

# From Revenue Assurance to Assurance


The Importance of Measurement in Computer Security

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University of Auckland

## Why Measure?

Reason for measurement in science/engineering is usually attributed to Lord Kelvin (William Thomson)



If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it  
— Lord Kelvin, possibly apocryphal

## Why Measure? (ctd)

What he actually said:

In physical science a first essential step in the direction of learning any subject is to find principles of numerical reckoning and practicable methods for measuring some quality connected with it. I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever the matter may be

— Lord Kelvin, “Electrical Units of Measurement”, 1883

- Victorians liked being long-winded

## Why Measure? (ctd)

From which we conclude that

- Someone who expresses himself like that is unlikely to have said “if you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it”

## Why Measure? (ctd)


Usually quoted in terms of management science,  
“if you can’t measure it you can neither manage it nor  
improve it”



You can't manage what you can't measure  
— Endless books on management

## Improvement through Measurement

In Lord Kelvin's day improvement-through-measurement  
was relatively easy



- The first versions of anything were somewhat rudimentary


## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)

People just copied each other, with a bit of tweaking



## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)


Failures were obvious





## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)


There were lots of knobs and levers to play with



- (It's like a Firewall-1)

## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)

This lead to many improvements




## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)

Some of which wouldn't look out of place today



## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)

Failures were still pretty obvious even with modern designs



## Improvement through Measurement (ctd)

The exact time of failure can usually be determined by the trained eye



## Measurement in Computer Security

A fully-functional firewall



## Measurement in Computer Security (ctd)

A catastrophically failed firewall



## Measurement in Computer Security (ctd)

A \$20,000 Ethernet cable





## Measurement in Computer Security (ctd)

Can you tell which is which?



## Measurement in Computer Security (ctd)

Trains are much easier to detect failures with...



## Measurement in Computer Security (ctd)

... than computer security gear



## Measurement for Revenue Assurance

Some technology companies have already run into this problem in the past



1980s: Telcos roll out cellular services

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

**PRICE AND TECHNOLOGY BREAKTHROUGH!  
LIGHTWEIGHT HANDHELD CELLULAR PHONE**  
Carry It Along With You to Make or Take Calls Wherever You Go!  
Keep in Touch When You're Out of Your Office, Home or Car

**1499<sup>00</sup>** Commercial Lease  
As Low As **4995**

ESP Available  
 • The Most Affordable Portable Available Anywhere  
 • Fits in Your Briefcase—Only 1 1/2" Wide  
 • Weighs Only 28 Ounces, Including Batteries  
 • Includes Rechargeable Battery Pack, Antenna, Carrying Case and Strap

Radio Shack CT-300, at the convergence of a full-feature cellular phone in a truly portable size. You can easily carry it with you wherever you go and use it just as you would a regular portable phone. But you can use it at times when you really need it. At the job site, in a rental car, on a service call or waiting on a boat. You'll always have just what you need. And you'll use your mobile phone in all around the over 100 states in the USA and 100+ countries outside the US with more ease on the way.

No larger than a cordless telephone, the CT-300 gives you all your memory for address bookkeeping of up to 64 phone numbers. High-energy batteries that deliver up to 15 hours standby and 1 1/2 hours of talk time on one charge, and that can be recharged in 60 minutes. Combined with the 60-play list you can easily keep track of the amount of time your phone has been in use, and an electronic "lock" that restricts phone use and a easily reprogrammable through the keypad. Other features include a three-way speaker, auto redial, call timer for AC service, timer, call timer, call timer, call timer.

We make the CT-300 easy to use with leasing and credit plans, in-store processing of all start-up paperwork and programming of the phone. You walk away with a working cellular phone. Available for all major carriers and 150+ carriers. See us for features, charging stand plus AC adapter or mobile charging kit. CT-300

**Accessories for the CT-300**  
 Charging Stand. Recharge battery pack in the hour. Free this guarantee while charging battery. Electronic AC adapter or mobile charging kit. \$7.95  
 AC Adapter. Us. Item # 373-1033 \$8.95  
 Rechargeable Nickel-Cadmium Battery Pack. Us. Item # 373-1034 \$8.95  
 Handheld Data Interface\*. Enjoy handy handheld use with laptop computers. \$24.95  
 \*Available in some areas only. See us!

**Mobile Mounting Kit**  
 Use the CT-300 in your car as a mobile cellular phone. Our Mobile Mounting Kit includes everything you need. Charge your phone in a vehicle. You can mount and talk while you're driving. In and from work, shop, school or waiting in line to a doctor. Good reason to keep the mobile mounting kit. Includes AC power cord and mounting hardware. \$14.95

© Copyright 1987 Radio Shack & Service of Telecommunications, Fort Worth, TX 76101. Item # 373-1034

Market uptake was rapid

- Not surprising, at these bargain-basement prices


## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

1990s: Telcos have this sneaking suspicion that they may be missing out on some amount of revenue due to inaccurate billing



## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)


Billing on fixed lines is relatively easy



- Anything going through this port at the exchange gets billed
- Recorded on tape at the switch and periodically dumped to the central office

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)



Mobile billing is really hard





## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

I mean *really* hard



## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

There's no easy way to measure billing accuracy though




- Surely we're not losing money from this?!?!

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

Engineers rigged up systems to place thousands of calls every day

- They knew the time and duration of each call
- Could compare their records with the resulting billing records



## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

Turns out that the telcos were clueless about the state of their billing



- “We’re sure people are making lots of calls, but \*(&Y\*’d if we can figure out how many, or who to”

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

Telcos had no idea just how bad things really were

If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it

— Lord Kelvin (perhaps)

You can't manage what you can't measure

— Management books

If you can't measure it, you don't even know whether it's working or not

— Me, paraphrasing someone possibly paraphrasing  
Lord Kelvin

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

This helped create the field of revenue assurance



- Formalised the process of verifying that the billing system was working as expected

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)

### Why revenue assurance?

From service provision to cash collection, there are limitless opportunities for revenue to seep through the cracks

— TM Forum

“If we don’t do this then we lose money”

- Like many other things, it started out as a good idea until management got hold of it
- See “TQM”

## Measurement for Revenue Assurance (ctd)


### Motivation for revenue assurance



“Fear will keep them in line — fear of ~~this battlestation~~ losing money”

# Measurement for Security

How do you get rid of these (on a large scale)?



# Measurement for Security (ctd)

You do this to them



## Measurement for Security (ctd)



This was considered good enough for many years...



...until this happened

## Measurement for Security (ctd)

The Iranians didn't know that you couldn't recover documents from this form




- Used Iranian carpet weavers (according to one version) and/or women (another version) to reassemble the documents

## Measurement for Security (ctd)

The Iranians laid the shreds out on a floor and devised a sophisticated procedure for numbering, indexing and reassembling the individual shreds

— BBC

- Published as a 60-volume bestseller(?), “Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den”



## Measurement for Security (ctd)

### Short-term outcome

- Assorted revisions of document-destruction requirements

Security standards for document destruction have always been prescriptive rather than descriptive

Die Partikelgröße darf 320 Quadrat-Millimeter nicht überschreiten, wobei allerdings 10% der Partikel eine Fläche zwischen 320 und 800 Quadrat-Millimeter aufweisen dürfen. Bei Streifenschnitt darf die Streifenbreite maximal 2 Millimeter betragen.

### Possibly based around the following thinking

- Commercial shredders come in these performance classes
- Assign a document sensitivity level to each class

## Measurement for Security (ctd)

Ongoing problem: Very little published data available on what can and can't be recovered

- Lack of measurement again

Attempts to evaluate the security of shredded documents barely seem to exist until about five years ago



The problem of automatic shredded document recovery has been sparsely researched to date

— “An Investigation into Automated Shredded Document Reconstruction using Heuristic Search Algorithms”, 2006

## Measurement for Security (ctd)

Then, in 2011...

- DARPA sponsors the Shredder Challenge



Computer-aided reassembly of shredded documents

- Ranged from 200 to 6,000 fragments
- \$50,000 first prize



## Measurement for Security (ctd)

Teams generally used a technique pretty similar to what the Iranians had done thirty years earlier

- Assign a unique ID to each fragment
- Analyse characteristics like size, colour, edge pattern, font used, graphics
- Perform approximate matching based on this
  - Early work in this area was based on automated jigsaw-puzzle solvers
- Use humans for the final assembly

## Measurement for Security (ctd)


Winning team exploited the fact that the documents were photocopied and contained a pattern of yellow dots used to track the source of printed/copied documents



- Other teams managed to do well even without this inadvertent help from DARPA


## Measurement for Security (ctd)

While the results were troubling for people who rely on shredders for document security...



## Measurement for Security (ctd)


...just this *one measurement* has now given us a means of evaluating their effectiveness



- Anything up to about DIN level 5 (0.8×12mm, “Classified/Top Secret”) probably isn’t that secure

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2


In a few rare cases we've run into the same thing with security



1990s: Netscape rolls out SSL for the web

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct

Handshake is secured using certificates



- With a certificate “it can be guaranteed that you are actually connecting to” a given site (Google Chrome)

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)


Certificates make you secure!




- By emphatic assertion of the browser developers

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)


Now there had been a few concerns over the years about just how valid this assertion was...




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
## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)



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
## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)



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## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)




- ISO 9000, demonstrating repeatability of process
- (Finally fixed by redirecting browsers to a non-SSL version of the site)

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)




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





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


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




## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)



## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)



## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct

```
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
MIIQOjCCCIoCAQAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEEBQAwGDEWMBQGA1UEAxMNS29tcGxleCBM
YWJzLjAeFw01MTAxMDEwMDAwMDBaFw01MDEyMzEyMzU5NTlaMBGxHjAUBGNVBAMT
DUtVbXBsZXggTGFiYy4wggggMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IIIDQAwgggIAoIIAQCA
A+++++
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///+++HELLO+THERE++++//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///And/welcome/to/the/base64/coded/x509/pem/certificate/of////
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///KOMPLEX/MEDIA/LABS//
+///www/dot/komplex/dot/org//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///created/by/Markku+Juhani/Saarinен//
+///22/June/2000//dw3z/at/komplex/dot/org//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///You/are/currently/reading/the/public/RSA/modulus//
+///of/our/root/certification/authority/certificate//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///Which/happens/to/be/16386/bits/long//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///And/fully/working/and/shit//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+///And/totally/insecure//
+//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
```

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct

... whether certificates had any effect at all ...

### Security

Our site is hosted on a secure server where software encrypts the credit card number into our rates reconciliation system. You can enter your credit card number on a secure form and transmit the form over the internet to a secure server without risk of an intermediary obtaining your credit card information. Your credit card details are temporarily stored on the secure server until your payment is completed and confirmed. After your payment is complete, these details are transferred to an offline database, using a secure transfer mechanism, and deleted from the site. At no stage are your credit card details held in a complete form at the offline site, but rather held in a truncated form for reconciliation purposes only.



Decline Accept

## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)

The image shows two overlapping browser windows. The top window is titled "American Express" and contains a security notice. The bottom window is titled "WACHOVIA" and also contains a security notice. Both notices discuss browser security indicators and the trade-off between security and performance.

**American Express** Close window

**Security is important to everyone!**

Please be assured that, although the home page itself does not have an "https" URL, the login component of this page is secure. When you enter your User ID and password, your information is transmitted via a secure environment, and once the login is complete, you are in a secure area.

**Browser security indicators**

You may notice when you are on our home page that some familiar indicators do not appear in your browser to confirm the entire page is secure. Those indicators include the small "lock" icon in the bottom right corner of the browser frame and the "s" in the Web address bar (for example, "https").

To provide the fastest access to our home page for all of our millions of customers and other visitors, we have made signing in to Online Banking secure without making the entire page secure. Again, please be assured that your ID and password are secure and the

**WACHOVIA** Close


**ONLINE SECURITY**

**Browser security indicators**



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
## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)



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


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


## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct

... and whether the bad guys weren't just getting certificates like everyone else ...




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





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
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## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)



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
## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct

... but luckily no-one was using them for anything too critical




## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)

(That's this place)



## Measurement in Computer Security, Part 2 (ct)

The plural of anecdote is not evidence



- I mean how bad can it really be?
- Until 2010, no-one had ever tried to measure it

## Measurement for Security Assurance

### EFF SSL Observatory results

- 7.7M SSL/TLS servers
- 4M distinct certificates
- 1.5M had certificates trusted by major browsers

Experiment was re-run two years later by folks from USCIB/UMichigan

- 12.8M SSL/TLS servers
  - Slightly different scanning method
- 5.8M distinct certificates
- 1.9M had certificates trusted by major browsers

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

*Two thirds* of all “secure” web sites visited result in browser warnings due to untrusted/expired/whatever certificates

- True figure is actually worse than that due to domain mismatches/virtual hosting
- Results in browser warnings even if the certificate is trusted

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

But wait, there's more...

- EFF looked at the contents of the certificates
- Not a very hard look, just some preliminary analysis

Results:

You name it, it's there

— An Observatory for the SSLiverse

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Private keys shared across multiple certificates/sites

- Private keys shared across CA certificates (!!)
- Appear to be unrelated, e.g. “American Optimum SSL CA” and “UK ComodoCA”
  - Possibly connected via something called “OptimumSSLCA”
- “UK ComodoCA Limited”, “US Positive Software Corporation” (issued by “US USERTRUST”), and another “US Positive Software Corporation” (issued by “Swedish AddTrust”)

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Invalid names (RFC 1918, unqualified names) all over the place

- According to the Belgian GlobalSign, 192.168.1.2 is in the US, the UK, Switzerland, Belgium, and at 77.76.108.82
- Over *six thousand* certificates issued to “localhost”
- Coming from CAs like Comodo , Go Daddy, GlobalSign, Starfield, Equifax, Digicert, Entrust, Cybertrust, Microsoft, and Verisign

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Other peculiarities

- Hundreds of thousands of certificates with 512-bit keys
- Tens of thousands of certificates with Debian weak keys
- End-entity certificates marked with CA capabilities
  - keyUsage = keyCertSign

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Arrghhh!!!!!!



## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

It's not that bad though





## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

There's a simple solution...

When a web (or SMTP, or FTP, or IMAP) server with SSL/TLS is set up, it should perform a loopback connection to itself to verify that everything's OK



- If this happens then there's a problem

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

General rule for all servers

A web server should never announce that it's ready for operation until it's verified that it really is ready

Completely automated process

- Step  $n$  of the server installation

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Re-run the check every  $n$  hours to ensure that everything is still working OK



The screenshot shows a report from SiteDown.co. The header includes the SiteDown.co logo and navigation links for 'Reports' and 'Sites'. The main heading is 'Certificate expired!'. Below this, it states 'Submitted by Anonymous on Sat, 07/07/2012 - 12:56am' and 'Site: Bank of America'. The report text reads: 'Whenever i click on any lick in bofa site it gives a security warning that certificate has expired.. is any one gacing the same problem?'. There is a 'Comments' section with two entries. The first comment is 'Submitted by Eric Nelson on Sat, 07/07/2012 - 1:11am.' with the text 'Yes. 1 a.m. PDT.' and a 'reply' link. The second comment is 'Submitted by Mark on Fri, 07/13/2012 - 6:05am.' with the text 'yes..... I had to go into my BIOS and change the date somehow it changed back to 2006' and a 'reply' link.

- Customers having to reset their BIOS clock to access your site isn't a good look for a large bank

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

This can be generalised to almost any security service

A system should never announce that it's ready for operation until it's verified that it really is ready

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Run metasploit against your servers

```
root@gandalf:/home/test/framework-2.0 - Shell - Konsole
Session Edit View Bookmarks Settings Help

[nirvana@gandalf framework-2.0] /msfcli iis50_webdav_ntdll $
  Name: IIS 5.0 WebDAV ntdll.dll Overflow
  Version: $Revision: 1.23 $
  Target OS: win32
  Privileged: No

Provided By:
  H D Moore <hdm [at] metasploit.com> [Artistic License]

Available Targets:
  Windows 2000 Brute Force

Available Options:
  Exploit:  Name      Default  Description
  optional  SSL        Use SSL
  required  RHOST     The target address
  required  RPORT     80        The target port


Payload Information:
  Space: 512
  Avoid: 13 characters

Description:
  This

References:
  http://www.osvdb.org/4467
  http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/MS03-007.aspx
  http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2003-0109
```

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

If your IDS tells you this ...



... then you've wasted your money

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Drop the EICAR test file on every machine you have



If you get this, you need a new A/V product


## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Regenerate your SSH server keys

```
kcave@phenominal-debian: ~
kcave@phenominal-debian:~$ ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa.example -C "Example SSH Key"
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/kcave/.ssh/id_rsa.example.
Your public key has been saved in /home/kcave/.ssh/id_rsa.example.pub.
The key fingerprint is:
bb:a2:ad:bd:2a:5d:ce:0e:90:71:52:eb:44:75:3d:c4 Example SSH Key
The key's randomart image is:
+--[ RSA 2048 ]-----+
  o..+.
  o+ . E
  B
  o . S
  .+.
  .++
  .+=0.
+-----+
kcave@phenominal-debian:~$
```

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Getting this isn't a good sign



```
jsmith@mydomain.com:~  
Using username "jsmith".  
Authenticating with public key "dsa-key-20080119"  
Last login: Tue Jul 15 09:08:39 2008 from 70.141.207.75  
[jsmith@havenshade ~]$
```

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

This could be a sign of an existing compromise

- You're connecting to a MITM
- MITM forwards the connecting to the actual server, suppressing the key-changed warning

As for the SSL loopback, checking this ensures that your view of what the server serves up is the same as the rest of the world's view

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)


But to do this we'd need to perform the checking from an external site! How can we do that?



- You'd think that someone would have thought about this sort of thing already...

## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Leverage the synergy of the cloud!



## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)


Make your security mechanisms part of an autonomous, self-evaluating system

- Mindlessly repeating boring tasks is what computers are there for
- No need to have humans checking and re-checking the controls



## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

Admittedly autonomous systems can be taken a bit too far if you're not careful...



## Measurement for Security Assurance (ctd)

### Summary

If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it

— Lord Kelvin (perhaps)

You can't manage what you can't measure

— Management books

If you can't measure it, you don't even know whether it's working or not

— Me, paraphrasing someone possibly paraphrasing  
Lord Kelvin

If you *don't* measure it, you won't even know whether it's working or not

— Me, corollary to the above