ECR Printout

ECR NUMBER: <u>OC</u> 06-00879	001	ECR TYPE:	DCP	• • • •
ASSIGNED ORG: <u>OEDM</u> ASSIGNED INDV: <u>MARKOS</u> INITIATOR: <u>TAMBURRO</u>	PRINT REQU E	DATE/TIME: IRED DATE: CR STATUS:	11/06/06	07:52
REQUEST ORG: <u>OED</u> A/R NO: <u>A2152754</u> PROJECT NO:	I	ATUS DATE: NIT. DATE: /R STATUS:	10/24/06	
A/R SUBJECT: <u>DRYWELL FLOOR</u>	/TROUGH/DRAINAGE IN	SPECTIONS AN	ND REPAIRS	
		· ·		
A. IDENTIFICATION:				e e s
SYSTEM: COMP ID:	OC 1 187 F	MTSC 18	7	
SYSTEM:COMP ID:INIT OPER:YQA CLASSTECH SPEC:YREQD IN NPAGES ATTACHED:YNO. (O POTL REPT:	<u>N</u>		
PAGES ATTACHED: Y NO. (DF PAGES: <u>38</u> ID/I	DATE: JDH1	11/03/06	_
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION and PH	ROPOSED DISPOSITION	!	•	
DURING 1R21, WATER WAS DIS OF THE DRYWELL ELEVATION 1 PROVIDE FOR INSPECTION AND PROVISIONS FOR THIS FLOOR, DRYWELL SHELL.	0'-3" FLOOR. THIS REPAIR OF THE DRAI	ECR WILL INAGE	CH	
IN PARTICULAR, THIS ECR AD	DRESSES:			•
1- CLEANING, INSPECTION A SUB-PILE ROOM TROUGH (CONC AREA UNDER REACTOR VESSEL) INCLUDING THE ENTRANCE TO DRAINS TO THE SUMP.	ND REPAIR, AS NEEDE RETE	REV 1	· · · · · · · ·	•
2- CLEANING AND INSPECTIO 3- CLEANING AND PREPARATI DRYWELL FLOOR AND DRYWELL CAULKING MATERIAL INTENDED	ON OF THE INTERFACE SHELL, AND INSTALLA	OF THE TION OF A		
CAULKING MATERIAL INTENDED 4 - ADDITIONAL EXCAVATION ALLOW FOR FURTHER UT EXAMI FOLLOWED BY PARTIAL GROUTI ONGOING PROTECTION OF THE	OF THE TRENCH AT BA NATION OF THE DRYWE NG OF THAT TRENCH T	Y 5, TO LL SHELL,		
•				· . ·
NOTE: THIS ECR WAS CREATED 06-00875, IN ORDER TO HAVE A/R.	D AS A REPLACEMENT THE ECR UNDER THE	FOR ECR APPROPRIATE		Q

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B. EVALUATION:

50.59 REVIEW REQD: Y ORIG 50.59 REVIEW AFFECTED: N 50.59 SE REQD: N REPORTABLE: <u>N</u> DATE/TIME: STATION PROC/PROGRAM REVIEW COMPLT: , . CAUSE: RE FINAL OPERABILITY: COMP: ___ SYSTEM: PLANT: SSV DATE/TIME: SSV NAME: SCHED CODE/WINDW: 1R21 187 CEG0 10/21/06 ADVANCED WORK AUTH: Y FINAL DISP: RP INTERIM DISP: APPROVED DISPOSITION: **REVISION 1** REV 1 INCLUDES MINOR REVISION PROVIDED BY PORC REVIEW OF REV 0 OF THIS ECR. PORC MEETING NO 06-18. THESE CHANGES ARE MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES TO MAINTAIN CONSISTENCY WITH EXISTING STRUCTURAL MONINTORING COMMITMENTS. REFERENCE TO A FREQUENCY OF 2 YEARS INSTEAD OF 4 YEARS. THIS REVISION REVISES: PAGE 1 OF THE ECR TO CLARIFY THAT CLEANING WAS NEEDED OF THE TROUGH. PAGE 4 OF ATTACHMENT 1 IS REVISED TO CHANGE THE RESULTS OF THE GROUT TESTING PAGE 9 OF ATTACHMENT 1 IS REVISED TO REFERENCE IR 00546049. ATTACHMENT 10D IS REVISED TO CHANGE FREQUENCY OF CAULK PM FROM 4 YEARS TO 2 YEARS. OTHER MINOR EDITORIAL CHANGES AND ENHANCEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE DISPOSITION. END OF REV 1 AWA FOR DRYWELL FLOOR REPAIRS: THE FOLLOWING ADVANCED WORK AUTHORIZATIONS ARE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CC-AA-103. THE WORK DESCRIBED BELOW DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN-SERVICE EQUIPMENT. THE SCOPE AND SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS DESCRIBED IN EACH SECTION BELOW. AWA #1 - SUB-PILE ROOM (CONCRETE AREA UNDER REACTOR VESSEL) TROUGH CLEANING, INSPECTION AND PARIAL REPAIR:

THE TROUGH IS THE DRAINAGE TRENCH AT THE SUB-PILE

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

ROOM PERIMETER. THE TROUGH MUST BE THOROUGHLY CLEANED AND INSPECTED, TO DETERMINE IF REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED. ALL STANDING WATER SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE TRENCH. ALL LOOSE MATERIAL (DEBRIS, LOOSE AGGREGATE, ETC.) MUST BE REMOVED. IN PARTICULAR, ALL LOOSE OR EASILY LOOSENED MATERIAL IN THE TROUGH, AROUND THE PIPES THAT CONNECT TO THE SUMP SHOULD BE REMOVED. DAMAGE TO ANY AREAS OF THE TROUGH SHOULD BE QUANTIFIED. WHERE DEPRESSIONS IN THE TROUGH FLOOR ARE VISUALLY NOTICED, PLACE A 24" LONG STRAIGHT EDGE IN THE TROUGH AND MEASURE THE DEPTH OF THE DEPRESSION. NOTIFY ENGINEERING OF THE DEPTH, EXTENT, AND LOCATION OF ANY POCKETS OR DEPRESSIONS GREATER THAN 1/4" DEEP. AT THE DRAIN PIPES FROM THE TROUGH TO THE SUMP, PROVIDE ENGINEERING WITH MEASUREMENTS OF DEPTH, WIDTH AND HEIGHT OF ANY CONCRETE DAMAGE. AT THE FOUR PIPES THAT PASS WATER FROM OUTSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM, NOTE AND INFORM ENGINEERING OF THE BOTTOM ELEVATION OF THE PIPE RELATIVE TO THE BOTTOM SURFACE OF THE TROUGH (E.G. PIPE BOTTOM IS 3/8" LOWER THAN BOTTOM OF TROUGH).

GROUT REPAIRS CAN BE PERFORMED TO THE AREA AROUND THE PIPES TO THE SUMP AND THE PIPES FROM OUTSIDE THE SUB-PILE ROOM TO INSIDE, AS NEEDED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFICATION OCIS 551-81-6 (AS A STRUCTURAL REPAIR). "MASTERFLOW 713 PLUS" OR "MASTERFLOW 928" SHALL BE USED FOR THE REPAIRS (SAFETY RELATED MATERIAL), AND IT SHALL BE MIXED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS RATHER THAN THOSE IN THE SPECIFICATION. TEST CUBE SAMPLES DO NOT NEED TO BE TAKEN AS DIRECTED IN THE SPECIFICATION, SINCE THIS APPLICATION DOES NOT RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CURED GROUT. BASED ON A PRELIMINARY INSPECTION BY SAM MARKOS, THE AREAS WHERE A GROUT REPAIR IS DEFINITELY REQUIRED AROUND THE DRAIN PIPE ARE: BOTH PIPES TO THE SUMP, AT THE POINT WHERE THEY EXIT THE TROUGH, AND THE INBOARD SIDE OF THE PIPE THROUGH THE PEDESTAL WALL, AT AZIMUTH 270. THESE THREE PIPES REQUIRE REMOVAL OF ALL LOOSE MATERIAL AROUND THE PIPE, DOWN TO CLEAN, SOLIDLY SECURED AGGREGATE. THE AREA MUST BE PREPARED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATION GROUTING PROCEDURE PRIOR TO GROUTING. CARE MUST BE TAKEN NOT TO CREATE ANY BLOCKAGES TO FLOW THAT WOULD CREATE STANDING WATER IN THIS AREA. OTHER REPAIRS TO THE TRENCH WILL BE SPECIFIED BY ENGINEERING FOLLOWING REVIEW OF THE DATA PROVIDED.

THE ABOVE SCOPE OF WORK DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ANY GROUT REPAIRS SERVE TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SSC TO ITS INTENDED DESIGN CONDITION.

COORDINATION WITH THE OCC IS IMPERATIVE TO MAINTAIN THE TROUGH AREA DRY DURING THE REPAIR AND CURING PROCESSES.

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

AWA #1 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO GEORGE SEVCIK (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS) (SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 12:00.

AWA #2 - DRYWELL SUMP CLEANING AND INSPECTION:

THE DRYWELL SUMP COULD BE A SOURCE OF WATER INFILTRA-TION INTO THE CONCRETE. THE SUMP INTERIOR SHOULD BE DRAINED AND CLEANED SO THAT THE STAINLESS STEEL LINER CAN BE INSPECTED FOR FLAWS OR DAMAGE. TEMPORARY DAMMING SHOULD BE PLACED TO PREVENT WATER FROM ENTERING THE SUMP UNTIL THE INSPECTION IS COMPLETE. THE SUMP SHOULD BE CLEANED SUFFICIENTLY SUCH THAT A VT-1 INSPECTION OF THE INTERIOR SURFACES OF THE SUMP LINER CAN BE PERFORMED. THE RESULTS OF THE INSPECTION SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO ENGINEERING. IF ANY FLAWS ARE FOUND, REPAIRS WILL BE SPECIFIED ACCORDINGLY.

THE ABOVE SCOPE OF WORK DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS.

AWA #2 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO GEORGE SEVCIK (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS) (SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 12:00.

AWA #3 - DRYWELL FLOOR-TO-SHELL INTERFACE CLEANING, PREP FOR CAULKING:

A BEAD OF CAULK WILL BE APPLIED TO THE DRYWELL SHELL WHERE IT MEETS THE CONCRETE STEPPED CURBING AROUND THE PERIMETER OF THE CONCRETE DRYWELL FLOOR SLAB AT ELEVATION 10'-3". THE SCOPE OF THIS AWA IS THE CLEANING AND PREPARATION OF THE CONCRETE AND STEEL SURFACES FOR CAULKING, BUT DOES NOT INCLUDE THE INSTALLATION OF THE CAULKING. ALL DEBRIS AND LOOSE CONCRETE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE INTERFACE. HAND TOOLS (DENTIST PICK, SMALL WIRE BRUSH, CHIPPING HAMMER, ETC.) AND A VACUUM SHOULD BE USED. THE CONCRETE SURFACE IS REPORTED TO BE SUFFICIENTLY ROUGH FOR ADHESION OF THE CAULK, AND THEREFORE MAY NOT REQUIRE ROUGHENING. THIS SHOULD BE ASSURED BY INSPECTION. A BAND OF AT LEAST 1" WIDTH OF CONCRETE ADJACENT TO THE DRYWELL SHELL SHOULD BE ASSURED TO HAVE A ROUGHNESS EQUIVALENT TO 60 GRIT SANDPAPER, OR THE STEEL SURFACE SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR A ROUGHER. BAND OF AT LEAST 1" ADJACENT TO THE CONCRETE. ANY LOOSE OR POORLY ADHERED MATERIAL SHOULD BE REMOVED USING HAND

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TOOLS SUCH AS A STIFF BRUSH, A PUTTY KNIFE OR SCOTCH-BRITE TO SSPC-SP 2 STANDARD. WELL ADHERED COATINGS DO NOT NEED TO BE REMOVED.

THE ABOVE SCOPE OF WORK DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN OR FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS.

AWA #3 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO GEORGE SEVCIK (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS) (SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 12:00.

AWA #4 - EXCAVATE ADDITIONAL CONCRETE FROM THE BAY #5 TRENCH

MORE OF THE DRYWELL SHELL MUST BE EXPOSED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY #5 TRENCH TO FACILITATE ADDITIONAL DRYWELL SHELL UT MEASUREMENTS. THE BAY #5 TRENCH IS IN THE DRYWELL ELEV 10'-3" FLOOR SLAB, IN THE BAY #5 REGION, ADJACENT TO THE DRYWELL SHELL.

CONCRETE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY #5 TRENCH SHALL BE EXCAVATED AS REQUIRED TO EXPOSE AN ADDITIONAL 3-1/2" (+/-) BAND OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. THE BAND SHALL BE ACROSS THE ENTIRE WIDTH OF THE TRENCH.

EXTREME CARE SHALL BE EXERCISED TO AVOID DAMAGE (NICKS, CUTS, SCRAPES) TO THE DRYWELL SHELL.

ALSO NOTE THAT A VERTICAL STEEL PLATE STIFFENER (APPROX 1" THICK) IS EMBEDDED IN THE CONCRETE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE BAY #5 TRENCH. THE STIFFENER PLATE IS PARALLEL TO THE DRYWELL SHELL AND APPROXIMATELY 7" FROM THE SHELL. A PORTION OF THE TOP EDGE OF THIS PLATE IS EXPOSED IN THE EXISTING TRENCH EXCAVATION. EXTREME CARE SHALL BE EXERCISED TO AVOID DAMAGE (NICKS, CUTS, SCRAPES) TO THIS STIFFENER PLATE.

ALL WORK SHALL BE DONE WITH HAND TOOLS.

ALL MATERIAL REMOVED SHALL BE QUARANTINED FOR FURTHER INSPECTION/TESTING AS REQUIRED.

DOCUMENT THE FINAL CONFIGURATION OF THE TRENCH (DEPTH AND WIDTH) AFTER THE EXCAVATION. FORWARD THIS INFORMATION TO THE PROJECT ENGINEERING TEAM (ATTENTION: HOWIE RAY).

DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS SHALL BE TAKEN OF THE NEWLY EXPOSED DRYWELL SHELL IMMEDIATELY AFTER EXCAVATION IS COMPLETE. DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS SHALL ALSO BE TAKEN OF

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

THE SURFACE OF THE EXCAVATED CONCRETE THAT WAS ADJACENT TO THE DRYWELL SHELL. ALL DIGITAL PHOTOGRAPHS FILES SHALL BE TRANSMITTED TO THE PROJECT ENGINEERING TEAM (ATTENTION: HOWIE RAY).

THE SCOPE OF THIS AWA DOES NOT ALTER OR IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF ANY PLANT SSC'S.

AWA PREPARED BY: DP KNEPPER - PEDM AWA REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO

AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO JIM HEARNS (OWP) BY HOWIE RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS) (SMDE) ON 10/24/06, 18:00.

AWA #5 - CAULK DRYWELL SHELL-TO-CONCRETE FLOOR JOINT:

AT THE OUTBOARD PERIMETER OF THE ELEV. 10'-3" DRYWELL FLOOR, THE CONCRETE SLAB MEETS THE DRYWELL SHELL. THIS INTERFACE HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR CAULKING UNDER AWA #3. THE CAULK WILL BE APPLIED TO THAT JOINT UNDER THIS AWA. THE CAULK SHALL LAP ONTO THE CONCRETE AND STEEL SURFACES BY 1/4" TO 3/4" ON EACH SURFACE.

THE CAULK IS TO FOLLOW THE

CONCRETE-TO-STEEL INTERFACE, FOLLOWING THE CHANGES IN CURB ELEVATION (INCLUDING THE SIDES AND TOPS OF THE CURBS), AND THE DIPS INTO THE TWO TRENCHES. THE BAY 5 TRENCH SHOULD NOT BE CAULKED UNTIL ALL NDE WORK IS COMPLETED, BUT PRIOR TO RECOATING THE STEEL. TECHNICAL EVALUATION A2152754-5 IS BEING DEVELOPED TO DOCUMENT THE TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THIS AWA, AND PROVIDES A DETAILED SKETCH OF THE CAULK CONFIGURATION ALONG WITH MANUFACTURERS INSTRUCTIONS. THE CAULKING MATERIAL SHALL BE THIOKOL 2235M BY POLYSPEC. THE INSTALLATION OF THE CAULKING MATERIAL IS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED THAT CAULKING MATERIAL IS QUALIFIED TO BE USED INSIDE THE DRYWELL AS AUGMENTED QUALIFY, QA CLASS "A" OR BETTER. THE SURFACE PREPARATION SHALL BE AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #3 OF THIS ECR, AND INSTALLATION SHALL BE IAW THE MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS (EXCEPT THAT PRIMER, BACKER ROD AND BOND BREAKER TAPE ARE NOT REQUIRED). QV VERIFICATION IS REQUIRED FOR PREPARATION (PER AWA #3 OF THIS ECR) AND INSTALLATION (MIXING, POT LIFE, APPLICATION). DBA QUALIFICATION OF THE CAULK IS BEING FINALIZED.

WORK SCOPE:

1- PERFORM UT OF DRYWELL SHELL IN THE BAY 5 TRENCH AFTER ADDITIONAL EXCAVATION DESCRIBED IN AWA #4 HAS BEEN COMPLETED. UT SCOPE IS SIMILAR TO THAT DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.6 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13, BUT FOR THE NEWLY EXPOSED STEEL AREA IN THE TRENCH (REF. AWA

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

#4).

2- CLEAN/PREP STEEL AND CONCRETE SURFACES FOR CAULKING AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #3

3- INSTALL CAULKING AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. FINISHED CAULK SHOULD FORM A CONTINUOUS BARRIER AROUND THE CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE CONCRETE FLOOR, WHERE IT MEETS THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL.

4- NDE SHALL PERFORM A PSI (PRE-SERVICE INSPECTION -VT3) OF, THE FINAL CAULK CONFIGURATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION XI REPAIR/REPLACEMENT PROGRAM. 5- RECOAT THE DRYWELL SHELL SURFACE IN BOTH THE BAY 5

AND BAY 17 TRENCHES AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.2.4.3 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13.

THIS AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN-SERVICE EQUIPMENT.

AWA #5 PREPARED BY: P. KESTER

REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO

AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS SCOPE IS PROVIDED TO JOHN BURT (VENTURE) BY F.H. RAY (SMDE DESIGNEE FOR S. HUTCHINS) (SMDE) ON 10/25/06, 13:30.

NOTE REVISION OF THE ABOVE AWA #5: THE MAXIMUM LAP LENGTH OF THE CAULK ONTO THE CONCRETE AND STEEL HAS BEEN REDUCED FROM 1" TO 3/4" TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL ADDED TO THE DRYWELL.

AS REVIEWER OF THE ORIGINAL AWA, I HAVE REVIEWED AND AGREE WITH THE REVISED LAP LENGTH - DAN FIORELLO

CHANGE APPROVED ON 10/26/06 AT 07:00 BY HOWIE RAY. JOHN BURT WAS NOTIFIED BY DAVE KNEPPER, AND A MARKED-UP SKETCH REFLECTING THE CHANGE WAS PROVIDED TO HIM.

REVISION 2 TO THE AWA #5:

AWA #5 AND ITS REVISION PROVIDE INSTRUCTIONS TO CAULK SURFACES BETWEEN THE DRYWELL VESSEL PLATE AND THE CONCRETE IN THE TWO TRENCHES. AWA #5 USED MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT MATERIAL. TO APPLY THE CAULK THE SURFACES MUST BE DRY. HOWEVER THE SURFACE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 AND THE SEAM BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND STEEL ARE MOIST EVEN AFTER APPLYING MASTERFLOW 928. THEREFORE, THE CAULK CANNOT BE APPLIED. IF THIS CONDITION CONTINUES TO EXIST, PREPARE THE SURFACES AND INSTALL THE MINIMUM ALLOWED LAYER 1/2 INCH AND MAXIMUM 2 INCH OF GROUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AWA #1. THE GROUTING MATERIAL SHALL BE "747 RAPID-SETTING GROUT" MANUFACTURED BY BASF AND MIXING SHALL BE PLASTIC TO ACHIEVE A FINAL SETTING TIME OF 80 MINUTES. THELAYER OF GROUT SHALL BE INSTALLED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

TRENCH AT MOIST SURFACES OVER EXISTING MASTERFLOW 928 HAVE BEEN PLACED WHERE CONCRETE MEETS THE DRYWELL VESSEL. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL LAYER OF 747 RAPID-SETTING GROUT IS TO COVER THE MOIST AREAS TO ALLOW PROPER APPLICATION OF THE CAULK. WAIT A MINIMUM OF 80 MINUTES FOR THE GROUT TO SET BEFORE APPLYING ANY CAULK. THIS GROUT DOES NOT PERFORM ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THE REQUIRED STRENGTH IS MINIMAL AND IS PLACED TO FORM A SUITABLE SURFACE FOR CAULK. THE MATERIAL WILL BE CONFIRMED TO BE SET BEFORE APPLICATION OF THE CAULK. THEREFORE, THE MATERIAL MAY BE COMMERCIAL GRADE.

THIS AWA AND ITS REVISIONS DO NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS.

AWA #5, REVISION 2 PREPARED BY: NIOGI, SUJIT (PIMS INPUT BY DJF)

REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO

THIS AWA REVISION 2 IS APPROVED BY F. H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE)

THIS AWA #5, REVISION 2 IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT 18:45 11/02/06 BY F.H. RAY

END OF AWA #5, REVISION 2

BASED ON THE LATE DELIVERY OF THE 747 GROUT, IT IS PERMISSABLE TO USE THE BASF MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT. PER THE MANUFACTURE PRODUCT DATA SHEET, MASTERFLOW 928 WILL REACH A FINAL SET IN 4 HOURS. THE CONSISTANCY OF THE 928 SHOULD BE MIXED TO PLASTIC CONSISTANCY. PER TELEPHONE WITH THE TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE OF POLYSPEC THE MANUFACTURER OF THIOKOL 2235M THE CAULK CAN BE APPLIED AFTER THE GROUT REACHES THE FINAL SET. REVISION 3 TO AWA #5 AUTHORIZES THE USE OF MASTERFLOW 928. THE MINIMUM THINKNESS OF THE APPLICATION NEEDS TO BE CONSISTANT WITH THE EARLIER GUIDANCE FOR MASTERFLOW 928.

AWA #5 REVISION 3 PREPARED BY J. HALLENBECK

REVIEWED BY:NIOGI, SUJIT

THIS AWA REVISION 3 IS APPROVED BY: MAKAR, JOHN

THIS AWA #5 REVISION 3 IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT: 12:05 NOV 3, 2006

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APPROVED 'DISPOSITION:

END OF AWA #5 REVISION 3

SCOPE OF AUTHORIZED WORK:

BASED ON THE SIZE OF THE GAP BETWEEN THE DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR SLAB AND THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL, IT IS DESIRED TO INSTALL BACKER ROD IN SOME AREAS TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF CAULK NEEDED. THE BACKER ROD IS A POLYETHYLENE MATERIAL (204-07780) THAT WILL BE COVERED BY THE CAULK, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT BE EXPOSED. THE INSTALLER ESTIMATES THAT 10' OF PERIMETER WILL THIS AMOUNT OF ROD WEIGHS ON THE ORDER REQUIRE ITS USE. OF A FEW OUNCES. RELATIVE TO THE MATERIAL WEIGHTS IN THE SUCTION STRAINER CLOGGING CALCULATION, THE WEIGHT IS INSIGNIFICANT COMPARED TO THE CALCULATION WEIGHTS OF 150 POUNDS FOR DUST, DIRT AND CONCRETE, AND 25 POUNDS FOR MISCELLANEOUS ADDITIONAL DEBRIS. IN ADDITION, THE BACKER ROD WILL EITHER FLOAT , OR MELT AND FLOWN DOWN THROUGH THE GAP BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND THE STEEL SHELL IF EXPOSED TO EXTREME TEMPERATURE. THEREFORE, THE BACKER ROD WILL NOT GET TO THE SUCTION STRAINERS TO CONTRIBUTE THEIR CLOGGING. PRIMARILY, THOUGH, THE BACKER ROD WILL BE WEDGED INTO THE

GAP BETWEEN THE SHELL AND THE CONCRETE, AND IS THEREFORE VERY UNLIKELY TO BE DISLODGED BY ANY DBA IN THE DRYWELL.

MARK CARLSON AND TIM TRETTEL WERE CONSULTED FOR FIRE PROTECTION CONCERNS, AND THEY INDICATED THAT BASED ON THE AMOUNT AND THE LOCATION, USE OF THE BACKER ROD IS ACCEPTABLE WITH REGARD TO FIRE LOADING ADDED TO THE DRYWELL. THEREFORE AUTHORIZATION IS GIVEN TO UTILIZE BACKER ROD IN THIS APPLICATION.

PREPARED BY: P. KESTER CHANGES TO THE ABOVE AWA WERE MADE BY THE REVIEWER BASED ON THE PREPARER INPUT.

AS STATED IN CC-AA-103, THIS WORK IS BEING PERFORMED AT RISK AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT.

THIS AUTHORIZATION IS GIVING TO TOM BADDERS, VENTURE PLANNING.

INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED BY S. MARKOS

THIS AWA HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY THE OC SDEM S. HUTCHINS, ON 10/26/06 @ 20:27

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

END OF AWA # 6

AWA #7 - REPAIR OF VOID IN THE TROUGH ADJACENT TO SUMP 1-8:

SCOPE OF WORK:

WALK DOWN BY WILLIAMS COATING INC. REVEALED THAT APPROXIMATELY 4 INCH WIDE VOID EXIST IN THE TROUGH ADJACENT TO THE SUMP 1-8. ALSO IT APPEARS THAT A FOREIGN GLASS OBJECT IS LODGED IN TO THE VOID. THE OBJECT SHALL BE REMOVED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE BY BREAKING IT IN TO SMALL PIECES AND VACUUM CLEANING THE BROKEN GLASS PIECES. ALL PIECES SHALL BE RETAINED FOR LATER EVALUATION. AFTER REMOVING THE BROKEN GLASS PIECES THE VOID SPACE SHALL BE FILLED WITH GROUT WITH "MASTERFLOW 713 PLUS" OR "MASTERFLOW 928". THIS HAS BEEN APPROVED FOR APPLICATION IN THE DRYWELL PER AWA #1.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:

ALL THE STEPS FOR CLEANING, SURFACE PREPARATION, MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF GROUT SHALL BE AS DELINEATED IN AWA #1 AND MANUFACTURER INSTRUCTIONS SHALL BE FOLLOWED. IF THE VOID IS MORE THAN 2" WIDE, 33% BY WEIGHT OF CLEAN, DAMP 3/8" PEA GRAVEL MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASTM C33 MAY BE ADDED TO THE MIXTURE. SEVENTEEN POUNDS OF PEA GRAVEL SHALL BE ADDED TO EVERY 50 POUNDS OF GROUT. GROUT AND PEA GRAVEL SHALL BE AT ROOM TEMPERATURE (APPROXIMATELY 70 DEGREES F). THE GROUT MIXTURE SHALL BE COMPACTED WITH A STEEL ROD OR SIMILAR DEVICE TO ELIMINATE VOIDS AND CONSOLIDATE THE GROUT MIXTURE AS IT BEING PLACED IN THE VOID.

THE AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ANY GROUT REPAIRS SERVE TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SSC TO ITS INTENDED DESIGN CONDITION.

AWA #7 PREPARED BY S. NIOGI. REVIEWED BY: P. TAMBURRO AND DAN FIORELLO

THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE) THIS AWA IS PROVIDED TO G. SEVCIK AND B. MAZE AT 1930 ON 10/28/06 BY F.H. RAY.

ENSURE ALL DEBRIS REMOVED FROM THE VOID IN THE CONCRETE TROUGH IS RETAINED FOR LATER EVALUATION.

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

IS 2 INCHES OR SMALLER PEA GRAVEL IS NOT REQUIRED TO BE ADDED TO THE GROUT MIXTURE.

REVISION 1 TO AWA #7 IS PREPARED BY SUJIT NIOGI REVISION 1 TO AWA #7 WAS REVIEWED BY DAN FIORELLO

AWA 7, REVISION 1 AUTHORIZATION: THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE) AND I PROVIDED TO D. RYAN AND J. BURT AT 1100 ON 10/30/06 BY F.H. RAY.

AWA #8 - SEALING TRENCH IN BAY 5

SCOPE OF WORK

AWA #5 PROVIDES INSTRUCTIONS TO CAULK SURFACES BETWEEN THE DRYWELL VESSEL PLATE AND THE CONCRETE IN THE TWO TRENCHES. TO APPLY THE CAULK THE SURFACES MUST BE DRY. HOWEVER THE SURFACE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 AND THE SEAM BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND STEEL ARE MOIST. THEREFORE THE CAULK CANNOT BE APPLIED. IF THIS CONDITION CONTINUES TO EXIST, PREPARE THE SURFACES AND INSTALL THE MINIMUM ALLOWED LAYER (1 INCH) OF GROUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH AWA #1. THE LAYER OF GROUT SHALL BE INSTALLED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH AT MOIST SURFACES WHERE EXISTING CONCRETE MEETS THE DRYWELL VESSEL. THE PURPOSE OF THE LAYER OF GROUT IS TO COVER THE MOIST AREAS TO ALLOW PROPER APPLICATION OF THE CAULK. WAIT A MINIMUM OF 24 HOURS FOR THE GROUT TO CURE.

APPLY THE CAULK ON DRY SURFACES BETWEEN THE GROUT AND THE STEEL VESSEL AND OVER LAP THE AREAS WHERE OTHER CAULKING HAS ENDED.

THE AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ANY GROUT REPAIRS SERVE TO RESTORE THE AFFECTED SSC TO ITS INTENDED CONFIGURATION.

AWA #8 PREPARED BY P. TAMBURRO

REVIEWED BY: DAN FIORELLO

THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS (SMDE)

THIS AWA IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT 1600 10/30/06 BY F.H. RAY.

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ECR NUMBER: <u>OC</u> <u>06-00879</u> 001

ECR TYPE: DCP

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

END OF AWA 8

AWA #9 - LEAK TEST OF TROUGH INSIDE THE PEDESTAL, EL.10'-9" UNDER VESSEL

SCOPE OF WORK

THE TROUGH IS APPROXIMATELY 8" DEEP AND LOCATED INSIDE THE REACTOR SUPPORT PEDESTAL AT EL.10'-9". THERE ARE FOUR 4" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES AT 90 DEGREES APART THROUGH THE 4 FEET REACTOR PEDESTAL WALL FOR DRAINING WATER FROM DRYWELL FLOOR EL. 10'-3" TO THE TROUGH. THE INVERT ELEVATION OF THE 4" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVE IS 10'-3". THE TROUGH IS CONNECTED TO THE SUMP 1-8 BY TWO 2" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES. THE INVERT ELEVATION OF THE 2" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVE IS 10'-1 1/4". THIS AWA #9 PROVIDES THE INSTRUCTIONS TO PLUG THESE SIX SLEEVES (FOUR 4" DIAMETER AND TWO 2" DIAMETER).

THE SLEEVES CAN BE PLUGGED USING TAPERED SILICONE RUBBER PLUGS, MCMASTER-CARR CATALOG PART NO. 9277K75 FOR 4" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES (FOUR REQUIRED) AND MCMASTER-CARR CATALOG PART NO. 9277K79 FOR 2" DIAMETER PIPE SLEEVES (TWO REQUIRED). THESE PLUGS SHALL BE INSERTED FROM INSIDE THE PEDESTAL IN TO THE AFTER THE PLUGS ARE INSERTED IN TO THE PIPE SLEEVES. SLEEVES THE SURFACE AROUND THE PLUGS BETWEEN THE PIPE SLEEVE AND THE PLUG SHALL BE COVERED WITH DUCT TAPE OR EQUAL AS APPROVED BY THE CHEMISTRY AND OPERATION DEPARTMENT. THE SURFACES MUST BE DRY BEFORE THE TAPE IS APPLIED. ALTERNATE TYPE PLUGS AS APPROVED BY ENGINEERING MAY BE UTILIZED IF REQUIRED.

BEFORE FILLING THE TROUGH WITH WATER, USING A THIN STEEL NARROW RULER OR THIS NARROW FLAT BAR (OR EQUIVALENT) TO VERIFY THAT NO ADDITIONAL VOIDS EXIST IN THE TROUGH THAT COULD ADD TO THIS LEAKAGE PATH.

IF SIGNFICANT VOIDS ARE DISCOVERED, REPAIR USING GROUT. REPAIR STEPS FOR CLEANING, SURFACE PREPARATION, MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF GROUT SHALL BE AS DELINEATED IN AWA #1 AND MANUFACTURER INSTRUCTIONS SHALL BE FOLLOWED. IF REPAIR BY GROUT IS PERFORMED, ALLOW 24 HRS FOR CURING PRIOR TO PLUGGING THE DRAIN HOLES OR PERFOMING THIS PMT TEST OF THE SUBJECT TROUGH. WATER IN BAYS 5 AND 17 TRENCHES SHOULD BE VACUUMED OUT. FILL THE TROUGH WITH WATER AT LEAST 7" DEEP AND

MONITOR THE HEIGHT OF THE WATER FOR TWO HOURS AND CAREFULLY RECORD THE DEPTH. REFILL THE TROUGH WITH WATER TO 7" HEIGHT IF ANY WATER IS LOST DURING THE FIRST TWO HOURS. AFTER THE TROUGH IS REFILLED, MEASURE THE HEIGHT OF WATER EVERY ONE HOUR FOR NEXT FOUR HOURS.

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ECR TYPE: DCP

- 1 -

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

THE HEIGHT OF WATER SHALL BE MEASURED AT 90 DEGREE DISTANCES APART USING THE EXACT LOCATIONS EACH TIME.

ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA - THE LEVEL AFTER 4 HOURS SHALL NOT HAVE DROPPED MORE THAN 1/4 INCH WITH A MEASURING ACCURACY OF 1/16 INCH

THE AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT. CLEANING AND INSPECTION ARE ROUTINE TASKS. ALL PLUGS AND THE TAPE SHALL BE REMOVED AFTER THE LEAK TEST AND THE AFFECTED AREA OF THE SSC SHALL BE RESTORED TO ITS INTENDED CONFIGURATION.

THIS AUTHORIZATION IS GIVEN TO TOM BADDER OF VENTURE PLANNING. AWA #9 PREPARED BY NIOGI, SUJIT

REVIEWED BY: P. TAMBURRO

THIS AWA IS APPROVED BY SP HUTCHINS (SMDE)

THIS AWA IS PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AT 1600 11/01/06 BY. F.H. RAY

REVISION 1 TO AWA 9

NOTE THAT REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 CHANGED THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO A DROP IN WATER LEVEL OF 1/4 INCH WITH A MEASURING ACCURACY OF 1/16 INCH. THE PURPOSE OF THE TEST IS CHECK FOR ANY GROSS LEAKAGE FROM THE TROUGH THROUGH CRACKS AND VOIDS. THERE WILL BE SOME LOSS OF WATER THROUGH EVAPORATION. ALSO SINCE CONCRETE IS PERMEABLE, THERE WILL BE SOME LOSS OF WATER THROUGH SEEPAGE INTO THE SOUND CONCRETE.

REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 PREPARED BY: DAN FIORELLO

REVISWION 1 TO AWA 9 REVIEWED BY PETE TAMBURRO

THIS AWA REVISION HAS BEEN PROVIDED TO DAVE RYAN AND JOHN BURT AT 15:00 ON 11/2/2006 BY F.H. RAY.

REVISION 1 TO AWA 9 APPROVED BY: F.H. RAY FOR S. HUTCHINS AS SMDE.

END OF AWA #9

REVISON 2 TO AWA #9

FOR BETTER ALARA PRACTICE: WATER LEVEL IN THE TROUGH AT 7" WILL BE MARKED ON THE REACTOR PEDESTAL WALL AT ONE LOCATION. A CAMERA WILL BE FIXED ON THE MARK TO

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ECR TYPE: DCP

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

FACILITATE MONITORING OF THE TROUGH WATER LEVEL WITH RESPECT TO THE LEVEL MARK ON THE PEDESTAL WALL. FINAL FIELD VERIFICATIONS WILL BE PERFORMED FOR WATER LEVEL AND DEPTH. RESULTS OF THE FIELD TEST WILL BE DOCUMENTED IN THE W.O. CREM FOR ACCEPTANCE.

THIS REVISION OF THIS AWA DOES NOT AFFECT ANY IN SERVICE EQUIPMENT. THIS AWA IS GIVEN TO TOM BADDER OF VENTURE.

PREPARED BY S. MARKOS REVIEWED BY: JOHN A. CAMIRE APPROVED BY SMDE: S. HUTCHINS

I.0 PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SCOPE

1.1 PROBLEM DEFINITION:

DURING 11R, TWO TRENCHES WERE CUT FROM THE CONCRETE FLOOR WHERE IT MEETS THE DRYWELL SHELL TO EVALUATE SHELL THICKNESS AND TO REMOVE PLUG SAMPLES IN BAYS 5 AND 17. AFTER EVALUATION AND REPAIR, THE SHELL WAS SPRAY COATED IN THE TRENCH AREAS, FILLED UP WITH DOW CORNING 3-6548 SILICONE RTV FOAM AND SEALED AT THE TOP BY POURING A PROTECTIVE SEALING LAYER OF PROMATEC LOW DENSITY SILICONE ELASTOMER. IT WAS EVIDENT AFTER A 12R INSPECTION OF THE AREA, THAT WATER WAS SEEPING INTO THE PROBABLE SOURCES OF WATER MAY BE (A): TRENCHES. VARIOUS COMPONENT (E.G. VALVE) LEAKAGES, (B): SPILLS FROM DRAIN TANKS, AND (C): EXCESS WATER FROM OUTAGE ACTIVITIES (E.G. CRD CHANGES). IN APRIL 1994, THE TRENCH AREAS WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED AGAIN (WITHOUT REMOVING THE FOAM COVER) WHEN A WALKDOWN WAS CONDUCTED DURING A FORCED OUTAGE. THE AREAS WERE FOUND DRY. DURING THE 1995 STRUCTURAL MONITORING INSPECTIONS NO SIGNS OF CORROSION OF THE INNER SURFACE OF EXPOSED STEEL SHELL IN THE TRENCHES WAS FOUND. THE PRESENCE OF WATER IN THE TRENCHES WAS OBSERVED IN 16R REFUELING OUTAGE IN 1997. IN THE 17R REFUELING OUTAGE, NO SIGN OF WATER WAS OBSERVED IN THE TRENCHES. IN THE 18R REFUELING OUTAGE DRYWELL INSPECTION THERE IS NO MENTION OF WATER PRESENCE IN THE TRENCHES.

DURING 1R21, AFTER THE REMOVAL OF THE FOAM COVER, WATER WAS DISCOVERED IN THE TRENCH IN BAY 5. THIS WATER WAS VACUUMED OUT, BUT THE TRENCH SOON REFILLED INDICATING THAT WATER WAS CONTAINED IN OR AROUND THE SLAB. THE FLOOR SLAB IS POURED AGAINST THE PAGE 0014

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ECR TYPE: DCP

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

BOTTOM OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF WATER SAMPLES SHOWED THAT THE WATER IS NEUTRAL TO WEAK BASIC. WHEN THE PLANT IS AT POWER THE DRYWELL IS INERTED WITH NITROGEN. LACK OF OXYGEN AND NEUTRAL TO WEAK BASIC WATER DO NOT FORM AN AGGRESSIVE ENVIRONMENT THAT COULD LEAD TO CORROSION OF THE DRYWELL STEEL THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED WITH VISUAL INSPECTION SHELL. OF THE INNER SURFACE OF THE DRYWELL EXPOSED SHELL IN THE AREA OF THE TRENCHES. THE ABOVE OBSERVATION INDICATES THAT (A): PROMATEC LDSE IS NO LONGER ACTING AS A SEAL TO PREVENT INTRUSION OF SURFACE WATER, AND (B): DOW CORNING RTV FOAM IS RETAINING THE WATER REACHING THE TRENCHES.

THE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF THE WATER ARE DIRECT LEAKAGE INTO THE FLOOR-TO-SHELL GAP DUE TO STANDING WATER ON THE FLOOR OR WATER RUNNING DOWN THE INTERIOR OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. IN ADDITION THE WATER COULD ALSO BE TRAVELING THROUGH CRACKS OR CONSTRUCTION JOINTS IN THE CONCRETE SLAB, COMING FROM THE TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL, OR FROM THE 1-8 SUMP IF HOLES EXIST IN THE SUMP LINER.

INSPECTION OF THE SUMP LINER SHOWS THAT IT IS IN GOOD CONDITION WITH NO HOLES. THEREFORE THE SUMP IS NO LONGER CONSIDERED AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE FOR THE WATER.

AFTER REMOVING DEBRIS FROM TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL (PER AWA #1) A VOID WAS FOUND IN CONCRETE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TROUGH (IR 00550437). IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS VOID ALLOWS WATER TO BYPASS THE TROUGH ROUTING ARRANGEMENT TO THE 1-SUMP AND ALLOWS WATER TO ENTER THE CONCRETE FLOOR AND MIGRATE THROUGH CRACKS OR CONSTRUCTION JOINTS TO THE TRENCH IN BAY 5. AS A RESULT AWA # 7 WAS ISSUED TO THE FIELD TO REPAIR THIS VOID AND ELIMINATE THIS LEAKAGE SOURCE INTO THE CONCRETE FLOOR.

1.2-SCOPE: THIS ECR THEREFORE ADDRESSES SEVERAL TOPICS:

1.2.1 THE GAP BETWEEN THE DRYWELL SHELL AND THE CONCRETE FLOOR SHALL BE CAULKED AT THE INTERFACE.

1.2.2-THE GAP BETWEEN THE DRYWELL SHELL AND THE TRENCH SIDES SHALL BE CAULKED AT THE INTERFACE.

1.2.3-THE EXISTING TRENCH IN BAY 5 IS EXCAVATED FURTHER TO DETERMINE THE CONDITION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL IN THAT AREA. ACTIONS ARE SPECIFIED FOR FINISHING THE TRENCH SURFACES AFTER THE UT INSPECTIONS ARE COMPLETED.

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ECR TYPE: DCP

1.

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

1.2.4 - INSTRUCTIONS FOR CLEANING AND INSPECTION OF THE DRYWELL SUMP WERE PROVIDED UNDER AWA #2 TO DETERMINE IF ANY REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED. THE RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED TO ENGINEERING FOR EVALUATION UNDER THE STRUCTURAL MONITORING PROGRAM.

1.2.5-THE TROUGH INSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM (THE AREA INSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL AT ELEVATION 10'-3") AND THE PIPES THAT CONNECT IT TO THE AREA, OUTSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL AND THE SUMP WERE INSPECTED UNDER AWA #1. THE RESULTS INDICATED THAT CONCRETE REPAIRS ARE NEEDED AROUND THE PIPES CONNECTING THE TROUGH TO THE SUMP, THE AREA OUTSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM, AND THE VOID IN THE TROUGH. THEREFORE THESE REPAIRS ARE ADDRESSED IN THIS ECR.

1.2.6-THE TROUGH INSPECTION ALSO IDENTIFIED LOW POINTS IN THE TROUGH. ACCEPTANCE OF THESE LOW POINTS WITHOUT ACTION IS JUSTIFIED IN THIS ECR.

1.2.7-INSPECTIONS IN THE SUB-PILE ROOM REVEALED THAT THE RAISED FLOOR SLAB IS DEGRADED, WITH EXPOSED AGGREGATE. THIS CONDITION IS ADDRESSED IN THIS ECR, INCLUDING JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED OPERATION UNTIL REPAIRS ARE DETERMINED AND IMPLEMENTED DURING A FUTURE REFUELING OUTAGE, IF DESIRED (SEE ATTACHED DESIGN ATTRIBUTES AND IR 546049),

1.3 ECR TYPE AND CLASSIFICATION: BASED ON "NO" ANSWERS TO SOME OF THE SCREENING QUESTIONS OF CC-AA-103 ATTACHMENTS F AND G, THIS ECR IS CLASSIFIED AS A DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE. SAFETY RELATED SSC'S ARE AFFECTED.

TECHNICAL TASK RIGOR/RISK ASSESSMENT: 1.4 A TECHNICAL TASK RIGOR/RISK ASSESSMENT WAS PERFORMED THE INITIAL BRIEF FOR THIS TASK WAS PER HU-AA-1212. CONDUCTED ON 10/18/06. FOR THE TASK OF DETERMINING THE SOURCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE WATER (ADDRESSED IN A2152754 E06, NOT IN SCOPE OF THIS ECR), A RISK RANK OF 2 WAS DETERMINED. AN EVALUATION TEAM OF MULTIPLE SME'S WAS ASSEMBLED, AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AN INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW WAS REQUIRED. THE SCOPE OF THIS ECR IS TO IMPLEMENT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THAT TECHNICAL TASK. FOR THE SCOPE OF THIS ECR, A RISK RANK OF 3 WAS DETERMINED. THEREFORE THIS ECR REOUIRES AN ON-SITE INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW.

2.0 SOLUTION / TECHNICAL EVALUATION:

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ECR TYPE: DCP

. 41.0

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

2.1 DESIGN CHANGE ATTRIBUTES: DESIGN CHANGE ATTRIBUTES AND INPUTS HAVE BEEN REVIEWED PER ATTACHMENT 1A OF CC-AA-102, AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 1 OF CC-MA-102-1001. THIS REVIEW IS PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 1 OF THIS ECR.

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2.2 CONFIGURATION ACTIVITIES IMPACT REVIEW: CONFIGURATION CONTROL ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTACHMENT 7 OF CC-AA-102 AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 7A OF CC-MA-102-1001, THIS REVIEW IS DOCUMENTED IN ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 OF THIS ECR.

2.3 PROGRAM IMPACT REVIEW

PROGRAM ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF ATTACHMENT 8 OF CC-AA-102 AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN ATTACHMENT 8A OF CC-MA-102-1001. THIS REVIEW IS DOCUMENTED IN ATTACHMENTS 1 AND 2 OF THIS ECR.

2.4 SOLUTION:

THE REPAIRS SPECIFIED UNDER THIS ECR ARE INTENDED TO CONTROL WATER FLOW IN THE BOTTOM OF THE DRYWELL. ALTHOUGH DETERMINED TO BE ACCEPTABLE IN A2152754 E06*, IT IS DESIRABLE TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF WATER IN THE PORES AND SMALL SPACES IN AND AROUND THE DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR SLAB AT ELEVATION 10'-3". TO DO THIS, THE SUMP HAS BEEN INSPECTED AS DIRECTED IN AWA #2 TO MINIMIZE ITS POTENTIAL AS A SOURCE OF LEAKAGE INTO THE SLAB. VT-1 INSPECTION OF THE SUMP SHOWS THAT THE STAINLESS STEEL LINER IS IN GOOD CONDITIONS AND HAS NO HOLES. THEREFORE THIS SOURCE OF THE LEAKAGE IS ELIMINATED AS A LEAKAGE SOURCE, (A2152754-13).

THE TROUGH AREA HAS ALSO BEEN INSPECTED, AND WILL BE REPAIRED AS REQUIRED TO DIRECT FLOW TO THE SUMP (BY REPAIRING THE CONCRETE AROUND THE PIPES). AFTER REMOVING DEBRIS FROM TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL (PER AWA #1) A VOID WAS FOUND IN THE CONCRETE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TROUGH (IR 00550437). THIS VOID MAY ALLOW WATER TO BYPASS THE TROUGH ROUTING ARRANGEMENT TO THE 1-8 AND ALLOWS WATER TO ENTER THE CONCRETE FLOOR, WHICH ALLOWS WATER TO MIGRATE THOUGH CRACKS AND CONSTRUCTION JOINTS IN THE FLOOR TO THE TRENCH IN BAY 5. AS A RESULT AWA # 7 WAS ISSUED TO REPAIR THIS VOID AND ELIMINATE THIS LEAKAGE SOURCE INTO THE CONCRETE FLOOR. THE REPAIR OF THE TROUGH SHOULD ELIMINATE THE LEAKAGE SOURCE, WHICH CONTINUES TO FILL THE BAY 5 TRENCH.

ENGINEERING & FIELD PERSONNEL ALSO PERFORMED ADDITIONAL |

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

INSPECTIONS OF THE FULL PERIMETER SURFACE OF THE TROUGH TO ENSURE NO OTHER VOIDS EXIST. ONLY MINOR SUPERFICIAL DEFECTS WERE IDENTIFIED AND DETERMINED NOT TO NEED REPAIRS.

IN ADDITION, THE PERIMETER OF THE SLAB WILL BE CAULKED TO THE STEEL VESSEL TO PREVENT WATER FROM ENTERING THE GAP AT THIS INTERFACE. THESE REPAIRS SHOULD ELIMINATE THE PRIMARY FLOW PATH INTO THE SLAB AREA.

THE TRENCH AT BAY 5 WILL BE EXCAVATED SEVERAL INCHES DEEPER TO ALLOW FOR FURTHER UT INSPECTION OF THE DRYWELL SHELL. THEN THE NEW CONCRETE EDGES AGAINST THE STEEL SHELL WILL BE GROUTED, CAULKED AND THE STEEL SHELL EXPOSED AREA WILL BE COATED. THE DEGRADATION OF THE RAISED SLAB IN THE SUB-PILE ROOM, AND THE LOW POINTS IN THE TROUGH DO NOT SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE CONTROL OF WATER IN THIS AREA. THEREFORE NO REPAIRS ARE REQUIRED FOR THESE CONDITIONS AT THIS TIME. THIS CONCLUSION WAS DOCUMENTED AS PART OF THE STRUCTURE MONITORING PROGRAM ER-OC-450 (REF. R2091380-01 & 02).

2.5 TECHNICAL EVALUATION:

THE DESIGN SOLUTIONS ARE EXPLAINED HERE, AND SUPPORTED BY THE ATTACHED DESIGN ATTRIBUTES.

WATER HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE TRENCHES OF THE 10'-3" DRYWELL FLOOR SLAB DURING SEVERAL PAST INSPECTIONS. AS JUSTIFIED IN IR 546049-02* (SEE NOTE AT END OF DAR).

THE PRESENCE OF THIS WATER IS NOT DETRIMENTAL TO THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL. HOWEVER, CAULK WILL BE INSTALLED AT THE INTERFACE BETWEEN THE CONCRETE AND THE DRYWELL SHELL TO MINIMIZE THE AMOUNT OF WATER ENTERING THE GAP BETWEEN THE CONCRETE SLAB AND THE SHELL. THE CAULK WILL FOLLOW THE CONTOUR OF THE EDGE OF THE CONCRETE ALONG THE STEEL SHELL, GOING UP AND DOWN THE CHANGES IN CURB ELEVATION AND INTO THE DEPRESSIONS OF THE TRENCHES. THE CAULK DOES NOT INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL POTENTIALLY FOULING THE SUCTION STRAINERS BECAUSE A GREATER AMOUNT OF MATERIAL (SILICONE FOAM AND ELASTOMER) WAS REMOVED FROM THE TRENCHES AND IS NOT BEING REPLACED, REFER TO TECHNICAL EVALUATION A2152754-05 FOR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON THE SUCTION STRAINERS

THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 WAS EXCAVATED APPROXIMATELY 3" DEEPER TO EXPOSE THE DRYWELL SHELL FOR ACCESS FOR UT MEASUREMENTS. THE MINOR AMOUNT OF CONCRETE REMOVED HAS NO IMPACT ON THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE SLAB SINCE THE SLAB IS PRINCIPALLY A FILL LAYER TO PROVIDE A LEVEL FLOOR (EXCEPT FOR BEARING DIRECTLY UNDER THE PEDESTAL).

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APPROVED DISPOSITION:

THE CONCRETE REMOVED IS A PORTION OF THE REMAINING THIN WEDGE AT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH, BETWEEN THE (RELATIVELY) FLAT BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH AND THE SLOPED SHELL SURFACE. NO REINFORCING OR STRUCTURAL STEEL IS AFFECTED. THE STEEL SHELL REMAINS INTACT AS THE CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY. UT EXAMINATIONS WERE PERFORMED ON THE NEWLY EXPOSED DRYWELL VESSEL, WHICH DEMONSTRATED THAT THE VESSEL THICKNESS WAS ESSENTIALLY UNCHANGED FROM NOMINAL THICKNESS.

THE NEW EDGE OF THE CONCRETE WILL BE CAULKED TO THE STEEL SHELL' TO MAINTAIN

THE CONTINUITY OF THE CAULK BARRIER. THE STEEL WILL BE COATED WITH GREASE AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.2.4.3 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13, TO PREVENT CORROSION OF ANY AREAS THAT ARE NOT COATED WITH THE NORMAL ZINC BASED COATING. REMOVAL OF THE SILICONE FOAM AND ELASTOMER FROM THE TRENCHES HAS NO IMPACT ON THE FLOOR SLAB OR THE STEEL SHELL. WATER WAS FOUND IN THE TRENCHES UNDER THE SILICONE MATERIAL, SO THEY ARE NOT EFFECTIVE AS A WATER SEAL IN THIS APPLICATION. ANY WATER COLLECTING IN THE TRENCHES WILL NOT AFFECT THE STEEL DUE TO THE GREASE APPLIED, AND THE CONCRETE IS NOT DETRIMENTALLY IMPACTED BY CONTACT WITH THE WATER.

IN THE TROUGH AREA, THE CONCRETE WAS FOUND TO BE DEGRADED AROUND SEVERAL PIPES. THE TWO PIPES TO THE SUMP WERE FOUND TO HAVE VOIDS AND LOOSE MATERIAL UNDER THEM ON THE TROUGH SIDE, AS WAS THE AZIMUTH 270 PIPE FROM OUTSIDE OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM TO THE TROUGH. THESE THREE AREAS WILL BE RESTORED TO THEIR ORIGINAL CONFIGURATION USING SAFETY RELATED MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT, WHICH IS AS STRONG OR STRONGER THAN THE ORIGINAL CONCRETE.

IN ADDITION, AFTER REMOVING DEBRIS FROM TROUGH AROUND THE INNER FACE OF THE REACTOR PEDESTAL (PER AWA #1) A VOID WAS FOUND IN CONCRETE IN THE BOTTOM OF THE TROUGH (IR 00550437). MOST LIKELY THIS VOID ALLOWS WATER TO BYPASS THE TROUGH GOING TO THE 1-8 SUMP AND ALLOWS WATER TO ENTER THE CONCRETE FLOOR, WHICH ALLOWS WATER TO MIGRATE THOUGH FLOOR TO THE TRENCH IN BAY 5. AS A RESULT AWA # 7 WAS ISSUED TO THE FIELD TO REPAIR THIS VOID AND ELIMINATE THIS LEAKAGE SOURCE INTO THE CONCRETE FLOOR. THE REPAIR OF THE TROUGH SHOULD ELIMINATE THE PRIMARY LEAKAGE SOURCE, WHICH CONTINUES TO FILL THE BAY 5 TRENCH.

THE DEPTH OF THE TROUGH WAS MEASURED RELATIVE TO STANDING WATER IN THE TROUGH TO DETERMINE IF THE FLOOR OF THE TROUGH WAS SLOPED TO THE SUMP AREA. IT WAS

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ECR TYPE: DCP

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

FOUND THAT, GENERALLY, THE LOW POINT OF THE TROUGH IS AT THE SUMP (O DEGREES) AND THE HIGH POINT IS OPPOSITE THE SUMP (180 DEGREES). THE TROUGH IS RELATIVELY FLAT FROM 270 DEGREES TO 0 DEGREES, HAVING ONLY A 1/8" DIFFERENCE IN WATER DEPTH. THE FLOOR AND WALLS OF THE TROUGH WERE FOUND TO BE IN GOOD CONDITION, HAVING NO SIGNIFICANT CRACKS OR PATHS OF LEAKAGE INTO THE SLAB INTERIOR. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE BENEFIT TO RESURFACING THE TROUGH FLOOR TO PROVIDE A CONTINUOUS PITCH TO THE SUMP. ANY STANDING WATER IN THE TROUGH DOES NOT AFFECT THE CONCRETE. ALSO, RAISING THE FLOOR OF THE TROUGH IN THE 270 DEGREE REGION COULD CAUSE WATER TO COLLECT OUTSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL IN THAT AREA, OR EVEN FLOW OUT OF THE TROUGH TO THE OUTER AREA THROUGH THE PIPE THAT CONNECTS THE TWO AREAS. THEREFORE, BASED ON THERE BEING NO TANGIBLE BENEFIT AND POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES, NO REPAIRS ARE SPECIFIED FOR THE TROUGH FLOOR OR WALLS.

THE RAISED SLAB IN THE CENTER OF THE SUB-PILE ROOM HAS EXPOSED AND LOOSE AGGREGATE, AND SPALLING ALONG THE EDGE IN A FEW PLACES. THIS SLAB IS PITCHED DOWNWARD FROM THE CENTER POINT IN ORDER TO SHED WATER INTO THE THERE IS NO STRUCTURAL FUNCTION OF THE RAISED TROUGH. PORTION OF THE SLAB OTHER THAN TO PROVIDE A WORKING SURFACE FOR UNDER VESSEL WORK. THE DISLODGED AND LOOSE AGGREGATE AND DEBRIS HAS BEEN REMOVED, SO THERE IS NO CURRENT CONCERN WITH THE CONDITION AND IT SHOULD NOT BE A SOURCE FOR WATER TO ENTER THE CONCRETE SLAB AT ELEVATION 10'-3". RESURFACING OF THIS SURFACE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO PRÉVENT ADDITIONAL DETERIORATON AND CREATION OF DEBRIS. THEREFORE THE DEGRADED CONDITION OF THE SLAB IS ACCEPTABLE AT THIS TIME, AND NO REPAIRS ARE SPECIFIED. (REFERENCE IR 546049-10)

3.0 10CFR50.59 REVIEW:

THIS ECR IS DETERMINED TO BE A DCP-TYPE PER CC-AA-103. AS SUCH, A 50.59 REVIEW IS REQUIRED. 50.59 SCREENING OC-2006-S-0379 HAS BEEN PERFORMED PER LS-AA-104 FOR THIS CONFIGURATION CHANGE. THE 50.59 SCREENING CONCLUDES THAT A 50.59 REVIEW IS NOT REQUIRED AND THAT PRIOR NRC APPROVAL IS NOT REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THIS CONFIGURATION CHANGE.

4.0 PLANNING, INSTALLATION AND TESTING INSTRUCTIONS:

4.1 PLANT MODE(S) APPLICABILITY:

THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE REQUIRES INSTALLATION OF MATERIALS IN THE DRYWELL. THEREFORE THIS MODIFICATION MUST BE INSTALLED AND INSPECTED DURING THE 1R21 OUTAGE.

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ECR TYPE: DCP

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

4.2 INSTALLATION REQUIREMENTS:

4.2.1 GENERAL

4.2.1.1 WORK WILL BE IN A POSTED HIGH RAD AREA. AN ALARA PLAN MUST BE DEVELOPED FOR THE REQUIRED WORK ACTIVITIES.

4.2.1.2 THE MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF GROUT SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 2400-SMM-3150.16 AND THE MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS. A QV QUALIFIED INSPECTOR MUST WITNESS THE MIXING AND PLACEMENT OF THE GROUT.

4.2.1.3 THE MIXING OF THE CAULKING MATERIALS AND PLACEMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANUFACTURER'S INSTRUCTIONS AND THIS ECR, AND BE WITNESSED BY QV QUALIFIED INSPECTOR.

4.2.2 REPAIRS IN SUB-PILE ROOM (AREA INSIDE OF THE PEDESTAL)

4.2.2.1 LOOSE DEBRIS AND EASILY DISLODGED AGGREGATE SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE TROUGH AND THE RAISED FLOOR SLAB.

4.2.2.2 GROUT REPAIR IS REQUIRED AT THE TWO PIPES FROM THE TROUGH TO THE SUMP, AND AT THE AZIMUTH 270 PIPE THROUGH THE PEDESTAL WALL TO THE TROUGH, AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #1. IN ADDITION THE VOID SHALL BE REPAIRED PER AWA #7.

4.2.2.3 ENSURE THAT LOOSE MATERIAL IS REMOVED AND CLEAN AGGREGATE IS EXPOSED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION OF THE REPAIR GROUT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURE 2400-SMM-3150.16.

4.2.2.4 THE DRYWELL SUMP LINER SHOULD BE CLEANED AND INSPECTED AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #2, WITH ANY UNSATISFACTORY RESULTS BEING REPORTED TO ENGINEERING FOR CONSIDERATION OF REPAIRS AND BEING TRACKED UNDER A2152754-13.

4.2.3 CAULKING THE ELEVATION 10'-3" SLAB PERIMETER

4.2.3.1 THE STEEL AND CONCRETE SURFACES SHOULD BE PREPARED AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #3. LOOSE COATINGS, DIRT, DEBRIS AND CONTAMINANTS MUST BE REMOVED PRIOR TO CAULKING. SURFACE CONDITIONS SHOULD MEET MANUFACTURERS INSTRUCTIONS FOR CAULK PLACEMENT.

4.2.3.2 CAULK SHALL BE APPLIED TO THE FULL PERIMETER

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ECR NUMBER: OC 06-00879 001

ECR TYPE: DCP

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

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OF THE SLAB, AT ITS INTERFACE WITH THE STEEL SHELL, AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #5 AND MODIFIED BY AWA #6 FOR USE OF BACKER ROD.

4.2.3.3 NOTE THE QV INSPECTIONS REQUIRED BY THE AWA, AND THE REVISION TO AWA #5 REDUCING THE MAXIMUM LAP OF THE CAULK ONTO THE STEEL AND CONCRETE TO 3/4".

4.2.4 TRENCH EXCAVATION AND RESTORATION

4.2.4.1 THE TRENCH IN BAY 5 SHALL BE FURTHER EXCAVATED AS DESCRIBED IN AWA #4.

4.2.4.2 AFTER COMPLETION OF UT EXAMINATIONS, CAULK CAN BE APPLIED AT THE INTERFACE WITH THE STEEL SHELL AND THE CONCRETE PER SECTION 4.2.3. REMOVE ALL STANDING WATER FROM THE TRENCH AND ALLOW THE SURFACES TO DRY SUFFICIENTLY TO ALLOW THE APPLICATION OF THE GROUT. CONDITIONS MAY NOT ALLOW FOR A COMPLETE DEWATERING OF THE TRENCH AND DRYING OF ALL SURFACES. IN THIS CASE APPLY A MINIMUM APPLICATION OF GROUT TO THESE SURFACES AND ALLOW 8 HOURS FOR IT TO DRY. ONCE DRY APPLY THE CAULK.

4.2.4.3 RECOAT THE DRYWELL SHELL SURFACE IN BOTH THE BAY 5 AND BAY 17 TRENCHES AS DESCRIBED IN SECTION 3.2.2.4.3 OF SPECIFICATION IS-328227-004 REV. 13.

4.2.4.4 DO NOT REINSTALL THE SILICONE FOAM OR ELASTOMER TOPPING IN THE TWO TRENCHES.

4.3 ACCEPTANCE TESTING:

4.3.1 GROUT REPAIRS - LEAK TEST WILL BE PERFORMED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE REPAIRS AS DETAILED IN AWA #9. THE LEAK TEST IS USED AS A POST MAINTENANCE VERIFICATION.

4.3.2 CAULKING - AN ISI PRE-SERVICE INSPECTION (PSI) WILL BE PERFORMED ON THE CAULK. SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS VISUAL EXAMINATION PROVIDES SATISFACTORY ACCEPTANCE TESTING FOR THIS INSTALLATION.

4.3.3 TRENCH EXCAVATION/RESTORATION - ACCEPTANCE TESTING FOR THIS PORTION OF THE WORK IS A VISUAL VERIFICATION BY THE WORK GROUP THAT ALL STEEL SHELL SURFACE AREA IN THE TRENCHES IS COATED, EITHER WITH THE ORIGINAL ZINC BASED COATING OR THE GREASE SPECIFIED IN THIS ECR.

4.4 MATERIALS: 204-04825 MASTERFLOW 928 GROUT (PC1) 204-07780 BACKER ROD

ECR NUMBER: OC 06-00879 001

ECR TYPE: DCP

1.1

APPROVED DISPOSITION:

POLYSPEC THIOKOL 2235M CAULK

5.0 REFERENCES

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1.-A2152754 E05, TECHNICAL BASIS FOR CAULK DEBRIS GENERATION 2.-A2152754 E06, EVALUATION OF WATER IN BOTTOM OF DRYWELL (THIS WAS TRANSFERRED TO IR 546049-02) 3.-50.59 SCREENING OC-2006-S-0379 4.-CALCULATION C-1302-241-E610-081 5. A2152754 E09, EVALUATION OF UT DATA (THIS WAS TRANSFERRED TO IR 546049-07)

6.0 ATTACHMENTS:

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1. -DESIGN ATTRIBUTE REVIEW, 9 PAGES 2. -IMPACT REVIEWS (ATTACHMENT 10'S OF CC-AA-102), 7 PAGES 3. -EP-011 QUALITY CLASSIFICATION FORM, 3 PAGES 4. -MARKUP TO DWG BR 4070, 1 PAGE 5. -KOREA ATOMIC ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE RADIATION TEST REPORT (CAULK), 17 PAGES 6. -COPY OF C-1302-241-E3610-081, REV 2A MINOR REVISION, 1 PAGE.

IND. DESIGN REVIEW COMMENTS:

STRUCTURAL TECHNICAL REVIEW WAS PERFORMED BY DAN FIORELLO I PERFORMED A REVIEW OF THE WORD DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE PROBLEM RESOLUTION, I REVIEWED THE AWAS AND THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF THE DESIGN CHANGE AND AM IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CHANGES. I ALSO REVIEWED THE DESIGN ATTRIBUTES IN ATTACHMENT 1. MY COMMENTS WERE MINOR AND WERE INCOPORATED INTO THE DOCUMENT

. INDEPENDENT REVIEW BY PETE TAMBURRO

SATISFACTORY RESOLVED AS DOCUMENTED IN EMAIL DATED 10/28.

ECR NUMBER: OC 06-00879 001

ECR TYPE: DCP

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IND. DESIGN REVIEW COMMENTS:

SIGNED FOR ELDRIDGE, SHARON DUE TO PIMS INACCESSIBILITY.

AWA 1 THROUGH 9 INCLUDING REVISIONS WHICH WERE REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT AND CORRECT THE IDENTIFIED DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AGAINST THE FINAL DISPOSITION AND ALL REVIEWER COMMENTS REMAIN VALID. THIS PACKAGE ALSO RECIEVED A FINAL INDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEW BY MPR ASSOCIATES AND WAS FOUND ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT REVISION.

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MANAGERS COMMENTS THIS DCP IS APPROVED FOR USE. THIS MODIFICATION WILL IMPROVED THE HEALTH OF THE DRYWELL AND CONCRETE TO ENSURE THAT THE PHYSICAL PLANT IS KEPT HEALTHY THROUGH LIFE EXTENSION.

THE SUBJECT ECR REVISION HAS BEEN INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED IAW PROCEDURE CC-AA-103 AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. THIS DESIGN REVIEW ONLY COVERS THE REVISION 1 CHANGES.

REVISION 1 MANAGER COMMENTS:

THE PERSONNEL WHO PERFORMED THIS DISPOSITION WERE QUALIFIED AND THE CHANGES HAVE RECEIVED A RIGOROUS CHALLENGE THROUGH THE PROJECT TEAM ALONG WITH IN HOUSE ININDEPENDENT THIRD PARTY REVIEWER (ITPR) (S. ELDRIDGE) AND AN OVERALL ITPR PERFORMED BY MPR (J. NESTELL) AS PART TO THE DRYWELL WATER ISSUE EVALUATIONS COVERED UNDER IR 546049.

I MADE NUMEROUS EDITORIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES WITHIN THE DISPOSITION TO IMPROVE THE WORDING AND ADDRESS SEVERAL QUESTIONS DISCUSSED AT PORC PORC MEETING 06-18.

THE HU-AA-1212 PRE-JOB BRIEF AND RISK SCREENING WAS INCLUDED AS PART OF THE OVERALL TASK OF EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF WATER FOUND IN THE DRYWELL PER IR 0546049, WHICH WAS GIVEN A RISK RANK OF 2. THESE REVIEWS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED AND COMMENTS RESOLVED. PAGE 0024

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D.	APPROVALS:	1		
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_ <u>C201372513</u> DESC: _187			<u>20061103</u> GH AND VERIF	Y NO LEAK		
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F.	COMPONENT CHANGE REQUESTS:	CCR	Revw	Prop	User	•
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COMPONENT CHANGE REQUEST

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OMP ID : <u>OC 1 187 M MISC NR01\MB001-INT</u> ECR/NCR ID: <u>E 06-00879 001</u> CR REV : <u>000</u>
AST UPD : 10/31/06 PXTO REVIEWED : Y REVIEWED BY : PXTO REVIEW DATE : 10/31/06 REVIEW DATE : 10/31/06 REVIEW DATE : 10/31/06
MP FEG : <u>OC 1 187 000</u> CLEAR PT :
MP DESCRIPT : DRYWELL INTERIOR MOISTURE BARRIER @ CONCRETE FLOOR ELEV 10-3 WHERE DW FLOOR MEETS DW SHELL
ANUFACTURER :
FG TYPE : ERIAL NUMBER:
A CLASS : * A SEIS CAT : Z SSEL/SQUG : N M EQPT : . . N REG.GDE. 1.23 . N REG.GDE. 1.26 : N E INTERFACE . . . N REG.GDE. 1.123 . N REG.GDE. 1.26 : N EG.GDE. 1.97 . N REG.GDE. 1.143 . N EG.GDE. 1.155 . N ATWS . N FIRE PROTECTION . N IRE SSD . . N 10CFR73.55 . N SWP/RWP : . . N IEB 80-11 . N SWP/RWP : . . N . . N . . N N N
ASIC REFERENCE DOCUMENT: BR 4070 SFS/OTHER COMMITMENTS :

THE AMOUNT OF POTENTIAL DRYWELL DEBRIS THAT COULD ENTER THE ECCS SUCTION STRAINERS IS EVALUATED IN CALCULATION C-1302-241-E610-081 PAGE 0032

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COMPONENT CHANGE REQUEST

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AST UPD : 10/31/06 PXT0	REVIEWED : Y
ROPOSD CRL STATUS: F CCR STATUS: AI	REVIEWED : Y PPVD REVIEWED BY : PXTO
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	KEVIEW DATE : 10/31/06
E COMMENTS =	EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
NOTE: THIS IS THE CAULK JOINT AROUND THE DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR AT ELEVATION 10'3'	PERIMETER OF THE DATE =
DRYWELL CONCRETE FLOOR AT ELEVATION 10:3	WHERE IT MEETS DEVI 10/2//06
THE STEEL DRYWELL SHELL.	PRK1 10/27/06 PRK1 10/27/06
	FRK1 10/2//06
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VALVE CAT :	SIZE: 0.00 0.00 FAIL :
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TEAM : FIRE : SECURIT	Y:
WATER: EWATER: S+HG	RAD:
IR : S CTMT:	
SIDE RM NBR: B SIDE	RM NBR:
PENETRATION/COMMODITY	
EN SIZE :	
EN CONFIG:	
OMMODITY SIZE :	
OMMODITY MATERIAL:	
IPING: MAX MVMT : AXIAL	LATERAL
MAX PIPE TEMP:	
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COMPONENT CHANGE REQUEST

MECHANICAL MISCELLANEOUS

OMP ID : OC 1 187 M MISC NR01\MB0	01 - INT	ECR/NCR ID	: <u>E 0'6-00</u>	<u>879 001 </u>
CR REV : <u>000</u> <u>AST UPD : 10/31/06 PXT0</u> ROPOSD CRL STATUS: <u>F</u> CCR STAT	US: <u>APPVD</u>	REVIEWE REVIEWE REVIEW	D BY : PX	<u>F0</u> /31/06
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ECR 06-00879 Rev. 0 Attachment 1 – Design Attribute Review

DESIGN ATTRIBUTES (Numbers correspond to CC-AA-102 rev 13, Att. 1 list items)

4.1.4.1 IDENTIFY BASIC SSC FUNCTIONS:

e.

The Containment is an enclosure for the reactor vessel, the Reactor Coolant Recirculation System, and other branch connections of the Reactor Coolant System. Per UFSAR section 6.2.1, the design criteria for the Containment are as follows:

a. To withstand the peak transient pressure (coincident with an earthquake) which could occur due to the postulated break of any pipe inside the drywell.

b. To channel the flows from postulated pipe breaks to the torus.

c. To withstand the force caused by the impingement of the fluid from a break in the largest local pipe or connection, without containment failure.

d. To limit primary containment leakage rate during and following a postulated break in the primary system to substantially less than that which would result in offsite doses approaching the limiting values in 10CFR100.

To include provisions for leak rate tests.

The concrete floor slab at the base of the drywell provides a foundation for the RPV support pedestal, as well as a level support surface for personnel and equipment. The slab internal to the pedestal has an additional 6"slab on top, and is therefore at a higher elevation than the slab outboard of the pedestal, with the exception of the 6" wide trough just inboard of the pedestal. Drains external to the pedestal can reach the trough (and sump) via four pipes in the base of the pedestal that connect the inboard and outboard areas. The higher slab inside of the pedestal is sloped downward from the center to shed water to the trough.

4.1.4.2 IDENTIFY SAFETY CLASSIFICATION OF CONFIGURATION CHANGE:

The structural support function of the concrete slab is safety related, in that it provides structural integrity for the reactor vessel and its supporting equipment. The steel drywell containment vessel is also safety related, providing the containment integrity. The concrete slab is not required to be impregnable to water, as justified in tech eval A2152754 E06*. Therefore any coatings and caulks are not safety related, and only provide the desired effect of minimizing water infiltration into the concrete/steel shell interface. This ECR is classified as safety related, however, because the added materials come into contact with the safety related steel and concrete, and could potentially have an adverse effect on them. Accordingly, the caulking material is Augmented, "A" Qualifty.

4.1.4.3 IDENTIFY SEISMIC CLASSIFICATION OF SSC :

The steel drywell vessel and the concrete floor slab are Seismic Category I structures. Any added coatings or caulks do not affect these seismic capabilities. Therefore there are no seismic qualification requirements for added coatings or caulks. The concrete/steel shell interface is not considered a seismic gap.

4.1.5 IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Coatings and caulk shall not degrade or alter the strength and integrity of the steel containment vessel and the concrete floor slab. Cementitious grout has a cured compressive strength as high, or typically higher than concrete, so it will behave in the same manner as the concrete to which it is applied. This prevents the need for consideration of any new failure effects for the grout. The caulk shall be qualified to remain adhered under all potential drywell conditions identified in procedure ES-027, with the exception of jet impingement.

4.1.6 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVEILANCE AND ACCEPTANCE TESTING:

The design allows for future inspections of the installed caulk as required under the ASME Section XI program.

4.1.7 SPECIFICATIONS, CODES, STANDARDS, OR REGULATORY REOUIREMENTS:

Specification IS-328227-004 Rev 13, "Function Requirements for Drywell Containment Vessel Thickness Examinations".

OC Station Procedure No. 2400-SMM-3150.16, "Mixing and Placement of Grouts". GE NEDO-32686, Rev 0, "Utility Resolution Guidance for ECCS Suction Strainer Blockage".

EP-057, "Component Record List Control".

EP-011, "Methodology for Assigning and Maintaining the Quality Classification of Components".

ES-027, "Environmental Parameters – Oyster Creek NGS".

4.1.8 PWR SUMP PROGRAM IMPACTS FOR BRAIDWOOD, BYRON AND TMI: Not applicable.

4.1.9 CALCULATIONS OR DESIGN ANALYSES AFFECTED:

The effect of the missing curb will not have a significant effect on the Design Basis Accident analysis of the Containment Shell For the following reasons:

The finite element models used in the GE analysis of the containment shell has fixed boundary conditions at the base where it is supported by the concrete foundation. With the sand bed removed, this interface is modeled at the base of the sand bed region (El 8' 11 7/8") The concrete floor inside the drywell at El 10'-3" extends up to an elevation of 12' - 3". The concrete floor and curbs above the bottom of the sand pocket region were not considered to provide any support to the Drywell shell.

The thermal analysis considered that the temperatures of the shell behind the curb were lower than that of the shell exposed to the drywell atmosphere. There are two portions of the curb that have been removed, each being approximately 16 inches wide. Cutting this small portion of the curb will expose a portion of the shell to higher temperatures. This will have a negligible affect on the shell thermal distribution and the

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thermal analysis stresses. A review of the GE stress report indicated that in the sandbed region the highest stress (primary & secondary) is due to load Case VI (Post –Accident condition) – Gravity, Flooded Seismic) which is a primary stress check and does not included the DBA accident temperature load. The load condition that includes the DBA accident temperature is Load Case V-1. This load case has a maximum primary plus secondary stress in the sandbed region, which is approximately 73 percent of the allowable stress. The Load Case V-1 includes the pressure, gravity, unflooded seismic, seismic relative support displacement and temperature gradient during DBA loads. The load case would conservatively determine combined stresses because the pressure and thermal stress will not maximize simulataneously. The local change in the shell temperature where the curb has been removed will increase the thermal stress in a localized area but this increase is judged not to be significant. The stresses are secondary and localized change in the thermal stress can be accommodated by the existing margin to the allowable stress.

As documented in Technical Evaluations A2152754-05, the amount of potential drywell debris that could enter the ECCS suction strainers is evaluated in calculation C-1302-241-E610-081. The grout behaves as the concrete already present in the drywell, and therefore does not contribute to the potential debris. No additional debris will be created by its presence, since it provides the same surface area available for abrasion or spalling during the DBA as the concrete, and has equal or better strength than the concrete.

The caulk can become dislodged by a water jet, and therefore must be addressed as potential additional debris. However, the amount of caulk added is less than the amount of silicone foam and elastomer removed from either one of the two trenches, and the silicone material was removed from both trenches. Therefore there is no net increase in mass that could clog the suction strainers. The calculation does not specifically address the silicone foam in the trenches, but rather generically includes dust, dirt, concrete and debris in typical amounts for nuclear plants. The amounts are not based on the drywell inventory specific to Oyster Creek (except for insulation), but are numbers utilized by the industry as typical. Since the caulk being added is typically installed in nuclear plants, it can reasonably be considered to be captured in the generic debris amounts utilized in the calculation. Thus, from a practical perspective, there is no net increase in the mass of material in the drywell. And from a configuration control perspective, the caulk being installed is represented in the existing mass values used in the calculation. Therefore it is not necessary to revise the numerical values of the calculation, and the calculation remains accurate to the same degree as when it was originally created. However, text is added to alert calculation users of this issue, and that the mass values are considered to include the caulk installed by this ECR.

There are additional facts that reduce the threat of suction strainer clogging from the caulk. The caulk is at the lowest level of the drywell, installed in a corner joint. The position of the recirc pumps and piping are such that a break would impinge on the caulk in a direction that would push it into the corner rather than in a direction that would tear it from the corner. If it were to be dislodged, its position is below the downcomers such that it would have to travel upward in the drywell to reach the torus. In most line breaks,

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flow in the drywell is downward to the downcomers, making it unlikely that the caulk strip would be washed upward. The cured caulk has a density roughly 1.5 times that of water, making it likely that it will remain at the bottom of the drywell and not reach the torus.

In some areas, backer rod will need to be installed in the gap between the concrete slab and the steel shell, to reduce the amount of caulk needed. The backer rod is a negligible contribution to debris. The installer estimates that 10' of perimeter will require its use. This amount of rod weighs on the order of a few ounces, which is insignificant compared to the calculation weights of 150 pounds for dust, dirt and concrete, and 25 pounds for miscellaneous additional debris. In addition, the backer rod will float, and therefore will not get to the suction strainers to contribute to their clogging. However, it is very unlikely that the backer rod will dislodge at all. It is a high friction, compressible material that will be wedged into the gap between the steel shell and the concrete. Any water jet or other DBA will not penetrate into this gap with any significant force, so the rod is expected to remain in its installed location under all conditions. Therefore use of the backer rod is acceptable, and no calculation changes are required to reflect its use.

4.1.10 REDUNDANCY, DIVERSITY AND SEPARATION REQUIREMENTS:

Not applicable to this modification.

4.1.11 FAILURE EFFECTS REQUIREMENTS :

As discussed above, the grout is no different than the concrete floor slab already present, so its presence does not add any new potential failure effects. It is used to restore the contour to the trough in the sub-pile room. The grout will be placed in accordance with Procedure 2400-SMM-3150.16 with adequate controls to ensure that the grout will not experience bonding failure to the existing concrete. However, if it became delaminated from the concrete substrate, it would result in localized ponding in the trough, and could potentially reach the sump. Localized ponding in the trough is not a concern, since it would not damage the remaining concrete and would allow a negligible volume of water to remain in the drywell. Any grout that reached the sump would remain on the bottom of the sump, and would not affect the operation of the sump pump.

Procedure ES-027 for the DBLOCA defines the environmental parameters inside the drywell. The caulking materials will survive the DBLOCA environmental parameters with exception of the impingement zone of influence caused by the recirculation piping in close proximity to the caulked joints. Failure of the caulk bond could result in water infiltrating the crevice between the concrete drywell floor and the steel drywell vessel. This is acceptable, as determined in A2152754 E06*. The caulk could become dislodged and travel through the downcomers to the torus. This has been addressed in the debris analysis as discussed above. The caulk is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any movement of the drywell vessel relative to its concrete floor slab, and will not restrict this movement. The caulk remains flexible and will remain adhered under the expected range of relative motion, having an elongation capability of greater than 400% (reference

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A2152754-05). The caulk material used has also been successfully tested to the radiation dose associated with plant life service plus accident conditions (see ECR attachments).

4.1.12 USE ATTACHMENT 2 TO IDENTIFY FIRE PROTECTION AND APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS:

All screening questions of CC-AA-102 Att. 2 are answered "no". Therefore a formal fire protection review is not required. In particular, question 1 is answered "no" based on the following reasons: The grout material is essentially concrete, and is not flammable. 'The MSDS for the caulk indicates that the material has an NFPA flammability rating of zero, and that it is not a fire hazard. Review by the fire protection program manager indicates that there is no impact to the fire protection and Appendix R safe shutdown requirements and that the amount of polyethylene backer rod material is insightficant, the material is not exposed, there is no fire source in the area, and the environment is inerted.

4.1.13 MATERIAL AND MATERIAL SUITABILITY REQUIREMENTS:

The cementitious grout used is compatible with the wet environment of the drywell and the concrete floor slab to which it is bonded, and is not adversely affected by the radiation levels present. The caulk material is designed for this type of application and has been qualified to perform satisfactorily under drywell design basis accident conditions. Furthermore, the caulking material is compatible with the DW steel shell structure and concrete structure and will not result in harmful chemical reactions to any of these structures. The backer rod is also compatible with the drywell environment, and will not react with the steel, concrete, or drywell atmosphere.

4.1.14 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS AND IMPACTS:

The installed materials are rated for the drywell normal and accident conditions provided in procedure ES-027. The materials are essentially inert once cured, and will have no effect on the drywell environment. They are not flammable and do not generate any flammable gases, with the exception of the small amount of backer rod added, which has been accepted in the fire protection review. This modification does not affect the temperature, pressure or humidity of the drywell environment.

4.1.15 EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION:

These modifications do not install any equipment requiring environmental qualification, and do not affect the EQ of any existing equipment.

4.1.16 OPERATING EXPERIENCE:

These repairs are based, in part, on the past findings documented in the structural monitoring program, as discussed in the ECR introduction. The caulk applied to the drywell floor joint is the same material used successfully in this application at Peach Bottom, Turkey Point, St. Lucie, Oconee, Catawba, McGuire, and Wolsong, per the coatings consultant on site for the outage (Jon Cavallo, VP of Corrosion Control Consultants and Labs, Inc.).

4.1.17 EPIX DATABASE IMPACTS: None.

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4.1.18 PRA IMPACTS:

Although the Level 2 PRA took some credit for the curb probabilistically, the minor amount of concrete removed from the trench in Bay 5 is not significant enough to markedly change LERF or the conclusions of the SAMA analysis, (Ref. IR 550022). The failure probabilities for the OC $\frac{5M^{11}}{1000}$ due to core material impingement are not significantly different than those for other Mark I containments where the concrete curb does not exist. Therefore there are no impacts to the PRA analysis.

4.1.19 SYSTEM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS;

The ECCS suction strainers must not become clogged to the point that they affect the operability of the ECCS systems. The amount of installed material that could become dislodged and reach the suction strainers has been analyzed and found to be within the available margin for continued operability of ECCS systems. Also, materials installed will not affect the operation of the drywell sump pumps.

4.1.20 HUMAN FACTORS REQUIREMENTS:

Not applicable to this ECR.

4.1.21 USE ATTACHMENT 9 TO IDENTIFY PROCEDURE CHANGES:

The requirement to inspect the caulk will be added to procedure ER-OC-330-1006 for the Containment ISI program inspections IAW ASME Section XI program and is tracked under A2152754-11. Based on review of attachment 9 and the impact review performed, there are no other procedure impacts.

4.1.22 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: None required.

4.1.23 SYSTEM INTERFACE REQUIREMENTS:

This activity will leave the two trenches that were previously filed with a foam material empty. This empty space may slightly delay the measurement of unidentified leak rate which is measured by the 1-8 sump. The open trenches may collect unidentified leakage and temporarily prevent the leakage from reaching 1-8 sump. However this delay is conservatively estimated to be no more than a 30 minutes. The total empty volume of the both trench is estimated to be approximately 50 gallons. Tech. Spec. 3.3.D.1 requires that reactor coolant shall be limited to a 2 gpm increase in a 24 hour period. Assuming a 2 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the same time, it would take about 30 minutes for the trenches to fill and overflow at which point the leakage would enter the 1-8 sump.

The installed materials are primarily structural and cosmetic repairs, and do not interface with any other plant systems.

4.1.24 LAYOUT AND ARRANGEMENT REQUIREMENTS: There are no special requirements for these modifications.

4.1.25 USE ATTACHMENT 5 TO DETERMINE RADIATION PROTECTION / ALARA APPLICABILITY:

Based on the responses to the attachment 5 questions, an ALARA review is required for this scope of work.

4.1.26 WALKDOWNS:

Several walkdowns and inspections were performed by engineering, planning and the work group to determine the best course of action and the preferred design solution. The walkdowns established the existing field conditions, and the installability of the intended design solutions.

4.1.27 ACCESS FOR MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, ISI, OR IST:

The design allows for future inspections of the installed caulk as required under the ASME Section XI program, and for future inspections of the trenches to determine if they contain water. The installed caulk and grout does not impede access to any plant equipment.

4.1.28 HANDLING, STORAGE, CLEANING, SHIPPING AND TRANSPORTING REQUIREMENTS:

Cleaning requirements in preparation for application of the caulking material are specified in AWA #3 of this ECR.

4.1.29 EMERGENCY PLAN IMPACT:

None for this modification.

4.1.30 INDUSTRIAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:

The MSDS for all materials should be obtained by the work group, and reviewed to determine the applicable hazards and precautions.

4.1.31 USE ATTACHMENT 6 TO DETERMINE IMPACT ON NUCLEAR FUEL, CORE COMPONENTS, CORE DESIGN, REACTIVITY MANAGEMENT, CRITICALITY CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS, AND TRANSIENT AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES:

There are no impacts. The materials used are qualified for the drywell environment. Potential creation of debris under DBA conditions has been evaluated and determined to be bounded by the existing conditions and analyses.

4.1.32 LOAD PATH REQUIREMENTS:

There are no special handling requirements for the materials used for these modifications.

4.1.33 MECHANICAL SYSTEM DESIGN LIMITS:

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None applicable.

4.1.34 IDENTIFY CHEMISTRY REQUIREMENTS:

Chemistry has approved the materials applied by this ECR for use in the drywell. Leachable contaminants are within the limits of this environment.

4.1.35 ELECTRICAL REQUIREMENTS: Not applicable.

4.1.36 INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL REQUIREMENTS: Not applicable.

4.1.37 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS: Not applicable.

4.1.38 IDENTIFY CIVIL / STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS:

The repairs do not perform a structural function, but only serve to direct water to the drywell sump. The materials utilized are compatible with, and do not affect the structural integrity of the existing structural elements.

4.1.39 IDENTIFY SEISMIC / DYNAMIC QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS:

Similar to the above item, the installed materials do not have a seismic function or requirements, and do not impact the seismic capabilities of existing SSC's.

4.1.40 PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS:

Personnel shall be qualified for installation of the materials specified.

4.1.41 SPECIAL PROCEDURES OR SPECIAL INSTALLATION SPECIFICATIONS:

The applicable portions of Specification IS-328227-004 rev. 13 are referred to in the work instructions of AWA #5. Unless directed otherwise within this ECR, all materials shall be installed in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions. Grout is to be installed in accordance with Specification IS-551-81-6 as directed in AWA #1.

4.1.42 IDENTIFY / OBTAIN INTERFACING DEPARTMENT REVIEWS:

Interface reviews have been performed by the work group (Dave Ryan), the Venture planner (John Burt), Operations (Robin Brown), the structural monitoring program owner (Sugit Niogi), the system manager (Sylvain Schwartz), the fire protection program manager (Mark Carlson) and the ISI program manager (Greg Harttraft). The completed reviews are attached to this ECR. All identified impacts have been addressed, or have a tracking mechanism to ensure their completion.

4.1.43 USE ATTACHMENT 11 TO DETERMINE POTENTIAL IMPACT ON LICENSE RENEWAL:

This ECR directs a VT inspection of the drywell 1-8 sump pit liner and tracked under A2152754-13, which will satisfy the structural monitoring requirement for license renewal and tracked under A2152754-13. All of the questions of attachment 11 are

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answered "no". The SSC's involved are not affected, and the materials installed do not perform any of the roles or functions addressed by the screening questions.

4.4.44 NEIL REQUIREMENTS:

None.

4.1.45 PERFORM A SINGLE POINT VULNERABILITY (SPV) REVIEW:

A single point vulnerability (SPV) review has been performed for this ECR to identify' all events that can result in an unplanned reactor scram in a proactive manner, with the intent of taking action to prevent such events. No SPV's were identified. This ECR does not eliminate any existing SPV's, and does not create any new SPV's.

4.1.46 STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENTS:

Not applicable.

4.4 USE ATTACHMENT 7 TO IDENTIFY CONFIGURATION CONTROL ACTIVITIES:

In order to inspect the caulk at the drywell floor under the ISI program, it must be listed as a component in the component database (CRL). Therefore component ID NR01\MB001-INT (system 187) has been created for the caulk.

Drawing BR 4070 sheet 1 is posted by this ECR, to show the caulk installation. Drawing GU 3B-153-34-1000 is also posted to indicate that the silicone foam and elastomer are no longer installed in the 2 trenches (no markup required).

The silicone foam and elastomer removed from the trenches was installed under specification IS-328227-003. This document could not be located in EDMS, but the posting of the drawing (above) to indicate removal of these materials provides sufficient configuration control.

No drawing revision is needed for the grout repairs around the embedded pipes to and from the trough. These repairs restore the trough to its design configuration and do not affect any drawings.

Calculation C-1302-241-E610-081 is revised to indicate that the caulk material is to be considered as included in the debris tally on sheet 5 of the calculation.

4.5 USE ATTACHMENT 8 TO IDENTIFY AFFECTED PROGRAMS:

The ISI program is impacted by this ECR. Future inspection of the caulk is required, and this is implemented by revision to procedure ER-OC-330-1006 and tracked under A2152754-11. Furthermore, the Structures Monitoring Program is impacted by this ECR and Procedure ER-OC-450 will be updated as required by the program owner and will be tracked under $\frac{A2152754-11}{A2152754-11}$. TR. 553500

*Note: This document refers to A2152754 E06 in several places and relies on its conclusions. At the time of preparation of this document, that evaluation had been prepared and reviewed, but not yet approved. Therefore its approval, with conclusions that still support the information in this document, must be verified prior to closure of this document. A2152754 E06 has been transferred to IR 00546049 A02. The conclusion this Tech Eval does not change disposition or repairs made by this ECR.

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ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 ATTACHMENT V PAGEL OF 7

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ATTACHMENT 10A

Operations Department (including Radwaste) Configuration Change Review Checklist

Page 1 of 1

Configuration Change Document No.: ECR 06-00879 Rev. 0

This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings. walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.

Review Requirements

Initial/Date

- 1. The impact on the station equipment, changes in equipment responses, and changes in operator response for different scenarios have been discussed. As the representative of the Operations Department, I fully understand the impact, including training needs, upon my department and concur that my concerns have been adequately addressed.
- 2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:
 - Attachment 7 Configuration Activities (List Tracking No. None

Attachment 8 - Programs (Tracking No. Nono

- Attachment 9 Procedures and Training (Tracking No, Non-)
- 3. Acceptance criteria for Post Maintenance Testing and any special tests required to adequately demonstrate system operability following implementation of a Configuration Change have been specified.
- 4. ALARA for operation has been considered in the design.
- 5. Appropriate component labeling is used in the design package, including drawings.
- 6. The Configuration Change does not interfere with operation of existing nearby equipment.
- 7. There are no operating procedure changes required by this Configuration Change that introduce new susceptibility to water hammer or hydraulic transients that might result in impacting plant operation.
- 8. The design can be implemented within constraints of plant operation/mode. This includes an operation assessment of all affected systems and interfacing structures, systems and components during the mode(s) in which the design change is being implemented.
- 9. The configuration change has been reviewed and will not introduce a new single point of vulnerability and there are no existing SPVs (unless approved by Site Engineering Director)
- 10. Impact of this configuration change on Operator Aids has been reviewed and appropriate actions have been or will be taken (refer to OP-AA-115-101 and the Operator Aid Log) Monte
- 11. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)
- 12. Changes impacting the Clearance and Tagging Program have been identified and are being tracked.

My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified.

wer **Operations Department Representative**

Date: 10-27-06

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer

NO-27-06 10-27-06

310-27-00

B 10-27-0 M 10-27-05 M 10-27-0

810-27-06

410-27-06 310-27-06 10-27-06 10-27-00 Y10-27-00

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ATTACHMENT 10B

Plant Engineering Configuration Change Review Checklist

Page 1 of 1

Configuration Change Document No.: ECR 06-00879 Rw. D

This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartment approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.

Review Requirements

Initial/Date

10/27/06

10/27/0E

127/06

NA

NL

1. My department has participated as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department. Included in this review is verification that restoration activities will not result in hydraulic transients that could result in water hammer or affect the continued operation of the unit

2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete. or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below: ECR 06-00879

Attachment 7 - Configuration Activities (Tracking No. 4 2/52754)

Attachment 8 - Programs

(Tracking No.

Attachment 9 – Procedures and Training (Tracking No.

- 3. Acceptance criteria for DCP Testing and any special tests required to adequately demonstrate system operability following Configuration Change implementation have been specified.
- 4. Parameters for performance monitoring and trending are adequately instrumented.
- 5. If applicable, changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and DBDs have been reviewed and are correct.
- 6. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or revision are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No.
- 7. PMs are not impacted or actions initiated to create or revise PM's
- 8. New components are classified per MA-AA-716-210 in the PCM web-based tool, appropriate revisions in the PCM web-based tool for existing components have been made, or additions and changes are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No.
- 9. Design conditions, inputs, and assumptions used in processes, designs or analyses subject to Nuclear Fuels Dept. design authority, if affected, have been discussed with NF and addressed if reg'd.
- 10. The configuration change has been reviewed and will not introduce a new single point of vulnerability and there are no existing SPVs. (unless approved by Site Engineering Director)
- 11. Changes to operator rounds data points have been initiated per OP-AA-102-102. (Action Tracking No.

12. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)

13. Determine if the interim configuration has any potential impact on the operational and nuclear safety requirements of all affected systems and interfacing structures, systems and components during the mode(s) in which the design change is being implemented.

My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified.

Plant Engineering Representative

<u>10/27/06</u> Date

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort

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ATTACHMENT 10C

Engineering Programs Configuration Change Review Checklist

Page 1 of 1

CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO .: ECR 06 - 00879

This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence <u>before</u> Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.

Review Requirements

Initial/Date

- 1. My department has participated as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department.
- I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:
 - Attachment 7 Configuration Activities (Action Tracking No.______)
 - Attachment 8 Programs (Action Tracking No._ N/A
 - Attachment 9 Procedures and Training (Action Tracking No.______)
- DCP Testing has been specified to adequately demonstrate program compliance for components. These tests have been reviewed to assure that there is no likelihood of initiating a water hammer event.
- Changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and component DBDs have been reviewed and are correct.
- 5. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or revisions are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No.

6. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)

My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of any department have been identified.

lark

Date

Engineering Programs Representative

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort

Mr. 10/27/06

MAC 10/27/06

ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 ATTACHMENT 2-PAGE 4-OF 7

CC-AA-102 Revision 11 Page 57 of 63

ATTACHMENT 10C

Engineering Programs Configuration Change Review Checklist Page 1 of 1

CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO .: ECR 06-00 879, FEV. 0

This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence <u>before</u> Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.

Review Requirements

Initial/Date

1. My department has participated as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change: and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department.

- I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:
 - Attachment 7 Configuration Activities (Action Tracking No. <u>/ / / /)</u>

NIA Attachment 8 – Programs (Action Tracking No.

- Attachment 9 Procedures and Training (Action Tracking No. <u>~ (fr</u>____)
- 3. DCP Testing has been specified to adequately demonstrate program compliance for components. These tests have been reviewed to assure that there is no likelihood of initiating a water hammer event.
- 4. Changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and component DBDs have been reviewed and are correct.
- 5. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or revisions are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No. ____ / A

6. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)

My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified.

SUJIT NIOGI Engineering Programs Representative

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort

ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 ATTACHMENT 2-PAGE & OF 7

CC-AA-102 Revision 13 Page 63 of 77

ATTACHMENT 10C

Engineering Programs Configuration Change Review Checklist

Page 1 of 1

CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO .: ECR. 06-00879 Rev. 0

This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence <u>before</u> Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.

Review Requirements

1. My department has participated as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department:

- I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:
 - Attachment 7 Configuration Activities (Tracking No._____)
 - Attachment 8 Programs (Tracking No. A2152/54 E)
 - Attachment 9 Procedures and Training (Tracking No._____)
- 3. DCP Testing has been specified to adequately demonstrate program compliance for components. These tests have been reviewed to assure that there is no likelihood of initiating a water hammer event.
- 4. Changes to system descriptions in UFSAR and component DBDs have been reviewed and are correct.
- 5. Existing Surveillance Procedures are adequate for monitoring system performance or revisions are being tracked to assure timely completion. (Action Tracking No.

6. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007)

My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or appropriate contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified.

Engineering Programs Representative

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort

Initial/Date

ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 ATTACHMENT 2 PAGE GOF 7

CC-AA-102 **Revision 13** Page 64 of 77

Initial/Date

ATTACHMENT 10D

Maintenance Department Configuration Change Review Checklist

Page 1 of 1

Configuration Change Document No.: ECR 06-008

This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility.

Review Requirements

- 1. My department has participated as required and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change; and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department.
- I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training 2. requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below:

· MULT RULE FNSDELTNN of CAUCK EVERY · ISI PROLEDUNE AN INSPECTION EVALS

Attachment 8 - Programs (Tracking

Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Tracking No.

- NO MOTE Programs on Procedure TROMING M 116100 Constructability requirements have been considered (e.g., shop fabrication, 3. field fabrication, scaffolding, rigging, ALARA, special tools, etc.) _ U
- Demolition and removal boundaries have been clearly specified. N/A 4.
- 5. Equipment layout allows maintenance space for newly installed components and does not interfere with maintenance of existing equipment. -9
- Items not in inventory, long lead time items, and required spare parts have -4been identified. (Tracking Number:
- Acceptance criteria for maintenance testing has been specified as required. -47.

My department has reviewed the Configuration Change Document (or applicable contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified.

Date: Maintenance Department Representative

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or **PassPort**

* PER DISCUSSION WITH OCC MOM ON 10/27/06 @17:30, GEORGE SEVICK Was EMPOWERED TO ACT ON MAINTENDAUE'S BENALF.

ECA DG-00879RØ Attachment 2 CC-AA-102 Revision 11 pasel of 7 Page 60 of 63 **ATTACHMENT 10F** Configuration Change Review Checklist for Use by Other Departments Page 1 of 1 Department MAINT. PLANING CONFIGURATION CHANGE DOCUMENT NO. 06-008-19 This Attachment is a sample of a format that can be used to obtain InterDepartmental approvals of a Configuration Change. The content of the Attachment is the required level of questions that each department is expected to answer and provide concurrence before Engineering issues the Configuration Change. As long as the content of the Attachment is being addressed, there is no requirement to use this particular format. This review covers activities performed during the design phase of a Configuration Change, including initial meetings, walkdowns, detailed design development, and identification of impacts on other station programs and areas of responsibility. **Review Requirements** 👘 Initial/Date 1. My department has participated in the Configuration Change process (scope meetings, walkdowns, impact review, etc.) as required, and concurred with the proposed Configuration Change: and fully understands the Configuration Change implications for my department. 2. I have confirmed the identified Programs, Procedures and Training requirements are complete, or initiated tracking for completion, for my department in accordance with CC-AA-102 attachments listed below: Attachment 8 – Programs (Action Tracking No. Attachment 9 - Procedures and Training (Action Tracking No. 3. Other Considerations required to be completed in support of the Configuration Change: 4. The configuration change has been reviewed and impacts on margin are understood. The design summary adequately addresses known margin impacts. (refer to ER-AA-2007) My department has reviewed the Configuration Change document (or applicable contents) and understands the impact regarding my department's operations, procedures, and programs. All Configuration Change support activities required of my department have been identified. Date: 10/22/06 Affected Plant Department Representative

(See EC Milestone for Dept Review signature authentication)

Return the completed form to the Configuration Change Preparer or Sign Electronically in PIMS or PassPort

· · · ·	· ·		Procedure EP-011 Rev. 11	
AmerGen.	Exhib			
An Exelon/British Energy Company			RM	
	(Typical)	EP-011		
ECR No: <u>06-00879</u>	REV	/:0	PAGE _1_OF	
,				. •
. Component Information		REVISION		
				. •
acility: <u>OC</u> Unit: <u>1</u> Category: _	MType:	_CRL Component No	: <u>NR01\MB001-INT.</u>	
lost System No.:187	Host Component/Descripti	on:DRYWELL		
System Classification:	🖾 Q		N 🗌	
lost Component Classification:	D 🖸			
. Evaluation		· ·		
. What are the safety functions of	f the host system and the ho	st component? If bot	h the host system and host	
omponent do not perform a safet	y function, mark this questio	n and question 2 as "	N/A" and continue to question 3.	
ost System:	· 1	•		
ost System:		•		
b. To channel th	e flows from postula	Dreak of any p	pe inside the drywell.	
largest local d. To limit prim in the primar offsite doses	the force caused by pipe or connection, ary containment leak	the impingement without contain age rate during ially less than iting values in	of the fluid from a break in ment failure. and following a postulated h that which would result in	
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AmerGen.	

E2-2

ECR 06-00879, REV 0, ATTACHMENT 3 PAGE 2 OF 3

an account of the energy company	QC Evaluation (Typical) Exhibit 2B – EP-011									
ECR No: <u>06-00879</u>	Rev No.:0	Date: 10/27/06	Quality Class: _	<u>A</u>	EQ (10 CFR 50.49):					
Facility: <u>OC</u> Unit: 1	System : <u>187</u>	Category: <u>M</u>	Туре:	Cmp Nbr:	NR01\MB001-INT					
Item Description: DF	RYWELL INTERIOR	MOISTURE BARRIER	@ CONCRETE FLOC	OR ELEV 10'-3"	WHERE DW FLOOR MEETS					
DW SHELL.										
Functions: (include Sa	fety Function for Safe	ety Related items)		-						
NONE. INSTALLED TO	MINIMIZE WATER IN	TRUSION INTO CONCR	<u>ETE FLOOR.</u>	<u>.</u>						
		ALL ITEMS AR	E TO BE EVALUATED							
REGULATORY COMM	TMENTS (Blank indicates	"N", X indicates "Y")		SSEL/	SQUG: Check One Box Only					
R.G. 1.23 (Meteoro	logical Monitoring)	10 CFR 50.62 (AT	WS)	🔲 1. (Host	Component SQUG Eval- Active SSEL.)					
R.G. 1.26 (Quality (Group Classification)	10 CFR 73.55 (See	curity) ***(Note 1)***	2. ("Rule	Of Box" SQUG Eval – Active SSEL)					
🗌 🗌 R.G. 1.143 (Radwa	ste Management Systems)	R.G. 1.97: Check	<u>one Box only</u>		ntial Relay – Active SSEL)					
R.G. 1.155 (Station	•		equired to be classified "Q"		ator Action Relay – Active SSEL)					
IEB 79-18 (Plant Pa	• •	🔲 R.G. 1.97 CAT 2			Component SQUG Eval- Inactive SSEL.)					
EB 80-11 (Block W	(alls)	🔲 R.G. 1.97 CAT 3		•	Of Box" SQUG Eval – Inactive SSEL)					
	·		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	7. (SQU	G Qualified Component Not On SSEL)					
	c Category: Check one Bo		•							
•	s 1 – Operable During & Afte	•	•		M-RULE/EPIX/PSA					
X – (Seismic Class	1 – Operable After SSE)	🛛 Z – (No Seisn	nic Class applies)		(R / Y / N) A4 SCOPE (Y / N)					
OTHER CLASSIFICATION		ndicates "N", X indicates "Y'		D PSA CL	ASS (Y / N) ORAM (O / S / B / N)					
1E Interface 🔲 E			nse Renewal	-						
AS		nk indicates "N", X indicates	<u>"Y")</u>	1	50 APP. R/BTP APP. A (FHAR)					
ISI CLASS (A / C /	• –	SEC XI ISI		FSSD (N	1/1/2) [] FIRE PROI (Y/N)					
SEC XI IST		ASME REPAIR/REPLACE		-						
Refs/Other Commitmen	te.									
		NDITIONS OF DBLOCA FO	OR SUCTION STRAINERS	CLOGING.						
				-						
Reason for Revision:	···			. –						

Note 1: "Y" Requires the following Special Text Entry in PIMS: "***SECURITY REQUIRED PRIOR TO WORK ON THIS COMPONENT***"


E2-3

Exhibit 2C - EP-011

QC Evaluation (Typical)

Multiple Component Sheet For ECR# _

CMP NBR	CATG	TYPE	FUNCTION (Include Safety Function for "Q" components)
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<u> </u>			
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· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			
	. I		



MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK(815)3375261



ECR 06-00879, REV.

ATTACHMENT PAGE 1 OF 17

PAGE 4

Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

P. O. BOX 7. DAEDUK-DANJI, TAEJON, 305-605. KOREA TEL.(042)868-2000 / TLX KAERI K45553 / FAX (042 868-2702

CERTIFICATE OF RADIATION PROCESSING

Date 1994. 7. 7.

. NO.027

P.4/16

CUSTOMER : Hyundai Engr & Const. Cg. Ltd. Molsong 12 NPPP

: Thickol (2235M, 2282) SAMPLE SIZE : W 15 cm × H 15 cm × T_0.2 cm CUANTITY : 3

Co-60 59,000 C1 SOURCE

DOSIMETER : Ceric-Cerous Sulfate

* MIN 200 Mrad (2,00 MSy) DOSE MAX 204 Mrad (2.04 MGy)

DOSE RATE : 0.5 Mrad/hr (AVR.)

EXPOSURE TIME : 400 hr

1994. 6. 20. 14:00 ~ 7. 7. 06:54 LOSS TIME : 54 min

PARK. SOONCHEDL _____ DATE ____ OPERATOR DATE <u>194. 7. 7</u> APPROVED : JIN. TOONTA

Head, Radiation Processing Project

1:09PM 27.1997

MORTON SCP WOODSTOCK (815) 3375261

(* +	
•	
No	
NO	

의뢰시험성적서

Repert (Test

집 수 번 .F. (Report No.)	E TF-04882 (1994.07.13)
신성인주소 (Applicant Address)	#260, NA A-RI, YANG NAH-MYUN, KYUNG BUK, KOREA
와 사 명(Compary)	HYUNDAL ENGR & CONST/WOLSONG #2 NPPP
니 표 저 명 (Representative)	YOUNG-JONG, KLY
표 명(Commendity)	THIOKOL SEALANT 2282 (2M-A/KKKC-B)

TEST ITEN	1	UNIT	 	RESULT	 	TEST	METI KO
Suscific Gravity Solid Content		%		1.44 98.9	1 1 1	•	000-90
Hardness (Shere 'A)	**************************************	<u> </u>		38		ASTM	U 2240
Work Life(20°C)		min		55	1	ASTM	C 503
Teck Free(20°C)	<u>ļ</u>	, hr		7.1/2	1	ASTM	C 679
Tensile Strength Elongation		kg f/cal	ļ	27 450		ASTM	D 412

** Mixing Estio = PTA: PTB = 17.0:3.4

SUBMITTED PURPOSE FOR (SUBMITTALTO KEDO) USE NOTE : . THIS SHALL NOT BE USED OUTSIDE THE DEFINED USAGE AS WELL AS FOR THE FURITSE OF PROPAGANDA, LAWSUIT AND OTHER LEGAL REQUIREMENTS ... THIS TEST REPORT WAS EXECUTED IN I PAGE(s).



A.K.

ECR 06-00879, REV. 0 ATTACHMENT 뛙의 의원자르부터 재물한 시도에 대하여 시평한 시험성져서임을 중명 Quis is to certify that the above mentioned commodities has been 중명함 Rested in the request test.

(Date)

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(Certificated by)

시운트법시 억등포구 억득포동 8가 88까지

Korea Testing and Research institute for Chemical Indusing

Director General

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No. 1	의퇴시험성적	4 서	1	
	(Test Repor	t)	•	2 C 1
접 수 번 호(Report No.)	: TP-048 33 (1994	1.07.12)	· .	
신성인주소(Applicant Addr	ess) : #260, NA A-RI, YAN	ic NAM-MYUN, KYUNG	BUK, LORES	
최 사 명(Company)	HYUNDAI ENCR & CON	IST / WOLSONG #2 N	qu	
대 표 지 명(Representativ	e) : JANG HENG-DUK	•		•
语 阳(Commodity)	: THIOKOL SEALANT (2	282)	· · · · ·	•
en de la companya de La companya de la comp	기 펌 결 과(Test Res	ult) AFTER R	ADISTICN.	 I
TEST ITEM	UNIT : RESI	JLT ; TEST	MET: KOD	
Tensile Strength Elongation	kg f/ci 10 9% 500	A511 	4 D 412	
Hardness (Shore A)	-! 17	i Asti	1 D 2240	
NOTE : . THIS SHALL NOT PURPOSE OF PROJ	E FOR (SUBMITTAL TO KEPOO) BE USED OUTSIDE THE DEFI PAGANDA, LAWSUIT AND OTHER AT WAS EXECUTED IN 1 PAG	NED USAGE AS WELL LEGAL REQUIREMEN	AS FUR TIO TS.	Ê
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(Date)

19년 187 개월 1일

(Certificated by)

foreu Testing and Research Institute for Chemical Industry Director General

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서울특별기 영등포구 영등포동 8가 88번지

TD-569N 5/69

Thicko

RADIATION RESISTANCE OF LP[®] LIQUID POLYSULFIDE POLYMER BASED COMPOUNDS

POLYSULFIDE POLYMER

INTRODUCTION

Several independent test laboratory studies have been conducted on the radiation resistance of LP[®] liquid polysulfide based compounds. In one study, an LP liquid polysulfide based compound withstood gamma radiation doses up to 8.6×10^7 roentgens, for a period of seven days, with little degradation to physical properties. In a second study, specially formulated LP liquid polysulfide based compounds immersed in JP-4 jet fuel withstood as much as 1.7×10^8 roentgens, with only a small loss in physical properties. Both studies showed that commercially available LP liquid polysulfide polymer base aircraft sealants formulated to meet Federal Specifications MIL-S-7502C and MIL-S-8802C had the best resistance to radiation.


DISCUSSION OF RADIATION RESISTANCE DATA FROM OTHER REPORTS

One report which contains radiation data is entitled, "Research on Elastomeric and Compliant Materials for Aerospace Sealants", Technical Documentary Report No. ASD-TDR-62-709. In this study, eight different polymer based sealants, which were all proprietary sealants, were evaluated and compared. Of those sealants tested, the LP liquid polysulfide based sealants gave the best resistance to gamma radiation. In testing the LP liquid polysulfide based sealant compounds for radiation resistance, three different curing agents were used. The best radiation and heat resistance results obtained were on those LP polysulfide polymer compounds which used either the chromate^{*} or MnO₂ cure as compared to the PbO₂ cure. The best results obtained in this study were on an LP liquid polysulfide polymer based compound that withstood gamma radiation doses of 6.4×10^6 roentgens at temperatures of 190°F for 16 hours. After 100 hours at 250°F, this compound was still serviceable although some degradation was evident.

A second report that contains considerable radiation data on various sealant systems is entitled, "The Effects of Reactor Radiation on Elastomers and Sealants-III", by L. L. Morgan. This is Document No. NARF-60-37T, and is also listed as ASTIA No. 256,689. In this study, a number of proprietary compounds, as well as compounds prepared by Thiokol, were evaluated against a number of combined environments. The maximum gamma dosage which LP liquid polysulfide based sealants withstood, when exposed in air at 90°F, was 1.7 x 10⁸ roentgens. After this maximum gamma radiation exposure, the samples still exhibited tensile properties of 400 psi and elongation values of 265%.

*U.S. Patent No. 2,787,608 issued 4/2/57 to Products Research Company, Los Angeles, Cal. should be referred to before processing and marketing commercial products based on the chromate cure system.

Thickoel CHEMICAL DIVISION 3930 Lower Ferry Road 3P.O. Box 1296 Trenton, N. J. 08607 (609) 396-4001



Registered trademark of Thickol Corporation.

The information in this builden is derived from the best available sources and is believed to be accurate. However, no guarantee is expressed or implied regarding the accuracy of these data of the year of this product, nor are any assessed in this builden intended to infringe on any patent.

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In another test, cured tensile specimen samples of several LP liquid polysulfide polymer based sealant compounds were immersed in JP-4 fuel for seven days. Next, the samples received a gamma dose of 1.7×10^5 roentgens, after which they were left immersed in the JP-4 fuel for thirty more days. After completion of the exposure tests, the samples still exhibited a tensile strength of 350 psi and an elongation of 125%. The LP liquid polysulfide polymer based compounds used in these exposure tests were based on a chromate and MnO₁ cure system.

Refer to Table I for typical LP liquid polysulfide polymer based formulations and the physical and heat resistant properties of the cured compounds. Then, refer to Tables II and III for a summary of results on five cure systems and their correlation between radiation and heat resistance. All data in the following Tables was compiled from tests conducted by Convair, a division of General Dynamics, Fort Worth, Texas. Convair conducted all the irradiation studies on the test samples, which were prepared and supplied by Thiokol Chemical Corporation. Among the sealants formulated by Thiokol, it was established that cure systems exhibiting the best heat resistance also exhibited the best radiation resistance. Exposure to higher temperatures during irradiation indicated that heat alone can cause degradation.

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TABLE I

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF COMPOUNDS BASED ON THIOKOL'S LP-32 POLYMER

Compound (pbw)	A	B	C	D	Ë	
•				1		•
LP-32 Polymer	100	100	100	100	100	
Titenox RA-50		50	4 4	·	· · · · ·	
EH-330	<u>شن</u> ه	· · · ·	1.2	_		
25% Maleic Anhydride in			1			1
Cyclohexanone	_		2	<u> </u>	_	3
Durez 10694	5	-	-	5	_	•
SRF #3	30	-		40	30	
MgO	(jinne).		4	-		
Sulfur	0,1	·· —		0.1		٢
Stearic Acid	1	—	2777	1	-	
Cumene Hydroperoxide	وخلته ا	-	6	-	-	
50% TeO ₂ in Dibutyl Phthalate	_	4 '	` — .	_		
50% PbO1 in TP-680	15	~	" حنشا	🕳 🕺	·	
43% Ammonium Chromate			• •			.'
Solution in H ₂ O	-		<u>1.2</u> 12	15	_	
Cabosil M-5		· -	20	-	.	- F
Sodium Stearate		5			· _	
MnO ₂ -"D" Grade	-	_	. –	÷	3	~
Iriginal Physical Properties		•			•	N. 10
Tensile, psi	390	310	435	800	390	という
300% Modulus, psl	240	780	130	610	280	6 Z -
Elonigation, %	500	530	910	59 0	435	8 4 4
Hardness, Shore A	50	33	46	61	50	U ES
hysical Properties After One Week at 15	8°F.					ECR 06-00879, REV ATTACHMENT 5 PAGE 60F 17
Tensile, psi	550	360	520	910	810	P A E
300% Modulus, psi	300	150	165	610	310	
Elongation, %	54D	630	830	490	700	
Hardness, Shore A	53	50	48	62	50	
hysical Properties After One Week at 212	2°F.		•	· · ·		
Tensile, psi	710	420	870	950	700	
300% Modulus, psi	380	140	290	680	780	
	440		740	460	290	
Elongation, % Hardness, Shore A	57	750		64	710	•
naroness, onore A	57	49	57	04	48	
ysical Properties After One Week at 250	°F.		•		· · · · ·	
Tensil e, psi	540	350	800	710 🐧	430	
300% Modulus, psi		120	460	51 0	160	
	190	850	460	420	750	
Elongation, %	100	004				

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TABLE II

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF EXPERIMENTAL SEALANTS, BASED ON THIOKOL'S LP-32 POLYMER, AFTER IRRADIATION IN AIR AT 90° F.

Compound	Gamma x 10 ⁷	Neutron x10 ¹⁵	Tensile, psi	Elongation, %
A	0	0	480	525
	1.4	1.4	460	490
	10.1	8	300	210
	10.1	7	250	160
le B	0	0	450	700
í	1,5	1.3	420	720
	10.1	8	260	280
	10.1	7	170	200 "
C	D	0	820	670
· ·	1.4	1,3	580	560
	10.1	7,1	420	320
	10.1	7	400	260 ''
D	0	0	1230	·· 570
· .	2.2	1.3	1140	440
	10,1	7	65 0	210
	10.1	7	5 30	160
E	O	0	570	500
i	2.2	1.3	480	450
	8.4	7	280	250
	17.4	10	250	210

Gamma irradiation in Roentgens, but originally expressed as ergs/gm. (C) Neutron irradiation in n/cm^2 where E>0.33 MEV

TABLE III

PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF EXPERIMENTAL SEALANTS BASED ON THIOKOL'S LP-32 POLYMER, AFTER IRRADIATION AND IMMERSION IN JET FUEL

Compound	Gamma x 10 ⁷	Neutron x 10 ¹⁵	Tensile, psi	Elongation, %		
A	Ô	0	480	540		
	2,9	1,2	290	340 .		
	11,3	7	60	40		
8	ρ,	0	340	670		
	2.9	1.2	, 160	240		
· •	1 3.D	6	20	.50		
С	0	0	740	650		
· [2.9	1.2	570	620		
	13.0	7	170	110		
D	0	0	1020	530		
	17.2	1	350	120		
E	9	C	600	530		
	11,5	8	115	70		

Treatment (JP-4 immersion 7 days at 75°F., intediation during immersion followed by 30 days immersion in JP-4 Fuel at 75°F.). Gemma irradiation in Roentgens, but originally expressed as ergs/gm. (C) Neutron irradiation in n/cm² where E>0.33MEV

LIST OF BRAND NAME COMPOUNDING INGREDIENTS

Material Trade Name

TP[®]-680 Cabosil M-5

Cabosil M-5 Durez 10694 EH-330 MnO₂ - "D" grade

Titanox RA-50

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Chemical Composition

Polymeric Fumed silica Phenolic resin Catalyst, tertiary amine Manganese dioxide, special grade MnO₃ Titanium dioxide

Manufacturer

Thiokol/Chemical Division Cabot Corporation Hooker Chemical Corp. Thiokol Chem. Corp. Manganese Chemical Corporation Titanium Pigments Corporation

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Thickol CHEMICAL DIVISION

A DIVISION OF THIOKOL CORPORATION TRENTON, NEW JERSEY 08607

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Engineering Paper No. 893

THE EFFECT OF NUCLEAR RADIATION ON SEALANTS

.

Raymond A. Siebert

Process Engineer

Materials Research & Process Engineering

Douglas Aircraft Company, Inc.

This paper to be presented at the Society of Aircraft Materials and Process Engineers, Symposium on Sealants and Sealing Aircraft, Missiles, and Electrical Components, October 28, 1959, in the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, 7660 W. Beverly Blvd., Los Angeles, California

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In addition to the obvious thermal and mechanical effects of an atomic explosion, additional effects may result from exposure to high intensity nuclear radiation. An aircraft or missile which might survive the hear and shock wave of an atomic detonation could conceivably become disabled because of radiation effects on components of an essential system such as hydraulic controls or power plant. Recently, Douglas Aircraft Company had the opportunity to investigate the effects of nuclear radiation from an atomic explosion on various process materials used in the construction of aircraft and missiles. Included in the test materials were various sealants which were selected because of their general usage in the airframe and missile industry.

- 1. Material A is a polysulfide based MIL-S-8802 type jet fuel resistant integral fuel tank sealant which employs a chromate based accelerator.
- 2. Material B is a black, polysulfide based MIL-S-7502 type integral fuel tank sealant which utilizes a lead peroxide based accelerator.
- 3. Material C is a polysulfide based MIL-S-8516 type electrical potting compound which utilizes a lead peroxide based accelerator.
- 4. Material D is a room temperature curing silicone based sealant.
- 5. Material E is a heat curing silicone based sealant which is putty-like in consistency before cure.

Specimen Preparation

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II. OF

Test specimens were prepared from 1/8 inch thick sheets of cured sealant which had been milled to removed entrapped air immediately after addition of the accelerator. After the sheets had cured 7 days at 77 ± 2°F., dumbbell specimens were cut using the die described in ASIM D-412-51T as Die D. The resulting specimens measured 4 inches in length with a maximum width of 5/8 of an inch and a throat width of 1/8 of an inch. Since Material E, the heat curing silicone, was too viscous for air-free milling, 1/2 by 4 inch rectangular specimens were cut from a 1/8 inch thick sheet which had been pressed from a portion of the uncured compound.

Each specimen was then weighed to the nearest milligram and enclosed in a piece of 1100 aluminum (2S) tubing with an inside diameter of 3/4 of an inch and a length of 5 inches. The ends of the tubes were crimped closed and the sealants allowed to cure an additional 37 days at 77 ± 20F.

The specimens were then divided into 5 groups, with each group consisting of 3 specimens of each sealant. Each group, with the exception of the " control group, was encased in a 6 inch aluminum sphere having a wall thickness of 1-1/2 inches in order to protect the specimens from thermal and mechanical damage. These speres were shipped to the test site where they were placed at varying distances from ground zero. The control specimens were maintained at $77 \pm 2^{\circ}F$. for the duration of the test.

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Evaluation of Effects.

Eighteen days after the detonation, the test specimens were removed from the aluminum tubes and checked for induced radioactivity. Only the polysulfide specimens - Materials A, B and C - which had been exposed at Positions 1 and 2 exhibited any measurable induced radioactivity, as shown in the Table of Results. All specimens including the controls were reweighed and per cent changes in weight calculated. There were no significant trends apparent in the weight changes except, perhaps, in Material E which will be discussed later.

All dumbbell specimens, with a total cure of 62 days, were tested for ultimate tensile strength and elongation properties at 77 ± 2°F. using a Scott Tester, Model L equipped with Type Z-1 clamps and operating at a clamp separation rate of 2 inches per minute. All specimens of Material E were measured for hardness using a Rex Durometer, Model A.

As indicated in the Table of Results, there was no consistent pattern in either the ultimate tensile strengh or elongation of the exposed specimens compared to the controls. The exposed specimens of fuel tank sealants, Materials A and B, exhibited very slight increase in ultimate tensile strength but this increase was not proportional to the amount of radiation received by the various groups. The only consistent changes were observed in the hardness readings or exposed specimens of Material E, where a progressive increase in hardness with increasing proximity to ground zero was noted.

The changes in weight and hardness exhibited by the exposed specimens of Material E were possibly caused by increased temperatures as the specimens were situated closer to ground zero. However, if the temperature at Position 1 was sufficient to cure Material E to a hardness of 45-50, which normally requires 5 to 6 hours at 250°P., the specimens of Materials A, B and C at this position should have exhibited detectable signs of heat exposure, such as increased tensile strength or reduced elongation. Since there appeared to be no other evidence of heat effects, the changes exhibited by Material E were probably a result of bombardment by thermal neutrons whose energy effects may have been sufficient to polymerize the relatively low molecular weight silicone compound.

Generally, the sealants tested did not experience sufficient damage to impair their serviceability at the levels of radiation involved in this test. Since an aircraft or missile exposed to higher levels of radiation from an atomic explosion would probably be destroyed or disabled by the heat or shock wave, any effects on sealant materials at these levels would appear to be of secondary interest.

				TABLE	OF RESULTS	ECR 06-0087 ATTACHME PAGE OF	ENT 5		<u>ې د او </u>
Naterial	Exposure in Roentgen ¹	Weight Actual Weight Ghange,%	Change Variation from Control	Vitimate Tens: Actual Tensile Strength.psi	Le Strength Variation from Control.7	Ultimate El Actual Elongation.%	Variation from	Rardnesa	Induced y Radioactivity Counts/Minute
A	1.1 x 10 ⁶ 4.0 x 10 ⁵ 9.0 x 104 2.7 x 104 Control	-0,30 -0,26 -0,34 -0.26 -0.38	-0.08 -0.12 -0.04 -0.12	419 419 432 422 390	+7.5 +7.5 +10.8 +8.2	175 205 195 180 170	+2.9 +20.5 +14.8 +5.9		1200 300 None None None None
В	1.1 x 10 ⁶ 4.0 x 10 ⁵ 9.0 x 10 ⁴ 2.7 x 10 ⁴ Control	-3.12 -2.74 -2.62 -2.80 -2.72	+0.50 +0.02 -0.10 +0.08	435 445 438 451 429	+1.4 +3.7 +2.1 +5.1 -	390 390 365 380 375	+4.0 +4.0 -2.7 +1.3		600 %C 100 V None WOODSTOCK
С	4.0 x 10 ⁵ 2.7 x 10 ⁴ Control	-1.71 -0.96 -1.01	+0.70 -0.05 -	- 196 - 208 208 208	-5.8 0.0	195 219 245	-16.3 -10.6		400 337572 None 64 None 7572
	4.0 x 10 ⁵ 2.7 x 10 ⁴ Control	 -0.89 -0.66 -0.40	+0.49 +0.26	- 532 588 571	-6.8 +3.0	- 138 - 160 158	-12.7 +1.3		None None None
	1.1 x 10 ⁶ 4.0 x 10 ⁵ 9.0 x 10 ⁴ 2.7 x 10 ⁴ Control	-1.25	+0.86 +0.46 +0.66 +0.31					45-50 35-40 - 30-35 25-30 15-20	None None None None None

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¹A Roentgen is defined as that quantity of X- or Gamma: radiation such that the associated corpuscular emission per

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NSF International

NOV 20, 1997

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100 NORTH RIVERSIDE PLAZA CHICAGO, IL 60606-1598

CHICAGO, IL 60606-1 Attn: MR. MARK NOWAK

Plant 32301

MORTON INTERNATIONAL, INC. 5724 ELDER FERRY ROAD ' MOSS POINT, MS 39581 Attn: MR. HAL MC LAUGHLIN

Thank you for having your product tested by NSF.

The enclosed report details the results of the testing performed on your product. Your program representative will be contacting you in the near future if there are any remaining issues concerning the status of this product.

Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any immediate questions pertaining to your product.

> 12-1-97 CC: P. ANDERSON J. GILMORE M. REYNOLDS -MUSS POINT M. SCHERRER

> > E. Y. I.

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Report for Job 955316

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		Benzyl P		•		3	ND (1)	ug/L	11-18	5-96
	· .			•	ND indicates	Not Detected.				•
	•			•			· _ ·	·	•	
•		F971120				or Job 9553	. –	e 2 of 6		
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S61003056 Continued

•			Parameter	Sample	Control Units	Entered
			in Water, Scan, 6 compou	nds, 625 Continued		
			1 Phthalate	<1 /	l ug/L	11-18-96
		-	hthalate	. 1	<1 ug/L	11-18-96
			Phthalate	ND (10)	ND(10) Ug/L	11-18-96
	•	-	1 Phthalate	ND (1)	ND(1) ug/L	11-18-96
	Note:		d approximately:		· · · · · ·	
			AS: Benzenemethanol		•	
	3.3		AS: 1-Phenyl ethanone		• .	. ,
•			AS: 2-Pheny1-2-propanol			, I
			AS: Bis (2-chloroethoxy)			
		E:	xternal [0 lines] Phthala	tes, in Water, Scan,	6 compounds, 625	
•	20	սց/Ն	LP: Oxygen containing,	MW>103		•
	7	ug/L	LP: Tetramethyl urea	•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	. 6	ug/L	LP: Mix of oxygen conta hexanol	ining, MW 89 and oxat	hiolane and ethyl	
	6	, ug/L	LP: Nitrogen containing	, MW>114	•	
•	· 9 '		LP: (Propenyloxy) benze	ne		
	· 200		LP: Mix of Dioxathiocan	e and surrogate stand	lard d5-nitrobenzene	
	10	ug/L		01	•	
• '	3	ug/L	LP: (Propenyl) phenol			
	3	UG/L	LP: Oxygen containing, 1	MHH=>144	•	
	.7		LP: Tetramethyl thioure.		•	•
•	3 20		LP: Nitrogen, dxygen com LP: Oxygen containing, 1	NGT-2140	•	
•	10		LP: Oxygen containing, 1	がオークエラム VIUS159	•	
	40	ug/L	LF: Oxygen containing, 1	WY>173		•
	900	ug/L			surrogate standard	
. •	20	ua/L	LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	taining, MW=>162		•
•	100	ug/L	LF: Aromatic oxygen cont	taining, MM=>164, #1		· . ·
	30	ug/L		oxygen containing, MW	1>178	•
0	100	ug/L	LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	taining, MW=>164, #2		•
06-00879, REV. 0	4.	ug/L	phenol		tert butyl methoxy	•
_ Z Z		ug/L		₩=>202		
~Z	<u> </u>		LP: Nitrogen containing,			
6-00879,]	Ъ,	ug/L	MW=>204	-		
Õ I			LP: Mix, two oxygen cont		MW>165 and aromatic	
- S <			oxygen containing, MW=>2(LP: Aromatic oxygen cont		•	
a F	Ded 100	. ug/L 	LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	aining $MW=>204$ 42		
្រក្ស		110/1.	LP: Nitrogen containing,	MW>200		
Щ ^с	¹ 100	ua/L	LP: Nitrogen containing,	MW>212. #1	•	
	10	ug/L	LP: Nitrogen containing	hydrocarbon, MW>192		•
	3		LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	aining, MW=>236		• •
1	4	ug/L	LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	aining, MW=>204, #3	· .	
	30	ug/L	LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	aining, MN=>192		1
•	50	սց/Լ	LP: Aromatic oxygen cont	aining, MW=>194		•
• •		ug/L	LP: Nitrogen containing,	MW>212, #2	· · · ·	•
	6	ug/L	LP: (Methyl phenyl ethyl) phenol		
	8	ug/L	LP: Nitrogen containing,	MW>240		•
	. 7	ug/L	LP: Unknown hydrocarbon,	_MW>209		
	0	nd\r	LF: Mix of nitrogen cont MW=>226	aining, MW>230 And o	xygen containing,	•

ND indicates Not Detected.

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Report for Job 955316

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ECR 06-00879, REV. 0

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\$61003056 Continued

-		Parameter	Sample	Control	Units	Entered
I	Phthalates, in W	ater, Scan, 6 compour	nds, 625 Continued			
	3 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing,	MW>244			
	80 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing,	MW=>257			
	B ug/L LP:	Oxygen containing, N	M=>166	•		
	100 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing	hydrocarbon, MW>270		•	
	40 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing,	MW>286			
•	10 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing,	MW>260			
	10 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing,	MW=>299	•		•
	100 ug/L LP:	Unknown hydrocarbon,	MW=>300			
	30 ug/L LP:	Unknown hydrocarbon,	MW=>312		· ,•	
	20 ug/L LP:	Mix of nitrogen cont	aining, MW>328 and (oxygen conta	ining,	
		MW->310				
	2 ug/L LP:	Oxygen containing, M	W=>390			
	200 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing	hydrocarbon, MW=>33	5	•	
	10 ug/L LP:	Unknown hydrocarbon,	MW>344	•		1
	3 ug/L LP:	Unknown hydrocarbon,	MW>253			
	40 ug/L LP:	Nitrogen containing	hydrocarbon, MW=>37)	11	
v	olatiles: Unregu				•	
	Comment	•		N.A.		10-18-9
	Sample: Aslc	had 520 ugi/L carbon	disulfide.			
	Dichlorodifluor	omethane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Chloromethane		ND(0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Bromomethane		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Chloroethane	•	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Trichlorofluoro	methane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5) .	ug/L	10-18-9
	Trichlorotriflu		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	Ug/L	10-18-9
	Methylene Chior	ide	ND (0.2)	ND (0.2)	Ug/L	10-18-9
	trans-1, 2-Dichl	oroethylene	ND(0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,1-Dichloroeth		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	2,2-Dichloropro	pane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	cis-1, 2-Dichlor	oethylene	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
•	Chloroform	• • •	1.2	ND(0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Bromochlorometh	ane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ນ g/L ,	10-18-9
	1,1-Dichloroprop	pene	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Carbon Tetrachl	oride	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,2-Dichloroprop		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
_	Bromodichlorome	tha ne	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
-	Dibromomethane	•	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	2-Chloroethy1vi		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
5.	cis-1,3-Dichlor	opropene	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
َ مَ	trans-1,3-Dichle	oropropene	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,1,2-Trichloroe	etha ne	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,3-Dichloroprog	pane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
ť.	Tetrachloroethy	lene	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	"ug/L	10-18-9
2	Chlorodibromomet	thane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
• •	Chlorobenzene	•	ND(0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,1,1,2-Tetrach1	loroethane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Bromoform		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	Ug/L	10-18-9
	1,1,2,2-Tetrach1	loroethane	ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,2,3-Trichlorop		0.5	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,3-Dichlorobenz		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1, 4-Dichlerobenz		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	1,2-Dichlorobenz		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L	10-18-9
	Methyl-tert-Buty		ND (0.5)	ND (0.5)	ug/L ug/L	10-18-9
	Weawly core weel		110 (V + O 1			TA-TO-3.
	Methyl Isobutyl	Ketone	ND (5)	ND (5)	ug/L	10-18-9

ND indicates Not Detected.

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Report for Job 955316

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ECA 06-00879 CC-AA-309-1001 Revision 3 Attachment 6 pase 1 st Page 31 of 64 **ATTACHMENT 2 Design Analysis Minor Revision Cover Sheet** Page 1 of 4 Design Analysis (Minor Revision) Last Page No. * sht. Analysis No .: C-1302-241-E610-081 Revision: ² ZA Title: Suction Strainer Debrts Generation and Transport EC/ECR No.: 06-00879 Station(s): Oyster Creek Revision: ' 🕐 Unit No.: / Safety/QA Class: Safety Related System Code(s): " 24/, /87 is this Design Analysis Safeguards Information? Yes 🔲 No 🖾 If yes, see SY-AA-101-106 Does this Design Analysis contain Unverified Assumptions? ¹² Yes No X If yes, ATI/AR#: This Design Analysis SUPERCEDES: " in its entirety. Description of Changes (list affected pages): * Add a note to sheet 5, stating that the caulk added at the bottom of the drywell is considered to be included in the total weight of dust/dirt/concrete debris per ECR 06-00879 Rev. O. Disposition of Changes: " This revision indicates that the carly is considered to be included in the existing debris category tallies, and is not new, additional debris, as described in ECR 06-00879 rev. O. This note is intended to aid titure users who may wish to assign the weights listed to specific materials or itens. AZ152754 eval 5 provides the technical evaluation, concluding that the added caulk represents less potential debris than the silicone form and elastomer that are removed by the same ECR. 10/27/06 aul Kester Preparer: * Detailed Review 🔀 Alternate Calculations _Testing Method of Review: " Reviewer: * 10/22/06 Vaniel Fiorello Land Independent review Peer review Review Notes: 1 (For External Analyses Only) External Approver: 20 Print Name Sign Name Date Exelon Reviewer ²¹ Print Name Sign Name Data Exelon Approver: 22

50.59 REVIEW COVERSHEET FORM

Station/Unit(s): _____Oyster Creek Unit 1

Activity/Document Number: _____ECR 06-00879

Revision Number:

LS-AA-104-1001 Revision 2 Page 1 of 1

Title: Drywell Floor/Trough/Drainage Inspection and Repairs

NOTE: For 50.59 Evaluations, information on this form will provide the basis for preparing the biennial summary report submitted to the NRC in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(2).

Description of Activity:

(Provide a brief, concise description of what the proposed activity involves.)

ECR 06-00879 specifies repairs to the lower drywell elevation. The joint at the perimeter of the concrete floor slab is caulked to the steel shell of the drywell. Degraded concrete around the pipes to and from the drain trough is repaired with grout. The existing trench into the concrete slab, in bay 5, is being excavated slightly deeper. The worn concrete surface of the raised slab in the sub-pile room is accepted as-is. The non-uniform slope of the sub-pile room drain trough is also accepted as-is.

Reason for Activity:

(Discuss why the proposed activity is being performed.)

Water was found in one of the 2 trenches in the drywell concrete floor slab. Extensive study (ref. Passport IR 00546049-02 and 07) was performed to evaluate the potential causes and effects. ECR 06-00879 was created to implement repairs to limit the amount of water that would bypass the intended drainage path and enter the floor slab crevices.

Effect of Activity:

(Discuss how the activity impacts plant operations, design bases, or safety analyses described in the UFSAR.)

The specified repairs do not impact plant operations or operability. There is no deviation from any described system function, method of operation, design basis or safety analysis described in the UFSAR. The repairs will help to ensure that the drywell drainage paths function as originally intended and designed.

Summary of Conclusion for the Activity's 50.59 Review:


(Provide justification for the conclusion, including sufficient detail to recognize and understand the essential arguments leading to the conclusion. Provide more than a simple statement that a 50.59 Screening, 50.59 Evaluation, or a License Amendment Request, as applicable, is not required.)

A 50.59 screening was prepared, and all five questions are answered "no". The repairs do not invalidate any stated or implied conditions of the UFSAR regarding plant SSC condition, operation or reason for acceptance, but rather serve to restore the intended design function of the drywell drainage system. Based on the assessment and screening responses, a 50.59 evaluation is not required, and the activity can proceed without prior NRC approval.

Attachments:

Attach all 50.59 Review forms completed, as appropriate. (NOTE: if both a Screening and Evaluation are completed, no Screening No. is required.)

Forms Attached: (Check all that apply.)



50.59 Screening

ing 50

50.59 Evaluation

).59	Screen	ing	No.

50.59 Evaluation No.

____Rev

OC-2006-S-0379

		50.59 SCREENING FORM	LS-AA	-104-1
				Revisio
	50 59 S	creening No. <u>OC-2006-S-0379</u> Rev. No. <u>1</u>	J.	Page 1
.				
4	Activity	//Document Number: <u>ECR 06-00879</u> Revision 1	Number:	1
		59 Screening Questions (Check correct response and provide separate written response providing the each question) (See Section 5 of the Resource Manual (RM) for additional guidance):	e basis for the	e answ
	1.	Does the proposed Activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects an UFSAR described design function? (See Section 5.2.2.1 of the RM)	YES	<u> </u>
	2.	Does the proposed Activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how UFSAR described SSC design functions are performed or controlled? (See Section 5.2.2.2 of the RM)	YES	<u>x</u>
	3.	Does the proposed Activity involve an adverse change to an element of a UFSAR described evaluation methodology, or use of an alternative evaluation methodology, that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses? (See Section 5.2.2.3 of the RM)	YES	<u> X </u>
	4.	Does the proposed Activity involve a test or experiment not described in the UFSAR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the UFSAR? (See Section 5.2.2.4 of the RM)	YES	<u>x</u>
	5.	Does the proposed Activity require a change in the Technical Specifications or Operating	YES	<u>_x</u> _
		License? (See Section 5.2.2.5 of the RM)		•
	,			
		the documents (e.g., UFSAR, Technical Specifications, other licensing basis, technical, commitment		wed,
	inch	the documents (e.g., UFSAR, Technical Specifications, other licensing basis, technical, commitment uding sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below.		wed,
	inch	uding sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each		wed,
	inch	uding sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below.	ch question).	
	inch II. Sele	uding sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below. ct the appropriate conditions: If <u>all</u> questions are answered NO, then complete the 50.59 Screening and implement the Activity	ch question). per the appli	cable
	inch II. Sele	uding sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below. ct the appropriate conditions: If <u>all</u> questions are answered NO, then complete the 50.59 Screening and implement the Activity governing procedure.	ch question). per the appli	cable formed
	inch II. Sele	 ading sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below. at the appropriate conditions: If <u>all</u> questions are answered NO, then complete the 50.59 Screening and implement the Activity governing procedure. If question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES and question 5 is answered NO, then a 50.59 Evaluation If questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are answered NO and question 5 is answered YES, then a License Ame 	ch question). per the appli a shall be perf endment is re- tred prior to ES for the rer	cable formed quired naining
IJ	inch II. Sele X	nding sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below. ct the appropriate conditions: If <u>all</u> questions are answered NO, then complete the 50.59 Screening and implement the Activity governing procedure. If question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES and question 5 is answered NO, then a 50.59 Evaluation If questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are answered NO and question 5 is answered YES, then a License Amer prior to implementation of the Activity. If question 5 is answered YES for any portion of an Activity, then a License Amendment is required implementation of that portion of the Activity. In addition, if question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YIS portions of the Activity, then a 50.59 Evaluation shall be performed for the remaining portions of (Print name) Sign: $M_{\text{(Signature)}}$	ch question). per the appli a shall be perf endment is re- tred prior to ES for the rer	cable formed quired naining
Π	inch II. Sele X V. Scree 50.59	 ading sections numbers where relevant information was found (if not identified in the response to each See below. act the appropriate conditions: If <u>all</u> questions are answered NO, then complete the 50.59 Screening and implement the Activity governing procedure. If question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YES and question 5 is answered NO, then a 50.59 Evaluation If questions 1, 2, 3, and 4 are answered NO and question 5 is answered YES, then a License Amer prior to implementation of the Activity. If question 5 is answered YES for any portion of an Activity, then a License Amendment is required implementation of the Activity. In addition, if question 1, 2, 3, or 4 is answered YI portions of the Activity, then a 50.59 Evaluation of the Activity. 	ch question). per the appli a shall be performed prior to ES for the reproduction of the Activity. 11/S Date: $10/-2$ Date: $10/-2$	cable formed quired maining $\frac{1}{27/-96}$

50.59 SCREENING FORM

50.59 Screening No. _OC-2006-S-0379_

Rev. No. 1

LS-AA-104-1003 Revision 1 Page 2 of 3

Revision Number:

Activity/Document Number: <u>ECR 06-00879</u>

Expanded Responses:

1. Does the proposed Activity involve a change to an SSC that adversely affects an UFSAR described design function?

No. The UFSAR contains extensive discussion on the concrete outside of, and beneath, the steel drywell shell, including the gap between the two. That is because that concrete provides important shielding and support functions, and the gap is essential to these functions. However, there is very little mention of the concrete floor slab inside of the drywell. Section 3.8.3.1.1, "Fill Slab", states that the concrete provides a working surface and transfers the loads of the drywell internal structures to the shell through direct bearing. Design functions of the fill slab are not impacted by the repairs performed under ECR 06-00879. The caulk installation serves to prevent water from entering any gaps between the slab and shell, and has no impact on the load transfer or support functions. Inspection of the caulk will be performed every two years under the structural monitoring program to ensure that it does not degrade.

The drywell sump's purpose is to collect all leakage in the drywell so that it can be monitored and quantified, as well as appropriately discharged. The trough and its supply and discharge paths direct the drains to the sump. The concrete repairs specified serve to restore the full capability of these functions by preventing any unintended diversion of the water from these pathways. The conditions of the raised floor slab section and the trough slope were determined to have no impact on the drainage function or the structural function of the concrete. This activity will leave the two trenches empty. This empty space may slightly delay the measurement of unidentified leak rate, which is measured by the 1-8 sump. The open trenches may collect unidentified leakage and temporarily prevent the leakage from reaching 1-8 sump. This delay has been evaluated in the ECR attachment 1 and is concluded to be minor. Tech. Spec. 3.3.D.1 requires that reactor coolant shall be limited to a 2 gpm increase in a 24 hour period. Assuming a 2 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the same time, it would take about 30 minutes for the trenches to fill and overflow at which point the leakage would enter the 1-8 sump. In addition the Tech Spec. requires that reactor coolant shall be limited to 5 gpm. Increases over 5 gpm over a short time frame are bounded by the tech spec requirement for the 2 gpm increase over a 24 hour period. Assuming a 5 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the same time frame are bounded by the tech spec requirement for the 2 gpm increase over a 24 hour period. Assuming a 5 gpm leak were to instantaneously develop and leak into both trenches at the same time, it would take about 12 minutes for the trenches to fill and overflow at which point the leakage would enter the 1-8 sump.

The torus suction strainers serve the function of preventing debris from damaging the ECCS pumps. The UFSAR section 6.3.2.2.3 describes the design analysis which ensures that excessive debris is not created such that the suction strainers could become too clogged by debris to allow sufficient flow to the pumps. That analysis was reviewed. The result of the materials (that could generate clogging debris) added and removed from the drywell by the subject ECR is a net reduction in these materials. Therefore there is no adverse effect on the analysis.

The 1986 removal of concrete from the floor and curb, that formed the trenches in Bay 5 and 17, does not affect any safety related design functions. A review of the Design Basis Accidents documented in chapter 15 of the UFSAR shows that the floor and curb are not credited for mitigation of design accidents. In addition it does not adversely affect the design inputs, assumptions or conclusions of the GE Design Bases Analysis of the Drywell Vessel (reference GE Report "An ASME Section VIII Evaluation of Oyster Creek Drywell for Without Sand Case Part I Stress Analysis -Index 9.3" dated Feb 1991). The effects of the missing curb will not have a significant effect on the Design Basis Accident Analysis of the Containment Shell as discussed in attachment 1 section 4.1.9 of the ECR.

The curb feature (which is unique to Oyster Creek) has been credited in some Severe Accident Mitigation Events. However the overall benefit of the curb is marginal. The PRA implications of the curb removal were not specifically addressed at the time the PRA was developed, which was after 1986. IR 550022 has been issued to address this omission. An initial review has been completed and the results demonstrate a less than significant impact on LERF and no impact on CDF.

The minor amount of concrete removed from the existing trench in bay 5 is in an area where it also has no impact on these functions.

Therefore the scope of ECR 06-00879 does not adversely affect any design function that is described, implied or referred to in the UFSAR.

50.59	SCR	EENING	FORM

LS-AA-104-1003 Revision 1 Page 3 of 3

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50.59 Screening No.	<u>OC-2006-S-0379</u>	Rev. No1	
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Activity/Document Number: ____ ECR 06-00879

Revision Number:

2. Does the proposed Activity involve a change to a procedure that adversely affects how UFSAR described SSC design functions are performed or controlled?

No. All of the changes made by the subject ECR are passive in nature, and do not affect the performance or control of any plant operations or evolutions. The repairs do not impact operation of the drywell sump, drywell structures or equipment or ECCS systems. No plant processes or procedures are affected by the changes. Therefore the scope of ECR 06-00879 does not adversely affect the performance or control of any UFSAR described design function.

3. Does the proposed Activity involve an adverse change to an element of a UFSAR described evaluation methodology, or use of an alternative evaluation methodology, that is used in establishing the design bases or used in the safety analyses?

No. The design analysis for suction strainer clogging described in the UFSAR was reviewed with regard to the materials added by the subject ECR. The net change in debris generating materials was evaluated using the existing methodology of the design analysis to establish its acceptability. There are no other evaluation methodologies involved with this activity. Therefore the evaluation methodology used within ECR 06-00879 does not deviate from those described in the UFSAR.

4. Does the proposed Activity involve a test or experiment not described in the UFSAR, where an SSC is utilized or controlled in a manner that is outside the reference bounds of the design for that SSC or is inconsistent with analyses or descriptions in the UFSAR?

No. The purpose of the repairs is to direct drywell drains to the sump, as described in the UFSAR. The caulk and grout serve to restore this function. The addition of the materials has been evaluated in accordance with existing analyses and processes, and was found to be acceptable. The scope of ECR 06-00879 does not affect the use or control of any plant SSC. Therefore this activity does not involve any test or experiment that is not bounded by the UFSAR.

5. Does the proposed Activity require a change in the Technical Specifications or Operating License?

No. The repairs in ECR 06-00879 are passive in nature and do not affect the operational parameters or operability of any plant SSC. As discussed under question 1, the potential for water retention by the concrete and trenches not reaching the sump is minimal and the changes implemented per this ECR would not require a technical specification change. However this issue is being further addressed by Licensing under IR 00546049 assignment 09. Therefore none of the required actions or limits for operation of the Technical Specification or Operating License are impacted by the repairs. Therefore no changes are required to the Technical Specifications or Operating License.

Documents Reviewed:

UFSAR: Overview of entire document, plus detailed review of sections 1.2, 1.9, 3.8.2, 3.8.3, 5.2.5, 6.2, 6.3, 9.3, 11.2.

Tech Spec: Overview of entire document, plus detailed review of sections 3.4, 3.5, 4.4, 4.5, 5.2.

Operating License DPR-16: Entire Document

References:

1. IR 546049, Water Observed Coming Into The Trench In Bay 5 Of Drywell