379
N81
NO, 683

CONFLICT IN THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV: DOSTOEVSKY'S IDEA OF THE ORIGIN OF SIN

THESIS

Presented to the Graduate Council of the
University of North Texas in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

By

Linda T. Kraeger, B.S., M.B.A.
Denton, Texas
August, 1992

Kraeger, Linda T., Conflict in The Brothers Karamazov: Dostoevsky's Idea of the Origin of Sin. Master of Arts (English), August, 1992, 94 pp., works cited, 34 titles.

The thesis systematically explicates Dostoevsky's portrayal of the origin of human evil on earth through the novel The Brothers Karamazov. Drawing from the novel and from Augustine, Pelagius, and Luther, the explication compares and contrasts Dostoevsky's doctrine of original conflict against the three theologians' views of original sin. Following a brief summary of the three earlier theories of original sin, the thesis describes Dostoevsky's peculiar doctrine of Karamazovism and his unique account of how human evil originated. Finally, the thesis shows how suffering, love, and guilt grow out of the original conflict and how the image of Christ serves as an icon of the special kind of social unity projected by Zosima the Elder in The Brothers Karamazov.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Chapter

I. OVERVIEW 1

II. THREE VIEWS OF THE ORIGIN OF SIN 8

III. KARAMAZOVISM: A CURSE AND A BLESSING IN SOME FAMILIES 29

IV. ORIGINAL CONFLICT: A BROADER VIEW OF SIN 49

V. FREEDOM, SUFFERING, AND LOVE: THE RESULTS OF ORIGINAL CONFLICT 65

VI. CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF SUFFERING AND THE UNIFYING POWER OF LOVE 81

WORKS CITED 91

CHAPTER I

OVERVIEW

For Augustine, sin entered the human race through the fall of Adam and Eve. After the Fall, the soul took an inferior position to the flesh, so that even in procreation the sin of lust or concupiscence predominates and transmits itself to the new generation. In each new generation, therefore, sin exists perpetually under the conditions of lust and sensuality. This transmission of sin, called original sin, means that each infant is born into a state of sin and thus becomes a part of the "mass of perdition." Adam is treated as the whole of humanity to the extent that in his sin all sin. Only through the Second Adam (Christ) can a believer restrain this inherited disease of the soul and eventually purge it from his or her life.

As will be shown later, Dostoevsky appears to restrict his view of original sin, or original pride and sensuality, to the Karamazov men and similar deposits of sensuality. In this way, Dostoevsky seems to adopt a kind of Augustinian doctrine, but he limits it to a special number of vile and tainted families. It is a kind of curse. The broader view of sin that seems to prevail in The Brothers Karamazov[1] may be characterized, not as original sin, but as original and inevitable conflict among finite mortals. The whole novel

appears to serve as a laboratory designed to spell out this thesis in rich detail, showing not only the inevitability of the conflict but also the sin and immorality that conflict invariably generates. Earthly existence requires living in conflict and contradiction, and from this condition emerges human evil.

Paradoxically, the state of original conflict gives birth also to the possibility of human freedom and the love that freedom makes possible. Specifically, without conflict, no suffering would occur; and without suffering, apparently no occasion for human love would emerge. Between the suffering and the possibility of love lies freedom, without which human love would amount to nothing more than the instinctive affection exemplified by animals to their young and to their mates. In The Brothers Karamazov, the cockroach and the insect represent blind passion and sensuality below the level of freedom and love. Only human beings can move beyond reaction to the point of free action. Consequently, the fall of humankind emerges in the state of conflict that allows humankind to rise above the animal. The fall and the ascendancy go hand in hand.

For Ivan, the original conflict generates such overwhelming suffering and agony, especially for children, that he deems the world unworthy of God. Alyosha, by contrast, believes that the only answer to the suffering arising from the conflict is the unifying power of love.

Unquestionably, the Elder Zosima envisions a utopia in the form of a com-unity that will somehow so overcome all estrangement, alienation, and conflict that all the contradictions and clashes of earthly existence will eventually be justified and will manifest the beauty and goodness of the Creator. For Dostoevsky, life cannot be life without passion--"the sticky little leaves . . . [and] the blue sky" (230; bk. 5, ch. 3). In short, it must have richness of content, which is to say that any unity that drains off the passion and richness of life is a mere anemic abstraction, a ballet of bloodless categories worthy neither of God nor his free creatures. Conflict and suffering, therefore, enrich the whole. The suffering in The Brothers Karamazov, neither a hapless nor an expendable byproduct, belongs to God's world; and without it creation as a whole would be less beautiful and good.

Drawing on these preliminary remarks, I will argue that as a major theme Fyodor Dostoevsky presents in The Brothers Karamazov an explanation of the origin of sin that differs significantly from that of Augustine, Luther, or Pelagius. Also, I will argue that Dostoevsky's novel depicts his explanation of the origin of sin, original conflict, as giving birth to the possibility of human freedom and the unifying power of love.

Chapter Two presents three views of the origin of sin with which to compare and contrast Dostoevsky's concept of

original sin and of original conflict as depicted in The Brothers Karamazov. For Pelagius, the soul at birth stands as a pure and fresh, unpolluted river, fed only by the purest of streams. From that point forward, the soul has the free will to choose the direction of its flow down either a path of goodness or a path of evil. For Augustine, two springs initially nourish the river: (1) beauty and goodness, the image of God, and (2) original evil. Pride and concupiscence block the flow of goodness, and the river becomes increasingly polluted. For Luther, after Adam only the evil source feeds the river until grace intervenes. An individual has no freedom to choose either a path of goodness or one of evil.

Chapter Three explores the tainted curse of some families like the Karamazovs. Like Augustine, Dostoevsky seems to believe in some form of biologically transmitted sin. For example, Dostoevsky portrays the Karamazov brothers as inheriting their capacity for evil from their father Fyodor. And, in concert with Augustine's beliefs, pride appears as the Karamazov's prominent sin, followed immediately by concupiscence.

Chapter Four describes Dostoevsky's broader view of sin, original conflict[2], as depicted in The Brothers Karamazov. Contradictions such as pride versus humility and passionless intellect versus active love abound in the novel. This chapter will attempt to support the contention

that the contradictions arise naturally when humans interact. In the monastery, by living with the Elder in a life of contemplation, Alyosha hopes to reduce the conflict that leads to sin. Soon he discovers that pride and other forms of tainted conflict have invaded the monastery. Like Martin Luther, Father Zosima believes that Christians should go out into the world where they can "serve and be of use" (77; bk. 2, ch. 7). Subsequently, Alyosha encounters perpetual contradiction.

Chapter Five presents each of the three Karamazov brothers in the throes of freedom, suffering, and love, all of which derive from the conflicts they experience. Drawing largely on "The Grand Inquisitor," this chapter describes Ivan's concept of freedom as a burden to mankind. Rather than see innocent children suffer, Ivan would prefer that God had constructed a world without the freedom to choose goodness or evil. Consequently, Ivan rejects God's world, denies responsibility for his brothers, and never finds love. By contrast, Dmitri, while initially consumed by pride and lust, eventually finds love because he accepts the fact that through his choices in interacting and conflicting with others he shares the common guilt and the suffering that follows. Finally, Dostoevsky's hero, Alyosha, the first of the brothers in the novel to find salvation, draws on the image of God, beginning with childhood memories, to choose to love and serve his brothers.

Chapter Six concludes the thesis by developing the relationship that The Brothers Karamazov portrays between suffering and the unifying power of love. Through Dmitri and Alyosha, Dostoevsky argues that when a person freely chooses to accept his or her guilt for others and suffers for it, the world grows more peaceful and unified. The common river of man, beginning with the flow from the stream of goodness, cleanses itself. And, if everyone would accept the common guilt and suffer for it, the river would become pure. The image and example of Christ who, though innocent, accepted the common guilt and sacrificed his life for human sin serves as the supreme icon in the heart and mind of every believer.

Notes

1. All references to the text of The Brothers Karamazov are from the Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky translation (North Point Press, 1990) and will be indicated by a parenthetical citation of the page number followed by the book number and chapter number.
2. This refers to a definition of original sin given by B. F. Skinner on page 104 of Walden Two.

CHAPTER II

THREE VIEWS OF THE ORIGIN OF SIN

A discussion of three views of the origin of sin will act as a backdrop to an interpretation of a major theme in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov:

1. Pelagius' conviction that sin accrues from social habit, not from an inherently bad nature,
2. St. Augustine's contention that sin originates in everyone through biological transmission, though some goodness in the form of the image of God remains, and
3. Martin Luther's belief that everyone inherits a totally sinful nature.

Like Dostoevsky, the particular way in which each of these men defines the origin of sin seems also to have an impact on his view of other critical matters, such as free will, the image of God, divine grace, pride, and concupiscence.

Two ancient views of depravity, distributed versus absolute, form a foundation for contrasting the opinions of Pelagius, Augustine, and Luther on the origin of sin. According to distributed depravity, sin touches and infects every aspect of human life. Corruption permeates not only the entire race, including every individual, but every aspect of each individual's life. No part of human

existence, including body and soul, escapes the plague of sin.

According to the doctrine of absolute corruption, on the other hand, not only does depravity stain every facet of human life, but it corrupts every aspect to the fullest, leaving no thread of goodness and blowing out like a candle whatever goodness once existed in the human race. Nothing remains but the absolute and total darkness of sin. Not only is there none righteous, no not one, but the spark of righteousness has been obliterated from human nature.

Unfortunately, the world lost many of Pelagius' writings because of his condemnation by Bishop Zosimus of Rome in A.D. 416 (Lehmann 205). We know that he was a monk, British or perhaps Irish, "of excellent repute, much learning, and great moral earnestness, who had settled in Rome. . . . With the East generally, and in agreement with many in the West, he held to the freedom of the human will. 'If I ought, I can,' well expresses his position" (Walker 185).

Although he portrays evil as widely distributed throughout many if not most members of the human race, Pelagius seems to disagree with both of the two ancient doctrines of depravity: distributed depravity and absolute corruption. According to Williston Walker, Pelagius "recognized that the mass of men are bad. Adam's sin set them an ill example, which they have been quick to follow.

Hence they almost all need to be set right" (185-6). Nevertheless, on the question of human depravity and free will, Pelagius and the African bishop Augustine lock horns. According to Pelagius, the pervasiveness of human sin around the world comes about through the misuse of the individual's free will. He questions the rationale behind holding people morally responsible for what they lack the capacity to achieve. Consequently, he sees mankind as born with a free will so powerful that each individual can always choose either in the direction of goodness and holiness or in the direction of evil and corruption. Sin pervades the world not because of some primitive deposit of evil in the stream of human life, but because over the years each individual has chosen immorality and in so doing has personally accumulated a backlog of evil.

Pelagius apparently believed that Augustine had generated a doctrine of original sin that caused two severe theological problems. First, he viewed Augustinianism as undercutting free will and therefore human responsibility. Second, he thought Augustinianism unwittingly made God the culprit. If mankind is born without the capacity for both choosing a life of holiness and rejecting immorality, the pervasiveness of evil lies at the Creator's doorstep (Lehmann 211).

A somewhat atomistic view of the self lies in the background of Pelagius' idea of sin, the opposite of the

position taken by Father Zosima in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov. As a radical pluralist, Pelagius views the individual as relatively disconnected from other individuals. This is true, however, only in one crucial respect. Without denying that each individual's life had far-reaching impact on the lives of others, Pelagius seems to assume that the individual, a moral island, must harbor his or her own responsibility for holiness. Otherwise, the whole idea of culpability and righteousness will break down. In short, for Pelagius, righteousness is radically individualized. The human race does not sin, but individuals do. Indeed, immorality accrues from holding individuals morally responsible for the sins of others, allowing each individual to shift moral blame to others. From mankind's pagan past had come the bad "social habit" of misplacing culpability, which resulted in the pain felt in the world (Brown 349). Pelagius finds morally repulsive the idea of treating the entire human race as one individual smeared with collective guilt.

Like Augustine, Pelagius holds that God created each human in his own image. For Pelagius, however, this image endures unobstructed after the Fall, for nothing exemplifies the image more than free will, a capacity unique to humans because God created no other species in his image.

The analogy of a river coursing its way through the terrain can throw considerable light on the similarities and

differences among Pelagius, Augustine, Luther, and eventually Dostoevsky. For Pelagius, each human, like a self-directing river, determines his or her own course. Veering in one direction, a person chooses to run through the terrain of holiness and righteousness, making the river itself increasingly pure and sanctified. Electing the opposite course, however, guides one's life through the terrain of vileness, perversity, and corruption. In time, this direction succeeds only in polluting the river, making it more difficult, though never impossible, to change course. The possibility of changing directions is the image of God in all its force. Without this possibility, the image of God is, for Pelagius, mere words.

Williston Walker states that Pelagius did embrace the concept of grace, "but to him grace was remission of sins in baptism and general divine teaching. To Augustine the main work of grace was that infusion of love by which character is gradually transformed" (186). Consequently, in their theological quarrel, Pelagius and Augustine disagreed not about the existence of divine grace, but about the way grace and human freedom interacted. For Pelagius, divine grace could never replace free will, but rather showed itself to be grace by respecting free will. Grace lies, at the same time, always available for both sinners and believers. It functions as the available terrain of goodness through which the river may travel. In doing so, the river receives from

grace all the purity and goodness that Christian doctrine has extolled. Grace, however, does not determine the path the river will take. Grace is not irresistible.

Pelagius disagreed vehemently with Augustine on the issue of the biological transmission of sin through the sexual act. Paul Lehmann notes that Pelagius saw as contrary to everyday experience the idea that infants sin.

> To focus the whole human and religious problem upon a biologically transmitted predisposition of sin . . . not only undermined the theory and practice of infant baptism but called in question the institution of marriage as well. (212)

Pelagius' principal opponent, St. Augustine (A.D. 354--A.D. 430), a North African, "the father of Latin Theology, the progenitor of the major ideas and terminology of medieval Catholicism . . . is also a kind of spiritual grandfather to Luther and the Protestant Reformers, whom he profoundly influenced" (Cole 43). According to Peter Brown, St. Augustine wrote his Confessions as an "analysis of the 'heart'," in which he states that he had witnessed jealousy and anger even in innocent-looking babies. Their innocence stemmed not from a lack of will, but from a lack of strength (28-9).

Augustine portrays the human race as a "'mass of perdition'" (Walker 181). In some sense, he views the first couple as the whole human race, so that when Adam and Eve

sinned, the human race sinned. In The City of God, Augustine writes, "Among the terrestrial animals man was made by Him in His own image, and . . . was made one individual, though he was not left alone. For there is nothing so social by nature, so unsocial by its corruption, as this race" (The City of God, 359). More specifically, Augustine advances the distributive version of depravity. Every human being is born into sin and is guilty. This is original sin. Augustine did not, however, embrace the notion of absolute corruption in the sense that each aspect of every individual stands one hundred percent corrupt. All the same, the weight of depravity presses so heavily that no sinner can of his or her own initiative change course. While there remains a perpetual restlessness in the individual as a testimony to a life better than perversity, no one can embark on a life of holiness and goodness apart from supernatural intervention from heaven.

Augustine rejects Pelagius' doctrine that one can be held responsible only for what one is capable of achieving. Augustine appears to embrace both a doctrine of free will and a doctrine of original sin that severely thwarts free will. Some interpreters see Augustine as a theologian of paradox at this point. His doctrine of predestination clearly comes down on the side of divine initiative, whereas Pelagius leaves initiative with the human individual. To be sure, for Pelagius, the original deposit of free will is a

divine work; but it remains an essential part of the "natural man." For Augustine, the "natural man" is in some sense no longer natural, but perverse because of Adam's sin.

If original sin brought about by the First Adam does in some way cause every individual thereafter to participate in sin to the point of depravity leading to damnation, what can be said of Augustine's notion of free will? Here the plot thickens. Aware that if he surrenders the doctrine of free will he will leave the cause of human sin at the doorstep of the Creator, Augustine tries to retain both free will and the majesty and goodness of God. He appears also to hold to the crucial importance of free will, not simply in rendering human beings responsible for their sins, but in advancing love. Without free will, human creatures could not love either God or other human beings; and human achievement would rise no higher than that of animal affection and desire. As discussed later, Dostoevsky's Father Zosima embraces a view quite similar to this, but with important shades of difference.

Augustine has a complicated, if not contradictory, doctrine of free will, incomprehensible apart from his view of the image of God in every person. Like Pelagius, he holds that the human race collectively and individually reflects the image of God. Also, with Pelagius, he regards free will as an element of that image.

Augustine elaborates on the image of God, seeing it as in some sense a reflection of the Trinity. The human self exemplifies a trinity of "memory, understanding, will, or the even more famous lover, loved, and love" (Walker 180). Augustine appears to see salvation as impossible without the image of God in his beloved creature because no residue would abide to be saved. Even after the Fall, each human being is, after all, still a human being, not an animal. The image of God in each individual causes him or her to suffer guilt after sinning. Sensing that the life currently led veers from his or her true destiny and fulfillment, the sinner, thanks to the image of God, sees that he or she lives a temporal, imperfect life, though God created him or her for eternity. Even when sinning, the individual cannot wholly thrive in his or her sin because the image of God generates a restlessness, a divine discontent. The life of the profligate Dmitri vividly exemplifies this theme in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov.

In Augustine's theology, pride appears as the most far-reaching and damning of sins. William Cole notes that Augustine in The City of God views original sin not as the sexual act, but "pride, which he defined as 'a perverse desire of elevation, forsaking Him to whom the soul ought to cleave as its beginning, and the making of one's self the one beginning'" (48). Pride, the sin of Adam of Eve, appears to turn even human sexuality into lust.

Unfortunately, pride seems to have many meanings or at least facets in Augustine's thought. One meaning appears to be a loss of perspective about oneself. In other words, in pride, the opposite of humility, a person makes claims that elevate him or her inordinately in the great chain of being. The chief sin seems to be that of exalting oneself in the place of God. This inappropriate status-juggling is defiance of one's position under God and the Church. Unbelief is the chief mark of pride for Augustine, who treats it as not mere suspension of belief or honest doubt, but belief in oneself as a God. When he condemns self-love as sinful, Augustine seems to imply that the sin lies in loving a distorted image of the self, so that the sin becomes not so much love per se but love misdirected. Etienne Gilson interprets Augustine on this issue as follows:

> No one will say that a person is ignorant of grammar because he does not think of it, or that a person does not know medicine because his attention is directed elsewhere. Thus it may be that when the soul looks for itself, this desire may originate in a memory of itself, hidden and unnoticed, which recalls it to itself and tries to make it find itself.

Gilson's interpretation of Augustine then asks whether the soul could forget itself. The soul cannot forget itself

if it places itself according to nature on the proper level of the chain of cosmic order (i.e., above bodies and beneath God).

> But as soon as it claims to be self-sufficient and to be responsible itself for the perfection it can receive only from God, it turns away from God towards the corporeal. The more it claims to grow in perfection the more it decreases, because once separated from God, its sole sufficiency, it cannot find sufficiency in itself, nor can any other thing satisfy it. (99)

Furthermore, Gilson states that for Augustine separation from God would cause the soul to live in constant turmoil, always seeking fulfillment but never attaining it.

> Although aware that the knowledge of the sensible will not meet its needs, it busies itself therewith, becomes dissatisfied even with the pleasure it derives therefrom, looks for other things which also fail to satisfy and which leave it rather hungrier than before and exhausts itself in a giddy pursuit of things which excite desire but fail to satisfy it. (99)

Finally, according to Gilson, Augustine believed that the image of God in the soul becomes clouded when the soul is enslaved by the excess of sensations. The pursuit of satisfaction, when deprived of God, turns sour.

> It [the soul] is present and vaguely known; it sees itself dimly through the veil of sensations which hide its true nature and simply tries to see itself more clearly. (100)

Concupiscence and lust for Augustine sometimes appear to be sexual desire itself; thus, Augustine condemns natural passion. Another interpretation, however, suggests that much of what troubled Augustine personally about sexual passion was its tendency to exalt itself over all else, thus making itself a god with a license to dominate and rule. When Augustine speaks of lust out of the control of reason, this may be interpreted to mean sexual passion unbridled, disconnected from the remaining human drives. According to William Cole, after the Fall, Adam and Eve no longer had "control of all of their faculties. . . . They were still able to control and direct their arms and legs and eyes, but their sexual organs acted independently. . ." (49-50). For Augustine, the "covering . . . of sensation with which it has become overlaid" obstructs the soul from seeing "its own nature" (Gilson 100). It is important to understand that even when a Manichee, Augustine had difficulty with lust. Apparently this was no academic problem only, but a personal crisis that he perhaps never resolved in his lifetime. It is fruitful to look upon The Brothers Karamazov as something of a literary laboratory in which intense personal struggles, as well as major theses of the Christian

tradition, are played out in the concrete lives of individuals like Dmitri, Ivan, and Alyosha.

In Augustine's scheme, pride appears to have something of an ontological or metaphysical ring. On the one hand, pride is an attempt to step out of one's ontological status, while, on the other hand, it is a kind of slide toward non-being. Here Augustine's Neoplatonic view comes into full play. Unwilling to follow the Manichees in giving evil a genuine ontological status, he was compelled by his mixture of monotheism and Neoplatonism to view evil as a derivative reality at best. He concludes that pride and all other sins infected by it are at heart a distancing of the soul from God (Goodness). Williston Walker elaborates:

> Man, according to Augustine, was created good and upright, possessed of free will, endowed with the possibility of not sinning and of immortality. There was no discord in his nature. He was happy and in communion with God. From this state Adam fell by sin, the essence of which was pride. Its consequence was the loss of good. (181)

If evil cannot under the rule of an omnipotent God obtain positive status, it can only have for Augustine something of a negating status. Augustine in defiance of his earlier Manichaeism seems forced to say that creation itself is good; therefore, if this is true, the existence of evil must in some sense be good. Augustine calls evil the

deprivation of good; that is, goodness in a deprived state, but nevertheless somehow a part of overall goodness. This concept emerges in The Brothers Karamazov when Ivan speaks of the ultimate harmony of all the contradictions. For Augustine, the contradictions are a part of the good, and yet for all that, sin is sufficient to damn great masses of human souls to endless torment. For Augustine, hell is the torment of the divine restlessness in the individual, a restlessness that never gains relief, but endures forever. Etienne Gilson interprets a belief held by Augustine as follows:

> Hidden somewhere in the memory must be the assurance that unless it [the soul] knows itself, it will never reach a certain goal which it ought to reach, a goal consequently of great excellence, namely peace, perfect security, in a word, happiness. (100)

Lust in the great scheme of things appears to be a type of theo-alchemy whereby sin as a disease of the soul is transmitted to the next generation, a spiritual Lamarckism that transmits original sin. The image of God is also transmitted in some sense, but the goodness and grace that come through the baptism of the parents is not transmitted by the parents but only through the means of the Church.

Augustine affirms both prevenient grace and irresistible grace. He believes that the two doctrines fit

hand in glove with the doctrine of original sin, the last doctrine leaving individuals lacking the ability to direct their lives into the territory of righteousness. For Augustine, an individual is not a self-directing river that can at will turn its course. Rather, the river comes already flowing. Into it flow from the beginning pure springs, which Augustine labels "the image of God." After the Fall, however, pride, concupiscence, and all the other sins pour in as pollutants to contaminate the river. The self is no longer pristine, but infected to the point that the sinner can no longer initiate repentance.

Augustine at this point is attempting to solve more than one problem; but in solving one, he makes it more difficult for the others. The problem is to explain the apparent loss that the Creator would experience in knowing that great masses will be doomed forever. If this doom extends beyond the pale of divine providence, however, so that God does not in some way bring it about, God's position as the Supreme Governor of the universe comes into question. Providence itself suffers a crack in the dike. By design, the doctrine of prevenient and irresistible grace maintains the doctrine of omnipotent Providence. Augustine could not bring himself to say that evil is somehow beyond the control of God or that it happened behind God's back without his awareness and will.

Predestination follows, Augustine appears to think, from the tenets of divine providence and omnipotence. In short, God not only knows what will happen so that nothing surprises him, but he foreordains all. If He foreordains all, He foreordains salvation for some and damnation for others. For God to avoid playing catch-up with his own creation, prevenient grace becomes necessary. The bishop cannot concede that Providence must wait upon human initiative before salvation can have a chance. Williston Walker explains Augustine's view as follows:

> This grace comes to those to whom God chooses to send it. He therefore predestinates whom He will, 'to punishment and to salvation.' The number of each class is fixed. Augustine had held, in the period immediately following his conversion, that it is in man's power to accept or reject grace, but even before the Pelagian controversy, he had come to the conclusion that grace is irresistible. (182)

Indeed, in Augustine's world, chance has no existence. All is of God, all planned, foreknown and predestined. God predestines not only the ends of his own counsel, but all the means and instruments by which the ends are to be attained. Free will, therefore, comes within the providence of God so that the will itself, which lies latent in human nature as a component of the image of God, can activate only

if touched by prevenient grace. But prevenient grace is also irresistible grace.

> Therefore assistance was bestowed on the weakness of man's will, that it might be unalterably and irresistibly influenced by divine grace; and that, weak as it was, it might still not fail nor be overcome by any adversity. So it came about that man's will, when weak and powerless, and as yet in a lowly state of good, still persevered, by God's strength, in that good; while the will of the first man, though strong and healthy, possessed of the power of free choice, and in a state of greater good, did not persevere in that good; and the reason was that though God's assistance was not lacking, it was the assistance without which it could not persevere even if it so willed, and not assistance of that kind by which God might work in man so to will. Doubtless to the strongest he vouchsafed to do what he willed; but for them that were weak he reserved his own gift whereby they should most irresistibly will what is good, and most irresistibly refuse to forsake it. (<u>De correptione et gratia</u> 79)

Augustine set for himself the task of holding on to absolute sovereignty, omnipotence, and omniscience for the Creator, on the one hand, and free will for the human

creature made in his own image, on the other hand. In the end, perhaps Augustine defined freedom more as unimpeded activity than as choice, since the unimpeded activity harmonizes more easily with the doctrine of predestination (City of God 617). In this way, once irresistible grace sets the elect on their course, they can proceed to their blissful end without fatal impediment from the powers of evil.

Though influenced strongly by Augustine, Martin Luther, some 1100 years after Augustine's death, embraced the absolute depravity view. Entering an Augustinian monastery in 1505 twelve years after his German birth, Luther sought to overcome two significant experiences: "the sudden death of a friend and . . . a narrow escape from lightening. . . " (Walker 337). While in the monastery, he developed his belief that mankind, a totally depraved species, had no free will from which to choose goodness. Ironically, some twelve years later, with no rebellious intention, the monk Luther stimulated the Protestant Reformation by pinning his "ninety-five theses on the theory and practice of indulgences" to "the door of the Castle church" in Wittenburg (Cole 100). He died in 1546, saddened that "the preaching of justification by faith" had not transformed "the social, civic, and political life about him. . . " (Walker 379).

For the Protestant reformer of Germany, every member of the human race is corrupted in every aspect of life and to the fullest. Adam and Eve infected the entire human race, Adam serving as something of a federal head representing all. The Natural Man after the Fall does evil because it is his nature. Indeed, for some Protestant scholars in Luther's tradition, the sin of the human race spread out across the earth and entered the animal kingdom.

According to Luther, even though mankind can create social good in the practical sense on earth, in the eyes of God, human goodness counts for nothing, since it rises from the sin of pride. All our deeds of righteousness are as filthy rags (Luther 296, 312).

For Luther, free will after the Fall is in bondage. The individual's rescue from total depravity requires an act initiated outside human nature. The river at the source was pure and untainted, but once the pollutants, beginning with Adam, poured into the river, all was lost. Not even one clear stream of free will remains, which means that no individual has any power to initiate a life of goodness. Only a supernatural influx of grace can create free will in the fallen creature (Luther 104-05).

Natural Man after the Fall walks in the gloom of depravity without one flicker of the divine image. "Nature, reason, intellect, works, all failed. . . " (Marty 215). If for Augustine the divine image in fallen man is distorted,

for Luther it is annihilated. Every move toward righteous goals is corrupted and wholly without merit. For all practical purposes, the Natural Man, wholly without worth and his doom certain, stands without hope (Luther 317).

For Luther, divine grace is an act of creation, not merely a cleansing process. The sinner, having nothing to commend himself or herself, lacks all capacity to initiate any change leading to God. Grace, therefore, must <u>create</u> the capacity itself. And this process is close to creation out of nothing. Discriminatory election obviously follows, since many go unsaved. Luther professed not to know why God chooses some to receive mercy and others damnation. It is ultimately and inexplicably of God's own free will in grace (Luther 314-15).

Luther seemed to look at the caste system implied in Augustine's Neoplatonism as a form of sinful pride. He shook the great chain of being. This is not to say that Luther advanced a democratic view of the state, but rather that he advanced a view that allowed the believers to regard their calling as sacred. He gave no special awards to the life of celibacy or monasticism. Christians were called to live in the world and to function in the world. Luther believed that "the normal trades and occupations of life" were essentially good and that "all believers are priests" (Walker 344). This doctrine appears to have influenced Dostoevsky to such an extent that the Elder Zosima urges his

disciple Alyosha to leave the monastery in order to do his good deeds in the world (77; bk. 2, ch. 7). The Elder has a very complicated and subtle position on the monastic life that is neither Augustine's nor Luther's position. In the monastery, the pride of Dostoevsky's Father Ferapont is graphically portrayed, suggesting with an ironic touch that pride can infect the life purported to be dedicated to the cultivation of humility (163-71; bk. 4, ch. 1).

Luther's view of concupiscence and lust is a mixed bag, portraying marriage as a high calling and placing no stock in celibacy. But in his theology the place of sexuality beyond the purpose of procreation and in the overall economy of God becomes lost in obscurity if not contradiction.

From this Christian heritage, Dostoevsky presents a view of the origin of sin that matches that of none of these men. Unlike Pelagius, Dostoevsky believes in some form of biological transmission of sin, but he confines it to the special case of Karamazovism. Unlike Augustine and Luther, Dostoevsky seems to believe more in mankind's ability to influence the good and bad contents of the river.

CHAPTER III

KARAMAZOVISM: A CURSE AND A BLESSING IN SOME FAMILIES

Throughout The Brothers Karamazov appears a phenomenon that deserves the term "Karamazovism," a curse and a blessing that distinguish some members of the human race from all other members. Professor Victor Terras defines it as "a faculty for going 'all the way' in everything" (A Karamazov Companion 102). Robert Belknap defines it as the thirst for life combined with the capacity for vileness (30). F. F. Seely characterizes the Karamazov brothers as sensualists, "greedy for life," not as voluptuaries like Fyodor, whose lusts have devoured his ability to love (123). Ironically, the blood inherited from Fyodor flows within the Karamazov brothers whose Karamazovism represents an intensified condensation of Dostoevsky's beloved Russian people.

The essence of Karamazovism lies in the individual's having been saddled with an excessive endowment of humanity, including pride and concupiscence. Karamazovism, the curse of being human in all its wildness and unrestrained passion, appears not so much the curse of original sin portrayed by Augustine or Luther as the curse of receiving the full cup of life from which to drink. In itself neither wholly good nor wholly evil, Karamazovism comprises the full potential

for either in all its fury. The oldest brother, Dmitri, says to Alyosha, the youngest:

> "And all of us Karamazovs are like that, and in you, an angel, the same insect [of sensuality] lives and stirs up storms in your blood. Storms, because sensuality is a storm, more than a storm! Beauty is a fearful and terrible thing! Fearful because it's undefinable, and it cannot be defined, because here God gave us only riddles."
> (108; bk. 3, ch. 3)

Significantly, this confession from the mouth of Dmitri occurs in the chapter entitled "The Confession of an Ardent Heart. In Verse," located in Book Three entitled "The Sensualists." By identifying Karamazovs with the insect, Dmitri focuses on pre-rational passion or sensuality, life before the constraints of the intellect have come upon it, life without evaluation and in its raw stage. Dmitri uses beauty to describe this sensuality both in its intensity and scope. In scope, it ranges from the ideal of the Madonna to the ideal of Sodom. The heart blazes with both ideals, so much so that Dmitri cries out:

> "No, man is broad, even too broad, I would narrow him down. Devil knows even what to make of him, that's the thing! What's shame

> for the mind is beauty all over for the heart." (108; bk. 3, ch. 3)

In the pre-rational heart, beauty exists even in Sodom, for it embraces not only fear, but also mystery. The heart emerges as the battlefield where the Devil struggles with God (108; bk. 3, ch. 3).

Karamazovism, life in its extremities, a laceration, an unbridled energy, teems to the point of erupting from within and contains all human contradictions and absurdities. Ivan describes this phenomenon when he tells Alyosha:

> "And observe, that cruel people--passionate, carnivorous, Karamazovian--sometimes love children very much. . . . I knew a robber in prison: he happened, in the course of his career, while slaughtering whole families in the houses he broke into and robbed at night, to have put the knife to several children as well. But he showed a strange affection for them while he was in prison." (238; bk. 5, ch. 4)

Karamazovism contrasts with its exact opposite, the Laodicean syndrome of lukewarmness, of being neither hot nor cold, for which the Christ of the New Testament Apocalypse spews the Laodicean Church out of his mouth (Rev. 3:15). No Laodicean, Alyosha always loves in an active manner that cannot bear uncertainty (187; bk. 4, ch. 5). According to the Protestant theologian Daniel Williams, Augustine thought

that understanding required belief (6). Likewise, according to the Roman Catholic philosopher Etienne Gilson, Augustine saw understanding as the reward of faith (Reason 19). If Augustine meant by belief whole-hearted commitment and passionate devotion, the Karamazovism exhibited in Alyosha stems from Augustinian roots. Thus, Karamazovism harbors not only the depravity, cruelty and shame that Dmitri professes as his lot, but the love that the oldest son believes God foreordained for Alyosha. Believing that he, too, participates in the extremes of Karamazovism, Alyosha tells Dmitri that they are the same.

> [Dmitri asks,] "You? Well, that's going a bit too far."
>
> "No, not too far," Alyosha said hotly. (Apparently the thought had been with him for some time.) "The steps are the same. I'm on the lowest, and you are above, somewhere on the thirteenth. That's how I see it, but it's all one and the same, all exactly the same sort of thing. Whoever steps on the lowest step will surely step on the highest."
>
> "So one had better not step at all."
>
> "Not if one can help it."
>
> "Can you?"
>
> "It seems not." (109-10; bk. 3, ch. 4)

Apparently, Alyosha agrees with Dmitri that Karamazovism is bestowed upon some but not all members of the race.

The Brothers Karamazov does not reveal Alyosha as one given to cruelty, shame, and depravity. While Alyosha's doubts after the Elder's "odor of corruption" prime him for an evening of debauchery at Grushenka's, his brief plunge ends abruptly the minute Grushenka shows him the slightest empathy.

> "The elder Zosima died!" Grushenka exclaimed. "Oh, Lord, I didn't know!" She crossed herself piously. "Lord, but what am I doing now, sitting on his lap!" She suddenly gave a start as if in fright, jumped off his knees at once, and sat down on the sofa. Alyosha gave her a long, surprised look, and something seemed to light up in his face. (351; bk. 7, ch. 3)

Commenting that he had come to Grushenka's "looking for a wicked soul," Alyosha concludes that he instead "found a true sister . . . a loving soul" (351; bk. 7, ch. 3). This would seem to suggest that, in fact, he does not participate fully in Karamazovism. To draw this conclusion, however, would be premature. Dostoevsky himself makes it clear in "From the Author" immediately before plunging into the story that while he has only one "biography," with Alyosha as its hero, he has two novels: the first, The Brothers Karamazov; the second, a future saga to take place thirteen years after

the first. Unfortunately, Dostoevsky died before completing his vision of the" main novel" (3; from the author). According to a March 25, 1870, letter written by Dostoevsky, he planned to write a novel as large and sweeping as War and Peace, with The Brothers Karamazov apparently serving as an earlier stage of this vision ("To Apollan" 190-2). In a March 24, 1870, letter, he proposed to title the sweeping novel "The Life-Story of a Great Sinner" ("To Nikolay" 187).

In some ways, for a life at the Karamazov level of wildness (i.e., untamed wilderness), all things are possible, everything lawful, for there is no law, no logos, "no meaning."

> "There is a force that will endure everything," said Ivan, this time with a cold smirk.
>
> "What force?" [asked Alyosha.]
>
> "The Karamazov force . . . the force of the Karamazov baseness."
>
> "To drown in depravity, to stifle your soul with corruption, is that it?"
>
> "That, too, perhaps . . . only until my thirtieth year maybe I'll escape it, and then . . ."
>
> "How will you escape it? By means of what? With your thoughts, it's impossible."
>
> "Again, in Karamazov fashion."

> "You mean 'everything is permitted'? Everything is permitted, is that right, is it?" (263; bk. 5, ch. 5)

Yet, ironically, this primordial surge brings meaning to life, for without it existence fades into abstraction and passionless nonentity. The middle brother, Ivan, insists that from this cup, this life of the blue sky and the sticky leaves in the spring, he will drink until at least the age of thirty.

> "I've asked myself many times: is there such despair in the world as could overcome this wild and perhaps indecent thirst for life in me, and have decided that apparently there is not--that is, once again, until my thirtieth year, after which I myself shall want no more, so it seems to me." (230; bk. 5, ch. 3)

Evidently, the Karamazov storm has enveloped Ivan. Even though Dmitri sometimes emphasizes the Karamazov curse as one of lechery and baseness, Ivan calls it the thirst for life and says to Alyosha that it resides in him, too. For that reason, Ivan does not reduce it to baseness, but calls it a centrifugal force on our planet and identifies it with the sticky leaves, the blue sky, persons whom he cherishes, and with the love of some "without even knowing why." (230; bk. 5, ch. 3). Even if no logic supports wanting to

continue living, "to honor one's heart" Ivan will go on despite logic. Alyosha agrees:

> "I understand it all too well, Ivan: to want to love with your insides, your guts--you said it beautifully, and I'm terribly glad that you want so much to live. . . . I think that everyone should love life before everything else in the world." (230-31; bk. 5, ch. 3)

To this, Ivan asks, "Love life more than its meaning" (231; bk. 5, ch. 3)? In one of his most philosophical moments, Alyosha states that love supersedes logic, and that only then can one understand the meaning of life. Ivan and Alyosha agree on this first half. On the second half, the resurrection, a continued existence and a never-extinguished thirst for life, Ivan disagrees. He does not believe in the order of life, he claims; and by this, he means in part that he does not believe in immortality. At the same time, a part of him does believe in the ongoing of life, but he refuses to approve of it because the contradictions and wildness bring too much suffering, especially to the children:

> "It's not God that I do not accept, you understand, it is this world of God's, created by God, that I do not accept and cannot agree to accept. With one reservation: I have a childlike conviction that the sufferings will be healed and

> smoothed over, that the whole offensive comedy of human contradictions will disappear like a pitiful mirage, a vile concoction of man's Euclidean mind, feeble and puny as an atom, and that ultimately, at the world's finale, in the moment of eternal harmony, there will occur and be revealed something so precious that it will suffice for all hearts, to allay all indignation, to redeem all human villainy, all bloodshed; it will suffice not only to make forgiveness possible, but also to justify everything that has happened with men--let this, let all this come true and be revealed, but I do not accept it and do not want to accept it! Let the parallel lines even meet before my own eyes: I shall look and say, yes, they meet, and still I will not accept it. That is my essence, Alyosha, that is my thesis." (235-6; bk. 5, ch. 3)

Ironically, Alyosha's gospel of immortality itself exemplifies Karamazovism, life at the extremities, going all the way. Despite Ivan's skepticism, the murder of his father, the shameless bickering and envy in the monastery, and all the other outrageous slings and arrows unveiled in the novel, Alyosha emphatically maintains, "Certainly we shall rise, certainly we shall see and gladly, joyfully tell one another all that has been" (776; epilogue, ch. 3). This makes the hero of the novel more fully a Karamazov than

either Ivan or Dmitri, although The Brothers Karamazov does not complete Alyosha's story.

Rakitin, a somewhat cynical seminarian with expediency as his modus operandi, looks upon Karamazovism as lechery, murder, and baseness. Indeed, according to Michael Holquist, Rakitin affirms a proto-Freudian doctrine of the primal horde when he says to Alyosha that his house stinks of crime. Embodying sensuality and a devouring fever, Fyodor, the Karamazovs' father and a tribal despot, dominates his sons and mistreats their mothers (178-80).

Dmitri, on the other hand, contends that while "base and vile," he still carries the capacity to love God and to enjoy, since indeed he is a child of God (107; bk. 3, ch. 3). For Dmitri, Karamazovism means falling into the abyss, heels up, pleased to fall, finding beauty in his humiliation. At the very moment of shame, however, he begins a hymn. Though base and vile, he kisses the hem that clothes God. Though following the Devil, he prays, "I am also your son, Lord, and I love you, and I feel a joy without which the world cannot stand and be" (107; bk. 3, ch. 3). Whereas Ivan insists that the world stands on absurdities and contradictions, Dmitri, while not denying this view, insists that the world cannot stand without joy. For him, joy functions as the mainspring of the whole, the brimming cup.

To think of the Karamazov storm as welling up solely from within individuals as if they led isolated, insulated lives would be a mistake. Life, and therefore baseness and love, springs into existence only through interaction and interrelationships. Karamazovism, a family curse, gives rise to the possibility of both damnation and salvation. When people fail to transform life's interactions into love, they experience damnation on earth. A second mistake, however, comes from thinking of love as some kind of essence that the individual either inhales or exudes. It is nothing if not a way of relating and interacting, a way of confessing, forgiving, and, above all, of being forgiven. Forgiveness begins with confessing one's pride and baseness and ends with the restoration to good favor.

Father Zosima, who perhaps represents more than anyone Dostoevsky's own theological perspective, insists that the believer must beg the forgiveness of birds and other creatures of the earth, since love requires an all-inclusive relationship with the world. When Zosima's brother insists that he finds life a paradise, he has in mind the recognition of all creatures as manifestations of divine glory and the acceptance of such creatures in the spirit of forgiveness and humility. "Let me be sinful before everyone, but so that everyone will forgive me, and that is paradise. Am I not in paradise now" (290; bk. 6, ch. 2)?

Dostoevsky's metaphysics, intimately binding God and creation, leans much more toward pantheism than toward the extreme dualism of the Western Church. Dostoevsky appears to view the earth as in some sense an incarnation of God and the Russian people and the soil itself as a special repository of divinity. In an earlier novel, Dostoevsky develops more thoroughly the theme of Russia as the "only God-bearing nation on earth, destined to regenerate and save the world" (The Possessed 234). Karamazovism represents a special condensation of the Russian people, a more intensified version that reveals Russian extremes. Therefore, both a curse and a blessing, Karamazovism acts as the full repository of life itself, God's greatest gift.

The logic of Dostoevsky's metaphysics progresses from the world in general to Russia and then to Karamazovism.[1] As if Russia were the soul of the planet, the phrase "the Russian Christ" resounds with a special cosmic meaning for Dostoevsky. Smerdyakov, who hates Russia, dreams of leaving Russia and becoming a Frenchman. By contrast, Dmitri exclaims, "I love Russia, Alexei, I love the Russian God, though I myself am a scoundrel" (764; epilogue, ch. 2).

For Dostoevsky, a philosopher first and foremost loves to contemplate the eternal question that Russian boys constantly entertain. While in jail, Dmitri refers to the Karamazovs and all "real Russians" as philosophers, not scoundrels, in contrast to Rakitin, who is the soul of

expediency and opportunism. Rakitin is not a philosopher despite all his pretensions (588; bk. 11, ch. 4). Dmitri confesses to Alyosha that perhaps he was drinking and fighting and raging because of unknown ideas storming inside him. He was struggling to quell them, confessing, "I'm tormented by God" (592; bk. 11, ch. 4). Dmitri himself, becoming a new man toward the end of the novel, confesses that he had ached for some time to speak to Alyosha and that he had kept silent too long about the eternal question.

> "I've been waiting till this last time to pour out my soul to you. Brother, in these past two months [in prison] I've sensed a new man in me, a new man has arisen in me! He was shut up inside me, but if it weren't for this thunderbolt, he would never have appeared. Frightening! What do I care if I spend twenty years pounding out iron ore in the mines, I'm not afraid of that at all, but I'm afraid of something else now: that this risen man not depart from me!" (591; bk. 11, ch. 4)

He goes on to speak of a suffering consciousness and a resurrected hero even in the bowels of the earth and breaks out with a new view of the world that in some ways resembles Zosima's.

> "And there are many of them [i.e., convicts], there are hundreds, and we're all guilty for them! Why did I have a dream about a 'wee one' at such a

> moment? 'Why is the wee one poor?' It was a prophecy to me at that moment! It's for the 'wee one' that I will go. Because everyone is guilty for everyone else. . . . All people are 'wee ones.' And I'll go for all of them, because there must be someone who will go for all of them." (591; bk. 11, ch. 4)

The emerging Dmitri grows pale, and tears pour from his eyes when he exclaims that life is full even underground. "You wouldn't believe, Alexei, how I want to live now, what thirst to exist and be conscious has been born in me precisely within these peeling walls" (592; bk. 11, ch. 4)! He proclaims that because he suffers he exists. He exists because he believes in a world beyond the atomistic self.

For Karamazovs like Dmitri and Alyosha, no philosophy can exist except through ecstasy. Neither pure subjectivism nor the atom gushing in its own limited walls, ecstasy is the doorway to heaven itself. Through ecstasy, the vision of pantheism grows stronger and clearer, for the wall separating nature from grace seems artificial. Thus, when Zosima and people like him fall in love with the earth and kiss it, they are in love with God and are kissing the bosom of Mother Earth.

> "Love all of God's creation, both the whole of it and every grain of sand. Love every leaf, every ray of God's light. Love animals, love plants,

> love each thing. If you love each thing, <u>you will perceive the mystery of God in things</u> [italics added]. Once you have perceived it, you will begin tirelessly to perceive more and more of it every day. And you will come at last to love the whole world with an entire, universal love."
> (319; bk. 6, ch. 3)

The youngest Karamazov, having inherited the Karamazov intensity for life, chooses to devote his energy to the image of Christ, thereby following by choice in the steps of his spiritual father, Zosima. Alyosha, too, wells up with rapture and ecstasy.

> Filled with rapture, his soul yearned for freedom, space, vastness. Over him the heavenly dome, full of quiet, shining stars, hung boundlessly. From the zenith to the horizon the still-dim Milky Way stretched its double strand. Night, fresh and quiet, almost unstirring, enveloped the earth. The white towers and golden domes of the church gleamed in the sapphire sky. The luxuriant autumn flowers in the flowerbeds near the house had fallen asleep until morning. The silence of the earth seemed to merge with the silence of the heavens, the mystery of the earth touched the mystery of the stars . . . Alyosha stood gazing

> and suddenly, as if he had been cut down, threw himself to the earth. (362; bk. 7, ch. 4)

This experience of rapture takes place not long after Alyosha has suffered the despair in knowing that the body of the Elder had decomposed prematurely. Having fallen to the ground in this moment of rapture, he did not know why he was embracing the earth and he did not try to comprehend the irresistible urge to kiss it--all of it--while watering it with his tears. He vowed ecstatically to love it unto the ages. The words of the Elder rang in his soul: "Water the earth with the tears of your joy." When he tells of Alyosha's rapture in weeping for the stars, the narrator unabashedly demonstrates his own ecstasy. He depicts a swirling vision in which the threads of all God's innumerable worlds come together within Alyosha. Believing that he is "touching other worlds," Alyosha wants to forgive all for all. This clearly marks the turning point in Alyosha's life. The narrator almost sings in his description.

> "He fell to the earth a weak youth and rose up a fighter, steadfast for the rest of his life, and he knew it and felt it suddenly, in that very moment of his ecstasy." (363; bk. 7, ch. 4)

Impossible to exaggerate, the crucial dimension of ecstasy in this most sensitive of the Karamazov men unfolds. Three days after the experience, Alyosha leaves the monastery "to

'sojourn in the world,'" for now he sees the world as touched with teeming life and divinity (363; bk. 7, ch. 4).

Karamazovism is not a reality cut off from humanity in general but rather a special endowment of all that humans can manifest. In this sense, the Karamazov curse springs not from original guilt, but from almost unbearable responsibility. This means, therefore, that it runs the risk of absurdity and irresponsibility as exemplified in Fyodor Pavlovich.

In some respects, Alyosha, Ivan, and Dmitri inherit Karamazovism through the blood. Otherwise, why the word "Karamazov" as its common thread? On the other hand, Karamazovism serves as a symbol of those special individuals in families both cursed and blessed with this double portion of human nature. Dostoevsky does not explicate the means of the transmission and appears to have no conscious theory of Lamarckism. Nevertheless, an obscure mixture of Lamarckism and blood transmission of the curse emerges in the novel, which simply does not make clear how precisely the old man's influence and endowment infused themselves into his sons. Ironically, Dostoevsky seems to have trapped himself in a contradiction. While he apparently rejects Rakitin's theory of the environment as a shaper of the human soul, the novel repeatedly shows that the aspect of the environment controlled by their father had some major influence over their lives. Early in the story, the narrator comments, "Of

course, one can imagine what sort of father and mentor such a man would be" (10; bk. 1, ch. 2). Indeed, from Fyodor's mentorship, Dmitri could emulate debauchery and Ivan avarice.

Having acquired by whatever means the blessing and taint of intense passion, the Karamazovs live a life filled with extremes seldom experienced by the majority of families. As Hermann Hesse comments:

> It would not do if there were many such, for the world would go to pieces. This sort of sick man, be he called Dostoevsky or Karamazoff, has that strange occult, godlike faculty, the possibility of which the Asiatic venerates in every maniac. He is a seer and an oracle. A people, a period, a country, a continent has fashioned out of its corpus an organ, a sensory instrument of infinite sensitiveness, a very rare and delicate organ.[2] (44-5)

The Karamazovs act not so much as models through which Dostoevsky can display the existence of original sin. They behave more like sensory instruments of "infinite sensitiveness" through which Dostoevsky can perform laboratory experiments. Dmitri speculates, "Maybe I was drinking and fighting and raging, just because unknown ideas were storming inside me" (592; bk. 11, ch. 4). Almost like

a scientist, Dostoevsky seems to use his Karamazovs to test various theories of good and evil.

Notes

1. Luigi Pareyson contends that Dostoevsky saw the contradictions as beginning at the level of God rather than with mankind in general.

> Indeed, in arguing that there is an implicit and inescapable conflict between God's justice and his cruelty, Ivan adumbrates for the first time a dialectic with a long tradition behind it--one that is the conclusion of Dostoevsky's meditation: the vision of conflict within God himself." (275)

Pareyson describes the conflict within God as follows:

> As we meditate on the suffering Christ, we begin to make our way to a dialectic concept of God who has within himself antinomy and contradiction, opposition and contrast, discord and conflict. We grope towards a God who, out of love, is both cruel and merciful towards humans and towards Himself; who, out of love, is cruel towards himself to the point of wanting to suffer, and towards the Son to the point of abandoning Him. . . . (285)

2. In various works, Dostoevsky uses the motif of "the holy fool" as something of a noble experiment by which to test extraordinary dimensions of human existence. The novel _The Idiot_ is his principal experiment.

CHAPTER IV

ORIGINAL CONFLICT: A BROADER VIEW OF SIN

In The Brothers Karamazov, if paradise lies in acceptance, forgiveness, and love in all their interrelationships, hell abides in a life drained of love or left to its own base devices. And hell resides in the human race at war with itself inwardly and outwardly. But do humans enter life in a state of hell or at least in a state of depravity and baseness? The Brothers Karamazov appears to have a doctrine of original evil irreducible to any major theological doctrine preceding it.

Of course, Dostoevsky did not create his concept of original evil *ex nihilo*, for it has deep roots in Christian theology, going back at least to the major contenders in the battle over original sin; that is, to Augustine and Pelagius. Neither agreeing with Pelagius that an infant enters the world as a sinless creature nor agreeing with Augustine that the infant is sinful, The Brothers Karamazov advances another view that grew out of the controversy and soared beyond it. The marks of both Pelagius and Augustine show on the face of this novel.

A Russian work through and through, the novel also displays the view of the Eastern Church, which has other sources in addition to its deep roots in both Pelagius and Augustine. As an advocate of the Russian Orthodox Church,

Dostoevsky objected to the West's decision-making process. In the Roman Catholic Church, the pope made many of the important decisions unilaterally, despite his emotional and physical distance from the people. Less than a decade before The Brothers Karamazov went to press, Pope Pius IX succeeded in having the papal office declared infallible when its occupants spoke ex cathedra (Hasler 81). Under Protestantism, various forms of church government flourished, ranging from episcopal authority to congregational democracy. In the Russian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, a consensus of the people was sought (Gibson 42). Dostoevsky admired the Russian Orthodox Church's ability to forego authoritarian absolutes and to cope with contradictions. A. Boyce Gibson states that Dostoevsky's years of living in Europe made him even more devoutly Russian Orthodox. Dostoevsky objected to the moral and social absolutes and the compartmentalism in Europe. "He developed almost a fixation on the Vsechelovek, the 'all-man', who can encompass the whole of human experience, discrepancies included" (33).

Given its capacity to cope with contradictions, the Eastern Church never nailed down a fixed doctrine of original sin. Instead, in this branch of Christendom, the idea of original sin floats between the extremes of total depravity and pristine free will.

The Brothers Karamazov spawns the doctrine of "original conflict" to replace the Augustinian version of original sin and guilt. At birth, human beings come into a thoroughly social world. Human mortals must relate to one another. The very idea of a self-contained individual forms an abstraction that represents no reality. A Russian thinker like Dostoevsky would find atomistic individualism completely foreign. "He found it [individualism] simple-minded to the point of being infantile. . ." (Gibson 28). Nicholas Berdyaev interprets Dostoevsky on this issue as follows:

> Unrestrained and objectless freedom . . . ceases to be capable of making a choice and is bandied about in opposite directions. Then is the time that two selves appear in a man and his personality is cloven apart." (109)

Dostoevsky illustrates the cloven personality bandied in opposite directions in the characters of Dmitri and Ivan. A paradox of opposing physical appearances, emotions, behaviors, and ideas, Dmitri epitomizes Dostoevsky's concept of unrestrained and objectless freedom, at least until Dmitri's salvation. While his muscular body and his sudden, frenetic actions make him seem young, his sunken cheeks and ashen coloring make him look sickly and "much older than his years" (67; bk. 2, ch. 6). More than any of his other features, his dark eyes exhibit contradictions.

Simultaneously conveying determination and ambiguity, his large eyes look pensive even when he laughs (67-8; bk. 2, ch. 6) "his clipped, wooden laugh" (372; bk. 8, ch. 1). Though Dmitri conducts his life in a wild and disorderly fashion, he dresses impeccably; and, despite the fact that he has a moustache, he keeps his beard shaved and his dark brown hair cut short (67-8; bk. 2, ch. 6). A recently retired lieutenant, he has a long, resolute military stride (67-8; bk. 2, ch. 6); yet, we see him "wildly gesticulating, waving and beckoning" or "'whispering like a fool when there is no need to'" (103; bk. 3, ch. 3).

Emotional and behavioral incongruities abound in Dmitri. Calling himself a depraved lover of cruelty and an evil insect, Dmitri also describes himself as honorable (109; bk. 3, ch. 4). Others say he has a stormy soul; and, though meek and honest, as a sensualist, he will in a fit of passion kill for the love of a woman's body (79; bk. 2, ch. 7). Madman (139; bk. 3., ch. 9), scoundrel (153; bk. 3, ch. 11), viper (187; bk. 4, ch. 5), earthy and violent (220; bk. 5, ch. 1), disorderly and absurd (432; bk. 8, ch. 8)--vile epithets frequently thrown at him--counter the following positive ones: trustful and noble (381; bk. 8, ch. 3), gentle and meek (396; bk. 8, ch. 5), tender (508; bk. 9, ch. 9), good-hearted and grateful

(673; bk. 12, ch. 3), light-minded (732; bk. 12, ch. 11), and sensitive (742; bk. 12, ch. 13).

Likewise, the novel portrays Ivan as a cloven personality whose heavy flirtations with egoistic freedom lead to madness. The novel depicts Ivan as having two personalities. First, during a large portion of the story, Ivan seems intellectual, not emotional and intuitive, and consistent, not erratic (228; bk. 5, ch. 3). Ivan seems to have "an unusual and brilliant aptitude for learning" (15; bk. 1, ch. 3), has obtained a degree in natural science from the university, and has published newspaper articles and book reviews (16; bk. 1, ch. 3). Known for his curious and quaint writing and his "cold common sense," Ivan never loses his contacts with editors, and he frequents literary circles (16; bk. 1, ch. 3). Ivan rejects substances and circumstances that might induce irrational behavior; he dislikes "drinking and debauchery" (17; bk. 1, ch. 3). Furthermore, Victor Terras hears in Ivan a fake, shifting voice, one that lacks poetry (A Karamazov Companion 90-2).

Nevertheless, the novel sometimes reveals an Ivan of an opposite personality and nature. Fyodor accuses him of overstating his level of education and of having more of an interest in money than he admits (173, bk. 4, ch. 2). In fact, Ivan sometimes seems less the rational intellectual than he does the passionate, irrational Karamazov, given to flashes of insight and sudden inexplicable convictions. For

example, aware of Smerdyakov's crime, Ivan suddenly decides that he will tell the prosecutor the truth. Relieved of his tormenting doubts, he immediately feels "a sort of joy . . . [descend] into his soul" (633; bk. 11, ch. 8). Just as suddenly, all his resolve melts, taking with it his newfound joy and self-content (634; bk. 11, ch. 8). Ivan's attempts to live his maxim that "everything is permitted," his attempt to exercise limitless freedom, has led to his madness.[1]

In other words, no human can exert his or her own free will limitlessly. Inevitably, one human's will collides with another. Each must then make choices that consider the other or else face disintegration into madness, a state known more for its lack of control than for its self-will.

Those who fail to restrain self-centeredness and pride in particular will lose the capacity to love. For Dostoevsky, love involves people interacting; otherwise, people relate to useless ideals, which "easily become a high-minded imaginative substitute for action. They [ideals] split the will from the deed" (Gibson 17). In a letter to his brother Michael, Dostoevsky confessed, "I could give my life for you and yours; but even when my heart is warm with love, people often can't get so much as one friendly word out of me" ("To his Brother" 44).

For Dostoevsky, free will can never mean a limitless will floating free of all human contexts. If Dostoevsky's

novels exhibit human freedom par excellence, his image of freedom always reveals human beings exerting themselves in relationships with each other. Freedom cannot conceivably exist for a solipsist. For freedom to exist, it must always occur in connections. At that point, however, sin enters through the doorway.

The Brothers Karamazov presupposes that human life begins in conflict. Why? Perhaps, unlike God, humans have limited perception and understanding. Some intimate connection between ignorance and sin exists, not as an instance of evil, but as a precondition. This point deserves development.

Human beings come into the world with a propensity to express themselves, to satisfy themselves, and to cultivate passion and commitment. As creatures of desire, they long for teleological fulfillment, reaching beyond themselves into the world of nature and human society. "There is nothing men prefer to knowledge of the truth. . . " (Gilson 101). Given the ignorance of human beings, their desire for objects in a common world, and their propensity for passion and commitment, conflict inevitably arises.

If human creatures enjoyed omniscience, they would foresee all the consequences of their actions and could conceivably avoid all clashes. For Dostoevsky, however, the dream of omniscience manifests pride, itself born of ignorance. Even Ivan sees the absurdity of the dream of

scientific omniscience emerging from the earthly Euclidean mind. Doomed to a continual state of partial knowledge and considerable ignorance, humans cannot avoid conflict.

In The Brothers Karamazov, when the motif of paradise on earth arises, it does not project a society of passionless harmony. Passion always lives, for without passion, meaning dies. Conflict inevitably appears where passion and desire dwell. By claiming to be in paradise now, Zosima's older brother does not mean a state of sinless perfection. The birds do not sin just because they cannot sin and because God did not make them in his image and likeness in the exalted sense in which he made human beings. By this earthly paradise, Zosima's brother means a state of mutual forgiveness. "Let me be sinful before everyone, but so that everyone will forgive me, and that is paradise. Am I not in paradise now" (290; bk. 6, ch. 2)? Just before proclaiming to his mama that he is in paradise, he describes this state in which each bears guilt and recognizes such guilt. The absence of sin does not make it paradise. Instead, paradise comes from the presence of forgiveness and the joy and peace that accompany the forgiveness process: repentance, perspective about oneself, and the unwillingness to hold a grudge. Did not Zosima himself as a young man understand this when instead of taking his rightful shot at the man who had challenged him to a duel he threw away the

gun and at the same moment threw revenge to the wind (299-300; bk. 6, ch. 2)?

Born into a state of contradictions, each individual must at every moment face the fork in the road: one direction leading to humility; the other to inordinate pride. Pride comes in many forms just because the individual must make decisions regarding himself or herself in relation to others.

First, pride derives from ignorance that leads a person to perceive himself or herself mistakenly as more righteous than others. Over and over, the Elder Zosima tells the monks that they sin more than those outside the monastery.

> "For we are not holier than those in the world because we have come here and shut ourselves within these walls, but, on the contrary, anyone who comes here, by the very fact that he has come, already knows himself to be worse than all those who are in the world, worse than all on earth . . . And the longer a monk lives within his walls, the more keenly he must be aware of it. For otherwise he had no reason to come here." (163-64; bk. 4, ch. 1)

Zosima tells this to the monks not simply to cultivate humility in the monastery, but to make them face an essential truth.

Pride develops in another way when, after incorrectly perceiving their own moral status in the world, individuals set out to demand recognition of their superiority. Soon this demand leads to requiring subservience and treating others as instruments of one's own self importance. A subtle demonstration occurs in the brilliant scene in which Katerina and Grushenka, with Alyosha listening, seek through the guise of humility to establish dominance one over the other (150; bk. 3, ch. 10). A dramatic instance, basic to the plot, happens when Dmitri bows to Katerina after he has tricked her into offering herself to him (114; bk. 3, ch. 4). Her humiliation entices her to attempt in several ways to humiliate him in return.

With devastating irony, Dostoevsky shows that humility can become the slave of pride. Filled with pride in his meticulous acts of ascetic gamesmanship, Father Ferapont in the monastery not only mistakenly perceives himself but sees a demon sitting on the chest of a rival monk (335; bk. 7, ch. 1). This, of course, allows Father Ferapont to demote his rival and elevate himself.

In The Idiot, Dostoevsky deals with a good man embodying humility in the world of conflict and pride. In the end, the good man not only suffers but is ground up. In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky experiments again with a good man in the world. Through Father Zosima, Dostoevsky

shows that monks like Alyosha should go out into the world beyond the monastery to generate active love.

Alyosha, the author's hero, exemplifies the good man. People enjoy this humble man's companionship. Never judging them as his inferiors, he avoids injuring their pride. Edward Wasiolek interprets Dostoevsky as saying that the beast within us causes us to exert our self-will and to use it to inflict pain on others even when we initially intended to show them love. Alyosha's teacher demonstrates the only way to overcome this human foible is to accept everyone no matter how corrupt he or she may appear. Only by considering himself more sinful than others, however, does Zosima discover the key to unlocking his total acceptance of others. Until then, Zosima carried with him the taint of a self-perception of superiority.

After the Elder Zosima decomposes, Alyosha wallows for a brief period in self-pity over the humiliation of his hero and thus over his own hurt pride. It takes a fellow sinner, one whom most people would consider more evil than Alyosha, to save Alyosha from his rebellion. By the mere offering of an onion of empathy, Grushenka facilitates Alyosha's dreaming of Christ's miracle of turning the water into wine at the marriage in Cana. He awakens free of his self-pity and full of joy for the happiness of others (177-9).

The narrator insists, however, that the realist Alyosha believes in miracles because he first had faith, not that he

acquired faith because he experienced miracles (25; bk. 1, ch. 5). The narrator calls Alyosha a realist, partly for his phenomenal acceptance of himself and his place in the community. Unlike Ivan, Alyosha does not resent his dependency upon others. At the same time, he knows little of subservience. Even when his father attempts to dominate him, telling him to leave the monastery, for example, Alyosha good-naturedly ignores the command. On the other hand, he has taken an oath of obedience to another father, the Elder; and he childishly elevates the Elder above human stature. Nevertheless, even here Dostoevsky portrays Alyosha as a youth in the process of outgrowing this aspect of subservience.

In some ways, the Elder serves young Alyosha, for Alyosha voluntarily went to the monastery to gain from the Elder freedom, a freedom from a life of the pursuit of self-will (27-8; bk. 1, ch. 5). Alyosha uses the Elder as his spiritual guide. Quite aware of the dynamics of their relationship, Zosima accepts it as mutually beneficial. The Elder fulfills gladly the role as a spiritual coach and takes delight in the progress of his trainee.

Already Zosima sees Alyosha as in some ways more advanced than himself and ready to face the world. Whereas the Elder must wait for the world to come to him to receive his blessing and counsel, Alyosha lives and interacts in the outer world of conflict on his mission to mingle with fellow

sinners and to sow the seed of love and sacrifice wherever he goes. Indeed, as the mediator, Alyosha repeatedly stands between the opposing parties in the hotbed of devastating conflict.

By contrast, Ivan often takes refuge in his private cave, his Euclidean mind. While not a monastery, Ivan's private world of thoughts and ideas partially insulates him from the conflicts that human relationships would naturally bring. Dmitri tells Alyosha, "Ivan knows everything. He's known it for a long time before you. But Ivan is a grave" (110; bk. 3, ch. 4). Yet, portrayed as a man ambivalent about living in this world, even Ivan dearly loves Alyosha and says that a god in the image of Alyosha would be a worthy deity. This again demonstrates that Alyosha not only mediates amid conflict and treachery, but inspires more love.

While Ivan attempts to escape conflict by withdrawing into his passionless intellect, Dmitri falls so fervently into the passion of sensuality that he deprives himself of other avenues of passion. Intellectually a dwarf, emotionally a cripple, and morally an adolescent on the way toward adulthood, Dmitri recognizes the immaturity and dangerous nature of the force of love in him. He knows that his state of being in love seldom results in loving behavior on his part. In fact, his form of love increases the conflict among the characters in the novel.

Absolutely essential to understanding Dostoevsky's doctrine of original conflict is the idea that paradise on earth develops only when people actively forgive one another. The existence, indeed the necessary existence, of forgiveness in the world presupposes unavoidable and inevitable conflict. And where conflict exists, according to the whole drift of The Brothers Karamazov, sin and moral evil inevitably occur.

With Pelagius, Dostoevsky seems to say that the individual starts life free of sin. Dostoevsky even depicts some youths as neither evil nor wicked even when they behave wickedly. In one of Father Zosima's recollections of his youthful years, he tells of the pride he and his fellow officers had in their drunken boasting. Yet, Zosima says, "I would not say we were wicked; they were all good young men, but they behaved wickedly, and I most of all" (296; bk. 6, ch. 2).

With Augustine, on the other hand, Dostoevsky does see the inevitability of sin as a part of the human inheritance. Upon interacting with others, the newborn human steps on the first rung of the ladder of sin; and, in the words of Alyosha, "Whoever steps on the lowest step will surely step on the highest" (109; bk. 3, ch. 4).

Apparently, for Zosima and his brother, in paradise on earth we experience not the ultimate resolution of all conflict, but rather conflict, inevitable moral evil, and

forgiveness. Apparently, on earth people can live the life of humility, but not a life absent of sin or of conflict. Indeed, in some ways, for Dostoevsky, the elevation of the species to higher consciousness, forgiveness, and love presupposes, as F. R. Tennant suggests, the prior fall of the species on earth (105-11).

The question as to why conflict must exist at all raises images of a world devoid of freedom. Only if some omniscient being totally predetermined and controlled human behavior could a conflict-free world emerge. Consequently, The Brothers Karamazov works on the presupposition that only where no human life abides can the possibility of sinlessness surface. But with human life emerges consciousness, freedom, and therefore sinfulness.

Notes

1. Gary Saul Morson contends that Smerdyakov sets up a double bind that drives "Ivan Karamazov mad by repeated interpretations, and interpretations of previous interpretations, of a coded conversation" (93). Faced with the contradictions in his philosophy and in his behavior, Ivan loses his sanity. Yet, Aileen Kelly contends that Dostoevsky himself saw that belief systems could not escape contradictions. Kelly writes the following interpretation of Dostoevsky given by the Russian radical intelligentsia between 1905 and 1917:

> To be internally consistent . . . ethical systems (and the religious and political creeds that embodied them) must therefore ignore or deny some of the moral imperatives rooted in man's nature. No system of belief, however compelling, could thus confer immunity from guilt, doubt, or self-contempt. (239)

CHAPTER V

FREEDOM, SUFFERING, AND LOVE: THE RESULTS OF ORIGINAL CONFLICT

Father Zosima pictures the world, apart from human beings, as sinless. Animals do not commit moral evil.

> "Gentlemen," I cried suddenly from the bottom of my heart, "look at the divine gifts around us: the clear sky, the fresh air, the tender grass, the birds, nature is beautiful and sinless, and we, we alone, are godless and foolish, and do not understand that life is paradise, for we need only wish to understand, and it will come at once in all its beauty, and we shall embrace each other and weep. . . ." (299; bk. 6, ch. 2)

Animal paradise lacks sin apparently because animals cannot experience the self-consciousness that leads to grossly mistaken perceptions of oneself and others, mistakes that lead to pride. Only humans reflect the image and likeness of God, at least in one crucial respect: they have freedom born of intense consciousness (298-9; bk. 6, ch. 2).

Although Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov gives voice to a doctrine of kinship between human beings and other species, it differs from the kind of kinship that

Darwin believed he had discovered. On the other hand, according to F. F. Seely, Dostoevsky objected strongly to psychological determinism, which blames social deviancy upon the environment (121). During Dmitri's trial, Dmitri disparagingly refers to Rakitin as a Bernard, implying Claude Bernard, a nineteenth-century French physiologist whose positivism included sociocultural determinism.

> Infuriated by the tone in which Rakitin referred to Grushenka, he [Dmitri] suddenly cried out from his place: "Bernard!" And when, after all the questioning of Rakitin was over, the presiding judge addressed the defendant, asking him if he had any observations to make, Mitya shouted in a booming voice:
>
> "He kept hitting me for loans, even in prison! A despicable Bernard and careerist, and he doesn't believe in God, he hoodwinked His Grace!" (668; bk. 12, ch. 2)

In contrast to Bernard's view, The Brothers Karamazov paints a picture of the human world as influenced by inheritance, but molded by conflict and free choice.

Darwin had a doctrine of original conflict that began before the arrival of homo sapiens. Even though he did not treat this original conflict in a strictly theological context, he did apparently understand that it had moral implications for at least one of the primates. For

Dostoevsky, the apparent conflict among animals does not raise the question of sin, perhaps because non-human animals lack the special consciousness that allows them to judge others and themselves morally in terms of rank and status.

Interestingly, the eighteenth-century French theologian and philosopher, Jean Jacques Rousseau, theorized that corruption did not arise in humans until they had evolved consciousness and intelligence enough to rely more on one another for survival than on their own brute strength as individuals.

> As ideas and feelings succeeded one another, and heart and head were brought into play, men continued to lay aside their original wildness; their private connections became every day more intimate as their limits extended. They accustomed themselves to assemble before their huts round a large tree; singing and dancing, the true offspring of love and leisure, became the amusement, or rather the occupation, of men and women thus assembled together with nothing else to do. Each one began to consider the rest, and to wish to be considered in turn; and thus a value came to be attached to public esteem. Whoever sang or danced best, whoever was the handsomest, the strongest, the most dexterous, or the most eloquent, came to be of most consideration; and

> this was the first step toward inequality, and at the same time towards vice. From these first distinctions arose on the one side vanity and contempt and on the other shame and envy: and the fermentation caused by these new leavens ended by producing combinations fatal to innocence and happiness. (241-42)

Ideas, too, cause friction among humans. For Dostoevsky, human individuals carry beliefs with them as a kind of mirror in which to examine perpetually the self and others. Stated even more strongly, human individuals seem capable of being carried by their beliefs, whereas other species have no such ability. Undoubtedly, The Brothers Karamazov is a novel of ideas and beliefs and the impact they make on the lives of individuals in the story. Ideas have consequences within the tale. For the human species, the conflict increases because the ideas to which they adhere come into conflict and make a kind of creative war on each other.

The Brothers Karamazov itself is polyphonic. According to Mikhail Bakhtin, "The plurality of independent and unmerged voices and consciousness and the genuine polyphony of full-valued voices are in fact characteristics of Dostoevsky's novels" (4).

Professor Victor Terras speaks of The Brothers Karamazov as a series of points and counterpoints. Here are some examples he specifies:

> Once "The Grand Inquisitor" has been read, responses to it can be recognized frequently throughout the rest of the novel. Father Zosima's wisdom contains some responses to it. . . . The entire episode of "An Odor of Corruption" is a counterpoint to the theme of the second temptation of Christ. Aliosha's vision in "Cana of Galilee" is the counterpoint to Ivan's later "vision" of the devil, and thus a response to "The Grand Inquisitor" as well. Grushen'ka's folk tale, "The Onion," echoes Ivan's paraphrase of "The Virgin's Descent to Hell." It emphasizes the belief that everybody can be saved--provided he wants to be saved. (A Karamazov Companion 105-06)

The supreme point-counterpoint of the novel occurs in the conflict between the belief system of Ivan and that of Zosima. In one way or another, starting at the level of psychology and carried to the heights of theodicy, the question of what to do with conflict dominates the entire novel.

Ivan provides the chilling example of human life in its blazing self-consciousness. He challenges heaven itself, demanding that the deity, if such exists, justify his world.

In "The Grand Inquisitor," Ivan's position gains representation by another old man, the Inquisitor himself, a more ancient man than the Elder. The question arises as to whether he is also wiser than Zosima. The Inquisitor contends that Christ expects too much of his human creatures, that he throws them in effect into more conflict than they can handle.

Ironically, whereas Zosima supposedly said that most people need looking after like children, the Inquisitor develops a plan for putting this belief into practice. Alyosha says, "You know, Lise, my elder said once that most people need to be looked after like children, and some like the sick in hospitals. . . " (217; bk. 5, ch. 1). In Ivan's "The Grand Inquisitor," the aged cardinal says to Christ:

> "Oh, we shall finally convince them not to be proud, for you raised them up and thereby taught them pride; we shall prove to them that they are feeble, that they are only pitiful children. . . . Oh, we will allow them to sin, too; they are weak and powerless, and they will love us like children for allowing them to sin." (259; bk. 5, ch. 5)

With double irony, Dostoevsky represents both Zosima and the Inquisitor as saying that <u>most</u> people should be treated like children. The Inquisitor charges Christ with advancing a religion for only the elect, a spiritual elite, and with, in effect, forgetting the weak. The irony cuts

sill deeper, and the Inquisitor sees it clearly when he accuses Christ of generating pride in the elite-elect. In one of the most shocking speeches in the entire novel, Ivan charges that the conflicts and the absurdities of life are too much. He makes his point with such telling brilliance that it becomes clear that no earthly harmony could ever justify God's creation of his favored species. Since Dostoevsky aligns with Zosima and Alyosha rather than with the Inquisitor and Ivan, only one avenue opens for Dostoevsky to answer Ivan's challenge. The existence of the horrendous conflict on earth demands that life go on beyond this Euclidean point. Immortality, for Zosima, must exist, for "only the idea of immortality stands between tears and despair, suffering and rebellion" (Jackson 321). Only if time touches eternity can there be the order and the harmony that earthly conflict seems to demand. Without immortality, there is no meaning. Without the conflict, on the other hand, Dostoevsky seems to imply, no truly human life, and therefore no meaning worthy of the human species, can exist.

Dmitri in many ways exemplifies the life of human conflict. Conflict, so obvious in the eldest son, begins in a fight with his father, with whom he battles over money and the same woman. Dmitri even finds conflict in love, on the one hand loving Katerina and on the other hand loving Grushenka. If he has in his father a rival for Grushenka, he has in Ivan a rival for Katerina. Even the normally

insightful Alyosha puzzles over the object of Dmitri's love. He sees the conflict but cannot determine which of the two women Dmitri truly loves. The conflict compounds when Dmitri comes to see that he has two kinds of love in him that conflict with one another. Everywhere he turns he meets conflict. A man of generous heart, Dmitri humiliates the bearded captain in front of others because of a quarrel over money. Katerina Ivanovna tells Alyosha about Dmitri's depraved behavior.

> "A week ago--yes, a week, I think--Dmitri Fyodorovich committed a rash and unjust act, a very ugly act. There is a bad place here, a tavern. In it he met that retired officer, that captain, whom your father employed in some business of his. Dmitri Fyodorovich got very angry with this captain for some reason, seized him by the beard in front of everyone, led him outside in that humiliating position, and led him a long way down the street, and they say that the boy, the captain's son, who goes to the local school, just a child, saw it and went running along beside them, crying loudly and begging for his father, and rushing up to everyone asking them to defend him, but everyone laughed.
> (193; bk. 4, ch. 5)

With blood on his hands, face, and clothing, Dmitri carelessly shows his presence in public and recklessly spends large sums of money on food and wine to impress Grushenka (399; bk. 8, ch. 5). Then he rashly breaks in on Grushenka and her young officer's party.

> "Gentlemen," he began loudly, almost shouting, but stammering at each word, "it's . . . it's nothing! Don't be afraid," he exclaimed, "it's really nothing, nothing," he suddenly turned to Grushenka, who was leaning towards Kalganov in her armchair, firmly clutching his hand. "I . . . I am traveling, too. I'll stay till morning." (416; bk. 8, ch. 7)

Alyosha, the most tranquil of the brothers, nevertheless has his own battles. A careful reading of the novel suggests that Alyosha is being prepared for a series of battles. Within the novel, he recognizes his own inner conflict and believes that he went initially to the monastery to find some way to deal with it. On the one hand, he is the son of a profligate. On the other hand, he is stirred by the memory of his mother as she holds him before the icon.

> He [Alyosha] remembered a quiet summer evening, an open window, the slanting rays of the setting sun (these slanting rays he remembered most of all), an icon in the corner of the room, a lighted

> oil-lamp in front of it, and before the icon, on her knees, his mother, sobbing as if in hysterics, with shrieks and cries, seizing him in her arms, hugging him so tightly that it hurt, and pleading for him to the Mother of God, holding him out from her embrace with both arms towards the icon, as if under the protection of the Mother of God . . . and suddenly a nurse rushes in and snatches him from her in fear. (18-9; bk. 1, ch. 4)

Later, the narrator reveals that Alyosha may have grown fond of the monastery because of memories of his mother's having taken him there for Sunday liturgy. The narrator speculates that:

> Perhaps he was also affected by the slanting rays of the setting sun before the icon to which his mother, the "shrieker," held him out. Thoughtful, he came to us, then, maybe only to see if it was "all" here, or if here, too, there were only "two roubles." (27; bk. 1, ch. 5)

On the surface, suffering seems to play a mysterious part in The Brothers Karamazov. Suffering might even look like an end in itself, a masochistic orgy Russian style. Indeed, Zosima implies that suffering and happiness are somehow linked, although the nature of the link lies in obscurity. Only a thorough understanding of Dostoevsky's

doctrine of original conflict can make sense out of the prevalence of suffering in the novel.

At least two major sources of suffering emerge. Above all, suffering comes naturally as a normal part of finite human existence in conflict. To live is to risk suffering. Given human ignorance and its contingencies, as well as family life and other social matrices, suffering inevitably occurs. Dostoevsky does not make an abstract moral principle of suffering or urge his readers to suffer,[1] but rather he avers that one can escape all suffering only by bowing out and leaving the stage of life. Even Ivan, who seems to suffer intensely, cannot imagine dashing the cup until he is thirty. It is crucial to understand that The Brothers Karamazov is a theodicy, that is, an attempt to give some wider meaning to suffering. In part, the meaning lies in the fact that suffering occurs simply as a byproduct of living. Its connection with life in all its fullness *is* its meaning.

Why should life and suffering be linked? That is the burning question demanding an answer in any theodicy worthy of the name. Does Dostoevsky deal with it forthrightly? Unlike Milton, he does not draw on a pre-earthly existence, when God and Satan set the stage for the emergence of evil, pain, and suffering. In fact, Dostoevsky allows the Elder to recall the criticisms raised against one of the biblical ventures into theodicy:

> "And so much in it [i.e., the story of Job] is great, mysterious, inconceivable! Later I heard the words of the scoffers and blasphemers, proud words: how could the Lord hand over the most beloved of his saints for Satan to play with him, to take away his children, to smite him with disease and sores so that he scraped the pus from his wounds with a potsherd, and all for what? Only so as to boast before Satan: 'See what my saint can suffer for my sake!'"
> (292; bk. 6, ch. 2)

Dostoevsky knows full well that he has entered into the heights of theodicy and that he cannot offer point for point refutations of Voltaire and other critics of classical theism.

A second source and kind of suffering, _nadryv_, only an honest genius like Dostoevsky would dare expose, even if it sends another arrow into the heart of his theodicy. The Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky translation of the novel uses "laceration" as a translation of _nadryv_. Masochists embrace laceration--Lisa slamming the door on her finger deliberately, for example. The word "laceration" or "eruption" occurs again and again throughout the novel, and it almost always contains the elements of self-injury or self-punishment.

Professor Victor Terras explains that _nadryv_ develops for several characters in the novel when they fail to live up to the image they have of themselves and that they desire others to have of them. Terras defines _nadryv_ as a strain or a rupture; and he indicates that it happens to Lisa, Katerina, Ivan, and Snegiriov (_A Karamazov Companion_ 82).

Edward Wasiolek summarizes examples of laceration in the novel as follows:

> Father Ferapont's ascetic deprivations are a self-denial from _nadryv_. He "hurts" himself, so that he can hurt the other monks; he needs the "indulgent" monks (which his exercises in asceticism create) as much as Katerina needs a fallen Dmitry. Father Ferapont's ascetic deprivations are weapons of humiliation of others and exaltation of self. . . .
>
> Katerina _loves_ from _nadryv_; Father Ferapont _fasts_ from _nadryv_; Captain Snegirev _loves honor_ from _nadryv_. . . .
>
> Ivan has his _nadryv_ also, for his hurt is his bruised sense of justice. (160)

Keeping in mind that Dostoevsky antedates Freud, one need not conjecture that Dostoevsky has developed a systematic theory of laceration. He does nevertheless provide an adequate framework to make an interpretation of this strange phenomenon possible. Indeed, Dostoevsky seems

to see self-injury as not strange after all to the creature created in the image of God. It is peculiar to that species. Why? The answer appears to lie in the fact that conflict and consciousness form so much a part of human life that the individual in some ways represents a kind of society at war with itself. Early in his literary career, Dostoevsky wrote a novella entitled The Double, which portrays a man over against himself. Self-injury, self-laceration, is perhaps one dimension of the self punishing another.

Notes

1. Found guilty by the "jury of peasants," who lacked "imagination, empathy, and inspiration" (Terras, "Art," 202), Dmitri, a man with "intuition, empathy, and imagination" will suffer unjustly (Terras, "Art," 198). But Dostoevsky then has Aloysha tell Dmitri:

> "Listen, then: you're not ready, and such a cross is not for you. Moreover, unready as you are, you don't need such a great martyr's cross. If you had killed your father, I would regret that you rejected your cross. But you're innocent, and such a cross is too much for you. You wanted to regenerate another man in yourself through suffering; I say just remember that other man always, all your life, and wherever you escape to--and that is enough for you. That you did not accept that great cross will only serve to make you feel a still greater duty in yourself, and through this constant feeling from now on, all your life, you will do more for your generation, perhaps, than if you went <u>there</u> [Siberia]. Because there you will not endure, you will begin to murmur, and in the end you may really say: 'I am quits.' The attorney was right about that.

Heavy burdens are not for everyone, for some they are impossible." (763-64; epilogue, ch. 2)

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF SUFFERING AND THE UNIFYING POWER OF LOVE

Dostoevsky's theodicy of universal harmony asserts the ultimate resolution of all conflicts. Ivan protests not against harmony per se--indeed, he has his own version of unity on earth--but against certain ingredients that go into unity. He protests in particular against the suffering of children, of innocent children, and demands to know what could possibly justify their torment. Through Father Zosima, Dostoevsky contends that harmony exists at various levels and that only the higher harmony, which includes both this Euclidean earth and eternity, is worthy of God. Better a life of suffering and conflict when it leads to the higher values than the life of the anthill, where presumably the anguish and horror experienced by human mortals never emerge. This radical doctrine implies that the quality of a world after human sin exceeds that of the Garden in which Adam and Eve roam in pristine innocence. Dostoevsky comes close to suggesting that God could not have created his best world without also creating freedom and all the terrible risks that follow in the train of freedom.

Zosima's version of redemption introduces a special kind of suffering, which goes beyond mere masochism and must above all never be confused with masochism. If, as the Elder believes, all people so intricately impact the lives of others that when one sins all sin, then it follows invariably that when one suffers all suffer.[1]

> "My young brother asked forgiveness of the birds: it seems senseless, yet it is right, for all is like an ocean, all flows and connects; touch it in one place and it echoes at the other end of the world. . . . All is like an ocean, I say to you. Tormented by universal love, you, too, would then start praying to the birds, as if in a sort of ecstasy, and entreat them to forgive you your sin. Cherish this ecstasy, however senseless it may seem to people." (319-20; bk. 6, ch. 3)

In response to Ivan's attack on Christian theodicy, Alyosha refers to the innocent suffering of the sinless one, meaning Christ. Zosima goes further to say that the whole body of Christ, indeed the whole of humanity, bears the torment and suffering of sin. He urges his fellow monks to give up the desire to revenge themselves upon the wicked.

> "Go at once and seek torments for yourself, as if you yourself were guilty of their wickedness. Take those torments upon yourself and suffer them, and your heart will be eased, and you will

> understand that you, too, are guilty. . . ."
> (321; bk. 6, ch. 3)

Readers from the West will perhaps stumble over the passages in which Zosima, Alyosha, and others kiss the earth and water it with their tears. This strange and spontaneous practice, however, manifests a feeling of oneness, not an excessive sentimentality. Even as God rains on the just and unjust alike, so the believer waters the earth and pours forth his heart without discrimination. It also manifests rapture and ecstasy in which apparently the believer can participate in the higher harmony. If this properly interprets Zosima, one has the key to understanding the passages in which Dostoevsky's believers pray for the forgiveness of not only their own sins but also the sins of others. Human beings may dare to ask forgiveness on behalf of each other because they are so intricately bound to one another.

This emphasis on unity and harmony might appear to contradict Dostoevsky's burning passion for individuality. So crucial to his theodicy and view of the world is individuality that he identifies it as the view of Christ in "The Grand Inquisitor." The harmony and unity of the anthill stand worlds apart from the harmony of which Dostoevsky speaks. The Grand Inquisitor charges Christ with having placed freedom "above everything"
(253; bk. 5, ch. 5).

> "Instead of taking over men's freedom, you increased it and forever burdened the kingdom of the human soul with its torments. You desired the free love of man, that he should follow you freely, seduced and captivated by you. Instead of the firm ancient law, man had henceforth to decide for himself, with a free heart, what is good and what is evil, having only your image before him as a guide." (255; bk. 5, ch. 5)

The Grand Inquisitor goes on to accuse Christ of leaving human beings with a terrible burden of freedom of choice, which throws them into greater confusion and torment and abandons them to many cares and insoluble problems (255; bk. 5, ch. 5).

Dostoevsky never wavers in his frankness about the suffering that lies always at the doorstep of freedom. Confusion, torment, suffering, contradiction--without them, freedom cannot conceivably occur. Fate deals humans this outrageous collective fortune to bear. It is either the anthill or freedom. Yet for the suffering that comes with freedom to have meaning, it must in the final analysis redeem humans. Zosima seems to believe that the redemptive suffering of the sins of others as well as one's own sins transports humanity to realms beyond the temporal existence.

> "Much on earth is concealed from us, but in place of it we have been granted a secret, mysterious sense of our living bond with the other world, with the higher heavenly world, and the roots of our thoughts and feelings are not here but in other worlds. . . . God took seeds from other worlds and sowed them on this earth, and raised up his garden; and everything that could sprout sprouted, but it lives and grows only through its sense of being in touch with other mysterious worlds. . . ." (320; bk. 6, ch. 3)

Has Zosima satisfactorily answered the questions raised by Ivan's critique of Christian theodicy? Early in the story, the narrator assures the reader that Alyosha, Zosima's disciple, is not a mystic but a realist (25; bk. 1, ch. 5). He goes so far as to describe him as "clear-eyed and bursting with health" and as a person "even more of a realist than the rest of us" (25; bk. 1, ch. 5). Zosima's doctrine of ecstasy, however, seems to fly in the face of this claim: for, after all, Alyosha knowingly follows in the steps of the Elder, "who takes your soul, your will into his soul and into his will" (27; bk. 1, ch. 5). Has Dostoevsky allowed himself no more formidable argument than this: one can find the answer to Ivan only by having a religious experience? Do Dostoevsky and Zosima fail to see that a mystical experience might be a

grand delusion? The answer, if an answer to this exists, lies in Alyosha's leaving the monastery for the very purpose of testing the inner experience of love. The world for Alyosha will act as a laboratory to test what he believes to be real.

Rakitin, a cheap and unworthy mutation of Ivan, scorns Alyosha's despair over the disappointing fact that the Elder's body decayed prematurely. More importantly, the premature decay does not uproot the faith of the youthful disciple. Dostoevsky appears to argue against a faith built upon trivial expectations that have little to do with the hard and tough gospel of loving one's neighbor. The point of Dostoevsky's theodicy appears to be that the more one learns to give one's life in love, the more one learns that a God exists and that he rules the world. In short, while the mystical experience sets the believer on the right road, it does not bring him to the end of the road. The believer must test the experience itself in day-by-day acts of love.

A revealing passage portrays Alyosha as a young man who loves perhaps in excess. It is an unrestrained love. The whole thrust of the passage nevertheless reveals this as the starting point of the truly religious life. Dostoevsky's narrator comes out in the open in defense of his hero:

> Nevertheless I shall frankly admit that it would be very difficult for me now to convey clearly the precise meaning of this strange and uncertain

moment in the life of the hero of my story, whom I love so much and who is still so young. To the rueful question Father Paissy addressed to Alyosha: "Or are you, too, with those of little faith?"--I could, of course, answer firmly for Alyosha: "No, he is not with those of little faith." Moreover, it was even quite the opposite: all his dismay arose precisely because his faith was so great. . . . I would only ask the reader not to be in too great a hurry to laugh at my young man's pure heart. Not only have I no intention of apologizing for him, of excusing and justifying his simple faith on account of his youth, for instance, or the little progress he had made formerly in the study of science, and so on and so forth, but I will do the opposite and declare firmly that I sincerely respect the nature of his heart. No doubt some other young man, who takes his heart's impressions more prudently, who has already learned how to love not ardently but just lukewarmly, whose thoughts, though correct, are too reasonable (and therefore cheap) for his age, such a young man, I say, would avoid what happened to my young man, but in certain cases, really, it is more honorable to yield to some passion, however unwise, if it springs from great

> love, than not to yield to it at all. Still more so in youth, for a young man who is constantly too reasonable is suspect and of too cheap a price--that is my opinion! (338; bk. 7, ch. 2)

In other words, the realist begins with excessive commitment and in his maturity learns to test and refine his commitment without losing the passion. The pseudo-realist begins with under-belief and never rises to the world of real life. His criticism has nothing to criticize.

Dostoevsky's integrity as a novelist of ideas shines when immediately after the narrator expresses his view of Alyosha, he allows the narrator to say that Alyosha did not demand a miracle but justice. At this precise point, Alyosha and Ivan meet face to face, for Ivan has already returned his ticket in the name of justice. Ivan wishes to have no part in the harmony that traditional theism has advanced over the centuries. This means that the whole thrust of the novel rests on the vision of justice to be embraced.

Alyosha and Ivan start at the same point, demanding justice, and end up in the novel _worlds_ apart. Only two pages after demanding "a 'higher justice'" (339; bk. 7, ch. 2), Alyosha says to Rakitin, "I do not rebel against my God, I simply 'do not accept his world'" (341; bk. 7, ch. 2). Alyosha at this point expresses his doubts and of course quotes his brother Ivan. No doubt a

conscious act, Dostoevsky then writes, "Alyosha suddenly smiled crookedly," a descriptive phrase he ordinarily reserves for Ivan. Of course, clear-eyed Alyosha recovers both his smile and his faith. Nevertheless, over the present novel hangs still a question mark like a haunting specter. It speaks: "Has anyone in this tale truly answered Ivan?"

Notes

1. In his book about the structure of <u>The Brothers Karamazov</u>, Robert Belknap includes some interesting drawings that show the changes in the relationships in the novel that occur because Alyosha leaves the monastery and enters the outside world. Belknap first draws a hexagon to depict the relationships of the characters in the early part of the novel. The hexagon connects Grushenka to Alyosha, Alyosha to Lisa, Lisa to Ivan, Ivan to Katerina, Katerina to Dmitri, Dmitri to Grushenka, and Grushenka to the Pole. In short, each person's love goes unrequited. To graph the relationships that develop after Alyosha leaves the monastery, however, Belknap uses six parallel lines, showing mutual love between Grushenka and Dmitri, between Alyosha and Lisa, and between Ivan and Katerina (70). In the eyes of Belknap, evidently, each person does have a rippling effect upon the world.

WORKS CITED

Augustine. <u>The City of God</u>. Rpt. in <u>Great Books of the Western World</u>. Ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins. Trans. Marcus Dods. Vol. 18. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952. 129-620.

---. <u>De correptione et gratia</u>. Rpt. in <u>Documents of the Christian Church</u>. Ed. Henry Bettenson. London: Oxford University Press, 1954. 78-9.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. <u>Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics</u>. Trans. R. W. Rosel. New York: Ardis. 1973.

Belknap, Robert L. <u>The Structure of The Brothers Karamazov</u>. The Hague: Mouton & Co. 1967.

Berdyaev, Nicholas. <u>Dostoevsky</u>. Trans. Donald Attwater. Cleveland: The World Publishing Company. 1966.

Brown, Peter. <u>Augustine of Hippo</u>. Berkley: University of California Press. 1967.

Cole, William Graham. <u>Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis</u>. New York: Oxford University Press. 1955.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. <u>The Brothers Karamazov: A Novel in Four Parts with Epilogue</u>. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. San Francisco: North Point Press. 1990.

---. <u>The Possessed</u>. Trans. Andrew R. MacAndrew. New York: New American Library. 1962.

---. "To Apollon Nikolayevitch Maikov." 25 March 1870. Trans. Ethel Colburn Mayne. Letter LV in Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky. New York: Horizon Press, 1961. 190-2.

---. "To his Brother Michael." 1847. Trans. Ethel Colburn Mayne. Letter LV in Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky. New York: Horizon Press, 1961. 190-2.

---. "To Nikolay Nikolayevitch Strachov." 24 March 1870. Trans. Ethel Colburn Mayne. Letter LIV in Letters of Fyodor Michailovitch Dostoevsky. New York: Horizon Press, 1961. 186-9.

Gibson, A. Boyce. The Religion of Dostoevsky. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1973.

Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine. New York: Random House. 1960.

---. Reason and the Revelation in the Middle Ages. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1938.

Hasler, August Bernhard. How the Pope Became Infallible: Pius IX and the Politics of Persuasion. Trans. Peter Heinegg. Garden City: Doubleday & Company. 1981.

Hesse, Hermann. In Sight of Chaos. Trans. Stephen Hudson. Zurig: Verlag Seldwyla. 1923.

Holquist, Michael. Dostoevsky and the Novel. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1977.

Jackson, Robert Louis. The Art of Dostoevsky: Deliriums and Nocturnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1981.

Kelly, Aileen. "Dostoevskii and the Divided Conscience." Slavic Review 47.2 (1988). 239-60.

Lehmann, Paul. "The Anti-Pelagian Writings." A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine. Ed. Roy W. Battenhouse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 203-34.

Luther, Martin. The Bondage of the Will. Trans. J. I. Packer and O. R. Johnston. Old Tappan, New Jersey: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1957.

Marty, Martin E. A Short History of Christianity. New York: The World Publishing Company. 1971.

Morson, Gary Saul. The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's Diary of a Writer and the Traditions of Literary Utopia. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1981.

Pareyson, Luigi. "Pointless Suffering in The Brothers Karamazov." Cross Currents 37.2-3 (1987): 271-86.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. "A Discourse on a Subject Proposed by the Academy of Dijon: What is the Origin of Inequality among Men, And Is It Authorized by Natural Law." The Social Contract and Discourses. Trans. G. D. H. Cole. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1950. 176-282.

Seely, F. F. "Ivan Karamazov." New Essays on Dostoyevsky. Ed. Malcolm V. Jones and Garth M. Terry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 115-36.

Skinner, B. F. Walden Two. New York: The MacMillan Company. 1962.

Tennant, F. R. The Origin and Propagation of Sin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1908.

Terras, Victor. "The Art of Fiction as a Theme in The Brothers Karamazov." Dostoevsky: New Perspectives. Ed. Robert Louis Jackson. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1984. 193-205.

---. A Karamazov Companion: Commentary on the Genesis, Language, and Style of Dostoevsky's Novel. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. 1981.

Walker, Williston. A History of the Christian Church. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark. 1953.

Wasiolek, Edward. Dostoevsky: The Major Fiction. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press. 1964.

Williams, Daniel D. "The Significance of St. Augustine Today." A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine. Ed. Roy W. Battenhouse. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. 3-14.