FM 30-5

FIELD MANUAL

COMBAT INTELLIGENCE

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1–1. Purpose and Scope

a. This manual furnishes guidance to commanders, staff officers, military intelligence officers, and other personnel concerned with the collection, production, and use of combat intelligence in planning or conducting military operations at all levels of command. It deals primarily with the organization of an intelligence section; the functions of the intelligence officer; the intelligence sources and agencies; the intelligence aspects of terrain and weather; and the planning, collection, processing, dissemination, and use of intelligence. Also included are the intelligence aspects of special environmental conditions, special operational methods, and special purpose operations including tactical cover and deception (TC&D) operations; and intelligence aspects of friendly employment of chemical and nuclear weapons and protection against enemy chemical, biological, and nuclear attacks.

b. This manual is in consonance with the international agreements listed below. Applicable agreements are listed by type of agreement and number at the beginning of each chapter.

Title	*NATO STANAG*	*CENTO STANAG*	*SEATO SEASTAG*	*ABCA SOLOG*
Bombing, Shelling, and Mortaring Reports	2008	2008	2008	
Operation Orders, and Administrative/Logistic Orders	2014	2014	2014	
Operational Situation Reports	2020	2020	2020	
Intelligence Reports	2022	2022	2022	
Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas and Boundaries	2029	2029	2029	
Interrogation of Prisoners of War	2033	2033	----------	
Enemy Order of Battle Records for Combat Intelligence	2077	2077		
Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment	2084	----------	2084	
Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment	2097	2097		
Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radioactive Fallout, and Biological and Chemical Attacks	2103	2103	----------	123
Radiological Surveys	2112	2112		
Intelligence Estimate	2118	2118	2118	
Offensive Air Support Operations	2134			
Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms	3377	3377	3377	

1–2. Recommended Changes

Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes and comments to improve the manual. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons will be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. **Comments should be** entered on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and **forwarded direct to the Commandant, US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613.**

CHAPTER 2

INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND OPERATIONS

Section I. INTELLIGENCE

2–1. General

Every profession has a language of its own, a language which is used in the particular environment of that profession. The military is no exception to this general rule. Therefore, when a soldier speaks of information or intelligence in general or combat intelligence, strategic intelligence and counter-intelligence in particular, he attaches to these words a specific meaning in a specific context. The reason for this special language is obvious—only in this manner will there be a common understanding among the individuals involved. From this standpoint, a knowledge of the accepted usage of these words is important. There is also a value in knowing their context, their interrelationships, and the environment in which they are found.

2–2. Intelligence Versus Information

Information is unevaluated material of every description including that derived from observations, communications, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources from which intelligence is produced. Information itself may be true or false, accurate or inaccurate, confirmed or unconfirmed, pertinent or impertinent, positive or negative. "Intelligence" is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of functional or geographic areas, and which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations. For definitions of specific types of intelligence, see AR 310–25.

2–3. Combat Intelligence

Combat intelligence is that knowledge of the enemy, weather and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations. It may be obtained from within his own command, or from higher, lower or adjacent headquarters. Combat intelligence is derived from the interpretation of information on the enemy (both his capabilities and his vulnerabilities) and the environment. The objective of combat intelligence is to minimize uncertainty concerning the effects of these factors on the accomplishing of the mission. The commander employs combat intelligence to determine how to best use available resources in accomplishing the mission and maintaining the security of his command. In noncombat commands, combat intelligence provides a basis for security measures, for decisions as to the best use of the area of operations in accomplishing the mission, and for determining or anticipating future support requirements. The term "tactical intelligence" has essentially the same meaning and the two terms are often used interchangeably.

2–4. Strategic Intelligence

Strategic intelligence is intelligence which is required for the formulation of policy and military plans at national and international levels. Oriented on national objectives, it assists in determining feasible national intelligence objectives and in furnishing a basis for planning methods of accomplishing them. Factors which influence the military capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of nations are considered components of strategic intelligence.

2–5. Interrelationship of Combat and Strategic Intelligence

a. Distinctions. The distinction between strategic intelligence and combat intelligence is principally one of scope. Both types of intelligence are concerned with a knowledge of foreign nations and with geographical or functional areas of actual or possible military operations and are produced by the application of the same fundamental

intelligence collection and processing techniques. The components of strategic intelligence are biographic, geographic, transportation and telecommunication, sociological, political, economic, scientific and Armed Forces intelligence. Combat intelligence focuses on the enemy and the environment, and is obtained through such means as interrogation, ground and aerial surveillance and reconnaissance, area intelligence, signals intelligence (SIGINT), counterintelligence, technical intelligence, imagery interpretation, and sensory data obtained from target acquisition and night observation devices.

b. Derivation. Although combat and strategic intelligence are treated as separate categories of intelligence, there are several *functional* subcategories of intelligence from which both are derived. Included are the major subcategories listed below:

(1) Order of battle.
(2) Technical.
(3) Target.
(4) Terrain.
(5) Weather.

c. Overlapping Interests. Many subjects of strategic intelligence interest are also of combat intelligence interest.

(1) Information gathered and intelligence produced for strategic purposes are useful in the conduct of tactical operations. In this category are maps and charts; descriptions and studies of beaches, ports, rivers, towns, hamlets, and other terrain features; studies of transportation and communications systems; data on trafficability, cross-country movement, climate, and hydrography; political, sociological, and economic studies; and order of battle studies on foreign armies, navies, and air forces. Field commanders, particularly of amphibious and airborne operations, may have to depend upon strategic intelligence for their initial knowledge of the enemy and the area of operations. In this instance, the distinction between the two loses its effect.

(2) Information collected by combat units assists in the production of strategic intelligence. Interrogation of prisoners of war and other individuals of intelligence interest (FM 30-15) provides strategic information on political and economic conditions within the hostile denied area. Technical and physical characteristics of a newly encountered enemy weapon or other item of equipment, in addition to providing valuable combat intelligence, may be used in producing strategic intelligence to aid in determining the production of industrial or manufacturing centers (FM 30-16). Much of what would be strategic intelligence in a conventional war becomes combat intelligence in an internal defense and development (IDAD) action. During IDAD operations, political, economic, sociological, geographic and insurgency intelligence is as important for day to day tactical operations as it is for strategic planning.

2-6. Counterintelligence

Counterintelligence is that aspect of military intelligence devoted to offensive actions to destroy or neutralize the effectiveness of adverse foreign intelligence activities and to defensive actions to protect information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or materiel against sabotage. Counterintelligence is an integral part of the overall operations security (OPSEC) program and is an essential element of TC&D planning. See FM 30-17, FM 30-17A and chapter 8 of this manual for additional discussions.

Section II. THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

2-7. General

a. Terms. The term "intelligence officer" is used here and elsewhere to include the assistant chief of staff, G2, of headquarters provided with a coordinating staff, and, as appropriate, the intelligence officer, or S2, below division.

b. Scope. This section deals with a discussion of the relationships of the intelligence officer with the commander and other staff members. FM 101-5 discusses in detail the responsibilities of the intelligence officer to include coordination with other staff officers, collection and processing of information, counterintelligence activities, and the intelligence officer's responsibility for preparation of reports.

2-8. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Commander

The commander is responsible for all intelligence activities within his command to include gather-

ing and reporting information on the enemy and the area of operations; converting information into intelligence; and disseminating intelligence to higher, lower, and adjacent units. In connection with the security of his command the commander is also responsible for taking appropriate counterintelligence measures.

2–9. Intelligence Responsibilities of the Intelligence Officer

a. The intelligence officer is the principal staff officer assigned to advise and assist the commander in carrying out his intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities. As such, the intelligence officer assists the commander (and staff) by furnishing intelligence which is needed to make decisions and to plan operations. The intelligence officer looks for ways to enhance the execution of the commander's mission and recommends appropriate actions. Intelligence is provided by the intelligence officer through written reports, estimates, and oral briefings.

b. The intelligence officer must plan, making logical assumptions about probable missions which the command mamy expect to receive, and collect all necessary information and intelligence. Advance planning may be facilitated by maintaining close contact with the other staff members of his own headquarters and with the G2/S2 of higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters.

c. Once a mission has been received, the intelligence officer reevaluates the intelligence that he has on hand and recommmends what additional intelligence is needed by the commander for planning operations and making decisions. The needs are usually related to enemy capabilities, enemy vulnerabilities, and the environment in which the operation will occur. These intelligence requirements are recommended to and approved by the commander and form the basis for the collection effort. Essential elements of information (EEI) are a primary basis of determining intelligence requirements and are determined by the commander.

d. The intelligence officer provides information, estimates, and intelligence plans during the planning phase of an operation. He also prepares, coordinates with the G3/S3, and recommends to the chief of staff pertinent fragmentary orders to initiate or modify intelligence and security operations.

e. During the execution phase of an operation, the intelligence officer supervises and coordinates intelligence operations to insure the successful execution of the commander's collection orders and to develop information of the enemy situation as rapidly and completely as possible. As an application, intelligence derived from the enemy situation is of critical importance to the commander in deciding when and where to employ reserves of combat power in both offensive and defensive operations.

f. The intelligence officer (G2/S2) assists the operations officer (G3/S3) in planning cover and deception missions by furnishing an assessment of the enemy's intelligence system to include capabilities and limitations; by providing an analysis of enemy vulnerabilities, weaknesses, peculiarities, and recent significant activities which could be exploited by cover and deception means; by increasing the counterintelligence effort to deny enemy attempts to detect friendly plans; and in coordination with the EW/cryptologic staff officer, coordinates appropriate aspects of electronic deception.

g. The intelligence officer is responsible for maintaining operations security (OPSEC) in discharging his responsibilities for intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. He recommends OPSEC plans and policies to the commander in the areas under his responsibility concerning intelligence operations, communications, signal security electronic counter-countremeasures, training, and tactical cover and deception.

2–10. Relationship of the Intelligence Officer to the Staff

a. Primary coordinating staff responsibility for any one functional activity (G1 through G5) is exercised by the designated staff officer. Many activities are closely related and may require close coordination among all members of the staff including the personal and special staff.

b. The G2 prepares the analysis of the area of operations and the intelligence estimate; both are used by all staff officers in estimating the effect of the environment and possible enemy courses of action in their areas of interest. All general and special staff sections furnish, in turn, information to the G2. For example, the G5 furnishes information within the political, social, economic, and psychological fields for inclusion in the analysis of the area of operations and otherwise assists

in intelligence activities involving TC&D, civil affairs and psychological operations, such as civil censorship, identification and recommendation of potential sources and agencies, detection of enemy agents within the civilian population, and in certain instances, procurement of civilian equipment and supplies required for military intelligence operations.

c. Other specific intelligence data are furnished to meet the requirements of various members of the staff. Staff members who want specific intelligence state these desires to the G2 so that he may include them in his collection plan. Specific intelligence demands may include such items as target intelligence, technical intelligence, reconnaissance requirements, and maps.

d. All the assistant chiefs of staff recommend to the G2 essential elements of information (EEI) on enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and area characteristics which have a major effect on activities falling within their primary staff responsibilities. The G2 uses these recommendations and his own determination of intelligence requirements as a basis for the EEI to be recommended to the commander.

e. The G2 assists the G1 by providing information on which to base personnel loss estimates for the whole command. In turn, the G1 assists the G2 by insuring the availability of intelligence specialists and by maintaining the strength of intelligence units and information collection agencies of the command. The G2 coordinates with the G1 in intelligence aspects pertaining to prisoners of war.

f. The G2/S2—G3/S3 relationship is necessarily close due to the need for a constant two-way flow of information, intelligence and operational data. The G2/S2—G3/S3 staffs normally operate a joint facility as part of the tactical operations center (TOC). The TOC facilitates the exchange of intelligence and information especially during a rapidly changing battlefield situation. When new intelligence or information is received it will be immediately evaluated and passed to the G3 staff. For example, information derived from operations may indicate a change of enemy intentions. This information will be processed and immediately passed to the G3 staff. The close relationship between the G2/S2 and the G3/S3 can hardly be overstated. The G3/S3 is one of the primary users of intelligence in the tactical organization. The intelligence demanded by the commander and the staff members is published by the G3/S3 in respect to its relationship with tactical operations, which are the primary purpose and activity of the combat units.

g. The G2/S2 must work closely with the G3/S3 and with the field artillery intelligence officer located in the TOC fire support element (FSE). In addition, the division artillery and its supporting target acquisition means (radars, aircraft, flash, and sound capabilities) can provide valuable information and intelligence. These sources should be considered when developing intelligence estimates and summaries. In turn, these agencies must be provided with all available intelligence. The G3/S3 will plan his operations based on this information and intelligence. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) will select targets and determine fire support requirements by analysis of the intelligence.

h. The G2 coordinates with the G5 because the population is a major source of information and intelligence. Psychological operations conducted in both hostile and friendly areas will also provide valuable information. The G2 provides information to the G5 on which the civil military operations officer and units base their analysis and estimate of psychological, political, sociological, and economic factors affecting the command. In turn, the G5 assists the G2 by providing the results of these detailed analyses to the G2.

2-11. Relationship of the Intelligence Officer to Higher, Lower, and Adjacent Units

a. The intelligence officer furnishes intelligence and information to subordinate units, adjacent units, and higher headquarters. This intelligence may have been produced by the G2/S2 and his staff or it may have been received from higher, lower, or adjacent units. Intelligence or unprocessed information may be disseminated based on the urgency and needs of the user. The distinction between information and intelligence is frequently a matter of degree. The point at which processing of information produces intelligence is difficult to identify. As a general rule, intelligence received from subordinate headquarters is treated as information by the receiving echelon inasmuch as this information must be integrated into current holdings, compared with other data,

and reassessed based on all data available at the higher echelon.

b. The intelligence officer develops the plans and orders that govern the conduct of intelligence activities and collection efforts of the command to include ground and air reconnaissance. He issues orders in the name of the commander and exercises staff supervision to insure their proper execution.

c. The intelligence officer assists subordinate commanders and intelligence staff officers in intelligence matters. Such assistance frequently requires coordination with other members of the special and coordinating staffs.

d. The intelligence officer maintains close liaison with the S2 or G2 of the next higher headquarters to obtain early information regarding planned future operations and to anticipate the next decision or mission affecting his own commander. In addition, a close working relationship must be established with subordinate intelligence officers to insure that responsive intelligence links are maintained. In stability operations, the G2/S2 will be required to maintain close and continuous liaison with both host country and allied forces, to obtain intelligence data and reports and provide assistance in the form of intelligence studies, reports, and estimates which may be needed by allied forces located within, or in some cases, outside of the area of operations. This liaison permits the intelligence officer to collect information and to prepare analyses and estimates needed by the commander, other members of the staff, and subordinate units to make their own estimates and plans. The intelligence officer at the next higher headquarters may be able to provide additional intelligence specialists or units for a given operation.

2–12. The Intelligence Officer as Staff Section Chief

a. The primary function of the intelligence officer (G2) at echelons of division or higher is to supervise and manage the overall intelligence effort and resources in such a way as to provide effective intelligence support to the commander and staff. Normally the G2 will not become directly involved in detailed intelligence production procedures but will remain relatively unencumbered by the daily routine of operations. He will coordinate and supervise the entire intelligence collection system and task appropriate collection assets based on the commander's EEI. The intelligence officer is responsible for the staff supervision of assigned and attached intelligence units. He recommends to the commander priorities for intelligence collection and production. He anticipates intelligence requirements and controls production and dissemination of intelligence by reviewing, modifying, and approving intelligence documents and reports produced by intelligence resources of the command. In this respect he must be particularly alert to any enemy deception efforts to present false or misleading indications. In conjunction with other staff sections, the G2 also supervises and monitors intelligence aspects of training and maintenance of intelligence related equipment.

b. The effective utilization of available personnel resources is the key to a G2's success. A means of insuring effective utilization of personnel is to establish a priority for each intelligence task, thereby minimizing the dissipation of limited personnel resources.

c. In addition to supervising and coordinating intelligence operations, the G2 must also keep the chief of staff and the commander informed of significant intelligence, information, and activities. He must coordinate with members of all the general and special staffs of his own headquarters as well as the G2 of the next higher headquarters.

d. In the conduct of the intelligence effort, the G2 should carry out a number of periodic and scheduled personal liaison visits to related intelligence organizations, including host country intelligence agencies in stability operations. Such steps should prove to be mutually beneficial—a closer working relationship can be established. The quality of intelligence should also be improved as each agency obtains an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the other and how each can provide support to others to resolve or minimize existing problems.

2–13. Intelligence Officer Functions in Intelligence Operations

G2/S2 intelligence functions generally follow the procedures set forth in the phases of the intelligence cycle (discussed in greater detail in this and later chapters).

a. At higher echelons, the production of military intelligence is an operation which requires a more thorough, integrated, and systematic effort than is necessary at brigade and lower echelons.

Sources are more numerous and varied, agencies acquire larger volumes of information to ultimately produce intelligence, and the intelligence picture is so complex that it may be misinterpreted unless the collected information and intelligence are properly integrated into a meaningful whole. At the same time, the very order and logic of an established, complex, integrated system for the production of intelligence can, if that intelligence is accepted at face value, constitute a significant vulnerability to the insertion of false information and ultimate deception by the enemy.

b. At lower maneuver echelons the intelligence officer (S2) devotes maximum effort to the production of intelligence on enemy capabilities and in determining the effects of those capabilities on the unit's mission as well as on the operation plans prepared for the mission. The S2 must devote his effort to answering the commander's specific questions on such subjects as strength, disposition and identity of enemy units and the location of enemy weapons, minefields and defensive installations. Concurrently, the S2 must determine the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action. In determining the enemy capabilities and probable courses of action, the S2 must also analyze the indications presented by the enemy to determine whether the enemy is attempting to deceive us or to counter our tactical cover and deception (TC&D) efforts. The S2 must coordinate most closely with the S3. At these levels the S2/S3 relationship can best be described by the term "dual function." That is, it is imperative that the S2 and the S3 possess a firm, clear, and realistic understanding of each other's functions, and each must be prepared to assume for short periods of time the functions of the other concurrently with his own.

Section III. ORGANIZATION

2-14. Organization of the Intelligence Section

a. General.

(1) The commander relies primarily on his G2/S2 section, the attached military intelligence elements and subordinate combat units for the combat intelligence he requires. Consequently, a knowledge of these organizations—their composition, capabilities, interrelationships and personnel—is a necessity. In an intelligence section there are normally several factors which will affect the organization and duty assignments. One such factor is the requirement placed upon the intelligence officer to be responsible for the operations of the section. In order that he may best meet this responsibility, the detailed supervision of the section should generally be left to an assistant. Such a measure will assure the intelligence officer of the continued operation of the section in his absence. It will provide him the time necessary to analyze properly the intelligence produced by the section and to use this analysis as a basis for making sound recommendations to the commander. G2/S2 and G3/S3 personnel must work together as a team in order to discharge their joint responsibilities. The intelligence officer has the responsibility to recommend friendly force courses of action to the G3/S3 or commander based on his analysis of the enemy situation. Based on operational requirements the G2/S2 must develop priorities for the tasks to be accomplished in consonance with command priorities and determine the most efficient manner in which to use his assets.

(2) Another factor that must be considered is the need for continuous (24-hour) operation of the intelligence section. The intelligence section must retain sufficient flexibility to meet peak workloads without impairing the ability to continue operations during displacement. The G2/S2 maintains personnel in the TOC and may be required to assist in the manning of an alternate command post.

(3) There are a number of issues that the G2/S2 will consider in organizing his section. He must organize his section functionally because the table of organization and equipment (TOE) specifies only the number of personnel authorized for the intelligence section and does not prescribe a functional organization. Under normal circumstances the "type" functional organization is modified to meet the needs of the command in terms of the mission assigned, the scope of the intelligence activities to be performed, and the number of personnel available. It may be necessary to augment unit intelligence sections with representatives of other agencies, units, or services.

b. Brigade and Battalion. In discharging their joint responsibilities, S2 and S3 personnel must be prepared to assume the duties and functions of the other when necessary. Organizational guidance required to accomplish the intelligence re-



* When required by nature or scope of intelligence operations.

Figure 2–1. Type G2 sections (division, corps, filed army).

sponsibilities at brigade and battalion levels is provided in appropriate FMs pertaining to a particular branch of service and unit SOP. Intelligence guidance for units below battalion level, where no intelligence organization exists, is provided in chapter 9.

c. Division. Normally a type G2 section at division level (fig 2–1) consists of four functional branches—operations, G2 reconnaissance and surveillance, counter-intelligence, and administration. These branches perform the functions described below:

(1) *Operations Branch.* The operations branch accomplishes functions which encompass the entire spectrum of the intelligence cycle—directing, collecting, processing the information, and disseminating the resulting intelligence. The operations branch also maintains the collection plan and publishes the commander's essential elements of information (EEI) in the form of orders and requests for information to units; maintains enemy situation maps; prepares daily summaries; develops target data; and prepares intelligence estimates, analyses of areas of operations, intelligence annexes, and intelligence reports. The branch engages in a variety of diverse but intelligence-related activities: conducting required research projects; arranging for liaison with higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters; disseminating weather information; supervising prediction of radioactive fallout from enemy-delivered weapons and supervising the monitoring and surveying of radioactive contamination from all weapons; supervising procurement and distri-

bution of maps and map supplements; supervising the activities of the intelligence analysts and coordinating the activities of the intelligence interrogation (IPW) personnel of the attached military intelligence (MI) companies; coordinating and correlating signals intelligence (SIGINT) activities of supporting USASA units; providing recommendations and advice for cover and deception operations; supervising the operations of the long-range reconnaissance element (if formed through division assets) which provides a deep reconnaissance and target acquisition capability; and providing intelligence training for division personnel. The division G2 obtains weather data from the assigned Staff Weather Officer (SWO). The SWO is supported by the Air Weather Service (AWS) Weather Team (WETM) assigned to the division. This team relies upon the Weather Center (WECEN) at field army TOC (FATOC) for forecasting support. Further details on the extent and types of meteorological weather data available are given in joint manual FM 31-3/ AFM 105-4.

(2) *G2 Reconnaissance and Surveillance Branch.* Personnel of this branch support the G2 Reconnaissance and Surveillance officer in his staff responsibilities for planning and coordinating of reconnaissance and surveillance missions; advising the G2 on the available reconnaissance and surveillance assets, their status, capabilities, and limitations; and preparing the proposed reconnaissance and surveillance plan. They exercise staff supervision for ground surveillance and target acquisition planning. They exercise staff supervision of all airborne SIGINT assets of the supporting USASA division support units when SIGINT operational tasking authority has been delegated. G2 Reconnaissance and Surveillance personnel are responsible for establishing priorities of requests for missions received from all units and staff supervision over the staff weather office and related activities. Personnel of the branch are also responsible for maintaining aerial reconnaissance maps and other essential records. Once the imagery is obtained, the G2 Reconnaissance and Surveillance branch supervises the imagery interpreter's effort through the imagery interpretation section chief. The reproduction of the aerial imagery obtained from Army and other services is accomplished by the imagery reproduction laboratory organic to the divisional MI company. The intelligence obtained is then distributed by the branch, in coordination with the operations branch, to all interested agencies. (For additional detail see FM 30-9, FM 30-20, FM 30-35 and FM 31-100 (TEST)).

(3) *Counterintelligence (CI) Branch.* Since there are no organic counterintelligence personnel assigned to the division G2 section, the chief of the CI section of the attached MI company usually serves as CI branch chief. His responsibilities include recommending, planning, and supervising counterintelligence measures; maintaining counterintelligence records, supervising the interrogation of personnel of CI interest; maintaining records of known and suspected enemy agents and collaborators; maintaining records on enemy intelligence organization and procedures, and advising the command on methods to counter enemy collection and deception efforts to include camouflage; providing assistance and advice for friendly OPSEC and TC&D operations; supervising the activities of the counterintelligence personnel of the attached MI company; preparing counterintelligence estimates, plans, directives, SOP, and reports; supervising security training within the command in conjunction with the G3; planning and supervising all aspects of signal security surveillance activities; and conducting CI liaison.

(4) *Administration Branch.* The administration branch fulfills the administrative, transportation, and housekeeping requirements of the G2 section. The branch is responsible for maintaining the section journal, central files and records, and duty rosters and establishes a G2 message center for the handling of outgoing and incoming correspondence and intelligence reports.

(5) *Supporting Elements.* There are two major support elements available to the division G2 section. The attached US Army Security Agency Division Support Company provides signals intelligence and electronic warfare support. The divisional MI company is attached from the field army MI battalion to the division. It performs specialized intelligence and counterintelligence functions to include analysis and production, interrogation of prisoners of war, imagery interpretation, and counterintelligence which require the employment of foreign languages or special skills (fig 2-2). The MI company commander advises the G2/S2 on the employment of the unit to insure that the company is responsive to the intelligence requirements of the command.

d. Corps. The functions of the G2 section at corps (fig 2-1) are basically the same as those at division. The scope of corps responsibilities is



* With Corps military intelligence company only.

Figure 2-2. Military intelligence company.

larger and the volume of information is greater. Additional personnel requirements are necessary because the corps G2 section is concerned with the collection efforts in a larger area of operations than the divisions. Furthermore, the lead-time required for intelligence planning of future operations is greater. Corps is supported by a USASA battalion. The MI company is changed by the inclusion of technical intelligence personnel who operate under the supervision of the operations branch. The organization of the corps G2 section includes a corps counterintelligence officer who directs counterintelligence activities of the corps. Other intelligence assets available to the G2 include the airborne infantry ranger company which provides a deep reconnaissance and target acquisition capability and the MI company (Surveillance Airplane) which provides aerial reconnaissance and surveillance support for the corps. The engineer terrain detachment performs terrain analysis and provides reports and studies required by the intelligence officer in preparing his analysis of the area of operations. The engineer staff and special engineer units have the responsibility and technical capability of performing detailed terrain analysis and evaluating the effects of weather on terrain. The G2 is also provided weather data and studies by the AWS WETM assigned at the corps TOC. Psychological operations and civil affairs units have intelligence personnel specifically trained to perform detailed analysis of psychological, sociological, and economic factors and to evaluate the effects of their operations on the corps mission. The target ac-

quisition battalion supporting corps artillery provides a valuable target acquisition capability. The G2 section should work closely with the corps fire support element to insure that the G2 section receives all targeting information secured by field artillery observers, radar, and target acquisition batteries. The fire support element must be provided with all available intelligence to insure the proper attack of all nuclear and nonnuclear targets.

e. Field Army.

(1) The field army is supported by an assigned Military Intelligence Battalion (Field Army), a Military Intelligence Battalion, Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance (MIBARS) and an attached USASA Brigade. At field army there is a significant increase in the amount and scope of activities compared to that found at division and corps levels (fig 2-1), and the MI element has an increased strength and capability. Planning leadtime is greater, the area of interest is increased tremendously, and the intelligence requirements are expanded to include strategic intelligence. In the latter case there is a need for target information from deep within the enemy territory so that suitable targets may be located for long-range weapons available at army level; correspondingly, the field army must also counter enemy air and missile capabilities.

(2) The operations branch of the field army G2 section performs the same basic functions as at the lower levels plus strategic intelligence research and analysis (SIRA) and technical intelligence (TI) functions. Strategic intelligence research and analysis personnel provide studies in fields of strategic intelligence interests, process information relating to the areas of assigned interest, and disseminate intelligence. Technical intelligence personnel plan and supervise the exploitation of captured materiel; coordinate activities of scientific and technical intelligence agencies in the field army area; assist special staff and technical service intelligence personnel in obtaining interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, photographs, and other available data on enemy technical and scientific materiel; prepare technical intelligence summaries and reports; and maintain collection directives and plans, items-wanted lists, and technical intelligence files.

(3) The field army G2 Air branch is also responsible for the staff supervision of Army imagery interpretation detachments operating with tactical USAF reconnaissance squadrons.

(4) The counterintelligence branch supervises the activities of attached and supporting censorship, signal security, and counterintelligence personnel.

(5) A plans branch is added to the G2 section at field army level and to lower echelons when required. This branch prepares and/or coordinates action on intelligence plans, intelligence collection memoranda, specific requests for information, EEI, and other intelligence requirements.

(6) Under the staff supervision of the G2, the engineer staff officer at field army is responsible for providing engineer topographic and geographic intelligence products. To accomplish this intelligence function, an engineer topographic battalion is assigned the mission of producing, storing, and distributing maps, performing topographic surveys, and preparing engineer intelligence reports as required for the field army (FM 30-10, FM 5-146, and FM 5-1).

(7) The Air Weather Service (AWS) of the US Air Force provides weather forecasts, climatic studies, and weather and climatic summaries through the SWO to the G2 based on his requirements. This data is provided by the Weather Center (WECEN) at Field Army TOC (FATOC). All weather teams in the Army in the field depend upon the WECEN through the WETM/FATOC for short and extended period forecasting services. To be effective, the WETM/FATOC must have a detailed knowledge of all aspects of tactical operations to tailor its forecasts to the weather needs of each particular mission and the general battle plan.

2-15. Relationship of Intelligence Section with the Military Intelligence Units

a. General. The G2/S2 section (separate brigade, division, corps, and field army) is authorized by TOE. MI personnel from the attached MI unit will be employed at all echelons based on the recommendations made by the MI unit commander to the G2/S2. The MI unit commander provides intelligence support to the G2 in the specialized fields of intelligence analysis, imagery interpretation, counterintelligence, and intelligence interrogation and, at corps and above, technical intelligence. Close liaison between the intelligence officer and the MI unit commander is essential. They should work together as a team to

insure the proper utilization of intelligence personnel.

b. Assignment and Attachment of MI Units. MI units supporting separate brigades, divisions, and corps are normally assigned to the MI Battalion (Field Army) and attached to the supported unit. In order to establish and maintain close, continuous working relationships, MI units should be assigned or attached to the supported commands early in the command's unit training phase and should remain assigned or attached with the displacement of the command. Personnel with linguistic or other highly specialized area-oriented abilities should join the MI unit as the supported command is assigned new geographical areas of operations. The appropriate parent unit in the new area of operations assumes administrative control of the supporting MI unit. See FM 30-9 for details of attachment and assignment of MI units.

2-16. Relationship of Intelligence Section with Attached USASA Units

The G2 has staff supervision over signals intelligence (SIGINT) resources that are attached or under the operational control of the commander. This includes the coordinating of SIGINT operations and recommending the employment of SIGINT resources. The G2 exercises staff supervision over signal security (SIGSEC) surveillance activities to include compromising emanations control activities. The G2 also recommends SIGSEC policy. The supporting USASA element assists the G2 in determining control measures necessary to prevent exploitation of command facilities through compromising emanations. The supporting USASA element also reviews those plans, directives, and training materials submitted by the G2 section which have communications security (COMSEC), electronic security (ELSEC), or compromising emanations control implications. See FM 101-5 for further details of USASA/G2 relations.

Section IV. OPERATIONS

2-17. General

Intelligence operations concentrate on those essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR) concerning the enemy and the environment needed by the commander to accomplish his mission. The enemy situation and the area of operations are analyzed to determine the key elements which affect military operations. Key elements include such conditions as extremes of weather and terrain; enemy use of particular forms of combat power; implementation of an enemy capability previously held in restraint; disposition, attitudes and sociological factors pertaining to the local population; or use of resources and characteristics of the area which affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

2-18. Geographical Areas of Intelligence Operations

a. General. Areas of intelligence operations are assigned to units on the basis of areas of influence and areas of interest. Such assignment provides for continuous surveillance of the entire area of operations. The immediate zone has been established as an aid in intelligence planning to be used in defining realistic areas of interest.

b. Area of Influence. The area of influence is that portion of the assigned zone or area of operations in which the commander is capable of directly affecting the course of combat by the employment of his own available combat power. Normally, each commander will possess the means for obtaining the information he needs from within his area of influence.

(1) Although the area of influence can extend in any direction from the forward disposition of the command, the significant direction and dimension is that which extends forward from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). For practical purposes the limit of the area of influence is set by the effective range of the available weapon systems since a commander will not normally maneuver the subordinate elements of his commmand beyond the range of the supporting fires available to him.

(2) A weapons system includes the means to acquire targets for the weapon; consequently, the range of the system is just as effectively limited by the inability to acquire targets as it is by a lack of weapon range. The area of influence, then, is sensitive to terrain and weather conditions which reduce the target acquisition capability for the weapon system involved.

c. Area of Interest. Intelligence operations are concerned not only with the area of influence but

also extend further to the area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning for the extension of the area of influence or for the displacement of potential targets into the area of influence.

(1) The area of interest includes the area of influence plus that area outside the area of influence containing enemy forces which, if employed in the area of influence, could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.

(2) The area of interest of a subordinate command is normally included in the area of influence of the next higher command. The next higher commander, therefore, has combat surveillance over it and provides the bulk of the surveillance required in that portion of the subordinate commander's area of interest which is outside the subordinate's area of influence. The relationship of the two areas is schematically depicted in figure 2–3.

d. Immediate Zone. The immediate zone serves as a quantitative guide in establishing the boundaries of the area of interest. The immediate zone establishes the distance beyond the area of influ-



Figure 2–3. Relationship of area of influence to area of interest and the immediate zone.

ence which allows the commander the reaction time to engage the enemy when he comes within the area of influence. Thus, the immediate zone is that area bounded by the distance at which a commander must have immediate knowledge of an enemy presence in order to act effectively when the enemy reaches the area of influence.

(1) The immediate zone is determined by adding to the boundary of the area of influence the distance the enemy can travel in the time it takes the friendly unit to react. This relationship may be expressed as follows: (Enemy Rate of Movement × Reaction Time) + Boundary of the Area of Influence = Immediate Zone. The reaction time is the total time it takes to detect the enemy, identify and locate the enemy, make a decision, and issue the appropriate command. The enemy's rate of movement is the rate at which he can be expected to move under existing conditions.

(2) In order that the immediate zone be realistic and useful, these factors are determined in light of their worst case, that is, the enemy's greatest expected rate of movement and the friendly unit's slowest expected reaction time. The effect is to make the immediate zone valid for all foreseeable eventualities.

2–19. Basic Principles of Intelligence Operations

Although the product of intelligence operations in the Army varies with the requirements posed by the operational environment, certain basic principles guide the conduct of all intelligence operations. Included are the following:

a. Intelligence operations and tactical operations are interdependent.

(1) Intelligence operations within the Army are an integral part of the operations of all units. The degree of success achieved by any unit in accomplishing its mission will be directly affected by the intelligence which it develops and uses, and the manner in which it is used.

(2) Staff agencies with responsibility and authority for preparing and issuing operational orders and those with responsibility for intelligence operations must work as one. Only in this manner can orders and plans reflect available intelligence and take full advantage of available knowledge of the situation and of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Responsibility for coordination rests jointly upon intelligence and other staff agencies.

b. Intelligence must be useful. Intelligence must increase knowledge and understanding of the particular problem under consideration in order that logical decisions can be reached.

c. Intelligence must be timely. The best intelligence is valueless unless it reaches the user in time to serve as a basis for appropriate action. Adherence to this principle may involve some sacrifice of completeness and accuracy in the intelligence product. The intelligence officer must make the commander aware of the trade-off between accuracy and timeliness so the commander can state a preference in his requests for intelligence.

d. Intelligence operations must permit flexibility in procedures. Standard procedures generally make intelligence operations more effective, provided the established processing does not lead to routine acceptance of the resulting intelligence with increased vulnerability to enemy deception. Intelligence operations are based upon reason and judgment; procedures must be flexible to meet unexpected requirements. Procedures which cannot be changed to meet the requirements of a given situation generally lead to failure.

e. Intelligence operations require imagination and foresight. Policies and procedures that limit the imagination or initiative of subordinate agencies are avoided. Intelligence personnel and agencies must be resourceful so that available information can be developed and exploited to produce intelligence for the user.

f. The nature of intelligence requires employment of continuous security measures.

(1) Unauthorized personnel must be denied information about operations of intelligence agencies, sources of information, and the intelligence product.

(2) The effects of compromise of complete intelligence studies and estimates are obvious. The cumulative effects of compromise of fragmentary information are also dangerous. The compromise of a source may result in loss or decreased value of that source to the intelligence element exploring it. Some sources are so peculiarly susceptible to this that elaborate security systems are required for protection.

g. Intelligence processing requires free, complete, and timely exchange of information and intelligence to permit production of a complete and usable product. Care must be taken to resolve the conflict between security measures and timely dissemination of information or intelligence to those who need it.

DIRECTING

- REQUIREMENTS
- PRIORITIES
- INDICATIONS
- SELECTION

COLLECTING

- TROOPS
- INTEL SPECIALISTS
- SPECIAL UNITS
- OTHER SOURCES



USE

- COMMANDERS
- STAFF
- TROOPS

DISSEMINATING

- TIMELY
- USABLE
- OTHERS

PROCESSING

- RECORDING
- EVALUATION
- INTERPRETATION

Figure 2–4. The intelligence cycle.

2–20. Intelligence Cycle

a. The activities connected with intelligence operations generally follow a four phase cycle oriented on the commander's mission. Supervising and planning are inherent functions involved in all phases of the intelligence cycle. The four phases are:

(1) Directing the collection effort.

(2) Collecting the information.

(3) Processing the collected information.

(4) Disseminating and using the resulting intelligence.

The intelligence cycle is continuous (fig 2–4) and all four phases may take place concurrently. At the same time that new information is being collected by intelligence assets, other information previously collected is analyzed, processed, and disseminated.

b. Directing the collection effort begins with determination of requirements and establishment of priorities. A continuously updated collection plan keyed to the mission of the command and enemy situation must be developed. Based on this plan, orders and requests for the collection of specific information are sent to selected units and organizations (collection agencies). A typical collection plan is discussed in chapter 4 to show how it is related to the mission through the EEI and other intelligence requirements, and to reveal the logical thought processes by which specific orders and requests are produced and sent to the collection agencies.

c. Collecting the information is the next phase of the intelligence cycle. After the agencies with a collection capability have been selected and sent specific orders and requests, the collection efforts are supervised to verify that orders and instructions are executed effectively and in a timely manner.

d. Processing is the third phase. As the information is collected and received, it is processed into intelligence. Processing consists of:

(1) Recording.

(2) Evaluating the information to determine its pertinence, reliability, and accuracy.

(3) Interpreting the information to determine its meaning and significance.

e. Dissemination and use of resulting intelligence is the final phase of the intelligence cycle. The completed intelligence product is disseminated through means of annexes, briefings, estimates, messages, reports, situation overlays, and summaries. A useful intelligence product is one which will assist the commander and staff and provide a basis for evaluating and interpreting new information while providing further direction to a new cycle of intelligence operations. The commander's need for intelligence products that will enable him to execute his assigned mission is the sole justification for the production of intelligence.

Section V. INFLUENCE OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ON INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

2–21. General

FM 100–5 presents a detailed discussion of the operational environment. While all elements of the operational environment do not necessarily influence every operation, each operation is influenced by the commander's mission, the nature of the conflict, the scale of use of nuclear and other weapons, the method of troop transport, the nature of enemy forces, the locale, the civil population in the area of operations, and the friendly forces available.

2–22. The Mission

The mission of the command is the paramount consideration in conducting intelligence operations. Intelligence operations must be conducted to produce the intelligence necessary to insure the successful accomplishment of the mission. Requirements are based on the mission. Information obtained is processed for its significance in relation to the accomplishment of the mission. These considerations make it imperative that intelligence personnel have a thorough knowledge and understanding of the assigned mission. In addition to the assigned mission, contingency missions will also generate requirements for intelligence.

2–23. Nature of Conflict

Intelligence requirements are similar for all types of conflict. However, in a given type of conflict, emphasis is often placed upon certain aspects of these intelligence requirements.

a. Cold War.

(1) The frequent noncombatant nature of

military activities in cold war situations influences intelligence requirements. While military aspects of the area of operations are emphasized, the political, economic, technological, sociological, and psychological actions in the area gain increased importance. Requirements for information on covert and overt activities and potential capabilities of dissident and insurgent elements also are necessary to determine the nature of the activities of these elements. An analysis of these activities is necessary to determine a counteraction, to provide warning of an escalation of the conflict to other types of conflict, and to provide for an immediate attack of targets if open conflict begins.

(2) Counterintelligence requirements are particularly significant. Since covert enemy activities such as espionage and sabotage; political, social, and economic subversion; guerrilla and insurgent activity, or any combination of these are normal operations, a continuous effort is necessary to counter them. This effort is a responsibility of the highest to the lowest individual from the highest headquarters to the lowest echelon. FM 30–17 and FM 30–17A provide detailed counterintelligence guidance and procedures applicable to the conduct of counterintelligence activities in stability operations.

(3) Intelligence collection procedures and techniques vary with the nature of the environment. Troop commitments will influence the scope of the operations; in some cases regular military forces may be required to conduct what are essentially combat-preventive operations. In this cold war environment, which encompasses stages from simple political maneuvering between some countries to insurgent warfare and low-intensity conflict in other countries, changes in conditions in turn demand a change in emphasis of procedures and techniques. The need to honor political boundaries often reduces the effective employment of airborne surveillance devices and requires a modified use of these means and a greater emphasis upon human intelligence (HUMINT) collection assets. The nature of Phase I insurgency may limit the effectiveness of electronic collection devices and combat intelligence techniques and may also require greater emphasis on HUMINT collection means. Collection means must be selected in terms of their capability and suitability within the nature of the situation. See chapter 9 for a discussion of intelligence aspects related to an insurgent warfare environment. FM 30–31 and FM 30–18 provide detailed intelligence guidance and procedures applicable to the conduct of intelligence activities in stability operations.

b. Limited War. Limited war is armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations. In a limited war, intelligence operations are primarily of a combat intelligence nature. Although the immediate emphasis in intelligence operations is determined by the requirement to support the existing operational situation, the consequences of a sudden extension of the conflict, particularly to a general war, dictate that intelligence operations be conditioned to this possibility. Intelligence operations must produce information and intelligence which will provide warning of an impending extension of the conflict. The overall system, which includes organization, equipment, personnel, and operations, must be maintained in such a condition so as to permit ready transition from a limited to a general war.

c. General War. General war is armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy. During the opening phases of a general war, the intelligence emphasis is on maintaining the security of the command; providing early warning of the start of major enemy tactical operations; protecting intelligence collection means; and providing such evaluated information concerning the nature of the enemy, the weather, and terrain, as may be available and is required. When tactical operations begin, intelligence operations are oriented toward securing the intelligence necessary for accomplishment of the assigned tactical mission.

2–24. Use of Chemical and Biological Agents

Enemy employment of chemical and biological agents introduces new factors into intelligence operations. The effectiveness of such agents, the difficulty of immediately detecting their employment, and the surprise with which they can be delivered present a formidable intelligence problem. They create requirements for means of detecting chemical and biological agents and obtaining information on the enemy's capability and intention to employ these agents. This capability will be influenced by weather conditions. Keeping abreast of current forecast weather con-

ditions is essential in determining the probability of potential chemical and/or biological attack. The influence of weather on the effectiveness of friendly chemical agents and on friendly troop safety distances requires detailed and reliable weather forecasts and observations. See TM 3–240 for field behavior of chemical and biological agents.

2–25. Enemy Forces

Enemy forces may vary from a well-trained, well-supported, highly mobile, and numerically superior force to one that is a loosely organized group of irregular forces operating with little or no support. These latter forces can be expected to exploit opportunities for guerrilla warfare, subversion, and sabotage, and maintain sustained operations under favorable conditions. The diversity of possible enemy capabilities correspondingly increases the scope of the intelligence requirements of the commander. Knowledge of enemy intelligence organizations and operational procedures is also a key factor in estimating enemy capabilities, adapting adequate security measures, and employing effective countermeasures.

2–26. The Area of Operations

An important intelligence task is to provide information about the area of operations. The magnitude of this task increases as the locale of military operations changes from a modern, well-developed, and well-documented area of the world to a more remote area on which little or no documentation is available. In such an area, greater effort must be expended on the collection of information about the area of operations (particularly terrain and populace).

2–27. The Civil Population

a. The attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the civil population significantly affect intelligence operations. A friendly populace that actively assists the military force is an important asset in collecting information and countering the enemy's intelligence activities. Vigorous well-planned civil-military operations, including civil affairs, civic action, community relations, and psychological operations programs will contribute to development of a cooperative attitude on the part of the populace. A hostile population makes the collection of information more difficult, increases the scope and magnitude of counterintelligence operations, and intensifies the requirements for detailed information on the political, social, and economic situations within the area of operations. In planning combat operations hostile civilian activities constituting a threat to the security of activities or installations must be taken into consideration.

b. In stability operations, the civil population is an important combat intelligence factor because the insurgent war revolves around the people. Both insurgent and government forces attempt to win the loyal support of the population. The insurgent has directly associated the people with the insurgency through promises or threats in order to gain their loyalty and continuing support, or, as a minimum, their neutrality. The insurgent depends on the support of the people to sustain his manpower requirements, logistical needs, and intelligence collection effort. This then provides one of the most important distinctions between stability operations and conventional warfare. Actions must be carefully considered as to their possible effect, weighing immediate effects versus long range effects, and effects on the enemy as opposed to effects on the people. In the traditional, large land mass type of warfare, the civil population will tend to have less relative importance than in insurgent type conflicts in an undeveloped area. Insurgent forces are dependent to a large degree on the support of the populace, thus creating a struggle not only for control of the land area, but also for control of the populace. See FM 30–31 for stability operations intelligence.

2–28. Friendly Forces

All friendly units are involved in offensive and defensive security measures. Intelligence operations are oriented primarily on aspects of the operational environment external to the command. However, the conduct of intelligence operations is affected by the means available to the friendly forces and the organization of the friendly forces.

a. Means Available.

(1) The availability and capability of intelligence units and information collection devices of friendly forces are important influences in intelligence operations. For example, a limitation in the number of aerial platforms may result in a reduction in the tactical air reconnaissance/surveillance capability. This in turn may require a greater dependence upon collection by ground reconnaissance/surveillance means.

(2) All military units are means for collecting information. The effort devoted to this aspect of intelligence operations varies with the primary mission of the unit. Combat and combat support units normally devote a significant effort toward the collection of information, while other types of units may collect information of intelligence value only as a byproduct of their normal activities.

(3) The individual soldier is a valuable source of information. Intelligence is collected by the individual through his five senses (seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting) by noting variations from the norm. From his past experiences and training he will reach his own conclusions. It is important that the individual soldier be encouraged and trained to turn in captured enemy documents, maps, and materiel and report, through command channels, observations that appear to vary from the norm.

(4) The availability of support from other services for tactical air reconnaissance and surveillance and meteorology affects Army intelligence operations.

(5) Other US governmental agencies may be represented in the area of operations. The agencies most frequently represented are the Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency Central Security Service.

(6) Specific agencies which collect or process information are included in chapter 4.

b. Organization of the Forces.

(1) The friendly force structure may dictate that a headquarters conduct intelligence operations which would normally be performed by a higher headquarters. In a small theater of operations, a field army headquarters may be required to perform the intelligence operations normally conducted by a theater army headquarters. A division may be required to perform the intelligence operations of the next higher echelon when the necessary intelligence assets are attached.

(2) In combined operations which involve the armed forces of allied nations, certain intelligence operations should be assigned to a combined effort of all the participating nations. Combined intelligence operations should be an essential characteristic of stability operations.

(3) In unified operations and joint actions, the basic intelligence function is unchanged. Intelligence functions, responsibilities, and procedures in unified operations and joint actions are conducted in accordance with Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication No. 2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)."

c. Composition of Forces. The composition of a force determines some of its intelligence requirements. A predominantly armored force has somewhat different requirements for detailed terrain information than an infantry force. Weather information requirements of an airborne or airmobile force are different from those of mechanized, motorized, or conventional infantry forces. An enemy capability or vulnerability which is an important consideration to one force may not be equally important to others. These different intelligence requirements influence intelligence operations to include the determination of intelligence priorities and methods of collecting information.

Section VI. WEATHER AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT

2-29. Weather

Weather is analyzed in terms of visibility, clouds, precipitation, temperature, and wind to determine its effect on tactical operations.

a. General Military Aspects of Weather.

(1) *Visibility.* Fog, haze, and precipitation reduce visibility and provide varying degrees of concealment from ground and air observation as well as lessen the effects of thermal radiation resulting from nuclear detonations. Decreased visibility normally favors the attacker because disrupting actions, feints, ruses, and other deceptive measures are aided. Good visibility favors the defender by permitting him to observe the approach of the enemy and allowing him to bring fire upon the enemy.

(2) *Clouds.* Clouds affect aviation activities by decreasing visibility. Natural illumination is decreased by clouds, although cloud cover may enhance the effects of certain types of illumination devices such as searchlights.

(3) *Precipitation.* Heavy snow or rain affects mobility, personnel, and equipment.

(4) *Temperature.* Extremes of temperature such as those found in deserts, jungles, arctic areas, and mountains may adversely affect tactical operations.

(5) *Wind.* Wind speed affects the degree of cold (i.e., wind chill factor). For example, per-

sonnel can be fairly comfortable at temperatures down to 0° F; however, a 15-mph wind at 5° F, or a 30-mph wind at 15° F, can cause exposed flesh to freeze (app S). Wind may affect visibility by creating dense screens of blowing sand, dust, or snow. Wind may play an important part in airmobile and airborne operations since aircraft and paratroopers are dependent on wind speed in the planning and execution of air operations. Wind also affects the accuracy of indirect fire weapons.

b. Effects of Weather on Personnel.

(1) Physical disabilities such as heat exhaustion, frostbite, and snow blindness may be caused by failure to prepare properly for weather conditions.

(2) Resistance to many diseases is lowered by the effects of weather on metabolism, level of physical activity, and morale.

(3) Seasonal patterns may cause common colds, influenza, and pneumonia.

(4) Physical and mental strain on personnel is increased by prolonged exposure to severe weather conditions.

(5) The incidence of communicable diseases is affected by the influence of weather on the distribution of disease-causing and disease-carrying agents.

c. Effects of Weather on Equipment and Supplies.

(1) Precipitation or humidity may cause deterioration, corrosion or mildewing of rubber, leather, cloth, rope, wood, paper or metal.

(2) Products such as food, medicine, film, and photographic chemicals require special handling in areas where extremes of temperature and/or humidity are encountered.

(3) High winds may damage or destroy unprotected equipment.

(4) Communications-electronics equipment is particularly vulnerable to the effects of extreme temperatures and humidity.

d. Effects of Weather on Natural Features.

(1) Soil trafficability is dependent upon the effects of weather. For example, frozen ground affording excellent track and wheel trafficability may, with a temperature rise of a few degrees, become an impassable sea of mud.

(2) Precipitation, rain run-off, and thawing ice and snow affect stream levels and may cause floods.

e. Effects of Weather on Manmade Features.

(1) Lines of communication such as railways and highways may be affected by heavy accumulations of snow heavy or prolonged precipitation (monsoon rains), or by frost action in the soil.

(2) Wire communication may be affected by formation of ice on wire lines, strong wind, and frost action in the soil.

(3) Buildings and other installations may be affected as follows:

(*a*) Heavy snow accumulations may collapse roofs.

(*b*) High winds, tornadoes, hurricanes, or severe thunderstorms may damage or destroy structures.

(*c*) Frost action may damage surfaced roads and runways.

(*d*) Hail may break exposed glass, plexiglass, and similar materials.

(*e*) High temperatures may be injurious to paint.

(*f*) Heavy or prolonged rains may weaken foundations and may flood subterranean and other installations constructed in low-lying areas.

f. Influences of Weather on Tactical Activities.

(1) Acquisition and exchange of information may be influenced as follows:

(*a*) Visual observation and photography are affected adversely by clouds, fog, smoke, dust, haze, and precipitation.

(*b*) Photography may be affected adversely by reduced illumination due to dense clouds or excessive light caused by sunlight reflected from a snow surface.

(*c*) The effectiveness of listening posts is decreased by thunder, heavy precipitation, and winds that reduce audibility.

(*d*) Sound ranging operations may be affected by changes in temperature, humidity, and wind.

(*e*) Radar is affected by vertical distribution of temperature and moisture in the atmosphere. Clouds and precipitation produce "clutter" that obscures echoes.

(*f*) Wire communication is affected by electrical discharges in the atmosphere and excessive ground moisture.

(*g*) Radio transmissions are affected by humidity, precipitation and temperature.

(*h*) Light data pertaining to moonrise,

moonset, phases of the moon, and twilight periods are required for planning night operations.

(*i*) Tidal variations may have an effect on river crossings and amphibicus operations.

(2) Movement by air may be affected by clouds, visibility, temperature, winds, and icing. Surface movement may be affected by trafficability and visibility.

(3) Weather may influence the use of weapons as follows:

(*a*) Muzzle velocity is affected by temperature.

(*b*) Trajectory is affected by wind, air density, and air temperature.

(*c*) Smoke for screening purposes is influenced by wind direction and speed, temperature gradient, precipitation, and humidity.

(*d*) Precipitation and wind influence the effectiveness of incendiaries.

(*e*) The effectiveness of chemical and riot control agents is influenced by temperature, temperature gradient, precipitation, humidity, and wind speed and direction. Most biological agents are quickly destroyed by sunlight.

(*f*) Wind speed and direction determine the distribution of propaganda leaflets by air and radioactive fallout.

(4) The effectiveness of certain types of special equipment may be influenced as follows:

(*a*) Low clouds provide a reflecting surface that increases the effectiveness of battlefield illumination; although clouds, fog, or precipitation decrease the effectiveness of searchlight direct illumination by scattering and diffusing light.

(*b*) Use of loudspeakers in psychological operations may be affected by any weather element that reduces audibility.

(*c*) Weather may have an effect on the effectiveness of surveillance, target acquisition and night observation equipment. Rain and high wind may cause false readings to be registered by acoustic ground sensors. Dense fog may reduce the effectiveness of starlight scopes. Aerial delivery of unattended ground sensors may be affected by adverse weather conditions.

g. Weather Modification. Current state-of-the-art provides a limited capability for small-scale, local modification of weather conditions (i.e., fog dissipation and precipitation augmentation). Future technology holds promise for expanding these capabilities to provide a significant modification of weather conditions over large portions of the battle area.

2-30. Terrain

a. General. Terrain is analyzed in terms of its five military aspects (observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach) to determine its effect on friendly and enemy courses of action. The engineer staff and special engineer units are responsible for special studies used in the analysis of the area of operations in support of the intelligence effort. Before the military aspects of terrain can be analyzed, the analyst must first consider the mission of the unit, the type of operation, the level of command, the composition of forces involved, and the weapons and equipment involved. Additional considerations of the military aspects of terrain are discussed in appendix B.

b. Observation and Fire.

(1) Terrain influences the ability of a force to exercise surveillance over a given area through the use of personnel or sensors. The best observation generally is obtained from the highest terrain features in an area; characteristics of the terrain which restrict observation include hills, cliffs, vegetation, and manmade features. The best observation might not be obtained from the topographic crest (the highest point). A fixed line on the forward slope of a hill or ridge might afford maximum observation from the slope down to the base of the hill or ridge. This fixed line is called the military crest. Visibility and observation are analyzed independently because the former varies with weather conditions which are transitory and the latter varies with terrain conditions which are relatively permanent. For example, a high hill may provide excellent observation (an aspect of terrain) even though visibility (an effect of weather) is restricted by fog surrounding the hill at a given time.

(2) The term "fire," as it pertains to observation and fire, encompasses the influence of the terrain on both direct and indirect fire weapons. Indirect fire weapons such as mortars and howitzers are affected primarily by terrain conditions within the target area which may influence the terminal effect of the projectile. Direct fire weapons such as machineguns and automatic rifles are primarily affected by terrain conditions which affect fields of fire (the area the weapon may cover effectively with fire from a given position).

(3) The analyst identifies those terrain fea-

tures within and adjacent to the area of operations which afford the friendly force favorable observation and fire in his analysis of the area of operations. The analyst must also consider the effects of terrain on the enemy's observation and fire.

c. Concealment and Cover. Concealment is protection from observation; cover is protection from the effects of fire. The analyst determines the concealment and cover available to both friendly and enemy forces.

(1) Concealment may be provided by darkness, smoke screens and terrain features such as woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, or cultivated vegetation. Concealment from visual ground observation does not necessarily provide concealment from air observation or from electronic or infrared detection devices. Concealment does not necessarily provide cover. Daylight concealment may be removed by the effects of herbicide operations (see FM 3–3 for further details).

(2) Cover may be provided by trees, rocks, ditches, quarries, caves, river banks, bunkers, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Areas that provide cover from direct fires may or may not protect against the effects of indirect fire; however, most terrain features that offer cover also afford concealment.

d. Obstacles.

(1) An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement.

(2) Mission execution is influenced by obstacles. In the defense the intelligence officer identifies obstacles which stop or impede enemy movement within the battle area. In the attack he considers the obstacles within his unit's zone of action which influence friendly movement.

(3) An obstacle may constitute an advantage or disadvantage. For example, obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing or canalizing the attacker. On the other hand obstacles parallel to the direction of attack may assist in protecting a flank of the attacking force.

e. Key Terrain. A key terrain feature is an area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to the occupying or controlling force. The term "seizure" implies physical occupation of the terrain by a force whereas the term "control" may or may not include physical occupation. Control can be exercised by the use of fire as well as physical occupation. The critical element in determining whether or not a given terrain feature is key terrain rests in the judgment of the analyst as to what constitutes a "marked advantage" in a given situation. "Marked advantage" normally implies a terrain feature of utmost importance either to friendly or enemy forces, which, if ignored, will have a definite impact on the accomplishment of the mission.

(1) *Level of Command and Type of Unit.*

(*a*) As an example of the influence of the level of command on the selection of key terrain, consider a circumstance in which a given city provides a common terminus for a network of highways, railways and canals. To the field army commander seizure or control of the city would afford the marked advantage of control of a vital link in his lines of communications; therefore, he might properly select the city as key terrain. An infantry battalion commander within that field army gains no advantage from seizing or controlling the city and would not consider it key terrain. A terrain feature is not considered to be both key terrain and an obstacle by the same commander. For example, to the division a large city is considered to be an obstacle. If securing that city is the mission of the division, then it becomes key terrain to the division. The structure of friendly and enemy units also influences the analyst in the selection of key terrain. An airborne battalion commander may select cleared areas as key terrain for use as drop zones. A tank battalion commander may consider the same areas of little or no consequence.

(*b*) Types of terrain features frequently selected as key terrain for tactical units include high ground from which favorable observation and fire over a significant portion of the operational area may be obtained, bridges over unfordable rivers, assigned or assumed objectives, and dominating terrain within a defensive sector. Obstacles are rarely selected as key terrain, although a terrain feature may be analyzed properly as key terrain at one level of command and as an obstacle at another. For example, use of an unfordable river as a defensive line is appropriate to a commander who has been directed to defend. At the tactical unit level, in normal terrain, the river is classified as an obstacle because of its primary effect of stopping or impeding military movement. The adjacent high ground is key terrain because its seizure or control permits full utilization of the obstacle value of the river.

(2) *Mission of the Unit.*

(*a*) In the attack, key terrain features usually lie forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. Terrain features in adjacent zones may be key terrain if their control facilitates the conduct of the attack or accomplishment of the mission. Terrain in an adjacent zone which gives the enemy effective observation along an avenue of approach which may be used by friendly forces may be key terrain. Key terrain may be selected within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, if the enemy can seize the terrain feature which prevents or hinders the launching of the friendly attack, then the terrain feature affords a marked advantage and is therefore, key terrain.

(*b*) In the defense, key terrain is usually located within the battle area. Infrequently, key terrain may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. A terrain feature forward of the battle area or in an adjacent defensive sector which gives the enemy a decided advantage of observation over defended localities, routes of communication, or enemy avenues of approach is key terrain.

f. Avenue of Approach.

(1) An avenue of approach is a route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective. To be considered an avenue of approach a route must provide enough width for the deployment of the size force for which the avenue of approach is being considered. Intelligence officers above corps level consider avenues of approach which are adequate for at least a division. The intelligence officer at corps and lower levels usually considers avenues of approach adequate for the deployment of the major maneuver element directly subordinate to his headquarters. Thus, the corps G2 considers avenues of approach which are adequate for a division. The division G2 considers those which are adequate for a brigade. The brigade S2 considers those which are adequate for a brigade. The brigade S2 considers those which are adequate for a battalion and the battalion S2 considers those which are adequate for a company.

(2) The analysis of an avenue of approach at any level of command is based on the following considerations:

(*a*) *Observation and fire.* Favorable observation and fire for the force moving on the avenue of approach.

(*b*) *Concealment and cover.* Favorable conditions of concealment and cover. This consideration is frequently in conflict with the preceding one.

(*c*) *Obstacles.* Avoids those which are perpendicular to the direction of advance and, whenever practical, takes advantage of those which are parallel to the direction of advance.

(*d*) *Utilization of key terrain.* Use of land for observation, orientation, and cover and concealment for friendly troops, as well as enemy forces.

(*e*) *Adequate maneuver space.* Determination of required maneuver space is based, in part, on consideration of deployment patterns, means of mobility, and the area required for maneuver to preclude presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.

(*f*) *Ease of movement.* This consideration includes relative length of the avenue of approach, directness of approach to the objective, soil trafficability, steepness of slopes, obstacles, direction of terrain compartments with respect to the direction of movement and those aspects of the terrain which enhance or restrict command and control.

(3) The ability of an opposing force to interfere with the use of an avenue of approach does not influence the analysis of that avenue of approach whether this analysis is being made by the commander, intelligence officer, or any other staff officer at any level of command.

(4) In the attack, avenues of approach which lead from the line of departure to key terrain within the objective area are analyzed and the best avenues of approach available to the friendly force are identified (fig 2–5).

(5) In the defense avenues of approach which lead from the enemy's position to key terrain within the battle area are identified and analyzed. Avenues of approach available to the enemy are described as terminating within that key terrain in the battle area which, if seized by the attacker, will threaten the overall defense position. Such an avenue of approach begins a reasonable distance beyond the initial disposition of the forward friendly forces of the unit for whom the analysis is being made. This distance is usually equal to the forward extent of the defense sector (fig 2–6). Avenues of approach are measured for determination of adequate maneuver space at the point where they cross the forward edge of the battle area.

2–31. Relationship of Weather and Terrain

The last two paragraphs discussed separately the



Figure 2–5. Avenues of approach in the attack.

elements of weather and terrain, however, these elements interact and affect the commander's mission and cannot be treated separately. Examples of such interaction follow:

a. Changes in weather tend to alter the surface condition of terrain. The same weather conditions, for example, rain, may have decidedly differing effects depending upon the type of terrain—a clay road becomes impassable while a road of sandy soil becomes more firm.

b. Terrain relief affects weather conditions; for example, moist air moving rapidly up the slopes of a mountain, hill, or ridge often causes fog, mist, or low-lying clouds over the elevated terrain, while the nearby valleys remain clear. Moisture at higher elevations may result in snow, while the same amount of moisture may fall as rain at lower elevations. The terrain also influences other aspects of the weather, such as wind velocity and humidity.



NOTE: IN THE DEFENSE, AVENUES OF APPROACH AVAILABLE TO THE ENEMY ARE SELECTED FOR IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS.

Figure 2–6. Avenue of approach in the defense.

CHAPTER 3

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTING (STANAG 2014, 2029, 2033, 2084, 2103; SEASTAG 2014, 2029, 2084; SOLOG 123)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

3–1. General

a. In his capacity as a staff officer, the G2/S2 directs his efforts toward the support of the planned or anticipated mission. This chapter provides the G2 with intelligence directing and planning guidance to include determining and understanding the intelligence requirements of the commander, determination of indications, sources of information, agencies available to obtain information, and coordination necessary for effective intelligence directing.

b. Although planning is continuous throughout all phases of the intelligence cycle, it will be discussed most extensively in this chapter on directing because of the importance of planning in the initial stages of intelligence operations. Intelligence planning is guided by the mission. Frequently the G2/S2 will recommend an operation to the commander or G3/S3 based on developed intelligence. Intelligence planning begins before the planning of other staff sections. Until an intelligence estimate is available, detailed operational planning cannot be completed. The intelligence officer must be ready to provide an estimate for the next operation and revise the current estimate to meet changed operational conditions.

c. The various steps in directing the collection efforts are as follows:

(1) Determine the intelligence required for decisions and plans.

(2) Determine the priority of need for each of the different intelligence items.

(3) Determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which would indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement.

(4) Determine the specific items of information the presence or absence of which would affirm or refute pertinent indications.

(5) Select collection agencies and prepare and dispatch appropriate orders.

(6) Supervise the collection effort through staff visits, review of records and reports, and inspections to insure productive and timely collection of information. Redirection is accomplished as some questions are answered and others arise.

3–2. Coordination

a. No intelligence action that affects the commander's decision can be concluded without appropriate coordination with one or more staff agencies.

b. The following list exemplifies some of the staff coordination which may be necessary in intelligence operations.

(1) Interrogation of prisoners of war: G1, G4, G5, staff judge advocate, provost marshal, aviation officer, EW/cryptologic staff officer, and surgeon.

(2) Censorship: G1, G5, AG, and information officer.

(3) Operations: All

(4) Use of combat troops for intelligence missions: G3.

(5) Escort, supervision, and briefing of visitors: G1, G3, provost marshal, information officer, and headquarters commandant.

(6) Location and construction of observation posts: G3, engineer, communications-electronics (C-E), and field artillery officers.

(7) Examination of captured equipment: G4, C-E officer, surgeon, chemical officer, EW/cryptologic staff officer, MI technical intelligence personnel, and elements of division support commands as appropriate.

(8) Needs for maps, imagery, and studies: all.

(9) Map procurement, storage, and distribution: G3, engineer officer and support commander.

(10) Aerial reconnaissance, photographic and visual: G3, air liaison officer, and field artillery officer.

(11) Civilian internees: G1, G5, staff judge advocate, and provost marshal.

(12) Intelligence training: G3.

(13) Procurement and replacement of intelligence specialists: G1 and MI unit commander.

(14) Signals intelligence: G3, C-E officer, special security officer (SSO), and EW/cryptologic staff officer.

(15) Engineer intelligence: Engineer officer.

(16) Electronic warfare intelligence: G3, C-E officer, and EW/cryptologic staff officer.

(17) Procurement, replacement and maintenance of intelligence-related equipment: G4 and MI unit commander.

(18) Chemical intelligence: Chemical officer.

(19) Cover and deception: G3, engineer, C-E officer, and USASA unit commander.

(20) Audio-visual support: C-E officer, audio-visual officer.

(21) Medical intelligence: Surgeon.

(22) Acquisition of targets for fire support operations: Fire Support Coordinator (FSCOORD) and FA S3.

3-3. Intelligence Planning Phases

a. General. Intelligence planning is a continuing process. Based on an analysis of planning tasks, periods are established for the completion of certain tasks before the plan is further developed. Further division of each planning period into phases facilitates coordination between staff sections. The sequence of intelligence planning phases, like that of the other staff sections, is generally outlined in the following paragraphs.

b. Preliminary Phase. Before the completion of a current operation and before the commander receives any directives or orders for further action, his staff considers what this further action is likely to be. When the commander receives a directive or warning for further action, the intelligence officer must have sufficient information immediately available for the commander to analyze the probable mission and issue preliminary planning guidance. A similar situation may exist when a headquarters is activated or at the beginning of any war, campaign, or operation.

c. Initial Phase. When a unit receives a new mission, an intelligence estimate (app J) is furnished to the commander and the staff so that operational, administrative, and logistical planning may be initiated. A counterintelligence estimate (app M) may be prepared to determine and evaluate the enemy's intelligence capabilities and their possible effect on friendly operations. An analysis of the enemy's intelligence capabilities must include not only methods by which the enemy is capable of gaining information but also how this would disrupt the effectiveness of friendly operations. Additional information is presented at the initial staff conference to assist the commander in analyzing the mission and providing planning guidance.

d. Subsequent Phases. These phases consist of preparation, approval, publication, and execution. Preparation approval, and publication refer to the operation plan and its various annexes; execution is a final, preoperational stage during which subordinate units complete their planning and conduct rehersals. These phases, which start the definite planning period, include the concurrent preparation of various plans and studies, based on current intelligence and counterintelligence estimates. The most important of these follow:

(1) Preparation of a counterintelligence plan which contains an enumeration of appropriate intelligence countermeasures required for the security of the operation and which may include appropriate aspects of cover and deception.

(2) Completion of plans to obtain necessary information not immediately available.

(3) Preparation of a plan for securing and distributing intelligence aids. These aids include materials such as charts and models of the area of operations, maps, photos and mosaics, imagery interpretation reports, sketches and diagrams, hydrographic charts, indigenous guides, and intelligence reports.

(4) Revision of the intelligence estimate after evaluation and interpretation of all available information. The estimate, which is based on initial and subsequent assumptions and changes in the known enemy and friendly situation, is constantly revised throughout the planning phase.

(5) Revision and recommendation of EEI and other intelligence requirements (OIR) in-

cluding those prepared earlier which are still applicable and those that concern the operational phase.

(6) Preparation of a collection plan based on the EEI approved by the commander and OIR. This plan is used by the intelligence section to develop collection missions. The collection plan is updated continuously as the planning phase continues.

(7) Preparation of an intelligence plan as an annex to the operation plan. (The operation plan becomes the operation order; thus, the intelligence plan becomes the intelligence annex to the operation order.)

e. Intelligence Planning is Continuous. Existing intelligence is revised as new intelligence is developed and the collection plan is altered to reflect current intelligence needs. Preliminary planning again commences in anticipation of future actions.

3-4. The Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan

a. Surveillance and target acquisition have traditionally been the responsibility of all combat units. With the introduction of new technology such as defoliation and more sophisticated detection equipment and the establishment of new techniques of employment, it becomes necessary to synthesize these separate plans and procedures into one coordinated plan at major unit level. The surveillance and target acquisition plan incorporates the thought process, analysis and best courses of action which consider the commander's assets. This results in a coordinated action for systematic and effective employment of the resources available to the commander in accomplishing his surveillance and target acquisition mission. See appendix U for a sample surveillance and target acquisition plan.

b. The surveillance and target acquisition plan is prepared within the framework of the plans of higher headquarters. This plan integrates surveillance and target acquisition resources utilizing both ground and aerial surveillance means which include visual observation, thermal imagery, infrared, image intensification, radars, unattended ground sensors, photography, defoliation, and special devices. The plan should insure that an enemy force cannot enter the unit's area of interest without early detection. It should also insure the detection, identification, and location of targets in sufficient accuracy, timeliness and detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

c. In making this estimate of surveillance and target acquisition requirements, both by day and by night, the intelligence officer should consider the following factors:

(1) The percentage of the perimeter or area of operation that must come under surveillance and the ranges at which the requirements are established.

(2) Surveillance and target acquisition resources available to the unit.

(3) Whether a specially equipped force should be organized.

(4) The extent to which surveillance and target acquisition is affected by the type of defense and/or offense adopted.

(5) The provision of reconnaissance elements for task forces and the provision for shifting the emphasis of resources as required.

(6) Probable enemy movement and suspected enemy assembly or base areas which require a high degree of surveillance.

(7) The requirement for surveillance in depth and to the flanks.

(8) The effect of reduced visibility caused by darkness, smoke or poor weather conditions.

d. The surveillance and target acquisition ground surveillance, aerial surveillance and/or target acquisition plan. These plans may be prepared separately as an attachment to the operation order or included in the basic plan, depending on the magnitude of the operation and area to be covered. These plans must be coordinated to insure effective execution.

(1) *Ground Surveillance Plan.* The ground surveillance plan covers the employment of patrols, defoliation, observation posts, listening posts, unattended ground sensors, night vision devices and ground surveillance radars. The ground surveillance plan must be coordinated with fire support and movement plans to preclude inadvertent disclosure of the location of friendly positions and activities when utilizing artificial illuminating devices (flares, searchlights, etc,) and/or to prevent target acquisition elements from confusing friendly with enemy movements. The plan must take into consideration the enemy's capability to employ night vision devices and/or to disrupt the ground surveillance plan.

(2) *Aerial Surveillance Plan.* The aerial surveillance plan covers the employment of aviation assets organic and in support of the unit and defoliation. In addition to visual observation and aerial photography, the use of airborne radar, infrared, image intensification, relays, and other aerial electronic devices will be outlined.

(3) *Target Acquisition Plan.* The target acquisition plan will delineate zones of responsibility and means to be employed in acquiring targets. It should also include target criteria to be followed when targets are eventually acquired or, as a minimum, it should state where these criteria are outlined.

e. The surveillance and target acquisition plan has no prescribed format. The paragraphing for the operation order should be used as a guide to insure that no significant aspects are omitted. A sample plan is included at appendix U.

3–5. The Intelligence Annex to an Operation Order or Plan

a. General. The intelligence annex (app N and FM 101–5) is one of the annexes of the operation order. The intelligence annex is standardized and has a more rigid format than other annexes.

b. Purpose. The purpose of the intelligence annex is to:

(1) Disseminate information/intelligence about enemy forces essential to the conduct of the operation.

(2) Issue instructions to subordinate commanders and requests to higher headquarters to collect information before or during the initial phase of an operation.

(3) Provide intelligence orders or guidance for handling of PWs, refugees, captured documents and materiel during the operation.

(4) Confirm the orders and requests for information that have been made in fragmentary form and that are still current at the time the annex is issued.

(5) Provide counterintelligence orders or guidance for the implementation of operational security measures.

(6) Preserve brevity, clarity, and simplicity in the body of the order.

(7) Amplify an order when information is of limited application to the entire command or is primarily technical in nature.

c. Preparation. General instructions for the preparation of the intelligence annex are the same as for the operation order. The following factors are further guidance to preparation of the intelligence annex:

(1) The annex is not intended to serve as a substitute for the intelligence collection plan.

(2) It may be issued before distribution of the operation order.

(3) An intelligence annex is normally prepared for each operation.

(4) It must be kept as brief as is consistent with clarity.

(5) Matters adequately covered in unit or command standing operating procedures (SOP) should not be repeated.

(6) Reference may be made to appropriate intelligence reports provided addressees have the reports.

(7) Material of limited interest or which involves considerable detail may be included in appendixes to the annex. The most likely appendixes are enemy situation maps or overlays, surveillance and target acquisition plan(s), and map distribution tables.

3–6. Field Army Intelligence Planning

a. The field army G2 is concerned with strategic and combat intelligence. The scope and projection of field army operations and the simultaneous planning for a number of operations affect intelligence planning as follows:

(1) Preliminary and initial intelligence planning is based largely on assumptions. As planning progresses, particularly as operational details are made firm, the assumptions may either be substantiated or discarded.

(2) Intelligence planning is flexible. The farther an operation is projected into the future, the more likely it is that changes in the situation will alter the plans.

(3) Concurrent planning by subordinate echelons is usually limited to the forthcoming operation due to limitations on information availability and the size of the planning staff at these echelons.

b. The conduct of current operations and the simultaneous planning of two or more future operations taxes the ability of the G2 section to operate on a 24-hour basis. For more efficient operation during peak workload periods, consideration must be given to reorganization for planning future operations. One method of reorganizing the G2 section is to provide intelligence representa-

tion from each branch to a headquarters planning group. Another is to organize within the G2 section an intelligence planning group representing each branch. A third solution is to continue under the normal organization and concurrently plan and operate. The intelligence officer must decide which system to use based on requirements and the personnel available.

3–7. Corps Intelligence Planning

Intelligence planning at corps is based on Army plans and is primarily a matter of determining how, by whom, and when the intelligence functions of the corps will be performed and setting forth the details in a logical, understandable fashion. Each of the phases is generally the same as it is for the field army, but the time available to corps will be less. During the execution phase of an operation, the corps G2 section is primarily concerned with the fulfillment of those functions which pertain directly to the operation. It will also be engaged in planning for future operations and may require a planning staff within the G2 section.

3–8. Division Intelligence Planning

The intelligence planning at division in preparation for combat is based on plans of the next higher headquarters. The same planning phases are applicable, although the preliminary phase will be considerably shortened. In addition to absorbing and disseminating the intelligence made available as a result of intelligence activities at higher headquarters, the division G2 develops intelligence requirements, levies requests for information and exploits any other sources available to him. In view of the reduced time available to prepare for combat, the division G2 must keep himself currently informed as to planning being undertaken at the next higher echelon.

3–9. Lower Unit Intelligence Planning

As at the higher levels, essentially the same planning is carried out. Because of the sizes of the units involved and their areas of interests, there will be a reduction in the number of operational plans and planning leadtime. Normally, operational planning at the lower levels is relatively informal.

Section II. REQUIREMENTS

3–10. General

The commander's intelligence requirements are those facts he needs to know concerning the enemy and environment to execute his assigned mission successfully. The collection capabilities of a command are seldom sufficient to satisfy concurrently all intelligence requirements. Therefore, collection resources of a command are directed toward definite intelligence objectives in the priority of their need. Such priorities should reflect the criticality of the need for a particular type of information. Unfortunately no formula can be provided to determine priorities automatically. The determination is largely one of value judgment based on relevancy to the mission. An intelligence priority in one situation or one command may not be a priority in another situation or command. Intelligence requirements generally can be divided into two broad categories—essential elements of information (EEI) and other intelligence requirements (OIR). In a tactical situation, EEI and OIR are normally developed by the G2 and G3 in the tactical operations center (TOC) or equivalent at every echelon, i.e., separate brigade, division (DTOC), corps (CTOC), and field army (FATOC) for approval by the commander.

3–11. Essential Elements of Information

a. Essential elements of information are those critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence to assist him in reaching a logical decision. The decision involves the mission of the command and the choice of courses of action to accomplish the mission. Any enemy capability or characteristic of the area which is a governing factor in the choice of courses of action will be an EEI. Enemy capabilities or area characteristics which may affect but which will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission, regardless of which courses of action are chosen, will qualify as other intelligence requirements. Care must be exercised to limit EEI to only those critical items of information.

b. The relationship between EEI and command decisions dictate that the establishment, modification, or cancellation of EEI must have the commander's approval.

c. Although EEI have a special relationship to the needs of the commander, they may be originated by the staff in the form of recommendations. These recommendations are coordinated

and presented by the intelligence officer for command approval.

d. An item of information or intelligence specified in the unit standing operating procedure (SOP) for collection or dissemination may become an EEI. For example, an SOP may require all units to report immediately such items as "known or suspected targets suitable for nuclear attack or indications of their existence or development."

e. The nature and number of EEI will vary with the type and phase of an operation and the extent and accuracy of the available information and intelligence. For example, in the planning phase of an airborne operation, there might be two EEI: (1) "What drop or landing zones exist in our objective area? Special attention. . . ." (2) "What are the enemy's air defense dispositions? Special attention to . . ." During the execution phase of the same operation, the EEI might be reduced to one, the nature of which would be directed toward the enemy's nuclear capability. It may be that limiting EEI to just those major enemy capabilities—attack, defend, reinforce, withdraw—which can impact on friendly mission accomplishment is best. This focuses commander attention on the enemy courses of action with which the commander should be most concerned. Normally, in this process, there are no more than two EEI.

3-12. Other Intelligence Requirements

a. Concurrently with tasking of intelligence elements to collect information required to satisfy the EEI, consideration is given to tasking intelligence assets to collect information on other capabilities, vulnerabilities, and characteristics of the area of operations which may affect the accomplishment of the mission. Collection agencies may be able to collect information needed to satisfy OIR concurrently with the collection of information needed to satisfy EEI. In addition such information of the enemy and of the area of operations which is needed to aid in the interpretation of the results of the collection effort must be collected.

b. OIR are derived from command requirements which do not qualify as EEI and from staff requirements. The formulation and/or announcement of intelligence requirements and the allocation of collection means to meet these requirements are staff responsibilities of the intelligence officer.

3-13. Stating Intelligence Requirements

a. When announced to the command, EEI and OIR should be stated in such a manner as to provide guidance to the receiving agencies to allow formulation of orders and requests for specific information. They should be stated as specific questions to be answered in a specified period of time dealing with—

(1) Enemy order of battle factors.

(2) Terrain, including natural and artificial obstacles.

(3) Weather.

(4) Social, political, economic and cultural factors.

b. EEI are not announced in the foregoing manner to units which do not have an assigned intelligence officer. For example, the battalion S2 does not announce EEI to a company commander in the broad terms described above. He will, instead, present specific requirements for information based on the EEI.

3-14. Dissemination of Requirements

a. EEI and OIR are disseminated to subordinate, higher, and adjacent commands to guide them in preparing collection plans and evaluating information by acquainting them with the commander's priority intelligence needs.

b. The intelligence requirements announced by another headquarters are analyzed by the receiving headquarters to determine whether or not that unit is capable of obtaining information pertinent to the requirements and whether or not the collection of that information is compatible with its mission. If not, the receiving headquarters does not repeat the requirements to its subordinate elements. The intelligence needs of higher headquarters are modified by a lower unit as required. Major modifications should be reported to higher headquarters so that the collection effort may be redirected as necessary. For example, a corps EEI may ask, "Where are possible crossing sites on the COTTONWOOD River in the corps zone? Special attention to area between CRATERVILLE and TRAIL CITY." Subordinate divisions upon receipt of the corps EEI, task their subordinate units to satisfy the requirement within the division zone. Special attention should be directed to specific portions of the river line within the division boundaries.

c. Intelligence requirements are disseminated by fragmentary orders or listed in paragraph 2 of

the intelligence annex to an operation order (app N) and they may be included only to subordinates in the coordination instructions of paragraph 3 of the operation order (FM 101–5).

3–15. Cancellation or Modification

EEI and OIR are canceled or modified by fragmentary orders or by a new list published in an operation order. Those which are concerned with the enemy's adoption of a course of action prior to a specified time are automatically canceled when that time arrives. The intelligence officer must insure that effort is not wasted on collection of information against EEI or OIR which are no longer valid.

3–16. Intelligence Requirements for Attack

a. General. Most of the commander's *initial* requirements must be satisfied during the planning phase so that plans can be properly formulated. *Subsequent* requirements, that is, information which is needed during the attack, must provide the basis upon which the commander can decide the proper time and place for the commitment of his reserves, employment of supporting weapons or units, and modification of his operation plan.

b. Specific Requirements for the Planning Phase of the Attack.

(1) *Location, type, strength, and morale of enemy units on line and in reserve.* The locations of the enemy in contact and reserve should be established down to the lowest unit practicable. The type, strength disposition, and morale of the enemy are indicative of the manner in which the area will be defended, the extent of enemy resistance, the force necessary to overcome the resistance, and the capability of the enemy to counter this force by employment of his reserves.

(2) *Location, type, nature, and extent of enemy defensive installations, to include supporting weapons, screening units, and obstacles.* The magnitude and the complexity of the enemy's installations will influence the choice of areas for the main attack, routes to the objective, areas for secondary attacks, and required destruction of obstacles or installations necessary to accomplish the mission. The density of supporting weapons, their caliber or delivery capability, and resupply of ammunition help determine the pre-attack preparation fires necessary and the main area of attack. Screening units and obstacles, special units and/or equipment necessary to overcome obstacles, timing of the attack, and use of deception or countermeasures must be taken into account in planning the phasing of an operation.

(3) *Location, type, and strength of enemy reserves.* The commander will be concerned with those enemy reserves which have the capability of reinforcing in time to affect the accomplishment of his mission. For this reason it is essential to locate and identify as to type, and determine the strength of enemy reserves in the area of operation. Unlocated enemy units must receive close attention due to their possible commitment as reserve forces. It is the intelligence officer's responsibility to determine the movement capabilities of enemy reserves and keep the commander informed as to their capabilities.

(4) *Location, number, and type of enemy automatic weapons.* Knowledge of the location, number. density, and fields of fire of automatic weapons in the enemy's defensive area will influence the commander's choice of areas for his main attack and planning of supporting fires.

(5) *Location, number, and types of enemy supporting weapons.* Supporting weapons include mortars, field artillery, air defense artillery, missiles, tank guns, antitank guns, or other supporting weapons which may bring fire to bear on friendly troops. Knowledge and location of these weapons enables the commander to plan for reducing the effectiveness of these fires by employment of his own fires, choice of routes for his attacking force, timing of the attack, and use of countermeasures such as smokescreens.

(6) *Location of enemy outposts.* An enemy may use outposts or a security force to prevent close ground observation of his main battle position or mislead the opposing force as to the location of his main defensive position. The commander may use the element of surprise in his operations when he knows the location of the enemy's outposts by denying them observation, cutting them off from the main body, reducing them through fire, or bypassing them.

(7) *Location of enemy command posts.* Locating and neutralizing enemy command posts aids in the reduction or elimination of command control over enemy subordinate units. This action may be carried out through harassment, destruction, isolation, or electronic warfare.

(8) *Location of enemy boundaries.* Enemy boundaries may reveal information of the enemy defense concerning time of attack, routes of advance, and general employment of subordinate units. If the enemy has moved into an area recently, shifted boundaries, or replaced units, he may be vulnerable along boundary lines.

(9) *Enemy vulnerability to cover and deception.* Assessment of enemy vulnerability to cover and deception includes an assessment of the enemy's preconceptions about us, our knowledge of his intelligence collection means, and our ability to conduct the cover and deception operation.

(10) *Observation.* Determination of the enemy's aerial and ground surveillance capabilities and the location and capability of his electronic surveillance means helps the commander plan effective countermeasures, determine attack timing, and plan for destruction, screening, or neutralization of these capabilities.

(11) *Concealment and cover.* In planning the attack, consideration will be given to those routes leading to the objective which offer concealment from the enemy's observation and cover from his fire. These factors must be viewed from the standpoint of the enemy's dispositions and his ability to counter the apparent advantage of concealment and cover along routes available.

(12) *Location of obstacles.* The presence and location of natural or artificial obstacles may be determined by means of map, aerial, and ground reconnaissance. The intelligence officer analyzes the relationship between obstacles and the enemy's dispositions in determining routes to the objective and planning a time schedule for the operation.

(13) *Weather and terrain.* Key terrain features and weather will be important factors in determining the scheme of maneuver.

(14) *Avenues of approach.* In planning an attack, the commander is concerned with the choice of direction of attack. The avenues of approach available will influence the choice of direction, when considered with available observation and fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, maneuver space, ease of movement, utilization of key terrain, enemy disposition, and weather.

(15) *Location, number and types of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and the method of delivery.* In the planning of an operation, consideration must be given to the possibility of enemy use of chemical and biological agents and nuclear weapons. Plans must be made to insure a continuous collection of data on the enemy's capability to employ CB agents and nuclear weapons. Based upon the enemy's capability, appropriate plans for protective measures and countermeasures must be made.

(16) *Plans and capabilities.* The commander is provided insights for developing his plans for the attack through estimates on enemy plans and probable courses of action derived from pattern analysis, signals intelligence, special intelligence units, or other means and agencies discussed in succeeding paragraphs. Such indications must be considered in the light of possible enemy deception activities.

(17) *Command, control, and communications.* Knowledge of the enemy's command, control, and communications helps the commander plan effective electronic countermeasures and signals intelligence operations.

(18) *Electronic countermeasures.* Determination of the enemy's electronic countermeasures capabilities enables the commander to plan effective counter-countermeasures and plan for the possibility that his own command control and electronic target acquisition devices may be disrupted.

(19) *Location and type of enemy target acquisition systems.* Locating and neutralizing enemy target acquisition systems aids the commander in an assessment of the enemy's vulnerability and influences the commander's choice of areas for his main attack and planning of supporting fires.

c. Requirements During the Attack.

(1) *Movement of enemy units.* Units may be moved for deception, reinforcement, replacement, counterattack, blocking or withdrawal. Direction of movement and location of vacated or newly occupied areas may provide indications of the enemy's defensive plan.

(2) *Displacement of weapons.* The displacement of enemy weapons provides indications of the enemy's plan of action. For example, weapons displacing to the rear or deployed in depth may indicate a planned defense.

(3) *Degree of resistance of units on contact.* The degree of resistance which the enemy offers and the manner in which he withdraws may give indications of the type of defense he will employ, whether he intends to hold, delay, withdraw or counterattack, and the enemy's degree of disorganization.

(4) *Expenditure of ammunition and resupply activities.* The amount and type of ammunition expended by the enemy may provide indications of the area the enemy most strongly desires to defend, his fire plan, the degree of his resistance, and his current supply status. Resupply activities may indicate the area to be most heavily defended, the type of defense action, and the possi-

ble shortages which may illuminate weak points in the defense.

(5) *Intelligence estimates.* A continuing assessment of the enemy's intelligence estimate of the situation can provide an important tool for the commander in the conduct of his own operations. Such insights into the enemy's estimate of the situation may be developed from analysis of his observation, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and activities, signals intelligence, and other special means and activities.

(6) *Command, control, and communications.* Continuing efforts are needed during the attack to assess the capabilities of the enemy for executing orders and acquiring information on friendly forces.

3–17. Intelligence Requirements for Defense

a. General. In the defense, many of the factors (of weather, terrain, and enemy situation) included in planning for an attack are considered; however, most of the factors take on a new meaning and must be interpreted in a different light. Whereas heavy rain may impede an attack, the rain may be an aid in defense because of its adverse effect on the enemy's capability to attack.

b. Specific Requirements for the Planning Phase of the Defense.

(1) *Disposition strength and morale of enemy units in contact, in reserve, or in position to influence the action.* As in the attack, the strength and morale of the enemy has a critical bearing on planning the defense. Disposition and type of the enemy units may be indications of an impending attack and help determine the planned location of the main attack. Important indications can be derived from enemy unit movements which show the progress of plans for an attack and provide indications of weakened areas in the line of contact. The number, type, and disposition of reserve units help determine likely areas of attack and potential reinforcements. Such indications must be considered in the light of possible enemy deception activities. Unlocated enemy units are important during the defensive planning stage as those units may be used to penetrate friendly defensive positions.

(2) *Location of potential enemy assembly areas.* The location of enemy assembly areas is influenced by the terrain and by the distance from the line of contact. The primary terrain considerations are those of cover and concealment and routes into and out of the area. The distance between assembly areas and the line of contact tends to change as the attack plan progresses. Early in the planning phase the assembly areas are usually farther to the rear, but they may move successively nearer the line of contact as the time of attack nears. If such a pattern of movement is detected, it will further indicate an area selected for the attack. Determination of assembly areas is of prime importance in target acquisition for the employment of both conventional and nuclear weapons. Map terrain analysis may provide likely assembly area locations.

(3) *Location of enemy boundaries.* The location of enemy boundaries is of significance due to its influence on the enemy plan of attack. A knowledge of boundaries provides indications as to the size of the force which may participate in the attack and, possibly, the depth of echelons. Consideration of boundaries and locations of enemy units in contact and rear areas provides an overall picture of the enemy situation.

(4) *Number and routes of enemy reconnaissance and/or combat patrols.* To execute his attack most advantageously, the enemy must collect information on the location of friendly security elements, defensive positions, fire support weapons, and reserves. During his preparation for the attack, the enemy usually will stress reconnaissance and will attempt to locate and to exploit gaps in our defensive positions. He may execute raids on our positions or installations, possibly even in our rear areas through successful infiltration. Destruction missions may be expected prior to the commencement of the enemy's main attack. Extensive patrolling, as a countermeasure, may be employed by the enemy to cover or misrepresent other enemy activity, as a show of strength to cover weaknesses, or as a measure to force our forward outposts and listening posts back. An analysis of the missions, routes, number, and probable, objectives of the enemy patrols will provide valuable intelligence.

(5) *Location and type of supporting weapons.* The location and type of enemy supporting weapons help the commander determine the likely areas of attack and estimate the degree of force which the enemy may use. Movements of weapons may also help to determine the enemy's scheme of maneuver and the timing of the action.

(6) *Cover and deception.* An assessment should be made to determine the enemy's vulnerability to cover and deception operations and his likelihood of employing cover and deception with his attack.

(7) *Observation and fire.* An accurate determination of the most advantageous observation sites and fields of fire available throughout a sector with special emphasis on the avenues of approach is important in defensive operations.

(8) *Location of natural and artificial obstacles.* The commander employs natural and artificial obstacles strengthen his defensive position. Natural obstacles should be considered in light of limitations imposed on enemy mobility and friendly counterattack.

(9) *Weather and terrain.* The effects of weather and terrain play an important role in the defense. Just as key terrain often must be secured in order to attack successfully, so must it be held in order to defend. Weather plays a key part in the operation, as the same weather conditions may have an entirely different effect depending upon whether an attack or a defense is planned.

(10) *Avenues of appraoch.* The avenue of approach of most concern to the defending commander is the route most advantageous to the enemy in his main attack. Enemy reconnaissance activity may provide indications of consideration of avenues of approach. Coupled with this, the commander considers avenues of approach for use by friendly forces in a counterattack. He also considers natural obstacles in the area with reference to their limitation on enemy mobility and on friendly counterattack.

(11) *Plans and capabilities.* To the extent information or estimates on enemy plans and capabilities can be derived from enemy pattern analysis, signals intelligence, intelligence units, or other means and agencies discussed in succeeding paragraphs, the commander is provided with invaluable insights for developing his own plans for the defense. Such indications must be considered in the light of possible enemy deception activities.

(12) *Command, control, and communications.* Knowledge of the enemy's command, control, and communication capabilities assists the commander in planning effective electronic countermeasures and signals intelligence operations.

(13) *Electronic countermeasures.* Determination of the enemy's electronic countermeasures capabilities enables the commander to plan effective counter-countermeasures and plan for the possibility that his own command control and electronic target acquisition devices may be disrupted.

(14) *Location and type of enemy target acquisition systems.* Locating the type of enemy target acquisition systems helps the commander determine the enemy's counterbattery capabilities, scheme of maneuver and timing of the action.

c. Requirements During the Defense.

(1) *Areas of enemy's main attack and secondary attacks.* Movement of enemy units, displacement of weapons, routes of movement, type and size of units involved, movement of reserve units, and location of unidentified or enemy caused nuclear bursts serve as indications of the areas under main attack and secondary or diversionary attacks. These are also factors to be considered in planning counterattacks, displacements, withdrawals, and the employment of reserves.

(2) *Enemy tactics.* Coupled closely with the foregoing factors are those indicators which disclose the enemy's scheme of operations. Unit movement, weapon disposition, formation, depth of echelon, and the type and size of units committed are significant considerations for early determination of enemy tactics.

(3) *Intelligence estimates.* Development of a continuing assessment of the enemy's intelligence collection effort can provide an important tool for the commander in the conduct of his own operations. This assessment can be made only through an understanding of the enemy's intelligence system capabilities.

(4) *Command, control, and communications.* Continuing efforts are needed during the defense to assess the capabilities of the enemy for executing orders and acquiring information on friendly forces as those capabilities may be affected by friendly electronic countermeasures and other battle actions.

3-18. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Capabilities

a. General.

(1) Enemy capabilities are usually the first consideration in determining intelligence requirements and their priorities, because of the commander's concern with intelligence which confirms, alters, or refutes the existing estimate of enemy capabilities and probable courses of action. Enemy capabilities which appear improbable of implementation are not considered in formulating EEI or OIR. For example, when a delaying action is being conducted against advancing superior enemy forces, priorities concerning enemy defense, delay, and withdrawal are not stated.

(2) Each enemy capability listed in the current intelligence estimate (chap 6) is usually the subject of either an EEI or OIR. If knowledge of

the implementation of the particular enemy capability or course of action is not available and this knowledge is needed by the commander at the time in order to make a reasonable decision, that enemy capability is an EEI rather than an OIR.

(3) EEI and OIR pertaining to enemy capabilities are not answered completely until the enemy has committed himself to a course of action. Partial answers are produced continually and result in progressive changes to the intelligence estimate. For example, efforts to determine in what strength the enemy may reinforce troops in contact often produce changes in the strength estimate of available enemy reinforcements and the enemy's capability to reinforce. Similarly, evidence that the enemy has reinforced certain units changes the estimate of the number of committed forces.

b. Attack Capability. An intelligence requirement concerning an enemy attack directs specific attention to definite areas and usually to specified times. The areas to which attention is directed are usually avenues of approach determined by analysis of the area of operations and enemy dispositions. If the enemy can attack using several avenues of approach, only one requirement is stated. The different avenues of approach are indicated as areas to which special attention is directed. Specified times are most frequently stated when the command's course of action is to attack. Time may be given precisely or may be stated as "before our attack," depending upon whether the time of the attack has been determined.

c. Defense Capability. Requirements concerning enemy defense specifically state the line or area concerned.

d. Withdrawal Capability. Requirements concerning enemy withdrawal usually indicate the line or area beyond which the enemy's withdrawal is of particular interest and may direct attention to a line or area to which the enemy might withdraw and the withdrawal route.

e. Delay Capability. Requirements concerning enemy delaying actions also specify the lines or areas along which delaying positions may be formed.

f. Reinforcement Capability. Requirements concerning reinforcement ordinarily do not distinguish between reinforcement of an attack and a defense. They simply ask when and where available reserves may be employed. Other requirements ask specifically whether the enemy will attack or defend. Requirements concerning reinforcement direct specific attention to known reserves and unlocated units.

g. Nuclear Capabilities. When the enemy has a nuclear capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yield, and by what delivery means? Special attention to very heavy field artillery units in the vicinity of GROTE and possible missile launchers in the vicinity of AVON."

h. Chemical and Biological Capabilities. When the enemy has a CB capability, the stated requirement may be, "Will the enemy use chemical or biological agents against us? If so, what agents, when, where, and by what delivery means? Special attention to field artillery, mortar, and rocket units."

i. Air Capabilities. Requirements as to enemy air capabilities are rarely listed at division, corps, or units in the communications zone. Normally intelligence on enemy air capabilities is disseminated by the field army or higher echelons. In airborne, airmobile, and amphibious operations where enemy air activity is a significant factor, a corps or division commander may appropriately designate an air EEI, especially during the planning phases of the operation. However, heavy reliance will be placed on higher headquarters to provide answers to such EEI.

j. Electronic Warfare Capabilities. The stated requirements might be—

"Will the enemy employ electronic warfare in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where, and to what extent? Special attention to EW units."

k. Tactical Cover and Deception Capabilities. The stated requirements may be—

"Does the enemy possess the capability to employ cover and deception operations? If so, at what level and with what type equipment?"

l. Miscellaneous Capabilities. Stated requirements concerning other enemy capabilities might be—

(1) "Will the enemy employ guerrilla forces in conjunction with his attack? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the heavily wooded area north of MASLEM."

(2) "Will the enemy infiltrate our lines? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the swampy area east of HAYS."

(3) "Will the enemy employ airborne or air-mobile forces in our sector? If so, when, where, and in what strength? What will be the direction and altitude of approach? What drop or landing zones will be used? Special attention to the area south of CUCHARA."

(4) "Will the enemy employ amphibious forces on our south flank? If so, when, where, and in what strength? How many landing vehicles of what type will be employed? Special attention to the beaches at SAVANAH and GEORGETOWN."

3-19. Intelligence Requirements Pertaining to Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. Requirements may be designed for developing knowledge of enemy vulnerability; that is, any conditions or circumstances which make the enemy vulnerable to neutralization, deception, or defeat. Such requirements are to develop intelligence as to the nature, extent, permanence, or other details of the conditions or circumstances which produce the vulnerability.

b. The details desired may be listed in the stated requirement or may be omitted if they are numerous and routine. For example, for analyses of nuclear or chemical targets, information is desired as to size, shape, composition, concentration, vulnerability, recuperability, and permanence. Since these requirements are both numerous and normal, details pertaining to them are properly omitted. The statement may ask what nuclear or chemical targets exist in our zone and direct attention to a specific area of activities. When enemy vulnerabilities result from faulty dispositions, logistical inadequacies, or administrative deficiencies, the degree of permanence of the condition may have to be established before tactical plans to exploit the vulnerability can be prepared. Hence, intelligence requirements may ask "if" and "when."

c. Psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy force must be known in order to plan cover and deception and psychological operations. Such questions as "Is the enemy commander predisposed to expect a given friendly course of action?" and "Will a particular theme appeal to potential enemy defectors?" would be appropriate.

3-20. Weather and Terrain Information Requirements

a. General.

(1) The military commander must consider the effects of weather and terrain on his mission when he plans for and executes an operation; as a result, he strives for a thorough and accurate knowledge of these factors. This knowledge, considered together with the enemy capabilities, is required to insure the accomplishment of the assigned mission.

(2) An analysis of the effect of all of the conditions of weather and terrain upon our own forces and the enemy constitutes the basis for estimates which may be made by the commander and his staff. The answer sought is the best utilization of the weather and terrain based on the mission and enemy capabilities.

(3) Terrain and weather influence the application of the principles of war, such as the ability to mass and maneuver. Properly exploited, terrain and weather may allow a numerically inferior force to achieve relative superiority of combat power. For example, a mechanized, well-equipped, heavily-armored force drawn into marshy or rugged terrain may well be defeated by a smaller, lightly-equipped force, because the smaller force is enabled, through mass, maneuver and surprise, to apply superior combat power at the point of decision.

b. Weather.

(1) There are two types of weather information requirements—those established by the Army and passed to the USAF Air Weather Service (AWS) for action (weather forecasts, studies, and summaries) and those established by the USAF AWS and passed to the Army for action (local weather, temperature, and wind). The establishment, coordination, and consolidation of Army requirements are intelligence responsibilities. Figure 3-1 lists the usual requirements for weather information required at all echelons within the field army.

(2) At brigade or battalion level, the intelligence officer coordinates the requirements of his command for weather information and interprets weather information received from higher headquarters in terms of its application to the local terrain and situation. When weather information is required but has not been made available, the intelligence officer should request such information from the intelligence section of the next higher echelon. When regularly distributed forecasts are inadequate to satisfy particular requirements such as a planned chemical operation, special weather forecasts may be requested.

(3) There are three types of weather forecasts: Short, Extended, and Long Period. For fur-

	Command and Staff	Air Defense Artillery	Armor	Aviation	CBR	Engineer	Field Artillery	G2 Intelligence	Infantry	Medical	Military Police	Ordnance	Psychological Operations	Quartermaster	Signal	Transportation	Unconventional Warfare
I-WEATHER OBSERVATIONS																	
A. Surface																	
1. Current observations	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Selected data*	----	-----	e12	acd1	acd1	acd	cd 1	-----	d 13	acd	acd	-----	acdf	-----	-----	acd1	f
3. Forward area Observations	-----	-----	-----	e1	-----	ac	-----	-----	e	-----	-----	-----	f	-----	-----	-----	f1
B. Low Level - Selected Data*	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	cde1	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acdf	-----	-----	-----	f
C. Upper Air																	
1. Current Observations	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	cd1	-----	-----	-----	-----	----	- ---	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Selected Data*	-----	a	-----	-----	acd	a	cd1	-----	d3	-----	-----	-----	f	-----	-----	-----	f
II-WEATHER FORECASTS/BRIEFINGS/CLIMATOLOGY																	
A. General Forecasts																	
1. 12 Hour	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd	cd
2. 24 Hour	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd
3. 48 Hour	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	avd	acd	acd	acdf	acd	acd	acd	acd
4. 72 Hour	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acdf	acd	acd	acd	acd
5. 3-5 Day	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acdf	acd	acd	acd	acd
B. Special Forecasts of Selected Parameters																	
1. Fallout Winds	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Aviation Route and Terminal	-----	-----	d4	acd	-----	-----	cde4	----	d4	acd4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd4	f4
3. 12 Hour Aviation	-----	-----	d4	acd	-----	-----	cde4	-----	d4	acd4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd4	f
4. 24 Hour Aviation	-----	-----	d4	acd	-----	----	cde4	-----	d4	acd4	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd4	f
5. Stability to 2 meters and Surface Winds	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
6. Winds - Surface to 2,000 feet	-----	-----	-----	acd	cd	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd4	acd	-----	acdef	-----	-----	-----	f
7. Precipitation Type and Amount	-----	-----	-----	acd	cd	acdf	-----	-----	-----	acd4	acd	-----	acdef	-----	-----	-----	-----
8. Special Mission Forecasts	acd	-----	-----	-----	acd	----	cd	acd	------	-----	-----	-----	f	-----	-----	-----	f
9. Upper Air for Ballistic Corrections	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	cd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
10. Refractive Index	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	f
11. Drapzone	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	acd	acd3	-----	-----	-----	acdef	-----	-----	-----	f
12. Sea Swell and Surf	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	a	-----	acd	------	-----	-----	-----	------	-----	-----	a	f
13. Severe Weather Warnings	acde	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acd	acdef	acd	acd	acd	f
C. Weather Briefings and Display	acd	-----	-----	acd	acd	-----	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
D. Climatology/Summaries																	
1. Climatic Summaries	ac	-----	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	-----	-----	acf	-----	-----	-----	-----
2. Climatic Studies	ac	-----	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	ac	-----	-----	-----	-----	acf	-----	-----	-----	f
3. Engineer Climate Information	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
4. Weather Summaries	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	acd	-----	acd	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

LEGEND:

a - Army area of interest
c - Corps area of interest
d - Division area of interest
e - Interest area of units below division
f - Interest area for operations deep in enemy held territory
* "Selected Data" are observations of selected weather elements taken at locations and times, as required, by the user.

FOOTNOTES:

1 - Provided by organization requiring information
2 - Armored Cavalry Regiments only
3 - Airborne Infantry only
4 - Required only by organic aviation

Figure 3–1. Requirements for weather information within the field army.

ther detail as to type and duration of forecasts, see paragraph 6–15*b*.

(4) At higher headquarters, climate and weather information is included in the Analysis of the Area of Operations and in the Intelligence Estimate (app B and J).

c. Terrain.

(1) Normally the smaller the unit, the

greater the interest in details of the terrain. The higher headquarters may think in terms of mountain ranges, a lower headquarters in terms of hill complexes, and a small unit in terms of small ridges and draws on a single hill. Detailed terrain data become particularly valuable during stability operations when the area of operations includes areas particularly suited for location of insurgent base camps, headquarters, hospitals, etc.

(2) Terrain is normally evaluated in terms of the following factors to determine its effect on military operations:

(*a*) Observation and fire.
(*b*) Concealment and cover.
(*c*) Obstacles.
(*d*) Key terrain.
(*e*) Avenues of approach.
(*f*) Trafficability, and its effects on (*c*), (*d*), and (*e*) above.

(3) At higher headquarters, information on terrain is included in the Analysis of the Area of Operations (app B). Terrain intelligence is provided by the engineer staff officer, engineer terrain teams, and other engineer units; however, surveillance and reconnaissance reports, interrogation reports, imagery interpretation reports and maps, together with other intelligence sources assist the intelligence officer in the overall analysis of the area of operations. At lower echelons, information may be provided by higher headquarters, adjacent units, local civilian inhabitants, and aerial surveillance.

Section III. DETERMINATION OF INDICATIONS

3-21. General

a. Although EEI and OIR announce the intelligence missions of the command, collection agencies normally are assigned specific tasks in the collection of information of enemy activity or of characteristics of the area of operation.

b. Particular enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations indicate various courses of action open to the enemy. A determination must be made as to which of these enemy activities or area characteristics should comprise a part of the mission of intelligence collection agencies. This determination is based upon the theory that probable enemy courses of action can be deduced from the knowledge that certain enemy activities such as movement of units, increase in sapper activities, construction of roads or stockpiling of weapons do or do not exist. Such knowledge of enemy activities forms the basis for deducing the relative probability of various enemy courses of action. This theory is extended to include enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, units, and installations.

c. A necessary step in directing the collection effort is to determine those enemy activities or characteristics of the area of operations which will indicate the answer to the intelligence requirement. This procedure is called "determination of indications" and is a function of the intelligence officer. The ability of the intelligence officer to "read indicators" (including recognition of enemy deception and counterdeception indicators) may contribute to the success of friendly operations since an analysis of all available enemy indications will be the basis for recommendations to the commander for specific courses of action. Typical intelligence indicators are found in appendix T.

3-22. Indications

a. An indication is any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the area of operation which points toward enemy vulnerabilities or the adoption or rejection by the enemy of a particular capability, or which may influence the commander's selection of a course of action.

b. Indications include conditions which result from previous actions or from enemy failure to take action. For example, enemy dispositions may indicate a particular enemy capability or vulnerability. The enemy's logistical situation may favor the adoption of a particular capability or may influence friendly selection of a course of action by indicating an enemy vulnerability. In a nuclear environment the destruction of large enemy forces by nuclear attack may result in a vulnerability which favors friendly resumption of the offensive. Destruction of river-crossing means in one area by friendly forces may lead to forcing the enemy to cross elsewhere. The presence of obstacles such as areas of poor trafficability may influence the adoption or rejection of a course of action by either force.

c. Indications provide the basis for orders and requests. The specific information which collection

agencies are directed or requested to supply is the information which will confirm or deny the indication.

d. Intelligence collection agencies must be alert to the fact that indications presented by the enemy may be false. The enemy will go to great efforts to deceive us by portraying indications which point to the adoption of a course of action which he does not intend to adopt. Even though the enemy's intention to attack, withdraw, or defend is known and verified, we can still be deceived as to the strength, location, time, and tactics he will employ.

3–23. Analysis of EEI and OIR

a. EEI and OIR are analyzed to determine the indications which by their existence or nonexistence provide an answer to an intelligence requirement. Normally, these are indications which are likely to exist when the enemy prepares to adopt or does adopt any particular course of action. Thus, a requirement which asks in part, "will the enemy attack" is analyzed by determining the indications of attack which may exist during the preparation or launching of offensive actions. These indications frequently include forward movement of hostile units, forward displacement of artillery, and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screens.

b. The analysis requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and of the characteristics of the area of operations which can affect military operations. Particularly valuable is detailed knowledge of the enemy organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods; the probable enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control; the personalities of the opposing enemy commanders; and the past performance of the opposing enemy units.

c. At every headquarters, lists of enemy activities peculiar to each indication are compiled. The lists are disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. For training exercises, FM 30–102 lists activities pertaining to operations of the maneuver enemy-aggressor.

d. Having identified indications which reveal answers to the intelligence requirements, the intelligence officer determines those specific enemy activities which by their very nature and location, will, if present, establish each of the pertinent indications. These specific items of information constitute a basis for orders and requests to agencies. In formulating the specific items of information required to determine enemy indications, items which afford the best probability of detecting the use of false indications by the enemy must also be formulated.

Section IV. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

3–24. General

a. A source is defined as a person, thing, or activity from which information is originally obtained. Sources may or may not be under friendly control.

b. The source of information to be selected to fulfill a given intelligence requirement is an important consideration. For this reason, a knowledge of what sources of information are available is essential to the planning of a collection effort.

c. The most common sources of information for intelligence purposes are enemy activities, prisoners of war, local residents, refugees, evacuees, displaced persons, civilian agencies, recovered US military personnel, captured enemy documents and materiel, enemy electromagnetic emissions and sounds, odors, duds, shell and missile fragments, craters, areas contaminated by CB agents, radioactive material, nuclear bursts, imagery, maps, weather forecasts, studies, and reports.

d. Other sources of information include informants; intelligence reports and studies prepared by higher, lower, and adjacent units and other military services and governmental agencies.

3–25. Enemy Activity

a. Enemy activity such as movements of troops, the presence of armor, weapons displacement, movement or stockpiling of supplies and materiel construction, and the amount and types of weapons fire all provide valuable combat intelligence information. Enemy intelligence collection activities and surveillance methods also provide valuable information. Knowledge of enemy intelligence organization, doctrine, procedures, communications, and relationships with the local civilian population provide vital information for planning

the deception, counterintelligence, and security measures of the command.

b. Conversely, the lack of enemy activity or the fact that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities is often of great value. For example, the information that the enemy has not moved his reserves or that he has not displaced certain support units may influence the commander's course of action.

c. The volume and type of information available from enemy activities are limited by the capabilities of the means to detect and observe them and the measures taken by the enemy to mask his activities. As examples, the enemy may use hills to cover troop movements from radar line-of-sight detection or he may use the noises of field artillery fire to cover the sounds of vehicular movement.

3–26. Prisoners of War

a. Prisoners of war (PW) are valuable sources of information of immediate tactical value and the effects of friendly psychological operations. Maximum information is obtained through skillful handling of PW from the time of capture until the interrogation is completed. Intelligence interrogation personnel must stay abreast of current enemy OB, tactics and organization in order to be effective in their interrogations. A thorough knowledge of current friendly operations is necessary. Intelligence interrogation personnel are briefed on the information desired and are provided with aids such as maps and aerial photos to assist them in the conduct of interrogations. PW of counterintelligence interest (for example, members of intelligence, reconnaissance or guerrilla organizations) should be identified and separated early from other PW. Counterintelligence personnel should be notified immediately.

b. Since qualified intelligence interrogation personnel are not normally assigned or attached below brigade level except for specified operations, PW are not formally interrogated at echelons below brigade; however, brief initial tactical interrogation is encouraged at the lowest echelon in order to determine information of immediate tactical value. Tactical interrogation of selected PW takes place at brigade and division and a detailed interrogation at field army. Normally corps is bypassed in the chain of PW evacuations. A PW collection point, however, may be established at corps for the temporary retention of selected PW for special interrogation or for interrogation of those who may be captured by corps troops. (See FM 30–15 for guidance in PW interrogation.)

c. When sick or wounded prisoners of war are undergoing treatment at medical treatment facilities, suitable arrangements for interrogations will be coordinated with the medical officer in charge.

d. Procedures for interrogation and handling of PW are standardized and are fully discussed in FM 30–15 and FM 19–40.

3–27. Civilians

a. The term "civilian" includes local inhabitants, line crossers, tourists, missionaries, displaced persons and repatriates. Civilians who have been within enemy controlled areas may be valuable sources of information. They must be screened carefully to detect line crossers and subversion, espionage and sabotage agents. Procedures should be established which insure early detection of these types of civilians and immediate notification of counterintelligence personnel. Generally, the longer the delay in questioning, the less valid is the information obtained.

b. Civilian sources may provide information on terrain in enemy-controlled areas and enemy installations and activities. They may provide data on climate; economic, sociological and psychological factors; local resources; and enemy population controls and counterintelligence methods. Civilians are particularly valuable sources of information in cold war operations and of information on immediate areas of operations for division and smaller units.

c. The civilian population is a lucrative source of information in stability operations. Some of the population, although appearing as innocent civilians, will be the insurgent, terrorist, or political organizer. The insurgent directs his efforts to gain the support and the control of the people. In stability operations the civilian population's knowledge of the insurgent and his activities is broader than in conventional warfare. The amount of information which may be derived from the population will largely depend on their existing loyalties which normally are accorded to the force which provides the greatest promise of security and economic well-being.

3–28. Recovered US Military Personnel

Recovered US military personnel are sources of

information on the area of operations and enemy dispositions and activities. US escapees and evaders are also sources of information on successful evasion techniques. Debriefing of recovered US military personnel is conducted in accordance with AFM 200–3/FM 21–77A/NWP 43(A), and regulations prescribed by the theater headquarters. Within the limits prescribed, debriefing of such personnel at division and lower levels is usually limited to obtaining information of immediate tactical value.

3–29. Captured Enemy Documents

a. General. Maximum collection of enemy documents is insured by appropriate training and supervision of small units. Documents may contain enemy propaganda or may have been prepared and planted by the enemy to be captured in an effort to confuse and deceive.

b. Handling, Reporting, and Evacuation of Captured Enemy Documents (CED).

(1) Captured enemy documents include any piece of recorded information which has been in the possession of the enemy and subsequently comes into US possession. Handling of captured documents should be outlined in unit SOP.

(2) Captured documents, excluding those found on PW, will be processed through the various echelons with each echelon extracting that data of immediate tactical significance. Documents found on PW will be delivered to the next higher headquarters by the guard(s) escorting the PW.

(3) At division level, the document will be assigned a category dependent on the type of information contained in the document. These include:

(*a*) Category "A"—Document(s) contains information of immediate tactical or strategic value.

(*b*) Category "B"—Document(s) contains cryptographic items and information relative to enemy communications-electronics systems.

(*c*) Category "C"—Document(s) contains information of lesser value to intelligence staffs.

(*d*) Category "D"—Document(s) contains no information of apparent value to intelligence staffs. (See FM 30–15 for further detail on categories assigned captured enemy documents.)

3–30. Enemy Material

Captured enemy materiel may provide technical intelligence information of immediate value to target intelligence, order of battle intelligence, or to the determination of enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities of tactical or strategic interest. The production of technical intelligence is facilitated by a continuous collection and exploitation effort by combat and support troops. (See FM 30–16 for detailed information on the handling and disposal of enemy materiel.)

3–31. Enemy Electromagnetic Emissions

Enemy electromagnetic emissions are valuable sources of information of enemy plans and orders, unit identification and locations, locations of fire control and surveillance devices, and similar data. Exploitation of these sources extends the depth of intelligence and contributes significantly to intelligence production (to include that used for target acquisition). Normally the means utilized to exploit these sources are capable of all-weather, day-and-night operations and often may provide unique insight into enemy plans or actions (FM 32–10).

3–32. Duds; Shell and Missile Fragments; Craters; Areas Contaminated by CB Agents and Radioactive/Radiological Fallout or Material; and Nuclear Bursts

a. Duds and missile and shell fragments are sources of information on the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. This information is an aid in determining order of battle and enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. Duds and crater analyses are used in target acquisition by providing direction to firing positions. See FM 6–121 for shell reporting procedures.

b. Examination of areas contaminated by chemical and biological agents, analyses and identification of agents used, and delivery means assist in developing countermeasures and in evaluating enemy capabilities. Information of areas contaminated by residual nuclear radiation, chemical agents, or spore-forming biological agents is required in determining terrain use and troop safety factors.

c. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attack information is essential to commanders and their staffs at all echelons for estimates of the situation. The initial NBC–1 message will contain as a minimum the location of the observer, the azimuth from his location to the attack, and the date/time of the attack. Additional information

will be transmitted as it becomes available (FM 21–40 and app H).

d. The existence of an enemy biological attack may not be known for days or weeks depending on the agent used. The first indication of a biological attack may be an apparent epidemic among troops of the attacked unit and/or civilians in the surrounding areas.

3–33. Imagery and Ground Surveillance Radar Reports

a. Imagery obtained by ground and airborne sensors is an excellent source of information for terrain evaluation, damage assessment, and enemy activities such as fortifications, weapon positions, organization or tactical locations, movements, and relative size and location of assembly areas. Current types of image-producing sensors include photographic equipment, airborne infrared detectors, airborne radars, ground surveillance radars, thermal imaging devices, and night vision devices.

b. Imagery obtained by ground-based sensors, for intelligence purposes, includes panoramic views of areas, large-scale coverage of specific objects and terrain features, flash recordings, and repetitive imagery of specific areas for comparative purposes. A special type of coverage is provided by comparative motion pictures with the capability of using selected frames as still pictures. Panoramic imagery taken from a dominant terrain feature may provide terrain information to supplement maps and aerial imaery for coordinating observation plans, ground reconnaissance activities, field artillery fires, and orientation of personnel of subordinate echelons.

c. Imagery obtained by sensors operating from airborne platforms, manned or unmanned, is particularly useful to combat elements in operational planning. Properly exploited, it is an excellent means for collecting information to assist in—

(1) Locating enemy offensive and defensive installations; supply installations and lines of communications; and armored, motorized, and personnel concentrations.

(2) Analyzing terrain.

(3) Confirming or denying intelligence data obtained from other sources or agencies.

(4) Preparing target folders.

(5) Assessing damage.

(6) Preparing mosaics and panoramas for planning purposes.

(7) Correcting maps and making map supplements.

(8) Recognizing both deception and counterdeception indicators.

(9) Identification of enemy major pieces of equipment by type and model.

(10) Accurate location and measurements.

d. Ground surveillance radar teams organic to infantry, mechanized, airborne, armored, and airmobile battalions, the armored cavalry squadron and division artillery are a source of valuable information concerning the movement of enemy personnel and equipment within the detection ranges of the radars used. These radars are especially valuable during periods of poor visibility. The G2/S2 exercises staff supervision over planning the employment of the ground surveillance radars organic to or in direct support of his organization and receives reports concerning moving targets detected by these radars. The ground surveillance radar section of the headquarters and headquarters battery of division artillery reports target information to the division artillery TOC for immediate use as target intelligence. Likewise, the artillery radar sections (countermortar) assigned to the direct support battalion report to the field artillery fire direction center (FDC) S2 and the supported unit for immediate use as target intelligence. Information orginating in these radar reports is also processed through normal intelligence channels.

e. Night vision devices are classified as either passive or active depending upon whether they make use of available light or require the use of artificial illumination.

(1) Passive night vision devices make use of available light, however limited it may be, and electronically intensify and/or convert optical or electronic images so that they may be seen in an eyepiece or on a screen. Passive devices include so-called "starlight scopes," which intensify low-light-level optical images so that they may be seen by the naked eye, systems employing low-light-level television, and passive infrared viewers, such as metascopes, which convert images produced by infrared light into visible images.

(2) Active night vision devices require the use of artificial illumination. Such systems usually consist of an infrared light source, which emits invisible infrared light, and an infrared viewer, which converts images produced by reflected infrared light into visible images. Active devices require more caution in employment since the in-

frared rays emitted can be detected by the enemy infrared viewer.

f. Thermal imaging devices are passive sensors which detect and display emitted and reflected thermal radiation coming from the terrain and objects on the terrain. The total emitted radiation is a function of an object's temperature and its emissivity. Emitted radiation differs between objects and the resultant differences are sensed and displayed by the system. The sensor can detect minute differences and, therefore, differentiate between objects close to each other. Both a real time pictorial display of the thermal images and the recording of the sensor acquired images on film are possible. This type of sensor is passive in that it does not depend upon detecting the reflection of artificial illumination or transmitted energy. Thermal imaging devices should not be confused with simple infrared viewing devices.

g. The G2/S2 is responsible for ensuring that all surveillance means are coordinated and integrated to preclude undesired duplication or gaps in the surveillance effort. The G2/S2 considers the mission of the unit or organization and the capabilities of each of the surveillance means available, and then prepares an integrated battlefield surveillance plan. A new surveillance plan is prepared whenever necessary, and each new plan is continually revised as the tactical situation or the mission changes.

3-34. Unattended Sensors

a. Unattended ground sensors can be used in a wide variety of military operations, to include both offensive and defensive situations as well as special surveillance missions. In each application, sensors are used to collect data concerning activity and/or movement in the area under surveillance. If accurately emplaced, sensors may also be used to provide accurate target locations. Sensor activations may be used to cue other surveillance means to confirm or more accurately sense enemy activity. Sensor data must be integrated with the information obtained by the other collection means available to the commander.

b. Unattended ground sensors detect various types of activity. Some sensors detect seismic vibrations produced by movement on the ground such as personnel walking and vehicle movement. Some sensors produce a magnetic field that detects the movement of ferrous metal within the field. Acoustic sensors detect sounds that are produced by activity such as talking and vehicular noise. The various types of activity detected by the sensors are reported by radio frequency signal to a monitoring station. The radio frequency signal produces an identification code at the monitoring station from which the operator is able to identify which sensor reported the activity. Sensors are used in detecting, locating, and monitoring enemy presence in the area under surveillance. Various types of sensors used in combinations provide a more accurate report of activity by resolving false activations caused by animals and other sources.

c. The G2/S2 exercises staff supervision over planning for the employment of unattended ground sensors, selection of locations for their emplacement, display and processing of the data collected through their use, immediate dissemination of target data acquired, integration of sensor data with information collected by other means, analysis of the integrated information, and dissemination of the resulting intelligence.

d. Unattended ground sensors are an additional major resource available for use by commanders as part of their total information gathering assets. Sensor information is reported and integrated into the intelligence system as is information from other sources. Sensor data, correlated with information obtained from other intelligence sources, can materially assist the G2/S2 in providing timely and factual intelligence for use by the commander and his staff (FM 31-100 (Test)).

3-35. Maps

Maps are a principal source of terrain information. Map accuracy is determined by the data used in the preparation of the map. Maps are supplemented by aerial or ground photographs, side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), sketches, visual observation, trig lists, gazetteers, and other information. Trigonometric lists contain the exact location and elevation of benchmarks and survey points with a complete description of their characteristics. They are of particular value to fire support elements and engineer units and are required for locating and orienting certain surveillance devices. Engineer topographic units are responsible for providing these data.

3-36. Weather Forecasts, Studies, and Reports

a. The mission of providing direct weather service for the field army is vested in a single US Air Force Air Weather Service (AWS) organiza-

tion functionally aligned with, and under the operational control of the field army units that are supported. AWS Staff Weather Officers are special staff officers to army, corps and division commanders. They also normally command the attached AWS weather units. Within the Army, these weather units are provided with Army transportation, Army field and communications equipment (except meteorological peculiar equipment) and logistical support, and are linked together by special dedicated Army communications circuits. These dedicated communications circuits are vital to Army weather support operations. It is an intelligence responsibility to assure that the attached weather units receive their authorized support. See FM 31-3 for details of AWS operations.

b. The Army is responsible for satisfying certain requirements of its own such as ballistic-meteorlogical data and fallout wind data. The responsibility for ballistic-meteorological data is carried out by field artillery meteorological sections, which can measure or determine current surface and upper air winds, pressure, temperature, and humidity. Army aviators report weather conditions within their areas of flight operations. All units can provide weather data obtained by visual observation and, if required, they may be equipped with instruments for collecting additional weather data. The responsibility for fallout wind data is carried out by personnel of the tactical operations center (TOC) or rear area operations center (RAOC). Air Weather Service units operate tactical weather stations with weather observing and forecasting capability at each army, corps, and division TOC. They also operate airfield weather observation units at major airfields. Air Weather Service units:

(1) Maintain continuous surveillance over weather conditions in the operationl areas of the units served, and advise commanders and staff officers of significant changes and developments in the weather situation. This surveillance may include operating tactical weather radar and meteorological satellite tactical ground readout equipment as well as acquiring conventional surface and upper air observation.

(2) Provide weather observations, detailed operational and planning forecasts, weather briefings for combat missions, reports of current weather, weather summaries, and climatological information as required to meet the needs of the organizations served.

(3) Provide experienced weather personnel as required for consultation on special weather problems.

(4) Collect, evaluate, and further disseminate weather data generated within the area.

c. AWS detachments send out tactical observer teams to make weather observations required to refine large area forecasts. Tactical units may be required to assist by supplying local weather data.

d. The Defense Mapping Agency Hydrograhpic Center (formerly, Navy Oceanographic Service) will provide necessary marine charts and tidal data in areas where this information is important to tactical operations.

Section V. AGENCIES

3-37. Agency

a. An agency is any individual or organization which exploits a source to collect and/or process information. To distinction is made between those agencies which collect information and those which process intelligence; all are regarded as agencies. All subordinate adjacent, and higher headquarters as well as certain intelligence personnel, are considered to be agencies (app C). Individual Soldiers of the command afford the lower echelon intelligence officer his most direct and basic means of collecting information.

b. Collection agencies use varying methods to collect information. The more common methods are intelligence interrogation; examination of documents; use of observation and listening posts; ground and airborne surveillance devices; air and ground reconnaissance; reconnaissance in force and by fire; chemical agent detection and identification; radiological monitoring and survey; interception of enemy communications and noncommunications electromagnetic emissions; and photography.

3-38. Selection of Agencies for Collection Tasks

a. General. After determination of the specific information required, available agencies are selected to obtain the information. In making this selection, the factors of capability, suitability, multiplicity, and balance are considered.

b. Capability. An agency must be physically

capable of providing the desired information in a timely manner. For example, an armor unit in reserve is not asked for identifications of units in contact, nor is artillery asked for information which can be obtained only from prisoners of war.

c. Suitability. The collection task assigned to a unit must be compatible with its primary mission. Only the agencies best suited to furnish the desired information are used. For example, information most readily secured by dismounted patrols should be obtained by infantry units rather than armor units. Economy of personnel and materiel also is considered.

d. Multiplicity. Evaluation of information requires that it be compared with information received from other sources and agencies. Subject to considerations of capability and suitability, more than one agency is used to obtain each item of required information.

e. Balance. Within the limits imposed by other considerations, the collection workload is balanced among agencies. Balance is a minor consideration when compared with the importance of other factors.

3–39. Troops

Combat and combat support units are especially useful for collecting information of the enemy and of the area of operations forward of the FEBA. Some units have exceptional capabilities for collecting information. For example, reconnaissance (para 3–55 below) is one of the primary functions of an armored cavalry unit. Army aviation, air defense, field artillery, and target acquisition units are organized to collect information by observation, radar, sound and flash equipment. Some combat service support units are capable of collecting significant amounts of information during the conduct of their normal operations. Virtually every military unit—combat, combat support and combat service support—has intelligence collection capabilities.

3–40. Military Police Units

Due to their characteristic employment and nature of activities throughout the field army area of operations, military police units are valuable collectors of information. Military police units may have access to information of interest to intelligence and counterintelligence agencies in the following military police areas of responsibility:

a. Physical characteristics of the friendly territory.

b. Enemy PW and civilian internees.

c. Crimes and offenses in the area of operation.

d. Operations of patrols, checkpoints, and information posts.

e. Operations of confinement facilities and rehabilitation centers.

f. Liaison with other civil and military law enforcement agencies in the area.

g. Physical security of key facilities and installations, including special ammunition escort and security.

h. Assistance in rear area security operations.

i. Circulation control to include traffic control.

j. Resource management.

3–41. Civil Affairs Units

Civil affairs units acquire much information of the physical and nonphysical characteristics of the area through contact with the civilian population, the government, the economy, and the institutions of the area. Information of intelligence interests acquired by civil affairs units through day-to-day operations should be collected discreetly so as not to jeopardize the primary mission of the civil affairs units in that area. See FM 41–10 for guidance on civil affairs intelligence activities.

3–42. Psychological Operations Units

Physchological operations (PSYOP) units acquire information of use to supported commands. This information is generally in the area of psychological, political, sociological and economic intelligence, dealing with enemy, neutral and friendly groups. When authorized by the appropriate command, PSYOP intelligence personnel participate in detailed prisoner of war interrogations. Analysis of enemy propaganda is a supplementary source of intelligence information. Opinion analysis based on carefully prepared and executed interviews with prisoners of war, civilian internees, refugees and similar groups is used to determine the attitudes of these groups, especially in stability operations. The results of these analyses may be used as an index of the effectiveness of friendly operations. Psychological operations units conduct radio monitoring of enemy propaganda broad-

casts. Analysis of enemy propaganda assists the supported command's G2 in determining the effectiveness of friendly operations.

3–43. Military Intelligence Personnel

Some military intelligence personnel are also collection agencies. Typical of these are intelligence interrogators, imagery interpreters, document analysts, counterintelligence personnel, area intelligence specialists, and strategic intelligence research and analysis personnel (see FM 30–9 for organization and employment of intelligence units and personnel).

3–44. US Army Security Agency Units

Army Security Agency (USASA) units support field armies, corps, divisions, and seaprate brigades by providing capabilities in the fields of signals intelligence (SIGINT), signal security (SIGSEC), and electronic warfare (EW). Integration of SIGINT at the earliest possible moment into the intelligence collection effort is a requirement for the most effective target acquisition, surveillance, and reconnaissance support to the tactical commander. SIGINT information can complement, confirm, or refute and, in many instances, provide leads to other intelligence collection elements. SIGSEC support denies the enemy information/intelligence from the commanders communications network and electronic equipment. USASA is also tasked with the timely exploitation of known or suspected sources possessing possible target exploitation or other information (AR 10–122 and FM 32–10).

3–45. Special Security Detachments

Special security detachments (SSD) are attached to field army, corps, and division headquarters from the US Army Special Security Group, a Field Operating Agency (FOA) of the Department of the Army Staff. The detachments operate the secure area for the receipt, storage, and distribution of certain signals intelligence (SIGINT) material within the supported command and are responsible for security, dissemination, and use of this material (AR 380–28 and AR 380–35). Each detachment is commanded by a Special Security Officer (SSO) who provides information, advice, and represents a direct link between the command, higher headquarters, and the Department of the Army on matters related to the above functions.

3–46. Special Army Intelligence Collection Units

Special Army intelligence collection units furnish information on activities in enemy areas of operations. These units furnish a liaison team to accomplish coordination with the command in whose area they are operating (FM 30–18).

3–47. Technical Intelligence Units

a. Technical intelligence units operate in the field army to perform the following functions:

(1) Collect, identify, and examine captured enemy materiel.

(2) Make preliminary tests and reports on capabilities, limitations, use, and effectiveness of enemy materiel.

(3) Arrange for evacuation of selected enemy materiel and recommend disposition of enemy materiel of no intelligence value.

(4) Prepare questionnaires for use by intelligence interrogation personnel.

(5) Instruct on recognition characteristics, use, maintenance of enemy materiel, countermeasures, and interchangeability of our own and allied materiel.

(6) Evaluate effectiveness of our own and allied weapons and ammunition against enemy materiel.

(7) Investigate intelligence targets to evaluate enemy scientific and technical achievements in research, development, production, and storage so that further detailed analyses may be made by appropriate personnel.

(8) Collect, evaluate, and interpret information affecting the health and welfare of man and animals in actual or possible areas of operation which is immediately or potentially significant for military planning.

b. Capture of special-interest equipment including ammunition containing chemical or biological agents or radiological material or protective equipment, nuclear munitions, or communications-electronics material and cryptographic material is reported to an appropriate technical intelligence team as standardized in STANAG 2084; captured cryptologic material is reported to the supporting USASA element. The team either arranges for the item to be evacuated for examination, examines the item at the location where it was captured, or directs other dispositions of it. Capture of explosive-type ammunition or munitions which contain chemical or biological agents

or radiological material is reported to an appropriate explosive ordnance detachment for safe-rendering of the munitions prior to evacuation or technical intelligence examination.

c. Technical intelligence units at Army level receive information and actual items from Army units as indicated. They evaluate and report on these items, as appropriate, within their capabilities and assigned missions. They also arrange for evacuation of appropriate items to the communications zone or the United States, as necessary. Details of the operations of technical intelligence personnel are contained in FM 30–16.

3–48. Engineer Topographic Units

Engineer topographic and intelligence units collect, evaluate, and disseminate terrain data, produce terrain studies, and provide consultant service in military geology and hydrology in support of programs of the intelligence officer of the appropriate command.

3–49. Special and Other Staff Officers

Special staff officers or elements having troops under their control can obtain information of intelligence value in the conduct of their normal duties and furnish the intelligence officer with such information and intelligence. All special staff officers are capable of advising on enemy activities which are similar to those within their own areas of interest. The following special staff officers can furnish information of the types indicated:

a. Field Artillery Officer. Information which can greatly assist in building an accurate intelligence picture of the enemy is available from the following field artillery sources: forward observers, aerial observers, radars, flash and sound elements, survey/meteorological elements, and other liaison representatives.

b. Chemical Officer.

(1) Information and intelligence are provided on location, time, number, and extent of reported enemy or unidentified nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) attacks; on location, size, duration, and effects of chemical and biological contamination; and on location, extent, and degree of radiological contamination caused by or expected from nuclear weapons (FM 21–40 and FM 3–12).

(2) Information obtained from airborne personnel detector operations is provided by the chemical officer who supervises the technical aspects of these operations. Selection of areas in which operations are to be conducted is a G2/S2 responsibility. The G2, in coordination with the G3, establishes mission priorities.

c. Engineer Officer. Information and intelligence are provided on terrain, enemy fortifications, engineer troops, tactics, materiel, and capabilities (FM 5–36). Terrain information includes stream data (width, depth, condition of banks and bottom, and rate of flow); landing beach data; trafficability studies; traffic and road conditions within the area of operations; port, railroad, canal, pipeline, airfield, and bridge data; and data concerning target acquisition and site selection for atomic demolition munition (FM 30–10). Special engineer units, including engineer terrain detachments, prepare terrain studies, topographic maps, terrain models, and map supplements. Engineers also provide flood warning service (FM 5–30).

d. Surgeon. Information is provided on non-US health problems, training, and materiel used by foreign medical services; status, capabilities, and limitations of foreign military and civilian medical installations and facilities; data on medical aspects of enemy combat operations and incidents involving diseases resulting from enemy biological agent employment and casualties resulting from enemy chemical and nuclear operations; identification of enemy chemical and biological agents and radiological materiel; medical information from interrogation of selected prisoners of war, refugees, defectors, and escapees; and disposition of captured medical materiel.

e. Provost Marshal. Information is provided on incidents involving enemy agents, saboteurs, guerrillas, bypassed units, enemy raiding parties, and other security threats.

f. Communications-Electronics Staff Officer. Information is furnished on the capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of enemy communications equipment and personnel. In addition information is also provided concerning the use and technical characteristics of enemy electronics equipment such as radar, optical, infrared, laser systems, and other peculiar type sensory devices. The status of enemy commercial communications sytems found in the area of operations is also analyzed to provide additional information to be used in the deveopment of a more detailed intelligence data base.

g. Aviation Officer. Information is provided on enemy aircraft and helicopter flight characteristics, load capacity, speed, endurance and armament; enemy airmobile tactics; normal and special aviation uses with particular attention to airborne surveillance devices; and enemy state of training.

h. Staff Weather Officer. Weather observations, weather forecasts, weather summaries, and climatic information are provided by the staff weather officer (provided by the Air Force Air Weather Service).

i. Other. Other staff officers who may provide information of value to the intelligence officer include: civil military operations officer (G5), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer, information officer, civil affairs officer, fire support coordinator or artillery officer, and air defense officer.

3–50. Stay-Behind Units

Stay-behind units are combat elements deliberately positioned in the enemy-controlled area for the purpose of collecting information of enemy activities or for target acquisition. To be most effective, units preselected for deliberate stay-behind missions should be given special training and equipment.

3–51. Agencies for Operations Behind Enemy Lines

a. Target acquisition and the collection of information concerning enemy activities deep in enemy territory are highly suitable missions for the airborne infantry ranger company, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance units.

b. The airborne infantry ranger patrol from the airborne infantry ranger company (AIRC) (FM 31–18) is normally controlled by field army or corps. In requesting the use of the AIRC, the requesting headquarters must consider the time required to process the request to the controlling headquarters and the time required for the desired information to be collected and reported back to the requesting agency. Requesting units must also consider the need for reaction forces to be committed to extract or reinforce the airborne infantry ranger patrol in case of contact and/or exploit patrol findings. The principal factors that limit the operations of AIRC are limited mobility and the necessity to escape detection. Generally, patrols of the AIRC depend upon foot mobility; thus, they cannot move rapidly from one area to another in search of information. Furthermore, their movement is limited by the threat of detection and logistical problems. The threat of detection also limits their communications capabilities.

c. US Army Special Forces (SF) consist of personnel trained in basic and specialized military skills, and organized into multi-purpose units. These units provide a training, advisory, or operational capability in many functional areas, including intelligence. SF elements are usually controlled by the theater headquarters and may provide intelligence from denied areas as a primary mission or as part of another mission.

d. Although USASA units do not normally operate in or over enemy-held territory, they do have the capability of intercepting enemy communications and noncommunications electromagnetic emissions that originate or terminate deep in enemy territory thereby providing target acquisition and intelligence information of enemy activity in that area.

3–52. Aerial Reconnaissance and Surveillance Units

a. The military intelligence company (aerial surveillance) normally assigned to corps and separate task forces is capable of performing near all-weather, day and night aerial surveillance and reconnaissance in support of the corps (FM 30–20 and FM 30–35).

b. A military intelligence battalion, air reconnaissance support (MIBARS), normally is assigned to each field army or independent corps. The MIBARS produces and disseminates intelligence information obtained from tactical USAF reconnaissance elements operating in support of the field army and provides liaison between the field army and the reconnaissance elements of the supporting tactical Air Force (FM 30–20 and FM 30–35).

Section VI. COMBAT SURVEILLANCE, RECONNAISSANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION

3–53. General

Surveillance is the all-weather, day and night, systematic observation of the battle area for intelligence purposes. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities or resources of an enemy or potential enemy.

Surveillance and reconnaissance are related activities. The distinction between them lies in scope and direction. Surveillance is a continuous watch and does not focus on a specific objective. Reconnaissance is finite in scope and time and has a specific objective. Target acquisition is the detection, location, and identification of a target with sufficient accuracy and detail to permit the effective employment of weapons. Surveillance reconnaissance, and target acquisition are closely related and the means to accomplish each of these activities are often identical.

3–54. Combat Surveillance

a. General. Combat surveillance is a principal means by which the intelligence officer implements his collection plan to provide for the detection of general enemy activity as well as to answer the commander's essential elements of information (EEI).

b. Combat Surveillance Requirements Within Field Army.

(1) *Field army requirements.* At field army, surveillance requirements are characterized by the depth of penetration required and a lesser need for continuous surveillance coverage. Enemy objects and activities subject to surveillance include movement and general location of major reserves, long-range missile sites, command posts and combat service support complexes, and electromagnetic emissions. Other surveillance requirements include information of the terrain, weather, nuclear detonations, and chemical-biological-radiological contaminated areas. Normally, periodic surveillance will suffice. The length of time between missions will vary with the situation. In fluid situations, continuous surveillance of given activities or objects for short periods may be required.

(2) *Corps requirements.* At corps, surveillance requirements are generated by both immediate and future operations. They are characterized by deep penetration of the enemy territory and a general reliance upon aerial surveillance means. Continuous surveillance is required to detect and obtain information of movements of enemy reserves into or within the corps area of interest, general location of enemy reserves and fire support weapons in the corps area of interest, missile attack, air attack, nuclear detonations, electromagnetic emissions, chemical-biological-radiological contaminated areas, and weather. Periodic area surveillance is required for supplemental information on the enemy and terrain required for planning the next operation. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required to assist in determining the enemy's course of action and the location of his main efforts. In static situations, periodic area coverage may suffice.

(3) *Division and lower echelon requirements.* At division and lower levels, surveillance requirements are characterized by the immediacy of operations. Continuous surveillance is required to detect or obtain information of movements into or within the area of interest, enemy dispositions, employment of supporting weapons, electromagnetic emissions, nuclear detonations, chemical-biological-radiological contaminated areas, air threats, weather, and topographical features. Periodic area surveillance is required for general information of the enemy and terrain to supplement current general intelligence. During fluid situations, continuous area surveillance is required. During static situations, periodic coverage of the area may suffice.

c. Ground Surveillance. Ground surveillance involves the systematic and continuous observation of selected areas, routes, or static locations such as crossroads, bridges, aircraft landing areas, or other specific type installations. Ground surveillance is characterized by line-of-sight limitations, dependence upon terrain for movement and site locations, and a limited capability of surface transport to displace surveillance means in time to be responsive to immediate requirements in new areas. Units performing ground surveillance missions provide current information by detecting, locating, identifying, and reporting information of military value. Ground surveillance is conducted in all combat operations by all combat units.

(1) *Surveillance Operations.* When planning surveillance operations, the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time and troops available (METT), as well as available equipment, will govern the organization and disposition of forces. Since surveillance usually consists of systematic and continuous observation of large areas, long routes or several specific locations, units conducting surveillance missions normally commit the bulk of their forces to performing observation while retaining a small reserve to assist elements that may be attacked by enemy forces. Ground units performing surveillance missions will usually operate in rear areas, areas adjacent to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), forward of the FEBA or provide dismounted elements which can be airlifted into areas forward

of the FEBA. Surveillance missions are conducted in a manner similar to that of a screening force or a rear area security operation. Observation posts, listening posts, and patrols are established to provide continuous and systematic observation. A surveillance force is not usually capable of offering strong resistance to the enemy; however, it must be capable of protecting itself. Air cavalry units may extend the surveillance capabilities of ground units beyond the FEBA. The intelligence officer plans and coordinates surveillance activities with the operations officer and consults with appropriate members of the staff to insure coordination of surveillance with other activities.

(2) *Surveillance Tasks.* Any unit or organization may be assigned a surveillance mission. Surveillance is routinely performed by units as a part of normal combat operations. Surveillance tasks which may be performed while conducting other primary missions are:

(*a*) Determination by observation of militarily significant activity (by the enemy or civilians influenced by the enemy) or the absence of such activity.

(*b*) Location of targets for employment of fire support means within assigned areas.

(*c*) Observation and adjustment of fire support delivered against surface targets.

(*d*) Damage assessment.

(*e*) Location and identification of enemy units moving or stationary within assigned areas of operations.

(*f*) Observation of enemy avenues of approach and lines of communication.

(*g*) Observation of routes and key terrain within friendly rear areas.

d. Aerial Surveillance. Aerial surveillance complements ground surveillance and is characterized by a capability to extend line-of-sight; to become independent of terrain for communications, movement routes and site locations; and to adjust or react rapidly to new requirements. The mobility of aerial surveillance platforms and their ability to operate free of terrain interference provide a capability to conduct surveillance over large areas. The air cavalry and other aviation units of the division, corps, and field army are used for reconnaissance and surveillance missions. When aerial surveillance units are used for missions forward of the FEBA, commanders must give careful consideration to enemy air defense capabilities. Generally, inclement weather will reduce the effectiveness of aerial surveillance. Turbulence and heavy precipitation degrade radar and infrared imagery; reduced visibility degrades visual surveillance. Problems of coordination and control of the use of the airspace may impose further limitations on its use.

(1) *Aerial Surveillance Missions.* An aerial surveillance mission is characterized by the large expanse of terrain that it covers and the frequency with which it is flown. Aerial surveillance is as continuous over the entire battlefield or area of interest as resources will allow. Generally, it is conducted without regard to specific targets, though major areas of interest may be emphasized. A surveillance mission normally is performed with a large area coverage sensor such as radar or by visual or photographic coverage from higher altitudes so that a large ground area can be observed at all times. Radar and some photographic and visual surveillance flights can be flown along or behind the FEBA parallel to the line of contact. Surveillance over-flights of enemy occupied areas may also be employed using visual observation, photography, or radar coverage to both sides of the aircraft's line of flight. The major advantages of aerial surveillance missions are their ability to:

(*a*) Cover large expanses of terrain rapidly.

(*b*) Maintain continuous surveillance over large hostile areas while flying over friendly positions which increases aircraft survivability and mission accomplishment.

(*c*) Observe movement or changes as they take place on the enemy side of the FEBA which will provide the commander with an early warning of probable enemy intentions and identify specific areas for further targeting of collection assets.

(2) *Visual Aerial Observation.* Visual aerial observation by aircraft crews is limited by the speed of the aircraft, the availability of visual aids such as binoculars and night observation devices, the distance from which observation must be made, the enemy's air defenses and concealment measures, and the existing visibility. Many of these limitations may be overcome by use of sensors to verify and to supplement visual sightings. The value of visual aerial observation lies in the speed with which information of fleeting targets can be relayed to friendly units capable of attacking such targets. There are four general types of visual aerial observation—area search, specific search, route reconnaissance, and artillery adjustment. The use of crews intimately familiar with the terrain will greatly increase the effectiveness of visual aerial surveillance.

PHOTO COVERAGE (1)	INITIAL RECORD	GENERAL INTELLIGENCE RECORD	DETAILED INTELLIGENCE RECORD	MAPPING RECORD
MAJOR USES (2)	General intelligence requirements, such es besic infermetien en terrein, routes ef cemmunicatian, and enemy ectivities. Plenning aperetians. Mepping.	Conduct ef current tecticel eperetiens. Terget acquisitien.	Study ef specific targets er objectives for informatien far immediate requirements and for specific planning.	Preparatian and revisien af maps.
TYPES OF PHOTOS (3)	Usuelly verticel stereo peirs	Usually vertical stereo pairs.	As required.	Usually small scale vertical sterea pairs*
AREA OF COVERAGE (4)	Projected areas ef eperetians.	Unit eree ef influence and specified partiens of the unit erea af interest.	As required.	As required.
FREQUENCY (5)	As necessary te shew seasonal changes.	As required by the tactical situatian, terrain characteristics, and ather variables. At times, daily ceverage af enly pertians af the bettle erea is required. In meving situatians, enly ceverage ef specified arees and immediate abjectives may be required.	As required.	As required.
DISTRIBUTION (6)	Nermelly requested by field army which mekes eutematic initiel distributien ta subordinete units eccarding ta areas af interest. Supplementary issues are made as the campaign pragresses. See FM 101-10-1 for typicel ellawences.	Narmally requested by divisians and higher headquarters. See FM-101-10-1 fer typicel ellewances.	As required.	Narmally requested by cerps end higher headquarters and distributed to topegraphic units.

* Often supplemented with lerge scale phatas af culturally develaped areas.

Figure 3–2. Categories of aerial photographic coverage.

(3) *Permanent Record Imagery.* Permanent record imagery is highly desirable before, during, and after most operations. Aerial imagery provides recorded images which are studied, analyzed, and interpreted by trained imagery interpreters. Such analysis is more accurate than that derived from visual observations. The time lag between acquisition and interpretation of permanent imagery may reduce or negate the value of information collected concerning transient and fleeting targets. Permanent imagery may be obtained through use of—

(*a*) Photographic coverage—the general categories of coverage are shown in figure 3-2.

(*b*) Emission detectors (light and heat in the infrared portion of the electromagnetic spectrum).

(*c*) Radar.

(*d*) Electromagnetic intercept devices.

(4) *Use of Radar and Infrared Devices.*

(*a*) Portrayal methods used by radar and infrared devices include scope presentation for instantaneous viewing, in-flight processing and viewing for near realtime intelligence, imagery recording for retention and detailed study, and transmission to ground stations. Airborne radar can produce acceptable imagery during most conditions of visibility and is particularly valuable during periods of degraded visibility. Infrared sensory devices produce acceptable imagery during most conditions of visibility but are somewhat degrade during bad weather conditions.

(*b*) Airborne radar can provide acceptable imagery during periods of darkness and in conditions of light rain, smoke, haze, fog, mist, and dust. It is valuable as a moving target indicator (MTI), particularly in a controlled environment with the organic Army side-looking airborne radar (SLAR) capability of in-flight processing, interpretation and reporting. Information obtained can be supplemented by use of other means, such as infrared (especially at night), visual observation, and photography to aid in the exact determination of the cause of the activity or other returns detected by the MTI radar. Airborne radar can quickly cover large areas. Side-looking airborne radars can operate from behind the forward edge of friendly dispositions. A limitation of airborne radar is its dependency upon line-of-sight which makes it susceptible to detection.

(*c*) Airborne passive infrared and thermal detection devices are valuable in detecting heat emissions or differentials penetrating some types of camouflage, and collecting information at night. As with airborne radar, the information obtained by these devices is normally corroborated by other means, such as photography, which can better determine the nature of the detected activity. Airborne passive infrared and thermal detection devices are designed for coverage of limited areas. The infrared (IR) devices are suitable for linear targets such as coastlines and communications net. The aircraft must penetrate enemy airspace to accomplish its mission, with subsequent vulnerability to enemy aircraft or ground fire. Passive IR and thermal detection devices are invulnerable to countermeasures but are susceptible to enemy deception measures. The effectiveness of these devices is reduced by fog, clouds, and precipitation (FM 30-20).

(5) *Collection Agencies.*

(*a*) The military intelligence (MI) company (aerial surveillance) is a specialized organization containing Army aircraft and various types of sensors. This company provides the Army with a limited organic means of collecting information which can be obtained only by aerial means in response to the commander's immediate needs.

(*b*) The military intelligence battalion, aerial reconnaissance support (MIBARS), field army, is a specialized organization created to provide the Army an organic means of interpreting, processing, and disseminating intelligence information from aerial reconnaissance missions flown by the Air Force or other services in support of the Army's requirements. It also provides liaison personnel to the reconnaissance elements of the supporting services.

(*c*) Within the military intelligence organization supporting the division and corps are imagery interpretation (II) sections that are responsive to the commander's needs.

(*d*) The Army Security Agency (ASA), in addition to other supporting units, provides tactical units the capability to conduct the electronic countermeasures (ECM) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) portion of aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations in support of Army field commands. The combined SIGINT Support Element/Electronic Warfare Element (SSE/EWE), collocated within the TOC, is the tactical command's integrated point of entry into the total SIGINT/ECM support system. The SSE/EWE coordinates and integrates the flow of SIGINT and ECM information into the command, and the flow of the command's SIGINT and ECM support requirements into the SIGINT-ECM system. The SSE/EWE functions as intermediary between the

tactical command and the total SIGINT/ECM system to insure the proper level and type of SIGINT/ECM support is provided. The SSE/EWE operates under the staff supervision of the supported command's EW/cryptologic staff officer.

(*e*) Army aviation units of the division are capable of performing visual aerial surveillance missions. In addition, helicopters of the division are also capable of performing airborne personnel detector and other developmental sensory missions when provided the necessary training, equipment and personnel.

(*f*) Tactical air reconnaissance provided by the USAF or other services is one of the sources of information available to the commander for planning and support of operations. This support normally is tailored to meet the specific tactical situation.

(6) *Aerial Surveillance Operations.* Aerial surveillance operations are based on continuous requirements for information. The G2 Air may initiate a requirement, or he may receive it from another staff section or from a subordinate unit. Division missions flown by organic corps aircraft are coordinated beforehand so that ground sensor terminal (GST) and division imagery interpretation support may be alerted to receive the results of missions as they are flown. Aerial surveillance operations are covered in greater detail in FM 30–20 and FM 30–35.

3–55. Reconnaissance

a. General. Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain information by visual observation or other detection methods, about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Reconnaissance missions provide specific coverage of areas of general activity detected by surveillance activities. They can also provide periodic coverage for areas where there is a high probability of enemy activity and there are insufficient resources available to maintain continuous surveillance. Reconnaissance missions obtain information which provides for the general development of probable targets in terms of identification, location, and activity.

b. Planning and Coordinating Reconnaissance Activities.

(1) The intelligence officer plans and coordinates reconnaissance activities with the operations officer and consults with appropriate members of the staff to insure coordination of reconnaissance with other activities. Adjacent and supporting units are informed of reconnaissance plans to preclude duplication of reconnaissance efforts. Coordination is especially important to the success of night reconnaissance missions. Factors to be taken into consideration in the planning stage should include the formulation of the plan itself, the selection of a unit, and coordination. In preparing the plan, broad generalizations such as "report strength and disposition of the enemy" should be avoided. The specific time that the information is desired or the latest time that the information will be of value should be included in the order or request. When more than one mission is assigned to a unit, priorities should be stated. Plans should include provisions for debriefing of participating personnel after the reconnaissance has been completed.

(2) Once a unit is selected in coordination with the operations officer the unit should be allowed sufficient time to prepare its plans, conduct the mission, and report the results. The assigned mission should be within the capability of the reconnaissance agency.

c. Fundamentals of Reconnaissance. The reconnaissance techniques used by the combat arms are described in branch field manuals. The principles for reconnaissance patrolling are—

(1) *To gain contact as soon as possible and maintain it continuously.* Ground reconnaissance elements gain and maintain observation of the enemy and by working continuously to the front, flanks, and to the rear, attempt to determine the location, identification, disposition, and strength of the enemy force and the approach of enemy reinforcements. Army aviation may be used to assist ground reconnaissance. Contact can be maintained by observation and does not require engaging the enemy with fire. Once contact has been made, it is not voluntarily broken without proper authority.

(2) *To maneuver freely in conformity with operations.* Patrols and reconnaissance units maneuver freely to orient on the location or movement of the intelligence objectives, not on other friendly elements. Reconnaissance of portions of the assigned area in addition to canalized routes such as roads, valleys, and ridge lines, will result in the maximum collection of information.

(3) *To fight only when necessary.* Reconnaissance is conducted preferably by stealth and observation of the enemy without his knowledge. Combat is resorted to only to prevent friendly casualties or capture, when prisoners are desired,

or when the mission requires combat to obtain the desired information. Reconnaissance forces are provided the means to accomplish their mission by close combat, if necessary.

(4) *To report all items of information.* Much information has importance that is not obvious at the time of its collection. Negative information shows where the enemy is not going, or where he is not located, at a given time. Information which seems unimportant to the observer may substantiate the intelligence officer's suspicions of the use of T&CD or counterdeception by the enemy. Information must be reported accurately, completely, and in a timely manner.

(5) *To develop the situation.* When enemy contact is made or an obstacle is encountered, the situation is developed rapidly. The following actions are taken on contact:

(*a*) Deploy and report.

(*b*) Reconnoiter.

(*c*) Choose a course of action.

(*d*) Report.

d. Principles of Counterreconnaissance. The principles of counterreconnaissance operations are as follows:

(1) Operations are adjusted to and oriented on the friendly forces being screened.

(2) Enemy reconnaissance elements are destroyed or neutralized by combat.

(3) Screening forces are echeloned in depth to provide mutual support and to limit penetrations by enemy reconnaissance elements. The counterreconnaissance screen prevents enemy reconnaissance forces from entering certain areas or places. It may be a moving or a stationary one depending upon the activities of the force being screened.

e. Ground Reconnaissance.

(1) Ground reconnaissance units consist of personnel manning ground observation posts or surveillance devices, elements of all combat arms, and units especially organized or designated to perform ground reconnaissance.

(2) The armored cavalry squadron is the principal ground reconnaissance element of the division. In addition, each maneuver battalion has an organic ground reconnaissance capability. The range of these ground reconnaissance elements can be extended by providing them with air transportation. Aggressive ground reconnaissance is a positive means of determining disposition and identification of enemy forces. The greater the dispersion of the battlefield, the greater the requirement for reconnaissance and the more readily ground reconnaissance patrols can penetrate enemy positions and obtain information. Mobility and the availability of sophisticated aerial sensors do not eliminate the need for aggressive ground reconnaissance.

f. Reconnaissance in Force.

(1) A reconnaissance in force is an attack by a considerable force to discover and test the enemy's dispositions, strengths and weaknesses, and develop related combat intelligence. The primary purpose of reconnaissance in force is to develop the situation rapidly and in more detail than is possible by other reconnaissance methods. The objectives are to gain information and intelligence on the enemy by causing him to disclose his planned fires or use of reserves. Normally, it is used when there is an urgent need for information concerning the enemy and when the effectiveness, speed, and availability of other collection agencies are inadequate. The reconnaissance in force should be a carefully planned operation which weighs the potential value of intelligence against the inherent risks. The reconnoitering force may be assigned terrain objectives or may be required to reconnoiter a particular area.

(*a*) Two general methods are associated with a reconnaissance in force: the limited objective attack in which the commander intends to hold terrain seized, if possible, and the raid, in which the intention is not to seize and hold terrain. The limited objective attack may involve an attack by one force, directed toward a particular area within which information is sought, or it may consist of a series of aggressive probes along a front, conducted by several subordinate elements of a large force to determine the enemy situation at several critical points. The raid is an attack within any enemy position to accomplish a specific mission, without the intention of holding the invaded territory. This method of reconnaissance in force varies with the size and type of force conducting the raid.

(*b*) The reconnaissance in force operation is characterized by a limited knowledge of the enemy and an urgent requirement for additional information. While the reconnaissance in force is conducted generally the same as other attacks, the maneuver force should not become so decisively engaged as to risk defeat. The primary mission of this operation is to obtain information; however, the commander anticipates striking either enemy weakness or strength and is prepared to exploit unexpected success or to extricate the reconnoiter-

ing force if this becomes necessary. In deciding to reconnoiter in force, the commander weighs the urgency and importance of the needed information against the possibility that the operation may disclose future plans to the enemy or that it may lead to a general engagement under unfavorable conditions. The reconnaissance in force must be conducted with sufficient strength to cause the enemy to react strongly and definitely, thereby revealing his location, dispositions, strengths, planned fires, and planned use of reserves.

g. Aerial Reconnaissance. USAF tactical air reconnaissance missions are undertaken in direct support of tactical operations. Through the use of aerial platforms or vehicles equipped with visual, optical, electronic and/or other sensory devices, specific information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy is obtained. In addition, data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic characteristics of a particular area are secured. Aerial reconnaissance must be coordinated with ground reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance provides greater range capability and timeliness.

(1) *Army aviation.*

(*a*) Army aviation supports and reinforces ground reconnaissance. Army aircraft have the range, speed, and special sensory equipment to cover large areas rapidly. This capability permits ground reconnaissance elements to concentrate on areas of greatest intelligence potential. Army aviation can extend the range of ground reconnaissance elements by providing them with air transportation to their starting point and picking them up at prearranged locations.

(*b*) Organic rotary-wing aircraft give the division a visual observation capability; however, none of these aircraft except those of the air cavalry and division artillery aviation sections have the primary mission of visual air reconnaissance.

(*c*) Attached or supporting aerial surveillance units from corps or field army provide day and night aerial photography, near all-weather aerial radar and infrared imagery, and daylight visual reconnaissance. This support includes transmission of infrared and radar images to the supporting ground sensor terminals. Aerial photographic imagery requires normal film processing before interpretation.

(*d*) FM 1–15, FM 6–20, FM 6–102, FM 17–36, and FM 30–20 contain detailed procedures for the employment of Army aviation reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft.

(2) *Other services.* By providing the aerial collection means required to increase the area coverage capabilities of the Army and extend that coverage beyond the limits of organic Army aerial collection means, the capabilities of air reconnaissance elements of the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps complement those of Army aircraft as a part of a joint operation. These air reconnaissance elements perform reconnaissance missions over the forward combat area and penetrate the airspace over and behind enemy forward combat elements. Present collection means include visual observation, photography, radar and infrared imagery, radar mapping, electronic reconnaissance, and weather reconnaissance. The greater speed of the aircraft and the capacity of the sensors of these services enable them to cover large areas more rapidly and with greater survivability than Army aircraft; however, their speed requires them to operate at higher altitudes and reduces information gained by visual observation. The attached USAF tactical air control party and the Fleet Marine Force air/naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) provide advice and detailed information concerning the employment of Air Force, Navy, and Marine reconnaissance resources as appropriate.

3–56. Target Acquisition

a. General.

(1) Target acquisition is that part of combat intelligence that pertains to detection, identification and location of a target with sufficient accuracy and in such detail to permit the effective employment of weapons.

(2) Target acquisition elements in the division field artillery are specifically organized, trained and equipped to accomplish the target acquisition mission. These elements are located in the division field artillery headquarters and headquarters battery and in each direct support field artillery battalion. Other field artillery target acquisition elements, possessing equipment and capabilities not found in divisions, are available from corps and army resources.

(3) Target acquisition normally is associated with field artillery and consists of indirect and direct target acquisition. Indirect target acquisition can best be defined by use of the term target development. A primary function of the field artillery target acquisition means is the gathering and reporting of information of importance to fire support operations of the combat force. Field artillery target acquisition elements are part of the information collecting agencies of the force and,

as such, are a major component of the combat intelligence system at all echelons. The force G2 makes full use of the target intelligence developed by all sources in formulating his collection plan. Continual emphasis is placed upon ensuring the flow of acquired information between the field artillery target acquisition means and the intelligence structure.

b. Target Intelligncee.

(1) *Requirements for detail and accuracy.*

(*a*) Target intelligence must be sufficiently detailed and accurate to permit an evaluation of the target's importance in relation to the mission of the command and to permit analysis to determine the most effective weapon or warhead for use against the target. Information collection and target acquisition agencies must be impressed with the requirement to provide the most complete and accurate target information in order to satisfy specific needs of users.

(*b*) Requirements for detail and accuracy will vary with the weapon or response to be employed (e.g., air strike, field artillery, maneuver force), the type ammunition (e.g., HE, chemical, or nuclear), the type fire (e.g., indirect or direct, observed or unobserved) and the effect desired (e.g., neutralization, destruction, or harassment).

(*c*) Target information must be reported as completely and accurately as time requirements and situations permit. This is not to imply that incomplete information should not be reported. Even minimum new information may serve to validate available information.

(2) *Requirements for timeliness.*

(*a*) Requirements for timeliness vary. Some information such as that gathered by unattended ground sensors is immediately available for interpretation. Other information such as photographic imagery, requires processing before it can be used. Requirements for timeliness vary with the nature of the target (i.e., whether it is permanent, semipermanent or mobile; whether it is building up or dispersing; and whether it is an immediate or future threat to the accomplishment of the mission). Forces in contact have the most stringent timeliness requirement.

(*b*) To insure timeliness in target acquisition, all commands and target acquisition agencies must be authorized to report information directly to whatever agency has the capability to react rapidly. Every effort should be made to prevent any unnecessary delay in reporting target information/intelligence. Delays caused by excessive intelligence processing or the use of circuitous reporting channels should be avoided.

c. Direct Target Acquisition.

(1) Traditionally, direct target acquisition has been thought to be accomplished only by the application of means designed for that purpose (e.g., forward observers, observation posts, aerial observers, countermortar/battery and ground surveillance radars, flash and sound ranging devices, and radio direction-finding equipment). These means are an integral part of the field artillery fire support system designed to be employed specifically to acquire targets for all fire support means. Implicit in the application of these elements is the requirement for detail, accuracy and timeliness sufficient for rapid target analysis and response (FM 6-121).

(2) Direct target acquisition may be accomplished by other means (i.e., by units in contact, night vision devices, searchlights, patrols of all types, survey parties, imagery acquired by aerial means, signals intelligence, electronic warfare support measures, ground and air reconnaissance elements, unattended ground sensors, airborne personnel detectors, and virtually anyone who sees a target and has the capability to communicate the required information to a reaction means). At times many of these means will be given the specific mission to acquire targets (e.g., long-range patrols, aerial imagery units, or surveillance radars which have been surveyed into the common grid). Although all the various means may not be formally included into a recognizable target acquisition system similar to the field artillery system, they play an extremely important part in target acquisition in support of current operations.

(3) Direct target acquisition is also accomplished by sensor-equipped armed helicopters. Available airborne sensor systems include airborne searchlights, forward-looking infrared, moving target indicator radars, and low-light-level television. These systems allow aerial acquisition of targets during periods of darkness or reduced visibility. Coupled with the helicopter armament system, they afford an accurate, realtime acquisition and engagement capability. The effectiveness of these airborne systems may be limited when the threat of enemy antiaircraft forces helicopters to fly nap-of-the-earth.

(4) Target damage assessment resulting from direct target acquisition activities is furnished to the intelligence subsystem to update the intelligence data base and influence collection and operational planning activities.

CHAPTER 4

COLLECTION OF INFORMATION (STANAG 2014, 2029, 2033, 2084, 2103; SEASTAG 2014, 2029, 2084; SOLOG 123)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

4–1. General

a. The intelligence officer has responsibility for defining collection tasks in terms of information requirements and apportioning the tasks to collection agencies. Assignment of collection tasks is based upon an analysis of the nature of the enemy threat, the mission of the command, and the information collection assets available. This chapter provides guidance concerning the implementation of the collection plan and supervision of the collection effort.

b. Collection of information is made difficult by the enemy's attempts to conceal strengths, dispositions, and movements; enforce censorship and communications security; disseminate false information; and adopt tactical measures designed to deceive.

4–2. Supervising the Collection Effort

To plan efficiently and to supervise the execution of the collection effort, the intelligence officer must thoroughly understand—

a. The mission of the command.

b. The area of operations.

c. The nature of the available sources of information and the capabilities and limitations of the available agencies.

d. The steps in planning and executing the collection effort.

e. The tactics, organizations, and characteristics of the enemy including the enemy intelligence and surveillance capabilities.

f. Characteristics of the local populace, to include loyalties, religions, and social customs.

Section II. THE COLLECTION PLAN

4–3. General

a. The collection plan is a means whereby an intelligence officer takes the intelligence requirements as announced by the commander and, by following a logical, orderly process, analyzes the intelligence requirements for indications, translates the indications into specific missions or requests, and tasks collection agencies. It is supplemented, as required, by workbooks and other plans such as aerial and ground reconnaissance plans and observation plans.

b. The collection plan assists the intelligence officer in the coordination and integration of the collection efforts of the collecting agencies and in keeping all elements of the intelligence structure informed of collection activities directed by the headquarters.

c. The collection plan is a continuously changing, working model. Since the collection effort involves continuous planning, an entirely new collection plan is seldom prepared except when a unit first enters combat. The collection plan is continually revised as required. In effect, it is a slate on which new entries are written and obsolete entries removed.

d. Because information requirements are more complex at higher levels of command, the collection plan is normally more extensive at such levels. At any level, however, collection planning is essentially a mental process and the collection plan—regardless of the format being used—is merely an aid to assist the intelligence officer. It is not a substitute for thinking, and is maintained only to the extent that it assists the intelligence

officer in planning and supervising the collection efforts.

e. An invaluable aid in directing the collection effort and in preparing the collection plan is the coverage map. Plotted on the coverage map are the extent and frequency of coverage of all collection sources and agencies, including aerial and ground reconnaissance, and any other activities which provide information coverage to portions of the battlefield. By use of a coverage map, the intelligence officer can quickly determine existing gaps in coverage as well as coverage that is already in effect against areas or targets of high interest. At lower levels, the coverage map may simply be an overlay to the situation map (para 5–6).

4–4. Format

a. The collection plan is not made up in any prescribed form. It can range from a fragmentary worksheet to a long, detailed plan, or it may be a mental plan alone. Although an experienced intelligence officer can formulate his collection plan mentally, the planning of the collection effort is facilitated and is less subject to error when a formal, written collection plan is used.

b. The type and makeup of the collection plan will depend upon the size of the unit, the mission, the situation, and the personalities concerned. At brigade and battalion levels, because of time and operational limitations, the collection plan must take the simplest form possible, consistent with operational necessity. For example, the format of the plan recommended for use at division and higher levels (fig 4–1), may be modified by eliminating columns 1, 2, and 5. Greater flexibility and mobility in future operations, together with the need for increased speed in the flow of information, may preclude a formal written collection plan. Regardless of what form of plan is chosen, it must be patterned to meet the intelligence officer's needs at any given time.

4–5. Contents of the Collection Plan

a. A collection plan includes the following items (fig 4–1):

(1) The EEI and other intelligence requirements—usually stated in question form.

(2) The indications pertinent to the EEI and to other intelligence requirements.

(3) The specific information sought in connection with each indication. This information is the basis for orders and requests to collection agencies.

(4) The agencies to be used to obtain the required information.

(5) The place and time the information is to be reported if not specified in the unit SOP.

(6) A column to indicate the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action.

b. Appendix E is an example of a partially completed collection plan.

4–6. Orders and Requests

a. Formulation of Orders and Requests.

(1) Orders and requests for specific information are based on indications (app T). Collection agencies are directed or requested to supply the information which will confirm or deny indications, but they are not given the responsibility for determining whether or not the information obtained does confirm or deny an indication. If the location of hostile artillery in depth is a defense indication, collection agencies are not ordered "report whether or not hostile artillery is located in depth." Instead, they are ordered to "report locations of hostile artillery in your sector/zone." Determination of whether the indication has been substantiated is then based on the information collected. Orders and requests for information deal with a specific enemy activity, location, or characteristics, or a specific terrain feature or weather condition. These orders and requests are specific as to what information is desired and where it may be found. For example, the forward movement of hostile troops has been determined to be an indication of reinforcement. An analysis of the road nets, communications centers, and locations of enemy forces—integrated with a knowledge of the enemy's tactical doctrine—indicates what routes the enemy will most probably use and where the effort of available collection agencies should be concentrated. A proper order to collecting agencies is "report volume, type, time and direction of traffic on the following roads."

(2) Orders and requests based on indications of enemy vulnerabilities are formulated in the same manner. For example, a battalion-sized troop unit disposed within a given area may have been determined to be the minimum target suitable for nuclear attack. Collection agencies are not ordered to report locations of battalions vulnerable to nuclear attack; instead, they are ordered to report location, composition, disposition, size, shape, and nuclear defense measures of enemy troop units. The intelligence analyst considers re-

UNIT:
Period covered: From: _____ To: _____

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4) List all ovoiloble ogencies						(5)	(6)
Essentiol elements of informotion ond other required intelligence items	Indicotions (onolysis of items in column (1))	Bosis for specific orders or requests	List all available	agencies to be	used in the	collection of	required information		Ploce ond time ot which informotion is to be reported	Remorks
List the EEI onnounced for the operotion or period ond other required intelligence items, spoced sufficently to permit entry in column (2) of oll indicotions pertinent to eoch item.	List opposite eoch item in column (1) those indicotions thot best provide on onswer to the question osked or implied by eoch item.	List the specific informotion sought in connectian with each indicotion.	Ploce o cross (X) under eoch ogency thot hos or con get the informotion beoring on each indicotion. The ogency (or ogencies) finolly selected to obtoin the informotion is indicoted by circling (X) except for SOP items for ogencies under the control of the unit.						Ploce: Headquorters or stoff section to which informotion is to be reported if other thon the insuing heodquorters. Time moy be o specific time, periodicolly, or os the informotion is obtoined.	Notes for future octions ond to indicote progress of the collection effort.

NOTE: This plan is recommended for use ot division ond higher levels.

Figure 4–1. A collection plan.

ported information collectively to develop the target data.

(3) Orders and requests for specific information frequently deal with specific characteristics of the area of operations. For example, an intelligence requirement may ask, "What obstacles exist in our zone?" A map study reveals that streams cross the axis of advance. This is an indication that natural obstacles may exist. The extent to which a located stream is actually an obstacle becomes the subject for orders and requests for specific information. Accordingly, the order or request to a collection agency may state, "Report width, depth, velocity, and condition of banks and bottom of JOH River between WALIS and HERMANN."

(4) Collection agencies do not restrict their efforts to items specifically mentioned in orders and reports from higher headquarters. Pertinent information, even if not specifically requested, is reported. If there is doubt as to the pertinency of information, it should be reported.

(5) The wording of an order or request is not necessarily the same as that used in column 3 of the plan. Several entries may be combined into a single order or request because the same specific information may be sought in connection with several different indications. For example, indications of attack may include "location of artillery well forward;" indications of defense may include a requirement to determine the "location of artillery laterally and in depth." In both of these cases the specific information desired from collection agencies is location of artillery by type and caliber.

b. Dissemination of Orders and Requests. Orders and requests for specific information are normally transmitted either as fragmentary orders or by means of the intelligence annex of the operations order. Security must be provided in the transmission of orders and requests because enemy knowledge of our requirements would furnish him with a basis for countering our collection efforts.

(1) Fragmentary orders are used most frequently because information requirements continually change. Operations orders have a prescribed format; however, a fragmentary (operation) order has no prescribed format. Those elements found in a complete order are omitted when they have not changed, are not essential, or are unavailable or incomplete at the time of issue.

(2) Intelligence and intelligence instructions, to include orders and requests for the collection of information, are normally disseminated by means of the intelligence annex. This annex normally accompanies each complete operation order issued by division and higher commands. An example of an intelligence annex is shown in appendix N.

(a) Paragraph 3 of the intelligence annex, "Inteligence Acquisition Tasks," implements the collection plan. It contains a complete list of current orders and requests for information. Except for collection orders which are a part of the unit SOP, previously issued collection orders and requests not repeated in the intelligence annex are automatically canceled. When orders and requests are lengthy, they may be placed in an appendix to the intelligence annex.

(b) Paragraph 4 of the intelligence annex, "Measures for Handling Personnel, Documents, and Materiel," lists under a separate subparagraph the items which require action different from those prescribed in the unit SOP. In preparing paragraph 4, the intelligence officer consults supporting intelligence agencies, as appropriate.

4-7. Available Agencies

a. All available collection agencies usually are listed at the top of column 4. Military intelligence units should be listed specifically. Material furnished by these MI units would include intelligence interrogation, imagery interpretation, counterintelligence and order of battle information. All other units to include combat, combat support, and combat service support with an intelligence collection capability are also listed.

b. Opposite each basis for specific orders or requests, an X is entered in the column of each collection agency capable of furnishing the required information. The factors of suitability, multiplicity, and balance are applied, and circles are drawn around the X's of the agencies to be ordered or requested to furnish the information. An exception to this technique is the handling of SOP items for agencies under the control of the headquarters.

c. The intelligence officer specifically selects those agencies with which he has direct communication. When information is desired from an agency of a higher or lower headquarters, normally the headquarters itself should be listed.

4-8. Place and Time of Reporting Information

a. Information may be required by or at a specified time or times, at specified intervals, or upon

the occurrence of specific events. A one-time report, for example, on the condition of a river bottom, may be required by a specified time. Reports on certain enemy activities may be desired at specified times. Such reports may be required daily at the beginning of morning nautical twilight and at the end of evening nautical twilight. Reports of other enemy activities such as movement along particular roads may be required periodically, that is, "every four hours beginning at 0800." Reports of identification of new units, enemy aerial activity, artillery bombardment, nuclear activity, and similar items are usually required as obtained. Periodic negative reports pertaining to specified activities may also be required.

b. Entries in column 5 are determined in consultation with the G3/S3. Information which arrives too late is of no value. Information received too soon may be inaccurate by the time it is used.

c. When the collection agency requires time for preparation, allowance is made for the time needed by the collection agency to issue orders prepare personnel for the mission, execute the mission, and report the results.

4–9. Remarks

a. Miscellaneous notes on the progress of the collection effort and notes for future action are recorded in column 6, "Remarks." A code consisting of plus and minus signs, check marks, and crosses may be used for designating whether positive or negative reports were received, whether the information received was adequate, or whether the indication concerned has been substantiated.

b. Notes on future cancellation or implementation of orders and requests, modifications of EEI and other intelligence requirements upon the occurrence of specific events, or other actions to be taken as the collection effort progresses are also entered in column 6.

4–10. SOP Items

a. As the collection plan is a means of facilitating analysis of the EEI and other intelligence requirements and insuring that pertinent orders and requests have been issued, entries are also made concerning information items specified by unit SOP (FM 61–100 and FM 101–5). For example, the SOP ordinarily direct subordinate units to report newly obtained identifications immediately. Nevertheless, the collection plan is completed with respect to new unit identifications exactly as it would be if the SOP did not require such reporting. For such items, however, the X's under agencies to be used need not be circled and the abbreviation "SOP" may be entered in the "Remarks" column to indicate that an order is not necessary.

b. If the basis for specific orders or requests directs attention to a specific area, the item is treated as if it were not an SOP item even though it may be information of a type covered in the unit SOP. For example, the unit SOP may prescribe reporting the location of hostile minefields, demolitions, and other defensive works. However, a requirement for reporting the location of minefields in the vicinity of a specific area is not treated as an SOP item.

Section III. SUPERVISION OF THE COLLECTION EFFORT

4–11. General

Active supervision of the collection effort by the intelligence officer is necessary to insure the success of the collection effort. This is particularly true of the collection agencies organic to or attached to brigade and lower units. Supervision can be best achieved by personal staff visits—by the intelligence officer himself or by members of his staff. For example, an S2 may brief members of a patrol before departure and debrief them, as a group, upon their return.

4–12. Significance

Because his primary function is to keep the commander and others informed of the enemy situation and capabilities in the area of operations, the intelligence officer is faced with the problem of efficiently employing all available collection agencies to collect information. The commander requires on a continuing basis, reliable information on the disposition, strength, composition, and movement of hostile forces as well as information on the area of operations. All means are employed to gain information of the enemy forces in his sector/zone and in other areas which may affect the preparation of plans and the accomplishment of the mission. Failure to exploit properly each source of information may deny important infor-

mation of hostile dispositions, movements, and operations and prevent the exploitation of enemy peculiarities and weaknesses. Supervision of the collection effort must, therefore, be an integral part of the intelligence officer's responsibilities in the collection of information.

CHAPTER 5

PROCESSING OF INFORMATION (STANAG 2022; SEASTAG 2022)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

5–1. General

Processing is the phase in the intelligence cycle in which information becomes intelligence. Processing consists of three operations—

a. Recording. The reduction of information to writing or some other form of graphical representation and the arranging of this information into groups of related items.

b. Evaluation. The determination of the pertinence, reliability, and accuracy of the information.

c. Interpretation. The determination of the significance of the information in relationship to information and intelligence already known and the drawing of deductions as to the probable meaning of the evaluated information.

5–2. Processing Procedure

a. Information is processed as received without waiting to collect additional information. The intelligence derived from fragmentary information may be particularly essential for nuclear targets or fast moving stability operations. Normally there is a time lag between the buildup of a target and the time that the information becomes available; in fact, complete information on the target may not become available until after the target has begun to vanish. If time permits, a search is directed for additional information to complete, confirm, or refute the intelligence developed from fragmentary information.

b. The sequence in processing depends upon the nature and urgency of the information. Recording is usually the first step; however, on urgent items, recording may occur simultaneously with evaluation and interpretation. Information needed immediately by higher, lower, or adjacent units is disseminated before it is completely processed. Information not of immediate concern, but of possible future value, is normally completely processed before being disseminated.

c. Evaluation and interpretation may occur simultaneously followed by immediate dissemination. For example, information from a reliable source and believed to be true may state that the enemy is about to launch a major attack. In this case, recording is of secondary importance and the intelligence report that an attack is imminent is disseminated as soon after receipt as possible.

d. Reporting of information to higher echelons may occur concurrently with processing. For example, to decrease the production time of intelligence related to nuclear targets, a commander may order that all information concerning specified enemy units, areas, or activities be reported concurrently with processing at lower headquarters.

e. Figure 5–1 illustrates a sample flow of processing at a division, corps, or field army headquarters having a tactical operations center (TOC). The upper portion of the figure reflects processing which occurs when the message is first received at the TOC; the lower portion reflects the processing which takes place when the message is first received at the G2 section. The latter portion may also apply equally as well to processing at brigade level except that those references to the G2 and TOC are not appropriate at this leve.l

f. A sound collection program and proper utilization of the various collection agencies and sources of information will result in a heavy volume of information which flows into the respective intelligence staffs' processing element. Many of the intelligence requirements can only be met by reporting minute details on a great variety of subject areas. Each one of these details may appear unrelated to others and insignificant by itself. However, when painstakingly mapped and otherwise chronologically reported over long peri-



Figure 5–1. Flow of processing.

ods of time and analyzed in the light of other details reported, they may lead to definitive and predictable patterns of enemy activity. This technique is known as pattern analysis. In developing the intelligence picture, the intelligence officer must decide what data he wants to compile by subject category. The types of overlays and categories of subjects plotted thereon will, therefore, vary extensively according to the needs. The use of a graphic keying system and color schemes in conjunction with large scale maps will greatly facilitate data analysis.

5–3. Processing of Information at Corps and Field Army

As the scope of intelligence activities and the volume of information increase, a more elaborate and intricate system of processing is required.

a. Recording. Above division, the wealth of information requires thorough and painstaking recording to prevent loss of items.

b. Evaluation. Evaluation of information is more complex at higher echelons because of the amount and variety of information received. This is partly compensated for by the greater number of sources and agencies that permit more specific determination of the accuracy of a given item, the reliability of the source, and the reliability of the agency obtaining the item. Evaluation above division may also be aided by the use of specialists who become experts on a particular enemy unit, geographic location or source of information. This technique, although requiring considerable human resource allocation, can be highly productive.

(1) *Pertinence.* The pertinence of information is more than just a matter of determining who needs it and when. There must be a sifting of the valuable information from that of little importance or relevance.

(2) *Reliability.* Determination of the reliability of the source and agency may be relatively easy because of the more frequent exploitation of a given source or use of a particular agency. Over a period much data accumulates on the accuracy and reliability of sources and on the ability, training, and experience of the collecting agency.

(3) *Accuracy.* The accuracy of information may be readily determined because of the comparative wealth of corroborating evidence. Frequently, however, a lower headquarters may use the same information to produce intelligence that agrees with the intelligence separately produced by a higher headquarters. These headquarters, therefore, must be careful not to become unduly reliant on intelligence produced by its subordinate units. Each echelon must have some independent capability for producing intelligence. Each intelligence officer must exercise independent, critical evaluation to detect enemy deception efforts to present false information through our intelligence system.

c. Interpretation. Interpretation of information at higher headquarters is a progressively more complex task. The same abundance of information and intelligence that makes determination of the significance of an item relatively more simple makes the task of selecting the appropriate information and intelligence for comparison more difficult. Moreover, the higher the headquarters, the less comparative significance an individual item has; and the linking of the item with those which in the aggregate have a major significance is more difficult. When there are large volumes of both new information and accumulated information and intelligence, efficient interpretation depends on systematic recording and precise analysis.

(1) The evaluated information and previously produced intelligence used in determining the significance of new information are carefully recorded so that items required for reference are available to the intelligence officer when he interprets a new item of information.

(2) Analysis of each new item of information is made to relate it to information already available. Every component part is judged in relation to known facts; and the significance of the parts, as well as the whole, is determined. Once this has been accomplished, the effect of the information on the current intelligence picture is established. Information has then been converted into intelligence.

d. Advent of Automatic Data Processing System (ADPS). With the advent and application of an intelligence data processing system in the field army, it is envisioned that the present-day problems of recording, storing, sorting, transmitting, retrieving, and displaying intelligence data will be somewhat alleviated. Intelligence data would be stored electronically and recalled and displayed either in graphic or hard-copy form. Access to data within the system may be provided through the use of area communications, with storage of data at one or more central points, perhaps including division level. Developments in the ADPS area would therefore reduce the large amount of time spent by intelligence personnel in procedural actions and allow additional time for analysis of intelligence trends and studies.

Section II. RECORDING

5-4. General

a. Recording makes subsequent interpretation easier and more accurate and facilitates preparation of intelligence reports by conveniently drawing together all available information on a specific subject. The recording means used must be adequate to handle the volume of information and intelligence received and to serve the needs of those who must have access to it. Means and techniques of recording must permit timely dissemination of information and intelligence.

b. At headquarters above division, recording is of increased importance and complexity. Maximum use should be made of mechanical equipment and, when available, automatic data processing (ADP) systems.

c. Common aids currently used in recording are the —

(1) Journal.
(2) Situation map.
(3) Intelligence workbook.
(4) Intelligence files.
(5) Coordinates register.

5-5. Journal

a. The journal is a permanent chronological record of reports and messages that have been received and transmitted, of important events that have occurred, and of actions taken in response, covering a stated period, usually 24 hours. Figure 5-2 is an example of a page from an intelligence journal, illustrating the types of entries normally made. The operations branch of the G2 section normally maintains the section journal. The journal is of great significance at division level and below.

b. The commander of a brigade may prescribe the maintenance of one journal for the unit or require the maintenance of separate journals by each staff section.

c. Journal entries should reflect—

(1) An accurate and concise statement of the message, report, or event.

(2) A notation as to the sender or individual making the report, to include unit duty position or section, such as S3 1/60 Inf.

(3) The time of receipt or dispatch and method of transmission.

(4) Action actually taken (not intended) as a result, to include dissemination given to reports or information received and other internal G2 recording (workbook, situation map).

5-6. Situation Map

a. The situation map is a temporary graphic display of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy. Information of friendly forces on this map is usually limited to boundaries; locations of command posts of higher, lower, and adjacent units; reconnaissance units; and the forward edge of the battle area. Separate overlays are often used to display separate categories of information. A typical overlay shows fortifications; another shows potential nuclear and chemical targets; and still another presents details of order of battle. The latest time at which the activity was observed or the disposition confirmed should be indicated when plotting enemy activities and dispositions. The intelligence officer keeps the situation map or overlay as simple as possible. He uses authorized conventional signs, military symbols, and abbreviations. (See FMs 21-30 and 21-31 for authorized military and map symbols.)

b. Other information and intelligence aspects of the situation may be recorded on situation maps. Chemical officers at respective headquarters, for example, record reported nuclear bursts and chemical and biological data on situation maps; and engineer officers similarly record mine and obstacle data.

c. Permanent recordings of the information on a situation map is achieved by overlay tracing or periodically photographing the map. Periodic overlays made from the G2/S2 situation map will provide quick reference to past enemy activity in a given area, can record locations of "hard targets" such as bunkers, trenches, or antiaircraft emplacements, and can assist the G2/S2 in determining patterns of enemy movement and intentions.

d. Maintenance of the situation map at brigade and battalion levels is usually a joint S2/S3 action while at higher levels a separate situation map is maintained by each section. The friendly situation is basically the responsibility of the S3 while the enemy situation is basically the responsibility of the S2. During operations, personnel from either section may plot friendly or enemy entries on the situation map and perform other processing functions.

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG
For use of this form, see AR 220-15; the proponent agency is Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.

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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: G2, 20th Inf Division
LOCATION: BURGEN (LA 567 275) GERMANY
PERIOD COVERED: FROM HOUR 0001 DATE 07 Dec 70 — TO HOUR 2400 DATE 07 Dec 70

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INITIALS
1			Journal opened 0001		RBW
2	0030		1st BDE: 2/20 Inf at 0005 during night recon		
			patrol vic LA 888 912 discovered en supply		
			dump. Search continues	M, WB, G3, F, C	RBW
3		0055	ALL UNITS: Aug alt chal/passw. Prim comp'd		
			at 070045	S.F.C.	RBW
4	0200		1st BDE: Follow-up msg to J-2: Search results		
			12xAT mines, 30,000 rds NATO 7.62 ammo,		
			6 rls barbed wire. Equip dest'd inplace	M, WB, G3, F, C	RBW
5			G2 & OB OFF departed HQ for Corps Brief.		
			at 0630. ETR approx 0930	DO	RBW
6		0700	DIST A: Wx forecast for 24 hrs: Prec: None;		
			Ceiling: Unl; Wind: S&SW at 6 KTS; Temp:		
			62-85; Humidity: 15%	F	RBW
7			Div HQ red'd en arty fire at 0900. Fires		
			lifted 0910. HQ rec'd approx 30 rds, unk		
			cal. Damage unk at present.	T, F, WB, M, C	RBW
81			Journal closed 2400		GD
			SUMMARY		
			There was no en contact during period,		
			but Div HQ rec'd 32 rds 8in arty fires		
			with no major damage. One en ammo dump dest'd		

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY: ROLAND B. WYNOT, MAJ, MI
SIGNATURE: Roland B Wynot

DA FORM 1 NOV 62 1594 PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. * U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1962 O—664194

Figure 5-2. Sample intelligence journal.

e. The situation map provides a basis for comparion of the enemy situation against the friendly situation. From the intelligence officer's standpoint, pertinent information of the enemy is recorded graphically on the situation map for reference and study. Whenever possible, both the situation map and the S2 workbook will be maintained. However, in a fast moving situation when the volume of messages is such that both cannot be maintained effectively, priority should be given to keeping the situation map current. The information posted varies with the size of the friendly unit. The smaller the unit, the more detailed is the information recorded. Division situation maps, for example, how the location of enemy units down to battalions (two echelons down); however, some smaller elements, particularly fire delivery means are shown. The following types of entries pertaining to the enemy should be posted on the situation map:

(1) Unit identification.

(2) Unit dispositions.

(3) Boundaries.

(4) Location of weapons, to include —

(*a*) Automatic weapons positions.

(*b*) Supporting mortars.

(*c*) Antitank gun positions.

(*d*) Artillery positions.

(*e*) Armored vehicles.

(*f*) Antiaircraft automatic weapons positions.

(*g*) Air defense artillery positions.

(5) Minefields.

(6) Roadblocks.

(7) Entrenchments.

(8) Other obstacles or defensive installations.

(9) Logistics and command facilities.

(10) Activities.

(11) Terrain data.

(12) Aircraft or helicopter staging areas.

(13) CBR contaminated areas.

(14) Enemy radars and other ground surveillance devices.

(15) Major roads or trails for movement of personnel, weapons and equipment.

f. The purpose of the intelligence situation map is to contribute to sound tactical decisions. The primary intelligence uses of the situation map are —

(1) To display the enemy disposition and situation.

(2) To provide a basis for comparison in order to determine the significance of newly received data pertaining to the enemy forces.

(3) To provide a background and basis for briefings and other required intelligence reports.

(4) To provide the basis for overlays which graphically portray the enemy situation.

(5) To assist in the determination of patterns of movement of guerrilla or insurgent forces.

(6) To focus attention on possible intelligence gaps which require redirection of the collection effort. For example, the need to locate and identify enemy units reported for the first time.

g. The secondary intelligence uses of the situation map are to post—directly on it or in its margins—the following information:

(1) Computations of enemy personnel and weapons strengths.

(2) Organization charts of specified enemy units.

(3) Summarizations of weather and terrain data.

(4) A listing of priority intelligence requirements.

(5) Notations pertaining to current patrol plans.

(6) Closing time computations.

(7) A listing of friendly attachments.

(8) A listing of unlocated enemy units believed to be in the area of operations.

h. The intelligence officer may consider the use of the following means of maintaining the situation map:

(1) Rather than attempting to plot all entries on a map by means of conventional or improvised military symbols, a number or letter may be plotted in the area where the activity was observed. A corresponding letter or number can then be entered into a space alongside the map and a notation entered as to the activity observed. The number or letter used may also be easily cross-indexed to the journal or message file, for a complete report. Use of the situation map in analytic applications and as a briefing aid is limited and caution should be exercised in these applications.

(2) A variation of the above would be to draw a line from the descriptive passage or statement to the exact location on the map where the activity was observed.

(3) Care must be taken to prevent overcrowding of the map. One method of doing this is

to group entries by categories on a series of acetate overlays.

(4) An enlarged sketch map can also be prepared to cover overcrowded areas. This will allow the posting of additional details.

(5) When separate maps are used by staff elements in a headquarters, care should be taken to insure that acetate overlays are readily interchangeable between maps within that headquarters. This precaution will permit easy comparison of the current enemy situation from the G2/S2's map with the disposition of friendly forces on the G3/S3's map, and easy comparison of enemy obstacles, barriers, and minefields with planned routes of march for friendly operations, etc.

5–7. The Intelligence Workbook

a. The intelligence workbook is a systematic arrangement by subject heading which aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. It is not a permanent record and it is not distributed to an outside agency. The workbook is kept current and obsolete entries are deleted. Specialized workbooks are usually maintained by each branch of the intelligence section at field army and higher headquarters.

b. There is no prescribed form for the workbook. At division and lower headquarters index tabs are labeled to assist in the preparation of paragraphs of the intelligence summary (INTSUM). At corps and higher levels, index tabs are utilized to assist in the preparation of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 5–3 shows a type workbook generally used at corps and higher levels. A type workbook for stability operations is contained in appendix O.

c. Information from incoming messages and reports is entered in the workbook under appropriate headings. For example, information on a newly identified infantry unit would be recorded under item 3A, "new units," as well as item 2A "Infantry." A message that furnishes information on different subjects results in several entries, none of which usually quotes the entire message. For example, a message containing information on the locations of a reserve armor unit and an artillery unit results in extracts under item 2A "Armor" and under "Artillery." Each entry in the workbook based on an incoming message includes a reference to the journal serial number of that message. For example: "J2, 091200 April, from 20th Engr Cbt Bn: Bridge at LINDEN (91246) destroyed by bombing. Estimated out of action for 30 hours." "J2" refers to the journal serial number, and the date-time group entered refers to the time of occurrence of the event. When appropriate, the intelligence officer should make written comments on his evaluation and the possible significance of the information following the appropriate entry.

5–8. Intelligence Files

Files are necessary to permit ready access to all available information. The files most commonly maintained are the —

a. Journal File. The journal file contains a record copy of each message or document noted in the journal. It supports the journal and is also a permanent and official record.

b. Information or Reference File. All information of possible future value is cross-indexed in this file. Much information is collected which has no immediate interest but which may be of future value. Because of the large volume of information filed at field army and higher headquarters, devices such as punch cards and electronic sorting machines are used where possible.

c. Order of Battle Files. These files are discussed in detail in chapter 7.

5–9. Coordinates Register

The coordinates register is a recording device primarily designed to provide the brigade and lower echelon intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the extensive intelligence files and workbooks maintained at higher echelons. Intelligence data should be organized by some means into related groupings or into systematized forms, in order that interpretation of them can be accomplished readily and without time loss. The coordinates register affords such a means; and it can also be compact enough to facilitate carrying the document on the person with the advantage of ready access.

a. Form of Coordinates Register.

(1) The register most commonly consists of a looseleaf notebook. Each page of the notebook pertains to a single grid square on the operational map, covering the geographical area of operations or area of interest. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly area, and areas of concern on both flanks.

(2) The pages of the coordinates register are of two types. One type of page is designed for



NOTES: 1. NUMBERS ON TABS REFER TO PARAGRAPHS IN PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT.
2. THE CLASSIFICATION IS STAMPED AT THE TOP AND BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE.

Figure 5–3. Type intelligence workbook.

GRID SQUARE 2815

ITEM	TIME	COORD	STATEMENT	NOTES
1.	092235	28381539	MG Fired on Recon Ptl from A Co	Have next Ptl check this area
2.	092318	?	Veh noise - Tk? - Heard direct N. of A Co OP #2 28321507	Ask Air OP to look
3.	100600		Special OB report on Wpns & Fortifications	Div OB wants more info on wpns strength
		28021523 to 28141527	Trenches & Bunkers	
		28141527 to 28221529	Wire	
		28611545 to 28781551	Platoon on line - has 2 MG's	Same MG as Yesterday? Check this!
		28811551 to 29001599	Extensive trenches and firing Psns	
4.	102335	28391530 to 28691541	B Co Ptl Rpts wire and AP Mines	New since 081800
5.	110600	28431588	Res Unit (Co?) in Gen'l Area	(From Div PIR)
6.	110630	28381557	Med Tank spotted by L Plane	How many more???
7.	111320	28731584 and 28151564	Active mortars	
8.	120010	28611564	Flash from small Cal. Arty not over 75	At? AA? Gun? RR or Bazooka ? Ask higher H Q

Figure 5-4. First type of page for the coordinates register.



Figure 5–5. Second type of page for the coordinates register.

written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and similar items. These entries are preceded by a date-time group and map coordinates. The S2 may, if desired, add his personal comments or notations to any entry. Figure 5–4 illustrates the composition of this type of page for the coordinates register.

(3) The second type of page is designed to represent a single grid square schematically. Entries are plotted on the square in a manner comparable to that used in plotting the enemy situation map. This page of the register shows graphically any data applicable to a single grid square. An enlarged grid square is drawn on the page and entries are made as shown in figure 5–5.

b. Uses of Coordinates Register. Some of the most important uses of the coordinates register are as follows:

(1) *Interpretation.* To develop patterns of enemy activity and to follow the progress of construction, laying of minefields, and other activities.

(2) *Planning.*

(*a*) To determine routes of movement, areas of main and secondary attacks.

(*b*) To provide guidance in selecting mis-

sions which should be assigned to patrols and to brief patrol personnel.

(*c*) To assist in formulating the friendly fire plan in either defensive or offensive situations.

(*d*) Data from the coordinates register can be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph that has been annotated with grid lines. A scale of 1:25,000 or larger is desirable. By plotting selected order of battle information on the photo, an analysis of the terrain can be conducted simultaneously with a correlation of information on the enemy. The photo provides an excellent means of briefing commanders down to platoon level on the area of operation and the enemy situation. Targeting can be done in a more precise manner by using a photo instead of the traditional 1:50,000 map.

(3) *Reference.* Answers the questions of the S2 and his immediate commander and the questions of higher headquarters.

c. Maintenance of Coordinates Register.

(1) The coordinates register should be reviewed periodically when unit movement to a new area necessitates addition of new data and deletion of obsolete data. Timely maintenance of the coordinates register might not be practical in fast-moving situations such as pursuit, delay, and exploitation.

(2) The register should be maintained, whenever possible, on strong semi-transparent paper such as bond paper. The transparency of bond paper is sufficient to allow the use of a grid scale underneath the schematic page, thereby allowing a more accurate and rapid plotting of or reference to the entries.

(3) The scale of the schematic page normally may be made a matter of SOP. Such standardization assists in dissemination of intelligence data from higher to lower echelons.

(4) For security reasons the friendly situation normally will not be plotted in the coordinates register.

Section III. EVALUATION

5–10. General

Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of the information, the reliability of the source and agency through which the information was derived, and its accuracy. Evaluation of information at the lower echelon is a simple step compared to the procedures employed at higher echelons. From the viewpoint of the brigade or battalion S2, information which relates to the unit's area of interest is pertinent; information relating to areas outside the area of interest may or may not be pertinent. The brigade or battalion S2 may not be able to judge the reliability of a source because he may not have repetitive contact with a given source. This difference between higher and lower echelons is largely due to the fact that information received from higher headquarters normally has been processed, evaluated and interpreted, and the information collected by organic agencies at lower echelons is generally acquired by direct observation or actual contact with the enemy.

5–11. Pertinence

The examination of information for pertinence specifically determines whether or not the information is—

a. Pertinent with regard to the enemy or to the characteristics of the area of operations.

b. Needed immediately, and if so, by whom.

c. Of possible present or future value, and if so, to whom.

5–12. Reliability

a. The source of information and the agency by which it was collected are both evaluated for reliability. The principal basis for judging the reliability of a source or an agency is previous experience. Other criteria include a knowledge of the training, experience, and past performance of troop units.

b. The headquarters closest to the source or agency is ordinarily the best judge of the reliability of the source or agency. Consequently, a higher headquarters normally accepts the reliability evaluation of the lower headquarters and will consider only the reliability of the reporting headquarters.

5–13. Accuracy

a. Accuracy means the probable truth of the information. Judgment of accuracy is based on the answers to the following questions:

(1) Is it possible for the reported fact or event to have taken place?

(2) Is the report consistent within itself?

(3) Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or agencies?

(4) Does the report agree or disagree in any way with other available information?

(5) If the report does not agree with information from other sources or agencies, which one is more likely to be true?

b. The most reliable method of judging the accuracy of a report is by comparing it with similar information which may already be available under the proper category in an intelligence file or workbook. When possible, the intelligence officer obtains confirming or refuting information through different agencies and from many sources.

c. Marked differences in the evaluation of the accuracy of information may occur between higher and lower echelons. The reason for this difference is the fact that higher echelons, which have more sources of information and intelligence than lower echelons, have a correspondingly greater opportunity to confirm, corroborate, or refute the accuracy of reported data. Regardless of the source, the accuracy of incoming information and intelligence is reevaluated at each echelon.

5–14. Evaluation Rating

a. The evaluation of each item of information is indicated by a standard system. The evaluation of reliability is shown by a letter and the evaluation of accuracy by a numeral as depicted in the paragraphs to follow. Evaluation ratings are made at the lowest headquarters possible.

b. Evaluations of the reliability of source and agency are as follows:

A—Completely reliable.
B—Usually reliable.
C—Fairly reliable.
D—Not usually reliable.
E—Unreliable.
F—Reliability cannot be judged.

(1) An "A" evaluation of a source is assigned under only the most unusual circumstances. For example, this evaluation may be given when it is known that the source has long experience and extensive background with the type of information reported. A rating of "B" indicates a source of known integrity. An "F" rating is assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the source.

(2) Agencies are ordinarily rated A, B, or C. However, when the source of an item and the collecting-reporting agency are evaluated differently, only the lower degree of reliability is indicated.

c. Evaluation of the accuracy of an item of information is indicated as follows:

1—Confirmed by other sources.
2—Probably true.
3—Possibly true.
4—Doubtfully true.
5—Improbable.
6—Truth cannot be judged.

(1) If it can be stated with certainty that the reported information originates from a source other than that for already existing information on the same subject, it will be classified as "confirmed by other sources" and will be rated "1."

(2) If no proof in the above sense can be established, and if no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source as the information already available on this subject, it will be classified as "probably true" and will be rated "2."

(3) If the contents of the report are confirmed in essential parts by information already available, the above procedure, (2), will also apply to unconfirmed information contained in the report.

(4) If the investigation reveals that the reported facts—on which no further information is yet available—are compatible with the previously observed behavior of the target, or if the known background of a person leads to the deduction that he might have acted as reported, the information received will be classified as ('possibly true" and will be rated "3."

(5) Reported but unconfirmed information, the contents of which contradict the estimate of the development or the hitherto known behavior of the target, will be classified as "doubtful" and will be rated "4" as long as this information cannot be disproved by available facts.

(6) Reported information which is not confirmed by available data and which contradicts the experience hitherto assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a target or issue is classified as "improbable" and will be rated in category "5." The same classification is given to reported information that contradicts existing data on a subject originally rated "1" or "2."

(7) If the investigation of a report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings "1" to "5" is

not given, the reported information will be classified as "Truth cannot be judged" and will be rated "6."

(8) The statement that a report cannot be judged as to accuracy must always be preferred to an inaccurate use of the ratings "1" to "5." If there is no sound basis for a rating of "1" to "5," because of the complete absence of other information on the same target, the rating "6" has to be given.

(9) It must be recognized that the scale "1" to "6" does not represent progressive degrees of accuracy. The stress must be given to the literal rating represented by the numeric symbol.

d. Although both letters and numerals are used to indicate the evaluation of an item of information, they are independent of each other. A completely reliable agency may report information obtained from a completely reliable source which, on the basis of other information, is judged to be improbable. In such a case, the evaluation of the information is A–5. A source known to be unreliable may provide raw information that when confirmed by reliable sources is accepted as accurate information. In such a case, a report is evaluated E–1. A report evaluated F–6 may be accurate and should not be arbitrarily discarded.

e. A report disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units contains the evaluation for each item of information. For example, "The division artillery of the Aggressor 46th Tk Div can fire nuclear rounds of 0.5 KT yield (C–3)."

f. The evaluation and interpretation of information at the brigade and battalion is a simplified mental process; thus, the standard evaluation rating has more limited application. This system assists the S2 in processing information received from other headquarters and, when appropriate, to evaluate information he disseminates to other headquarters.

Section IV. INTERPRETATION

5–15. General

The processing of information continues with interpretation, which consists of three steps—analysis, integration, and deduction. It is during this phase of the intelligence cycle that information becomes intelligence.

5–16. Analysis

a. Analysis is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to isolate significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the command. Analysis requires judgment and a thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations, the characteristics of the area of operations, and the enemy situation. to include enemy doctrine and past practices.

b. Analysis at headquarters above division level often involves detailed research with greater difficulty caused by the increased volume of information. The many individuals who will be involved in performing analysis must relate their efforts to the mission of the command in order to avoid the needless expenditure of time and effort.

5–17. Integration

a. Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in analysis with other known information to form a logical picture or hypothesis of enemy activities or the influence of operational area characteristics on the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated based upon existing intelligence.

b. Integration, particularly the development of hypotheses, requires the same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential to making a good analysis. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer must avoid preconceived opinions and hypotheses based solely on personal experience or preference. He must attempt to place himself in the role of the enemy commander in the development of these hypotheses.

c. After they are formulated, all hypotheses are analyzed and tested. Analysis of an hypothesis includes determining the indications that should exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the existence or non-existence of these indications within the limitations of available time and means.

d. Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments or it may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of additional information.

5–18. Deduction

The last step in the interpretation of information

is deduction. Here meaning is deduced from the hypothesis developed; it is then tested and considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction is designed to answer the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the area of operations and the enemy situation?" The resulting answer provides a useful conclusion which can serve as a basis for determining future enemy courses of action and for keeping the intelligence estimate current. Deduction should also answer the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the enemy's use of TC&D or counterdeception?" The resulting answer will reduce friendly vulnerability to being deceived or from the false belief that friendly TC&D operations are being believed by the enemy.

CHAPTER 6

DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION (STANAG 2008, 2014, 2020, 2022, 2097, 2103, 2118, 2134, 3377; SEASTAG 2008, 2020, 2022, 2118; SOLOG 123)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

6–1. General

Dissemination is defined as the timely conveyance of information and/or intelligence in an appropriate form and by any suitable means to those who need it. The primary purpose of timely dissemination of intelligence is to enable the commander to make decisions with confidence; a secondary purpose is to provide knowledge, in the light of which new information may be processed. Intelligence is used in much the same manner at all echelons. The means of dissemination are likewise similar at all levels, with variations occurring in the volume, coverage, and frequency.

6–2. Dissemination Criteria

a. One objective in disseminating intelligence is to insure that the intelligence staffs at various echelons of command have the same general picture and use the same frame of reference in planning their operations. Coordination and cooperation among units is essential.

b. Intelligence is disseminated within the producing headquarters, to next higher, next lower, and adjacent units. Dissemination to lower and adjacent units is more difficult and yet important because—

(1) The intelligence picture at lower echelons changes more rapidly.

(2) The requirement for a greater amount of detail may result in delay.

(3) The intelligence produced at levels above division by specialized means must also be disseminated to lower echelons.

c. Dissemination of intelligence is judged in order of priority by the following criteria:

(1) Information and intelligence are placed in the hands of the ultimate user in time to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation before the intelligence picture changes. If the information is of such value that time does not permit complete processing before the information is disseminated, the recipient is made aware of this fact. The source of the information being sent is given if security permits.

(2) Only intelligence which can be used by the unit concerned is disseminated; however, if there is any doubt as to the usefulness of the intelligence, it will be disseminated.

(3) Dissemination means selected are those that, based on priority, interfere least with operational messages.

(4) The information being disseminated is in such form that the recipients may readily identify items of interest.

d. During stability operations, it is imperative that dissemination of appropriate information and intelligence be made to both host country and allied forces operating in the area of operations consistent with security requirements.

Section II. DISSEMINATION MEANS

6–3. General

a. Dissemination within a headquarters is usually made by personal contacts, oral reports, briefings, and by distribution of intelligence estimates, analyses of the area of operations, and written reports.

b. Dissemination to higher, lower, and adjacent units is by means of reports, summaries and stud-

ies, intelligence estimates and analyses of the area of operations, operational plans and orders, overlays and maps. Command SOP will dictate how intelligence reports will be disseminated between US/allied and host country units.

6-4. Spot Reports

Spot reports are one-time reports used by all echelons to transmit intelligence or information of immediate value. Since the information or intelligence may have an immediate and significant impact on current planning and operations, speed of transmission of the spot report is essential. The spot report is afforded the most expeditious means of transmission consistent with requisite security. No format is prescribed for the spot report; however, the spot report should as far as practicable, answer the questions who?, what?, where?, when?, and how?

6-5. Intelligence Reports (INTREP)

a. The INTREP is a standardized intelligence report which, based upon its importance, is disseminated without regard to a specific schedule. Consideration will be given to dispatch of an INTREP when facts influencing the enemy capabilities have been observed, or when a change in enemy capabilities has taken place.

b. The INTREP is passed to higher, lower, and adjacent units at the discretion of the commander producing the report.

c. The INTREP will be dispatched as quickly as possible following receipt of the information and will be sent by the most expeditious means available.

d. There is no prescribed format for the INTREP except that the word "INTREP" will be the first item to appear in the report. However, when involved in joint service operations, originators of INTREPs will use the prescribed format as contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12.

e. Whenever time permits the INTREP should include the originating office's interpretation of the information or intelligence being reported.

6-6. Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP)

a. The SUPINTREP is a NATO standardized report form used for more comprehensive reviews concerning information on one or several specific intelligence targets. In addition, the SUPINTREP may also contain selected intelligence data collected over an extended period of time, and may include items contained in INTREP (para 6-5) or INTSUM (para 6-7).

b. The nature and content of data contained in the SUPINTREP dictate the specific dissemination. At the commander's discretion, the SUPINTREP is passed to higher, lower, or adjacent units.

c. The SUPINTREP normally is produced on special request or in support of a particular operation, and is dispatched by the most suitable means available.

d. There is no prescribed format for the SUPINTREP except that the term "SUPINTREP" will appear at the beginning of the report.

6-7. Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

a. The INSTUM contains a brief summary of information of intelligence interest covering a period of time designated by the commander. Although the length of the period will vary with the desires of the commander, the INTSUM is normally prepared as often as required by the commander. The INTSUM provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear areas, enemy operations and capabilities, and weather and terrain characteristics. The INTSUM is in fact an aid in assessing the current situation and updates other intelligence reports. Negative information will be included in the INTSUM but non-operational information will be excluded. The INTSUM reflects the intelligence staff officer's interpretation and conclusions as to enemy capabilities and probable courses of action.

b. The INTSUM normally is prepared at brigade and higher echelons and is disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units.

c. An INTSUM has no prescribed format except that the word "INTSUM" will be the first item of the report. However, when involved in joint service operations, originators of INTSUMs will use the prescribed format as contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12. Non-essential detail should be excluded from the INTSUM, but, as indicated by the example format, information concerning the issuing unit, date-time-group (DTG) of issue, brief discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities, and conclusions should always be included. A type format and an example of an INTSUM are provided in appendix F

6-8. Periodic Intelligence Report

a. The periodic intelligence report (PERIN-

TREP) is a summary of the intelligence situation for a specified period, normally 24 hours in a tactical situation. The PERINTREP is a means of disseminating detailed information and intelligence. It covers the enemy situation, operations, capabilities and vulnerabilities; characteristics of the area of operations; and counterintelligence. No details of friendly forces which may be of value to the enemy are included. Other intelligence documents such as technical intelligence summaries, intelligence interrogation reports, translations of captured documents, and weather and climate summaries may be disseminated as annexes to the PERINTREP. The PERINTREP is concise, but complete, and makes maximum use of sketches, overlays, and annotated maps. The use of abbreviations and unnecessary references to map coordinates are avoided. The correct format for the PERINTREP is shown in appendix D.

b. The PERINTREP normally is prepared at corps and higher echelons. Corps may dispense with the PERINTREP if the situation does not permit timely dissemination. At field army, a PERINTREP is always issued. Dissemination is made by the most suitable means—usually by liaison officers or messengers—to the staff, adjacent units, and to the subordinate and higher headquarters at the next two higher and lower echelons. The period covered by the document varies with the tempo of intelligence activities. Normally, a 24-hour period is covered during combat. The PERINTREP should be disseminated in time for use in daily planning.

c. In joint service operations, the PERINTREP is replaceed by the periodic intelligence summary, PERINTSUM. The correct format for the PERINTSUM is contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12.

6–9. Weekly Intelligence Summary

The weekly intelligence summary generally follows the format of a PERINTREP (or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations). It serves to highlight trends that are useful in planning future operations and in processing current information. This report normally is prepared at field army and higher headquarters.

6–10. Imagery Interpretation Reports

Information or intelligence obtained by imagery interpretation is disseminated through the use of imagery interpretation reports. The basic types of imagery interpretation reports are the mission report, hot report, initial imagery interpretation report, supplemental imagery interpretation report and the general imagery interpretation report. A detailed discussion and examples of these reports are contained in FM 30–20. In addition, during joint service operations the applicable portion of JCS Publication 12 will used.

6–11. Intelligence Interrogation and Translation Reports

Intelligence interrogation and translation reports summarize the results of interrogations of prisoners of war, civilian detainees, or refugees and translations or summaries of enemy documents. Information of immediate value is disseminated in spot reports. Other information is disseminated in the most convenient form considering the needs of the users. At corps and higher echelons, detailed interrogation and translation reports usually are distributed as annexes to the PERINTREP (or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations). For a detailed discussion of specific intelligence interrogation reports, see FM 30–15.

6–12. Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring (BOMREP, SHELREP, MORTREP) and Aircraft Hostile Fire Reports

a. Information on enemy bombing, shelling, or mortaring activity is initially disseminated by means of a BOMREP, SHELREP, or MORTREP, as appropriate. Submission is a responsibility of the affected unit. Reports are rendered as normal messages and are transmitted by the fastest means available (app G). Each transmission is preceded by the code word "SHELREP" in the case of enemy artillery, by the code word "MORTREP" in the case of an enemy mortar or rocket fire, and by the code word "BOMREP" in the case of an enemy air attack. The text of the message is transmitted in the clear except that the current call sign of the unit or origin will be used rather than referral to unit identification. Also the position of the observer will be encoded if it discloses the location of a headquarters or an important observer post (app G).

b. The Aircraft Hostile Fire Report should be completed by the air mission commander at the end of each day's activities or after each mission completion. Intelligence officers at each level of command should require the submission of a report in each instance where an aircraft was en-

gaged by fire. Information contained in the report will be incorporated into the intelligence situation. The information contained in the report should be substantially as indicated in appendix R.

6–13. Nuclear Burst and Biological or Chemical Attack Reports

a. General. Initial reports and data of enemy or unidentified nuclear detonations and reports of enemy or unidentified biological or chemical attacks are disseminated from the source level through designated headquarters to the highest headquarters in the area of interest. Reporting will be by flash precedence. Type formats used when reporting NBC attacks are shown in FM 21–40 and appendix H. Initial and followup reports are evaluated at each headquarters and the results are appropriately disseminated.

b. Warning of expected contamination from a nuclear burst or biological or chemical attack is disseminated by the first headquarters capable of determining such information.

c. Information pertaining to the submission and transmittal of NBC reports is contained in FM 21–40 and FM 3–12.

6–14. Radiological Contamination Estimates and Reports

a. Radiological contamination information is disseminated by means of an NBC–5 (nuclear) report (app H) and by means of current or future radiological contamination overlays. The current radiological contamination overlay is a plot of dose rate contours of operational interest extracted from the radiation situation map maintained by the Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Element (CBRE) within the appropriate TOC. In future radiological contamination reports, decay factors are applied to estimate the radiation situation at future times. Current and future contamination reports and overlays are disseminated to interested headquarters, staff sections, and agencies. Contamination overlays or reports are prepared and disseminated by the CBRE of the command as directed by the G2 (see FM 3–12 for details). If there is no CBRE within the TOC, the G2 assumes these responsibilities. The G3 exercises staff responsibility over the employment of friendly nuclear weapons and fallout predictions for friendly employed weapons.

b. Fallout predictions from enemy or friendly use of nuclear weapons are prepared in the CBRE of the TOC or similar agency, before and after the burst and provide information which is used as a basis for planning and estimating. Fallout predictions are reports which indicate the probable areas of contamination resulting from a nuclear burst; dose rates are not predicted. The reports contain information for estimating the time of arrival in a certain area. Fallout predictions are based on current or forecast meteorological data and actual or assumed ground zero, yield, height of burst, and cloud data. Fallout predictions are distributed to interested staff sections; agencies; and higher, adjacent, and subordinate units. For details concerning radiological survey data and sign-posting of radiologically contaminated areas, see FM 3–12; for information on friendly nuclear strike warning, see FM 5–26 and FM 101–31–1. Detailed procedures for predicting fallout are contained in TM 3–210.

6–15. Weather Forecasts

a. A weather forecast is a prediction of the weather conditions at a point, along a route, or within an area for a specified period of time. The accuracy and reliability of weather forecasts depend upon such factors as characteristics of the area, available weather data, reliability of weather communications facilities, length of forecast period, and the experience of the forecaster. Reliability of forecasts generally decreases as the forecast period increases. Weather forecasts are in coded (numerical), graphical (pictorial), or written (plain language) format. Weather forecasts for use by troop units are usually in plain language form. The contents of weather forecasts are as shown in figure 6–1.

b. There are three types of weather forecasts: a short period forecast which is any forecast covering up to a 48-hour period; an extended period forecast which covers a period of between 3 and 5 days; and a long period forecast which covers a period of 5 days or longer. In addition to the forecasts mentioned, an outlook may also be given as an extension to the basic weather forecast; e.g., a 48-hour outlook beyond a 24-hour weather forecast. (For details, see USAF Air Weather Service Reg 55–1.)

c. Because of the changing nature of weather forecasts, especially short period forecasts, timeliness is a critical factor in their dissemination. Weather forecasts normally are transmitted by electrical means.

ELEMENT	DESCRIPTION	WEATHER FORECASTS: GENERAL: 12 Hour	24 Hour 1	48 Hour1	72 Hour	3.5 Day Extended Period	SPECIAL: Aviation: Route	12 Hour Area	24 Hour Area	12 Hour Terminal	24 Hour Terminal	Artillery2	CBR: Low Level	Fallout	Dropzone2	Engineer	Military Police	Signal	Unconventional Warfare	Transportation	Mission Control3	Severe Weather Warnings	CLIMATE DATA: STUDIES: Analysis of Area of Operations	Intelligence Estimate	Engineer Intelligence Annex	Terrain Study	Special Area Study	Weather Summary for Engineers	Climate Summary
SYNOPTIC CONDITION	Frontal types, location, movements and intensities; location and movement of major surface High and Low pressure systems.	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓																				
SKY CONDITION	Cloud cover in eights, height of bases and tops above the surface in hundreds and thousands of feet, times of significant changes.	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓														
	Cloud types.	✓	✓				✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓														
	Cloud cover, height of bases and amount in general terms.			✓	✓	✓																					✓		
	Frequency of occurrence of various cloud conditions.																									✓			
	Sky conditions in general terms - fair, cloudy, etc.																						✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
VISIBILITY AND OBSTRUCTIONS TO VISIBILITY	Surface horizontal visibility in miles and fractions of miles, time of significant change, Obstructions.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓														
	Surface visibility in general terms with Obstructions. Flight level visibility.																				AS REQUIRED	AS REQUIRED	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
PRECIPITATION	Type, location, character, intensity, time of beginning and end.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓			✓								✓	
	Accumulation.															✓													
	Character and intensity in general terms.																						✓	✓	✓		✓		✓
	Frequency of occurrence by type and amount.																									✓			
WEATHER PHENOMENA	Tornadoes, thunderstorms, lightning, squalls, hail, etc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓				✓	✓							✓	✓					✓
TEMPERATURE	Surface temperature, daily maximum and minimum in degrees Fahrenheit, abrupt changes and times thereof including freezing, thawing, and wind chill factor.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓						✓													✓	
	Surface temperature in degrees Fahrenheit, and temperature gradient, as a reflection of stability, between 0.5 and 2 meters.												✓																
	Aviation terminal temperatures in degrees Fahrenheit.									✓	✓																		
	Surface temperatures in general terms - cold, warm, etc.																								✓				✓
	Surface temperature range.																						✓	✓			✓		
	Frequency of occurrence of temperatures.																									✓			
	Flight level temperatures in degrees centigrade.						✓	✓	✓																				
	Temperature variations from a mean.																												✓
	Temperatures aloft in degrees centigrade, to 30,000 feet above sea level, at 2,000 foot intervals.							✓	✓																				
	Temperature profile - from the surface to 30 km.											✓																	

Notes:

1. Weather section of Intelligence Summary is derived from this forecast.
2. Data provided on on "as required" basis only.
3. Data provided only for specific operations having weather effect criteria.
4. Based on predetermination of what "severe weather" means.
5. Climate data contents are established locally. Listed elements are typical.

Figure 6–1. Elements of weather forecasts, climate studies, and weather and climate summaries.

ELEMENT	DESCRIPTION	WEATHER FORECASTS: GENERAL: 12 Hour	24 Hour 1	48 Hour	72 Hour	3-5 Day Extended Period	SPECIAL: Aviation: Route	12 Hour Area	24 Hour Area	12 Hour Terminal	24 Hour Terminal	Artillery 2	CBR: Low Level	Fallout	Dispersal 2	Engineer	Military Police	Signal	Unconventional Warfare	Transportation	Mission Control 3	Severe Weather Warnings 4	CLIMATE DATA: STUDIES: Analysis of Area of Operations	Intelligence Estimate	Engineer Intelligence Annex	Terrain Study	Special Area Study	Weather Summary for Engineers	Climate Summary
HUMIDITY AND DEW POINT	Relative humidity in percent.	✓	✓										✓										✓	✓				✓	
	Relative humidity in general terms - humid, dry, etc.			✓	✓																					✓			
	Surface dew point temperature in degrees Fahrenheit.						✓			✓	✓																		
	Relative humidity in percent, from the surface to 15 km.											✓																	
WINDS	Surface winds, average speed in knots, direction in tens of degrees, significant changes thereof, maximum wind speeds and gusts.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓				✓														
	Wind direction to eight points of the compass, wind speed in miles per hour.																						✓	✓					
	Frequency of occurrence of specified wind directions and speeds.																									✓	✓		✓
	Surface to four meters - effective wind direction in degrees and wind speed in knots.																												
	Wind direction in degrees and speed in knots at surface and at 2,000 feet above the terrain.							✓	✓						✓		✓												
	Flight level winds - direction in tens of degrees and speed in knots.						✓	✓	✓																				
	Wind direction in tens of degrees and speed to nearest five knots at 2,000 foot intervals to 30,000 feet.							✓	✓												AS REQUIRED	AS REQUIRED							
	Wind direction in tens of mils and wind speed in knots for 2,000 meter zones to 30 km.													✓															
	Effective winds for estimating movement of nuclear clouds.													✓									✓	✓					✓
	Wind direction in degrees and speed in knots from the surface to 30 km.											✓																	
PRESSURE AND DENSITY	Altimeter setting and density altitude						✓			✓						✓													
	Pressure in millibars for from the surface to 30 km.											✓																	
	Sea level pressure in millibars																						✓	✓					
SURFACE CONDITIONS	State of the ground in general terms - wet, dry, snow covered, icy, etc.	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓										✓												✓	
TURBULENCE AND ICING ALOFT	Type and relative intensity.						✓	✓	✓																				
INDEX OF ANOMALOUS PROPAGATION	Qualitative and quantitative.																	✓	✓										
LIGHT DATA	Moon phases, moon rise and set.																						✓		✓	✓			
	Beginning and end of nautical and civil twilight.																						✓			✓			
	Sunrise and sunset.																								✓	✓			
SEA CONDITIONS (Where needed)	State of sea and surf including direction, period and height of waves, direction of swell, and height of breakers.															✓			✓	✓									

Notes:

1. Weather section of Intelligence Summary is derived from this forecast.
2. Data provided on an "as required" basis only.
3. Data provided only for specific operations having weather effect criteria.
4. Based on predetermination of what "severe weather" means.
5. Climate data contents are established locally. Listed elements are typical.

Figure 6-1.—Continued.

d. The intelligence officer makes provisions for timely dissemination of severe weather warnings to enable units to take necessary preventive action. Severe weather warnings usually cover tornadoes, thunderstorms, dust or sand storms, extremely heavy precipitation, freezing temperatures, winds above specified speeds, and freezing precipitation. Warnings are issued by the supporting air weather service detachment, as required. Flood warnings are the responsibility of the unit engineer. Severe weather warnings are normally disseminated as spot reports.

6–16. Current Weather Reports

These reports contain information on existing weather conditions or specific weather elements. They may be oral, written, or graphic representations prepared by Army aviators, field artillery target acquisition units, field artillery meteorological sections, or air weather service detachments. Other units furnish current weather reports as directed. Reports of current weather conditions are used in connection with the operation of aircraft, use of indirect fire weapons, nuclear weapons, chemical agents, or other activities requiring this information. Normally these reports are disseminated directly to the user by the collection agency.

6–17. Summaries of Weather and Climate

a. Summaries of weather and climate are information summaries used as a basis for other estimates and plans. They are usually prepared by the supporting air weather service detachments at the request of the intelligence officer and disseminated in intelligence documents such as written analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and PERINTREP, or the PERINTSUM in joint service operations.

b. A weather summary is a description of the weather at a point, along a route, or within an area during a specified period. Weather summaries are used in analyzing the effects of weather on recent operations and in estimating the effects of weather on future operations. They are required for engineer forecasts of streamflow, condition of ground, and trafficability. Weather summaries have no prescribed format or content. The contents of a weather summary are determined by the requester based on intended use.

c. A climatic summary gives statistical data in terms of averages, extremes, and frequencies of occurrence for a specified period of time such as a year, season, or month, at a given point, along a route, or within an area. Climatic summaries are compiled from historical records of weather observations over long periods. Format or content are not prescribed. Appendix I contains an example of a climatic summary.

6–18. Climatic Studies

A climatic study is the compilation of the climatic data (climatic summary) and the analysis and interpretation of that data in the light of its possible effects on military operations. Climatic studies usually are prepared at corps and higher headquarters. Detailed climatic studies for strategic areas of the world are included in the National Intelligence Survey (NIS). The supporting air weather service element, at the request of the intelligence officer, prepares climatic studies to meet the particular requirements of the command. Climatic studies are disseminated on the same basis as weather and climatic summaries.

6–19. Technical Intelligence Bulletins and Summaries

Technical intelligence bulletins and summaries are prepared at corps and higher headquarters to disseminate the results obtained from an examination of enemy materiel. Bulletins usually deal with individual items while summaries are broader in scope. They are disseminated through command, technical intelligence, or combat service support channels depending upon the scope and nature of the contents. The current NATO standardized nomenclature for Soviet Bloc army weapons and equipment described in FM 30–16 will be used in technical intelligence reports when possible.

6–20. Geographic Intelligence

Engineer units provide terrain reports and specialized engineer reports in support of the G2.

6–21. US Army Security Agency Reports

USASA units provide intelligence reports, both spot and periodic reports, in accordance with the desires of the G2 of the appropriate command.

6–22. Order of Battle and Handbooks

Order of battle books contain lists, histories, code names, and other data of foreign units, and biographical data on foreign military personalities. Order of battle handbooks contain data concerning the political structure, military system and

organization, equipment, and tactical doctrine of foreign nations. Order of battle books and handbooks are usually prepared by the Department of the Army and theater headquarters. Field army may issue supplements to keep these documents current.

Section III. THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

6–23. General

The analysis of the area of operations is a detailed comprehensive study with emphasis on weather and terrain data designed to enable the commander to determine the effects of the area of operations on the opposing forces. It may include information about the people in the area, their economy, sociology, religion, and psychology. Its preparation is the responsibility of the intelligence officer, although other staff officers assist in its preparation. The analysis includes use of intelligence to serve as a basis for development of specific friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities (courses of action) in the commander's estimate, the operations estimate, the intelligence estimate, and other staff estimates. The analysis is oriented on the mission of the command with limiting considerations such as operational environment, time, and boundaries. Appendix B provides additional guidance and information concerning the preparation of the analysis of the area of operations.

6–24. Frequency of Preparation

a. An analysis of the area of operations is required for each mission. It may involve the preparation of an entirely new analysis or the updating of an existing analysis.

b. An analysis of the area of operations is prepared before the mission is received, if a logical mission can be assumed based upon the known situation. Analyses based on assumed missions are reevaluated upon receipt of the actual mission.

c. Analyses usually require revisions in light of the commander's decision, the uncovering of new areas, or the receipt of additional or more accurate information.

6–25. Form of Presentation

a. At corps and higher headquarters, the planning of projected operations requires the preparation of a written analysis of the area of operations.

b. At division level and below, an abbreviated form of the analysis is included in the intelligence estimate (app J). As with the other contents of the intelligence estimate, this abbreviated analysis is given orally. A written analysis at division level is usually prepared for future operations or when changes in the mission, enemy, or environment render the previous analysis obsolete.

Section IV. THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

6–26. General

a. The intelligence estimate is a logical and orderly examination of the intelligence factors affecting the accomplishment of a mission. It provides the commander with an analysis of the area of operations, enemy strength and enemy capabilities that can influence his mission. It provides the commander with a basis for planning operations and for disseminating intelligence to his staff and to other headquarters. It may be in many forms and prepared at any level. However, due to limited intelligence assets below division, the intelligence estimate is written at division and higher headquarters and briefed down to battalion. It may be presented to the commander formally or informally and may be written or verbal, detailed or summarized. It may be of scope sufficiently great to cover the entire situation of a large area or it may be so narrow in scope to estimate only those factors concerning a special operation or series of related operations. In combat operations the varied forms of estimates may run from the simple intelligence briefing given to the personnel about to undertake a bombing mission, beach reconnaissance, or scouting patrol, to the elaborate presentation of detailed data to an area commander whose assigned mission is the neutralization of the enemy's industrial potential and the destruction of his military forces. Because sufficient time is normally available during the planning phase of an operation, the intelligence estimate should be a written document. In addition, for large operations, there is usually such a vast amount of material available to the intelligence

officer that it is almost mandatory that the estimate be written so all of the necessary and important material may be presented to the commander in a clear, concise form.

b. On the other hand, the subsequent continuing or running estimates made as the operation progresses are generally called for on such short notice and normally based on such a small amount of new material that these estimates would be presented orally, supported perhaps by a situation map and hurriedly compiled notes. However, these changes must be incorporated into the basic estimate as soon as time permits.

c. The requirements of each command level for an intelligence estimate determine the scope, form, and substance of the estimate. These requirements are based on a consideration of the following:

(1) Purpose for which the estimate is made.

(2) Ultimate uses of the estimate.

(3) Degree of guidance in the estimate required by subordinate and adjacent commands.

(4) Desires of the commander whose intelligence staff prepares the estimate.

6–27. Purpose of the Intelligence Estimate

a. The intelligence estimate is designed to bring together significant aspects of the area of operations and of the enemy situation, present the enemy's capabilities, analyze them in relation to one another, and consider each capability in its relation to the friendly mission. With the intelligence estimate, the commander can balance enemy capabilities against his own courses of action and thereby choose his own most favorable course of action.

b. The primary purpose of the intelligence estimate is to determine the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and, if possible, the probable order of their adoption. Secondary purposes include the following:

(1) To disseminate information and intelligence on the possible area of operations and the enemy military situation to the commander, the staff, and interested superior, subordinate, and adjacent commands.

(2) To disseminate to intelligence officers of subordinate commands the intelligence officer's assessment of the identification, strength, and disposition of enemy forces which might be employed against each such subordinate command.

(3) To determine the essential elements of information (EEI) concerning the possible area of operations and enemy forces which must be collected prior to or during operations.

6–28. Responsibility

a. The intelligence staff officer has the responsibility of assisting the commander in making sound and timely decisions and assisting other staff members to meet their responsibilities. The intelligence officer does so by preparing an estimate of the enemy situation. His duties are not finished with writing only one estimate, because intelligence estimating is a continuing process. As the factors with which it is concerned change, the estimate must be revised. Preparation of estimates is a continuing responsibility of the intelligence officer. He must not, however, allow this process to become so routine and uncritical that it becomes vulnerable to the presentation of false information in support of the enemy deception story and objective.

b. An estimate of the situation will be furnished the commander by the intelligence officer, either upon his own initiative when warranted by developments in the situation, or when required by the commander. It will summarize the enemy situation and capabilities. The intelligence officer will usually be able to anticipate the necessity of such an estimate; but in any case, he must be prepared to furnish it to his commander when required.

6–29. Continuing Intelligence Estimate

a. The commander must know immediately of any significant changes in enemy capabilities. To keep him apprised of such changes, the intelligence officer must maintain in current status a continuing intelligence estimate. This estimate—sometimes called a "running intelligence estimate"—continually recomputes enemy strength, reappraises the enemy situation, and performs new analyses of enemy capabilities. Outdated and irrelevant intelligence is eliminated and new or newly appropriate material is added. The last formal estimate is only as current as the date and hour of its completion. It is constantly overtaken by new events and newly acquired intelligence. Whenever an intelligence item bears on the capability of the enemy to affect our chances for success in the planned operation, there is a possible need for a new intelligence estimate.

b. The continuing estimate performs the same function as all other estimates; it analyzes enemy capabilities. But frequently it also reveals the

need for specific friendly action caused by specific and new enemy circumstances. Occassionally, it is concerned with the overall enemy situation; but if the intelligence officer has been thorough in his previous estimates, the continuing estimate will illuminate some particular enemy capability of immediate concern.

c. The continuing estimate is usually contained in a loose-leaf binder in order that new material can quickly and easily be inserted without destroying the entire document. It must allow for new intelligence constantly being obtained and for operations continually changing. Maximum use is made of overlays, plots, and short summaries, as these media increase the flexibility of the estimate and make it easier to revise.

d. Accuracy in determining the most probable enemy courses of action is particularly important in preparing the continuing intelligence estimate, since its effect on our own tactics is immediate. Occasionally, it produces intelligence of so drastic a nature as to change completely the commander's decision. In these circumstances, the continuing estimate would provide a valuable basis for the new formal intelligence estimate of the situation.

6–30. Reason for Design of Form and Scope

a. The form and scope of the intelligence estimate are designed specifically to satisfy the primary purpose of determining enemy capabilities against the command preparing the estimate. They are not particularly suitable for accomplishing the secondary purposes listed above. In accomplishing its primary purpose, the intelligence estimate serves as an initial essential step in the process by which the commander evaluates and compares the enemy and friendly situations, decides upon a course of action in light of these situations, and plans the conduct of that course.

b. The degree to which the intelligence estimate accomplishes its secondary purposes is limited. The estimate can never include all the information and intelligence required by other staff divisions and subordinate commands. Such an estimate would be too lengthy and unwieldy. Likewise, it cannot always provide sufficient basis for determining all the essential elements of information required. Some essential elements of information often are not determined until the commander's estimate of the situation, or perhaps the operation plan, is being prepared. For these reasons, it is essential during preparation of the intelligence estimate that its form, scope, and content be geared to its primary rather than secondary purposes. After all, there are other intelligence vehicles specifically designed to accomplish the secondary purposes. When there is difficulty and conflict in preparing an estimate intended to accomplish both the primary and secondary purposes, the primary purpose of determining enemy capabilities receives overriding consideration.

c. The intelligence estimating process contributes significantly, however, to the intelligence collection plan. The glaring gaps in the estimator's knowledge of the enemy may frustrate even the seasoned intelligence officer. Never does one have sufficient information on the enemy. It is easy to see why this can occur when one recalls that even the operations officer seldom has all the information he wants on his own friendly forces, but for him the information is relatively easy to obtain. However, the enemy has an extensive security program designed to prevent disclosure of information concerning his own forces. As the intelligence estimate is prepared, these gaps in the knowledge of the enemy are phrased into questions (EEI) to be answered by the intelligence collector. When the questions are answered it is probable that the new information will change the estimate. As the estimate is revised, new questions will be indicated by new gaps in known information, so that a new series of EEI are formed. Thus a cycle of estimating, collecting, and other intelligence activities is formed.

6–31. Relation to Problem Solution

Intelligence estimating, like estimating in other staff sections, is basically problem solving and all use the problem solution process. However, an intelligence estimate is unique in that it cannot be based on the wealth of firm facts which are available to other staff members for estimates of their own forces. The intelligence estimate can never be any better than the basic intelligence which goes into it. If that is unreliable, inaccurate, or incomplete, these deficiencies will be reflected in the estimate.

6–32. Preparation

a. It must be remembered that the appropriate treatment of any topic included in the outline which follows is determined by the sense in which, and the extent to which, that topic applies to the particular operation and possible area of operations under consideration. When cogent rea-

sons exist, the estimate may be modified or supplemented to permit appropriate treatment of any topic. If the discussion of any topic is not pertinent nor applicable to the specific estimate, the discussion is omitted and so noted in the estimate.

b. One important consideration is to keep the intelligence estimate concise, clear, and brief. An estimate is not encyclopedic. Coverage must be adequate but must also be distinctly limited to the specific mission at hand. Briefness is not necessarily a virtue but it makes the intelligence estimate a simpler document for other members of the staff to use. References to other documents should be held to a minimum; however, reference may be made to overlays, enemy situation maps, or previously published documents which are readily available to the user of the intelligence estimate.

c. The conclusions paragraph of the intelligence estimate should include:

(1) All enemy courses of action which might affect the accomplishment of the commander's mission listed in the order of relative probability of adoption.

(2) Enemy vulnerabilities.

d. Appendix J and FM 101–5 contain examples and additional guidance on content and format.

e. In joint service operations, where international standardization agreements do not apply, the intelligence estimate outlined in JCS Publication 12 will apply.

Section V. OPERATION PLAN OR ORDER AND REPORTS

6–33. Operation Plan or Order

Intelligence on enemy forces is disseminated in paragraph 1*a* of the operation plan or order .The paragraph may make reference to an intelligence document such as a summary or annex or include specific intelligence or information. Paragraph 3, "Coordinating Instructions," may be used to disseminate orders to obtain or report specific items of information and to disseminate intelligence countermeasures applicable to two or more units.

6–34. Intelligence Annex

The intelligence annex is a formal intelligence tasking document that may accompany an operation plan or order. Its first paragraph gives a summary of the enemy situation required to understand the plan or order and may refer to annotated maps, enemy situation overlays, or current intelligence reports. Subsequent paragraphs contain specific collection requirements and instructions. Appendix N is an example of a division intelligence annex to an operation order; however, in joint service operations, where international standardization agreements do not apply, the intelligence annex shown in JCS Publication 12 will be used.

6–35. Operational Situation Report (SITREP)

The operational situation reports are the principal means used to report to higher authority information of the tactical situation and such administrative information as may affect the tactical situation. Although its preparation and dissemination is a staff responsibility of the operations officer, the intelligence officer prepares paragraph 1 (Enemy) of the SITREP (FM 101–5).

Section VI. MAPS

6–36. Responsibility

a. The intelligence officer prepares plans and policies concerning military maps and determines map requirements for the command.

b. At division, the division support command is charged with the procurement, storage, and distribution of military maps in accordance with policies established by the division G2. At corps and field army, the engineer officer is charged with the procurement, storage, reproduction, and distribution of maps and map substitutes in accordance with policies established by the respective G2.

c. Intelligence officers of units below division are responsible for determining the map requirements for the command and normally store and distribute military maps; however, the logistics officer is responsible for the procurement of military maps.

6–37. Military Maps

The term "military maps" refers to all maps (other than aeronautical and hydrographic charts) used for military purposes. Military maps are classified generally according to scale which is

indicative of their precision, detail and general use. General classifications are commonly used to indicate the extent of geographic information given as well as the manner in which it is portrayed.

a. Military Classification.

(1) *By scale.*

(*a*) *Small scale.* 1:600,000, and smaller.

(*b*) *Medium scale.* Larger than 1:600,000, but smaller than 1:75,000.

(*c*) *Large scale.* 1:75,000 and larger.

(2) *By use or description.*

(*a*) *General.* Maps smaller than 1:1,000,000—used for general planning purposes.

(*b*) *Strategic.* 1:1,000,000—used for strategic planning purposes.

(*c*) *Strategic-tactical.* 1:250,000 (1:500,000 alternate)—for use when other scales are unsuitable or unavailable.

(*d*) *Road.* 1:250,000—for tactical and administrative troop movements.

(*e*) *Tactical.* 1:50,000 (1:100,000 alternate)—for tactical and administrative purposes.

(*f*) *Artillery.* 1:50,000—for artillery fire control.

(*g*) *Photomap.* 1:5,000–1:60,000 (1:25,000 preferred)—for tactical and administrative purposes.

(*h*) *Town plan.* 1:12,500.

b. General Classification.

(1) *Planimetric map.* A map showing only the horizontal (flat) position of features.

(2) *Topographic map.* A map that presents the horizontal and vertical positions of the features represented.

(3) *Plastic relief map.* A topographic map printed on plastic and molded into a three-dimensional form.

(4) *Photomaps.* A reproduction of a photograph or photomosaic on which grid lines, marginal data, place names, and boundaries are added, and which, in some instances, depicts relief graphically.

(5) *Plastic relief photomap.* A photomap printed on plastic and molded into a three-dimensional form.

(6) *Photomosaic.* An assembly of aerial photographs to form a composite picture.

(7) *Military city map.* A large-scale topographic map (usually 1:12,500) of a town or city.

(8) *Special maps.* Maps for special purposes, such as trafficability maps, transportation maps, and boundary maps.

(9) *Terrain Model.* A three-dimensional representation of an area, modeled in plaster, rubber, or other materials. It is distinguished from other map types by showing some cultural and terrain features realistically instead of symbolically.

(10) *Pictomap.* A photomap type product usually published at the scale of 1:25,000 or larger, depicting terrain and vegetation in near natural colors and with important cultural features and drainage systems overprinted in red and blue, respectively. Names, contours, grids, and marginal data are depicted.

(11) *Joint Operations Graphics (JOGS).* A 1:250,000 scale series of maps printed in a ground (G) or air (A) version. JOGS are designed to provide a common base map of an area for combined air/ground operations. The ground version shows elevation and contours in meters while the air version emphasizes air landing facilities, and depicts elevation and contours in feet.

(12) *Tactical Commander's Terrain Analysis (TACCTA) Maps.* Contingency maps that are periodically updated for issue only when troops are committed in the area covered. These maps contain, or have printed on their reverse sides, significant information not found on ordinary tactical maps.

6–38. Requirements

a. General. Timely planning is necessary to insure that sufficient quantities of suitable maps are available to units at the time and place needed. The basic factors that govern this planning are—

(1) The area of map coverage.

(2) The map scales required.

(3) Initial allowances.

(4) Replenishment issues.

(5) Replacement issues.

(6) Emergency issues.

b. Initial Allowances.

(1) Initial allowances prescribe the number of copies of map sheets, by type or scale, that can be requisitioned by each organization without further approval. Initial allowances furnish units sufficient numbers of map sheets by scale. Difficulties of production, distribution, and storage necessitate economy in map issue. Various factors such as the strength, composition, and functions of a unit are combined with experience data to determine the quantities of maps to be allowed the unit in tables of initial allowances. The allowances prescribed in FM 101–10–1 are based on experiences of World War II and are a guide only. The

vide dispersion required by the nuclear battlefield may require increased allowances.

(2) Tables for determining map requirements and discussions of the subject frequently employ the terms "sheet" and "copy." The term "sheet" is used to describe a map of given scale that covers a given area of ground. It is a single piece of paper. The term "copy" designates any exact counterpart or facsimile of a sheet. Physically, as an imprinted piece of paper, a sheet and a copy are identical. As used in connection with map requirements, the term "sheet" conveys the idea of an area of terrain cartographically depicted on a piece of paper. The term "copy" connotes quantity.

(3) Initial map requirements for the division are determined jointly by the G2, G3, and support command commander. The G3 outlines the operational plan. The G2 and G3 determine the types and scales of maps to be used. The support command commander advises on the availability of maps, including types and scales. The G2 marks the projected boundaries of the division and its subordinate units and the overall area for which coverage is desired. Allowance is made for the time necessary for procurement and distribution. The G2 also informs the support command commander of other factors involved in the scheme of maneuver which are pertinent to map requirements.

(4) The Support command commander calculates map requirements for the division essentially as follows:

(*a*) Determine the projected division area for which coverage is desired taking scale into consideration.

(*b*) Indicate tentative battalion and brigade boundaries in the division area outlined on the map index. Project these boundaries forward to cover the area for which map coverage is desired at each scale.

(*c*) List the identifications of each sheet within the boundaries of each echelon from battalion to division.

(*d*) Determine the number of copies of each sheet required at each echelon from the experience table.

(*e*) List the total number of copies of each map sheet required. These are planning figures for initial issue.

(5) The support command commander requisitions, stores, and issues maps in addition to advising on availability and determining specific requirements. The division engineer provides technical information on methods, facilities, and quality of reproduction.

(6) In the above illustration, it is assumed that the division is calculating its own initial allowances. Initial allowances for a division are determined at field army in most situations.

c. Replenishment Issues. A replenishment issue is based on replenishment allowances that include authorized supplemental issues to cover normal losses and authorized quantities to cover areas of new interests. Replenishment requirements are calculated by applying a percentage factor to the number of copies required for initial issue. The sum of the initial requirement plus the replenishment requirement for each sheet represents the total number of copies of each sheet that the field army is prepared to distribute.

d. Replacement Issues. Replacement issues refer to recalling or voiding old map issues and issuing new editions. Replacement issues are made on the same basis as initial allowances.

e. Emergency Issues. Emergency issues are made to fulfill immediate combat requirements.

6–39. Distribution

a. General.

(1) The distribution of maps is keyed to the operation plan. Changes in tactical plans may have an immediate effect on map requirements. The map distribution system must provide for timely issue of maps in response to changes in tactical plans.

(2) Premature issue of maps not of immediate interest to friendly forces is inadvisable. The issue may be a needless one due to a change in the operation plan, and, once issued, the maps can seldom be withdrawn for reissue to another unit. Logistical limitations prevent maintaining excessive reserves of maps; hence, map distribution is carefully controlled to prevent waste.

(3) In a mobile situation, detailed issues to individuals and small units are difficult to make. The bulk of maps needed to cover any substantial area makes it impractical to supply a unit with maps for any prolonged period of mobile operations. In airmobile situations, detailed issue to individual aviators and small aviation units is necessary. The G2 normally provides organic and attached aviation units with a bulk issue of maps for the operational area and updates the issue as necessary.

b. Maps and Intelligence Documents. Maps are

valuable sources of information concerning the area of operations and are classified as intelligence documents. Because they are considered as intelligence documents rather than as items of standard supply, maps are handled through an independent system. Corps, primarily a tactical headquarters, is an integral part of the map system. Divisions requisition and draw their maps from corps rather than from field army as in the case of standard supply items.

c. Map Designations. The intelligence annex to the operation order designates the maps to be used during an operation. In paragraph 5 of the annex, the intelligence officer lists the maps that will be supplied to each unit, in the number of copies of each classification or scale, and includes instructions concerning special requisitions and distribution.

Section VII. AERIAL IMAGERY

6–40. Types of Aerial Imagery

a. Aerial imagery is normally broken down into three basic types: photographic, infrared, and side looking airborne radar ZSLAR). Each is discussed separately below. For additional information see FM 30–20.

b. Photographic Imagery: Photographic imagery includes the following types:

(1) *Vertical.* Vertical photography furnishes coverage of a target photographed from directly overhead. It provides photography of relatively constant scale which allows the interpreter to achieve the best stereovision and the most accurate measurements. It is, therefore, the most suitable type of photographic imagery for use in conjunction with mapping requirements or construction of mosaics or terrain models. A variation of the conventional vertical photograph is the split vertical which provides essentially two side-by-side vertical photographs with minimum center overlap.

(2) *Oblique.* Oblique photography furnishes coverage of a target area photographed at an angle from the vertical. Oblique photography closely resembles the normal eyeview and allows the interpreter to "see" into an area in a more normal fashion rather than seeing the target as it appears from directly overhead. It allows inspection of cloud covered areas normally obscured in vertical photography. High oblique photography includes a portion of the skyline behind the target area; low oblique photography does not.

(3) *Panoramic.* There are two types of panoramic photography, both of which are taken with special cameras capable of wide-angle viewing. Oblique panoramic photographs include a portion of the horizon and are usually taken in a forward-viewing made and referred to as "forward pans." Vertical panoramic photography will normally provide oblique imagery extending to the horizon on each side of the aircraft's line of flight while also providing verticle coverage directly beneath the aircraft. Panoramic photography can provide rapid coverage of areas in one pass over the target area.

(4) *Stereopair.* A stereopair consists of two aerial photographs in which a portion of the total area projected thereon is common. Examination of such pairs with a stereoscope gives an exaggerated three-dimensional view of the terrain in the area of overlap. Limited stereoviewing can be accomplished with overlapping oblique and panoramic photography; however, the best stereoviewing is achieved through vertical and split-vertical type photography. A special type of stereopair is the vectograph which is two specially printed overlapping airphotographs. These give the illusion of the third dimension when viewed with polaroid spectacles.

(5) *Wide-Angle Photo.* A wide-angle photo is an aerial photograph taken with a camera that has a wide-angle lens which photographs a cone of approximately 90°.

c. Infrared (IR) Imagery.

(1) An IR system is a passive sensor which detects emitted and reflected thermal radiation coming from the terrain and objects on the terrain. With the use of a replaceable filter, current IR systems filter out reflected radiation and record only that radiation emitted by the target area and objects. The total emitted radiation is a function of an object's temperature and its emissivity. Emitted radiation will differ between objects and the resultant differences will be sensed and recorded by the IR system. The IR sensor can detect minute differences and, therefore, differentiate between objects close to each other. To achieve the maximum capability, the IR system must operate at low altitudes as its scan coverage

is limited to the area directly below the flight path of the aircraft; therefore, it is used normally only for point, linear, or small area targets.

(2) IR aircraft are equipped for both a real time pictorial display of the IR returns as the aircraft is passing over the terrain and the recording of the sensor acquired information on strips of film for later development and interpretation. Some versions of Army IR aircraft can also transmit their imagery to a ground sensor terminal (GST) thereby providing a real-time presentation of the target area to personnel on the ground. When available, the GST also records these presentations on film which is developed by a recorder-processor-viewer and available for interpretation within 20 to 60 seconds.

d. Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR).

(1) SLAR is an active electronic device which emits energy and senses that portion of the emitted energy which is returned by reflection off the terrain and objects thereon. The radar's energy may be directed at terrain to the left, right, or both sides simultaneously along the flight path of the aircraft. Energy reflected from objects on the ground, both fixed and moving, is recorded on strips of film. It should be noted that since the radar pulse is line-of-sight, any high ground or tall objects in the path of the radar pulse will block out radar returns from any smaller objects which they mask. This causes SLAR returns to leave blank spots called radar shadow or nonsensed areas wherever these hidden areas occur.

(2) The SLAR produces two images simultaneously: one depicts fixed target information (FTI), such as terrain features and buildings, and the other depicts moving target information (MTI); however, in order for the SLAR to acquire MTI, movement of the object must be greater than 2.5 mph. These two strips of film when developed are called SLAR imagery. Army SLAR aircraft are equipped to process exposed film continuously and provide the airborne sensor operator a pictorial display of the returns while the aircraft is still in flight. Time delay from the time of film exposure until it is developed and ready for viewing is approximately 2 minutes. Like the Army IR aircraft, some Army SLAR aircraft have a capability for transmission of imagery data to ground sensor terminals. When available, SLAR sensings are received at the GST and recorded on film, developed, and ready for viewing by image interpreters in approximately 2 minutes.

6–41. Aerial Photographic Coverage

a. Aerial photographic coverage includes ground area represented on aerial photographs, photomaps, and mosaics. It falls into two general classes of permanent record imagery and mapping photography as follows:

(1) *Permanent record imagery.* The three categories of permanent record imagery commonly used by the imagery interpreter are initial record, general intelligence record, and detailed intelligence record.

(*a*) *Initial record.* The initial record is complete permanent imagery coverage, flown seasonally, of a projected area of operations usually extending from the line of contact with enemy ground forces to deep within the enemy territory. Photographic coverage is of small scale (1:20,000 to 1:60,000) and suitable for stereoscopic study. The initial record imagery provides basic information about enemy installations and defenses, cultural features, trafficability, and soil and vegetation. Its principal value is to provide a basis for evaluating changes in enemy-occupied territory. Areas subject to seasonal changes are recorded under conditions characteristic of each season to eliminate the observed differences caused by these changes. Vertical initial record serves as a map substitute or supplement. The field army normally supervises the automatic initial distribution to subordinate units according to areas of interest, and supplementary issues are made as necessary. Typical allowances are shown in FM 101–10–1.

(*b*) *General intelligence record.* The general intelligence record is vertical, medium scale (1:10,000 to 1:20,000) imagery covering the field army's area of interest. It provides current intelligence and is compared with initial record imagery to determine current location and disposition of enemy installations, troop concentrations, troop movements, equipment, and supplies. This type of imagery is normally requested by divisions and higher headquarters.

(*c*) *Detailed intelligence record.* Detailed intelligence record is obtained to supplement the general intelligence record by providing large-scale imagery of areas of specific interest in the battle area. It provides the imagery for detailed analyses of selected terrain features, installations, and equipment. It is frequently necessary to use more than one sensing or recording system over the target. Types of detailed analyses are—

1. Vertical analysis. The study of large scale (1:10,000 and larger) photography reveals

the plans and heights of installations not shown in general intelligence record.

2. Oblique analysis. The study of air photographs taken at an angle from the vertical reveals installations from the elevation viewpoint. This type of imagery is particularly important in the analysis of features not suitable for vertical analysis, such as concealed or well-camouflaged installations.

3. Concealment analysis. Installations and equipment hidden from observation are detected and subjected to study by special recording techniques; for example, a camouflage net located through general intelligence record photography may be identified as a covering for mechanical equipment when the area is subjected to infrared (IR) search.

4. Deception analysis. Enemy measures designed to develop and confuse friendly intelligence collection agencies are detected through analysis and comparison of photographic and electronic presentation such as radar, infrared, and electronic intelligence.

(2) *Mapping photography.* Mapping or charting photography is taken for the purpose of preparing or revising maps and charts. It is generally taken at much smaller scales (1:20,000 to 1:50.000) than intelligence phtography and is used for intelligence purposes only when no other intelligence photography is available. This photography is taken with specially stabilized cameras and other equipment. The flight pattern and elevation are carefully controlled.

b. Imagery obtained by the use of Army aircraft is a type of detailed intelligence record. Air observers or photographers equipped with suitable cameras can, in many cases, provide commanders with low-altitude (orientation) obliques and limited vertical phtography under conditions and at times when high-performance aircraft are unable to meet Army requirements. This is in addition to the Army capability with conventional mounted cameras. Commanders should fully exploit the employment of Army aviation in a supplemental photo-reconnaissance role.

c. In stability operations, the scale of coverage, as a general rule, should be the largest possible consistent with the type of coverage desired, intended use, size of area to be recorded, time allocated for the mission, type of aircraft and systems available and the degree of urgency of the desired information. Due to the special factors inherent in stability operations the following photography imagery scales are recommended: initial record 1:10,000 to 1:25,000; general intelligence record 1:5,000 to 1:10,000; and detailed intelligence record 1:5,000 or larger.

6-42. Mosaics

A mosaic is an assembly of overlapping aerial photographs that have been matched to form a continuous photographic representation of a portion of the earth's surface. There are four types of mosaics: controlled, semicontrolled, uncontrolled, and strip.

a. A controlled mosaic is laid on ground control to provide an accurate representation of distances and directions. It can be made quite accurate if sufficient control data exist, but its preparation is slow and tedious. For controlled mosaics, photography taken by a mapping camera should be requested.

b. A semicontrolled mosaic is constructed of unaltered contact prints aligned to plotted control points and mounted on a stable base. The photograph is oriented for mounting by matching principal points and flight lines with no regard for matching detail.

c. An uncontrolled mosaic is made without the check of scale or position that would be given by a framework of control points. In comparison with a controlled mosaic, its preparation is quite rapid, but it is much less accurate.

d. A strip mosaic consists of one strip of aerial photographs taken on a single flight. Depending on the time and the amount of control available, it may be controlled or uncontrolled. For a mosaic to provide maplike presentation, vertical photography normally is used. For special mosaics such as coastlines, head-on views of mountainous terrain or built-up areas, oblique photography can be used.

CHAPTER 7

ORDER OF BATTLE (STANAG 2077)

Section I. INTRODUCTION

7–1. General

a. Order of battle (OB) is the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. Complete OB data is not normally furnished the commander. Instead, he is provided conclusions, estimates, or analyses of enemy probable courses of action based on collated OB information. In campaigns involving irregular force units all such units as well as auxiliary and underground elements will be included. OB consists of evaluated information regarding the following elements:

(1) Composition
  (*a*) Unit identification
  (*b*) Organization
(2) Disposition
  (*a*) Geographical location
  (*b*) Tactical deployment
  (*c*) Movements
(3) Strength
  (*a*) Personnel
  (*b*) Weapons and equipment
  (*c*) Type of units
(4) Training status
  (*a*) Individual
  (*b*) Unit
  (*c*) Special
(5) Tactics
  (*a*) Tactical doctrine
  (*b*) Special operations
(6) Logistics
  (*a*) Systems
  (*b*) Current status
(7) Combat effectiveness
  (*a*) Combat experience
  (*b*) Morale
  (*c*) Other factors
(8) Miscellaneous
  (*a*) Personalities
  (*b*) Unit history
  (*c*) Uniforms and insignia
  (*d*) Code names and numbers

b. Order of battle intelligence is an integral part of combat and strategic intelligence. In determining enemy capabilities and probable courses of action, the intelligence officer must consider order of battle intelligence together with other intelligence pertaining to the weather and terrain. The significance of OB in stability operations is discussed in detail in FM 30–31.

c. In general, order of battle personnel are responsible for all information concerning foreign military forces. In order to accomplish this mission, the order of battle analyst has to consider and develop intelligence concerning the order of battle elements as they pertain to foreign military forces. Order of battle techniques employed in support of stability operations parallel those used during conventional warfare; however, the nature of stability operations, particularly of the enemy forces encountered, will require modification of techniques and expansion of the scope of order of battle to include both military and nonmilitary personnel of significant interest.

7–2. Relationship to Other Intelligence

Military intelligence is developed in many fields outside the scope of order of battle but all intelligence is ultimately related to it. For example, technical intelligence produces intelligence on the capabilities and characteristics of a weapon or weapons system but order of battle intelligence determines the effect of the weapon capabilities and characteristics on enemy tactics, combat effectiveness, and organization. Enemy military intelligence organizations are of primary interest to counterintelligence, but as part of a military organization, they are also of interest to order of

battle analysts. SIGINT can contribute to development of order of battle and other information. The relationship between order of battle intelligence and other military intelligence cannot be overemphasized.

Section II. ELEMENTS OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

7-3. Composition

Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to type units.

a. Unit identification is often called the key to order of battle intelligence because it leads to the answers to many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification consists of the complete designation of a specific unit by name or number, type, relative size or strength, and usually subordination. Through identification, the order of battle analyst is able to develop a history of the composition, training, tactics, and combat effectiveness of an enemy unit. Combined with organization, the identification of a specific unit alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified units of the same organization.

b. Organization is the structure of a unit and the relationship of the various echelons within the structure. Knowledge of the organization of a military forces aid in developing accurate intelligence concerning strength, tactics, training, logistics, and combat efficiency. Enemy capabilities are difficult to assess accurately without knowledge of his current organization.

c. The basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit (in the US Army a combat division) must be considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. In some countries the field army is considered the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit. The importance of this concept lies in the term self-sufficient. Units subordinate to self-sufficient tactical units, although capable of limited independent action, cannot sustain themselves over relatively long periods of time. They are dependent upon their self-sufficient headquarters or upon that unit which by design is self-sufficient. Subordinate units are seldom employed independently or separately from the basic, self-sufficient tactical unit. For example, a new enemy mechanized regiment is reported in the area of operations. Knowing that the mechanized division is the basic, self-sufficient, tactical unit and its three mechanized regiments are seldom employed independently, the presence not only of a new regiment but of a new mechanized division is tentatively accepted. When one of these regiments is located it may be reasonably assumed that the remaining elements of the division are also in the area.

7-4. Disposition

Disposition consists of the location of enemy units and the manner in which these units are tactically (or administratively in times of peace) deployed. In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and proposed (or probable) movements of enemy units.

a. Location refers to a geographical area or position occupied by a unit or units. Knowledge of the strength and location of an enemy assists the intelligence officer in determining the capabilities of this force and its effect upon the accomplishment of the mission. Data of this type are also collected during times of peace; however, knowledge of foreign military forces is severely limited due to limitations on collection elements.

b. Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with respect to one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for executing the various tactical manuevers. If this deployment can be predetermined, it may lead to an accurate appraisal of probable enemy courses of action. The knowledge of how enemy units are echeloned may indicate (if the enemy assumes the offensive) which units will be used in the initial attack and which units will be employed in supporting and reserve roles. Tactical deployment with respect to terrain is also important. A study of dispositions, coupled with an analysis of the area of operations leads to conclusions concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

c. Movement of enemy units is another subelement of disposition. Movement is the physical relocation of a unit from one geographical point to another. Patrol activity may be an indication of planned movement but, in itself, is not movement. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the tactical deployment of the opposing forces. When an enemy has moved, is moving, or will possibly move in the future, it may become capable of a number of actions which affect the

order of battle situation. Such a unit may be moving into an attack position, or moving to reinforce, or to replace a unit, or to perform other missions unknown to friendly forces. In view of these possibilities, movement of an enemy unit becomes important and units must be monitored at all times in order for the OB analyst to provide correct and detailed data on enemy dispositions.

7–5. Strength

The term "strength" covers the description of a unit or force in terms of men, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of enemy capabilities, and assists him in determining the probable courses of action or options open to enemy commanders. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or buildup of units in an area gives the commander certain indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential enemy forces are important factors which indicate the enemy's intention to wage war. Strength computations are discussed in appendix K.

7–6. Tactics

Tactics in order of battle intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted principles of organization and employment of forces for the conduct of operations. Tactics, on the other hand, describe the manner in which the enemy conducts an operation. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the OB analyst knows how the enemy may employ his forces under various conditions and in certain type situations or special operations. Conventional enemy forces normally can be expected to perform according to certain patterns within the framework of tactical doctrine. There are established principles and patterns for the employment of infantry, mechanized, armor, and artillery in the offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of employment and enemy action or reaction is extremely important in the planning phase of an operation as well as in the execution phase.

7–7. Training

Individual and unit training can significantly contribute to the combat effectiveness of any military organization. The thoroughness, degree and quality of individual training received by the recruit, specialist, NCO, and officer are major factors in determining the overall efficiency of an armed force. Unit training, normally conducted in seasonal cycles from small unit exercises to large-scale maneuvers, is an essential part of the training necessary for a unit to operate at its full potential. Each type or phase of training accomplished by a unit adds to its capabilities and effectiveness. Therefore, the combat effectiveness of an enemy unit is more easily appraised when the degree and quality of its training are known.

7–8. Logistics

Logistics also is closely related to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course of action is influenced by the ability of the logistical system to support that action. Knowledge of the enemy's logistics facilitates a more accurate evaluation of enemy capabilities, strength, combat efficiency, and disposition. Types of logistic information include—

(1) All classes and types of supply.
(2) Requirements.
(3) Procurement.
(4) Distribution.
(5) Transportation.
(6) Installations.
(7) Terminals.
(8) Evacuation and salvage.
(9) Maintenance.

7–9. Combat Effectiveness

Combat effectiveness is a term used to describe the abilities and fighting quality of an enemy unit. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army and may be predicted by analyzing—

a. Personnel strength.

b. Amount and condition of weapons and equipment.

c. Status of training.

d. Efficiency of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps.

e. Length of time a unit has been committed in combat.

f. Traditions and past performance.

g. Personality traits of the unit commander.

h. Geographical area in which committed.

i. Morale, health, discipline, and political reliability (or belief in the cause for which they fight).

j. Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.

k. Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.

l. National characteristics of the people.

7-10. Miscellaneous Data

Miscellaneous data include various types of supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of the other order of battle elements. Miscellaneous data include basic intelligence that can be described as "know your enemy."

a. Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of an enemy military force. A knowledge of personalities is important as an aid to identifying units, and, in some cases, predicting the course of action the unit will take. Personality data, therefore, is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are closely related to key individuals.

b. Unit history includes information and intelligence on component elements of a specific unit; on present and past parent units; personalities who have commanded the unit; and other details such as past performance and activities which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit concerned. The development of unit history is important because it aids in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military or paramilitary units, like individuals, develop characteristics which distinguish them from other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits of enemy personalities, order of battle personnel must also consider an enemy unit as a "personality" in analyzing its capabilities and limitations.

c. Information on uniforms and insignia is an important part of know-your-enemy intelligence. This information assists in establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

d. Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers (and names) to conceal true designations (or affilitation) of units, field post numbers and vehicles. These code number systems, when properly analyzed, are valuable sources of information related to composition and disposition.

e. The order of battle analyst must be able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of weapons and equipment characteristics and capabilities, the analyst uses this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the military force.

Section III. PLANNING THE COLLECTION EFFORT

7-11. Responsibility

Order of battle analysts assist the G2 in continuously planning the collection effort. They may be required to draft collection memorandums for the guidance of collection agencies. As intelligence is developed, the need for new information arises and every effort is made to maintain a continuous flow of order of battle information by timely requests to the collection agencies.

7-12. Collection

Order of battle analysts do not have a collection capability; therefore, most of the information is received from agencies and sources outlined in paragraphs 3-24 through 3-52. The G2 section sends incoming information to the analysis and production section for detailed processing. From the standpoint of report and source evaluation, order of battle analysts must know which agencies are available and their capabilities to collect accurate information.

Section IV. PROCESSING ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE

7-13. Introduction

The analysis and production section of the military intelligence company is responsible to the intelligence officer for the processing of order of battle information. The intelligence and information received and processed by an analysis and production section normally becomes voluminous within a short period of time. In organizing this

information, order of battle analysts maintain extensive and systematic filing and compilation systems. Specific items of intelligence and information must be located on short notice and incorporated into comprehensive reports or analyses. These requirements necessitate a high degree of efficiency in the processing of data received.

7–14. Order of Battle References

Typical order of battle references currently published are—

a. Order of Battle Handbooks. Order of battle handbooks contain background data including descriptions of a foreign nation's political structure, typical organization of that nation's military establishment, tactical doctrine applicable to various types of military units, and other more technical data, such as the logistic system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment. The Handbook of Military Forces is largely a historical and capability study of a nation's military forces. Since it does not depict unit locations, as do OB Handbooks, the data is of a less perishable nature.

b. Order of Battle Books. Order of battle books are compilations of current intelligence which show the composition and disposition of the military establishment of foreign nations. They are normally published by higher commands or at the department level. Unlike the order of battle handbooks, they contain established intelligence data on major identified units and their subordinate elements. They may also contain personality data, lists of logistic installations, unit history data, and other order of battle data. Changes or updated versions normally are disseminated on a regular basis by the publishing headquarters.

c. Installation Handbooks. Ideally, installation handbooks contain complete information concerning every military installation in every city in the country or area of interest. They are useful, particularly during peacetime, for establishing disposition of forces.

d. Miscellaneous References. Other publications and periodicals prepared at departmental and area command levels are of value to the order of battle analyst. These references may deal specifically with order of battle or any and all phases of combat and strategic intelligence. Civilian organizations under contract to the Department of Defense make special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military forces. These studies are usually detailed, technical in nature and provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.

7–15. Recording Order of Battle Data

a. The recording aids outlined in paragraphs 5–4 through 5–9 may be adapted to order of battle use (for example, the index tabs on the workbook corresponding with the order of battle factors). Order of battle records and files are consulted continually for the purpose of producing new intelligence. Files are established to catalog incoming information for easy reference and for use as a basis for comparison and contrast in the production of new intelligence. Order of battle files should be simple, complete and effective. One or more of the typical aids discussed below may be used; the type used depends upon the existing situation and the echelon maintaining the files:

(1) Unit workbook.
(2) Order of battle workbook.
(3) Order of battle situation map.
(4) Order of battle card file.
(5) Personality file.
(6) Military installation file.
(7) Organizational file.
(8) Strength file.
(9) Topical file.

b. Other file systems or forms are developed locally to cope with special situations; however, the primary purpose of these other file systems is the production of intelligence.

7–16. Unit Workbook

The format of the unit workbook depends upon the structure of the foreign army being monitored and consists typically of a collection of unit worksheets arranged by type of unit or in numerical sequence (fig 7–1 and 7–2). Analysts may use them as unit workbooks by inserting additional pages as new information is received. The enemy parent unit listed on the unit worksheet should be in consonance with the analyst's level of command. The analyst is charged with maintaining records two levels below his own. Personalities are listed on the worksheet as a ready reference to the personalities of the enemy unit. Unit, postal, and vehicle numbers are noted on the worksheet and are used in determining order of battle changes or as confirmation of current data. Details which may reveal any facet of the enemy unit's order of battle are noted in the remarks



Figure 7–1. Example of a unit workbook.

PARENT UNIT 110 Mechanized Division

SUBORDINATE UNITS	CITY	COORDINATES	INSTL	PERSONALITIES	ID OR CODE NO	REMARKS
Division Headquarters	Stein	PV818147	1 & 3	CG G/D Murdack Edward R		PW No 26, Captured 2 Feb 68
96 Mechanized Regiment	Delitsch	PU81934	4	CO - COL Oldham Ernest B	16181	Document captured 19 March 68
145 Mechanized Regiment	Eilenburg	PU852961	2		16182	Deserter 21 March 68
3d Battalian	Gladbach	PV891024	1			Gladbach residents report battalion subardinate to Headquarters in Eilenburg, 3 Feb 68
63 Medium Tank Regiment	Linburg	PV863106	3	CO - COL Bhartrhari, Kerala N		Agent report 26 May 68
358 Transportation Battalian	Lehrt	PV825158	1		16195	Order of Battle Book

Figure 7–2. Example of a unit worksheet from a unit workbook.



Figure 7–8. Example of an order of battle workbook.



STRENGTH				UNLOCATED UNITS	LEGEND
COMMITTED FORCES					
	NR	PERS	WPN		
Mech Bn	5	2625		Recon Co, 22 Div	I Irregular
Mdm Tk Bn	2	384	62xMdm Tk	160mm Mort Bn, 22 Div	
FIRE SUPPORT				How Bn, 22 Div	
Gun-How Bn	1		18x152mm Gun-How	Gun-How Bn, 22 Div	
Mort Bn	1		18x160mm Mort	Mdm Tk Regt, 22 Div	
At Bn	1		18x100mm Gun	RL Bn, 22 Div	
How Bn	1		18x122mm How		
MRL Bn	1		18x140mm Rkt		
RL Bn	1		2x200mm RL		
			2xNERONO		
AD Bn	1		18x57mm Gun		
REINFORCEMENTS					
Mech Bn	1	252			
Mdm Tk Regt	1	842	95xMdm Tk		
			3xAMPH Tk		
			6x57mm AD Gun(SP)		
Mech Regt	1	2350	31x Mdm Tk		
			3xAMPH Tk		
Irregular Co	1	95			
Recon Co	1	129	12xAMPH Tk		

Figure 7-4. Order of battle situation map.

column. Reports of branch insignia, number and type of weapons, and statements of local residents are entered in this column in abbreviated form. The date and the source of information are entered for each entry. The installation column of the worksheet shows the numerical designation assigned a particular enemy installation when plotted on a sketch, map sheet, or town plan attached to the workbook.

7-17. Order of Battle Workbook

a. The order of battle workbook aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports. Its purpose and use are identical to those of the intelligence workbook (fig 5-3).

b. There is no prescribed form for the order of battle workbook. At corps level and higher, the order of battle workbook is tabbed to conform with paragraphs of the order of battle annex of the periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP). Figure 7-3 shows the method of tabbing the workbook.

c. Information is entered under the appropriate heading or headings as either a complete report or a digest of the original report. All entries contain a journal date and number in addition to identification of the source. Comments, when appropriate, are added after each entry to show the significance of the report when compared with the overall tactical situation.

7-18. Order of Battle Situation Map

The order of battle situation map is a graphic portrayal of current enemy order of battle, either confirmed or unconfirmed. It shows identification and disposition of the enemy units and any other information which will assist in developing the enemy order of battle (fig 7-4).

a. As a general rule, enemy units down to and including two echelons below the analyst's own level of command are plotted by using the appropriate symbols in FM 21-30. For example, at division, enemy regiments and battalions are plotted; at corps, enemy divisions and regiments. Higher units are plotted to the extent practicable. The foregoing information is only a guide. Analysts at theater level who are responsible for publication of order of battle books may plot separate battalions. Peculiarities of enemy organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel available determine more precisely what will be plotted and what will be omitted on order of battle maps. The time and date of the informatiion are entered below each symbol or plotting. During stability operations, however, it may be necessary to plot enemy/insurgent units down to the squad level, since, depending on the situation and the area, there may be no large sized units operating against friendly forces.

b. A caption box on the order of battle situation map is an annotation containing information which helps to identify and explain the order of battle situation graphically. Although any number of caption boxes may be used, normally three types are necessary—strength, unlocated units, and legend caption boxes.

(1) The entries in the strength caption box usually consist of a digest of strength computations in numbers of personnel, types of units, and weapons and equipment categorized as committed forces, their fire support units, and reinforcements (fig 7-4). Since a reconnaissance company is part of an aggressor mechanized division, it is considered a reinforcement which is unlocated since its position is unknown. Assumptions such as these must be made to portray significant enemy probable capabilities.

(2) It is important that the order of battle analyst be aware of that which is not known about the enemy. The unlocated units caption box calls to his attention existing units which remain unlocated. It is a reminder that maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of unlocated units in the area of operations and that these units pose a threat to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

(3) A legend caption box is included on the order of battle situation map when it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units. Within this caption box, the exact meaning of each improvised symbol is explained.

7-19. Order of Battle Card

Order of battle card files are used to maintain accurate and complete data on any enemy unit (fig 7-5). Order of battle cards should be maintained at all echelons down to and including division or such lower levels as may be necessary. (To meet the requirement for more detailed recording and filing or order of battle intelligence, particularly at higher levels, a supplementary filing system may be maintained. This system generally will be based on the component parts of the order of battle card.) Normally, one card will be maintained on each enemy division or any other unit in

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD (STANAG 2077)			
1. TITLE-NATIONALITY:		2. CODE NAME:	3. NICK NAME:
4. PARENT FORMATION:		6. FIELD POST NO.	8. COMMANDER:
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS: (List only major subordinate elements)	FPN	COMMANDER	7. INSIGNIA: a. Personnel: (Attach patch) b. Equipment: (Sketch)
9. UNIT HISTORY:			10. MISCELLANEOUS: a. Logistics: b. Training: c. Tactics: d. Other:
NOTE: This card is a summary of OB information pertaining to the diviaion. Other card files containing information pertaining to the subordinate elements are necessary.			

Figure 7–5. Format for Order of Battle Card (STANAG 2077).

11. LOCATION:

12. TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT (Ref STANAG 2077)

		PERSONNEL: TOE			ARMOR: TOE			ARTILLERY: TOE			AIR VEHICLE: TOE			GEN VEH: TOE		
DATE	J No	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %	LOSS	REPL	EFF %
TOTALS																

13. COMBAT EFFICIENCY:

a. Strengths:

b. Weaknesses:

Figure 7–5—Continued.

a position to affect current operations. The order of battle card contains the following minimum information, numbered as follows:

1. TITLE (number and designation of unit/formation) —NATIONALITY
2. CODE NAME (official name assigned by the enemy for convenience)
3. NICKNAME (unofficial popular name)
4. PARENT FORMATION
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS
6. FIELD POST NUMBER (FPN)
7. INSIGNIA
   (a) Personnel
   (b) Equipment
8. COMMANDER
9. UNIT HISTORY
10. MISCELLANEOUS
11. LOCATION
12. TABLE OF PERSONNEL AND MAJOR ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT (to include initial and effective strengths and casualties)
13. COMBAT EFFICIENCY

Note. Data contained in Items 11, 12, and 13 are subject to frequent change and are listed on the back of the card.

7–20. Personality File

Personality data on designated categories of individuals are recorded in a personality file. The purpose of this file is to provide reference material used in the development of other order of battle intelligence. Information on key military figures can be of significant value in the establishment of unit identifications, tactics, and combat effectiveness. The file is kept in alphabetical order. The card (or sheet) contains information concerning the individual's name, rank, current assignment, date and place of birth, civilian education, political affiliation, nicknames, and physical peculiarities. Reference also is made to the individual's school, qualifications, awards, decorations, chronology of assignments, campaigns, engagements, demonstrated performance in leadership assignments, and important activities participated in, as well as character traits such as morals, reputation, appearance, and mannerisms. Source and date of information are recorded with each entry. The personality file also includes information which will aid the commander, G2 and G3 in TC&D planning and operations: such as habits that make the enemy commander and staff vulnerable to deception, those aspects that present the least likely deception target, the degree of freedom the enemy commander allows his subordinates, the enemy commander's reaction time to new situations, and how the enemy commander's fear of the unknown influences his actions.

7–21. Military Installation File

Military installation files normally are maintained during peacetime by higher echelons to facilitate publication of installation handbooks. A collation or explanatory sheet contains all information that has been collected on each installation to include the number and types of buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major items of unit equipment (fig 7–6). Maps, town plans, or sketches showing the location of each installation within the city supplement this file.

7–22. Organizational File

The organizational file provides a convenient method of showing types of units within an armed force. Organizational files depict the complete breakdown of all units from the highest type headquarters to the lowest unit including personnel and major weapons strengths. Since this is rarely possible on a single sheet of paper, a chart showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts for each of its subordinate units are prepared. Principal weapons and equipment charts may be prepared to supplement organizational charts (fig 7–7).

7–23. Strength Worksheet

The strength worksheet (fig 7–8) is used to maintain a running numerical tabulation of the enemy's personnel and equipment strengths. This information is recorded on committed units, fire support units, and reinforcements.

7–24. Topical File

This file is maintained when detailed information is desired on new items of enemy equipment, changes or clarification of tactical doctrine, or on any additional data which will clarify enemy order of battle. Cards or sheets are filed alphabetically by subject.

7–25. Evaluation and Interpretation

The same methods of evaluation and interpretation discussed in chapter 5 are used. An analysis of the order of battle elements is required in the interpretation of order of battle information. The interrelationship of these elements is such that it is difficult to place a greater importance on one than another. Similar difficulty is encountered in analyzing one element without reference or dependence upon another. Therefore, a combination of data pertaining to all elements is required to accomplish complete interpretation.

TOWN HEIMERZHEIM COORD 33ULB 5220

INSTL	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	USE	CAPACITY	STRENGTH	UNIT	TIME LAST INFO	EVAL	REMARKS
1	523208 (201-4th St)	5 story, red brick bldg, Flagpole extends from 5th story window	Unident Hq	400	Unk	Unk	0758	B-2	Many high ranking officers and official sedans observed.
2	522211 (Hwy 2 between K & L Sts)	4x 2-story, wood barracks surrounded by 8' board fence	Trps	500	350?	Engr?	0758	C-2	Sentry observed wearing engineer insignia.
3	531215	6x 4-story, red brick barracks with 2-story bldg	Trps	1,000	850	Unidentified Army	0458	B-2	Sentry observed wearing art insignia. Known to local residents as "Kaiser ᵀks"
4	533218 (N of Instl 3)	8x 1-story garage-type bldg	gun park	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Probably belongs to unit in Instl 3. 9x100mm guns observed
5	514231	2x 3-story, stucco bldg	Trps	Bn	Bn	1st Bn 19th Mtz R Regt	1257	A-1	
6	535211	Local tng area, obstacle course in NW corner	---	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Believe used by trps from both Instl 2 and 3
7	554205	Several underground bunkers inclosed by 8' barbed wire fence. Guard towers located on each corner.	Ammo dump	10 Tons (est)	---	---	1257	F-6	

Figure 7-6. Example of an installation handbook explanatory sheet.

MECHANIZED BATTALION, MECHANIZED REGIMENT

UNIT	PERSONNEL*		SMALL ARMS		MORTARS	AAA	ANTITANK ARTILLERY			VEHICLES		ELECTRONIC	
	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	LIGHT MACHINEGUN	HEAVY MACHINEGUN	82-mm MORTAR	14.5-mm ANTIAIRCRAFT MACHINEGUN (DUAL)	57-mm ANTITANK GUN	82-mm SQUADRON ANTITANK LAUNCHER	82-mm RCL RIFLE	APC	TRUCKS	MANKO	RADIOS
Rifle Company (3)	18	315	27	18				27		27	3		15
Mortar Battery	5	43			6					4	2		3
Support Battery	5	48				2	3		3	6	2		3
Headquarters and Service Campany	10	81								48	10	1	13
TOTALS	38	487	27	18	6	2	3	27	3	85	17	1	34

* Individual weapans: Officers - pistal; Enlisted men - 5 percent pistol, 35 percent submachinegun, 60 percent rifle.

Figure 7–7. Example of a principal weapons and equipment chart

STRENGTH WORKSHEET UNITS BY TYPE

		ARMOR																		
1. COMMITTED FORCES	PERSONNEL	HV	AMPH	MDM	ASLT GUN															
FIRE SUPPORT																				
2. REINFORCEMENTS																				

Figure 7–8. Strength worksheet.

Section V. DISSEMINATION OF ORDER OF BATTLE INTELLIGENCE

7-26. General

The methods of dissemination are discussed in detail in chapter 6. The analysis and production section is normally responsible for most of the enemy situation of the intelligence estimate (app J). Paragraphs J-6 through J-11, are primarily its concern. Although paragraphs J-12 and J-13 usually involve the order of battle analyst, other intelligence personnel may also contribute to these paragraphs.

7-27. Order of Battle Annex

An order of battle annex is a document containing order of battle information/intelligence which normally is disseminated with the PERINTREP. Since it is a means of disseminating newly developed intelligence, only the intelligence produced during the reported period is presented. Appendix L provides additional guidance and a sample annex.

CHAPTER 8

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Section I. INTRODUCTION

8–1. General

a. Security is essential to the preservation of combat power and is a recognized principle of war. A command achieves security by protecting itself from espionage, observation, sabotage, annoyance and surprise.

b. Counterintelligence is that element of military operations which deals with neutralizing or destroying the effectiveness of the enemy's intelligence systems. It is an essential element in the success of any military operation and is a major part of the overall operations security concept. By denying information to the enemy and thereby decreasing his ability to use his combat power effectively, counterintelligence aids in reducing the risks of a command. Achieving surprise and maintaining the initiative is dependent upon reliable intelligence and effective counterintelligence. Counterintelligence provides a significant contribution to friendly tactical cover and deception (TC&D) and operations security (OPSEC) activities.

8–2. Counterintelligence Measures

a. Defensive. Defensive counterintelligence measures are designed to conceal information from the enemy. They include measures such as operational security, personnel security, security of classified or sensitive documents and materiel, installation security, signal security, movement control, resources control, noise discipline, light discipine, border and frontier security, popular control, censorship, camouflage, and use of concealment and electronic counter-countermeasures. Defensive counterintelligence measures are readily standardized in the unit SOP regardless of the specific nature of the unit's mission.

b. Offensive. Offensive counterintelligence measures actively block the enemy's attempts to gain information or to engage in sabotage or subversion. They include counterreconnaissance, counterespionage, countersabotage, countersubversion, deception programs, to include confusion and harassment, electronic countermeasures against hostile SIGINT and ESM collection activities, camouflage, and the use of smoke to deny enemy observation. Offensive counterintelligence measures vary with the mission of the unit.

8–3. Counterintelligence Responsibilities

a. The individual soldier has ultimate responsibility for counterintelligence. Defensive counterintelligence operations depend upon his ability to carry out proper security, camouflage, and observation and reporting procedures in his daily activities. It is also important for the individual soldier to evade the enemy if cut off from his unit, and, if captured, to resist enemy interrogation, adhere to the code of conduct, and escape if possible. Evaders and recovered US prisoners of war are valuable counterintelligence sources for obtaining information concerning enemy intelligence activities, including subversion.

b. All units have counterintelligence responsibilities since they must implement appropriate counterintelligence measures to keep information on their activities, locations, and disposition from the enemy. Some units such as US Army Security Agency units and censorship units have specialized counterintelligence functions based on the nature of their missions. Every staff officer and commander must be aware of the counterintelligence aspects of his particular activity.

c. Counterintelligence personnel are assigned to military intelligence companies, battalions, and groups (FM 30–9) to provide the command with an operating element in the field of counterintelligence. Typical staff agencies with which a counterintelligence officer can expect to coordinate are:

(1) G2 Operations—Development of collec-

tion requirements, collection tasking of other than counterintelligence organizations, integration of counterintelligence information, information of counterintelligence interest, security training.

(2) G2 Reconnaissance and Surveillance—Sorties to check countersurveillance measures.

(3) ACofS, G3—Operational security, countersurveillance and counterreconnaissance measures, tactical cover and deception operations.

(4) Commander, Supporting USASA Organization—Signal security.

(5) ACofS, G4—Critical installations, lines of communications, rear area security, storage of special weapons.

(6) C-E Officer—Security aspects of signal arrays.

(7) ACofS, G5—Control of civilians.

(8) Civil Affairs—Political intelligence, indigenous officials.

(9) Provost Marshal—Military police intelligence, military police assets, physical security of restricted and other sensitive areas, security of PWs of CI interest, security of special weapons.

(10) Headquarters Commandant—Security of the TOC.

(11) ACofS, G1—Personnel aspects of counterintelligence.

(12) Adjutant General—Assignment of personnel to sensitive positions, security of message center operations, reproduction of classified documents, TOP SECRET control.

(13) Surgeon—Security implications of drug abuse.

(14) Chaplain—Morale.

(15) Inspector General—CI support of inspections.

(16) Staff Judge Advocate—Legal aspects of counterintelligence investigations and activities.

(17) Engineer—Barrier plan, LOC critical points, camouflage.

(18) Indigenous officials—Selected counterintelligence liaison.

d. Agencies such as the US Army Criminal Investigations Command (USACIC), Naval Investigative Services Office, the Office of Special Investigations (USAF), the Coast Guard's Intelligence Division, the State Department, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department, and the Defense Investigative Service perform functions that assist Army counterintelligence operations.

Section II. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

8-4. General

a. Operational Categories. Counterintelligence operations may be divided into the three general categories of counterintelligence investigations, counterintelligence services, and counterintelligence special operations. Counterintelligence investigations include specific investigations of individuals or incidents through personnel security investigations (PSI) and complaint-type investigations (CTI). Counterintelligence services encompass specific security services provided by counterintelligence personnel and units to assist commanders at all echelons in planning, implementing, and maintaining proper and adequate safeguards against the threats of sabotage, espionage, and subversive activity. Special operations are concerned with sophisticated and highly specialized techniques in the areas of counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion (FM 30-17A).

b. Functions in Combat Operations. The emphasis of counterintelligence operations will vary with mission, echelon of command, and tactical situation. Denial of information to the enemy is one of the most important aspects of counterintelligence operations at the tactical level and receives greater emphasis during actual operations. Counterintelligence operations within the field army under tactical conditions generally consist of personnel security; physical security; special weapons security; civil security; and counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion. Each of these can comprise a major factor of operational security (OPSEC) operations and programs. See FM 30-17 and FM 30-17A for detailed discussion of counterintelligence operations and AR 530-1 for OPSEC.

(1) Personnel security includes security clearances and security education programs. Personnel clearance programs are based upon "proper clearance" and "need-to-know" and must be designed to insure maximum protection for classified information while insuring flexibility of command under tactical conditions. Security education programs are aimed at the protection of classified information and security awareness on the part of all personnel. Command security mea-

sures require strict adherence to security regulations on the part of the individual soldier. When considering security measures during the security education program, the following measures should be stressed:

(*a*) Personal or official information should not be carried on the person during tactical operations.

(*b*) Incidents of agitation or other attempts to promote disaffection or subversive activity must be reported immediately through intelligence channels.

(*c*) Receipt of unsolicited correspondence of an inflamatory nature or correspondence seemingly designed to lower troop morale should be reported through intelligence channels.

(*d*) Personnel must be encouraged to exercise self-censorship in their personal correspondence.

(*e*) All correspondence, both personal and official, must be destroyed when no longer of value.

(*f*) Commanders, staff, and individuals must be cautioned against establishing patterns which may indicate a pending operation.

(*g*) Code of conduct requirements must stress the individual's responsibility to escape and evade and to resist enemy interrogation if captured. This information should be stressed in briefings, promoted in security training, and included in locally published directives and SOP.

(*h*) Individuals should be made aware of their communications security responsibilities.

(2) Physical security comprises a system of controls, barriers, and other devices and procedures to prevent destruction, damage, and unauthorized access to Army facilities/activities. Counterintelligence personnel must provide installation and unit commanders with survey and inspection services to insure protection against physical penetration and compromise of classified information and materiel. Physical security measures will be coordinated with military police personnel. The mobility and frequent displacement of installations, their proximity to the indigenous population, and the complications presented by combined operations. Recommendations for use of unattended ground sensors for physical security should be coordinated with unit sensor officer. Counterintelligence surveys and inspections by CI units and signal security surveys conducted by US Army Security Agency units complement each other. These efforts will be coordinated through G2/S2 channels to maximize the overall security posture of the installation.

(3) Special weapons security is concerned with the security of components, ancillary equipment, and supporting documents of special weapons systems during use, storage, and transportation. Counterintelligence personnel assist special weapons unit commanders and others with responsibility for these systems in establishing adequate security measures. Assistance is provided in the form of CI surveys and inspections, monitoring of shipments and deliveries to sites or depots, and in conducting effective security education programs, and coordinating with other units (E.G., military police) responsible for providing security for these systems.

(4) Civil security is concerned with all counterintelligence activities affecting the civil population of an area. Civil security operations are extensive in commands with large territorial responsibilities, heavily populated areas, and in cold war situations. Civil security measures include population-resources control, civil censorship, security screening of civilian labor, monitoring of suspect political groups, and industrial plant protection. Close coordination should be maintained with civil-military operations staffs, G5/S5, and civil affairs units operating in the area.

(5) Counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion include both offensive and defensive operations of a special nature directed against hostile intelligence organizations and activities. At tactical levels these operations will be oriented toward tactical operations and closely coordinated with military intelligence units having area intelligence responsibilities. See FM 30–17, FM 30–17A, and FM 30–18 for further details.

(6) Censorship, as an additional function of counterintelligence, may be employed in combat operations to prevent information from reaching the enemy or to collect information. The G2 has primary staff responsibility for Armed Forces, and enemy prisoner-of-war and civilian internee censorship (AR 380–200, AR 380–235, and FM 30–28). Civil-military operations staff officers coordinate with the G2 in planning and implementing civil censorship (AR 380–83 and FM 45–20).

8–5. Brigade and Battalion

a. A basic counterintelligence function of the S2 consists of implementing and supervising counterintelligence measures directed by higher head-

quarters. He is responsible for reporting information of counterintelligence interest through counterintelligence channels. At lower echelons the emphasis is on denial (defensive) measures—measures which are applied to prevent the enemy from obtaining information—rather than detection (offensive) measures used to expose and neutralize the enemy effort. Deception measures are employed to mislead the enemy as to the true status or purpose of friendly activity, personnel and weapons, strength, disposition, and logistical buildup. These denial measures are directed and controlled by higher headquarters through the use of standing operating procedures (SOP), communications-electronics standing instructions (CESI), communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI), adminstrative orders (ADMIN O), and operation orders (OPORD). The application of the measures should be closely coordinated with other command and staff personnel, particularly with the S3 (who has staff responsibility for deception measures), and the communications officer.

b. The S2 functions as a staff advisor for the application of counterintelligence measures in an operational situation. Operational activities, such as the establishment of outposts, listening posts, and ambushes, which are normally S3 functions, also have counterintelligence implications. These activities are designed not only to protect the unit, but also to counter the enemy's collection effort. Therefore, the location of such positions or activities should be selected based on their security and operational values. To arrive at such a determination, close coordination and joint planning by the S2 and S3 are required.

c. The counterintelligence section of the military intelligence company attached to the division provides direct counterintelligence support to the division. Counterintelligence personnel are deployed throughout the division area of responsibility as needed, but are normally not deployed lower than brigade. CI teams may be temporarily attached to brigades in accordance with the tactical situation. These CI teams become fully responsive to the counterintelligence needs of the brigade commander.

d. The S2 assists in planning and supervising counterintelligence training conducted for personnel of lower echelons. The training of these troops should include both unit and individual security measures to include the counterintelligence aspects of evasion and escape, and conduct in the event of capture.

8–6. Division

a. The counterintelligence section chief of the division MI unit is usually designated chief of the counterintelligence branch of the G2 section and, as such, is responsible to the division G2 for implementation and execution of the division counterintelligence efforts.

b. Counterintelligence operations at division level should include internal security measures and counterintelligence coverage of the area for which the division is responsible. The primary concern of the division counterintelligence section is denying combat intelligence and target information to the enemy. Activities appropriate for supervision by the division counterintelligence section and performance by security personnel may include—

(1) Personnel security, physical security, and special weapons security. These measures provide internal security to the division headquarters, communications centers, and other division installations and areas through counterintelligence surveys, inspections, checks, and personnel security investigations. Specific counterintelligence measures to be adopted for a tactical operation must be established early in the planning phase. Because these measures support the accomplishment of the mission, they should be closely coordinated with the command and staff elements concerned. Of particular concern are special weapons security measures for the neutralization of enemy target acquisition efforts directed toward locating friendly nuclear weapons systems.

(2) Screening of refugees, linecrossers, defectors, and PW of counterintelligence interest. Refugees fleeing the battle area or evacuees being moved to safer locations pose a threat to friendly tactical units. Large numbers of refugees or evacuees may hamper the movement of friendly troops and supplies. In addition to hampering friendly movement, refugee groups may be used by hostile agents as a cover to infiltrate friendly positions, either for short-range or long-range hostile activities. The control of civilians including legal residents in the tactical area and the detection of hostile personnel require close and continuous support on the part of combat units, military police elements, civil affairs teams, and counterintelligence elements within the area. Refugees, linecrossers, and PWs are valuable sources

of information regarding enemy imposed security measures, resource controls, and intelligence agencies within the denied area.

(3) Identity, exploitation, and neutralization of counterintelligence targets assigned to the division and targets of opportunity. Specific targets include enemy intelligence agents; installations used by enemy intelligence, counterintelligence or paramilitary organizations; enemy communications media; selected enemy personnel in the political and scientific area; records and files of intelligence and counterintelligence interest, and—

(*a*) *Personalities.* Known individuals and their locations are listed and disseminated to all intelligence and nonintelligence agencies requiring this information.

(*b*) *Organizations.* Identified political, underground, partisan, insurgent infrastructure, or other groups of counterintelligence interest are listed by priority of importance to the command. This information is disseminated to agencies concerned.

(*c*) *Installations.* Buildings, offices, utilities, storage facilities or other installations of counterintelligence interest are cataloged in the appropriate CI file for further exploitation.

(*d*) *Lists.* Each counterintelligence unit is responsible for the preparation and dissemination of target lists. For ease in identification a color code has been established to indicate the area of counterintelligence interest.

1. White List. Contains a listing of friendly targets which may require protection or evacuation.

2. Grey List. Contains a list of targets whose purposes and motives are not known.

3. Black List. Contains a list of targets that in some manner pose a threat to the command.

(4) Contributing information regarding enemy intelligence collection capabilities to the G2 for TC&D operations. The counterintelligence section through its data base aids the G2 in determining the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the enemy's intelligence collection effort which might be susceptible to a TC&D operation. The section is also cognizant of the ground truth which is presented to the enemy intelligence collection effort by the friendly force.

c. Frequently, situations may arise that are beyond the capability of the counterintelligence section of the supporting MI Company. Examples include the security screening of an abnormally large influx of refugees into the division area and the necessity of reducing an unusually large number of high-priority counterintelligence targets. In such cases, counterintelligence augmentation personnel may be requested by the division G2 from the G2 at the higher echelon.

d. The division counterintelligence element will be concerned with informants having information of immediate tactical significance. Informants as sources of information of strategic and non-tactical significance are of concern to the field army and theater army counterintelligence units. During stability operations the divisional element will usually be concerned with internal and installation security only; informants will be the concern of the unit charged with area coverage.

8–7. Corps

a. Normally, corps has no area responsibility; therefore, the military intelligence company attached to corps normally confines its counterintelligence activities to internal security functions of the corps headquarters and to other security functions, such as military, civil, frontier and travel security and censorship operations, which are related to the mission of the corps. However, there may be instances when nuclear battlefield conditions, independent actions, or increases in workload and responsibilities of the field army military intelligence company (counterintelligence) require the counterintelligence section of corps to assist in area coverage or counterintelligence operations that are normally the responsibility of counterintelligence personnel of field army and division.

b. The corps is the lowest headquarters which has a counterintelligence (CI) staff position. Typical responsibilities of a coordinating staff CI officer are as follows:

(1) Advises on CI aspects of operations, counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion measures, and censorship requirements.

(2) Prepares CI estimates, plans, directives, reports, the CI portion of the intelligence annex of operations plans and the CI portion of required periodic reports and develops counterintelligence collection requirements.

(3) Supports operational security and tactical cover and deception operations as required.

(4) Advises on the counterintelligence aspects of countersurveillance activities and assists

in insuring that appropriate countersurveillance measures are carried out.

(5) Develops and administers a program for the safeguarding of defense information.

(*a*) Promulgates security directives and procedures.

(*b*) Directs the programming of CI services.

(*c*) Advises concerning security violations.

(*d*) Recommends and directs or monitors investigations.

(*e*) Establishes requirements and directs or requests technical assistance for protection of sensitive areas and areas utilized in accordance with AR 381-14.

(*f*) Processes the designation of restricted areas in accordance with AR 380-20.

(6) Prescribes and monitors a program of security indoctrination of personnel in accordance with AR 380-5 and AR 381-12.

(7) Administers the personnel security program, maintains a master file of clearances within the HQ and supporting activities, and verifies clearances for access purposes.

(8) Develops or controls counterintelligence operations within the command's area of responsibility.

(9) Collects information and maintains files regarding matters of intelligence interest and security significance, prepares reports regarding incidents and personnel of CI interest, and determines appropriate dissemination of counterintelligence information.

(10) Has operational control over the counterintelligence section of the attached military intelligence organization.

(11) Monitors the CI investigative activities of intelligence elements attached to the HQ and subordinate units, promulgates directives relating to CI activities, and levies requirements pertinent to CI coverage of the corps area.

(12) Directs interrogations and debriefings of individuals of counterintelligence interest, including military evaders and escapees, members of reconnaissance, espionage, sabotage and guerrilla organizations, and selected civilians.

(13) Performs counterintelligence liaison with counterintelligence security, police, and other appropriate agencies, both US and indigenous.

(14) Coordinates with appropriate operating personnel and agencies in sensitive investigations and related actions which may require immediate action.

(15) Insures the establishment and dissemination as needed of counterintelligence target information and is responsible for source control.

(16) Maintains, as necessary, counterintelligence situation map, counterintelligence measures worksheet, counterintelligence collection worksheet, and other operational aids.

(17) Establishes counterintelligence security requirements for Tactical Operations Center and insures that the requirements are followed.

(18) Advises the G2 on signal security matters.

(19) Provides staff guidance regarding signal security (SIGSEC) surveillance.

(20) Programs security monitoring and reviews USASA SIGSEC analysis reports.

(21) Coordinates the signal security activities of supporting USASA organizations.

8-8. Field Army

a. Counterintelligence operations at field army are similar to counterintelligence operations at division and include responsibility for area coverage. Operations are broader in scope because of the greater number of units, the larger area involved, and the requirement for longer-range planning. The territorial responsibilities of the field army result in more extensive counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security and special operations than at lower echelons. Field army counterintelligence operations pertaining to civil security are based upon support of tactical operations as well as considerations for support of rear area security requirements.

b. The field army continually conducts counterintelligence operations within the field army and corps areas. Such activities are coordinated with the corps intelligence officer to avoid conflict and duplication of effort.

c. Normally, a counterintelligence team of the field army military intelligence company (counterintelligence) will provide area counterintelligence coverage for each corps area. Other teams will be so located as to maintain effective counterintelligence coverage in the remaining field army area. The counterintelligence element may be augmented as necessary by personnel from theater counterintelligence resources.

8-9. Army Group

Army group has no territorial responsibilities and

conducts only such counterintelligence operations as are necessary to maintain the security of the army group headquarters. Counterintelligence plans of army group are usually general in nature and take the form of policy guidance to coordinate counterintelligence operations of subordinate units. Major emphasis is placed upon security of military operations. This involves considering enemy activities which threaten military security and the necessary civil and military security countermeasures. Counterintelligence operations in support of the army group cover those of subordinate units.

8–10. Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM)

a. The TASCOM commander has the responsibility for rear area security throughout the communications zone down to the field army rear boundary. The TASCOM commander normally delegates this responsibility to the commander of the theater army area command (TAACOM). To assist in the performance of rear area security, a military intelligence group, counterintelligence, is assigned to TAACOM. This group provides counterintelligence support for all installations and activities in the communications zone, to include the headquarters of theater army and TASCOM.

b. Denying the enemy information of the supplies, service installations, nuclear weapon systems, and transportation and communication means, and their protection against sabotage, are vital to the accomplishment of the TASCOM mission. Thus, TASCOM requires extensive counterintelligence operations of all types. Although the scope and emphasis may vary, counterintelligence procedures and techniques are similar to those at field army level.

c. The subordinate military intelligence companies of the military intelligence group (counterintelligence), normally are attached to the area support groups to provide area coverage throughout the communications zone. Strengths may be shifted to cope with varying workloads and levels of activity. Companies are responsive to the staff intelligence or security officers of the area support groups although operations are centrally coordinated at the group headquarters under the staff supervision of the ACofS, security, plans, and operations, TAACOM. The following functions constitute most of the workload of the military intelligence group (counterintelligence):

(1) Personnel security investigations and complaint type investigations.

(2) Counterintelligence surveys and inspections.

(3) Counterintelligence support for Army nuclear weapons systems and facilities.

(4) Counterespionage, countersabotage, and countersubversion operations.

(5) Interrogation of suspected guerrillas and prisoners of war captured in the TASCOM area who are of counterintelligence interest.

(6) Operation of a central records facility (CRF) on information of counterintelligence interest within the theater.

(7) Assistance in the security education program for TASCOM personnel.

8–11. Theater Army

a. Theater army counterintelligence activities are usually confined to the coordination of operations of subordinate commands, the administrative control of counterintelligence personnel assigned to the theater echelons, and the conduct of highly specialized counterintelligence operations (FM 30–17 and FM 30–17A). The theater army coordinates and supervises counterintelligence operations by—

(1) Publishing policy statements and directives.

(2) Planning and supervising the assumption of counterintelligence control of army rear areas by TASCOM when the field army moves forward. Coordination usually takes place between the armies and TASCOM or the TAACOM.

(3) Coordinating the activities of subordinate commands to insure complete counterintelligence coverage.

(4) Planning the procurement of counterintelligence specialists.

b. The theater army commander exercises operational control over the military intelligence group, theater army, assigned to his command. This MI group provides specialized support, such as theater-wide special operations and technical intelligence analysis, which requires centralized control and direction. The counterintelligence element of the military intelligence group is a military intelligence detachment, counterintelligence. The detachment conducts CI special operations in support of national, theater, TA field army, and TASCOM requirements.

8–12. Counterintelligence Support to the Theater Army Civil Affairs and Air Defense Commands

The counterintelligence assets of the theater army provide counterintelligence support to the theater army civil affairs and air defense commands. Both the civil affairs and air defense commanders are concerned with internal security of their commands. The air defense command requires counterintelligence support to insure the protection of weapons and target acquisition means. The civil affairs command requires counterintelligence support directed toward civil security to include the civil aspects of port, frontier, and travel security.

Section III. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLANNING AND ORDERS

8–13. General

a. Counterintelligence planning is accomplished concurrently with the planning and conduct of theater army operations plans and policies and include both offensive and defensive aspects. Counterintelligence plans at lower echelons are increasingly detailed but flexible to insure adequate support for all phases of operations of the supported units.

b. Planning the counterintelligence measures in support of any operation is concurrent with the planning and conduct of the operation. It begins with the inception of the operation plan and continues until the operation is completed. The procedures used in counterintelligence planning generally are similar to the planning of the collection effort described in an earlier chapter.

c. The counterintelligence officer has three separate roles in carrying out his responsibilities:

(1) He directs intelligence agencies in obtaining intelligence concerning the enemy's reconnaissance, battlefield surveillance, signals intelligence, guerrillas, espionage, sabotage, and subversion capabilities.

(2) He is collector and producer of intelligence concerning the enemy's intelligence capabilities, especially his covert capabilities.

(3) He plans for, recommends, and monitors counterintelligence measures throughout the entire command. See FM 30–17 for more details on combat counterintelligence operations.

8–14. Counterintelligence Estimate

a. The counterintelligence estimate is an evaluation of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage and subversive capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capabilities. It includes the effects of these capabilities on friendly courses of action, how effectively existing friendly countermeasures can negate enemy capabilities, and the need for additional countermeasures or increased emphasis on current countermeasures.

b. The estimate is based on knowledge of the order of battle of enemy units and agencies which collect intelligence data and conduct sabotage and subversive activities—of special interest are organization, training, equipment, doctrine, techniques, and deployment.

c. The counterintelligence estimate is applicable to all echelons of command. However, a written estimate will not normally be prepared below division. The counterintelligence estimate is normally prepared for the intelligence officer by the chief of the counterintelligence branch, G2 section. In preparing such an estimate the counterintelligence branch chief must consider the entire range of enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities. He, therefore, must obtain detailed information from all available sources such as ASA, other branches within the G2 section, other staff sections, air defense units, engineer elements, civil affairs and PSYOP units, MI elements, Air Force, etc. The counterintelligence estimate may be prepared in support of a single tactical operation or in support of a long-range broad mission assigned to a unit. The format of a counterintelligence estimate may be found in appendix M.

8–15. Counterintelligence Measures Worksheet

Based upon the conclusions reached in the counterintelligence estimate, the counterintelligence measures worksheet is prepared or revised. This worksheet (fig 8–1) is an essential aid in counterintelligence planning and is the basis for preparing counterintelligence plans, orders, and requests. It is designed to assist the intelligence staff officer in developing a comprehensive and detailed listing of defensive and offensive intelligence countermeasures required for a specific operation. It also includes the identification of

units/agencies which are recommended for executing the countermeasures as well as appropriate staff coordination required.

8–16. Counterintelligence Plan

a. One of the problems of modern warfare is to deny knowledge of impending operations to the enemy, who seeks that knowledge through use of varied and sophisticated intelligence means and battlefield surveillance capabilities. In addition, the order and logic of our established staff procedures and command decision-making process constitute vulnerability for prediction by the enemy. The commander must, therefore, insure that all elements of his command contribute to the implementation of operational security measures which are designed to preserve the element of maximum surprise in the conduct and planning of tactical operations. Such measures are both defensive and offensive in nature and may range from the implementation of a simple security procedure to augmentation of a cover and deception operation.

b. The intelligence officer's principal contribution to the commander's operational security consists of the formulation of the counterintelligence plan. It is a systematic listing of all intelligence countermeasures to be carried out by a command, indicating the units/agencies responsible for the execution of each task. It is prepared from the counterintelligence measures worksheet, and, when completed, becomes an appendix to the intelligence annex to the operation order or is included in paragraph 6 of the intelligence annex. The G2/S2 must continuously coordinate with G3/S3 on proposed intelligence countermeasures. The counterintelligence plan, or parts of it, may be disseminated in message form or through a fragmentary order. A sample counterintelligence plan format may be found in appendix V.

UNIT:

Period covered: From _____ To; _____

(1) Phases or periods of operation	(2) SOP counter measures requiring emphasis	(3) Additional counter measures to be adopted	(4) Units/agencies responsible for execution of countermeasures											(5) Instructions, notes for future action, and staff coordination measures.

Figure 8–1. Counterintelligence measures worksheet.

CHAPTER 9

ADDITIONAL INTELLIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS

Section I. SMALL UNIT INTELLIGENCE

9–1. General

a. This section provides the small unit commander with additional guidance in determining his intelligence requirements and in formulating means and methods for the collection of information and the dissemination of information and intelligence. The scope of intelligence activities at the company level is much reduced from that at higher echelons. An urgent need does exist for the collection of information and the application of intelligence to the tactical plan or mission of the company.

b. The company commander must make the greatest possible use of the time and means available to him in order that collection of information and the use of resulting intelligence will fulfill the maximum number of his requirements. The company commander has a realistic and urgent responsibility to supply the information needed by the battalion S2. It is largely through the efforts of the individual companies that the battalion S2 is able to produce the intelligence necessary for the commander and the subordinate elements of the command.

c. One of the most difficult links in the intelligence chain is the dissemination of tactical intelligence from the S2 to the company commander. The company commander relies upon the battalion S2 to furnish him with much of the intelligence necessary for planning his assigned mission. The S2 must make maximum effort to insure that the information flows down to small unit leaders. Simple sketches, pencil INTSUM's, and annotated aerial photos are invaluable tools for planning at the company level.

d. The company commander, like the S2, is often unable to satisfy all of his requirements for information. This means that he must establish a working priority for his requirements after considering the mission of the company and the enemy situation as known at the time.

9–2. Requirements for the Attack

a. In order to execute his attack order successfully, the company commander requires timely and accurate intelligence concerning the enemy's capabilities. In general, the commander will always require information on the enemy and the environment which will enable him to influence the outcome of the action through proper decisions. Some examples of actions which are influenced by the intelligence available to a commander are—

(1) Positioning of the reserve.
(2) Employment of weapons.
  (*a*) Location.
  (*b*) Type of fire.
  (*c*) Priorities for fire support.
(3) Location of the company commander.
(4) Commitment of the reserve.
(5) Requests for support from higher headquarters.
  (*a*) Fire support.
  (*b*) Other support.

b. During stability operations the company commander will require intelligence data concerning not only the traditional aspects of enemy, weather, and terrain, but also intelligence data oriented toward the sociological, political, and economic aspects of the population.

c. Intelligence is important to the company commander in the attack because knowledge of the manner in which the enemy is conducting his defense allows the commander to take a positive approach in influencing the action, enables him to maintain the initiative and exploit his own successes as well as enemy weaknesses, and it permits him to apply the force available at the most advantageous moment.

9–3. Requirements for the Defense

a. As in the attack, intelligence requirements for the conduct of a successful defense will vary.

Generally, the following requirements will be given priority during the period prior to the enemy attack which can be anticipated in a defense situation:

(1) Locations of avenues of approach into the friendly position.

(2) Locations of obstacles.

(3) Locations and strengths of opposing enemy forces, including his reserves.

(4) Locations of enemy automatic weapons.

(5) Locations of likely enemy assembly areas.

(6) Weather forecasts and information.

b. As in the attack information or intelligence concerned with these requirements will enable the company commander to take a positive approach to influence the action and will enable him to exploit fully his own capabilities and the enemy weaknesses. (See chapter 3 for additional guidance.)

9-4. Intelligence Requirements for Other Actions

a. Withdrawal. A withdrawal conducted during daylight or at night poses definite intelligence requirements. One of the most important means of fulfilling these requirements is reconnaissance. The company commander must select routes to assigned or designated assembly areas; these routes should provide security from enemy observation and fire. Terrain and weather will play an important part in selection of routes. Security for a withdrawal begins with the inception of planning and continues until the movement is completed. Security must include both security for the force and security measures designed to deny the enemy knowledge of the withdrawal before, during, and frequently after the action is completed.

b. Company as a Security Force. The company may be designated as a security force for the next higher echelon or as a part of a larger security force for the division. Security forces are used to provide security, deception, and flexibility, and add depth to the defense of a larger unit. Security forces should have greater mobility than the enemy; a similar result may be achieved by use of deception, movement in darkness, and retention of the initiative. The company commander continues to have responsibility for rapidly passing information and intelligence to the echelon controlling the security force. Requirements will be focused on terrain, reconnaissance, and the effects of the weather forecasts.

c. Company as a Reserve Force.

(1) When a company is designated as the reserve or as part of a larger reserve unit, planning for employment in at least one, but usually several roles is necessitated. The company commander must use reconnaissance to ascertain the best utilization of terrain for each role in which his unit may be employed. Weather information and its effect on terrain must be weighed and studied. Enemy capabilities as they affect each role must be determined. Since the company is in reserve, the opportunity for using organic means to acquire information is limited or nonexistent. Requests must be made of the battalion S2 for the intelligence necessary to plan for the various missions anticipated. The S2, on his own initiative and in coordination with the S3, must take positive action to provide the maximum amount of available intelligence to the reserve force.

(2) In reserve, the company commander will frequently be charged with an area security responsibility. As a general rule when increased dispersion is necessitated by the enemy's capability to employ nuclear weapons, the area security mission will require utilization of most, if not all, of the company's personnel. The security mission will necessitate the employment of some of the counterintelligence and security measures mentioned in chapter 8.

d. Other Actions. Regardless of mission or role, the company commander is responsible for the security of his unit. Insuring the security of a company while it is in movement presents many problems. All security measures which do not interfere with the accomplishment of the mission should be implemented. Security measures must be developed for each situation on an individual basis.

9-5. Intelligence Means Available

The company commander must accomplish the S2 functions since he has no personnel whose primary duty is intelligence. With the urgent need for intelligence at this level, the company commander must organize his unit to provide for the handling of collected information and the dissemination of intelligence.

a. Organic Collecting Agencies. All subordinate elements of the company must be trained and prepared to function as collection agencies as a secondary mission. Available to the commander are his tactical elements (platoons), his organic supporting weapons observers, and each individual of

the company who can observe enemy activity or its effect. The main problem in transmitting the information available to the company commander, and through him to the battalion S2, is one of command emphasis on the training and conduct of personnel to insure that items of significant information are recognized and reported expeditiously to the commander.

b. Attached or Supporting Collection Agencies. The company commander should insure that personnel of attached or supporting units such as forward observers of supporting ground surveillance radar teams from the combat support company, and personnel manning outposts in the company area of responsibility report information of possible interest or significance to him for his consideration. In addition, personnel of other supporting arms such as a forward air controller or a naval gun fire spotter and reconnaissance elements from the next higher echelon which are attached to or operating in the unit area may provide significant intelligence data to the company commander.

c. The Company Commander's Intelligence Role. The company commander can analyze, collate, evaluate, and produce intelligence on a limited scale for the use of his company and its subordinate elements. This process is largely mental and instinctive, but it does encompass the elements associated with the production of intelligence. A requirement exists for designation of personnel and means of communication for receiving the information from the collection agencies with some means of recording information in the absence of the company commander. The company commander has the responsibility of insuring the uninterrupted flow of these items of information to the next higher echelon.

d. Dissemination. Equally as important as the receipt of information and production of intelligence is timely dissemination to personnel and units concerned with the use of these items. This requirement alone justifies the procedure of insuring that certain personnel are assigned intelligence duties. In addition to reporting (disseminating) information to the battalion S2, the company commander must keep his assigned, subordinate, attached, and supporting elements informed.

9–6. Intelligence at Lower Levels

Generally, information is collected at lower echelons and flows up to higher echelons while intelligence is produced at higher echelons and is disseminated to lower echelons. The majority of intelligence used by the platoon and squad is produced at company or higher.

a. Platoon Intelligence Requirements. As a major subordinate element of the company, the platoon comprises the main tactical echelon of the company. Needs will vary with the different types of platoons within the company, based on the mission, assignment, and capabilities of each. Platoon leaders will develop some intelligence information at their level for use of the platoon and squad. Care must be taken, however, that the company provides the broadest coverage and that information developed at platoon and squad level is viewed in its proper perspective. Effective training and supervision will increase the value of information reported by the individual Soldier. Platoon leaders must transmit expeditiously to company that information acquired. It must be recognized that the effective production of intelligence requires the participation of all elements of the command.

b. Squad Intelligence. As the lowest tactical entity of the company, the squad intelligence needs are commensurate with the mission assigned to the squad. Because of the small size of squads and the limitation of the area of knowledge, most of the squad's information requirements will be met by higher echelons. Intelligence produced at squad level is limited and subject to distortion unless correlated with intelligence developed at company and higher level. It is the squad leader's responsibility to insure the receipt of intelligence from above and to disseminate it to each of the members of the squad. Equally important is the squad leader's responsibility for training the members of his squad in intelligence matters, particularly in the need for immediate and accurate reporting of all items of information (FM 21–75).

c. Company Patrols. Company-directed patrols are those patrols that the company commander feels necessary to maintain contact among elements of the company, adjacent units, and provide early warning and security. Battalion-directed patrols are dispatched by the company commander at the request of the S2 to obtain information, provide contact with adjacent units, and serve as screening or counterreconnaissance forces. These patrols are briefed and debriefed by the S2 in coordination with the battalion S3. The S2 includes in his daily patrol plan those patrols which must be coordinated with higher and adjacent units.

Section II. SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

9-7. General

a. Information concerning extreme characteristics of weather and terrain is a prerequisite to the initiation of an operation. In addition, the effects of these on both friendly and enemy courses must be considered.

b. Operations in extremes of weather and terrain affect intelligence operations by creating unique intelligence requirements and by generally impeding collection and dissemination of information and intelligence. Specific intelligence requirements and problems posed by extremes of weather and terrain are discussed in certain field manuals of the 31-series. Paragraphs 9-8 and 9-9 emphasize significant intelligence considerations.

9-8. Extremes in Weather

a. Provisions must be made for frequent weather forecasting and for rapid dissemination of forecasts to the lowest echelons. Forecasts must include special items of particular significance to the military operation. For example, wind speed in arctic operations is extremely important because of its use in determining the wind chill factor. In mountain operations, storms of all types are a critical factor in the conduct of operations. Weather forecasts and forecasting capabilities must be responsive to these special conditions. Additional equipment or units may be required to meet the need.

b. Extremes in weather affect intelligence requirements concerning enemy capabilities. Specific information of the enemy's capabilities for moving cross-country and for living and fighting for prolonged periods in extreme weather is an essential intelligence requirement.

c. Preplanning is necessary to minimize the effects of weather extremes on intelligence collection efforts. Extremes of cold or heat affect the operation of sensory devices; prolonged periods of reduced visibility limit the effectiveness of reconnaissance/surveillance and the effectiveness of visual and photographic capabilities; and sudden storms place limitations on all battlefield surveillance operations.

9-9. Extremes in Terrain

a. Extreme terrain features increase the complexity or difficulty of the effort required to collect needed information. Because of the extreme terrain variations, more detailed information is required for planning purposes. Jungle areas require close examination in order to penetrate the jungle cover; mountainous regions limit observation, especially when the high ground cannot be occupied; and northern regions or deserts are conspicuous by their lack of easily identified and located terrain objects.

b. Generally, areas of extreme terrain lack accurate geodetic and map coverage. This creates a requirement for greater detail in the collection of terrain information.

c. Early examination and evaluation of the collection efforts required and prior planning and preparation will minimize collection problems during the conduct of the military operation.

Section III. SPECIAL TYPE OPERATIONS

9-10. Joint Airborne Operations

a. The production and dissemination of intelligence are influenced by the following characteristics of joint airborne operations:

(1) Planning is concurrent.

(2) Higher headquarters provide most of the information and intelligence for airborne units during the planning phase.

(3) Terrain analyses are more detailed. Special emphasis is placed upon the location of suitable drop zones and assault aircraft landing zones. These locations are developed by means of a point landing area study.

(4) Weather information must be broader in scope and more detailed; weather forecasts must be more frequent than for ground-based operations.

(5) Counterintelligence measures are stringent and rigidly enforced. However, intelligence disseminated to subordinate units is as extensive and detailed as practicable.

b. Certain enemy capabilities receive special emphasis. Examples are his capability to employ nuclear weapons, chemical and biological agents, and airstrikes against the airborne force in the departure area, en route, and in the objective

area; his armor capability; and his air defense capability (FM 57–1).

9–11. Airmobile Operations

a. Initial Entry Into an Area of Operations.

(1) Normal combat intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination procedures will normally not satisfy initial intelligence requirements without assistance from higher echelons. Increased requirements exist for maps, weather forecasts, and up-to-date intelligence on enemy antiaircraft capabilities, with dissemination down to company level. Airmobile operations are normally based on continuous offense with extensive requirements for rear area security, population controls, and heavy logistical support requirements. Therefore, airmobile operations require simultaneous consideration of strategic and tactical information for defensive and offensive operations at all times by all echelons.

(2) Battalion and brigade commanders are forced in many instances to make their own intelligence estimates. This is due primarily to the rapid pace of decision-making in airmobile operations. The battalion and brigade S2 must develop a much broader awareness of intelligence requirements and prepare increasingly detailed and comprehensive briefings for their commanders.

b. Stable Base Area of Operations.

(1) Intelligence requirements include terrain analyses of landing areas, detailed and frequent weather forecasts and accurate locations of enemy air defense installations.

(2) The determination of aerial avenues of approach and landing zones are major requirements. Normally, these requirements cannot be fully accomplished by ground reconnaissance. For areas immediately in front of the FEBA, information can be obtained from the units in contact. Aerial reconnaissance (visual, SLAR, IR) is employed in the objective area and in other areas beyond the capability of the units in contact (FM 57–35).

9–12. Amphibious Operations

a. Special considerations that affect intelligence requirements for amphibious operations include the following:

(1) Length of time elapsing between the initiation of planning and the execution of the operation.

(2) Dependence upon higher echelons for information and intelligence.

(3) Lack of opportunity for supplemental ground reconnaissance prior to initiation of landing.

(4) Difficulty in dissemination of intelligence during the initial stages of the landing.

b. Intelligence requirements that receive special emphasis include information about beaches and the terrain inland to the beachhead line, including obstacles and demolitions on beaches and under water; weather conditions; and current information of the enemy situation just prior to and during the assault landing (FM 31–12).

9–13. Unconventional Warfare

Intelligence requirements at all command levels concerned with the conduct of unconventional warfare operation encompass the entire spectrum of intelligence. Unconventional warfare includes the three related fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion, conducted within hostile areas by predominately indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. The planning and conduct of unconventional warfare encompasses the entire spectrum of intelligence and counterintelligence activities at all command levels concerned with this type of warfare.

a. Guerrilla Warfare.

(1) Planning and conduct of intelligence and counterintelligence activities to support guerrilla forces are normally centralized in the J2 and J3 staff sections of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF) of the unified or specified command. Once unconventional warfare operational areas (UWOA) have been designated by the theater commander, Army Special Forces operational detachments are infiltrated into these areas. To provide a focal point for planning and conducting unconventional warfare operations in these areas, Special Forces is given the primary task of organizing an area command headquarters for integrating Special Forces operational detachments and the resistance forces. (See FM 31–21 and 31–21A for details.)

(2) Guerrilla forces conducting overt offensive operations in UWOA will be primarily interested in acquiring combat intelligence for use in their own operations. To this end, guerrillas normally will employ conventional information gathering techniques such as patrols, observation posts, and area and target site reconnaissance, supported in varying degrees by information from their auxiliary and underground forces. Guerrilla

forces must employ agent/informant networks for gaining information/intelligence in support of operations. The expansion of insurgent operations increases the problem of security; therefore, guerrilla forces must have a well-developed counterintelligence capability to prevent enemy security forces from penetrating the main guerrilla force organization by infiltrating informants or agents.

(3) Intelligence requirements in support of military objectives are dictated by the nature and scope of unconventional warfare operations to be conducted in the designated UWOA. They are primarily directed toward information which—

(*a*) Provides a thorough background knowledge of the UWOA area to include an intimate understanding of the population within the UWOA and an evaluation of their resistance potential.

(*b*) Aids in determining political trends.

(*c*) Aids in determining enemy activities and capabilities.

(*d*) Supports guerrilla psychological operations.

(*e*) Supports the expansion of guerilla operations.

(*f*) Provides weather and terrain data.

(4) The employment of guerrilla forces as intelligence collection agencies for commanders of theater and component forces is restricted by communication limitations and the nature of their collection effort to support their own operations. The security of guerrilla forces dictates restrictions on radio traffic and, consequently, the amount of intelligence that can be provided. This limitation notwithstanding, guerrilla forces are ideally suited to contribute to the theater intelligence effort—chiefly through the collection of information in the areas of target acquisition, damage assessment, and enemy order of battle (FM 31-21 and FM 31-21A).

b. Evasion and Escape.

(1) Information and intelligence of the area of operations and enemy procedures and techniques are required for an effective evasion and escape program.

(2) Information on the area of operations is collected using all available resources in addition to normal tactical intelligence collection methods. Specific requirements include information on usable routes for escapees and evaders, cover and concealment, sources of water and subsistence, areas to be avoided, areas safe for use as removal areas, borders, and the attitude of the local population according to social, ethnic, religious, political, and economic groups, if possible.

(3) Requirements concerning enemy procedures and techniques in countering the evasion and escape operation are collected primarily by interrogation of knowledgeable prisoners of war, refugees, escapees, and evaders.

(4) Details on evasion and escape are discussed in FM 21-76 and FM 21-77A.

c. Subversion.

(1) Subversion consists of those actions designed to reduce the military, moral, political, economic, or psychological strength of any enemy. One of the objectives of indigenous underground resistane groups, in coordination with its guerrilla forces, is to attempt to undermine or overthrow a government or occupying power.

(2) The success or failure of the underground resistance movement to operate effectively in a hostile environment hinges largely on the effectiveness of its intelligence networks to provide the intelligence needed for planning and conducting subversion against the enemy government or occupying power. These intelligence networks must be sufficiently broad in scope to cover every facet of the society and government, including enemy military forces. Correspondingly, it must have a well-developed counterintelligence capability to prevent opposition security forces from penetrating vital operational elements of the underground.

(3) Due to the sensitive nature of such operations and the need to communicate with underground leaders in utmost secrecy, military intelligence requirements levied on the resistance underground organization may be greatly circumscribed. Normally, this will be accomplished through the area command headquarters in the UWOA. However, other channels of communication may be used (FM 31-21A).

9-14. Chemical and Biological Operations

a. The enemy's chemical and biolcgical capabilities and the effects of chemical or biological agents on the area of operations are considered in analyses of the area of operations, intelligence estimates, and collection plans. The surprise with which chemical and biological agents can be used and the difficulties involved in the immediate detection of their use—but particularly verification of a biological attack—make indications of the use of these agents an important element in intelligence collection planning.

b. Current US policy renounces the use of toxins and biological agents as methods of warfare

and first use of lethal and incapacitating chemicals (FM 101–40). Effective use of chemical munitions or agents, as a retaliation in kind, requires information and intelligence on targets and target areas for attack by friendly forces. Predictions are required as to the effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on the use of chemical munitions or agents. Specifically, information is required on the surface wind speed and direction, temperature, temperature gradient, relative humidity, and precipitation. In addition, data on the type of soil, surface contour, and vegetation, and civilian population are needed. Physical protection available to target personnel (such as foxholes, overhead cover, or bunkers) is needed for accurate effects assessment. Further personnel protection afforded the enemy by protective clothing is a required item of information (FM 3–10 series and TM 3–240.)

c. The unit counterintelligence plan includes measures to prevent the enemy from learning of our intentions regarding the use of chemical agents or other countermeasures.

9–15. Psychological Operations

a. Psychological operations are conducted against enemy troops and hostile civilians to cause disaffection. They are directed toward friendly or neutral civilians in order to win their support or to influence their behavior so as to preclude interference with US tactical operations. In stability operations the objectives of PSYOP programs are to gain the support of the people for the host government, exploit PSYOP susceptibilities of the insurgent elements, provide a psychological basis for accepting and rehabilitating returnees, strengthen friendship and cooperation between the host country and the US, and influence neutral groups.

b. Intelligence is required concerning the enemy and hostile and friendly civilians to identify susceptible groups and their potential vulnerabilities toward which psychological operations can be directed in order to cause surrender or disaffection.

c. Intelligence is required concerning personnel whose loyalties are unknown to help identify key individuals or groups and those social, ethnic, religious, political, or economic attitudes toward which we can direct our psychological operations in order to win their support.

d. For detailed psychological operations intelligence requirements see FM 33–1 and FM 33–5.

9–16. Rear Area Operations

It is anticipated that there will be a major threat in the form of guerrilla attacks, sabotage,and terrorist attacks in the areas to the rear of corps boundaries in future conflicts. These attacks may be generated by organized enemy special forces type units, local partisans or other individuals, and small groups hostile to US forces. When such hostile conditions prevail, they generally parallel the threat presented in stability operations. Many of the operational concepts of stability operations intelligence will also apply in rear area protection (RAP) operations.

a. The threat will be subversive and clandestine in nature and involve the local population. For this reason, maximum use must be made of civil affairs and military police units in the area.

b. Maximum use must be made of host country or indigenous police and security elements in obtaining intelligence.

c. Intelligence information will need to be disseminated on a wide basis to the following as a minimum:

(1) Military police, Criminal Investigation Division (CID), and other security elements.

(2) Local police and security elements, when appropriate.

(3) Separate and often isolated facilities installations.

(4) Transportation as well as military police when information indicates possible threats to lines of communication.

(5) Rear area operations center (RAOC) elements.

(6) Civil affairs elements.

(7) Area commands and headquarters.

(8) Tenant and transient units in an area.

9–17. Mine/Countermine Operations

a. In most areas of the world, mine/countermine operations will play an important role in ground warfare. Knowledge or lack of knowledge of the enemy's mine capabilities and his ability to counter friendly mine efforts could contribute immensely to success or failure on the battlefield. As evidenced by recent unconventional warfare experiences in Vietnam, enemy mine and boobytrap efforts can take a heavy toll in personnel casualties and vehicle losses.

b. Accordingly, a concentrated effort must be taken for the continuous collection of all information on enemy mining activities in order to pro-

duce the necessary intelligence on enemy patterns of employment by frequency, area, type and trend. Experience has shown that adequate information will reveal definite operational procedures and preferred areas for the enemy's mining effort. Thus, defining the mine threat will provide a realistic basis for committing the proper resources to counter it.

c. In addition to intelligence received from intelligence units in the field, spot reports of enemy mines and minefields or of attempts of the enemy to lay mines should be encouraged and solicited from unit personnel, friendly patrols and indigenous personnel in the area.

d. In large theaters of operations, where the enemy mine threat constitutes a serious impediment to friendly operations, consideration should be given to the creation of a theater mine warfare center. This center would receive all information on enemy mines and mine doctrine. After evaluation and processing, this intelligence would be disseminated to all troop units and personnel in the theater of operations. Creation of the theater mine warfare center, however, would not lessen the G2/S2's responsibilities in the detection, reporting and dissemination requirements pertinent to enemy use of mines in the forward battle area.

e. For further information on reporting both friendly and enemy mines and minefields, see FM 20-32.

Section IV. ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW)

9-18. Vulnerabilities of Intelligence Operations

a. The unimpeded performance of communications-electronics (C-E) systems is desirable for effective military operations. Degradation of C-E systems will seriously impair the command and control of a unit and adversely affect the capabilities of intelligence, operations, and support systems to effectively support tactical operations.

b. All radiations, intentional and unintentional, emanating from C-E equipment such as radios, radar, and electro-optical devices are susceptible to interception, direction-finding and analysis. The intelligence officer must be aware of the threat posed by hostile SIGINT and EW activities which seek to disrupt, deceive, harass, or otherwise interfere with the friendly command and control capability and its supporting intelligence activities. The enemy's exploitation may be oriented toward signals intelligence (SIGINT) support of his fire and maneuver elements, his intelligence operations, or electronic warfare support measures (ESM) in support of electronic countermeasures (ECM). Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) are types of information that a commander would not want known to an enemy about his unit. EEFI are invaluable in determining what information must be denied an enemy SIGINT effort. The consequences of interception and exploitation can be reduced through the adoption and enforcement of the strictest signal security practices to minimize enemy exploitation and a strong electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) program to combat enemy ECM (FM 32-20).

c. All frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum are vulnerable to enemy ECM. For example, the airborne infrared sensor, despite its passive state, can be subjected to countermeasures such as jamming by high-intensity light sources or deception through the deliberate placement of heat dispersing objects. The overall military use of these devices occurs in communications, target acquisition and tracking, battlefield surveillance, missile guidance, weapons fusing, and control systems and navigational aids.

9-19. Intelligence Officer's Role in EW

The intelligence officer has two responsibilities in the area of EW. He must plan and coordinate inteligence support for friendly ECM and other EW operations. He must evaluate the vulnerability of friendly C-E systems to hostile EW.

a. Vulnerability of Friendly C-E Systems. The intelligence offiecr must consider the potential vulnerability of C-E systems to hostile ECM. He must coordinate with other staff elements to insure the unimpeded interface of collection assets, communications media and data processing resources. Degradation through electronic jamming or deception will have an adverse effect on the entire command. The G2/S2 coordinates with the G3/S3 and the C-E staff officer to insure that personnel engaged in such C-E activities receive adequate training and supervision in SIGSEC procedures and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) techniques.

(1) In the case of jamming the enemy seeks to deny the effective use of C-E and sensor equipment by interferring with a single frequency or a range of frequencies. The specific effects on the victim equipment depend on the enemy's selection of jamming modes, their modulation by interference signals, and the kinds of C-E equipment, both friendly and enemy. For additional detail refer to FM 24–18 and FM 32–20.

(2) Hostile electronic deception can seriously degrade the capabilities of all our C-E systems as well as operations, intelligence, combat support, and combat service support functions. Imitative deception is the intentional introduction of fraudulent traffic into our C-E system. Hostile impostor traffic passed over radio nets carrying intelligence information could cause the production of faulty intelligence. The enemy, through the deliberate radiation, reradiation, alteration, absorbtion, or reflection of electromagnetic energy can cause false target presentations on friendly sensors which distort the actual enemy situation. The likely result is a miscalculation of enemy capabilities. Manipulative deception employing the enemy's own electromagnetic radiations is a deceptive tool directed against friendly SIGINT, surveillance and target acquisition resources. For details refer to FM 31–40 and FM 32–20.

b. Intelligence Support of EW.

(1) The vulnerability of enemy C-E systems to EW can be exploited by friendly forces to further the attainment of tactical objectives. In order to plan and conduct EW operations, intelligence data concerning the enemy force and the area of operations must be obtained from all available sources. The enemy's jamming and deception potential must also be determined for the development of effective ECCM circuitry and operational procedures. Tactical commanders also use this information for evaluating the effectiveness of friendly and enemy EW operations.

(2) The data required for effective employment of ECM is referred to as electronic warfare support measures (ESM). This information is derived from all-source intelligence and may consist of the following information requirements:

(*a*) Electronic order of battle, including communications and noncommunications emitters.

(*b*) Technical parameters of C-E and EW equipment (e.g., operating frequencies, power input, and modulation type).

(*c*) Communicative procedures.

(*d*) Overall SIGINT and DW capabilities.

(*e*) Communication procedures (notably for imitative deception).

(*f*) SIGINT capability (notably for manipulative deception).

(3) The intelligence officer is responsible for insuring coordination among the G3/S3, C-E officer and the SIGINT Support Element/Electronic Warfare Element (SSE/EWE) through the EW/Cryptologic staff officer relative to the intelligence aspects of current and planned EW operations. For example, the potential tactical advantages to be gained from jamming hostile radio transmissions must be weighed against the possible loss of SIGINT. For further details regarding electronic warfare see FM 32–20.

Section V. TACTICAL COVER AND DECEPTION (TC&D)

9–20. General

a. With the employment of highly sophisticated methods, techniques, and equipment in modern warfare, deception is an increasingly effective instrument of war for the opponent as well as for ourselves. Tactical cover and deception can be employed effectively both in cold war and in actual hostilities. It is essential that indications of deception efforts against friendly forces be uncovered and the true intent be identified as early and as expeditiously as possible. Hostile deception will probably employ the same visual, electronic, sonic, olfactory measures which friendly forces use against the opponent. Intelligence personnel must continually analyze hostile activities from the opponent's point of view to unmask deception intentions and measures which are being employed against friendly forces. (See FM 31–40 for further details on TC&D.)

b. Communications-electronics cover and deception is of paramount importance to the success of TC&D operations (FM 31–40 and FM 32–20). The communications-electronics staff officer is capable of furnishing advice and assistance relative to communications-electronics aspects of all cover and deception operations.

c. Continued success of TC&D operations depends in part upon convincing the enemy that his failure was due to faulty evaluation of information. To accomplish this, the normal pattern of intelligence activities is continued during and after TC&D operations.

9-21. Intelligence Officer Responsibilities in TC&D

a. Tactical cover and deception plans (a G3 staff responsibility) are based particularly upon knowledge of the enemy vulnerabilities, to include weaknesses, peculiarities and recent significant activities which are exploitable by TC&D means. In planning TC&D operations, the intelligence officer is responsible for providing information and intelligence on enemy intelligence collection systems, to include means, capabilities and limitations; how the enemy processes information to include weak links in their intelligence cycle and what the enemy considers to be indicators of friendly capabilities; the enemy command level which is expected to react to friendly TC&D efforts; and personalities and weaknesses of the enemy commander and his key staff officers who react to our efforts. This information and intelligence is derived in part from studies of enemy procedures and order of battle on enemy units that collect and process information.

b. The G2 is responsible for TC&D efforts in the areas of combat intelligence collection, counterintelligence, security, and certain aspects of electronic deception and jamming. Through these functions he provides information on the enemy commander, his capabilities, and his collection resources required in developing the TC&D estimate and plan. He manages the tasking of ground and aerial surveillance assets and coordinates with the EW/Cryptologic staff officer to insure the effective utilization of these SIGINT/EW assets is accomplished without compromising sensitive intelligence sources. Inherent in these responsibilities is the necessity of providing accurate assessment of enemy capabilities and maintaining a constant vigil for situations in which TC&D may be advantageously applied. The G2 is also charged with detecting and alerting the commander to enemy employment of TC&D operations to our advantage.

c. To execute TC&D operations, it is essential to have intelligence on the progress of the operations and early warning of enemy suspicions that a deception operation is being used against him. Such intelligence is produced by the coordinated use of all available normal collection means and full exploitation of communications intelligence capabilities.

9-22. Operational Security

The security essential to successful TC&D operations is dependent upon effective counterintelligence. The counterintelligence plan (para 8-17) must prescribe the necessary countermeasuers within the overall OPSEC efforts of the command to insure the enemy does not obtain prior knowledge of the operation. Considerations for security discipline, personnel, documents, material, installation security, and censorship are incorporated into counterintelligence planning for TC&D. This detailed effort is coordinated with the next higher and adjacent units when appropriate. Tactical cover and deception instructions are disseminated only on a need-to-know basis. To safeguard this information, special procedures such as restricted areas, security checks, special passes, and special handling of documents and equipment may be established as necessary.

9-23. Camouflage

The basic principles of camouflage are followed in an offensive operation as well as in a static or defensive situation. The responsibility for camouflage rests on the commander. All troops must be aware of the principles and techniques of camouflage. Technical advice and assistance are provided by the engineers. The division engineer, under the general staff supervision of the division G3, is responsible for camouflage planning in coordination with the division G2 and G4. In a fast-moving offensive situation it is doubtful if time will allow extensive artificial camouflage measures. However, engineers advise and assist other troops in the utilization of natural features which will aid in camouflage. During preparation for offensive operations, special attention is given to camouflage, concealment, and disguise of units and activities which may reveal friendly plans. Additional information on camouflage practices and techniques can be found in FM 5-20.

Section VI. STABILITY OPERATIONS

9-24. General

a. The US Government has provided for security assistance to friendly host nations threatened with insurgency. US Army participation in such assistance is called stability operations. Stability operations include advice and assistance in the

training of host country military and para-military ground forces. Stability operations are coordinated with other US military services and government agencies.

b. A significant variation in stability operations intelligence is that intelligence must place greater emphasis on the population in addition to the three traditional considerations of the enemy (insurgent), weather, and terrain. The population is both the primary target of the insurgent and a principal source of his intelligence, cover, personnel, and logistical support. Therefore, the civilian population as well as the insurgent military forces represent major intelligence targets.

c. Because of the broad scope of stability operations, intelligence data base requirements differ greatly from those needed for conventional military operations. Stability operations require elaborately detailed intelligence concerning sociological, political, geographic, and economic information which may have significant impact on internal defense and development (IDAD) operations. Commanders and intelligence staffs must give these requirements the same consideration given to the usual tactical requirements concerning the enemy military forces. Furthermore, collection of such data is vitally needed for the support of psychological, populace and resource control, and civil affairs operations which play a prominent role in stability operations. Military operations may detrimentally affect the population. The commander must take equal consideration of both tactical and non-tactical intelligence requirements so that operations will produce the least detrimental effects and thus increase the probability of gaining and retaining the support of the people.

d. The task of obtaining timely information in a stability operations environment is made more difficult by the nature of insurgent activities. The insurgent has the capability of changing units or organizations, blending with the populace, using border areas as sanctuaries, infiltrating host country forces, and living to a degree off the land, with little logistical support, particularly in the early phases of an insurgency. Although conventional intelligence doctrine remains valid for stability operations, there must be some modifications made both in operational techniques and in the organization of intelligence units to fully exploit the peculiarities of the insurgent, the locale in which the insurgency is taking place, and the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of friendly operations to that point. In stability operations, it is imperative that there be close and continuous liaison between all elements which directly or indirectly contribute to or receive intelligence data necessary for operational efficiency. This is especially true between counterintelligence and combat intelligence units because information/intelligence on the insurgent's infrastructure directly complements tactical intelligence. During all phases of an insurgency US advisory and operational elements will work closely with host country intelligence resources at all echelons to assure continuity of effort and management of intelligence assets commensurate with the mission. When possible, combined intelligence operations with the host country will be used to efficiently establish joint interrogation, document and materiel exploitation, and imagery interpretation centers. Furthermore, intelligence officers from US operational units should establish liaison with the intelligence staffs of any area coordination centers (ACC) in their tactical areas of responsibility (TAOR). For detailed discussion of stability operations see FM 30–18, FM 30–31, and FM 31–23.

9–25. Intelligence Collection

Intelligence collection during stability operations will differ somewhat from conventional collection due to the nature of the insurgent environment. Intelligence requirements will be satisfied only by reporting information in minute detail and analyzing and scrutinizing all data reported in order to accurately and rapidly assess the insurgent capabilities and possible courses of action. Information must be compiled on the local populace to determine if support or aid is being provided the insurgent and to assess the overall strength of the insurgent movement. The intelligence needs for stability operations are based upon broader considerations of the insurgent situation and the operational environment. Based on all available information, an intelligence estimate for stability operations is develped based not only on traditional information on the enemy, weather, and terrain, but also on the population, including nontactical data such as psychological, political, economic, and sociological factors relating to the insurgency. US Army intelligence organizations can obtain this nontactical data from host country intelligence organizations as well as from their normal day-to-day contacts with the population in their area. Tactical operations involving the population offer opportunities to gather nontactical information from the people. Specific groups of individuals who may be able to furnish information

to friendly collection agencies include the following:

a. Leaders of dissident groups within the country.

b. Captured insurgents.

c. Defectors from the insurgent ranks.

d. Insurgents who have been recruited or who volunteered to work for friendly forces.

e. Businessmen, to include merchants, wholesalers, etc.

f. Medical personnel (doctors, nurses, pharmacists).

g. Bar owners.

h. Prostitutes.

i. Religious leaders of all groups within the country.

j. Political leaders of opposition parties.

k. Labor leaders.

l. Government agencies such as hospitals and agricultural agencies.

m. Friendly US or foreign nationals such as missionaries and business representatives who are established and/or long term residents of the area.

9–26. Intelligence Activities

Intelligence activities conducted during stability operations are characterized by extensive coordination with host country intelligence agencies and participation in intelligence activities to include the following:

a. Penetration of the insurgent infrastructure.

b. Extensive interrogation of suspected insurgent elements.

c. Compilation and maintenance of extensive dossiers of individuals of intelligence interest to include leaders and members of its infrastructure as well as leaders of the insurgent armed forces.

d. Surveillance of individuals of intelligence interest.

e. Censorship activities appropriate to the degree of insurgent activity.

f. Complete documentation of civilians for easy identification.

g. Exploitation of captured documents and materiel.

h. Extensive counterintelligence, countersubversion, and countersabotage activity directed toward elimination or neutralization of the insurgent threat.

i. Establishment of intelligence files.

j. Resources control to deny the enemy food and logistical support.

9–27. Insurgent Intelligence System

Since the insurgent intelligence system utilizes overt, covert, and clandestine collection activities, the identification of these activities will require extensive data on the insurgent elements to include mission, organization, strength, and location. Counterintelligence operations are complicated by the degree of reliance which must be placed on local organizations and individuals, the difficulty in distinguishing between friendly and hostile members of the population, and political considerations which will frequently hinder proper counterintelligence operations. Normally there will be a requirement for a larger number of intelligence and counterintelligence personnel in all phases of an insurgency than required in normal combat operations due to the many and varied intelligence requirements in the insurgency (FM 30–31).

9–28. Combat Intelligence

a. The role of the individual soldier is much broader in stability operations since the need for locating the insurgent and reporting information of intelligence value becomes of prime importance. Detailed collection plans are prepared at all echelons, and requirements for information entail requests for data of both tactical and nontactical significance. Patrolling becomes of paramount importance during tactical operations since patrols provide a basis for reporting both positive and negative information on insurgent activities. Effective ground surveillance and reconnaissance become particularly difficult in an insurgency since friendly units seldom fight in the traditional manner and are more apt to be employed in relative isolation. Airborne Infantry Ranger Company elements will be of particular value in an insurgent environment in providing detailed information on remote portions of the area of interest. Special Forces units, located astride lines of communication (LOC) or near suspected insur-

gent base areas, will also be constant sources of current information of intelligence value.

b. In addition to providing intelligence data on a conventional nature, friendly forces must also be alert for indirect evidence(s) of insurgent activity within the area of operations. These include:

(1) Built-up areas not recorded on maps.

(2) Abandonment of villages, food producing areas, or equipment.

(3) Civilian activity in isolated areas of the country.

(4) Areas being cleared of foliage for no apparent reason.

(5) Unexplained movement of people from one area to another.

(6) Abnormal traffic on roads, paths, or waterways.

(7) Roads or paths constructed in relatively remote areas of the country.

(8) Unidentified activity detected by sensor devices, particularly during the hours of darkness.

(9) Absence of adult males of fighting age.

(10) Increased nighttime activities.

(11) Decrease in the amount of goods and produce at local markets.

c. During stability operations, tactical operations are oriented on locating guerrilla or armed elements rather than the seizure of terrain. Once the guerrilla or armed element has been located and neutralized, friendly elements can extend their control into the area. Strict operational security, therefore, must be established to avoid early detection of friendly forces by either the insurgent element itself or by sympathizers who may signal the approach of friendly forces. Adequate safeguards must be taken to insure that personnel in the area of operations, to include women or children, are provided with no indication of the friendly courses of action.

d. Prisoners should be taken whenever possible, and every opportunity should be given the insurgent to surrender or defect. Psychological operations should include themes which encourage surrender or defection. The success of such a plan depends on the treatment provided insurgents who join the government side. Reasonable treatment normally will generate additional defections —particularly when immediate exploitation is made by the capturing unit.

e. Intelligence interrogation of returnees, prisoners of war, and other persons detained play an important role in the determination of the capabilities, organizations, outside support, and locations of insurgent elements. The basic principles and techniques for intelligence interrogation of prisoners of war are valid for stability operations except that in the case of an insurgency, the intelligence interrogator will be faced with the problem of interrogating not only captured military personnel but also friendly, hostile, or suspect civilians located within the area of operations. One solution to this problem is the cross-attachment of CI and IPW personnel available, which not only improves the overall effectiveness of counterintelligence efforts but also expands the scope and knowledge of the interrogation element. Interrogations during stability operations dictate that the intelligence interrogator have a detailed familiarity with the military and political organization of the insurgent elements and a complete and detailed knowledge of the area of operations. Treatment of prisoners of war is governed by the guidelines outlined in the Geneva Conventions (FM 27–10). To insure maximum exploitation all prisoners, whether military guerrillas, returnees, political cadre, suspects, or deserters, should be treated firmly but fairly.

f. Another valuable source of information is the person who has traveled through or has worked in an area known or suspected to be a hiding place for insurgent elements. Woodcutters, farmers, nomads, or individuals who have been conscripted and have been forced to work for the insurgents may provide invaluable information on order of battle, terrain, capabilities, caches, base camp locations, or other intelligence information.

g. Funds should be made available to reward informants and other persons providing valuable intelligence information. It is imperative, however, that such funds be controlled since monetary reward serves as an incentive not only to the reporter of factual information, but also to the "informant" who provides false or fabricated information either solely for the material gain or for deliberately misinforming. Extreme caution in the evaluation and use of information provided should enable the agency buying the information to distinguish the factual from the false reporter. To prevent the buying of the same information from the same source by more than one agency, control records should be organized collectively, by geographical area, rather than having each collecting unit maintain its own. Collective control could also facilitate the timely discovery and exposure of persons providing fabricated information or misinformation.

h. Information on known insurgents should be distributed as widely as possible consistent with security requirements. Suitable rewards can also be established for information concerning insurgents.

i. Maximum use should be made of aerial surveillance and reconnaissance throughout all phases of an insurgency. Aerial reconnaissance can provide tactical commanders and patrol leaders with updated imagery on specific areas. Aerial surveillance can provide a continuous day-night capability and can often assist in locating insurgent base camps, and gun positions and directing forces or fire to destroy them. Visual surveillance also achieves confirmation of certain terrain information when integrated with other imagery. The effectiveness of visual observation generally increases as pilot and observer perform repetitive search of a specific area. By observing the same topography, the same manmade objects contained there, and the same activities which take place day after day, observer personnel will more readily detect changes which may indicate insurgent activity.

j. Intelligence collection operations involving human sources are highly sensitive and demand that they be conducted by specially trained intelligence personnel. Such operations are usually highly centralized with tight control exercised to protect both the operations and sources involved. Information of a tactical nature is normally passed to the area tactical commander whose intelligence staff must evaluate it not only in the light of other information available but also based on the source reliability rating given to the original source reporting the information. The tactical commander is responsible for providing the reporting unit with an evaluation of the report and furnishing data regarding the results of combat response taken based on the information furnished. This will greatly assist the reporting unit's assessment of the source and its conduct of future intelligence collection operations involving this source. For additional information see FM 30–18.

k. Police intelligence is of special importance in the latent and incipient phase of insurgency for it is then that the gradual changes in the social, economic, and political conditions of a country which establish the basis for an insurgency may be found. Forgers, safecrackers, counterfeiters, smugglers, and assassins may be enticed or coerced into performing certain tasks for the insurgent organization. Prostitutes, racketeers, small-time hoodlums, and corrupt officials may be forced, under a threat of disclosure to police, to provide information and support to the insurgents. The insurgent organization may actively enter or take over existing crime syndicates (or initiate their own) to finance insurgent activities, disguise insurgent activities, or infiltrate legitimate business and the host country government through the syndicates' connections. The methods of obtaining funds and equipment necessary for an insurgency provide a source of intelligence for police agencies. An increase in the demands for money or supplies or in the theft of materiels such as explosives or weapons which could be used by the insurgents are examples of activities on which the police can base their predictions of insurgencies. Police intelligence may well be the first means of detecting an impending insurgency or the elements of the population supporting the insurgency. The integration of police intelligence and combat intelligence is of extreme importance during stability operations. The intelligence sections of the National Internal Defene Coordination Center (NIDCC) and the Area Control Centers (ACC) should insure that proper coordination and liaison is promoted among the intelligence community.

9–29. Counterintelligence

a. Since stability operations are basically aimed at the restoration of internal security in the area of operations, they demand a vigorous and coordinated counterintelligence effort. Liaison and exchange of information between both military and civilian counterintelligence agencies and related agencies, such as police, are essential to the success of the counterintelligence effort (FM 30–18 and FM 30–31).

b. Many counterintelligence efforts are defensive in nature and are aimed at the protection of installations against sabotage, personnel against espionage and subversion, and information against compromise. Examples of defensive counterintelligence measures which may be employed are the following:

(1) Maintenance of files on organizations, location, and individuals of counterintelligence interest, to include the insurgent infrastructure.

(2) Background investigations and records checks on persons in sensitive positions and those whose loyalty is questionable.

(3) Indoctrination of personnel in all fields of security.

(4) Inspection of the internal security of installations and units.

(5) Population resources control measures to include identification systems used to minimize the possibility of insurgents gaining access to areas in the proximity of, or within installations; curfews; travel restrictions; and coordination of search procedures in the installation with military police elements.

(6) Raids on suspected insurgent meeting and hiding places to include cordon operations.

(7) Coordination of censorship activities with those staff elements or units given this primary responsibility.

(8) Debriefing of selected personnel, friendly and hostile, to include combat patrols, aircraft pilots, or other elements which may unwittingly possess information of counterintelligence interest.

(9) Coordination with military police elements concerning control of black marketable material which could aid insurgent forces such as maps, batteries, communication wire, medical supplis and food.

(10) Investigations of terrorist or sabotage incidents in conjunction with EOD, military police, and technical intelligence personnel in an attempt to identify the terrorists and saboteurs.

c. Counterintelligence operations must place great emphasis on offensive operations against the insurgent infrastructure so that it can be identified, neutralized or destroyed. One of the significant variations to the overall collection program and the selection of collection agencies in stability operations is the heavy reliance on police, security, and counterintelligence units and agencies. As a result of the subversive nature of an insurgency, these agencies which are normally charged with the conduct of countersubversion operations, have the best capability to satisfy a wide range of high-priority intelligence requirements.

Section VII. TRAINING

9–30. General

Intelligence training, including counterintelligence training, is given to all personnel. Personnel whose primary duties are concerned with intelligence are given additional training appropriate to their assignments.

a. Intelligence training is integrated with other training (app P) except for specialized subjects and orientation. It is not conducted as a separate activity distinct from all other training.

b. Intelligence training emphasizes speed of collection and processing of information and the extension of collection activities to the depth of the unit's area of interest. It should constantly stress proper security practices. When appropriate, this training should be supplemented by additional hours of specialized instruction in stability operations. Army Subject Schedule 30–9 provides uniform guidance in the conduct of combat intelligence training in all components of the Army.

c. In training exercises, units should be provided with the intelligence means normally required during combat operations. Realistic training situations requiring the use of these means should be provided.

9–31. Responsibilities

a. All commanders are responsible for the intelligence training of their units. The operations officer has primary responsibility for matters pertaining to overall training of the command. All staff officers are responsible for the intelligence training of their staff sections.

b The intelligence officer, in coordination with the operations officer, supervises intelligence training within the command. He prepares the intelligence training program, conducts intelligence schools, supervises intelligence training, conducts tests, and assists lower units in obtaining training aids and qualified instructors. He informs the operations officer of the time needed for intelligence training and requirements for facilities, training aids, and instructors. Close coordination between the intelligence officer and other members of the staff helps insure the integration of intelligence training with other training.

c. Unit training in reconnaissance and the collection of information is planned and supervised by the intelligence officer. Orders directing unit intelligence training are issued by the operations officer in the name of the commander.

9–32. Specialized Intelligence Instructional Methods

a. The methods of instruction prescribed by FM 21–6 are applicable to specialized intelligence training. In most cases, specialized intelligence

training is best accomplished by centralizing instruction.

b. A system of intelligence schools within the command helps establish standard practices throughout the command.

(1) Establishment of theater-level intelligence schools for officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties should be considered. This training can provide area orientation and familiarization of conditions peculiar to the command and intelligence functions and procedures.

(2) Division-level schools should be established for instruction of officers and selected noncommissioned officers assigned to intelligence duties. Subordinate units should conduct intensive intelligence training of intelligence personnel and personnel in intelligence-related positions. Schools and training are conducted by unit intelligence officers, with the assistance and under the supervision of the division intelligence officer at each echelon. Preferably, instructors should have attended the school established at the next higher level.

c. Training is not concluded with the completion of the intelligence schools; it is conducted on a continuous basis and perfected by integration of intelligence training with on-the-job and other military training.

9–33. Intelligence Training and Maneuvers

a. Intelligence play in maneuvers should furnish realistic training in every aspect of combat intelligence. The use of aggressor as a maneuver enemy improves realism and helps make commanders, staffs, and troops conscious of the enemy as a real opposing force. FM 30–102 provides guidance concerning intelligence training planning and training phases and means of simulating intelligence play.

b. Intelligenec training during maneuvers include aerial and ground reconnaissance and surveillance, use of sensor devices, crater analysis, interrogation of PW and other detainees, debriefing of refugees, acquisition and exploitation of enemy documents and materiel, safeguarding military information, camouflage and camouflage discipline, communications discipline, signals intelligence, identification of enemy materiel to include aircraft, radiological monitoring, reporting of nuclear bursts, identification and marking of friendly and enemy chemical-biological-radiological areas, detecting and reporting chemical and biological attacks, preparation and distribution of photographs as supplements to maps, and the requisition and distribution of maps.

c. Intelligence training should include training individuals to understand the effects of weather upon tactical operations, personnel, weapons, equipment, terrain, and movement. Particular emphasis should be given to training the individual soldier in the timely, accurate, and factual reporting of information.

d. Training should emphasize intelligence operations during all phases of stability operations to include coordination and liaison with host country intelligence resources and the collection and interpretation of political, economic, and sociological data.

Section VIII. STANDING OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

9–34. Section SOP

The intelligence officer prepares the intelligence SOP for the intelligence section. The format and content of the SOP will depend upon the level of command, the nature of the operations, and the desires of the intelligence officer. Under certain circumstances, it may be advisable to prepare both a garrison and a tactical or field SOP. A typical intelligence section SOP may contain the following:

a. A description of the functional organization of the intelligence section, accompanied by appropriate diagrams.

b. A description of the responsibilities and duties of all personnel.

c. Assignments and instructions pertaining to duty shifts.

d. Security procedures within the section.

c. Administrative procedures to be followed in recording, filing, and message handling.

f. Detailed procedures to be followed in the processing of information.

g. Procedures pertaining to the maintenance of the collection plan.

h. Instructions concerning coordination and staff liaison with other staff sections and subordinate units.

i. Instructions concerning the procurement and distribution of maps, imagery, and map substitutes.

j. Instructions concerning the preparation and dissemination of intelligence reports.

k. Internal training procedures, such as the cross-training of section personnel.

9–35. Command SOP

a. The intelligence officer prepares the intelligence portion of the command SOP. A format for a command SOP is contained in FM 101–5. An example of a division SOP is contained in FM 61–100. Entries therein suggest matters which should be included in the intelligence portion of a command SOP. In order to insure uniformity throughout the command, the intelligence portion of the command SOP should standardize methods for directing the collection effort and prescribe dissemination and reporting format and procedures.

b. While the intelligence part of a command SOP contains instructions pertaining to significant, routine intelligence matters, the intelligence annex to an operation order contains special instructions pertaining to intelligence tasks in a specific tactical operation (app N). An effective command SOP can assist the intelligence officer in preparation of the intelligence annex. The intelligence officer will find it convenient to organize the intelligence portion of the SOP into major paragraphs similar to those prescribed for the intelligence annex to the operation order.

9–36. Tactical Cover and Deception Vulnerability

As in the case of all established procedures, care must be exercised that SOPs do not become so routine, apparent, and accepted as to be vulnerable to the insertion of deceptive enemy information.

APPENDIX A

REFERENCES

A–1. Field Manuals (FM)

1–15	Aviation Company, Battalion, Group and Brigade.
1–100	Army Aviation Utilization.
3–10	Employment of Chemical Agents.
(C) 3–10B	Employment of Chemical Agents (U).
3–12	Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense.
5–20	Camouflage.
5–26	Employment of Atomic Demolition Munitions (ADM).
5–30	Engineer Intelligence.
5–36	Route Reconnaissance and Classification.
5–146	Engineer Topographic Units.
6–15	Artillery Meteorology.
6–20	Field Artillery Tactics and Operations.
6–40	Field Artillery Cannon Gunnery.
6–121	Field Artillery Target Acquisition.
8–10	Medical Support, Theater of Operations.
9–15	Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit Operations.
11–40	Signal Corps Pictorial Operations.
17–30	The Armored Brigade.
17–36	Armored Cavalry Platoon, Troop, and Divisional Armored Cavalry Squadron.
17–37	The Air Cavalry Squadron.
19–1	Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades.
19–4	Military Police Support, Theater of Operations.
19–30	Physical Security.
19–40	Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.
20–32	Mine-Countermine Operations.
20–60	Battlefield Illumination.
21–5	Military Training Management.
21–6	Techniques of Military Instruction.
21–26	Map Reading.
21–30	Military Symbols.
21–31	Topographic Symbols.
21–40	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense.
21–75	Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling.
21–76	Survival, Evasion and Escape.
(E) 21–77A	Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U).
24–18	Field Radio Techniques.
27–10	The Law of Land Warfare.
30–9	Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army.
30–10	Military Geographic Intelligence (Terrain).
(C) 30–10A	Special Applications of Terrain Intelligence (U).
30–15	Intelligence Interrogation.
30–16	Technical Intelligence.

30–17	Counterintelligence Operations.
(C) 30–17A	Counterintelligence Special Operations (U).
(S) 30–18	Intelligence Collection Operations.
30–20	Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army.
30–28	Armed Forces Censorship.
30–31	Stability Operations—Intelligence.
30–35	Military Intelligence Battalion Aerial Reconnaissance Support.
30–102	Handbook on Aggressor.
30–103	Aggressor Order of Battle.
31–3/AFM 105–4	Weather Support for Field Army Tactical Operations.
31–10	Denial Operations and Barriers.
31–11	Doctrine for Amphibious Operations.
31–12	Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force).
31–16	Counterguerrilla Operations.
31–18	Long-Range Reconnaissance Ranger Company.
31–20	Special Forces Operational Techniques.
(C) 31–20A	Special Forces Operational Techniques (U).
31–21	Special Forces Operations US Army Doctrine.
(S) 31–21A	Special Forces Operations US Army Doctrine (U).
31–23	Stability Operations US Army Doctrine.
31–35	Jungle Operations.
31–36 (TEST)	Night Operations.
(C) 31–40	Tactical Cover and Deception (U).
31–73	Advisors Handbook for Stability Operations.
31–100 (TEST)	Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Night Observation (STANO) Operations.
(C) 32–5	Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U).
(S) 32–10	United States Army Security Agency in Support of Tactical Operations (U).
(C) 32–20	Electronic Warfare (U).
33–1	Psychological Operations—US Army Doctrine.
33–5	Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures.
41–10	Civil Affairs Operations.
44–1	US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment.
45–20	Civil Censorship.
45–25	Field Press Censorship.
55–8	Transportation Intelligence.
57–1	US Army/US Air Force Doctrine for Airborne Operations.
57–35	Airmobile Operations.
61–100	The Division.
100–5	Operations of Army Forces in the Field.
100–10	Combat Service Support.
100–15	Larger Units Theater Army—Corps.
100–20	Field Service Regulations—Internal Defense and Development (IDAD).
100–26	The Air-Ground Operations System.
101–5	SOFM, Staff Organization and Procedures.
101–10–series	SOFM, Organization, Technical and Logistical Data.
101–31–series	SOFM, Nuclear Weapons Employment.
101–40	Armed Forces Doctrine for Chemical Warfare and Biological Defense.
105–5	Maneuver Control.

A–2. Technical Manuals (TM)

3–210	Fallout Prediction.
3–215	Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents.
3–216	Technical Aspects of Biological Defense.

3–220	Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination.
3–240	Field Behavior of Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents.
5–248	Foreign Maps.
5–545	Geology.
30–245	Image Interpretation Handbook.
30–246	Tactical Interpretation of air Photos.

A–3. Army Regulations (AR)

(C) 10–122	United States Army Security Agency (U).
95–1	Army Aviation—General Provisions and Flight, Regulations.
(C) 105–87	Elecrtonic Warfare (U).
310–25	Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title AD).
310–50	Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes.
340–1	Records Management—Programs, Policies and Procedures.
350–30	Code of Conduct.
350–225	Survival, Evasion, and Escape Training.
360–65	Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship in Combat Areas.
380–5	Department of the Army Information Security Program.
380–83	Civil Censorship.
380–200	Armed Forces Censorship.
380–235	Enemy PW and Civilian Internee Communications Censorship.
(C) 381–103	Administration of Counterintelligence and Area Intelligence Personnel (U).
(C) 381–115	Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies.
(C) 381–150	The Army Human Resource Collection System (U).
(C) 530–1	Operations Security (U).
(C) 530–2	Communications Security (U).
(C) 538–3	Electronic Security (U).
(C) 530–4	Control of Compromising Emanations (U).
604–5	Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material.
604–10	Military Personnel Security Program.

A–4. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

108–1	Index of Army Motion Pictures and Related Audio-Visual Aids.
310–series	Military Publications Indexes.
350–15 series	Operations—Lessons Learned.

A–5. Miscellaneous Publications

AAP–6 (J)	NATO Glossary.
JCS Pub 1	Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.
JCS Pub 2	Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).
JCS Pub 12	Tactical Command and Control Procedures for Joint Operations.
ASubjScd 30–9	Combat Intelligence.
ASubjScd 30–40	Order of Battle Personnel.
TC 30–1	Tactical Cover and Deception.
STANAG 2008 and SEASTAG 2008	Bombing, Shelling and Mortaring Reports.
STANAG 2014 and SEASTAG 2014	Operations Orders, and Administrative/Logistic Orders.
STANAG 2020 and SEASTAG 2020	Operations Situation Reports.
STANAG 2022 and SEASTAG 2022	Intelligence Reports.
STANAG 2029 and SEASTAG 2029	Method of Describing Ground Locations, Areas and Boundaries.

STANAG 2033	Interrogation of Prisoners of War.
STANAG 2073	NATO Intelligence Subject Code.
STANAG 2077	Enemy Order of Battle Records for Combat Intelligence.
STANAG 2084 and SEASTAG 2084	Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Documents and Equipment.
STANAG 2097	Nomenclature for Soviet Bloc Army Weapons and Equipment.
STANAG 2103 and SOLOG 123	Reporting Nuclear Detonations, Radioactive Fallout and Biological and Chemical Attacks.
STANAG 2112	Radiological Surveys.
STANAG 2118 and SEASTAG 2118	Intelligence Estimate.
STANAG 2134	Offensive Air Support operations.
STANAG 3377 and SEASTAG 3377	Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms.

APPENDIX B

THE ANALYSIS OF THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

B–1. General

An analysis of the area of operations is a study to determine the effects of the area of operations on the general courses of action that the enemy and friendly forces may adopt. It includes consideration of climatic or weather conditions, relief and drainage systems, vegetation, surface materials, manmade features, military aspects of the area, observation and fire, concealment cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, air avenues of approach, and other effects of the area on combat service support. Additional considerations include sociological, political, economic, religious, science and technology, materiel, transportation, and hydrography factors as they may affect enemy or friendly military operations.

B–2. Sources of Information

a. Analyses of the area of operations from other headquarters and studies prepared by higher headquarters are valuable source materials in the preparation of a current analysis of the area of operations. The conclusion of analyses prepared by higher headquarters are usually not directly applicable to a subordinate unit. Considerations that are important to the higher commander's mission are not necessarily applicable at the subordinate headquarters.

b. Technical reports, maps and imagery, and reports of ground and aerial reconnaissance are valuable as sources of information in the preparation of an analysis of the area of operations.

c. Other staff officers assist in the preparation of the analysis by furnishing specialized information.

(1) At all echelons of command, the engineer produces and distributes terrain studies, including soil analyses and technical interpretation of terrain characteristics of military significance; included are obstacles, routes, avenues of approach, cover and concealment, and trafficability.

(2) At field army and higher headquarters, the preparation of intelligence studies of manmade features of the area of operations is the responsibility of the engineer staff officer for other than communications facilities.

(3) Weather information of both a general and a special nature is provided by the staff weather officer.

(4) Information and analyses of political, economic, sociological, and psychological aspects of the civil community are obtained from the civil-military operations officer.

B–3. Contents of the Analysis

a. An annotated example of a written analysis of the area of operations is contained in FM 101–5.

b. Additional guidance is provided in subsequent paragraphs, the titles of which correspond to selected paragraphs and subparagraphs of the example.

B–4. Climatic or Weather Conditions

a. The paragraph of the analysis concerning climatic or weather conditions lists the items of weather information that have military significance. Throughout the remainder of the analysis, the weather information is interpreted as to its operational effects. For example, winds at low temperatures are interpreted in terms of the wind chill factor and the resulting effects on operations, such as an attack or defense which must face the prevailing winds, or the use of open or closed storage facilities.

b. Light data always are given as they are necessary for the selection of courses of action and the conduct of military activities.

(1) The beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT) and the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of enough light for limited visibility. The beginning of morning civil twilight (BMCT)

and the end of evening civil twilight (EECT) are the beginning and end, respectively, of adequate light for large-scale operations.

(2) Moon phases and other phenomena such as atmospheric conditions and star brilliance influence night operations. During full moonlight, conditions of visibility sometimes approach those of daylight. Such conditions are anticipated as they influence friendly and enemy courses of action such as attacks, patrolling, and changes in dispositions at night.

B-5. Relief and Drainage System

Drainage and ridge lines are the basic elements in studying terrain as they clearly indicate the general shape of the ground. A complete study of the relief and drainage includes detailed information about slope, configuration, elevation of ground forms, and depth, width, tide data, and conditions of banks and bottoms of streams and rivers. These items can be portrayed graphically on maps by various methods.

B-6. Vegetation

Vegatation studies are best presented in the form of tinted, or otherwise marked, overlays. Considerations include locations of trees, diameters of trunks, density, ground cover or canopy, undergrowth, and types of natural and cultivated vegetation of non-wooded areas.

B-7. Surface Materials

These data, if extensive, are best presented in colored or marked overlays. In preparing these data, soil maps made by the agricultural services of various countries are particularly valuable. The information contained in soil maps can frequently be translated into a trafficability map and a map of areas susceptible to high radiation intensities of induced radioactivity. A trafficability map based on weather forecasts and colored or marked to indicate degrees of trafficability effectively shows areas suitable for cross-country movement.

B-8. Manmade Features

Manmade features of potential military significance include roads, railroads, bridges, tunnels, mines, towns, industrial areas, and fortifications. These features are best represented on a map or marked overlays.

B-9. Additional Characteristics

Only those characteristics (e.g., sociology, politics, economics, transportation, manpower, etc.) which influence the choice of a course of action by either force are included. Lengthy data are presented in annexes, preferably in tabular form.

B-10. Military Aspects of the Area

This paragraph analyzes the facts listed in the "General Description of the Area" paragraph and determines their influence on the tactical and combat service support factors that are considered in the selection of a course of action by either force. In the analysis of these factors, the effects of and on nuclear fires, chemical and biological agents, and important devices and equipment used in implementing courses of action are integrated as appropriate. The tactical aspects of observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, avenues of approach, and the combat service aspects are discussed in the following paragraphs.

B-11. Observation and Fire

a. Observation depends on conditions of terrain which permit a force to locate the enemy either visually or through the use of surveillance devices. The highest terrain in an area usually provides the best observation. The increased use of equipment with line-of-sight characteristics requires the availability of suitable terrain features for sighting purposes. The capability of employing organic aerial platforms reduces the requirement to use such terrain. Dust clouds caused by nuclear blast reduce electronic observation. Other factors that limit or deny observation include darkness and tall vegetation (woods and jungle canopy). The effects of visibility on observation are analyzed with weather conditions.

b. Fire, as used in the analysis of the area of operations, includes the field of fire of the weapon and characteristics of weapons delivery systems affected by weather and terrain. For example, gusty surface winds affect the use of projectiles. High, irregular terrain features or the absence of overhead mass clearance may limit the field of fire weapons. A field of fire is an area that weapons can cover effectively with fire from given positions. Although observation is essential to effective control of fire, the best observation does not always guarantee the best field of fire. An ideal field of fire for flat-trajectory weapons is an open area in which the enemy can be seen and on which he has no protection from the fire of such weapons.

B–12. Concealment and Cover

a. Concealment is protection from observation and may be provided by woods, underbrush, snowdrifts, tall grass, cultivated vegetation, darkness, smoke, dust, fog, ground haze, rain, or falling snow.

b. Cover is protection from the effects of direct and indirect fires and is provided by ditches, quarries, caves, riverbanks, folds in the ground, shell craters, buildings, walls, railroad embankments and cuts, sunken roads, and highway fills. Defiladed areas which provide protection against nonnuclear weapons do not necessarily protect against effects of nuclear fires. Unless the forward slopes of a terrain mass are very steep, blast will affect personnel and materiel on the reverse slope because the blast wave follows the configuration of all but the most rugged terrain. When a nuclear weapon is fired over a deep valley, or the valley axis points toward ground zero, the blast effects may be channelized and increase damage. Irregular terrain provides some cover from thermal radiation of nuclear fires. Few buildings are sufficiently strong to withstand all effects of blast and, if not damaged or destroyed by blast, may be damaged by thermal radiation. Foxholes, bunkers, and tunnel type shelters offer the simplest forms of effective cover.

c. Concealment and cover are desirable for both the attack and the defense. If troops can move forward under the concealment of woods, fog, or a moonless night, the chances of achieving surprise are greater. If troops can move protected from the enemy's fire by ditches, embankments, or walls, the attack will be more effective. In a defensive situation friendly forces seek to defend in an area which offers both cover and concealment but does not provide covered approaches for the enemy.

d. The mobility of the command is considered in determining available cover and concealment. Cover and concealment are desirable during troop movements by any means. Routes which afford good cover and concealment reduce the vulnerability of a moving force to detection and to destruction by fire.

B–13. Obstacles

a. An obstacle is any natural or artificial terrain feature which stops, impedes, or diverts military movement. Natural obstacles include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, swamps, cliffs, steep slopes, dense woods, jungles, deserts, mountains, cities, and certain types of unstable soil. Artificial obstacles are works of construction and destruction executed to stop or impede military movement. They include minefields, craters, antitank ditches, trenches, abatis, roadblocks, deliberately flooded areas, areas contaminated with chemical and biological agents, extensive rubble, forest fires, tree blowdown, and areas contaminated with residual nuclear radiation.

b. Obstacles to be fully effective must be covered by observation and fire. However, even undefended obstacles may channelize an attacker into concentrations which are easier to detect and are suitable for nuclear attack. Obstacles perpendicular to a direction of attack favor the defender by slowing the enemy, forcing him into concentrations that tend to occur while crossing obstacles, and holding the attacker for a longer time under the effective fires of the defense. Obstacles parallel to an axis of advance may give the attacker flank protection. However, parallel obstacles may interfere with lateral movement and coordination.

c. Consideration of obstacles is influenced by the mission of the command. In the defense the intelligence officer identifies as obstacles those features of the terrain which stop, impede, or divert military movement into, out of, or within the area encompassed by the FEBA, lateral boundaries and the rear boundary (prescribed or assumed). In the attack he considers the obstacles from the line of departure to the objective (both inclusive), bounded laterally by the assigned or assumed operational zone.

B–14. Key Terrain

a. A key terrain feature is any locality or area whose seizure or control affords a marked advantage to either opposing force. Key terrain features are selected to indicate areas and localities whose seizure or control must be considered in formulating and selecting courses of action. The selection is based on the level of command, type of unit, and mission of the command. Key terrain is selected which if in our control would give us a marked advantage in the accomplishment of our mission, or which if seized or controlled by the enemy would hinder materially the accomplishment of our mission. For example, a bridge over an unfordable river may give access to the opposite shore without requiring an assault crossing. Control of a road or rail center may reduce the enemy's ability to resist our advance. A level

clearing in rough terrain may be the only accessible landing field for airmobile operations Key terrain varies with the level of command. For example, to an army commander a large city may afford marked advantages as a communications center. To a division commander the high ground which dominates the city may be more important and the city itself may be an obstacle. Obstacles are rarely key terrain features. The high ground dominating a river rather than the river itself is usually the key terrain feature for the lower unit commander. An exception is an obstacle such as a built-up area which is assigned as an objective to a force; the obstacle then becomes key terrain to the force ordered to capture it.

b. Key terrain, in addition to influencing the mission accomplishment, is also highly significant in applying combat power. Control is not insured only by seizure and occupation. Seizure and physical occupancy of key terrain features by relatively large forces may not be desirable. Destructive fires delivered by long-range means can destroy forces physically occupying key terrain. The commander then controls key terrain to avoid destruction of his force while keeping the enemy from gaining control. Control includes maneuver, surveillance, security, and use of fires. Terrain which permits or denies maneuver may be key terrain. Tactical use of terrain often is directed at increasing the capability for applying combat power and at the same time forcing the enemy into areas which result in reduction of his ability to apply his combat power. Terrain which permits this also may be key terrain. The effect of terrain on maneuver, application of combat power, and preservation of force integrity are considerations in selecting key terrain, its control, and tactical use.

c. In the offense, key terrain features are usually forward of the friendly dispositions and are often assigned as objectives. However, terrain features in adjacent sectors may be key terrain if their control is necessary for the continuation of the attack or the accomplishment of the mission. If the mission is to destroy enemy forces, terrain may be selected whose seizure helps insure the required destruction. Terrain which gives the enemy effective observation along an axis of advance to be used by the friendly forces may be key terrain if the enemy must be denied its possession or control. Key terrain may be within friendly territory when its control is essential to the success of an offensive operation. For example, if the enemy can attack before our attack, the control of this terrain is essential because it affords us a marked advantage. Thus, it is a key terrain feature.

d. In the defense, key terrain is usually within the assigned sector and within or behind the selected defensive area. Some examples of key terrain are—

(1) Terrain which gives good observation over avenues of approach to and into the defensive position.

(2) Terrain which permits the defender to cover an obstacle by fire.

(3) Important communication centers which affect command communications and the use of reserves.

e. Key terrain also may be forward of the defensive area or in adjacent sectors. For example, a terrain feature forward of the edge of the battle area or in an adjacent sector which gives the enemy good observation over defended localities, communication routes, or enemy avenues of approach, is key terrain when active measures must be taken to reduce the enemy advantage. The defender may move his position forward to include the feature or take action to minimize the enemy advantage by the use of fire, chemicals, smoke, concealment, and cover.

B–15. Avenues of Approach

a. An avenue of approach is a route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective or key terrain. To be considered an avenue of approach, a route must provide some ease of movement and enough width for dispersion of a force of a sufficient size to affect significantly the outcome of the operation. The division G2 usually considers avenues of approach adequate for at least the type brigade of the particular division. The corps and higher G2 usually consider avenues of approach adequate for at least a division. In determining the width of dispersion, consideration is given to the deployment patterns, mobility means, and the area required for maneuver to prevent presenting lucrative targets for nuclear fires.

b. A valley approach gives the advancing force some cover from enemy direct fire and some concealment from enemy observation. A valley approach includes the floor of the valley, the slopes of the ridges, and the military crests. Control of the military crests on each side of the valley is essential. In a valley approach, the best avenue of

approach is that which offers the best observation, cross-country trafficability, road net, fields of fire, concealment and cover, and dispersion. In evaluating the use of a deep valley approach, the possible intensification of nuclear effects and resulting greater casualities on the valley floor are considered. At times, the best avenue may be along the slopes of a ridge below the military crests, rather than along the valley floor.

c. The use of a ridge approach depends upon the width and shape of the ridge, the size and deployment of the units involved, and the distance to the elevation of adjacent ridges. A ridge approach usually has the advantage of good observation. However, there may be little protection from enemy fire on the ridge. The best avenue of approach in a ridge approach is often slightly below the topographical crest, with sufficient force on the crest to control it.

B–16. Air Avenues of Approach

a. An air avenue of approach is a route which provides a suitable path for a particular number of aircraft to reach a landing zone. The aviation officer or the aviation mission commander assists in evaluating the effect of density altitude, wind, turbulence, and visibility on selected avenues of approach. In selecting air avenues of approach the following factors are considered:

b. Sufficient air space for rapid movement of the aircraft to the landing zones. Fire support requirements involving artillery and tactical air support may restrict the availability of air space. Consideration must be given to gun-target lines and to restrictive fire plans that will be in effect during the air movement phase. The size of the airmobile force involved in the operation must also be considered; however, no parameters may be given as to width concerning air avenues of approach. Depending on the flight formation, a large number of helicopters may be flown over a relatively narrow air avenue of approach. Another consideration in relation to adequate air space is the desirability of having multiple flight routes available. Generally, in situations with concentrated enemy forces along the line of contact, multiple flight routes from the pickup zone to the objective area and return are desirable.

c. Concealment from ground observation. Heavily forested and swamp areas provide good routes because ground troops have little opportunity to see and fire on helicopters passing overhead at tree-top level. Low altitude operations over heavy foliage distort the acoustic wave from aircraft and decrease the distance at which the sound can be detected. It also hampers determination of the direction of the noise source by ground observers. Desirabyl, air avenues of approach will be in defi- weapon locations. Ridge lines are crossed as infre- lade with respect to enemy air defense radar and quently as possible to reduce exposure time to radar detection. Steep defiles or canyons are avoided, however, especially when there is an appreciable amount of surface wind that can cause momentary loss of aircraft control because of downdrafts.

d. Easily recognized terrain features. Navigation at low altitudes is extremely difficult. The presence of easily recognized terrain features, such as a river or road, can significantly improve the pilots' ability to navigate by reference to ground features. Terrain corridors are usually desirable because they afford ease of navigation and defilade. Linear features that parallel the direction of flight are the most valuable in assisting navigation.

e. Length of flight paths. In the interest of minimizing the exposure of aircraft en route to the objective area, the shortest possible flight paths that afford sufficient air space, concealment from ground observation, and easily recognized terrain features are usually preferred. However, longer flight paths may be selected for purposes of deception.

B–17. Combat Service Support Aspects

a. The analyses of the facts and subconclusions developed in the preceding parts of the analysis are used as a basis for further studies of effects of combat service support activities on friendly and enemy units. In this paragraph the effects of the characteristics of the area on combat service support that influence the selection of a course of action by either force are determined.

b. In studying the influence of the area, consideration is given to effects on matters such as availability of adequate routes for lines of communication, facilities for maintenance and storage, construction resources, public health situation, required shelter for administrative facilities, availability of labor, maintenance of discipline, law and order, and control of refugees.

B–18. Effects of Characteristics of the Area

This paragraph contains the conclusions reached

on the basis of the facts and subconclusions previously developed. The effects of the characteristics of the area of operations on each significant course of action of which the enemy is physically capable of adopting and which, if adopted, could adversely affect the accomplishment of our mission are discussed. Usually, the discussion includes effects on the enemy's ability to defend and on his ability to attack. It also includes, as appropriate, the effects on the enemy's ability to delay, use his reserves, amphibious or airborne forces, nuclear fires, guerrilla forces, chemical and biological agents, cover and deception, sensor devices, or to conduct special operations and support his forces administratively. The discussion of the effects on our courses of action is limited to those required for the accomplishment of the mission.

APPENDIX C

AVAILABILITY OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

C–1. Division, Corps, and Field Army

The agencies usually available at a division, corps, and field army are shown in figures C–1, C–2, and C–3.



LEGEND: ——— Assigned or attached.
– – – – Suppart available by request.

1 Organic ta Infantry and Airborne Division. Aviation company arganic ta Armored and Mechanized Divisian.
2 Organic ta Airmabile Divisian.

Figure C–1. Intelligence collection agencies available to division.



LEGEND:
——— Assigned or attached.
– – – – Support available by request. May be employed as a Corps Support Command with assignment to Corps Headquarters.
1 FASCOM elements may become Corps Support Command (COSCOM) when assigned to independent corps..

Figure C–2. Intelligence collection agencies available to corps.

C–2. Army Group

The agencies normally available at the army group are:

a. Subordinate forces.

b. Army group special staff.

c. Adjacent army groups.

d. Tactical air force.

e. Theater task force.

f. Theater army support command (TASCOM), theater army civil affairs command, (TACAC) if established, theater army air defense command (TAADC), theater army signal command (TASC), and theater army psychological operations group.



Figure C–3. Intelligence collection agencies available to field army.



Figure C–4. Intelligence collection agencies available to Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM).



Figure C–5. Intelligence collection agencies available to Theater Army Civil Affairs Command.



Figure C–6. Intelligence collection agencies available to Theater Army Air Defense Command.

g. Theater army, theater navy, and theater air force.

h. Military intelligence units.

C–3. Communications Zone

Agencies available to major army commands located within the communications zone are shown in figures C–4, C–5, and C–6.

C–4. Theater Army

The agencies available at theater army vary with the organization of the theater and generally include:

a. Subordinate army commands.

b. Theater army special staff sections.

c. Army Security Agency elements.

d. Army Special Forces elements.

e. Military intelligence units.

f. Agencies organized primarily for production of strategic intelligence, but which also develop combat intelligence and information. Such agencies may include interrogation centers, document exploitation centers, and materiel exploitation centers.

g. Comparable headquarters of other services, allied forces, and joint commands subordinate to theater headquarters.

h. Higher headquarters.

i. Psychological operations units and theater army civil affairs command.

APPENDIX D

FORMAT FOR PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT (PERINTREP)

(Classification)

Copy No _____
Unit
Location
Date-time group
Message reference number

PERINTREP NO _____
Period covered: (date and time to date and time).
References: Maps or charts.
Disposal instructions: (if any).

1. GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION

This paragraph contains a brief summary of enemy operations during the period. Amplifying details are furnished in the paragraphs that follow and in appropriate annexes, or both. This paragraph provides a quick briefing on the highlights of the enemy situation and the significance of the enemy's major activities, to include marked changes in morale, strengths, dispositions, tactics, combat effectiveness, and equipment. Data that are lengthy or can conveniently be shown graphically are presented in annexes.

2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES

This paragraph, in conjunction with those following, provides the details of the situation summarized in paragraph 1. Detailed intelligence provided in this paragraph covers all operational activities. Information may be presented graphically by overlays, printed maps, sketch maps, and annexes. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligence is not available or is adequately covered by other portions of this report.
(Short title identification)

a. Ground. (Primarily includes activities of combat arms, reserves, and reinforcements; includes enemy defenses, minefields, fortificaitons, barriers, obstacles, and other defensive works.)

b. Air. (Includes Air Force activities, such as bombing, close air support, and tactical aerial reconnaissance; air surveillance, and air-supported operations.)

c. Airborne.

d. Irregular.

e. Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Operations.

f. Electronic Warfare.

g. Other. (Normally includes other than combat arms; includes appro-

(Classification)

priate comments not covered in other paragraphs on reserves, reinforcements, new tactics, weapons and equipment, administrative installations, and combat service support. Also includes appropriate technical intelligence.)

3. ORDER OF BATTLE

Frequently, this paragraph will consist only of references to the enemy situation map (or overlay) and to the order of battle annex, which is developed using the format shown below. When desired by the commander, particularly significant order of battle changes may be summarized in this paragraph in addition to being discussed in detail in the order of battle annex. (See Appendix L, Order of Battle Annex to PERINTREP).

a. Composition and Disposition.

b. Strength. (Personnel and major weapons and items of equipment.)

(1) Losses.

(2) Current strength.

(Short title identification)

c. Tactics.

d. Training.

e. Combat Service Support.

f. Combat Effectiveness.

g. Miscellaneous Data.

4. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

This paragraph, or parts thereof, should be issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.

a. General. (A short summary of the counterintelligence situation during the period.)

b. Espionage.

c. Sabotage.

d. Subversion.

e. Communications and Noncommunications Security.

f. Miscellaneous.

5. WEATHER

This paragraph gives a summary of the effect of weather on operations during the period.

6. TERRAIN

Use an annex, special maps, and overlays when possible. Include impact on future operations, if appropriate.

7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This paragraph lists and discusses briefly enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The conclusions present the commander's assessment of the most probable courses of action available to the enemy in order of probability of adoption and vulnerabilities that are exploitable by own, higher, or lower echelons.

(Classification)

a. Enemy Capabilities.
b. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
c. Conclusions.

Acknowledge.

Signature

(Short title identification)
Annexes: (Any intelligence document may be distributed as an annex to a PERINTREP. Although annexes are a means of distributing detailed intelligence and information, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk and duplication.)

Distribution:

Authentication:

Note: In joint service operations, the PERINTREP is replaced by the periodic intelligence summary (PERINTSUM). The correct format for the PERINTSUM is contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12.

(Classification)

APPENDIX F

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF AN INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (INTSUM) (STANAG 2022; SEASTAG 2022)

1. Format of an Intelligence Summary.

   Note: Omit items not applicable unless otherwise indicated.

   1. Issuing unit (always included).
   2. Time and date of issue (always included).
   3. Summary of enemy activity for period.
      a. Ground activity.
      b. Trace of forward elements.
      c. Potential targets for nuclear weapons.
      d. Nuclear activity.
      e. CB activity.
      f. Air activity.
      g. Other (new tactics, counterintelligence, etc.).
   4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses.
      a. Personnel (KIA).
      b. Prisoner of war.
      c. Equipment destroyed or captured.
   5. New obstacles and barriers.
   6. Administrative activities.
   7. New identifications.
      a. Units.
      b. Personalities.
   8. Enemy movements.
   9. Estimates number and types of vehicles.
   10. Weather and terrain conditions.
   11. Brief discussion of capabilities and vulnerabilities (always included).
   12. Conclusions (always included).

IMMEDIATE

TO CG 2D CORPS

INTSUM NUMBER 144 ENDING 040600 PARA 3 ALFA AGGRESSOR CONTINUED DEFENSE IN ZONE EXCEPT FOR LOCAL ATTACK AT 0415 VICINITY R376759 WITH ESTIMATED 90 MEN CMM 3 MEDIUM TANKS CMM AND LIGHT ARTILLERY SUPPORT PD ATTACK REPULSED PD PARA 3 DELTA ATTACK PRECEDED AT 0410 BY VERY HIGH AIR BRUST NUCLEAR WEAPON CMM GROUND ZERO R374761 CMM DELIVERY MEANS UNDETERMINED CMM YIELD ESTIMATED AT 0 PD 5 KT PD PARA 3 FOXTROT ATTACK SUPPORTED BY 2 JET ATTACK AIRPLANES BOMBING AND STRAFING VICINITY R396756 FOR 5 MINUTES STARTING AT 0425 PD PARA 4 ALFA CONFIRMED 20 KIA CMM ESTIMATED 5 KIA CMM PA PARA 4 BRAVO 10 INCLUDING 2 WIA PD PARA 4 CHARLIE 2 MEDIUM TANKS DESTROYED CMM 1 DAMAGED CMM 1 JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN PD PARA 6 PRISONER STATES AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN FORWARD UNITS RUNNING LOW PAREN CHARLIE DASH 3 PAREN PD PARA 7 ALFA PATROL REPORTS BATTERY 152 MM GUN-HOWITZERS AT R303292 PD PRISONERS CONFIRM LOCATION 2D BATTALION CMM 17F MECH REGIMENT VICINITY R375758 PAREN BRAVO DASH 1 PAREN PARA 8 AIRBORNE RADAR RE-

2. Examples of a Division INTSUM (full distribution not indicated) FM CG 52D INF DIV (MECH)	CONNAISSANCE DETECTED 1Ø TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH ON ROAD AT R33Ø28Ø AT Ø345 PD PARA 9 PROBABLY ROUTINE SUPPLY VEHICLES PD PARA 1Ø SNOW STARTED AT Ø4Ø545 AND CONTINUING PD GROUND FROZEN HARD AND SUPPORTS ALL TYPES OF VEHICLES PD PARA 11 LOCAL ATTACK REPORTED PROBABLY WAS TO SEIZE HILL 4Ø5 PD ENEMY IS CAPABLE OF CONTINUING DEFENSE IN PRESENT POSITION CMM MAKING LOCAL ATTACKS TO IMPROVE HIS DEFENSIVE POSITION CMM DELAYING TO STRONGER POSITION ALONG LAURIEX RIVER PD PARA 12 CONTINUED DEFENSE IN PRESENT POSITION MOST PROBABLE.

Note: In joint service operations, the format in JCS Publication 12 will be followed.

(Classification)

APPENDIX G

FORMAT FOR BOMBING, SHELLING AND MORTARING REPORTS BOMREP, SHELREP, OR MORTREP (STANAG 2008)

(indicate which)

A. UNIT OF ORIGIN. (Use current call sign, address group or code name.)

B. POSITION OF OBSERVER. (Grid reference preferred—encode if this discloses the location of a headquarters or important observation post, or if sub-paragraph F2, below is used to give information on location.)

C. DIRECTION AND ANGLE OF FALL/DESCENT (Omit for aircraft). DIRECTION (bearing) of FLASH, SOUND, or GROOVE OF SHELL (state which) is measured CLOCKWISE from GRID NORTH in mils, unless otherwise specified. The ANGLE of FALL/DESCENT may be determined by placing a stick/rod in the fuze tunnel and measuring in mils, unless otherwise specified, the ANGLE formed by the stick/rod in relation to the horizontal plane.

D. TIME FROM.

E. TIME TO.

F. AREA BOMBED, SHELLED, ROCKETED, OR MORTARED. May be sent either as:

1. Grid reference (Clear reference is to be used).

OR

2. Direction measures clockwise from grid north to impact points (Degrees or mils—state which) and distance in yards or meters (state which) from observer. This information must be encoded. (When this method is used, maximum accuracy possible is essential.)

G. NUMBER AND NATURE OF GUNS, MORTARS, ROCKET LAUNCHERS, AIRCRAFT, OR OTHER METHODS OF DELIVERY.

H. NATURE OF FIRE. (Adjustment, bombardment, harassing, etc.) (May be omitted for aircraft.)

I. NUMBER, TYPE AND CALIBER. (State whether measured or assumed) of SHELLS, ROCKETS (OR MISSILES) BOMBS, ETC.

J. TIME FROM FLASH TO BANG. (Omit for aircraft.)

K. DAMAGE. (Encode if required.)

(Classification)

APPENDIX H

REPORT FORMATS FOR REPORTING ENEMY NUCLEAR DETONATIONS, RADIOACTIVE FALLOUT,AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL ATTACKS

(STANAG 2103)

Note: The North American Air Defense Command uses NORAD Manual 55–19, Vol. 8, NBC Reporting Procedures and Techniques.

Section I. GENERAL

H–1. NBC Reports

Reports of enemy or unidentified nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) attacks and the resulting chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) hazardous areas are made according to the provisions of STANAG 2103. Expected chemical and radiological hazardous areas resulting from nuclear and chemical attack by friendly forces is also reported. These reports are:

a. NBC 1. Report used by the observing unit to give initial and subsequent data of an enemy chemical, biological, or nuclear attack.

b. NBC 2. Report used for passing evaluated data of a chemical, biological, or nuclear attack.

c. NBC 3. Report used for immediate warning of expected chemical, biological, and radiological contamination or hazardous area.

d. NBC 4. Report used for radiation dose-rate measurements.

e. NBC 5. Report used to locate the area of chemical, biological, and radiological contamination or hazard.

H–2. Initial Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Attack

The INITIAL enemy use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons is reported to the theater commander through the chain of command by the fastest means with the highest message precedence.

H–3. NBC Information Source

The information source may be a unit under attack or a unit observing an attack. The NBC information source submits NBC reports through command, intelligence, or field artillery communications channels, as appropriate, to the designated headquarters tactical operations center by the fastest means.

a. Nuclear Attack Report. The information source, normally headquarters of field artillery and air defense units (other units may also be designated as collection and reporting agencies. See appendix D, FM 3–12.) submits—

(1) An initial NBC 1 nuclear report to its next higher headquarters, with a FLASH message precedence.

(2) Subsequent NBC 1 nuclear reports to its next higher headquarters with an IMMEDIATE message precedence, giving followup data.

b. Chemical and Biological Attack Reports. The information source, normally headquarters of a company or independent platoon, submits—

(1) An initial NBC 1 chemical or biological report to its next higher headquarters with a FLASH message precedence. The next higher headquarters forwards the initial NBC 1 chemical or biological report through command channels to the NBC collection center with the same message precedence.

(2) Subsequent NBC 1 chemical or biological reports to its next higher headquarters with an IMMEDIATE message precedence, giving follow-up data. The next higher headquarters forwards subsequent NBC 1 chemical or biological reports through command channels to the NBC collection center with the same message precedence.

H–4. NBC Collection Center

The NBC collection center, normally the CBR ele-

ment of the tactical operations center at division, consolidates NBC 1 nuclear, biological, or chemical reports of the same attack received from its various information sources and transmits an NBC 1 report to the NBC control center, normally the tactical operations center at field army headquarters. It transmits appropriate NBC 2, 3, and 5 reports to subordinate, adjacent, and higher commands. If there is no CBRE, the G3 assumes these responsibilities.

H–5. NBC Control Center

The NBC control center, normally the CBR element of the tactical operations center at field army, consolidates and evaluates NBC reports received from subordinate commands and Air Force, Marine Corps, and civilian installations and agencies. It directs reconnaissance and survey efforts; transmits evaluated chemical, biological, and radiological data to subordinate commands and adjacent area commands; and submits appropriate reports to higher headquarters, adjacent commands, and national agencies. If there is no CBRE, the G3 assumes these responsibilities.

Section II. FORMAT OF REPORTS (STANAG 2103, Edition No. 3, Abstract)

H–6. Description of Letter Items

a. Purpose. To describe the meaning of the letter items that are used in NBC reports.

b. Notes.

(1) The letter items as shown below are used in appropriate NBC reports.

(2) NATO forces operating in a NATO area use ZULU time only for these reports.

LETTER	MEANING NUCLEAR REPORTS	MEANING CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS
A.	Strike serial number (s).	Strike serial number(s).
B.	Position of observer (UTM or place).	Position of observer (UTM or place).
C.	Direction measured clockwise from grid or magnetic north (state which) of the attack from observer (degrees or mils, state which).	Direction measured clockwise from grid or magnetic north (state which) of the attack from observer (degrees or mils, state which).
D.	Date/time of detonation (local or ZULU time, state which). If local time is used, give the letter of the local time zone, if known. See FM 101–10–1 for time-zone charts. If the local time is used and the time-zone letter is not known, the word "local" will be transmitted with this item.	Date/time attack started (local or ZULU time, state which). If local time is used, give the letter of the local time zone, if known. See FM 101–10–1 for time-zone charts. If the local time is used and the time-zone letter is not known, the word "local" will be transmitted with this item.
E.	Illumination time. (Report only when other data are not available. Report in seconds.)	Time attack ended (local or ZULU, state which).
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) (actual or estimated, state which).	Area attacked (actual or estimated, state which).
G.	Means of delivery, if known.	Means of delivery, if known.
H.	Type of burst—air, surface, or unknown (state which—including height, if known.	Type of agent, if known (chemical or biological). Type of attack (chemical or biological).

LETTER	MEANING NUCLEAR REPORTS	MEANING CHEMICAL OR BIOLOGICAL REPORTS
I.	(This letter item is not used for nuclear report.)	Type and number of munitions or aircraft (state which).
J.	Flash-to-bang time (seconds).	
K.	Crater present or absent and diameter, if known (meters).	
L.	Nuclear burst angular cloud width measured at 5 minutes after the detonation (degrees or mils, state which). (Do not report if data are obtained more than 5 minutes after the detonation.)	
M.	Stabilized cloud-top angle and/or cloud-bottom angle (state which) or cloud-top height and/or cloud-bottom height (state which) measured at H + 10 minutes (degrees, mils, meters, or feet—state which).	
N.	Estimated yield (KT).	
O.	Reference date/time for estimated contours when not H + 1 hour.	
P.	For radar purposes only: P.A. UTM coordinates of points to outline external contours of radioactive cloud. P.B. Effective wind direction (direction from which the wind is blowing) in degrees or mils (state which).	Area of expected contamination (UTM).
Q.	Location of reading (UTM).	
R.	Dose rate (rad/hr). The words "initial," "increasing," "peak," or "decreasing" may be added.	
S.	Date/time of reading (local or ZULU time, state which).	Date/time contamination initially detected (local or ZULU time, state which).
T.	H + 1 date/time (local or ZULU time, state which).	Date/time of latest reconnaissance of contamination in the area (local or ZULU time, state which).
U.	1,000 rad/hr contour line coordinates (UTM) (red).	
V.	300 rad/hr contour line coordinates (UTM) (green).	
W.	100 rad/hr contour line coordinates (UTM) (blue).	
X.	20 rad/hr contour line coordinates (UTM) (black).	Located area of contamination (UTM) (yellow).

Y. Direction measured clockwise from grid north to the left and then to the right radial lines (degrees or mils, state which—4 digits each).

Z. Effective windspeed (kmph), 3 digits; downwind distance of zone I (km), 3 digits; cloud radius (km), 2 digits. (When effective windspeed is less than 8 kmph, the NBC 3 report will contain only three significant digits, that is, the radial distance of zone I.)

H–7. NBC 1 Reports

a. Purpose. Report used by observing unit, giving initial data and subsequent followup data of an enemy nuclear, biological, or chemical attack.

b. Notes.

(1) NBC 1 report follows the same format as the SHELLREPS, MORTREPS, and BOMBREPS, which are included in STANAG 2008 dealing with conventional enemy attacks.

(2) The item "Type of Report," and letter items D, H, and either B and C or F must always be reported; other items are optional.

(3) Users of NBC 1 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items from paragraph E–6, FM 21–40 may be added at the users' discretion.

(4) For examples of NBC 1 chemical report messages, see paragraph E–8, FM 21–40.

(5) For examples of NBC 1 nuclear report messages, see FM 3–12.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL	EXAMPLE BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence* Date/time (local or ZULU time, state which) Security Classification From To Type of Report	NBC 1 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 1 (CHEMICAL)	NBC 1 (BIOLOGICAL)
A.	Strike serial number (if known—as assigned by the CBRE at the operations center responsible for the area in which the strike occurs).	A. 04	A. 02	
B.	Position of observer (UTM) or place).	LB 196400	B. MARVILLE	
C.	Direction measured clockwise from or magnetic north (state which) of the attack from observer (degrees or mils, state which).	C. Grid 060 degrees		

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL	EXAMPLE BIOLOGICAL
D.	Date/time of detonation or date/time attack started (local or ZULU time, state which).	D. 201405 ZULU	D. 201405 (local)	D. 201405 HOTEL
E.	Illumination time (seconds) or time attack ended (local or ZULU, state which).		E. 201412 (local)	
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) or area attacked (actual or estimated, state which).		F. LB 25305 estimated	F. LB 2030 actual
G.	Means of delivery, if known		G. Artillery	G. Aircraft, 100 meters
H.	Type of burst—air, surface, or unknown (state which)—including height, if known; type of agent, if known (chemical or biological); or type of attack (chemical or biological).	H. Surface	H. Airburst, nerve	H. Aerial spray
I.	Type and number of munitions or aircraft (state which).			
J.	Flash-to-bang time (seconds)	J. 60		
K.	Crater present or absent and diameter if known (meters).			
L.	Nuclear burst angular cloud width measured at 5 minutes after the detonation (degrees or mils, state which). (Do not report if data are obtained more than 5 minutes after the detonation.)	L. 280 mils		
M.	Stablized cloud-top angle and/or cloud-bottom angle (state which) or cloud-top height and/or cloud-bottom height (state which) measured at H+10 minutes (degrees, mils, meters, or feet—state which).			
S.	Date/time of reading or date/time contamination initially detected (chemical or biological). State whether local or ZULU time.		S. 201500 (local)	
X.	Located area of contamination (UTM).		X. LB 208303 LB 208308	
	Note. When the contaminated area is a complete circle, the first coordinate will be repeated as a last coordinate.		LB 203303 LB 203308	

H–8. Examples of Initial and Subsequent NBC 1 Chemical Reports

Company A, 2d Batallion of the 1st Brigade, is under artillery chemical attack. The call sign of the 2d Battalion is REDDOG and of the 1st Brigade is VICTOR. Examples of initial and subsequent NBC 1 chemical reports from the company through the brigade are given below. The actual message format follows the unit SOP.

a. Actions by Company A. First, the company alerts its subordinate units of the company net with a FLASH precedence brevity code "GAS."

(1) *Initial NBC 1 chemical report.* The company alerts the 2d Battalion (S3) with an initial NBC 1 report, assigning its own strike serial number as follows:

FLASH
201408 HOTEL
FROM ALFA
TO REDDOG
NBC 1 CHEMICAL
ALFA 02
BRAVO MARVILLE
DELTA 201405 HOTEL
FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO 205305 ESTIMATED
GOLF ARTILLERY
HOTEL AIR

The actual message might be transmitted as follows: FLASH FLASH, REDDOG REDDOG, NBC 1 CHEMICAL, FROM ALFA, 201408 HOTEL, ALFA 02, BRAVO MARVILLE, DELTA 201405 HOTEL, FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO 205305 ESTIMATED, GOLF ARTILLERY, HOTEL AIR, END OF MESSAGE, MORE TO FOLLOW.

(2) *Subsequent NBC 1 chemical reports.*

(*a*) When the chemical agent used in the chemical attack has been identified, the company submits a subsequent NBC 1 report, using the same strike serial number as used in the initial NBC 1 report and giving followup data, as follows:

IMMEDIATE
201418 HOTEL
FROM ALFA
TO REDDOG
NBC 1 CHEMICAL
ALFA 02
ECHO 201412 HOTEL
HOTEL NERVE

(*b*) If a persistent chemical agent was used in the attack and the contaminated area is located, the company submits another subsequent NBC 1 report, giving followup data and using the same strike serial number as was used in the initial NBC 1 report, as follows:

IMMEDIATE
201438 HOTEL
FROM ALFA
TO REDDOG
NBC 1 CHEMICAL
ALFA 02
X-RAY LIMA BRAVO 208303, 208308, 203303, 203308

b. Actions by 2d Battalion. First, the battalion alerts its subordinate, attached, and supporting units on the battalion net with a FLASH precedence brevity code "GAS."

(1) *Initial NBC 1 chemical report.* The battalion submits an initial NBC 1 report to the 1st Brigade, based on the Company A NBC 1 report received (and repeats pertinent parts of the body of the message on the battalion net), assigning its own strike serial number, as follows:

FLASH
201411 HOTEL
FROM REDDOG
TO VICTOR 3
NBC 1 CHEMICAL
FROM REDDOG 3
ALFA 06
BRAVO MARVILLE
DELTA 201405 HOTEL
FOXTROT LIMA BRAVO 205305 ESTIMATED
GOLF ARTILLERY
HOTEL AIR

(2) *Subsequent NBC 1 chemical reports.* The battalion submits subsequent NBC 1 reports to the 1st Brigade, based on the NBC 1 reports received from Company A (and repeats pertinent parts of the body of the message on the battalion net), using the same strike serial number used in its initial NBC 1 report.

Note: If more than one company of the battalion submits NBC 1 reports for the same chemical attack, the battalion consolidates the several NBC 1 reports received and submits one NBC 1 report to the 1st Brigade.

c. Actions by the 1st Brigade. First, the brigade alerts its subordinate, attached, and supporting units on the brigade net with a FLASH precedence brevity code "GAS."

(1) *Initial NBC 1 chemical report.* The bri-

gade transmits the 2d Babtalion initial NBC 1 report to the division TOC (and repeats pertinent parts of the body of the message on the brigade net), assigning its own strike serial number.

(2) *Subsequent NBC 1 chemical reports.* The brigade transmits the 2d Battalion subsequent NBC 1 reports to the division TOC (and repeats pertinent parts of the body of the message on the brigade net), using the same strike serial number used in its initial NBC 1 report.

Note: If more than one battalion submits NBC 1 reports for the same chemical attack, the brigade consolidates the several NBC 1 reports received and submits one NBC 1 report to the division TOC.

H–9. NBC 2 Reports

a. Purpose. Report used for passing evaluated data of a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack.

b. Notes.

(1) This report is normally based on two or more NBC 1 reports. It includes an attack location and, in the case of a nuclear detonation, an evaluated yield.

(2) When adjacent agencies (for example, Navy and Civil Defense organizations) use a different radiological fallout prediction system, this report may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computations.

(3) Letter items A, D, F, H, and N may be repeated as often as necessary to produce a summary report.

(4) Users of NBC 2 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items from paragraph E–6, FM 21–40, may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence		
	Date/time (local or ZULU time, state which).		
	Security Classification		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 2 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 2 (CHEMICAL)
A.	Strike serial number.	A. 24	A. 1
D.	Date/time of detonation or date/time attack started (loal or ZULU time, state which).	D. 201405 ZULU	D. 200945 (local)
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) or area attacked (actual or estimated, state which).	F. LB 187486	F. LB 126456 actual
G.	Means of delivery, if known.		
H.	Type of burst—air, surface, or unknown (state which)—including height, if known; type of agent, if known; (chemical or biological); or type of attack (chemical or biological).	H. Surface	H. Nerve
N.	Estimated yield (KT).	N. 50	

H–10. NBC 3 Reports

a. Purpose. Report used for immediate warning of expected chemical, biological, or radiological contamination or hazardous area.

b. Notes.

(1) When adjacent agencies (for example, Navy and Civil Defense organizations) use a different radiological fallout prediction system, NBC

2 report may be sent to provide basic data for their fallout computations.

(2) Users of NBC 3 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items from paragraph E–6, FM 21–40, may be added at the users' discretion.

(3) When the effective windspeed is less than 8 kmph, the NBC 3 nuclear report will consist of the letter items D, F, and Z. A will contain three digits only, that is, the radial distance of zone I.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence		
	Date/time (local or ZULU time, state which).		
	Security Classification		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 3 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 3 (CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL)
A.	Strike Serial No.	A. 24	
D.	Date time of detonation or date/time attack started (local or ZULU time, state which).	D. 201405 ZULU	D. 201415 (local)
F.	Location of attack (UTM or place) or area attacked (actual or estimated, state which).	F. LB 187486 actual	F. LB 206300 actual
P.	Area of expected contamination (UTM).		P. LB 208320, LB 210320, LB 206130, LB 204310.
Y.	Direction measured clockwise from grid north to the left and then to the right radial lines (degrees or mils, state which—4 digits each).	Y. 0272–0312 degrees	
Z.	Effective windspeed (kmph), 3 digits; downwind distance of zone I (km), 3 digits; cloud radius (km), 2 digits. (When effective windspeed is less than 8 kmph, use three digits only for radial distance of zone I.	Z. 019–025–05	

H–11. NBC. NBC 4 Reports

a. Purpose. Report used for radiation dose-rate measurements.

b. Notes.

(1) Letter items Q, R, and S may be repeated as often as necessary.

(2) Radiation dose rates are measured in the open, 1 meter above the ground. Other conditions will be specified in the message.

(3) Users of NBC 4 reports are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items from paragraph E–6, FM 21–40, may be added at the users' discretion.

(4) For example of an NBC 4 radiation dose-rate message, see paragraph E–12, FM 21–40.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE
	Precedence	
	Date/time (local or ZULU time, state which).	
	Security Classification	
	From	
	To	
	Type of Report	NBC 4 (NUCLEAR)
Q.	Location of reading (UTM).	Q. LB 123987

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE
R.	Dose rate (rad/hr). (This is NOT normalized to H+1 hour.) The words "initial," "increasing," "peak," or "decreasing" may be added.	R. 1 INITIAL
S.	Date/time of reading (local or ZULU, state which).	S. 201735 (local). Q. LB 129965 R. 60 S. 201650 (local). Q. LB 146808 R. 27 INCREASING. S. 201710 (local)

H–12. Example of an NBC 4 Report Message

Company A, 2d Battalion of the 1st Brigade, is transmitting radiation dose-rate measurements described in the example, paragraph E–11, FM 21–40. The call sign of the 2d Battalion is REDDOG. The local time zone is HOTEL. An example of the first NBC 4 radiation dose-rate message is given below.

REDDOG 3 REDDOG 3
IMMEDIATE NBC 4
FROM ALFA
201745 HOTEL
QUEBEC LIMA BRAVO 123987
ROMEO 1 INITIAL
SIERRA 201735 HOTEL

H–13. NBC 5 Report

a. Purpose. Report used to locate the area of chemical, biological, or radiological contamination or hazard.

b. Notes.

(1) The report is best sent as a trace or overlay if time and distance permit.

(2) When the contamination arises from a single enemy or unidentified nuclear burst, the dose rate always refers to H + 1 hour, and the letter item T is used. When there have been several nuclear detonations at different times or on different days and no single H + 1 hour is possible, the dose rates are reported as at a specified time, using letter item O. Letter items O and T are, therefore, alternative and cannot both be used in the same report.

(3) It is not necessary or even desirable to report all four of the contours of different dose rates. Four are given to provide flexibility. (In the example only two are reported.)

(4) When a contour closes to form a complete ring, the first coordinate is repeated at the end (see example for 300 rad/hr.)

(5) Colors for plotting, and when sending the report as a trace, are as follows:

Red for 1,000 rad/hr.
Green for 300 rad/hr.
Blue for 100 rad/hr.
Black for 20 rad/hr.
Yellow for chemical and biological contamination or hazardous area.

(6) Contour lines are to be annotated with the dose rates.

(7) When requested, decay rates are to be transmitted according to letter item R.

(8) Users of NBC 5 are not confined solely to the use of the letter items shown in the examples; other letter items from paragraph E–6, FM 21–40, may be added at the users' discretion.

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
	Precedence		
	Date/time (local or ZULU time, state which).		
	Security Classification		
	From		
	To		
	Type of Report	NBC 5 (NUCLEAR)	NBC 5 (CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL)

LETTER	MEANING	EXAMPLE NUCLEAR	EXAMPLE CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
A.	Strike serial number(s) causing contamination (if known).	A. 24	A. 1
O.	Reference date/time for estimated contours (see note (2) above) when not H+1 hour.		
S.	Date/time contamination initially detected (chemical or bioligical (local or ZULU time, state which).		S. 200800 (local)
T.	H+1 date/time or date/time of latest reconnaissance of contamination in the area (chemical or biological). State whether local or ZULU time.	T. 201505 ZULU	T. 201045 (local)
U.	1,000 rad/hr contour line coordinates.		
V.	300 rad/hr contour line coordinates.	V. ND 651455 ND 810510 ND 821459 ND 651455	
W.	100 rad/hr contour line coordinates.	W. ND 604718 ND 991686 ND 114420 ND 595007	
X.	20 rad/hr contour line coordinates, or located area of contamination (chemical or biological).		X. CHEMICAL ND 206991 ND 201575 ND 200787 ND 206991

APPENDIX I

EXAMPLE OF CLIMATIC SUMMARY

CLIMATIC SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF JULY

III CORPS AREA

I–1. General Circulation

Generally air flows from the west and northwest. Occasionally warm, dry continental air from the Soviet Union causes a relatively intense, dry heat with temperatures of 90° or more.

I–2. Temperatures

Afternoon temperatures generally are in the 70s and morning temperatures are in the 50s. There are occasional periods of hot, dry spells that last more than a week with temperatures in the 90s. The highest temperature ever recorded was 101° F.

I–3. Thunderstorms

Thunderstorms occur frequently. They usually develop during the day and reach maximum intensity in the late afternoon and evening.

I–4. Surface Winds

The average wind speed is 5.8 knots. The most predominant direction is northeast, with a mean speed of 8.4 knots. The strongest mean wind is from the east-northeast 10.0 knots. Calms are frequent occurring 25.2 percent of the time, and usually in the early morning. Calms or near calms often last the whole day.

Percentage frequency of surface winds by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
2.1	2.0	8.6	1.0	0.7	0.3	0.4	0.0	1.2	2.1	19.5	10.9	12.2	2.7	9.6	1.0

Average surface wind speed by direction for month of July

S	SSW	SW	WSW	W	WNW	NW	NNW	N	NNE	NE	ENE	E	ESE	SE	SSE
5.6	9.4	8.8	7.6	6.8	8.3	3.2	0.0	5.0	6.3	8.4	10.0	7.1	6.6	6.0	4.0

I–5. Cloudiness

Mornings frequently are clear. Clouds develop by noon and cloud cover reaches a maximum in the late afternoon, decreasing to nil just before sunset.

I–6. Visibility

Normal visibilities are from 7 to 13 kilometers and occasionally farther. Occasional haze may reduce visibility to about 3 kilometers.

1-7. Precipitation

Thunderstorms are the usual cause of precipitation. Occasionally a southwesterly wind will cause continued drizzle and low, overcast skies for 1 to 3 days. This is the only time low visibilities occur.

	Jun	Jul	Aug	Annual	Years recorded
Mean precipitation (inches)	2.56	2.48	2.86	26.97	40
Mean number of days with thunderstorm	4	4	3	18	11
Temperature (° F.)					
Absolute max	95	101	97	--------	10
Absolute min	50	43	43	----------	10
Mean daily max	71	74	73	----------	40
Mean daily min	51	55	53	----------	40
Mean number of days with fog	2	2	4	57	11

APPENDIX J

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE (STANAG 2118, SEASTAG 2118)

Section I. THE MISSION

A restatement of the assigned and/or assumed mission of the command.

Section II. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

J–1. General

a. Weather and terrain always are included in the characteristics of the area of operations discussed in paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate. Other characteristics are included if they are important in selecting courses of action by either force to carry out their mission, assigned or assumed. Characteristics, other than weather and terrain, are of greater importance in areas of operations which have large civilian populations and to commands with extensive territorial or combat service support responsibilities.

b. The effects of each characteristic on nuclear weapons and chemical and biological agents are discussed when either combatant has the capability to use them. The discussion includes consideration of both the weapons effects and impact on the delivery means.

c. The discussion of the effects of each characteristic of the area of operations on possible enemy courses of action normally includes consideration of ability to attack and to defend. It also includes, as applicable, consideration of effects on other possible enemy courses of action, such as delay, and on the enemy's possible use of particular weapons, methods, techniques, or forces.

d. The extent of consideration of the effects of each characteristic on broad friendly courses of action is limited by the mission. When the mission is offensive, the discussion does not include consideration of defensive courses of action. It does, however, include consideration of security.

J–2. Weather

The estimate usually includes a current weather forecast. When operations cover a long period, or are programed for a future operation, climatic information may replace weather data forecasts. Light data, in tabular form, include the beginning or morning nautical and civil twilights, the ending of evening nautical and civil twilights, moonrise, moonset, phase of the moon, and other information, as required.

J–3. Terrain

The existing terrain situation usually is described in terms of the tactical aspects of the area: observation and fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach. The discussion of each of these aspects is oriented on its influence on the selection of broad courses of action by either force. For example, for a combat service support unit, the discussion of cover and concealment is oriented on their influence on those courses of action, including installation locations, required to accomplish the combat service support mission and on enemy forces which can interfere with the accomplishment of the mission. In combat service support unit intelligence estimates, discussion of key terrain features is omitted unless the enemy has the capability to seize or control terrain features which will materially affect the accomplishment of the mission.

J–4. Other Characteristics

The following additional subparagraphs of the in-

telligence estimate are considered, as pertinent: sociology, politics, economics, psychology, and other factors. Other factors may include such items as science, materiel, transportation, manpower, and hydrography. (They are analyzed under the same headings as weather and terrain.

Section III. ENEMY SITUATION

J–5. Dispositions

Reference may be made to overlays, enemy situation maps or previously published documents.

J–6. Composition

a. This subparagraph lists the order of data used for later determination of the strength the enemy may use to prevent the accomplishment of the mission. It lists all the units, including insurgent and guerrilla-type forces, with identifications and subordination as known, that can affect the accomplishment of the mission. Included are such supporting units as air, nuclear delivery, and electronic warfare units that also can affect the accomplishment of the mission. In determining which enemy units can affect the accomplishment of the mission, time and space factors are considered.

b. This subparagraph lists other forces, including long-range weapons delivery units, that may be used in support of the enemy ground elements in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. Enemy units believed to be under control of the opposing comparable command but which are committed outside the zone of the friendly unit also are listed by tactical units. Elements of the opposing enemy force deployed in areas where time and space factors do not permit their use in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission are indicated specifically.

J–7. Strength

a. This subparagraph lists all the opposing enemy forces which can be logically employed against the command in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. The total forces listed cannot exceed, but can equal or be less than, the total forces listed in the "composition" subparagraph.

b. Enemy strength is categorized as committed forces, reinforcements, air, nuclear, chemical, and biological operations. Air, nuclear, chemical, or biological operations units are omitted, as appropriate, when the enemy lacks such capabilities to interfere with the accomplishment of the mission.

J–8. Committed Forces and Reinforcements

a. Committed Forces. Committed forces are those enemy ground units in contact whose area of employment is not expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate, and the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared.

b. Reinforcements. Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of a specific course of action and enemy capabilities. Reinforcements include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but which can reasonably be considered capable of closing with the friendly force in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.

c. Guidelines for Computing Committed and Reinforcing Enemy Units

(1) General. The information provided by the G2 on enemy committed forces and reinforcements is used by the commander and the operations officer for planning and conducting tactical operations. Accurate information is particularly important during the commander's analysis of opposing courses of action. For example, in planning for an attack, an over-estimation of committed enemy forces and an underestimation of enemy reinforcements could cause the friendly commander to attack with a small reserve. The G2's error in computing committed and reinforcing forces could allow the enemy to counterattack with an unexpectedly strong force, inflicting unacceptable casualties upon the friendly force.

(2) All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they can be committed in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. If there is doubt as to whether an enemy unit is committed or reinforcing, it is considered

as a reinforcement. This reduces the risk of the friendly command being surprised.

(3) Usually a G2 accounts for committed enemy forces by the size of the enemy unit which is opposing the friendly elements. For example, against an aggressor organization, as given in FM 30–102, a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of battalions; a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher headquarters, in terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army, a statement of the number of armies and army groups is also included. For example, "The committed forces facing this army group consist of one army group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 mechanized rifle divisions and 3 tank divisions) . . . ." When the committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have a known organization, the strength is stated in total numbers.

(4) The brigade S2 considers as committed forces the first and second echelon companies of enemy mechanized, rifle, tank, or reconnaissance battalions in contact with the brigade. Although the enemy company is the basic sized unit used by the brigade S2 in accounting for committed forces, he will also account for smaller units which have been located as separately employed.

(5) The battalion S2 considers as committed forces the first and second echelon platoons of the enemy mechanized rifle, tank, or reconnaissance companies in contact with the battalion. Although the enemy platoon is the basic unit used by the battalion S2 in accounting for committed forces, frequently available intelligence does not enable the individual platoons composing the enemy company to be located. Therefore, the battalion S2 will consider that a located enemy company normally consists of three platoons; a company minus consists of two platoons.

(6) The designation of enemy units as committed forces depends primarily on their disposition and location at the time the estimate is made. Enemy unit identification may facilitate determining if a particular unit is the reserve of elements in contact with the brigade or battalion.

(7) When an enemy unit of the size used in accounting for committed forces is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is considered to be committed by the G2/S2 of both friendly units. For example, if an enemy battalion is in contact with elements of two adjacent US divisions, both division G2s consider the entire battalion as committed against their respective divisions. This points up the need for correct identification and accurate strength computation at each echelon.

(8) All ground fire support weapons organic to the enemy mechanized battalion or regiment are referred to as "normal regimental artillery" and are always considered as in support of committed forces. That is, each committed unit is assumed to have available to it, its normal proportion of the available supporting weapons organic to the regiment. These weapons therefore need not be enumerated. Fire support weapons not organic to the enemy mechanized battalion or regiment which can be identified as within supporting range are enumerated as in support of committed forces. In the event that the forces committed against the brigade or battalion have no known TOE: i.e., "volunteer" or irregular type units, all fire support weapons which can be identified are enumerated.

(9) When enumerating enemy forces, enemy security elements forward of the combat outpost line are normally considered reinforcements of the main defensive position until contact with these security elements is made. The intelligence officer must correctly identify the enemy's main defensive positions and must not be deceived by security forces. The security forces will normally become reinforcements for the main defense after completing their security mission.

(10) In addition to determining the enemy's ground combat unit strength in terms of committed forces and reinforcements, the G2/S2 also considers the enemy's air and nuclear weapons stength. However, as estimates of enemy air, nuclear, chemical and biological warfare strength are usually prepared only at field army level and higher, the G2/S2 simply restates these capabilities in his estimate.

(11) Reinforcements are stated in convenient and meaningful terms. For example, if the opposing division has a mechanized regiment in reserve, this reinforcement is referred to as a "mechanized regiment," rather than "three mechanized battalions." When enemy units, either committed forces or reinforcements are very much understrength, the estimated remaining strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usually more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat support probably available. A half strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective as a full strength battalion.

(12) When only two elements of a unit can be located they are counted as they appear. By

triangulation it may be possible to determine the approximate location of the third element. Although this unit cannot be counted, the commander should be advised as to its possible location.

J-9. Illustrative Examples of Committed and Reinforcing Enemy Units

a. Example 1 (Fig J-1).

(1) *Situation.* The 20th Inf Div, an interior division, is advancing to the south. The advance of the division has been stopped by elements of two mechanized regiments (8th and 12th) of the Aggressor 16th Mech Div. Each of these mechanized regiments has two mechanized battalions in contact and one mechanized battalion in the second echelon. The third mechanized regiment (96th) of this division is in contact with the 72d Inf Div on the flank of the 20th Inf Div. About 25 miles in rear of the 16th Mech Div, and in the area of the 20th Inf Div objective, two mechanized regiments (43d and 75th) of the Aggressor 12th Mech Div are preparing field fortifications.

(2) *Discussion.* The four battalions of the 8th and 12th mechanized regiments in contact with the 20th Inf Div are considered as committed forces by the 20th Inf Div G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div to continue the advance, the area of employment of these four battalions in contact will not change appreciably. The second echelon battalions of the 8th and 12th Regiments are not considered committed since they are not in contact and can be employed in other areas. The 96th Regiment would be mentioned in the "composition" subparagraph, but only its second echelon battalion would be listed as a reinforcement by the 20th Division. The other two battalions are committed against the 72d Division and are not available as reinforcements against the 20th Division. The 43d and 75th Regiments of the 12th Mech Division are considered as reinforcements because these units are not committed



Figure J-1. Schematic sketch.

against the friendly force and can be committed in time to affect the mission of the 20th Inf Div. Although the two regiments of the 12th Mech Div are digging field fortifications in the vicinity of the division objective, the enemy commander can employ these units against either the 20th Inf Div or adjacent divisions.

b. Example 2 (Fig J–2).

(1) *Situation.* The 20th Inf Div is attacking to the east.

(2) *Discussion.* Aggressor committed forces are the 3d Bn, 3d Mech Regt, three battalions of the 5th Mech Regt and the 1st Bn, 7th Mech Regt. The 2d Bn, 3d Mech Regt, the 3d Bn, 7th Mech Regt, and the 2d Bn, 33d Mech Regt are committed against units on the 20th Inf Division flanks. The 1st Bn, 3d Mech Regt and the 2d Bn, 7th Mech Regt are not in contact and are second echelon battalions which may be employed against the 20th Inf Div. They are considered reinforcements. Two aggressor mechanized regiments in the assembly area astride the 20th Inf Div north boundary and the aggressor mechanized regiment south of the south boundary are reinforcements. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent that they are the reserves of the regiments committed against the 20th Inf Div. Depending on the course of action selected by the commander of the 20th Inf Div and the enemy plans, all or part of these aggressor elements can be employed against the 20th Inf Div at various times and places, in time to affect the accomplishment of the division mission.

c. Example 3 (Fig J–3). This example discusses the determination of Aggressor strength opposing the 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division and each of its composite units, the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry.

(1) *Situation.* 1st Brigade, 21st Inf Div, with the 1st Bn, 69th Inf and the 1st Bn, 70th Inf forward, is defending positions as indicated on figure J–3. Reports from 21st Inf Div indicate that Aggressor has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons available.

(2) S2, 1st Brigade determines Aggressor strength as follows:

(*a*) *Committed Forces*: 1st Brigade is opposed by three mechanized companies, one recon-



Figure J–2. Schematic situation sketch.



Figure J-3. Schematic sketch.

naissance platoon and one medium tank company (10 tanks), supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160-mm mortars, six 122-mm Howitzers, six 100-mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.

(*b*) *Reinforcements*: Aggressor reinforcement available for commitment in the sector of 1st Brigade is unidentified mechanized battalion located vicinity HILL 250.

(*c*) *Discussion*: The three mechanized platoons northwest of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are disposed so as to logically constitute one mechanized rifle company in contact with and committed against the 1st Brigade. The reconnaissance platoon southwest of HILL 200 and the mechanized company northeast of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are in contact with and committed against the 1st Brigade and its respective adjacent brigades. All three platoons of the company northeast of HIGHWAY 82 BRIDGE are considered committed against 1st Brigade since brigades account for committed forces in terms of companies. The mechanized company immediately south of CHIGGER Woods is located so as to logically be the reserve company of an enemy battalion in contact with 1st Brigade and is therefore committed. The mechanized companies of the 25th and 23d regiments, located to the east and west of the sector of the 1st Brigade are totally committed against adjacent brigades and are therefore neither committed nor available as reinforcements against 1st Brigade, 21st Inf Div. Ten medium tanks are located in the vicinity of the mechanized rifle companies committed against 1st Brigade and are therefore also committed. S2, 1st Brigade would be equally correct to account for these committed medium tanks as "three medium tank platoons" or "ten medium tanks." (The three amphibious tanks organic to the reconnaissance platoon, although not specifically located at this time, are accounted for as normal components of one reconnaissance platoon.) The ripsnorter, 85-mm SP gun (ATAP) and 120-mm mortars located north of the MUDDY River are part of the "normal regimental artillery" in support of committed forces. The 160-mm mortars, 100-mm AT (SP) and 122-mm Howitzers are organic to the Aggressor division artillery and are therefore *not* part of the "normal regimental artillery." However, they are within supporting range and are therefore *enumerated* as in support of committed forces. The enemy also has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons which can be emloyed in support of committed forces.

(3) S2, 1–69 Inf determines Aggressor strength now opposing the battalion as follows:

(*a*) *Committed Forces*: 1–69 Inf is opposed by two mechanized platoons, one reconnaissance platoon and one medium tank platoon, supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160-mm mortars, six 122-mm Howitzers, six 100-mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.

(*b*) *Reinforcements*: Aggressor reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1–69 Inf are: Unidentified mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250 and unidentified mechanized company and medium tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods.

(*c*) *Discussion*: One mechanized platoon is in contact with and therefore committed against 1–69 Inf. The mechanized platoon north of boundary 1–69 Inf—1–70 is counted as committed against both 1–69 Inf and 1–70 Inf. The medium tank platoon in the same vicinity is in contact with and therefore committed against both 1–69 Inf and 1–70 Inf. S2, 1–69 Inf considers all of the recon platoon in contact because this is the size force the battalion S2 uses for computation of enemy strength. None of the tanks organic to this platoon have been specifically located at this time; however, they are accounted for as a normal component of the reconnaissance platoon. The mechanized rifle company and tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods which are considered as committed by S2, 1st Brigade could logically be employed against 1–69 Inf in time to affect the accomplishment of the battalion mission and are therefore considered as reinforcements. The discussion above (para *c*(2)(*c*)), concerning the battalion vic HILL 250, the "normal regimental artillery" and nonorganic weapons in support of committed forces applies also to the determination by S2, 1–69 Inf.

(4) S2, 1–70 Inf determines Aggressor strength now opposing the battalion as follows:

(*a*) *Committed Forces*: 1–70 Inf is opposed by four mechanized platoons and two medium tank platoons supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160-mm mortars, six 122-mm Howitzers, six 100-mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.

(*b*) *Reinforcements*: Aggressor reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1–70 Inf are: Unidentified mechanized battalion located vic HILL 250 and unidentified mechanized company and medium tank platoon located vic CHIGGER Woods.

(c) *Discussion*: S2, 1-70 Inf considers the individually located mechanized platoons vic boundary 1-69 Inf—1-70 Inf in the same manner as does S2, 1-69 Inf. Two platoons of the mechanized company northeast of Hwy 82 Bridge are considered committed against 1-70 Inf. S2, 4-80 Mech could also consider two platoons of this company committed against his battalion. The discussion ((2)(c) and (3)(c) above) concerning reinforcements and supporting fires applies also in the determination by S2, 1-70 Inf.

J-10. Air

The enemy air capability is based upon numbers of enemy aircraft within operational radius, maintenance facilities, expected attrition, the ground tactical situation, and other factors. The supporting tactical air force furnishes intelligence on the number of sorties, by type, which the enemy can be expected to make within the field army or comparable areas. The estimate usually is not prorated below the field army level. Usually no attempt is made to calculate the number of sorties the enemy can or may make against a subordinate command of the field army or communications zone section. Corps, division, and communications zone command intelligence officers usually quote the estimate furnished by the higher headquarters in stating enemy air capabilities. For example, a corps or division G2 might state, "30th Army estimates that the enemy can be expected to attack within the army area with as many as 150 fighter, 100 attack, and 75 bomber sorties daily. By massing all aircraft within operational radius, the enemy can make a maximum of 250 fighter, 300 attack, and 250 bomber sorties daily."

J-11. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Operations

a. Estimates of NBC enemy capabilities usually are prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to gather the information to make such estimates. They use the estimates of the higher headquarters and modify them with available information.

b. The determination of enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical operations capabilities is based primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience, and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground troops. As with the enemy air capability, it is rarely feasible to estimate what portion of the available enemy NBC effort may be used against a division or corps within a field army or a command in the communications zone. It is also rarely feasible to estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a period as short as one day. The period selected is a month or other period depending on the available information and past experience.

c. The statement of the enemy capabilities to use chemical and biological agents includes, if known, the amount, type, and delivery means of available chemical and biological agents.

J-12. Recent and Present Significant Activities

This paragraph summarizes recent and current enemy activities which may serve as indicators to future enemy actions. Significant enemy failures to take actions also are listed. For example, if the enemy is apparently defending behind a river obstacle but has failed to destroy certain bridges, the omission is listed as a significant activity. Any basis for belief that the enemy has specific knowledge of the friendly situation or intentions also is listed. For example, mention is made of capture by the enemy of an operation order or compromise of current signal operation instructions of cover and deception operations.

J-13. Peculiarities and Weaknesses

a. This paragraph lists peculiarities and weaknesses and briefly discusses each, indicating the extent to which it is a vulnerability and how the selection of broad friendly courses of action are affected. For example, if the enemy has an open flank, the fact is stated in the "operations" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which the open flank constitutes an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. If enemy reserves are small and are poorly positioned to extend the flank, the vulnerability may be great. If the enemy reserves are large and in position to extend the flank or to counterattack an enveloping force, the vulnerability is probably insignificant. The G2 might state it as, "The enemy north flank is open. Available reserves are adequate to extend this flank a distance of only about 3,000 meters. Positions to extend the flank have not been prepared. The enemy is vulnerable to a flank attack." Conversely, it might be stated as, "The enemy north flank is open. However, available reserves are adequate either

to extend this flank beyond our zone, or to counterattack an enveloping force. Positions suitable to block an attempted envelopment have been prepared as shown on the enemy situation map." In the first case, the enemy's vulnerability to a flank attack is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph of the intelligence estimate. In the second case, the open flank apparently is not a vulnerability, and is not carried any further. Another example, if the guerrilla forces are poorly equipped with antitank means of all types, the fact is stated in the "logistics" part of the subparagraph and the extent to which this is an exploitable vulnerability is discussed briefly. The intelligence officer might state, "The guerrilla forces in our area are poorly equipped with antitank means. They cannot effectively defend against armored vehicles." The inability to defend against armored vehicles is carried forward to the "Conclusions" paragraph as a vulnerability.

b. Typical peculiarities and weakness include—

(1) *Personnel.*

Replacement situation (shortages or overages, particularly in specialists).

Morale less than excellent, or exceptionally high. Disproportionate number of very young or very old men.

High rate of sickness.

Percentage of authorized strength, if less than 80 percent.

(2) *Intelligence.*

Susceptibility to deception or neutralization of certain enemy information collecting agencies.

Overdependence on one or more categories of information sources.

Ineffectiveness of enemy intelligence.

(3) *Operations.*

Habitual repetition of certain schemes of maneuver, or unconventional patterns of operations.

Faulty organization of the terrain.

Faulty disposition of reserves.

Susceptibility to electronic countermeasures.

Inadequate troop training, especially in defense against nuclear weapons or chemical agents.

Lack of adequate mobility.

Inadequate air or artillery support, or nuclear weapon delivery systems.

Pronounced failure to disperse and dig in.

Habitual failure to attack certain types of targets.

(4) *Combat Service Support.*

Shortages or inadequacies of particular supplies and materiel, including nuclear weapons.

Status of equipment, if less than 80 percent.

Large concentrations of supplies.

Location of vulnerable points and bottlenecks in the logistics system or lines of communications.

Inability to resupply during action.

Failure to equip troops with protective masks or protection clothing.

(5) *Civil-Military Operations.*

Hostile attitude toward the civil populace, or of the civil populace toward the enemy.

Inadequacies in the control of civil communications, to include movement of civilians.

(6) *Personalities.*

Peculiarities or weaknesses of the enemy commander, major subordinate commanders, or principal staff officers, as disclosed by or deduced from their past performance, education, politics, experience, or other basis.

Section IV. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

J–14. Enumeration

This paragraph lists the enemy capabilities. Enemy capabilities are courses of action which the enemy can adopt and which will influence the accomplishment of the friendly mission, either favorably or unfavorably. A properly stated enemy capability indicates what the enemy can do, when he can do it, where he can do it, and in what strength he can do it. For example, "Attack (what) now (when) along our front (where) with five mechanized battalions supported by all available nuclear weapons, artillery and air (strength)." Another example, "Conduct harassing operations (what) at any time (when) in our area (where) with about 200 guerrillas equipped only with small arms (strength)." For determination of enemy capabilities see paragraph J–19 through J–25.

J–15. Analysis and Discussion

a. The evidence considered in the analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities includes charac-

teristics of the area of operation and positive or negative evidence of enemy activity, from the "recent and present significant activities" subparagraph. A major obstacle across part of the friendly area is evidence that attack elsewhere is more likely. Low ceilings and low visibility are evidence that the enemy may not use all his available aircraft. Open, flat areas without any appreciable cover are evidence that the enemy may not use guerrilla or infiltration forces.

b. In analyzing and discussing each enemy capability, or appropriate combination, the intelligence officer judges from the enemy point of view the advantage or disadvantage in adopting the capability. In making this judgment, the G2 also considers the enemy doctrine and practices and the ultimate results of adoption or rejection of the particular capability. For example, "The enemy employment of the unidentified tank division at TNOMYEH will deprive him of the reserves to counterattack a penetration by either of the two friendly divisions to our south. Commitment of this tank division too early will result in the later defeat of the enemy."

c. If there is no evidence of the enemy's possible adoption of a particular capability, and the capability does not represent a major threat to the accomplishment of the mission, the intelligence officer does not judge it. For example, the enemy usually can withdraw beyond our objective. Ordinarily, such withdrawal is not a threat to the accomplishment of the mission. If there is no evidence that the enemy may withdraw, a statement of conclusions is omitted. The intelligence officer merely states, "There is no indication of withdrawal."

Section V. CONCLUSIONS

J–16. Effects of the Area on Our Courses of Action

For a defensive mission, conclusions identify the best defense area(s) and the best avenues of approach into the defense sector. For an offensive mission, the conclusion describes the best avenues of approach to the objective(s).

J–17. Probable Courses of Action

a. The enemy probable courses of action are determined by the previous analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities. Consideration is given to how the enemy views his own vulnerabilities as indicated by his doctrine, past experiences, and personality of the enemy commander. Consideration is also given to previous enemy courses of action selected under similar circumstances. The determination is objective and not an unsubstantiated guess at what the enemy will do.

b. In determining the relative probability of adoption of enemy courses of action, the intelligence officer avoids conclusions based on friendly doctrine and practices. The available evidence considered includes the enemy doctrine and practices as well as positive or negative enemy activity. If enemy activity is not definitive enough to justify selection of the enemy's most probable course of action, the intelligence officer determines the most probable one based on the characteristics of the area of operations, enemy doctrine, practices, and previous experiences. Conclusions as to the enemy's most probable courses of action are then presented.

c. In the statement of course of action most likely of adoption by the enemy, several capabilities may be combined for brevity and clarity. All the enemy capabilities combined in one statement must be capable of being implemented at the same time. For example, the most probable enemy course of action may be, "Attack to envelop our northern flank reinforced by his corps reserve and using all available nuclear weapons, artillery, and air support and conduct harassing operations in our rear areas with guerrillas and infiltrating forces."

d. If more than one enemy course of action is stated, they are listed in the order of their relative probability of adoption.

J–18. Enemy Vulnerabilities

a. An enemy vulnerability is any condition or circumstance of the enemy situation or the area of operations which makes the enemy especially liable to damage, deception, or defeat. In this paragraph, only those enemy weaknesses which may be exploited are considered. In studying the enemy peculiarities and weaknesses to determine such vulnerabilities, the characteristics of the area of operations, all aspects of the enemy situation, and the enemy's doctrine and practices are considered. Only actual vulnerabilities are presented. An open northern flank which the enemy

cannot, with available forces, extend or refuse, is a vulnerability. If, however, the enemy has reserves which can readily extend the flank to an impassable obstacle or counterattack to pin enveloping troops against that obstacle, the open flank is mentioned as a possible vulnerability, although the vulnerability may be eliminated by commitment of the enemy reserves. However, the commitment of reserves creates another vulnerability.

b. Each exploitable enemy vulnerability is listed as a brief statement of the effect of the vulnerability rather than a repetition of the peculiarity or weakness. For example, "Shortage of antitank means" is not stated. Instead, the effect of that weakness is given by stating, "Limited capability to oppose armored vehicles." The vulnerability discussed in *a* above, could be stated as, "Enemy northern flank open to envelopment subject to destruction of enemy reserves at . . . ."

c. In determining the enemy vulnerabilities, the G2 considers the feasibility of their exploitation and makes appropriate recommendations to the G3. All enemy vulnerabilities may not be exploited at the same time. The exploitation of one vulnerability may preclude the exploitation of another vulnerability. For example, the enemy may be vulnerable to both a night penetration and a daytime flank envelopment. The G3 in coordination with the G2 recommends to the commander the priority of vulnerabilities to be exploited.

Section VI. DETERMINATION OF ENEMY CAPABILITIES

J–19. General

a. Commanders base plans and actions upon estimates of enemy capabilities and the probability of their adoption. Enemy capabilities can be estimated objectively because they are based upon knowledge of the area of operations, enemy situation, enemy doctrine, time and space factors and pattern analysis. The enemy may practice cover and deception to indicate actions different from those which he actually intends.

b. In considering enemy capabilities, actions which are grossly disadvantageous to the enemy or unreasonable are not included. For example, the enemy may be physically capable of disengaging troops committed outside our zone in order to employ them against us. However, in most circumstances the G2 does not consider this to be a capability because it is unreasonable.

J–20. The "What" of an Enemy Capability

a. Four general types of tactical courses of action are usually possible. The enemy can attack, defend, reinforce, or execute a retrograde movement. These operations are usually divisible into a variety of specific courses of action. For example, an attack may be a penetration, an evelopment, a turning movement, or a pursuit. A defense may be in one position or in successive positions, either static or mobile. A retrograde movement may be classified as a withdrawal, retirement, or delaying action.

b. The specific actions which the enemy can physically adopt depend upon the available means and conditions under which those means can be used. Consequently, the "what" of each of the enemy's capabilities is determined by the characteristics of the area of operations, the order of battle of the opposing forces, and time and space factors. Characteristics of the area of operations, friendly situation, and the means available to the enemy usually indicate that the enemy is physically capable of certain actions and physically incapable of others. For example, the enemy can envelop only when we have an assailable flank. He can conduct airborne operations only when he has the necessary troops and aircraft.

J–21. The "When" of an Enemy Capability

a. The time required for the enemy to employ his combat power capabilities depends upon the disposition of his forces and equipment. Forces deployed near the FEBA may be committed without significant delay. Considerable time may be required to commit other resources. Complicated weapons systems such as long-range missiles require time to emplace before missiles can be launched.

b. An enemy capability involving displacement of forces cannot be put into effect until some time after the force has started to move. Reserves cannot reinforce an attack or defense until they have been moved to appropriate locations such as attack positions or forward assembly areas. Consequently, time and space factors are computed in determining the "when" of a capability involving the displacement of forces or equipment. These computations are discussed in paragraph J–25.

c. References to "when" usually are omitted

from a statement of the enemy air, nuclear, chemical, and biological capabilities and other capabilities if "at any time" is intended. References to "when" usually are omitted from statements of enemy capabilities pertaining to withdrawal and delay in successive positions as "at any time" is implied. Such actions can be started at any time. In withdrawal capabilities, reference may be made to the time of the start of the withdrawal. For example, "The enemy can withdraw beyond our objective at any time before our attack."

J-22. The "Where" of an Enemy Capability

a. The "where" of an enemy capability depends upon the weather, terrain, and disposition of his forces. Under existing and predictable conditions of weather, the terrain may provide avenues of approach into our position from the front, flanks, or rear. Conversely, it may prevent the enemy's use of armored, mechanized, or airborne forces in certain areas. Cross compartments may provide the enemy with suitable defense or delaying positions. The existence of suitable objectives, drop or landing zones, indicates where airborne forces may be employed. The presence of suitable beaches suggests where enemy amphibious forces may land. The locations of adequate assembly areas and attack positions indicate where enemy missile launchers may be located. Accordingly, the intelligence officer determines the "where" of each enemy capability through analysis and integration of the characteristics of the area of operations with the situations of the opposing forces. If the enemy is physically capable of launching an attack, the G2 asks himself in effect, "Where can he do it?" If the enemy defends, he asks, "Where are suitable defense positions and to what places must reinforcements be moved before they can be committed?" If the enemy delays in successive positions, he asks, "Where are the favorable delaying positions?"

b. Examples.

(1) If the enemy can attack, and the situation and the area of operations indicate that the attack may strike anywhere along the friendly front, the partially stated enemy capability becomes: "Attack along our front. . . ." In other circumstances, enemy capabilities, stated in part, may include: "Attack to envelop our north flank . . .," or "Attack in the direction BEIRUT-ACRE," or "Land (amphibious or airborne) forces in the vicinity of . . . ."

(2) Partial statements of an enemy defense capability may include: "Defend in his present position . . . ," or "Defend the line of the OB River . . . ."

(3) Delay capabilities may include: "Delay in present and successive positions to the line of the HAN River . . ." or "Delay along the general lines PAULUS-JOANA, PENNYAWILLTHIR. . . ."

(4) Partial statement of the enemy's reinforcement capability may include: "Reinforce an envelopment of our north flank . . . ," or "Reinforce his defense of the line . . . ."

J-23. The "In What Strength" of an Enemy Capability

a. The strength the enemy can use in any particular capability depends primarily upon the composition, disposition, and strength of his available forces. Order of battle intelligence furnishes necessary data.

b. Forces which the enemy has committed against friendly units can be employed in almost any capability the enemy chooses to adopt. If six mechanized battalions are committed against a division, the enemy can attack with six mechanized battalions, supported by all available artillery, air, and nuclear weapons. He also can defend in his present position with the same six battalions and the same support. In addition to the forces committed, the enemy also can use the reserves available at any echelon. If the enemy has six battalions committed and a regiment in reserve, he usually can reinforce either his attack or his defense with the reserve regiment. A partial statement of this capability could be, "Attack now to envelop our north flank with six mechanized battalions supported by all available artillery, and nuclear weapons, air, reinforced by one mechanized regiment at the following times and places . . . ."

c. The statement of strength is usually confined to close combat units such as infantry, armor, guerrilla, and mechanized (including reconnaissance) units and their combat support means such as artillery, air, nuclear weapons, and chemical agents. The usual unit of enemy strength is the battalion or a larger unit. Guerrilla strength is expressed in total numbers, if more appropriate. Units smaller than the battalion may be used, if appropriate. The number and details of artillery, air, and similar units, available to support the enemy's operations, are specified in the "strength" subparagraph of the intelligence estimate and are usually not repeated in the statement of a capability involving support of close combat units.

d. Reference to "in what strength" usually is omitted in the statement of enemy capabilities for withdrawal and delay in successive positions as it is implied that such actions involve all the available forces.

J–24. Capabilities in Support of Combat Forces

a. Some enemy capabilities refer specifically to the support of close combat forces rather than to the capabilities of close combat units. Such capabilities include air; nuclear, chemical, and biological operations; cover and deception; and electronic warfare capabilities.

b. Enemy combat support capabilities such as use of electronic warfare and cover and deception are stated when enemy implementation of such activities will significantly affect the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Statements of such capabilities include, when the capability can be implemented, the area over which the capability will be effective, and the enemy resources available or the results that can be accomplished. The "where" is omitted if it is meant anywhere throughout the unit area of operations. For example, "Start cover and deception operations at any time to include imitative and manipulative transmissions and use of special units capable of depicting two divisions, either tank or mechanized rifle," or "Aggressor can, under the proper conditions intercept electromagnetic radiations emanating from our transmitters, and jam our receivers."

J–25. Reinforcement Capabilities

a. The time required for an enemy to move troops from one place to another and commit them is determined by factors derived from analysis of past similar enemy movements. The considerations described below are applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors in operations against an enemy force. See FM 30–102 for Aggressor troop movements.

b. To determine the time when the enemy can employ an uncommitted unit, the travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can be committed is calculated. To the travel time is added the closing time (pass time (PST) of a column). Except when observation of enemy units is continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to determine the earliest time at which the enemy can reinforce, it is necessary to add the travel plus closing time to the time last observed. For example, if an enemy reinforcement was last observed at 0800 hours and it can deploy to envelop our northern flank in one hour, it is assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus one hour). In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, travel time only is considered. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.

c. Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements of enemy reinforcing capabilities preferably include both the earliest time and the time after starting movement when the reinforcement can be accomplished. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mech Regt at 0900 hours, or one hour after starting movement." When the time since the last report is greater than the after starting movement time, only the after starting movement time is given. For example, "The enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th Mech Regt now or one hour after starting movement." When the number of reinforcements is large or the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are presented in tabular form. For example, the enemy can reinforce his attack or his defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated below:

Unit	Place	Motor	Foot
45th Mech Regt—.....	RJ 638	Now or 1 hr after starting movement...	091205 Jun or 4 hr 5 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090930 Jun or 1 hr 30 min after starting movement.	091605 Jun or 8 hr 5 min after starting movement.
37th Mech Regt—.....	RJ 638	091000 Jun or 2 hr after starting movement.	100740 Jun or 23 hr 40 min after starting movement.
	RJ 888	090920 Jun or 1 hr 20 min after starting movement.	091430 Jun or 6 hr 30 min after starting movement.

d. In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, the effects of such characteristics of the area of operations as avenues of approach and logical enemy reactions to friendly courses of action are considered. For reinforcement of an attack capability, attack positions are selected for battalions and regiments and forward assembly areas for division and larger units. For units moving to reinforce a defense, defense or counterattack positions are selected. For movements by aircraft, logical landing or drop zones from which the enemy forces can materially affect the accomplishment of the mission are selected.

e. The time required by the enemy to entruck, detruck, issue extra ammunition, make detailed reconnaissance, issue orders, deploy, or move from an attack position to a line of departure, is not considered because all may be completed before starting the operation or simultaneously with the movement.

f. The guidance below is applicable until experience factors against a particular enemy are developed.

(1) Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements. Compute motor movement time only for distances greater than 10 kilometers (six miles). If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor movement time.

(2) Consider a foot march of more than 20 miles as a forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 175 miles as a forced march for motorized units and a movement of more than 140 miles as a forced march for tank and mechanized units.

(3) If a column begins to close prior to the beginning of morning nautical twilight (BMNT), closing time is computed at the night rate of march; if a column begins to close at or shortly after BMNT, use the day rate of march. If a column begins to close prior to the end of evening nautical twilight (EENT), use the day rate of march; if a column begins to close at or shortly after EENT, use the night rate of march.

(4) To move an enemy infantry battalion, move and close the entire unit. To move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and close two-thirds of the combat elements, that is, two battalions of an infantry regiment, two regiments of an infantry division.

J–26. Sample Intelligence Estimate, Division

(Classification)

G2 Section, 52d Division (Mech)
GLENVILLE (NF3277), EASTLAND
230830Z June 19____

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 20
Reference: Map, series EASTLAND, sheets DELTA through KILO, edition 2, 1:50,000

1. MISSION

52d Division conducts mobile defense along DRY CREEK, accepts no penetration south of HILLS 333 and 421, and prepares to conduct offensive operations within 12 hours.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

a. Weather.

(1) Existing situation. Weather for the period 23 June to 28 June will be rainy and cool, gradually warming and clearing as a high pressure system moves through the area of operations from the south. Temperatures from 40° to 65°F. Visibility will range from 16 to 25 kilometers, except during precipitation and in morning fog in low drainage areas. Surface winds from the south 8 to 10 knots.

(2) Light data.

Date	*BM-NT*	*BC-MT*	*EE-CT*	*EE-NT*	*Moon-rise*	*Moon-set*	*Date*	*BM-NT*	*BC-MT*	*EE-CT*	*EE-NT*	*Moon-rise*	*Moon-set*
23 Jun	0331	0419	2029	2130	1746	0125	27 Jun	0344	0425	2022	2118	2001	0518
25 Jun	0339	0422	2025	2124	1907	0214	29 Jun	0349	0428	2018	2112	2022	0820

(Classification)

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(3) Effects on enemy courses of action:

(*a*) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement except in the low drainage areas of MINERTOWN.

(*b*) Southerly winds will not affect enemy employment of CBR.

(*c*) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will favor enemy attack.

(4) Effects on friendly courses of action:

(*a*) Precipitation will not hinder cross country movement except in the low drainage areas of MINERTOWN.

(*b*) Southerly wind direction will not affect friendly use of chemical or nuclear weapons.

(*c*) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will not favor friendly defense.

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing situation.

(*a*) Cover and concealment. Wooded areas around MIDWAY offer good concealment. Numerous ravines in drainage areas of MINERTOWN offer limited cover and concealment.

(*b*) Observation and fire. There are good observation points along bluffs above GRINGO River. Fields of fire are excellent throughout plains areas north of MUD CREEK but limited moderately in populated and vegetated areas near GLENVILLE.

(*c*) Obstacles.

1. SWIFT River (fordable 1 kilometer east of GLENVILLE).

2. Bluffs above GRINGO River.

3. City of GLENVILLE. Routes around city are passable; routes through city impassable.

(*d*) Key terrain. Hill mass MUKELROY and HILL 333.

(*e*) Avenues of approach.

1. Available to Aggressor into our sector:

(a) Avenue of approach 1 is from LARGO through gap around the northeast end of HILL 702, 34 kilometers southwest to MINERTOWN and south to DRY CREEK.

(b) Avenue of approach 2 is from LARGO southeast through MIDWAY to river crossing east of GLENVILLE.

2. Avenue of approach available for US movement into Aggressor's area will be generally the same as those listed for Aggressor into our sector.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Terrain favors the enemy attack using avenue of approach 1.

(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Terrain favors our defense of the area around DRY CREEK.

c. Other Characteristics.

(1) Existing situation. Local nationals throughout the area favor friendly military operations. Large numbers of refugees can be expected to pass through friendly lines.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The enemy can be expected to insert infiltrators into refugees.

(3) Effect on fr y courses of action. Refugees can be expected to provide valuable intel ce.

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3. ENEMY SITUATION

a. Disposition. Annex A, Situation Overlay.

b. Composition. Enemy forces opposing 52d Division (Mech) consist of elements of the 4th Combined Arms Army.

(1) Identified units are:

(*a*) 10th F Mech Div consisting of:
27th Mech Regt
30th Mech Regt
31st Mech Regt
121st Mdm Tk Regt (unlocated)

(*b*) 19th Mech Div consisting of:
23d Mech Regt
37th Tk Regt

(2) Unidentified units are: U/I Mech Regt of 19th Mech Div.

c. Strength.

(1) Committed forces. 52d Div (Mech) is opposed immediately by 4 mechanized battalions and 1 tank battalion. These units are supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.

(2) Reinforcements. Reinforcements available to the enemy for commitment in our zone are a total of 5 mechanized battalions and 4 tank battalions from the 27th Mech Regt, 121st Mdm Tk Regt, and the second echelon battalions of the 30th and 31st Mech Regts and the 37th Tk Regt. Also, the 23d Mech Regt can reinforce in total within 8 hours from start of movement.

(3) Air. Aggressor is supported by the 3d Air Army consisting of unidentified numbers of fighter-bomber aircraft, ground attack aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft. Air parity currently exists with either force capable of obtaining air superiority for limited periods of time. Up to now Aggressor has used a maximum of 60 fighter-bomber sorties in a 12-hour period.

(4) Nuclear. No estimate of the enemy's nuclear support for the next 30 days is available. Aggressor currently has 152-mm Gun-Hows with a nuclear round and TONDRO SSMs which can deliver rounds of 10–50 KT yield within range of our division.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities.

(1) Air reconnaissance and photo reports indicate increased Aggressor movement along axis BRAVO to LIMA. Movement indicates reinforcement of forward element of 4th CAA.

(2) Enemy's aerial recon and tactical air flights have increased in the last 36 hours, particularly along the GOP line.

(3) For the past 36 hours, volume of vehicular traffic has increased in southerly direction.

(4) Artillery fire from the enemy has become more intensive in the last 24 hours.

(5) Reliable source reports large tracked, amphibious vehicles moving into area vicinity HILL 805.

(6) Enemy has begun to employ smoke along the forward slope of HILL 702.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

(1) Personnel. Enemy units are presently estimated to be at 85% to

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90% authorized strength. Morale is high, although replacements may not be highly trained.

(2) Intelligence. Aggressor stresses communications security and subordinate units of the 4th CAA have recently initiated intensive radio security and procedures training.

(3) Operations.

(*a*) Aggressor is susceptible to mine warfare and antitank weapons.

(*b*) Aggressor has trained heavily on attack formations and have been told offensive action is the only way to victory.

(*c*) Aggressor is vulnerable to nuclear weapons due to massed forces and canalization by further advancement.

(4) Logistics. Supplies are adequate for the enemy's conduct of either the offense or defense. The enemy had previously stockpiled supplies well forward in division areas.

(5) Personalities. G/D Masonski, CG of the 10th F Mech Div, is an advocate of penetration type offense on a narrow front with subsequent widening of the gaps to split enemy forces.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES

a. Enumeration:

(1) Attack at any time along avenue of approach 1 with 4 mechanized battalions and 1 tank battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.

(2) Attack at any time along avenue of approach 2 with 4 mechanized battalions and 1 tank battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.

(3) Defend at any time with forces in contact supported by all available divisional and regimental artillery.

(4) Reinforce his attack or defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated:

	Unit	*Place*	*Time*
(*a*)	30th Mech Regt (-)	Avenue of approach 2	immediately
(*b*)	31st Mech Regt (-)	Avenue of approach 1	immediately
(*c*)	37th Tk Regt (-).	Avenue of approach 1	immediately
(*d*)	27th Mech Regt.	Avenue of approach 1 or 2	2 hr after start of movement
(*e*)	23d Mech Regt.	vic LITTLE	8 hr after start of movement
(*f*)	121st Mdm Rk Regt.	Unlocated	Unknown
(*g*)	U/I Mech Regt of 19th Mech Div.	vic BRAVO	9 hr after start of movement

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(5) Delay in successive positions to the east of LITTLE.

(6) Employ chemical agents within our sector at any time.

(7) Employ nuclear weapons of a 0.5–50 KT yield with delivery by artillery or SSM.

(8) Employ guerrilla forces in our rear area either alone or in conjunction with the capabilities enumerated below.

(9) The enemy can attack our area with an undetermined number of fighter, ground attack, and bomb sorties daily. The maximum number of daily sorties mounted in our area has been 60.

b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) Attack along avenue of approach 1.

(*a*) The following indicate adoption of this capability:

1. Uses a good avenue of approach.

2. The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks, artillery and logistic support along this avenue

3. Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow front.

4. Extensive artillery preparation along approach.

(*b*) The limited cover presented along this avenue of approach is a limiting factor but does not preclude adoption of this capability.

(2) Attack along avenue of approach 2.

(*a*) The following indicate adoption of this capability:

1. The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks, artillery and logistic support along this avenue.

2. Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow front.

3. Extensive artillery preparation along this avenue.

(*b*) The following indicate rejection of this capability:

1. This avenue of approach accommodates only one deployed regiment and offers limited cover and concealment.

2. The limited obstacle presented by GLENVILLE.

(3) Defend. The following indicate rejection of this capability:

(*a*) The enemy is massing his forces along the line of contact.

(*b*) Enemy has followed known doctrine for attack.

(*c*) Terrain favors attack.

(4) Reinforce. The following indicates adoption of this capability:

(*a*) Movement of additional troops toward the front.

(*b*) New units identified in the combat zone.

(*c*) Forward logistical buildup.

(5) Delay. There are no indications of the enemy's adoption of this capability.

(6) Employ chemical agents. There is no indication the enemy will employ chemical agents other than smoke.

(7) Employ nuclear weapons. There is no indication the enemy will employ nuclear weapons.

(8) Employ guerrilla forces. The following indicates adoption of this capability:

(*a*) Doctrine calls for use of guerrilla force.

(*b*) Use would enhance enemy advance by creating panic and confusion.

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(9) Air attack. Indications are that Aggressor will continue to employ this capability as referenced in paragraph (9) above.

5. CONCLUSIONS

a. Probable Courses of Action.

(1) Attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery with the main attack of one mechanized regiment along avenue of approach 1. Will reinforce with elements as indicated in para 4*a*(4).

(2) Conduct secondary attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery with one mechanized regiment along avenue of approach 2.

(3) Employ guerrilla or special forces in our rear areas in conjunction with the above courses of action.

b. Vulnerabilities.

(1) Aggressor is vulnerable to counterattack since he has been slow to exploit potential penetrations.

(2) Vulnerable to nuclear attack due to massing of troops and concentrated logistics depots.

(3) Mine warfare will be effective against enemy mechanized elements.

KROOK

BG

OFFICIAL:

/S/ Bagger

BAGGER

GS

Annex: A—Situation Overlay (omitted)
Distribution: A

(Classification)

APPENDIX K

ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATION (STANAG 2077)

K–1. General

a. Enemy strength undergoes continuous fluctuation through casualties and replacements. This fluctuation results in approximated enemy strength figures. Computing the troop strength of insurgent or guerrilla forces is difficult since these units often form, disband, and reform in another area of operations. However, efforts must be made to estimate accurately the size of the insurgent infrastructure, regular, and irregular forces.

b. Enemy strength is computed in terms of committed forces, reinforcements, air, and nuclear weapons and CB agents capabilities. Since doctrinal differences allow for the holding of specific units in a reserve and reinforcement role, it is extremely important to study a country's doctrine prior to computing strength. Enemy strength normally is presented in terms of numerical strength by type of unit. Nuclear weapons capabilities are expressed in terms of the number of weapons, delivery systems and yields. CB capabilities are expressed in terms of the type, persistency, lethality and delivery systems.

K–2. Explanation of Terms

a. Numerical strength is the expression of a unit or force in terms of numbers or personnel, weapons, and equipment.

b. Initial strength of an enemy unit or force comprises the number of personnel, weapons, and equipment authorized by established and approved tables of organization and equipment (TOE).

c. Effective strength of an enemy unit or force consists of that part, including logistic components, of its initial strength which is currently capable of combat employment.

d. Strength by type unit is the expression of units or forces in terms of numbers of units by type, such as infantry, armor, artillery, and air.

K–3. Initial Compilation of Effective Strength

a. Prior to and at the onset of hostilities, effective strength is compiled from intelligence estimates based on the initial strength and such circumstances as:

(1) The degree to which the enemy unit is up to initial strength at the time.

(2) Whether the enemy maintained large standing forces before the outbreak of hostilities.

(3) Whether war was premeditated.

(4) Whether any warning of war was (or would be) received.

(5) Whether the enemy was (or would be) committed in other theaters.

(6) Movement facilities and lines of communication (adequacy of land, sea or air; whether interior or exterior).

b. Basic considerations:

(1) A consideration of the previous estimates (if any) of effective strength as well as more recent reliable intelligence.

(2) The incidence of casualties, reinforcements and replacements.

c. The calculations, which are to be expressed as percentages of the initial strength, are computed as follows. (Where it is apparent that a percentage does not accurately reflect the fighting ability of a unit, it may be necessary to elaborate on this figure):

(1) A percentage attrition rate is deducted when experience has enabled this to be established for the circumstances. This rate is based on those men, weapons and equipment temporarily not available to a unit for reasons other than battle casualties or losses.)

(2) Subtractions (or additions) are made in the light of reliable intelligence. (Any items having only a temporary significance should have their time-lapse noted on the estimate.)

(3) The following (which should be physi-

cally counted where possible, but which, in nuclear war, is more often based on statistical estimates) is then deducted:

(*a*) *Personnel.*

1. Killed.

2. Prisoners of war.

3. Wounded noneffectives.

(*b*) *Weapons and Equipment.*

1. Destroyed.

2. Captured.

3. Damaged to extent requiring workshop repair.

(4) Personnel reinforcement and replacement of weapons and equipment is then added in accordance with the scale estimated, or the scale justified by reliable intelligence, where this is different. In the absence of other guidance and where the enemy has secure lines of communication to the main base, it is to be assumed that:

(*a*) Personnel reinforcement can be completed within 72 hours.

(*b*) Small weapons and light equipment can be replaced within 72 hours: Other weapons and equipment can be replaced within 6 days.

d. Resultant calculations are expressed as percentages of TOE strength where possible; however numerical expression may be necessary to present a better understanding of the combat capability of a force and provide the commander with a basis for comparison.

e. The computation of enemy strength requires the utmost caution and alertness for intelligence that may reveal the enemy's actual strength. This is especially true at the onset of hostilities when accurate intelligence pertaining to enemy strength is lacking or inadequate, and the initial strength figure is only an approximation.

K-4. Numerical Strength Computation Formulas

a. Effective strength—TOE strength minus losses, plus replacements.

b. Percentage of

$$\text{TOE strength} = \frac{\text{Effective strength} \times 100}{\text{TOE strength}}.$$

c. In time of peace, strength generally can be computed by annual induction quota times term of conscript, plus cadre.

K-5. Combat Readiness Rating

a. Based upon the above discussions of numerical strength computations, a combat readiness rating can be established. A suggested rating system is as follows:

C-1—Combat effective—Any unit or force at 80—100% TOE strength in a high state of training.

C-2—Marginally combat effective—Any unit or force at 70—80% TOE strength in an acceptable state of training.

C-3—Limited combat effective—Any unit or force at 50—70% TOE strength in an only partially trained state.

C-4—Noneffective—Any unit or force below 50% TOE strength and seriously lacking in training.

b. The above ratings do not take into account unit leadership and morale which are both important factors in determining a unit's combat effectiveness. Generally, however, the higher ratings imply good leadership and morale both in peacetime and after initiation of hostilities. The two lower ratings may reflect poor leadership and morale but may also reflect either a unit buildup or, after repeated engagements in wartime, obvious combat ineffectiveness due to losses.

c. The above "C" ratings apply most readily to conventional warfare employment. This rating scheme may be expanded to include nuclear delivery capability:

N-1—Possesses strategic and tactical nuclear weapons.

N-2—Possesses tactical nuclear weapons.

N-3—Maintains a nuclear weapons delivery capability but is not believed to possess a nuclear weapons inventory.

N-4—Unit is nuclear noncapable and is not a nuclear threat.

d. By combining the two rating systems, a total rating of unit capability can be achieved; i.e., C-1/N-1 or C-1/N-4. This system provides the analyst with an additional tool in determining strength in terms of combat readiness and capability by consideration of effective strength, training, morale, leadership, and nuclear capability. As automatic data processing systems come into use as intelligence data handling means, this rating system will lend itself readily to computerization.

K–6. Computation of Strength by Type of Unit

a. Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category and type. Normally, order of battle analysts account for enemy units down to and including two echelons below their own level of command. For example, an analyst at division level would express enemy strength in battalion sized units.

b. Expressing strength in terms of number of units by type within an enemy force is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and a readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the order of battle analyst cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy's strength compared to friendly forces. The enemy may have eight battalions of infantry in a given area, and only five friendly battalions may be located in the same area. However, because of differences in organization, the total friendly strength may exceed that of the enemy force.

c. Techniques for computing strength by type of unit are thoroughly discussed in paragraphs J–6 through J–9. Organic or supporting artillery and reconnaissance units are considered and counted as committed forces unless known otherwise. For example, organic divisional artillery within range is considered committed unless it is located outside the friendly commander's area of influence and not capable of firing support missions. Frequently, artillery units are listed as fire support units when categorizing enemy strength. Numerical tabulation of the committed forces and reinforcements, as well as their individual strengths in personnel and equipment, is maintained on a strength worksheet (fig 7–8).

APPENDIX L

FORMAT AND EXAMPLE OF ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO PERINTREP (STANAG 2014)

1. Format of Order of Battle Annex

Notes. 1. Omit items not applicable and renumber remaining paragraphs.
2. All entries are followed by a comment.
3. Evaluation of source and information, including type of source, accompanies each entry.

(Classification)

ORDER OF BATTLE

Annex ____, (OB) to PERINTREP NO. _____, _____, Corps, _____

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, overlay). An overlay is usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The initial subparagraphs always consist of identification and disposition; the remaining subparagraphs contain information pertaining to organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate units from left to right, or top to bottom, as displayed on the overlay. Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.
2. STRENGTH. This paragraph contains information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength figures of individual units may be listed.
3. TACTICS. Only new tactics and deviations from prescribed tactical doctrine are reported.
4. TRAINING. New development and recent changes in training programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the initiation of hostilities are reported.
5. LOGISTICS. Enter data concerning those items which will affect current enemy operations such as supply status, supply systems, and locations of supply facilities.
6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS. This paragraph includes data on the combat effectiveness of enemy units, either of the entire force or of a major tactical unit. Items indicating morale, esprit, quality of troops and commanders are listed. The ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission is expressed.

(Classification)

(Classification)

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA. Personalities, unit history, field post numbers (FPO), code numbers and names, order of battle changes, and any other item of order of battle intelligence that cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs are listed.

Acknowledge.

(SIGNATURE)

Appendixes:
Distribution:
OFFICIAL
(NAME OF G2)

2. Example of Order of Battle Annex

Annex B (OB) to PERINTREP 29, 3 Corps, 201800 August 19____

ORDER OF BATTLE

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, Overlay).

a. All PW captured during period are from Aggressor 2d Combined Arms Army. Unit identification include: (C–1)

17 Mech Div	30 Mech Div	32 Mech Div
283 Mech Regt	141 Mech Regt	132d Mdm Tk Regt
290 Mech Regt	142 Mech Regt	
	130 Mdm Tk Regt	
	130 Recon Bn	

COMMENT: 32 Mech Div accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 Tk Div previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

b. Two large missile-type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vic MP 420513. (B–2)

COMMENT: Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously unlocated.

c. Captured Aggressor field order reveals plan to attach 40 TK Div to 2d CAA effective 22 Aug. (B–1)

COMMENT: PW previously reported 40th Tk Div moving to reinforce 2d CAA. Aggressor main effort probably planned for this area.

2. STRENGTH.

En losses reported during period:

	PW	KIA	ARTY	ARMOR	AIR	VEH
16 Mech Div	37	302	2	4	1	21
30 Mech Div	16	52	8	1	—	16
32 Mech Div	8	12	—	—	—	4
Total III US Corps Sector	61	366	10	5	1	41

COMMENT: The marked increase in personnel losses during the period have been sustained primarily by Aggressor combat patrols. Aircraft loss was H1, Observation Helicopter equipped with AERO radar. Overall strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

(Classification)

(Classification)

3. TACTICS.

a. PW from 16 Mech Div and 30 Mech Div state they have been instructed in the event their units are cut off to continue fighting as guerrilla units or in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much US Army property as possible before gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (C-6)

COMMENT: Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear areas can be expected if elements of these units are cut off.

b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for battalion, company and platoon commanders, written by G/D GRIBOYEDOV entitled "Tanks Out Front," (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting US patrols and advancing forces to pass through Aggressor lines. A coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear elements with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining US forces. (B-2)

COMMENT: Considering Aggressor doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm, the above tactic is possible, particularly in view of reports of probable employment of 40 Tk Div (para 1).

4. TRAINING.

a. Reference paragraph 3b.

b. Indications of Aggressor concern for COMSEC is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio security and communications procedures. (B-2)

COMMENT: ASA confirms Aggressor lack of radio discipline and states that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief operations. Numerous Aggressor security violations have been noted since 17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

5. LOGISTICS.

a. PW state Aggressor supply personnel have recently contacted local merchants, farmers, and fishermen for supplies of most Class I items. (C-6)

COMMENT: Aggressor either has critical shortage of Class I items or has a bottleneck in the supply system requiring local procurement of Class I items.

b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported Aggressor stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of frontline divisions. (B-2)

COMMENT: Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet undetermined. Would indicate Aggressor may be planning major offensive soon.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

a. PW from 16 Mech Div and 30 Mech Div state morale is high but senior officers are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while the 32 Mech Div and 56 Tk Div have, until recently, been assigned less hazardous missions. (F-6)

(Classification)

(Classification)

COMMENT: Analysis of unit history and recent operations of Aggressor 2d CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and the fact that 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Div has not been engaged in combat with US Forces in this campaign.

b. PW reports 30 Mech Div to be redesignated 30 "Fusilier" Mech Div for superior combat record. (F-6)

COMMENT: III US Corps rates combat effectiveness of 30 Mech Div from excellent to outstanding in comparison to other Aggressor divisions in same sector. 30 Mech Div casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

a. Personalities Identified by PW: (C-1)

CG, 40th Tk Div	G/D GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P. (Ref 3b)
CO, 282 Mech Regt	Col CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.
CO, 283 Mech Regt	Col UNDSET, Bjornstjerne (Acting CO)
CO, 130 Mdm Tk Regt	Col STEENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 Mdm Tk Regt	Col Mattez, Mario

COMMENT: Confirms previously obtained information.

b. Unit History: Officer PW stated his unit (32 Mech Div) trained extensively during 1965 and 1966 in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6)

COMMENT: Special training received by 32 Mech Div should increase its overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No evidence of other units so trained.

c. Field Post Numbers: Captured document reveals Aggressor field post numbers being used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and last three digits are transposed. Field post number of 46 Mech Div will appear as 75031 instead of 31750. (B-1)

COMMENT: Aggressor has employed this system previously as a security measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different patterns during future operations.

Acknowledge.

LEE
LTG

Appendixes: 1-En Disp Overlay
2-Aggressor Army Org Chart
3-Aggressor Training Pamphlet

Distribution: Same as PERINTREP 29

OFFICIAL
GRANT
G2

Note: In joint service operations, the Order of Battle Annex to the PERINTREP will be replaced by the Order of Battle Annex to the PERINTSUM as contained in Chapter V, JCS Publication 12.

(Classification)

APPENDIX M

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE FORMAT

(Classification)

Issuing Section and Headquarters[1]
Location
Date and Time

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER _____

Reference(s): Maps, charts, or other documents.

1. MISSION

State the assigned or assumed unit mission.

2. THE AREA OF OPERATIONS

This paragraph discusses the influence of the area of operations on enemy intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversive efforts and on friendly countermeasures, where appropriate.

a. Weather. Discuss the effects of the weather on enemy battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Light data and weather forecasts or climatic information as appropriate should be considered. Conclude the discussion with a statement as to whether or not the weather favors enemy collection efforts and the impact of the weather on friendly countermeasures.

b. Terrain. Consider such factors as observation, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain features, and avenues of approach and conclude the discussion with effects of these factors on enemy collection efforts and the impact on friendly countermeasures.

c. Other Factors. List other factors which may be considered, if pertinent, in separate subparagraphs: political, economical, sociological, psychological and transportation.

3. ENEMY INTELLIGNCE, SABOTAGE, AND SUBVERSIVE SITUATION

Discuss in this paragraph enemy intelligence, sabotage, and subversive activities in terms of the current situation and recent and significant activities. Include in the discussion, where appropriate, known factors regarding disposition, composition, strengths, efficiency, peculiarities and weaknesses. Fact sheets may be attached to the counterintelligence estimate as an annex. This paragraph should also include any significant evidence of enemy knowledge concerning friendly intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.

(Classification)

[1] If distributed outside the headquarters, the first line of the heading is the official designation of the issuing command and the ending modified accordingly.

(Classification)

a. Intelligence.
(1) Ground surveillance and reconnaissance.
(a) Visual observation.
(b) Patrols.
(c) Ground radar.
(d) Infrared surveillance.
(e) Unattended ground sensors.
(f) Other.
(2) Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance.
(a) Intrusion flights.
(b) Stand-off flights.
(c) Sensors.
(d) Reconnaissance satellites.
(3) Signal intelligence.
(a) COMINT.
(b) ELINT.
(4) Guerrillas/Insurgents.
(5) Espionage.
(6) Other: Line-crossers, refugees, PW, etc.

b. Sabotage.
(1) Military (key installations, lines of communications, etc.).
(2) Economic.

c. Subversion.
(1) Propaganda.
(2) Terrorism.
(3) Political.

4. ENEMY INTELLIGENCE, SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES

a. Enumeration of Enemy Capabilities.
(1) Intelligence.
(2) Sabotage.
(3) Subversion.

b. Analysis and Discussion. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities to provide a basis for conclusions as to the relative probability of adoption of above enumerated enemy intelligence, subversive, and sabotage capabilities.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. Relative probability of adoption of enemy intelligence, subversive and sabotage capabilities.

b. Effects of enemy capabilities on friendly courses of action.

c. Effectiveness of current friendly countermeasures.

d. Additional friendly countermeasures or emphasis needed.

/s/
G2

(Classification)

ANNEX TO COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Organization Name

Location

Strength (Actual and Authorized)

Leadership and key Personalities

Liaison, Coordination and Cooperation with Other Intelligence, Subversive and Sabotage Organizations

Capabilities

Typical Activities

Strengths and Weaknesses

Other Information as Required

APPENDIX N

EXAMPLE OF A DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ANNEX
(When issued separately from an operation order)
(STANAG 2014)

(Classification)

Copy No 4 of _____ copies
20th Inf Div
ZELLE (4671), BUTTANO
101900 September 19____
BQ 13

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operations Order 24

Reference: Map, BUTTANO, Edition 2, 1:50,000 sheets 204 (ZELLE-PAGT.)

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION

See INTSUM, this HQ, 101800 September, and Appendix 1, Situation Overlay.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

a. Essential Elements of Information.

(1) Will Aggressor reinforce his forces along the FLOOD River before the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to the mechanized regiment and the medium tank regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(2) Will Aggressor employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means?

b. Other Intelligence Requirements.

(1) Will Aggressor continue to defend in his present position? If so, how will he organize his forces on the ground, and with what troops? Special attention to locations and activities of reserves, and vulnerability to nuclear attack.

(2) Will Aggressor attack prior to 110500 September? If so, when where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis Hill 536—Hill 524—CR 981.

(3) Will Aggressor use CB agents? If so, what agents, when, how, and where?

3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

a. Orders to attached and subordinate units.

(1) 1st Bde.

(2) 2d Bde.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

2. Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

3. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

4. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

5. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

6. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

7. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(3) 3d Bde.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of CR 987.

2. Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

3. Status of construction of defensive positions and mine-fields on and to the east of FLOOD River.

4. Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

5. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

6. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols and time they were observed or contacted.

7. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

8. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

9. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(4) 1/21 Cav Report as obtained.

(a) Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

(b) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

(c) Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

(d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles with Aggressor position in division zone.

(Classification)

(Classification)

(e) Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

(f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

(g) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(5) Div Arty.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

2. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in division zone.

3. Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed or contacted.

4. Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

5. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of position.

(6) 20 Avn.

(a) Report as obtained.

1. Activity of mechanized battalion north and east of CR 987.

2. Activity of mechanized battalion on Hill 503.

3. Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill 536 (north of BURG).

4. Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

5. Location and size of ammunition sites, location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

6. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).

7. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:

a. North on Highway 25.

b. West on Highway 2.

c. West on Highway 4.

2. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4. Location of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(7) 20 Engr. Report as obtained.

(a) Status of construction of defensive positions and minefields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

(b) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(Classification)

(Classification)

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

(1) 1st Corps is requested to provide:

(a) As obtained.

1. Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of Hill 536 (north of BURG).

2. Number, types, direction of movement, and time of movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone, with special attention to Highway 2.

3. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

4. Evidence of field fortifications and troop concentrations along the following lines:

a. Hill 503—CR 987.

b. Hill 518—Hill 536—Hill 499.

5. Location and size of ammunition storage sites and locations, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

6. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

7. Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

8. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

9. Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

10. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

11. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

12. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

13. All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

14. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:

a. North on Highway 25.

b. West on Highway 2.

c. West on Highway 4.

2. Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3. Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4. Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 994.

5. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

6. Command posts, supply points, and medical facilities east of Highway 25.

(2) 18 Inf Div is requested to provide:

(a) As obtained.

1. Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of High-

(Classification)

(Classification)

way 25 within the divisional area of interest.

2. Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

3. Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

4. Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

5. Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilian have been evacuated.

6. Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

7. Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

8. Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

9. The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

10. All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

11. The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400 September.

1. Movement on the following roads:

a. North on Highway 25.

b. West on Highway 2.

c. West on Highway 4.

2. Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 994.

(3) 52 Mech Div is requested to provide as obtained:

(a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

(b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

(c) Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

(d) Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

(e) Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

(f) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

(g) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(h) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.

(i) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(j) All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

(k) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(4) Supporting USASA units provide information derivable from SIGINT and ESM and will respond to specific tasking as described in separate instructions.

(Classification)

(Classification)

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIEL See Division SOP.

5. DOCUMENTS AND/OR EQUIPMENT REQUIRED.

a. Maps. SOP distribution of map, BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT.

b. Photographic. Following aerial photographs will be furnished:

(1) Basic cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximate), six copies of each brigade and Div Arty; one copy each tank battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, 1/21 Cav, division engineer, aviation battalion or group, and division signal officer.

(2) Annotated airphotos distributed automatically, as available.

6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

a. Appendix 2, Counterintelligence.

b. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division tactical operations center (DTOC) to minimize number of aircraft in air over division zone prior to attack.

7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION

Effective 110800 September units will submit INTSUM at 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400, and 0400 hours daily in lieu of times prescribed in division SOP.

8. MISCELLANEOUS INSTRUCTIONS

None.

Acknowledge.

POWERS
MG

Appendixes: 1—Situation Overlay
2—Counterintelligence

Distribution: Same as OPORD _____

OFFICIAL:

/s/AUSTIN

AUSTIN

G2

Note: In joint service operations where international standardization agreements do not apply, the Intelligence Annex in JCS Publication 12 will be used.

(Classification)

APPENDIX O

EXAMPLE INTELLIGENCE WORKBOOK FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS

1. ENEMY OPERATIONS
   a. Units
      (1) Guerrillas
      (2) Political (to include infrastructure)
      (3) Underground
      (4) Others
   b. Modus Operandi
      (1) Tactical
      (2) Political
      (3) Propaganda
      (4) Logistics
      (5) Sabotage, Assassination etc.
2. CIVILIAN POPULACE
   a. Hostile
   b. Friendly
   c. Neutral
3. THIRD COUNTRY OPERATIONS
   a. Units
   b. Personnel
   c. Command
   d. Organizations
   e. Logistics
   f. Training Areas and Programs
   g. Other Support Operations
4. ORGANIZATIONS
   a. Political
   b. Military/Guerrilla
   c. Paramilitary
   d. Command
   e. Logistical
   f. Propaganda
   g. Subversive
5. TARGETS AND LOCATION
   a. Command and Tactical Units
   b. Paramilitary
   c. Political Cells
   d. Propaganda Cells
   e. Supply Installations and Caches
   f. Line of Communications and Supply
6. EFFECTS OF WEATHER AND TERRAIN
   a. Military Operations
   b. Political Activities
   c. Economic Factors
7. LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEMS
   a. In-Country
   b. Third Country
8. RECRUITING AND TRAINING
   a. Military/Guerrilla
      (1) In-Country
      (2) Third Country
   b. Political
      (1) In-Country
      (2) Third Country
   c. Others
      (1) In-Country
      (2) Third Country
9. MISCELLANEOUS

APPENDIX P

SAMPLE METHOD OF INTEGRATING INTELLIGENCE WITH OTHER TRAINING

Integration of Intelligence into Other Subjects

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
CHARACTER GUIDANCE AND THE CODE OF CONDUCT.	Security	Stress the moral obligation of all military personnel to report violations of security.
EMPLOYMENT OF THE ARMED FORCES.	The intelligence chain	Present the intelligence structure from the individual Soldier to DA.
RULES OF LAND WARFARE AND GENEVA CONVENTION.	Handling of PW and other persons of inteligence interest.	Correct treatment of enemy PW means more information during interrogations.
TROOP INFORMATION	Orientation in foreign armies. Aggressor, the maneuver enemy.	Use foreign armies as a topic, if possible. Otherwise, integrate as much information during other training as is possible considering the primary topic scheduled.
CONCEALMENT AND COVER	Counterintelligence. Patrolling	Good concealment and camouflage denies the enemy information about out dispositions, both troops and supplies. Stress noise and light discipline and policing of bivouac areas.
FIELD SANITATION	Counterintelligence. Survival	Clean bivouac areas mean less information for the enemy.
FIRST AID	Survival. Patrolling	Troops on patrol or evading capture must often treat injuries without professional aid or medical supplies.
GUARD DUTY	Counterintelligence, Use of Agressor. Security.	Use challenge and password in the field as well as garrison. Maintain bivouac security guard against infiltration and guerilla activities. Practice cover and concealment. Use Agressor to add realism in demonstrations and practical exercises.
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL ATTACK.	Reporting. Necessity for speed in reporting.	Report nuclear, biological and chemical equipment whenever observed. A person detecting nuclear, biological or chemical attack must report: (a) location; (b) time of attack; and (c) method of release (if known).
INSPECTIONS	Patrolling. All intelligence subjects	Troops, especially NCOs must know the difference between a formal field insepction and the inspection of a patrol. During garrison inspection, question individuals about meaning of combat intelligence, observation, counterintelligence, etc.
EVASION AND ESCAPE	Collecting and reporting information. Camouflage and concealment. Scouting and patrolling. Map and compass reading. Survival.	Remember and report information of intelligence value; practice cover and concealment techniques during escape and evasion training. Apply the principles of scouting patrolling as insurance for successful evasion. Weather may be used as a cover for evaders and escapers but may complicate the escape effort.

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
MAINTENANCE, SUPPLY ECONOMY, AND COST CONSIOUSNESS.	Counterintelligence. Security	Do not leave equipment where the enemy can pick it up. Discarded equipment is as important a source of information to the enemy as any other data. Littered bivouac areas mean more information for the enemy. Practice security measures.
SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS, ELEMENTARY.	Patrolling. Reporting. Security	A patrol acts as the eyes and ears of the commander. Messages used to report information must be clear, concise, and timely. Be security conscious.
ANTIGUERRILLA AND ANTIINFILTRATION TRAINING.	Counterintelligence. Collection of information. Handling of PW.	Guards and sentries should practice cover and concealment at all times; discover the enemy before being discovered; get the drop on the enemy and attempt to capture him for interrogation. Report guerrilla activities. Other troops must be alerted and antiguerrilla operations conducted.
DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK	Collecting and reporting. Counterintelligence.	Good camouflage and concealment prevent detection from both air and ground. Practice light discipline. Use Agressor to test cover effectiveness and discipline.
HASTY FORTIFICATIONS.	Observation. Counterintelligence	Select a position that affords good observation, camouflage it well, and practice light and noise discipline.
INDIVIDUAL DAY TRAINING	Observation. Counterintelligence. Security.	Observation must be continuous. Practice cover and concealment. Use cover at all times. The chances of avoiding capture are enhanced by following the simple rules taught in scouting and patrolling and use of cover and concealment.
INDIVIDUAL NIGHT TRAINING	Counterintelligence. Map and compass reading. Collecting and reporting information. Evasion and escape.	Practice light and noise discipline. Use compass and the stars to determine direction. Use night observation and listening techniques to collect information.
MAP AND AERIAL IMAGERY	Reporting information. Patrolling. Counterintelligence.	Learn how to use coordinates in reporting information. Aerial imagery is valuable both for obtaining and verifying information. Use map and aerial imagery to select patrol routes that afford maximum cover and concealment.
MARCHES AND BIVOUACS	Maps and aerial imagery. Counterintelligence. Collecting and reporting information. Handling PW and persons of intelligence interest. Security. Handling captured documents.	Use maps and aerial imagery for planning routes and selecting bivouac areas. Practice cover and concealment, communications security. noise and light discipline. Leave a clean bivouac area. Remove all unit signs, etc. Unit intelligence officer should check area. Use Aggressor to add realism to problem. Observe for enemy activity, report unusual activity. Attempt to capture Aggressor PW during problem. Search for documents and properly process them.

Principal subject	What to integrate	How to integrate
MINES AND BOOBYTRAPS	Collecting and reporting information. Patrolling.	Importance of reporting and marking enemy mines and boobytraps. Patrols must be proficient in detecting and skirting or passing through enemy minefields. Knowledge of the patterns used by friendly and enemy forces and methods by which mines and boobytraps may be disarmed are very important.
SQUAD AND PLATOON TACTICAL TRAINING.	Collecting and reporting information. Counterintelligence. Maps, compass, and aerial imagery. Handling enemy PW and material. Security. Crater analysis.	Review observing, listening, reporting of information and crater analysis reports, cover and concealment, noise and light discipline. Use challenge and password, compass, map and aerial imagery. Use Aggressor to add realism and to teach handling of PW and enemy documents.

APPENDIX R

AIRCRAFT HOSTILE FIRE REPORT

1. Unit _____.
2. Date fire was received _____. Time of day _____.
3. Type of aircraft _____. Serial number _____.
4. Location/coordinates where fire was received _____.
5. Altitude of aircraft _____ (feet above the terrain).
6. Estimate number of rounds fired at aircraft _____. Number of hits aircraft received _____. Where on aircraft were hits taken? _____ _____.
7. Type of mission flown (circle one):
   a. Armed visual recon
   b. Visual recon
   c. Photo recon
   d. IR recon
   e. SLAR recon
   f. Combat assault
   g. Extraction of troops
   h. Aircraft recovery
   i. Log (resupply)
   j. Command and control
   k. Armed escort
   l. Attack/AFA
   m. Administative
   n. Maintenance test flight
   o. Training
   p. Low level screening
   q. Other (explain briefly)
8. Where in the flight profile of the mission was the fire received?
   a. Landing at LZ
   b. Departing LZ
   c. Landing at PZ
   d. Departing PZ
   e. En route
   f. Departing secure base of opns
   g. Arriving at secure base of opns
   h. Inbound on ARA/gun run
   i. Breaking off gun run
   j. Orbiting over _____
   k. Hovering at _____
   l. Other (explain briefly) _____
9. What airspeed was being flown? _____knots.
10. What attitude was aircraft?
    a. Straight and level flight
    b. Straight descending
    c. Straight climbing flight
    d. Steep climb
    e. Steep descent
    f. Turning and climbing
    g. Turning in level flight
    h. Turning and descending
    i. Shallow descent
11. Type of enemy fire received? (small arms, automatic or both)
12. Was aircraft in formation? YES NO If yes, were other aircraft in the formation hit? YES NO If yes, what was the position of the aircraft in relation to yours? _____

13. If hit in formation, what formation was used?

14. Condition of aircraft:
    a. HFL (Hit flyable)
    b. HNF (Hit not flyable)
    c. SRR (Shot down-recovered-repairable)
    d. SRN (Shot down-recovered-not repairable)
    e SNR (Shot down-not recovered)

15. Casualties:
    a. _____KIA MedEvac YES NO
    b. _____WIA

16. Was weather a factor in altitude being flown? YES NO

17. Was fire received over what was considered a secure area?
    YES NO

18. Remarks: (Returned fire, amt, assessments, etc.)

APPENDIX S

EQUIVALENT CHILL TEMPERATURE CHART

WINDSPEED																					
KNOTS	MPH	TEMPERATURE (°F)																			
CALM	CALM	40	35	30	25	20	15	10	5	0	-5	-10	-15	-20	-25	-30	-35	-40	-45	-50	-55	-60
		EQUIVALENT CHILL TEMPERATURE																				
3– 6	5	35	30	25	20	15	10	5	0	-5	-10	-15	-20	-25	-30	-35	-40	-45	-50	-55	-65	-70
7–10	10	30	20	15	10	5	0	-10	-15	-20	-25	-35	-40	-45	-50	-60	-65	-70	-75	-80	-90	-95
11–15	15	25	15	10	0	-5	-10	-20	-25	-30	-40	-45	-50	-60	-65	-70	-80	-85	-90	-100	-105	-110
16–19	20	20	10	5	0	-10	-15	-25	-30	-35	-45	-50	-60	-65	-75	-80	-85	-95	-100	-110	-115	-120
20–23	25	15	10	0	-5	-15	-20	-30	-35	-45	-50	-60	-65	-75	-80	-90	-95	-105	-110	-120	-125	-135
24–28	30	10	5	0	-10	-20	-25	-30	-40	-50	-55	-65	-70	-80	-85	-95	-100	-110	-115	-125	-130	-140
29–32	35	10	5	-5	-10	-20	-30	-35	-40	-50	-60	-65	-75	-80	-90	-100	-105	-115	-120	-130	-135	-145
33–36	40	10	0	-5	-15	-20	-30	-35	-45	-55	-60	-70	-75	-85	-95	-100	-110	-115	-125	-130	-140	-150

WINDS ABOVE 40 HAVE LITTLE ADDITIONAL EFFECT	LITTLE DANGER	INCREASING DANGER (Flesh may freeze within 1 min.)	GREAT DANGER (Flesh may freeze within 30 seconds.)

INSTRUCTIONS

MEASURE LOCAL TEMPERATURE AND WIND SPEED IF POSSIBLE; IF NOT, ESTIMATE. ENTER TABLE AT CLOSEST 5° F INTERVAL ALONG THE TOP AND WITH APPROPRIATE WIND SPEED ALONG LEFT SIDE. INTERSECTION GIVES APPROXIMATE EQUIVALENT CHILL TEMPERATURE; THAT IS, THE TEMPERATURE THAT WOULD CAUSE THE SAME RATE OF COOLING UNDER CALM CONDITIONS.

NOTES

WIND

1. THIS TABLE WAS CONSTRUCTED USING MILES PER HOUR (MPH); HOWEVER, A SCALE GIVING THE EQUIVALENT RANGE IN KNOTS HAS BEEN INCLUDED ON THE CHART TO FACILITATE ITS USE WITH EITHER UNIT.
2. WIND MAY BE CALM BUT FREEZING DANGER GREAT IF PERSON IS EXPOSED IN MOVING VEHICLE, UNDER HELICOPTER ROTORS, IN PROPELLOR BLAST, ETC. IT IS THE RATE OF RELATIVE AIR MOVEMENT THAT COUNTS AND THE COOLING EFFECT IS THE SAME WHETHER YOU ARE MOVING THROUGH THE AIR OR IT IS BLOWING PAST YOU.
3. EFFECT OF WIND WILL BE LESS IF PERSON HAS EVEN SLIGHT PROTECTION FOR EXPOSED PARTS – LIGHT GLOVES ON HANDS, PARKA HOOD SHIELDING FACE, ETC.

ACTIVITY — DANGER IS LESS IF SUBJECT IS ACTIVE. A MAN PRODUCES ABOUT 100 WATTS (341 BTUs) OF HEAT STANDING STILL BUT UP TO 1000 WATTS (3413 BTUs) IN VIGOROUS ACTIVITY LIKE CROSS COUNTRY SK

PROPER USE OF CLOTHING and ADEQUATE DIET are both important.

COMMON SENSE — THERE IS NO SUBST FOR IT. THE TABLE SERVES ONLY AS A GUIDE TO THE COOLING EFFECT OF THE W BARE FLESH WHEN THE PERSON IS FIRST EXPOSED. GENERAL BODY COOLING AND MA IER FACTORS AFFECT THE RISK OF FREEZING INJURY.

APPENDIX T

TYPICAL INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS

T–1. General

a. In spite of all precautions taken to deceive, the enemy must inevitably carry out specific activities in preparation for or in conjunction with specific actions. These activities may be detected, evaluated and interpreted to develop a reasonable estimate of the enemy's probable courses of action. The enemy however, is aware of this and may attempt to turn this apparent vulnerability into deceptive measures by allowing friendly intelligence to detect activities intended to indicate a course of action which may be the opposite of what he intends.

b. The following paragraphs contain some intelligence indicators with an explanation for each. This list of indicators is by no means complete nor is it intended for dogmatic application in all situations. It is primarily a sampling of typical indications of typical enemy activities. See FM 30–102 for explanations of enemy equipment.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Concentration of mass toward either or both flanks.	Single or double envelopment normally is attempted in the offiense. Tanks and mechanized units on either or both flanks may indicate single or double envelopment.
Extensive artillery preparation.	Offensive built around the striking power and shock of massed artillery. Preparations to ½ to 1 hour normally precede offensive.
Artillery positions well forward and concentrated.	Artillery positions for the attack are well forward, with direct fire weapons, artillery pieces, and large numbers of mortars concentrated.
Dispersal of tanks and SP guns to forward units.	Tanks accompanying leading waves of assault mechanized units. SP guns follow tanks closely by bounds.
Medium air defense guns located in forward areas.	Medium air defense guns displaced forward prior to attack to protect assault forces and to facilitate forward displacement during the attack.
Clearing lanes through obstacles within own position.	Lanes are cleared and marked through mined areas, and ramps and bridges prepared over ditches and trenches within enemy's own position. This is done prior to attack to facilitate forward movement and grouping, particularly at night.
Reconnaissance and 'estruction of obstacles that are part of friendl defenses.	Usually on night preceding attack, enemy patrols reconnoiter friendly obstacle to determine plan for clearing lanes. Patrol destroys only such obstacles as will not disclose direction of main effort.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Demonstrations and feints.	Local, small-scale attacks or demonstrations involving mechanized units, tanks and artillery frequently precede a general attack.
Conducting drills and rehearsals in rear areas.	Major attacks may be preceded by rehearsals. This is particularly true of attacks against fortified positions or strongly defended river lines.
Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.	Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in the attack.
Movement of hostile units forward.	Prior to launching an attack, troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.
Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.	Troops are assembled in areas from which they can launch the attack.
Increased patrolling.	Patrolling by mechanized units usually is more active before an attack.
Increased activity in rear areas.	Before an attack, supply and administrative activities increase in the rear areas.
Location of supply and evacuation installations well forward.	Supply and evacuation installations usually are located well forward for an attack.
Increased air reconnaissance.	Air reconnaissance usually is more active before an attack.
Systematic air bombardment.	Before the attack, the enemy may engage in systematic "softening up" of friendly position by bombardment.

T–2. Attack

Attack may be indicated by—

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Massing of mechanized elements, tanks, artillery, and logistical support.	Areas of secondary importance are often denuded to mass maximum strength for main effort.
Deployment of combat elements (mechanized, armor, antitank) in echelon.	Normal attack formation provides for the second echelon of the regiment to be located 3–6 kilometers in rear of the first echelon on line; division second echelon 6–8 kilometers in rear of first echelon; and army second echelon 15–25 kilometers in rear of first echelon.
Forward units disposed on relatively narrow fronts.	The actual attack zone of a mechanized regiment is about 4 kilometers within an assigned frontage which varies from 5 to 8 kilometers.

T–3. Defense

Defense may be indicated by—

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Preparation of battalion and company defense areas.	Defense is based on stubborn defense of battalion defensive areas, and counterattacks by tank heavy forces.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Extensive preparation of field fortifications.	The enemy makes extensive use of trenches, prepared positions, and overhead cover in defensive operations.
Formation of antitank strongpoints.	Antitank strongpoints are formed along logical avenues of approach for armor. These are made up of mechanized engineer, and antitank gun units with positions strengthened by mines, ditches, and other obstacles.
Attachment of additional antitank units to front-line defensive positions.	In areas where there is a serious armored threat, the enemy will concentrate as many as 25 antitank guns for every 1,000 meters of front.
Preparation of alernate artillery positions.	In normal defensive operations, three positions are prepared for each firing battery.
Employment of roving artillery.	Roving guns are part of normal defensive operations.
Large tank units located in assembly areas to the rear.	Tank units are held in assembly areas for employment in counterattack roles.
Preparation and occupation of successive defense lines.	In the defense, separate and distinct defense lines are prepared and occupied.
Presence of demolitions, contaminated areas, obstacles, and minefields.	Demolitions and minefields and other obstacles are placed to cover approaches to the position.
Deployment of mechanized units on good defensive positions.	Dominating terrain that has good fields of fire and is relatively inaccessible to tanks usually is selected for a defensive position.
Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment and fortifying buildings.	Enginner tools and equipment may be used to dig trenches and to erect obstacles.
Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	Digging of trenches and the erection of wire indicate preparations to hold the position.

T–4. Delaying Action

Delaying action may be indicated by—

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Withdrawal from defensive position before becoming heavily engaged.	In delaying action units avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Successive local counterattacks with limited objectives.	Counterattacks are employed to assist in disengaging first echelon units rather than to restore position.
Counterattacks broken off before position is restored.	Same.
Maximum firepower positioned forward; firing initiated at long ranges.	Long-range fires facilitate the delaying action.
Frontages up to four times that normally assigned to units on the defensive.	Forces conducting a delaying action are normally assigned frontages in excess of that normal for enemy units on the defense.
Use of prepositioned nuclear weapons.	Prepositioned nuclear weapons facilitate the delaying action.

T-5. Withdrawal

Indications for withdrawal are generally the same as those for delaying action with the addition of the following:

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Rearward movement of long-range artillery and supply echelons.	In withdrawal, the first units to be withdrawn are long-range artillery and the supply echelons which move back under cover of darkness 1 or 2 days before main withdrawals.
Systematic destruction of bridges, communication facilities and other military assets in enemy-held territory.	Deliberate demolition and scorched earth tactics may be employed in general withdrawals.

T-6. Reinforcement

Reinforcement may be indicated by—

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Movement of additional troops toward the front.	This action could increase enemy's present strength.
Increased traffic toward present position.	This increased traffic may bring up additional troops and supplies.
Identification of new units in combat zone.	The presence of new units in addition to units already present will increase enemy's strength.
Additional command posts and supply and evacuation installations.	Presence of additional units would cause an increase in number of these installations.

T-7. Nuclear Weapons

a. Presence of nuclear delivery systems may be indicated—

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Heavily guarded movement of supplies, equipment and materiel.	Movement of supplies, equipment, and material of nuclear nature requires special security measures.
Heavily guarded installations.	Sites for storage of nuclear supplies and the locations of delivery units are heavily guarded.
Preparation of very heavy artillery positions.	Primary and alternate positions for nuclear delivery artillery are prepared prior to movement of the units.
Movement or detection of SP launchers.	NERONO and KOLOSSO, free rockets, and TONDRO, and FULMO, surface-to-surface missiles have tracked SP launchers.
Presence of radars and other electronic equipment.	Surface-to-surface missile systems employ the DIREKTO radar for control.
Sudden increase in communication and electronic activities.	Enemy nuclear delivery units are heavily equipped with radios and electronic devices.
Movement of small, heavily guarded convoys, including closed vans, with a high percentage of automatic weapons.	Nuclear warheads are moved under heavy security, usually in closed vans. Escort vehicles are equipped with machineguns.
Light aircraft circling over moving convoy.	Nuclear warhead convoys often use aerial radio relays to maintain communication.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Movement of small groups of heavily armed helicopters escorted by tactical fighters.	Nuclear warheads may be moved by helicopters, with guards and armed helicopters as escort. Tactical aircraft may provide air cover.
Movement of pole trailers with rockets or missile bodies.	Pole trailers are used to resupply missile and rocket units.
Presence of heavy and very heavy artillery.	203-mm gun-howitzer, 310-mm gun SP, and 400-mm mortar SP have nuclear delivery capabilities.
Identification of tall slender objects, such as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees, not previously in area.	Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees, such as poplars.
Large, well-guarded complexes including tank trucks, radars, electronic equipment, generators, and maintenance tents, located well to the rear.	Surface-to-surface missile units require extensive ground handling equipment.
Heavily guarded closed vans.	Nuclear warheads normally are carried in closed vans that are heavily guarded.
Evacuation or exclusion of civilians from specific areas suitable for nuclear storage or delivery sites.	Civilians may be evacuated from areas selected for nuclear storage or delivery sites.

b. Use of nuclear weapons may be indicated by—

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Location of missile and/or free rocket units within striking range.	Missile and free rocket units are located within one-third maximum range from the line of contact on the offense, and one-half on the defense.
Use of missiles and/or free rockets with high explosive warheads.	Missiles or free rockets may be used to deliver high explosive warheads either in a normal support role or a registration.
Location of very heavy artillery within supporting distance of frontlines.	Nuclear delivery artillery is located within one-third of its maximum range from the line of contact on the offense, and one-half on the defense.
Registration of very heavy artillery.	Registration may be required, using smoke, low charge, or high explosive projectile, prior to firing a nuclear projectile.
Special or unusual activity by frontline troops.	Frontline troops may construct special positions usually deep or covered foxholes, prior to enemy use of nuclear weapons.
Limited withdrawal of frontline units without apparent tactical reason.	Frontline units may withdraw for a limited distance to avoid casualties from close-in nuclear explosives.
Sudden and energetic digging in enemy areas.	Prior to use of nuclear weapons, frontline units may be ordered to dig deeper foxholes or take other individual protective measures.
Large concentrations of radios, radars and other electronic equipment located in the vicinity of suitable sites for guided missile launching.	Concentration of equipment is necessary to guide and control guided missiles, and must be located in close proximity of the launching site.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Sudden increase in communications and electronic activity.	Increase may be incident to delivery of nuclear weapons, for example, last minute orders and warnings, and use of electronic guidance and control.
Use of smoke cover on frontline troops.	Smoke may be used to protect troops against thermal effects of weapons used in close support.
Disappearance of known enemy agents from specific areas.	Prior to nuclear attack of an area, agents may be ordered to leave the area.
Increased or unusual air activity.	Delivery of nuclear weapons by air may require a temporary degree of local air superiority, special photo missions, and/or practice flight pattern runs by the delivery aircraft.

APPENDIX U

SAMPLE SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ACQUISITION ANNEX TO DIVISION OPERATION ORDER

(CLASSIFICATION)

ANNEX J (Surveillance and Target Acquisition) to OPORD 6–20th Inf Div
Reference: Map, Series _____, Editions 1–AMJ, 1:50,000.
Time Zones Used Throughout the Order: _____

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.
(1) Annex A (Intelligence)
(2) Enemy is capable of . . .

b. Friendly Forces.
(1) 1st Corps attacks . . .
(2) 9th TAF supports . . .
(3) Annex B (Fire Support)

c. Attachments and Detachments. Attached effective _____.
(1) A Btry, 6th Bn (Tgt Aqn), 25th Arty
(2) 2d Plt, A Co (Ranger), 75th Inf

2. MISSION.

Maintain a 24-hour all weather observation of the Division AO. Locate targets for employment of fire and maneuver elements of the Division.

3. EXECUTION.

a. Each brigade will be responsible for security and observation of its own area. OP/LP, restrictions on use of white light and other active emitters per Division SOP.

b. Resources.
(1) 1st Sqdn, 23d Cav:
(a) Ground:
Metascope
Periscopes, electronic and optical
Binoculars, electronic and optical
Night observation devices, med range
Radar
Infrared viewers
Unattended ground sensors and receiver/monitors
Laser range finder
Battle Area Surveillance System, Phase III (BASS III)
(b) Air:
Night Vision sights, indiv and crew served weapons
Metascopes

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

Binoculars, electronic and optical
Searchlights, infrared and visible light
Night fire control and observation systems employing image intensification and thermal imaging techniques

(2) 120th Avn Bn:
Night vision sights (individual and crew served weapons)
Receivers/monitors for unattended ground sensors
Searchlights (infrared and visible light)
Night fire control and observation systems employing image intensification and thermal imaging techniques

(3) 20th Inf Div Arty:
Radar
Infrared viewers
Night observation devices
Binoculars, electronic and optical
Battery cmdr scope
Laser rangefinder
Night vision sights (individual and crew-served weapons)

(4) 20th MI Co:
Ground sensor terminals for both aerial infrared and radar imagery

(5) 1st Bn (C/V) (SP), 439th Arty:
Radar
Binoculars, electronic and optical
Night vision sights, individual and crew-served weapons

(6) Nondivisional:
(a) MI specialists from 20th MI Co (Inf Div)
(b) 6th Bn (Tgt Aqn), 25th Arty
(c) 1st Plt, Btry A (Slt), 190th Arty
(d) 2d Plt, Co A (Ranger), 75th Inf
(e) 377th ASA Co (Inf Div)

c. 1st Bde:
(1) Be prepared to survey in Zone A (Annex B (Operations overlay) to OPORD 6) for special requirement.
(2)

d. 2nd Bde:
(1) Survey routes Quebec and Romeo (Annex B (Operation overlay) to OPORD 6) for special requirement.
(2)

e. 1st Sqdn Cav:
(1) Screen left and rear flanks of the division on a continuous basis.
(2) Be prepared to release one troop to the 1st Bde for special surveillance mission TBA.

f. 120th Avn Bn:
(1) Annex D (Aviation) to OPORD 6.
(2) As directed by supported Bdes.

g. Div Arty:
(1) Annex C (Fire Support) to OPORD 6.
(2) Appendix 3 (Tgt Aqn Plan).

h. 20th MI Co: Div SOP.

i. 1st Bn (C/V) (SP), 439th Arty:
(1) 24-hr overhead surveillance in division AO.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

(2) Acquire and engage targets IAW Div SOP.

j. A Btry, 6th Bn (Tgt Aqn), 25th Arty: As directed by CO, 1st Bde.

k. 2d Plt, A Co (Ranger), 75th Inf: As directed by CO, 2d Bde.

l. Res: 3d Bde: OPORD 6.

m. Coordinating Instructions:

(1) Task organization effective 222000 Aug.

(2) EEI: Is the enemy countering thermal imagery systems?

(3) Use of friendly devices as nav aids: Div SOP.

(4) FDC will approve all use of flares.

n. Present rainy season attenuating signatures for use by thermal imagery devices.

o. Surveillance countermeasures: Div SOP.

p. Deception: As directed.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT.

a. Div installations remain at present locations.

b. Annex E (Service Support Overlay), OPORD 6.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

a. Index 1–3, SOI.

b. Annex H (Communications-Electronics), OPORD 6.

Appendices: 1—Ground Surveillance Plan (omitted)
2—Aerial Surveillance Plan (omitted)
3—Target Acquisition Plan

APPENDIX 3 (Target Acquisition Plan) to ANNEX J (Surveillance and Target Acquisition) to OPORD 6—20th Inf Div.

Reference: Map, Series ____, Sheets ____, Edition ____.
1:50,000

O–O Line (300100) = (340060) = (380049) = (420023)

1. ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY.

a. 1st Bn, 45th Artillery: Observation in 1st Bde zone, south (short) of O–O line.

b. 1st Bn, 45th Artillery: Observation in 2d Bde zone, south (short) of O–O line.

2. GROUND VISUAL OBSERVATION.

a. Observation Posts.

(1) Division Artillery: 20th Inf Div Arty SOP.

(2) 1st Sqdn, 23d Cav: As directed by sqdn cmdr.

b. Capability Chart: 20th Inf Div Arty NLT 210700 Aug 19____.

3. RADAR.

a. Special attention to areas indicated on Tab A to Appendix 3 (omitted).

b. Direct support battalions: As directed by CO, Div Arty.

c. Hq Btry, Div Arty: As directed by CO Div Arty.

d. Gnd Surv Sect, 1st and 2d Bde: As directed by battalion commander.

(CLASSIFICATION)

(CLASSIFICATION)

4. AIR OBSERVATION.

a. Airfields and heliports.
(1) Div Main (321236).
(2) Hq, Div Arty (269287)
(3) Field Artillery Bns: Select and report by 210700 Aug 19____.

b. Surveillance Schedule.
(1) 120th Avn Bn: Minimum of one aircraft continually in division zone from BMNT — 15 minutes to EENT + 30 minutes.
(2) Hq Btry, Div Arty: As directed by CO, Div Arty.

TABS:

A. Overlay, Special Areas of Attention (omitted)

B. Division Artillery Capability Chart

(CLASSIFICATION)

(Classification)

Tab B (DIVARTY Capability) to APP 3 (Tgt Aqn) to annex J
(Surveillance and Target Acquisition) to OPORD 6



(Classification)

Figure U–1. Division artillery capability chart.

APPENDIX V

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FORMAT

(CLASSIFICATION)

Heading

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN
Appendix _____, Counterintelligence Operations to Annex _____, Intelligence to OPLAN _____.

1. ( ) PURPOSE. To provide planning guidance concerning procedures and responsibilities of commanders for counterintelligence activities within their area of responsibility.

2. ( ) REFERENCES. List the basic references essential to accomplishment of the counterintelligence mission of the command.

3. ( ) MISSION. State the counterintelligence mission.

4. ( ) EXECUTION. Assign tasks to counterintelligence units and/or staff offices under the command of the headquarters, considering the following factors:

a. Provision for flow of counterintelligence information of interest to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands.

b. Effect of status of forces agreements on counterintelligence collection.

c. Liaison with counterintelligence elements of other commands, national organizations, and/or national counterintelligence elements.

d. Personnel security.

e. Security of classified information.

f. Physical security of installations.

5. ( ) MILITARY SECURITY.

6. ( ) CIVIL SECURITY.

7. ( ) PORT, FRONTIER, AND TRAVEL SECURITY.

8. ( ) CENSORSHIP.

9. ( ) SPECIAL OPERATIONS.

10. ( ) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS.

a. Channels for reporting.

b. Type of report, frequency, priority.

(Classification)

GLOSSARY

Agency—An individual or organization which exploits a source to collect or process information.

Analysis of the area of operations—A study to determine the effects of the area of operations on the general courses of action that the enemy and friendly forces may adopt.

Area of influence—That portion of the assigned area of operations in which the commander is capable of directly affecting the course of combat by the employment of his own available combat power.

Area of interest—That area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning for the extension of the area of influence or for the displacement of potential targets into the area of influence.

Area of operations—That portion of the area of conflict necessary for military operations, either offensive or defensive, pursuant to an assigned mission, and for the administration incident to such military operations.

Avenue of approach—A route for a force of a particular size to reach an objective.

Civil security—Counterintelligence operations concerned with local civilian elements, refugees, displaced persons, and indigenous employees of US Forces.

Cold war—A state of international tension wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

Collection—The process of gathering information from all available sources and agencies.

Collection plan—A logical plan for determining indications from intelligence requirements and translating them into orders and requests for specific information.

Combat intelligence—That knowledge of the enemy, weather and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat operations.

Communications security (COMSEC)—The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny to unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunication, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretations of the results of such study.

Communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI)—A series of orders issued for technical control and coordination of the communications-electronics activities of a command.

Communications-electronics standing instructions (CESI)—A series of instructions explaining the use of items included in the communications-electronics operating instructions.

Concealment—The protection from observation only. See also cover.

Coordinates register—A recording of enemy events by grid square designed to provide brigade and lower echelons a workable counterpart to the extensive intelligence files and workbooks maintained at higher echelons.

Counterintelligence (CI)—That aspect of military intelligence devoted to offensive actions to destroy or neutralize the effectiveness of adverse foreign intelligence activities and to defensive actions to protect information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations against sabotage.

Counterintelligence estimate—An evaluation of the enemy's intelligence, sabotage, and subversive capabilities to determine the relative probability of enemy adoption of these capabilities.

Counterintelligence plan—A systematic listing of all intelligence countermeasures to be carried out by a command, indicating the units/agencies responsible for the execution of each task.

Cover—Shelter or protection, either natural or artificial. See also concealment.

Coverage Map—A plotting of the extent and coverage of collection sources and agencies which provide information coverage to portions of the battlefield.

Direction—The phase in the intelligence cycle which includes determination of intelligence requirements, preparation of a collection plan, issuance of orders and requests to information collection agencies, and a continuous check on the productivity of collection agencies.

Dissemination—The timely conveyance of information and/or in an appropriate form and by any suitable means to those who need it.

Electronic countermeasures (ECM)—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM)—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to insure friendly effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum despite the enemy's use of electronic warfare.

Electronic security (ELSEC)—The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from their interception and study of friendly noncommunications electromagnetic radiations.

Electronic warfare (EW)—Military use of electronics involving actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy, and actions taken to insure our own effective use of radiated electromagnetic energy.

Electronic warfare support measures (ESM)—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to search for, intercept, locate, record, and analyze radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of exploiting such radiations in support of military operations.

Essential elements of information (EEI)—The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment required to make timely decisions.

Evaluation—The step in the processing phase of the intelligence cycle in which an item of information is appraised in terms of credibility, reliability, pertinency, and accuracy.

General war—Armed conflict between major powers in which the total resources of the belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a major belligerent is in jeopardy.

Imagery interpretation (II)—The process of location, recognition, identification and description of objects, activities and terrain represented on imagery.

Immediate zone—The area bounded by the distance at which a commander must have immediate knowledge of an enemy presence in order to act effectively when the enemy reaches the area of influence.

Indication—Information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bears on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action.

Information—Unevaluated data of every description which, when processed, may produce intelligence.

Insurgency—A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.

Intelligence—The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and interpretation of information.

Intelligence annex—A supporting document of an operation plan or order which provides detailed information on the enemy situation, assignment of intelligence tasks, and intelligence administrative procedures.

Intelligence cycle—The steps by which information is assembled, converted into intelligence, and made available to users consisting of the phases of direction, collection, processing, and dissemination.

Intelligence estimate—An appraisal of the elements of intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the probable order of their adoption.

Intelligence interrogation—Systematic effort to produce information by direct questioning of a person under the control of the questioner.

Intelligence journal—A chronological log of intelligence activities covering a stated period, usually 24 hours.

Intelligence officer—The principal staff officer assigned to advise and assist the commander in carrying out his intelligence and counterintelligence responsibilities.

Intelligence report (INTREP)—A specific report of information, usually on a single item, made at any level of command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in keeping with the timeliness of the information.

Intelligence requirement—Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information or the production of intelligence.

Intelligence summary (*INTSUM*)—A brief summary of intelligence covering a period of time designated by the commander, usually 6 hours.

Intelligence workbook—A systematic arrangement by subject heading which aids in the sorting, evaluation, and interpretation of information and in the preparation of intelligence reports.

Interpretation—The act of determining the significance of information in relation to the current body of knowledge through analysis, integration, and deduction.

Key terrain—Any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.

Limited war—Armed conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents, involving the overt engagement of the military forces of two or more nations.

Military crest—A fixed line on the forward slope of a hill or ridge from which maximum observation covering the slope down to the base of the hill or ridge can be obtained.

Obstacle—Any obstruction that stops, delays or diverts movement.

Operations security (*OPSEC*)—Actions taken to deny the enemy information concerning planned, on-going, and completed operations.

Order of battle (*OB*)—The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.

Other intelligence requirements (*OIR*)—Items of information of secondary importance to essential elements of information regarding the enemy and environment which may affect the accomplishment of the mission.

Pattern analysis—Technique of analyzing and correlating a series of enemy events over a period of time and predicting future enemy trends, activities, and courses of action.

Periodic intelligence report (*PERINTREP*)—An intelligence summary covering a longer period of time than the intelligence summary.

Personnel security—Counterintelligence operations concerned with security clearances and security education.

Processing—The phase of the intelligence cycle in which information becomes intelligence through recording, evaluation, and interpretation.

Reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain information about the activities or resources of an enemy or potential enemy.

Recording—The reduction of information to writing or some other form of graphical representation and the arranging of this information into groups of related items.

Signals intelligence (*SIGINT*)—A generic term which includes both communications intelligence and electronic intelligence.

Signal security (*SIGSEC*)—A generic term which includes both communications security and electronic security.

Situation report (*SITREP*)—The principle means used to report to higher authority information of the tactical situation and such administrative information as may affect the tactical situation.

Situation map—A temporary graphic display of the current dispositions and major activities of the enemy.

Source—A person, thing, or activity from which information is originally obtained.

Special weapons security—Counterintelligence operations concerned with the security of special weapons systems, ancillary equipment, and supporting documents.

Spot report—One time reports used by all echelons to transmit intelligence or information of immediate value.

Standing operating procedure (*SOP*)—A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness.

Strategic intelligence—Intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.

Supplementary intelligence report (*SUPINTREP*)—A NATO standardized report form used for comprehensive reviews of one or more specific intelligence targets.

Surveillance—All weather, day and night, systematic obsevation of the battle area for intelligence purposes.

Tactical operations center (*TOC*)—A physical groupment of those elements of a coordinating and special staff concerned with current tactical operations and the tactical support thereof.

Target acquisition—The detection, identification, and location of a target in sufficient detail for the effective employment of weapons.

Technical intelligence—Intelligence concerning technological developments, performance, and operational capabilities of foreign materiel.

Topographic crest—The highest point of a hill or ridge.

Weekly intelligence summary—An intelligence summary usually prepared at field army and higher headquarters which serves to highlight trends that are useful in planning future operations.

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

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APPENDIX E

EXAMPLE OF A PARTIALLY COMPLETED COLLECTION PLAN

UNIT: 20th Inf Div
PERIOD COVERED From 131530 Jul To: Capture of high ground at 1055-1357

(1) Essential elements of information and other required intelligence items	(2) Indications (analysis of items in column 1)	(3) Basis for specific orders or requests	List all available agencies: 1st Bde	2d Bde	3d Bde	1/21 Cav	Div Arty	20th Engr Bn	29th Arty Bn	262d USASA Co (Div Spt)	55th Inf Div	22d Inf Div	1st Corps	Auxiliary agencies	(5) Place and time at which information is to be reported	(6) Remarks and notes for future actions
FEI 1 What are the enemy dispositions? Special attention to organization of the ground, troops occupying strongpoints, and locations and activities of reserves.	a. Location and strengths of: (1) Units in contact. (2) Reserves. (3) Artillery. (4) Others.	(1) Report location, strength, and activities of troops on JANINA-CELINA Ridge.		⊗		⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	×		⊗	⊗	(1) As obtained. Negative reports every 2 hours starting 131800 July.	Assign to 3d when committed. ✓
		(2) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Hill 408 (1651) and Hill 282 (1251).		⊗		⊗	×					×	⊗	(2) Same as (1).	✓
		(3) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity Plateau BELLE-RIVE.	⊗			⊗	⊗		×				×	⊗	(3) Same as (1).	+
		(4) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints vicinity BRAZOS Woods.	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗		×				×	⊗		✓
		(5) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 2050.	⊗			⊗	⊗		×					⊗	(5) Same as (1).	✓
		(6) Report location and strength of occupied strongpoints on PETROV Woods Ridge vicinity 1849.		⊗		⊗	⊗		×					⊗	(6) Same as (1).	If positive, notify 1st Corps without delay and make maximum effort to get details for target analysis. +
		(7) Report location and strength of troops in LARUNA River Valley vicinity LEON (1647).				⊗	×		⊗					⊗	(7) Same as (1).	If positive, notify 22d Inf Div and 1st Corps. +
		(8) Report location and strength of troops vicinity Hill 326 (1153).		⊗		⊗	⊗		×				×	⊗	(8) Same as (1).	Cancel after damage assessment reports received. ✓
		(9) Report location of all artillery and mortar positions in zone to include those unoccupied and number of pieces.	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	×	×	⊗	⊗	(9) As obtained.	Check corps and army PERINTREPTS. ✓
	b. Presence of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields.	(10) Report location and extent of demolitions, gassed areas, radiological and biological contamination, obstacles, and minefields to front, flanks, and forward of present position.	×	×		×	×	×	×		×	×	×	×	(10) As obtained.	SOP. +
	c. Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	(11) Report hostile entrenching and erection of bands of wire along present line of contact.	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗							⊗	(11) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
		(12) Report hostile entrenching and bands of wire on JANINA-CELINA Ridge.		⊗		⊗	⊗						⊗	⊗	(12) As obtained.	✓
	d. Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment, fortifying buildings.	(13) Report evidences of fortification of buildings in zone, particularly WACO (1451) and ST GEORGE (1554).		⊗									×	⊗		If no information by 132300, try 1st Corps. ✓
	e. Location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations.	(14) Report location of command posts and supply and evacuation installations in division zone north of road LA PALOMA-WACO special attention to vicinity CR 1356.				⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗			⊗	⊗	(14) As obtained.	+
OTHER INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS. 2 Will the enemy attack prior to 140430 July? If so, when, where, and in what strength? Special attention to the axis LEON (1647)-OSTRO (2046); Hill 406 (1849)-Hill 418 (1848).	a. Movement of hostile units forward.	(15) Report volume and type of traffic across TAKASAN Canal and on roads leading south from CELINA, JANINA, CR 1356, and CR 1255.				⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	×	×	×	⊗	(15) Same as (1).	Assign to 1st Bde, 2d Bde when railroad through LAY is reached. ✓
	b. Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas.	(16) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1550.				⊗	⊗		×					⊗	(16) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
		(17) Report location of troops, types, and numbers, vicinity 1851.		⊗			⊗		×					⊗	(17) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
	c. Clearing of lanes through obstacles within own position.	(18) Report clearing of lanes through obstacles within Aggressor position in zone.	⊗	⊗		⊗	×	⊗	×						(18) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. +
	d. Increased patrolling.	(19) Report the number, size, composition, routes, and time observed of enemy patrols in zone.	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗								(19) As obtained.	✓
	e. Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.	(20) Report activity and size of units blocking our patrolling along line of contact.	⊗	⊗		⊗									(20) As obtained.	Cancel at 140430. ✓
	f. Extensive artillery preparations.	(21) Report any marked change in artillery fire to include time, location, direction of fire, number of rounds, rate and caliber received in zone or area.	×	×	×	×	×	×	×						(21) As obtained.	
	g. Increased aerial reconnaissance.	(22) Report amount and type of air activity in zone or area.	×	×	×	×	×		×						(23) As obtained.	SOP. +
	h. Forces in contact being replaced or reinforced by new units.	(23) Report new identifications.	×	×		×				⊗	×	×	×	×		SOP. +

FOOTNOTES: ⊗ COLLECTION AGENCIES LEVIED REQUIREMENT
X AVAILABLE COLLECTION AGENCIES

✓ NEGATIVE REPORTS RECEIVED
+ POSITIVE REPORTS RECEIVED

APPENDIX Q
TYPICAL INFORMATION NEEDS IN AREA OF INFLUENCE OF VARIOUS UNITS

CATEGORY OF INFORMATION	SUBCATEGORY OF INFORMATION	TIMELINESS	GENERAL LOCATION (Accuracy in meters)	SPOT LOCATION (Accuracy in meters)
PERSONNEL				
COMPANY	RIFLEMEN, MORTAR OBSERVERS, ARTILLERY OBSERVERS, SQUADS, PLATOON	IMMEDIATE	10, 50	50
BATTALION	ARTILLERY OBSERVERS, PLATOONS	IMMEDIATE	10, 100	50
BRIGADE	ARTILLERY OBSERVERS, COMPANIES	IMMEDIATE	100, 500	50
DIVISION	BATTALIONS	IMMEDIATE	200	100
CORPS	REGIMENTS	IMMEDIATE	500	100
FIELD ARMY	DIVISIONS	IMMEDIATE	500	NA
VEHICLES				
COMPANY	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	10	50
BATTALION	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
BRIGADE	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
DIVISION	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	200	50
CORPS	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	500	100
FIELD ARMY	GROUND, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	500	100
WEAPONS				
COMPANY	DIRECT FIRE, DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, INDIRECT FIRE, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	10, 50, 200	50
BATTALION	DIRECT FIRE, DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, INDIRECT FIRE, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100, 200	50
BRIGADE	DIRECT FIRE, DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, INDIRECT FIRE, ANTIAIRCRAFT, AERIAL	IMMEDIATE	100, 200	50
DIVISION	COMPANY-SIZE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, COMPANY-SIZE INDIRECT FIRE (NON NUCLEAR), NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, ANTIAIRCRAFT	IMMEDIATE	200, 100	100
CORPS	BATTALION-SIZE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, BATTALION-SIZE INDIRECT FIRE, NUCLEAR ARTILLARY, ANTIAIRCRAFT	IMMEDIATE, 3 HOURS	500, 100	100
FIELD ARMY	REGIMENT-SIZE DIRECT FIRE SUPPORT, NUCLEAR ARTILLERY, ANTIAIRCRAFT	IMMEDIATE, 3 HOURS	500, 100	100
STRUCTURES				
COMPANY	ALL	IMMEDIATE	25	50
BATTALION	ALL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
BRIGADE	ALL	IMMEDIATE	100	50
DIVISION	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR LANDING FACILITIES, SUPPLY FACILITIES, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, ADM	30 MINUTES	150	100
CORPS	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR LANDING FACILITIES, SUPPLY DEPOTS, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, BUILDINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE, ADM	1 HOUR	200	100
FIELD ARMY	FIELD DEFENSES, BRIDGES, AIR LANDING FACILITIES, SUPPLY DEPOTS, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, BUILDINGS, NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORAGE, ADM	2 HOURS	500	100
TERRAIN AND WEATHER				
COMPANY	WEATHER FORECASTS	IMMEDIATE, EACH 12 HOURS	25	25
BATTALION	WEATHER FORECASTS	IMMEDIATE, EACH 12 HOURS	25	25
BRIGADE	WEATHER FORECASTS	IMMEDIATE, EACH 24 HOURS	50	25
DIVISION	RELIEF AND DRAINAGE, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, MAN MADE FEATURES, HYDROGRAPHY, WEATHER FORECASTS	30 MINUTES, EACH 24 HOURS	50	50
CORPS	TOPOGRAPHY, VEGETATION SURFACE MATERIALS, RIVERS & STREAMS, LAKES & PONDS, SWAMPS, MINES & QUARRIES, URBAN AREAS, WEATHER FORECASTS	1 HOUR, EACH 6 & 48 HOURS	100	50
FIELD ARMY	TOPOGRAPHY, VEGETATION, SURFACE MATERIALS, RIVERS & STREAMS, LAKES & PONDS, SWAMPS, MINES & QUARRIES, URBAN AREAS, WEATHER FORECASTS	2 HOURS, EACH 6 & 48 HOURS	500	100
ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATIONS				
COMPANY	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS	IMMEDIATE	10, 100	50
BATTALION	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS	IMMEDIATE	10, 100	50
BRIGADE	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS	IMMEDIATE	100, 500	50
DIVISION	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS, ANTIAIRCRAFT RADARS, RADIOS	30 MINUTES	100, 200, 500	100
CORPS	GROUND SURVEILLANCE RADARS, COUNTERWEAPONS RADARS, ANTIARCRAFT RADARS, RADIOS	1 HOUR	500, 100	100
FIELD ARMY	ANTIAIRCRAFT RADARS, RADIOS	3 HOURS, 2 HOURS	100, 500	100
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS				
COMPANY	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BATTALION	FRIENDLY, ENEMY, ADM	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BRIGADE	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100	NA
DIVISION	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	100, 200	NA
CORPS	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	300	NA
FIELD ARMY	FRIENDLY, ENEMY	PRIOR, IMMEDIATE	500	NA
CONTAMINATED AREAS				
COMPANY	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BATTALION	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	100	NA
BRIGADE	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE	200, 500	NA
DIVISION	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE, 1 HOUR	200, 500	NA
CORPS	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE, 1 HOUR	300, 500	NA
FIELD ARMY	AREA OF OPERATIONS, AREA OF INTEREST	IMMEDIATE, 1 HOUR	500	NA

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