

ANNEMARIE MOL



Eating
in Theory

EATING IN THEORY

BUY

ANNEMARIE MOL

Eating Theory



DUKE

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS DURHAM & LONDON 2021

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

© 2021 Duke University Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America on
acid-free paper ∞
Cover designed by Aimee C. Harrison and
Courtney Leigh Richardson
Text designed by Aimee C. Harrison
Typeset in Minion Pro and Avenir LT Std by
Copperline Book Services

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Mol, Annemarie, author.

Title: Eating in theory / Annemarie Mol.

Other titles: Experimental futures.

Description: Durham : Duke University Press, 2021. |

Series: Experimental futures | Includes bibliographical
references and index.

Identifiers: LCCN 2020030114 (print)

LCCN 2020030115 (ebook) |

ISBN 9781478010371 (hardcover)

ISBN 9781478011415 (paperback)

ISBN 9781478012924 (ebook)

Subjects: LCSH: Eating (Philosophy) | Food—Environmental
aspects. | Food habits—Psychological aspects. | Food
habits—Netherlands.

Classification: LCC TX357.M653 2021 (print) |

LCC TX357 (ebook)

DDC 394.1/2—0dc23

LC record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020030114>

LC ebook record available at <https://lcn.loc.gov/2020030115>

Cover art: Apple branch. Courtesy Guiter Dina/
Shutterstock.com.

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

CONTENTS

- 1 Empirical Philosophy 1
- 2 Being 26
- 3 Knowing 50
- 4 Doing 75
- 5 Relating 102
- 6 Intellectual Ingredients 126

DUKE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 145 NOTES 149 BIBLIOGRAPHY 177 INDEX 195

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Empirical Philosophy

1

AMONG CURRENT GLOBAL PROBLEMS, those of ecological sustainability are particularly pressing. It is no wonder, then, that scholars from a wide range of backgrounds seek to get an intellectual grasp on them. This book seeks to help with that quest. It has no practical solutions to offer, but it does present some suggestions about how the theoretical tools of the social sciences and the humanities might be adapted to the pressing realities of environmental destruction. My contribution takes the shape of an exercise in empirical philosophy. Drawing on ethnographic stories about eating as sources of inspiration, I seek to enrich existing philosophical repertoires. This is urgent, since the theoretical terms currently in use in academia are equipped to deal with the problems of the past. Those problems have not gone away, but the terms crafted to tackle them are not particularly well attuned to addressing present-day human interferences with life on earth. This is because they are infused with a hierarchical understanding of 'the human' in which thinking and talking are elevated above eating and nurturing. What if, I wonder, we were to interfere with that hierarchy? What if we were to take bodily sustenance to be something worthy, something that does not just serve practical purposes, but has theoretical salience as well?

In this context, the term *theory* does not stand for an overarching explanatory scheme that results from a process of analytically drawing together a wide range of facts. Instead, it indicates the words, models, metaphors, and syntax that help to shape the ways in which realities are perceived and han-

DUKE
UNIVERSITY
PRESS

dled. It connotes the intellectual apparatus that makes it possible for some thoughts to emerge and be articulated, while others are forced into the background or blocked altogether. If ‘theory’ opens and closes ways of thinking, the question arises as to what the theoretical repertoires currently prevalent in academia help to articulate—and what they silence. Here is my concern: the theoretical repertoires that contemporary social sciences and humanities draw on were pasted together in relation to humanist ideals such as seeking liberty from feudal overlords, protecting human beings from alienation, or dreaming up peaceful political arrangements. Over the past century, scholars have spoken for human dignity, argued against the ways in which industrial processes use people as resources, insisted that human subjects should not be treated as dumb objects in laboratory research, and defended rationality and due process in response to wars in which millions were killed. Time and again, it has been said that humans deserve more respect than many of them were—and are—granted. However, as human rights were, at least in theory, accorded to all of humanity, humans were, again in theory, disentangled from the rest of the world. Their ability to think and talk, or such was the idea, set them apart. This is *human exceptionalism*—the belief that somehow ‘the human’ is an especially deserving kind of creature.

Over the last few decades, human exceptionalism has been widely criticized. The critics do not deny that it makes sense to try to protect ‘the human’ from abuses like coercion, alienation, and violence, but they question restricting our empathy to humans. Other living creatures deserve similar respect, they say, and so do nonliving things on earth. Recent multispecies scholarship attends to elephants, dogs, tomatoes, earthworms, salmon, rubber vines, wheat, and many other forms of life; and, added to that, more-than-human work also reaches out to such varied stuff as rocks and rivers, water and oil, phosphorus and salt.¹ The scholars involved seek to query these phenomena on their own terms. But what are those terms? It is possible to talk about the *agency* of sheep, microbes, or molecules; or to celebrate the unique *subjectivity* of ticks, vines, or rocks. However, here is my concern: terms such as ‘agency’ and ‘subjectivity’ have been thoroughly informed by a particular understanding of ‘the human,’ the very humanist version which (building on earlier precedents) took shape in twentieth-century philosophical anthropology. It is from this observation that the present study departs: ‘the human’ inscribed in our theoretical apparatus is not *the* human, but *a* human of a quite particular *kind*, a human rising above other creatures, just as his [*sic*] thinking rises above his bodily engagements with the rest of the

world. Hence, robbing ‘the human’ of his exceptionalism by spreading out his particular traits over the rest of the world is not enough. These traits, too, deserve to be reexamined. What is it to be human?

The intellectual apparatus of the humanist philosophical tradition permeates contemporary ‘international’ social sciences and humanities. In this book, I will primarily refer to work done in English. This is not to say that the theories embedded in adjacent languages are radically different. Both German and French have been crucial to the formation of the particular versions of philosophical anthropology about which I come to write. To acknowledge that I was raised and educated in the Netherlands, I will mobilize some Dutch sources, too. However, the commonalities and frictions between these linguistically adjacent tongues fall beyond the scope of the present book.² Overall, I keep the precise boundaries of my inquiry unexamined. All I seek to do is interfere with the traces of the hierarchization of ‘the human’ that are left behind in current academic work published in English. This hierarchization comes in variations. Sometimes, ‘the human’ is split into two substances, stacked on top of one another: a lowly, mortal body, and an elevated, thinking mind. Elsewhere, it is not substances but activities that are differentiated. In this case, metabolic processes such as eating and breathing are deemed basic; moving is situated somewhat higher; perception is above that; while thinking stands out as the highest-ranked activity. In other scholarly work, the senses are judged comparatively, which leads to a mistrust of smell and taste, touch being doubted, and sight and hearing being praised as providing information about the outside world. In this book, I explore this ranking in detail, but this short summary already indicates that, in one way or another, eating (pertaining to bodily substances, a metabolic activity, and involving untrustworthy senses) has been persistently downgraded. This informs my quest: What if we were to stop celebrating ‘the human’s’ cognitive reflections *about* the world, and take our cues instead from human metabolic engagements *with* the world? Or, to put it differently: What if our theoretical repertoires were to take inspiration not from thinking but from eating?

To address this question, I analyze a few ways in which current intellectual repertoires are marked by hierarchical understandings of ‘the human.’ As points of contrast, I will, time and again, introduce exemplary situations of eating, as so many alternative sources of theoretical inspiration. These interventions are grouped together under a series of general terms. For chapter 2 this is *being*. Under scrutiny, this abstract term is filled with quite specific

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

concreteness: that of three-dimensional, embodied human *beings* situated in surroundings that stretch out around them. An important icon of these beings is the walker. But while walkers (putting one foot in front of the other) move their bodies through their surroundings, eaters (as they bite, chew, and swallow) move their surroundings through their bodies. Which makes for another kind of *being* altogether. Chapter 3 is about *knowing*. Knowing is usually framed as following from a subject's engagement with objects of knowledge perceived from a distance. But if remote knowing may indeed be orchestrated, in eating foods, the known objects become incorporated into the knowing subject. This makes for the transformation of both object and subject. Established understandings of *doing*, the topic of chapter 4, are modeled on the agency implied in willful action, such as the voluntary movements of arms and legs. In eating, hands usually move food to mouths. Swallowing is a muscular activity, too. However, the digestion that follows cannot be similarly

trained, and rather than being steered from a center, it constitutes a spread-out, churning kind of *doing*. Chapter 5 addresses *relating*. Twentieth-century scholars have explored how humans relate, or should relate, to each other. They stressed that giving is better than receiving or insisted on kinship and companionship. This insistence was predicated on equality between those who relate. Eating, however, is an asymmetrical relation. This shifts the question from how to achieve equality to how to avoid the erasure of what is different. In chapter 6, finally, I attend to socio-material politics and return to theory. Rather than fusing the lessons learned in this book into a coherent whole, I leave them standing as they are: a multicolored patchwork, a polyphonic song, or, if you will, a buffet meal.

This is a difficult book, if only because it moves between theoretical apparatuses and empirical configurations in an un-

TERMS AND THE REVOLUTION

In 1971, Dutch public television aired a philosophical debate about *human nature*. The two protagonists each spoke in their own language—Noam Chomsky in American English, Michel Foucault in long-sentenced French—while the Dutch chair spoke mostly English but from time to time shifted to French. There were subtitles and background explanations in Dutch. The latter were provided by Lolle Nauta, public intellectual and philosophy professor at the University of Groningen. I saw a taped version of this debate in 1977, in my first week as a philosophy student at the University of Utrecht. Ten years later, Lolle Nauta (who by then was my PhD supervisor) told us over a meal that we shared after a seminar with a bunch of colleagues that Foucault had been reluctant to participate. He only accepted the invitation once he learned that the proposed chairperson, Fons Elders, had been the first man to appear

usual way. The empirical stories told here do not lead to theoretical conclusions about eating itself; rather, they are meant to rekindle our understanding of *being*, *knowing*, *doing*, and *relating*. Over the course of almost a decade, I have read the relevant literatures and studied eating situations ethnographically. Based on this work, I have authored and coauthored articles about such issues as the importance of food pleasure in health care settings; tensions between contrasting nutrition science repertoires and ideas about dieting; and the ways in which the stakes of research projects affect the crafting of food facts.³ In this book, my analyses have a different aim: they are meant to do philosophical work. Hence, my primary aim here is not to contribute to Food Studies or, for that matter, to Eating Studies. I gratefully draw on scholarship from those fields, but rather than being *about* eating, this book takes its cues *from* eating. It provides lessons for theory. It reconsiders the terms, models, and metaphors that, along with a plethora of socio-material infrastructures, make academic writing possible. Theory in this sense of the term does not describe the world; instead it takes the form of a toolbox that affords diverse—though not endlessly diverse—descriptions. Theoretical tools often stubbornly sustain themselves in the background of remarkably different positions in ongoing debates. However, they are not fixed. It is possible to *recall* them—even if recalling takes effort. This entails, first, digging up the past and carefully revisiting the concerns that were built into vested theoretical tropes, and then, second, to let go of those tropes and propose verbal openings that allow for other ways of thinking.

Eating in Theory is a book in the tradition of empirical philosophy, written in the form of short, dense chapter sections that hang together under chapter headings. You are now reading the first section of the introductory chapter, in which I summarize what *Eating in Theory* sets out to do. In the second section, I present a prototypical example of a hierarchical model of *the human*. I extract this from *The Human Condition*, a book published by Hannah Arendt in 1958.⁴ In my brief analysis of this book, I cannot begin to do justice to what it was meant to achieve at the time of its writing. Instead, I hope to convince you that the hierarchical version of ‘the human’ embedded in its theoretical apparatus (and in that of many kindred books) indeed deserves to be shaken up. To introduce ‘empirical philosophy,’ the subsequent section explores the classic contrast between philosophical normativity and the empirical gathering of facts. The section that follows explicates how these opposites became pasted together by robbing philosophy of its alleged transcendence and tracing the empirical realities that inhabit prevailing theoretical tropes. This raises the question which theoretical inspiration alternative ‘empirical reali-

naked on Dutch television, most probably a European first as well. The acceptance left Elders, now fully dressed, with the task of bridging not just the gap between English and French, but also that between two repertoires of thinking that went off on entirely different tangents.

This debate is currently viewable on YouTube, with subtitles in English (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3wfnI2LOGf8>). At the time, YouTube and related wonders, such as personal computers, smartphones, and the internet, were undreamed-of marvels. Dreams instead envisioned 'the revolution.' This has not quite materialized. Other transformations, yes. But not that one, even though *revolution* was more or less the only term both protagonists used approvingly. They disagreed about everything else—certainly the topic they were asked to comment on, *human nature*. Chomsky firmly believed in 'human nature.' He took it to be important to underscore that all humans, regardless of where they come from and what they live through, have an innate core in common. Trained as a linguist, he argued that this commonality was evident in the human ability to learn languages. The scientific theory to which Chomsky put his name was that all human languages have the same fundamental grammatical structure. He took this basic grammar to be innate. If his theory was scientific, it was also political. Chomsky argued that because humans were similar in nature they should be treated equally in society: social justice was long overdue. Foucault, by contrast, took 'human

ties' might have on offer. Such as, notably, realities to do with eating. But what is 'eating'? Empirical philosophy has not just brought 'philosophy' down to earth but also altered 'empirical.' The next section traces how reality came to be understood as multiple, as something that comes in versions.

In the last section of this chapter, I write a bit more about the stories of *eating* that animate this book. These are deliberately provincial. They are specific to the sites where I, and sometimes other researchers, studied them. These sites include rehabilitation clinics, nursing homes, research laboratories, shops, restaurants, kitchens, and living rooms, most of them situated in the Netherlands. I work not only with materials from eating practices I observed or talked about, but also with those I engaged in as an eater. In the field thus pasted together, *eating* takes a variety of shapes: ingesting, stocking up on energy, feasting, stilling hunger, taking pleasure, and so on. These variations form multitudinous intellectual sources of inspiration. Throughout the book, I call on one version of eating or another, picking whichever best serves my theory-disrupting purposes. But beware. While I interfere with vested theoretical reflexes, I do not offer a coherent alternative. This is a book of theory, but it does not present 'a theory.' Rather, it shakes things up and creates openings. Instead of reassuring answers, I offer eating-inflected intellectual terms and tools. I hope they are inspiring.

The Human Condition

This book has been germinating in me for some time. Its starting point dates back to 1977, when I was a first-year philosophy student at the University of Utrecht, in the Netherlands.⁵ For our Philosophical Anthropology class, we had to read Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition*. The subdiscipline 'philosophical anthropology' was tasked with describing 'the human' in a transcendental way, which meant beyond all particular (physically, socially, or culturally specific) humans. My teachers considered *The Human Condition* an exemplary specimen of the genre, one that all philosophy students ought to encounter. As an eager novice, I read the book with dedication. Making my way through demanding passages and a somewhat muddled overall structure, I gradually got a grip on it and was astounded. It did not surprise me that the book aimed to build an intellectual means of defense against totalitarianism. In the Netherlands in the late 1970s, the question of 'how to avoid another Holocaust' was vividly present as a normative hallmark, while the horrors of the gulag had gained enough public attention to get through to me. However, my feminist sensibilities revolted. While at the time many writers still unashamedly equated 'the human' with 'the man,' Arendt did not. She wrote about 'women' or, rather, in line with her ancient Greek sources, about 'women and slaves.' This left people who might be classified as 'women' and as 'slaves' in a somewhat awkward position, but I was willing to suspend judgment on that.⁶ What astounded me was that Arendt agreed with her sources that 'women and slaves,' who in ancient Greece did all the work of daily care, were engaged in demeaning tasks. 'Free men,' by contrast, took political action, and this she praised. Why, I wondered, did Arendt go along so easily with the self-congratulatory way in which ancient Greek 'free men' celebrated their lofty politics, while scathingly denouncing the life-saving efforts of the so-called women and slaves?⁷

It has taken me some time to put the argument together, but the present book is my belated response to that early encounter with philosophical anthropology. Let me therefore say a bit more about *The Human Condition* as an example (one among many) of the hierarchical tropes in which 'the human' is cast in twentieth-century Western philosophy. Hannah Arendt wrote this book in the 1950s against the background of the Holocaust, the gulag, and less obvious forms of tyranny—among which she counted bureaucracy. The concerns of people submitted to colonial rule and their struggles for independence did not inform her analysis; they remained conspicuously absent. Arendt argued that the sciences offer no political protection against

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Empirical Philosophy

7

nature' to be a delusion. He did not dwell on the shared human ability to speak, but he addressed the diversity between ways of speaking. He did not foreground grammar, but semiotics. In his academic work, he explored what different, historically specific linguistic repertoires allowed people to say and what they made unthinkable. Take the term *justice*. By calling for social justice, Chomsky considered himself a political radical, but Foucault did not see this as radical at all. To him 'justice' was not *an ideal state of affairs* to strive for, something to realize after the revolution. Instead, it was a *term that figured as an ideal* within the discursive structures of present-day societies. The notion of 'justice' was fundamental to the police (both in France and the US) and to justice departments working to impede the revolution.

Nauta, operating in didactic mode, tried to stay neutral and explain what animated both positions. He visibly enjoyed the task. By today's television standards, his accounts are movingly longwinded. Camera positions, cuts made and not made in the filming, body language, clothing, hairdos, and questions from the audience are all also markedly out of date. But at the time, they were unsurprising. At some point, Foucault, in a slightly patronizing, matter-of-fact tone, asserted that in the revolution those whom he called 'the oppressed classes' would 'obviously' use violence against those currently in power. Chomsky was taken aback, shocked. He asserted that

tyranny as they merely gather factual knowledge: they remain shallow and flatten out what is normatively at stake. Only the arts and philosophy, normative endeavors, could offer the imaginative response necessary to safeguard liberty in the face of totalitarianism. Seeking to provide a philosophical contribution, Arendt took her inspiration from ancient Greek sources, notably Aristotle. Along with him, she asserted that it was the true calling of 'the human' to engage in politics. Withstanding the lure of totalitarian rulers depended on rising above the banalities of the flesh. Arendt deplored the fact that the bodily incarnation of humans means they need to eat and drink: "To mortal beings this natural fatality, though it swings in itself and may be eternal, can only spell doom."⁸ It was her quest to eschew this doom. It is in this context that she deplored the 'grinding tasks' of 'women and slaves,' which are 'merely' necessary for survival and keep humans tied to 'nature.' She called these endeavors *labor*.⁹ Elevated above *labor* was *work*, which was performed by 'craftsmen.' This included making things, like houses or tables, which had a certain durability. Their solidity protected humans against 'nature' and their durability stood out against nature's capriciousness and fluidity. Highest among human occupations was *action*, which broke the endlessly ongoing repetition of life and death. In ancient Greece, engaging in *action* was the prerogative of

‘free men,’ who saw to it that their *polis* did not submit to the laws of nature but set its own laws.

Once Arendt had spelled out the differences between *labor*, *work*, and *action*, which in ancient Greece were performed by different social groups, she took the philosophical liberty of fusing them together as jointly forming ‘the human condition.’ In the philosophical anthropology she proposed, anthropos, the human, is a hierarchical composite. Lowest in the hierarchy is *animal laborans*—the ‘laboring animal,’ engaged in repetitious care to assure the food, drink, and cleanliness necessary for survival. Next comes *homo faber*—not an animal, this time, but a ‘making man,’ crafting the durable goods that help to safeguard humans against the perils of nature. The highest level in the hierarchy is the *zoon politicon*—the ‘political being’ whose creativity allows humans to organize themselves as a society. As the *zoon politicon* engages in action, he breaks with nature and its necessities. It is this break that held Arendt’s normative attention. Breaking with nature, she contended, marks ‘the *truly* human.’ Arendt criticized political theories in which the *zoon politicon* is not similarly celebrated, notably the versions of nineteenth-century naturalism in which Marxism is rooted. Naturalists, wrote Arendt, sought to escape the Cartesian dichotomy between human consciousness and the material world by foregrounding eating. They theorized the human as “a living organism, whose very survival depends upon the incorporation, the consumption, of outside matter.”¹⁰ In this way, the material world no longer opposed the ‘cogito,’ but entered the human ‘being.’ Arendt wrote that while this may sound tempting, it is yet another manifestation the Christian inclination for granting too much importance to human life.¹¹ Survival is not what makes *us* human; freedom is.

Like ‘the Greeks’ whom she admired, Arendt had little patience for the chores necessary for survival. This impatience did not clash with her own apparent membership in the category of ‘women and slaves.’ Instead it fit her attempts to break out of the social position accorded to ‘women.’ Arendt sought, in an emancipatory mode, to live and work as ‘a philosopher’—however difficult this was for someone all too easily considered to be ‘a woman’ in the eyes of others. As a philosopher, Arendt sang the praises of the *zoon politicon* contra totalitarian arrangements that kept people mindlessly focused on survival. However, by the time I read her work, some twenty years later, emancipatory ideals of equality between the sexes had been supplemented with feminist critiques on one-sidedly acclaiming the pursuits of men. Shaped by this new feminist ethos, I revolted against the idea of casting aside as lowly

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

he saw violence as unjust, something that, he underlined, he would turn against, no matter from whom it came. I do not remember whether this painful part of the exchange got through to me as a first-year student. But the academic side of the debate certainly caught my imagination. It struck me that rather than making arguments in given terms (as Chomsky did), philosophers could apparently also doubt terms (as Foucault did). They could put certain words between brackets, abstain from using them, and instead put them in their historical and social contexts. They could willfully ignore what otherwise seemed self-evident and suspend conclusions—even in the face of political urgency. Stop. Take a step back. For new things to happen, we might need to dream up new words.

Most of the sidelines in the margins of this book contain stories about *eating* that I import from the works of others. This is to compensate for the limits of my own, narrowly situated, fieldwork. It helps to underscore, that beyond my particular field, *eating* takes on a myriad of other shapes. However, this first sideline does something different. It is a caveat. It issues a warning that in this book I will *not* address the many *injustices* related to eating, however pressing they are. Along with that, I will bypass all kinds of other inequalities between people, grouped along class, gender, ancestry, color, country, culture, or other lines. Injustices and inequalities form real enough reasons for concern, but the present book I have written as a student of Foucault, not

the life-saving labor of people—women or otherwise—such as farmers, cooks, and cleaners. Arendt might have retorted that she sought to downgrade not some groups of people but, rather, the fleshy substrate of all people: “The human body, its activity notwithstanding, is thrown back upon itself, concentrates upon nothing but its own being alive, and remains imprisoned in its metabolism of nature without ever transcending or freeing itself from the recurring cycle of its own functioning.”¹² However, in the late 1970s, it was already too late to take ‘the recurring cycles of nature’ for granted. These were noticeably under threat.¹³ And what, I wondered, would become of pleasure if ‘the body’ was cast as a prison from which ‘we humans’ needed to free ourselves?

The Human Condition presents just one version of the hierarchical thinking that permeated twentieth-century philosophical anthropology. In the present book, I will revisit a number of others. In this way, we may come to recognize the traces they have left behind in our present-day conceptual apparatus, in the ways in which we imagine what it is to *be*, to *know*, to *do*, and to *relate*. This inquiry should help us reimagine what those verbs might mean. But if I seek to escape from (some of) the theoretical hold of our philosophical ancestors, I do not argue that they were wrong in some general sense, nor that I have access to a deeper truth that eluded them. Instead, I seek to situate their work in re-

lation to the concerns they sought to address. This opens space for the question of what alters now that different concerns come to the fore: concerns to do with metabolism, ecology, environmental destruction. Hence, in this book I do not aim to contribute to the emancipation of this or that group of people—farmers, cooks, or cleaners. Instead, I seek to revalue their pursuits, the *labor* relevant to survival. This I approach by unraveling (things to do with) ‘eating.’ Mind you, the Western philosophical tradition is not univocal, and along the way, eating has been recurrently appreciated. Take the nineteenth-century naturalists whom Arendt reproached for seeking to escape Descartes’s binary between *ego* and *world* by attending to ego’s ingestion of the world. Or, for that matter, take Descartes. He may have insisted that his *thinking* (not his eating) proves his *being*, but in letters to his learned female friends, he used to dwell for pages on end on dietary advice.¹⁴ Here I will leave out such complexities, take shortcuts, and simplify. I do not aim to do justice to the philosophical anthropologists of old. Instead, I seek to recall them: to revisit samples of their work in order to escape from its grip.

Facts and Norms

In philosophical anthropology, ‘the human’ was a general figure, abstracted from really existing ones. And although Arendt differentiated between *types* of humans, she too combined ‘free men,’ ‘craftsmen,’ and ‘women and slaves’ into a single entity, *the human*, whose condition she sought to define. In response to this, some scholars raised the concern that leaving ‘the human’ unspecified meant, by stealth, that only ‘the man’ was taken into account. In this way, philosophical anthropology concerned itself with no more than half of the species and elevated male standards into general ones. One author who voiced this concern was Frederik Buytendijk, who in the early 1950s published a book titled (I translate from the Dutch) *The Woman: Her Nature, Appearance, and Existence*.¹⁵ The aim of the book was to give ‘the woman’ the recognition she deserved and to articulate her particular qualities. Buytendijk mused that ‘the man,’ though difficult to know, forms a puzzle that can be solved, while ‘the woman’ (‘as is widely recognized’) somehow remains a mystery that defies knowledge. Rather than seeking to tame this mystery, Buytendijk said, ‘we’ would do well to stop overvaluing masculine achievements and appreciate ‘the woman’ for her distinctive, elusive traits, including her passivity. We know, wrote Buytendijk, that ‘the man’ realizes himself in his activities, in getting things done. ‘The woman,’ by contrast, has the virtue of staying closer to nature. Poetically speaking, she resembles a plant, most

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

Chomsky. Hence, I do not critique realities that fail to live up to given standards, but seek to contribute to a collective search for other words, for other ways of speaking and writing. Since that 1971 debate, a lot has changed, but the question of what intellectual work should contribute to has not gone away. And that is fine. There is no added virtue in agreement at this point; these are productive frictions. At the same time, any single book can only do so much, and this one is about ways of wording and models with which to think. It does not outline 'human nature,' but recalls it. It does not serve justice, nor contribute to equality, but asks questions concerning other *goods*.

notably its flowers, which graciously display their beauty.

Not everybody welcomed this particular brand of praise. One of Buytendijk's opponents was the philosopher Else Barth.¹⁶ In her thesis, written in the 1960s and published as a book in the early 1970s, Barth did not argue with the above (and similar) contestable declarations one by one. Instead, she countered the very project of characterizing 'the woman.' In doing so, she drew on the philosophical discipline of logic, in which at the time reasoning about particulars like q and p was being supplemented with reasoning about heterogeneous sets. Women, she argued, form a heterogeneous set and there is no logical operation that allows for the fusion

of the varied members of such a set into a singularity that warrants the use of 'the.' The members of the class of 'women' do not share a long list of discernible, distinctive traits. Women only have their biological sex in common, nothing more. (Querying the pertinence of 'biological sex' came only later; see below.) If Buytendijk was worried that 'the human' was readily equated with 'the man,' Barth had another concern. This was that people classified as 'women' might have to live up to fantasies about 'the woman' cultivated by the likes of Buytendijk. She was not eager to be respected for being passive and resembling a flower. Like others calling for emancipation, Barth welcomed the societal opportunities that women had just about, but only just about, obtained. Possibilities such as studying philosophy and becoming professional logicians.

'The human' was not just a philosophical puzzle-slash-mystery, but also topicalized in a wide range of empirical sciences. In that arena, the question of how to split up 'the human' played out along more axes than those of two sexes alone. Particularly prominent were attempts to divide the single human species into contrasting biological races. Early on in the twentieth century, physical anthropologists measured physical traits, such as height, skull size, and facial angles.¹⁷ Some hoped their findings would allow them to differ-

entiate between groups of people originating in different continents. Others worked on a smaller scale: in the Netherlands, there were attempts to differentiate racially between people from different provinces or even towns. Despite all the effort invested in it, the project was never particularly successful in its own scientific terms. Even so, 'racial difference' was used to legitimize colonial rule. Then the Nazis murdered millions of people, whom they designated with racial terms as 'Jews' or 'Roma.' Afterward, 'race' became—in Europe—a forbidden word.¹⁸ In the 1950s, geneticists asserted that genetic variation among people did not cluster into discrete groups. The differences *among* those who allegedly belonged to 'a race' were as significant as the differences *between* such groups. But the story did not end there. Ever more elaborate tools made it possible to map ever more genes, while ever more powerful computers allowed for ever more types of clustering. Attempts to classify people into biological races thus linger on, often along with out-of-date classificatory terms.¹⁹ At the same time, the idea that beyond their differences, humans share a *common nature* also endures: the discipline of genetics prides itself in having mapped 'the human genome' as if there were only one. This singularization goes together with a pluralization that descends to level of the individual, at which genetic profiling distinguishes between single people on the basis of their unique genetic codes—identical twins exempted.

While geneticists tried to link biological differences between groups of humans to their genes, epidemiologists studied how human bodies are affected by their social and material surroundings. This, they hoped, would help in tracking down the environmental causes of disease. Research along these lines made it possible to conclude, for instance, that when people who lived at sea level traveled high up into the mountains, their hemoglobin levels increased. Or that men in Japan had fewer heart attacks than their counterparts in the US because the former ate a lot of fish while the latter coveted meat. Migrants who moved from Tokyo to New York and then adopted the eating habits of their new neighbors saw their chances of having a heart attack increase accordingly. Women in Japan, in their turn, were far less bothered by menopause than their North American counterparts—maybe thanks to the amounts of soy they ate. All in all, the conclusion was that human bodies, whatever their starting point at birth, come to differ depending on the circumstances in which they find themselves.²⁰ These few sentences summarize decades of research, shelves full of books, or, nowadays, servers full of journal articles. Here, they are meant to indicate that differentiating a single, categorical 'human' into different 'groups of humans' was both backed up

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

and undermined, in various ways, by diverse strands of biologically oriented research.

At the same time, social, linguistic, and cultural anthropologists also explored how humans may differ and what they have in common. Very roughly speaking: social anthropologists asserted that people gather together in societies to assure that collectively they have enough food and fluids to subsist on, safe places to shelter from harsh weather and wild animals, and protection against people from other groups. If different societies functioned in different ways, the pertinent commonality was that all societies seek to sustain themselves. Linguistic anthropologists, in their turn, differentiated between groups of people on the basis of their linguistic repertoires. Different ways of speaking allowed people to think and say different things. However, once again this also generated a commonality, the assertion that all humans use spoken, signed, and/or written symbols to communicate with others, express themselves, and arrange their affairs. Cultural anthropologists, finally, focused on a further kind of meaning-making. They gathered the stories that people tell each other as they try to get a grasp on an otherwise bewildering reality. Some traced commonalities between diverse foundational myths. Others clustered people into ‘cultures’ and cultures into ‘types’ on the basis of structural similarities between their folklore. In one way or another, all humans were taken to make sense of the world and give meaning to it.²¹

There is a crucial difference between, on the one hand, all these empirical attempts to specify ‘the human’ and, on the other, the philosophical discussions about ‘the human’ that I recall in this book. While empirical researchers, whatever the differences among them, shared the ambition to represent reality *as it is*, philosophy took itself to be a *normative* endeavor. It did not represent reality, but instead sought to qualify it, judge it, critique it. Take once again *The Human Condition*. If, in it, Arendt claimed that ‘the human’ is a *zoon politicon*, she did not ascertain a fact, but proposed a counterfactual. Exactly because so many people were *not* particularly interested in politics, Arendt insisted that *political* is how a proper human *should be*. She considered the reality she witnessed around her to fall short of the standards it was meant to meet. Empirical sciences were not supposed to be similarly normative, which is why Arendt called them ‘shallow.’ She asserted that in representing reality, scientists merely repeat it, while philosophy is able to offer more, that is, critique. Buytendijk was deliberately normative as well. He argued against the elevation of male traits to standards for ‘the human.’ In his book, he engaged in a dialogue with Simone de Beauvoir, who in *The Second*

Sex, published a few years earlier, had also insisted that ‘the human’ does not come in one sex only. But if Buytendijk gracefully accepted some of De Beauvoir’s points, he passionately turned against her emancipatory call for women’s equality with men. This, he argued, unwittingly left ‘the male’ intact as a standard. ‘The woman’ deserved her own standards.

It is easy to understand that Barth was not enthused about the particular standards that Buytendijk proposed. After all, if ‘the woman’ was to be beautiful and passive like a flower, Barth would be disqualified in one way or another. Either her sharp reasoning meant she was not a true woman, or her being a woman meant she could not be a true philosopher. Such judgments the empirical sciences emphatically hoped to avoid. For them, someone who did not fit the rules did not commit a *transgression* but constituted an *anomaly*. Anomalies were not to be corrected; rather, they suggested that the theory stipulating the regularities had to be adapted. Hence, confronted with ‘women philosophers,’ an ideal-type empirical researcher should have concluded that Buytendijk’s assertion that ‘the woman’ is ‘beautiful and passive like a flower’ is simply not true. Thus, the word *true* shifts its location. It no longer belongs to a person who (being a philosopher) is not a true woman, or who (being a woman) is not a true philosopher. Instead, it now pertains to a sentence (‘the woman’ resembles a flower) that is not true (given the existence of women philosophers). In short, while philosophy cherished its norms *over* reality, the sciences had to adapt their propositions *to* reality. This meant that these two research styles did not combine. Scholars were warned never to mix them up. The *is* of empirical studies and the *ought* at stake in philosophy had to be kept apart. Empirical researchers needed to see to it that societal or personal norms did not unduly color their facts; philosophers encouraged each other to go beyond the facts. Only a *transcendental* position, they agreed, made it possible to gain distance from *immanent* realities and be critical of them. This, then, is the contrast between ‘empirical’ and ‘philosophy’ that dissipated in the ostensible oxymoron ‘empirical philosophy.’

Philosophy down to Earth

Twentieth-century philosophy had normative ambitions. As the sciences, in their own different ways, sought to establish empirical facts, philosophy granted itself the task of transcending those facts.²² This task was divided between different branches of philosophy, which each tackled its own set of normative questions. Logic asked how to reason well, political theory how to achieve a just society, epistemology how to know well, ethics how to live well,

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

and aesthetics sought to define beauty. Normative questions were to be answered not by attending to empirical realities, but by engaging in abstract reasoning and rational argumentation. That was the idea. But all along, that idea was contested. Diverse scholars interfered in diverse ways with the divide between immanent and transcendent, empirical and philosophical. In this way, gradually, *empirical philosophy* emerged. I use the term here as per the suggestion of the Dutch philosopher Lolle Nauta, who used it for the research that, in the late 1980s, he allowed his PhD students (including me) to do under his critical guidance.²³ To give a sense of the intellectual ancestry of the genre, I will cut a trail that starts with Wittgenstein's undermining the idea that proper reasoning depends on clearly defined concepts. The trail then shifts to Foucault's attack on the notion of counterfactual norms and presents Nauta's detection of empirical realities in philosophical classics. Afterward, it moves on to Lakoff and Johnson's demonstration that metaphors form a great conduit for such realities, and finally arrives at Serres's idea that alternative empirical configurations may inspire alternative theoretical tropes. This trail is not meant to serve as a historical overview; it is cut with the purpose of introducing the research techniques at work in the present book.

To reason well, or so a wide range of twentieth-century philosophers stipulated, one must start by properly defining one's concepts. It has to be clear what exactly particular terms do and do not allude to. Wittgenstein underscored this normative position when, in his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophus*, he wrote, "The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence." In the decades that followed its publication, Wittgenstein spent a long time outside academia, and once he returned, it was this very phrase that he began to hollow out. Why, he asked, do philosophers spend so much effort on clearly outlining their concepts, while elsewhere, in ordinary settings, people manage very well without conceptual precision? If two friends play a game of tennis in the morning and one of chess in the afternoon, they do not need to wonder what exactly the word *game* refers to. What is more, in ordinary practices, words often do not *refer* at all. Rather than functioning as a label, they form part the action. Take two builders. If one of them yells "Stone!" to the other, he is not denoting an object, but giving an order: "Hand me that stone!" Spoken in another tone of voice, this same word "stone" might be a request: "Could you hand me that stone, please?" Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, published in 1955, is packed with such ultrashort stories about ordinary events which succinctly

convey his theoretical messages. Taken together, they undermine the idea that normative rules for the use of language add something significant to the practices that elude them.²⁴

Wittgenstein's stories are quasi-ethnographic snapshots of ordinary language use. They show that such language use does not meet the standards of clarity and consistency, but that this does not mean things necessarily fall apart in practice. People get by very well with fuzzy and adaptable speech. Hence, or so Wittgenstein argued, the norms of 'proper language use' that philosophers try to erect are superfluous. They have nothing of value to add to a reality that does not take heed of them. In the work of Michel Foucault, empirical studies were made to do philosophical work in a different way. Foucault did not say that the norms dreamed up by philosophers have little salience for social practices. Instead, he argued that the norms that philosophers take to be transcendental are always already part of the society from which they emerge. Hence, they are not counterfactual, but belong to the same discursive field as the realities they are meant to critique. Foucault supported his arguments with detailed empirical studies of French historical archives. Drawing on these, he demonstrated that over the last few centuries conceptual repertoires, social institutions, and material arrangements had been formed and transformed together. Norms came and went as part of discourses, that is along with the socio-material configurations that they helped to foster and legitimate.

A particular norm that Foucault worked on was that of 'normality.' He pointed out that in modern societies populations are governed not just by means of lawlike rules set by kings or governments, but also through divisions between 'normal' and 'abnormal' made by professionals—from linguists to physicians. While people who transgress rules may be punished for this, people who do not meet standards of normality instead try to improve themselves to avoid ending up in the margins. People from the French provinces learn to speak 'normal French' and submit themselves to standards decided on by a Parisian committee of experts. If they maintain their local linguistic variety, they remain stuck in the provinces. By analogy, if people are sick or insane, they tend to seek out professionals for advice, pills, therapy, or some other intervention, hoping that this will return them to normality. The norms of grammar, health, and sanity are therefore far from counterfactual. They do not afford critical distance so much as they allow for the normalizing governance of populations.²⁵ What follows? Foucault's analyses have widely been read as pessimistic declarations that, in one way or another, the doings of people in modern societies are all firmly disciplined. End of story. How-

ever, Foucault's work may also be read as an activist call to escape. Or, as he put it in an often-quoted phrase (for which I cannot find the reference): "My job is making windows where there were once walls." If historical investigations show that things used to be otherwise, this offers the promise that they might become different again. And maybe they already are, somewhere else. As criticism is inevitably caught in the terms of those being criticized, it may be wiser to go out, run, play. Experiment with alternatives.

Hence, while Wittgenstein undermined the salience of crafting transcendental norms, Foucault cast doubt on their transcendence. And while Wittgenstein recounted anecdotes from everyday life to show that language-in-practice does not bow to philosophical norms, Foucault used archival materials to demonstrate that norms do not oppose the societies in which they occur, but help to sustain them. Another way to undermine the idea that philosophical notions reside in the transcendental realm was to show that philosophical treatises inevitably contain traces of the empirical realities relevant to their authors. Lolle Nauta called these *exemplary situations*. He adapted this term from the *exemplars* about which Thomas Kuhn wrote when describing how scientific knowledge is taught. When students learn about Newtonian physics, Kuhn contended, they are provided not just with wide-ranging theories, but also with exemplary demonstrations. To get a grasp on what 'gravity' entails, they are shown a ball that rolls down an inclined plane; to gain a sense of 'force,' they observe a demonstration of a spring pulled out of shape and then returning to its former position.²⁶ By analogy, or so Nauta proposed, philosophical texts become easier to understand if we dig out the empirical incidents that inform them. If Sartre wrote that 'the human' is a stranger to other humans, Nauta suggested that the *exemplary situation* behind this was a Parisian sidewalk cafe where solitary people sip coffee or pastis while eying strangers. Similarly, while philosophers used to read Locke as an author who wrote about 'property' in the abstract, attending to the empirical realities at stake showed that his concerns were rather practical: Could English gentlemen own land in North America? When Locke argued that land ownership follows from working the land, and that the way Native Americans lived off the land did not count as 'working,' he was defending his personal right to own property in the colonies.²⁷

Exemplary situations may infiltrate philosophical texts in many ways. They may travel along with an evocative term, as they do when Sartre writes about 'strangers'; or they may hide in a concern, as they do in the case of Locke's musings about property. Metaphors form another possible conduit.

Take the famous ‘argument is war,’ which forms the opening case in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s book *Metaphors We Live By*.²⁸ Philosophers used to present their preferred conversational format, that of ‘rational argumentation,’ as a peaceful alternative to violence. But, Lakoff and Johnson pointed out, they talked about it in bellicose terms. One may *win* or *lose* an argument, *attack* an *opponent*, *defend* oneself against such an *attack*, be more or less *tactical* or devise a long-term *strategy*. After a lecture presented in a philosophy department, the discussion period was opened with an inviting ‘shoot!’ The metaphorical transposition of war language into argumentative settings is not just a verbal ploy. Philosophers did not just talk about *winning* an argument; they also avidly tried to *win*—for *losing*, they feared, would turn them into *losers*. That is to say: this metaphorical register was at work in departments of philosophy around 1980 and not just in the US, where *Metaphors We Live By* was published that year. I remember all too well how it also permeated intellectual practices in the Netherlands. This has changed. These days, academic conversations are no longer primarily staged as quasi-wars, fights over which univocal truth deserves to rule. Instead, they are cast as a matter of *exchanging* ideas, as if the academy is a marketplace where goods are bought and sold. *Ownership* has become important. For instance, behind crucial terms in a text, the name of an author may get added in parentheses: “(Foucault, 1973).” In this way ideas become intellectual property, to be protected by trademarks. A remarkable shift it is, and it provides another example of an empirical reality that speaks from ways of wording and their metaphorical resonances.

The empirical realities embedded in philosophical theories may also take the shape of traveling models. The work of Michel Serres provides endless examples of this. For instance, Serres has pointed out that Western philosophy is infused with models of stable, solid structures, while lacking in fluid or fire-like equivalents.²⁹ As part of this, there is an investment in transitive relations that may be thought of as modeled on wooden boxes. If box A is bigger than box B, then B fits into A and not the other way around. But if A and B are bags made of cloth then B, the smaller one, may hold a folded A inside it. This means that cloth offers a model for intransitive relations. Or take time as an example. This is imagined in a linear way as stretched out along a solid ruler: the present has left the past behind, while the future is still to come. But what, or so Serres proposed, if we were to model time on a handkerchief? When the handkerchief is stretched out flat, once again the past is over and the time ahead has not yet imposed itself. But a handkerchief may also be crumpled up, this suggests that the past may still be at work in the here and

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

now, while the future may be acute, threatening or calling. A final example, should philosophers define concepts in a clear and distinct way? Wittgenstein said that in ordinary practices people get by very well without such solidity. Serres, in his turn, wondered about the effects of hardening concepts: this, he said, stifles thinking. Reflections become subtler when their terms are supple; philosophy is more versatile when ways of wording are allowed to transform viscously. In a turn against an excess of solidity, Serres proposed alternative models to think with: muddy places where water and land mix, clouds first forming and then dissipating into rain, curving paths that twist and turn, fires that consume what they encounter.

Serres is inventive. He does not just indicate the empirical realities embedded in existing theories: he ‘goes out to play.’ He leaves ordinary practices, historical narratives, vested exemplary situations, well-worn metaphors, and solid models behind and experiments with alternatives. In this way, new things get articulated. These ‘new things’ are not better in any absolute or transcendental sense. They do not ultimately fit standards for proper philosophy that his predecessors failed to meet. Instead, they allow for other things to be remarked on, and they speak to different concerns. This way of working forms a source of inspiration for the present book. Twentieth-century philosophical anthropology fostered the hope that the ability to think and engage in conversations might help humans to rise above physical violence. But in thus celebrating rationality, philosophical anthropology downgraded physical *labor* and elevated humans above other creatures. This does not help when we seek to address concerns pertaining to ecological fragility. The Anthropocene requires us to revisit what we make of *anthropos*. Our theories are in dire need of other terms. Serres played with cloths, fluids, and fires as alternative models with which to think.³⁰ My theoretical inspiration in this book comes, by contrast and complement, from diverse exemplary situations that all have to do with eating.

Empirical Multiplicity

When the divide between them is bridged, when *empirical* and *philosophy* are pasted together, this transforms them both. Philosophy, as I just recounted, is brought down to earth. It is prompted to take lessons from ordinary practices; it is situated in the societal setting from which it emerged; and it may be read as infused with immanent exemplars, metaphors, and models. In line with this, reading philosophical texts no longer stands in contrast to probing historic archives or doing ethnographic research, but becomes its own kind of

empirical inquiry. At the same time, engaging in empirical inquiry changes, too, and that alteration forms the topic of the present section. The short version is that doing research is no longer understood as learning about a reality that passively waits to be represented. Instead, the reality under study shifts and changes depending on the intricacies of the study. Different operationalizations bring to bear different versions of reality. There are diverse stories to tell about this transformation. The one that I have on offer here starts once again with Wittgenstein and his call to learn from the ways in which language is used in ordinary practices. It then moves on to Foucault's insistence on divergence between discourses. Finally, I will exemplify what it means to say that reality is multiple by coming back, as promised, to the idea that women 'have only their biological sex in common.' Biological sex, indeed, is not just one thing; it comes in different versions.

Back to the beginning. While at first Wittgenstein contributed to the search for solid concepts, his later work demonstrated that, in ordinary practice, people get by very well with fluid terms. What did that mean for empirical research? While philosophers had thought that they needed solid concepts to reason well, empirical researchers called on solid concepts to ensure that dispersed findings could be added together into a coherent whole. They feared that loosening up on conceptual rigor would lead on to fragmentation. Based on the insights he gained by analyzing ordinary practices, Wittgenstein suggested that between firm coherence and radical fragmentation, there are looser ways of hanging together. Among these are, for instance, the *language games* that stipulate the use of words in a given practice. When two friends are playing chess, the word *king* evokes a piece on their chessboard; when they talk politics, the word *king* recalls a head of state. These are seriously different *kings*, but this does not lead to confusion. After all, between playing chess and talking politics, the two friends shift language games. In one case, the word *king* is part of a linguistic repertoire that also includes *board*, *pawn*, and *checkmate*; in the other, other relevant terms are *constitution* and *good governance*. If research rules impose the use of uniform concepts, this means that some language games triumph and others are silenced. Whatever does not fit the winning definition cannot be articulated.

If Wittgenstein's language games are tied to practices, Foucault's *discourses* include the societal *conditions of possibility* that allowed for their emergence and their salience. For instance, by the mid-twentieth century, the French law treated men who had sex with men as criminals, while, according to psychiatry, they suffered from a neurosis. The juridical system dreamed up punish-

ments for offenders; psychiatric clinics offered treatments meant to transform effeminate deviants into *real* men. (Incidentally: since gay men were considered to be effeminate they, quite like women, always risked, if outed, being disqualified as philosophers.) But though legal and psychiatric discourses varied, both discredited male homosexuality and wished it away. Foucault, seeking to underline that this was not self-evident, presented a contrasting discourse that he found reading ancient Greek sources. Interestingly, these sources appeared to celebrate sex between men. What is more, they did not cast men who engaged in homosexual acts as effeminate. A man's masculinity depended not on *whom* he had sex with, but on *how much* sex he had. The proper masculine thing to do, no matter with whom one did it, was to refrain from overdoing it. Whether a free man lay with women, slaves, or young boys, he was supposed to be moderate. Foucault's conclusion was that neither 'homosexuality' nor 'masculinity' are stable configurations. They are understood and lived in different ways from one era to another. Holding up moderation as a masculine virtue inspires different sexual practices than (legally) forbidding gay sex or (psychiatrically) taking heterosexuality to be an instantiation of normality.³¹

Hence, each in his own way, both Wittgenstein and Foucault suggested that diverse socio-material formations and ways of using words make diverse 'realities' possible. Along with the work of many kindred authors, this inspired new ways of understanding the sciences. Here scientific meddling with the difference between the sexes may serve as an example. When, in the 1960s, Else Barth turned against stereotypes of 'the woman,' she proposed that 'women' have only their biological sex in common. But do they? When reexamined this appeared to be an all-too-simple way of putting it. For 'biological sex' means something different in the *language games* of diverse biological disciplines, or, in other terms, is ordered differently in concurrent biomedical *discourses*. Take anatomy and endocrinology.³² Anatomy depends on the practice of cutting up corpses in order to visually inspect their insides. In line with this, it suggests that the sex of bodies may be read from the spatial arrangement of their organs: a woman has a womb, a vagina, labia, and breasts. In endocrinology, by contrast, biochemical techniques are used to measure hormone levels in blood drawn from living people. The definition of woman now depends on levels of estrogen and progesterone that, between menarche and menopause, change in rhythmic alternation. These versions of reality do not necessarily add up: a person may have a womb but low levels of estrogen; or her breasts may have been removed, while her menstruation is still regular. As a technique for contraception, anatomy suggests the use of

condoms or diaphragms to block the passage of swimming sperm. Endocrinology, by contrast, offers ‘the pill,’ which contains hormones that interfere with the gestation of eggs. Hence, anatomy and endocrinology do not simply represent ‘biological sex’ differently. They also interfere with women, men, and heterosexual practices in different ways.³³

This, then, is the particular way of understanding ‘empirical’ that *empirical philosophy* allowed for. The term *empirical* does not call up a univocal reality that the sciences represent in complementary ways. Instead, different knowledge practices interfere with reality in contrasting ways. Disciplines like anatomy and endocrinology may well share the term *woman*, but the term evokes different realities. Between these realities there are both tensions and interdependencies—in other words, reality is multiple.³⁴ This means that stating, or denying, *in general* that women have their ‘biological sex’ in common becomes rather vacuous. Instead, the issue arises as to which specific version of sex is realized, where, and to what effect? What do various branches of biomedicine depend on, orchestrate into being, or push aside? Along with these questions, normativity comes down to earth. It no longer resides in a transcendental realm of counterfactuals, nor is it flattened out by indisputable factuality. Instead, it resides in the contrasts between different ways of ordering, different versions of reality, all equally immanent. Critique takes a different shape: one mode of ordering may come to figure as the counterfactual of another. In the absence of an external, transcendental, position, normative questions cannot be answered in absolute terms. But they can still be asked. Not just by philosophers, in the abstract, but concretely, here, now, by everyone engaged in a particular practice.³⁵

Eating

While in this book I recall philosophical anthropology—remembering it so as to interfere with it—I take inspiration from eating. But what is eating? Like ‘king,’ ‘man,’ or ‘woman,’ eating is not just a single thing. The word figures in diverse language games; the activity is shaped differently in different discourses. Eating comes in versions. This book, then, will not reveal what eating *really* is. Instead, I will work with selected versions of eating, hand-picked to serve my theoretical purposes. While musing about *eating in theory* for years on end, I have ethnographically studied *situations of eating* in a range of sites. Most of my fieldwork I did in places I could easily reach by bicycle or train from the urban settings in the Netherlands where I have been living all this time. In health care facilities, I learned that eating may be dif-

difficult to do if one has no appetite or a hard time swallowing. In laboratories, I came across versions of eating that included ingesting nutrients, savoring flavors, or feeling satisfaction. In restaurants, I ate foods from diverse cuisines. In conferences, I heard speakers argue about the health effects of different foods, or deplore the depletion of earthly resources. And so on. I also learned a great deal from reading diverse literatures pertaining to food and/or eating (see for this and other scholarly relations the references in the end-notes!).³⁶ Thanks to a generous grant from the European Union, I worked with a team of spirited colleagues who were studying eating in yet more sites and situations. From them I learned about mundane tasting, global hunger, excretion, avoiding food waste, irrigation, kitchen fats, earthworms, and attempts to lose weight. Putting our newly gained insights together during team lunches, dinners, and seminars, we gradually developed a kaleidoscopic understanding of ‘eating’ as a composite-in-tension. In this book I draw from this composite, time and again, whatever allows me to interfere in vested understandings of ‘the human.’

The field research on which this book depends concerns all kinds of people eating, and in a few cases nonhuman creatures too. At the same time, I shamelessly write about my own eating. In part, this is a methodological shortcut. Me-the-eater allowed me-the-researcher easy access to all kinds of details that would be otherwise difficult to study. However, my use of the first person singular *I* is also a play on the tradition of philosophical anthropology. The philosophical anthropologists whose work I seek to recall, wrote *I* in order to take a first-person perspective. They prioritized the subject position because they were concerned about the ways in which both natural and social sciences studied people from the outside, as if they were objects. Their particular *I* was meant to be a tenacious reminder that ‘the human’ forms the center of his (maybe a *sic* again?) own individual experiences. Hence, when philosophical anthropologists wrote *I*, their story was not meant to be about themselves, but instead to have universal salience. Their topic was *the* subject. My topic is not *the* subject at all—there is no such thing. When I write about *my* eating, I seek to underline once more the specificity of every eater. *My* eating is marked by such idiosyncrasies as a reliable university salary, access to well-stocked shops, modest but sufficient cooking skills, and a taste for a few comforting food repertoires. Other people eat different foods, in different ways, with different costs to themselves and their surroundings. Sociology has ample categorizations on offer to pin down the differences between ‘me’ and ‘other people.’ These make it possible to write that we match or differ

in class, gender, nationality, ethnicity, dis/abilities, and so on. Here, I will abstain from using these categories. I do not want to import them from the settings where they were coined and impose them on the materials I gathered. Sometimes they fit the eating practices I write about, but sometimes they do not. It would be possible to consider their pertinence in each case again, but that would readily derail this book and turn it into a different one.³⁷ Above, I wrote that I am not out to emancipate oppressed groups of people, but hope, in a feminist mode, to revalue the denigrated pursuits of those who engage in life-sustaining *labor*. In line with that, my empirical interest is also not in people and the differences and similarities between them. It is, instead, in eating practices that, when analyzed afresh, are theoretically salient.

The *I* in the pages of this book, then, does not evoke a universal subject, nor does it stand in for a focal point at the intersection of well-vested sociological categories. Instead it is a reminder of the specificity and situatedness of each and every eater. That this particular ‘I’ frequently is ‘me’ and that, at least in some ways, the author and exemplified eater in this volume share quite some overlap is rather arbitrary. It is a methodologically convenient incident.³⁸ One last caveat for now. This book is called *Eating in Theory*. But that does not mean that I have an alternative *theory of eating* on offer, let alone an alternative overall theory. The theory relevant to this project is not a grand scheme that holds smaller elements together in the way a large wooden box may hold smaller wooden boxes. It is rather like a cloth that may be wrapped around or, alternatively, is folded within what is being said and done. It is a repository of metaphors to write in, models to think with, ways of speaking and forms of responding. It is a style. It does not hover above the social sciences and the humanities, but allows for them. It affords them. This is not the kind of theory that one may build from scratch or transform in total, but it is still possible to interfere with it. That is what I set out to do here. I use stories about situations of eating to shake up prevailing understandings of *being*, *knowing*, *doing*, and *relating* in which a hierarchical version of ‘the human’ goes into hiding. Mind you, these interferences are just a beginning. They only become relevant if you happen to find them inspiring, run with them, and put one or two of them to work in your own writing.

DUKE

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

One. Empirical Philosophy

1. For just a few among very many examples, see Charis Thompson, “When Elephants Stand for Competing Philosophies of Nature: Amboseli National Parc, Kenya,” in *Complexities*, ed. John Law and Annemarie Mol (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Thom van Dooren, *Flight Ways: Life and Loss at the Edge of Extinction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014); Marianne Lien and John Law, “‘Emergent Aliens’: On Salmon, Nature, and Their Enactment,” *Ethnos* 76, no. 1 (2011); Lesley Head, Jennifer Atchison, and Catherine Phillips, “The Distinctive Capacities of Plants: Re-thinking Difference via Invasive Species,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 40, no. 3 (2015); Hugh Raffles, “Twenty-Five Years Is a Long Time,” *Cultural Anthropology* 27, no. 3 (2012).

2. On this topic, see the fabulous *Dictionary of Untranslatables*, which traces what happens to philosophical terms between languages: Barbara Cassin et al., *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); the collection of essays assembled in Annemarie Mol and John Law, eds., *On Other Terms*, Sociological Review Monograph (2020); and the twin volume to the present one, *Eating Is an English Word*, still in the making, that addresses some linguistic particularities to do with food pleasures.

3. See, for instance, Annemarie Mol, “Care and Its Values: Good Food in the Nursing Home,” in *Care in Practice: On Tinkering in Clinics, Homes and Farms*, ed. Annemarie Mol, Ingunn Moser, and Jeannette Pols (Bielefeld, Germany: Transcript Verlag, 2010), 215; and Else Vogel and Annemarie Mol, “Enjoy Your Food: On Losing Weight and Taking Pleasure,” *Sociology of Health and Illness* 36, no. 2 (2014); Sebastian Abrahamsson et al., “Living with Omega-3: New Material-

D

UNIVERSITY
PRESS

ism and Enduring Concerns,” *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 33, no. 1 (2015).

4. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (1958; repr., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).

5. In the Dutch university system, students do not go to a college and sample courses in diverse disciplines. Instead, after completing secondary school, we enroll in a single discipline. This does not require special admission; a diploma from a targeted preuniversity secondary school is all that is needed. I had started as a medical student in my first year but was eager to acquire more tools with which to think. Hence, in my second year I took up a second discipline, philosophy.

6. In more recent scholarship, whether in ancient Greece ‘women and slaves’ shared a single fate is contested. If religious practices are taken into account as relevant to citizenship, women (certainly in Athens) were in a better position than people who had been captured in wars and thereby had the status of slaves. See Josine Blok, *Citizenship in Classical Athens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

7. Other feminists read Arendt’s work quite differently and, focusing on other elements, even take feminist inspiration from it. See, for example, the contributions to Bonnie Honig, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt* (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2010). This signals that there are problems with treating ‘theories,’ let alone ‘theorists,’ as if they were coherent wholes.

8. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 246.

9. As in ancient Greek city-states, war captives were given the status of ‘slaves’ and ‘free men’ were haunted by the fear that, sooner or later, if they were to lose a war, they would no longer be ‘free men,’ but someone else’s slave. For the argument that this fear left deep marks in Greek philosophy, see Tsjalling Swierstra, *De sofocratische verleiding: Het ondemocratische karakter van een aantal moderne rationaliteitsconcepties* (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok/Agora, 1998). Thus, being a slave was a social position that, with bad luck, every person might come to inhabit, and it was not tied to other—say, physical—categorizations. Even so, later systems of slavery that were accompanied by racialization inherited a lot from those earlier, Greek ones; on this, see Enrico Dal Lago and Constantina Katsari, eds., *Slave Systems: Ancient and Modern* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

10. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 312–13.

11. Here Arendt skips over the fact that there was also a vivid Christian tradition of starving one’s body so as to purify oneself and attain holiness. See, for example, Caroline W. Bynum, *Holy Feast and Holy Fast: The Religious Significance of Food to Medieval Women* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

12. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, 115.

13. This was clearly signaled in scholarly literature and reached general audiences through such publications as the reports of the Club of Rome, beginning

with the first one: Donella Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth: A Report to the Club of Rome* (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

14. For this and other details on Descartes's investment in diets, see Steven Shapin, "Descartes the Doctor: Rationalism and Its Therapies," *British Journal for the History of Science* 33, no. 2 (2000). For a series of marvelous studies on the ways in which their own bodies mattered to early modern scientists, see Christopher Lawrence and Steven Shapin, eds., *Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of Natural Knowledge* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

15. This book grew out of a lecture the author gave to an audience of women who were members of an active women's organization. See Frederik J. J. Buytendijk, *De vrouw: Haar natuur, verschijning en bestaan* (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 1951).

16. Published in Dutch in 1971 and in English in 1974. For a later reprint, see Else M. Barth, *The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy: A Contribution to the Study of Conceptual Structures* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2012).

17. In doing so, they built on an earlier tradition of differentiating between physical traits and of using anthropology to both legitimize and facilitate colonial rule. See, among many other works, Henrika Kuklick, *The Savage Within: The Social History of British Anthropology, 1885–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Robert J. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London: Routledge, 2005); and contributions to Peter Pels and Oscar Salemink, eds., *Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History of Anthropology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

18. This is a marked difference with other regions, notably the US or South Africa, which have histories of racial segregation and related deprivation, though not the systematic murdering on the scale that the Nazis had introduced. However, racism in Europe did not disappear along with the term *race*; it was simply hidden in other terms, while taking different shapes from one European country to the next. On this, see Amâde M'charek, Katharina Schramm, and David Skinner, "Topologies of Race: Doing Territory, Population and Identity in Europe," *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 39, no. 4 (2014); and Francio Gadeloupe, *So How Does It Feel to Be a Black Man Living in the Netherlands? An Anthropological Answer* (forthcoming).

19. For how this plays out in the particular case of the Netherlands, see Dvora Yanow, Marleen van der Haar, and Karlijn Völke, "Troubled Taxonomies and the Calculating State: Everyday Categorizing and 'Race-Ethnicity' — the Netherlands Case," *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* 1, no. 2 (2016); Amâde M'charek, "Fragile Differences, Relational Effects: Stories about the Materiality of Race and Sex," *European Journal of Women's Studies* 17, no. 4 (2010); and Amâde M'charek, "Beyond Fact or Fiction: On the Materiality of Race in Practice," *Cultural Anthropology* 28, no. 3 (2013).

20. See, for a comparison between the US and Japan, Margaret Lock, *Encounters with Aging: Mythologies of Menopause in Japan and North America* (Berke-

ley: University of California Press, 1994). For questions about how genetics and environments may relate, see Jörg Niewöhner and Margaret Lock, “Situating Local Biologies: Anthropological Perspectives on Environment/Human Entanglements,” *BioSocieties* 13, no. 4 (2018). On how bodies may differ from one site to another, while the way ‘bodies’ are enacted likewise differs, see Emily Yates-Doerr, “Counting Bodies? On Future Engagements with Science Studies in Medical Anthropology,” *Anthropology and Medicine* 24, no. 2 (2017).

21. Despite this all-too-quick division, actual studies often mix these styles. Anthropologists who studied food could readily shift between its alleged physical, social, and cultural significance, while also presenting the relevant local terms. For true classics, see Audrey I. Richards, *Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe: A Functional Study of Nutrition among the Southern Bantu* (1932; repr., London: Routledge, 2013); and Mary Douglas, ed., *Food in the Social Order* (1973; repr., London: Routledge, 2014).

22. The timeline disentangling the sciences from philosophy is stretched out and far from linear. Roughly, the natural sciences gained independence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the social sciences in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But in the Netherlands, for instance, psychology was still situated in philosophy departments up until the 1950s. For an interesting history of the sciences, see Chunglin Kwa, *Styles of Knowing: A New History of Science from Ancient Times to the Present* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2011); and for a history of the humanities, all too often skipped in histories of ‘science,’ see Rens Bod, *A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from Antiquity to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

23. On Nauta’s use of this term, see Lolle W. Nauta, “De subcultuur van de wijsbegeerte: Een privé geschiedenis van de filosofie,” *Krisis* 38 (2006). In a festschrift in his honor, I picked the term up and elaborated on it. See Annemarie Mol, “Ondertonen en boventonen: Over empirische filosofie,” in *Burgers en Vreemdelingen*, ed. Dick Pels and Gerard de Vries (Amsterdam: Van Genneep, 1994). For a more extensive articulation, written on the occasion that the (at the time still entirely Dutch-language) journal *Krisis* was granted the subtitle “Journal for Empirical Philosophy” (which later it lost again), see Annemarie Mol, “Dit is geen programma: Over empirische filosofie,” *Krisis* 1, no. 1 (2000).

24. For recent editions, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (1953; repr., Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2009). For an interesting reading of the latter work (and of the lecture notes in the years preceding it) that argues that Wittgenstein opened up the possibility for a sociology of all kinds of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, see David Bloor, *Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

25. For the method of writing history involved and the idea that over time particular discourses came and went along with their conditions of possibility, see Michel Foucault, *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969; repr., London: Routledge, 2013); for an extensive inquiry into the ‘normality’ that emerged historically as a

counterpoint of ‘madness,’ see Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization* (1962; repr., London: Routledge, 2003); and for the connection to the modes of governing that normalization processes allowed for, Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (1975; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 2012). For an analysis of normalization in grammar and what this meant in France, see George Canguilhem, *The Normal and the Pathological* (1966; repr., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989) (this issue is dealt with in a chapter that was newly added to second edition of the French original, which came out in 1966).

26. See Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). In the philosophy of science, reflecting on materials was more widespread than in some other branches of philosophy. The moot point there was *which* materials counted for most: final theories and the arguments on which they were based, or the questions asked and the practices that were orchestrated to answer them?

27. On Locke and property, see Barbara Arneil, “Trade, Plantations, and Property: John Locke and the Economic Defense of Colonialism,” *Journal of the History of Ideas* 55, no. 4 (1994).

28. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

29. For these stories, see Michel Serres, *Le Passage du Nord-Ouest* (Paris: Éditions du Minuit, 1980). For an interesting and accessible introduction into Serres’s work, see Latour’s book of interviews with him: Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, *Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).

30. Here, for the sake of simplicity, I presented Serres’s cloth, fluids, and fire models. In his expansive work, he uses many other evocative images as well. Among these is that of the parasite. The French term *parasite* encompasses a species eating a host from the inside, an uninvited human guest, and meaningless noise that accompanies messages. Serres uses these disturbers of equivalence and equity to critique social scientific and economic fantasies about the possibility of clear, fair, and friction-free exchange. See Michel Serres, *The Parasite* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).

31. On this, see Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, vol. 2: *The Use of Pleasure* (1985; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 2012). This book has been read as if Foucault were praising the particular self-care in which Greek men engaged. But he extensively comments on all kinds of implicit problems, for instance, for the boys, slaves, and women with whom the self-celebratory ‘free men’ had sex. Rather than the particulars of the ancient Greek circumstances, it was the very possibility of *otherness* in which Foucault was invested.

32. For more versions of ‘woman’ and for an English translation of the article (originally from 1985) on which I draw here, see Annemarie Mol, “Who Knows What a Woman Is . . . : On the Differences and the Relations between the Sciences,” *Medicine, Anthropology, Theory* 2, no. 1 (2015).

33. Later work would insist that this does not just have different implications for women, men, and potential offspring, but also for other entities, such as the rubber trees on plantations that supply the materials for condom and diaphragm production, or the fish confronted with the hormonal effluent of women on the pill, and so on. On this, see Max Liboiron, Manuel Tironi, and Nerea Calvillo, “Toxic Politics: Acting in a Permanently Polluted World,” *Social Studies of Science* 48, no. 3 (2018).

34. The term *multiple* is used here in differentiation from *plural*. In pluralism, different *entities* form a plurality, while each of them is individuated. Multiplicity, by contrast, suggests that different *versions* of an entity may clash *here* while *elsewhere* they overlap or are interdependent. On this, see Annemarie Mol, *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003).

35. In earlier work on multiplicity, I use the term *ontologies*—in the plural—to interfere with the idea that a single ‘ontology’ precedes diverse kinds of knowledge about it. Alternatively, I proposed *ontonorms* to insist that normativities and realities tend to be *done* together. As these technical terms lead (often confusing) lives of their own, in the present book I have mostly abstained from using them.

36. Food studies is a great interdisciplinary field and some of its richness will be apparent from the references in the chapters to follow. Pivotal studies have ‘used’ food facts to place other concerns in a new light, such as the seminal re-writing of the history of both modern slavery and capitalism in Sidney W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York: Viking, 1985). The contributions to James Watson, ed., *Golden Arches East: McDonald’s in East Asia* (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), challenge the idea that globalization and homogenization necessarily go together. Food serves as an entrée into studying socioeconomic class in Jack Goody, *Cooking, Cuisine and Class: A Study in Comparative Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); or gender, as in Carole M. Counihan, *The Anthropology of Food and Body: Gender, Meaning, and Power* (Hove, UK: Psychology Press, 1999). For a more recent overview, that takes (English) words as stepping stones, see Peter Jackson, ed., *Food Words: Essays in Culinary Culture* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). Even more recently, eating has been topicalized in a practice-theory theory mode, see Alan Warde, *The Practice of Eating* (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2016).

37. For the argument that in ethnographic research, the particularities of the performance of ‘gender,’ like that of ‘sex,’ deserve to be investigated time and again, rather than carried from one context to another, see Stefan Hirschauer and Annemarie Mol, “Shifting Sexes, Moving Stories: Feminist/Constructivist Dialogues,” *Science, Technology, and Human Values* 20, no. 3 (1995). For a careful analysis of the way different categorizations may inform and transform one another as they intersect, see Ingunn Moser, “On Becoming Disabled and Articulating Alternatives: The Multiple Modes of Ordering Disability and Their Interferences,” *Cultural Studies* 19, no. 6 (2005).

38. Obviously, this also comes with methodological limits and challenges. On this, see Marilyn Strathern, “The Limits of Auto-Ethnography,” in *Anthropology at Home*, ed. Anthony Jackson (London: Tavistock, 1987); or, in a very different vein, Carolyn Ellis, *The Ethnographic I: A Methodological Novel about Autoethnography* (Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press, 2004). For the argument that method is always an issue of theory rather than just one of access, see Stefan Hirschauer, “Putting Things into Words: Ethnographic Description and the Silence of the Social,” *Human Studies* 29, no. 4 (2006).

Two. Being

1. John Wylie, “A Single Day’s Walking: Narrating Self and Landscape on the South West Coast Path,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 30, no. 2 (2005): 234.
2. Wylie, “A Single Day’s Walking,” 235.
3. Wylie, “A Single Day’s Walking,” 243.
4. Wylie, “A Single Day’s Walking,” 243.
5. Wylie, “A Single Day’s Walking,” 241.
6. Tim Ingold and Jo Lee Vergunst, eds., *Ways of Walking: Ethnography and Practice on Foot* (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008).
7. Ingold and Vergunst, *Ways of Walking*, 245. I added italics here and deleted internal author-date references to facilitate the reading.
8. This quote is from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception* (1958; repr., London: Routledge, 2005), 353.
9. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, 235.
10. For an introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s work that is invested in its salience to present-day concerns to do with bodies, affect, animality, intersubjectivity, and so on, see Rosalyn Diprose and Jack Reynolds, *Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts* (London: Routledge, 2014).
11. In the analysis in this chapter, I foreground ‘my’ relation with the food I eat, pushing to the background (to reduce complexity) those who cared for my food, from the cooks working in the restaurant kitchen (on their work, see Gary Alan Fine, *Kitchens: The Culture of Restaurant Work* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008]) to those who cultivated, harvested, and transported it (see Michael Carolan, *The Sociology of Food and Agriculture* [London: Routledge, 2016] and *The Real Cost of Cheap Food* [London: Routledge, 2018]). More on the theoretical salience of this follows in the chapter on *doing*.
12. For this history and more on Goldstein and the context in which he worked, see Anne Harrington, *Reenchanted Science: Holism in German Culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
13. Kurt Goldstein, *The Organism: A Holistic Approach to Biology Derived from Pathological Data in Man* (New York: Zone Books, 1995).
14. Merleau-Ponty, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, 146.