Signature Based Intrusion Detection Systems

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Intrusion Detection Systems

Detect malicious activities/attacks

- Hacking/ unauthorized access
- DOS attacks
- Virus/ Malware

Log events

• For Forensics and security auditing



React to attacks

- Disconnect attack channels
- Quarantine infected systems

Network IDSs

- Monitors and analyzes data packets on a network to look for suspicious activity
- Large scale servers can monitor backbone network links
- Small scale systems can monitor local routers/switches
- Two major approches
 - Signature based (this lecture)
 - Anomaly detection based

Signature Based IDS

Advantages

- Simple to implement
- Lightweight
- Low false positive rate
- High true positive rate for known attacks

Disadvantages

 Low detection rate for zero day attacks


Signature Based IDS

Key Challenges

• Packet analysis is major bottleneck

- How fast can signature string matching be done?
 - Exact string matching
 - Approximate string matching


Example




- One pass multi-string matching
 - Can find all occurrences of any number of keywords in a string, in ONE pass
- Constructs a finite state string pattern machine
- Construction of state machine proportional to sum of lengths of keywords
- FSM input: text string

- Naive approach
 - Assume keyword starts at byte 0 of payload, traverse trie
 - $\circ~$ If failed, start from byte 1 and traverse, etc
 - Worst case: L * h
 - L : length of payload
 - h : height of trie

- Aho-Corasick
 - Computes internal failure pointers and suffix pointers
 - Eliminates needs to backtrack and restart at top of trie every time
 - Complexity: O(len(payload) + #pattern occurrences)
 - assuming FSM is precomputed offline



- Keywords: {test, telephone, phone, elephant}
- Solid lines: Normal transitions
- Dotted lines: Failure transitions



Searched words: The, han, and, pork, port, pot, ha, e

- Fast one pass *single-string* matching
- Explicit character comparison at different alignments of keywords in payload
 - Keywords preprocessed
 - Skip as many alignments as possible
- Compare strings from END of keywords
- Usually very fast in practice
 - skips a large portion of characters
 - compared to Aho-Corasick which goes through whole string regardless

- Shifting through alignments
 - Start with last char in keyword
 - Match: continue
 - All match: word found in payload
 - Not match: does char exist in keyword?
 - Yes: shift to that char closest to current position
 - No: skip whole string
 - Continue




FIGURE 17.3 Integrated Boyer–Moore by shifting a character.


- Slide keywords along payload
- Match compare from END of keywords
 Example

- Concurrent multi-keyword comparisons
 - Trunc all keywords to length of shortest keyword
 - Build trie in reverse (start from end of truncated keywords)
 - so concurrent comparison only requires current packet char to index into trie node
 - On success: continue down trie
 - If at leaf, check if truncated characters match
 - For small number of strings, this generally performs better than Aho-Corasick in implementation
 - On failure: shift by precomputed amount in failure pointer

Performance


- In practice, Aho-Corasick and Boyer-Moore provides little performance improvement
 - Very little packets match a large number of strings/signatures
 - Naive method would generally also do well
 - More overhead due to code complexity
- However, large improvement for *worse-cast* traces
 - May be crucial from hardware perspective
- A lot of research in effort to enhance Aho-Corasick/Boyer-Moore to further improve performance

Snort



Source: Nalneesh Gaur, Snort: Planning IDS for your enterprise


Snort





Source: Rafeeq Ur Rehman, Intrusion Detection Systems with Snort: Advanced IDS Techniques with Snort, Apache, MySQL, PHP, and ACID


Snort - Detection Engine



Boyer-Moore works most efficiently when the search pattern consists of non-repeating sets of unique bytes.

e.g. in x86, avoid including 0x90 (NOP) in pattern to avoid repeated partial matches.

Snort - Rules



Source: Nalneesh Gaur, Snort: Planning IDS for your enterprise

- written in single line in snort config file
- created by known signatures
- rule (type) scanning order
 - Alert -> pass -> log



Questions?