NATIONAL TRANSPORT COMMISSION AND ANOTHER v CHETTY'S MOTOR TRANSPORT (PTY) LTD
[1972] 3 All SA 623 (A)

Division:	Appellate Division
Judgment Date:	30 May 1972
Case No:	not recorded
Before:	Holmes JA, Wessels JA, Trollip JA, Rabie JA and Kotzé AJA
Parallel Citation:	1972 (3) SA 726 (A)

• Keywords • Cases referred to • Judgment •

Keywords

Motor Carrier Transportation - Appeal - Nature - National Transport Commission reversing local board decision

Motor Carrier Transportation - National Transport Commission - Reversal of local board's decision - Refusal to give reasons - Review of proceedings - Necessity for proof of gross unreasonableness

Review - Statutory bodies and tribunals - Reasons for decision - Refusal to give reasons - Necessity for proof of gross unreasonableness

Cases referred to:

Administrator, Transvaal and The Firs Investments (Pty) Ltd v Johannesburg City Council 1971 (1) SA 56 (AD) - Referred to

Golden Arrow Bus Services v Central Road Transportation Board and Others 1948 (3) SA 918 (AD) - Applied

Hung Son v Municipal Council of Krugersdorp 1935 WLD 26 - Referred to

Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Transvaal, and Mayofis 1971 (1) SA 87 (AD) - Referred to

Pretoria North Town Council v A1 Electric Ice-Cream Factory (Pty) Ltd 1953 (3) SA 1 (AD) - Referred to

R v Ismail 1952 (1) SA 204 (AD) - Compared

S v Letsoko and Others 1964 (4) SA 768 (AD) - Compared

S v Masia 1962 (2) SA 541 (AD) - Compared

S v Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (AD) - Compared

S v Snyman 1968 (2) SA 582 (AD) - Compared

Tayob v Ermelo Local Transportation Board and Another 1951 (4) SA 440 (AD) - Applied

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Judgment

HOLMES, J.A.: The factual background to this appeal is as follows—

1.

The Local Transportation Board, sitting in Pietermaritzburg in August, 1969, had before it two applications for motor carrier certificates by established operators. One, dated February, 1969, was by the City Council of Pietermaritzburg for a certificate for one bus to carry non-European passengers along the route between Churchill Square and Newholme, the latter being within the Raisethorpe complex for Indians, in the municipal area. The other, a rival application dated June, 1969, was by Chetty' s Motor Transport (Pty.) Ltd., for two certificates over much the same route, from East Street to Newholme.

2.

The two applications were reciprocally opposed.

3.

At the hearing it was common cause between the parties and the board that there was a need for further transportation services on the route. The only issue to be decided by the board was which of the applications should be granted. Evidence was led and argument was addressed by the representatives of both sides.

4.

The Council contended—

(*a*)

that it was the only operator already serving the Raisethorpe area, and that it should therefore be granted the authority to serve the Newholme area which is within the Raisethorpe complex;

(*b*)

that the granting of the Chetty application would adversely affect the municipal bus service.

5.

The Chetty company contended—

(i)

that it was Indian-owned and wished to convey Indians to and from an Indian Township (Newholme), and that the Board should therefore give it preference in terms of sec. 13 (2) *bis* of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, 39 of 1930, as amended;

(ii)

that it was providing an efficient service with 14 certificates from Pietermaritzburg to the Bantu area of Edendale, but that because of Government policy it would be compelled to relinquish that service in order to afford Bantu operators the opportunity of serving their own race group;

(iii)

that it was right and in conformity with Government policy that the Chetty company should be afforded an opportunity of serving Asiatics;

(iv)

that the Council's bus service was unsatisfactory;

(v)

that the residents would prefer an Indian service conveying only Asiatics and employing Indian drivers and conductors.

6.

The Board, after reserving its decision, granted the Chetty application. In its reasons—

(*a*)

it made no mention of the Council's main contention under 4 (*a*), *supra;*

(*b*)

it held against the Council's contention under 4 (*b*);

(*c*)

it adopted the Chetty contentions, save that it made no finding under 5 (ii) and (iv) thereof.

Hence the gist of its *delectus* in favour of the Chetty company was sec. 13 (2) *bis* of the Act, and the local acceptability of an Indian-operated service.

7.

The City Council appealed to the National Transport Commission. That body hears applications afresh, despite the term "appeal". There were several grounds of appeal, the most relevant being—

(i)

The board attached undue importance to the fact that the shareholders of the Chetty company are Indians, and allowed this fact to outweigh more important considerations set forth in sec. 13 of the Act.

(ii)

The board failed to appreciate that the introduction of a new operator on a route served exclusively by the City Council would cause unnecessary difficulty in the co-ordination of services.

(iii)

The board failed to attach sufficient weight to the representations of the Council in its capacity as the local authority.

8.

In Pietermaritzburg the Commission, consisting of a quorum of three members, heard addresses and factual submissions on the merits from the same representatives of the parties, who elected not to lead evidence save that certain schedules were handed in on behalf of the Council.

9.

The Commission reserved its decision and thereafter granted the City Council's application for an additional certificate, and refused the application of the Chetty company for two certificates. Despite request, the Commission gave no reasons, not being statutorily required to do so; but, in an affidavit in the present proceedings, the chairman of the Commission stated that it was aware of all the foregoing facts, and was fully aware of the locality to which the applications related; that the merits were fully canvassed before it; that it gave full consideration thereto; that it was unconvinced of the need for two certificates for the area in question; that it applied the provisions of sec. 13 (2) *ter* of the Act; that it made its decision in good faith; and that all three of its members considered the facts put before them with unbiassed minds, and honestly and unanimously decided to grant the Council's application for one certificate.

10.

Against the Commission's decision the Chetty company instituted proceedings by way of review in the Natal Provincial Division submitting—

(*a*)

that there could be no valid basis for the Commission's decision;

(*b*)

that its decision was so grossly unreasonable as to be arbitrary; and

(*c*)

that the only inference which could be drawn from the decision was that—

(i)

the Commission did not properly apply its mind to the issues before it; or

(ii)

the Commission was motivated by considerations which were completely extraneous to the issues and which should not have been entertained at all.

11.

The Natal Provincial Division set aside the decision of the Commission as being grossly unreasonable in the extended sense, and ordered the matter to be sent back to it for consideration afresh.

12.

Against that decision, the Commission and the City Council have appealed to this Court.

I think it would be helpful at this stage to mention certain relevant statutory provisions—

The National Transport Commission (the first appellant) was appointed in terms of sec. 3 of the Transport (Co-ordination) Act, 44 of 1948, as amended. It includes members who possess wide experience of and have shown ability in transport, or aviation, or industrial, commercial or financial matters or in the conduct of public affairs; see sec. 3 (4). Three members constitute a quorum (subject to certain provisos not here relevant; see sec. 6 (4).

"The object of the Commission shall be, subject to the provisions of this Act or any other law, to promote and encourage the development of transport in the Republic and, where necessary, to co-ordinate various phases of transport in order to achieve the maximum benefit and economy of transport services to the public."

See sec. 7.

With particular reference to motor carrier transportation, the function of the Commission is stated to be—

"to advise and direct local road transportation boards, appointed under sec. 3 of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, 1930, in the exercise of their powers and the performance of their function under the Act".

See sec. 9 (ii).

In sec. 1 of the Motor Carrier Transportation Act, 39 of 1930, as amended, the Commission is referred to as the "Board" (spelt with a capital "B" to distinguish it from the "local board", i.e. the local road transportation board). And, in terms of sec. 5 (1) (*f*), one of the functions of the Commission is

"to hear and determine appeals from the decisions of local boards in terms of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 6".

The latter provision reads—

"Whenever a local board has performed any act or given any direction or decision, any person affected thereby may appeal therefrom to the Board, which may confirm, vary or set aside such act, direction or decision or substitute therefor any other act, direction or decision which the local board could have performed or given, and any such amended or substituted act, direction or decision shall thereupon be deemed to be an act, direction or decision of the local board concerned."

Sec. 19 (1) (*e*) of Act 39 of 1930 empowers the Minister to make regulations prescribing the procedure to be followed in connection with any appeal to the Board (i.e. the Commission) from any decision of a local board, and the powers of the Board in dealing therewith. Regulations were published in *Government Notice* R.45 in *Regulations Gazette* 282 of 17th January, 1964. The following are relevant—

Ref. 53 requires the notice of appeal to set forth clearly the issue in respect of which the appeal is made, and the grounds of appeal.

Reg. 54 (1) requires the local board to forward to the Board

(i.e. the Commission) all documents relating to the matter, and its reasons.

Reg. 57 (1) empowers the Commission to determine the appeal on the information contained in the documents submitted to it by the local board in terms of reg. 54 and by the appellant in his notice of appeal. It may also, in its discretion,

"consider further representations made or information submitted by any person, whether verbally or in writing . . ."

(It has discretionary power to administer an oath; see sec. 5 (1) *bis* of Act 30 of 1930.

Lastly, sec. 13 (2) of Act 39 of 1930, as amended, contains various provisions which local boards or the Board (i.e. the Commission) "shall take into consideration" in determining whether any application for a motor carrier certificate shall be granted or refused. The following are relevant in the present case—

(*a*)

the extent to which the transportation to be provided is necessary or desirable in the public interest;

(*b*)

the requirements of the public for transportation within the area or along the route in or over which the applicant proposes to operate:

(*c*)

the existing transportation facilities available to the public in that area or over that route;

(*f*)

the ability of the applicant to provide in manner satisfactory to the public the transportation for which a certificate is sought;

(*i*)

any representatives by a local authority;

(*i*)

bis—the class of persons to which the applicant belongs and the class or classes of persons to be served by the service for which a certificate is sought;

(*j*)

any other factors which, in the opinion of the body by which the matter in issue is to be determined, may affect the question.

13

(2)
bis—

"the Board (i.e. Commission) or a local board may give preference to an applicant who belongs to the same class as the majority of the persons to be served by the transportation service for which a certificate is sought".

13

(2)
ter—This sub-section provides a test for determining whether any association of persons, or any body corporate or unincorporate, including a registered company, shall be deemed to be a person of a certain class. The test is that the local board or the Commission may

"have regard to the classes of persons who are members of or have interests in (belang het by) such association or body".

It was by virtue of this provision that the local board decided that the Chetty company belonged to the Indian class; and was therefore eligible for a preference under sub-sec. 13 (2) *bis, supra.*

In considering this appeal there are four cardinal factors which must be borne in mind very clearly—

1.

The Commission is not a court. It is a body of men appointed for their expertise in their particular field. It is not bound by rules of judicial procedure.

It is not obliged to hear oral evidence. It is not required to keep a record of the proceedings. It can reach its decision in

its own way, so long as it honestly applies its mind to the issue: observes the requirements of natural justice, such as *audi alteram partem;* and bears in mind any relevant statutory provisions, such as sec. 13 (2) of Act 39 of 1930, as amended. In terms of reg. 57 it may consider further information which the local board did not have before it. And it is not obliged to give reasons for its decision.

2.

The word "appeals" in sec. 5 (1) (*f*) of Act 39 of 1930 as amended, and the word "appeal" in sec. 6 (2) thereof, are not used in their narrow legal sense, but in the connotation of "a rehearing in the fullest sense of the word"; see *Tayob* v. *Ermelo Local Road Transportation Board and Another*, 1951 (4) S.A. 440 (A.D.) at p. 448E-F. This follows from the nature of the Commission and its functions, as set out earlier herein, and the language of sec. 6 (2). As to the latter, see *Golden Arrow Bus Services* v. *Central Road Transportation Board and Others*, 1948 (3) S.A. 918 (A.D.), in which CENTLIVRES, J.A., referred at p. 924 to the clear meaning of the words

"or may substitute therefor any other act, direction or decision which the local board could have performed or given, and any such amended or substituted act, direction or decision shall thereupon be deemed to be an act. direction or decision of the local board concerned".

It follows that, on appeal, the issue before the Commission is not whether it is persuaded that the local board was wrong. The Commission comes to its own decision. The most that can be said about the decision of a local board, and its reasons, is that these constitute a factor which the Commission will bear in mind.

3.

There is no appeal against the decision of the Commission. The Legislature has appointed it as the final arbiter in its special field and, right or wrong, for better or worse, reasonable or unreasonable, its decision stands—unless it is vitiated by proof on review in the Supreme Court that—

(*a*)

the Commission failed to apply its mind to the issues in accordance with the behests of the statute and the tenets of natural justice: in other words that, *de jure*, it failed to decide the matter at all. Such failure could be established by reference to *mala fides*, improper motive, arbitrariness or caprice. The list is not exhaustive; or

(*b*)

the Commission's decision was grossly unreasonable to so striking a degree as to warrant the inference of a failure to apply its mind as aforesaid—a formidable *onus.*

The authorities are legion. It is only necessary to refer to the two most recent decisions by this Court, namely *The Administrator, Transvaal, and the Firs Investments* (*Pty.*) *Ltd.* v. *Johannesburg City Council*, 1971 (1) S.A. 56 (A.D.) at pp. 79 to 80, and 86B; and *Johannesburg City Council* v. *The Administrator, Transvaal, and Mayofis*, 1971 (1) S.A. 87 at pp. 96, 100. The degree of proof required is a preponderance of probability; but this is less easily envisaged in that one does not readily impute dereliction of duty to a responsible body.

4.

As already indicated, the Commission is not obliged to give reasons for its decisions. However, if there is direct *prima facie* testimony against it, for example of arbitrariness, and it elects to remain silent, in general the direct testimony *ipso facto* tends to become strengthened in that there is nothing to gainsay it and therefore less reason to doubt it; see, by way of analogy, *S.* v. *Snyman*, 1968 (2) S.A. 582 (A.D.) at p. 588G, and *S.* v. *Mthetwa* (A.D., 22nd May, 1972),* and Hoffmann on *Evidence*, 2nd ed., pp. 429 *in fin.*, to 430.

By contrast, if the evidence is circumstantial, a failure to give reasons does not necessarily strengthen it; see *The Firs Investment* case, *supra* at p. 81G. It will depend upon various factors such as the strength or weakness of the applicant's case, and the ease with which the Commission could demolish it, if untrue, by giving reasons. Basically, the applicant must make out a *prima facie* case before he can invoke the absence of reasons by the Commission in order to tip the scales of inrefence to a preponderance of probability; see, by way of analogy *R.* v. *Ismail*, 1952 (1) S.A. 204 (A.D.) at p. 210; *S.* v. *Masia*, 1962 (2) S.A. 541 (A.D.) at p. 546E; and *S.* v. *Letsoko and Others*, 1964 (4) S.A. 768 (A.D.) at p. 776A-D. In other words, it is not enough for an applicant to aver vitiating conduct by the Commission: he must demonstrate it, *prima facie*, before he can draw supporting inferences from the absence of reasons by the Commission. This is consistent in principle with what was indicated by DE WET, J., (as he then was) in *Hung Son* v. *Municipal Council of Krugersdorp*, 1935 W.L.D. 26 at p. 33, namely, that the refusal to give reasons is an important element to be taken into account only where there is evidence *aliunde* of bad faith. That reasoning was referred to with apparent approval by this Court in *Pretoria North Town Council* v. . . .*A.I. Electrict Ice-Cream Factory,* (*Pty.*) *Ltd.*, 1953 (3) S.A. 1 (A.D.) at p. 16E.

It is apparent from the foregoing that a body such as the Commission, by not giving reasons, runs the risk of an adverse inference being drawn, depending on the circumstances of the case. At the final stage the Court takes into account the papers as a whole, and if an adverse inference can be drawn from the absence of reasons, such inference is weighed together with all the other factors in the totality of the case, in deciding whether there is proof, upon a preponderance of probability, of the arbitrariness, etc., averred against the Commission.

With that prelude I turn more specifically to the facts. As to the respective qualifications of the two applicants, it was common cause that the Chetty company was an established and efficient operator, with 14 buses carrying Bantu passengers to and from Edendale. As to the Council's qualifications, an effort was made to criticise the efficiency of its bus service to Raisethorpe. The criticism was advanced before all the tribunals in turn, and evidence thereanent was adduced before the local

board. Its essence was that Bantu instead of Indian drivers were used; that the service was inefficient; that the non-use of conductors caused delays; and that the non-availability of buses at peak hours led to an inability to cope with the number of passengers to be carried. The local

board did not make any finding on this score, nor did it base its decision thereon, presumably because it was not impressed thereby. The Commission might well have been similarly unimpressed and have taken the view that the Council, as an established and extensive operator, could overcome any shortcomings of that sort. Furthermore, the Court *a quo* also did not take this criticism of inefficiency into account. In the result, it seems to us that the matter has to be approached on the footing that both of the applicants, namely the Chetty company and the Council, were experienced and efficient operators.

It was urged on behalf of the Chetty company that sec. 13 (2) *bis* read with sec. 13 (2) *ter* of Act 39 of 1930, as amended, empowered the local board, and also the Commission, in its discretion, to give preference to the Chetty company because of the Indian composition of its shareholding, in seeking to convey Indian passengers to and from Newholme in the Raisethorpe complex.

The weight to be accorded to this discretionary provision will obviously vary according to the particular facts of any given case. Suppose there are two applicants, each belonging to a different class, for example, A, a Bantu operator, and B, an Indian operator, each applying for a certificate for a bus on a route to and from an Indian area. There being no substantial disparity between their qualifications, in general the board or the Commission could, in its discretion, prefer the Indian operator.

In the present case, however, the situation is different. The Council, as the local authority, is empowered, indeed, expected, to provide transportation services for *all* of its inhabitants, whether European, Bantu, Indian, or Coloured, and to *all* areas within its jurisdiction where a service is required. To this end, the Pietermaritzburg City Council, for the year 1968-69, was operating a fleet of 131 buses, over a distance, in the aggregate, of nearly 4 millions of miles, and conveying more than 20 millions of passengers. Of the fleet of 131 buses, 96 were available (including spares) to operate the 88 motor carrier transportation certificates issued to the Council by the local board for the Council's non-European services, the total number of such passengers being nearly 18 million. The Council's transportation service is thus mainly for the benefit of non-Europeans. And the services for the latter include two bus routes catering for Indians, to Raisethorpe and the Northdale Indian Village, close to Newholme, making numerous trips a day and conveying nearly 5 millions of passengers. (Most of the foregoing information comes from the schedules handed in on behalf of the Council at the hearing before the Commission). In the context of transportation, therefore, it cannot be said that the Council, which is a corporate body, belongs to any one particular class. And it gathers beneath its transportational wing all classes throughout the entire municipality. In these circumstances the Commission, or a local board, would be entitled, in its discretion, to give little weight to any preference under sec. 13 (2) *bis*. To put it another way, any preference in favour of the Chetty

company might well, in the discretion of the Commission, have lost much of its force in the circumstances of the present case, bearing in mind also what is said in the following paragraph hereof.

With regard to the Chetty company's claim to be favoured because its buses were to be operated by Indians, it is common cause that the Council's attorney informed the Commission that the Council was planning adequate rest-room and ablution facilities for its Indian operating staff, which would enable the Council to appoint Indian staff to buses operating to predominantly Indian areas. The replying affidavit filed on behalf of the Chetty company expresses some scepticism about this, on the basis of previous promises said to have been made. It does not appear whether this scepticism was voiced before the Commission; but in any event that body was in a position to form its own opinion.

It was contended on behalf of the Chetty company that the Commission had misdirected itself by not insisting on the adduction of evidence to resolve any matters of factual dispute. This was not a specific ground of review; but, in any event, the contention cannot be accepted. As indicated earlier, the Commission is not a court, and it can reach its decision in its own way. Reg. 57 entitles it to decide the matter before it by reference to the documents (e.g. applications and objections) forwarded by the local board, with its reasons, and the grounds of appeal. In the present case the Commission, fully aware of the locality to which the applications related, had before it not only the local board's documents and reasons and the grounds of appeal, but also relevant maps which were shown to it, and operating schedules which were handed in, by the Council's representative. Moreover, the parties themselves did not press for *viva voce* evidence to be led. Furthermore, the Commission heard addresses and factual submissions from both sides. We find no misdirection or irregularity in the Commission's discharge of its statutory function.

There is this further factor. The route of the existing Council bus service, relevant to this case, runs from a terminus more or less in the centre of the city to a terminus in the outer marches of Raisethorpe. It also takes in an area to the left known as Northdale or the Northdale Indian Village. The proposed new route will follow the old route for most of the way, but will branch off into Newholme which is part of the Raisethorpe complex. Realising the need for further service, i.e. for the Newholme area, the Council applied for a certificate therefor in February, 1969, with the required degree of publication. Thereupon the Chetty company applied in June, 1969, for two certificates in respect of almost the identical route. Now the Council, in operating a service for of all its inhabitants, inevitably has some uprofitable routes and time-tables. It cannot, like a private operator, select only the profitable routes. It was the Council which initiated and developed the Raisethorpe transport service: and now that a further certificate is necessary for the Newholme offshoot, which is regarded as a profitable route, it would be within the discretion of the local board or the Commission to accord some preferential consideration to the Council in respect of that certificate.

Lastly, counsel for the Chetty company levelled much criticism against the Commission for not giving reasons for its decision. As to that, the

starting point is that it is not statutorily required to do so. As indicated earlier, the most that the Court can do is to draw an adverse inference if the applicant makes out a *prima facie* case

warranting an inference of arbitrariness, etc., and thereafter the Commission remains silent as to its reasons.

As to that, the Commission, hearing the matter afresh, had before it two established and efficient operators. In the particular circumstances of this case, it was within its discretion to regard any preference under sec. 13 (2) *bis* and *ter* as being of no particular cogency. The Council had some advantage already alluded to. In favour of the Chetty company was the factor (no more than a factor) that the local board had found in its favour; but it apparently did not have before it the operating schedules handed in to the Commission, nor the information that the Council was planning an Indian operational staff.

In the result, the Commission decided in favour of the Council. That does not, in our view, amount to a *prima facie* case, by inference, that the Commission was guilty of the dereliction of duty imputed to it. Hence the absence of reasons from the Commission carries the case no further.

I would add, however, that, in the circumstances of this case, we consider that the Commission would have been well advised to accede to the request by the Chetty company to give its reasons. This would have been helpful—

(*a*)

to the local board, which had given a considered decision with reasons, on a difficult matter involving the policy of the statute in sec. 13 (2) *bis;* and

(*b*)

to the parties before it, who would then know how to gauge their future operations.

To sum up, in all the circumstances, including the affidavit by the Commission's chairman (referred to in para. 9 of the chronology at the commencement of this judgment), we consider that the Chetty company failed to prove what it contended for, namely, gross unreasonableness so striking as to vitiate the Commission's decision.

Where, then, did the Court *a quo* go wrong? We consider, with respect, that it attached overmuch importance to the decision of the local board; paid insufficient regard to the need for a *prima facie* case before the silence of the Commission as to its reasons can be invoked to tip the scale in the matter of any inferences; overstressed, in the circumstances of this case, the discretionary preference permitted by sec. 13 (2) *bis* of Act 39 of 1930; and tended to overlook the fact that, when the Commission has before it two applicants of established repute, the dividing line between success and failure may well be so thin as to afford scant basis for an inference of strikingly gross unreasonableness in the choice between them.

In the result—

(*a*)

The appeal is allowed with costs.

(*b*)

The order of the Court *a quo* is set aside with costs.

(*c*)

The order of the National Transport Commission is restored.

(*d*)

The Council's costs relating to the employment of two counsel are allowed in both Courts.

WESSELS, J.A., TROLLIP, J.A., RABIE, J.A., and KOTZ , A.J.A., concurred.

Appearances

JH Combrink - Advocate/s for the First Appellant/s

JJ Kriek, SC and PW Thirion - Advocate/s for the Respondent/s

RCC Feetham, SC and PMA Hunt - Advocate/s for the Second Appellant

Deputy State Attorney, Natal and Bloemfontein - Attorney/s for the First Appellant

Leslie Simon and Company, Pietermaritzburg; Israel, Sackstein and Simon, Bloemfontein - Attorney/s for the Respondent/s

R Tomlinson, Francis and Company, Pietermaritzburg; McIntyre and Van der Post, Bloemfontein - Attorney/s for the Second Appellant

Footnotes

* See *post* p. 766.—EDS.

Footnote

* See *post* p. 766.—EDS.

Parallel Citation

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Repealed Act

Act 39 of 1930 has been repealed by s 47 of Act 74 of 1977

Repealed Act

Act 39 of 1930 has been repealed by s 47 of Act 74 of 1977

Parallel Citation

Page 732 of 1972 (3) SA 726 (A)

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Parallel Citation

Page 733 of 1972 (3) SA 726 (A)

Repealed Act

Act 44 of 1948 has been repealed by s 53(3) of Act 4 of 1998

Repealed Act

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Repealed Act

Act 30 of 1930 has been repealed by s 1 of Act 94 of 1981

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Act 39 of 1930 has been repealed by s 47 of Act 74 of 1977

Parallel Citation

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