

HUMAN TERRAIN SYSTEM



KANDAHAR PROVINCE SURVEY REPORT MARCH 2010

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Contents

Kandahar Province Report.....	8
Key Findings.....	8
Demographics Summary	8
Safety/Security.....	8
ANSF Recruitment.....	8
Corruption.....	9
Political Legitimacy	9
Reconciliation.....	9
Introduction	10
Significance of the Study	10
Framework for Assessing Political Legitimacy.....	11
Service Satisfaction	11
Security, Corruption and Government Work Ethic.....	11
Preference for Dispute Resolution	11
Study Limitations and Challenges	12
Kandahar Province Findings.....	13
Kandahar Province Demographics	13
Crime and Security.....	14
Crime	14
Security.....	15
Services	22
Corruption.....	30
ANSF Recruitment and Popular Perception.....	35
Governance and Political Legitimacy	36
Perceptions of the Legitimacy of District Government.....	36
Perceptions of the Legitimacy of the National Government	49
Reconciliation.....	53
Conclusions and Further Considerations.....	54
Conclusions	54
Recommendations.....	54
Specific Recommendations and Challenges.....	55
Appendix 1 – MG Flynn’s Questions for A Rich Contextual Understanding of Afghanistan	56
Appendix 2 - Methodology.....	59
Distribution of sampling points by region and urban/rural Strata	59
Selection of sampling points and replacement of sampling Points.....	59
Selection of starting points within each sampling point	60
Household Selection.....	60
Respondent Selection	60
Respondent Substitution.....	60

Callbacks (rate, method, and results)	60
Interviewers	61
Training of Interviewers	61
Refusals/Non-Contacts/Completed Interviews	61
Breakdown of Non-Response Rate	62
Quality Control Methods	62
Results of Back-Check Controls	62
Problems Encountered During Field	62
Margin of Error and Post Sample Weighting	63
Glossary of Statistical Terms	64
Appendix 3 – Demographics	65

List of Figures

Figure 1: Districts of Kandahar Province analyzed in this survey.....	13
Figure 2: Percentage of respondents who believe there is a lot of crime in their area by district in Kandahar Province.	14
Figure 3: Percentage of individuals who feel unsafe when traveling in Kandahar Province.....	15
Figure 4: Percentage of individuals who feel unsafe when traveling in their home district in Kandahar Province.	15
Figure 5. Perceived dangers while traveling on the roads in Kandahar Province.....	17
Figure 6. Service satisfaction ratings in Kandahar Province.	22
Figure 7-A. Perceptions of service satisfaction by district in Kandahar Province – water, electricity, boys’ schools, girls’ schools.....	28
Figure 7-B. Perceptions of service satisfaction by district in Kandahar Province – medical care, cell service, development projects, justice & Courts.....	29
Figure 8. Corruption as a major problem in Kandahar Province.	30
Figure 9-A. Percentage of respondents who claim to have paid extra for government service – obtain identity document, resolve civil court case, receive services.	32
Figure 9-B. Percentage of respondents who claim to have paid extra for government service – file a police case, transit through a checkpoint.	33
Figure 10. Other beliefs about corruption in Kandahar Province.	34
Figure 11. Distribution of political legitimacy summary scores for Kandahar Province.	37
Figure 12. Districts in Kandahar Province with an overall ambivalent opinion of their government’s political legitimacy – Kandahar City, Shah Wali Kot, Panjwayi, Maywand.....	41
Figure 13. Districts in Kandahar Province with an overall negative opinion of their government’s political legitimacy – Rural Kandahar, Arghandab, Zhari.....	42
Figure 14. Districts in Kandahar Province with an overall positive opinion of their government’s political legitimacy – Daman, Khakrez, Spin Boldak.....	43
Figure 15-A. Political legitimacy summary scores for Kandahar Province.....	47
Figure 15-B. Perceptions of GI RoA and AGE control of district governments in Kandahar Province.	49
Figure 16. National officials work hard to improve Afghanistan.....	50
Figure 17. Government Respect for Islam.	51
Figure 18. Taliban Respect for Islam.	52

Figure 19. Perceptions of the Taliban..... 53
Figure 20. Support for Loya Jirga..... 53

List of Tables

Table 1. Perceived dangers while traveling on the roads in the districts of Kandahar Province.....	17
Table 2. Favorability ratings of the Afghan National Army and the Taliban by district in Kandahar Province.....	19
Table 3. Favorability ratings of the Afghan National Police and the Taliban by district in Kandahar Province.....	20
Table 4. Security threats in Kandahar Province.....	21
Table 5. Service satisfaction rating by district for Kandahar Province.....	24
Table 6. Perceptions of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police recruitment in Kandahar Province.....	35
Table 7. Definitions of political legitimacy.....	39
Table 8. Perceptions of political legitimacy by district in Kandahar Province.....	40
Table 9. Political legitimacy score between men and women by district in Kandahar Province.....	44
Table 10. Political legitimacy score between age groups by district in Kandahar Province.....	45
Table 11. Political legitimacy score between income levels by district in Kandahar Province.....	46
Table 12. Number and type of interviewers for Kandahar Province survey by Gender.....	61
Table 13. Number and type of interviews for Kandahar Province.....	61
Table 14. Kandahar sample weight and sample distribution.....	64
Table 15. Demographic tables by district for Kandahar Province.....	65

Kandahar Province Report

Key Findings

Demographics Summary

- A total of 1,994 people in nine districts were interviewed with a provincial sampling error of $\pm 4.2\%$.
- In the nine key districts of Kandahar Province: Arghandab, Daman, Kandahar (urban and rural Kandahar surveyed separately), Maywand, Panjwayi, Khakrez, Shah Wali Kot, Spin Boldak, and Zhari:
 - 56% are men; 44% are women
 - The median age is 31
 - The average level of education is 6.1 years
 - No tribal affiliation in this survey exceeds 7%, with Norzai and Alkozai tribes both equaling 7%

Safety/Security

- Security is viewed as a major problem in all districts surveyed, one that has deteriorated in the past six months.
- Road travel between districts in Kandahar Province is a major concern, especially for Zhari residents.
- Road travel outside their respective districts is perceived as worse than inside the district.
- The biggest travel threats are the checkpoints and convoys of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP).
- Al Qaeda and Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) are perceived as bringing the most insecurity to Kandahar Province, followed by criminals and smugglers.
- No district strongly favors the Taliban or strongly opposes the ANA and ANP.
- Daman and Zhari trust the elders/shuras more than the ANP.
- Except in Khakrez and Spin Boldak, the ANA rank highest in terms of providing security. Few consider ISAF Forces as providing security to Kandahar Province.

ANSF Recruitment

- The main reason for joining the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is the desire for employment and a paycheck.
- The main reasons for not joining the ANSF are high risk and corruption; the ANP is considered more dangerous to join than the ANA.

Corruption

- Corruption is viewed as a widespread problem and is experienced by respondents on a regular basis.
- Kandahar City has the highest level of corruption (71%).
- Corruption erodes confidence in the Afghan government. A majority of respondents believe government corruption forces Afghans to seek alternative solutions to problems.
- In five Kandahar districts, Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) have more influence than the Afghan government.

Political Legitimacy

- Kandahar Province as a whole is ambivalent about the political legitimacy of their government.
- Lower income males tend to be disenchanted with their government.
- Perceptions of political legitimacy vary little by age. Higher family income is associated with increased perceptions of political legitimacy.
- Residents of Kandahar Province believe that the National Government respects Islamic values, except for residents of Arghandab, Shah Wali Kot and Kandahar city districts, which view the Taliban as more closely aligned with Islam than is the government.

Reconciliation

- There is wide support for negotiation with the Taliban and a *Loya Jirga* to spur negotiation.
- Most respondents have sympathy for the reasons AGEs take up arms against the government.

Introduction

This report details the findings of an Attitude and Perceptions Survey in Kandahar province. The report uses descriptive and inferential statistics for the purpose of assessing attitudes and perceptions and providing information for planning purposes. The findings are structured around three priorities: to understand how connected district residents are to their district government, to promote good governance, and to determine what drives popular support or opposition to the insurgency.

Perceptions of the following are addressed in this report:

- The government as the officially recognized authority of the district and province.
- The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as viable, trustworthy entities that provide safety and security for the people of Kandahar.
- The provision of essential services by trusted authorities.
- Corruption control and the work ethic of government officials.
- The Taliban, as a competing force for control of the government and Islamic values.

The overarching goal of this report is to produce actionable insights that will improve policies and programs aimed at enhancing the quality of life for Afghans. In addition, the findings are presented with the expectation that the results will point to potential means for strengthening support for the Afghan government.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is three-fold. First, the study includes the results of surveys that included key districts in Kandahar Province (N = 1,994). The data generated allow for multiple approaches to address key questions of interest to the Coalition Forces (CF) and GIRoA. The information is also used to address questions proposed by MG Flynn to help facilitate research in Afghanistan (Appendix 1).

Second, this study utilizes both descriptive and inferential statistics. Graphic analysis and descriptive statistics (for instance, the percent of district respondents who believe that corruption is a major problem) describe the basic features of the data and form the basis of this report. Inferential statistics (e.g., *Chi-square* analysis, ANOVA, *Pearson's r*, *t*-tests) can reach conclusions that extend beyond the sample data to the population of interest; in this case, all district residents. Furthermore, because inferential statistics is based on probability theory, it permits a test of whether observed group differences (e.g., respondent attitudes toward the ANA by district government) are *real* differences, or might have happened by chance. For more information on statistical techniques used in this report see the *Glossary of Statistical Terms* in Appendix 2-Methodology.

The third significant feature of this study is that it applies different analytical techniques to assess interrelated themes. That is, respondents' perceptions are researched from the

assumption that perceptions are not always discrete; rather they are interconnected, as illustrated in the next section.

Framework for Assessing Political Legitimacy

Political legitimacy, a term used throughout this report, is a value-laden concept that individuals and groups ascribe to things that they believe should be supported and sustained. Without it, states, development projects, stability operations, and reconstruction efforts fail. How does one gauge if a government is perceived as legitimate, or at least more legitimate than other AGE vying for political power, such as the Taliban? This concept can be measured in ways that will be useful to those organizations and agencies involved in these districts and provinces. This report uses a broad set of indicators which, when combined, create an index of political legitimacy as described below (see also *Table 7 – Definitions of political legitimacy*).

Service Satisfaction

These questions examine respondent opinions regarding the quality and availability of services. The services include clean water, electricity, primary schooling for girls and boys, medical care, development projects, and justice and the courts. Cell phone service is excluded from this analysis because it is provided by private telecommunication companies.

Security, Corruption and Government Work Ethic

Effective control over territory is a key element of political legitimacy especially in a conflict state. Are government officials viewed as the legitimate power in the district? Or are AGEs in control? Furthermore, to what extent are district officials perceived as corrupt and inefficient or hard-working and capable? These questions are included in the analysis of the perceived legitimacy of district government.

Preference for Dispute Resolution

The *jirga* or *shura* is the forum that tribes in Afghanistan have used for centuries to discuss social issues and settle disputes. Therefore, district residents were asked where they go to resolve their disputes about land, property or personal issues.

The enhancement of governmental legitimacy requires building support among diverse populations. Therefore, whether districts face serious problems of political legitimacy among different population groups (men and women, younger and older residents, low and high income earners) is considered. No judgment is made about whether government at the local or national level is or is not legitimate. Instead, the focus is on whether certain groups view government as more or less legitimate compared to other groups similarly situated.

Finally, it is not assumed that the population under study shares a particular normative view about what constitutes the political legitimacy of the district government. Instead, multiple statistical tests help determine how reliable and accurate our conception of political legitimacy is for this population.

Study Limitations and Challenges

In the field of research, every study has limitations and challenges that need to be taken into account when considering the findings and their contributions. This project is no different. First and foremost, sampling issues and the safety of the interviewers presented a challenge.

There are inherent dangers associated with conducting surveys in a conflict zone such as Afghanistan. As a result, the interviews were conducted in districts which were safely accessible to interviewers implementing a multi-stage sampling plan. These include 9 out of 16 districts in Kandahar Province, with the main population center, Kandahar City, sampled separately. Thus, scores that combine district responses to compute an overall provincial score reflect only the districts in this study.

Kandahar Province Findings




Figure 1: Districts of Kandahar Province analyzed in this survey.

Kandahar Province Demographics

A total of 1,994 individuals were interviewed with a margin of error of $\pm 4.2\%$. A full depiction of the demographic summary is presented in Appendix 3. By gender, the sample is 56% male and 44% female. Due to local security conditions, only men were surveyed in Maywand and Shah Wali Kot districts. Sixty percent are between the ages of 18 and 34; 40% are 35 and older. The mean age is 34. Fifty-seven percent have no formal education.

Thirty-eight percent are employed in non-farm professions, nine percent are unemployed, and 43% are housewives. An additional 7% are full-time farmers. Eighty-two percent are married. The monthly income based on the trichotomized sample is: less than 10,000 Afs (28%), 10-20,000 Afs (33%), and more than 20,000 Afs (37%).

Ninety-nine percent of the sample is Pashtun and 98% is Sunni Muslim. In the Kandahar sample, no tribes are greater than 10% of the sample. The most represented tribes in the sample are Norzai and Alkozai, each at seven percent.

Crime and Security

Security is a core issue for the people of Afghanistan. Consequently, the survey covered this issue from a number of vantage points.

Crime

Crime is a concern in Kandahar province in some districts. Although there is little difference between rural Kandahar (20%) and Kandahar City (25%), in six of the ten districts surveyed, at least 30% of those interviewed believe there is a lot of crime in their area (Figure 2).

Concerns about crime are most severe in Khakrez (42%).




Figure 2: Percentage of respondents who believe there is a lot of crime in their area by district in Kandahar Province.

Security

Security on the roads is a major concern for Kandahar respondents. When respondents are asked if they feel unsafe traveling within their district or around the province, in eight out of ten districts, at least half say they are unsafe (Figure 3 and Figure 4). Residents of Zhari (73%) and Khakrez (59%) feel the most vulnerable when traveling within their district. Residents of these two districts also have the highest perception that travel within Kandahar province is unsafe as well. Kandahar City has the lowest percentage of individuals who feel unsafe traveling within their district (47%) and around the province (42%).




Figure 3: Percentage of individuals who feel unsafe when traveling in Kandahar Province




Figure 4: Percentage of individuals who feel unsafe when traveling in their home district in Kandahar Province.

Figure 5 displays the reasons people feel unsafe on the roads. The greatest perceived threats when travelling are ANA and ANP convoys and checkpoints (Figure 5). Given that over half of the respondents identify the ANA/ANP checkpoints (58%) and vehicles on the roads (56%) as a source of danger, there is a strong possibility of increased friction between the Afghan government and the people of Kandahar.

The same trend is observed in district-level responses. The people of Kandahar City see the greatest number of threats while traveling. The ANA/ANP are the biggest threats while on the road. Danger from ANA/ANP vehicles comes in two forms – either check points or vehicles that run other travelers off the road. Except for Kandahar City, less than half of those interviewed believe ISAF convoys or check points are a threat while traveling. In Daman, the biggest threats are roadside bombs (64%) (Figure 5 and Table 1).




Figure 5. Perceived dangers while traveling on the roads in Kandahar Province.

Table 1. Perceived dangers while traveling on the roads in the districts of Kandahar Province.

	ANA/ ANP Check points	ANA/ ANP Vehicles	ISAF Convoys	ISAF Check points	Roadside Bombs	Taliban / AGE Check points	Criminals
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Kandahar City	65	62	55	50	42	48	42
Kandahar Rural	60	55	37	33	56	33	39
Arghandab	65	48	26	39	53	39	35
Daman	49	51	38	31	64	33	27
Khakrez	46	59	32	37	30	18	26
Maywand	55	62	52	47	32	27	31
Panjwayi	44	40	39	29	44	37	29
Shah Wali Kot	49	54	37	43	27	28	27
Spin Boldak	59	50	38	35	39	28	31
Zhari	52	61	45	43	51	24	16
Province	58	56	44	41	44	37	34

Because government, anti-government activities and security are interconnected, attitudes toward the predominant institutions of security – the ANA and ANP – are examined in conjunction with attitudes toward the Taliban (see Tables 2 and 3).

“Attitudes toward the Taliban” is a composite measure based on responses to the following questions: whether it’s better to negotiate with the Taliban; whether the Taliban are “our Afghan brothers”; and whether most Taliban would stop fighting if they were given jobs. Attitudes toward the ANA and ANP are measured with single questions asking respondents how much they favor or oppose these institutions. The categorization of Kandahar districts is based on their rankings. Districts in the top half of the rankings are categorized as “more favorable,” while districts in the bottom half of the rankings are categorized as “less favorable.”

Across all districts of Kandahar Province, the ANA is viewed favorably (Table 2). As a result, most districts cluster at the bottom row of Table 2. However, many respondents also favor the Taliban. In Panjwayi, Shah Wali Kot and Spin Boldak, respondents are more “pro-ANA” and they hold less favorable views of the Taliban, the optimal scenario for the Afghan government. Daman respondents hold a less favorable opinion of both the ANA and the Taliban. It is important to note that while perceptions of the Taliban are less favorable than of the ANA, they are not unfavorable.

The ANP is not as popular as the ANA in Kandahar Province (Table 3). Respondents in districts that have less favorable views of the ANP do not gravitate toward more favorable feelings on the Taliban. However, in Maywand, Shah Wali Kot and Khakrez respondents like the Taliban less and the ANP more. While the favorability ratings of the ANP are not as high as the ANA in both instances, no district is completely for the Taliban and against the ANA or ANP.

Two districts, Shah Wali Kot (Table 2) and Khakrez (Table 3) have rankings that are middle of the road for the Taliban.

Table 2. Favorability ratings of the Afghan National Army and the Taliban by district in Kandahar Province.

		Taliban	
		Less Favorable	More Favorable
Afghan National Army ¹	Less Favorable	Daman	
	More Favorable	Panjwayi Shah Wali Kot ¹ Spin Boldak	Kandahar City Rural Kandahar Arghandab Khakrez Maywand Shah Wali Kot ¹ Zhari

¹ District falls on both sides of the median value of the logged Taliban variable.

Table 3. Favorability ratings of the Afghan National Police and the Taliban by district in Kandahar Province.

		Taliban	
		Less Favorable	More Favorable
Afghan National Police ¹	Less Favorable	Rural Kandahar Arghandab Daman Panjwayi Spin Boldak Zhari	
	More Favorable	Khakrez ¹ Maywand Shah Wali Kot	Kandahar City Khakrez ¹

¹ District falls on both sides of the median value of the logged Taliban variable.

Table 4. Security threats in Kandahar Province.

Brings Insecurity	%	Brings Security	%
Mukhalafeen-e-Dawlat (AGE)	19	Afghan National Army	30
Al Qaeda	18	Afghan National Police	24
Taliban	18	Shuras/Elders	15
Criminals	16	The People Themselves	10
Jobless people	9	Local commanders	9
Smugglers	7	ISAF	5
ISAF	6	No one	3
Local armed groups/Commanders	4	Taliban	2
Afghan National Police	2	Don't Know	0.6
Other Government agencies (not ANP/ANA)	1	Other Government agencies (not ANP/ANA)	0.5
No one	1	Other	0.3
Don't Know	0.4	Refused	0.2
Refused	0.3		
Other	0.1		
Afghan National Army	0.1		

There is no consensus on the main threat to security in Kandahar (Table 4). While respondents are uncertain about which group is the greatest threat in their mantaqa, they are more likely to view the Afghan government's security forces—the ANA and the ANP—as having a positive effect on security conditions in their area. The only districts where the ANP is not one of the top two sources of security are Daman and Zhari; in both districts opinion of the ANP is mixed and shuras and elders rank higher than the ANP.

Services

Respondents also indicated their level of satisfaction with the provision of services in Kandahar Province. In Figure 6, the two categories of very and somewhat satisfied and very and somewhat unsatisfied are combined to give an overall indication of service satisfaction or dissatisfaction. As a whole, residents of Kandahar Province are satisfied with their access to clean water (74%) and cell phone service (57%). Conversely, the services they are most dissatisfied with are the availability of girls' schools (62%) and electricity (72%).




Figure 6. Service satisfaction ratings in Kandahar Province.

Table 5 categorizes respondents' perceptions of the quality of services by district. On a positive note, clean water is perceived to be readily available throughout the province with the majority of districts displaying a service satisfaction rating of 70% or higher (Very Satisfied and Somewhat Satisfied combined). Khakrez and Shah Wali Kot are the two districts with the lowest overall satisfaction at 54% and 58% respectively (Figure 7). However, a regular, consistent supply of electricity appears to be lacking. Except for Kandahar City, all areas of Kandahar Province report a satisfaction rating of less than 30%

percent. Moreover, seven districts indicate less than 20% satisfaction with the access to electricity. Maywand has the lowest satisfaction at eleven percent.

In terms of the quality and availability of boys' and girls' primary schools, there is wide variation between districts. For boys' schools, Kandahar City has the highest approval rating (72%, Very Satisfied and Somewhat Satisfied combined). Arghandab has the next highest satisfaction rating (57%), but drops to 19% in Zhari district. Satisfaction with girls' schools is similar to boys' schools with a 60% satisfaction rating in Kandahar City, which drops precipitously to 15% in Maywand. Of interest is Khakrez where the satisfaction with girls' schools is 41% compared to only 30% for boys' schools. Khakrez is the only district in which satisfaction with girls' primary schools is higher than that of boys' schools.

Access to satisfactory medical care is roughly evenly split across districts. Interestingly, people in the Maywand district— a predominantly rural area – are more satisfied with medical care (64%) than Kandahar City (55%), where people have greater access to modern medical care services. Arghandab (31%) and rural Kandahar residents (37%) are the least satisfied with medical care in their respective districts.

Not unexpectedly, cell phone service is perceived to be the best in Kandahar City with a 73% satisfaction rating. All other districts have less than a 60% satisfaction rating with four districts, Arghandab, Daman, Shah Wali Kot, and Zhari ranging falling between 40 and 42%.

Development projects get mixed reviews in Kandahar Province. Overall, 48% of respondents (Very Satisfied and Somewhat Satisfied combined) are satisfied with development in the province, with Kandahar City (58%) having the highest level of satisfaction. Four districts, however, have a less than 40% satisfactory opinion of development in their district. These include Daman, Shah Wali Kot, Spin Boldak, and Zhari.

Lastly, respondents were questioned about their satisfaction with services in the court system. The opinion among those surveyed is that dealing with the court system is risky, with roughly a 50% chance of being satisfied with the outcome. This is similar across districts with satisfaction ratings between 40% (Daman and rural Kandahar) and 60% (Kandahar City).

Table 5. Service satisfaction rating by district for Kandahar Province.

Services	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Unsatisfied	Very Unsatisfied	Don't Know	Refused
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Clean Water	26	48	18	8	0.1	---
Arghandab	16	57	19	8	---	---
Daman	40	41	15	4	---	---
Kandahar City	27	46	21	6	---	---
Kandahar Rural	26	52	16	5	---	---
Khakrez	12	42	23	23	---	---
Maywand	22	48	20	10	0.9	---
Panjwayi	34	46	14	6	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	21	37	22	20	---	---
Spin Boldak	18	48	20	13	---	---
Zhari	42	48	5	4	---	--
Electricity	7	21	35	37	0.1	---
Arghandab	3	20	40	36	0.8	---
Daman	1	16	41	42	---	---
Kandahar City	16	30	28	26	---	---
Kandahar Rural	2	14	44	39	---	---
Khakrez	2	14	57	27	---	---
Maywand	3	8	42	47	---	---
Panjwayi	4	22	37	37	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	2	14	38	45	---	---
Spin Boldak	0.4	16	36	48	---	---
Zhari	2	11	32	55	---	---
Primary School for Boys	9	42	29	19	---	---
Arghandab	7	50	31	12	---	---
Daman	4	33	34	28	---	---
Kandahar City	16	56	26	2	---	---
Kandahar Rural	9	39	29	24	---	---
Khakrez	7	23	48	23	---	---
Maywand	2	33	28	37	---	---
Panjwayi	8	33	32	27	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	---	25	38	38	---	---
Spin Boldak	5	40	32	22	---	---
Zhari	2	17	25	56	---	---

Services	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Unsatisfied	Very Unsatisfied	Don't Know	Refused
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary School for Girls	8	30	36	27	---	---
Arghandab	6	34	21	38	---	---
Daman	8	21	36	36	---	---
Kandahar City	15	45	32	8	---	---
Kandahar Rural	6	16	46	31	---	---
Khakrez	7	34	36	23	---	---
Maywand	2	13	44	41	---	---
Panjwayi	4	28	35	33	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	4	15	39	42	---	---
Spin Boldak	2	25	34	38	---	---
Zhari	2	14	34	50	---	---
Medical Care	12	37	37	13	0.1	0.1
Arghandab	4	27	52	16	0.8	---
Daman	10	43	28	18	---	2
Kandahar City	18	35	38	8	---	---
Kandahar Rural	6	31	38	24	---	---
Khakrez	12	37	35	16	---	---
Maywand	10	54	30	6	---	---
Panjwayi	8	39	39	14	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	13	28	39	20	---	---
Spin Boldak	13	41	35	11	---	---
Zhari	10	45	30	16	---	---
Cell Phone Service	21	36	31	12	0.1	---
Arghandab	12	29	33	26	0.8	---
Daman	12	29	44	13	2	---
Kandahar City	32	41	21	7	---	---
Kandahar Rural	26	28	36	10	---	---
Khakrez	24	33	36	7	---	---
Maywand	14	40	40	6	---	---
Panjwayi	14	37	38	11	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	12	28	33	28	---	---
Spin Boldak	13	37	37	13	---	---
Zhari	8	34	32	26	---	---

Services	Very Satisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Somewhat Unsatisfied	Very Unsatisfied	Don't Know	Refused
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Development Projects	10	38	38	14	0.1	0.1
Arghandab	6	40	38	14	2	---
Daman	7	26	44	22	---	---
Kandahar City	14	44	34	7	---	---
Kandahar Rural	6	33	39	22	---	---
Khakrez	9	35	42	14	---	---
Maywand	10	41	40	9	---	---
Panjwayi	14	37	32	17	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	9	29	44	18	---	---
Spin Boldak	5	34	42	19	---	0.4
Zhari	8	25	47	20	---	---
Justice & Courts	13	36	33	17	0.3	0.1
Arghandab	6	36	40	16	2	0.8
Daman	6	34	40	21	---	---
Kandahar City	22	38	26	14	---	---
Kandahar Rural	8	32	32	27	0.4	---
Khakrez	14	32	39	16	---	---
Maywand	6	44	38	12	---	---
Panjwayi	13	30	36	22	---	---
Shah Wali Kot	15	30	30	24	---	---
Spin Boldak	7	40	38	14	0.5	---
Zhari	7	36	44	12	0.6	---

To illustrate fully the overall perception of satisfaction for these eight types of services, satisfaction ratings in each district are compared to the provincial value (Figure 7). This is accomplished by subtracting the district satisfaction score (% Very/Somewhat Satisfied) from the provincial satisfaction score (% Very/Somewhat Satisfied). For example, the percent of respondents very or somewhat satisfied with clean water in Daman is 81% (40% + 41%) while the overall level of satisfaction in Kandahar Province is 74% (26% + 48%). Thus, the difference score (district minus province) for Daman is +7 (81% – 74%). This comparative score provides an indication of respondent satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a particular service. A score of zero indicates that the level of satisfaction for a particular service in the district is equal to the overall provincial level of satisfaction for that particular service.

What is apparent in Figure 7 is that residents of Kandahar City are highly satisfied with all services except clean water. Conversely, residents of Shah Wali Kot, Maywand and Spin Boldak are not satisfied with any services. Except for Kandahar City, most districts have negative satisfaction ratings compared to the overall province.




Figure 7-A. Perceptions of service satisfaction by district in Kandahar Province – water, electricity, boys’ schools, girls’ schools.




Figure 7-B. Perceptions of service satisfaction by district in Kandahar Province – medical care, cell service, development projects, justice & Courts.

Corruption

Corruption in Kandahar not only affects all levels of government, 53% of respondents believe it affects their daily lives, as well. In Maywand and Zhari, more than seven out of ten respondents see corruption as a major concern in their daily lives (Figure 8). When asked about the level of corruption in their district government, 63% believe it is a major problem. The perceived level of corruption is highest in Kandahar City at 71% (Figure 6).





Figure 8. Corruption as a major problem in Kandahar Province.

To better understand respondents' personal experiences with corruption in their districts respondents were asked if they had to pay extra money for five services over the past year (Figure 9). Approximately two-thirds (61%) of all individuals say they have paid extra fees to obtain an identity document. The percentage is higher for five districts with no less than 55% of respondents having to pay extra for this service. For civil court cases, in Maywand (71%), Zhari (67%), and Shah Wali Kot (63%), a large proportion of individuals say they resort to bribery and corruption to resolve cases. The graph pertaining to extra payments through a checkpoint is interesting when compared to Table 1 which displays respondents' fears about



road travel. While Table 1 clearly demonstrates a wide variety of physical obstacles to traveling safely, respondents' primary fear at checkpoints may have to do with producing a bribe to proceed on their journey. Residents of Shah Wali Kot (56%) and Maywand (52%) worry about this the most.




Figure 9-A. Percentage of respondents who claim to have paid extra for government service – obtain identity document, resolve civil court case, receive services.




Figure 9-B. Percentage of respondents who claim to have paid extra for government service – file a police case, transit through a checkpoint.

Figure 10 examines respondent beliefs about corruption in Kandahar Province. A significant majority of respondents think corruption is the underlying reason behind conflict in the country. Furthermore, a strong majority of respondents believe that corruption in the government forces them to seek alternate solutions to their problems. These solutions may include reliance on anti-government elements. Slightly more than half of the Kandahar respondents believe that the Taliban cannot be corrupted.




Figure 10. Other beliefs about corruption in Kandahar Province.

ANSF Recruitment and Popular Perception

The primary reason respondents in Kandahar consider joining the ANSF is the desire for a job and a paycheck. Respondents are deterred from considering a career in the ANSF because of the dangers. Across all districts, the ANP is viewed as a more dangerous profession than the ANA.

Table 6. Perceptions of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police recruitment in Kandahar Province.

Reasons to Join	%	Reasons Not to Join	%
Afghan National Army			
Need a job	28	Danger	44
Money/Pay	21	Further studies	13
Family wants him to join	12	Army is corrupt/bad	12
To defend country	10	Would like to go but needed at home	8
Excitement/adventure	9	Different profession desired	8
Elders/community want him to join	7	Money/Pay	7
Previous fighter/similar work	6	Family do not let them	1
Training/skills	4	Taliban threaten their families	1
Refused	---	They are supporter of USA	---
Don't Know	3	Refused	---
		Don't Know	6
Afghan National Police			
Need a job	40	Danger	62
Money/pay	13	Police corrupt/bad	10
To defend country	10	Further studies	8
Family wants him to join	10	Money/pay	6
Excitement/adventure	7	Want to do something different	6
Elders/community want him to join	7	Would like to go but needed a home	5
Previous fighter/similar work	5	Taliban threaten their families	1
Training/skill development	5	Family do not let them	---
Don't Know/Refused	2	Don't Know/Refused	3

Governance and Political Legitimacy

Perceptions of the Legitimacy of District Government

How do Kandahar residents view the political legitimacy of their district government? To address this question, six survey questions were combined to create a political legitimacy index (Table 7). Figure 11 displays the slant or "skew" of these scores—i.e., the extent that the legitimacy scores lean to the left (low legitimacy) or right (high legitimacy) of the scale, or cluster around the middle value (medium legitimacy).

Ideally, the political legitimacy scores of a district would be high, i.e., respondents' answers to the legitimacy questions would tightly cluster around the higher values of the scale with few, if any, scores below the midpoint of the scale. For Kandahar Province as a whole, this is untrue. Most responses fall near the center of the scale indicating that respondents do not generally hold very positive or negative views about the legitimacy of their government; instead, they are ambivalent (Figure 11).

Districts that are ambivalent and thus similar to the shape of the Kandahar Province graph are Kandahar City, Maywand, Panjwayi, and Shah Wali Kot (Figure 12). Districts with legitimacy scores that lean to the right, a positive direction, are Daman, Khakrez, and Spin Boldak (Figure 14). Districts that lean to the left of the graph and, thus, have a low opinion of the political legitimacy of their government are Zhari, Arghandab and Rural Kandahar (Figure 13).

While the effects are slight in some cases, even a slight lean to the left on the political legitimacy graph should not be taken lightly, as it may foreshadow a negative directional shift of opinion. Moreover, even though a few districts in Kandahar Province lean to the right toward higher political legitimacy, their scores are far from ideal.




Figure 11. Distribution of political legitimacy summary scores for Kandahar Province.

Table 8 presents the mean scores on the political legitimacy scale by district. The district with the lowest political legitimacy summary score is Arghandab (14.49). The highest score occurs in Spin Boldak (15.74).

Respondents in all districts express concern about the provision of services and corruption. Still, they give government officials high marks for managing dispute resolution, though not for controlling corruption. Furthermore, government officials are not seen as providing services equally across the province. Nevertheless, while perceptions of service provision vary across districts, the people believe the local government is working hard for them.

In every district in which both genders were interviewed (Maywand and Shah Wali Kot being the exceptions), women display higher legitimacy *summary* scores than men (Table 9). The largest differences in legitimacy scores between men and women are in rural Kandahar (13.7 / 15.9) and Zhari (13.9 / 15.7). Men's assessment of the government's ability to control corruption may be less positive than women's assessment due to their different roles in society. Afghan men are more likely to be engaged in public life than women and, thus, may

be more likely than women to encounter corruption and perceive it as a larger problem in Afghan governance.

Men and women also hold distinct views of the local government's provision of safety/security and dispute resolution. Taken together, these findings reveal important differences of opinion between men and women.

There is a much weaker relationship between age of the respondent and perceptions of political legitimacy by district (Table 10), as indicated by the fewer number of shaded cells in the table. Age is split into younger/older categories based on the median age of the sample (31 years). In Khakrez and Spin Boldak, however, respondents aged 31 or less do seem to have a greater perception of political legitimacy, which declines with age.

The last assessment of political legitimacy is based on income levels (Table 11). Family income is split along the median income of the sample, which is 19,000 AF/month. Kandahar City and Spin Boldak residents have the most distinct differences in opinion based on the high number of shaded cells in the row by district. The greatest disparity by income levels appears in the dispute resolution column. Families with higher income tend to hold more positive views of the district's ability to handle dispute resolution than those with lower incomes.

The legitimacy summary scores in Table 8 are displayed in Figure 15. The green color represents a district population that perceives a government with high political legitimacy; blue indicates a population with some perception of political legitimacy; yellow represents a population that is neutral or ambivalent; gray indicates a population with some perception that the government is not legitimate; finally, the color red signifies a population that perceives a lack of political legitimacy. All of the Kandahar districts in the sample are yellow indicating ambivalent perceptions of the government's legitimacy.

Table 7. Definitions of political legitimacy.

Variables	Lowest Possible Value	Highest Possible Value	Survey Questions
Safety/Security ¹	1. Least safe/secure	4. Most safe/secure	Q1C, Q7A, Q7B, Q7C, Q7D, Q7E, Q7F, Q7G
Service Satisfaction ¹	1. Least satisfied with services	4. Most satisfied with services	Q11A, Q11B, Q11C, Q11D, Q11E, Q11G, Q11H
Government Control ^{2,3}	1. AGE in control	4. Government in control	Q8A, Q9A
Government Work Ethnic ²	1. Disagree government works hard	4. Agree government works hard	Q15A
Corruption Control ¹	1. Not a problem	4. Major problem	Q17B
Dispute Resolution ¹	1. Go to local elders, local religious leaders	4. Go to district government or governor	Q16A, Q16B, Q16C

1 Likert scale recoded to range from 1 “Strongly Disagree” to 4 “Strongly Agree.”

2 Original question recoded to a 1-4 point scale.

*3 Of these six variables used to create the political legitimacy index, “government control” is the most strongly associated variable with this index (Pearson’s *r* and reliability analysis).*

Table 8. Perceptions of political legitimacy by district in Kandahar Province.

	Safety Security	Service Satisfaction	Government Control	Government Work Ethic	Corruption Control	Dispute Resolution	Summary Score
Kandahar City	2.48 ¹	2.69	2.72	2.98	1.56	3.2	15.63 ²
Rural Kandahar	2.62	2.24	2.55	2.89	1.84	2.59	14.73
Arghandab	2.63	2.31	2.09	2.83	1.68	2.95	14.49
Daman	2.62	2.28	2.06	3.02	2.05	3.04	15.07
Khakrez	2.73	2.29	2.61	3.05	1.84	3.15	15.67
Maywand	2.62	2.27	2.45	2.96	1.75	2.86	14.91
Panjwayi	2.72	2.36	2.32	3.04	2.04	3.05	15.53
Shah Wali Kot	2.73	2.15	2.59	3.04	1.94	2.85	15.30
Spin Boldak	2.68	2.26	2.92	3.07	1.74	3.07	15.74
Zhari	2.63	2.19	2.08	2.94	1.87	3.06	14.77
Provincial Mean	2.59	2.41	2.55	2.98	1.74	3.02	15.29
F-value	9.923 ³	42.033 ³	7.073 ³	1.170 ³	5.593 ³	10.513 ³	

1 Numbers are the mean scores for each district and the province. Higher values indicate greater perceived legitimacy. Statistical differences between means tested with ANOVA.

2 Summary scores shown in the last column on the right are based on sum of mean scores in that row.

3 Statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level based on an Analysis of Variance F-test.

Districts in Kandahar Province with an **ambivalent opinion of the government’s political legitimacy.**







Figure 12. Districts in Kandahar Province with an overall ambivalent opinion of their government’s political legitimacy – Kandahar City, Shah Wali Kot, Panjwayi, Maywand.

Districts in Kandahar Province with a lower opinion of the government’s political legitimacy.






Figure 13. Districts in Kandahar Province with an overall negative opinion of their government’s political legitimacy – Rural Kandahar, Arghandab, Zhari.

Districts in Kandahar Province with a **higher opinion of the government’s political legitimacy.**




Figure 14. Districts in Kandahar Province with an overall positive opinion of their government’s political legitimacy – Daman, Khakrez, Spin Boldak.

Table 9. Political legitimacy score between men and women by district in Kandahar Province.

Men / Women	Safety / Security	Service Satisfaction	Government Control	Government Work Ethic	Corruption Control	Dispute Resolution	Summary Score
Kandahar City	2.4 / 2.6 ¹	2.7 / 2.7	2.2 / 3.3	3.3 / 2.6	1.8 / 1.4	3.1 / 3.3	15.5 / 15.9
Rural Kandahar	2.7 / 2.6	2.1 / 2.4	2.4 / 2.7	2.7 / 3.1	1.7 / 2.0	2.1 / 3.1	13.7 / 15.9
Arghandab	2.7 / 2.5	2.1 / 2.6	2.2 / 2.0	2.7 / 3.0	1.6 / 1.8	2.5 / 3.4	13.8 / 15.3
Daman	2.5 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.3	2.0 / 2.1	2.9 / 3.2	1.8 / 2.3	3.2 / 2.9	14.7 / 15.5
Khakrez	2.6 / 2.8	2.3 / 2.3	2.1 / 3.0	3.2 / 2.9	1.8 / 1.9	2.8 / 3.4	14.8 / 16.3
Maywand (Men only)	2.6 / ---	2.3 / ---	2.4 / ---	3.0 / ---	1.8 / ---	2.9 / ---	15.0 / ---
Panjwayi	2.7 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.4	2.3 / 2.4	3.1 / 3.0	1.9 / 2.2	2.9 / 3.3	15.2 / 16.0
Shah Wali Kot (Men only)	2.7 / ---	2.1 / ---	2.6 / ---	3.0 / ---	1.9 / ---	2.9 / ---	15.2 / ---
Spin Boldak	2.6 / 2.7	2.2 / 2.3	3.2 / 2.6	3.0 / 3.1	1.7 / 1.8	2.8 / 3.3	15.5 / 15.8
Zhari	2.7 / 2.5	2.1 / 2.3	1.9 / 2.3	2.9 / 3.0	1.5 / 2.2	2.8 / 3.4	13.9 / 15.7

¹ Shaded areas indicate mean score for the two groups are statistically different at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table 10. Political legitimacy score between age groups by district in Kandahar Province.

$\leq 30 / \geq 31$ Yrs ¹	Safety / Security	Service Satisfaction	Government Control	Government Work Ethic	Corruption Control	Dispute Resolution	Summary Score
Kandahar City	2.6 / 2.4 ²	2.7 / 2.7	2.7 / 2.8	2.8 / 3.1	1.5 / 1.6	3.2 / 3.2	14.8 / 15.2
Rural Kandahar	2.6 / 2.6	2.2 / 2.3	2.4 / 2.6	3.0 / 2.8	2.0 / 1.7	2.7 / 2.5	14.9 / 14.5
Arghandab	2.6 / 2.6	2.3 / 2.3	2.1 / 2.1	2.8 / 2.8	1.6 / 1.8	3.0 / 2.9	14.4 / 14.5
Daman	2.7 / 2.6	2.3 / 2.3	2.0 / 2.1	3.2 / 2.9	2.1 / 2.0	3.2 / 2.9	15.5 / 14.8
Khakrez	2.7 / 2.8	2.3 / 2.3	2.9 / 2.3	3.1 / 3.0	2.0 / 1.7	3.3 / 3.0	16.3 / 15.1
Maywand	2.6 / 2.6	2.3 / 2.3	2.5 / 2.5	3.1 / 2.9	1.8 / 1.7	2.7 / 3.0	15.0 / 14.9
Panjwayi	2.7 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.4	2.3 / 2.3	3.1 / 3.0	2.2 / 1.9	3.1 / 3.4	15.7 / 15.7
Shah Wali Kot	2.7 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.1	2.6 / 2.6	3.1 / 3.0	2.0 / 2.0	3.0 / 2.8	15.7 / 15.2
Spin Boldak	2.7 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.2	2.9 / 2.9	3.2 / 2.9	2.0 / 1.4	3.1 / 3.0	16.2 / 15.1
Zhari	2.6 / 2.6	2.2 / 2.2	1.9 / 2.2	3.0 / 2.9	2.1 / 1.7	3.1 / 3.0	14.9 / 14.6

1 Age is divided at the median split of the sample (31 years) into two categories: younger and older.


2 Shaded areas indicate mean scores for the two groups are statistically different at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

Table 11. Political legitimacy score between income levels by district in Kandahar Province.

$\leq 20 / \geq 20$ Afs ¹	Safety / Security	Service Satisfaction	Government Control	Government Work Ethic	Corruption Control	Dispute Resolution	Summary Score
Kandahar City	2.4 / 2.5	2.8 / 2.6 ²	2.8 / 2.7	3.0 / 3.0	1.4 / 1.7	3.1 / 3.3	15.5 / 15.8
Rural Kandahar	2.6 / 2.6	2.3 / 2.2	2.6 / 2.4	2.9 / 2.9	1.9 / 1.7	2.5 / 2.7	14.8 / 14.5
Arghandab	2.6 / 2.6	2.2 / 2.5	2.2 / 1.9	2.7 / 2.9	1.6 / 1.9	2.9 / 3.2	14.2 / 15.0
Daman	2.7 / 2.5	2.2 / 2.4	2.1 / 1.9	3.1 / 2.9	2.2 / 1.6	2.9 / 3.3	15.2 / 14.6
Khakrez	2.8 / 2.6	2.3 / 2.3	2.8 / 2.3	2.9 / 3.2	1.9 / 1.8	3.2 / 3.1	15.9 / 15.3
Maywand	2.6 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.4	2.4 / 2.5	2.8 / 3.3	1.8 / 1.7	3.0 / 2.6	14.9 / 15.2
Panjwayi	2.7 / 2.7	2.3 / 2.4	2.3 / 2.3	3.1 / 2.8	2.1 / 1.9	2.9 / 3.3 ²	15.4 / 15.4
Shah Wali Kot	2.8 / 2.7	2.1 / 2.2	2.8 / 2.3	3.0 / 3.1	2.0 / 1.9	2.9 / 2.7	15.6 / 14.9
Spin Boldak	2.7 / 2.6	2.2 / 2.4	3.0 / 2.8	3.0 / 3.2	1.7 / 1.7	3.0 / 3.4	15.6 / 16.1
Zhari	2.7 / 2.5	2.2 / 2.2	2.1 / 1.9	2.9 / 3.0	1.9 / 1.8	3.0 / 3.2	14.8 / 14.6

¹ Total household income is divided based on the median value. Afs refers to current Afghan currency.

² Shaded areas indicate mean scores for the two groups are statistically different at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.




District Political Legitimacy Summary Scores

Highly Legitimate Government 25-22	Somewhat Legitimate Government 21-18	Neutral Value 17-14	Somewhat Illegitimate Government 13-10	Highly Illegitimate Government 9-6	No Data Available
---------------------------------------	-----------------------------------------	------------------------	-------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------	-------------------

Figure 15-A. Political legitimacy summary scores for Kandahar Province.

A key question that emerges when people consider the political legitimacy of the government is who really controls the territory, the district government or Taliban? As shown in Figures 15-A and 15-B, respondents' perceptions of government control by district varies in distinct and unfortunate ways. Strong AGE control of a territory as in Daman, Arghandab, and Zhari districts, or even divided control as seen in several other districts, may hinder development projects, security, local community initiatives, education and other positive forces at the district level, which, in a circular fashion, further disengages the population.



GIRoA in Control	GIRoA/ AGE	AGE in Control	No Data Available
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Figure 15-B. Perceptions of GIRoA and AGE control of district governments in Kandahar Province.

Districts divided into categories based on nonparametric statistical analysis of government control questions in Table 7. Definitions of political legitimacy.

Perceptions of the Legitimacy of the National Government

Given that the focus of this survey is on the district government, questions about the legitimacy of the national government were limited in scope. However, two survey questions asked respondents whether or not they believe that the national government and the Taliban

show respect for Islamic values. The percentage of respondents who strongly or somewhat agree with these questions by district is displayed graphically (see Figures 17-18). Some districts that view the government as having respect for Islamic values also view the Taliban in this light (Shah Wali Kot, Khakrez, and Daman). Other districts are more selective in their perception (Kandahar, Spin Boldak and Arghandab).

Figure 16 displays responses to the question about the national government's effort to improve Afghanistan. Interestingly, this belief is highest in Zhari. In the previous section on security, security conditions in this district are perceived to be poor and anti-government elements are perceived to have greater influence than the Afghan government. A breakdown of Zhari opinion reveals that only 15% of the respondents in this district strongly agree that officials in Kabul are working to improve the country.




Figure 16. National officials work hard to improve Afghanistan.

Respondents in most Kandahar districts believe that the national government respects Islam. Of these districts, Arghandab has the lowest opinion rating (Figure 13). However, in two districts, people view the Taliban as more closely aligned with Islam than the government: Shah Wali Kot and Kandahar city (Figure 14). Respondents' perceptions of Islamic values by districts, shown in Figures 13 and 14, are statistically different at the $p \leq 0.05$ level (Chi-square test).




Figure 17. Government Respect for Islam.




Figure 18. Taliban Respect for Islam.

Reconciliation

Reconciliation is a popular concept in Kandahar province. There is almost universal agreement that negotiation with the Taliban is preferable to continued fighting (Figure 19). Specific approaches such as calling a *Loya Jirga* and a jobs training program for former fighters are both widely supported (Figure 20). The desire for reconciliation is likely driven by the perception that the Taliban are part of Afghan society; a significant majority of respondents view the Taliban as “our Afghan brothers.” This opinion is unsurprising considering the ethnic makeup of the Taliban – highly Pashtun – and the movement’s history in Kandahar Province.




Figure 19. Perceptions of the Taliban.




Figure 20. Support for Loya Jirga.

Conclusions and Further Considerations

Conclusions

This survey's findings indicate endemic corruption, along with a lack of security and basic services, in Kandahar Province. Collectively, this sets conditions for a disenfranchised population to respond either by *not* supporting the government due to its inability to deliver improvements in the quality of life or, worse yet, by *supporting* the Taliban. It is clear that thoughtful, deliberate action must be taken to achieve enduring Afghan solutions, which will be implemented by a government that, at minimum, is showing progress towards demonstrating legitimacy.

Recommendations

Based on the findings presented in this report, the following points should be given further consideration:

- Develop and execute a holistic COIN campaign that employs practices proven successful elsewhere in Afghanistan with focus on addressing the concerns of troublesome districts identified herein. This must be done as swiftly and effectively as possible to stem the seemingly *negative* directional flow of respondents' perceptions of their government, as indicated by the data underpinning this study.
- Weight the campaign heavily with Afghan capacity to increase its palatability to the population. For example, recent HTS SSRA reports indicate that the National Solidarity Program (NSC) and Community Development Councils (CDC) enjoy popularity among the Afghan people. The CDCs are viewed as relatively corruption free because the stakeholders collectively benefit from the program's success. Since CDC members are elected by local villages, many Afghans view it as a functioning grass-roots democracy delivering concrete results to the people while instilling a sense of community pride and ownership.
- Make this an Afghan campaign. Previous reports indicate that the Afghan people prefer Afghan solutions, even if those solutions are less effective. Leverage the good will and respect that the population currently has regarding the Afghan National Army by making them *responsible*, within capacity, for establishing a secure environment.
- Ensure projects are prioritized to remedy the basic services shortfall described as a core issue in the Services section of this report and other assessments made by the field interviewers. Special attention should be paid to the uneven distribution of services by district, especially given the linkage of these disparities to the perceived lack of legitimacy of district governments.
- Support GIRoA participation and leadership in this campaign with a robust information effort to highlight the increased legitimacy of all levels of government. Emphasize the

perceived lack of corruption of the ANA as services are delivered to the disenfranchised people of Kandahar. Highlight national government effectiveness and care for local residents by explaining the linkage between national programs and community development.

- Establish the linkage of CDCs to district governments to increase local government legitimacy.
- Consider reconciliation to also be a possible element to this holistic campaign. However, specific recommendations require further research and analysis

Specific Recommendations and Challenges

The maintenance of any modest success requires the ability to leave in place a force capable of holding previously insurgent areas. Like many other areas in Afghanistan, without competent and trustworthy ANP, either Coalition or ANA forces will be tied down to maintain security-consuming capacity that could be used elsewhere.

Appendix 1 – MG Flynn’s Questions for A Rich Contextual Understanding of Afghanistan

Report	Question #	Questions
GOVERNANCE		
	G1	Are conservative-rural Pashtun cultural and religious views represented within the current government?
	G2	How do allegations of fraud associated with the 2009 election impact confidence in the government and ISAF?
	G3	What drives popular support/ tolerance for the insurgency v. the government?
Table 8	G4	How does population accept/ see governance? What is historic response to governance?
Table 2	G5	How does local population perceive/ relate to local army, police versus the insurgency?
Table 7 Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11	G6	What are components of “political legitimacy” for the local population?
	G7	What is popular perception of effectiveness/ intent of local/ national governing officials?
	G8	What is perception v. reality of institutional capacity?
Table 8	G9	How much does corruption impact perceptions of local, provincial, and central governance in Kabul?
Figure 8 Figure 9A and 9B8	G10	How does government corruption impact the Afghan population?
MARGINALIZE INSURGENCY		
Table 4 Figure 15B Figure 18 Figure 19	IN1	How does the population relate to different insurgent groups as organizations, not as insurgencies?
	IN2	What is perception of the insurgent group’s ultimate objective/ goal? Tactics? Capabilities?
	IN3	What narratives do the insurgent groups use to gain popular support?
	IN4	What tactics of intimidation do insurgents use?
Figure 8 Figure 18 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11	IN5	How do we split the population from the insurgents, especially in Helmand/Kandahar?
Figure 18 Figure 19	IN6	What about the Taliban appeals to different population groups?
	IN7	What services do the insurgents provide that the Afghan government/ ISAF have been unable to deliver?

Report	Question #	Questions
	IN8	Are individuals joining the insurgency because they want Mullah Omar to return to power, or are they fighting for local reasons?

PROTECT & ENGAGE POPULATION		
	P&E1	How would the population design their rule of law apparatus if given the opportunity? (How does the population define rule of law and justice?)
	P&E2	How would the population design their local, district, provincial and national government if given the opportunity?
	P&E3	Do leaders of social networks want central government delivered security, rule of law, taxation, and oversight of their activities?
	P&E4	Does the population want central government delivered security, rule of law, taxation, and oversight of their activities?
	P&E5	Is the current fight perceived as anti-Pashtun?
	P&E6	Are international forces viewed as an ‘Army of Liberation’ or ‘Army of Occupation’?
Table 1 Figure 2 Figure 3 Figure 4 Figure 5 Table 4	P&E7	How do people (at district; group level) define “security”?
	P&E8	How does the population respond to basic force maneuvering?
	P&E9	How will the population respond to the new Striker brigade?
	P&E10	What is the popular perception of coalition intent and level of commitment?
	P&E11	How can we institute a sense of rule of law?
Table 5 Figure 6	P&E12	How can the central government more effectively dole out justice to be as swift as Sharia law?
	P&E13	How does the population respond to strategic communication?
	P&E14	How is the population informed?
	P&E15	How do they like to be informed?
	P&E16	What are the primary narratives?
	P&E17	What kind of development do people prefer on a district level?
	P&E18	How do the people define “progress” or “improved quality of life”?
	P&E19	What efforts have historically been successful on a district level?
	P&E20	What is the status of the infrastructure including banking and finance?
	P&E21	What would be the accepted (active) role of the government in business development?
	P&E22	What is the importance of the poppy trade to the Afghan population?

	P&E23	What are basic ethnographic factors by district?
	P&E24	How does the population interact as tribes?
Table 8 Table 9 Table 10 Table 11 Figure 13	P&E25	What part of the population is disaffected and why?

BROAD ISSUES		
	B1	Are we facing an insurgency or a separatist movement?
	B2	What is the relationship between a physical security, level of insurgency support and the degree of development in an area?
	B3	Will more local interaction (e.g., embedded PRTs) result in improved security, reduced corruption and greater employment?
	B4	Will massing resources in “model areas” to provide a demonstration effect be more effective in engaging the population than diffusing resources around PAKAF?
	B5	What is the relationship between ISAF kinetic operations in AF and stability in Pakistan?
	B6	What are the regional dynamics (AF, PAK, Russia and the CTSO [Collective Security Treaty Organization], Iran, China and India) that will affect the security and development future of the region?
	B7	Is there a correlation between perceptions of governance and support for the insurgency?
Table 4	B8	How/does the population perceive the differences between elements of the insurgency/ insurgent groups?
	B9	Does marginalizing local Taliban insurgency undermine other elements with broader regional aspirations (including AQ)?

Appendix 2 - Methodology

A total of 1,994 interviews covering nine districts were conducted in Kandahar Province were conducted between December 23rd and 29th, 2009. Kandahar district was divided between urban (Kandahar City) and rural areas.

Surveys were conducted by face-to-face interviews with a representative sample of adult Afghan citizens, 18 years of age or older. Interviews were conducted in Dari or Pashtu depending on the area. The sample is drawn using a multi-stage random stratification process, with the village level stratum as the primary sampling unit. The basic overview of the sampling process is as follows:

- 1st stratum = Province. The interviews are distributed across Kandahar Province following the project's specification for size of the sample.
- 2nd stratum = District. The sample is further distributed across districts in Kandahar Province using the population estimates of the Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO).
- 3rd stratum = Village. In urban areas the next stratum are neighborhoods called *nahias*, while in rural areas these are villages. A simple random selection is used to choose designated locations. The size of a sampling point in this study is either five or ten interviews.
- 4th stratum = Household. Maps and available information about the villages are used to select starting points for the random walk method of selecting a household. A Kish grid is utilized to select the respondent within selected households.

Distribution of sampling points by region and urban/rural Strata

The survey included both urban and rural respondents in these provinces. The *Sheharwali* (municipal administration in Afghanistan) defines the urban population as those living within municipal limits. By default, the rural population comprises those who are living outside the municipal limits. The rural areas are defined neither in terms of population density nor remoteness.

The sample is distributed proportional to residential characteristics of population in the province. Within the province, districts are selected first listing them by size of population in descending order and then selecting the villages.

Selection of sampling points and replacement of sampling Points

The interviews are completed using multi-stage random sampling. Due to the local cultural traditions, at the outset the universe is divided into male and female sub-samples. Each region, province and further strata are allocated an equal number of male and female sampling points. These two sub-samples are covered by the field-force of the respective gender. The instability and frequent fighting in these provinces caused some sampling points to be adjusted or replaced to keep interviewers out of areas with active violence.

Selection of starting points within each sampling point

The villages within each district are selected at random by the field director. Each sampling point is assigned a starting point and given a starting direction. The starting points are recognizable locations – such as a mosque, school, bazaar, or other easily recognizable location within each of the selected villages for the survey.

Household Selection

In urban areas, from the given starting point, the interviewer heads in the assigned direction and stops at the 4th street/lane on the right hand side of his/her route. From there on, the first contacted household is the first house on the right from the beginning of the street. Further on, the selected household is each third inhabitable house on the right side of the interviewer route. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine is again each third apartment. In buildings with more than one household, no more than two households are interviewed.

In rural areas, the interviewer starts from the center of the village or the bazaar, mosque, etc., and goes to the right selecting each first inhabitable house on his/her route. Compounds containing two or more houses behind a common wall are treated like detached houses counting them counter-clock-wise from the gate to the compound.

Respondent Selection

After selecting a household, interviewers utilize a Kish grid to randomly select the target respondent within the household. Members of the household are listed by age in descending order.

Respondent Substitution

Under no circumstances do interviewers substitute an alternate member of a household for the selected respondent. If the respondent refuses to participate or is not available after all callbacks are completed, the interviewer moves on to the next randomly selected household.

Callbacks (rate, method, and results)

Typically interviewers are required to make two call-backs before replacing the designated respondent. The majority of the interviews were completed on the first attempt (99.6%), 0.3% in the second attempt and 0.1% were completed in the third attempt. The completion of interviews on the first attempt is high, but comparable to surveys in similar countries where weak economies, high unemployment, and large rural populations create conditions where large numbers of people are at or near their homes. The field work is timed so that people (by gender) are most likely to be at home, which also significantly increases completion rates for the first visit.

Interviewers

The total number of interviewers employed in this survey is 71 (Table 12).

Table 12. Number and type of interviewers for Kandahar Province survey by Gender.

	Female	Male
Number of female/male interviewers	21	50
Number of experienced interviewers	18	40
Number of interviewers new to the project	3	10

Training of Interviewers

The briefings for supervisors were held in Kabul. Issues emphasized during briefing(s) included proper household and respondent selection, review of the questionnaire content, appropriate interviewing techniques, and pilot interviews conducted to make sure the concepts and techniques are well understood.

Refusals/Non-Contacts/Completed Interviews

Refusals/Non-Contacts/Completed Interviews are provided in Table 13.

Table 13. Number and type of interviews for Kandahar Province.

Result Category	Number	% of Category
Non-Contact		
No one at home after three visits	241	9
Respondent long-term absence /for the field work period	174	6
No adults (18+) after three visits	64	2
Subtotal	479	17
Refusals	---	---
Not feeling informed to answer the questions	---	4
Prefers head of the house to be interviewed	---	4
In a hurry/ No time	1	4
Respondent got angry because of a question and aborted interview	---	---
Subtotal	338	12
Completed Interviews	1994	4
Total Contact Attempts	2811	---

Breakdown of Non-Response Rate

For Kandahar Province there were 338 refusals and 479 residences in which no one was home.

Quality Control Methods

After the delivery of the questionnaires from field, most of the completed questionnaires were subject to logical control for proper administration. In the delivered output, actual interviewing was monitored directly by a supervisor in 1.7% of the sample. Another 12.2 % of the completed interviews were back-checked by a supervisor in person. The issues verified during in person back-checks were proper household and respondent selection, as well as correct recording of answers to three randomly selected questions from the main body of the questionnaire.

Results of Back-Check Controls

In Kandahar there were 102 interviews which were rejected due to a 90% or higher rate of similarity to other interviews.

Problems Encountered During Field

On December 23rd, 2009 a civilian vehicle was struck by roadside IED near Kandahar city.

Reportedly the vehicle was en route from Spin Boldak to the center of the city. As a result of which two people were killed. No arrests were made.

On December 24th, 2009, a suicide attack occurred in the vicinity of Kabul Bank, District 2, Kandahar City of Kandahar province. Reportedly four people were injured. No one claimed responsibility for the incident.

Because of security problems the following substitutions have been made:

Projected District/Village	Replaced with	Reason
Aji Mawla Dad Kalai. Village	Nawi Mashor. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Shakh Mushkila. Village	Timorian Bala. Village	No Village found with such name
Omad Kalai. Village	Majnon Kala. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Shomol Zai Kalai. Village	Bawari Enayat. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Mir Abad. Village	Aji Wakil Saheb. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Asekzo. Village	Asekzo Bari. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Chehl Gazi. Village	Sar Sarak Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Mohammad Sidiq. Village	Markaz Bazar	The village is under control of

		Taliban
Shira Khan	Abdul Rahoof. Village	There is Taliban on the road to the village
Bagh Sara. Village	Aminullah Kalai. Village	No Village found with such name
Dalak Alia Aw Safla. Village	Asekzai Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Hajinan. Village	Kampnay. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Mahbob Khan Kariz. Village	Aji Abdullah Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Shila Gip. Village	Lakri. Village	The village is under control of Taliban
Kalak. Village	Noorudin Kalai. Village	The village is under control of Taliban

Margin of Error and Post Sample Weighting

The sampling error for Kandahar with a 95% confidence interval is 4.2%. Because the data are weighted according to available population estimates, the “margin of error” incorporates the inflating impact of post-stratification weighting effects.

In Kandahar Province the weights vary by district from 0.23 to 3.60, indicating that some respondents are given more than 15 times the weight of other respondents, reflecting the relative difficulty (or ease) of contacting those individuals relative to their prevalence in the population.

Post sample weighting calculations are typically made using rim-weighting-- an iterative process whereby the marginal distributions of the relevant demographic variables match the marginal distributions of a trusted enumeration such as a survey or census. Although there is no recent census in Afghanistan, the Afghan Central Statistics Office (CSO) with the assistance of the United Nations and the World Food Program releases basic population statistics including total numbers of residents by region, province, and district. The data the CSO provides are generally accurate at the provincial level, though less so at the district level.

Table 14. Kandahar sample weight and sample distribution.

District	Unadjusted Response Rate	Sample Weight	Adjusted Response Rate
Kandahar City	200	3.60	720
Kandahar Rural	200	1.39	277
Arghandab	197	0.62	122
Daman	204	0.33	68
Khakrez	191	0.23	44
Maywand	205	0.56	116
Panjwayi	197	0.87	171
Shah Wali Kot	192	0.45	86
Spin Boldak	207	1.09	223
Zhari	201	0.83	167
Total	1994	---	1994

Glossary of Statistical Terms

Chi-square determines if the distributions of two categorical variables are truly different from each other, such as when respondents' location in a district appears to influence responses to survey questions with categorical response options (such as the percent who "favor" or "oppose" a political figure or group).

Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) is used to test whether the mean scores of more than two variables are in fact different from each other. The F -values associated with ANOVA indicate whether or not the difference in means scores are in fact statistically differentiable, or could have occurred by chance.

T-tests determine whether the mean scores of two variables are statistically different. For example, this test is used to determine whether the mean security score in one district is different from the security score in the province.

Pearson's r examines the strength of association between two variables. It ranges from 0 to 1 in absolute value. As Pearson's r increases so does the association between the two variables. Pearson's r is used in this analysis along with other tools (reliability and factor analysis), to assess whether the responses to different survey questions can be combined into reliable composite measure.

Appendix 3 – Demographics

Table 15. Demographic tables by district for Kandahar Province.

	Kandahar City (n=720) ¹	Rural Kandahar (n=277)	Arghanda b (n=121)	Daman (n=68)	Khakrez (n=44)	Maywand (n=116)	Panjwayi (n=172)	Shah Wali Kot (n=86)	Spin Boldak (n=223)	Zhari (n=168)	Province (n=1994)
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Gender											
Men	52	52	53	51	45	100	53	100	50	51	56
Women	48	48	47	49	55	---	47	---	50	49	44
Age											
18-24	34	24	21	23	34	20	32	27	31	20	28
25-29	13	12	23	14	13	14	14	9	16	18	14
30-34	18	21	15	20	20	20	15	17	19	15	18
35-39	8	17	13	17	10	13	13	23	12	13	12
40-44	12	13	11	9	12	12	11	8	10	14	12
45+	16	15	18	18	11	21	15	16	13	20	16
Education											
No Formal Education	59	46	62	58	72	53	61	49	60	61	57
1-5 Years	17	25	12	18	7	36	11	24	18	16	19
6-10 Years	17	24	16	10	16	9	11	19	11	10	15
11 or More	7	6	11	13	5	3	17	8	11	13	9
Job Status											
Working	33	27	35	33	37	84	35	74	39	31	38
Unemployed	10	9	14	9	3	9	9	9	5	10	9
Housewife	49	48	47	49	54	---	46	---	50	46	43
Full Time Farmer	6	14	3	5	4	4	7	14	5	7	7

¹ - Number of individuals represents the weighted value based on population size.