

**“GIREOGI GAJOK”:  
TRANSNATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE LEARNING**

**by**

**Hyunjung Shin**

**A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
Department of Curriculum, Teaching and Learning  
Ontario Institute for Studies in Education  
University of Toronto**

© Copyright by Hyunjung Shin (2010)

**“GIREOGI GAJOK”:  
TRANSNATIONALISM AND LANGUAGE LEARNING  
Doctor of Philosophy, 2010  
Hyunjung Shin  
Department of Curriculum, Teaching and Learning  
University of Toronto**

**Abstract**

This dissertation examines effects of globalization on language, identity, and education through the case of four Korean *jogi yuhak* (early study abroad) students attending Toronto high schools. Resulting from a 2.4-year sociolinguistic ethnography on the language learning experiences of these students, the thesis explores how globalization--and the commodification of language and corporatization of education in the new economy, in particular--has transformed ideas of language, bilingualism, and language learning with respect to the transnational circulation of linguistic and symbolic resources in today's world.

This thesis incorporates insights from critical social theories, linguistic anthropology, globalization studies, and sociolinguistics, and aims to propose a “globalization sensitive” Second Language Acquisition (SLA) theory. To better grasp the ways in which language learning is socially and politically embedded in new conditions generated by globalization, this new SLA theory conceives of language as a set of resources and bilingualism as a social construct, and examines language learning as an economic activity, shaped through encounters with the transnational language education industry.

The analysis examines new transnational subjectivities of *yuhaksaeng* (visa students), which index hybrid identities that are simultaneously global and Korean. In their construction of themselves as “Cools” who are wealthy and cosmopolitan, *yuhaksaeng* deployed newly-valued varieties of Korean language and culture as resources in the globalized new economy. This practice, however, resulted in limits to their acquisition of forms of English capital valued in the Canadian market. As a Korean middle class strategy for acquiring valuable forms of English capital, *jogi yuhak* is caught in tension: while the ideology of language as a skill and capital to help an individual’s social mobility drives the *jogi yuhak* movement, the essentialist ideology of “authentic” English makes it impossible for Koreans to work it to their advantage.

The thesis argues that in multilingual societies, ethnic/racial/linguistic minorities’ limited access to the acquisition of linguistic competence is *produced* by existing inequality, rather than their limited linguistic proficiency contributing to their marginal position. To counter *naturalized* social inequality seemingly linguistic in nature, language education in globalization should move away from essentialism toward process- and practice-oriented approaches to language, community, and identity.

## Acknowledgements

A great number of people have helped me during this “long” journey. This thesis journey literally involved the longest institutional affiliation I have ever experienced in my life, during which I observed former M.A. studies colleagues getting married, having a few children, and establishing careers in new destinations, sometimes even after obtaining a Ph.D. degree. Nevertheless, I have not yet mastered the art of writing to adequately express my heartfelt gratitude for every single individual who has supported and sustained me at various crucial points along the way.

First of all, my deepest gratitude goes to the four students, Yu-ri, Su-bin, Yu-bin, and Se-jun, and their families who graciously shared their time and life stories with me. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all the secondary participants both in Canada and in Korea for their support and insights. As Se-jun remarked during a research interview, “Oh then, it’s like you live my life twice”; these individuals made me to reflect on what it means to be an ethnographer and further motivated me to produce an interesting and convincing story of their lives to urge people to think about the significant issues this story raises. I am eternally grateful to you all for your generosity, trust, and inspirations.

I have been extremely fortunate to work with an amazing thesis committee of world-class scholars and incredible human beings. My thesis co-supervisors, Dr. Jim Cummins and Dr. Monica Heller, demonstrated what can be gained from a co-supervision arrangement through their complementary expertise and first-rate supervision practices. Jim has witnessed all my struggles from the very beginning of this journey. He has always been tremendously patient, flexible, and supportive while helping me to

maintain a balanced perspective of the field of second language education and the theory and practice connection. It is not only his work, but his modesty, compassion, and understanding of and respect for his students, that has offered me a model path that I would like to follow as an academic. Jim, I would not have been able to begin nor survive my doctoral work at OISE without you and your research. Being a walking example of a first-rate ethnographer, Monica's courses, feedback, and our conversations have taken me a step further in my growth as an ethnographer and sociolinguist as well as an applied linguist. She has also patiently watched and allowed me to go through the struggles that were required to produce this work and was always willing to offer structured guidance when needed. After talking with her, I always felt reassured that I was right in what I believed in and what I was doing. Monica, I trust that you understand how much I admire you and your research. Dr. Tara Goldstein has always amazed me with her talent of being strict, challenging and critical in her interactions with students, and yet wonderfully supportive and personable at the same time. I would like to offer my sincerest thanks to all of you for your support and unwavering trust in me even at times when I began to lose confidence in myself. It has been a genuine pleasure and privilege to work with a committee who I can trust and respect for not only nourishing me intellectually, but also personally.

My external examiner, Dr. Bonny Norton, has always been an incredibly supportive senior scholar whose work was an inspiration for my own research. She obviously heard my message, rewarded my time and effort with her thoughtful and very generous report, and asked insightful questions which made the defence discussion a joy. My internal examiner, Dr. Katherine Rehner, engaged with my work and provided a good

example of what an internal examiner can contribute. Thank you both for making the final stage of my thesis journey celebratory.

In addition to my committee members, however, I cannot imagine going through this long, hard process of professional and personal growth without the support of others located in various parts of the globe. They offered me sympathetic ears, trust in my scholarly capacity, words of wisdom during the painfully slow processes of thesis writing and personal difficulties, academic conversations, and last-minute editorial help, as well as dine-out chats, home-made dishes, and Whole Foods gift cards for the nutritional well-being of a student cook. I will not be able to list all names of the individuals who deserve my words of sincere thanks and appreciation; however, two names deserve recognition. Dr. Merrill Swain has always been unbelievably generous in sharing her time and wisdom with me and served as a role model of a supportive senior scholar outside of one's own immediate research areas. Ena Lee showed me what a friend with a first-hand understanding and empathy towards the thesis writing experience can do to make this experience as much about personal growth as it is about professional growth. I can hardly find words to express what the support of both of you has meant to me, and I will pass your spirit to other students who I will meet along my future career trajectories. I also owe my gratitude to beautiful, shiny spring and summer days in Toronto that enabled me to survive the "nothing but thesis writing" months in 2009 without losing my mind. My thanks and condolences are due to all the plants who sacrificed their lives to make the days of writing locked in a condo unit during the dull, severe Toronto winter bearable.

Last, but certainly not least, I offer my unending thanks to my family for all of their love, support, trust in me, and for sheltering me. Although I have always tried to

prioritize my academic growth over the real-life demands, the only moment I regretted not having rushed to put the three letters “Ph.D.” in front of my name was when I learned last year that my mother would not survive the too long a process of completing the thesis. Mom, your unconditional love and trust in me have been the primary source of my self-confidence and the love and respect I have for myself and others. I love you and I know you have always been with me. We will celebrate together over the Christmas break!

To thank you, I return this story to all of you who made this thesis possible.

## Table of Contents

Abstract.....	ii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Dedication.....	xi
Chapter 1: Transformation of Language and Education in the Globalized New Economy.....	1
<i>Jogi Yuhak</i> : The Migration .....	1
Introductory Vignettes: Globalization and Transnational Koreans .....	1
Overview of the Migration.....	6
The Political Economy of <i>Jogi Yuhak</i> and the Symbolic Power of English in Korea .....	9
The New Economy and the Rise of Education Industry.....	16
Globalization, Bilingualism, and Language Learning .....	18
The Economics of Language and Rethinking Bilingualism as a Social Construct.....	18
From Linguistic Competence to Linguistic Capital: Rethinking SLA as Second Language Capital Acquisition.....	25
Research Questions.....	33
Research Methodology: A Critical Sociolinguistic Ethnography.....	34
Undoing the “Social” and the “Linguistic” in SLA Research .....	34
The Fieldwork: Phases in the Field.....	37
Phase One (February 2006 – July 2006): Locating the <i>Jogi Yuhaksaeng</i> community in Toronto. ....	41
Phase Two (July 2006 – June 2007): Identifying focal participants. ....	44
(1) Yu-bin: Immigrant student awarded a school academic excellence award. ....	45
(2) Yu-ri and Su-bin: <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> of <i>Gireogi Gajok</i> . ....	47
(3) Se-jun: <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> with Canadian citizenship. ....	48
Phase Three (March 2007 – July 2007): The <i>Yuhak</i> industry in Toronto and Seoul. ....	49
Phase Four (August 2007 – July 2008): On-going data collection while writing. ....	51
Overview of the Thesis .....	52
Chapter 2: “English Divide” and <i>Jogi Yuhak</i> : Globalization and English Education in Korea.....	56
Introduction.....	56
“ <i>Hakbeol</i> Society” and the <i>Sagyoyuk</i> (Private After-school Education) Market .....	57
<i>Hakbeol</i> (School Ties) and Symbolic Domination in Korea .....	57
School Equalization Policy and the <i>Sagyoyuk</i> Market .....	63
Neoliberal Education Reforms and the “Enterprisation” of the <i>Sagyoyuk</i> Market.....	66
The financial crisis and the discourse of “globalism.” .....	66
Neoliberal education reforms and the reshaping of <i>hakbeol</i> playing field. ....	69



The “enterprisation” of the <i>sagyoyuk</i> market. ....	72
“Republic of English” and the <i>Jogi Yuhak</i> Market.....	74
Globalization and English in Korea: The “English Immersion” Debate and “English Divide”.....	74
English as a “Global Skill” and the English Education Industry.....	78
Learning as “Self-Management” and the <i>Jogi Yuhak</i> Industry.....	81
Conclusion: Monolingual Ideologies amidst Multilingual Practices.....	84
 Chapter 3: Speaking “Cool” Korean in Toronto: Tensions and Contradictions of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> Life .....	88
Introduction.....	88
Reworked Authenticity: “The Korean Wave” and “Modern, Cosmopolitan Korea”.....	90
“Digital Korea” and Youth Internet Language .....	92
The Social Construction of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	96
“No, but These Koreans Are Different from Those Koreans.”: Contested Meanings of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> and <i>Iminja</i> .....	99
A FOB, A Nerd, or Something New?.....	105
From “FOB” to “Cool”: Negotiating the Meaning of Koreanness among <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	110
Trajectories: Racism and Struggles Over Access to “Authentic” English .....	111
Styling “Cool”: Social (and Linguistic) Practices of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	114
Tensions Between Essentialism and Hybridity in the Social Construction of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	117
“Coolness” as Resources to Obtain University Admission .....	128
Conclusion: Translingualism .....	132
 Chapter 4: Ambivalent Calculation: The Language Education Industry and Strategies of Linguistic Investment of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	134
Introduction.....	134
The Transnational Language Education Industry and the Commodification of Language .....	136
Language as Skills and Commodity at Transnational <i>Yuhak</i> and Tutoring Agencies.....	139
Credentialized Bilingualism as a Commodity at “Buy-a-credit” Schools.....	142
Playing Multiple Games: Negotiating the Meanings of “Success” in <i>Jogi Yuhak</i> .....	144
Sanctions, Ambivalence, and Strategies of Maximization of Capital Accumulation.....	148
Misrecognition, Anxiety, and Construction of University of Toronto as a New Symbolic Capital Among <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	154
Strategies of English Capital Acquisition of <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> .....	164
Yu-ri and Su-bin: Successful Admittance to the University of Toronto .....	165
Motivations and trajectories. ....	165
The accumulation of linguistic capital for university admission. ....	168
Se-jun: Returning to Korea Without an Ontario Secondary School Diploma .....	169
Motivations, trajectories, and strategies of English capital acquisition.....	169

Habitus, Legitimacy, and (Multiple) Markets: Tensions Between Authenticity and Commodity.....	173
“[That’s] the English to enter the university, as you know”: Credentialized bilingualism as a skill and a commodity. ....	174
“Better” speakers of English than Koreans in Korea: Transnational Koreans as legitimate speakers of English. ....	177
“It’s like buying [a credit], you know”: Discourses of “shamefulness” and the persisting myth of “authenticity.” .....	180
Racialized Linguistic Ideologies and <i>Yuhaksaeng</i> ’s Investment in English Credentials .....	182
Conclusion: Language Learning as an Economic Activity.....	189
 Chapter 5: Transnationalism, Bilingualism, and Social Changes.....	191
Language and Globalization in Korea .....	191
Globalization and Translingualism .....	195
“Theory” in Applied Linguistics.....	199
 References.....	207

### **List of Appendices**

Appendix A Transcription Conventions .....	224
Appendix B Summary Table of Focal Participants (as of September 2006) .....	225
Appendix C List of Translations for Key Korean Terms .....	227

## **Dedication**

To the memory of my mother,  
OK-JA KIM

**Chapter 1:**  
**Transformation of Language and Education**  
**in the Globalized New Economy**

*Jogi Yuhak: The Migration*

*Introductory Vignettes: Globalization and Transnational Koreans*

*Scene #1: Incheon International Airport, Seoul, Korea (Fieldnotes, June 14, 2007)*

A landing announcement is made for the Korean Air flight from Toronto. The people waiting must have been sitting up late to meet the 2:00 a.m. plane. Among the crowd in the waiting area are many men and women, seemingly in their thirties and forties, gazing at the exit door and chatting to each other. The door opens. Rushing out of the door are many Korean adolescents carrying backpacks and suitcases. A teenage girl walks out of the door carrying two suitcases and a violin case. She looks around. A smile appears on her face. She runs to a man and a woman who have waved their hands to her. They hug and greet each other with big smiles and high-pitched shouts and are jumping around. The woman touches the girl's face and closely looks at her while talking to her (inaudible at a distance). They soon walk away. I overhear conversations from two boys and two men and women nearby (who I presume to be family friends): "Wow, you've grown!" "You got tanned." "Did you gain weight?" "If you were in Korea, what grade would you be in?"

I, myself, have arrived in Korea that day to conduct a month of fieldwork, and I am amazed at the number of Korean teenagers and their families enjoying their reunion at the airport. Over the ten-minute period between 2:54 a.m. and 3:04 a.m. alone, I observe fifty-four such adolescents and young adults. While taking notes of the scene, I am

reminded of the conversation I heard between two Korean girls in the restroom before I proceeded to customs. One girl had expressed her concern that her mother might not have arrived to pick her up because the flight landed an hour earlier than scheduled. The other girl tells her that she can just wait for her arrival. As the conversation continues, the first girl attempts to find the appropriate Korean vocabulary for the English word “delay” (I translate the conversation into English as follows):

- First girl: She [my mother] always arrives early, but the plane used to be *yeon chak* (delayed)? *yeon gi* (postponed)? I don’t know.  
 Anyhow... [she is interrupted by her interlocutor]
- Second girl: Say it in an easy word. *Delay* [original in English].
- First girl: Yes, it’s always *delay* [original in English]-ed.
- Second girl: Is English easier [than Korean]?
- First girl: No, it isn’t. Korean is easier, but [short pause] I don’t know, Korean is also difficult.

Both Korean words for “delay” (*yeon chak*) and “postpone” (*yeon gi*) are Chinese loan words of relatively formal usage that might be difficult for young Koreans whose schooling is not based in Korea to acquire and use. The above conversation is indicative of the bilingual repertoires of the growing number of young, transnational migrants in Korea.

***Scene #2: Incheon International Airport/Korean Air flight bound for Toronto (Fieldnotes, July 19, 2007)***

I am in the same airport a month later on my way to the gate for a return trip to Toronto. I constantly encounter groups of Korean children at different gates accompanied by one or two adults who are holding signs displaying the names of cities such as Cebu and Vancouver. It is the beginning of summer vacation in Korean schools in mid-July, and these children are leaving for short-term English study programs or an equivalent in English-speaking countries.

On the plane, I am sitting in an aisle seat in the middle section. Sitting in the aisle seat across from me is a Korean boy, around 8- to 9-years-old, with a young Caucasian man and woman seated next to him. The man and woman, seemingly in their twenties, are trying to converse with the boy and are asking him questions in English; the boy offers them brief responses while reading a book. Although I cannot hear the boy clearly (other than him responding, “forty days”), the young man and woman’s questions to him include, “Wow, are you flying alone?” and “How long are you staying in Toronto?” Their exclamations and comments, as well as their raised eyebrows and exchanges of smiles and looks between them, indicate their surprise and curiosity towards the unaccompanied young traveler on this 14-hour flight across the Pacific. By this time, I, on the other hand, am well-informed enough (both through my research and regular visits to Korea) not to be struck by the presence of such an unaccompanied minor. I wonder with humor if his parents would be pleased to see him communicating with English speakers.

I presume from the boy not being part of a guided group that he is probably attending an English summer camp or an equivalent in Toronto while staying with a relative or family friend (which turned out to be correct, I would later find out). I see a yellow pouch hanging on his neck and am intrigued. The language researcher and ethnographer in myself forces me to initiate some small talk with him. The boy, well-equipped with plenty of in-flight entertainment in his backpack such as books, comics, and game machines, does not appear to be particularly keen on having a conversation with me, as with the young English-speaking couple. Nonetheless, I manage to learn that he is in Grade 4, is visiting his mother’s friend in Toronto for forty days during his summer vacation, and would probably be attending some sort of classes in the city. The

yellow pouch is for “children who fly alone,” said the boy, referring to the “Flying Mom” service--the unaccompanied-minor program of Korean Air. As the flight approaches its destination, I see a flight attendant taking the pouch from him and then returning it, probably after filling out the customs form for him. About ten such pouches are held in her hand<sup>1</sup>.

The above two scenes from my fieldnotes represent snapshots of the huge wave of transnational migration of pre-college-aged Korean students for international education, known, among Koreans, as *jogi yuhak*<sup>2</sup> (early study abroad, or pre-college-aged study abroad). The vignettes are presented to illustrate how popular *jogi yuhak* has become, and how this transnational migration has produced a new generation of Korean-English bilinguals.

This dissertation examines effects of globalization on language, identity, and education with a focus on four *jogi yuhak* students attending Toronto high schools. In particular, this 2.4-year sociolinguistic ethnography examines language learning within the context of transnationalism, highlighting how new conditions generated by globalization have transformed ideas of language, bilingualism, and language learning, with respect to transnational circulation of linguistic and symbolic resources in the ever more globalizing world.

The thesis aims to propose a “globalization sensitive” Second Language Acquisition (SLA) theory, which conceives of language as a set of resources, or capital

---

<sup>1</sup> The number of elementary school student users of the unaccompanied-minor program offered by two major airlines in Korea has rapidly increased in recent years: during the first half of the year 2007, 4,503 elementary students used the service--an increase of 23.8 % compared to the same period in the previous year (Kim, 2007).

<sup>2</sup> The transliteration of Korean in this paper follows the Revised Romanization System. All translations from Korean are mine, with the exception of occasional consultations with several Korean bilinguals when the translations were more complex. Names of individuals and institutions in this paper have been changed.

(cf. Bourdieu, 1977, 1991), and bilingualism as a socially constructed hybrid repertoire of linguistic capital (rather than two parallel sets of monolingualism), to better grasp the ways in which language learning is socially and politically embedded in new conditions generated by globalization. To this end, the theoretical and analytical framework of this thesis incorporates insights from critical social theories (Bourdieu, 1977, 1991; Giddens, 1984), (linguistic) anthropology (Barth, 1969; Irvine and Gal, 2000; Schieffelin, Woolard, & Kroskrity, 1998), globalization studies (Appadurai, 1996; Ong, 1999), and sociolinguistics (Cameron, 2000a; Coupland, 2003b; Fairclough, 2006; Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1996; Heller, 2007).

The analysis examines new transnational subjectivities of “*yuhaksaeng*” (visa students<sup>3</sup>) for teenage bilingual Koreans, which index hybrid identities that are simultaneously global and Korean. In their construction of themselves as “Cools” who are wealthy and cosmopolitan, *yuhaksaeng* deployed newly valued varieties of Korean language and culture as resources in the globalized new economy, contesting their marginal positions as “FOBs (Fresh-Off-the-Boats),” “problem” speakers of poor English, and “Asian Nerds” in dominant Western racial discourse. Creative use of linguistic and symbolic resources to carve out a new social position by *yuhaksaeng*, however, resulted in limits to their acquisition of forms of English capital valued in the Canadian market. *Yuhaksaeng* dealt with this contradiction by investing in the acquisition of English credentials required for acceptance to universities, which were not always

---

<sup>3</sup> A literal translation of the Korean term *yuhaksaeng* would be “study abroad students,” but I find a rendition of “visa students” to more accurately represent the category, for the construction of this social category has to do with either family arrangements (i.e., the absence of both parents in Toronto) or citizenship (i.e., student visa). Further elaboration of the category of *yuhaksaeng* will be provided in Chapter 3.



successful. In this process, their language learning is constructed as economic activities, shaped through encounters with the transnational language education industry.

My argument is that as Korean middle class strategies for acquiring valuable forms of English capital, *jogi yuhak* is caught in tension between two contradictory language ideologies: while the ideology of language as a measurable (and acquirable) skill and capital to help an individual's social mobility drives the *jogi yuhak* movement, the essentialist ideology of the "Native Speaker" or a particular geographical location (i.e., authenticity) as a source of the value of "good" English makes it impossible for Koreans to work it to their advantage.

In what follows, I first outline the migration of *jogi yuhak* under a political economic framework with respect to the symbolic power of English in Korea. Next, research questions and their theoretical significance are presented. The remainder of the chapter offers a description of the methodological choice to investigate those questions and an overview of the thesis.

### ***Overview of the Migration***

*Jogi yuhak* has rapidly increased in visibility over the past decade. According to the Korea Educational Development Institute (KEDI), between the years of 2000 and 2005, the number of pre-university students who have left Korea on student visas has increased nearly five times from 4,397 to 20,400 (Kim Jin-Gon, 2007). The 2006 figure (29,511) shows another 45% increase from the previous year. Elementary school students represent a particularly explosive growth of 69.5% during this one-year period (see Chapter 2 of this thesis for a discussion of some reasons why this may be), followed by a 38.6% increase for middle school students and a 15.5% for high school ones (KEDI,

2007). In the same year, the total number of *jogi yuhak* students (including those accompanying their parents for temporary career relocations or family emigration) reached 45,431 (ibid.). Students from metropolitan Seoul and its adjacent province of Gyeonggi constitute nearly 70% (35.3% and 33.6% respectively) of the total number of *jogi yuhak* students in 2005. Within Seoul, as of April 1, 2007, the number of elementary students who left for *jogi yuhak* during the academic year from affluent *Gangnam* and *Seocho* areas was almost 10 times as many as that of the low-income areas of *Dongdaemun* and *Jungrang* (Park, Soo-jin, 2008).

The official statistics, however, do not include the huge number of students who embark upon short-term forays to English-speaking countries in various forms and for varying durations, not all of which necessarily require student visas. Therefore, the actual number of Korean students who receive international education should be significantly higher. As an agent at a major *yuhak* (study abroad) agency in Korea who I interviewed has remarked: “It is impossible to obtain accurate statistics because no single regulatory body exists on gathering information on *jogi yuhak*” (Interview, Seoul-based agency A, June 21, 2007).<sup>4</sup> Over the 2.4-year period from 2002 to 2004, the *jogi yuhak* market has experienced a 100% growth in revenue, which constituted a \$550 million industry in the first quarter of 2004 (<http://www.aasp.uiuc.edu/EducationExodus/index.html>).

*Jogi yuhak* takes various shapes, from prestigious boarding schools in the U.S. and short English trips to the Philippines to family emigration, *gireogi gajok* (wild goose family), and home-stay. Of these forms, *gireogi gajok* has attracted the most media attention within Korea. *Gireogi gajok* is a Korean term which has appeared in the media

---

<sup>4</sup> Interviews were conducted in the language of the interviewee’s choice with Korean being the language most often requested except for the interviews with non-Korean interviewees; for this reason, I have only specified the language of the interview when not originally conducted in Korean.

since 1999 (Cho, Shim, Shin, & Lee, 2006, p. 18). The term was coined to refer to the newly-emerged split-household transnational family where the mother and pre-college-aged children migrate to a foreign country for the children's education while the father remains behind to ensure the financial security of the family. *Gireogi gajok* typically consists of educated, middle-class parents in their thirties or forties with children in elementary or middle school at the time of departure, and their destinations are mostly English-speaking nations. According to information produced by the Ministry of Education and Human Resources in Korea, between March 2004 and February 2005, more than 50% of *jogi yuhak* students left for North America (Interview, Toronto-based agency A, June 13, 2007).

Despite its newness to most Korean eyes, transnational family arrangements to amplify children's educational opportunities are not new on the global scene. Similar cases of trans-Pacific migration of middle-class Chinese families, notably from Hong Kong and Taiwan, have produced numerous terms to refer to these families and their members such as "flexible family," "transnational family," "astronaut family," "parachute children," and "satellite kids" (see Ong, 1999, for ground-breaking work on this topic; for studies on such Hong Kong-born students in Vancouver, see Waters, 2001, 2006, and in Toronto, see Goldstein, 2003). On the one hand, both the Korean *jogi yuhak* and the Hong Kong/Chinese "astronaut family" migration are observed among relatively well-off families in relatively prosperous nations to ensure their social reproduction. Conversely, *jogi yuhak* has been more directly driven by economic motivations in a democratic nation, particularly around the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and its social aftermath in Korea, whereas the outgoing migration of wealthy Hong Kong families was

sparked by anxiety over the opaque political scene around the hand-over to communist China in 1997. In addition, the role of English, namely a quest for “good” English, is explicitly foregrounded in *jogi yuhak* debates in Korea, whereas pursuit of “flexible citizenship” (Ong, 1999) or Western educational capital (Waters, 2006) was primarily highlighted in studies of affluent Hong Kong/Chinese families. Given the increased class disparity and the collapse of segments of the middle class during and after the financial crisis in Korea, the pace and extent to which *jogi yuhak*, which was initially the practice of well-off members of at least upper-middle class, has spread into different tiers in the middle class is noteworthy.

Why do middle class citizens in a democratic nation with a respectable public school system embark upon the journey? Why has the *jogi yuhak* market experienced such a rapid growth at this particular historical moment and in this particular shape? Why is English such a sought-after resource in Korea? What kind of English matters? For whom? And why? This thesis aims to address these questions by situating *jogi yuhak* in the globalized political economy, where both “language” and “education” are increasingly being transformed into *economic* concerns (and are hence commodified) by both nation-states and corporate sectors.

### ***The Political Economy of Jogi Yuhak and the Symbolic Power of English in Korea***

Heated media reports and public debates on *jogi yuhak* in Korea tend to attribute the exodus to individual dissatisfaction with the excruciatingly competitive Korean educational system and Korean society as a whole, the desire to excel in English ability, or dysfunctional family dynamics. But these discussions have lacked critical analyses of the complex relationship between the local and global conditions conducive to the recent

escalation in migration. A burgeoning number of researchers have begun to explore *jogi yuhak* with varying foci such as the upward social mobility of Korean middle class families and their cosmopolitan striving (Cho, 2004; Park & Abelmann, 2004), the increasing heterogeneity in the ethnic and linguistic landscape of U.S. cities (Lo & Kim, 2009; Song, 2009), the experiences of *gireogi* mothers in the U.S. (Kim S-K, 2007; Lee, 2008), and emerging *jogi yuhak* sites within Asia (Park & Bae, 2009).

While all these studies attend to English as a major driving force to the migratory choices of *jogi yuhak* families, little research has engaged in the political economic analysis of the role of English regarding both heightened intensity of and increased heterogeneity within this transnational migration in recent years. For example, Cho's (2004) ethnography on *gireogi gajok*, one of the first scholarly investigations on the topic within Korea, portrays wealthy upper middle class families in California who reportedly spend \$100,000 annually for educational and living expenses as representative of *gireogi gajok*. As this thesis shows, however, this particular group of families in California does not adequately represent the recently increasing visibility of less-privileged middle class families and the resulting complexities in the paths and shapes migration takes. Furthermore, few studies on *jogi yuhak* or "satellite kids" explicitly focus on "visa students" as a new type of transnational migrants.

To gain a better grasp of recent transformation in the *jogi yuhak* market, the current study shifts the focus of the analysis to political economic shifts in the globalized new economy. Of particular interest are shifting meanings of language as well as shifting relations between private and public education sectors in the new economy regarding the rise of the transnational "language education industry," and how those shifts interplay

with individuals' struggles over access to "good (or authentic)" English, which has become a marker of elite status in the new economic order in Korea. I argue that the recent transformation of the *jogi yuhak* market results from several interrelated global and local factors: (1) the transformation in the global market structure of the "education industry" and the subsequent shifts in the Korean *hakbeol* (school ties) system, where international education for *undergraduate* degrees has gained high value over the domestic equivalent<sup>5</sup>; (2) a "step-up" strategy of the "old" Korean middle class (now elites) to reproduce their social positions by creating new "capital of distinction" (Bourdieu, 1984) in the *hakbeol* system, in response to the increased presence of the "middle class" over the compressed modernization period in the 1960s and 1970s. This was followed by participation in the game by the "new" middle class in search of the best strategy for social mobility under the new political economic conditions in Korea; (3) the intensified role of "authentic" English as a key source of symbolic capital in Korean class distinction in this process. As such, two key resources pursued through *jogi yuhak* are: educational credentials from prestigious Western universities and "authentic" English. While I revisit these issues in the following chapter, I briefly explain what I mean by "authentic" English here.

I use "authentic" English in this thesis to refer to what counts as "good" English in the contemporary Korea (see Chapter 2 for details). As a fictive construct of *the* dominant global variety of *spoken* English, perceived by Koreans to be conducive to their social mobility both in the Korean and the global market, "authentic" English indexes

---

<sup>5</sup> As the term *jogi* (early) denotes, post-graduate degrees from prominent Western universities have always constituted essential symbolic capital in building Korean elite credentials. Before the recent *jogi yuhak* boom, however, in popular discourse, *yuhak* (study abroad) for undergraduate degrees was often associated with an index of failure in the competition to obtain admission to "good" universities within Korea.

global elite bilingual status. In conjunction with the neocolonial power of the U.S. in post-World War Two Korea (cf. Shin, 2007), in the Korean context, this version of English is best associated with the “standard” American variety, or “Native Speaker” English (or “live” [*sal a it neun* or *saengsaenghan*] English, referring to English learned in the local [*hyeonji*] context).

Albeit a vexed term (see for example, Bucholtz, 2003; Coupland, 2003a; Eckert, 2003), I find it useful to call it “authentic” English because it is through the ideological construction of “authenticity” as a source of value for English capital, in relation to specific *geographical locations* in which the resource is believed to be exclusively distributed, that a unified market structure in the *jogi yuhak* industry is ensured within Korea. For example, one of the language ideologies underlying the *jogi yuhak* movement is the widely-held assumption that English is learned best in English-speaking countries (rather than within Korea). What matters is, however, not *any* English learned in *any* English-speaking country, but a particular kind of English only available in particular locations. Hence, the more “authentic” the location is, the greater the market value of both the linguistic and educational capital obtained therein.

This ideological work subsequently translates to the material structure of the *jogi yuhak* market, where the U.S. (and the U.K.) is placed at the top of the hierarchy (with the highest market price), followed by non-traditional destinations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines in that order. Consequently, who enters which market is reflective of the social position of the corresponding individuals, thereby further reproducing social inequality. It is through the construction of “standard” American (or British) English as legitimate, “authentic” English, both ideologically and

materially, that the symbolic power (i.e., socially-recognized power) of English (and hence *jogi yuhak* as a way to access it) is maintained and reproduced in Korea. Such symbolic domination (cf. Bourdieu, 1991), through which hegemonic ideology or discourses are rendered natural without appearing so, is vital to ensuring the total investment of individuals in the unified linguistic market, including those who least benefit from the discourses, such as those not able to enter the U.S. market or those who are not able to participate in the *jogi yuhak* game at all.

The ideological construction of “authentic” English relates to the ideological construction of the “Native Speaker (NS)” as legitimate speaker of English, and hence as legitimate teacher of English. For example, English Program in Korea (EPIK) was implemented in 1996 to recruit NSs of English to improve oral English ability of the Korean students and teachers. EPIK seeks applicants from designated six English-speaking countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America (EPIK brochure, Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development; for further details regarding ideologies of NS in Korea, see Park, 2009; Shin, 2007).

Yet the construction and maintenance of the unified market structure is not without constraints, particularly with respect to the newly produced markets under the new economy (see the next section) and the subsequent competition among them. In this sense, *jogi yuhak* to Canada is especially revealing of the possible transformation (or reinforcement) in what counts as “authentic” English. Closest to the U.S. in the market order as an advanced North American country and hence in terms of its “authenticity,” Canada represents the most attractive *alternative* market for those who are not able to



migrate to the U.S. (see Chapter 3). In 2000, for example, when a total number of 20,145 students left for *jogi yuhak*, Canada constituted the second most popular destination (14.1%) next to the U.S. (43.2%), and the third largest group (12.6%) in 2005 following the U.S. (34.6%) and China (18.0%).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, about 50% of Koreans (out of 11,564) who emigrated in 2001 chose to go to Canada (Editorial/*The Korea Herald*, September 8, 2003).

On the other side of the Pacific, Korean students constitute the largest group both in terms of the total number of individuals (27,549) studying in Canada on student visas as of the end of 2005 (Interview, Toronto-based agency A, June 13, 2007) and in terms of the international student population at a major school board in Toronto. According to the information I obtained from the international student office at this board, between 2001 and 2008, the number of their international students had nearly tripled from 457 in the 2001 academic year to 1,250 in the 2007 academic year. Koreans have represented about 60% of their international student population. Although the number of Koreans has begun to decline slightly since 2006 with the People's Republic of China (PRC) beginning to outnumber them at the secondary level, Korean students remain the majority at the

---

<sup>6</sup> Obviously, the recent emergence of *jogi yuhak* destinations in non-English speaking nations within Asia as more affordable alternatives is noteworthy. For example, while only 5.9 % (1,180) of the total number of *jogi yuhak* students chose China in 2000, the proportion reached 18% (6,340) by 2005 (Kim Jin-Gon, 2007, p. 31). However, I chose not to include *jogi yuhak* to non-English speaking destinations in this thesis for the following reasons: the first has to do with the absence of the *jogi yuhak* product to China in most major *jogi yuhak* agencies I contacted, as well as the absence of consideration of this destination among individuals I interacted with during my research. My speculation is that *jogi yuhak* to China is either operated by separate, smaller-scale agencies, or mainly through personal contacts given the rapidly increased business transactions between China and Korea in recent years. Secondly, while China is not exactly an English-speaking nation, its market value as a *jogi yuhak* destination is based on more affordable access to English capital in English-medium international schools, rather than on the acquisition of multilingualism (e.g., Mandarin, Cantonese, and English) per se. Although the value of multilingualism is mobilized at the discourse level (produced by the industry as a marketing strategy and reproduced by individuals), actual investment in the acquisition of Mandarin or Cantonese is observed to be minimal (see for example, Park & Bae, 2009, for the case of *jogi yuhak* families in Singapore).

elementary level and continue to be the primary market for this board (Interview, school board administrator, June 24, 2008)<sup>7</sup>.

To highlight the shared background of participating students in this outgoing migration (in terms of their social position as children of the urban [upper] middle class), I use “*jogi yuhak*” and “*jogi yuhaksaeng (jogi yuhak students)*” throughout this dissertation as a comprehensive term to refer to various forms of transnational educational migration of pre-college-aged Korean students, including family emigration, temporary migration caused by parental professional relocation, *yuhak* on student visa, as well as short-term forays to English speaking countries. Although citizenship status or migration type at the time of departure does index the relative social position of the individuals to some extent, as this research will illustrate, “who does what” among various options of migration is not clear-cut but rather constantly shifts or converges along their trajectories (see Chapter 3). Rather, I highlight “who goes where” and how subdivisions within the groups in the local context happen, which, as the research shows, is presumably a better indicator of the relative positioning of the corresponding individuals. On the other hand, I use “*yuhaksaeng*” (visa students) as well as “*iminja*” (immigrants) in this thesis as an analytic category and participant category (see Chapter 3) as constructed in the local Toronto context.

---

<sup>7</sup> Given the intensity of the media scrutiny and scholarly investigations of the topic as well as perceived pervasiveness of the migration as represented in popular discourses and as this research will show, the total number of *jogi yuhak* students (both on student visa and tied with family emigration or relocation) remains embarrassingly low: less than 1% of the total student population from elementary to high schools (Cho et al., 2006, p. 13). While on the one hand I remain suspicious whether that number accurately reflects the reality for aforementioned reason, I draw attention to the ideological construction of *perceived* pervasiveness of the migration through the process of symbolic domination. Of course, then, the majority of Koreans who remain in Korea are left with options trying to acquire the English capital in the domestic market. This includes English-medium kindergarten, different forms of private after-school English programs (see e.g., Park & Abelmann, 2004), and more recently “English villages.” English villages refer to short English-immersion camps established by several provincial governments. Bases on the information I obtained from my research, however, English villages are a “political artifact” (Park, 2009) and do not appear to be key sites to acquire English capital for Korean students.

Before moving to a discussion of theoretical significance of these issues, below I provide a brief account of the global condition for the recent reshaping of the *jogi yuhak* market with a focus on the rise of the global education industry.

### ***The New Economy and the Rise of Education Industry***

‘In a knowledge age economy,’ Louis Perelman writes in *School’s Out*, ‘the learning enterprise is strategically crucial.’ ‘Far too crucial to leave to the schools’, he adds. (Peters, 1994, pp. 183-184, as quoted in Gee et al., 1996, p. 6)

The Canadian Education Industry Summit (CEIS) is an annual forum providing a platform for education industry leaders and the business community to discuss unique opportunities in the education industry. The conference has become a huge success and is recognized as the premier event *linking education and business*, with no other forum like it existing in the country. (Charles Ivey, Chairman, Welcome message, The Canadian Education Industry Summit, 2004, p. 1, emphasis added)

The Toronto District School Board (TDSB) is actively involved in the international student program at the elementary and secondary level. . . . With *a strategic marketing plan*, the international student program has grown by 25 per cent each year for the last three years in the school district. . . . Dr. Sengupta has advocated for international education at many forums and firmly believes that Canada needs to improve its current global position in *education exports* relative to other countries. . . . She is also an invited member of the National Education Marketing Roundtable discussion held by International Trade Canada and Foreign Affairs Canada twice a year. (speaker biography of Dr. Smita Sengupta, Manager of International Student Programs and Admissions Office, TDSB, The Canadian Education Industry Summit, 2004, p. 15, emphasis added)

The salient role of knowledge in the knowledge- and service-based new economy has triggered corporate interest in educational institutions. The subsequent increase in corporate funding has rendered education systems, which previously enjoyed exclusive control over knowledge and learning, increasingly susceptible to corporate logic. The

*corporatization* of educational practices is increasingly observed both in higher education and the K-12 education sectors (Yarymowich, 2003).

In the discourses of corporate-driven educational reforms, the *value* of knowledge is highlighted and students are constructed as *consumers*, faculty/teachers as *employees*, educational practices as *services*, and education as *resources* or *product*. The accountability of education is thus determined by the ability to provide students with skills required in the labour market. Education is constructed as *economic* resources of the nation-state often through discourses of crisis on the “inadequate” public education system regarding its inability to promote the economic growth of the nation (Gee et al., 1996; Yarymowich, 2003). As such, education and business are increasingly conflated; the education industry rises.

For the education industry, “international” students represent attractive resources to be tapped as consumers of their programs (or products) both in the local and overseas context. The private language education sector has been one of the most active players in this market, but K-12 public education is an increasingly visible actor as represented by the institutionalization of international student offices in school boards/schools, policy shifts regarding recruitment and admission criteria, or immigration policy changes. For example, Waters (2001) notes that Canadian (provincial) governments actively attempt to attract wealthy families (including their children) from the so-called “Asian Tigers” (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan) by rendering immigration policy favorable for their entrance.

The global education business constitutes an annual U.S. \$100 billion industry (The Canadian Education Industry Summit, 2004, p. 1). The ever more fierce competition

in the market demands “ever more perfected and customized products and services” (Gee et al., 1996, p. 27) for increasingly well-informed customers. The resulting “niche marketing,” facilitated by the active participation of the governments of English-speaking nation-states in the education industry, has complicated the landscape of *jogi yuhak*.

First, fragmentation of the mass market brought about diversification of the destinations, from predominantly U.S.-bound migration to alternative destinations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and China. Second, the emergence of alternative markets and tailored services in the *jogi yuhak* industry attracted a wider range of students (e.g., younger students, less-privileged middle class families, students whose parents are not able to accompany them) to *jogi yuhak*. As a result, while the total number of *jogi yuhak* students in 2005 showed a 6.6 % increase from the previous year, the number of students who embarked on the journey on student visas increased by 24% during the same period (Kim Jin-Gon, 2007).

The globalized new economy has contributed to the rapid escalation of *jogi yuhak* (thereby to the creation of new conditions for language learning) by transforming not only the nature of education, but also that of language. The following section takes up this latter issue of shifting meanings and the roles of language (and identity) in the new economy, along with research questions and their theoretical significance to both studies of globalization and applied linguistics.

### ***Globalization, Bilingualism, and Language Learning***

#### ***The Economics of Language and Rethinking Bilingualism as a Social Construct***

Language and globalization as a research theme is gaining attention in sociolinguistics (e.g., Cameron, 2000a; Coupland, 2003b; Fairclough, 2006). A topic of

research attracting the attention of sociolinguists is the analysis of the linguistic consequences of globalization associated with “the new work order” (Gee et al., 1996), in which language plays a central role in the economic processes as both product and modes of production (Heller, 2005). That is, new capitalism is based on the service-based tertiary sector and places on workers greater “autonomy” to organize their work activity, thereby requiring them to acquire new forms of linguistic abilities. For example, while verbal communication was marginalized in the Fordist regime of mass production and standardization, in the post-Fordist regime of flexible accumulation (Harvey, 1989), the importance of workers’ *oral* communication skills rises, for service inherently involves *talking* with people. Subsequently, the importance of language on the management side to *control* the workers’ linguistic behavior--thereby the need for *standardization* of linguistic competence--also increases (Cameron, 2000a, 2000b). In this context, language is constructed as a work-place related *skill* (rather than, for example, identity marker): something workers “are expected to be, or become, ‘good at’” (Cameron, 2000a, pp. 18-19, emphasis in original; see also Heller, 2005). Furthermore, “style” and “stylization” (see Cameron, 2000b, pp. 325-327, for a concise review of sociolinguistic use of *style*, *styling*, and *stylization*; see also Rampton, 1995; see Chapter 3 for my definition of style in this thesis) become important in the context of globalization, because it is not just language, but particular styles of language that are globalized (Blommaert, 2003; Cameron, 2000b).

Radical transformation of our understanding of language necessarily reshapes how we understand identity. Due to the essentialist ideology of linguistic nationalism, namely the one nation-one language-one culture equation (Bauman and Briggs, 2003;

Blommaert, 1999; Hobsbawm, 1990), language has always played a key role in the construction of national identities since the modern nation-building projects of 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. In this discourse, language and community (and hence identity) were constructed as a whole, bounded system. Challenges faced by nation-states in the new economy, however, such as increased corporate control over formerly public sector activities and the emergence of supranational organizations and markets beyond the control of States, have rendered the idea of language as an emblem of (national) identity dubious. The politics of identity is increasingly replaced by the economics of language, and as such, both language and identity are increasingly commodified (Heller, 1999, 2003).

Although a detailed discussion of various social theorizations of globalization is beyond the scope of this thesis (but see for example, Appadurai, 1996; Giddens, 1991; Hannerz, 1996; Harvey, 1989; Robertson, 1992), this study attends to the role of language in globalization with respect to one recurrent topic of debate in studies of globalization: the dialectic between the local and the global (e.g., Appadurai, 1996; Freeman, 2001; Ong, 1999). Indeed, the “time and space compression” (Harvey, 1989) as well as increased mobility and flows in the current globalizing world has enhanced the interconnectivity between the two. Given its enduring commitment to theorizing the relationship between the micro and the macro (e.g., Heller, 2001; see also Giddens, 1984, for the notion of structuration), sociolinguistics is particularly well-suited to explore how the global and the local are not mutually exclusive but rather constitutive of each other, often through language. For example, Fairclough’s (2006) critical discourse analysis unpacks how globalization is constructed as inevitable and inexorable, thereby

naturalized through a neoliberal ideology (namely the discourse of “globalism”) in locally-produced speeches and documents. Furthermore, sociolinguistic research has examined whether globalization is equated with the global hegemony of English and thus poses a threat to the local (or national) languages and identities, or whether it creates opportunities to produce new, hybrid forms of languages and identities (e.g., Heller, 2003; House, 2003; Rampton, 2006; Pennycook, 2007). Yet empirical studies to illustrate the specific ways in which linguistic resources are transformed to form new identity resources have been scarce.

Building on the emerging scholarship on language and globalization, this dissertation examines the impact of political economic shifts in the new economy on language, identity, and education through the case of four Korean *jogi yuhak* students in Toronto high schools. The globalization-language education nexus is examined with a particular focus on one aspect of the new capitalism: niche marketing of the global language education industry and the subsequent emergence of the new local/regional (linguistic) markets. In these new locales, new linguistic resources are produced, distributed, and accorded new values, thereby serving new identity resources. In this sense, globalization is simultaneously localization. Likewise, while widely-circulated discourses such as Mcdonaldization or Americanization of the world equates globalization with linguistic homogenization (or Englishization), the transnationalization of economic activities in the new economy has rather rendered multilingualism vital (see Heller, 2005). Although I am wary of the controversy over what constitutes “local” in these processes (i.e., as a disguised form of the global, see for example, Grewal and Kaplan, 1994), I highlight the new conditions generated in the new, fragmented markets,



presumably conducive to transforming language and identity in ways which challenge essentialism and promote diversity and hybridity, thereby a more process-oriented understanding of language and identities (and hence language learning).

This thesis connects these inquiries to a discussion of bilingualism as a social construct (e.g., Heller, 2007). Understanding bilingualism as socially-constructed entails rejection of the dominant view of bilingualism as the coexistence of two autonomous linguistic systems: a remnant of 19<sup>th</sup> century European linguistic nationalism. Rather, this new view seeks more hybrid ideas of bilingualism (or bilingual repertoires), informed by the notion of language as a form of social practice and as one of the terrains (embedded in cultural, political economic, and social practices) to observe relations of social difference and inequality. During the period of ideological construction of a nation as a fixed, bounded unit through creating its cultural and linguistic homogeneity (e.g., the construction of “standard language” for the cohesion of the State), the heterogeneity inherent in bilingualism was inevitably disregarded (if not avoided) as a threat to maintain the boundary. Shifts in political economic bases in the new economy and intensified transnational flows of resources, ideologies, people, and commodities pose challenges to fixed boundaries and homogeneity associated with the construction of nation-states. As the discursive regime of nationalism, the very condition for producing and reproducing essentialist ideology, is challenged, so is the ground for the dominant view of bilingualism. To gain a better grasp of the increasingly nebulous nature of boundaries and ruptures, contradictions, and heterogeneities therein, a more hybrid understanding of bilingualism warrants recognition.

Researching transnational educational migrants such as *jogi yuhak* students offers a particularly enlightening site to examine both the new conditions to produce new resources and the new identities and new linguistic repertoires that are produced. Playing multiple games while traversing multiple linguistic markets across the globe, their very mobility, displacement, and ambivalence render their practices and trajectories full of tensions, ruptures, and contradictions. A critical examination of ways in which different actors deal with these tensions and contradictions can shed light on how shifts in the new economy transform or reinforce existing relations of power and social order.

I use “*transnational(ism)*” in this thesis to highlight the “horizontal and *relational* nature” (Ong, 1999, p. 4, emphasis added) of the flow of resources and ideologies across the nation-states and the subsequent *transformation* in their value. On the one hand, I remain mindful that globalization is an unequal process, that resources are circulated only with constraints in material and symbolic structures and that not everyone has equal access to capital and mobility (Heller, 2003; Spivak, 1996). On the other hand, I aim to highlight the multidirectionality of the flow of resources to examine the dialectic relationship between the local and the global. In doing so, I underscore that globalization not only transforms globally-dominant languages such as English and French, but also languages with relatively low global currency such as Korean as well. For example, the “Korean Wave (*Hallyu*),” the recent craze for Korean popular cultural products (especially TV dramas and movies) in the East/Southeast Asian (hence transnational Asian) markets, has refigured the meaning of *Koreanness* both as symbolic capital representing a new form of Asian modernity (e.g., Lin & Tong, 2008) and as marketable commodities. The current study attends to what I call “translingual” flows of linguistic

resources in the bi/multilingual repertoires of transnational subjects, and examines how the new discourse of *Koreanness* came to serve as a symbol of globality associated with cosmopolitanism in the social construction of *yuhaksaeng* (see Chapter 3).

Below, I situate these inquiries within the disciplinary context of applied linguistics, and its subdiscipline of Second Language Acquisition (SLA)<sup>8</sup> in particular. My argument is that to better explain today's language data imbued with contradictions, mobility, and multiplicity, globalization-sensitive applied linguistic research warrants transforming the conventional view of language, which highlights regularity, stability, and uniformity. This thesis aims to propose one such SLA theory which foregrounds learners (and hence agency) over the linguistic system, which has predominantly been the focus of analyses in SLA research. In terms of its ontological stance (i.e., the idea of the nature of language), this research adds to "social/sociolinguistic" approaches to SLA research. But it seeks to move the discussion forward by proposing the idea of bilingualism as a social construct and by employing political economic frameworks which have attracted little attention in SLA research. Furthermore, as with applied linguistic research conducted under "critical" frameworks (e.g., Cummins, 2000, 2001; Goldstein, 2003; Norton, 2000; Pennycook, 2001), this research holds an interest in the role of language in the construction of social inequality and social change.

---

<sup>8</sup> Although "second language acquisition (SLA)" has been a conventional term to refer to the institutional discipline of research on language learning (vs. teaching) in applied linguistics (e.g., "Handbook of SLA"), researchers working with a language-as-social-practice framework tend to prefer "learning" to "acquisition." I use "SLA" to refer to both "acquisition" and "learning" throughout this dissertation.

*From Linguistic Competence to Linguistic Capital: Rethinking SLA as Second Language Capital Acquisition*

In conventional, “cognitive/psycholinguistic” approaches to SLA, language is conceptualized as an autonomous, bounded system. Drawing on information-processing theories, researchers working under this framework tend to conceive of language learning as an inherently information-processing activity where the learner, metaphorically constructed as a computer, is processing linguistic input to produce output (for overviews, see Doughty & Long, 2003; Ellis, 1997; Lightbown & Spada, 1999; for critiques of this model, see Block, 2003; Kramsch, 2002; Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Pennycook, 2001). Thus, the ultimate goal of SLA is to acquire the target linguistic *form* while the goal of second language (L2) teaching is to move student’s L2 behavior closer to the fixed target norm, against which learner’s success in the acquisition of L2 form is measured (cf. Reagan, 2004). As such, the linguistic practices of language learners, or “learner language” in common applied linguistic terms, are best recognized as “*interlanguage*” (Selinker, 1972).

In the history of SLA research, theorizing learner output as *interlanguage* was, in fact, a significant move, advancing the status of the non-target form produced by learners from simple errors to a *language*. Nonetheless, *interlanguage*, defined as “a continuum between the L1 and L2 along which all learners traverse” (Larsen-Freeman & Long, 1991, p. 60), inherently involves the notion of fixed boundaries between the L1 and L2 (for critiques on *interlanguage*, see Block, 2003; Firth & Wagner, 1997; Pennycook, 2001). As a result, albeit *systematic and dynamic* (Selinker, 1972), *interlanguage* does not constitute legitimate linguistic practice, but still needs to be *assimilated* to the target

norm; language learners are doomed to be constructed as inherently deficient communicators.

Over the past two decades, the emergence of “social/sociolinguistic” approaches to SLA has brought a much-awaited ontological turn to SLA research, reconceptualizing L2 learning as a social practice. Representative social practice perspectives in SLA include L2 socialization theory (e.g., Bayley & Schecter, 2003; Duff, 2008; Watson-Gegeo, 2003), different versions of “sociocultural theory”—notably, Vygotskian sociohistorical models (Lantolf, 2000; Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Swain & Deters, 2007), L2 identity research (McKay & Wong, 1996; Norton, 2000; Siegal, 1996), and conversation analysis (Kasper, 2006).<sup>9</sup> While differences exist among these approaches, they converge in their understanding of language and SLA as situated, social practice. As such, SLA research has begun to increasingly attend to learners as complex human beings and the complex relationship among language, identity, and learning.

The increased diversity within SLA theories informed by these studies, however, did not arrive without controversies. Most notably, Firth and Wagner’s (1997) call for including the *social* (dimensions) to the *cognitive*-dominated SLA research has fueled a debate among applied linguists concerning the nature of SLA as an institutional discipline (see the 1997 *Modern Language Journal* Special issue on the topic; see also Trappes-Lomax, 2000). In response to the supporting voices for Firth and Wagner’s claim (e.g., Block, 2003; Lantolf & Pavlenko, 2001; Rampton, 1997), SLA researchers who opposed the call (e.g., Gass, 1997; Kasper, 1997; Long, 1997) maintained that SLA is essentially a cognitive endeavor to build knowledge structure. Even some L2 sociolinguists thus

---

<sup>9</sup> Pennycook (2004) represents another noteworthy emerging theorization of language as social practice—namely, performativity—but he does not attempt to explicitly develop it as an SLA theory. Given the current discussion’s focus on SLA theory, I therefore did not include performativity here.

claimed that (bi/)multilingualism and L2 sociolinguistics “belong to second language studies, but not to SLA” (Kasper, 1997, p. 310). On the one hand, such preference for a clear-cut disciplinary boundary, or the binary between *acquisition* and *use*, has to do with the institutional history of the discipline. Applied linguistics, to establish itself as a legitimate academic discipline on its own, had to show itself to be “as scientific as linguistics” (Pennycook, 2004, p. 5), its intellectual parent. Furthermore, as an *applied* field, it is often faced with the demand to offer immediate solutions to real world problems. Hence, “simple and elegant” theory with the fewest variables is preferred over the “complex and messy” of the reality of everyday language usage (Watson-Gegeo, 2003, p. 3).

On the other hand, the issue is ontological. That is, the concept of language as an abstract, bounded system developed from structural linguistics is not suited, by definition, to accommodate the complexities and messiness inherent in the “social,” which necessarily challenge and obscure the fixity of such boundaries. Likewise, the assumption of language as an autonomous system is inevitably tied with the understanding of bilingualism as two parallel sets of monolingualism, each of which is assumed to be an equally idealized, fixed system (Heller, 1999). Bilingualism as a whole is thus constructed as an anomaly to be explained or regulated (Heller, 2007). Bilingual practices of language learners, or use of the learner’s first language (L1) in L2 contexts (including mixed codes), are considered non-target forms or errors to be corrected, and considered to be detrimental to L2 acquisition (cf. Cummins, 2000, 2001).

Furthermore, unlike the conventional “cognitive/psycholinguistic” framework in SLA, the “social/sociolinguistic” approaches are developed from different disciplinary

traditions and hence diverge in their epistemological and methodological orientations. As a result, slippage appears to exist among these theories concerning their use of the term “social,” which ranges from something simply interindividual (e.g., cognition as “social” rather than purely intraindividual) to societal power relations. Subsequently, ideas of what constitutes data and convincing evidence in SLA also differ among them. In addition, not all these approaches have endeavoured to develop compatible theories of learning on their own.

For example, Vygotskian sociocultural theory (SCT) in SLA, with its disciplinary origin in psychology and subsequent epistemological focus on the development of the mind, remains interested in cognitive development in SLA, albeit refigured as socially-constructed and distributed in nature rather than locked within the individual mind. Conversation analysis as an approach to SLA (CA-for-SLA) shares a similar view on social cognition with SCT. Given its intellectual roots in sociology and more specifically, ethnomethodology, however, its emphasis is on social interaction or the accomplishment of interactional order. While its strengths include a well-defined epistemological and methodological stance as well as a clear articulation of a direction for developing compatible theories of learning, the “interactional competencies,” as defined by CA-for-SLA researchers, are observable *exclusively* in “concrete, local, situated activities” (Kasper, 1997, p. 86), thereby rendering the “social” relatively narrowly defined. L2 socialization studies (developed from language socialization research and linguistic anthropology) and L2 identity research (mostly informed by feminist poststructuralist theories) converge both in their ethnographically-oriented methodologies and their interest in situated learning theory (Lave & Wenger, 1991). L2 socialization research is

interested in the development of “sociocultural competence” through language use during the acculturation and assimilation process of learners into the new linguistic communities, from being a legitimate periphery participant to a full member through the guidance of expert members (for reviews, see Bayley & Schecter, 2003; Duff, 2003; Kramsch, 2002; Watson-Gegeo, 2003). As such, these studies essentially involve the idea of relatively homogeneous and stable communities and hence their capacity to handle tensions, and contradictions typical of increasingly heterogeneous populations in today’s multilingual communities is put into question. In addition, its assumption of welcoming and receptive community members and enthusiastic newcomers results from the lack of attention to societal power relations at stake (but see the notion of “marginality” in Lave & Wenger, 1991). L2 identity research offers a more politically productive account of the role of power in the relationship between the individual and the social in L2 learning, and hence offers the most inclusive view of the “social” among these approaches. Its most significant contribution to SLA research is the introduction of the notion of identity as a contributing factor to language learning. Nevertheless, L2 identity research still needs a better articulation of the link between identity and SLA.

In sum, given its relatively short history, language and language learning as social practice in SLA research still warrant better theorization. Furthermore, how bilingualism might be reconceptualized from this perspective is rarely discussed in these studies. As represented in terms such as code-switching or “proficient” bilinguals (as opposed to language learners), bilingualism in SLA still remains, if not untheorized at all, as two parallel sets of autonomous and bounded linguistic systems (see Heller, 2007, pp. 6-17, for a concise review of different sociolinguistic approaches to bilingualism). This



dominant view of bilingualism translates into educational practices--most notably regarding the (monolingual) language norm at (multilingual) schools--that often marginalize the bilingual practices of students (e.g., Cummins, 2000, 2001; Kanno, 2003; Goldstein, 2003).

This thesis attempts to further advance the discussion of SLA as social practice by asking in what ways theories of language and language learning as social practice are useful concepts in globalization sensitive SLA research and how such theories may help to advance our understandings of language education in today's world. I should first note that I acknowledge the contribution of the so-called mainstream, "cognitive/psycholinguistic" approach to SLA research in the field in explaining aspects of L2 learning, and as such, I am wary of making any sweeping critiques of these theories as inherently lacking. Nonetheless, I argue that to better explain the contradictions, ruptures, and multiplicity typical of new problem areas brought about by globalization, we need new theoretical and methodological tools to move away from ideas of language (and hence those of community and identity) as a whole, bounded system to language and identity as practices and processes (see e.g., Heller, 2008b).

To this end, the approach I propose here conceives of language as a set of resources (or "capital," see Bourdieu, 1977, 1991) constituting one's linguistic repertoires, learners as social actors, and language learning as an economic activity to access the resources. Bilingualism in this model is conceptualized as a hybrid repertoire of linguistic resources rather than two parallel sets of autonomous linguistic systems. As such, focus of analysis in SLA research from this perspective is placed on ways in which

individuals draw on linguistic resources from their linguistic repertoires in relation to the markets that matter in particular time and space.

The idea of linguistic resources is associated with an entirely *sociological* definition of competence (Bourdieu, 1977) or *social* competence, which is learned *in situ* through practice. SLA from this perspective thus moves away from abstraction inherent in the specifically linguistic definition of competence in the Chomskyan sense (namely, the ability of the *ideal* speaker to generate an infinite number of grammatically correct sentences) and instead highlights the *actual* competence individual speakers hold in specific time and space. As such, attention is due to “the adequate *use*” (ibid., p. 646, emphasis in original) of the linguistic competence by speakers, or appropriateness *in situ*, the capacity to do the right thing at the right time. Emphasis is placed on *legitimate* competence, or “socially approved” competence; analyses of the social conditions of acceptability of the linguistic products are vital to SLA research under this framework. Furthermore, the value of linguistic capital is contingent on the specific linguistic market concerned. Thereby, when an individual’s social position shifts across different linguistic markets, variations in the value of their linguistic capital occur. The linguistic stigmatization ESL students experience regarding the variety of English they speak upon their migration to English-speaking Western nations serves to illustrate this point.

The role of identity in language learning in this model is examined through the concept of social categorization. Inspired by Barth’s (1969) seminal work on ethnic group formation, I define identity as constructed through the *processes* of (social) *boundary* making (and remaking) by social actors. Boundaries or groups (hence identities) are thus products of social action rather than reflective of *a priori*

characteristics inherent among group members. Language plays a key role in boundary making and maintenance as criteria for determining membership and exclusion. How boundaries are formed, maintained, or resisted, and how actors engage in these processes is crucial to understand language learning with respect to what linguistic resources they gain or lose access to through those practices. Linguistic resources are, however, almost always unequally distributed; individuals have differential access to them contingent upon their social positions. As such, critical analyses of who gets to include and exclude through the boundary making, who has the power to decide, and hence who has access (or are denied access) to what resources distributed and circulated therein shed critical light on how linguistic difference connects to social inequality. In this sense, boundary making (and hence, language learning) is essentially related to power.

The economics of language approach to SLA that I propose is particularly useful to explain one key contradiction widely observed in SLA research and practices: despite the common-sense assumption (supported by some SLA theories as well) that English is best learned in English-speaking countries and through speaking English only with native speakers of the language, SLA research is full of accounts of language learners in multilingual societies (including in ESL classrooms) whose English use or interaction with English-speaking natives is minimal for various reasons (e.g., Goldstein, 2003; Han, 2007; Harklau, 2000; McKay & Wong, 1996; Norton, 2000; Talmy, 2004; Toohey, 2000). This thesis seeks to *explain*, rather than dismiss (as simple marginalization or disengagement) or problematize (and hence attempts to fix), this contradiction. By highlighting the *actors* (i.e., why they do what they do) in the social categorization processes, this research attempts to render visible what might have been neglected under

the traditional emphasis on the (linguistic) *system* that I believe is crucial to understanding their language-learning trajectories. In what follows, I present specific research questions the thesis seeks to answer. After that, I offer a description of how I addressed these questions and why I addressed them as I did.

### ***Research Questions***

Initially, the major research questions of this thesis were formulated around the conditions and motivations for the migration of *jogi yuhak* (at that time, more narrowly referred to as *gireogi gajok*) students, their linguistic and identity practices, and the consequences of those practices:

1. What are the factors and motivations behind the transnational migration of the Korean students of *gireogi gajok*?
2. What are the language practices of these Korean students?
3. What kinds of identities are constructed through such language practices? How do such identity constructions in turn influence their language practices? How do their language practices and identity constructions/negotiations change over time? How do such changes reflect the English learning of the students? What are the implications for English language teaching?

These questions evolved corresponding to the findings from the present research as well as feedback from the thesis committee on initial writing, and are rearticulated as follows:

1. What are the social and political economic conditions of the *jogi yuhak* movement (both at the global and the local level)? What resources are at stake? And why?
2. What are the processes of social categorization of “*yuhaksaeng*”? What are the tensions and contradictions in *yuhaksaeng* life as represented in their social and linguistic practices?
3. How are the tensions/contradictions dealt with? What are the consequences of strategies of their linguistic investment? For whom?
4. What are the consequences for the Korean middle class and for Korea? What does

the story of the *jogi yuhak* students in this study tell us about the role of language in the Korean experience of globalization? What are the implications for research on language and globalization and for applied linguistics (both for SLA and English Language Teaching [ELT])?

To address these questions, I turned to a research methodology that would link the political economic and social conditions to the language learning practices *in situ*.

***Research Methodology:***  
***A Critical Sociolinguistic Ethnography***<sup>10</sup>

***Undoing the “Social” and the “Linguistic” in SLA Research***

What does it mean methodologically to research the role of language in the social categorization processes? How can we make the “macro/social and political economic” structure visible through the “micro/linguistic” interactions here and now? This thesis approaches these questions through a research methodology of sociolinguistic ethnography oriented toward practices and processes.

The ontological position this research takes, which conceives of language as social practice, necessarily leads to an epistemological stance (i.e., how do we know about language?) connected to interpretivism. From this perspective, knowledge is socially-constructed, thereby language (and bilingualism) needs to be *described and interpreted*, rather than *discovered* as a fixed thing existing objectively (Heller, 2008a)—an assumption in the positivist approaches of conventional SLA research. A practical question then is: To be able to describe and explain social categorization and to best identify and understand social power relations in the process of categorization in an empirically observable way, where must we look?

---

<sup>10</sup> See Heller, 2008a for this term.

As discussed earlier, social groups/categories are often (though not always) formed based on apparently linguistic difference (e.g., “ESL,” “(Non)Native Speaker”). Language thus plays a central role in social selection processes (e.g., as a criteria for inclusion/exclusion and who counts as a legitimate speaker of the language) and subsequently in the construction of social inequality. What this analytically means is that it is through linguistically-observable social practices that we might understand the broader social organization (cf. Gumperz, 1982); that is, social processes are constituted through interactions in specific time and space.

Yet to understand how boundaries are formed through specific interactions, how individuals are positioned vis-à-vis the categories created through their practices, and what resources they gain (or lose) in the process, we need to *situate* them (cf. Gumperz, 1982). Social categorization happens with material and symbolic constraints regarding the production and distribution of resources under specific local conditions as well as social positions of the individuals involved. Furthermore, boundaries are not static but are constantly shifting. Thus, to gain a better grasp of complex processes of construction of social categories, analyses of this boundary making through interactions here and now need to be connected across space and time (cf. Giddens, 1984). To make this linkage, sociolinguistic analyses of interactions need to be ethnographically informed (Heller, 2001, 2008a). It is through this linkage among observable daily linguistic practices *in situ* that the processes of categorization in specific linguistic interactions connect to an understanding of the larger structure, by linking practice to ideology or agency to structure (cf. Irvine and Gal, 2000). That is, social structure is “*essentially involved in*” (Giddens, 1984, p. 70, emphasis in original) the production of social (and linguistic)

action—referred to by Giddens as the “duality of structure,” or the dialectic relationship between structure and agency.

In practical terms, what this all means is that to understand the social categorization processes of “*yuhaksaeng*,” I have traced some of its formations through their social and linguistic practices (e.g., what they say and what they do), tracked those social interactions through their trajectories, and connected them across different discursive spaces (e.g., spaces where discourses of *yuhaksaeng* or of relevant categories are produced) over time. By doing so, I have linked the construction of seemingly linguistic categories (based on them speaking Korean) to the categorization of people and hence to the construction of social inequality.

More specifically, to understand the processes of social categorization of “*yuhaksaeng*” in relation to their English learning, I focused on who did what with what kinds of available resources, why they did that (with what consequences), and how they made sense of what they did (cf. Heller, 2007; see also Blommaert, 2003; Eckert, 1996; Rampton, 1995). Two concepts emerge as analytically useful to this end: *habitus* (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) and *language ideology* (Irvine and Gal, 2000; Schieffelin et al., 1998). Linguistic habitus, a subset of one’s class habitus as defined by Bourdieu, is constituted through trajectories of experiences of reinforcements or sanctions for one’s linguistic products across different linguistic markets. As for transnational migrants, I highlight the *dynamic* nature of their habitus as learned through their journey traversing multiple global markets. Habitus thus offers the speakers a certain sense of the social value of linguistic utterances (of their own and of others) and hence of one’s place in the linguistic market concerned, or a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 76). Subsequently,

habitus often informs one's strategies of linguistic (and social) investment in relation to anticipated profit. Understanding the relation between habitus and the market, or how one makes sense of one's investment connects to the idea of language ideology, for one's ideas about language (and subsequent investment) are constructed in relation to the concrete, practical conditions of the market concerned. Therefore, critical analysis of language ideologies with respect to how value is accorded to linguistic capital across discursive spaces sheds light on how their investment may result in unanticipated consequences, thereby connecting to the construction of social inequality or change (Heller, 2008a; Irvine and Gal, 2000).

What follows is a detailed description of how the actual journey tracing the social categorization processes of “*yuhaksaeng*” unfolded over the course of my two years of research.

### ***The Fieldwork: Phases in the Field***

The major ethnographic fieldwork for the current research began at the end of February 2006 and continued through July 2007, focusing on four focal participants chosen among *jogi yuhak* students in Toronto. Sporadic follow-up interviews with focal participants and interviews with some continuing and new supplementary participants occurred until July 2008. Given that university admission is a key resource at stake in *jogi yuhak* (see Chapter 2), the focal participants were selected among *jogi yuhak* students attending high schools. During my preliminary research (see section 1.3.2.1.), I have learned that various routes of *jogi yuhak* can be roughly categorized as: (1) family immigration, (2) *gireogi gajok* (both as *immigrants* and as *yuhaksaeng* [visa students]), and (3) “home-stay” *yuhaksaeng* (characterized by absence of both parents in Toronto,



either staying with family-friends or managed by agencies). These categories informed my selection of focal participants who differed in their citizenship status and family arrangement: (1) Yu-bin, an immigrant girl in Grade 9, (2) Yu-ri and Su-bin, Grade 12 girls who are sisters from *gireogi gajok* on student visas, (3) and Se-jun, a Grade 12 boy holding Canadian citizenship who was unaccompanied by his parents.

Data collected during this period include 32 interviews with four focal participants over one academic year (with some follow up interviews afterwards) and 35 observations at their home and social sites (e.g., church, public school events, peer social gatherings, text messages among peers, personal homepages), to gain a sense of their *jogi yuhak* trajectories as well as their linguistic and social practices in Toronto. I also collected relevant documents (e.g., newsletters, brochures and flyers, community newspapers, school assignments and writings). Field notes, my personal journal, communications between focal participants and myself through email, MSN messenger, or text messaging, and readings of published *jogi yuhak* narratives constituted vital sources of data as well.

In addition, I conducted a total of 33 interviews with 34 supplementary participants, some of whom were interviewed multiple times. The first group of these secondary participants were identified as either having relatively frequent contact with, or an important influence on, the educational and linguistic practices of the focal participants (e.g., parents, teachers, and peers). They were recruited through the focal participants. Interviews with focal participants and this group of supplementary participants were conducted to understand motivations for and trajectories of the focal participants' *jogi yuhak*, their assumptions about language and language learning, and

how those assumptions interact with their linguistic and social practices. The second group of the supplementary participants included workers in the “language education industry” (see Chapter 4) who appeared to play key roles in educational experiences of *jogi yuhak* students and their families (e.g., school board administrators, agents at *yuhak* agencies both in Toronto and in Seoul, administrators at private tutoring agencies, school-based community workers in Toronto associated with Korean students). I contacted relevant institutions or individuals myself to recruit them. They were interviewed for me to better situate the focal participants’ trajectories and practices in the broader political economic background.

Interviews varied in length from thirty minutes to occasionally several hours depending on the interviewee’s choice. All Korean-English bilingual interviewees chose to be interviewed in Korean. Some interviews were conducted in a group if the interviewees so wished. All interviews were audiorecorded with participants’ permission except in a few cases where the interviewee chose not to be recorded (e.g., school board interviewees). All names for individuals and institutions that appear throughout this thesis have been changed.

Decisions regarding choices of specific sites of observations, types of data collected, and selection of supplementary participants were made based on the findings over the course of the research, as well as feasibility of access to the sites. For example, I did not observe the focal participants’ practices in their schools for several reasons. Se-jun did not attend his school regularly and moved to different schools over the course of his participation. The other three students were new to their schools at the time of their participation and did not feel comfortable with the idea of having to make arrangements

with the school for potential observations or interviews. In addition, for three *yuhaksaeng* participants (Yu-ri, Su-bin, and Se-jun), school did not appear to be a key language learning site. So I instead attended public events at their schools whenever possible, and attempted to learn about their practices at school through interviews.

Furthermore, although I was able to meet with some of the focal participants' peers, arrangements of face-to-face observations or interviews with their peers were faced with practical constraints due to their hectic schedule with school work, procedures for informed consent for minors, and constant shifts in transnational migrants' trajectories. For example, as for Yu-ri and Su-bin, their volunteer cohort group, whom they met in summer 2006 at the Korean heritage language program, emerged as an important peer social network toward the end of the year. The teacher at the program, a Korean immigrant, would invite the students to her place for a party once a month or every other month. To make arrangements with obtaining verbal consent from the group for potential observations, I first met the teacher for an interview. I interviewed her in Spring 2007 and she agreed to obtain permission from the students in advance for my potential visit to one of her parties. Yet, after the final was over (which kept the students busy), the teacher went to visit Korea for two months during the summer. By the time she returned in fall, the girls entered the university and the group did not continue. Thus, I chose to observe their interaction with peers in indirect ways<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, all students were heavily invested in some form of electronically-mediated practices with their peers (e.g., MSN, text messaging, Internet social network services such as Facebook or the Korean

---

<sup>11</sup> I also provided the students with audio-recorder so they could record interactions they chose. Most of the recordings were done at their homes or interaction with family members, presumably due to the complexities involved in arranging the informed consent.

equivalent of Cyworld home page). Given the complexities involved in obtaining archives of MSN chats, I chose to focus on text messaging data (see Chapter 3 for further details on how text messaging data were collected).

Below, I offer a brief description of how my ethnographic fieldwork over the course of 2.4 years has unfolded in four different phases, from locating the sites and identifying focal participants in Toronto to research in Korea and on-going data collection while writing. Although the division of the stages is not intended to be linear or clear-cut, each phase constitutes a critical part of the study in that what I have learned at an earlier stage informed how I went about making choices for the next stage.

***Phase One (February 2006 – July 2006): Locating the Jogi Yuhaksaeng community in Toronto.***

In February 2006, I began preliminary research to gain knowledge of the overall Korean community as well as of the *jogi yuhak* population in Toronto. While not constituting official interview data prior to my ethics approval, various *jogi yuhak* trajectories I learned about during this period provided me with vital insights to locate the sites, select focal participants, and obtain practical assistance with details such as feedback on my draft recruitment letter as well as research compensation. For example, I have learned about the *yuhaksaeng* vs. *iminja* (immigrant) divide prevalent among the Koreans, the construction of *yuhaksaeng* as a “problem” category both by *iminja* and occasionally by *yuhaksaeng* themselves, two key resources reportedly pursued through *jogi yuhak* (i.e., “authentic English” and “*hakbeol*”), and some key sites where those resources might be circulated (e.g., “buy-a-credit” school, tutoring agencies).

I had first contacted two representative Korean (or Korean-Canadian) community organizations in Toronto. At one organization, I volunteered to offer a summer English

story-telling class for young children; at the other, I was able to meet with the youth counselling program coordinator. I learned that their clientele included mainly immigrants and only a fairly small number of home-stay *yuhaksaeng*. I visited an ethnic Korean church known for its large youth ministry of *jogi yuhak* students. I attended Sunday services and events at the church fairly regularly and chatted with students and teachers whenever possible. At the same time, I informally met with some *jogi yuhak* students and their families through individual contacts. I offer a brief sketch of various *jogi yuhak* trajectories that I have learned about through these interactions:

- A Grade 9 girl in a downtown high school staying with her aunt, a Korean professor at a Toronto university;
- Several *jogi yuhak* students taking a Korean course as a “foreign language” credit towards their secondary school diploma at (what I later learned to be) a “buy-a-credit” high school downtown;
- A Grade 10 girl in a private high school, who was living in Toronto by herself; her parents were successful businesspeople in Korea, and she hoped to study at a U.S. university. She was one of the wards of a Korean administrator at a downtown ESL school for adults, who was simultaneously working both as a *jogi yuhak* agent during his promotional visits to Korea and as a local legal guardian for *jogi yuhak* students;
- More than one hundred *jogi yuhak* students with various citizenship status in a Korean division of a youth ministry at an ethnic Korean church in Toronto.

Meanwhile, I frequently traveled to the North York area, given the high concentration of Koreans living in the neighborhood, to obtain a good sense of the

background of the Korean population in the area as well as to locate *jogi yuhak* students. I walked along the street spending hours observing the linguistic and social landscape of the neighbourhood. I eavesdropped on conversations and chatted with people on the subway, at the subway stations, on the street, and at the stores. I organized my life so I socialized at Korean stores and used Korean hairdressers and travel agencies. At times, I simply spent hours observing people and the bulletin board at Korean stores or at a coffee shop. I also read Korean community papers and carefully followed the media reports on *jogi yuhak* movements. Once my ethics protocol was approved, I carried my recruitment letter to places that were frequented by many *jogi yuhak* students but were not easy to simply walk into--tutoring agencies (*hakwon*) and *noraebang* (the Korean equivalent of Japanese karaoke). I also moved to North York. Moving to North York proved to be extremely helpful for my research in various ways, increasing research efficiency associated with proximity to my participants which allowed more frequent interactions with them.

Two girls whom I met during this period were potentially interested in participating in my study. But while I was waiting for the university ethics approval, their final examination period started, shortly after which the girls were to fly to Korea for the summer. So their participation did not get realized. Nonetheless, research during this period provided me with valuable information regarding daily practices of *jogi yuhak* students which guided me through this thesis research. The knowledge obtained through the preliminary research informed my choice of focal participants.

*Phase Two (July 2006 – June 2007): Identifying focal participants.*

On a summer day in July 2006, I was walking around the North York neighborhood for my ethnographic observations when I happened to find a flyer in the public library advertising upcoming workshops on the Ontario school system for Korean parents. Observing these workshops to be a confirming indicator of the prevalence of *jogi yuhak* families in the vicinity, I approached the head librarian of the library and was referred to one of the workshop providers, a school settlement worker. She contacted a few Korean parents on my behalf to connect me with potential participants. This was how I met one of my focal participants, Yu-bin, an immigrant girl.

At a workshop offered by the settlement worker the next month, I was allowed to briefly speak about my research and distribute my recruitment letters. After the workshop, several mothers approached me. Through conversations with them either at a coffee shop or on the phone, I selected Yu-ri and Su-bin--sisters and two *yuhaksaeng* participants of *gireogi gajok*. My decision to choose them as focal participants was made based on the representativeness of their trajectories as one typical of *gireogi gajok* (as their mother self-identified herself as “the sixth year *gireogi gajok*”), their strong interest in participation in my research, and the easy rapport building between them and myself.

The last and the only male focal participant, Se-jun, was selected among the secondary group at the Korean church I had been attending since March 2006. He was one of the students with whom I had built up a relatively good rapport during the period and who showed a great interest in participating in my research (although his commitment later on did not prove to match his initially expressed aspiration). In addition, both his parents lived in Korea, but because he held Canadian citizenship, he did not qualify for a typical “home-stay” *yuhaksaeng* (i.e., visa students accompanied by neither

of their parents). Yet his ambivalent position as a *yuhaksaeng* (as he self-identified himself as one) with Canadian citizenship was deemed to be pertinent to show the complexities of the category of *yuhaksaeng*.

Before proceeding to the description of Phase Three, I sketch very briefly below the focal participants' trajectories to Toronto. As for Yu-bin, I include a brief description of her language practices as well, as the remainder of the thesis will focus mainly on the practices of the other three *yuhaksaeng* participants, because I have learned that *yuhaksaeng* was the category that was talked about and was *problematized* by community members (see Appendix B for a summary table of the focal participants).

***(1) Yu-bin: Immigrant student awarded a school academic excellence award.***

Yu-bin had lived in Toronto for two years when I first met her, and she was entering Grade 9 at a Catholic Arts School in September 2006. She was a “successful” student, both academically and socially, in her Korean school before leaving the country in Grade 6. She graduated from her Toronto elementary school with an academic excellence award--probably a first in the school's history for an ESL student. Her family immigrated to Canada under the “skilled-workers” category in August 1, 2004, and had lived in a northern Toronto neighborhood with a large Filipino immigrant population.

While not affluent, Yu-bin's family lived in a middle-class neighborhood in Seoul with both her parents achieving postgraduate education (M.A. level). The migration was motivated by a combination of several factors: her father's job insecurity after the 1997 financial crisis, her brother facing academic challenges at school, and the high cost of private after-school education required to further support Yu-bin's academic success. Yu-bin's father initiated the idea of family migration imagining a “better” future in Canada in



terms of free education for his children and a secure post-retirement life. Lacking English proficiency and Canadian credentials and experiences, however, Yu-bin's parents suffered unanticipated downward mobility from professional careers in Korea to menial jobs in Toronto and subsequent financial hardships. Yu-bin's academic success at school was thus most rewarding to her parents; their dream was, as the mother reported, for Yu-bin to enter the University of Toronto.

Yu-bin was used to socializing mostly with English-speaking friends at her elementary Catholic school, where there were very few Korean students and the majority of the students were of Italian origin. At her high school, on the other hand, she tended to speak more Korean as there were more Korean immigrant students (mostly academically high-achieving), although the majority of the students were white. Her relationship with other Korean immigrant students at her school or at the Korean Catholic church the family attended was a little complicated, however. Having limited financial resources to join the social activities they engage in (e.g., going to Korean restaurants or *noraebang*, the Korean equivalent of Japanese *karaoke*) and not being particularly interested in those activities, she did not participate in their activities. She was sometimes emotionally bullied by some Korean students at her high school.

Since entering high school, Yu-bin became increasingly interested in applying for U.S. Ivy League universities. Several "good" students at the school, including one of her closest friends, an immigrant girl from a Southeast Asian country, aimed to enter elite U.S. universities, which are believed to occupy a superior status over their Canadian counterparts in the global market.

**(2) Yu-ri and Su-bin: *Yuhaksaeng* of *Gireogi Gajok*.**

Yu-ri and Su-bin were “visa students” (i.e., studying in Canada on a student authorization) at a public high school in a suburban neighborhood in the northern Greater Toronto Area which houses a large *yuhaksaeng* population. The girls and their mother had lived in Toronto for six months when I met them in August 2006. Prior to their migration to Canada, they had lived in New Zealand for four years. Yu-ri was 19 years old and Su-bin was 17 when I met them, but they were taking Grade 12 classes together in their Toronto high school during their participation in my research. Yu-ri had to move down by one school year when she first moved to New Zealand from Korea due to the different school calendars of each country. She similarly had to move down another year when she came to Toronto.

Yu-ri and Su-bin were in Grade 8 and Grade 6 respectively when they first left Korea. The girls were born and raised in a recently-developed (upper) middle-class neighborhood in Seoul by university-educated parents. Their father was a senior staff member at a major broadcasting company in Korea. The family did not feel it necessary to emigrate to another country as the father had a secure and decent job. But to save on the girls’ educational costs, they filed an application through an emigration agency in Korea for Canadian permanent residency under the investment category before they moved to Canada. The emigration agency helped them find a school and housing in Toronto. Their immigration application was initially denied and, as of December 2007, was still under review.

**(3) *Se-jun: Yuhaksaeng with Canadian citizenship.***

Se-jun was from a medium-sized, provincial city in Korea where his parents, both university-educated, currently live with his younger sister. His father was a senior administrator at a university-affiliated language institute in the city. His mother was a stay-at-home mother, but to support Se-jun's *jogi yuhak* expenses she began to work at an insurance company as a sales agent (one of the most well-known professions for unskilled women in Korea due to easy entry). Born in Canada while his mother was visiting her family who had earlier immigrated to the country, Se-jun held Canadian citizenship even though he grew up in Korea. At the time of his consent to participate in my research in summer 2006, the 18-year-old boy was to enter Grade 12 at an inner-city school in downtown Toronto in close proximity to his grandparents' home (where he had been living since his arrival in Toronto in November 2002). Over the course of his participation in my research, he alternated between his grandmother's house and home-stay with different Korean families. He self-identified as *yuhaksaeng* in that he was not accompanied by his parent(s) for his studies in Canada. At the same time, however, he acknowledged that he did not exactly fit that category because he was eligible for free public education as a citizen; otherwise, he admitted, he would not have been able to leave for *jogi yuhak*.

Before migrating to Toronto, he had attended Grade 3 in a small city in Ontario between September 1997 and June 1998. During that period, he home-stayed with an elderly Canadian couple whom he met while they were teaching English at the university-affiliated language institute where his father was working in Korea. They agreed to bring Se-jun with them when they returned to Canada. As he wanted to continue to study in Canada, his mother tried to figure out the best way to realize the

idea. In summer 2001, she went to visit her sister in the U.S. with Se-jun and examined the possibility of sending him to stay with her to go to school with his cousin in Grade 6. The situation did not appear to be favourable due to her sister being busy with her own work and kids. Se-Jun's mother thus decided to send him to his grandparents in Canada instead. In November 2002, Se-jun left his Grade 8 classroom in Korea for Toronto.

***Phase Three (March 2007 – July 2007): The Yuhak industry in Toronto and Seoul.***

As my ethnographic case study evolved, I have learned that *jogi yuhak* families' migratory choice to Canada was closely related to their social positions within Korea, which in turn shape their daily activities in Toronto (see Chapter 3). Furthermore, I have learned that there are two major paths *jogi yuhak* families follow to obtain information while making migratory choices and decisions: through *yuhak* agencies (*yuhakwon*) or personal networks (notably, Internet Cafés<sup>12</sup> as well as personal contacts). To better understand how the specificities of my case study findings fit within the larger picture of *jogi yuhak*, I thus conducted interviews with *yuhak* agencies (*yuhakwon*) both in Toronto and in Seoul. I also interviewed educational workers associated with *jogi yuhak* students

---

<sup>12</sup> Throughout this thesis, I use the term *Internet Café* to refer to online community/forum for social network, rather than the physical café/restaurant where one pays for time at an Internet-connected computer. Internet Cafés became extremely popular in Korea when Daum Communications Corporation, a representative Internet portal service provider in Korea, began in 1999 Daum Café, their web forum/community service. Among Koreans, opening and participating in Internet Cafés to share information or network are extremely popular. Internet Cafés are sometimes used to organize social/political activities. In addition, Naver, another representative web portal service provider in Korea, specializes in their knowledge search service (*Jishik iN*), an information sharing tool launched in 2002. The popularity of *Jishik iN* contributed to ranking *Naver* the fifth most used search engine in the world, and *Jishik iN* was later benchmarked by Yahoo for *Yahoo! Answers* (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naver>). Given the heavy use of user-defined/generated content available through services offered by *Naver* or *Daum*, cyber space serves important marketing tool for *jogi yuhak* agencies as well as for information sharing or seeking for *jogi yuhak* parents.

in Toronto at varying institutions such as school boards, federally-funded settlement-service-providing organizations, and the Korean consulate.

I first spent several days exploring the two central locations for *yuhak* agencies in Toronto. After experiencing a few rejections at some agencies, I was able to interview administrators at two *yuhak* agencies, which turned out to be representative of two different types of *yuhak* agencies: (1) a small-scale (often with 1-2 employees) business targeting only a selected number of *jogi-yuhak* clientele; (2) a more “enterprised,” large-scale business with its own subsidiaries of related business such as home-stay and tutoring, often connected to agencies in Korea and targeting both *jogi yuhak* and other types of study abroad (e.g., university students studying ESL). For the Korea-based research between mid-June and mid-July 2007, given the time constraints and the experienced and expected challenges in conducting interviews with the business sector, I focused on approaching several major agencies in Seoul. To compensate, I spent several days around the *Gangnam* and *Jongro* area, two major locations for *yuhak* agencies and English education industry, conducting ethnographic observations of the linguistic landscape of the area. I conducted four interviews with administrators or agents at four major *yuhak* agencies in Seoul. In addition, I had brief conversations with agents at two other agencies although they did not agree to be formally interviewed for a longer period. During this period, I also interviewed Se-jun and his mother in his hometown; at the time, he had temporarily returned to his hometown in Korea.

Meanwhile, stories I heard from the Korean families and students did not tell me how these students were taken up by “mainstream” Canadian institutions. It appeared to me that Korean students and families mainly relied on Korean networks to acquire

necessary linguistic and educational capital. Accordingly, I decided to interview administrators at the school board and community workers associated with Korean students to learn about policy around international students and the kind of support provided to them in Toronto. I interviewed three school settlement workers located at different schools in Toronto, where the Korean students constituted a critical mass. Additionally, I interviewed an ESL counselor and four counselors/administrators working with international students at one of the major school boards of the city.

***Phase Four (August 2007 – July 2008): On-going data collection while writing.***

After returning from Korea at the end of July 2007, I started further analyzing the data and writing. I met with focal participants from time to time to be informed of developments in their lives. During this period, Yu-ri and Su-bin's mother returned to Korea permanently upon their admittance to university. The girls enjoyed the freedom of university life while at the same time were busy dealing with the academic demands of their programs. Se-jun resumed his studies in Toronto at an adult school but eventually returned to Korea in March 2008 without completing his studies in Toronto. He joined the army in June 2008 to complete mandatory military service for Korean men. Yu-bin constantly shifted her post-secondary plans as to whether studying at an Ivy League university would be a feasible plan for her or whether she should simply remain in Canada. Her mother felt sorry for not being able to offer sufficient financial and extracurricular support Yu-bin might need to enter an elite U.S. university; she wanted Yu-bin to go to an elite Canadian university as her marks would qualify her for a scholarship even at a top Canadian university. If that would be the case, however, Yu-bin did not feel that she needed to study as hard.

In addition, I became increasingly more involved in some Korean community activities through contacts I had made during my research. For example, in April 2008, I joined a social gathering of a Korean-Canadian educators' network where I met a group of Korean parents who represented a voluntary network of *yuhaksaeng* parents. I interviewed three parents to gain insight for some practical implications of my research; I also visited their Internet Café and attended one of their information sessions on university admissions. Conversations and interactions at those activities sometimes confirmed my research findings and analysis and offered new insights at other times.

### *Overview of the Thesis*

The present chapter has set out the theoretical and disciplinary background of the research with a delineation of the methodological approach to the empirical investigation of the issues raised. In response to the first set of research questions, this chapter also provides an overview of the global and local conditions of *jogi yuhak* which continues to the next chapter. Chapter 2 offers a critical analysis of the social historical context of the phenomenon under investigation, *jogi yuhak*, as the backdrop for the present study. The discussion focuses on how globalization has reconfigured the Korean system of *hakbeol* (school ties) in ways which privilege a greater investment in international education to the detriment of indigenous capital, and how in this process, "authentic" English has become a key source of symbolic capital in Korean class distinction as a marker of elite bilingual status.

The next two chapters present analyses of the data from the ethnographic case study. Chapter 3 addresses the second set of research questions and discusses how the social category of "*yuhaksaeng*" (visa students) is constructed through the students'

linguistic and social practices, and the complex ways in which tensions and contradictions between modernity and post-modernity, or between essentialism and hybridity, are manifested in *yuhaksaeng* life. In the first half of the chapter, the complex ways in which language interplays with class, citizenship, ethnicity, and race in this social categorization process in various discursive spaces are depicted. Although this social category is apparently constructed in opposition to long-term Korean immigrants, this categorization practice is indeed an action to counter the North American racial/ethnic order in which middle class Korean families feel a sense of displacement. The second half of the chapter illustrates how, in this social categorization process, *yuhaksaeng* transformed a variety of Korean language and culture, namely contemporary youth pop culture and youth Internet language, into an element of their bilingual repertoires as stylistic resources (as represented in the Korean-English bilingual text messaging), to present their “globality” associated with cosmopolitanism as manifested in the local Toronto context. This practice, however, has resulted in contradictions in ways which constrain their English capital acquisition--the very resource they claimed to pursue through the migration.

In response to the third set of research questions, Chapter 4 explores how individuals dealt with those contradictions and the results of those strategies. The chapter begins with a discussion of how participants’ understanding of the meaning and goals of *jogi yuhak* are negotiated not only by the local reality in Toronto and that of Korea, but by imagined future trajectories that go beyond both the Canadian and the Korean market. The rest of the chapter illustrates how the acquisition of educational and linguistic capital by *yuhaksaeng* is shaped through encounters with the transnational English language



education industry, and how tensions between authenticity and commodity are revealed in ideological manifestations and practices in such a process. Since the twofold goals of admission to a prestigious university and acquisition of “authentic” English were not always compatible due to the linguistic and racial stigmatization they experienced, *yuhaksaeng* chose to invest in acquiring English credentials required for acceptance to universities. These strategies sometimes resulted in successful admittance to a desired university, but often did not, seeing *yuhaksaeng* dropping out and returning to Korea. Access to English credentials was provided through an expanding network of “buy-a-credit” schools and tutoring agencies, which sprung up in response to the growing population of *jogi yuhak* students.

The fourth set of research questions are addressed in the concluding chapter. Chapter 5 discusses the role of English in the Korean experience of globalization and its implications for studies of globalization and applied linguistics.

The thesis argues that social categorization apparently based on linguistic difference is not really about language, but about social organization and regulation; in multilingual societies, ethnic/racial/linguistic minorities’ limited access to the acquisition of linguistic resources is *produced* by existing inequality (or social order), rather than their limited linguistic proficiency contributing to their marginal position. The commodification of language and corporatization of education in the new economy and subsequent tensions between essentialism and hybridity as well as between authenticity and commodity, have rendered the role of language and education in the processes of social construction of inequality (and its transformation) ever more vital and in ever more complex ways. To counter *naturalized* social inequality seemingly linguistic in nature,

language education in globalization should move away from essentialism toward process- and practice-oriented approaches to language, community, and identity, which are better positioned to accommodate hybridity and heterogeneity represented in trajectories of students traversing multiple linguistic markets across the globe.

**Chapter 2:**  
**“English Divide” and *Jogi Yuhak*:**  
**Globalization and English Education in Korea**

***Introduction***

This chapter discusses how the globalized new economy and its emphasis on language skills and on multilingualism (cf. Cameron, 2000a; Gee et al., 1996), especially knowledge of English, has produced “authentic” English as a key source of symbolic capital in the construction of Korean class distinction. English has long served as a key source of symbolic/cultural capital in Korea through the complex political economy of *hakbeol* (school ties). However, globalization, the new post-industrial economy, and neoliberalization, particularly acute in Korea due to the financial market crisis, have recently reshaped the Korean *hakbeol* system in ways which produce a greater investment in English-language learning overseas and in education in other countries (especially but not only English-speaking ones) from an earlier age, to the detriment of the indigenous *hakbeol* sources. The subsequent expansion of the *jogi yuhak* (early study abroad) market interplays with several competing ideologies of English and learning: (1) the commodification of English as an essential part of a skillset of “Global Korean (or Global *Injae*)”; (2) the persisting, essentialist ideologies of “authentic” English (and hence “NS-supremacy”) [see Chapter 1]; and (3) the construction of education as a “self-management” project associated with the rise of the education industry in the new economy.

To better understand the place of English in Korean class politics, the following section begins with a discussion of social reproduction through *hakbeol* in Korea and

how the State's efforts to level the internal *hakbeol* field have only further encouraged people to invest in its acquisition from various sources opened up by globalization.

***“Hakbeol Society” and the Sagyoyuk (Private After-school Education)<sup>13</sup> Market***

***Hakbeol (School Ties) and Symbolic Domination in Korea***

A dragon can be born at a creek [referring to someone who climbed up from the bottom of the social ladder]<sup>14</sup>. (A Korean proverb, my translation)

Which university one graduated from determines one's social status in Korea. Wealth and power are dominated by the very few elites from the first-tier universities. Across the legislature, the court, and the administration as well as in the economic sector, media, academia, and even the cultural industry, power is dominated by the few *hakbeol-munjung* (*hakbeol* clanship) centering around Seoul National University. In such a society, those without university degrees and those with degrees that are not from the first-tier universities are always subject to discrimination, visible and invisible, and disrespect. *Hakbeol* matters the most in the hiring process and even in marriage. Such discrimination stemming from *hakbeol*-supremacy is so prevalent that we have come to a point where we feel we know a person only after we find out which university s/he has graduated from. It's black and white; if one has good *hakbeol*, s/he is somebody; if not, s/he becomes nobody. (<http://www.antihakbul.org/>, my translation)

A field is always the site of struggles in which individuals seek to maintain or alter the distribution of the forms of capital specific to it. The individuals who participate in these struggles will have differing aims — some will seek to preserve the status quo, others to change it — and differing chances of winning or losing, depending on where they are

---

<sup>13</sup> *Sagyoyuk* literally means “private education,” but I offer a rendition of “private after-school education” throughout the thesis. The distinction between *gongrip* (public) and *sarip* (private) schools in Korea is different from that of North America. Most private schools in Korea are partially funded and regulated by the government and thus the tuition, the curriculum, and the admission process are fairly similar to those of public schools. In the Korean context, *sagyoyuk* has been used to refer to the activities in the market sector of the education. I use “public education” (*gonggyoyuk*), or “public schools” to refer to both *gongrip* and *sarip* schools when I discuss the Korean situation. I use “elite (high) schools” to refer to schools which may be equivalent to the private schools in North American (i.e., schools with higher tuition and autonomous curriculum and selection process).

<sup>14</sup> For Korean proverbs/expressions used in this paper, I provide a literal translation with a rendition whenever possible. In East Asian culture, the dragon represents an auspicious mythical animal, which is often used as a symbol of a King/Emperor.

located in the structured space of positions. . . . All participants must believe in the game they are playing, and in the value of what is at stake in the struggles they are waging. The very existence and persistence of the game or field presupposes a total and unconditional ‘investment’, a practical and unquestioning belief, in the game and its stakes. (Thompson, 1991, p. 14)

Anyone who carefully follows Korean media coverage may be struck by the amount of news reports and debates centered around education. The main topics include the competitive university admission system/entrance exam, “inadequate” public K-12 education to prepare students to win the competition, and the subsequent expansion of costly *sagyoyuk* (private after-school education) market. Therefore, policy initiatives of each incoming government almost always include some form of educational reforms, particularly those of the university entrance exam system and increasingly those of the English education system, the most to blame for the increased household expenditure on *sagyoyuk*. Frequent reshuffling of the educational planning team results in a lack of consistency in planning and implementing educational policy in Korea and renders educational decision making susceptible to political agendas rather than educational judgments, producing the “politicization of education,” which in turn causes public distrust in educational policy. Why then is education such a tricky problem, or the center of so much controversy and debate in Korea? Why are Koreans so invested in education?

The educational zeal or “education fever” of Korean/East Asian families is recognized worldwide and has been often constructed as a cultural trait relating to Confucian heritage; this zeal has served an ideological tool for the discourse of economic development within Korea and the ideology of the “model minority” in U.S./North American racial politics. While acknowledging the legacy of Confucianism, the current discussion moves away from the cultural reductionism of “education fever”; the

discussion instead highlights symbolic domination (Bourdieu, 1991) through the *hakbeol* (school ties) system in its account of Koreans' investment in education. That is, "good" education is a much sought-after resource in Korean society because it plays a key role in class reproduction through the ideology of *hakbeol*. Simply put, access to elite educational institutions and obtaining good *hakbeol* is essential in one's social mobility in Korea because it regulates access to other valuable resources such as lucrative jobs, promotion, marriage, and networking and information. Since one's educational background is often representative of one's class background in that not everyone has equal access to costly elite educational institutions, *hakbeol* is an ideological construct of the Korean elites to justify their class reproduction without appearing to do so: by labelling it as *hakbeol* instead of "class," it disguises class as a producing mechanism of this capital (cf. symbolic domination, Bourdieu, 1991).

While education, along with family, serves as a key reproduction institution in other societies as well, the ways in which *hakbeol* capital is produced and distributed in Korea represent a few specific characteristics, which contribute to the maintenance of powerful symbolic domination through education. First, the production of *hakbeol* as cultural capital is strictly regulated by the elites through the tiered structure of the universities. What counts as the most valuable *hakbeol* in the Korean market is an *undergraduate* degree from one particular university, Seoul National University (SNU), with all other universities hierarchically ordered underneath according to the academic achievements (i.e., marks at the entrance exam) of the students who matriculate. Each academic program is tiered in the same way within a university. The structure of one National University at the top and other private universities underneath it is reproduced at

the provincial level. However, it is through this ideological construction of a “single best university” versus the rest that the system reproduces itself. That is, under this system, even a student who receives a high enough mark to enter the top program at the second best university, for example, is often left with feelings of failure to enter the one at the SNU rather than feeling pride in relation to his/her achievement. In doing so, even those who do not benefit from the ideology believe in the superiority of the SNU capital. This misrecognition (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) of the symbolic domination by the dominated is crucial to maintain the system. Consequently, whereas 82 % of the population are university educated (*Gukjeong Briefing* special project team, 2007), competition over university entrance remains high because everyone aspires to enter the best possible university relative to their social and academic position.

This ideology of “single-best” university applies to *hakbeol* from international sources as well. Given strong neo-colonial influence of the U.S. in modern Korea, the ideology of U.S.-supremacy significantly influences Korean’s understanding of the global symbolic order. For example, academic credentials from U.S. universities, particularly those from Harvard university which is considered as *the* best university in the U.S. (and hence *the* best in the world) by Koreans, are believed to be more valuable than educational capital acquired from other countries, even by those who are not able to obtain U.S. (or Harvard) degrees. Through this ideological construction of the U.S. educational capital as *the* most valuable in the global market, the global hegemony of the U.S. is locally reproduced within Korea, which in turn further reinforces the ideology.

Second, given that access to an undergraduate education is more susceptible to one’s class background than a postgraduate degree for which various alternative paths are

available (e.g., self-funding through work), family plays a key role in the acquisition and reproduction of *hakbeol* capital. Third, as an undergraduate degree, the value of *hakbeol* capital is semi-permanent once acquired. Additional acquisition of *hakbeol* capital through transfer to a top-tier university or international education may thus *add* value to the individual's *hakbeol*, but does not shift its value order in the system. For example, an MBA from Harvard University with an undergraduate degree from SNU is more valuable than a Harvard MBA without the SNU degree (and an SNU degree without a Harvard MBA) in the Korean market. Fourth, Korean universities have largely relied on academic achievement (i.e., high marks on the standardized, national entrance examinations) as a sole admission criterion, which contributed to naturalizing the *hakbeol* system through the ideology of meritocracy. Fifth, as Bourdieu (1986) argues, this very “high degree of concealment” (p. 254) in the production and transmission of the *hakbeol* as cultural capital translates it as symbolic capital, to be recognized as “legitimate competence” (p. 245) based on personal qualities, rather than as capital, perpetuating symbolic domination through education in Korea. Sixth, as such, *hakbeol* also constitutes social capital of *hakyeon* (academic cliquism), notably through institutionalized practices of *dongmunhoe* (alumni association) of elite schools.

The ideology of “*hakbeol* supremacy” is widely circulated through pop culture, daily conversations and other social practices, which in turn further reproduces the ideology. For example, a student's academic achievement is often constructed as the honor of his/her *mogyo* (mother school; alma mater); names of students admitted to elite schools/universities are often displayed in banners placed at the entrance of the school. High schools are (unofficially) tiered based on the number of students who obtained an



admission to top-tier universities, particularly to SNU, a statistic which often appears in media reports. Children's academic achievement is one of the most popular topics of conversation in social gatherings and is often associated with parents' reputation. Familial conflicts over a dowry when a man with good *hakbeol* in a lucrative profession (notably a medical doctor) but from a poor family is married to a rich girl without good *hakbeol* have been a popular theme of soap operas. Furthermore, stories circulate in the media of many "dragons from the creek" who moved up to the political and economic elite group allegedly thorough hard work and education during the compressed modernization period since the decolonization from Japan (1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953).

In sum, *hakbeol* is a coveted resource in the Korean society both as a means of social mobility as well as the product of one's social status. One material effect of the prevailing "*hakbeol* supremacy" in Korea is its extraordinarily highly educated population, with 82 % of the population being university educated (*Gukjeong Briefing* special project team, 2007). This, in turn, further strengthens the ideology. Therefore, competition remains high over entrance to the best possible university relative to one's social and academic position. It is thus common for students who fail to enter the university they aimed at to spend another year or two at private university-prep academies to repeat the entrance examination the following year. That is, no one is free from the game. More important for my purpose here, the fierce competition over admission to the first-tier schools has resulted in the growth of the *sagyoyuk* market, where students seek additional resources to strengthen their competitiveness in the admission process. Differential access to various types and qualities of *sagyoyuk* by

different individuals, constrained by one's socioeconomic position, further contributes to the reproduction of their social position. In response to public discontent with the social and educational polarization, the state has mainly attempted to regulate the *sagyoyuk* market by removing the tiered structure of the public schools. A brief account of the complex history of state regulation and deregulation of the market is the topic of the next section.

### ***School Equalization Policy and the Sagyoyuk Market***

Contemporary education policy in Korea represents a virtual war against *sagyoyuk* by the government both through indirect control of the market by reforming the entrance examination system and through direct regulation of the market by legislation. During the two successive military regimes of Park Chung-Hee (1961-1979) and Chun Du-Hwan (1980-1987) during the modernization period, a series of policy implementations have phased out the “tier-conscious” or “*hakbeol*-conscious” selection process, which was to blame for the escalating *sagyoyuk*. What is noteworthy for my purpose here is the “high school equalization policy” which removed the tiered structure of the high schools in 1974, and the “elimination of *bongosa* (the second-round entrance examination administered by each university following the first-round of state-run, standardized entrance examination)” in 1980. A more direct control of the *sagyoyuk* market was enacted through the announcement of “The July 30 educational reform plan” in 1980, which strictly prohibited all forms of *sagyoyuk*, mainly in the form of *gwaoe* (individual or group tutoring)<sup>15</sup> at that time. The reform plan was politically motivated by

---

<sup>15</sup> *Sagyoyuk* typically comprises various forms of *gwaoe* (individual or group tutoring) and *hakwon* (private academic institutes). Although *hakwon* includes extracurricular institutes (e.g., art or athletic institutes) as

the Chun Du-Hwan regime as a means to alleviate anti-government sentiment prevalent among the public towards the military regime. To maximize the appeal to the public, the Chun regime particularly targeted “the very expensive tutoring (*goaek gwaoe*),” popular among the very rich, and in fact acquired strong public support even amongst political opponents.

Nevertheless, the actual effects of these policies on decreasing *sagyoyuk* are contested. For the deep-rooted “*hakbeol*-supremacy” in the society goes beyond what a single education policy can effectively address. For example, the school equalization policy has only restructured the *hakbeol* system and the associated *sagyoyuk* market through residential segregation, under the new system of *hakgun* (school district), rather than eliminating *hakbeol* supremacy or *sagyoyuk*. That is, the competition to enter the first-tier *schools* has now shifted to competition over entrance to the schools in the first-tier *hakgun*, notably “Gangnam (the south of the Han River) 8-*hakgun*.” That is, under the school equalization policy, reproduction through education occurs through residential segregation, institutionalized through “proximity-based *hakgun* policy,” instead of explicit school tiers, creating a new group of prestigious schools.

*Hakgun* is the product of the school equalization policy combined with the real estate policy since speculative investment in real estate has been the major means of accumulation of wealth for the rich in Korea during the industrialization period. Indeed, the formation of the “Gangnam 8-*hakgun*” was closely related to the government policy to develop the Gangnam area during the Park Chung-Hee regime, which first moved first-tier schools in Gangbuk (the north of the Han River) to Gangnam. Housing prices in this

---

well as academic institutes (e.g., subject-specialized institutes, cram schools, language schools), I use *hakwon* to refer to private *academic* institutes including private language institutes in this paper.

area have soared, with large number of people wanting to reside in Gangnam initially for investment purposes, but increasingly for educational purposes. As a result, access to elite universities is regulated through access to Gangnam *hakgun* schools, which has to do with who has access to costly housing in the gated community of the Gangnam area, among others. With its affluent residents, Gangnam has also developed as the mecca of quality *sagyoyuk*. Students in this area have thus better access to the first-rate *sagyoyuk* than the students in other areas; student achievements in Gangnam schools are much higher than in schools in other areas. At the university entrance examination in 1984, when the first cohort of the “proximity-based *hakgun* policy” entered the university, the students from Gangnam *hakgun* schools constituted the vast majority of the SNU freshmen (*Gukjeong Briefing* special project team, 2007, 2-4, p. 4).

Despite the limitations, the decades-long school equalization policy has significantly contributed to enhancing equal opportunity in access to education in Korea and strengthening public education by abolishing the tiered structure of the secondary schools, at least at the surface level. At the same time, however, the equalization policy has been constantly contested by various social actors. For example, the alumni of the old elite schools and top-tier universities have repeatedly attempted to adopt a high school rating system (i.e., offering additional points to students from “elite high schools” or schools in the first-tier *hakgun*) and restore university-administered entrance examinations in order to set selection criteria serving their interest. Opponents of the equalization policy frequently adopt a form of discourse of crisis, specifically the discourse of “downward equalization,” meaning declining academic achievements of the

students due to lack of competition in the “equalized” system. Furthermore, the prevalence of strong neoliberal discourses in Korea since the mid-1990s, which value excellence and competition in education, presents a significant challenge to proponents of the equalization policy. Following recent neoliberal educational reforms, the *sagyoyuk* market in Korea has experienced a rapid growth with the pendulum swinging back to elite education, as illustrated in the following section.

### ***Neoliberal Education Reforms and the “Enterprisation” of the Sagyoyuk Market***

#### ***The financial crisis and the discourse of “globalism.”***

Neoliberal discourses in Korea came to the fore with the presidential “Globalization Announcement” (*segyehwa seoneon*) in 1995 during the Kim Yeong-sam government (1993-1998). The declaration was soon followed by Korea’s joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the subsequent shift toward economic (neo)liberalization. Korea’s entry to the OECD, or to the globalized market economy, has increased the vulnerability of its economy to foreign capital. As a result, the “Asian financial crisis” (what has come to be known as “The IMF Crisis” or “Foreign Currency Crisis” within Korea), originating in Thailand in July 1997, quickly spread to Korea (as well as to Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). Foreign investors hastily moved their capital out from the Korean market. The consequent shortage of the U.S. dollars to repay the debt led the Korean government to sign the IMF bailout packages by the end of the year (for a fuller description of the Asian financial crisis, see Kelly & Olds, 1999). Stringent, rapid-paced IMF-prescribed economic restructuring was implemented during the succeeding regime of Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003).

The neoliberal economic restructuring process has resulted in radical and fundamental changes in almost every sector in the Korean society. For example, extremely high interest rates imposed by the restructuring plan triggered the bankruptcy of numerous companies, which in turn led to several major Korean banks being merged into or sold to foreign banks. Tightened management in the financial sector also influenced individuals who suddenly experienced bankruptcy or credit risk, producing a rapidly increased number of homeless people and suicides. One of the most shocking incidents to Koreans was the bankruptcy of the Daewoo Group, one of the big three conglomerates (*jaebeol*<sup>16</sup>) at that time. Overall, the “IMF crisis” led to economic neoliberalization and a conservative turn in the society. “Reviving the economy” became a buzz term and took precedence over social justice concerns which boomed during the political democratization movements of the previous decade.

In this context, globalization in Korea is predominantly represented with the discourse of “globalism” (or neoliberal globalization), the dominant strategy of globalization which equates globalization with global market liberalization (Fairclough, 2006). An example of such representation is offered with the inauguration address of the current president Lee Myung-bak. As former Chief Executive Officer of Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co., the nation’s largest construction company, Lee’s election campaign slogan was “economic president” (*gyeongjae daetongryeong*, meaning president with expertise on economic affairs). In his speech, Lee declared the year of

---

<sup>16</sup> *Jaebeol* refers to family-owned and managed conglomerates which developed a “cozy” relationship with the political sector during the “compressed” industrialization period (1960-1970) in Korea, in exchange for election funds with various incentives such as easy access to bank loans and tax benefits. While their significant contribution to the rapid economic growth of the nation is undeniable, *jaebeol* has been criticized for its monopoly, collusion with corrupt politicians, and continued expansion of its subsidiaries including media management. As such, immense influence of *jaebeol* in Korea is not limited to the economic sector but extends to social and political sectors.

2008, which coincided with the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the Republic, as the first year of national “advancement” (*seonjinhwa*) and urged the public to:

. . . move from ‘the age of *ideology*’ to ‘the age of *pragmatism*.’ Pragmatism. . . is *practical wisdom* to go through *the wave of globalization*. . . . While we are unguarded, the world has moved far ahead of us. The less developed countries are catching up with us. Korea’s national competitiveness is declining and we are threatened by unstable resources and financial markets. . . . To survive this *historically critical moment*, I request that you actively *change yourselves* first. If we neglect this call for change, we will fall behind. . . . Even though it is *hard and painful*, we must change more quickly. The direction [for change] is *openness, autonomy, and creativity*. . . . I will increase *efficiency* [in the government sector] through ‘small government, big market.’ . . . I will adopt *competition* in the public sector as well. . . . Market opening is an *unavoidable trend*. Since our economy is export-oriented, we must *increase the national wealth* by Free Trade Agreements. But we have much concern about less competitive sectors, particularly about farmers and fishermen. Yet, we cannot give up here, can we?

(Lee Myung-bak, Inauguration address delivered on February 25, 2008, my translation, emphasis added)

In this text, globalization is constructed as inevitable and unstoppable (“the wave of globalization”); corporate and market-friendly neoliberal economic policy is justified and advocated as “practical wisdom” to survive global competition. Lee associates globalization with “pragmatism,” which is positioned as opposed to “ideology.” By this juxtaposition of the two terms, he naturalizes the neoliberal *ideology* as neutral.

Consequently, the “hard and painful” competition in the liberalized market, particularly for those in less competitive sectors, is naturalized as an “unavoidable trend” for the nation’s survival in the era of globalization. He employs nationalist discourse in urging individuals to gain their own competitive edge and live with the disadvantages for the sake of the nation-state, while the state is no longer responsible for social justice. The application of market principles to the government sector highlights its accountability for efficiency and competitiveness. Individuals are thus left to be responsible for the

potential risks and the consequences of free market competition by developing qualities such as openness, autonomy, and creativity. The following section illustrates how neoliberal emphasis on these values has been employed to produce new *hakbeol* sources.

***Neoliberal education reforms and the reshaping of hakbeol playing field.***

In the discourse of neoliberal globalization (or globalism) in Korea, the significance of education is highlighted, for what helps the nation to be competitive in the global market is its people. At the juncture of transition from “export-oriented” to “injae (or *injeok jawon*, human resources)-oriented” economy, education is transformed as an *economic* concern of the nation. This is accompanied by the emergence of a new discourse on citizenship, for public education has been a key site for reproducing citizens. President Lee’s inauguration speech illustrates the construction of *injae* as the deserving citizen in the era of globalization:

The advancement of the Republic depends on how many *outstanding injae* we can secure. . . . The greatest need is *education reform*. We should abandon the government-led and entrance exam-oriented educational system for its lack of flexibility and openness. We must accept the *global standards* (geulobal seutendadeu, original in English) and infuse the education field with the spirit of *autonomy, creativity, and competition*. . . . The autonomy of universities is crucial to the *advancement* of the Korean society as well as to national competitiveness. Universities should increase their research and educational capacity and fiercely compete with the universities of the world. We should stand at the battlefront of the knowledge-based society.

(Lee Myung-bak, Inauguration address delivered on February 25, 2008, my translation, emphasis added)

The text represent the radical change in the discourse in educational values and goals from “uniformity and equality” under equalization policy to “autonomy and competition” (Park, 2007). Neoliberal values such as autonomy, creativity, and competition are associated with ‘advancement’ and thus are constructed as beneficial to



everyone. New educational reforms to this end are naturalized as a way to produce “outstanding” *injae*, a key resource to advance the nation to meet global standards (i.e., “global” *injae*). As such, during the Kim Dae-Jung regime (1998-2003), the “Ministry of Education” has been renamed as the “Ministry of Education and Human Resources”; the status of Education Minister has risen to one of the Deputy Prime Ministers.

The concept of *injae* is not entirely new in Korea. Scarce in natural resources (*cheonyeon jawon*), the importance of humanpower (*inryeok*) has long been underscored in the nation. During the export-oriented industrialization period, for example, workers in labor-intensive industries were constructed as an “export workforce” (*suchul yeokgun*) for the nation. The construction of *injae* as “outstanding,” however, is noteworthy regarding the inherent emphasis on elitism (over egalitarianism) in neoliberal discourses. An example of such an outstanding *injae*, or “global *injae*” is presented in the discourse of “genius management,” proposed by Lee Geon-hi, Chairman of Samsung Group. He contends, obviously referring to Bill Gates, that in the knowledge and information based society, one genius can support a hundred thousand ordinary people.

Such a construction of global *injae* has impacts on educational practices: shifting from school equalization policy to elite education. In 1995, a sweeping neoliberal education reform package, “the education reform plan to establish a new education system,” was proposed. Most noteworthy for my purposes here are: (1) the increased autonomy of the university in the admissions process and the diversification of the evaluation criteria to be determined by the university; and (2) diversification in school types to respect students’ (*suyoja*; consumer) right to choose. While appearing all positive values, neoliberal discourses on autonomy and diversity have been employed to

shift the ways in which *hakbeol* capital is produced and regulated. First, universities now have autonomy over setting their own admission criteria; many top-tier universities have attempted to revive university-administered entrance examinations, in various forms. Second, diversity in school types has revived the tiered structure of the high schools, producing new “elite” high schools such as “Special Purpose High Schools (*teuksu mokjeok godeunghakgyo*)”, “Independent Private High Schools (*jariphyeong sarip godeunghakgyo*)”, and “International Schools (*gukje hakgyo*).”

While old elite high schools under school equalization policy still belonged to the public education system, these new “elite” high schools operate with autonomy over tuition, curriculum, and admission criteria.<sup>17</sup> These schools have quickly gained reputations for the large number of their graduates who enter top-tier universities, notably Ivy League universities. The emergence of these new elite high schools are related to the production of new *hakbeol* sources: what I call as “global *hakbeol*,” that is, the construction of top universities in the West, notably Ivy League universities, as more valuable *hakbeol* sources than domestic universities. In fact, adding a postgraduate degree from renowned U.S. universities to one’s *hakbeol* has long been crucial to build elite credentials in Korea; Koreans constitute one of the three largest groups of international graduate students studying in the U.S. along with India and China (Kim S-K, 2007). However, *yuhak* to obtain undergraduate degree was not significant. The restructuring of the *hakbeol* market is intertwined with the “winner-take-all” (Gee et al.,

---

<sup>17</sup> “Special Purpose High Schools (*teuksu mokjeok godeunghakgyo*)” was initially designed to offer specialized education for gifted students, especially in the areas of science and foreign languages. They belong to the public school system and the tuition is not as high as other private “elite high schools.” However, “Special Purpose High Schools” significantly contributed to the revival of elite education and legitimizing the proposed increase in “Independent private high schools,” which has been much resisted until very recently. “International schools” are mainly for education for foreign passport holders or returnee students. While these schools had existed, their number has increased under the new regulations.

1996) nature of the new capitalism and active marketing of global education industry (see Chapter 1):

When local communities were fairly autonomous they could each have their own artists, musicians, doctors, lawyers, professors, and so on. But today . . . . Why go to local college when you can as easily travel to the ‘best’ university? Why trust the local lawyer, doctor, engineer, or agent when modern information technology has let everyone know who the ‘best’ is and you can hire them from afar and deal with them by fax and e-mail? Why hire local workers when there are cheaper and ‘better’ ones elsewhere who can do the work via computers and other space-fracturing technology? Why buy the local brands when the ‘best’ can be shipped from Timbuktoo by this afternoon? Even if the ‘best’ is only a little better than the ‘next best’, why settle for anything less, when it is as cheap and easy?” (pp. 156-157)

So, as for Korean students: now that studying at Harvard University is not as hard as before, why go through the arduous education system in Korea to enter Seoul National University? The construction of “global *hakbeol*” is thus accompanied by media reports on “world university ranking” which indicate that the SNU is not even included in the “top 100 world universities.” This shift in *hakbeol* playing field is a major driving force for the recent increase in *jogi yuhak*. English figures in complex ways in this process. Before turning to that point, I offer the effects of neoliberal educational reforms on the *sagyoyuk* market, which forms the basis of *yuhak* industry.

***The “enterprisation” of the Sagyoyuk market.***

Needless to say, the neoliberal application of market principles to education has resulted in further flourishing of the *sagyoyuk* market. The Constitutional Court decision on April 27, 2000, to reverse the banning of *gwaoe* (tutoring) accelerated this process. During this period, the *sagyoyuk* market not only thrived but experienced a qualitative turn: the “enterprisation” (cf. Cameron, 2000a) of the market. Heightened corporate interest in education in the new economy (see Chapter 1) has led major media companies

and large corporations including *jaebeol* to enter the market. Subsequent exponential increase in capital has contributed to shifting formerly small-scale business or tutoring-oriented industry to large-scale institution-based industry. Daechidong, an area in affluent Gangnam, for example, came to prominence as a so-called “special *sagyoyuk* zone” (*sagyoyuk teukgeu*), packed with numerous high-rise offices of education businesses.

English education is the key player in the education industry in Korea. The English *sagyoyuk* industry, including *hakwon* (private language institutes), *eo hak yeonsu* (language study abroad) and *yuhak* (study abroad), is estimated to be 15 trillion won (U.S. \$15.8 billion), constituting almost half of the entire *sagyoyuk* industry (Samsung Economic Research Institute, 2006, as quoted in Park S-J, 2008). The English education industry for children, for example, has experienced an exponential growth with the launching of the elementary English education program in 1997. The emergence of new “elite” high schools also contributed to the expansion of the market. For example, an increasing number of *hakwon* (private academic institutes) specialized in preparation for obtaining admission to these schools appeared.

Universities and media companies are often cooperating actors in the English education industry. For example, the SNU and *Choseon Ilbo*, the largest newspaper company in Korea, collaborated to produce an English proficiency test, the Test of English Proficiency developed by Seoul National University (TEPS), with a view to replacing TOEFL in some domestic markets. Furthermore, many universities run university-affiliated language institutes (*oehakdang*) or certificate-awarding programs. *Choseon Ilbo* offers or sponsors English camps through its subsidiary company. Provincial governments and large media companies collaborate in the case of

establishment of “English Villages (*yeongeo maeul*),” short-term immersion English camps.

Why has the English education industry experienced a particularly significant growth? How and why has the domestic English *sagyoyuk* market expanded to the *jogi yuhak* market? The following section takes up this issue, focusing on the intensified role of English in class reproduction in Korea over the course of education reforms.

### ***“Republic of English” and the Jogi Yuhak Market***

#### ***Globalization and English in Korea: The “English Immersion” Debate and “English Divide”***

In January 2008, the new administration of Lee Myung-bak made quite a “loud” debut with his presidential transition committee’s announcement of “Plans for Enhancing English Education in Public Schools.” As part of the new administration’s “Global Korea” programs, the proposed reform plans included: (1) “English Immersion Program” (*yeongeo molip gyoyuk*, meaning English-only instruction) in upper elementary grades and secondary schools from 2010; (2) replacement of English tests in the national entrance examinations with an “English Ability Test” (*sangsi yeongeo neungryeok pyeongga si heom*) to be launched in 2013; (3) hiring “Teachers for Teaching English in English (TEE)” (*yeongeo jeonyong gyosa*) as contract employees from 2009. According to the proposed plan, the TEE teachers are to be hired among 1) holders of TESOL (Teaching English to Speakers of Other Languages) certificates from Korean or overseas universities; 2) holders of M.A. (or higher) degrees with English majors from English-speaking universities; 3) unappointed, domestic teacher-certificate holders; or 4) professionals with proficiency in English such as former diplomats and resident

employees of foreign companies in Korea. In addition, “Supplementary English Teachers” (*yeongeo bojo gyosa*) will be selected to assist with English teachers among university students, housewives, and ethnic Koreans overseas (*jaewe dongpo*) who are fluent in English.

However, the instant and severe backlash from the public that followed the announcement of the provocative reform plan, particularly about the “English Immersion Program,” has led the transition team officially to reverse their position shortly. The spokesmen of the transition committee reiterated that the purpose of the new English education plan was not to employ the “English Immersion Program” but to improve each student’s English *speaking* and *writing* ability (Lee D-K, as quoted in Yu, 2008). Two key figures in the production of the contested English education reform plan were: (1) the then president-elect Lee Myung-bak who had built the “Seoul English Village” (Seoul *yeongeo maul*) during his term as Seoul Mayor prior to his running for the presidency, and (2) Lee Kyeong-Suk, chairwoman of the transition team and president of Sookmyong Women’s University, the first domestic university which established TESOL programs worth nearly 100 billion Korean won (U.S. \$ 100 million) in 2006 (Kang, 2008). In addition to the suspected connection between the planned introduction of TESOL certificate requirements for potential TEE teachers and the certificate-awarding program at her own university, Lee Kyeong-Suk and her transition team became the target of criticism for her overly aggressive promotion of English. Upon the disclosure of the English education plan, Lee’s approval rating slipped to the lowest compared to the three previous presidents at the same stage of their presidency.

Indeed, numerous media reports on the debates and controversies around the proposed policy indicate the contested meanings of English in Korea, or “Republic of English” as referred to in some media reports. The term “English Divide” (*Enggeulishi divaideu*, referring to social polarization based on English ability), which recently appeared in policy descriptions and in media reports in Korea, symbolizes the key role English plays in class reproduction in Korea:

The purpose of enhancing English education in *gonggyoyuk* (public education) is to reduce so-called English polarization, that is, “English Divide” (*Enggeulishi divaideu*), signifying that the wealth of parents determines their children’s English ability, and the gaps in English proficiency further reproduce the disparities between the rich and the poor. Eliminating the ‘English Divide’ (*Enggeulishi divaideu*) has been raised as a critical issue regarding social polarization.

(Lee Dong-Kwan, presidential transition committee’s spokesman, in his media conference on the new “Plans for Enhancing English Education in Public Schools,” as quoted in Hwang 2008, my translation).

The transition team claimed that the purpose of the new English proposal was to alleviate the “English Divide” through improving English education in public education, which will supposedly reduce *sagyoyuk* expenses. However, public criticism was triggered by the opposite view: once executed, the new English education plan, particularly the “English Immersion Program,” will drastically increase English *sagyoyuk* and thus further aggravate social polarization, for students will need to gain additional assistance in the market to catch up with their school education conducted in English.

Why does this differential access to English *sagyoyuk* matter that much? Why does it matter more now than before? Why is English such a valuable resource in Korea? What kind of English matters? As an attempt to address these questions in relation to recent increase in *jogi yuhak*, I attend to two issues emerging from the debate and the proposed English education plan: (1) increased public perception of the role of English in

class reproduction; (2) increased emphasis on oral communication skills and the standardization in their evaluation in educational practices.

First, English (American English in particular) has long maintained its symbolic power in Korea as *the* dominant global language in conjunction with the neo-colonial role of the U.S. in the Post World War Two Korea (cf. Shin, 2006). English has been used as a key gate-keeping device in critical social selection processes such as in hiring processes and school/university admission processes. As such, English in Korea is a cultural and symbolic capital both as a means to access social mobility and as a product of such a mobility or social status. Yet, a recent shift in the *hakbeol* playing field has increased the significance of English in the admissions process.

For example, the new “elite” high schools such as “Foreign Language High Schools” often run two separate programs: (1) the “domestic program” for students wishing to enter top-tier universities in Korea and (2) the “international program” for students seeking admission to prestigious universities in the West. Therefore, they adopt distinctive admission criteria in their pursuit of applicants for their “international program,” which operates with English as medium of instruction. High TOEFL scores, English interviews with a native speaker, English essays, and/or awards in major English competitions are often required to win the extremely difficult competition to be admitted to those programs. As for the entry to higher education, universities continue to increase the quota for what is referred to as the “special screening category” (*teulbyeol jeonhyeong*), from 9.7% in 1997 to 23.4% in 2001 and to 37.4% in 2006 (*Gukjeong Briefing* special project team, 2007). That is, one out of three students in 2006 were admitted to a university based on their “quality” (*jajil*) and “ability” (*neungryeok*) rather



than “academic achievements” (*seongjeok*). While this sounds encouraging, the reality is that admission based on language ability, particularly that of English, constitutes the majority of this screening category, which apparently benefits students from the “elite high schools” or students with overseas residency or educational experiences.

Second, in this process, what is highlighted is oral English skills and the standardization of its measurement. For example, according to the proposed new English education plan, speaking and writing skills will be highlighted over listening and reading skills in the 8<sup>th</sup> national curriculum to be implemented in 2010. To measure the speaking and writing skills, “English Ability Test” will replace the current English test in the national university entrance examination. As for an index of English teachers’ speaking abilities, TESOL certificates or academic credentials (e.g., post-graduate degrees from English-speaking universities) will be used. These shifts in educational changes are reflective of shifts in workplace, for education is believed to help students’ successful entry into the labor market. The following section discusses the emergence of a new ideology of language in Korea: English as a skill.

### ***English as a “Global Skill” and the English Education Industry***

Along with the construction of “global *injae*” as an ideal citizen in neoliberal discourses, a new ideology of language has emerged associated with the vital role of language in the new economy and the increase in the labor market demand for *oral* communication skills: English is constructed as an essential part of a skillset of a “global Korean” (or global *injae*). As president of Sunggyungwan University, owned by Samsung Group, Seo Jeong-Don’s comments represent the skillset of “global *injae*” desired in the labor market as follows:

Global *injae* can be summarized as a 21<sup>st</sup>-century *injae* who is equipped with *global basic skills* to understand and appreciate diverse cultures in the world and *professional knowledge* to become world-best in his/her own field, as well as having *foreign language ability* (*oegukeo gusa neungryeok*).

(Seo Jeong-Don, as quoted in Kim, 2008, my translation, emphasis added)

In this text, the skillset of a “global *injae*” comprises three key skills: (1) Foreign language ability, (2) global basic skills (i.e., cultural knowledge and appreciation of diversity), and (3) field-specific professional knowledge. As for the language ability, it is “*gusa neungryeok*” (ability to use/speak) of a foreign language, rather than having mere “*yuchangseong*” (proficiency), that matters now. Since these skills need to be measured based on a certain standard and norm, this skill set has been translated into the following practices in the recruitment process of major corporations in Korea: (1) increased emphasis on *oral test scores* and (2) the expansion of “overseas *injae* recruitment” (*haewoe injae chaeyong*).

First, using oral test scores is closely intertwined with the English industry in Korea. While highlighting oral communication ability alone is not a significant change in the hiring practice (major Korean corporations have conducted English interviews in the recruitment process anyway), using test scores as evaluation criteria is noteworthy. For it has to do with who has the power to decide which test will be used. For example, the Samsung Group announced that they would drop the English interview for applicants with a certain level in ACTFL (American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Language)’s OPIc (Oral Proficiency Interview-computer) or TOEIC (Test of English for International Communication), in order to strengthen accurate evaluations of applicants’ oral English skills (Park S-Y, 2008). The OPIc, first included in 2008 in Samsung’s hiring process, would completely replace TOEFL in the following 2-3 years (Jo, 2008).

This shift has to do with who would benefit from new revenue streams (e.g., admission fees, related test preparation materials) created by adopting this new test. The OPIc test, currently used in about 70 Korean companies and in some English teacher education programs at the Ministry of Education and Human Resources, is administered by CREДУ, an educational-venture subsidiary of the Samsung Group and Korean agency of the ACTFL's OPIc (ibid.). With active marketing and the huge, influential networks of the Samsung Group, OPIc is expected to gradually replace TOEIC, which is administered by YMC Sisa.com, the current dominant provider in the English oral test market for adults in Korea. In addition, with the planned inclusion of speaking tests in the regular "English Ability Test" for university admission in the new English education policy, the English speaking test industry will expand to the secondary market as well. The English oral test industry is expected to experience a 10 times increase between 2000 and 2013, from 20 billion won (U.S. \$ 20 million) to 200 billion Korean won (U.S. \$ 200 million) (Cho G-W, 2008).

Second, standardization of the "global basic skill" (i.e., cultural knowledge and appreciation of diversity) in the recruitment process is more difficult than that of oral communication skills. As such, overseas hiring, both for regular recruitment and internships, emerged as a new trend among the major corporations. They actively send employees to travel around the globe in order to offer job fairs for Korean students in the renowned Western universities. Overseas hiring is effective for the company as a means to measure both the "global" cultural and "global" linguistic ability. The "global *injae*" hired through the overseas hiring processes are often offered a more lucrative salary and benefits package than those domestically educated new hires. In this process,

“global *hakbeol*” is constructed as a capital of high value. In the following section, I discuss a new discourse on learning in relation to the rise of *jogi yuhak* industry.

### ***Learning as “Self-Management” and the Jogi Yuhak Industry***

As Cameron (2000a) argues, in the new capitalist discourses:

. . . every aspect of life becomes potentially a *self-improvement project*. This in turn reflects perceptions of *the self as a tradeable asset*. . . not only jobs but social and sexual relationships have their ‘markets’, in which individuals must advertise themselves as desirable commodities. Language is both a medium for this kind of advertisement and one of the commodities being advertised. When incorporated into the school curriculum, the self-improvement project effectively becomes compulsory for people of a certain age; but there are plenty of other social locations where adults may (and do) engage in it by choice. (pp. 20-21)

In neoliberal Korea, learning is an area which is constructed as a “self-improvement” project to develop skills or talent of the individual to increase his/her *competitiveness* through a discourse of “self-management.” Below is an illustration of one such discourse regarding the mother’s role in the self-improvement project of children’s education. An image of the “educational manager mother” (Park, 2007) is illustrated below:

Mothers chauffeur around their elementary school children for their private-after school programs, while providing fast-foods for their dinner inside cars to save time; to keep track of their children’s after-school schedules, mothers need a thick calendar, as shown by a single page example in the diary of a 30-something housewife who sends her two children to twenty-three private after-school programs (p. 1).

In this discourse, a mother’s “ability” to manage their children’s education in order to build the skill sets or increase the competitiveness of their children is highlighted. The image of the manager mother extends to *jogi yuhak* as represented in the case of “*Gireogi* Mother.” In addition, the Korean publication market is currently flooded with

numerous *jogi yuhak* narratives or success stories of students who entered elite schools.

The titles of such books include (my translation, emphasis added):

“World class study *method*”

“*Gangnam* mothers who *design* their children’s future”

“*Daechidong* mothers’ 2008 entrance examination *strategies*”

“I am poor but I have a dream”

“We all can do it”

“Nonetheless, we go to Special Purpose high schools”

“The twin brothers shoot for Harvard”

As represented by terms such as “method,” “design,” and “strategies,” this discourse of “self-management” constructs learning (including language learning) as an individual project to develop skills for the efficient and effective organization of educational activities, and hence for social mobility through access to elite schools such as Harvard University and Special Purpose high schools. In this sense, (language) learning is an economic activity. Furthermore, while upscale *Gangnam* and *Daechidong* areas in Seoul are represented in the discourse, these skills and activities are nonetheless constructed as equally accessible to everyone regardless of one’s social position. Consequently, this discourse of “self-management” obscures differential access to material and symbolic resources to develop the skills among different social actors. As such, narratives on successful upward mobility through education contribute to reinforcing “*hakbeol* supremacy” and increasing the anxiety and concerns of the students and parents. This, in turn, contributes to their further investment in *sagyoyuk*, including *jogi yuhak*.

The *jogi yuhak* industry is indeed where various forms of self-management skills training or the skills themselves are readily available. For example, “management-type *yuhak*” (*gwallihyeong yuhak*) provides parents who are not able to accompany their

children for *jogi yuhak* with a package of educational management projects, including assistance with school application and admission process, preparing required citizenship documents, arranging accommodation or home-stay/local guardian, tutoring, and after-school activities.

The flexible and tailored services offered in the *yuhak* industry creates *jogi yuhak* as capital to access domestic *hakbeol* sources as well. For example, in the past 2-3 years, “short-term” *yuhak* (*dangi yuhak*) has rapidly become popular. Short-term *yuhak* typically involves elementary students who study at local schools in English-speaking countries for 1 or 2 years (or sometimes even for 2-3 months), so that early on, the students can build two key skills to become global *injae*—specifically, “global” linguistic and cultural ability. In other cases, sometimes, students would like to become more competitive in the entrance examinations for the newly emerged “elite” middle and high schools in Korea. This temporary migration is also an affordable alternative for families who are not able to send their children for long-term *yuhak*. Furthermore, earlier *jogi yuhak*, which primarily involved secondary students, did not prove to be very successful in terms of students’ access to “good” English or “good” universities. Shifts in the *jogi yuhak* industry from long-term *yuhak* to short-term *yuhak* have significantly contributed to the exponential growth of the number of *jogi yuhak* students in elementary schools in recent years.

The increased visibility of the “educational manager mother” in the popular discourse simultaneously has to do with the emergence of the new middle class and the elites following the “compressed” modernization period of the 1960s and 1970s. The term “Generation 386” widely circulated in the media in the 1990s referring to those who

were in their 30s, attended universities in the (19)80s, and were born in the (19)60s. Reportedly coined by student-protest leaders of the political democratization movements in the 1980s, some of who later became political elites, this term signified the rapidly increasing visibility of the full-fledged middle class in post-Korean War (1950-1953) Korea. Furthermore, some of “Generation 386” formed a new elite group towards the late 1990s with respect to the economic shifts in the globalized new economy. The emergence of this new, relatively young elite group has shifted traditional elite credentials previously associated with professional careers (notably in law and medicine) to high-income earners in the (international) financial industry, IT-related venture industry, and entertainment industry. These new elites are represented with more “global” images in various social spaces. *Jogi yuhak* is a product of the “step-up” strategy for social mobility or the reproduction of new and old elites in relation to shifting global economic conditions. As Bourdieu (1984) remarks:

When class fractions who previously made little use of the school system enter the race for academic qualifications, the effect is to force the groups whose reproduction was mainly or exclusively achieved through education *to step up their investments so as to maintain the relative scarcity of their qualifications* and, consequently, their position in the class structure. Academic qualifications and the school system which awards them thus become one of the key stakes in an interclass competition which generates a general and continuous growth in the demand for education and an inflation of academic qualifications. (p.133, emphasis added)

### ***Conclusion:***

#### ***Monolingual Ideologies amidst Multilingual Practices***

The current chapter has provided an overview of the social, political economic, and historical context of the rapid growth of *jogi yuhak* in Korea. Over the past decade, this growth has reshaped the Korean *hakbeol* system in relation to the political economic

shifts in the globalized new economy. In this process, “global” *hakbeol* and “authentic” English have emerged as key symbolic capital in Korea.

At the juncture of the transition from a state-controlled economy during the industrialization period to global capitalism, Korea is caught in tensions between modernity and late-modernity, or between essentialism and hybridity. On the one hand, Korea has long constructed itself as a monolingual and monocultural country. Essentialist ideology of language purism thus persists which constructs Korean language as the emblem of national identity with respect to the colonial history of the country (cf. Park, 2009; Shin, 2006). As for English, essentialism is manifested in the ideological construction of “authentic” English as legitimate English and “Native Speakers” as legitimate speakers of English. This ideology, in turn, constructs Koreans as illegitimate, “poor” speakers of English, regardless of the actual linguistic competence they possess (cf. Park, 2009). Furthermore, such an ideological constructions of Korea as a homogeneous nation renders invisible the increased pluralism on the ground.

For example, Korea has always been extremely multireligious. Buddhism, Christianity, Catholicism, Confucianism, Shamanism, and those who do not participate in any institutionalized religious practices without being atheist, all relatively peacefully co-exist in Korea. Linguistically, before the Korean alphabet (*hangeul*) was invented in the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Chinese literacy was the marker of elite credentials, and the majority of Koreans today possess some level of Chinese literacy. Some older generations of Koreans who experienced Japanese colonial rule speak some level of Japanese. Many young Koreans are fluent speakers of English. In addition, the variety of Korean spoken in North Korea significantly differs from that of the South. More importantly, the



ideology of homogeneity naturalizes discrimination faced by linguistic and cultural minorities within Korea. These include speakers of regional dialects and colonial migrants such as ethnic Koreans who used to reside in China and who are discriminated against based on their language (e.g., accent and vocabulary).

Furthermore, globalization, the new economy, and neoliberalism have rendered the nation even more rapidly diverse. The influx of transnational migrant workers and brides from South-East Asian countries, for example, has produced terms such as “multicultural households” (*damunhwa gajeong*) and has rendered even rural areas of Korea increasingly multilingual and multicultural. Koreans have witnessed an increasing number of foreign nationals who speak fluent Korean as well as Korean-English bilinguals. In addition, authenticity is transformed in niche markets generated by the global industry: with the rise of the “Korean Wave,” Korean language and culture have recently gained unprecedented global currency in East/Southeast Asian (hence, transnational Asian) markets (see Chapter 3) and are thereby becoming increasingly commodified.

In the midst of these tensions and contradictions, what counts as “good” English in globalizing Korea? The kind of standardization or credentialization for Koreans to gain recognition for their linguistic competence requires credentialized bilingualism combined with (global) *hakbeol*. In this context, as represented in the excerpt below taken from advertising materials produced by a representative *yuhak* agency in Seoul, *jogi yuhak* emerges as a sensible investment strategy to acquire this legitimate kind of credentialized bilingualism:

When is the optimal time to leave for *jogi yuhak*?: As *jogi yuhak* has become popularized, increasingly younger students join the movement.

Even kindergarten children leave for *jogi yuhak*. This is because “good” English ability is essential to enter the elite schools, and because they know the earlier you send your children, the better their English will be. Now, the elite schools in the U.S. who have accepted Korean students begin to doubt whether the students’ TOEFL or SSAT scores accurately reflect their actual ability to use English. Accordingly, *students who have never studied in schools in English-speaking countries tend to be regarded as ‘students whose English ability has not been verified.’* Therefore, more and more parents send their young children to *jogi yuhak* destinations. (advertising brochure, *jogi yuhak* agency in Seoul, my translation, emphasis added)

With the rapid neo-liberalization of society, individuals are left with the responsibility to look for ways to acquire the kind of linguistic capital constructed as essential in the above text. They take various routes for various reasons albeit limited by their social positions (cf. Giddens, 1979, 1984). What some of those journeys might look like is what the remainder of the thesis explores.

**Chapter 3:**  
**Speaking “Cool” Korean in Toronto:**  
**Tensions and Contradictions of *Yuhaksaeng* Life**

***Introduction***

This chapter explores processes of social categorization of “*yuhaksaeng* (visa students<sup>18</sup>),” focusing on an observed contradiction in their linguistic practices: While students claimed that they left for *jogi yuhak* in search of “authentic” English, they invested heavily in Korean language and culture while in Canada. This contradiction resulted from their limited access to “authentic” English due to their social position in North America as linguistic and racial minorities. I highlight ways in which *yuhaksaeng* contested this positioning and deployed newly valued varieties of Korean language and culture in the globalized new economy as stylistic resources, to forge hybrid identities that are simultaneously global and Korean, vis-à-vis long-term immigrants in the local Korean diasporic communities (as well as local Canadians). In this process, *yuhaksaeng* transform the meaning of Koreanness as an index of “globality” in relation to modern cosmopolitan Korea/Seoul in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

I define style as an index of distinctiveness (cf. Irvine, 2001), which obtains meaning only through processes of opposition building, rather than through *a priori*, inherent characteristics; social categorizations are thus frequently combined with stylistic practices. As such, I use (social) style broadly to refer to life-style associated with one’s habitus, including “embodied features of verbal and nonverbal actions, aesthetic choices

---

<sup>18</sup> Although “international students” is what frequently appear in the official discourse to refer to students studying in Canada on student visas, my observation in Canada is that the term “visa students” is commonly used in daily institutional practices and is probably a better indicator of the category. For many students of international origin in Canada are immigrants (some land the country directly from their home country as immigrants), whereas in the U.S., most international students are on student visas.

(‘taste’ in appearance, clothes, etc.” (Auer, 2007, p. 12). My argument is that styling “Cool” by *yuhaksaeng* is a reaction against both the figure of the “Asian nerd,” which circulates widely in popular culture and daily interactions in North America, and against the long-term immigrants’ construction of newcomers as “FOB (Fresh-Off-the-Boats).” Therefore, while the social construction of *yuhaksaeng* happens with processes of opposition building apparently vis-à-vis long-term *iminja* (immigrants), it really is White racism and the figure of Asian nerd that is at the center of it all.

In the first half of the chapter, the complex ways in which language interplays with class, citizenship, ethnicity, and race in the social construction of *yuhaksaeng* are depicted, with a focus on the sense of displacement middle class Korean families felt in the North American racial/ethnic order. The second half of the chapter illustrates how in this social categorization process, *yuhaksaeng* transformed a variety of Korean language and culture, namely contemporary Korean popular culture and youth slang, to construct them as “cool, wealthy cosmopolitan” with examples from daily social and linguistic interactions including Korean-English bilingual text messaging.

Styling “cool” was important for *yuhaksaeng* to access to resources circulated within the peer social network of *yuhaksaeng*, some *iminja* students, and other Asian students, in order to ultimately obtain university admission. This practice, however, has resulted in contradiction which presented limits to their English capital acquisition, the very resource they claimed to pursue through the migration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of what I call as “translingualism” as one of the linguistic consequences of globalization.

In the following section, as the backdrop to understanding what legitimate discourse was available for *yuhaksaeng* to mobilize the resources they possess as symbolic capital in this categorization process, I first briefly discuss a renewed meaning of Koreanness in the regional Asian and Korean market.

***Reworked Authenticity: “The Korean Wave” and “Modern, Cosmopolitan Korea”***

Over the last decade, the East Asian media markets witnessed an increase in transnational media flows as well as close partnerships among media corporations in production and marketing their products (Iwabuchi, 2008). While Japanese cultural products swept over Asian markets in the early 1990s, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Korean popular cultural artifacts (films, pop music, TV dramas) enjoy the highest popularity in Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, Japan, Vietnam, and Thailand (cf. Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008). Referred to as “the Korean Wave (*Hallyu* or *Hanryu*)” by the Chinese media in 2001, the influx of Korean cultural products, especially TV dramas, in different Asian nations rendered consuming Korean TV dramas daily routine for some Asian viewers (ibid., p. 2). Furthermore, Korean contemporary pop singers, such as Rain or Boa, sell out their concerts in Beijing, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.

In Japan, the Korean wave arrived with the phenomenal popularity of a TV drama entitled *Winter Sonata* (*Gyeoul Yeonga*) since 2003 (Mori, 2008). Particularly appealing to middle-aged Japanese women for pure romance and romantic relationships depicted in the storyline, *Winter Sonata* raised Bae Yong-Jun, the lead actor, to huge stardom. Nicknamed *Yon-sama* (Lord/Prince Yong) in Japan, Bae attracted five thousand fans to welcome him on his arrival at Tokyo international airport on April 3, 2004, whereas the world-renowned football star David Beckham gathered only five hundred fans when he

arrived in Japan (Mori, 2008, p. 130). The majority of his fans consists of middle-aged women, between 30 and 70 years old, who felt nostalgia regarding memories of pure romance and romantic relationships that are missing in contemporary Japanese cultural products (Iwabuchi, 2008).

Among ethnic Chinese viewers in East Asia, conversely, *Dae Jang Geum* (Jewel in the Palace, 2003), a chronicle of the first female imperial physician in the 16<sup>th</sup>-century Chosun Dynasty, was the most influential Korean Wave. While the cultural affinity between the two countries during the historical period was a significant contributor to its success, the traditional Asian value in cosmopolitan packaging (Lin & Tong, 2008) represented in the drama attracted most of its female viewers in Hong Kong and Singapore. On the one hand, Korean dramas, compared to Japanese equivalents, better represent traditional Asian values, such as love between family and friends as well as restrained sexual scenes. Yet, such tradition is hybridized with a modern outlook. For instance, aesthetic devices such as beautiful sceneries, music, good-looking people in fashionable and chic clothing/costumes to present glamorous cosmopolitan urban life styles are widely acclaimed by Asian viewers of Korean dramas (Huat & Iwabuchi, 2008). Furthermore, the image of modern, professional female characters who are tough enough to refute tradition and achieve social mobility through personal choices and efforts depicted in the Korean dramas provide alternative imagery of modern femininity by female viewers of *Dae Jang Geum* in Hong Kong and Singapore (Lin & Tong, 2008).

In sum, the media flows from Korea to various Asian countries have created a sense of “Cosmopolitan ‘Asian Us’” (Lin & Tong, 2008), particularly among younger generations, in rapidly globalizing Asian cities which have seen an expansion of the

middle class with the rise of the “Asian tigers.” Heightened status and increased visibility of Korean cultural products in turn have significantly influenced the image of Korea (and Koreans) in East Asian countries, as an urbanized, modern country with cosmopolitan urban lifestyles. Furthermore, consumption of the Korean pop culture products in *Hallyu* was followed by social practices such as touring to shooting sites, attending fan meetings, and learning the Korean language and its history. The unprecedented economic gains for the industry and the government have led the Korean government to actively utilize *Hallyu* as economic resources for the nation (see Lee K-H, 2008). Furthermore, the government began to actively mobilize *Hallyu* as resources to create a new cultural identity of the nation, or to “brand” (cf. Cameron, 2000a) the nation. Recently, the Korean government endeavoured to create a distinctive brand image for the nation. Yet, what they initially selected from its cultural heritage did not prove to effectively distinguish the nation’s image from that of China. In this context, contrary to common association of authenticity with the past or tradition (Blommaert, 1999), the meaning of Koreanness is transformed to index urban, *contemporary* Korea. In the government’s effort to mobilize the Korean Wave for branding the nation, *Hallyu* is accompanied by the IT-industry through the discourse of “Digital Korea” (Lee K-H, 2008).

In the following section, I examine how the rise of the entertainment/cultural industry and IT-industry in the new economy and the intensified role of youth in those industries have contributed to the heightened status of (youth) Internet language in Korea.

### ***“Digital Korea” and Youth Internet Language***

Korea is one of the best Internet-connected countries in the world. The prevalent use of technology across generations in Korea has resulted in Korean becoming one of

the top ten languages used on the Internet (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2008, as quoted in Garcia, 2009, p. 28). In addition, with the rise of youth as the powerful consumer and producer of cultural products in the new economy, youth Internet slang (or Internet language) is increasingly gaining legitimacy as a new form of language in Korea. For instance, some Internet slang terms are registered in the dictionary, appear in daily conversations, and have entered mainstream media. Increasing numbers of Korean TV dramas and movies are based on Internet novels or comic books (*manhwa*), which are often produced and consumed by teens. As such, these novels tend to show heavy use of youth Internet slang. For example, a Korean hit drama, *Gung* (the Palace, aired in Asia with an English title of Princess Hours), was based on a popular comic book which was widely popular among teens. Set in an imaginary 21<sup>st</sup> Korea with a royal family, the storyline depicts the love story of the crown prince and his new bride, both high school students, who heavily use laptops and cell phones. The drama offered subtitles for youth Internet slang terms, presumably for adult viewers who are not familiar with them. Although youth Internet slang is continually criticized for violating linguistic purism by some scholars and some people of the older generations, a lack of knowledge of it is simultaneously linked to an index of someone who is “backward.” The knowledge or use of Internet language is an index of contemporariness—keeping up with the new—or coolness, both for the adults and the youth.

Contrary to the common assumption that English use dominates the Internet, linguistic hybridity is a salient feature of the Internet slang in Korea. Internet language is known to be created by *netizens*, and it is often used in text messaging or on Internet messengers. As represented in the following examples, Korean, Sino-Korean (Chinese



character-based Korean, with which the older generation are more comfortable than do the younger generations), English, Konglish (a Korean term referring to localized English), and emoticons are used to present hybrid identities. The new hybrid identities are associated with cool, technology-savvy, young generations with bi/multilingual repertoires. Crucial for text messaging or chatting are simplicity, efficiency, immediacy, and speed; shortened forms/abbreviations (*jul im mal*) are widely used, and are written as they are pronounced rather than the correct spelling. Since predominant users of this language are the young generations in their teens or 20s, some words are related to student life, technology, and youth pop culture.

Several of these abbreviated forms found in Korean Internet slang include (1) *nam-chin* (short for *nam-ja chin-gu*, or boy friend); (2) *yeo-chin* (short for *yeo-ja chin-gu*, or girl friend); (3) *be-peu* (abbreviation for best friend); (4) *yeol-gong* (abbreviation for *yeol-shi-mi* [hard] *gong-bu-ha-da* [study]); (5) *al-ba* (short for a Konglish term, *a-reu-ba-i-teu*, which was adapted from the German word *arbeit* [but is often considered as an English term by Koreans], and has long been widely used to refer to part-time work); (6) *jjang-na* (short for *jjaj-jeung nan-da*, or irritated/frustrated); (7) *wan-jeon* (short for *wan-jeon-hi*, or very/really). Sometimes, abbreviations twist the original word(s) into creative meanings while keeping adults clueless: (8) *wan-so* (short for *wan-jeon(-hi) so-jung-han*, or very precious); (9) *eom-chin-a* (short for *eom-ma chin-gu ui a-deul*, or my mom's friend's son, referring to a son of one's mother's friend who tends to be perfect in his professional or academic accomplishment which his mother brags about to my mother); (10) *an-seup*, which consists of two Sino-Chinese vocabulary, *an* (eyes) and *seup* (presumably short for *seup-ha-da*, or [are] damp), literally means (my) eyes are damp (in

tears). It is used to express sympathy to someone in miserable condition but often with humor (e.g., your face is *an-seup*); (11) *sseol-leong* (short for *sseol-leong-ha-da*, or it is chilly, often referring to jokes or situations that are cheesy or not very amusing [e.g., *sseol-leong gag*]).

Additionally, the prevalent use of cell phones and the rise of the beauty industry have produced new terms associated with technology or new lexical items relating to one's appearance. Some examples include: (12) *di-ca* (shortened from digital camera); (13) *sel-ca* (short for "self-camera," referring to taking pictures of yourself with a digital camera or a camera phone); (14) *eol-jjang* (short for *eol-gul* [face] *jjang* [the best], referring to someone with the best looks or who is very good looking). The term *jjang*, meaning the best or top, is widely used to mean the best on its own with a positive connotation of being cool (e.g., He is *in-gi* [popularity] *jjang*; (You're) *jjang meot-gi-da* [cool].)<sup>19</sup>; (15) *ssaeng-eol* (bare face, normally referring to a woman who looks good even without make-up).

The majority of these terms are not only circulated but are produced on the Internet, especially through Internet Cafés or discussion forums. For example, *wan-so* is reportedly widely used when some enthusiastic viewers of the drama, *Gung* (the Palace), coined and used terms such as "*wan-so* Eun-hye" (to refer to actress Yun Eun-hye featuring the royal princess) and "*wan-so* Ji-hun" (to refer to actor Ju Ji-hun featuring the crown prince), in the viewers' discussion forum on the drama's homepage. Media

---

<sup>19</sup> According to my research on the Internet, the origin of this term *jjang* is disputable. In terms of meaning, it is presumably derived from Sino-Chinese word *jang* (leader). In terms of pronunciation, it is believed to be either a fortis of *jang*, or derived from Japanese suffix "*-chan*," which is similar to *jjang* in pronunciation. *Jjang* was initially used among school-aged students to refer to the leader of student violent group, who frequently appears as the main character in youth Internet novels or Japanese comic books which are popular among the Korean students. Similarly, *kaeb*, presumably derived from an English word "cap," means the best or cool (e.g., Wow! Your dance is *kaeb*). These two terms sometime appear together for an emphasis (e.g., He's *wan-jeon kaeb jjang*).

coverage of celebrities or marketing for new products frequently mobilizes Internet slang, which significantly contributes to the wider circulation of these terms. For instance, the term *ssaeng-eol* (bare face) appeared and was widely used with respect to a new cosmetic product, which will cover-up the flaws of one's facial complexion in a way so the person will look pretty in a very natural way as if one did not put on any make-up.

As illustrated, technological development in the new economy does play a crucial role in how discourses and resources are produced, circulated, and distributed. I now turn to how these resources are mobilized in the social construction of *yuhaksaeng* in the local Toronto context through global circulation.

### ***The Social Construction of Yuhaksaeng***

This section illustrates how the social category of *yuhaksaeng* (as well as “*yuhaksaeng* mothers”) is constructed by processes of opposition building vis-à-vis long-term *iminja* in the diasporic Korean community in Toronto. I argue that *yuhaksaeng*'s setting off themselves from long-term *iminja* results from their sense of displacement, and the subsequent contestations of their marginal position as Asian newcomers in the White supremacy-racial order, as reflected in the Korean diasporic communities (see Ong, 1999 for a similar observation among Hong Kong investors in California). Explicit categorization is accompanied by display of stylistic behaviors such as locating themselves in (formerly) white suburbs in North York rather than in downtown Korea Town, institutionalizing a separate social space for themselves (e.g., Korean ministry in an ethnic Korean church, organization of *yuhaksaeng* parents' group), and investing in Korean language and culture as well as middle class cultural capital such as golfing to present themselves as (upper) middle-class transnational subjects.

I use both *yuhaksaeng* and *iminja* as social categories. I am not so much interested in explicit naming of the category by participants as ways in which they mobilize their (linguistic and other) resources in the boundary making processes, as well as what value they associate with those practices (Auer, 2007). That is, *iminja* in this research refer to 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Korean-Canadians, long-term Korean immigrants with permanent residency or Canadian citizenship, and newcomers including students of *gireogi gajok* with permanent residency. *Yuhaksaeng* include students studying in Canada on study permit, home-stay students (or unaccompanied minors) on student visa or with permanent residency/Canadian citizenship, students of *gireogi gajok* either on study permit or with permanent residency.

In my analysis of the participants' accounts of their experiences of racial and linguistic marginalization, I define race as a social construct rather than biological essence, and racism as discourse (cf. Foucault, 1980) rather than as mere individual prejudice. As a discourse, racism often works as common sense; racist beliefs and practices are naturalized (Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Kubota, 2004; van Dijk, 1999). As such, whites often fail to recognize their white privileges and the victims of racism sometimes do not recognize the effects of racism. Furthermore, the notion of race as a social construct (i.e., race is not a fixed, stable category, but is shifting and is constructed by interacting with other social categories such as class, gender, language, culture, and religion) makes it extremely difficult to identify a single object called race/racism in today's world. Indeed, as van Dijk (1999) argues, it is through the denial of (overt) racism (i.e., discrimination based on one's skin color) that contemporary racism

continues to perpetuate itself.<sup>20</sup> Racism today thus works covertly by disguising itself as something else such as linguistic proficiency and cultural competency (cf. Razack, 1998; Stoler, 1997). Therefore, predicaments of racial minorities are often attributed to their lack of linguistic and cultural competence (e.g., lacking the motivation, education, or desire to adapt to the mainstream society), thereby rendering racial minorities responsible for the perpetuation of social inequality (Bonilla-Silva, 2003).

To demonstrate how processes of social construction of *yuhaksaeng* are mediated by racist discourses in North America, I highlight racializing ideologies of linguistic stigmatization which construct Asians and Asian Americans/Canadians as “poor” speakers of English. Such ideologies of race frequently interact with those of language in the West through racialized discourses on the linguistic differences of minorities (cf. Lippi-Green, 1997). Examples of how apparently linguistic arguments often entail racial issues include the complicity between whiteness and the construct of the Native Speaker (NS) as an ideal language teacher and speaker (Pennycook, 1998; Kubota, 2004), the ideology of “Standard English” as a racial construct in the U.S. as the counterpart of “Non-standard” English (i.e., African-American English) (Milroy, 2001), the linkage between criticisms of bilingual education in the U.S. and the social/racial status of Spanish-speakers in the U.S. society (Cummins, 2000), the relation between “English-only” policy and anti-immigration movements in the U.S. (Auerbach, 1993), and the construction of “ESL” students as a marked, racial category in North American educational institutions (Cummins, 2001; Goldstein, 2003; Kanno, 2003; Talmy, 2004).

---

<sup>20</sup> It is important to note, however, that even colonial racism was never solely based on skin color (cf. Stoler, 1997). For example, in Canada, racism is often associated with the recent arrival of immigrants of colour; however, accounts of racism in the earlier period of Canadian history abound (see, for example, Henry & Tator, 2005, chapter 3).

As for Koreans more specifically, English spoken by Koreans and Korean Americans/Canadians has long been the object of ridicule in Western pop culture and media reports within the larger discourse of “accented,” mocking Asian English, which, in turn, is associated with the marginal social position of its speakers (Lippi-Green, 1997; Lo & Kim, 2009). More recently, this Western linguistic ideology of Asians as “poor” speakers of English was reproduced in the Ladies Professional Golf Association (LPGA)’s announcement of its oral English proficiency requirement for all its members, which was charged to particularly target its South Korean members, who rapidly grew in number in recent years and comprise 41 out of 121 international players of the LPGA (Lim, 2008).

In what follows, I describe specific ways in which social categorization of *yuhaksaeng* (vis-à-vis *iminja*) happens.

***“No, but These Koreans Are Different from Those Koreans.”: Contested Meanings of Yuhaksaeng and Iminja***

During my initial research, I ran into a group of immigrant women at a coffee shop in North York. I explained my research to them and was allowed to go out for dinner with them to learn about *jogi yuhak* families in Toronto. During the conversation, the women talked about how fast-paced Korean society is and hence whenever they go back to Korea, they feel they need to actively catch up; and that is one of the reasons why long-term immigrants look “backward” to the newcomers. One woman, who was an owner of a Korean restaurant, commented that as she constantly interacted with Koreans through her business, she did not feel the gap. Another woman jumped in and remarked: “No, but these Koreans are different from those Koreans.”

Indeed, when I initially began to explore the North York area by walking along the high rise corridor of the neighborhood, I heard many stories about long-term immigrants (*orae doesin bundeul*) and newcomers (*saero osin bundeul*) as well as the division between *iminja* and *yuhaksaeng*.

A summary of the stories describes the groups as follows: long-term immigrants are “low-income” people in “old Korea town” in downtown who tend to preach about their initial hardships upon migration with “only \$400 in their pocket.” They work menial jobs at factories or in small-scale ethnic businesses which project, to the newcomers, an image of Korea in the 1960s or 1970s. They did not make it into “mainstream” society, thus have to work hard to earn Canadian dollars, and do not have a sense of humor.

Newcomers constitute about 30% of the residents in the middle-class high rises in the area. They are well-educated and live a relatively easy life (compared with the old immigrants) with expenses sent from Korea. Within the newcomers, those who came after 2000 are different from those who came around 1995 or earlier in terms of education, economic capital left in Korea and their migration status. For this group, migration to Canada is mainly for their children’s education, rather than family migration, given the options available to them as racial minorities in the Canadian society. That is, even those who migrate with university education and middle class economic capital in the 1990s are self-employed in ethnic restaurants or convenience stores. Thus, “mainstream” society appears to be hard to enter, but the “Korean” community looks backward to the “mainstream” as well as to the contemporary Korea. Thus, immigration, which involves engaging in the primary wage-earning economic activity in Canada at the bottom of the social hierarchy, does not entice them to give up their (upper) middle-class

position in Korea. The majority of *jogi yuhak* families belong to this post-2000 newcomer group.

The divide between the old/new migrant groups in the discourse (see also Lo & Kim, 2009; Song, 2007 for observations on social divisions between *jogi yuhak* families and long-term immigrants in U.S. contexts) has to do with a recent change in the background of the Koreans who migrate to Canada. Korea has not been a major source of immigrants. In particular, migration to Canada only began to be visible within the public eye in the 1990s under the investment category. Around the mid-1990s, particularly around the 1997 Financial crisis, the so-called “*imin* (emigration) boom” hit the country. The implementation of the skilled-worker category in the Canadian immigration policy had also played a role in the increase of the influx of the Koreans to Canada. An example of Korean immigrants during this period include a group of computer engineers in high-tech research institutes, most of whom, in the end, were not able to have professional career in Canada. With the experience of the harsh reality of immigrant life in the host society as well as with the economy in Korea recovering, the ‘*imin* (emigration)’ bubble started to burst. For example, the number of K-12 students who left Korea due to family emigration almost doubled between 1998 and 2000 (5,757→10,438), reached its peak in 2001 (12,537), but started to decrease from 2002 (10,448) (Cho et al., 2006).

The explicit categorization in the discourse is accompanied by stylistic behaviors as represented by practices of *yuhaksaeng* mothers. *Yuhaksaeng* mothers are typically described as spending their days chatting at a coffee shop (run by old immigrants), spending money sent from Korea, putting on make-up and being well-dressed, playing



golf, not knowing how to do tipping, and “contaminating” the local community with their “Korean” practices such as chauffeuring their children to tutoring classes.

Example 1 and 2 below represent how *yuhaksaeng* mothers contest such marginal positioning and construct themselves as “cosmopolitan middle-class” valuing family and how to enjoy life. They contrast this to the image of Asian migrants in the model minority discourse in the North American racial order, or the grim-faced immigrant store owner who lacks cultural capital and do not know how to enjoy life, as represented in the image of long-term *iminja*. In this process, they construct Korea in the 21<sup>st</sup> century as glamorous, busy metropolis with *culture* and *civilization*, whereas they represent Canada (and the Korean diasporic community in Toronto) as “backward,” which has a small population and is more known for its natural beauty than for its urban vitality. Such an ideological construction of global Koreanness is based on their sense of economic development and technological advancement of Korea, as well as their (upper) middle class positions in the Korean society.

Example 1 is extracted from an interview with Yu-ri’s mother, *Gireogi* mother on Temporary Resident Visa (issued to parents of visa students). In addition to Canada’s geographical proximity to the U.S. and the lower value of the Canadian dollar (compared to the U.S. dollar), most *jogi yuhak* families mentioned that they chose Canada because of the availability of both the Temporary Resident Visas for mothers and public schools for visa students, which is not the case with the U.S. In this talk, Yu-ri’s mother constructs emigration as only for those who do not have decent jobs in Korea, thereby constructing *iminja* as less privileged than *yuhaksaeng* families in terms of their social position.

*Example 1. Interview with Yu-ri's mother (March 7, 2007)*

Mother: The reason why we considered immigration is not because we plan to come to live here, but because you get more benefits. For example, when you get sick, things like that. . . . for us, as for my husband, **he still has a decent job [in Korea] so we don't need to immigrate** [otherwise].

Example 2 is obtained from a group interview with three mothers from *yuhaksaeng* parents group, a voluntary self-supporting network of mothers of *yuhaksaeng*. All three had children attending Toronto public schools at the time of the interview. Mother 1 moved to Canada in August 2004 with a son then in Grade 8 and a daughter in Grade 4. Prior to their migration to Canada, her son had been to two short-term English camps which, according to these mothers, is typical of *jogi yuhak* students: first to the U.K. for two months while he was in Grade 5, and another two months in the U.S. in Grade 6. Mother 2 and her two children had been in Canada on student visa for two years before they obtained a permanent residency the previous year. Mother 3, in her 30s, was a younger mother among the three and was a *Gireogi Mother* with a Grade 3 girl.

The conversation began to discuss how the group was formed and how they became involved in the group. Mother 1 commented on how *yuhaksaeng* mothers do not feel welcomed by the local community. When I asked her what she meant by the local community, all three mothers immediately responded: "Of course the Korean community!" Mother 3 continued: "How can we dare to enter the English community here? It seems to be difficult. You know, we always go to the same restaurant that we know. (. . .) maybe not for the kids, but for us, [it's difficult]." In the following example, Mother 1 continued to share her thoughts on why she found networking with other

members in the group helpful, such as sharing information on tutoring activities as well as emotional support, when Mother 3 jumped in:

**Example 2: Interview, Yuhaksaeng Parents group (May 2, 2008)**

- Mother 3: Because our circumstances (*cheoji*) are similar.  
 Hyunjung: (laughing, in a sympathetic tone) I feel sad when you say *cheoji*<sup>21</sup>.  
 Mother 3: (laughing, rather bitterly) it's sad, isn't it?  
 Mother 2: Well, I feel different from *iminja* in terms of the way we think or things like that.  
 Hyunjung: Could you elaborate more on that? . . .  
 Mother 1: Because we play golf and powder our faces . . . but we, according to our lights, have our social position that we have had in Korea, so it is hard to give it up as yet. And when we try to fit the life here [in Canada], here (.) **it's really like a town office or a village office [of Korea]**. The condos here, (.) my daughter was struck when we first came because there was no bidet in the bathroom. In Korean condos these days, each bathroom is equipped with a bidet, as you know. Because of Korea's economic development, without considering things like the national income//  
 Mother 3: //at least from the outlook, Korea is glamorous.  
 Mother 1: [Canada has] only population of 30,000 [*sic.* 30 million].  
 Hyunjung: (laugh)  
 Mother 1: To take an example, there are too few things to see [here], too little to enjoy. We used to live like this [pointing high] and there is a gap.  
 Mother 2: It's like this. **In Korea, you enjoy culture (*inwijeokin jaemi*), here [in Canada] you enjoy nature.** So if that doesn't suit you (.) for those who like such things (as nature) [it will work]. If you like those things. . . .  
 Mother 1: Among immigrants, those who came 30 years ago, working in the factory, their educational level seems to be different from us.  
 Mother 3: It's like this. *Imin* five years ago is for those who live more comfortable life, and is different from *imin* in the 1970s. So we shouldn't generalize *iminja*.  
 Mother 1: [Contrary to the 1970s] Now, you don't have anything to show off as immigrants. How developed Korea is [now]!  
 Mother 2: If you go playing golf, among *iminja*, not many go as couple. Wives work at the store while husbands play golf. But those who are open-minded, even if they won't earn as much money, they would play together. Those who came lately, they will golf together despite financial loss. . . .  
 Mother 3: (laughing softly) And you can't do online banking [here].  
 Hyunjung: But I do online banking.

---

<sup>21</sup> The Korean term *cheoji* contains a negative connotation associated with being miserable or a difficult situation. I felt sad because I sensed the feeling of marginalization from the choice of the vocabulary, rather than *sanghwang*, which may be a more neutral term.

- Mother 3: No, what I mean is, how do you say, *tahaenghwan* (transferring funds to an account with another bank), you can't do that on-line (laugh softly).  
 Hyunjung: A-ha.

In the next section, I discuss how the social category of *yuhaksaeng* is constructed among the *jogi yuhak* students.

### ***A FOB, A Nerd, or Something New?***

The growing presence of study abroad students in Toronto has led to competition over access to resources within Korean diasporic communities. (Long-term) immigrant students and (short-term) *yuhaksaeng* construct social divisions through two-way intraethnic othering: *iminja* see *yuhaksaeng* as “FOBs (Fresh-Off-the-Boats)” and “problem” speakers of “poor” English and students with no academic aspiration, while *yuhaksaeng* construct *iminja* as “uncool” and “backward.”

At a youth ministry of an ethnic Korean church in North York, this tension has resulted in a separation of the Korean Ministry (KM) from the English Ministry (EM). The division happened presumably upon requests by the students who later belonged to the KM (Interview, KM pastor, February, 21, 2007). Thus, while the EM mainly consists of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Korean-Canadians and long-term immigrants, the KM houses what was commonly referred to among them as 1.5 generations and newcomers, who “feel more comfortable with speaking Korean . . . [because] when the [KM] students were mixed with the EM students, they would not speak up because they felt intimidated” (Interview, KM Pastor, February, 21, 2007). For many students in the KM, the church often represents the only social community where they access to resources (e.g., leadership positions, volunteer opportunities, emotional support) which were not always available at their school. Once the KM was separated, “the workshop team in the KM, for example,

rapidly grew.” (Interview, EM Pastor, May 2, 2007). As such, although the division between the KM and the EM is based on the essentialist assumption of the linguistic difference between the two groups, both KM and EM are actually linguistically hybrid and students mobilize their (linguistic) resources to better access resources they desire. Example 3 below, extracted from an interview with Ji-yeon, volunteer teacher at the KM, is illustrative of these points.

Ji-yeon was a *Gireogi* Mother and was one of the supplementary participants associated with the focal participant Se-jun. Ji-yeon migrated to Canada in 2002 with a son and a daughter. Her husband was a professor in Korea. Her children initially came to Canada on student visas, but the family soon obtained permanent residency when Ji-yeon and her husband learned from the immigration agency (which they used for assistance with obtaining visas and admissions) that they qualified for the skilled-immigrant category. Her son, who left Korea in Grade 5, was born and raised in the U.S. while the family lived in the country for the father’s doctoral study. He did not adapt well to the Korean school upon return migration in Grade 1. This motivated Ji-yeon to embark on the journey of *jogi yuhak*. She was happy overall about the decision as her son enjoyed his school in Canada and was doing relatively well. Her son, in Grade 10, was attending the KM at the time of the interview.

***Example 3: Interview, Ji-yeon, Gireogi Mother, Church Teacher (May 15, 2007)***

Hyunjung: Why does your son choose to attend the KM then?

Ji-yeon: He moved from the EM after he went to the first KM retreat, (.) you know. My son came [to Canada] quite young, in Grade 5, but still, (.) I think he felt emotionally more comfortable, something like Korean (. .). These days, they only physically live in Toronto, but still, Internet and things like that (.) like fashion style hot in Korea came immediately, as you know. . . . So I think they share those things [in the KM] (.) things like culture (.) . . . You need emotional security, you know. I think that was the

case with my son. Because he feels secure emotionally, he can study, and then he gets good grades, and then he gains confidence. . . .  
 And as for my daughter (laughing), she was at the EM but transferred to the KM recently. She (.) her Korean is not even good, she can barely write in Korean, but still, (.) when she came to the retreat with me . . . . I think they have something Korean in common. . . . If you were in EM Children's Ministry, mostly you would go to EM Youth Ministry, you know. But she has me and her brother [in the KM], and so interacts with her brother's friends and my students a lot. And she thinks it's fun.

Whereas students tend to choose to attend the KM to better position themselves vis-à-vis the EM students, as the next example demonstrates, even within the KM, *yuhaksaeng* are often constructed as a “problem” by immigrants. Most students who hold the leadership positions are immigrants. Since the immigrants' new positioning in the KM is based on the ethnonational ideology, and since they are relatively newcomers themselves, in this context, the construction of *yuhaksaeng* as a problem is based on their non-academic aspiration or patterns of consumption (rather than speaking Korean or “poor” English). Example 4 is an excerpt from an interview with two immigrant students who were well recognized by the pastor and the teachers.

**Example 4: Interview, Ji-na and Se-hee (March 6, 2007)**

- Ji-na: But [in Toronto] I don't see many *yuhaksaeng*. Maybe schools [here] are not accepting them. But in Vancouver, REA(.)LLY(.) a lot [of *yuhaksaeng*]. So for one school, [they said] if you go [to that school], there are only *yuhaksaeng*. . . . In my school . . . **Korean** students often get into **trouble**.
- Hyunjung: Is that right? Isn't [it true] that Korean students are normally known for being a hard-worker?
- Ji-na: It's either. You really study hard and a nerd (*beomsaeng*) or WAN(.)JON(.) [really]//
- Se-hee: //WAN(.)JON(.) [really]
- Ji-na: Really. . . .
- Hyunjung: Are there many Chinese students in XXX (name of Ji-na's school)?
- Ji-na: Really many. Because it's a good school, there are many Chinese

- students.
- Hyunjung: Because it's a good school, there are many [Chinese students]?  
 Ji-na: You know, Koreans are like that too. Word of mouth. If they say that [school] is good, they all rush there. The reason why a school is good is because there are many **Chinese** students. . . Because they are **REAL(.)LY(.) high-achieving**.
- Hyunjung: (laugh) REALLY high-achieving?  
 Ji-na/Se-hee: (together) Yes.
- Hyunjung: Those Chinese you just mentioned, are they *yuhaksaeng* or//  
 Ji-na/Se-hee: //(together)  
 All **immigrants**.

In this talk, ethnolinguistic minority students from Asia in multilingual societies are provided with only two options to their subject position within the dominant North American racial discourse: One is being marginalized as “FOB” or the other is trying to fit into the mainstream order as model minority, Asian “Nerd.” While the following example from a conversation with Yu-bin, an *iminja* participant of this research, offers a similar construction, it also indicates that a change began to happen in such binary construction.

In May 2008, I met Yu-bin to catch up after she completed her official involvement in the research for one academic year. She was in Grade 9 at a Catholic high school in North York during her participation. Having graduated from her elementary school with an academic excellence award, she continued to be a strong student in her high school, maintaining an average of over 90, and was well recognized by her teachers. She told me about her new boy friend who was a long-term Korean immigrant. In this talk, consuming Korean pop culture is constructed as an index of a “FOB.”

***Example 5. Dinner time Conversation<sup>22</sup>, Yu-bin (Fieldnote, May 12, 2008)***

- Hyunjung: What is he like?  
 Yu-bin: He looks fobbish. Do you know the word fobbish?  
 Hyunjung: Yes, but what do you mean [by he looks fobbish]?

<sup>22</sup> This conversation was not recorded but I took notes shortly after the gathering.

- Yu-bin: He listens to Seo Tae-ji [a famous Korean musician and idol star from the 1990s]. . . . [but otherwise] he's very white.
- Hyunjung: What do you mean?
- Yu-bin: Things like study, when we talk about grade, he would tell me "you are already doing well and why do you need to worry?" But when I talk to Korean kids, they would understand and tell me "right, we need to do better."  
(smiling)
- Hyunjung: (laugh) Why do you think is that?
- Yu-bin: (laugh) I don't know. Because of our parents?

The conversation continued as Yu-bin commented that in her high school, where "White" students constitute the majority, minority students tended to be lumped together with "Whites." Amongst them, according to her, "Asian" students and "Korean" students represent those with high academic achievement. Yu-bin remarked that about twenty Korean students at her high school were all high achievers, except for one or two. As such, she described a senior Korean student who immigrated to Canada at the age of five as follows:

- Yu-bin: He once received 75 in math. (smiling) And the first thing he said was "Oh, I'm turning white." You know, white kids don't care things like 60 or 70.

She went on to offer another example of construction of Asian students as "good" students.

- Yu-bin: An Asian student who received 80 is agonizing over the grade like this (putting her hand under her chin). Then, a white student tells the Asian student that "Come on. That's good enough." And the student responds, "You know, I'm an Asian." Then the white student goes, "That's right," you know. (laugh)

As illustrated, while described as "high achieving (*gongbu jal haneun aedeul*)" by Yu-bin, the construction of "Asian" or "Korean" students in this talk more or less fits the image of "Asian nerd" under the discourse of model minority. Later, I asked whether



students frequently use the word “fobbish” at her school. She responded “on a daily basis” and added that she thought the boy who remarked that he was turning white was “*becoming fobbish*,” as he would listen to Korean music. According to Yu-bin, being “fobbish” means going to XXX [name of a store next to the school] and buying Korean snack, listening to Korean music, and as for Chinese students, always using charming stationery from Hong Kong. She added that she also felt that she speaks more Korean with increased presence of Korean students at her high school, compared to her elementary school where she and her younger brother were the only Korean students. For example, in her math class, the teacher seats students with over 90 average in the back, most of whom are Koreans. During this time, they talk about issues in Korea such as President Lee Myung-bak.

Investing in Korean language and culture in this discourse is constructed as an index of “FOB” as opposed to (long-term) immigrants who tend to be “Nerds.” Yet, Yu-bin’s remark on the Nerd immigrant boy’s “becoming fobbish” indicates that being a FOB began to signify some new meanings among the Korean youth in Toronto, as something that a Nerd wishes to identify with (whether consciously or not). The emergence of a new way of being a newcomer, rather than a FOB, among *jogi yuhak* students is the focus of the next section.

### ***From “FOB” to “Cool”: Negotiating the Meaning of Koreanness among Yuhaksaeng***

This section explores how *yuhaksaeng* create a new social position of “cool,” moving away from “FOB” and yet without submitting to the stereotypical image of “Asian Nerd.” In this social categorization process, *yuhaksaeng* stylistically construct themselves as “cool, wealthy cosmopolitans,” through conspicuous consumption,

investment in contemporary youth language and popular culture, notably in fashion, pop music, text messaging, and Internet activities. In this process, *yuhaksaeng* negotiate the meaning of Koreanness (or Korean language and culture) as an index of modernity and globality. Maintaining “coolness” through such categorization practice is important for them in gaining an access to resources circulating within the peer social network of *yuhaksaeng*, including some Korean immigrants and other transnational Asian students, in order to do well at school and ultimately obtain admissions to prestigious universities. This practice, however, has reportedly resulted in contradiction in ways which present limits to their acquisition of forms of English capital valued in the Canadian market.

The discussion focuses on the case of two focal *yuhaksaeng* participants, Yu-ri and Su-bin, because they best represent the points discussed so far. I first offer brief sketches of their trajectories to their Toronto high school.

### ***Trajectories: Racism and Struggles Over Access to “Authentic” English***

Yu-ri and Su-bin grew up in an upper-middle class neighborhood in Seoul, one of the two educational “meccas” along with upscale Gangnam. Their neighborhood rapidly gained a reputation in the 1990s for its high success rate in matriculating its students to new elite high schools. According to their mother, Su-bin was among the “good” students in terms of her academic achievement while Yu-ri was an “average” student. Thus, the family could not be optimistic about both girls entering elite universities in Korea. Furthermore, *jogi yuhak* was becoming very popular in Korea at that time and they had a family friend in New Zealand who had left for *jogi yuhak* earlier. Therefore, the mother was intrigued by the idea of sending the girls for *yuhak*, which the girls also welcomed.

In the summer of 2002, to check out the local situation, the entire family visited New Zealand and traveled around the country on a guided tour. After a one-month summer program at a local elementary school, they decided to continue their study in the country. Upon returning to Korea, they obtained visas to study in New Zealand and left again for the country in November. Both of the girls' parents agreed that the mother should accompany the girls because they believed that the sisters were too young to be left alone in a foreign country. After the girls and the mother left Korea, the father downsized the house and moved to a suburban neighborhood due to the high cost of the girls' overseas education he had to support.

The girls were initially excited about their studying abroad, anticipating that they could make friends with students from different parts of the world and thus they would soon be able to speak English "fluently." Upon their arrival in New Zealand, however, they quickly realized that the reality was not as rosy as imagined. Most importantly, they were truly disillusioned with the "whites" because they experienced such severe racism that they "will never forget." For example, Yu-ri went to a semi-private school where she was indeed hurt by racial slurs such as "yellow monkey," "flat face," and "you stink." Su-bin once physically fought back, by pulling her hair, to the "blonde-hair girl" who cast her racial slur and contemptuous look. In addition, when they gave presentations in class, the (white) students laughed at or mimicked what they said, giggling. What was worse, the teacher would not intervene. The girls thus did not want to speak up in class. Furthermore, the family once attended a Catholic church, and felt truly embarrassed when they found themselves left with nobody sitting next to them, while the rest of the seats

were filled with people. As Yu-ri remarked, they almost wanted to leave before the mass ended.

After two years in New Zealand, the mother had considered returning to Korea because she missed her husband and also believed that if the girls were to enter elite universities in Korea, returning any later might cause challenges in the girls' academic adjustments to Korean schools. When asked, however, the girls preferred to stay in New Zealand because they did not feel that their English had improved much for the length of their residency in the country. For a long-term stay, they chose Canada because Canada, unlike New Zealand did not require a minimum score on English proficiency test for immigration application. In February 2007, the three members of the family moved to Toronto, after having filed an application for Canadian permanent residency in the investment category through an emigration agency in Korea. Overall, they felt more comfortable living in a metropolis in which large numbers of visible minority groups lived. They were certainly impressed when people sat next to them on the subway shortly after they migrated to Toronto. The girls also enjoy the busy urban life and increased diversity in Toronto compared to the small, homogeneous New Zealand town they had lived. But they still found it difficult to make friends with "Canadian" students so they felt more comfortable with "Asian" students. Furthermore, they continued to remain relatively silent in class. At times, Su-bin remarked, she would like to better interact with the teacher in the same way as "local" students who often laugh with the teachers, making small talk and asking questions. For she believes relationship with friends and teachers is important and might affect her achievement at school. When the teacher was sick, for instance, Su-bin wanted to say to him "take good care," but she did not know

how to say that “nicely” in English. Overall, the girls reported that they did not feel that their English was “good enough,” despite their years of overseas schooling.

Their relationship with other “Korean” students is rather complicated, however. They sensed, *iminja*, who possess English ability and social network, are not willing to let *yuhaksaeng* into their circle—especially *iminja* girls. For example, Yu-ri wanted to work for the female president position at the “Korean club” at her school, for she believed, as her friends told her, these leadership positions would look good on the college admission application. The new male president, who is Yu-ri’s friend, supported the idea. Yet, the current female president, an *iminja* girl, wanted to continue with her job. Faced with the constraint to access to the *iminja* network, but not wanting to beg them to let them in as Yu-ri remarked, the girls feel most comfortable with socializing with other *yuhaksaeng*.

### ***Styling “Cool”: Social (and Linguistic) Practices of Yuhaksaeng***

When I first met Yu-ri and Su-bin at a fast food restaurant near their home in summer 2006, I exclaimed, “Wow, you guys look like TV stars (*yeonyein*)!” Wearing makeup and dressed in trendy training attire with well-maintained long, straight hair in caps, they greeted me with big smiles and high-pitched voices in an affable tone. The sisters projected an image of charming and stylish young Koreans to me, as often represented in Korean pop culture. Whenever I met them over the course of this research, I felt that they dressed stylishly with accessories such as fashionable sunglasses and bracelets. My impression was the same regarding their mother. For an interview in October 2007, the mother, who was 47, appeared in a glossy black jacket with a long-sleeve black shirt inside and fashionably baggy beige trousers. Her long, slightly wavy

hair was well-groomed. She held a shopping bag from a fashion store. She showed me two outfits from Tommy Hilfiger she had just bought. She also showed me DVDs of Pink Floyd and Led Zeppelin whom she liked while in university, and shared with me her plan to learn electric guitar once she returns to Korea upon the girls' entrance to a university in upcoming fall.

In Toronto, the girls and their mother rent a two bedroom-plus-den condominium in a middle-class high-rise within a walking distance from the girls' high school and from the largest Korean grocery store of the city. The emigration agency helped them find the school and housing in Toronto. Given Yu-ri's experience at the semi-private school in New Zealand falling short of expectation as well as Canada's reputation for good quality public education, not to mention the high tuition of private schools, Yu-ri's mother requested for a list of good public schools close to Korean grocery stores, as their housing arrangement would be subject to the location of the school. As the mother remarked during our initial telephone conversation in summer 2006, the family has been *gireogi gajok* for the past six years. Their school houses a large *yuhaksaeng* population mostly from Korea and China (PRC) and some from Iran. The girls share a bedroom and they study and spend most of the times together, both in and outside of school. Both Yu-ri and Su-bin acquired their drivers' licenses shortly after they migrated to Canada and sometimes drive to their school, as many other students at the school do. They also drive their mother to her golf lessons sometimes. On weekends, they watch Korean TV shows on the Internet (hooked up to the projection TV in the living room) or go shopping. The girls and the mother sometimes go to *noraebang* (singing room, Korean equivalent of Japanese Karaoke bars) or go to see movies together. Both Yu-ri and Su-bin often surf

the Internet to download Korean music and sometimes update their mini homepage in the “Cyworld,” a tailor-made personal homepage provider site run by a Korean Internet company extremely popular among young Koreans. They also heavily use text messages and MSN to communicate with their friends both from their study in Korea and New Zealand as well as in Toronto. At home, the sisters do not talk to each other in English because they feel “very awkward.”

As a *Gireogi gajok*, the family makes extra efforts to keep in close touch with their father in Korea. During their study abroad, the girls traveled back to Korea every winter, the mother usually making another trip each year, and the father visited them in summer. While they were busy studying in Grade 12, however, the girls only made a short trip to Korea in spring. Her mother talks to him on the telephone every day through the Internet phone, provided by a Korean telephone company which allows calling each other at a domestic rate regardless of where one is worldwide. When he visited them in Toronto in summer of 2006, the girls welcomed him with balloons hung on the wall and the family went for a ten-day trip to Atlantic Canada and Quebec, where they met “a Canadian who did not speak English,” that is, a Francophone. On their father’s birthday in September 2006, the girls played music for him over the phone. Yu-ri plays the violin and Su-bin the flute—they took private lessons in Korea.

While the mother was gone to Korea in winter 2007, she bought the girls a seasonal pass for a ski resort. The girls love skiing and snowboarding, and they took several ski trips with other Korean students. The mother and daughters also started taking horseback riding lessons together in the summer of 2007, as the mother believed that it would be important for the girls to learn the kind of sport which they believed to be what

“local” people enjoy. Popular among the boys, the girls mostly hang out with boys, primarily other Korean *yuhaksaeng* as they report, at *noraebang* (singing room), Korean restaurants, or ski resorts. They both are good singers and Yu-ri is also very good at dancing. They wear make-up when they go out on weekends. They periodically order clothes through a Korean on-line shopping mall, well-known among Korean *jogi yuhaksaeng* in Toronto. Either their father or mother delivers them to Toronto on their visit or return trip from Korea to save the shipping cost. But when both parents stayed in Korea, they had them shipped directly to Toronto.

In what follows, I illustrate how they made sense of their linguistic and social practices as represented so far (notably conspicuous consumption of Korean language and culture).

### ***Tensions Between Essentialism and Hybridity in the Social Construction of Yuhaksaeng***

This section concerns how *yuhaksaeng* used Korean language and culture as stylistic resources to index their “cool, wealthy cosmopolitan” identity that is simultaneously Korean and global (*vis-à-vis* peers in the local diasporic community as well as “local” students). Examples are drawn from face-to-face interactions as well as Korean-English bilingual text messaging among peers. In this ideological construction of Koreanness as an index of globality associated with cosmopolitanism, tensions between essentialism and hybridity are revealed.

In two naturally occurring interactions represented below, the meaning of *yuhaksaeng* is relatively directly associated with wealth, as reflected in the privileged backgrounds of *yuhaksaeng* from other Asian countries, notably from nations which are



not as affluent as Korea (Example 6), and as revenue source for the host society or institution (Example 7). Example 6 is extracted from the lunchtime conversation with Yu-ri's family, shortly after her mother had returned from a one-month visit to Korea. Selecting the menu at a Chinese-owned Western restaurant, the mother shared her stories about life in New Zealand as well as her trip to South Asia during her visit to Korea. The stories of traveling evolved to their family trip to China (PRC) several years ago, while they were still living in New Zealand. Yu-ri joined the conversation and made comments about how astonished she was at the poverty and untidiness, observed in some parts of China during her trip to the country. In Example 6, absence of the "rich" Chinese students in her Toronto school is equated with absence of *yuhaksaeng* (line 6), which in turn is associated with the presence of many immigrants (line 7). Thereby, *yuhaksaeng* is constructed as wealthy, as opposed to *iminja*. As she paused and hedged (line 6-7), it is not socially appropriate to categorize people based on their wealth. Therefore, Yu-ri shifted to the reference to *yuhaksaeng* instead of saying, "there aren't many *rich* students." Likewise, she uses *iminja* instead of "students who are *not rich*."

**Example 6. Lunch time conversation with Yu-ri's family (March 3, 2007)**

- |   |           |  |
|---|-----------|--|
| 1 | Yu-ri:    | There is a huge gap between the rich and the poor [in China].                    |
| 2 |           | Really, after I visited China, I realized that ah, the Chinese students          |
| 3 |           | around me were all very rich. When we lived in New Zealand, the                  |
| 4 |           | Chinese students were all rich. . . .  |
| 5 | Hyunjung: | Is it also true for Chinese students here [in Toronto]?                          |
| 6 | Yu-ri:    | Here (. .) <b>there aren't many [Chinese] <i>yuhaksaeng</i></b> . I don't really |
| 7 |           | know. Well, (.) I think most of them are <i>iminja</i> here. In New              |
| 8 |           | Zealand, there were really a lot of <i>yuhaksaeng</i> .                          |

Example 7 is taken from a conversation with her family at their home. Initially, the visit was arranged for an observation of their practices and I asked to see what they would normally do at home. We watched a Korean TV show together on the Internet,

they showed me around their place, and I conducted a short interview with them. The mother invited me to stay for dinner and we began to chat about their lives in New Zealand. The conversation went on to racial slur of “flat face.” Yu-ri and her mother remarked that they appreciated that the teacher asked both the student who cast the slur and his parents to apologize in writing when Yu-ri reported the incident to the teacher. She and her mother supposed that the school’s action had to do with the fact that Yu-ri was a *yuhaksaeng* as they knew that the school needed to recruit and retain international students who would pay the high international tuition rate.

***Example 7. Conversation with Yu-ri’s family at their home (November 25, 2006)***

- Yu-ri: Because the school was semi-private, they wanted more *yuhaksaeng* because they need money. The school goes to Korea to recruit potential students. They also go to Thailand and China. So teachers and the school, they consider *yuhaksaeng* important. So if I tell the teacher a problem, they will take care of it.
- Mother: It will be a problem if *yuhaksaeng* go back and speak ill of the school. I think because it was semi-private, because there were many rich kids, it was worse. They felt superior and felt they were a selected group.

The following two examples illustrate how Koreanness is transformed as an index of globality in the social construction of *yuhaksaeng* as “cool cosmopolitan,” not just vis-à-vis other Asian *yuhaksaeng* from less advanced nations than Korea (Example 8), but as opposed to “backward” New Zealanders locked on the island who lack global knowledge of rapidly developing Asian metropolis (Example 9). In Example 8, cultural artifacts associated with the “Korean Wave (*Hallyu*)” as well as fashion are used as stylistic resources to index *yuhaksaeng*’s transnational subjectivity. Conversely, in Example 9, Yu-ri exploits Korea’s technological advancement as a resource to present Korea as a global nation as opposed to “backward” New Zealand. Example 8 is an excerpt taken

from the same conversation at Yu-ri's home as in Example 7. The mother remarked on her former ESL classmate in New Zealand, a Chinese woman, who would write down in Chinese character the names of Korean stars that she knew from Korean soap operas and movies, and ask her about them. Yu-ri joined the conversation, commenting on her classmate from Thailand, who was even more knowledgeable of Korean pop culture than herself. She reported that the boy was from a family that was very well-off as with most other *yuhaksaeng* from South-Asian countries in her class. His family reportedly owned a crocodile farm in his house. The ideological construction of Korean language and culture as symbolic capital (i.e., something to desire) in this transnational Asian market is mapped onto people, thereby constructing Koreans as an object of envy by the Thailand boy, who were eager to "look like Korean kids."

**Example 8. Conversation with Yu-ri's family at their home (November 25, 2006)**

- Yu-ri: [In my New Zealand school], there were a lot of foreign students. One of the students from Thailand had told me that those students from his country who came here [New Zealand] are all REALLY rich. He said he had a pond at home and crocodiles and everything. And his family also owned several shoe factories. You won't imagine how much they [students from Thailand] **are eager to look like Korean kids** (*eolmana hanguk aedeul cheoreom doego sipeo haneun deyo*). If I tell them you look like a Korean, they really like it. And how hard they try to mimic Korean students.
- Hyunjung: You mean, things like clothing?
- Yu-ri: That's right, and things like hairstyle. If Korean students dye their hair, they will do the same.
- Mother: When you see things like that, you feel proud.
- Yu-ri: (smiling) I benefited a lot from *hallyu*. If I say for example "*iri wa*" (come here), they would understand it. And things like, some Korean TV programs that I don't know of, they keep asking me about them.

The conversation continued in Example 9. The small New Zealand town the family had lived in was famous as *jogi yuhak* destination given its middle class

neighbourhood, beautiful scenery, and reputable schools, but was obviously far less sophisticated than rapidly developing Asian metropolis such as Seoul and Beijing.

***Example 9. Conversation with Yu-ri's family at their home (November 25, 2006)***

- Mother: Those who have been to Korea or China are not like that. Those who know [what Korea or China is like] all know. Once a New Zealander, who had been to Beijing [and was impressed at the scale of the city] asked us if Seoul was like that too. So the girls said yes, Seoul is probably more so than Beijing, but no less so than Beijing. Then he said, "Is that right?"
- Yu-ri: And there was someone who asked whether we have electricity in Korea, or "in your country, is there TV or Internet?" **Those who don't know** [what Korea is like] **would underestimate us.**
- Mother: Well, when we were in New Zealand, there was no ADSL (Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line), so we couldn't watch Korean TV on the Internet [because it was too slow]. So we had to rent video tapes.

In Example 10 below, extracted from an interview with Su-bin, *yuhaksaeng* is indirectly constructed as cool, by constructing (long-term) *iminja* (notably second-generation Korean-Canadians in the local Toronto context) as uncool. In this construction, Su-bin draws on competence in contemporary youth slang and Korean popular culture as stylistic resources to assert their distinction from *iminja*. In doing so, she constructs shared knowledge of the meaning of Koreanness/Korea (line 18-20) as an index of Cool, rather than FOB. Since the transformation of the meaning of Koreanness is based on its indexical meaning of *contemporary* Korea, rather than tradition or past, newcomers such as *yuhaksaeng* are better positioned to claim legitimate ownership of such Koreanness, compared to long-term immigrants who had left Korea long time ago or second-generation Korean-Canadians who have never lived in *contemporary* Korea. As such, the value of length of residency in the host society, which is often used to position

*yuhaksaeng* as FOB, is shifted to construct long-term *iminja* and second-generation Korean-Canadians as illegitimate speakers of the particular varieties of Korean language and culture. In the interview, as I had learned about the binary between *iminja* and *yuhaksaeng* over the course of my research, I asked Su-bin why the distinction between *iminja* and *yuhaksaeng* mattered to her and what distinguished *iminja* from *yuhaksaeng*.

**Example 10. Interview, Su-bin, (December 20, 2007)**

- 1 Hyunjung: Then how about your friends? Who do you usually hang out with?  
 2 *Yuhaksaeng* or *iminja*?
- 3 Su-bin: *Yuhaksaeng*. (laugh)
- 4 Hyunjung: Why is that?
- 5 Su-bin: (laugh) Uh (.) I do hang out with *iminja* as well but because I  
 6 am *yuhaksaeng* (.) I don't know. There's no particular reason  
 7 but I just have more *yuhaksaeng* friends (laugh).
- 8 Hyunjung: Then is it because there is any difference when you interact  
 9 with *iminja* friends and *yuhaksaeng* friends?<sup>10</sup> Su-bin: Among  
 10 *iminja*, (.) well, (.) not everyone, but **I feel different**  
 11 **from some of them.**
- 12 Hyunjung: What's the difference?
- 13 Su-bin: Um (.) just (.) I don't know (.) something is different. (small  
 14 laugh)
- 15 Hyunjung: Please think hard (laugh).
- 16 Su-bin: (laugh) There is something invisible (.)
- 17 Hyunjung: Umm.
- 18 Su-bin: (.) For example, **some *iminja* have lived here very long**  
 19 you know, and they don't understand when we say "oh, I really  
 20 want to go to Korea."
- 21 Hyunjung: A-ha.
- 22 Su-bin: And with some *yuhaksaeng*, we talk about Korea and about  
 23 parents in Korea, but for *iminja*, they have all their family here  
 24 and it's their country you know. . . . It's like this. When I first  
 25 went for *yuhak*, I felt ***iminja* were a bit *dabdab*** [they were old  
 26 fashioned and didn't fully understand what we were talking about]  
 27 and didn't like them. I think I was influenced by my sister. She didn't  
 28 like *iminja*. . . .
- 29 Hyunjung: What do you mean by *dabdab*?
- 30 Su-bin: Well (.), just something about them (.) they behave *dabdab* (laugh)//
- 31 Hyunjung: //(laughing) Give me an example.
- 32 Su-bin: (laugh) . . . . There's that and, for example, things like language,  
 33 when we talk, **they don't know things like [youth] slang (*eun-eo*)**  
 34 **or they are not trendy (*saeryeondoiji aneun*)**. . . . When I was  
 35 little, that mattered, but now, (.) **unless they are *iminja* like second**

36 **generation**, they all watch things like [Korean TV] programs and  
 37 so (.) **unless I feel they speak really good English**, that doesn't  
 38 really matter.

As represented in line 37 (“speak really good English”), not only incompetence in Korean youth slang but English language proficiency, or “authentic” English ability, is constructed as a salient difference of (long-term) *iminja*, from *yuhaksaeng*. The conversation continued as follows:

1 Hyunjung: When do you feel they speak really good English?  
 2 Su-bin: Well, if their pronunciation is very good **as if [they were] local**  
 3 **people living here**, then I think “Ah, they are long-term ‘*iminja*’”.  
 4 You know, you can't hide things like that. There is a 16-year old  
 5 boy in our volunteer group, who came around the time when he  
 6 was in kindergarten. One night, we hung out till late and said (with  
 7 a hand waving) “let's get ‘call taxi’ (*kol-taek-shi*)” you know  
 (laugh).  
 8 Hyunjung: (laugh)  
 9 Su-bin: Then he suddenly said (.) (in a softer voice) “kol TAK (high pitch)  
 10 XI (rising tone)”? (laugh)  
 11 Hyunjung: (laugh)  
 12 Su-bin: (laughing) So we all mimicked him saying “kol TAK XI (rising  
 13 tone)” and laughed. . . .  
 14 Hyunjung: Why do you think you laughed?  
 15 Su-bin: Um (.) usually among Koreans, (.) I don't know, my friends,  
 16 among Koreans, you don't usually use English, you know.  
 17 Umm (.) but then, he, like saying in pronunciation **like**  
 18 **Native Speakers here**, so it was **unfamiliar** (*natseolda*) to the  
 19 kids. So kids all laughed and I laughed too. (laugh)  
 20 Hyunjung: Hmm.//  
 21 Su-bin: //So it's not bad, but while speaking in Korean, you suddenly  
 22 hear **English in Native Speaker-like pronunciation** (laugh).

On the other hand, “authentic” English ability, particularly pronunciation, constitutes one of the main criteria to distinguish *iminja* from *yuhaksaeng* who are more legitimate Korean than *iminja*. Rather paradoxically, however, the legitimacy of *iminja* as speakers of authentic English is denied based on their Koreanness (or non-Canadianness), only sounding *as if* or *like* a Native Speaker or a local person/Canadian (Line 2-3, Line

17-18). Therefore, when an *iminja* speaks authentic English (or sounds like he or she is speaking authentic English) it achieves a humorous effect, as illustrated in the example of mimicking and laughing at the *iminja* boy's pronunciation of "call taxi." The construction of the *iminja* boy as an illegitimate speaker of authentic English is supported by two linguistic devices (lexicon; pronunciation). First, "call taxi," a Koreanized English expression (or what is known among Koreans as Konglish) referring to a particular type of taxi service operated only by pre-arranged calls—it is common in Korea to hail a taxi on the street by waving a hand—does not constitute legitimate English vocabulary. So it is questionable whether a Native Speaker would actually repeat the lexical item.

Secondly, the way Su-bin mimicked his pronunciation in a high pitch and exaggerated rising tone, which does not sound like an original English word combination (call taxi) nor the Konglish word (*kol taek shi*), indexes the illegitimacy of the lexical item as a legitimate English expression, thereby constructing its speaker, the *iminja* boy (including second-generation Korean-Canadians), as an illegitimate speaker of English. At another interview, Su-bin described second-generation as "interesting" (*sin gi han*) because they are "Koreans but were born in a foreign country," and because "their Korean is awkward (*eo neul han*) although they are Koreans" (Interview, November 15, 2006).

Example 11 represents actual ways in which a new variety of Korean, namely contemporary youth slang, plays a key role in the construction of identity in text messaging among *yuhaksaeng* (line 33-34, Example 10). Ji-hun, a *yuhaksaeng* boy from the volunteer group at the Korean heritage language program where Su-bin also volunteered, was one of her main interlocutors in text messaging. Despite their claimed monolingual practice of using Korean among the *yuhaksaeng* peers, examples from text

messaging data illustrate that it is the linguistic capital as an element of their hybrid bilingual repertoire, that the Korean resources are accorded the symbolic value as stylistic resources in the social categorization process. For *yuhaksaeng* mothers' identity construction is not based on their language, but on cultural practices.

While Yu-bin, the *iminja* participant of this research did not own a cell phone, Yu-ri and Su-bin heavily used text messaging among their peers. Since they had to clear their message box frequently, between November 2006 and February 2007, they periodically sent me the messages saved in their mailboxes in a word file. During the 9 day period between November 25 and December 4 in 2006, for example, Su-bin forwarded me 38 sent messages and at least equal number of received messages. The actual number of messages they exchanged among peers must have been higher than this, since they were not able to save all the messages and reproduce them for me. Se-jun, another *yuhaksaeng* participant who is a boy, did not as heavily use the text messaging as the girls.

In the following example, the bilingual *yuhaksaeng* draw resources from their bilingual repertoire to present their hybrid identity. For example, although the cell phones they use in Toronto do not provide the function to type messages in the Korean alphabet (*hangeul*), they mix English and Korean in their text messaging. Text messages in Korean were written using the romanization of the Korean pronunciation, although "text messaging in English is faster and more convenient (than in Korean)" (Yu-ri, Interview, October 23, 2006). Furthermore, their bilingual text messages represent hybrid forms resulting from language contact. For example, 'kk' presumably is a romanized representation of 'ㄱ ㄱ,' the phonetically equivalent Korean consonant used in



Internet/chat language to index the sound of chuckling. I italicized all romanized Korean alphabets in the transcript below. *Hul* (or *heol*) is a Korean Internet slang, reportedly abbreviated from *heo-geok* (or *heok*), an onomatopoeic sound of breathing when one feels astonished or startled. This term is used to express feelings of surprise, absurdity, speechlessness, or embarrassment.

In my analysis here, I highlight Su-bin's use of the term "anti pho." Pho refers to Vietnamese noodle soup, which is commonly associated with "cheap" Asian food. In Korea, this ethnic food is referred to as Vietnamese noodle (*bae-teu-nam guksu*) or rice noodle (*ssal guksu*). In the Korean diasporic community in Toronto, the term *wolnam guksu* (*wolnam* noodle; *wolnam* is an old-fashioned Sino Korean term to refer to Vietnam) is widely used, particularly among older generations, but still much more widely than in Korea. The term "Pho" is rarely used by monolingual Koreans. "An-ti" is an Internet slang, which was adopted from English prefix "anti," and has gained popularity as a Korean slang through the widespread use of the Internet. It was initially used for social movements against conservative mainstream media under the progressive government of Roh Mu-hyun (2003-2008). For example, many "an-ti Cafés" (Internet Cafes for *an-tis*) or Internet communities were formed to oppose a representative conservative newspaper, *Chosun Ilbo* (e.g., "an-ti Chosun (*Ilbo*)" movement). Among young students, however, the term "anti" is increasingly used to relate to pop stars, such as the term "anti-fans," referring to people who verbally attack a celebrity on Internet discussion forums, or in rather humorous senses, who upload pictures of the star taken at moments when the star was not very presentable. The term is both used as a prefix (e.g.,

*an-ti paen* [fan]) and as a noun (e.g., She has many *an-ti* [fans]; XX [name of a celebrity, meaning XX's] *anti*).

In the example below, Su-bin uses the Korean slang “*anti*” along with Pho (instead of *Wolnam* noodle or Vietnamese noodle), and later uses it as a noun (e.g., became *anti* [Pho]). This signals her cosmopolitan bilingual status--someone who has sophisticated tastes in her choice of cuisine as well as international experience to develop such a taste.

**Example 11. Text message, Su-bin (December 13, 2006-Jan 3, 2007)**

- |         |  |   |
|---------|--|---|
| Ji-hun: | I didn't go to skwl yesterday<br>kk my body stil hurts T.T<br>u ok right?  | I didn't go to school yesterday<br>kk my body still hurts T.T.<br>You are OK, right?  |
| Su-bin: | <i>mom jom ssu shyu..kk</i><br><i>chubgung T~ bab muguru watda</i><br><i>hehe</i>  | My body aches a bit..kk<br>And I'm cold T~ I came [to a<br>restaurant] to eat, hehe.  |
| Ji-hun: | <i>ah na bae go pa.. onle bongsa</i><br><i>hwal dong ol ggu ya? Na onle</i><br>food <i>na nu ju nun gu hal la go</i><br>kk   | Ah, I am hungry.. Are you coming<br>to volunteer today? I'm going to<br>work for serving food today<br>kk   |
| Su-bin: | Im not going today <i>neil test~~</i>  | I'm not going today. I have a test<br>tomorrow~~  |
| Ji-hun: | T.T <i>hal su um ji.. na ppo muk u ru</i><br><i>ga ya ji nal ssi ga chu ul dden ppo</i><br><i>chae go! Christmas da um ju</i><br>Monday <i>in ga?</i>                | T.T That's fine..I'm going to go eat<br>Pho now. When it's cold,<br>Pho is the best [food]! Isn't<br>Christmas next Monday?   |
| Su-bin: | <b>Hul..nan anti pho!!</b> Kk nxt Monday<br><i>ga 25il..ansp[an-seup]</i>  | Hul..I am anti pho!! Kk Next<br>Monday is the 25th. I'm in tears.   |
| Ji-hun: | Ah finally <i>do chak hat da bae go pa</i><br><i>dol a ga si nun jul al at ne kk</i><br>why u hate pho?<br>Taste <i>ga si ru?k nadoo jaju muk</i><br><i>jin an a</i> | Ah, I've finally arrived [at the<br>restaurant]. I nearly starved to death<br>kk Why do you hate Pho?<br>You don't like the taste ?k I don't<br>have it too often either.           |
| Su-bin: | New Zealand <i>ehsu mukdun wolnam</i><br><b>noodle</b> <i>chat get dagu pho yugi jugi</i><br><i>sin ga bwat daga anti dewssu</i><br><b>kk</b>                        | I tried different Pho restaurants [in<br>Toronto] looking for what I had in<br>New Zealand, but I became <b>anti</b><br>(Pho) [I came to hate Pho because<br>they were terrible] kk |
| Ji-hun: | <i>keke gugisu mukdun ge gureke mat</i><br><i>it sut u? na in je bae boo rum..</i>   | Keke was it that good what you had<br>there [in New Zealand]? I'm full  |



activities), how to obtain high marks (e.g., assistance with school assignments and exams, planning timetable, tutoring information), and where to go to get information regarding the college application process, and simply to build social network.

This network helped them to access the expanded peer social network of *yuhaksaeng*, some *iminja*, and other Asian students (notably high-achieving Chinese students) through various school activities, volunteer works, and mutual friends. For example, the girls were invited to a birthday party of a second-generation Korean boy with whom they had not heavily socialized before. Su-bin was invited to join a study group, to be formed by a Chinese immigrant boy she was close to at school. In addition, they obtained information through peers about college admissions information session offered by a Korean-Canadian student association at the University of Toronto. In fall of 2006, I attended this information session with the girls. Their cultural capital associated with their (upper-)middle class upbringing (playing musical instruments, being good at sports [skiing, snowboarding] as well as singing and dancing, previous studies in New Zealand, etc.) eased their entry to the school band, ski club, and socializing in various venues.

One of the Korean peer social networks was built through their volunteer work as teaching aides at a Korean heritage language program (*hangeul hakgyo*). Arriving in Canada near their last year in high school, the girls (and their mother) felt that time was short to accumulate all the necessary resources for college admissions and believed that volunteer work would be the only distinction they could make in their qualifications. Because they are on a student visa, they are not allowed to work part-time and thus not

able to acquire work-related experiences<sup>23</sup>. Initially, the girls went to the Korean program in summer of 2006 to complete their school community service requirements, but through the contacts they built during the summer, they were asked to continue to volunteer throughout the following academic year. Their competence in Korean language and culture was a big asset at the Korean school; there tends to be only a limited number of *yuhaksaeng* in each volunteer cohort. Their volunteer cohort consisted of six *yuhaksaeng* and about ten *iminja*, and they regularly met for birthday parties and other activities along with the teacher.

As the teacher at the Korean school, a long-term immigrant, reports below, stylishly dressed and good looking, the girls were “popular” among the students. One of the roles of the volunteer aides was playing the leader role conducting class activities (e.g., game):

***Example 12. Interview, Teacher at a Korean heritage language school (June 13, 2007)***

Teacher: They are very good at playing such a facilitator role. And they have some natural attraction. The kids all love them, calling them “pretty sisters.” When a male volunteer gives the kids instructions, they tend to sit back and don’t care, but when Yu-ri and Su-bin tell them (changing to the girlish, affable tone in a high pitch) “let’s do this,” all the kids happily follow them.

Although this volunteer effort did not directly help them, in the end, with the college admission, they were able to network with a group of *iminja* peers (and the teacher) through this activity. The network in turn helped the sisters to maintain their popularity among the *yuhaksaeng* peers by sharing key information with them. For example, Yu-ri introduced two of her *yuhaksaeng* friends to the teacher so they could

---

<sup>23</sup> At times, their mother arranged some community service activities for the girls through her own contacts within the Korean community such as feeding service at a local hospital which she was told would look good on applications to the Life Science program. All these resume building efforts, however, turned out not to be vital to college admission as the information was not requested on the applications.

volunteer at the school as well, which they believed, at that time, would help with their college admission.

Example 13 below further illustrates that investment in coolness is also a way to secure middle class cultural capital for their future trajectories. In the interview with Yu-ri's mother shortly after the girls entered the university, she told me about her socializing with a Korean immigrant woman who are married to a Canadian man. Then she commented on the horseback riding course that she began to take with the girls. I asked why they chose that particular activity.

**Example 13. Interview, Yu-ri's mother (October 5, 2007)**

- Mother:           Something they can learn locally (*hyeonji-eseo*), **the kind of sports the locals do, not things like tennis or badminton**, you know.
- Hyunjung:       Why do you think it would be helpful for the girls to learn the kind of sports the locals enjoy?
- Mother:           [They] love animals so much. (.) When they go [to do the horseback riding], they pat the horse [on the back] and it's expensive in Korea. (.) And I've also heard that it's important here, like even at work, things like **teamwork** is important, so [you need to] get along with people (.) if you're not good at that, (.) only being good at work/study is not enough. . . .
- Hyunjung:       Who tells you about these things? The couple you met yesterday?
- Mother:           Yeah, and also **on the Internet**, things like XXX (the name of an online discussion forum service for transnational Koreans offered by a representative Korean Internet Portal site), you know. They say that. Those who have lived in the U.S. (.) of course most are personal opinions, but if you read through the stories posted, you can get a broader picture. A-ha, someone had earlier said something about the same issue from a different perspective, but this person looks at it this way.

As illustrated, user-defined or generated knowledge circulated through cyber space such as Internet Cafés among transnational Koreans play a key role in the circulation (and sometime production) of discourse among *jogi yuhak* families.

***Conclusion: Translingualism***

This chapter has examined how the growing presence of *jogi yuhak* students in Toronto and subsequent competition over access to resources within Korean diasporic communities has led to tensions and social divisions between old and new migrants, and how in this process a new cosmopolitan identity of *yuhaksaeng* has emerged among transnational migrant adolescents in Toronto. The analysis highlighted ways in which *yuhaksaeng* employed a new variety of Korean language and culture as stylistic resources to contest the subject positions of “FOB” and “Nerd” in the dominant racial discourse in North America, and carve out a new position of “Cool.” In doing so, *yuhaksaeng* transformed the meaning of Koreanness as an index of globality and contemporariness, as opposed to “backward” Korean diasporic community in Toronto as well as “backward” Canada/New Zealand.

I argue that the global circulations of discourses, resources, and people in the new economy, associated with technological development (cf. Appadurai, 1996), contribute to what I call “translingualism,” whereby local linguistic resources are assigned non-referential indexical meanings, which is global. That is, it is through the use of Korean language and culture, rather than English, that *yuhaksaeng* index their global cosmopolitan identity. Such reordering in the symbolic value of each of the linguistic resources in their hybrid repertoires indicates how language ideologies might affect language change, challenging the essentialist ideology of language and identity. Yet, creative deployment of resources to ascribe new subject position by *yuhaksaeng* is constrained by their social positioning, both as urban, (upper) middle class transnational migrants and as ethnolinguistic minority in North America. In addition, it is the Korean

language as an element of their bilingual repertoire that came to represent their global, cosmopolitan identities. Furthermore, it is not languages but linguistic resources that are reordered in their bilingual repertoires (cf. Blommaert, 2003). Namely, it is not the reordering of the symbolic value of Korean language and English language that happens in translanguaging, but particular varieties of Korean language (i.e., contemporary youth slang) and a particular variety of English (i.e., ESL in the North American context) that are shifted.

Yet, styling “cool” through Korean language and culture has reportedly resulted in contradiction in ways which present limits to *yuhaksaeng*’s acquisition of forms of English capital valued in the Canadian market. How *yuhaksaeng* dealt with these contradictions with what consequences is what I examine in the next chapter.



**Chapter 4:**  
**Ambivalent Calculation:**  
**The Language Education Industry and Strategies**  
**of Linguistic Investment of *Yuhaksaeng***

*Introduction*

This chapter explores how *yuhaksaeng* dealt with the tension between investment in “cool” Korean practices (Chapter 3) and subsequent constraints to authentic English capital acquisition, and the results of those strategies. The discussion focuses on how habitus (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) and language ideologies (e.g., Irvine & Gal, 2000) inform their linguistic investment. The chapter begins with a discussion of ways in which participants’ understanding of the meanings and goals of *jogi yuhak* were negotiated not only by the local reality in Toronto and that of Korea, but by imagined future trajectories that go beyond both the Canadian and the Korean market. Since *yuhaksaeng* learned, through linguistic and racial stigmatization they experienced in their Canadian schools, that the twofold goals of admission to a prestigious university and acquisition of authentic English were not always compatible, they chose to invest in acquiring university admission. In this process, they constructed University of Toronto as a new symbolic capital to be pursued as an index of “success.”

The rest of the chapter illustrates how subsequent acquisition of educational and linguistic capital by *yuhaksaeng* was shaped through encounters with the local/transnational (language) education industry. In terms of their linguistic investment, *yuhaksaeng* focused on acquiring English credentials required for acceptance to universities, rather than “authentic” English. Their strategies sometimes resulted in successful admittance to a desired university, but often did not result in graduation, as

*yuhaksaeng* dropped out and returned to Korea. Access to English credentials was provided through an expanding network of “buy-a-credit” schools and tutoring agencies, which sprung up in response to the growing population of *jogi yuhak* students.

Before I move to the next section, I would like to caution that I do not mean to make the assumption of a zero sum relationship between investment in aspects of Korean-ness and acquisition of authentic English by *yuhaksaeng*. My argument is that the kind of hybrid bilingualism *yuhaksaeng* possessed (Chapter 3) were not recognized as legitimate language at their school, where monolingual, “standard academic language” (Coulmas, 2005, p. 215, as quote in Garcia, 2009, p. 35) is typically constructed as valuable forms of linguistic capital. To the extent that legitimate language is defined by the dominant group and is thus reflective of the variety of language they speak, linguistic minority students’ access to valuable forms of school language is constrained by their social position. Furthermore, “authentic” English is an ideological construct and as such, it is difficult to determine how to define and measure its mastery. Therefore, ideas held by the speakers of the social value of their (and others’) linguistic utterance significantly informs their language practices, and hence their investment in language learning. Subsequently, in the analysis of *yuhaksaeng*’s language learning trajectories in this chapter, emphasis is placed on what resources they gain or lose, what happens to their bilingual repertoires through such practices, and how they make sense of their practices.

To begin with, as the backdrop to the analysis that follows, commodification of language in the transnational “(language) education industry” is discussed.

***The Transnational Language Education Industry  
and the Commodification of Language***

The thrust of *jogi yuhak* students in the global scene has witnessed the emergence of social institutions responding to their transnational activities, what I call “transnational (language) education industry” (see, for example, Waters [2003, p. 165] for a brief comment on the “education industry” for “Satellite Kids” in Vancouver such as home-stay agencies). Representative institutions for this emerging industry regarding *jogi yuhak* include international student programs at school boards<sup>24</sup> as well as related governmental bodies in the public sector. In the private sector, these representative institutions include *yuhak* agencies, tutoring agencies, and various forms of private schools including “buy-a-credit” schools.

Frequently, the public and private sectors are closely working together. For example, the industry sector hosts major promotion fairs with schools and embassies, for which representatives from school boards, (private) schools, and relevant public institutions travel to source countries for recruitment and promotion. In addition, agents from *yuhak* agencies often connect students with the school boards or private schools individually. In Seoul, two major *yuhak* fairs are held annually (in Spring and Fall). The public and private sectors often merged as the players in such events. For example, in an advertising brochure of *jogi yuhak* to Canada produced by a representative *yuhak* agency in Seoul, recommendation comments are provided by the director of the Canadian Education Centre Korea, the director of an international program at a major Canadian school board, and the executive director of an elite private high school in Canada.

---

<sup>24</sup> For Toronto public schools, for example, international students (students studying in Canada on student visas) must work with the international programs of their school boards regarding applications, initial orientations, and school transfer, while principals of a limited numbers of schools which accept international students determine how many international students they will actually take.

What is called the “*yuhak* industry” in Korea has developed since the early 1980s from small-scale *yuhak* agencies (*yuhakwon*), which mainly offered services regarding obtaining school admission and visas. Following the “act of liberalization of overseas traveling and *yuhak*” in 1981, the *yuhak* industry began to emerge. By 1992, about 40 *yuhak* agencies established the Korean Association of Overseas Educational Counseling Institutes, which was later renamed “KOSA” ([www.kosa.or.kr](http://www.kosa.or.kr)). The *jogi yuhak* market has been forming since the mid-1990s (Interview, Seoul-based agency B, June 21, 2007). The “act of liberalization of *jogi yuhak*” in 2000 was followed by an exponential growth of the market. As of 2007, nearly 800 *yuhak* agencies (a moderate estimate) exist nationwide; KOSA, as the only national association of individual *yuhak* agencies, has 130 registered member agencies (Interview, Seoul-based agency B, July 11, 2009). The “enterprising” of the industry in recent years has produced several major *yuhak* agencies located in glamorous high-rise buildings in upscale Gangnam area of Seoul. They offer a wider ranges of services in an increasingly transnational scope.

For example, services offered at a representative *yuhak* agency in Seoul include: formal (*jeonggyu*) *yuhak* and language-study abroad (i.e., ESL) for post-secondary students, *jogi yuhak* and short-term English camps for pre-university students of varying ages, home-stay and travel arrangements, tutoring services, and on-line education. Each of these services is provided by their in-house subsidiary companies. Furthermore, these major agencies are opening an increasing number of local outlets in destination cities in order to offer more customized and long-term services for their clients employing agents with local knowledge and experience. While these major agencies offer “products” targeting most of the popular *jogi yuhak* destinations, severe competition in the market

simultaneously produced agencies targeting niche markets such as the “Canada-specialized” (Canada *jeonmun*) *yuhak* agency. Toronto-based *yuhak* agencies tend to be of much smaller scale than those in Seoul, and are mostly run by 1-2 individuals. At a few major ones in Toronto, however, services offered for “total-care management” range from airport pick-up and settlement services, home-stay and guardian arrangements, tutoring and after-school activity arrangements, and arranging TOEFL tests, to school transfer and visa renewal. For example, personnel at a representative Toronto-based *yuhak* agency consists of 4 agents in charge of business related to ESL for college students, 2 agents for home-stay/travel, and 2 others in the *jogi yuhak* section (Interview, Toronto-based agency A, June 13, 2007). In addition, major local agencies increasingly collaborate with major Seoul-based agencies mainly to gain legitimacy in marketing.

Transformation in the business sector, with the increasingly transnational nature of the services offered, in turn contributes to the shifting patterns of *jogi yuhak*. For instance, while Canada is commonly reported as more popular than Australia as a *jogi yuhak* destination, at one of the major *yuhak* agencies in Seoul, Australia-bound *jogi yuhak* outnumbered Canada-bound ones due to the expertise of the employees. As the agent-interviewee of the institution reported: “We are strong in Australia, because we have well-established local network” (Interview, Seoul-based agency C, June 20, 2007). Collaboration with local public educational institutions also contributes to the market shift such as the recent increase in “short-term (*dangi*)” *yuhak*. According to the information I obtained from the *yuhak* agencies in Seoul, within Canada, Vancouver school boards are particularly active in collaborative promotion of their programs with the the industry sector. The flexible and tailored services offered by industry participation

within the public sector has resulted in “short-term” English programs, which formerly typically took place in private language schools, taking place at public schools. In the past 2-3 years, “short-term” *yuhak* has rapidly become popular among increasingly younger students in Korea. Example 1, extracted from an interview with an administrator/agent at a representative *yuhak* agency in Seoul, offers a glimpse of how this happens.

***Example 1. Interview, agent, Seoul-based agency A (June 21, 2007)***

Hyunjung: So, you mean Vancouver houses more *yuhaksaeng* per capita [than Toronto]?

Agent: That’s right. The *yuhak* industry in Vancouver, merchandising, (.) such as related programs or landing service, and other services are well merchandised as a product. [So it’s] easy to work (.) And school boards and schools closely work together [with us]. . . .

Hyunjung: Could you give an example of what you mean by the product (*sangpum*)?

Agent: For instance, there is a three-month short-term program, co-merchandised by XXX [name of a school board in Vancouver] school board and a *yuhak* agency (*yuhakwon*), a package with total cost including tuition, guardian fees, and fees for extra activities.

With the emergence of the transnational language education industry, the commodification of language becomes salient both as a skill and commodity—a phenomenon which I turn to next.


***Language as Skills and Commodity at Transnational Yuhak and Tutoring Agencies***

Examples offered in this section illustrate how the corporatization of education along with the emergence of the (language) education industry is tied in with the commodification of language. In a document produced by a Toronto-based *yuhak* agency (Example 2), the meaning of “success” of *jogi yuhak* is equated with admission to elite universities; English abilities (including test scores such as TOEFL and SAT) are

constructed as one of the key skills to reach that goal with respect to its value in obtaining university admission (and hence increasing the social mobility of the individual):

**Example 2. Handout distributed by a Toronto-based agency at a seminar for *jogi yuhak* parents (May 21, 2008, my translation)**

Three standards for successful *yuhak*



The next two examples are produced in English by a leading English tutoring agency (*hakwon*) in Toronto. This tutoring agency was established in Toronto by a Korean whose father ran a successful *hakwon* business in Korea. Their clientele includes local Chinese and Korean students (both immigrants and *yuhaksaeng*) as well as short-term ESL students from Korea. In these texts, language, particularly English (as implied by the term “universal” in Example 3), is constructed as a key skill for mobility in the age of globalization towards a “successful future” in general (Example 3) or Ivy League universities more specifically (Example 4). As represented in Example 4, in this context, the construction of language as a skill (i.e., something one must be good at/must master) simultaneously represents commodification (e.g., an SAT or TOEFL score as a particular

credentialized form of linguistic competence) because such skills are presumably acquired in exchange for the tuition fee for the course.

***Example 3. Advertising material, English tutoring agency in Toronto (italics added)***

Open the Door to Your Future

In this day and age, our world is closer than ever. The key to this closeness is *the universal ability to communicate*. Learning new language is not only beneficial to the present, but is *the gateway to a successful future*.

***Example 4: Advertising brochure, English tutoring agency in Toronto***

SAT/SSAT Summer & Winter Intensive Camps

Are the SAT or SSAT scores the only thing missing from letting you enter the school of your dreams? We have the courses suited, not only for those who need to take the SAT and SSAT tests, but for those students who want to *master* them. . . . The continuous and intensive training that our camps offer allow our students to master the knowledge they need to score in the top percentile of these tests. Each class, we not only offer *new skills*, but provide timed practice tests, in order for the student to push themselves to the limit, and improve almost immediately. . . . We offer *tours to various prestigious IVY League school* [sic.] in the U.S.A. This not only allows students to have a good time with new friends, but shows the students *what exactly they are working so hard for*. Our Ivy League school visits inform, and most of all motivate the students to maximize their efforts.

Furthermore, with the increased presence of short-term *jogi yuhak* students, some major English tutoring agencies in Seoul open local branches in *jogi yuhak* destinations. They offer courses for areas that are reportedly known to pose an obstacle for students upon their return migration to assist them in catching up with their Korean peers. Math is one of the popular subjects offered at such institutions because the math curriculum in Korean schools is more advanced than the one found in most Western schools (which is why Korean students are known for being good at math at their local schools). As for English, test preparation courses, vocabulary, and grammar are popular. Such increase in transnational ties among educational business sectors is not limited to Korea. In the



Toronto context, the growing number of international students from increasingly varied source-countries such as PRC, Iran, and Russia have produced private educational institutions not with Korea-Canada ties, but nevertheless attended by Korean students: “buy-a-credit” schools.

### ***Credentialized Bilingualism as a Commodity at “Buy-a-credit” Schools***

In what is known among students and some educators as “buy-a-credit” or “credit” schools, language is literally commodified in the form of educational credentials that may be purchased by paying additional tuition. These refer to a particular type of accredited private high school in which courses are offered for a 2-3 month period. Among students I interacted with, these schools were referred to as “credit” schools. Except for the occasions where the term “credit” schools is used by participants themselves, I use the term “buy-a-credit” school. For this term appears to better capture the derogatory connotation of such schools as expressed by both educators (of more prestigious institutions) and students, regarding the generous marks reportedly obtained from these schools in return for payment of a relatively high tuition fee per course.

As represented in this naming practice, rather than its official category of a private high school, “buy-a-credit” schools are constructed as illegitimate educational institutions by students and by the educators as *business* institutions. Example 5 is extracted from advertising material produced by a Seoul-based *yuhak* agency. Among the four different types of schools available in Canada as represented in this material, namely public schools, private schools, elite private schools, and international schools, “buy-a-credit” schools are best associated with international schools. While descriptions of elite private high schools are represented with terms such as “strict regulation and curriculum” and

“high academic achievement,” emphasizes on the characteristics of international schools are placed on their flexibility associated with meeting academic requirements in an easy and fast way and, hence, are presumably of lower quality.

**Example 5: *Joi yuhak brochure, Seoul-based yuhak agency (my translation)***

International schools are mainly for immigrants or *yuhaksaeng* in Canada . . . [and] is good for *jogi yuhak* students who would like to accumulate their required credits within a short-period of time. For students who left *jogi yuhak* rather late, such as in Grade 11 or 12, it might be very difficult to complete the credit requirements as well as to obtain a good TOEFL score and good marks. Intensive language programs or expedited credit acquisition at international schools will help them to better adjust to the new environment and make their study easy.

In the next example produced by a “buy-a-credit” school, the perceived illegitimacy is indirectly reproduced by their efforts to construct themselves as legitimate educational institutions. Example 6 is taken from the website of one of the representative “buy-a-credit” schools in Toronto. In this text, the construction of the school’s legitimacy is garnered by focussing on their accredited status within the government sector. They include their accreditation number and highlight their recognition by universities both in and outside of Canada, their high academic standards and advanced pedagogical practices, and the high performance of their students entering university.

**Example 6: “Buy-a-credit” School Website**

About XXX [name of the school]

Established in YYY [year], XXX is a *fully registered and accredited* secondary school inspected by the Ontario Ministry of Education and Training (*Official Training Number: \_\_\_\_\_* [number offered]). We employ *the latest pedagogical methods and technological aids* to provide students with *superior* educational opportunities. XXX is a vibrant academic and social community, boasting *the highest North American standards* through a collaborative effort from teachers and students alike. Our reasonable tuition fee enables you to make your dream come true at a considerably

low cost. *Our credits are recognized by all American and Canadian universities and colleges. Since our inception, over 10,000 students from over 30 countries have graduated from XXX and successfully entered many famous universities and colleges in Canada and the United States. In addition, over 20% of our graduates are offered universities' Entrance Scholarships each year.*

(retrieved from website of the school, italics added)

In what follows, I discuss how these shifts in the education industry contribute to tensions and contradictions in *yuhaksaeng*'s strategies for English capital acquisition. These tensions and contradictions concern the increased flexibility both in the criteria and means for gaining access to the linguistic competence needed to meet the academic demands required for their future studies, as well as their ambivalent positions.

***Playing Multiple Games: Negotiating the Meanings of “Success” in Jogi Yuhak***

This section concerns the second set of contradictions observed in *yuhaksaeng* practices: Contrary to their claimed goal of *jogi yuhak* to gain “better” (or what they believe to be more humanistically oriented) education in Canadian schools while learning English, *yuhaksaeng* are observed to continue to invest in tutoring activities in their Korean networks oriented toward obtaining university admission. This practice is ironic because most *yuhaksaeng* and their parents criticized the emphasis on university admission in the Korean system they left behind. For *yuhaksaeng*, such practices are strategies to deal with the tensions and ambivalence they feel regarding their future trajectories, as a result of linguistic and racial stigmatization experienced in the local Toronto context (see Chapter 3) and subsequent limits to English capital acquisition. Conversely, their practices render *yuhaksaeng* susceptible to criticism not only by Korean immigrants as discussed in the previous chapter, but by “mainstream” Canadian educators, albeit implicitly.

To better illustrate ways in which *yuhaksaeng*'s limited access to "authentic" English capital in their Canadian schools and subsequent investment in the acquisition of English credentials interact with racialized linguistic ideologies, the analysis underscores "institutionalized" racism, namely, racism as systemic and institutionalized rather than mere individual prejudice (Henry & Tator, 2005; Kubota, 2002). Although *race* is a socially-constructed category, it produces racialized social structures, which reinforce white privilege and are maintained and reproduced by the dominant race who materially benefit from it (Bonilla-Silva, 2003). For example, in educational settings, racism is often institutionalized as "everyday values" and "normal" practices in curriculum, teaching and test materials, and attitudes and assumptions of educators, which do not adequately reflect the history and experiences of racial minority students (Cummins, 2001; Henry & Tator, 2005).

Data offered below illustrate how "Canadian" educators tend to attribute these unwittingly marginalizing practices of *yuhaksaeng* (i.e., investing in tutoring activities and "Korean" practices) to their seeking their future in Korea, and ultimately construct *yuhaksaeng* as illegitimate students in Canadian schools. For example, in May 2008, I met with three counselors who work with international students at a major school board in Toronto. In a group interview, they discussed the practices of Korean students as these were reported to them by school personnel. These practices include: (1) "hurry-up" aspect regarding their desire to go through the system quickly (as is the case with other international students who pay high fees), (2) very strong post-secondary aspirations, (3) spending so much time communicating in Korean with peers, and (4) rushing to meet with their tutors for after-school activities, while unwilling to take advantage of support

provided by teachers at school or classroom activities to speak English. As one counselor cautiously commented, mindful of overgeneralization: “10-15 years ago, the Korean students we saw had very, very strong academic sense of direction,” whereas today they observe greater cross section of students including students who “are here for different purposes” (Interview, May 20, 2008, Fieldnotes<sup>25</sup>).

Similarly, Example 7 below is illustrative of how *yuhaksaeng* are positioned by well-meaning “Canadian” educators only as temporary sojourners, whose future presumably does not reside in Canada. Subsequently, albeit mitigated to avoid generalization by repeated comments such as “not everyone is academic, right?,” *yuhaksaeng* are constructed as a “problem.” That is, *yuhaksaeng* appear to be driven to obtain university admissions only, excessively hanging out with fellow *yuhaksaeng*, and lack in academic endeavor in their Canadian classrooms. The interviewee, Penny, was a 2<sup>nd</sup> generation Korean-Canadian, a Korean-English bilingual. She had been seconded for two years from her teaching job to a counselor position at the international student program in the same board. The interview was conducted in English and centered around her experience working with Korean *yuhaksaeng* and their parents at the program:

***Example 7. Interview, Penny, Korean-Canadian teacher (July 02, 2008)***

- Hyunjung: When you say students want to succeed, what do you mean by success?  
 Penny: Well, my interpretation of success is different from theirs, right?  
 Hyunjung: What are theirs?  
 Penny: For me, I look at it as a person as a whole, right?  
 Hyunjung: U-huh.  
 Penny: But (.) for THEM (.) the success (.), the actual (.) uh (.) tangency of the success is getting into university. That’s how they see it. So whether they care for the university or not, **as long as they get**

---

<sup>25</sup> This interview was not recorded upon the interviewees’ request. The data is extracted from my fieldnotes taken during and after the interview.

**the LETTER of acceptance, that's the most important thing for them, right?** And that's not what I consider as successFUL as a teacher. So there's a huge gap in between.

I went on to ask if she would have any thoughts on the reported division between immigrants and *yuhaksaeng* that we had earlier chatted about at an informal gathering:

- Penny: Well, I could see why there could be a division, because their agendas are different, right? And then, I guess their goals are different.
- Hyunjung: Could you elaborate more on that? How are they different?
- Penny: I can only speak academically. But (.) **immigrant students here**, if they (inaudible), right? This, (.) what they do, how they act, who they hang out with, how they study, it's all (.) **investing into future in Canada, right? Whereas (.) international students, (.) it's just part (.) of their life (.) here**, so their (inaudible) is one thing, of course not everybody is academic, right? So therefore, (.) how they (.) act and who they hang out, (.) for immigrants, it's very important, but (.) for a lot of (.) uh (.) for a lot of (.) international students, **that's not important (.) as much as (.) the goal.**
- Hyunjung: Their goal to be getting their university acceptance letter? Is that what you mean?
- Penny: Yeah, and also a lot of them, even though that may be their goal, a lot of international students, sometimes they CAN be (.) they can be swayed into different directions, right?
- Hyunjung: (laughing) Like what?
- Penny: (laugh) Well, uh, (.) not everyone is as I said academic, so therefore, there are students who come because they are sent, right? Not because they want to study. So their direction can be different, right? Not too academic. So therefore for them (.) socializing is important for them (.) uh (.) day to day (.) uh (.) life here (.) is important, is challenging, right? So therefore, uh (.) if you have immigrant students hanging out with THOSE students right, whose academic is not their priority, I can understand why parents would say (.) OK you know what you need to (.) maybe hang out with somebody else.

Penny was reported by several *yuhaksaeng* mothers whom I met to be extremely sympathetic and supportive of *yuhaksaeng*. I felt the same way with all school board interviewees. Nevertheless, their understandings of the goals, motivations, and trajectories of *yuhaksaeng*, which inform such practices as investing in university

admissions and tutoring activities rather than school activities, significantly diverge from those of *yuhaksaeng* themselves, which I turn to next.

***Sanctions, Ambivalence, and Strategies of Maximization of Capital Accumulation***

The discussion in this section highlights that for *yuhaksaeng*, it is their very sense of ambivalence and indeterminacy in their future trajectories, rather than a determined prospect of returning to Korea, that distinguishes them from immigrants. Indeed, as their migration from the beginning was motivated instead to become “global leaders,” their imagined future trajectories go beyond the binary of either staying in Canada or going back to Korea, to include moving to another English-speaking country, notably to the U.S., if necessary. Accordingly, they need to orient their linguistic and educational investment to position themselves advantageously in multiple global markets, which turns out to be difficult to negotiate from the peripheral positions of *yuhaksaeng*. In this process, they learn that their initial goals of admission to a prestigious university and acquisition of authentic English are not always compatible given the time constraints. Consequently, the best strategy they figure is to maximize the capital acquisition while in Canada, so they can flexibly respond to the demands of different markets. As such, they negotiate the meanings of “success” of *jogi yuhak* from learning authentic English to admittance to a prestigious university.

Their sense of ambivalence results from several related factors: (1) discrimination and sanctions experienced in Toronto through racial and linguistic stigmatization, and subsequent anxiety over successful acquisition of desired linguistic and educational capital; (2) uncertainty in anticipated profit (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) from a Canadian degree outside of the Canadian market, given the “U.S.-supremacy” in the Korean *hakbeol*

system as well as perceived devaluation of *jogi yuhak* capital relating to the recent increase in migration; and (3) their sense of possession of material and symbolic resources to relocate themselves to another market if necessary (as opposed to some immigrants who have no option but to stay in Canada).

First, in contrast to their initial assumption that English will *naturally* improve through *jogi yuhak*, their access to authentic English was constrained relating to their ethnolinguistic minority status in the host society at the individual social practice level (Chapter 3). At the institutional level, placement in “ESL” classes poses another barrier to their English capital accumulation. For “ESL” does not represent authentic English to *yuhaksaeng* and their families (i.e., there are no “Canadian” students in ESL classrooms and they sense a lack of symbolic power of the variety of English learned in ESL classes). As such, even for those who initially came for short-term *yuhak*, which is more oriented toward acquisition of English capital rather than educational credentials, when to return to Korea is not an easy decision to make. For what constitutes the mastery of authentic English is not clear. For parents who do not have the linguistic capability to make such a judgement, it is often associated with completion of ESL classes or children’s ability to successfully handle academic demands on their own (i.e. without tutoring support and yet achieving high academic standing). Further stay in Toronto to develop English ability without necessarily envisioning post-secondary education therein, however, is risky because it could jeopardize the students’ chances of entering “good” universities in Korea upon return. In addition, by the time they will have spent a few years in the new schools in Toronto, the students might not want to return to Korea and go through another readjustment.



And yet, settling in Canada (in which case it would be wise for them to become landed immigrants) does not appear to provide too attractive an option for *jogi yuhak* families either. As educated (upper) middle class Koreans, these parents are unwilling to subject themselves to the marginal social position that the host society is presumably ready to offer them. In this sense, unlike traditional immigrants, *yuhaksaeng* and their families might belong to what Conradson and Latham (2005) call “middling transmigrants” (as quoted in Block, 2006, p. 202), whose migration is motivated to concentrate on one particular activity, namely, acquisition of educational and linguistic capital. But the value of Canadian university degrees in the Korean market is not yet proven, given the U.S. hegemony in the Korean *hakbeol* system (see Chapter 2). Furthermore, it is common for *yuhaksaeng* to come with siblings, so coordinating arrangements that work best for all the children is another challenge. Subsequently, constant shifts and modifications in the initial plan had to be made contingent upon the local realities as to their imagined future trajectories in multiple global markets.

Example 8 is illustrative of the points that have been discussed. The excerpt is taken from the same interview with a group of *yuhaksaeng* mothers represented in Chapter 3.

***Example 8: Interview, Yuhaksaeng Parents Group (May 2, 2008)***

Mother 1: At first, I was going to put him into boarding [a boarding school] after spending about two years together. But we have changed the plan.

Hyunjung: Why is that?

Mother 1: Well, I think I misjudged in Seoul. I thought, because my son was academically high-achieving, he would be able to finish ESL requirement within a year. But that was not the case. So if he goes to boarding, it costs about 50,000, or between 40,000 and 50,000 dollars, you know? If we spend that much money, then what he gets in return [with limited English proficiency], (.) how do I say this, like (.) benefit of the study, falls short of the expectation.

- Rather, I thought he could go to a public school which costs only about 10,000 dollars, and I could separately [offer] at home//
- Mother 2: //sagyoyuk
- Mother 1: *sagyouk*, then that could meet the need more or less. And we have been *yuhaksaeng* [on student visa] but now my son grew up, and if he doesn't go to boarding (. . .), my second one, now she doesn't want to go back to Korea.
- Hyunjung: Is that right?
- Mother 1: Yes, initially, we came [to Canada] for the son, but now it seems that we need to focus on the little one. . . . She studies hard and enjoys what she does, so she said, if we don't have any financial concern, she would like to go to university here. So we are now considering immigration.
- Hyunjung: What do you mean by immigration, only getting the permanent residency or does your husband actually consider to move to join you here?
- Mother 1: For now, it's a little hard [for him to move], but perhaps later. Well, for the moment, it is not likely that we [my kids] return to Korea. **We are not sure yet whether my children will go to universities in the U.S. or here.** But whether or not they graduate from universities here or in the U.S., it is not likely for them to go back to Korea. So, whether we should only leave the children here and I go back to Korea, or my husband **sacrifice** and come to join here, we don't know yet. So for the time being, he probably continues to work in Korea and travels back and forth. . . . They [*iminja*] say, why we need to send children to *hakwon* and things like that, but we feel busy [pressed for time] (laugh together). . . . We came in the middle [i.e., was not born and grew up in Canada], we feel our English proficiency is relatively low. And my children were already high achieving students in Korea so they don't want to feel behind [in their Canadian schools]. **We came here to become the head, the leader,** and so if they don't get as good grade here [as they did in Korea]. . . . They say if you work at a factory here, you're paid less than 2,000 dollars a month. And after tax, it will be much lesser. So they [*iminja*] say why we have to spend 40-50 dollars per hour for children's English tutoring, when they will learn English naturally after all. But *because we don't know* how things will unfold, while we are here, we need to make the most out of it. For example, if you came [for *jogi yuhak*] thinking of one year, you soon learn **that English doesn't improve that fast.** So those mothers who are only staying for two years or so, they feel pressed [for time]. You need to ensure that the children's English is good enough so they don't lose it even when they go back to Korea.

Mother 1 went on to comment that her husband in Korea did not welcome the idea of applying for permanent residency, but wanted her to come back to Korea once the

children enter the universities. He was willing to provide additional material resources to pay high international fees and additional expenses in the meantime. For the children, however, Canadian citizenship would constitute a valuable cultural and symbolic capital, should they stay in Canada (or in the U.S.) and want to be successful in the “mainstream” society:

Mother 1: First of all, in terms of cost, [we pay] 12,000 dollars per year for tuition for public schools, so, it’s already (.) if you have two kids, without including living cost, you save about 20,000 dollars per year. . . . So, there are many who think of it as **purchasing** the permanent residency. And it also provides some **sense of stability** for children. Both mothers and children feel a little in limbo. We are neither Koreans nor Canadians. When I discussed applying for permanent residency with my kids, they were very positive. They said even if I don’t necessarily live here with them [after they enter universities], if they go to medical schools or law schools, there are some disadvantages [for *yuhaksaeng*]. If one wants **to move up to a high level**, there are things parents should support [such as obtaining citizenship].

As illustrated, while citizenship is commodified for these transnational migrants as a capital to better access material and symbolic resources available in the Canadian market, it is also an identity marker presumably to increase their sense of belonging to the host society (i.e, they might feel more “Canadian” if they obtain permanent residency). The conversation continued as I asked for further elaboration on the mothers’ previous comment on their feeling distinct from *iminja*.

Mother 1: I feel a little sorry to say this, but the way the Korean community looks at us is not quite welcoming but rather cold, as you know. I hope they could change that. If they continue to look at us from that perspective, **many will soon leave for the U.S.** Now, Koreans can travel to the U.S. with no visa<sup>26</sup> and with the high Canadian dollars, and Canadian universities are not well recognized in Korea. Well, look at this new government. **Is**

---

<sup>26</sup> Korea has been a visa waiver program country for the U.S. since November 2008, which was announced earlier in the year.

**there any graduate from a Canadian university in Lee Myung-bak administration?** All are [from] U.S. universities.

As the reproduction of the belief in the symbolic power of U.S. degrees in the above interaction illustrates, ideological construction of U.S.-supremacy in the Korean *hakbeol* system has material consequences: the majority of Korean elites are U.S. educated, who in turn are likely to further reinforce the symbolic power of U.S. educational capital.

Anxiety over anticipated profit from the Canadian credentials in the Korean market is further exacerbated by *yuhaksaeng* and their families' sense of decrease in the value of *jogi yuhak*, given recent exponential growth in migration. Whereas ten years ago, for example, *jogi yuhak* itself could guarantee privileged access to jobs and opportunities in Korea, it has become "something like a trend in Korea" (Interview, *yuhaksaeng* parents group, May 2008). This means increased presence of fluent Korean-English bilinguals returning from various *jogi yuhak* destinations, not to mention graduates from new elite high schools in Korea who tend to attend U.S. Ivy League universities. Therefore, what kind of *jogi yuhak* now matters in terms of what counts as *legitimate* authentic English obtained from it. Given their experience of limited access to authentic English in Toronto as well as their lack in Korean *hakbeol* (as opposed to elite high schools graduates), *yuhaksaeng* in Canada thus are unsure of their social mobility in Korea. Example 9 and 10, taken from interviews with Yu-ri, one of the focal participants of this study, and her mother, are presented to illustrate these points.

***Example 9: Interview, Yu-ri (January 27, 2008)***

Yu-ri: They say there are too many *yuhaksaeng* [in Korea] these days, so they won't even recognize you as *yuhaksaeng*.

*Example 10: Interview, Yu-ri's mother (March 20, 2007)*

Mother: At first we were planning to stay for 1-2 years. But that wasn't enough, (.) **that level of English**, (.) it's easier to achieve at a tutoring agency in Korea. . . . So, we are again confused what we should do once they [the girls] finish their study here. You're fine because you have completed your undergraduate education in Korea. But the girls **need to go back to Korea if things don't work out for them, but then, the Korean society does not always welcome yuhaksaeng**. (.) And I'm not sure if it was a good decision to have gone through all this hassle only to be good at English.

As such, those *yuhaksaeng* who possess material and symbolic resources would seek an opportunity to enter a U.S. university. As for those who have to stay in Canada, at least until they enter the university, they have to figure out the best way to make sense of their continued investment in Canadian capital. The next section discusses how *yuhaksaeng* and their families in Toronto deal with these tensions by symbolic production of "University of Toronto" as a new resource. In this process, they negotiate the meanings of "success" in *jogi yuhak*, from acquisition of authentic English to admission to the University of Toronto—after all, the value of authentic English in the Korean market is contingent upon that of the accompanying educational capital.

*Misrecognition, Anxiety, and Construction of University of Toronto as a New Symbolic Capital Among Yuhaksaeng*

The value objectively and subjectively placed on an academic qualification is in fact defined only by the totality of the social uses that can be made of it. Thus the evaluation of diplomas by the closest peer groups, such as relatives, neighbours, fellow students (one's 'class' or 'year') and colleagues, can play an important role in masking the effects of devaluation. These phenomena of individual and collective misrecognition are in no way illusory, since they can orient real practices, especially the individual and collective strategies aimed at establishing or re-establishing the objective reality of the value of the qualification or position; and these strategies can make a real contribution toward actual revaluation (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 143).

Examples in this section are offered to demonstrate ways in which *yuhaksaeng* and their families in Toronto make sense of their investments by constructing “University of Toronto” as a new symbolic capital among themselves. This process involves multiple steps: (1) constructing Canada as legitimate *jogi yuhak* destination over other alternative locations through the discourse of “springboard [to the U.S.],” namely as *the* best alternative path to access the U.S. educational capital; (2) constructing migration to Toronto as legitimate choice over other *jogi yuhak* destinations within Canada; (3) constructing University of Toronto as a new symbolic capital through the discourse of “*the* best university” in Canada. Obviously, *yuhaksaeng* and their families’ practices to produce Candian educational capital as a new symbolic resource in the U.S.-dominant *hakbeol* system in Korea is counter-hegemonic. Nonetheless, it is through their misrecognition (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) of the symbolic power of the ideology of U.S.-supremacy embedded in the discourse of “springboard [to the U.S.]” that *yuhaksaeng* in Canada unwittingly contribute to further undermining the legitimacy of non-U.S. bound *jogi yuhak*, including their own.

Examples 11-13 illustrate how the discourse of “springboard to the U.S.” is mobilized in documents produced by the education industry to promote *jogi yuhak* to Canada (and Toronto). Example 11 is an excerpt taken from a brochure produced by a major *yuhak* agency in Seoul, in which profiles of different *jogi yuhak* destinations are provided for a comparison. This material includes five destinations in the following order: the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand. The Philippines or other

destinations in Asia are not represented in this material<sup>27</sup>. Key values of each destination as represented in headings include: “the scene of advanced (*seonjin*) education” (the U.S.), “safety and quality education” (Canada), “authentic English and high quality education” (the U.K.), “British English and the best natural environment” (Australia), and “British educational system and excellent natural environment” (New Zealand). Here, both the U.S. and the U.K. are constructed as symbolic capital in terms of the value of their educational or linguistic capital. Strengths of Australia and New Zealand as *jogi yuhak* destinations are constructed based on their presumably shared value with the British capital. While the connection between the U.S. and Canada is not as explicitly made in the heading, the description of details of Canada-bound *jogi yuhak* indicates rather explicit adoption of discourse of “springboard to the U.S.”:

***Example 11: Advertising Document, Seoul-based yuhak agency (my translation)***

Characteristics of *jogi yuhak* to Canada

- Advantage for entering U.S. universities/full recognition of Canadian credits
- Use of North American English, the most standard pronunciation and standard English among English-speaking countries

In this text, the symbolic production of English spoken in Canada as “standard” is based on its status as “North American” English, not as “Canadian” English. That is, the market value of Canadian English is contingent upon its closeness to American English.

---

<sup>27</sup> Such constructions of Asian nations as illegitimate *jogi yuhak* destinations (and hence the illegitimacy of English capital obtained therein) were widely observed in the *yuhak* industry as represented in the following remark of an agent: “Who on earth would want to send [their children] to South-Asian countries [other than to save the cost]?” (Interview, Seoul-based *yuhak* agency C, June 21, 2007).

Such implicit mobilization of the discourse of “springboard to the U.S.” (by merging Canada and the U.S. as North America) is represented in Examples 12 and 13 as well. Example 12 represents a heading on a page to introduce Toronto in the advertising material of a Korean tutoring agency in Toronto. Example 13 is extracted from a hand-out prepared for *jogi yuhak* parents by a representative *yuhak* agency in Toronto. In Example 12, Toronto’s advantage relating to its geographical proximity to the U.S. is represented by literally constructing it as the “doorway” to North America (rather than to Canada). In doing so, North America is implicitly equated with the U.S., thereby Canada is rendered invisible as a separate market.

***Example 12: Advertising material, Korean tutoring agency in Toronto***


TORONTO, The Doorway to North America

In Example 13, the absence of entering “Canadian” universities as a possible path for *yuhaksaeng* after obtaining Ontario Secondary School Diploma (OSSD) indicates that they do not represent as attractive capital as “North American” universities, which presumably include U.S. universities. As illustrated, even after entering Canadian universities, there is still a chance for *yuhaksaeng* to transfer or move to a U.S. university for further education:



**Example 13: Handout distributed at a seminar for *jogi yuhak* parents, Toronto-based *yuhak* agency A (my translation)**

Options for further study after completion of high school education



The next example shows how the same discourse of “springboard to the U.S.” (and hence the U.S.-norm in *jogi yuhak*) is reproduced by *yuhaksaeng* families, in their symbolic production of *jogi yuhak* to Toronto as capital of distinction among alternative *jogi yuhak* destinations. Example 14 is taken from the same group interview with three *yuhaksaeng* mothers represented in the previous section. In response to their perceived devaluation of *jogi yuhak*, from something special to nothing special, the mothers negotiate the meanings of their investment in *jogi yuhak* by constructing Canada as a legitimate destination, given both the “authenticity” of its English capital and the social position of the participating individuals. In doing so, they construct *jogi yuhak* as “at least middle-class” practices, which constitute the source of value accorded to the capital. In this sense, the symbolic value of authentic English presumed to be acquired through *jogi yuhak* has to do with the social position of its speakers, rather than actual linguistic characteristics of the capital. Furthermore, Toronto is constructed as a legitimate destination over alternative destinations within Canada, based on the presumably higher

value of its educational credential (given its geographical and symbolic proximity to eastern Ivy League universities) over that of the western coastal city of Vancouver.

**Example 14: Interview, Yuhaksaeng Parents Group (May 2, 2008)**

- Mother 1: I chose Canada because I could get a visa, and then we could choose public school, and if we want to send the children to the U.S. university, because it's close (.) we can drive back and forth. Vancouver is, like, (.) something like for pleasure?//
- Mother 2: //for relaxation  
and sightseeing
- Mother 1: Right, that's it. There are a few good schools [in Vancouver]. I have also researched on that. But if you want to go to UNIVERSITY, you don't have many options. There are more universities here [in Toronto/Ontario]. . . . IN THE PAST, in the past, only the very rich came for *yuhak*, but as I said in the interview with a Korean community newspaper, NOW, anyone who can afford a living would consider *yuhak*. Either the child is either academically very strong or very weak. But, Canada, in my opinion, still those who choose to come to the U.S. or Canada are (.) still more or less **at least (.) middle (.) class (*jungsancheung*)**. Because as you mentioned earlier, Australia, New Zealand, and China, and now the Philippines, there is nowhere you can't go. [Koreans] would go ANYWHERE. But, well, as for China, I learned that it only costs a third of what we pay here. . . . So I think still those who come at least here [Canada], in English-speaking countries, **they choose real authentic English-speaking countries (*jeongtong yeongeo gwon*), you know.**
- Hyunjung: When you said middle class, so you mean, upper or upper middle//
- Mother 3: //It's like  
this. In the past, only those who are with *sa-ja* [meaning representative high professionals in Korea, such as doctors (*ui-sa*), lawyers (*byeonho-sa*), and judges (*pan-sa*), which all end with the Korean character '-sa'] would go for *jogi yuhak*, but now, even ORDINARY salaryman would go. Like at least for 1-2 years, (.) //
- Mother 2: //That is nothing special (*gibon euro*)
- Mother 1: //nothing special (*gibon euro*)
- Mother 3: Most people, like even those who work for a large company, would go [send their kids] for at least one or two years.
- Mother 1: If you are Grade 5 or so, more than half of the entire class will go//
- Mother 2: //inaudible
- Mother 3: At least, two months in summer, or one month in winter//
- Mother 1: //they  
say one can go so far as to open an instalment savings account to that end
- Hyunjung: (laugh)
- Mother 1: (laughing) still they will send their children.//The reality is really
- Mother 3: //(inaudible)//

- Mother 1: // because of the importance of English//
- Mother 3: // It [*jogi yuhak*] used to be something special, but now (.) it has been (.) levelled off (*pyeongjunhwa*)?
- Mother 1: It has become very common (*ilbanhwa doeet eoyo*), indeed.

Examples 15-17 illustrate processes of symbolic production of “University of Toronto” as a new capital of global currency among transnational Koreans relating to studying in Canada, namely *yuhaksaeng*, their mothers, and *yuhak* agents. Given the scarcity of Canadian degree holders among Korean elites, it is through discourse of “the best university” in Canada that they construct the symbolic value of the capital, for the ideology of “single best” university has long functioned as a source of symbolic value in the Korean *hakbeol* system (see Chapter 2). Given relatively prestigious positions of Canada (and Toronto) in symbolic order in *jogi yuhak* market, the symbolic value of University of Toronto as “the best” university in Canada is expected to gain higher currency than even some average U.S. universities. Investment in obtaining admission to the University of Toronto then would position themselves advantageously, not only in the Canadian market (where the university is already considered as one of the best, if not the best, universities) and in other English-speaking countries, but also in the Korean market in case they need to return to Korea.

In this process, the relatively low currency of Canadian degrees in the Korean market is attributed to Koreans’ lack of “global” knowledge, rather than illegitimacy of the capital itself, as represented in comments such as “[not known] in Korea” and “Koreans in Korea [don’t know].” Yet, frequent uses of “still” and “not yet” indicate their anticipation that the value will soon increase as Korea is being ever more globalized. As such, whereas *yuhaksaeng* mobilized Koreanness as symbol of globality (as opposed to

long-term Korean immigrants in Toronto) in the previous chapter, in this context, they distance themselves from Koreanness which indexes “backwardness” and construct themselves as more “global” than Koreans who remain in Korea.

Example 15 is taken from an interview with Yu-ri when she began to visit university fairs in Grade 12 to prepare for upcoming applications. Yu-ri was concerned about her academic capacity to obtain admission to as well as to maintain good academic standing at the University of Toronto. Unlike Korean universities, which are hard to get into (especially good ones) but not graduate from, at the University of Toronto reportedly quite a few students fail to move on to the next stage of their studies. So she often mitigated her desire to enter the university as indicated by the denial of her intention to apply for the school:

*Example 15. Interview with Yu-ri (October 10, 2006)*

At first, I didn't consider UT [University of Toronto]. (.) Someone who I know went to UT and said it's not good for study because there are too many Korean students and if you socialize with them. (.) But then I might go back to Korea later so if I think about it, **they know nothing but UT in Korea** (.) they don't recognize things like XX (name of another Ontario university) (. .) and so I am thinking, (.) but I don't know.

While I doubt the truth of statements such as “they know nothing but UT in Korea,” since most Koreans would not even recognize University of Toronto, it is through this belief in the symbolic value of the University of Toronto as “the best university” in Canada that she makes sense of her investment in obtaining admission to the university. As long as she proves that she obtained admission to the best university in Canada, even if she was not able to meet the academic demands at the university, she

could relatively easily transfer to a high standing Korean university. For more and more Korean universities apply relaxed admission criteria for returning *yuhaksaeng* based on their English ability. Or as her sister Su-bin remarked, even if she does not plan to look for a job in Korea, it would be “nice to say” that she graduated from a “good” university (Interview, Su-bin, December 15, 2007) given the prestige associated with high symbolic capital.

Example 16 represents an interview with Yu-ri’s mother, prior to her permanent return to Korea in Fall 2007, shortly after the girls’ admittance to the University of Toronto.

***Example 16. Interview, Yu-ri’s mother (October 5, 2007)***

Mother : If it takes 2-3 years to get the permanent residency, we don’t really need it. We’re applying for it to save the tuition, so even if our application gets through after that [the girls graduate], it’s not that [my family] can come here [Canada]. Because my husband has a good job so he will probably work till he retires. If we have to pay international fee anyway, then it would be better to go to the U.S. [medical school].

Hyunjung: Why is that?

Mother: It’s easier in the U.S. university [to graduate]. **My husband says, the girls] don’t need to worry even if they fail to move on [at the university], because they can still come to Korea and be able to get a job. Because they speak English,** at the very least, they can work at a travel agency. We knew some students who failed to enter university in New Zealand and returned to Korea. They went to some provincial colleges but still they all worked part time jobs at travel agencies. They say that agencies approach you first and offer jobs according to where you had studied. . . . My husband prefers University of Toronto of course. **He is a Korean living in Korea.** XX (name of a university in Ontario) or things like that, they are **not known in Korea.** Still, University of Toronto is well recognized as the best [university in Canada] (.) It will also make him feel confident and proud after all these years of support for *yuhak*, you know.

Hyunjung: Then he must be an object of envy.

Mother: Well, then, if it’s a U.S. university, many people better recognize it. If you say like Virginia university or University of Michigan, people go wow, but it doesn’t look like, here [Canada] (.) is not so (.), **not as much as he had expected.** One of his colleagues has studied in Michigan. When my

husband talked to him [about University of Toronto], he said “ah, that’s a good university, the one with a high academic standing.” So my husband told me that **those who have studied in North America seem to recognize [University of Toronto]**.

Example 17 is extracted from an interview with an agent at a Canada-sponsored *yuhak* agency in Seoul, which primarily promotes Canadian schools in Korea. The excerpt followed conversation regarding active promotion of the U.S. government in *yuhak* industry in Korea.

***Example 17. Interview, Canada-sponsored agency in Seoul (June 26, 2007)***

- Hyunjung: How about, for example, Australia compared to Canada then?  
 Agent: Australia is very active. . . . So Australia is well known and *yuhak* to Australia is now very popular whereas New Zealand went down. Australian government is actively promoting in Korea, but AUSTRALIA, it’s like, when we do consulting, for example, there was a student who was offered admission both from University of Toronto and XXX (name of an Australian university in Sydney). So he was debating between the two and chose to go to Australia because (laughing) the term starts in March but in September in Canada. So he thought he would start early [Korean school year begins in March]. And he finished his study in Australia and came back to Korea. But (.) no one called him for an interview when he applied for jobs (laugh).
- Hyunjung: Oh, no.  
 Agent: His application didn’t go through. Australia, Sydney, is not known, not as yet. (a few words inaudible) Universities. (.) He was so mad and reapplied for a graduate school at the University of Toronto. And he got an admission and so he was leaving again. And he really regret having studied in Australia. You know, **still**, the perception in Korea is that (.) schools, university education (a couple of words inaudible) Australia and overseas universities are not known in Korea. If you graduate from somewhere in the U.S., some state university, it gain a better recognition than University of Toronto **in Korea, as you know**. Those perceptions are likely to change though, because now many people have been to *yuhak* and *eo hak yeonsu* (language study abroad). . . . And, like, my boss offered a seminar [on studying in Canada] at a university teacher education program. And she asked me “Can you pinpoint anyone from a Canadian university who really gets ahead in Korea?”
- Hyunjung: (laugh)  
 Agent: And even I (a couple of words inaudible), well, the CEO of XXX company is from UBC, but other than that (.) perhaps (.) there is one minister (laugh).

- Hyunjung: A-ha.  
 Agent: Then, there's none other than that. Someone who stands out. Things like that, when you promote studying in Canada, you need to show an example of someone who was Canada-educated and became successful. But *still*, there is a significant shortage for that. And those who are Canada educated and are relatively successful, they won't come back to Korea.  
 (laugh)  
 Hyunjung: (laugh)

I am unable to tell whether or not his failure in getting a job interview is actually due to his Australian degree. Nor is it clear whether a degree from University of Toronto would actually enhance his chances of success in the Korean job market. Yet, I highlight this belief in the higher symbolic value of a Canadian degree over an Australian degree, presumably as a North American degree, reproduced in the interaction. As such, whereas this ideological construction of symbolic value of Canadian degree may challenge the U.S.-dominance in the Korean *hakbeol* system to some extent, it further reproduces the symbolic order of "authenticity" and hence the ideology of U.S.-supremacy. Thereby, it inadvertently contributes to constructing Canadian degrees as illegitimate (along with Australian ones).

In the next section, I describe ways in which the discursive construction of University of Toronto as a new symbolic capital, as index of "success" in *jogi yuhak*, has focused linguistic investment of *yuhaksaeng* toward acquisition of English credentials prerequisite to the university admission.

### ***Strategies of English Capital Acquisition of Yuhaksaeng***

This section examines the ways in which *yuhaksaeng*'s acquisition of English credentials to meet university admission requirements were shaped by the transnational "(language) education industry." Of particular interest are ways in which habitus (cf.

Bourdieu, 1991) and language ideologies (cf. Irvine & Gal, 2000; Woolard, 1998) inform the students' investment strategies as well as consequences of those strategies.

I first offer a brief delineation of the trajectories of English capital acquisition of three focal *yuhaksaeng* participants, Yu-ri, Su-bin, and Se-jun, that were aimed at university admission. After that, I discuss tensions between authenticity and commodity as well as essentialism and hybridity, revealed in their acquisition of one key English credentials (namely Grade 12), in relation to the multiple paths to access the linguistic capital represented by the global education industry, as well as ambivalent positions of *yuhaksaeng* playing multiple games. In exploring the participants' ideologies of different values accorded to different varieties of English, the analysis highlights how the ideological construction of linguistic difference connects to categorizing people, thereby leading to social inequality through the participants' *misrecognition* (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) of the symbolic domination at play in this process of categorization.

### ***Yu-ri and Su-bin: Successful Admittance to the University of Toronto***

#### ***Motivations and trajectories.***

When they first left for *jogi yuhak* to New Zealand, both Yu-ri and Su-bin expected that they would learn English quickly in the English-speaking country by interacting with students from all over the world. Yet, they found it practically impossible to make friends with “white” students due to their experience with linguistic and racial marginalization (see Chapter 3). Yu-ri believed that all the initial hardships were due to her “poor” English: Since she “didn’t speak English well,” she “couldn’t do well in other things,” and so she was “looked down upon.” Her English did not improve much, however, because she mostly socialized with Korean students and did not enjoy talking in



class. Even after they moved to Canada, the girls found it difficult to make friends with the “Canadian” students, and they felt more comfortable with “Asian” students, or other Korean *yuhaksaeng*.

During their study in the Toronto high school, they made a conscious effort to organize their activities in order to increase their possibility of gaining admission to a good university. For instance, the girls actively pursued extracurricular activities and community service because as told by their mother and friends, they believed that it would look good on their résumés and would thus increase their chances of being offered admission to the university. They also found those activities to be fun as well. The girls joined six clubs at their school. Outside of school, the sisters volunteered as teacher-aides at a Korean Heritage Language program, to help feed patients at a neighborhood hospital, and at a breakfast service program for the homeless. Furthermore, they also carefully planned their academic courses so that they could maintain a high average. Yu-ri, for example, chose to remain in an ESL class when she first arrived in her Toronto school even though the ESL credits from her New Zealand schools qualified her for an exemption. She figured that because the regular English course would be more demanding, it would be difficult for her to acquire a good grade. Furthermore, ESL classes offered her resources such as opportunities to practice presentations in a supportive environment, recognition as a legitimate member of the group, and a relatively close relationship with the teacher. In addition, she dropped courses at the high school when she did not anticipate a good mark and acquired the credit at a “private” high school (i.e., “buy-a-credit” school) instead. When needed, the girls were provided

assistance for their academic work through tutoring and attending private tutoring agencies.

Although Yu-ri did not necessarily envision herself in the medical profession, both the girls decided to study Life Science at university as many other Korean students do, for it is believed to be a safe path to a prestigious profession not only in Korea, but also presumably in other countries as well. Initially, Yu-ri wanted to become an architect or a fashion designer because she was good at the Arts and took some private lessons in Korea. However, when she was repeatedly told by other Korean students that “Asian” students could not compete with “White” students in terms of creativity, she changed her idea.

During their university application processes, Yu-ri and Su-bin initially applied to six universities in Ontario. The girls did not complete the application procedures for the two of them, however. One university did not grant them an exemption from the English proficiency requirement and requested further proof (e.g., a TOEFL score). They did not bother to follow up with the request because it was not “even from the University of Toronto.” The other university was removed from their list when they learned that the program was not well-known to people around them; the university was mainly famous for its engineering program among their Korean peers, but not for Life Science. They had been offered admissions from all four universities for which they had completed the application process. They chose to attend the University of Toronto despite the offer of small scholarships from another Ontario university.

Upon the girls' admission to the university, Yu-ri's mother permanently returned to Korea in October 2007, pleased with the fruition of her years' efforts overseas to provide the best possible support for the girls' education.

***The accumulation of linguistic capital for university admission.***

The three major requirements in the sisters' university applications consisted of: (1) the completion of secondary school qualifications (i.e., an Ontario Secondary School Diploma), (2) achievement of a mandated minimum grade for required Grade 12 courses, and (3) the English language proficiency requirements for ESL students. These requirements involved three English-specific credentials: (1) the Grade 10 literacy test mandated for all Ontario secondary students to acquire a diploma, (2) a required minimum mark in Grade 12 English, and (3) an English facility testing score (e.g., TOEFL). Yu-ri and Su-bin strategized to acquire these language credentials to maximize their chances of being admitted to the best possible university.

First, the girls had to take the Grade 10 literacy test in March 2006, only one month after their arrival in the Toronto high school. Given the short time for test preparation as well as their unfamiliarity with the Ontario education system and the test itself, their mother registered them for a one-week intensive preparation course for the test offered at a Korean tutoring agency (*hakwon*). They found the course very helpful and were offered focused instruction on analyses of test items and types as well as reviews of past examinations. Both girls passed the test without too much difficulty.

Second, as for the required Grade 12 English credit, they obtained the desired mark at a private high school, or a "(buy-a-) credit" school in lieu of taking the course at their high school. Having learned that the English teacher at their school was known for

being a tough marker, the girls followed this alternative path to acquire the credit, as advised by other *yuhaksaeng*. To obtain an offer from the University of Toronto, a mark of at least 80 or 85 is reportedly required. According to the girls, taking the course at a “credit” school was common practice among *yuhaksaeng* as well as some *iminja* or even some “Canadian” students who wished to upgrade their marks.

Third, their four years’ schooling in an English-speaking country qualified them for an exemption from the English facility testing requirement for ESL students. To qualify for an exemption, the girls had to provide a letter to explain the details of their studies in New Zealand along with copies of their report cards and transcripts as requested by the universities they had applied to. They asked me to comment on their hand-written draft of the letter, and I helped them with revising the letter.

Their strategies of investing in English credentials proved to be successful to the extent that they were able to attend the University of Toronto as they desired.

***Se-jun: Returning to Korea Without an Ontario Secondary School Diploma***

Se-jun was referred to as a “typical, struggling” student by two supplementary adult interviewees from his Korean church. He often missed classes, did not complete assignments, dropped courses or failed in some, and constantly transferred to different schools. As such, his mother remarked that Se-jun’s *yuhak* did not prove to be successful. In March 2008, he returned to Korea without a high school diploma and joined the army in the Fall to complete the mandated military service for Korean men.

***Motivations, trajectories, and strategies of English capital acquisition.***

As for his motivation for studying in Toronto, Se-jun remarked that both he and his parents believed that the experience of living overseas, or, more precisely, obtaining a

degree from a highly-regarded Western university, was essential for anyone to get ahead in Korea. As a result, they believed that authentic English ability was vital to success “in this global era.” Furthermore, as a Canadian citizenship holder, his *jogi yuhak* could be arranged in the most efficient way as he did not have to pay tuition, and he could stay with his grandparents to save on living expenses. Se-jun’s *jogi yuhak* thus appeared to be “the natural thing” to do for the family, as his mother remarked (Interview, June 29, 2007). In addition, Se-jun desired to experience life in a “broader world” as he often referred to an old Korean saying, “a frog in the well,” meaning someone who has tunnel vision.

During his studies in Grade 3 in a small Ontario city, home-staying with a Canadian family, he enjoyed a “truly Canadian experience,” being immersed in English and in “Canadian” culture. When he returned to Korea after one year in Canada, he felt that his English had so improved that his pronunciation sounded somewhat like that of a “native speaker” of English. His peers and family friends echoed this sentiment.

Although Se-jun was hoping to enter the University of Toronto, he was not academically successful. Unlike his experience at the Ontario elementary school in Grade 3, Se-jun found it difficult to mingle with his high school peers; he sensed the invisible lines among the racial/ethnic groups. Being social and athletic, he served as field captain for his school’s soccer team, where he was able to make some friends. Nevertheless, Koreans constituted the major body of his peer social network in Toronto, mainly from his church group or from the soccer team connection. According to him, school was merely a place where he needed to complete courses to fulfill the requirements for his university application.

His life circumstances further exacerbated his non-investment in academic work. After his grandfather passed away in 2005, he lived with his grandmother who was in her 80s. Given her age, among other factors, he did not share much in common with her. In the summer of 2006, he moved out of his grandmother's house downtown and home-stayed with a Korean family. In the winter of that year, he moved again to North York, renting a room in a condo and living with another Korean family from his hometown. While living by himself, he found it hard to practice the self-discipline required to successfully juggle his studies, part-time work at a Korean restaurant, and peer social activities essential to maintaining his emotional well-being.

At times, he had desired to return to Korea. Watching most of his friends in his hometown eager to leave for *yuhak*, however, he did not find it to be an appealing alternative path to return back home either. Not having been educated in the Korean secondary school system, he would not likely be admitted to an elite university in Korea, which would presumably prevent him from landing a prestigious job. Furthermore, he was one of the very few *yuhaksaeng* among his friends in the relatively small provincial city of his hometown. As his mother reported, he and his family were thus an object of envy and attention (Interview, June 29, 2007). After all these years in Canada, Se-jun believed that returning from *yuhak* without at least being offered admission to, if not graduating from, a good university would fall short of expectations from family and friends, and that his parents might lose face.

Upon entering Grade 12 in Fall 2006, his main goal was to obtain a high average because Grade 12 courses were to be included in his university application. After two months into the new school year, however, his attendance started to drastically decrease

again, to nearing non-attendance by the end of October. He figured that continuing at the high school would not help him to achieve a high average because his school was a “term school,” where courses were offered throughout the academic year. Since he had already missed too many classes, it would negatively affect his academic records for the entire academic year. He thus decided to transfer to a “semester school,” which offers courses per semester, so he could start anew. In January 2007, he began to attend a new high school in a Jewish neighbourhood in Toronto. He chose the school because one of his Korean friends was attending there. Even if he was determined to be more disciplined and to do better at this new school, the vicious cycle of staying up late, playing computer games or watching Korean TV shows on the Internet resulted in a repeat of school absence and lack of motivation in his schoolwork. By March 2007, his non-attendance was so severe that he gave up hope of continuing Grade 12 that school year. He decided to repeat Grade 12 in Fall 2007 and returned to Korea to be with his family in the meantime.

Upon his return to Toronto from Korea in August 2007, he moved back into his grandmother’s house to reduce living expenses. Instead of repeating Grade 12 at a high school, he registered for a municipal adult education program to complete the requirements for an Ontario Secondary School Diploma. Feeling “behind” due to his delayed graduation from high school, Se-jun’s motivation to register for this program was to expedite acquiring the required credits for university application. Each term in this program consisted of nine weeks, during which time he could take up to three courses. His good attendance during the first month of the program started to fluctuate around the mid-term however. In October 2007, he dropped two courses in the program including

Grade 12 English. Instead, he decided to take those courses at a “credit” school, for which he felt ashamed. In addition, he had to pay an extra \$550 in tuition per course. When I met him in December 2007, he told me that he would start his university application in January 2008 to study business at the University of Toronto. In March 2008, however, he had permanently moved back to Korea without completing the requirements for a high school diploma.

Albeit with diverse consequences, the trajectories of the three students contributed to the construction of their sense of the value of their linguistic production (and those of others) in relation to different markets (cf. habitus). How their habitus influenced their investment and language learning is what I discuss next.

### ***Habitus, Legitimacy, and (Multiple) Markets: Tensions Between Authenticity and Commodity***

This section concerns *yuhaksaeng*'s strategies of obtaining one particular linguistic capital in the university application process--that is, credentials for Grade 12 English--and the consequences of those strategies, focusing on how the students made sense of their linguistic investment. Emphasis is placed on ways in which ideological manifestations and practices in their acquisition of this particular linguistic capital reveal tensions between authenticity and commodity regarding both different paths to access the resource generated by global education industry, and different meanings of legitimate “credentialized bilingualism” in different markets.

The discussion underscores how the students' linguistic habitus are constituted through their trajectories while traversing multiple markets, and how their habitus inform their linguistic practices. On the one hand, linguistic and racial stigmatization *yuhaksaeng*



experienced in their Canadian schools has formed their sense of anticipated sanctions (e.g., ridicule, laugh, disrespect, lack of recognition) for their linguistic production and thus resulted in their minimal speaking of English. On the other hand, their (and their families') ongoing interactions with (transnational) Koreans in various transnational social spaces, both discursively and materially, have constituted their sense of anticipated rewards for their English in the Korean (and transnational Korean) markets. In this process, *yuhaksaeng* constructed themselves as "better" speakers of English than Koreans remaining in Korea, in relation to the symbolic power of North American academic credentials they (would) hold. Consequently, they invested in acquisitions of English credentials required for university admission. Their very investment in credentials undermined, however, their access to *legitimate* English (i.e., authentic English) in their Canadian schools, thereby further marginalizing *yuhaksaeng* in the Canadian market.

***"[That's] the English to enter the university, as you know": Credentialized bilingualism as a skill and a commodity.***

This section examines how Grade 12 English is constructed as an essential *skill* to enter "good" universities (and hence for social mobility) by *yuhaksaeng*. Namely, to enter prestigious universities such as the University of Toronto, what matters is not just taking the course and acquiring the credit, but "doing well" (i.e., obtaining high marks) in the course. At an interview over lunch shortly after his transfer to a "semester" school, Se-jun shared his renewed resolve and plans to study hard at a new school where he was to take Grade 12 English. As for his plan of how to obtain the required credit for Grade 12 English, he commented that whereas it was sufficient to "just pass" Grade 11 English (line 25), Grade 12 English was more important because it is to be included in the university application. From my perspective, at least when I first met them, Se-jun was

the most fluent speaker of English among the four focal participants. Whereas he did not deny that he was fairly fluent in daily conversation among peers, he constantly mentioned he felt “intimidated” speaking English or speaking up in class and was “feeling behind (academically).” Thus, even before he took the course, he sensed a negative reward (i.e., it did not appear feasible to him to acquire high marks in school). He therefore strategized how to obtain the credit: either at a “credit” school or at his high school.

**Example 18. Interview, Se-jun (February 5, 2007)**

- 1 Hyunjung: Then, for your English class, (.) what would you like to do?
- 2 Se-jun: I’m thinking (.) whether or not I should just **go get [the credit] at a**
- 3 **credit school.**
- 4 Hyunjung: A credit school?
- 5 Se-jun: Yes.
- 6 Hyunjung: Is Grade 12 English [at your school] really tough?
- 7 Se-jun: I don’t know. (Casting me a pitiful gaze, in a humorous tone) Since I
- 8 haven’t studied it yet, how do I know?
- 9 Hyunjung: (laugh)
- 10 Se-jun: (laugh)
- 11 Hyunjung: Then why (.) (still laughing) are you concerned [about whether or not
- 12 you should take it]?
- 13 Se-jun: **I feel intimidated.**
- 14 Hyunjung: I mean, why do you feel intimidated? (laughing) You need to know
- 15 something about it first to feel intimidated, don’t you?
- 16 Se-jun: (laugh) (.)
- 17 Hyunjung: You took Grade 11 English, didn’t you?
- 18 Se-jun: Yes.
- 19 Hyunjung: Was it challenging?
- 20 Se-jun: Not really (.) I did fine.
- 21 Hyunjung: Then, it [Grade 12 English] shouldn’t be much different, no?
- 22 Se-jun: **This one is (.) English for entering the UNIVERSITY.**
- 23 Hyunjung: A-ha, you mean grade?
- 24 Se-jun: That’s why (.) (in a softer tone, talking to himself) a-ha, that’s why.
- 25 (.) I didn’t care when I was in Grade 11. Honestly, just pass
- 26 was enough.

As the conversation continued, I asked why he felt unconfident in his English. He commented (as he was told by his father since his youth and observed in his high school classes) that there is “high quality (*gogeub*)” English (e.g., academic vocabulary) and

“general (*ilban*)” English, and that he “can’t speak high quality English at all.” In the following excerpt, he shifts the value of these two varieties of English. For the purpose of university admission, which he values, English credentials (good grades) are given higher value than “authentic (or academic)” English; he thus invested in the acquisition of the former:

- 1 Se-jun: So because I know it [there are different kinds of English], I can  
 2 sense it [that I don’t have that]. . . . if you are a “good” student,  
 3 you would work harder if you know that [you’re missing  
 4 something]. But I am even less motivated because I know that  
 5 (laugh).  
 6 Hyunjung: (laugh)  
 7 Se-jun: (laugh) Because that’s too much (. ) It’s hard [to learn all those  
 8 things]. I really don’t like something difficult (laugh). I’m not  
 9 persistent and I don’t like suffering. But I do what I must do.  
 10 Hyunjung: (laughing) I see.  
 11 Se-jun: But that [“high quality” English] is not a must (. ) honestly.  
 12 Hyunjung: Why not?  
 13 Se-jun: Well, (. ) there are want [English that you want] and need  
 14 [English that you need]. Need is a must. Want is (. ) well, it’s a  
 15 luxury, luxury.  
 16 Hyunjung: So you mean, “high quality” English is not a need?  
 17 Se-jun: Want is just what I want [but not something I must learn]. (. )  
 18 Hyunjung: Then, a need is, (. ) what kind of English is a need for you?  
 19 Se-jun: Grade. Good grade in English  
 20 Hyunjung: Good grade? Then, you mean you don’t need “high quality”  
 21 English to get good grade?  
 22 Se-jun: Of course not.

This shift in the symbolic order of the value of different varieties of English is, however, incongruent with that of the school, where academic English tends to get constructed as a *legitimate* form of linguistic capital. Subsequently, Se-jun’s English (and educational) capital acquisition was not successful and he dropped out of high school. Furthermore, while the symbolic value of the legitimate English at school is actually associated with the power of its speakers, Se-jun misrecognizes (cf. Bourdieu, 1991) this ideology. He thus correlates the higher symbolic power of “academic” English at school

with its linguistic superiority (i.e., “high quality”) and consequently, the superiority of its speakers. This submission to the symbolic domination further reinforces his sense of illegitimacy of his English, constructing himself as a “poor” speaker of English.

***“Better” speakers of English than Koreans in Korea: Transnational Koreans as legitimate speakers of English.***

In this section, examples are offered to illustrate how *yuhaksaeng*’s investment in acquisitions of English credentials required for university admission are further reinforced by anticipated rewards in the (transnational) Korean market, where there is an increasing demand for the kind of bilingual and bicultural skills and knowledge they possess. Example 19 represents a conversation with Yu-ri, Su-bin and their mother occurring shortly after the mother’s visit to Korea. The mother recounted the story of running into an engineering student at the Toronto airport, who was attending a respectable Ontario university. The girls had just accepted the entrance offer from the University of Toronto, despite their initial concern regarding whether they would be able to handle the academic demands at the institution.

***Example 19. Interview, Yu-ri’s family (September 20, 2007)***

- Mother: The bottom line was when I went to Seoul, I ran into a student from XXX [the name of an Ontario] university. . . . We somehow got into a conversation while waiting for a transfer. He was going back to Korea for the summer. I asked him why he was going to Korea and he said, (.) he was entering his third year at university, and those *hakwon* (tutoring agencies) in Gangnam, he didn’t know how they obtained his contact information, but they had contacted him.
- Hyunjung: Oh//
- Yu-ri/Su-bin: //Wow (laugh)
- Mother: I know, (laughing) isn’t it scary? So they contacted him and asked if he would be interested in teaching there.
- Hyunjung: At their *hakwon*?
- Mother: That’s right. English and other things. Because he has been studying here [in Canada], for all subjects, he should know terms and jargons, things like that, right? So they approached him. And he went there to teach and he got

almost 10,000 dollars a month. In addition to teaching at *hakwon*, he also did private tutoring, and he paid his tuition and all expenses for himself. So he was going this time as well to teach till August. . . . He mentioned that he did not worry about money, saying “it’s probably the compensation of my hard work so far.”

Similarly, Se-jun experienced first-hand the prestige of being *yuhaksaeng* whenever he returned to his hometown. He thus had a keen sense of the higher value of his English (associated with North American educational capital) in comparison to the English used by Koreans in Korea. For instance, while his part-time work in Toronto involved menial jobs at local Korean restaurants and a Korean grocery store, he was relatively easily hired for more lucrative part-time jobs in Korea mainly through his father’s contacts. He once worked as an interpreter for a nine-day business meeting organized by a large Korean company. He was paid \$150 per day for the job. For the job, he was initially paired with a Korean university student. Se-jun was chosen, however, as an interpreter of the final meeting by the Korean staff of the company, who, Se-jun believed, thought his English was better than that of the Korean university student. Se-jun agrees because he “lives in *hyeonji* [the local, meaning an English-speaking country].” In addition, he earned \$300 in four days for another interpretation job for investigating crimes committed by migrant workers in Korea. In addition to generous monetary compensation, those jobs provided him with insider knowledge and insight of the legal and corporate systems in Korea. For these jobs, he did not need to go through any application process. Because he was studying in Canada, he was believed to speak “good” English.

Likewise, Yu-ri had a sense of being a “better speaker” of English than Koreans remaining in Korea. Instead of understanding the higher value of her English relating to

North American academic credentials she (would) hold, however, Yu-ri associated it with the qualities she possessed stemming from her overseas experiences. In doing so, she constructed herself as a “global” Korean, while further marginalizing Koreans who remain in Korea as lacking global experiences.

*Example 20. Interview, Yu-ri (January, 27, 2008)*

- Yu-ri: I'm not sure whether I will stay here or move to Korea but in case I go to Korea (. .) [I] have been to *yuhak*, (.) well, they say it's not that they recognize any *yuhak* because there are too many [*yuhaksaeng*]. But still, if you say you've been to *yuhak* (.) I don't know (laugh). Because you have something like [overseas] EXPERIENCE (.), you've been to *yuhak* and plus you have even experience, then you will have **more opportunities than those who are in Korea, won't you?**
- Hyunjung: What do you mean by opportunities, you mean, something like jobs?
- Yu-ri: Yes. And if I stay here, because I've been here since young, so I think it'll be **more comfortable than coming [to Canada] when you get older.**
- Hyunjung: When you say feel comfortable, what do you mean, what aspect?
- Yu-ri: In every aspect of life. (. .)
- Hyunjung: You said you would have more opportunities in Korea. Why is that?
- Yu-ri: **These days, things like language [ability] matters a lot, after all.** I don't plan to work in those areas, but still, they usually value language [ability]. And if you have more experience, then (.) they will acknowledge (*haejuda*) people who have been to *yuhak* **more than those who just learned [English] in Korea**, in my opinion.
- Hyunjung: You mean in terms of English?
- Yu-ri: In the end, **things like conversation**, [*yuhaksaeng*] can do better, there will be a difference [between *yuhaksaeng* and local Koreans], no?
- Hyunjung: Then what do you mean by experience?
- Yu-ri: Something like Internship? I don't know because I haven't done any yet. All I did was volunteer work, part-time job, and so I don't know yet. But if I do have an experience, if you have worked here, things like job, then . . . . And I think it was helpful to do *yuhak* for a long time. If I had come here directly without going to New Zealand, I might not have been accepted to the university due to TOEFL.

As illustrated, the ideological construction of *yuhaksaeng* as “better” speakers of English than Koreans who remain in Korea is transformative to the extent that it renders

transnational bilingual Koreans as *legitimate* speakers of authentic English, at least in the (transnational) Korean market. It is linked, however, to the idea of the superiority of *yuhaksaeng* as global cosmopolitans over “backward” Koreans locked in the peninsula, who are constructed as illegitimate speakers of English. Subsequently, *yuhaksaeng* reproduce the essentialist ideology of “authentic” English, rendering it what Park (2009) calls “the unspeakable English” for Koreans (including themselves). The next section further discusses this point.

***“It’s like buying [a credit], you know”: Discourses of “shamefulness” and the persisting myth of “authenticity.”***

This section illustrates how *yuhaksaeng*’s understanding of themselves as bilinguals (as legitimate speakers of authentic English in the Korean market) has, in turn, further reinforced their sense of themselves as illegitimate speakers of authentic English in the Canadian market through the discourse of “shamefulness.” Albeit their success in acquiring English credentials for admittance to the University of Toronto, both Yu-ri and Su-bin repeatedly reported that they did not feel their English was “good enough,” particularly given six years of their overseas studies: “As Su-bin said, it’s a shame (*jjok palida*, youth Internet slang)” (Interview, Yu-ri, January 27, 2008).

This feeling of shamefulness is related to the way they obtained the required English capital for the university admission (i.e., through a “credit” school), as well as differential value they accorded to the English capital acquired from credit schools and from (public) high schools regarding the symbolic power of the credit awarding institutions. In Examples 21 and 22, “credit” schools are constructed as illegitimate educational credit-awarding institution vis-à-vis (public) schools. As Se-jun also remarked, “they [credit schools] are [for] business [rather than education]” (Interview,

November 20, 2007). Therefore, normalized naming practices among students to refer to these schools as “credit” schools renders it humorous to map the official category, “(private) high schools,” onto these schools (Example 21). Additionally, acquiring credentials at these institutions is associated with “buying” a commodified credit rather than legitimate educational activities (Example 22). Hence, the English capital acquired in these institutions is attributed a lower value by participants than the capital one might have obtained from (public) schools, which are considered to be legitimate *educational* institutions. This, in turn, leads to students further marginalizing themselves as illegitimate speakers of English in the Canadian market, perpetuating the myth of “authentic” English as well as “Native Speakers” as legitimate speakers of authentic English:

***Example 21: Interview, Yu-ri’s family (September 20, 2007)***

- Hyunjung: In credit schools, what kinds of courses are offered?  
 Yu-ri: They offer everything, everything. I don’t think there is anything they don’t offer . . . .
- Hyunjung: What are students’ backgrounds?  
 Yu-ri: Asian students and foreign kids. About 30% would be Asians, and 70% foreigners [i.e., students who are not Asians, including “Canadian” students] . . . .
- Hyunjung: Among your friends, how many would go to credit school?  
 Yu-ri: A lot, almost everyone. At least for one course, things like English, it’s very difficult. Even 2<sup>nd</sup> generations and local ones get something like 60. You can’t apply with that score.
- Su-bin: Among my friends, they often take English and Calculus. . . .
- Hyunjung: How are the schools like XXX (name of the credit school they attended) officially called?  
 Yu-ri: PRIVATE//  
 Mother: //XXX private school  
 Yu-ri/Su-bin: (laughing) What they say on the sign is a high school.  
 Mother: Secondary (.) private school (inaudible) (.) high school

***Example 22. Interview, Yu-ri (January 27, 2008)***



Yu-ri: In Korea, *hakwon* is still for study, but here, honestly, **it's like simply buying [a credit] by paying money for it.** (small laugh) WHAT KIND OF COUNTRY IS THIS? . . . But I can't help it, because getting a high mark is the immediate need for me. . . . You learn English fast if you come here [Canada], faster than in Korea. But unless you come really young, I don't think your English can become like that of a 2<sup>nd</sup> generation or Native-speaker.

Whereas it is theoretically conceivable that these students could have pursued strong academic credits while, at the same time, socializing more with “Canadian” students and participating in *school*-based activities, the next section discusses how racializing practices at their schools have made it difficult for them to do so.

### ***Racialized Linguistic Ideologies and Yuhaksaeng's Investment in English Credentials***

In this section, three examples are presented to demonstrate how *yuhaksaeng's* strategies of linguistic investment (and hence their language learning) in Canada are shaped by racialized linguistic ideologies, as represented in curriculum and teaching materials (Example 23) and teaching practices (Example 25). As illustrated in the experiences of Yu-ri and Se-jun who drop courses at their schools, such ideologies contribute to constraining the students' investments in the acquisition of authentic, or legitimate, English in their Canadian schools.

Example 23 is taken from an interview with Se-jun three months after he resumed his studies at a municipal adult learning centre to complete requirements for an Ontario Secondary School Diploma after dropping out of his high school. Of the three courses he was enrolled in at this school, he ended up with dropping two and only passing one. In the following excerpt, he provided an account of how his decision to drop one of the courses (Grade 10 Food) was triggered by the challenge to complete a group course project that did not reflect his background knowledge at all. For this group project,

students in groups of three or four were to choose one country from the examples offered on the teacher-provided handout. They would then research the culture of the country with a specific focus on its cuisine and would cook a complete meal (from appetizer to dessert) from its culinary culture. The project ran for several weeks. Se-jun missed several initial classes, so when he joined the class, the project was already in progress. He was thus grouped with two other students (who similarly missed the initial classes) to work on German cuisine. Contrary to the white Canadian girl in the group who had contact with a German student, Se-jun had little familiarity with Germany or German cuisine (or culture). Among the countries to be selected as presented in the teacher-provided handout were those with Asian cuisines relatively well-known to Westerners such as Vietnam, Thailand, and Japan, but Korea did not appear on the list.

*Example 23. Interview, Se-jun (December 4, 2007)*

- Hyunjung: Why did you drop those two courses?  
 Se-jun: As for English, it was because my mark was too low, and as for this course, I just didn't want to continue. It's for Grade 10, you know. And the teacher, (.) and, something was too complicated [about the course]. There is something like a procedure. And the final project was, like, Germany, we chose Germany you know. You need to make from appetizer to dessert in German food, and I felt I would fail even if I tried to do the project. It was so annoying.
- Hyunjung: . . . Why did you think you might fail? Aren't you good at cooking?
- Se-jun: No.
- Hyunjung: (laughing) But you've been working at restaurants for so long.  
 Se-jun: (laughing) Come on, do you think I've ever cooked German food?
- Hyunjung: (laughing) So what was hard about the project? Because it was about German food?
- Se-jun: From the research, all (.) ah, well, **I didn't have any background** [about Germany or German Food] . . . .
- Hyunjung: What were the example countries offered (in the handout)?  
 Se-jun: Like, Germany, Italy, France, Vietnam, Thailand, Japan, (.) There was no Korea, you know (laugh)
- Hyunjung: (laugh)

- Se-jun: And things like, Mexico? There were many. And if you really wanted to work on another country, you could talk to the teacher, but (. .)
- Hyunjung: So how many countries altogether?
- Se-jun: Like thirteen? . . .
- Hyunjung: So if it was for German food, . . . you mean you didn't want to bother to do the research?
- Se-jun: No, it wasn't because it was bothersome, but you know, the dishes, when I proposed a dish, the teacher would say no.
- Hyunjung: What was the dish you proposed?
- Se-jun: I don't know. What was it, shu-wa-reu-cheu or something like that? (laugh)
- Hyunjung: (laughing) Where did you learn about that dish?
- Se-jun: On the Internet.
- Hyunjung: Why did you propose the dish to the teacher (when you didn't even know what that was)?
- Se-jun: Because there was a main course and an appetizer (. .), because it looked easy (to cook). . . .
- Hyunjung: Then why did you choose Germany? . . . For example, if you had chosen Japanese food//
- Se-jun: //There were already students who worked on Japan. . . .
- Hyunjung: Then did all your group members drop? Or was it only you (who dropped the course)?
- Se-jun: Only me. . . .
- Hyunjung: The students in your group, did they have any connection to Germany?
- Se-jun: There was a white [Canadian] girl who once had an exchange student from Germany [at her school]. So we asked her to email him/her to get some information. . . . And there was a Vietnamese boy. . . .
- Hyunjung: And the girl was a Canadian?
- Se-jun: Yes, she was white. (. .)
- Hyunjung: And the Vietnamese boy, well, (.) was he also born or raised in Canada?
- Se-jun: No, I don't think so.
- Hyunjung: How did you know?
- Se-jun: **He didn't speak good English.**
- Hyunjung: How so?
- Se-jun: It's just that (.) **his English (ability) was similar to mine.**
- Hyunjung: (laugh) What do you mean?
- Se-jun: Was it not? I'm not sure. . . . It was just my feeling.
- Hyunjung: Why did you feel that way?
- Se-jun: **He wouldn't speak up in English.**

In Se-jun's account of the Vietnamese boy's (as well as his own) English, the North American linguistic ideology which constructs Asian English as "poor" and as an index of non-Canadianness is reproduced by *yuhaksaeng* themselves, and is particularly associated with silence in class (and incompetence). As illustrated in the next example, however, even when Asian students do speak up in class, as with the case of some of his Chinese classmates at his high school, their English is still constructed as "poor" because it is not "perfect," and speaking such English is associated with low self-esteem.

*Example 24. Interview, Se-jun (February 5, 2007)*

- Se-jun: I'm afraid of using English. It doesn't come out of my mouth. I don't want to speak English.
- Hyunjung: I mean, why do you feel unconfident (in your English)?
- Se-jun: I envy when I see Chinese students, **they don't speak good English but they just speak up**. I think I have **high self-esteem, (.) if I can't speak perfect English, I'd rather not [speak it]**. It hurts my pride, as you know.

In addition, an interview excerpt with Yu-ri in the following example demonstrates that the racialized ideology of linguistic stigmatization applies to some "non-Canadian" white speakers of English (e.g., presumably, a Russian speaker of English) as well. In this process, only "white, Canadian" English is constructed as authentic, legitimate English in the Canadian market by these Korean students, rendering all "non-white" or "non-Canadian" English (including their own) as illegitimate.

In Example 25, Yu-ri reported on her experience of dropping a course at her high school. The primary cause for the decision was to maintain her academic average for university application shortly after receiving a low mark in one of her course exams; but the teacher was another significant contributor to the decision. Yu-ri did not find his teaching style suited her and he was notorious for tough marking. According to Yu-ri,

such complaints were widely shared by other students; about a third of the students in her class dropped the course by the time of the interview. Although she initially wanted to investigate ways to increase her marks while remaining in the course, the narrative illustrates how normalized racial practices in the class rendered it challenging for her. Furthermore, the accounts illustrate how racialized linguistic ideologies are linked to the categorization of people. For example, Asian students (including Yu-ri) are constructed as non-deserving students based on their silence in class. This same ideology is reproduced, however, by Yu-ri in her linguistic stigmatization of her teacher. Yu-ri identified the primary reasons for dropping the course as his racist teaching practices and tough marking rather than his English ability. Nevertheless, she repeatedly commented on the phonological competence of the teacher (who is presumably of immigrant origin albeit white) in her construction of the teacher as an “incompetent” teacher.

*Example 25. Interview, Yu-ri (November 25, 2006)*

Hyunjung: Why did you drop it?

Yu-ri: Right before the mid-term, there was an exam and I didn't have much time to study for it. And I got a really low mark. I was shocked. I know I could improve the mark if I study harder for future exams, but it will require too much time. And I don't like the teacher too much. He's new at the school, and oh well, he's really not for me!

Hyunjung: Like what?

Yu-ri: **I shouldn't say this when I'm not even very good at English**, but his English, pronunciation, (.) well, **his English is good, but** he would say things like 'E-EN DU (and).' This is just an example. He drags on the sound . . . . You know, we are in Grade 12 so we need to get high marks to apply (for universities). . . . In addition, I sensed **kind of some racism**, so I didn't feel good about it. . . . When an Asian student would ask him a question, his facial expression would change first, as if he was annoyed. . . . In class, where I sit [she would normally sit at the very front with her sister Su-bin in this class] and on this side of the classroom there are many Asian students, and many foreign kids would sit on the other side. And he wouldn't even come to this side [where Asian students sit]. You know, kids in this country tend to speak up a lot in class (laugh).

- Hyunjung: (laugh)  
 Yu-ri: So with those kids on that side, he would always talk to them smiling . . . .  
 Hyunjung: You mentioned that the teacher's English pronunciation is not good.  
 Yu-ri: When I was in New Zealand, we had many Russian teachers at school as well. So pronunciation, **it's not exactly pronunciation that matters**, but this teacher, well, because I was annoyed at him and I didn't think he and I were a good match, so even those things [pronunciation] bothered me.  
 Hyunjung: Did the teacher's pronunciation matter [to your study]?  
 Yu-ri: (. ) It's like, he speaks rather slowly. **He would say all he needs to say but there is something like a strong accent**. I'm not in a position to say this because my English is not good either, but (. ) **when I listen to it, because I don't like him, it's annoying** (laugh) . . . . And another reason why I was mad at him was there was a Canadian boy in the class who failed [in one test] at the beginning of the semester. . . . So he went to the teacher to drop the course. But the teacher said (softly) 'no, you can't' and he advised him not to drop saying that he wouldn't let anyone in his class drop the course. He went on to say that he would give the student an opportunity and if he would do the assignment, he would pass him for the test. You know, because I sit at the very front, I clearly saw it. But when I went to him to drop, he wouldn't say such a thing to me. So I asked him, 'ah, is there possibly another opportunity? Because my mark was too low, so if there was another opportunity, I would prefer staying in class.' Then he said there was no such a thing and simply told me to do well in the next exam. Ah-, (. ) I was mad at him, as you know (laugh).

As the conversation continued, Yu-ri discussed the co-op arrangement she was required to complete in lieu of the course she had dropped. As the school regulation requires students to take at least three courses per term, after a long negotiation with the school counselor, she was only allowed to drop the course on the condition that she would take up a teaching assistant position. She did not mind this condition though, because she was told by other students that it would look good on her resume if she received a good evaluation. Similar to her volunteer work at a mainstream Canadian institution (i.e., feeding the elderly at a hospital), however, her co-op arrangement resulted in painting the school hallway – a task involving minimal linguistic interaction.

- Yu-ri: So the counselor would keep telling me to remain in the course. And I said no because my mark would go down, and so would my level (. ) But I

needed to apply [for universities]. . . . He told me to do a TA (teaching assistant) so I said yes.

Hyunjung: You mean, you would assist a particular teacher in lieu of taking the (third) course?

Yu-ri: Well, it's like, there is a separate teacher who is responsible for co-op. So I made an appointment with the teacher and had a meeting with the co-op teacher. And she said that to do a teaching assistant, it's not that I would go to any class that I like, but the teacher needs to, like approve me first. Like, a teacher who knows me well needs to allow me to do that, or among the teachers who I know. But I came to this school only last semester, so I don't have many teachers who I know well, as you know. So I told her so (. .) but the co-op teacher still would tell me to find a way to make the arrangement. Then she asked me, if that was not possible, what I was good at. So I told her the subjects I like and that I like painting. Then she said I could start with painting. We have some pictures displayed on the board in the school hall, although it's not that big. So she told me to do that, saying that if there is a position available later I could move to the TA position.

In sum, *yuhaksaeng*'s strategies of linguistic investment in the acquisition of academic credentials while socializing with Korean/Asian peers should be understood in relation to the *social* conditions which make it worthwhile for them to make this form of linguistic investment, rather than as mere individual choice. Furthermore, students' accounts of constraints in their authentic English capital acquisition resulting from their investment in the acquisition of academic credentials, as represented in the *ideological* construction of their own English as "poor," should not be read as an accurate representation of actual linguistic proficiency of these students. Nonetheless, ideas held by the speakers of the social value of their (and others') linguistic utterances have significant material effects on their English capital acquisition. For their linguistic investments are mediated through both racializing linguistic ideology and their habitus formed through processes of social exclusion from "White" Canada (and New Zealand).

Furthermore, it is through this ideological reproduction of authentic English as an unattainable goal that *yuhaksaeng* continue to view themselves as "poor" speakers of

English even when they obtain relatively high English proficiency (as evidenced in Yu-ri and Su-bin's university admission). This in turn further contributes to reproducing social inequality based on racialized linguistic stigmatization in the Canadian market. At the same time, however, the same linguistic ideology constructs the value of the linguistic capital *yuhaksaeng* possess as a capital of distinction in the Korean market.

***Conclusion: Language Learning as an Economic Activity***

The current chapter has examined how the acquisition of educational and linguistic capital by *yuhaksaeng* is shaped through encounters with the local/transnational English language education industry. Due to their limited access to authentic English associated with linguistic and racial stigmatization, *yuhaksaeng* chose to invest in acquiring English credentials required for acceptance to universities. While these strategies sometime proved to be successful as with the case of Yu-ri and Su-bin, *yuhaksaeng*'s investment in English credentials undermined their investment in legitimate English (i.e., authentic English) in their Canadian schools. Subsequently, they were further marginalized as illegitimate speakers of English in their Canadian schools. In this sense, contrary to their assumption that they were marginalized because they did not speak English well, their English learning was constrained due to their marginal position as ethnolinguistic minority.

The emergence of educational institutions such as "buy-a-credit" schools, where credentialized bilingualism is available as a commodity, have important implications for education: (public) schools can no longer enjoy exclusive control over distribution of the kind of credentialized bilingualism required for the recognition of the students' linguistic competence in important social selection processes. As such, language learning for these



transnational migrant students is constructed as an economic activity to accumulate linguistic resources that are simultaneously valuable in multiple linguistic markets in the globe planning their future trajectories.

Further elaboration of the implications of the study with respect to the shifting meanings and roles of language and education in the globalized new economy is what follows in the next chapter.

## **Chapter 5: Transnationalism, Bilingualism, and Social Changes**

This thesis has explored how globalization, and the commodification of language and the marketization of education in the new economy in particular, have refigured ideas of language, identity and education. The discussion focused on the case of four Korean *jogi yuhak* students in Toronto high schools and explored their language learning as economic activities as part of individuals' self-improvement projects (cf. Cameron, 2000a), shaped through encounters with the transnational language education industry. The analysis also examined new transnational subjectivities of South Korean *yuhaksaeng* (visa students). The thesis proposed a new SLA theory which conceives of language as a set of resources, or capital, and bilingualism as a socially constructed hybrid repertoire of linguistic capital, to better grasp the ways in which language learning is socially and politically embedded in new conditions generated by globalization and transnationality.

In this concluding chapter, I discuss what the stories of Yu-ri, Su-bin, and Se-jun tell us about the role of language in the Korean experience of globalization. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of this research for studies of language and globalization as well as applied linguistics/language education, with respect to renewed meanings of language, bilingualism, and education in the context of transnationalism.

### ***Language and Globalization in Korea***

Over the past 4,000 years of its history, Korea has long been the subordinate power to Chinese (cultural) imperialism, which was then followed by Japanese colonial rule (1910-1945). The end of Japanese colonialism came with the occupation of the

country by the U.S. military government (1945-1948) and the subsequent division of the peninsula between the communist North and the capitalist South, as well as the civil war (the Korean War, 1950-1953) between the two Koreas. The modern Korea in the post-Korean war era is characterized by “compressed” industrialization under the military dictatorship of the 1960s and 1970s. Over the past two decades, the nation has experienced another rapid transition from an authoritarian state of industrialization to a liberal democratic state through political democratization in the 1980s and economic neoliberalization since the 1990s.

Given such rapid transformation in society and the subsequent intensity in tensions between modernity and late-modernity in contemporary Korea, tensions and contradictions among competing language ideologies represented by globalization (e.g., the politics of identity and an economics of language) are particularly salient in Korea. While an essentialist ideology of linguistic nationalism prevailed in Korea throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, Korean-English bilingualism emerged as an index of global elite status in rapidly globalizing Korea in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. As such, the government (including provincial jurisdictions) began to realize the importance of bilingualism in the new economy, and attempted to mobilize both English and Korean as symbolic resources for national “branding” (cf. Cameron, 2000a). Yet, the tensions between the old discourse of language as an emblem and the new discourse of language as capital are left unrecognized or unresolved in this process, by constructing bilingualism as two sets of monolingualism. Therefore, various policy initiatives to promote “global Korea,” including the establishment of “English Villages,” (cf. Shin, 2006) did not prove to be

widely successful in terms of attracting foreign investors or carving out a national identity that would bring Koreans together.

The result in English education is the coexistence of two contradictory ideologies: the ideology of language as a measurable (and acquirable) skill and capital in the new discourse, and the essentialist ideology of the “native speaker” or a particular geographical location (i.e., authenticity) as a source of the value of “good” English. Such essentialist ideology leads to unproductive investment in English acquisition by Koreans both at the individual and national level, as represented in the “boom” of *jogi yuhak*. As illustrated in the stories of *yuhaksaeng* in this thesis, while the search for English as capital to help an individual’s social mobility drive the *jogi yuhak* movement, the essentialist ideology of “authentic” English makes it impossible for Koreans to actually obtain the English they claimed to desire.

In the midst of these contradictions, for the Korean middle class *jogi yuhak* both opens up possibilities and constraints for their social mobility. Going to U.S. or Canadian universities through the Korean *hakbeol* system where they had to compete with the elites in Korea is extremely difficult. In this sense, *jogi yuhak* offers some middle class individuals alternative paths to acquire high-status Western educational and linguistic capital. Upon their migration to Western countries, however, they enter another social hierarchy in which they are marginalized as ethno-racial minorities. Thus, *yuhaksaeng* (as a social category) is difficult to negotiate because these students are attempting to position themselves advantageously in multiple markets from a position where such action is virtually impossible. This is partly because each market requires something

which undermines an investment in the others, and partly because the actual concrete position makes the students peripheral to all the markets concerned.

Furthermore, the rapid increase in the number of *jogi yuhak* students is accompanied by the devaluation of the *jogi yuhak* capital. For example, one out of four elementary students in upscale *Gangnam* and *Mokdong* areas in Seoul have experienced *jogi yuhak*; over 3,200 Korean students (both undergraduate and graduate) are currently studying in elite U.S. universities including Ivy League universities, MIT, The University of California-Berkeley, and Stanford University (Yim, 2009). This number is slightly more than the 3,100 students Seoul National University accepts each year (Ibid.). The majority of these students will form future elites in Korea. Subsequently, a new hierarchy and tension between the “global” and the “local” elites might appear based on the relevant symbolic value of their educational and linguistic capital.

The greatest losers in this struggle might be those who are not able to participate in the *jogi yuhak* game at all, and, amongst *jogi yuhak* students, those whose capital has least relative value in the symbolic order (Bourdieu, 1984)--namely *jogi yuhak* students returning from South-East Asian countries. In this sense, the global symbolic order in the value of English and educational capital is locally reproduced within Korea.

In this context, educational policy makers in Korea will have to decide what constitutes legitimate English for Korean students, how the mastery of that English is measured in educational decision-making processes, and how individuals may access it. As represented in the stories I have outlined, trajectories of students traversing multiple linguistic markets in the globe represent increasing hybridity and heterogeneity. Thus,

essentialism may not be the most effective ideological response to rapidly increasing pluralism within an ever more globalizing Korea.

How does this Korean experience of globalization help us to better understand the larger processes of globalization and transnationalism? This is the topic of the next section.

### ***Globalization and Translingualism***

The story of *jogi yuhak* students can shed light on the multiple roles of language in the construction of social inequalities and changes in globalization. For example, tensions and contradictions around competing language ideologies in the social construction of *yuhaksaeng* as “Cools,” vis-à-vis the images of “(Asian) Nerds” and “FOBs” (as represented in the North American racial order), act to challenge the essentialist ideology of language and identity. Additionally, this social categorization illustrates how language serves as social action for social change, with respect to new ways of production and circulation of symbolic and material resources, brought about by technological development and the consumption based on niche markets in the new economy.

Furthermore, the “translingualism” observed in this research (Chapter 3) demonstrates how language-focused research (whether in sociolinguistics or applied linguistics), through practice and process-oriented approaches to bilingualism, may better contribute to social theories of globalization, particularly on the dialectic relationship between the global and the local. Shifts in the symbolic order of the value of linguistic resources in multilingual repertoires of *yuhaksaeng* through translingualism, whereby Korean language, rather than English, indexes globality, serves to exemplify specific

ways of how both the global and the local are socially constructed. Subsequently, the boundary between the global and the local is open to contestation; the global hegemony of English is not unchallengeable. Furthermore, the way the local market value of authenticity (i.e., renewed meaning of Korean language and culture) gains global currency through global circulation of resources and ideologies implies that globalization is not necessarily about a top-down imposition of the global on the local.

Additionally, contrary to the common association of globalization being the amplified linguistic homogeneity across global linguistic markets, this research shows that globalization produces new hybrid social positions (such as “Cools”) and sociolinguistic communities which are increasingly multilingual. For example, at the youth ministry of the ethnic Korean church where I conducted my research, the English Ministry houses second generation Korean-Canadians who do not speak any Korean as well as various long-term immigrants (including bilingual second generations) speaking different varieties of English and Korean. In the Korean Ministry, both newcomers and long-term immigrants speak different varieties of English and Korean with varying proficiency. This in turn serves to challenge the essentialist ideology of ethnicity and language: In this youth ministry of the ethnic *Korean* church, the shared language is (different varieties of) English, rather than Korean.

This ethnography of *yuhaksaeng* enables us to gain a better grasp of the complexities regarding renewed notions of citizenship, language and education in globalization. In Canada, immigration has contributed to two-thirds of the country’s population growth between 2001 and 2006 (Chui, Tran, & Maheux, 2006a) and has long played a key role in defining Canada’s identity. Asian nations, including Korea, comprise

five out of the top six source countries for recent immigrants to the country, representing over 40% of all newcomers in 2006 (Chui, Tran, & Maheux, 2006b). The discourse of bilingualism in Canada, however, is based on the notion of Canada as a nation of European settlers, consisting of English Canada and French Canada; such ideological construction contributes to marginalizing non-European (including Asian) immigrants (as well as other groups of European-origin) and the bilingualism or multilingualism they possess.

In addition, globalization has brought a new group of wealthy Asian migrants (such as *yuhaksaeng* and their families), who do not necessarily enter the country in pursuit of the “Canadian Dream,” but come more so as consumers or clients in search of particular resources. Unlike traditional (Asian) immigrants, these new middle-class Asians are not willing to be positioned at the bottom of the social hierarchy waiting for upward mobility by the next generation. They have the means to move to another market if their capital acquisition does not prove to be successful in Canada. As such, while they are not always *immigrants*, they are significant figures in the nation’s economy as revenue sources.

Yet, what the stories outlined in this thesis tell us is that Canadians are not widely well-prepared to meet or support these new group of migrants. Stories of *yuhaksaeng* significantly resonate with messages from wealthy Hong Kong immigrants in California who participated in Ong’s (1999) study, as represented in an interviewee’s remark: “They want your Pacific Rim money, but they don’t want you” (p. 108). Indeed, *yuhaksaeng* are the kind of highly-skilled human capital (with Canadian credentials and linguistic capital) Canada seeks to attract through their immigration policy. In addition, the political



economic transformation in the new economy and resulting intensification of competition underscores serving the needs of the customer. As Brah (1996) argues, “(diasporic) journeys are essentially about settling down, about putting roots ‘elsewhere’” (p. 182). Where they would essentially settle down depends on how the host society might serve them. Despite the nation’s roots in Europe, given the exponential growth of the number of international students from Asian countries in Canadian schools as this research has shown, the future of the Canadian education industry relies on Asia.

I was struck by the remark of an interviewee at the same school board in Toronto where 60% of its international students were from Korea (Chapter 1). In the interview, she showed me a document indicating that “Korean” students constituted less than 1% of their student population (Interview, school board interviewee, May 2, 2007). One consequence of the ideological construction of Canada as a country of immigrants in the state discourse of multiculturalism is the erasure of the existence of aboriginal peoples in the country (see also Ang, 2001, for a similar observation in Australia). Likewise, the same discourse renders populations such as *yuhaksaeng* (visa students) invisible, buried under the number of 1% along with Korean-Canadians, Korean immigrants, ethnic Koreans from China, and North Korean refugees. One of the aims of this thesis has been to illustrate how ethnography is an effective methodological tool to render the category of *yuhaksaeng* visible, and help us to think about issues relating to them that might have not been captured in a number.

The journey is not yet complete. Non-immigrant migrants within the “immigrants’ country” are struggling for their visibility.

### *“Theory” in Applied Linguistics*

In this final section, I discuss the contributions of my research to applied linguistics (both to SLA and ELT), as well as challenges and questions it opens up with respect to new ideas of language, identity, and education generated by globalization.

Given the salient role of language and education in the new economy, applied linguistics, an academic discipline based on *language* and *education* (learning and teaching), serves as a particularly revealing site of social changes associated with globalization. As represented in the stories of *jogi yuhak* students outlined in this thesis, globalization--most notably through the commodification of language and corporatization of education--opens up new challenges for language education researchers and practitioners. The new condition subsequently demands ideological shifts in key concepts and tools in applied linguistic research. For example, the tensions, contradictions, ambivalence, and complexities revealed in the trajectories of resources and of social actors in the stories of *yuhaksaeng* teach us that essentialist ideologies of language, as a bounded system and as an emblem, may not be the best tools to grasp the ways in which language learning is socially and politically embedded in contemporary conditions. I argue that practices and processes oriented approaches to language, which highlight political economy and ideology, offer us better tools to research language education in today's world.

As Gass (2000) complains about the one-way flow of knowledge from related *theoretical* disciplines to applied linguistics, its marginal position in the academic communities as an *applied* science has prevented applied linguistic theories from gaining high symbolic value outside of its own discipline. The “theory versus practice” binary prevalent within the discipline further exacerbates this situation, whereby *applied* is

frequently equated with “atheoretical.” If applied linguistics is associated with its focus on the “real world” issues regarding language, we have all the more reasons to tackle the complexities in the real, “social” world of language. Thus, developing an applied linguistic theory with clear ontological, epistemological and methodological stance from practice and process-oriented perspectives better positions the discipline to engage in the transdisciplinary dialogues on globalization. Given their expertise on both language and education, applied linguistic researchers have much to contribute to the *social* theorization of globalization in the new economy. Yet, scholarly investigations of globalization as a mode in applied linguistic inquiry have been scarce.

This research contributes to an applied linguistic theorization of globalization by opening up a new territory in SLA research that examines “transnationalism” as a new language learning situation. If we agree that the contemporary world does provide a different context for language learning, particularly in relation to the circulation of linguistic resources, people and ideologies, we need an SLA theory that engages with such new conditions more seriously and critically. The current research proposes one such theory, employing political economic frameworks which have attracted little attention in SLA research. Below, I discuss in what ways this new SLA theory contributes to enhancing our understandings of language learning and teaching in the ever more globalizing world, particularly regarding the role of language and education in not only constructing but also challenging social inequality.

First, this thesis advances the notion of language as social practice further, and introduces a notion of bilingualism as a social construct. Although the emergence of “sociolinguistic” approaches to SLA has reconceptualized language as social practice

from an abstract, bounded system, discussions of bilingualism as a social construct have attracted little attention in applied linguistic research. Accordingly, bilingualism in SLA still remains as two parallel sets of autonomous linguistic systems; linguistic productions of language learning individuals are thus constructed as inherently deficient (e.g., interlanguage). As demonstrated in this research, an understanding of bilingualism as a socially constructed hybrid repertoire of linguistic capital is better positioned to explain and accommodate the complexities and heterogeneity represented in language data produced by, and language learning trajectories of students, who play multiple games in multiple linguistic markets across the globe.

Second, this dissertation serves to illustrate what an SLA theory from a social practice perspective might look like. While language as a social practice has gained much currency in recent SLA research, “acquisition” largely remains as a “cognitive” endeavor to build knowledge structure of linguistic forms; we still poorly understand what it means to learn language as social practice. This thesis proposes a “social” perspective of acquisition, which conceptualizes language learning as an economic activity as part of an individual’s self-improvement project. The notion of language as a set of resources, or capital, is particularly useful to conceptualize acquisition (of the linguistic capital) as social. For the value of the linguistic capital is inherently related not only to the linguistic market concerned, but to the social position of its speaker in that market. Since this new SLA theory highlights *legitimate* (or socially approved) competence, rather than linguistic competence, an individual’s access to (and hence the acquisition of) linguistic resources is contingent upon his/her social position in the market concerned.

Third, by situating identity within processes of social categorization (or boundary making), this thesis contributes to a better articulation of the role of identity in language learning. Although L2 identity studies have advanced the theorization of social aspects (particularly, societal power relations) of L2 learning, the nature of the role of identity in L2 learning is still under-theorized. The analysis of processes of boundary making (hence, identities) and of why individuals engage (or do not engage) in certain forms of boundary making reveals how individuals access (or are denied access to) particular linguistic resources, and what subsequently happens to their hybrid linguistic repertoires.

What, then, do all these new understandings of language, identity, and language learning tell us about language teaching? Why are social *theories* of language and globalization important for language teachers and policy makers? Why do teachers need to understand contemporary conditions such as the political economy, globalization, and transnationalism? Why do (language) ideologies matter for them?

I should first note that although I highlighted language *learning* in this research because SLA appears to be the domain in the field which remains least challenged by recent critical L2 research, I attempt to dismantle the dichotomy between theory and practice (or SLA and ELT) in applied linguistics. For example, earlier SLA research focused on classroom issues with the intent of better informing language instruction. (Ellis, 2007).

First, ideas of language have consequences in how language teaching is conceptualized. With the prevailing view of bilingualism as two sets of parallel monolingualisms, consisting of first language (L1) and second language (L2), in SLA theories, L2 teaching is often conceptualized as an attempt to move students'

interlanguage closer to the target norm (cf. Reagan, 2004). This, in turn, has influenced how decisions regarding what constitutes legitimate competence and measurement of the linguistic competence, have been made, thereby how language testing/evaluation/assessment practices have been conducted in applied linguistics. In L2 education, learner languages have typically been *measured* against the fixed norm/target; non-target forms have been categorized as anomalies--errors to be corrected.

How might we imagine second language teaching in different ways if we conceive of bilingualism as a socially constructed hybrid repertoire of linguistic capital? How might bilingual education be better conceptualized in theory and practice from this perspective (see e.g., Garcia, 2009, for the notion of translanguaging and Martin-Jones, 2007, for the call for critical, interpretive approaches to bilingual education)? How might we envision language testing, planning, and policy in different ways if we highlight *social* competence (or appropriateness *in situ*) rather than linguistic competence?

Second, educational experiences of *jogi yuhak* students in this research illustrate how language teaching is constructed as part of the language education industry in the new economy, and how language learning in a contemporary world thus almost always goes beyond the language classrooms or schools. The increasing conflation between language education and language industry in today's world poses challenges to public schools. For example, given the neo-liberal emphasis on education as work-related training and expanding corporatization of educational institutions, how might public schools (and teachers and administrators therein) redefine their roles? How might they secure their competitive advantage over the corporate sector, given the significant role of the language education industry in students' language learning as documented in this

study? Are we, as educators, serving our cosmopolitan *clients* to help their self-improvement through education to supply workforce to labor market? Or are we educating future generations of multicultural, Canadian citizens? The decisions and choices we make as educators regarding these issues--on notions of language and language learning--have a significant consequence on students' lives.

Last but most importantly, ideas of language play a key role in educational decision-making processes by categorizing people based on their perceived linguistic differences. In this sense, ideologies of language and learning that teachers and educators hold contribute to the construction of social inequality (or change). Subsequently, a critical understanding of the historical construction of ideologies and social organization enables us to comprehend how to intervene in the (re)production of the ideologies (and hence, inequalities), as well as understand where we begin to take action to advocate for social change. For example, strategies of linguistic investment of *yuhaksaeng* outlined in this research indicate the salient role of habitus, as learned through their trajectories traversing multiple linguistic markets, in shaping students' language practices and hence their language learning (see Chapter 4). Can we, as teachers, teach or help students to rebuild their habitus so they will not invest in marginalizing practices? How might we do so?

The banal essentialism of nationalist language ideology, whereby language, culture, nation, and people are mapped onto one another in one-to-one correspondence is one of the hardest essentialisms to challenge (Woolard, 1998), and is thus prevalent in daily practices in language classrooms. Thus, a well-meaning, liberal multiculturalist educator who tries to choose resources that recognize students' background might

ultimately contribute to reproducing such essentialism (and hence, inequality), by encouraging students to share their own experiences in their countries/cultures of origin. For example, most of the *jogi yuhaksaeng* who I interacted with during this research had left Korea in their early teens, if not earlier, and the significant amount of their schooling experiences had often occurred in English-speaking countries by the time they attended high schools. Therefore, Yu-ri reported that she could most actively participate in her ESL classroom in Canada when the class discussed racism, where she could share her experience in New Zealand. A critical understanding of how ideology is constructed and functions thus helps teachers to see such consequences of their own practice, which lie beyond their knowledgeability (cf. Giddens, 1984).

Likewise, to better understand how students' language learning happens and how their practices are mediated through ideologies of language, language teachers and educational practitioners need to critically understand the social conditions of their language learning, which make certain forms of linguistic investment by students more profitable than others. For example, to critically understand the social meaning of bilingual practices of *yuhaksaeng* (i.e., why they invest in conspicuous consumption of Korean language and culture), which might have been dismissed or problematized in conventional approaches to L2 learning and teaching, teachers need to understand the relation between the social value of linguistic capital and the multiple linguistic markets the students are traversing. This, in turn, will help teachers and policy makers to better accommodate and assist with transnational migrant students such as *jogi yuhaksaeng* by designing transformative pedagogies (cf. Cummins, 2000) specifically targeted to them. After all, these students' numbers are rapidly increasing in Canadian (and other English-



speaking countries') schools and yet remain significantly under-represented in the literature.

This thesis has provided my account of why and how the language learning of Korean *jogi yuhak* students occurs through their transnational migrations, and why it happens the way it does.

Where will this take you?

## References

- Ang, I. (2001). *On not speaking Chinese: Living between Asia and the West*. London: Routledge.
- Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. *Theory, Culture and Society*, 7, 295-310.
- Appadurai, A. (1996). *Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Press.
- Auer, P. (Ed.). (2007). *Style and social identities: Alternative approaches to linguistic heterogeneity*. Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Auerbach, E. (1993). Reexamining English only in the ESL Classroom. *TESOL Quarterly*, 27, 9-32.
- Barth, F. (Ed.). (1969). *Ethnic groups and boundaries*. Boston: Little Brown.
- Bauman, R. & Briggs, C. (2003). *Voices of modernity: Language ideologies and the politics of inequality*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Bayley, R., & Schecter, S. (2003). *Language socialization in bilingual and multilingual societies*. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Block, D. (2003). *The social turn in second language acquisition*. Edinburgh, Scotland: Edinburgh University Press.
- Block, D. (2006). *Multilingual identities in a global city: London stories*. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Blommaert, J. (Ed.). (1999). *Language ideological debates*. Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Blommaert, J. (2003). Commentary: A sociolinguistics of globalization. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(4), 607–623.
- Bonilla-Silva, E. (2003). *Racism without racists: Color-blind racism and the persistence of racial inequality in the United States*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). The economics of linguistic exchanges. *Social Science Information*, 16(6): 645-668.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984). *Distinction*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital (R. Nice, Trans.). In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241-258). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1991). *Language and symbolic power* (J. B. Thompson, Ed.; G. Raymond & M. Adamson, Trans.). Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- Brah, A. (1996). Diaspora, border and transnational identities. In A. Brah, *Cartographies of diaspora: Contesting identities* (pp. 178-210). London: Routledge.
- Bucholtz, M. (2003). Sociolinguistic nostalgia and the authentication of identity. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(3), 398–416.
- Cameron, D. (2000a). *Good to talk?* London: Sage.
- Cameron, D. (2000b). Styling the worker: Gender and the commodification of language in the globalized service economy. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 4(3), 323-347.

- Cho, G-W. (2008, February 15). *Jeot gwa ggul i heureuneun yeongeo malhagi sijang* [English-speaking test market]. *Hangyeore* 21, 697. Retrieved February 28, 2008, from <http://hani.co.kr>
- Cho, U. (2004). *Segyehwa ui choicheomdan e seon hanguk ui gajok* [Korean families on the forefront of globalization]. *Gyeonje wa sahwo*, 64, 148-171.
- Cho, S., Shim, S., Shin, I., & Lee, J. (2006). *Jogi yuhak seonggonggwa silpae sarye josa mit hakbumo gyedo rul wihan hongbo bangan yeongu*. Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development.
- Chui, T., Tran, K., & Maheux, H. (2006a). Immigration in Canada: A portrait of the foreign-born population, 2006 Census: Findings. Statistics Canada. Retrieved April 30, 2009, from <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/index-eng.cfm?CFID=3249442&CFTOKEN=18311105>
- Chui, T., Tran, K., & Maheux, H. (2006b). Immigration in Canada: A portrait of the foreign-born population, 2006 Census: Immigrants came from many countries. Statistics Canada. Retrieved April 30, 2009, from <http://www12.statcan.ca/census-recensement/2006/as-sa/97-557/p4-eng.cfm>
- Conradson, D. & Latham, A. (2005). Transnational urbanism: Attending to everyday experiences and mobilities. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31(2), 227-233.
- Coupland, N. (2003a). Sociolinguistic authenticities. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(3), 417-431.

- Coupland, N. (Ed.). (2003b). Special issue on Sociolinguistics and Globalization. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(4).
- Cummins, J. (2000). *Language, power and pedagogy: Bilingual children in the crossfire*. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Cummins, J. (2001). *Negotiating identities: Education for empowerment in a diverse society* (2nd ed.). Los Angeles: California Association For Bilingual Education.
- Doughty, C., & Long, M. (Eds.). (2003). *Handbook of second language acquisition*. Oxford, England: Blackwell
- Duff, P. (2003). New directions in second language socialization research. *Korean Journal of English Language and Linguistics*, 3, 309-339.
- Duff, P. (2008). Language socialization, participation and identity: Ethnographic approaches. In M. Martin-Jones, A. Mejia, & N. Hornberger (Eds.), *Discourse and education: Encyclopedia of language and education 3* (pp. 107-120). New York: Springer.
- Eckert, P. (1996). *Vowels and nail polish: The emergence of linguistic style in the preadolescent heterosexual marketplace*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University/Institute for Research on Learning.
- Eckert, P. (2003). Sociolinguistics and authenticity: An elephant in the room. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(3), 392-431.
- Editorial/*The Korea Herald* (2003, September 8). Reasons of exodus. *The Korea Herald*. Retrieved December 10, 2004, from <http://www.kinds.or.kr>

- Ellis, R. (1997). *Second language acquisition: Oxford introductions to language study*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Ellis, R. (April, 2007). *Developments in SLA research*. Paper presented at the American Association for Applied Linguistics Conference, Costa Mesa, CA.
- Fairclough, N. (2006). *Language and globalization*. New York: Routledge.
- Firth, A., & Wagner, J. (1997). On discourse, communication, and (some) fundamental concepts in SLA research. *Modern Language Journal*, 81(3), 285-300.
- Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon.
- Freeman, C. (2001). Is local : global as feminine : masculine? Rethinking the gender of globalization. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 26(4), 1007-1037.
- Garcia, O. (2009). *Bilingual education in the 21st century: A global perspective*. Oxford, England: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Gass, S. (1997). Apples and oranges: Or, why apples are not orange and don't need to be. A response to Firth and Wagner. *Modern Language Journal*, 82, 83-90
- Gass, S. (2000). Changing view of language learning. In H. Trappes-Lomax (Ed.), *Change and continuity in applied linguistics* (pp. 51-67). Clevedon, England: British Association for Applied Linguistics/Multilingual Matters.
- Gee, J., Hull, G., & Lankshear, C. (1996). *The new work order: Behind the language of the new capitalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

- Giddens, A. (1979). *Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Giddens, A. (1984). *The constitution of society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Giddens, A. (1991). *Modernity and self identity: Self and society in the late modern age*. Cambridge, England: Polity.
- Goldstein, T. (2003). *Teaching and learning in a multilingual school: Choices, risks and dilemmas*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Grewal, I. & Kaplan, C. (1994). Introduction: Transnational feminist practices and questions of postmodernity. In I. Grewal & C. Kaplan (Eds.), *Scattered hegemonies: Postmodernity and transnational feminist practices* (pp. 1-33). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Gukjeong Briefing Special Project Team. (2007). *Shillok gyoyuk jeongchaeksa. Gukjeong Briefing* (The Republic of Korea Policy Portal). Retrieved February 26, 2008, from [www.korea.kr](http://www.korea.kr)
- Gumperz, J. (1982). *Discourse strategies*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Han, H. (2007). *Language, religion, and immigrant settlement: An ethnography*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
- Hannerz, U. (1996). *Transnational connections: Culture, people, places*. London: Routledge.

- Harklau, L. (2000). From the “good kids” to the “worst”: Representation of English language learners across educational settings. *TESOL Quarterly*, 34, 35-67.
- Harvey, D. (1989). *The condition of postmodernity*. Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Heller, M. (1999). *Linguistic minorities and modernity: A sociolinguistic ethnography*. London: Longman.
- Heller, M. (2001). Undoing the macro/micro dichotomy: Ideology and categorization in a linguistic minority school. In N. Coupland, S. Sarangi, & C. Candlin (Eds.), *Sociolinguistics and social theory* (pp. 212-234). Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson Education.
- Heller, M. (2003). Globalization, the new economy, and the commodification of language and identity. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(4): 473-492.
- Heller, M. (2005). Language, skill and authenticity in the globalized new economy. *Noves SL. Revista de Sociolinguística*. Retrieved January 28, 2006, from <http://www.gencat.net/presidencia/lengcat/>
- Heller, M. (Ed.). (2007). *Bilingualism: A social approach*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Heller, M. (2008a). Doing ethnography. In L. Wei & M. Moyer (Eds.), *Blackwell guide to research methods in bilingualism and multilingualism* (pp. 249-262). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Heller, M. (2008b). Language and the nation-state: Challenges to sociolinguistic theory and practice. *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 12(4), 504-524.
- Henry, F., & Tator, C. (2005). *The colour of democracy: Racism in Canadian society* (3rd ed.). Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Nelson.



- Hobsbawm, E. (1990). *Nations and nationalism since 1760*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- House, J. (2003). English as a lingual franca: A threat to multilingualism? *Journal of Sociolinguistics*, 7(4), 556-578.
- Huat, C. B., & K. Iwabuchi, K. (Eds.). (2008). *East Asian pop culture: Analyzing the Korean wave*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Hwang, S.-H. (January 28, 2008). *Yeongeo gonggyoyuk ganghwa ro 'yeongeo yanggeukhwa' haeso handa* [Eliminating 'English Polarization' by enhancing public English education]. *Daehanminguk jeongchaek portal* [Korea's policy portal]. Retrieved March 2, 2008, from <http://www.korea.kr>
- Irvine, J. (2001). "Style" as distinctiveness: The culture and ideology of linguistic differentiation. In P. Eckert & J. Rickford (Eds.), *Style and sociolinguistic variation* (pp. 21-43). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Irvine, J., & Gal, S. (2000). Language ideology and linguistic differentiation. In P. V. Kroskrity (Ed.), *Regimes of language: Ideologies, politics, and identities* (pp. 35-81). Santa Fe, NM: School of American Research Press.
- Iwabuchi, K. (2008). When the Korean wave meets resident Koreans in Japan: Intersections of the transnational, the postcolonial and the multicultural. In C. B. Huat & K. Iwabuchi (Eds.), *East Asian pop culture: Analyzing the Korean wave* (pp. 243-264). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Jo, K.-W. (2008). English test market in Korea. *The Hangyeore*. Retrieved March 13, 2006, from <http://hani.co.kr>

- Kang, H.-K. (2008, March 3). Half-baked policies lie behind record-low support. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved March 13, 2008, from <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>
- Kanno, Y. (2003). *Negotiating bilingual and bicultural identities: Japanese returnees betwixt two worlds*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Kasper, G. (1997). "A" stands for acquisition: A response to Firth and Wagner. *Modern Language Journal*, 81, 307-312.
- Kasper, G. (2006). Beyond repair: Conversation analysis as an approach to SLA. *AILA Review*, 19, 83-99.
- KEDI. (2007). The number of students in elementary and secondary schools who left for study abroad in 2006. Retrieved October 20, 2008, from <http://std.kedi.re.kr/index.jsp>
- Kim, J. (2007, July 19). *Jogi yuhak · eohak yeonsu*. . . 'na hollo chulguk' chodeungsaeng geubjeung [elementary students leaving Korea for study abroad]. *Chosun Ilbo*. Retrieved August 6, 2007, from <http://news.chosun.com>
- Kim, Jin-Gon. (2007). Special article: Early study abroad. *Yuhak Journal* 129. Seoul, Korea: *Yuhak Journalsa*.
- Kim, S.-K. (2007, November 9). *Global citizens in the making: Transnational migration and education in Kirogi Families*. Paper presented at the Korean Studies Workshop, Centre for the Study of Korea, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
- Kim, S.-H. (2008, March 14). *Asia chodaeseok: Asia choigo MBA uri ga chaek im jil geot* [Asia invitation: We plan to offer the best MBA in Asia. Interview with Seo

- Jeong-Don, president of Sunggyungwan University]. *Asia Gyeongje*. Retrieved October 1, 2009, from <http://www.asiae.co.kr/news/print.htm?idxno=2008031409334161883>
- Kramersch, C. (Ed.). (2002). *Language acquisition and language socialization*. New York: Continuum.
- Kubota, R. (2002). The author responds: (Un)Raveling racism in a nice field like TESOL. *TESOL Quarterly*, 36, 84-92.
- Kubota, R. (2004). Critical multiculturalism and second language education. In B. Norton & K. Toohey (Eds.), *Critical pedagogies and language learning* (pp. 30-52). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lantolf, J. (Ed.). (2000). *Sociocultural theory and second language learning*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Lantolf, J. P., & Pavlenko, A. (2001). (S)econd (L)anguage (A)ctivity theory: Understanding second language learners as people. In M. P. Breen (Ed.), *Learner contributions to language learning* (pp. 141-158). Harlow, England: Longman.
- Larsen-Freeman, D., & Long, M. (1991). *An introduction to second language acquisition research*. London: Longman.
- Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). *Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Lee, H. (2008). *"I am a Kirogi Mother, so this is my job, not father's!": Education exodus and life transformation among Korean immigrant women*. Unpublished

- scholarly paper, Department of Second Language Studies, University of Hawaii at Manoa.
- Lee, J. (2006). Linguistic constructions of modernity: English mixing in Korean television commercials. *Language in Society*, 35, 59-91.
- Lee, K.-H. (2008). Mapping out the cultural politics of “the Korean Wave” in contemporary South Korea. In C.B. Huat & K. Iwabuchi (Eds.), *East Asian pop culture: Analyzing the Korean wave* (pp. 175-189). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Lee, M.-B. (2008, February 25). Inauguration address at the 17th President inaugural ceremony. *Chosun Ilbo*. Retrieved February 28, 2008, from <http://news.chosun.com>
- Lightbown, P., & Spada, N. (1999). *How languages are learned* (Rev. ed.). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Lim, J. (2008). LPGA masquerade. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved October 1, 2009, from <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>
- Lin, A., & Tong, A. (2008). Re-imagining a cosmopolitan ‘Asian Us’: Korea media flows and imaginaries of Asian modern femininities. In C. B. Huat & K. Iwabuchi (Eds.), *East Asian pop culture: Analyzing the Korean wave* (pp. 91-125). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Lippi-Green, R. (1997). *English with an accent: Language, ideology, and discrimination in the United States*. London: Routledge.

- Lo, A., & Kim, J. (2009, March 22). The transnationalism of linguistic ideologies and linguistic capital: South Korean “Early Study Abroad” Students. Paper presented at the 2009 American Association for Applied Linguistics Conference, Denver, CO.
- Long, M. (1997). Construct validity in SLA research: A response to Firth and Wagner. *Modern Language Journal, 81*, 318-323.
- Martin-Jones, M. (2007). Bilingualism, education and the regulation of access to language resources. In M. Heller (Ed.), *Bilingualism: A social approach* (pp. 161-182). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- McKay, S. L., & Wong, S. C. (1996). Multiple discourses, multiple identities: Investment and agency in second-language learning among Chinese adolescent immigrant students. *Harvard Educational Review, 66*, 577-608.
- Milroy, L. (2001). The social categories of race and class: Language ideology and sociolinguistics. In N. Coupland, S. Sarangi, & C. Candlin (Eds.), *Sociolinguistics and social theory* (pp. 235-260). Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson Education.
- Miniwatts Marketing Group (2008). *Internet world stats. Usage and population statistics*. [www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.html](http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats7.html)
- Mori, Y. (2008). Winter sonata and cultural practices of active fans in Japan: Considering middle-aged women as cultural agents. In C. B. Huat & K. Iwabuchi (Eds.), *East Asian pop culture: Analyzing the Korean wave* (pp. 127-141). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.

- Norton, B. (2000). *Identity and language learning: Gender, ethnicity and educational change*. Harlow, England: Longman/Pearson Education.
- Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Park, J. S. (2009). *The local construction of a global language: Ideologies of English in South Korea*. Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter.
- Park, J. S., & Bae, S. (2009, submitted). Language ideologies in educational migration: Korean jogi yuhak families in Singapore. In N. Abelmann, S. A. Kwon, A. Lo, & S. Okazaki (Eds.), *South Korea's educational exodus: The life and challenges of early study abroad*.
- Park, S.-J. (2007). Educational manager mothers: South Korea's neoliberal transformation. *Korea Journal*, 47(3), 186-213.
- Park, S.-J., & Abelmann, N. (2004). Class and cosmopolitan striving: Mothers' management of English education in South Korea. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 77(4), 645-672.
- Park, S.-J. (2008, February 14). Seonmudang i saram jabneunda. *Hangyeore 21*. Retrieved February 28, 2008, from <http://www.hani.co.kr>
- Park, S.-Y. (2008, March 2). Samsung Group embarks on recruitment in March. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved March 13, 2008, from <http://news.mk.co.kr>
- Pennycook, A. (1998). *English and the discourses of colonialism*. London: Routledge.
- Pennycook, A. (2001). *Critical applied linguistics: A critical introduction*. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

- Pennycook, A. (2004). Performativity and language studies. *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies, 1*(1), 1-19.
- Pennycook, A. (2007). *Global Englishes and transcultural flows*. London: Routledge.
- Peters, T. (1994). *The Tom Peters seminar: Crazy times call for crazy organizations*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Rampton, B. (1995). *Crossing: Language and ethnicity among adolescents*. London: Longman.
- Rampton, B. (1997). Second language research in late modernity. A response to Firth and Wagner. *Modern Language Journal, 82*, 329-333.
- Rampton, B. (2006). *Language in late modernity: Interaction in an urban school*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Razack, S. (1998). *Looking white people in the eye: Gender, race, and culture in courtrooms and classrooms*. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press.
- Reagan, T. (2004). Objectification, positivism and language studies: A reconsideration. *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies, 1*(1), 41-60.
- Robertson, R. (1992). *Globalization: Social theory and global culture*. London: Sage.
- Schieffelin, B., Woolard, K. A., & Kroskrity, P. V. (Eds.). (1998). *Language ideologies: Practice and theory*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

- Selinker, L. (1972). Interlanguage. *International Review of Applied Linguistics*, 10, 209-231. Reprinted in J.C. Richards (Ed.), *Error Analysis* (pp. 31-54). London: Longman, 1974.
- Shin, H. (2006). Rethinking TESOL from a SOL's perspective: Indigenous epistemology and decolonizing praxis in TESOL. *Critical Inquiry in Language Studies*, 3(2/3), 147-167.
- Shin, H. (2007). English language teaching in Korea: Toward globalization or *glocalization*? In J. Cummins & C. Davison (Eds.), *International handbook of English language teaching* (Vol. 1, pp. 75-86). Norwell, MA: Springer.
- Siegal, M. (1996). The role of learner subjectivity in second language sociolinguistic competency: Western women learning Japanese. *Applied Linguistics*, 17(3), 356-382.
- Song, J.-Y. (2007). *Language ideologies and identity: Korean children's language socialization in a bilingual setting*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ohio State University, Columbus.
- Spivak, G. C. (1996). Diasporas old and new: Women in the transnational world. *Textual Practice*, 10(2), 245-269.
- Stoler, A. (1997). Racial histories and their regimes of truth. *Political Power and Social Theory*, 11, 183-206.
- Swain, M., & Deters, P. (2007). "New" mainstream SLA theory: Expanded and enriched. *Modern Language Journal*, 91, 820-836.



- Talmy, S. (2004). Forever FOB: The cultural production of ESL in a high school. *Pragmatics*, 14(2/3), 149-172.
- The Canadian Education Industry Summit. (2004, October 28). *Conference Agenda, Speaker Biographies* (p. 15). Retrieved January 5, 2008, from [www.ceis.ca](http://www.ceis.ca)
- Thompson, J. B. (1991). Editor's introduction. In P. Bourdieu (1991) (J. B. Thompson, Ed.; G. Raymond & M. Adamson, Trans.), *Language and symbolic power* (pp. 1-31). Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- Toohey, K. (2000). *Learning English at school: Identity, social relations and classroom practice*. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.
- Trappes-Lomax, H. (Ed.). (2000). *Change and continuity in Applied Linguistics: Selected papers from the Annual Meeting of the British Association of Applied Linguistics (BAAL)*. Annual meeting, University of Edinburgh (September 1999). Clevedon, England: BAAL in association with Multilingual Matters.
- van Dijk, T. A. (1999). Discourse and the denial of racism. In A. Jaworski & N. Coupland (Eds.), *The discourse reader* (pp. 541-558). London: Routledge.
- Waters, J. (2001). *Migration strategies and transnational families: Vancouver's Satellite Kids*. Retrieved November 26, 2005, from [http://www.riim.metropolis.net/research-policy/research\\_policy2/papers\\_e3.html](http://www.riim.metropolis.net/research-policy/research_policy2/papers_e3.html)
- Waters, J. (2006). Geographies of cultural capital: Education, international migration and family strategies between Hong Kong and Canada. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 31, 179-192.

- Watson-Gegeo, K. (2003). Language socialization in SLA. In C. Doughty & M. Long (Eds.), *Handbook of second language acquisition* (pp. 155-177). Oxford, England: Blackwell.
- Woolard, K. A. (1998). Introduction: Language ideology as a field of inquiry. In B. B. Schieffelin, K. A. Woolard, & P. V. Kroskrity (Eds.), *Language ideologies: Practice and theory* (pp. 3-47). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Yarymowich, M. (2003). *Language tourism in Canada: Theorizing language education as a global commodity*. Unpublished master's thesis, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
- Yim, K.-J. (2009, June 23). 1988 nyeon ihu daehan minguk eseo taeonan i deul eu saedae jeok uimi. *Juhan Hanguk (The Weekly Hanguk)*. Retrived July 20, 2009, from <http://weekly.hankooki.com/>
- Yu, S.-J. (2008, January 28). Insuwi, 1 juil mane “Yeongeo molip gyoyuk baekjihwa.” [withdrawing the English immersion plan] *Hangyeore*. Retrieved February 28, 2008, from <http://www.hani.co.kr>

**Appendix A**  
**Transcription Conventions**

(.)	Short pause
(. .)	Long pause
word//	Overlap starts
//word	Overlap ends
<u>word</u>	words uttered in English in the Korean data
WORD	Speaker's emphasis
words	Researcher's emphasis

## Appendix B

### Summary Table of Focal Participants (as of September 2006)

Pseudonym (*self selected)	Grades/ School type (*education level of parents)	Citizenship status in Canada	City lived in Korea/ in Canada	Gender	Appro x. age (years)	Data obtained	Previous overseas background (*occupation of parents)	Number of years in Canada	University (plan)
1.1 Yu-ri* (focal)	Gr. 12 / Public	Study permit ( <i>gireogi gajok</i> )	Seoul/ Toronto	Female	19	Interview, obsrv. , text msg, MSN, homepage, recording	NZ (Gr. 8+ 4 years; short-term in summer 2002)	0.7 (since Feb. 2006)	University of Toronto (since Fall 07)
1.2 Su-bin* (focal)	Gr. 12/ Public	Study permit ( <i>gireogi gajok</i> )	Seoul/ Toronto	Female	17	Interview, obsrv. , text msg, writing sample, recording	NZ (Gr. 8+ 4 years; short-term in summer 2002)	0.7 (since Feb. 2006)	University of Toronto (since Fall 07)
Mother	B.A.	Temporary Resident Visa ( <i>gireogi gajok</i> )	Seoul/ Toronto	Female	46	Interview, obsrv.	NZ (summer 2002-2006) Stay-at-home mother	0.7 (since Feb. 2006)	Returned to Korea Oct. 2007
Father	B.A.	N/A	Seoul	Male	46-49	N/A	Senior staff, broadcasting station	N/A	N/A
1.3 Yu-bin* (focal)	Gr. 9/ Catholic	Immigrant	Seoul/ Toronto	Female	14	Interview, obsrv., MSN, school assignments	N/A	2 (since Aug. 2004)	Canada or U.S.
Mother	M.A. (coursework completed)	Immigrant (skilled)	Seoul/ Toronto	Female	43	Interview, obsrv.	Stay-at-home mother/ Korean community organization	2 (since Aug. 2004)	N/A
Father	M.A.	Immigrant (skilled)	Seoul/ Toronto	Male	44	Interview, obsrv.	Producer(radio)/ factory worker	2 (since Aug. 2004)	N/A
Brother	Gr. 6 /Catholic	Immigrant	Seoul/ Toronto	Male	11	Interview, obsrv.	N/A	2 (since Aug. 2004)	U.S. (baseball)

Pseudonym (*self selected)	Grades/School type (*education level of parents)	Citizenship status in Canada	City lived in Korea/in Canada	Gender	Approx. age (years)	Data obtained	Previous overseas background (*occupation of parents)	Number of years in Canada	University (plan)
1.4 Se-jun	Gr. 12/ Public	Citizen (unaccompanied)	Provincial city/ Toronto	Male	18	Interview, obsrv. , text msg, MSN, homepage, recording	Ontario (Grade 3, 1997-1998)	4 (since Nov. 2002)	Returned to Korea March2008/army
Mother	B.A.	N/A	Provincial city	Female	40-49	Interview	Stay-at-home mother/ sales agent- insurance company	N/A	N/A
Father	B.A.	N/A	Provincial city	Male	40-49	N/A	Administrator, university-affiliated language program	N/A	N/A

## Appendix C

### List of Translations for Key Korean Terms

*Gireogi gajok* (wild goose family)

*Gonggyoyuk* (public education)

*Hakbeol* (school ties)

*Hakgun* (school district)

*Hakwon* (private tutoring agencies)

*Iminja* (immigrants)

*Jogi yuhak* (early study abroad; pre-college aged study abroad)

*Jogi yuhaksaeng* (*jogi yuhak* students)

*Sagyoyuk* (private after-school education)

*Yuhaksaeng* (visa students or Korean nationals with student visas;  
unaccompanied study abroad adolescents)

*Yuhakwon* (*yuhak* agencies)