
Number Obs.	244	59

Models are estimated with 1980s to 2000s annual data from 17 nations (low income earners) and 13 nations (family market income) by Prais-Winsten (AR1) regression with panel correct standard errors.

*indicates significance at the .10 level
** indicates significance at the .05 level or below.