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Direct speech compounds: Evoking socio-cultural scenarios through fictive interaction

Abstract: This paper examines English nominal compounds whose modifier could serve as a self-sufficient discourse unit (e.g. "*Hi honey, I'm home* happiness," " *'not happy, money back'* guarantee"). The scant literature on the construction treats such modifiers as embedded sentences, clauses, or phrases. Drawing on a collection of over 7,000 different examples from written as well as oral English of various dialects and registers, we suggest that regardless of their internal syntax, they always constitute (pieces of) fictive conversational turns. They are structured by the conversation frame as they are based on our everyday experience with situated communication. Hence, they constitute instances of fictive interaction (Pascual 2002). The direct speech element metonymically sets up a significant and easily knowable or recognizable scenario, which serves as a reference point for subcategorizing the denotative potential of the head noun. Making use of encyclopedic and episodic knowledge, direct speech compounds serve to name subjective semantic categories. They are catchy and involving, as they construct a sense of immediacy through (re)enactment. We claim their use to be motivated by the cultural model that relates saying, believing and the truth (Sweetser 1993 [1987]) as well as the understanding of talk-in-interaction as the most concrete indication of the utterer's mental, emotional and behavioral world (cf. Cicourel 1973).

Keywords: direct speech, discourse unit, fictive interaction, conversational turn, metonymy, nominal compound, reference point, scenario, ad hoc categorization

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1 Introduction

In Germanic languages, a head noun can be modified by a sentence or clause, as in the English, Afrikaans, German, and Dutch examples below (our italics):

(1)　a.　*stick it in your ear* attitude (Carroll 1979: 876)
　　　b.　*ekskuus dat ik lewe*-gesig [*sorry that I live* face] (Botha 1981: 75–76)
　　　c.　*Wer-war-das*-Frage [*who was this* question] (Toman 1983: 47)
　　　d.　*lach-of-ik-schiet* humor [*laugh or I shoot* humor] (Hoeksema 1988: 128)

This construction is poorly studied, but the diversity of the examples in our extensive database shows that it is productive, fairly widespread, and occurs across a variety of genres. Following Lieber (1988) amongst others, we analyze structures like those in (1) as nominal compounds rather than modifier-noun combinations. An argument in favor of the compound analysis is that in non-contrastive uses, at least a part of the first element is phonetically more prominent than the second one, as in ordinary productive nominal compounds in English (Lieber 1988: 205; Giegerich 2004). Another argument is that the two elements involved cannot normally be separated by an attributive adjunct.[1] As will be shown, these compound

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1 In Afrikaans, Dutch, and German the compound head may even appear joined to the modifier with or – in the case of Dutch – even without a hyphen (e.g. *blijf-van-mijn-lijf*huis [stay-away-from-my-bodyhouse] [women's shelter]). Anecdotally, we also found one English case of a direct speech modifier attached to the head noun (i.e. "*Idontknow*sexual" <http://www.urbandictionary.com>). However, in certain cases, this type of structure may also be analyzed as a modifier-noun combination (De Brabanter 2005: 188), as when preceding '*sort of* ' or '*kind of* ' '*kinda*' ("*kiss-up, kick-down* sort of guy", "*I never got any in high-school* kinda logic"). More surprisingly, we also found over 80 examples of (multi-)sentential modifier with an adjective and/or noun immediately preceding the head noun, as in (i), as well as cases of gradation and adverbial modification as in (ii):

　(i)　a.　"boys will be boys" lowest common denominator mentality of upbringing
　　　b.　*Enough is Enough* Anti-violence Movement Inc
　　　c.　*lick-my-neck* silk shirt open at the throat, an *eat-your-heart-out* Italian silk-and-wool loose-knit
　(ii)　a.　a very *don't ask, don't tell* life
　　　b.　quite the *'I've got to be organized, get 100%, be the best'* person
　　　c.　a particularly *'I'm out of ideas'* mood . . .

Notes:
(i) a.　Online post in thread 'He Loves You But Still Looks At Other Women' by drrionelli(m) in Nairaland Forum, on 21 July 2007 (http://www.nairaland.com/drrionelli/posts/76).

modifiers can comprise one or more sentences or clauses of the same or different illocutionary types and display the formal and functional characteristics of direct speech. Therefore, they seem to serve as self-sufficient discourse wholes, which raises various interesting issues.

From a grammatical perspective, the compounds under examination are intriguing. They modifiers could serve as self-sufficient discourse wholes, since they share grammatical characteristics with sentences or clause, and pieces of discourse, while constituting in and by themselves (parts of) lexical items. Hence, if they involve morphological, syntactic and/or discursive processes, how are these processes intertwined?

From a pragmatic perspective, the compounds at issue are remarkable since their modifiers constitute a direct speech construction, but do not function as ordinary quotatives. The question then is how the conceptual configuration these modifiers set up differs from that of direct quotation and what the underlying motivation is for using direct speech as a modifier. A related question is of course whether they subcategorize the denotative potential of their head nouns differently than modifiers in ordinary compounds do, and if this is the case, why one should choose to use a direct speech compound instead of an adjective-noun or noun-noun one.

In view of their structure, compounds whose modifiers feature one or more sentences or clauses could be called '(multi-)sentential(ly modified) compounds.' However, we will call them 'direct speech compounds,' since this term highlights some of their most important formal and functional features, as we will argue. We explore the formal and pragmatic characteristics of the modifiers of direct speech compounds in section 2, their interactional nature in section 3, and the creation of novel direct speech compounds and their potential lexicalization in section 4. Section 5 concludes this study.

(i) b. *The New York Times*, August 18, 2007.

(i) c. 'Hairball,' fictional story in *Wilderness Tips*, by Margaret Atwood, 1991, p. 44.

(ii) a. Tab Hunter, 'Larry King Live', CNN, 10 October 2005 [http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0510/10/lkl.01.html].

(ii) b. Post on Sauk online discussion board, by Shining Star, 28 June 2012, 14:04 [http://www.social–anxiety–community.org/db/showthread.php?p=1521096].

(ii) c. 'Visual Inspiration for Musical Exploration', by Peter Hodgson on gibson.com/News– Lifestyle, 21 September 2012 [http://www2.gibson.com/News–Lifestyle/Features/en–us/ visual–inspiration–musical–exploration–0921–2012.aspx].

2　Direct speech modifiers

Since no broad outline of direct speech compounds has been provided so far, we describe in this section their formal and pragmatic characteristics. But first we have a look at our database.

2.1　Database

This study is based on over 7,000 different attested examples from oral as well as written English (American, British, Canadian, and other varieties of English). The examples come from a large collection of different sources and different genres, ranging from everyday conversations to poems and academic publications. The sources of the examples discussed in this paper can be found in the appendix.[2] About three quarters of the written examples were gathered from the search engine Google, trying combinations such as "the why bother," "the I'm" or "the I'm*attitude." Most examples are from contemporary English. Our three oldest examples are from the 1950's and 1960's, namely "*I'm so handsome, you can't resist me*' look" from the well-known Marilyn Monroe movie "The Seven Year Itch" from 1955, "AUDELS *DO-IT-YOURSELF* book" from 1960 and "The *I Never Cooked Before* Cookbook," first published in 1963. We have not searched for older sources. All italics and underlinings in the examples are ours; in all examples the original spelling and punctuation have been maintained. Unless otherwise specified, examples in the text are directly retrievable from the internet.

2.2　Formal and pragmatic characteristics

From an internal syntax perspective, modifiers of what we call direct speech compounds have been described in the literature as clauses or phrases and the modifiers cited mostly consist of a single clause in the imperative, which in English may easily be understood as infinitives.[3] However, this type of modifiers share the formal characteristics of direct speech. Therefore, they may appear in all illocu-

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2 The database of English direct speech compounds we put together is available online at: <http://unquoted.webhosting.rug.nl/> . This intends to be a comprehensive, theory-independent collection of attested examples of direct speech constituents not functioning as ordinary reported speech (verbal as well as multi-modal). It constitutes an ongoing project, and hence new (cross-linguistic) examples are most welcome.
3 See Pascual and Janssen (2004) for a review.

tionary forms: declarative (e.g. "*I-told-you-so* reproach"); interrogative (e.g. "*will-he-get-there-in-time* stories"); imperative (e.g. "*let's-all-be-supportive-of-each-other* atmosphere"); or exclamative (e.g. "'*ain't I wonderful*' genre").[4] Additionally, the modifiers may comprise coordinate and subordinate clauses, different grammatically independent embedded sentences, and or even a short dialogue. Consider for instance:

(2) a. *"Yeah, I was here first, and I'll kill you if you try to say you were first and try to get this before I do"* look
     b. *touch-your-nose-and-stand-on-one-foot,-are-you-drunk?* test
     c. *"How are you? Fine."* relationships

These examples show the large range of forms these compound modifiers can take, from a simple interjection to a small dialogue. This fact indicates that the internal structure of the modifier of a direct speech compound is based on ordinary syntactico-semantic processes. Thus, the coherence between the sentences or clauses constituting the modifier is not so much a matter of syntax as it is a matter of discourse. The term 'direct speech compound,' whose modifier is function-oriented, is therefore a more accurate general name for the phenomenon under examination than a term whose modifier would be syntax-oriented, such as, e.g. the term '(multi-)sentential(ly modified) compound.'

     From a pragmatic perspective, direct speech modifiers also share a great number of characteristics with ordinary quotations. They can be defined in deictic terms as featuring an independent grammatical viewpoint, just as is the case in direct quotation, e.g. "'*I want it now*' <u>couple</u>". Moreover, regardless of their varied internal structure, they always constitute punctuation units, often marked with inverted commas and/or hyphenated (e.g. "'*but-we've-written-that-before*' defense"). Also, just as direct quotation, direct speech modifiers show dialogical features. They may involve expressive and emotive elements, invariably expressing speaker and/or non-speaker subjectivity, and thus enabling discourse distance, for instance through irony or sarcasm, as in (3a) and (3b), respectively:

(3) a. *"<u>Augh! Enough already! Move on, dammit!</u>"* point
     b. *"No, I'd really rather not back up because I enjoy losing my data"* button

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4 Modifiers of direct speech compounds can also consist of elliptic forms (e.g. "*can-do* president," "*serves you right* look," "'*nice girls don't*' attitude". For a more complete overview of the construction's formal features and an outline of its most common semantico-pragmatic types, see the extended version of this paper in Pascual (under review).

Thus, although most examples treated in the literature consist of very simple grammatical structures which may easily be described as phrases, our database shows that direct speech modifiers can be quite complex.

In sum, direct speech modifiers share formal and pragmatic characteristics with ordinary direct speech.[5] This notwithstanding, we draw a fundamental distinction between direct reported speech and fictive interaction, including the use of direct speech in the compounds under discussion. In the former case, (part of) a particular speech occurrence produced by a particular enunciator in a past real or imaginary scenario is reenacted in a more or less literal way. By contrast, in the latter case, the speech represented is an utterance type meant to say something about something else, rather than to report something that was previously said.

3 Fictive interaction

We suggest that modifiers of direct speech compounds are functionally determined by fictive interaction (Pascual 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2008). This constitutes a communicative type of *fictivity* (in the sense of Talmy 2000 [1996]), involving the use of the conceptual frame of situated face-to-face conversation. Our basic assumption is that the pattern of ordinary face-to-face communicative interaction partially structures: (i) the conceptualization of experience (e.g. speech metaphors); (ii) the structure of thought (e.g. internal dialogues); (iii) the structure of discourse (e.g. dialogic monologues); and (iv) the structure of language and its use (e.g. rhetorical questions). At the intra-sentential level, fictive interaction consists of the embedding of a (part of a) fictive verbal exchange in a grammatical unit in order to refer to or characterize what may or may not be a conversational reality. This appears as a piece of direct speech which is generally not construed as a literal or loose quotation of an actual utterance or exchange. The claim is that fictive interaction emerges from and is inspired by our everyday experience with situated verbal interaction with others. This should not be surprising, since fictive phenomena arise from their factual counterparts, so that fictive motion, for instance, emerges from our experience with real motion (Talmy 2000 [1996]; Matlock 2001). This can be illustrated by example (4), taken from an interview with a writer working on a book on the international trial against the late president of Serbia:

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5 Vandelanotte and Davidse (2009) also find a fundamental formal and semantic correspondence between ordinary direct reporting clauses on the one hand and 'be like' and 'go' quotatives, which we consider instances of fictive interaction at the clausal level (Pascual 2002, forth.), on the other hand.

(4) [Milosevic's] first sentence when ehm he came to the tribunal, he <u>said</u> *"I don't recognize* [acknowledge] *this court."* However, he now is, you know, he's listening to the witnessing – the witnesses, he's preparing his defense . . . So there is no longer <u>this kind of arrogance saying</u> eh ehm *"I don't recognize* [acknowledge] *this court."* His arrogance has melted a little bit.

Here, a particular situation of communication is reported in which Milosevic makes his attitude towards his trial manifest by actually saying to the court judging him that he does not acknowledge it as a legal institution. This is what allows the second usage of the speech representation in (4) in order to characterize Milosevic's "kind of arrogance." There exists after all "a general experiential correlation between attitudes and beliefs and the expression of these states of mind" (Brandt 2008: 117). More generally, there is a (perhaps universal) folk model which establishes a fundamental link between an individual's words, that individual's mind and – when that is relevant – an objective fact (Sweetser 1993 [1987]: 47–48).[6] Indeed, if we assume that in the default case what one says corresponds to what one believes and eventually also to what is found to be the case, then we can use people's verbal behavior as a door to their mental, emotional and behavioral world. Indeed, in social life talk-in-interaction is generally considered the most concrete and graspable indication of the interlocutors' thoughts, emotions, intentions, knowledge and social activities (cf. Cicourel 1973, 1978; Wierzbicka 1974; Haiman 1989).

   Critically, one may also characterize a particular kind of attitude in conversational terms even when no instance of the verbal utterance type presented has ever been produced, as in:

(5) a. A POSITIVE ATTITUDE means <u>saying</u>, *"Yes I can do it!"*
   b. The [radio] show features high profile personalities and an attitude that <u>screams</u> *"listen to me!"*

Counter to (4), in these examples the pieces of direct speech in italics represent entirely constructed communicative occurrences. They stand for the type of utterance that – if produced in earnest – would be interpreted by addressees, bystanders and overhearers as indicating the kind of attitude referred to.

   Importantly, a fictive verbal occurrence can also appear embedded in other syntactic structures. Indeed, fictive interaction can become manifest at different

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6 This is the cognitive cultural version of Grice's (1975) conversational maxim of Quality, based on the so-called 'cooperative principle' that governs successful communication.

levels within the sentence: the level of the clause, the phrase, the lexical item,[7] and – at least in Germanic languages – the modifier in a nominal compound (Pascual 2002, 2006b, forth.). Consider the examples below:

(6) a. the attitude that *'I'm better than you are'*
    b. an attitude of *'I'm better than you are!'*
    c. the *'I'm better than you are'*
    d. the *'I'm better than you are'* attitude

In these four examples, constituents at different grammatical levels each represent a kind of communicative event in order to refer to a particular kind of attitude. They all do so through a demonstration rather than a description (cf. Clark and Gerrig 1990).

3.1 Fictive interaction constituents

Our claim is that direct speech modifiers are instances of fictive interaction and thus constitute fictive conversational turns (Pascual and Janssen 2004; Pascual 2006b). This can be illustrated by the following example of fictive interaction through facial expressions:

(7) Tom looked at the Perfectionist. He made his *'no big deal to me'* face. The Perfectionist looked at Tom. She made her *'same here'* face.

Here, the second character's facial expression, referred to as a "*'same here'* face," is presented as the response to the first character's " *'no big deal to me'* face." Similarly, the idea of two fictive conversational turns has to be assumed, in a

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7 At least in English and Dutch, and other unrelated languages such as modern Hebrew (Sandler p.c.), fictive interaction construction can fill the syntactic position of all major lexical categories showing ordinary morphological features. Examples of fictive interaction items with a suffix are adjectives such as "*don't-you-talk-to-your-father-like-that*-ish" (De Brabanter 2005: 188) or "*so-what*-ish", the rarely used adverb "*do-it-yourself*ly", and verbs such as "to *poor thing*" as in "people started *'poor thing'*ing me" or '*to knock- knock, who's there*", as in "That'll have associations *knock- knock, who's there*-ing on the door"). Pascual (2002: 218) cites an instance featuring an infixal direct speech item (serving iconically as a middle name): "Gid–*even though I just finished my finals I still see the need to keep writing about things I don't know much about*–eon," from a student's signature in a public e-mail.

somehow playful manner, in *" 'not happy, money back' guarantee."* The modifier implies the following scenario: the guarantor's question *'Not happy?'* is followed by a non-verbalized negative answer by an unsatisfied customer, which in its turn receives the fictive response *'Money back!'*, expressing the guarantor's promise. Direct speech compounds may also present an enunciation meant for bystanders in a 'fictive trialogue' (Pascual 2002, 2006a, 2008), as in the fragment below:

(8) '. . . And sometimes I dream about this guy I kissed in a bar last month.'
    Natalie made a noise. 'Something you should have told me about?'
    'Maybe. But not like that. It was a *Fuck Off* Kiss.'
    'You were telling him to fuck off?'
    'No, <u>I was telling everyone else they could fuck off</u>.

In this example, by kissing a man in a bar, the character is expressing something to him, which is ultimately aimed at those who saw it happen. Thus, it is the observers of the kiss who are ultimately fictively addressed as bystanders.

Most instances of direct speech modifiers do not explicitly represent a whole dialogue exchange. This notwithstanding, we suggest that these instances still do set up a (fictive) verbal interaction, since the enunciation presented in the modifier is metonymically interpreted as the kind of verbal interaction of which the said enunciation is a part.

3.2 Metonymy

Metonymy plays a crucial role in the production and interpretation of fictive interaction constituents, such as modifiers in direct speech compounds (Pascual 2002, 2006b; Pascual and Janssen 2004; Królak 2005, 2008; Brandt 2008). Consider for instance (9):

(9) My body is the Lord's temple and [I']m not going to let just anyone gain access to it. The[re] is only one key to opening the door to this temple and that[']s an *"I do*"* ring not an *"I will**"* ring (see bottom for explanation). [. . .]

    * An *"I do"* ring is the ring you get when you get married. The minister says '. . . do you take . . .' and you say 'I do'.
    ** An *"I will"* ring is [. . .] your engagement ring. The guy says '. . . will you marry me . . .' and the girl says 'I will.'

Here, the difference between two kinds of rings is not marked by the use of existing descriptive nominal categories (i.e. "*wedding* ring" vs. "*engagement* ring"), but in the metonymical evocation of the verbal exchange that generally precedes the act of receiving each of these symbolic rings in Western culture.[8] Different head nouns cue specific parts of the overall scenario within which this communicative setting takes place. Consider the following examples:

(10) a. *'I Do'* kiss
     b. *"I do"* dress
     c. *"I do"* fear

In (10a), the modifier-head noun combination highlights either central or peripheral elements of the WEDDING frame, metonymically retrieved through the ritualistic "I do".

Direct speech compounds may also involve the metonymic triggering of pragmatic inferencing (Panther and Thornburg 2003) in a metonymic chain (Barcelona 2005). Consider:

(11) *"I Have a Dream"* Foundation

This is the name of a charity organization that gives children the opportunity to pursue higher education. First, a famous utterance is set up in order to mentally access the entire speech by Martin Luther King in which the words "I have a dream", which had a key function in the speech, were repeated. This UTTERANCE FOR DISCOURSE metonymy is then chained to the DISCOURSE FOR DISCOURSE IDEOLOGY metonymy, which in turn is chained to the IDEOLOGY FOR THE CARRIER OF IDEOLOGY metonymy.

As Fauconnier (1981) points out, when a specific symbolic act always co-occurs with a particular linguistic manifestation, the latter is conceptualized as a symbol of that act. It should then not be surprising that an utterance type (e.g. "I do!") associated with a given act (e.g. a wedding ceremony) is introduced through fictive verbal interaction for making mental contact with the entire act, and thereby also with an entity associated with that act (e.g. a ring). As we will see in the next subsection, what goes for symbolic acts – or historical ones, for that matter (Martin Luther King's speech) – also goes for events from our cultural or

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8 The metonymic evocation of fictive interaction compounds such as "*will you marry me? ring*" has been investigated experimentally by Stec (2011).

historic heritage, as well as for more mundane ones that are equally salient and socio-culturally meaningful.

3.3 A fictive conversation as reference point

A direct speech modifier in a nominal compound prompts a socio-culturally meaningful communicative event. This event serves as a cognitive reference point to gain mental access to a subcategory. It serves to determine the denotative potential of the head noun referent.

As a reference point, the communicative event presented through fictive interaction needs to be cognitively salient in the same way that prototypical landmarks or prototypes are in compounds of color terms (e.g. "*fire* red" and "*wine* red," Tribushinina 2008). Typically, this communicative event is retrievable and can be made sense of through accessing: (i) cultural knowledge (e.g. "*the emperor has no clothes* experience;" " *'who's buried in Grant's tomb[?]'* argument", Pascual 2006a: 396; 2008: 88); (ii) historical knowledge (e.g. "*Eureka* moment," "*make love not war* primates"); (iii) social and everyday life knowledge (e.g. "*I'm-sorry-baby-it-will-never-happen-again* treatment," "*How are you? Fine.* relationships"); or (iv) knowledge of the ongoing discourse in the here and now (Janssen 2007: 376–379, see below). Not surprisingly, direct speech compounds emerging from socio-cultural and everyday life knowledge often constitute (adaptations of) well-entrenched occurrences or common phrases (e.g. " *'shop till you drop'* ethos," "*not guilty!* verdicts," Pascual 2008).

It cannot be overemphasized that even when the direct speech modifier 'refers' to a concrete (socio-)culturally knowable verbal exchange, such as a historical quote, this does not mean that this particular exchange serves as the ultimate reference point. Consider for instance the following example:

(12) . . . the trouble with cocaine is that the "*. . . but I didn't inhale"* excuse doesn't work.

In (12), a type of excuse is categorized through evoking part of an actual quote produced in 1992 by then-presidential candidate Bill Clinton, referring to his having experimented with marijuana in the past. Even though the "I didn't inhale" part is certainly intertextually related to the famous admission, in (12), it is used fictively to subcategorize the denotative potential of a type of excuse referring to the consumption of a different drug, and relating to its consumers in general. Therefore, even though "I didn't inhale" constitutes a token, once it is used as a reference point to characterize a kind of excuse, it is construed as a type of

enunciation in a type of communicative event. The interpretation of a direct speech constituent as a type rather than a token is what distinguishes fictive interaction constituents from ordinary reported speech ones.[9]

Modifiers in direct speech compounds may also emerge from or be anchored in the here and now. Indeed, fictive interaction modifiers just as fictive interaction verbs or noun heads (Pascual 2002: 203; 2006b: 258) – may have a temporary situation-related reference. Take for instance the example below:

(13) Doctor's office receptionist: From now on, you know what we're going to have in this office? The *"**you** first"* [pointing to addressee] policy.

This was produced to a particular demanding patient who had had the doctor's office change their appointment policy twice as a response to his complaints for not being served before other patients. With her comment, the receptionist character points out that what the patient seems to want is a policy where he goes first, no matter the circumstance. Note that the 'you' in "'*you* first' policy" is pronounced emphatically and with a pointing gesture to the addressee. Thus, the pronoun 'you' in the modifier "*you first*" constitutes a rigid identifier used exophorically to refer to the addressee in the here and now. This implies that the pronoun serves as an indexical element across the compound's boundary (Ward et al. 1991; Meibauer 2003: 178–179, 183). Hence, the indexical capacity of per-

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9 The following examples show the need to treat fictive interaction constituents as types rather than tokens:

(i) a. *"if only I had bid X!"* regret
    b. *"I'm an idiot/minority/handicapped person"* card
    c. *"if only I had this or that [. . .] then I'd be happy"* attitude

Clark and Gerrig (1990) define this kind of examples as demonstrations with generic – rather than specific – referent. De Vries (2008) defines them as instances of what he calls the 'typifying indefinite variant' of compounded direct speech. Foolen et al. (2006) also provide a typification analysis for instances of the 'be like' construction (e.g. "I was like *Oh, Gosh*"), which we treat as fictive interaction constructions (Pascual 2002, forth.). The assumption here is that a type rather than token reading constitutes a characteristic of fictive interaction constructions in general (Pascual 2002, 2006).

Notes:
(i) a. Post by Laurence Passmore at online forum, 24 June 2007
    [http://forum.jbidwatcher.com/forums/7/topics/1008].
(i) b. Post at 'apologies and more – The Mega Man Network Community'
    [http://blue–bomber.jvmwriter.org/community/index.php?act=findpost&pid=13383].
(i) c. Online anonymous question, "Turning 30!" issue (p. 2), "Health A & Q"
    [http://www.lifepfs.com/issues/question–02506.html].

sonal pronouns in the compound is not restricted to it, as is assumed by Bresnan and Mchombo (1995: 193–194). Example (13) suggests that both linguistic and situational information may contribute to the creation and interpretation of novel direct speech compounds. It also indicates that the fictive type of conversation that serves as reference point for subcategorizing the head noun may be anchored in the specific actual situation of communication in which this fictive conversation is produced.

4 Creating new categories

Direct speech compounds, just like ordinary ones, have a categorizing function, since they give labels to nameworthy cognitive categories. The fact that they stand for a kind of a category becomes obvious in their frequent occurrence with head nouns such as 'category', 'genre', and 'variety' (e.g. "the *I'm honored* category," "the *'ain't I wonderful'* genre"). But the question remains, what makes creating direct speech compounds so popular?

The use of direct speech in compounds serves to (re)create a staged verbal performance in the current interaction as though it were occurring at the time of speech. By so doing, a story becomes more vivid (Wierzbicka 1974; Longacre 1976; Schiffrin 1981; Chafe 1982), constructs a sense of immediacy (Tannen 1986), and attains conversational involvement (Tannen 1986; Rosen 1988). More generally, direct speech presents what is talked about as concrete subjective (re)enactment, rather than abstract objective description. This allows the audience to imagine and live the situation concerned, and to appreciate for themselves what the narrator attempts to express. The addressees in the here and now are, then, not merely recipients, as they may be expected to become involved in the demonstrated speech situation as temporary fictive addressers, addressees or bystanders. This is the reason why direct speech compounds appear more dramatic, attention-gripping and involving than ordinary nominal compounds.

Additionally, direct speech modifiers often make compounds dramatic and emotionally loaded by virtue of interjections, vocatives or other emotive elements. Therefore, direct speech compounds produce rhetorical effects that are not usually achieved by other types of compound. Consider the examples below:

(14) a. *"I don't have to run"* day (for Sunday)
   b. *Good-God-I'm-Old* day (for somebody's birthday)
   c. *"go-prove-you-love-her"* day (for Saint Valentine's Day)
   d. *Make-your-kids-into-greedy-little-materialistic-consumption-addicts*   day (for Christmas day)

The direct speech compounds in (14) all provide alternative names for semantic categories that may also be referred to by available lexical entries, as indicated in parentheses. Still, the fact that their modifiers set up fictive verbal exchanges makes them catchy, humorous, emotionally-loaded, and mostly refreshingly different from their lexically available counterparts.[10] More importantly, the categories created by direct speech compounds may also be more apposite and informative, as they carry subjective information.

Direct speech compounds also seem to be especially useful for coding concepts that are difficult to describe by means of traditional compounds. Indeed, Clark and Gerrig (1990: 793) claim that nearly "ineffable" concepts are sometimes easier to demonstrate than describe (Clark and Gerrig 1990: 793). This can be illustrated in the categorization of different literary works below:

(15)　the *oh-my-God-the-pain* poetry; the *everyone-lets-you-down* short stories; the *isn't this-great-because-it-happened-to-me* novellas

Direct speech compounds may also provide apposite names for entirely novel nearly ineffable concepts, as in the examples below, from an advertising series:

(16)　a.　The AXA *'I want to retire from work not life'* plan
　　　b.　The AXA *'I might be off work for a little while'* plan
　　　c.　The AXA *'I'm glad I won't have to wait months to see a specialist'* plan

These direct speech compounds provide informative names of insurance plans aimed at different segments of the population. By using these individuals' fictive voices the advertisers manage to present the possible incentives for signing up a particular plan. This makes the addressees of the advertisement and prospective consumers implicitly prominent as the satisfied fictive enunciators.

Finally, direct speech compounds may be used to name certain relatively new socio-cultural or technical phenomena, which may appear as entries in online urban dictionaries. An example is "*I'm not gay* seat," referring to the empty seat in a movie theater that two heterosexual males may purposely leave between them. Direct speech compounds are also abundant in computer culture (e.g. the

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10 One anonymous reviewer suggests that the use of direct speech compounds is inspired by the maxim of extravagance ('Ausgefallenheit', Keller 1994), i.e. the interactive principle of using original formulations in order to attract attention. We fully agree that direct speech compounds can be prompted by such a reflex. However, once a given instance is so frequently used that it is incorporated by the members of a linguistic community, their use no longer hinges on their extravagance.

Linux community),[11] as in computer companies' official naming of types of error reports ("*oops* report"). In other communities, the following examples have also become lexicalized: "*publish or perish* policy," "*Bring Your Own Bottle* (*BYOB*) party," and "*Define The Relationship* (*DTR*) talk." The use of direct speech compounds may thus become widespread in a particular community, possibly constituting contextualization cues signaling group membership. Not surprisingly, some of these compounds may with time become fully conventionalized and become lexical entries in traditional dictionaries. Examples are: "*wake-up* call," "*take-home* exam," "*bring-and-buy* sale," "*hand-me-down* clothes," and templates such as "*do-it-yourself* + N" ("*do-it-yourself* kit/store/project").[12] To sum up, we observe a continuum of compound lexicalization, with at one end some instances of direct speech compounds constituting one-time occurrences emerging from the needs of ongoing discourse in the here and now, and at the other end, instances that have become fully conventionalized.

5   Final remarks

The data discussed show that present-day English allows the productive creation of compounds with a first element consisting of one or more sentences or clauses of any syntactic form, often displaying clear conversational features. Counter to the scant literature on the construction, we analyze such modifiers as (pieces of) fictive conversational exchanges.

    Our study indicates that direct speech modifiers are not only halfway between syntax and morphology (Toman 1983; Hoeksema 1988; Lieber 1988; Wiese 1996), since they have internal syntactic structure while constituting parts of a nominal compound; they also show the interplay of conversation, discourse, syntax and morphology. Thus, we may conclude that morphological processes can be intertwined with discursive and even conversational ones. Although the

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11 Almost all postings at the Linux news website, <http://slashdot.org> involve a direct speech compound. The poster of the message is always presented as belonging to a 'department' that generally expresses their feeling about its content through fictive interaction. See e.g. "*dude-are-we-late* dept.," "*admirable-work-deserves-commemoration* dept.," "*but-my-computer-already-is-my-singing-coach* dept." (all posted on July 6, 2008).

12 It should be noted that in conventionalized instances of fictive interaction or those whose modifiers are extremely frequent or involve common phrases, one most probably does no longer think of a fictive conversation. In other words, these cases seem to constitute instances of what Langacker (1999) calls 'linguistic units,' that is, they constitute a structure – no matter how complex – which "comes to be manipulated as a 'pre-packaged' assembly, no longer requiring conscious attendance to its parts or their arrangement" (Langacker 1999: 93).

modifier may consist of a fairly long piece of discourse instead of one single word or phrase, its presentation can in some sense be called economical, since the fictive interaction involved metonymically evokes (a part of) a whole socio-culturally meaningful scenario. By so doing, direct speech compounds may be very apposite and socio-culturally meaningful. Moreover, contrary to nominal compounds such as "engagement ring" or even alternate descriptors such as "*propose-to-his-love* ring", direct speech compounds enable the recipient to mentally enact the evoked fictive conversation and thus invariably express the subjectivity of the utterer/writer (Stec 2011). In sum, as opposed to regular nominal compounds, direct speech compounds seem to constitute a catchy, vivid, involving, and in some sense economical means of category formation. More generally, direct speech compounds illustrate the extraordinary human ability to make up and understand new semantic categories on the spot (Barsalou 1983; Clark 1983/1992). The fact that we may create one-time instances of such compounds shows that there is a need for the creation of new semantic categories, which results in a dynamic rather than static lexicon (Clark and Clark 1979; Clark 1983/1992; Langacker 1987).

The cases at hand fit within an account of grammatical categories as having diffuse rather than clear-cut boundaries (Langacker 1987: 18–19, 1991: 511–525) and consequently also a treatment of grammatical embedding as gradual (cf. Matthiessen and Thompson 1988). In fact, our examples of direct speech compounds do not just involve an embedded sentence or clause functioning as a nominal constituent, as in "*What you told John* makes sense", but an embedded sentence or clause functioning as part of a word. To take this even one step further, our claim is that what often may appear as an embedded sentence or clause actually needs to be understood within an interactional context as a fictive conversational turn or sometimes even a whole exchange.

Having an interactional constituent as part of a word may come across as a complex, outlandish and marginal phenomenon. However, we postulate that this is not only fairly common, but more critically, that it provides a glimpse at the fundamental structuring aspect language. Our claim is that, language being intimately related to interaction, the most basic unit of linguistic analysis should not be the word or the sentence, but the conversational turn. More generally, we postulate that the most fundamental structure of language is not syntax or semantics, but interaction. Clearly, interaction is more basic than language, the conversation frame is universal (Sacks et al. 1974) and the conversation is the primary form of communication (Clark 1996). This study is hence in line with the work in Interactional Linguistics (Ochs et al. 1996) and on intersubjectivity (Verhagen 2005; Zlatev et al. 2008), which views grammar as arising from interaction, challenging long-standing assumptions by linguists. The idea that the structure of language reflects its communicative function and interactional dimension is cer-

tainly not a new one (Voloshinov 1986 [1929] 1986; Bakhtin 1981 [1975]; Vygotsky 1962). However, it has taken the field of linguistics a long time to integrate this basic idea into the study of grammatical structure. We hope the study of fictive interaction will contribute to this awareness.

Although, as we have shown, direct speech compounds occur in different genres of spoken and written English, it is to be expected that their frequency, linguistic form (long and elaborate vs. short and based on existing phrases) and communicative function will vary depending on the medium (oral vs. written) and the genre (colloquial conversation, literature, advertisement) in which they occur. It would also be interesting to explore whether the apparent formal simplicity of direct speech compounds in oral communication relative to their written counterparts comes with multimodal richness in intonation and gesture, as in the "*'you first'* policy" example (13). Also, an exploration of the processing and communicative effectiveness of such structures in different settings should shed more light on the reasons why they are used. To conclude, we believe that the poorly studied construction of fictive interaction compounds deserves the attention of linguists. Our large database of over 7,000 examples from a broad range of different sources shows that it is a productive and widespread structure. Furthermore, it suggests that language users draw on their knowledge of the dynamics of ordinary intersubjective communication for categorizing the physical and mental world.

Appendix (data sources)

The text surrounding the original examples can be found in the online database *unQUOTED* (http://unquoted.webhosting.rug.nl/).

<u>Text</u>

(2) a. Posting on online forum on computer games, by only-1-mac, September 17, 2007 [http://www.1up.com].
(2) b. Oral conversation between friends, American native speaker, San Diego, Spring 2000.
(2) c. Post by Betsy Whaley at the '16 Independent Christian Thinkers on Indie Allies waiting list' blog, 5 May 2009 (http://indieallies.meetup.com/members/us/in/muncie/).
(3) a. Online 'Imagine Player's Handbook' on a role play game, by W. M. Tennery III [http://www.rpg.net].
(3) b. Weblog at 27 January 2006 [http://blogs.opml.org/thisislisa].

(4)   Interview with writer Slavenka Drakulic, television program *Netwerk*, NL1, 24 February 2004.

(5) a.   'Positivity' post by Lyric in 'beauty in everything' blog (http://iamlyricreed. com/post/45238485266/positivity).

(5) b.   Home page of Sports Grind Entertainment website [http://www. sportsgrindent.com/index.php]

(6) a.   Transcript of interview with native American subject, quoted in: Li, Z. (2007). *Factors Contributing to Job Retention of Direct Care Staff in Urban Assisted Living Facilities*. Master's thesis, Georgia State University, p. 56.

(6) b.   Scholarly paper "Temptations that Especially Confront the Orthodox [1] Revisited", by Stephen C. F. Kurtzahn in *CLC Journal of Theology* Vol. 39(4), December 1999 [http://clclutheran.org/library/jtheo_arch/jtdec99.html].

(6) c.   Online article "Love that bod! Do you have a case of bad bod-itude? Lost it ... by feeling beautiful from the inside out," by Sandy Fertman Ryan, June–July 2005 at BNET [http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Love+that+bod!+ Do+you+have+a+case+of+bad+bod–itude%3F+Lost+it+...+by...– a0132841734], among other sites.

(6) d.   Online article "AAM: Curious About the Mac Attitude," by A. Wright, 18 October 2006 [http://www.applematters.com/article/aam–curious– about–the–mac–attitude], among other sites.

(7)   *All My Friends Are Superheroes*, by A. Kaufman, Toronto: Coach House Books, 2003, p. 101–102.

(8)   *American Gods*, by N. Gaiman, Headline Book Publishing, 2001, p. 615.

(9)   Posting "To[o] [s]acred to give away freely", by Lady D, 22 May 2005 [http:// godschick.blogspot.nl/2005/03/to–sacred–to–give–away–freely.html].

(10) a. "The Archipelago Of Kisses," poem 23 by Jeffrey McDaniel [http://www. poemhunter.com/best–poems/jeffrey–mcdaniel/the–archipelago–of– kisses/].

(10) b. Posting on wedding site, by M on 3 December 2003 [http://www.partypop. com].

(10) c. "The 'I do' fear: Dealing with commitment phobia", by P. Bhattacharya, 27 January 2006 [http://www.shaaditimes.com/love/gender–relations/ commitment–phobia–050920].

(11)   I Have A Dream Foundation – official name for the charity organization [http://www.ihaveadreamfoundation.org/html/].

(12)   Online forum on cocaine, by MenTaLguY [http://qdb.us].

(13)   Comedy series "Curb Your Enthusiasm," by L. David, season 1, episode 5, "Waiting Room Policy", 24: 3.

(14) a. Pop song "Manic Monday," by The Bangles, 1986.

(14) b. Posting at Star Trek forum by Korvar, 21 April 2005 [http://ussintrepid.net/].

(14) c. "Good sex comes from knowing what you want for it," by L. Nedwick, *The UCSD Guardian*, 2004, p. 32.

(14) d. Cartoon, 24 December 2012 [http://lolzombie.com/7543/happy–kids–greedy–materialistic–consumption–addicts–day/].

(15)   "Have fun with 'Germanisms' by A. Plotnik," *The Writer's Magazine*, December 2001 [http://www.writermag.com].

(16)   The AXA company advertising slogans [http://www.axa.co.uk], downloaded on 30 July 2008.

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