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ABSTRACT

It is possible to approach, but not to achieve, the goal of perfection. To the three traditional philosophical values of truth, goodness, and beauty it is appropriate to append the important values of wisdom, humanness, and grace. Among the resources available toward the perfection of behavior are ethics, morality, and mores. The first chapter of this document introduces a structured approach to the subject of ethics, morality, and mores. Chapter 2 defines principal terms and chapter 3 gives reasons for the importance of ethics, morality, and mores. The fourth chapter discusses the content of the three subjects and synthesizes their concepts. Chapter 5 attempts to get at the dynamics of ethics and morality, while the sixth chapter provides a brief historical summary. Separately, the seventh chapter records various efforts to make the approach to ethics more scientific. Chapter 8 underlines the enjoyment of life, suggesting that the "good life" emphasizes the individual, "quality of life" emphasizes the group, and "proper life" emphasizes the culture. In the ninth chapter is a summary of conclusions about personal behavior, findings, understanding, and enjoyment. The book represents an attempt to combine technical accuracy with clarity of presentation. (SG)

Ethics, Morality, and Mores







ROYAL PURCELL

ETHICS, MORALITY, AND MORES

This book is an interesting and useful compendium and analysis of concepts pertaining to the subjects of its title -- *Ethics, Morality, and Mores.* It provides a stimulant to thinking about widely used and usually poorly defined terms. . . . The book should help readers be a little wiser about what they read or hear in the news media and in assessing their own viewpoints on behavior.

Lynton K. Caldwell, political and environmental scientist

Ethics, Morality, and Mores

Royal Purcell

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Dedicated to my wife

Frances Alice Purcell

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Acknowledgments

Special tribute is here given to authors and educators William S. Sahakian (1921-) and Lawrence Kohlberg (1927-). These two scholars have shown remarkable insight into their particular subjects and have presented their viewpoints deftly in their writings. Notably, Sahakian has highlighted the individual and Kohlberg has encompassed the social.

Sahakian's *Ethics: An Introduction to Theories and Problems* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, a Divison of Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), *History of Philosophy* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, a Division of Harper and Row, Publishers, 1968), and *Systems of Ethics and Value Theory* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963) provide clarification about the subject of ethics, fullness of knowledge about historical contributions to ethics, and clearness of presentation about ethical issues. A professor both of philosophy and of psychology, Sahakian has also written books dealing with psychology and social psychology. He has personally commented that "a joy of living is a concomitant of a sense of achievement and self-fulfillment."

On the subject of morality, the distinctive contributions by Kohlberg have been to amplify biologist-psychologist Jean Piaget's two stages of moral judgment into six stages of moral development and to probe interdisciplinarily the importance of moral judgment. Many results of Kohlberg's exemplary concentration and of his extensive research have been gathered into *The Philosophy of Moral Development, Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (San Francisco CA: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1981) and *The Psychology of Moral Development, The Nature and Validity of Morality Stages* (San Francisco CA: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1984).

Appreciation is here further expressed for use of the extensive holdings of the Indiana University library system and of the outstanding reference resources of the Monroe County Public Library located in Bloomington, Indiana. Grateful acknowledgment, moreover, is given on the next page for specific permissions to quote enlightening comments from many excellent writers about the subjects of ethics, morality, and mores.

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Preface

Perfection is an ideal goal which -- like all ideals -- can be approached yet never completely achieved. Here, beside the three traditional, philosophical values of truth, goodness, and beauty, the three important values of wisdom, humaneness, and grace are appended to fill six levels of perfection.

Among the resources available toward the perfection of behavior are ethics, morality, and mores (pronounced MOH-rays). Ethics here refers to the singular *who* of the individual person, morality to the plural *who* of a society, and mores to the *what* of a culture -- or a society's "way of life."

After a first chapter introducing the structured approach used here about the subjects of *Ethics, Morality, and Mores*, the second chapter presents definitions of principal terms. The third chapter gives reasons for the importance *(why)* of ethics, morality, and mores. The fourth chapter discusses the content *(what)* of the three subjects and synthesizes their technical concepts (or technical ideas). The fifth chapter attempts to get at the dynamics *(how)* of ethics and morality, while the sixth chapter provides a brief historical summary *(when)*.

Separately, the seventh chapter records various efforts to make the approach to ethics more scientific. The eighth chapter next individualizes the presentation by underlining the enjoyment of personal life, while suggesting that the "good life" emphasizes the individual, the "quality of life" emphasizes the group, and a "proper life" emphasizes the culture. The ninth chapter then continues the individual emphasis by summarizing conclusions about personal behavior, personal findings, personal understanding, and personal enjoyment.

The reader may choose to follow this procedure: (1) read the text casually to get an overall understanding, (2) glance through the tables subsequently for the structuring (outlining) of topics, (3) browse through the "footnotes" section separately for any notes that arouse personal interest, and finally (4) read each chapter carefully and reflectively, with quick reference both to tables and notes when mentioned in the text.

An attempt is made here to combine technical accuracy with clarity of presentation. The result, for the reader, can be better understanding of the content and relations of ethics, of morality, and of mores, along with wiser enjoyment of personal existence within a social group within the physical universe.

Royal Purcell

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Chapter 1

Perfection, Ethics, and You

Question: What is perfection? Answer: Truth, humaneness, grace, wisdom, beauty, and goodness. Thus William Harper has stated, "Examples of the major qualities of which perfect ideas could be found in man's mind are truth, beauty, and good."[1]

Individually, "Man has aspirations toward the good, the beautiful, and the true," according to Harold Titus. "Unless he can fulfill and express these functions, he falls short of self-realization and lasting happiness."[2]

Socially, "In the good society, the highest value would be the primacy of the person. The good person is one whose inner growth is aimed at actualizing the highest values -- truth, beauty, and love," in the opinion of Elizabeth Drews and Leslie Lipson.[3]

More completely, perfection[4] (or quintessence) can consist of verity (or truth) at a top, ideal level, humaneness (or humanitarianness) at a fifth, social level, grace (or graciousness) at a fourth, emotional level, sapience (or wisdom) at a third, mental level, beauty (or beautifulness) at a second, physical level, and goodness (or good) at a basic, gross level. Along with the three traditional philosophical goals of truth, goodness, and beauty then are added the further perfectionist concepts of wisdom, humaneness, and grace.

Etymologically, perfection refers to *per*, through, thoroughly + L., *facere*, to do, make + -tion, the act of = the act of doing thoroughly -- or the act of or condition of ideality. The term "quintessence" (L., *quinta*, fifth + L. *esse*, to be = to be fifth) has a more dramatic history. The fifth essence was supposed to be a subtler element than the four essential qualities of earth, air, fire, and water. Here the quintessential notion of ideal all-inclusiveness is emphasized in considering the technical term "quintessence" to be a near-synonym for the popular term "perfection." A similar technical term would be "meta-essence" (above-essence) or "supra-essence" (transcending-essence).

While the concepts of goodness, truth, and correctness (rightness) have been of especial concern to philosophy's division (branch) titled "ethics," what for further understanding are their subconcepts? In Table 1, verity (or truth) includes, at the bottom, gross level, the

subconcept of verisimilitude (seeming truth). At the external, physical level comes candor (or frankness). At the internal, mental level is placed veritability (tendency to be truthful). At the analytical, emotional level is veracity (or truthfulness). At the synthesizing, social level is authenticity (or genuineness). At the top, ideal level is verifiability (or perhaps more accurately, verification).

Similarly, for overall structuring (outlining), goodness can also consist of six relevant subconcepts. Suggested in Table 1 are obligingness (good-naturedness) at the gross, basic level of behavior, righteousness (uprightness) at the external, physical level, rectitude (correctness, rightness) at the internal, mental level, propriety (properness) at the analytical, emotional level, morality (morals) at the synthesizing, social level, and virtue (virtuousness) at the highest, ideal level of goodness.

Furthermore, these various concepts concerning perfection and ethics provide goals or ideals both for yourself and for society. That is, you would want to be truthful, to show humaneness, to demonstrate graciousness, to attain wisdom, to create beauty, and to do good deeds. In turn, you would want other persons around you in the social environment to be truthful with you, to act humanely, to display graciousness and courtesy, to aim at wise decisions, to appreciate beauty, and to act good rather than bad.

To achieve the goals of perfection, then, would result in a perfect you living within a perfect society. Obviously, these ideals of perfection are far from present actuality, but each person can aim toward these goals and try to make life's conditions a little better during one's own existence.

Chapter 2

Definition of Main Terms

Already, you have a better understanding of ethical concepts like goodness, truth, and correctness (rightness). But what is the relation of ethics to the subjects of morality and of mores? A next step toward clarification is to attempt definitions of these six important terms.

Goodness

Suppose that you want to impart the concept of "good" to a foreign visitor who has a limited English vocabulary. You decide to give an ostensive definition -- a physically pointing-to type of definition.[1]

1. Gross goodness. You take a large breath, hold still momentarily, exhale the breath with relieved countenance, point to your chest, and exclaim "Good!"

2. Physical goodness. Next, you point to a peach, peel it, slice it, eat a slice of the peach, show your facial satisfaction, pat your stomach happily, and mutter "Good."

3. Mental goodness. Now you want to illustrate mental goodness. You get a dictionary, turn to a word, pronounce the word, read its definition aloud, look wise, nod your head understandingly, and declare "Good."

4. Emotional goodness. Since you further insist on demonstrating emotional goodness, you turn on the radio to a pleasant melody, tilt your ear toward the loudspeaker, sway your head rhythmically to the music, and smile "Good."

5. Social goodness. But there's also social goodness. You offer a second slice of the peach to your visitor, point to the visitor's

mouth to indicate eating, plop another peach slice in your own mouth, chew the peach slice, next point back and forth from visitor to yourself, and repeat the word "Good."

6. Ideal goodness. You finally decide to ostend ideal goodness. You take half a dozen marbles, put one marble in front of the visitor, place the remaining five marbles in front of yourself, but shake your head No. You give the visitor a second marble, point to your remaining four marbles, and again nod your head No. Then you give the visitor one more of your marbles, point to the visitor's three marbles in comparison with your present three marbles, bob your head Yes, and say "Good" to indicate an ideal condition of equal treatment.

After these six behavioral examples, the intelligent visitor has presumably induced the concept of goodness. Each enacted instance has demonstrated the desirability essenced in the concept of goodness.[2]

Truth

Now, you are ready to turn to a definition of verity, or its popular synonym of truth. You try to imagine appropriate examples for six levels of truth.

1. Gross truth. Is it true that "you walk at least a mile a day"? Yes (true), if you walk half a mile to a job and back each weekday and walk a similar distance while shopping on Saturday and when visiting on Sunday.

2. Physical truth. Is it true that "the electric light is on"? Yes (true) if the light bulb is glowing, but No (false) if the light bulb emits no light waves to be detected by your sense of sight. More dangerously, you could use your sense of touch to determine that the light bulb is on (warm) or off (cool).

3. Mental truth. Is it true that "six equals half a dozen"? Yes (true). By definition, a dozen refers to a count of 12, and in the decimal number system 12 divided by 2 gives 6. More formally,

Major premise: dozen = 12
Minor premise: ½(12) = 6
Conclusion: ½(dozen) = 6 (substitution)
Transposition: 6 = ½(dozen)
Translation: six equals half a dozen

4. Emotional truth. True or false: "You are happy." True, if you are in a pleasant state emotionally. False, if you are worried or perplexed.

5. Social truth. Is it true that "you agreed to play cards tonight"? True, if the engagement calendar has a factual note: "Card game with Jim at 7:30 pm," inked for today's date. The engagement calendar provides written confirmation of the promised agreement to play cards this evening with another person on a social basis.

6. Ideal truth. T or F: "Do you always do the best you can?" T (true), if this is the case for your every effort. When a condition like fatigue prevents doing your best, you can still aim at the ideal of doing the best you can.

Rectitude (correctness, rightness)

Since you have stipulated examples at all six behavioral levels for the concepts of goodness and of truth, you next attempt illustrating six levels of rectitude (correctness, rightness).

1. Gross correctness. Question: "Should one avoid bad behavior?" Your answer: Correct. Proper behavior continues to be considered desirable socially rather than abusive conduct that is factually offensive and disturbing.

2. Physical correctness. "Do you drive safely"? The answer is "Correct" if you have in fact passed an official test for your driver's license and if you drive defensively, a desirable mode of cautious traffic behavior physically.

3. Mental correctness. "Did the vending machine return the correct amount of money?" The answer is Correct when the coins factually total the appropriate amount and are the desired currency.

4. Emotional correctness. "Is your portrait pleasing?" Correct, if you consider the portrait to be an adequate factual representation and find the visual impact to be desirable.

5. Social correctness. "Is it correct to eat a salad with a salad fork?" It would be correct if the desired salad fork is in fact available in accord with social convention.

6. Ideal correctness. Right or wrong: "Virtue is its own reward." Right (correct), since virtue is in fact considered to be both ideal thought and ideal conduct, a desirable situation.

However, more convenient for everyday use than ostensive definitions or a set of examples would be brief, rememberable definitions of the concepts of goodness, truth, and correctness, in terms which a person has already learned. It is here deemed that the adjective forms good = desirable,[3] true = factual,[4] and correct = true

and good (that is, factual and desirable) -- a combination of the previous two concepts. The opposite terms can then be briefly defined: bad = not good, false = not true, and wrong = not correct (not right).[5]

Etymologically, the term "correct" comes from the Latin *com*, with + *regere*, to lead straight = "to lead straight with." Dictionaries, beside giving the synonym of "right," do indeed often provide a double content to the definition of "correct" -- for example, in "agreeing with fact" (true) and in "comparing to an approved or conventional standard" (good).[6]

The act of making a correction (rectification) is important in itself and is structured in Table 1 with the subconcepts to mend at the gross level, to replace at the physical level, to repair at the mental, connecting level, to amend at the analytical, emotional level, to revise at the fifth, synthesizing level, and to refine (or polish) at the top, ideal level.

Ethics

The term ethics itself has often been defined with a listing of goodness, truth, and correctness (rightness). More comprehensively, Marcus Singer has stated that ethics, "the branch of philosophy concerned with conduct and character, is the systematic study of the principles and methods for distinguishing right from wrong and good from bad."[7]

To clarify the difference between ethics and morality, use can be made of the *where* principle of personal behavior: "Each person ordinarily lives within a social environment within the physical environment." Consequently, ethics is here considered to emphasize individual, *personal* behavior, while morality emphasizes *social*, group behavior.[8] At the same time, ethics, morality, and mores all utilize the philosophical, axiological concept of "values."[9] Ethics (Gr. *ethikos*, character) is here briefly defined to be desirable personal behavior, valuable personal behavior, or good personal behavior, or to comprise the values of desirable personal conduct.[10]

Morality

While ethics then focuses on personal conduct, the subject of morality (morals)[11] can be defined in terms of social behavior. More exactly, morality (L. *moralis*, manners, conduct) is defined to be desirable social behavior, valuable social behavior, or good social behavior, or to be the values of desirable social conduct. Since individual persons function mostly within social groupings, ethics and morality tend to be mutually consistent and supportive.

Stephen David Ross has explicitly emphasized the connection of morality to the social environment: "Morality certainly involves

social relations, duties which individuals owe to others as well as benefits they receive from others."[12]

Peter Angeles has further connected group behavior to morality: "The manner of behaving of groups or individuals according to what is regarded as good, right, virtuous, proper, correct."[13]

Paul Taylor has linked morality directly with values: "Morality has to do with values, that is, with normative standards of evaluation and normative rules of conduct."[14]

Mores

The terms "morality" and "mores" both trace to the Latin word *mos*, plural *mores*, meaning custom, manner. For consistency, the sociological term "mores" is here briefly defined to be desirable cultural behavior, valuable cultural behavior, or good cultural behavior, or to be the values of desirable cultural conduct. That is, ethics can focus on the personal; morality can focus on the social; and mores can focus on the cultural. Thus John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz have written. *"Mores are norms that are considered vital to the welfare of the group. . . .* They are supported by the dominant values or principles of the culture. Mores define right and wrong."[15]

In an early definition, sociologist William Sumner in his 1907 *Folkways* defined mores to be "popular usages and traditions, when they include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare."[16]

Angeles has likewise described mores to be "the practices, behavior patterns, customs, attitudes, values held in common by a group."[17]

Carl Wellman has expanded, "Mores are those customs which are enforced by social pressure. They are established patterns of action to which the individual is expected to conform."[18]

Primitive, developing, or well developed cultures each have a different pattern of existence (way of life) and consequently have different mores, including ethical and moral expectations. To the extent that common requirements for daily living occur, the result can be universal or general principles of ethics and of morality.

Chapter 3

Importance of Ethics, Morality, and Mores

What is the importance of each of the subjects of ethics, morality, and mores? An effort is made here to give three reasons each for the significance of these three subjects.

Ethics

Ethics -- as valuable personal behavior or desirable personal behavior -- is consequently good personal behavior. Ethics provides the important *what* principle of personal behavior: "Do good, not bad." Moreover, ethics is important for at least three reasons:

1. Goal. Goodness can be considered a major goal of personal endeavor. The goals of learning to write, of graduating from high school, of obtaining a specialized skill, of earning a fair income are, for examples, all relevant to personal goodness. To learn the specialized skill of lock-making is good if a person intends to make or repair locks but bad if the individual is going to unlock doors for theft.

2. Success. Has the effort to achieve a particular goal been successful? The answer will be true or false (or in-between). Thus the ethical concepts of truth or falsity relate to the concept of success.

3. Serenity (mental ease, "peace of mind"). Mental ease, or peace of mind, does not come during the endeavor to reach a goal but after reaching the goal. The effort requires nervous tension while the attainment allows nervous release, or relaxation. If and when the goal is attained, the individual evaluates the goodness accomplished, including personal satisfaction and social contribution.

The concept of "peace of mind" can also be more than momentary. Serenity refers to a continuing mental ease in personal perspective.

"Peace of mind" indicates an internal poise relating to all the incidents of daily living -- not only to career goals or to personal accomplishments, but also to unexpected demands and even to disappointments. With achievement of good results, an evaluation using the ethical concept of goodness helps to realize personal serenity.

Morality

Yet, much personal conduct occurs within a social environment. Individuals usually develop through childhood and adolescence within the social unit of a family. Young persons are often expected to acquire formal knowledge within the social unit of a school system and obtain much recreational satisfaction within the social units of peer groups. The contribution of valuable, desirable behavior socially is based on the precepts of morality. Thus morality is important for at least three reasons:

1. Honesty. Ordinarily, honesty is a requisite for reliable, trustworthy conduct in social situations.

2. Courtesy. The use of courtesy is a social lubricant for daily contacts between individuals.

3. Duty. The chores of everyday living -- though perhaps endurable more than enjoyable -- should be performed adequately and agreeably. Morality supplies the emotional support and self-reward for fulfilling social duties and obligations during daily activities.

Mores

Those persons who live within a tribal group, a regional group, or a national group usually share a common way of life -- a common culture. What ethics is to each person and what morality is to a society, the concept of mores is to a cultural group. Cultural mores are important for the three following reasons:

1. Survival. In a primitive culture, cooperation among the group's members has been essential for mere survival against other organisms and a difficult physical environment. Mores provide the folkways and customs which facilitate this basic cooperation for survival.

2. Dependability. Children at first depend on their parents and subsequently during adolescence learn the requirements for becoming independent personally. Nonetheless, at any age, the members of a cultural group remain interdependent. Traditions and conventions delineate acceptable behavior among these individual members.

3. Propriety. Beyond meager survival and beyond dependable conduct, a culture with available leisure time will develop manners and fashions that give admiration, verve, and diversity to everyday existence. This virtuous activity in daily cultural conduct has been labeled propriety or proper behavior.

Chapter 4

Content of Ethics, Morality, and Mores

After emphasis on the *why* (importance) of ethics, morality, and mores in the last chapter, will you now please attend to the *what* (content) of each of these three vital topics? You will want to consider both the differences and the similarities among the three subjects and reflect briefly on the substructure of technical concepts put together for each subject.

Ethics and morality

Both ethics and morality, along with many of their subtopics, can be structured (outlined) with theory, system, and practice at the three upper levels. Indeed, while ethics emphasizes individual behavior in Table 2 and morality emphasizes social behavior in Table 3, their consistency in application is here evidenced by parallel substructures at the six initial levels and by the inclusion of many similar subconcepts.

Specifically, ethical character (ethical nature) and moral character (moral nature, natural morality) are at the gross, basic level, ethical living (ethical life) and moral living (moral life) are at the external, physical level, ethical relation (relational ethics) and moral relation are at the linking, mental level, ethical practice (practical ethics) and moral practice (practical morality) are at the *how*, analytical level, ethical system (systemic ethics) and moral system (systemic morality) are at the fifth, synthesizing level, and ethical theory (theoretical ethics) and moral theory (theoretical morality) are at the top, ideal level.

Distinctively, the careful consideration given by professional philosophers to ethical theory is reflected in the substructure in Table 2 for ethical theory (to include fundamental ethics, descriptive ethics, comparative ethics, normative ethics, substantive ethics, and metaethics) and contrasts with the more routine structure here for moral theory: moral foundation, moral adequacy, moral logic, moral propriety, moral substance, and moral unity.

Ethical theory

Indeed, the topic of ethical theory has its own elaborate substructuring, provided in Table 2. Noteworthy for attention here are metaethics, emotive ethics, conative ethics, normative ethics, and ethical relativism.

1. Metaethics. Within ethical theory, the domain of metaethics (Gr. *meta*, above + ethics = above ethics) at the highest level includes the technical analysis of ethics and has been structured -- from bottom to top -- under the subconcepts of metaethical problem, metaethical account, metaethical logic, metaethical practice, metaethical system, and metaethical theory.[1]

At the fifth level of ethical theory, the topic of substantive ethics has been fitted appropriately with ethical element, ethical attribute (or ethical "dimension"), ethical knowledge (or ethical information), ethical feature (or ethical aspect), ethical formalism (or formalist ethics), and ethical quality. The concept of ethical formalism, in turn, is outlined to include -- from bottom to top -- ethical intuitionism (intuitive ethics), ethical actualism (ethical realism), ethical egoism, ethical functionalism, ethical relativism, and ethical absolutism.

2. Emotive ethics. Of particular interest within ethical absolutism is emotive ethics at the fourth level -- including emotive problem, emotive description, emotive thought (emotive thinking), emotive function (emotive property), emotive application (emotive use), and emotive significance (emotive importance).

3. Conative ethics. Conative ethical theory at the second level of ethical absolutism similarly comprises conative problem, conative description, conative thought (conative thinking), conative function (conative property), conative application (conative use), and conative significance (conative importance). While emotive ethics has been placed at the fourth, emotional level, conative ethics (L. *conatus*, attempt) has been positioned at the second, physical level since *conatus* is "the drive, force, or urge possessed by a thing which is directed towards the preservation of its own being."[2]

4. Normative ethics. Directly under ethical theory, the subtopic of ethical normativism (or normative ethics) at the fourth level has been substructured with the concepts of normative interest, normative conduct, normative relation, normative ethical practice (normative practice), normative ethical system (normative system), and normative ethical theory (normative theory).

5. Ethical relativism. For an alternative to absolute ethics, the subtopic of ethical relativism has been developed to put ethical concepts within a relative framework. In consequence, Richard Brandt

has indicated that in ethical relativism (which is outlined under ethical formalism in Table 2) "the rightness of an act is relative to the circumstances or situation."[3]

What would be an example of an ethical decision related to the conditions of a particular situation? Suppose that a street repair truck is blocking the width of half a side street. You are driving in one direction, but a second car is approaching in the opposite direction. Should you accelerate and hope the other driver will pause? Instead, you apply the what-to-do principle of "Do good, not bad," stop promptly, and signal the other driver to come ahead first.

That was an easy application within conditional ethics, but now for a more difficult situation. Suppose that ("what if") a member of the street repair crew signals you to come ahead but he doesn't see behind him that a second driver is already making a dash to plunge through the single lane available. Ordinarily, you would comply with the signal to proceed, but a collision could occur. In this dilemma, you decide to stop immediately at the side of the open traffic lane (danger avoidance) and wave to the repair crew member to look behind him (danger warning) to protect himself from the speeding vehicle (danger protection). Hence it was necessary to make a complex decision and to apply several relative principles of social conduct.

Ethical relativism has further been considered to be part of cultural relativism. Brandt, for instance, has suggested cultural relativism can "mean that a person's values are 'relative' to his culture in the sense of being a function of or causally dependent on it."[4] Brandt has also referred to the concept of survival: "Uniformity of evaluation is the rule in areas that pertain to survival or to conditions for tolerable social relationships."[5]

Moral issues

Also upon relative and practical bases comes deliberation of various moral issues of social significance. Thus the social emphasis on morality has resulted in the elaborate development of the topic of moralism, given in Table 3.

1. Moralism. Moralism as the doctrine of moral conduct is here placed at the fifth level of moral propriety within moral theory. In turn, a moralist fact (or moral fact) comes at the bottom, gross level of moralism, moralist activation (or moral actuation) at the physical, actualizing level, moralist distinction (or distinctive morality) at the mental, linking level, moralist diversity (or moral variety) at the fourth, analytical level, moralist integration (or integrative morality) at the social, synthesizing level, and moralist regulation (or moral regulation) at the top, ideal level.

Each of these six subconcepts becomes a subtopic, and a glance at moralism in Table 3 indicates the further substructuring of various

moralistic concepts. Only the subconcepts for moralist function follow a familiar pattern.

2. Moral code. While the concept of an ethical code has been widely applied in professional ethics, the technical literature also contains frequent references to "moral codes." The oldest and best known moral code in Western history is the Decalogue, or Ten Commandments.[6] The Decalogue is a list of religious precepts that, according to the Bible, were revealed to Moses on Mount Sinai in the Sinai peninsula and were engraved on two stone tablets. In shortened form,

I the Lord am your God. . . .
You shall have no other gods beside Me. You shall not make for yourself a sculptured image. . . .
You shall not swear falsely by the name of the Lord your God. . . .
Remember the sabbath day and keep it holy. . . .
Honor your father and your mother. . . .
You shall not murder.
You shall not commit adultery.
You shall not steal.
You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor.
You shall not covet your neighbor's house; you shall not covet your neighbor's wife . . . or anything that is your neighbor's.[7]

The first four commandments refer to the deity and to the sabbath day, the remaining six commands to moral behavior. The fifth commandment is a positive admonition to honor one's parents, while the last five commandments are negative strictures against murder, adultery, stealing, falsehoods, and covetousness.

It will be noted that the outline of Biblical moralism in Table 3 has Biblical allegories at the gross, basic level, catechism at the timely, physical level, casuistry at the mental, relating level, Biblical parables at an analytical, emotional level, the Decalogue itself at the synthesizing, social level, and salvation at the highest, ideal level.

Moral codes, beside the Ten Commandments, include the scouting codes, well known to young persons. According to Robert McElhinney and Henry Smith,

Perhaps no standards of conduct have been learned and observed by so many boys and girls as the "laws" of the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts organizations. . . . The Boy Scouts have twelve laws centering around twelve traits of character. The laws state that a Boy Scout will be trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean, and reverent.[8]

The Girl Scouts code includes the concepts of being honorable, loyal, dutiful, friendly, courteous, humane, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, and cleanly.[9]

McElhinney and Smith have also compiled a list of 50 familiar

ethical guides, for example, "Better be safe than sorry." They have advised, "The chief value . . . in these mottoes, proverbs, and old sayings, is that they furnish a store of wisdom, ready at hand in a case of moral emergency."[10]

Further, McElhinney and Smith have referred to Hutchin's Code,

> Perhaps the most usable, practical, and popular in schools is the Hutchin's Code known also as the Children's Morality Code. In this code there are eleven "laws" which are suggested as laws of right living -- laws which the best Americans have always obeyed. The laws are: of self-control, of good health, of kindness, of sportsmanship, of self-reliance, of duty, of reliability, of truth, of good workmanship, of team work, and of loyalty.[11]

A personal code for morality has come from Benjamin Franklin. According to McElhinney and Smith,

> The code written and followed by Benjamin Franklin is one of the best-known individual codes and has been used as a model for code writing since Franklin's day. The following traits of character were emphasized: temperance, silence, order, resolution, frugality, industry, sincerity, justice, moderation, cleanliness, tranquility, chastity, and humility.[12]

3. Moral education. Moral codes have further been an important source for the content of moral education. Moral education, shown in Table 3, belongs to the social institution of education, a subject located elsewhere in an overall structure of knowledge. However, the concepts of moral education are tentatively structured to consist of moral conditioning at the gross, basic level, moral training at the second, physical level, moral learning at the third, mental level, moral instruction (moral teaching) at the *how*, analytical level, moral homily (moral lecture) at the fifth, synthesizing level, and moral excellence at the sixth, ideal level.

While moral education during infancy and early childhood tends to occur informally within the family institution, moral education during continued childhood and adolescence is presently provided by school systems in Western cultures. In the opinion of Monica Taylor,

> Significantly, it has been the school, that initial link between the morality of the home and the less certain, public morality of the world at large, which has historically played an important part educating the young in morality. Moral education in school is thus the meeting point for a study of these social problems. Yet, to date, it has lacked the coherence and structure of a subject in its own right, thereby often forfeiting a claim to merit serious attention as a part of the curriculum.[13]

Moreover, the label attached to moral education has varied. Taylor has written,

In practice, the school has always been concerned with something more than the imparting of factual knowledge or social skills. Often this additional dimension has been known as "character training" or "liberal education" or "education of the whole man".[14]

Less inclusive in scope, according to Taylor, has been a demand "on those engaged in educating to promote in their pupils such things as 'a critical attitude', 'maturity', 'responsibility', and 'autonomy'."[15]

Taylor has given this summary of Jean Piaget's studies on moral development in children.

> As is now well-known, on the basis of careful and detailed analyses of data gathered from questioning a small number of children on their understanding of rules, he postulated three stages in their moral development. The child, he suggested, begins egocentrically, by seeing rules as examples rather than obligations; later, he accepts the rules transcendentally as emanating from adults, unalterable and backed by praise or blame; and, lastly, he passes from this heteronomous morality to a more autonomous position where rules are seen as changeable, depending on reciprocal respect for and cooperation with others.[16]

In Piaget's words,

> Our study of the rules of a game led us to the conclusion that there exist two types of respect, and consequently two moralities -- a morality of constraint or of heteronomy, and a morality of cooperation or of autonomy.[17]

McElhinney and Smith have further suggested that "courses in morals, however, should deal particularly with the subject of mores -- the laws, customs, and principles which society has worked out for the guidance of its members in moral situations."[18]

George Sher and William Bennett have stated that moral education specifies "(a) the traits and principles to be taught, and (b) the relevant methods of teaching them, and (c) the positive reasons for adopting such methods."[19]

Philip Phenix has additionally tied values to moral education and to mature behavior:

> Moral education, then, must evidently be concerned with the actual values which govern free conduct and not merely with the production of certain approved modes of behavior. It is not enough to teach a person how he should act, by instructing him in conformity to a so-called moral code of conduct, or by providing him with a set of ideals to which he may pay lip-service and by which he may conveniently justify himself to himself or others.[20]

4. Ethical education. While ethical education has mainly been subsumed within moral education during elementary and secondary schooling, ethical education has particularly been emphasized in the specialized education within higher education: for example, in medicine, dentistry, nursing, law, clergy, journalism, librarianship, engineering, social work, and teaching. In the tentative structuring at the level of general education, ethical education is here given consistent consideration with moral education so that ethical education in Table 2 proceeds from ethical conditioning to ethical training to ethical learning to ethical instruction (ethical teaching) to ethical homily (ethical lecture) to ethical excellence.

5. Values education. Beside ethical education and moral education, the subject of "values education" has been given distinct consideration by professional educators. Alan Lockwood, in a 1976 summary published by the National Education Association, has evaluated,

> There is no one curricular theory or body of practice which educators would agree constitutes what is meant by values education. On the contrary, there are a number of competing conceptions of values education which differ markedly in theory, goals, content, and methods.[21]

Of five approaches reported, Lockwood noted about "values clarification":

> The primary purpose of Values Clarification is to help students choose values which can serve as satisfactory guides for their lives. Proponents of Values Clarification claim that obtaining such values is extremely difficult in modern society.[22]

Lockwood further described the emphasis on "moral development".

> The Moral Development approach derives from the work of Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates. Kohlberg's research in the acquisition and development of moral judgment led to the identification of six stages of moral reasoning which develop sequentially. . . .
>
> I. The preconventional level.
>
> Stage 1: Punishment and obedience.
>
> Stage 2: Personal usefulness.
>
> II. The conventional level.
>
> Stage 3: Conforming to the will of the group.
>
> Stage 4: Law and order.
>
> III. The level of independent judgments based on general principles of behavior.
>
> Stage 5: Social contract, constitutionalism, and higher law.
>
> Stage 6: Personal conscience.[23]

An approach of "values analysis" has also been specified:

The purpose of the Values Analysis approach to values education is to teach students to apply logical thinking and scientific inquiry to the resolution of value problems. Proponents of this approach contend that ". . . anyone making a value judgment commits himself to: (1) a value principle, and (2) a set of facts about the value object which shows that the principle applies to the value object".[24]

Another approach to values education has been titled "public issues":

> The major purpose of the Public Issues approach to values education is to help students formulate clear and defensible points of view for the resolution of public policy disputes. The proponents of this approach argue that citizens in a democracy must be able to take positions on questions of public policy. Public issues vary in the extent to which they involve factual, definitional, and value considerations, but most, if not all, controversial public issues embody significant conflicts among values. These conflicts stem in part from the recognition that our society is pluralistic in its primary value commitments.[25]

Lockwood has also mentioned a British version of moral education.

> This approach to values education will probably be least familiar to American readers. It has been developed under the direction of the British philosopher John Wilson. At the moment it consists primarily of an extensive analysis and rationale for a particular view of moral education. . . . The primary purpose of this approach is to help students acquire facility with content-free principles for making moral decisions.[26]

6. Human rights. Among the important values emphasized in formal education have been human rights, including natural rights, personal rights, civil rights,[27] and political rights. Here the use of the term "right" essentially synonyms to the concept of "prerogative." However, the concept of personal prerogatives (personal rights) emphasizes the individual (rather than society). According to Robert Louden, "Many theorists have held that the concept of rights is a peculiarly modern invention -- one restricted to Western societies that place a strong emphasis on the freedom and equal worth of all individuals."[28]

Steven Maarenen has provided this view of natural rights (natural prerogatives):

> From the general right to self-preservation are derived specific natural rights. These include the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness appealed to in the Declaration of Independence. Any government, to be legitimate, must observe these natural rights of its citizens.[29]

By now, the number of personal rights has both swelled and expanded beyond Western cultures. Indeed, Louden has continued,

> The Declaration of Independence (1776), for instance, speaks only of unalienable rights of "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), after mentioning rights to "life, liberty, and security of person" in Article 3, goes on to list rights to "periodic holidays with pay" and to "housing and medical care and necessary social services" in Articles 24 and 25.[30]

However, according to Thomas Hill,

> No complete list of rights can be drawn up for all time, for no one can foresee all future conditions. However, useful lists have been worked out for our own times upon which rather remarkable unanimity has been attained, at least in principle.[31]

Hill has provided the following summary combined from the U.S. Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution, and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

General: Right to life, liberty, security of person, and pursuit of happiness.
Expression: Freedom of speech, press, and other means of communication and of assembly.
Religion: Freedom of belief, teaching, ecclesiastical organization, and worship.
Movement: Freedom to move within the boundaries of one's own state, and to leave and return to one's state.
Political: Right to a nationality, to political asylum, to vote, and to hold office.
Juridical: Freedom from involuntary servitude, arbitrary arrest, torture, cruel or degrading punishments; right to recognition as a person before the law, to trial by impartial jury in open court, to security against unwarranted searches and seizures, to be confronted by one's own accusers, and to be assumed innocent until proved guilty.
Domestic: Right to marriage, the protection of the home, and special care of motherhood and childhood in cases of need.
Economic: Right to own property and not to be arbitrarily deprived of it, to work, to equal pay for equal work, to join a trade union, to a decent livelihood.
Recreation: Right to rest, leisure, holidays, and recreational facilities.
Education and culture: Right to education, to enjoyment of the arts, and participation in scientific achievement.[32]

An exception would be suspension of a civil right during a social emergency.

> No individual right is absolute in the sense that it may not in some dire emergency have to be suspended in the interest of all individuals. . . . But such a situation only suspends -- it does not destroy -- the rights in question for the sake of other rights; and on the whole the good of all demands a scrupulous observance of rights and only rare suspension of any of them.[33]

Civil duties can be a balance to civil rights. Thus, according to Hill, the duties of the good citizen of a national state include national defense, legal compliance, minority protection, tax payment, and political participation.[34] In return, Hill has suggested, governmental officials are expected to show financial integrity, nonconflicting interests, impartiality, respect, diligence, fairness, and enlightened decisions.[35]

Hill has concluded, "Since the ability of the state to secure the rights of its citizens or to perform any other significant function depends upon the activity of its citizens, the duties of citizens are quite as important as their rights."[36]

For related terminology, Ian Brownlie has noted that "the more modern concept of human rights is . . . often described as the 'rule of law,' 'constitutionalism,' 'civil liberties,' 'constitutional rights,' and 'fundamental rights.'"[37]

Sociologist Max Siporin in 1982 affirmed a tilt toward the individual.

> A number of studies and surveys have demonstrated that many people today give greater value to individualism, autonomy, equality, personal well-being, and self-realization than to reciprocity, loyalty, self-sacrifice, devotion to duty, consensus, competent performance, or work achievement.[38]

Mores

The content of "mores" has been explicated particularly by sociologists and anthropologists. Thus, sociologist Sumner in 1907 described,

> We see that we must conceive of the mores as a vast system of usages, covering the whole of life, and serving all its interests; also containing in themselves their own justification by tradition and use and wont, and approved by mystic sanctions until, by rational reflection, they develop their own philosophical and ethical generalizations, which are elevated into "principles" of truth and right.[39]

Philosopher-psychologist Sahakian has noted the near relation of the mores and morality concepts: "The folkways and mores constitute the criteria of morality, and determine which acts are right and which are wrong."[40]

Additionally, Robin Williams has connected mores to obligatory customs: "Customs that are regarded by general agreement as highly important and obligatory, as evidenced by strong sentiments against deviation and by severe punishments for violation, are usually called *mores.*"[41]

Mores are part of a group's culture, which is a group's "way of life" or pattern of existence. The culture concept (or culture, for short) shown in Table 4 is summarized to consist of folkways[42] at the gross, basic level, customs at the second, timely level, cultural traditions (traditions) at a mental, linking level, cultural conventions (conventions) at an analytical, emotional level, mores at the synthesizing, social level, and ethos at the top, ideal level. Sumner in his 1907 *Folkways* declared ethos (Gr. *ethos,* character, usages) to be "the totality of characteristic traits by which a group is individualized and differentiated from others."[43] Concerning a "folkway," Sumner has stated, "A selection results by which one way becomes customary for all -- a habit for each and a custom for the society. This way is a folkway."[44]

Mores themselves can tentatively consist of mores problem at the gross, basic level, mores support at a physical, timely level, mores categorization (mores classification) at a mental, relational level, mores enforcement at an analytical, emotional level, mores system at a synthesizing, social level, and mores value at the highest, ideal level.

Indeed, Biesanz and Biesanz have connected values directly to the concept of culture: "Human society is a complex system of relationships among individuals and groups, based on shared values and beliefs and behavior patterns -- that is, on culture," which is "the learned portion of human behavior."[45] Governmental laws "enforce the mores accepted by the dominant cultural group in the society" and bring "cultural patterns more into line with the ideal patterns and dominant values."[46]

Cultural norms are also based on values -- "the principles by which the norms are justified and explained,"[47] while cultural sanctions stipulate "rewards for proper behavior and punishments for deviant behavior -- that enforce the norms."[48] Biesanz and Biesanz have thus concluded, *"Values,* then, are the underlying standards or principles by which social and individual goals are chosen and the criteria by which means and ends are judged and evaluated."[49]

Moreover, Biesanz and Biesanz have distinguished the individual person from the social group. "The dominant values set individual as well as social goals. They give members of the society a purpose or meaning in life. Goals set by the social values are sanctified as worth seeking."[50]

Chapter 5

Dynamics of Ethics, Morality, and Mores

Within the subjects of ethics, morality and even mores, how does a person make the transition from statics (being passive) to dynamics (being active)? At least part of the answer is provided with the concepts of ethical imperative, moral imperative, and perhaps a cultural imperative.

Ethical imperative

For clarity about the concept of "ethical imperative," please glance at Table 5, which presents the recurring six levels of general behavior, six corresponding levels of ethical imperative, and six applications of ethical behavior.[1]

1. Gross level. At the basic, gross level of a structure for ethical imperative (L. *imperare,* to command) is an ethical presumption in which an individual person "might" act a particular way.

2. Physical level. At the externalizing, physical level of ethical imperative is the ethical possibility that an individual "could" perform a particular behavior.

3. Mental level. Within the internalizing, mental level of ethical imperative comes the ethical expectation, or ethical probability, that an individual "should" (ought to) behave in some manner.

4. Emotional level. At the fourth, emotional level of ethical imperative comes the ethical volition or will that an individual "would" behave appropriately.

5. Social level. At the synthesizing, social level of ethical

imperative, an ethical command takes the form of "I must (have to) do this."

6. Ideal level. Finally, at the highest, ideal level of ethical imperative, an ethical mandate impels that "I should ideally do this" (or archaically, "I wist do this").

Also, McElhinney and Smith have described three steps to move from the statics to the dynamics of ethical behavior.

> Knowledge of what is right being insufficient alone must be accompanied by a second factor -- the desire to do the right. . . . Even the possession of the desire to do right when added to the knowledge of what is right is not enough. There must be a third step -- the carrying over of desire into action.[2]

In a related approach of the paired "is/ought," the verb "is" can be considered to be static and the "ought" to be dynamic, although "is" has also been deemed to represent a fact and "ought" to represent a value. Thus, when a person should (ought to) cross the street carefully, the action refers to ethical dynamics involving physical caution.

Indeed, John Hospers has put the static "is" to an ethical use appropriately.

> Ethics is concerned not only with what a certain individual or group considers right but with what *is* right. Ethics not merely describes moral ideals held by human beings but asks which ideal is *better* than others, more worth pursuing, and why.[3]

Hospers has also used the subjunctive "should" (rather than informal "ought to") in an ethical question "In what way should a person conduct his life?" to start the preface of his 1972 edition of *Human Conduct*.[4]

Hospers has further provided a negative example of ethical deduction, here presented with marginal notations:[5]

Major premise:	1. The infliction of needless suffering is wrong.	Moral value
Minor premise:	2. This act is a case of the infliction of needless suffering.	Moral fact
Conclusion:	*Therefore,*	
	3. This act is wrong.	Moral judgment

Hospers has elaborated,

> The third statement does give . . . the desired conclusion, and the first statement is . . . a true moral principle. But the second statement is also required . . . to arrive at the conclusion; and this second statement . . . is not a statement in ethics at all but an empirical statement about a specific act or situation.[6]

Another insight about the subjunctive "ought to" has come from Brand Blanshard, who has indicated that "ought" is an implicit if-then hypothesis.

> To say that I *ought* to do something is ultimately to say that *if* a set of ends is to be achieved, whose goodness I cannot deny without making nonsense of my own nature, *then* I must act in a certain way.[7]

Moral imperative

The tentative structure of the ethical imperative can be paralleled by a similar structure for the closely related moral imperative, shown in Table 3 and repeated in Table 5. Thus, moral imperative here proceeds from moral presumption to moral possibility to moral expectation (moral probability) to moral volition (moral will) to moral command (moral commandment) to moral mandate. The modal auxiliary verbs given in Table 5 can be used in moral statements beside in ethical statements.

Another approach to ethical and moral dynamics is embedded in the concept of deontology. In Sahakian's words, "Deontology, the ethics of duty, consists of a theory of duty and moral obligation. The term finds its etymology in the Greek *deon*, meaning obligation, or that which is necessary, hence, moral necessity."[8]

Similarly, Hospers has connected "ought" with "duty": "When we say that you ought to do it, or have a duty or an obligation to do it. . . ."[9]

Monica Taylor has emphasized that "it was Kant whose stress on 'duty' in *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (translated by H. J. Paton, Harper & Row) had such an influence on subsequent Western ethical thought."[10]

The older teleology (Gr. *telos*, purpose + -ology, the study of = the study of purpose) has also emphasized ethical conduct. Teleologists have held that actions are correct because of their bringing good consequences, while deontologists have believed that actions are correct because of being good duties. The concept of duty indicates that moral behavior may be burdensome to an individual. Indeed, Kurt Baier has stated that morality "demands substantial sacrifices."[11]

Table 6 shows how, from an overall structure of knowledge, the topic of concern can tie together the concepts of responsibility, obligation, and duty -- from regard at the gross, basic level to respect at the external, physical level to responsibility at the internal, mental level to obligation at the emotional, analytical level to duty at the social, synthesizing level and finally to conscientiousness at the top, ideal level.

In turn, both ethical concern and moral concern, also shown in Table 6, are here considered to include ethical regard (ethical "sense") and moral regard (moral "sense") at the gross, basic level,

ethical respect and moral respect at the overt, physical level, ethical responsibility and moral responsibility at the covert, mental level, ethical obligation and moral obligation at the analytical, emotional level, ethical duty and moral duty at the synthesizing, social level, with ethical conscientiousness and moral conscientiousness at the evaluative, ideal level.

More of the conceptual overlap between ethics and morality can be outlined within the concepts of teleology and deontology. Thus -- under ethical intuitionism (intuitive ethics) in Table 2 -- teleological ethics and deontological ethics (deontology, deontic ethics, duty ethics) can be similarly structured in a tentative manner to include telic (teleological) ethical behavior and deontic behavior (deontological behavior) at the gross, basic level, telic ethical actuality (teleological ethical reality) and deontic actuality (deontological reality) at the external, physical level, telic ethical rationale (teleological ethical reasoning) and deontic rationale (deontological reasoning) at the internal, mental level, telic (teleological) ethical practice and deontic (deontological) practice at the *how*, analytical level, telic (teleological) ethical system and deontic (deontological) system at the fifth, synthesizing level, with telic (teleological) ethical theory and deontic theory (deontological theory, duty theory) at the top, ideal level. These words and phrases, though lengthy, can hence be fitted together.

Cultural imperative

The possibility of a "cultural imperative" developed from the mores of a cultural group provides another distinctive approach to the dynamic regulation of individual behavior in accord with group expectations, particularly in the form of norms, standards, and criteria.

Here, then, a "norm" is an ordinarily accepted and expected principle of individual behavior, within a cultural group. A "standard" is a usually accepted and expected principle of individual behavior, within a cultural group. A "criterion" is an ideally accepted and expected principle of individual behavior, within a cultural group.

A norm, standard, and criterion are thus differentiated in the following example:

Norm: One should *ordinarily* be honest.
Standard: Honesty is *usually* the best policy.
Criterion: It is *ideally* desirable to be honest.

Tersely,

A norm is a principle of ordinarily valuable, cultural behavior.

A standard is a principle of usually valuable, cultural behavior.

A criterion is a principle of ideally valuable, cultural behavior.

The term "norm" at the fourth level of valuation comes from the Latin *norma*, a carpenter's square, and has become an ordinary rule or model to follow. The term "standard" at the fifth level of valuation can be considered a standing, a generally accepted, social usage. The term "criterion" at the sixth level of valuation comes from the Greek *krites*, judge, and is a value used in making an ideal judgment.

The concept of norms has received much attention in sociological literature. According to Jack Gibbs, "Most definitions emphasize that a norm necessarily represents a high degree of consensus in a social unit as to what the conduct of members *ought to be*."[12]

Gibbs has further noted the interest of the social sciences in the application of norms: "No concept is invoked more often by social scientists in explanations of human behavior than 'norm'."[13]

Gibbs has also confirmed the linking of sociological norms to values: "Functionalists from Durkheim to Parsons have viewed norms as reflecting consensus and a common value system."[14]

Williams has agreed that norms are related to social behavior. "The norms of moral conduct . . . guide direct social interaction."[15]

Williams has also linked the concept of norm to ethical correctness: "A norm calls for 'right action' and implies a generalizable reason for the rightness of the indicated conduct."[16]

Francis Merrill has noted that "norms do not always represent the 'ideal' patterns in a particular society, but rather those that are widely accepted."[17]

Merrill has also quoted Muzafer Sherif that "a norm denotes not only expected behavior but a *range of tolerable behavior*, the limits of which define deviate acts."[18]

Merrill has additionally suggested, "The norm exists in the personality of the individual and serves as a standard by which he judges his own behavior."[19]

Felix Keesing has summarized that norms of behavior

> represent what have been variously called expectations (or expectancies), values, goals, ideals, designs for living. Humans are inveterate rule makers. The society presents to the individual what he *should* do, the behaviors which are counted *normal*, correct, desirable, in its particular cultural tradition. In turn, the actual behavior of the individual is likely to approximate to these norms, especially to the extent they are 'valued,' or affectively (emotionally) charged as being 'good,' held up as conative (action) goals and cognitive (thought) ideals as being 'right,' backed up by compulsions or 'sanctions' as being 'expected,' 'lawful.' For some behaviors the ideal may be a perfect standard out of ordinary reach, e.g., never breaking traffic laws.[20]

The application of norms has further resulted in the elaboration of normative ethics, already indicated in Table 2. Thus Gibbs has declared, "A normative explanation of behavior presupposes not only the existence of a norm but also conformity to it."[21]

Table 7 gives the results -- from identification of technical concepts in the literature -- for structuring within ethos (characteristic quality) of cultural norm, cultural standard, and cultural criterion.

Ethical goal-achievement

A further, positive approach to the dynamics of personal behavior is goal-achievement. Phenix has described the utility of personal goals:

> Every human being needs goals and principles by which to direct his life and shape his conduct. To be a person in any satisfactory sense is to have a characteristic way of life -- a system of ideals and values that one has adopted as his own or to which he has declared his allegiance. Not only the quality of life, but also its intensity, creativeness, and persistence are dependent upon the possession of definite aims.[22]

Selected values can become goals. Indeed, Margaret Goodyear and Mildred Klohr have discusssed a combination of goals and values in the phraseology of "goal values."

> Values are those deep-seated beliefs and desires that give direction to our life. College students usually hold high in their value system education, knowledge, economic security, friendship, romantic love. These values, and many others, are the basis for setting goals. The specific values an individual emphasizes in seeking a particular goal are his goal values. Another individual seeking the same goal will have a different set of goal values.[23]

Values contribute to satisfaction: "Managing human and material resources to attain goals based on clearly defined values contributes to a satisfying way of life."[24]

Sahakian has further noted an emphasis by philosopher John Dewey on the importance of ethical goals.

> The proper ethical goals, according to Dewey, are the fulfillment of human needs and desires, the continuous growth of human beings in moral sensitivity, and human progress in the practical realization of a better social world.[25]

In the Dewey approach, "Neither happiness nor goods can be fully achieved to perfection, for they are but steps to higher levels of moral progress."[26]

Moral problem-solving

A negative approach to the dynamics of morality has been the use of problem-solving. Etymologically, a problem (*pro*, forward + Gr. *ballein*, to throw = to throw forward) is the throwing forward of a question that requires an answer. Briefly, however, a problem = trouble.

A problem, in Table 8, consists of difficulty at the gross, basic level, of a conflict (clash) at the physical, timely level, of confusion at the relating, mental level, of dispute at the emotional, analytical level, and of controversy at the social, synthesizing level, with the goal of solution placed at the top level.

The concept of a solution, in turn, can consist of alleviation (relief) at the gross, basic level, of aid (assistance, help) at the external, physical level, of rectification (correction) at the mental, relating level, of diagnosis at the fourth, analytical level, of treatment at the fifth, synthesizing level, and of remedy at the top, ideal level. The most general problem-solving method is to analyze *what* to do, synthesize *how* to do it, and evaluate *what* was done.

Also, in Table 8, under the topic of difficulty, moral evil (evil) proceeds from moral trouble (trouble) at the gross level to vilification (vileness) at the physical level to moral iniquity (iniquity) at the mental level to sin (wickedness) at the emotional level to moral infamy (infamy) at the social level to vice (viciousness) at the worst level.

Still within the topic of difficulty, moral badness (badness, bad) includes plague at the gross level, famine at the physical level, deceit (deception) at the relating, mental level, malevolence (ill will) at the emotional level, crime at the social level, and despotism (tyranny) at the worst level.

To be further noted from Table 8 is that the general approach to problem-solving can be applied almost completely to the special topic of moral problems and of moral solutions.

Thus, moral difficulty is tentatively structured to range from moral vacuum to moral obstacle to moral error (moral mistake) to moral distraction to moral predicament to moral abomination.

In turn, moral abomination is structured to consist of moral negligence (negligence) at the gross level, moral culpability (moral blame) at the physical level, moral blasphemy (profanity) at the mental level, moral aggravation (aggravation) at the emotional level, moral guilt (guilt) at the social level, and moral hatred (hate) at the worst level.

Historically, however, there has been more concern with the best rather than with the worst forms of behavior.

Chapter 6

History of Ethics

Now that you have become well acquainted with the importance, content, and dynamics of ethics, morality, and mores, maybe it's time for a historical glance, often summarized within a history of ethics.

The history of ethics can be highlighted in terms of the search for the "highest good" (*summum bonum* in Latin) for the individual person and of the advocacy of "virtue" (*aretē* in Greek) for the highest form of social behavior.

Socrates (c.470-399 B.C.), the accredited founder of Western philosophy,[1] borrowed the slogan "Know thyself" from the Delphic oracle in ancient Greece to emphasize the goal of self-realization and further propounded the concept of *aretē* to be the goal for social existence.

The theoretically minded Plato (c.427-c.347 B.C.), one of Socrates' students, explicated the "highest good" for an individual goal and proposed at the social level the four virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice.[2]

The practically minded Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), who was a student of Plato, acclaimed the "highest good" to be *eudaemonia* (Gr. good spirit, happiness) and also advocated moderation in social living.

Other early Greek philosophers espoused variations of these approaches, including several versions of pleasure to be the "highest good."

During later medieval West European history, the religious philosopher Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) added three theological virtues of faith, hope, and love to four secular virtues of prudence (in place of wisdom), fortitude (in place of courage), temperance, and justice[3] and urged personal salvation for an individual goal.

Subsequently, secular philosopher John Locke (1632-1704) emphasized natural rights to protect individual existence, while idealist philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) emphasized social duty according to a universal, "categorical imperative."

Realistically inclined utilitarians Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) supported a social goal of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" to improve living conditions for citizens in an industrializing society.

Prior to the 20th century then, professional philosophers were proffering goals for individual existence within the social environment within the physical environment. By 1907, sociologist Sumner (1840-1910) was propounding the concepts of folkways and of mores (cultural behavior patterns) to understand better the relative ethical and moral conduct of social groups. Today, an individual is much concerned with pursuing the "good life," while society morally urges good citizenship within a high "quality of life."

Radoslav Tsanoff, in "History of Ethics,"[4] has again made a direct link to values, holding that "the problem of right and wrong conduct" requires "a choice between alternative values."[5] Tsanoff has further referred to "the problem of the highest good or the supreme principle of valuation."[6] He questioned, "What is the final and basic good to which all values in life point and by which they are to be judged?"[7]

One possible answer is the value of virtue. According to Tsanoff, Socrates, "the father of moral philosophy, . . . expressed as the first principle of his philosophy of life: Virtue is Knowledge."[8]

Tsanoff has also connected the Platonic concept of justice to value: "Justice is right distribution of emphasis in valuation and choice."[9]

Tsanoff has then declared that

> the Stoics revised the cardinal virtues of classical Athens. Temperance became self-control; courage was conceived as fortitude; wisdom gained a practical note as prudence. Justice was interpreted as fairmindedness in social relations.[10]

Another suggestion for the "highest good" has been the evaluative reaction of satisfaction, beside that of happiness or that of pleasure. Pleasure, though intense, tends toward the *immediate* and temporary, with satisfaction more *intermediate* and longer-lasting, while happiness is deemed an *ultimate* and durable state. Thus, Tsanoff has referred to "passing pleasures, abiding satisfaction and happiness."[11]

Philosopher Kant has further emphasized the value of "good will," which Tsanoff has interpreted to be "upright will": "This upright will alone has moral worth; in Kant's words, 'Nothing can possibly . . . be called good, without qualification, except a Good Will.'"[12]

Kant has also elaborated upon concepts like moral duty ("the dutiful spirit is the essential mark of moral action")[13] and moral agent: "This Kantian emphasis throughout on the inner spirit and character of the agent and not on the consequences of his actions marked a deepening of moral insight."[14]

With Charles Darwin (1809-1882) came the explication of evolutionary ethics. In Darwin's chapter on "The Moral Sense" in the 1871 *The Descent of Man*, Tsanoff has noted that Darwin traced a beginning of moral conduct in higher mammals to group behavior and to parental-filial reactions in common survival and feeding: "All this is still not quite conscience nor a sense of duty or justice or benevolence, but it is on its way to these moral qualities."[15]

Tsanoff further emphasized Kant's ultimate goal "of the consummate good that should harmonize virtue (socially) and happiness (personally)"[16] within a productive physical environment.

Despite the enormous cultural evolution over the past 2000 years, the minimal biological evolution of the human species during this interval permits the ancient ideal of the "highest good" to remain a valid goal. In the Platonic view, "So our highest faculty, reason, should direct our will-energy and control our desires and appetites. The perfect life is marked by justice."[17] Similarly, the Aristotelian advice for moderation remains valid "to maintain a balanced course between the extremes of excess and deficiency."[18]

Historically, then, appropriate ethical and moral goals have long been apparent: personal goals of happiness and moderation; social goals of justice, peace (non-violence), and well-being for all -- within the now-realized need to attain an ecologically balanced physical environment. Yet the dynamic problem remains of *how* to achieve these goals individually and socially, while evaluating personal satisfaction within the immediate potentialities of one's own lifetime.

Any ethical theory to be complete must unify all six levels of ethics utilized in Table 2 and not remain on a single level. Thus, Tsanoff has criticized that

> ethical theories have erred mainly through exclusive concentration on some particular values, to the neglect of others. Each of the specific values emphasized -- pleasure, survival, dutiful will, social benevolence -- is an unquestionably important element in human well-being, but it is not by itself sufficient for the moral appraisal of conduct.[19]

Hedonism

One of the oldest concerns in the history of Western philosophy has been the topic of hedonism (Gr. *hedone*, pleasure + -ism, doctrine of = the doctrine of pleasure). Hedonism is here readily structured in Table 9 into hedonic basis (hedonistic "ground," pleasure basis) at the bottom, gross level, hedonic conduct (hedonistic conduct, pleasurable conduct) at the external, physical level, hedonic rationale (hedonistic reasoning) at the internal, mental level, hedonic practice (hedonistic practice) at the *how*, analytical level, hedonic system (hedonistic system, systematic hedonism, systematic pleasure) at the fifth, synthesizing level, and hedonic theory (hedonistic theory, pleasure theory, theoretical hedonism, pure hedonism) at the top, ideal level.

In the literature, both the adjective forms of "hedonic" and "hedonistic" have been put to use, and both the terms "pleasure" and "pleasurable" have been used adjectivally, with the result that often "hedonic" = "hedonistic" = "pleasure" = "pleasurable." Further, when concepts like "hedonic" and "theory" have similar significance, the phrase "hedonic theory" is equivalent to "theoretical hedonism."

According to a dictionary definition, hedonism can be "a doctrine that pleasure or happiness is the sole or chief good in life." Sahakian has noted that hedonism has further been considered "the pursuit of pleasure."[20]

At the highest level of hedonic theory comes spiritual hedonism, followed at the fifth level by Epicurean hedonism, founded by Epicurus (341-270 B.C.). According to Sahakian, "Epicurean ideals included pleasures ensuing from friendship, contentment, peace, morality, and aesthetic pursuits."[21] In a modest, withdrawn existence, "the Epicurean *summum bonum*, prudence or insight, was deemed necessary for the proper exercise of virtues leading to the pleasant or good life."[22]

Next appears quantitative hedonism at the fourth, *how* level of hedonic theory, qualitative hedonism at the mental, relating level, Cyrenaic hedonism at the second, timely level, and sensual hedonism at the gross, basic level.

Aristippus (c.435-c.356 B.C.) of Cyrene founded the Cyrenaic form of hedonism. In Sahakian's words,

> Aristippus defined virtue as the capacity for enjoyment, and enjoyment was to him a state of happiness resulting from a satisfied will, with its attendant pleasures fulfilled. Pleasure becomes the sole good and *summum bonum* (the highest good).[23]

Additionally, ethical hedonism -- at the top level of historical ethics -- has been outlined into altrustic hedonism at the highest, ideal level, sympathetic hedonism at the fifth, social level, psychological hedonism at the fourth, separative level, and egoistic hedonism (self-centered hedonism) at a third, individual level "in which each person is interested solely in his own private pleasures, oblivious to social responsibilities, friendship, and the welfare of others."[24]

Moreover, an evolutionary hedonism can be placed at the physical, timely level of ethical hedonism, and existential hedonism at the gross, basic level.[25]

It's time for more clarification. If pleasure itself is essentially an emotional reaction, then it is an accompaniment or concomitant of a personal activity. Thus, Frankena has written,

> Non-hedonists often point out . . . that if we consciously take pleasure as our end, we somehow miss it, while if we pursue and attain other things for their own sakes, not calculating the pleasure they will bring, we somehow gain pleasure. This is known as 'the hedonistic paradox'."[26]

Similarly, Sahakian has written

> that the conscious pursuit of happiness leads a person to the *hedonistic paradox*, the inability to find happiness by direct pursuit of it, since happiness is a by-product of an activity which in itself cannot be said to be happiness per se.[27]

Ralph Blake has further referred to the

> familiar "hedonistic paradox" to the effect that "pleasure to be got must be forgot" -- a paradox which may certainly be quite consistently accepted by hedonists.[28]

Perhaps the hedonic paradox is one type of hedonic problem.

Utilitarianism

While hedonism has tended to emphasize the individual outlook, the approach of utilitarianism has emphasized the social outlook. For consistency and comparison, the initial structure in Table 9 for utilitarianism can parallel that of hedonism by placing utilitarian basis (utilitarian "ground") at the gross, bottom level, utilitarian conduct at the *when*, physical level, utilitarian rationale (utilitarian reasoning) at the mental, relational level, utilitarian practice at the *how*, analytical level, utilitarian system at the fifth, synthesizing level, and utilitarian theory at the ideal, top level.

Along with further similarities, differences nonetheless between the two topics rapidly appear in the substructuring in Table 9. Thus, utilitarian theory here comprises act utilitarianism at the gross, basic level, descriptive utilitarianism at the external, physical level, egoistic utilitarianism at the concentrated, internally linking level, rule utilitarianism at the *how*, emotional level, agathistic utilitarianism at the social, synthesizing level, and ideal utilitarianism at the top, ideal level.

From review of the literature, further varieties of utilitarian philosophy have appeared. Preliminarily, the actualizing value of descriptive utilitarianism at the second level is here used to include intuitional utilitarianism at the gross, basic level, restricted utilitarianism at an active, physical level, qualitative utilitarianism at the mental, relating level, quantitative utilitarianism at the separative, *how* level, general utilitarianism at the fifth, synthesizing level, and universalistic utilitarianism at the top, ideal level.

Of the remaining sets of terms in Table 9, each is intended to form a pattern that supports its particular subtopic.

The content of utility has been deemed by philosophical utilitarians mainly to be happiness, so that the "highest good" has perhaps become the "greatest good" and then become the "greatest happiness." In Sahakian's description of utilitarian philosophy,

> the useful is the good, the good consists of the best consequence of our actions, the best consequences are happiness, and happiness must be interpreted in terms of pleasure and pain.[29]

Bentham has been credited with sparking the development of utilitarian philosophy. According to Sahakian,

Bentham became best known for his *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (1789. 1823). in which he discussed utility as the greatest happiness principle, that is, as means to achieve "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Universal happiness is the common good.[30]

Gerald Runkle has described how Bentham linked utility to morality.

> The principle of utility requires us to promote pleasure and decrease pain. Since pleasure is intrinsically good and pain intrinsically evil, morality consists of generating as much of the former and as little of the latter as posssible.[31]

Bentham also tried to quantify the concept of utility. Sahakian has stated.

> Bentham insisted upon Quantitative Hedonism. the theory that pleasures are of one kind only, namely, physical or sensual. the only difference among pleasures being one of quantity measurable by the Hedonistic Calculus. Mill contended that pleasures differ in kind as well as in amount; qualitative distinctions among pleasures could make slight amounts of high-quality pleasures much more valuable than large amounts of qualitatively inferior pleasures.[32]

In Runkle's words.

> After the *good* has been identified (pleasure). it would appear reasonable to measure *rightness* by the degree to which that good is promoted by the action in question. The theory has the advantage of being based on objective and measurable experience. How long is the pleasure (or pain)? How intense is the pleasure (or pain)? Bentham was confident that morals and legislation could be quantified and thus approached in the spirit of science.[33]

Bentham has also linked the concepts of right and wrong to the utility concept: "It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong."[34]
Utility can thus lead to correct behavior and to right action.

> The philosophy of utilitarianism is based upon the doctrine of utility, which states that the right act is that which produces the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness with the least amount of pain.[35]

In further consequence, according to Sahakian.

> Two important democratic principles followed as corollaries of Bentham's philosophy: (1) *the greatest happiness of the greatest*

number, and (2) *everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one*. The former became the definition of utilitarianism, and its criterion of the right act; the latter, which Mill named *Bentham's dictum*, was regarded as an explanatory commentary on the principle of utility.[36]

Bentham was nonetheless applying a borrowed principle. Sahakian has written, "As early as 1725, Hutcheson had formulated the principle of 'the greatest happiness for the greatest numbers'."[37]

Similarly, "The moral end can be put in a phrase that Benthamism has borrowed from a moralist of another school, namely, 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'," in Hill's words.[38]

Sahakian has further noted the historical importance philosophically of utilitarianism:

> The better part of two millenia passed before any important development in the philosophy of hedonism took place. The change occurred when British philosophers found in hedonism an individual ethic capable of social application.[39]

With realization that "felicific" is a fancy synonym for "happy," Bentham switched the label of "hedonistic calculus" (pleasure calculus) to "felicific calculus" (happiness calculus). Bentham also made a valiant effort to develop a scientific measurement of happiness. Sahakian has summarized,

> He asserted that pleasures can be evaluated solely in terms of quantitative differences. The elements to be measured are (1) *intensity*, (2) *duration*, (3) *certainty*, (4) *propinquity*, (5) *fecundity*, (6) *purity*, and (7) *extent*."[40]

Thus, propinquity is at the first, *where* level, duration is at the second, *when* level, intensity is at a concentrated, third level, extent comes at the fourth, separative level, certainty appears at a fifth, synthesizing level, and purity warrants an ideal level. The concept of fecundity can presumably refer to a wide applicability of the proposed felicific calculus. However, a usable measurement unit of happiness was still needed to provide a practical operation for quantifying.

Another historical contribution from utilitarianism has permitted the completion here of a set of ethical principles, given in Table 2, through application of the principle of utility at the fifth, social level: "An action is right insofar as it tends to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number."[41]

Kant's earlier, universal imperative (his "categorical" imperative) has been fitted at the ideal, transcendental level: "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law."

From Biblical tradition has come the ancient urging to "do unto others as you would have them do unto you." While this precept has been popularly titled the "Golden Rule" (a precious rule), it is in

fact a general statement and fits appropriately at the fourth, emotional level of ethical principles. Kant has developed an extended, more abstract version: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only."

Also from antiquity has come the Aristotelian "Doctrine of the Mean" or "Golden Mean" (a precious average) of moderation, which fits at the third, mental level of a structure of ethical principles.

Review of the technical literature has further revealed at least one entry for an ethical principle at the second, common level. In Josiah Royce's "dual principle of loyalty,"

> The first is: Be loyal. The second is: So be loyal, that is, to seek, so accept, so serve your cause that thereby the loyalty of all your brethren throughout all the world, through your example, through your influence, through your own life of loyalty wherever you find it, as well as through the sort of loyalty which you exemplify in your deeds, shall be aided, furthered, increased so far as in you lies.

Finally, at the gross, action level, another possible inclusion to complete a six-level set of ethical principles for an absolute imperative is James Martineau's "criterion of the right act":

> Every action is RIGHT, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is WRONG, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower.

Chapter 7

Sciensation of Ethics

The further desire to transform the subject of ethics into ethical science -- that is, to achieve a sciensation[1] of ethics -- was early evidenced in the 1882 publication titled *Science of Ethics* by Leslie Stephen.[2]

George Moore in his 1903 *Principia Ethica* subsequently called attention to "the ideal of ethical science."[3] Moore also referred to "ethics as a systematic science" and to the "science of ethics."[4]

Dewey and James Tufts in their 1932 *Ethics* text held that "ethics is the science that deals with conduct, in so far as this is considered as right or wrong, good or bad."[5]

More recently, Trueblood in 1963 was declaring that "ethics is the science of moral values" and the "science of conduct."[6].

Wellman affirmed in 1972 that "Moore, like most of his contemporaries, assumed that ethics is a science, a systematic body of knowledge."[7] Bahm in 1974 wrote about *Ethics as a Behavioral Science*.[8]

In line with a goal of sciensation, a six-level structure for a scientific approach proceeds from the concept of factor at a bottom level to reliability to validity to testing to hypothesis to knowledge at the top level. In the tentative structure of ethical science provided in Table 2, the six levels of ethical character, ethical living, ethical relation, ethical practice, ethical system, and ethical theory can subsume the results of ethical science.

Moreover, further development of ethical science can take place in accord with ethical sapience (ethical wisdom) -- which is here put at the top level of ethical knowledge -- that includes ethical factor at the gross level, ethical reliability at the dependable, physical level, ethical validity at the relating, mental level, ethical testing at the analytical, *how* level, and ethical hypothesis at the fifth, synthesizing level, to result in ethical truth at the top, ideal level. Thus, if hypothesis-testing is the best method to produce scientific knowledge, then ethical hypothesis-testing should be the best method to produce scientific ethical knowledge.[9] Similarly, appropriate moral hypothesis-testing could increase scientific moral knowledge and expand moral science.

Ethical measurement

Toward being scientific, scales of measurement are advantageous in permitting objectivity, mathematical calculation, and general agreement. The value-rating scale of minimum-to-maximum could be applied to a scale of goodness, as indicated in Table 10. Alternatively, the concept of goodness could be scaled along a continuum from least good to most good. However, the problem remains of deciding a measurable unit of goodness which could be readily and consistently applied.

Also shown in Table 10 is a possible scale of enjoyment. Again, the minimax value-rating scale could be applied. Even without a specific unit of enjoyment, another approach could use the concept of sentiment to start from 0% enjoyment, could indicate comfort at 20% enjoyment, show convenience at 40% enjoyment, yield satisfaction at 60% enjoyment, provide happiness at 80% enjoyment, and conclude with pleasure at 100% enjoyment. A third possibility would use equal intervals of least joy to most joy.

Finally, a preliminary scale of correctness is provided in Table 10. In actual achievement, correctness can proceed from fiasco to failure to error (mistake) to adequacy to success to triumph (breakthrough). Fiasco can readily be considered 0% correctness, but should failure be considered 20% correctness or error to be 40% correctness? More immediately plausible would be adequacy at 60% correctness at least, success at 80% correctness at least, and triumph at 100% correctness.

On an alternate continuum, right and wrong are bracketed with true and false, which are then ended with universal and null. Instead of percentage, null could get a 0 point-count, false a 20 point-count, wrong a 40 point-count, correct a 60 point-count, true an 80 point-count, and universal a 100 point-count.

Perhaps the suggestions here about ethical measurement can yield heuristic stimulation. Also toward sciensation, more structure is given here for the ethical topics of goodness, virtue, and truth.

Goodness

In *The Right and the Good*, W. D. Ross has written that Moore theorized "what makes actions right is that they are productive of more *good* than could have been produced by any other action open to the agent."[18] In Table 1, this important concept of goodness not only utilizes correctness (rectitude, rightness) at its third level but also subsumes six levels of obligingness, righteousness, correctness, propriety, morality, and virtue.

While the structure of morality has been outlined in several tiers in Table 3, a reference to Table 11 will reveal more outlining relevant to goodness. Thus, obligingness (or good-naturedness) can

consist of good tendency at the gross, basic level, of good attention at the external, physical level, of good intent (or good intention) at the internal, mental level, of good extent (or good extension) at the separative, emotional level, of good desire at the synthesizing, social level, and of goodness appreciation (or good appreciation) at the evaluative, ideal level.

For righteousness, rectitude, propriety, and even virtue, the concepts of practice, system, and theory have been appropriate to the higher levels of structuring, and rationality has been pertinent at the third level for these four of the goodness subconcepts, although the first two levels are more distinctive.

More exactly, righteousness (uprightness) here proceeds from behavioral goodness (good behavior) to common goodness (common good) to rational goodness (reasoned good) to practical goodness (practical good) to systemic goodness (systematic good) to theoretical goodness (goodness theory).

The concept of rectitude (correctness, rightness) moves from fundamental correctness (basic rightness) through *prima facie* correctness (face-value correctness, surface rightness) through rational correctness (correct rationale, right reasoning) through practical correctness (practical rightness) through systemic correctness (systematic rightness) to theoretical correctness (theoretical rightness).

Next, propriety (properness) can be outlined with fundamental propriety (basic propriety), living propriety (proper living, proper life), rational propriety (reasoned propriety), practical propriety, systemic propriety (systematic propriety), and theoretical propriety.

The concept of virtue itself can be outlined according to particular virtue at the basic, gross level, typical virtue at the external, physical level, rational virtue at the internal, mental level, practical virtue at the *how*, analytic level, systemic virtue (systematic virtue) at the fifth, synthetic level, and theoretical virtue at the top, ideal level.

Table 11 also shows a testing of the hypothesized structures for correctness and for righteousness. That is, each of the six subconcepts of rectitude (correctness, rightness) is made into a subtopic supported by its own set of six subconcepts obtained from the relevant literature. For example, under rectitude in Table 11, "correct choice" or "right choice" is placed at the mental level of fundamental correctness; "correct living" comes at the physical level of *prima facie* correctness; "correct judgment" appears at the top level of rational correctness; "correct conduct" fits the physical level of practical correctness; and "scientific correctness" is positioned at the top level of theoretical correctness.

Similarly, the concern for righteousness (uprightness) reveals that its six subconcepts can be further outlined with appropriate (apt, "suitable") technical terminology. Thus, under righteousness in Table 11, the concept of "good application" or "good use" comes at the social level of behavioral goodness (good behavior); "good faith" comes at the top level of the "common good" (common goodness); "good motive" comes at the emotional level of rational goodness (reasoned good); the "good things of life" (good possessions) come at the gross,

basic level of practical goodness; a "good cause" comes at the basic, input level of systemic goodness (systematic good); and a "knowledge of good" (goodness knowledge) comes at the mental level of theoretical goodness.

Virtue

More of the relevant (pertinent) technical terms are yet to be accumulated to complete filling a preliminary structure for both virtue and propriety, but these two structures have been partially filled and tested. Virtue (from the Latin *virtus* for courage) has been a significant philosophical concept from the time of the ancient Greek philosophers. According to Tsanoff, "By virtue Socrates signified excellence or self-fulfillment, and by knowledge he understood the conviction of thorough insight."[11] Tsanoff has further suggested that "virtue is a habit of the will, to keep us within reason in every situation."[12]

Sahakian has written that "Plato defined virtue as excellence; Aristotle defined it as habitual moderation."[13] Moreover, Aristotle provided a list of moderate virtues like courage, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, gentleness, truthfulness, wittiness, and friendliness, with accompanying vices of deficiency or of excess.[14] In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle declared, "The Good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue."[15]

Kant, at a much later date, linked virtue to the emphasis on duty: "*Virtue* is the strength of the man's maxim in his obedience to duty."[16]

While Kant thus used virtue to underlie social morality, he also tied the ancient concept of happiness to personal ethics. Happiness is "the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will."[17]

Kant then combined the two concepts to give the highest good: "Virtue and happiness together constitute the possession of the *summum bonum* in a person."[18]

The next concern about virtue was educational: "Can virtue . . . be . . . taught?" was in the opening line of Plato's *Meno*.[19] In Socrates' viewpoint, according to Sahakian, "Virtue, inasmuch as it is knowledge of what is good, can be taught to anyone; consequently, man, through instruction, can improve his moral lot and thereby his happiness."[20]

For significance and consistency, in Tables 2 and 3, ethical virtue and moral virtue are placed at the ideal level of ethical learning and of moral learning respectively. According to Sahakian, the learning and practice of virtue can become a habit: "Virtue is a personality characteristic that results from the regular practice of the right act until it becomes a habit of the individual."[21] That is, since "correct behavior" is a more common phrase for "right acts," an individual can practice correct behavior until it becomes habitual.

Angeles has defined cardinal virtues to be "the highest ideals or forms of conduct in a given culture."[22] From this emphasis upon the importance of virtue, the phrase "by virtue of" has come to approximate "by authority of."

Truth

Beside virtue, another long-time philosophical concern has been the topic of truth -- presently a prime ingredient of ethics. Verity (or truth), according to Table 1, appears at the sixth, highest level as the goal of quintessence (or perfection). The subconcepts of truth given in Table 1 are partly substructured in Table 12. That is, verifiability (or verification) can consist of truth character (truth nature) at the bottom, basic level, truth measurement at the external, physical level, truth research (truth study) at the mental, relational level, truth practice (or practical truth) at the *how*, analytical level, truth system (or systemic truth, systematic truth) at the fifth, synthesizing level, and truth theory (or theoretical truth) at the top, ideal level.

Appropriate structures of technical concepts are also presented in Table 12 for verisimilitude (seeming truth), veritability, and veracity.

Preliminarily, candor (or frankness) is fitted -- from bottom to top -- with openness, plainness, probity, sincerity, honesty, and honor. Similarly, for authenticity (or genuineness), a technical structure can preliminarily be filled in ascending levels with asseveration, ascription, profession, affirmation, confirmation, and trustworthiness.

Philosophical literature has already provided further development of the structure of verifiability, which is also shown in Table 12. Tentatively, the six levels of truth theory (theoretical truth) are filled with empirical theory of truth at the gross, basic level, with correspondence theory of truth (corresponding truth, in brief) at the overt, physical level, with coherence theory of truth (coherent truth) at the linking, mental level, with pragmatic theory of truth (workable truth) at the *how*, analytic level, with a consistency theory of truth (consistent truth) here inserted at the synthesizing, social level, and with a scientific theory of truth (scientific truth or truth science) placed at the top, ideal level.

The scientific theory of truth is immediately given a scientific structure of truth factor (or true factor) at the gross, basic level, truth reliability (or true reliability) at the external, physical level, truth validity (or true validity) at the mental, relating level, truth test (or true test) at the analytical, emotional level, truth hypothesis (or true hypothesis) at the fifth, synthesizing level, and truth unity (or true unity) for the result at the top, ideal level.

However, more approaches to truth theory have been offered philosophically, and are here covered by the separate, suggested "consistency theory of truth," included at the fifth level of truth

theory.[23] The umbrella-like consistency theory of truth could be composed of an intuitive, or "intuitionistic," theory of truth at the gross, basic level, the historic theory of truth at a descriptive, physical level, the semantic theory of truth at the covert, mental level,[24] the performative (performatory) theory of truth at the emotional, energetic level, a utilitarian-style (useful) theory of truth at the fifth, social level, with the ideal level available for a suggested "unification theory of truth."

The proposed consistency theory of truth illustrates that the six levels of structuring permit a cumulation -- or inclusiveness -- of content. Thus, a concept at a third level can make use of the previous concepts at both the first and second levels. For example, the coherence theory of truth at the third relational level could include physical correspondence coherently from the correspondence theory of truth at the second level and also include factual confirmations coherently from the empirical theory of truth at the gross level so that this data occurs ' a rational manner.[25] Similarly, a scientific theory of truth could integrate the various emphases from previous levels of truth theory.

Of an intuitive (intuitionistic) theory of truth, in contrast to a perceived, "common sense" approach to truth, Nicholas Rescher has written,

> According to the intuitionistic theory there are two sorts of truths: (1) basic or primitive truths whose truthfulness is given immediately by some nondiscursive process or processes that may be characterized as intuitive, and (2) inferred truths that can be established by appropriate processes -- be they deductive or inductive -- from those of the former group.[26]

Additionally, a historic theory of truth could come at the second, *when* level. In a summary by Phenix,

> Actually, the goal of a complete history, even of one event, is never attainable. The whole truth about anything is infinitely complex and can never be told. Hence the historian, who is a finite being writing for an audience of finite beings, has to tell a partial truth. The critical question for the historian concerns the grounds for selecting what he will include in his account. The artist's grounds for selection are esthetic effect, the historian's are fidelity to the facts. The historian's task is to decide which limited materials will most faithfully represent the infinite concrete truth about what happened.[27]

Phenix has further described the particular contribution of historic truth:

> Does historical knowledge give insight into the true nature of things? Is it as reliable as knowledge in the sciences? Perhaps the best answer is that historical knowledge does yield truth, but of a somewhat different kind from that of the natural sciences.

Historical knowledge embraces the particular and unique as well as the generalized and abstract qualities of things. By its interpretive schemes it also integrates value factors into knowledge. History thus provides true insights into the nature of things as perceived within the context of human significance. Truth in history is thus broader in scope and more personal in reference than the abstract metrical truth of natural science.[28]

Among the various theories of truth, however, perhaps the best developed are the correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories.

1. Correspondence theory. Rescher has given this description of the correspondence theory of truth.

Perhaps the most ancient and certainly in all eras the most widely accepted theory of truth is the *correspondence theory*, according to which truth is *correspondence to fact*. The theory stipulates that a proposition is true if the results of a confrontation between it and the objective situation with which it deals show that the facts actually are as it represents them. Aristotle formulated the principle as follows: "To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false, while to say that what is is, or that what is not is not, is true".[29]

C. J. F. Williams has added,

Aristotle's dictum that to say of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not . . . has been regarded as the first statement of the Correspondence Theory of Truth.[30]

According to D. J. O'Connor,

The correspondence theory of truth may be regarded as a systematic development of the commonsense account of truth embodied in such dictionary definitions for "truth" as "conformity with fact" and the like.[31]

2. Coherence theory. Along with the correspondence theory of truth, the coherence theory of truth has received much philosophic attention. For example, Alan White has provided the following type of comment:

According to the coherence theory, to say that a statement (usually called a judgment, belief or proposition) is true or false is to say that it coheres or fails to cohere with a system of other statements; that it is a member of a system whose elements are related to each other by ties of logical implication as the elements in a system of pure mathematics are related.[32]

White has further described the historical usage of the coherence theory:

The coherence theory is characteristic of the great rationalist system-building metaphysicians Leibniz, Spinoza, Hegel, and Bradley; but it has also had a vogue with several members of the logical positivist school, notably Neurath and Hempel, who were much influenced by the systems of pure mathematics and theoretical physics.[33]

3. Pragmatic theory. More recent than the correspondence or coherence theories is the pragmatic (practical) theory of truth, which has several varieties. Thus, according to Gertrude Ezorsky,

> Peirce had insisted that a clear concept must have practical bearings on conduct. But Peirce, it must be remembered, was thinking of the practice of an experimenter, for, as he saw it, only the sort of experience that might result from an experiment can have a bearing upon our practice. Moreover, this experience must be seen not as particular but as inescapably general.[34]

William James' interpretation was more toward the individual than toward the general:

> Whereas Peirce had construed practical consequences to be those which are experimentally and publicly determinable for the community, James interpreted "practical" to mean the particular import that a belief has in the life of the individual.[35]

Dewey's pragmatic outlook has been termed "truth as warranted assertibility."

> Dewey developed a theory of truth consistent with the pragmatic method. He began with the assumption that if we are to understand the practical bearings our ideas have on our experience, we must see them at work in the contexts of their use, those of reflective thinking and problem solving. It is easy to subscribe to the formula that truth is the correspondence between ideas and facts. But what does this correspondence mean in practice?"[36]

Beside an attempt to expand on topics like truth which are relevant to ethical sciensation, it is also possible to expand on the usefulness to ethics of the concept of enjoyment, an undertaking for the next chapter.

Chapter 8

Enjoyment of Personal Life

"Appreciate the past, anticipate the future, and enjoy the present -- moderately, according to environmental opportunities." This statement can be the *when* principle for the dynamics of personal behavior. The presentation of a scale of enjoyment (joy) that proceeds from sentiment to comfort to convenience to the philosophically familiar concepts of satisfaction from achievement, of happiness from utilitarianism, and of pleasure from hedonism has indicated the encompassing scope of joy in relation to individual existence and life.

Since joy is here deemed essentially an emotional reaction, so presumably are each of the six values strung along the continuum of enjoyment (Gr. *en*, in + joy + -ment, result of = the result of taking in joy). That is, one *feels* sentimental, *feels* comfortable, *feels* convenience (at least a little), *feels* satisfied, *feels* happy, and *feels* pleasurable, with *feeling* itself placed at the gross, basic level of emotion.

An emotion is an internal, intangible mood which can be accompanied by an external, tangible expression like a smile or a frown, and perhaps a physical manifestation like hand-clapping or finger-chiding.

The general advice to enjoy oneself in present time does not specify a particular application. One can gain enjoyment from a pleasant melody, a refreshing drink, a friendly companion, an interesting story. Enjoyment being an emotional reaction presumably has both a physical component and a mental component, and probably includes a mental evaluation. Accordingly, there is a difference of degree between concepts like satisfaction, happiness, and pleasure rather than a difference of type (or "kind").

For further background about emotional behavior, a glance at Table 13 shows a tentative structure (or outline) of emotion (emotive behavior, emotional behavior) -- with feeling at the gross, basic level, passion at a second, externalizing level, compassion at the third, mental level, favoring at the fourth, analytical level, desire at the fifth, synthesizing level, and idealization at the highest level.

Within the subtopic of desire, need appears at the gross, basic level, want at the physical level, wish at a mental level, fancy at the analytical level, urge at the synthesizing level, and pleasure at the top, evaluative level. While pleasure comes at the highest level of desire, Table 13 also indicates that satisfaction comes at the highest level of application and that felicity (happiness) comes at the highest level of harmony.

John Kekes has clarified the concept of an attitude concerning happiness:

> The attitudinal aspect of happiness is more than a succession of satisfying episodes. For the attitude requires that the significance of the episodes be appraised in terms of one's whole life. This appraisal need not involve conscious reflection, although it frequently does. It may simply be an unspoken feeling of approval of one's life and a sense that particular episodes fit into it. The episodes may be goals achieved, obstacles overcome, experiences enjoyed, or just a seamless continuation of the approved pattern of one's life.[1]

Kekes has also noted the affinity of the concepts of happiness, satisfaction, and pleasure with the notion of enjoyment:

> According to common sense, then, a happy man is satisfied with his life. He would like it to continue the same way. If asked, he would say that things are going well for him. His most important desires are being satisfied. He is doing and having most of what he wants. He frequently experiences joy, contentment, and pleasure.[2]

Enjoyment would be an important part of the long-time philosophical concept of the "good life." Each individual should want a "good life" personally, a high "quality of life" socially, and a "proper life" culturally.

Understanding of one's culture provides a realization of feasibility, of practicality. To desire to go on a space voyage was not feasible in 1900, but today is a practical possibility.

To appreciate the past includes the realization that a monarch in 1800 did not enjoy airconditioning which is available to the ordinary U.S. citizen today.

To anticipate a future activity not now extant can perhaps be turned into a challenge to create this activity (to change a "stumbling block" into a "stepping stone").

Yet, regardless of various cultural conditions, philosophical literature has provided many historical references to the "good life" for the individual and also to a high "quality of life," hopefully provided by a society.

Moreover, a cultural concern with an individual's "proper life" has provided an ethical and moral emphasis, while concern with the familiar concept of "common good" indicates a balancing of social interests with personal interests.

The "good life" and "quality of life"

The "good life" is here positioned in Table 14 at the highest level of "quality of life." That is, in Table 14, individual life is considered to consist of living basis (life base, basis of life) at the gross, basic level, of living conduct (life conduct) at the *when*, physical level, of living rationale (life rationale) at the mental, linking level, of living style (life style) at the emotional, analytical level, of living integrity (life integrity) at the fifth, synthesizing level, and of living quality (life quality) at the ideal, top level.

In turn, life quality (quality of life) steps upward from tolerable living (tolerable life) at the gross, basic level to comfortable living (comfortable life) at the actual, physical level to correct living (right life) at the mental, relational level to compatible living (compatible life) at the *how*, analytical level to congenial living (congenial life) at the fifth, synthesizing level to good living (the good life) at the top, ideal level.

The good life itself, then, in Table 14, provides interesting living (interesting life) at the basic, gross level, abundant living (abundant life) at the external, physical level, moderate living (moderate life) at the mental level, leisurely living (leisurely life) at an emotional level, useful living (useful life) at the synthesizing level, and joyous living (joyful life) at the top, ideal level.

Philosophically, according to Frankena,

> the good life will be a "mixed life," as Plato said, consisting of activities and experiences . . . that are enjoyable. . . . We may think of these experiences and activities as making up the *content* of the good life.[3]

Frankena further believes that the good life should provide a harmonious pattern and a subjective form -- or personal lifestyle. "Just what content, pattern, and subjective form the good life has will, no doubt, vary considerably from person to person."[4]

Of the good life, Phenix has adjudged, "Pleasure and happiness are commonly associated with the good life; but they are not its inevitable goal or standard."[5]

Phenix has further suggested that "the primary aim of education should be conversion from the self-centered striving for advantage to a life of loyal dedication to excellence."[6]

Proper life

Also structured in Table 14 is a tentative outline for the "proper life" -- positioned within the topic of propriety (properness) which itself consists of fundamental propriety (basic propriety) at

the gross, basic level, living propriety (proper living or proper life) at the physical, external level, rational propriety (reasonable propriety) at the mental, linking level, practical propriety (proper practice) at the *how*, analytical level, systemic propriety (systematic propriety) at the fifth, synthesizing level, and theoretical propriety at the top, ideal level.

The "proper life" then includes proper problem at the gross, basic level, proper conduct at the *when*, physical level, proper correctness (proper rightness) at the mental, connecting level, proper norm at the emotional, analytical level, proper standard at the fifth, synthesizing level, and proper criterion at the top, ideal level.

Common good

Beside proper living, the approach of the "common good" has further been used to help blend individual living into desirable welfare for a social group. A quick reference to Table 11 will disclose that common goodness (common good) -- at the second, physical level of righteousness (uprightness) -- consists of a good existence at the basic, gross level, a good time at the *when*, actual level, a good selection (good choice) at the mental, relational level, good option at the emotional, analytical level, good usage at the synthesizing, social level, and good faith at the highest, ideal level.

The concept of goodness has been attached directly or inherently to important, familiar phrases like the "good life," good "quality of life," "human rights" (good and true personal prerogatives), "good behavior," good conduct," "common good," and a good "way of life."

The time-honored concept of the "common good" seemingly balances the concept of "human rights," or personal rights.

These individual prerogatives include both personal freedoms (positively) and protections against social interference (negatively). A balancing of personal rights with the "common good" socially can result in a good cultural "way of life" (pattern of living).

The general topic of the "common good" has also been extended to many social applications. The Phenix book titled *Education and the Common Good* uses the concepts of "intelligence" to deal with intellect and communication, of "creativity" to deal with aesthetics, manners, work, and recreation, of "conscience" to deal with nature, health, family, social class, race, economics, government, and world responsibility, and of "reverence" to deal with religion.

The Neill book directly titled *The Common Good* consists of 12 units concerning: government, society, liberty; liberty and loyalty; American educational issues and problems; social problems in an expanding society; family and community; national economic problems; government and politics; the federal government and the welfare state; problems of state and local government; the foreign policy of the United States; foreign trade, aid, and procurement; and international organization for peace.

According to Neill, "The object of a political society is to enable men to achieve the common good while still allowing each person to develop the faculties he received from his Creator."[7] Neill has continued,

> In a concrete sense, the common good is expressed in the benefits we share together: adequate military defense, protection of our civil and political rights, community services such as good roads and adequate water supplies. These services are concrete tasks performed by our government in the name of the common good. In a less concrete sense, the common good is the good life for all persons. The common good, however, does not ignore the more fundamental rights of the family, which is a more basic social unit than the state.[8]

Robert Roth has noted a Deweyan emphasis relevant to the common good: "Does the object or action contribute to the welfare of others? If it does, it is not only valued but valuable, not only prized but appraised, not only an object of desire but a true or reasonable good."[9]

Roth has further written,

> Dewey wanted the individual to appreciate the attractiveness of cooperating with others in the common enterprise of achieving the welfare of all so that the individual might voluntarily and joyously engage in such activity.[10]

Roth's language leads to the realization that several more familiar phrases have similar meaning. Thus, "common good" is similar to "general good" is similar to "general well-being" is similar to "general welfare."[11] Since "well" is the adverb equivalent of "good," the phrase "well-being" approximates the phrase "good-being" and again links the ethical concept of goodness to terms like "well-being" and "well-fare" (welfare). For example, the U.S. constitution refers to the "general welfare" rather than to the similar "common good."

Indeed, while the concept of human rights was proclaimed in the first paragraph of the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the social concept of "general welfare" was proclaimed in the preamble (the first paragraph) of the U.S. Constitution in 1787.

> We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

Alternatively, Angus Campbell in the 1981 *The Sense of Well-Being in America*, used the term "well-being" rather than "welfare" in carrying out a psychological and sociological survey nationally.

> In this book I have reported the major findings of a series of national surveys conducted by the Institute for Social Research between the years 1957 and 1978. I have attempted to describe, without the aid of charts, statistics or professional jargon, the state of psychological well-being of the American people during this period and the changes which have occurred over these two eventful decades.[12]

While "several hundred different aspects of people's lives that contribute to their general feeling of satisfaction and pleasure in life" could be listed, Campbell considered 12 "domains of life": marriage, family life, friendship, standard of living, work, neighborhood, city or town or residence, the nation, housing, education, health, and the self.[13] Overall, "Americans are most likely to express high satisfaction with their marriage and their family life and low satisfaction with their economic status and their education."[14]

Campbell noted that "we have learned to associate national well-being with economic welfare."[15] He added,

> It is difficult to doubt that economic welfare contributes something critical to the psychological quality of life. Certainly as income has increased over the nation's history, the proportion of the citizenry living pleasant and satisfying lives must also have increased. And . . . studies comparing measures of satisfaction with life in countries at various levels of economic development typically find the highest sense of well-being in the countries with the highest per capita income.[16]

Campbell has further commented about the "good life":

> We have tended very strongly in this country to identify economic welfare with the good life and to equate a rising national income with general well-being. It will be our argument in these pages that economic welfare may be a necessary condition for public well-being but it is not a sufficient one.[17]

Campbell also connected good health to the concept of general welfare.

> No one would contest the assumption that the status of the nation's physical health is a measure of national well-being. Whenever people are asked what they consider to be the essential requirements of a good life, good health is invariably near the top of the list.[18]

Campbell tried to apply the concept of "quality of life" also. The survey teams used an open-ended question:

> When a cross-section of Americans was asked in 1973, "What does the quality of life mean to you -- that is, what would you say

that overall quality of your life depends on?" their most frequent answers were in order: (1) economic security, (2) family life, (3) personal strengths (honesty, fortitude, and intelligence), (4) friendships, and (5) the attractiveness of their physical environment.[19]

Moreover,

> Satisfaction with self has the strongest relationship with general life satisfaction, satisfaction with standard of living is second and satisfaction with family life is a close third. . . . Satisfaction with marriage is also high on the list, as are satisfaction with friends and work.[20]

Chapter 9

Testing and Conclusions

Now, maybe it's time for some testing. Let's return from a possible balancing of common good and of individual good to this essay's main procedural goal, which has been been to structure (outline) the technical concepts of ethics -- although doing so has required consideration of the closely related technical concepts of morality and of mores.

Testing the hypothesized structuring

Is the presentation made in this essay consistent with other carefully developed approaches to the subjects of ethics, morality, and mores? While the testing will be qualitative (rather than quantitative) and rational (rather than empirical), nonetheless it adheres to the suggested "consistency" theory of truth. Moreover, both a secular testing and a religious testing will be provided here.

1. A secular test. The first testing comes particularly from *The Philosophy of Moral Development* written in 1981 by Lawrence Kohlberg, founder and director of the Center for Moral Education at Harvard University. During this time Kohlberg has taught a course about "Moral Development and Moral Education."

> The major required readings for my graduate course . . . are Plato's *Republic*, Emile Durkheim's *Moral Education*, Jean Piaget's *Moral Judgment of the Child*, and John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*. These books on moral education were not written for professional researchers or graduate students but for literate people interested in the great questions of society.[1]

Kohlberg has "also tried to keep in mind the awareness these great writers had that moral education is 'inter-disciplinary' and that it requires an integration of psychological, philosophical, and sociological (or political) perspectives."[2]

Initially, Kohlberg for a doctoral dissertation in 1958 attempted to test and extend Piaget's exposition of moral judgment.

> When I started my dissertation in moral psychology, I was aware of a tradition of thought about moral education originating with Plato. In the contemporary world, however, it seemed as if only optimistic Sunday school educators and Boy Scout leaders thought or wrote about moral education.[3]

More specifically,

> I started the dissertation as an effort to replicate Piaget's (1948) description of moral judgment stages, to extend them to adolescence, and to examine the relation of stage growth to opportunities to take the role of others in the social environment. These goals led to my revision and elaboration of Piaget's two-stage model into six stages of moral judgment, at first cautiously labeled as "developmental ideal types."[4]

He noted this approach of the phases (stages) of moral development differs from conditioning psychology or from psychoanalysis:

> These implications define a cognitive-developmental theory or paradigm for the study of the child's moralization that is basically different from that offered by behavioristic learning theories or psychoanalytic accounts of superego formation.[5]

Kohlberg has also suggested

> that a stage of judgments . . . is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral action, which also requires a second phase judgment of responsibility and "ego strength" or "will."[6]

Kohlberg in his approach has emphasized the overall goal of justice.

> Following Socrates, Kant, and Piaget, the answer I and my colleagues offer says that the first virtue of a person, school, or society is justice -- interpreted in a democratic way as equity or equal respect for all people.[7]

He has further tied the concept of social justice to deontology (duty ethics): "Democratic justice is an answer to the deontological question, 'What are the rights of people, and what duties do these rights entail?'"[8]

Kohlberg has attempted to find general or even universal principles, declaring, "Judgments to be moral should rest on certain principles, on those principles that are universalizable."[9]

These encompassing principles could in part be the result of human commonalities. But Kohlberg has also referred to "ideal principles."

> This is because the ideal principles of any social structure are basically alike, if only because there simply are not that many principles that are articulate, comprehensive, and integrated enough to be satisfying to the human intellect.[10]

These universal principles are in addition to any cultural or social relativity.

> In more elaborated form, a theory of the virtues usually rests on social relativism, the doctrine that, given the relativity of values, the only objective framework for studying values is relative to the majority values of the group or society in question, an assumption I criticize.[11]

Kohlberg has also defined, "Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them."[12]

He has integrated both the personal and the social in his concept of right action: "Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and in terms of standards that have been critically examined and agreed on by the whole society."[13]

Kohlberg has added this comment about the "naturalistic fallacy."

> Philosophers tell psychologists they cannot go "from *is* to *ought*" by erecting a philosophy of the good and the right simply from a study of what people do value as good and right. To do so, they claim, is to commit "the naturalistic fallacy." My colleagues and I agree with them. Psychologists can, and should, however, move back and forth between philosophic assumptions and empirical findings.[14]

Thus Kohlberg has labeled one of his chapters "From *Is* to *Ought:* How To Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral Development."[15]

Another suggestion given here is that *ought* may not be derived from *is* but can be combined with *is*. Thus, in a deductive syllogism, the major premise can be a universal principle of oughtness, the minor premise can be a factual case of isness, and the deductive conclusion becomes an application of the universal oughtness (a value) to a particular isness (a fact).

Similarly, Samuel Hart has combined "factual evidence" with "valuational norms" in moral reasoning:

> Reason transforms our impulsive behavior into a principled conduct. In justifying conduct from a moral point of view reason appeals to factual evidence and the implicit valuational norms centering on the common good, as a heuristic principle in the process of harmonizing our genuine wants, goals, and aspirations.[16]

Incidentally, the following summary of "six moral stages" by Kohlberg[17] can compare readily to the six presumed levels of general

behavior. Thus Stage 1 (or phase one) of "punishment and obedience" can come at a gross level of behavior, Stage 2 of "instrumental exchange" at a physical level of behavior, Stage 3 of "interpersonal conformity" at a mental level of behavior, Stage 4 of "social system and conscience maintenance" at an emotional level of behavior, Stage 5 of "prior rights and social contract" at a social level of behavior, and Stage 6 of "universal ethical principles" at an ideal level of behavior. These comparisons are put below into table form. Thus, the presumption of six levels of general behavior is both consistent with six phases of moral development and indicative of a rationale for there being six particular moral stages.

Six Moral Stages	Six Levels of General Behavior
Stage 1. Punishment and obedience	Gross
Stage 2. Instrumental exchange	Physical
Stage 3. Interpersonal conformity	Mental
Stage 4. Social system and conscience maintenance	Emotional
Stage 5. Prior rights and social contract	Social
Stage 6. Universal ethical principles	Ideal

In the search for universalization, Kohlberg has suggested that "virtue is ultimately one, not many, and it is always the same ideal form regardless of climate or culture" and also that "the name of this ideal form is justice."[18] In terms of the *where* principle of personal behavior ("Each person ordinarily lives within a social environment within the physical environment"), Kohlberg has seemingly included both a reference to the "climate" of the physical environment and to the "culture" of a social environment.

On an individual, personal basis, virtue could be considered *excellence*, while on a social basis virtue could be considered to be *justice*. Thus, C. Eugene Conover has declared that U.S. culture emphasizes both personal happiness and social justice.

> The dominant emphasis in the most influential new ethical theories and in our culture is upon the freedom and the happiness of persons, and the conditions for the fulfillment of our hopes for social justice and peace.[19]

Even then, perhaps it can be argued that the concept of social

justice subsumes personal excellence and hence that the single virtue of social justice includes the virtue of personal excellence. Substantively, Kohlberg has defined justice to be "primary regard for the value and equality of all human beings and for reciprocity in human relations."[20] Procedurally, according to Kohlberg, "By definition, justice is a resolution of conflicting claims in light of principles and procedures that appear fair to the parties involved in the conflict."[21]

Indeed, Kohlberg has already pushed the Golden Rule into the conceptual boundary of justice by referring to "justice as reversibility."

> "Justice as Reversibility" begins where "From *Is* to *Ought*" ends. It claims that there is one moral principle at the heart of ethics, the Golden Rule. Another name for the Golden Rule is *reversibility*: "Put yourself in everyone else's place." Still another name is "moral musical chairs": "Let everyone trade places before choosing and be willing to be in the worst-off chair."[22]

Kohlberg has further used the "reversibility" approach to place utilitarianism into the scope of the justice concept. When "there is a conflict between the principle of utility as the greatest good of the greatest number and the principle of justice as respect for individual human dignity,"[23]

> I claim that justice as reversibility (moral musical chairs) resolves these dilemmas by recognizing utility within the framework of respect for individual dignity expressed as the willingness to trade places with others; that is, the Golden Rule.[24]

For clarification, it is worth noting that the idea of the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" of utilitarianism emphasizes the social environment while the concept of "individual human dignity" emphasizes the single person.

In a social application of his six stages of moral development, Kohlberg has commented that ideas of justice can differ from a majority opinion because "most adults in American society reason mainly not at the principled but at the conventional stages, Stages 3 and 4."[25] He then proposes "that the dominant ideology of the United States and other Western countries has been a liberal social contract view corresponding to Stage 5"[26] and urges "that the liberal faith is and should be evolving toward the ideas of justice embodied in a sixth stage."[27]

In a separate application, Kohlberg has noted how a U.S. adult majority at the conventional stages of reasoning can differ from Supreme Court justices who could be at Stages 5 and 6 of moral judgment.

> In the United States, legislators are usually responsive to public opinion, but the Supreme Court should be responsive to "evolving

standards of justice" rather than to common opinion when interpreting the Constitution.[28]

Kohlberg, while differentiating between moral development and religious orientation, has noted the possibility of parallel stages.

> I restate the autonomy of ethics, the claim that stages of justice and the highest-stage formulation of principles of justice stand on philosophic and psychological grounds independent of religious thinking or religious faith. However, I also point to stages of religious and metaphysical orientation parallel to the moral stages.[29]

The fact that moral development is but a part of a larger picture of human existence is labeled by Kohlberg to be a hypothetical seventh stage or to be perspectives beyond justice.

> I acknowledge the fact that each moral stage poses and leaves unanswered such questions as "Why be just or moral in a world that often appears to be unjust?" Finally, I consider as a hypothetical "seventh stage" kinds of religious thought and experience that can offer answers left unanswered by Stage 6 rational justice.[30]

In his research methodology, Kohlberg has made use of "hypothetical dilemmas."

> We studied seventy-five American boys from early adolescence on. These youths were continually presented with hypothetical moral dilemmas, all deliberately philosophical, some found in medieval works of casuistry. On the basis of their reasoning about these dilemmas at a given age, we constructed the typology of definite and universal levels of development in moral thought.[31]

He has also turned this approach into a repeated, longitudinal study.

> For fifteen years, I have been studying the development of moral judgment and character, primarily by following the same group of seventy-five boys at three-year intervals from early adolescence (at the beginning, the boys were aged 10-16) through young manhood (they are now aged 22-28), supplemented by a series of studies of development in other cultures.[32]

With rapid changes in living conditions externally and with different levels of moral development internally, educator Kohlberg has found that the "Socratic dialogue" of questions and answers can be used so that "the teaching of virtue is the asking of questions and the pointing of the way, not the giving of answers."[33] In Kohlberg's opinion, "Moral education is the leading of people upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that was not there before."[34]

Thus, in this selective summary of Kohlberg's approach to moral development, the present structured approach to ethics and morality can readily be blended to much of his findings and interpretations.

2. A religious test. The fact that the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, and his student Aristotle, lived several hundred years B.C. (Before Christ) indicates their versions of ethics and of morality would have been constructed separately from Christian religion.

However, both approaches can seemingly support each other in practical personal and social guidance. Thus, George Thomas has suggested, "Should not moral philosophy and Christian ethics be regarded as complementary rather than mutually exclusive?"[35]

Arthur Holmes has urged that the 20th-century Christian "develop for himself a working relationship between Christianity and philosophy that will discredit neither Christianity nor philosophy.[36]

Richard Gula, in his 1982 book about "moral norms," has written that "moral theology, or Christian ethics, is concerned with God's revelation of himself in Christ and through the Spirit as an invitation calling for our response."[37]

While he held that "Christian morality is a religious morality,"[38] he also made a secular-like statement that "the moral community's experience of what helps and hinders the well-being of human life gives rise to moral norms.[39]

Gula has further referred to "formal norms" that "remind us of what is good or bad and encourage us to do good and avoid evil."[40]

Gula has considered the Golden Rule to be "a formal norm: 'whatever you wish others to do to you, do so to them.'"[41] He has also expanded upon formal norms within Christian ethics:

> Other examples are do good and avoid evil, respect life, be honest, be just, be chaste, be grateful, be humble, be prudent, be reasonable, etc.; expressed negatively, do not be selfish, vain, promiscuous, proud, stingy, merciless, foolish, etc.[42]

Beside these norms which could also be deemed appropriate within philosophical ethics, Gula has given consideration to the philosopher's *should* ("ought to") approach by referring to a "moral agent."

> The analysis begins and ends with the *moral agent*. Who is the "I" of "What should I do?" This involves clarifying the personal context of the moral agent by considering the person's capacities for certain moral action, the person's identity and integrity, as well as intentions.[43]

Gula has also harnessed the philosophical concept of "deductive syllogism" to moral decisions.

> The norm serves as the major premise of a syllogism, the minor premise is the situational analysis identifying the circumstances relevant to the norm, and the conclusion of this deductive process is the judgment of conscience.[44]

Moreover, Gula has highlighted, in tabular format, what can be considered a historical change from the religious "absolutivity" of the medieval period in Western history to a present, more knowledgeable form of religious relativity. While making no particular reference to the change in the physical sciences from the absolute physics of Isaac Newton (1643-1727) to the relative physics of Albert Einstein (1879-1955), Gula has contrasted a "classicist worldview" and a "modern worldview." He has commented that

> contemporary moral theology wants to preserve the clarity, consistency, and precision of the classicist worldview while at the same time respecting human freedom, the uniqueness of the historical moral situation, and the unfinished character of the moral life so valued by the historically conscious worldview.[45]

Gula has rationally compared the two viewpoints according to the features of characteristics, method, moral theology and the moral life, advantages, and disadvantages.[46]

Features	Classicist Worldview	Modern Worldview
Characteristics	Views reality primarily as static, immutable and eternal	Views reality primarily as dynamic and evolving, historical and developing
	The world of reality is marked by objective order and harmony	The world of reality is marked by progressive growth and change
	Speaks of the world in terms of well-defined essences and abstract, universal concepts	Speaks of the world in terms of individual traits and concrete historical particulars
Method	Begins with abstract, universal principles	Begins with the experience of the particular
	Primarily deductive	Primarily inductive
	Conclusions always the same	Some conclusions change as the empirical evidence changes
	Conclusions are always secure and complete as long as deductive logic is correct	Leaves room for incompleteness, possible error; open to revision; conclusions are as accurate as evidence will allow

Features	Classicist Worldview	Modern Worldview
Moral Theology and the Moral Life	Deals with issues in the abstract and as universal	Deals with issues in the concrete particularity of historical moment
	Deals with universals of humanhood	Deals with the historical person in the historically particular circumstances
	Conforms to pre-established norms and to authority	Formulations of norms are historically conditioned
	Emphasis on duty and obligation to reproduce established order	Emphasis on responsibility and actions fitting to changing times
	Lacks integration with the great mysteries of faith and roots in critical biblical orientation	More soundly integrated with the mysteries of faith and nourished by biblical teaching
Advantages	Clear, simple, and sure in views of reality and in its conclusions about what ought to be done	Respects the uniqueness of the person and the ambiguities of historical circumstances
		Sees the moral life as always incomplete and in need of conversion
Disadvantages	Tends to be authoritarian in the sense of claiming to have answers suitable for all time	Tends to relativism in the sense that nothing seems unconditionally binding
	Tends to be dogmatic in the sense of having the last word	Tends to be antinomian (anti-legal) in the sense that all laws are irrelevant

Overall, the earlier religious approach tended toward the general while the present approach can be more particular and specific. Along with the enormously increasing knowledge that is now available to the human species, the qualitative, enlightening table above indicates that religious ethics in Western regions is being updated and elaborated in universal, relative, and even particular manner.

Conclusions from the hypothesized structuring

In line with both a religious and secular emphasis upon the importance of the individual person, concluding comments about the present hypothesizing efforts are considered under the subheadings of personal behavior, personal findings, personal understanding, and personal enjoyment.

1. Personal behavior. Beside the statics of structure, use was made here of three principles concerning the dynamics of personal behavior. In Table 15, three additional principles are given that then complete a set of six tentative principles for the dynamics of personal behavior.

The use of the "Six W's" of journalism (or of knowledge or of fact) for these principles helps provide an adequacy or sufficiency. If each principle in Table 15 is appropriate, or necessary, for personal behavior, then all six principles are necessary and sufficient for the topic.

2. Personal findings. In addition, the following conclusions occur from preparation done for this essay:

(1) Ethics with its emphasis on goodness provides the guidance given in the *what*-to-do principle of personal behavior: "Do good not bad."

(2) The *where* principle of personal behavior ("Each person ordinarily lives within a social environment within the physical environment") helps clarify that ethics can focus on good personal conduct while morality can focus on good social conduct, with much overlap.[47]

(3) The culture concept, with its mores of group conduct, helps clarify that many values (including ethical and moral values) tend to be relative to a society's culture, or "way of life,"[48] beside important, universally common values stemming from universal human needs.

(4) The important ethical concepts of truth, goodness, and correctness can be defined ostensively or illustratively.

(5) Briefly, good = desirable, true = factual, and correct (right) = true and good, while bad = not good, false = not true, and wrong = not correct.

(6) Both ethics and morality can have elaborate yet consistent infrastructures (substructures) of technical concepts, which themselves often have popular synonyms.

(7) Several approaches including ethical imperative and ethical goal-achievement have been used historically to provide a dynamics of ethical and of moral behavior.

(8) The philosophical division (branch) of ethics can apply values supplied by the philosophical division of axiology (the study of values).

(9) While the essence or core of ethics seems to be goodness, perhaps the essence or core of virtue is ideal value (including goodness, justice, excellence, etc).

(10) The ancient philosophic quest for truth is manifest in today's search for accurate knowledge (truth), while the ancient emphasis on virtue is continued with the emphasis here on applying ideal values (virtues).

(11) Moreover, while the ancient search for truth and virtue tended to be in absolute terms, the present search for knowledge and values can be in relative terms.

(12) The concepts of sentiment, comfort, convenience, satisfaction, happiness, and pleasure can be arranged along a continuum of enjoyment, which itself emphasizes both an evaluational and an emotional reaction.[49]

(13) Efforts here toward explicit definitions, technical structuring, ethical scales, hypothesis-testing,[50] improved problem-solving, and better understanding help toward the sciensation of ethics and of morality.

(14) The technical concept "quality of life" -- here put at the highest level of individual living -- is tiered from tolerable to comfortable to correct to compatible to congenial to good living ("good life"), while the ethical concept "good life" can consist of an interesting life, abundant life, moderate life, leisurely life, useful life, and joyful life.

(15) The concept of "common good" ≐ (approximates) "general good" ≐ "general well-being" ≐ "general welfare."

(16) Concepts like the "common good" help balance social needs against personal needs.

(17) The use of six levels for structuring ethical theory indicates that concepts at all six levels are to be included for completeness of an ethical theory.[51] That is, an attempted theory which omitted only one of the six levels would presumably still be non-sufficient -- whether non-natural, non-pragmatic, non-cognitive (non-mental), non-emotive (non-emotional), non-moral, or non-hedonistic.[52]

(18) When an overall approach is used to fit both ethics and morality into six levels of general behavior, the results can sometimes seem novel and hence require reflective mental digestion. For example, a total of six concepts of perfection can include not only truth, goodness, and beauty but also wisdom, humaneness, and grace.

(19) Secular ethics and religious ethics should reinforce each other.[53]

(20) The tentative structuring here of ethics, morality, and mores is now available for constructive criticism and refinement.[54]

3. Personal understanding. The question further arises: Why are the concepts of good, true, and correct so firmly embedded within the theory of ethics? Historically, ancient philosophers were searching for the "good life" for an individual and presumed that the goal for individual character *(ethikos)* was the "highest good." This reasoning accounts for goodness, but why would truth have so

much ethical interest? Perhaps the concern for truth (accurate knowledge) came as a byproduct of the search for good self-knowledge (to "Know thy self") and the realization that one's sensory knowledge wasn't always reliable.

After the two concepts of goodness and of truth had become accepted content within ethics, then the concept of correctness (rightness) could readily be linked since correctness can be considered a combination of goodness and of truth. Additionally, perhaps the concept of correctness also crept into ethics because of the social environment within which the individual person functioned. That is, good behavior personally should be correct behavior socially.

After these three conceptual values had become ethically significant, then the difficulties of social reality would arouse interest in the opposite concepts of badness, falsity, and wrongness.

Also historically impressive in ethics has been the profound interest in the concept of virtue. While truth has been the ancient philosophical search for accurate knowledge about reality (actuality) and for universal principles to summarize reality, the advocacy of virtues -- personal applications of ideal concepts -- gave philosophical guides to individual conduct. The Socratic statement that "Virtue is knowledge" implied that knowledge itself was an ideal value and that the acquisition of knowledge would result in ideal conduct personally.

The quest for personal understanding about truth (accurate knowledge) can be presented in a sequence of steps.

(1) Given: A personal desire for understanding.

(2) Question: Understanding of *what?*

(3) Answer: Understanding of life on earth (not necessarily in the universe, and mainly human life).

(4) Next question: To understand human life on earth, what is needed?

(5) Next answer: Knowledge.

(6) Qualification: But the knowledge should be accurate, so what is needed is accurate knowledge -- or truth.

(7) Extension: One's personal interest can next extend to understanding of life in the universe, beside on earth, and to the understanding of all forms of life, beside human.

(8) Evaluation: While happiness may need pursuit, truth requires search.

(9) Comment: Perhaps truth is what actually exists, while knowledge is a rational version of what exists. Knowledge can be stored biologically inside one's brain; however, with development of spoken language, knowledge can also be obtained and exchanged between individuals. With further development of written language, information can be obtained from past individuals and recorded for future individuals. Beside this transmission of knowledge during time, the written form of language has permitted exchange of information over longer distances than spoken language permitted, although, with development of electronic communication, the spoken language can also be transferred rapidly over long distances.

(10) Further comment: Truth could also be considered presently accurate knowledge plus all facts not yet known. According to Austin Fagothey, "Truth may be eternal but our knowledge of it is fragmentary."[55] Perhaps truth about the physical universe (that is, Truth with a capital T) could be considered absolute, immutable (unchanging), and eternal (ever-lasting). The truth about the social environment however would be relative to the social environment. Thus, social truth would vary according to each social group and its culture ("way of life"), although presently and urgently needed is development of globally adequate ethics, morality, and mores for the "global community."

4. Personal enjoyment. One final commentary concerns the *when* principle to appreciate the past, anticipate the future, and enjoy the present. Here, the concept of joy (enjoyment) can subsume the long-time philosophical topics of satisfaction, happiness, and pleasure. Indeed, joyful living -- or, in the French wording, *joie de vivre* (joy of living) -- is here positioned at the top level of the "good life."

The types of personal enjoyment vary during the periods of personal development from the enormous dependence of infancy and childhood through the increasing independence of youthhood and young adulthood to the social interdependence of mature adulthood and seniorhood.

Personal enjoyment can also vary from culture to culture and from historical period to historical period. Further, within a culture, consider the effects of the six major social institutions of economy, family, education, recreation, government, and religion. Family values permeate the first six years or so of one's life, and are usually good and desirable. Public and private educational institutions, while providing general knowledge and special skills, also emphasize good and desirable behavior. Here in the United States, the various governmental institutions depend on individual cooperation and voter participation to make representative democracy effective and continuous. Moreover, religious institutions have responsibility for urging and demonstrating good and desirable goals and actions. These four social institutions then, certainly within the United States, should corroborate and support each other's efforts toward good ethical conduct personally and good moral behavior socially.

Why has there been any difficulty in minimizing selfish conduct and in improving social interdependence within the U.S.? While U.S. economic insitutions desirably encourage self-reliance and innovation, they are also impacted by imperfect competition, limited resources, and threatening side effects like environmental pollution. Moreover, recreational institutions should maximize those leisure activities which are good and desirable while minimizing unhealthy and deteriorative ventures.

All these institutional endeavors are especially important during the time when young persons are establishing individual independence. The impact of peer groups, however, upon the behavior of

young persons, during recreational activity, can often outweigh the combined guidance of family, school, church, and government. Moreover, undesirable leisure-time activity can occur at any age if economic agencies over-dramatize undesirable commodities and services rather than spotlight desirable goods and services.

The result of such institutional analysis indicates that the four social institutions of family, education, government, and religion need to do a better job of encouraging the acceptable offerings and limits of both the institutions of economy and recreation in regard to personal behavior and to social interdependence. Perhaps more philosophical explication (the act of making explicit) is also needed of what is possible and not possible in life-styles for the enjoyment (that is, satisfaction, happiness, and pleasure) of a "good life" personally and a high "quality of life" socially.

What, indeed, is joy? "The emotion excited by the acquisition or expectation of good" is the definition provided by one dictionary. Another dictionary definition presents the near-synonyms: "feeling of great pleasure or happiness that comes from success, good fortune, or a sense of well-being."

Etymologically, the term "enjoyment" can be considered a combination of *en*, in, into + Fr. *joir*, to give joy + -ment, a result of = a result of giving joy into. Dictionarily, enjoyment is "the deriving of pleasure or satisfaction." A dictionary example is "the enjoyment of good health."

The close relation between the concepts (ideas) of joy and of pleasure has also been highlighted in *Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms:*

> pleasure, delight, joy, delectation, enjoyment, fruition denote the agreeable emotion which accompanies the possession, acquisition, or expectation of something good or greatly desired. Pleasure . . . strongly implies a feeling of satisfaction or gratification. . . . an excitement or exaltation of the senses or of the mind that implies positive happiness or gladness.[56]

Moreover, according to this dictionary of synonyms,

> Joy is often used in place of *pleasure* and still more often in place of *delight*. It is, however, especially appropriate when a deep-rooted, rapturous emotion is implied or when the happiness is . . . great.[57]

Correspondingly, the concept of enjoyment "usually implies an attitude or a circumstance or a favorable response to a stimulus that tends to make one gratified or happy."[58]

If the evaluation and emotion of joy are a byproduct of a "good life" personally and of a high "quality of life" socially, at the fourth and fifth behavioral levels respectively, then what is the status of joy at each of the other four levels of behavior? Well, a personal philosophy of living with its emphasis on personal wisdom can provide enjoyment at the third, mental level.

"Comfortable living" and "good health" could further provide joy at the gross and physical levels respectively. At the sixth, top level of behavior, joy can come from spiritual development.

Since each person's philosophy of life will differ to some extent, the resulting enjoyment will also vary from person to person -- although still within the range of similar versions of comfortable living, good health, good life, high quality of life, and spiritual development. Certainly, professional philosophy has been concerned then not only with the meaning of life and with the value of life but with the enjoyment of life.

Tables

TABLE 1

Substructures for Quintessence (Perfection), Verity (Truth), and Goodness (Good)

Quintessence (Perfection)	Verity (Truth)	Goodness (Good)
Verity[1] (Truth)	Verifiability (Verification)	Virtue[2] (Virtuousness)
Humaneness (Humanitarianness)	Authenticity (Genuineness)	Morality (Morals)
Grace[3] (Graciousness)	Veracity (Truthfulness)	Propriety (Properness)
Sapience (Wisdom)	Veritability	Rectitude (Correctness, rightness)
Beauty[4] (Beautifulness)	Candor (Frankness)	Righteousness (Uprightness)
Goodness (Good)	Verisimilitude	Obligingness (Good-naturedness)

TABLE 2

Tentative Structure of Ethical Science (Scientific Ethics, Ethics)

Ethical Theory (Theoretical Ethics)	Ethical System, Ethical "Organization" (Systemic Ethics, Systematic Ethics)	Ethical Practice[5] (Practical Ethics)
Metaethics[6]	Ethical product	Ethical goal (Ethical objective, ethical "end")
Ethical substance, ethical content (Substantive ethics, contentive ethics)	Ethical procedure, ethical formation (Procedural ethics)	Ethical plan (Ethical scheme)
Ethical normativism[7] (Normative ethics)	Ethical phase (Ethical stage)	Ethical technique (Ethical method, ethical "means")
Ethical comparativism (Comparative ethics)	Ethical process	Ethical categorization (Ethical classification)
Ethical descriptivism[8] (Descriptive ethics)	Ethical deportment (Ethical conduct)	Ethical modification (Ethical change)
Ethical foundation, ethical basis[9] (Fundamental ethics, basic ethics)	Ethical data	Ethical behavior

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Tentative Structure of Ethical Science (Continued)

Ethical Relation (Relational Ethics)	Ethical Living (Ethical Life)	Ethical Character (Ethical Nature)
Ethical value	Ethical philosophy (Philosophical ethics)	Ethical development
Ethical imperative	Ethical application, ethical use (Applied ethics)[18]	Ethical perspective
Ethical emphasis	Ethical compatability	Ethical determinacy (Ethical determination)
Ethical relevance (Ethical pertinence)	Ethical rationale, ethical rationalization, ethical reasoning (Rational ethics, reasonable ethics, reasoned ethics)	Ethical notion
Ethical issue (Ethical "matter")	Ethical decision-making (Ethical decision)	Ethical agent
Ethical requisite (Ethical requirement)	Ethical activity	Ethical interest

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Theory (Theoretical Ethics)

Metaethics	Ethical Substance, Ethical Content (Substantive Ethics, Contentive Ethics)	Ethical Normativism (Normative Ethics)
Metaethical theory	Ethical quality	Normative ethical theory (Normative theory)
Metaethical system	Ethical formalism (Structuralist ethics, formalist ethics)	Normative ethical system (Normative system, normative "organization")
Metaethical practice	Ethical feature (Ethical aspect)	Normative ethical practice (Normative practice)
Metaethical logic	Ethical knowledge (Ethical information)	Normative relation
Metaethical account	Ethical attribute (Ethical "dimension")	Normative conduct
Metaethical problem	Ethical element	Normative interest

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Theory (Continued)

Ethical Comparativism (Comparative Ethics)	Ethical Descriptivism (Descriptive Ethics)	Ethical Foundation, Ethical Basis (Fundamental Ethics, Basic Ethics)
Ethical appraisal (Ethical assessment)	Ethical treatise	Ethical conscience[11]
Ethical interpretation	Ethical statement (Ethical sentence)	Ethical desirability (Ethical desirableness)
Ethical diversity (Ethical variety)	Ethical expression (Ethical utterance)	Ethical faculty (Ethical "sense")
Ethical comparison	Ethical terminology (Ethical vocabulary)	Ethical concept (Ethical idea)
Ethical corresponding	Ethical declaration	Ethical consequence (Ethical result)
Ethical contrasting	Ethical pronouncement	Ethical sensitivity (Ethical sensitiveness)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical System, Ethical "Organization"
(Systemic Ethics, Systematic Ethics)

Ethical Product	Ethical Procedure, Ethical Formation (Procedural Ethics)	Ethical Phase (Ethical Stage)
Ethical goodness (Ethical good)	Ethical judgment	Ethical credo[12] (Ethical creed)
Ethical integrity	Ethical order	Ethical promulgation
Ethical preference	Ethical option	Ethical commitment
Ethical decency	Ethical selection (Ethical choice)	Ethical conviction
Ethical deed	Ethical operation	Ethical trend
Ethical sentiment	Ethical discourse (Ethical discussion, ethical talk)	Ethical directive (Ethical direction)

Ethical Process	Ethical Deportment (Ethical Conduct)	Ethical Data
Ethical appreciation	Ethical opinion	Ethical tenet (Ethical belief)
Ethical construction	Ethical honesty	Ethical dogma
Ethical deliberation	Ethical endeavor	Ethical phenomenon (Ethical event)
Ethical consideration	Ethical rectitude (Ethical correctness, ethical rightness)	Ethical authority
Ethical reflection	Ethical righteousness (Ethical uprightness)	Ethical entity
Ethical consciousness (Ethical awareness)	Ethical approbation (Ethical approval)	Ethical fact

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Practice (Practical Ethics)

Ethical Goal (Ethical Objective, Ethical "End")	Ethical Plan (Ethical Scheme)	Ethical Technique (Ethical Method, Ethical "Means")
Ethical ideal (Ideal ethics)	Ethical program	Ethical criterion
Ethical discipline	Ethical project	Ethical standard[13]
Ethical challenge	Ethical enterprise	Ethical norm
Ethical prerogative (Ethical right)	Ethical counsel (Ethical advice)	Ethical neutrality
Ethical advantage	Ethical guide (Ethical guidance)	Ethical support
Ethical liberty (Ethical freedom)	Ethical guideline	Ethical approach

Ethical Categorization (Ethical Classification)	Ethical Modification (Ethical Change)	Ethical Behavior
Ethical law	Ethical refinement	Ethical reward (Ethical "dessert")
Ethical pattern	Ethical transformation (Ethical conversion)	Ethical demand
Ethical variation (Ethical difference)	Ethical prescription (Prescriptive ethics)	Ethical motivation
Ethical similarity	Ethical internalization	Ethical thought (Ethical thinking)
Ethical sameness	Ethical reform	Ethical supply
Ethical item	Ethical displacement	Ethical drive

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Relation (Relational Ethics)

Ethical Value	Ethical Imperative	Ethical Emphasis
Ethical worth	Ethical mandate	Ethical progress
Ethical utility (Ethical usefulness)	Ethical command (Ethical commandment)	Ethical certitude (Ethical certainty, ethical sureness)
Ethical essence	Ethical volition (Ethical will)	Ethical extent (Ethical extension)
Ethical efficiency	Ethical expectation (Ethical probability)	Ethical intent (Ethical intention)
Ethical efficacy (Ethical effectiveness)	Ethical possibility	Ethical attention
Ethical expediency	Ethical presumption	Ethical tendency

Ethical Relevance (Ethical Pertinence)	Ethical Issue (Ethical "Matter")	Ethical Requisite (Ethical Requirement)
Ethical significance (Ethical importance)	Ethical claim	Ethical regularity
Ethical urgency	Ethical topic	Ethical consistency
Ethical plausibility	Ethical affair	Ethical variability
Ethical connection (Ethical association)	Ethical equality	Ethical constancy
Ethical alternate (Ethical alternative)	Ethical propagation	Ethical continuity
Ethical experience	Ethical problem	Ethical stability

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Living (Ethical Life)

Ethical Philosophy (Philosophical Ethics)	Ethical Application, Ethical Use (Applied Ethics)	Ethical Compatability
Evaluative ethics (Ethical evaluation)	Ethical purpose	Ethical benefit
Synthetic ethics (Ethical synthesis)	Ethical inquiry	Ethical appeal
Analytic ethics (Ethical analysis)	Ethical pressure	Ethical influence
Traditional ethics ("Classical" ethics)	Ethical concentration (Ethical focus)	Ethical compliance
Modern ethics	Ethical antecedent	Ethical consensus
Contemporary ethics	Ethical precedent	Ethical orientation

Ethical Rationale, Ethical Rationalization, Ethical Reasoning (Rational Ethics, Reasonable Ethics, Reasoned Ethics)	Ethical Decision-making (Ethical Decision)	Ethical Activity
Ethical justification	Ethical dedication	Ethical valuation
Ethical sufficiency	Ethical agreement	Ethical transaction
Ethical contingency	Ethical consent	Ethical extraction
Ethical cogency	Ethical concurrence	Ethical interaction
Ethical exigency	Ethical assertion	Ethical reaction
Ethical necessity (Ethical necessariness)	Ethical position	Ethical action (Ethical act)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Character (Ethical Nature)

Ethical Development	Ethical Perspective	Ethical Determinacy (Ethical Determination)
Ethical maturity (Ethical maturation)	Ethical overview (Ethical overlook)	Ethical resoluteness
Ethical society	Ethical outlook	Ethical orderliness
Ethical advocacy	Ethical purview	Ethical definitiveness (Ethical definiteness)
Ethical interdependence	Ethical prevue (Ethical preview)	Ethical relatedness
Ethical dependence	Ethical view	Ethical decisiveness
Ethical independence	Ethical viewpoint	Ethical terminancy (Ethical termination)

Ethical Notion	Ethical Agent	Ethical Interest
Ethical import	Ethical judge	Ethical priority
Ethical prospect	Ethical leader	Ethical community
Ethical tension	Ethicist (Ethician)	Ethical tolerance
Ethical link	Ethical creature (Ethical animal)	Ethical concern
Ethical impact	Ethical follower	Ethical sustenance (Ethical sustaining)
Ethical characteristic	Ethical spectator	Ethical need

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Metaethics

Metaethical Theory	Metaethical System	Metaethical Practice
Metaethical postulate system	Metaethical product	Metaethical goal (Metaethical objective)
Metaeth'l objectivism (Objective metaethics)	Metaethical doctrine	Metaethical inquiry
Metaeth'l subjectivism (Subjective metaethics)	Metaethical phase	Metaethical technique (Metaethical method)
Metaeth'l cognitivism (Cognitive metaethics)	Metaethical process	Metaethical research (Metaethical study)
Metaethical standpoint	Metaethical issue	Metaethical review
Metaethical point	Metaethical task (Metaethical chore)	Metaethical activity

Metaethical Logic	Metaethical Account	Metaethical Problem
Metaethical conclusion	Metaethical thesis	Metaethical solution
Metaethical argument	Metaethical theme	Metaethical controversy
Metaethical question	Metaethical expression, utterance	Metaethical dispute
Metaethical deduction	Metaethical contention	Metaethical confusion
Metaethical induction	Metaethical declaration	Metaethical conflict
Metaethical premise	Metaethical pronouncement	Metaethical difficulty

TABLE 2 (Continued)

(to Metaethical Theory)

Metaethical Objectivism (Objective Metaethics)	Metaethical Subjectivisim (Subjective Metaethics)	Metaethical Cognitivism (Cognitive Metaethics)
Transcendental metaethics	Metaethical tenet (Metaethical belief)	Metaethical evaluation
Structural metaethics (Formal metaethics)	Metaethical perspective	Metaethical synthesis
Pragmatic metaethics	Metaethical deliberation	Metaethical analysis
Correct metaethics (Right metaethics)	Metaethical consideration	Metaethical thought (Metaethical thinking)
Adequate metaethics	Metaethical reflection	Metaethical assumption
Particular metaethics	Metaethical discourse Metaethical discussion)	Metaethical presupposition

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Formalism (Structuralist Ethics, Formalist Ethics)

Ethical Absolutism, Ethical Absolutivity[14] (Absolute Ethics)	Ethical Relativism, Ethical Relativity[15] (Relative Ethics)	Ethical Functionalism
Perfectionist ethical theory (Perfectionist ethics)	Humanist ethics (Ethical humanism)	Situation ethics[16] (Situational ethics, "contextual" ethics)
Ethical imperativism[17] (Imperativist ethics)	Humane ethics, (Ethical humanitarianism)	Ethical dogmatism (Dogmatic ethics)
Emotive ethical theory[18] (Emotive ethics)	Working ethics (Work ethics)	Ethical conventionalism (Conventionalist ethics)
Cognitive ethical theory[19] (Cognitive ethics)	Articulated ethics (Ethical articulation)	Ethical categoricalism (Categorical ethics)
Conative ethical theory[20] (Conative ethics)	Historical ethics	Ethical consequentialism[21] (Consequentialist ethics)
Material ethical theory (Material ethics)	Established ethics	Ethical conditionalism (Conditionalist ethics)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

Ethical Formalism (Continued)

Ethical Egoism[22]	Ethical Actualism (Ethical Realism)	Ethical Intuitionism (Intuitive Ethics)[23]
Critical ethics (Ethical criticism)	Ethical legalism (Legalistic ethics)	Telic ethics[24] (Teleological ethics)
Socionomous ethics (Ethical socionomy)	Ethical structure, form, "framework" (Structural ethics, formal ethics)	Deontology, deontic ethics[25] (Deontological ethics, duty ethics)
Skeptical ethics (Ethical skepticism)	Ethical pragmatism (Pragmatic ethics)	Voluntarist ethics, (Voluntaristic ethics)
Authoritative ethics (Ethical authority)	Ethical instrumentalism (Instrumental ethics)	Ethical rationalism (Rationalist ethics, rationalistic ethics)
Heteronomous ethics (Ethical heteronomism)	Ethical dialectics (Dialectical ethics)	Ethical pluralism (Pluralistic ethics, including ethical dualism, dualistic ethics)
Autonomous ethics (Ethical autonomism)	Ethical empiricism (Empirical ethics)	Ethical monism (Monistic ethics)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

(to Ethical Absolutism)

Ethical Imperativism	Emotive Ethical Theory (Emotive Ethics)	Conative Ethical Theory (Conative Ethics)
Absolute imperative (Unconditional imperative)	Emotive significance (Emotive importance)	Conative significance (Conative importance)
Hypothetical imperative	Emotive application (Emotive use)	Conative application (Conative use)
Functional imperative (Imperative function)	Emotive function (Emotive property)	Conative function (Conative property)
Logical imperative (Imperative logic)	Emotive thought (Emotive thinking)	Conative thought (Conative thinking)
Historical imperative	Emotive description	Conative description
Natural imperative	Emotive problem	Conative problem

(to Ethical Actualism) (to Ethical Relativism)

Ethical Structure, Ethical Form, "Framework" (Structural Ethics, Formal Ethics)	Historical Ethics
Ethical harmony	Ethical hedonism (Hedonistic ethics)
Ethical edifice	Ethical utilitarianism (Utilitarian ethics)
Ethical hierarchy	Ethical determinism
Ethical level	Ethical nominalism (Nominalist ethics)
Ethical tier	Ethical metaphysics (Metaphysical ethics)
Ethical component	Ethical naturalism[24] (Naturalist ethics)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

(to Ethical Imperativism)

Absolute Imperative (Unconditional Imperative)	Functional Imperative (Imperative Function)	Logical Imperative (Imperative Logic)
Universal imperative[27] ("Categorical" imperative)	Situational imperative (Imperative situation)	Imperative conclusion
Principle of utility[28]	Integrative imperative	Imperative argument
Golden Rule[29]	Stipulational imperative	Imperative question
Golden Mean[30]	Instrumental imperative	Imperative deduction
Dual principle of loyalty[31]	Modal imperative	Imperative induction
Criterion of the right act[32]	Conditional imperative (Imperative condition, imperative circumstance)	Imperative premise

TABLE 2 (Continued)

(to Ethical Intuitionism)

Telic Ethics (Teological Ethics)	Deontology, Deontic Ethics (Deontological Ethics, Duty Ethics)
Telic (teleological) ethical theory	Deontic theory (Deontological theory, duty theory)
Telic (teleological) ethical system	Deontic system (Deontological system)
Telic (teleological) ethical practice	Deontic practice (Deontological practice)
Telic ethical rationale (Teleological ethical reasoning)	Deontic rationale (Deontological reasoning)
Telic ethical actuality (Teleological ethical reality)	Deontic actuality (Deontological reality)
Telic (teleological) ethical behavior	Deontic behavior (Deontological behavior)

(to Ethical Substance)		(to Ethical Practice)
Ethical Quality	Ethical Knowledge (Ethical Information)	Ethical Pattern
Altruistic ethics (Ethical altruism)	Ethical sapience (Ethical wisdom)	Ethical principle
Objective ethics (Ethical objectivism)	Ethical object	Ethical precept
Subjective ethics (Ethical subjectivism)	Ethical subject	Ethical rule
Logical ethics (Ethical logic)	Ethical research (Ethical study)	Ethical code
Evolutionist ethics (Evolutionary ethics)	Ethical discovery (Ethical finding)	Ethical cue
Ecological ethics (Environmental ethics)	Ethical search (Ethical seeking)	Ethical clue

TABLE 2 (Continued)

(to Ethical Knowledge)	(to Ethical Truth)	(to Ethical Substance)
Ethical Sapience (Ethical Wisdom)	Ethical Hypothesis	Ethical Usage
Ethical truth	Ethical speculation	Ethical satisfaction
Ethical hypothesis	Ethical proposition (Ethical proposal)	Ethical doctrine
Ethical testing	Ethical suggestion	Ethical partitioning
Ethical validity	Ethical conjecture (Ethical guess)	Ethical culture[33]
Ethical reliability	Ethical surmise (Ethical supposition)	Ethical reference
Ethical factor	Ethical intuition (Ethical hunch)	Ethical domain

(to Education)	(to Ethical Education)
Ethical Education	Ethical Learning
Ethical excellence	Ethical virtue
Ethical homily (Ethical lecture)	Ethical understanding
Ethical instruction (Ethical teaching)	Ethical attitude
Ethical learning	Ethical trait
Ethical training	Ethical skill
Ethical conditioning	Ethical aptitude

TABLE 3

Tentative Structure of Moral Science (Scientific Morality, Morality, Morals)[34]

Moral Theory (Theoretical Morality, Pure Morality)	Moral System, Moral "Organization," Morality System[35] (Systemic Morality, Systematic Morality)	Moral Practice (Practical Morality)
Moral unity (United morality)	Moral product (Moral "fruit")	Moral goal (Moral objective, moral "end")
Moral substance (Moral content)	Moral procedure (Moral formation)	Moral plan (Moral strategy, moral scheme)
Moral propriety, moral properness (Proper morality)	Moral phase (Moral stage)	Moral technique (Moral method, moral "means")
Moral logic (Logical morality)	Moral process	Moral categorization (Moral classification)
Moral adequacy (Adequate morality)	Moral deportment (Moral conduct)[36]	Moral modification, moral change (Changing morality)
Moral foundation, moral basis, moral "ground" (Fundamental morality, basic morality)	Moral data	Moral behavior[37]

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Tentative Structure of Moral Science (Continued)

Moral Relation	Moral Living (Moral Life)	Moral Character, Moral Nature (Natural Morality)
Moral value[38]	Moral philosophy[39] (Philosophical morality)	Moral development
Moral imperative[40]	Moral application (Moral use)	Moral perspective
Moral emphasis	Moral compatability	Moral determinacy, moral determination (Determinant morality)
Moral relevance (Moral pertinence)	Moral rationale, moral rationalization, moral reasoning (Rational morality, reasonable morality, reasoned morality)	Moral notion
Moral issue (Moral "matter")	Moral decision-making (Moral decision)	Moral agent
Moral requisite (Moral requirement)	Moral activity	Moral interest

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral Theory (Theoretical Morality, Pure Morality)

Moral Unity (United Morality)	Moral Substance (Moral Content)	Moral Propriety, Moral Properness (Proper Morality)
Cosmic morality, universal morality (Moral universality)	Moral quality	Moral perfection (Perfect morality)
General morality (Moral generality)	Moral structure (Moral form, moral "framework")	Moralism (Moral doctrine)
Special morality (Moral specialty)	Moral feature (Moral aspect)	Moral permission
Individual morality (Moral individuality)	Moral knowledge (Moral information)	Moral lesson ("Moral")
Generic morality (Moral generics)	Moral attribute (Moral "dimension")	Moral cultivation
Specific, detailed morality (Moral specifics, details)	Moral element	Moralization[41] (Moralizing)

Moral Logic (Logical Morality)	Moral Adequacy (Adequate Morality)	Moral Foundation, Basis, "Ground" (Fundamental, Basic Morality)
Moral conclusion	Moral improvement	Moral conscience
Moral argument	Moral control	Moral desirability (Moral desirableness)
Moral question	Moral explanation	Moral faculty[42] (Moral "sense")
Moral deduction	Moral prediction	Moral concept (Moral idea)
Moral induction[43]	Moral description	Moral consequence, result (Consequential morality)
Moral premise	Moral notation	Moral sensitivity (Moral sensitiveness)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral System, Moral "Organization"
(Systemic Morality, Systematic Morality)

Moral Product (Moral "Fruit")	Moral Procedure (Moral Formation)	Moral Phase (Moral Stage)
Moral goodness,[44] moral good (Good morality)	Moral judgment[45]	Moral credo (Moral creed)
Moral integrity	Moral order	Moral promulgation
Moral preference	Moral option	Moral commitment
Moral decency	Moral selection (Moral choice)	Moral conviction
Moral deed	Moral operation	Moral trend
Moral sentiment	Moral discourse (Moral discussion, moral talk)	Moral directive (Moral direction)

Moral Process	Moral Deportment (Moral Conduct)	Moral Data
Moral appreciation	Moral opinion	Moral tenet (Moral belief)
Moral construction (Constructive morality)	Moral honesty	Moral dogma
Moral deliberation	Moral endeavor	Moral phenomenon (Moral event)
Moral consideration	Moral rectitude[46] (Moral correctness, moral rightness)	Moral authority
Moral reflection[47] (Reflective morality)	Moral righteousness (Moral uprightness)	Moral entity
Moral consciousness (Moral awareness)[48]	Moral approbation (Moral approval)	Moral fact

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral Practice (Practical Morality)

Moral Goal (Moral Objective)	Moral Plan (Moral Scheme)	Moral Technique (Moral Method, Moral "Means")
Moral ideal (Ideal morality)	Moral program	Moral criterion[49]
Moral discipline	Moral policy	Moral standard[50]
Moral challenge	Moral enterprise	Moral norm (Normative morality)
Moral prerogative[51] (Moral right)	Moral counsel (Moral advice)	Moral neutrality
Moral advantage	Moral guide (Moral guidance)	Moral support
Moral liberty (Moral freedom)	Moral guideline	Moral approach

Moral Categorization (Moral Classification)	Moral Modification, Moral Change (Changing Morality)	Moral Behavior
Moral law[52]	Moral refinement	Moral reward (Moral payoff)
Moral pattern	Moral transformation (Moral conversion)	Moral demand
Moral variation (Moral difference)	Moral prescription (Prescriptive morality)	Moral motivation
Moral similarity	Moral internalization	Moral thought (Moral thinking)
Moral sameness	Moral reform	Moral supply
Moral item	Moral displacement	Moral drive

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral Relation

Moral Value	Moral Imperative	Moral Emphasis
Moral worth (Moral worthiness)	Moral mandate	Moral progress[53]
Moral utility (Moral usefulness)	Moral command (Moral commandment)	Moral certitude (Moral certainty, moral sureness)
Moral essence	Moral volition (Moral will, moral willpower)	Moral extent, moral extension (Extended morality)
Moral efficiency (Efficient morality)	Moral expectation (Moral probability)	Moral intent, moral intention (Intended morality)
Moral efficacy, moral effectiveness (Effective morality)	Moral possibility	Moral attention
Moral expediency	Moral presumption	Moral tendency

Moral Relevance (Moral Pertinence)	Moral Issue (Moral "Matter")	Moral Requisite (Moral Requirement)
Moral significance (Moral importance)	Moral claim	Moral regularity
Moral urgency	Moral topic	Moral consistency[54]
Moral plausibility	Moral affair	Moral variability
Moral connection (Moral association)	Moral equality	Moral constancy
Moral alternate (Moral alternative)	Moral propagation	Moral continuity
Moral experience	Moral problem[55]	Moral stability

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral Living (Moral Life)

Moral Philosophy (Philosophical Morality)	Moral Application (Moral Use)	Moral Compatability
Evaluative morality (Moral evaluation)	Moral purpose	Moral benefit
Synthetic morality (Moral synthesis)	Moral inquiry	Moral appeal
Analytic morality (Moral analysis)	Moral pressure	Moral influence
Egalitarian morality	Moral concentration (Moral focus)	Moral compliance
Evolutionary morality[56]	Moral antecedent	Moral consensus
Libertarian morality	Moral precedent	Moral orientation

Moral Rationale, Moral Rationalization, Moral Reasoning (Rational Morality, Reasonable Morality, Reasoned Morality)	Moral Decision-making (Moral Decision)	Moral Activity
Moral justification	Moral dedication	Moral valuation
Moral sufficiency	Moral agreement	Moral transaction
Moral contingency	Moral consent	Moral extraction
Moral cogency	Moral concurrence	Moral interaction
Moral exigency	Moral assertion	Moral reaction
Moral necessity (Moral necessariness)	Moral position	Moral action (Moral act)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral Character, Moral Nature (Natural Morality)

Moral Development[57]	Moral Perspective	Moral Determinancy, Moral Determination (Determinant Morality)
Mature morality[58] (Moral maturity, moral maturation)	Moral overview (Moral overlook)	Moral resoluteness
Socionomous morality (Moral socionomy)	Moral outlook (Moral "vision")	Moral orderliness
Emotive morality (Moral emotion)	Moral purview	Moral definitiveness (Moral definiteness)
Cognitive morality, mental morality (Moral cognition)	Moral prevue (Moral preview)	Moral relatedness
Heteronomous morality (Moral heteronomy)[59]	Moral view	Moral decisiveness
Autonomous morality (Moral autonomy)[60]	Moral viewpoint	Moral terminancy (Moral termination)

Moral Notion	Moral Agent	Moral Interest
Moral import	Moral judge	Moral priority
Moral prospect	Moral leader	Moral community
Moral feature (Moral aspect)	Moralist (Moral person)	Moral tolerance
Moral link (Moral linking)	Moral creature (Moral being)	Moral concern
Moral impact	Moral follower	Moral sustenance (Moral sustaining)
Moral characteristic	Moral spectator (Moral onlooker)	Moral need[61]

TABLE 3 (Continued)

(to Moral Propriety)

Moralism (Moral Doctrine)

Moralist Regulation (Moral Regulation)	Moralist Integration (Integrative Morality)	Moralist Diversity (Moral Variety)
Sanctional morality[62] (Moral sanction)	Unified morality (Moral unification)	Absolute morality[63] (Moral absolutism, moral absolute)
Public morality (Public morals)	Social morality (Moral society)	Relative morality[64] (Moral relativism)
Private morality (Private morals)	Personal morality (Moral personality, moral personalism)	Functional morality (Moral functionalism, moral function, moral property)
Authoritative morality (Moral authority)	Positive morality	Cultural morality (Moral culture)
Common morality	Historical morality	Sober morality, sober moralism (Moral sobriety)
Environmental morality (Moral milieu, moral environment, moral atmosphere, moral climate)	Negative morality	Paroemiac morality[65] (Moral paroemia)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moralism (Continued)

Moralist Distinction (Distinctive Morality)	Moralist Activation (Moral Actuation)	Moralist Fact (Moral Fact)
Transcendental morality	Legalistic morality (Moral legalism)	Extraordinary morality
Synderesic morality (Moral synderesis, synderesis)[66]	Dynamic morality (Moral dynamics, moral dynamism)	Group morality
Pragmatic morality (Moral pragmatism)	Static morality (Moral statics)	Working morality (Moral work)
Instrumental morality	Open morality[67] (Moral openness)	Covert morality (Implicit morality)
Domestic morality	Closed morality[68]	Overt morality (Explicit morality)
Empirical morality (Moral empiricism)	Established morality	Ordinary morality
(to Moral Practice)	(to Cultural Morality)	(to Religion)

Moral Pattern	Particular Morality (Concrete Morality)	Biblical Moralism
Moral principle	Moral exemplar	Salvation[69]
Moral precept	Moral illustration	Decalogue (Ten Commandments)
Moral rule	Moral instance	Biblical parable[70]
Moral code	Moral case	Casuistry[71]
Moral cue	Moral example	Catechism[72]
Moral clue	Moral delineation	Biblical allegory[73]

TABLE 3 (Continued)

(to Moralist Regulation)

Sanctional Morality (Moral Sanction)	Public Morality (Public Morals)	Private Morality (Private Morals)
Divine morality (Moral divineness)	Reverent morality (Moral reverence)	Moral humanism (Humanistic morality)
Ratified morality, (Moral ratification)	Popular morality	Moral humaneness (Humanitarian morality)
Enforced morality (Moral enforcement)	Technical morality	Moral sincerity
Authorized morality (Moral authorization)	Recognized morality	Moral liberalism (Liberal moralism, liberal morality)
Endorsed morality (Moral endorsement)	Declared morality (Moral declaration)	Moral conservatism (Conservative morality)
Given morality	Existing morality (Moral existence)	Moral spontaneousness (Spontaneous morality)

(to Moralist Integration)

Social Morality (Moral Society)	Personal Morality (Moral Personality)	Historical Morality
Religious morality	Heroic morality	Hedonistic morality (Moral hedonism)
Secular morality	Objective morality[74] (Moral objectivism)	Utilitarian morality (Moral utilitarianism)
Official morality	Subjective morality[75] (Moral subjectivism)	Determinist morality (Moral determinism)
Nominal morality	Interdependent morality (Moral interdependence)	Comparative morality (Moral comparison)
Routine morality	Dependent morality (Moral dependence)	Metaphysical morality (Moral metaphysics)
Prevailing morality	Independent morality (Moral independence)	Naturalistic morality (Natural morality)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

(to Moralist Diversity)

Absolute Morality (Moral Absolutism, Moral Absolute)	Relative Morality (Moral Relativism)	Functional Morality (Moral Functionalism, Moral Function, Moral Property)
Moral ultimacy (Moral finality)	Moral altruism (Altruistic morality)	Situational morality (Moral situation, moral "context")
Moral dominance (Moral domination)	Moral compromise	Moral state
Moral innocence	Moral appropriateness (Moral aptness, moral suitability)	Moral stipulation
Moral arbiter	Moral nuance	Moral equilibrium (Moral balance)
Moral immutability (Moral unchangingness)	Moral resource	Moral mode (Moral way)
Moral destiny (Moral fate)	Moral source (Moral origin)	Conditional morality (Moral condition, moral circumstance)

TABLE 3 (Continued)

(to Moralist Diversity)

Cultural Morality (Moral Culture)	Sober Morality, Sober Moralism (Moral Sobriety)	Paroemaic Morality (Moral Paroemia)
Civilized morality, civil morality (Moral civilization)	Moral enlightenment (Moral insight)	Moral maxim
Institutional morality (Moral institution)	Moral esteem	Moral slogan
Conventional morality (Moral convention)	Moral demureness	Moral motto
Traditional morality, "classical" morality (Moral tradition)	Moral equanimity	Moral dictum
Customary morality (Moral custom)	Moral discretion (Moral discreetness)	Moral adage (Moral saying)
Particular morality (Concrete morality)	Moral disposition	Moral proverb (Proverbial morality)
(to Moral Development)	(to Education)	(to Moral Education)
Mature Morality (Moral Maturity, Moral Maturation)	Moral Education	Moral Learning
Senescent morality (Elder morality)	Moral excellence	Moral virtue[76]
Middle adult, middle age morality	Moral homily (Moral lecture)	Moral understanding
Young adult morality	Moral instruction (Moral teaching)	Moral attitude
Adolescent morality (Youth morality)	Moral learning[77]	Moral trait[78]
Child morality	Moral training	Moral skill
Infant morality[79]	Moral conditioning	Moral aptitude

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Moral Excellence (to Moral Education)

Moral Creativity	Moral Status (Moral Standing)	Moral Role
Moral ingenuity	Moral admiration	Moral paradigm
Moral invention	Moral reputation	Moral career
Moral imagination**	Moral recommendation	Moral self
Moral initiative	Moral commendation	Moral earnestness
Moral innovation	Moral stance (Moral stand)	Moral obedience
Moral originality	Moral standpoint	Moral seriousness (Moral graveness)

Moral Ranking	Moral Health	Moral Limit (Moral Limitation)
Moral supremacy	Moral compassion	Moral redemption
Moral superiority	Moral sanity	Moral reciprocity
Moral superordinacy (Moral superordinate)	Moral passion	Moral pride
Moral coordinacy (Moral coordinate)	Moral clarity	Moral fitness
Moral subordinancy (Moral subordinate)	Moral stamina	Moral deliverance
Moral inferiority	Moral risk	Moral extreme

TABLE 3 (Continued)

(to Moral Goal)

Moral Ideal (Ideal morality)	Moral Discipline	Moral Challenge
Moral quintessence (Moral perfection)	Moral rigorousness (Rigorous morality)	Moral triumph (Moral breakthrough)
Moral sympathy	Moral completeness (Moral entirety)	Moral philanthropy
Moral grace (Moral graciousness)	Moral courage (Moral bravery)	Moral incentive
Moral dignity	Moral involvement	Moral moderation (Moderate morality)
Moral beauty	Moral response	Moral welfare (Moral well-being)
Moral purity	Moral stimulus	Moral emancipation

(to Moral Knowledge)	(to Moral Support)	(to Moral Limit)

Moral Truth (True Morality)	Moral Measurement	Moral Control
Moral sapience (Moral wisdom)	Moral appraisal (Moral assessment)	Moral coercion
Moral hypothesis	Moral examination	Moral guardianship
Moral testing	Moral grade (Moral score)	Moral stricture
Moral validity (Valid morality)	Moral weighting	Moral constraint (Moral constriction)
Moral reliability (Reliable morality, "sound" morality)	Moral scale	Moral restraint (Moral restriction)
Moral factor	Moral unit	Moral strictness

TABLE 3 (Continued)

(to Moral Substance)		(to Moral Structure)
Moral Structure (Moral Form, Moral "Framework")	Moral Knowledge (Moral Information)	Moral Harmony
Moral harmony	Moral truth[81] (True morality)	Moral felicity (Moral happiness)
Moral edifice	Moral object	Moral congeniality
Moral hierarchy	Moral subject	Moral compatability
Moral level	Moral research (Moral study)	Moral concord
Moral tier	Moral discovery (Moral finding)	Moral accord
Moral component	Moral search (Moral seeking)	Moral cord (Moral tie)

(to Moral Rectitude)	(to Moral Process)
Moral Necessity (Moral Necessariness)	Moral Consciousness (Moral Awareness)[82]
Moral spirituality (Spiritual morality)	Content-values approach
Moral exception[83] (Exceptional morality)	Developmental-structural approach
Moral acceptance (Acceptive morality)	Emotional-psychodynamic approach
Moral abstraction (Abstract morality)	
Moral actuality, moral reality (Actual morality)	
Moral potentiality, moral potential (Potential morality)	Social-behavioral approach

TABLE 4

Culture Concept (Culture), Ethos, Mores, Cultural Convention (Convention), and Cultural Tradition (Tradition)

Culture Concept (Culture)	Ethos (Characteristic Qualities)
Ethos[84]	Cultural criterion
Mores[85]	Cultural standard[86]
Cultural convention (Convention)	Cultural norm[87]
Cultural tradition (Tradition)	Cultural probity
Cultural custom (Custom)	Cultural respect
Folkway[88]	Cultural regard

Mores	Cultural Convention (Convention)	Cultural Tradition (Tradition)
Mores value	Decorum	Chivalry (Gallantry)
Mores system	Etiquette	Courtesy[89] (Politeness)
Mores enforcement	Style	Propriety (Properness)
Mores categorization (Mores classification)	Fashion[90]	Manners[91]
Mores support	Vogue	Deference
Mores problem	Fad	Homage

TABLE 5

Tentative Structure of General Behavior, Ethical Imperative, Ethical Applications, Modal Auxiliary Verbs, and Moral Imperative

General Behavior	Ethical Imperative	Ethical Applications
Ideal behavior	Ethical mandate (wist)	I *should ideally* do this chore. (Archaic: I *wist* do this chore.)
Social behavior	Ethical command (must, have to)	I *must (have to)* do this chore.[92]
Emotional behavior	Ethical volition, ethical will (would)	I *would* do this chore.
Cognitive behavior (Mental behavior)	Ethical expectation, ethical probability (should, ought to)	I *should (ought to)* do this chore.
Physical behavior	Ethical possibility (could)	I *could* do this chore.
Gross behavior	Ethical presumption (might)	I *might* do this chore.

Modal Auxiliary Verbs	Moral Imperative
wot-wist	Moral mandate
mote-must (have to)	Moral command (Moral commandment)
will-would	Moral volition (Moral will)
shall-should (ought to)	Moral expectation (Moral probability)
can-could	Moral possibility
may-might	Moral presumption

TABLE 6

Tentative Structure of Concern Applied to Ethical Concern and to Moral Concern

Concern	Ethical Concern	Moral Concern
Conscientiousness	Ethical conscientiousness	Moral conscientiousness
Duty	Ethical duty	Moral duty
Obligation	Ethical obligation	Moral obligation
Responsibility	Ethical responsibility	Moral responsibility
Respect	Ethical respect	Moral respect
Regard	Ethical regard (Ethical "sense")	Moral regard[93] (Moral "sense")

TABLE 7

Tentative Structure, within Ethos (Characteristic Qualities) of Cultural Norm, Cultural Standard, and Cultural Criterion

Cultural Norm	Cultural Standard	Cultural Criterion
Norm satisfaction	Standard goal (Standard objective)	Evaluative criterion
Norm utility (Norm usefulness)	Standard plan	Synthetic criterion
Norm identification	Standard technique (Standard method)	Analytic criterion
Norm categorization (Norm classification)	Standard rationale (Standard reasoning)	Rational criterion (Reasonable criterion)
Norm type	Standard mode (Standard way)	Typical criterion
Norm character	Standard behavior	Fundamental criterion (Basic criterion)

TABLE 8

Tentative Structure of Problem-solving, Including Problem and Difficulty, Moral Problem and Moral Difficulty

Problem

Solution	Controversy	Dispute
Remedy	Unjustice (Injustice)	Crisis
Treatment	Abuse	Emergency
Diagnosis	Bellicosity	Perturbance
Rectification (Correction)	Antagonism	Disquiet
Aid (Assistance, help)	Aggression (Aggressiveness)	Disturbance (Upset)
Alleviation (Relief)	Adversity	Vicissitude

Confusion	Conflict (Clash)	Difficulty
Enigma	Holocaust	Moral evil (Evil)
Mystery (Mysteriousness)	War (Warfare)	Predicament
Perplexity	Hostility	Distraction
Puzzle	Interference	Error (Mistake)
Ambiguity	Commotion	Obstacle (Obstruction)
Vagueness	Agitation	Moral badness (Badness, bad)

TABLE 8 (Continued)

Difficulty

Moral Evil (Evil)	Predicament	Distraction
Vice (Viciousness)	Anarchy	Transgression
Moral infamy (Infamy)	Plight	Turpitude
Sin (Wickedness)	Nastiness	Temptation
Moral iniquity (Iniquity)	Gullibility	Vexation (Annoyance)
Vilification (Vileness)	Inadequacy (Weakness)	Lethargy
Moral trouble (Trouble)	Naughtiness	Lapse

Error (Mistake)	Obstacle (Obstruction)	Moral Badness (Badness, Bad)
Falsity (Falseness)	Danger	Despotism (Tyranny)
Failure (Failing)	Censure (Censorship)	Crime
Fallacy	Obstinacy (Stubbornness)	Malevolence (Ill will)
Wrongness (Wrong)	Impediment	Deceit (Deception)
Blunder	Detriment	Famine
Straying	Hindrance (Handicap)	Plague

TABLE 8 (Continued)

Moral Problem

Moral Solution	Moral Controversy	Moral Dispute
Moral remedy	Moral unjustice (Moral injustice)	Moral crisis
Moral treatment	Moral abuse	Moral emergency
Moral diagnosis	Moral bellicosity	Moral perturbance
Moral rectification (Moral correction)	Moral antagonism	Moral disquiet
Moral aid (Moral assistance, moral help)	Moral aggression (Moral aggressiveness)	Moral disturbance (Moral upset)
Moral alleviation (Moral relief)	Moral adversity	Moral vicissitude

Moral Confusion	Moral Conflict (Moral Clash)	Moral Difficulty
Moral enigma	Moral holocaust	Moral abomination (Abomination)
Moral mystery (Moral mysteriousness)	Moral war (Moral warfare)	Moral predicament
Moral perplexity	Moral hostility	Moral distraction
Moral puzzle	Moral interference	Moral error (Moral mistake)
Moral ambiguity	Moral commotion	Moral obstacle (Moral obstruction)
Moral vagueness	Moral agitation	Moral vacuum

TABLE 8 (Continued)

Moral Difficulty

Moral Abomination (Abomination)	Moral Predicament	Moral Distraction
Moral hatred (Hatred)	Moral anarchy	Moral transgression
Moral guilt (Guilt)	Moral plight	Moral turpitude
Moral aggravation (Aggravation)	Moral nastiness	Moral temptation
Moral blasphemy (Profanity)	Moral gullibility	Moval vexation (Moral annoyance)
Moral culpability (Moral blame)	Moral inadequacy	Moral lethargy
Moral negligence (Negligence)	Moral naughtiness	Moral lapse

Moral Error (Moral Mistake)	Moral Obstacle (Moral Obstruction)	Moral Vacuum
Moral falsity (Moral falseness)	Moral danger	Moral dissolution
Moral failure (Moral failing)	Moral censure (Moral censorship)	Moral nonperspective (Moral "blindness")
Moral fallacy	Moral obstinacy (Moral stubbornness)	Moral gap
Moral wrongness (Moral wrong)	Moral impediment	Moral prohibition
Moral blunder	Moral detriment	Moral elimination
Moral straying	Moral hindrance (Moral handicap)	Moral nihilism

TABLE 9

Tentative Structure (to Philosophy) of Hedonism and of Utilitarianism, Including Partial Substructures

Hedonism (Hedonic Doctrine, Hedonistic Philosophy)

Hedonic Theory, Hedonistic Theory, Pleasure Theory (Theoretical Hedonism, Pure Hedonism)	Hedonic System, Hedonistic System (Systemic Hedonism, Systematic Pleasure)	Hedonic Practice (Hedonistic Practice)
Spiritual hedonism	True hedonism (Hedonic truth)	Hedonic goal (Pleasurable objective)
Epicurean hedonism[94]	Hedonic procedure (Pleasure formation)	Hedonic plan (Pleasurable scheme)
Quantitative hedonism[95]	Hedonic pursuit (Pleasure pursuit)	Hedonic technique (Pleasurable method)
Qualitative hedonism[96]	Hedonic process (Pleasure process)	Hedonic notion (Pleasurable notion)
Cyrenaic hedonism[97]	Hedonic consequence (Pleasure result)	Hedonic modification (Pleasurable change)
Sensual hedonism	Hedonic experience (Pleasure experience)	Hedonic behavior (Pleasurable behavior)

TABLE 9 (Continued)

Hedonism (Continued)

Hedonic Rationale (Hedonistic Reasoning)	Hedonic Conduct (Hedonistic Conduct, Pleasurable Conduct)	Hedonic Basis (Hedonistic "Ground," Pleasure Basis)
Hedonic justification (Pleasure justification)	Hedonic principle (Pleasurable principle, pleasure principle)	Hedonic value (Pleasure value)
Hedonic substance (Pleasure content)	Hedonic application (Pleasurable use)	Hedonic perspective (Pleasure perspective)
Hedonic fulfillment (Pleasure fulfillment)	Hedonic rule (Pleasurable rule)	Hedonic motive (Pleasure motive)
Hedonic contention (Pleasure contention)	Hedonic term (Pleasurable word)	Hedonic concept (Pleasure idea)
Hedonic exhilaration (Pleasure exhilaration)	Hedonic discovery (Pleasurable finding)	Hedonic living (Pleasure life)
Hedonic excuse (Pleasure excuse)	Hedonic search (Pleasurable seeking, pleasure seeking)	Hedonic problem (Pleasure problem)

TABLE 9 (Continued)

Utilitarianism (Utilitarian Doctrine, Utilitarian Philosophy)

Utilitarian Theory (Theoretical Utilitarianism)	Utilitarian System	Utilitarian Practice
Ideal utilitarianism[78]	Utilitarian goodness (Utilitarian good)	Utilitarian goal (Utilitarian objective)
Agathistic utilitarianism[79]	Utilitarian procedure (Utilitarian formation)	Utilitarian plan (Utilitarian scheme)
Rule utilitarianism[180]	Utilitarian pursuit	Utilitarian technique (Utilitarian method)
Egoistic utilitarianism	Utilitarian process	Utilitarian notion
Descriptive utilitarianism	Utilitarian consequence (Utilitarian result)	Utilitarian modification (Utilitarian change)
Act utilitarianism[181]	Utilitarian requisite, requirement)	Utilitarian behavior

Utilitarian Rationale (Utilitarian Reasoning)	Utilitarian Conduct	Utilitarian Basis (Utilitarian "Ground")
Utilitarian justification	Utilitarian purpose	Utilitarian value
Utilitarian substance (Utilitarian content)	Utilitarian application (Utilitarian use)	Utilitarian perspective
Utilitarian definition	Utilitarian emphasis	Utilitarian diversity (Utilitarian variety)
Utilitarian derivation	Utilitarian logic	Utilitarian concept (Utilitarian idea)
Utilitarian reduction	Utilitarian account	Utilitarian advantage
Utilitarian expediency	Utilitarian character (Utilitarian nature)	Utilitarian problem

TABLE 9 (Continued)

(to Hedonic Theory)		(to Historical Ethics)
Quantitative Hedonism	Qualitative Hedonism	Ethical Hedonism (Hedonic Ethics)
Hedonic valence (Pleasure valence)	Hedonic quality (Pleasure quality)	Altruistic hedonism
Hedonic scaling (Pleasure scaling)	Hedonic proposition (Pleasure proposal)	Sympathetic hedonism
Hedonic grading (Pleasure grading)	Hedonic emphasis (Pleasure emphasis)	Psychological hedonism[182]
Hedonic calculus (Pleasure calculus)	Hedonic logic (Pleasure logic)	Egoistic hedonism[183] (Self-centered hedonism)
Hedonic quantity (Pleasure amount)	Hedonic actuality (Pleasure reality)	Evolutionary hedonism
Hedonic unit (Pleasure unit)	Hedonic potentiality (Pleasure potential)	Existential hedonism

(to Utilit'n Conduct)	(to Utilitarian Basis)	(to Utilitarian Theory)
Utilitarian Logic	Utilitarian Perspective	Descriptive Utilitarianism
Utilitarian conclusion	Utilitarian overview (Utilitarian overlook)	Universalistic utiltarianism
Utilitarian argument	Utilitarian outlook	General utilitarianism
Utilitarian question	Utilitarian purview	Quantitative utilitarianism
Utilitarian deduction	Utilitarian prevue (Utilitarian preview)	Qualitative utilitarianism
Utilitarian induction	Utilitarian view	Restricted utilitarianism[184]
Utilitarian premise	Utilitarian viewpoint	Intuitive, intuitional utilitarianism

TABLE 10

Preliminary Scales of Goodness, of Enjoyment, and of Correctness

Scale of Goodness

Minimum goodness	Minor goodness	Middle goodness	Major goodness	M goooaness	Maximum goodness
0 Least good	20 Lesser good	40 Less good	60 Much good	80 More good	100 Most good

Scale of Enjoyment (or of Joy)

Minimum enjoyment	Minor enjoyment	Middle enjoyment	Major enjoyment	Main enjoyment	Maximum enjoyment
Sentiment	Comfort	Convenience	Satisfaction	Happiness	Pleasure
0 Least joy	20 Lesser joy	40 Less joy	60 Much joy	80 More joy	100 Most joy

Scale of Correctness

Fiasco	Failure	Error (Mistake)	Adequacy	Success	Triumph (Breakthrough)
0 Null (Non-existent)	20 False	40 Wrong	60 Correct (Right)	80 True	100 Universal

TABLE 11

Tentative Structure of Goodness (Good), Including Substructures of Rectitude and of Righteousness

Goodness (Good)

Virtue (Virtuousness)	Morality (Morals)	Propriety (Properness)
Theoretical virtue	Moral theory (Theoretical morality)	Theoretical propriety
Systemic virtue (Systematic virtue)	Moral system (Systemic morality)	Systemic propriety (Systematic propriety)
Practical virtue	Moral practice (Practical morality)	Practical propriety
Rational virtue	Moral relation	Rational propriety (Reasoned propriety)
Typical virtue	Moral living (Moral life)	Living propriety (Proper living, life)
Particular virtue	Moral character (Moral nature)	Fundamental, basic propriety

Rectitude (Correctness, Rightness)	Righteousness (Uprightness)	Obligingness (Good-naturedness)
Theoretical correctness, rightness	Theoretical goodness (Goodness theory)	Goodness appreciation (Good appreciation)
Systemic correctness (Systematic rightness)	Systemic goodness (Systematic good)	Good desire
Practical correctness (Practical rightness)	Practical goodness (Practical good)	Good extent (Good extension)
Rational correctness (Correct rationale, right reasoning)	Rational goodness[105] (Reasoned good)	Good intent (Good intention)
Prima facie, face-value correctness (Surface rightness)	Common goodness (Common good)	Good attention
Fundamental correctness (Basic rightn's)	Behavioral goodness (Good behavior)	Good tendency

TABLE 11 (Continued)

Rectitude (Correctness, Rightness)

Theoretical Correctness, Rightness)	Systemic Correctness (Systematic Rightness)	Practical Correctness (Practical Rightness)
Scientific correctness (Scientific rightness)	Correct formulation (Right formulation)	Correct goal (Right objective)
Objective correctness (Objective rightness)	Correct application (Right use)	Correct plan (Right scheme)
Subjective correctness (Subjective rightness)	Correct function (Right function)	Correct technique (Right method)
Logical correctness (Logical rightness)	Correct process (Right process)	Correct authority (Right authority)
Typical correctness (Typical rightness)	Correct consequence (Right result)	Correct conduct (Right conduct)
Characteristic correctness, rightness	Correct data (Right data)	Correct activity (Right activity)

Rational Correctness (Correct Rationale, Right Reasoning)	*Prima Facie*, Face-value Correctness (Surface Rightness)	Fundamental Correctness (Basic Rightness)
Correct judgment (Right judgment)	Correct valuation (Right valuation)	Correct value (Right value)
Correct substance (Right content)	Correct procedure (Right formation)	Correct structure (Right form)
Correct inference (Right inference)	Correct performance (Right performance)	Correct option (Right option)
Correct implication (Right implication)	Correct logic (Right logic)	Correct selection (Right choice)
Correct decision-making (Right decision)	Correct living (Right life)	Correct course (Right course)
Correct approach (Right approach)	Correct behavior (Right behavior)	Correct path (Right path)

TABLE 11 (Continued)

Righteousness (Uprightness)

Theoretical Goodness (Goodness Theory)	Systemic Goodness (Systematic Good)	Practical Goodness (Practical Good)
Goodness criterion (Criterion of good)	Good product	Good goal (Good objective, good "end")
Goodness standard (Standard of good)	Good policy	Good plan (Good scheme)
Goodness norm (Norm of good)	Good affect	Good technique (Good method, good "means")
Goodness knowledge (Knowledge of good)	Good process	Good thought (Good thinking)
Goodness type (Type of good)	Good effect	Good conduct
Goodness character (Nature of good)	Good cause	Good possessions (Good "things of life")

Rational Goodness (Reasoned Good)	Common Goodness (Common Good)	Behavioral Goodness (Good Behavior)
Good value	Good faith (Bona fide)	Goodness creation (Good-creativity)
Good desire	Good usage	Good application (Good use)
Good motive	Good option	Good work
Good reason	Good selection (Good choice)	Good concept (Good idea)
Good consequence (Good result)	Good time	Good deed
Good basis (Good "ground")	Good existence	Good activity

TABLE 12

Tentative Structure of Verity (Truth) and of Verifiability (Verification)

Verity (Truth)[186]

Verifiability[187] (Verification)	Authenticity (Genuineness)	Veracity (Truthfulness)
Truth theory (Theoretical truth)	Trustworthiness	Truth promise (True promise)
Truth system (Systemic truth, systematic truth)	Confirmation[188]	Truth acknowledgment (True acknowledgment)
Truth practice (Practical truth)	Affirmation	Truth determination (True determination)
Truth research (Truth study)	Profession	Truth knowledge (True information)
Truth measurement	Ascription	Truth story (True story)
Truth character (Truth nature)	Asseveration	Truth experience (True experience)

Veritability	Candor (Frankness)	Verisimilitude
Truth-claim	Honor	Truth belief (True belief)
Truth-exceptance	Honesty	Truth structure (True form)
Truth-acceptance	Sincerity	Truth answer (True answer)
Truth-candidate	Probity	Truth comprehension (True comprehension)
Truth-bearer (Truth-vehicle)	Plainness[189]	Truth apprehension (True apprehension)
Truth-establishment	Openness	Truth problem (True problem)

TABLE 12 (Continued)

Verifiability (Verification)

Truth Theory (Theoretical Truth)	Truth System (Systemic Truth, Systematic Truth)	Truth Practice (Practical Truth)
Scientific theory of truth (Truth science, scientific truth)	Truth product (True product)	Truth judgment (True judgment)
Consistency theory of truth[110] (Consistent truth)	Truth substance (True content)	Truth procedure (True formation)
Pragmatic theory of truth[111] (Workable truth)	Truth pursuit (True pursuit)	Truth function (True function)
Coherence theory of truth[112] (Coherent truth)	Truth process (True process)	Truth rationale (True reasoning)
Correspondence theory of truth[113] (Corresponding truth)	Truth discovery (True finding)	Truth resource (True resource)
Empirical theory of truth (Empirical truth)	Truth search (True seeking)	Truth source (True origin)

TABLE 12 (Continued)

Verifiability (Continued)

Truth Research (Truth Study)	Truth Measurement	Truth Character (Truth Nature)
Truth criterion (True criterion)	Truth formula (True formula)	Truth value[114] (True value)
Truth experiment (True experiment)	Truth table (True table)	Truth object (True object)
Truth model (True model)	Truth degree (True degree)	Truth subject (True subject)
Truth investigation (True investigation)	Truth approximation (True approximation)	Truth concept (True idea)
Truth record (True record)	Truth frequency (True frequency)	Truth type (True type)
Truth observation (True observation)	Truth unit (True unit)	Truth characteristic (True characteristic)

(to Truth Theory)

Scientific Theory of Truth (Truth Science, Scientific Truth)	Consistency Theory of Truth (Consistent Truth)
Truth unity (True unity)	Unification theory of truth
Truth hypothesis (True hypothesis)	Useful theory of truth
Truth test (True test)	Performative theory of truth (Performatory theory of truth)
Truth validity (True validity)	Semantic theory of truth
Truth reliability (True reliability)	Historic theory of truth
Truth factor (True factor)	Intuitionistic theory of truth (Intuitive theory of truth)

TABLE 13

Tentative Structure of Emotion (Emotional Behavior), Application (Use), Harmony, Desire, Satisfaction, Felicity (Happiness), and Pleasure (Pleasurableness)

Emotion[115] (Emotive Behavior, Emotional Behavior)	Application (Use)	Harmony
Idealization	Satisfaction	Felicity[116] (Happiness)
Desire	Consumption	Congeniality
Favoring	Service	Compatability
Compassion	Device	Concord
Passion	Employment	Accord
Feeling	Engrossment	Cord (Tie, binding)

Desire	Satisfaction	Felicity (Happiness)	Pleasure (Pleasurableness)
Pleasure (Pleasurableness)	Euphoria	Beatitude	Ecstacy
Urge	Pacification	Tranquility	Bliss
Fancy	Fulfillment	Amiability	Glee
Wish	Recompense	Gladness	Delectation (Delight)
Want	Repleteness (Repletion)	Gratitude (Gratefulness)	Pleasantness (Pleasingness)
Need	Satiation	Thankfulness	Sensuality (Sensuousness)

TABLE 14 *Tentative Structure of Individual Living (Individual Life) and of Propriety (Properness)*

Individual Living (Individual Life)

Living Quality, Life Quality, (Quality of Life)	Living Integrity, Life Integrity (Integrity of Life)	Living Style, Life Style (Style of Life)
Good living[117] (Good life)	Successful living (Successful life)	Life ideals (Ideals of living)
Congenial living (Congenial life)	Consistent living (Consistent life)	Life standard (Standard of living)
Compatible living (Compatible life)	Confident living (Confident life)	Life art (Art of living)
Correct living (Right life)	Positive living (Positive life)	Life distinctiveness (Distinction of living)
Comfortable living (Comfortable life)	Daily living (Everyday life)	Life support (Support of life)
Tolerable living (Tolerable life)	Negative living (Negative life)	Life behavior (Behavior of life)

Living Rationale, Life Rationale (Rationale of Life)	Living Conduct, Life Conduct (Conduct of Life)	Living Basis, Life Base (Basis of Life)
Life meaning (Meaning of life)	Worthy living (Worthwhile life)	Life value
Life sufficiency (Sufficiency of life)	Disciplined living (Disciplined life)	Life application (Life use)
Life contingency (Contingency of life)	Emotional living (Emotional life)	Life energy (Life force)
Life clarity (Clarity of life)	Cognitive living (Mental life)	Life concept (Life idea)
Life consequence (Result of life)	Actual living (Real life)	Life span (Life length)
Life necessity (Necessity of life)	Potential living (Potential life)	Life constituent (Life "ingredient")

TABLE 14 (Continued)

Propriety (Properness)

Theoretical Propriety	Systemic Propriety (Proper Systematization)	Practical Propriety (Proper Practice)
Proper improvement	Proper regulation	Proper goal (Proper objective)
Proper control	Proper procedure (Proper formation)	Proper plan (Proper scheme)
Proper explanation	Proper function	Proper technique (Proper method)
Proper prediction	Proper process	Proper recognition
Proper description	Proper consequence (Proper result)	Proper raising (Proper upbringing)
Proper disposition	Proper fact	Proper behavior

Rational Propriety (Reasonable Propriety)	Living Propriety (Proper Living, Proper Life)	Fundamental Propriety (Basic Propriety)
Proper purpose	Proper criterion	Proper value
Proper substance (Proper content)	Proper standard	Proper application (Proper use)
Proper deliberation	Proper norm	Proper work
Proper consideration	Proper correctness (Proper rightness)	Proper concept (Proper idea)
Proper reflection	Proper conduct	Proper time
Proper domain	Proper problem	Proper place

TABLE 14 (Continued)

(To Living Quality)	(To Actual Living)
Good Living (Good Life)	Practical Living (Practical Life)
Joyous living (Joyful life)	Life goal (Life objective)
Useful living (Useful life)	Life plan (Life scheme)
Leisurely living (Leisurely life)	Life technique (Life method)
Moderate living (Moderate life)	Life cogitation
Abundant living (Abundant life)	Life decision-making (Life decision)
Interesting living (Interesting life)	Life experience

TABLE 15

The Six Basic Principles of Personal Behavior

Why principle: "Each person ordinarily[a] behaves according to one's values, within environmental constraints (social and physical)."

Who principle: "Each person ordinarily[a] wants self-actualization, within cultural possibilities." (That is, each individual ordinarily desires self-realization or self-fulfillment within a group's "way of life," or pattern of existence.)

How principle: "Each person ordinarily[a] uses food-obtained energy to satisfy personal needs -- immediately (now), intermediately (short-run), and ultimately (long-run) -- within a particular situation and in accord with one's health."

What principle: "Each person should do good, not bad."[b]

When principle: "Each person should appreciate the past, anticipate the future, and enjoy the present -- moderately, according to environmental opportunities."

Where principle: "Each person ordinarily[a] lives within a social environment within the physical environment."[c]

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[a]The qualification of "ordinarily" allows exceptions for extreme situations.

[b]A similar statement has been "Do good and avoid evil." Thus, Otto Bird has written, "The principle can, accordingly, be formulated strictly as a precept, that is, as a command: 'Do good and avoid evil,' or as the corresponding *ought* statement: 'Men ought to do good and avoid evil.' It is a directive principle." Otto A. Bird, *The Idea of Justice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1967), p. 154.

Similarly, "There is no basic argument over the first normative or regulative principle of our moral life, namely that good is to be done and evil is to be avoided." William E. May, *Becoming Human. An Invitation to Christian Ethics* (Dayton, OH: Pflaum Publishing, 1975), p. 86.

[c]Presumably, there could also be six separate principles for the dynamics of social behavior and six distinct principles for the dynamics of the physical environment. The interaction of these 18 principles would then tend to account for many complexities of personal, social, and physical behavior.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. William A. Harper, et al. *The Philosophic Process in Physical Education*, 3rd ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Lea and Febiger, 1977), p. 120.

2. Harold H. Titus. *Ethics for Today*, 2nd ed. (New York: American Book Company, 1947), p. 233.

3. Elizabeth Monroe Drews and Leslie Lipson, *Values and Humanity* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 91.

4. "The concept of perfection has two closely allied and often overlapping meanings. First, it means 'completeness,' 'wholeness,' or 'integrity': *X* is perfect when he (or it) is free from all deficiencies. Second, it means the achievement of an end or a goal. This meaning emerges most clearly from the connection between the Greek words *teleios* ('perfect') and *telos* ('end' or 'goal'). An entity is perfect (to use Aristotelian terms) when it has achieved its goal by actualizing its potentialities and realizing its specific form." H. P. Owen, "Perfection," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 6:87.

Chapter 2

1. According to Edwards and Arthur Pap, "Basic terms can have their meaning explained only by pointing to instances of the qualities they designate." Edwards and Arthur Pap, ed., *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 286.

Similarly, "There are different ways of indicating what language means, of course. We can define it ostensively, i.e., by pointing to its referent; or we can define it verbally, i.e., by naming, or

referring to, its referent in other terms." W. D. Hudson, *Modern Moral Philosophy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1970), p. 21.

2. Dictionary definitions of "good" list adjectives like adequate, agreeable, ample, attractive, benevolent, cogent, excellent, favorable, fitting, prosperous, and salutary. The dictionaries also define "desirable" in terms of advantageous, beneficial, wise, and worthy. All these terms indicate goodness and desirability.

3. In the words of philosopher Mortimer Adler, "The idea of *goodness* has its own sphere of influence. We cannot think of the good without thinking of the desirable, or of the desirable without thinking of the good." Mortimer J. Adler, *Six Great Ideas* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1981), p. 25. Adler has further declared that "the good is always and only the desirable and the desirable is always and only the good." Ibid., p. 75.

4. Truth is dictionarily defined to be actuality, constancy, fact, or fidelity. In language usage, the phrase "in truth" synonyms to the phrase "in fact." Truth can be more fully designated to be "accurate knowledge."

5. For undesirable difficulty, the word "right" has had at least four distinct usages:

(1) That's *right* = That is *correct*.
(2) Remember your civil *rights* = Remember your civil *prerogatives*.
(3) Turn *right* = Turn in a particular *direction*.
(4) Come *right* away = Come *promptly*.

More confusion can occur from the differing, homophonous (same-sounding) terms of *write* and *rite*.

6. The technical term "rectitude" also comes from the Latin *regere*, to lead straight + -itude, the condition of = the condition of leading straight.

7. Marcus G. Singer, "Ethics," *Academic American Encyclopedia* (Danbury, CN: Grolier, 1983), 7:250. In terms of *what* and *how*, the approach of metaethics (Gr. *meta*, above + ethics = above ethics) considers the *what* of ethical concepts, beyond the *how* of ethical applications.

In William Sahakian's words, "Metaethical philosophers are interested primarily in the analysis of moral concepts or in the logical analysis of moral language." William S. Sahakian, *Ethics: An Introduction to Theories and Problems* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974), p. 3. In consequence, Sahakian has combined the following definition of ethics: "Ethics is the study of the right and the good together with the logical analysis of ethical terms, theories, and beliefs." Ibid.

F. E. Sparshott has added. "If . . . philosophy is the pursuit of wisdom, ethics will then be the pursuit of wisdom in conduct." F. E.

Sparshott. *An Enquiry into Goodness* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 27.

8. Another approach has considered ethics to be theoretical and morality to be practical. Thus Sahakian has noted, "In this text, however, the term *ethics* will be used to denote moral theories; the term *morals* will denote ethical practices." Ibid., p. 202.

9. For example, Archie Bahm has tied ethics with values: "*Ethics* is concerned with values, both good and bad, and with maximizing the good and minimizing the bad." Archie J. Bahm. *Ethics as a Behavioral Science* (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1974), p. 28.

10. The emphasis here is on desirable, not merely desired, since what is desired could be bad rather than good. In the statement of John Randall and Justus Buchler, "The good, it has been pointed out, is not that which we *desire* but that which is *desirable*, not that which we prefer but that which is preferable." John Herman Randall, Jr. and Justus Buchler, *Philosophy: An Introduction*, rev. ed. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1971), p. 165.

Or, the usage here can be that desirable "means *worthy to be desired*, which is of course very different from *able to be desired*." Thomas E. Hill. *Ethics in Theory and Practice* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), p. 165.

11. The plural term "morals" has been a popular synonym for morality, while the singular term "moral" has been a short form for "moral lesson."

12. Stephen David Ross. *Moral Decision -- An Introduction to Ethics* (San Francisco, CA: Freeman, Cooper and Company, 1972), p. 155.

Similarly, James Feibleman has written, "Morality has to do primarily with the rules of conduct which have been established in a given society." James K. Feibleman. *Moral Strategy. An Introduction to the Ethics of Confrontation* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967), p. 11.

13. Peter A. Angeles. *Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1981), p. 179.

Lindley Stiles and Bruce Johnson have added, "Morality connotes conformity to the rules of 'right conduct' of an established ethnic, racial, or cultural entity, such as a family, community, bloodline, or religious denomination." Lindley J. Stiles and Bruce D. Johnson, ed. *Morality Examined, Guidelines for Teachers* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Book Company, 1977), p. xii.

14. Paul W. Taylor, ed., *Problems of Moral Philosophy, An Introduction to Ethics* (Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1967), p. 2.

15. John Biesanz and Mavis Biesanz. *Introduction to Sociology* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 65.

16. William Graham Sumner, *Folkways* (Boston, MA: Ginn and Company, 1907), p. iii. In the opinion of Edward Sagarin, "*Folkways* remains, as rich and as important as ever, probably the first effort to amass such a comprehensive compendium illustrating cultural variability. Its achievement is greater than this, however, for it introduced into the language not only the words but the accompanying concepts of folkways, mores, ethnocentrism, we-group and they-group, in-group and out-group." William Graham Sumner, *Folkways and Mores,* ed. Edward Sagarin (New York: Schocken Books, 1979), p. ix.

17. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy,* p. 179.

18. Carl Wellman, "The Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity," *Journal of Philosophy* (1963), 60:170.

Chapter 4

1. According to Wellman, "Metaethics does not make judgments of value or obligation; it analyzes such judgments epistemologically. It is called *meta*ethics because it is on a higher level than ethics; it takes as its subject matter the statements and arguments that constitute normative ethics. Its purpose is to explain the meaning of ethical words and ethical sentences and to determine what sorts of reasons, if any, can be given for or against the conclusions of normative ethics." Wellman, *Morals and Ethics* (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1975), p. xvii.

2. Dagobert D. Runes, ed., *Dictionary of Philosophy* (Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1962), p. 61.

3. Richard B. Brandt, "Ethical Relativism," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* 3:76.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 3:77.

6. Gr. *deka,* ten + *logos,* word, study = ten words. According to Biesanz and Biesanz, "The Jewish and Christian religions offer the Ten Commandments as a set of norms expressing the values of worship of one God, chastity, honesty, respect for parents, and so forth." Biesanz and Biesanz, *Introduction to Sociology,* p. 80.

7. Translation is from Hebrew text published by the Jewish Publication Society. Sheldon H. Blank, "Ten Commandments," *New Book*

of Knowledge (New York: Grolier, 1978), 18:72.

8. Robert Stewart McElhinney and Henry Lester Smith. *Personality and Character Building* (Winona Lake, IN: Light and Life Press, 1942), p. 212.

9. Ibid., pp. 212-13.

10. Ibid., pp. 217-18.

11. Ibid., p. 211. Harry McKown has provided further background information: "The most famous of all recent morality codes, because of its own excellence and also because of the publicity which it received as the winner of the $5,000 prize offered by an anonymous donor through the Character Education Institution, is the Hutchins Code, which appeared in 1916. In one form or another it is found in most of the codes and in many of the plans developed later. This code is composed of eleven 'laws' such as, for instance, the Law of Self-control, the Law of Good Health, the Law of Kindness, the Law of Duty, and the Law of Loyalty. Daily discussion periods of ten or fifteen minutes are recommended." Harry C. McKown. *Character Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1935), p. 78.

12. McElhinney and Smith. *Personality and Character Building*, p. 213.

13. Monica Taylor, ed., *Progress and Problems in Moral Education* (Windsor, Berks: NFER Publishing Co., 1975), p. 11.

14. Ibid., p. 12.

15. Ibid., p. 13.

16. Ibid., pp. 14-15.

17. Jean Piaget. *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 197.

18. McElhinney and Smith. *Personality and Character Building*, pp. 203-04.

19. George Sher and William J. Bennett. "Moral Education and Indoctrination." *Journal of Philosophy* (1982), 79:666.

20. Philip H. Phenix. *Philosophy of Education* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), p. 279.

21. Alan L. Lockwood. *Values Education and the Study of Other Cultures* (Washington, DC: NEA, 1976), preface.

22. Ibid., p. 11.

23. Ibid., pp. 13-14.

24. Ibid., p. 16.

25. Ibid., p. 18.

26. Ibid., p. 20.

27. According to Thomas Neill, "Roughly speaking, civil rights are personal liberties or freedoms guaranteed by the law of the land." Thomas P. Neill. *The Common Good*, rev. ed. (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962), p. 64.

28. Robert B. Louden. "Rights Infatuation and the Impoverishment of Moral Theory," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (1983), 17:88.

29. Steven A. Maarenen, "Natural Law," *Encyclopedia Americana. International Edition* (Danby, CN: Grolier, 1983), 19: 791.

30. Louden, "Rights Infatuation," 17:88.

31. Hill, *Ethics in Theory and Practice*, p. 370.

32. Ibid., pp. 370-1.

33. Ibid., p. 371.

34. Ibid., pp. 373-77.

35. Ibid., pp. 377-82.

36. Ibid., p. 373.

37. Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on Human Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 1.

38. Max Siporin, "Moral Philosophy in Social Work Today," *Social Service Review* (1982), 56:526.

39. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 79.

40. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 197.

41. Robin M. Williams, Jr., "The Concepts of Norms," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David L. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 11:205.

42. Williams ties folkways to mores: "When certain folkways become well-established and are supported by the belief that they are proper, right, and indispensable, they become mores. They are ordinarily thought to be supported by diffuse common agreement." Ibid.

43. Sumner. *Folkways*, p. 70.

44. Sumner, "The Mores of the Present and the Future," *Yale Review* (1909), 18:233.

45. Biesanz and Biesanz, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 26, 34.

46. Ibid., p. 68.

47. Ibid., p. 48.

48. Ibid., p. 62.

49. Ibid., p. 79.

50. Ibid.

Chapter 5

1. In an English sentence, the imperative mode expresses a command or a firm request.

2. McElhinney and Smith, *Personality and Character Building*, p. 147.
Annie MacGregor has further emphasized the self control which enables one "to know the Truth, to desire the Good, and to will the Right." Annie F. MacGregor, "Ethical Discipline." *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, ed. James Hastings (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961), 5:407.

3. John Hospers, *Human Conduct. Problems of Ethics*, short ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. 6.

4. Ibid., preface.

5. Ibid., pp. 9.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. Brand Blanshard, *Reason and Goodness* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 331. Italics inserted.

8. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 106.

9. Hospers, *Human Conduct*, p. 5.

10. Monica Taylor, *Progress and Problems in Moral Education*, p. 29.

11. Kurt Baier, *The Moral Point of View, A Rational Basis of Ethics* (New York: Random House, 1965), p. 3.

12. Jack P. Gibbs, "The Study of Norms," *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences*, 11:208.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., 11:211.

15. Williams, "The Concepts of Norms," 11:205.

16. Ibid.

17. Francis E. Merrill, *Society and Culture, An Introduction to Sociology*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 110.

18. Ibid., p. 109.

19. Ibid., p. 114.

20. Felix M. Keesing, *Cultural Anthropology, The Science of Custom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1958), p. 40.

21. Gibbs, "The Study of Norms," 11:211.

22. Phenix, *Education and the Common Good* (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 17.

23. Margaret R. Goodyear and Mildred Chapin Klohr, *Managing for Effective Living*, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1965), pp. 21-22.

24. Ibid., p. vii.

25. Sahakian, *History of Philosophy* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1968), p. 265.

26. Ibid.

Chapter 6

1. For Western culture, "Ethical philosophy began in the fifth century B.C., with the appearance of Socrates, a secular prophet whose

self-appointed mission was to awaken his fellow men to the need for rational criticism of their beliefs and practices." Greek society at that time "was in a state of rapid change from agrarian monarchy to commercial and industrial democracy." Raziel Abelson, "Ethics, History of," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 3:82.

2. Radoslav A. Tsanoff, "Ethics, History of," *Collier's Encylopedia* (New York: Macmillan Educational Company, 1981), 9:334.

3. According to William Frankena, "Christianity is traditionally regarded as having seven cardinal virtues: three 'theological' virtues -- faith, hope, and love: and four 'human' virtues -- prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice." William K. Frankena, *Ethics*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 64.

4. Tsanoff has defined, "Ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with the values of human life in a coherent, systematic, and scientific manner," and subsequently added. "It is concerned with the type of conduct or character that is approved of or disapproved of, in terms of right and wrong or good and bad." Tsanoff, "Ethics, History of," 9:333.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 9:334.

10. Ibid., 9:335.

11. Ibid., 9:333.

12. Ibid., 9:340-41.

13. Ibid., 9:341.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 9:339.

16. Ibid., 9:342. Parenthetical terms inserted.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 9:344.

20. Sahakian. *Ethics*, p. 23.

21. Ibid., p. 25.

22. Ibid., p. 26.

23. Ibid., p. 24.

24. Ibid.

25. "Pessimistic hedonism" is a negative version.

26. Frankena, *Ethics*, p. 86.

27. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 32.

28. Ralph Mason Blake, "Why Not Hedonism? A Protest," *Ethics* (1926) 37:4-5. David Trueblood has stated, "This paradox, long acknowledged by philosophers, is the observation that the surest way to miss happiness is to seek it directly. When happiness comes to a person, it usually comes as a by-product rather than as something at which the individual directly and expressly aims." David Elton Trueblood, *General Philosophy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 271-72.

29. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 31.

30. Sahakian, *History of Philosophy*, p. 216.

31. Gerald Runkle, *Ethics: An Examination of Contemporary Moral Problems* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982), p. 31.

32. Sahakian, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 219-20.

33. Runkle, *Ethics*, p. 31.

34. Ibid.

35. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 28.

36. Ibid. pp. 30-1.

37. Ibid., p. 31.

38. Hill, *Ethics in Theory and Practice*, p. 161.

39. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 28.

40. Ibid., p. 30.

41. See "Absolute Imperative" in Table 2 for bibliographic sources for the remaining chapter quotations.

Chapter 7

1. Sciensation = the act of making scientific. To be scientific can require an explicit, advancing, informed effort. The act of making a topic scientific could be labeled "scientification" or "scientization"; however, the shorter term "sciensation" seems sufficiently appropriate.

2. Leslie Stephen in 1882 produced a book titled the *Science of Ethics*, which emphasized altruistic hedonism. Tsanoff, "Ethics, History of," 9:340. Earlier, Bentham in 1834 authored *Deontology, or the Science of Morality*, while Francis Wayland in 1835 wrote about *The Elements of Moral Science* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1963). In the 1837 edition of the book, Wayland declared that "Ethics, or Moral Philosophy, is the Science of Moral Law." Wayland, p. 17.

3. George Edward Moore, *Principia Ethica*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 5.

4. Ibid., p. 6.

5. John Dewey and James H. Tufts, *Ethics*, rev. ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1932), p. 3. Dewey and Tufts elaborated, "Ethical science, tracing and interpreting this process of growth and adjustment, has as its task, not to create moral life -- for that life is already present -- but to discover its laws and principles, and thereby aid in making its further advance stronger, freer, and more assured because more intelligent." Ibid., p. 517.

6. Trueblood, *General Philosophy*, pp. 254, 262.

7. Wellman, "Ethics Since 1950," *The Journal of Value Inquiry* (1972), 6:83.

8. See Note 9, Chapter 2.

9. For example, Wellman has declared, "Ethical theories are properly taken to be hypotheses to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the truth or falsehood of their implications in concrete cases, real or imagined." Wellman, "Ethics Since 1950," 6:89.

10. W. D. Ross, *The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 16.

11. Tsanoff, "Ethics, History of," 9:333.

12. Ibid., 9:335.

13. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 56.

14. Ibid., pp. 57-58.

15. Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, tr. Harris Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934), 1:15.

16. *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 3rd ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1883), p. 305.

17. Ibid., p. 221.

18. Ibid., p. 206.

19. *Plato's Meno*, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), p. 17.

20. Sahakian, *History of Philosophy*, p. 32.

21. Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 58.

22. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 313.

23. Thus Feibleman has declared, "A conceptual scheme is true to the extent to which it is consistent and inclusive, and to the extent to which its contents represent the external world in which the individual lives." Feibleman, *The Stages of Human Life* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. 19.

24. Phenix has further linked the various criteria of truth to personality development: "When sense perception is taken as the final test of knowledge, life will develop around the senses as primary sources of meaning and truth. When reason is the criterion, a reflective, logical orientation will result. Intuitive standards will emphasize the importance of feeling and inwardness in personal growth and existential tests will put greatest stress on action, will, and decision. Tradition as a standard will tend to produce obedient, conservative personalities, while revelation as an ultimate court of appeal will engender reverence and devotion." Phenix, *Philosophy of Education* (New York: Henry Holt, 1958), p. 315.

25. This approach avoids a difficulty like: "Any attempt to change the meaning of 'coherent' from coherence with other statements to coherence with fact (or reality of experience) is to abandon the theory." Alan R. White, "Coherence Theory of Truth," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2:132-33.

26. Nicholas Rescher, *The Coherence Theory of Truth* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982), p. 10.

27. Phenix, *Realms of Meaning* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 237.

28. Phenix. *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 401-02.

29. Rescher, *The Coherence Theory of Truth*, p. 5.

30. C. J. F. Williams, *What Is Truth?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 74.

31. D. J. O'Connor, *The Correspondence Theory of Truth* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1975), p. 17.

32. White, "Coherence Theory of Truth," 2:130.

33. Ibid.

34. Gertrude Ezorsky, "Pragmatic Theory of Truth," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 6:427.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 6:428.

Chapter 8

1. John Kekes, "Happiness," *Mind* (1982), 91:358-59.

2. Ibid., 91:358.

3. Frankena, *Ethics*, p. 92.

4. Ibid.

5. Phenix, *Education and the Common Good*, p. 9.

6. Ibid., p. 10.

7. Neill, *The Common Good*, p. 27.

8. Ibid.

9. Robert J. Roth, "John Dewey's 'Moral Law' Ethics," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (1980), 20:133.

10. Ibid., 20:134.

11. In terms of approximation (symbolized ≐) "common good" ≐

"general good" ≠ "general well-being" ≠ "general welfare" ≠ "common well-being."

12. Angus Campbell, *The Sense of Well-Being in America, Recent Patterns and Trends* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1981), p. xi.

13. Ibid., pp. 40-7.

14. Ibid., p. 47.

15. Ibid., p. 2.

16. Ibid., p. 3.

17. Ibid., p. 14.

18. Ibid., p. 15.

19. Ibid., p. 6.

20. Ibid., pp. 48-9.

Chapter 9

1. Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development. Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981), pp. ix-x.

2. Ibid., p. x.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. xvii.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. xviii.

7. Ibid., p. xiii.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. xxxii.

10. Ibid., p. 27.

11. Ibid., p. 2.

12. Ibid., p. 18.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. xxxi.

15. Ibid.

16. Samuel L. Hart. *Ethics, The Quest for the Good Life* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1963), p. 46.

17. See Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development*, p. xxviii.

18. Ibid., p. xxix.

19. C. Eugene Conover. *Personal Ethics in an Impersonal World* (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1967), p. 89.

20. Kohlberg, "The Future of Liberalism as the Dominant Ideology of the West," *Moral Development and Politics*. ed. Richard W. Wilson and Gordon J. Schochet (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), p. 57.

21. Ibid., p. 63.

22. Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development*, p. xxxii.

23. Ibid., p. xxxiii.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

30. Ibid., p. xxxv.

31. Ibid., p. 16.

32. Ibid., p. 115.

33. Ibid., p. xxix.

34. Ibid.

35. George F. Thomas, *Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 372.

36. Arthur F. Holmes. *Philosophy: A Christian Perspective*, rev. ed. (Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1975), p. 8.

37. Richard M. Gula. *What Are They Saying about Moral Norms?* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), p. 9.

38. Ibid., p. 29.

39. Ibid., p. 46.

40. Ibid., p. 58.

41. Ibid., p. 56.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., p. 108.

44. Ibid., p. 107.

45. Ibid., pp. 20, 22.

46. Ibid., pp. 20-1.

47. Beside suggesting ethics to be theoretical and morality to be practical, Sahakian has connected ethics to "study" and morality to "standards." "The terms *ethics* and *morals* should not be used interchangeably. . . . *Ethics* is the term for the *study* of morals or moral issues; ethics consists of a theoretical or rational interpretation of moral phenomena. On the other hand, the term *morals* refers not to a study or discipline, but to the standards which individuals are enjoined to observe in their conduct." Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 6.

In terms of overlap between personal and social, the President's Commission on National Goals noted in 1960 that a social goal could emphasize personal self-realization: "Our enduring aim is to build a nation and help build a world in which every human being shall be free to develop his capacities to the fullest." President's Commission on National Goals, *Goals for Americans* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1960), p. 1.

Conversely, I. B. Berkson had earlier noted in 1958 that self-realization could emphasize social cooperativeness: "In a democracy every person is an end-in-himself and the self-realization of each individual to the maximum of his potentialities is its goal, but self-realization of the personality requires the full development of the social self, since the human being is social by his very nature." I. B. Berkson. *The Ideal and the Community, A Philosophy of Education* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 37.

Again, to coalesce individual with social, James Dixon has declared, "We believe that the individual is central to our society, that the principal asset of human society is human life itself, and that society must therefore help to protect the lives and interests of every individual." James P. Dixon, Jr., "Meeting Human Needs," *Goals for Americans*, p. 249.

More inclusively, in the view of Wilma Longstreet, "There are values we hold which are comprehensive of only ourselves; they concern the relationship of self to self and of self to intimate life with others. Moving along on a continuum of comprehensiveness, there are values which are comprehensive of the relationship of the self with social groupings and with government. Still further on, there are values which are comprehensive of the relationship of the self, mankind, this planet and the universe." Wilma S. Longstreet, "Morality: A Course of Study," *The Teaching of Values, The Third Yearbook of the Arizona Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development* (Tempe, AZ: AASCD, 1975), p. 130.

48. Wellman has stated, "Science has shown that certain things that were once thought to be absolute are actually relative to culture." Wellman, "Ethical Implications," 60:169.

49. A possible continuum of morality could range from anti-moral (against morality) to nonmoral (immoral, not moral) to amoral (without moral, zero moral) to morally neutral to morally apt (morally appropriate) to pro-moral (for morality).

50. Thus Ewing has written, "It is part of a philosopher's work, as it is of a scientist's, to try out tentative hypotheses and examine their advantages and disadvantages." A. C. Ewing, "A Suggested Non-Naturalistic Analysis of Good," *Mind* (1939), 48:1.

51. In similar manner, Abraham Edel in *Science and the Structure of Ethics* has commented, "To speak of 'the structure of ethics' is to go beyond the particular notion of 'the structure of a given ethical theory.' It assumes a certain community of enterprise in different ethical theories -- that they are addressing themselves to the same central problems however different their solutions." Abraham Edel, *Science and the Structure of Ethics* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 11.

52. Accordingly, Feibleman has declared, "Ethical theories do not fail so much because of what is false in them as they do because of what is omitted from them." Feibleman, *Moral Strategy*, p. 5.

53. Geoffrey Parrinder has commented about religion and morality: Religion has always been linked with morality, though moral systems differ greatly from place to place. . . . The rules of moral behavior in most societies have a strong religious basis, and they are supported by the teachings of scriptures and the actions of religious officials." Geoffrey Parrinder, ed., *World Religions from Ancient*

History to the Present (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1983), p. 10.

54. In an overall structure of knowledge, the concept of morality has been put at the fifth level of goodness, which concept has been placed at the basic level of perfection. Thus, morality is here expanded within a substructure of perfection, although the subjects of ethics and of morality are both given major attention here.

55. Austin Fagothey, *Right and Reason, Ethics in Theory and Practice*, 4th ed. (St. Louis, MO: C. V. Mosby, 1967), p. v.

56. Philip B. Gove, ed., *Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms* (Springfield, MA: G. and C. Merriam Company, Publishers, 1978), p. 614.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., p. 615.

Tables

1. According to Max Black, "Traditionally, the True has been linked with the Good and the Beautiful as one of man's supreme values." Max Black, "Truth," *Encyclopedia Americana*, 27:185. Note that a technical term like "verity" is placed first and is followed by a popular synonym like "truth" in parentheses.

2. Adler has written that virtue "is the habitual disposition to desire aright, which means choosing what one needs -- the real goods one ought to desire." Adler, *Six Great Ideas*, p. 142.

3. Religious emphasis on grace concerns both individual person and deity acccording to a description by Owen Sharkey: "Man's living union with God is spoken of at times as a *life of grace*. God's grace, or favor, is *his* free and loving turning to each and every human person. It is God's immanent, creating, and loving Presence. . . . On man's part, grace is a *life* which a human person shares with God. Because grace pertains to a man's personal life and experience, it possesses a dimension of human consciousness. Who and what man is, then, has a created meaning in his daily conscious life, especially the consciousness of free love offered and shared." Owen Sharkey, *The Mystery of Man, An Anthropologic Study* (Philadelphia, PA: Franklin Publishing Company, 1975), p. 7.

4. Angeles has given a detailed summary about beauty: (L., *bellus*,

"pretty"). 1. That which is pleasing. 2. That quality or group of qualities which pleases a sense organ such as the eye or the ear, and/or pleases the intellect by proportion, unity, variety, symmetry, simplicity, grace, fitness, suggestiveness, intricacy, perfection, or excellence. 3. The quality or property of a thing that produces aesthetic pleasure or satisfaction. Comprises one of the triad of ideals -- Truth, Goodness, Beauty -- with which classical philosophy has been especially concerned." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, pp. 23-24.

5. "These experiences give rise not only to questions of practical ethics (What should I do? Is this arrangement fair?) but also to questions of theoretical ethics (Is any one of these standards really right or are they all just arbitrary?)." Singer, "Ethics," 7:250.

6. According to Sahakian, "The term *metaethics* was coined by Ayer, who used it in 1949 in an article entitled 'On the Analysis of Moral Judgements.'" Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 5.

Singer has added, "Metaethics (literally 'about ethics') is the analytical study of the discipline of ethics itself. The term came into use only in the 20th century and thus cannot be found in the works of any of the classical moral philosophers, although inquiries of the sort that constitute it certainly can." Singer, "Ethics," 7:250.

Also, "Metaethics examines the meanings and uses of moral terms such as 'good,' or 'right,' the analysis of moral discourse and reasoning, and the foundations upon which moral judgments are based." The Hastings Center. *The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education* (Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, 1980), p. 14.

Moreover, "The methodology of ethics -- or 'meta-ethics,' as it is often called -- seeks to clarify the nature of ethical inquiry itself, by examining the logical functions of ethical language and the meaning of ethical terms." W. T. Jones, et al, ed., *Approaches to Ethics, Representative Selections from Classical Times to the Present* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1962), p. 10.

7. According to Antony Flew, normative ethics is "investigation into the content of moral principles and virtues, and their justification in terms of the human condition." Antony Flew, *A Dictionary of Philosophy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 106.

William Reese has agreed that normative ethics is "building systems designed to provide guidance in making decisions concerning good and evil, right and wrong." William L. Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, Eastern and Western Thought* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), p. 156.

Furthermore, "Normative ethics studies actual moral agreements or statements: about what instances or classes of conduct are right or wrong, good or bad, for instance; or about traits of personal character that are worthy of praise or blame; or about the justice or injustice of societies and institutions." The Hastings Center, *The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education*, p. 14.

8. "Descriptive ethics is concerned with stating what in fact the moral views of a society or of individuals are or have been in the past." Luther J. Binkley, *Contemporary Ethical Theories* (New York: Citadel Press, 1961), p. 59.

Similarly, "Descriptive ethics seeks an accurate, objective account of the actual moral behavior or beliefs of particular persons or groups; it attempts to avoid either moral judgment or moral prescription concerning the behavior or belief system studied." The Hastings Center. *The Teaching of Ethics in Higher Education*, p. 14.

9. "*Basic* ethics lays down the broad principles that must govern all human conduct, and must logically come first." Fagothey. *Right and Reason*, p. 7.

10. "There are courses with distinctive and specific areas of concern such as bioethics, business, business ethics, the morality of war, or ethics and experimentation. Such courses concentrate on the application of moral theory to particular domains or problems rather than on the history or rationale of morality and ethics per se." Bernard Rosen and Arthur L. Caplan. *Ethics in the Undergraduate Curriculum* (Hastings-on-Hudson, NY: The Hastings Center, 1980), p. 7.

11. McKown has stated negatively, "Nor can 'Let your conscience be your guide' be considered a final desirable standard for evaluating conduct unless that conscience has been educated to appreciate, completely, wholesome activity and conduct." McKown. *Character Education*, p. 61.

12. Again from McKown. "A creed (from *credo*, I believe) is a personal acceptance of a concise summary of the principles and essential doctrines of an organization, cause, or institution." McKown, ibid., p. 129.

13. "Rather, moral philosophers have attempted to arrive at acceptable universal ethical statements which could serve as standards for the appraisal of particular situations." Richard B. Brandt. "Epistemology and Ethics, Parallel Between." *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 3:6.

14. "Absolute ethics holds that there is one universal and eternal moral code which applies equally to all men of all ages, and that changing circumstances or changing opinions make no difference whatsoever to this absolute moral code." William Lillie. *An Introduction to Ethics*, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1955), p. 98.

Further, "Ethical absolutism interprets ethical norms in terms of the will or commandment of God or in terms of natural law or in terms of a demonstrative rational morality like that of Immanuel Kant." J. V. Langmead Casserley, "Relativism from a Theological Standpoint." *Relativism and the Study of Man*, ed. Helmet Schoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1961), p. 96.

15. "Relative or relativistic ethics holds that the moral standard varies with different circumstances." Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics*, p. 98.

16. "Situation ethics, which has come into prominence only recently, claims that the morality of an action depends on the situation and not on the application of a law to the case." Singer, "Ethics," 7:251.

17. Ethical imperative is described by Angeles to be "the view that morality is directive language: a set of commands or recommendations to act or not to act in certain specified ways." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 129.

18. See Richard B. Brandt, "Emotive Theory of Ethics," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2:493-96.

19. "A cognitivist theory maintains that moral judgments can be true or false and can, in principle, be subjects of knowledge or cognition." Singer, "Ethics," 7:250.

20. Perry has commented, "Wherever accounts of *conation* preserve anything distinctive, they appear to incorporate something of the action of the physical organism." Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926), p. 144.

21. "The rightness of an act is judged according to the consequences of doing it. If the consequences are good, the act is right; if they are evil, the act is wrong." Phenix, *Realms of Meaning*, p. 230.

22. Wellman has written that *"ethical egoism* is the theory that what makes an act right or wrong is the agent's welfare." Wellman, *Morals and Ethics*, p. 37. Further, "Ethical egoism is the theory that each moral agent ought always to do that act that benefits himself most; each act is to be judged right or wrong by its impact on the good of the agent." Ibid., p. 196.

23. "By ethical intuitionism is meant the theory of the immediate apprehension of right and wrong, the possession of innate conceptions of moral principles by a unique moral faculty or moral sense somewhat comparable to other human senses." Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 90.

Also, "Intuitionists such as H. A. Prichard and W. D. Ross claim that the sort of knowledge we have of right and wrong is immediate and self-evident." Singer, "Ethics," 7:250.

According to Reese, ethical intuitionism is "the view that ethical terms are primary and underived, i.e., different in nature from all non-ethical terms and thereby not wholly definable." Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, p. 156.

24. "The common feature of all teleological theories of ethics is the subordination of the concept of duty, right conduct, or moral obligation to the concept of the good or the humanly desirable." Robert

G. Olson, "Teleological Ethics." *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8:88.

Patrick Nowell-Smith has written also that teleologists "regard moral rules as rules for producing what is good (health, happiness, knowledge, beauty) and avoiding what is bad (disease, misery, ignorance, ugliness); they are to be judged empirically on the basis of their tendency to promote what is good and prevent what is bad." Patrick H. Nowell-Smith, "Religion and Morality," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 7:150.

25. While teleological ethics is but a portion of overall teleology (the study of purpose), the topic of deontology (the study of duty) can be included entirely within ethics.

According to Olson, "The term 'deontology' derives from the Greek words *deon* (duty) and *logos* (science). Etymologically it means the science of duty. In current usage, however, its meaning is more specific: A deontological theory of ethics is one which holds that at least some acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences for human weal or woe." Olson, "Deontological Ethics," *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2:343.

Lillie has written similarly, "A deontological theory holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on the action itself and not on the consequences it produces." Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics*, p. 100.

26. "The view that ethics is a part of the natural world, and that ethical issues can be settled by an appeal to facts. Dewey . . . is the best-known adherent of the doctrine." Reese, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, p. 156.

27. "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." Immanuel Kant, *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*, p. 38.

28. "An action is right insofar as it tends to produce the greatest happiness for the greatest number." Richard H. Popkin and Avrum Stroll, *Philosophy Made Simple* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 36.

More elaborately, "that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to suggest or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness." Jeremy Bentham, *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, ed. John Bowring (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), 1:2.

29. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Popkin and Stroll, *Philosophy Made Simple*, p. 41.

In Kant's more abstract version, "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as a means only." Ibid.

30. "Moderation in all things." Runkle. *Ethics*. p. 6. Moderation comes between the extremes of too much or too little: "Courage is the mean between cowardice and rashness; liberality between prodigality and frugality; pride between vanity and humility, and so forth." Popkin and Stroll. *Philosophy Made Simple*. p. 21.

31. "The first is: Be loyal. The second is: So be loyal, that is, to seek, so accept, so serve your cause that thereby the loyalty of all your brethren throughout all the world, through your example, through your influence, through your own life of loyalty wherever you find it, as well as through the sort of loyalty which you exemplify in your deeds, shall be aided, furthered, increased so far as in you lies." Josiah Royce. *The Sources of Religious Insight* (New York: Scribner, 1912), p. 202.

32. "Every action is RIGHT, which, in presence of a lower principle, follows a higher; every action is WRONG, which, in presence of a higher principle, follows a lower." James Martineau. *Types of Ethical Theory*, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 2:270.

33. The formal title for "a movement stressing ethics as the center of religion. Introduced in New York City by Felix Adler (1851-1933)." Reese. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, p. 156.

34. Reese notes that the Latin term *"moralis* was introduced into the vocabulary of philosophy by Cicero who regarded it as the Latin equivalent of Aristotle's *ethikos."* Reese. *Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion*, p. 156.

35. "Essentially, a moral system is a major component in a total socio-cultural system. Its basic function is to keep individual behavior 'harmonized' to the degree that the society in question can function with reasonable efficiency." Christopher Boehm. "The Moral System." *Morality Examined*, ed. Stiles and Johnson, p. 25.

Further, "A moral system is a set of rules of conduct, preferred qualities of character, typical approved goals, within a given community." Edel. *Method in Ethical Theory* (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 50.

36. "Moral conduct, beginning in selfish or even animal desires, grows, in an atmosphere of warm social feeling, into what seems the opposite of selfishness -- into generosity, devotion, disinterestedness, unselfishness. And yet these great social qualities are themselves the outgrowth of the common human nature." Charles F. Dole. *The Ethics of Progress, or The Theory and the Practice by Which Civilization Proceeds* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1909), p. 54.

37. "To behave morally is to have internalized the controls on behavior that inhibit harmful acts and facilitate beneficent acts (acts that promote the well-being of others)." Joan E. Sieber. "A Social Learning Theory Approach to Morality," *Moral Development and*

Socialization, by Myra Windmiller, Nadine Lambert, and Elliot Turiel (Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1980), p. 138.

38. "If values in general are concepts of the undesirable and the desirable, we may say specifically that moral values are those that relate to desirable or undesirable conduct, motives, and attitudes of human beings interacting with other human beings." Boehm, "The Moral System," p. 26.

39. "Throughout most of the nineteenth century, the most important course in the college curriculum was moral philosophy, taught usually by the college president and required of all senior students." Douglas Sloan, "The Teaching of Ethics in the American Undergraduate Curriculum, 1876-1976," *Ethics Teaching in Higher Education*, ed. Daniel Callahan and Sissela Bok (New York: Plenum Press, 1980), p. 2.

40. "Grant that, so far as man shares the animal life, his moral actions are governed by animal and material instincts. Nevertheless, as man, he thinks and deliberates concerning duties, he feels ideal motives, he chooses and approves at times what he is not able to do. At his best he puts aside food and drink, passion and appetites, he counts not his own life dear to him, while he lets this tide of the moral imperative bear him where it may." Dole, *The Ethics of Progress*, p. 51.

41. "There is, however, a body of knowledge collected with the special aim of guiding people in the practice of right conduct or the art of living the good life. We call such guidance 'moralizing', and moralizing is by no means confined to the student of ethics, or even to the moral philosopher." Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics*, p. 11.

42. "In like manner, he that will judge of the first principles of morals, must consult his conscience, or moral faculty." Thomas Reid, "The Moral Faculty and the Principles of Morals," *A Modern Introduction to Philosophy*, ed. Edwards and Pap, p. 293.

43. "Reasoning can be valid or invalid -- valid when the conclusion follows logically from the premises, invalid when it does not. (In inductive reasoning, it is enough if the conclusion acquires a certain degree of probability on the basis of the premises.)" Hospers, *Human Conduct*, p. 28.

44. Sharkey has correlated the individual and group: "What is morally good for man is that he should develop and fulfill his nature in being human." Sharkey, *The Mystery of Man*, p. 158.

45. A value judgment using particular moral qualities or moral values. Thus, "Moral judgments function to guide conduct, to voice decisions of policy, and to evaluate conduct according to the norms which are accepted by one's society." Binkley, *Contemporary Ethical Theories*, p. 193.

Thus, "According to the broad view, moral judgments are not limited to such particular concerns as sexual relations, gambling, drinking, and murder, but are relevant also to such matters as choice of friends, selection of occupation and manner of pursuing it, participation in civic affairs, and decisions about recreation." Phenix, *Philosophy of Education*, p. 277.

46. Two varieties of "moral right" are identified here: moral correctness, with emphasis on the morality of rightness; and moral prerogative, with emphasis on a right being morally due.

47. "The essence of reflective morality is the ability and the willingness to weigh all relevant facts in moral conduct and to base choices upon the results of such reflection." Titus, *Ethics for Today*, p. 207.

48. In Pattison's description, "The 1960s and '70s, however, were a period of intensive scientific study of morality as a behavioral phenomenon." E. Mansell Pattison, "Moral Awareness," *Academic American Encyclopedia*, 13:572.

49. "Perhaps the chief task confronting the philosopher of ethics is that of determining the *moral criterion*, a criterion capable of indicating as exactly whether an act is moral or immoral." Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 38.

50. "All societies set up moral standards and rules to signify behavior that is preferred, expected, considered virtuous, evaluated positively, and rewarded. They also signify behavior that is disapproved, labeled sinful and deviant, proscribed, and denied social rewards." Siporin, "Moral Philosophy," 56:524.

51. See 46.

52. According to Sahakian, "The main purpose of Kant's system of ethics was to formulate moral laws as those necessary and universal objects of the human will which must be accepted as valid for everyone." Sahakian, *History of Philosophy*, p. 175.

53. "Good will is surely the norm or the goal of moral effort and progress." Dole, *The Ethics of Progress*, p. 104.

54. "Just as . . . consistency and comprehensiveness are criteria of the truth and progress of science, so, in our moral experience, we find that the very same criteria are significantly relevant to our moral judgments." W. H. Werkmeister, *Theories of Ethics. A Study in Moral Obligation* (Lincoln, NE: Johnsen Publishing Co., 1961), p. 84.

55. "In fact, most moral problems arise in situations where there is a 'conflict of duties,' that is, where one moral principle pulls one way and another pulls the other way." Frankena, *Ethics*, p. 3.

56. Titus has suggested. "Moral evolution has moved in the direction of emanicipating the individual from the complete control of the group." Titus. *Ethics for Today*, p. 118.

57. For moral development. the three levels of autonomous morality (moral autonomy), heteronomous morality (moral heteronomy). and socionomous morality (moral socionomy) are here supplemented with cognitive morality (mental morality, moral cognition). emotive morality (moral emotion). and mature morality (moral maturity, moral maturation) to complete all six levels of structuring.

58. "When social-class differences in moral conduct are examined carefully it is clear that five moral traits emerge as characteristic of moral maturity. These are (1) moral judgment. (2) deferred gratification and future orientation, (3) moral personalism. (4) moral flexibility, and (5) moral dynamism and moral creativity." William Kay. *Moral Education* (London: George Allen and Unwin. 1975), p. 14.

59. "Based on his child-development studies. Piaget found that the young child has a 'heteronomous' morality: the child's notions of right and wrong are imposed from without and accepted as unbreakable rules. without the mediation of thought or judgment." Pattison. "Moral Awareness." 13:572.

60. "Between the ages of 6 and 12 the child. in stages. internalizes the rules of morality into an 'autonomous' morality. an internal sense of moral principle." Ibid.

61. "The need for morality arises because men are social animals. The human baby cannot survive without the help of its parents: and a small human group such as the family needs mutual support and cooperation for defense against other groups. against other animals. and against the forces of nature." Nowell-Smith. "Religion and Morality." 7:151.

62. "A system of promises and threats which serve to enforce a definite kind of conduct (usually conformity) is known in ethics as a system of moral *sanctions*." Randall and Buchler. *Philosophy*, p. 262.

63. "The absolutist has meant to insist that there is less diversity in moral standards than has been claimed. that in a sense the basic moral attitudes of human beings are somewhat constant." Binkley. *Contemporary Ethical Theories*. p. 196.

64. The relativist . . . has correctly stressed that over the ages moral standards do change. that not all societies have had the same moral codes. and that moral attitudes are influenced by the prevailing opinions of the society in which one lives." Ibid.

65. The Greek word *paroemia* for saying. byword (from *para*. by. beyond + Gr. *oimos*. way = by the way) is here used technically to

be inclusive of proverb, adage, dictum, motto, slogan, and maxim. In common usage, McKown has written, "A slogan, motto, or maxim is a proverbial statement embodying a moral or practical precept, usually in a more or less logical and sententious form." McKown, *Character Education*, p. 128.

66. "Medieval writers use the word *synderesis* to mean the habit of general moral principles, the habit of possessing such principles formed in mind and ready for use as the basis of one's conduct. What the broad metaphysical principles of contradiction, sufficient reason, causality, and the like are to theoretical reasoning, the principles of synderesis such as 'Do good and avoid evil,' 'Respect the rights of others,' and 'Do as you would be done by,' are to practical moral reasoning." Fagothey, *Right and Reason*, p. 35.

67. Sahakian has stated, "Open morality refers to a preferred or ideal form of behavior motivated or directed by no one but the free individual." Sahakian, *History of Philosophy*, p. 234.

68. "Closed morality refers to a compulsive form of behavior, i.e., rote (or instinctive) conduct which conforms to the prevailing conventions in a particular society." Ibid.

69. Deliverance from sin.

70. A short, simple story illustrating a moral or spiritual truth.

71. Case studies to resolve questions of right and wrong conduct.

72. A summary of religious guides, often put in the form of questions and answers.

73. A religious story using symbolic interpretation concerning appropriate behavior.

74. "Those theories, on the one hand, that find the meaning of moral terms solely in the attitudes of someone judging the act are called subjective, or approval, theories, and those, on the other hand, that find the meaning of moral terms in an objective characteristic of the act being judged, regardless of whether or not the act is approved, are called objective theories." Hill, *Ethics in Theory and Practice*, p. 23.

75. See 74.

76. According to Hill, "Moral virtue consists neither of emotion nor of native capacities as such but of dispositions or habits. It is made up of such dispositions as represent the proper excellence of man, or prompt him to seek his supreme Good. It is acquired not by chance or by instruction but primarily by practice." Hill, *Ethics in Theory and Practice*, p. 129.

77. "It is now a well-established fact that no moral values or beliefs are inborn. All our moral attitudes and judgments are learned from the social environment." Paul Taylor, *Problems of Moral Philosophy*, p. 42.

Consistently, "Moral learning is socially learned behavior. It is initiated through direct teaching and modeling and imitation, and it's maintained by positive reinforcement. The person eventually internalizes these behaviors and they become part of him or her." Windmiller. *Moral Development and Socialization*, p. 4.

78. "Moral traits are dispositions to act. Without constant employment and reemployment in concrete situations their effectiveness decreases." Hart. *Ethics*, p. 25.

79. Kay has noted. "The quality of home life in infancy is such a powerful determinant of later moral conduct." Kay. *Moral Education*, p. 14.

80. "The ability to picture vividly the good or evil consequences to self and to others of any type of behavior." Given by McElhinney and Smith. *Personality and Character Building*, p. 148.

81. "True morality seeks for the positively good, for that which brings happiness and wholesome, abundant life under present conditions." Titus, *Ethics for Today*, p. 123.

82. Concepts and terminology given by Pattison. "Moral Awareness." 13:572-73. Additional approaches appear available at the second, physical level and third, mental level.

83. Absolutely, there could be no exceptions: relatively, there could be occasional exceptions.

84. Biesanz and Biesanz have declared. "Each society has its own characteristic quality, its own *ethos*, that springs from many contributing factors, particularly from the beliefs and values around which its culture is integrated." Biesanz and Biesanz. *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 83.

85. "Group mores . . . become for the members of that group a standard of conduct." McElhinney and Smith. *Personality and Character Building*, p. 204.

"The mores are enforced both by positive sanctions and by *taboo*. . . . Taboo involves behavior that under no circumstances should be performed." Merrill. *Society and Culture*, p. 118.

86. "Standards of right and wrong of a given people at a given time have no other basis than the mores." Merrill. *Society and Culture*, p. 120.

87. "Each society takes certain culture patterns as the norm and

directs the socialization of its members accordingly." Merrill, *Society and Culture*, p. 195.

Hence, "'Thou shalt not steal' is a norm, honesty the value that underlies it." Biesanz and Biesanz, *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 78.

88. "The folkways are simply the accumulated patterns of expected behavior that have arisen to meet the recurrent situations of social interaction." Merrill, *Society and Culture*, p. 115.

89. The emotional impact of courtesy (politeness) is emphasized in a story about an elementary school student.

Teacher: Why do you say, "Thank you"?
Child: Because it is polite.
Teacher: Is that the only reason?
Child: It makes me feel good inside.

Cited from McElhinney and Smith, *Personality and Character Building*, p. 287.

90. "Fashions permit a latitude of variation around a norm. . . . Fads are fashions that come and go very quickly." Biesanz and Biesanz. *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 67.

91. According to Phenix, "Good manners are modes of behavior that are fitting and appropriate to a particular situation; bad manners are modes of behavior that are out of place in the same situation." Phenix, *Education and the Common Good*, p. 77.

92. "The must-rule is familiar enough both in human history and in ethical theory. It characterizes some types of action as morally imperative in the most emphatic and unqualified sense." Edel, *Ethical Judgment. The Use of Science in Ethics* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan, 1955), p. 43.

93. Technically, the term "sense" is better reserved to refer to physiological sensation. The choice of the terms "moral regard" or "moral faculty" according to one's intent also avoids ambiguity otherwise occurring with the non-preferred term moral "sense."

94. Angeles has written of hedonism (Epicurus): "The highest good in life is the absence of (a) pain and (b) vexing pleasures that bring pain or discomfort as their consequence. The aim of life should be *ataraxia:* tranquility (imperturbability) of body, mind, and spirit." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 114.

95. According to Sahakian, "The theory that pleasure is of one kind only, differing merely in its quantitative aspects, not in quality." Sahakian, *Ethics*, p. 29.

96. Again from Sahakian, "A small amount of pleasure of high quality is preferable to an enormous amount of pleasure of inferior quality." Ibid., p. 34.

97. "Cyrenaics stressed sensual or physical enjoyment of the immediate present, since only the present is in a person's power; the future is beyond one's control." Ibid., p. 24.

98. "What is good conduct? Or, what kind of actions ought we to perform? To this, Moore's answer follows the lines of ideal utilitarianism in stating that the right act is one which will produce the best actual consequences." Ibid., p. 42.

99. According to Angeles, the Greek word *agathos* refers to good, noble, gentle, brave. Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 5.

100. "The moral worth of an act is judged according to the good (pleasant) or bad (unpleasant) consequences that ensue from following a general moral rule of conduct such as 'Never lie,' 'Never steal,' 'Never murder.'" Ibid., p. 307.

101. "The moral worth of an act is judged according to the good (pleasant) or bad (unpleasant) consequences that are produced by each individual act judged in itself." Ibid.

102. "The theory that all human actions are in fact motivated by the desire to secure pleasure, and by the desire to avoid pain." Ibid., p. 114.

103. "The theory that all human actions should be motivated by the desire to secure one's own pleasure, and by the desire to avoid pain to oneself." Ibid.

104. From D. H. Monro. "According to this amended theory, the test of rightness is not whether an individual action will have better consequences than any alternative but whether it would have such consequences if it formed part of a general practice." D. H. Monro, "Utilitarianism," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas. Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas*, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), IV:448.

105. "Rational goodness" can itself include one or more "good reasons."

106. Angeles has written of "verity": "(L., *veritas*, 'truth,' 'reality,' 'the true nature of something,' from *verus*, 'true,' 'real,' 'genuine,' 'actual'). 1. That which is true or real. 2. The quality of being true or real. 3. The conformity of a statement with fact. a truth or reality." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 312.

107. "Some of our beliefs are verified by personal observation, some by inference from known facts, some by checking authorities and so on. . . . To verify a given belief means to establish it as true." D. J. O'Connor, *The Correspondence Theory of Truth* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1975), p. 18.

108. The importance of the concept of "confirmation" is evidenced by fitting it preliminarily with authentication at the highest, ideal level, substantiation at the synthesizing, social level, corroboration at the personal, emotional level, validation at the mental, relating level, dependability at the physical, timely level, and voucher (vouchsafing) at the gross, basic, level of confirmation.

Moreover, "authentication" can be expounded with accreditation at the ideal, evaluating level, certification at the social, synthesizing level, endorsement at the personal, emotional level, warranty (or guarantee) at the mental, relating level, assertion at an external, timely level, and avowal (avouching) at the gross, basic level -- all within authentication.

Indeed, another tier of outlining can fill out the concept of "accreditation" with license (licensing) at the ideal, lawful level, delegation (delegating) at the social, synthesizing level, commission (commissioning) at the personal, emotional level, authorization (authorizing) at the mental, authoring level, enablement (enabling) at the physical, timely level, and permit or permission (allowing, letting) at the gross, basic level within accreditation.

109. "Open implies both frankness and candor, but it often suggests more naturalness or artlessness than *frank* and less conscientiousness than *candid.*" Gove, *Webster's New Dictionary of Synonyms*, p. 359. Plain "suggests outspokenness, downrightness and freedom from affectation more than fairness of mind." Ibid., pp. 359-60.

110. A "consistency theory of truth" is here suggested to fill the fifth, synthesizing level of truth theory and to integrate several types of truth theory that have been presented. Angeles has noted of the term "consistent": (L., *consistere*, 'to stand still or firm' 'to be stable,' from *con*, 'with,' and *sistere*, 'to cause to stand'). Concepts are consistent (a) if their meanings do not contain contradictory terms (e.g., 'squared circle') which mutually exclude each other or (b) if they do not contain inherent contradictions . . . or (c) if they are not outright contradictions." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 46.

111. "According to the pragmatic theory of truth, a proposition is true insofar as it *works* or *satisfies.*" Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 322.

112. "A proposition is true insofar as it is a necessary constituent of a systematically coherent whole." Ibid.

Also, the coherence theory of truth is "the view that a statement (proposition, idea, thought, belief, opinion) is true if it can be put logically, consistently, systematically into a coherent body of knowledge whose every member entails and is entailed by every other member." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, pp. 297-98.

113. Aptly, "According to the correspondence theory, a proposition (or meaning) is true if there is a fact to which it corresponds if it

expresses what is the case." Runes, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 321.

In Angeles' words, "The view that a statement (proposition, idea, thought, belief, opinion) is true if what it refers to (corresponds to) exists. That to which it truly corresponds is called a fact." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 298.

114. "The term 'truth value' is a convenient accepted short-hand for the phrase 'truth or falsity'." O'Connor, *Correspondence Theory of Truth*, p. 13.

115. Emotion is here considered a combination of the physical and mental. In the words of McElhinney and Smith, "Emotions . . . are not merely the result of sensory experiences. They are a composite of body and mind experiences. They are physical-mental reactions." McElhinney and Smith, *Personality and Character Building*, p. 241.

116. Note that the Greek term *eudaemonia* is "Aristotle's word for the happiness attained when all of an individual's potentiality for a full rational life is realized to the utmost and the individual fully expresses all of his varied capacities." Angeles, *Dictionary of Philosophy*, p. 86.

Harper has agreed, "To achieve eudaemonia (the closest synonym in English is happiness), for Aristotle, was to succeed in living the good life." Harper, *The Philosophic Process in Physical Education*, p. 144.

117. "The good life, we have said, is the healthy, the happy, the satisfactory, and the full life." Titus, *Ethics for Today*, p. 199.

Index

The Joy of Personal Behavior

What is the difference between ethics and morality and mores? Here it is suggested that ethics particularly refers to a singular *who*, morality to a plural *who*, and mores to the *what* of culture. Beginning with definitions of these three terms — along with definitions of the philosophically time-honored concepts of goodness, truth, and correctness — author Royal Purcell then answers the question *why* the subjects of *Ethics, Morality, and Mores* are important and next discusses the content (*what*) of the three subjects.

In the process, the author summarizes the ethical concepts of metaethics, emotive ethics, conative ethics, normative ethics, and ethical relativism. Among the moral issues highlighted are moralism, moral code, moral education, ethical education, values education, and human rights. Also presented are the topics of ethical dynamics, ethical history, and the sciensation of ethics.

After consideration of the enjoyment of personal life — including the "good life" for the individual and the "quality of life" of a social group — the author winds up with conclusions about personal behavior, personal findings, personal understanding, and personal enjoyment. Not only will the reader find careful analysis and synthesis of ethical and moral theory but also practical insight for personal consideration and use in the present book *Ethics, Morality, and Mores*.

Again, the author of the earlier book *The Concept of Being Human* has identified the technical concepts of an important subject and structured these "key" ideas into technical tables (listed for easy reference in a separate section after the text). He here provides original suggestions about perfection, the relations of norm, standard, and criterion, the distinctions between hedonism and utilitarianism, a "consistent" theory of truth, the similarities of satisfaction, happiness, and pleasure, possible scales of goodness, enjoyment, and correctness, and six basic principles of personal behavior.

The author is a professional writer and editor who has degrees in political science, international relations, and librarianship. In the immediate book *Ethics, Morality, and Mores*, he has moved from the preliminary basics about *The Concept of Being Human* to the concern about desirable ethical and moral conduct within cultural groups. The result is better understanding of both personal behavior and the social environment.

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