DYNAMICS OF COMMUNICATION: NEW WAYS AND NEW ACTORS

Dynamics of Communication:
New Ways and New Actors

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Zagreb, 2006

C o n t e n t s

Cultural Diversity
The Path of Multiculturalism/Interculturalism. Mediated Cultures
and New Technologies. New Cultural Identities

New Ways of Communication and Cooperation
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Introduction

The ten-year period between the First World Culturelink Conference held in June 1995 and the Second World Culturelink Conference held in June 2005, was characterized by ever more rapid and important changes introduced by and developed through the globalization processes in the field of culture. These changes, influenced especially by the development of new information and communication technologies, affect the very ways of communication. New ways and new actors of global communication as well as new possibilities of networking and the role of networks in promoting intercultural dialogue in the 21st century are examined in this book which presents the contributions of 50 experts from Europe, Asia, Africa, the Americas and Australia, representing different international and national associations, universities, cultural institutions, and other organizations.

We live in societies which are, or are increasingly becoming multicultural. The challenge of multiculturalism/interculturalism requires growing efforts in international cultural communication/cooperation and intercultural competence. This concerns especially new tasks and roles of cultural policies in the processes of decentralization and regionalization of cultural development and cultural life. As the role of the national state diminishes, local authorities and professional organizations take over new tasks and functions in cultural policies and cultural development. It is necessary to start developing cultural policies as shared policies, implying state and private sectors, and civil society. This dialogue and partnership among the public and the private sector and civil society in the process of reshaping public cultural policies is needed in order to establish flexible and open approaches to cooperation.

We also live in a time in which the spread of information is faster than the analysis of its cultural and social impact. Digital cultures, spreading from technological backgrounds, concentrate on communication as the strategic input of cultural development. They produce new changes: digital cultures are cultures of users, and at the same time, they produce different digitalized art forms. Cultural policies, however, do not fully recognize these new digital forms and the newly emerging trends they set. Parallelling the acknowledgment of new actors in the processes of cultural development, new types and areas of artistic and cultural creativity should be better integrated into cultural policies.

Part one and two of this volume are dedicated to globalization processes, their consequences and the redefined roles of all actors involved in the cultural field (the role of the state, of local communities, professional organizations, etc.). Cultural policies and developing partnerships with civil society and the private sector are analyzed. The topics of part three comprise cultural diversity - especially with a view to Unesco's Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions - the path of multiculturalism/interculturalism and new cultural identities. Part four is devoted to the new ways of communication and cooperation, to cultural networks and digital culture, and the uneven global spread of digitization, while part five describes some relevant cultural networks' projects in the making.

This book identifies the new tasks and changing roles of cultural policies related to cultural diversity and the newly emerging digital cultures, and calls attention to the impressive phenomenon of new ways and new actors in communication - all of which announces a restructuring of the global cultural space. The interconnection of cultural diversity, intercultural communication and digital culture expresses new approaches to and prospects for cultural development and international cultural cooperation.

The First World Culturelink Conference resulted in intensified international research activities in the field of cultural policies and led to the perception of a distinct 'Zagreb school of cultural policy research'. May the Second World Culturelink Conference and this book, with its wealth of contributions from a large number of experts, result in intensified international research into the interconnectedness of the three most important phenomena of today's world - cultural diversity, intercultural communication and digital culture - and contribute to the creation of what we have termed *un monde meilleur*.

The Editor

The End of Globalization?
Redefined Role of States and National Cultures.
Regionalization and Decentralization.
Trans-border Cooperation

New Borders and the Borderless Cultures

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In his book *The End of Globalization. Lessons from the Great Depression* Harold James (2002: 1) claims that at the turn of the millennium: "Increasing economic interconnectedness has led to a profound political and social revolution". Indeed, it can be said that the interconnectedness in all fields, whether economic, political, social, cultural or any other has dramatically increased and provoked the abolishment of disciplinary, intellectual, cultural and even physical and geographical borders traditionally established during the centuries to help us understand and interpret the world in which we live. Crossing of many cultural, systemic, intellectual or physical borders has not been simple and easy. A large part of human history reflects the efforts invested in crossing and overcoming what has been established either as knowledge, social norm, or a geographical and territorial asset. Nevertheless, the challenge of crossing borders of whatever character and nature is extremely exciting as it provides for enlarged cultural, intellectual or geographical spaces in which something new can be created, and in which everything happens in a slightly different way.

Globalization as a process and as an ideology resides in the unprecedented economic, technological and systemic expansion that has embraced the whole planet and tends to interpret it as a market, a set of interactive communication networks and the dominance of only one, capitalist, system of production. The process has been extremely successful. Differences among economic systems have been almost erased, or severely diminished. Societies and cultures are integrated into networks and ever more ready to communicate and exchange cultural values. Spaces for exchange and trade have invaded practically all domains of human work and creativity. Markets have grown and diversified. All cultures have invested large efforts in entering markets, in adapting to globalization and in modernization, which is particularly reflected in the redefinition and change of cultural identities.

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However, the globalizing drive that dominates the planet has never been simple and uni-directional. Not only has it caused resistance at all levels and in all cultures, societies and states, but it has provoked an incredible amount of reorganization, redefinition, reform, attempts to adapt and models that all stood for defence of diversity, authenticity and originality in the newly created globalized world. Globalization has brought new experiences and insights enabling new types of creativity and the appearance of new cultures. Not all of these new experiences are supportive of the enlarged exchange and communication in the present-day globalized world. Some of them have provoked ultra-conservative reactions, conflicts and the rise of intolerance. Globalization has obviously produced positive and negative effects, which rationalize the analysis of the processes, showing both its successes and failures.

The number of analysts and authors claiming that the end of globalization is now visible grows almost as quickly as the literature on globalization used to grow only a few years ago. The present-day globalized world allows for analyses of all its aspects and developments on practical levels. This enables us to ask: what are, or may be, the setbacks of globalization? Harold James points out that the "volume and volatility of capital movements" (ibid: 2) increase instability of the already unstable economies, and that the "crisis of globalization in terms of the social and political responses and reactions" may be even more dangerous. Globalism fails because "humans and the institutions they create cannot adequately handle the psychological and institutional consequences of the interconnected world" (ibid: 4-5). The internationalized world has been fundamentally managed by national institutions, hardly able to meet the challenges of globalism. The same may be true of the cultural field. The strong structures that have been enabling and shielding cultural and artistic creativity are either ethnic or national cultures. Nevertheless, an open globalized cultural space has enabled cultures to get in contact and fertilize each other's creativity.

Interconnectedness therefore remains the key word of contemporary cultural development. Whether it has produced good or bad results, the fact is that it has opened up new spaces for cultural and intellectual creativity and that this has been achieved through the elimination of the existing borders dividing cultures into strictly ethnic or national. The removal of strict borders has produced blind spaces of cultural identification and fortified individual identity and cultural choices. It has also become the source of the new cultural creativity and of the production of new, borderless cultural values.

The spread of global cultural values is based on their use of new technologies, both in the production of cultural products and in their dissemination. Their "global influence" widens through market networks, and it is supported by the logics of profit making. The wide and fast spread of almost universally acceptable cultural contents

has shocked national and ethnic cultures who are trying to protect themselves. Their resistance to global influences is perhaps best expressed in efforts to protect cultural diversity, mainly by protecting cultural creativity from market forces and usages.

In practical terms and in daily life global cultural expansion and reaction to it is expressed in the redefinition and change of cultural identities. These are exposed to global cultural market influences on one side, and to interventions of the nation state on the other. While the markets are defined by profits and attempts to be value-neutral, the nation state is driven by attempts to protect national and ethnic cultural values at all costs, and to be profit-neutral. The main function of a nation state in the cultural field is to shield the cultural values, histories and memories of a nation and to provide for such a type of (inter)cultural communication that enables all cultures in a state to express their cultural identities. It further promotes these national identities while they enter international communication through programmes and projects jointly designed by the state partners, and thus interpret international cultural cooperation as having predominantly cultural value, and not being profit- and market-oriented. In order to perform this duty, a national state has to be "enlightened", enabled to define its cultural values and policies, flexible and decentralized in acting. Needless to say that in reality nation states rarely have such abilities. Besides, cultural creativity is not very high on the list of their priorities, and it is mostly at the time of crises that cultural and national identities gain attention, and incite direct actions by the national state.

Globalization transcends cultural and national identification as the key framework of cultural communication, and it therefore needs to open up other possibilities and incentives for global cultural exchange. These reside in local and regional spaces within nation states and in virtual spaces outside of any states. They play a major role in endogenization of global trends and processes and in transcending the established cultural identities, including the national ones.

The reinvented regional and city identities thus represent values of the revived and reorganized national cultures. They re-introduce, and opt for socio-spatial definition of identities. The identities developed through socio-communicational approaches (Canclini, 2001) and virtual identities may now be localized. The influence of virtual/global and socio-communicational approaches on local levels incites new cultural and creative developments, open to global and local communication. They represent a meeting point of global influences and national identity strategies, which turns them into a weak point of resistance to globalism, and opens up ways for global influences on national and ethnic cultures. The ultimate reaction of these cultures may be very different: they either accept some influences and open up to make further development choices, or they reject a possibility to enter global-local interaction and close down. The Norwegian anthropologist Karl-Eric Knutsson (1996) pays

particular attention to the analysis of the "closed cultural structures" and "closed cultural constellations". They tend to decline and perish. In this process they interact with "open" cultural structures and systems that tend to develop further and survive through communication. The contexts of human existence are defined in interactions of closed and open cultural systems. Knutsson also mentions "cultural constellations" and different dimensions of globalism and global developments. He presumes that the communicational opening or closing of different cultures may be measured. Those that tend to close perish indeed; those that open in different ways and degrees persist and become different in the context of global cultural development.

The globalized world is therefore not flatly unique and universal. It may rather be perceived as a network of co-existing different cultural worlds and values that need to interact in order to exist and develop new values and creativity. A new dynamism based on an increased individualization of values and cultures, that include acceptance of cultural de-homogenization and cultural differences, reflects the appearance of the globalized, borderless cultures. These are mainly perceived as either virtual or the cultures of information societies. Supported by the new communication technologies, cultural creativity becomes de-territorialized. The created values are mediated through networks. This promotes utterly individualistic approaches, values and choices, as well as a kind of solidarity in sharing information, knowledge and creativity.

The borderless cultures nevertheless reside in specific cultural contexts of either national or ethnic cultures. This is why they cannot avoid producing new borders, best reflected in the digital divide, in sub-urban pop cultures and in hackers' cultures. These are clearly perceived in the cities that have become their residence. Technological modernization is concentrated in city areas; new city tribes find their cultural expression in the sub-urban pop cultures mainly confined to music, dance and graphic arts, and hackers' cultures are developed by the new technology specialists working and living in cities that provide the best connections. Paradoxically, in spite of highly individualistic approaches to creativity, these developments make cultures more similar than diverse, more exposed to communication and interaction than to solitary isolation.

The point, however, is that the borderless cultures do not and cannot avoid producing borders, which are different from the traditional ones, but which nevertheless indicate that the globally opened space for cultural creation is now being structured, or re-structured in a new way.

This, as well as the previously mentioned global/local relationships, is best reflected in cultural identities' de-construction and re-construction. How are the identities affected by the new, post-globalism developments, in which new cultural borders have gradually been established?

Firstly, they are ever more individualized, which is seen in processes of deconstruction of corporate identities. The dissolution of the corporate Yugoslav identity may be taken as an example. The Yugoslav identity initially evolved from the pan-Slavic, romantic ideas on South Slavs' unification at the end of 19th century. The Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts was established in Zagreb, in 1866, to promote the idea of common origins of populations of Illyricum,[1] i.e., South Slav populations. The Yugoslav cultural identification oscillated over time and developed in line with historical conditions: the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes after the First World War; the establishment of the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia after the Second World War, and the inner dynamics of nation building reflected in Yugoslav national and cultural identification. It should be mentioned that the Yugoslav identification was first included in the third post-Second World War census in 1961 (Sekulić, 2003). It therefore took at least around a century to establish and promote the Yugoslav identification. However, the content of this type of identification has never been clearly defined, but it might have stood for "nationally non-committed persons" (ibid: 237), meaning, in practical terms "ethnically non-committed persons", whose choice was to stress the identity of state, along the lines of political identification based in the tradition of the French revolution, as the framework of cultural identity. The number of persons who identified themselves as Yugoslavs oscillated in ex-Yugoslavia, in the period 1961-91, from the peak of 5.5% to 3% of the total population. It was always evident that Yugoslavia consisted of a number of nations (and ethnicities), but never of a Yugoslav nation. The attempt to create and sustain this corporate identity depended on the state, and as it dissolved in 1990/91, such identification faded away. It was absorbed in processes of a painful reinvention of "new" national and ethnic identities in the newly independent national states established in 1990 and 1991, with the fall of socialism. Unfortunately, reinvention of national and ethnic identities, inspired by geographical, historical, religious, cultural and other references, reflected primarily conservative orientation to past myths and histories. The promotion of references implanted in the redefined identities was much below the level of civilized communication, respect for others and tolerance. For a number of years such promotion of renewed identities relied on mythic images and stories of ethnic and national superiority, and avoided international communication that would inevitably balance this newly invented "superiority" of a nation or ethnicity. However, the process helped clarification of a set of references important for the national reinvention of identities. It might be said

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1 The name refers to the Roman times and settlement of the Slav tribes in South Eastern Europe. The term "Balkans" (covering approximately the space of the old Greek "Haemus") is of Turkish origin, and it was established in the 15th and 16th centuries. "South Eastern Europe, introduced in the 20th century (with different connotations) stands for a neutral geographic reference and covers "Illyricum", "Haemus" and "Balkans". Cf. also Todorova (1997: 21-37).

that this process may now be nearing its end, and that it is being checked in an ever widening global cultural setting.

In practical terms, the European Union stands for a global cultural setting for the Southeastern European region. The possibility to join the EU already influences discussions on the re-definition of cultural identities, particularly stressing the intercultural communication and relationships among majority and minority groups. The need to clearly define one's own identity appears in this setting as a precondition for sound intercultural relationships, and the ability to tolerate and respect the others. The deconstruction of blurred corporate identities is therefore the process that leads to higher individualization, social responsibility and, hopefully, to better communication among differentiating groups. Tolerance and intercultural communication are possible when processes of de-construction and re-construction are over. The Southeastern European cultures may be on the threshold of this phase now. Liberated from the corporate collectivity, they are ever more individualizing their positions in relation to each other, and they are becoming globally recognizable even if they remain "small" or "weak" cultures. However, this new position that they are struggling to take now introduces new challenges reflected primarily in influences of global cultural trends on their weak and not well-researched structures and values.

The processes of redefinition of cultural identities have at the same time prompted the new borders among (redefined) national cultures and orientated them to the newly established nation states. At the present such states appear to be disorganized transitional states that are far from being able to perceive problems of structural cultural transformations. They are hardly willing to support complex projects, the unique aim of which is not only national cultural identification. Thus the cultures of the region are today encountering a new danger, the danger of shrinking their own values and closing themselves to the inherited traditions in which the choice of values has already been accomplished. The re-invented national identities may prove to be an insufficient basis for cultural development, openness and creativity.

They may, however, also be used to orientate the redefined national and ethnic cultures towards a more intensive cultural communication through which the encounters with new borderless cultural values are possible and realistic. The process may lead them towards the creation of new socio-communicational spaces and contexts. Such efforts are reflected in cultural creativity and the invention of new values, compliant to information societies, new technologies and new brands of multiculturalism and intercultural communication. They all incite cultures to open up new spaces of their own creativity, and to communicate within them. Such developments are related to cultural identities and changes in the position of cultures in global settings.

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If the re-established national and ethnic cultural borders tend to promote cultural specificity and cultural diversity, the global spaces suck them into new commonalities. In the information age cultures share information technologies, exchange through the global (market) economy and accept human and cultural diversity as a framework of their existence. Information societies are developing in the plurality of social and cultural models, and this makes information societies and e-cultures ever more diverse. Globalism is not imposing one model on all societies, but helping the development of different models, based on a relatively standardized technological background and the possible planetary reach of any culture. It may be said that the new information and e-cultures are orientated toward the future. They imply a positive, friendly attitude to technological development and to social plurality, prompted by mutual understanding and solidarity.

Cultures may get closer through technologically prompted communication, digitalization and new creativity spaces. In them openness does not coincide with accessibility, but with an increased adaptation to different local contexts and different cultural backgrounds. In this sense the new borderless cultures challenge the already standardized globalizing processes of mass cultural production. They are not territorialized, they do not belong to a particular ethnic or racial group of people, they are not particularly marked by class identification, and they adapt extremely well to different cultural contexts by being able to endorse almost any kind of cultural consumption. Borderless cultures are always mediated, and their existence is technologically prompted. This is their point of challenge and attraction for any and all national and ethnic cultures.

In the perspective of borderless cultures, issues like national cultural identity appear to be irrelevant. The tolerance is in-built in them. They straddle borders, but they also produce regional and professional specificities that hallmark their social roots and characterize substantially their identity. They are the outcome of the situation in which globalization has indeed abolished many intellectual, professional and cultural borders. However, with the end of globalization (James, 2002) these have been replaced by either the reinforcement of old national and ethnic borders, which produces the closed cultural systems that can barely be sustained (Knutsson, 1996) or by the new information cultures (Castells and Himanen, 2002), which are openly spreading over the world and producing diverse cultural systems that may be self-sustainable and fully developed in future. This is why it can be argued that cultures have witnessed the end of one phase of globalization, and that they have now entered the new era of borderless, technologically mediated cultures. It is also becoming evident that the parallel existence of re-created national and ethnic cultures refers primarily to local levels, while the borderless cultures are being developed and persist at global levels. The interconnections and interactions between the two levels are, however, quite clearly visible, which indicates that the cultural spaces, be they

local or global, relate to the same and diversified sources of human creativity and invention. In this respect it is possible to conclude that the cultures that have established new borders, and those that appear to be borderless, are creating just a new cultural interface, that represents a new challenge to creativity and that is searching for new identification that would not be biased by either ethnic, national or global limits to creativity.

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The Spectre of Globalization and Multiple Identities

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The title of my paper comes evidently from the famous formula about the "Spectre of Communism", haunting Europe in the *Communist Manifesto* by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. I have the feeling that our relations with globalization are fundamentally the same love-hate relations as those with the advent of Communism in the mid-19th century. In talking about the end of globalization we are playing a curious video-game: in a video-game you can die a thousand times, coming back in the next round.

In newspapers and magazines, as well as in scientific literature globalization is treated mostly as an economic and political concept, a result of the activities of transnational corporations and supra-national organizations.

On the other hand, globalization is part of everyday life all over the world. Of course, there are some intellectuals who declare themselves immune to globalization, they do not watch (or even have) a television at home and do not go to MacDonald's, preferring French restaurants, do not listen to the same music as their children (or taxi-drivers) and go to classical concerts. But they are wrong about immunity: these concerts themselves have passed through the networks of the market economy, as have their dresses and costumes, office equipment or furniture. Even if we want to remain outside this horrible mass-culture, in fact we are part of it as consumers and/or participants. The question is how does global culture interact with the network of subcultures, local, demographic (etc.) cultures?

My feeling is that the current notions of multiculturalism (co-existence of many cultures in one society) or even interculturalism (relations between these cultures) are very quickly becoming obsolete. Thus the notion of transculturalism, the possibility to transcend your own (sub)culture and go to a neighbouring one - a bigger or just a different cultural community, enlarging the context, that might (or might not) mean

Major cultural communities are defined by their common language, on a state level different from the national one and in the international framework - different from English. Here again we step into a contradiction, reflected in the current joke, that Great Britain and the USA are two countries, separated by the same language. From this perspective "international" English is different from all national and regional variants of English, each reflecting the particularities of a cultural minority. It is even truer for accents.

In the former Soviet Union the so-called Union Republics (those that became independent states after 1991) had two official languages for press and broadcasting - their national language and Russian. After gaining independence Russian lost this status in most of them, but survived in a diminished scope in the media. In fact, English replaced it for the new elites and young people. This last remark is even truer for major Eastern European Slavic countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, etc.). In fact, globalization took over where regional blocks failed.

Globalizing other parts of Europe was easier. Big transnational companies wanted to be perceived as non-national: Nokia as not Finnish, Philips as not Dutch, Shell as not British, Siemens as not German, etc. Market liberalization brought mass cultural products to Western Europe sooner (just after the Second World War) than to the East. The globalizing of Eastern Europe went more actively and quickly. These processes are generating a renewal of understanding of cultural policies.

The main problem in the public-media relationship becomes cultural diversity inside the mix of global mass culture. From this point of view, external relations change into internal ones and communication processes become much more complex. The key is a slight difference in meaning between the terms "popular" and "mass".

There are different kinds of popular culture: a Balkan culture and within it a Croatian culture; there is a popular culture in Russia and in specific regions of Russia, in France as well as in Burgundy, Alsace or around Marseille. Each time that something appeals to popular feelings and not only to those of educated people, it might be called popular. Therefore, we can say that there exist different popular cultures all over the world and they try to communicate with each other. When Europeans say "mass culture", they usually mean this horrible spectre of Americanization, which is forced upon poor people all over the world, who just do not know what to do about it and how to counteract its "bad" effects. Globalization is understood as cultural unification.

There is a different position. Some researchers do not think that "mass culture" is a homogeneous phenomenon, but it has a unifying force - it tends to cover the whole globe, it appeals to every age and every social stratum, in a word, it tries to be

universal. Of course, it never really succeeds, whatever part of it we take - a hit song, a blockbuster movie, or a star - but thanks to its diversity (which could never be matched by any separate popular or even "high" culture), ability to switch very quickly, from week to week, from day to day, from one tune, public figure, or best-seller to another, it continually adapts itself to different kinds of audiences, reuniting them in a more or less global network.

The use of the word "network" is not accidental, because everybody, at least in Europe (West and East) is speaking of networking. Nevertheless, there is a huge distance between cultural policy networking, establishing links between groups of intellectuals, and the potential globalism of TV networks or cyberspace, including everything from video games to the World Wide Web. Mass culture is ruled by impulses, the main one being the commercial impulse - to maximize profits. In order to do this, you need to maximize audiences, which means having to find the common denominator for the population of the whole world.

As it is, this population is separated into groups and, as I already pointed out, each one has its own popular culture. They form closed worlds, even if some kind of interrelation between them exists. A tribal culture of a part of Africa and a Russian traditional folkloric site can be linked by groups of tourists visiting both of them. There is no integration between the two. Actually, for a variety of reasons, such integration is impossible. These two kinds of popular culture are just not close enough to each other to establish a real dialogue. And of course, there are a great many similarly locally-defined popular cultures.

What are their relations with global mass culture? The majority of these local cultures stand no chance of invading the global networks of the media. But sometimes things happen.

If we look closely into the Russian part of the global mass culture, we find different phenomena: adaptations (digests or films and TV series) of classical novels, especially by Leo Tolstoy or Dostoyevsky, the idea of the Russian soul, Rasputine, vodka, the tennis player Kurnikova… The most recent and the only entertainment industry example is the Tatu group - two very young singers pretending to be teenage lesbians, more crying than singing about their passions and pains. Love and sex appeal to young audiences everywhere.

And there is another example of the same kind: in a region of Algiers we find a local kind of popular music dealing mostly with love and sex. Such local tunes exist everywhere. This one is called *rai*. And this small regional product, which enjoyed no special popularity even within North Africa, almost by accident (very much like the Russian singers), came out into global mass culture and for a while was part of it. This can be partly explained by the fact that, as it happens, the things that interest most

people are pretty basic - sex and violence. And those can be the expressions of very different meanings. But why precisely Tatu, *rai*, *reggae*, or *lambada?*

I study mass culture and am supposed to be a specialist in this field. Once I went outside Moscow to the ancient city of Tver, powerful in the Middle Ages but now deeply provincial and much smaller than the capital, at one time its rival. Here I discovered the *lambada*. Everybody danced it, though I, a popular culture scholar, had at that time never heard of it. Then I found that the *lambada* was danced not only in Tver, but also all over the world. The dancers were not researchers in folk music, but just ordinary people, living in a mass culture. I was able to discover a popular tune from Latin America in a small town in Russia only because it became a really universal global phenomenon, made universally available by the media.

Of course, apart from the *lambada*, there are thousands of dances in Latin America. There are different kinds of musical groups in Russia, of popular music in North Africa and next to Tatu or the *rai* you can find hundreds and thousands (even millions) of other performers that never wanted to, or succeeded in, joining the global mass culture. It just happens that mass culture can adapt itself and find a way to integrate these popular cultural phenomena, and the dialogue between Tatu, *reggae*, *rai* and *lambada* can happen everywhere, including here, on European or Russian territory. And this kind of dialogue is fundamentally unlike traditional travels of artists or tourists. In the global networks they are not exotic but equal.

A different problem is the relationship between mass culture and subcultures, including this time not only regional or national, but also "high", "youth", "minority", etc., cultures. These and other subcultures tend also to become closed worlds, they expressly do not want to be part of the mass media network but rather forge group cultural identities.

Many intellectuals and artists point out the contradiction between wild "capitalism", reigning in the world, and the fundamental cultural values most countries still live with. It explains the importance given to contradictions between cultural and economic development. Members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, especially scholars of literature and the arts, emphasize their pessimism about current cultural development and the feeling that the wild market is killing true culture. Many intellectuals and artists, not only from the East, but also from the West share this feeling.

Economists and policy makers, on the contrary, concentrate upon the absence of fundamental contradictions between culture and current development, cultural economics and the global and local market economy.

Most scholars refuse to acknowledge the cultural roots of the present conflicts, concentrating mostly on their economic, political and military aspects. On the

contrary, broadcasting transfers throughout certain territories a clearly political and culturally acceptable image of unacceptable wars and conflicts.

Looking at general trends and local specificity of different transitions defined the plurality not only of cultures but also of scenarios of future development for Central and Eastern European countries in relation to the theory of multiculturalism. The focal point here is the problem of cultural adaptation.

A consensus was achieved on the impossibility of automatic adaptation to Western standards. The misadaptation, or radical refusal of modernization proves itself an impasse. As for the two other scenarios - selective adaptation and co-adaptation or modernization of a convergent type - its results depend on the combination specific to each country of leading national and minority cultures and their interrelation, bringing forward pathologies of transition.

This is not an essentially European problem. Most representatives of traditional groups feel that mass culture falsifies their heritage, values and aspirations.

Let me take a Japanese example. Worldwide mass culture, at one point, adopted the oriental martial arts and more specifically the "ninja" tradition in stories and films. It became one of the most popular myths in action movies. For the Japanese, this use of a secret teaching was intolerable. The word "ninja" disappeared from the titles of such films when they were released in Japan. In this and many other cases, the subculture, instead of being proud to get access to the media, was ashamed of the transformations that their values endured going through the networks. The resulting mixture is well illustrated by the popular American film *Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles*. A Frenchman invented the story; the myth was Japanese, first illustrated in an animation series. And the turtles have those European classical names of Donatello, Michelangelo, Leonardo and Raphael.

This shows that the phenomenon of mass culture is not exclusively American, as some cultivated Europeans tend to think. And North American culture itself is a symbiosis of Indian, African, European (Hispanic, Anglo-Saxon, French, Dutch, Eastern European, Scandinavian, etc.) and, increasingly, Asian traditions. In California, the recognized world centre of the entertainment industry, almost 30% of the population are of Asian descent and less than 50% are white.

On the one hand, the melting pot of the New Continent became the basis of intercultural polylogue and transcultural mentality that some intellectuals see as the future of apprehending cultural diversity and globalization. New communication technologies put it on a universal level. That is why mass culture adapts itself so easily to different cultures everywhere in the world.

On the other hand, US (American) culture(s), that is seen by the world majority as *the* global culture is (and are) in fact very different from the transnational product of Hollywood or Microsoft. *The Matrix* and its sequels are much more adaptations of Japanese video games than the expression of American national character (in whatever meaning of the word). Inside the United States, California is perceived as a foreign entity, a state within a state, not only culturally but also politically. Ethnic identities in the New World are multiple by definition. Looking for national American identity is a difficult and contradictory task and it takes the scholar more to Utah, Arizona or Texas than to L.A. or New York. The combination of Mormons, Indians, Hispanics, and Black and White supremacists is a better reflection of American unity than the cosmopolite crowd of entertainment and cultural capitals, even if they are located in the US.

In different meetings and conferences, Europeans constantly complain that American mass culture, MacDonald's and Coca-Cola, are killing us. What will happen to the real culture with which we have been familiar for centuries? We should just remind ourselves that on the highest level of what is perceived as "American" mass culture we always find Europeans. Limiting our examples to Hollywood, we find the Austrian Arnold Schwarzenegger, the Italian Sylvester Stallone, the Dutch Paul Verhoeven, the Belgian Jean-Claude Van Damme... And this is of primary importance as far as dialogues are concerned. The cultural diversity we are looking for may be realized this particular way.

Why have those people, born and raised in Europe (with the exception of Stallone), moved to the United States? For the simple reason that their skills were not valued enough in Europe, where the cultural elites, dreaming about competition with the USA, despise mass culture and are powerful enough to break its blossoms.

This is how world mass culture becomes more and more Asian or European through California. Global culture becomes a place of dialogue between components grown from different roots and traditions.

The Benefits of Globalization? Misconceptions and/or Misunderstandings

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Of the benefits of globalization, I am very suspicious. I cannot accept an unquestioned belief that it should produce more equitable life conditions for the current world population, especially if that is expected as the consequence of an abstract moral imperative. At least, unless we became aware of what kind of imperative globalization itself is.

Moral imperatives?

Globalization is a morally neutral concept. It is neither good nor bad, but it may be motivated for good or bad reasons, and bring about more or less good or bad results. Such opinions are very diffused and they never ask who is motivated nor do they say who is judging the results. In the same way, John Dunning (2003: 12) is able to make a distinction between *globalization* as the connectivity of individuals and institutions across the globe and the separate idea of *the global market place* and *global capitalism*. These concepts, he believes, should be treated as having distinctive meanings. Thus the connectivity itself may be geared to advancing personal or institutional interests, or used for economic, cultural or political goals separately. Is it really possible?

There has to be a set of ethical standards to which all its participants should adhere to make global capitalism more responsible, Dunning considers (2003: 13). History is replete with examples of private enterprises, labour unions, governments, and NGOs eroding the benefits of societal capitalism by their unacceptable moral codes and behaviour. At the same time, the moral dimension of responsible global capitalism must also reflect the wider social and cultural mores of society which are highly contextual over time and space. (Dunning, 2003: 14)

It is widely accepted that capitalism, and especially the market economy, is likely to result in an uneven distribution of income, Dunning continues. It has also always been accepted by capitalist societies that it is the responsibility of voluntarism and governments to put right any perceived injustices of the market place. The moral conscience of both individuals and nation states is central to this issue (2003: 18). Today's responsible global capitalism - if it is to be sustained - has its own unique moral imperatives (2003: 23). Its unique nature is precisely that it exposes cross-border economic and social activity to a mosaic of cultural mores, related to different religions, different stages of development and traditional behavioural values. Dunning (2003: 25) is worried that indifference or even hostility towards those who are ill-served by global capitalism or are excluded from its benefits could have extremely serious consequences and cut at the very heart of Western civilization.

The cultural circuit of capital is able to produce constant discursive-cum-practical change, with considerable power to mould the content of people's work lives. It also influences general cultural models that affect the rest of people's lives and the kind of subject positions that are deemed worthy. Even more, the discursive style of state policy has become ever more closely aligned with the discursive style of corporations, as Olds and Thrift (2005: 271) observe. There is the continuous process of osmosis between academic and management knowledge. The process of instrumentalized commodification that calls it into being brings with it a set of highly politicized values. These values are the same ones that underlie the influential spread of neo-liberal policies through much of the world. What we are tracking is an expansion of the older Euro-American mindset, not its extinction, says Nigel Thrift (1999: 59).

Collective intelligence?

Today, says Pierre Lévy (2004), cultures as the symbolic ecosystems are taken by a movement of convergence and increasing interdependence. The new media of interactive planetary communication put in question the former rules of symbolic life. The movement of globalization and informatization asks of us to find, *nolens volens*, a sense in a possible cultural unity of humanity. It is nothing less than an invitation to make an interconnected society on a planetary scale, argues Pierre Lévy. Is this an illusionary project, an illusionist idea or a utopian vision?

If we can witness evolution - organic, sensitive and linguistic - as a sole movement, if we understand the profound unity of the cultural and biological evolution and their interdependence, then we can discover that cyberspace is at the peak of this unified evolution, Pierre Lévy (2001) believes. In his definition, life is a process, an evolutionary process that does not stop at the organic layer. Since there is still

reproduction of forms in later layers, life continues at the higher (or more virtual) levels of perceptual experience and culture. There is a direction in the evolutionary process and this direction is a process towards digitalization, virtualization and collective intelligence. The human race becomes a super-organism building its unity through cyberspace as the biosphere's nervous system.

Human culture is now the main factor of the biosphere's evolution, but also the main factor of its own evolutionary course. We do not know the precise goal in advance, but we know that the human race has in its collective hands, in its collective brain, the fate of the biosphere and its own destiny. Organic life and techniques will blend very finely, and shall do so because they have no distinct essences. Cyberspace will inform us in real time of echoes of our economic activities on the biosphere. Cultures will combine themselves and multiply their powers in an Earth Spirit that will bring together animals, plants, micro-organisms and minerals as well. Such a perspective implies that we stop wars and invent together a new kind of life.

In this beautiful evolutionary story that Lévy is teaching us there is no history. By abstracting too far into theory, Lévy avoids examining the messy nature of human activity. The Net opens the space of Knowledge, completely distinct and independent from the space of Commodity. But we know that the Net itself is created out of the convergence of already existing industries: telephony, media and computing. What is happening in cyberspace is the intensification of previous trends rather than something completely new, says his book reviewer in the *New Scientist (1997)*. Nevertheless, we should hear Lévy again:

> "It is because knowledge is held in common that human beings can understand one another, help each other, make progress and manage their relations with the natural environment ... proprietary rights over software, instead of encouraging enterprises, lead them to set real traps which impede communication ... We recall that a healthy and well-managed economy is needed to eliminate the abuse of dominant power and position."

These are the quotations from the recently published *Déclaration d'Autrans 2005*, written by Pierre Lévy.

Surveillance and control

This new world is not being created so that we can move into an era of playfulness and personal freedom. It is a complex historical extension of the domination and inequality that define our divided societies, as Dan Schiller (2005) bitterly concluded his recent article "Why the world went mobile". The demand for the mobile telephone is not a mechanical outcome of technical progress, but the product of the balance of forces that shape society. Frenetic market development efforts are evident in every niche in the emerging mobile economy, he argues. Those who control the means of

production, and have a political interest in precipitating the trend towards individualism, create the need for cell phone communication. It is an attempt to wrest a measure of personal control in a social world out of control.

What is not so well understood is the fact that many of these surveillance systems have been implemented for years, Brian Holmes (2003) remarks. Even military technology has been adapted for the data gathering techniques to make the job of building profiles on one's individual desire for marketing companies' purposes. In fact, labour patterns, managerial techniques and consumer desire are all being mobilized under increasingly tight regimes of monitoring and control, guided from a distance by the imperatives of transnational financial speculation. Holmes has a very clear perception of actual circumstances. What we are seeing in this process of mobilization is an economization of subjectivity. He specifies it: ushering human existence into the accelerating circuits of networked capitalism, and over-coding every form of behaviour with a monetary calculus.

While colonialism and imperialism are widely recognized as historical forms of capital, the contemporary round of globalization represents a new form of capitalist imperialism constituting what can be called the "informal empire", says Wolf Heidebrand (2003: 161). Finance capital now rules over the process of its own production in that it represents the most liquid, abstract, non-specific and generalized form of capital. The high degree of liquidity of finance capital implies a new level of power over all other forms of capital (2003: 162). To overcome capitalism without simply negating it but rather making it serve human society and unalienated human needs, it must be controlled and regulated not just by a political form of democracy, but by an economic and participatory form of democracy that empowers the development of human liberation and self-organization on both global and local levels, Heidebrand anticipates (2003: 180).

The rapid succession from a neo-liberal to an imperial project yields a combination of American economic and political-military unilateralism and a novel formation of neo-liberal empire. Neo-liberal policies come in addition to and not instead of the framework of neo-liberal globalization. It is an attempt to merge the America whose business is business with the America whose business is war, at a time when business is not doing so well, as Jan Nederveen Pieterse very sharply observes (2004: 123). The new "Empire", argues Robert Cox (2004: 309), penetrates across borders of formally sovereign states to control their actions from within through compliant elites in both public and private spheres. Empire constitutes a movement towards convergence in political, economic and social practice and in basic cultural attitude - a movement tending to absorb the whole world into *one civilization*.

The multivalence

To break the nexus between neo-liberal globalization and the ICT revolution would be to begin to control the spread and the comprehensiveness of network time in people's lives. It would allow ICTs to work in the service of humanity as opposed to the narrow interest of business, is the concluding remark in an essay of Robert Hassan (2003: 239). He is conscious that breaking the nexus will require a sea change, a political revolution that would make the market and information technology work for cultures and society instead of the other way round. Nevertheless, he says, until this happens, network time will spread and compel more and more of us to try to synchronize with the networks' "discordant function of time".

As Paul Virilio envisaged (Bleicker, 2001: 3-5) the world is undergoing significant change, the globe will no longer primarily be divided spatially into North and South, but temporally into two forms of speed, absolute and relative. The most fatal disparities may well emerge from the creation of two different mindsets and the types of privileges they engender.

Those who operate in the cyberworld of speed will gradually acquire different thinking patterns. The dictates of linear thought, imposed by the representational limits of books and other printed materials, are gradually giving way to a more interconnected system of communication. New informational sources such as the CD-Rom and the World Wide Web have already created logics of representation that defy linearity and, instead, provide the reader with a multitude of access points and connections between them. Fluency in the ensuing types of thinking patterns will increasingly dominate access to privileges and basic necessities. People trained in and accustomed to linear thinking are likely to become more and more marginal.

At the same time we are witnessing a decline in state responsibility for social affairs, which has either been relegated to the nongovernmental sector or simply left to market dynamics. The latter operate along principles other than those necessary for the establishment of social justice. Decades after decolonization was introduced in most parts of the world the gap between rich and poor has grown to grotesque proportions. Disempowerment and disentitlement have become key features of globalization. We see emerging a neo-liberal world order that is increasingly run by a few powerful multilateral institutions and multinational corporations whose strategic leitmotifs and decision-making principles reflect the imperatives of short-term material objectives.

The role of the powerless is something that is crucial to understanding what is happening, Saskia Sassen (2004: 84) stresses. The truth is that the American empire is not going to last for ever its current configuration. Change and transformation make

destabilization part of it. The point is that the powerless are actors. The practices of the excluded are part of what will become formalized inclusions.

What we are actually naming globalization are two very different types of processes and two distinct dynamics: the formation of global-scale institutions and processes and a set of processes that do not necessarily scale at a global level, Sassen explains (2004: 85-86). We can think of certain features of globalization as a heuristic space that makes the transformation visible. For it to be epochal it has got to engage the national, because that is the thickest condition. Part of the work of the state is now oriented towards the global agenda, changing the criteria and normativities of the national state that were exclusive, in national monetary policies, in fiscal policies etc. Also, the growth of a global consciousness unbundles national citizenship.

The power of finance to destroy and create whole new concepts of the economic has been enormous in the last fifteen years. The hidden rules of permission in the legal architecture allow a variety of new developments. Thanks to powerful digital technology there is a possibility of new forms of politics and multiple localized forms of struggle. Those who are too poor to move, too busy struggling for clean water, they are also actors in the emergent set of globality (2004: 87-88).

Multitude

The poor are neither simple dupes nor secret revolutionaries; they are survivors, Arjun Appadurai (2001) says. The effort to strengthen the idea of aspiration as a cultural capacity corresponds today to the challenge of how to bring the politics of dignity and the politics of poverty into a single framework: of how human beings engage their own futures (2001: 5-6).

The closer we look at the lives and activities of the poor, Hardt and Negri (2004) argue, the more we see how enormously creative and powerful they are, and indeed how much they are part of the circuits of social and biopolitical production. To the extent that social production is increasingly defined by immaterial labour such as cooperation or the construction of social relationships and networks of communication, the activity of all in society including the poor becomes more and more directly productive (2004: 129).

These authors discern two faces to globalization: Empire spreads globally its network of hierarchies and divisions that maintain order through new mechanisms of control and constant conflicts. Globalization is also the creation of new circuits of cooperation and collaboration that stretch across nations and continents. This second face of globalization provides the possibility that, while remaining different, we discover the commonality that enables us to communicate and act together (xiv).

The common we share, in fact, is not so much discovered as it is produced. The production of the common tends today to be central to every form of social production, no matter how locally circumscribed. Labour itself tends through the transformations of the economy to create and be embedded in cooperative and communicative networks. This is especially true for all labour that creates immaterial projects, including ideas, images, affects, and relationships (xv).

This newly dominant model which Hardt and Negri call biopolitical production, touches on and produces all faces of social life, economic, cultural and political. Its expansion of the common is one strong pillar on which stands the possibility of global democracy today, they believe. The desire for democracy is the common currency that runs through so many struggles and movements for liberation across the world today - at local, regional, and global levels (xvi).

Whereas biopower stands above society, transcendent, as a sovereign authority and imposes its order, biopolitical production, in contrast, is immanent to society and creates social relationships and forms through collaborative forms of labour (2004: 94-95). Class is really a biopolitical concept that is at once economic and political. When they say biopolitical Hardt and Negri also mean that their understanding of labour cannot be limited to waged labour but must refer to human creative capacities in all their generality. The poor are thus not excluded from this conception of class but central to it. The singular social differences that constitute the multitude must always be expressed and can never be flattened into sameness, unity, identity, or indifference. Once we recognize singularity, the common begins to emerge. Singularities do communicate, and they are able to do so because of the common they share (2004: 128). Just as we must understand the production of value in terms of the common, so too must we try to conceive exploitation as *the expropriation of the common* (2004: 150)*.*

A cultural politics of cyberspace

The World Social Forum (WSF), the so-called movement of movements, does not declare itself against globalization but for another globalization and against its neo-liberal management. What these people are asking for is autonomous thought, reappropriation and socialization of knowledge and technologies. They are defending diversity, plurality and identities, and weaving people's resistance culture. They are trying to develop counter-hegemonic practices defending Earth and people's common goods - as an alternative to commodification and transnational control.

Arturo Escobar (2004), one of the most prominent and theoretically most articulated promoters of WSF's ideas and activities strongly believes that "cyberspace constitutes a signifying space of subject-subject interaction

(individually and collectively) for the creation and negotiation of visions and meanings. The resulting systems of networked intelligence could be of great cultural, social, and political potential. They could make up an inter-networked society of intelligent communities, centered on the democratic production of culture and subjectivity. Rather than at the service of capital, this new economy of knowledge would be at the service of an emerging humanity of cooperation, pluralism (singularity), and collective learning".

Escobar (2004) recognizes that this is a utopian conception in which cyberspace is seen as enacting a decentralized non-hierarchical way of self-organization. But he also refers to scientists for a new way of looking at social reality that can be apt to explain some of the social dynamics we are witnessing today. The same dynamics and processes can be seen at play in many domains of material, biological and social life. "Scientists have a new word for this discovery, emergence, when the actions of multiple agents interacting dynamically and following local rules rather than top-down commands result in some kind of visible macro-behaviour or structure." To have a chance, this vision has to be accompanied by an ineluctable obligation: to the marginalized, to the public sphere, to a constant critical self examination, since the very same ICTs foster a degree of global de-localization and erasure of place that is perhaps greater than ever before.

Notwithstanding these circumstances, there is a political ecology of cyberculture that suggests that the "cultures" developed out of ICT-supported networking need to be conscious of the double character of the struggle. Arturo Escobar makes it clear: over the very nature of cyberspace and ICTs, on the one hand; and over the real restructuring of the world being effected by ICT-led transnational capitalism and neo-liberal globalization. This means that if the aim is to create subaltern intelligent communities, these need to be ecological and ethical in the broad sense of these terms. There is thus a cultural politics of cyberspace that resists, transforms, and presents alternatives to the dominant real and virtual worlds.

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Fronteras de la globalización

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I

¿Fin de la globalización? El asunto es, sin duda, intrincado; estamos hablando de un proceso que apareció como necesariedad de la historia, y no como una mera contingencia. La globalización fue el núcleo de la agenda en los '90'. Hace apenas diez años, cuando participamos en la Primera Conferencia Culturelink, se imponía como una dimensión ineludible y una proyección certera hacia el futuro.

En esa etapa el debate era intenso; se elaboraron desde complejas interpretaciones económicas hasta ingeniosas definiciones, como aquella que interpretaba a la globalización como la "macdonaldización del mundo", o inventaba nuevas palabras: "globalobediencia", "glocalización", etc. Muchos teóricos y políticos consideraron la globalización como un horizonte nuevo en las relaciones humanas; de hecho, por un corto tiempo esta idea optimista corrió en paralelo con la "tercera vía", una propuesta que apareció como una posición política superadora y se extinguió como una estrella fugaz. "*La globalización* - decía Giddens (1999), el teórico de esta "tercera vía" - *no es sólo, ni principalmente, interdependencia económica, sino la transformación del tiempo y del espacio en nuestras vidas... La globalización es fundamentalmente interdependencia, sobre todo interdependencia cibernética... un mundo de comunicación electrónica instantánea, en el que están implicados todos los que viven en las regiones más pobres...*"

Más recientemente, en febrero de 2002, el secretario general de las Naciones Unidas, Kofi Annan, reafirmaba la idea de que la globalización no es la causa de la pobreza y otros problemas sociales sino, más bien, la mejor oportunidad para superarlos.

Discutiendo esa visión positiva sobre la globalización, otros autores comenzaron a analizarla críticamente.

En algunos casos la consideraron directamente como una nueva etapa de la hegemonía capitalista, simple continuidad de cinco siglos de expansión. Representativo de esta posición es el economista Carlos Vilas, quien sostiene que con la globalización *"…estamos hablando de un proceso que se extiende por lo menos durante 500 años. La globalización es un proceso ligado íntimamente al desarrollo del capitalismo como modo de producción intrínsecamente expansivo respecto de territorios, poblaciones, recursos, procesos y experiencias culturales"*. (Vilas, 1994)

Bernardo Kocher, de la Red de Estudios de la Economía Mundial, plantea directamente que la globalización es un objeto histórico construido por el capitalismo; en un juego de palabras dice que *"la globalización no explica la globalización, sino que es el capitalismo quien explica la globalización"*.

Para él la globalización es el movimiento nuevo de un proceso antiguo. Tiene como primer objetivo formar un mercado mundial, pero presentando otros elementos hegemónicos. Se destacan la imposición del inglés como lengua utilizada en distintas culturas, dólar como moneda universal, la hegemonía del mercado por sobre las decisiones de los Estados, la predominancia del capital sobre el trabajo en la formación del valor. Como factor primordial señala las telecomunicaciones y la informática, que aproximan a las personas pero calificadas genéricamente como consumidores. (Kocher, 2000)

El teólogo brasileño Leonardo Boff sintetizó la visión crítica de manera sencilla: *"¿Cuál globalización?"*, se pregunta; *"los poderosos, y por eso son poderosos, se apropiaron de la palabra globalización y le impusieron una significación que sirve a sus intereses. Es el proceso mundial de homogeneización del modo de producción capitalista, de globalización de los mercados y de las transacciones financieras, del entrelazamiento de las redes de comunicación y del control mundial de las imágenes y de las informaciones"*, dice Boff. Claro que Boff, al contrario de otros críticos, estima que hay dos concepciones de la globalización; él reivindica otro tipo de globalización, diametralmente opuesta a la que llama "de los poderosos". Esa globalización *"pasa por la solidaridad a partir de abajo, por la mundialización de los derechos humanos, por la socialización de la democracia como valor universal, por el control social de los capitales especulativos, pasa, además, por la aplicación en todas las economías de la tasa Tobin, por la creación de instancias de gobernancia mundial, por la universalización del cuidado para con la Tierra y los ecosistemas y por la valorización de la dimensión espiritual del ser humano y del universo…"* Como ejemplo de construcción de esa "globalización humanista" Boff plantea la experiencia del Foro de Porto Alegre que, en el marco de su oposición a la globalización planteada por los países ricos, denunció las normas del libre comercio que perjudican el desarrollo de los países pobres. Se critica especialmente el proyecto del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas (ALCA), impulsado por Estados

Unidos, y definido como mecanismo para la *"recolonización de la región y la destrucción de los derechos y los valores sociales, económicos, culturales y ambientales"*.

Vemos, en estos pocos ejemplos, que los análisis y las posturas frente al proceso globalizador son múltiples y a veces definitivamente contrapuestas.

Este debate fue y es un análisis muy rico sobre las relaciones entre las sociedades, la economía y el poder.

Pero este debate no sólo se da en forma teórica. En el plano de las acciones concretas, la globalización impulsada desde los centros del poder mundial generó su propio antagonista, el movimiento globalifóbico. Este movimiento – centrado primordialmente en la crítica a la economía transnacionalizada – comenzó a expresarse mediante protestas multitudinarias. Algunas de estas manifestaciones tuvieron destinatarios muy específicos, como las cadenas de hamburguesas; pero otros llevaron la protesta a las mismas sedes de los encuentros de los organismos internacionales, a las reuniones del Grupo de los Siete, al Foro de Davos. Paradójicamente, sus acciones cobraron fuerza porque se transformaron en acontecimientos globalizados. El principal aporte fueron los recursos de difusión ofrecidos por los conglomerados multimedia y las NTICs.

Como ha escrito el sociólogo catalán Manuel Castells, "… el principal mérito del movimiento global contra la globalización: (es)… el haber puesto sobre el tapete del debate social y político lo que se presentaba como vía única e indiscutible del progreso de la humanidad. Como es lo propio de todo gran debate ideológico, se plantea en medio de la confusión y la emoción, muertos incluidos". El movimiento antiglobalización se expresó con tanta disparidad de enfoques como diferentes son los actores que lo integran: verdes, rojos, anarquistas, violentos, pacifistas, miembros de Vía Campesina, estudiantes, ecologistas, en fin, toda la rica diversidad que caracteriza a las sociedades dinámicas. Sus actividades han incluido desde la retórica contra los cultivos transgénicos a los violentos hechos ocurridos en Barcelona y Génova. Pero toda esta diversidad se unifica en el lema con el que se convocó la primera manifestación, la de Seattle: 'No a la globalización sin representación'.

Esta consigna es central en el debate. Porque gran parte de ese debate suele limitarse a la liberalización del comercio, la generación de un mercado mundial, etc. Pero esa consigna del movimiento globalifóbico resume la gran cuestión: en nombre de una globalización que fue presentada como proceso histórico necesario e indiscutible, ¿quiénes toman las decisiones que involucran a miles de millones de personas? ¿Cuán legítima es su representatividad?

Ahora bien, no es posible hablar de los contenidos de la globalización sin referirse, en forma inmediata y necesaria, al gran instrumento de este proceso: las Nuevas Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación.

Porque en la idea de la aldea global, las Nuevas Tecnologías de la Información se instalaron como la herramienta imprescindible para una conectividad sin fronteras. Su dinamismo y crecimiento catalizó el ideal mundializador, en base a dos protagonistas centrales: el ordenador e Internet al alcance de millones de personas.

En esto coinciden tanto los panegiristas como los críticos. Se ha dicho que "globalización y nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación y la información van de la mano"; y no hay acuerdo cuál de estos elementos es causa y cuál consecuencia. Son mutuamente determinantes. Se puede argumentar que la globalización es parte de la historia capitalista, pero entonces hay que admitir que si aparece como novedad se debe, precisamente, a estas nuevas tecnologías que modificaron sustancialmente los intercambios comerciales y los flujos financieros, que hoy se realizan a la velocidad de la luz y saltando toda frontera o accidente geográfico.

Las empresas transnacionalizan los procesos productivos, que se deslocalizan y se desparraman por el mundo entero. La interacción inmediata mediante las comunicaciones permite la migración de las plantas fabriles hacia los países pobres, donde aprovechan la mano de obra barata y sin la protección de los derechos laborales.

A la vez, la investigación, la fabricación de los equipos y el diseño y elaboración de programas informáticos generaron una nueva industria y nuevas especialidades profesionales. Surgió un nuevo estamento social, protagonista esencial para el funcionamiento del nuevo mundo virtual; este estamento ocupa hoy un lugar estratégico, porque de él depende la eficiencia de los sistemas de informática y conectividad. Y estos sistemas son los que hacen posible las grandes transacciones financieras, y también los vínculos sociales entre millones de personas. Internet surgió en el contexto de la guerra fría. Como sabemos, fue diseñada como un sistema de comunicación con capacidad de superar el caos en caso de un ataque nuclear. Su primera expresión fue un plan piloto que vinculaba a quince universidades norteamericanas. Pero esta experiencia se transformó rápidamente; primero la comunidad académica y luego las organizaciones de la sociedad civil descubrieron este recurso, lo hicieron propio y lo transformaron en una herramienta de articulación a escala mundial.

Este proceso fue facilitado por instrumentos cada vez más perfeccionados, como la consolidación de la World Wide Web, la difusión de un protocolo estandarizado, el diseño de navegadores de uso fácil, el desarrollo de microcomponentes, el uso de satélites y las mayores velocidades de conexión y tráfico.

Pero las nuevas tecnologías de la comunicación y la información son mucho más que esos avances. El salto que verdaderamente representan en términos cualitativos es su carácter multimedia; como indica Manuel Castells, "…la aparición de un nuevo sistema de comunicación electrónico, caracterizado por su alcance global, su integración de todos los medios de comunicación y su interactividad potencial, está cambiando nuestra cultura y lo hará para siempre" (Castells, 2000). Con este potencial, es natural que las Nuevas Tecnologías de la información y la Comunicación aparezcan como un mismo y único proceso con la globalización.

II

Cuando nos preguntamos sobre el fin de la globalización, creo que en verdad estamos plateando dos problemas: por un lado, lo que fue perdiendo fuerza no es el asunto sino el debate.

Y esto es así porque lo que llamamos "globalización", aún considerada tan sólo una etapa histórica del proceso capitalista, tiene suficiente entidad y no puede darse por agotado en apenas diez o quince años.

Pero sí podemos aceptar que su lugar en la agenda fue superado por otros núcleos discursivos, generados por los profundos cambios ocurridos en el escenario mundial. En ese plano se destacan el desequilibrio del poder a escala internacional, concentrado ahora en una sola potencia, y la imposición del modelo neoliberal.

Hace menos de treinta años el poder mundial se repartía en la Comisión Trilateral. Los países industrializados de Europa, Japón y Estados Unidos resumían la capacidad de regir los destinos del mundo, y a la vez competían por ese liderazgo con la Unión Soviética; la China de Mao estaba más cerca del Tercer Mundo que de los poderosos. En tres décadas los cambios han sido radicales: Estados Unidos representa hoy el poder unipolar pero China se convertirá, durante los próximos veinte años, en la primera potencia económica mundial.

En el breve tiempo disponible no podemos presentar la historia de estos profundos cambios; en cambio, podemos fijar lugar y momento de eclosión de los mismos: Torres Gemelas, 11 de septiembre de 2001. Y, a partir de este hecho trágico, una nueva forma de globalización, digamos, de "globalización impuesta". Podríamos decir que mediante bombardeos globalizadores, primero en Afganistán, luego en Irak y mañana no sabemos dónde, irrumpió la hegemonía total por parte de una sola potencia. Es una nueva fase en el proceso globalizador: su imposición y la búsqueda de la homogeneidad económica, política y cultural mediante el uso de cualquier recurso disponible, sea militar, económico o político.

En segundo lugar, se da la paradoja de que la misma globalización ha generado su propia frontera interna; la aldea global, ilusoriamente unificada por Internet, está poblada hoy por dos humanidades, la de los integrados al sistema por un lado y los excluidos del mismo por otro. Es una divisoria dramática, causada por la aplicación del modelo neoliberal; se manifiesta en el crecimiento exponencial de la exclusión social, cultural y económica de miles de millones de personas.

La exclusión social significa una tragedia humana sin precedentes, y que se multiplica día a día. Podríamos compararla con los incendios forestales, que crean su propio viento; es un viento que a la vez va realimentando el furor destructivo del fuego. Instala una nueva frontera, pero no entre territorios sino en el seno mismo de cada pueblo y cada nación. Se expresa en la desesperación de quienes son marginados de los beneficios, avances y perspectiva futura de la sociedad moderna. Estamos hablando de un proceso que es mucho más devastador que la pobreza. La pobreza está implícita en la exclusión pero se la puede considerar en su gradualidad. Hay gente más o menos pobre. Por el contrario, la exclusión es una situación absoluta; es un salto cualitativo hacia el vacío de las sociedades, estructural e irreversible, por el cual se establece una división inconciliable entre ciudadanos y no-ciudadanos. La pérdida de ciudadanía es un camino sin retorno para los actores sociales, considerando que la ciudadanía es un status con que las comunidades políticas legitiman la pertenencia e identidad de los individuos a esas comunidades.

La exclusión y pérdida de ciudadanía excluye a amplios sectores de la población de los derechos y obligaciones fiscales, impacta en la autovaloración de las personas y establece un cuadro de anomia y desesperanza.

Esta fractura social distorsiona la esencia misma de la globalización y traza esta frontera interna. Pero la cuestión no termina ahí. Porque sería erróneo pensar que la única consecuencia es la victimización pasiva de los excluidos, o las reacciones elementales expresadas en la violencia delictiva. La realidad actual es que los excluidos alcanzan a sociedades enteras, y están pasando a la acción. Esta se concreta en movimientos fundamentalistas de base étnica, religiosa o nacionalista, o en proyectos secesionistas que erosionan la integridad de los Estados nacionales. Los movimientos fundamentalistas se corresponden con sociedades o grupos que resisten la fragmentación cultural producida por la intrusión de la cultura globalizada, representada en general por productos sintéticos de la industria cultural. El fundamentalismo religioso o étnico tiende a enfrentar estas intromisiones reforzando valores y muchas veces generando imaginarios extremos. Los núcleos más activos de estos grupos, cuando cuentan con posiciones de poder imponen estos imaginarios al conjunto social, como ocurrió con la ideología talibán. Los proyectos secesionistas son otro ejemplo de las repercusiones contradictorias, tanto de la globalización, como también de las propuestas de integración a menor escala, como el Acuerdo de

Cartagena o el MERCOSUR en América Latina. Muchos de estos proyectos integradores de regiones no tienen inserción social, porque en muchas sociedades se está diluyendo la idea de que es beneficioso pertenecer a una nación grande. Emerge una nueva perspectiva, basada en razones históricas, culturales, religiosas, etc. por la cual se empieza a luchar por nuevas formas de autonomía o incluso la creación de nuevos estados nacionales.

En muchos lugares del mundo estas ambiciones son de larga data (por ejemplo, la reivindicación separatista del País Vasco); pero es particularmente demostrativo que este fenómeno comience a darse en América Latina. En Europa los límites de los estados nacionales han sufrido diversas e importantes modificaciones a lo largo del siglo XX, sólo por mencionar el período cercano. Por el contrario, el mapa político de América Latina se mantiene prácticamente inalterado desde 1903, cuando Panamá se segregó de Colombia. Este es un caso bastante excepcional teniendo en cuenta que los territorios de los estados latinoamericanos tienen límites muchas veces artificiales; en su definición no se respetaron las biorregiones, ni las realidades étnicas originarias. Pero en los últimos años diversas sociedades están siendo alcanzadas por vientos separatistas, incentivados por varios factores: el reverdecer de reivindicaciones de los pueblos originarios, las situaciones de extrema pobreza generadas por las políticas neoliberales, y también la resistencia de regiones ricas a compartir su riqueza con regiones pobres en un mismo país. Esta última situación también debe anotarse en las consecuencias del modelo neoliberal, que acentuó la desigualdad entre sectores sociales y regiones. El registro actual de focos separatistas o de mayor autonomía en América Latina incluye, entre otros, al movimiento aymara del alto andino boliviano; la Republiqueta del Chapare, en Santa Cruz de la Sierra, también en Bolivia; los mapuche del sur de Chile y Argentina; la región de Magallanes en el extremo sur chileno; sectores de la Patagonia argentina; el Ejercito Zapatista en Chiapas; los estados de Santa Catarina, Río Grande do Sul y Paraná, en Brasil; la provincia de Guayas en Ecuador; la región del Zulia en Venezuela; en Colombia, las FARC controlan 40.000 kilómetros de territorio autónomo con respecto al gobierno central; y los resabios de la república de Airregu ubicada entre Nicaragua y Costa Rica. Estos son por ahora focos, expectativas de cambio. Pero su misma existencia, aún latente, muestra que el proceso globalizador no es capaz de contener la fragmentación social y que busca expresarse en lo territorial. Si la exclusión generada por la globalización neoliberal es negación de ciudadanía, es evidente que los no-ciudadanos están tratando de encontrar una reformulación de su propia ciudadanía.

Señalamos anteriormente el papel decisivo de las NTICs en el proceso globalizador; ahora debemos señalar que las NTICs también generaron una frontera entre incluidos y excluidos. Esta frontera se llama brecha digital. Se trata de una frontera de nuevo tipo, cuyo eje es el analfabetismo tecnológico. La brecha digital se define como la separación que existe entre las personas (comunidades, estados,

países…) que utilizan las Nuevas Tecnologías de la Información (NTI) como una parte rutinaria de su vida diaria, y aquellas otras que no tienen acceso a las mismas y que aunque las tengan no saben como utilizarlas.

Su significado profundo es la desigualdad de posibilidades que existen para acceder a la información, al conocimiento y la educación. Pero la brecha digital no se relaciona solamente con aspectos exclusivamente de carácter tecnológico, sino que es el reflejo de una combinación de factores socioeconómicos y, en particular, de limitaciones y falta de infraestructura de telecomunicaciones e informática. Como señalaba un estudio del Observatorio para la CiberSociedad…"hay un viejo dicho en la Red que hace referencia a la posibilidad abierta de ocultar buena parte de los rasgos de identidad de uno mismo en las comunicaciones. "En Internet nadie sabe que eres un perro". Efectivamente, nadie puede saber si eres alto o bajo, delgada o gorda, hombre o mujer, niño o anciano, si eres tartamuda o sufres de incontinencia verbal... Pero de algo todos podemos estar casi seguros: que ni tú ni yo somos pobres". En esta era, llamada también del conocimiento, las diferencias no se establecen sólo entre ricos y pobres, sino entre alfabetos – los conectados a la red – y los que no lo están, los analfabetos de nuevo tipo.

III

Volvamos a la pregunta inicial, la que nos convoca en este capítulo. ¿El fin de la globalización?

O la pregunta sería: ¿El fin de una forma específica de la globalización?

En nuestra perspectiva, esta pregunta es coherente con lo ocurrido después de las Torres Gemelas.

Hasta ese momento, la globalización neoliberal era una certeza. Para unos, se trataba de un proceso histórico ineludible; para otros, desde la crítica, se reducía a una fase peculiar del capitalismo. Finalmente estaban quienes – como Leonardo Boff – criticaban la globalización neoliberal pero defendían un proceso humanizado de universalización.

La operación "Libertad duradera" resolvió algunas cosas al respecto, porque a partir de ella la globalización neoliberal se resignificó como un proceso controlado por una sola potencia mundial, Estados Unidos. La operación "Libertad duradera" fue la señal de inicio de un nuevo modelo hegemónico. Como las bombas de racimo al estallar, estas señales llegaron a todo el planeta. Pero sería reduccionista interpretar estas señales exclusivamente en el plano militar o como garantía de expansión y funcionamiento del mercado transnacionalizado; todas las operaciones políticas, comerciales y militares que se apliquen para afianzarla parece que sólo serán

definitivamente exitosas si se logra también una homogeneidad cultural. Con ese objetivo, la operación "Libertad duradera" encontró el antagonista perfecto para justificar esa hegemonía cultural. Los talibanes son suficientemente repudiables pero también simbolizan el opuesto cultural de la cultura occidental. Dar la batalla a los talibanes fue una advertencia contundente a toda la gradación de culturas diferenciadas, y una amenaza para las masas que puedan encontrar en sus propias identidades el elemento cohesionador, en su lucha contra la globalización capitalista.

A partir de todos estos acontecimientos es lógico especular con el fin de la globalización; la unipolaridad significa el eclipse de una universalidad basada en la riqueza de la diversidad.

Pero en verdad este proceso negativo no concluyó y ni siquiera se ha impuesto en la escala que pretenden sus impulsores. En principio, comprobamos que como contrapartida emergieron o bien se resignificaron las categorías de ciudadanía y sociedad civil, y comenzaron a surgir nuevos actores colectivos. Son estos actores los que posibilitarán superar el modelo unipolar de control mundial, reinstalando paulatinamente tanto el protagonismo de las culturas locales como los sistemas de articulación global.

La globalización, lejos de agotarse como proceso horizontal entre esas culturas locales, entre realidades particulares, puede tomar nuevos rumbos. Para lograrlo se requiere un nuevo enfoque que imagine las formas de disminuir esa frontera que hoy separa a "globalizados" de "no globalizados".

Siguiendo el pensamiento de Leonardo Boff, convengamos en que esa globalización humanista "crea las condiciones para un salto cualitativo de la antropogénesis: la irrupción de aquello que Teilhard de Chardin llamó noosfera: la creación de una nueva armonía entre los humanos en la cual técnica y poesía, producción y espiritualidad, corazón y pensamiento encuentran una nueva sintonía más alta y más sinfónica". Y como el mismo Teilhard de Chardin decía: "La edad de las naciones ya pasó. Si no queremos morir, es la hora de sacudir los viejos prejuicios y de construir la Tierra".

En ese plan, las NTICs tienen un rol fundamental. Si fueron creadas y en gran medida sirven a la interconexión financiera, y a la industria cultural de los grandes conglomerados multimedia, también pueden ser el gran instrumento de esa nueva perspectiva de la globalización. Para que eso ocurra, debemos abordar una nueva perspectiva sobre su aplicación y su futuro. Porque hoy comprobamos que, en la nueva situación mundial, las NTICs pueden jugar un rol fundamental como instrumento de inclusión e integración.

En ese plan, los principales rubros que deberían abordarse son la educación, los proyectos de conectividad (incluyendo la dotación tecnológica) y el uso de la NTICs en el impulso a la economía de los pobres y los excluidos.

Para ello debe continuarse y fortalecerse el diseño y ejecución de proyectos orgánicos para su utilización, con objetivos claramente dirigidos a la inclusión social, cultural y económica, y la futura eliminación de la brecha digital.

En esta materia, los países desarrollados pueden prestar una fuerte colaboración. Algunos proyectos demuestran que ya se intentan experiencias en ese sentido. Un ejemplo es el programa LINK ALL@LIS, de la Comisión Europea, cuyo objetivo manifiesto es la inclusión de comunidades remotas. Su ejecución, como plan piloto entre 2004 - 2006 en varios países de América Latina, permitió a poblaciones excluidas integrarse a la sociedad de la información, potenciando también actividades dirigidas al desarrollo local.

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Nation State, Culture, Region

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"Pursue an international policy on culture that is 'culture-oriented'
rather than one which merely serves economic or political goals."
(Definition of one of the cultural policy priorities of the Belgian territory
of Flanders, Compendium: Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe)

Who is "we"

Globalization opens up many questions, but offers few answers. Possibly also, to paraphrase Karl Marx, because production was largely increased, including the production of cultural industries, but the number of those benefiting from it remained, oligarchically, small. This classical imbalance is additionally aggravated by a specific state of mind. The most numerous ones, those who benefit least from globalization or not at all, primarily smaller countries, lack a real interest to strengthen their position by joining forces with their equals or neighbours. One reason for this may lie in the fact that globalization, owing to the widening of communication channels among geographically distant groups (such as air transport, international migrations, telecommunications, television and the Internet), "decreases the attention paid to one's neighbours" while increasing the attention given to distant others (Geig, 2002: 232). The other possible, and to this discussion more relevant reason, is a certain reluctance, where official policies of smaller countries are concerned, to establish closer relations with geographic/regional neighbours, due to a fear of loss of national independence and renewal of relations which characterized the old empires or multinational states, as is, for example, the case with the countries of former Yugoslavia or the region of Southern Caucasus, formerly part of the Soviet Union.

However, reluctant are not only those with lesser powers or a lower reputation in the informal world hierarchy of states, but also great powers and other important actors in the process of globalization, including large corporations. Manuel Castells

attributes this discrepancy between the global circulation of means and the narrowness of goals the actors are trying to achieve, on the one hand to the exceptional techno-economic progress which, through networking, encompasses almost the entire world, and, on the other hand, to the narrow-mindedness of all actors involved, ranging from national and religious fundamentalist ones to the new networked enterprise, whose "we" cannot reach the horizon of a unified world, but rather composes it from the sum of activities of single actors who disregard or exploit others. (Castells, 1997)

Official cultural policies give a similar picture. Without exception they are all nationally framed, understanding international cooperation as an addition to this framework.

National priorities

If we take a look at the goals or the priorities of the cultural policies of European countries, as shown in the Compendium of cultural policies of 37 countries and territories of Europe (including Canada), we will notice the following (*Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe*, 2004): from 37 profiles, only in 7 cases are international, regional or European cultural cooperation included among the declared priorities of the cultural policies. These are the cultural policies of Austria, the Flemish and the French linguistic communities of Belgium, Greece, the Holy See, Montenegro and, partly, Ukraine. In all other cases the declared priorities are exclusively national in scope. The only markedly international cultural policy is the one of the Vatican City State.[1]

A relatively similar picture is drawn from the analysis of 48 projects of cultural cooperation within (former) Eastern Europe (The Budapest Observatory, 2004), which shows that East-East cooperation represents a neglected dimension of European cooperation, especially among the countries of South-Eastern Europe. Instead, West-West and West-East relations dominate.

Consequently, in most cultural policies the national is the strategic, the target orientation, while the international represents the tactic orientation. It can, however, not be expected that this relation should reverse, or that the national and the international or regional should become interdependent or complementary, until a specific advantage of international cooperation in culture, including cross-border cooperation, is determined. This should imply a quality of the cultural product or

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1 From the six priority goals of Vatican City, three are international in scope: (1) "Establishment of interreligious dialogue", (2) "Monitoring the activities of international bodies concerned with culture, the philosophy of science, and the human sciences", and (3) "Monitoring cultural policies and activities of governments throughout the world".

good which cannot be attained on the national nor on the global level. It is, thus, a question of the need for diversification of the effects of the cultural activity of partners in international cooperation, who cannot attain at home what they can in cooperation, and not a plainly commercial activity characteristic of a globalizing market of cultural products. Let us call this a need for a region, though, unfortunately, at the moment we cannot describe this cultural niche in a more specific way, defining the details by which regional cultural cooperation could enrich the cultural landscape created through national cultural policies on the one, and through globalizing effects on the other hand.

National and corporate prerequisites

It may be needless to note that the fundamental "we" in culture is rooted in the nation state, which represents the standard frame of reference of cultural policies, and which is not damaged significantly by the processes that create different cultural landscapes. According to Arjun Appadurai (1990), new cultural disjunctions and landscapes appear - ethnical (tourists, refugees, immigrant workers, i.e. all those moving between existing states and their old ethno-national matrices), media-related, technological, financial and idea-related (including diversified meanings of "freedom", "sovereignty" and "democracy"). These are all effects of globalization that escape the strict control of the nation state. And yet, nation states resist disjunctions by treating them, in most cases, as phenomena in interstices, which do not significantly damage the nationally defined spaces. On the contrary, as the theoretician of nationalism, Anthony D. Smith, states: "with every year the state's intrusive powers are more keenly felt by all sectors of society" (Smith, 2004: 205). The cultural sector may corroborate this even more strongly than others, since, as an effect of globalization, the economic and the military functions of the state have weakened, and the field of culture is increasingly distinguished as a culturally-political unit within the larger economic and military security entity. It may be due to this fact, due to the nation state's hard-fought defense of its position in the field of culture as one of the last places of discernment of identity (and prestige), that cultural policies carry a more permanent national imprint.

The relation towards others is not significantly different in the globalized world of business. Here the developmental and technological know-how lies in the hands of only a few global players. While it may be wrong to link them to single nation states, as these are large corporations, their American pedigree, as for example is the case with Hollywood's film production, directs reflections about the carriers of development towards a framework of methodological nationalism. Thus, the majority of cultural policies and strategies of lesser developed countries are well-situated and firmly organized within nation states, which offer a passable refuge

from the merciless market logic of large corporations. These countries have mostly come into existence through the breakup of multinational empires, ranging from the classic to the new socialist ones. How can these entities now, and should they, again associate, be it in a different manner, without the old coercion, to grow stronger individually?

The expansion of the European Union is a successful example of associating several national "we's" into a large regional "we" on a voluntary basis. At the same time, the cooperation between smaller regions within Europe, the "Europe of Regions", serves primarily to promote cross-border cooperation, namely on the eastern EU borders, in order to bridge the gap resulting from the establishment of these (Schengen) borders (Kennard, 2004). Yet, this European process does not guarantee that some twenty-odd European countries still outside the EU will soon become its members, which determines their interest in mutual cooperation, including regional cooperation (e.g., the Southern Caucasus, Southeast Europe). But these are not the only countries attached to national sovereignty. It seems that in the European Union itself the national interest is not ceding its place to the supranational or some other interest, at least where questions like the immigration policy or the reasons for the rejection of the European Constitution at the referenda in France and the Netherlands are concerned.

Unequal effects of nationalism

The situation in which less influential actors are becoming aware of the importance of their mutual relation, cooperation or association, but have at the same time an aversion to it because of a fear of losing their own identity and drowning in something that reminds them of old super-structures, is caused by the relation between the centre and the periphery, or rather by the unequal effects of nationalism in the two regions. Nationalism is the decisive process of recent history, spreading from the (former European) core toward the periphery. This spread, however, turns the periphery ever weaker, as opposed to the core, where in the 19th century nationalism has established a national economy, the main developing force of the time, and formed an alliance with republican, civil-democratic and even leftist powers. This economic rise of nationalism in the developed parts of Europe, and the West in general, lasted on until the end of the welfare state period, in which also the typical state-defined cultural policy took shape. Finally, the neo-liberal policy of the centre, which decreased the scope of the welfare state, caught the countries of the periphery, including those swept along by the new nationalism, on the "wrong foot". Like the erstwhile nationalist policies at the centre, they would like to foster the styles of national economy and welfare state, and thus act autonomously at the international scene, but

the new times do not favour this, at least not as far as smaller countries and their cultural sectors are concerned.

The moment demands the association of small countries, some kind of a regional augmentation of cultural potential, in order to achieve a level of efficiency competitive with larger and more developed countries. However, such a rational arithmetic is not compatible with the arithmetic of real interests and feelings towards others. Not insignificant cultural barriers are found in the way of communication and cooperation within the peripheral areas, where the region is perceived more as a solely geographic notion or a negative historic experience than as a chance for a new developmental relation. Perhaps mutual dislike even precedes this negative experience and in a way creates it. It may sound strange, but it is not unsubstantiated to assume that the war in former Yugoslavia was also to a certain extent the consequence of disorientation in the face of the breakup of a complex state, where the actors no longer saw any reason to continue living together as they had nothing left to say or offer to each other, and one part of them turned toward the West (Slovenia, Croatia) while the other part turned toward its self-projected image of a superior power (Serbia) allowed to impose its own interests upon its ex-partners without agreement. In fact, the periphery has in this case repeated the ancient history of the struggles within the core, only that now the core no longer allows them and urges that new development must not be founded upon conflicts but must include the cooperation of everyone with all others.

In terms of the development of the Internet, such relations at the periphery can be described as the "Hollywood model". The actors seem to worship the content provider, mostly the West, as their central point, while at the same time hardly any mutual communication takes place. Even if they are not at war, they seem to be at odds with or lacking any interest in each other. On the other side, in the core, relations are established according to the Internet model, a peer-to-peer network, where almost everyone communicates and collaborates with everyone else.

Ten years ago, at the First World Culturelink Conference held in Zagreb, I discussed this topic based on the example of Croatia, namely how people under the impression of wartime dangers tend to see "exotic friends" (in the West) and "enemies" (in their neighbourhood) (Katunarić, 1996). This feeling has faded in the meanwhile, but not in a way that would bring culture closer to peer-to-peer relations. On the one hand the distrust towards Serbia and the Serbs has reduced, but on the other hand the euroscepticism increased, which can be interpreted as a changed image of the West, now perceived as a demanding director of the international community, and no longer as a "big brother" with a special liking for Croatia (as people in Croatia tried to understand it in the past) owing to its traditional inclination towards the West and its wartime suffering. What the national "we", now somehow at equal distance

from all, wants, whom it wants to be its partners and why, is now probably more difficult to establish than it was before.

Towards a cultural diversification of the region

Does the regional stand a chance in a situation in which neither national self-isolation nor opening widely to the West, i.e. to global influences, brings about a solution? This is a difficult path, but it is worth exploring. Firstly, it is possible to develop significant joint projects on the regional level, reaching from cultural heritage preservation to cultural industries and cultural tourism. However, the direction of the relations thus established could hardly be judged or characterized as (merely) renewing former relations. After all, people and projects associate also according to artistic affinities - different aesthetics, poetics etc. - so that in this sense the new relations, should they be established, will bear little resemblance to those forged according to the policies of former empires or multi-national states (including former Yugoslavia in this case). To quote Gregor Podnar, curator and art director of the ŠKUC Gallery in Ljubljana, "the region is a mental, centrifugal artefact constantly changing its own boundaries and horizons" (Glavan, 2000). In other words, the notion of the region depends more on a programme than on a geographic location, and what is even more important, this programme gives no one a central position, which is extremely important if the participants are to free themselves of old nationalist fears or aspirations. In the region, no one is of second rank, everyone is equally important.

Secondly, it is difficult but rewarding to destigmatize regions where such marks exist, as is the case of the Balkans. One should consider the statement of former Director-General of UNESCO, Federico Mayor, who called the Balkans a "laboratory for the future" (as quoted by Suteu, 2003). This may sound like an inversion of orientalism-balkanism, like a reversal of the ancient stereotype of the Balkans as a "powder keg", but as such stimulating visions are rare in a sea of discouraging messages, they do deserve to be supported as a hope which, after all, has not been expressed by just anyone, but by someone important and influential in the world of cultural policies. However, arriving from inversion to change, primarily in the sense of establishing peer-to-peer relations, requires fresh programmes and newly defined goals of cultural cooperation in the region.

As this should be awarded significant international assistance, coming primarily from the developed part of the world, the question arises whether the big actors - the EU, the USA, the World Bank and other international organizations and substantial non-governmental donors - will support the development of peer-to-peer culture in this and other areas that still occupy a peripheral position. I am emphasising this because it seems that, after a period of successful and beneficial mediation in establishing relations between peripheral countries, the big actors are withdrawing, at

least where cultural programmes are concerned. Priority is given to the development of security mechanisms and to the policy of rapid privatization, whereas culture is regarded as a sensitive field, in which offering options for regional cooperation from the outside is futile if it is not desired by the regional participants themselves. This is probably caused by a fatigue arising from development problems affecting even the most developed countries (e.g., it is a fact that a cultural policy has not been formulated on the EU level nor has it been assigned an important position in the Union's further development) as well as from the insight that regional programmes of cultural cooperation cannot be influenced from the outside as effectively as from the inside, through the will of local or national actors, supported by the official cultural policy. This will, however, is weak not only due to the fears of a renewal of old relations, but also due to the fact that existing regional cultural cooperation does not yet display the contours of the "laboratory for the future", a future different from the past or from what reminds of this (unpleasant) past, representing instead a supplement to regional security mechanisms; for example, when the exchange of theatre performances is put on the same level as sports events or conferences gathering regional politicians. In such a case nothing new happens, nothing that could guarantee that an enthusiastic reception of a cultural performance from a neighbouring country would not be spoilt by a scandal at a match between sports clubs from those countries (which in recent years have occurred e.g., in the matches between Croatian and Serbian sports teams). How can regional cultural cooperation be immunized against such negative shockwaves from other sectors, while, at the same time, extending its own positive influence onto those sectors and thereby onto the social environments in the countries of the region? In the future, the region, as a "disjunction" in a cultural landscape stricken with the struggle between the national and the global, can have a special meaning and motivate existing actors to a cooperation exceeding by far the present diplomatically correct minimum, if it manages to produce the cultural quality and change which cannot be brought about by either the commercial profile of globalized cultural industries (a few large corporations) nor by traditional forms of expressing the values of national culture. May we see such a future special quality of regional relations in the emergence of new forms of public culture, which will transform the environments of many local communities and whose primary carriers will come from the non-governmental cultural sector? (Katunarić, 2004)

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La longue marche de la décentralisation des politiques culturelles en Europe

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La décentralisation des politiques culturelles en Europe est désormais un fait institutionnel et politique. A quoi correspond-il? A la montée en puissance des pouvoirs territoriaux, dès l'après-guerre mais surtout à partir des années 70, dans la gestion des affaires culturelles publiques, au détriment des pouvoirs centraux ou fédéraux. Toutefois, la décentralisation n'a pas cheminé d'un même pas et présente des configurations diverses à travers le continent européen: les types d'échelons territoriaux, leur nombre, leur assise, leurs compétences respectives, sont variables d'un pays à l'autre. L'ensemble de ces éléments politico-administratifs doit être examiné attentivement pour comprendre à la fois les lignes communes de ce processus et les singularités des différents modèles en présence.

Cependant, on manquerait le cœur de ce phénomène si l'on ne disait d'abord que la décentralisation est un fait de civilisation et de société qui pose les bases d'un nouvel équilibre entre les pouvoirs, tout en répondant aux besoins d'autonomie des territoires, des groupes sociaux et des individus. La décentralisation permet de rapprocher la décision politique des populations concernées, d'inventer dans la société moderne des modes de gouvernance plus proches des citoyens, plus proches de ce que l'on appelle parfois «le terrain», c'est-à-dire de l'espace de vie des habitants. Elle constitue une plaque sensible de la démocratisation dans les sociétés contemporaines. Alain Delcamp et John Loughlin soulignent aussi très bien que «les tendances à la décentralisation et à la régionalisation sont liées à la nécessité de gérer des services croissants aux citoyens»[1]. Les autorités locales ou les «collectivités locales», selon la manière dont on les dénomme, apparaissent aujourd'hui plus aptes que les pouvoirs centraux à assumer cette tâche. Dans le domaine des politiques

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1 Cf. Introduction d'Alain Delcamp, John Loughlin (dir.), *La décentralisation dans les États de l'Union Européenne*, Paris: La Documentation Française, 2002, p.p. 11-26.

culturelles, la décentralisation s'avère plus appropriée pour porter des enjeux de proximité, c'est-à-dire pour favoriser des rapports plus directs entre une offre culturelle et les populations. Sans constituer une réponse exclusive, elle peut aussi faciliter la prise en charge d'enjeux de démocratie et de diversité culturelle, de création et d'échanges artistiques et culturels, de coopération souple, directe, entre les territoires et entre les acteurs, les artistes, les opérateurs culturels. Elle s'impose comme une «solution» efficace pour accompagner le développement territorial dans ses différents aspects, économiques, urbanistiques, sociaux, culturels... Mais il est vrai que ces défis exigent une pensée dynamique et démocratique de la décentralisation, qui ne peut se satisfaire d'une simple «copie» locale de ce que fait le pouvoir central, avec, le cas échéant, ses travers bureaucratiques. De plus, et c'est là un point crucial de toute décentralisation, ils exigent un partage des tâches entre les différents niveaux de collectivités qui fait régulièrement en Europe l'objet de débats, de négociations et d'évolutions.

Dans cette contribution, nous essaierons de faire ressortir les lignes forces de la décentralisation culturelle en Europe, d'en mentionner les principaux relais institutionnels et associatifs européens et, par quelques touches impressionnistes, d'établir quelques éléments de comparaison entre divers pays. Cet exercice montre d'ailleurs la difficulté de modéliser la décentralisation culturelle en Europe, tant chaque pays, quand bien même il s'inscrirait dans une dynamique européenne, construit son projet de décentralisation culturelle en prenant d'abord appui sur ses propres spécificités historiques, institutionnelles et territoriales.

Les mots-clés de la décentralisation

Le débat sur la décentralisation mobilise des concepts différents mais qui peuvent parfois, du fait de leur malléabilité, de leur proximité sémantique et théorique, entretenir une certaine confusion. Essayons tout d'abord d'éclairer quelques-uns de ces concepts que sont la décentralisation, la déconcentration, la régionalisation, le régionalisme, la territorialisation.

La décentralisation signifie que les collectivités infra-étatiques voient leur(s) responsabilité(s) s'accroître, soit par attribution (ou dévolution), soit par transfert de prérogatives (ou compétences). Selon ce principe, des collectivités peuvent avoir à jouer, de par la loi, un rôle de plus en plus important dans le domaine notamment culturel. Mais il existe aussi une approche moins normative de la décentralisation qui insiste sur le fait que les autorités locales, quand le cadre légal dont elles dépendent le leur permet, prennent de plus en plus d'initiatives librement, indépendamment même de leurs obligations et au-delà de celles-ci. La culture apparaît comme un champ d'implication volontaire par excellence pour de nombreuses collectivités locales en

Europe, voire un champ d'expérimentation aux multiples dimensions pouvant de surcroît se conjuguer les unes aux autres: artistique, sociale, économique, urbaine…

À côté du concept de décentralisation, une autre notion apparaît dans cette réflexion, à savoir celle de déconcentration. Elle renvoie à la territorialisation de l'administration d'un Etat. Elle correspond, par exemple, à la mise en place d'administrations culturelles d'Etat au niveau de régions, départements, provinces, comtés, districts… Aujourd'hui, un certain nombre de pays en transition s'engagent sur la voie de la déconcentration de leurs services étatiques. Pour ces pays européens, marqués par des décennies de centralisme bureaucratique, l'objectif de déconcentration de l'Etat précède celui de décentralisation. La déconcentration permet d'abord d'assouplir l'appareil d'Etat et de ne pas penser la gestion étatique à partir d'un centre institutionnel unique mais d'une organisation administrative plus adaptée à la diversité locale et régionale, mieux représentée auprès des territoires, et accordant à ses antennes locales un certain degré d'autonomie. La décentralisation constitue un palier démocratique supplémentaire dans la mesure où elle vise à instaurer des autorités infra-étatiques en pouvoirs souverains, dans un cadre réglementé. Autrement dit, dans la décentralisation, la souveraineté des collectivités locales et régionales est limitée aux prérogatives constitutionnelles prévues par chaque Etat.

Un troisième concept doit être mobilisé dans notre débat, celui de régionalisation. La région est une entité difficile à définir de manière générique à l'échelle européenne puisqu'elle renvoie aussi bien par exemple aux *länder* allemands, qu'aux communautés belges que sont la Flandre et la Wallonie, ou bien encore à des régions dont le degré d'autonomie peut être variable à l'intérieur d'un même Etat, comme c'est le cas en Espagne, en Italie, en Grande-Bretagne ou en France. Certaines régions sont apparentées à des nations (l'Ecosse et les autres nations du Royaume Uni, la Catalogne, le Pays Basque…); d'autres, à l'opposé, ne sont que des entités administratives, sans pouvoir politique. C'est le cas des régions anglaises. Ces deux figures régionales ne sauraient épuiser le genre... En tout cas, à quelques exceptions près, le niveau régional s'impose massivement en Europe comme un niveau de référence structurant dans la gestion des affaires culturelles territoriales, entre le local, le national et l'espace européen. Cependant, les régions européennes présentent des différences importantes du point de vue des pouvoirs et des moyens dont elles disposent, de leur rôle politique ou de leur aire géographique. On comprend aussi que le thème de la régionalisation concerne moins des pays de petite taille tels que le Luxembourg ou les pays baltes. De même, les Pays-Bas ne comportent pas de régions, mais trois niveaux d'intervention publique que sont l'Etat, les provinces, les communes.

Précisons encore que la régionalisation fait référence au processus politique accordant aux régions un rôle plus important dans la gestion des affaires territoriales, tandis que la notion de régionalisme pourrait être plutôt définie comme une idéologie visant à la reconnaissance et à la promotion d'une identité territoriale. Le régionalisme en Europe prend des formes variées, selon le degré d'autonomie et d'identité revendiqué. Il exprime un besoin d'affirmation qui va souvent de pair avec la contestation, voire la dénonciation du pouvoir central et de son caractère hégémonique. Il s'appuie souvent sur une histoire vécue de manière douloureuse et mythifiée. Toutefois, la revendication régionaliste est à géométrie variable. Tantôt elle reconnaît la pleine légitimité de l'Etat-nation dans le cadre duquel elle s'exprime, tantôt elle cherche à incarner un nationalisme pouvant déboucher sur une logique séparatiste.

Un cinquième concept mérite d'être introduit dans ce débat sur la décentralisation, celui de territorialisation. La notion de territorialisation signifie que les collectivités territoriales jouent un rôle prépondérant dans la gestion politique des territoires, mais aussi que les politiques mises en œuvre à cette échelle sont conçues non plus à partir de modèles imposés de l'extérieur (par l'Etat) mais en fonction des spécificités et de l'identité des territoires eux-mêmes, à partir des populations qui les composent, de leurs demandes et de leurs besoins: dans cet esprit, la notion de projet de territoire est souvent mise en avant.

L'Europe et la décentralisation culturelle

Considérons maintenant comment l'Europe, à travers ses institutions, la Communauté puis l'Union Européenne ainsi que le Conseil de l'Europe, précurseur sur ce thème, ont appréhendé la problématique de la décentralisation culturelle. En préambule à ce point, comment ne pas relever ce paradoxe: il a fallu tout de même attendre de longues décennies de construction européenne avant que la culture ne figure en tant que telle dans les textes fondamentaux de l'UE et que les échanges culturels soient considérés comme un facteur d'intégration européenne. C'est le cas depuis le Traité de Maastricht (1992), à travers son article 151. C'est que l'Europe communautaire s'est édifiée prioritairement sur des bases économiques.

Cependant, la Communauté Européenne devenue Union Européenne n'a eu de cesse d'encourager, au préalable, le développement régional et interrégional à travers divers programmes, depuis 1973, en particulier à travers la mise en place des fonds européens de développement pour les régions (FEDER). Les programmes INTERREG ont ensuite été conçus pour favoriser le développement de la coopération décentralisée en Europe. Ces programmes ont joué un rôle politique, économique et pédagogique important pour soutenir les processus de régionalisation en Europe. Le Traité de Maastricht a aussi eu le mérite d'aboutir à l'instauration d'un Comité des

Régions (CRE). Cet organe consultatif fonctionne officiellement depuis mars 1994. Il compte 317 membres après l'élargissement du 1er mai 1994. Il relaie auprès de la Commission européenne et du Parlement européen les vues des collectivités locales et régionales qu'il représente. L'une de ses commissions permanentes, EDUC, se consacre aux politiques d'éducation, de communication et de culture.

La problématique de la décentralisation culturelle - qui déborde le cadre de la seule Union Européenne - est une cause défendue de longue date, au niveau européen, par le Conseil de l'Europe ainsi que par l'UNESCO. Le Conseil de l'Europe s'est toujours montré très investi dans la question culturelle. Il a également pris en compte la problématique de la décentralisation à travers différentes résolutions, notamment depuis 1978, ou mieux encore à travers différentes résolutions, notamment depuis 1978, ou mieux encore à travers la Conférence des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux de l'Europe (CPLRE) qu'il avait instaurée en 1957. Ses projets «culture et villes» puis «culture et régions» conclu en 1991, attestent de cet engagement. A cette époque déjà, il reconnaissait l'importance du rôle culturel des régions en insistant sur la valorisation des identités régionales et du patrimoine. La Conférence s'est transformée en Congrès des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux de l'Europe à partir de 1994. Il représente désormais plus de 200 000 collectivités locales et régionales des 46 Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe. Le Congrès a tout particulièrement vocation à aider les nouveaux Etats membres du Conseil de l'Europe à la mise en place d'une autonomie locale et régionale.

Pour accompagner ce vaste mouvement de décentralisation, diverses chartes ont été promues par le Conseil de l'Europe depuis plus d'un quart de siècle. Dès 1980, il adoptait une Convention-cadre sur la coopération transfrontalière des collectivités ou autorités territoriales qui visait à leur reconnaître le droit de coopérer, par-delà les frontières, dans un certain nombre de domaines au premier rang desquels figure la culture. Quelques années plus tard, en 1985, le Conseil défendit la Charte européenne de l'autonomie locale et régionale qui associait l'idée de décentralisation à celle de démocratisation. Ce texte a été néanmoins diversement approuvé et ratifié par les pays européens. La Charte des langues et cultures minoritaires, adoptée en 1992, connaît le même sort puisque, aujourd'hui encore, elle n'est pas formellement signée ou ratifiée par l'ensemble des Etats européens.

Dans les années 80-90, le Conseil de l'Europe contribua encore à la réflexion sur la décentralisation culturelle par la mise en œuvre de programmes d'études comparatifs portant sur la place de la culture dans les politiques des villes et des régions. Ces démarches ont été un facteur de sensibilisation important pour les acteurs qui y participèrent, en les incitant notamment à interroger en profondeur leurs situations culturelles respectives, à les mettre en perspective et à se forger des références communes, embryon d'une culture partagée. On relira par exemple avec profit le

rapport conclusif du projet «Culture et régions», dit Projet 10 du Conseil de l'Europe, où René Rizzardo mettait en évidence, en 1991, trois enjeux culturels essentiels pour les régions d'Europe: les réseaux et les échanges culturels, le dialogue entre identité régionale et identité européenne, la culture comme élément de développement régional. Ces thèmes conservent leur pleine actualité, même si la configuration de l'Europe et de la décentralisation a beaucoup évolué depuis[2]. Au-delà de ce rapide récit, il est intéressant de noter que l'Europe a fait le pari de la décentralisation en privilégiant tout particulièrement un échelon, le niveau régional, à partir de l'hypothèse que les institutions de compétence régionale devraient permettre de réduire le développement inégal des territoires, de faire surgir des pouvoirs plus réactifs, d'apporter une plus-value démocratique par rapport aux États centraux ou fédéraux.

Les formes de la décentralisation culturelle en Europe

Comme le soulignent Jan Olsson et Joachim Aström, «La question des régions figure en première ligne sur le calendrier politique de nombreux Etats européens».[3] Mais l'histoire de la régionalisation en Europe a suivi des cheminements variés. Si l'organisation territoriale de l'Allemagne repose sur des bases stables depuis l'après-guerre, force est de constater que beaucoup de pays européens ont engagé des transformations institutionnelles de leur administration territoriale depuis moins d'une trentaine d'années et souvent plus récemment. Ces réformes connaissent différentes étapes et le rapport entre les différents niveaux fait constamment l'objet de débats ou d'ajustements. Ainsi, en Allemagne, la recherche d'un bon équilibre entre la Fédération et les *Länder* est de nouveau en discussion. En Italie, le système régional lancé en 1947 avec la création de 5 régions autonomes, n'a commencé à se concrétiser qu'à partir des années 70 avec l'émergence de 15 nouvelles régions «ordinaires», tout en présentant une configuration déséquilibrée à travers le pays du fait de ces différents statuts. Une révision de la Constitution en 2001 tend à renforcer le pouvoir des Régions. Selon Alberto Lucarelli, celles-ci ne se sont imposées à l'échelle de l'ensemble du pays qu'à partir des années 90.[4] En Grande-Bretagne, Etat unitaire composé de différentes nations, la «dévolution» confère aux «régions» des pouvoirs qui ne sont pas équivalents. La France, modèle-type d'Etat historiquement

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2   René Rizzardo, Les enjeux culturels pour les régions d'Europe, Culture et régions - Projet 10. Strasbourg: Editions du Conseil de l'Europe, 1991.

3   Jan Olsson, Joachim Aström, "Régionalisation et régionalisme en Suède", in Gérard Marcou, Hellmut Wollmann (dir.) *Réforme de la décentralisation, réforme de l'Etat. Régions et villes en Europe. Annuaire 2004 des collectivités locales,* Paris: CNRS Editions, 2004, p. 335.

4   Alberto Lucarelli, "Le régionalisme italien après les réformes constitutionnelles", in G. Marcou, Hellmut Wollmann, op.cit. p. 293.

centralisé, a connu un mouvement de décentralisation-déconcentration qui s'est concrétisé à la fois par un transfert des responsabilités de l'Etat vers les collectivités territoriales (communes, départements, régions) dans les années 80 et par une territorialisation des services de l'Etat, y compris dans le domaine très régalien de la culture. Ce processus a été complété par diverses lois dans les années 90 et par une accentuation de la décentralisation en 2004 au profit des départements et des régions[5]. Globalement, les obligations légales des collectivités territoriales françaises en matière culturelle restent limitées, mais elles investissent toutes dans la culture bien au-delà de leur champ de compétences formelles. C'est ainsi que des villes pionnières avaient impulsé des politiques culturelles plus ambitieuses dès les années 70, en s'appuyant sur le principe de libre administration qui les régit. Ce principe leur permet d'intervenir comme elles l'entendent dans le secteur culturel dès lors qu'elles n'empiètent pas sur des compétences obligatoires de l'Etat ou des autres collectivités territoriales, lesquelles bénéficient de la même prérogative. La Suède compte deux échelons infra-étatiques: les comtés et les communes. Si les 24 comtés exercent des compétences culturelles, les communes demeurent l'échelon privilégié du système administratif. En Slovénie, il n'y a pas de niveau intermédiaire entre l'Etat et les communes, qui se partagent les responsabilités culturelles. La Pologne, quant à elle, s'est engagée dans une réforme de la décentralisation dans les années 90. Dans ce pays, la régionalisation a été présentée comme «une condition préalable à l'accès aux fonds européens»[6], alors que le pays n'était pas encore membre de l'Union. De fait, comme pour d'autres pays européens, cette réforme «a été l'un des principaux leviers de transformation de la Pologne dans les années 90»,[7] même si les régions, dotées de compétences relatives à l'aménagement du territoire et au développement régional, demeurent un échelon faible par rapport aux communes.

S'interrogeant sur les conditions nécessaires pour que les régions jouent un rôle culturel fort, Mario d'Angelo et Paul Vesperini énumèrent trois conditions: «une autorité politique autonome et des prérogatives culturelles reconnues», «une autonomie et des marges de manœuvre financières», «une capacité stratégique d'organisation de sa sphère d'influence» dans le secteur culturel. De fait, même lorsque ces conditions sont réunies, les différences d'implication des régions dans la culture sont grandes.[8]

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5   La Loi sur les libertés et responsabilités locales d'août 2004 représente une étape modeste de décentralisation culturelle et fait l'objet de débats intenses sur ses conditions budgétaires.

6   Pawel Swianiewicz, "Un échelon faible promis à un rôle important: les régions polonaises", in G. Marcou, Hellmut Wollmann, op.cit. p. 307.

7   Ibid.p. 305.

8   Mario d'Angelo, Paul Vesperini, *Politiques culturelles en Europe. Régions et décentralisation culturelle,* Strasbourg: Éditions du Conseil de l'Europe, 2000, p. 53.

Outre la montée en puissance d'institutions régionales, l'autre aspect majeur de la décentralisation en Europe est constitué par le rôle prépondérant, et plus ancien, des communes dans la définition, la gestion et le financement des politiques culturelles. Bien entendu, les communes et leurs groupements coopèrent avec les autres échelons institutionnels de manière souvent étroite et sont impliquées de ce fait dans des programmes de financements conjoints avec d'autres partenaires publics.

Si l'on constate un mouvement général convergent à l'échelle du continent dans le sens d'une décentralisation-régionalisation, les manières d'y parvenir sont très variées d'un pays à l'autre et même d'un territoire ou d'une région à l'autre. Plus encore, il y a presque autant de modèles de décentralisation - culturelle - que de pays, d'où la difficulté d'établir une typologie de la décentralisation culturelle. Pour y voir plus clair, essayons d'opérer un certain nombre de distinctions. Tout d'abord en considérant les pays européens selon qu'ils relèvent d'un Etat unitaire ou bien d'un Etat fédéral. Les formes de décentralisation dans le cadre d'un Etat unitaire sont multiples: la Suède, la Finlande, la France ou l'Italie présentent des organisations politico-administratives différentes, un même échelon territorial n'assurant pas le même rôle ici et là, de même que la répartition des prérogatives entre les échelons publics s'avère dissemblable d'un pays à un autre. L'histoire culturelle du pays et celle des différents secteurs de l'art et de la culture, le jeu des acteurs administratifs et politiques sont des facteurs déterminants à cet égard.

Par exemple, les régions italiennes disposent de moyens relativement plus importants que leurs homologues françaises, mais ces dernières tendent à jouer un rôle croissant et de plus en plus structurant sur le plan culturel, même si celui-ci demeure encore - généralement - plutôt modeste par rapport à celui des communes. Cependant, les départements français jouent un rôle politique et culturel plus important que les *provincie* italiennes. Ce raisonnement peut également s'appliquer aux Etats fédéraux tels que l'Allemagne, l'Autriche, la Suisse ou la Belgique (qui relève de cette catégorie depuis sa Constitution de 1993). En outre, certains Etats sont difficilement classables à l'intérieur de ces deux grands modèles, à savoir unitaire ou fédéral. L'Espagne représenterait de ce point de vue le cas d'espèce d'un Etat unitaire à tendance fédéraliste, mais d'un fédéralisme à géométrie variable selon la *Comunidad aútonoma* considérée. A cet égard, la Catalogne incarne une «région» qui accentue progressivement sa dimension nationale. Elle investit d'ailleurs beaucoup dans la culture, ce qui correspond à une stratégie de renforcement de son identité et de son émancipation politique. D'autres régions européennes misent également sur la culture, non par référence à une identité historique qui n'existe pas, mais comme élément stratégique d'une identité en devenir, comme vecteur de rayonnement et d'attractivité du territoire pouvant épauler une politique d'image s'intégrant dans une stratégie plus globale de développement. Rhône-Alpes illustre ce positionnement.

Les autorités locales européennes jouent un rôle d'autant plus essentiel dans les politiques culturelles qu'elles disposent de capacités fiscales appropriées. Dans la plupart des pays européens, la question des ressources financières locales et régionales se pose avec acuité, la répartition des charges et des moyens entre Etat central et collectivités territoriales faisant l'objet d'âpres négociations. Certaines autorités locales ont même la faculté de lever l'impôt. Bon nombre d'entre elles se révèlent très actives dans la culture, s'engageant dans ce domaine bien au-delà, généralement, de leurs obligations formelles. Toutefois, la clé de répartition de l'investissement culturel des pouvoirs locaux et régionaux est variable d'un pays à l'autre. C'est sans doute au niveau des villes européennes que les comparaisons en matière de dépenses culturelles publiques feraient apparaître une - relative - homogénéité. Les grandes métropoles consacrent à la culture des fonds conséquents, se situant fréquemment dans une fourchette de 10 à 15% de leur budget. Certaines d'entre elles vont même au-delà, attribuant jusqu'à 20 % de leurs moyens aux affaires culturelles (Lyon, Bordeaux). Du côté des régions européennes, les variations entre elles sont très grandes dans la manière dont elles financent la culture. Ces différences peuvent être notamment corrélées à la nature des Etats – unitaire ou fédéral - dont procèdent les régions, ainsi qu'à l'histoire des processus de décentralisation culturelle dans chacun des pays. En Pologne, la réforme de la décentralisation de 1999 a conduit les autorités territoriales à accroître la part de leur financement pour la culture par rapport à l'Etat central. En 2004, le budget culturel de l'Etat représente 21,9% des crédits publics, les Voïvodies, 20%, les provinces, 27,6%, les communes 30,6%. En 2002 en Allemagne, les länder couvraient en moyenne 46,5% de l'ensemble des dépenses culturelles publiques, c'est-à-dire à peu près autant que les communes. Aux Pays-Bas (2003), les villes supportaient 62% des dépenses culturelles publiques, l'Etat 30%, le différentiel de 8% étant assumé par les provinces. En Italie et en France, l'Etat (tous ministères confondus) apporte environ 50 % des fonds culturels publics[9]. En France, les régions consacraient en 2004 de 1 à

9 *Compendium. Cultural policies and trends in Europe*, ERICarts, 7ème édition, 2006. Le compendium présente de manière synthétique l'organisation des politiques culturelles de 36 pays d'Europe. C'est l'outil le plus fiable concernant la dimension technique du sujet aujourd'hui. Cependant, les chiffres que nous rapprochons pour les besoins de notre analyse n'ont pas été collectés en même temps et selon les mêmes critères. C'est pourquoi il faut les utiliser avec beaucoup de prudence. On se référera aussi aux *Chiffres clés* publiés tous les ans par le Département des études, de la prospective et des statistiques du ministère de la Culture et de la Communication en France. La dernière enquête sur les dépenses culturelles des collectivités territoriales en France a été réalisée en 1996. Une nouvelle enquête devrait être publiée courant 2006. Par ailleurs, on peut signaler l'étude *Culture et régions* d'Europe. Ouvrage coordonné par Robert Palmer et dirigé par Christopher Gordon, octobre 2004. Ce livre présente des éléments d'étude sur les politiques culturelles en Europe. Réalisé à la demande de la région Nord-Pas-de-Calais par le réseau EFAH, il comporte encore un certain nombre d'approximations qui montrent à quel point le travail comparatif sur les politiques culturelles territoriales en Europe en est à ses balbutiements.

6% de leurs moyens en faveur de la culture[10]. Cependant, leur poids dans l'ensemble des dépenses culturelles publiques n'était que de 4% (contre 40% pour les communes et 25% pour le ministère de la Culture) en 1996, mais ces chiffres ne correspondent plus à la réalité actuelle. D'autre part, s'il est incontestable que cet engagement est inégal, il faut aussi l'analyser globalement car, sur un même territoire régional, communes, groupements de communes, départements et région consacrent des moyens, variables, à la culture qui se cumulent les uns aux autres. Dès lors pour que des comparaisons budgétaires aient un sens, il faudrait pouvoir observer, de manière territorialisée, des ratios tels que la dépense publique par tête d'habitant (cumulant l'ensemble des moyens affectés par les collectivités publiques sur un territoire donné) ou encore la dépense additionnant moyens publics et privés par tête d'habitant, incluant la dépense culturelle des ménages ainsi que les moyens investis dans la vie culturelle par le mécénat et d'autres financements privés. De tels ratios sont encore difficiles à établir avec la rigueur scientifique qui conviendrait, d'autant que les enquêtes sur les dépenses culturelles des collectivités territoriales en Europe ne sont pas harmonisées dans le temps et ne reposent pas sur une définition commune du «champ culturel». Les organismes statistiques nationaux, lorsqu'ils existent, proposent des données précieuses à ce sujet. En outre, de plus en plus d'organismes à vocation interrégionale ou plus strictement régionale, produisent ce genre de données, à l'instar du Budapest Observatory qui développe des programmes d'études territoriales de l'Europe orientale aux Balkans ou d'ARTECA en Lorraine (France), qui se définit comme un observatoire culturel régional.

Nous évoquons ici essentiellement les politiques publiques de la culture, mais il faudrait aussi préciser, dans une analyse plus complète, le rôle du financement privé ou mixte en faveur de la culture dans de nombreux pays européens, comme le confirme une étude européenne récente d'ERICarts : «Alors que l'intervention publique demeure un facteur clé de soutien aux artistes, ce n'est pas la seule source de soutien»[11]. Les fondations publiques, alimentées par les jeux de hasard, ou portées par des entreprises ou des mécènes privés tiennent une place importante dans certains pays (Pays-Bas, Grande-Bretagne, Allemagne, pays nordiques…). Par ailleurs, dans bien des pays issus du bloc soviétique, la séduction du modèle libéral a engendré des logiques de privatisation de nombreuses activités culturelles.

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10 Enquête APCVL citée par *Le Monde*, 23 février 2004.

11 *Creative Europe. On Governance and Management of Artistic Creativity in Europe*. An ERICarts Report, prepared by Danielle Chiche, Ritva Mitchell, Andreas Wiesand, in co-operation with Ilkka Heiskanen and Luca Dal Pozzolo, Bonn, ARCult Media, 2002, p. 77.

Associations et réseaux dans la dynamique de la décentralisation culturelle en Europe

La dynamique de la décentralisation culturelle en Europe passe par le développement des relations internationales entre collectivités territoriales et des échanges artistiques et culturels entre institutions et acteurs de terrain. Longtemps, les jumelages ont été la forme privilégiée par les villes pour coopérer sur le plan culturel.[12] Cette forme de partenariat perdure, mais elle s'est également beaucoup transformée avec le temps, délaissant une approche traditionnelle et folklorique de la culture pour une conception plus moderne et plus professionnalisée des échanges. De plus, les autres échelons publics que sont les régions sont désormais fréquemment engagés dans l'accompagnement direct et indirect d'échanges artistiques et culturels. Certaines régions ont développé un volet de coopération culturel pionnier, dans le cadre de programmes de coopération basés en premier lieu sur des convergences de développement. C'est le cas du Bade-Wurtemberg, de la Catalogne, de la Lombardie et de Rhône-Alpes, quadrige régional surnommé «les quatre moteurs» qui présente la particularité d'associer des régions non mitoyennes. Il faut bien constater que, dans le domaine culturel, les dynamiques d'échanges culturels entre ces régions n'ont pas été soutenues de manière continue depuis la signature de l'accord de coopération en 1988[13]. Relevons que leur partenariat culturel fait l'objet aujourd'hui d'une relance, à l'initiative du Conseil Régional Rhône-Alpes.

La coopération culturelle transfrontalière s'avère être une des modalités de développement des échanges artistiques et culturels très prisée à travers toute l'Europe. L'UE facilite ces échanges à travers les programmes d'initiative communautaire INTERREG qui contribuent à toutes sortes de projets en soutenant des festivals communs, des facilitations d'accès par le moyen de pass entre musées ou bibliothèques, des résidences croisées d'artistes, des aides à la mobilité des artistes. INTERREG participe aussi activement au développement d'un tourisme culturel qui s'organise généralement à partir des atouts patrimoniaux des régions partenaires. On dénombre aujourd'hui plus d'une centaine d'eurorégions. C'est ainsi que la Communauté française de Belgique, la Région Wallone, le Kent et le Nord - Pas-de-Calais sont associés au sein de la même eurorégion. Dans une autre aire européenne, on pourrait citer l'eurorégion adriatique qui comprend les régions

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12 Cf. Gérard Ignasse, Marc-Antoine Génissel, *Les collectivités territoriales françaises et les cultures européennes*, Paris, Ellipses, 1994. Michel David, Vincent Dubois, Guy Saez, *Les collectivités territoriales vers une politique de relations culturelles internationales?,* Grenoble: Observatoire des politiques culturelles, 1996.

13 Les politiques culturelles de ces régions ont fait l'objet d'une approche comparative approfondie dès 1994. Cf. Mireille Pongy, Guy Saez, *Politiques culturelles et régions en Europe*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994.

italiennes baignées par l'Adriatique ainsi que la Slovénie, la Croatie, la Bosnie, la Serbie-Monténégro, l'Albanie. Ces eurorégions développent des coopérations diverses, y compris culturelles. Il convient ici de rappeler que le statut des régions n'est pas équivalent en Europe et qu'il influe sur leur faculté à signer des accords de coopération ou sur la nature de tels accords.

Dans un esprit voisin, une plate-forme de coopération culturelle entre les pays de l'Europe centrale et orientale intitulée *Policies for culture* a été mise en place à partir de l'année 2000 à Bucarest. Soutenue par la Fondation Européenne de la culture d'Amsterdam et l'association ECUMEST, *Policies for culture* encourage l'élaboration et l'évaluation de politiques culturelles par la concertation, la recherche, l'information, la mise en réseau des acteurs, de la Slovaquie jusqu'à la Turquie, en passant par tous les pays des Balkans.

Ce qui est en jeu à travers la coopération culturelle interrégionale, c'est à la fois la construction d'aires de développement solidaires, le rapprochement stratégique de régions souvent liées par une histoire commune, qu'il convient de mieux assumer et de dépasser tout à la fois, la question du développement des réseaux à une échelle «humaine». A propos de la politique régionale communautaire, Anne-Marie Autissier pose sans détour une question essentielle: «La politique régionale communautaire renforce-t-elle la conscience d'appartenir à un même territoire européen? Compte tenu des moyens financiers et humains investis dans cette activité, on voudrait pouvoir le croire.»[14] La réserve, qui est ici exprimée à demi-mot, peut être aussi considérée comme un appel à mieux évaluer les actions entreprises…

Ouvrons ici une parenthèse à propos du programme-phare de la Commission européenne pour la culture en posant une question basique. Le programme Culture 2000, principal dispositif de soutien aux activités artistiques et culturelles en Europe, favorise-t-il le développement des politiques culturelles territoriales en Europe? Une réponse négative s'impose pour deux raisons. La première est que, de fait, ce n'est pas exactement son objet. La seconde raison tient au fait que les moyens affectés à ce programme demeurent de toute façon très limités à l'échelle du continent. Culture 2000 cible essentiellement des projets portés par des institutions, des ONG ou des collectivités territoriales, mais n'est pas destiné à des politiques de fond. Une nouvelle mouture de ce dispositif est en préparation pour la période 2007-2013. Malgré la promesse d'une simplification des procédures de concours et une certaine augmentation des moyens correspondants, il est clair que l'Europe ne semble toujours pas avoir décidé de faire de la culture un point fort de son action. Dans un

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14 Anne-Marie Autissier, *L'Europe de la culture. Histoire(s) et enjeux*, Paris: Babel - Maison des cultures du monde, 2005, p. 353. L'ouvrage d'A.-M. Autissier constitue la meilleure somme dont on puisse disposer aujourd'hui sur les différentes dimensions de la question culturelle en Europe.

autre ordre d'idées, l'Europe accorde son label, assorti d'un certain soutien, aux «capitales culturelles de la culture». Nécessairement rares, les villes élues utilisent diversement cet outil, soit pour financer un projet prestigieux (Avignon en 2000), soit pour donner un véritable élan à une politique globale de développement (Glasgow 1990). Parfois attribué à de grandes capitales comme Paris, le label devient illisible. Il peut aussi avoir un effet d'entraînement symbolique très intense (Lisbonne 1994, Lille 2004). Mais les lendemains de fête sont aussi difficiles à gérer, lorsque la ville doit prendre le relais de projets engagés dans la dynamique de sa désignation comme capitale culturelle, d'où la nécessité de programmer «l'après» de ce type de manifestation, avant même d'avoir engagé un projet par définition ponctuel…

La décentralisation et la régionalisation en Europe sont relayées politiquement par tout un ensemble d'associations et de réseaux représentant les collectivités territoriales et développant diverses stratégies d'influence vis-à-vis des politiques européennes. Parmi ces organisations, on peut citer parmi les plus importantes, le Conseil des communes et régions d'Europe, l'Association des Régions d'Europe, la Conférence des régions périphériques maritimes d'Europe, l'Association des régions transfrontalières d'Europe, ainsi que des réseaux tels qu'Eurocités (villes de plus de 250 000 habitants). Le Conseil des Communes et Régions d'Europe, association créée dès 1951, fédère 46 associations nationales de 33 pays européens. Le CCRE milite à la fois pour l'autonomie des pouvoirs territoriaux, pour la prise en compte de l'esprit européen au niveau local et pour le dialogue et la coopération décentralisée. Dans cette perspective, il soutient notamment le développement des jumelages.

Parmi les réseaux de collectivités territoriales actifs en matière culturelle, la Conférence des villes de l'Arc Atlantique, qui rassemble grandes villes et villes moyennes de l'ouest européen, se distingue par un programme de réflexion culturelle comparative et de coopération, qui s'enrichit régulièrement depuis le début des années 2000[15]. De son côté, Eurocités a engagé, de 2003 à 2005, un chantier de coopération destiné à comparer les politiques culturelles de 19 villes partenaires. Au-delà de ces résultats factuels, ce travail a pour objectif de valoriser le rôle culturel des villes et leur place centrale dans l'espace public européen[16]. Il existe également d'autres réseaux, plus informels qui participent à la structuration de la vie artistique et culturelle en Europe. C'est le cas de l'Association des Villes et Régions de la Grande

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15 Cf. Notamment *Les résidences d'artistes en Europe. Lieux privilégiés d'échanges et de création ?* / Artists residencies in Europe. Privileged venues of exchanges and creation? édition bilingue français-anglais, Actes du colloque de Rennes, 2005.

16 Trois ouvrages rendent compte des travaux d'Eurocités sur la gouvernance culturelle métropolitaine en Europe : *Eurocult 21. Integrated Report, Eurocult Stories,* et *Eurocult 21 Compendium. Urban cultural policy profiles*, disponibles en téléchargement sur le site www.eurocult21.org. Cf. Aussi Guy Saez, "La "gouvernance culturelle" des villes dans l'espace politique européen", in L'observatoire n°28, Été 2005.

Europe pour la Culture, *Les Rencontres*, qui regroupe des élus de collectivités territoriales de pays membres et non membres de l'Union Européenne[17]. C'est aussi le cas de réseaux tels qu'EFAH-FEAP, réseau européen pour les arts et le patrimoine, IETM, réseau européen informel de théâtres, d'ENCATC, réseau européen de centres de formation d'administrateurs culturels, de Banlieues d'Europe, réseau d'acteurs artistiques et culturels impliqués dans la lutte contre les exclusions dans les villes d'Europe. Ces quatre derniers réseaux, apparus entre la fin des années 80 et le début des années 90, fédèrent de nombreux professionnels de toute l'Europe et jouent, parmi d'autres, un rôle essentiel en faveur du développement des échanges culturels, de la mobilité et de l'intégration des professionnels dans le jeu européen. Malgré leur contribution politique et culturelle à l'Europe, ils demeurent des structures fragiles dans la mesure où la Commission Européenne n'a pas encore défini une politique cohérente et lisible à l'égard de ces réseaux. Il est vrai qu'ils sont nombreux et couvrent tant des problématiques généralistes que des disciplines artistiques et culturelles, des lieux, des corporations professionnelles…

Éléments de conclusion

Les notions d'autonomie locale et d'autonomie régionale sont aujourd'hui au premier plan de l'actualité politique et institutionnelle en Europe. Depuis la chute du mur de Berlin, les pays d'Europe engagés dans une phase de transition économique ou démocratique cherchent pour la plupart les voies d'une décentralisation adaptée à leur contexte. Certains privilégient plutôt le désengorgement de l'Etat central par sa déconcentration au niveau territorial. Cette seule problématique de la déconcentration, notamment dans le domaine culturel, représente déjà un premier pas vers une sorte de révolution institutionnelle pour certains de ces pays.

On a souligné que la décentralisation culturelle était porteuse de multiples enjeux. Redisons qu'au-delà de sa dimension strictement institutionnelle et des bénéfices de rationalisation de l'action publique qu'elle vise à apporter, elle peut favoriser une meilleure prise en considération de la démocratie culturelle, dans la mesure où elle tente de rapprocher le pouvoir des citoyens. Elle constitue un cadre de référence à partir duquel on peut penser et agir sur le développement local: partout en Europe, la culture est de plus en plus considérée comme un facteur d'attractivité, de rayonnement, de valorisation symbolique et économique, de créativité territoriale. En même temps, si les collectivités territoriales sont mieux placées pour accompagner une certaine diversité culturelle à leur échelle, elles ne sont pas les mieux armées pour s'opposer aux logiques de globalisation culturelle. Pour ce faire, elles ont besoin du relais des Etats et des instances internationales qui travaillent à la défense de la

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17 Cf. *Livre vert des politiques culturelles des collectivités territoriales en Europe*, édité par Les Rencontres, 2004.

diversité culturelle, à l'instar de l'UNESCO, dont la Convention pour la protection de la diversité culturelle, adoptée en octobre 2005, représente une avancée décisive mais qui attend maintenant d'être confirmée par une ratification. Quoiqu'il en soit, la vigilance devra continuer d'être de mise par rapport à la marchandisation croissante des activités culturelles, sans compter les bouleversements de notre rapport à la culture induit par les technologies de l'information et de la communication, la numérisation et les nouveaux problèmes de droits d'auteur et de droits industriels qu'elles soulèvent. Les politiques culturelles, qui incarnent une idée finalement neuve et fragile, ont aussi à se situer par rapport à ces évolutions.

Vers quelle Europe décentralisée allons-nous aujourd'hui ? Dans le domaine culturel, trois Europes semblent se dessiner: une Europe des villes, une Europe des régions, une Europe des réseaux artistiques et culturels. Sur le plan institutionnel, l'Europe des villes pèsent d'un poids prééminent, à la fois par la densité des politiques culturelles qu'elles portent, mais aussi par leur engagement dans des coopérations internationales où leurs atouts artistiques et culturels sont de plus en plus sollicités. Mais l'Europe des Régions, qui a relevé de grands défis politiques et économiques, regarde de plus près l'enjeu que représente la culture, dans une perspective voisine de celle des villes, mais à une échelle territoriale plus vaste. Quant aux réseaux artistiques et culturels professionnels, ils sont des relais incomparables des évolutions artistiques et culturelles, économiques et politiques, qui traversent les sociétés européennes à l'heure de la mondialisation. Ils témoignent de l'ouverture des Etats européens à des dynamiques de partenariats décentralisés. Plus généralement, les artistes ou les opérateurs culturels, qui voyagent et font voyager leurs projets, qui s'accueillent mutuellement, pensent et vivent spontanément dans le dialogue, dans l'échange interculturel, dans des relations transterritoriales. Il faut, en même temps, s'interroger sur les réseaux associatifs, moins reconnus que les institutions artistiques et culturelles professionnelles, mais qui souvent, inventent les nouvelles formes d'action propres à créer de vraies solidarités dans les espaces urbains ou ruraux marginalisés par la logique économique. Tous ces acteurs, soutenus dans leurs démarches par la logique de la décentralisation, font plus que bâtir une Europe de la culture: ils construisent les fondements de l'Europe de demain, celle qui ne saurait se contenter de ne reposer que sur une identité économique. Car l'Europe a besoin de toutes les formes de créativité pour devenir un dessein citoyen, c'est-à-dire partagé et assumé par le plus grand nombre.

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Of Cultural Decentralization in Southeastern Europe
Do We Ever Change and Do We Wish to Change at All?

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About the non-existence of a passing on of good practices and institutional formats

Danilo Kiš devoted his entire life to literary publishings of seemingly unimportant details. This act in itself gives them a character of unique and unparalleled artefacts. Nothing is as fictional as life itself, to which meticulous stock-taking of the factual does not give a meaning but it irrevocably confirms life's existence, while the complex process of artistic moulding brings about the transfer of the symbolic foundation of the world which through it (and through it alone) becomes part of collective thinking and collective memory. The particular opus of this writer is obsessively devoted to disintegration and evanescence, to the transience of man and his world, in which he is not unprecedented in modern-day European literature, especially not in that of the last century, but he is unmatched in his observation of the loss, as the most real and terrifying part of every single and collective duration. The non-existence of the art of inheritance does not imply, as this author teaches us, the draping of all those passed and expired lives and the worlds they have outlined and painted with a veil of oblivion.[1]

The question which Kiš puts before us with his opus is certainly fateful for Southeastern Europe as a geographic space, a region, not primarily because it marks a certain "state of spirit" but rather because it withstands time as a sort of admonishing pendulum. It may be paraphrased as follows: Does a structure of memory exist in this region which would make possible the inheritance of the best experiences? What do we even regard as experiences, traditions and verified practices which we would consider to be individually or collectively worth passing on? And this is not simply about accumulations of the past, as Kiš states. As much as we may bury it, the past

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1 For details see: Danilo Kiš (1983) *Enciklopedija mrtvih* (*Encyclopaedia of the Dead*), Zagreb: Globus, Beograd: Prosveta.

surfaces at every step: in the forms and ornaments of the façades (and even more so in the names of construction companies chiselled into them, usually names of families whose descendants no longer exist, saved timidly in a couple of square decimetres), in old occasional greeting cards which at times speak of entire quarters which have disappeared, and by some miracle saved old decorative boxes used for keeping biscuits, matches or sweets in which later just caught insects could be placed before being prepared (as in the case of the Entomology Museum established in the city of Varaždin, whose boxes are just as valuable exhibits as the insects themselves).

From the multitude of such examples of a ubiquitous but often amputated or falsified past, which does not represent merely a decorative framework of our strained lives and durations but an earlier saved or kept imaginarium of our futile efforts, the question arises: are we truly capable of choosing and initiating that sort and character of change that not only suits ourselves best but that is also deeply rooted in the developmental, social and cultural accomplishments and achievements of a given area. Kiš has devoted practically his entire opus to the Pannonian meeting grounds and the Central and Southeast European intertwinings, at the centre of which he placed Vojvodina as the essential space of an excess of spirit, contact and memory, but also as the space of terrifying deaths, madness, migrations and irreversible disappearance. Thus this space marks a special entity whose meaning we cannot read from or cover by the names of provinces, regions or autonomous districts. A few rare authors will warn and remind us of the fact that for over one hundred and fifty years in Southeastern Europe we have not been able to create, establish, maintain and pass on any *territorial and developmental formats* of political, social and cultural life whose lifespan would be greater than that of at least a forty-year old, not to mention a full human lifetime. Paradoxically, it may hence be said of the entire region of Southeastern Europe that by constantly changing it essentially always remains the same (as the various stagings of one and the same theatre with scenographies ranging from utmost bloody to operatically entertaining). For a true change requires the passing on of certain attainments to serve as a solid basis for self-recognition and collectively established values which are subject to verification through expansion and transformation but not through decomposition and destruction.

If we focus on the question of cultural decentralization in the above manner, it will become clear why we have no positive experiences in this entire region, and why it is exactly this area which is most problematic, most painful, most neglected and repressed in all cultural policies of the states in the region. The question of decentralization is seen as an area of threat and disintegration, of politically dysfunctional options with hidden or clearly displayed most undesirable political outcomes. It should be noted that all states advocate this tacit statement equally,

regardless of the degree of their actual political development, social welfare and economic prosperity, ethnical and cultural diversity or the degree of involvement of international organizations in the pacification of the states themselves or the entire region.[2] Finally, this is a phantom which is continuously present among us, hovering above our heads. And it is well-known that this phantom ought to come out of the dark, since it probably cannot stay there forever. But precisely this is the reason we surrender lightly to all sorts of political, social, administrative and media ploys (which naturally are officially called "transitional measures") in order to gain time and to silence and drive the demon of decentralization away at least briefly.

The Croatian decentralization failure: decentralization on paper – an approach based on a strategic model

If we take a closer look at Croatia, we also arrive at a paradoxical conclusion: this is a post-transitional country which finds itself only at the beginning of true and broad acts of reconstruction. Only these operations will, however, bring it closer to dominant European development models. The issue of decentralization is, not without reason, the first on the list of questions indicating whether the process of functional reconstruction (as the third modernization) running in the right way and in the desired direction. We are talking about a country which is even considered to be taking the lead in all relevant parameters of integrational change (be it in comparison to countries such as Bulgaria and Romania), while at the same time lacking any advancements towards decentralization processes, not only in the nineties but also after the year 2000, which is considered to be a turning point directing the country towards true reform. The failure is even more serious as since that time the country has drafted a strategic document of its cultural development, with a special emphasis on decentralized operation[3], and as in the meantime a special decentralization model has been developed in the field of culture which was intended to gradually transfer various forms of cultural powers from the central to "regional" (county) and local (municipal and district) authorities and administration.[4] As the relevance of this model remains virtually unchanged until present-day, and it has not been implemented either in its entirety or in part, it is necessary to present it once more at least as principle, because essentially in large parts it not only addresses the problems but also offers possible answers to most countries of the region.

The basic problem of the Croatian cultural development lies in the dysfunctional middle and local level of public administration in the field of culture. In this sense,

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2 Details in: Vjeran Katunarić. "New public culture as an objective of the decentralization process". In: *The arts, politics and change. Participative policy-making in SouthEast Europe* (Hanneloes Weeda, Corina Suteu and Cas Smithuijsen, eds.) (2005) European Cultural Foundation; ECUMEST Association; Boekmanstudies, Amsterdam.

only the Ministry of Culture and larger Croatian cities are capable of defining and implementing effective measures of cultural development, while this does not hold true of most counties, towns and, above all, municipalities. At the same time, in Croatia no middle administrative level exists which would correspond to the European term of a region with an autonomous and identifiable cultural policy. It is precisely for this reason that the establishment of a regional polycentric cultural development is proposed as the essential priority of the overall cultural policy as well as the new organization of the public administration. In line with this, a broadening of the authority of this level and a reduction of the number of local units of public administration is proposed. The fundamental objective is to decentralize cultural policy politically and technically in multiple dimensions (finances, infrastructure, decision-making, cultural creation and cultural life), based on a polycentric development which is to arise from the historic cultural regions of Croatia (according to the model, these should count at least five and no more than ten).

As stated above, the decentralization process would have a political and a technical aspect. The political decentralization should shift the concentration of power in the field of culture from the middle level primarily to the regional level. Through a better coordination of municipalities, towns and mid-sized cities on a regional level, these cultural entities should be given a much more significant and dynamic role than they have today. The technical decentralization would gradually alleviate the pronounced imbalance in cultural development and life country-wide but also within the future regions, especially where cultural programmes and cultural infrastructure are concerned, as well as the protection of cultural heritage. It is expected that over a shorter period of time this entire process should lead to the advancement of cultural life and cultural creation, and to a higher level and quality of cultural heritage protection.

This is why the decentralization process should be carried out under two preconditions. Firstly, the transfer of powers from the national to the sub-national level may not lead to a lowering of cultural standards and needs. And secondly, the rights and obligations of the cultural policy carriers on the sub-national levels, especially the regional and municipal one, need to be clearly and unambiguously legally defined, including the obligation of defining a cultural policy and the necessary amount of budgetary spending for culture. In addition to securing the necessary financial resources, the technological and infrastructural bases as well as

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3   Sanjin Dragojević. "Decentralization". In: *Croatia in the 21st century. Strategy of Cultural Development* (Biserka Cvjetičanin and Vjeran Katunarić, eds.) (2001) Ministry of Culture, Zagreb.

4   Sanjin Dragojević; Vjeran Katunarić; Jadran Antolović (2003) *Culture. Decentralization of public administration in the Republic of Croatia* (Inge Perko, Project Manager). Open Society Institute, Zagreb.

the human resources are prerequisites for the success and sustainability of the decentralization measures.

Polycentric regional cultural development implies regions which will not consist of one sole centre at which all key administrative and cultural functions will concentrate, but rather their distribution over several centres, relying on the excellence of knowledge and the sufficiency of resources. It also implies a priority development of those areas which substantially lag behind in attaining the drawn-up cultural objectives and standards (the interventionist right of the Ministry of Culture and the regions).

Model basics

The powers of defining development priorities and goals, as well as cultural standards and cultural policy profiles should remain at the national level, while the powers of cultural planning and implementation of key priorities and goals determined at the medium level should be transferred to and concentrated at the regional level.

At the same time the regional level needs to be given the obligation of defining an autonomous long-term cultural policy, while the central level would receive the right of intervention and sanction should any proposed regulations and proposals threaten the fulfilment of its priorities and goals or should professional standards and standards of cultural creation, life and heritage protection defined as obligatory country-wide be lowered. The national level would also keep precedence in determining inalienable cultural goods and solving key issues of cultural development (especially in areas which are lagging behind in this sense).

The central national administration, professional bodies and cultural councils could intervene in regional and local development where needed, while regions could intervene in the intraregional development. Such interventions should take place as rarely as possible, only in cases of conflicts of interest which cannot be solved on the subnational levels. In order to avoid a strictly pyramidal administrative system, permanent and mandatory horizontal coordination needs to be established between the municipalities and the cities, and between the regions (the future expanded counties) and the central level, especially where planning and financing are concerned, which can have a strategic character only in this way.

In a transition country like Croatia, the process of decentralization needs to fulfil four conditions diagnosed as crucial for the establishment and development of a cultural system of long-term stability. Decentralization, hence, needs to be: 1. sustainable, 2. coordinated, 3. intersectorial, and 4. stimulative.

The first condition, the sustainability of decentralization, was clearly highlighted at the beginning of this text, and it implicitly includes such a range of measures which will not threaten the already attained level of cultural life and cultural creation nor the state of cultural infrastructure and heritage, but will secure a new long-term development period which will primarily improve cultural communication, while at the same time raising the inner efficiency in the field of culture, strategically directing the resources and developing the resource basis (human, financial, information, and organization resources).

The entire process also needs to be permanently coordinated, i.e. agreed in advance and accepted broadly, which represents the basis of procedural clarity and synchronized operation on all three levels of cultural policy, as well as the basis of operations with transformational impact on all cultural activities (literature and publishing, visual arts, music, performing arts, film, etc.).

Only the intersectorial approach will guarantee the successful attainment of the assigned goals. It insists on "couplings of interest" which overcome the barriers within the cultural activities themselves (especially where so called publicly financed or institutionalized culture is concerned) but also those between the field of culture and everyday as well as work life (especially where education, science, tourism, transport and communication, entrepreneurship, etc. are concerned).

Finally, the decentralization measures have to be stimulative, which means they should be equally acceptable to the public sector and to the non-profit and the private sector. Creating the preconditions for their basic equality leads to clearer competitive relations within the field of culture, to stronger profiled criteria and standards, and to the distinction of quality and excellence which is of key importance in this field.

The decentralization model proposes the implementation of four dimensions of decentralization: 1. decentralization of decision-making, 2. decentralization of financing, 3. decentralization of the infrastructure, and 4. decentralization of cultural life.

Finally, it is proposed that, with a view to the future territorial organization of the country, Croatia could be defined in legal terms as a country of cultural-historic regions of significantly broader borders, differing both from today's counties and from a merely mechanical sum of several of them (except possibly for Istria and Međimurje), which would lead to markedly different cultural dynamics within the country as well as to a balanced development over its entire territory.

The reasons for the failure and what to do next

Even though both the professionals and the general public in Croatia agree that the two mentioned documents[5] are of an exceptional, not only projective, character, and that they are well-grounded in the profession, they have so far remained unimplemented. Politically speaking, we might say that the level of risk was, and still is, considered to be too high to undertake this "risky step". Croatia is hence a characteristic case in the region: in spite of the comprehensive research and analytical effort invested in defining the basic long-term guidelines for cultural decentralization and an almost unanimous public support, the situation has not changed significantly since the end of the nineties, at which time it was established that such a change was necessary and should be undertaken without delay.

Yet, as research into the correlation of micro- and macro-identities shows using the example of the inhabitants of Zagreb originating from Selca on the island of Brač (a small village in central Dalmatia), the local micro-identity (i.e., the affiliation with Selca) perseveres unremittingly even in the third generation. Here these identities are not contradicting but rather complementing each other, and for most respondents both represent a very valuable personal enrichment of experience and life. It is also interesting that the study shows a lack of any organized and coordinated cooperation between Zagreb and Selca in either direction, so that the above-average level of education of these inhabitants of Zagreb contributes very little or nothing at all to the social and economic development of Selca, while small-scale cooperation is realized only in the field of culture.[6]

This example teaches us that without an overall strategy of decentralization, especially in the field of culture (which is also being applied and systematically implemented), we cannot expect any significant transfer of "cultural capital" from larger and more developed areas to the smaller and less developed ones. It is, in fact, just the deficiency in human resources which proves to be the main barrier for the emergence of any systematic and noticeable regional and local development (especially in the case of counties, smaller towns and villages). In this sense, not only in Croatia but throughout South Eastern Europe, the process of decentralization, or rather its non-existence, represents a permanent systematic barrier to accelerated social development and the overall stabilization and reconstruction of society. The integration processes which represent the key development framework to most of them, will undoubtedly bring this issue to the fore. In Croatia, in this sense, the main

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5   See footnotes 3 and 4.

6   For details see: Štambuk, Maja. "Two Hometowns: Zagreb citizens originating from Selca". In: *Living in Zagreb. Contribution to a sociologic analysis* (Anka Mišetić, Maja Štambuk, Ivan Rogić, eds.) (2004) Zagreb: Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences.

attention is focused on the transformation of the entire judiciary system and on the raising of the capacities and the professional level of public administration and self-government, especially on the local level and in small-town areas. Should the country wait for the decentralization to be initiated from the outside, this will certainly become a long and inefficient process which will be perceived in public as yet another coercion from the international community. Hence, the professional and the general public's continuous questioning of the process of decentralization, its projectional goals, methods and course of implementation is of paramount importance.

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Development and Change, and the Role of the State: The Case of Iran

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Introduction

During the last few decades, the economic and social situation of most Third World countries (TWCs) has not significantly changed and, consequently, their quality of life has not really improved. Development projects (designed and implemented either by internal or external experts, or with the cooperation of both) have mainly concentrated on economic aspects, while social, administrative and cultural factors have been, to a great extent, ignored. Even so, in most cases the economic need, priorities, possibilities and limitations of TWCs have been very often disregarded. Economic and political development theorists are convinced that the development of the world economy has been instrumental in creating striking economic inequalities that currently divide North from South.

As the gap between developed and underdeveloped nations grows wider, these theorists wonder whether it will ever be closed, yet the fundamental point is that the quality of life in TWCs must be improved. Even if self-interest is to be our only guide, we should pay very close attention to what is happening in the TWCs. In social reality, all achievement of economic growth in one country depends increasingly on the performance of others. (Najafbagy, 1990)

Cultural preconditions for development

Most theorists of both modernization and revolution had previously assumed the replacement of tradition by modernity as development progress. In such a preconceived theory of development, tradition has no function to perform; it is, in fact, considered as an obstacle to modernization. However, from the perspective of the late twentieth century, it is clear that revolution has not completely destroyed

tradition, as amply evident in post-Communist societies, nor has modernization entirely replaced tradition, as richly evident in the newly industrializing countries. In fact, in the later cases, tradition has been an invisible maid-servant of industrial revolution. (Norbu, 2005)

For decades, development economists and foreign aid officials acted as though growth came from government. Indeed, some believed that promoting development was government's most important role in society. Thus, poor countries were to undertake government intervention in economic programmes, and rich ones were to offer foreign aid plans. (Bandow, 1997) In reality, the result of this has been unsatisfactory and in most cases failure, to the extent that many developing states have actually been growing poorer. Development and growth will come only when governments realize that their proper role is to stay out of the way, to stop impeding the development that would naturally occur but for state intervention.

One should keep in mind that understanding a particular culture requires a correct comprehension of its underlying ideas and intelligent appreciation of its aesthetic forms. It is, however, the values of a culture that contain its essence and offer the best way to understand it and participate in it. Hall says that "the real job is not to understand foreign culture but to understand our own" (1965: 39). We are the problem. We have not done a competent or convincing job in contributing to development projects that help the people in TWCs.

What causes development failure and success?

The West's dramatic escape from poverty has always been a good place to start in attempting to understand development. The rapid economic and social progress in Europe, during which people first rose out of the dismal poverty that characterized most of human history, was largely due to a specific kind of regime - classical liberalism. The resulting systems generally allowed markets to operate, respected the rule of law, protected private property, and permitted competition. Historian Ralph Raico explains that the European miracle developed because of greater market autonomy, which was possible only through the inhibition of the predictor-state. Obviously, individual national experiences varied, but the grand sweep of history presents powerful evidence that the West's development was not accidental. Rationalization has been a sound base for development in the West, while in many TWCs emotionality has played a major role in development and change.

The development crises faced by the TWCs have proved that Western development and modernization theories that held that Westernization, development and change, and the suppression of traditional cultures would promote the development of TWCs have been no more that wishful thinking. A challenge is thus

posed to the concept of a Western-oriented world culture; i.e., cultural domination. Due to a number of economic, social, cultural and political events beginning in the late 1970s in a number of TWCs such as Iran, Pakistan, Nicaragua, and later the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil and Chile, there has been a shift in ideas among development economists and planners.

In reality, there is still a Western bias against tradition: if traditional cultures do not cope with Western modernity and development, then traditional culture is seen as incompatible. But one should remember that tradition played an important and stimulating role in the modernization of Western Europe and the United States. TWCs are not dominated by unchanging traditions, customs, values and beliefs. On the contrary, they are highly flexible. As Singer (1971) points out, it is possible to examine adjustments and adaptive strategies to innovations only over a longer term.

Most development projects and technical assistance provided to TWCs do not take administrative, cultural and social factors into consideration. Kottak (1986) believes that many projects' incompatibilities have arisen from inadequate attention to, and consequent lack of or fit with, existing socio-cultural conditions. We can learn a lot from past experiences such as the case of failed technical assistance to Iran. In 1980 a seminar was organized by a number of American academics and advisers who tried for years to introduce reform to Iran. Their lack of understanding of society, culture, administration, politics and the history of external agents not only led to the failure of their reform, but it created extra problems and pessimism among the people of the host country. An explanation for this failure follows:

> *"Nearly all advisers in the public administration program arrived in Iran with no knowledge of the language and with a superficial knowledge of Iranian culture, its history, and its social, economic, and political systems.*
>
> *To attune an American to the internal politics of a strange country requires radical shifting of his habits and attitudes….*
>
> *Although one must be cautious about generalizing from a single case, or a few cases, there is strong suggestion from the Iranian case and others that we do not know how to help developing nations reform their administrative structures."*
> (Seitz, 1980: 409-11)

The above conclusion indicates two very important points: first, the academic ethics and honesty of American advisers who were involved in the reform of the administration system of Iran, to set up such a seminar, to study their approach and to confess their mistakes, which could significantly contribute to application of organizational and management research methods, particularly as an external change agent. Secondly, it shows that the government of Iran relied heavily on the role and ability of foreign experts in improving Iran's administrative and management

systems. In fact, the role of external change agent should be very closely monitored, and coordinated with cooperation of officials and experts of the host countries.

Doug Bandow, reviewing *History of Development Theory*, has given a clear picture as to how extensive state economic intervention has long existed around the world, including in the West, for political as well as philosophical reasons. Such policies have been especially evident throughout the twentieth century. In particular, the vast majority of the TWCs followed the socialist path as de-colonization proceeded after World War II. Their decision was in part nationalistic; many new countries believed that true independence required indigenous control of economic resources. But there was also a genuine belief that the government should guide the development process. As Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah said: only a socialist form of society can assure Ghana a rapid rate of economic progress without destroying that social justice, that freedom and equality, which are a central feature of our traditional way of life. (Bandow, 1997)

The "government as prime mover" in development was reinforced by the realization in the late 1950s that insufficient entrepreneurship was leading to serious absorptive capacity constraints in the provision of foreign aid and the undertaking of government-sponsored investment projects. Adelman argues that there were simply not enough potential industrialists willing and able to undertake industrial projects. This argument might be true, but I believe that governments in many TWCs, for different reasons, prefer to intervene in public affairs as much as possible. (Adelman, 1999: 2)

Lessons for developing nations

What was applied in Europe, the United States, Japan and other developed countries is also true of today's successful developing countries. Bandow cited that perhaps the best broad-based study of economic policies over the last two decades is *Economic Freedom of the World: 1975-1995*, by economists James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Walter Block. They created an index of 17 component parts to measure economic freedom, as well as three alternative summary indexes. Ranked highest were Hong Kong, Singapore, the United States, and New Zealand. At the bottom came numerous Latin American and African countries. Most improved between 1975 and 1990 were Chile, Iceland, Jamaica, Malaysia, and Pakistan (Bandow, 1997). Development in all these countries was affected by the degree of government intervention in public affairs and the tendency towards privatization and outsourcing. Bryan Johnson and Thomas Sheehy believe that economic freedom is the single most important factor in creating the conditions for development and change, economic growth and prosperity (ibid.).

Development and change, the state's role in Iran

In this article, we want to concentrate on the administrative system in Iran, and the role of the state in privatization and separation of the government's authoritative duties from its executive responsibilities. Some 25 years have elapsed since the first law on expansion of transfer of production units to the private sector in the country. However, there has not been much improvement in this effort due to various mainly legal problems as well as lack of experience and absence of a custodian agency. One of the achievements of the privatization plan during the third plan (1999) has been the transfer of shares worth over 648 billion Rial (US $ 72 billion) from 180 manufacturing units to 359,270 workers from 300 workplaces.

The history of privatization in Iran in general dates back to the law in 1975 pertaining to the expansion of the transfer of manufacturing units. The above law provided that up to 99% of the government's ownership in non-basic industries, as well as 49% of the stocks of the private sector be transferred to the blue-collar workers as well as other segments of the population. Sub-article 32 of the First Development Plan in 1369 (1989) after the Islamic Revolution of Iran was the first legal fulcrum for adopting privatization policies in the country. The main idea behind this decision was the separation of the government's authoritative duties from its executive responsibilities.

When the idea of privatization was first initiated in Iran, the absence of an organization in charge of the issue, a lack of legal basis and also the necessary resolve and experience of transferring organizations are elements that prevented the expansion of privatization within a statistical scope. 6100 billion Rial in revenues from the sale of government-owned stocks in the above years must, for the most part, be attributed to the Ministry of Industry.

In Iran, for decades there have been many attempts to change the management of the public sector, but so far there has been no success. In this context, before the Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979, bureaucracy was the most complicated and hindering factor for handling government tasks in the country, but unfortunately, after the Revolution, more organizations than ever became governmental. This has tremendously increased government involvement in planning and controlling the public sector which has seriously hindered successful change and the eradication of the traditional and bureaucratic model of public administration in Iran. At present, the government is directly involved in many activities which could be carried out by the private sector. It has become a direct provider of goods and services through bureaucracy. Unfortunately, the role of the state in Iran in planning, organizing and implementing public affairs has immensely increased, and at present, it has become a complex issue, hard to be easily solved.

On the other hand, there has been a transformation in the management of the public sectors of many advanced countries. The traditional model of public administration, which predominated for most of the twentieth century, has changed since the mid-1980s to a flexible, market-based form of public management. This is not simply a matter of reform or major change in management style, but a change in the role of government in society and the relationship between government and citizenry. Traditional public administration has been discredited theoretically and practically, and the adoption of new forms of public management means the emergence of a new paradigm in the public sector. (Hughes, 2003: 1)

By the beginning of the 1990s, the new model of public sector management was in the process of development in most advanced countries, followed by many developing countries (Politt, 1990). The new model has several incarnations, including: "managerialism", "new public management", and "market-based public administration or entrepreneurial government" (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). But regarding this trend in the new model of management of public sectors, in my country, Iran, there has been quite the opposite process, and the role of the state in dealing with public affairs has been much wider and more bureaucratic than ever. In practice, the government takes care of most public services.

The main question facing the government of Iran is how to get rid of all these governmental affairs and how to privatize and outsource present governmental services. The other serious problem which the government faces is the shortage of private organizations in the country who could take part in the process of privatization and accepting outsourcing. One should not forget that economic investment by entrepreneurs requires political, social and in some cases economic support from the state, otherwise investors prefer to invest in areas which face the minimum risk to capital return. In Iran, presently, investors prefer to invest in activities such as construction buildings which is short-term investment, rather than in industrial production and employment.

Conclusion

The social, economic situation and quality of life of most TWCs has not significantly changed. Economic and political development theorists are convinced that the development of the world economy has been instrumental in creating striking economic inequalities. No doubt cultural preconditions (in their widest context) for development and change are essential. The case of the failed administrative reform in Iran could be a good lesson for successful development and change plans. In the development and change process, change agents could play the most crucial role, and governments, particularly in TWCs, can monitor, control and guide change plans instead of intervention. In developing nations, governments tend to intervene and act

as provider of all public services and affairs, ignoring the need for job creation and support for privatization and outsourcing. In practice, in a country like Iran, government responsibilities have expanded enormously to the extent that it will take years of hard, logical and rational work to reduce the degree of government intervention in public affairs.

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New Actors and Cultural Policies
New Public Policies/Cultural Policies: Developing Partnerships
with Civil Society and the Private Sector. Mobility

Cultural Policy Beyond and Below the Nation State:
New Forms of Subnational and Transnational
Cultural Identity and Citizenship

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Culture - the cultural field - has, in the modern period, historically been the most fundamental and most powerful domain in which a sense of the "national" of national identity, affiliation and belonging, has been developed, consolidated and embedded in both national and individual consciousness. Beyond the formal and legal national identity documents of the passport and the identity card, the myriad of national cultural "documents" - novels, dictionaries, folk tales, poetry, newspapers, art and museum collections, bibliographies, libraries, musical and literary traditions, national broadcasting systems - have constantly affirmed and re-affirmed, produced and reproduced, the deepest and most embedded sense of the nation and the national: what is inside and what is outside, the borders. These have been the cultural technologies of national imagining.

National cultural and media policies - and policy frameworks - have historically been formed in this context and guided by this logic. But, increasingly, in the context of globalization, transnational flows of people and cultural goods, the development of diasporas, and the "virtual mobility" produced by the Internet and mobile telephony, the national frame and policy remit is proving inadequate to address the realities of cultures which are both subnational and transnational in their allegiances and belongings. These are realities which are often beyond or below the horizons of visibility of established national policy frameworks. We need to begin to more urgently pose the question of what are the new technologies of cultural imagining - CNN, Al Jazeera, BBC World, Bloomberg, the Internet, non-terrestrial television and digital radio, the iPod, the mobile phone and text messaging, the weblog, and other communications protocols yet to be envisaged.

Let me begin, then, by quoting from the Final report prepared for the Council of Europe's *Differing Diversities* project by British academic Kevin Robins:

"…contemporary developments, associated with the economic dynamics of globalization, have been giving rise to increasing transnational migrations of people, as well as transnational flows of goods, media, information, and so on. These new and various global mobilities and movements have brought with them new kinds of diversity and complexity into the European cultural space, involving new kinds of cultural juxtaposition, encounter, exchange and mixing. And, crucially, these new forms of diversity and complexity are transnational and transcultural in their nature - functioning, that is to say, across national frontiers and operating across different cultural spaces. And these transcultural developments are presenting important new challenges to the established national mechanisms through which European states have hitherto managed policy for cultural diversity and citizenship. The challenge, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is to respond to the changing transcultural landscape in Europe." (Robins, 2006: 19)

Why is this a challenge?

Because if there is anything we have learned over the past 10-20 years, it is that cultural policy, understood in its broadest and most connected sense with other policy domains, has become newly strategic in its remit and potential. Cultural policy has become much more serious and now increasingly touches on (i) identity and citizenship in a world which is increasingly post-national in its dynamics and flows, (ii) security and dignity of persons, communities and nations, (iii) quality of life in its profoundest sense as a combination of personal, economic, environmental and social life options; and (iv) the massive inequalities in the allocation and distribution of these options between countries.

These four issues pose the most urgent questions to cultural policy since its historical inception as a modern "technique of government" in Europe in the late 18th century. The questions posed then were not dissimilar in terms of content and strategic orientation. They were questions about how to "manage" newly politicized and *nationally* aggregated citizens and populations through education, enlightenment, and ethical and moral formation. They were questions about how to form and manage (cultural) citizenship.

In the midst of the French Revolution, for example, administrators, legislators and intellectual functionaries were working hard on constituting "culture" as a strategic field of person, citizen, community, and population management within the framework of the proto-democratic nation state. They were working hard then (as many other nations subsequently have) on a *national* language policy, on a *national* curriculum, on *national* and community museums and libraries: on the new symbols, icons and monuments of the "indivisible" *national* Republic, Federation or

Constitution. They were working hard on building the cultural resource base for new identities, lifestyles and regimes of personal, community and national conduct. Cultural policy, then as now (though we forgot this for a while when cultural policy was reduced to arts policy), was about making citizens and enabling citizenship by providing or enabling the resources of identity, affiliation, belonging, sense of place and knowing the inside and outside (the real and imaginary borders) of that place: its distinctive texture and quality.

The geo-political bearings have changed significantly between the beginning of the 19th century and the beginning of the 21st but the central fact and logic of the strategic role of culture in the "management of conduct" has not.

The central issue therefore becomes how to remodel and reconcile the new geo-political bearings with the enabling potential of cultural policy to contribute to global quality of life, cultural diversity and social cohesion within, beyond and below the national sphere.

Cultural policy was born, most punctually and evidently in France under the guidance of the Abbé Grégoire, as a strategic science, art and technique of both government *and governance* in order to consolidate a new polity, to have done with the iniquities of the *Ancien Régime*, to prevent the possibilities of further murderous mass uprisings, to create and consolidate, in the full sense of the word, *citizens* who would be largely responsible for their own self-management within the domain of the nation state.

Here, for example, is the Abbé Grégoire in the late 18th century on the importance of "signs", the "senses" and "the soul" (the cultural field as we might now call it) in developing national and republican characters and citizenries:

"When one reconstructs a government anew it is necessary to republicanise everything. The legislator who does not recognise the importance of the language of signs will fail in his mission. We must lose no opportunity to seize hold of the senses in order to evoke republican ideas. The soul will be penetrated by objects constantly reproduced before the eyes … this ensemble of principles, facts and emblems which constantly retrace for the citizen his rights and duties, and form, so to speak, the republican mould which gives to him a national character and the attitude of a free man." (Grégoire, 1977, Vol. 5: 31)

Citizens were progressively given the cultural tools, resources and "capital" (books, newspapers, national curricula, local and national traditions, images) by which they could, on a regular and daily basis *imagine* themselves, in a strong sense, on a regular and quotidian basis, as members of a particular type of community and culture in which, to use Edward Said's expression, they could "feel at home … in a place" (Said, 1984: 8). In a world of increasingly global flows - of people, images,

capital and weapons - those older and more secure cultural borders are no longer intact.

Just as European nation states in the early modern and modern periods began to emerge culturally as a form distinct from the great transcontinental sodalities of Christendom and the Ummah Islam with their own material cultures of national vernacular languages, reconstructed folk and literary traditions, newspapers, novels and a whole panoply of techniques for *imagining* the national community and creating the terms of affiliation, so now we are witnessing, in different terms, the re-emergence of possibilities of affiliation and imagining that are transnational, post-national and even subnational. How can we enable cultural policy to respond to and provide these citizen-affirming new forms of imagining?

One of our problems has been that within dominant western and northern cultural systems, there has been a fundamental mis-recognition - often wilful ignorance - of the crucial role of what Augustin Girard once called the "cultural machines" to which traditional cultural policy has been historically or conceptually blind. These machines - the new cultural technologies - are quite simple and manifest (and commercially successful). They are photographs, other images, advertising, film, radio, television, video, CDs, CD-ROMs, DVDs, the Internet and the World Wide Web: forms of what we might call "popular narrative". They are the "content" or "creative industries" which are now growing globally faster than any other industrial sector.

These "machines" are, in spite of their mis-recognition - or absence except in the form of (often despised) market data and "additional considerations" - in traditional cultural policy frameworks, the fundamental "material culture" resources for new forms of narrative, new forms of and commitments to belonging, new ways of imagining for the majority of most populations in the North, South, East and West. These are the forms that, in Arjun Appadurai's words, "challenge the megarhetoric of developmental modernisation". What Appadurai calls this "master discourse" is still both persuasive and pervasive but now, as he puts it:

> "…often punctuated, interrogated and domesticated by the micro-narratives of film, TV, music, and other expressive forms which allow modernity to be rewritten more as vernacular globalisation and less as a concession to large-scale national and international policies." (Appadurai, 1996: 10)

Vernacular globalization - the use of globally available cultural resources to develop new and distinctive languages of affirmation and identity - is what we are dealing with here and it is not unfair to say that, in spite of the advocacy of Girard and others, and the lessons of cultural studies and other disciplines such as economic geography over the past 40 years, this crucial domain of cultural activity has at best been "tolerated" and at worst dismissed by the gatekeepers of legitimate cultural

policy with the watchwords of "commercialization", "Americanization" and now "globalization". Appadurai and other commentators suggest that, in the context of globalization, transnational and subnational systems of cultural affiliation and allegiance, "diasporic public spheres", are emerging – *or coming to policy visibility* now - in ways that they were never before able to.

This is partly brought to visibility by the contemporary reality of globalization and the transnational flows of goods and information and partly by the fact of the digitalization of cultural "content" enabled by new information and communications technologies. But we know very little about this process of vernacular globalization, about the diverse *uses* of culture which give it a currency from the corporate boardroom to the backstreet of the *favela*, about the nature of the public spheres that are emerging, and ultimately, what new forms of cultural citizenship and affiliation are being generated in those contexts.

There is a growing body of work, for example, that is showing how new forms of transborder networking, especially in the creative industries, are producing new forms of culturally specific entrepreneurship:

> "The second aspect of transnational migrant practices that is new and distinctive concerns the way in which new economic and social livelihoods are being established on the basis of this networking culture. Alejandro Portes and his co-researchers suggest that the development of transnational businesses and enterprise may now be regarded as a new - and growing - form of immigrant economic adaptation (Portes et al., 2002). What we are seeing is the emergence of new kinds of enterprises, and of diverse kinds, operating on the basis of transnational economic and social networks …Whereas previously economic success and social status depended exclusively on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society, at present they depend (at least for some) on cultivating strong social networks across national borders … For immigrants involved in transnational activities and their home country counterparts, success does not so much depend on abandoning their culture and language to embrace those of another society as on preserving their original cultural endowments, while adapting instrumentally to a second …. From one perspective, what has emerged is the fact that cultural diversity can be a vital stimulus to cultural entrepreneurship, opening up new cultural and creative markets." (Robins, 2006: 25-26)

Cultural diversity, that is, is not simply a "policy obligation" to which we have to be attentive: it is dynamically *constitutive* of the contemporary cultural field in both ethical and economic terms. This means both diversity of content and reference and the diversities of uses and technologies.

The creative industries, especially as they operate in an increasingly digitalized environment, have both responded to and capitalized on this trend:

"… creative industries have become more attuned to transnational markets and audiences. Their response to diverse cultures has stimulated the cultural sector, contributing to the development of new cultural products. In the last decade or so, then, we have seen significant transnational developments in the creative industries themselves, to the extent that transcultural production has become routine." (Robins, 2006: 38)

So, while we cannot deny the sheer persistence, resilience and, in some cases the reality of "national cultures" we have to allow that this "unit of calculation" is now one among many. And we also, therefore, have to allow for the fact that in the cultural field especially, national policy frameworks may not be adequate to the task of responding to these realities and that, as the Council of Europe work strongly advocates, a transcultural approach needs to be developed in terms of both the geographical movement of cultural forms and the diverse uses to which those forms are put in consolidating, challenging, shifting identities and affiliations *and* in the development of new entrepreneurial and social networks.

An example of the importance of the recognition of the emergence of diverse public spheres based on ethnicity and sexual orientation, for example, can be found in the research findings of the Australian *Accounting for Tastes: Australian Everyday Cultures* project. (Bennett, 1999) One key finding concerning the role of culture in the formation and consolidation of new forms of "public sphere" and, especially, the forms of its contemporary *pluralization* where:

"… in the form of feminist, black or indigenous public spheres … [which] … have facilitated effective interventions in the policy process in establishing forms of cultural entitlement that have gone beyond considerations of access, equity and community empowerment to establish new forms of public, and publicly educative, presence: Sydney's Gay and Lesbian Mardi Gras [now the largest of its kind in the world] is a classic example, as is the Aboriginal community radio sector."

The researchers, grasping the clear policy impetus of this body of research, identify four key implications (or policy rationales) that emerge from it:

- the "*importance of bending the inherited apparatuses of public culture to new purposes in the aid of 'governing differences'; that is, managing the relationship between the increasingly diverse ways of life that make up civil society*";
- the role of "*the nexus between public culture and public education in enhancing and equalising the cultural life-chances of citizens while, at the same time, reducing its ability to organise, symbolise and thereby legitimise class differences*";

- the role of government "*in supporting new forms of public, and publicly educative, presence on the part of groups previously excluded from bourgeois definitions of the public*";
- the role of government "*in organising a public component within the sphere of mass-mediated communication*".

Based on an extensive national three-year research programme funded by the Federal Government, this is probably the most comprehensive extant national mapping of contemporary cultural tastes, the uses of diverse cultural forms and the policy implications of those uses and is rich in policy implications for the understanding of new uses and users of culture.

In the Americas, and engaging the reality and politics of cultural diversity - in this example, the place of Hispanic populations in the USA - Renato Rosaldo also argues that cultural citizenship should be thought of as "a broad range of activities of everyday life through which Latinos and other groups claim space in society and eventually claim rights … [it] allows for the potential of opposition, of restructuring and reordering society." (in Stavenhagen, 1998: 19)

This is an especially important issue in the context of what Arjun Appadurai calls the emergence of "diasporic public spheres" where migrant and ethnic communities construct repertoires of cultural association and identity for themselves in - and often against - the official and dominant culture of the nation state in which they are resident. It is an important area, that is to say, for any affirmation and assessment of cultural citizenship in its new and more diverse forms.

From another example, diasporic communities in Australia (especially Vietnamese and Chinese Australians):

"…organize to consume and produce media to dwell both within and outside the spaces of Asia, Australia and the West. These practices occur beside and around the regulatory provisions of national media and cultural policy…[and thus] a new take has to be developed on globalization, with the focus being on diasporic media serving global 'narrowcast' audiences." (Meredyth and Minson, 2001: xxiv)

In engaging with the question of culture, lifestyles and identity then, we are touching on what has been called a new "politics of behaviour" with which many of our national cultural institutions and agencies are very unfamiliar.

As Anthony Everitt has put it, in a critical comment on the 1995 UNESCO report of the World Commission on Culture and Development, *Our Creative Diversity*:

"… [t]he point is that today's culture is taking place messily on the streets, in under-funded schools, in video arcades, and in bleak suburbs and *favelas* from Cairo to the Caucasus. It is a million miles away from the committee rooms of the great and is not readily accessible to the application of reason, of sweetness and light."

The key issue here is that of how cultural policy, planning and assessment can enable us to work in culture in a way that enables us to "act on the ethical self-government of human behaviour in this new plural field". This is what Nikolas Rose has called a "new set of problems for the politics of conduct", and it returns us to the points made at the beginning of this paper on the necessity for the strategic re-invention and re-alignment of cultural policy to engage those issues.

In recognizing this we must also register that much of where culture is now at "escapes" the regimes and institutions originally established to manage it. To cite Rose again:

"… [w]ithin these new spaces of lifestyle and culture and no longer integrated in a total governmental field, it is possible for subjects to distance themselves from the cohesive discourses and strategies of the social state (schooling, public service broadcasting, etc., … and access resources of subject formation in order to invent themselves as new kinds of political actors … This fragmentation of the social by the new commercial technologies of lifestyle-based identity formation has produced new kinds of collective existence lived out in milieus that are outside the control of coherent norms of civility or powers of political government." (in Meredyth and Minson, 2001)

This is an important argument that both recognizes the "lifestyle-forming" and constitutive role of culture in our identities but also the fact that most of this is happening beyond the purview and parameters of cultural policy (and of much public policy) in its received national forms. Theatre, museum and gallery attendance figures matter very little in this context and it is clear that in order to engage this agenda, cultural policy has to move beyond government and into the realm of *governance*.

We can do this by referring to what Nikolas Rose calls a "new ethopolitics" of community which is developing along four axes of governance that reconfigure the relationship between state, society and individual that once lay at the heart of the social politics of welfare.

These axes are explained as new "rationalities of government" in which lifestyle, behaviour, conduct, community - strategic stakes in the field of cultural policy - are becoming more and more important in mainstream public policy considerations.

The four principal axes of this new "ethopolitics" are:

- *objects*: the "emergence of community as an object of government";
- *subjects*: "new specifications of political subjects are involved in the framing of moral responsibility in terms of identities, values and belongingness in the new politics of conduct";

- *new explanatory regimes*: in the form of the new conceptions of economic and moral processes … entailed in the take up of the terms *human capital* and *social capital* … activating the responsibility of communities for their own well-being;
- *techniques and technologies*: new "techniques of subjectification are *being incorporated into technologies for the reactivation of civil society, for the management of risk and security, and the regulation of pathological conduct*".

What this means is that there is emerging a new logic of government (and governance) in which both the stakes and the stakeholders - community, identity, senses of "belonging", human and social capital, civil society, the regulation and management of conduct - are now much more "mainstream" issues.

From the point of view of cultural policy, broadly and strategically conceived, this means that many more doors are opening that will enable the positioning of cultural policy within mainstream public policy agendas. This is analogous to the ways in which the category, concept and "policy object" of the environment has, over the past 30 to 40 years been positioned in relation to personal, familial, community, corporate and governmental "behaviours".

Cultural diversity matters. But we need to find ways of engaging diversity which move beyond the statement of the fact and towards ways of knowing, understanding and analysing why and how it matters for policy, resourcing and the "management of conduct" towards new forms of cultural citizenship and the analysis of the resources which will enable that form of citizenship to be realized.

What role, then, for the new cultural technologies here?

"... local societies ... must preserve their identities, and build upon their historical roots, regardless of their economic and functional dependence on the space of flows. The symbolic marking of places, the preservation of symbols of recognition, the expression of collective memory in actual practices of communication, are fundamental means by which places may continue to exist as such ...."(Castells, 1991: 350-1)

Castells goes on to warn, however, that this should not mean a recourse to "tribalism and fundamentalism". First, there is an increasingly urgent need for a full recognition of the importance and role of government *at the local level* which, rather than being superseded by the global information economy, becomes, in fact, more important with an increased need, in the face of anonymous and "placeless" global economic and political interests, "...to establish their own networks of information, decision making, and strategic alliances.." (Castells, 1991: 352-3)

Second, it is precisely in this context that the new information technologies acquire a strategic significance at the local level:

"Citizens' data banks, interactive communications systems, community-based multimedia centres, are powerful tools to enhance citizen participation on the basis of grassroots organizations and local governments' political will." (Castells, 1991: 353)

More than a methodology for the sake of it, cultural policy seen in these terms responds to urgent new and integrally connected issues in the global cultural and communications economy and requires us to broaden our purview of the place of local cultural resources in that context, both recognizing and enhancing the relations between the "local" and the "global" - the "glocal".

We will need to be more attentive to the complex uses and negotiations of cultural resources - artefacts, ideas, images, activities, places, institutions - which characterize the cultural field and its contemporary diverse and diasporic geography. This will require much greater collaboration between research, community, industry and government sectors to the mutual benefit of each, and there is some hard but useful work of "translation" to be done between these.

These arguments are useful in helping us to define our policy parameters within the cultural domain. This is a field characterized by practices, products and institutions of great prominence and power, and by practices, products and institutions which have remained largely invisible in traditional policy-related research frameworks. In a world where the great majority of nations remain net importers of cultural product, this perspective gains added significance from the point of view of both endogenous industry development and the real recognition of cultural diversity: combined economic and ethico-political imperatives.

But to both engage that reality and achieve our ambitions of bringing cultural policy into the 21st century, we need to be attentive to the following issues:

- The need to develop a much broader and more inclusive approach to cultural resources and to recognize that these resources are not just commodities but also sets of relations and systems of classification. That is to say we need an active and use-oriented definition of resources accounting for the ways in which people and communities interact with and negotiate them.
- The importance of developing methodologies not only for identifying these resources but also for assessing how people interact with them and how, at the local and community level, they "hang together" and become meaningful in fields of interaction, negotiation and consumption which often fall below the horizon of intelligibility of more traditional approaches to culture.
- In developing this approach there needs to be a new compact and relationship between "local knowledge" and tactics on the one hand, and the larger and strategic prerogatives of cultural policy and service delivery on the other. This is a matter not simply of the adjustment of existing settings but also of the

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production of new forms of knowledge through inclusive and integrated research and knowledge base development agendas.

In the end, of course, what we are confronted with in the development of an agenda for the development of policy-enabling knowledge in the cultural field is a new conceptual paradigm - or at least a theoretical horizon - within which it becomes possible to reconcile a broad and inclusive approach to the forms of *production* which constitute the cultural field with an equally broad approach to the forms and modalities of *consumption and uses of culture* which escape established national policy purview.

When we recognize both the realities of contemporary cultural production and consumption and the ways in which they move within, between and below the national frame, we will be much better positioned to do that.

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Mondialisation/Globalisation et nouveaux rôles pour les politiques culturelles

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Remarques préliminaires

Je voudrais commencer par faire trois remarques préliminaires:

- quand je suis intervenu à la 1[re] Conférence mondiale de Culturelink, il y a dix ans, je l'ai fait en tant que représentant du Conseil de l'Europe[1]. A l'époque, je mettais en évidence trois défis que je considérais comme particulièrement importants: la gestion du pluralisme culturel; l'impact culturel de la société de l'information; la multipolarité de la coopération culturelle, impliquant un nouveau partage des responsabilités entre les différents acteurs, publics, civils et privés;

- aujourd'hui, je revendique une parole non-institutionnelle et libre qui, bien que marquée par une double pratique de la coopération culturelle internationale, institutionnelle d'une part (au sein d'un Ministère national de la culture, ainsi qu'au sein de l'UNESCO et du Conseil de l'Europe), associative d'autre part (notamment comme président de la Laiterie à Strasbourg ou comme responsable du programme Pépinières européennes pour jeunes artistes, du Collège européen de coopération culturelle ou du Forum européen des réseaux culturels), est la parole d'un individu qui n'a pas la prétention de «représenter» autre chose qu'un trajet personnel essayant d'allier constamment réflexion et action, éthique et pratique, évaluation et prospective;

- je travaille maintenant dans la coopération au développement, domaine qui semble a priori assez éloigné de la coopération culturelle et dans lequel l'accès à l'eau ou à la santé de base est apparemment jugé plus important et plus urgent

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1 L'auteur de ce texte est l'ancien directeur de l'enseignement, de la culture et du sport au Conseil de l'Europe.

que l'accès à la culture. Je constate cependant que, non seulement le développement est culture tout comme **la culture est développement**, mais que les politiques culturelles et les politiques de coopération au développement présentent des parallélismes et des convergences qu'il serait difficile de sous-estimer, voire d'ignorer. Ainsi, dans les deux politiques, on insiste beaucoup sur l'appropriation (*ownership*) et la participation, sur l'*empowerment* des acteurs et le *capacity building*, ainsi que sur la nécessité d'une meilleure gouvernance ou d'un développement durable. Et ce n'est sans doute pas un hasard si le Rapport mondial 2004 sur le développement humain du PNUD (Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement) sur le thème de «la liberté culturelle dans un monde diversifié» place la liberté culturelle et les démocraties multiculturelles au centre du développement humain et d'une coopération internationale refondée.

Bref, par mon parcours professionnel et personnel, j'ai l'impression de vivre aujourd'hui comme un «passeur» et médiateur entre différents mondes, celui de la culture et celui de la coopération au développement d'une part, ceux des secteurs public, privé et civil d'autre part.

Où en sommes-nous aujourd'hui des politiques culturelles?

Depuis une vingtaine d'années, la coopération culturelle internationale s'est profondément transformée. Esquissons seulement quelques aspects de cette mutation:

- **le concept de culture a changé**: jadis stable, unique et défini, il est devenu en mouvement, pluriel, flou. Par ailleurs, la culture s'est décloisonnée de plus en plus et des produits culturels, on est passé aux processus, trajectoires et flux culturels;
- **la vie culturelle s'est transformée**: de nouvelles expressions artistiques et des pratiques culturelles innovantes ont vu le jour, mélangeant consommation et participation, engagements solidaires et événements festifs;
- **les «marges» se sont fait connaître et reconnaître par leur créativité et les solidarités nouvelles qui s'y développent**, sur les friches industrielles et urbaines, dans les quartiers et banlieues métissés de nos villes, à travers des projets artistiques et culturels qui présentent des alternatives aux offres des grands équipements culturels;
- les **métiers culturels** se sont **diversifiés** et les **acteurs culturels** se sont **professionnalisés**. Si ces métiers peuvent apparaître aujourd'hui comme la préfiguration des métiers du futur, il est évident que le statut des artistes et des acteurs culturels est extrêmement fragile, socialement et économiquement;

- il y a aussi un changement important dans les «**temporalités culturelles**», c'est-à-dire dans la manière de situer un projet et une action culturelle dans le court ou le long terme: à côté des échanges éphémères, on trouve des coopérations en profondeur, mais l'expérimentation sociale et culturelle semble se réduire à la portion congrue;

- les **politiques culturelles** sont **en crise**, tant dans leurs objectifs (qui apparaissent comme largement inadaptés) que dans leurs structures (qui sont devenus obsolètes) et méthodes (qui restent souvent prisonnières d'un *top down* et ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte des projets, des réseaux et de la mobilité). J'ai surtout l'impression que les politiques culturelles se sont dépolitisées et technocratisées, en adoptant un langage managérial anglo-saxon, en se déconnectant des enjeux de société d'une part et en se sectorialisant par rapport à d'autres politiques beaucoup plus dynamiques, telles par exemple que celles de l'environnement et de la coopération au développement, d'autre part. Assistons-nous, comme le prétend Jean-Michel Djian dans un livre récent, à «la fin d'un mythe», celui de la sauvegarde d'un patrimoine culturel, de l'aide à la création artistique et de la démocratisation de la culture, sur lequel ont été construites les politiques culturelles, dans le cadre de l'Etat-nation et de l'Etat-providence, à partir des années 60, du moins dans les pays de l'Europe de l'Ouest?

  Selon Jean-Michel Djian, «la politique culturelle, engoncée dans ses discours, ses rituels et son économie de prototype, se trouve orpheline d'un grand dessein».

  Heureusement, cette dévitalisation constatée de l'action publique dans le secteur culturel se trouve en quelque sorte compensée par une grande vigueur de la société civile, à travers les associations, fondations et réseaux culturels, et par une appropriation par les artistes et par les militants associatifs d'espaces de création et d'action plus libres, plus dynamiques et plus innovants.

  Mais où débat-on vraiment des enjeux de politique et de coopération culturelles? Le «consensualisme culturel» qui semble caractériser notre époque ne tue-t-il pas progressivement toute «marge», toute «déviance», toute «résistance» au système, et ne rend-il pas impossible toute innovation un peu radicale?

Bref, les politiques culturelles se trouvent en échec, notamment par rapport f leurs objectifs de démocratisation et de démocratie culturelles. Elles réagissent par des déstructurations/restructurations permanentes, mais sans vision pro-active. Elles semblent s'ériger en instance justificatrice de nos peurs et de nos lâchetés. Elles apparaissent surtout comme «désenchantées», sans force, sans impulsion d'innovation de la part des pouvoirs publics, incapables de relever les nouveaux défis qui se posent, et notamment celui lancé par la mondialisation/globalisation.

Quels sont aujourd'hui les principaux défis des politiques culturelles?

Etienne Grosjean, dans son *Rapport sur la coopération culturelle européenne*, établi ŕ l'occasion du 40ᵉ anniversaire de la Convention culturelle du Conseil de l'Europe, en 1994, a insisté sur cinq «concepts intégrateurs» de la coopération culturelle européenne: la démocratie culturelle; le développement culturel et les finalités culturelles du développement; l'éducation permanente; un patrimoine commun; identités culturelles et diversité culturelle.

Tous ces défis gardent pleinement leur actualité aujourd'hui. J'y ajouterais les défis de la mondialisation/globalisation, de la citoyenneté/gouvernance, des libertés et droits culturels et du développement durable.

Abordons brièvement l'un ou l'autre de ces défis:

- la **mondialisation/globalisation**: même si je suis tout à fait conscient des dangers de commercialisation, d'instrumentalisation et de fragmentation culturelles qu'induit ce que Jacques Robin appelle «une mondialisation globalisée», c'est-à-dire une mondialisation qui n'est pas seulement celle des marchés et de la communication, mais qui comprend aussi les dimensions culturelle, politique et idéologique, je partage les analyses d'un Arjun Appadurai qui voit dans la mondialisation/globalisation la chance d'une démultiplication des publics, capables de produire de nouvelles formes culturelles. Ce qui entraîne des «explosions de modernités culturelles», en permettant à des cultures locales de se reformuler, en procédant à un alliage du moderne et de la tradition, en élaborant les bases de leurs propres industries culturelles et de leur propre champ de création artistique.
  Conséquence: relayé aujourd'hui par le Forum social mondial a commencé, un peu partout dans le monde, un processus de revalorisation des cultures particulières, condition préalable à l'invention d'un modèle économique et social moins soumis aux seuls impératifs dictés par les marchés extérieurs;

- la **diversité culturelle**: pour moi, elle n'est pas une valeur en soi, elle n'est qu'un constat. Ce qui fait la richesse de la diversité culturelle, c'est l'interaction, la remise en question par l'Autre, les processus dynamiques et dialogiques qui se déroulent, le passage d'une logique du monoculturel vers une logique de l'interculturel. J'aime bien l'image utilisée par l'UNESCO dans son *Rapport mondial sur la culture* de 2000: le monde n'est pas fait d'une mosaïque des cultures, mais d'un fleuve continu des cultures, dont les différents courants se mêlent continuellement et définitivement.
  Aujourd'hui, la diversité culturelle doit devenir un élément central de toute politique culturelle, intérieure et extérieure, comme le demande la Déclaration

universelle sur la diversité culturelle, adoptée par la Conférence générale de l'UNESCO, en novembre 2001. Dans sa contribution au Sommet mondial sur le développement durable, à Johannesburg, en août-septembre 2002, Arjun Appadurai utilise la diversité culturelle comme une plate-forme conceptuelle pour l'indivisibilité de la culture et du développement qui permettrait de penser la globalisation dans l'intérêt de la dignité et de l'équité, et non simplement comme abandonnée aux mains d'un marché débridé;

- **démocratie, gouvernance et citoyenneté culturelles**: après les échecs des politiques culturelles en matière de démocratisation et de démocratie culturelles, nous devons aujourd'hui repenser la question de la démocratie culturelle. Davantage en termes procéduraux, comme le demande Jean-Louis Genard, qu'en termes de contenus culturels déterminés. Penser l'accès à la culture non plus donc à partir simplement des libertés subjectives (liberté de création, d'expression,…) ou des droits-créances (droit à l'éducation, aux loisirs, à l'accès aux biens culturels,…) qui demeurent à l'évidence fondamentaux, mais plutôt à partir des droits-participations de ce qu'on pourrait appeler la liberté communicationnelle, c'est-à-dire la possibilité d'accéder à un espace public et à une parole libérée.

  La Déclaration sur les droits culturels, de l'Institut interdisciplinaire d'éthique et des droits de l'homme de l'Université de Fribourg va dans ce sens. Elle permet aussi de fonder une gouvernance et une citoyenneté culturelles, à partir d'un enjeu éthique et méthodologique.

  L'enjeu éthique, c'est d'établir les liens au savoir et de remettre au centre l'autonomie du sujet, ainsi que celle des acteurs sociaux. C'est la recréation permanente de liens entre libertés culturelles et institutions. Mais l'enjeu éthique porte aussi sur l'*empowerment* de tous les acteurs sociaux.

  L'enjeu méthodologique, c'est qu'une gouvernance culturelle est à la fois une politique sectorielle et une culture de l'ensemble du champ politique, notamment par sa promotion de l'espace public, entre les secteurs public, privé et civil.

Quelques pistes pour une refondation des politiques culturelles

Ma thèse serait la suivante:

> Les politiques traditionnelles de la culture, qui sont des politiques fondées, soit sur l'offre (les pouvoirs publics proposent une offre culturelle à laquelle il convient de faire accéder le plus grand nombre), soit sur la demande (les différentes communautés d'une société expriment leur demande de culture à laquelle les pouvoirs publics tentent de répondre), ayant échoué, il convient de passer d'une politique culturelle définie à partir d'objectifs à une politique culturelle se fondant

sur des valeurs et sur des droits.

Une telle politique permettrait à la culture de se désenclaver, de «réenchanter» et de «repolitiser» la culture et de s'exprimer sur les enjeux essentiels de nos sociétés, tels que: migrations, exclusion sociale, chômage et mutations du travail, droits des consommateurs, droits de l'homme, etc.

Une telle politique permettrait à la culture d'échapper aux différentes instrumentalisations qui la guettent dans des sociétés risquant d'être de plus en plus sous l'emprise des logiques économiques et technocratiques.

1. *Les principes d'une politique culturelle fondée sur des valeurs et des droits culturels*

Les pouvoirs publics devraient, à mon avis, se retirer complètement de leur fonction de gestionnaire et de prestataire de service, pour se concentrer sur leurs fonctions de gardien des lois, d'arbitre et d'«animateur» (remplir une fonction instituante en matière d'aménagement du territoire et de création d'un environnement favorable aux missions et projets culturels):

- être le garant du respect des libertés et droits culturels, notamment par des actions et programmes antidiscriminants;
- reconnaître à l'homme le droit d'être auteur de modes de vie et de pratiques sociales ayant signification (comme le demandait déjà la Déclaration d'Arc-et-Senans, en 1972);
- renforcer les structures de débat public;
- être «l'architecte» d'un espace public ouvert et dynamique et le promoteur d'une sécurité et d'une fiabilité culturelles (par la protection d'identités ouvertes, interactives et créatrices);
- promouvoir les synergies entre acteurs culturels, civils, publics et privés et redéfinir les rôles des différents acteurs;
- favoriser non seulement les échanges, mais surtout la coopération entre cultures différentes et entre disciplines différentes;
- suivre une stratégie d'*empowerment* des acteurs culturels et notamment des réseaux culturels et des acteurs les plus fragiles. Une politique culturelle n'est démocratique que si elle s'appuie sur une habilitation/responsabilisation systématique des acteurs. On pourrait s'inspirer ici de la «*capability approach*» d'Amartya Sen, prix Nobel d'économie, qui insiste sur les performances que les individus peuvent réaliser et non sur la nature de leurs biens;
- promouvoir une société d'apprentissage;
- relier constamment le local et le global;
- faire de la «durabilité» et de l'éthique de la coopération un principe de base de toute action: la coopération ne doit pas être vue comme une agréable complémentarité, mais comme confrontation/dialogue qui commence par la

reconnaissance de l'Autre, dans son identité et dans son altérité. Les acteurs se modifient mutuellement dans la coopération, au fur et à mesure qu'ils créent un milieu commun.

2. *Les postures de l'innovation artistique et culturelle*

- savoir assumer des situations complexes;
- pratiquer non seulement l'interdisciplinarité, mais aussi «l'indisciplinarité» (Pierre Bongiovanni) par la valorisation, en chacun de nous, de sa part de jeu, d'humour, d'écart et d'impertinence, bref de désir;
- explorer l'étendue des possibles en privilégiant les questions plutôt que les réponses et en établissant des architectures nouvelles, conceptuelles, poétiques, langagières;
- créer les conditions d'un doute favorable et dynamique;
- vivre le conflit comme une dynamique active.

3. *Les «outils» d'une telle politique culturelle*

- une **charte culturelle** et un code de déontologie pour la coopération;
- des espaces publics de débat, de confrontation des idées et de coopération;
- un Observatoire-Laboratoire-Conservatoire culturels;
- des Agences d'exécution, sur le principe du *arm's length*.

Tout cela peut paraître utopique et trop ambitieux. Et alors?

Ayons l'ambition d'une utopie réaliste pour les cultures - et pour les politiques culturelles - en Europe et dans le monde.

Shared Policies: The Future of Cultural Development New Models of Partnership Between the Public, Private and Civil Sectors

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Introduction

The main aim of this paper is to show that only "shared policies" are legitimate ones in contemporary world, and that mutual complementary enrichment of researchers and policy makers coming from all three sectors will be beneficiary for the creation of new, more democratic standards in policy making.

The synergy of the *elected power* (government and its main ideology), *expert power* (public and private cultural institutions) and *socially responsible forces* (NGO sector) who approach the process of policy making from different standpoints will definitely contribute to ensuring that "territory driven cultural policy"[1] will prevail instead of "constructed community driven cultural policy" (nation building or "dreaming"). (Dragičević Šešić and Dragojević, n.d.).

Cultural policy was for a long time an activity undertaken within narrow circles of cultural administrators in the public sector, under the patronage of the Minister of Culture and the ideology of the political party s/he represents.

Depending on the level of democracy, the more or less meritocratic principle has been applied, as well as the arm's length principle. It means that more and more expert bodies and professional opinions have been taken into account, and less and

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1 Word: territory here does not mean spatial aspects of cultural policy, but taking responsibility to raise the quality of cultural life and practices in the whole country, region, city, for all communities, groups and individuals on it. So it cannot be one and the same policy - "one" culture (usually of the main ethnic group) for all - but support for all forms of expression and participation in cultural life. It is exactly opposite to the traditional concept of cultural policy which aimed to reinforce the so-called national cultural identity, national values and artistic traditions.

less power has remained within ministries and public authorities themselves, but also, less and less participation from citizens in policy making has been expected. It has very positive consequences regarding the introduction of the diversity of policy measures and instruments, evaluations, etc., but brings at the same time a certain level of alienation and bureaucratization.

But, the time of "Malraux" or "Lang" (great individual-driven) cultural policy has passed, as well as of cultural policy making within circles of anonymous bureaucracies. The necessity now is to create a new model of policy making where all actors within one society will have a possibility to contribute.[2]

Maybe Chris Smith, as British Minister for Culture has represented a new kind of leader in policy making - somebody who wanted "creative industries" to take over the cultural field - meaning that the cultural field and all its actors should take responsibility for their own development.

But now - a more coherent and balanced approach should be invented in countries where markets do not have the potential for easy sustainability of the creative sector, and countries where the language spoken is not advantageous for future commercialization or use of artistic (creative industry) verbal products.

Principal approach in policy making

If we can define the method of creating cultural policy within the EU as *territory driven cultural policies* (based on facts and present research, the situation and needs of a diverse population) within the borders of one country,[3] at the same time the method which prevailed in the Eastern world was method based on *constructed community driven cultural policy*.

The first approach emphasizes territory and citizenship. It is an inclusive approach, because all cultural models (social, generational, elitist, popular, traditional), major

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2   The French "NO" to the European Constitution is significant as a "mark", a symbol of the end of a political leadership era, although it was a huge shock to European cultural and political elites. It has shown that administrative elites can not debate among themselves and create a platform for themselves. Although the constitution might be an excellent instrument - it was not felt by social actors to be a SHARED achievement, but an invention from Brussels which will further distance policy making from citizens.

3   The only exception is Belgium. "Since the 1970s, Belgium has undergone a step-by-step process towards building a federal state made up of territorial regions and linguistic communities. The history of cultural policies since the 1970s can therefore be looked at by examining the activities of the three independent linguistic communities (Flemish-, French- and German-speaking communities) and that of the federal state; each with their own independent institutions, traditions and political influences". (Compendium, 6th edition)

and minority cultures are taken into account not only within instruments of cultural policy, but also in a way of conceiving and developing cultural practices. The motto would be: celebrating cultural diversity on our territory![4] The main issue became: "How are the cultural institutions linked up with their territories?" and not anymore with their (national) community.[5]

The second approach emphasizes "ethnicity" as the key element of self-identification, trying to conceive and conceptualize cultural policy for the imagined (constructed) community. The word "diaspora" is emphasized, as well as all key "national identifiers", in the majority of cases, language, alphabet, religion, traditional art forms. The document "Armenia 2020" clearly represents this approach. Special characteristics of Armenian culture are cited as: "unique language, unique alphabet", "the place of culture in Armenian identity", "church vs. state as keeper of culture", while "bi- and multiculturalism of Armenians is seen as the most negative component of present day culture. It seems that another document, the *National Report of Armenian Cultural Policy,* done within the Council of Europe programme of evaluation of cultural policies, is unacceptable to the Council of Europe (the national debate and acceptance of the national report, due to be published on the Compendium of Cultural Policies of Europe website, has been postponed for two years after the reports of national and foreign experts were finished in 2003). It means that mutual non-understanding exists of those two concepts in policy-making and that dialogue between the two is barely established.

Still, in many countries the rationale of territory driven cultural policies has not yet been accepted. They are still obsessed with ethnic (constructed community) based cultural policies. In this case - there are no SHARED cultural policies. Cultural policy is centralized in the hands of so-called "national" institutions (academies of science, national museums, libraries, etc.). It is not even a question of transferring, delegating responsibilities (deconcentration), which is a new challenge for modern democratic cultural policies.

Analysis of the cultural policies of many transition countries, and even of the countries who joined the EU in 2005 (e.g. Latvia) is showing that the citizen is still less important then the compatriot wherever s/he lives, and that the imaginary "national" territories (sometimes politically lost territories like Kosovo for Serbia, or

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4   The theory and the texts of French cultural policy documents are significant in this respect. While since the 1980s the word "territory" could hardly be found in cultural policy documents, since 2000 it is the key word to describe the concepts and priorities. See for example texts of Jean-Pierre Saez.

5   Citation from the symposium: "The opening up of cultural institutions to a new public in Europe; Towards new territorial cultural policies", Banlieues d'Europe, Reims, 21-22 November 2004.

parts of Turkey for Armenians) are still more present in cultural discourse than the territory on which the contemporary state is developed and for which it is really responsible.

Conversely, territory driven cultural policy is policy usually created through dialogue, involving many different groups and cultural sectors and different fields (from urban planning to social development, tourism and enterpreneurship, etc.). As the traditional cultural sector did not identify with territories, but with "nation" and then later with cultural urban elites, it imposed the necessity for new public policies to explicitly address the territory in its totality. So, this was the reason that when public policy decided to go towards territory, it had to address not only "its" institutions and artists (the majority in urban centres), but all the "actors" (operators) on the territory (social workers, educators, etc.).

This new model of partnership in creating (conceptualizing and designing) cultural policy priorities, strategies and instruments started slowly to be developed through different models of "para-state" bodies (arts councils, etc.), but also of civil society initiated "forums", and associations from the private sector.

Now we are speaking more and more about Public-Private Partnership (3Ps), but not only two, but all three sectors have to be in permanent dialogue and interaction. There will be no real, balanced, sustainable cultural development if all three sectors are not engaged in both creating and implementing cultural policy. Why?

A balanced approach and complementarities of interest and possibilities are guaranteeing the realistic, down-to-earth selection of priorities and instruments. Shared aims are the only aims to be achieved, and the intersectorial approach is contributing towards widening of the policy perspectives and alternatives. Also, linking together the private and civil sectors to the public sector in policy making is bringing another sort of knowledge and operational method to public administration management, giving more certainty to policy planning in its viability and legitimacy.

What are the interests and the values of the three sectors which are crucial for their involvement in policy making and priority selection?

Of course, their contributions can be both positive and negative, but I will focus here mostly on positive contributions, because negative ones will be rejected in policy dialogue and the selection of alternatives from the other two sectors (and if there is real dialogue in policy making, because there are three partners - two can always find a way to prevent possible predominance of the risky elements, for the state of the arts and cultural policy, in each of them).

With a risking of oversimplification, we can see the following scheme:

Public	Private	Civil
Traditional values	Modern values	Social values
Identity building	Risk orientation	Inclusivity
Appreciation of old elites	Elitism and leadership	Equality
Institution building	Organization building	Movements
Museums and libraries	Enterprises	Circles, clubs, NGOs
Past	Future	Present
High standard routine	Innovation	Social experiment
Works	Product	Process

Negative elements, among others, could be:

Sclerotization	Commercialization/ consumerism	Propagandism
Bureaucratization	Oversimplification	Amateurism (diminishing of professional standards)

It is clear that without *civil society* participation in cultural practices and its influences on public policies, when would the cultural policy of any country integrate instruments and measures for people and groups with special needs?

If the *private sector* had not forced a "product approach" in the arts, how small would accessibility to work of arts have been? "Spectacularization" of museums and projects like "museum nights", might be insignificant from the standpoint of museology and sometimes kitschy from the aesthetical standpoint - but they have brought new audiences, especially those who for different reasons do not want to be part of associative movements, and at the same time are lacking cultural capital by their birth and education.

Analysis of cultural policies in the countries with underdeveloped civil society has shown that many instruments are lacking, and even if those instruments are recommended by the evaluation experts of the Council of Europe, they cannot be implemented solely through public policies (Bosnia and Herzegovina is an excellent example).

On the other hand it is clear why Great Britain has developed the concept of creative industry. Obviously, it was not just the wish of the public sector, but its strong private sector in culture wanted development and business success, which is part of the culture of entrepreneurship of a neo-liberal state (there is no wish for "growth" within the cultural sector in other European countries yet).

But, at the same time it means that it is impossible to suggest this same approach as a main policy priority for the countries where the private sector has just re-started, such as Albania. In those countries public policies to support development of creative industries are not realistic and not viable; they can even be counterproductive in their implementation.

However important content and instruments might look, even as a panacea for the country's problems, policy transfer is practically impossible. Policy should be created in dialogue with existing sectors, not imposed from above or from outside, because it needs active implementators outside of public administration, in all three sectors. Likewise, strategy has to come through interactive dialogue on the already consensual policy. Cultural policy and cultural strategy today have to be "agreed", shared. It is not about consensus - it is more about a participative process of making.

Shared policy is:

- transparent (naturally as publicly debated and agreed)
- pro-active, fostering innovation, stimulating non-existent areas
- catalytic, initiating new programmes, projects and ideas
- cross-fertilizing, involving different sectors, and ideas from artistic, scientific and other fields
- coordinated within government and within different levels of public policies
- inclusive, for all marginal and minority groups.

So, shared policy is the future of cultural development within each country, region and city. Cultural policy has to be an integral part of public responsibility; it means responsibility for all the main vectors of cultural life, undertaken through precise procedures and in dialogue.

But policy making dialogue has to be installed on a European and world level too (through the Council of Europe and UNESCO) - as only shared policies on a large scale can be effective and achieve the right impact.

Using parameters for the evaluation of the level of democracy of cultural policy it is evident that shared policy will help in achieving the highest democratic standards:

- a model of cultural policy which implies systemic measures and existence of long-term planning

- a mechanism for decision making - detached from political bodies
- public dialogue (consensus around major policy issues)
- all actors included (government, parliament, professional organizations, creative industries, media, public participation in the widest sense)
- publicly known priorities and criteria of evaluation
- transparency of the whole model (from declared priorities to budget distribution)
- evaluation as a starting and final point of operation.

So is shared policy a necessity (or a trendy tool)? Is this not just a rhetorical question, but a real one, if we are to achieve the shared policy with the initiative coming from above? On the other hand, if it is a grass-roots initiative, there is a great probability that it will not be heard by public bodies. It shows the real limits of public-private-civil partnership, whose success will always depend on the will of the public sector.[6]

In spite of that, the shared policy is the future of democratic transformation. Developed with strong commitment of civil and private sector, it demands the professional and highly responsible public sector, accountable for its achievements.

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6   Since 1997 many (un)successful moves in this respect have happened in Serbia - all of them initiated from the civil sector. "Education for cultural policy" (Magna agenda, PALGO centre, YUSTAT) and finally the big conference on "Cultural Policy and Cultural Production", organized by the Centre for Contemporary Arts in autumn 2000. But, however successfully organized, their impact was limited and effectiveness negligible. One "small" project *Open road E - 761* is trying to show the path again toward new public policies of decentralization and the intersectorial approach through a partnership of four towns (Kraljevo, Cacak, Uzice and Pozega), uniting the NGO sectors in those cities and trying to raise awareness and sensitivity of politicians and the public sector of the necessity for the new policy approach. (Once again, it is only money of foreign donors involved; the local economy and local politics, as well as the Ministry of Culture, have not yet recognized the importance of the project).

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Searching for New Ways of Cultural Policy Implementation Proposal of the Organizational and Financial Changes in the Field of Culture in Poland[1]

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The European perspective

Public funding still remains dominant in Europe. However since the beginning of the 1990s of the 20th century relations between the state and local authorities, public authorities and cultural institutions have been changing. The state does not disown itself from the responsibilities in the field, but it modifies its competencies in order to increase effectiveness and achieve higher quality of the subsidized cultural activities. Such changes would not be possible without basing them on partnership cooperation with the non-profit and commercial sector entities, and also by passing on to them some elements of administrative empowerment.

A transformation in the organizing and financing of cultural activities is underway. The changes are a relatively new phenomenon. So there are only a few comparative literary works describing them. The work of John Myerscough, published at the beginning of the year 2000, *National Cultural Institutions in Transition, Desetatisation and Privatisation*, deserves special attention. It contains the results of research on the transformation in the national cultural institutions, which was done at the request of the Cultural Commission of the Council of Europe. The research embraces the following countries: Cyprus, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland and Hungary.

In recent years two tendencies became dominant.

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1 Based on the "*The background paper for the reform of organizing and financing culture in Poland*" , elaborated in 2005 in the Pro Cultura Foundation by Dorota Ilczuk in cooperation with Katarzyna Badźmirowska-Masłwska and Magdalena Kulikowska.

The first is the *decentralization* of the management and financing of culture. Decentralization is based mainly on passing bigger responsibility in the field to local authorities, leaving the central authorities solely responsible for institutions of national significance. A different form of decentralization is incorporating into the process of culture management intermediary entities, agencies/funds/councils, which distribute public funds for cultural activities as well as play an advisory role towards the ministries of culture.

The fact which needs to be underlined is that most countries decide to apply the second form of decentralization. The most popular in this area, descended from the John Maynard Keynes's rule of "arm's length principle", are the British solutions. After the necessary modifications have been made, the solutions based on the rule of "arm's length principle" became a supplementary element in the continental model of financing culture. This way the guarantee of social supervision of the expenditure of public funds has appeared and a higher level of competency has also been reached.

The second tendency concerning organizing and financing of cultural activities in Europe is a change in the way of public (subsidized) cultural institutions management itself. This new approach can be characterized as a process where institutions are drawing away from the state and in consequence gaining larger *autonomy* (a process called *desetatization*). According to the process of loosening dependencies between cultural institutions and their founders (still most often being public authorities) the public cultural institutions in Europe obtain a new legal status. Within the state sector these may be special entities, described in separate law acts, such as, for example, British non-governmental public bodies. Also, public institutions can operate as foundations or different kinds of companies. This is therefore privatization based on using forms of organizations typical for the non-profit and commercial private sector and not a privatization of cultural activity. Cultural institutions functioning up to now as public entities are being transformed into specific foundations and companies. Their founder is usually a minister of culture or a local authority and the capital and estate belongs to the Treasury.

For example, in 1995 in the Netherlands twenty-five museums were transformed into independent foundations. The buildings and collections still belong to the state; the Ministry of Culture still finances the museums. Therefore it is not a change of ownership but of the way of management. In Finland some institutions have a status of private institutions and are financed by the Ministry based on yearly contracts, e.g. the National Opera (a foundation), the National Theatre (joint-stock company).

Due to changes:

• institutions are becoming independent;

- the quality of services is higher, and the range on offer is wider, more differentiated and in accordance to needs, with the level of support maintained from public funds;
- the ministries are released from a detailed administrative role.

The Polish perspective

The presented tendencies in the way of organizing and financing of culture in Europe are unevenly identified and applied in the new European democracies, in Poland as well.

Decentralization based on the state passing on legitimization to local authorities with reference to the managing and financing of culture became a fact and is treated as a commonly accepted standard. At present, a greater part of the responsibility for culture lies with local authorities. In the year 2003 they distributed 79.4% of public funds for culture. This indicator is significantly higher than the European average. At the same time, creating intermediary bodies ("quangos"), presented as the second form of decentralization, practically does not exist in Poland. The situation is similar as regards desetatization and privatization of cultural institutions. Such changes were not introduced in Poland and awareness of how common they are in Europe is very poor. This is as a result of the lack of a system transformation in the field of culture that would take into account the specifics of the sector. Until now the modifications were strictly adapted towards the new administrative and market reality. Such a situation was diagnosed several times. In the first half of the year 2004 the Culture and Business Group affiliated to the Polish Confederation of Private Employers took action. A team, in cooperation with the Pro Cultura Foundation, drew up an outline model for financing and organizing cultural activities.

The basis of the presented model consists of the following:

- strengthening the autonomy of entities running cultural activities, which is to be favoured by, *inter alia*, broadening procedural and legal possibilities of the functioning of cultural institutions, thereby transforming them into, for example, foundations or companies;
- financing based on long-term planning and long-term managerial contracts;
- new categorization of entities in the public sector, taking into account, among others, the need for creating joint institutions for the national and local authorities;
- underlining the strategic, and not the managerial role of the Ministry of Culture, as a body responsible for formulating the national cultural policy;

- change in the local authorities' responsibilities in the field of culture, focused on indicating one level of local authorities as the one essentially appropriate/responsible for organizing cultural activity;
- multiple sources of funding for culture, including searching for new solutions in this domain;
- assigning from the Ministry of Culture project funding and establishment of an Arts Council as a body responsible for content-related decisions concerning the division of public funds through the Culture Fund established for this purpose.

The proposal has the character of fundamental systemic change for the functioning of culture, but at the same time the cultural milieus are not yet fully prepared for such crucial and rapid changes. Within the project it is important to define the final formal aim - the new rules for organizing and financing of culture in Poland - and the presentation of the steps leading to its achievement.

In order to prepare and undertake the changes, the following steps were proposed:

In the year 2005: presentation of the background proposal for the transformation of cultural activities in Poland; carrying out expert consultations with those being an authority in the field of cultural activity, representing the EU countries; transforming the chosen national cultural institution so as to try the process out; initiating wide-spread consultations and promotion of the proposed solutions.

In the year 2006: preparation of the new bill on national cultural institutions; transforming the joint institutions of the Ministry of Culture and local authorities in order to try it out; consultations and promotion - continuation; initiation of preparation of the system law changes project in the field of culture, including the preparation of bills on the Polish Culture Council and the Culture Fund.

In the year 2007: preparation of a complex bill on the legal transformations in the field of culture; propagation of the new way of organizing and financing cultural activities, being the direct result of the new and amended legal acts.

Conclusion

In many European countries the state is still responsible for cultural policy and the funds for its realization. Nevertheless the analysis of the transformation of public cultural institutions proves the existence of a new role for the state in this sector. The state has now learnt to manage efficiently the redistribution of public funds for culture. The pro-civil direction of the undergoing changes - the use of social dialogue, legal entities of the third sector - makes all actors in the cultural scene more responsible and wiser.

Crisis social y políticas culturales en la Argentina
Espacios de la sociedad civil, generadores de proyectos culturales

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Introducción

En este artículo nos proponemos reflexionar - tanto desde el aporte teórico reciente como desde la constatación de la emergencia de nuevos imaginarios - sobre las formas que adquiere la sociedad civil en un contexto de crisis del Estado y de globalización económica. Específicamente, nos interesa analizar la relevancia que adquieren las manifestaciones culturales en la esfera pública dentro del contexto de la crisis social que enfrenta la Argentina en el ámbito urbano.

Sostenemos que la presencia de estos nuevos hechos sociales responde a la conformación de nuevos imaginarios sociales aún minoritarios, críticos de la hegemonía neoliberal dominante de la escena económica y cultural durante los noventa. En ese contexto nos preguntamos si los centros culturales autogestionados constituyen una respuesta a la crisis social desde la acción cultural que tiene consecuencias en el campo cultural y en la vida colectiva en general. En ese sentido nos interesa reflexionar sobre el lugar de la cultura y del interés por la acción cultural en el marco de formas organizativas autogestionadas cuyo punto de inflexión son los acontecimientos de diciembre de 2001, pero que en algunos casos emergen tiempo antes, durante la segunda mitad de los noventa.

Transformación de la Argentina

Con el acrecentamiento de la desigualdad social que atraviesa la sociedad argentina, profundizada aceleradamente en esta última década, un amplio espectro de la sociedad se vio enfrentado a diversos problemas sociales. Podemos enumerar entre otros: hambre, problemas de salud, problemas de adicciones, inseguridad cotidiana, violencia, crisis educativa, falta de acceso a la cultura, falta de opciones para el ocio y

tiempo libre, etc. Si bien la Argentina confinó históricamente los problemas sociales a un porcentaje limitado de la población, en relación al resto de las sociedades latinoamericanas, en el presente estos problemas atraviesan un porcentaje mucho mayor, aproximándolo a las características del subdesarrollo que atraviesa el resto de América Latina, situación que lo convierte en el continente más desigual del mundo[1].

En efecto, el enfrentamiento de la sociedad argentina a los problemas sociales se articula estrechamente con el alto porcentaje de su población atravesada por la pobreza. En la actualidad, alrededor del 44 por ciento de la población argentina se encuentra por debajo de la línea de pobreza, y un 17 por ciento es indigente. El primer dato fue aún mayor en el marco del epicentro de la crisis del 2001 y hoy se encuentra contenido por la existencia a partir de julio de 2002 de planes sociales, los cuales en realidad tienen algún efecto en el no crecimiento de la indigencia, pero ninguno en las condiciones de vida de gran parte de la población. Asimismo es importante señalar la significación en imaginarios arraigados sobre la sociedad argentina tanto entre sus habitantes como en la mirada que el resto del mundo tuvo sobre este país, el crecimiento de la nueva pobreza, fenómeno con el que se pretende nombrar el crecimiento de sectores de la sociedad que pertenecieron a las clases medias, alcanzaron cierto bienestar y desarrollo humano y ahora están atravesados por los problemas sociales.

Este arrasamiento de ciertos niveles de estabilidad social que han tenido un fuerte impacto en las subjetividades, debe entenderse en el marco de la destrucción del Estado social en forma paulatina a partir de 1975, en el plano educativo, de salud y social y la transformación de la sociedad argentina en un país de servicios atravesado por un creciente proceso de desindustrialización. Si bien no vamos a ahondar en estas cuestiones, sobre las cuales se ha escrito y se sigue investigando en la actualidad, sugerimos en ese sentido revisar una vasta bibliografía al respecto, nos parece de suma importancia recordar algunos de estos fenómenos para comprender el contexto en el cual emergen determinados proyectos sociales, sobre los cuales pretendemos colocar nuestra mirada.

Dentro de las diversas organizaciones sociales que pretenden responder a necesidades no satisfechas por el Estado y menos aún por el mercado, más recientemente, ante la situación de desempleo, subempleo y empleo en negro, generando una sociedad excluyente y con un alto porcentaje de excluidos, también constatamos la emergencia de nuevas formas de asociatividad que tienen como fundamento la acción cultural.

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1   Ver al respecto informes recientes de la CEPAL

Antecedentes de la acción cultural

Si bien el Estado ha tenido una presencia fuerte y decisiva en la constitución de las formas de la sociedad argentina, hoy en franca desaparición, reformulación y resignificación, en particular a partir del peso que ha tenido en nuestra sociedad la educación pública, en todos sus niveles, no ha ocurrido lo mismo en el plano de las artes y la cultura en general. Como señalan los escasos estudios sobre la historia cultural contemporánea en nuestro país, han sido más espacios privados, individuales, en torno a llamados organizadores o empresas culturales los que han promovido la incipiente industria cultural como el cine, la industria editorial o la radio (King, 1980, Landi, 1984). Asimismo, espacios culturales como el teatro estuvieron más asociados a las colectividades y a instancias de la sociedad civil en general (Sarlo, 1983). Estos fenómenos de comienzos del siglo XX dan cuenta de que históricamente Argentina tuvo una conformación estatalista y societalista en forma paralela, con preeminencia de una u otra según el régimen político de turno.

En las últimas dos décadas, el campo de conocimiento denominado historia cultural ha tenido algún desarrollo en particular vinculado al ámbito de la ciudad de Buenos Aires, especialidad que nos aporta algunos elementos para pensar el presente. En dicha producción podemos confirmar algunos de estos fenómenos de asociatividad cultural en forma temprana. Así en los trabajos de Gutiérrez y Romero (1989), como el de Barrancos (1996), se hace mención al papel que tanto el partido Socialista como las asociaciones de inmigrantes, a través formas asociativas tales como bibliotecas, sociedades de fomento, centros barriales y mutuales tuvieron en la difusión de la cultura y de las ciencias en sentido amplio, en la conformación de nuevos espacios barriales en la ciudad de Buenos Aires. Por su parte, en los trabajos de Sarlo (1983, 1994) se alude a dos cuestiones, por un lado al éxito de cierta literatura de folletín, lo cual daba cuenta de la emergencia de nuevos públicos, recientemente alfabetizados, ávidos de lectura, y por otro al papel que la maestra normal, pensada en términos de intermediaria cultural estatal, siguiendo a Sarlo, tuvo en la generación de sujetos ávidos de aprender y de ser cultos. Sin embargo, esta visión relativamente iluminista sobre la historia de la movilidad de clases argentina, historia que sostiene el imaginario construido en torno a nuestra sociedad, como una sociedad de clase media, la cual llegaría a su fin a partir de la aplicación de recetas monetaristas a mediados de los años setenta. Se pone entre paréntesis a partir de nuevas investigaciones que cuestionan la vinculación entre sociedad relativa y crecientemente integrada con tendencias de movilidad social y debilitamiento de características de clase y desarrollo cultural. Los trabajos de Camarero (2002), en relación al papel del Partido Comunista y su énfasis en la conformación de una cultura obrera, se inscriben en este cuestionamiento. En efecto, estos últimos trabajos echarían luz sobre la persistencia de un espacio social y cultural de "resistencia" y de

emergencia de otros significados contraculturales paralelos sobre cuyo derrotero sería productivo ahondar para comprender huellas en el presente.

Sociedad civil, movimientos sociales y cultura

En los años ochenta, en el marco de la crisis de los llamados socialismos "reales", es decir, a partir de la crisis del Estado burocrático soviético, de sus Estados satélites y de la demanda societal de "democratización", es decir, de una democratización no formal fundada en nuevos estilos de vida y nuevas formas de ciudadanía, el concepto sociedad civil ha sido objeto de revisiones y actualizaciones teóricas de distinto signo.

Es sabido que en el mundo desarrollado, los llamados nuevos movimientos sociales se vinculan con el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida, el reconocimiento de identidades sociales de corte subjetivo, vinculadas al derecho de elegir vidas múltiples, lo cual incluye entre diversas cuestiones de orden privado pero con impacto público, nuevas formas de vivir la sexualidad, al uso del espacio, a los derechos civiles, estilos de vida, movimientos de consumidores, etc.

En nuestros países, y en el Cono Sur en particular, estos debates tienen diferentes recepciones según las clases socioculturales, adoptan un formato local y están atravesados por otras conflictividades sociales y políticas. Si bien existen movimientos sociales que recogen estas problemáticas asociadas a la valoración de cuestiones postmateriales, la situación social y política que atraviesa América Latina prioriza los valores materiales, por una cuestión de subsistencia, tanto en lo referido a la opresión económica como política, ya que la situación social y política en algunos países es tan cruda y violenta que la vida está puesta en cuestión. Así debemos resaltar la importancia que han cobrado en estos últimos veinticinco años los movimientos por los derechos humanos y luego los movimientos por las identidades, femeninas, juveniles, atravesados ambos por cuestiones políticas, sociales y económicas y, más recientemente, estético-expresivas. Pasados los tiempos de dictaduras y persecuciones ideológicas, los movimientos de derechos humanos resignifican su presencia e inciden en las formas de hacer política.

Si la cultura había sido el blanco de las derechas y los gobiernos militares y represivos, dado el alcance que tenía la producción cultural y el tono crítico que ésta ha asumido, el escenario de la cultura también ha sido particularmente perseguido y restringido en el Cono Sur y en particular en la Argentina. Como una forma de reparar esta situación, el gobierno de la transición democrática otorga particular importancia a la cultura, ya que se la considera como un ámbito generador de nuevas relaciones y prácticas sociales. Un concepto muy difundido de este momento es el de cultura

política, nuevas significaciones, nuevos imaginarios, nuevas formas de sociabilidad, nuevos espacios. (Wortman, 1996)

La conformación de una esfera pública de la cultura con el propósito de recomponer el tejido social destruido por la dictadura y también por los efectos de nuevas formas de relación social, como consecuencia del neoliberalismo de entonces, constituía un propósito de la refundación de una sociedad democrática. El Estado asume la conformación de una esfera pública fundada en la acción cultural, la formulación de políticas culturales y la promoción cultural en general. El punto fue que este proyecto de democratización a través de iniciativas culturales se enfrentó con otros componentes de poder, aún persistentes y quizás más poderosos en el contexto de las transformaciones del capitalismo y de la incorporación de nuestro país al sistema económico mundial.

Por otra parte, este proceso fue acompañado por la articulación de una esfera pública vinculada a la cuestión de los derechos humanos. Si bien este tema de la agenda democrática no tuvo un alcance masivo, tuvo una importante recepción en el marco de los imaginarios y de repercusión internacional en relación a otros países con experiencias semejantes, ocupó la escena publica mediática y tuvo efectos a largo plazo en relación a la credibilidad de la población en el sistema democrático como única forma de gobierno y cierta reactividad frente a posibles reapariciones represivas.

Los noventa, crisis, paréntesis y emergencias

A pesar de la escasa importancia que asumió el ámbito de la cultura durante el menemismo y en los gobiernos neoliberales en general, dado el carácter eminentemente economicista impuesto por su política, la esfera de la cultura no dejó de estar presente. En la Argentina, se sabe, siempre hay algo que decir en torno a la cultura aunque ya poco importe. En el marco de la política de privatizaciones que signaron los años noventa en la Argentina, el ámbito de las comunicaciones ocupó un lugar muy relevante. En ese contexto, favorecido por la política de convertibilidad, se produjo un proceso de concentración mediática, el cual constituyó el basamento del imaginario cultural del menemismo. Se generó un nuevo *ethos* cultural[2]. Si bien las políticas culturales no formaron parte del discurso político durante la transición, sí, en cambio constituyó parte de la estrategia político cultural del menemismo el énfasis puesto en favorecer la concentración de medios de comunicación.

Es sabido que en el marco del neoliberalismo prima el interés por las ganancias que pudieran generar las industrias culturales, fundamentalmente TV y posteriormente

2   Hemos escrito largamente sobre este tema en nuestro libro en colaboración *Imágenes publicitarias/nuevos burgueses*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Prometeo, 2004.

Internet. Frente al desinterés estatal frente a la cultura y el arte, se instaló la sociedad de consumo como escenario de satisfacción de intereses individuales. La cultura dejó de ser un valor ya que se conformó una sociedad orientada a la capacitación, el conocimiento debía tener alguna utilidad. Las personas ahora ya no tenían que ser cultas sino capacitadas, su saber debía servir para algo en el mercado de trabajo y se creó un imaginario en torno al cual la falta de capacitación era la explicación frente al aumento del desempleo, limitando y ocultando las verdaderas razones de la reducción del mercado laboral.

A partir de un imaginario fuerte de corte neoliberal, la educación formal en general se orientó en ese sentido, debilitando todo aquello que tuviera relación con la formación, con la llamada cultura universal, con el saber. Predominó entonces el saber técnico para el mercado de trabajo, es decir, aquel saber que tuviera valor en el mercado. Si la sociedad civil era sinónimo de mercado, poco lugar había para lo cultural. La mercantilización de la sociedad y la cultura fue casi absoluta, quedando en una minoría marginal aquellos que pensaban diferente. Si un libro debía venderse como un detergente, poco importaba su contenido, su valor simbólico. Su primado debilitó otro tipo de preocupación no material, y prácticamente el conjunto de la sociedad orientó sus acciones en torno al consumo de objetos para el goce individual.

En el marco de la exacerbación del individualismo, lo cultural poco convocaba. El menemismo tuvo la capacidad de generar un proceso de hegemonía cultural, acompañando la solidez de cierto discurso único que se difuminaba por el mundo, reforzando el nuevo capitalismo. En reemplazo de los centros culturales de la transición, se instaló el *shopping* y la televisión. La desaparición de la política como espacio de participación, como estética y concepción, se la concibe como administración y como técnica, como saberes expertos, se debilitó el campo cultural en general y desapareció el debate desde diversos ámbitos por las políticas culturales. Se consagraron estilos de vida vinculados con el consumo y el goce en el espacio privado orientado al equipamiento hogareño, lo cual restó interés social y público a la acción cultural: se volvió innecesaria.

La desaparición de los grandes relatos como eje de la política habría hecho desaparecer también a la cultura. Sin embargo, como no existen procesos apocalípticos mientras exista una sociedad, ésta reaparece con nuevos signos y formas culturales. Así, esta dinámica en torno a la cultura comienza a modificarse con la crisis política del menemismo y del modelo económico que lo sustentaba.

Ante la fractura de la hegemonía cultural neoliberal, la sociedad civil comienza a percibirse como algo distinto del mercado, comienzan a emerger nuevas concepciones de la acción social, ya no sólo instrumental propósito responder a necesidades antiguamente satisfechas por el Estado. Como la sociedad de consumo demuestra que no puede satisfacer las ilusiones que crea, los sujetos comienzan a

imaginarse formas de sociedad alternativa. El mito de la sociedad de consumo no se consuma porque en el escenario social aparecen más pobres que consumidores. En una sociedad transformada y despedazada abruptamente por el neoliberalismo pero también largamente por la desindustrialización, las reiteradas dictaduras y represiones, etc., diversas esferas sostienen la necesidad de reconstruir nuevos sentidos de las prácticas sociales. Pensamos que la cultura se constituye en un espacio de generación de sentidos en la vida cotidiana opuestos a los establecidos por el capitalismo consumista, esto es, el mundo de la vida no colonizado por la razón instrumental. Se perciben fallas en el modelo anticultural. Ante la constatación del fracaso de paraíso consumista, comienzan a reemerger sentidos arrinconados y sentidos nuevos.

La cultura, ¿reemplaza a la política? Nuevas concepciones de sociedad civil se potencian

Diversos ensayos que se proponen develar las causas de los acontecimientos de diciembre de 2001[3], hacen alusión a la conformación lenta de un movimiento social paralelo a la política nacional, cuyo origen remoto estaría vinculado al peso que la cuestión de los derechos humanos fue adquiriendo en la política y en la sociedad en la última década. Según señalan diversos autores como Zibecchi (2003), y Peruzzotti (2003), en diferentes registros y lenguajes disciplinarios, este movimiento habría incidido en la conformación de nuevas formas de organización social y política en Argentina, o más levemente, en cambios de ejes y prioridades de las respuestas en política en general. Para Zibecchi en particular, estos movimientos habrían modificado las formas organizativas, fundadas en estructuras verticales y burocráticas de la política y de las instituciones en general, acompañando las formas de socialización de las nuevas generaciones ya menos vinculadas con instituciones y estructuras.

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3 En la fecha indicada se produjeron varios episodios en forma simultánea que expresan un antes y un después en la historia política y social argentina: saqueos espontáneos y organizados por caudillos políticos de zonas empobrecidas, los cuales se montaron en la agudización del hambre en masas desempleadas, protesta callejera masiva de sectores medios afectados por las últimas medidas económicas, crisis institucional debido a la pérdida de legitimidad creciente del gobierno de la Alianza, falta de apoyos políticos, el Parlamento enfrentado al Ejecutivo, etc. La ferocidad de la represión policial junto con la fuerza y masividad de la protesta otorgaron a dichas jornadas aspectos de estallido social. Este escenario callejero atrajo poderosamente la mirada internacional sobre las consecuencias del experimento neoliberal aplicado en la Argentina en los últimos 25 años. Imaginarios constitutivos del mito argentino comenzaron a caer rápidamente a partir de imágenes mediáticas que recorrieron el mundo.

Este movimiento, asimismo, no estaría exento del proceso que diversos sociólogos dan en llamar la extensión de la cultura a diversas esferas de la sociedad. Autores como Lash y Urry (1998), Featherstone (2000), Yúdice (2003), entre otros, señalan que la dimensión adquirida por las industrias culturales en la sociedad contemporánea debilita el peso de lo social como marco de referencia de la acción y en su reemplazo se instala la cultura, lo cual generaría un nuevo tipo de reflexividad subjetiva que denominan estética. Una consecuencia de la expansión de las industrias culturales en la sociedad contemporánea es la proliferación de productores culturales.

Esta expansión de la esfera cultural impugna las esferas autónomas de la modernidad, proceso denominado por Scott Lash (1997) "crisis del régimen de significación moderna", como consecuencia de la desdiferenciación de dichas esferas, y produce lo que Featherstone (2000) señala como la estetización de la vida cotidiana. En ese marco podemos comprender el fenómeno que presenciamos en los grandes centros urbanos de estetización de los movimientos sociales, así como el creciente interés por las actividades culturales en las formas asociativas recientes. (Yúdice, 2003)

En la actualidad aparece como una nota distintiva de los espacios sociales emergentes una consideración de la cultura como un espacio generador de significados alternativos al modelo económico hegemónico de la década anterior, donde la palabra resistencia se reitera. En las entrevistas es frecuente escuchar que las actividades culturales que se ofrecen pretenden hacer reflexionar a los públicos en torno a una vida menos poblada de objetos materiales, se trata de generar valores de solidaridad, convivencia, estilos de vida no consumistas, formas cooperativas. También la tendencia de los artistas a asociarse se orienta en esta dirección, entre sus fundamentos aparece la crítica a la lógica mercantil de la industria cultural dominante e hiperconcentrada y apuntan a recuperar la dimensión crítica del arte. Ahora bien, este discurso de resistencia expresa la distancia en torno a la constitución de un discurso ideológico articulado. No tiene una dimensión contrahegemónica en el sentido en que lo plantea Williams (1980), ni mucho menos. Se trata de buscar un espacio propio en un contexto dominado por la concentración massmediática Si la cultura no fue asumida como política cultural explícita durante los noventa, considerada sin utilidad ni provecho económico, por el contrario, ésta comienza a invadir la esfera social, pero como resistencia en grupos sociales juveniles y en nuevas formas de asociatividad cultural[4].

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4 Las reflexiones que presentamos sobre este tema derivan de entrevistas realizadas en el marco del Proyecto UBACYT 052 2004-2007, radicado en el IIGG-FCS, a espacios culturales situados en fábricas recuperadas, centros culturales derivados de Asambleas y nuevos productores culturales, como el caso del nuevo cine documental. Las entrevistas a las que aludo en este trabajo fueron hechas junto con Sebastián Benítez Larghi, Nicolas Grossman, Viviana Molinari, Claudia Uhart.

A pesar de que este proceso de búsquedas comienza en el marco de la crisis económica del menemismo, hace eclosión, o al menos se hace visible, con los acontecimientos de diciembre de 2001, los cuales para estos jóvenes organizadores impone un antes y un después en la sociedad argentina. Ellos dicen "todo se vuelve más real".

La composición de estos imaginarios llamados de resistencia en las agrupaciones sociales emergentes se funda en diversos componentes. Nos preguntamos entonces: ¿la resistencia cultural reemplaza a la resistencia política de los setenta?

Por un lado, observamos la recuperación y reivindicación de un pasado previo a la transición democrática. Ante el fracaso del discurso de los beneficios que traería la democracia institucional, reemerge el discurso político ideológico de los setenta, revisitado. Cabe señalar que algunos entrevistados que participan en acciones culturales vinculadas a espacios sociales de lucha, como fábricas recuperadas, o centros culturales autogestionados, provienen de la experiencia de militancia en agrupaciones como *Hijos* y luego han pasado por la práctica teatral alternativa y experimental. Así podemos constatar que se produce una tradición selectiva de los imaginarios de los años setenta, en el marco de la experiencia cultural de los noventa y de nuevas procedencias político-culturales. Lo presento así porque pasados unos años, se manifiesta una idealización del pasado, a la vez que porque, por otro lado, se hace explícita una crítica profunda a los partidos de izquierda tradicionales, a su dinámica estructural y organizativa. Y fundamentalmente podemos observar la presencia de una nueva subjetividad más desestructurada que la del militante de izquierda moderno y encuadrado en la línea del partido. Quienes participan en los nuevos movimientos sociales también están atravesados por estilos de organizaciones de corte más horizontal, democrático, igualitario y hedonista. Precisamente una característica de los centros culturales de nuevo tipo y los colectivos de artistas es la práctica asambleística e informal.

Se percibe una exaltación de ciertas figuras políticas de esos años como el Che Guevara, pero en términos míticos, fundamentalmente, por la elección de un estilo de vida no burgués, por la opción por una causa, la búsqueda de ideales, pero con una vivencia de lo moderno distinta de las generaciones anteriores. Se puede observar en las asociaciones de músicos, de fotógrafos, colectivos de artistas, la preocupación por la búsqueda de nuevos estilos de vida, con cierta reminiscencia comunitaria al estilo *hippie*, un cuestionamiento de las estructuras burocráticas de corte instrumental, la recuperación de formas cooperativas pero sin pensar en transformaciones totalizadoras de la sociedad.

En esta resistencia cultural aparece una intencionalidad orientada a la difusión de valores no mercantiles, cuyas producciones culturales comienzan a circular en una

esfera pública no mediática tradicional promovida por un conjunto de grupos musicales independientes, colectivos de arte, artistas no convencionales.

Asimismo, estos nuevos promotores culturales alternativos cuestionan a los artistas del espectáculo, o industria cultural, en los centros culturales que intentan promover se pretende generar una nueva concepción cultural no pensada como autorreferencial, no para sí mismo, para el campo, sino tiene que transmitir la realidad de la gente, pero no en el sentido del realismo imperante en los años setenta sino desde una recuperación de lo corporal. Aparece mucho en estos espacios el uso de prácticas como *clown*, malabares y murga.

Otros sujetos, otras subjetividades, se producen socializadas entre el mito del paraíso consumista, la amenaza de la exclusión social, el irresuelto desempleo y el empobrecimiento creciente de la sociedad así como el debilitamiento de las instituciones de la modernidad. La escuela, el trabajo, la fábrica y la familia no constituyen referentes de socialización para las jóvenes generaciones herederas de cierto capital político y cultural[5]. No están acostumbrados a la organización, a las pautas, a las normas. Encuentran en la cultura y en la estetización un espacio para construir nuevos estilos de vida. No siendo la corporación trasnacional el espacio de inclusión de ciertas clases medias, la cultura, la industria cultural, las organizaciones y proyectos culturales y sociales de nuevo tipo resultan instancias atractivas para las nuevas generaciones socializadas tempranamente con las industrias culturales como la televisión, la música, Internet, la cultura informática, telefonía celular, a la vez que el *management*, y formas organizativas de la sociedad civil.

Por otro lado podemos suponer que esta expansión de la cultura surge en un contexto de cierre de los campos culturales consagrados que incluyan a la proliferación de productores culturales. Podemos constatar que algunos de los espacios culturales que surgen vinculados a otras prácticas sociales y requerimientos ciudadanos, como fábricas recuperadas y asambleas barriales, convertidos en centros culturales, no necesariamente están destinados a los sujetos urgidos por una carencia social, sino que en muchos casos configuran un espacio autorreferencial. El desarrollo de las nuevas tecnologías, la digitalización e Internet, configuran una nueva dinámica en la conformación de esferas públicas de la cultura y de nuevos públicos.

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5   Surgiero en este aspecto revisar Bauman (2001)

Reflexión final

Según hemos podido constatar, la emergencia de centros culturales autogestionados en espacios abandonados de la ciudad y en fábricas e instituciones en crisis aparece en sujetos desocupados y con problemas serios de empleo en forma no consciente. Se parte de un diagnóstico de la carencia de opciones culturales para una sociedad acosada por la crisis y la desintegración social, cuya única opción son ofertas mercantiles. En quienes encaran estos proyectos se observan trayectorias personales vinculadas a militancia social. Se constata una respuesta subjetiva frente al desempleo, que incluye la dimensión cultural y que asume el reconocimiento de nuevos derechos. La cultura aparece como ámbito de generación de recursos y búsqueda de otros estilos de vida, también se observa búsqueda de sentidos en prácticas culturales no occidentales. No todos los centros culturales son iguales, en algunos casos se recoge la práctica profesional universitaria de profesiones como médicos, psicólogos o educadores. Con los proyectos que desarrollan, estos profesionales precarizados responden a necesidades otrora satisfechas por el Estado. La crisis de cierto modelo profesional aparece como resultado de cierto diagnóstico de la sociedad contemporánea, provocado por la exacerbación del neoliberalismo, pero también de una tímida reemergencia de búsquedas menos estructuradas. Del discurso neoliberal y de la presencia fuerte de las agencias internacionales estos nuevos trabajadores han adoptado el discurso acerca de la capacidad individual para gestionar proyectos. A pesar de la profunda crisis de sentido que atraviesa aún la sociedad argentina, se puede visualizar un valor incuestionado como la cultura y la educación. Así observamos que la cultura asume distintos usos: estetización de la protesta social, como recurso económico, legítimas luchas sociales fundadas en otras sensibilidades.

Como el empleo es vivido como enloquecedor, y destructor de la vida cotidiana, se adopta como emergencia social el concepto de empresa social derivado de prácticas psiquiátricas. Esta reivindicación retorna en el marco de la emergencia del ensayo de nuevas formas de hacer política distanciadas de los partidos políticos y de las viejas formas de hacer política, influenciadas por nuevos discursos ideológicos promovidos por los movimientos sociales antiglobalización.

En síntesis, si bien se puede afirmar que el modelo cultural hegemónico de los años noventa ha dejado de integrar imaginariamente al conjunto de la sociedad, a partir de la emergencia de nuevas formas asociativas y nuevos estilos de vida, aún no logra plasmarse en formas políticas ni tampoco se extiende al conjunto de la sociedad.

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The Hybrid Worker

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"*A growing number of experts foresee a radical break in the organisation of work. They expect that use of the new technologies and related profound changes in production will overthrow the long-established work patterns that allowed individuals to predict safely how a job would structure their day, week, year and lifetime.*"
Future of Work: Towards a Jobless Employment? OECD, 1991

For decades, we have been speculating about how work will look as we move out of the industrial age into the age variously called post-industrial, information or knowledge age. The context in which this discussion about the future of work must take place at the beginning of the 21st century is change and change is gathering pace. The world population is going through an exponential rise in number and, according to experts in population dynamics, it will continue at this speed for at least another hundred years. At the same time, society is becoming more complex and only just beginning to understand how the new technologies can be best put to work.

New structures are being called for as a response to this mounting complexity. These new structures, however, must be informed by completely different organizing principles and values from those that have guided us in the past. This shift in thinking is already taking place simultaneously throughout society - in homes, offices, schools and factories.

Logically, systems dedicated to service provision, such as care, education and mental and physical well-being, must also carry out a thorough examination of all aspects of their delivery, taking into account a full range of resources available, including new kinds of workers.

This paper narrows in on a particular aspect of the changes that are clearly underway: the emergence of a number of hybrid fields and within those fields,

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workers that are called for the purposes of this paper "hybrid workers". And within this hybrid worker group, this paper will look at those who use the arts, culture or creativity as a basic ingredient in their work. The paper will also talk a little about some of the shortcomings visible in the established systems we have for the encouragement of these new forms of working and the implications for initial training in a number of fields.

As mentioned, the context for this topic is a time in which society, and the way it is organized, is changing rapidly. The nature of this new society is one that begins to recognize that our problems, whether economic, environmental, educational or social are not separate from one another. They are, in fact, clearly interdependent.

The perspective of the author is from her post as Director of the Centre for Creative Communities (CCC). CCC works on problems of social equity and factors of successful community building and focuses ways to encourage people to be active in their communities. This encouragement happens through two fairly new but pervasive contexts.

The first context is lifelong learning. All people in our societies and the systems that serve them are hugely affected by the decision to accept that "lifelong learning" is not only a goal but also a right of all people. How do we encourage people to acquire a hunger for learning and participation throughout their lives? What does it mean for schools? What does it mean for health and social services? What does it mean for artists?

The second context is the plethora of new technologies that pervade all our systems and relationships. These new technologies have a profound effect on the connection between teaching and learning, between citizens and public services and certainly between the voluntary sector and government. Both of these contexts affect communities and our traditional sectors are beginning to adapt to more process-based methods of personal and social development, thinking laterally about how to work more closely together. As a result, new communities of work are emerging as personal and community development become the shared responsibility of many departments or sectors of society: health and social services, formal and informal education, criminal justice, arts and culture, the police, and business.

This phenomenon immediately poses some problems however, since sectors continue to be quite separate from one another in the way they conduct their training and in the many ways they approach their jobs. Only in a few places do we start to see whole systems change in the direction of collaboration with other areas of expertise. In Finland, for instance, the health department is converting away from having as its central function the fixing of sick people and, instead, becoming a department that is chiefly concerned with the development of well-being in its population. In order to

make this transition, the department is well aware that it needs new skills and sensitivities towards understanding what makes people feel well and secure in the places they live. This focus on community shows an interest in how people form a sense of place and get a grip on their personal identity.

From this scenario, it is not surprising to discover that health workers are engaging in new collaborations with experts in alternative learning, community animation and personal empowerment.

The work of these new collaborations is not easy to describe and it is not yet very well understood. But it is precisely the processes that make up these new kinds of collaborations that CCC is working to understand, particularly those new processes and mechanisms that rely on artistic, creative and cultural practice to form their powerful instruments of change.

The Centre for Creative Communities works in this context and uses the following questions to construct its research:

- How can we understand the collaborative processes that get people excited about their own lives and give them fair and just opportunities to develop their full potential?
- How are those processes changing the traditional sectors and settings?
- How can people learn to live in peaceful co-existence? And, importantly,
- What kind of workers can take us closer to some of these complex destinations?

New ways to think about the organization of work

To begin a description about the growing volume of work that does not easily fit into existing categories it is useful to look first at what triggers the need for the work in the first place. It could be shared problems in society such as urban and rural decline, issues around health, literacy or social inclusion. Equally, the trigger might be a desire to create opportunities, such as lifelong learning, ecological planning or the maintenance of traditional art forms. The clusters of people that congregate around these challenges are bravely stepping outside of their specialist areas, pooling personal and professional knowledge and addressing the problem collaboratively. CCC calls the phenomenon that emerges "creative community visioning", which typically involves at least three sectors, though the activity itself is not usually sector specific.

In a creative community, the specialist sectors will still be drawn upon and necessary but there is also a need to suspend disbelief, think laterally and develop organically. In a creative community, hybrid sectors like arts and education,

education/business partnerships, and others have fused to enable the emergence of a meta sector with individual creativity as a central ingredient.

Creative community visioning is not owned by any of its individual parts. It is an expression of a new metaphor of continuous change, which requires constantly evolving language, values and behaviours. It is about collaborative participation and shared vision and it is locally owned.

The Centre for Creative Communities' work on creative community visioning led to its first cross-sector study, which was called *Common Threads, Participation for a Better World*. It focussed on 14 projects in 10 European countries. Each of the projects combined the expertise and interests of people from education, community development and the arts.

From this study, many lessons were learned, the first of which was that creativity is not owned by any one sector. Another was that the education of a child happens in many places in and out of school and that many people can be teachers. In a creative community, the roles of teacher and learner are constantly changing from one person to another.

It was clear that people conducting their practice in collaborative ways took risks more readily and saw things in new ways. The nature of their work changed too - it was becoming more hybrid.

New concepts, language and structures: hybrid work

There are some stories that can help illustrate the concept of hybrid work. These stories should begin to give us the concepts, language, structures and even the feelings that comprise hybrid work. And a review of these elements should make it possible for us to get a picture of the hybrid worker and what it might take to legitimize that worker within society.

The first story is that of Heads Together, a small company comprising a couple of artists, Adrian and Linda, who lived with their young family on a low-income tarmac-covered housing estate in Leeds.

They knew that the arts can be used to engage with people and that there can be a beneficial growth in confidence, skills etc., among those participating. But they were also keenly aware of the lack of experience that most other residents had of artists and of the arts. Adrian and Linda decided not to say they were artists and simply started a conversation with as many people on the estate as possible. The conversation was about hopes and fears and about place and identity. They spent a great deal of time developing trust among the residents focussing first on the young and older people.

After many community meetings, residents began to be comfortable about sharing their dreams, their disappointments and their fears. They decided mainly that they wanted to be like other places - to be able, for instance, to have a village fête. Their problem was that they had only cement streets with no green spaces or venues.

They decided to rent a great deal of turf to cover up the streets and painted a tall wall white. The result was a bang-up village fête rich with talent show, film festival (all films made by the local people) and food fair.

Heads Together has worked in many settings, most recently in a factory, which was scheduled to be closed in six months. Joining the 250 factory staff, Adrian, Linda and colleagues set in motion a number of processes by which the workers could come to terms with a complete change of direction in their lives. They were encouraged to interview each other, take photos and films, and participate in discussions and performances. The National Heritage Lottery Fund and the workers' union paid for the residency. The process that paid detailed attention to each worker and the products, all artistic in nature (films, photographs, written pieces all compiled into a full colour book with DVD), were high quality and gave participants tangible ways to remember their experiences.

The techniques of Adrian and Linda are quite organic in nature, allowing the participants to complete the meaning of the experience for themselves. Should we think of Adrian and Linda as artists? Community development workers? Social workers? They don't define themselves in any of those categories; instead, they talk about what drives them, what inspires them. In short, they are driven by their strong values.

The Heads Together stories came to light through the course of a study conducted by CCC looking at policies within Europe developed specifically to encourage cross-sector or hybrid work. The findings showed that though cross-sector policies and practice are only beginning to appear, they do seem to be here to stay.

The study revealed that people did not tend to talk about their hybrid work in traditional education, health or arts terms, but rather were more inclined to describe broad categories of targets aimed at creating situations of social inclusion or encouraging the development of creativity. Creative community building is in fact based first on values choices such as access, well-being or citizenship and therefore cuts indiscriminately across the traditional sectors. Values-based processes are creating a more lateral way of doing things and the traditional sectors have fewer and fewer borders between them. The new ways of working make explicit the interdependence of our lives and work.

A pattern of development seemed to emerge from these studies, which might be necessary components to building successful hybrid work:

- Trust
- Sharing
- Participation
- Responsibility
- Futures
- Sustainability.

Most effective projects will have gone through a similar pattern of development.

New partnerships and new sensitivities

In the UK, there are hundreds of projects and organizations addressing health and well-being issues in collaboration with the arts. Arts and health practitioners admit that there is sometimes a tension as to whether they are artists or health workers. They say that they enhance healthcare using arts as a tool.

The Walsall Community Arts Team was established in 1989 as part of the Walsall Metropolitan Borough Council. The team quickly established a reputation for using the arts in an effective way by engaging and involving communities in exploring sensitive health issues. Between 1999 and 2004, they staged or commissioned 23 projects in a variety of settings. For instance, the East Walsall Health Action Zone recognized the difficulty that men seemed to have in talking about health, visiting the doctor, and taking positive steps to improve their health and well-being. So, the initiative focused on health education.

But the hospitals were brought to the men, right to their local pubs, community centres and workingmen's clubs. Nurses, local volunteers and comedians together created fun learning situations. There were 15 gigs in all and hundreds of health checks were made. So great was the success that local residents wanted more and wanted to be actually involved in the comedy themselves. This led to the establishment of *Private Parts*, where two Christmas shows were performed in which local residents told their own stories and enacted their own comedy. The theatre company involved, called Round Midnight, spent twelve weeks in the workingmen's clubs in Rushall and Ogley Hay. Rushall produced a cabaret style event, called *From Rushall with Love*, and Ogley Hay performed *The Good, The Bad and the Ogley*.

Health checks were made during the 12-week periods alongside the performances. Findings were recorded on cards, which the men took away. If necessary, they also took a referral letter that highlighted a health need for their doctor. The positive statistics of this project were impressive to say the least.

This is an encouraging story, but it is a fairly isolated example of public policy buying into an arts-based solution to health problems. The larger policies are far less likely to give the creative solutions a fair wind.

The National Network of Arts and Health (NNAH) has over 400 members throughout the UK. The NNAH article in the spring 2005 issue of *Animated* magazine asks the question: *Will the government be able to reach the goals it has set for itself in the 2004 spending review? Will the year on year increase in under 11s childhood obesity halt by 2010? Will there be a decline in the number of falls of the elderly? Bigger problems, new targets - same old way of working. The politicians appear to be brave to set targets high enough to raise eyebrows and expectations, but equally they appear to be too scared to try anything innovative to help these targets be achieved. Their answer to all of the questions is the same one that has been given for years: SPORT.*

And yet, hundreds of stories can illustrate the fact that dance and creative movement can attract and engage a broad spectrum of the community regardless of age in both urban and rural settings.

These new fields linking arts, creativity and culture to health, social inclusion, education or community development are simply not on the screen of most traditional sector planners. So there are pitifully few resources and even fewer policies in existence.

A Scottish ray of hope

A 23-year old mother of two lives on a tough Glasgow estate. Last year her youngest child started school and this still young woman once again thought about becoming the musician she knows is inside her.

The only music class she could find, however, wanted her to study guitar only. This felt very much like the school she had left at 14. However, through an informal programme on offer, this young woman met a musician who had decided, alongside his regular work as a popular Glaswegian musician and DJ, to devote time to helping young aspiring musicians to develop. After an interview, the young mother was deemed to have enough drive and passion to carry her through a nine-month set of open sessions and she was invited to join.

The programme, called the REAL Partnership, dignified the young mother's drive and made space for her talents to emerge. It also gave the musician a new beginning. Besides using his talent, artistic know-how and music industry acumen, he developed a complex array of new skills. He gained an expertise in working with disenfranchized young people that would rival the practice of many professional

social and health workers for its effectiveness. He also became a first-rate information technology teacher. His contact with young musicians' social and musical development not only improved his own ability to make music, but also fulfilled him in ways that touched him deeply. The students and their multi-faceted development have become part of his life's work. He has, in short, become a hybrid worker joining a small but growing list of people skilled to understand what inspires young people. He will likely never return to being "just a musician".

Where do we go from here?

Quietly, alongside the always long and often painful processes to reform our public policies, there is a steady growth of hybrid workers tackling some of the most intractable problems in society today through inventive collaboration with people and communities.

The contact between the musician-cum-social worker and the young aspiring musician was facilitated by a network of collaborators that includes Scottish Enterprise Glasgow, the Lighthouse, the Trialect creative industries programme and others, to promote new ways to link learning, enterprise and respect for the learner.

This story is a hopeful and successful indication that creative hybrid work is being recognized for its strong potential to encourage groups of people to develop their potential in a way that is meaningful for them.

Reports published recently by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister remind us of the government's drive to raise the quality of life in our communities. Their emphasis is on increasing prosperity, reducing inequalities, creating employment, improving public services, and delivering better health and education, while tackling crime and antisocial behaviour. It often sounds as if these programmes are geared to people, but in reality, most are not. In fact, these good intentions are a result of a growing awareness that urban regeneration, lifelong learning and community development are at a watershed and pressure is building to find ways to reach the people at the centre of their programmes more effectively.

The studies of the Centre for Creative Communities and others would indicate that all communities have within them this spirit of optimism and enthusiasm. It can be a powerful force for change, but those who have responsibility for political, cultural or educational policy can so easily overlook it.

The processes that prove successful in strengthening collaborative teams are, in themselves, straightforward but they need to be better understood by all who profess an interest in fostering creative development.

As the government papers indicate, we are recognizing that problems, whether economic, environmental, educational or social are not separate from one another. But translating this knowledge into practice through our traditional sectors is not at all straightforward. Old hierarchies and established training tend to re-invent familiar approaches with new names. All too often these time-honoured specialized methods of delivery and organizational hierarchies are overwhelmed by new challenges. There are few official programmes sufficiently in touch with (particularly young) people's lives to effect lasting change. Nor are they geared up to facilitate alternative forms of practice.

This lack is frustrating for a growing number of people who are using creative processes to confront the complex interests, talents and problems of people and communities directly. Artists are working with hospital patients, theatre practitioners are working with young offenders, and police are working with designers on public spaces. On the fringes of all sectors new, often creative hybrid workers are emerging who deal directly with the interdependent realities of contemporary problems. It is not surprising, perhaps, that traditional sectors struggle to keep up.

The youth, community development and informal education worlds have had hybrid workers for decades. With the notable exception of community arts workers who have been active in the UK since the 1960s, designers and others in the creative industries are relative newcomers to the ranks of those who are eager to become more involved in the political, social, cultural and economic context of their work.

Hybrid workers

Hybrid work and its practitioners, characterized by unconventional thinking that leads to unexpected discoveries, have their share of problems. Policy and training structures that feed into health, education, the arts and other public services are usually rigid in structure and slow to change their ways of working. Known structures are usually favoured over more risky propositions. This is certainly true of creative hybrid practice, which can be ignored by arts and social policy funding alike.

Dutch information specialist, Bert Mulder, describes hybrid work as coming out of a period in which the over-riding context is an extraordinary rate of change. It is not surprising perhaps, that large institutions and indeed whole sectors such as the education sector, the health sector, the arts sector, etc., are really struggling to evolve fast enough to keep up with the fields they serve. As a society we have entered a period of confusion - and the search is on for new organizing principles with which to think about and design our work.

New organizing principles enable the creation of new work patterns based on networks and away from traditional hierarchies. A networked society differs from a hierarchical one in that its emphasis is more on dynamic processes rather than static products. It relies on fluidity and situations that are developed from implicit and unfolding meanings as opposed to being explicit and predicable. There is a strong recognition that the emphasis must be on what people and institutions are becoming rather than acting on an impression of what they already are. These transitions force us to take account of our work habits and our institutional structures.

Creative hybrid practice is so new that there is debate as to what constitutes quality and success. Should the work be judged on the process or on the product at the end of the process? Some would say that the quality of the process is inextricably linked to the quality of the product and that their constant interaction is key to their transformative abilities. It is evident from such debate that new evaluation methods are needed to judge the success or failure of hybrid practice.

Implications for training

There are implications for training as hybrid sectors emerge both for initial training and for post-graduate professional development. Put simply, all social workers, teachers, artists, politicians, public administration and health workers should be sensitized, through their initial training, to the agendas of other sectors. They should be given skills in the art of collaboration. This kind of adjustment in training will not only help lay the groundwork for the traditional institutions and sectors to change with the times, but it also gives more people within those institutions the understanding needed to recognize and engage with hybrid activity.

As for hybrid workers themselves, I expect that many will continue to form in response to real situations. There are a few courses starting to appear in FE and HE colleges and universities, a Masters programme in arts and health in East Anglia and a number of community arts degree courses. In general, however, training opportunities are thin on the ground.

It is pretty clear that private business is looking at ways to encourage the development of new kinds of workers through better use of shared work environments. An imperative today is for traditional public service sectors to come to terms with the fact that there are now many hybrid sectors and hybrid workers that can make a huge contribution to some of our toughest problems if given the space and resources. This is not easy, given that many of our structures are rigid and have no mechanisms in place to take advantage of new kinds of workers. The irony is that it is likely that hybrid workers could be the catalysts to accelerate the evolution of traditional institutions into ones in tune with the complex 21st-century society.

Dialogue or Diplomacy? Public Policy and International Artist Mobility Programmes

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Nearly five years ago, the Canada Council hosted the first World Summit on the Arts and Culture in Ottawa. The summit programme bore a quote from Mexican-born artist and writer, Guillermo Gómez-Peña: "*The border is the juncture, not the edge*."

In the context of the summit, the first meeting of people from arts funding agencies in over 55 countries, I interpreted Gómez-Peña's border as a geographic one... And that his point was that borders should not be barriers, but rather opportunities for connection and dialogue.

So, I searched for the source of that quote. I discovered that it is from his manifesto, "The border is …", contained in his 1989 book *Warrior for Gringostroika*.

I found that Gómez-Peña says much more about what the border is:

- "But it also means to develop new models to interpret the world-in-crisis, the only world we know.
- But it also means to push the borders of countries and languages or, better said, to find new languages to express the fluctuating borders.
- But it also means experimenting with the fringes between art and society…. and subverting these relationships…
- But it also means to analyze critically all that lies on the current table of debates…
- But it also means to question and transgress border culture…".

And so I was led to wonder: if all this transgressive, analytical and experimental stuff is going on at borders, are governments really interested in supporting artists' attempts to cross them?

I pose the questions then:

What *are* the objectives of public policy that supports international artist mobility programmes - the crossing of borders? And, is public policy, at its core, about dialogue or diplomacy?

Late last year, the International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies (IFACCA) published a 40 page report, called *Artists' International Mobility Programs*. (Staines, 2004)

Written by Judith Staines, the report was based on information supplied by the IFACCA network of government policy makers and researchers in over 100 countries. The report found that international artist mobility programmes exist around the world in many forms, but that "genuinely open, transnational mobility programs that are dedicated to the creative process and unconstrained by bilateral frameworks, cultural diplomacy agendas and national interests are somewhat rare".

International mobility is nothing new for artists: the journey has been central to the quest for creative expression for centuries. Yet, in the last ten years, there seems to have been an increasing interest in international artist mobility from policy and programme makers around the world. Programmes have been launched and refined as national and regional borders have changed. Debate has intensified with several conferences staged and research reports published.

It raises the question: is there a sense in which artists are being "used" by governments to achieve their public policy objectives? In seeking to answer this, I am speaking from two perspectives. First, as someone who worked for ten years in the Australian government's agency that funds the arts, the Australia Council, and secondly, as the founding Executive Director of IFACCA. It has become clear to me that most governments, whatever their size, use the arts and culture to influence global agendas. They do this both through their own national agencies and by participation in international organizations or networks.

In analysing the objectives of national agencies, I will use Australia as an example, but I believe the principles apply to many other countries. Before I start, I should put Australia itself in some context. Although it has only the population of the Netherlands, just over 20 million people, Australia has a landmass equal to the United States or China. Of the world's 200 or so countries, Australia is the about the 12th wealthiest in economic terms - after the Netherlands and Korea. It is a highly urbanized, westernized and technologically advanced society. It is, surprisingly to some, one of the world's most culturally diverse nations. And it has the oldest living culture in the world. Comprising less than 2% of the population, Australia's indigenous peoples have inhabited Australia for over 40,000 years.

How does the government of a country such as Australia supports its artists on an international stage… and why?

There seem to me to be four main reasons why government funding agencies support the arts internationally: for artistic development, to boost exports, to support diplomatic agendas, and as part of aid programmes. Of course, the programmes that support such policy objectives do not sit in neat boxes. The objectives often overlap thereby blurring the motivations for government activity. For example, in a recent *Australia Council Annual Report* (Australia Council, 2003: 26), the description of a large festival of Australian arts in Berlin (the programme - artsaustralia berlin - increased opportunities for collaboration between Australian, German and other European artists, and opened up European markets to tours and exhibitions. At the same time it projected a positive and sophisticated image of contemporary Australian culture) suggests it served multiple objectives - a combination of art and export, or dialogue and diplomacy.

Looking now at the first of the four strands:

The primary objective of artistic development is focused on the artist and his or her art.

The main agency supporting this type of objective in Australia is the Australia Council. Of the Australia Council's annual budget of $147 million, about 5% supports activity outside Australia. Examples of programmes designed to achieve artistic objectives include:

- residencies or studio programmes (and exchanges e.g., in Paris, Asia)
- international exhibitions and tours
- grants to attend international events.

Essential to such programmes is dialogue, that is, opportunities for collaboration between the visiting artists and artists and communities in the country being visited.

Before moving on to the next three areas, I should say that programmes supporting such objectives *can* result in dialogue, or art and artist development, but this is not their primary objective. Take for example the Venice Biennale. Today, in fact, just a few hundred kilometres from here, one could be attending the Vernissage of the Biennale.

In the way the Australia Council described its reasons for supporting the previous Biennale, the overlap between dialogue and diplomacy is quite apparent. (Australia Council, 2003: 25)

This brings me to the next area of export development. The primary objective here is the creation of sales of artworks. It may also include building the profile of Australia and its artists to support that marketing and export drive.

The Australian Government's export agency - the Australian Trade Commission or Austrade - has, over the last ten years gradually broadened its focus to include arts products alongside its support for export of coal and cattle.

Ten years ago, the Australia Council also started to support exports, developing several programmes in areas such as:

- contemporary music
- bringing international publishers and agents to Australia to meet writers and agents
- supporting commercial galleries to attend international art fairs
- staging and attending performing arts markets - Adelaide and elsewhere - e.g., CINARS, APAP.

One of its latest initiatives, Ozarts online, (designed to be an appealing and accessible online service promoting contemporary Australian culture internationally - an online showcase of "export-ready" Australian contemporary arts) is a portal to Australian arts product that is "export-ready".

Moving then to diplomacy.

The objective of cultural programmes organized by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, is "to present a positive image of Australia which advances its foreign and trade policy interests" (Australia International Cultural Council, 1999).

The way this is done in Australia differs from the larger wealthier nations, which have established separate government agencies to promote their country or language through the arts.

For example, the British Council, the Goethe Institut in Germany, l'AFAA (l'Association Française d'Action Artistique) in France and the Japan Foundation all operate virtually independently of the agency that funds the arts domestically - the four British Arts Councils, the culture ministries of the 12 *Länder*, the art form based departments of the Ministry of Culture in France, and the Bunka Cho or Agency for Cultural Affairs in Japan.

For a detailed comparison of international cultural relations strategies, covering these and four other countries, I recommend Margaret Wyszomirski's report (2003).

In my experience there is always an undercurrent of tension in the relationships between these two types of organizations. It is that tension between dialogue and diplomacy. To see a really tough-minded version of arts diplomacy - and the ease

with which the artist can be lost in the process - I refer you to a recent paper by Cynthia P. Schneider, a former US ambassador to the Netherlands (2003: 2): "Performances such as those of Porgy and Bess (1952) in the Soviet Union and Martha Graham in Vietnam (1975) brought the abstract ideals of liberty and equality to life…. Then, as now, self-criticism and experiments in artistic expression are among the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of a super power". She relies on the artistic brilliance of George Gershwin and Martha Graham to describe how notions of freedom and equality can be exported. Yet, she proposes "best practices in cultural diplomacy" as follows (Schneider, 2003: 3): "To be successful, initiatives in cultural diplomacy should contain one or several of the following characteristics. They should:

- communicate some aspect of America's values
- cater to the interests of the host country or region
- offer pleasure, information or expertise in the spirit of exchange and mutual respect
- open doors between American diplomats and the host country
- provide another dimension to the official presence of America in the country
- form part of a long-term relationship and the cultivation of ties; and
- be creative, flexible and opportunistic."

In my view, best practice would also require both:

- an assessment of the quality of the art, and
- respect for the artist who makes it.

The last of the four reasons that governments support the arts internationally is to assist sustainable development through support for creative practices.

One of the agencies best known in this field is Sweden's International Development Cooperation Agency - SIDA. The goal of SIDA's work is to improve the standard of living of poor people and, in the long term, to eradicate poverty. Apart from women, children and young people, minority groups and journalists, SIDA's policy targets "cultural practitioners" defined as those who "administer their cultural heritage, examine the age they live in, and contribute to their homeland's innovative activities…" (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2000: 8). I use Sweden to illustrate this objective as, to my knowledge, Australia's equivalent agency, AusAID, is not active in arts at all.

Having covered the national agencies, I will now cover very briefly, the ways in which governments operate through international agencies and networks in the arts field.

Probably the oldest and highest profile is UNESCO, the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization. Its role spans the dialogue/diplomacy continuum as highlighted in the preamble to its constitution: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defence of peace must be constructed". UNESCO's culture agenda is broad, covering areas such as: tangible heritage, intangible heritage, intercultural dialogue, culture and development, cultural industries, arts and creativity, cultural industries, copyright, etc.

But, as well as UNESCO, there are an increasing range of other international agencies, funded directly or indirectly by government, that have programmes that support artist mobility and artist-led dialogue. For example,

- ASEAN Committee on Culture and Information
- Asia Europe Foundation
- Commonwealth Foundation
- Convenio Andrès Bello
- World Bank - Development Gateway
- European Union
- Organisación de Estados Iberoamericanos
- Organization of American States
- Secretariat of the Pacific Community
- The African Union

There is a similarly long list I have called "international networks". While the distinction between the two is not always clear, in this category I include those international organizations that are more membership-driven.

- Ars Baltica
- CIRCLE
- Conseil International des Organisations de Festivals, de Folklore et d'Arts Traditionnels
- Culturelink
- European League of Institutes of the Arts
- Informal European Theatre Meeting
- International Federation of Actors
- International Federation of Arts Councils and Culture Agencies
- International Network for Cultural Diversity
- International Network of Observatories in Cultural Policies
- International Network on Cultural Policy
- World Crafts Council

There are many more - covering everything from museums to cultural economists all with the aim of boosting cultural dialogue. Many of them are the result of public policy and/or have government support. I note, as an example, the International Network on Cultural Policy, and the role of the Canadian government and other national governments that have become active in it. The INCP was created in 1998 to strengthen cultural policies so that governments, together with civil society, can create an international environment that values diversity, creativity, accessibility and freedom. It is an informal, international venue where national ministers responsible for culture can explore and exchange views on new and emerging cultural policy issues and to develop strategies to promote cultural diversity (INCP website, 2005).

The International Network for Cultural Diversity (INCD) is "a worldwide network of artists and cultural groups dedicated to countering the homogenizing effects of globalization on culture."

Both the INCD and the INCP were initiated by the Canadian government, which continues, with other governments, to play a key role in resourcing these networks. The primary motivation for governments to be involved in these networks is their concern about the impact of trade issues on culture.

There is insufficient time to analyse the public policy objectives of other networks, but it is interesting to consider whether their roles are about dialogue or diplomacy.

IFACCA is the first global network of arts funding agencies - now comprising 47 countries. Our role is to create opportunities for people working in arts funding policy to share information and to meet each other to exchange knowledge and expertise. We hope that this will enable them to do what they do better and to have a more expansive view about the role of governments in supporting the arts. While we do not directly support artist mobility, this may, in time, become an indirect result of the strengthening of relationships between domestic funding agencies. The website www.ifacca.org provides more information.

In conclusion, I should stress that as each national agency has its own institutional framework and cultural backgrounds, it is impossible to lift a policy or programme from one country and expect it to work in another.

Nevertheless, IFACCA often tries, through its D'Art reports, to offer some general principles about what might constitute good practice.

In terms of artist mobility programmes, the IFACCA D'Art report mentioned earlier proposes that good practice might have these characteristics.(Staines, 2004: 8)

They should:

- be transparent (i.e. publicly advertised with deadlines, guidelines and selection procedures);
- use a professional jury system in the selection process;
- put the artists-directed creative process at the centre of the programme;
- offer flexibility and a degree of autonomy about where and when artists can go, and who they'll meet; and finally
- provide the artist, host and funding body, with an opportunity to learn from the exchange.

There *is* potential for public policy to bridge the gap between dialogue and diplomacy. The challenge for governments is to allow artists to think freely and to tell their own stories. And allow borders to become junctures, not preserve them as edges.

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Partenariat entre l'État et la société civile
L'exemple de l'Observatoire de la culture et des communications du Québec

Serge Bernier
Observatoire de la culture et des communications du Québec
Canada

Le statisticien est l'agent d'un immense et difficile dialogue.
Claude Gruson

En raison de la place occupée par le Québec sur le continent nord-américain, le monitoring culturel a dû venir à la rescousse de sa langue et de ses traditions. La mondialisation, à la fois résultat et cause de nombreux changements technologiques, a d'ailleurs amplifié cette tendance. Ainsi, l'Observatoire de la culture et des communications du Québec - désormais appelé «l'Observatoire» - né en 2000, s'est voué à la recherche quantitative. Voilà pourquoi la production et l'analyse statistique occupent une large place dans sa programmation.[1]

La structure de gouvernance de l'Observatoire reflète fort bien la connivence nécessaire des milieux culturels et de l'État. Que ce soit pour définir les projets, les mener à bien ou en assurer le financement, le mariage des moyens à prendre et des ressources à consacrer doit naître d'une analyse commune. L'Observatoire constitue un modèle du genre.

En avril 2000 la Commission de la culture recommande à l'Assemblée nationale du Québec que «Le gouvernement, de concert avec le Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec et la Société de développement des entreprises culturelles et le milieu culturel, travaille à la mise sur pied d'un observatoire de la culture».

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1 Un condensé du texte original est présenté ici. Le lecteur pourra consulter la version complète du document sur le site de l'Observatoire de la culture et des communications http://www.stat.gouv.qc.ca/observatoire/publicat_obs/pdf/

L'un des aspects novateurs de ce choix est que le gouvernement décide d'élaborer un outil qui fournira au milieu culturel et à l'État une information unique et utile aux deux parties. En quarante ans, le Québec est passé d'une situation de pauvreté de l'offre culturelle à l'abondance. Désormais, l'Observatoire prendra charge du monitoring devenu nécessaire.

L'Observatoire, d'abord un partenariat financier

Le financement de base de l'Observatoire est assuré par quatre partenaires: l'Institut de la statistique du Québec (désormais appelé «l'Institut»), le Ministère de la Culture et des Communications, le Conseil des arts et des lettres du Québec et la Société de développement des entreprises culturelles. En raison de la diversité de ces sources pécuniaires, il jouit d'une certaine autonomie. De plus, il lui est loisible d'ajuster sa programmation aux besoins des différents milieux et d'assumer le rôle d'arbitre du fait de sa neutralité.

Intégré à l'Institut dont il constitue une unité administrative, l'Observatoire ne fait pas partie du même périmètre financier que les ministères. En outre, la Loi sur l'Institut de la statistique lui confère un pouvoir d'enquête, lui permet de garantir la confidentialité des renseignements qu'il collige, lui donne accès aux données administratives du Québec (y compris les données fiscales) et à celles de Statistique Canada.

Grâce à cet arrangement, l'Observatoire offre des garanties d'utilisation de méthodologies scientifiques standard, déjà appliquées par la plupart des agences statistiques nationales. Il adhère d'ailleurs aux principes fondamentaux de la statistique officielle adoptés par la Commission économique pour l'Europe, organisme des Nations Unies. Comme il n'est pas soumis aux aléas et aux exigences d'un ministère sectoriel, il assure une production statistique continue. Par ailleurs, il a le droit de recueillir des fonds (revenus autonomes) quand il mène des projets particuliers.

Un partenariat dans la gouvernance

La participation culturelle ne peut être simplement définie comme l'ensemble des pratiques culturelles des consommateurs. En effet, elle est aussi l'apanage de plusieurs acteurs - organisations et associations - très présents dans la sphère culturelle québécoise. Ce milieu est très structuré; il comprend plus de 300 associations nationales (Union des artistes, Association québécoise de l'industrie du disque, du spectacle et de la vidéo, Alliance québécoise des techniciens de l'image et du son, etc.), sans parler de la multitude de regroupements régionaux et locaux.

L'État a innové en instituant un organisme pour répondre aux besoins des milieux culturels, mais en choisissant d'en confier la responsabilité aux regroupements d'importance, plutôt qu'aux individus et aux entreprises. Ces associations nationales forment huit comités consultatifs, qui correspondent aux six principaux domaines culturels, ainsi qu'aux milieux municipal et universitaire.

Ces comités sont les suivants:

- Arts visuels, métiers d'art et arts médiatiques;
- Cinéma, audiovisuel et radiodiffusion;
- Disque et arts de la scène;
- Livre, littérature et bibliothèques;
- Multimédia;
- Patrimoine, institutions muséales et archives;
- Municipalités et administrations locales;
- Recherche universitaire.

Le rôle de ces comités consultatifs est de donner des avis et de faire part des besoins du milieu qu'ils représentent. Un conseil de direction - au sein duquel le milieu culturel est majoritaire - chapeaute ces comités consultatifs et il fixe les orientations et la programmation de l'Observatoire.

La mission de l'Observatoire

La mission confiée à l'Observatoire est décrite dans une entente signée entre les partenaires financiers. Cette entente est renouvelée tous les trois ans, mais la mission est restée la même depuis le début des activités.

Cette mission peut être ainsi décrite:

- développer un système intégré de statistiques par la réalisation d'enquêtes et l'exploitation de sources statistiques diverses, de façon à couvrir tout le champ de la culture et des communications;
- assurer la diffusion des informations statistiques auprès des intervenants des milieux de la culture et des communications;
- collaborer avec les unités ou les centres de recherche existants, notamment dans le milieu universitaire;
- valoriser les banques de données existantes chez les partenaires institutionnels et privés (associations, syndicats, entreprises, etc.), et interagir avec les autres producteurs de statistiques ou de connaissances exerçant des activités dans des domaines semblables ou connexes;

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- rechercher de nouvelles ressources financières, notamment en offrant ses services sur une base d'affaires à des organismes, privés ou publics, qui désirent faire réaliser des travaux «sur mesure» contre rémunération;
- documenter l'importance et le rôle de la culture dans la société québécoise et contribuer à la réflexion sur les grandes tendances internationales.

L'Observatoire est mis concurremment au service du secteur culturel et de l'État. Il doit donc produire une information inattaquable, que ce soit sur le plan technique ou en matière de neutralité politique. Pour ce faire, l'Observatoire se limite à des travaux quantitatifs.

Mandats statistiques

Les travaux statistiques de l'Observatoire ont pour objectif la connaissance des marchés (l'offre et la demande) et des secteurs.

Pour répondre à ce besoin, l'Observatoire mène des enquêtes récurrentes dans les domaines du cinéma, du disque, du livre, du spectacle, des musées et des arts visuels. En outre, il produit des statistiques fiables, neutres et objectives sur l'état des différentes facettes de la culture québécoise.

Au départ, il a fallu organiser l'univers observé, à partir d'une classification qui oriente et facilite le travail statistique. Les frontières du secteur culturel sont donc délimitées dans un document intitulé *Système de classification des activités de la culture et des communications du Québec*. Les établissements étudiés par l'Observatoire y sont répartis par domaines, considérés comme producteurs de biens symboliques. Comme cette classification a obtenu l'aval et même la participation du milieu, les statistiques qui en découlent sont crédibles et bien acceptées.

Pour rendre possible l'étude des filières sectorielles, l'Observatoire s'est attardé à chaque maillon d'une chaîne, par exemple, dans le domaine du livre, depuis le travail de l'écrivain jusqu'à l'étalage du libraire. Ainsi, il peut mesurer l'importance et l'apport de chacun de ces maillons. Bien entendu, pour inventorier tous ces aspects, l'Observatoire a parfois dû mener de nouvelles enquêtes. En réunissant ces diverses données, il a produit un premier état des lieux du livre et des bibliothèques, exercice qui sera répété dans un autre champ pour mieux découvrir le patrimoine, les institutions muséales et les archives.

Mandats de recherche

Pour remplir sa mission de recherche, l'Observatoire doit apporter son soutien au milieu universitaire, puisqu'il ne conduit pas lui-même de tels projets. Il travaille plutôt à établir des ententes de collaboration ou de partenariat avec les chercheurs québécois intéressés par des études quantitatives sur la culture.

Ces ententes sont de deux ordres. D'abord, certains mandats d'analyse et de recherche sont confiés à des experts en fonction d'attentes précises. L'Observatoire en publie ensuite les résultats dans son bulletin *Statistiques en bref*. Ensuite, des actions concertées entre l'Observatoire et le Fonds de recherche sur la société et la culture ont pour but de financer des projets soumis par des chercheurs, sur un thème déjà retenu. Le milieu culturel est étroitement associé au choix de ces projets de recherche, car les présidents des comités consultatifs participent à l'occasion aux jurys de sélection.

Diverses formes de collaboration avec les milieux culturels

Des ententes de partenariat interviennent dans le financement des projets ou leur réalisation même, parfois sur les deux fronts à la fois.

Milieux culturels partenaires financiers

L'Observatoire peut compter sur le soutien financier des milieux culturels pour mener à bien certains projets. Par exemple, une association du secteur du multimédia participe pécuniairement à une enquête sur le sujet, l'état des lieux des domaines du livre et des bibliothèques a bénéficié de la collaboration de la Bibliothèque nationale du Québec et la Régie du cinéma appuie l'Observatoire dans son enquête mensuelle sur ce pan de la culture québécoise.

Milieux culturels partenaires dans les activités

L'Observatoire peut également compter sur un appui d'un autre type de la part des milieux culturels, qui investissent leurs connaissances et leur temps dans certains projets. Par ailleurs, ils participent à des tables rondes mandatées pour élaborer les questionnaires d'enquête, ou valider les résultats avant diffusion. Enfin, au moment de la publication des statistiques de l'Observatoire, ils soulignent et commentent ses réalisations dans les médias.

Il serait impossible à l'Observatoire de se priver du savoir des divers experts en matière de culture. Ainsi, les professionnels de l'industrie du disque aident à définir les genres musicaux et la Bibliothèque nationale a affecté une analyste à l'état des lieux du livre. Des chercheurs universitaires ont également contribué à certaines publications en rédigeant des analyses. En outre, les associations participent fréquemment à la collecte de l'information, notamment en incitant leurs membres à répondre aux questionnaires de l'Observatoire. Grâce à ce soutien constant, les taux de réponse obtenus sont très élevés.

Milieux culturels fournisseurs d'information

Parfois, les milieux culturels fournissent eux-mêmes de l'information.

Politique et modes de diffusion

Comme l'Observatoire établit un lien entre l'État et la société civile, la politique de diffusion adoptée est entièrement axée sur un accès aussi complet que possible à ses travaux. Le principe premier de cette politique exige la gratuité de l'information disponible. En conséquence, toutes les études de l'Observatoire sont consultables sur son site Web, même s'il arrive qu'elles soient aussi offertes en version papier. De plus, l'Observatoire publie ses travaux d'analyse, dans une collection appelée «Statistiques en bref», qu'il envoie à ses frais à toutes les personnes intéressées du secteur culturel.

Pour que les travailleurs des milieux culturels soient tenus au courant de la mise à jour des données qui les intéressent, l'Observatoire a constitué une liste d'abonnés qui reçoivent un courriel *(e-mail)* chaque fois qu'une information nouvelle devient consultable sur le site Web. Ce service est d'ailleurs offert à tous ceux qui en font la demande à l'aide du formulaire accessible sur le site Web.

Enfin, en vertu du principe de neutralité, l'accès à l'information est simultané pour tous, sans favoritisme aucun. De surcroît, les résultats sont diffusés aussitôt colligés, sans tenir compte de l'agenda politique.

Un coup d'œil sur l'avenir

L'Observatoire poursuit sa mission, mais les changements à venir suivront trois axes. Le premier est de rapatrier toutes les statistiques culturelles préparées au gouvernement du Québec. Le deuxième élément prioritaire est de construire des indicateurs, dans tous les champs de la culture. Enfin, il importe de pouvoir comparer la situation québécoise à celle d'autres sociétés; un appareil statistique bien étoffé et un système d'indicateurs cohérent devraient faciliter ces travaux de comparaison.

Conclusion

Le partenariat établi avec les milieux culturels a maintenant fait ses preuves et l'Observatoire a tout lieu d'être satisfait de son évolution, bien qu'il ne puisse pas encore combler tous les besoins.

L'une des principales retombées de la création de l'Observatoire tient au fait que celui-ci équilibre les rapports de force entre les différents acteurs du système culturel quant à l'accès à l'information et aux usages qui en sont faits. Tous ont maintenant accès à une information exhaustive; ils peuvent donc l'interpréter à leur manière (qui n'est pas forcément celle de l'administration centrale) et promouvoir leurs intérêts. Mais, quel que soit le sens donné aux chiffres, ceux-ci sont fiables et neutres, et considérés comme tels par toutes les parties.

ASEF's Dialogue on Policy and Culture:
The Role of Civil Society in Asia and Europe

Chulamanee Chartsuwan[1]
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), Singapore

The Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) was created in 1997 by the members of the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) in order to promote more intellectual, cultural and people-to-people exchange between civil societies from Europe and Asia. ASEM's members comprise the 25 European Union members as well as 13 Asian countries (10 ASEAN countries + China, Japan and Korea). The European Commission is also a separate member of the ASEM process.[2] The interesting characteristic of the setting up of ASEF is that, beyond political and economic concerns, the ASEM political leaders recognized the fact that mutual understanding is a key component for the promotion of exchange, be it economic, financial or political between the two regions.

ASEF, whose headquarters is in Singapore, is by nature a hybrid organization. It was founded by inter-governmental decision, as a private institution, with a mandate to promote exchanges among civil society in Asia and Europe. Apart from its structure, its partners in different projects are even more diverse, from international organizations, government institutions, cultural structures, museums, associations, art and film festivals, regional institutes, art schools, the press, NGOs, etc.

The arguments I will advance below, to highlight the role of ASEF in linking civil societies from Europe and Asia, and the challenges and opportunities it implies, are in particular based on my experiences as the Director for Cultural Exchange at ASEF.

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1 Ms Chulamanee Chartsuwan was Director, Cultural Exchange, Asia-Europe Foundation, until 31 December 2005. This text is based on Ms Chartsuwan's presentation and has been updated by Ms Marie Le Sourd. The views express the authors' ones.

2 www.asef.org

The mission of the Cultural Exchange Department is to provide a unique environment where young artists and cultural professionals from Europe and Asia can meet, get inspiration from each other and eventually develop multilateral cultural projects between both regions. To meet such a mission, we have developed four types of programmes:[3]

- Young Artists' Exchange: in the field of new media arts, photography, music and contemporary dance (focus on creative and learning process);
- process-oriented platforms for exchange: through networks and related programmes co-initiated/co-organized by ASEF, in the fields of museums (ASEMUS); cinema (SEA-Images) and autonomous cultural centres/artists' initiatives;[4]
- Dialogue on Policy and Culture: ASEF as an interface between the levels of policy makers and the artists/cultural professionals;
- the Asia-Europe Cultural Portal, Culture360: a portal in progress whose development involves policy makers, practitioners, artists from ASEM members.

The above-mentioned programmes often imply partnership with artists' networks or initiatives from civil society. For instance, through its yearly series of Asia-Europe Art Camps focused on new media arts, ASEF regularly works with independent spaces/initiatives such as the Arts Initiative Tokyo (AIT) in Japan in 2004 and the Bandung Centre for New Media Arts (BCNMA) in Indonesia in 2005.[5] Both experiences have involved for one week about 20 new media art students from Europe and Asia to follow a programme of lectures, workshops and cultural visits. If their working environment is different, both AIT and BCNMA were created in early 2000 by young curators/artists as a possible response to the development of contemporary practices and the apparent lack of adequate cultural structures in their respective countries.

In the same vein, ASEF co-organized in September 2004 in Shanghai with Biz-Art and Art-factories the International Meeting between Autonomous Cultural Centres,[6] which gathered close to 40 centres from ASEM members, all stemming from artists and civil societies' initiatives.

Through these different experiences, ASEF has greatly benefited from the flexibility of such autonomous structures, their ability to network as well as to find partners, sponsors and media support, both locally and internationally. These centres/artists initiatives have proven that, despite their small size and limited budget,

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3   www.asef.org/dir/ce

4   www.asemus.org; http://sea-images.asef.org

5   www.asef.org/dir/ce/artcamp2004 and www.asef.org/dir/ce/artcamp2005

6   www.asef.org/dir/ce/shanghai2004

they can reach high level of professionalism and management of international cultural projects. In a time of budget cuts for cultural organizations and greater competition to get sponsorship, the management study of alternative art spaces could constitute a good reference for cultural professionals and public organizations at large.

Such supports and partnerships are being reinforced at the policy makers' level through the ASEF "Dialogue on Policy and Culture". ASEF aims to act as an interface between the levels of cultural practitioners/artists and policy makers, in order to advocate to the appropriate ASEM level, policies favourable to creativity, artistic innovation and cultural diversity.

In that sense, the meeting "Diversities in society, integration of civil societies' contributions to public policies in favour of cultural diversity", organized by ASEF in 2005 - prior to the Second ASEM Culture Ministers' Meeting in Paris - was an important step in recognizing the role of ASEF in promoting more exchange between civil societies from Europe and Asia.[7]

This workshop gathered 22 representatives from civil society (autonomous cultural centres, media, academics, youth organizations) from 17 ASEM members. Their set of recommendations (whose highlight was: "*To formally associate civil society to the discussions on cultural diversity at a governmental level*") was then presented by ASEF's representative during the Second ASEM Culture Ministers' Meeting. Three representatives from the workshop were also invited at the ministers' meeting in a special session to interact with the cultural ministries' representatives.[8]

Recommendations to assist with the recognition of civil society's contributions in the definition of public policies at the ASEM level, and the necessity of giving opportunities and chances for citizens and practitioners from civil society are being supported as much as possible by ASEF, not only in the fields of culture but also in the intellectual and people-to-people exchange departments of ASEF.

A few important challenges are however faced by ASEF when working with/partnering civil society groups and individuals.

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7   www.asef.org/dir/ce/culturaldiversity

8   Chairman statement: "ASEM Culture Ministers acknowledged the significant role that the Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF) plays in developing dialogue between European and Asian civil societies and between the latter and the public authorities. The ASEM Culture Ministers agreed to strengthen a favourable and sustainable environment for these initiatives to develop, so that they contribute to the framing of public policies in favour of cultural diversity"; action plan (item 8): "To recognize the important role of the media and civil society, in particular cultural organizations, in promoting dialogue among civilizations and cultural diversity".

- As an interface for dialogue, ASEF always tries not to discriminate or support any opinions shared during its meetings with civil society's representatives but to primarily act as a channel of information. This point is particularly important to preserve ASEF's integrity not only at the policy makers' level but also towards organizations, which may have some concerns about a foundation like ASEF being founded and partly funded by the ASEM governments and whose mission is to bring more understanding between civil societies from Europe and Asia.
- Since ASEM5 in October 2004 in Hanoi, ASEF's family has grown to encompass the 10 new EU members as well as Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. This situation adds to the diversity of contexts in which civil societies emerge (when they are even given a minimum of space for expression), are recognized and develop.

The interesting but challenging task of ASEF in this respect, is that its partnerships with civil society's groups would bring them more national/regional support, after having gained recognition at an international/bi-regional level.

- ASEF can face financial constraints and potential changes of political agendas, issues that may affect the way it cooperates with civil society's groups.

In any case, experiences have proven that a constant advocacy is always necessary, not only to continue to work with autonomous/artists/civil society groups but also to bring as many as possible recommendations and suggestions from civil society groups to the appropriate ASEM level.

On this idea of constant or permanent need for exchange, ASEF continues to spearhead the development of Culture360, an Asia-Europe cultural multidisciplinary Web-portal, a unique tool expected to connect thousands of cultural practitioners of the two regions, to facilitate bi-regional cooperation in the arts as well as to promote exchange of ideas, information and persons in the ASEM members. Beyond its programme, ASEF illustrates through the coordination of this portal, the need to link - on the e-level - the different spheres of our cultural societies, from policy makers to artists and cultural professionals.

A Stronger Role for Artists in Civil Society and Public Discourse

Karl-Erik Norrman
European Cultural Parliament (ECP), Germany

These days European politicians, diplomats and bureaucrats are not very popular. The gap has become too big between the political and technocratic elite and ordinary people. The link or the bridge between elite and People seems to be missing. I believe that Artists and other cultural personalities could contribute to the filling of this gap.

A hundred years ago, Emile Zola wrote his famous article "J'accuse!" He had an impact on the Dreyfus trial and on the political climate in France. He became a symbol for artistic intervention in public discourse.

Then came the world wars, the nazi and fascist regimes, several communist regimes. Cultural personalities were executed, imprisoned, tortured or escaped into exile. Those who survived or remained in their countries often chose to disappear from public debate. They continued their artistic work in their studios, their ateliers or their writing chambers.

Except for the years of the "68-movement" when everything became politics in Western Europe, specialization was the solution for many artists and intellectuals. This, however, also meant a relative isolation.

There are some brilliant exceptions:

Kurt Masur, the great conductor and leader of the famous Gewandhaus in Leipzig, led the famous Monday demonstrations in the autumn of 1989 under the motto "*Kein Gewalt!*" - no violence! This opened the way to the fall of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989.

The author Vaclav Havel had a long and enduring fight for human rights and dignity in Czechoslovakia, which led to democracy and brought Mr Havel to Presidency.

In recent years the climate for interaction between Arts and Letters on one hand and Politics and Power on the other hand may have improved. I represent the European Cultural Parliament, the founding of which was inspired by Maestro Yehudi Menuhin and by the former EU president Jacques Delors. Menuhin said: "The artists need a parliament". Delors said: "Europe needs a soul". So we opened a unique forum for more than 100 independent strong cultural personalities from 40 European countries: 50% from Eastern and 50% from Western Europe, almost 50/50 men/women and with an average age about 40 years. These outstanding artists/intellectuals represent literature, philosophy, music, fine arts, theatre, film, architecture, design, dance, cultural management and artists' rights issues - in fact ALL art forms.

The ECP is an encouragement *per se* for the artists and intellectuals themselves to return to the "barricades" of European discourse and to the creative exchange of views on culture, politics, civil society and business.

Two of the leading figures of the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" - the poets Yuri Andrukovych and Olexandr Butsenko - are members of the ECP and could use the forum as a platform for ideas and hopes for change.

In the European Union we have enough political rhetoric and enough technocratic details. The citizens now seem to be fed up, at least in France and the Netherlands. Artists and other creative people should have more space. They can offer other, interesting dimensions to European affairs.

Artists can provoke and inspire, through visions, pictures, sounds, stories, creations, feelings, that go far beyond the political, economic and technocratic language! The famous "sixth sense" of the artist could be helpful and useful in the Europe of today and tomorrow.

Cultural conferences in Europe have a tendency to become rather one-dimensional. They deal with:

- lobbying in Brussels - yes, that is good and necessary;
- the need for higher cultural budgets - yes, absolutely necessary in times where most budgets are being reduced;
- trying to convince governments, foundations and private companies to be more generous towards arts and culture - also necessary and the ECP does that too!

BUT, people of arts and letters can offer so much more!

- They must go far beyond being "hostages" or "decorations" of governments or business, which have their own agendas.
- They could take a leading, creative role in NGOs and other parts of the civic society.

- Business has a lot to learn from creative artists! *Nota bene*: the strong growth in the commercial part of the cultural sector.
- Politicians would be much better and more credible, if they adopted a bit more of the ethical and aesthetic dimensions of cultural life.
- Politicians and businessmen must realize that Europe needs a soul and that the common denominator between the very diverse and heterogeneous peoples of Europe is culture.
- There is room for much more mix of values between the public sector, the commercial sector and the civil sector. The artists need good cooperation with all three categories and can contribute a lot.

In all modesty, through three sessions so far, in Bruges 2002, in Graz 2003 and in Genoa 2004, we are trying to contribute to the strengthening of these dimensions of Europe and the European dimensions of culture. We will continue in Lisbon in December 2005, in Germany in 2006 and possibly in Romania in 2007.

Important themes are on the agenda of the ECP, such as:

- How can artists and cultural personalities contribute to tolerance and understanding between nations, regions and religions in Europe? or
- How to promote creative milieus in Europe? or
- How can European culture promote European cohesion?

We are trying to make "Europe into a cultural project". I am more confident than ever, in these days of "Euro-pessimism", that we are on the right track!

Cultural Diversity
The Path of Multiculturalism/Interculturalism. Mediated
Cultures and New Technologies. New Cultural Identities

Multiculturalism and Beyond:
The New Politics of Identity

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At the beginning of his very important book for contemporary cultural theory, *The Location of Culture*, Homi K. Bhabha says: "It is the trope of our times to locate the question of culture in the realm of the beyond. At the century's edge, we are less exercised by annihilation - the death of the author - or epiphany - the birth of the 'subject'. Our existence today is marked by a tenebrous sense of survival, living on the borderlines of the 'present', for which there seems to be no proper name other than the current and controversial shiftiness of the prefix 'post'". (Bhabha, 1994: 1)

Postcolonial and postmodern cultural identities become today the key marks of being in the "beyond". Plural, diverse and multicultural are terms commonly used to describe societies that comprise different religions, races, languages and cultures. The concept of multiculturalism contributes to the democratization and non-discrimination of different cultures in the nation-state policies of a global world. The theory and practice of multiculturalism was a response to the pressure of modern nationalism through the whole period of modern development of Western societies.

Theories of multiculturalism today reflect the change based on the liberal construction of postmodern societies after the fall of communism at the end of the 1980s. The focus is not only on providing special and collective rights to native minorities, as in the USA, Canada and Australia, but how to articulate the new liberal multiculturalism for immigrant populations. We are witnessing an increasing proliferation of literature trying to understand the new economic, political and cultural arrangements that are inaugurated by global capital. Globalization reveals the limits of Western modernity: various ethnic and racial minorities, their traditions, memories, myths and symbols are now incorporated in the dominant societies abroad. For instance, when we are talking about interculturalism today, we cannot escape from the fact that the situation in Western societies is not really far from some kind of

"multicultural wall" between the different nations in the same area. Is it possible to speak about multiculturalism as a concept without any contradictions today, particularly in the field of respect for the Other and cultural differences?

As we know, current critical discourse which characterizes the debate on globalization concerns the opposition between homogenization and heterogenization or between universalization and particularization. I would suggest that this is a misleading opposition as it identifies globalization with universal tendencies. The global world is nothing but a reshaping of same: the global domination of capitalism as regards systems of production, lifestyles and consumer societies. Resistance to this tendency comes from all over the world in areas where there is a struggle for identity. So, multiculturalism today must change its focus from protection of differences in the field of culture to another area of conflict. That is the way to progress in the essence of the matter. We have to go another step forward and articulate the new politics of identity. Multiculturalism is not an old concept for a new global age, but a concept which is not satisfactory without any reference to the political struggle for the Same despite differences.

As the French contemporary philosopher Alain Badiou said in his critique of pure tolerance of cultural differences, multiculturalism is rooted in the idea of peaceful coexistence of cultural, religious and national "communities", the refusal of "exclusion". But what we must recognize is that differences hold no interest for thought, that they amount to nothing more than the infinite and self-evident multiplicity of humankind, as obvious in the difference between me and my culture in Croatia as it is between the Shi'ite community of Iraq and Indian native culture in the USA. (Badiou, 2002) The problem is that respect for difference and the ethics of human rights do seem to define an identity. As a matter of fact, this celebrated Other, postcolonial and postmodern identity is acceptable only if it is just like Me or integrated into the dominant culture of the West. Even immigrants today in the whole of Europe, as seen by the partisans of ethics, are acceptably different only when they are integrated.

Multiculturalism is that situation of global liberalism which is nothing more than culturalism without any real force for political struggle to overcome the walls between cultures. The only acceptable solution to this problem is rearticulation of the new politics of identity. Hybridity is a key term in cultural theory today which has the power to protect the Other and differences between cultures and to move beyond the global homogenization of the world. Hybridity is tied to the idea of cultural syncretism, rather than the cultural differences encapsulated by multiculturalism, in terms of the interpretation of elements. The argument about multiple belonging in the modern state rests largely on the dismantling of the notion of a unitary identity, partly

through a critique of unitary notions of the self and partly through a critique of unitary notions of cultural identity. (Hannerz, 1992; Appadurai, 1996; Bhabha, 1994)

Over recent years the study of identity and difference has become a crucial hallmark of postmodern theory in the age of globalization. Identity refers to who people think they are, either individually or collectively, and the ways that this is culturally constructed. Ideas about difference try to capture the diversity of forms of human identity and experience. We can identify, according to Calhoun, two ways in which we investigate the politics of identity and difference: differences of values and the value of difference. (Smith, 2001) Nowadays, when the concept of multiculturalism has become the key idea in culturally pluralistic societies, something is wrong: between the different cultures in the global world there are no more productive dialogues, but rather invisible conflicts, particularly in Western societies.

In the age of global network societies only the concept of hybridity of cultures can survive as a vital structure at all. But hybridity works to transgress existing discourse and reveal the incomplete and contingent nature of nationalist ideologies. The notion of hybridity is clearly connected to the ideology of postnationalism. Homi Bhabha, for instance, claims that hybridity counters the dominant logic of authoritarian discourse and opens up the third flow-space, the interstices where meaning is always in-between, never stable, rigid and fixed. (Bhabha, 1994) Hybridity can produce a conceptual fixity in its disavowal of any kind of politics of subjectivity. Hybridity, of course, as the cultural shift away to post/transnational identities has the potential to create some kind of new politics of "cultural translation" which is necessary in the process of mutual understanding of different cultures.

Many social and cultural theorists today are moving to the hybridity concept of culture because they see the influence of the global transformation age in the field of creation of new identities. In fact, approaches that see hybridity of social and cultural forms to be the result of interculturality and diasporic relations also claim that these signify new forms of identity. The terms hybridity and diaspora open up spaces hitherto foreclosed by traditional approaches to ethnicity and migration. With this new term we are witnessing basically new anti-essentialist projects and critiques of static modern nation state notions of stable ethnicity and traditional culture.

The idea of transnational or translocational hybridity culture(s) moves beyond the paradigm of modern identity politics. The sense of belonging today in the age of the end of globalization as an ideological concept (the "new world order" and the hegemony of the USA and the West as the rulers of globalization policies) must result in the reconsideration of culture. We do not, in any case, belong to the nation-state's identity in the sense of modern nationalism without a nation, but rather to the

transnational hybrid identity. The true politics of identity has to be a project of individual lifestyle, whatever it means in culturally pluralistic societies.

There are at least three main ways in which the term culture has been used in contemporary sociology: 1) it denotes a set of cultural attributes and artefacts, symbols and practice; 2) culture as a world view or a way which is very familiar with ideology; 3) hegemonistic processes or structures, or the way that societies articulate their essential ways of life. Contemporary investigations in current cultural theories try to examine the core of identity problems. It is now acknowledged that hybridity overcomes the reduction of culture in the globalized world to ethnicity and diaspora. The whole field of symbolic and anthropological meanings forms the complex background to new understanding of cross-over culture. There are no successful politics of identity in Western and non-Western societies which try to be isolated from this paradigm shift. Hybridity, finally, is not an old wine in a brand new bottle. However, it must be very clear that hybridity opens up a whole new horizon of transnational/translational values, in the application of Bhabha's famous phrase about identities in the global network world.

Liberal and multicultural post-politics of new identities today in Europe and all over the world can only be acceptable if the Other and cultural differences are more than the folklorist Other. It is true that there cannot be a multicultural society without recourse to universal principles that enable communication between socially and culturally different groups. But there also cannot be a real multicultural society when the organizing principle is but another means to assert the hegemony of the dominant groups. (Touraine, 1994)

A true politics of identity for the contemporary global condition has to be more than respect for the Other, otherness and differences between cultures. Culture has become a new ideology in the age of globalization. Although contemporary definitions of ideology are diverse, we can articulate two main tendencies which can be broadly identified. One is ideology associated with the sense of illusion or distortion. From this point of view only science investigates the source of false conscience. (Althusser, 1975) The second approach treats ideology more neutrally in the sense of values or beliefs which are shared by groups of people. This conception is broadly acceptable in whole areas of post-Marxist theories of culture and identity. (Eagleton, 1991; Haslett, 2000) One of the most comprehensive theories today is Slavoj žižek 's critique of ideological foundations of neo-liberal realities in network societies in the age of globalization. žižek 's consideration of ideology follows the process of historical-metaphysical analysis of Hegel's system as a totality of conscience in the circle of reality.

The ideology has three crucial aspects: doctrine, ritual and belief. The contemporary ideology of neo-liberalism as doctrine, ritual and belief perfectly goes

beyond the world views of the system of values and cultural identities. In this kind of theoretical observation, we are living in symbolic, imaginary and real globalization as the ideological subjects/actors of the "new world order". (žižek, 1994; 2004) The problem is how to destroy or rather deconstruct the holy circle of cultural differences as the signs of identity (nation state, region, religion, culture). Postmodern identities in the age of globalization are hybrid and changing entities. Individual choice leads to some kind of new cultural identity which, indeed, is nothing more than an acceptable lifestyle.

What's wrong with that? Surely one thing. Without symbolic, imaginary and real political power, all mainstream identities are very fragile and with an extremely low capacity to overcome the pressure of globalization. The ideology, finally, becomes the cultural field of agencies today. That is the reason why we have to find a way out of the present politics of multiculturalism as a "carnival of cultures". (Kureishi, 2005)

Within the culture, we live with all the obstacles which destroy real communication in the complex network society. This ideological notion is not only the result of the neo-liberal politics and cultural imperialism of the USA/West. As we know, there are many dangerous voices today in the theory and practice of cultural dialogue and interculturalism. As opposed to the ideologies of unitary and homogenous identity we can articulate the new politics of identity. Following the break with the concept of postmodernism, which is seen in global society today as a "spiritual" superstructure and ideological system, we are witnessing some kind of paradoxical "cultural turn": the keywords of postmodern theory - cultural difference and multiculturalism - have become the new ideology of global capitalism. (Jameson, 2002; Agamben, 2003)

The main task of the radical approach to contemporary problems in whole areas of cultural globalization should be recognized as political deconstruction of multiculturalism and the cult of cultural differences. Instead of depolitization of culture in the global age, the main direction of the radical-critical potential of social sciences and politics needs very urgent change to its present condition. (Paić, 2005; žižek, 2004)

In the context of globalization, changes in the political distribution of power necessarily lead to changes in cultural representations of the cartography of discourse, and not the other way around. Thus the "dialogues between cultures" are merely a charming but illusory fiction of understanding the Other in terms of respect for their person. What is going wrong with this fairly reasonable and generally acceptable paradigm in culturally pluralistic societies? Let me make some brief comments about Dieter Senghaas's theory of intercultural communication as the only alternative to Huntington's "clash of civilizations". He emphasizes the mobilizing function of intercultural mutual understanding of different cultures as the key concept

acceptable in the extremely polarized world today. A model of any kind of politics of struggle in the economy, politics and culture is out of the question. Senghaas does not deny the realities of cultural struggle. But, as he pointed out in the context of discussion of Huntington's essentialist paradigm for future geopolitical global disorders and battles for hegemony in the Third World, if culture is understood as the totality of typical life-forms of a population, including its underlying mental constitution and values, then the political circumstances describe and constitute a cultural conflict. (Senghaas, 2002: 79)

It is true, of course. But if we took "cultural revivalism" as the main source of our present identity politics, which is not the problem for Senghaas, where are the key arguments for excluding the ideological force of culture today? In other words, if we agree with the thesis that culture in the sense of transnational, hybrid and rhizomatic attitudes is the concept to overcome the political gaps between the geopolitical regions and nation states in global conflicts, why still insist on articulating a new identity politics? If identity is nothing more than endless self-reflection about our cultural demise in a situation of global instability and crisis, why should we talk about dialogue between the cultures? Wouldn't a better solution be Huntington's break with old dichotomies (the clash of civilizations vs. intercultural dialogue or conflicts vs. peace solutions) which goes beyond the present *status quo*?

We do not operate as isolated cosmopolitan co-citizens of the global world, but as culturally and nationally determined conglomerates of social constructs that only through a sacrifice to the universal are able to offer resistance to dangerous ideologies of identity such as "blood and soil". From this perspective, hybridity as the new form of identity opens a new horizon in the whole context of globalization theories and cultural practice. But that is not enough for a true and radical approach to multiculturalism and identity in the globalized world.

The struggle for new identity is the struggle for recognition of the Other in oneself, conditional on exposing all the ideological illusions representing the West as a universal way of progress for the Other, or the East as an individual and particular way of preserving the spiritual primordial. Global network societies are still transnational and transcultural areas of movement and being beyond. Thus, a political strategy against the threat of globalization has to be an alternative not only to errors of previous politics of multiculturalism in Western societies, but also to the ideological illusion that cultural differences and respect of the Other can result in a better and fairer world of many different values and attitudes.

Multiculturalism, yes, but as the way to protect the Other from violence by a dominant culture in the context of the political struggle for the Same - the equal and fair power of true identity. Hybridity resolves the problem only when the new politics of identity is more than pure culturalism. In the age of ideological illusions that

ideologies are dead and gone, we have to recognize that cultural identity in the global age is the post-national and transcultural weapon for an alternative politics of identity.

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The Need for a Global Cultural Movement
Strategies in Favour of Cultural Diversity

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A Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions is only a tool, though to be sure an extremely important tool. However, it is a means to reach something. Once adopted, signed and ratified it would give national states the right to take those measures and to install those regulations that they, and their populations, think appropriate for the protection and promotion of cultural diversity. It is elementary that they should be able to do so without being threatened by trade sanctions by any other country that might wish that those regulations did not exist. The convention is a tool to make it possible for all countries to create the conditions enabling as many artistic expressions as possible to flourish in their societies and communities.

A convention is one thing, but the key preoccupation should be that this diversity will not be oppressed or pushed aside by market forces, that it will be sustained by adequate and flexible policy measures, and will be respected and desired by the majority of our populations. This will not happen automatically, not even after the UNESCO's adoption of such an important document as a Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, here to be called the Convention on Cultural Diversity.

There should be *movements* that push governments to shape the conditions in which cultural diversity can flourish and who will not be overshadowed by the monopolistic control of a few cultural giants. There is a need for there to come into existence cultural movements that are strong enough to determine the political cultural agenda and who can prevent this agenda from being dominated only by economic forces. It asks also for thinking in terms of *strategies*. There is a huge necessity that for the defence of cultural diversity arguments will be built up and

translated into strategies for action, processes of influencing, lobbying, and the making of coalitions.

This does not mean that the time for the development of theories concerning cultural diversity is over. On the contrary. But it should be combined with the development of *strategic* thinking and action by the people in our societies that feel that cultural diversity is a value worth defending. These should not only be artists, but all people that feel that cultural democracy is of crucial importance. Strategic thinking should be accompanied by concrete activities which are more effective than cultural movements have been thus far. These should be learned from the environmental movements that defend the same principle, namely diversity.

At first glance, the task cultural movements have is even more difficult than the challenge people have in asking for attention for biodiversity. Citizens can smell that the air is polluted, can be aware that the food is tasteless, can see that trees are falling when there is only a little bit of a storm, and can observe that the climate is changing. However, those citizens become flooded with the products of the entertainment industry and they like it. Of course they like it, because it has been made to be considered as great fun. How can one explain that the cultural debate on cultural diversity does not disrespect their taste and their pleasure? How can one explain that there should be sorrow about cultural diversity, about the diversity of contents that become distributed and promoted in the media and other outlets, and concerning the multiplicity of the ownership relations of the means of production, distribution and promotion of cultural expressions? How can one explain that those owners should behave responsibly from a social and cultural point of view?

These questions look very abstract but have a direct and unavoidable influence on whether cultural diversity can exist or not. But how can one explain this? How can one give people the conviction that they are gaining and not losing when cultural diversity becomes the practice in their societies? What are they gaining? All these questions should get high priority in cultural movements.

It is amazing to realize that environmental movements have reached the stage when what they have to explain to citizens is also quite abstract and has, for instance, only an effect on the long term. How can one explain that there really is a problem, or several, with genetically modified food, to give one example, or that there something is going terribly wrong in the depths of the seas? These kinds of questions are as far away from the daily experiences of common people as the topics to be raised concerning cultural diversity.

Both kinds of worlds - the ecological and the cultural - have to deal with the fact that for a couple of decades many people have believed in the ideology of unregulated markets (which are much better and even natural!) and regulated markets (that

neglect the choice of audience, and that prevent even the freedom of expression!). However, we should remember, time and time again, that in no society, nowhere in history have there existed unregulated markets. All markets have been regulated, also cultural markets. If we observe, for instance, how the leaders of the American film- and music industry co-negotiate with the American Secretary of Commerce during WTO negotiations, in favour of their interests, we will understand that we should forget about the fiction that there exist unregulated markets. This awareness provides us with the freedom to think productively about what kind of regulations may serve the interests of cultural diversity and will not hamper the freedom of expression; what kind of arguments can be used; what kind of cases can be brought into the spotlight; and what kind of coalitions can be forged?

In this text I will try to outline the different steps that could be considered while thinking about adequate strategies in order to get cultural diversity policies accepted and implemented, in all parts of the world, more specifically in all separate countries; of course according to their own needs, but nevertheless in a certain coherence with, for instance, surrounding countries, and protected by global defence mechanisms.

Where can one start? Of course, the ultimate purpose is that national states make regulations, for instance concerning the diverse ownership of the tools of cultural production, distribution and promotion; or, that they oblige the different media and outlets to present currently existing artistic diversity from all parts of the world. But, this local interest is a question heavily influenced by global concerns. The companies that prevent cultural diversity from having as many outlets as possible are global operators. The WTO, which also aims to liberalize cultural markets, is a globally operating mechanism. Countries can never by themselves resist the pressure of a few big states, international organizations like the WTO, media and entertainment corporations, and sections of their populations. They should combine their forces and strategic creativity to forge intelligent measures that protect and promote the development of artistic cultural diversity.

Once we realize that we are dealing with a global question, with local consequences, we should start to think about a global movement, an NGO that stimulates and coordinates. Let's imagine that it has been called *All the Arts of the World*, though another name is possible as well, of course. It should really be an organization that is capable of fulfilling several complicated tasks, which I will indicate below. Who will constitute this global NGO? One can imagine that the founding father and mother are the International Network for Cultural Diversity and the Coalition for Cultural Diversity, both heavily involved in the global mobilization for a Convention on Cultural Diversity. But from the beginning onwards, hundreds of cultural organizations or networks from all corners of the world should be involved as founders of the NGO and they should create together an effective and transparent

organization where many branches flow together and split again into separate activities, something like a delta. What are the strategic tasks that should be fulfilled in this cultural delta where the overwhelming sea of economic interests should be pushed back?

The first task is to gather information on different subjects, particularly, of course, on every step UNESCO and its member states take concerning the Convention on Cultural Diversity. What is happening within the WTO and its treaties - GATT, GATS and TRIPs - concerning culture? How is the WTO dealing, for instance, with the obligation formulated in Article 31 of the Doha Ministerial Meeting (14 November 2001) that the relation between treaties in the fields of trade and the environment must be scrutinized? For cultural diversity this is an extremely interesting question! Mergers of media and entertainment companies must be mapped; what are their links, what is their influence, what are their sources of funding; how are they vertically, horizontally and cross-industry integrated? Therefore attention should be given not only to the US, but also to Europe, Japan, Russia, the Arab world, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Hong Kong. This is also part of the monitoring that should take place.

The consequences of the new technologies for creation, production, distribution and promotion of artistic expressions should be analysed, for all different genres, from very popular ones to those appreciated only by small groups, and from more tradition-based ones to those very much hinging on the future. One should not be afraid as well to consider whether the present copyright system has not become too much a tool that defends the interests of the major cultural conglomerates, and works, consequently, against the promotion of cultural diversity.

The second strategic task for the global NGO and for all the networks and organizations in the different countries is to identify who are the potential supporters for the promotion of cultural diversity. Who are the stakeholders, globally, and locally? Where can they be found? There must be millions and millions of people who detest that our cultural life becomes more and more determined by commercial interests and corporate culture; that only a few persons and their stockholders decide what kinds of films we will watch, what music we will hear in general, and what books become pumped to bestsellers; and that the actually existing diversity evaporates like snow in the summer. How can these be mobilized? How can they be given the feeling that they can be *proud* about the fact that they care for a rich and diverse cultural life?

These people are the constituencies that can actively help regulations in favour of cultural diversity find broad acclaim among the different layers of the population in cities, regions and countries. They can convince their neighbours, friends, and colleagues and tell them: through these kinds of regulations more pleasure and

satisfaction can be found in the fields of music, films, books, design and other forms of cultural expression! They can promote the notion that people in the different countries of the world can enjoy (again) a diverse range of cultural opportunities, if you make the effort to find them. Where are those millions of people? In what kinds of organizations can they be found? Of course, we may hope that many artists, from all different genres, feel the need to contribute to the protection of cultural diversity; it is also in their personal interest, not only financially but also aesthetically. However, it should be in the democratic interest of all citizens to have a cultural landscape that is as open as possible to many different kinds of artistic expression.

This brings us to the third task. What are the arguments that will encourage national governments to regulate cultural markets in favour of the development of cultural diversity? The main argument is respect for human rights. This concerns access to the means of communication for as many people as possible. We should remember that the arts are specific forms of communication in which aesthetic aspects are essential. It also means that everybody should have the right to participate in the cultural life of his or her community. If we take this seriously, then we must conclude that nobody should be entitled to dominate cultural life so that the majority of the population becomes relegated to the position of passive consumers. Maybe those human rights arguments stay abstract for many people. How can it be made more concrete, with examples from nearby? What will get lost, what will be damaged? How can democracy function if only a few, artistic, voices count?

Concrete examples can help. For instance, what about the extraordinary budgets (many times more than half of the total production budget) for the promotion of stars, bestsellers and blockbusters? These extreme promotional budgets clearly falsify competition. Doesn't this distort the possibility for the majority of artists to become visible in public cultural life? It should be possible to raise the awareness of many people through such an example that something very strange is going on. Another example is of course the peer-to-peer exchange of music. People who practise this are no thieves, but at present they are on the defensive and keep quiet about what they do. However, the lawsuits of cultural conglomerates can be used as cases to make clear what is wrong with this kind of enterprise; their behaviour provides insight.

The fourth strategic task for the global NGO for all the networks and organizations in the different countries is to formulate what kind of regulations may be helpful for the protection and the promotion of the development of cultural diversity. The strategic task is, of course, how to formulate them in such a way that many people understand why such regulations would make sense. It is important that people do not get the feeling that certain kinds of music or films, for example, will be taken away from them. It should become clear that the change is that they will have more options.

Serious thought should be given as to how the capacity of non-Western countries can be raised in order to produce cultural productions that cost more than those countries can afford. It is clear that cultural exchange between countries and parts of the world should take place on a more reciprocal basis than is now the case. Specifically the question should be raised, how can it be realized that rich countries open their cultural markets for the cultural expressions coming from poorer nations on a more regular basis? These are complicated topics that demand serious strategic analysis: what are the effective tools; how can they be popularized; what would it cost and what would it lead to?

So far the strategic topics have had a theoretical character: gathering information; identifying potential supporters; developing arguments; and formulating possible regulations. The fifth task of the global NGO and the local organizations is to make strategic decisions, including concerning who will be the main target of all activities? The basic and permanent endeavour should be to convince national governments to adapt and implement measures that guarantee that artistic cultures can develop as diversely as imaginable, or to refrain, for instance, from censorship. The focal point is thus national governments and public authorities at regional and local levels. They are the only ones, in the present world, that can decide that cultural markets should be structured in such a way that they are open to many artistic expressions. The fulfilment of this basic purpose includes the need for information to be gathered on what strategies of persuasion are successful.

In line with this purpose is the task of keeping UNESCO on track. UNESCO should be a strong organization that is able to bring culture onto a level playing field with commerce. This can be done only if it is supported by movements from all over the world that defend the cause of cultural diversity and that have the strategic insight and capability to withstand the trade-only theories and practices of WTO. A parallel objective would be to systematically highlight the faults of cultural enterprises that dominate cultural markets and that neglect the rich artistic diversity that exists in any society. The capacity should be built up to convince cultural enterprises that they have a responsibility concerning cultural diversity. Obviously this is a difficult issue that probably can only be realized by winning the support of staff working in these cultural corporations. The blame should also lie with public authorities that continue to allow these conglomerates to merge and buy up other cultural outlets and production facilities.

A second side purpose is to stimulate the growth of infrastructures that are appropriate for the distribution of diversities of artistic expression. It demands an enormous creativity and entrepreneurial courage to imagine that other channels of production, distribution and promotion of the arts can exist that are not oligopolistically controlled. How can the digital field become the place where

cultural diversity can be distributed in abundance, without being controlled by the interests of huge cultural industries? How can the experience be shared of artists from all corners of the world who already use the Internet effectively for the distribution of their creations and performances? The more these infrastructures for the production, distribution, promotion and exhibition of the diversity of the arts become effective, the less additional government regulations are necessary.

The sixth task, then, is to analyse what are the obstacles to achieving these purposes, and what are the opportunities. This will differ enormously from country to country. Concerning the varied fields of arts and entertainment the differences might also be substantial. It would make sense to try to categorize these obstacles and opportunities. What can be done on the political level? What kinds of campaigns would be necessary? Can reasons be found to bring cases to court? Is it possible to play off enterprises inside the economic cultural sectors against another? What is the Achilles heel of the "enemy"? Of course, it is essential that care be taken to find funding for all these activities. What arguments could work? Which kind of institutions or individual persons - maybe unexpected ones - can be convinced that it is also in their interest that cultural diversity continues to exist; why not play on their feelings of guilt? Let them pay!

The seventh task of the global NGO and the many cultural diversity networks and organizations in the different countries is to forge coalitions, with environmental movements of course, but one must also think, for instance, about trade unions and professional organizations and their different specific subsections; arguments may work for people in different positions differently. Why not join up with women's organizations, with federations of small and medium-sized enterprises, with social associations and clubs, with hackers, and with churches and other religious groups? It must be possible to start the debate in these contexts about the values of cultural diversity, about cultural expression and human rights, about pleasure related to their daily affairs, and about the relation between local economic life and local cultural life.

There should also be links with, for instance, the G 77 (the group of countries that is critical about the WTO) and with China; thus with countries who might have a vested interest in cultural independence, and hopefully also in cultural exchange with many parts of the world. The debates that take place in UNESCO on the Convention on Cultural Diversity give insight as to how countries formulate their interest in cultural diversity and what should belong to it and not. Those experiences should be memorized: they can be used strategically in the future!

The eighth task is to reach out, to campaign, and to seek public attention for specific topics that should be discussed, influenced or implemented concerning cultural diversity. A campaign is a connected series of operations designed to bring

about a particular result. What should be the result and which operations can support this purpose, at a local and a global level? Who will be the target of a specific campaign? What should be done to make it measurable, achievable, realistic, and time-based? Stories should be told, people's imagination should be triggered. The cultural sectors have the advantage, compared to ecological movements, for instance, that they are in the "business" of story telling, of seducing through fantasy. Communication should take place at a more sophisticated level than having, for example, a rock group after a speech on the importance of cultural diversity! There is also the advantage that in the arts sectors there are plenty of celebrities who can mobilize attention for cultural diversity. But this should be done in ways that make sense. How can one intervene effectively concerning cultural diversity topics, ownership questions and content regulations in processes of WTO trade negotiations, at the IMF and the World Bank? What should and could be the demands?

The ninth and the last task in this categorization is that the global NGO and the cultural diversity networks in the different countries should make sure that monitoring takes place at different levels. It should be the strategic task of the different global and local cultural diversity organizations that this monitoring indeed becomes effective, in the service of all the arts of the world.

"Cultural Treatment" and "Most-Favoured-Culture" to Promote Cultural Diversity vis-à-vis International Trade Regulations

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Introduction

This paper focuses on the policy goal of "cultural diversity" for "international trade related cultural goods and services", and on strategies and means to achieve this goal for countries that cannot afford substantial subsidies for these purposes. It proposes to explore and discuss an innovative legal approach in order to materialize cultural diversity based on a set of rules prohibiting "cultural discrimination". This idea is inspired by the prohibition of economic discrimination that underlies WTO law and that is articulated in the basic principles of national treatment and most favoured nation. The contemplated new concept is intended to establish an institutional dialogue based on case law between the WTO and an international organization in charge of cultural matters, for example the UNESCO where a convention on cultural diversity is adopted.

The analysis in this paper refers to the film industry. However, most of the discussion and findings can also apply to literature and music as well as to other mass cultural goods and services.[1]

New approaches

1. Subsidies as the cultural policy tool of the rich

Unfortunately, almost the whole debate on cultural diversity today is driven and squatted by the question of subsidies.[2] The substantial private interests at stake

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1 For a more extensive analysis of the issues at stake, see Christophe Germann, Diversité culturelle et libre-échange à la lumière du cinéma, doctoral thesis to be published in autumn 2006.

2 For a definition of subsidies according to Community law, see Christoph Herrmann, Der gemeinschaftsrechtliche Begriff der Beihilfe, in: ZeuS, 3/2004, p. 415 ff.

explain this situation: If France could no longer subsidize its national film producers in the near future, the beneficiaries would soon be out of business, unless some alternative solution came up to preserve their economic viability.

We challenge subsidies as a tool to implement cultural policies from the perspective of poorer countries that do not dispose of the corresponding public resources. We believe that it is unethical that a filmmaker from a rich country such as France can enjoy, at least in theory, substantive freedom of creation whereas her colleague from Poland or Burkina Faso must remain invisible and unheard because their States are not capable of intervening on a level playing field. As a complementary and, in the longer run, alternative solution to subsidies, we therefore suggest:

a) working towards a new deal in the area of intellectual property protection;

b) instrumentalizing competition laws, in particular the doctrine of "essential facilities", by using a market definition that takes into account the economic specificities of cultural industries; and

c) introducing and implementing new rules of law that are inspired by the principles of national treatment, most favoured nation and market access, and that shall prohibit "cultural discrimination" in international trade of cultural goods and services based on the novel principles of "cultural treatment" and "most favoured culture".

2. Intellectual property, competition and the prohibition of cultural discrimination

The interface between intellectual property and competition laws and policies provides the starting point of this innovative approach that shall eventually confront the multilateral trading system with the principle of equal treatment of cultural contents, including, but not limited to, films, books and music, and of the suppliers of such contents from a variety of cultural origins. In the best case scenario, the principles of "cultural treatment" ("CT") and "most favoured culture" ("MFC"), as we shall call them, will reinforce the peace promoting functionalism of economic integration on the global level, and make the trade of cultural goods and services economically even more profitable. Last but not least, this program, leading from cultural uniformity to diversity, would enrich the art and entertainment created, produced and distributed by cultural industries to the benefit of the society at large.

In this context, legislators should focus on the issue of intellectual property protection. High standards of intellectual property protection are an incentive to proceed to excessive marketing expenditures for the majors' films, and, therefore, detrimental to films that do not enjoy comparable investments to accede to the

audience. In this sense, too much copyright, trade mark and trade name protection contributes to driving films from other cultural origins than the dominant one out of competition.[3] On the other hand, certain standards of protection in the form of authors' rights should remain in place as incentive for creativity and in order to guarantee to filmmakers more independence from subsidies granted by, and from corresponding control of, the State. Legislators who are eager to promote cultural diversity in cinema will therefore have the task of finding a new balance with respect to the standards of intellectual property protection. The TRIPs Agreement should provide the necessary flexibility to achieve this goal (see preamble and art. 6 to 8 and 40 TRIPs Agreement). In this context, one may trigger inspiration from the debate on the standards of patent protection and their impact on public health in the light of South Africa's struggle with the pharmaceutical majors to insure access to essential medicines.[4] I therefore advocate that States shall implement the national treatment and most favoured nation principles in the context of intellectual property rights (art. 3 and 4 TRIPs Agreement) only in exchange of a contribution by the beneficiaries of this protection towards materializing the public policy goal of cultural diversity.

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3 One of the rationales underlying the grant of exclusive rights consists in providing incentives for qualified creative achievements. Authors and investors therefore advocate high standards of copyright protection. On the other hand, too much protection is detrimental to the interest of the users and, in certain instances, the society at large as it increases the price of the protected goods and services. This is particularly true with respect to the huge accumulation of capital fueling the production and distribution of blockbusters. These investments, that are protected by intellectual property laws and are channeled to marketing rather than creative efforts, drive most of Hollywood Majors' competitors out of the market. The following polemic formula can be used to express the basic threat at stake: TMC = SPA = TMC (where "Trade Mark and Copyright" equals "Stars, Print and Advertisement" equals "Total Mono Culture").

4 See references in Christophe Germann, Diversité culturelle et cinéma : une vision pour un pays en voie de développement, op. cit., p. 99 ff. See also Frederick Abbott, Study Paper 2a: WTO TRIPs Agreement and Its Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Countries, in: Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (ed.), Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, on:
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/study_papers/sp2a_abbott_study.pdf; on the flexibilities granted under TRIPs based on competition law, see UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity Building on IPRs, Resource Book on TRIPs and Development: An authoritative and practical guide to the TRIPs Agreement, Part III, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition, on: http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/Part3_Update.pdf

3. Cultural industries and the "Essential Facilities" doctrine

According to US law that inspired EU law, the "essential facilities" doctrine "imposes liability when one firm, which controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first."[5] Because it represents a divergence from the general rule that even a monopolist may choose with whom to deal, courts have established widely-adopted tests that parties must meet before a court will require a monopolist to grant its competitors access to an essential asset. Specifically, to establish antitrust liability under the essential facilities doctrine, a party must meet five criteria:

(1) the control of the essential facility by a monopolist;

(2) the competitor's inability, practically or reasonably, to duplicate the essential facility;

(3) the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor according to reasonable conditions;

(4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors, and

(5) the absence of legitimate business reasons to refuse the access to the facility.[6]

Given the varied contexts in which the essential facilities doctrine has been applied, US courts have declined to impose any limit on the kinds of products, services, or other assets to which the doctrine may appropriately be applied: "The term 'facility' can apply to tangibles such as sports or entertainment venues, means of transportation, the transmission of energy or the transmission of information and to intangibles such as information itself".[7]

Arguably, one could consider the majors' marketing and distribution oligopoly, including the accounting structure allowing to set off the many "flops" against the

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5 The Supreme Court first articulated this doctrine in United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). In Terminal Railroad, a group of railroads controlling all railway bridges and switching yards into and out of St. Louis prevented competing railroad services from offering transportation to and through that destination. This, the court held, constituted both an illegal restraint of trade and an attempt to monopolize.

6 For an overview on the "essential facilities" doctrine with further references, see the opinion of the Advocate General Jacobs of 28 May 1998 in the case Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Case C-7/97, ECR 1998 I-07791. The Court came to the conclusion that there was no essential facility at stake in the case.

7 Christophe Germann, Diversité culturelle et cinéma : une vision pour un pays en voie de développement, op. cit., with further references.

rare "blockbusters", as an essential facility for content providers from other cultural origins to reach a broader audience on the world markets. The business practice known as "blockbuster strategy" in fact largely denies the audience access to independent film producers and distributors.[8] It would therefore be interesting to test before courts whether the current system that enables the majors to concentrate total investments of yearly over 10 billion USD in marketing (stars, print and advertisement) would qualify as an essential facility. An argument in support of this claim would be that the majors' oligopoly is able to attract these marketing funds because of its assets (catalogue of rights) as well as its corporate and contract based control of domestic and international film distribution.

This approach may inspire legislators in other jurisdictions to elaborate competition rules and develop an administrative and judicial case law based on the essential facilities doctrine that are specifically aimed at enhancing a level playing field for audio-visual content providers of diversified cultural origins. Furthermore, it may substantially contribute to making cultural diversity in cinema economically viable without unduly relying on taxpayers' monies. In the context of the EU, one must remember that Art. 151 of the EC Treaty requires to take into account cultural policies also in the context of competition law.

4. Marketing means as the main criterion for substitutability

Competition laws should also be applied with respect to the control of transactions that could lead to a concentration of market power harming cultural diversity, i.e. preventive control of mergers and acquisitions. However, competition authorities have so far faced the difficulty of defining and implementing cultural diversity in assessing mergers and acquisitions. In our opinion, the main problem resides in predictable indicators or criteria of cultural diversity as well as in the traditional definition of relevant markets.

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8 De Vany, Arthur (2004) Hollywood Economics. How extreme uncertainty shapes the film industry, London / New York, pp. 122-138: "The blockbuster strategy is based on the theory that motion picture audiences choose movies according to how heavily they are advertised, what stars are in them, and their revenues at the box office tournament. The blockbuster strategy is primarily a marketing strategy that suggests the movie-going audience can be 'herded' to the cinema. Were this theory true, then the choices of just a few movie-goers early in a film's run would determine the choices of those to follow. This suggests that the early choosers are leaders or people on whom later choosers base their choices. They choose to follow these 'leaders' because they believe they are more informed than they are or because they neglect their own preferences in order to mimic the leaders. Audiences who behave this way are said to be engaged in a non-informative information cascade. It is non-informative because their choices are not based on the opinions of the leaders, only their revealed actions, and the followers do not reveal their true preferences when they choose only what the leaders chose."

First, the relevant competitors must be defined. For the cinematographic sector, that drives large parts of the audiovisual one, there are several main markets in the exploitation cascade (theatrical market, various types of television and video markets). If a film is successful in the theatres, it will likely be broadcast at prime time on television, and become a video bestseller. Theatrical exploitation, as the initial main market, includes three sub-markets, i.e. first the sub-market between film producers (supply) and distributors (demand), then the second sub-market between distributors investing in print and advertisement (supply) and exhibitors investing in the screening facilities and local advertisement (demand), and eventually the third and final sub-market between the exhibitors (supply) and the cinema audience (demand). The most significant sub-market is the one between the distributors (supply) and the exhibitors (demand), since it conditions, to a large extent, what the public will be given to consume in the theatres, on television and in home cinemas (video), as well as on parallel markets such as books and music markets that recycle the success of films. The territorial market between distributors and exhibitors is international, since, in theory, a local exhibitor can rent a film for screening in his theatre from distributors around the world. We shall therefore take the second sub-market between distributors and exhibitors to explore the definition of the product or service relevant market.

According to our thesis, the definition of the product and service market needs to take into account the specific economics of cultural industries. The common approach under competition law is to assess the substitutable character between the goods or services from the perspective of demand in order to determine whether such goods or services are in a competitive relationship with each other. According to Community case law, the relevant product or service market encompasses all products or services that the consumer considers as substitutable or interchangeable with each other based on (1) their physical characteristics, (2) their price, and (3) the use they are dedicated to.[9] These criteria make limited sense when they are applied to mass cultural goods and services. As a matter of fact, films, books and music often show little price differentiation, their physical characteristics are difficult, or even practically impossible, to define without an arbitrary recourse to aesthetic and content related considerations, and their intended use is commonly entertainment along with some form of personal enlightenment through the art. From the perspective of the exhibitors, the rental price of a film is generally based on a percentage of the box office results, and aesthetic and content related aspects are largely irrelevant as long as the use of the film for screening purposes attracts as many moviegoers as possible into their theatres. In other words, exhibitors are interested in quantity (audience) rather then in quality (content). Therefore, the most relevant criterion for substitutability is the audience appeal of a given film. This appeal is largely

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9   See JOCE C 372 372, 9 December 1997.

unpredictable prior to the launching of the film on the market if one relies on a subjective criterion such as the characteristics of the film. We therefore suggest that competition authorities replace this criterion with the more objective one of the amount of investment in print and advertisement.

5. "Like" marketing and distribution power

A similar approach may be used in the context of international trade rules where a violation of the national treatment (NT) or the most favoured nation (MFN) principles requires, among other conditions, that the discriminatory treatment take place between "like products" or "like services".[10] As a rule, the application of the principle of equal treatment in trade includes a "substitutability" or "interchangeability" test as one of its basic prerequisites. One shall compare products or services that are "similar" to each other in order to assess whether there is a level playing field for the purposes of competition and cross-border trade. Based on the economic specificity of cultural industries, we argue that cultural goods and services that do not enjoy comparable marketing investments are not "like" goods or services.

In the area of human rights, equal treatment of men and women or black and white persons relies on the assumption that men and women or black and white persons are "like" human beings. From the perspective of the rule of law materializing the principle of equality, this analogy makes sense if one considers that gender, race and culture have in common the challenge of assimilating diversity without causing uniformity. The prohibition of discrimination therefore imposes a similar approach on the normative level between different individuals, communities and cultures to enable their factual diversity to flourish. This abstract rule of law is most often concretized in practice with respect to economic activities: for example, equal salary for equal work by men and women or equal job opportunities for black and white persons. This long standing experience could inspire legislators who want to promote cultural diversity by enforceable rules of law. In this sense, economic activities related to culture should be the primary subject matter of the principle of equality of treatment or, at least, of the prohibition of discrimination.

6. Prohibition of "Cultural Discrimination"

In order to encourage cultural diversity one should focus on cultural goods and services, and apply the principles of equal treatment to their economic aspects by promoting a competitive level playing field. Correlatively, normative action should be content neutral in order to avoid State or private filtering or censorship. In other words, neither private nor public powers shall distort competition between cultural content providers in a way that discriminates on the basis of the cultural origins of the

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10 See Won-Mog Choi, 'Like Products' in International Trade Law, Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO Jurisprudence, Oxford, 2003, 11-90.

authors and their works. If a merger between two music corporations leads to the result that less artists from a variety of cultural origins are produced and distributed on a competitive level, one may argue a violation of the prohibition to culturally discriminate. If authors are refused the access to competitive marketing means for their work without legitimate business reasons because these works do not reflect the economically dominant culture, trade and competition are distorted in an abusive way. If no facility that allows managing the high entrepreneurial risks at stake by forms of private cross-subsidization is granted to such works, these cultural goods and services will miss economic viability on a sustainable basis. If local and export markets are out of reach for certain categories of cultural goods and services for other reasons than their intrinsic artistic and entertainment values and mass appeal, there is ground to suspect cultural discrimination. Furthermore, achieving a level playing field based on equal opportunities for artists from all cultural origins could positively widen the scope of the diversity of cultural expressions that are not directly trade relevant ("spill over" effect).

7. The "Distribution Bottleneck" in the light of a concrete example

In order to structure our new approaches, we propose to distinguish between

- the factors of creation and production (artists, creative technicians and producers),
- the factors of commercialization (distributors and content disseminators such as theatrical exhibitors, broadcasters, video and "new media" outlets), and
- the factors of consumption (audience and other media adapting and multiplying the original contents in other formats).

The first and last categories of actors in the cinema market are affected by the distribution "bottleneck" where the factor of commercialization "filters" mass cultural goods and services. Let us take as a concrete example the distribution of films in a small country like Switzerland. It is typical of an American comedy that is distributed by a local subsidiary of a major, to be widely released with over 50 copies and investments in advertisement of over 300,000 Euro. In addition, such a film normally enjoys global advertisement goodwill, owing to the investments performed on a worldwide basis in the stars acting in it, and the functioning like trade marks. In comparison, a film that is not distributed by a Hollywood major will be released with not more than 10 copies and less than 50,000 Euro for advertisement purposes. In addition, such a film does not enjoy any additional goodwill induced by advertisement abroad (e.g. star brand value) to appeal the audience. If we take the second sub-market between the distributors (i.e. supply and main investors in marketing) and the exhibitors (i.e. demand), it is obvious that the exhibitors will tend to rent the comedy that enjoys the more competitive marketing investments since they are more likely to attract a greater audience (i.e. demand of the third sub-market) into the theatres. In turn, the better box office results achieved in the theatrical release

will generate a higher visibility for the film and cause a programming on more popular schedules on television ("prime time"), and boost video sales and the demand on subsequent or parallel markets (merchandising, books, music, etc.). The visibility that a film can acquire on the theatrical market translates in terms of public appeal. This visibility implies corresponding marketing efforts that, in turn, trigger media coverage multiplying this visibility.[11] According to our thesis, this marketing induced visibility is the most objective indicator to assess substitutability or a "like" character between cultural goods and services. It allows to define whether two cultural goods or services are in competition with each other or not (substitutability test).

8. The principles of "Cultural Treatment" and "Most Favoured Culture"

The Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions that the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) approved on 20 October 2005, arguably is, in fact, no real convention at all. In my opinion, this instrument is rather a mere declaration that has almost no legal effect beyond what the UNESCO Declaration on Cultural Diversity already achieved in 2001.[12] As, among other weaknesses, this instrument does not provide a system of dispute settlement and sanctions that are equivalent to the means at the disposal of the WTO to enforce its trade agreements, such a convention will have little or no effect.[13] In order to address this issue, we recommend to adopt an approach limiting the power of the factors of

11 See Sandra Vinciguerra, "Hollywood pratique une discrimination culturelle à l'échelle planétaire", in: Le Courrier, 13 October 2003, available at:
http://www.lecourrier.ch/modules.php?op=modload&name=NewsPaper&file=article&si d=2858

12 The preparatory documents and the various drafts of the UNESCO Convention on cultural diversity are available on the UNESCO website under the heading "Towards a Convention on the Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions" at http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=11281&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&UR L_SECTION=201.html (status April 2005). The Swiss government engaged in a detailed consultation of the civil society to refine its position in the negotiations of this convention; the documents in French are available on the Swiss UNESCO website at: http://www.unesco.ch/work-f/diversite.htm. Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, adopted by the General Conference of the UNESCO on 2 November 2001: http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/diversity.htm. For a brief discussion of the initial experts' draft Convention on Cultural Diversity of July 2004, see Christophe Germann, Culture in Times of Cholera. A Vision for a New Legal Framework Promoting Cultural Diversity, in: ERA Rechtszeitschrift der Europäischen Rechtsakademie Trier, ERA-Forum 1/2005, pp. 109-130.

13 For a more detailed critical analysis of the UNESCO Convention, see Christophe Germann, "Towards a *Global Cultural Contract* to Counter Trade Related Cultural Discrimination", in: Nina Obuljen and Joost Smiers (eds.), UNESCO's Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: Making It Work, Zagreb: Culturelink/IMO, 2006, pp. 277-339.

commercialization (distributors) over the factors of creation (creators and producers) and the factors of consumption (audience). In other words, we argue that a new balance should be implemented between these three factors based on principles of law prohibiting "cultural discrimination". These "meta-rules" would mirror the prohibition of economic discrimination as set forth in the principles of "national treatment" and "most favoured nation" building the basis of GATT law, and subsequently WTO law, for more than half a century. With a view to illustrate our proposal and to cause a discussion on it, we have adapted art. II and XVII GATS as follows:

Article I
Most Favoured Culture Treatment

With respect to any measure covered by this Agreement, each public, private or mixed-economy factor of cultural commercialization of one cultural origin having a dominant market position shall accord immediately and unconditionally to cultural goods and services and to the factors of cultural creation and production of another cultural origin treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like cultural goods and services and their suppliers of any other cultural origin.

Article II
Cultural Treatment

Each public, private or mixed-economy factor of cultural commercialization of one cultural origin having a dominant market position shall accord to cultural goods and services and to factors of cultural creation and production of any other cultural origin, in respect of all measures affecting the commercialization of cultural goods and services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like cultural goods and services and like factors of cultural creation and production.

Article III
Maintenance of a Culturally Discriminatory Measure

The factors of cultural commercialization having a dominant market position may maintain a measure inconsistent with articles 1 and 2 provided that such a measure is effectively demanded by the factors of consumption.

This tentative formulation of the principles of "cultural treatment" and "most favoured culture" will require a more comprehensive elaboration. In our opinion, this approach is compatible with the provisions on cultural diversity, competition and intellectual property protection of the EC Treaty and with the TRIPs Agreement, in particular its preamble, art. 7, 8 and 40.

9. Banana, films and trade sanctions based on Intellectual Property Protection

The States are the gate keepers in the context of international trade rules. These rules impose legal obligations on the States to remove obstacles to trade by applying the principles of "national treatment" and "most favoured nation". With respect to the economic specificity of cultural industries, one can argue that not only States, but also private actors having a dominant position on national and cross-border markets condition the free movement of mass cultural goods and services. In other words, the majors as multinational corporations acting within an oligopoly are in the position to control cross-border trade of films. For the time being, these factors of commercialization keep the gate open for works from one single, largely homogeneous cultural origin, and keep the gate closed for movies from all other cultural origins. It therefore makes sense to focus normative action on these private market actors by way of a combination of competition, intellectual property and "free culture" rules. As a matter of fact, intellectual property protection is the *nerf de la guerre* of cultural industries. This protection relies on State action, i.e. on the elaboration and implementation of national and regional legislation in the areas of copyright, neighboring rights, trade marks, trade names, etc. If a State is eager to promote cultural diversity on its territory, it should be legitimated to put its public resources dedicated to intellectual property protection at the disposal of private actors in exchange for these beneficiaries' contribution to the State's cultural policy goals. Concretely, the State should only protect a major's intellectual property if this corporation participates as a factor of commercialization in preserving and promoting cultural diversity on the State's territory. On the other hand, if such a dominant position systematically discriminates on the basis of the cultural origin of films, i.e. violates the principles of "cultural treatment" or "most favoured culture" as phrased above, the State should be entitled to refuse to grant intellectual property protection with respect to the works owned by that corporation. In the arbitration procedure European Community EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Ecuador was granted the authorization to suspend intellectual property protection for right holders from the EC as compensation for the EC's violation of the "most favoured nation" clause and further specific provisions that applied to the export of Ecuadorian bananas into the EC.[14] Why should this form of incisive sanction be available against infringement of international trade rules, and not against violation of the prohibition of cultural discrimination?

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14 EC - Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas - Recourse to arbitration under Article 22.6 of the DSU, Decision by the Arbitrators, 24 March 2000, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU; see also Fritz Breuss, Stefan Griller and Eric Vranes (eds.), The Banana Dispute - An Economic and Legal Analysis, Vienna / New York 2003.

10. Feasibility of a new legal framework

The feasibility of the change of paradigm that is proposed in this paper will be conditional on the resistance of those individuals, companies and State entities who are satisfied with the *status quo*, and on the strength and perseverance of those individuals who are genuinely engaged in promoting cultural diversity. For example, subsidized film producers, who receive a substantial rent from the State each year, because they control the peer review procedures, based on which public aid is granted to local film industries, through clientelism and other forms of dysfunctioning, will strongly lobby against a radical change of the system. Similarly, the majors will strongly hinder any attempt to link the promotion of cultural diversity to the protection of their intellectual property. If these conservative forces should prevail, creative individuals and their public from all cultural origins, especially from transitional, developing and least developed countries, would eventually be the big losers, and with them society at large.

Conclusion

Today there is a need to coordinate laws and policies on the national, regional and global level in order to encourage and materialize cultural diversity. In the field of cinema, that exemplified the issues and solutions at stake for the purposes of this paper, market mechanisms have so far failed to preserve and promote cultural diversity. Cultural diversity can be considered to be both a public good and a prerequisite of the freedom of expression and opinion. As a consequence, many States and supranational bodies, such as the European Union and the Council of Europe, intervene today in the audiovisual sector by way of subsidies and other forms of public support. At the same time, the United States, driven by the oligopoly of the Hollywood majors, seek to remove, or at least to reduce to a minimum, such intervention within the WTO, arguing that public aid distorts competition. In reality, however, one can argue that there is no level playing field in the audiovisual sector between the majors' motion pictures and the ones from other cultural origins. The overwhelming distribution and marketing powers of these corporations drives most competitors out of business. Since consequent subsidies for cultural industries are out of reach for the majority of States, legislators should focus their attention on complementary or alternative means to pursue public policies aimed at preserving and promoting cultural diversity. To achieve this goal, we recommend to consider competition and intellectual property laws and policies as well as the implementation of a legal system inspired by the international trading system that would promote cultural diversity by prohibiting cultural discrimination.

Any Body There? Virtual Diaspora

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Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation ...A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in the nonspace of the mind, clusters of constellations of data. Like city lights, receding. (Gibson, 1984: 51)[1]

The aim of this paper is to draw the contours of the Croatian diasporic community in Australia within the context of virtual communication and hybrid cultural formations. It seeks to identify how digital communication remakes traditional modes of communication as a key concept for understanding of the current dynamics of the process of migration. I argue in this paper that due to recent information technology innovations, a new, distinctive form of cultural mobility has emerged in diasporic communities. Consequently, there is a need to innovate and reinterpret a sense of community, cultural identity and belonging as well as concepts of the social and the spatial.

This paper is based on two main premises:

1. Migrant experience of cyberspace contributes to the complexity of the issue of identity and the process which results in creation of a new hybrid identity.

2. The Internet is one of the central mechanisms for the production of contemporary culture and creation of various forms of identity.

Later I discuss aspects of experiences of virtual communication of a sample of Croatians in Australia and their networking between various geographical regions in Australia as well as their connections with their country of origin, or the country of their parents' origin. Arguments in this paper are additionally supported through my

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1 The term *cyberspace* was coined by William Gibson and first used in his novel *Neuromancer*.

involvement in various formal and informal Internet discussion groups currently active in the Croatian community in Australia, and the observation of these groups and the web content lists both in Australia and Croatia. These include the Croatian Information Centre for South Australia (www.croatiasa.com), the Croatian World Congress-Australian branch (www.crowc.org), small informal discussion groups (Down and Under), Crolinks (www.crolinks.com), and Culturenet (www.culturenet.hr) to name just a few.

With the wide use of the Internet, migrants' links between the home and the host society have found new forms of connection and extension. The emergence of Croatian virtual communities in Australia, these "digital diasporas" created and supported in cyberspace, has partly been a result of social and political transformations that took place in the homeland but also a result of the interplay of the socio-political developments in Australia and the accessibility of new communication technologies. Once digitized, information can circulate across vast geographical distances in a very short time. The result has been the emergence of a new form of cultural mobility in cyberspace as the capacity to engage with culture and cultural services across the entire spectrum of digital networks thus (re)positions oneself in the cultural info-sphere.

A possible dawn

The basic argument is that before popular use of the Internet, communities were people who lived and worked spatially close to each other. The global Internet transforms this - for those, as always, who have access to it - because it enables like-minded people to form communities regardless of where they are located in the physical world. Never before has it been possible for groups and individuals to communicate, cooperate, organize, and discuss with so little interference from the barriers of time and distance. Instead of transporting the user to a different place, a sense of presence may bring the objects and people from another place to the digital media user's environment.

Virtual communities: searching for the like-minded

The "virtual" raises issues regarding our attitudes and actions towards our understanding of the importance of balancing the "virtual" with the "actual" in our everyday life, and the "virtual" and the "abstract" in our culture. Since the end of the previous century the concept of virtual community has been introduced into this theoretical context (Rheingold, 1993; Porter, 1997; Smith and Kollock, 1999). Rheingold's seminal text *The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier* is of special significance here. He defines virtual communities as "social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public

discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace". (Rheingold, 1993: 5)

Also, the concept of ethnicity is in constant flux partly due to the new means of communication. With the increased use of new communication technologies where the social space can expand over several geographic spaces, the concepts of identity, belonging, homeland, distance, presence and place is only becoming more complex. These new forms of (virtual) migration bring together distant and separate geographic spaces beyond the grasp of physical proximity, providing a potential for constituting virtual communities.

Space - virtuality - virtual space

An information society is a society which is characterized by an increased use of communication technologies, technological convergence between computers and telecommunications, and associated social changes. (Poster, 1990; Bukatman, 1993; Virilio, 1995) I discuss potential implications of these issues tracing them at the level of ethnicity, community, interpersonal relationships, culture and society.

At the beginning of the 21st century questions about nationhood, ethnicity and identity are in the forefront of political and theoretical agendas. These issues were raised in the theoretical discourse at the end of the previous century as being in a state of fragmentation. (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992; Bauman, 1995; Kellner, 1997) They are fluid as any cultural group and therefore difficult to define. However, there is a broad consensus in regards to virtual (Rheingold, 1993; Smith and Kollock, 1999) communities as a late modern phenomenon which came into focus of interest under the influence of radical social changes caused by advances in communication technologies which have increasingly decentralized and have a tendency to be based around networks of mutually interdependent localized groups. The word *virtual* is often used to describe graphical objects and animated personae which populate fictional, ritual and digital domains as representatives of actual persons and things. These software agents and virtual objects stand for physical persons and places and have significant impacts on our understanding and construction of actual reality. (Rheingold, 1991) This is not such a new phenomenon, but it is gaining special relevance with the emergence of virtual communities (Rheingold, 1993; Smith and Kollock, 1999) which share their social space(s), mediated by new communication technologies. This implies the process of restructuring of social space and social relations. (Jameson, 1991; Virilio, 1995) The opening of virtual or cyberspace begins a movement of hyper-deterritorialization. As Appadurai (1990) argues, "the new global cultural economy has to be understood as a complex, disjunctive order, which cannot any longer be understood in terms of existing centre-periphery models". He proposes a framework which identifies five dimensions of the "global cultural flow"-

ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes. (Appadurai, 1990: 296)

This emerging cultural landscape requires a theoretical reassessment of cultural relations including an appreciation of the complexities of simultaneously local and global networks of cultural production, communication and consumption. The nature of these interconnections has been shaped by the concept of *hybrid identities* as discussed in recent cultural debates. (Lash, 1992; Friedman, 1992; Radhakrishnan, 1996; Morley and Robins, 1995)

The new information technologies, as central mechanisms for the production of contemporary culture, are generating fundamental transformations in the structure and meaning of contemporary society. (Poster, 1990; Jameson, 1991) The Internet has a key role in this digitally mediated communication that infiltrates interpersonal relations and permeates society. It is viewed as a universal tool, a human-created "ambience" which is altering the local structures of the historical world into non-local structures. In a world of distributed virtual realities, multi-local net-links, and online multi-user environments, any person can actively contribute to the shaping and function of the Net as a creative media forum for exchanging information and expressing ideas without structural restrictions. Although basically textual at this stage of development, the Internet is a multimodal type of communication (Kress and Van Leeuwen, 2001) where visual and sound components are equally important and only through this media interplay do diverse elements of construction of identity emerge and both stabilize and destabilize the notion of cultural identity. In this sense digital technology is not a neutral instrument that merely facilitates certain human activity but it is involved in the creation of culture. (Poster, 1990; Benedikt, 1991; Lunenfeld, 1993; Heim, 1993) The computer-mediated communication is therefore a projective medium for the construction of diverse public and private spaces. This results in the appearance of computer-mediated or virtual communities. (Rheingold, 1993; Foster, 1997; Smith and Kollock; 1999) One common element to all communities is mutually understood communication. Communication means encounter and interaction and it happens somewhere. I will therefore briefly examine the concept of space as a frame of these interactions.

Lefebvre (1991) proposes a concept of space as a social construction and as a representation of social practices specific for a particular historic period. Lefebvre argues that "(social) space is a (social) product". (Lefebvre, 1991: 26) It incorporates the social actions of both individuals and the collective. They express themselves within it and hence it is essential to society. It operates as a tool for the analysis of society through a complex structure of social actions, social locations, spatial functions and spatial forms. Social space is therefore a multi-dimensional set of relatively autonomous fields within which the participants are constantly engaged in

activities of different forms. It can be constructed and reconstructed according to different visions and divisions. Social space contains a great diversity of natural and social objects including networks and pathways which facilitate the exchange of material objects and information. In such defined space an individual is a "continuously constructed product of intersections or junctions of spatial fields" and cannot therefore be considered to exist in a unified homogenous space. Only our bodies operate in Euclidean space, but our senses and our mind occupy more fluid spaces which are the result of cultural constructs where "the space as directly lived tends towards an imaginary, sometimes utopian system of textual or/and non-textual signs". (Lefebvre, 1991: 19)

In this sense the concept of space is rather a complex frame which engages the participant in the multileveled meaning-making process. When we are talking about virtual space we are actually thinking of the visual space which is a two-dimensional representation of an *actual* space perceived by the sense of sight and transformed into a *virtual* space. Its main form is simultaneity, encounter and interaction of everything that is produced in space through the process of cooperation or through confrontation. Therefore, virtual space is a form of language, it can be "read" but it does not construct a simple message, it is rather a set of overlapping multilayered directions and instructions. (Lunenfeld, 1993; Heim, 1998)

Scratching the surface: diaspora, culture, identity

Migrants' connections to place and people are part of the process of migration embedded in issues of culture and identity. This process transforms individuals and results in the creation of hybrid identity. It also generates the simultaneous coexistence of opposed processes of both cultural change and resistance to change in ethnic or migrant communities. Migration has a significant impact on cultural values. The previously distinct hierarchies of "here" and "there", "self" and "Other", centre and margin, influence national self-identification. Ethnic and national identities manifest in the lives of individuals by connecting them with some people and dividing them from others. Such identities are often deeply embedded in a person's sense of self, defining an "I" by placing it against a background "we". Foster argues that a community is built by "a sufficient flow of 'we-relevant' information. The 'we' or the collective identity that results is structured around others who are seen as similar to the 'me'". (Foster, 1997: 25)

Croatian actual and virtual communities have been formed mainly according to national, ethnic and regional affiliations. If the relationship is hierarchically structured, such that the national is supposed to subsume or transcend ethnic identity it produces a "hyphenated identity" such as Croatian-Australian, similarly Vietnamese-Australian and so forth, where the hyphen marks "a dialogic and non-hierarchical conjuncture". (Radhakrishnan, 1996: 204) But this only indicates an

effort to overcome such a complex issue in which a person remains in a liminal space where the home country is not "real" in its own terms and yet it is real enough to support full integration into Australian society. On the other hand the "present home" is materially real but "not real enough to feel authentic" (Radhakrishnan, 1996: 204). Therefore, such a fluid personality in search of his or her identity feels a need for knowledge and close connections with the home country. Consequentially, looking for the more immediate modes of communication with the homeland has brought about creation of virtual communities. The emergence of Croatian virtual communities in Australia has partly been a result of significant transformations that took place in the homeland but also a result of the interplay of the socio-political developments in Australia and the accessibility of new communication technologies. It is also a result of an increased awareness of accessibility of diverse data related to the everyday social and political life "back there". One of the significant examples is an ongoing process of a post-war reconstruction of the country as well as the simultaneous and complex processes of adjustments to the standards of the EU with a view of unification with it, which is regarded by both the ruling party and the opposition coalition as a climax to the long process of restructure of Croatia on a regional and global political map.

National culture has been generally defined by the way social groups occupied a given territory and the forms by which their members communicate their everyday social relationships. The emergence of new digital media transformed these concepts and produced spatial trajectories and identities that do not fit into the traditional models of communities defined by nation, territory and belonging to the spatially unified culture. Migrants are substantially transformed by their journey and their presence is a catalyst to new transformations in the spaces they arrive in and temporarily or permanently settle. The migrant as a "fluid" personality is in constant search of his or her identity and feels a need for information, knowledge and close connections with the home country.

So, what does being Croat in Australia (but also in the USA, Germany and/or Croatia) mean and how does one construct Croatian identity? Anderson (1983) has described the nation as an imagined community which is produced through sharing of a range of myths and knowledge. This may turn into a transhistorical and mystic quest for origins. Bauman defines community in late modernity as "common understanding" which remains unachieved, and therefore virtual because it "stands for the kind of world which is not, regrettably, available to us - but which we would dearly wish to inhabit and which we hope to repossess". (Bauman, 2001: 3) He argues that at the time of globalization we are all interdependent. There are tasks which "each individual confronts but which cannot be tackled and dealt with individually" (Bauman, 2001: 149). Therefore we need other individuals for "sharing and mutual care". Bauman argues that "we miss community because we miss security".

(Bauman, 2001: 144) In this sense, Croats in Australia have a high degree of national coherence whether visible through various community groups and associations or "invisible", but maintaining elements of their cultural traditions on a private and personal level, and only occasionally visible to their broader community.

The study

Participants

This study involved a group of male and female participants coming from first and second generation Croatians living in several cities - Perth, Sydney, Melbourne and Adelaide.

Data collection

Nine respondents were interviewed in order to research their attitudes to virtual communication in relation to their national identity. They ranged in age from 28 to 61, most with a university degree and with lengthy experience of use of the Internet. Respondents were approached through several formal and informal networks. I made initial contacts individually, explained the study and upon their response emailed them a set of questions. After that I exchanged one or two additional emails clarifying some issues. Some of them phoned me inquiring about some issues or making comments which were not directly related to the set of emailed questions.

Data analysis

Collected data were analysed according to the conventions of thematic analysis. I analysed themes from the interviews, looking for similarities and differences across the questionnaires and common themes were summarized.

Discussion

Four respondents belong to first generation immigrants who arrived in Australia at the pre-school age. Five respondents are second generation Australians of Croatian descent. All participants stated they were proficient in both English and Croatian. Six are fully bilingual and have no difficulties in verbal communication. Three reported difficulties with reading and writing in the Croatian language. Their proficiency in Croatian is based on everyday communication shaped by their social environment and as part of the processes of family interaction.

> *My main language is Australian-English…I use the Croatian language when speaking with my parents…and a few Croatian friends I keep in contact with in Australia. Having this contact always reminds me that I am and always will be part of the Croatian culture/community, so the language, as a symbol of my identity, is very strong for me. (Female participant 1)*

I speak to my parents solely in Croatian…I also have friends who migrated here from Croatia. (Male participant 1)

Most of my closest friends are Australian/Croatians and we would meet/talk at least once or twice a week and we communicate half in English - half in Croatian. (Female participant 2)

All participants had an intensive contact with their local Croatian community at some stage, mainly in their adolescent years. Half of them continued maintaining strong links through regular participation in the activities of the Croatian ethnic clubs, other ethnic community groups and regularly or occasionally attend services at the Croatian Catholic churches.

[My personal situation] *keeps me on the margins of the Croatian community life, mainly looking in instead of looking from within. It gives me a more objective look at the community as a whole instead of just one particular group. (Male participant 2)*

When migration was discussed, six participants reported economic reasons as the main reason for migration of their parents to Australia. Two participants did not specify reasons but reported family reunion as the main reason for immigration. Only one participant reported political reasons which forced his family to emigrate from Croatia.

When asked to identify their understanding of the cultural background participant's answers were diverse. Subtle variations in their answers reveal the refined differences in the process of construction of their identity and interpretation of their cultural background. Five participants identified themselves as Croatians, two as Australians of Croatian descent, one as Australian Croatian, and one as Croatian Australian. Every individual linguistic distinction reveals a complex spectrum of internal varieties of an otherwise unified qualification of one's nationality.

Participants' view of their cultural identity was further refined through their listing of symbols which for them represented the notion of Croatian identity. The range of their answers covered a broad spectrum ranging from the official symbols like Croatian coat of arms, the war of independence, general value symbols like family and Catholicism, national food, arts and popular culture, music in particular.

GRB (Coat of Arms), but which square starts it..? (Male participant 3)

One of the strongest symbols of Croatia that I have is the Croatian war of independence of 1991…That war has left an imprint on me because it's probably the most tragic event to have occurred in my lifetime (to date) that has had serious ramifications on members of my close knit family. (Female participant 1)

I don't subscribe to any particular symbolism or ideology. I would say my personality has a Dalmatian influence of being relaxed laid back and a need to be in close proximity to the sea and generally open minded. (Male participant 2)

Cooking and food - My mother gave me a Croatian cookbook (written in English) that, at times, I find recipes from and cook dishes…This food reminds me of my Croat background. (Female participant 1)

Given the above comments it can be said that the participants do not regard linguistic modes of communication as a constraint on other more exciting or preferred modes of communication and identification with their cultural background.

When virtual communication is concerned, all participants reported that they were regular users of the Internet. Most of them use the Internet on a daily basis to browse various web sites and to receive and send emails. The data collected suggest that the concept of the Internet is interpreted by most participants as a navigating tool which operates as a source of information. There were no indications that any of the participants use it as a two way interactive tool, but rather engage with the content available on the Internet as passive recipients.

The Internet is my main communication tool - for work and personal life. I email and surf the net daily. It is a way to obtain information instantly at any time of day or night! I don't know what I would do without it now! (Female participant 2)

I use the Internet once a day, on average. I use the Internet for communicating via email for personal and work related reasons, as well as to find information on a wide variety of subjects including work related and personal interests. (Female participant 3)

I use the Internet almost daily, predominantly to keep in contact with my distant friends. (Female participant 4)

My Internet communications with Croatians tends to be with those who reside elsewhere in Australia or in Croatia. (Male participant 1)

On one level, it can be argued that these four participants find practicalities and preferences in virtual communication. Work-related necessity to use digital communication technologies also plays a part. So, to some extent unequal use can be attributed to individual expectations and habits or patterns of living. This is significant if we consider that they, as professionals, spend the most part of a working day in a computer-based environment. Such an attitude also determines their relatively low participation in discussion groups. Only two interviewees reported membership in discussion groups. Others were critical of the efficiency of such membership.

I no longer am on Internet discussion groups - I found it time consuming and interruptive at work. (Female participant 2)

Involvement in communication as a part of construction of identity is a choice. However, this seeming disconnection from discussion groups as a potential way of forming and maintaining a virtual community can be subject to an alternative interpretation: issues fundamentally related to national identity are predominantly maintained through personal relationships which involve both actual and virtual community members in a world with blurred boundaries. When the interviewed participants navigate the Internet they look for diverse information:

I check out what is written about Croatia, the accommodation and cultural information of certain regions I would like to visit and re-visit. (Female participant 2)

I usually conduct a search of Croatian sites when something raises a particular query regarding some aspect of Croatia or my relation to it. (Female participant 3)

I like to be aware of how the people I feel I belong to are represented locally, nationally and internationally in the media. I know, and am regretful, that we are not always represented in a good light!! (Female participant 1)

Their comments express a remarkably open attitude to nationality in order to question and identify the key components of their identity. However, the participants are reluctant to accept that they belong to the Croatian virtual community. Only half of them admitted belonging to a community as uncertain and unstable as a virtual or cyber community. Most of the interviewees argued that the concept of community had strong internal bonds similar to the family relationship. They could, therefore, hardly fully accept a fluid concept of virtuality as a notion of community. The traditional values inherited from their ancestors are strong determinants of acceptance and rejection within the virtual space.

This set of values also determines their notion of difference between actual and virtual space which is based on the two concepts: spatial and cultural distance:

Basically as two separate concepts; living the Australian way with heavy Croatian involvement (Male participant 2);

and a relationship in actual space which is reluctant to engage with cyber characters.

Since I "know" all the people I communicate with via email (they are not cyber friends but rather people that have been friends in real life) it does not matter to me whether I see them personally to talk to them or contact them via email or phone for a chat. (Female participant 1)

The way the participants describe their contribution to the construction of the virtual community suggests the continuing relevance of inherited cultural values based on traditional forms of social connectedness to place, family, relatives and friends. These forms for most participants have no alternative. When they move to

another place by virtue of their professional mobility, they move from the place of initial integration into Croatian community. This often results in dis-connection from the local Croatian community, and they usually do not re-establish their links with the Croatian community in their new place of living.

> *At the time I had a great deal of contact with the Croatian community in WA… however since moving to NSW and undertaking other professional duties, my contact with the Croatian community has almost completely diminished. (Female participant 1)*

It can be argued that respondents do not (re)position themselves within the same cultural space. They remain fixed in relation to others as the sets of values are fixed or slowly change, definitely not fast enough to consider virtuality as a potential factor of integration in a time of transition.

This paper focuses on a relatively small sample and it is not claiming that it fully represents a particular ethnic community in its current stage. However, analysing the nature of virtual communication among Croats in Australia confirms the existence of a Croatian virtual community and at the same time reminds us of the often surprisingly stable nature of the actual or real community and its potential for adaptation. This discussion has highlighted the current state of equally distributed orientation to virtual communication through the use of digital technologies as well as traditional modes of communication based on physical proximity and flash-to-flash interaction.

Border crossings - interactive Utopia

The aim of new media is to transform the traditional, passive, receiving audience of mass media into an interactive audience of the Internet in its current form. However, the question is whether, when communicating in a disembodied form, we can construct a meaningful social community. This question also raises issues about the possibility of developing close social relationships with people that cannot be met in the physical world and how the communities are formed and maintained where the other participants are not known.

There is, however, solid evidence from everyday practice that people can discuss their individuality and collectivity in the context of new cultural and political geographies shaped by new communication technologies. Instead of sharing the same characteristics of their social position and other local issues, participants in the virtual space have a greater tendency to base their relationships with other participants on the basis of shared interests. Croatian immigrants in Australia regularly access web sites containing news and multiple news lists in their home countries. They exchange information from politics, economy, sport, to culture, local news, individual web pages of their family members and friends. They participate in chat groups linking

their experience with memories of their homeland. This gaze may be uncritical and nostalgic, Croatia as a homeland may be cultivated as idealized, mythical space which serves as an antidote to the maladies "here" and "there" and pretend that the homeland hasn't change since we left it or that only certain changes occurred which only nurture such mythical construction, for example a centuries long dream of an independent state. Links between members of virtual communities are therefore based on the relative homogeneity of their interests. Operating via the Net, virtual communities are "*glocalized*". They are simultaneously global and local where global interconnectivity intersects with domestic issues. All this indicates that it is possible to create non-physical communities where meaningful and important social contact occurs to and for the participants.

Conclusion: Digital diasporas under construction

In contemporary global information society millions of users interact in virtual info-spheres expressing, as well as testing, their social, cultural and political ideas. The digital transformation is simultaneously the unfolding of intertwined processes of technological innovation, social reorganization, and cultural change. We are becoming inhabitants of techno-cultural environments structured by new forms of technology where digital communication remakes every aspect of the traditional patterns of daily life.

I have suggested in this paper by means of brief illustration of the research findings that the Internet can be viewed as a socio-technological model. I have looked at the symbolic side of the Internet in society. One of the reasons that the Internet may serve as a model of society is that it has developed in response to the functional differentiation of society and its compatibility with contemporary society. Through its speed, interactivity and multimodality the Internet influences communication patterns on an individual and on a collective level. It is therefore essential to understand how people inhabit and use virtual space in order to innovate and reinvent a sense of community. The question as to whether the virtual migrant communities, these "digital diasporas" created and supported in virtual space, will alter the fabric of our physical communities remains open to further investigation. These investigations can be especially useful as a way of questioning, rethinking and redefining issues of belonging and distance, identity as a construct and politics of its representation. An analysis in this area will be crucial for understanding what these communities are and which types of communities people can create under the changing social and cultural circumstances.

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Le multiculturalisme en question – une vue linguistique

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Selon sa définition la plus simple, le multiculturalisme est la coexistence de diverses cultures au sein d'une même société. Malgré sa limpidité apparente, cette définition n'admet pas une interprétation univoque, car son interprétation dépend évidemment de la signification attribuée aux notions de diversité culturelle et d'identité sociale, c'est-à-dire des critères choisis pour déterminer si des phénomènes observés appartiennent à un ou plusieurs cadres culturels, et si une ou plusieurs sociétés sont représentées dans une organisation sociale complexe. Nous pouvons néanmoins, pour les besoins de notre modeste analyse, accepter l'interprétation habituelle selon laquelle la langue, l'appartenance ethnique, la religion, les traditions et l'apparence «raciale», par exemple, sont les critères décisifs de la diversité culturelle, et qui se plaçant sous une perspective clairement pragmatique voit dans l'État les limites «naturelles» d'une société. Cette acception pragmatique du multiculturalisme provient du domaine de la politique où le terme, cette fois normatif et non descriptif, dénote l'orientation politique qui reconnaît la diversité culturelle et le droit d'être divers comme un principe constitutif de la société; de plus, elle doit soutenir et promouvoir les spécificités des divers groupes qui constituent la totalité de la société.[1] Il s'agit donc toujours, au niveau descriptif comme au niveau normatif, d'identités collectives différentes et de leurs interactions, observées le plus souvent à l'intérieur des frontières d'un État.

La langue étant, d'un côté, l'un des critères possibles de la diversité culturelle et, de l'autre, un moyen (et un lieu) d'interactions de groupes différents, un aspect important du multiculturalisme peut être le multilinguisme, qui serait, par définition, la coexistence de plusieurs langues dans une même société et qui aurait, lui aussi, ses aspects descriptif et normatif, dont le contenu est la diversité langagière, soutenue par

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1 Pour la différence entre multiculturalisme normatif et multiculturalisme descriptif, et pour les définitions de ces notions, *cf.* Heywood 2004, 231-236.

le vouloir politique. De nouveau, il faut négliger le fait que la linguistique ne dispose pas de critères sûrs pour définir une langue (tant par rapport à une autre langue que par rapport à ses dialectes ou sociolectes),[2] de sorte qu'il est nécessaire de se contenter d'une compréhension ordinaire ou intuitive (c'est-à-dire non-scientifique) de la diversité langagière. Malgré cette relation étroite entre le multiculturalisme et le multilinguisme, toute situation multiculturelle ne s'accompagne bien sûr pas nécessairement de l'usage de différentes langues, et la perception de la diversité culturelle peut se fonder sur des indicateurs autres que la langue (confessionnels ou «raciaux», par exemple), comme en témoigne, entre autres, la coexistence de diverses cultures dans une même communauté linguistique, celle de l'anglais aux Etats-Unis (marquée, il est vrai, par une diversité dialectale et sociolectale considérable). De même, le multilinguisme n'implique pas forcément une situation multiculturelle: il serait par exemple difficile de parler de diverses cultures suisses, bien que quatre langues différentes soient en usage dans ce pays.

Ces observations préliminaires sur le multiculturalisme et le multilinguisme et sur leurs aspects descriptif et normatif sont peut-être bien banales, mais elles nous signalent néanmoins quelques points moins triviaux, qui méritent une analyse un peu plus profonde. Tout d'abord, il est très raisonnable de supposer que le multiculturalisme normatif (c'est-à-dire réglé par des institutions politiques, donc institutionnalisé) et le multiculturalisme réalisé dans la vie quotidienne (donc pratiqué), tout comme leurs équivalents langagiers, ne doivent pas nécessairement être identifiés. Les manifestations du multiculturalisme pratiqué se font jour partout où deux ou plusieurs groupes constituant leurs espaces symboliques propres d'une manière suffisamment différente entrent en contacts réciproques, et nous pouvons imaginer que les premières relations entre la culture des Néandertaliens et celle d'*Homo sapiens* ont produit une situation multiculturelle élémentaire. Du commencement du néolithique jusqu'à nos jours, l'archéologie et, pour les périodes plus récentes, l'histoire nous présentent des témoignages innombrables des contacts et mélanges de cultures diverses: dans l'Antiquité, les grands Empires persans à l'Est et l'Empire romain à l'Ouest peuvent être interprétés, par exemple, comme des espaces où le multiculturalisme pratiqué était un phénomène plutôt normal qu'exceptionnel. A ce niveau du multiculturalisme réalisé, c'est la pratique même d'échanges de messages et de produits matériels qui règle les interactions entre groupes d'une manière dynamique et changeable, dépendante du contexte social concret, où cette pratique se déroule. En outre, le multiculturalisme pratiqué, bien qu'il soit en principe déterminé par des relations entre identités collectives, inclut également toujours l'identité individuelle des participants réels à la pratique d'échanges, identité qui n'est jamais complètement définie par une seule collectivité

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2 *Cf.* Škiljan 2002, 21 *sq*.

mais se manifeste comme une mosaïque (plus ou moins dynamique, elle aussi) des identités collectives différentes.

D'un autre côté, bien que, depuis l'Antiquité du moins, les contacts entre les participants à des cultures diverses aient été réglés par des institutions sociales ou étatiques, et bien que beaucoup d'Etats anciens et modernes (de l'Empire romain jusqu'à l'Autriche-Hongrie, par exemple) aient fonctionné comme des sociétés organisées sur des principes multiculturels, le multiculturalisme normatif, étant une option politique et idéologique consciente, ne date que de la deuxième moitié du siècle dernier. Cette période a vu, par conséquent, une expansion des règles et des institutions politiques dont l'intention était de protéger les spécificités culturelles de divers groupes et de promouvoir leurs relations mutuelles; en même temps, cette orientation politique vers le multiculturalisme soutenu par des institutions de l'Etat a suscité aussi toute une série de réponses qui, partant de positions politiques et idéologiques contraires, prétendaient prouver de façon argumentée que les sociétés multiculturelles sont nécessairement plus faibles et moins cohérentes que les sociétés monoculturelles.[3] En tout cas, le multiculturalisme normatif se rapporte explicitement aux seules collectivités et n'influence qu'indirectement les vies individuelles.

Comme il s'agit de l'institutionnalisation de relations entre des groupes au sein d'une organisation politique, de l'Etat, il n'est pas étonnant que les règles du multiculturalisme institutionnalisé soient toujours dictées par un groupe, celui qui est dominant dans la société et l'Etat donné; or, aux temps modernes, l'Etat étant le plus souvent un Etat-nation et la diversité culturelle se reliant à la diversité ethnique, c'est la nation «éponyme» de l'Etat (et, notamment, son élite politique) qui détermine les normes du multiculturalisme, en les articulant en termes de rapports entre la majorité et les minorités.[4] Cette articulation politique (et toujours non seulement idéologique mais aussi idéologisée) des conditions multiculturelles fixe des limites à la portée effective du multiculturalisme institutionnalisé, lequel, de son côté, agit sur les réalisations du multiculturalisme pratiqué dans la vie quotidienne des sociétés modernes.

Ces processus et leurs conséquences peuvent être observés dans tous les domaines où se manifestent les relations entre les groupes (c'est-à-dire, le plus souvent, aujourd'hui, entre les ethnies) qui participent aux cultures différentes, et nous allons les examiner avec quelques détails dans le domaine linguistique, en puisant des

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3 Heywood 2004, 231.

4 Dans cette acception, la *differentia specifica* de la majorité est sa position dominante dans la société, la position qui résulte de son pouvoir, et non de sa supériorité quantitative, quoique d'habitude - dans les Etats-nations - la nation "primaire" prévale quantitativement aussi.

exemples aux situations où la diversité langagière coïncide avec la diversité culturelle. Le choix du domaine linguistique se justifie facilement par le fait que les politiques langagières constituent une partie explicite et importante des politiques générales de la majorité des Etats nationaux modernes. Ce choix peut être défendu aussi par un argument moins pragmatique: le multiculturalisme inclut toujours la nécessité d'un degré quelconque de compréhension mutuelle entre des groupes pratiquant diverses cultures, et la langue est - comme nous l'avons déjà souligné - le moyen le plus répandu d'interactions communicationnelles entre les hommes, si bien que chaque situation multiculturelle exige des échanges particulièrement intenses des messages langagiers.

Si on examine d'abord le multilinguisme spontané, qui résulte d'un contact plus ou moins durable entre deux (ou plusieurs) communautés linguistiques partageant le même territoire ou se rencontrant dans le même espace, on voit que la pratique communicationnelle amènera ces communautés à trouver le(s) moyen(s) commun(s) de communication mutuelle entre les locuteurs des langues différentes en présence, ces processus pourront produire quelques situations diverses. Il est concevable que tous les membres de ces communautés (ou, du moins, ceux qui entrent en contacts réciproques) deviennent multilingues et maîtrisent tous les idiomes qui sont en usage sur le territoire donné: la conséquence en sera un plurilinguisme spontané et des *code switchings* permanents et imprévisibles, mais aussi la possibilité que tout locuteur utilise son propre idiome dans chaque situation. Cette solution - qui caractérisait, par exemple, certaines régions (surtout urbaines) multiethniques de Macédoine sous l'Empire ottoman - n'est applicable qu'aux lieux de contact d'un nombre restreint de communautés linguistiques, parce qu'il est difficile d'imaginer qu'un individu puisse réellement maîtriser plus que trois ou quatre idiomes différents.[5] En outre, il est très probable que, tôt ou tard, une hiérarchie des idiomes en usage sera constituée, selon leur efficacité communicationnelle et le pouvoir dont leur communauté linguistique dispose.

Cette disposition du pouvoir social ou de l'autorité conduit, de son côté, à la différenciation de la majorité et des minorités, ce qui a le plus souvent pour résultat une diglossie asymétrique, où la majorité ne parle que son propre idiome, qui est, en même temps, le moyen de communication commune, et les minorités disposent de deux idiomes, parmi lesquels leur idiome «maternel» est destiné à l'usage interne, à l'intérieur de leur communauté linguistique, de sorte qu'il occupe une place plus basse à l'échelle des valeurs sociales. De telles circonstances, dans lesquelles le *code switching* est obligatoire pour les membres de la minorité seulement, proviennent donc très fréquemment des distributions inégales du pouvoir social, et la plupart des

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5 Pour une description de telles situations multilingues partout dans le monde, *cf*. Calvet 1987, *passim*.

pratiques langagières des administrateurs romains dans les provinces impériales peut en donner un bon exemple. Mais, si les membres de la communauté minoritaire renoncent finalement à l'usage de leur langue, même pour leurs besoins internes, et s'ils acceptent l'idiome majoritaire comme moyen unique de communication, la diglossie se transforme en une situation monolingue, comme en témoignent les processus d'abandon des idiomes vernaculaires presque partout dans l'Empire romain, auxquels vint se substituer la langue latine.

Il est possible aussi que les communautés linguistiques en contact créent ou choisissent un troisième idiome pour la communication réciproque, une langue donc qui n'est «maternelle»[6] ni aux uns ni aux autres et qui est, en apparence du moins, un idiome «neutre». Dans les cas, assez rares d'ailleurs, où deux ou plusieurs communautés ont une position sociale égale, leur langue commune peut être perçue comme un «mélange», lui aussi réellement neutre et égal, de tous ses idiomes «sources»; tel est le cas du sabir original des ports méditerranéens. Mais ce «mélange» fonctionne plus fréquemment comme *pidgin*, ayant une position très faible dans la hiérarchie sociolinguistique et étant utilisé par le groupe dominant uniquement pour la communication avec des membres de groupes dominés; quant aux idiomes de ces groupes, idiomes qui ont dans la totalité de la société une valeur encore plus basse, ils pourront être remplacés par le *pidgin*, qui deviendra le moyen de communication interne des dominés et leur langue «maternelle», c'est-à-dire le créole. Enfin, le troisième idiome destiné à devenir le moyen de communication entre deux communautés linguistiques différentes pourra être une langue qui n'est pas mixte mais qui «appartient» à une autre communauté, jouissant ordinairement d'une renommée sociale plus grande; par conséquent, cette langue est le plus souvent un idiome majoritaire utilisé par des membres des minorités différentes. C'est ainsi que, par exemple, les Arabes et les Chinois immigrés en France parlent français dans leur communication mutuelle.

Dans toutes ces manifestations du multilinguisme spontané, il faudrait faire la différence entre l'aspect communicationnel et la dimension symbolique de la langue.[7] Comme c'est dans la dimension symbolique que se réalise l'identité collective, elle est plus étroitement liée au domaine de la culture, et dans les conditions multiculturelles les groupes différents sont souvent symbolisés par leurs langues; il est même possible qu'une communauté conserve sa langue en tant que symbole, mais accepte un autre idiome (en règle, majoritaire, c'est-à-dire dominant) comme moyen de communication: cela arrive fréquemment non seulement aux immigrés de la deuxième ou de la troisième génération mais aussi aux ethnies

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6   La notion de *langue maternelle* et ses modes de construction notionnelle sont décrits en détail dans Škiljan 2002, 184 *sq*. et dans Trabant & Naguschewski 1998, par exemple.

7   *Cf*. Edwards 1984, 16 *sq*. et *passim*.

«autochtones», et même à des nations entières, ainsi qu'en témoigne le cas de l'Irlande.

Quant au multilinguisme institutionnalisé, du point de vue de la théorie, chaque manifestation provenant de la pratique langagière spontanée que nous venons d'examiner peut être soumise à des règles explicites, mais la situation dans laquelle le pouvoir politique et social est distribué de manière égale entre deux ou plusieurs groupes ne se présente qu'exceptionnellement. Cela n'est pas inattendu si l'on observe le multilinguisme dans des Etats nationaux, où - par définition - une ethnie, *la* nation, doit être dominante et majoritaire, les autres étant minoritaires. La communauté linguistique (et ethnique, bien sûr) majoritaire vise à organiser la société tout entière de la façon la plus efficace, mais en même temps c'est elle qui définit les critères de cette efficacité en accord avec ses propres intérêts. Ainsi, dans les Etats modernes, les politiques langagières par rapport aux minorités, selon la classification la plus connue,[8] englobent toute une gamme de procédés possibles, tels que la prohibition totale de l'usage de la langue minoritaire (du moins dans la communication publique), la tolérance tacite, la non-discrimination sans soutien, la permission ou, enfin, la promotion des droits langagiers minoritaires, et tous ces procédés peuvent être soutenus explicitement par des lois et institutions d'Etat ou mis en œuvre selon un règlement implicite. Le choix de la stratégie majoritaire envers les minorités linguistiques dépend partiellement de l'idéologie qui se trouve à la base de la politique générale (et qui peut se réaliser sous des formes diverses, d'un système d'idées libéral à un autre, résolument conservateur) et de la façon dont se conçoit la nation (comme une communauté civique contractuelle ou comme une communauté «organique» du «sang et du sol»). Cependant, le but et le résultat final de cette stratégie sont presque toujours les mêmes: l'intégration des minorités dans l'espace communicationnel public, soit par assimilation complète, soit par diglossie asymétrique, les seules autres possibilités étant leur ghettoïsation ou leur exclusion totale de cet espace. Les politiques d'enseignement dans la plupart des Etats européens contemporains qui offrent aux membres des minorités linguistiques une éducation bilingue au commencement, qui se transforme progressivement en éducation en langue majoritaire, sans réciprocité dans les processus d'instruction de la majorité, témoignent bien de cette tendance assimilatrice latente, tandis que le choix entre exclusion ou assimilation immédiate peut être illustré parfois par des conditions minoritaires sous régimes totalitaires (celles des Kurdes, par exemple, récemment encore en Turquie). Dans tous ces cas, l'inclusion des minorités dans l'espace communicationnel majoritaire se justifie par l'efficacité communicative indispensable pour le fonctionnement de la société et de l'Etat.

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8   Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1995, 71 *sq.*

De leur côté, les minorités ne peuvent qu'accepter, en dernière conséquence, la solution proposée par la majorité; il est possible, bien sûr, qu'elles participent activement aux processus d'élaboration de la politique langagière ou qu'elles y résistent vivement, mais le succès de leur engagement dépendra avant tout du pouvoir social et politique dont elles disposent dans la société donnée, et les «règles du jeu» fondamentales seront toujours imposées par le groupe dominant. Par conséquent, la minorité deviendra bilingue (avec une tendance forte à la diglossie, où elle réservera sa langue au domaine du privé voire, peut-être, du public «interne»), ou monolingue (en langue majoritaire), ou bien elle sera condamnée à la ghettoïsation communicationnelle et à l'exclusion des cours principaux de messages socialement importants. Ainsi la minorité se conforme-t-elle le plus souvent, d'une manière ou d'une autre, aux exigences de la majorité et - même dans les circonstances politiques et idéologiques les plus favorables (ou, peut-être, plus particulièrement dans de telles conditions) - pénètre dans l'espace communicationnel surtout par le moyen de la langue majoritaire, en destinant à sa propre langue le rôle symbolique, c'est-à-dire en reproduisant sous cet aspect le paradigme général de l'idéologie nationale, où la langue doit être un symbole essentiel de la nation.

L'individu qui appartient à une communauté minoritaire se trouve ainsi sous des pressions différentes: d'un côté, s'il veut participer réellement à l'espace public de la société, il doit nécessairement maîtriser la langue majoritaire; de l'autre, son groupe minoritaire exige qu'il maintienne, ne serait-ce que dans la dimension symbolique, sa propre langue comme garant de son identité collective. En même temps, la nation majoritaire, visant à la cohérence symbolique de la société tout entière, promeut implicitement et explicitement sa langue - qui, d'ailleurs, a déjà une place privilégiée dans la hiérarchie sociolinguistique - comme le symbole commun le plus approprié, tandis que l'élite minoritaire essaie de maintenir l'aspect communicatif de la langue minoritaire aussi, parce qu'elle sait que, sans cette maintenance, sa portée symbolique sera bientôt diminuée. Il en résulte souvent qu'un tel individu devient «sémilingue», c'est-à-dire un locuteur incompétent des deux langues.

Ces quelques observations concernant les deux faces du multilinguisme parviennent semble-t-il à démontrer, malgré leur généralité, certaines caractéristiques également propres au multiculturalisme, en particulier dans son aspect institutionnalisé. Ici encore, les règles fondamentales sont dictées par le groupe dominant - la majorité - et, même dans des Etats où le multiculturalisme est promu en principe constitutif de la société, la règle essentielle le plus souvent inexprimée mais parfois explicite, prescrit aux minorités: Soyez différentes, mais ne le soyez pas trop, c'est-à-dire, quant aux matières et pratiques vraiment substantielles pour le fonctionnement de la société (y compris la pratique communicative

langagière dans le domaine public), soyez comme nous.[9] Cette attitude implique, en dernière analyse, une obligation imposée aux minorités: elles doivent être constituées, en tant que communautés, sur le même modèle que celui qui s'applique à la majorité, à savoir le modèle ethnique proposé par l'idéologie nationale; elle implique aussi une obligation à l'individu: il ne peut être différent que dans les limites déterminées par son appartenance à un groupe minoritaire reconnu comme tel. La conséquence en est que la minorité culturelle, tout comme la minorité linguistique, située dans le cadre du multiculturalisme institutionnalisé doit choisir entre la ghettoïsation, l'assimilation ou – le plus souvent – la ségrégation latente où les spécificités culturelles sont permises avant tout dans l'espace symbolique «interne» du groupe minoritaire, tandis que l'espace «externe» reste sous la domination de la majorité.[10]

Cette attitude institutionnalisée, qui produit par sa force idéologique une verticale dominante de la conscience commune de la société, se reflète bien sûr dans les manifestations du multiculturalisme spontané, si bien que, même dans les communautés qui pratiquaient traditionnellement une vie où toutes les différences culturelles avaient été sauvegardées et acceptées comme conditions habituelles de l'existence, les pratiques minoritaires sont perçues maintenant comme une conduite spécifique, qui est, d'une certaine manière, moins valable et qui est une manifestation apparente d'un certain Autre.[11]

Les causes de cette position du groupe dominant et de ce multiculturalisme qui impose des limitations sérieuses aux minorités n'ont rien d'énigmatique. Elles proviennent forcément de la conception (et de la réalisation) de l'Etat national et de l'idéologie nationale, qui prétend que les circonstances idéales pour le fonctionnement efficace de la société (et de l'Etat) seraient réalisées si l'identité collective (qui ne pourrait être que l'identité nationale) se manifestait d'une manière univoque et sans conflits internes, c'est-à-dire sans intrusions des Autres. L'idée qu'une société pourrait fonctionner aussi efficacement dans les conditions d'interactions multiples et dynamiques des identités diverses en présence est complètement étrangère à l'idéologie nationale, et les pratiques multiculturelles spontanées qui démontrent cette possibilité sont, de son point de vue, nécessairement subversives.

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9 Le problème qu'ont provoqué les voiles portés par les étudiantes musulmanes en France illustre bien cette demande de n'être pas trop différent, au moins dans l'espace public.

10 C'est pourquoi le multiculturalisme est souvent réduit à des manifestations minoritaires *pro foro interno* et folkloriques.

11 Cette tendance est évidente, par exemple, dans tous les Etats issus de l'ex-Yougoslavie où, après la constitution des Etats nationaux, les minorités sont devenues un Autre manifeste et incontestable.

Il ne faut cependant pas négliger le fait que le multiculturalisme institutionnalisé moderne offre en même temps aux collectivités minoritaires une certaine protection réelle, sans laquelle - abandonnées à la spontanéité de la pratique - elles seraient parfois condamnées à la perte rapide de leur identité. Il serait donc erroné de conclure qu'il faudrait insister exclusivement sur l'aspect spontané du multiculturalisme; mais nous pouvons supposer qu'un cadre institutionnel placé au niveau local ou régional, donc à un niveau plus proche des pratiques multiculturelles spontanées, serait plus approprié (ou moins traumatisant) aux besoins sociaux des femmes et des hommes en tant qu'individus et en tant que membres des communautés minoritaires et majoritaires.

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Cosmopolitan Identity Combined with Multilingual Ability for a New Dimension and Dynamics of Individual Intercultural Competence and Communication

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Introduction

This paper is a condensed account of research (Gunesch, 2002; 2003; 2004) which fulfils the demand of recent literature (Skrbis, Kendall and Woodward, 2003: 131-132) to conceptually and empirically substantiate cosmopolitanism. In doing so, it proposes the combination of cosmopolitan identity with multilingual ability for a new dimension and dynamics of individual intercultural competence and communication.

Conceptual framework

The matrix of cosmopolitanism

The definition of cosmopolitanism below is a literature matrix of cosmopolitan cultural identity with writings from several disciplines. It is not merely a literature review, but a literature synthesis, that has been, in turn, subjected to substantial critical thinking.

1. The cosmopolitan straddling of the global and the local

In terms of a simplifying model, one can distinguish between cosmopolitanism and localism, or between people who are cosmopolitans and locals. While the local is not interested in cultural diversity, the cosmopolitan consciously values, seeks out and tries to access local cultural diversity. Since that cultural diversity always comprises the respective local(s), cosmopolitanism logically presupposes localism. (Friedman, 1994: 204-205; 1995: 78-79; Hannerz, 1990: 237, 249-250; 1996: 102, 111; Pollock,

2002: 17) These two, then, do not have to be exclusive opposites, but can be seen as the extreme ends of a continuum. There is a possible development process for the individual from local to cosmopolitan. This continuum idea is relevant to other aspects of the cosmopolitan model.

2. Cosmopolitan competence or mastery

The cosmopolitan's access to local cultural diversity leads to a competence or mastery in the respective local culture(s). Depending on the degree of that competence or mastery, one can speak of "connaissance", rather than (mere) "dilettantism". (Hannerz, 1990: 239-240; 1992: 252-253; 1996: 103) These two can again be seen as extreme ends of a continuum along which the cosmopolitan can advance, and which serves to distinguish between different cosmopolitans with respect to their local competence, as well as between different degrees of competence (from one local culture to another) within the same cosmopolitan person.

3. The cosmopolitan metacultural position

The competence aspect of cosmopolitanism could be described as "knowledge", an objective characteristic of a cosmopolitan person. An open-minded engagement with cultural diversity could be described as "attitude", a subjective characteristic of a cosmopolitan person. (Hannerz, 1990: 239; 1992: 252; 1996: 103) This can apply to the individual cosmopolitan's access to as well as competence within the respective local culture. It also allows for individual dislike of what is open-mindedly engaged with, either in its entirety or with respect to its components.

4. The question of mobility or travelling

On the one hand, travelling is indispensable for cosmopolitan experiences (Appadurai and Breckenridge, 1998: 5; Beck, 2000: 96; Clifford, 1992: 103). On the other hand, it is not sufficient unless done with the background and the attitude of connaissance and cultural engagement, lest it be mere tourism. (Hannerz, 1990: 240-242; 1992: 246-248; 1996: 105; Robbins, 1998a: 254; Tomlinson, 1999: 186)

5. The relationship between cosmopolitanism and tourism

The mobility aspect also evokes a comparison with the image of the typical tourist. As the adjective "typical" suggests, the tourist lacks the objective requirement of competence or mastery as well as the subjective requirement of pursuit of open-minded, deep and meaningful engagement with cultural diversity. The tourist prefers to hang on to holiday stereotypes and cultural clichés with respect to the target culture. (Baumann, 1996: 29; Bruckner, 1996: 247-249; Carter, 2001: 77; Curtis and Pajaczkowska, 1994: 201; Featherstone, 1993: 182; 1995: 98; Fischer, 1996: 73-76) Taking out the "typical" does, however, mean that even a cosmopolitan can engage in tourism. (Appiah, 1998: 91) As with the cosmopolitan-local image, one could see this

either as a black-and-white dichotomy or as a continuum that makes it possible for an individual to develop from tourist to cosmopolitan. Indeed, the investigated multilingual individuals defined an intermediate category of "advanced" tourist on such a continuum.

6. Home for the cosmopolitan

Even with a shorthand definition such as "at home in the world" (Brennan, 1997), the question of where "home" is for the cosmopolitan individual is perplexing or paradoxical. (Eagleton, 2000: 63; Iyer, 2000: 136) With a variety of accessed and accessible cultures, home might not be the "home culture" any more, due to acquired multicultural perspectives or identifications. For that reason, the "classical home" as locals know it, might have ceased to exist. Or, it might indeed be the classical home, albeit seen from the new cosmopolitan perspective, which would then alter its original meaning. Home could also take on an entirely new meaning formed from the multicultural perspective of the cosmopolitan individual. (Hannerz, 1990: 240, 248; 1992: 253-254; 1996: 110) Another possibility is a multiplicity of homes, combining several or all of the previous alternatives, while logically and logistically home cannot be everywhere. In the end, the question of home remains literally wide open, to be substantiated in the empirical part.

7. The relationship between cosmopolitanism and the nation state

Some cosmopolitans regret, or even reject, the practical (historical, political, legal, etc.) prevalence of national affiliations and identities over global ones. (Buzan, Held and McGrew, 1998: 388-389; Friedman, 1994: 204-205; 1995: 78-79; Kymlicka, 2001: 204) Others go as far as attempting to construct a new model of citizenship beyond internationalism, which even in practical terms gives first preference to the global identity sphere, and some take this even further by making this global preference an exclusive one. (Nussbaum, 1996: 4-9; Rée, 1998: 88; Sarup, 1996: 142-143) Their arguments range from a cosmopolitan being, quite simply, "nowhere a foreigner", over the dangers of patriotism in the form of nationalism, to the argument of embracing humanity as a whole, just as in the smaller identity circles such as family, city, or nation.

The counter-arguments to these cosmopolitan positions mainly invoke the geographical or emotional difficulty or impossibility of embracing such large circles of identity, in contrast to the smaller ones of family, city, or nation. (Barber, 1996: 33; Glazer, 1996: 63; Heater, 2002: 58-59; McConnell, 1996: 81; Pinsky, 1996: 89; Putnam, 1996: 96; Turner, 2002: 49) Against these arguments, in turn, is invoked that there are no logical reasons for the historical and geographical arbitrariness of the demarcations of nation states, or why large entities like the whole world could not be embraced in a similar fashion to entities like nation states - themselves already very

large in terms of human emotional attachments. (Nussbaum, 1996: 17; Robbins, 1995: 174; 1998b: 5-6)

Some finally argue for a mediating position, namely a "rooted cosmopolitanism", which tries to combine the contending lines of thought: cosmopolitans can, accordingly, be patriots, and vice versa. The two models were already included in each other, since larger circles of identity like the world automatically comprise smaller ones like nation states and others. (Appiah, 1998: 91, 95-97; Bhabha, 1996: 202; Cohen, 1992: 483; Malcomson, 1998: 234-235, 242-243; Robbins, 1998b: 1) In sum, while the nation state issue remains open to debate, it is also one of the most interesting aspects of the cosmopolitan matrix with respect to an investigation of multilingual individuals whose languages happened to be mostly nation state languages.

The differentiation between cosmopolitanism and internationalism

Inter-national-ism is by definition an extension of nation state categories, which triggers several geographical, political and cultural limitations:

- Internationalism cannot question, transcend, or even try to ignore the nation state as a category, whereas these are strongly discussed features of cosmopolitanism.
- Internationalism cannot explain why a person's "home" might actually be outside his or her own nation state, or in several parts of the world, as symbolized in the cosmopolitan shorthand definition of "feeling at home in the world".
- Similarly, with "being international" defined as having "attitudes which place the cultures and views of others on a par with one's own" or as "showing respect for others" (Hayden, Rancic and Thompson, 2000: 120), the possibility of viewing and placing other cultures and views actually above one's own (for example, a strong emotional involvement in local culture beyond connaissance) is more easily conceivable in cosmopolitanism.
- Cultural issues that are below or above the nation state remit (for example, interest in small-scale local cultural diversity, like regions or cities, or identity dimensions covering continents or even the whole world) are easier to capture with cosmopolitanism defined as "straddling the global and the local".

The differentiation between cosmopolitanism and globalization

- Globalization is associated with cultural uniformity (Jameson, 2000: 51; Sifakis and Sougari, 2003: 60; Watson, 2000: 68-71) rather than with cultural diversity (Scholte, 2000: 23). Cosmopolitanism, however, is only concerned with cultural diversity.

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- For that reason, globalization defined as going "global and local at the same moment" (Hall, 1991: 27; similarly Featherstone, 1993: 169; Fishman, 1998-99: 37; Held et al,. 1999: 28) is not the same as the cosmopolitan straddling of the global and the local.
- Historically, the globalization debate originated in the 20th century (Nicholson, 1999: 24; Scholte, 2000: 16), while the idea of cosmopolitanism goes back to the Greek Stoics of the 1st and 2nd centuries BC.

Conceptual link between cosmopolitanism and multilingualism

Pascal Bruckner, in his article "The edge of Babel" (1996: 247-248), closely links his notion of individual cosmopolitanism to the linguistic development of the individual. Bruckner gives examples of historic and contemporary writers and poets who learned and used foreign languages in their works. However, he more or less takes for granted and without empirical substantiation that the cosmopolitan model he proposes has a lot to do with languages and language learning.

The definition of multilingualism

There are two areas to define: quantity (number) and quality (mastery) of the languages that individuals are required to speak (in a wide sense). As for quantity, a definition that goes beyond "trilingualism" requires the mastery of "at least three foreign languages". (Apeltauer, 1993: 275) As for quality, the literature maintains that for multilinguals "it is inappropriate to expect near-native speaker competence". (Morgan, 2001: 46; similarly Gnutzmann, 1997: 163) For the three languages each multilingual participant was supposed to speak, I required if possible "advanced knowledge", but at least "good working knowledge" across the spectrum of skills (reading, listening, speaking, and writing).

The identity of multilingual persons

The literature that addresses the identity of multilingual persons is unrelated to cosmopolitan cultural identity. The authors merely find themselves "acquiring a different cultural identity in every language that I speak" (Kotchemidova, 2000: 130; similarly Enquist, 2001: 54), or claim that multilingual individuals "have a richer repertoire of linguistic and cultural choices and could fine-tune their behaviour to a greater variety of cultural contexts". (Stroińska, 2003: 97; similarly Kellman, 2000: 33)

Empirical investigation

Methodology

The relationship between cosmopolitanism and multilingualism was explored from the perspective of multilingual persons, via their revelations of cosmopolitan cultural identity against the matrix of cosmopolitanism. Semi-structured interviews ("covert", for the topic of cosmopolitanism was not given away) were conducted with eleven international post-graduate students, selected for their multilinguality.

Empirical synthesis

Against the background of the cosmopolitan matrix categories of the literature, empirical and ideal-typical personal profile categories emerged:

- Type 1, labelled Advanced Tourist, is not the "simple" tourist defined by the literature as a counter-example to the cosmopolitan. However, some interviewees revealed functional mastery concerns, a consumerist "taking" attitude and/or a maintained national identity, which limited their willingness to engage with the cultural diversity of target cultures.
- Type 2, labelled Transitional Cosmopolitan, is located somewhere between the tourist and the cosmopolitan on the continuum, but developing over the matrix categories towards the third type.
- Type 3, labelled Interactive Cosmopolitan, reveals on the whole rather or even very advanced forms of interactive and integrative behaviour and mindset as would befit the already ideal-typical literature requirements for a cosmopolitan individual in that he or she has an open-minded, flexible, and/or giving attitude.

These three ideal types were compared to each other by means of an empirical synthesis that went beyond the empirical (interview) analysis insofar as it now worked with the ideal types rather than with the individual interviewees. (The quotes below stem from individual interviewees, but they now contribute to making up the respective ideal type.)

The Advanced Tourist

The Advanced Tourist stresses for instance the professional usefulness of language learning, for instance as a commercial advantage in a competitive marketplace. In almost all the aspects that involve language, arguments and stances are not so much emotional as rational, functional, utilitarian, oriented towards mastery and efficiency:

> "I think why I chose [to learn] Spanish is especially because…Latin America is for Political Scientists a very interesting field of study…This was more utilitarian, to have more possibilities afterwards with the language…to find a job, in the now uniting Europe or in a job market that is getting more international every time."

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Regarding cosmopolitan matrix issues, parochial, that is, local or regional, or at most national remits and identity dimensions prevail:

"First of all I'm Basque, and afterwards a European. My European feelings haven't been very developed yet."

"I am from Munich. This is like an identity that cannot be changed."

"First of all, you have your family identity. Your Greek identity…European is a very thin layer."

The Transitional Cosmopolitan

The key summarizing characteristic of the Transitional Cosmopolitan is that he or she has left behind the advanced tourist point on the continuum, but has not yet, or not yet in sufficiently many aspects, or in an overall sufficiently rounded manner, reached the interactive cosmopolitan point. Accordingly, the transitional cosmopolitan can on the one hand have a profile more of an advanced tourist regarding certain matrix issues, such as the question of home, where national and even local attachments prevail, and wider attachments are only established marginally:

"I cannot say that 'home' is somewhere else than where my parents are, where I grew up…I'm feeling very well here [in England] now, so I'm not missing what would be my home in Greece. If you said 'home country' to me, I would say that it's Greece."

On the other hand, the transitional cosmopolitan's attitude towards his or her (native) nation state is very cosmopolitan, presenting an either anti-nationalist or a personal internationalist position due to a lived perspective:

"People [should] get out of this stupid national border…Being national is so stupid, things were never national, they became national in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century…I was always an internationalist… This is why I don't believe in borders and nationalities…The whole idea is…just get to know yourself, and get to know the others better."

"I have been treated as a xenomaniac by my friends sometimes… Comme si j'étais un traître [as if I were a traitor]. Ou si je critique la Grèce en étant en Grèce, comme si je n'avais pas le droit de faire ça, et que je, c'est une allégeance [allegiance] with [a] traitor. [Or if I criticise Greece while being in Greece, as if I hadn't got the right to do that, and as if it were an alliance with a traitor]…The fact that I can criticise Greece, it means that for them [the Greeks] I am a little bit of a foreigner."

Overall, due to the convincingly profound interactive cosmopolitan stances in these central cosmopolitan issues, and especially because of occasional linguistic mediation via expression in several languages, the transitional cosmopolitan is arguably closer to the interactive cosmopolitan than to the advanced tourist; hence the label of this ideal type.

The Interactive Cosmopolitan

The Interactive Cosmopolitan reveals the most open-minded, flexible, holistic and giving attitude of the three ideal types. His or her language mastery allows for highly open and interactive two-way cultural access and engagement. Reflexivity about the link between language and culture as altered by the linguistic-cultural experience culminates in critical self-reflection about one's own country and culture. This enables a highly interactive travel with a "giving" element:

> "If you want to go deeper in another culture…to get really involved in that culture…first of all, you have to try to speak the language…That means you…have some questions about the way you live until that moment."

> "They [languages] mean the opportunity of learning…Not only learning about people…It also would inspire your personal view of things. It makes you more open…It makes me feel more that I know where I'm going, and getting to know people better."

> "If I travel, I like to talk with people, and to learn something about their country and to learn then something about mine…Language learning…it's a way of education, it's a way of learning not only more about other cultures but also about yourself…You can anticipate to give something."

For an interactive cosmopolitan, language knowledge is not causal, but an essential and indispensable factor for feeling at home:

> "Knowing the language well doesn't make you feel at home. But you cannot feel at home unless you know the language."

> "The language that is necessary to cope in the [everyday] situations is a basic factor of feeling home."

The interactive cosmopolitan picture of "home" is highly differentiated, multi-dimensional and complex. The immobility aspect is contrasted with the desirability of mobility, the latter being a cosmopolitan trait. "Home" can also be seen on different context-dependent geographical levels, trigger a complex diversity of dynamic interactions, a process on the whole embraced with an open attitude, besides involving multi-sensory perceptions:

> "['Home':] how boring, at first. But of course, it's more than that…The word 'home' is 'stick to the same place', and I would like to move a lot…I would like to say that it is an uninteresting concept, but I still have some nostalgia towards 'home'."

> "It [home] is also where you're born at, but other home places accumulate…It captures all of your senses, it's what you see, it's also what you smell…Then again it depends on the context…I would say that 'a home' is a place where I can live any mood, a range of different situations."

Overall summary

The investigated multilingual individuals were characterized as different ideal types of cosmopolitans. Especially those multilingual individuals typified as Interactive Cosmopolitans can be seen as embodying - and living - a new dimension and dynamics of individual intercultural competence and communication.

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Identité Bantu et diversité culturelle

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L'une des caractéristiques essentielles parmi les plus marquantes de l'évolution du monde ces dernières années est, sans nul doute, l'accélération et l'expansion du processus de globalisation des économies nationales, mutation qui entraîne, naturellement, dans le sillage des progrès extraordinaires et concomitants des technologies de l'information, une tendance à l'uniformisation des modèles culturels.

C'est ce contexte qui a provoqué l'émergence du grand débat sur la diversité culturelle.

Le présent article aborde, dans un premier temps, les éléments récurrents qui, cumulativement, concourent à la parenté des civilisations de l'Afrique centrale, orientale et australe puis, dans un deuxième temps, les nouveaux moyens de communication mis en place par l'instrument, par excellence, de la promotion de cette identité, à savoir le Centre International des Civilisations Bantu (CICIBA).

Homogénéité

Deuxième bloc continental le plus vaste du monde, l'Afrique présente un certain nombre de particularités notables. L'une d'elles est la remarquable homogénéité linguistique et anthropologique dite bantu, attestée en Afrique centrale, orientale et australe. Ce cadre, qui offre donc un ensemble de similitudes sur près d'un tiers de cet immense espace, évolue parallèlement avec diverses spécificités.

Ces concordances que l'on prouve grâce au proto-bantu, permettent d'établir l'identité des cultures de cette région, dans des domaines aussi variés que les systèmes de production, l'organisation politique, l'architecture, la médecine traditionnelle, les arts et la religion.

Nous illustrerons cette réalité linguistique et cette substance anthropologique par le concept de la danse.

La forme commune primitive supposée par Malcolm Guthrie (Guthrie: 1967) est: *-ina*.

Nous pouvons donc affirmer, en nous fondant sur l'échelle glotto-chronologique de Swadesh, que cette notion gestuelle remonte, chez les peuples bantu, à quelque 4000 ans.

Elle se définissait probablement, dans le foyer originel des Grassfields, comme un ensemble de mouvements du corps généralement rythmés par la musique et obéissant à des règles. Cette vieille tradition s'est visiblement perpétuée jusqu'à nos jours.

Cet héritage peut être exemplifié à travers deux langues bantu assez éloignées: le *kikongo*, parlé en Afrique centrale, et le *macua*, en usage en Afrique australe.

Les parlers kikongo présentent le cadre suivant:

makinu	danse
nkini	dansant
nkini ou *nkuakina*	danseur

Quant au *macua*, on y trouve:

yowina, *ninkiniha*	danse
owina	danseur
wina	danser

La racine proto-bantu servira aussi de base pour caractériser les diverses modalités de l'expression corporelle qui se cristalliseront dans des danses de type protocolaire, récréatif, rituel ou funèbre.

L'on a ainsi, pour les danses de loisir:

makinu ma nkembo	(kik.)
yowina othya	(mac.)

Cette brève comparaison démontre bien que l'identité culturelle bantu a des fondements linguistiques et anthropologiques très anciens.

Diversité

L'on soulignera néanmoins que ces similitudes s'inscrivent concomitamment dans des contextes plus nuancés. En effet, conséquence de l'extraordinaire expansion des populations de cette zone, les diverses expressions culturelles originelles s'adaptèrent à de nouveaux contextes géographiques et influences adjacentes, mais aussi évoluèrent sous l'influence de la propre créativité des groupes migrants. Ce processus, associé aux contacts extra-continentaux, finit par consacrer la particularisation définitive du demi-millier de langues et cultures de cette aire.

Dans le domaine que nous avons choisi, l'éloignement alternatif par rapport au proto-bantu est assez notable.

Ainsi, des variantes du kikongo présentent des termes faisant figure de synonymes ou parasynonymes du bantu commun pour désigner:

- la danse (dans son acceptation générique): *iele*, *lulekutu*
- une danse rituelle: *kihehe*, *madobo*
- l'adjectif dansant: *unleketi*, *unvoi*
- le verbe danser: *voia*, *leketa*, *viluka*, *viluluka*, *dienga*, *mangununa*, *kemba*
- un danseur: *unzoji*, *unleketi*

Quant au *macua*, ses locuteurs disposent d'une vingtaine de termes, synonymes ou parasynonymes, parmi lesquels:

- le substantif danse: *nsoma*, *harapa*
- la danse d'initiation masculine: *ekoma y'olukhu*
- la danse d'initiation féminine: *emwali*

Nous insistons pour dire qu'en somme, les éléments présentés confirment le fait que le monde bantu présente à la fois un vaste ensemble de similitudes et diverses singularités plus ou moins propres à chaque groupe.

Dynamiques communicationnelles

L'un des défis majeurs que devait affronter, dès sa création en janvier 1983, le Centre International des Civilisations Bantu, était celui de la promotion de l'identité dans la diversité des peuples habitant au sud de la fameuse ligne qui coupe le continent, des confins orientaux de la fédération nigériane aux savanes méridionales de la Somalie.

Cela représentait une tâche véritablement immense: en effet, le monde bantu est, après la zone indo-européenne, l'espace le plus vaste du monde où l'on a reconstitué, par comparaison avec les langues actuelles, un système de concordances aussi proches.

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De fait, cette aire s'étend sur près de 11 millions de km^2, soit le tiers de l'Afrique, et sa population est estimée à plus de 200 millions de locuteurs.

Il s'agissait donc de régénérer par la communication les diverses convergences des civilisations bantu mais aussi de souligner leurs spécificités.

Nous avions en effet conscience que la dimension «communication» devient incontournable et marquera les cultures contemporaines. Les contours de cette dimension ont été significativement modifiés ces dernières décennies, suite aux impressionnants progrès des technologies de l'information et de la communication, mais aussi suite à la rapide expansion en Afrique, à partir de la fin des années 80, des radios de proximité.

Cette mutation technologique a permis un net élargissement des populations-cibles de nos programmes radiophoniques, et cela grâce à l'un de nos partenaires dans ce domaine, la radio à vocation panafricaine Africa N°1, basée à Libreville, Gabon. Elle a depuis substantiellement amélioré son réseau en modulation de fréquence, qui s'étend aujourd'hui sur une douzaine de villes africaines et dans la région parisienne. Sa portée, en ondes courtes, est intercontinentale. Elle diffuse aussi, dernière avancée technologique, par le satellite Intelsat 770.

Le Centre a mis assez rapidement à profit le changement intervenu pour concevoir et réaliser un site internet: www.internetafrica.com/ciciba.

Conclusion

L'approche que nous venons de proposer met en relief le CICIBA, un exemple d'initiatives de coopération intergouvernementale qui vise, parmi tant d'autres, la consolidation du principe revivifiant de la diversité culturelle.

L'un des enseignements que nous pourrions retenir à l'issue de notre analyse est que grâce aux extraordinaires facilités qu'offrent aujourd'hui les technologies de l'information et de la communication, nous avons des possibilités de corriger les tendances à l'uniformisation des cultures du monde, enregistrées ces dernières années. Le renforcement de notre actuelle dynamique de communication et l'élargissement des modalités de diffusion électronique, ainsi que l'implication dans une stratégie de grande décentralisation des commissions nationales et autres représentations du Centre (Etats-Unis d'Amérique, Brésil), pourront permettre à l'institution - grâce au potentiel fédérateur contenu dans l'identité bantu qu'ont en partage les civilisations s'étendant des mangroves équatoriales gabonaises jusqu'aux terres volcaniques de l'archipel des Comores et des rives de l'Oubangui jusqu'au plateau sud-africain du Great Karoo - d'y contribuer significativement.

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La diversité culturelle d'un point de vue islamique

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Introduction

Suite à l'adoption de la Déclaration islamique sur la diversité culturelle en décembre 2004, par le 4ème sommet des ministres de la culture des pays islamiques réunis à Alger, l'ISESCO s'est félicitée de cette décision et a décidé d'introduire la diversité culturelle dans son prochain plan d'action triennal 2007-2009.

En effet, cette Déclaration offre des opportunités pour approfondir la réflexion sur les valeurs qui découlent de la diversité culturelle pour apprendre à «vivre ensemble». L'ISESCO, consciente des défis que soulèvent les changements survenus dans le monde ces dernières années a pris l'initiative de concevoir cette déclaration pour qu'elle exprime mieux les spécificités de la civilisation islamique. Elle vient consolider la Déclaration universelle de l'UNESCO sur la diversité culturelle, adoptée à l'unanimité par les 185 Etats membres représentés à la 31ᵉ session de la Conférence générale en 2001, au lendemain des événements du 11 septembre. La Déclaration islamique sur la diversité culturelle est l'acte fondateur d'une nouvelle éthique promue par l'ISESCO au début du XXIᵉ siècle. Les pays islamiques se sont dotés d'un instrument normatif afin d'affirmer leur conviction que le respect de la diversité des cultures et le dialogue entre les civilisations constituent l'un des meilleurs garants pour la paix et le développement.

La dernière décennie du XXᵉ siècle a vu naître des conflits dits d'origine culturelle. Le théâtre de ces conflits était un peu partout dans le monde, et les pays islamiques étaient parmi les premières victimes de cette nouvelle idéologie destructrice de guerre des civilisations.

Le nouveau millénaire n'a pas réussi à éviter la peur et la méfiance envers «l'autre». Or, notre monde est tissé en une toile complexe de peuples divers, dont chacun possède sa civilisation, sa langue, ses traditions, bref, son identité spécifique,

qui est un patrimoine universel. Ces identités devraient enrichir l'humanité toute entière par leur créativité. A l'heure actuelle, lorsque la mondialisation est devenue un mode de vie obligatoire, peut-on continuer à ignorer «l'autre»?

Méfiance à l'égard de la diversité culturelle

La méfiance née de la théorie du choc des civilisations, n'est pas prête de disparaître, puisque la nouvelle menace selon S. Huntington dans son dernier livre «*Qui sommes-nous?*» est la diversité culturelle, qui est devenue son nouveau cheval de bataille. En effet, dans ce livre au titre bien évocateur, Huntington traite du choc culturel né de l'incapacité de certaines communautés à s'intégrer à l'Etat-nation. Il s'inscrit dans la logique de son premier livre, qui avançait l'idée qu'à la suite de l'après-guerre-froide, les affrontements culturels, ethniques, religieux, avaient remplacé les conflits idéologiques. La question centrale était la coexistence pacifique de l'Islam et du Confucianisme avec l'Occident. Aujourd'hui, il revient à la charge et essaie d'examiner les clivages culturels à l'intérieur des Etats-Unis et l'impact qu'ils peuvent avoir sur l'identité américaine. La mondialisation et le grand brassage des hommes, des cultures, et des activités culturelles menacent selon lui les valeurs américaines. Les coupables sont donc les immigrants. Selon Huntington, la communauté hispano-mexicaine semble incapable de s'assimiler à la société américaine. Le comportement de ces nouveaux immigrants n'a plus rien à voir avec les populations d'origine européenne. Il fustige les grandes lois sur les libertés civiques et l'immigration pour dénoncer l'ampleur, la proximité, la clandestinité, la concentration régionales, la persistance et l'antériorité même de la présence historique de ces immigrants.

Parmi ces lois, il y a celle de la **discrimination positive** qui a été conçue afin d'obtenir un traitement spécifique ou un bénéfice particulier pour intégrer les populations défavorisées. Aujourd'hui, cette loi sert, selon Huntington, à relégitimer les concepts de race, d'ethnie, qu'elle souhaitait abolir. Au moment où l'Europe découvre cette notion de **discrimination positive** avec des quotas pour les populations issues de l'immigration, cette position a de quoi étonner, surtout lorsque Huntington attaque également ce qu'il appelle «les élites dénationalisées» par la mondialisation, les considérant comme une réelle menace pour la cohésion et l'identité américaines. Les valeurs américaines proviennent selon cette optique de la culture anglo-protestante, dont les fondements sont la langue anglaise, le protestantisme, l'individualisme, la morale du travail et la conviction que les hommes ont la faculté de créer un paradis sur terre.

Parmi les conséquences de cette méfiance à l'égard de la diversité culturelle, les populations amérindiennes autochtones se voient dénier toute participation à l'élaboration de l'identité et l'histoire américaines.

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Objectifs de la diversité selon la Déclaration islamique sur la diversité culturelle

«L'islam est porteur d'un message divin d'essence humaniste. De ce fait, les musulmans estiment que toute hiérarchisation des cultures serait factice, puisque chaque culture est l'expression du génie d'un peuple. Si l'on part de ce principe qui fait de chaque culture le réceptacle d'une richesse et d'une sagesse propres, il devient nécessaire de décréter les postulats de base suivants:

- La diversité des cultures et des civilisations est un don de Dieu. En tant que musulmans, nous sommes investis d'une mission universelle qui consiste à enraciner les fondements de la paix mondiale et à envisager une coopération avec toutes les civilisations humaines pour le bien de l'humanité.

- Chaque culture se distingue par une identité propre et des apports particuliers à la richesse du patrimoine culturel humain. Elle doit, de ce fait, s'associer à l'œuvre de rapprochement des peuples et faire barrage aux manœuvres tendancieuses qui cherchent à nuire à l'image de l'islam et des musulmans et à porter de fausses accusations contre notre religion tolérante.

- A priori, il n'existe pas de culture ennemie, et encore moins de nation ennemie, contrairement à ce que peuvent laisser entendre les stéréotypes fallacieux qui brouillent l'image authentique des cultures, des civilisations et des peuples. A cet égard, le besoin se fait sentir de veiller constamment à ce que le meilleur parti soit tiré des bienfaits de la mondialisation et à ce que ses méfaits soient définitivement neutralisés.

- La diversité culturelle est une richesse qui ne doit pas servir d'alibi pour exciter la haine et le rejet de l'Autre. Tout à l'opposé, cette richesse doit tenir lieu de levier pour le renforcement des affinités, la réduction des divergences et le règlement pacifique des conflits.

- La somme des représentations culturelles matérielles et immatérielles qui respectent la diversité culturelle sous toutes ses formes constitue un patrimoine commun à l'ensemble de l'humanité. Celle-ci peut en tirer le meilleur parti pour consolider les liens d'entente entre les peuples et préserver la paix et la sécurité mondiales.»

Traits distinctifs de la diversité culturelle

La diversité culturelle est un constat, un fait. Le monde compte quelque 6000 communautés et autant de langues. Il est vrai aussi qu'elles sont menacées chaque jour, puisque nous déplorons chaque année la disparition d'un certain nombre de ces langues. Cette diversité donne lieu à des visions du monde et traditions différentes, qui chacune méritent respect et dignité.

La diversité culturelle est notre réalité quotidienne, puisque le mouvement migratoire des populations est en augmentation constante. Une personne sur dix vivant dans les pays industrialisés est d'origine immigrée. Ces populations proviennent de toutes les régions du monde. La conséquence immédiate de ces déplacements pour le travail, les études ou le tourisme, est l'apparition d'une société hétérogène, multiculturelle.

La diversité culturelle dénote un respect particulier pour les droits fondamentaux. Une société démocratique et libre tolère et encourage l'expression de toutes les formes culturelles des groupes ethniques et sociaux qui y vivent. Favoriser la diversité culturelle implique le respect des droits de l'homme, dont le droit à l'expression, la liberté de pensée, etc. …

La diversité culturelle est une force vive collective; elle n'est pas seulement un fait, mais aussi une dynamique de connaissances et de sagesses humaines qui concourt à améliorer le monde.

La promotion de la diversité culturelle, expression présentant sous une perspective positive ce que le syntagme «exception culturelle» pouvait avoir de défensif, a permis d'aboutir à un instrument international sur la diversité culturelle, c'est-à-dire à une convention[1] fixant une norme dotée d'un statut équivalent à celui de toutes les autres normes du droit international. Cette convention a reconnu la spécificité des biens et services culturels; le droit de chaque gouvernement à prendre toute mesure législative, réglementaire ou financière pour la préservation de son patrimoine culturel et linguistique national; la nécessité de coopérations avec les pays du Sud, par exemple sous la forme d'accords de co-production cinématographique ou audiovisuelle leur permettant d'avoir accès aux aides nationales et aux réseaux de diffusion des pays du Nord.

Tous les pays ne sont pas d'accord sur cette nouvelle orientation dans les rapports internationaux. L'arbitrage de la Cour internationale de justice de La Haye, seule juridiction habilitée à apprécier la compatibilité des normes internationales, pourrait être sollicité. Ce dispositif pourrait donc remettre en cause la prédominance du droit du commerce, du libre-échangisme débridé, sur tous les autres droits (notamment sociaux, environnementaux et culturels), qui fait de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) le fer de lance de la mondialisation libérale.

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1 UNESCO's Convention of the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, UNESCO, 2005.

Diversité linguistique

Parmi les points d'achoppement se trouve le problème des langues. En effet, la langue anglaise se situe ainsi au centre d'un système global où elle joue un rôle identique à celui du dollar dans le système monétaire international, système qui repose sur l'existence de l'anglais, langue dite «*hypercentrale*», autour de laquelle gravitent une douzaine de langues, elles-mêmes entourées d'environ 200 langues, dans l'orbite desquelles évoluent quelque 6000 autres langues.

La rente des pays anglophones est aussi économique: c'est aux autres pays de financer les coûts d'apprentissage et de traduction de (ou vers) l'anglais. L'enseignement de cette langue, en termes de méthodes, d'outils d'évaluation et de personnel, est devenu une véritable industrie et un poste d'exportation non négligeable pour les Etats-Unis et le Royaume-Uni.

Ces facteurs idéologiques et économiques se renforcent mutuellement et contribuent à la consolidation d'une unipolarité linguistique planétaire. Si elle se veut conséquente, la recherche d'un monde multipolaire doit avoir pour corollaire celle d'un ordre linguistique lui aussi multipolaire. Elle implique de ne laisser ni symboliquement ni matériellement à une seule langue le monopole de l'hypercentralité.

La réponse, au moins partielle, réside dans la prise en compte du concept de «familles linguistiques», et dans l'apprentissage de l'intercompréhension au sein de ces familles. Dans cette optique, ces dernières pourraient être considérées comme une seule et unique langue en termes d'apprentissage. En termes démographiques, des projections à l'horizon 2025 donnent 1,561 millions de Chinois, 1,048 millions de ressortissants de pays anglophones, 484 millions d'hispanophones, 285 millions de lusophones et 506 millions de francophones. Le chinois, l'espagnol, l'arabe, le français, le russe, le portugais ou encore l'hindi ont, à l'instar de l'anglais, une égale vocation à incarner une hypercentralité linguistique au niveau mondial. Figer cette dernière dans une seule langue n'est pas faire preuve d'une grande capacité d'anticipation.

Nous pensons que la diversité linguistique doit toujours s'accompagner de la diversité culturelle. Le rôle des organisations internationales est capital dans ce domaine pour avoir plusieurs langues de travail. Les conférences internationales devraient également inscrire la diversité linguistique dans leur programme.

Je termine par cette citation coranique: «Parmi Ses signes aussi, le fait d'avoir créé les cieux, la terre et la diversité de vos langues et de vos couleurs. Il y a là des signes certains pour l'ensemble des humains» et dans une autre variante de lecture «…des signes certains pour ceux qui savent» (Les Byzantins, 22).

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Harmony with Diversity: Orientation of World Development and the Case of China

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Orientation of world development

The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) pointed out that cultural diversity is the common heritage of humanity. Undoubtedly, diversity is the basic character of world civilization, diversity promotes development of world civilization, respect for diversity guarantees correct orientation of globalization, and harmony with diversity is the orientation of world development.

Diversity is the basic character of world civilization. Different natural and social conditions nurture different human communities and form different modes of production and styles of life as well as different social structures which create different social civilizations, i.e., multiple and different histories, cultures, religions and ethnic groups with different ideologies, different values, and different ways of thinking. All these determine a variety of development models and social patterns in different nation states and regions of the world. Therefore, diversity is the objective reality of socio-cultural development of humanity, also the objective reality of world development. Diversity is the motive force of world development. Diversity means difference, difference needs exchange, exchange promotes development. Various civilizations learn and relate to each other, enrich and develop mutually, thus make our world richer, more colourful and full of vigour. Human civilization never develops monomorphically, different civilizations will achieve co-development and progress in the process of mutual competition, absorption and exchange. Diversity is also a natural basis for inter-dependence and cooperation in international relations.

Respect for diversity helps the development of democratization in international relations. As we know, democratization in international relations is to guarantee that all states in the world, big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, are equal members in the international community, that they all have rights to decide their own affairs, and all have an equal say in international affairs. Democratization in international

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relations will facilitate negotiation on an equal basis and friendly cooperation among all countries, so as to effectively promote international consensus, emphasize common interests, cope with common challenges, and achieve world peace, stability and prosperity. Respect for diversity in international relations is in essence respect for the different histories and different cultures of all countries, respect for the different interests of all countries, and respect for the equal status of all countries. Therefore, respect for the diversity of the world, respect for the equal status of all countries, is the foundation of democratization in international relations.

Globalization is the inevitable result of growth of world productive forces and an objective trend of development of the world. But there are three different orientations of globalization: first, the orientation of spontaneous development of globalization; second, the orientation of manipulation by Western powers with their predominant economy, while the developing countries remain in dominated position with widening North-South gaps; third, the orientation of globalization with co-participation of all countries and with the prospect of common prosperity of the whole world. Of the three orientations, the first is a purely theoretical assumption. The attention of the international community has centred on the interaction of the second and third orientations. Here, globalization is related to the question of democratization in international relations. As everyone knows, present-day globalization is dominated by Western developed powers. Relying upon their strong economic and technological strength, the Western powers dominate in international economic and trade organizations and in economic rules of game, hence gain most in the globalization process, while the developing countries are in an unfavourable position. The widening North-South gap has forced some economically and technologically weaker developing countries to the brink of further marginalization. In the final analysis, the question is how to guarantee the weaker countries their right of equal participation in globalization, including the adjustment and reform of the rules of the game, genuine support for the development of the South countries, and so on, so that the North-South gap can be narrowed, a new fair and just world economic order can be built, and a world economy of co-participation, cooperation and co-prosperity can gradually be realized. This is the correct orientation of globalization. And all these start from respect for diversity in the world, that is, respect for the history and culture of different societies, respect for the interests and equal rights of different countries.

In the age of globalization, not only economic activities, but also the cultural activities of the world are strengthened. With the rapid development of information technology and the innovation of media tools, temporal and spatial distance in the world is greatly reduced. For the first time in history, people in remote places of the world are now able to instantly share and exchange information, cultures and ideas of all kinds and from all lands. This may provide unprecedented opportunities for

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cultural connection, cultural exchange and cultural integration in the world. This will not cause disappearance of cultural diversity and loss of cultural identity and bring along a global homogeneous culture. World culture should not be a homogenous culture reproduced by a single cultural model, but a cultural entity constituted by pluralist cultures of different features and different identities. Therefore, the development of world culture will not lead to cultural uniformity, but harmony with diversity.

The case of China

Harmony is a basic factor in traditional Chinese philosophical thinking. The essence of harmony is embodied in the idea of "harmony with diversity" or "harmony in diversity", also in the idea of "unity of plurality" or "entity of multiplicity". So, unity of plurality and harmony with diversity is in fact the world outlook of Chinese philosophy, hence the orientation of Chinese cultural values, and the guiding principle for progress and prosperity of the Chinese nation and the ideal order for the human world as a whole. Chinese traditional thinkers believed that this idea should be reflected in almost all aspects of human life: political life, economic life, social life, cultural expression, intellectual activity, national relation and international affairs, etc., while in essence it is reflected in culture - culture in its broad sense. Thus, the ideal world depicted by Confucius was "A World of Great Harmony".

China has experienced cultural diversity and cultural uniformity in history and in modern days, their impact on national development is fairly clear: cultural diversity promotes economic, social, political and cultural development and cultural uniformity hinders those developments.

In ancient China, nearly 3,000 years ago, there was a fairly long period of cultural diversity, a period of drastic social transformation which was reflected strongly in cultural thoughts and theories. Numerous diverse thoughts and conflicting ideas were freely expressed and debated on various political, cultural, economic, social, legal, philosophical and religious questions. This free cultural and theoretical contention lasted for a long time and greatly helped to promote social progress, political reform, cultural advance and economic development. That was known in Chinese history as a period of a "Hundred Schools Contending" and a "Hundred Flowers Blooming". The greatest sage in Chinese history - Confucius - emerged as a result of this trend of cultural diversity.

Another important example of cultural diversity took place in the famous Tang Dynasty. Tang was at that time the most economically, politically and culturally developed empire in the world. It became the centre of economic and cultural exchange for the people of many countries, mostly the Asian countries. Chang-an, the

capital of Tang, became a metropolitan city of several million inhabitants. Foreign visitors who came to Chang-an enjoyed the same citizenship rights as the Chinese. Their customs, habits and religious beliefs were respected. Merchants from the Western regions, Central Asia, Persia and Arabia came to China to trade. Some came and went, but others stayed and settled. Some of the foreign visitors were scientists and artists. Those from India, Central Asia and Western regions introduced excellent music and dance to China. There was a large state academy in Chang-an where Chinese and foreign students studied together. The foreign students spread Chinese culture to other parts of the world and brought foreign cultures to China. The Zoroastrians, the Nestorians and the Manicheans set up their churches and temples in Chang-an. Peoples of other cultures got on very well with the Chinese, yet they kept their way of life. As a result, Chang-an became the converging and exchanging centre of different cultures, not to mention that the influences of Chinese culture reached other parts of the world. This cultural diversity greatly enriched Chinese culture and promoted the development of China. For instance, Chinese music was influenced by music and dance of central Asia and India, painting was influenced by Central Asia and underwent important reform, architecture was influenced by West Asian and Byzantine styles, costumes were influenced by Persia and India, cuisine was influenced by Persia, as was sport, etc. There were of course philosophical and super-structural mutual influences between China and other cultures.

Of course, there were examples in Chinese history of how the opposite trend to cultural diversity - cultural uniformity - did harm to development. In modern China, we can mention here the notorious 10-year "Cultural Revolution" from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. It was an extreme example of cultural uniformity. Quotations from Mao became the universal mandatory reading for all Chinese, all books of classical content were branded as "feudalist rubbish" and all foreign language books were accused of being "capitalist stuff" and many of them were destroyed. As a result, China lost time in development for much more than 10 years.

Therefore, a world of harmony with diversity and unity of plurality is a world of healthy development. But the dominant power of the world today and its spokesmen always try to impose their model of development, their way of life, their form of democracy, their social system, their political institutions, their cultural values as the ONLY correct and reasonable model, criterion and prototype for other peoples and nations to copy and to follow. They never respect cultural diversity. They stress "clash of civilization" but not co-existence, co-prosperity and co-development of civilization. They claim that "if you don't follow me, you are against me". This is in fact the danger to human civilization.

Since the reform and the policy of openness, state policy and social trends have been changing a lot. The idea of cultural diversity has been embodied increasingly in

many aspects of Chinese society, including political life, economic activities, the educational field, scientific and technological exchange, academic research, artistic creation, as well as the way of life. Undoubtedly, cultural diversity is one of the basic factors of China's unprecedented development today. The following part is a description of the reform of the cultural industry in China today as a concrete example of the idea of harmony with diversity instead of cultural uniformity and state monopoly.

The development of cultural industry in China today

With the progress of national development, the cultural industry is receiving more systematic investigation and research in China. In July 2003, a Statistics and Research Group on Cultural Industry was established with the participation of the State Bureau of Statistics, the Ministry of Culture, the General Administration of Radio, Film and TV, the General Administration of News and Publication, the State Bureau of Relics and other related state agencies, and the first official collected data on the development of the Chinese cultural industry was published in July 2004. This itself is an unprecedented event in the development as well as the reform of the cultural industry in China. The recent development of the cultural industry in China has the following important aspects.

1. In 2004, the added value created by cultural and related industries was close to 390 billion RMB (8.3 RMB to 1 US$).

   Structurally, the cultural and related industries in China today can be divided into three levels: The Central Level is composed of the traditional cultural bodies of news, publishing, radio and TV, and art and culture, etc. The cultural industry at this level had 2.23 million employees and realized an added value of 88.4 billion RMB in 2004. The Peripheral Level is composed of emerging cultural bodies such as network culture, leisure and entertainment, tourism, advertisement, and conference and expo organizing, etc. The cultural industry at this level had 4.22 million employees and realized an added value of 83.5 billion RMB in 2004. Then the Related Level is composed of the business bodies of producing and marketing the items and equipments for cultural use and related cultural products. This level had 6.29 million employees and realized an added value of 185.8 billion RMB in 2004.

   From these brief figures, we can see that the size of the emerging part of the cultural industry has surpassed that of the traditional part (the employees of the former is double that of the latter) and the value created is close to the latter, while

the scale of growth of the Related Level in the cultural industry constituted almost half of the total.

2. In June 2003, the preliminary stage of the cultural institutional reform in China got started, which gave a substantial push to the marketization of the cultural industry. News and publishing business underwent the most profound reform. Except for the party newspapers and journals of the Communist Party and some national important publishing houses which remain as public institutions, social cultural newspapers and journals and the overwhelming majority of publishing houses are to be transformed into enterprises and accept public and private investments. In the marketing and circulation field, the Xinhua Book Stores (formerly the state monopoly body in this field) will complete the transformation to a joint-stock system. The institutional reform of the field of radio, film and TV is carried out along the principle of "functional separation of government and enterprise" towards the direction of transformation to enterprise and joint stock system. The field of film and teleplay production enjoys the most flexible open policy and the highest level of market access, so it recorded the best result of development of the cultural industry in 2004. In 2004, the number of films produced in China surpassed 200 for the first time, far more than that of 2003 (140), of which 80% of the films were jointly made by state and private capital, though investment from state enterprises in this field has dropped to less than 50% of the total. The private film and teleplay producing enterprises is becoming an important force in this field.

The cultural market has developed further. The most noteworthy event is that, after the West China Cultural Industry Expo in Sichuan Province, the First International Cultural Industry Expo was held in Shenzhen City in November 2004. This is the first international comprehensive expo of cultural industry ever held in China, which was sponsored jointly by the Ministry of Culture, the General Administration of Radio, Film and TV, the General Administration of News and Publication, and the Provincial Government of Guangdong, and organized by the Municipal Government of Shenzhen. This expo had over 60 cultural-industry-related items of display, trade, a forum and other activities with over 700 participating enterprises from China and abroad, and items negotiated in the expo reached a total value of 38 billion RMB.

3. The Chinese Government emphatically encouraged the development of the film and network culture that is helpful to the healthy growth of young people physically and mentally, including animated cartoon and network game software. More satellite TV channels for children have been established. The Ministry of Information Industry will give full support to the development of the network game business.

The contents industry of network information has continued strong growth in China. The Internet has developed very fast in recent years, and now the number of people getting on the Internet in China has surpassed 90 million, ranking second in the world. In the first half of 2004, the market value of the network game industry in China reached 1.55 billion RMB, an annual growth of 87.2%, and will reach 3 billion RMB towards the end of the year. But the network game developed by China only constituted 10% of the market value, which is why the Chinese departments concerned have strongly emphasized developing national industry in this field. The Ministry of Culture established the first National Base of Animated Cartoon and Network Games in Shanghai in 2004, and then the General Administration of Radio, Film and TV the second and third bases after that. While the General Administration of News and Publication declared their plan to invest 1 to 2 billion RMB in 2004-2008 to develop 100 high-quality network games. The Chinese Academy of Sciences has also included two research projects on the universal engine of network games and on development of exemplary related products in the state scientific programme.

4. The construction of infrastructural facilities of culture is pushing forward energetically in China. Now, a group of big projects of cultural facilities including the State Grand Theatre, the State Museum, and the State Library are under construction or expansion, or undergoing a major overhaul in Beijing, and construction in this field is also going on in other places in China. The public cultural service system (as it is called in China) is improving and developing. In 2004, the Ministry of Culture and the State Bureau of Relics jointly issued the decision of free admittance to public cultural facilities for persons under age, so that museums, memorial halls and art galleries at all levels in the whole of China will admit persons under age free of charge.

Les peuples autochtones: de sujets à acteurs de la solidarité, de la diversité culturelle et de la globalisation

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Il est important de parler - même très brièvement - des 350 millions d'habitants, soit 5% de la population dans 70 pays, que comptent les peuples autochtones, parce qu'on ne peut pas évoquer la diversité culturelle et ses nouveaux acteurs sans les mentionner. Les autochtones, il y a dix ans, nous disaient : «Nous n'avons pas de voix». Aujourd'hui, ils nous disent: «Nous avons une voix, mais on ne nous écoute pas.»

Est-ce un progrès? Oui, c'en est un, mais très limité, car comme l'a reconnu le rapport 2004 du PNUD sur le développement humain, si ces peuples détiennent 80% de la biodiversité, il est également vrai qu'ils sont dépositaires de 90% de la diversité culturelle.

Depuis dix ans, ou un peu plus, différents éléments ont permis que la prise de participation des peuples autochtones au débat et à la société civile en général connaisse l'essor probablement le plus rapide de toute l'histoire de l'humanité. Certes, il est difficile de parler en termes généraux des peuples autochtones, parce qu''il est effectivement question de 70 pays, de quelque 2500 à 3000 langues. Toutefois, on observe dans cette grande diversité qu'ils partagent certains éléments communs, et non des moindres.

Les étapes de cet éveil sont multiples: en 1992 a eu lieu le Sommet de Rio, qui a reconnu les autochtones comme détenteurs d'un savoir traditionnel. D'ailleurs, la Convention sur la biodiversité a été la première à reconnaître les peuples autochtones comme détenteurs d'une part du patrimoine de l'humanité. 1992 fut aussi marquée par les célébrations du 500ème anniversaire de l'arrivée de Colomb sur la terre d'Amérique, or ceci eut bien entendu des retombées qui dépassèrent largement les limites de l'Amérique. Enfin, cette année 1992 fut également celle où le Prix Nobel de la paix fut décerné à Rigoberta Menchú: pour la première fois dans l'histoire de

l'humanité, on a reconnu qu'un, qui plus est *une* autochtone, était porteur d'un message pour l'humanité toute entière.

Mais ce n'est pas pour autant que les peuples autochtones sont entrés dans le concert des nations, ni que leur présence est admise au sommet de l'Etat. On l'a vu récemment, quand les autochtones de Bolivie se sont imposés comme un facteur essentiel du renversement du Président Messa, de même qu'ils l'avaient été, trois ans auparavant, en Equateur, et comme ils l'avaient déjà été deux ans plus tôt en Bolivie. C'est dire combien ils sont restés jusqu'à présent en marge du pouvoir.

Mais ils sont en revanche présents dans la société civile, ils le sont dans les mouvements de protection de l'environnement, ou encore, de façon très marquée, dans les grandes fêtes de l'altermondialisme, où leur présence est devenue incontournable. Dorénavant, ils sont aussi très présents à l'ONU. Depuis 2002, les peuples autochtones sont des acteurs à part entière de la vie internationale, avec la création de l'Instance permanente de l'ONU sur les questions autochtones, un organe rattaché à l'ECOSOC. Ils disposent donc d'un espace officiel très important au niveau des Nations Unies, au moment où la diversité culturelle entre dans l'agenda international. Ils étaient d'ailleurs à Paris lors des négociations de la Convention de l'UNESCO sur la diversité culturelle.

Mais ne rêvons pas: de nombreuses difficultés demeurent pour que les autochtones puissent s'intégrer au système et que leur place dans cette diversité soit reconnue. J'évoquerai d'abord l'accélération des *challenges*. Cette accélération des défis est due, d'une part, à l'érosion des idéologies, qui longtemps constituèrent une sorte de carcan au sein duquel tourbillonnaient les idées et qui aujourd'hui a explosé, et d'autre part, au développement des technologies de l'information et de la communication. Ce sont là deux éléments qui posent des entraves sérieuses à la possibilité pour les autochtones d'assumer leur place dans cette diversité.

D'abord du fait de leur propre système d'organisation: un système spécifique basé sur un sens de la représentation différent de celui du système démocratique tant voulu. Le mandat du dirigeant autochtone n'est rien de plus qu'un mandat de représentation avec un pouvoir de décision très limité. Or dans ses contacts avec le monde extérieur, on lui demande de disposer d'un pouvoir de décision qu'il ne détient pas; l'exigence de consulter en permanence la base - le pouvoir réel - est très liée à la cosmovision autochtone.

Un autre obstacle réside sans nul doute dans la capacité réduite des autochtones à s'adapter à cette accélération des défis, pour la simple et bonne raison qu'ils sont les champions de l'analphabétisme, les champions de la pauvreté et, comme je l'ai dit, les champions de la non-représentation dans les instances politiques.

Multicultural Diversity: The Case of Macedonia

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Introduction

The modest size of Balkan territory and its geographical diversity, an area populated by an enormous number of different ethnic groups, coupled with the century-long presence in the Balkans of two powerful, and at the same time internally different states (the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires) from a political and economic point of view, on the one hand created a civilizatory distinction, and on the other a historical interethnic mixture. Regardless of the ethnic and religious diversity, regardless of the insufficient communication, the history of the different Balkan peoples was influenced by each of these two empires separately and yet was entwined in a close mutual interdependence. Because of this, any memory of a kind of a historical uniqueness is just impossible to scientifically defend.

My country, on its territory, has a large number of cultural monuments, both material and immaterial, that are usually the only witnesses of its history, as well as of its socio-political, economic relations, and cultural-artistic creativity in the past.

Due to its geographical position, Macedonia was predisposed to experience and survive the great events that, from the earliest epochs of civilization, touched its soil. Many cultures have been created, have flourished and expired without leaving written traces of their authors, because of which archaeological and other similar remnants have the role of testimonies about the existence of peoples and cultures that have moved on and whose traces have been left in the long process of their appearance, development, and disappearance. Thanks to these activities, we can today review the cultural heritage that determines our cultural history and its cultural diversity.

There is no doubt that the various population groups have lived for centuries in varying degrees of agreement and disagreement, the result of which is a common

history and cultural wealth that is still demonstrated today in a number of greater urban and rural areas.

Thanks to its geographical position, but also its historical development, Macedonia in the Balkans is one of the rare historical sites where two dominating European cultures have been intermingled - the Western and the Eastern - because of which the region is a rare example of how such contacts and connections can bring to light a new quality in the aesthetic and spiritual sense.

Following the chronological development of cultural history in the region, it is evident that the events and changes of the various forms of material and spiritual culture on this historical soil have very often been created on top of the bloody ruins of the former ones, as one's own culture has to continue and live over the alien's. All this has survived and emerged from the assemblies of various cultural milieus that have exclusively developed in a defined historical period, when the native inhabitants have defended, by any available means, their own culture from the strong influences from the "West" or the "East". In this situation, one cannot disregard and deny the fact that with the penetration of Islam onto our soil the historical dimension has been enriched in its culture. However, in spite of this strict separation of historical periods, the internal interethnic mix was indispensable, which makes communication so intrinsically important.

Thanks to the rich and long cultural traditions of Macedonia, and also with respect to its multi-ethnicity over time, the country is today a real storehouse of material and spiritual artefacts from its historical development: starting from the very outset of civilization, through the ancient period with remnants of Macedonian culture, including the Roman period, the remnants of Byzantine art, the Slav and Ottoman periods that represent the wealth of religious and profane objects with a marvellous abundance of icons, frescoes, manuscripts, and so on.

Cultural diversity

In Macedonia, the question relating to multi-relationships is one of the most researched subjects of the last ten years, starting from their position as the main instrument in political marketing, through scientific analyses and research, to the separate projects that come from various areas. The primary goal of this approach should be: to adequately and scientifically form a critical view of the types and degrees of Macedonian incorporation throughout history in cultural and artistic processes and their results in Europe. This will thoroughly reanimate the available theoretical and methodological resources in order to accomplish the anticipated project methodology and with a view to accomplishing the basic goals of such a project. One of the main problems facing the cultural politics of Macedonia is the

absence of scientific cultural research, which is indispensable for the development of a plan or strategy for the cultural development of a state, and which is the main instrument of cultural politics. In trying to view the compound dimensions of the various conditions regarding the definition of the framework for the entire development of arts and culture in Macedonia, we underline the indispensability of adequate acknowledgment of the problem. How much is Macedonian culture actually preconditioned by the pressure of historical facts: the Macedonian people, constantly exposed to the danger of disappearing from the historical scene, are looking for their highest spiritual expression and national legitimacy in the forms of their cultural history.

Every attempt at possible discussion related to the problem of the achieved level, maintenance or backwardness of interethnic relations in every multi-ethnic state, should start from the existing complete social context, but it should also be observed in the region as a whole, that is to say, the present Balkan reality should be taken into consideration (the fall of Communism, the reinforced integration at regional, pan-European and trans-Atlantic levels, as well as the military presence of foreign troops).

The use of cultural politics for the purpose of focusing on intercultural understanding, as a way of realizing this, and the attitude towards the differences, represent the key questions for all countries in the 21st century. Its role is not only in offering equal opportunities and respect for existing cultural diversities, but it is also a transmitter of a pluralist transformation of a civic cultural institution and public space. The aim is to encourage a dialogue, exchange, and equal understanding among the people of different cultural heritages.

Multiculturalism is one of the main factors in our society and one of the main points on which the cultural policy of the Republic of Macedonia is founded. Multiculturalism is generally accepted as a conceptual and political response to the state's cultural diversity. Cultural diversity has become recognizable as a starting point of the development and organization of cultural relations, and after these relations have influenced, and even defined, the social positions of different groups and individuals, these cultural rights have been incorporated into the category of basic human rights.

However, now the social and national or ethnic groups have concentrated on how to communicate in a better manner and how to establish relations among these groups and eventually decrease the problems encumbering social, political, economic, and cultural interaction. I have to admit that Macedonia has, until recently, realized its cultural policy in quite a peaceful cultural environment. At the start of this century, in a time of strong ethnic tension, cultural diversities were accentuated. This accentuation of diversities and the divisions caused by them can seem to be a problem

of fine semantic distinction, but in essence it is a completely different view of the world. In the first place, the possibility for innovation is diminished, and by stressing diversity the pride in some traditions is expressed, but not at the expense of denying the others. The focus on diversity means ghettoization, divisions and taking sides, while the essence of the historical moment is to have a common goal and create the conditions in which people from different cultures will have joint influence on the change or reinforcement of a political structure. The new cultural politics developed in Macedonia is definitely based on the basic democratic principles adopted by the international community as the fundamental principles for developing a civil society. One of these principles is the respect for cultural diversities that are an indivisible part of cultural identities. The term cultural diversity is very often related to ethnic diversity, ethnic majorities or minorities, and it is unfortunate that in Macedonia the ethnic forms of cultural diversity still dominate public discourse. Macedonia is a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, and multicultural area. To overcome the borders of ethnicity and to link the Macedonian vision to a pluralism of orientation, as well as its implementation in everyday life, in practice means changing our mental maps. This is a process that has started and it is a question of time before we shall witness the opening of a new space where other options for cultural diversities will be more dominant, a characteristic of positive European democratic societies. It is necessary to say that Macedonia is not an exception in its perception of this term at the moment, but it should be strongly stressed that the new cultural policy of Macedonia is working towards a new understanding of the term "cultural diversity", in a broader cultural context, including issues related to: sex, class, people with special needs, the poor, sexuality, geography, age, employment status, and so on. Cultural diversities are equally acknowledged, as are the diversities among cultural and social groups. They are even protected by law in the Republic of Macedonia.

According to the 2002 census, the population in the Republic of Macedonia is 2,022,547, including:

Macedonians - 1,297,981 or 64.2%

Albanians - 509,083 or 25.2%

Turks - 77,959 or 3.9%

Romas - 53,979 or 2.7%

Serbs - 35,939 or 1.7%

Vllachs - 9,695 or 0.5%

Bosniaks - 17,018 or 0.8%

Others - 20,993 or 1.0%

In the context of the above-mentioned data, we can conclude that members of several ethnic communities live in Macedonia. All the ethnic communities have their own mother tongue that they use. According to research regarding the use of the mother tongue in everyday communication, the conclusion is that the dominant, and also the official one, is the Macedonian language. It is practised in everyday communication by members of different ethnic groups. Albanian is also spoken (as an official language) among that ethnic group and it is also used, to a lesser extent, in communication with other groups. The members of the Turkish community practise their language, but they also speak Macedonian and Albanian.

There is also a problem concerning the language of minority groups. Nearly all the surrounding countries acknowledge one national language that is equally official in the state. If there is good knowledge of the languages of the minorities, this can contribute a lot to the enrichment of the national culture and education. The practice of the national languages is equally important for unity and national self-identity, as it is for the development of every individual country, and this problem is something that nearly all countries are endeavouring to solve as quickly as possible.

There is often an attempt to reduce the right of people to speak in their own language using the alternative: "to close up or to be open to others". This alternative confirms the first meaning that actually originates from a tradition of domination. They will either speak a universal language or another one that has the tendency to become universal, and in such a case you either share your life in the world or withdraw within the boundaries of your own language that has no prospect of becoming universal. In such a case, you are separated from the community and the world and remain sterile and lonely in your so-called self-identity. If they remain closed internally, or if they are amplified into some "general level", the languages have no cultural perspectives.

The Macedonian experiences are applicable in multi-ethnic societies but also in "quasi" single nation states that will most probably, with the process of globalization, liberalization, and European integration, be frequently faced with ethnic transformation of the forgotten "nations" and the forcible assimilation of ethnic and national minorities. The liberal and democratic norms and standards have so far proved to be entirely inadequate in solving these problems in Western countries as well, let alone in the post-communist ones. Democracy, economic prosperity, and personal tolerance are great achievements of Western civilizations with autochthonous values. However, they cannot by themselves rise to the challenge of ethno-cultural diversities and ethnic conflicts. This is another impetus for searching for alternatives and positive experiences for non-violent resolution of ethnic conflicts.

In Macedonia, some system changes have been made, but there is no guarantee that from the moment of their implementation to the moment of reaching their goal they will be successful. If there is no readiness to establish cultural communication and intercultural dialogue, there is no way of enabling intercultural communication, as this is possible only if based on tolerance for diversity.

The Macedonian identity can be viewed as an open process of modern cultural and social changes provoked by the transition process. Over the past few years Macedonian society has become aware of its multicultural character and cultural diversity as a result of its modern development processes. The self-identification of the various cultural and social groups has become possible via the representation of democracy and the loss of traditional group identification. Democratic pluralism has established various cultural groups and social standards and it should produce new types of identity and new links among the different cultural and social groups. These new types of identity represent a huge step forward from the traditional types of ethnic or national identity.

However, not all minorities in Macedonia are organized or willing to defend and promote their minority rights. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse and discuss the dynamics of the changes in cultural identities not only in the global situation, but also in the context of cultural diversity and cultural conflicts that have to be managed in a democratic and modern context.

New Communication, New Interpretations
A Challenge for Intercultural Understanding

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What do multicultural and intercultural mean when we find ourselves in a context of cultural diversity in an intra- or international context?

Any reflection from an intercultural point of view begins with the conviction that cultures do not develop in an isolated way but rather in constant interaction and with interdependence among each other, considering that a culture needs other cultures in order to maintain its own survival. In this sense, an intercultural perspective aims to favour the understanding of dynamics, more than to describe identities, groups or situations and to rethink these relationships in their historical, political or social context.

It would be more correct to consider these dynamics through a verb, to "interculturalize", as a task or a learning experience, or as an adjective, "intercultural", a view, a relationship, a perspective or an intercultural dynamic. Without multiculturality, we cannot speak of intercultural dynamics; even multiculturalism can be interculturalized. If we compare it with "international", we do not speak of "internationality"; there are multinationals that will have their meetings at an international level, or that internationalize their market, but the basic structure lies within a national context. There exist, however, some discourses, opinions, and proposals for intercultural projects as a process of transformation through interaction. They are, above all, proposals in relation to, or beginning with, the school and intercultural education in the context of immigration.

With multiculturalism, we mean the way to organize (supposed) coexistence within a national context. It is understood as the possibility of coexistence in the framework of a single society, postulating equal rights for all groups. This concept, which emerged in the United States (in the 1960s and 1970s), was at first used equally for talking about the situation itself (multicultural social spaces) and about the

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policies that it had generated. It is also in the United States that criticism of the melting pot stemming from these policies emerged.

Some of the positive effects of multiculturalism are that it has been able to create or promote a greater respect for peoples and cultures, school reform and the fight against racism. Nevertheless, in the past few years, multiculturalism has been the object of criticism from a political, social and scientific point of view, since it can take difference to extremes - and, indeed, this occurs in different contexts. In this way, it culturalizes inequalities, forgetting about other forms of hierarchization and social exclusion. Although it recognizes the fact that in a society different cultures coexist, it maintains the principle that in the end the different cultures have to subordinate themselves to a dominant one, with its codes, norms and systems of values.

When we talk about multiculturalism in relation to the policies for organizing coexistence in the multicultural space, we can see how certain elements serve as an ideological base for globalizing capitalism. It reaffirms particularisms to focus on differences, without questioning possible equivalencies. In this way, it casts each culture in a uniform way, as if there were no contradictions or divergences within it, and it presupposes that the objective of all who come from outside is the integral preservation of their "whole" culture, which in relation to immigration becomes an argument for returning.

Within the global processes, we have to bear in mind the great strength of one form of multiculturalism, which is called "corporate multiculturalism". The horizon of this multiculturalism is economic, and it makes difference its selling point. Cosmopolitanism, difference and ethnic groups become markets, forms which are compatible with the capitalist economy in its current process of globalization. As J. Baudrillard says, "With modernity, we enter the era of the production of the other. It is no longer a question of killing him, devouring him or seducing him, of facing up to him or rivalling him, of loving or hating him, it is a question, more than anything else, of producing him". (Baudrillard, 2002)

Interpretative vices

We can see that, in the face of the emergence of new relationships, there also emerge new redefinitions and new interpretations. It is impossible to separate interpretation from management. Interpretation is what orientates management, but in a multicultural context we are not the only ones who interpret; there are other interpretations, and not always in a relationship of equality. This, on many occasions, causes this inequality to be culturalized just enough for one to be able to interpret it. And for this, we have interpretative vices, with their almost magical action at the current time and their effect of activating non-existent structures. Some people call

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them key concepts, while others refer to them as catchall or talisman words. Claude Dubar refers to the term, "identity as the paradigm of the catchall word, in which each person projects his beliefs, emotional states and positions". (Dubar, 2002)

These are confused ideas, without pre-established limits, through which, on many occasions, reference is made to the complexity of the identity project within global processes, and their function is to explain the complexity in which we live. One cannot define these terms exactly, because "they only work socially because of their imprecision". (Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 2005) They are reducers of complexity, principles, positions of dominant groups within a society, but are presented as being neutral. They have the power of a *normalization statute*, which means that the other points of view are evaluated according to this measure of neutrality, and what does not conform with this zero point is considered extreme, radical or abnormal, not due to an analysis of their content but because they diverge from this zero point. This ideological zero point, the supposed normal version of things, is not neutral; it is the opinion of those who dominate.

We can find one example in the use that is given to the word *tolerance* in the discourse of identity or citizenship and its implicit connotations. It is taken for granted that what is tolerated is an infraction, a nuisance (shouts at night are tolerated, but this verb is not used with a symphony). The behaviour of foreigners is implicitly indicated as being a bothersome factor, an anomaly, and these actions are tolerated in a passive way, justified by this neutrality characteristic of key concepts. The lack of involvement is excused and everything ends in praise for the natives, who tolerate the abnormal behaviour of the foreigners. What if, instead of tolerance, we talked about respect, respect for kinds of positions that quite possibly we do not share exactly but that we understand to represent a moral point of view, a value, a feeling?

Identity

Identity is another word that we can find in contexts ranging from political speeches to cooking recipes. The importance of the use of this word nowadays is in itself a cultural fact. It is a name given to the search for a way out of uncertainty. The brevity of this article does not allow us to focus on the topic of identity, which would require a historical, political, social and psychological reading in order to understand the cultural identity dimension. We only propose to think about identity as a dynamic of identification that must be situated in a context. For example, when, how and why is a given identity preferred, demanded, emphasised or forgotten? How does one define one's identity membership, one's "Catalanness", one's "Spanishness"? It seems to be easier to define that of the *others* rather than one's own, because we need to define the *other* in order to situate *us*. Gustavo Bueno says, "Identity did not become a problem

during any era; it has been a problem since its birth. It was born as a problem, that is, as something with which something must be done: as a task". (Bueno, 1996)

Identity has to do with what is the same and what is different, with what is personal and what is social, with what we have in common with other people and what differentiates us from others. "To know in a practical way what the idea of culture and, in particular, what the idea of cultural identity means is to know against whom and against what one is directed in set conditions, that is, principally, what or who threatens the constitution of the reference culture as a practical process" (ibid.).

When "inside" ceases to be clear, when it seems to be at its weakest, the need to demonstrate or invent its solidity is at its strongest. The "we", built on inclusion, is where one feels at home, an "inside" which needs to protect itself from an "outside", inhabited by "them": "*They* are always too numerous; *they* are the ones that there should be fewer of, or better yet, absolutely none of. And *we* are never enough in number; *we* are the people that there should be a greater abundance of". (Bauman, 2005)

And it is here that the key concepts become interpretative vices for determining a position, justifying reactions or guiding a morality and an evaluation.

Models of understanding

When we talk about intercultural relationships, we must discuss what happens between, on and with each of the participants in the relationship. Cultures are not living beings, they are the people that form them. And it is the people, carriers of culture, that enter into a relationship, a relationship that can be one of cooperation or conflict, creating their expectations and channelling their defences but also their hopes and fears.

1. Culture: what is of interest to include comes to be called culture. One does not talk about assimilation or acculturation; it is culture, and in some cases it even silently comes to form part of the national culture.

2. Hybridization: a second appreciation is in relation to cultural elements, which are recognized but which are not of interest as elements of (dominant) identity construction. In this case, one talks about a hybrid, a concept whose transience and future are not questioned. It is taken for granted that these hybrid elements can be bought and sold but they cannot generate a dynamic capable of causing the dominant culture to be reconsidered: they end up outside, in a *hybrid* category.

3. Difference: the third category would be when their contribution is of no interest, when it is considered that these elements are contaminants for the dominant culture

and that it is desirable to exclude them. In this case, we call it *difference*. With it, even though we talk about "the right to be different", we are excluding, and we put a label on those who are not like us, establishing, moreover, conditions for a possible inclusion.

Based on this framework, we can situate the relationships produced by migration policies but also by the results of the negotiation between new and old experiences which are expressed through an everyday experience of multiple references. If we take, for example, jazz, in its origin we could place it in the third category of difference and exclusion. In its period of hybridization, it arrived in Europe, where, in turn, it was cultivated within a certain volitional exclusion by the progressive intellectuals of the period. Nowadays, nobody would argue against the "Western" contribution to jazz by Western composers and performers. We may talk about a Western jazz.

1. Culture

The first problem that we have with the word culture is that its meaning changes depending on the moment in history in which it is used and on the language, or rather, the people who use it. For the French of the Enlightenment, culture meant civilization (as opposed to uncivilized). The German Romantics opposed the idea of *volkskunst* culture, in opposition to culture as civilization, which in that period was almost synonymous with "French". From this moment on, there has always existed this dual explanation: on the one hand, that which is civilized, that which one learns, and on the other hand, that which is innate in a person: the way one gives meaning to one's life. But, in the majority of cases, the word culture is accompanied by an adjective: popular culture, national culture, ethnic culture... making the claim for the idea of culture as a practical idea explicit.

Words evolve and adapt to new contexts, new realities. Just as we cannot foresee the evolution of words like multiculturality or intercultural, we witness the emergence of words that had been forgotten or were known in other contexts. This is the case of "ethnic groups" or "ethnicity" in relation to the discourse on cultural/national identity.

For F. Barth, "The juxtaposition of ethnicity with the current debate on the concept of culture is a way of trying to clear up one problem with another... Ethnicity represents the social organization of cultural difference. Ethnic groups are not groups formed upon a shared culture but rather the formation of groups based on cultural differences. To think about ethnicity and only think about one group and its culture is like trying to applaud with only one hand". (Barth, 1976; Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart, 2005) The traits which are taken into account to construct ethnic identity are not the sum of objective cultural differences, but rather only those that the

actors themselves consider to be signs of difference, while other aspects of cultural content, not necessarily less important, are ignored.

Nation is "a social group that shares a common ideology, institutions and customs, and a feeling of homogeneousness". (Connor, 1998)

Nations did not previously exist; they have had to be built as something collective and as a political actor. They are the result of a historical construction. Every nation has had to not only develop but also to construct this feeling. They have had to be created, and for this reason, they have had creators and authorities: they needed culture. In order for these "imagined communities" that are nations to be born, an enormous work has mobilized thinkers, writers and artists to give a history, a language and a common culture to a reality which was not one. The intellectuals of the 19th and 20th centuries have forged the symbols, heroes and events. Historical novels, public monuments, universal expositions have ensured their propagation. Thus, the idea of nation as a cultural community is founded on the supposition that all of its members share the same culture that makes them different from the people of the "other" nations. National culture is a differentiating element, which at the same time is blind to the differences within national societies.

The claims for the idea of culture, be it national or ethnic, as a practical idea are orientated towards the defence and exaltation of the people that have identified with this culture in the face of those who put its purity, and even its survival, in danger. It is a symbolic dimension which narrates or creates the idea of origins, of the continuity of tradition, returning to a glorious past or reactivating forgotten memories. As Paul Ricoeur says, "I am still confused by the worrying spectacle offered by the excess of memory here, and the excess of forgetting there, not to mention the influence of commemorations and abuses of memory - and forgetting. The idea of a policy of the right amount of memory is therefore one of my declared civic issues". (Ricoeur, 2000)

2. Hybridization

Like all new terms that have a period of adaptation until the word is accepted and its meaning becomes clear, the term "hybrid" is in this phase: it is used, criticized and justified. It is a term which has received many kinds of criticism, among which are:

- When people talk about hybridization (miscegenation or creolization), it is taken for granted that pure cultures exist.
- Neither the time nor the space of hybridization are questioned. What future lies in store for that which is hybrid?
- It can suggest easy integration and fusion of culture, without giving much weight to contradictions and to what does not allow itself to be hybridized.

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- Inequality (the role of social relations in the structuring of the hybrid mix) is not taken into account.

Néstor García Canclini defines hybridization in the following way: "sociocultural processes in which discrete structures or practices, which existed in separate forms, are combined to generate new structures, objects and practices". (García Canclini, 1989) As a process of relationship, communication and interaction articulating reconversion strategies, we include what does not manage to or refuses to be fused (limits of hybridization). The interesting aspect of the term in its dynamic version is that in order for there to be hybridization, there have to be two or more cultures that interact and these cultures have to be strong enough not to be absorbed or diluted (principle of equality). "If we talk about hybridization as a process that can be accessed and abandoned, that one can be excluded from or that we can be subordinated to, then it is possible to understand the different positions of the subject with respect to intercultural relations" (ibid.).

Resistance to hybridization

The theory of hybridization has to take into account the movements that reject it. They do not stem only from fundamentalisms. There exist examples of resistance to accepting the forms of hybridization because they generate insecurity in cultures and conspire against their ethnocentric self-esteem. It is challenging for modern analytical thought, binary thought, which aims to order the world into pure identities and simple oppositions (civilized and savage, national and foreign). These oppositions and their categorizations are rooted in a we/they division. People talk of "our" kind of society and "theirs", and they look for positive and negative cases for confirming our ideas about the relevant factors... they speak in terms of primitive and advanced, underdeveloped, or development, or developed. A long list of oppositions with a single need to prove more than to assume difference: the step from myth to history, from magic to science, from what is collective to what is individual, from concrete to abstract, and from ritual to rational.

Taking into account the complexities in the relationships of "similarity" and "opposition": just through words: same, equal, like, similar, other, different, contrary, contradictory, opposite. Without mentioning another category, which would be: kin, relatives, neighbours, foreigners, strangers, etc. The question is: do all of these nuances fit into a single opposition: we/they? Unsatisfactory solutions are often caused by unsatisfactory formulations.

3. Difference

The creation and development of this illusion of positive identity makes there exist a kind of need to find in the *other* the defects that one dreads to find in oneself. This view contributes to strengthening the intimate territory (individualism) and the

territory of cohesion (group), making the *others* the equivalent of an assuring negative reverse side.

We construct the *we* from the inclusion, acceptance, and confirmation of its members. It is the kingdom of comforting security, isolated from the terrifying barrenness of an outside inhabited by them. And in order to be able to reaffirm itself as being positive, the easiest thing, and in fact what has been always done, is for us to create a negative, devaluing criticism of *them*, the *outsiders*. Inclusion and exclusion are the two sides of a single coin: identity. It has to do with what is the same and what is different, with what is personal and what is social, with what we have in common with some people and what differentiates us from others: identity and difference.

With exclusion, one speaks of a category or one puts into the same category all that cannot be included, and the reasons for this exclusion are decided by those who are included. The only point in common is to be excluded from something. García Martínez (2004) talks about "exclusion" as a new interpretative talisman in which all of the possible variants are concentrated: the unemployed, drug addicts, immigrants, vagabonds, women, etc., are all excluded. The term translates but conceals at the same time, it hides what it consists of or where it comes from, it remains in a purely negative and shared description.

Another facet of the dynamics of exclusion is stigmatization through exoticism or defending a supposed authenticity that some authors (Pinxten, 2003) call *fossilization*: members of a minority are obliged to be, in an authentic way, members of this minority group and cannot be anything else. In this way, they are only recognized inasmuch as they represent their own codes and system of values, which is taken for granted to be different and incompatible with norms of modernity. There exists a predisposition to consider non-Western identities to be monolithic and unchangeable. This mentality was typical of a colonial interpretation which denied non-Westerners of history and change, but we can find it in some present-day political discourses.

Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is an attitude or point of view in which each person applies the values deriving from their own cultural background to other cultural contexts, regarding those of other cultures as incorrect, inferior, or immoral. In this way, Eurocentrism rationally justified slavery and colonialism for a long time.

There also exists a long tradition of *implicit ethnocentrism* transmitted by Western education as something obvious but which deep down is determined by an ethno- or Eurocentric attitude.

The East, for example, is divided into the Near East, the Middle East and the Far East, in relation to what? Europe acts as an arbitrator of spatial evaluation. Eurocentrism divides the world between the West and the East, and it organizes its everyday language into binary hierarchies that always favour Europe. People talk of our nations, their tribes, our demonstrations, their riots, our defence, their terrorism.

Another example is colour and the treatment it has received throughout history, linking it to racial phobias: from Aristotle and Pliny, for whom the rational traditions of Western (white) culture were threatened by Eastern (coloured) sensuality, to Le Corbusier, the architect of modernity who, in *El viaje de Oriente* [*Journey to the East*] (Jeanneret, 1993) sustained that "colour matches simple races, farmers and savages. The East becomes an explosion of colour as if it were a case of drunkenness, like the disorder that takes us over, alien to the centre of civilization, we are savages..." For him, the annihilation of the East is the annihilation of disorder. In the universe of puritanism, colour is a problem, a dangerous agent. (Batchelor, 2001)

Edward Said (2002) has rightly denounced the habit of Orientalists of "orientalizing" Muslims; the orientalism of the 19th- and 20th-century approach to Arab-Muslim culture has not been an innocent one. It has been linked to the quest for domination and to the conviction that knowledge is useful for dominating better. One example is the journey by the Catalan, Ali Bey, a pilgrimage by one of Godoy's spies disguised as a Muslim gentleman.

In art, we find examples: the opposition between primitive and modern art makes one surmise that from the Western point of view, it was supposed that Western art was developed, while non-Western art was primitive and had as its goal the level of "civilized" Western art. In this way, it can also be understood why this art has been (and still is) exiled to ethnographic museums. On the other hand, concepts such as "the Middle Ages" and "Renaissance" are still used for organizing most of the topics in history, literature and art. When contents characteristic of African and Asian cultures are incorporated into a curriculum, they are generally seen within the context determined by European concepts and paradigms.

Although Picasso was inspired by African masks when creating his Cubist paintings, he is not considered to be "Africanized". However, when Chéri Samba (a Congolese artist) is inspired by Escher, he is accused of being "Westernized". In the opinion of African artists, the notion of contemporaneity could well be the ultimate refuge in a scheme in which the centre has, in fact, the privilege of decreeing what is contemporary. "We must bear in mind a dimension of 'today' which is not ours. Today, here, there is art and it is not contemporary... Africa, in its turn, fights with the 'centre' over its legitimacy to pontificate on the contemporary as a category that involves a meaning much more complex than the mere fact of belonging to today,

with it being, rather, a historical perspective". (Catalogue of the exhibition *Africa Hoy*, 1992)

Culture has become a political subject. It has successfully placed cultural authenticity on the agenda, and it has labelled certain citizens as being culturally different. There exists a challenge and, at the same time, a unique opportunity to reconsider the lack of global coexistence beginning with this process of identification which is under way, thus overcoming the dangers of disintegration, on the one hand, and petrification, on the other. The cohesion necessary for culture is achieved by demonstrating that all of us citizens are involved in this process and that intercultural dynamics make a culture be alive.

This necessary cohesion also makes it unacceptable to talk about culture, hybridization and difference as if they were three different things. The question is, to what extent will we be capable of involving hybrids and differences in their cultural project?

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Developing Democracy Through Cultural Diversity

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The referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands has demonstrated four major facts:

1. when they are given an opportunity to express their opinion on fundamental issues, the citizens are seizing it, even if the vote is not compulsory and not necessarily binding for their governments;

2. the gap between the political world and the electorate is widening rather than tightening - it is a deficit in democracy;

3. citizens are afraid of losing their national, regional or cultural identity;

4. the future of Europe is a true concern of the citizens, but the European Union is the scapegoat for national domestic problems and inappropriate policies on global issues such as unemployment, insecurity and economic recession.

The first conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that democracy doesn't really function as well as it should. The second conclusion is that the perception of identity is at the very heart of this crisis, which is a crisis of democracy.

The question then is: what can we do to improve, to further develop democracy?

Democracy is not a rigid system. It is not a framework with a set of tools and recipes for stability, prosperity and peace for humankind. It is not an insurance against tension and conflicts. It is, on the contrary, an everlasting process of checks and balances, of ups and downs, of progress and recession, of profits and losses. Yet it clearly is the only way through which fundamental human rights can be expressed and further developed.

Democracy is canvassed in rules and institutions, which may have the same purpose but are being used in different ways throughout the world. The most striking example nowadays is the manner in which the Bush administration is trying to impose their view of democracy in several regions of the world, not the least in Iraq.

Globalization, particularly of free trade, is bringing governments together, increasing international exchanges and cooperation. So also do planetary threats such as climate change, global warming, environmental depletion, tsunamis, earthquakes…and international terrorism. The fact that our planet Earth has become one global village might give the impression that people are growing towards each other, sharing common concerns and seeking common solutions.

Yet the emergence of one single hyper-power - the United States, the worldwide spread of the American way of life, the dominant position of financial markets and capital, unemployment in the Western world and poverty in the developing countries are felt as a regression and a threat to self determination by an increasing number of citizens in all free countries.

There are signs of reaction throughout the world, where states are creating new communities of interest to strengthen their position against the excesses of globalization and the hegemony of hyper-power and capital: South-East Asia, Latin America, even Africa. But the most successful example - in spite of the recent NO votes - is definitely the European Union. Here is a global region emerging on the basis of shared views on democracy and law, challenging to some extent the very concept of national sovereignty itself.

The major obstacle to further success and the obvious reason for the spectacular setback to the European Union is that we are still dealing with institutions, policies and governance systems which are inadequate to deal with the democratic aspirations of the citizens. The political elites of the member states as well as those in the European institutions have conducted their business "as usual". They failed to acknowledge the deeply rooted need for human beings to have an identity and to protect it.

Most people find their identity by belonging to a specific group, distinct from other groups. In recent history, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries we can see how people identified themselves with their country or rather with their state, thus becoming nationalists or patriots, prepared to give their life for it. At the same time there has been the awakening of another consciousness: a sense of belonging to a people, a particular ethnical group, often without or outside a national state. Such groups are characterized either by common religion or by language, territory, and race. Quite often they consider themselves as a nation without a state or within a

foreign state. This is the case, for example, for Flanders in Belgium or Catalonia in Spain.

In order to legitimize their sovereignty, many states have captured the nationalistic feelings of the people, thus creating the "nation state". The model was born in France between 1790 and 1794, soon copied in other parts of Europe and the world.

The original sin of the nation state was to appropriate a part of the territory belonging to its inhabitants and to use it with absolute power in the name of the sovereignty dogma. It means that natural resources, the environment, the goods and even the people belong to the State. And the State demands the service of its citizens, rather than to be at the service of the citizens.

Cooperation between free citizens, regional autonomy and individual development have been abandoned for nearly two centuries, substituted by central governments. The logic of state centralization called for standardization. People, minds, systems and products needed to be streamlined. The army first, but quite soon also the schools, public administration, the press, the currency, and the fiscal system were the tools used to reinforce a strong national cohesion and a sense of power.

The interest of the State is sacred. But the State as a set of institutions is an abstract, cool concept. The nation or the people, on the contrary, is a warm, human notion. It is a most dangerous threat to democracy when the State coincides with an exacerbated national feeling, when a people identifies itself totally with its nation and its leaders. The fascist regimes have clearly proven this, at the cost of millions of human lives.

But even in pacific national states democracy has been and still is often ignoring the common interest of citizens or large minorities of them. In the name of efficiency almost all power has been concentrated in capital cities of the national states: public administration, communications systems, infrastructure, etc.

Only in the last decades has there been some significant devolution to some regions in Europe. At the same time, however, some national powers have been delegated to the higher level of the European institutions, mainly the Commission. Policies were increasingly decided by the Council of Ministers, meaning the heads of national states or governments. Harmonization and the protection of some vested interests were - and still are - keywords.

While entirely justified because of the need for effectiveness in some areas of competence, this new form of centralization, at a greater distance from the citizens' daily concerns, has created a perception of remote technocracy without any possibility of control.

The rejection of the Constitutional Treaty by the citizens of two founding member states - and others might well follow the trend - has both negative and positive consequences.

It undoubtedly will have an impact on short term economics. It definitely will fuel the arguments of Euro-sceptics and opponents, agitating the ghost of a "super-state", and pleading for more national, if not nationalistic, cohesion.

This could lead to the manipulation of territory, separating physically the existing differences, though closing frontiers, building walls or ethnic purification do not solve the problems, but reinforce them. The rights of people do not exist in the land they master. National territory divides, people meet. In fact, the frontiers dividing people are not to be found on the land, but in their minds.

The only answer to the rejection of solidarity, to the reluctance of transferring some sovereignty in a federal perspective and to conflicts between different identities is therefore *"cultural"*. People should understand *what* and *how* they themselves think. They should then talk about their situation, how they gauge with their own values their position in the world, and how they actually relate to that reality created by the presence of the "other". The step towards a constructive dialogue is indeed to be able to truly understand one's own expression, one's own identity. Conflicts do not arise from the existence of the other, but from *what* I think about the other, and *why*?

Difference is not a choice, but an accident of birth. It is a given fact of humanity, not the result of particular judgements or policies. The way to constructive cooperation, prosperity and peace is therefore more democracy, meaning more respect for diversity and differences, seeking at the same time common ground for rules and institutions.

These institutions, like the European Union, but also national states have to better integrate and protect the diversity of cultural identities, assuring time and again that it is by working together on the same territory - be it transnational, national, regional or local - that prosperity, stability and peace can be obtained, instead of dividing into separate, totally sovereign entities - which are myths.

Consequently the *"cultural"* approach in the construction project of a true European Union - and indeed in the further development of democracy all over the world - calls for a different approach.

Top-down policies need to be balanced by bottom up initiatives from individual citizens and from the civil society. This includes:

- the search for the origins of the world views and sensitivities of the citizens, including an analysis of their beliefs, attitudes, expressions and certainties;

- the acceptance of an open dialogue including all cultural means of contact, including art and creativity;
- the willingness to change one's own values and convictions in order to share common ground;
- the ability to invent new common institutions and cooperative endeavours.

We don't have to deny our own roots, languages, traditions - in short: our own identity. But as citizens we should seek *confrontation* - through political debate and public conferences - of the cultural components and existing differences among peoples, regional cultures, nations and countries that represent possible obstacles to political cooperation.

Beyond what is often superficially called "intercultural dialogue", there are hidden concepts and values which are so deeply rooted in the way of thinking and reacting, that most participants in dialogue do not become aware of it, ignoring their impact and their importance. In spite of willingness and good faith, these underlying differences remain hidden obstacles to constructive exchanges and cooperation.

There is therefore a need to develop a *"cultural self-analysis"* inducing a new awareness of one's own identity, leading to those "cultural changes" which will be able to overcome these obstacles.

Let me conclude by referring, once again to Europe.

"The European Union is the most striking example of conflict resolution in the history of the world" said Nobel Peace Prize Winner John Hume.

The undeniable success of the Union, regardless of the current situation, is largely due to the fact that the peoples of Europe have voluntarily chosen cooperation on common grounds and interests, keeping their cultural identities, at least so far.

The developments in European history in the last half century have proved that peace does not come through the overcoming of differences, but through learning to live with them. Conflicts often result from a misunderstanding of reciprocal expressions of the different ways of looking at reality. When that reality is not limited to the material and natural world, but is made up of human beings, the lack of recognition of one's own identity leads to frustration, aggression and violence. The present world crisis related to the existence of terrorism illustrates that point.

Conflicts and misunderstandings are still present today in different regions in the world. In Europe the Balkan countries are most often mentioned, as they had to face the most violent conflicts in recent years. Also, let's not forget that peaceful regions are also affected by prejudices and cultural bias, often not completely alien to the difficulties with minorities, conflicting neighbours or economic competition.

Reducing the democratic deficit means further refining and developing democracy as the only answer to all conflict issues, whether political, ethnical, economic and ecological. It means permanently seeking the right balance between, on the one hand, the diversity of cultural identities and on the other hand, the common ground and values based on our common human roots. For Europe it means working towards the union, not of 25 member states but of 450 million citizens, all equal in their own cultural identity, yet willing to communicate and share a common vision on their future.

La angustia democrática: una respuesta desde la cultura

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La emergencia norteamericana como único poder militar ha supuesto con razón una notable preocupación no sólo desde el punto de vista político y económico sino también cultural. En países como el Paraguay es evidente que la marginación de los centros de poder ha llevado a pensar modelos de integración como alternativas. Lo hemos hecho con el Mercosur que desde el 26 de marzo de 1991 con el tratado de Asunción sigue esperando una concreción más allá de las fotos y convenios entre presidentes. La cultura es la olvidada en estos procesos. La ingobernabilidad por viejas prácticas que no se ha podido *aggiornar* a modelos de transparencia e inclusión emergentes ha llevado que la propia democracia como instrumento político de oportunidades sea hoy severamente cuestionada y puesta en duda, como lo prueba el informe de Proddal, un organismo del PNUD, en su informe presentado en marzo del año pasado en Lima (Perú) donde sus resultados muestran que más de la mitad de los latinoamericanos no miraría con sentido crítico ni rechazo "la irrupción de un gobierno autoritario que ponga fin a la inseguridad, el desempleo y la falta de certezas". Y es en este último de los campos que creo con firmeza la necesidad de repensar una cultura integradora que debata desde el ámbito de lo público y lo privado nuevos escenarios posibles que recobren el "entusiasmo" en la democracia que ciertamente en muchos países latinoamericanos ha bajado considerablemente. El Paraguay que desde 1989 comenzó a construir una plataforma democrática, débil e irresoluta en varios sentidos, tiene según el mismo informe del PNUD una población mayoritaria que anhela un gobierno autoritario.

La cultura es lo que importa en los tiempos actuales y, sin embargo, de ella casi no se habla o cuando se lo hace, se lo mire de soslayo sin importar casi nada en la construcción de un imaginario colectivo donde la diversidad y el multiculturalismo sean posibles y den pistas ciertas a millones de seres humanos que no logran entender por qué son tan democráticos en lo político y tan pobres en lo económico y cultural. La pobreza material es el resultado de una degradación de la dignidad humana. Es la

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constatación de un fracaso colectivo y sobre todo es una muestra de como conocimientos, actitudes y posturas de nuestros pueblos, acumulados a lo largo de nuestra historia, no han sido suficientes para evitar el menoscabo de la condición humana, primero, y el deterioro de la calidad de vida, después. Nuestros pueblos conocen de virtudes ciudadanas y los ejemplos existen a montones pero sin embargo no fueron lo suficientemente claros ni nítidos para sobreponerse a una avalancha consumista que sólo considera viable en la globalización lo que viene de afuera, lo que se importa y no lo que se tiene, lo que se hizo construyendo civilizaciones que llevaron a nuestros pueblos a mostrar con orgullo el grado de evolución logrado.

Los medios de comunicación han ayudado desde la banalización, la trivialización y lo light a esta cultura de lo externo como valor y al menoscabo de lo propio. La publicidad y en especial la manera de abarcar estos tiempos de conflictos y de cambios de paradigmas como nunca antes conocidos, no han sido desde la prensa un apoyo donde sostener un discurso claro y un debate exegético que sirviera para encontrar claves de sobrevivencia y de entusiasmo hacia el futuro. El lenguaje es la primera víctima en esta concepción de lo global en su dimensión de tiempo y de espacio. La conversación ha sido sustituida por el chat telefónico o de la computadora donde nuevos símbolos son inventados para "conversar" en espacios virtuales desprovistos de emociones y de gestos. La banalización de la persona y la explotación del morbo con una insistencia rayana en el insulto hacia la inteligencia humana de lo burdo ha llevado hoy a los medios de comunicación a exacerbar de manera reiterada y constante la desgracia, el fracaso, el dolor, la muerte y la necesidad humana a niveles nunca antes conocidos. Los programas de televisión orientados hacia la invasión de la privacidad, donde todos somos voyeristas y donde lo burdo tiene rating, como el programa peruano "Laura en América", ha llevado a un relativismo cultural donde el plástico es igual al metal y en donde el insulto es una forma de comunicación que brinda audiencia.

La cultura en su manifestación más amplia y generosa del espíritu humano sufre hoy por efectos de los cambios de paradigmas no asumidos ni entendidos y menos aún direccionados una socavación notable sobre la que habría que situar alguna vez un debate más intenso que nos permita observar de qué manera ella impacta sobre la ansiedad y la depresión de muchos que hoy ni se comunican ni desean ser parte de ninguna comunidad porque sencillamente no encuentran razones de celebrar juntos la consolidación de una cultura común de valores y actitudes compartidas. Los demás medios de comunicación no escapan de estos parámetros. Los diarios y emisoras de radio han buscado mantener lealtades sobre la base de concursos y premios sin importarles mucho la inversión en la calidad de los medios y, consiguientemente, en la modificación de una pauta cultural más dada a la evasión y no al compromiso.

Desde esta preocupación de lo global, la emergencia de un poder militar único y la creciente marginalidad y pobreza del subcontinente americano vale la pena insistir en un multiculturalismo donde la defensa de los derechos humanos en su más amplio sentido sea urgente y necesario reclamarlo y ejecutarlo. La cultura de lo mundial desde lo local debe tener sentido cuando el trabajo en redes de organizaciones sea posible. No seremos capaces de empujar un horizonte diferente desde la defensa temerosa de lo propio sino desde la recreación de nuestros valores culturales más intensos y válidos. Cuando aquel joven escritor ruso le había preguntado al maestro Tolstoi cómo podría ser universal, éste le respondió: describe tu aldea y serás universal. Debemos describir nuestras aldeas desde la diversidad que nos acerca y no la que nos separa. La posible secesión en Bolivia y los crecientes problemas étnicos en otros países andinos es una llamada de atención para la cultura de los países del subcontinente que comparte la herencia común de haber acogido culturas tan distintas como distantes.

Hay también la necesidad de hablar desde el multiculturalismo de una concepción de paz y de una búsqueda a través del diálogo y del re-conocimiento, de un apropiarnos de las notables desigualdades en la región y de comprometernos en atenuarlas. No será posible entender la libertad con hambre y menos hacer pervivir la democracia con miedo y desamparo. Requerimos por lo tanto una labor más rica desde el ámbito de la sociedad organizada conjuntamente con un estado más honesto en las limitaciones e incapacidades para desentrañar los misterios de una globalización impuesta sin comprender la clave para poder discernirla.

Un gasto suicida en educación

La inversión en educación es criminalmente pobre en la mayoría de nuestros países. No pasa del 7% del PIB y el gasto está, en la mayoría de los casos, mal hecho o no llega a los destinatarios de este "gasto" clave para crear oportunidades y posibilidades. La era del conocimiento no será posible para nuestros países si no damos paso a un *shock educativo* que nos permita entender la complejidad de los cambios y las posibilidades que se nos abren a partir de nuestra cultura milenaria que sólo tendrá sentido valórico y no monumentalista o de artesanía cuando la educación y el conocimiento se conviertan en herramientas claves para salir de las dudas y tribulaciones que el mundo actual somete a varias naciones inermes e incapaces de salir adelante de la mayor crisis que recuerde la humanidad desde los tiempos de la revolución industrial.

Tenemos herramientas nuevas, Internet (acaso el símbolo de la globalización) es una de ellas, pero su impacto e influencia en la región sigue siendo bajo. Es una posibilidad más pero solo útil en la medida en que las labores básicas de formación educativas hayan sido llevadas adelante por el Estado y la sociedad de una manera

más firme y decidida. Vivimos relativamente más cerca pero con angustias y urgencias que nos limitan notablemente articular proyectos comunes a nivel global que permitan entender la cultura como un vínculo universal que entrega en cualquier lugar y tiempo valores comunes que enriquecen la condición humana. No debemos renunciar a la creatividad y al optimismo a pesar de la idea de naufragio que muchos tienen en torno a la emergencia de hechos y circunstancias absolutamente nuevos para sociedades ancladas en diferentes tiempos de evolución humana.

Debemos insistir sobre el valor de la educación, rescatar la comunicación para la comunidad, articularlas entre sí y con otras organizaciones similares y enriquecer este tiempo que para muchos - y con razón - demandan creatividad e innovación justo cuando la inversión educativa muestra niveles alarmantemente bajos en toda la región. Temo más a la ignorancia y el analfabetismo propios que a las amenazas del mundo globalizado que nos quieren imponer. La oscuridad propia es mayor y el miedo es directamente proporcional cuando no podemos hacer que la fórmula de John Dewey de *comunidad + comunicación = democracia* sea posible.

Una forma de entender con optimismo y entusiasmo, y aquí presto la palabra usada reiteradamente en los informes de gobernabilidad en América Latina, es a partir de la reinvención creativa de lenguajes comunes, ricos en matices, con medios de comunicación que logren comprender la gravedad de su responsabilidad y en donde la comunidad pueda compartir códigos comunes que le permitan mirar el horizonte de manera más clara y menos temerosa.

Latinoamérica puede quedar fuera de la "conversación mundial" si no logra dinamizar su riqueza cultural a través de una educación orientada a hacer de las capacidades de sus habitantes la mayor de las oportunidades posibles. De lo contrario, no pasaremos de ser un territorio de riquezas y tradiciones insondables pero de posibilidades dinámicas reducidas. Hace falta invertir, y mucho, en conocimiento, todo en educación para poner a la cultura al frente de los procesos de integración que hasta ahora no han pasado de meros intentos políticos y económicos pero sin ninguna trascendencia, porque a pesar de compartir un idioma común y una historia y tradiciones similares no podemos decir que nos conozcamos y nos reconozcamos los latinoamericanos en nuestra diversidad y potencialidad. No se ha hecho la labor de la integración desde la cultura en su dimensión humana más amplia y el fracaso ha rodeado a todos los intentos de hacer frente a ese mundo unipolar, estadounidense y hegemónico, que sí ha usado la cultura como arma y herramienta para proyectar sus valores y visiones a escala mundial.

Es evidente que de esta encrucijada sólo saldremos en la medida y proporción del esfuerzo que hagamos desde el ámbito de lo cultural. Es ahí donde radica la fuerza de este continente que hoy mira desde la pobreza, la marginalidad y el descontento un mundo que cambia y en cuyo cambio no tenemos ni la voz ni el esfuerzo que nos

acerque a la discusión mundial de los hechos. Miles de latinoamericanos hoy viven fuera de sus países y varios de éstos tienen en la remesa de dinero de sus connacionales su fuente de ingresos principal, mientras los que se quedaron o no pudieron salir observan la degradación del medio ambiente, la ineptitud de la política, la falta de inventivas del sector privado y la tendencia creciente hacia formas de nacionalismo político con su carga de demagogia y populismo que surgen como rechazo y angustia antes como opción y respuesta. La democracia está en peligro en América Latina. La viabilidad de nuestras naciones desde el punto de vista de su concepción cultural de estados-naciones hoy se pone en duda y la irrupción de conflictos armados entre algunos países no deja de ser una amenaza latente en un continente que mira los cambios a escala mundial sin la capacidad ni el conocimiento necesarios para sacar provecho de ellos.

Es evidente que necesitamos redescribirnos desde lo comunitario, es preciso volver a conseguir un lenguaje común que nos permita identificarnos en nuestros valores y que no sea la más burda de las expresiones de nuestras angustias, fracasos y rechazos. Desde la comunidad y desde la comunicación es bueno que volvamos a la creatividad que ha sido desde siempre el único invento original del ser humano (la educación), el factor central que ha sacado a los pueblos del marginamiento, la pobreza y la exclusión.

Formar vínculos, relacionar ideas, construir escenarios comunes permite dejar a un lado los temores de un tiempo que por falta de elementos que nos permitan comprenderlo ha terminado por ser el territorio de lo unipolar, de lo hegemónico o lo nacionalista, populista y demagógico como respuesta.

La cultura tiene mucho que decir en estos cruciales tiempos de cambios que vive el mundo y que han golpeado severamente al subcontinente. Nunca fuimos tan democráticos en lo formal como ahora pero jamás hemos llegado a niveles de pobreza, de exclusión y de desigualdades tan altos. Para recuperar el vigor y el entusiasmo en las soluciones creativas que anhelan nuestro pueblos es preciso echar una mirada a lo cultural correspondiendo desde el ámbito de la educación, la comunicación y el compromiso de los intelectuales en la tarea de proyectar no sólo el entusiasmo democrático perdido sino el valor de la libertad como espacio único y vital del ser humano que lo hace digno, fuerte y global.

New Ways of Communication and Cooperation
Internet and Cultural Networks: Diversity of Cultural
Communication. Impact of Virtual Communication on Cultures.
Digital Culture

Communicating for Global Interculturality

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From transmission to interaction

Every season has its own buzzwords. These are usually concepts that are analytically totally useless, intellectually flawed, and extremely popular. One of these buzz words today is the "information society". We need to be aware of the fact that buzz words are always discursive constructs. They are always used to serve a specific interest. Words never describe the world. Words shape the world. When the UN decided to convene a world summit that would focus on the "information society", there was a political motive behind this. Initially this meeting was never supposed to take place. In 1996 UNESCO already had the splendid idea to convene a World Conference on Communication and Information for Development. That conference was never realized largely because its theme and focus did not fit into the plans of the Clinton-Gore administration.

This administration had great plans for a National Information Infrastructure to be expanded into a Global Information Infrastructure. This was designed as a highly technologically oriented, technologically driven and techno-centric project. The former US Vice President - not a gifted speaker - talked about it in very moving words. Gore said "once we have the global information structure, there will no longer be poverty in the world, there will no longer be environmental degradation, there will no longer be conflict, there will be good health care, there will be marvellous education, and, finally, we will enter the age of Athenian democracy." At that point, my euphoria was abruptly undermined. "Athenian democracy?" Did the Vice-President realize that at the time of Athenian democracy most of those who lived in Athens were not citizens? The migrant workers, the slaves, the foreigners and the women did not participate in Athens' democracy. One cannot help but wonder whether this reflects the global information infrastructure the Vice-President had in mind.

In the spirit of this technology-driven project the concept of the "information society" fitted perfectly well and thus became the theme for the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), convened by the specialized UN agency ITU (International Telecommunication Union). One could speak at length about the many shortcomings and failures of this summit, but here I want to address an aspect that is especially relevant in the context of cultural diversity.

In all the preparations for the conference, in all its documents, in its preparatory committees, in its final declaration, there was a very strong emphasis on the notion of information. This raises the question "whatever happened to communication"? The almost exclusive focus on information points to two serious problems.

First of all, it reinforces a series of flawed assumptions about the significance of information. Among them is the attractive and popular line of thought that proposes that once people are better informed about each other, they will know and understand each other better and be less inclined to conflict. However, deadly conflicts are usually not caused by a lack of information. In fact, they may be based upon adequate information that adversaries have about each other. One could equally well put forward the view that social harmony is largely due to the degree of ignorance that actors have with regard to each other.

The second problem is that the emphasis upon information keeps us locked into what can be called the "transmission paradigm". This finds its origin in a book written in 1949 by C. Shannon and W. Weaver entitled *A Mathematical Theory of Communication*. The authors defined communication as the transmission of signals, and indeed, when people talk today about communication they usually mean transmission. Even when people talk to each other, using interactive technologies like the Internet, they are usually just transmitting. All the babbling, for example, on the mobile phone, is mere transmission. Communication however is more: communication is interaction; it is mutuality; it is a learning process. Of course, information is important as a key resource to modern societies. But it could be that today we are not in need of more information in our world. We may not need information societies. We desperately need interactive, communicative societies. We have overloads of information and exceedingly large volumes of knowledge, but lack the capacity for interaction. For interaction to replace transmission, communication has to meet two fundamental conditions. Communication has to be dialogical and it has to be non-violent.

This mode of communication is very critical in the development of modern, multicultural, and multi-ethnic societies.

Modern societies: The challenges of multicultural and multi-ethnic communities

The formation of the modern nation state posed complex questions such as: "Who belongs to the polity?"; "Who is citizen of the national state?"; "On what grounds can citizenship be granted?"; "Who can legitimately participate in the making of public choices?"; and "What fundamental rights will be recognized for those who are not admitted to citizenship?"

An obvious solution for the question about the nature of citizenship was the linkage of citizenship with ethnic and cultural identity. Most national administrations preferred to link national citizenship with the ethnically dominant group in the population. This simple solution runs however into problems when national borders turn out to be porous. Time and again people move across borders as a result of migration and cross-border marriages. Following the massive labour migration in past decades in most European countries one finds today large diaspora communities that have established themselves permanently in host countries. Increasingly these communities became more assertive and vocal about the protection of their cultural identities.

Through modern communication and transport technologies they also could maintain links with their home lands. These links were also strengthened as a result of the financial flows from emigrants to those family members who stayed at home. The International Monetary Fund estimates that this global money flow amounts annually to some $100 billion.

This development has often caused a forceful confrontation for states that largely perceived of themselves as mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and mono-religious. The encounter with pluriform cultural identities and forms of transnational loyalties challenged the conventional notion of citizenship. To deal with this, states have deployed a variety of administrative solutions, such as ethnic cleansing, formal and informal apartheid, assimilation or integration politics. Of these solutions, the integrationist approach finds most political support. In various dictionaries integration means "to create a harmonic whole". Integration is a social process by which "newcomers" voluntarily or by coercion become part of an existing national community and form a harmonious totality within the societal mould of the "indigenous tribes". It is expected that this process resolves confrontations and that conflicting values and norms are manufactured into a societal consensus.

However, in such situations the consensus does not involve two equal parties because what in fact happens is that the newcomer minorities have to satisfy the demands imposed upon them by the official representatives of the indigenous majorities. The dominant societal model is taken for granted and is not opened up for

public deliberation. In general, it can be observed that integration processes at national, regional and global levels are top-down impositions.

The European integration process, for example, was from its very beginning a highly undemocratic project: a political choice made by an elite that was to be imposed upon European citizens. The same happens at the global level where a World Trade Organization (WTO)-elite inspired economic model is imposed on individual countries. These impositions remind me of what the Brazilian ambassador during the GATT Uruguay Trade Round said: "The third world is a chicken and the first world is a cook. And the cook says to the chicken: 'With what sauce would you like to be cooked?' The cook has never wondered about whether the chicken wants to be cooked at all". In many societies the chickens have not been asked whether they want to be cooked at all. There is a strong risk that as long as the chickens are not asked, integrationist politics will meet around the world with increasingly extremist and violent responses.

In this predicament we should rather try to cooperate than to integrate! Integration of cultural varieties into larger units tends dangerously towards cultural destruction and is of necessity a non-democratic process. It would be good if we revisited E.F. Schumacher's felicitous phrase "Small is Beautiful" (1973). The serious recognition of cultural diversity and cultural difference demands selective cooperation among small autonomous units.

The key to achieving this is the need to learn how to communicate.

The dialogue

The ability to engage in dialogue and the capacity for interactivity as a learning process needs to be taught and learned.

Conversation in the sense of a genuine dialogue is a demanding art and in many societies people have neither the time nor the patience for dialogical communication. Dialogues have no short-term and certain outcome. This conflicts with the spirit of modern achievement-oriented societies. Moreover, the mass media are not particularly helpful in teaching people the art of conversation. Much of their content is babbling (endless talking without saying anything), hate speech, advertising blurbs, sound bites or polemical debate. The requirements for a meaningful dialogue begin with the need for internal dialogue. This implies that all participants question their own judgments and assumptions. The critical investigation of our own assumptions is, however, a major challenge as we are often ignorant about our basic assumptions. Assumptions are the mental maps that we tend to follow uncritically. We all have different and often conflicting assumptions, certainly when we come from different cultures. Equally difficult is the suspension of judgment since we are

strongly attached to our opinions and assessments and prefer them to uncertainties. Dialogue also requires the capacity to listen and to be silent. Learning the language of listening is very hard in societies that are increasingly influenced by visual cultures whereas listening demands an ear-centred culture! The mass media offer "talk shows", not "listen shows". The dialogue can only take place where silence is respected. This borders on the impossible in modern societies where talking never seems to stop and where every void needs to be filled with noise.

Another basic requirement for the dialogue is the readiness to change. The dialogue changes its participants. Real interaction makes those involved different persons.

This poses an enormous challenge since most people are very hesitant about change and are in essence conservative.

The modality of dialogical communication could and should be taught in the early stages of people's lives in school, at home, and through the media.

Communication should not only be dialogical but also non-violent. This is not so easy since most of the world's public communication processes are competitive and loaded with violence and aggression. Illustrations include the disproportionate attention to sport, to all kinds of games and quizzes, to hate speech and polemical debate. But also our personal exchanges are often battlefields. People get hurt, wounded, traumatized and silenced in private exchanges. In much of our domestic communications there are winners and losers. This reflects the competitive nature of modern societies. People are competitive in the legal system, in the business system, in sport, and even in education. One of the worst things that happened to our universities is that they became competitive institutions. This is absolutely dramatic for the quality of academic education.

Competition is beneficial for a tiny minority in each field; it discourages, disappoints and demotivates the majority of people who may have special talents but are not strong enough to survive competitive pressure.

It is a fatally flawed myth that competition leads to better results than cooperation!

This myth proliferates in all the sectors of our social, economic, political, cultural and private lives. It is legitimized by a liberal market model that sees human beings primarily as competing individualists.

An illustration of a field where competition ruins much talent is music education. There are, however, exceptions like the French Ecole Supérieure de Musique, Danse, et d'Art Dramatique in Paris. In this school that began in 1896 as a Schola Cantorum, Satie, Debussy, Albéniz and Messiaen taught and Cole Porter studied there. Its basic philosophy is: "*On ne fait pas de musique contre quelqu'un*". One does not make

music against someone else. This imaginative school keeps its pupils away from the musical rat race. The school cares for music and renounces competition.

Conclusion

The most crucial challenge in societies that strive towards the protection of cultural diversity is the question: "Can we learn to communicate with each other and not against each other?" If we do not manage to learn the art of dialogical and non-violent communication, we are on a tremendously dangerous, if not lethal route towards the future.

Cultures of Control and Dispersion
New Media and Global Information Networks

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Shedding baggage

Grand narratives centring on the discourse of "nation-building" remain prominent in Africa as development philosophies. Core to Africa achieving peer access to the global arena are the twin pillars of education and equitable access to communications infrastructure. If participation in the global information economy is denied, then local economic development stagnates.

African economies may be characterized as post-colonial extraction in nature, identified by dispersal, petty commoditization, and subsistence production and consumption in rural areas. Debates in South Africa immediately following apartheid's demise equivocated over the restructuring of outmoded Fordist modes of production rather than considering post-Fordist solutions (Collins, 1992). Emerging benefits of New Media and ICT began to be appreciated as late as the mid-1990s. One example is the PAS4 satellite, launched in 1996, which opened Africa, Europe and the Middle East to South African radio and TV broadcasters. Cell phones, introduced in many countries in the 1990s, filled yawning gaps left by inefficient, expensive state-run telephone systems.

Societal options

Africans often blame external influences for deficiencies in the continent's lack of development. Central to opting in to the global economy is a combination of infrastructure and policy in the form of telecommunications networks, skills and education. Innovation incubators might exist as easily in Africa, the Far East or anywhere else. For example, India's long-term emphasis on secondary and tertiary

education and access to global communications underwrote its burgeoning ICT service industry. The Indian ICT sector aggressively promotes programming, remote consultancy, project management and ICT-related helpdesk functions on a global basis. (Accenture et al., 2001)

Participation at minimum levels requires the Developing World to have coordinated, accelerated input of resources and promotion of:

- emphasis on mass provision of quality primary and secondary education;
- economically-sensitive access to ICT infrastructure and international telecommunications; and
- liberalization of telecommunications policies - at national and global levels.

The information economy has relativized the world. The Developing World needs to embrace competition in this relativized environment, shaped by post-structuralist logic. ICT has changed the means of access, commoditization and marketing of knowledge. African media policies have largely failed to respond to new conditions, being better suited to entrenching of local political interests.[2]

The Developing World continues to under-prioritize education, remaining focussed on sustainability of subsistence economies. An undereducated workforce is unable to engage with industrialized nodes on a simple transactional level. Notions of "job creation" in the Developing World remain limiting *sans* education and connectivity.

New Media and the evolution of culture

Elision of time, space, and economic influence through New Media results in diasporic, evolving telecommunities of production and consumption. These innovate by developing new interactions, identities, information flows and modalities of economic production and political influence. (Braman, 1994) A non-linear, self-organizing post-modern world operating beyond modernist prescriptions emerged in the 1990s and developed dramatically over the next decade. Mobile data services and attendant applications demonstrate the potential for innovation and use of communications as means of accessing global information flow. These include web access, cellular services such as *NewsBreak* (Sandison, 2000), cellphone banking, and others. Spreading of access, largely independent of location, occurs also via the spread of cashpoints (ATMs) and access to Internet banking and other wired/wireless services.

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2   Notable exceptions are addressed in the Digital Opportunities Initiative Report (Accenture et al., 2001).

Freire's (1970, 1973) "archaeology of consciousness" aims at development of informed and independent "critical consciousness", or a transitive stage, facilitated via critical pedagogy. The archaeology of consciousness begins with a stage identified by Freire as "intransitive thought", where individuals and society are at their most dominated by apparently overwhelming external influences. Existence is fatalistic, with determinants of change and improvement being attributed to outside or supernatural forces. There is a feeling of inevitability, with little perceived prospect for improvement.

"Semi-transitive thought" follows "intransitive thought", and political and social turbulence occurs as individuals begin exercising independent thought and action. A limiting aspect is the tendency to react to issues and problems in isolation, rather than trying to understand and affect complex interactions. The post-revolutionary phase has potential for persistence of the single-issue agendas and policies - a prime example being the persistent call from South African trade unions for protection and creation of jobs through tariff protection, restrictive labour legislation and preferential trade agreements, doing nothing to improve domestic production efficiencies, or in encouraging small-scale entrepreneurship.

New global commodities are information, domain knowledge and ideas. New inputs are time, creativity, multimedia and international labour competitiveness. These dynamics have brought together diverse areas: music, media, software, technology start-ups, publishers, engineers, intellectual property legislation, state employment agencies and so on, previously separated under industrial capitalism. In Freirian terms, tariff protections and artificial promotion are semi-transitive; from the perspectives of GATT, WTO, G8 and others, these are intransitive.

Africa remains mired in a mix of intransitive and semi-transitive thought and practice, from the high cost and inefficiencies of national carrier airlines, to the lack of affordable telecoms bandwidth. Proponents of protectionism contend that the transitive stage will have been achieved when protectionism becomes entrenched.

South African entrepreneur Mark Shuttleworth is a prime example of transitivity from an African base. Freire's transitive stage is exemplified in his popularization of science and technology education in South Africa through the [It's] *Hip2B²!* [3] and *Shuttleworth Foundation* [4] (TSF) initiatives, launched after his trip to the Space Station. Shuttleworth's ability to transcend semi-transitive thought arose from the realization of a single intangible and tradable product - the Thawte[5] digital certificate for secure Internet and Web transactions. Promotion of the idea that Africa can

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3 http://www.hip2b2.co.za/

4 http://www.shuttleworthfoundation.org/

5 http://www.thawte.com

compete globally is key. It is this ability to conceive and engage in the global information economy which is key to elimination of economic/digital divides.

Products emerging from Fordist methods under protectionist conditions are no longer competitive. This is cemented in the modernist notion of the uniformity and integrity (economic, political, cultural, cosmological) of the "nation-state", national versus global citizens, and cultures bounded by geographical considerations.

Freirian transitivity (individuals effecting change) is readily apparent in this transitive stage. An anti-essentialist, dynamic and networked definition of culture is required to critique bounded notions of ethnicity, language, temporal and spatially-specific formulations of identity impeding African development and governance. Crucially, Shuttleworth advocates promotion of competitiveness through popularization of science, education and development of self-esteem.

Global information age networks with local linkages contrast with traditional notions of linked, localized networks. Reaching the transitive stage requires consideration of the following shifting relationships between culture and economy.

- Few countries retain internal homogeneity in the post-modern world. Top-down paradigms of development ignore intercultural and interlinguistic natures of national populations. Local cultural specificities are jealously guarded as large tracts of the world join a single market via the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the World Trade Organization and other regulatory and policy vehicles.
- Different cultural formations found within and across geographical and national borders exhibit differing patterns and modes of communication and, from this, require different foundations of mobilization and development. Universalization of consumption does not equate cultural and ideological homogenization.
- New approaches to development studies internationally move towards serious emphasis on cultural rights, diversity and dialogue. (*Culturelink Special Issue*, 2002/2003)

Talk of culture leads into language, linguistics, orality, ontology, philosophy, education, religion, sociology, anthropology and power relations. Development issues cannot be studied from the confines of single disciplines or grand narratives. New Media and ICT offer opportunities for engaging international development agencies such as the World Bank in opposition to the imposition of inappropriate development projects.

Communication and culture are fundamental to development strategies. Projects fail in the field because development agencies and planners often ignore these crucial

dimensions. Agencies - particularly where state directed - tend to apply development projects to secure sectarian goals, usually at the expense of the intended beneficiaries.

Loci of control have both shifted and multiplied with the considerable help of ICT and New Media. Old global conglomerates, regional and international hegemonies are still extant, though with less authority than before. The shift in control referred to is dilution of these loci through the emergence of fast, globally accessible ICT and New Media applications - including, but not limited to, e-news services (online newspapers, push-news services and subscriber-controllable selection of news), online fora and the blurring of traditional web activities with mobile telephony. Nokia headlines the idea of a "culture of mobility" on its website[6] - with the emphasis on cellular devices seen as shifting from voice telephony to mobile anywhere, anything, anytime services. Cellular technology is positioned as embedded in consumer lifestyles - a strong Developed World perspective. Connectivity and mobility are usefully applied to Developing World environments as a means of abbreviating the paucity of communications infrastructure.

Many instances exist of old loci of control recognizing and attempting to achieve control of New Media and global information networks through commoditization, regulation and throttling of access. Anti-globalization movements simultaneously seek to position New Media and global information resources firmly in the public domain, keeping them as free of hegemonic interference as possible. South Africa has a history of "racial Fordism" (Marais, 1998) where a two-nations hegemony was maintained by the erstwhile apartheid government. Similarly, there exists a two-economy hegemony, maintained by the Developed World, which the Developing World must resist. And such resistance can only come from within, if it is to be at all meaningful. As Africans, we find this two-part hegemony reflected over many colonial interventions in our continent's past. We are duty-bound to resist the imposition of insidious and subtle variations of the same - distinguished only by attribute and not by ultimate effect.

Whose development? Whose media?

New Media integrates consumers into production, and selection permits the following variety of question, from the marginalized in the Kalahari desert periphery:

"What's all this Western-type development stuff?"
(Belinda Kruiper, in Dyll 2002)

Extending this leads to questions including:

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6   http://www.nokia.com

a) Are subjects able to recognize self and own experiences in proposed development narratives? How do media affect these?

b) Do narratives include experiences from below? How do subjects construct stories?

c) Is theory used strategically or mechanistically? Are engagements mindful of power relations, deceit, and manipulation? How do subjects manoeuvre themselves through development projects?

d) Is cultural negotiation elemental in development work? New Media has relevance in answering questions on how the local engages with the global. How do subjects voices get onto the global record?

Donor demands for precise measurement of outcomes often obscure the questions asked above. Development metrics tend to be biased in favour of interests and objectives of funders. Development NGOs tend to attempt quantification of that which is difficult to measure objectively - behaviour-change, creativity and success in linking local to global.

Development agencies need to be reminded that metrics and balances feed into strategies designed to bring about development. Cultural development and linkage cannot be measured by direct metrics. New Media facilitates a flavour of qualitative/quantitative measurement and assessment of development projects and outcomes. Metrics cannot easily or meaningfully encode the sensibility of development projects to intended beneficiaries. Narratives cannot be quantified in terms of structural adjustments and economic criteria.

Defining culture in hyper-reality

A definition of culture responding to the above imperatives would explain how networks:

- emerge historically;
- are socially and technologically constructed;
- are articulated and rearticulated through social institutions, social interaction and the media into social practices and distinct ways of making sense.

Crucially, New Media is taking on the mantle of cultural intermediary. Our definition of culture thus includes the following dimensions:

- Ways in which individuals as subjects of social practices and particular networks of meaning interpellate their behaviour into social action distinguish them from other kinds of interpretive communities. The latter might include cultural protectionists, essentializing discourses and claims of genetic/spiritual/racial difference. (*cf.* Tomaselli, 2003)

- Essentialism negates admission of shifting self-identities and networks in attempts to freeze romantic visions of "Africa" and "African values". Ideology constrains the ability to move laterally to engage and shape development trajectories which are considered culturally inappropriate.

Subjectivities of individuals in the post-modern world cannot be assumed to be static, stable or even predictable. The Subject/Object dichotomy of cartesian cosmology is bluntly overturned by the paradigm emerging from the mix of globalization, development and New Media. Transitive thought implies a state of continuous change, with the ability to create alternative meanings itself being a form of liberation not understood by Afrocentricists. Development becomes a way of connecting the local to the global and the global to the local in ways which benefit all parties.

Benefit, however, is squandered when African cultural intermediaries invoke theoretical literature on regulatory issues to additionally imply regulation of content, as well as notions of African morality, decency and virtue. (Kasoma, 1996; Moemaka and Kasoma, 1994; Okigbo, 1994) Intransitive thought leads to category confusion - between industry and channel regulation on the one hand, and morality on the other. It is underpinned with injunctions for institution of content barriers to "protect" Africans from allegedly insidious influences of so-called (Western) "foreign culture", "alien" genres of reporting (Kasoma, 2000: 85; Tomaselli, 2003) and to ensure that Africans as an essentially moral society "constantly strive to lead good lives so that their ethnic community can prosper". (Kasoma, 1996: xv) Embedded in this definitional conflation and essentialistic thinking is the reductive assumption that the 50+ African countries, and myriad cultures, religions and languages, can be prescriptively reduced to homogeneous sets of continent-wide social and cultural "African values". The cultural/regulatory logic, for example, finds expression as follows in Swaziland: "[our] culture" [African], authentic, besieged, defensive, bordered, national = [the King''s] authority, who is the sole **unimpeachable** custodian of African cultural values, the Final Authority/Law and embodiment of Right Reason. Communalism is the second problem. It is *a priori* assumed to be discursively hegemonic, legitimately censorious and above question. "Culture", subsists in myth, as that taken for granted to reside in culture, seen to be embodied in the position of the King as Authority/Law/God; it is an utterance without an utterer. Culture, known only by "us" becomes the Ultimate Arbiter. (Tomaselli, 2003) This kind of intransitive thinking imprisons Africans into a discursive box, possibly limiting the creative use of digital technology.

Out of the discursive dungeon

For the Developing World, the issue of spectrum scarcity - allocation of which remains largely controlled by governments - has been displaced by bandwidth demands of networked multimedia and New Media applications. Paradoxically, bandwidth is becoming exponentially less of a problem with respect to democratization of communication in the Developed World where efficiencies and low prices disadvantage the Developing World's low capacity, inadequate networks and high prices. Ownership and control is not limited to global players - local control is found in the shape of state-owned telecommunications interests. South Africa has Telkom, which, in the face of progressive deregulation, persists with artificial barriers to access.[7] Indeed, few Africans have access to New Media in any meaningful sense.

As Africans, we would do well to consider the power of innovative New Media and ICT applications. Indian successes and those of Silicon Valley, touched on earlier, are instances to use as inspiration. The Malaysian initiative (Accenture et al., 2001) and other instances of Developing World initiatives are indicative of the potential and necessity for Africa to be a leader, and not a follower in its own upliftment.

New Media and Freirian pedagogy meet in a space where reflection, exchange, interaction and radically altered temporal factors shrink the world.

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International Communication and Cooperation Through Visual Art

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Visual art and visual-verbal communication

We like to say that we live in a society which is based on visual culture. But this is an ill-founded and arbitrary assertion, which was created and is disseminated under the strong influence of the visual media, besieging us with news, advertisements and entertainment on a daily basis. It is a fact, that the Internet, computer and video games, TV, ads, entertainment and movies - inventions of the times we live in - are powerful, absorbing technologies. But they only create the illusion that all important messages are conveyed through pictures. Indeed, under the influence of the intimidating amount of pictures that we receive in this way, we have even changed the perception of the term "picture" in such a way, that today it mainly signifies a computer generated image. We thus seldom distinguish between, let us say, three types of picture: the plane, the spatial and the electronic picture, i.e. between the picture as a product of art and the visual message of social or commercial meaning. As often as not, this is also the merit of modern art itself, owing to its visual phenomena such as video, video installations, computer art, site-specific art, visual events in conceptual artworks, multimedia, etc. Thus, as Mie Buhl (2005) puts it: "At present, it is difficult to distinguish art from, for example, social or commercial projects. In fact, it is possible to argue that the reflexive form of communication evident in many commercials has emerged from art. This reflexive form of communication is part of a late modern visuality that can be seen everywhere, including television news and documentaries."

We live at a time of universal haste or, as Christa Maar and Hubert Burda state in their book *Iconic Turn* (2005), in "accelerated times" that shorten spatial distances, in times of the domination of commercial culture. This is a culture which uses visual language for announcement, propaganda, advertisement, persuasion, and communication at the service of, and solely for the purpose of transmitting

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information following the dictates of, business practices. Media institutions shape the public taste according to a system of economic values. A symbolic environment has been created, in which communication technologies have widened the use of the picture in such a way, that the visual language transports messages only as a substitute for the verbal language, at the service of some state ideology or market economy. The advantage of these media lies in the high rate of data compression they achieve, allowing the transfer of large amounts of data through a simple phrase, picture or shape. So this markedly commercial culture uses the picture for a quicker and easier transfer of messages which would be much more complicated in the spoken/written language.

But this transmission of information does not imply a system of symbols by which a true dialogue might be established between the sender of the message and the public. It is thus irrelevant to talk of the visual culture as a cultural paradigm and of a wide use of a visual instead of a verbal language, only because an increased number of messages is being conveyed in the form of a picture.

On the contrary, we are still very much a verbal culture, as words and numbers form the basis of our communication. The language we use when analyzing, describing, replying and communicating is a verbal one. Visual thought is always translated into verbal language in order to be broadly understood. Even when we succeed in recalling consciously that the cognitive process starts with visual forms, we always talk and theorize, to finally come to the understanding of those forms via mental constructs. We owe this type of "phono-logo-centrism" (a term coined by Chris Jenks, 2005) to an understanding of culture based on the Cartesian idea of the "mental substance" and Locke's conception of the "mental process", which in its essence is rationalistic and never intuitive. In other words, we understand that the image is a fact, but we attach more importance to the thought as a logical picture of the fact. We will, for example, say "do you see" or "see what I mean", though we do not at all mean seeing but rather thinking. In the social discourse of the Western European culture, the system of non-verbal signs is still neglected, especially the visual signs which the visual arts are based on, though they form a way of communication as essential as the way of communication embodied in the verbal-auditory language. This is a trait of Western culture, which expanded with the emergence of rationalism in the 18th century; the rationalists held the opinion that humanity in its intellectual development has transcended the symbol and that logical cognition was more valuable than any other cognition, thus holding the idea to be more valuable than the image.

We stand today before the task of conceiving and evaluating the power of the symbolic way of thinking, and of defending the return and spread of it. We must face

the fact, that any valid social integration requires the full development of both systems of communication: the verbal and the visual one.

In order to be able to accept this as a fact, we must first understand that the language of art is a symbolic language, and that visual art is capable of transporting information or evaluating a situation with the same precision as the verbal description of a situation. Music can also convey information about some situation or a mood. We must understand that art is a cognitive activity, that it is not merely a decoration or reinforcement of the linguistic type of discourse. Art is not even a substratum for this type of discourse, it is a unique type of speech, which gives access to realms of knowledge out of reach to other types of discourse.

Few are those who understand the role of art in this way. This only seems logical, taking into account that the visual language has always been a great rival of the verbal-auditory language, and that the gulf between the picture and the word is one of the fundamental contradictions of our culture. Why do we feel this urge to think of the relationship between words and pictures in political terms, as a fight for territory, or a contest of opposing ideologies? Why is our entire civilization based on the assumption that the scientific, legal, technological, political, moral, religious and all other forms of discourse are not only appropriate, but are also exclusively suitable for the acquisition of knowledge and the revelation of truth? A simple answer to this question was given by W. J. T. Mitchell (1986) in his book *Iconology: Image, Text and Ideology*: "The relationship between words and images reflects, within the realm of representation, signification, and communication, the relations we posit between symbols and the world, signs and their meanings. We imagine the gulf between words and images to be as wide as the one between words and things, between (in the largest sense) culture and nature. The image is the sign that pretends not to be a sign, masquerading as (or, for the believer, actually achieving) natural immediacy and presence. The word is its 'other', the artificial, arbitrary production of human will that disrupts natural presence by introducing unnatural elements into the world – time, consciousness, history, and the alienating intervention of symbolic mediation." This further implies that culture is a form of mediation that makes possible the distancing from nature and the control of natural phenomena, and that is supported by the rationalistic view of the world. At the same time, this view fosters the development of science, for which we claim to be the only thing leading us to the truth. Visual communication and visual thinking are, even in today's era, still under pressure from the scientific approach or rather from the ideology of scientism. Scientism is not the professional practice of genuine scientists, but rather a naive and popular approach that attributes the split truth to the infrastructure of technicism which surrounds us and upon which the economy is developing. To those who still believe that the truth is everything to some (scientists) and nothing to others (artists), Nelson Goodman (1976) replies in his book *Languages of Art*: "If we speak of hypotheses but not works

of art as true, that is because we reserve the terms 'true' and 'false' for symbols in sentential form. I do not say this difference is negligible, but it is specific rather than generic, a difference in field of application rather than in formula, and marks no schism between the scientific and the aesthetic." We all notice that even today scientific literature oftentimes lacks illustrations, and that many highly educated persons are 'visually illiterate' because they belong to a generation whose education consisted of reading texts. Peter Burke (2003) states that historians still do not take graphic evidence, e.g. photographic archives, seriously enough, but rather depend on texts, political and economic facts. He also points out that in the United Kingdom the first illustrated scholarly articles started to appear only in the late 1970's, slowly growing in number since that time. The question arises whether this was only due to a poor education in the usage of the image, or whether it was due to a fear that visuality might destroy literacy, a fear of losing/dislodging the written word. This may well be considered the reason behind the resistance to the image. Of course, numerous other reasons exist for giving the verbal language such importance. Seen historically, this is a language that serves not only communication purposes – it served and still serves cultural and political goals, for example. Its role was especially significant at the time of the establishment of national states in 19th-century Europe. Language is considered the single most important element of a country's cultural identity. For this reason, until present day European states have kept in their elementary schools' educational programmes one third of the total schedule for the study of the mother tongue, in spite of the fact that Europe is integrating and slowly removing borders between national states. As Diana Crane (1994) states: "Language is the fundamental human mass medium. It is the mass medium through which all other media speak. No other medium is so deeply rooted, so emotionally fraught, so insistently the basis for political aspirations, or so much an impediment to the efforts of states to use modern media for hegemonic control."

Speaking of political aspirations, there is no better proof that verbal language unites people, but also divides them, than the recent wars of former Yugoslavia. Language as an element of cultural identity around which nations homogenize at times of conflict became such an important issue, that ardent discussions were led around it on all sides. But the result was the same everywhere: one insisted on linguistic purism and on differences at all cost, in order to facilitate and speed up the closure of the borders around the newly established states.

This phenomenon is, of course, an anachronism of sorts, especially taking into account the fact that in Europe we all have our roots in the same Indo-European family of peoples. And while the history of symbols speaks of a common archetypal imaginarium, linguistic variation and differences among today's peoples were born much later, but live on until the present day. We are, unfortunately, not aware that verbal language can present a barrier. On the contrary, today we feel that the

processes of globalization have stimulated a global communication, and that national language barriers have been torn down, at the same time overseeing the fact that the English language appears as the dominant means of understanding because, in its essence, it best corresponds to the technicist nature, the market economy and politics of the West. This language proved practical in communication on the international level, primarily owing to the use of electronic media and to political and economic integration. What, then, about the language of understanding between different cultures in contact?

When speaking about verbal and visual language, we are undoubtedly considering two different forms of communication. The point is not to bridge the gulf between the word and the image, but rather to define the realms of interest and power they each possess. The power of the image is truly great. We are becoming increasingly aware of this since we live in a digital era, dominated by images and visual communication. Herein lies the paradox – on the one hand we have a need for visual language in our daily communication, and on the other one, we remain focused on verbal and written communication. Everything indicates that we are trying to bridge this gulf, but the problem of our technical skill is getting in our way, that is the insufficiency of our competence in making use of the image, in reading the visual sign and expressing ourselves through it. And while modern society is increasingly relying on visual components, inclining towards a real explosion of visual symbols, the visual literacy has not been systematically developed and is still at a rather low level. We thus experience the somewhat strange situation that culture is becoming increasingly visual in character, though, at the same time, the significance of visual arts is not on the rise. The other, much more serious problem is that we do not understand art as a symbolic language, which in its form of manifestation unveils hidden reality. A time in which photography, film, television and painting take such a significant place, undoubtedly calls for semiotics which will not neglect the visual sign.

Communicative success of visual art

In the Statutes of the International Society for Education through Art (InSEA) we find the statement that "Creative activity is a basic need common to all people, and Art is one of human kind's highest forms of expression and communication." This fully corresponds to the thesis of this paper that international cooperation mobilizes all forms of communication, especially those that include components familiar to all people. Art is, by its nature, a universal language. It is a symbolic language people have used for centuries, regardless of which culture they belonged to. It is characterized by simple conventions that people have always employed to express what could not be expressed in any other way, and especially what could not be uttered. Symbolism is an instrument of knowledge and the oldest fundamental

method of research, which, as such, uncovers aspects of reality that escape other forms of expression. Not only is symbolism international, it is also present throughout history – its value lies in the fact that it expressed in simple terms the thoughts and aspirations of a given community through the centuries.

Visual art uses the language of the image that is comprehensible to all, and thus it is singular. It can not be compared to English, Arab or Chinese. In his book *Languages of Art*, Nelson Goodman (1976) states: "What we know through art is felt in our bones and nerves and muscles as well as grasped by our minds... All the sensitivity and responsiveness of the organism participates in the invention and interpretation of symbols".

The great theoretician John Dewey shared this opinion, stating, as early as 1934, in his book *Art as Experience* that art is "the best possible window into another culture", having primarily the communicological value of art in mind, which springs from the fact that "*au fond*, the aesthetic quality is the same for Greeks, Chinese, Americans." The aesthetic experience as a form of direct understanding, stripped of words, is immanent to all people, without exception.

Though a work of art / picture must never be seen solely as a communicational structure, an artwork still, undoubtedly, is at the same time a message that transfers the living experience of a community in the most direct way, a way that is also understandable to any other community. This directness is best described by the old Chinese proverb: "a picture says more than a thousand words". As contemporary scientific research (perceptual psychology) shows, the psychological effects of colours and forms on people are essentially the same, regardless of their cultural identity. Scientists exploring the functioning of perspective in painting are reaching the same conclusion. The aesthetic experience is a generic essence of man and is equally distributed among all people.

Art is such a diverse and flexible medium that it serves the transmission of a large number of basic scientific principles among people of different ages and origins. Art facilitates the transmission of complex ideas in an acceptable and culturally relevant way. Art and science have a symbiotic relation. Observation, knowledge, memory, expectation, imagination, etc. - they all can be induced through pictures, possibly even more radically than through words. The observation of pictures and the creation of images are already happening for some twenty or thirty thousand years of the human era, and this achievement is immanent to man. The advantages of expression through pictures can briefly be described in words as follows: those who create pictures can stimulate the consciousness of others with what they themselves have seen or observed, what they remember, what they expect or imagine, and they do this without any conversion of this information into a different form. While description translates optical data into words, presentation through pictures catches and exhibits

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them in an optical sequence, in which they may be more or less equal to the direct perception. The picture gives us some sort of information, rich and complex, about our natural environment, which words cannot give us. Moreover, pictures do not turn our experience into stereotypes. The visual language is universal, and we can learn from pictures with less effort than needed when learning through words. Man draws since primeval times. Every one of us can draw, even those who have not learned to read or write. Drawing has always been the elementary form of pictorial expression.

But the picture does not only represent information about the environment, it is also a recording. Pictures are like writings, the same observer may observe them repeatedly, but they may also be observed by several observers simultaneously. This means that they render communication possible, including communication among generations. Arts museums are like libraries – archives of knowledge, allowing for the accumulation of knowledge.

We are, unfortunately, still not fully aware of the communicational powers the picture possesses. We mostly experience art as a nice, undefined decoration of our lives, one which is pretty but dispensable. This myth is supported by the European opinion that art is a thing of the past, something we take pride in as part of our common culture. In the United States, on the other hand, as Wendy Richmond (2001) states, the role of art is marginalized:

1. "Works of art have no productive function in our [American] economy.

2. Art is politically dangerous.

3. Contemporary art is too difficult to understand."

If, however, the integrational processes in culture continue to spread internationally, as they have started to, we ought to expect that the need will arise for the development of a language which will lead to a faster and simpler understanding of people originating from different cultures. Indications pointing in this direction already exist. The need to rely on forms of communication which do not depend on high technologies, arises from the fact, as Niklas Luhmann (1990) puts it, that, in a society overburdened by an enormous amount of information, we must establish systems of communication which will help us to reduce unpredictability. We seem to increasingly rely on primitive forms of social contact, for example on oral tradition and non-verbal forms of communication. The number of non-verbal theatres arising from the need for non-verbal communication is growing. The advantages of such communication lie in the fact that it allows us to quickly understand the intentions and traits of other persons from their feelings, moods and emotions expressed through non-verbal signs, such as facial expression, eye contact - look, body posture and movement.

Finally, the cultural cooperation which we are aiming for requires a clear strategic plan that will strengthen cooperation through visual communication in the field of art and other forms of non-verbal communication. Through art, a highly productive form of international cooperation could be established.

Art as a form of expression

Considering visual art in the world today, from the aspect of what it is telling us as well as from the aspect of its role in communication, we notice that it presents itself as the creator of the universal form of visual speech about universal themes, universalities, which makes it similar to philosophy or even turns it into philosophy. Art is not interested only in communication as such, we could rather say that an inherent part of art today is the search for a new universality, the aspiration to discover what we call the *sensus communis* of the meaning of the world we live in. Contemporary art usually transcends the specific reality, as the environment which it is emerging from, through a symbolic language, unveiling to us what we all have in common. At the same time expressing some sort of ethical dimension, that refers more to the future than to the past and the present, contemporary art is more prospective than retrospective. In this way, it often draws attention to global problems and to the conflict inherent to human existence, the fundamental opposition of good and bad, truth and delusion, beauty and ugliness, the conflict that sets our lives in motion. While the scientist, searching for the empirical cognition, may be allowed to ignore this conflict owing to the risk that it may include value judgements, the artist cannot evade it. In this sense, art has always been tied to the destiny of the world, be it the antique or the present one.

One of the more important roles of art, one in which it is irreplaceable, is the one it plays in the organization of emotion – it registers feelings in all its special meanings, giving structure and refinement, as well as direction to the inner life of its contemporaries. The assignment of the artist today is to penetrate into the yet unseen realms of biological functions, to explore the new dimensions of post-industrial society and to translate new discoveries into emotional orientation. Consciously and unconsciously, the artist solves many of the problems arising from the distorted and chaotic complexity of daily life, and ties them into an emotional structure of great significance. This talent is an exceptional gift, based on the powers of intuition and insight, of thinking and knowledge, and on the immanent responsibility towards the biological and social laws which stimulate reinterpretation in every civilization. This power of cognition is also present in other creative fields, following the same hopes, searching for the same meanings, though the contents of their works differ.

When speaking of the social sensibility of the artist and the social character of art, we may not forget that, not infrequently, in difficult times it was precisely art that was the conscience of humanity. Let us take surrealism and the way this artistic movement opposed "unacceptable human behaviour" as an example. In the case of Otto Dix' paintings of trench warfare, his aesthetic transmutation of death and destruction, turned into a supernaturally beautiful image, offers us a very particular critical view of the scene, and raises our awareness more efficiently than any newspaper report. These aesthetically brilliant paintings kindle in us stronger unpleasant feelings than any photograph ever could. A photograph shows destructive scenes, but Dix' picture not only shows destruction, it connects us with it in complex dialectics of identification and disidentification – a shocking connection and a decisive distancing. This image holds the truth of the world, and the way in which it is shown saves the soul and creates a cathartic effect.

Not only this case, but many other examples prove that the message transmitted through the picture will create a higher degree of identification and empathy than any other message.

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Cultural Networks in Virtual Sphere - Between Infrastructure and Communities

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Cultural networks – real and virtual

In recent years networks have become a focus of attention in different fields. According to research in various disciplines - from mathematics to biology and social sciences - the network seems to be the broad organization structure. In the extensive literature on the so-called network society or information society, networks are described to be its basic organizational form. Many existing social, technical or biological phenomena are recognized to have a network structure but definitions vary from field to field. It is especially recognized in ICT applications, where network structure seems to be the element that has changed the logic of our everyday work, so that ICT networks have become one of the most prominent social phenomena of our times. The ICT networking environment has enabled the development of many online resources and the cultural sector went virtual a decade ago. But before that happened, cultural networks were already recognized phenomena that have been facilitating international cultural cooperation over the past two decades.

In the 1990s cultural networks became a popular organizational infrastructure in the cultural sector in Europe. In the discussion paper on "Evaluation Criteria for Cultural Networks in Europe" networks have been referred at as a "communication infrastructure for European cultural cooperation" (DeVlieg, 2001). In their evaluation of existing European cultural networks, Minichbauer and Mitterdorfer define the term "cultural network" as "a structure and work method characterized by non-hierarchical, horizontal cooperation, a transnational orientation, establishment by the grass roots, a non-representational character, diversity and the absence of the powerful central forces". (Minichbauer and Mitterdorfer, 2000) They consider that minimum requirements for cultural networks are that they are designed for long-term cooperation, the existence of a common goal, the existence of members, and their physical meetings. Different authors also add to these minimum requirements: loosely defined network borders, voluntary participation of members and a structure

that can continue functioning if a particular member decides to leave network (see studies done by Simon Mundy, Judith Staines, Gudrun Pehn).

The reason for the popularity of networks as a cultural cooperation infrastructure can be found in the fact that they try to enable flexible ways of cooperation, they try to solve concrete problems that members are facing, they bring together people in common pursuit of an interest, that through them existing institutions can be bonded together around common projects, and they provide efficient communication channels for their members.

Communication is an important aspect of a network's success. The reliability of information received through the network channels and the possibility to communicate with fellow members are crucial for the efficient functioning of networks. In the situation of information overflow it is not necessarily easy to communicate one's information through existing public channels, and networks and their focus towards particular themes or types of members enable efficient filtering mechanisms that enable members to access relevant and reliable information. Quick and simple online communication can enhance communication and exchange of information among network members. The new information technology paradigm, as an underpinning material base of information/networked society that Castells describes, has enabled the spread of network models and virtual networks in particular. Its main elements - information as its basic element or raw material, networking logic, flexibility - are also basic characteristics of cultural networks, and many existing cultural networks have gone virtual in order to increase the effectiveness of their functioning.

As the Internet has become a basic information infrastructure in all developed countries, so different virtual networks and portals have become a part of the virtual landscape in the cultural sector. There is a difference between the two terms. Looking at some existing virtual networks in the cultural field we can see that they have started from an existing members' base (existing community) of real cultural networks and have then extended their activities in the virtual domain, while cultural portals started with objectives of providing infrastructure to cultural organizations and end users that first must be motivated to cooperate. But, in most cases, these virtual structures are trying to balance a technological base with communication and information elements, trying to provide to their members, and/or potential users the services that they need.

Cultural networks, as well as communication networks, enable access to their members/users, and combining them into virtual networks is an attempt to provide structure for professional virtual communities in the cultural sector. When existing cultural networks create their virtual versions it could be somewhat easier to build virtual communities, but if an attempt is made to build from scratch, the process is a

bit more difficult, as the motivation and trust that exists among network members has to be built from scratch as well. Numerous discussion forums, mailing lists, and specialized portals are created with such aims. Their effectiveness depends on members' interest and motivation as well as on their goals and its underlying networking structure. Today we are witnessing a proliferation of numerous cultural portals and one question is - can we consider them to be virtual networks, in the sense described above, i.e. as a structure supporting cultural cooperation?

In other words, we could ask ourselves the same question that Eugene Tacher posed: are we connected because we are collective, or are we collective because we are connected? (Tacher, 2004)

Despite the given definitions for cultural networks it seems that the term "network" has different meanings and when we switch from cultural network (community) to ICT network (infrastructure) we are talking about different kinds of networks. Their characteristics are not the same, but their differences are sometimes blurred with different uses of the term "network" in terminology related to the network society.

Back to the network's basics

What is a network? - from the social science field here come some definitions and observations:

"Networks embody a set of fundamental principles for the ordering, distribution and coordination of different components, whether chemical, natural, social or digital". (Network Logic, 2004: 12)

"…networks provide a 'platform' for coordinating highly diverse activities, many of which are not predicted in advance". (Network Logic, 2004: 17)

Or as Fritjof Capra observes, social networks are networks of communications. (Network Logic, 2004: 29)

A different, more basic and structural definition of network phenomena comes from a graph theory.

"A network is a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point at which a curve intersects itself". (Castells, 1996: 470)

This basic definition of network that Castells uses comes from a graph theory that views a network as a graph structure consisting of nodes (vertices) and ties (edges) - nodes being individual actors within networks and ties being relationships or links between actors.[1] What a node is depends on a concrete case of a network. Ties or links

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1   "A network is a set of items, which we will call vertices or sometimes nodes, with connections between them called edges" (Newman, 2003).

in particular networks can be directed or undirected, meaning the particular relation can go one way or two ways.

Physicists and mathematicians have studied network structures as an abstract system (random graphs) but they have also studied different real world networks and their characteristics and structures. Newman distinguishes between four loose categories of real world networks: social networks, information networks, technological networks and biological networks. (Newman, 2003)

- A social network is a set of people or groups of people with some pattern of contact or interrelations between them (e.g. the patterns of friendships between individuals, business relationships between companies, sexual contacts, or different kinds of collaboration networks). A particular type of social network is an affiliation network in which participants collaborate in groups of one kind or another, and links between pairs of individuals are established by common group membership.
- Information networks - in this category Newman places networks of citations between academic papers (the node here being a particular paper and the ties being citations of other authors in the mentioned paper) and the WWW - a network of web pages containing information, linked together by hyperlinks from one page to another.
- Technological networks are man-made networks designed for distribution of some commodity or resource (e.g. an electricity power grid, a network of roads, or the Internet, which is a physical network of computers linked together by optic fibre and other data connections for distribution of information).
- A number of biological systems can be represented as networks, e.g., a network of metabolic pathways, genetic regulatory networks, neural networks, food web, etc.

These four categories describe different real world networks that, according to Newman, unlike random graphs, "…suggest both possible mechanisms that could be guiding network formation, and possible ways in which we could exploit network structure to achieve certain aims" (Newman, 2003: 9). From Newman's detailed article on the structure and function of complex networks, where he reviews extensive empirical studies of networks, I have summarized some basic characteristics that network researchers have observed in real world networks through research - mapping, and measuring of concrete network examples:

A small-world effect has been discovered in a famous experiment done in the 1960s by Stanly Milgram in which letters passed from person to person were able to reach the designated target individual in only a small number of steps (six steps). This effect has been observed in a large number of different networks. The small-world effect has implications for the dynamic processes taking place in real world networks,

e.g. the speed of spreading information across the network, etc. It is the shortest path through the network (or network diameter).

Clustering (transitivity) - a clustering coefficient is the probability that two nearest neighbours of a particular node are also nearest neighbours of one another, e.g. a friend of your friend is likely also to be your friend.

Connectivity (degree) is a total number of ties of a particular node (number of nearest neighbours). Again, studies of different real world networks showed that in real world networks connectivity of particular nodes differs in scale as it often follows power law that leads sometimes to the so-called **scale-free networks** (many communication and social networks have power-law link distributions, containing a few nodes that have a very high degree and many with a low degree of connectivity). An example of power law, i.e. a scale-free network, was recorded in citation networks, the WWW, the Internet, metabolic networks, telephone call graphs, human sexual contacts, collaboration networks, etc.

Mixing patterns - **assortative mixing** seems to be a common phenomenon in social networks where it was observed that people tend to associate themselves preferentially with people who are similar to themselves in some way. This can lead to a "**community structure**" in social networks meaning groups of nodes having a high density of ties within them and with a lower density of ties between groups (Newman, 2003). Such networks are also called stratified networks.

Network navigation - in social networks people can find the shortest path through the network (a small-world effect) - Newman finds this fact surprising and observes that this would not have happened in random graphs. He concludes that "if it were possible to construct artificial networks that were easy to navigate in the same way social networks appear to be, it has been suggested they could be used to build efficient database structures or better peer-to-peer computer networks", and this is exactly what I find interesting when looking into the phenomena of virtual cultural networks.

Networks are not unchangeable structures, and observations of examples of real world networks showed that different *dynamic processes* are taking place in the networks. Networks grow by the gradual addition of nodes and ties and the growth process in fact leads to the specific structural features of particular networks, e.g. scale-free networks that follow power-law distributions (when the amount you get goes up with the amount you already have - the rich get richer rule), a rule also known as cumulative advantage or preferential attachment. An example of a scale-free network can be observed in a network of citation where e.g. "the probability that one comes across a particular paper whilst reading the literature will presumably increase with the number of other papers that cite it, and hence the probability that you cite it

yourself in a paper that you write will increase similarly". (Newman, 2003: 30) Newman reports that the same principle is noticed in the WWW or different collaboration networks.

Another related process observed to be taking place in networks was network resilience to the deletition of some nodes or links. Networks having power-law distribution were observed to be robust to the random removal of nodes, but if in such a network a node with high connectivity was removed this would greatly impact the functioning of such a network. The WWW network and the Internet, for example, are robust decentralized networks but if a node with a high connectivity ceased functioning it would affect its functioning much more than any randomly chosen node with a low connectivity degree. This fact makes scale-free networks vulnerable to targeted attacks.

Network search is another process taking place in networks which has an impact on many practical applications. This issue becomes relevant in very large networks such as the WWW, as it affects how effectively we can communicate or get the relevant information. It has been observed that relevant information is contained in the web pages (nodes) as well as in the corresponding hyperlinks (ties), since both have been created by people that wanted to highlight the content of related pages. When searching a large network such as the WWW one can opt for exhaustive search techniques (used by big search engines) or guided searches that search for specialized content by searching only a small part of a network, but doing it intelligently in a way that deliberately seeks the nodes that are most likely to contain relevant information and presuming that pages containing information on a particular topic will be clustered together. Research on searches in social networks also suggests that people navigate social networks by looking for common features between their acquaintances and the target (e.g. those belonging to a certain group - location, occupation, etc.). As such groups can be part of larger groups this can be pictured as a tree structure that defines a social distance between two people (i.e. how many steps up the tree structure one must go to find a common ancestor).

This short excursion into network theory research shows us that real-world networks are in fact not random structures and that concrete models of different networks should be identified that could be used to analyse cultural networks and portals as well.

Networking and communicational meta-structure models

When looking into structures of different kinds of networks, we can see how they differ from each other. Many observed real-world networks are, in fact, informal structures that can be recognized as networks and not a registered entity called

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network (Figure 1). An example given below is a structure of a collaboration network and is taken from Dorogovtsev's and Mendes' article on "Evolution of Networks" (2001).

Figure 1 (Source: Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2001)

The structure in Figure 1 marked as a) shows two different kinds of nodes - black nodes representing collaboration actors and white nodes collaboration acts. This means that actors collaborating are doing this through common collaboration acts e.g., common projects that they are undertaking. But most commonly the collaboration network would be represented in a more simple but less informative way where collaborators would be directly connected by links without indicating acts of collaboration (as in example b).

As a special case of social networks Newman mentions affiliation networks and in that category we can place the cultural networks that we have described at the beginning of this paper. They usually seem to have two structural forms. The model below (Figure 2) presents the networking model of affiliation networks where the network secretariat just facilitates members' joint activities and cooperation projects (as is the case with previously described cultural networks). The secretariat facilitates information exchange but also provides infrastructure support for the realization of joint projects. The secretariat can be viewed as a node with a high connectivity degree in the network and thus a common point that can in fact produce a small world effect as all other nodes are connected to this one.

Figure 2 (Source: Starkey, 1999)

Cultural networks and their virtual versions are networks, whose members are communicating through Internet infrastructure, but they have common aims and activities and they collaborate on particular joint projects. They may be networking in real life (meetings, conferences) and the Internet may be just a means of communication for them. For them, the aim is to achieve more than information

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exchange. In fact a cultural network advantage is that the information exchange is already present, as members are motivated to communicate among themselves (or with a network secretariat), and this facilitates networking, resulting in joint projects (research, conferences, exhibitions, etc.). In order to be a community and not just an infrastructure, a virtual network should be about communicating and common aims, and not just about access to information. Here the starting base is an existing community (a group of people networking) that is collaborating and sharing knowledge and for them a secretariat or a virtual resource point of that network serves as an artificial shortest path to necessary information (a high connectivity node). But information exchanged through the network serves as a starting point for new joint projects that really connect the members.

The second model (Figure 3), a decentralized networking model, can be recognized in some existing cultural networks, where, for example, different national networks interact with each other and in which secretariat responsibilities can be delegated and rotated after a period of time. It is a model that can be recognized in networks such as ITI, ASSITEJ, etc.

Figure 3 (Source: Starkey, 1999)

What we should keep in mind when looking at these networking structures is that in fact they all fit into version b) of Figure 1, i.e. even though the collaboration acts are not explicitly shown in these schematic models, they are implicit.

Previously, Newman has differentiated between social networks (such as the examples given above of collaboration networks and affiliation networks), information networks (such as the WWW) and technical networks in which he also included the Internet. The Internet as a network of interconnected computers is an extremely useful infrastructure for a communication network. It is in fact a network of wires and hardware that gives us access to another related network of information (i.e. the WWW) and it enables us to network via emails or other peer-to-peer services, etc. Its connections are undirected and traffic that goes through it changes all the time. The Internet is a physical network with geographical coordinates. It interconnects all of its nodes and it grows constantly in both aspects - nodes and links. We could represent its schematic structure (Figure 4) with a network model in which all nodes in it are interconnected - directly or indirectly.

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Figure 4 (Source: Starkey, 1999)

As an underlying infrastructure of the WWW network (information network) and other peer-to-peer services, we see that through the Internet everything is potentially accessible. It is often said that because of the network structure of the Internet and the WWW we are only a click away from a desired information or a document. Still this does not mean that information or web pages can be easily found by targeted users. As Eszter Hargittai informs us "information abundance still leaves the problem of attention scarcity" and the fact that something is available online does not mean that it is really accessible, i.e. easily reachable (Hargittai, 2000: 2). As previously mentioned, the WWW is a scale-free network, meaning that a few nodes are highly connected and many nodes have a much lower degree of connectivity (Figure 5). What this means in fact is that if one finds such a highly connected node it will allow one to find many other relevant nodes (information) much more efficiently, as often such relevant nodes in a certain thematic area are clustered around portals that serve as users' "shortcuts" to relevant web pages in the particular thematic area as well as a billboard for syndicated news in the field. The pictures below illustrate this.

Figure 5 (Source: Wikipedia, scale-free networks)


(a) Random network   (b) Scale-free network

So, to get the information, one can search for it through search engines, browse through web pages using hyperlinks, or access some relevant portals in a particular area of interest. Strategies for attention getting and filtering are important elements in developing any e-culture service. Online search engines, e-newsletters, specialized portals and virtual networks are existing mechanisms through which users are receiving information that are of their interest. They are considered important due to their attempt to introduce a "quality control" of available information, i.e. to channel relevant information only. Today, in addition to search

engines, different cultural portals are the main gateways between creators and consumers of cultural products available on the Internet/WWW network.

When looking at the level of nodes in the WWW network, we see that most web pages could be described as having a communication/networking structure like this (Figure 6).

Figure 6 (Source: Starkey, 1999)

This picture illustrates the underlying logic of the numerous websites and portals aimed at general audience. They provide information on the webpage and give links to some additional web pages, but their communication logic towards users is that of an information dissemination service. According to Paul Starkey (1999) this model does not seem to be a real network, but, as we already said, a service for information dissemination, since it does not provide for reciprocity of communication - from end users to the "network" secretariat/centre or in this case website (content is being produced by the portal team and not by users). Such a communication model we could describe as a broadcasting model. This networking model does not prompt users for participation in sharing content, but just in using it.

Another communicational model that is often found in portals targeted at professional communities is the one where members/users are all communicating with the portal's secretariat, but they do not network with other users/members through the portal (Figure 7). This is not a real cooperation but information exchange that is channelled through a portal's web services and newsletter. Such portals aim to get relevant information from users and then publish it online.

Figure 7 (Source: Starkey, 1999)

The described models represent a communicational meta-structure and not some physical structure, which means that a portal can get information from its users by simple emails but it has to have specific services or channels through which it will disseminate it. Both website models have provided users of a portal with the possibility for connecting, but, still, these models do not really provide structural possibilities for forming virtual communities, i.e. transforming users into a

community or "a collective", since its main purpose is informing users of relevant news through established information services.

A portal being a node in the WWW network (and at the same time a specialized subnetwork) fits into the category of information network that people are trying to navigate through in search of a particular content. The definition tells us that cultural portals or gateways are defined as centrally coordinated web-based gateways, which offer access to accredited websites, with limited original content or other resources available at the gateway site (Digicult Report, 2002: 56). By facilitating access to the existing sites of interest and providing some additional structural resources or other services that do not exist elsewhere, portals contribute to the organizational enhancement of a particular field. In addition to numerous links leading to other sites, a portal also informs on news and announcements happening in the field and it must take into account where it gets the information from that it presents through the portal and for whom it is intended. Sometimes portals describe themselves as a network, but it would be more correct to think of a portal as a node in a network with a high connectivity degree, thus enabling users to find short-cuts to a resource or a type of resource he/she is looking for. So, in addition to structural pointing to other sites (a signpost or a map function), in order to be effective, a professional portal must be an information digest (a resource), bringing to users' attention relevant news. However, in all its aspects it is an information infrastructure and it is hard to see it as a community.

Concluding remarks

The described networking structures showed us that there is a big difference between infrastructure and community. The Internet and the WWW are giving us a necessary information and communication infrastructure for our work but if we would like to achieve building collaboration networks in the virtual sphere, such as previously described cultural networks, we must understand what makes them a community. In order to transform a portal's networking model towards the model of the previously described cultural networks (a platform for cultural cooperation), a portal should be able to generate genuine cooperation among some of its members as a result of its own activities. It seems that acts of collaboration are the real glue of a collaboration network.

It is clear that the cultural networks that were described above rely on more than just the networked information infrastructure; they have a common goal, common projects and members that are participating voluntarily. They are not only a structure, but as the definition stresses, a work-method as well.[2] It is important to keep in mind

2 See Minichbauer and Mitterdorfer definition of cultural network at the beginning of this article.

that different networking structures that were described in this paper have an important effect on what kind of network will be built - the one that is simply connecting users to a certain resource, or the one that is building a kind of "collective" or community. It is clear that by providing services that would correspond to the information dissemination model, one cannot hope to achieve building a model that corresponds to cooperative cultural networks.

Today the discussion is going on in Europe on how to ensure better coordination and cooperation among the existing cultural networks and portals in the virtual sphere. The Internet seems to be a good media for sharing but we still have not learned how to achieve an efficient networked collaboration on the Internet. So far online joint collaborations are not very evident. There is much talk about joint collaboration while everybody is busy doing their own virtual projects. This question of how to efficiently cooperate among different virtual projects still remains without a definite answer, but being aware of the underlying networking structures of different existing virtual structures that are attempting to cooperate might help in building some sustainable cooperative networking structures in the future.

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Les réseaux culturels: outils efficaces de coopération ou dégâts interculturels collatéraux?

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Nous sommes une petite fondation qui s'appelle Fondation Hicter pour la Démocratie Culturelle. Les mots, à ce niveau, sont très importants; ils ne sont pas neutres. Cela signifie un engagement politico-culturel. Nous étions venus à Zagreb il y a dix ans, et à l'issue de cette période, nous pouvons faire une évaluation de l'impact des réseaux. Globalement, il est très positif. Pourquoi? Parce que, dans un secteur fragile dont les opérateurs sont en général assez isolés, c'est un endroit où ils peuvent se rencontrer et voir leur réalité à travers les yeux des autres. Ils peuvent donc bénéficier de ce nécessaire décalage quant à leur propre situation. Il s'agit de quelque chose d'extrêmement important et c'est grâce aux réseaux que cela peut se réaliser. Le deuxième apport des réseaux culturels consiste en ce qu'ils ont plongé les opérateurs dans un bain interculturel, bon gré mal gré. Evidemment, il se trouve toujours quelques personnes qui viennent dans les réseaux et restent avec les collègues de leur pays, mais en général ce qui est intéressant, c'est ce grand mélange, ce bain où l'on devient interculturel par la force des choses. C'est une sorte de virus qu'on attrape et cela s'avère vraiment très utile. Le troisième élément essentiel quant à l'apport des réseaux dans le monde culturel, est la possibilité d'y initier des coopérations. Il s'agit d'un endroit où l'on peut trouver des partenaires potentiels. En termes de coopération culturelle, un outil formidable a été construit.

Mais comme le disaient Rosenkranz et Guilderstein: «Tout n'est pas rose au Royaume de Danemark»; en effet, les réseaux connaissent beaucoup de problèmes. Le premier problème réside dans le fait qu'ils ne sont pas assez reconnus, pas assez financés. Le niveau national prétend que, vu leur caractère international, il n'est pas tenu de les soutenir. Pour leur part, les instances internationales ne font pratiquement rien pour apporter un soutien aux réseaux.

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On observe également des problèmes internes qui sont, peut-être, plus graves encore. Il ne faut pas être naïf: le monde culturel est très doué pour jouer au jeu des «petits meurtres entre amis», et la grande famille se déchire parfois. Ce n'est pas tout. Si on analyse les réseaux, on se rend compte que certains tombent dans le piège de l'institutionnalisation, une pratique complètement antinomique avec la notion de réseau, mais qui existe malgré tout. Par ailleurs, risque d'un effet pervers plus dangereux encore, certains deviennent essentiellement des fournisseurs de services. Cette dérive signifie à terme la mort des réseaux. Pourquoi? Parce que cela veut dire qu'ils seraient orientés plutôt vers une logique de service, ou encore une logique «*customer oriented*». On quitte alors le cœur même du sens recherché, à savoir l'interaction entre opérateurs de différents pays, la «mise en réseau»…

Il faut donc analyser sans complaisance la situation actuelle des réseaux et mettre en lumière tant leurs points forts que leurs faiblesses.

Ainsi, il est peut-être temps de réaliser que certains réseaux n'en sont pas réellement. Le concept de plate-forme pourrait, par exemple, avoir plus d'utilité pour des gens qui veulent collaborer et ne souhaitent pas installer une dynamique de réseau comportant une ouverture, une interaction très riche mais parfois peu maîtrisée. Parce que les réseaux sont des organes vivants: un réseau naît, traverse des crises, meurt parfois et éventuellement redémarre.

Si les réseaux veulent avoir un futur, ils doivent se recentrer sur leur sens même, leur raison d'être. C'est-à-dire la culture et la pratique de l'échange, du débat, du questionnement. Il s'agit de garder l'espace d'échanges interactifs nécessaires aux professionnels de la culture de différents pays.

Mais, et cela est de plus en plus urgent, l'état de l'Europe (et du monde) impose, que les culturels sortent de leur attitude trop souvent défensive et prennent part au débat sur la gestion de la cité, qu'ils se positionnent.

Au moment où l'Europe risque de se replier sur elle-même, sur ses Etats-Nations, sur des égoïsmes nationalistes, je suis convaincu que le terrain non seulement culturel mais politique doit être occupé par les culturels et les artistes. Même si notre secteur est petit, fragile, périphérique, il peut faire bouger les choses parce qu'il est porteur de sens, de signes. Cela ne se fera qu'à condition que s'ouvrent des débats et que soient menées des actions communes. A ce propos, les réseaux sont et restent à peu près le seul endroit où cette dynamique positive et citoyenne peut trouver un «nid».

The "Tinkelink Effect": Cultural Networks, Between Encounter and Connection in Europe

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Some fifteen years ago, at the moment when isolation between Eastern Europeans and their Western neighbours disappeared, Central Europeans felt like immigrants in their own land, as all former points of reference had collapsed and the need to rebuild new ones was vital. At that time, Western European cultural organizations understood to bring their support to the process of rebuilding references. However, this was often done, unfortunately, through imposing the existing cultural reference they had themselves, not by engaging a mutual dynamics of understanding and integrating the otherness of post-communist societies.

The question today is, in fact, whether another, more balanced way to engage cultural networking and mutual exchange is possible, despite the sense of defeat and inferiority of some cultures and the sense of superiority and victorious logic of Western educated populations.

Most of the existing references available in this sense can be encapsulated in the following example: seven years ago, while organizing the meetings of the Forum of European Cultural Networks with important support from the Council of Europe a negotiation with the Council's administration took place in terms like: "what quota" of Bulgarian or Polish or Romanian participants are going to take part in a meeting. For an Eastern European, this appeared to be an unusual, even "shocking" approach, but it was the translation of the Council's way of formulating the matter. Today one may still wonder if we are not still inside this "quota" mentality, at least as far as European integration processes are presented.

Networks against "the unfinished encounter between East and West"

It is in this sense that cultural networking evolution in the last decade might make a difference, because the very process it engages is never about quantitative "quotas", but always about the quality of individual exchange. Hence, the suggestion to approach networks as spaces of connection and start from the observation that our language itself is filled with borders that design their map in our interior framing of European and its "beyond" territories. We should first define what is our intimate and symbolic mapping of Europe before we consider further why we should connect and how we would connect with others.

In helping to facilitate this understanding and the break through process of intimate mapping, cultural networks had a critical role after 1989, in the first place, because they provided spontaneously a space where Eastern and Western Europeans found an antidote to the "quota" and to "stamp"-like definitions and stereotype delimitations. They allowed the continuation of what one can call the "unfinished encounter" that was possible after the collapse of communism between Eastern and Western artists and cultural mediators (a process which had radically slowed down at institutional level after the first hours' enthusiasm).

The "good" independent sector and the "bad" public sector in culture

However, this huge amount of open encounter space that networking offered was also, on the less positive side, a ground for the birth of the false impression that the post-communist cultural domain (institutions, restructuring, legislative measures …) can and will be entirely revisited and re-built by the emergent cultural civil sector, the independent organizations.

Thus, the state-subsidized cultural institution should only survive in the process as a marginal corpus. But, in the long run, this dynamics had more of a negative then positive effect on the Eastern European cultural economy, because a strong civil sector in culture needs a strong public sector and *vice versa*. And the civil sector does not have to be exclusively market oriented. Also, one could not compare the recent dynamics of state retreat from culture in countries like France, Spain and Italy with the same phenomenon and its consequences in Poland, Romania or Serbia. Hence, the idea of the "good" independent cultural sector and the "bad" public administration in culture was a little too simplistic to answer the complex questions of cultural transitions in former communist countries.

Needing ropes for democratic building

So, networks are "teachers" for good and not so good influences, they are learning spaces, as well as spaces for meeting and sharing, for the diversity of individuals that compose them. For Eastern European members, they also are places of direct experience related to the abstract notion of "democracy" and "cultural governance". When Romanian artist Dan Perjovschi drew a picture featuring three little men on the edge of a big hole where a bomb had just fallen, and one says: "and now let's build democracy here"… we immediately understand why there is a need to adapt the understanding of democratic thinking and why individual experience can have a crucial role in it. When one is inside a big hole (like after when communism collapsed), one needs ropes to be sent down, so that one can resurface - and three people on the margin cannot do this alone!

Networks like IETM (Informal European Theatre Meeting), or TransEuropeHalles or Theorem (a co-production performing arts network) were, among many others, what can be called "rope-throwers communities" and they still are. And because in physics there is no action without reaction, this process involved mutual strength and commitment, and resulted in better understanding on both sides.

Confronting cultural realities and transferring generational dreams

However, the process of reciprocity once engaged, one observes that there is no real equality in resource or in approach, there is no free mobility for Eastern Europeans yet and there is no sense of equitable exchange. The policy enquiry "Every step has an Echo" (De Vlieg and Ilic, 2003) demonstrates how much intercultural communication performed within networks does not yet improve the sense of failure-driven fatalism of Eastern European operators, despite their capacities, skills and proven acquired experiences. This is mostly due to the fact that at national levels, the added value of such competences is not recognized and profession-wise legitimated.

And it is due, too, to the generational problem that one witnesses in the national context of European countries, which can be formulated as a refusal of the 1968 generation to transfer trust and confidence to younger generations, together with power at decision-making levels.

Again, cultural networks could in this respect be forward looking, as their "ecosystem" allows these transgenerational and transnational transmission channels to grow and develop naturally. However, they cannot yet counteract the inertia of

national systems, based on exclusive top-down and mono-dimensional authority in cultural matters.

Digital culture and networking

What would be the means, then, to boost and enhance networking further, so that its trans-disciplinary and individually tailored dynamics become more effective? An answer lies in the new media and new technology domain and the following hypotheses, despite their empirical nature, deserve some consideration.

A study performed by Italian research foundation Fitzcarraldo (2000) on cultural networking listed among its important findings the fact that the main activity of networking - "meetings"- is so valuable at European scale because it provides a space of communication that becomes (as performed by the diversity of actors) what researchers called "strategic content".

This observation leads to another one, by American/French scientist and art researcher in digital culture, Don Foresta (2005), who considers that one has to first define one's "locality" in the digital space; the better defined, the more one will be enabled to speak globally, because the key to communicating globally is to be clear and well defined "locally".

In a similar way, cultural networking is a process about what we can call "de-contextualized individual communication". No one knows you inside a network beyond what yourself, individually, define as being your "locality". And the better one communicates about it, the larger spectre of "users" one will build around this specificity? The larger community will be touched. A successful networker is a "locality profiler", in the first place.

From this derives a second issue relevant to our demonstration. Digital culture is a culture of the "user". Nothing can be predetermined of the success or failure of a digital tool - it is the user alone who will decide upon its degree of importance and relevance ("Google" is, in this respect, a perfect example).

Cultural networking does not impose, in its turn, any cooperation tools, but offers in itself a systemic dynamics that gives priority to a culture of the user. When joining or leaving a network, one considers and assesses freely if it is or is not a "useful" medium to develop into and connect with.

When evaluating the degree of success of a network it is just like with digital tools: we measure it in the number of its "users". And these users are both "shapers" and "beneficiaries" of the system.

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Last but not least, both cultural networks and digital networks turn around the issue of "dematerialization". "All that exists can be translated in a binary program", affirms French scholar Christophe Genin (2005); in the same way, all traditional cultural cooperation practice is dematerialized within the cultural networking process and becomes a fluid entity, guided by the only principle of the "connexion". Cultural networks could easily have, like Nokia, the emblem: "Connecting people".

The sense is the connection.

What to conclude?

First, that cultural networking is today the living example of "transnational sodalities" (Mercer, 2005) and a form of existence of cultural community that ensures the preservation of the "vernacular globalization" (ibid.) in a completely digitalized era. Unfortunately, the type of knowledge of this model of cultural connective empowerment is not yet translated into cultural policy national paradigms, despite its lively existence in European cultural practices. From this point of view, Eastern and Western realities are equally inertial.

Second, in search of cultural policies that respond effectively to the heterogeneity of our societies, digital culture and cultural networks are complementary forms of transcending the identitarian aspects, by redefining the "symbolic geographies" of belonging, "localities" based on connective values but respectful of irreducible cultural specificities. These are the territories necessary to root a more balanced dynamics of cultural exchange and develop effective intercultural competences in a post-communist, post-totalitarian and, hopefully, "post-identitarian" Europe.

Finally, it looks like both through cultural networking and the digital culture, dematerialization becomes a key to connectiveness and mutuality, the dematerialization of the cultural object becoming a new form of reciprocal appropriation of future cultural processes, and not of inherited cultural products.

Hence, communication becomes not only strategic content, but also the content itself, while culture becomes the context of the continuous flow of interacting systems.

This profound mutation, as soon as translated into policy measures, can and probably will erase the mental borders not only between Eastern and Western Europe, but also between Europe and the rest of the world; this will also equalize exchange and determine completely redesigned cooperation and empowerment paradigms.

Like Peter Pan's "Tinkelink" fairy, cultural networking and digital networking should gently guide us back, towards the real self of European "locality", which the

clearer we can profile as a place of genuine belonging, the better we can communicate on a global scale.

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Des sociétés multiculturelles aux sociétés interculturelles: le rôle des réseaux culturels

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Les processus de la mondialisation, plus particulièrement l'élargissement des marchés, les formes nouvelles et dynamiques de mobilité des personnes et de circulation des marchandises, ainsi que l'évolution rapide des technologies de la communication, ont ouvert et intensifié les possibilités d'insertion des individus, des communautés, des institutions et de régions socio-économiques entières dans la communication internationale. Ces nouvelles formes de mobilité ont créé de nouveaux modes de liaison, d'échange et de coopération culturelles, qui ont à leur tour suscité des modèles très complexes de diversité culturelle.

Dynamisme de la diversité culturelle

Cette dynamique des changements culturels et de la diversité culturelle dans le monde contemporain, exige qu'on lui consacre encore beaucoup de recherches. Le monde devient de plus en plus interdépendant et les approches nouvelles de la diversité culturelle aspirant à promouvoir les spécificités culturelles comme fondement de la communication interculturelle, démontrent qu'il est aujourd'hui impossible d'évoquer la diversité culturelle sans se référer à la communication et au dialogue interculturels. Le dynamisme de la diversité culturelle présente deux points importants, à savoir la mobilité et les migrations transnationales, dont le rythme s'est accéléré à un point tel qu'il suscite des effets surprenants sur certains pays et certaines villes. Il suffit pour illustrer ce phénomène de mentionner les données de l'UNESCO, d'après lesquelles 175 millions d'habitants de notre planète vivent dans un pays autre que celui où ils sont nés. Une personne sur dix résidant dans les régions développées du monde, est un migrant. Près de la moitié de la population de Toronto est née en dehors des frontières canadiennes. Nous vivons dans un monde culturellement très dynamique et très divers, aussi le *Rapport mondial sur le développement humain*

2004 souligne-t-il fort justement que "la diversité culturelle est là pour rester et pour s'épanouir". Ajoutons ici la pensée du grand intellectuel indien Amartya Sen, lauréat du prix Nobel: "Qui dit migrations dit société multiculturelle… le multiculturalisme doit mener à une société ouverte, où les individus décident de leur destin". (Sen, 1995)

C'est pourquoi il faut être conscient que les méthodologies des approches traditionnelles de la diversité culturelle se confrontent aux problèmes qu'apportent les changements et les nouveaux rapports transnationaux et transculturels dans le monde. La diversité culturelle est en perpétuelle transformation, et l'on voit se profiler une multiplicité d'approches différentes aux problématiques qu'elle soulève. Cela exige l'établissement de méthodologies innovatrices dans les approches à la problématique de la diversité culturelle (par exemple, sa place dans les politiques culturelles et éducatives transnationales et nationales). Dans son article 'The Fate of Culture', Tyler Cowen souligne avec raison qu'il faut se demander avant tout quelle sorte de diversité apporte le processus de mondialisation. (Cowen, 2002)

Portée des réseaux culturels

Ce sont surtout les réseaux culturels qui jouent un rôle décisif au niveau international dans la protection et la promotion de la diversité culturelle. L'ensemble des rapports internationaux est aujourd'hui marqué par l'activité des réseaux, qui sont en partie matériels et en partie virtuels, mais toujours 'nomades' et transculturels. Grâce à la mise en circulation de différentes idées, valeurs et expériences, c'est à travers les réseaux de communication que se réalisent de nouveaux modes d'échange des expériences culturelles, d'interaction et de participation. Au moyen des réseaux, les différentes sociétés et systèmes de production peuvent s'insérer dans la communication en affirmant leurs cultures, leurs diversités. Il s'ensuit que la portée la plus notable des réseaux consiste en ce qu'ils permettent un dialogue culturel interactif, où chaque culture garde sa spécificité. Si l'on considère que la fracture numérique (*digital divide*) porte en elle une fracture cognitive et fait courir le risque d'une marginalisation définitive des populations déconnectées, on comprend combien le rôle des réseaux culturels se révèle encore plus précieux.

La mise en réseaux des cultures entraîne une nouvelle dynamique de la diversité culturelle, tant au niveau européen qu'au niveau mondial. Au fond, notre monde globalisé peut être perçu comme un réseau des différentes cultures qui y coexistent, et qui éprouvent un besoin permanent d'entretenir des relations interactives pour pouvoir exister et développer des valeurs, des créations et des pratiques nouvelles. Par leur ouverture, leur approche non-hiérarchique et horizontale, ainsi que par leur flexibilité, les réseaux stimulent l'échange des valeurs culturelles diverses, promeuvent l'affirmation de la diversité culturelle et facilitent le dialogue des

cultures. D'autre part, les principes de la diversité exercent une influence importante sur les missions opératives des réseaux culturels. Les efforts des réseaux se concentrent sur des entreprises communes, depuis les recherches (politiques culturelles, développement culturel) jusqu'à la mobilité des artistes.

La question de la diversité culturelle est donc étroitement liée à la communication et au dialogue interculturels. Comme le souligne le sociologue français Jean-Pierre Saez, ce dialogue doit embrasser non seulement les autorités publiques, mais avant tout la société civile, les collectivités locales et régionales, les organisations professionnelles ainsi que les individus en tant que nouveaux acteurs, qui contribuent à la dynamique de la communication.

Les activités nombreuses des réseaux culturels européens et mondiaux représentent des expériences et des pratiques de valeur de ce dialogue interculturel; c'est le cas par exemple pour CIRCLE, Les Rencontres, EFAH-FEAP (Réseau européen pour les arts et le patrimoine) en Europe, l'Observatoire des politiques culturelles (OCPA) en Afrique, la Fondation Asie-Europe (ASEF) en Asie, le Forum Culturel Mondial et le Forum brésilien en Amérique latine, l'Observatoire du Pacifique-Asie pour la diversité culturelle en Australie, etc. Ils démontrent qu'il existe des approches à la communication interculturelle différentes, variées, tout comme une multiplicité d'approches différentes aux problématiques soulevées par la diversité culturelle.

Une analyse des documents préparés pour l'UNESCO met en lumière que la diversité culturelle est perçue en Asie avant tout comme une diversité des media, en Europe et en Afrique à travers la place de la diversité culturelle dans les politiques culturelles, dans les pays arabes comme une diversité des expressions artistiques et culturelles, en Amérique du Nord comme une diversité raciale et ethnique, en Amérique latine comme une diversité ethnique et religieuse. Mais toutes ces approches ont en commun la reconnaissance de la diversité des cultures comme composante de leur identité et comme facteur contribuant à la promotion de leur interaction. Ce n'est que sur cette base que l'on peut promouvoir la communication et le dialogue interculturels. Il est nécessaire de rappeler ici qu'une partie du monde participe avec ses biens et services culturels pour à peine 1% dans cette communication et surtout dans l'échange international. L'absence de la majorité des pays en développement et des pays en transition dans l'échange international des biens culturels démontre d'une manière évidente pourquoi nous avons besoin de l'implementation de la Convention sur la Protection et la Promotion de la Diversité des Expressions Culturelles. Une étude récente de l'Institut statistique de l'Unesco à Montréal met en relief que plus de soixante-dix pour cent de l'échange international des biens culturels revient à trois pays dans le monde.

La culture numérique

On ne saurait mettre l'accent sur l'interdépendance de la diversité culturelle et de la communication interculturelle sans aborder la question de la culture numérique (*digital culture*).

Comment les nouvelles technologies de communication, et plus spécialement l'Internet, ouvrent-elles de nouvelles chaînes de communication, comment promeuvent-elles des formes spécifiques de créativité qui deviennent de plus en plus déterritorialisées, quelle est leur influence sur l'affirmation et la dynamique de la diversité culturelle, étant donné que la culture numérique ne transforme pas seulement notre monde, mais aussi la manière dont nous comprenons ce monde? La numérisation agit sur toute une gamme de productions, de distributions et de présentations culturelles. La culture numérique change le champ de la culture et des politiques culturelles, elle tend vers de nouvelles formes d'expression créative, et pour finir offre une nouvelle perspective au développement culturel et à la communication culturelle internationale. Il faudrait donc identifier tout un bloc de questions embrassant la culture numérique et son influence sur la diversité culturelle, c'est-à-dire toute une série de phénomènes nouveaux représentant un vrai défi pour la diversité culturelle.

C'est pourquoi un certain nombre d'experts, réunis au sein du réseau des réseaux CULTURELINK, propose une étude sous le titre: *Diversité culturelle, communication interculturelle et culture numérique*, qui porterait sur la nature et les différentes caractéristiques de leur interdépendance. Le monde continuera à se mouvoir vers une plus grande diversité, vers un plus grand choix, enfin vers une plus grande décentralisation. S'il est vrai que les processus de la mondialisation n'ont ni réduit ni supprimé le fossé qui existe entre développés et non-développés, il n'en reste pas moins qu'en leur sein l'interdépendance entre la diversité culturelle, la communication interculturelle et la culture numérique s'impose comme une question primordiale à la communauté mondiale. Le réseau CULTURELINK qui, dans sa nature même, contient ces trois éléments, pourra mener à bien un projet aussi important.

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The Internet, Cultural Networks and Diversity of Cultural Communication: The Case of the Caribbean

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The unique feature of the Internet is that it is simultaneously a source of enormous amounts of pre-packaged information (the World Wide Web) as well as a technology that facilitates communication between people (email, chat rooms etc.); that allows people the opportunity, in Paulo Freire's felicitous phrase "to name the world" for themselves.

In the context of the neo-liberal agenda of globalization, governments the world over recognize the economic potential of the Internet and seek to harness its potential to gain competitive advantage in the global market. In doing so, they promulgate policies and regulations that largely liberalize and privilege the telecommunications sector - itself a cause and a consequence of the contemporary version of globalization.

Since the mid-1990s, Caribbean governments have pursued such policies in keeping with the structural adjustment strictures of the US government's Caribbean Basin Initiative. Among other things, this resulted in deregulation and liberalization of markets, and divestment and privatization of state controlled entities including government monopoly telecommunications services, so that today the telecoms sector is open to competition in most Caribbean countries.

One result of this competitive market-driven environment is that most Caribbean countries possess to a greater or lesser extent cutting edge telecommunications infrastructures with tele-densities ranked high to medium high on the UN's Human Development Index. Jamaica's Ministry of Industry and Commerce for example, estimates that there are approximately two million mobile phones in the country with a total population of 2.6 million people. As a matter of fact, there are more mobile phones than fixed lines in Jamaica and the ubiquity of mobile telephones in the Caribbean, and the rapid evolution of wireless technology, make the traditional development indicator of fixed lines per thousand population obsolete if not entirely

quite meaningless. The majority of countries also have multiple multi-channel cable television as well as Internet Service Providers (ISPs).

But with this plethora of technologies and highly developed telecommunication infrastructure, what is the reality on the ground? In particular to what extent has the Internet made for greater cultural networking and diversity between and among the people of the region?

While in comparison with other parts of the world, geography, historical circumstances and a common language locate the English-speaking Caribbean in a favourable position vis-ŕ-vis the United States of America, the world's leading innovator in the telecommunications industry, "A large and growing gap remains between the technology (H)aves and (H)ave nots. Differences in access to computer and communications technology also exist by household income, educational attainment, age and gender, with greatest inequities occurring for those with the lowest income and the fewest educational opportunities". (Sanatan, 2003: 76) This quotation comes from the preamble to a paper describing a programmatic attempt by the government of Barbados to address the problem of Internet access of its citizens, but it is a statement that is applicable across the entire region.

It isn't overstating the case to say that governments of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in their attempt to ensure economic competitiveness in the global market and having facilitated the building of a modern and contemporary telecommunications infrastructure, now recognize the imperative of also ensuring access of all their citizens to the technologies if their countries are to reap the perceived benefits of a globalized economy. A brief description of a select few of these efforts is revealing.

The Barbados Community Technology Program seeks to "provide effective access to technology and the Internet by economically disadvantaged community members" by converting some fourteen community centers spread across the 431 square km island into "Community Resource Centers" equipped with computers with Internet access , and available to the public from 10.00 a.m. to 10.00 p.m. six days a week. The program which started in 2003 has so far trained nearly 4000 citizens ranging in age between 17 and 82 with females being in a 5:1 majority in Windows, keyboarding, word processing and Internet skills, and is ongoing. It should be noted that Barbados has a total population of under 300,000.

In Suriname, the only Dutch speaking member of CARICOM and geographically located on the South American mainland, a similar but more ambitious entrepreneurial-driven project started in 2000. The Education and Communication Network (EDUCON) has the "…single objective of accelerating the socio-economic development of Suriname through the use of ICT". (Sanatan, 2003: 12) Starting with

a single privately funded "Knowledge Center" in the heart of the capital, Paramaribo, EDUCON now has 22 such centers spread across the country and receives assistance from the Alcoa Foundation, UNESCO and UNICEF.

An EDUCON Knowledge Center is essentially a computer center that provides training in computing skills for persons from a wide range of backgrounds at a very nominal cost. With its own Server, EDUCON also provides Internet access to users of its centers and most importantly a structured distance education (DE) program utilizing both the Internet and other technologies for its "students". For a fee of approximately US$1.00 per month, any computer literate person can get daily access to a computer and the Internet as well as a virtual campus offering primary and secondary school courses and educational content designed by Surinamese teachers. It also offers courses to teachers and via VSAT technology, online extension services to the agricultural sector. A sparsely populated country of 438,000 people and some 163,270 square km, the Surinamese project is one of the most ambitious of its kind in the region and to date has trained over 20,000 people in the use of ICTs. A paradox here is that the government of Suriname maintains a monopoly on telecommunications so that the EDUCON Server cannot be used to generate income commercially for the sustainability of the enterprise.

By contrast, in Trinidad and Tobago where government maintains a monopoly in telecommunications but within a deregulated environment, government policies have encouraged the consumption of computers by citizens. No taxes are imposed on computer imports and purchases and the government makes soft loans available to civil servants for such purchases - a policy also followed by private businesses. Computers are also accessible through schools, all public libraries and in cybercafes.

Research undertaken by the National Institute of Higher Education, Science and Technology (NIHERST) in 2001, showed that 13% of the 350,000 households in the country had computers and access to the Internet with the majority of these being held by upper income households and least by the lowest income households. Impressively, over 70% of the households used the computer daily for between two and five or more hours with use being evenly split between male and female users. A majority of users were teenagers followed closely by the 30-39 year olds and the majority of users were secondary school graduates with only 3.8% having university level education.

Forty three per cent of all businesses surveyed in Trinidad in 2004 used computers and the Internet for public relations purposes and to enhance customer service, with 19% actually engaging in some form of e-commerce. (White in Sanatan: 2003)

In the most comprehensive study of the cultural impact of the Internet undertaken in the Caribbean to date, ethnographers Daniel Miller and Don Slater (2000) found

that in Trinidad and Tobago, "The heaviest and most universal use was of email, for correspondence between relatives and friends and between businesses." They also found that chat and "…surfing popular culture, such as MTV, games, music and sports" was the preferred use among young Trinidadians, with surfing pornography ranking high as well among these users. "Impressive" was the word they used for describing the level of diffusion of the Internet in the society including among squatters with no running water in their huts. A mostly urban society with a population of 1.2 million, access to the Internet is low in the rural areas of Trinidad and Tobago.

Jamaica has the most liberalized telecommunication sector in the CARICOM with three telephone companies and 20 ISPs serving its population of 2.6 million people. Eight per cent of the population owns computers with 5% having Internet access at home. However, diffusion of the Internet is more widespread since over 900 public schools have computer access and 234 of these also have multimedia facilities. Computer and Internet access is also available in the island's post offices, public libraries, and numerous cybercafes.

Mobile telephony which covers the entire island is readily available. However, given the island's mountainous topography, Internet services are limited in many rural communities and where they do exist, are relatively expensive since they are provided by wireless technologies.

All 13,000 students of the University of the West Indies' (UWI) campus in Kingston have access to the Internet (a ratio of approximately 14:1) and the University, itself an ISP, offers many courses online and a full B.Ed secondary degree by distance using a mix of technologies including the Internet. Course registration by the University's students and other administrative functions such as fee payments, are done online.

Typically, students of the UWI use the Internet primarily for research but a majority of students also indulge in chat, game playing, listening to and downloading music as well as surfing sports, and some pornography as well.

The Caribbean Coastal Area Management Foundation (C-CAM), an environmental NGO located in a rural town on Jamaica's South Coast, apart from publicizing its activities on its website, also operates a small cybercafe providing basic computer training and Internet skills for members of the community and primary school children. The dominant use of the Internet by adult users is email with the children indulging in chat and games.

As in Trinidad, most businesses in Jamaica use the Internet for customer relations purposes but banks and other financial services offer online facilities as well. Recently an enterprising journalist discovered numerous "hot spots" in Kingston's

financial district where it was possible to boot up his laptop and access the websites of a number of corporate businesses. Following publication of his story, they all shut down their systems temporarily for obvious security reasons.

The Jamaican government's policies of attracting international e-business has resulted in the establishment of numerous call centers across the island in both urban and rural areas, employing some 2,900 persons, mostly women. This has had the unintended but positive spin-off of developing literacy and Internet skills among these employees. (Sanatan: 2003)

Given the global reach of the region's popular cultural expressions especially in music, (*reggae* and *calypso*), there is genuine and growing concern for issues related to intellectual property rights. Internet streaming of programs by some of the larger radio stations that connect the significant Caribbean diasporas, particularly of New York, London and Toronto, to their home countries and the online publication of a number of the region's major daily newspapers, makes these issues particularly pertinent to the producers of information.

By way of summary then, a number of issues emerge. The first is the lead role played by Caribbean governments in developing their countries' telecommunications infrastructure in response to the imperatives of the dominant neo-liberal ideology that gives primacy to the global market and hence, a perceived need to achieve competitiveness within such an environment. Liberalization of the environment followed, and with it, emergence of a relatively technologically advanced ICT sector.

Second, demand for ICT trained and skilled personnel across various sectors, places the issue of access to ICTs high on the agenda of governments, and the business sector. And as the rather random sample of cases that I have described indicate, responses vary in approach but not in outcome. Though still a small percentage of national populations, more citizens are becoming computer literate and have access to the Internet thereby slowing the rate of increase if not narrowing the real gap between the information haves and have-nots. In all countries of the region however, personal ownership of computers is concentrated in upper income groups with majority access being in public facilities such as government offices, educational institutions, public libraries, cybercafes and facilities of NGOs and CBOs.

Third, the region's governments' preoccupation with the neo-liberal agenda of developing marketable skills, backgrounds the potential cultural impact of the Internet as a unique technology through which culture can be and is expressed. As a discernible consequence the majority of Caribbean youth who have access to the Internet appear to be drawn to it both as information content provider and as *bona fide* communication technology - a technology that gives them the opportunity to "name

the world" for themselves. However, Web surfing, music, game playing, and chat - the most popular uses of the Internet by Caribbean youth, expose them to virtual worlds that are essentially not of their own making but which nonetheless, are communities of interest to which they have the opportunity to link globally, hampered only by language barriers and the perennial stultifying effects of illiteracy - two phenomena that can be overcome by a less market-driven and more socially conscious use of the Internet itself.

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Internet Connectivity in African Museums

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Introduction

The Internet is an information superhighway that is indispensable in the museum for the many advantages that it offers such as acquisition and dissemination of information in all fields. The present boundaries set up by colonial rule do not support the cultural zones and communities sharing cultures. The Internet is a tool that promises to pull down such barriers via the exchange of information that is held by museums and community galleries. The Internet at the same time, shares the content of African museums in diasporas with the peoples of Africa and the world. (Chieze, n.d.: 5)

"Globalization is the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on people and societies far away" (Bayliss and Smith, 1992: 7). Thabo Mbeki argued that Africa's disadvantageous position is a function of underdevelopment in general. As the world progresses and embraces new technologies, Africa does not have the critical mass infrastructure that would enable it to fully take part in the Global Information Society (Mbeki, 1997) and this effectively threatens to lock the continent out of global communication systems.

The Internet eliminates both barriers of space and time and allows people to interact in a manner that could never have been envisaged a few years ago. An advantage of the Internet is the ability to acquire/access the requested information in seconds through discussion lists or search engines. The cost of using Internet resources is low and with the reducing budget for purchase of books in the museum, the Internet becomes the most convenient source and resource.

Internet material is produced easily and disseminated at low costs compared to use of postal services which tend to be slow and expensive. The printed materials are

likely to be obsolete in a few months or years but materials stored in the Internet can be updated regularly. (Conner, 2005)

Requirements for Internet and access connectivity in the museum:

The connection is made having subscribed to an Internet Service Provider (ISP) who is paid a monthly fee and another fee to the telecommunication organization.

Most of the connections (the most affordable) are made using phone line, modem computer and software.

The present status of Internet connectivity in African museums

African museums continue to lag behind in various fields of development. The changes that come with globalization have led to the opening up of African markets to the latest technology with the commercial sectors being in the lead. Museums are yet to fully benefit from the technology, for example in many South Korean museums PDAs (interactive presentations) are used to guide visitors through the exhibitions, while in many African museums exhibitions are still kept on shelves and behind dusty glass.

Most of the African countries have Internet connections in the capital cities and major towns through Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in education institutions, governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and commercial institutions/enterprises. For the museum professionals to access information from email or to carry out research on the Internet, they have first to travel to these places (often far away) and then pay for the service. In places that an email reaches, the service goes to the administration and sometimes some of the key departments.

The development of Internet access and connections in African museums promises to bring development through the access to knowledge and information. The communities around the museum can benefit more from the Internet if the information is presented to them in African languages that they best understand. It is important to note that most of the Internet pages are in English and other Western languages. Some of the issues to be tackled would include poverty, illiteracy and the high cost of Internet access.

Very few museums in Africa actually have Internet connection and those that do rely on extremely slow dial-up connections that enable the forwarding of stored emails and the receiving of new messages from the ISP. Such connections do not support long term use such as browsing the net due to low speeds, disconnections during peak times. This limits the ability of the African museum professionals to carry out research and find more information.

Uses of the Internet in the museum

The Internet may serve various purposes in the museum that include but are not limited to the following.

Education - professional development opportunities in capacity building and dissemination of teaching resources for museum professionals. The Internet thus becomes a wonderful forum for the exchange of information and ideas among museum professionals.

Exhibitions - the Internet could be used to carry out virtual exhibitions and presentations of collections. Virtual visits to the museum digitally (via the Internet) can encourage people to actually go to the real museum hall. This kind of visit encourages interaction with museum collections.

Research - the Internet could be used to carry out research and reference to educational material held by online libraries. Visitors can be encouraged to fill in questionnaires online on their experiences in the museum.

The Public Relations Department could use the Internet to inform the public of museum programmes and products through online newsletters, press releases and other promotional materials.

Red List - the Internet can be used to host databases of stolen cultural property in danger to assist in fighting illicit traffic. To be able to track stolen items or endangered objects (by museum professionals, custom officers and the police) it is necessary to carry out inventories and computerize them using software that would ease retrieval and publishing. (ICOM, 1997)

Networking of professionals - the Internet can be used to host online databases, announcements of conferences and meetings, job opportunities and exchange programmes. One of the major objectives of AFRICOM (International Council of African Museums) is to develop networks among museum professionals.[1]

Twin museums - the Internet can act as a mode of linking various museums together, for example all ethnographic museums, natural history museums or even several museums in different parts of a country through a wide area network.

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1 In 2003, AFRICOM published the Directory of Museum Professionals which is available in print and CD and later on its website in both French and English.

Challenges to Internet connectivity

Lack of electricity or unstable or irregular power supply
The cost of electricity remains one of the barriers to Internet connectivity. A typical scene in a working week would include at least one blackout that would last an hour or more. Many museums cannot afford a generator, and those that can have to bear with the high cost of fuel. The cost of such power outages include damaged power back up batteries, lost man hours and lost opportunities.

High costs of computers
Most of the countries experience heavy taxation and this pushes the price of computers way above the reach of many museums. A solution would be to subsidize computers purchased by museums and cultural institutions.

Poor telecommunication infrastructure
Most of the Internet connections in Sub-Saharan Africa rely on dial-up access which in turn rely on telephone lines (still the backbone of provision in many parts of Africa), which tend to be poorly maintained or networked especially in the far flung rural areas. When the telephone lines are down, it means that people cannot access the Internet.

Insufficient or inadequate staff training
This situation is fast changing with the introduction of several computer colleges that offer courses, especially in the major cities. Universities and schools are now offering Internet development courses but a lot needs to be done.

High cost of access (high cost of bandwidth)
Many of the museum professionals in Africa are poorly paid and this in turn limits adversely their ability to access the Internet for as many hours as they would like compared to their counterparts in Western countries and Asia. T. Kelly attributes this to:

- "high costs for international leased lines in some markets, especially those without infrastructure competition;
- for LDCs (Least Developed Countries) with only low levels of IP demand, unit bandwidth costs are higher than for countries with higher levels of demand (economies of scale);
- many countries are not served by international cables (e.g., landlocked countries, small islands)". (Kelly, 2002)

This high cost of the Internet has contributed to many websites being hosted out of Africa for example the AFRICOM website, UNEP (headquarters in Nairobi) website in the USA.

State monopoly and poor investment environment

Telecommunication in many African countries is provided by government enterprises that have a monopoly in the provision of Internet and other communication services such as radio waves and Internet provision. Many governments in Africa have been accused of not providing equal opportunities to new entrants to service provision which has in turn discouraged meaningful competition. This leads to conditions that do not favour investment.

Inadequate funding

Extreme financial want and lack of training in strategic planning and grant proposal writing means that museums do not have adequate funds. Most of the museums rely on government funding, which is mostly prioritized to cover basic sectors like health, security and education. There is an urgent need to find alternative sources of long-term sustainable funding for culture and heritage sectors. There is a need for new partnerships and collaboration that will help to bring museum development to Africa.

Some of the cultural institutions, such as AFRICOM, could assist in the procurement of funds for establishing Internet connections in museums.

Improvement of Internet connectivity in African museums

The role of a museum includes collection, research, exhibition and conservation; they also have a duty and responsibility to be accountable, by communicating with the donors, the community and the world at large.

This mandate can only be fulfilled if the museums are given the tools and capacity to effectively operate in the current information society. The reduction of the cost of accessing the Internet is the solution. The Africa Internet Service Providers Association - AfrIsPA, estimates the cost of access to the Internet at 25 times more expensive in urban areas and between 100-400 times in rural areas compared to the Western countries (Osiakwan, 2004). This makes the Internet a luxury for many African museums and calls for urgent measures to extricate Africa from what has been described as a "digital quagmire" (ibid.).

It is the responsibility of policy makers to address the question urgently to reverse the trend that is driving Africa into marginalization. Some of the changes that can be affected immediately include:

- Government policy: policies to promote the provision of affordable Internet access through the reduction of taxes on telecommunication equipment and the education of the citizenry on the uses of the Internet in economic and cultural development.

- African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): ask the international community to remove reverse subsidies that Africa pays for Internet connectivity to the Internet Backbone Providers (IBP) and encourage African governments to provide an enabling environment for competition in the telecommunication industry.
- G8 countries and the donor community: they have been instrumental in lamenting the poor Internet connectivity in Africa and LDCs. It is time they acted by providing financial resources to bridge the digital gap.[2]
- AFRICOM: during the AFRICOM conference and General Assembly held in 2003, several recommendations were made on "How can the Internet be used to preserve Africa's Cultural Heritage?" In response to this need, AFRICOM developed an ambitious proposal to create a digital link for museums. It hopes to build network and communication links through the provision of computers and connection to the Internet through various means.
- IT firms in the Western world have a great opportunity to invest in Africa. There is a huge market that remains unexploited and … and what? Governments need to remove taxes on computers and computer software especially ones destined for not-for-profit organizations such as museums, churches, hospitals and charities. Incentives for investment should be provided.

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Russian State Library, an Active Component of the Information and Cultural Communication

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The information society and, furthermore, the knowledge society, possesses a number of challenges for libraries. We are witnessing the gradual but vigorous transformation of libraries from traditional systems and services with a lot of technological restrictions to systems providing users with universal access to trusted information resources.

Libraries, now able to comply with new user expectations regarding information and knowledge, due to digitization and communication technologies, turn into fundamental elements of modern culture, an important object of state information and cultural policy. Libraries' involvement in global networks is also one of the main factors in this process.

But in Russia at the beginning of 1990s not only public but specialized research libraries were at the beginning of the journey. Nevertheless it was obvious to professionals that the intrusion of digitization and the production and dissemination of trustworthy information is crucial for libraries in modern society. We started with the main national libraries in order not to let them remain just "warehouses of books". These are: the Russian State Library in Moscow (RSL) and the National Library of Russia (Saint-Petersburg) and some specialized libraries.

The Russian State Library (which has remained in the memory of most of us as the Lenin State Library) is the largest in Europe. Nowadays the total size of the RSL's collections exceeds 42 million items. Collections of the RSL are unique in terms of completeness and universality and include documents in 247 languages of the world. Behind the formal word "item" there are "hiding" masterpieces of world literature,

ancient manuscripts, rare books, scientific works (dissertations), specialized collections of maps, musical scores and records, printed arts, periodical issues, etc.

There is no field of science and practice which is not reflected in the sources stored here. Daily the RSL stock is enlarged by 600 items. Thousands of people have gained knowledge here. It has become a second home for many students, post-graduates and researchers. The reading rooms can accommodate about 5000 readers daily.

During the difficult transitional period, the Russian State Library, with its unique collections, and having prestige both in the professional community and in other social and cultural institutions, demonstrated its stability and ability to modernize.

Thanks to state support and considerable international assistance the electronic catalogue of the RSL was created. This project started in 1998, was fulfilled in the framework of the TASIS programme and was financed by the European Commission (EC). It was the first TASIS project in the humanitarian sphere. The main objective of the project was to create the online catalogue of the RSL and provide access to it. Now it contains more than 2.5 million records. The number of the Russian State Library Internet site hits is about 5000 per day, and this is compatible with the amount of reading room users.

The digital joint catalogue of Russian books of the 19th century, published in Russia and abroad, is now available for users. The unique character of the new resource cannot be overestimated. The digital system's opportunities allow a user to select information from the collections of the six largest Russian libraries.

With UNESCO as patron, the project "The memory of Russia" is being carried out with the help of digital technology. The aim of the project is to preserve and provide unrestricted access to rare books considered as cultural monuments of mankind.

A contemporary user increasingly needs concentrated information. This statement illustrates the heightened interest with which the scientific community greeted the appearance of another RSL information resource - the digital library of dissertations (theses). The thing is that RSL for some decades has been receiving a copy of each dissertation published in our country (except those on medicine). Only last year more than 25,000 dissertations were received by the library. The works on humanitarian themes are much in demand by readers, cultural studies as well. As a result, the digital library of dissertations was set up. Access to it is realized in the virtual reading halls, which are established in more than 70 large libraries in the Russian regions.

Where other cultural institutions such as conservatoires, museums, art galleries, etc., can exist in isolation to some extent, contacting each other only for some joint activities, libraries ought to collaborate. The thing is that life puts the task before society - each individual must have equal rights to access a variety of information in a

particular country or in the world. We are living in the information society, which is why the information resource, which is concentrated in libraries, must be united. In the very near future a large-scale project will start. The issue is – the creation of the Russian National Digital Library. A global depository of regulated information will be created on the basis of the central Russian libraries' collections (first of all on the basis of the Russian State Library, then the National Library of Russia), and some already existing virtual projects will also be used.

As a result of all these projects the Russian State Library has turned into a modern, completely computerized library, offering people its unique collections and catalogues via the Internet.

The RSL is making significant progress towards achieving its new strategic direction based on telecommunication technology that promotes its active role in the cultural communication system.

Library development as an information centre is an indicator of the evolution of the information society in the country. "Libraries are rivers", some artist said long ago. "Libraries are the heart of the information society", we are saying today.

In the structure of the RSL activity there is a special sphere which is connected directly with the dissemination of cultural information.

For more than 30 years the RSL has been providing information support for cultural activity in Russia. For all these years the library has within its framework the Research and Information Centre on Culture and Arts (Informkultura), that is one of the leading scientific and information centres in Russia, creating an information base for research in the field of culture and arts.

Informkultura has created contemporary information products and services on various subjects and problems of cultural development and cultural life both in Russia and other countries. Its information products are widely used by scientists, researchers of different institutions, libraries, museums, professors of universities and also by specialists responsible for making management decisions and elaborating cultural policy. Among the users there are specialists not only of the cultural sphere but the spheres of education, training, mass media and leisure.

Informkultura has created resources in electronic form, among them a bibliographic and abstract database, which has been growing since 1982 and has records of domestic and foreign books, articles from journals and "grey literature" on culture and arts. The total size of the database is 200,000 records. It is available on-line and on CD-ROM.

Four years ago the Informkultura site (http://infoculture.rsl.ru) was set up on the Internet. This site is used by its visitors as a joint electronic resource and information

Ignoring the Bleeps: Digital Art Music in Ireland

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An exploration of digital art music in Ireland, its relationship with Irish funding bodies and its future in Irish cultural policy, through its most comprehensive platform, the Dublin Electronic Arts Festival.

The research in this 2004 study builds upon information obtained through interviews with key stakeholders in the Irish digital art music arena. It attempts to represent, within limits, as broad a spectrum of viewpoints as possible - including, artistic, academic and policy-making.

The explosion in the late 1980s of electronic music resulted in a global cultural movement that resonates throughout fashion, style, technology and the performing and visual arts today. In *The Ambient Century*, (Prendergast, 2000; preface), Brian Eno proposes that "house", "techno" and its kaleidoscope of subcultures gave birth to "the most significant change in popular music since the 1960s heyday of psychedelic rock". It has literally rewritten the cultural landscape - changing the way people make music and radically altering the way people listen to and experience music.

Although digital music - "this odd pairing of fashion and art music" (Cascone, 2000) - draws inspirations from the masters of 20th century classical music who may best describe its lineage, it has predominantly arisen from the underground. It evolved from "rave culture" - the global cultural youth movement that saw electronica become prolific throughout every aspect of modern life and many aspects of modern art.

Nearly two decades on, electronic music has fragmented. On the one hand there are the commercially successful mainstream and leftfield forms. On the other, there are the more challenging and groundbreaking aspects, the "sonic art forms" (Clint, 2002), described here as "digital art music" - which itself can be subdivided into two distinct but often overlapping categories, the (high modernist) "classical" and the "underground".

The Dublin Electronic Arts Festival

In Ireland, this cross-over is best illustrated through the Dublin Electronic Arts Festival (DEAF). Though its roots are firmly planted in dance music, DEAF is the only significant music event in Ireland that naturally encompasses both "classical" and "underground" digital art music, as well as their associated arts.

Set up in 2002, and now established as an annual event, DEAF is widely acknowledged by artists and in the media as both a groundbreaking step in developing the digital arts and as the most significant platform for digital art musicians in Ireland. DEAF has grown in scale and scope since its inception and now incorporates digital screenings, audio-visual installations, DJ sets, music workshops and live music performances in a variety of settings.

Mulgan and Worpole (1986) define a crisis in the arts in a number of ways, including a shortfall in necessary public funding; a push towards sponsorship with all the associated distortions; a failure to understand the consequences of new technologies; and the creation of a permanent conceived dichotomy between a "high" and a "low" culture.

The recognition and funding of digital art music in Ireland, through its most significant platform DEAF, is an opportunity for the Irish funding bodies to address these issues and to show initiative and vision.

A "bottom-up" approach

Many theorists argue in favour of a "bottom-up" approach to cultural policy-making (Williams, 1989; Willis, 1990, 1998; Gripsrud, 2000; Gans, 1974; Benson, 1979); indeed it is one of the basic tenets of cultural democracy. However, notions of "access" and "participation" are redundant if genuine modern cultural movements go unrecognized in terms of state support.

Digital art music is a "bottom-up" cultural movement, both in terms of emerging from a global cultural phenomenon and in terms of the accessibility of music making. Reflective and explorative of post-"Celtic Tiger" society in Ireland today, it is on an upward trajectory, with a hurricane of talent and interest. According to the first Minister for Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht, Michael D. Higgins: "What the state should do is assist the expression, the evolution of new cultural forms". (Kelly, 1994: 86)

However, as most digital art music is released on labels peripherally associated with the commercial dance music market, it is therefore removed from the contexts of academic consideration and acceptability that it might otherwise earn. (Cascone,

2000) According to the 1999 *Statement of the Ars Electronica Digital Music Jury*, it can be subject to "crude terms such as commercialism, entertainment or popular music", which the statement describes as "irrelevant", as they are unable to analyse artistic value to any meaningful degree. Indeed, complaints about commercialism really point to an academic community that is losing the cultural authority and historical privilege it has taken for granted.

In an age of globalization, the "elite" or "official" culture has lost its dominance. (Willis, 1990) While many creative innovations in the new medium of digital art music are indeed made on the fringes of high art, Cutler (2000) notes that their adoption and subsequent extension has typically come though "other, less ideologically intimidated musical genres".

There is room for both classical and underground digital art music in modern Irish arts policy.

Arts provision in Ireland

While provision for the arts in Ireland has improved dramatically in the last decade, the injection of EU structural funds and increased state subsidy cannot fully compensate for long neglect. According to the 2004 *Compendium of Cultural Policies in Europe* (www.culturalpolicies.net/profiles), it may be some time before Ireland achieves the level of funding and the managerial capacity that "corresponds with and allows for full delivery according to its cultural reputation".

In Ireland, as in all countries where the arts are reliant on state subsidy, there is an aggravated sense that certain practices are legitimate and valued *because they are funded*, whereas others are deemed culturally valueless (Waters, 2000; italics own). On the other hand, commercial backing can have negative connotations (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2002; Williams, 1989; Klein, 2000), and is generally only available for non-contentious brand alignment. According to Waters (2000: 75), there is a preoccupation in Ireland with tradition and heritage at the expense of risk and innovation - until recently, little or no evaluation of traditional canons has taken place.

While Ireland's burgeoning digital art music scene is highly respected in an international context, particularly with regard to digital improvisation and cross-genre collaboration, there is a consensus amongst digital art musicians that the output is being virtually ignored at home. Furthermore, if there is funding, it is more oriented towards the high modernist classical.

Internationally, the representation of Irish culture is dangerously distorted through the continuing programming of the usual suspects in traditional music, whilst

completely ignoring our rich culture in contemporary classical music-making and an exciting emerging new generation of jazz and electro-acoustic technologists (Doyle, 2004). Perhaps a truer representation of modern Irish culture would involve promoting Ireland as a cultural centre for digital as well as traditional music?

What is interesting for all working in the arts sector in Ireland at the moment is that there is a rethinking of current goals and priorities in motion. At this time of political upheaval in the Arts Council, with an increased emphasis on consultation with the wider arts community, new policy directions must be proposed, including those that further embrace the dynamic, not-yet-institutionalized forms of art - art Gripsrud (2000) describes as "alive and kicking".

Sounds of the underground

In his discussion of "cultural planning", Bianchini (2000) discusses the increasing cross-party consensus in Europe (at local, national and supra-national levels) about the important contribution of cultural policies to improving the images of places, attracting tourists and investors, fostering social inclusion and cohesion, and, more generally, enhancing the quality of life.

Increased state support for digital art music can help rebuild Ireland's reputation as a centre for both cultural and technological excellence while showing government understanding and foresight. It would raise the profile of the country and facilitate belief in home talent. Furthermore, festivals such as SONAR in Barcelona, MUTEK in Montreal and Ars Electronica in Austria are testament to the cultural tourism potential of digital art festivals.

Fundamentally, as this huge cultural movement through electronica was initially primarily a youth movement - evidence of a widespread creativity in young people's lives, articulated in daily practice (Willis, 1998) - that evolved into a more extensive cultural phenomenon, embracing it is one way to make a connection with a wider, more diverse audience. It is an art form that more people will easily respond to and will thus provide a major point of access to the arts.

One of the main conclusions of the research was that, in all likelihood, digital art music *will* receive further subsidization. However, questions arise as to how digital art music should be funded - a balance between digital and non-digital art; "classical" and "underground" music; "establishment" and "off-the-cuff" projects, must be preserved. Therefore, support of a representative multidisciplinary digital art festival, such as the Dublin Electronic Arts Festival, makes sense.

In order to address concerns regarding the institutionalization of a more spontaneous art form, the wider scope of project grants, which focus on innovative

and groundbreaking proposals, needs to be further developed. In the absence of more funds being available, fewer project grants should be awarded with a much higher financial ceiling.

Increased local government involvement and support in highly-centralized Ireland is key to developing policy that is relevant, meaningful, implementable and, ultimately, successful.

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Theory and Design in the Digital Age

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We live in an age that has its very specific conditions and rules which most of today's architectural practice is not dealing with. Digitalization is bringing more qualities into life, which are going to overwhelm the flamboyant visual, the main feature of the late mechanical era.

In Tokyo, in 1990 we delivered a lecture on the topic of perception entitled "From a Visual Civilization to an Audio Tactile Culture". In that lecture we set a firm boundary between the mechanical and the electronic age and stated that man had always formed an image of reality according to his momentary needs and possibilities. There is no world beyond perception; in fact there are just as many worlds as there are perceptions.

Long ago the world was really the finiteness of the two-dimensional plane, then it became a physical body - a sphere, but since those times it has become something entirely different. We presented that as the infinite interweaving of network systems. The lecture was given as part of the presentation of our award winning project "Glass House 2001". We literally turned the topic upside-down as we proposed a glass house for a blind person, making the presently dominant visual characteristics of the material relative and privileging the audio-tactile instead.

This was a turning point in our work since we then vigorously started investigating the phenomenological, not only the functional and aesthetic characteristics of the architectural appearance. We anticipated the possibility that technological progress might lead to the total distortion of the flamboyantly visual world of the mechano-electric age through the predomination of the imminent corporeality of the post-industrial electronic age, and thus to the total disintegration of the pastoral, natural quality of light into the stochastic information world of pixels.

The opportunity for the further elaboration of that idea and the inauguration of a different sensibility was the Venice Bienniale 2000 with its topic "Less Aesthetics, More Ethics".

We presented the idea of corporeality in close relation to electronics in the award winning Reality-Show Para-Site House project for the Tokyo competition Surround Data Home 2001 exhibited at the Venice Bienniale 2004 entitled Metamorph. The project dealt with the possibility of implanting a dwelling into a dense and defined present-day environment. Together with the basic motto "Post-Spatial Urbanism - Post-Natural Ecology - Post-Pop Population" we presented the idea of self-generating implants created more according to the rules of the Internet than classical urbanistic principles. As the digital annihilates the analogous, electronic graffiti are replacing our accustomed way of perception, creating a frightening non-apocalyptic infrastructure of pixels that tends to transform visual gluttons into "bats". Because of hyperinvestment our ego is being separated from its identity through the same process of desubstantiation, fragmentation of oneself, since, according to Gilles Lipovetsky, the paradigmatic TV viewer is "attracted by everything and nothing, excited and indifferent all at the same time".

We have deployed some of those principles in our new projects such as the interior of the atrium and the auditorium of the Pliva Research Centre in Zagreb where we materialized the idea of an arid Zen garden, a contemplative space to be used for the relaxation of scientists. The project consists of several juxtaposed elements - an elevated meandering teakwood platform, glass prisms - integrated visual-audio-tactile architectonic elements with water mantles, transparent veils with "calligraphy" written by means of light and bamboo groves. The computer-directed sensitive interactive elements of the Pliva interior personalize the immediate environment of an individual by creating an ambience with infinite magnitudes where light, in its analogous and digitized sense, has an important role.

In the project "Architecture in the Digital Age" the potentials of information technologies for creation of a new multisensorial nature were investigated. As architecture in the Digital Age is "no longer simply the play of masses in light" but it now "embraces the play of digital information in space" the concept of the digital information environment - Datasupermarket: infoscapes, mediascapes, e-scapes - like an entirely new kind of nature - represents a tent for modern nomads, hypertextual space surfers.

Embroidered by the interweaving of ever-changing constellations and configurations generated by the information itself, the Datasupermarket is not analogue (like a traditional library), nor analogue-digital (like a mediatheque), but a digital, highly personalized tactile-corporeal simulacrum - an electronic environment "constructed" by information where bits replace bricks, information replaces mortar and interfaces replace walls, comprising the ritual (physical anchors - atavistic remains) and the virtual (cyber-matrix - transformational algorithms) part of the public/social event, an environment totally constructed by information itself updated in real time.

**Cultural Change and Cultural Networks's Projects:
International Cultural Cooperation**

The World Cultures Yearbook Project: New Approaches to Building an Evidence Base for Policy-Making

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Introduction

Anniversaries are surely occasions for reflection in, for and about the present that evoke both the past and the future, when stocktaking stands together with new departures and fresh imaginings. Presenting the *World Cultures Yearbook* project when the celebrant is CULTURELINK, is thus especially appropriate.

Indeed, the project itself is a new, forward-gazing international initiative inspired by a now canonical reference, the work carried out by the World Commission on Culture and Development exactly a decade ago (and CULTURELINK was already a major player in the international "constituency" served by that effort). A key issue addressed by the World Commission was the poverty of the evidence base for policy-making in a rapidly changing cultural arena and it therefore recommended that UNESCO prepare a periodic report in this field. *Our Creative Diversity*, the Commission's report, envisioned this as:

> "… an independent statement addressed to policy makers and other interested parties … [which would] survey recent trends in culture and development; monitor events affecting the state of cultures worldwide; construct and publish quantitative cultural indicators; highlight good cultural practices and policies at local, national and international levels…and present an analysis of specific themes of general importance with policy suggestions."

As many of you know, UNESCO for its part implemented the World Commission's recommendation by preparing and publishing, in 1998 and 2000 respectively, two editions of a *World Culture Report* (note the use of the word "culture" in the singular) that focused on the topics "Culture, creativity and markets" and "Cultural diversity, conflict and pluralism". This enterprise, however, was subsequently abandoned, leaving a vacuum that needs to be filled.

In rising to that challenge, the present project is different from the UNESCO effort in two key ways. First, it is being carried out by an independent academic consortium operating as an independent team. It will not be the outcome of an intergovernmental process, in which substance often defers to cultural diplomacy and institutional rhetoric. Secondly, the project focuses on the interactions between cultures and globalization rather than on the relationships between culture and development. The impacts of globalization have in fact profoundly modified the goals, visions, resources and processes of development itself. This shift of focus reflects a major evolution of the late 1990s that had become quite clear by 1998, when the Stockholm Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development mainstreamed the ideas in *Our Creative Diversity*. These emerging realities were precisely what the Stockholm Conference had in mind when it underlined the lack of a robust evidence base for better cultural policy-making and called for the development of an international research agenda to fill the gap. The core purpose of the *World Cultures Yearbook* project is to marshal and present for this purpose leading edge ideas as well as empirical data drawn from existing research around the world and to do so in an inclusive and conceptually sensitive way, addressing the field of culture in a broadly defined manner.[1]

Globalization profoundly affects these diversely envisaged cultural behaviours and values, just as the latter interact with globalization. These interactions, as yet imperfectly understood, are transforming: (i) the relationships, for both individuals and groups, between culture and cultural identity as well as civil society, community, and nation and (ii) the institutional roles of markets, governments, the non-profit sector and organized citizens groups and movements in cultural creation, production, consumption, interpretation and preservation. There has been little empirical analysis of these interactions, however: why does globalization matter for culture and why does culture matter for globalization? Thus the aim of the *World Cultures Yearbook* project is to explore systematically how different facets or dimensions of globalization relate to cultural awareness, development and affirmation. It will thus address the effects of globalization, at once unifying and divisive, liberating and corrosive, homogenizing and diversifying. It will show how cultural fragmentation and modernist homogenization are not just two opposing views of what is happening in the world today but are on the contrary both constitutive of current reality. It will seek to map, measure and analyse changing cultural patterns, as well as the values, aspirations, meanings, representations and identities they express or suppress, and the ways they are appropriated by people across the world.

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1 The *Yearbook* will use a broad understanding of the concept of "culture", which ranges from culture as art and heritage to the wider, anthropological notion of cultures as systems of meaning, values and symbols.

Structure, coverage and goals

The project designed to attain these goals was launched jointly in 2003 by Professor Helmut K. Anheier, Director of the Center for Civil Society at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), and myself. Professor Anheier is the Principal Investigator; I am the Managing Editor.[2] As Chief Editors we will benefit from the guidance and suggestions of a distinguished International Advisory Board (which includes Arjun Appadurai, Tony Bennett, Craig Calhoun, Vjeran Katunarić, Mike Featherstone, Noburu Kawashima, Achille Mbembe, David Throsby, Jean-Pierre Warnier and George Yudice). UCLA has formed a partnership with the London School of Economics to provide the basic axis around which we are eliciting the cooperation of many other world-class academic institutions from Africa, Asia/Pacific, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean. The project is funded by a coalition that currently includes the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Swedish International Development Agency; the Compagnia di San Paolo; the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development, the J. Paul Getty Trust, the Gulbenkian Foundation and the Aventis Foundation.

For the *Yearbook*, leading experts will track major cultural trends in all regions of the world. It will involve open and frank debate, beyond the "politically correct". It will be conceptually pluralist, emphasizing fresh empirical data. It will seek to give voice to "globalization from below". It will also aim to build better links between research, pedagogy and activism. It will cover issues ranging from the role of cultural difference in politics and governance and patterns of innovation and diffusion to heritage conservation, artistic expression and the cultural industries. It will include a data section that consolidates the recently commenced but still inchoate work of constructing cultural indicators. This data section will involve state-of-the-art methodological tools and statistical procedures, presented in a user-friendly form with a high graphics content to facilitate accessibility and understanding.

This structure has been conceived in order to meet several goals. First, to highlight key contemporary cultural changes and the policy implications they have. A second aim is to provide an outlet for channelling and encouraging cutting-edge research. The *Yearbook* will focus discussions, generate enthusiasm among academics, students, policy-makers, as well as the members of cultural and artistic communities around the world, and become a fixture on the calendar of all these audiences. A third aim is to contribute to the development of the social sciences in a globalized world, in this case around the need for social science information and reporting systems in the field of culture. In so doing, it will build bridges between the social sciences, the arts

2   We are soon to be joined by a third editor from the African continent, whose participation will be supported by the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development.

and the humanities, and policy studies. Social science disciplines and the humanities have become too compartmentalized to allow the kind of inter- and cross-disciplinary thinking required for a project of the kind proposed here. We will therefore encourage "out of the box" thinking and approaches that cut across established social science disciplines, policy studies, history, cultural studies, art and art history, library studies, cultural anthropology, and other "specialties," and also invite different perspective from a range of approaches and models used to study culture.

To head off the danger of producing little more than a compilation of separate and loosely connected papers that this risk, an analytic framework of interest to both academics and policy makers will spell out the publication's organizing principles and substantive priorities. In addition, a strong editorial hand will ensure the substantive and linguistic coherence of each volume, and make sure that sequential volumes relate to each other in covering both central as well as emerging topics and issues. The *Yearbook* should be more than a compendium of country studies, or an inventory of patterns and practices that have limited salience outside their own geo-cultural area. Albeit important, such aspects will take second place to a distinctly comparative, evidence-based perspective.

Format

Each *Yearbook* will have about 12 to 15 chapters, and run some 275 to 325 pages. In addition, an integrated "table programme" with 40 to 50 core tables and accompanying maps, charts and illustrations will provide a statistical overview of the main dimensions and contours of culture in both the broad and the narrow sense of the word. The list of tables and indicators to be developed during the preparatory phase of this *Yearbook* will be based on extensive consultations with international and national statistical offices as well as experts in the field. The analytic framework that guides the content and direction of the *Yearbook* as a whole will closely inform the table programme, and individual chapters will draw on the information presented in it:

- context tables (economic globalization, political, legal, social indicators)
- indicators on values, identity, language, religion, etc.
- indicators on cultural production, distribution, consumption, preservation, etc.
- data on major public, business and non-profit institutions in the field of arts and culture.

The *Yearbook* will be published by Sage Publications (London), which has an excellent distribution network that reaches diverse and substantial readerships. It will be reasonably priced, issued in several languages, and will be complemented by appropriate websites.

The inaugural issue in 2007

The inaugural issue in 2007 will be devoted to the theme "Cultures, Conflict and Globalization." Why this choice?

Behind the concern for "culture" that is increasingly evoked in contemporary public debate lurks the spectre of conflict: the culture dimensions of conflict on the one hand, and the conflict dimensions of culture on the other. The duality inherent in this concern is, however, not always overtly stated. Yet, like so many other phenomena that characterize and are generated by globalization, conflict/culture relationships remain inadequately analysed and little understood. This applies in particular to cultural identities and their forms of expression, creation, maintenance and renewal.

In this first issue of the *Yearbook*, however, the focus on culturally linked and induced conflicts is not only to ensure or somehow shield the well-being of the cultural-artistic dimension in the process of globalization. More than that, and in a broad and genuine sense, we want to serve the cause of peace and security through open debate, learning and understanding. We argue that the kinds of culturally driven and culturally implicated conflicts now unfolding are becoming increasingly dangerous politically and damaging economically. Together with a tendency to instrumentalize culture and to ascribe causality to it - when conflicts are in fact generated by contests over power and resources - we now confront a situation where fact-based and theoretically informed debate about the relationships between globalization and culture becomes ever more difficult.

Having indicated the dual usage we make of the term "culture," it is appropriate at the outset to also state what we mean by "conflict". At one level, we mean the tensions between values, interests, etc. that are an integral part of the human and social condition, arising particularly in times of accelerated change. Numerous observers make the point that the arts and culture flourish during times of change and tensions of many kinds. Often, these are the "creative conflicts" that sociologists from Simmel to Dahrendorf have written about, or the "creative destruction" economists such as Schumpeter have identified. Harnessing such creative conflicts through adequate institutions and ways of conflict regulation in an era of globalization is a key challenge to policy makers.

What we have in mind more than these creative conflicts are extreme and often violent conflicts that are not only hideously wasteful of social energies, but also acutely harmful to the economic interests and general creativity of all those engaged in them. Addressing this increasingly topical - some would say burning - question of

cultures and conflict understood in these two senses, then - both within and among nations - is our focus for the maiden issue of the *Yearbook*.

The topic of culture and conflict has become salient in two ways. First, through identity politics, which generate conflicts largely but not exclusively within national boundaries, and have a tendency to instrumentalize culture for other ends. Second, through what has become known as the "clash of civilizations", a discourse that exercises certain hegemony upon academics, journalists and politicians as well as in the popular imagination.

Identity politics and mobilization. The first avatar of the "cultures and conflict" binomial, its mainly national manifestations, stems from the increasing collective recourse to culture in connection with politicized and often conflict-saturated discourses of identity, ethnicity and nationalism. A renewed politics of identity, often bloody, emerged forcefully at the end of the Cold War, whose bloc confrontations had masked a multitude of local claims and tensions over scarce resources or over the sharing of newly acquired ones. Once freed, these claims began to push collectivities of many different kinds into the narrow walls of group identity, often the "narcissism of small differences", feeding a new tide of smaller confrontations between, ethnic, religious and national communities.

The collapse of the USSR and other regimes in Central and Eastern Europe revealed the resilience of apparently widespread nationalist sentiment hitherto hidden under the mantle of Soviet universalism. The cultural vocabularies of this resilience, in Europe and elsewhere, revealed the strength with which the "bent twigs" of suppressed or wounded *Volksgeist* spring upright, to quote the image Isaiah Berlin often used, borrowed from Schiller. And the story has been repeated elsewhere across the world, as a world system centred on transnational corporate power and globally-ranging financial markets has taken hold, generating strong local reactions in the sphere of ideas, values, sentiments and aspirations. The values of different ways of life have risen to consciousness to become the rallying cry of diverse claims to a space in the planetary culture. Before, culture was just lived. Now it has become a self-conscious collective project.

As populations shift and societies change, people turn to cultural distinctions embodied in their traditions to resist what is perceived as a threat to their integrity and prosperity, even their very survival in terms of transmission of identities and values. This recurrent mobilization around group identity has led to a kind of cultural politics whose stakes include gaining control of (or access to) political and economic power. Where ethnic groups have enjoyed relatively equitable positions, tensions have arisen as soon as one or several of them has begun to feel that their relative position is slipping. Such tensions, often inevitable as economic conditions change, have led to

contentions over rights to land, education, the use of language, political representation, freedom of religion, the preservation of ethnic identity, autonomy or self-determination.

The standard "development" models have paid little attention to this culturally articulated diversity, assuming that functional categories such as class and occupation are more important. We suggest, however, that many development failures and disasters stem from an inadequate recognition of precisely these cultural complexities. In these situations, culture has been a determining factor in the nature and dynamic of conflict, as language, race or religion, among other features, have been used to distinguish the opposing actors. All too frequently, one specific group has assumed state power, and state building has rendered many other groups devoid of power or influence. Where it is perceived that the government either favours or discriminates against groups identifiable in cultural terms, this encourages the negotiation of benefits on the basis of cultural identity and leads directly to the politicization of culture. The dynamics of this process are such that when any one group starts negotiating on the basis of its cultural identity, others are encouraged to do likewise; and it has often been cumulative.

Civilizations and conflict. The idea of a cultural conflict at world level has been generated by S. Huntington's thesis that "the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations". Although the thesis remains largely untested empirically, the phrase "clash of civilizations" has become a contemporary cliché, abundantly thrown around by academics, politicians and journalists who have read neither Huntington nor his many critics. The thesis itself is reductionist and highly abstract, starting with the definition of the "civilizations" concerned, among which serious fault lines are predicted to emerge. It treats culture with little heed for the internal dynamics and plurality of every so-called "civilization", or for the fact that the major contest in most cultures concerns the diverging definitions and interpretation of each of them.

Indeed the same could be said of "Islamic civilization", which has such a central place in Huntington's theory. This is particularly ironic post-September 11, when we realize that the thesis is identical with the reasoning of the chief protagonist of that horrific event, Osama Bin Laden himself, and this may well be the case as well of many who have since waged latter-day "crusades", if subsequent events in Iraq are any indication. Nonetheless, it appears necessary to present empirical evidence that either supports or rejects the thesis, and to shift the debate away from its highly ideological justification to evidence-based reasoning.

The initial framework for the 2008 issue

We have chosen the topic "Globalization and the cultural economy" as the thematic focus of the 2008 *World Cultures Yearbook*. What is the rationale for this choice?

All contemporary societies possess a growing cultural economy, as cultural goods and services become increasingly commodified and commodities in turn become increasingly aestheticized. Cultural goods and services are to ever greater degrees supplied through profit-making institutions in decentralized markets. Cultural forms and meanings are becoming critical elements of many different productive as well as discursive strategies. In other words, as Allen Scott has observed, "an ever widening range of economic activity is concerned with producing and marketing goods and services that are permeated in one way or another with broadly aesthetic or semiotic attributes".

Although the economic weight of cultural goods and services is much greater in the USA, Western Europe and Japan than elsewhere, it is increasing all over the world. Globally, then, the capacity to create new ideas and forms of expression for the "knowledge economy" is becoming a valuable resource base for national as well as local communities. Vitality, knowledge, energy and dynamism in the production of ideas and creative forms is thus today's wealth of nations. And hence the international political focus on the place of cultural goods and services in the free trade environment. We have all followed developments since 2001, when UNESCO adopted an *Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*, whose Article 8 – "Cultural goods and services: commodities of a unique kind" - reads as follows:

> "In the face of present-day economic and technological change, opening up vast prospects for creation and innovation, particular attention must be paid to the diversity of the supply of creative work, to due recognition of the rights of authors and artists and to the specificity of cultural goods and services which, as vectors of identity, values and meaning, must not be treated as mere commodities or consumer goods."

In October 2005 UNESCO's General Conference adopted an international *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* based on the same logic. Indeed, many governments have recognized the strategic importance of the cultural economy at national level, whether on an artisan or industrial scale, and have given it adequate attention. Those which have not done so may either find their markets dominated by foreign cultural products and contents, which saddles their societies with heavy royalty payments and the anxieties of cultural identity under threat, or obliged to take the protectionist route of closure. It has become commonplace to recognize that the *creative* or *cultural* industries generate income and employment and also communicate, reflect and celebrate diversity of cultural expressions. In an ideal world, therefore, one would expect each

society to be able to elaborate goods and services that express its own particular cultural visions and aspirations and be able to see them compete fairly in domestic, regional and global markets. This is far from being the case, for production, distribution and trade flows are dominated by a limited number of countries in the global "North". While these asymmetries obviously affect earnings, they also aggravate historic imbalances in communication exchange, in access to information and entertainment and in civic participation. They hold back cultural development and intercultural dialogue. The asymmetries exist within the countries of the South as well. Many people simply cannot afford to pay for the reconfigured cultural and media industries and their only access to globalized culture is through free, state-run radio and television.

Yet globalization has also stimulated a range of strategies on the part of nations, cities, and cultural organizations to cope with, counter, or facilitate culturally globalizing forces. These include strategies for preserving and protecting cultural forms inherited from the past, strategies for rejuvenating traditional cultures, strategies for resisting cultural imposition, and strategies that aim to process and package - maybe even alter or transform - local and national cultures for global consumption. Local cultures have also been reconfigured through globalization and regional integration. The intellectual property industries are increasingly organized on transnational lines. Digitalization, television channels, the production of films, discs and videos, opera company tours and music and drama groups are all cases in point. The more traditional forms of art and craft production continue for their part to express national cultures and to circulate mainly within their country of origin. International cultural exchange has seen a significant shift towards international co-productions, joint exhibitions, mutually conferences or festivals - in short professional networking - which facilitates cost-sharing, economies of scale and international marketability. The internationalized market is reflected in increasing trans-frontier cooperation among film distributors, broadcasting companies, publishers and the music industry.

There are thus a range of policy challenges: of fostering new forms of support and regulation for these processes, of putting in place infrastructures, of providing subsidies and of discovering complementarities between public and private financing, between subsidies and investment, and between cultural consumption and cultural production. But there is very little in-depth analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of the field to be promoted. It is almost impossible to make choices and establish clear priorities in the context of the landscape as a whole. For, barring a few Western European countries, this complex landscape has not yet been properly mapped. The cultural economy remains subjected to speculative, often inflated data and guesswork. The conceptual and empirical grounding is fragile; taxonomies are diverse; comparisons are extremely difficult.

There is an ever more strongly articulated need, then, to "map" the state of cultural enterprise, in other words a broad range of market-related cultural activities. This issue of the *Yearbook* is designed to contribute significantly to this mapping process. It will thus need to explore cultural industries *stricto sensu* as well as artisan endeavours in fields such as handicrafts, exploitation of the intangible heritage, artistic production, etc. The main focus will be on the political economy of these cultural enterprises large and small, including their relationship to the reconfigurations of the economy in a globalized world. Yet sociological or semiological analyses of cultural phenomena as symbolic production systems of collective representation that are central in forging visions of public identity (national or local) will also be relevant. Thus the need to shed new light on the economic as well as social nature, dimensions and significance of the cultural economy in different regions:

- What are the barriers to its development?
- What national or transnational mechanisms are being used to promote cultural enterprise and to what effect?
- What are the features of local cultural resilience or resistance *vis-à-vis* the global corporate agenda, as well as the global cultural flows, forces and practices involved?
- What are the key new developments with respect to intellectual property rights?
- To what extent does the cultural economy in each country reflect, accompany or generate inequalities of income and wealth? Specific case studies might interrogate new or transformed sectors such as the "heritage industry" or the festival phenomenon.
- What are the identities, careers, and behaviour patterns of the entrepreneurs in this field, particularly the new elites among them?
- What patterns of innovation by government and civil society in creating favourable environments for cultural creativity can be identified?
- Are new cultural management practices emerging?

In the light of the above, we shall therefore seek contributions based on empirical study as well as case studies of specific initiatives and projects that illustrate these issues in a particularly salient way. Contributions should also address the policy implications of these findings. Any reader of this book who would like to comment on and/or enrich the preliminary just presented or propose a contribution to the volume is most welcome to do.

Cultural Change and Networks in Africa:
The Experience of the Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa

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General context

Over the last decades, cultures in Africa have been undergoing rapid transformation due to development processes, globalization and the rapidly spreading information and communication technologies. As in the other regions these transformations can have positive and negative impacts. Unhappily, due to its weak position, Africa tends to cumulate the disadvantages of an inequitable competition.

One of the major reasons for the current situation has been the fact that in Africa the prevailing development model ignores the realities, traditions and specificities of the socio-cultural environment and local populations. In general cultures, cultural diversities and traditions have been neglected or considered as obstacles to development. Consequently many of the development efforts not only fail to achieve their economic objectives, but create serious social identity problems.

Thus, while in other regions such development models brought about an unprecedented progress, in Africa it is perpetuating and even aggravating poverty, insecurity and marginalization. To illustrate the growing gap between rich and poor, the UNDP's (United Nation's Development Programme) 1999 *Human Development Report* points out that the personal wealth of the three richest people in the world was greater than the aggregate gross national product of the least developed countries, most of which are in the African continent. The tensions and conflicts arising from this situation and the environmental degradation that accompanies the scramble for economic profit alone constitute a real danger both within and among the countries.

The impact of globalization and the underlying technological innovations are no less problematic than the model of development from which they resulted. They offer new opportunities for freedom, participation and solidarity, for those who have the

resources necessary to benefit from these opportunities. At the same time they represent a greater risk of domination, inequality and exclusion for those from the poor and disadvantaged countries and communities. In the field of culture, on the one hand, they open up new prospects for creative diversities to flourish, for broader participation and access as well as for increasing exchanges; on the other hand they are being threatened with the standardization of models and the imposition of an increasingly passive consumption of products distributed in a one-way flow from an ever smaller number of creative centres.

Due to the absence of effective measures of solidarity, most African countries cannot really take advantage on an equal footing of the opportunities offered by a globalization process taking place in a competition for domination. Africa's weak position appears clearly if we look at some basic indicators published in the 2004 edition of the UNDP's *Human Development Report* and in the 2005 edition of the *World Development Indicators*.

Some relevant indicators

Life expectancy at birth in Sub-Saharan Africa is only 46.3 years, some 30 years less than in the most developed countries. If we consider that two thirds of the people living worldwide with HIV/AIDS are living in Sub-Saharan Africa, we must realize that this dramatic situation risks deteriorating even further in the near future. In fact as a consequence of the epidemic, in nine African countries life expectancy at birth has already dropped below 40.

The average GDP per capita is 469 dollars in comparison with 27,312 dollars in the high income OECD countries. The number of extremely poor people in Sub-Saharan Africa has almost doubled since 1981 to 313 million people in 2001. This is a terrible human tragedy and represents the greatest challenge to development. As people living in extreme poverty increased in number in Africa, they also became poorer. The average daily income or consumption of those living on less than $1 a day fell from 64 cents in 1981 to 60 cents in 2001. In the rest of the developing world it increased from 72 cents to 83 cents. (World Bank, 2005)

At the regional level the adult literacy rate is around 63%, but in some countries it stays at less than 20%.

According to the document African Internet - A Status Report (July 2002) (http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm), the last decade has seen numerous efforts by African Governments to develop their info-communications and technology infrastructure, namely the African Information Society Initiative launched in 1995. Initially this brought about remarkable growth. However, when compared with the rest of the world, the results are still insignificant.

Of the approximately 816 million people in Africa in 2001, it is estimated that only:

- 1 in 4 have a radio (205m)
- 1 in 13 have a TV (62m)
- 1 in 35 have a mobile phone (24m)
- 1 in 40 have a fixed line (20m)
- 1 in 130 have a PC (5.9m)
- 1 in 160 use the Internet (5m)
- 1 in 400 have pay-TV (2m)

On the same subject in the 2005 UNDP's *Human Development Report*, we can find the following comparative data.

In Sub-Saharan Africa there are 15 fixed telephone lines and 39 cellular phones for one thousand inhabitants, while their number is 590 and 650 respectively in the OECD countries.

The use of the Internet has grown relatively rapidly in most urban areas in Africa. But in spite of the encouraging trends, the differences between the development levels of Africa and the rest of the world remain very wide.

In every 1000 inhabitants only 9.6 people have access to the Internet in Africa, compared with 450 in the high-income OECD countries. This is easily understandable if we consider that the average GNP per capita in Africa is less than the cost of annual Internet subscription.

Cultural changes in Africa

In these conditions, after the alienating impact of colonial history, African cultures are today seriously threatened by the effects of rapid socio-economic transformation processes and by the invasion of foreign models and mass cultural products.

These major changes very strongly affect the cultural life in African developing societies, specifically in big cities. The ways of life, the ancestral values, the endogenous forms of solidarity and expression, the traditional knowledge and know-how are marginalized or are lost. There are also serious threats to the rich diversity of local cultures, oral traditions and languages as well as to the African heritage, both cultural and natural.

Young people are turning more and more towards outside and are not interested any more in the traditional cultures. Millions of rural people are migrating to and seeking work in industrial and urban zones, at the same time as huge masses are displaced as refugees due to ethnic conflicts and civil wars.

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Challenges for cultural policies

If African cultures are to meet these challenges and play a dynamic role in regional development, cultural life and creativity should be preserved and developed through coherent and efficient cultural policies harmonized with national and regional development strategies.

However, less developed than in any other region, cultural policies in Africa are presently not in a position to successfully take on this challenging task.

In many African countries there are no national cultural policies formulated.

In other cases official cultural policies are not adapted to the population's needs and situations. In fact, for great masses of the population, in particular in rural areas, culture remains essentially a part of the traditional way of life of their community for which the cultural activities, goods and services proposed by the official cultural institutions or the business sector do not have any relevance.

In most cases the implementation of adopted cultural policies is hindered by complex political and economic problems.

The weakness of institutions, the persisting financial constraints and the lack of specialized personnel and infrastructures cruelly limit the effectiveness of public policies.

The development of alternative mechanisms of financing is blocked by the precarious situation of the private sector and the absence of a tradition of mecenate.

Vis-à-vis the pressing material needs, governments and the international development aid organizations are reluctant to give priority to culture within the framework of the national development strategies and international cooperation programmes.

Hindered by the absence of capital and investments the weakness of the capacity for acquisition, the ill-controlled piracy, the parcelling out of the markets and the unfavourable tax and customs policies, African cultural industries and the media cannot give effective support for the creation and distribution of cultural and artistic goods, crafts and services. Consequently, the African cultural sector and creativity do not participate in, nor do they benefit from, the economic development of the continent, nor in the international cultural exchanges at the level of their potential. According to the estimates in developing countries their contribution to national economies is limited to around 3%, in comparison with 7% in industrialized countries.

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In addition to these problems, it has to be recognized that many important policy decisions affecting cultural development are more and more often taken beyond the specific sphere of cultural affairs, in fields such as social policy, education, science and technology, communication or urban development.

In parallel with these phenomena the influence of national cultural policies is rapidly weakening as compared with that of the economic powers controlling the evolution of the cultural world market and the production of transnational cultural industries.

Due to this trend, the possibilities and limitations of national cultural policies are increasingly questioned everywhere in the world, even in the most industrialized countries, and a need is felt for rethinking the role of public policies.

It is evident that appropriate and effective policy and action depends not only on the institutions, financial and human resources, but also on the information infrastructure and networks that are available to policy makers and cultural agencies.

In most countries, in particular in Africa, this infrastructure is either absent or insufficiently developed. Much of the existing research is not of the kind that readily finds an audience beyond the academic community.

Positive trends

With a view to giving a more balanced presentation of the realities, it should be stressed that in spite of the dramatic situation described above, African cultures show a great vitality and creativity. News published in the African press and in the information bulletins of the various networks such as *OCPA News* and *Africinfo* reveal an increasing diversity of initiatives. It appears that there are hundreds of festivals, fairs, cooperation programmes and local initiatives, conferences, exhibitions, events, manifestations that take place in Africa even in war-torn countries or in post-conflict situations.

Thousands of African artists, musicians, dancers, painters, sculptors, writers and other creators or associations work with determination for the promotion of African cultures and the enrichment of the world cultural patrimony. Some of them have acquired excellent managerial experience in developing cultural enterprises and can successfully compete with foreign firms and agencies at the national level and in the international cultural market.

We must also mention that at the level of the national and regional institutions we can observe a growing awareness as to the importance of culture in an African Renaissance.

Among the encouraging facts mention should be made of the following.

Some efficient cultural policy measures put in place in some countries, such as South Africa, Morocco and Burkina Faso have already permitted the creation of a more favourable environment for the dynamic development of national cultural industries.

There is an increasing number of countries which have already adopted or are planning to adopt coherent national cultural policies.

1. The Secretariat of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has asked UNESCO to assist the African countries to integrate culture in the regional strategy concerning NEPAD. The first consultation organized to follow up this request was organized in September 2003 in Abidjan by UNESCO in cooperation with the Observatory of Cultural Policies for Africa.

2. Some sub-regional organizations of economic integration have adopted important strategies for the development of the production and circulation of cultural goods and services, for example "Programme d'actions communes pour la production, la circulation et la conservation de l'image au sein des Etats membres de l'UEMOA", approved in June 2004 in Ouagadougou, or the Cultural Trust Funds established by the Southern African Development Community in 2002.

3. More recently, the African Union is proposing a cultural strategy and several important initiatives in this sense under the leadership of Alfa-Oumar Konaré, Chair of the Commission of the organization in the strategic plan "Vision of Africa". This document under Priority Programme 23: "Cultural Renaissance", in Action Area 6: Culture, stipulates the following objectives:

   • develop local expertise and skills;
   • strengthen Africa's cultural growth and development in the world, and effective representation of Africa and its material and nonmaterial productions;
   • achieve an African common position in debates on cultural diversity and cultural exception, and strengthen African cultural cooperation;
   • enhance development of cultural industries in Africa;
   • resituate culture and cultural players in development; this should not simply be a dimension of development, but rather a foundation of development;
   • preserve Africa's cultural heritage;
   • consolidate historical memory in Africa;
   • fight piracy;
   • support scientific and cultural associations.

These initial proposals will be further developed in the coming African Cultural Congress and Conference of Ministers of Culture of the AU, and will be finalized at the occasion of the AU Summit of Heads of State and Government to be organized in Khartoum in 2006 on "Education and Culture". It is expected that the results of these events will create an impetus and a framework for a new approach to culture as an integral part of national development priorities.

The role of networks - the two sides of the coin

In the preservation and development of African cultures a growing number of regional cultural organizations and networks are playing an active role. Some of the more dynamic organizations are the Ecole du patrimoine africain (EPA/PREMA, Porto Novo, Benin), the International Council of African Museums (AFRICOM, Nairobi, Kenya) in the field of material cultural heritage; the Marché des Arts du Spectacle Africain (MASA, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire), the FESPACO (Pan African Film and Television Festival, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso), the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) and the Sithengi Film and TV Market (Cape Town, South Africa) in the field of performing arts and cinema; the International Arts and Crafts Fair (SIAO, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso), the African Publishing Network (APNET, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire) and the International Centre of Bantu Civilizations (CICIBA, Libreville, Gabon).

Mention could be made of a wide range of festivals of music, dance and drama and also of the various regional organizations and institutes promoting African studies, languages and oral traditions as well as cultural diversity and cultural dialogue, which cover all the different aspects of cultural life and its transformations. Unhappily many of them are struggling for survival in the absence of the necessary funds for developing concrete and regular activities.

In spite of these difficulties these networks could serve as useful instruments for analysing and monitoring cultural changes in their specific fields. They could also channel sound policy recommendations and professional advice for meeting the present and foreseeable challenges, but too often they are working in isolation in their specialized area due to insufficient funding, linguistic barriers, lack of interdisciplinary cooperation, absence of coordination and limited access to publishing and ICT facilities.

The conclusions of their research activities and experts' meetings are given even less attention by the decision-making factions than in other regions of the world. The same happens with the concerns expressed by the various professional organizations and art associations.

Finally it appears that after the dissolution in 1993 of the African Cultural Institute (ACI/ICA, Dakar, Senegal) for a decade there was no regional structure or framework dedicated to consider the problems of culture, cultural development and their role in development strategies in an integrated approach.

The Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa (OCPA)

Background, status and objectives

In this situation the launching of the Observatory appeared as a concrete initiative to cover this gap and to give an answer to a priority need not only for monitoring cultures and cultural policies in Africa, but also for promoting their integration in sustainable human development efforts in general.

The idea of the Observatory was proposed in following up the recommendation of the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm, 1998), which proposed to "encourage the establishment of networks for research and information on cultural policies for development, including study of the establishment of an observatory of cultural policies."

It was launched on the basis of the recommendations of a series of regional consultations and experts' meetings (Kinshasa, August 2000; Pretoria, January 2001; Cape Town, May 2001) organized jointly by the Organization of African Unity, the Ford Foundation and UNESCO. Altogether some 90 experts, representing the various regions of Africa as well as the different disciplines and organizations interested, have participated in these preparatory consultations.

At the end of this process of consultation, a Task Force was set up in May 2001 and a concrete work plan of ten steps was adopted for setting up the Observatory and developing its activities.

In fact the Observatory is an independent international non-governmental organization based in Maputo, registered in 2004 in the Republic of Mozambique. It was set up in 2002 with the support of the African Union (former Organization of African Unity), the Ford Foundation and UNESCO with a view to monitoring cultural trends and national cultural policies in the region and enhancing their integration in human development strategies through advocacy, information, research, capacity building, networking, coordination and cooperation at the regional and international levels.

The Observatory is being developed as a service-oriented resource centre and a regional coordinating and monitoring body for a network of experts and institutions involved in policy and decision making, cultural administration and management as well as research, training and information.

It is governed by a Steering Committee composed of seven experts from the various regions of the African continent representing different disciplines. The programme of the Observatory is implemented by the Executive Secretariat established in Maputo and headed by the Executive Director.

Achievements - general assessment

In spite of the short time of existence and the limited resources made available for the realization of its objectives, it can be considered that, within its possibilities, the Observatory has developed its activities successfully, in a dynamic and creative manner. It is now widely known and recognized as a unique regional resource centre in Africa in its field of competence.

As it appears from activities realized, decisive progress has been made towards implementing two main objectives of the Observatory:

- on the one hand, through various meetings organized with its participation, which have contributed to relaunch reflection at the regional level for reviewing the situation and trends in the field of arts and culture and on the role of cultural development, cultural industries and cultural policies in Africa in the context of the challenges of sustainable human development, implementation of NEPAD, regional integration, globalizing processes as well as the promotion of cultural diversity and cultural rights;
- on the other hand, through the establishment of the Observatory, the project made it possible to create a permanent operational facility acting as a key regional resource centre for assessing, monitoring, and supporting the development of coherent and integrated cultural policies in Africa.

As foreseen, the Observatory has already successfully developed a series of concrete activities and information services such as a website, a listserve, a newsletter, a database of experts and institutions. It is also producing reports and publications and providing advisory services and technical assistance and developing methodological tools.

The Observatory is neither duplicating existing institutions and networks nor working in isolation. It is performing its tasks in cooperation, networking and partnership with the various existing regional cultural structures and organizations. It seeks to link the existing initiatives and efforts in the various fields relating to arts, culture and cultural policy at the regional level, it is striving to create synergy among

them and federate the various structures and programmes linked with cultural policy information and research.

These achievements show that the Observatory of Cultural Policies in Africa (OCPA) is developing a real capacity for providing useful services to African countries and regional organizations in their endeavour to adapt their cultural policies and strategies to the changing cultural realities of the continent.

ConnectCP - The International "Who's Who" of Cultural Policy, Planning and Research

Diane Dodd
ConnectCP, Spain

Background

Recent years have seen growing interest in conferences, research and dialogue on cultural issues, at local, regional, national and international levels. Key players in the debate include not only those in governing authorities (referred to throughout this document as policy-makers) but also those involved with networks of arts-based institutions, project coordinators, researchers in universities and non-government organizations, the media and consultants. At the same time, there has been enormous energy applied in the field of cultural policy, as in many other areas, towards building knowledge management systems that seek to compile "everything there is to know" about selected topics. Despite this, many policy-makers and researchers struggle to find relevant and up-to-date information as so much is contained in the heads of individuals or as unpublished "grey literature".

So, while there has been a surge in the development of various on- and off-line databases in the cultural policy area, each encounters problems in being kept up-to-date.

> "Even the most organized efforts collect just a fraction of what people know, and by the time this limited knowledge is published, it's often obsolete."
> (Gilmour, *Harvard Business Review*, 23/02/04)

The move away from knowledge management systems towards those that stimulate the interaction of "people with knowledge" - needed to be addressed in the cultural sector. The proliferation of conferences and networks demonstrate how keen we are to connect to one another.

> "Technology should not flood people with information or take it from them; it should identify connections that are valuable to the people that are being connected."
> (Gilmour, *Harvard Business Review*, 23/02/04)

Carl-Johan Kleberg comments that researchers must engage themselves in helping the new international agenda for cultural policy, bridging the gap with governments, international agencies and civil society.[1] This echoes Mark Schuster's comments in his book, *Informing Cultural Policy: The Research and Information Infrastructure:*

> "One of the lingering issues in the cultural policy infrastructure has been the perceived gap between researchers, policy-makers and practitioners. During my interviews I heard repeatedly that there was considerable frustration with how poor the links were between research and information, on the one hand, and practice and administration, on the other".
> (J. Mark Schuster, 2002: 42)[2]

Best practice methods, comparability studies, project reports and statistics from "other" countries are being consulted as never before but there is still a need for people with the expertise to verify, analyse and comment on research and to guide policy-makers. This face-to-face contact is irreplaceable.

Knowledge alone is not enough - people are the key to knowledge and this is where ConnectCP will concentrate its efforts.

Aim

The aim of the ConnectCP initiative is to mobilize human resources and knowledge and help the flow of cultural policy information. By doing so, the project will bridge the gap between researchers, commentators and policy-makers and stimulate interaction of people with knowledge in the cultural policy sector to the furtherance of cultural policy development. By creating an international database of cultural policy experts the project aims to assist national, regional and transnational networking, resource and information exchange and therefore improve the capacity for decision-making in the cultural policy sector.

ConnectCP's aim is to be a selective database of experts, researchers, academics, policy-makers, practitioners and advocates with specialist knowledge in areas of cultural policy issues, from around the globe.

By increasing access to and communication between the most qualified and skilled experts in the field of cultural policy, ConnectCP aims to ensure a better quality of debate and dialogue in the future and a global exchange of ideas and practice methods.

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1 Kleberg, Carl-Johan "International Cooperation for Cultural Policy Motivated Research - Setbacks and Promises" in: *Culturelink*, no. 40/August 2003, page 105.

2 Schuster Mark J. (2002) *Informing Cultural Policy: The Research and Information Infrastructure*, New Jersey: Center for Urban Policy Research.

Identifiable gaps - research into existing initiatives

In order to identify gaps and clarify the objectives of ConnectCP, existing information resources and databases were reviewed and evaluated for their use and function. The following conclusions emerged:

1. *Lack of information about completed or ongoing research*

   While a number of specialist cultural policy information resources exist, few hold information on current or ongoing research or provide contact details, and none specifically provide profiles of experts. Published works feature highly in all these databases but such information is often just as easily found in library catalogues or online search engines such as Google.

   Researchers are often willing to share their work-in-progress on a one-to-one basis, or to present it at conferences, or to submit an article for a newsletter. This suggests that researchers prefer to be personally involved in the sharing of their work and to know with whom they are sharing their work.

2. *University departments - resources and information on cultural policy*

   With many universities now offering post-graduate courses in arts or cultural management and policy, there are various libraries and resource centres, as well as extremely knowledgeable academic staff, able to offer information and expertise. However, our research showed enormous inconsistencies in the data and format so that searching universities one by one is a slow and frustrating process.

3. *Observatories/foundations/institutes and consultancies for cultural policy*

   There are many cultural policy observatories, associations, foundations and institutes that provide information and/or possible partnerships in research projects. Few, however, currently offer biographical information beyond brief information about their staff, board or key experts. As for universities, this information is inconsistent and the interfaces of each website so different that it is difficult to find key experts.

   Furthermore, these institutions range vastly in their field of coverage, as well as geographical coverage making Web searches impractical. Determining which observatories have, for example, expertise on cultural industries requires a large degree of prerequisite knowledge. The process can be hit and miss and very time-consuming.

4. *Biographical databases*

   A number of biography style databases exist on the web - normally associated with famous people. Some offer interesting information but most are basic in their design and content. The most interesting is, perhaps, the World Development Gateway, which aims to produce on-line forums amongst its members. This is a development that ConnectCP would like to consider in the future.

Even the CPRO database (which is an initiative of the Boekmanstichting) provides contact information for authors but it does not include information about the authors. It has identified, in its own self-evaluation, the problems in gathering information about researcher's current work:

> "There is a common difficulty encountered when it comes to extracting information about unpublished work from researchers. It has been suggested that one of the problems is that researchers do not wish to disclose their work until it is finished, partly so as not to be tied to earlier thought out objectives (when the research slant might change during the research process). Secondly, the problem may lie in researchers desire to protect their research idea or thirdly, as a natural wish to control who receives information about their work."

At the same time, there is no easy way to find cultural policy experts to participate in conferences and research projects or to comment on cultural policy trends. Organizers of international gatherings frequently encounter problems in locating experts from particular countries or with particular cultural backgrounds, in order to support cultural pluralism, ensure equality and give a voice to those from marginalized sectors or to speak on a specialist topic.

The ConnectCP database would provide a central place and format for all experts in the cultural policy field to be listed. Finding a biography, or finding experts in a particular field and how to contact them would be made easier with ConnectCP.

Who will use ConnectCP?

The ConnectCP project will aim to serve:

- *Policy-makers and decision-makers* - (at international, national, regional and local level) requiring policy advice and ideas from experts, commissioning research to underpin policy development or wishing to connect to their equivalent representative in other countries for collaboration purposes.
- *Academics and researchers* - wishing to find experts to verify research results, give expert advice, answer key policy questions or share a research project. ConnectCP will also provide an easy way to record one's *curriculum vitae* or profile so that it is readily available on request.
- *Cultural administrators* - looking for expert help or needing contacts in other countries to support collaborative projects.
- *Event organizers* - especially those with little international experience and those wishing to create events with a greater international diversity. ConnectCP will provide the opportunity to select speakers on the basis of, for example, expertise, gender, nationality or language skills.
- *Journalists and media* - looking for experts to comment on and explain cultural policy trends and issues.

- *Students* - looking for reference materials and key experts to interview or for advice.
- *Arts managers, producers, policy-makers and journalists* - touring other countries and wishing to identify key players in arts and cultural policy.

Pilot project

By the time of its launch the "pilot" database will be produced containing 250 key or "star" experts. With strategic marketing support, this first phase would aim to attract others to join voluntarily and using the selection criteria would ensure the database grows in quality, validity and prestige for the project.

Development strategy

The aim is to minimize completely the administrative needs of such a database by making it function semi-automatically. It is to be considered of personal benefit to the user to update and add information to their profile - however, the system will automatically generate reminders if profiles are not updated over a period of time.

We aim to develop the system further by adding an automated service whereby the member can convert their information into a printable curriculum standard or book list standard and later we hope to be able to allow profile users to add video, audio clips, papers and archives.

We are also going to seek partnerships with international organizations so that ConnectCP becomes the link to expert information in future.

Quality and prestige

In order to ensure the quality of the database it must be linked only to people of key knowledge and expertise in cultural policy research or decision-making. Therefore selection criteria need to be agreed and publicized in advance of launching the initiative.

While the database will allow self-updating, a 24-hour screening process will be used to ensure quality. The coordinator will be able to validate an application or update, based on the selection criteria and his/her own knowledge, or by consulting with the steering committee, or by checking on references (where information is received from unknown sources). The website will state clearly that the partners retain the right to choose appropriate content and information and deny permission to be included in the database.

Privacy

While ConnectCP will provide ready access to institutional addresses and contact numbers, it will guarantee not to give any personal mail address or contact numbers, unless permission is given to do so. In order to prevent abuse of the database, direct e-mail addresses will be "hidden". If a user wishes to contact an expert they will be able to send an e-mail using the "mail-to" button on the member's page, which will hide the member's personal e-mail address. The e-mail will be automatically forwarded to the expert (not giving away the destination). The expert can decide whether or not to reply (thus revealing their email address).

Partners

Boekmanstichting, The Netherlands
The Boekmanstichting has a long record in supporting cultural policy research and access to resources in Europe. It has supported the secretariat of CIRCLE (Cultural Information and Research Centres Liaison in Europe) for eight years and provided biographies of CIRCLE's members for CIRCLE's website. The Boekmanstichting also supports the Cultural Policy Research On-line database and is committed to either re-designing or combining this database in line and compatibility with the CONNECT project.

IFACCA, Australia
The International Federation of Arts Councils and Cultural Agencies (IFACCA) is the first global network of arts funding agencies. With members in over 50 countries covering all continents, IFACCA aims to assist policy-makers to share information and expertise on best practices in arts support. IFACCA provides a range of research and information services in arts and cultural policy including an online newsletter and international networking events.

The Future of National Cultural Centres Abroad

Willy Faché
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Introduction

In cultural epicentres, such as Paris and London, countries from all over the world have opened their national cultural centres. In Paris, for example, 44 countries have a national cultural centre. (Lesbros, 2004; Toula-Breysse, 1999) Most European countries have several cultural centres abroad. In the European Union alone there are some 300 national cultural centres of member states.

The idea of national cultural centres abroad originated and developed primarily in Europe. The institutes Dante Alighieri (Italy) and l'Alliance française (France) were the first to take this initiative at the end of the nineteenth century. They are private initiatives aiming to promote respectively the Italian and the French culture and language abroad. L'Alliance française was created in 1883. Other countries, such as Germany and the UK, followed the French example. (Roche, 1998; Sticht, 2000)

Nowadays, for example, the German network of the Goethe Institutes has 141 centres in 78 countries, the Italian 89 centres and the Spanish 23 centres. Recently, non-European countries have also become interested in opening national centres abroad. For instance, Japan has 17 national cultural centres abroad. Another recent development is that also self-governing regions are opening cultural centres abroad to demonstrate their cultural identity (e.g., the francophone and Flemish communities of Belgium have their own cultural centres abroad).

These cultural centres and institutes are acting as "mediators" in cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy has been defined by Cummings (2003) as "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding". In a report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy of the US Department of State (2005) cultural diplomacy is considered as being the linchpin of public diplomacy.

Period of crisis for national cultural centres abroad

Not all countries use their own cultural centres for their cultural diplomacy, since the cost of maintenance of buildings and personnel expenses are very high.

The *financial problems* of some centres are partly due to the fact that these cultural centres have been set up in beautiful palaces and "hôtels particuliers", such as the Palazzo Spalletti (Germany in Naples), the Palais Clam-Gallas (France in Vienna), etc. (Roche, 1993). Moreover, cultural centres installed in these buildings are seldom equipped with modern facilities and are barely suitable for hosting modern cultural activities. (Roche, 1993)

In the 1990s many national cultural centres abroad were confronted with budgetary restrictions. The economic crisis forced many nations to impose cutbacks. In such a climate neither culture nor public diplomacy was a priority, especially since governments were faced with serious domestic challenges, such as reducing unemployment, defending the health care system, etc. (Roche, 1998)

National cultural centres abroad are not only confronted with budgetary restrictions, but also with more and more competitors in the field of cultural leisure for people. Especially in large cities there are more and more local *cultural organizations and institutes* (e.g., museums, local cultural centres) organizing international exchange programmes (e.g., music performances with foreign musicians, international festivals for film, cartoons, puppet theatre, expositions of paintings). An interesting example of a cultural exchange programme is the Festival Europolia in Belgium. Europolia was established in 1969. The original aim was to organize a cultural event in Belgium every two years, which highlights the cultures of a member country of the European Union. Later on other European countries as well as non-European countries were invited to organize major and smaller arts exhibitions and performances of music, dance, theatre, film and other arts.

Next to these international exchanges initiated by local organizations, the European Union also established cultural programmes, such as Kaleidoscope, Ariane, Raphael, Culture 2000 and programmes which have an indirect influence on the arts, such as Erasmus, Socrates, Tempus, Medo, Asia Link. (Faché, 2000)

Recently there is another development related to "expatriate" culture: long-standing important museums decided "to remove" part of their collection abroad. The Guggenheim foundation was the first to remove part of its collection to another country (Venice, Bilbao, Berlin). Others followed: the Ermitage, the Centre Pompidou… The aim is to increase public accessibility to a country's cultural heritage, which is mostly hidden in museum depots. (Varga, 2001) This is part of a

broader development to move international museum collections (Congress Museum Collections on the Move, The Hague, 2004).

In search of a new identity

The growing number of international cultural exchanges initiated by local cultural organizations, and budgetary pressures on most governments in Europe and the USA to reduce their cultural diplomacy, have contributed to an identity crisis in important networks of national cultural centres abroad (Roche, 1998). These centres must now determine the specific role of a national cultural centre abroad. To this end we started research into the future of national cultural centres abroad. On the basis of ongoing interviews with visitors and cultural workers in these centres (in Paris, London, Cologne, Bremen, Budapest, Amsterdam, Brussels, Antwerp) and the analyses of programmes of these centres, we found that these centres must (1) pursue an extension or reorientation of their official activities and functions, (2) develop partnerships with local cultural institutes, and (3) integrate a European dimension. This repositioning is necessary in order to prevent an increased marginalization of most national cultural centres.

Let us first have a look at the extension or the reorientation of official activities and functions.

In general means/instruments are developed in order to realize certain objectives. Because particular means are chosen to reach particular goals, people are inclined to think that those means should completely serve the original purposes. Means can also fulfil functions that were not foreseen originally (Faché, 1985). There is no linear connection between goal and means. Usually the goal is wrongfully considered of primary importance. The means are then almost exclusively functionally made subordinate to a goal that is set in advance. This asymmetrical relationship between goals on the one hand, and means on the other, may impede finding optimal and new solutions. Goals and possible solutions to problems and means should be continuously interrelated. In this respect we can speak of iterative search and construction processes. Usually people take too little account of the different functions means. (e.g., national cultural centres) may fulfil or already implicitly fulfil (Faché, 1985)

Most expatriate cultural centres were originally developed as instruments for the diffusion of their national culture and language, to demonstrate the national or regional cultural identity, to promote a positive image of themselves throughout the world or to validate their national or regional ambitions.

If we wish to reposition national cultural centres abroad, we must start from the different functions these centres may fulfil *from the point of view of the public*.

During our interviews with visitors and cultural workers of national cultural centres abroad, we found that these visitors and cultural workers considered the following functions advisable for the public. Expatriate cultural centres should explicitly consider these, insofar as they are not explicitly realizing them already.

Expected functions of expatriate cultural centres

To make accessible national culture to the public abroad

A retrospective on "Prints and Drawings" by the Japanese artist Hiroshige in the Royal Academy of Arts in London (1997) made the work of this important Japanese artist accessible to the European public. Such large retrospectives appeal to a very broad public. National cultural centres abroad do not have the infrastructural means to organize such large crowd pullers. They must rather concentrate their restricted resources on "niches" in the cultural market (niche strategy) in order to become known to the relevant public.

Successful examples of national cultural centres abroad are the exhibition "One Hundred Famous Views in Edo", a series of wooden block prints by Hiroshige, in the Maison de la Culture du Japon in Paris (2005) and the exhibition of portrait photography by the German A. Sanders, one of the twentieth century's best photographers, in the Goethe Institute in Budapest (2001). Such niche exhibitions, as well as performances of chamber music, jazz, film, cabaret, theatre, traditional crafts and recitals, are cultural events that are suitable for national cultural centres abroad.

To act as an information office for cultural events and existing cultural organizations in the host country

Information on expatriate cultural events and organizations is usually only available in a dispersed manner. Yet people need a single central point where they can get all the cultural information related to their national culture. The website of the cultural centre can be such a medium.

To make accessible literary, cultural-historical and socio-scientific literature to the public

Most national cultural centres abroad already have a library, with books, journals and newspapers in the national language. This literature, especially the contemporary literature, is not only considered to be important by expatriates, but also by people from the host country, because that literature is otherwise difficult to find.

To support and assist living artists to bring them to their audience abroad and to provide facilities which enable the breakthrough of young artists abroad

The breakthrough abroad is very difficult for young artists, in commercial galleries as well as in non-profit museums. (Faché, 1985)

To support lifelong learning

Lifelong learning has two dimensions. The vertical dimension takes into account learning during the various periods of one's life. The horizontal dimension refers to learning various activities concurrently during specific periods of one's life. The term "lifewide" is used for the horizontal dimension. (Lobo, 2004) The development of a knowledge society creates the need for more and more adults to learn all life long, for example learning a foreign language in order to secure a job. Also in the leisure field there is a demand for lifelong learning of foreign languages and other subjects and skills, such as Japanese calligraphy, ikebana, etc.

The demand for learning opportunities does not only come from beginners who wish to learn a new skill, but also from people who have acquired sufficient mastery of a given activity and who are *eager to develop and refine their competence* in, for example, a language. (Faché, 2005) Within the framework of national cultural centres abroad, adults can be supported in different ways. A first, most common way consists in organizing courses for different skill levels. A second important way involves the organization of group discussions, for instance for language learners who want to practise their language skill. Finally, there is, for example, the organization of language aptitude tests.

To provide a social environment at the centre so as to foster social contact and integration in networks of friends

The importance of social contacts with friends becomes clear from the fact that more and more people are living alone. It is obvious that the ageing of the population constitutes an important intermediary factor, but the increase in the percentage of men and women living alone is, according to research, general and spectacular among young adults, especially among expatriates. This trend is expected to continue.

Due to the absence of other persons to do something together with at one's leisure, participation in cultural and other activities outdoors decreases. If friends can be involved in recreation, a wider range of leisure possibilities is the result. Moreover, networks of friends play an important part in coping with stress and other psychological problems. According to expatriates, national cultural centres abroad could become important meeting places for expatriates. Recreational group-oriented

activities are in demand, because they offer the opportunity to meet other (single) people. This goes especially for activities for face-to-face groups in which personal recognition of and familiarity with others contribute to the development of friendship. (Faché, 1992) This is the case in language discussion groups, workshops on subjects of interest to adults, a series of jazz sessions with a brunch on Sunday, etc.

Switchboard for socially and culturally committed people

The trend towards individualism has reinforcing counter-trends on the lines of upgrading partnership with commitments. Individuals are increasingly prepared to take social responsibility. Partnership on traditional or less conventional lines is gaining in importance. The non-material components in the quality of life are becoming increasingly significant and with them the willingness to become involved in social, cultural and political issues. (Faché, 1992)

A national cultural centre abroad can function as a switchboard, connecting expatriates and locals that are interested to commit themselves culturally or socially.

All these functions of a national cultural centre abroad can foster understanding of the way of living and enhance a country's image abroad.

These are all functions expected of national cultural centres abroad, according to the expatriates and local people visiting these centres. Depending of the centre, some goals are more relevant than others. The infrastructure, the staff, the existing network of local cultural organizations, the number of expatriates in the catchment area of the centre became major factors in determining the objectives that can be included in the repertoire of objectives of a centre.

New partnerships

Some of the functions mentioned above have already been realized in some cities by local institutes and local authorities. *Partnership with these local institutes and local authorities is very important.*

Conversely, partnerships with local authorities do not establish the organizational culture of national cultural networks abroad, particularly in networks with a strong centralized policy. The German and Italian networks had the first successfully implemented local partnerships. The Swiss, Spanish, British and French followed with success. (Roche, 1998)

Roche (1998) and Sticht (2000) also plead for another partnership, a *European cooperation between national cultural centres abroad*. Sticht refers to the example of Sydney, where the British Council, the Alliance française, the Istituto Italiano di Cultura, the Dutch-Australian Centres and the Goethe Institute, since 1996, jointly

organize multinational projects and promote the European culture in all of its diversity. In Lyon a similar cooperation was established between the British Council, the Istituto Italiano di Cultura, the Österreiches Kulturinstitut, the Goethe Institut, as well as the embassies of Switzerland and Portugal.

So far, an initiative of the national cultural centres in Brussels to jointly establish a "Centre Européen de la Culture" was not successful. From this it has become clear that a European initiative is still determined by the national ideas and interests of the member states. Within the framework of the European Union, this is translated into the subsidiarity principle, which says that the cultural competence is always bestowed on the national politics. So far, there is still no European Institute of Culture. Consequently, we can confirm the predominance of the concept of national culture within the European context. (Sticht, 2000)

Finally, according to Roche (1998), the European Community should not ignore the national cultural centres, because they can make an important contribution to the realization of European projects. In the European Union there are approximately 300 foreign cultural centres of member states. On the one hand these centres may serve as footholds; on the other hand they offer relevant competence with respect to cultural diplomacy.

Conclusion

National cultural centres abroad that can listen to the cultural expectations of expatriates and the local people and try to cooperate with other cultural institutes, can prevent marginalization.

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Les réseaux: «Entre ce qui n'est plus et ce qui n'est pas encore»

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Banlieues d'Europe est ce qu'on appelle un vieux réseau puisqu'il existe depuis près de 15 ans, rassemblant des acteurs culturels, des artistes, des chercheurs, des responsables en charge des questions de politique de la ville et des travailleurs sociaux œuvrant à la croisée des champs artistique, culturel et social. En effet, Banlieues d'Europe défend l'idée que la culture a un rôle à jouer au plus près des populations démunies, dans les quartiers ou dans tout autre zone d'exclusion, géographique mais aussi artistique. Le réseau tient donc son nom de la «mise au ban» et tente de lutter ainsi contre toute forme d'exclusion au travers de projets artistiques et culturels. Jean Hurstel, le président-fondateur du réseau, défend ardemment l'idée de dépasser les frontières, géographiques et mentales, grâce au travail sur l'imaginaire que proposent des projets artistiques.

Et lorsqu'on parle de démocratie culturelle c'est bien dans le sens de l'articulation entre des projets artistiques, des habitants et un territoire. Comment ces projets occupent-ils l'espace urbain? Comment s'adressent-ils directement aux populations d'un quartier, d'une ville, d'un territoire? Comment ces projets impliquent-ils la population? Les approches, les processus de création artistique, de rencontre, ainsi que les formes d'actions peuvent être extrêmement variés. Mais tous s'inscrivent dans une démarche commune consistant à aller à la rencontre des populations tout en défendant une exigence artistique qui contribue à donner du sens à l'action. Bien que situé à la frontière des champs artistique, culturel et social, le rôle de chacun est très clair: l'artiste n'est pas un éducateur ou un travailleur social et il est bien là pour son rôle de révélateur, pour sa capacité à montrer quelque chose de différent, à déplacer le regard et à rendre les choses visibles. Et c'est sans doute pour ces capacités-là que les artistes sont de plus en plus à même d'intervenir au plus près des populations, non pas dans une fonction d'aspirine sociale mais bien pour les qualités intrinsèques liées à une pratique et une pensée artistiques.

Banlieues d'Europe est un réseau de projets ouvert, mouvant, qui veut non seulement soutenir et développer des pratiques artistiques mais aussi donner des éléments de réflexion sur ces pratiques, d'où la diversité de ses membres. La mise en réseau est avant tout un outil de travail permettant des échanges, dans lequel il faut toujours veiller à ne pas se laisser enfermer pour garder une certaine «efficacité», et qui malheureusement va de pair avec une certaine fragilité de structure. Concrètement, les «résultats» de cette mise en réseau se traduisent aujourd'hui par des projets de coopération entre les membres, sans passer forcément par la coordination, par des demandes d'experts pour accompagner des porteurs de projets, par du partage d'expérience et de réflexion permettant aux uns et aux autres d'affiner leurs pratiques. Nous nous voyons comme des passeurs, des «facilitateurs» de circulation des idées et des projets.

A l'heure où les réseaux, ou plutôt le concept de réseau, essoufflé, est réinterrogé, à l'heure où l'on parle de période post-réseau en Europe de l'Ouest, il y a beaucoup de demandes et d'attentes en Europe du Sud-Est, et c'est à cela qu'on veut répondre par la création de l'antenne Banlieues d'Europe à Bucarest.

La création de cette antenne n'est qu'un geste pour dépasser une rupture, pour construire des ponts reliant des acteurs culturels, des sujets humains à l'Est avec l'Ouest de l'Europe. Banlieues d'Europ'est valorise les problématiques et la philosophie de Banlieues d'Europe mais dans un contexte particulier dominé par des contraintes et aussi par de fortes intensités créatrices. Un contexte qui reprend de façon presque obsessionnelle l'idée de la décontamination (il existe à Belgrade un Centre pour la décontamination culturelle), de la dé-construction (la Roumanie possède un Institut pour la déconstruction et la construction), voire même de la dé-estification[1].

Dans un climat d'insensibilité publique, Banlieues d'Europ'est essaie de repérer et encourager les pratiques artistiques émancipatrices qui libèrent, qui donnent la parole. A travers les expériences repérées en Roumanie et dans d'autres pays est-européens, nous avons constaté une forte volonté de créer, d'intervenir, de faire, d'expérimenter, d'agir en stratégies de résistance ou de contre-système.

L'idée première du réseau est de donner la parole aux acteurs qui développent des projets artistiques dans des contextes spécifiques - dans des quartiers, dans la rue, dans des hôpitaux, dans des prisons, dans des appartements, etc. - pour faire connaître les difficultés qu'ils rencontrent et surtout l'enjeu de ce type de projets. Une des vertus des réseaux reste encore aujourd'hui celle du respect réciproque de la diversité (la diversité créatrice qui unit), ainsi que les échanges, la mobilité des gens, des idées.

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1 L'expression appartient à un sociologue roumain et résume l'idée que, pour arriver en Europe, il faut quitter l'Est et de se confronter à autrui.

Dans ce contexte, un des objectifs de Banlieues d'Europ'est est de rendre visible ce type d'expériences, de les confronter, de les partager afin de pouvoir créer un espace d'échange, d'émulation dans la région.

Un autre constat s'impose aujourd'hui, à savoir que les artistes, les acteurs culturels de l'Est continuent à se rencontrer, à se connaître par l'intermédiaire de l'Ouest. Il y a effectivement un manque d'échanges, de collaborations dans la région est-européenne et il est souvent plus facile de monter des projets de coopération Est-Ouest que des projets Est-Est. On est encore tributaire d'un système de pensée et d'action qui «oblige» à un positionnement bipolaire Est/Ouest, alors que l'Europe actuelle essaie de se construire en affirmant sa diversité, sa multipolarité. Banlieues d'Europ'est tente de tisser des liens entre les artistes, les acteurs et les structures culturelles à l'Est, et de passer à une vraie dynamique de coopération.

Dans ce contexte, ce qui nous semble extrêmement important sont les petits réseaux d'artistes et leurs projets qui visent le lien entre l'art et la population et favorisent la participation à la création.

On sait bien aujourd'hui que les réseaux d'artistes sont encore rares alors que les réseaux des professionnels de la culture sont nombreux. Ces petits réseaux d'artistes sont importants parce que leur travail et leur manière d'être reflètent une nécessité et non pas une conjecture. Ces petits réseaux, des communautés artistiques transnationales, sont des laboratoires où les artistes pensent et expérimentent en totale liberté, même si cela pose souvent des problèmes au niveau des moyens et de la visibilité.

Ils agissent comme une sorte de **plate-formes biodégradables**, avec un mode de fonctionnement simple, flexible, ouvert à des initiatives spontanées, et donc très efficace. Leur rôle privilégié est de **jouer les perturbateurs**, les perturbateurs des conventions, des consensus, du figé. Parfois ces réseaux agissent loin de lieux formatés, essayant de dépasser les comportements consuméristes ou standardisés. On sait bien que loin des normes, des stratégies officielles, il y a des artistes qui créent et activent leurs propres centres, leurs espaces d'innovation et de rencontre, essayant de briser la barrière artiste/populations/public. «*Aux quatre coins des Balkans des artistes ont décidé de se grouper pour promouvoir de nouvelles formes d'expressions ouvertes à tous, dans des lieux inédits et touchant des thèmes de réflexions communs aux Balkans…*» (présentation du réseau Art is not dead).

Nous sommes aujourd'hui dans une logique de production des objets, des œuvres, qu'il faut par la suite socialiser. Mais la vraie question qui se pose est: «*qu'est-ce qu'on donne à vivre comme expérience esthétique à des gens*»[2]?

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2   Philippe Henry, "Le tiers-espace de l'utopie", dans la revue *Mouvement*, 2002.

Et dans ce contexte, dans la majorité des expériences recensées par Banlieues d'Europ'est, l'attention est portée sur le processus artistique, ce parcours qui lie intimement l'artiste, le public et un endroit.

En tant que réseau culturel européen, il est essentiel pour nous de soutenir les initiatives qui émergent des contextes est-ouest-européens et de montrer le rôle que les petits réseaux peuvent jouer pour favoriser les échanges au sein de l'Europe actuelle.

Notre image de perspective est celle des multiples ponts qui traversent l'Europe et qui lient des sujets humains et des points sur la carte, même si les emprunter constitue parfois une démarche difficile à cause des conflits sociaux, politiques, ethniques et idéologiques, qui créent des ruptures, des isolements. Ces petits ponts lient surtout des individus, des cultures, des imaginaires différents, des mentalités et des vitesses différentes. Il y a aujourd'hui une Europe géographique, politique qui se construit, se développe sur l'horizontale des surfaces. Mais les expériences repérées sur le terrain nous montrent que cette Europe tente également de retrouver ses profondeurs en réhabilitant cette construction européenne sur la verticale de la pensée, de l'imaginaire, de la création, qui unit les gens au-delà des frontières.

The Walking Project: Desire Lines, Walking and Mapping across Continents

Erika Block
Walk and Squawk Performance Project, New York University, USA

The Walking Project is an interdisciplinary performance, mapping and cultural-exchange project collaboratively developed by my company, Walk and Squawk, with US and South Africa-based artists during a series of residencies in Detroit and KwaZulu-Natal from 2003 through to 2006.

The Walking Project uses the paths people make across vacant lots in Detroit and across fields in South Africa - desire lines - as a springboard to explore the paths we walk and how they are formed through culture, geography, language, economics and love. It looks at how people make their own paths; how and why people's paths cross; and how changing patterns of movement can alter perceptions, attitudes and lives.

In the past year I've been exploring the use of locative technologies to create alternative maps of desire lines by converting GIS (geographic information systems) data into audio and visual material for the Web, for physical installation and for live performance. Apart from the technology, I've been thinking about the stories maps tell, not only about the places they locate, but also about the people who make them. Denis Wood writes that maps are as important for what they don't include as for what they do include. (Wood, 1992) As I've been learning about the process of map-making, I've thought a lot about information and the way it both shapes and becomes "place", and I've stumbled upon a mother lode of material about this emerging field, from tools and technologies to projects, policies and politics.

Maps

Our sense of the world is informed by narratives of the places we inhabit, so it's not surprising that kids are fascinated by maps - creating cities with shoe boxes, blocks and Lego, towns of Fisher-Price animal barns, complexes of Barbie's Dream Houses,

or fantasy worlds from the Hogwarts maps of Harry Potter. This fascination typically evolves into practical skills of map reading and navigation that are basic to western cultural and civic literacy.

Beyond this core navigational function, however, maps are stories and often works of art. Cartographers are storytellers who make choices that reflect specific goals and perspectives. Even a standard AAA highway map tells a story about urban planning, civic engineering and the rural/urban/suburban nature of a particular place. Maps of a single place made by people from different cultures tell very different stories - such as the Toas that map the song lines of Aboriginal Australians, juxtaposed with a more familiar map of Australian towns, roads or topography.

One set of a region's stories can be told by looking through maps from different times in its history. The same series of maps also tells stories about the history of technology and culture with paper, inks, language, symbols and data, in both analog and digital formats, through the evolution of tools and materials used to create the maps. Cartographers can affect communities and territories through the information they choose to include - or not include - on a map. People use maps to navigate, to orient themselves, to help make decisions about where to build, where to live and what to do with built and undeveloped spaces, which is part of what makes maps so powerful.

Mapping has become a way to navigate more than just physical territory. There are Internet maps, mind maps, DNA maps, maps of neural and social networks. There are maps of emotions and bodies, maps of personal histories and imaginary places. Maps are tools for "information visualization", both predating and staking a place within digital visualization technologies that help uncover, organize and contextualize vast amounts of information, which is what makes maps even more powerful.

As Paul D. Miller (a.k.a. DJ Spooky) has said, "information is culture". Conversely, culture is information. Maps help us navigate culture by visualizing information that addresses those big, fat, universal questions: Who are we? Where are we? Why are we here? Where are we going? How do we get there?

Maps, in all their shapes and forms, help us navigate these questions - not only by answering the more literal "where" and "how", but also the who and why. Artists/storytellers/cartographers create visual media with which most of us have experience, going back to childhood and within our daily lives. This familiarity imbues maps with a sense of the ordinary that makes them highly accessible.

Access, location and personal mapping

In the past several years, there has been a surge of "locative" activity among social scientists, geographers, urban planners, community-development workers, artists and political activists, in addition to ongoing work by businesses and government agencies. Individual and community mapmakers and annotators have been prolific in adapting new technologies to contextualize (and re-contextualize) their personal geographies. This locative fecundity is related to a convergence of technological, cultural and political factors.

Technology: Global Positioning System (GPS) technology was developed by DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), using satellites maintained by the US Department of Defense. Until only five years ago, GPS information was available to nonmilitary users on a limited and selective basis (including for law enforcement purposes). However, as Brian Holmes writes: "Since [President] Clinton lifted the encryption of GPS signals in the year 2000, the infrastructure has functioned as a global public service: its extraordinary precision (down to the centimeter with various correction systems) is now open to any user, except in those cases where unencrypted access is selectively denied (as in Iraq during the last war). With fixed data from the World Geodetic System - a planetary mapping program initiated by the US Department of Defense in 1984 - you can locate your own nomadic trajectory on a three-dimensional Cartesian grid, anytime and anywhere on Earth." (Holmes, 2005) Where am I going? How do I get there?

The convenience and security of having a navigation system in your car or on a remote hiking trail isn't the most significant implication of public access to GPS. The significance takes us back to mapping and those big, fat, existential questions. It's cool to see the GPS tracks you made superimposed on an aerial map - to see your traces on the earth. It's cool to *be* a red dot on a map of the planet. It's even cooler to be able to connect the red dot to a picture of your best friend's house and a description of the day you broke a window there and got that scar on your left hand. And then see how it intersects with someone else's memory from the same neighborhood. Who am I?

Since the introduction of Google Maps and its accessible Application Programming Interface (API) in February 2005, there have been numerous "Google map hacks" - including projects that combine photo tagging and annotation features from Flickr with pinpoint mapping features of Google, such as Geobloggers and Memorymaps. Paul Rademacher has created a housing search tool that links listings from Craigslist to maps generated by Google. There are open source projects using flash or java programs that make it fairly easy for both programmers and nonprogrammers to annotate maps and parse geographic information. The

technology has evolved to a point where it's hackable and accessible through new devices, increased bandwidth and online data-storage options that facilitate these projects.

Culture: Digital photography, video and audio, combined with text applications such as Weblogs, have created a generation of active culture makers and "remixers". Culture is shifting towards participation/interaction/creation. While by no means eliminating cultural consumption, we now have the tools to create, comment on and interpret our own cultural products. Our growing fluency with these tools brings new approaches to the process of making maps and annotating physical space for art, community and politics.

Politics: Judging from listservs and event announcements, the most active community of independent mappers (at least per capita) seems to be in the UK. This is no accident. Geospatial information is licensed to corporations who sell it back to the citizens whose tax dollars paid for it in the first place. As Jo Walsh recently wrote in an e-mail to the "geowanking" listserv: "All of you working in the US are in a situation where maps are free, where geodata is free and open. Why hasn't some kind of revolution happened, showering the world with proofs of the economic and social value of putting state-collected data into the public domain?"

Reclaiming the territory: While mapping for art, education or propaganda isn't new, the toolbox has grown and the capacity of the distribution networks available to artists, activists and everyday folks has multiplied exponentially. Many questions can and should be (and have been) raised about using technologies such as GPS, which are developed and controlled by the military. But the expansion of tools, participation and audiences allows us to reclaim and re-purpose this technology from its military/surveillance origins for creative and community-building processes.

Back to the Walking Project

The Walking Project involves universities and community organizations that serve K-12 and college students, elders, people with disabilities, artists and general audiences in the United States and South Africa - literally and figuratively connecting people who live 8,700 miles apart.

In June 2004, we concluded a research residency in Detroit with two performances of the work-in-process and related events, including:

- Paths We've Walked - an installation by elder artists tracing their personal histories of Detroit
- Walking Detroit - a workshop exploring techniques used to create the piece

- Walking Jam Session - a free-form jam with musicians, DJs, poets and actors improvising on the theme of walking
- Walk the Walk - a voter-registration drive to honor those who walked from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama, to ensure the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

Activities that are part of KwaZulu-Natal residency in 2005 and next year's premiere of the performance in Detroit include:

- a humanities convening developed by university students
- more jam sessions with musicians and spoken word artists
- a printmaking exchange
- university student exchanges
- a curriculum guide
- workshops at schools, galleries, universities and community centers.

The Walking Project explores the paths or "desire lines" made by people who walk across vacant lots in Detroit and across fields in South Africa - and what connects them. We look at how people make their own paths; how and why people's paths cross; how they are formed through culture, geography, language, economics and love; and how changing patterns of movement alter perceptions, attitudes and lives.

Desire lines

"are those well-worn ribbons of dirt that you see cutting across a patch of grass, often with nearby sidewalks - particularly those that offer a less direct route - ignored. In winter, desire lines appear spontaneously as tramped down paths in the snow. I love that these paths are never perfectly straight. Instead, like a river, they meander this way and that, as if to prove that desire itself isn't linear and (literally, in this case) straightforward."
(wordspy.com)

Much like the desire lines we're investigating, our ideas about the practice and possibilities of performance have evolved with The Walking Project. We have been asking ourselves how this work operates both off and on stage, how the growing body of research can be applied across disciplines, and how it crosses, or maybe even erases, boundaries between art and everyday life, between people from different places, and across hierarchies of "experts" and "community participants".

What started off as a bike ride along paths through abandoned housing lots in Detroit has led to a series of walks along desire lines in neighborhoods in the city and KwaZulu-Natal, generating conversation, photographs, stories and connections between the two places.

We have shaped a series of workshops and improvisation sessions around the themes of walking, geography and place. We've been collecting stories from elders, high-school students and the people we've taken walks with in rural areas and urban neighborhoods. We've been making connections between walking and thinking, evolution and history, class, race and political action.

The inspiration for The Walking Project comes from the observations of my co-director, Hilary Ramsden, who divides her time between Bristol, UK and Detroit:

"I moved to Detroit from Ann Arbor in September 1999, determined to keep my bike as main transport in spite of (or perhaps because of) the many raised eyebrows and just plain incomprehension of friends and acquaintances. However, I was not prepared for the hostility of the four-wheelers towards two-wheelers - I was sworn at, screamed at to get off the road, motorists swerved around me as if shocked by my very presence … the only alternative was to cycle on the pavements. ... I had already noticed the lack of pedestrians but it wasn't until I tried to ride the pavements that I began to understood some of the reasons for this - many roads had no pavements at all, many were cracked, badly pot-holed, overgrown with grass and, most surprisingly, suddenly ended for no apparent reason. Had the construction workers run out of cement? Then I began to notice footpaths that seem to appear from nowhere and disappear into the tall grass of abandoned lots. And I saw people walking along them. People who were walking with a purpose. These were paths off the grid, made by people who need to get somewhere on foot. Something stirred in my memory and it took me a while before I realized that it reminded me of South Africa.

The first time I went to South Africa I spent three months working at a convent school in the then homeland state of Bophutatswana, in the middle of the Orange Free State. Early every morning from my window I would see heads suddenly appear over the horizon of the veldt. People would emerge apparently from nowhere, walking with great purpose, and would then disappear into the grass or another rolling hill. I discovered they came from the many surrounding huts and villages that were not visible from my room. Many people were walking to wait for a ride to take them to work, others were walking to school or another village.

Detroit is a strange city. Once a rich, booming industrial city, it fell into notorious decline and it is now a mixture of wealth, modernization, renovation and extreme dilapidation and poverty. It is the city of the motorcar where highways have carved up the landscape and separated people who were once neighbors. And it is a city where many people do walk - on paths they have carved over the years, to stores, neighbors, to a chair under a tree, to a bar. Paths that do not follow beside the broad streets and the sidewalks that city planners designated for pedestrians. These paths are made by people who may not have a car, who need to get somewhere fast and on foot. I began to wonder what paths connected these people to the people in South Africa."

The Walking Project has drawn connections between walking and political protest - from antiwar marches around the world to anti-eviction marches in South Africa and water-rate protests in both Detroit and KwaZulu-Natal. It has juxtaposed Gandhi's first act of civil disobedience in the Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, train station in the 1890s with paths to safe houses that were part of the underground railroad system in Detroit, as escaped slaves passed through the city on their way to Canada. And it has connected workers losing manufacturing jobs in the US with workers losing jobs in South Africa.

Through our research for the piece, we've learned about new political movements in South Africa, responding to struggles for economic justice and basic survival. As global markets have opened up, those who controlled resources during apartheid were in a better position to profit, while those who had no resources are getting even poorer, losing their jobs in areas such as clothing and shoe manufacturing to the flood of cheaper imports, and, ironically, fighting ANC-controlled city governments against eviction from the substandard housing they were pushed into during the forced relocations of the apartheid era.

The project has stimulated a personal rethinking of Detroit, the place where I grew up, which I used to consider the most pedestrian-hostile city in the country. Exploring desire lines has meant learning about its walkers, who are largely invisible, despite the paths they etch into the ground, reshaping a landscape that, like the city itself, is disintegrating on a daily basis.

This disintegration comes from neglect and redevelopment - the paradox of abandoned shops, crumbling houses and imploded department stores alongside speculative housing developments, new sports stadiums (while old ones stand

vacant) and a new downtown office development by a single corporation, as office buildings all around it are empty. As old sites decay, new sites emerge alongside them and clear away history, with little documentation of what came before or any real urban planning process to help shape what will come next. In its very real, desperate need for economic development, Detroit is in the midst of a messy reorientation that fails to take stock of what already exists. (A website cataloguing the Ruins of Detroit, http://detroityes.com, offers some documentation of "what was". While the city had two million inhabitants in the 1940s, the 2000 US Census puts Detroit's population at just over 985,000.)

We've participated in six exchanges between South Africa and Detroit since 1997 (three in each country). These residencies have generated questions about whether Detroit and KwaZulu-Natal are on parallel paths of redevelopment and redefinition, in spite of the vast differences between these two places. And while there may not be any answers, the conversations recur enough for us to keep exploring.

Rebecca Solnit writes about "… the way walking reshapes the world by mapping it, treading paths into it, encountering it; the way each act reflects and reinvents the culture in which it takes place". (Solnit, 2001) These networks of desire lines are personal, often intimate, maps that tell stories about these shifting communities. They demonstrate differences, but they also illuminate similarities.

There is something worth capturing here - beyond the ephemera of our performances and the shifting geographies of KwaZulu-Natal and Detroit. As Denis Wood writes, maps offer "… a reality that exceeds our vision, our reach, the span of our days, a reality we achieve no other way. We are always mapping the invisible or the unattainable or the erasable, the future or the past, the whatever-is-not-here-present-to-our-senses-now and, through the gift that the map gives us, transmuting it into everything it is not … *into the real*". (Wood, 1992)

From a series of ongoing GPS walking workshops, in collaboration with Karl Eric Longstreth from the University of Michigan Map Library, we are building a database of geocoded drawings, notes, photographs, video and audio material from walks in both countries, with walkers from many different backgrounds, each gathering their own locative information in Detroit and KwaZulu-Natal. After The Walking Project performance premieres in 2006, we will develop mapmaking tools for this database.

We're interested in digging deeper into the intersections of performance and community interaction while creating a meaningful expansion of the ways this work moves back and forth across geographic, disciplinary and demographic borders. The next phase of The Walking Project uses locative technology to augment our work process, providing new tools with which collaborators near and far can create maps of desire lines and other ephemeral territories we encounter on our walks, imbued with

local stories and significance, using alternative audio and visual representations rather than traditional cartographic concepts.

We are combining a process for visual and collaborative theater-making that is about telling the stories of unmapped paths, with visual and collaborative locative media processes, which, as Ben Russell writes, annotate space and provide "... a new site for old discussions about the relationship of consciousness to place and other people ... a context within which to explore new and old models of communication, community and exchange". (Russel, 2006)

These new maps will be generated by mixing and layering audio and visual material from the database we're building. People can make an infinite series of new "map mixes" that can be stored and added to the database for someone else to sample. This "map mixing" will happen in three different formats: live performances with DJs and VJs; an interactive montage for installation in public spaces; and an interactive Web experience. New maps will be added to an online gallery as they're created.

> "Of course, part of what fascinates us when looking at a map is inhabiting the mind of its maker, considering that particular terrain of imagination overlaid with those unique contour lines of experience. If I had mapped that landscape, we ask ourselves, what would I have chosen to show, and how would I have shown it? The coded visual language of maps is one we all know, but in making maps of our worlds we each have our own dialect."
> (Katherine Harmon, 2004)

The opportunity to add new material, create, mix and remix maps allows us to act on these "what ifs" while putting the invisible and disintegrating territories of The Walking Project on a map of our collective choosing.

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