black hat USA 2018

AUGUST 4-9, 2018 MANDALAY BAY / LAS VEGAS

Detecting Malicious Cloud Account Behavior: A Look at the New Native Platform Capabilities

@bradgeesaman

🕈 #BHUSA / @BLACK HAT EVENTS

Bio

Previously

- Network Security Engineer
- Penetration Tester/Security Consultant

Past 8+ Years

- Cloud Infrastructure Administrator
- "DevOps" practitioner *
- Ethical Hacking Educator
 - CTF Scenario design
 - Running CTF competition workloads inside public clouds using containers **

Past Two Years

- Researching Cloud Security Issues with Containers and Container Orchestrators
 - Hacking and Hardening Kubernetes Clusters by Example: https://youtu.be/vTgQLzeBfRU
- Independent Consulting Securing Containers and Kubernetes

Twitter: @bradgeesaman

* Sorry ** Not recommended. It seemed like a good idea then.



...usage of data, resources, workloads, and APIs inside a public cloud environment.

This Talk is Aimed at

Attackers



How malicious activity is being detected with the latest services enabled.

Defenders



Know more about cloud-specific attack indicators and how to gain better visibility of that activity.

Business Leaders



Understand the cloud-specific threat landscape, the cloud shared responsibility model, and where to focus detection efforts.

Security Architects/Ops/Builders



How and when to best leverage their cloud provider's security service offerings.

Roadmap

Cloud Detection Challenges and Example Scenario

- Differences from Traditional Environments
- The Cloud Shared Responsibility Model
- The Cloud-Specific Attack Lifecycle
- Public Cloud Detection Data Sources
- Example Attack Scenario

The Latest "Native" Cloud Security Services

- Microsoft Azure Security Center
- Amazon GuardDuty (and CloudTrail) DEMO!
- Google Cloud Security Command Center


Key Takeaways

- Benefits of the New Capabilities
- Areas for Improvement
- Adoption Recommendations
- Parting Perspectives




What makes detecting malicious behavior in the cloud different from traditional environments?

Cloud Environments Change Fundamental Assumptions




Pace of Innovation Leaves A Wake




Understanding the responsibility boundary

AWS Shared Responsibility Model




https://aws.amazon.com/mp/scenarios/security/malware

AWS Shared Responsibility Model (Adapted)




Adapted from https://aws.amazon.com/mp/scenarios/security/malware/

Shared Responsibility Model - Customer's View



Adapted from https://aws.amazon.com/mp/scenarios/security/malware/

Shared Responsibility Model - Cloud Provider's View




Adapted from https://aws.amazon.com/mp/scenarios/security/malware/


Protecting those shared APIs are challenging and nuanced, but very necessary.

What does an attack lifecycle look like in a cloud environment?

Traditional Attack Path/Lifecycle (Simplified)



Cloud Attack Path/Lifecycle (Adapted)



Escalation, Enumeration, Persistence, Covering Tracks

Escalation

• <u>https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/</u>

Enumeration/Exploration

• <u>https://danielgrzelak.com/exploring-an-aws-account-after-pwning-it-ff629c2aae3</u> <u>9</u>

Persistence

• <u>https://danielgrzelak.com/backdooring-an-aws-account-da007d36f8f9</u>

Covering Tracks

• <u>https://danielgrzelak.com/disrupting-aws-logging-a42e437d6594</u>

* Concepts apply to all cloud providers

What detection methods are available?

Cloud Account Behavior Data Detection Sources*

Network

- Activity to/from known-bad IPs
- Unusual changes to traffic patterns
- Unusual outbound port usage

DNS

 Queries to known-bad domains (CnC, bots, malware, crypto-mining, etc) or embed data in the lookup

Host-based

- OS, Application, Security/Audit logs
- Endpoint security events

Network-Device based

• FW/IDS/IPS "drop-in" solution logs/alerts

Cloud Provider API Activity

- Multiple failed logins
- Simultaneous API access from different countries
- Attempted activity from terminated accounts/credentials/keys
- Uncommon service/API usage
- Credential/permission enumeration
- Changes to user accounts/logging/detection configurations
- Sensitive changes to user permissions
- Internal IAM credentials used from external sources

Service Access Logs

• Web/User Access logs

Cloud Account Behavior Data Detection Sources*

Network

- Activity to/from known-bad IPs
- Unusual changes to traffic patterns
- Unusual outbound port usage

DNS

 Queries to known-bad domains (CnC, bots, malware, crypto-mining, etc) or embed data in the lookup

Host-based

- OS, Application, Security/Audit logs
- Endpoint security events

Network-Device based

• FW/IDS/IPS "drop-in" solution logs/alerts

Cloud Provider API Activity

- Multiple failed logins
- Simultaneous API access from different countries
- Attempted activity from terminated accounts/credentials/keys
- Uncommon service/API usage
- Credential/permission enumeration
- Changes to user accounts/logging/detection configurations
- Sensitive changes to user permissions
- Internal IAM credentials used from external sources

Service Access Logs

• Web/User Access logs

* Not an exhaustive list.

Example Attack Walkthrough


An Electric Car Manufacturer

Exposed Kubernetes Dashboard

- Kubernetes Cluster on AWS
- Installed CPU-throttled **crypto-mining** workers
- Tight integration with AWS Access Keys led to **S3 data exfiltration**
- Masked their sources behind a CDN

Not Alone

• Multiple other Companies had the same issue



http://fortune.com/2018/02/20/tesla-hack-amazon-cloud-cryptocurrency-mining/

An Electric Car Manufacturer

Possible Detection Methods

- Instance IAM credentials usage from a non-cloud instance
- **DNS logs** of malware/crypto-mining software
- Dashboard Application Logs
- Netflow Logs of Docker image download
- Netflow Logs of reports into mining pool

| ≡ kubernetes | Workloads | | | | | + CREA |
|-------------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|---------|--|-------------|
| Admin Namespaces | CPU usage history | | Memory usage history | | | |
| Nodes Persistent Volumes | 0.045 0.040 2 0.030 | \sim | 751 Mi 668 Mi 501 Mi | | | - |
| Namespace kube-system 🍷 | (s 0.030 0.020 0.010 15:01 15:03 15:06 | 15:10 15:13 15:15 | 5 334 Mi 167 Mi 15:01 | 15:03 | 15:06 15:10 | 15:13 15:15 |
| Workloads | | Time | | | Time | |
| Deployments Replica Sets | Deployments | | | | | |
| Replication Controllers | Name | Labels | Pods | Age | Images | |
| Daemon Sets 👸 Pet Sets Jobs | heapster-v1.1.0 | k8s-app: heapster kubernetes.io/cluster-service: version: v1.1.0 | 1/1 | a month | eu.gcr.io/google_containers eu.gcr.io/google_containers | : |
| Pods | Skubernetes-dashboard | app: kubernetes-dashboard | 3/3 | 21 days | eu.gcr.io/google_containers | : |
| Services and discovery | | | | | | |
| Services | Replica sets | | | | | |
| Ingress | Name | Labels | Pods | Age | Images | |
| Storage Persistent Volume Claims | heapster-v1.1.0-2533923641 | k8s-app: heapster pod-template-hash: 2533923 | 0/0 | a month | eu.gcr.io/google_containers eu.gcr.io/google_containers | : |

http://fortune.com/2018/02/20/tesla-hack-amazon-cloud-cryptocurrency-mining/

Note: A Direct Compromise May Not Be Needed

Credential theft

- Phishing
- Malware
- Backdoored libraries/tools
- Password guessing/weak passwords

Malicious Outsiders

- Compromise of 3rd Party Services with integrated access
 - Source Control
 - CI/CD
 - Mail Delivery
- Failure to disable, delete, rotate credentials post termination

Credential Leaks

- Checked into source code
- Technical support tickets
- Public Q&A Tech
 Help chat/forums
- Applications transmit keys in headers, messages, or logs of API calls

The Latest "Native" Cloud Security Services

Services In Scope




aws



Microsoft Azure Security Center, Advanced Threat Protection AWS GuardDuty (and CloudTrail, CloudWatch) Google Cloud Security Command Center

Service Launch Dates



Very Recently Released

Questions Asked During This Review

- What **data sources** do they use?
- How do they operate on that data?
- What **visibility** does that data provide?
- What is **not covered** in the service?
- What is needed for onboarding?
- What's the **cost** structure?
- How does it **integrate** with other internal services and partners?
- How accessible are these services to **customization**?
- How do you validate the detection capabilities?

Different Questions for Different Roles

Attackers



 What methods and tactics need to change to remain undetected?

Defenders

- What can be covered?
- What still isn't covered?

Business Leaders

- What's my exposure?
- What's the ROI?

Security Architects/Ops/Builders



- How does this change my infrastructure design?
- What do I no longer have to build?

Azure Security Center



Azure Security Center



- Released
 - Initial Fall 2015
 - Generally Available Spring/Summer 2016
 - Advanced Threat Detection Summer 2017

Description

- Azure Security Center provides **unified security management** and advanced threat protection **across hybrid cloud workloads**. With Security Center, you can apply security policies across your workloads, limit your exposure to threats, and detect and respond to attacks.
- Cost: \$15/system/month

Links and Documentation

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/

Key Features



Unified / Hybrid Security Dashboard

• Common **Windows-style management experience** in the cloud and on-premise in a single place.

Security Recommendation Engine

• Suggests **security hygiene** items to address proactively. Offers customizable policy (XML) for user-supplied checks.

Microsoft Provided Agent

• OS, Application, Security/Audit logs, missing patches, weak configurations and more supplement network-based detections. Can be automatically enabled for all VMs.

Key Features (Cont'd)



Third-Party Security Tool Integration Marketplace

• **Centrally integrate** your choice of multiple security endpoint solutions, host-based vulnerability management agents, and network-security devices with a few clicks and some license keys.

Custom Alert Rules

• Custom queries on all log event types to trigger **notification alerts**.

File Integrity Monitoring (Preview)


• Validates the integrity of Windows files, Windows registry, and Linux files

REST API

• Integration with your existing security systems and workflows for inserting and pulling events.

Detection Data Sources






Microsoft Agent Operating Systems

- Windows Server (of course)
- Amazon Linux 2012.09 --> 2017
- CentOS Linux 5,6, and 7
- Oracle Linux 5,6, and 7
- Red Hat Enterprise Linux Server 5,6 and 7
- Debian GNU/Linux 6, 7, 8, and 9
- Ubuntu 12.04, 14.04, 16.04 LTS
- SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 11/ 12

Simplified Architecture





https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities

Detections



Threat Intelligence

- Outbound communication to a malicious IP address/Domains
- Threat intelligence monitoring and signal sharing across all their services


Behavioral Analytics

- Suspicious process execution: models processes behaviors and **monitors process executions** to detect outliers
- Hidden malware and exploitation attempts: **memory analysis, crash dump analysis**
- Lateral movement and internal reconnaissance: monitors process and **login activities** such as remote command execution network probing, and **account enumeration**
- Malicious PowerShell Scripts: inspects **PowerShell activity** for evidence of suspicious activity
- Outgoing attacks: take part in brute force, scanning, DDoS, and Spam sending campaigns


Anomaly Detection


• Inbound RDP/SSH brute force attacks

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security-center/security-center-detection-capabilities



Policy & compliance





Agent Reports Missing Patches

| RESOURCE | SEVERITY |
|-------------------------|----------|
| ? 1 subscription | 0 High |
| <+> default | 0 High |
| 2 VMs & computers | 🔺 Medium |
| 2 virtual machines | A Medium |



Apply system updates

T Filter



Critical updates 20 Security updates


7

□ ×


| NAME | NO. OF VMS | UPDATE SEVERITY | STATE | |
|--|------------|-----------------|-------|--|
| RHSA-2018:1453-01 dhclient_12:4.2.5-68.el7_5.1 security update Critical | 1 | Critical | Open | |
| RHSA-2018:1453-01 dhcp-common_12:4.2.5-68.el7_5.1 security update Critical | 1 | Critical | Open | |
| RHSA-2018:1453-01 dhcp-libs_12:4.2.5-68.el7_5.1 security update Critical | 1 | Critical | Open | |
| 2018-07 Security Monthly Quality Rollup for Windows Server 2012 R2 for x64 | 1 | Important | Open | |
| 2018-07 Security and Quality Rollup for .NET Framework 3.5, 4.5.2, 4.6, 4.6.1, 4 | . 1 | Important | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:2771-01 emacs-filesystem_1:24.3-20.el7_4 security update Important | 1 | Important | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:3075-01 wget_0:1.14-15.el7_4.1 security update Important | 1 | Important | Open | |
| RHSA-2018:1700-01 procps-ng_0:3.3.10-17.el7_5.2 security update Important | 1 | Important | Open | |
| RHSA-2018:2181-01 gnupg2_0:2.0.22-5.el7_5 security update Important | 1 | Important | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:1860-01 libtasn1_0:4.10-1.el7 security update Moderate | 1 | Moderate | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:1865-01 libX11-common_0:1.6.5-1.el7 security update Moderate | 1 | Moderate | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:1865-01 libX11_0:1.6.5-1.el7 security update Moderate | 1 | Moderate | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:1865-01 libxcb_0:1.12-1.el7 security update Moderate | 1 | Moderate | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:2285-02 authconfig_0:6.2.8-30.el7 security update Moderate | 1 | Moderate | Open | |
| RHSA-2017:2292-01 gnutls_0:3.3.26-9.el7 security update Moderate | 1 | Moderate | Open | |
| | | | | |



Agent Reports Missing Patches



All Agent Logs are Searchable



Value Added



Hybrid-first approach

• Leverages the vast amount of **enterprise management features** and capabilities applied to Azure resources.

Provides a Microsoft-supported Windows/Linux Agent

• Supported OSes get enhanced detection capabilities (logs, process monitoring, crash dump analysis)

Integrated, Self-Service Partner Marketplace

• Adding a solution is a few clicks and a license away in many cases.

Leverages the Azure Log Analytics Service

• Mature integrations, advanced querying, and **full-featured REST API**

Areas for Improvement



Areas for Improvement

- A detailed list of anomalous detection capabilities is not yet available.
- Ability to **tune detection** parameters.
- Potential delay from agent deployment to it reporting in the Dashboard.
- The ability to supply custom threat/IP feeds to aid in improving detection accuracy.

Amazon GuardDuty et al



Amazon GuardDuty et al



Released

- AWS CloudTrail: Spring 2013
- AWS VPC Flow Logs: Summer 2015
- Amazon GuardDuty: Winter 2017

Description

- Amazon GuardDuty offers threat detection that enables you to continuously monitor and protect your AWS accounts and workloads.
- 30-day free trial.
- North America: \$0.25-\$1 per GB of VPC/DNS, \$4 per 1M Cloudtrail Events

Links and Documentation

• https://aws.amazon.com/guardduty/

Key Features

aws

Watches Data Streams

• AWS CloudTrail Events, Amazon VPC Flow Logs, and DNS Logs.

Integrates Threat Intelligence Feeds and Machine Learning

- Feeds with **known malicious IP addresses and domains**.
- Environment specific baselining.
- You can supply your **own IP lists** for "good" and "bad" hosts.

Generates Findings

• Creation action creates CloudWatch events useful for triggering Lambda functions for further processing and sending notifications.

Cross-Account Visibility

• **Events can be centralized** across multiple "member" accounts to a centralized "master" account.

How CloudTrail Works

Amazon CloudTrail









CloudTrail records a CloudTrail Event



You can view/download your activity in the CloudTrail Event History




You can set up CloudTrail and define an Amazon S3 bucket for storage A log of CloudTrail Events is delivered to an S3 bucket and optionally to CloudWatch Logs and CloudWatch Events

How GuardDuty Works

aws

Amazon GuardDuty



Enable GuardDuty

With a few clicks in the console, monitor all your AWS accounts without additional security software or infrastructure to deploy or manage

Continuously analyze

Automatically analyze network and account activity at scale, providing broad, continuous monitoring of your AWS accounts

Intelligently detect threats

GuardDuty combines managed rule-sets, threat intelligence from AWS Security and 3rd party intelligence partners, anomaly detection, and ML to intelligently detect malicious or unauthorized behavior

Take action

Review detailed findings in the console, integrate into event management or workflow systems, or trigger AWS Lambda for automated remediation or prevention

Detections

aws

"Threat Purposes" (Types of Findings)

- **Backdoor** Compromised AWS resource contacting its **C&C** server.
- **Behavior** Activity patterns that are different from the established baseline.
- **Cryptocurrency** Detecting software that is associated with **cryptocurrencies**.
- **Pentest** Potential attack activity generated by known **pen testing tools**.
- **Persistence** An IAM user is **behaving differently** from the established baseline.
- **Recon** Reconnaissance attack underway probing ports, listing users, database tables, etc.
- **Resource Consumption** An IAM user is **behaving differently from the established baseline** to create new resources, such as EC2 instances.
- **Stealth** Detects attacks leveraging an **anonymizing** proxy server, disguising the true nature of the activity.
- **Trojan** Malicious activity associated with certain **Trojan applications**.
- Unauthorized Access A suspicious activity pattern by an unauthorized individual.

https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types.html

Count

Created at

07-24-2018 12:30:38 (24 minutes ago)

3

| | | Finding type | Resource | * | Last seen | Count |
|------|------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|----------------|-------|
| | Δ | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 25 minutes ago | 2 |
| | 0 | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0a726a2dd140c4458 | | 28 minutes ago | 3 |
| | 0 | Recon:EC2/PortProbeUnprotectedPort | Instance: i-0b5717b9ffbbc8af5 | | 29 minutes ago | 2 |
| | Δ | Trojan:EC2/DNSDataExfiltration | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours ago | 3 |
| | | Recon:EC2/Portscan | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours ago | 1 |
| | Δ | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/SSHBruteForce | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours ago | 1 |
| | 0 | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/SSHBruteForce | Instance: i-0b95fbcf4a9d4d2a6 | | 2 hours ago | 1 |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |
| 1? # | 4 IF | | | | | |
| | | | | | | |



| EC2 instance i-0e074acf904a90a45 is attempting to query domain names that resemble exfiltrated data. This could be an indication of a compromised instance. 🗹 |
|---|
| |

| Severity |
|------------------|
| High Q Q |
| Account ID |
| 203960472692 Q Q |
| Updated at |

07-24-2018 12:30:38 (24 minutes ago)

| - | Resource | affected |
|---|----------|----------|
|---|----------|----------|

| Resource role | Resource type |
|--------------------------|--|
| TARGET @ Q | Instance ପୁ ପ୍ |
| Instance ID | Instance type |
| i-0e074acf904a90a45 ගු ල | m4.large |
| Instance state running | Availability zone us-east-1b |
| Image ID | Image description |
| ami-428aa838 Q Q | Amazon Linux 2 LTS Candidate AMI 2017.12.0.20180115 x86_64 HVM GP2 |
| Launch time | |

Region

us-east-1

Resource ID

i-0e074acf904a90a45



| | Dashboard | | | | | | aws | | | |
|----|--------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------|----------------|----------------|-----|----------------|-------|--|
| | T. Add filte | r criteria | | | | | | | | |
| | | Finding type | Resource | - | Last seen | Count | | | 7 | |
| | | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 25 minutes ago | 2 | | | | |
| | 0 | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0a726a2dd140c4458 | | 28 minutes ago | 3 | | | | |
| Ac | ld filter | criteria | | | | | | | | |
| | | Finding type | | Res | ource | | * | Last seen | Count | |
| | Δ | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBrute | Force | Insta | ance: i-0e07 | 74acf904a90a45 | | 25 minutes ago | 2 | |
| | 0 | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBrute | Force | Insta | ance: i-0a72 | 26a2dd140c4458 | | 28 minutes ago | 3 | |
| | 0 | Recon:EC2/PortProbeUnprotectedF | fort | Insta | ance: i-0b5 | 717b9ffbbc8af5 | | 29 minutes ago | 2 | |
| | Δ | Trojan:EC2/DNSDataExfiltration | | Insta | ance: i-0e07 | 74acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours ago | 3 | |
| | | Recon:EC2/Portscan | | Insta | ance: i-0e07 | 74acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours ago | 1 | |
| | Δ | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/SSHBrute | Force | Insta | ance: i-0e07 | 74acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours ago | 1 | |
|) | 0 | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/SSHBrute | Force | Insta | ance: i-0b9 | 5fbcf4a9d4d2a6 | | 2 hours ago | 1 | |
| | | | | | | | | | | |

| ✓ Resource affected | |
|-------------------------|--|
| Resource role | Resource type |
| TARGET Q Q | Instance QQ |
| Instance ID | Instance type |
| i-0e074acf904a90a45 @ @ | m4.large |
| Instance state | Availability zone |
| running | us-east-1b |
| Image ID | Image description |
| ami-428aa838 Q Q | Amazon Linux 2 LTS Candidate AMI 2017.12.0.20180115 x86_64 HVM GP2 |
| Launch time | |

Dashboard - Finding

| 🔨 Ad | ld filter | criteria | | | | |
|------|-----------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|----------------|-------|
| | | Finding type | Resource | * | Last seen | Count |
| | Δ | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 25 minutes ago | 2 |
| | 0 | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0a726a2dd140c4458 | | 28 minutes ago | 3 |
| | 0 | Recon:EC2/PortProbeUnprotectedPort | Instance: i-0b5717b9ffbbc8af5 | | 29 minutes ago | 2 |
| | Δ | Troian: FC2/DNSDataEvfiltration | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 2 hours and | 3 |



Trojan:EC2/DNSDataExfiltration @Q

Finding ID: dcb266906b1db8d2078d8a84f9618c5f

EC2 instance i-0e074acf904a90a45 is attempting to query domain names that resemble exfiltrated data. This could be an indication of a compromised instance.

| Severity | | Region | Count | |
|----------|------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|--|
| l | High 🔍 🔍 | us-east-1 | 49 | |
| l | Account ID | Resource ID | Created at | |
| l | 203960472692 🧕 🤤 | i-0e074acf904a90a45 | 07-24-2018 09:30:38 (15 days ago) | |
| | | | | |

Updated at

07-24-2018 09:30:38 (15 days ago)

| _ | Resource role | Resource type | |
|---|-------------------------|--|--|
| | TARGET Q Q | Instance Q Q | |
| | | | |
| | Instance ID | Instance type | |
| | i-0e074acf904a90a45 Q Q | m4.large | |
| | | | |
| | Instance state | Availability zone | |
| | running | us-east-1b | |
| | | | |
| | Image ID | Image description | |
| | ami-428aa838 @ Q | Amazon Linux 2 LTS Candidate AMI 2017.12.0.20180115 x86_64 HVM GP2 | |
| | | | |
| | Launch time | | |
| | | | |

Dashboard - Finding

| ▼ Add fil | ilter criteria | | | | dvvs |
|-------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|
| 0 | Finding type | Resource | Last seen | Count | |
| | UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | 25 minutes ago | 2 | |
| n C | | Instance: i-0a726a2dd140c4458 | 28 minutes ago | 3 | |
| Ċ. | Resource affected | 1 | | | |
| R | Resource role | | | | Resource type |
| T | TARGET 👲 🗨 | | | | Instance 🗨 Q |
| I | nstance ID | | | | Instance type |
| i- | -0e074acf904a90a45 @ Q | | | | m4.large |
| lı | nstance state | | | | Availability zone |
| | unning | | | | us-east-1b |
| h h | mage ID | | | | Image description |
| 19 11 a | ami-428aa838 | | | | Amazon Linux 2 LTS Candidate AMI |
| L | aunch time | | | | |
| | 07-24-2018 08:09:52 | | | | |
| | nstance profile | | | | |
| A | Arn: arn:aws:iam::2039604726 | 92:instance-profile/Testing-R | edTeamInstance | Profile-1CLL | BJXV6IRTW |
| | D: AIPAI3XTYTDHAAFC56CJK | | | | |

Dashboard - Finding

| 🐺 Add filter criteria | Dashbo | bard | - FI | nding | aws |
|---|-------------------------------|----------|---|---|------------------------------|
| Finding type | Resource | * | Last seen | Count | |
| UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0e074acf904a90a45 | | 25 minutes ago | 2 | |
| UnauthorizedAccess:EC2/RDPBruteForce | Instance: i-0a726a2dd140c4458 | | 28 minutes ago | 3 | |
| - Action | | | | | |
| ction type | | | | Protoc | col |
| DNS_REQUEST @ Q | | | | 0 | |
| llocked | | | | First s | een |
| alse | | | | 07-24- | -2018 08:18:28 (15 days ago) |
| ast seen | | | | | |
| 7-24-2018 08:18:28 (15 days ago) | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| | | | | | |
| - Actor | | | | | |
| Domain | | | | | |
| qhbrenpjyobgcbvgighmcmbwyfo9dwaf | fxmqmx5cwcb1besgb | s252n3gc | cydo | €€ | |
| Image ID ami-428aa838 Q Q Launch time | | | description In Linux 2 LTS Candidate | 2 AMI 2017.12.0.20180115 x86_64 HVM GP2 | |

Demo!



Rhino Security Labs - Cloud Goat (Slightly Modified)

Safe, practice environment for learning how to collect keys, move laterally, escalate privileges, and more.

• Blog

https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cloudgoat-vulnerable-design-aws-envi ronment/

• Code

https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/cloudgoat

Demo!



Attack Path Steps

- 1. Server-Side Request Forgery to steal EC2 IAM instance credentials
- 2. Enumerate API access unsuccessfully
- 3. Escalate to Administrator using attach-role-policy
- 4. Enumerate API access successfully
- 5. Find and exfiltrate PII from an S3 bucket
- 6. Add a permanent Administrative user
- 7. Cover our tracks
- 8. Review the IAM, Cloudtrail, and GuardDuty logs/alerts

Value Added



Zero-Impact Setup

• Nearly a "one-click" installation process.

Clear Listing of GuardDuty Detections

• You know what AWS is monitoring for you.

Broad Partner Ecosystem

• Many options to choose from in many different areas of security, not just detection.

Detects Multiple Forms of API Misuse

• Several key detections for behaviors associated with compromised credentials.

Areas for Improvement



Areas for Improvement

- Ability to **tune** parameters for all settings and detections
- Ability to add **custom detections** into the native analytics engine/flow
- API ability to create **custom findings**, not just view them.
- **Unified security dashboard** and workflow for all AWS Security services
 - AWS Config
 - AWS Inspector
 - AWS CloudTrail
 - AWS GuardDuty

Google Cloud Security Command Center



Google Cloud Security Command Center

Released

- Google StackDriver: Spring 2016
- Google Cloud VPC Flow logs: Spring 2018
- Google Cloud Security Command Center (Alpha): Spring 2018

Description

• The Cloud Security Command Center (Cloud SCC) is the canonical security and data risk database for Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Cloud SCC enables you to **understand your security and data attack surface** by providing asset inventory, discovery, search, and management.

Links and Documentation

https://cloud.google.com/security-command-center/

Key Features



Asset Discovery/Inventory

• Across App Engine, Compute Engine, Cloud Storage, and Cloud Datastore

Anomaly Detection

- Identifies threats like **botnets**, **cryptocurrency** mining, anomalous reboots, and **suspicious network traffic**.
- Cost: Unknown. Free during Alpha period.

Centralized Finding Dashboard

- Web application vulnerability scans Cloud Security Scanner
- Sensitive data on storage bucket scans DLP API
- Access control and policy scans Forseti
- All third party security solution findings/results

Key Features (Cont'd)




Real-Time Notifications

• Receive Cloud SCC alerts via Gmail, SMS, and Jira with Cloud Pub/Sub notification integration.

REST API

• Integration with your existing security systems and workflows.




Detections

As Listed but not Detailed

- Botnets
- Cryptocurrency mining
- Anomalous reboots
- Suspicious/anomalous network traffic







| Security Comman | nd Center 🚛 | 0 | Security Comman | nd Center 🥑 | ALPHA | | |
|-------------------------------|-------------|-----|-----------------|-------------|----------|------------|----|
| DASHBOARD | ASSET INVE | | | | | | |
| Assets | | 10 | DASHBOARD | ASSET II | NVENTORY | | FI |
| Туре | New | | | | | | |
| ORGANIZATION | 0 | 100 | | | | | |
| PROJECT | 0 | 5.5 | Assets | | | 1 day - | |
| APPLICATION | 0 | | | | | | |
| SERVICE | 0 | Ø | Туре | New | Deleted | Totai | |
| ADDRESS | 0 | | ORGANIZATION | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| DISK | 0 | 0 | ORGANIZATION | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| FIREWALL | 0 | · · | DOO ISOT | | | 10 | |
| GLOBAL_ADDRESS | 0 | æ | PROJECT | 0 | 0 | 18 | |
| INSTANCE | 0 | ~ | APPLICATION | 0 | 0 | | |
| INSTANCE_GROUP | 0 | | APPLICATION | U | 0 | ▶ 6 | |
| NETWORK | 0 | | ormaor | 0 | 0 | 7 | |
| ROUTE | 0 | | SERVICE | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| SSL_CERTIFICATE | 0 | | ADDRESS | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| SUBNETWORK | 0 | | ADDRESS | U | 0 | 1 | |
| CLUSTER | 0 | | DISK | 0 | 0 | 12 | |
| GLUSTER | 0 | | DISK | U | 0 | 12 | |
| \rightarrow View all assets | | | FIREWALL | 0 | 0 | 52 | |
| | | | FIREWALL | u | 0 | 92 | |
| | | | GLOBAL_ADDRESS | 0 | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | GLOBAL_ADDRESS | U | 0 | 1 | |
| | | | INSTANCE | 0 | 0 | 12 | |
| | | | ING IMPLE | v | 0 | 12 | |
| | | | INSTANCE_GROUP | 0 | 0 | 2 | |

0





| 52 | DASHBOARD | ASSET INVE |
|----|-------------------|------------|
| | Assets | |
| 1 | Туре | New |
| 0 | ORGANIZATION | 0 |
| | PROJECT | 0 |
| ۲ | APPLICATION | 0 |
| | SERVICE | 0 |
| | ADDRESS | 0 |
| | DISK | 0 |
| | FIREWALL | 0 |
| | GLOBAL_ADDRESS | 0 |
| | INSTANCE | 0 |
| | INSTANCE_GROUP | 0 |
| | NETWORK | 0 |
| | ROUTE | 0 |
| | SSL_CERTIFICATE | 0 |
| | SUBNETWORK | 0 |
| | BUCKET | 0 |
| | CLUSTER | 0 |
| | → View all assets | |

Findings

S Findings Summary

292 total security findings for the organization

+5 More

| Source | Findings |
|------------------------|----------|
| Palo Alto Networks | 133 |
| Cloud Security Scanner | 96 |
| Crowdstrike | 11 |
| Redlock | 11 |
| Qualys | 10 |



| Findings (ALPHA) | | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------|--|-------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------|-------|
| DASHBOARD ASSE | T INVENTO | RY FINDINGS | | | | | | |
| View by Finding type Source type | | | | | | | Jul 25, 2018, 12:53:07 AM 👻 | Now |
| Q Search finding type | | = Filter by attributes, properties and marks | | | | | (| 0 111 |
| Item 🔨 | Count | attribute.result_type | attribute.asset_id | property.count | attribute.scan_run_timestamp | attribute.first_discovered | attribute.scanner_id | marks |
| ✓ All | | EMAIL_ADDRESS | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | 1 | Jul 25, 2018, 12:49:01 AM | Jul 25, 2018, 12:45:01 AM | DLP_SUMMARY_SCANNER | |
| EMAIL_ADDRESS | 1 | PHONE_NUMBER | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | 2 | Jul 25, 2018, 12:49:01 AM | Jul 25, 2018, 12:45:01 AM | DLP_SUMMARY_SCANNER | |
| PHONE_NUMBER | 1 | US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | 1 | Jul 25, 2018, 12:49:01 AM | Jul 25, 2018, 12:45:01 AM | DLP_SUMMARY_SCANNER | |
| US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER | 1 | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | |

| Findings (ALPHA) | | | | | | |
|----------------------|---|-------------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| DASHBOARD | TORY FINDINGS | | | | | |
| View by Finding type | s | | | | I 25, 2018, 12:53:07 AM ▼ No | |
| Item ^ | Filter by attributes, properties and mark | s | | | canner_id mar | |
| ✓ All | | | | | MARY_SCANNER | |
| EMAIL_ADDRESS | t attribute.result_type | attribute.asset_id | property.count | attribute.scan_run_timestamp | MARY_SCANNER | |
| PHONE_NUMBER | EMAIL_ADDRESS | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | 1 | Jul 25, 2018, 12:49:01 AM | MARY_SCANNER | |
| US_SOCIAL_SECURIT | 1 PHONE_NUMBER | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | 2 | Jul 25, 2018, 12:49:01 AM | | |
| | 1 US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | 1 | Jul 25, 2018, 12:49:01 AM | | |
| | | | | | | |

| Finding Details | | |
|---|--|--|
| Summary | | |
| Finding type US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER | First discovered Jul 25, 2018 12:45 AM (8 minutes ago) | Most recently seen Jul 25, 2018 12:49 AM (4 minutes ago) |
| Security marks | | |
| Attributes | | |
| Asset id | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii | |
| Configuration Id | bf32ed7a46ef88f385768ee87b816e6b5b9b5e893edc93ee8e0569 | 3be4d15a54 |
| First Discovered | July 25, 2018 at 12:45:01 AM UTC-4 | |
| d | 80fbe57de6ce511e0095a90d0a7f502f992dd8b9bb570f329a0f135 | i8806a6805 |
| Result Type | US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER | |
| Scan Run Id | projects/vulnerable-ssrf/dlpJobs/i-5405955858454632083 | |
| Scan Run Timestamp | July 25, 2018 at 12:49:01 AM UTC-4 | |
| Scanner Id | DLP_SUMMARY_SCANNER | |
| Update Time | July 25, 2018 at 12:48:56 AM UTC-4 | |
| Properties | | |
| Count | 1 | |



Dashboard

| Findinç | Finding Details | |
|---|---|--|
| Finding ty US_SOC | Summary | Most recently seen Jul 25, 2018 12:49 AM (4 minutes ago) |
| Security No marks Attribute Asset Id Configurat | Finding type US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER | 15a54 |
| First Disco Id Result Typ | Security marks | 16805 |
| Scan Run Scan Run Scanner Ic Update Tir | Attributes Asset Id | |
| Propertie Count | Configuration Id First Discovered | |
| | ld Result Type | |



Dashboard

| Finding Details | | |
|--------------------|------------------|--|
| Summary | | |
| Finding type | First discovered | Most recently seen |
| Security marks | | |
| No marks | | |
| Attributes | | |
| Asset Id | | vulnerable-ssrf/bucket/my-pii |
| Configuration Id | | bf32ed7a46ef88f385768ee87b816e6b5b9b5e893edc93ee8e05693be4d15a54 |
| First Discovered | | July 25, 2018 at 12:45:01 AM UTC-4 |
| Id | | 80fbe57de6ce511e0095a90d0a7f502f992dd8b9bb570f329a0f1358806a6805 |
| Result Type | | US_SOCIAL_SECURITY_NUMBER |
| Scan Run Id | | projects/vulnerable-ssrf/dlpJobs/i-5405955858454632083 |
| Scan Run Timestamp | | July 25, 2018 at 12:49:01 AM UTC-4 |
| Scanner Id | | DLP_SUMMARY_SCANNER |
| Update Time | | July 25, 2018 at 12:48:56 AM UTC-4 |
| Properties | | |

Value Added



Zero-Impact Setup

• Setup does not affect any running workflows.

Partner Focus

• The API and Interface feature partner solutions and integrate their output streams into a single management interface.

Framework-Oriented

• Similar to the Stackdriver logging service in that it's a framework for handling all security events across all applicable services.

Limitations and Suggestions

Limitations



- Still in Alpha, so anomalous detection capabilities are still in the early stages.
- Not yet a comprehensive or detailed list of detection capabilities.

Suggestions

- Ability to **tune** all settings and detections
- Ability to add **custom detections** into the native flow
- Integrated security detections for all managed GCP services
- Integrate **native notification and alerting** functionality

Key Takeaways and Looking Ahead

Common Areas for Improvement

Detections

- Visibility dependent on implementation
- Detection capability listings
- Customization / Tuning
- ML/AI in use, but how exactly?

Integrations

- Wide range of ease of integration
- A small selection of vendors that integrate natively into the new services.

Education

• Clearer guidelines needed.

Are the provider-native threat detection services all I need?

Should I Adopt These Services Now?

The Framework is Important

Wherever possible, avoid undifferentiated heavy lifting

Watch this space closely

Security solution vendors -- Take note

Additional Learning and Exploration

Cloud Goat - Rhino Security Labs

- <u>https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/cloudgoat</u>
- "Vulnerable by Design" AWS infrastructure setup and testing environment

FlAWS.Cloud - Scott Piper

• <u>http://flaws.cloud</u>

Detecting Credential Compromise in AWS - Will Bengston

• <u>https://www.blackhat.com/us-18/briefings.html#detecting-credential-compromi</u> se-in-aws

Cloud Security Trends Reports

- <u>https://info.redlock.io/cloud-security-trends-may2018</u>
- <u>https://start.paloaltonetworks.com/cloud-security-report-2018</u>

black hat USA 2018

AUGUST 4-9, 2018 MANDALAY BAY / LAS VEGAS

Thank you! Questions?

@bradgeesaman

🕈 #BHUSA / @BLACK HAT EVENTS