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The Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

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Introduction

These are important times for how the world manages the annual flow of around $200 billion in development cooperation assistance to developing countries. A number of changes in global international development co-operation are in the offing: within a one month span, development issues will be taken up by the G-20 at the Leaders' Summit at Los Cabos, by the United Nations at its Rio+20 Summit, and by Jim Kim upon taking over as the first ever development professional to become president of the World Bank. The key issues on the table are implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, building consensus on a new set of post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, implementing a New Deal on fragile states, and closer integration of environmental, security, trade, investment and development agendas.

There is now an opportunity to establish a new paradigm and governance structure for coordinating the many state and non-state actors engaged in development cooperation. A new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation is taking shape, backstopped by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Establishing this partnership was one of the key outcomes of the Busan High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in December 2011.

On June 28-29, 2012, the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, a DAC-supported international partnership for aid effectiveness, will hold a plenary meeting in Paris which should conclude with three consequential outcomes: (i) it will bring into being a new Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation with a governance structure that truly reflects the multi-stakeholder nature of development today; (ii) it will dissolve itself, marking one of the first times that a multilateral structure is actually replaced by a more suitable mechanism; and (iii) it will adopt a set of indicators for monitoring global progress towards more effective development cooperation.

Already, the outlines of the new partnership are becoming clear, thanks to a transparent process of meetings and dialogue. There is much to be encouraged about, but as with most efforts for institutional change, the devil is in the details. At first glance, while the Global Partnership promises to deliver substantial and significant improvements in governance, its proposed new monitoring indicators are still rooted in the past and do not reflect the new style of development cooperation that is expected in the next decade. This policy paper explores the approach to building indicators and suggests improvements to ensure better development cooperation.

Context

A total of 159 countries, 39 international organizations and seven other organizations have endorsed the Busan Partnership document, the agreement reached at the end of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held in Busan, South Korea on November 29 to Dec 1, 2011.[1] This document, painstakingly negotiated between 18 sherpas elected to represent a wide array of stakeholders, called on the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to establish a new global partnership by June 2012, with a framework of indicators through which progress could be assessed.

Members of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness selected a Post-Busan Interim Group of negotiators to lead the development and design of the mandate and governance structure, and the monitoring framework of the new Global Partnership. That group has had to construct a partnership that would reflect the main outcomes of the Busan High Level Forum.

Busan was, first and foremost, an expression of the diversity of stakeholders involved in development cooperation. At the Paris High Level Forum in 2005, the principle of country ownership was first adopted, stressing that development should be driven by partner countries themselves, not by aid donors. At Accra in 2008, the role of civil society organizations was formally acknowledged. At Busan, the tent was broadened again to recognize the importance of emerging economy donors, the private business sector and parliamentarians. At the same time, international and local civil society organizations (CSOs) were mainstreamed into the debates and partner countries actually led many side-events. But while Busan signaled the expansion of the range of partners in development, it did not formalize their roles: the key international structures of accountability remain narrowly focused on traditional donors and partner countries alone.

Busan was also about the need to move away from one-size-fits-all answers to development cooperation. Different country contexts require differentiated solutions. This was most apparent in the discussions on fragile states, where an increasing share of poor live and where traditional approaches to development cooperation have failed because of the absence of long-term commitment mechanisms, lack of coordination between development and security efforts, a poorly managed transition between the stages of relief, reconstruction and development, and inadequate attention to peacebuilding and statebuilding. To overcome this, a New Deal on engagement in fragile states was unveiled at Busan, endorsed by participants in the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. By encouraging a number of voluntary agreements on specific aspects of development cooperation, Busan paved the way for more customized approaches by individual donors. This has had the benefit of moving the agenda forward in focused areas with a limited number of engaged actors, but some observers have worried that permitting voluntary mechanisms could undercut peer pressure for all participants to embrace common responsibilities.

Perhaps the most remarkable feature of Busan was the self-critical appraisal of the functioning of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and the role of the DAC. In a highly unusual step, the DAC recognized that the legitimacy of its deliberations could not be broadened beyond its own membership, so that a different governance structure would be needed in order to support a broader partnership. To this end, it has involved the United Nations' Development Program as a full partner that has endorsed and will provide secretariat support to the new Global Partnership. With this political backing, non-DAC countries can participate more fully and on a more equal footing in the new partnership.

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Busan also tracked progress made by donors against a set of commitments made in Paris in 2005. Despite the fact that only one of 13 targets was fully met, there was a sense that the process of setting goals, targets and indicators was useful. There was also a determination to complete the unfinished business of meeting the Paris commitments.

Against this background, the challenges for the new partnership are:

- First, to design a governance structure to reflect the broad nature of new actors in development cooperation;
- Second, to ensure a more inclusive role for emerging economy donors and to integrate the differing nature, modalities and responsibilities of south-south cooperation into a global framework;
- Third, to mainstream the private business sector into the development cooperation effort, in service delivery, resources, supply chain management, jobs and other ways;
- Fourth, to construct a set of manageable indicators to monitor global progress in development cooperation, while differentiating between country contexts.

The remainder of this paper elaborates on each of these challenges.

GOVERNANCE OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

The Global Partnership presents a unique opportunity to build a new form of partnership among stakeholders. The governance structure must wrestle with two problems. First, it must balance legitimacy and inclusiveness of the multiple stakeholders involved in development cooperation with effectiveness and a sufficiently high political profile to generate sustained support for and progress on development cooperation. Second, it must provide a balanced platform to which all parties are committed and in which they participate actively.

The solution to the issue of legitimacy/inclusion versus effectiveness has been elegantly designed. It consists of a two-tier structure, with plenary sessions at the ministerial level that permit full participation by all members (probably with a frequency of every 18-24 months) along with a Steering Committee that is limited to 18 members representing a constituency of stakeholders. The membership of the Steering Committee will rotate every two years, ensuring that many groups have a chance to be part of the committee over time and giving individual members the sense of representing a constituency as well as speaking on their own behalf.[2]

The Steering Committee is the working body of the new partnership and a reflection of a new style of global governance for the 21st century that tries, from the outset, to be inclusive of state and non-state actors. It is charged with the mandate of preparing the agenda and workstreams for the ministerial meetings as well as overseeing the monitoring framework. The Steering Committee will have three co-chairs, one each from DAC donors, partner countries and an emerging economy donor. The remaining 15 members will be comprised of five partner countries (including one from the g7+ group of fragile states), three donors and one each from emerging economies, multilateral agencies, civil society, private business, a parliamentarian group, the UNDP and the DAC.

This composition of the Steering Committee already represents a significant step forward in balancing the breadth of stakeholders and the need to keep the group small enough to have effective discussions. The fact that partner countries have the greatest number of seats, while other groups have formalized roles is also positive. Details of the process for selecting representatives from each group and the level of participation are still to be worked out and will be important in ensuring that the Steering Committee functions well. It is also necessary for countries to develop internal coordination processes so that their representative reflects the views of finance ministries as well as foreign affairs, defense and functional ministries with specialized expertise.

One finding from the Busan High Level Forum was that development cooperation was not always given the prominence it deserved in donor capitals. As a result, promises made by development officials and ministers at international forums could not always be implemented if they ran afoul of domestic vested interests. One example is the effort to untie aid. In her speech at Busan, Secretary Clinton candidly discussed the trade-offs involved. On the one hand, she said, the U.S. clearly understood the benefits of untying aid, and had moved to double the percentage of untied assistance between 2005 and 2009, but on the other hand it felt a need to get political support for the budgets that are turned into development assistance. The presence of Secretary Clinton and other dignitaries at Busan gave that forum the stature and political backing needed to move ahead to the next stage of developing a new Global Partnership.

This example shows that a high level of representation, preferably at the minister or deputy level, is needed for the Global Partnership and the Steering Committee to be able to project a coherent national position. Absent this, there is a risk that the debates at the Steering Committee will not have the full endorsement of capitols when it comes to implementation. That has already been a problem with the current Working Party mechanism and remains a risk to the new partnership.

SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION

The Steering Committee has given reasonable representation to emerging economy donors to reflect the growing importance of south-south cooperation. Emerging economy donors will have a co-chair position as well as another representative. However, unlike other groups, emerging economy donors are not organized as a distinctive body with uniform views and policies, so they may not find it easy to speak from a constituency stand-point. There is no mechanism for defining a common south-south position and southern providers of development cooperation do not have enough in common to develop a shared view in the way that the Paris principles define DAC donor strategies, or the Istanbul principles define civil society approaches. Given the growing number of south-south donors (at least as many in number as DAC donors), and their differences with regard to technical cooperation, financial assistance, geographic footprint, turn-key delivery, time-frame of engagement, and sectoral focus, it will be challenging for them to engage effectively on the Steering Committee.

Yet southern donors are an essential ingredient of the new partnership. They are the most dynamic source of funds and assistance, seeing sharp growth in recent years and promises of more to come. They often are important actors in regional cooperation structures, going well beyond aid, and therefore can leverage other instruments for development in a more organized way. Indeed, aid itself is probably the least important instrument of south-south cooperation.

More fundamentally, it is crucial for a global partnership to have a healthy dialogue between southern donors and DAC donors because of the potential for adverse spill-overs from the activities of each on the other. DAC countries hope that southern donors do not inadvertently lead countries back into debt difficulties and overhangs from which they have just been extracted thanks to the heavily indebted Poor Countries Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. They also look for greater transparency from southern donors and companies on environmental and social standards being applied to development projects. Southern donors, on the other hand, could also look to DAC countries to reduce the volatility of their aid, which can potentially lead to conflict and reduced effectiveness for all development cooperation.[3] Southern and advanced economy donors also can benefit from working together to ensure that partner country capacity is built to ensure good operation and maintenance of infrastructure and ultimately better results for partner countries.

As Ngaire Woods has argued, the reasons why donors fail to cooperate among themselves are deep-rooted.[4] She argues that each country has its own vested interests and need for accountability to its own taxpayers, its own philosophies about what is important for development (girls' education or infrastructure), and its own experiences with success as to what works and under what conditions. These fundamental differences have made it hard for like-minded donors to cooperate effectively (which is why multilateral aid has not become the dominant modality), let alone donors with wide gaps in development cooperation philosophy. Her conclusion: do not try to force cooperation and harmonization as it will not work, but pay more attention to coordination failures that largely stem from a lack of information. Transparency can go a long way toward instilling a "do no harm to others" mentality among donors. So far, however, the transparency debate has been conducted among DAC donors, through the International Aid Transparency Initiative, a voluntary grouping in which no emerging economy has yet agreed to participate. But if recipient countries request data to be made public, that should apply to all donors respecting country ownership and leadership in development cooperation. For example, Chinese aid to Cambodia is available in the local aid management platform and included in the annual Cambodia Development Effectiveness Report.[5] Building more comprehensive and transparent local platforms of this type should be the focus of the debate between DAC donors and emerging economy donors in the Steering Committee.

Emerging economy donors need the flexibility to be treated differently and on their own merits should they choose, rather than being shoe-horned into a common global standard for aid. From this perspective, the "building blocks" initiative launched at Busan provides a further opportunity for emerging economy donors to be treated as having shared principles, common goals and differential commitments for effective development cooperation. The south-south cooperation building block is a start at providing an avenue for sharing experiences among developing countries. It can serve as a mechanism through which emerging economy donors can express their different approaches more broadly than through the narrow experiences of the two members that will sit on the Steering Committee. It is to be hoped that the most important emerging economy donors will participate actively in this building block.

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One problem with south-south cooperation is that it is a broad term applied to many different modalities of development cooperation. It is about the "who" not the "what" of development cooperation. The Working Party building block on south-south cooperation does not, in practice, encompass the full range of activities and many of the most important providers of south-south cooperation are not active in that building block. It is therefore unclear whether that can become the locus for a substantive engagement with emerging economy donors.

Accordingly, it may be opportune to think of alternative topics where a substantive contribution can be made by emerging economy donors to the Global Partnership. Agriculture and food security is one possible area where there is growing interest from many stakeholders. Recipient countries in Africa have embraced the prioritization of agriculture through the Maputo Declaration and some, like Ethiopia, have new agricultural transformation agencies. Both Brazil, via its experiences with Embrapa, and China, via its extensive rural development and rice technology experiences, have a lot to contribute to agricultural development. Both China and Brazil have signed memorandum of understandings with third parties on this topic (China with the Gates Foundation and Brazil with Japan and other donors). International NGOs and the private business community are also active in this area. Businesses have recently pledged $3 billion for investment in African agriculture under the New Alliance for Food Security, announced at the G-8 meeting at Camp David in May 2012.

Without supplanting these other mechanisms, it may be worthwhile exploring if a new building block for the Global Partnership can be put in place, with active participation from advanced and emerging economy donors, recipient countries, business and international NGOs. Such a building block could connect the dots of the various coalitions already present in the sector and develop a comprehensive approach that is oriented to feeding the 9 billion global population envisaged for 2050.

THE PRIVATE BUSINESS SECTOR

Although the private business sector is now involved in several international forums, including the U.N.'s temporary Business Action for Sustainable Development and the Business Call to Action, its role in development cooperation has not been formalized except in specific sectors like HIV/AIDS. The Busan forum was successful in bringing the private sector into mainstream thinking on development solutions by providing a place for the private sector on the Steering Committee, and there is now a clear mechanism for developing further cooperation between the business and development communities.

The private sector, however, is not monolithic and its impact on development is quite different according to the sector of engagement. Mining and natural resource extraction companies contribute to development largely through foreign exchange earnings and revenues provided to support government budgets. Large consumer product companies, on the other hand, may contribute through supply chain networks involving millions of small-holder producers and distributors. Telecommunication companies can contribute by making access to financial services more universal through mobile banking.

These examples suggest that if the private sector representative on the Steering Committee is to have more than a *pro forma* voice, she must be supported by workstreams with active private sector engagement in "building blocks". But the existing building blocks are thematic rather than sectoral so it is not easy for the private sector to engage. The private sector building block has focused on public-private partnerships in specific projects, largely infrastructure, and the use of guarantees and other forms of public financial support to leverage and catalyze private financial flows for development. That is useful, but leaves untouched a large array of other private sector contributions to development.

Already there are calls for a new Global Coalition for Education.[6] The private sector has also been actively involved in thinking through solutions to agriculture and food security, both at a global level and at the country level.[7] Globally, businesses pledged to invest $3 billion in African agriculture during the 2012 G-8 meeting at Camp David, during which a new Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition was announced. Locally, Ethiopia has established a new Agricultural Transformation Agency to bring together public and private efforts to improve productivity and food security and other countries are emulating this kind of institutional innovation. The key point is that there is a new enthusiasm for integrating the resources and expertise that the private sector can offer with public and philanthropic funds in a partnership that can deliver economy-wide results.

These efforts are largely happening outside the current debates on the Global Partnership, but it is essential that the partnership play a role in joining together the various international efforts that are underway. New sectoral building blocks in agriculture and education, for example, could be ways for bringing the debates happening in other forums into the discussions on aid and development effectiveness that should be pursued through the Partnership.

TOWARDS A NEW MONITORING FRAMEWORK

It is in the area of designing monitoring indicators that ideas have still not evolved sufficiently.[8] The principles of focusing on indicators that are useful for a political discussion and review, and the desire to be focused rather than comprehensive are well founded. The indicators also have to strike a delicate balance between incorporating new elements of the partnership and continuing to monitor unfinished commitments made at under the Paris Declaration. They correctly have steered clear of outcome measures on the grounds that the Millennium Development Goals and any successor arrangements will address these, and focused more on indicators where there is a desire to change behavior. However, the indicators do not seem based on a sound theory of change and hence could be usefully adjusted.

The basis for the new approach is the recognition that effective governments, engaged civil society and competitive businesses are the institutional foundations of sustainable development and the relationships between these groups are the basis for the domestic accountability that is the heart of the principle of "country ownership" endorsed in the Paris Declaration. It is this domestic accountability that therefore should be measured in the new monitoring framework of the Global Partnership. But the approach proposed in the current working draft from the DAC is a mix of concepts. For effective states, the indicator is the use of country results frameworks. For civil society, it is the enabling environment that maximizes the contribution of civil society to development. For the private sector it is the ability to engage with development, although without any specificity, the default indicator again appears to be a measure of the enabling environment.

An alternative, adapted from a triangle concept introduced by Oxfam, is to develop indicators of the relationships between the three groups of actors that generate accountability for development results, rather than measures of the strength of the groups in the abstract. Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic exposition of how such a focus on engagement and impact could work.[9] It suggests that the key relationship that needs to be measured between the government and the business sector is the degree to which public resources can leverage private investments for development, either through joint activities or through joint programming and planning exercises. Private businesses, in turn, relate to civil society and contribute directly to development when they start to adopt a triple bottom line approach rather than conventional profit-maximization. (Of course, private business also contributes to development through profit maximization, but this is an indirect consequence of its normal activities rather than an explicit part of their accountability to civil society.) Civil society can also further development when it interacts with governments in a way to strengthen accountability for public expenditure of development resources.

By focusing on indicators about the relationship between actors and not the actors themselves, the monitoring framework can usefully position aid as a catalyst for development rather than a central actor. In the Paris process, mutual accountability was defined in terms of donor-recipient responsibilities, and this may have inadvertently crowded out more important domestic accountability relationships. The triangle of relationships depicted in Figure 1 brings the focus more squarely on domestic accountabilities as the main driver of development.

Translating these concepts into actual monitorable indicators appears feasible, and components of such indicators already exist or can be easily gathered. For example, the relationship between the government and the business sector can be measured in part by the degree of leverage of private resources for development that is created by public spending and aid. Already, as in the example given above of agricultural pledges, the private sector is committing to investments in development. It is obviously important not to simply count all private sector investment, but only that which is explicitly linked to government and aid agency plans and instruments. Thus, the degree of leverage could include all private resources formally linked to an official development project or program, either in the context of a public-private partnership, or in the context of a specific sectoral strategy or plan. The commitments made in formal partnerships such as the Global Business Coalition, or the New Alliance for Food Security or other pledges made by the business sector would be included. It would also be useful to include an indicator on whether information is available on payments made by resource extraction companies to governments, which signatories to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have agreed to do. Revenue Watch, an international think-tank, is already engaged in collecting such information and could be tasked more formally with providing an input into this component.

One side-benefit of this approach is that it would encourage the development of better statistics on aid and private sector resources for development. There are several distortions in aid statistics at present, one of which is the absence of any counting for public guarantees that leverage private resources, unless these guarantees are actually cashed-in (in which case the project is most likely to have been unsuccessful). By focusing on an indicator that explicitly measures leverage (and asking donors to report on their leverage of private resources) the monitoring framework would improve the database on development cooperation in a significant way. Most donors already try to measure leverage to some degree, so agreement to include this should not pose any major incremental burden.

The indicators for the triple bottom line are more complicated to measure and it may be necessary to start with a few examples. The triple bottom line approach tries to go beyond simple measures of corporate social responsibility to include more direct measures of the development impact of business. Civil society organizations are actively trying to promote improved standards of companies' behavior to maximize their development impact. Examples of indicators that could be developed include the number of companies signing integrity pacts, perceptions of corruption, willingness to participate in the EITI, and the extent to which Equator Principles are adopted and implemented. Rather than settling immediately on an indicator for this engagement, a pilot process should be launched by the Steering Committee with interested elements of civil society to explore workable alternatives. Without such a process, there is a risk of reverting to what is available. The proposed indicator, based on the Civicus' health of civil society index, is far broader and is not designed to reflect the specifics of how aid and other resources are mobilized and used for effective development. Using this metric would be expedient but not necessarily appropriate.

The third relationship of the triangle in Figure 1 measures the engagement between governments and civil society. Here the proposed emphasis is on the degree to which civil society is helping ensure accountability in the use of public resources. A critical element of this accountability is transparency. Civil society should have the right to know about public development spending, including resources mobilized domestically and through international cooperation agreements. That information should be available locally. Publish What You Fund has developed a useful metric on the degree to which local civil society can actually access information on aid flows. The indicator proposed by the post-Busan implementation group, namely the use of country results frameworks, is also a valuable indicator of accountability. It should not, however, be the sole indicator.

For donors who have already signed onto the International Aid Transparency Initiative or equivalent reporting mechanisms, transparency is not an issue in principle, although the experience with its implementation in practice still leaves much to be desired. Broader metrics of budget accountability and participation are compiled by the International Budget Partnership and should also be used.

For each relationship in the triangle, there will probably be a number of indicators that give some insight into the broader concept. In several instances, the raw data is being collected by think-tanks. Where that is the case, the data should be used rather than being independently and redundantly collected by donors or countries. In principle, there should be little difficulty in combining several indicators into a composite. That serves to add information in a useful way and does not add to the complexity or expense if the data already exist.

There are other aspects of the indicators that could be improved. The proposal to focus on the predictability of aid data rather than on its volatility is unfortunate. Predictability is defined as the share of aid disbursed within the fiscal year in which it was scheduled and by the coverage of aid in indicative forward spending plans provided to countries. But the cost to government is only partly from these elements. The bigger cost is when aid is suddenly cut off or disbursements are withheld as leverage by donors in their broader bilateral discussions with partner countries. Note that neither of the proposed indicators would show any movement if such a cut-off does in fact occur.

There are metrics of volatility that can be directly calculated and that could be used if donors are prepared to face the reality that when aid is unreliable (for whatever reason) its usefulness diminishes.[10] Responsible finance ministers cannot include aid receipts in the budget until they are realized, and cannot embark on long-term programmatic investments based on promises of aid. The cut-back in funding de-worming programs in Kenya in 2010 because of financial management problems in the ministry of education is an example of the collateral damage to development when aid is volatile.

The proposed indicator 9 on use of country systems is also unbalanced. This indicator measures continued improvements in country financial management systems and better use of such systems. But the bar for donors is set very low. For countries with excellent systems, donors only need to reduce the gap in using country systems by two-thirds. They should be asked to eliminate it. When country systems are good, donors only need to reduce the gap by one-third. This is an unnecessary burden. Given that donors have plenty of *ex post* mechanisms for review and redress if their funds are inappropriately used, they should be asked to use country systems as a matter of course.

There is also a lost opportunity caused by focusing the country systems proposal so tightly on financial management. What many countries are lacking is sound strategic plans and capabilities at the sectoral level. Indeed, a major part of donor aid goes toward technical cooperation that is aimed at enhancing such capabilities. This kind of aid, however, is notoriously inefficient (with exceptions in some agencies). The indicator on country systems should be broadened to include indicators of the effectiveness of sectoral budget, planning and implementation capacity that should be collected as part of sector-wide approaches and consultations.

Figure 1: Monitoring the Institutional Basis for Effective Development Cooperation



Source: Author adaptation of Oxfam triangle.

Other areas that are excluded will disappoint many observers. There is no space for an indicator on learning, despite the enormous emphasis today on knowledge and evaluation, and despite the idea that the purpose of the indicators is to inform a dialogue on behavior change. This is a serious omission as few developing countries have any formal processes for evaluating their development spending. One indicator that already exists is an assessment of the monitoring and evaluation framework of recipient countries, conducted by the World Bank. There is also considerable scope for aid agencies themselves to improve evaluation and learning processes. An example of what a learning indicator for donors may look like is provided by Birdsall, Kharas and Perakis.[11]

There is also no indicator on aid fragmentation or its converse, programmatic scaling up, although the Busan outcome document discusses scaling up as one of the key changes in emphasis when shifting the debate from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. Program-based aid approaches, the top priority for developing countries going into Busan, and one example of a potential scaling up metric, is also excluded as a monitored indicator.

Most developing countries will have their own priorities for how aid can be most effectively used. The indicators collected to monitor global progress should be complemented with qualitative assessments as to the performance of governments and donors in achieving the results laid out in national strategies and goals. It would be useful if the new Global Partnership could encourage such assessments to be systematically undertaken each year, perhaps by a local NGO or perhaps by an Aid Management Agency or department of the government itself. A few examples of such accountability reviews show their value. For example, the Royal Government of Cambodia produces an annual Development Effectiveness report. Among other interesting findings, that document also has information on development assistance by NGOs and from China. Building the data base from the bottom-up, through such reviews, may offer a pathway to more effective coordination than top-down processes. Local development effectiveness reviews are also more likely to be useful when governments have dedicated aid management agencies or departments to link development cooperation to their own national processes. That should become the norm rather than the exception and provide a solid base to link the Global Partnership with local partnerships that coordinate development cooperation in each individual recipient country.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The arrangements for the new Global Partnership are moving steadily ahead. There is already agreement on many of the key elements but success is not guaranteed. A few key changes could still be put in place.

The new partnership has correctly identified its key mandate as providing a global forum for a better political discussion on development cooperation. It has gone to considerable lengths to try and improve the legitimacy of the forum by associating with the U.N., by formalizing the roles given to emerging economy donors and non-state actors, and by increasing the relative representation of partner countries. It must now ensure that representatives on the Steering Committee have sufficient political clout to engage in meaningful discussions.

There is still uncertainty over the level of representation of select emerging economy donors. This is vital for the success of the new partnership. These donors should feel reassured if the emphasis of the new partnership is on coordination to achieve shared principles, common goals and differential responsibilities, not cooperation or harmonization of approaches. Bolstering emerging economy participation in voluntary “building blocks” is another mechanism for deepening their engagement that should be explored.

The private sector should also be encouraged to participate in building blocks. This can be done most effectively by forming new coalitions around sectoral objectives such as education or agriculture and food security where embryo groups already exist.

It is important to get the monitoring indicators right. It may be advisable to take more time before prematurely concluding on a set of indicators. This paper proposes focus on the institutional pillars of successful development and an emphasis shift from an abstract and very broad concept of trying to measure the maturity of the institutional pillars to more narrow focus on the nature of engagement between actors on key aspects of the mobilization and use of, and accountability for, development resources. It recommends a pilot phase of consultation and experimentation with civil society participation in developing indicators that best reflect the nature of civil society engagement with government and business in bettering development results.

The monitoring framework at the local level would also be more useful if it is accompanied by annual qualitative assessments that dedicated Aid Management agencies should be called upon to produce.

Endnotes

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