


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Olav Stokke

NIGERIA

An Introduction to the Politics, Economy
and Social Setting of Modern Nigeria

The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
Uppsala 1970

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The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies has served at Uppsala since 1962 as a Scandinavian documentation and research centre on African affairs. The views expressed in its publications are entirely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute.

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
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PREFACE

This volume on Nigeria appears in a series of books on various African countries that the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies has published over the last years (in Swedish and English). Earlier titles include Tunisia, Angola, Moçambique and Namibia. The present volume is written by mag.art. Olav Stokke, formerly of The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Mag.art. Stokke has published extensively on West African problems and is since 1969 Associate Research Director of the Institute.

Uppsala, June 15, 1970

Carl Gösta Widstrand
Director



Introduction

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the first President of the Federation of Nigeria, once stated that Africa should seek unity in diversity and diversity in unity. Thus, in one sentence this veteran of the nationalist struggle in Nigeria and in Africa at large and the leading statesman of by far the most populous country of Africa, summed up his experience of both Nigerian and African politics. His experience of Nigerian politics alone provided him with an ample background for appraising many of the problems which have bedevilled African relations. The population of Nigeria was approximately one-fifth of Africa's total population; it consisted of a multitude of ethnic groups living in their own territories, differing from each other in language, traditional social and political structure, way of life and other cultural traits, and having their own separate histories. Add to this the latent sources of conflict at the structural level, stemming from uneven development between the different regions with regard to cultural values, economic development and western education; claims for separate status along cultural or linguistic borders; the more general problem of disparity between the available resources and the growing expectations; and the competition at the elite level among a growing number of qualified people for a limited number of positions, a competition that in the Nigeria of the fifties and the sixties had overtones of ethnic rivalry—then you have Nigeria's predicament in a nutshell, and Africa's as well.

In its approach to African co-operation during the decisive years of the early sixties, Nigeria offered the solutions arrived at on the national level—a functionalist approach, starting in a modest way with solutions at practical levels and with the ultimate aim of African unity somewhat blurred. This approach was not so easy to defend, and definitely less exciting, than the rival approach, defended at that time impatiently and imaginatively by the Government of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah—to create political unity first and then the rest would follow—with a detailed plan for both the institutional and the ideological and political set-up of a present time goal of

African unity. The Organization of African Unity was, however, ultimately established more or less according to the Nigerian concept—and even these more limited aspirations for continental co-operation have so far proved too optimistic confronted with the everyday life of political Africa.

The developments in Nigeria have a considerable bearing upon the developments in Africa at large, and upon Africa's standing in world politics, its vitality and its ability to handle pressing problems, both within Africa itself and in connection with world affairs generally. This fact has been illuminated during the recent crisis in Nigeria and will probably have repercussions in the future, even though the armed conflict is now ended.

Early History

The Nigeria of today has an area of 356,669 sq. miles; it is approximately as large as Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands put together. The climate, natural resources and vegetation vary from one area to another. Geographers distinguish between three principal zones of vegetation: the swamp forests of the coast belt, the high forests of the humid south and the savannahs of the subhumid Middle Belt and the north. Such differences have an effect on the living conditions of the peoples in the various areas and at the same time constitute natural barriers that were not easily penetrated by expansionist peoples at various stages of Nigeria's precolonial history.

The history of the interior of West Africa is the history of the movement of different peoples and a constant process of fusion between them. In the ninth and tenth centuries the incoming movement of peoples into Nigeria seems to have been part of the upheaval caused by the rise of Islam in the Middle East—a development that speeded up migrations that were already taking place through the Nile Valley into northern and western Africa. There seems from this time on to have been a two-way traffic of mutual influence in terms of trade, education, religions and ideas between several mediaeval empires in western Sudan, many of which seem to have achieved a high degree of political, economic and cultural development—the Ghana, Melle and Songhai kingdoms being the most famous—and the states along the coast of North Africa and the Middle East.

THE MUSLIM NORTH

The people of Bornu in the northeastern corner of Nigeria seem to have been in the first wave of the movement from the northern coast through Egypt, bringing along with them trade, Islam and new ideas. To the west of Bornu were the seven Habe states—Daura, Kano, Zauzau, Gobir, Katsina, Rano and Biram—established shortly after Bornu, in the tenth century. Close

co-operation existed between these seven states, each of them being assigned an appropriate function. Gobir to the west was obliged to provide defence against the empire of Ghana and later Songhai. Kano and Rano were the main producing states, especially iron and cotton. Katsina and Daura were trading states. Zauzau (Zaria) to the south provided slaves. Other lesser kingdoms of this region were Kebbi, Nupe, Gwari, Yelwa, Ilorin, Zamfara and Kwarafara.

During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the Habe states seem to have come within the sphere of influence of the kingdom of Kanem-Bornu, the dominant state of central Sudan. During the following century Islam was introduced. Shortly afterwards Fulani tribesmen migrating from the west were welcomed as allies by the kings of the Habe states. Some of the Fulani denizens gave up their nomadic life and settled permanently in the Habe towns and were integrated. The Habe states had a fairly high degree of centralized government, and had at an early stage developed a confederal type of co-operation among themselves.

A new political system was created in the north during the first half of the nineteenth century. In 1804 Shehu Usman dan Fodio, the learned head of a Fulani clan and a devoted puritan Moslem, rebelled against the persecution of Muslims by the King of Gobir, rallied devout Muslims, especially among the settled Fulani, and proclaimed a Jihad (a holy war) against the Habe rulers. During the following years Usman dan Fodio and his followers subdued both pagan and Islamic communities in the whole of Hausaland and beyond, and established a new system of government. He divided his secular empire between his son, the Sultan of Sokoto, and his brother, the Emir of Gwandu, the two becoming the overlords of a loosely knit system of vassal states ruled by emirs with extensive autonomy in local affairs. The new political systems in the north were characterized in the first place by their centralized and hierarchical structure even though the various emirs and other rulers at the state level enjoyed a large degree of autonomy in local affairs. Emirate rule in Hausaland was, as elsewhere, theocratic, involving the fusion of political and religious authority. It was also dynastic, the emirs, as a

rule, being elected by defined electors from among royal dynasties. The emirs ruled through aristocracies of birth and rank, and most of the higher offices were held by men of noble birth, even though trusted clients might be co-opted into the bureaucracy for the services they had rendered.

The traditional forms of government in Northern Nigeria outside Hausaland varied widely, though many areas of the predominantly pagan Middle Belt were to varying extents integrated into the administrative superstructure of the northern emirates. The institutions of traditional local government in the Kanuri area of Bornu and the Nupe area were similar to the emirates of Hausaland. In the Middle Belt the system of traditional government varied from divine kingdoms (the Igala and the Jukun, amongst others) to the non-centralized communities of Tivland.

The Fulani expansion was confronted with successful military resistance in the northeast (Bornu) and from the Yoruba kingdoms in the southwest. The high forests of the southeast proved to be natural barriers against penetration by the Fulani cavalry. Parts of the Middle Belt constituted a buffer zone between the Fulani empire and the Yoruba kingdoms to the south. The non-Muslim communities in this area were heavily taxed by the slave-raiding of the Fulani rulers.

TRADITIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF SOUTHERN NIGERIA

The prestige of the Yoruba kingdoms was at its highest at the end of the seventeenth century, but long before that time Yorubaland was politically well organized. According to a tradition reviewed during the 1940s and 1950s, the origin of the Yorubas was a deity, the Oduduwa, which settled at Ife. The principal royal families of Yorubaland (seven) were founded by the grandsons of the Oduduwa. The kings (the Obas) were therefore sacred; the pre-eminent spiritual Oba was the Oni of Ife and the politically most powerful was the Alafin of Oyo. In the years after 1800, the Yorubas were split into numerous kingdoms of various sizes, which got involved in wars among

themselves and were at the same time under pressure from the outside—from the Fulanis of the north and from Dahomey to the west. These city-kingdoms were highly autonomous, though there was a hierarchy among the royal families and military alliances were established. These political systems could be classified as constitutional monarchies, the power of the Obas being subject to consent from other institutions. The governments were centralized, with a high degree of specialization as regarded their functions.

Southeast of Yorubaland the kingdom of Benin had a separate history, though the royal dynasty of Benin was derived from the Yoruba dynasty of Ife. The Benin kingdom was a society with a hierarchical elite structure, a centralized administration and a strong army and military traditions. During the slave-trade era this kingdom was a centre of slave-raiding. Its traditional political institutions differed from those of the Yoruba-kingdoms. The power of the sacred Oba of Benin was absolute; the principal chiefs might influence the Oba but had no traditional rights of opposition.

The political organizations of the communities in the southeast of Nigeria differed. Broadly speaking, the structures were more decentralized than in the political systems to the north and southwest, and the polity was more egalitarian.

Developments During the Colonial Era

As a political entity, Nigeria is a relatively young state, being, like most African countries today, in the first place a product of the Berlin Congress of 1884-85 and the policies and activities of European colonial powers during the two or three decades before and after that congress.

Formally, Nigeria became one administrative unit in 1914; real unity was first achieved several decades later. Even its name was coined in this century and has a "colonial" flavour; its first occurrence is attributed to an article in The Times by Flora Shaw, the wife of Nigeria's first Governor-General, Lord Lugard.

THE COLONIZATION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE SET-UP

The colonization of Nigeria by the British started as early as 1861-62, when the Crown Colony of Lagos was established. British penetration in the following years was fairly modest, being restricted to the coastal areas. After the Berlin Congress of 1884-85 the coastal areas were named the Oil Rivers Protectorate. This protectorate was extended in 1893 and re-named the Niger Coast Protectorate. The Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was established in 1900, now under the Colonial Office. When Lagos was amalgamated in 1906, the name was changed to the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. The Protectorate of Northern Nigeria was established after Lugard had subdued the northern emirates at the turn of the century. In 1914 the two protectorates were formally amalgamated, the office of the Governor-General being the primary common institution. The Crown Colony of Lagos, however, was given a separate status.

In fact, the two protectorates were administered as two separate entities. The southern protectorate was divided administratively into three groups of provinces. These were later on united administratively, with the headquarters first in Lagos and later transferred to Enugu. In 1939 this unit was split into two,

the Niger River constituting the dividing line.

When the second world war started, Nigeria was divided administratively into four units, the colony and the northern, eastern and western groups of provinces. Due to war conditions, the central administration situated in Lagos had to delegate powers to the administrative sub-centres in Kaduna (north), Enugu (east) and Ibadan (west)—a practice that further extended the established division.

After the war this practice was formalized in the Richards Constitution of 1946, which in fact created a federal type of administrative structure, with political powers vested in a central authority and three regional authorities—in the north, the east and the west. The division of political powers between the federal centre and the regional centres was developed further during the Macpherson Constitution of 1951, the Lyttelton Constitution of 1954 and the constitutional revisions of 1957 and 1958 before independence—in the fifties with broad Nigerian participation in the constitution-making process.

At least two other characteristics of the brief colonial period are worth special mention, because of their impact on genuine Nigerian politics during the 15 years before independence and after.

INDIRECT AND DIRECT RULE

Lord Lugard developed the doctrine of indirect rule as a convenient and economically favourable form of government. Indirect rule meant that the colonial power ruled through the established traditional governments. In the case of the northern emirates this meant, inter alia, that the British deprived the emirs of their traditional de jure authority and left them with a de facto control that was ultimately based on the British monopoly of forces.

This form of government worked well in the strong and highly

centralized emirates of northern Nigeria. Here the traditional governing elite had for a long time exerted continuous administrative and judicial control on a territorial basis through formal governmental institutions, had a monopoly of military power and had even developed a system of effective taxation. In these areas the colonial administration thus tended to consolidate the power positions of the traditional political and religious elites and their system of government. It also tended to strengthen the isolationist tendencies in most local communities.

Indirect rule did not turn out so successfully elsewhere in Nigeria. The centralized traditional elites of Yorubaland provided a fairly good basis for this form of government in the southwest. In many areas of the Middle Belt and for many societies in the east, however, it did not work, and the colonial power had to apply a direct-rule system of colonial administration, using its own administrative set-up. This difference of colonial administration between the various parts and communities of Nigeria further extended the existing cultural and political gaps.

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

These differences in social and political organization, religion, cultural values, way of life and other traits that had existed between the various societies 70 years ago, when they were first united by an outside power, had their background in different living conditions, in different traditions and origins, and in differences with regard to the stimuli received through contacts with the outside world. The north had for long had cultural and economic connections across the Sahara and with the predominantly Muslim empires of western Sudan, whereas the south had, from the seventeenth century on, had its primary contacts with the outside world through European traders (slaves being the main export) and later on also through Christian missionaries.

These differences were reinforced by other factors under colonial

rule, the most important being the uneven developments between the north and the south with regard to social and economic progress, western education and political development. Western education proved to be the most crucial factor—the developments in the other sectors were to a large extent correlated with this key factor. The missionary schools had a de facto monopoly of western education up to the end of the second world war, when the state made a modest start in the field of education.

In the treaties with the northern emirs formalizing the conquest, the British agreed to keep Christian missionaries out of the Muslim North. Later, it was an important feature of British policy to preserve the Muslim North in its Islamic purity by excluding Christian missionaries and thereby in practice to restrict education to that provided by the Koranic schools, excluding western education.

In the pagan areas of the Middle Belt, however, some missionary stations were gradually established. This development may be illustrated by the following statistical evidence. In 1925 there were only five Christian missionary stations in the Muslim societies of the north, compared with 57 in the Middle Belt. In 1920 a total of 19,200 Christians was registered in the north. This figure was increased to 558,000 or 3.3 per cent of the population of the Northern Region in 1952-53; of these, 73 per cent were to be found in the Middle Belt provinces.

This development in the north helped to create a new gap within the Northern Region itself between the Muslim North and the societies of the Middle Belt, and also to deepen the gap between northern and southern Nigeria. The Muslim North was deprived of the schools that in the south stimulated the modernization process and provided a basis for social mobility. Christian missionary schools were rapidly established in the south, first in Yorubaland and later on also in the east.

The following statistical abstracts illustrate the new gap with regard to western education between southern and northern Nigeria:

Primary education

Year	Number of schools		Enrolment	
	Southern Nigeria	Northern Nigeria	Southern Nigeria	Northern Nigeria
1906	126	1		
1926	3,828	125	138,249	5,210
1957	13,473	2,080	2,343,317	185,484

Secondary education

Year	Number of schools		Enrolment	
	Southern Nigeria	Northern Nigeria	Southern Nigeria	Northern Nigeria
1906	1	0		
1926	18	0	518	
1957	176	18	28,208	3,643

ANTAGONISM BETWEEN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH

This uneven growth with regard to western education had consequences at various levels, which in due time deepened the gap between the north and the south.

The north/south split within the nationalist movement. The nationalist movements in Nigeria had, generally speaking, their main social basis in the new elites—the professional classes, trade unionists, teachers, clerks, public servants, people engaged in business, artisans and intellectuals. These new elites provided the backbone of the political parties that were established during the forties and the fifties. In the Eastern Region these new elites dominated the nationalist movement, which in the Western Region consisted of an alliance between the traditional elites and the new ones, the impetus being provided by the latter.

Given the educational and social setting of Nigeria, it is not surprising that the nationalist movements with this social basis were first established in the south, where also councils with African participation were established at an early date. Nationalist movements in Northern Nigeria were established at a much later date—at the beginning of the fifties. In the north, nationalism developed in two directions. One of these was an extension of the nationalist movement in the south. In fact it was exported to the north by southerners and had a large influx of southerners living in the north, combined with radical northern youths in the urban areas—in the first place members of the new elites. The second direction was a different brand of nationalism in many respects. Its social basis differed from that of the nationalism in the south. In the north it consisted of the traditional elites and the politically moderate sector of the new elites, a large proportion of whom were recruited from the northern aristocracy. In part due to these differences in social basis, and in part because of the educational gap between south and north, this northern nationalism took on an anti-southern flavour. While the counterpart of the southern nationalism was the colonial authorities, the counterpart of this brand of northern nationalism was southern nationalism as well. The uneven development had thus created conditions that split the nationalist movement in Nigeria, in the first place because the two areas perceived that their genuine interests and their situations were different.

Southern immigrants occupying the modern sector in the north.

A main cause of the split in the nationalist movement was another effect of the educational gap between the north and the south during the pre-independence period. The colonial government had filled the civil service, in the beginning only at the lower levels, with southerners with western educations. With the extension of the modern sector in the north, southerners with more education and experience were in a position to compete successfully for most of the positions. In every sector of Nigerian society the northerners met with the competition from the southerners.

During the early period of colonization, these southern immigrants to the urban centres of the north were housed in separate residential areas (sabon garis) on the outskirts of the old towns, a practice that was also followed later, with the effect of creating an explicit dividing line between the indigenous city dwellers and the newcomers from the south, who had a better education, a higher standard of living, different cultural traits and a different way of life.

These factors contributed heavily to the growth of anti-southern undercurrents in the north, especially directed against the competitors from the south on the spot.

The Cultural Setting

Nigeria is culturally heterogeneous. There are approximately 250 different ethnic groups along linguistic dividing lines, approximately 200 in the Middle Belt alone. It is important to realize that the various ethnic groups each have their own territorial area as their homeland, even though migration to the urban centres outside the home area has taken place.

Four ethnic groups (nationalities) make up approximately half of the total population of Nigeria: the Habe and Fulani in the north, the Ibo in the east and the Yoruba in the west. These ethnic groups were the predominant groups in the three regions of the Federation of Nigeria at independence. Each of the three regions was culturally heterogeneous. Along with the ethnic majority group, many ethnic minorities, many of which were small, were to be found in each of the regions. The predominant ethnic groups were situated in the regional centre, the minorities in the regional periphery. The predominant groups were, generally speaking, better off and also held the positions of political power in their regions. This created a source of tension between the ethnic majority group and the minorities within each of the regions.

THE NORTHERN REGION

In Northern Nigeria a predominant cultural system might be distinguished. The main cultural denominator was Islam. This religion, with its implications for social relations and government, was common to the Habe and the Fulani nationalities and to the Kanuri in the northeast and the Nupe in the southern area of the Northern Region as well. These were the main ethnic groups within the predominant cultural system of Northern Nigeria. Most ethnic groups in the north had also—as described previously—to some extent been part of a hierarchical religious and political system whose judicial and administrative set-ups had many similarities, though especially the Bornu empire of the Kanuris had a long tradition as a separate and

strong political system. The Habes and the settled Fulanis also had a common language (Hausa), the lingua franca of traders in most parts of central West Africa south of the Sahara.

Most of the northern ethnic minorities were situated in the Middle Belt. Some of these were partly integrated in the predominant cultural system of the north, being part of the traditional administrative and judicial superstructure and having adopted Islam and the Hausa language. Most of them, however, continued with their old language and their animist religions.

The largest of these ethnic groups was the Tiv of the Benue Province. Other important nationalities were the Birom of the Plateau Province, the Igbira, the Idoma and the Igala. In the Ilorin and Kabba districts the predominant ethnic group was the Yoruba, who had dual loyalties—towards the administrative and religious community of the north that they had long been part of and towards the ethnic community with the Yoruba of the Western Region and the cultural tradition that was revitalized in modern times.

THE WESTERN REGION

In the Western Region the Yoruba nationality, with its own language, legend of a common origin, and similar political and administrative traditions, was the predominant cultural group, constituting two-thirds of the population. In the periphery to the east, several smaller ethnic groups were situated, the Bini, Itsekiri, Urhobo and Ijaw being the largest, together with the Western Ibo. Edo was the common language of several of these nationalities.

THE EASTERN REGION

The predominant group of the Eastern Region—the Ibo—constituted approximately three-fifths of the total regional population. In the periphery—in the Delta area, along the coast and to the

east—several minorities were situated, the most prominent being the Ijaw nationality of the Delta (and of the neighbouring areas of the Western Region), the Ibibio, the Annang and the Efik along the coast and to the east.

As we have seen, the ethnic and the political borders did not always coincide—only the Western Region, after the Mid-West had at a later stage been carved out as a separate region, came close to ethnic homogeneity. Outside the Western Region, the Yoruba element was predominant in the Federal territory of Lagos and in the Ilorin and Kabba areas of the Northern Region. All the other regions were ethnically heterogeneous. Nor did the political borders coincide with the borders of the cultural systems—the different ethnic groups with one or more common cultural traits, such as language, religion, traditional administrative practice, traditional political system, etc. Such cultural systems were to be found in Northern Nigeria and in the Mid-Western Region. Only in a few cases did the political borders, however, split ethnic communities. Such instances were (1) the border between the Western and the Northern Regions that parted the Yorubas of the Ilorin and Kabba districts from the Western Region and (2) the border between the Western Region and the Federal Territory of Lagos with a predominantly Yoruba population, The Niger River, being the dividing line between the Western Region (later the Mid-Western Region) and the Eastern Region, separated (3) the Ibos on the western bank of the river from the Ibos on the eastern and also (4) the majority of the Ijaws of the Delta area belonging to the Eastern Region from those who were situated on the western side of the regional border.

Claims for Separate Status on the Eve of Independence

Given this ethnical distribution, the tensions created by the federal set-up and by the regional borders that existed at independence were found at two levels: at the federal level, where the main tension was built up between the predominant ethnic groups of the three regions, and at the regional level, where the main tensions existed between the predominant ethnic group and the regional minorities.

At the regional level the minorities were split between two different courses of action, either to work within the established regional framework, that is, to integrate with the predominant group or to co-operate with it or to work for a partition of the existing regions in such a way that their area would form a new and separate region.

Both courses were adopted by various ethnic communities and within the same ethnic community by different factions. Claims for separate status were asserted especially strongly by minority groups on the eve of independence.

THE NORTHERN REGION

In Northern Nigeria such claims for separate status came in the first place from the Middle Belt, but also from Bornu and from the Yoruba districts of the lower northwest.

The Yoruba districts of Ilorin and Kabba. The claims for separate status in the Yoruba districts were especially strong in Ilorin and were put forward by a political party with a local power basis (The Ilorin Talaka Parapo (ITP)). The claim had strong outside support from the governing party of the Western Region, the Action Group (AG). The driving force behind this specific claim for separate status was, first of all, the Yoruba cultural renaissance stimulated by the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, the pan-Yoruba cultural organization. The separatist movement in these districts was, however, split into two factions, the

largest wanting to include the predominantly Yoruba-inhabited districts in the Western Region and the other wanting separate status for these districts within the federation. However, the Yoruba communities were split on this question and a large section wanted to continue within the existing regional boundaries—a tribute to the ability of the governing party, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC), to make use of the instruments at its disposal to make co-operation worthwhile and to deter support for opposition parties.

The Middle Belt. The claims for separate status in the Middle Belt were most strongly asserted by a movement that had its primary social basis in the Tiv and the Birom areas. At the political level these claims were most strongly expressed by the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). The driving forces behind these claims were significantly enough the Christian leaders in these areas. Even within the Tiv and Birom communities the claims for separate status could not command full support. Some sectors perceived that the interests of the communities as well as their own personal interests would best be served by co-operation with or within the regional governing party of the north.

Bornu. The long tradition as a separate political system was the primary source of the claims for separate status in Bornu. This claim was maintained by the Bornu Youth Movement (BYM), a political party that had its social basis in the dominant ethnic group, the Kanuri. The BYM was a radical party by northern standards. Its alliance with the southern-based AG during the late fifties discredited the BYM among the Kanuris. Though the party in the middle fifties held a strong position in Bornu, it never had the full support of the Kanuri communities: there were sections of the Kanuris that perceived that their own interests as well as those of their communities would best be served by working through the regional government party.

THE WESTERN REGION

In the Western Region the claim for separate status came from the minority areas to the east. As already mentioned, Benin had a long tradition as a strong kingdom on its own. The claim for a separate Benin-Delta State within the federation was asserted by an organization established for this purpose, which drew support from most of the many ethnic groups within this area, though the support was not evenly distributed, and some sectors of most communities were at least ambivalent on the question. This claim was fulfilled when the Mid-Western Region was created in 1963-64.

THE EASTERN REGION

In the Eastern Region claims for separate status came from the minority areas of the Delta and the coast areas—the old Rivers, Ogoja and Calabar Provinces.

A Rivers State. One of these claims envisaged a separate Rivers State, made up of the area predominantly populated by the Ijaw people of the Rivers Province of the Eastern Region, together with the adherent districts of the Western Region. The Rivers State would have been a predominantly Ijaw-populated state. This concept was most strongly maintained by the Niger Delta Congress (NDC)—a small party with a local power basis. It did not, however, receive full support, even in the Ijaw communities.

A Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers (COR) State. Another claim envisaged a separate state made up of the minority areas of the three old provinces. This broader concept aimed at a multi-cultural unit, the main proponent of which was the COR State Movement. This movement was closely connected with the United National Independence Party (UNIP)—and had strong support from the AG.

Though the political parties that gave the separate state issue first priority and full support had established strong footholds in the minority areas, the governing party of the Eastern Region,

the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC), was even stronger in most of these areas during the fifties, even though its standpoint towards these claims for separate status could at best be characterized as being ambivalent.

THE CONCEPTS OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT PARTIES

The many claims for separate status within the federation led the constitutional conference in London in 1957 to appoint a commission to go into the complaints from the minorities and to suggest appropriate solutions to a later constitutional conference. In its report, the commission maintained that, regardless of how the regional borders were to be drawn, the new units would have their minorities and accordingly concluded that it would not solve the problems of the minorities to create new states. The main solution suggested was to write into the independence constitution safeguards for the minorities, and to strengthen federal authority, inter alia, through the establishment of a federal police force. This was the solution agreed upon, not least because the colonial power during this conference gave the Nigerian delegates the choice between independence at a fixed date—October 1st, 1960—with the existing regional set-up or at an unspecified later date in the case of a new re-grouping of the federation before independence. The government parties of the north and the east, the NPC and the NCNC, gave an early date for independence first priority, while the AG strongly insisted on having both.

The political parties, various Nigerian organizations and leading political personalities had during the forties and fifties put forward many proposals for a re-grouping of Nigeria, all having a confederal or a federal set-up as the basis. The one prominent exception in this regard was the NPC, the government party of the Northern Region, which alone had an area almost four times as large as the rest of the federation put together and more than half of Nigeria's total population. The NPC slogan was "One North, one people, irrespective of religion, rank or tribe", and it vehemently opposed any concepts that involved any

splitting up of that region—the very region that made the pre-1967 federation unbalanced. The NPC only hesitantly accepted any re-grouping within the federation at all, such as the establishment of the Mid-Western Region. On the contrary, the party would have preferred a fusion of the southern regions. During the fifties the NPC preferred a confederal state system, with as much autonomy as possible for the regional units. This attitude to the federation changed radically during the early sixties, when the Northern Region, thanks to the powerful position of the NPC in the Federal Government, was the one that benefitted most from the federation.

None of the larger political parties favoured a unitary state system; most proposals envisaged some form of federal set-up with a varying degree of autonomy for the sub-units—the regions, states or provinces.

As early as 1943 Nnamdi Azikiwe proposed a scheme involving the re-grouping of Nigeria into eight sub-units (protectorates). After the establishment of the NCNC, the party took over this policy. In 1947 Obafemi Awolowo, later the leader of the AG, suggested that eight states should be established along cultural and linguistical dividing lines. In 1953 he proposed a re-grouping into nine states—four in the north, three in the east and two in the west. Two years later the Nigeria Union of Students of Great Britain and Ireland suggested a scheme involving a 12-state federation. In 1957 the NCNC in its election manifesto fixed the number of states at 14, each having a population varying between 1.4 and 3.3 million, with the existing provincial boundaries as the basis. Also the Northern Elements' Progressive Union (NEPU) and the UNIP, the opposition parties in the Northern Region and the Eastern Region respectively, wanted to split the existing regions into a larger number of smaller states. So did the AG—and restructured its party organization accordingly into five zonal organizations in the Northern Region, two of them in the Middle Belt, and two each in the Western and the Eastern Regions. The regional government parties in the Eastern and the Western Regions, the NCNC and the AG respectively, although favouring a restructuring of the federation in principle, were,

however, more reluctant to accept claims for separate status within their own region. Here both parties made the realization of such claims dependent on the realizations of similar claims made in the other regions.

The Political Parties

Until 1966, when all political organizations were restricted by decree, Nigeria had several large political parties and many smaller ones. An important function of the parties in any political system is to aggregate interests, and to adjust claims from various groups to each other within the framework of the existing resources and the adopted aims. Another important function is to recruit the political leadership. In the Nigerian situation the ethnic dimension became crucial with regard to all these functions.

THE NORTHERN PEOPLES' CONGRESS

The NPC was the largest political party in Nigeria. It was the governing party in the Northern Region from the early fifties until the January 1966 coup d'état, and has participated in the Federal Government since 1952—as the senior partner from 1959 onwards.

The NPC was almost exclusively restricted to the Northern Region and to the peoples of northern origin. The ethnic groups making up the hard core of the NPC were the Hausa and Fulani. The NPC had strong support also from the Nupe and the Kanuri nationalities, and managed to obtain support from some sectors of most other northern ethnic communities. The party used all the means at its disposal, including "punishments" and "rewards", to make support worth while for most minorities and displayed an extensive willingness to integrate cultural groups which did not belong to the predominant cultural system of the north.

On the basis of the composition of the NPC leadership, the party was an alliance between the traditional elites of the north, the growing bureaucracy and the moderate section of the new elites, mostly recruited from the northern aristocracy, and the larger businessmen belonging to the talakawa, the commoners in the traditional northern society, in which ascribed social status ranked much higher than achieved social status. These were also

the social groups within the minority communities that were most attracted by co-operation with or within the NPC.

The NPC made extensive use of the widespread fear in the north of being dominated by the educationally more advanced peoples from the south. Its "northernization" policy, preferring applicants from the north to southerners for posts in the government services, was an important weapon in this regard and yielded dividends everywhere in the north, even in the minority areas. It was an effective weapon against those opposition parties in the north that were allied with the two large southern parties, the NCNC or the AG, like the NEPU, the UMBC and the BYM.

In the Northern Region, several smaller parties with a local community basis were affiliated to or allied with the NPC. Outside the Northern Region, the NPC had no real foothold until the establishment of the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) in 1964. In 1953-54, an alliance with the AG, then limited to the Western Region, was unsuccessfully aimed at. During 1958 and 1959, the NPC did, however, succeed in forming alliances with a few small political parties in the south—the NDC, a small political party of the Delta area with a Rivers State for the Ijaws on its program, the Mabolaje of Ibadan, formerly a NCNC ally that turned to the NPC after the NCNC had intervened in an internal quarrel on the losing side, and the National Muslim League of the Western Region and Lagos, a party that did not succeed either in the federal or in the local elections. With the establishment of the NNA in 1964, the NPC became allied to the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), a combination of the United Peoples' Party (UPP), Akintola's splinter faction of the AG after the party split of 1962, and a majority of the NCNC parliamentarians in the Western Assembly that in 1963 had combined with the UPP to form the regional government, and in 1964 had left the NCNC to form the new party. Participants in the NNA were also the Dynamic Party (DP), a small party with national aspirations and a foothold only locally in the east (Onitsha), and the weak opposition party of the Mid-Western Region, the Mid-West Democratic Party (MWDP).

THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF NIGERIAN CITIZENS

The oldest of the Nigerian political parties at the date of independence was the NCNC (founded in 1943). Until 1961 the name was the Nigerian Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons. It was the government party of the Eastern Region during the fifties and until the military take-over of January 1966, and became the governing party also in the new Mid-Western Region from the start in 1964. In the Western Region the NCNC constituted a strong parliamentary opposition until 1963, when it combined with the UPP to form the regional government. In the middle of 1964 the parliamentary party of the NCNC in the Western Region was split—a large section broke away to form the new NNDP, together with the UPP, and the NCNC loyalists returned to regional opposition, now together with the reduced former government party, the AG. At the federal level the NCNC played an important role in the Federal Government from the very start, its importance, however, being gradually reduced to that of a junior partner during the early sixties. The NCNC was mainly a southern-based party, having its core area in Iboland, and its strongest support outside Iboland among the minorities of the old Western Region—which later became the Mid-Western Region—and among the Yorubas. In the Northern Region, the local NCNC organizations were mainly composed of southerners, mainly Ibos, living in the north. The NCNC also had substantial support in the minority areas of the Eastern Region.

The NCNC had substantial communal support in the Ibo areas of the Eastern Region and the Mid-West. The party leadership in these areas consisted of the new elites—people in business, professional men, intellectuals, administrators, a few trade-union leaders, etc. Though the party sought to attract communal support also in the minority areas of the East, its penetration was only partially successful. Opposition parties—the NDC in the Delta area, the UNIP, allied to the AG during the late fifties, and even the AG itself—had established a strong foothold in the minority areas of the east. In Iboland, the Aro Ibos and also the Onitsha Ibos proved to be the most difficult societies to integrate for the NCNC, and on the border of

Iboland, the Aro Calabar, being bilingual (Efik and Ibo), proved to be a basis of opposition to the NCNC.

In the north the NCNC had been allied with the NEPU since 1954. The NEPU was a radical party, with its basis among the Habe and Fulani peoples, especially among the urban dwellers in Hausaland—craftsmen, shop-keepers, small traders and reform-oriented Koranic teachers. The NEPU pictured itself as a class party for the talakawa—the common man, peasants, etc. Until 1957, the NCNC was also allied with the BYM—also a radical political party. In 1957 this party switched to an alliance with the AG. Smaller, locally based, political parties or state unions in the Middle Belt and Ilorin were also occasionally allied to the NCNC.

In the Western Region the NCNC had strong support from most ethnic communities in the minority areas—later the Mid-Western Region—where prominent NCNC politicians took the lead in the separatist movement. In Yorubaland, one side in the various conflicts oriented itself towards the NCNC and the other towards the AG. Such conflicts included the old conflicts between communities, stemming from wars between the old city states of Yorubaland, and conflicts in urban areas, stemming from migration, between the indigenous city dwellers and the newcomers. The indigenous population—predominantly poor Muslims with little western education—generally gave their support to the NCNC, whereas the newcomers, belonging to the rising class—prosperous, well-educated, and predominantly Christian—constituted the leadership of the AG.

After the establishment of the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) in preparation for the 1964 federal elections, the NCNC, as the senior partner, became allied with political parties that had their social basis in all major ethnic groups and most minorities of the federation, taking also the NCNC's own cultural background into consideration: the AG of Western Nigeria, the Northern Progressive Front (NPF), consisting of the opposition parties of Northern Nigeria, the NEPU, the UMBC and some smaller northern political organizations.

THE ACTION GROUP

The AG was raised by the cultural organization of the Yorubas (Egbe Omo Oduduwa) in 1950-51. The AG was the government party of the Western Region until the split in 1962, and constituted the parliamentary opposition in the northern and the eastern legislatures. Except for a short period (1957-59), when the AG participated in the national government, the party constituted the federal parliamentary opposition.

During its first couple of years, the AG explicitly posed as a political party for the Western Region only, with its basis in the dominant nationality—the Yoruba. However, the party was neither in intention nor in composition exclusively a mono-cultural party, even in the beginning: it made some efforts to include the minorities of the Benin-Delta area. Its scope was extended after a few years. The party activities were extended to other regions after 1954—first to the Yoruba areas of the Northern Region, Ilorin and Kabba, where the AG inspired Yoruba nationalism to favour inclusion of these districts in the Western Region through its ally, the ITP—later on also to the Eastern Region and elsewhere in the Northern Region. The strategy everywhere outside Western Nigeria was to concentrate on the regional minorities, especially through unreserved support of their claims for separate status. In the Eastern Region the AG established an alliance with the UNIP and also created party organizations of its own at the local level. In the Northern Region it established alliances with the UMBC of the Middle Belt and the BYM of Bornu.

In the Eastern and the Northern Regions the AG put its advanced organizational skills and much money into its expansionist drive. Its organizational set-up was more centralized than that of the other main political parties. Its expansion in the east and the north was reinforced by the building up of a chain of party newspapers that played at least as important a role in the AG activities during the late fifties as did the private Zik newspaper chain in the NCNC.

During the initial period the AG was primarily an alliance between the traditional and the new elites of Yorubaland—the new rising class playing the most important role, even though the traditional leaders might also play an important role at the grass-roots level. The party split in 1962 was partly due to the conflict between, on the one hand, the traditional elites and the moderate sector of the new elites—which later became the backbone of the UPP—and, on the other, the rest of the party under the party leader, Chief Awolowo, which grew more radical during the early sixties, in part owing to its role as an opposition party at the federal level.

INTEGRATIVE AND DISINTEGRATIVE EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The three big nationalist parties all sought support from both the predominant ethnic group and the minority groups of the region in which they held the government position—all with a high degree of success with regard to the predominant group. Their success within the minority communities was more limited—though some social groups within these societies, which were dependent on some kind of support from the regional government, found co-operation with the party in power attractive. The general trend, however, was that the minorities found alliances with extra-regional government parties attractive, partly as a result of the support these extra-regional parties gave their separatist claims, and partly because of their ability to provide financial support.

Because the "big three" had their main social bases in each of the three main ethnic groups, the competition for a limited number of positions and limited resources had a "tribal" component, causing antagonisms especially between the three main ethnic groups. The three big political parties carried the stigma of being arms of the Hausa/Fulani, the Ibo and the Yoruba nationalities respectively, an aspect that was stressed by the counter-propaganda of the parties, though in various ways and with varying strength by the different parties.

During the fifties, when the AG sought to establish itself in the Western Region and in the minority areas of the Eastern Region, the AG propaganda labelled the NCNC as an Ibo party. The AG propaganda stressed the expansionist character of the Ibos. In Yorubaland, the propaganda stressed the conflict of interests between the Ibos and the Yorubas. In the minority areas of the Western Region and, especially, in Eastern Nigeria, the propaganda stressed the conflict of interests between the Ibos and the minorities. The subsequent NNDP government of Western Nigeria followed suit, and stressed the conflicting interests of the Ibos and the Yorubas even more unreservedly, since this party never tried to obtain support in Ibo communities. At the same time it exposed itself as a Yoruba party and branded the NCNC as an arm of Ibo imperialism.

The anti-southern platform of the NPC propaganda—which because of the actual distribution of the immigrant section of the Northern Region had in practice an anti-Ibo flavour—added to these inter-cultural antagonisms. Even the NCNC at times played on anti-tribal feelings, notably in the minority areas of the Western Region during the fifties. Partly due to its ideology and partly due to its multi-cultural composition, the NCNC and its allies, generally speaking, abstained from tribal counter-propaganda, at least in their federal campaigns, and concentrated on general policy appeals and counter-propaganda against certain social structures (inter alia, feudalism, the emirs, etc.).

These traits of the political parties had an disintegrative effect at the federal level as far as the relations between the dominant ethnic groups were concerned. As far as the minority groups were concerned, the effects at the federal level may, generally speaking, have been slightly the opposite, while the effects at the regional level were most probably disintegrative.

Contemporary Politics

The conflict connected with the secession of Biafra and the civil war has thrown its dark shadow over Nigerian politics in the late sixties. Any survey of contemporary Nigerian politics, however brief, must therefore aim at explaining the main reasons why this conflict started and give an outline of what actually took place.

CONSTITUTIONAL CRISES

During the first five years after independence, the Nigerian federation went through many serious constitutional crises. Most of these were related to the malpractices of the government parties in connection with the struggle for political power.

One non-constitutional crisis should, however, be mentioned, even though it had little or no bearing on the developments that later led to the secession of the Eastern Region—the conflict concerning the minimum wage that took place during the summer of 1964. A commission appointed by the Federal Government, the Morgan Commission, had delivered a report on living conditions and costs that concluded with recommendations involving fixed minimum standards. When the authorities and the private employers refused to agree to these standards, a joint committee of the several national labour unions succeeded in staging a nation-wide general strike that proved more effective than most observers had expected in advance.

The AG split in 1962 and the subsequent regional crisis. The split within the AG, which took place during the spring and summer of 1962, was partly a conflict at the party-leader level between the party leader, Chief Awolowo, who in 1959 had given up the regional premiership to play an active role in federal politics and became the leader of the opposition in the Federal Parliament, and his lieutenant, Chief Akintola, who succeeded him as Premier of the Western Region. As previously indicated,

the conflict was also a conflict between two political factions of the party—one moderate and the other gradually growing more radical. The conflict also concerned differences with regard to the choice of strategy—the moderate faction opting for participation in the Federal Government and for co-operation with the NPC to achieve that aim.

Chief Awolowo got the support of an overwhelming majority of the 1962 party convention and—the conflict coming out into the open—Chief Akintola was asked to resign his premiership, which he refused to do. He was thereupon excluded from the party and a majority of the AG parliamentary party in the Western House of Assembly signed a petition to the Regional Governor asking for the removal of Akintola as Premier. The Governor acted accordingly and appointed Chief Adegbenro as the new Premier. Chief Akintola refused to accept this decision, and filed a suit in the regional High Court to get the decision declared invalid, since it was not based on a majority vote in the House of Assembly. In due course Akintola won his case, and a contrary decision by the Privy Council later on was overruled by the Federal Government.

In the meantime, however, the Western Region was placed under federal administration under emergency regulations. In the wake of the party crisis, Awolowo and several of the leaders of the AG were accused of corrupt practices, of having used public funds for party activities during the Awolowo regional government up to 1959. In addition to this, the AG leadership was later accused of having conspired to overthrow the Federal Government by an armed coup d'état and of having illegally imported weapons and trained Nigerians in Ghana for military operations to this end. Several of the AG leaders were found guilty in a celebrated court case and were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, Awolowo to 10 years, and Anthony Enahoro, the vice-president of the AG, to 15 years.

In the Western Region these sentences were widely regarded as political punishments. The conflict left the Region deeply split politically. The AG remained loyal to Awolowo's leadership, and

in this party Akintola and his supporters in the UPP were regarded as traitors; relations were consequently bitterly hostile. The hostility towards the new regional government became even more bitter after the fusion of the UPP and a majority of the NCNC parliamentary party into the NNDP, whereupon the NCNC loyalists returned to regional opposition.

The Federal elections of December, 1964. An important cause of the political re-alignments which took place during the spring and early summer of 1964 was the political storm raised by the results of the censuses of 1962 and 1963. The official results of the 1962 census were never published, but the census was cancelled after the NPC had called for new counts in the Western and the Eastern Regions, claiming that the turnouts, especially in the east, had been grossly inflated by double counting and large-scale rigging of the results by the regional authorities. The north-south balance had as a result been tipped in favour of the south. A "verification" under the auspices of the federal Prime Minister, who belonged to the NPC, resulted in another 8.5 million people being shown in the Northern Region.

The reason why a technical question like this was able to raise such strong emotions was the political implications of the census results. They might have influenced the distribution of the federal revenues between the regions, and—given the realities of Nigerian politics—they might also have seriously influenced the relative strengths of the main political parties at the federal level, given the many opportunities which the regional government parties had of influencing the outcome within their own regions. The main protagonists in this conflict were the NPC and the NCNC—the two political parties that in coalition constituted the Federal Government. The new census of 1963 re-established the former north-south balance in favour of the north and now there were protests from the NCNC governments of the Mid-Western and the Eastern Regions, suggesting inflated and falsified results in the Northern Region. Since the counts showed favourable results for the Western Region, the Akintola UPP/NCNC coalition government accepted the census. This in turn split the NCNC partners in the coalition with Akintola's UPP.

The faction of the NCNC that was loyal to co-operation with the UPP reacted hotly against their former party, accusing it of being an Ibo instrument that, when put to the test, sacrificed genuine Yoruba interests to Ibo interests. This conflict helped to forge the NPC/NNDP Nigerian National Alliance. It was also instrumental in creating the other national alliance—the UPGA—by bringing together the two former southern antagonists—the AG and the NCNC.

The heated federal-election campaign had several effects. The propaganda—especially that of the NNNDP and NPC—had tribal overtones that contributed to widen the cultural gaps in Nigeria, in the first place between the Ibos and the other major nationalities. In the NNA propaganda the Ibos were stigmatized as an arrogant imperialist people, who grabbed the best jobs everywhere for themselves at the expense of Nigeria's other peoples. In this propaganda the NCNC was branded as an Ibo party and its allies in the UPGA—the NPF and the AG—were characterized as being just tools of Ibo imperialism. The UPGA propaganda, on the other hand, pictured the NPC as an instrument of the feudalistic rulers of the north, and the NNNDP as a willing tool of their imperialist expansion.

The malpractices during the election campaign furthermore contributed to raise the political temperature and make the polarization even more complete between the ruling elites in the Northern and Western Regions, on the one hand, and those of the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions, on the other. It had the same effects on the two sides in the two regions where the real contest took place—the Western and the Northern. In both these regions the conflicting sides posed as being traditional/conservative/moderate and progressive/radical respectively—the first being the government side—the NPC and the NNNDP in the north and the west respectively—and the second the opposition parties of the two regions, a fact that probably added to the radical flavour of the UPGA. In some parts of the north—especially in the Middle Belt—the minority issue gave an additional dimension to the conflict. The bitterness of the campaigns split the societies.

The means which the rival parties made use of—and which the government parties had the easiest access to, and also made the most extensive use of— included jailing the candidates of the opponent party, manipulating the nominating machinery in such a way that the UPGA candidates could not get registered, treating the candidates psychically and/or physically in such a way as to scare them away, withholding the necessary permission for campaign meetings by the local authorities or hiring thugs to break up such meetings—to mention only a few of the means used. In 66 of the 167 constituencies of the Northern Region the NPC candidate had no opponent when the nominations were closed and was thereby automatically elected.

Three days before the election day, the UPGA leaders tried to get the elections postponed but without success and therefore decided to boycott them. As a result, the NPC swept the north, except for a few constituencies in the Middle Belt, where UMBC candidates were returned. A great number of the NNDP candidates were successfully elected in the stormy elections that took place in Western Nigeria, where the elections were only partly boycotted by the UPGA supporters, with the result that the UPGA won several seats. In the Mid-West the regional NCNC leader decided to call off the boycott on the election day and the NCNC candidates were returned in all the constituencies except one, where the elections, due to technical difficulties, could not take place. In Eastern Nigeria the boycott was effective.

During the ensuing crisis—in which the Eastern Premier, M.I. Okpara, threatened secession if the returns were accepted—the NNA parties won the day. The results were accepted. The "compromise" furthermore called for a broadly based national government, with Tafawa Balewa re-appointed as federal Prime Minister, and new elections in the Eastern Region only, where the NCNC in due course won all the seats. The outcome of this conflict created bitterness between the ruling elites of the Eastern and the Mid-Western Regions, on the one hand, and those of the Western and the Northern Regions, on the other. The bitterness in the Northern Region and the Western Region between the regional government parties and the regional opposition

increased as a result of the elections, in which the opposition parties became the victims of the boycott strategy of the UPGA, which misfired when put to the test, and of the malpractices of the government parties during the election campaign.

The regional elections in Western Nigeria in October 1965. The unrest and the political campaigning continued in the west after the federal elections, aiming at the regional elections due to be held in October, 1965. Much was at stake for both the regional government party and the opposition, the latter being confident of a landslide victory, provided the elections were fair.

Though the regional elections were in the first place a struggle for the governmental power in the Western Region, more was at stake, which gave the regional elections national importance. If the NNNDP—the NPC's ally—was swept out of office, the NPC would most probably lose its foothold in the south for a long time to come, and the NNNDP would most probably be eliminated as a political force. A victory in the west would furthermore give the UPGA an important control over the Federal Senate—controlling three out of four regional delegations—with the opportunity to strangle federal legislation, even though the NNA held a safe majority in the House of Representatives for the 4 years to come. A thundering defeat for the NNNDP in the west would also have some bearing on the legitimacy of the Federal Government, based, as it was, on the results of the boycotted federal elections of 1964. It would imply a moral victory for the UPGA.

Accordingly, the campaign became extremely bitter on both sides. The NNNDP government, backed up by the NPC, used all available means to intimidate its opponents—making full use of the whole well-known repertoire from the federal elections of 1964, in even stronger doses and in more elaborate forms. The electoral commissions went into hiding after having registered the NNNDP candidates, thus making it impossible for the UPGA candidates to register in some instances; 16 NNNDP candidates were announced as having been elected unopposed at the end of the nomination period. The mass media controlled by the regional government—the radio, the television and the Sketch—were used for party

purposes as extensively as possible, the propoganda having an anti-Ibo twist.

In the end the election procedures were made difficult for the UPGA to check and the results were extensively falsified. Even so, the actual turnouts were contested—the UPGA claiming on the basis of the local counts that it had won 68 out of 94 constituencies, as against the official results (NNDP 71, AG 15, NCNC 2). After these mock elections, the situation in Western Nigeria got out of control. Supporters of the UPGA demonstrated violently against NNDP politicians, law and order broke down, and several persons were killed during the upheavals that followed.

This time, however, the Federal Government did not take over the regional administration, as it did in 1962. The NPC was therefore open to accusations from its opponents that it would not sacrifice its ally the NNDP, now also a partner in the Federal Government.

THE MILITARY COUPS OF 1966

The flagrant corruption of the regional elections in Western Nigeria and the ensuing crisis resulted in the collapse of parliamentary rule in Nigeria. Confidence in the political authorities had disappeared—the events during the Western Region elections just strengthened the widespread disillusion in Nigeria caused by the outcome of the 1964 federal elections. Extensive corruption in almost every field of public affairs had discredited the government parties and the politicians at large. All the governments of the federation were confronted with the general problem created by the gap between the actual resources and the economic growth and the rising expectations created by the political parties themselves. Especially in the south the governments were confronted with the problem of a growing number of school leavers without jobs. The discontents were widespread and rising.

The January coup. A group of young army officers started a coup d'état on January 15, 1966. The Premier of Northern Nigeria, the Sardauna of Sokoto, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the most powerful politician in Nigeria, was shot at his home. The Premier of Western Nigeria, Chief Akintola, was also killed at his home. The latter had just returned to Ibadan from consultations in Kaduna with the NPC leader. The federal Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, was also taken away and killed, together with the federal Minister of Finance, Chief Okiye-Eboh, a wealthy businessman from the Mid-Western Region and a member of the NCNC.

The take-over was, however, not complete. The remaining federal ministers convened, and were persuaded to delegate their powers to the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, Maj.-Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi. The rebels thereupon decided to surrender to the new leadership, provided no punishments were applied.

The military take-over was welcomed in most communities, due to the disillusion with the former political leadership. All political parties and tribal organizations, such as the state unions, were dissolved.

The new military government aimed at a unitary state. By decrees of May 24, 1966, the adjective "Federal" in the Republic's name was dropped and the federal institutions were abolished. The regions were dissolved. A single civil service and a single Civil Service Commission were also created.

This frightened the traditional rulers in Northern Nigeria as well as the northern bureaucracy. Especially in Northern Nigeria the January coup gradually came to be regarded as having been an Ibo coup d'état, as it was planned mainly by young Ibo officers at a time when it was widely assumed that the Premiers of the Western and the Northern Regions had agreed on a plan that involved the declaration of an emergency, together with extensive redistributions within the army, involving the removal of officers who held important positions and had UPGA sympathies, as most Ibo officers were assumed to have. The immediate outcome

of the military coup provided additional confirmation to those who interpreted it as an attempted Ibo take-over. The politicians and high military officers who were killed had come, with one exception, from the non-Ibo nationalities, and the new political and military leadership had an Ibo at the top—Maj.-Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi—who surrounded himself with mainly Ibo civil advisers. Though the regional Military Governors who were appointed belonged to the main ethnic group of the region where they resided, it was generally assumed in the north that it was the Ibos who had reaped the short-term benefits of the military take-over, due to their military rank and hence their political power. These power positions affected the distribution of promotions in the civil service and the army and also the distribution of scholarships and the jobs in the armed forces that usually led to promotions. It was also widely assumed that it was the Ibos who would reap both the immediate and the long-term benefits of the unitary policy of the new military government.

In Northern Nigeria, the unitary decree was regarded as an instrument to lay the north wide open to Ibo dominance. This led the traditional elites in the north to inspire demonstrations against the decree in the main northern towns. These demonstrations escalated into riots that led to the killing of Ibos and the looting of Ibo property. After the emirs had been reassured that they would be consulted before important policies were decided on by the Military Government, the Sultan of Sokoto successfully made an appeal for peace and order. During the riots, the armed forces and the police had tried to protect the southerners in the northern cities, without much success. Many Ibos felt that their safety in Northern Nigeria was threatened and started to move to the south after the riots were over.

The July coup. Officers from non-Ibo nationalities—mainly from Northern Nigeria—staged a new coup on July 29, 1966. This coup was directed against the Ibos—many Ibo officers and soldiers were shot down in their barracks, and Maj.-Gen. Aguiyi-Ironsi was taken away and executed, together with his host, the Military Governor of Western Nigeria, who declined an offer to

allow him to escape. Afterwards, it was maintained that the main objective of the rebels was to make it possible for the Northern Region to secede.

After deliberations between the rebels and representatives of the Military Government, the rebels returned to their barracks. The Chief of Staff, Lt.-Col. Yakubu Gowon, emerged as the new Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.

One of the first acts of the new government was to re-establish the federation and the former regions. The rebels had released the NNDP politicians who had been held in custody. The new government released the former AG leaders, including Awolowo and Enahoro.

The new coup had split the new political elite in Nigeria—the army officers—into two groups: the Ibos and the non-Ibos. This split in the social group that had, it was assumed, the strongest national orientation, even with the quota system of recruitment, had developed gradually in the wake of the January coup but became complete after the July coup. This was demonstrated when the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, Lt.-Col. Ojukwu, declared that after the latest events Ibos and soldiers from the north could no longer share the same barracks. Ojukwu asked for regionalization of the army as a prerequisite for participation in constitutional talks with the other military leaders of Nigeria. Officers and soldiers from other regions stationed in the Eastern Region were disarmed and escorted out of the Region.

An ad hoc conference of delegates from the four regions and Lagos was convened, however, and started to work on a future constitution for Nigeria. This conference agreed upon a preliminary report which recommended that Nigeria should continue as one political unit, with a federal government and a parliament. The federal government should have exclusive authority over foreign affairs, communications and common services. The armed forces and the police should be retained but should be regionalized and recruited exclusively from the people of the

region in which they served. The regional Military Governor was to have control over the armed forces.

The delegations submitted memoranda to the ad hoc conference that displayed the prevalent attitudes of the various regional governments. The Western delegation preferred a confederal type of constitution and wanted to split up the existing regions into more states. The Mid-Western delegation preferred a federal set-up with a strong central government and the regrouping of the existing regions into more states. The Northern delegation preferred at the beginning of the conference a loose federal set-up, with extensive autonomy for the existing regions. Under the influence of officials from the northern minority areas who held federal positions in the army and the civil service, this stand was changed. The delegation ended up by supporting a federal structure with a strong federal government and more states. The Eastern delegation preferred a confederal structure, with extensive autonomy for the existing regions, arguing strongly that the splitting up of the existing regions was a question that would take time and therefore could only be decided in the future and not under the prevailing conditions.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO THE SECESSION OF THE EASTERN REGION

The strained relations between the military authorities of the federation and those of the Eastern Region after the July coup, were not, however, to benefit from the progress which was reflected in the preliminary report of the ad hoc constitutional conference. The upheavals in the Northern Region during September and October, 1966, had a decisive impact on the later developments, leading to the secession of the Eastern Region.

The massacres in Northern Nigeria and the exodus of Ibos to the Eastern Region. Fresh and violent riots broke out in the urban areas of the Northern Region (September 18-24), starting in Makurdi, Minna, Gboko, Gombe, Jos, Sokoto and Kaduna, and continuing in Kano. People from the south without the Yoruba tribal marks were indiscriminately killed by the rioters, their

property being looted and their homes burned. The brutality added to the horror. In Kano even soldiers who had returned from Eastern Nigeria participated in the massacres. Estimates of the number of people killed during the riots vary from 10,000 to 30,000.

The Federal Military Government and the Northern government both tried desperately to get the situation under control, without much success until the riots were over. The massacres in the north led to reprisal actions against Hausa traders in the Eastern Region, though on a smaller scale.

These events led to dramatic structural changes in the social setting of Nigeria. The easterners in the north—and the Ibos in the federation at large—flooded back to Iboland. Estimates of the number differed, varying from 1 to 1.5 million. A smaller stream of non-easterners went in the opposite direction—all non-easterners, except resident western Ibos, were asked to leave by the Eastern Region authorities. This mass migration had many effects.

The refugees created tremendous problems in the Eastern Region. The immediate problem of accommodation was the easiest to solve. The long term problem of creating jobs for so many additional people—many of whom were highly skilled and had held important positions in the public administration or in business or other trades—posed the real difficulty.

In the Northern Region, but also to a lesser extent in the Western, the sudden mass flight of Ibos created chaos in many public services during the weeks that followed. The fact that these vacated positions were filled almost at once by northerners, who within a short time were running the services almost as before, casts an interesting side-light on the conflict of interests between the northerners and the southerners.

Another effect had more fundamental consequences. The stories about the horrors of the massacres related by the refugees who returned to their homeland contributed more than anything else

to create and extend the cultural antagonisms. In Iboland such stories removed what was left of the feeling of unity with the peoples of the Northern Region. These events had greatly reduced the attractiveness of the federation to the Ibos—most Ibos regarded their very existence outside the Eastern Region as threatened. A large number of well-established Ibo bureaucrats had also left their federal positions to flee to the Eastern Region.

These changes in their attitude towards the federation, together with the prospect of large incomes from oil royalties, generated a strong demand for secession in the Ibo communities of the Eastern Region. The attitudes in the non-Ibo communities were more ambivalent. The massacres in Northern Nigeria had affected easterners from all ethnic communities, a fact that might have created "anti-solidarity" among the Eastern Region groups. It is, however, also possible that this fact may have created the opposite attitudes among the minorities, who may have blamed the Ibos for their sacrifices in Northern Nigeria.

The Eastern Region strategy for autonomy. Lt.-Col. Ojukwu, the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, and his council, aiming at autonomy for the Eastern Region, were in full accord with the prevalent attitudes in Iboland after the massacres. First, they applied a strategy of non-co-operation with the federal authorities. They declined to participate in the resumed constitutional talks, making their participation dependent on the fulfilment of certain conditions, involving the transfer of the Northern troops stationed in the Western Region and in Lagos back to their region of origin. Constitutional proposals from the Federal Government were rejected by Ojukwu, who also declined to participate in the federal executive organs of which he was a member, and refused to accept Gowon as his military superior. He suggested that under the existing conditions the regional units of Nigeria ought to "pull apart".

During this period the Federal Government several times insisted that the integrity of Nigeria as one unit should be maintained, if necessary by the use of physical force.

The Head of State of Ghana, Lt.-Gen. Ankrah, succeeded in bringing the parties in the rising Nigerian conflict together for conciliation talks in Aburi, Ghana, on January 4-5, 1967. This meeting of the Supreme Council, presided over by Lt.-Gen. Ankrah, ended with agreement on many points. The constitutional talks should be resumed, the army and the civil service should be re-organized and the payment of compensation to the refugees should be considered. The participants re-affirmed their belief in the existing organs. However, the crucial point in the compromise arrived at gave the regional military governors a veto in the Supreme Military Council in matters that concerned regional affairs. This in effect envisaged a confederal constitutional set-up. Thus Lt.-Col. Ojukwu obtained what he had been aiming at.

The Aburi agreements were never put into force. When during the following months Ojukwu took the unilateral decisions that formalized the changed relationship between the Federal Government and the Enugu government, he used the non-implementation of the Aburi agreements by the Federal Government as his main justification. Such unilateral decisions included the release on March 12, 1967, of army officers who had participated in the January coup—including the leader of the coup, Maj. Nzeogwu—against protests from Lagos. The following day the Enugu government published a white paper, maintaining that the regions should have full control over their own resources. However, as the Enugu government was concerned about the unity of Nigeria, it would contribute its fair share towards the maintenance of the federal services.

The Enugu government had also taken several measures to fortify its position in the Eastern Region. In December, 1966, it undertook an administrative reform that divided the former provinces into 17 smaller units, and to these new units it delegated extensive executive and legislative authority in local affairs. This reform aimed at removing the fear of Ibo dominance among the minorities. In February, 1967, the Enugu government adopted special laws, giving the government, in case of a serious crisis, the power to declare an area to be "disturbed" and hence to put

it under regional administration, and to establish special courts with powers to inflict heavy punishments. On March 25, the Enugu government published an edict which extended these emergency powers, by giving the Military Governor what amounted to a carte blanche to apply the measures he deemed necessary to meet threats from within or outside the region.

Under the pressure of these developments in Eastern Nigeria, the Federal Government on March 17, 1967, published a decree that purported to implement the Aburi agreements. This decree went a long way in that direction by giving the regional governors virtually full autonomy within their regions. However, a new point was included, giving the federal Supreme Military Council the legislative and executive powers exercised by the regional authorities, in case the Council should declare a temporary emergency in the region.

The Enugu government rejected the federal decree, especially because of this clause, claiming that it was contrary to the Aburi agreements. When the Lagos government on March 31 published its budget statement, not taking account of the claims of the Enugu government that the regions themselves should have control over regional resources, the Enugu government published an edict stating that all revenues from Eastern Nigeria which had gone into the federal treasury were now to be paid to the Eastern Region treasury, and the revenue collection would be subject to control by the regional government. This edict was explicitly presented by the Eastern Region authorities as the first step towards secession and was immediately turned down by the Federal Government, which maintained that the edict was illegal and contrary to the constitution. A new edict published by the Eastern Region government on April 18 continued this process by proclaiming the take-over of 10 federal corporations and installations situated in the Eastern Region. One of the justifications for these two edicts put forward by the Eastern Region authorities was that the Federal Government had not fulfilled its financial obligations towards the Eastern Region government. These edicts were followed up by measures with similar effects. Regional institutions were created to replace federal; foreign

firms operating in Eastern Nigeria had to register themselves with the Eastern Region authorities if they wanted to continue their activities; the Eastern Region withdrew from the federal social-security programme; and the Enugu government, and no longer the Federal Marketing Company, was to be the partner in future contracts concerning products of the Eastern Region.

During this decisive phase in the relations between Enugu and Lagos, it was possible to discern a split in the federal side. This split concerned the future relationship between the units of the Nigerian political system, as well as the way to handle the Eastern Region's secession threat and whether to use military force to stop it or not. The Federal Government had several times stated officially that Nigerian unity would be upheld, in the last resort by the use of force. During early May, Awolowo indicated that, if the Eastern Region got away with secession, the Western Region might as well also consider seceding. The Military Governors of the Western and the Mid-Western Regions indicated in public utterances that they disagreed with the use of military force to keep Eastern Nigeria within the federation. In the east such statements were considered as clear indications of a split in the Federal Government—as it was generally assumed that the Northern Region Military Governor was the spokesman for enforcement measures in the case of an Eastern Region secession. It may be that the Eastern Region Military Governor, knowing the main lines of the federal split, played his cards accordingly and took bigger risks than he would have done in the case of a united federal front.

During this period another development took place that helped to cement the federal side. At a meeting of "leaders of thought" in Northern Nigeria, the emirs, conscious of the split, decided to split up the Northern Region into more states in accordance with the decision arrived at in principle during the ad hoc constitutional conference of September, 1966. A declaration stated that the Northern Region would start on this process regardless of what might be the case in the other regions. This statement of faith was welcomed by the leading personalities of

Yorubaland and elsewhere in the south and the Middle Belt, as such a partition met the old demands for a more balanced federation. Awolowo now agreed to participate in the new military Federal Executive Council as its Deputy Chairman, and take up the additional position of Commissioner for Finance. Other Commissioners included Anthony Enahoro, the former Vice-President of the AG, Aminu Kano, the former President-General of the NEPU and the NPF, Joseph Tarka, the former President of the UMBC, and Okoi Arikpo. A reconciliation committee, established on the initiative of the Federal Chief Justice, tried to remove the differences, without much success—even though the Federal Government accepted most of its peace proposals. After these developments, the Federal Government stand towards the Eastern Region authorities stiffened.

The crisis entered a decisive phase during the last part of May. On May 26, Lt.-Col. Ojukwu demanded and got a mandate to declare the independence of the Eastern Region from an assembly consisting of approximately 300 delegates from the various districts of the Region. In advance he had warned the delegates of the possibility of economic hardship and even war as a result of such a decision. At the same time Ojukwu indicated that an independent Biafra might be able to maintain common services, such as harbours, railways and airways with the rest of Nigeria—and to establish a custom union and possibly double citizenship for the inhabitants of the states of such a union.

Later the same day the Federal Head of State announced that he had taken over full powers as the C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces, and declared a state of emergency throughout Nigeria. He announced a decree that would give Nigeria a new constitution and divide the federation into 12 new states. Northern Nigeria was to be divided into six states—North-Western, North Central, Kano, North-Eastern, Benue-Plateau and West-Central (Kwara State); Eastern Nigeria was to be divided into three states—East-Central, South-Eastern and Rivers; Western Nigeria was to continue as one state with the exclusion of the Colony Province, which was to be incorporated in Lagos, from now on a separate state; and the Mid-Western Region was to continue as the Mid-

Western State. Governors for the new states were nominated (Ojukwu for the East-Central State). The Governor of Northern Nigeria, Col. Hassan Katsina, was nominated as Chairman of the Northern Council of States, another new body.

The Enugu government rejected the planned regrouping of Nigeria, stating that it would not be implemented in Eastern Nigeria. The Eastern Military Governor gave warning of the possibility of an armed conflict and accused Gowon of treason and of establishing a one-man dictatorship in Nigeria by a coup d'état.

On May 30, 1967, the secession was formally announced by Ojukwu when he proclaimed the Republic of Biafra.

THE CIVIL WAR

The Federal Military Government adopted most of the measures that usually characterize a serious crisis, including economic sanctions and a blockade of the Eastern Region. On July 6, enforcement measures on a grand scale were applied. Federal forces advanced into the Eastern Region from the south and from the north.

The military conflict. At the beginning the military initiative lay with the federal side, until the Biafran forces countered and advanced into the Mid-Western Region, where for a short period they were in command. They advanced further to the west against Lagos. However, this offensive did not last, for many reasons, and the Biafran forces were driven back into the Eastern Region. The effects of the offensive were negative, at both the political, the military and the psychological level. The sympathy which the secessionists enjoyed in some sections of the Western and the Mid-Western Regions was lost. Gradually large parts of the Eastern Region came under federal control, and the Biafran forces were driven into the core area of Iboland, parts of which were held by the Federal Government, which established a civilian administration in Enugu. For long periods the fronts were more or less frozen, with occasional offensives

and counter-offensives.

In purely military terms, the federal side was superior in comparison with the Biafran side. The federal side was able to buy weapons and military equipment in the open market, mainly from Great Britain and the Soviet Union, while the Biafran side had to rely on the international black market, covert assistance from some friendly countries and its own industries set up for this purpose. The Federal side was superior in the number of enlisted regular forces.

There were several reasons why the Biafrans were able to resist against such heavy odds for such a long period. The aim of the Biafran authorities was most probably not a military victory, but rather to raise the cost of a federal victory and in this way to tire out the federal side. They hoped thus to obtain a political solution involving separate status, and to obtain it through outside political intervention, a split in the federal side, upheavals in Western Nigeria or peace talks.

One explanation may be a function of the different aims of the two sides. The Biafran side could best fulfil its aim of obtaining separate status by putting up a defence at all costs. The Federal side, however, had the dual task of winning a military victory and also of achieving this victory in such a way that Nigeria could continue as one nation afterwards.

Other explanations were of a more technical nature, *inter alia*, problems of transportation and logistics in connection with the operations, the problem of a growing proportion of new recruits without sufficient training, and trends towards war-lordism on the part of some of the federal military commanders. It should be added that the high morale of the Biafran forces was another important factor. This morale was bolstered by a highly effective Biafran propaganda machine that succeeded in presenting the alternatives for the Biafrans as being a choice between continued desperate self-defence or complete extinction.

The decisive factors in the breakdown of the Biafran resistance

—beside the federal military offensive of January, 1970, which was built up during the last few months of 1969—was the loss of the main agricultural area of Iboland and the breakdown of morale. The decline in morale was caused partly by the deteriorating famine situation, partly as a function of the appraisal of the dwindling chances of getting away with the secession, partly by the dwindling support from the outside world—even from the World Council of Churches—and partly as a result of the increasing difficulties in getting hold of military equipment and the resulting disagreements on the policy implications of these developments between factions of the military and political leadership.

The conflict at the diplomatic level. Though it is fair to say that the Biafran Government won the propaganda warfare, especially in the western world, it is also safe to say that it lost the diplomatic struggle to the Federal side from the start. The Federal Government succeeded in getting the secessionist government diplomatically isolated. No African government recognized Biafra until the spring of 1968, when Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon and the Ivory Coast recognized the Ojukwu government. A few other African states, including Sierra Leone, displayed an ambivalent attitude towards the two parties during 1969. The other African countries—excluding the white regimes of South Africa, Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories—gave the Federal Government their support all through the conflict.

The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government dealt with the conflict in successive resolutions—at Kinshasa in 1967, at Algiers in 1968, and at Addis Ababa in 1969. Though it is possible to trace a slight change of attitude towards the two conflicting parties, it is fair to say that neither the Assembly of Heads of State, the highest authority of the OAU, nor its consultative mission (later its Consultative Committee on Nigeria) considered its role as that of a mediator between two equal parties, but rather as that of an instrument for securing peace, offering its good offices to facilitate negotiations with the object of getting Biafra back into the federal fold. The effects of such initiatives, including the efforts to bring the

conflicting parties to the conference table to iron out their differences, proved to be of little avail. The same may be said of similar Commonwealth initiatives.

The Biafran authorities tried to get the conflict recognized as an international conflict by bringing it before the United Nations. The Federal Government succeeded in preventing this, claiming that the conflict was an internal matter. Several ideas of the UN playing a peace-promoting and peace-keeping role—including the employment of observers and peace-keeping forces—were favourably considered by the two parties. However, their attitudes differed widely with regard to the role and the functions of such forces. The Federal concept was that international forces should be given police functions in Eastern Nigeria immediately after the secessionists had laid down their arms, with the implicit additional function of reducing the fears of the Ibos that the federal troops would be a threat to their safety after the war,—fears that were built up by the Biafran information media. The Biafran concept was that the international forces should be used to separate the two parties along a recognized demarcation line after the cease-fire—with functions similar to those of the United Nations Emergency Force in Suez—thus giving the Biafran Government some sort of implicit de facto recognition. This idea was never accepted by the Federal Government.

Outside Africa, no government, except that of Haiti, actually recognized the Biafran Government. A few governments, including the Portuguese and the French, gave some sort of tacit support to the Biafran Government, whereas the Federal Government received active support from the governments of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union (which probably caused the Chinese Government to give moral support to Biafra), and tacit support from most other governments. A great many governments were, however, rather ambivalent in their attitudes towards the conflicting parties, opting for a peaceful solution of the conflict through talks with the Federal Government, in part as a result of the pressure of domestic public opinion, activated by an extensive mass-media coverage of the famine catastrophe

in Biafra, facilitated by the Biafran authorities.

The humanitarian strategy. At the non-official level, the humanitarian aspects of the conflict were highlighted, especially by the mass-media of western Europe and North America. The extensive coverage of the humanitarian side of this conflict, contrary to what has been the case in many other conflicts, was the result of a combination of many factors, including the famine, which produced its own casualties, and the facilities provided by the Biafran authorities, who used the catastrophe as an instrument to obtain international sympathy, which could be transformed, as it actual was, into outside pressure on the Federal Government for peace talks, a cease-fire, concessions to the Biafran side, etc., and possibly also to obtain de jure or de facto recognition. To obtain humanitarian aid was, of course, an independent aim of the Biafran authorities, but the additional political effects of such activities were highly appreciated. Another factor that may explain the widespread publicity was the heavy involvement in the humanitarian activities of the Churches. As a result, this distant conflict became of indirect and immediate interest to large communities in western Europe and North America through the bond of a common religious faith. Outside Nigeria; the pro-Biafra factions succeeded in creating the false impression among the general public that religious issues constituted important dividing lines in the conflict. Other international bodies were also active in providing humanitarian aid, including the International Red Cross League and UN bodies like the FAO and the UNICEF.

The diplomatic activity in connection with the channels for the transportation of relief clearly demonstrated that both sides in the conflict were very much aware of the political and strategic implications of the relief operations. The Biafran authorities rejected transportation routes that might involve security risks or otherwise have unfavourable effects on the supply of arms. The Lagos Government agreed in principle to the transportation of relief to the territory held by the Biafran authorities, even though such relief had—as it emphasized—the effect of prolonging the conflict. However, the Federal Government preferred

solutions that involved the possibility of federal control of what actually was transported into Biafra.

THE FOREIGN-POLICY ORIENTATIONS OF NIGERIA

The three main pillars of the Nigerian foreign policy during the first five years after independence were its African policy, its United Nations policy and its pro-western non-alignment. There were, of course, interconnections between these policies.

The Nigerian approach to Pan-Africanism. When Nigeria became independent, Pan-Africanism was already transplanted to African soil. The initiative rested with the Kwame Nkrumah Government of Ghana, which after Ghana's independence in 1957 had opened up the country for Pan-African activities. The Pan-Africanism that found in Ghana a base for its activities throughout Africa, was a radical and militant blend of many components, including the drive for the liberation of the rest of Africa from colonialism and imperialism, African socialism, and positive neutralism, as the doctrine governing relations with the two sides in the East-West conflict. This brand of Pan-Africanism was directed, first of all, against interference in African affairs from outside. Gradually it was also directed against moderate African governments, that after independence maintained close political, economic and/or military links with the former colonial power or otherwise demonstrated leanings towards the western powers.

From the very beginning, the relationship between the Ghanaian and the Nigerian Governments was one of rivalry, which was partly concerned with the leadership of independent Africa but was primarily based on differences in outlook and approaches towards African affairs and inter-African relations. Ghana became the driving force in a group of six African states—the Casablanca group—which included Algiers, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic.

The Nigerian Government was one of the driving forces behind

another rival continental organization—the Monrovia Group—consisting of the 12 French-speaking states of the Union of African States and Madagascar (UAM) and most other independent African states, with the exception of the East African states. Within the Monrovia group there were several regional groupings of French-speaking states which had more intimate political and economic relationships. Nigeria did not participate in any of these organizations.

The Monrovia group had a gradualist approach to African unity, aiming at the development of co-operation in practical problems, such as common services, economic co-operation where a future common market was envisaged, the development of transport and telecommunications, etc. The emphasis was on co-operation between independent states, which preferred a functionalist approach to the professed ultimate aim of African unity—the Nkrumah approach was a federalist one, starting with the establishment of a political union and an all-African government. The Monrovia states accordingly stressed the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other independent African countries, with the exception of the apartheid regime of South Africa.

The Federal Government of Nigeria was also active in the preparation of what was to be the foundation of the first true all-African organization of independent African states, the Addis Ababa Summit Conference in May 1963. This Conference brought together all the regional groups of states, including the Casablanca and the Monrovia powers. As a result of the creation of the Organization of African Unity, the former regional organizations were dissolved, one important exception being the UAM organization for economic co-operation.

At the Addis Ababa Summit Conference the two conflicting concepts of African unity confronted each other, resulting in a compromise, in which the Nigerian concept provided the basis, but with added militancy as regarded active and organized support for liberation movements in non-independent Africa. The Nigerian Government played an important role in the activities of the OAU during

the following years.

Nigeria and the United Nations. Like most African countries, Nigeria took an active part in the various UN bodies. It participated in the United Nations operations in the Congo, contributing forces that earned a high reputation. It was also represented in the 18-power disarmament talks in Geneva.

Pro-western non-alignment. After independence, Nigeria followed a middle-of-the-road course in international relations. The federation was, however, clearly oriented towards the western powers. A defence pact—the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact—was established with the United Kingdom, which was also a member of NATO. The Federal Government showed reluctance to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Before independence, the AG and the NPC were strongly pro-western, whereas the NCNC generally preferred a neutral role for Nigeria. Gradually this picture changed. Some radical factions of the NCNC continued to disagree with the general foreign policy of the Federal Government, though the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wachuku, belonged to the NCNC. In its role as the federal opposition, the AG gradually went over to advocating a genuinely neutral foreign policy, charging the Federal Government with following a policy of biased neutralism, contrary to the spirit of African independence and non-alignment. The military pact was also strongly attacked by the Nigerian Youth Congress (NYC) under the leadership of Tunji Otegbeye, later the leader (Secretary-General) of the Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers Party. After stormy demonstrations in the big cities, especially in Lagos, the defence pact was abrogated in 1962.

The general western orientation of the Nigerian Government did not, however, change fundamentally during the following years. The bad relations with France, including the severance of diplomatic relations in protest against the French nuclear tests in the Sahara, may be considered an important exception to this general rule. During the 1964 federal elections campaign, most of the UPGA parties, including sections of the NCNC, favoured

a more genuine non-alignment in foreign affairs.

After independence, Nigeria continued as a member of the Commonwealth.

The Nigerian attitudes to the European Common Market (EEC) have, however, been more ambivalent. The Federal Government declined the invitation to join the EEC as an associated member in the event of British membership—an invitation extended during the British efforts to join the EEC in the early sixties—as did the East African countries that received the same invitation. Later on, the Federal Government succeeded in negotiating with the EEC a special trade treaty which, for most practical purposes, amounted to an association. Under this agreement, which was signed in Lagos in July 1966, Nigeria gained free access to the EEC market for all her export products, except for some of the most important (cocoa beans, groundnut and palm oil, and plywood), which were to be subject to a tariff quota. In return, the EEC countries obtained preferential status for a fixed number of products that amounted to about 4 per cent of Nigeria's total imports. Nigeria was not to share the EEC development fund with the associated African states. This agreement was never ratified, however, and was repudiated by the Federal Government in 1968.

Post-war perspectives. As a result of its experiences during the civil war, the present Nigerian Government has probably developed new loyalties and orientations, in addition to those that existed before, a few of which may have been changed. It remains to be seen which of these orientations constitute permanent traits of Nigerian foreign policy, and which will turn out to be only temporary. A crucial question in this context is what groups and social structures will provide the basis for the Nigerian Government in the years to come.

As has been noted, the prominent politicians who formerly belonged to the federal opposition parties constitute a majority of the civilians in the present Federal Government. Though attitudes may change with changing political roles, it is important to note that most of the politicians now in the Federal Govern-

ment, preferred a more active foreign policy during their time in opposition, and a stricter adherence to genuine non-alignment. This fact, combined with the unreserved support which the Federal Government received from the Soviet Union during the civil war—in addition to the delivery of military equipment and the willingness of the Soviet Union to participate quite extensively in Nigerian reconstruction—may well for the immediate future involve the more active and more genuine non-alignment of Nigeria in world politics.

The Nigerian Economy and the Natural Resources

Nigeria has a fairly diversified economy. As is the case in most developing countries, agriculture constitutes the most important sector. Nigerian agriculture is, however, diversified. Natural resources, including forests and minerals, constitute another important sector. The rich oil deposits may be the basis of a structural change in the economy and provide promising prospects for the future. A growing and diversified manufacturing industry is also an important part of the picture.

The civil war has, of course, had negative consequences of many kinds for the growth of the Nigerian economy during the last few years—the effects being most obvious in the war zones, the eastern parts of Nigeria, including the Mid-West and the Niger Delta area. This outline of the economic trends, therefore, concentrates on developments before the secession.

GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

The Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP), valued at constant prices (1962), rose from £1,023.9 million in the fiscal year 1958-59 to £1,583.1 million in 1966-67, which gives an average compound growth rate of 5.6 per cent per annum. The growth rate fluctuated from year to year, varying between 0.5 and 13.4 per cent, in accordance with fluctuations in agricultural outputs caused by changing weather conditions. However, during the same period the annual population growth amounted to about 2.5 per cent. The average per capita GDP thus had a growth rate of 3 per cent annually.

A comparison of the average annual growth rates of the GDP between the periods 1958-62 and 1962-66 reveals some interesting trends. The growth rates were 6.5 per cent and 4.7 per cent respectively. The decline was most considerable for private consumer expenditure (from 6.6 per cent to 3.3 per cent), general government consumption expenditure (from 5.0 per cent to 4.1 per cent) and imports of goods and services (from 6.2 per cent

to 5.3 per cent). However, the growth rate of the gross domestic fixed-capital formation showed only a minor decline (from 6.0 per cent to 5.8 per cent) and, most important, the annual growth rate of exports of goods and services rose extensively (from 6.6 per cent to 13.9 per cent).

During these years savings grew at an average annual rate of 12.5 per cent, the trend being favourable (6.4 per cent and 18.9 per cent respectively for the two periods). Savings were the main source from which the fixed-capital formation was financed. Government savings contributed one-third of the total fixed-capital formation. Foreign capital inflow constituted another but more modest source (£48.3 million in 1958 and £84.4 million in 1962 at constant (1962) prices) and the annual growth rate of this source was also lower.

The fixed-capital formation was distributed as follows: 35 per cent on building (residential and non-residential); 23 per cent on plant, machinery and equipment; 20 per cent on civil engineering works; 15 per cent on land, agriculture and mining development; and 7 per cent on vehicles. The non-corporate private sector and private corporations owned 60 per cent of the newly established fixed-capital, while the share of public corporations and governments was 40 per cent.

A comparison of the growth rates of the various sectors of the Nigerian economy between the periods 1958-62 and 1962-66 displays interesting structural changes.

Agriculture is, as has previously been pointed out, the predominant sector of the economy, contributing, together with forestry and fishing, 65.6 per cent of the GDP in 1958 and 54.9 per cent in 1966. Compared with the average annual growth rate of 5.6 per cent, these sectors had a bad record—an average annual growth rate of 3.3 per cent, declining from 4.6 per cent during the first period to 2.0 per cent in the second.

Distribution is the second largest sector, amounting to 12.5 per cent and 12.7 per cent of the GDP in 1958 and 1966 re-

spectively. It had an average annual growth rate of 5.8 per cent, declining from 6.0 per cent during the first period to 5.7 per cent during the second.

Mining constituted the third largest sector in 1966, amounting to 7.2 per cent of the GDP. The proportion of mining was rather small in 1958 (only 1 per cent of the GDP). The most impressive growth rate, which rose rapidly—from an annual average of 27.3 per cent during the first period to 43.7 per cent during the second—was due to the rapid increase of the oil production.

Manufacturing and handicrafts was another sector with a high growth rate. This sector ranked third in 1958, with 4.4 per cent of the GDP, and fourth in 1966, with 5.9 per cent of the GDP. The average annual growth rate was 9.4 per cent, declining from 13.8 per cent during the first period to 5.2 per cent during the second.

Building and construction ranked fifth in 1966, with 5.2 per cent of the GDP, having risen from 3.4 per cent in 1958. This sector had an average annual growth rate of 11.0 per cent, declining from 13.0 per cent during the first period to 9.0 per cent during the second.

Transport and communications ranked sixth and constituted 4.0 per cent of the GDP, both in 1958 and in 1966. This sector had an average annual growth rate of 5.5 per cent, declining drastically from 10.5 per cent during the first period to 0.7 per cent during the second.

General government administration ranked seventh. This sector declined from 3.9 per cent of the GDP in 1958 to 3.2 per cent in 1966. The average annual growth rate declined markedly—from 6.6 per cent during the first period to 0.6 per cent during the second.

Education made up 2.3 per cent of the GDP in 1958, rising to 3.1 per cent in 1966. The average annual growth rate during these years was 9.2 per cent, declining from 10.7 per cent during

the first period to 7.8 per cent during the second.

Electricity and water supply showed a rapid rise—from 0.3 per cent of the GDP in 1958 to 0.7 per cent in 1966. The average annual growth rate of this sector was 18.2 per cent, declining from 21.0 per cent during the first period to 15.6 per cent during the second.

Health services showed a rise from 0.4 per cent of the GDP in 1958 to 0.6 per cent in 1966. The average annual growth rate was 11.1 per cent, declining from 15.8 per cent during the first period to 6.6 per cent during the second.

Other services made up the rest (2.1 per cent of the GDP in 1958 and 2.6 per cent in 1966). These services had an average annual growth rate of 8.4 per cent, rising from 6.6 per cent during the first period to 10.1 per cent during the second.

The total current federal and regional revenues increased from £96.3 million in 1959 to £189.2 million in 1966, thus having an average annual growth of 10.5 per cent. During this period, total recurrent expenditure increased from £98.9 million to £174.8 million, the average annual growth rate being 8.4 per cent. Revenue rose from 9.8 per cent to 11.8 per cent of the GDP and expenditure rose from 10.1 per cent to 10.9 per cent.

During these years the structure of both revenue and expenditure changed, however. With regard to the revenue, the major changes concerned the proportion of taxes, which dropped from 80.3 per cent of the total revenue in 1959 to 71.6 per cent in 1966. Within this sector the most prominent changes were the decline of the proportion represented by export and import duties and the rise of the proportion stemming from excise duties. Government policy during this period aimed at protecting local industries, providing incentives to private investors and improving the balance of payments, using the raising of import duties

as a major instrument. This policy resulted in increased domestic substitute production of the main consumer products. Import regulations contributed to these developments. Another significant change was the rise in the proportion of the revenue stemming from mining and royalties, etc. which increased from 2 per cent of the total revenue in 1959 to 8.5 per cent in 1966. This trend will continue, mainly as a result of growing output from the petroleum industry. Significant also is the increase in the payments of interest and dividends, which rose from 3.5 per cent in 1959 to 5.3 per cent in 1966, a rising trend which continued during the following years.

The main change with regard to expenditure concerns the cost of administration, which rose from 23.8 per cent of the total expenditure in 1959 to 32.6 per cent in 1966. Another important change is the rising proportion allocated to economic services—from 8.8 per cent in 1959 to 17.8 per cent in 1966. Within this sector, expenditure on construction rose from 2.0 per cent of total expenditure in 1959 to 9.0 per cent in 1966. Expenditure on agriculture rose, more modestly, from 3.9 per cent to 5.0 per cent during the same period.

The capital expenditure increased from £56.5 million in 1959 to £84.4 million in 1966, showing an average annual growth rate of 5.9 per cent, but rapidly declined after 1964. The current surplus was not sufficient to cover these expenditures, which were mainly financed by the raising of internal loans and by drawing on foreign cash balances. External grants and loans were of minor importance. The amount of public debt, accordingly, went up from £52.4 million in 1959 to £243.4 million in 1966, a trend that continued, due to the civil war. The ratio between internal and external debt changed during the period—external debts made up 39.1 per cent of the total public debt in 1959, declining to 28.8 per cent in 1966.

Nigerian foreign trade displayed an upward trend after the second world war. In 1959 the value of merchandise exported was £163.50 million, while in 1966 this value was £283.13 million. The value of imports increased from £178.41 million in 1959 to £256.27 million in 1966. The increase of the value of merchandise exported has been almost entirely the result of increased export volumes, and has not been due to changes in export prices.

The growth of petroleum exports has greatly affected the trade structure. In 1959 the four main agricultural exports contributed about 70 per cent of the total exports (the distribution of these exports, in £ million was cocoa 38.29, groundnuts, including oil and cake, 33.79, palm kernels 25.97, and palm oil 13.81), while petroleum contributed 1.7 per cent (£2.7 million). The share of the above-mentioned agricultural exports declined to 51.6 per cent of the total exports in 1965, while the share of petroleum increased to 25.9 per cent—a trend that will most probably continue (the percentage increased to 33.0 in 1966, but declined, due to the civil war, to 29.8 in 1967 and 17.9 in 1968).

Significant changes have also taken place in the structure of imports. Imports of food have declined from 11.7 per cent of the total imports in 1959 to 8.4 per cent in 1965; imports of beverages and tobacco have declined from 3.3 per cent in 1959 to 0.7 per cent in 1965; and imports of manufactured goods and articles have declined from 47.1 per cent to 40.1 per cent during the same period. During this period the imports of crude materials increased from 1.1 per cent of the total imports to 2.4 per cent, chemicals from 5.6 per cent to 7.3 per cent, and machinery and transport equipment from 24.1 per cent to 33.6 per cent. These changes reflect the expansion of domestic manufacturing industries and the increased demand for heavy equipment stemming from capital projects, though higher import duties on consumer goods and import restrictions have also contributed to this development.

The growth of invisible trade is another highly significant development. The value of non-merchandise imports increased from £32.9 million in 1959 to £153.3 million in 1966 while the value

of exports amounted to £17.7 million and £28.9 million respectively for the two years. This development was mainly caused by dividend payments on foreign direct investments in Nigeria, which increased from £8.5 million in 1959 to £37.7 million in 1966, and by miscellaneous services purchased from abroad, which increased from £1.9 million to £49.9 million during this period. The increase in the first sector was a result of the increased level of foreign investment in Nigeria, while the increase in the second sector may be explained partly by the expansion of government overseas spending and partly by the growth of the oil industry.

This growing deficit on invisible trade is, of course, reflected in the Nigerian balance of payments.

As has previously been noted, important changes in the direction of external trade have taken place since Nigeria became independent. In 1959 the Commonwealth trade predominated (51.4 per cent of the imports were from and 52.1 per cent of the exports were to the Commonwealth countries; the United Kingdom's shares of the total imports and exports were 45.3 per cent and 50.5 per cent respectively). In 1965 the Commonwealth proportion had declined to 36.1 per cent of the imports and 40.2 per cent of the exports—and statistics for later years confirm this trend. The EEC countries have gradually secured a larger proportion of the total trade, increasing from 18.3 per cent of the imports and 33.9 per cent of the exports in 1959 to 24.8 per cent of the imports and 36.6 per cent of the exports in 1965. Also this trend is confirmed by later trade statistics. Imports from the United States have increased—from 4.4 per cent of the total imports in 1959 to 12.0 per cent in 1965. This increase may be explained by foreign-assistance contributions, tied to imports from the donor country. However, the fact is that Nigeria has dispersed her trade to a greater number of countries since 1959. Trade with eastern Europe has, however, been rather small during the whole period (3.2 per cent or below both for exports and imports).

DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Planning has long traditions in Nigeria. The first 10-year development plan, involving £55 million, was adopted in 1946 and was revised several times during this period. A new development-plan period started in 1955. The executive machinery was simplified. Planning became a regional as well as a federal matter, and a National Economic Council was created to co-ordinate federal and regional activities. In 1959 this institution was strengthened by the appointment of a Joint Planning Committee.

The most important aspects and projects in the 1962-68 development plan have already been referred to. The total outlay under the plan amounted to £676.5 million, of which 13.6 per cent was allocated to primary production, 13.4 per cent to trade and industry, and more than 40 per cent to other sectors that also contribute directly to economic growth, such as transport, communications, irrigation and power supply for industrial purposes. The largest single project was the Kainji Dam, planned to cost £68.1 million. This project was intended to provide cheap electricity, with the additional effects of improving navigation on the River Niger and, through irrigation and flood control, contributing towards agricultural developments. The plan aimed at an average annual growth rate of 4 per cent.

It should be emphasized that the plan consisted of three regional plans, supplemented by a federal plan. Though the emphasis was on co-ordination, the plan did not succeed in preventing the regional governments from claiming an iron and steel complex each. The plan may be characterized as a co-ordinated series of public investment and policy programmes, which, together with the expected amount of private investment, were required to support the postulated minimum growth rate. Thus, it was not a wholly interdependent and binding policy blueprint, but a looser type of statement, indicating the main directions of development and open to improvisations. However, private investments and assistance fell short of the estimates in the plan.

The following plan (1968-73) was intended to be part of a 20-year plan covering the period 1968-88. The effects of the civil war have, of course, affected the first part of this long-term plan. The need for economic and social reconstruction is extensive, and the setbacks caused by the war are considerable, especially in the four states that were directly affected by the war. A four-year National Reconstruction and Development Programme was considered in March 1969. However, later developments caused by the civil war and changes in policy priorities after the end of hostilities may affect this programme seriously. This blueprint fixed the minimum target for annual growth at 5 per cent. During the four-year period, £1,163 million was to be invested and was to be allocated as follows: Federal Government, including state corporations, £465.2 million; state-governments programmes, including statutory corporations and local authorities £232.2 million; and the private sector, excluding the petroleum account, £465.2 million. Industrial priority projects that were considered included the investment of £200 million, of which a projected iron and steel complex accounted for £50 million. These projects were to be promoted by the Government, but with private participation. First-priority projects included agriculture-based industries. Second priority was assigned to the development of chemical and petro-chemical industries, third priority to further integration and diversification in the textile industry, and fourth priority to the establishment of an integrated iron and steel complex.

A Post-War National Reconstruction and Development Plan, 1970-74, was announced in the Budget broadcast by Maj.-Gen. Gowon on April 20, 1970. No details were given, but Gowon indicated agriculture, industry and transportation as "the three topmost priority sectors", adding education at all levels to the area of special importance.

The Federal Government has placed great emphasis on central planning and national co-ordination of the development planning of the States.

AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHERIES

Agriculture. As has already been pointed out, Nigeria is predominantly an agricultural and pastoral country. This sector of the economy supports by far the largest part of the population. Though the relative proportion of agriculture in the Nigerian economy in terms of its share of the GDP, has showed a declining trend, and the growth rates of other sectors have been higher during the last few years, agricultural products still contribute the largest part of the Nigerian export. Unlike the agricultural exports from most African countries, the Nigerian exports are diversified.

A certain amount of specialization has also taken place as between the different areas. Approximately 98 per cent of the cocoa crop is produced in Western Nigeria, particularly in the Oyo and Ondo districts. More than 1 million acres of land have been used for this production. Virtually the whole crop is exported, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands being the principal destinations. Northern Nigeria is the main producing area for groundnuts, the production being particularly extensive in the former Kano, Bornu, Katsina and Sokoto provinces. Palm products (oil and kernels) are mainly produced in the south, kernels in larger quantities in the west than in the east; the main oil exports, however, used to come from the east. However, the first palm-kernel-processing factory, established in 1965, was situated at Ikeya, near Lagos. Later on, similar factories were also established in the Mid-Western Region and at Port Harcourt. Cotton is mainly grown in Northern Nigeria, except for a relatively small proportion in Western Nigeria, and is processed locally, mainly for export. Tobacco-growing and processing is a fairly new, but rapidly expanding industry, situated in the north and the west. Rubber production, which was rapidly expanding before the civil war—Nigeria ranked as the fifth largest world producer—was mainly situated in the Mid-Western Region around Benin and Sapele. Though most of the production came from peasant farmers' small-holdings, large-scale plantation projects have increasingly been established. Soya beans are produced in the north, mainly in the Benue area

and almost exclusively for export. This is also the case in the production of benniseed. The production of coffee (Northern Nigeria) and sugar is of recent date but is expanding. So is also the production of rice. Livestock production—mainly cattle, sheep and goats—is situated in the north. The tsetse fly restricts cattle-ranching to the dry savannah areas, though major efforts have been made during the last decade to combat the tsetse fly and open up new areas for cattle production. The existing production, which is predominantly in the hands of the nomadic Fulani, is, however, susceptible of improvement. Hides and skins are also predominantly northern export products.

Nigeria's agricultural growth rate compares favourably with that of most developing countries. It is assumed that since 1950 the output for domestic use has increased approximately in line with the population growth, whereas the export of agricultural products has grown by about 4.5 per cent annually. This rather impressive growth, which has been accomplished by small-holders, has, however, had little or no immediate effect on the average welfare levels. The small-holders have been drained off by marketing-board surpluses, export duties and purchase taxes. The indirect benefits of this process for the farmers and for the Nigerian economy at large, are not easily measurable. However, the marketing-boards surpluses—both those of the Western Region, as evidenced by the report of the Coker Commission and by the trials in 1963, and those of the Northern Region, as revealed in the 1967 White Papers on the Northern Nigeria Development Corporation and the Northern Nigeria Marketing Board—were used for purposes that did not have improving effects on the economy.

Nigeria ranks as the largest exporter of groundnuts in the world, as the second largest exporter of cocoa, and also as one of the largest exporters of palm oil. Its cotton exports have been declining, mainly as a result of increasing domestic consumption of Nigerian cotton as substitute for imported cotton. As regards the main agricultural exports, the Nigerian crop producers have competed successfully on the world market, despite the export taxes and drains resulting from the activities of the marketing

boards. The low returns on land, labour and capital in the export-oriented sector of the agricultural economy were in the first place not due to inadequate technology and poor natural resources, but rather to low prices artificially imposed by the government.

The public influence on agriculture grew during the colonial period. From 1910 on, the colonial government started to encourage the farmers to increase their output per acre. During this early period, and also later, the main emphasis was on research and education rather than on direct public involvement in agricultural production.

A more direct public involvement on the marketing side—and hence in the returns to the farmers—resulted from the establishment of governmental marketing boards in 1947, partly as a consequence of the organizational set-up during the second world war.

Shortly afterwards, the government also began to involve itself directly in the productive processes. At the end of the fifties, when the regional governments had taken over responsibility for agriculture, it is possible to trace a shift of emphasis in the government involvement—from merely providing social overhead and administrative services to providing direct investments in agricultural plantations and directing investment schemes concerning farm settlements. The policies laid down in the 1962-68 Development Plan strengthen this new emphasis.

One-third of the resources devoted to agriculture in the federal and the regional budgets during this planning period were allocated to government-directed investment projects, including farm settlements, plantations, irrigation schemes, etc. The allocations to extension amounted to 23 per cent; 13.3 per cent were to credits and 10 per cent to research.

Systems of land-holding in Nigeria vary according to local conditions but in general, agricultural lands are traditionally held in communal or clan ownership, though adaptations have been made

in tenure to meet the needs of modern agriculture. Though small-holders have been the main producers, increased attention has been given in the south to government-sponsored land settlement and plantations owned by the government. During the colonial period the authorities bolstered up tradition by not allowing the sale of land to foreigners.

Before independence, the emphasis was on the expansion of export crops; since independence, increasing attention has also been given on import substitution, especially in the south and for products like tobacco, cotton goods and sugar. Export agriculture has in the past been heavily taxed to finance industrial developments.

The internal exchange of agricultural products was on a rather small scale until recently, when well-developed road and railway systems have made transportation to distant domestic consumption centres possible. Before the civil war this trade was developing rapidly. Yams were supplied by the Ilorin, Kabba and Benue areas to the markets of the densely populated areas of southern Nigeria—to the Eastern, Mid-Western and Western Regions. Cola nuts went from the south-western areas to the north. Palm oil produced in the west was sold in the northern towns. Cattle were transported from the north for sale and slaughter in the south.

Nigerian agriculture has suffered from the effects of the civil war, especially, of course, in the war zones in the east. Agricultural trade has been disrupted, transport facilities have been overloaded, improperly maintained, destroyed or diverted to military uses, research stations, extension services and university teaching in the Mid-Western Region and the Eastern Region have been disrupted, and production seriously disturbed and partly destroyed in these areas. Nigerian agricultural reconstruction and development are closely interrelated and the opportunities for growth and development are considered so good that reconstruction investments may well be directed to growth and development to achieve both objectives.

Forestry. Approximately one-third of Nigeria—31,960,000 hectares out of 92,377,000—is covered by forest, nearly 80 per cent of which is savannah woodland, so far of little productive value. The rain-forest belt makes up the rest, except for the mangrove forests, mainly in the Niger Delta area. It is mainly the high forests of Western and Mid-Western Nigeria that have been exploited commercially.

The forest resources of Nigeria are not yet fully explored—and far from fully exploited. Forestry plays a modest and declining role in the Nigerian economy, contributing about 5 per cent of the GDP in 1966. The average annual growth rate has been low (0.6 per cent during the period 1958-66).

Fisheries. Fishing contributes an even smaller proportion of the Nigerian GDP, but this sector more than doubled its output between 1958 and 1966. Progress started in 1962 with the new development plan. Prior to that date, the freshwater fisheries of Lake Chad predominated. The funds allocated for the development of fisheries were spent mainly on the sea and coast fisheries. A small modern trawler fleet has been built up, and the establishment of processing facilities was included in the 1962-68 development plan. Nigeria is, however, still importing large quantities of fish, as domestic production only supplies about 80 per cent of the consumption.

MINING, FUEL AND POWER

Nigeria has rich mineral deposits, of which oil, tin, columbite, coal and limestone so far have been the most exploited. The contribution of the mining industry to the GDP rose from 1.5 per cent in 1952-53 to just under 2 per cent in 1962-63. As previously noted, this proportion grew rapidly in the following years, due to the development of the petroleum industry, which has highlighted this sector as the most important for the future. But though Nigeria's mineral resources are rich, they are limited. The greatest challenge the Nigerian Government is confronted with today is to find a way of using these resources to create an

economy which will still be vital without them.

Oil. Though the production of oil in commercial quantities is a recent phenomenon, the search for crude oil in Nigeria started as early as 1937 with geological and geophysical investigations. Drilling operations started in 1951, and the first commercial oil field was discovered in 1956. From then on, development has taken a rapid course; during the period from 1957 to the start of the civil war, 627 wells were drilled with a rate of success of 68.9 per cent, and 176 oil deposits were identified, of which less than 20 have so far been developed and put into production. Preliminary estimates of the crude-oil reserves in southern Nigeria amount to more than 800 million tons. However, large areas have not yet been intensively investigated. Future discoveries may, therefore, open even larger oil potentials.

The commercial exploitation of the Nigerian wells began in December 1957, and production grew rapidly—from 5.9 million tons a year in 1964 to 13.3 million tons in 1965 and 20.7 million tons in 1966, before the civil war brought oil production almost to a standstill in 1967. However, the production in the off-shore fields went on, uninterrupted, and it could be resumed in most other places by late 1968.

Most of the oilfields opened up for commercial development before 1965 were located in the former Eastern Region. Early in 1965 the trans-Niger pipeline connected the Ughelli area with the pipeline system to the port of Bonny and made it possible to expand the production in the Mid-Western Region. Until the Nigerian Gulf Oil Company in 1965 for the first time extended production to the off-shore Okan field, all oil production in Nigeria was in the hands of the Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company.

The export value of crude oil increased rapidly—from £1 million in 1958 to £92 million in 1966, when it constituted 33 per cent of Nigeria's total exports. During this period 84 per cent of the total exports went to western Europe, 14 per cent to the United States and 2 per cent to other African countries.

In 1965 a start was made in the refining of oil in Nigeria. A £12 million refinery was built outside Port Harcourt, and since November of that year this refinery has supplied most of the domestic consumption, in addition to small quantities that were exported to neighbouring countries. This refinery, which is owned jointly by the Nigerian Government (50 per cent), Shell (25 per cent) and BP, was damaged early in the civil war but will probably be back in operation by mid-1970.

In addition to Shell/BP and Gulf, the following international oil companies have been directly engaged in oil production in Nigeria: Mobil, AGIP/Phillips, and the French company SAFRAP. Other companies with fields as yet unexploited include Amoseas, Tennessee Nigeria, Esso, and Great Basins Petroleum.

Natural gas. Rich natural-gas resources, both associated with the oil and in isolation, have been discovered in Nigeria. Unfortunately most of the gas produced so far has been flared away, due to the lack of markets. The extent of natural-gas production was in the past dependent on the crude-oil output, being a by-product of this production. The production increased from 1.6 by 10^9 cubic feet in 1958 to 101.6 by 10^9 cubic feet in 1966. Gradually a small portion of the output has been put to commercial use in Nigeria; the domestic consumption increased from 1.1 by 10^9 cubic feet in 1965 to 5.7 by 10^9 cubic feet in 1966. Plans to export the gas and to make more extensive domestic use of it have been under consideration.

Coal. Another important source of energy in Nigeria is coal, though the role of coal is declining. Coal deposits in the Enugu area have been exploited since 1915, being first discovered in 1909. At Enugu the known reserves are estimated to be 30 million tons, and deposits are also found in Northern Nigeria. The Nigerian Coal Corporation took over the production in 1950, and operates four collieries, Iva, Okpara, Ekulu and Ribadu, all of them modern and capable of producing in the aggregate about 80,000 tons per month. The actual output has been restricted to 54,000 tons, due to marketing considerations. The production goes mainly to domestic consumption, except for the small

quantities that are exported to neighbouring countries, chiefly Ghana. In 1967, the civil war caused a complete shutdown of all coal-mining at the Enugu collieries, but the coal-fields at Okpara were opened up again in May 1968. The future of this industry is probably not bright, as coal will gradually be replaced by oil also in the domestic market.

Electricity. The Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (ECN), a statutory corporation set up in 1951, is the principal supplier of electricity. The total installed capacity in 1967 was 430 MW, of which the ECN supplied 400 MW. The electricity generated rose from 284 million kWh in 1958/59 to 1,164 million kWh in 1966/67, corresponding to an average annual growth rate of 19.3 per cent. The total electricity generated in Nigeria was 918.6 million kWh in 1963/64 and 1,053.1 million kWh, 1,202.4 million kWh, 1,322.1 million kWh, and 1,030.2 million kWh in each of the following years. Since December 1968, the ECN has been getting part of its supply from the new Kainji Dam, a \$245-million project for which the IBRD has lent \$96.5 million. The capacity of the Kainji power station is planned to be increased from 320 MW to 880 MW.

Mining. We have already noted that the mining industry, the crude-oil industry excepted, contributes only a small, though important, proportion of the total GDP of Nigeria. In 1965, the labour force employed in the mining industry, the coal and petroleum sectors excluded, was 58,000, compared with the 96,000 employees in the whole of the manufacturing industry. As previously noted, all mineral rights are vested in the Nigerian state.

Until the oil production started, the tin industry, which is mainly situated on the Jos Plateau, was Nigeria's main mining industry. Columbite constituted another export commodity, while coal and limestone were produced mainly for domestic use. These are the five commodities that are produced on an economically significant scale.

Other minerals include argentiferous galena, gold, monozite, molybdenum, tantalite, thorite and wolfram, most of these,

however, in deposits which so far have not attracted large-scale commercial exploitation.

Before the civil war, plans for the large-scale production of lead and zinc concentrates from the Abakaliki deposits in Eastern Nigeria were being considered by the Nigerian Lead and Zinc Mining Company.

The large deposits of iron ore which have been discovered near Enugu and on the Agbaja Plateau not far from Lokoja in the Kwara State are of even more importance. Iron ore has been discovered in many places in Nigeria, but production has so far not been developed, partly because Nigeria is situated far from the industrial centres of the world, partly as a result of lack of funds, partly because of lack of suitable fuel for large-scale smelting, and partly also because of the low iron content compared with that of deposits in other countries. This is also the case with the deposits of the Enugu area (32 per cent iron content, that might be raised to 41 per cent) and of the Lokoja area (48-49 per cent). These reserves are estimated at 22 million tons and 30 million tons respectively.

A deposit of white marble has been located more recently, and has been put into production for export.

Tin. The tin ore is obtained chiefly from alluvial deposits situated in the provinces of Plateau, Bauchi, Zaria, Kano and Benue. This mineral has been exploited commercially for more than 55 years, the output having varied with the fluctuating prices on the world market. However, from 1958 to 1964 the cassiterite (tin ore) production increased gradually from 8,400 tons to 11,850 tons, and the annual output since 1965 has been around 12,700 tons. During this time, the prices on the world market have not fluctuated as much as before, partly due to the international quota system instituted in 1958. Almost all the tin ore is now melted locally, by the Makeri Smelting Co. Ltd., at Jos, which has been operating since 1961. Except for a proportion earmarked for domestic consumption, all the production is exported. Nigeria is the sixth largest producer of tin among

the countries which are members of the International Tin Council. The reserves of cassiterite are estimated to be 146,000 tons.

Columbite is found with tinstone, and is essentially a by-product of tin-mining. The average annual output for the period 1958-68 was 2000 tons, which corresponds to an export value of £1.2 million. Nigeria provides 95 per cent of the world's supply of columbite, which is used in the production of heat-resisting steels. Since the collapse of the columbite market in 1955, when the United States terminated its stock-piling programme, the demand has been weak and prices low. Total reserves in Nigeria are estimated to be 54,000 tons.

Limestone. Substantial deposits of limestone exist throughout Nigeria, and have provided the basis for a growing cement industry, supplying the home market. In 1965 plant capacity was estimated at 1,390,000 tons, and was increasing. Factories were established at Nkalagu (near Enugu), Abeokuta, Calabar, Ukpilla, Yandev (near Makurdi) and Sokoto.

INDUSTRY

A considerable expansion in industrialization took place during the years before the civil war. One feature of this development was the creation of main industrial areas, particularly those of Apapa, Ikeja, Kaduna and Port Harcourt, all of which were well equipped with the basic facilities, including access to main roads, water, electricity, drainage, telecommunications, etc. Ibadan, Sapele, Aba and Kano are other industrial areas.

Manufacturing industry has had a rapid growth in recent years, though it still accounts for a small proportion of the GDP. The output rose by 500 per cent between 1950 and 1960 and doubled during the following three years, but the actual value of the production is less impressive; £3 million in 1950, £15 million in 1960, and £30 million by the end of 1962. However, it should be emphasized that this includes only production by the modern establishments. The output in the traditional sector of Nigerian

manufacturing consists mainly of handicraft products, textiles, leather goods, wood products, pottery, cutlery, etc., mostly produced by very small establishments.

However, the traditional sector has stagnated, while the modern sector has expanded. Manufacturing has grown from 2.6 per cent of the GDP in 1958 (£26.2 million at the 1962 factor cost) to 4.6 per cent in 1966 (£72.7 million), while the proportion of handicrafts declined from 1.9 per cent in 1958 (£19.1 million) to 1.3 per cent in 1966 (£20.4 million). The proportion of 5.9 per cent of the GDP which manufacture and handicrafts contributed in 1966, does not, however, compare favourably with similar data for other African states.

As has previously been noted, the building and construction industry has shown a high growth rate during this period, expanding from 3.4 per cent of the GDP in 1958 (£35.3 million at the 1962 factor cost) to 5.1 per cent in 1966 (£81.3 million).

In 1966, 16 per cent of the industrial plants (264 establishments) were devoted to the food-processing industry, 38 per cent (621 establishments) to light industry and 46 per cent to heavy industry. Of the 750 establishments in the heavy-industry sector, about 19 per cent (142 plants) were devoted to vegetable and animal-oil production, about 20 per cent (155 plants) were motor-vehicle repair shops, and 15.6 per cent (117 plants) were producers of "other metal products", including very small-scale manufacturers of metal containers etc.

More than 80 per cent of the manufacturing establishments employed less than 100 persons, 160 establishments employed 100-199 persons, 91 establishments employed 200-499 persons, 41 establishments employed 500-999 persons, 13 establishments employed 1000-1999 persons, and seven establishments employed more than 2000 persons, of which one belonged to the food-processing industry, four to light industry and two to heavy industry.

Statistics of the distribution of the Nigerian labour force

between the various sectors should be treated with caution. This is true also of the manufacturing sector. The traditional manufacturing sector, though it is stagnant, employs a labour force estimated at half a million, mainly in small-scale producing units. In the above statistics concerning the 1966 distribution of manufacturing industries, enterprises with less than 10 employees are not included—a fairly large sector of the Nigerian manufacturing industry, which was estimated to provide employment for approximately 100,000 employees in 1963.

It is possible to discern three phases in the development of the modern sector of the Nigerian manufacturing industry. During the first, modern large-scale methods were established in the processing of the main export products—vegetable-oil extraction, latex production, tin-smelting and wood-processing. During the second, large manufacturing enterprises were established to supply consumer goods which were in mass demand. This development was supported by incentives from the government, which wanted to have import-substitute industries established. The government was also willing to protect such industries by its tariff policy. This resulted in the establishment of home-market-orientated industries, producing flour, beer and mineral waters, bottles, cotton textiles, shoes, margarine, cigarettes, etc. A more recent development, however, is the large-scale investment in the production of goods like cement and related construction materials, aluminium, steel, tires, various metal products, etc.

The prospects for industrialization are more favourable in Nigeria than in most developing countries, partly as a result of the wide range of raw materials available, and partly as a result of the large domestic market. Before the civil war, the governments of Nigeria consistently encouraged the establishment and growth of industries, and offered highly favourable incentives to industrialists who wished to be involved in the industrial development of Nigeria, by granting tax holidays to new industries qualifying for "pioneer" status, duty-free imports of machinery and parts for factories, raw materials, etc., in addition to protection through the tariff policy and

import regulations.

COMMUNICATIONS

The Nigerian infra-structure facilities are well developed, consisting of a railway system of approximately 2,178 miles, about 55,300 miles of roads (March 1966), a network of inland waterways made up of 4,000 miles of navigable creeks and rivers, a modern postal service, a coastal shipping fleet, an internal airline using the two international airports of Ikeja (Lagos) and Kano, in addition to the airports of Benin, Enugu, Port Harcourt, Ibadan, Calabar, Zaria, Kaduna, Jos, Gusau, Yola, Maiduguri and Sokoto, and modern ports constituting the main trade link with the outside world. The use of these facilities is growing rapidly, both those which serve the internal flow of people and goods and those connecting Nigeria with the outside world. The extension and improvement of the transport facilities are considered important tasks by the Federal Government, which has allocated one-eighth of the public investment capital in the 1962-68 development plan to this sector.

Marketing Boards, Co-operatives and Trade Unions

MARKETING BOARDS

As already noted, the marketing boards established from 1947 onwards stemmed from conditions during the second world war, when the British Government took over the purchase of Nigerian agricultural produce. Overseas marketing before the war used to be controlled by a few big European industrial companies in Nigeria. The Nigerian Cocoa Marketing Board was the first to be established by statute, followed in 1949 by the Nigeria Oil Palm Produce Marketing Board, the Nigeria Groundnut Marketing Board, and the Nigeria Cotton Marketing Board. These boards were responsible for the marketing of their respective products throughout the country. This system was radically changed in 1954-55, in accordance with the generally regionalist orientation of the Lyttelton Constitution, and the existing one-crop boards were replaced by regional marketing boards and a Central Marketing Board. The main responsibility of the latter was to serve as a common organization for the regional boards, taking care of the shipping, port storage, and selling operations. In 1958, the Central Board was replaced by the Nigerian Produce Marketing Co. Ltd., which was owned by the Regional Marketing Boards and was to be the contracting partner in export matters.

By law, the regional marketing boards were charged with the duty "to secure the most favourable arrangements for the purchase and the evacuation to a port of shipment of the produce intended for export, and by means of allocation of funds ... to promote the development of the producing industries concerned and the benefit and prosperity of the producers and the areas of production". The marketing boards fixed minimum prices for the producers in advance of the season, in order to ensure stable prices for the producers throughout each crop season. The boards also aimed at creating orderly marketing and improvement of quality. An additional task was to supply produce for local processing.

As previously indicated, there was a discrepancy between the aims established by law and the actual practice of the various

marketing boards. In some cases the price policy of the marketing boards have had effects which were contrary to the intentions when the boards were established. In some cases the policy has had disincentive effects on production, and has also contributed to the migration from agricultural to urban areas because of low returns. The price policy was probably mainly responsible for the levelling off in the growth of palm-oil production, as many producers diverted their resources from palm-oil production to rubber, which was not under the marketing boards.

The drainage by the marketing boards is illustrated by the fact that their share of the export returns amounted to an annual average of £13.825 million in the period 1947-48 to 1953-54, £3.268 million from then to 1960-61, and £2.820 million from that date to 1965-66. Between 1947 and 1962 estimated withdrawals through taxes and marketing-board surpluses amounted to the following proportions of potential producer income: cocoa, 31.9 per cent; groundnuts, 24.9 per cent; palm kernels, 28.1 per cent; palm oil, 21.0 per cent; and cotton, 22.1 per cent.

By annually prescribing producer prices which were, on the average, much below world prices, the marketing boards have, of course, influenced both existing and potential producers. Though these operations have not prevented all expansion in the agricultural production over the years, they may well have discouraged substantial expansions. Most surpluses have been transferred to the government for infrastructure expansion, though a small amount has been transferred back to agriculture via subsidized inputs (fertilizer, cocoa-sprayers, etc.), support of agricultural research, and university instruction. Neither the marketing boards nor the Nigerian Produce Marketing Company have been sufficiently producer-oriented to provide sufficient incentives for the extended growth of agriculture.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

Co-operation has long traditions in Nigeria, though the co-operative movement did not receive official recognition until 6 February 1936. By 31 March 1961, there were 4,018 different co-operative societies, with altogether 251,868 members. Marketing societies were in the majority—3,299 societies, of which 1,417 were situated in Northern Nigeria, 61 in Eastern Nigeria and 821 in Western Nigeria. In addition, there were 1,215 credit societies, of which none was situated in Northern Nigeria, 994 in Eastern Nigeria, 219 in Western Nigeria and two in Lagos. Of the registered societies, 1,497, with a total membership of 125,002, were situated in Northern Nigeria; 1,228, with a total membership of 55,295, were situated in Eastern Nigeria; 1,180, with a total membership of 62,289, were situated in Western Nigeria; and the rest, 113 societies, with a total membership of 9,282, in the Federal Territory. The total produce marketed was valued at £7,594,000, of which the societies in Western Nigeria alone accounted for £6,379,000. Almost all sales by consumer societies, totalling £2,010,000, were attributed to Western Nigerian societies. With regard to loans granted and loans repaid, totalling approximately £3 million and £2.4 million respectively, Northern Nigeria was responsible for about 50 per cent, and Western Nigeria for a little more than Eastern Nigeria.

The more important co-operative societies are concerned with agricultural products—the movement started with cocoa-marketing groups in Western Nigeria. Since 1951, the co-operative movement has been built up on a regional basis. However, efforts have been made to co-ordinate the activities on the national scale, through the establishment of the Co-operative Federation of Nigeria in August 1959.

TRADE UNIONS

In many ways the development of the Nigerian economy is reflected in the growth of the trade-union movement. Other social traits

in Nigeria have also affected the course of Nigerian trade-union development in many ways.

The trade-union movement started as trade organizations pre-dominantly for government employees. It has been weakened by a pattern of organizational fragmentation, the so-called "company" union system, under which membership is limited to single companies or governmental departments. In 1940, 14 trade unions were registered, with a total membership of 4,629. In 1946 the number of trade unions passed the 100 mark, with a total membership of 52,747. From now on, both the number of unions and the total membership grew rapidly. In 1955-56 the number of unions was 232, three years later 318; in 1963 there were 399 unions, the number growing to 487 in 1964, 600 in 1965 and 625 in 1966. The total trade-union membership in these years was 175,987, 248,613, 375,345, 416,082, 486,430, and 490,905 respectively.

Most of the unions have been small, a pattern that has not been radically changed with the growing number of unions and increased total membership. Thus, of the 298 trade unions registered in 1958, with a total membership of 235,742, only eight had a membership exceeding 6,000. Six of these consisted exclusively of employees of government departments or public corporations. The largest trade union was the Nigerian Union of Teachers, with 37,153 members (1955), followed by five unions with a membership of between 10,000 and 19,999. In 1966 the pattern was as follows: 102 trade unions with 1-50 members; 245 unions with 51-250 members; 157 unions with 251-1000 members; 53 unions with 1000-5000 members; nine unions with 5,001-10,000 members; seven unions with 10,001-20,000 members; one union with 20,001-50,000 members; and one union with more than 50,000 members.

At no level, however, have the unions been organized in industrial councils, according to the sector of the economy to which they belong.

At the national level, the Nigerian trade-union movement has been split into many rival organizations. The bases for such

splits have partly been basic political attitudes, partly conflicts and rivalry between trade-union leaders, partly office-seeking by these leaders, and partly disagreements over international alignments. Thus, politics have played an important and disintegrative role in Nigerian trade unionism, though the participation of the trade unions and trade-union leaders in the political parties or in parliamentary or governmental positions has been on an extremely modest scale.

The national alignment of the trade unions has not corresponded with the industrial sector to which they belonged. Neither has it depended on the position of the trade unions after 1962, with one important exception.

Before 1949, the dominant national trade-union federation was the Trade Union Congress. Many of its member unions as well as its national leaders, were aligned with the NCNC, especially during the 1947-48 campaigns. In 1949, the TUC was split into two federations, the Trade Union Congress and the Nigerian National Federation. The first posed as being neutral towards the political parties, the second had alignments with the NCNC. During the following year the two organizations combined in the Nigerian Labour Congress, which established some contacts with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In 1953, the name was changed to the All-Nigerian Trade Union Federation, and the international alignments were abrogated. In 1957, a new split occurred. The two new Federations were the National Council of Trade Unions of Nigeria, aligned with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), under the leadership of Adebola, Cole and Borha; and the All-Nigerian Trade Union Federation, under the leadership of Imodu, Nzeribe, Bassey and Goodluck. The two organizations combined again in 1959 under the leadership of Cole, Borha and Imodu; but already in the following year a new split took place—into the Trade Union Congress of Nigeria, under the leadership of Cole, Borha, and Adebola and aligned with the ICFTU, and the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, under the leadership of Imodu, Nzeribe, Bassey and the two northerners, Khayam and Nock, and aligned with the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF). Under strong pressure

from the Federal Government, the two federations combined into the United Labour Congress in 1962. Even from the start this new federation showed signs of strains. It was aligned with the ICFTU, and this alignment came to the forefront when the Imoudu-Ikoro-Goodluck-Bassey group seceded and formed the Independent United Labour Congress, which was aligned with the AATUF. The United Labour Congress continued its ICFTU alignment, under the leadership of Adebola and Borha. Another national federation established in 1962 was the Nigerian Workers Council, under the leadership of Chukwurah and Okongwu and aligned with the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions (IFCTU). Another important development in 1962 was the establishment of an exclusively northern trade-union federation, the Northern Federation of Labour (NFL), under the leadership of Nock. In 1963 the Independent United Labour Congress was split into the Nigerian Trade Union Congress under the leadership of Goodluck and Bassey and aligned with the AATUF, and the Labour Unity Front under the leadership of Imoudu, Esua and Nzeribe, with no international alignments.

During the period 1963-65 all these national federations, except the NFL, constituted the Joint Action Committee, which in 1964 organized the successful general strike in connection with the claims for minimum wages based on the findings and recommendations of the Morgan Commission. In January 1965, this ad hoc committee was split into the Trade Union Supreme Council under the leadership of Adebola, Borha and Chukwurah (i.e. of the United Labour Congress and Nigerian Workers Council) and the Joint Action Committee under the leadership of Goodluck, Bassey, Imoudu and Nzeribe (i.e. the Nigerian Trade Union Congress and the Labour Unity Front). The Northern Federation of Labour did not participate in these mainly southern-based national ad hoc organizations.

Though the Federal Government during the sixties appointed the leaders of most national federations to official committees of various categories, the United Labour Congress under the leadership of Adebola and Borha was clearly favoured, and was recognized as the major national labour federation by the Federal

Government.

During the early sixties, most labour leaders stayed out of party politics, and the trade-union federations were not aligned with any of the big parties. Some of the member unions, however, did have such alignments. After the establishment of the SWAFP in 1964 under the leadership of Dr. Tunji Otegbeye (the Secretary-General of the party and the former President of the Nigerian Youth Movement) this party considered itself as the political wing of the Nigerian Trade Union Congress. The leaders of the NTUC (Goodluck and Bassey) participated as leaders of the SWAFP. The Labour Unity Front leaders established the Labour Party of Nigeria. During the late forties and the early fifties, Imoudu had been active in the NCNC.

The international alignments of the national trade-union federation were a major source of dispute between the main factions of the Nigerian trade-union movement. The international trade-union federations were also a major source of funds and other benefits, such as scholarships for external training programmes, etc., which played an important role in the competition between the national Nigerian federations to obtain affiliations from the trade unions.

Though tribal loyalties probably played a certain role also in the Nigerian trade-union movement, clear-cut manifestations of such loyalties on any major scale at the national level are not easily discernible. However, the anti-southern flavour of the NFL was manifest. In many ways, the NFL was the proponent of the NPC "northernization" policy at the trade-union level—and the relationship between the NPC and the NFL was cordial most of the time.

The civil war did not contribute to peace in industrial relations in Nigeria. The Federal Government appealed for peaceful industrial relations, and in May 1968, it introduced by decree compulsory arbitration and a time-table for intervention in trade disputes. The effects were meagre. During 1968 and 1969 there were 264 trade disputes, of which 67 resulted in strikes

and lockouts, despite the decree, 32 were referred to conciliation, four to arbitration, and one to a board of inquiry, and the rest were settled by direct negotiation, assisted by officers of the Ministry for Labour and Information. This resulted in a new decree towards the end of 1969, banning all strikes and lockouts for a period of 12 months.

The Nigerian trade-union movement was seriously affected by the civil war. All the national trade unions welcomed the military coup of January 1966 but showed reluctance towards the second. In Northern Nigeria, however, the July coup was welcomed, not least by the Northern Federation of Labour, which took advantage of the changed situation to campaign for full "northernization" of jobs in Northern Nigeria, and the withdrawal of southerners, especially people from Eastern Nigeria.

The massacres in September-October 1966 had the greatest impact on trade-union members—in Northern Nigeria easterners constituted about 70-75 per cent of the district and branch officials and members of district and branch executive committees of the national unions. Even so, the national trade unions lay low and at first did not react to the killings in the north. Only at a late stage did the United Labour Congress of Nigeria try to initiate some relief programmes, after initiatives from outside and protests from inside.

Before the secession, these developments resulted in a new split in the Nigerian trade-union movement. Most trade unions in the Eastern Region severed their connections with the national federations with which they were aligned, and established the Eastern Nigeria Council of Trade Unions. This split, which will probably have repercussions in the future, adds to the many challenges that today confront the Nigerian trade-union movement in its search for unity and strength.

Education

In the last analysis, the wealth, prosperity and vitality of a nation rest upon the development of its human resources and upon the effective commitment of human energies and talents. Capital and natural resources are secondary in importance to this, though they constitute important assets and are necessary in most cases. Education at various levels is, therefore, of paramount importance for the general development, as also are training facilities.

Until 1944, formal education was in the hands of the Christian missionary stations and—in Northern Nigeria—of the Koranic schools, the Government's involvement being restricted to small-scale financial contributions. However, after the second world war, the government took over the initiative and today the governments run almost all formal education in Nigeria.

From the beginning, Nigeria's formal educational system was established on the western pattern of primary, secondary and tertiary levels, with heavy emphasis on general education. The major emphasis of this educational system is towards ever-higher levels of general education for the relatively small group of students that survives the selection processes. Until the fifties, the main emphasis was on elementary education. During the fifties the expansion of the education system in Nigeria was of an explosive character. At the primary level enrolments increased from about one million to three million pupils, and also at the secondary and tertiary levels the expansion was great.

During the first half of the sixties, this pattern changed: enrolment at the primary level stagnated between 1960 and 1965, being 2,912,619 and 2,911,742 respectively, while enrolment in secondary grammar schools had an annual average growth rate of 19.6 per cent, increasing from 52,437 to 128,160; and the enrolment of students aiming at the sixth form had an even higher average annual growth rate, 39.9 per cent, increasing from 899 to 4,815. Enrolment in technical and vocational schools also

showed an expanding trend, increasing from 4,555 (not including 482 students enrolled in unaided schools in Eastern Nigeria) to 8,581, with an average annual growth rate of 13.5 per cent. University enrolment increased from 2,659 to 7,709 students, with an average annual growth rate of 23.8 per cent. Teacher-training, however, showed a stagnating trend, increasing from 27,909 students in 1960 to 30,805 students in 1965, with an average annual growth rate of only 2 per cent.

These developments followed a change in government policy after the Federal Government had accepted the conclusions of the Ashby Commission report of 1960, which emphasized the need to expand secondary and higher education and to gear the output more closely to expected high-level manpower needs.

Another important pattern concerns the geographical distribution of formalized education. The educational gap between the southern and the northern parts of Nigeria during the pre-independence era has already been noted. Though during the post-independence era Northern Nigeria made large strides to catch up with southern Nigeria in the educational field, the gap was still wide in 1965. More than half of Nigeria's total population was situated in Northern Nigeria, but the primary-school enrolment in the north was 492,859, out of a total Nigerian enrolment of 2,911,742; the junior secondary enrolment in the north was 1,923 out of a total enrolment of 48,963; the senior secondary enrolment of all categories in the north was 26,193, compared with the Nigerian total of 171,894; the non-university tertiary enrolment in the north was 981 and the university enrolment was 956, the Nigerian totals being 8,508 and 7,709 respectively.

In Northern Nigeria, provincial differences were detectable: a further geographical disparity existed between the northern areas and the Middle Belt areas.

Another discernible educational gap which exists throughout Nigeria is that between urban and rural areas. Not unexpectedly, the proportion of school-age children attending school in urban

areas tends to be higher than in the countryside—also at the primary level.

At all levels, there is a large percentage of drop-outs from the educational system. Statistics reveal that, of the gross outturn from the primary level of 680,559 pupils in 1965, 439,914 were drop-outs; at the secondary-school level there were 13,987 drop-outs out of a total of 56,155 pupils. The percentage of drop-outs at higher levels was smaller, but complete data are not available. Approximately 60 per cent of the labour-force increase in 1965 had some schooling, but nearly 60 per cent of these were drop-outs from the primary level.

These figures indicate that in-employment training most probably plays an important role. The various ministries and public corporations as well as private firms provide such training in a variety of ways, including attendance at institutes of administration, staff development centres and clerical-training schools.

For the year 1966-67, the total expenditure on education (excluding foreign aid) was 3.75 per cent of the GNP. Public expenditure on education amounted to 18 per cent of the consolidated budget expenditures of the Federation. An overall sum of £52 million was spent on the education of Nigerians, in Nigeria and abroad, of which public funds contributed 75 per cent. Of the remaining 25 per cent, 60 per cent came from private persons, and 40 per cent from foreign aid.

Health

The administrative set-up of public-health service varied with constitutional changes. After independence, health services were regionalized, which resulted in some overlapping in administrative staff and in the ineffective use of scarce manpower. Since the first 10-year plan, health programmes have included the provision of an adequate supply of pure water, the development of environmental hygiene and the expansion of hospitals, maternity centres, child-welfare clinics, dispensary services and preventive medicine. These programmes were continued during the sixties. New programmes included socialized medical facilities, such as a free school medical service, a pilot health-insurance scheme, a private-practitioner service and hospital visiting committees. It should, however, be emphasized that federal services at the local level were only concerned with the Federal Territory of Lagos—which was a direct Federal Government responsibility—and practices in the regions varied.

The education of medical staff of various categories was another important part of the 1962-68 development plan, which set a target of 200 doctors a year. Government expenditure on health has been about 10-11 per cent of total government spending during the last 4-5 years.

Of the Nigerian total of 245 general hospitals in 1966, 66 were located in the Northern Region, 85 in the Eastern Region, 20 in the Mid-Western Region and 42 in the Western Region and 32 were under Federal control. The type of ownership varied, as is indicated by the distribution of doctors by their employers. Of the Nigerian total of 1,240 doctors, governments employed 519, local authorities 13, missions 216, industrial enterprises 46, the armed forces 31, universities 265, private practitioners 114, the World Health Organization 18, and 18 were in miscellaneous employment.

Like other West African countries, Nigeria is afflicted by several tropical diseases, including yellow fever, yaws, trypanosomiasis, leprosy, tuberculosis and malaria. For several

years, campaigns have been under way, with assistance from the WHO, and the situation has been considerably improved. In the main towns the causes of such diseases have been eliminated or considerably reduced.

The Nordic Countries and Nigeria

At an early date after Nigeria's independence, all Nordic governments except the Icelandic, established embassies in Lagos. In 1969 the Nigerian Federal Government established an embassy for the Nordic countries in Stockholm.

Until the outbreak of the civil war, relations between Nigeria and the Nordic countries were cordial but distant. The conflict changed this state of affairs, not so much at the official as at the non-official level. The distance disappeared, having, as is often the case, the effect of creating both togetherness and conflict in the relationship. Through the mass media and other means of communication the conflict and its effects became the topic of the day for a long period in the Nordic countries, as well as in the world at large, generating verbal civil wars also outside Nigeria. In the Nordic countries, this verbal conflict took place on many levels and covered different aspects. However, a broad consensus existed about the need to help those Nigerians on both sides who were suffering as a result of the war. Such an attitude, when it was followed up by action, had political implications which affected the relationship to the Nigerian Government, as the humanitarian aid had in practice the unintended supplementary effect of prolonging the war. This aspect of the humanitarian aid was an important point in the public debate in the Nordic countries. Almost all governmental relief from the Nordic countries was channelled through UN agencies like the UNICEF, or through national, Nordic or international Red Cross or Church relief organizations. A principle upon which the Nordic governments insisted was that the relief should be distributed to both sides.

Inside the Nordic countries, there were also demands for the recognition of Biafra and the Biafran government, demands that were also reflected in parliamentary debates. All the Nordic governments took a decisive stand against such demands.

The Nordic governments repeatedly appealed to the conflicting parties to reach agreement on a cease-fire and to facilitate

the humanitarian relief activities. In a declaration of February 28, 1969, the Federal Government pointed out that an armistice should be preceded by negotiations. The Federal Government stressed that it was aiming at the effective distribution of relief aid but regretted that it had not been possible to persuade Biafra to accept the most efficient methods of bringing in relief consignments on a large scale to the breakaway area. The Federal Government repudiated the voluntary relief agencies, which were operating illegally from Sao Tomé without the consent of the Nigerian Government, contrary to international laws, conventions and practice, and appealed to the Nordic governments to use their influence to persuade the voluntary relief organizations to let relief consignments to Biafra go to the Federal-held Obilagu airfield for further distribution. This Biafra had rejected.

Thus, the large-scale humanitarian relief activities placed a strain on the relations between Nigeria and the Nordic countries. The position of the Nordic governments was not an enviable one. At the domestic level, they were confronted with far-reaching demands from an active public opinion, national Biafra committees, etc., criticizing the government for passivity and turning the governments—in practice—into pro-Federal Government advocates. At the external level, their concern for humanitarian relief and the restoring of peace in Nigeria resulted in slightly strained relations with the Federal Military Government. Such strained relations were especially manifest during the last phase of the civil war, when Church relief organizations declined to comply with regulations explicitly laid down by the Federal Government with regard to the transfer of relief aid, and when private citizens of a Nordic country under the leadership of Count von Rosen built up a military air force for Biafra, based on Swedish-built light planes. The Swedish Government strongly dissociated itself from the military activities of its citizens. In 1968, the Swedish Government was invited to nominate a member of the international Military Observer Group established by the Federal Government and accepted the offer.

Before the civil war, the economic relations between Nigeria and the Nordic countries were at a low level. The trade between Nigeria and the Nordic countries was almost negligible—in 1966 the value of imports from Nigeria constituted only 0.432 per cent of total Danish imports, 0.021 per cent of total Finnish imports, 0.003 per cent of total Icelandic imports, 0.065 per cent of total Norwegian imports, and 0.243 per cent of total Swedish imports. (However, the value of the Swedish imports from Nigeria more than doubled from 1966 to 1969). In 1966 the value of exports to Nigeria constituted only 0.140 per cent of total Danish exports, 0.168 per cent of total Finnish exports, 3.537 per cent of total Icelandic exports, 1.078 per cent of total Norwegian exports and 0.160 per cent of total Swedish exports. However, the Nigerian market was of fairly great importance to Iceland and Norway, as a large proportion of the stockfish production of these countries was directed to this market.

A few Nordic firms have established themselves in Nigeria, but on a modest scale. Such firms include the Danish Det Østasiatiske Kompagni (The East Asiatic Co., Ltd.—EAC), which runs an automobile and truck company and is engaged in the import and distribution of machinery, pharmaceutical articles and other chemicals, and its subsidiary company, Dumex, which established a pharmaceutical firm in Nigeria in 1960. EAC represents several Scandinavian exporters, for instance the Swedish firms Alfa-Laval, ASEA, Atlas Copco, Nohab, Stal-Laval Turbin AB, Svenska Metallverken and Volvo. Some Scandinavian shipping companies have combined with the Nigerian National Shipping Line in the West African Shipping Conference.

At the cultural level there have been increasing exchanges between Nigeria and the Nordic countries. The Nigerian mass media have shown a keen interest in the welfare states of Scandinavia. On a small scale, some Christian organizations in the Nordic countries, including the Salvation Army, the Baptists and the Norwegian Church Relief organization, have been engaged in activities at various places in Nigeria. The books of some Nigerian novelists have been translated into Nordic languages and published in the Scandinavian countries. Especially during

the last few years, several books and pamphlets on Nigeria and Nigerian affairs have been published in the Nordic countries. During the sixties, a few Nordic researchers studied various aspects of Nigerian society. The Red Cross Societies of Finland, Norway and Sweden have since 1964 established close co-operation with the Nigerian Red Cross through the "Nordic Red Cross Action in Nigeria". Since independence the Nigerian Government has had a close co-operation with the Nordic Governments on concrete matters at the United Nations and in the various UN bodies.

All the Nordic countries concentrate their bilateral development co-operation geographically to a small number of states, mainly in East Africa. Nigeria is not among these countries, and as a consequence, the development co-operation between Nigeria and the Nordic countries has been almost non-existent.

The Danish contribution include a Dkr. 141,000 (\$18,800) kindergarten in Lagos, established in co-operation with the UNICEF and run by the Nigerian Womens Organization, with two Danish volunteers as assistants; a Dkr. 500,000 (\$66,666) centre for the education of women, situated in Ibadan, with accommodation for 20 students; and an egg-packing establishment. Up to 1967, 18 senior experts (the Danish total was 163) and 1 junior expert (46) had been active in Nigeria. Until 1965 Denmark had provided scholarships for 15 Nigerian students (the total number of scholarships provided was 437, of which 176 were for Africans). The number of scholarships awarded to Nigerians increased during the following years—15 in 1965 (out of a total of 234, of which 96 were for Africans), 19 in 1966 (total 299, of which 124 were for Africans) and 18 in 1967 (total 340, of which 121 were for Africans). Total expenditure for the financial year 1967-68 amounted to Dkr. 756,000 (\$100,800).

Neither Finland nor Iceland has so far established any bilateral development assistance co-operation with Nigeria.

The Norwegian contributions include an agriculture project in Abakaliki in Eastern Nigeria, run by a private organization (the Norwegian Church Relief organization), with supplementary

financial support from Norwegian governmental sources amounting to Nkr. 465,000 (\$65,035) during the years 1963-65. A few Norwegian experts have been engaged in Nigeria and a small number of Nigerians have held scholarships in Norway, but total Norwegian development assistance has been at a low level —Nkr. 263,650 (\$36,874) in 1964, Nkr. 303,536 (\$42,453) in 1966 (of which Nkr. 65,000 (\$9,091) was financial aid, Nkr. 169,326 (\$23,682) the cost of expert assistance, and Nkr. 69,210 (\$9,680) scholarships), and Nkr. 49,982 (\$6,990) in 1968 (3 scholarships). In 1969 the amount increased to Nkr. 16,166,712 (\$2,261,079), of which Nkr. 16 million (\$2,237,762) was commodity assistance (relief), Nkr. 140,000 (\$19,580) project costs (mainly a nutrition project), and the rest scholarships for three Nigerian students (total number of scholarships 145, of which 51 were for Africans), and for three Nigerians who participated in seminars or courses (total 63, of which 28 Africans).

The Swedish bilateral development assistance is even more strictly concentrated in a few priority countries than is the case with the other Nordic countries. Consequently, in mid-1969 there were no Swedish experts in Nigeria working under bilateral programmes (465 Swedish experts were active in other countries under bilateral agreements). However, under multilateral programmes, six senior experts and 15 junior experts were engaged in Nigeria. In 1968-69 17 Nigerian students held scholarships in Sweden (total number of scholarships 177), 10 Nigerians participated in seminars and courses in Sweden (total scholarships 367) and two Nigerians with multilateral scholarships stayed in Sweden. Of the total 1968 public expenditure for development assistance of Skr. 215.6 million (\$41,782,945) Skr. 106.3 million (\$20,600,775) went to Africa, and Skr. 3.2 million (\$620,156) to Nigeria.

None of the Nordic countries have granted development credits to Nigeria, though such credits were under consideration in some of these countries during the early sixties.

The Nordic countries did, however, provide a fairly extensive amount of humanitarian relief during the last two years of the civil war. During 1968-69, Danish public contributions amounted to Dkr. 18.9 million (\$2,520,000), of which Dkr. 1.5 million (\$200,000) was spent on stockfish deliveries, and private contributions amounted to Dkr. 17.6 million (\$2,346,667). Up to May, 1970, Finnish public contributions amounted to NM 1.1 million (\$261,967) and private contributions amounted to NM 2,058,550 (\$490,248). Norwegian public contributions amounted to Nkr. 80 million (\$11,188,811), of which stockfish deliveries made up the largest part, and private contributions amounted to Nkr. 32 million (\$4,475,524). In January 1970 an additional Nkr. 6 million (\$839,161) for relief was granted by the Norwegian Parliament. Total Swedish public grants amounted to Skr. 20.5 million (\$3,972,868) of which Skr. 18 million (\$3,488,372) was contributed before the civil war ended (the contributions in 1968-69 amounted to Skr. 12.5 million (\$2,422,480)). Of private contributions the Swedish Church aid provided Skr. 26,061,700 (\$5,050,717), the public contributions and contributions from the Swedish Union for Child Welfare not included, and the Swedish Union for Child Welfare Skr. 6,790,300 (\$1,315,950).

It remains to be seen whether this active humanitarian engagement can be developed into closer future co-operation between the Nordic countries and Nigeria in the Nigerian Government's reconstruction and development programme. The Norwegian Government has already indicated its interest in such co-operation, and the Danish Government has given similar indications.

Selected List of Literature

This list includes some selected bibliographies for the benefit of those with special interests of a more limited scope than this rather broad introduction to Nigeria.

The works mentioned in this list have been used as sources for this introduction or have served as background material. Those who are specially interested in some single field covered by this introduction to Nigeria may find references to other sources and more specialized literature in the works listed under the various headings below.

The list is systematized according to the main theme of the works. Most of the works, however, cover more than one of these fields, and have been used as sources (or background reading) for several chapters of the present book.

Included in the list are also a few primary sources, documents, speeches, etc., providing information which is not available elsewhere.

Some publications consulted for general information are not included in this, for examples The Europa Yearbook, The Statesman's Year-Book, Africa Contemporary Record, Africa Research Bulletin and Africa 69/70 (Jeune Afrique), etc., to mention only a few.

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List of Abbreviations

AATUF	All-African Trade Union Federation
AG	Action Group
BYM	Bornu Youth Movement
COR State	Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers State
DP	Dynamic Party
ECN	Electricity Corporation of Nigeria
EEC	European Economic Community
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICFTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IFCTU	International Federation of Christian Trade Unions
ITP	Ilorin <u>Talaka Parapo</u> (People's Party)
MWDP	Mid-West Democratic Party
NCNC	National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (until 1961, National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons)
NDC	Niger Delta Congress
NEPU	Northern Elements' Progressive Union
NFL	Northern Federation of Labour
NISER	Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (University of Ibadan)
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	Northern Peoples' Congress
NPF	Northern Progressive Front
NYC	Nigerian Youth Movement
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SWAFP	(Nigerian) Socialist Workers and Farmers Party
TUC	(Nigerian) Trade Union Congress
UAM	Union Africaine et Malgache
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UNIP	United National Independence Party

UPGA United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPP United Peoples' Party
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
WHO World Health Organization

Appendix



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


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
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B. STATISTICS

1. Population Densities of Nigeria and the 12 States

The first census for the whole of Nigeria was conducted in 1911. The total Nigerian population was 15,966,380—7,855,749 in the Colony and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria, and 8,110,631 in the Northern Provinces. A census in 1921 showed a total population of 18,624,690, of whom 9,994,515 were in the Northern Provinces, 261,663 in the Northern Cameroons, 8,069,406 in the Southern Provinces, and 299,106 in the Southern Cameroons. A census conducted in the years 1950-53 gave the following results (1952): Nigeria, excluding the Cameroons, 29,093,007, of which 17,007,377 were in Northern Nigeria, 4,595,801 in Western Nigeria, 7,217,829 in Eastern Nigeria, and 272,000 in Lagos. The results of the disputed census of November 5-8, 1963, distributed between the States established in 1967, are shown in the following table:


State	Population	Area in km ²	Persons per km ²
North-Western	5,733,297	168,590	34
North-Central	4,098,305	70,155	58
Kano	5,774,842	43,038	134
North-Eastern	7,893,343	272,516	28.9
Benue-Plateau	4,009,408	100,748	39.7
Kwara	2,399,365	74,203	32
Lagos	1,443,568	3,574	403.9
Western	9,487,526	75,310	125
Mid-Western	2,535,839	38,618	65
East-Central	7,227,559	29,270	247
South-Eastern	3,622,591	28,897	125
Rivers	<u>1,544,313</u>	<u>18,136</u>	<u>85</u>
Nigeria	55,769,956	923,055	60

(Source: Nigeria Yearbook, 1969)

2. The Main Nationalities of Nigeria according to the 1952-53 and 1963 Censuses (thousands)

Nationality	1952-1953	1963
Hausa	5,544	11,653
Ibo	5,458	9,246
Yoruba	5,045	11,321
Fulani	3,030	4,784
Kanuri	1,301	2,259
Tiv	788	1,394
Ibibio	762	2,006
Edo	466	955
Anang	435	675
Ijaw	343	1,089

(Source: Africa report, Vol. 15, No. 1, January 1970)

3. The Main Religious Groups (1963)

4. NATIONAL ACCOUNTS

4a) Gross Domestic Product at 1962 Factor Cost

	£ million				
	58-59	60-61	62-63	64-65	66-67
1. Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing	672.2	799.9	804.8	866.7	869.5
1.1 Agriculture	524.2	642.2	649.6	656.4	675.5
1.2 Livestock	63.3	69.8	71.8	80.6	80.5
1.3 Forestry	62.7	65.9	61.4	66.2	65.9
1.4 Fishing	22.0	22.0	22.0	33.5	47.6
2. Mining	10.2	15.8	26.8	47.5	114.4
2.1 Oil	1.5	5.5	15.8	35.4	101.0
2.2 Metalliferous Ores	3.0	4.5	4.8	5.2	5.3
2.3 Coal	2.6	0.9	1.0	1.7	0.8
2.4 Quarrying	3.1	4.9	5.2	5.7	7.3
3. Manufacturing and Crafts	45.3	57.0	75.9	78.8	91.1
3.1 Manufacturing	26.2	37.6	56.1	58.7	72.7
3.2 Crafts	19.1	19.4	19.8	20.1	20.4
4. Electricity and Water Supply	2.9	4.2	6.0	8.1	10.7
4.1 Electricity	2.5	3.6	5.1	7.0	9.3
4.2 Water Supply	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.4
5. Building and Construction	35.3	55.4	57.5	65.0	81.3
6. Distribution	127.9	154.7	161.1	194.9	200.9
6.1 Marketing Boards	0.7	5.8	3.2	6.3	6.2
6.2 Other Distribution	127.2	148.9	157.9	188.6	194.7
7. Transport and Communication	40.5	51.4	60.9	67.2	62.7
7.1 Transport	37.0	48.2	55.0	59.3	53.3
7.11 Road Transport	15.4	28.9	35.3	40.0	36.0
7.12 Railway	14.9	11.1	12.1	10.3	9.2
7.13 Harbours	4.5	5.4	5.4	5.9	5.5
7.14 Water Supply	1.1	1.4	1.0	1.8	1.3
(a) Inland	1.1	1.4	1.0	0.9	0.8
(b) Overseas	—	—	—	0.9	0.5
7.15 Air Transport	1.1	1.4	1.2	1.3	1.3
7.2 Communication	3.8	5.2	5.9	7.9	9.4
7.21 Posts and Telegraphs	3.1	4.2	4.9	6.7	7.8
7.22 Broadcasting	0.7	1.0	1.0	1.2	1.6
8. General Government	39.8	49.7	51.3	52.1	51.6
9. Education	23.8	29.5	35.7	43.0	48.7
9.1 Government	2.1	2.4	2.9	3.4	3.7
9.2 Missions and Private	20.2	26.1	30.3	34.6	37.0
9.3 Universities	0.7	0.7	2.2	4.1	5.7
9.4 Other	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.9	1.8
10. Health	4.0	5.3	7.2	9.1	9.3
10.1 Government	3.4	3.9	5.2	6.2	6.1
10.2 Missions and Private	0.9	1.4	2.0	3.2	3.2
11. Other Services	21.8	25.3	28.2	30.7	41.4
TOTAL	1023.9	1250.2	1315.4	1463.4	1583.1

4b) Gross Capital Formation in Nigeria by Sectors: 1961-1966

Sector	£ million					
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
A. AT CURRENT PRICES						
(a) Main Sector :						
1. Government	46.9	45.9	47.0	50.0	54.6	61.7
2. Corporations	13.4	18.7	16.4	18.0	29.2	29.2
3. Companies	67.2	69.3	85.8	104.0	99.4	99.4
4. Voluntary Agencies	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.0	1.5	1.5
5. Total Main Sector	128.7	135.1	150.5	174.0	184.7	191.8
(b) Other Sector :						
1. Supplement for companies	6.7	6.9	8.6	10.4	9.9	9.9
2. Imports of equipment not included in (a) or (b) 1	8.0	7.7	7.9	0.6	27.5	28.9
3. Accommodation not included in (a) or (b) 1	9.1	10.1	10.0	10.0	12.0	12.0
4. Total for Other Sector	23.8	24.7	26.3	21.0	49.4	50.8
GRAND TOTAL	152.5	159.8	177.0	195.0	234.1	242.6
of which :						
(i) Public Sector	60.3	64.5	63.4	68.0	83.8	90.9
(ii) Private Sector	92.2	95.3	113.6	127.0	150.3	151.7

4c) Gross Capital Formation in Nigeria by Assets: 1961-1966

ASSETS	£ million					
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
A. AT CURRENT PRICES						
1. Land, agricultural and mining development	30.2	25.6	33.4	30.0	36.7	35.8
2. Buildings	45.9	55.1	53.3	54.0	56.7	58.2
3. Civil Engineering Works	29.7	34.2	37.2	35.0	47.5	52.4
4. Plant Machinery and Equipment	35.3	38.3	39.3	54.0	68.9	76.8
5. Vehicles	11.4	6.6	13.8	22.0	24.3	19.4
TOTAL	152.5	159.8	177.0	195.0	234.1	242.6

(Source: Digest of Statistics, Vol. 17, No. 4, October 1968. Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos)

5. MANPOWER

5a) Nigeria High-level Manpower Employment by State and Industry, January 1963 (excluding teaching and research staff)

State and Category	Agriculture, Mining and Quarrying	Manufacturing and Construction	Wholesale and Retail Trade	Finance	Transport, Storage and Communications	Services	Professional, Technical, etc.	Number	
								1963	Total
FEDERAL TERRITORY									
Senior Category	3	17	374	310	163	1,371	659	3,791	70
Intermediate Category	13	10	642	930	451	1,832	1,443	12,176	219
TOTAL	26	27	1,016	1,240	614	2,893	2,104	14,999	289
NORTHERN STATES									
Senior Category	319	175	226	135	14	442	77	742	70
Intermediate Category	1,065	245	344	175	15	710	325	6,442	229
TOTAL	1,404	423	570	310	29	1,152	366	9,184	297
EASTERN STATES									
Senior Category	127	355	252	240	—	456	118	1,621	30
Intermediate Category	795	366	554	394	—	750	129	3,317	55
TOTAL	933	752	606	634	—	1,206	247	4,338	85
WESTERN STATE									
Senior Category	88	6	362	103	—	293	66	2,052	162
Intermediate Category	391	1	628	369	—	1,479	159	6,154	510
TOTAL	479	7	990	463	—	1,772	225	8,206	672
TOTAL ALL CATEGORIES	2,842	1,209	3,182	2,697	674	6,023	3,014	36,272	1,322

5b) Employment by Type of Employer, Industry, Sex and State

Industry Groups	Number			
	1962	31st December, 1964		
		Total	Government (a)	Non-Government (b)
Agriculture, etc.	21,308	17,876	17,245	35,116
Mining and Quarrying	47,817	255	30,849	31,088
Manufacturing	53,125	3,719	38,148	61,504
Construction	160,797	28,098	50,014	78,020
Electronics, etc.	16,385	4,814	19,355	18,949
Commerce	38,925	838	44,310	45,165
Transport, Communications, etc.	49,531	17,981	40,217	23,088
Services	369,461	147,398	70,039	237,327
Total	518,893	239,442	341,092	561,314
of which:				
Male	485,404	207,189	322,051	529,191
Female	33,491	13,252	19,091	32,143
and:				
Lagos (c)	106,374	41,144	105,659	147,813
Northern States	148,465	69,095	91,289	160,733
Western State	129,165	60,890	56,379	97,270
Eastern States	134,300	47,892	67,464	115,316
Mid-Western State	—	20,301	19,859	20,340

(Source: Digest of Statistics, No. 4, October 1968, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos)

5c) Average Cash Earnings by Industry Division—All Employers: 1962 and 1964

Industry Division	All Employers (a) Average Cash Earnings (N) (b)	
	1962	1964
All Industries	110.2	200.3
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	101.1	211.5
Mining and Quarrying	161.9	235.0
Manufacturing	199.8	262.8
Construction	151.0	222.5
Commerce, Water and Sanitary Services	129.9	202.3
Transport, Storage and Communications Services	274.8	313.0
Professional, Technical, etc.	213.2	290.0

5d) Number Employed by Industry, 1965

Industries	No. of Establishments	NIGERIAN					Non-Nigerian	Total Employed (a)
		Professional and Managerial	Clerical	Skilled and Semi-skilled	Unskilled	Total		
Meat Products	10	17	187	461	369	22	1,036	
Dairy Products	4	3	55	85	112	8	205	
Fruit Canning	3	1	12	27	296	—	608	
Grain Mill Products	6	12	93	190	239	25	569	
Bakery Products	70	41	342	1,174	872	—	2,607	
Sugar Confectionery	6	35	35	219	618	26	929	
Spirit and Spirit Distillery	3	16	79	751	1,296	58	2,537	
Miscellaneous Food Products	9	76	572	726	1,139	—	2,963	
Beer Brewing	6	65	712	979	1,155	—	3,009	
Soft Drinks	13	21	164	332	429	25	1,011	
Manufacturer of Textiles	14	76	789	6,207	4,622	37	11,555	
Footwear	21	34	111	1,177	205	51	2,099	
Wearers Apparel	13	15	31	106	76	8	258	
Made-Up Textile (Excluding Wearers Apparel)	6	6	24	698	702	23	1,437	
Saw Milling	46	204	304	3,507	3,742	76	8,677	
Other Wood Products	4	5	7	14	—	—	92	
Furniture and Fixtures	53	86	403	2,165	1,017	77	4,591	
Paper Products	9	9	81	432	139	24	633	
Pencils	77	196	1,074	3166	1,058	17	6,322	
Printing and Travel Goods	8	8	29	209	99	17	322	
Rubber Products	35	105	537	1,917	4,169	47	6,805	
Basic Industrial Chemicals	6	9	108	59	82	7	205	
Vegetable Oil Milling	62	48	476	1,661	4,251	35	7,024	
Plastics	3	18	50	182	138	24	416	
Miscellaneous Chemical Products	27	113	381	1,838	1,339	43	3,813	
Bricks and Tiles	7	4	25	48	26	—	109	
Pottery and Glass Products	7	26	132	458	119	16	679	
Ceramics	12	23	205	1,274	896	36	2,765	
Coffee Products	8	24	132	724	621	10	1,672	
Basic Metals	3	10	82	377	268	50	698	
Metal Products	40	113	476	3,650	2,076	26	6,495	
Electrical Equipment	10	38	201	277	217	15	751	
Iron Building and Repairs	3	4	46	227	77	5	352	
Motor Vehicle and Bicycle Assembly	11	17	363	1,134	303	26	1,803	
Motor Vehicle Repairs	121	234	1,475	5,288	2,202	32	11,411	
Miscellaneous Manufactured Goods	18	39	333	825	807	30	1,989	
Total	776	1,242	12,347	42,942	26,270	2,342	93,814	

6. EDUCATION

6a) Recurrent Educational Expenditures as a Percentage of Total Government Recurrent Expenditures

Region	(Actual) 1963/64	(Actual) 1964/65	(Approved Estimate) 1965/66	(Approved Estimate) 1966/67
North	23.9%	21.7%	22.1%	26.1%
East	34.8%	39.3%	37.0%	40.6%
West	35.1%	34.6%	39.1%	36.9%
Midwest	47.0%	33.6%	44.6%	45.6%
Federal	6.3%	8.6%	8.1%	7.7%
Consolidated Budget Accounts	18.2%	20.2%	20.3%	21.0%

(Source: Nigerian Human Resource Development and Utilization, Education and World Affairs, New York, N.Y., December 1967)

6b) Educational Establishments, Teachers and Students - 1966

	Number of Establishments	Number of Teachers	Number of Students
Primary Schools	14,907	91,049	3,025,981
Secondary Schools	1,350	11,644	211,305
Technical Schools	73	789	15,055
Teacher Training Colleges	193	1,837	30,493
Universities (1968)	5	1,328	9,705

(Source: The Europa Yearbook 1969, Vol. II)

6c) Enrollments in Primary Schools, projections and actual, 1956-70

Year	(thousands)					
	North Projs Actual	East Projs Actual	West Projs Actual	Midwest Projs Actual	Lagos Projs Actual	All of Nigeria Projs Actual
1956	- 185	- 904	- 908	- -	- 39	- 2,036
1959	- 251	- 1,378	- 1,080	- -	- 66	- 2,776
1960	304 283	n.a. 1,430	1,125 1,125	- -	73 74	- 2,913
1963	489 411	1,575 1,279	1,203 1,099	- -	93 108	3,360 2,877
1966	679 519	1,705 1,237	1,288 741	part 387	111 142	3,783 3,026
1967	731 507	1,725 n.a.	1,314 757	of 385	117 131	3,887 n.a.
1970	842 -	1,770 -	1,393 -	projs for West	139 -	4,144 -

(Source: Economic and Social Survey 1958 to 1968, by the Staff, The Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of Ibadan, Ibadan, March, 1969)

6d) Enrollments in School Certificate Classes, projections and actual, 1960-70

Year	(thousands)					
	North Projs Actual	East Projs Actual	West Projs Actual	Midwest Projs Actual	Lagos Projs Actual	All of Nigeria Projs Actual
1960	5.3 6.2	17.8 17.9	25.8 25.8	- -	n.a. 3.5	- 53.3
1963	9.4 9.3	27.8 33.6	38.1 38.5	- -	n.a. 6.6	- 88.0
1966	17.1 15.9	46.8 60.1	56.7 48.1	part 16.1	5.7 8.8	126.2 149.0
1967	20.8 18.1	53.2 n.a.	62.8 55.2	of 20.9	6.1 8.6	142.9 n.a.
1970	35.0 -	67.9 -	77.1 -	projs for West	7.3 -	189.3 -

(Source: Economic and Social Survey 1958 to 1968 by the Staff, N.I.S.E.R., University of Ibadan, Ibadan, March, 1969)

6e) University Enrollments, projections and actual, 1964-70

University	Projections 1969-70	Actual 1964-65	Actual 1966-67	Actual 1967-68	per cent achieved 1967-68
Ahmadu Bello	1,550	719	894	1,390	90
Usukka	2,500	2,499	3,482	-	-
Ibadan	3,000	2,284	2,729	2,749	92
Ife	1,350	659	945	1,256	93
Lagos	1,000	558	1,119	1,877	187
Total	9,400	6,719	9,170	-	-

(Source: Economic and Social Survey 1958 to 1968 by the Staff, N.I.S.E.R., University of Ibadan, Ibadan, March, 1969)

6f) 1966 Graduates of Nigerian and Overseas Universities by Faculty of Study

Faculty	Number
1. Humanities	311
2. Fine Arts	109
3. Law	401
4. Languages	161
5. Social Sciences	1,228
6. Education	600
7. Natural Sciences	424
8. Engineering and Technology	573
9. Medical Sciences	321
10. Agriculture	376
11. Unspecified	28
	4,532

(Source: Nigerian Human Resource Development and Utilization, Education and World Affairs, New York, N.Y., December 1967)

6g) Total Enrollment in Nigerian Universities: 1965/66 by Faculty

University	Arts	Educa- tion	Law	Social Science	Pure Science	Medicine and Pharmacy	Techno- logy	Agric., Forestry and Vet.Med.	Post- Graduate	Total
Ahmadu Bello	293	-	52	116	131	-	303	51	10	956
Ibadan	653	272	-	314	563	467	-	224	195	2,688
Ife	239	-	104	72	159	72	-	47	20	713
Lagos	81	-	100	260	152	118	61	-	1	773
Nigeria	395	393	110	718	334	-	295	334	-	2,579
Total	1,661	665	366	1,480	1,339	657	659	656	226	7,709

(Source: Nigerian Human Resource Development and Utilization, Education and World Affairs, New York, N.Y., December 1967)

7. TRADE

7a) Trade Statistics

Country	Imports			Exports		
	1966	1967	1968	1966	1967	1968
	January to December			January to December		
Sterling Area:						
Ghana	248	372	1,086	796	748	463
Hong Kong	1,815	2,607	2,325	77	117	288
Iceland	1,951	1,015	109	—	2	—
India	3,163	3,219	1,785	153	167	48
Ireland	446	647	407	445	625	1,096
United Kingdom	76,253	64,574	59,882	105,177	70,316	61,939
Others	8,330	5,582	5,903	2,309	908	1,004
Total Sterling Area	92,206	78,016	71,497	108,957	72,883	64,838
Non-Sterling Area:						
Belgium-Luxembourg	3,508	2,905	3,284	7,078	3,153	5,881
Canada	3,125	1,683	917	9,831	8,917	5,543
Czechoslovakia	2,509	2,642	3,410	1,002	813	1,831
Denmark	1,310	1,241	1,182	1,817	3,444	3,793
France	14,497	9,420	7,183	25,909	22,425	11,540
Germany—East	467	681	175	47	29	7
Germany—West	27,458	25,226	21,231	27,757	25,155	17,863
Italy and Trieste	13,045	10,748	13,782	13,660	14,082	13,118
Japan	14,320	18,751	7,164	4,250	6,140	3,664
Netherlands	9,287	9,336	7,830	26,105	30,792	27,036
Netherlands possessions	520	1,427	2,684	1,665	294	509
Norway	6,764	4,557	2,105	463	522	954
United States of America	41,516	27,854	22,289	22,331	18,476	16,039
Other Countries	23,906	27,137	26,506	27,732	30,866	33,881
Total non-Sterling Area	162,232	143,608	119,742	169,647	165,108	141,659
Ships' Stores	14	6	26	93	105	8
Total Domestic Exports	—	—	—	278,697	238,096	206,505
Parcel Post	1,920	1,920	1,920	36	36	36
Re-Exports	—	—	—	5,351	3,686	4,544
Total Imports/Exports	256,372	223,550	193,185	284,084	241,818	211,085

(Source: Nigeria Trade Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, April/June 1969)7b) Trade between Nigeria and Nordic countries
(value in thousand Nigerian £)

Country	General Imports c.i.f.				
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Denmark	1,411	1,419	1,443	1,310	1,241
Finland	574	563	1,147	899	859
Iceland	1,488	2,217	2,187	1,951	1,015
Norway	5,664	4,852	5,715	6,764	4,557
Sweden	1,746	2,187	3,523	2,858	2,239
Total trade	207,477	253,880	275,149	256,372	223,550

Country	National Exports f.o.b.				
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967
Denmark	2,380	2,390	2,804	3,524	3,444
Finland	33	5	53	126	97
Iceland	1	0	1	0	2
Norway	929	838	748	463	522
Sweden	1,158	1,445	1,734	3,722	4,271
Total trade	184,932	210,499	263,284	278,733	238,132

(Source: Yearbook of International Trade Statistics 1967. United Nations, New York, 1969)

7c) Imports—by Commodities

Section and Item	Unit	January to December, 1967			January to December, 1968		
		Quantity	Value £'000	% of value of total imports	Quantity	Value £'000	% of value of total imports
Section 0.—Food:							
Flour	tons	1,452	58	0.0	530	21	0.0
Stockfish	17,259	4,451	2.0	4,417	173	0.0
Sugar	78,345	3,054	1.4	35,264	0.9	0.0
Others	—	13,747	0.1	—	11,212	5.8
—	—	—	21,250	9.5	—	14,197	7.3
Section 1.—Beverages and Tobacco:							
Beer	000 gals.	240	319	0.1	254	313	0.2
Unmanufactured tobacco	tons	901	715	0.3	409	357	0.2
Others	—	—	798	0.4	—	503	0.2
—	—	—	1,832	0.8	—	1,173	0.6
Section 2.—Crude Materials:							
Salt	tons	124,029	2,307	1.0	127,782	2,291	1.2
Others	—	2,494	1.6	—	2,976	1.5
—	—	—	5,801	2.6	—	5,267	2.7
Section 3.—Mineral Fuels etc.:							
Petroleum oils	000 gals.	133,561	7,520	3.4	289,242	13,701	7.1
Others	—	1,245	0.6	—	890	0.4
—	—	—	8,785	4.0	—	14,551	7.5
Section 4.—Animal and Vegetable Oils:							
All	—	—	301	0.1	—	289	0.1
Section 5.—Chemicals:							
Medical preparations	—	—	4,627	2.5	—	7,130	3.7
Others	—	15,767	7.0	—	15,313	7.9
—	—	—	21,294	9.5	—	22,443	11.6
Section 6.—Manufactured Goods:							
Cement	tons	134,364	1,157	0.5	90,075	769	0.4
Constructional steel	234,659	15,244	6.8	229,128	14,223	7.4
Cotton piece goods	000 sq. yd.	182,606	14,240	6.4	128,045	8,919	4.6
Corrugated iron sheets	tons	790	63	0.0	356	88	0.0
Household utensils	4,256	601	0.3	2,073	303	0.2
Jute bags	000	23,410	2,924	1.3	1,740	220	0.1
Paper and board	—	5,724	2.6	—	4,542	2.3
Rayon piece goods	000 sq. yd.	12,941	1,864	0.8	3,778	408	0.2
Tyres and tubes	1,405	1,203	0.5	1,127	0.6	0.0
Yarns	tons	7,441	2,760	1.2	2,997	4.4	0.0
Others	—	26,559	12.0	—	20,391	10.5
—	—	—	73,292	32.4	—	54,657	28.3
Section 7.—Machinery:							
Aircraft and parts	no	—	1,014	0.5	—	1,028	0.5
Boats, barges, etc.	—	2,294	0.6	—	813	0.4
Cars and motorcars	—	13,412	3.5	—	4,366	2.5
Cycles	—	64,712	8.3	—	36,926	0.3
Electrical machinery and apparatus	—	16,900	7.6	—	15,378	0.9
Lorries and chassis	no	—	6,311	0.9	—	8,292	4.3
Railway rolling stock	—	—	1,225	0.5	929	0.5
Road construction, mining and conveying plant	—	10,043	4.5	—	4,003	2.1
Other non-electric	—	15,464	6.9	—	19,825	10.3
Other road vehicles and parts	—	9,929	4.4	—	8,849	4.6
—	—	—	71,597	32.0	—	60,473	31.4
Section 8.—Miscellaneous manufactured articles:							
Clothing	—	4,599	2.1	—	4,921	2.5
Footwear	—	1,003	0.4	—	856	0.4
Others	—	11,791	5.3	—	8,398	4.4
—	—	—	17,393	7.8	—	14,005	7.3
Section 9.—Miscellaneous Transactions:							
All	—	—	2,972	1.3	—	6,095	3.2
Total Imports			223,550	100.0		193,185	100.0

(Source: Nigeria Trade Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, April/June 1969)

7d) Exports—by Commodities

Section and Item	Unit	January—December, 1967			January—December, 1968		
		Quantity	Value £'000	Per cent of value of total exports	Quantity	Value £'000	Per cent of value of total exports
Section 0.—Food:							
Cocoa	ton	244,263	54,688	22.6	205,584	51,741	24.5
Coffee	—	1,885	0.1	—	2,322	0.2
Groundnut cake	—	136,776	4.2	17	170,713	4.8
Spices	—	1,392	0.1	—	2,387	0.3
Others	—	1,169	0.2	—	8,320	4.0
—	—	—	62,506	25.8	—	65,730	31.1
Section 1.—Beverages and Tobacco:							
—	—	—	69	0.0	—	11	0.0
Section 2.—Crude Materials:							
Bennoced	ton	3,241	296	0.1	14,084	1,167	0.6
Columbite	—	2,055	993	0.4	1,349	0.3
Copra	—	2,543	158	0.1	1,961	0.1
Cotton	—	33,900	6,341	2.7	14,048	3,267
Cotton seed	—	63,097	1,885	0.8	28,519	8.8
Groundnuts	—	540,052	35,413	14.6	638,012	37,923
Gum arabic	—	4,452	379	0.2	3,793	0.3
Hides and skins	—	7,486	4,322	1.8	7,172	3,912
Kapok	—	125	3	0.0	50	1.9
Palm kernels	—	162,503	7,797	3.2	159,014	10,173
Plastic	—	1,928	649	0.1	28	3
—	—	47,938	6,347	2.6	51,973	6,311
Soya beans	—	5,759	213	0.1	13,962	478
Timber—logs	000 cu.ft.	—	9,219	2,622	1.1	8,667	2,571
Timber—sawn	—	1,450	921	0.4	2,101	1,627
Tin ore	tons	—	909	77	0.0	1,151	98
Others	—	—	1,897	0.8	—	1,346
—	—	—	70,168	29.0	—	71,108	33.7
Section 3.—Mineral Fuels, etc.:							
Ceol	ton	—	8	—	—	—	—
Crude petroleum oil	—	14,773,521	72,108	29.8	6,889,548	36,999
Others	—	—	1,362	0.6	—	0.3
—	—	—	73,450	30.4	—	37,529	17.8
Section 4.—Vegetable Oils:							
Groundnut oil	ton	71,100	7,195	3.0	109,194	9,454	4.5
Palm oil	—	16,466	1,260	0.5	3,341	142
Others	—	—	3,930	1.6	—	3,339
—	—	—	12,361	5.1	—	12,935	6.1
Section 5.—Chemicals:							
Glycerin	000 gals.	—	105	97	0.1	—	—
Others	—	—	22	0.0	—	28
—	—	—	119	0.1	—	28	0.0
Section 6.—Manufactured Goods:							
Tin metal	tons	—	10,813	13,079	5.4	11,200	13,712
Cotton textiles	sq. yd.	—	331,167	61	0.0	746,259	73
Leather	tons	—	1,467	1,759	0.3	1,958	1,554
Plywood	cu. ft.	—	511,759	763	0.3	584,059	746
Veneers	—	13,083	18	0.0	—	1,080
Others	—	205	0.1	—	271	0.1
—	—	—	15,887	6.6	—	16,358	7.8
Section 7.—All Machinery	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Section 8.—All Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles	—	—	111	0.1	—	105	0.0
Section 9.—Miscellaneous Transactions	—	—	3,377	1.4	—	2,691	1.3
Total Domestic Exports			238,036	98.5		206,505	97.8
Re-exports	—	2,722	1.5	—	4,580	2.2
Total Exports			241,818	100.0		211,085	100.0

(Source: Nigeria Trade Journal, Vol. 17, No. 2, April/June 1969)

C. POLITICAL DATA

1 (a) The Head of State, Head of the Federal Military Government, and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces: Major-General Yakubu Gowon.

1 (b) The Federal Government

The Federal Military Government of the Second Republic consists of two major organs: (i) the Supreme Military Council, comprising the Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Chairman), the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, the Chief of Staff, Nigerian Armed Forces, the Head of the Nigerian Navy, the Head of the Nigerian Air Force, the Military Governors of the 12 States, and the Inspector-General of Police, and (ii) the Federal Executive Council, which is composed of Armed Forces personnel and civilians vested with departmental responsibilities as Commissioners.

(i) The Supreme Military Council(ii) The Federal Executive Council

<u>Name</u>	<u>Function</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Portfolio</u>	<u>Nationality</u>	<u>Religion</u>
Major-General Yakubu Gowon	Head of State, Head of the Federal Military Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chairman of the Supreme Military Council	Major-General Yakubu Gowon	Head of State, Chairman of Executive Council, Cabinet Office and Defence	Angas	Christ.
Rear Admiral J.E.A. Wey	Head of the Navy and Commissioner for Establishments	Chief Obafemi Awolowo	Vice-Chairman of Executive Council, Finance	Yoruba	Christ.
Colonel E.E. Ikwue	Head of the Air Force	Dr. Okoi Arikpo	External Affairs	Ekoi	Christ.
Brigadier E.O. Ekpo	Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters	Mr. Joseph Tarka	Transport	Tiv	Christ.
Brigadier Usman Katsina	Chief of Staff, Army Headquarters	Alhaji Aminu Kano	Communications	Fulani	Islam
Superintendent of Police, Usman Faruk	Governor of North Western State	Dr. J.E. Adetoro	Health	Yoruba	Christ.
Lt.-Col. Abba Kyari	Military Governor of North Central State	Attorney-General, Dr. T.O. Elias	Justice	Yoruba	Islam
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Abdu Bako	Governor of Kano State	Alhaji Yahaya Gusau	Economic Development and Reconstruction, Agriculture and Natural Resources	Hausa	Islam
Lt.-Col. Musa Usman	Military Governor of North Eastern State	Rear Admiral J.E.A. Wey	Establishments	Yoruba	Christ.
Assistant Commissioner of Police, Joseph Gomwalk	Governor of Benue-Plateau State	Chief Anthony Enahoro	Information and Labour	Ishan Edo	Christ.
Lt.-Col. David Bamigboye	Military Governor of Kwara State	Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Kam Selem	Internal Affairs	Kanuri	Islam
Colonel Mobolaji Johnson	Military Governor of Lagos State	Mr. Wenike Briggs	Education	Ijaw	Christ.
Brigadier Adeyinka Adebayo	Military Governor of Western State	Mr. Femi Okunnu	Works and Housing	Yoruba	Islam
Colonel Samuel Ogbenudia	Military Governor of Mid-Western State	Dr. A.R.B. Dikko	Mines and Power	Fulani	Christ.
Mr. Ukpabi Asika	Administrator of East Central State	Alhaji Shettima Ali Monguno	Trade and Industry	Kanuri	Islam
Colonel U.J. Esuene	Military Governor of South-Eastern State				
Lt. Commander A. Diete-Spiff	Military Governor of Rivers State				
Alhaji Kam Selem	Inspector-General of Police and Commissioner for Internal Affairs				

2. Nigerian Political Parties of the First Republic

The Aguiyi-Ironsi Military Government dissolved all political parties by a decree issued on May 24, 1966. The political parties listed below are therefore those of the First Nigerian Federal Republic. The parties are arranged in accordance with the position before the Federal elections of December, 1964. It should be noted, however, that the parties in the national alliances were separate organizations:

- (1) UNITED PROGRESSIVE GRAND ALLIANCE (UPGA) consisting of
 - (a) National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC)
Regional government party in the Eastern and the Mid-Western Regions, regional opposition party in the Western Region, and partner in the Federal Coalition Government until 1966. Major ethnic basis: Ibo, Yoruba and Edo.
 - (b) Action Group (AG)
Opposition party in the Western Region and in the Federal Parliament. Before the 1962 split, government party in the Western Region, and regional opposition party in the Eastern and the Northern Regions. Major ethnic basis: Yoruba.
 - (c) Northern Progressive Front (NPF), itself a party alliance, consisting of
 - (i) Northern Elements' Progressive Union (NEPU)
Opposition party in the Northern Region. Major ethnic basis: Hausa.
 - (ii) United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC)
Opposition party in the Northern Region and in the Federal Parliament. Major ethnic basis: Tiv and Biom.
 - (d) A few local community parties—or even factions of such parties—especially in the North.
- (2) NIGERIAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE (NNA), consisting of
 - (a) Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC)
Federal government party and regional government party in the Northern Region. Major ethnic basis: Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri, Nupe, and with support also from other Northern nationalities.
 - (b) Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP)
Regional government party in the Western Region, and from the fall of 1964 also partner in the Federal Government. Major ethnic basis: Yoruba.
 - (c) A few local community parties in the Northern Region, and the following parties of the Eastern and Mid-Western Regions:
 - (i) Dynamic Party (DP)
A small opposition party with a foothold in Onitsha in Eastern Nigeria, but with national aspirations.
 - (ii) Niger Delta Congress (NDC)
A small opposition party in Eastern Nigeria (one faction aligned to UPGA). Ethnic basis: Ijaw.

- (iii) Mid-West Democratic Party (MDP)
Regional opposition party in the Mid-West Region.

(3) OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES

Before 1966, there were a few other minor political parties, mainly with communal support. Two political parties of a different kind, with national aspirations, should be mentioned; the more important is the first-mentioned, which had a fairly well-established organization:

- (a) Nigerian Socialist Workers and Farmers Party (SWAFP)
(b) Nigerian Labour Party (NLP)

3. Note on the political and cultural composition of the present Federal Military Government

As previously noted, the political parties of Nigeria were dissolved in May, 1966. Civilian politicians have, however, been brought into the present Federal Executive Council with ministerial responsibilities as Commissioners.

Before 1966, the Army officers kept out of party politics. Most civilian members of the Federal Military Government were, however, politically active before 1966. It may be of some interest to look at the composition of the present Government on the basis of the previous political alignments of its members.

Of the 15 Commissioners of the Federal Executive Council, three belong to the military and the police: the Head of State and Chairman of the Executive Council, Major-General Gowon; the Head of the Nigerian Navy, Rear-Admiral J.E.A. Wey; and the Inspector-General of Police, Alhaji Kam Selem.

Of the rest, only one—the Commissioner for Health, Dr. Adetoro—has not been committed to one or more of the old political parties by holding high party offices or holding parliamentary or governmental positions on a party basis.

Four of the remaining 11 Commissioners, including the Vice-Chairman of the Executive Council, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, belonged to the Action Group. Awolowo was the leader of the Action Group from the beginning. Chief Anthony Enahoro was the second Vice-President of the AG. Dr. Okoi Arikpo became an AG leader in the Eastern House of Assembly after he was expelled from the NCNC, on whose behalf he was a Federal Minister in 1952. He quitted politics for post-graduate law studies in 1961. Wenike Briggs was an AG member of the House of Representatives from 1959 to 1964.

Joseph Tarka was the President of the UMBC and the Secretary-General of the Northern Progressive Front. Before 1962, he was also a Vice-President of the Action Group.

Aminu Kano was the President of the Northern Elements' Progressive Union and of the Northern Progressive Front. He was

also a Vice-President of the NCNC.

Dr. T.O. Elias has been Attorney-General and Minister of Justice in the Federal Government since Nigeria's independence in October 1960, except for a short interval in 1966-67. Before 1966 he represented the NCNC.

Dr. A.R.B. Dikko was the President of the NPC during the period 1949-51, until it was turned into a political party. He then continued as a civil servant, ending as the Permanent Secretary of the Northern Ministry of Health. Alhaji Yahaya Gusau was Secretary-General of the NPC when it was still a cultural organization, and continued in that position for some time after the NPC had been transformed to a political party. Alhaji Shettima Ali Monguno was a member of the House of Representatives on behalf of the NPC.

Mr. Femi Okunnu held no parliamentary position before the military take-over, but was active in the Nigerian Youth Movement, which later became an arm of the SWAFP.

From this it may be concluded that politicians who belonged to the opposition parties of the First Federal Republic have a strong position in the present Federal Executive Council and not only because of their numerical strength. Of the 11 Commissioners previously committed to a political party (including also the NYM) seven belonged to one of the former opposition parties. The effect of this numerical distribution takes on added importance from the fact that it is the leaders of these former political parties who are now members of the Federal Executive Council, while the three Commissioners previously committed to the NPC did not hold any governmental or top party executive positions during the 1960s. This fact adds to the general conclusion already drawn.

The ethnic composition of the present Federal Executive Council is also of some interest: 5 Yoruba, 2 Fulani, 2 Kanuri, 1 Hausa, 1 Tiv, 1 Angas, 1 Ijaw, 1 Ishan Edo, and 1 Ekoi. This implies that eight of the 15 Commissioners come from three of the four major nationalities—Hausa, Fulani and Yoruba—and none from the fourth, Ibo. One-third of all the Commissioners are Yoruba.

A further breakdown of the present Federal Executive Council by ethnic majority and minority group within the old regional setting gives the following picture:

Region	Majority groups	Minority groups	Total
Northern	3 (2 Fulani, 1 Hausa)	5 (2 Kanuri, 1 Yoruba, 1 Tiv, 1 Angas)	8
Western	1 (Yoruba)	0	1
Eastern	0	3 (1 Ijaw, 1 Ekoi, 1 Yoruba)	3
Mid-Western			1
Lagos	2 (Yoruba)	0	2
Total	6	8	15

However, the most interesting questions are those which refer to the future. To what extent will the present composition of the Federal Government influence the future political setting in Nigeria, when the ban on the political parties, which are already active, is lifted? To what extent will the future party structure be influenced by the present administrative 12-state structure? And to what extent will the Ibos now be integrated in the Federal Military Government?

D. GENERAL INFORMATION

1. Climate

The tropical climate varies with differences in latitude, topography and vegetation, between the south, which is hot and wet, and the north, which is hot and dry. There are two main seasons: the wet season, when the prevailing monsoon winds blow from the south-west from April/May to November, and the dry season, when the harmattan blows from the north-east from December to March.

The southern states have a warm climate with a high degree of humidity for most of the year, though there are lower temperatures and less humidity in the northern areas of the southern states, except the coastal states. Most northern states have a hot, dry climate, though the harmattan causes the temperatures to fall during January and February. Throughout the year, the Plateau is cooler than the rest of Nigeria.

At the coast temperatures vary from 70° to 90°F (21° to 32°C). In the north temperatures may vary between 50° and 110°F (10° and 43°C); the extremes are more common from October to April.

2. Official language

The official language is English. In the former Northern Region, Hausa was the second official language.

3. Currency

£N1 = 20s. = 240d. £N 17 s. 1d. = £1 sterling; £N 7s. 2d. = U.S. \$1.00. £N100 = £116 13s. 4d. sterling = U.S. \$280.

E. NORDIC DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN NIGERIA, AND NIGERIAN
DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIESEmbassies

- Denmark - address: 12, Eleke Crescent, Victoria Island,
P.O. Box 2390, Lagos. Tel. 28211/3
- Finland - address: 8-10 Broad Street, 10th floor, P.M.B.
12018, Lagos. Tel. 24050
- Nigeria - address: Brahegatan 56, Box 628, 114 37 Stockholm.
Tel. 08/627577
- Norway - address: 8-10 Broad Street, 12th floor, P.M.B.
2431, Lagos. Tel. 25966/7
- Sweden - address: 62-64, Campbell Street, P.O. Box 1079,
Lagos. Tel. 20381/2

Consulate

- Iceland has a Hon. Consul-General in Lagos—address: 130
Awolowo Road, S.W. Ikoyi, P.O. Box 2498, Lagos. Tel. 2827
- Norway has a Hon. Vice-Consul in Lagos—address 8, Creek
Road, P.O. Box 96, Apapa, Lagos. Tel. 55392
- Sweden has a Hon. Consul in Lagos—address 62-64, Campbell
Street, P.O. Box 471, Lagos. Tel. 23638