How *Do* We Get Along? Linked Fate, Political Allies, and Issue Coalitions

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Abstract
How cohesive are the nation's female and male minority elected officials in their group identities, political networks, and public policy outlooks? This paper empirically evaluates the coalition-building potentials of these elected officials in their sense of minority group linked fate, sources of policy support, and policy stands on key issues of pressing importance to women and minorities: immigrant rights, contested new rights, welfare and work, minority rights, among others. We assess the statistical significance of the intersecting identities of race and gender in their ability to structure the elected officials' potentials to form political coalitions based on common identity, political allies, and issue concerns. We explore possible confounding factors in this process such as experiences of socialization, social networks, perceived structural barriers, and personal political orientations and other resources.

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Introduction

A central debate in political science is whether, as the United States becomes "majority-minority," the different racial/ethnic groups will work together in ways that change policies, or whether the differences within these groups will lead to a more diverse and contested set of "identity politics." Furthermore, as increasing diversity has moved the discourse in this country from a "black-white" dichotomy to embrace multiple races, the diversity within each racial/ethnic group means that even the categories "Black, Hispanic, Asian" are, for example, insufficient as descriptive terms. For example, there is considerable diversity by nationality and experience among Asians, Hispanics/Latinos, and, with the arrival of more Africans and Caribbean Blacks, among African Americans. Should we use the term American Indian or Native American for those who were here before the advent of Europeans? Even the term "elected officials of color" generates discussions and, at times, arguments—the words we use reflect the complexity of racial/ethnic identity and political fights.

And, of course, the elephant in the room has been gender: Do women of different racial/ethnic groups have political experiences and policy positions that make them more similar to white women, cohesive within a single racial/ethnic group, or like women from non-white racial/ethnic groups other than their own? Furthermore, to what extent do women of color share more similarities because of their gender than they do with men of their own group? In 1992, the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings reshaped the discourse about race to include gender in new ways, and raised the question: Does gender trump race or does race trump gender? The fallout from that Supreme Court nomination roiled the political waters among the civil rights coalition, among blacks, and also energized gender debates, resulting in a record number of electoral races in which women ran for the Senate and the House (Morrison? 1993; Smitherman 1995; Witt, Paget, and Matthews 1995).

Just as communities of color – and women from different racial/ethnic backgrounds – have to manage identities and relationships that are complex beyond the "simple" dimensions of race/ethnicity and gender, so do the political elites who are Black, Hispanic/Latino, Asian/Pacific Islander, and American Indian/Native American. And they do so while they are shaping public policy and power in this country.

In this paper we address the questions: How do these groups of elected officials manage the complexities of their diversity – by race/ethnicity, gender and class within and across the different groups – especially as they provide leadership on policies currently under debate? In other words, what are the factors that support the potential for coalitions across race/ethnicity and gender within our multicultural leadership? Using the 2006-2007 Gender and Multicultural Leadership (GMCL) Survey, which is the nation's first multiracial and multi-office survey of female and male elected officials of color, we systematically examine the experiences, attitudes and opinions of elected officials of color holding public office at state and local levels to identify the potentials and constraints for coalition-building across elected officials of color. We begin with a brief discussion of the theoretical considerations underlying interracial coalition building. We then describe the historical experiences of the different groups that may inhibit or facilitate coalitions. After providing a brief description of our methodology, we present bivariate and multivariate findings, and conclude with a discussion of the significance of our findings for answering the question: How do we get along in a diverse and complex political world?

Theorizing the Possibilities and Constraints of Complex Coalition-Building

In analyzing the possibilities and constraints of interracial coalition-building, Lien (2001) argues the formation of long-lasting intergroup coalitions across racial groups may be assessed at three separate but interconnected levels: 1) the between-group level or factors related to racial interactions, 2) the within-group level or factors dealing with the formation and maintenance of a multiethnic community, and 3) the beyond-group level or factors related not to group characteristics but to the very nature of U.S. racial system. Based on Blalock's (1982) theory of inter-minority coalition-building, she hypothesizes that "cross-racial coalition is more likely to occur between groups that have high levels of friendly contacts, low incidence or sense of intense economic competition, are similar in language, religion, beliefs, and values, and are not too far apart in social and political rankings" (p. 126).

Given the varied and diverse histories and experiences of the ethnoracial populations in the Gender and Multicultural Leadership Survey, it is not evident that the empirical conditions for forging common interests exist. Indeed, it seems difficult to anticipate the natural formation of long-lasting, harmonious interracial relationships across these communities of color.

The GMCL Survey has also added gender to an already complex political framework; we examine the relationships between elected officials who are female and male, in addition to the racial and ethnic populations in state, county, municipal and school board offices. Whether these multicultural officials will be able to manage race and gender and also have some impact on their respective groups' status, has been one of the primary questions in our research efforts. Gender adds to the complexity in that gender relationships in American public life have been undergoing considerable reconfiguration in recent decades. Given the different social and economic standings of the groups in the study, their presence in the American nation, and cultural variations and practices in their home countries as well as those developed after immigration, gendered relationships will exhibit varying patterns across the groups, not necessarily in the same direction.

To be sure, under certain conditions, racial minorities have historically been able to form cooperative relationships among and across their various populations as well as with White liberals at the individual and group level. Cooperative relationships have emerged out of common interests and needs as well as shared concerns over racial grievances and aspirations for liberty and equality (Lien 2001). At the same time, in specific historical and contemporary contexts, racial conflicts and competition have also been observed for these groups. In some cases, the issues and interests of Latinos and Asians are different from Blacks(Munoz and Henry 1990) There are significant internal divisions within each race, and each group is being affected differently by global economic forces (Saito 1998). Scholars have observed competition and conflicts in governance in multiracial cities such as Los Angeles and other major U.S. cities (Jones-Correa 2001).

On top of continuing racial segregation and discrimination in housing and public education, Blacks, Latinos, and to an increasing extent Asians, have been in direct competition for housing, jobs, access to educational and health institutions, and political office-holding (Chang and Diaz-Veizades 1999). Black-Korean conflicts have been the subject of several studies (Abelman and Lie 1995; Kim 2000, 2001; Park and Park 2001) where economic and political competition are heightened by differences in cultural orientations and practices. Latino-Korean relations are observed to be equally multidimensional (Chang and Diaz-Veizades, 9).

Besides socioeconomic issues, a basic source of tension is the different concept of race and racial positions across the three nonwhite groups (Robinson and Robinson 2006). And gender, as a

way of understanding how the groups differ or cohere, can also be seen as another strategy for exploring group political development and dynamics.

Reviewing the political incorporation of people of color in American cities—defined as the extent of their role in dominant coalitions that controlled city government, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (2003) note significant transformations in race relations and opportunity structures for minority group advancement. They note that because of the significant entry of Latinos and Asians in local politics, the ground for political coalitions has been transformed by immigration. According to them, in many cities the future of political incorporation will be very different from the enduring bi-racial coalitions between blacks and whites that explain the strong incorporation of blacks in some American cities at the end of the last century. Instead, "[r]acial politics will be increasingly multiracial, multiethnic politics in many cities" (p. 366) and characterized by concrete and fluid formations of crosscutting and shifting, issue-oriented coalitions (p. 373).

On the optimistic side, Lien (2001) maintains that monumental changes in the social, economic, and political orders on both the domestic and international fronts in the post-1965 era may have significantly improved the opportunity structure for racial minorities to construct interracial connections. She notes that new grounds for interracial coalition-building between people of color at the *mass level* have emerged because of increased opportunities and means for personal and organizational contacts, improved economic and political status for the disadvantaged compared to the pre-1965 era, greater tolerance of and appreciation for cultural diversity in U.S. society and politics, as well as the nation's continued commitment to the founding principles of liberty, equality, and prosperity and the need to address issues of social justice and empowerment for all. Her analysis of public opinion data suggests that "[c]oalitions between Asians and Latinos and Blacks can be established based on their shared concerns over race-related social redistributive issues at the local level, even though Latinos and Blacks have distinct issue concerns and different social distance to Asians" (p. 168). She also finds that racial bridges are easier to build between Asians and Whites based on interpersonal relationships and shared ideology. Moreover, participation in group- or organization-based activities may reduce racial tensions between Asians and others by increasing the opportunity to forge a sense of common identity or linked fate with each other.

Lien's (2001) previous analysis, however, is based on analyzing the mass data, while this paper rests on analysis of political elites. The research reported here uses a new and one-of-a-kind large-scale survey of elected female and male elected officials of color. We explore the opportunity structures and possibilities of these officials to remake the contemporary political environment, and to represent the interests of their respective constituencies.

The paper now turns briefly to a discussion based on group narratives, before we begin our analysis of the data. This is important theoretically as the tendency in the early phases of comparative racial and ethnic group social science research was to elide the differences among Blacks, Latinos, Asians and American Indians in an effort to aggregate political coalitions beyond minority status in relationship to the majority white population.[1] We do not ignore the similarities in the groups' histories, but find it important to lay out the dimensions on which their experiences differ. Understanding these patterns will allow us to consider to consider how the categories of race and gender work across and within racial/ethnic as well as across and within gender groups.

[1] Important, irresolvable tensions associated with various classifications of these groups , inserted themselves into our research group's efforts to select satisfactory language category for them collectively or separately: are they minorities, are they non-white. Who is Black, who is Asian, who is Hispanic, Latino, Native American. The common group identity names we use were settled upon after considerable discussion. We've settled for "multicultural" as satisfactory for the four groups as a category, but the tensions remain.

We also want to recognize these differences which originate in the histories of the respective groups, in relation to the evidence offered in our individual level survey data (Junn 2007).

Narratives of Exclusion and Political Contestation

Elected officials of color represent constituencies with profoundly distinctive histories. That is, the groups they **represent** arrived in the country from nations with complex diplomatic relations with the US (Japanese and Chinese Americans), were made part of the US through postwar negotiations (e.g., Mexican Americans and Puerto Rican Americans), and/or have been conquered by population expansion and competition for land and natural resources (American Indians/Native Alaskans). African Americans became residents of colonial America by invasion, conquest and displacement from the African continent to all parts of the Americas; European nations sought to create a labor force in the Americas capable of the work other Europeans avoided if at all possible (Lowndes, Novkov, Warren 2008). The legal frameworks, economic development, constitutional recognition of citizenship, differing purposes for which the groups became part of the Americas (or as Southwest Latinos might say, the United States migrated to them), helped create important and varying patterns of political life for each of the groups in the GMCL survey.

At the beginning of the 20th century, all four of the groups were legally constrained, but in sharply different ways. African Americans, recently freed from slavery and made citizens, faced a long period of *de jure* segregation, which, accompanied by violence and the inattention of national government, strengthened by the decade (Payne 1995). The Native American population was gradually circumscribed by efforts to control, even destroy, the character and strength of tribal cultural life. Small numbers of Asians, primarily of Japanese, Chinese and Filipino origins, were isolated from their families and denied citizenship or the comfort of new immigrant cohorts from their homelands (Hing 1993). Chicanos in the Southwestern United States were gradually incorporated into the national polity, but as subordinate to the new 'white' Anglo- Americans who settled and displaced the indigenous populations (Hero 1992).

By the end of the twentieth century, sufficient liberalization and civil rights reform of the American nation state in competition for international leadership after World War II had reframed the political status of the groups, and begun remaking the character of American politics. The Civil Rights Movement in the American South, the protests and challenges of Chicanos and Latinos in the American west and Southwest, the Native American rejection of national Indian policy, and Asian American legal campaigns and protests as well as shifts in diplomatic relations after WWII, gradually liberalized and opened the American political system to all four of these groups (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967; Deloria 1985; Wei 1993). Physical access to the American nation, citizenship, voting and representation, long denied to nonwhites, had by the last decades of the twentieth century, become largely available to all of the groups (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1993; Hero 1992; Sonnenshein 1994).

While this description of the groups' respective experiences in the twentieth century suggests that they were more similar than different, research has shown that the differing characters of African American, Latino, Asian American, and American Indian political history, economic entry into the nation, subsequent social status and role, legal issues and interaction associated with their 'place', also produced differences in their respective political profiles (Junn and Haynie 2008; Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Saito 1998; Espino, Leal, and Meier 2007).

African Americans' long subjection to slavery, followed by *de jure* segregation and other patterns of discrimination, helped generate the conception, "linked fate," in which as Dawson (2001) argues, Blacks see their individual experiences related to the status of the group as a whole (also see Williams 2003; Pinderhughes 1987). The centuries of subordination from the earliest years of Colonial America, unaccompanied by large, fresh cohorts of African immigrants until the most recent times, produced a more consistent grasp of the American state and its relationship to the status of Blacks, than has been the case with any other of the groups we study (Perry and Parent 1995; Nelson 2000; Kluger 1975).

"Hispanic," is a complicated concept, with both out-group and in-group origins. Along with the term "Latino," both labels are used interchangeably to refer to those persons living in the United States who come from or who trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Yet another label, "Chicano," was self-generated as a positive political identity especially among youth of Mexican origin residing in California and other areas of the Southwest. "Chicano" still enjoys some currency and further complicates notions and definitions of identity among Spanish-origin groups.

Espiritu (1992) identified the concept of panethnicity as a possible bridge between various nationalities and races. By the latter decades of the 20th century, large numbers of immigrants to the United States added greatly to the diversity of the Spanish-origin population and raised issues of identity formation and definition. Pan-ethnic identity when first explored, was rejected in the 1980s (DeSipio 1996; de la Garza and DeSipio 2002) but has begun to be acknowledged more frequently by Latino/as since 2000 (Fraga et al., 2006).

Asian Americans, so long isolated after the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and other legislation barring immigration or citizenship, became citizens after the Post WWII 1950s legislation. The Asian population also grew rapidly in after passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, which lifted the highly restrictive country of origin quotas, and changed the admission criteria to equal quota per country and take education, occupation, refugee status, and family reunification into account. Now, except for the refugee communities, Asians of many different nationalities have access to the US, and tend toward a much more highly educated and high income population than either Latino/as or African Americans(Saito 1998, 21-22).

Earlier work in this project summarized the growth in the numbers of women and men elected officials of color after the passage of the Voting Rights Act (Hardy-Fanta et al. 2005, 3-4) and noted the significant contribution in the growth of women of color in increasing the size of the Black and Latino populations among state and local elected officials.

Historical and group specific description help frame the types of problems each group has faced. These challenges have not disappeared now that their access to political life has grown, and they have elected increasing numbers of public officials. A number of factors generate issues of considerable volatility: race whether sharply defined, or spread across multiple ethnic and nationality groups; language, if only a dialect, or a means of communication sustained across several generations; socioeconomic status, whether high or low; the concentration or the spread of the group across the country, continuing immigration from the home country, or lack thereof. Historically citizenship and immigration law carefully limited entry to Europeans, thereby, or at least attempting to, make the US a white country. Yet, racial and ethnic groups have populated Los Angeles, New York, Chicago and many other parts of the U.S., as the nation has been settled, The fiction of the racially dominant white nation, was belied by the significant presence of multiracial "others" throughout American history.

Stigmatized, segregated, denied citizenship or, if held legally, its exercise curtailed, African Americans, Native Americans, Latino/as and Asian Americans shared all of these experiences. Yet there are sufficient differences in their lives in the United States that they are not identical, and their political responses and efforts at representation will vary. What kinds of efforts do these groups make as they seek to participate in American public life? While African Americans were the "racial other" up until the 1960s and 1970s, they now share the political environment with other groups.

The history of women demonstrates some parallels, especially when examining the diversity of experiences in the acquisition of basic civil rights. While middle- and upper-class white women enjoyed certain privileges, the legal status of women was a hotly contested arena for centuries. Women were not allowed to vote until 1920. Rights we take for granted today are the result of legal battles: right to execute contracts; practice certain professions, including the law; own property; retain custody of children after a divorce. "It was not until 1978…that marital rape was outlawed anywhere in the United States" (Ford 2002, 17). The prospect for coalitions among women across race is even more fraught with obstacles. While there are certainly bright spots – including the strong links between those working in the suffrage and abolition movements – there are even more examples of tensions and racism between white women and women of color. Locke (1997) points out that passage of the Fifteenth Amendment reduced African American women's status "from three-fifths to zero" (385). The suffrage movement was filled with "nativist and racist rhetoric and action" (Ford 2002, 41). Later, within the Civil Rights and Chicano Movements, Black and Chicana women, respectively, felt marginalized by their male counterparts. Feminism's current focus on reproductive rights to the relative exclusion of concerns of greater importance to women of color/poor women (e.g., economic rights, the incarceration of minority men), has continued to create strains between women from different racial/ethnic groups. The rifts between Black women and White women, in particular, have generated mistrust; the literature on this topic is vast (see, as a few examples, Hull, Scott & Smith 1982; Moraga and Anzaldúa, 1983; Cohen, Jones & Tronto 1997). Thus, as in the question whether elected officials of color can form coalitions across the divides of race/ethnicity, one must ask as well whether women of color can build bridges across gender and race/ethnicity combined.

When looking at the full range of diversity by race/ethnicity, gender and other dimensions, to what extent do their political interests converge, and how divergent are they from each other and from the other groups as a whole? This paper explores these questions among political elites. We now turn to an examination of the views of female and male multicultural leaders from the 2006-07 GMCL Survey.

Data and Methods

Data used in this paper come from the Gender and Multicultural Leadership (GMCL) survey which is a systematic telephone survey of the nation's 1378 interviews represent 13% of the nation's total number of 10,073 nonwhite elected officials serving at the sub-national levels in 2006-07. (See more of the survey methodology in Appendix A) Among the 1,359 valid cases of survey respondents, 727 or 54% are Black, 513 or 38% are Latino, 95 or 7% are Asian, and 24 or 2% are AIAN elected officials. Close to half (47%) hold positions at the municipal level, 26% at the school board level, 16% at the county level, and 11% hold positions at the state legislative level of governance. About every 4 in 10 respondents are women of color (37%). The share of women

of color elected officials is highest among Blacks and AIANs at 42% each, followed by Asians at 33% and Latinos at 31%.

Participants in this telephone survey include 95 Asians or 27% of the universe of 342 AEOs, 17 American Indian or Alaskan Native (AIAN) elected officials or 40% of the universe of 43 AIAN state legislators, 727 Blacks or 12% of the universe of 5972 BEOs, and 513 Latinos or 14% of the universe of 3,707 LEOs. Among the universe of 3,238 women of color elected officials, 16% or 504 of them participated in the survey; among men of color, 13% or 855 of the 6,835 officials participated.

To answer the research question of if and how much our nation's state and local minority female and male elected officials can be considered as a politically cohesive community, we have developed an analytical scheme that tests the elected officials' perspectives and policy positions using six dependent variables. The first two are measures of the elected officials' perspectives (Linked Fate; Political Allies) and the other four are about their positions on certain public policies ("Traditional" Minority Rights; Immigration; Welfare/Work; and what we call "Contested New" Rights). Each of the six dependent variables is measured with a summed index where survey responses to questions used in each index share a moderate to high similarity in underlying structures across all respondents. Table 1 defines and describes how these variables were constructed.[2]

Table 1. Key Measures

Dependent Variable	***Measurement***
Linked Fate	3-item summed index of responses to survey questions asking whether what happens generally to other minority groups, people of their own racial and ethnic background (co-ethnics), or women in the United States would affect what happens in their life and how they view politics (adjusted alpha=.81).
Political Allies	6-item index of survey questions asking respondents to estimate the likelihood of support for their policy initiatives from colleagues who share their political partisanship, ideology, racial/ethnic background, or are white/nonwhite women, or from other racial and ethnic background (adjusted alpha=.83).
"Traditional" Minority Rights	3-item index of questions asking respondents to indicate the degree of importance for them to support affirmative action for women, and affirmative action and voting rights for persons from one's own racial and ethnic background (adjusted alpha=.81).
Immigration	4-item index of survey items asking respondents their attitude toward policy proposals that would permit immigrants access to driver's licenses, bilingual services, voting in school board elections as parents, and bilingual education (adjusted alpha=.67).
Welfare/Work	3-item index that consists of three items from the survey asking respondents their attitude toward proposals for the government to provide for poor working women and parents access to college education and childcare services (adjusted alpha=.62).
Contested "New" Rights	3-item index of respondents' attitude toward proposals to overturn the Roe v. Wade decision that made abortion legal during the first three months of pregnancy, and to allow gay and lesbian couples to legally form civil unions; and to view abortion being a legally protected right to privacy (adjusted alpha=.66).

We examine survey respondents' potential to form political alliances among themselves and build coalitions with other groups with ordinary least-squares (OLS) based analysis for each of the six indices discussed above. Each of the multiple regression models is based on the idea that minority elected officials' policy attitude and political network may be a function of their social group identity at the intersection of race and gender, sociodemographic background (such as

[2] See Appendix B for description of specific questions, for each indexed variable.

income, education, marital status, age, and immigration generation), and political characteristics related to their political orientations (ideology and partisanship), strength of social network, and political concerns as expressed in their assessment of minority policy impact from the increased presence of women and minorities in their respective governing bodies and their support for minority rights (except in the models that predict support for minority rights). For the models that estimate the likelihood of policy support from potential political allies, we add two additional variables that gauge the influence of one's incumbency status in the most recent election campaign and whether one typically votes with the majority in the governing body. We control for the level and type of office held by these state and local elected officials.

The results are reported in six tables with nested OLS-regression models to gauge the independent effects of the three sets of factors hypothesized as influential in structuring one's policy attitudes, political identity, and policy network. In each table, model I estimates the effects of respondents' group-based identities at the intersection of race and gender (Group Identity Model); model II estimates the additional effects of respondents' sociodemographic background after controlling for their group identities (Sociodemographic Model); and model III estimates the additional effects beyond group identity and sociodemographics of the political orientations, social ties, and views on minority rights and impact among the four groups of racial minority elected officials in the survey (Political Factors Model).[3]

These models are commonly used and have been assumed to explain various dimensions of political participation/influence by elected officials of color. The Group Identity Model, based on membership in racial/ethnic categories, suggests that elected officials with strong racial/ethnic and/or gendered identity might also have high levels of linked fate, either individually or in combination with race and gender, and might hold common positions on certain policies(Dawson 2001; Tate 1993; DeSipio 1996). While slavery, *de jure* segregation and *de facto* discrimination are likely to have had a significant impact among Blacks, Latino and Asian histories are much shorter and followed less consistent patterns. American Indians, having originated in North America, could also have strong group identity, and hence high levels of linked fate. And the various waves of the women's movement have documented that, while some women live privileged lives, others – especially women of color -- have had to fight to secure equal rights under the law; the model tests whether there are common bonds by gender among these women of color elected officials. We hypothesize that sociodemographic factors, especially education and income, play a significant role in predicting political perspectives and policy positions, irrespective of race/ethnicity and gender.

The Sociodemographic Model uses variables that would identify elected officials by higher measures of social status. Whether at the mass or elite levels, higher levels of SES or Sociodemographic variables typically are associated with higher levels of political participation and political influence. Given the life experiences and backgrounds of people of color, including elected officials (Hardy-Fanta et al., 2007), the Sociodemographic Model we use here goes beyond traditional SES models and includes additional variables: marital status, age and immigration generation. Finally, where elected officials hold similar views ideologically, are associated with the same political party, and have been involved in civic organizations, we hypothesize they would also hold similar views on policy positions, and as well on the other dependent variables.

Bivariate Analysis: A Selected Profile of Elected Officials of Color by Race/Ethnicity and Gender

[3]

Level of Office. A far greater proportion of women and men of color hold positions at the municipal level (45%/45%) and school board (34%/22%) levels than as state legislators (11%/11%) or county officials (10%/19%). Among Blacks, Latinos and Asians in the survey, the largest share of the elected officials is at the municipal level. Larger proportions of Asians and Latinos are school board members, than Blacks. A higher share of Blacks holds positions at the county level than Latinos or Asians. American Indians, only hold lower level office as state legislators, while a higher share of Asians (19%) than Blacks (10%) or Latinos (8%) hold positions at the state legislative level.

Most women in the survey, with highest proportions among Blacks and Asians hold municipal offices, while for Latinas school board representation is highest. Similar patterns appear for men: Blacks, Latinos and Asians all holding their largest proportions in municipal offices. [4]

Sociodemographic Characteristics. Substantial racial and gender gaps exist among respondents in family income earned in 2005. Nearly half of American Indians, one-third of Blacks and one-quarter of Latinos earned less than $50,000 in contrast to only 10% of Asian Americans. Women of color as a whole in the survey report having lower income than men of color, but within each race only the income difference between Black women and Black men is statistically significant. Lower proportions of women officials earn higher income than men: e.g. one-quarter of women but nearly one-third of men have family income of more than $100,000; 18% of Black women but 31% of Black men report family income of more than $100,000; while more than one-third of Black women and less than one-third of Black men earn family income of less than $50,000 in 2005.

Sharp racial gaps also exist in the educational attainment of minority elected officials in the survey, even though they are much better educated than the general population: 94% of Asians, 74% of Blacks, 62% of AIANs, and 51% of Latinos have a college degree or more advanced education. A higher percentage of women of color (70%) in the survey report having at least a college degree than men of color (62%), but within each race only the difference in educational attainment between Black women and Black men is statistically significant. More than three-fourth of Black female elected officials report having a college degree or more, but only two in three of Black male elected officials have attained such level of education.

Marriage rates differ significantly across racial groups. They range from 82% among Asians and 81% among AIANs to 63% among Blacks and 77% among Latinos. In each race except for AIANs, a significantly lower percentage of women reporting being married and a significantly higher percentage of them report being divorced than their male counterparts. The widest marriage gap is found among Blacks where 75% of males and 46% of females are married. Latinos and Asians report comparable gender differences in marriage rates: 83% of Latino males and 63% of Latinas, and 88% of Asian males and 69% females report being married. (?Tucker and Mitchell-Kernan, 1995)

Only 6% of the respondents were born outside of the United States, with the highest proportion among Asians (42%), followed by Latinos at (8%). Only 1% or 7 BEOs in the survey were foreign-born while all of the AIANs were born in the US. Twelve percent of the respondents were U.S.-born but had foreign-born parents. These second generation Americans are 25% among Asians and 28% among Latinos in the survey. Seventy percent of the respondents are of the fourth or higher generation. The average age of respondents varies from 59 for Blacks, 56 for AIANs, and 53 for Asians and Latinos. Females are older in average age than males in each race except among AIANs.

[4] This is partially a factor of the number of offices at each level with the largest at the local, i.e. the municipal level.

Political Characteristics: Partisanship & Political Ideology. About nine in 10 respondents are Democrats by political party affiliation (Table 2). However, there is a large racial difference in the percentage of those who identify as Democrat or strong Democrat Blacks report the highest share at 90%, followed by AIANs at 85%; Asians report the lowest share at 58%. About a quarter of Asians identify themselves as Republican or strong Republican, which is the highest percentage of all racial groups. There is no significant gender difference in political partisanship within each of the racial groups.

Table 4. Partisanship & Ideology, by Race and Gender

	Black		Latino		Asian		AIAN	
	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M
Democrat	91	90	78	78	68	61	90	79
Republican	2	3	16	16	23	33	10	14
Liberal	43*	30	38*	22	42*	20	20	14
Conservative	22	25	28	39*	16	33*	50	50
N	305	422	158	355	31	64	10	14

Table 2. Partisanship, by Race

	All	Black	Latino	Asian	AIANs
Strong Democrat	65.5	73.4	59.2	39.5	70.0
Democrat	17.3	16.5	17.7	22.1	15.0
Leaning Democrat	6.6	7.3	5.6	8.1	.0
Leaning Republican	2.2	1.2	3.2	4.7	.0
Republican	4.4	.8	6.9	16.3	10.0
Strong Republican	4.0	.8	7.3	9.3	5.0
N	1212	643	463	86	20

Despite the highly Democratic skew in partisanship, nonwhite elected officials in the survey have a three-way split in their political ideological orientation (Table 3). About an equal share of these elected officials indicate that their view on most matters having to do with politics would fall under the liberal, conservative, and middle-of-the-road banners. Asians report the highest level of being middle-of-the-road (44%). Blacks report the highest level of liberalism at 38%. AIANs report the highest level of conservatism (57%), which is followed by Latinos at 38%. Women of color are significantly more likely to report being liberal than their within-group male counterparts (Table 4).

Table 3. Political Ideology, by Race

	All	Black	Latino	Asian	AIANs
Very Liberal	10.0	11.0	9.5	7.5	4.8
Liberal	23.5	27.4	19.2	20.4	14.3
Middle of the Road	35.7	36.3	33.8	44.1	23.8
Conservative	24.4	20.4	29.1	24.7	42.9
Very Conserv.	6.3	4.9	8.5	3.2	14.3
N	1274	675	485	93	21

*p<.05

Bivariate Analysis: A Multicultural Context for Coalition Building?

While for the bulk of this paper we include elected officials from all levels of office, there is one type of data available only for state legislators that offers potential insight into the context where opportunities for perceptions of linked fate across groups and the potential for political allies and issue coalitions might emerge. We examine the extent to which a "multicultural context" exists at the state legislative level; we asked state legislators in the survey whether there a "minority" (or women's) caucus exists within their legislative bodies. In Table 5 the states represented by legislators of color have been assigned to categories based on whether or not they have one or more racial/ethnic legislative caucus or caucuses, and/or whether or not there is also a women's caucus.

Table 5. State Legislative Caucuses, by Race/Ethnicity and Gender

	States with a Women's Caucus but no minority caucus	States with a Black Caucus	States with a Black Caucus & a Latino Caucus	States with an Asian Caucus	States with an American Indian/Native American Caucus	States with a combined minority caucus
No Women's Caucus		AL, DE, KY,NV, OH, OK*, PA, VA			OK*	CT,WI
Women's Caucus	ME,MO,RI, WV,WY	AR,GA,IA*,IN,KS, LA,MD,MS,NC,IN	AZ,CA*, FL,IL,MA, MI,NJ,SC,TX	HI, CA*	IA*	NY
Total	5	18	9	2	2	3

*In order to show the states with an Asian Caucus or an AIAN Caucus, there are three states in multiple boxes: OK (both with AIAN and Black); CA with both Black/Latino and Asian; and IA with both AIAN and Black; the overall N of states in this table is 36.

Table 5 shows that the states of Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania and Virginia, have caucuses representing Black legislators, but none representing women. Maine, Missouri, Rhode Island, West Virginia and Wyoming have caucuses representing women, but none representing racial or ethnic groups. The states which mounted both Black Caucuses and Latino Caucuses (not combined, but both groups are represented separately in the legislative environment) include Arizona, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Jersey, South Carolina and Texas. Legislators in Hawaii have an Asian American caucus as well as a women's caucus. California is the only state that has Black, Latino and Asian American Caucuses, as well as a Women's Caucus. Only two states have an American Indian caucus, but

Oklahoma does not have a women's caucus, while Iowa has one. There are only three states with "combined minority" caucuses, but, of these, only New York also has a women's caucus.

We would hypothesize therefore that the most complicated legislative environments, that is, those in which intersectional policy approaches might be able to be proposed or sustained, would be in the states with combined or joint racial/ethnic caucuses in which there are also women's caucuses. We expect to continue this line of analysis infuture work.

Multivariate Analysis: Evidence of Coalitions?

Linked Fate

We gauge the respondents' sense of linked fate with their own and other racial minority group(s) and women; we report the findings in Table 6. When only group identities are considered (Model I), we see that Latino and Asian males register significantly lower degrees of linked fate than Black males, but there are no significant differences from Black males for any of the different groups of women of color (or AIAN males).[5] These racial gaps seem to grow larger when we add variations in sociodemographic background into consideration in model II. Here, we see that more education may significantly increase the sense of linked fate, while getting older in age may decrease it. The negative effect of age continues, the positive effect of education is moderated, and the effect of racial/gender gaps disappears in model III, when we consider the additional differences in political orientations, ties, and concerns.

What do we learn from this analysis? First, we should not be surprised that, among elected officials of color, the groups with the strongest sense of linked fate would be black men, and women of color. Blacks – female and male alike – in the country have a long tradition of "we rise and fall together" so it is not surprising that the same pattern would hold among their elected officials. Second, we posit that the "dual oppression" of women of color by race/ethnicity and gender might lead them to a similar sense that their fates are linked. This holds true even when sociodemographic variables are added to the mode, with women of color not dissimilar from Black males in their sense of linked fate. Additional education may be the result of its leading to greater understanding of the structural sources of discrimination; the negative direction of age may be because younger elected officials may have had less access to education or experiences that lead to a sense of shared fate.

Third, what is striking about these three models is that, in looking at Model III, race and gender are not significant when compared with the extent to which the elected officials share a political and civic perspective (i.e., the added political variables). And, other than age, the sociodemographic variables are also not significant (education is significant but only at the $p<.1$ level). Thus, a respondent's political ideology, partisanship, social ties, and support for minority rights may facilitate the forging of a sense of common identity as minorities in US society and politics, even more than their race/ethnicity and gender. We should also note that the adjusted R^2 is also more robust than when simply considering race/ethnicity in combination with gender. These findings suggest that our hypothesis that sociodemographic factors would be as influential as race/ethnicity and gender is clearly not supported. Finally, the findings are not unidimensional, but are complex. Some of the findings are based on what we already understand, involving stronger findings of linked fate, and for minority issues among Blacks – male and female – but they also

[5] When constructing the database of all elected officials of color that formed the sampling frame for the GMCL Survey, we included American Indian/Native American mostly from the level of state legislator. The N for the AIAN group is therefore small (24) and findings for this group should be approached with caution.

seem to move in the same direction with relatively strong support for linked fate among women of color elected officials.

Policy Allies

An important dimension of coalition-building among political elites is the ability to enlist support from potential allies – and, as discussed in the literature review above, inter-group coalitions are more likely under certain circumstances. We look into factors that may help predict policy support from potential political allies. Model I in Table 7 shows that, compared to Black males and other racial and gender groups, Latino males are significantly *less* likely to report getting support for their policy initiatives from colleagues who share their political partisanship, ideology, racial and ethnic background, those who are white or nonwhite women, or those who come from some other racial and ethnic backgrounds.

However, the Latino male EO disadvantage in lower levels of support from colleagues disappears when we consider the differences in sociodemographic background especially regarding family income and education in Model II. Respondents who are more resourceful because of their family income and education are significantly *more* likely to report getting support from potential policy allies. But, as in the case of Linked Fate, above, Model III demonstrates that shared political factors (i.e., one's level of prior civic engagement, assessment of minority impact on governing to benefit minorities, and supportive attitude toward traditional minority rights) may facilitate the likelihood of gaining support from potential allies more than group identity. The interaction of race/ethnicity and gender become essentially insignificant. The sociodemographic factors vary in unpredictable ways: for example, the previously significant effect of family income holds while the education effect disappears, and age turns out again to have a negative sign. Furthermore, whereas in the other tables, liberal ideology is a strong predictor of common positions/views, that is not the case in seeking support from political allies; interestingly, having a Republican partisanship may suggest a greater likelihood of receiving support from potential allies who share their ideology, partisanship, and racial/ethnic identity but this finding is somewhat puzzling. Also, being an incumbent in the last election campaign may have a marginal advantage in receiving more support from potential policy allies, while having a voting record that is typically with the majority in their governing body is strongly associated with the likelihood of perceiving policy support from their potential allies. Finally, what one must deduce from these findings is that certain sociodemographic characteristics are less powerful than race/ethnicity and gender – and that even more salient are the political dimensions. (One could make the case that Asian males as a group report getting more policy support from these potential allies to a substantial degree [b=. 619], but this is significant only at the $p<.1$ level.)

"Traditional" Minority Rights

Table 8 examines factors associated with respondents' level of support for traditionally defined minority rights such as affirmative action and voting rights; it is important to keep in mind that "minority rights" in this case includes affirmative action for women, as well as for nonwhites. Model I shows that compared to Black males, both Latino and Asian males are significantly *less* likely to support minority rights. Asian females, on the other hand, are marginally more likely than other groups of women to support minority rights.

Model II shows that the additional considerations of variations in sociodemographic background among the respondents do not explain or change the existing racial/ethnic and gender gaps. In fact, the only sociodemographic variable that has a significant contribution to the model is

age. The older the respondents are, the greater the support they exert for traditionally defined minority rights. We suggest that older elected officials of color in our survey (of which half are Black), may have strong ties to the Civil Rights and Women's Movements, resulting in stronger support for minority rights than their younger counterparts. When a series of political characteristics are introduced in model (III), the racial/ethnic gaps between Black males/women of color and Latino and Asian males are reduced but not removed, and the distinctiveness of Asian females as a group disappears. We also note that: one's political ideology, political partisanship, the degree of prior engagement in civic organization, and perception of the impact of the increased presence of women and minorities in public office in facilitating the making of policies beneficial to both nonwhite and white women, racial minorities, and the economically disadvantaged, all have statistically significant impacts on the degree of support for minority rights among minority elected officials in the survey.

Immigrant Rights

Table 9 reports factors associated with respondents' attitudes toward immigrant incorporation by permitting them access to driver's licenses, bilingual services, voting in school board elections as parents, and bilingual education. Model I shows that compared to Black males, Latinos males and Black females in the survey are significantly more supportive of these proposals to incorporate immigrants. After controlling for variations in sociodemographic background in Model II, only more education can be significant in increasing support for minority rights, and the racial and gender gaps remain. When adding differences in a variety of political characteristics into consideration in Model III, we see that gender differences between Black males and females disappear, but an additional racial gap between Asian males and Black males appears. Thus, everything else being equal, both Latino and Asian males are more supportive of policy proposals favoring immigrant incorporation. Here again, we observe that one's political ideology, political partisanship, the degree of prior civic ties, and perception of the minority impact on passing policies to benefit minorities by race, gender, and class, all have statistically significant impacts on the degree of support for immigrant rights. In addition, other conditions being equal, being more supportive of traditional minority rights may significantly increase the degree of support for immigrants rights as well.

Welfare & Work Rights

In Table 10, Model I shows that, when group identity is considered alone, Black women are clearly more supportive of this set of policy proposals than other women and than Black men, while Latino males are marginally less likely to support this right. When sociodemographic differences are considered in Model II, the unique supportive position of Black women as a group holds, but respondents with higher income are also somewhat more likely to lend support ($p<.1$). This is especially notable in that Black women as a group have lower incomes than Black men, so they are supportive despite the fact that their income does not compare with other higher income elected officials. Of course, their lower income, may allow them to grasp the problems and struggles of others seeking work and education, while simultaneously trying to manage child care. When additional differences among respondents in their political orientations, social ties, and opinions on minorities are considered in Model (III), we see that the significant gap between Black women and other women or men is reduced, while Asian males emerge as a group of elected officials who may be more supportive of welfare and work rights. We also observe that more income may facilitate support while being older in age may be an obstacle in lending support. The

negative role of age found in supporting welfare and work rights is contrary to its positive role found in the minority rights model. As in previous tables, we see that political ideology, partisanship, civic engagement, and support for minority rights are significant in predicting attitude of support for welfare rights. However, whether one perceives the benefits of having more women and minorities in office in passing policies to benefit the socially and economically disadvantaged is not a significant factor here.

*"**Contested New Rights***"

The most heated political fights going on today (other than health care reform) are around what we have chosen to call "Contested New Rights." These include attitudes toward overturning *Roe v. Wade*, viewing abortion being a legally protected right to privacy, and allowing gay and lesbian couples to legally form civil unions. Table 11 shows the results of predicting support for these contested new rights. Model I shows that, compared to Black males, Asian males and Black females are significantly *more* likely to hold supportive attitudes for this set of rights. When indicators of sociodemographic background are considered, only Asian males continue to show a greater support than the other racial/ethnic/gender groups. In Model II, higher family income and educational attainment are found to increase support substantially, but those who are married offer less support. These sociodemographic effects remain when political variables are added to the model (III). However, we see that in addition to Asian males, Latino males are also more likely to lend support for these new rights when all else is equal. Consistent with findings in the previous regressions, we find political ideology, partisanship, and attitudes toward minority rights to matter significantly in predicting support for these contested new rights. However, unlike previous findings, prior engagement with civic organizations does not matter and, curiously, respondents who perceive fewer benefits from having more women and minorities in office in passing policies to benefit the socially and economically disadvantaged may be the ones who are likely to lend support for these new rights.

We should note that we included level of office in Model III for each of the six multivariate analyses. In general, they are included as control variables. We did find that, compared to elected officials in other offices, state legislators are significantly more likely to support controversial (i.e., "contested new rights") policies such as regarding immigrant incorporation, abortion rights for women, and civil union rights for gays and lesbians. County elected officials seem to be most concerned about the implementation of providing childcare and other welfare services to needy women and parents. They are joined by locally elected school board members in expressing reservation regarding contested new rights. We find also that school board members may show less support for traditional minority rights and report a higher likelihood of receiving support from potential policy allies on their respective school boards.

Discussion and Conclusions

Analysis of data from the GMCL Survey of elected officials of color offers a unique opportunity to examine the potential for political coalitions among elected officials of color with full attention to the diverse and complex nature of the groups. Multivariate analysis including the intersection of race/ethnicity and gender together with class and other sociodemographic factors, plus political dimensions demonstrate the parameters (and positions) within which coalitions are possible. We hypothesized that we would find significant differences by race/ethnicity and gender in most of our six dependent variables: Linked Fate, Political Allies, and Support for Minority

Rights and expanded Immigration and Welfare/Work policies. We anticipated a decidedly mixed picture for what we called "Contested New Rights." We also hypothesized that many of the differences between the race/ethnic/gender groups of elected officials – i.e., male Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indian/Native Americans compared with female Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indian/Native Americans – would be modulated significantly when sociodemographic characteristics, especially education and income, were introduced.

What we found was somewhat surprising. For the most part, the analysis showed that women of color and Black men tended to be more similar, with Latino and/or Asian men less likely than the other racial/ethnic/gender groups to support most of the measures. In two cases, Welfare/Work Rights and Contested new Rights, Black women elected officials stood out as showing greatest support, which is not unexpected given the socioeconomic status of Black women and the relatively high educational levels the Black female representatives have achieved.

What was unexpected was that, although some sociodemographic factors were significant, they did not lend a substantial amount of explanatory power to the regression models (see, especially, Tables 6, 8, 9 and 10). In some cases, for example, where the dependent variable was whether the elected officials shared a sense of "linked fate" – surely a key element in coalition building among racial/ethnic/gender groups – the Political Factors Model (III) reduced the racial/ethnic and gender variables to insignificance; the *only significant sociodemographic* variable (at the $p<.05$ level) was age, but *four out of the five political variables* were significant. With the exception of Asian male elected officials, a similar pattern held for the support of expanded welfare and work policies (Table 10) and support from political allies (Table 7). Race/ethnicity and gender variables maintained significance (with Black males and women of color sharing similar supportive stances) in support of minority and immigrant rights (Tables 8 and 9) even while political factors were strongly significant. In these two cases, however, again we saw a weak showing for the predictive impact of sociodemographic factors.

What can we conclude, therefore, about the intersection of race/ethnicity, gender, class (and other sociodemographic factors), when seeking to explain shared political perspectives and policy positions among elected officials of color? First, that Latino and Asian men are, generally, less supportive of many of the perspectives and positions examined here than women of color and Black men (and, for the most part AIAN men). While Black males and women of color are generally more supportive, the striking pattern shown here is the lack of cohesion among the men of color, especially when compared with the cohesion among women of color. Thus, we can assert that, across the different measures, women of color do present a relatively consistent opportunity for political coalitions among elected officials of color.

Second, that, for the most part, sociodemographic variables (even income and education) did not add as much to the explanatory value of the model as we hypothesized. Third, that shared political ideology, partisanship, and other political factors seemed to contribute the most to the models, all else being equal (from a methodological point of view). Finally, and most provocatively for the larger field of intersectionality research and the prospects for coalitions across race/ethnicity and gender, women of color and black male elected officials share perspectives and positions that may offer the *best* hope for multiracial/ethnic coalitions among the nonwhite political elite.

Having reached these conclusions about intersectional prospects, it's also important to acknowledge that the patterns that shaped this first significant generation of African American elected officials are likely to change in the coming years. Ironically, the very existence of access to the American polity may lead to different patterns of participation, socialization and complexity

within the Black population. President Barack Obama claims all dimensions of his identity while successfully mobilizing the Black American population and others beyond it. Increased immigration from Africa, South America and the Caribbean may also lead to a more heterogeneous Black population than was possible before the end of *de jure* and *de facto* discrimination. For the moment, however the composition of elected officials by race and ethnicity may only change marginally, while gender seems to be changing more rapidly (Bratton, Haynie, and Reingold 2009).

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TABLES 6 –11

Table 6. OLS Estimations of Sense of Linked Fate with Own and Other Minority Group(s) and Women in the US

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	.845***	.019	1.007***	.096	.520***	.118
Race x gender (ref.=black male)						
Latino male	-.089**	.028	-.118***	.033	-.027	.034
Asian male	-.105*	.052	-.174**	.060	-.022	.061
AIAN male	.113	.121	.107	.121	.177	.119
Black female	-.032	.030	-.036	.031	-.042	.030
Latina	-.004	.048	.002	.048	-.009	.046
Asian female	.025	.095	.034	.094	-.022	.091
AIAN female	.073	.195	.093	.195	.052	.187
Sociodemographics						
Income			.000	.003	-.000	.003
Education			.031*	.016	.028#	.015
Married			-.008	.025	.004	.025
Age			-.003*	.001	-.004***	.001
Immigration gen.			-.020	.015	-.019	.014
Political Orientations, Ties, and Concerns over Minority Impact and Rights						
Ideology (5=very liberal)					.033***	.010
Partisanship (Republican)					-.137***	.039
Prior involvement in civic organization					.012*	.005
Perceive minority impact on governing					.028	.020
Support minority rights					.033***	.008
Level/Type of office (ref.=municipality)						
State legislature					-.015	.038
County					.024	.030
Local school board					-.020	.025
Adj. R-square	.015		.025		.107	
F-score	3.195		3.121		7.015	

N=1002						

SOURCE: GENDER AND MULTICULTURAL LEADERSHIP SURVEY, 2006-7.
NOTES: B=UNSTANDARIZED SLOPE COEFFICIENT, S.E.= STANDARD ERRORS
*** P≤.001 **P≤.005 *P≤.05 #P≤.10

Table 7. OLS Estimations of Predicting Degree of Policy Support from Potential Political Allies

	MODEL I		MODEL II		MODEL III	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
CONSTANT	7.455***	.102	6.651***	.508	3.560	.615
Race x gender (REF.=BLACK MALE)						
LATINO MALE	-.289*	.149	-.196	.175	.269	.175
ASIAN MALE	.029	.281	-.102	.323	.619#	.323
AIAN MALE	.508	.561	.487	.555	.498	.539
BLACK FEMALE	.201	.161	.223	.164	.126	.156
LATINA	.072	.255	.034	.253	-.056	.239
ASIAN FEMALE	-.387	.539	-.368	.533	-.437	.504
AIAN FEMALE	.070	.937	.241	.929	.490	.874
Sociodemographics						
INCOME			.047***	.014	.033*	.013
EDUCATION			.184*	.082	.119	.078
MARRIED			-.063	.135	-.005	.128
AGE			-.005	.005	-.016**	.005
IMMIGRATION GEN.			.066	.078	.113	.074
Political Orientations, Ties, and Concerns over Minority Impact and Rights						
IDEOLOGY (5=VERY LIBERAL)					.046	.054
PARTISANSHIP (REPUBLICAN)					.449*	.207
PRIOR INVOLVEMENT IN CIVIC ORGANIZATION					.200***	.027
PERCEIVE MINORITY IMPACT ON GOVERNING					.226*	.102
SUPPORT MINORITY RIGHTS					.163***	.039
INCUMBENCY					.205#	.112
VOTING WITH MAJORITY					.444***	.113
Level /Type of office (REF.=MUNICIPALITY)						
STATE LEGISLATURE					.223	.194
COUNTY					.165	.156
LOCAL SCHOOL BOARD					.253#	.134

ADJ. R-SQUARE	.005		.029		.147	
F-SCORE	1.652		3.086		7.610	
N=842						

SOURCE AND NOTES: (SEE TABLE 6)

Table 8. OLS Estimations of Support for Minority Rights

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	9.337***	.085	8.802***	.420	6.889***	.440
Race x gender (ref.=black male)						
Latino male	-1.143***	.123	-1.131***	.145	-.682***	.138
Asian male	-2.257***	.227	-2.291***	.264	-1.716***	.250
AIAN male	-.670	.505	-.650	.502	-.553	.471
Black female	.093	.130	.046	.134	.018	.123
Latina	.088	.209	.124	.209	.086	.191
Asian female	.727#	.416	.706#	.414	.517	.379
AIAN female	1.073	.798	1.094	.794	1.134	.724
Sociodemographics						
Income			-.007	.011	-.011	.010
Education			.005	.068	-.014	.063
Married			-.086	.111	-.028	.102
Age			.016***	.004	.010*	.004
Immigration gen.			-.078	.064	-.081	.059
Political Orientations, Ties, and Concerns over Minority Impact and Rights						
Ideology (5=very liberal)					.178***	.043
Partisanship (Republican)					-1.135***	.157
Prior involvement in civic organization					.078***	.022
Perceive minority impact on governing					.552***	.079
Level/Type of office (ref.=municipality)						
State legislature					.183	.157
County					.150	.127
Local school board					-.178#	.105
Adj. R-square	.168		.177		.318	
F-score	30.369		19.308		26.043	
N=1020						

Source and Notes: (see Table 6)

Table 9. OLS Estimations of Support for Immigrant Rights

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	2.509***	.032	2.291***	.162	1.374***	.192
Race x gender (ref.=black male)						
Latino male	.208***	.047	.210***	.055	.356***	.054
Asian male	.101	.086	.041	.100	.263**	.098
AIAN male	-.009	.186	-.016	.185	-.057	.178
Black female	.111*	.050	.106*	.052	.074	.048
Latina	-.051	.080	-.041	.080	-.056	.074
Asian female	-.065	.166	-.052	.166	-.095	.154
AIAN female	.347	.294	.383	.294	.334	.273
Sociodemographics						
Income			.001	.004	.001	.004
Education			.058*	.026	.033	.025
Married			.018	.043	.043	.040
Age			.002	.002	.000	.002
Immigration gen.			-.020	.025	-.021	.023
Political Orientations, Ties, and Concerns over Minority Impact and Rights						
Ideology (5=very liberal)					.080***	.017
Partisanship (Republican)					-.280***	.062
Prior involvement in civic organization					.017*	.009
Perceive minority impact on governing					.065*	.031
Support minority rights					.060***	.012
Level/Type of office (ref.=municipality)						
State legislature					.197**	.062
County					.004	.049
Local school board					.036	.041
Adj. R-square	.025		.029		.167	
F-score	3.503		3.343		10.517	
N=951						

Source and Notes: (see Table 6)

Table 10. OLS Estimations of Support for Welfare and Work Rights

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	3.028***	.027	2.986***	.133	2.090***	.160
Race x gender (ref.=black male)						
Latino male	-.068#	.039	-.055	.046	.070	.045
Asian male	-.035	.072	-.043	.083	.172*	.082
AIAN male	.158	.156	.156	.156	.178	.149
Black female	.115**	.042	.108*	.043	.065#	.041
Latina	-.006	.067	-.010	.067	-.017	.062
Asian female	-.034	.134	-.027	.134	-.095	.125
AIAN female	.089	.246	.107	.247	.077	.229
Sociodemographics						
Income			.006#	.004	.006#	.003
Education			.018	.022	.001	.020
Married			-.049	.035	-.023	.033
Age			-.001	.001	-.003*	.001
Immigration gen.			.011	.020	.017	.019
Political Orientations, Ties, and Concerns over Minority Impact and Rights						
Ideology (5=very liberal)					.087***	.014
Partisanship (Republican)					-.113*	.053
Prior involvement in civic organization					.019**	.007
Perceive minority impact on governing					.003	.026
Support minority rights					.067***	.010
Level/Type of office (ref.=municipality)						
State legislature					.061	.051
County					-.090*	.041
Local school board					2.090	.160
Adj. R-square	.017		.019		.158	
F-score	3.412		2.579		9.989	
N=958						

Source and Notes: (see Table 6)

Table 11. OLS Estimations of Support for Contested New Rights

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Constant	2.545***	.037	2.303***	.176	1.701***	.209
Race x gender (ref.=black male)						
Latino male	.007	.053	.036	.060	.131*	.059
Asian male	.394***	.098	.297**	.112	.441***	.110
AIAN male	.121	.217	.127	.211	.059	.201
Black female	.126*	.056	.083	.056	.036	.052
Latina	.029	.090	.034	.087	.069	.081
Asian female	.046	.179	.063	.173	.035	.160
AIAN female	.074	.350	.194	.340	.169	.312
Sociodemographics						
Income			.026***	.005	.026***	.004
Education			.078**	.029	.057*	.027
Married			-.234***	.046	-.194***	.043
Age			.000	.002	.000	.002
Immigration gen.			.008	.027	.001	.025
Political Orientations, Ties, and Concerns over Minority Impact and Rights						
Ideology (5=very liberal)					.126***	.018
Partisanship (Republican)					-.349***	.068
Prior involvement in civic organization					-.011	.009
Perceive minority impact on governing					-.062#	.035
Support minority rights					.060***	.013
Level/Type of office (ref.=municipality)						
State legislature					.132*	.066
County					-.111*	.054
Local school board					-.119**	.045
Adj. R-square	.031		.092		.234	
F-score	5.098		8.608		14.851	
N=906						

Source and Notes: (see Table 6)

APPENDIX A

Description of the GMCL Survey

Data used in this paper come from the Gender and Multicultural Leadership (GMCL) survey which is a systematic telephone survey of the nation's nonwhite elected officials holding state and local offices across the 50 states of America. It was conducted by the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) at the University of New Mexico whose interviewers telephone interviewed a sample of randomly selected individuals from a population of nonwhite elected officials grouped by race, gender, and level of office.

The IPP Survey Research Center, equipped with a computer assisted telephone interviewing system and a nineteen-station survey laboratory, trained interviewers to conduct the survey under full-time supervision, using a protocol that included at least ten attempts per number, respondent appointment tracking and follow-up, and reluctant respondent persuasion where necessary. In the event the eligible respondent from the list-based component was not at a particular number, interviewers tried to acquire a valid number for the designated point of contact. The protocol utilized to track calls and respondents was designed to maximize both the survey response rate and the consistency with which the survey was applied to assure maximum data validity and reliability. Upon request, the IPP survey research staff faxed and/or emailed a general study description to potential participants in an attempt to validate the study and the IPP as the survey implementers for this project.

Multiple lists of elected officials in the population grouped by their office levels and complete with their first and last names, official titles, phone numbers, and their reported race and gender identification were prepared by the GMCL project team and handed to IPP for field work, which lasted from June 5 to November 9, 2006.[6] A follow-up phase aiming to enhance the participation of American Indian and Asian American elected officials was conducted by the Center for Women in Politics & Public Policy (CWPPP) at the University of Massachusetts Boston and took place between December 15 and January 31, 2007.

Overall, 1,378 interviews were completed between June 5 and March 21, 2007, with 1,359 valid. The survey response rate as a percentage of the total successful contacts was 72%, the cooperation rate was 77%, and the refusal rate was 22%. It is worth noting that, overall, the refusal rates for this study were quite low for most groups and the completion rates are very respectable considering the difficulty of identifying valid telephone numbers where elected officials in state, municipal, and county offices, as well as serving on school boards can be easily contacted. Also affecting the ability to complete interviews was the degree to which elected officials—or staff members—were willing to comply with requests via *cold-call* from an unknown entity to participate in research, especially during an active campaign season such as was true during the implementation phase of this endeavor. The average length of interviews is 44 minutes. There are no statistically significant differences in the interview length by race, gender, level of office, or implementation stage.

[6] Information on the content and construction of the database which served as the sampling universe of the telephone survey can be found in Hardy-Fanta et al. (2006) and Lien et al. (2007).

Differential quota or unequal selection probability rates are assigned for each of the population groups to permit gathering enough cases for analysis by race, gender, and office. For example, the quota rate for Asian male municipal officials is .5, but that for their female counterparts is 1.0; the quota rate for Black female state legislators is .5, but that for their male counterparts is .33; and the quota rate for Latino male county officials is .33, but that for their female counterparts is 1.0. The overall quota rate is .24.

Limitations. Although the survey is designed to be a probability study of the population, our ability to generalize the findings is limited by the scarcity of the population in some offices and for some racial and gender groups as well as the idiosyncratic nature of the elite population that facilitates the participation of those who have more time in hand (fewer responsibilities, less campaign need) and are more accessible for the survey interviewers (have valid contact information on record, have no or friendly gatekeepers). To the extent that the survey approximates a probability sample of the nation's nonwhite elected officials at sub-national levels of office, we estimate the margin of error or the measure of the variation one would see in reported percentages if the same survey were taken multiple times for the total N at the 95% level of confidence to be ±3%. That is, the "true" percentage for the entire population would be within the margin of error around the survey's reported percentage 95% of the time. Note that the margin of error only takes into account random sampling error. It does not take into account other potential sources of error such as bias in the questions, bias due to excluding groups who could not be contacted, people refusing to respond or lying, or miscounts and miscalculations, as well as other limitations mentioned above.

APPENDIX B Question Wording

The **Immigration** measure is a summed index of four variables on eo's attitude toward proposed immigration reform

q 136 – immigrant drivers' licenses,
q137 – govt services in languages other than English
q138 – legal immigrant voting in school board elections
q146 – law that schools instruct in languages other than English -

The **Welfare measure** is a summed index of three variables

q 130, childcare services paid on sliding scale
q139, subsidized childcare increased for poor working mothers in welfare-to-work programs
q140, College ed count twd 'work requirement' for women on welfare

The **New Rights/ Contested Rights** variable is a summed index of three variables

q129, Sp Ct should overturn *Roe v. Wade*
q131, Gay and Lesbian couples form civil unions/legal rights of married couples
q141, which statements agree with your view on abortion

The index of **Minority Rights** is made of the summed scores of three measures on support for affirmative action for women and for minorities and the importance of protecting voting rights for minorities

q150, how important are affirmative action programs in helping women
q151, how important are affirmative action in helping **your** racial/ethnic background
q155, how important protections in current VRA for persons of **your** racial/ethnic bgrd

The index **of linked fate** is made of the summed scores of three measures on an eo's identity with his/her own minority group, other minority groups, and women

q56, what happens generally to other minority groups affects you, life and view politics
q58, what happens to people of your racial/ethnic background affects you, life, view politics
q60 what happens to women affects you, your life, view politics

The index of **policy allies** is made up of the summed scores of six measures of an eo's perceived allies in policy-making from colleagues who share their

political ideology,
ethnicity,
partisanship as well as
nonwhite women,
other nonwhite people, and
white women :

q 95 Elected Officials from your own party
q96 Elected officials from your own racial or ethnic background
q97, Minority elected officials from racial or ethnic backgrounds other than own
q98, Female officials from non-minority backgrounds
q99, Elected officials who share your ideology
q100, Elected officials who are minority women

<u>Institutional Context</u>

A. **Women and Minorities Make a difference**

q.121 number of women has increased – do you think presence of women has affected your particular governing body works – a lot or a little
q.125 number of minorities has increased – do you think the presence of minority eos has affected the way your particular governing body works – a lot or a little

b**. Race and Gender Caucuses**.

q112, formal women's caucus in your (state) legislative chamber
q115, is there a formal minority caucus in your (state) legislature
q119, is there a formal caucus for minority women in your (state) legislature