

## **DEDICATION**

This thesis is dedicated in memory of my valued and precious siblings Fatimah Abdul Majeed Muhammad Alhasaniy, and Abdul Kabeer Abdul Majid Muhammad Alhasaniy who passed away in 2018 during this program. Their sisterly and brotherly encourage and cherish will always be remembered. I pray for their gentle soul to continue to rest in perfect peace.

I also dedicated this work in memory of the wonderful and respected Father of mine Shareef Abdul Majeed Muhammad Alhasaniy may his gentle soul rest in peace and tranquillity in the heaven, and his fatherly unique upbringing will always be remembered.

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## ABSTRACT

### **THE IMPACT OF ARAB UPRISINGS ON DEMOCRATIZATION MOVEMENT IN MAGHREB: THE CASES OF MOROCCO AND TUNISIA**

Three decades after the beginning of the ‘third wave’ of democratization, more than 30 countries in southern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Europe, some part of Africa, and some Asian countries have swiftly experienced ‘transition to democracy’. The Arab countries, however, were relatively bypassed by this process and rather launched measures towards political liberalization at the expense of democratic models.

With the onset of the Arab uprisings by the ending of 2010 and the emergence of popular demonstrations that incited revolution across the Arab states; the literature on democratization in Middle East (Mashreq) and North Africa (Magreb) has begun to improve recently. One of the crucial aspects of the Arab Spring or Uprisings is the overthrow of the long-lasting rulers like Ben Ali of Tunisia and Mubarek of Egypt as well as the questioning of the authoritarian regimes by the masses. On the one hand, the public protests have engulfed some Arab states; but on the other some of them have found the ways to overcome the internal unrest and contain the opposition. In this regard, this thesis aims to analyze the two cases in the post-Arab uprisings era; Tunisia and Morocco where republican regimes – like Tunisia – have engaged in a transition to democracy through toppling of the long-lasting ruler; Morocco –a monarchical rule– has sustained and consolidated its regime through different methods of regime’s survival.

**Keywords:** Arab uprisings, democracy, Maghreb region, authoritarianism, monarchism, Tunisia, Morocco

## ÖZ

### ARAP AYAKLANMALARININ MAĞREP'TEKİ DEMOKRATİKLEŞME HAREKETLERİNE ETKİLERİ TUNUS VE FAS ÖRNEKLERİ

Üçüncü dalga demokratikleşme hareketlerinin başlamasının ardından 30 yıldan fazla sürede Avrupa, Latin Amerika, Doğu Avrupa ve bazı Afrika ve Asya ülkelerinde hızlı bir şekilde demokrasiye geçiş süreçleri yaşanmıştır. Arap dünyası ise, bu süreçlerde doğrudan geçişler de bölgedeki bazı ülkelerin siyasi liberalleşme yolunda adımlar atmışlardır.

2010

yılında sonlarında başlayan Arap Baharı ve Arap ayaklanmaları veya Devrimleri olarak nitelendirilen halk protestoları; Orta Doğu (Maşrek) ve Kuzey Afrika (Mağreb) coğrafyasında demokratikleşme çağrılarının dile getirilmesinde önemli bir zemin hazırladı. Arap Ayaklanmalarının veya Baharı'nın ortaya çıkardığı en hayati sonuçlardan biri de uzun yıllardır iktidarda bulunan ve otoriter yapıları kuran Tunus lideri Ben Ali ve Mısır Cumhurbaşkanı Mübarek'in halk keylemleri ile devrilmeleri olmuştur. Biryandan, halk ayaklanmaları Arap ülkelerini etkisi altına alırken; diğer yandan ise bazı ülkelerde yükselen muhalif hareketler ve protestoları çerçevede aldıkları bazı önlemlerle bertaraf etmeyi başarmışlardır. Bu kapsamda, bu tez temel amacı; Arap ayaklanmaları sonrasındaki Mağreb coğrafyasında yer alan ülkeler olan Tunus ve Fas örneklerini incelemek ve bu ülkelerin söz konusu ayaklanmalar çerçevesinde karşılaştırmaktır. Tunus örneği cumhuriyetçi bir yönetim şeklini yaşadığı dönüşümü sergilerken; Fas ise monarşik bir yönetim şeklinin Arap Baharı ile kendinin asıl muhafaza ettiği ortaya koymaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Arap ayaklanmaları, demokrasi, Mağreb bölgesi, otoriterizm, monarşi, Tunus Fas

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## INTRODUCTION

When the 'third wave of democratization' has begun in many countries in the world; the prospects for the fourth wave were expected to happen in the Arab world (Rina&Tanja 2014). Yet, after thirty years of what the Arab Middle East is deprived of the third wave of democratization (Lust 2011), and the myth of authoritarianism is still one of the key aspects shaping the academic literature regarding regional politics. However, the political liberalization has become apparent in the region in the last quarter of the twenty century, following the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, in which some researchers considered it as the third wave of political liberalization in the Arab world (Abushouk 2016).

The reason behind this phenomenon is; there is declaration of serious constitutional and political reforms in many countries in the region that planned to reinforce popular participation in political landscape. Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Egypt are considered among the list of countries that have shifted towards democratic opening by the late 1980s. While Egypt started its reformation in 1973, and precisely in 1976; it basically regarded it as a return to multiparty political life.

Egypt's dedication to change was renewed in the 1980s after the assassination of President Anwar Al-Sadat due to peace-making with Israel. Another example can be given from Morocco; when in early 1970s there has been a change to political liberalization – when King Hassan II reconciled with the political opposition party shortly following barely shirking the King demise. In 1991, various methods of political liberalization were witnessed and political openings were progressively arisen in many Arab countries such as Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia and Yemen. The political party systems were strengthened and parliaments were convened in the 1980s (Lust 2011).

This political transformation happened also in the Gulf countries by the end of the Gulf War in 1991. *Majlis Ash-Shura* which means consultation Council, the consultation Council was elected in Oman in 1991, and the legislative elections took place in Kuwait in October 1992. Another case was the establishment of a *Shura* Council in Saudi Arabia as well, and Bahrain also promised for reformation. The Shura council is a house of representative that headed by a Speaker, is the parliamentary body that counsel the monarch on matters that are important to government.

All these measures have showed that there was an ongoing political reform process in the region since the following of the third wave; but there was no adequate improvement that can create a 'real' political transformation. Instead, these reforms and attempts towards democratization have restored the power of the authoritarian rulers in the region (Abushouk 2016). However, by the arrival of the 2011 popular protests, the emblematic which known as 'Arab Democratic Spring' or 'Arab upheaval' or 'Arab Uprisings' or 'Arab Awakening' or 'Arab revelation' has been a great surprise for the entire world as well as the academics writing in this particular field of study (Peace & Cavatorta, 2012). The evolution of public riots that have engulfed most of the Arab countries have brought optimism and hope for building democratization in Arab states after a long period of authoritarianism (Kausch, 2015).

The revolutions or reforms that have been brought by the Arab Springs, have then, destabilized the literature regarding undemocratic endurance or authoritarian persistence in the Arab territories (Asseburg, 2015 & Fishman, 2015). Thus, the Arab upheavals have led to democratic transitions as in the case of Tunisia – which is regarded as the most successful case – and also it led to the removal of long-lasting rulers in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Whereas the upheavals caused the death of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya by an external intervention (through NATO) and casted the country into an extended civil war;

the civil war in Syria and sectarian conflict in Yemen still remained as the legacies of the Arab Spring.

Some leaders were extracted through enormous public protests; some through the renunciation of chief military officers or *coup d'état*; and in some cases, with exterior intervention (Asseburg&Wimmen, 2015). This is, in fact, what was observed in the Arab republican governments. In Arab monarchies, however, the situation was quite different with the exception of countries like Bahrain – which have seen serious pressure, because of the sectarian division that has been there for decades between the Sunni Royal family and elites and Shite majority, this is blazed again on 14 February to 14 March intervention of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) forces (Hussein Ibish 2011).

This thesis, then, aims to analyze two different trajectories of Arab Spring in the post-2011 era; where a republican regime was totally engulfed by the protests, i.e. Tunisia and the case of Morocco where the popular demonstrations have not resulted in the toppling of the regime, but rather consolidation of the monarchy though constitutional reforms.

#### **1. Aim of the research:**

The overall purpose of this thesis is, therefore, to explain and explore the impacts of the 2011 Arab uprising on the two countries of Maghreb, i.e. Tunisia and Morocco. Even if there are similarities among them that led to the uprisings in the selected countries; there also exists different trajectories regarding their political systems and transitions. In this regard, this work aims to compare the upheavals in these countries with an observation and analysis to question what is the difference of the 2011 occurrences from the former riots, and why the uprisings following is different from one another?

Additionally, this work analyses the ways of the ruling government of Tunisia has managed to survive during the earlier protests and the reasons of failure during

the 2010-2011 upheavals? And as a corollary of this objective, this work also sheds a light on how the Kingdom of Morocco has achieved to sustain its rule during the public rallies. The conclusion summarizes the whole research and provides several recommendations.

For that particular purpose, this thesis is an attempt to cover the literature on Arab upheavals, the major motives of it, and the spillover effects, in the wide-ranging logic to look at two specific Maghreb nations of “Tunisia and Morocco”. Thus, Tunisia and Morocco are among the two Arab countries that are in despair and are suffering from the outcome of the democratic insufficiency. Lack of democracy does not only affects the right of people, but it also affects the right of the leaders that think democracy will end their regime, as it involves people’s psyche that prevents their contribution to their community. It also affects the citizens to get involved in the affairs of the nation, and this can make the state weaker and creates insurgency and terrorism, which will bring the end of their regime in the nastiest method. For the season, it is a very important principle to have an exhaustive knowledge and understanding of democracy so as to all kind of progress?

## 2. **Statement of the Problem**

Following analytically considering several theories which have been established by many intellectuals, researchers and scholars on Arab Spring and its negative or positive impact on the processes of democratization in Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, and the challenges and prospect for democracy in the entire region. Therefore, this dissertation would discourse subsequent objection: to find out the reasons of *resilience* of monarchies and the resistance to democracy, and tactics to convalesce the level of political situation in these case studies. One of the main motivation behind this work is to have comprehensive knowledge about internal, regional and global socio-political framework on Maghreb region with the aim of illustrating the upshots of the Arab uprisings.

Then, the thesis attempts to demonstrate the different trajectories of two Maghreb nations in the African-Arab lands.

Democracy can be best defined as a system of government, which expresses in a diversity of establishments and apparatuses, the supreme political authority that is based on the people's desire. (Boutros Ghali, 1996). The democracy deficiency may also lead to political instabilities in the region, so taking the impact, sources, and circumstance of this issue into account in a soft manner of approach way it will surely solve the global threat, which is terrorism and corruption. This dissertation discourses the recent of the series of upheavals that took place and still taking place in the Arab world and attempt and elucidate its sooth with the purpose of reaching to a solution that eradicates the problem.

### **3. The pprimary research questions of this thesis are:**

The study aims to explore the spill-over effects of Arab Spring on democratization movements in the cases of Tunisia and Morocco. Both cases suggest that there are differences among the 'republican' and 'monarchical' regimes for decade up until after the Arab Spring. For instance, both countries have been under long lasting rules, but Morocco offers a case where constitutional monarchy managed its survival as compared to Tunisian republic. In addition, the both of the countries have similarities that are inherited from a top-down political system under the leadership of their presidents and/ or kings with the same style; but when the Arab Springs hit the northwest Africa it resulted in divergent outcomes. Here comes out the main question then:

- A. Why did the Arab uprisings start in Maghreb countries?
- B. Why is the Arab Spring significant for democratization studies in the Middle East?
- C. Do the events of a series of Arab Spring that began with unrest from the Maghreb in late 2010 - which has brought down some regimes in Arab countries and not in others?

#### 4. Theoretical Framework

This thesis uses a comparative approach, to combine geographical location of Maghreb nations in general, and provide a brief evaluation of basic political structures of the selected countries in Ottoman and French eras, in order to help to understand the issues concerning Arab uprisings. Within this regard, the research questions is centered on to elucidate on of the Arab upheaval in general, and in the two selected countries in the Maghreb region in particular. This is for the reason that this paper explores to study the impact of Arab Spring on the selected countries and to observe, why the Arab uprising began in one of the Maghreb nations. And why the revolution in these two countries have similar implications that resulted in an uprising but led to different endings even though the outcome was somehow similar through comparative exploration. In this respect, the thesis sheds a light on the similarities and the differences between Arab monarchies and republics. This thesis don't have an initial hypothetical presumption, as it has followed an inductive approach, so the work reached to its hypothetical conclusions via the research.

The region of North Africa, which borders the great Sahara to the south, the Mediterranean Sea to the north, the Atlantic Ocean to the west, and by hundreds of miles of desert to the east is known as *Al maghrebul-Arabiya* or the Arabic Maghreb. The word Maghreb mean "west", "Occident" or "sunset"; so, the two words mean "the Arabic west". And also this region was known as "*Al maghrebul-Kabeer*" which means the Great Maghreb, and "*Biladul-Maghreb*" – the land of Maghreb. This name was first coined as "*jazeeraatul-Maghreb*", which means the island of the west, and this name was given to this region at early seventh century during the Arabic invasion or Islamic conquest that came from Mashreq which means "East" or "Orient". So, they called the states in the Western Arab lands as opposed the Eastern Arab lands in western Asia. Most of the northern

African countries and a large portion of Africa's Sahara, without Egypt and Republic of Sudan, are Arabic west, and the nations of Maghreb are all the regions that contain Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, and Algeria, extended with the addition of Mauritania and Western Sahara. This region has approximately 100 million population, the most of the nations of Maghreb excluded Libya, Western Sahara, and Melilla and Ceuta cities were former French Colonies. And Islam is the dominant religion in nearly most of the Maghreb territories, and their most popular languages are Arab and Tamazight (Ali Debouz 1964; Massaoudi 1994).

Thus, the reasons behind the birth of the Arab Spring in Maghreb nations should be discovered: First of all, the combination of the region which is Islam and French's secularism "*Laïcité*" that has influenced many former French colonies, as we may know that secularism that means the separation of religion and state is practiced very different universally. The United States' (US) practice of secularism is different from practice of French secularism, because in America's law the state and religion may not interfere with each other. Under American law religion is one of the most protected forms of speech, and American law protects religious freedom, while in the French practice of secularism can show us that the religion may not interfere in the state, but the state may interfere in the religion, because religion is excluded in private place, and may not display in public, so display of religion are prohibited in French secularism. French government banned the headscarves and veils most famously in 2011, but in public school and other government offices, and Muslim veils is compulsory in especially in public in most of Islamic school of ideology. As known that many non-western seculars practiced French secularism system, talk less Maghreb states that most of them were former French Colonies. This made the region magnets basically on a history of secular policies under dictatorial leaders together with Muslim authority in society. So the religion and French practice of secularism influence the meaning of traditional western understanding of democracy in Maghreb states (Mery, 2014).



Thus, these problems can create an insurgency which was one of the major reasons for starting the events known as Arab Spring in one of Great Maghreb nations like in Tunisia. And the similarities such as being hereditary and aging military dictatorship, global economic conditions, and so on help the prodigious radical social protests knock closely every Arabic Maghreb, Mashreq, and Gulf countries, that is also known as the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

During 16<sup>th</sup> century all Maghreb nations excluding Morocco have interned into the political trajectory of the progressively influence under the effective rule of Ottoman Empire. So it means all of the region of Modern-day Algeria, Libya Tunisia and Mauritania passed under the control of Ottoman, while only present-day Morocco didn't passed under this effective control in the region. The reason of intervention of the Ottoman power in this territory was basically came in regard to expanding Cristian's movement into North Africa by forces from Europe. Hence, the Ottoman involvement as Muslims was essentially welcome by their coreligionist in Maghreb. The Ottomans' intervention in the region first took the system of inaugurating of 'preeminence' in the majorconsidered and tactical cities of the Maghreb. Once in place, thesepreeminence only had a restricted impact on the daily lives of most people of the states. Apart from tax collecting and the most and basic systems of thegovernment, the authority of Ottoman was limited to the preeminence's cities and the other coastal towns. And even in the cities, preeminence reliance on a small governmental leaders brought in from Istanbul, reinforced by a similar imported militarycaste, all these showed that their there was no communications and relations between the government elite with the native population, the interaction between them was too narrow. From there the increasing autonomy from Istanbul benefit from preeminence serve togrowth the impact that were confined political bodies rather than Ottoman empire'sdominion. Actually, the administrators of the Ottoman impairer's supreme in Tunis known as the official beys increasingly took on thecharacteristic of heritable empires of the document frankly becoming known as the husainids who

rule as byes, a former ruling dynasty of Tunisia, which was of Cretan Turkish origin.

Though absent the attributes of an established colonizing empire, the power of Ottoman in the Maghreb was not without impact. The creating of the Tunis's regency help promote shape the identity and value of the city and its surroundings. Indeed, all these style of ruling have both positive and negatives impacts on Tunisians' rules, and this one of the things that makes Tunisia and Morocco different in some time because Morocco didn't experience all these as it didn't be under the Ottoman control. But both Morocco and Tunisia experienced land sequestration, significant of European immigration and authoritarianism of terminologies of resistance to colonial power, these were not no practically the same with other Maghreb states. These selected countries' colonial experiences were so much comparable, although there is significant different between them, but many correlated to their different occurrences in the pre-colonial era. Both the Alawites in Morocco and Hussainids in Tunisia tried their best to do some reforms that help them escape from this colony. They develop and strength their armed forces and economies to endure in growing tensions and infiltration from European power and particularly French that had already arrived in neighboring country Algeria.

In Tunisia, a determined time of amendment under the Prime ministership Khair ad-Din from 1873 to 1877, even though one-sided and fleeting aspects of the government, military and education system, authorizing the latter to put down the 1894's rural insurgence and then for the first time formed the almost full rule of the significant government over the rural area. This help French to find all component of a solid and stable government in the country (Wills, 2014). French rule in Tunisia acted to aid further the improvement of a substantial metropolitan, restructuring prepared middle classes that had already started to appear and develop throughout the period of Ottoman, the formal establishment of the colony in 1883 really welcome by much of this part of the inhabitants, seeing the rule of

French assimilating the combination of new modern knowledge and transformation from Europe. This outlook was improved and revised overtime, as Tunisians' middle classes always did their best to benefit from associate with French, especially in the education's fields. Regardless of having a smaller population than Morocco, three-quarters of the undoubtedly small number of North African students studying in University of France during the early 1930s were Tunisians (Moore,). This additional amalgamation and strengthening of the Middle class of Tunisia originated at the cost of the traditional and residential upper classes in Tunisia whose power and influence weakened as an outcome.

The Moroccan sultan's forces at improvement were, by discrepancy, much fewer active and had weakening impact on the pre-colonial state, since many worked to damage the traditional formulas of networks of benefaction that strengthen the régime of Sultan. The European penetration progressively penetrated Morocco in the end part of 19<sup>th</sup> century, the European penetration in Morocco led to frequent trivial riots against the Sultan in protest against this form a civilization that had far fewer exposed to the outside world than in Tunisia; product of the lack of connection to the policies' of Ottoman, and the more nationalist policy tracked by sultan Suleiman in the early decades of 19<sup>th</sup> century. The country was possibly the least affected by colonial power, this was not exclusively due to the reasonably late penetration of foreign power. The outcomes relatively short period of the European protectorates were additional more relived by the policies of the first French resident General, Marshall Louis Hubert Gonaux Lyautey's policy of minimum infrastructure in traditional Muslim life together with his respect for Sultan, possibly encouraged by his own royalist confidences through his long stay as resident General between 1912 to 1925 additional conserved and protected Morocco's traditional social and political foundations. Traditions of Monarchy were allowed and in some cases revitalized under Lyautey and the resident General also confirmed that groups played the Morocco rather than French national anthem in central event, and that it was the flag of Morocco that flew over public buildings. This politics of Lyautey, although largely not sustained

by his replacement helped support traditions of Morocco's political institutions which, as noted previously had been reinforced by the incident of various states of hereditary monarchy continuous by the Ottoman control felt in neighboring Maghreb states, this wasn't mean to say that the country was politically unaffected by colonial presence, but French power obviously unimportantly damaged the administrative and governmental stability of Morocco, it left the political style of Moroccans basically intact (Wills, 2014).

## **5. Research method and instance selection**

This dissertation concentrates on the Arab Springs in general; then a general argument and illustration is taken from the North African countries and mainly two Maghreb nations of Morocco and Tunisia. And in style, the study uses a comparative method with regard to effectually discourse the research question. The work has struggled to borrow the most similar system design (MSSD), which is one of two main methodologies of comparative study. Most similar systems designed to discover the mainstay among similar countries that are dissimilar variable between case and effort to detect different of the consequence between the cases. (Levy, 2008). According to Anckar (2008) when using Most Similar System Design, we select that are as much as possible similar except for the phenomenon that the aftermath of which we are attracted in evaluating. Additionally, Anckar indicated two systems of affiliating the Most Similar System Design. An austere implementation and looser implementation, and depend on this research question and since the research regulator adaptable in the relevant instance are related in many aspects; this thesis will use the austere implementation. But using the type of implementation as stated by Anckar would make the paper select states that are similar in a number of many variable and different concerning to only one characteristic. This dissertation is made to detect the impact of the uprisings on states that are in the same area and have a similar style of the incidents that spark the uprising, which was economic mismanagement and corruption and to observe the reasons behind the different outcomes of the experience referring to these states that are as comparable as

possible in a lot of features. The instance selection in this research was depend on the statistic that every one of the instance has important and enough to do research on it, for example Tunisia that has been the birthplace of Arab Springs has become the birth place of transition to democracy in the Arab world. And the North African's monarchy Morocco that has seen similar event of the protests that known as the February 20 movement is witnessing a significant democratization process.

Thus, both countries – Tunisia and Morocco – have a lot of aspects that to share, especially in terms of religious and ideological practices, both countries always avoid Religious Radicalism and Extreme secularism when compared to Algeria, that is why both counters escape conflict or civil war. And the Moroccan and Tunisian had similar colonial experiences, when compared to that of other Maghreb regions. Both countries witnessed the incidents of 2011, but with different style, and with different result, but the uprisings in this two countries characterized and ended in peace. It is also important to read, to research, and to discover why they have different results.

As the thesis focuses on the Arab Springs, the statistics of it gathered from different news agencies concerning Arab Spring, and for easiness of the thesis focus websites were used. The work used Data from international and local newspapers affecting the substance of Arab Springs was used. Also the events' video on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and etc. will be done to get simplicity on the theme of analysis.

## **6. Plan of the research**

The thesis divided into four chapters. At the beginning, the thesis is designed to study the ramifications of Arab Spring with country studies. The thesis then introduces and clarifies its research question, its objectives, as well as the theoretical framework in the introduction. The conclusion of the introduction indicates the methodology adopted by this research. Then, in chapter one, the

main literature regarding the study is addressed. The chapter also discusses the literature review lodge on the political situation of most of the Arab countries prior to the revolution and in post-independence era since the third wave of democratization. The literature review explores main writings on the Arab uprisings, possible causes of the revolution of 2011, impact of the Arab Spring and the transition towards democracy in the post-2011 era.

In chapter two, the literature review on Tunisian upheaval – *Jasmine* revolution, its characteristics, and the actors who involved in the uprisings like the role of non-governmental organizations as well as the political opposition is addressed and discussed in a systematic way. For a better comparison, the chapter sheds a light on pre-2011 and post-2011 periods in Tunisia through addressing political and socio-economic situation before and after the uprisings. The opposition, role of the military and other organizations under Ben Ali regime, Tunisian social classes' structure pre and post revolution is also explained in this chapter. Then the chapter concludes by the trend towards democratic transition and the role of Islamists in the country.

Chapter three covers the literature review and analyses on the Moroccan Spring – the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement, and the characteristics of the movement and their demands, the respond of the monarchy to the movement, the players/ actors who supported the movement, the roles of civil organizations. For better comparison between pre and post revolution, there is a discussion on the political and the socio-economic situation in the pre-revolutionary Morocco. The oppositions, military and other organizations, social classes' structure of Morocco before 20<sup>th</sup> February is also discussed, the processes of democratization in the country since 2011 are addressed in the chapter.

Chapter four contains the conclusion, it discusses the similarities and difference in the uprising movement of the selected countries. The research attempts to address a comparative country-study which tries to relate the two public protests

during the Arab Spring and what the Spring has brought changes in both cases differently.

## **CHAPTER I**

### **ARAB SPRING AND DEMOCRATIZATION**

To comprehend the topics surrounding the post-Arab Spring process of democratization in the Arab world especially Maghreb states that were former French colonies, we must first briefly look at the terminologies connected with Arab's political entity. As it was stated above most of the Arab states generally bond on a Muslim influence in civilization under authoritarian republic leaders or authoritarian monarchy leaders alongside secular policies. Now with the 2011 popular revolutions some of the Arab countries are forming democracy but not in the way western recognizes the word. Because of the combinations that was mentioned above Arab countries' democracy may not be matching or equal to western methods of democracy. In understanding what these vocabularies means in the Arab states perspective, the work can then briefly look at the political history from the era of third wave of democratization until the 2011 revolutions.

#### **1.1 The process of democratization in Arab world prior to Arab Spring:**

##### **Country by country Studies**

The processes of political reform in the Arab world has started since post-independence that is the era of the third wave of democratization in the 1970s to 1980s and continued during the collapse of Soviet Union. The political history of the regions will let us learn more about the process of democratization, and it will let us to conclude that the revolutions/ revolts of 2010-2011 is the fourth regional wave of regime change. For instance, as mentioned earlier, Egypt's history of democratization started in the 1970s after the death of Gamal Abdel-Nasser with Anwar Al-Sadat ascension to the presidency, the socialist policies came to an end by Sadat and launch political and economic liberalization policies since that time. One of the first measures that Sadat put into force was to release Muslim Brotherhood participants from the prison who are imprisoned during Nasser's era, followed by some limited amendments. After Sadat was assassinated; the reform processes sustained by the next president Hosni Mubarak that came to power in 1981 (Aras, 2015). His first political amendment was releasing a number of political prisoners of Islamists – particularly the members of Muslim Brotherhood, and he approved civil society organization to work without limitations. Mubarak played a crucial role to gain legitimacy from the republic, and he tried his best to persuade the citizens (Nagarajan, 2013).

In a passage, as the amendment commitment slowly become Arab authoritarianism's system; Mubarak's political reform efforts also steadily improved his influence and appeared as more autocratic afterwards. After gaining people's consideration, the amendment developed totally into control of very few actors which involved the National Democratic Party's (NDP – Mubarak's party) leaders and members, which is the ruling party. The economic class who holds the capital also supported the presidency of Mubarak. It means all these changes was the trick of regime, because basically, the ruling party turned into an 'instrument' that provided the president the political and legal will, so the democratic process during that time was just enormously consolidated with power collaborated and vested



in the hands of the president. Several tactics created by Mubarak rule just to frustrate and put the opposition parties under the ruling party's control (Tudoroiu, 2011). In 2005 after some months of opposition protests, there was another constitutional reform, which allowed numerous candidates to participate in the presidential vote. The ballots of parliamentary election ended with conflicts between security forces and Muslims Brotherhood who won 20% of seats by position as nonaligned (BBC, 2018).

Algeria as one of the Maghreb states, former French colonies, and gain its independence through decolonization war has a lot of Islamic groups, there is a greater influence of extreme Secularism, religious radicalism in the country, and the army's' political rule which subsequently brought out what should have been expected; long lasting conflicts between the radicalism and extremism. These issues led the work to somehow focus on Algeria in this chapter, although the country is not the case study of the work; but it contributes in order to improve knowledge about the dangerous of both radicalism religious and extremism secular, further with the political military system. There was a top down political situations and many conflicts that the countries witnessed because of the combination that stated above. In 1976 there was a new constitution announced by the Algeria's second president Houari Boumediene and then elected as the president of the country under his new constitution. Boumediene served from 1965 until his death in 1978.

The constitution in Algeria approves to pledge to a socialist system and the role of the National Liberation Front (FLN), as the single political party was huge in shaping the political system. The elected president after him was Colonel Chadli Benjedid, who become the president in 1979, the beginning of his administration he changed the system of the dictatorial rule and made a sincere struggle to bring some problem of the country to an end. For instance, Benjedid reduced central planning and decreased government control over the economy. He also released some political prisoners,

including Ahmad Ben Bella the first president of Algeria – who was under house arrest by Boumedienne from house arrest but, so he too propagated new national constitution with a moderate democratic improvement, all these liberal biases that he shows was just because he somehow became dictator. He was reelected twice in 1984 and 1988, in his third election he tried to adopt a multiparty legislative, but in 1992 he was overthrown by military when Islamists won most of the seats in the legislature in the first round elections in 1991, and in the second round in 1992, he was put in house arrest until 1999 (Shepherd, 2018). This military coup caused a crisis that place the country into a bloody civil war from 1992 to 1999. This period of conflict and the failure of Soviet Union that gives the country more aid brought a lot of encounters for the political system of the country, in 1994 the state was about to face financial bankruptcy, so the regime did not have time to concentrate on policy (Boukhars, 2013).

During the rule Colonel Bendjedid the democratic tradition developed in the Algeria; which made the country seen as a model for democracy from 1980 to 1991, because a model that would shift an undemocratic government into a democratic government. At that period, many western states considered Algeria as an example to democracy for two reason; firstly the country during Bendjedid was observed a real case to democratic thinking and acting. Secondly it was democratic only within African autocracies, the Arab world as well. But this democratic transition hasn't take long, because it hasn't come to the reality when the country went back to a dictatorial regime and still remains, though some exercises of democracy that executed during Bendjedid are still operating, to a certain degree mostly free press and multiparty election (Terranova, 2011). Nevertheless, there were three unsolved and indisputable political obstructions in the country that destroy transition to democracy in Algeria; and resulted in a hazardous absence of political amendment, and a propensity for inaction. The main obstructions were: first of all, the country's history with that French colonialism that has

left the effect of extremism secular system in many countries. Secondly, the radical Islam's political system that considers democracy as a rival of Islam, and always attempt to bring the end of it. Thirdly, the army's' political rule; that is to say, the country has a political army system since its independence was gained through war of national liberation, so the army controls the political system of the country, as the army itself is the selected the head of the state and the representative of regime. The army also interferes in the political sphere, under the administration of the unique service, the military security which under the control of Ministry of Defence. Really, extreme Ottoman officials in Algeria in the military beys gradually took an attribute of the letter political military system. These are the three problems of democracy as a mystery that have reflective outcome of the present conditions of the country (Lahouari, 2001).

In Tunisia, the country has only two president since post-independent era till 2011 when the fourth wave brought the end of dictatorial system; the political process was an uncertain political regime under the country two presidents who are President Bourguiba and Ben Ali, they declared themselves president, and wanted to be in the office for life. The first party which founded by the country's first president Bourguiba in 1934 which was renamed as the Constitutional Democratic Rally Party (RCD) in 1988 by the president Ben Ali manipulated the political activities of the country. The party was recognized in 1934 as the neo-Destour party, this party played an essential role in gaining the country's independence in 1957, and since then it was the ruling party of the country without any significant political rival (Penner, 1999). Instead of the political liberalization that most of countries are transform to in 1970s to 1980s. The Tunisian ruler Bourguiba concentrated in establishing a political system that allowed him and his party to dominate power and impetus through his modernist social and economic reform in 1987 When Ben Ali came to power by a coup there was a prospect for change by the citizens, and he announced major change after renaming

the parting, starting to release many political prisoners from the oppositions, but all that promises and some of the changes was just deceptive ((Kaboub 2013)), because the government activities was just like the previous regime or we can say it was more corrupt than before, as if the first president can become the political system of the country as he said in one of his interviews; the second president used the country as his property as it was revealed that he and his family controlled about 40% of the country's companies. As a result of the way the president's family seized the country's properties for their selves Ben Ali's government was lost its legitimacy, and this may be among the reasons that made Tunisia breaking the silence.

The case Libya offers a monarchical system under King Idris since the country gained its independence in 1952 from Italia. The constitution was established before the independence in 1951 – which is known as the constitution of independence. It was drafted by the constitutional assembly, and it inaugurated a constitutional monarchy and the constitution was outlined by the people, not by monarchy. It was reproduced by the citizens' representatives –who led the revolutionary battle for independence. The most legendary and recognized constitutional professionals and groups of leaders and scholars were the people who structured the constitution. And it amalgamated several essential and principal components, counting contemporary drafting practical authenticity. The United Nations has supported the constitution as well. However, the constitutional monarchy has come to an end in 1969, when a military coup removed the constitutional monarchy, and from that time there was no any kind of democratic, political, or constitution in the country, the rulers were governed according to what they saw was suitable, until 1977 when the green book declared as the constitution of Libya that was written according to Qaddafi's thinking that is being against elections, political parties, popular representation and etc.so the state continued to rule with the green book, the book that written by

Qaddafi, and there was no any attempt of changing or democratic process until 2011 (Ahdash, 2011).

The Arabic Western monarchy, which is the kingdom of Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. After getting its independence from Spain and French rules respectively in 1956 Sultan Muhammad V created a constitutional monarchy – in which he sustained a considerable amount of power. In 1958, the Sultan Mohammad V also declared the kingdom's assurance to transfer Morocco into a democratic constitutional monarchy when he appointed the Prime Minister Ibrahim (of the third government) since its independence. According to this commitment, the King tasked the prime minister with applying the primary stages of democratization, which is holding to vote for the municipal and legislative organs. Unfortunately, the monarchy didn't let the movement towards democratization to enhance and the monarchical control of the political system has strongly remained (Storm, 2007).

When he has succeeded by his son king Hassan II in 1961 who originated his rule by calling himself the Prime Minister and assigned a new cabinet. Fulfilling the promise of his father of implementing the constitution, the King established a new constitution in 1962. Political freedom was definite (Cross, 2017); it was embraced by a national ballot. Under its establishment, the legislative election took place for the first time in 1963, and the monarchist alliance held a small popularity of seats. Nevertheless, this political progress didn't take long because following a just small time all power returned to the palace, and the regime was accused by illegitimate imprisonment of the system detractors and human right abuse, maybe Hassan II's popularity has strengthened his hand politically that happened due to a serious domestic chaos. Nationalism affected the country's involvement in the Middle East conflict and the incident in Western Sahara. But there is substantial political reform during 1990s. In the 1999 when his elder son Muhammad VI inherited

the throne upon his father's death, he banished valiant oppression primarily; while he released 8,000 prisoners, and expanded the process of political liberalization he had inherited, he permitted the return of expatriate political rebellious. He also founded an organization for investigation of official human rights violence from 1956 to 1999 and reach out to electorates like northern Morocco and previous political prisoners. This means there was a significant political legalization commitment before 2010 but it wasn't materialized as promised, as we can see there was a process, but it was slow until 2010 (Denoeux, 2011).

The Arabic east monarchy, i.e. the Kingdom of Jordan, is also a constitutional monarchy, the new liberalized constitution was created by the founder of the kingdom Abdullah I in 1952. Right from the beginning, this constitution was more democratic than the previous one as it was an imitation by the document of the parliamentary system of the western democracy, particularly the Belgian constitution. The structure offered that the citizens were the foundation of the monarchy, and turned the regime diplomatically responsible to the House of Representatives, which was allowed to block an autonomy. Additionally, the documents commended the control of parliament over legislation, however most of the power was vested in the hands of the monarch. Jordanians had the electoral liberty and could form political parties. Though this new constitution never presented assurances to confirm the practice of this freedom and right as written, under its provision the country observed sincere and open voting; and effective political parties, and political opposition in the parliament was capable to character an activity of assurance in the regime. That time was considered by many people as the golden age of Jordanian democratic practice as the media experienced full freedom. Regrettably, it didn't stay long because this lovely democratic experience ended in 1957 during the King Hussein's n regime. The conditions that the Kingdom experienced after 1956 on attempted coup d'état against the King alarmed King Hussein, who has seen

a lot of turbulent challenges from the opposition during his rule (Abu Odeh, 1999). There were uncountable interior and exterior risks for the government that has brought an obstacle and resulted in an end of Jordan's democratic experience. But there was a reform in 1989 after the upheavals of April in the city of Maan, yet the reform was not completed in King Hussein's period because of other incidents that the country has witnessed after 1989, such as the Gulf War in 1991 and the ending of the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. Thus, the commitment of reform continued to challenge the Kingdom and after the death of Hussein in 1999; he was succeeded by his son King Abdullah II – who dissociated himself from existing power over his state, and his initial agenda was to improve and renew the state by embracing a liberal method particularly in the economic realm. He declared free and fair elections; and also he took the issue of practicing constitutional monarchy. So, prospects for change were elevated so that the transformation would be attended by political renovation and constitutional reforms leading to a regular evolution of pluralism. Unfortunately, all this commitment never occurred, the state continued to rule with its old methods, the democratic process was shaken until 2010 (Salameh, 2015).

The Arabic Gulf's monarchies announced their reforms, in the only gulf constitutional monarchy, in Kuwait, the constitution was established following the country independence in 1961 and had authorized by the law 1962 and in 1963 it allowed for a liberally elected legislature that has actual parliamentary and has influence, but as usual the parliament didn't take time in the office as its articles were suspended twice in the 1970s, and 1980s, as the parliaments were accused by ruling monarchy for the country's failure to develop as rapidly as Dubai, But there was a constitutional reform in 1992, after the country was liberated from Iraq (Brown, 2018). But even with the constitutional referendum of 1992 the parliament was incapable to exercise control and reached to a very little, high parliamentary positions that were always held by the monarchist, as it was the tradition of the prime minister

was held by the crown prince (Thuroczy, 2010). The remaining Gulf absolute monarchies such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar are still governing without actual constitution, so the kings have the full control over all issues and every sector in the state. There is a system called no taxation without representation in the oil producing Gulf sheikhdoms – without plural elections. One of them which is Oman that has led the way beginning reforms to improve Oman's rule style, in 1991 *Majlis Al-Sura* means consultative council was issued by Sultan Qaboos Said Al-Said; until 2010 the main aim of the council was just to counsel the regime on socio-economy issues, without any actual control (BBC, 2011).

In Arabic East's republics also the political situation has never been stable, in Syria since post-independence the political situation has faced changes as the country has at last twelve constitutions since it attained independence in 1946, the country was amongst the first countries in the MENA region to instigate democracy by operating popular election, but the most liberal one was the constitution of 1950 which also known as the constitution of independence. After the second military coup in 1949 that was led by Sami al-Hinnawi who called for the election of a Constitutional Assembly to draft a new constitution. This is the constitution that gave Syrian women right to vote for the first time and allowed her in to participate in politics before many western states, it had meaningful democratic improvement in Syria. But as usual, it didn't stay long, as it was suspended and returned, and even changed. Until 1973 the permeate constitution was drafted under the strong guidance of Hafiz Al-Assad who came to power in 1971; this was the first constitution in the history of the Arab world to implement a socialist-nationalist source, this was implemented through popular vote and insisted Ba'ath party's ideas, and standards upon the Syrian civilization. Al- Assad declared that the Ba'ath party was the country's leading party and announced that the party as National Council for Revolutionary Command to be the special association and establishment that allowed and approved to



elect and name the president. That was the starting of the ruling of the system of one party in the country which ruled for almost four decades (Ziadeh, 2017).

Yemen's history of the democratic process started from 1990s. The country has been in a serious tension prior to the unification of the North Yemen which is the Yemeni Arab Republic, and the South of Yemen which is the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in 1990. These two states often opposed each other physically, while the South supported by USSR, and the North received assistance and backing from the United States and Saudi Arabia. After the two-state were united in 1990s, the ruler of the North Ali Abdullah Saleh who was military officer became a president, and the previous ruler of the South Ali Salem Al-Beidh became vice of the president the constitution was drafted in 1991 to confirm the state's dedication to free elections under a multi-party system, whereas acknowledging the right to hold private property. This constitution contains personal rights, in short it recognizes respect for the human rights. Unfortunately, the unification and the new system of government didn't solve the problem, because the inside instability has been continued when the domination of Northern parties in political sphere of the country has confirmed after the parliamentary elections of 1993. The dominance of the north in seats and receiving more economic benefit caused the civil War in 1994, in the wake of this war Saleh started consolidating more influence, particularly in the hand of a small group of leaders in the Capital Sana'a. From that time Saleh extended his authoritarian system, under his system including military supports was usually allocated regarding kinship and tribal relations, he continued to be ruled and depend on a benefaction method of neo-patrimonial system which satisfied a small group of leaders. And in control he mostly depended on a supportive, strong and familiar set of mentor to make decisions that drive for instance as a tracker state (William, Sommadossi, & Mujais, 2017).

In Lebanon, right from post-independence since 1943, there is consociational democracy. This political system of government means power-sharing engagements are an assurance of the political representation of all disconnected collections and democratic parties. Furthermore to stop domestic conflicts and create political solidity and strength in extremely separated societies. Unfortunately, this political system worked for some time, because it was not working since the outbreak of civil war in 1975 (Sileikait, 2016).

Iraq is the country that has been a center of political chaos all through its history. Almost close to 9 decade Iraq has gained independence, and after that it was granted an independence in 1932 for almost two and half decades, the country has remained under the Hashemite monarchy which was structured under the British protectors in 1921. After several conflicts, the animosity of British involvement in the state and for its instrument kingdom caused a military coup that occurred in 1958 revolution, led by General Abdul Karim Qassim; piloted in a bloody new episode in the state. Since the overthrown and the elimination of the Iraqi's kingdom anarchy arisen and turmoil developed; ten of thousand were killed and suspended from streetlamps as a symptom, indication and lesson for upcoming generation. It means the political situation of the country was uncertain; and after the monarchy was deposed the country remained under the rule of a series military and civilian, the Iraq's revolution and heritage coup characterized and shape the future of modern Iraq (Aljazeera, 2008).

This chain of different government has come to an end in 1979 with the beginning of Iraq dictatorship system; when Saddam Hussein has toppled General Bakar and grabbed onto power with an iron grip, up to 2003 when he was vanished during American led alliance's attack of Iraq. It means the political establishments that Iraq adopted from the British had neither had the faculty nor the power to transmute Iraq into a steady state with affluent

economy leaving the country vulnerable to tyrannical rule, and been deeply divided, there is no political improvement in the country after two and half decades that Iraq spent under the dictatorial leadership to the 2011 the era of Arab Spring. Iraq contains uncountable various ethnic group that have had trouble living in harmony all those years. Since the state attained freedom from Great Britain in 1932 it hasn't witnessed an established and stable government until now (Melaragno&Ollunga, 2013). All these developments have shown that political instability in MENA region has hindered the democratic government to grow in the region. Although there was a commitment of political liberalization process, the real action has never arisen, which has also been the main reason of the unrest of 2011 hitherto.

### **1.2A Historical Outlook to the Arab uprisings: Case by case**

The Arab Spring can be described as leaderless, belligerent, and non-belligerent protests that have engulfed the Arab world by the end of 2010 after Mohammed Bouazizi inflamed himself in Tunisia. On 18<sup>th</sup> December 2010, the unexpected revolutions or upheavals have begun and were quickly widespread to the whole region and also resulted in a civil war in the case of Syria. The Arab popular protests have been described since then as Arab Spring, Arab upheavals, Arab uprisings, Arab awakenings, Arab revolution by some scholars; but the Arab Spring was the first label used for the events, which was devised by the US-based *Foreign Policy Journal* and popularized by the Western media since then (Lynch, 2011).

The leaderless revolt that exploded first in Tunisia and then spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen, and led to overthrow of four Arab most powerful rulers and triggered a civil war in Syria (Dalacoura, 2012). Some other Arab countries like Algeria, Morocco, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan, Mauritania, and so on have also affected by the revolts, but have not shaken by them. The 2011 events have led to transformation of the state-society relations in the region and also influenced the internal political landscape of

the Arab countries (Abushouk, 2016). However, these Arab political upheavals were considered by some scholars as the fourth wave of democratization, because during the third wave of democratization almost most of MENA regime proclaimed general amendments that did not result in empowering the opposition. This shows that there has been a process of political reform in MENA before the Arab uprisings, regardless of its quality of democratization.

On 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010, the revolution flared-up in Tunisia, when a young fruit and vegetable street seller named Muhammad al-Bouazizi exploded himself in the abandoned interior of the state, in the town of SidiBuzid. He perpetrated this catastrophic act because of the degradation he faced at the hand of the municipality, and he had no hope for the future. This occurrence created mass protests in the country and in the other Arab countries one after the other. The 26 years old young boy died in the hospital on January 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011, the death of the boy increased the tension and caused the inspiration of the riot reached everywhere in the country, the protestors' slogan was pointed at the president: (get out Ben Ali, freedom and democracy). The regime tried all kind of tactics from a brutal system to soft to bring the end of this revolutions but unfortunately it was the revolution that has brought an end to the regime in the short time of 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011 when Ben Ali got out of the country with his family to Saudi Arabia, that was the end of two and half decade of Tunisian authoritarian regime (Schiller, 2011).

This confirmed that the Arab world has similarities in most of the events, before the toppling of Ben Ali the protests have erupted in two Arab countries, one in the neighbor Arabic West Country which is Algeria, and one in Arabic East which is Jordan. The Algerian upheaval exploded on 28<sup>th</sup> December 2010. In several of the destitute areas of the countries and the second largest city of the country Oran, on 3<sup>th</sup> January protests had blowout

to other districts very close to the capital city, on 5<sup>th</sup> January the event has spread to many other towns all around the country, but the event was covered by Algerian's relatively free press, and rapidly protests were informed in twenty regions. Like in others demonstrators mostly youths blocked roads shouting for freedom, scorched trees, and despoiled government buildings and business centers. But didn't demand for regime change as we can see the primary disgruntlement a reduction in sponsor important goods gave way to riots over a comprehensive of socio-economic complaints, so the government made the actions that meet the demonstrators demands, by announcing the cancellation of the prices multiplications and set up new policies planned to lower the charge of food importation. So within some days, the demonstrations had dropped and enormous public rebellion lost energy. Additionally, the qualified security's control had forced to confirm that country subjugation itself didn't be the reason of increasing the event, to create uncertain situation or more riots and anger of citizen like was occurring in their neighbor Tunisia (Volpi, 2013).

The demonstration arose in Jordan on 7<sup>th</sup> January 2011, so the Hashemite kingdom was among the one who witnessed earlier incidents of the Arab Spring. The first protest was erupted in a village south of Amman which is Dhiban very close to Madaba where the people spent a week calling for a major riot and protest in Amman. But at that time the opposition parties were not answered, because they had doubts to join or not because they were not confident. After some time when they had long dialogues, they agreed to join the youth to participate without formally confessing it. The protestors were thousands of people and they came out every Friday took pale at downtown (Lubbe, 2015). But yet Jordan has not seen the terrible disturbance that at that time Tunisian government had seen to demand from the regime to hand over power. The protestors were screaming for extra jobs and to end corruption of the regime corruption, and when the Muslim

Brotherhood was involved, they requested for democracy and to reduce the power of the king (BBC, 2016).

11 days after the end of Ben Ali's regime, Egyptian revolution instigated that was on 25<sup>th</sup> January 2011 against the same problem which was high unemployment, poverty, and corruption committed by Mubarak's administration and his closet associates. The Tahrir square revolution led to an overthrow the regimes' of Mubarak, and among the factor of the people's anger was the idea of transpiring power to his son Gamal and the reelection of Mubarak in 2010 the duplicated of disfigured corpse of the Young boy Khalid Muhammad Saed who died mat increased the pressure. The regime at the first time used power on the protestors to stop them, but it didn't work, and then used flexible act of promises, but it was too late the people want the government to leave and given to a voted democratic leadership that will address their need, so no any other option for the regime except to step down on 11<sup>th</sup> February leaving the office to the head of Military council Muhammad Hussein Tantawi and his team of the military 2011 (Abushok, 2016).

Before seeing the end of Egypt's dictator end on the Syrian uprising has arisen, as in 26 of January 2011 the upheaval blowup in Syria, this was the worst of all events. Because from a civil uprising it turned to a civil war that was still unfolding (Pace & Cavatorta, 2012). One day after the start of the Syrian unrest, Yemen was already been in danger because thousands of Yemenis were on the streets of the Capital city Sanaa on 20<sup>th</sup> January 2011 calling of Ali Saleh to leave the presidential office, Saleh who has the same style with Ben Ali and Mubarak because he was military and over 30 years was president he was came to power since 1990 and also there was a narration that he also wanted to the hand power over to his son like his predecessor, so he also tried his best to calm the riot by announcing that he would neither contest for the coming elections nor deliver power to his son

Ahmad, and he promised for several reform and a regime change, but as the protestors and opposition party were not interested in this promise, they just continued to compress on the regime to leave in order to have a Parliament and presidential elections. The conditions were very complicated, because of that the Gulf cooperation council states interfered between the government and the opposition parties and they presented a suggestion for a peaceful and soft surrender.

At the first time the rulers haughtily disallowed the suggestion, but when the president lost control and have a rocket attack on presidential compound which made him even have a serious wound on 7<sup>th</sup> June by a rocket attack, he ran to Saudi Arabia and took medical treatment, as he was receiving medical treatment his vice Abdurabah Mansur Hadi was ruling the country. On August 18<sup>th</sup> 2011 a transformation committee was established by demonstrators to propose for a power transfer. So with the swelling tension from outside and inside Saleh agreed to hand over power to his vice on 22 November 2011 the date which marked the end of his 33 years of dictatorial rule. He handed over power on the condition that he will be given protection from harassment (Abushouk, 2016).

After the incidents happened in Yemen, Syrian, Egypt and others upheavals appeared 18 days after and protests blowup in Bahrain on 14<sup>th</sup> February 2011, which led by Shiite and secularist it was also peaceful protests while the demonstrators held only Bahraini flag and vocalized pro-democracy phrases as usual, but security respond was brutal which cause few deaths and a lot of injured which increased the people anger and created the quick increase of protests. This speedy rise of the demonstration produces several civil conflicts on the street, and the different party ran to join in a public front to advocate the government and to protect the presence of the state. This acceleration of the uncertain issue let the government requested for help from Gulf cooperation council to it regime and to have additional security, and as

soon as the regime seeking for GCC support they answered and sent troops to save one of them from devastation (Aljazeera, 2016). Just 3days between Bahrain and Libya, while witnessing the Bahrain event the Libyan opposition were already on the street southing for changing of the regime.

So on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2011, the event vented in Libya, it started from the eastern town and city which right from the time have insurgency against the government, in the second largest city of the country tens of thousands people have come out took the street gathering at police station, airport, barracks. Before realizing the Libyan, revolution turn into full-fledged armed conflict with the government that act showed that the regime was not ready to answer the protestors' earlier request or to negotiate with them (Ranj, 2012), as he accused the protestors by being drugged and cooperating with Al-Qaida, Gaddafi also declared that he will not leave his country for the drugged and mercenaries of the west he rather sacrifice and die for his country and in his country. This situation led to innervation that brought the end of Qaddafi life on 20<sup>th</sup> of October 2011, this date has been the end of Libyan decade's dictator. Three days after his death, the national council of the country announced the liberation of the state and began the procedure of preparing new constitution and vote for a new regime (Abushok, 2016).

After 3days of the beginning of Libya uprising the movement has erupted in Morocco on 20<sup>th</sup> of February 2011 which popular known as 20<sup>th</sup> February movement which were held in Rabat, Casablanca, Fes and Tangier and Marrakech which was peaceful protests that request a modern constitution, adjustment in regime and end of corruption (Allilou, 2014). So, the most eventful uprising that rocked Arab world were six, five of them happened in the authoritarian presidential republic which were: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria and one authoritarian constitutional monarchy which was Bahrain (Dalacoura 2012). The protests in the authoritarian constitutional monarchies which are Jordan, Morocco, and Kuwait were totally minor,



because the protestors request for amendment, not for the overthrowing the regime, and the governments respond to the event in a soft and flexible manner, while the security officer avoided inconsistent relation. (Barany 2012).

In the absolutist monarchies which is: Oman Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates have seen some kind of public protest in one form or another, Oman experienced elongated street protests just like in Bahrain (Silvia Colombo 2012); While public protest occurred in Saudi Arabia in the eastern province and some bigger cities, but the improvement of social prosperity and public spending by ruling monarchy, and the resorting of renewing suppression help to limit the protests (Dalacoura 2012). Qatar avoided Arab Spring because the country has the voice in the revelations, so being the voice of the protestor and interventionist role of Qatar during the upheaval helps the country to escape from the uprising (Ulrichsen 2014). During the Arab eruption nothing occurred in the United Arab Emirates because before the event there is an appetite for change, so no even a complaint that has come close to the ruling regime (AfifAbrougui 2016).

And the socialist state Algeria which suffered from the internal conflict in the 1990s the protests in January 2011 was not important as others (Dalacoura 2012). Mauritania also witnessed the same drama of 2011, when the young boy of 14 years old YacuobOludDohoud put on match to himself in front of presidential building in 17 January 2011, the demonstrations started within the country immediately after the occurrence and has the same aspects like in other Arab states, but media didn't pay attention to it so it was ignored because the country has always been ignored on media, this has made Al-Jazeera defined it as "the overlooked uprising" (Nashashibi, 2012).

Sudan also encountered the Arab Spring regional protest movement in January 2011 which encouraged by widespread uprising in neighboring

Egypt, it arose the capital Khartoum organized by students wishing for their dictator retirement, but Sudan security force handle the case with tactic while they finished up the group of Sudanese protestors and surrounded the entrance of universities, so the protest vanished as soon as possible because the Sudan government managed the situation, meant the rebellions wiped out as quickly as it arose. (The three regions which are Iraq, Lebanon and occupied Palestinian their internal Aljazeera 2012). The geopolitical problem is beyond the pale which avoid them from expansion among Arab nations. So, their problems don't let the uprising to be shown. In the Horn of African Arab countries, Somalia and Djibouti demonstrative and protest have occurred in the same factors as in another Arab country: economic, political, and public marginalization (Dalacoura 2012). There is no part of Arab countries that have not seen these sorts' political protests in one kind of another, where there is no this demonstrative there is a much more problem that preoccupies the region, or there is change before the uprising.

### **1.3 Possible causes of the revolutions of 2011**

The possible causes of the revolutions of 2011 were encouraged by the following:

#### **1.3.1 Economic discrepancy**

The economy was stimulated by three deficits:

- a. Global crisis: the global crisis has a major role in MENA regime economy deficits, the situation of North Africa and the Middle East is varied. Because the difference in their progressive level and economic structure are exiting. The countries like Algeria and Libya their earnings are based upon their oil and gas export, while the earnings of countries like Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt are based on manufacturing and tourism. There was a development in North African's economies since the 1990s, which happened with the support of IMF and World Bank. These states have been privatized by the

Public sectors, and administrative intervention has dwindled in the commercial sector. Among the things that affected the economies of these states was the decreasing in oil price during 2018 to 2019, this declining of oil price has a bad impact not only on the countries that exporting oil, but it was affected all the states in the region seriously. Because during the crisis USA and European countries that used to import manufactured goods from the region reduced their needs.

- b. Food crisis: The Food crisis has played an essential role in these 2011 popular uprisings because the role that raised of food expenses played in political turmoil is well recognized particularly in simple states and poor nations that they have to depend on other countries for food. Due to the rise of prices of food grain the Arab States like Tunis, Morocco, Yemen and Egypt experienced public demonstrations and complaints since 2007-8. What made North Africa region to be the birthplace of these radical popular protests was this food crisis, because the North Africa countries were the countries that have noxiously affected by this prices incensement.
- c. Unemployment: the unemployment that has a hug role in radical protests increased in Tunisia, Morocco and, Egypt, because of the decreasing of manufacturing of several goods in 2010 (Afzal, 2017). So, it means these problems mentioned above increased unemployment, corruption, and ongoing gap between wealth and poverty, and extravagant use capitals (Dede, 2012). During Arab upheaval, one out of three Tunisian, Moroccan, Egyptian young was out of employment (Afzal, 2017).

### **1.3.2 Political liberty and economic inequalities**

Behr & Aaltola (2011) argues that the main causes that led to political unrest in the Arab world is the deficiency of political freedom and public responsibility. So the absence of membership and involvement of any qualified citizen in government and accountability put Arab

countries into this uncertain situation (Dede, 2012). Arab people have the aspiration for an increment of political and civil freedom especially the youths of the region (Afzal, 2017). Prior the Arab upheavals Political and influence mostly was governed by the governing party and small authoritative groups of individual (Dede, 2012), the people in the region particularly youth have been demanding and asking their authoritative rulers to improve their social and economic situations with the source of occupation and education but the rulers were not even paid attention to their people demand until it reached the bad stage that some countries are about to lost hope because of the deadly civil war. Because of economic reform the Arab world adopted the policy of privatization of public sector, trade liberalization and deregulation to put on essential amendment system, but this structural amendment used to increased economic growth, not the economic situation of middle class and majority youth, it has no impact on political amendment that will support the ordinary people civil freedom, instead it encouraged and empower the undemocratic regime and shrink the way of democracy. The measurement percentage of the income inequality in Tunisia and Morocco is in between the richest 10percent and the poorest 10 per cent of the population (Afzal, 2017).

### **1.3.3 Absence of dignity**

What triggered Arab people is lack of self-respect, that made the high school students losing hope and has no option than to drop education and sell fruit on the street, uncountable university graduate in Arab countries were reduced to work as ruined street merchants, drivers and shopkeepers, some didn't have luck to have even these kinds of street job all this because their government could not provide a job for them. Life has been expensive and suppression becomes the routine and traditional as security operators can openly abuse and attack the civilians. This is really showed that citizens have lost dignity, respect,

and acknowledgment from the government. All these degradations and disgraces increased people annoyance and got ready to fight for their right and wish for the democratic government that they have trust on it, and have faith that it will cure their conditions (Hinnebusch, 2015).

#### **1.4 The earlier revolutionary movements vs. the Arab Springs**

The events of 2010-2011 were influenced by the public unrests in 1989, so there are similarities and differences between Eastern Europe revolution which occurred in 1989 and North African and Middle East revolution that occurred in 2010-2011 (Springborg, 2011). Some scholars also made an attempt to compare the similarities and difference between the revolutions that happened over the two decade that defeated communism in Poland and Eastern Europe and the current revolutions that have toppled most Authoritarian regimes in Middle East and North Africa, because the two revolutions reason is the same as they all strive for bringing an end to corrupt tyrannical and government in their region (Zantovsky, 2011). The difference maybe is that the revolution of Esteem Europe use non-violence struggle, while some incidents in the 2011 revolution were violent. The way the incidents of 1989 and 2011 exploded and demand for economic and political reform and the popular protest are similar characters (Booth, 2015). Erik Voeten 2011 argue that there are similarities and differences as follow:

##### **The similarities:**

1. The two revolutions were unexpected, even by professionals. Mean no one thinks that the earlier event and the present one will happen in the future.

2. In both revolutions an important part of the anti-government protests were developed from influential desertion, such as the Military, diplomatic, security forces changed allegiances. The governments were not monumental, and the opposition got potency while convinced previous influential changed point of view at a crucial period.
3. Even though both series of the occurrences have engaged domestic activities which were penetrated via national substances and perspectives, they were also the uncomplicated image of the global protest influence and swelling. As in the Eastern Europe, the riots erupted first in Poland to Hungary to East Germany to Czechoslovakia to Romania and Bulgaria, and ultimately to the Baltics, Ukraine and even Russia itself. In MENA region the riots first erupted in Tunisia, to Egypt, Libya, Bahrain Yemen, and Syria.
4. The local attentiveness of the two instances has been extraordinary and significant, crafting it simple to follow by humbly viewing the geographical outline.
5. The amazing incident in the two regions offers an authoritative trial to simple and contemptuous argument about whether people in assured values and beliefs desire for freedom. Obviously, a great desire for better political liberation and equitability is there.

**The differences:**

1. The 1989 revolutions occurred within the cold war's circumstance, with two highest super-power and their reciprocally certain devastation. But the 2011 events took place while there are uncountable confounding dynamics which was there in previous time, but currently have their own post-cold war factors, such as oil, the Arab Israeli disagreement, the rise of China and so for. So this shows that the huge geostrategic environment is different today.
2. The Eastern Europe revolutions were not the first democratic revolution that occurred in states, there were the movements that

erupted in 1953 in East Germany, in 1956 in Hungary, in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, and in 1980-81 in Poland. But the 2011 revolution was the first democratic movement in the regions, although there were many rebellion in the regions for the past decade which has been the opening of this current revolution

3. Eastern Europe was not independent, certainly, the Soviet Union was the supporter of constancy and solidity in the region. While the MENA region has several levels of independence and contains the combination of small and large states.
4. Religion was completely far away in 1968 revolution, excluding in Poland for the Catholic Church. Even though churches were safe zone occasionally in communist countries, but the upheavals themselves were not religious, and the people themselves were the least religious people in the world, but in the upheavals of 2011 the religion had a big role in political life, though the protests have not been acutely religious, somehow became religious.
5. The earlier revolutions mostly adequate and suitable the characteristic and model of elite agency, whereby differences between extremist and moderate in the government led to agreements with the opposition, causing in consultations on both part. In this ideal, the revitalization of the non-government organization only came at last. But in the current revolution, in compare, before the elite disagreements became obvious, the public upswing came.
6. In Eastern Europe when the opposition is generally unknown there were well-arranged protestors who had much popular genuineness. Even if they have been small in number, environmental leaders, authors, and preachers were instrumental. In compare, in MENA states many of the long-lasting opposition leaders are hopeless, appointed or detached from politics, hence backing to the big gap

between elite opposition politics and recognized need for democratic transformation.

7. Both revolutions relied on broadcastings, but the promptness of the latest media was clearly changed. The 1968 revolutions information mostly blowout through “*Samizdat*”, which was an underground press or print media, while 2011 revolutions’ information blowout suddenly through Facebook, Twitter, and blogs.
8. In fact, the communist defeated after the revolution of 1968, despite the fact that they restructured and contested electorally in some case. But in 2011 revolution this was not the same, the products of only Tunisian transition is having good results, Egypt has back to the same system or even worst, and in other states, dictators still persist in control, although the revolutions have surprised and trembled them.

### **1.5 The struggle for democracy after the Arab Spring and the features of the transition process in the Arab world**

These events produced the debate about the Middle East and North African region excepted to the tendency of democratization change (Dalacoura2012), and at begging of these unexpected incidents it was reflected by the world as a suitable struggle headed for democracy, when the protests became peaceful and more organized people from different states had to proclaimed it as the true opportunity for political change (Afzal, 2017).

The literature of the region, politicians, researchers, and newscaster assumed that this so-called Spring will lead the Arab world into direct democracy, but after some years the significance and embroilment of the events developed a question to asked by many researchers, politicians and even ordinary people asked: why the Arab Uprisings have not implemented the expectancies of



fundamentally political and social changes which were belated throughout the demonstrations? And until now due to the unknown transition which some segment of the Arab world is still in created a debate: whether are the indications of democratization or it was just shifting from one type of authoritarian regime to another (Kenig 2013). Because of the limited change that occurred in some Arab countries, and the failure that other countries are facing after many years of the popular upheavals it reach to be concluded by others that all these sensational events that happened or are still happening will not portend well for democratization, so it made some intellectual to call the series of revolutions Arab winter instead of Arab Spring, because they considered it as nothing more than a reflection of the dissatisfaction of the people and their division in themselves.(Boukhasa 2015).

But in my view the Arab uprising has impact on democratization of Arab world, although it is more than difficult to figure the result of the Arab Spring in any way since that the occurrence is still evolving, but some advantage can be founded by studying and keeping in view the longtime arising procedure as last diplomatically, constitutionally, and politely:

#### **1.5.1 Elimination of the dictators**

if these revolts can be the motive of the toppling of the long-time term four powerful leaders from power some whiten someday, while some withdraw in months, (Kenig, 2013) while the stubborn one of them met dishonorable and staggering end (Afzal, 2017).

#### **1.5.2 Questioning the hereditary Arab leaders:**

And if the hereditary leaders of two countries like Jordan and Morocco that have been above questioning can be requested for institutional reform, it means that Arab uprising is the first symptom of a democratic admittance in the region. (Asseburg&Wimmen, 2016).

### **1.5.3 Social freedom, political, and economic right**

The Arab eight monarchies leaders have granted their respective people social and economic freedom, because of the consequences of the 4 republics countries' leaders which let them know that their people now can bring the end of any types of regime that will torture them and put their lives in danger. So this one of the things that help the kingdoms to escape.

### **1.5.4 Political Improvement**

Regardless of all the deleterious outlook of the Arab revolutions it has confirmed the major and important thing, which is the birth of the Arab citizen, this has been considered as the begging of any change. If the Arab common people could opposite the government, and adverse in politics in public, and talk about their anticipated future and struggle to achieve democratic transition in the Arab region, that means Arab Springs marked the establishment of the public political sphere (Afzal, 2017).

All these showed that there is a positive political process in the region since the following of the Arab Springs which Arab world have never come across in the history, and there is a lot of improvement that creates the political transformation. The series of the events of Arab Spring reflected as a wonderful

challenge to democracy, when the protests became more systematized the world had to proclaim it as the actual voices to democracy. Uncountable academics, offer their outlook about the transformation, some people concluded that the democracy has emerged the Arab world. So, if these protests were peaceful and organized, and then they had good result as expected in some region, the details of it and its outcome will come in the next chapter in one of the selected countries "Tunisia".

## **CHAPTER II**

### **THE TUNISIA'S UPRISING**

By the end of 2010, on 17<sup>th</sup> December a policewoman's unethical action produced history on the earth that will never be forgotten. She had impounded the vegetables and fruits cart of a street's vender Muhammad Bouazizi in the SidiBuzid town 190 miles 300 km south of the state capital city, where Bouazizi adjured to be provincial headquarter of the metropolis SidiBuzid. Muhammad Bouazizi was a young graduate from high school (Abushok 2016). The policewoman did that because the 26 year Bouazizi was accused of illegal trading, as he didn't have the permission of selling on the street, the hero of his widowed mother and six siblings agreed to re compensate for it immediately after the accusation, he had a desire to give his debt which was 10 Dinar equivalent to 7 US Dollars that was the worth a good day's profit, but the policewoman didn't allow him to pay for the prescribed fine that he wanted and asked to pay the prescribed fine because it is a routine matter but the policewoman turn down his offer and allegedly slapped the young man spat on his face and insulted his dead father (Abouzid 2011). This humiliation and degradation didn't let the fruit seller to lose hope, he ran to the local office anticipating to complain to provincial office. Unfortunately, they refused even to see him, the irresponsible action increased his anger and despondent, almost an hour after his has clashed with the policewoman, he returned to the place near the municipality building and spilt his body with fuel and set himself on fire. He didn't die on the same day as he rushed to the hospital, but he died there on 4th January 2011. The riot started instantly after this occurrence, because the family of the fatality and the people of SidiBuzid assured that their uprising shouldn't go in vain, they shared what was happening in social media, for social recognition. This was not beginning for the Tunisian young man to be a self-immolated burning as in the public protest. One of the several incidents like this was mentioned on media, which happened in Manastir about one street vendor who set ablaze on his body when he faced governmental harshness in the same street work, but lack of broadcasting made the protest ended with no impact,

so that made the SidiBuzid locals in a struggle to get media attention for what was going on and they got it (Yasmine, 2011).

The death of Muhammad Bouazizi causes significant attention and resulted in enormous revolts all over the country, and brought the finale of the Tunisian dictator that ruled for almost two and half decades in just 28 days from the commencing of the occurrence, and the president has to give up his sovereignty and absconded to Saudi Arabia 10 days after the demise of the young boy (Obosedede 2015). The literature about this region, debater, and all deemed that the Arab authoritarians could never knock down so easily, they could only be overthrow by armed forces, strong policy-making, or an exterior intervention, in other concept there is a belief that democratic change would never be in the Arab world, because their civilization was not prepared for democracy, but what the local social protests have produced for toppling the 23 years totalitarian rule in 23 days without any internal or external power intervention or an extremist Islamic groups, or any centralized leadership support has shaken the world and is be recorded in the history (Kaboub 2013).

At the initial stage of the upshot, the dictator rule didn't take the event serious, because they assumed that they have the tactics to end the radical protests, as nearly all of these regimes' totalitarian nature have formulated how to handle and approach with all types of established oppositions, but they were not ready control the radical street protests that happened unexpectedly (Kaboub2013). This is why as they have used all of their tactics at the early period to stop the riots, but it didn't work, instead it made the protests nationwide, because brutally responded from the authority developed anger of people, when the police killed the demonstrators in neighboring towns it was that time the local protests became national or even international upheaval. The state's media also ignored the events and this is an assured that the régime didn't take good action about the revolts, the peaceful protest

was showed on Aljazeera Mubasher channel in the evening of 17<sup>th</sup> December which Ali Bouazizi the cousin of Muhammad Bouazizi had sent the video through trough Facebook, but the country didn't show anything until the 29<sup>th</sup> December after the propagating of the upshot, then the Nessam TV disclosed (Yasmine, 2011). Letter on after performing all the tactic that the regime has prepared to use it in order to defeat all kind of organized oppositions they changed the system of responding to the protests from being cruelty to being sympathetic just to eliminate the demonstrative, to stop the protestors' anger the government promised to create 300. 0000 job and the dictator visited the victim in the sanatorium on 28<sup>th</sup> December, but it is too late the turmoil could not be vanquished, so the only way out is overthrowing the regime as the people desired. This was the motto of the motion of the several upheavals of 2011: "The people want to overthrow the regime" and it happened because on 14<sup>th</sup> January the president had no option but to abdicate and flee to Saudi Arabia. The jasmine revolution showed the level of discomfort and despondency that the young Tunisians were facing under Ben Ali regime, where the high school graduate can be withdrawn from the school to be a street seller, because of the economic condition and unemployment. As we can see the protests were encouraged by thousands of jobless graduates including postgraduates and Ph.Ds. (Lahmar 2015).

The Jasmine uprising in Tunisia was not the first public demonstrations in the Tunisians' history. There were several protests before the 2011, popular uprisings, as mentioned, there was a chain riots which was known as the Tunisian bread riots that erupted by multiplying of bread price caused in December 1983 to January 1984 under Habib Bourguiba regime. Just 3 years before Ben Ali seized the power in a coup, the state's response to rioters was enormously brutal, because as the upheavals and the mass crowds controlled by security forces (Seddon 1986). Alongside these riots, there was a protest which occurred in Gafsa city 360 km south west of Tunis, the house of mining industry of Tunisia is located close to the Algerian border. The riots were

known as Gafsa mining basin revolts which busted in January 2008. This demonstration was also concerned costs of living, taxes, and unemployment because an unemployed person such as in the family of a mining workers could faced some misfortunes in the procedure of their work, youth graduates, university and high school students, and short-term staffs from the variant area (Gobe, 2010). No one assumed that the protest of ordinary Tunisians would hit down a dictatorial rule of 23 years and to spread out to numerous states leading to the deposing of some authoritarians who controlled their countries' affairs for three to four decades and drive some states into failed states and civil war (Bayat, 2012). The Tunisian event that has been the introduction of the many events that has not reach to an end didn't take a long time to the conclusion, because by started by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010 exactly with the self-victimized Muhammad Bouazizi on the side of Buzid and inspired to other Towns and regions of the country that ended with the deposition of Ben Ali regime in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century which was exactly on 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011. This victory was considered as a procedure of gathering of brawls, nonviolent action and endeavor to produce modern administrative opportunities (Ayeb, 2011).

Other than these two protests there were many discounting protests that took place in Tunisia but the government used power to overcome them, which was why at the first time the Ben Ali regime didn't take the 2011 riot serious, knowing that he was able to defeat the previous revolts successfully, he was not aware that this the ending era of the autocracy in the Arab world not only Tunisia. What have started in Tunisia at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century to shake the world, because no one thought that the fourth wave of Arab democratization would start with a common protest, and everyone was expected to see a huge powerful organized group that will thump the dictators who ruled for decades, and it was assumed that it will take a decade to remove then one by one from sovereignty that had been their heritage. But the dictator that ruled for 23 years was defeated in 23 days, and his identical

who had spent 3 to 4 decades of rule have followed him one after the other like a TV drama series.

### **2.1 Tunisia's upheaval and its Characteristics**

During the earlier of the Tunisian uprising the protestors were harassed by police, but they tolerated all the vexation and constraint, they didn't allow the aggravations and duress change the method of the movement, the upheaval continued with its style of peaceful riot against the government. Throughout the period of the rally, this character of the serene demonstration was retained. There is no any anticipation by the youth that this unrest would transmute to messy conditions in diverse towns and cities of Tunisia, talk less to think that it will develop in many neighboring countries and to toppled four engrained autocrats, placed some countries in unknown transition, and vibrated the thrones numerous kinds and emirs in all the Arab world, and even some non-democratic Arab countries.

In this is was the jasmine uprising, it were the demonstrators disclosed their great dispassionate, and accountabilities in concerning of the building of government and properties, because throughout the unrest they didn't attack any government buildings and institutions. As it was used to happen in most of the riots, most of the protestors usually destroy some of the government properties. This humble and reasonable activities was the major reason to enable the protesters to win the heart of many security force at once, then the security forces quickly changed side and supported the demonstrators, and this wonderful characteristic gave stringent, and contributed greatly to the Tunisian's revolution gain success and had a new era of democratic government (Sadiqi 2011).

### **2.2 Actor players who prepared the Tunisia's upheaval**



The express collapse of Tunisian president's regime in 2011 has not only triggered a billow of Upheaval through MENA regime, but also farmed many question about the player actors and the rotations of youth unemployment, socio-economic imbalance, corruption government dominations in making Tunisian uprising (Kaboub, 2014). All this showed that the government itself was the first actor that played an instrumental role in creating this uprising. The unexpected spark, which is self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi has been the cause of the Arab Spring, so he was the main actor of all the actors that will be mention below. The death of Muhammad Bouazizi a street hawker made him to be the major actor who made a lot of Arabs to go against their tyrannical rulers, because he broke the wall of fear not only in Tunisia but in All Arab regime (Muhammad Afzal, 2017. And the second maker of this jasmine uprising was the police, because without the police's immoral action the event will never happen.

### **2.2.1 Rule of social media and educated youth**

The Arab Spring was encouraged by the university graduates because this demonstrative action became more methodical, improved and increased in size after students have returned to school on 3<sup>rd</sup> January 2011(Ryan, 2011). The advocates of the Tunisian graduate youth not only set their president run away, but also forced the incumbent administration to grant disputed elections to a congress that produced and establish a new democratic constitution. Social Media didn't caused the uprising, but the instruments of social media like Face book, Twitter, You tube and etc. were used by the educated youth to mobilize people during the uprising. The jasmine uprising was the first coverage through Face-book, and was the first to show what was happening in SidiBuzid.

On 17<sup>th</sup> December 2010, Aljazeera Mubasher channel was displayed the incident which a video was shared by the cousin of Muhammad Bouazizi, the first day of the event through social media instruments and called people to

attend the protests. Similarly, in Egypt face-book let the world know what was going on in Egypt, and call Egyptians to join, through the popular face-book page: “we are all Khalid Saeed” was the phrase to be used to call people to attend the demonstrations. So, most people got to know about the events of 2011 via social media, pictures, videos, sound and the movement was in the coverage through numerous means of social media and it was through the use of social media that the Tunisian demonstration attained universal advertising and blowout to uncountable part of the world within a short time (Khonker, 2011). Conversational media also played a rule that will never be overlooked because without them social media will never be trusted, as we have seen the family of Muhammad Bouazizi first sent the incident to Aljazeera channel knowing that this will help them to spread the issue. So media help in informing the global community with genuine information and details about the protests which led to international empathy and support for the demonstrators. Most famous were Aljazeera, BBC, VOA, and French 24.

### **2.2.2 Role of the civil society**

Tunisian upheaval was encouraged by online activities, university graduate unemployed people and student who were afraid of their future. But Tunisian civil society groups were the substantial player in exhibiting to include the desirable of regime change and democracy, and their present splayed and maintain the riot generally obvious the labor union groups (Veronica 2015). The labor union UGTT) has been the first key player of the jasmine revelation, it was because of their endeavor that the demonstration attained noticing, regional trade union leaders in SidiBuzid were the first group who planned the revolt in the very beginning of the events. The SidiBuzid trade union leader joined with the local intellectual and some opposition called for riot overtly to show their concern about the calamity which occurred on Friday, so the main demonstration started on Saturday the day of

SidiBuzid weekly market. The residents of SidiBuzid who used to patronize the market every week to buy different kinds of stuff, and the provincial people that visit the market weekly linked the trade union. The street traders that came from the western portion of the country to buy and sell are among the first people that joined the union. Mature and respectable people of the countryside societies were present at the market that day and they joined the protests immediately when they learnt about it, it means all people that came to the weekly market that that day have cooperated in that march just to protest against the disaster that happened on Friday. So the appearance of the elderly people of SidiBuzid and involvement of those elderly agrarian people from different nearby villages in this unrest encouraged many people to come out and join the event. (Lahmar 2015).

The leadership of the UGTT at the first time needed to turn out of the encounter and behave as negotiators between the protestors and the government, but being the UGTT local and regional part of their groups have already joined the uprising without considering the UGTT leadership natural position made the national leadership be persuaded and supported. The UGTT call for a chain of the walkout and peaceful rallies all over the country on January 2011. The 14<sup>th</sup> January 2011 labor strike gathered hundreds of thousand Tunisians in the rallies on the streets, it was the last day of Ben Ali regime in Tunisia. This is why many academics have deliberated the support of the labor union as the vital consequence that has transferred the requirement of the Tunisian uprising from socioeconomic complaints to the transformation of the administration. The groups that supported riot in its first stage among the labor group are the Tunisian health workers' union, the Postal workers union, the primary school workers' union, and the secondary school workers' union. And also the Tunisian association of democratic women (ATFD) played a wonderful and vital role in the uprising, without this group the revolution will never be organized as it was them who organized

marches, strike protests, and demonstrations, the Tunisian national order of lawyers (ONAT) necessary role in this uncomfortable battle granted the protestors more support and energy, because the young lawyers marched with their respective black robes in front of the ministry of internal affairs, and their effort of keeping the crowds focused on human rights, and civil freedoms was among the reasons which make the authoritarian regime weak and lose hope.

Inside these non-governmental organizations together with the Tunisian Association of Human Rights (ATDH) and the National Syndicate of Tunisian Journalists (SNJT), these unions tried and amalgamated the attention of the marches in the headquarters by embracing diplomatic tricks, communal intellectuals and bourgeois. However, the residue of the civil society organizations reinforced the riot by accumulating their members and spreading them across the country to raise the movement and make it sensible. (Veronica 2015).

### **2.2.3 Role of parents/women**

Parents were crucial participants in the Dignity of the revolution, their role will never be overlooked, as the victim's mother was the initial grievance that started the peaceful protest outside the municipality building, as we watch in Aljazeera mubasher which were posted by Ali Bouazizi the cousin of Muhammad Bouazizi on 17<sup>th</sup> December (Ryan 2011). And they continued to play an instrumental role in, we can see they appeared on all TV and social media such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and etc. as we can see a family of all number exited in all revolt, as a regular job, since the beginning of the uprising they have never been absent, they use to take all their needs along with all of their family members to appear in the street demonstration, we can see in the recorded video a mother, a father and their children shouting for the

regime to takeover, even pregnant women, breast feeding mothers along with their infants and kids were present in the event, among them there were workers and occupational lecturers, teacher, lawyers, doctors, etc. and house wives also joined the uprising as they were shown on the video they were at the middle shoulder to shoulder with men shouting for their dignity and freedom. (Khalil 2014). As it showed on Aljazeera how demonstrators were women, men, boy, and girls young's and old walk from SidiBuzid through the night to incline on Prime Minister's office.

#### **2.2.4 Role of the military**

Military of Tunisia has played an indispensable role in empowering and keeping the protestors in peace, because the decision that they made to stay neutral and thereupon to even support the demonstrators was an important contribution to the uprising's success, and it has brought the peaceful transition to the revolution. The president Ben Ali wanted the army to use violence when the upheaval exploded as he apparently ordered them to pressure and crush the demonstrators on 7<sup>th</sup> January when the police were overpowered, but the chief of staff general Rachid Ammar has rejected and disobeyed the order. The denial of the opening fire on the crowds made the president enraged and endeavored to put the chief of staff Ammar under house arrest, but he failed to do that. The military response made the president commanded the deployment of military in Tunis Street back to the barrack, but they returned when he left the country. Assuming that the army obeyed this command and implement it, surely the sequence of the events will be wounded and endless. So the backing of the armed forces to revolts is a crucial situation that brought succeed of the revolution as soon as it started (Brooks 2013).

#### **2.2.5 Role of Islamist movement (*Ennahda*)**

All Islamist political parties were late to join the riot, they joined the protests in just some days before Ben Ali withdrawal. At the early time of the revolution they didn't play a big role, because if the revolution fail they are the most who will suffer for it, in part the government will say it was terrorist attack, and of course the will take the blame and punishment, even the incident of the young self-immolation will be their fault, as historically Islamist has been characteristic of campaigns for authoritarians to succeed pluralism and selective political openings, and it happened as at initially Ben Ali blamed the demonstration on a marginal of extremist, this made Islamist agonized which may be the reason of their disappearance in the first stage of the popular uprising.

So they didn't play an essential rule in jasmine revolution (Veronica 2015), but their movement since the 1980s has constantly played a considerable part in Tunisian society because under the former regime they have played a role under the former regime by managing the most significant political opposition. (Wolf 2013).It is wrong to say role of women in this uprising, as the woman were the actor that made this uprising, and made it achieve its goal, because they were appeared in all players of the revolutions, as they were the trade unionist the human rights, the lowers, the opposition politicians, the militaries, the activists, the journalists, the Islamists, the parent, the bogglers, the protestors, and they have their group for only the. So their participation led to equal or more if we count with their group and their natural engagements which didn't prevent their image which made people like and supported the revolution.

The reason why all groups united in this leaderless revolution, did not only made it achievable, but also simply has led to the full transition of Tunisian political and socio-economic system to restructure since then.

### **2.3 Tunisian political panorama before Arab uprising**

The post-colonial nations who inherited top-down political system, because they were just free from the colonial leadership, so most of the charismatic hero of independence announced themselves presidents, and they have already adopted colonial political system, as in African states you can see an African Muslim or Christian but colonial authoritarian French secular by nature, when the colonial left us and go back to his land with a new administrative system to develop his country, those champion of freedom were here keeping the system and demolishing their lands.

So, Tunisia was like that in post-colonial the Habib Bourguiba the country independence hero proclaimed himself president for life, as we can see his response when he was asked about the Tunisian political system "Which system? What system? I am the system" (Kaboub 2013). The political character in Tunisia was intensified to the authority of the constitutional Democratic Party, this party was created before the independence in 1934 which known as Neo-Destour it was the party which Bourguiba used for the struggle of gaining independence in 1956 (Penner 1999), the country became a constitutional kingdom with their king Muhammad VIII, at that time Bourguiba was the premier minister of the country and used that influence to change the country from kingdom to republic in 1957 and the country since then became the republic of Tunisia.

However, when he became the president he created the political structure that will give him and his the party full authority and influence, at the early of post-colonial era the party receive respect and love by citizens because of two reasons: firstly it was actor player in struggling

and gaining the country independence, secondly the president social modernist and economy reform, but right from the time the party has no any important political opposition, the political system that was created by Bourguiba it was the political method that will let the national assembling approved presidential determinations and put delusion of government responsibility. And his electrical system was uncompetitive which was created only to criterion the popularity of government policies rather than to defy its leadership (Kaboub 2013). So it means no one can challenge Bourguiba as he has strange political decision so it made him ruling since 1957 to 1987 when Ben Ali seized power by bloodless coup, Ben Ali didn't change the political system he only changed the name of the party one year after being the president the party known as constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) instead of new-Destour, and he did some institutional reform that will reshape his reigning of course the party will continue to be present as the dominant in political arena since it was the same system, it always won over 8% of the seats in the parliament in all the election of the country for decades until the end of Authoritarian regime on 4<sup>th</sup> January 2011 the court debarred it (Penner 1999).

Consequently, the ruling party dominated the whole parliament, because of the abrogation of the constitution which benefits ruling party, the amendment of the constitution happened twice, thus the office of the president could continue to serve. Since then the citizens started to be unhappy as Ben Ali didn't fulfill his promise, he promised a regular move towards democracy, but all he did is the amendment which legalized his victory, while his first two presidential ballot he was voted uncontested, that is in 1989, and 1994. And also in 1990 Ben Ali gained enormous majorities because they were also fixed prejudiced affairs that were the time multi-party presidential poll were revealed they were also fixed prejudiced affairs. Ben Ali wins a fourth election in 2004 with 90% of the ballot (BBC, 2011).



In 2002 when the president's third successive time in office was about to conclude there is chance and prospect for change in the country from the military, as the military attempted to stop the autocrat from reinstating presidency for life. But the military helicopter crash that happened on 1th may 2002 which killed the chief of Army staff, five colonels, four majors, two lieutenants and one warrant officer first class, has stopped the military's attempting to interfere again. In this catastrophe, the whole of the military highest election was swabbed out. So this gave the regime chance to win again, on May 26, 2002, the constitutional plebiscite was passed with 99.5% approval, hence offering Ben Ali the consent of governing the state till 2014 (Kaboub 2013).

#### **2.4 The socio-economic situation before Arab uprising**

The economy of Tunisia faced the main economy catastrophe during the last years of Bourguiba's ruling. The country was about to break down because of the political emptiness as the growing popularity and Islamist political determinations became more obvious. Ben Ali assured to create liberal pluralistic democracy when he accompanied in the World Bank-subsidized organizational amendment program (Kaboub2013). Surely during Ben Ali time, Tunisia was applauded for an advanced posture on woman right and for economic restructures, the beaches of Tunisia became the highest terminus for tourists of Europe. So it means under Ben Ali Tunisian Economy got stable economic growth (BBC2011), but the high proportion of unemployment among young people ruined central bank capitals, economic pressure, price freeze, valorization, credit squeeze, income restrictions, and financing (Trimeche 2004).

This high unemployment and enormous parts of Tunisian internal that stayed deprived affected the country economy in 1988s as it suffered from trade gap, trade balance, weakening export, and increasing foreign

debt (Dillman 1998). Tunisia's increasingly desperate economic saturation led it to adopt structural adjustment programs (SAP) from the international financial institution for the sake of getting out of the central economic problem. In 1986 the structural adjustment programs (SAP) was propelled by Tunisia in partnership with the World Bank and IFM. This SAP was instigated conducive to slacken the economy of the country. The SAP wants to place the country on a free market and decrease the participation of government in the economy besides to growths its simplicity to foreign investors and to moderate the spending of government through allowance withdrawal, etc. the structural alteration platform had failed to work in the country it didn't make any difference.

Because officials like economic sector and state-owned enterprise were opposed for many aspects of the progression. Hence, instead of the plan to progress to the country and make life simple to working class and small trade operatives; but it made life more difficult, and increase poverty because it headed to graveness that bumps lot sectors of the citizens. Even with all these trials there was a succeeded for the amendment because the country economy developed, with this economic remodel there was a modest economic recovery, from 1997 to 2001 the country real GDP growth rate of 5.8% and rise rate decrease to 2.9%, while in a year after the record of growing external investors was 13.5% that was in the year 2000 (Trimeche 2004).

Before Arab uprising, Tunisia was graded among the greatest in the Middle East and North Africa in relations of economic development, because of that economic amendments the country economy has been execution properly particularly in the last period. All these economic achievement couldn't offer or create the job for the huge educated youth of the country. This was ascribed to the regular consequence of systematized corruption and neoliberal policies that boost has driven a lot

of youth into an unofficial subdivision of the frugality which contributes a minority of citizens salaried jobs. This attached to the swelling injustice and unfairness among populations, besides spending of incomes to some part of the country by developing them and ignoring major parts made people became animosity to the government. Increasingly, the graduate unemployed that incapable to locate work developed in number, which in sequence, give rise to failure in the government's authenticity. All these established antipathies of people against the system of ruling, which terminated to leaderless revolution (Achy, 2011).

The economy falling of creating a job for the crowded educated youth of the country was attached to the excessive extent of corruption preserved by the president' folks who captured the procedure of liberalization to the benefit them self and their all families. This structured exploitation was narrated since 1990s during the progression of the amendment of the country economy. The family of the president were contended to have ruled the economic sector of the county and oppressed the procedure of the economic reforms. The laws made by the government in relation to internal and external business was to avoid the materialization of new industrialists in Tunisia, thus, the ruling kin and their allies would have unequivocal domination above the economy.

Ben Ali was married twice with six children, and his second wife Laila played a noticeable role in the country's municipal life, and allegedly facilitated enormous financial assets for her numerous family (BBC, 2011). This ruling family controlled various economic sectors such as media sectors, importing, airport, industry, banking, telecommunication, and etc. they did all this by purchasing many state-owned enterprises at a figurative sum volume and then acquired controlled on it. It was narrated that Ben Ali has control on over 40% the country's companies. All these merciless let the regime vanished its sincerity. With the

omission of this planned exploitation of the kin's of the president, the international financial disaster of 2008 linked along with the feeble flow of external open asset, at the period of economic collapse increased the failure of the country economy (Tsourapas, 2013).

## **2.5 Oppositions under Ben Ali regime**

As it was mention above, when Ben Ali seized power in 1987 pledged the citizens a series sequence of amendment, as he promised to reform political system by forming pluralistic liberal democracy, and acknowledge other political parties and grant them freedom to vie contest with the ruling party, he promised to eradicate lifetime presidency, and political time limit will be three-5 years successive term. Dolorously this promises was not kept, the president was just restructuring his regime, all these false promises was just devious fraudulence that will let him have time to intensify his reign on the political scene and reserve identical political method which he learned from Bourguiba. Ben Ali called 16 parties and organizations consist of the Islamist party which was banned to sign a "national pact" together to advocate democratic reforms, interest, strength, and state profit. To gain much backing from his antagonists Ben Ali freed political prisoners and took advantage of pro-human right and pro-democracy language.

A political player by training from his Godfather Bourguiba tricked to estimate Islamist popularity and detect their setup and their devotees by promising to validated their party in his first three years on the presidential sit, and then he launched a huge clinch down on the whole group (Kaboub2013). So from then Ben Ali showed his real color as he was behaved as more tyrannical and controlled the citizens hard line, thereby abusing and arresting political rebels an unethically arresting, and controlling Tunisian political life. Prior to Arab upheaval Ben Ali constrained all political party this didn't allow them to log their success in

the voting, this made the ruling party was the only party that always win the elections (Zarlenga 2011). Equally, Signe & Smida, 2014 argue that utmost opposition's parties were cooperated and dominated by the governing parties throughout Ben Ali regime, and strict action used to be taken against all opposition groups who try to cause tension by the rulers includes forced deportee, this is what affected Ennahdha the most powerful collection of Muslims in Tunisia. During 23 years of Ben Ali regime, political parties have agonized which include escalating of the ruling party and main opposition was insolence by force in favor of diminutive parties that around the government. The parties recognized as devotees parties shaped to improve autonomous disguise to the Tunisian bigoted style. (Sadiqi 2011). There was a rumor in the country that Ben Ali wanted one of his relative to succeed his power because he has no any palpable opponents. Hostrup & Cavatorta, 2011 argue that the ruling party has this influence because of the debilitation of the oppositions, by amalgamating their dilemma. The reason of all these was the opposition's failure to establish an accommodating and operative network throughout Ben Ali regime. As well as their ideological diversity and private contentions among them didn't allow them to deliberate their vitalities together to defy Ben Ali. Hence inter-division within the political oppositions and management disability support to settle the ruling party and maintain the administration of Ben Ali.

## **2.6 Non-governmental organization during Ben Ali's rule**

In the phase of the administration Tunisian dictator all the association of unions was undefended. As all know that the system of Authoritarian government doesn't allow anything that will put pressure on it, so during Ben Ali liberated CSOs doesn't have the freedom to mien their movement liberally. Most groups were banned and some were restricted, other Unions group and human rights faced unjustified constriction and logical vexation (AmroBoubakri 2015). The country has more than 9000

public and charitable civil society organizations in the year 2009. Regardless of this huge size, but incapacity of their activities didn't allow them to act and save the interest of the citizens. Some of these organizations were nominated by the government, of course, they will support the regime, and Maximal of them was work determined. Even though there is subsistence of right to organization and congress in the country's constitution, but the regime ignore it and have to create some laws bring obstructions for the real exercise of independent civil society in Tunisia (NCVO and ANND report).

It means the role played by civil society in the uprising was not just as their duty, but to some magnitude, it was constructed on their relationship with the regime.

## **2.7 The military under Ben Ali regime**

Since after the independence the system of the Tunisian government under the rule of Bourguiba kept the military away from politics. Military have never had any good relationship with their country regime since their existence as indecent military of the country, so correlation between the military and their government was anxious for long, because since 1962 their relationship with the first government has vanished, and since 1991 their topic with Ben Ali And the successor of the second government has underway, he started his own issue with the military by blaming a unit of officers of strategizing trickery coup for him. The result this accusations made him sent some prison while some into early retreat (Gaaloul, 2011).

Thence, Ben Ali continued to keep the military away from politics, the military authority in the government was restrained under Ben Ali. In the time of dictatorship ruling there is no picket in politics for the military, hence he focusses and spent energy and time on preserving its struggle and reliability to elevate its own competence and develop more entrenched (Brooks, 2013). Ben Ali didn't concentrate simply in declining the military in a political arena, but he also relegated them on state safekeeping, and service of the military in the country as a recruit is required for one year at the age of 20 for men and elective for women. The president as the military has experience of weakening the power of the military, so he implemented several methods that sluggish and demoted the army, such as raze Ministry of defense funds, clashing, their preferment, and compelling the most qualified, capable, and veteran officers to retreat. The military of Tunisian vigor was diminished from 58,000 to about 40,000 by Ben Ali since 1991 to 2011. So late 2010, the military has the power of about 40,000 recruits with about 30% enrolls (Gaaloul, 2011). Thus people weren't at all surprised by the decision of the military to stay silent or to persist keep on nonaligned and even to extend to take the decision of helping the demonstrators because they have no any relation to the government that would let them be by its side.

## **2.8 The structure of social classes before 2011**

Before the Jasmine revolution, there were 4<sup>th</sup> types of social classes in Tunisia, the first class was exercised noteworthy authority in the Tunisian's activities, the group comprises of the political Related elect (PER). This includes the president, his second wife Leila Trabelsi and her family who played a noticeable role in the country public life and economy assets, his close colleagues, his political advisors, his topmost ministers, leaders of domestic security management, the governing party administrators and other government highest standing officer

(Kaboub2013). The second class was the class upper middle class, this class encompasses businessmen, policymakers, huge property-owners, and experts educated in the west of the country. The third class was middle class, this group includes small commerce holders, liberated agriculturalists, property-owner, storekeepers, teachers, junior workers in the state's service, and other skilled workers and self-employed (Solski, 2007). The fourth class contains poor agriculturalists, farmhands, farm worker, and jobless. So the upheaval was shaped by the country upper middle class with the middle class and other working class, as they create a coalition together to juncture the turmoil, the upper class were with the government, they are inimical that the rest class joined the bring their end (Bensassi, 2012). Moreover, the middle class contributed in the revolt consequence based on the antagonistic upshot of the rules that created extended hard life for them, whereas the working class was more affected by that regime in method of early retirement and trimming that's why the class participation was more active than the other (Tsourapas, 2013).

The Tunisian uprisings would be the most successful one; because the Tunisian previous government created huge adversaries that can bring the end of any powerful dictator and his supporters.

## **2.9 Democratic transition in Tunisia: an assessment**

The dream about the opportunities of democratic development in Tunisia has come true, though there are several obstructions to democracy this is in the observation of the element that some political assembly has not focused-on democracy because don't participate in the effort that will be democratically angled. Most undemocratic force depend on tyranny, beside autonomists and previous origins of the old system that



dishonestly united the opposition will participate for influence and probable cause confusion to the evolution and headed to dictatorial revitalization, or the most horrible of all, the military can grab power in this manner commandeering the transformation (Landolt&Kubicek, 2014). Though, with these incredible obstacles and misfortune that was mention above the country overpower them and make substantial progress, and take a wonderful step facing democracy since after the tumble of the dictator. Tunisia did fall into the political crisis like other authoritarian countries after the revolution, it encountered negligible political catastrophes, and was eligible to chew them over and move on toward tranquil transformation. In the year 2014, the recent charter was embraced by the country, which was prepared by the national constitutional assembly (NCA).

The national constitutional assembly comprises extensive depictions from different political groups from provincial electorates. The (NCA) also held discussions with various performers consist of human right, trade union, and CSOs. The country adopted a new constitution in 2014, which was drafted by the national constitutional assembly (NCA). The NCA involve broad representations from various political groups from regional constituencies. Negotiations were also held between different actors comprising trade unions, CSOs and human rights organizations and other pressures groups for a new legitimate structure for the elections. That was the first period in the record of the country to have the balloting law which was enrolled and publicized on negotiation and real accord among several political actors. On 23 October 2011 the multiparty election held and Ennahdha the Tunisian Islamist movement won parliamentary election with 90 out of 217 seat, while Nida Tunis party became the second largest party in the parliament. The proficiency of the country proved that democratization has amalgamated Islamist into the

political scheme, amongst its Islamist group and Arab analogs *Ennahda* emerge by the character of its practicality attempt to get through other political assets, and elegant logical stance. Being a moderate Islamist party made Ennahdha to be trusted and achieved its standing in Tunisian politics, Rashid El-Gannushi the leader 's of Ennahdha made a statement showed the distance of his party from extremism: " The kind of nation we need is one that doesn't intervene in any one personal life". He elucidated that: "The government have nothing to do with what people will wear, commanding or telling people what the kind of clothes to wear, what kind of food to eat, what type of to drink, what the sort of religion or ideology to adhere, and what they should believe in" (Koprulu 2015).

The transitional regime *Ennahda* displayed it's desires since the early time that it came to power, which are: firstly is the country stability, so the party can go to any extent to keep that interest, as it was ensued in a struggle to retain democratic transition of Tunisia inundated, the party's leader Ghannouchi have arrangement with the secular trouper BejiCaidEssebsi the resent president for conceding influence to a concierge government that give chance to a fresh charter to be espoused. Secondly is to reserve one foot in the politics of the state at all cost, as it was happened the party segregated its religions and political activities, party's leader Ghannouchi called for more democratic comprise, and to be distance from Islamic political, the party has announce its separation with political Islam after being deliberated Mo modest and reasonable Isalamist for almost 3 years. The Friday 2012 when the party made first congress's opening, which was hold in the country's capital city, and was attended by tens of thousands of the citizens has rescored proclamation of the leader of the party R. Ghannouchi was saying:"we are knee to keep religion far from political struggle, and we call for complete neutrality" as he was continuo saying:

“A modern state is not run through ideologies, big slogans and political wrangling, but rather through political programmes” (Aljazeera, 2016). *Ennahdda* representative emphasized that the party’s segregation of system of belief and politics is an authentic alteration. Saying that it’s a standard improvement in Tunisia, and standard progression of the party and democratic Tunisia (Souli, 2016). To end the activities of religious in the party, the member of the party will no longer teach or preach in the mosque, and anyone can join the party without having to attain two signature from the party. Opinion and outcome of the moderate Islamist party to become more of Democratic Party emerge from struggles to enlarge and develop the party’s attractiveness to the broader subdivisions of citizens (Aljazeera, 2016).

Regardless of all eagerness to conciliation by joining in confederation government, *Ennahda* faced a lot of trials being the first democratic regime in Tunisia governing, for the reason that it ruled in the turbulent years next to the insurgency. The cycle of transitional régime shaped for the period of transition officially completed by the governmental congressional election of late 2014. In late 2014 which 26 October the general voting was held this period the Nida Tunis party seized the major amount of chairs of the parliament which is 85 out of 217, *Ennahda* became second this time with 96 seats in legislature, the anti-Islamist secularist party Nida Tunis gained the correct to place the head of state and lead the assemblage régime (NurKöprülü, 2015), the party made its originator BejiCaidEssebsi who was acting prime minister in 2011 to be selected as president, Nida Tunis formed the administration of state accord with the *Ennahda* agreement and two other secular parties. The political group usually have several political crisis during the transition activities, but they always overcome it by implementing interchange and negotiation which let them to fireside forward and finally prospered in

transition. The country military reinforced all the transition stand that was commonly considered as nonviolent (Arieff&Humud, 2015). The non-governmental organizations contribution in the transient is significant as the organization also witnessed substantial changes after jasmine revolution. At the beginning of the 2013 the country has about 14, 966 civil society organization that are working in many spaces mostly human right who was neglected during Ben Ali. Besides totally civil society organizations have currently regenerated their duties in the improvement of multicultural political formation as main companions as recommended by the legal order (Foundation for the future, 2013b).

## CHAPTER III

### MOROCCO'S 20<sup>TH</sup> FEBRUARY MOVEMENT

Morocco possesses the third largest population in the North Africa, and the fifth in the Arab world with 36,139,641 million inhabitants as estimated in 2018– 20% of whom are aged between fifteen and twenty-four (Worldometers, 2018). The country has high unemployment rate which is recorded as 15% and 60% of whom are graduates. For several years unemployed graduates have been complaining and protesting virtually every day in front of parliament in Rabat, needing stable occupations in the public sectors (Brouwer & Bartels, 2014). It is pertinent at this point to state that the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement is not the new phenomenon in Morocco. This because prior to Arab Spring there were different huge riots which include mass protest of 1956 against the French rules, which brought the end of French protectorate, and the riots of 1965 against the government, which made King Hassan announce a state of emergency and suspend parliament, and the 1973 protests formed by Polisario desiring to inaugurate an independent country in Sahara which was under Spain. In 2010 there was a violent demonstration in regional capital *Elayoun* when security forces dispersed a protest camp in disputed territory of Western Sahara (BBC, 2018).

And Morocco historically was portrayed by massive political suppression throughout the 1970s to the early 1990s, so the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement occurrence's assertions were again coming back on the political outline. Despite the fact that 2011 February movement was not expected in Morocco, but it didn't come to many as a surprise. Moroccans have been living in difficult conditions just before Arab Springs, this due to the economic difficulties in the country, as Morocco is economically a developing nation, and its residents are more destitute than other Great Maghreb nations, like Algeria, Tunisia, especially Libya. According to World Bank estimations from 1999 to 2004 poverty decreased from 19% to 15% of the inhabitants, but still the most serious trial and errand that residues in the country is this poverty mostly in countryside zones, where the ratio goes beyond 25%, but still the fifteen percent of the inhabitants live below maintenance level, however this situation and the popular unrest that happened in Tunisia and was happening in some Arab world encouraged young Moroccans to organize a mass protests across the state on 20<sup>th</sup> February which known as 20<sup>th</sup> February movement it was named 20<sup>th</sup> February movement a day after the starting of the event. (Brouwer& Bartels, 2014).

The toppling down of Ben Ali and Mubarak encouraged Moroccan who understand that mass demonstrative can bring change in their life and turn their state into the full and genuine constitutional monarchy. As a result made them became blonder and started to call for change and demand for more democracy, social justice, and anti-corruption measures. 9days after the stepping down of Mubarak has happened to be a first day of the protest of Arab Springs in Morocco, a large number of Moroccans in over 50 towns took the streets calling for change, a rally took structure that obviously required a tangible constitutional monarchy in which a voted and responsible administration and leadership would have ruled the social economy and

security policies of the state. This movement virtually and approximately request has been the power of Monarch that has been controlling all influential parliamentary and armed activities right from independence. Particularly from 1961- 1999, that was during King Hassan II. (Sater, 2011).The structure's rule of the kingdom named "*Makhzen*" has constantly had an opportunity to rule the country since post-independence, as known that the country is a religious, Islamic country with a legislative body and political parties. The Monarch is the core of power religiously, because of his claim to be descendant of the Islamic prophet, so he has the legitimacy by his ancestral line back to the Muslims' leader, which is why he is Commander of the Faithful. However, the country is reflected to be one of the most democratic countries in North Africa and the Arab world because there are official polls and the public media of the country has a level of right and expressions' freedom (Brouwer& Bartels, 2014). Since post-independence era, Morocco has been one of the steadiest and established Arab state, but all these didn't let the country to be safe from the turmoil that swept the Arab region in 2011 (Lalami, 2011).

### **3.1 Morocco's 20<sup>th</sup>February movement characteristics and its demands**

The most critical characteristic of Moroccan uprising was its peaceable nature and environment. During the movement, youths exhibited a high level of patience and reliability and they are ready to tolerate any type of aggravation from the regime, despite there was no any provocation by the rulers. At the initial time, the social media was used by a group of young protestors letting the world know about the rally in Casablanca on 20<sup>th</sup> of February. The video showed thirteen young women and men talking in their Arabic and Amazigh dialect "I will participate in the movement on 20<sup>th</sup> February, I am Moroccan" all of them said, and after that, they started to clarify the causes for their movement: dignity, right, freedom, better living standards, equality. Education, minority right, labor rights, Amazigh language

right and so on. The view of the video elucidate the peaceful nature of the activities and self-restraint exhibited by the youth, so the movement right from time was very organized and was started by a small group yelling and calling itself freedom and Democracy Immediately. The movement request contains amendment of the country constitution, the suspension of the current parliament, the formation of a short-term transitional government, a liberated judiciary, responsibility for elected representatives, and all political prisoners must be released (Lalami, 2011). All these demands were requested in a good manner, this pacifism outlook of the movement to some degree defined the aftermath of the movement. Is not like its colleagues in Arab 2011 revolutions, though the Moroccan uprising didn't request for the overthrow of the regime, Moroccan people don't the removal of the monarch from the office or the elimination of the kingdom, the only want a serious amendment to the constitution, not a revolution (Sater, 2011).

The demonstrations in the country like its colleagues was publicized by the use of social media channels like YouTube, Facebook, and, Twitter, etc. to promote and broadcast the message about the movement, that expressively develops and boosts the advertising and publicity of the movement and motivated more citizen to link the occurrence.

### **3.2 The respond of the monarchy to the movement**

Unlike its parallel, nevertheless, the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement's demand was not to overthrow the regime, because they didn't ask for the removal of the monarch from the office or the obliteration of the kingdom. Further, despite the fact that there was a violation from Morocco's' security at the first time, but its character has never been nearly as cruel as that of its partner in Tunisia, Egypt or talk less in Libya. As all know that Morocco has been reflected one of the most democratic of all of the totalitarian rule in the Arab world. Since the begging of the movement, the kingdom of Morocco didn't retort to hostage the movement with an even bit of the force or fierceness



like it had happened in the other states during the events of 2011. As we have seen even the worst furious ferocious clampdown on the 13<sup>th</sup> March which occurred in Casablanca didn't upshot any deaths, and thus far only one demonstrator lost his life from police cruelty in June (Sater, 2011). At the beginning of the protest the régime has nearly doubled its food subsidies, and the government immediately respond they recognized that the demand is for significant political transformation. The minister of Youth MoncefBelkhayat posted calling on the protestors to use negotiation instead, as he posted a long speech saying: "my position and opinion as citizen of Moroccan who live in Casablanca, and not in Paris or Barcelona, is that this movement is today operated and influenced by Polisario, with the aim of producing and generating a street conflicts that will deteriorate the policy and situation of our state in the United Nations concerning the human right position in the Sahara", as was claimed by the communication minister Khalid Naciri on his Facebook that: since a long time ago Morocco has launched an irreparable procedure of democracy and broadening of open and public rights and liberties" (Lalami, 2011).

All through the monarch has remained silent, until 9<sup>th</sup> March just 17 days from the starting of the event the Monarch Mohammad VI responded to the demonstrators' requests, and he assured far-ranging constitutional amendment, and a liberated judiciary, improved rule of law, and a nominated government that manifests the will of the citizen. Immediately a board appointed by the king to outline constitutional transformations. And there was national ballot approving on 1<sup>st</sup> July 2011; according to the interior minister, 95.5% of electorates preferred the change. As it happened the election was held in November and legislative vote brought a new rule to power, ruled by a moderate Islamist-oriented party which named the party of Justice and Development (PJD). This party had not before taking any position as a leader in parliament (Lawrence, 2016).

### **3.3 20<sup>th</sup> February movement: Actors and their choices**

Initially, a group basically containing student and graduates' unemployment led a series of protests around the country. And was succeeded by Moroccans living abroad (Allilou, 2014). Unlike other demonstrative that was organized by regional trade union or political parties at the first stage, February movement gained attention through the youth's students' effort, there were discussing about Arab Uprising in other countries on social media by young Arab, this encouraged Moroccans Young people to organized their protests out of the support or backing of political parties or any association. They called for a demonstration to protest against the old constitution, and request a change in government, and the end to corruption, and new structure. The young people were not officially associated with conventional political parties, even though far along they were supported by one of Moroccan's oldest Human right organization (AMDH). As in Morocco politics is actual personally related with the older generation, with corruption and system of government which young citizen do battle with and dispersed massively. (Brouwer& Bartels, 2014). All these reasons made the youth to be liberated demonstrators, requesting for right and freedom, social justice, dignity, physical and authentic democracy, and equality, they tried to make their claimed and needed concentrates on the topics that are connected to an international human right dialogue. Using the outline of these new global standings that Moroccan's young people were protesting for showed that they banned and refused old meanings of typical politics, and at the same time they frustrating to get contact to discussions of the global public. It means the stated lethargic politically unaware youth appeared to have rolled out, this was one of incredible shock and revelation (Balleria, 2011) what has become a core prospect and opportunity of the public movement is this participation of young people who were not thought to be politically dynamic, effective, or aware.

Nevertheless, the independent youth was not only the organizers of the movement, there were an involvement and support of Berber movement, different political parties, labor union and Marxist group. Morocco's mainly co-opted, aging political parties, and Party of Justice and Development (PJD) which is one of Islamists party remained silent, so they didn't join and the distanced themselves from the young movement. But the biggest Islamist party (*Al-adlWalhisaan*) means the Justice and Charity group (JCH) which established by Sheikh Yassine surely joined the movement. This organization was forbidden organization which has been criticizing the system of Morocco's government for a long time (Brouwer& Bartels, 2014).

### **3.4 Social media and 20<sup>th</sup> February movement**

Just like others, the movement which has been Moroccan's Arab Spring organized on Facebook dialogue among youth activities under the online sign "democratic and freedom now" the video which showed on Facebook was arranged by youth decide to activate people for the big demonstration against Makhzen on 20<sup>th</sup> of February, in the video they asked women, men, youth and old to elucidate why they want rise their voices in this first video one of the young activities was saying that another video was sustained needed to reach a larger community "to find new people who were willing to show their faces on camera was not easy" he narrated, as they had practiced; a large number of disparagement and security and opposing protest after the first video was showed. For example young royalties had blowout a gossips on the internet saying that the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement was critical of the King, motivating fear among all public. The young activities emphasized that their effort and battle was not against the King, they have no problem or issues with him, but they are against the some officials and powerful groups of authorities around the King, so the so-called Makhzen. They confirmed that the King is not the focus, he is not the topic for the 20<sup>th</sup> February.

The Arab uprising in Morocco which known as movement of 20<sup>th</sup> February was young demonstrative on some issues inside the regime; and they sustained their skirmish by setting up several digital platform, Face book pages, You tube, and Twitter accounts, to update people about their claims and activities that they were designing to form. For example, the opened the website *“Mamfakinch”* ‘meaning we will not give up’, to informed people in Arabic, English, French, Berber, and somewhat in Spanish about the news of the Movement and protest, and to gather artefact on struggle. Various online news site were set up in Arabic, English, French and Etc. site that publish acute articles on the regime, debating and discussing the corruption apparent in dominant political and judiciary institutions. (Brouwer& Bartels, 2014).

### **3.5 Political landscape before the movement**

Historically, Political situation of Morocco was obvious by a political clash between monarchy and the left’s political organizations. The political system of the country was conquered by massive political tyranny throughout 1970s. Up until the early 1990s (Jadidi& Cohen, 2006). As usual since post-colonial era the hereditary downward political system in post-colonial countries affected political system of most African and Arab nations. Also Moroccan political influence was condensed to the control of the constitutional monarchy, in 1956 Morocco attained independence after being under French protectorate for more than 40 years, while the northern third of the state including Western Sahara was under Spain control. Muhammad VI became a King and founded a constitutional monarchy in which he sustained almost total influence. Muhammad V ruled until when he dead in 1961, from that time His son Hassan II, started his Tyrannical rule for three decade, supplant by a substantial democratic novelties during 1990s. So the reign of King Hassan who is best known as the monarch during a long period of regime despotism labeled highlighted wide ranging political domination, which

caused illegal imprisonment of government opponents, including cruelty human right abuse, and the forced withdrawal of many political opposition all from 1960s through 1980s.

He represented new constitution which was adopted by a national ballot in 1962 the constitution gave the king all control, because it made him as the crucial superior symbol of the regime (Denoeux, 2011) During His rule Morocco adopted five constitution, so it means prior to Arab uprisings five constitution had introduced in the country, and all of them entered into force of under King Hassan's control; which were in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1992 and 1996. However, there was some democratic innovations 1992 and 1996 constitutions, as it was announced the economy and social council, constitutional council, and stronger fundamental. But the legitimate structure of all five constitution characterized a significant apparatus for the King to practice and use his tyrannical control over the states. So it means all constitution allowed the king approximately absolute control, as the Article 19 granted him both spiritual and secular power; he was both the commander of the faithful "Ameerul- Mumineen", and the head of state, the supreme representative of the nation (Biagi, 2014).

The processes of political liberalization that King Hassan left behind had extended when Muhammad VI assumed the country's throne in 1999, during his first administration he announced a reasonably political and social amendments, with the launch of the IER. He has a planned to liberalize Morocco right from the beginning, so because of that has made a number of principal improvements, we can mention the three most important and needed official and influential programs which are the creation of firstly: the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) to investigate human right abuses from post-independence which was from 1956 till 1999. Primary work of IER is to address violations which happened within the year of lead

*"Zaman al Rusas"*, a time of political instability, political abuse, and stark government suppression starting in the 1960s and ending in 1980s. Secondly: the reform of the country's family law which known as *"Moudawana"*, the main target of Moudawana reform is to develop and improve the right of woman in the country. Thirdly: fighting radical Islamic idea that create terrorism act. The mean aim of fighting against religious extremism is to make sure that the country stable democracy, as studied by many intellectuals that terrorism presents a huge challenge to democracy, particularly within Middle East and North Africa. These three recognized amendments are crucial to the country's probable transition to a democratic government, as the three discourse previous human right violation, and substances the country cruelty, therefore for approving resolution and the instituting of trust in the authorities of the state.

Furthermore, advance woman's right and give her legality to contribution in the country's public, social and political life (John, 2010). So it seemed that Morocco has make an attempt to three accomplishment that showed the country transition from a monarchy to a democratic state. Which is why the demand of the 2011 revolution castrate on the continuation and fulfilment of the democratic process that has been started since 1990s. Because this 1990s democratic transition seemed to be in log jam up until revolution of 2011, when demonstrations erupted and swept through North Africa and Middle East (Monjib, 2011), possibly there were two major causes which made the democratic process of 1990s in Morocco slow, and the amendment was not applied until 2011 on 9<sup>th</sup> March when Muhammad VI declared his intention to fulfilled and complete the commitment of 1990s reforms which is international constitutional amendments. Firstly: cause products from the point that the new constitution approval didn't materialized an importance for the most important parties characterized in the parliament; literally, these important parties regarded this constitution reform of 1996 to

be reasonable and adequate, and what required the improvement and change was not, on the contrary exercises; acquiescence with the constitution was all that was required. Secondly, this was more imperative which the reason developed from the point that there was not any consequence and relevance for doing this constitution reforms of 1886 or implementing new one by monarch, since there was not any political tension toward. Hence, Moroccan history has confirmed that democratic amendments are only apply and arrange when the political parties, the military, the international community, or the population put the kingdom under the serious unrest, disturbance, and pressure (Biagi, 2014).

### **3.6 Socio-economy situation before the movement**

The situation of Moroccan economy speedily declined immediately after the country attained independence in 1956, before speedily recover in 1980s. This early economic deteriorate can be surely connected to King Mohammad V's and his son Hassan II's Moroccanization of the economy. As previously noted, under their governance ruling was stabilized around the kingdom, and the country diverged towards import replacement and the nationalization of most industries, additionally, Morocco has short colonial period; from 1912 to 1956, the country's shorter colonial era led to fewer of infrastructural investment by the French and Spanish. These occasioning calamity almost bankrupt the country (Steven J, 2010). As a result, the country fell through a lot of Economic problem which include a massive of external debt, rate of an unemployment conventionally approximate at 25%, population increment, two-third of whom are under the age of 25<sup>th</sup>, and continual shortage and divergence's years. Searching for economic opportunities made many Moroccans were absconding to Europe (Campbell, 2003). The imbalanced wealth distribution that exited under the regime of colonial only became worst under Hassan Iis' regime. While deprived Moroccans collected not as much of what they collected under the colonialism, the poorer people 10%

decreased from 3.3% to 1.2% of total feeding and utilization of the most huge of the country's wealth was now change the owner from the colonial French elite to the elite of Morocco, this worst economic and political condition led two unsuccessful coup attempts.

From 1981 to 1983 the country fell into economic contradiction, Moroccan's GDP recorded a decline rate of 19 to 17%, in 1983 the GDP rate of 1983 was 0.3%, this caused widespread anger and blowup across the state occasionally from 1981 to 1983, numerous brutal demonstrations resulting in hundreds of deaths. These terrible economic circumstances required King Hassan to efficaciously change course in order to win debt relief from foreign financiers, as he realized that his control was threatened by ongoing turmoil, this foreign forgiveness which will decrease external funds forced the country to reform its enormous foreign debt load, in exchanging for foreign relief and reforming the World Bank's demand from the country was a new track that will lead to success. So according to this agreement the country made several wide-ranging economic adjustments in 1983. However at the first time the policy result was negative, which caused another uncountable unrest, but in less than one year Moroccan economy started to improve, it means that the reform of Moroccan economy resulted in one of the most rapidest economic amendments in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

During the late 1980s to early 1990s, external exchanging getting advanced on a reliable source, indicating that the country started off developing its exports quicker than its imports. As anticipated the inflation has reduced, floating at a more equitable 6 percent in the second half of the 1980s and ahead. This agreement the country economy improved 4% to 6% growth rate in GDP throughout the 1980s. The achievement marked the first time a kingdom of Africa was capable really to accomplish the economic progress plan rate reported in each four-year master plan of economy (Steven J, 2010).



Just like Tunisia in 1990s Morocco was ranked among the highest in the North Africa in dealings of economic development, because the 1983 economic adjustments the economy of Morocco has been accomplishment accurately especially in the last period of the King Hassan regime, as in 1996 the real DGP growth of the country was about 12.4. It sound all the struggle were attributed to the country's economic development, but it was uncertain whether these achievement go much further. Expected that the owners of largest landowner are the royal family, and much of Morocco business enterprises is under their control, and the own Omnium Nord Africa, accurate privatization of state-owned enterprises and greater access to domestic market for foreign cooperation is questionable. The strategy of using Economic price policy along with state contract and state land for maintenances also to nominate opposition, has similarly obstruct capability of the state to completely implement the SAPS. The black market in the economy of Morocco is expected to be rated \$3billion, as it may be basically 50 percent of the country economy. The drugs dealer is probable to be \$2billion per annum. This both action have reduced the SAP achievements fairly, on the other hand they have also established challenging because foreign investor hesitate at the regime's failure to take action, handle and treat the drugs dealers and black market. Regardless of the economic adjustment the debt of the country didn't decreasing, and it benefit minor percentage of the population in metropolitan area, while societies were surely poorer by cause of reluctance of the government to mobilize the needed resources to treaty with the chronic deficiencies or failure to provide employments for the teaming Moroccans educated youth, and the high gap between rich and poor was growing. The country economic inaction has resulted the increment of illegal migration to Europe through the Passages of Gibraltar (Campbell, 2003).

Among the new King Muhammad VI early administration was to concentrate on the development of the country economy. The King has fabricated into new surviving area, like subcontracting and exotic and luxurious tourism. This is one of his extraordinary struggle in the 21<sup>th</sup> century (Steven J, 2010). Tourism has long existed as Moroccan's essential sector, so as early as the opening of 20<sup>th</sup> century the country was became tourism terminus for French speaking countries. Currently, Moroccan's government has been recognized this sector as one of five importance and significance sectors for Morocco to progress. Certainly, the country has uncountable natural benefits that situation it in good health to participate in tourism. The benefits contain a vastly varied landscape with wide mountain ranges, shoreline, forestry, enormously enjoyable and lovely climate, and extensive knowledge of French and Spanish among the population, making the country a natural vacation destination for the resident of France and Spain (Porter, 2018).

Mohammad VI struggle to restructure and develop tourism sector of Morocco have taken worldwide honor, and his struggle to develop and enlarge into language-specific offshoring earn equivalent honor, admiration and analysis. Based on his economic plan of 2006 the king allotted state assets for the improvement of the offshoring sector in Morocco. Just one year later through 2007 the country has lucratively interested approximately half of French-speaking call centers and uncountable Spanish-speaking call centers. Morocco had about 200 call centers in 2007, with 30 of meaningful size that employ a total of over 18,000 people. Is not only this various language offers plans made the country to be an attractive destination for such offshoring, but also because of the advanced of its telecommunication infrastructure and its relatively affordable of labor pool (Steven J, 2010). There was a plan by the government of Morocco which is known as Vision 2010, this plan connected to the private sector in 2001 to operate as an agenda for the tourism sector up to 2010, and to agree the country tourism collection to

compare effectively with other tourism collection in Mediterranean states, specifically with Turkey, Tunisia and Egypt. The ambition of the strategy was to attract 10 Million tourist by 2010, compared to 4.4 Million in 2001, establishing 600, 000 fresh jobs compared to a complete effective population in 2006 of 11.3 Million, producing 48 billion Euros incomes over the period of 2002-2010, compared to annual incomes in 2001 of less than 3 billion Euros, and growing the compering facility to 230, 000 beds, compared, compared to 97,000 in 2001(Porter, 2018). So in order to attract 10 Million tourists in the year 2010 the king is insisently pushing the increase and multiplication of available hotels and alternative standards, This plan to attract 10 million tourism in the 2010 was about to achieve, because the country's tourisms 2008 figure are up to 8 Million, while the figure of 2009 were up approximately 20% from 2008. It mean Moroccan economy has developed prior to Arab Spring, as we have seen all these economic development was in tourism alone, while other sectors such as trade, agriculture, foreign direct investment, and etc. have positively maintain the increment of the rate of the country economic growth, in 2007 Moroccan real GDP growth rate was 7.6%, Morocco manage to growth its economy even in 2009, when most of the countries in the world suffered from GDP reduction with over 4. 2% granted. The aggressive goal to the planned role of the tourism sector in strategy of the state to decrease the joblessness and poverty level produce employment chances, and increase the level of economic growth. So the vision 2010 goal to characterize 20% of the national GDP in 2010, while the real GDP in 2010 was 3.8% (Porter, 2018).

In the context of the perspective of the above study one could realistically argue that why all this struggle that Moroccan government organized and some of the goals was achieved, didn't help the government to avoid the popular unrest of 2011? The unrest resulted from lack of standard political reform, the government decelerating with the democratic amendment let it

lost its struggle, and hustle for the development of the country. And most of the aim didn't achieved, because lack of significant amendment of democracy let the outside development organization and trade partner like the World Bank and European Union stop supporting the growth of many new sectors. Means lack of democracy was the main reason of the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement as it was shouting on the street.

### **3.7 The political parties and oppositions prior to the movement**

Throughout the émigré time in 1953 to 1955, it was the persistence of Maulay Hassan to Monarch Mohammad that manipulated the émigré's leader not to create any compromise with the colonial rule. So in 1955 the Sidi Muhammad returned from émigré and required the country's independence and his return to the throne. After gaining the independence in 1956 and returning to the throne in 1957, he assigned his son Maulay Hassan head of the future and expected national army in the same year 1957, after he was appointed as the formal heir to the throne. Sultan Muhammad dead in 1961, when the king dead the battle of the country's control sustained between the Monarchy and the previous nationalist of independent party "*Hizb al Istiqlal*", the two Morocco's dominant foundations that had overpowered and defeated any discussion of Morocco's post-independence period. As Maulay Hassan became a King he delimited himself with the same expert political leader who worked under his father. The new king abounded independent party who were the nationalist champion, and he did not have the same captivation as his father. These two issues affected the new Monarch relation with people and Moroccans' political parties in the beginning of his regime, and also he didn't establish any new policy. However, he followed the system and ideologies applied by King Muhammad V (Cross, 2017). Both Muhammad V and his son Hassan II scientifically influenced Morocco's political landscape. Because political culture of Morocco is built on patron-client system, so it made it easy for

monarch to use conflict-ridden in order to implement break up inside political parties. This confirmed that within this support method the king remained a dominant character and that even those parties with a surviving patron and system remained reliant on the king. Also it offered King Hassan II the politically knowledge with the trappings to produce political arena for developing leaders who didn't find a place in older parties, so appointing them. Consequently, despotic monarch leading a collection of weak and destroy political parties, as it successfully defeated the independence party immediately after their struggling together to bring the end of protectorate, instead of ruling together as they join hand in the struggle of freedom, the king struggled to establish himself as a head actor on political extent (Boussid, 2009). So all these showed that before the election of parliament in 1997, the political panorama in Morocco was basically controlled by pro-monarchical parties, which have been unsuccessful in opposing political structure. In the outcome of these votes, Hassan the second hand over the government control to the Socialist Union of popular forces (USFP) which was the previous opposition party, that won 57 seats out of 309 seats lower house 18%. This was seen as a boosting and positive move into significant political amendment. Resultantly, political parties eventually be more dynamic and have hunted improved political autonomy. The political parties occupy the country in an official and recognized policy inside the background of restricted votes that give a chance to challenge the hegemonic ascendancy of the kingdom.

Even though primary confidence, the panorama continue disintegrated, with 33 political parties contending for political supremacy inside restricted political scope. The 2007 parliamentary election proved the disintegrated panorama, and overall vote unconcern 37% vote attendance specifies an inadequacy of mutual trust in the political gentry. However, Moroccan elections in 1990s unrestricted like in the past, but before the revolution of

2011 they are still structured and controlled by the government. As indicated by some 50 political official and parties members in Morocco that the reign's rituals of authority prevent any organization and deployment of sustenance and encouragement for political parties. This ritual of control are: commander of faithful, Bai'a, and prophetic Ancestry's Baraka, that are virtually invaluable to digressive permeation (Daadaoui, 2010). These made political parties in Morocco face an incredible trial in activating and organizing the citizens in opposition to the reign, which circles the kingdom beyond any political tournaments.

### **3.8 Non-governmental organization prior to the movement**

Just like in Tunisia, Non State actors have faced bullying by government since pre- and post-independence era, especially when the political power was totally under the control of monarch, as Known that the system of royal power hate any attempt that will create tension on it, so any association that will try to come close to the throne with the intention of demanding citizen freedom will face public policy and official limitation. So in that era NGOs encounter equally restrictions on the freedom of expression and the freedom of association, along with institutional restriction, such as the absence of liberation in jurisdictive system and the deficiency of financial support (Jacob, 2013) . So in early 1960s when there was an internal difference between the monarch and the state bureaucracy mostly the security agencies and part coup attempt the regime acted to create a robust post-colonial state, using force, conditional democracy and bargaining, meanwhile from that period to early 1970s were consequently considered by weak associational life and by an absence agreements. James N. Sater (2011) argues that in the period of both pre- and post-colonial the realm of the community scope didn't subsist as the associations of Non-state actor, because they were not able to successfully challenge the power of the state

and sufficiently and effectively interpret and talk social demands into public issue (p.160).

But during the last decades that was in the late 1980s when King Hassan has begun to soften the hard position of the country toward ostensibly mutineer associations, the previous civil society's sector in the country, specifically political movement non-governmental organization (NGOs) has experienced an enormous development. As well, from when the King Hassan II decided in 1980s to select a government containing of previous opposition parties, independence party (Hizbulistiqlal) and Socialist Union Popular forces (USFP), civil society has seen a great increasing activities. In Morocco Non-state organizations have become even more increases in active. When Muhammad VI ascended to the throne in 25 July 1999 upon the death of his father that was the time of the existing NGO's role in policy-making, civil society organizations have become more active, enjoying a freedom in their movement that the country have seen before (Sater,2007). The significant reform from 1999 to 2008 assured that prior to Arab Spring Morocco's NGOs have achieve many of their goals, these achievements are definitely incredible, as it showed the world the good relation between the regime and the country's Non-governmental organizations which didn't allowed them to join the youth and play their role in the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement as it was occurred in Tunisia

### **3.9 The military prior to the movement**

Unlike Tunisia, while president Bourgiba urgent tasks after gaining independence was keeping military away from politics, and concentrate in declining their power, the King Mohammad V's crucial missions after attaining the independence was establishing a specialized expert, and loyal military. As monarch he was commander-in-chief of the Military and his son

was appointed by him as a supreme chief of Royal Moroccan army (RMA) staff. King Mohammad in early stage had to undertake intra-government discussions over the construction and finance of the new force, because he determined such political hindrances and provide frequent inaccuracy and leadership in mounting and rising the country's military formation, Muhammad VI is considered by the military of Morocco as its creator. And after his short time of leading he left Hassan II an active, practical military force under royal control that had obviously described military and civil public work assignment. The creation of loyal military save King Hassan to escape two attempt of coup, as a result of this failed coup attempt which was involved by his minister of defense, the King absolutely improved the RMA and exchanged most of senior officer in the force. The fresh new RMA construction approved the King to have much superior oversight of military activities but also guaranteed loyalty rather than power resolute which officers received and engaged important projects. (Abdelhak, 2000).

After the attempt of coup, the kingdom attentive on loyalty above all other things from the senior officers it employed to run the Royal Moroccan army and the security services. When king Hassan die the new king after he made a number of long needed change, he focused on loyalty all of them they make sure they surround by their reliable interior circle, sensibly chosen to confirm that no coup attempt again, especially the new king time that the rise of Islamist movements has increased that was from late 1990s. Since the succession of Muhammad VI he made sure a main improvement ensue, there has been continuously a major engagement to develop housing for Royal Moroccan military member, with advanced housing allowances, as well as the provision of on-base military housing, they get a good amount of social, and medical welfares, that increase in rank and time in service, there are other welfares offered for RMA member which are housing rations, education for dependent relative, health services for families, retirement



welfares, and their training for military to civilian transition. These welfares endure to make military attractive for Moroccans, and create loyalty to between them and their leaders.

Moroccans view military service in positive bright, not only because of the welfares it affords to the members and their families, but also for rank given those military service, military is also seen as one of the supreme terms of loyalty, offering the means to serve both state and king (Mohammed, 2009).

### **3.10 Structure of the social classes before the movement**

Moroccan Social structure comprise of tribe people are not familiar for their worth, importance, knowledge. Donation and Etc. but for their ethnic distinctiveness; to which big and powerful family they belong. The social structure involves the group and categorization of dominant family collections as follows:

- A. (**9ouyad**) governors 'families: this made of the governors of Sultan in the regions who exercised a lot of control and have power over these provinces pitilessly. This collection also include the military chief who racket the population in the name of Sultan work and consider this to be honor of their occupation and rank.
- B. (**Makhzen**) government and official families: habitually these families were under sultan services and his regime as civil servant or political, or pecuniary or military consultants. These families were living in the palace zone because the king could need them any time.
- C. (**Tujjar**) these are merchants' families: these families controlled industry, business and commerce with European and had stable instruments in

London, Paris, and Madrid, they also owned financial institutions, trade posts, and ships. They had money, power, and the partnership with European, so in short they had control and had open door to the Sultan.

D. (**Amghar**) these are Berber tribal chiefs families:

These are the lords of Amazigh tribes, very influential and attractive enigmatic. They are generally speaking, they were elected by the different five circles this social institutions, for one of two purposes: based on land, capital and water right ownership and principled origin, meaning ancestry from a family of religious scholars and hence, they are extensively valued and respected by all Moroccans' tribes (Chtauo, 2016).

These family classes were signified to historical documentations by the word "**Khassa**" which means special, so it means these family are special citizenries; as a result of their power, wealth, closeness to Makhzen and religious authority. So it mean in this analysis just two classes in general, the Khassa who are the special people have four categories and then we have rank and file who were called utterly (**3ammah or Aammah**) which means common or ordinary people, those citizens are who followed and obeyed. So it means two main social class is Khassa and Aammah means Saints and servants (Ensel, 1999). Means that if you are from this Aammah whatever you can be doesn't mean anything, you can a doctor, engineer, academist in any rank even professor or else, but if you are only servant "**Aammah**", you can be of no use to the populace at enormous. Because In primordial Morocco, the Khassa were dominant and rich, as they were known as **Ahlihlaalwaliqlaal**, literally those who are maker of decision, and solvers of all problems. In Morocco's' Modern-day nothing has change in that respect, because the Khassa maintain their power and influence as before. Consequently, in outlook Morocco continued patriarchal and

ancestral notwithstanding of the layer of transformation, advance and modernization, by degree that is true of most of the Arab world too not only Morocco, which is why the introduction of the Arab Spring is the outcome of this blatant social irregularity, and so is the revival of the **Salafist** activities the cliques angry and poor people **Aammah** population. Not only Morocco, all Arab countries will remain undemocratic and clannish as long as they don't identify people by their value and merit, but by their ancestry, wealth and position. (Chtauo, 2016).

### **3.11 The processes of democratization today**

All the previous talking about Morocco being enthralled in a process of democratization, limited significant action have taken prior to Arab Spring to backup demand. As it was discussed above if we realized the monarch takes socio-economic advancement more important than political advancement, as it was revealed in his all activities he prioritized the development of socio-economic over political reform, probable, on the core of a progression of reflections that include: the disinclination of kingdom to deprive itself of key authorization in the section of fundamental decision-making; the demand to adjust authoritative electorates opposite to authentic democratization, cynicism toward the political parties and delegate ability institutes to accomplish and achieve better ranks in contest, concern of that liberal powers would help strangely from political opening, and help that the public will judge the kingdom largely on its power to motive development, produce job and decreased poverty. All proof from these time of report period of reportage from January 2006 to 2010, advocate that the kingdom continue indecisive at greatest regarding the amendment that will moderate its extortionate influence. With the movement of prodemocracy protest that erupted in 2011 and overthrow the regime in Tunisia n some days, Morocco's basically delayed process of reform was return. As mention above on 205<sup>th</sup> February 2011 tens of thousands Moroccan came out

took part calling for change, the protest brought together a large-scale of aspects from broad-minded and independents to socialist and associate of the restricted Islamist party justice and charity movement, none of them demand or aim to the changing of the government, they just call for an authentic constitutional monarchy, the suspension of legislature, and the removal of Prime Minister Abbas El-Fassi his many kinsfolks in position of senior government, as well as complete cabinet. In rejoinder (Denoeux, 2011).

On 9 March 2011 under the cause of practicing the procedure of an advanced regionalization structure, and with no comment on the movement of February King Mohammad VI proclaimed an authentic decision in which he assured seven vital element on which the constitutional reform was to be constructed on:

1. Reassurance of the institution regarding good authority, defense of liberty and human rights.
2. Strengthening of the role of political parties within a structure of pluralities, and bolstering of the task of legislature opposition and non-state actors organizations.
3. Strengthen of the fundamental of the separation of control through the handover of new control to legislature, the position as Prime Minister of an adherent of party, attaining the hugest number of ballot in election and the buttressing of the Prime Minister's position as the president of the decision-making office.
4. Supporting an instruments projected to assurance ethical reliability in communal life to esteem accountable manner within municipal office.
5. Strengthening of the rule of law, the advancement and development of opportunity of basic rights, and promise of their practice.
6. Intensify the neutrality of the judiciary, and support of authority of the constitutional council.

7. The country's individuality, as well as the Amazigh constituent.

Just one day after the delivering of his discussion that was on 10 March 2011, he employed an ad hoc body, the advisory commission of constitutional amendment, which was alleged with a mission to formulating a new draft constitution (Biagi, 2014).

The country adopted another new constitution in 2011, which was assembled by consultative body that work in combining with the commission of professionals. The extraordinarily named "accompanying mechanism" was also led by an advisor to king, Muhammad Mo'taseem, and worked as association between political parties and the constitution drafters, human rights organization, businessmen association, labour union, youth organizations, and other groups or even entities involved in having feedback in the new constitution. Regardless of the restricted edges conference and contribution obligatory on the preparing of the constitution, the development was doubtless one exposed than former ones (Ottaway, 2011). The review of the constitution spent three-months on the order of the monarch after the movement calling for constitutional amendment erupted the African kingdom in February. In Friday night of 17 June 2011 King Muhammad proclaimed a chains of constitutional reforms, in his statement he said he will turn to the North African country into a constitutional monarchy. The new constitution promotes the Prime Minister to the president of the government, and confirms he is chosen from the parity that received the most ballots in polls instead than just selected by the monarch. Mohammad VI said: "the constitutional amendment verifies the structures and instruments of the parliamentary nature of Moroccan political system, and arranged the source for an effective reasonable constitutional system whose basic components are equilibrium liberation and separation of power, and whose notable aim is the independence and formality of the citizenries (CBA news, 2011).

There is a huge improvement in the new constitution, because it brought a new formula that limits the monarch's control. He can't select any Prime Minister he want like before; but he must respect voting outcome and name the government president as the Prime minister is now mention from the party, that receive the highest ballots. The monarch will no longer involve in and control over the meeting of the cabinet. Reasonably, it is the government president who now control over the renamed government council. Certainly the constitution extends the control of the parliament, give it chance to permit laws on most matters; it grosses stages headed for defending freedom of judiciary; and it growths the role of numerous commissions' freedoms. This was the first time in Moroccan's world record to have an incredible constitution that have improvement like this, but the only and important thing that this constitution obviously fail to do was reducing the control of the monarch. Because the new constitution reserves three main area for the monarch's high-class sphere; main tactical policy selections, securities matters and religious, as the article sanctified him as highest religious authority in morocco, in accumulation, he will remain the supreme commander of the army, so he is head of intermediary among political forces. It means the King still have controls over the cabinet, when tactical policy decisions and securities matters are at prize. Since the new constitution doesn't evidently incantation out what would establish evaluation, it seems that the choice if up to the monarch himself. His place as intermediary also gives him the control to evaluate in most vital subjects (Ottaway, 2011).

On 25<sup>th</sup> November 2011 the first parliament election since the adopting of new constitution was held in the country there were more than 300 international witnesses who observed and examined the polling, together with 3,500 Moroccan's witnesses. The moderate Islamist justice and

development party (PJD) have more vote (Smith-Spar CNN, 2011), as it was announced by interior Ministry the PJD took 107 out of 395 seats, while the nationalist Istiqlal party came second with 60 seats (BBC,2011). The country's moderate Islamist party Justice and development is likely to be moderated than all Islamist party, as it is more moderated than the Islamist who won power in Tunisia, or the Turkish's ruling justice and development party (Spar CNN, 2011). In Moroccan's second election since it adopted constitutional amendment in 2011, the governing party won again, unlike Tunisia; in 2006 the ruling party justice and development party PJD have won parliamentary election with 90% polls counted they have 99 seats making them ahead of their rival, whereas the opposite party Authenticity and modernity (PAM) the second largest party in the parliamentary election with 88 seats, and this time Istiqlal became third with 31 seats out of 395-seats parliament (BBC,20016).

So a part from some obstacles, this reform treasures liberal and more freedom to elected officials and the judiciary. It approves gender equality, and even produces an organization that is meant to manage the authentic application of gender equality. It also improved the position of Tamazight, the language of Amazigh to become the second language of the country next to Arabic. The King in this manner formed a strong motivation to two vital populations, which are woman and Amazigh people, to enhance and support not only new constitution but also his station as patron of these liberal standards. This because in idiom of ingredient, the monarch's position as Commander of the Faithful stands integral (Sater, 2011). There is improvement that will never be overlook in this new constitution, as we can see now in article 6 " the law is the supreme expression of will of the nation. All physical or moral person, and including the public power, are equal before it and held submit themselves to it. The public power work for creation of the condition

permitting the effectiveness of liberty *and* equality of citizen (*feminine*) *and* (*masculine*) citizens to be made general as well as their participation in political, economic, cultural and social life..”(Chtauo, 2016). So this law eradicate the khassa and Aammah diversity, and all these is not only written in Morocco but also work in practice. The non-state actors also perceived abundant transformation after the movement calling for change activity. At the early stage of the popular revolution of the morocco country have about 14, 966 civil servant Groups that are working in many places, mostly human right who was neglected in 1970s to 1080s. Also entirely civil organizations have presently restored their burdens in the development of inclusive political construction as main acquaintances as acclaimed by the allowed tranquility. Additional, morocco is the only country in Arab world that always response to the public demand as early as possible, and do expertly what the citizens request for, this made the country be consider as one of the most liberal of all fascistic system in North Africa and the Middle East.



## **CONCLUSION**

### **Tunisian's and Moroccan's upheavals comparative analysis:**

The uprising in these two selected countries shared many similarities and differences. Both revolutions have similar root reasons; from all indication, the upheavals originate from socio-economic and political injustices, as it was cleared that during the Uprisings people in the Middle East and North Africa were going through nothing less than a political transformation, and socio economic change. And both of the protests use of graduate's youth unemployed, as we have seen in all two upheavals the frustration among unemployed youth spilled out into the street by the beginning of 2011. And the using of social media has appeared in all two upheavals, social media supports were used to encourage the reason of the upheavals. Both protests have happened in peaceful characters, the violence was avoided in the two upheavals, the youth tried their best and adopted diplomatic movement, they behave well in meaningful manner, and they didn't devastate any government's properties. This peaceful

nature of the demonstrative contributed a lot to the outcome of both upheaval.

The post uprising election in both countries won by moderate Islamist parties: this is another interesting similarity, the moderate Islamist party (Ennahdha) won parliamentary election in the post uprising election which occurred on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2011, the same scenario occurs in Morocco the November 2011 parliamentary elections and won by moderate Islamist movements the justice and development party (PJD), both moderate Islamist parties have not played leadership role in both Parliaments before.

As the thesis has observed the similarities in the selected countries' Upheaval, were also detected differences, unions, political parties, moderate Islamist party movement and military in both countries acted in a different way, the Tunisia's' upheaval seemed to be a united upheaval, because it was supported by all of the political parties including Moderate Islamist party, and all of the civil society organizations, and their role in Tunisia's revolution was meaningful and resulted of the positive political change. But in Morocco aging political parties, moderate Islamist Party, and many organizations have distanced their selves from the youth movement. Both countries have different demands; as we have seen in the style of the 2011 upheaval in republics was different from monarchy, the protestor in the republic demanded the overthrow of the regime that cannot be changed for too long, but in Monarchies they only need constitutional reform in the regime,. The response of the regime in both countries are different, however the 20<sup>th</sup> February movement has not frankly requested for the removal of Mohammad VI from his office or for the ending of the kingdom that will make the regime take strong action, but still the way the security apparatus involved was softer far away from the its counterpart Tunisia. The winners in the second elections in both

countries made the system to be different. In the subsequent elections of 2014 the Nida secular party overtook *Ennahdha* in a parliamentary election, while in Morocco the election of 2016 was won by the same party (PJD).

The main and attracted difference between the two upheavals was their aftermath. In Tunisia the upheaval was able to provide a relatively successful transition to democracy, but in Morocco it wasn't. Why the aftermath of the upheaval differed in Tunisia and Morocco? Firstly: The land mass and population size facilitated the ability to compare both of the countries, Morocco is larger than Tunisia from a land area and population, Tunisia is about 3 and half times smaller than Morocco from population, and by land area Tunisia is about 28 times smaller than Morocco. So Morocco's larger size has created trouble to political government that surely have had economic impact, as well as the conflict of Western Sahara. Tunisia has escaped such distress. Secondly: The absence of Ottoman policies and common colonial and pro-independence government configuration as was discussed above can also simplify both countries' political modernization. Tunisia was colonized in 1880 and gained independence in 1956 with the elected government of Bourguiba. While Morocco was colonized from 1912 to 1956 with the returning of the Sidi Mohammad V as the King, this also can led Morocco to the less knowledge and practices on western form of democracy. Thirdly: The regime ritual of power impedes any enrolment of upkeep for political stability and growing, Tunisia avoids all these rituals. Fourthly: Tunisia has meaningful challenge to the regime, because there is political stability in Tunisia right from time, though there was no political freedom, but there was not changing face in the country, Tunisia has never change from liberalization to strong dictatorship, it has only one style which was dictatorship political, the constitution of Tunisia since post-independence witnessed only changing of name, while Moroccan constitution was

changed 9 times prior to Arab Spring. So political instability, and deficiency of reasonable encounter to rule, are the backbone of the Moroccan democracy.

From the accessible literature, the incident of Arab Spring were caused by numerous circumstances, among them was economic and political grumbles (Behr, 2011). Though the grumbles various among countries and therefore the incident of each state was stand on their own internet background (Toby, 2012). So thinking that the Arab Spring failed to achieve the aim is unfair, although some post-revolution Arab countries were still far away from democratization (Rina&Tanja 2014), the progress of this two nations of Maghreb will never be overlooked, however the upheavals proffer dissimilar outcome, but on the outward, Tunisia and Morocco seem to be the Maghreb nations that have bright future in post-Arab Spring, because Tunisia, the country that has been the birthplace place of the Arab Spring presented enormous anticipation of the occurrence of democratic modification in the Middle East and North Africa (Joffe 2011). The Tunisian political transition has appeared to be successful immediately after the catastrophe of Arab uprising on 23<sup>rd</sup> October 2011, the transitional vote was held and the Tunisian largest Islamist group, which activates as the major opposition faction during the despotic ruling known as *Ennahdha* won the majority of the seats (Boubakri, 2015). The Nida Tunis (Tunis calls) party which was considered as a secularist party won the second top amount of the seats. This first election of the country of a Muslim society after some years of the overthrown Zine El Abidine Ben Ali elucidate the greatest expressive substantiation of the possibility of achieving an extensive political and democratic process in the country. And getting the second democratically elected government on 26<sup>th</sup> October 2014 affirmed the democratic transition of the country. In the second election, the Nida secular party overtook *Ennahdha* due to the failure in the national conference between

Ennahdha and oppositions, and the Nida Tunis won popular parliamentary seats, and Ennahdha became the second largest party (Koprulu 2015). At the first time Tunisia elections have confirmed that the political democratic process is possible to be achieved, and then the country's new constitution showed the beginning of democracy has knocked the door of the country (Mary E., 2014). Only the behaviors of Ennahdha Islamist party in both elections gave the answer of developing democratic government in the Arab world. The means Tunisia has become the first country where the Arab Spring emerges has become the first country that reached to democratic transition in the Arab world since the existent of the social upheavals.

The Moroccan process of democratization, which is known as "third way" process of change (Ottaway 2012), is the amendment of the old constitution which was the demand of the demonstrators in 2011, the urgent respond of the protestors request help to calm the protests without completely changing of the political life, because in the following month of the protest which known as Moroccan's February 20<sup>th</sup> democracy movement the king declared a constitutional amendment, the amended constitution's main purpose was to approve elected bodies by reducing the power of the king. In the new reformed constitution's approach, the prime minister is the chief of the executive branch. The introduction of this constitution reiterates the dedication of the country to invariably acknowledged human rights and recognized the language of Berber Amazigh as the countries second language following Arabic. This new Constitution, of course, is the process of democratization, as it is the most liberal constitution that the country has witnessed, which is the way to succeed in bringing more steadiness in the political life in little time (Dr. Gallala-aendt 2012).

However these events of 2011 didn't achieve social revolution because all of the available information assured that the Arab Spring is political revolution. In concern of the explanation of social revolution by Skocpol (1979) as "Rapid basic transformation of a society's state and class structure that are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolt from below", so the Arab Spring especially in the selected countries are not social revolution. The fact that Skocpol was separated between social and political revolution. Revelation from bellow that changes both structure of country and structure of class is what Skocpol named as social revolution. The revolution has changed only the structure of country not structure of social is a political revolution. Hence the Tunisian revolution could be considered as a political revolution since it only changed the structure of the government and not the structure of social class. In Morocco, also the revolution can be named as political revolution since it change limited structure of the government. In other countries like in Egypt the revolution also can be titled as political revolution since it changed the structure of the government in short time before the old system rematerialized through Military and democratic coup. In Jorden just like Morocco, However Syria and Libya the revolution was neither political nor social ass the countries embarked into civil war.

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