PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

SERIES EDITOR

Harvey J. Langholtz, Ph.D.

Peace Operations Training Institute®

Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations

Peace Operations Training Institute®

A Note from the Series Editor

Dear Student,

Welcome to the course *Principles and Guidelines for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations.* This course has been developed in consultation with the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Policy, Evaluation and Training Division, and the Peace Operations Training Institute. This course is based on the internal DPKO/DFS publication entitled *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, which was co-drafted for DPKO by General Robert Gordon and promulgated in March 2008 under the signature of Mr. Jean-Marie Guéhenno, then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping. This course replaces an earlier POTI course entitled *Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations.*

Peacekeeping is both a complex undertaking and an evolving concept. *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* – which came to be more widely known under its informal name *Capstone Doctrine* – was, by its own assertion, written "to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations." The document certainly lives up to that expectation.

The original *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* is a comprehensive document that defines and promulgates available peacekeeping doctrine, definitions, procedures, and policy. In 10 chapters, it introduces the concept and evolution of UN peacekeeping, explains the decision process that precedes the deployment of a peacekeeping operation, and then the planning process to implement that decision. It discusses the art of successful mandate implementation. It discusses the management of peacekeeping operations, how operations are supported and sustained, and how they are concluded at their termination.

This course is designed as a teaching document, and it is the purpose of this course to teach this DPKO doctrine. Every word of the original internal UN document is provided as the core reading of this course, but here the student will also find chapter introductions, learning objectives, photos to illustrate the text, inserted text boxes that define or explain specific concepts, sidebars that explain relevant broader topics, quizzes to confirm and reinforce an understanding of each chapter, and an End-of-Course Examination to test the student's overall mastery of the materials. In addition, the course includes reprints of some relevant reference materials, and where the materials are too large to be included, a web URL is provided. Students enrolled in this course will also have the opportunity to interact online with other students of the course and can find additional online resources provided by the Peace Operations Training Institute. Students who pass the online End-of-Course Examination will be provided with their own downloadable Certificate of Completion.

We have designed the visual appearance of this course to enable students to easily differentiate the original text as contained in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* from text that has been added for teaching purposes. In each chapter, all text found under the headings Learning Objectives and Introduction, as well as the text found within the blue text boxes, has been added by the Peace Operations Training Institute.

Thank you for enrolling in this course, and thank you also for your interest in United Nations peacekeeping. I trust you will be pleased with the materials you find in the following pages. I wish you every success in your studies.

Harvey Langholtz
Executive Director, Peace Operations Training Institute

Principles and Guidelines for UN Peacekeeping Operations

<div style="border:1px solid">

**PART I:
THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
11–54**

</div>

Foreword by Jean-Marie Guéhenno

Over the past sixty years, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into one of the main tools used by the international community to manage complex crises that pose a threat to international peace and security. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the number of military, police and civilian personnel deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world has reached unprecedented levels. Not only has United Nations peacekeeping grown in size but it has become increasingly complex. Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today's multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law.

In order to meet the challenges posed by the unprecedented scale and scope of today's missions, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) have embarked on a major reform effort, Peace Operations 2010, aimed at strengthening and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations. A key objective of this ongoing reform process is to ensure that the growing numbers of United Nations peacekeeping personnel deployed in the field, as well as those serving at Headquarters, have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the multitude of tasks they are required to perform.

The present publication, which has been developed in close consultation with field missions, Member States, United Nations system partners and other key stakeholders, represents the first attempt in over a decade to codify the major lessons learned from the past six decades of United Nations peacekeeping experience. It is intended to help practitioners better understand the basic principles and concepts underpinning the conduct of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as their inherent strengths and limitations.

I would like to express my gratitude to all those who have contributed to the development of this key guidance document, which will continue to be reviewed and updated in the coming years as United Nations peacekeeping evolves and new lessons are learnt.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno
Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
March 2008

Introduction: Scope and Purpose of the Document

Over the past six decades, United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into a complex, global undertaking. During this time, the conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations has been guided by a largely unwritten body of principles and informed by the experiences of the many thousands of men and women who have served in the more than 60 operations launched since 1948. This document captures these experiences for the benefit and guidance of planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations.

The spectrum of contemporary peace operations has become increasingly broad and includes both United Nations-led peace operations as well as those conducted by other actors, normally with the authorization of the Security Council. This guidance document focuses on only one element of that spectrum: United Nations-led peacekeeping operations, authorized by the Security Council, conducted under the direction of the United Nations Secretary-General, and planned, managed, directed and supported by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS). The specific focus of this document recognizes the need for a clearer articulation of the doctrinal foundations of United Nations peacekeeping operations, in light of the new challenges posed by the shifting nature of conflict, from inter-state to intra-state conflicts.

The present document aims to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations, which are usually deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to build a sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict. It identifies the comparative advantages and limitations of United Nations peacekeeping operations as a conflict management tool, and explains the basic principles that should guide their planning and conduct. In doing so, it reflects the primary lessons learned during the past sixty years of United Nations peacekeeping. It draws on landmark reports of the Secretary-General and legislative responses to these reports, as well as relevant resolutions and statements of the principal organs of the United Nations.

The present document is an internal DPKO/DFS publication. It sits at the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United Nations peacekeeping. Any subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform to the principles and concepts referred to in this guidance document.

The document is intended to serve as a guide for all United Nations personnel serving in the field and at United Nations Headquarters, as well as an introduction to those who are new to United Nations peacekeeping. Although it is intended to help guide the planning and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations, its specific application will require judgement and will vary according to the situation on the ground. Peacekeeping practitioners in the field are often faced with a confusing and contradictory set of imperatives and pressures. This document is unable to resolve many of these issues; indeed, some have no clear, prescribed answers. Instead, it provides a handrail to assist planners and practitioners manoeuvre through the complexities of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations.

This document reflects the multi-dimensional nature of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations, which are normally led in the field by a senior United Nations political figure. It does not seek to override the national military doctrines of individual Member States participating in these operations and it does not address any military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which remain the prerogative of individual Member States. It is, nonetheless, intended to support civilian, police and military personnel who are training and preparing to serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Troop Contributing Countries and Police Contributing Countries (TCCs/PCCs) to United Nations peacekeeping operations may wish to draw on this document in developing their respective doctrines, training and pre-deployment programmes.

For partners, this guidance document is intended to foster a clearer understanding of the major principles guiding the conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations. Key partners include TCCs/PCCs, regional and other inter-governmental organizations, the range of humanitarian and development actors involved in international crisis management, as well as national and local actors in the countries where United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed. In this regard, the document supports a vision of a system of inter-locking capabilities in which the roles and responsibilities and comparative advantages of the various partners are clearly defined.

This document draws on analysis contained in the landmark 2000 *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (*The Brahimi Report*) and other existing sources to help guide United Nations peacekeepers in the coming years. It is a living document that will be reviewed and updated regularly to reflect major evolutions in United Nations peacekeeping practices. The current version will be due for review in January 2010 and may be updated earlier, if required. As with the current version, Member States, TCCs/ PCCs, field missions, United Nations system partners, regional organizations and other key stakeholders will be consulted to ensure that the document continues to reflect the concerns, views, insights, and expertise of major partners both within and outside the United Nations system.

To view a video introduction of this course by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www. peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/361/ introduction*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Method of Study

The following are suggestions for how to proceed with this course. Though the student may have alternate approaches that are effective, the following hints have worked for many.

- Before you begin actual studies, first browse through the overall course material. Notice the lesson outlines, which give you an idea of what will be involved as you proceed.

- The material should be logical and straightforward. Instead of memorizing individual details, strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.

- Set up guidelines regarding how you want to schedule your time.

- Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson, orient yourself to the main points. If you are able to, read the material twice to ensure maximum understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.

- When you finish a lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. For any error, go back to the lesson section and re-read it. Before you go on, be aware of the discrepancy in your understanding that led to the error.

- After you complete all of the lessons, take time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, while the material is fresh in your mind, take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.

- Your exam will be scored, and if you acheive a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent, you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.

- One note about spelling is in order. This course was written in English as it is used in the United Kingdom.

Key features of your course classroom:

- Access to all of your courses;

- A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;

- Access to additional training resources, including Multimedia course supplements;

- The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed course; and

- Student fora where you can communicate with other students about any number of subjects.

Access your course classroom here:

http://www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login

PART I
THE EVOLUTION OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS was signed, in San Francisco, on 26 June 1945 and is the foundation document for all the United Nations' work. The United Nations was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose.

CHAPTER ONE
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER THREE
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

CHAPTER 1
THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK
FOR UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 1

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 1, the student should be able to:

• Understand the chapters of the UN Charter that are relevant to peacekeeping;

• Be aware of *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, its place in International Human Rights Law, and the normative framework it provides for United Nations peacekeeping operations;

• Understand how International Humanitarian Law is set in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as how International Humanitarian Law restricts the means and methods of armed conflict; and

• Understand the function the Security Council plays in setting mandates for UN Peacekeeping Missions.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www.peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/362/lesson-1*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

The League of Nations: Predecessor to the United Nations

The League of Nations was created in the aftermath of the First World War to "promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." It proved singularly unsuccessful. The League alienated the international powers who were defeated in the First World War and even failed to hold together the victorious allies; indeed, the United States never became a member. During the 1920s and 1930s, the former allies of World War I drifted apart and disarmed, while international powers outside the League took to dictatorship and rearmament. As the international scene took on more ominous directions, the League of Nations was powerless to prevent the world's descent into a second global war.

The Birth of the United Nations

The UN was created after World War II. Like the League of Nations, it was based on the assumption that the victorious wartime powers would keep the international peace. Unlike the former League, however, the UN made considerable efforts to reconcile and assimilate the defeated nations of World War II. In addition, the rapid growth of its membership due to decolonization gave new nations a voice and influence that they had never had before. In its preamble, the Charter of the United Nations asserted its goals as:

• To save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

• To reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

• To establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

• To promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom.

In this chapter, the student will receive a brief introduction to the Charter of the United Nations, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, International Humanitarian Law, and how the concepts and tenets of these documents are reflected in Security Council resolutions and, in turn, the mandate of each UN Peacekeeping Mission.

1.1   The Charter of the United Nations

The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco, on 26 June 1945 and is the foundation document for all the United Nations' work. The United Nations was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose.

Joseph Paul-Bancor, former Prime Minister, member of the Delegation from France, signing the Charter at a ceremony held at the Veteran's War Memorial Building on 26 June. (UN Photo #84200 by McCreary, June 1945)

The Charter gives the United Nations Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.[1] In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. While Chapter VI deals with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", Chapter VII contains provisions related to "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression." Chapter VIII of the Charter also provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.

United Nations peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Chapter VI of the Charter. However, the Security Council need not refer

---

1   Although the United Nations Charter gives primary responsibility to the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November 1950, also known as the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, states that: "...if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-1) of 5 November 1956 authorizing the establishment of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) was adopted under procedure established by the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.

to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI. In recent years, the Security Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order. The Security Council's invocation of Chapter VII in these situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can also be seen as a statement of firm political resolve and a means of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider United Nations membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions.

Linking United Nations peacekeeping with a particular Chapter of the Charter can be misleading for the purposes of operational planning, training and mandate implementation. In assessing the nature of each peacekeeping operation and the capabilities needed to support it, TCCs and PCCs should be guided by the tasks assigned by the Security Council mandate, the concept of operations and accompanying mission Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the military component, and the Directives on the Use of Force (DUF) for the police component.

Blue Helmets on the Horizon

The word "peacekeeping" is never explicitly mentioned in the UN Charter, but the Charter, *the Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, and International Humanitarian Law all contain the broad foundations for UN Peacekeeping. The international community sets specific mandates for each United Nations Peacekeeping Mission through Security Council resolutions. While peacekeeping is only a small part of United Nations operations, UN peacekeepers and military observers, known as "blue helmets" for their distinctive blue berets and helmets, are globally recognized as the most visible sign of UN operations. Peacekeeping is the single activity for which the United Nations is most known, and it is the most effective tool available to the international community for the maintenance of peace and security.

Organs of the United Nations Body

SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council consists of five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ten non-permanent members. Half of the non-permanent members are elected each year by the General Assembly for a term of two years. The UN Charter confers a unique authority on the Security Council to investigate any situation or conflict that threatens international peace and security. The Security Council is, therefore, the principal organization in the world for international peace and security and, thereby, has legitimacy under international law for the use of force or intervention against a sovereign state. It can delegate this responsibility under Chapter VIII of the Charter to regional organizations, such as the African Union (AU).

In carrying out these duties, the Security Council acts on behalf of all UN members. The Security Council asks the Secretary-General to prepare a plan to deal with the problem, and the SC will normally be the approving authority for any plan. There can be some specific circumstances under which the decision can be referred to the General Assembly. However, the General Assembly itself has no powers to authorize enforcement of the peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Such powers are the exclusive preserve of the UN Security Council.

SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General of the UN is responsible to the Security Council for the organization, the conduct, and the overseeing of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation. In addition to preparing the operational plan and presenting it to the Security Council for approval, the Secretary-General is responsible for conducting negotiations with the host countries, the parties in conflict, and the Member States contributing troops and resources.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The General Assembly considers any matter referred to it by the Security Council. It also deals with matters pertaining to the promotion of international cooperation, disarmament, trusteeship, and human rights. Even though most of its resolutions are not binding, it is the General Assembly that approves and apportions the UN's annual budget, including all costs related to Peacekeeping Operations.

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Article 47 of the UN Charter calls for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee. The Committee includes the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council, who act to advise and assist on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security. Even though this role is called for in the UN Charter, in practice, the Military Staff Committee has not played the role envisaged by the Charter and has exerted very little influence on UN PSOs.

UN SECRETARIAT

The UN Secretariat is the permanent organization responsible for the broad range of United Nations activities. Its head is the Secretary-General, and it is, in effect, the UN's civil service branch. While it has many departments, the principal departments that deal with PKOs are the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the Department of Field Support (DFS); and the Department of Safety and Security (DSS). The Under-Secretaries-General of these departments, with their specialist advisers – such as the Military Adviser or Police Adviser – are responsible for providing advice and guidance to the SG and the Security Council on peacekeeping operations and their associated disciplines, as well as for providing executive authority for their conduct and support when so delegated.

Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt of the United States holding a Declaration of Human Rights poster in Spanish. (UN Photo #1292, November 1949)

1.2   Human Rights

International human rights law is an integral part of the normative framework for United Nations peacekeeping operations. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, which sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards, emphasizes that human rights and fundamental freedoms are universal and guaranteed to everybody. United Nations peacekeeping operations should be conducted in full respect of human rights and should seek to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates (See Chapter 2).

United Nations peacekeeping personnel – whether military, police or civilian – should act in accordance with international human rights law and understand how the implementation of their tasks intersects with human rights. Peacekeeping personnel should strive to ensure that they do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses. They must be able to recognize human rights violations or abuse, and be prepared to respond appropriately within the limits of their mandate and their competence. United Nations peacekeeping personnel should respect human rights in their dealings with colleagues and with local people, both in their public and in their private lives. Where they commit abuses, they should be held accountable.

→ **The Universal Declaration of Human Rights** *is provided as Appendix B.*

1.3   International Humanitarian Law

International humanitarian law is known also as "the law of war" or "the law of armed conflict," and restricts the means and methods of armed conflict. International humanitarian law is contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their two Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as in rules regulating the means and methods of combat. International humanitarian law also includes conventions and treaties on the protection of cultural property and the environment during armed conflict, as well as protection of victims of conflict.

International humanitarian law is designed to protect persons who do not participate, or are no longer participating, in the hostilities; and it maintains the fundamental rights of civilians, victims and non-combatants in an armed conflict. It is relevant to United Nations peacekeeping operations because these missions are often deployed into post-conflict environments where violence may be ongoing or conflict could reignite. Additionally, in post-conflict environments there are often large civilian populations that have been targeted by the warring parties, prisoners of war and other vulnerable groups to whom the Geneva Conventions or other humanitarian law would apply in the event of further hostilities.

United Nations peacekeepers must have a clear understanding of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law and observe them in situations where they apply. *The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law of 6 August 1999 (ST/SGB/1999/13)* sets out the fundamental principles and rules of international law that may be applicable to United Nations peacekeepers.

→ **The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law of 6 August 1999 (ST/SGB/1999/13)** *is provided as Appendix C.*

The Geneva Conventions, a series of four treaties and three protocols, were created to set international standards of humanitarian treatment for the victims of war. They cover provisions for prisoners of war, the wounded, and civilians.

The Hague Conventions are international treaties created to establish the rules under which war may be conducted.

The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their three protocols are not provided with this course because of their size, but the student is invited to find them at: *http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView*.

International Humanitarian Law is discussed in depth in the Peace Operations Training Institute course *International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict*. The course covers the history of international humanitarian law, the protocols establishing common standards, and situational applications of international humanitarian law.

1.4   Security Council Mandates

United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of a mandate from the United Nations Security Council. The tasks that a United Nations peacekeeping operation will be required to perform are set out in the Security Council mandate. Security Council mandates differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents. Since United Nations peacekeeping operations are normally deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or a more comprehensive peace agreement, Security Council mandates are influenced by the nature and content of the agreement reached by the parties to the conflict.

Security Council mandates also reflect the broader normative debates shaping the international environment. In this regard, there are a number of cross-cutting, thematic tasks that are regularly

assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the basis of the following landmark Security Council resolutions:

• Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security;[2]

• Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict;[3]

• Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict;[4]

→ *The three Security Council resolutions are provided as Appendix D.*

2   It is widely recognized that the international community's objectives in countries emerging from conflict will be better served if women and girls are protected and if arrangements are put in place to allow for the full participation of women in the peace process. Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security therefore calls on all United Nations peacekeeping operations to mainstream gender issues into operational activities.

3   Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) stresses the responsibility of United Nations peacekeeping operations to ensure a coordinated response to children and armed conflict concerns and to monitor and report to the Secretary-General. Under resolution 1612 (2005) the Secretary-General is required to ensure that the need for, and the number and roles of Child Protection Advisers are systematically assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation. In United Nations peacekeeping operations where there are country monitoring and reporting Task Forces on CAAC, these are headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG).

4   Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) reaffirms the Council's commitment to ensuring that the mandates of peacekeeping operations, where appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, include provisions regarding: (i) the protection of civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical danger within their zones of operation, (ii) the facilitation of the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

The range of tasks assigned to United Nations peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to best address emerging threats to international peace and security. Although each United Nations peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council. These are described in greater detail in Chapter 2, below.

Some Security Council Facts

- The Security Council has a limited number of members (15) but acts on behalf of all UN members (192).

- All members of the UN agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the SC (UN Charter, Art 25).

- Each member has one vote. Nine votes are required to pass a resolution, provided there is no veto.

- Only the five permanent members (P-5) hold veto power.

- The 10 non-permanent members, who represent their regions, serve for two years and are elected by the General Assembly.

- The Security Council must be able to function at all times (24/7/365), so membership comes with an administrative burden.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are established by the adoption of a resolution in the United Nations Security Council. Adoption requires affirmative votes by at least nine of the 15 members, with no "no" votes by the five permanent members - China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (UN Photo #361874 by Jenny Rockett, March 2009)

Chapter 1 Quiz

1. **When was the UN Charter signed?**
   a. 7 December 1941;
   b. 6 June 1944;
   c. 26 June 1945;
   d. 6 August 1945.

2. **Chapter _____ of the UN Charter deals with the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.**

3. **Chapter _____ of the UN Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security.**

4. **What document sets the cornerstone of international human rights standards?**
   a. *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights*;
   b. The Geneva Conventions;
   c. The Hague Conventions;
   d. The Charter of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

5. **What are two other names by which International Humanitarian Law is known?**

6. **What does International Humanitarian Law do?**
   a. It determines how wars will be won;
   b. It restricts the means and methods of armed conflict;
   c. It sets a scale for the payment of war reparations;
   d. It determines how humanitarian operations will be conducted.

7. **International Humanitarian Law is designed to protect whom?**

8. **United Nations peacekeepers:**
   a. Will be instructed regarding International Humanitarian Law when it is needed;
   b. Must have a clear understanding of the principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law and observe them in situations where they apply;
   c. Are exempt from the rules of International Humanitarian Law;
   d. Will adapt International Humanitarian Law for each peacekeeping mission.

9. **United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of:**
   a. A mandate from the United Nations Security Council;
   b. The Geneva Convention;
   c. The United Nations Charter;
   d. The Hague Convention.

10. **Security Council mandates:**
    a. Are generally standard for all peacekeeping missions;
    b. Are subject to a review by the UN General Assembly;
    c. Are updated monthly depending on realities on the ground;
    d. Differ from situation to situation depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents.

ANSWER KEY

1C, 2 VI, 3 VIII, 4A, 5 "The law of the world" and "the law of armed conflict", 6B, 7 Persons who do not participate, or are no longer participating, in hostilities, 8B, 9A, 10D

CHAPTER 2
THE EVOLVING ROLE OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 2

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 2, the student should be able to:

- Understand the definitions of and relationships between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement;

- Understand peacekeeping as the core business of the United Nations;

- Understand the differences between traditional peacekeeping and multidimensional peacekeeping;

- State why traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations were deployed;

- List and discuss the tasks assigned to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations by the Security Council;

- List and define the core functions of a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation; and

- List and discuss the critical peacebuilding activities mandated by the Security Council for multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www.peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/363/lesson-2*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

The first UN Peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), was created as a military observer mission in response to what is now known as the 1948 Arab–Israeli War. This and other early peacekeeping missions are known as traditional peacekeeping missions. These traditional peacekeeping missions are a response to interstate conflict and are principally mandated to observe, monitor, and report on military activities, supervise a ceasefire, and serve as a buffer between the parties to a conflict.

Effects of the Cold War

However, the increased conflict of interests and hostility between East and West in the years following the Second World War affected the functioning of the Security Council and, thus, of the United Nations. The Security Council, then as now, was unable to act if any of its permanent members vetoed a resolution or if the resolution did not receive the requisite number of votes. Consequently, the UN's pursuit of international peace and security did not often include provision for significant enforcement measures. Because of recurrent tensions and disagreements between the United States and the Soviet Union during those years, the superpowers used their veto; this limited the executive functions of the Security Council. This was especially the case whenever an issue arose that was perceived to threaten the vital interests of one of its permanent members. Thus, during the Cold War years the executive functions of the UN were carried out within contexts of disagreement, strain, and often, impasse, among its permanent members.

Nevertheless, the competitive interests of the prevailing superpowers served to contain and suppress nationalist and inter-ethnic violence. At times, the superpowers were even able to cooperate over peacekeeping ventures. However, the superpower competition and the Cold War conflict ended with the disestablishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1990 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

UN Peacekeeping After the Cold War

The ending of superpower competition introduced a greater degree of consensus to the UN Security Council. It also coincided with a period in history that, as the Soviet Union dissolved and the bipolar "stability" of the Cold War ended, restraints on ethnic-based communal violence were released. Accordingly, the paradigm of conflict shifted from interstate (state versus state) to intrastate (within a state). This created a new challenge for the five permanent members of the Security Council as a group to address breakdowns in international peace and security.

As a result of these changes, in the late 1990s the UN began to deploy multidimensional, or "contemporary", peacekeeping missions, which are characterized by political leadership of complex mandates with many lines of integrated activity (political, security, humanitarian, developmental) designed to consolidate a fragile peace.

For more information on the history of UN Peacekeeping and the changing roles of the United Nations, see the following courses provided by the Peace Operations Training Institute:

- *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War: 1945 to 1987*

- *The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Following the Cold War: 1988 to 1996*

2.1 The Spectrum of Peace and Security Activities

Peacekeeping is one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security throughout the world. Although peacekeeping is the focus of this document, it is important for practitioners to understand how it relates to and differs from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.

Conflict prevention involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes

from escalating into violent conflict. Ideally, it should build on structured early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict. Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General's "good offices," preventive deployment or confidence-building measures.

Brigadier General Hussein Ali Kamba (left), Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF); General Simon Kawanja (centre), Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS); and Brigadier General Mac Paul, Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), sign a ceasefire agreement between the warring parties, following the fighting in the town of Malakal. (UN Photo #133837 by Tim McKulka, December 2006)

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement. The United Nations Secretary-General, upon the request of the Security Council or the General Assembly or at his her own initiative, may exercise his or her "good offices" to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations. Peacemaking efforts may also be under taken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.

Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers. Over the years, peacekeeping has evolved from a primarily military model of observing cease-fires and the separation of forces after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements – military, police and civilian – working together to help lay the foundations for sustainable peace.

Peace enforcement involves the application, with the authorization of the Security Council, of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. Such actions are authorized to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. The Security Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority.

Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. It works by addressing the deep-rooted, structural causes of violent conflict in a comprehensive manner. Peacebuilding measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

Peace Support Operations was a term introduced by the United Kingdom; it is now used in NATO doctrine to cover the range of operations, from peacemaking to peace enforcement, through peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The United States and some other nations prefer to use *peace operations* (PO) as the generic term for missions mandated by the United Nations.

Whichever term is used, we need to be clear that these processes are not linear and that, in one mission, a peace operation may be conducting peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement concurrently, as illustrated in Figure 1 on the following page.

2.2   Linkages and Grey Areas

The boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred, as seen in Figure 1. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity, whether United Nations-led or conducted by non-United Nations actors.

While United Nations peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a cease-fire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peacebuilding activities. United Nations peacekeeping operations may also use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order. As discussed in Chapter 3 below, although the line between "robust" peacekeeping and peace enforcement may appear blurred at times, there are important differences between the two. While robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2 (4) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council.

Figure 1: Linkages and Grey Areas

Conflict prevention, peace-making, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential way. Indeed, experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict that, thereby, reduces the risk of conflict recurring. However, the international community's ability to combine these activities effectively remains limited and this has, in some cases, resulted in critical gaps in the international response to crises that have threatened international peace and security.

The Peacebuilding Commission was established as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and the Security Council in December 2005. It is an advisory body focusing specifically on peacebuilding in order to tackle the root causes of conflict, which tend to require long-term and remedial investment by the international community.

→ *For additional background on the Peacebuilding Commission, please refer to Security Council resolution 1645 (2005), which established the Peacebuilding Commission and is provided as Appendix E.*

The creation of a new United Nations peacebuilding architecture reflects a growing recognition within the international community of the linkages between the United Nations peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles. When a country comes before it, the Peacebuilding Commission helps marshal the resources at the disposal of the international community and advise on and propose integrated strategies for peacebuilding and recovery. In doing so, it aims to bring together relevant actors, including international financial institutions and other donors, United Nations agencies, civil society organizations, and others in support of these strategies; as well as to provide strategic advice to the principal United Nations organs and help facilitate political dialogue, enhance coordination, and monitor the progress of both national and international actors.

2.3   The Core Business of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Although not provided for in the Charter, the practice of peacekeeping began in 1948 when the first United Nations military observers were deployed to the Middle East. During the ensuing Cold War years, the goals of United Nations peacekeeping were necessarily limited to maintaining cease-fires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means. Several of the United Nations longstanding peacekeeping operations fit this "traditional" model.

Traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed. The tasks assigned to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations by the Security Council are essentially military in character and may involve the following:

• Observation, monitoring and reporting – using static posts, patrols, over-flights or other technical means, with the agreement of the parties;

• Supervision of cease-fire and support to verification mechanisms;

• Interposition as a buffer and confidence-building measure.

By monitoring and reporting on the parties' adherence to commitments regarding a cease-fire or demilitarized zone and by investigating complaints of violations, traditional peacekeeping operations enable each party to be reassured that the other party will not seek to exploit the cease-fire in order to gain military advantage.

Traditional peacekeeping operations do not normally play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict. Other actors such as bilateral partners to the parties, regional organizations or even special United Nations envoys may be working on longer-term political solutions, which will allow the peacekeeping operation to withdraw. As a result, some traditional peacekeeping operations are deployed for decades before a lasting political settlement is reached between the parties.

*The observers and the United Nations flag became well known to the children in Palestine.
(UN Photo #125735, January 1948)*

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for United Nations peacekeeping changed dramatically and the Security Council began to work more actively to promote the containment and peaceful resolution of regional conflicts. While the end of the Cold War coincided with a general decline in the incidence of conflict around the world, internal armed conflicts constitute the vast majority of today's wars. Many of these conflicts take place in the world's poorest countries where state capacity may be weak, and where belligerents may be motivated by economic gain, as much as ideology or past grievances. Moreover, evidence has shown that a large proportion of all civil wars are due to a relapse of conflict, the risks of which are particularly high in the first five to 10 years following a conflict.

The transformation of the international environment has given rise to a new generation of "multi-dimensional" United Nations peacekeeping operations. These operations are typically deployed in the dangerous aftermath of a violent internal conflict and may employ a mix of military, police and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement.[1]

---

1   In most post-conflict environments, a peace accord or other agreement, such as a cease-fire

An Agenda for Peace

Throughout the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were constrained in what they could attempt, as each superpower would use its Security Council veto if a peacekeeping operation appeared to give any advantage to its superpower rival. With the end of the Cold War, however, a Security Council Summit convened on 31 January 1992 in which the members asked the new Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali of Egypt, to draft a blueprint for future UN operations to support peace. Five months later, he presented to the Security Council *An Agenda for Peace*. The document recommended a number of measures to strengthen and streamline United Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping processes, and it discussed the changing roles of UN peacekeeping in the modern world. To read the text of *An Agenda For Peace*, visit *http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html*.

Some multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations have been deployed following a request from the national authorities to support the transition to legitimate government, in the absence of a formal peace agreement. In exceptional circumstances, the Security Council has also authorized multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations to temporarily assume the legislative and administrate functions of the State, in order to support the transfer of

---

agreement or agreement on disengagement of forces, is likely to be in effect and include provisions directly related to the peacekeeping operation. The peace accord may be quite detailed, spelling out the various phases of the peace process and the specifics of post-conflict arrangements. Or, it could be more general, leaving details for future negotiation. The signatories to a peace agreement have an obligation to abide by the terms of the agreement. In certain cases, the United Nations or key Member States have also signed peace agreements as guarantors, who undertake to ensure that the peace process remains on track.

Capt. Torben Kruger (left) of Denmark and Capt. Harri Pantzar of Finland are seen observing and reporting at OP X-RAY, located in the Syrian Forward Defended Localities (FDLs) in the Golan Heights. (UN Photo #137794 by Yakuta Nagata, April 1973)

authority from one sovereign entity to another, or until sovereignty questions are fully resolved (as in the case of transitional administrations), or to help the State to establish administrative structures that may not have existed previously.

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations deployed in the aftermath of an internal conflict face a particularly challenging environment. The State's capacity to provide security to its population and maintain public order is often weak, and violence may still be ongoing in various parts of the country. Basic infrastructure is likely to have been destroyed and large sections of the population may have been displaced. Society may be divided along ethnic, religious and regional lines and grave human rights abuses may have been committed during the conflict, further complicating efforts to achieve national reconciliation.

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to help countries emerging from conflict make the transition to a sustainable peace. As shown in Figure 2 below, this effort consists of several phases and may involve an array of actors with separate, albeit overlapping, mandates and areas of expertise.

Within this broader context, the core functions of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation are to:

Figure 2: The Core Business of Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

Above, Figure 2 identifies some post-conflict tasks and actors needed to move from a post-conflict environment to one of a sustainable peace. This takes time. Note that the peacekeeping mission does not have responsibility, authority, or resources for all lines of activity, but all need to be integrated within a coherent framework, provided by the political leadership of the mission and its more limited duration. Other actors are there before a peacekeeping mission and will be there after a mission has gone.

a.) Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State's ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;

b.) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;

c.) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.

The Core Functions of UN Peacekeeping

Many tasks and lines of activity are required to support a mandate designed to move an immediate post-conflict towards a sustainable peace. Contemporary, multidimensional peacekeeping missions have political leadership of this process but without the necessary authority, budget, expertise, or resources to undertake all tasks. In order to help peacekeeping operations focus on their mission-essential business, the core functions of peacekeeping have been articulated from an extrapolation of past mandates. They tell senior leadership: "This is your business."

In addition to monitoring and observing cease-fires, multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are frequently mandated to provide operational support to national law enforcement agencies; provide security at key government installations, ports and other vital infrastructure; establish the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance; and provide humanitarian mine action assistance.[2] By helping to fill the security and public order vacuum that often exists in post-conflict settings, multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations play a critical role in securing the peace process, and ensuring that humanitarian and development partners are able to work in a safe environment.

In situations of internal armed conflict, civilians account for the vast majority of casualties. Many civilians are forcibly uprooted within their own countries and have specific vulnerabilities arising from their displacement. As a result, most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of

2   Even if the clearance of landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) has not been explicitly mandated by the Security Council, humanitarian mine action activities will invariably need to be undertaken by a mission, as an issue of United Nations staff safety and security.

Opposition and Insurgencies

Today's peacekeeping operations are likely to take place in environments that display some or all of the following characteristics, which need to be addressed:

- Fragile cease-fire and peace agreements;
- Numerous parties to a conflict;
- Undisciplined factions who are not responsive to their own controlling authorities;
- A breakdown of the rule of law and an absence of law and order;
- Presence of local armed groups or spoilers to the peace process;
- Instances of sexual- and gender-based violence (SGBV);
- Systematic and endemic violations of human rights;
- Involvement of large numbers of civilians affected by conflict, including as refugees and displaced persons; and
- Collapse of civil infrastructure and basic lifesaving services.

Thus, today's peacekeeping operations are likely to occur in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments that bear the characteristics of civil war or insurgency. The motivations of parties to the conflict may have origins that are barely comprehensible to outsiders. Random atrocity and large-scale human suffering – such as the deliberate use of SGBV as a weapon – may characterize the overall security environment and complicate a mission's overarching responsibility to protect civilians. The intensity of such conflicts will probably vary from area to area and day to day. Changes in intensity could be rapid and unexpected. Local governments may be uncooperative or rendered ineffective, and peacekeeping forces could face unexpected responsibilities by assisting in the provision of basic needs and services for the local population.

physical violence. The protection of civilians requires concerted and coordinated action among the military, police and civilian components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and must be main-streamed into the planning and conduct of its core activities. United Nations humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organization (NGO) partners also undertake a broad range of activities in support of the protection of civilians.[3] Close coordination with these actors is, therefore, essential.

3   The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) have express protection mandates. In an increasing number of countries, one of these agencies will be responsible for the overall coordination of the protection response among humanitarian actors through a dedicated protection "cluster" or working group. The Mine Action Service of DPKO is also

In contrast to traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations, multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations usually play a direct role in political efforts to resolve the conflict and are often mandated by the Security Council to provide good offices or promote national political dialogue and reconciliation. The fact that multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations enjoy a high degree of international legitimacy and represent the collective will of the international community gives them considerable leverage over the parties. This leverage can be used to build and sustain a political consensus around the peace process, promote good governance and maintain pressure on the parties to implement key institutional reforms.

designated as the focal point for mine action within the Protection Cluster Working Group (PCWG), and is actively engaged with these agencies and partners.

All military operations try to match the environment with the level of required capability (x=y). However, given the ad hoc and multicultural, multinational nature of UN peacekeeping, plus the administrative restrictions associated with the management of UN peacekeeping, there is a limit to the level of deployable capability and the tempo it can achieve. (The UN is not designed to undertake war-fighting operations.) The vertical red line in the figure illustrates this limit. At the same time, UN peacekeeping is driven by the fundamental

principle of consent, and, therefore, there is a limit on the y axis beyond which a UN peacekeeping operation should not go in terms of sustaining the legitimacy and credibility of the Organization (see the horizontal red line). These two red lines serve to define the space in which UN peacekeeping operations have a chance of success. UN operations outside this space are either not peacekeeping or are likely to fail. An issue for the international community is what mechanism should be used for peace and security outside this space. In the past, unilateral action, coalitions of the willing, or regional organizations such as NATO or the AU have been deployed. Danger lies where organizations with low capability are deployed to non-consensual environments.

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations also play a critical role in ensuring that the activities of the United Nations system and other international actors are guided by a common strategic vision. The United Nations has the unique ability to mount a truly comprehensive response to complex crises and has developed the concept of "integrated missions" to maximize the overall impact of its support to countries emerging from conflict.[4] To help draw these capabilities together, multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are normally headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)

who has overall authority over the activities of the United Nations. The SRSG also establishes the framework guiding the overall activities of the United Nations peacekeeping operation and those of the United Nations Country Team (UNCT).[5] The SRSG is supported in this task by a "triple-hatted" Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC). This Deputy also serves as the principal interface between the United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT; leads the coordination effort for humanitarian, development and recovery activities; and brings concerns raised by the UNCT to the attention of the SRSG.[6]

---

4   See Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordination, 17 January 2006.

5   See para. 5 of the Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions.

6   See Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, para. 22.

For additional details on the roles and responsibilities of the SRSG, DSRSG, UNCT, and others, please refer to the *Secretary-General's Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination, 17 January 2006*, which may be downloaded from *http://www.peaceopstraining.org/ resources*.

See the diagram in Chapter 5.1 that illustrates the coordinating relationship between the SRSG, the DSRSG RC/HC, and the humanitarian and developmental actors.

Ambulances of the British contingent of UNPROFOR moving through the streets of Vukovar, which was destroyed by Serbian shelling. (UN Photo #61382 by Steve Whittehouse, July 1992)

2.4   Peacebuilding Activities

While the deployment of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation may help to stem violence in the short-term, it is unlikely to result in a sustainable peace unless accompanied by programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Every situation invariably presents its own specific set of challenges. However, experience has shown that the achievement of a sustainable peace requires progress in at least four critical areas:[7]

a.) Restoring the State's ability to provide security and maintain public order;

b.) Strengthening the rule of law[8] and respect for human rights;

c.) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes;

d.) Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict.

---

7   See Report of the Secretary-General, No Exit without Strategy: Security Council Decision-making and the Closure or Transition of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, S/2001/394. [Editor's note: Document provided as Appendix F.]

8   According to Decision No. 2006/47 of the

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations generally lack the programme funding and technical expertise required to comprehensively implement effective peacebuilding programmes. Nevertheless, they are often mandated by the Security Council to play a catalytic role in the following critical peacebuilding activities:

• Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants;

• Mine action;

• Security Sector Reform (SSR)[9] and other rule of law-related activities;

• Protection and promotion of human rights;

• Electoral assistance;

• Support to the restoration and extension of State authority.

Secretary General's Policy Committee, the rule of law in the context of conflict and post-conflict settings includes the following sectors: transitional justice; strengthening of national justice systems and institutions, including police and law enforcement agencies and prisons; and other priority areas such as victim and witness protection and assistance, anti-corruption, organized crime, trans-national crime, and trafficking and drugs.

9   According to Decision No. 2007/11 of the

DDR

DDR is a critical part of efforts to create a secure and stable environment in which the process of recovery can begin. United Nations multidimensional peacekeeping operations are usually mandated to assist in the development and implementation of national DDR programmes.[10] This may entail the provision of technical advice; the securing of disarmament and cantonment sites; and/or the collection and destruction of weapons, ammunition and other materiel surrendered by the former combatants. Other agencies, working in close coordination with the United Nations peacekeeping operation, are responsible for supporting the critical reintegration process, which aims to provide demobilized former combatants with sustainable livelihoods.

Members of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) after being encouraged to disarm and repatriate to Rwanda board a UN helicopter of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) headed to the Demobilization, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) base camp in Goma. (UN Photo #185621 by Marie Frechon, April 2008)

Secretary-General's Policy Committee: "The objective of a United Nations approach to SSR is effective, accountable and sustainable security institutions operating under civilian control within the framework of the rule of law and respect for human rights. The focus should be on executive security agencies, armed forces, police and law enforcement agencies, relevant line ministries and judicial and civil society oversight bodies."

10   The role of United Nations peacekeeping operations in this area is defined in the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS),

DDR in Depth

One of the prerequisites for the conclusion of an armed conflict and the return to peaceful self-sufficiency is the disarmament of warring factions, the demobilization of the fighting units, and the reintegration of former combatants into civil society.

The UN approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration is established by the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS). The Foreword to the IDDRS, dated December 2006 and signed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, is provided as Appendix G. The full 770-page IDDRS, along with the operational guide for field planning and other resources, are available for the student to view online at *http://www.unddr.org/*.

Students interested in studying DDR in more detail may enrol in the Peace Operations Training Institute course entitled *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR): Principles of Intervention and Management in Peacekeeping Operations*.

Mine Action

In many post-conflict settings, landmines and other unexploded ordinance constitute a threat to the safety of civilians and pose a major obstacle to successful post-conflict recovery. Mine action is therefore necessary to recreate a safe environment conducive to normal life and development. In addition to providing emergency mine action assistance, multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are often mandated to help the national authorities develop medium-and long-term mine action plans.[11]

available at www.unddr.org/iddrs. [Editor's note: The Foreword to the IDDRS, dated December 2006 and signed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, is provided as Appendix G.]

11   The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is responsible for building the capacity of the national institutions that will ultimately assume responsibility for long-term mine action management within the country.

Landmines

Landmines have had a long history, dating back to the Greek and Roman empires. However, it was during the Second World War that antipersonnel and antitank landmines started to be widely used. Advances in technology in the 1960s made it possible to scatter mines mechanically rather than planting them by hand. This meant that hundreds of landmines could be deployed at the same time using aircraft, rockets, or artillery. As conflicts became more brutal, the effect of landmines was no longer strictly limited to military targets. In the 1980s, mines proliferated as the weapon of choice in many internal conflicts. Years of war have left millions of landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO) scattered in more than 60 countries worldwide. In war and in peace, civilians are their most common victims.

Demining engineer of the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) clears one of the anti-personnel landmine. (UN Photo #185319 by UNMACA, January 2007)

UN and International Response to Landmines

In 1992, six humanitarian organizations joined together to create the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). From their work in mine-affected countries, they had seen first-hand the horrendous toll landmines take on innocent people in countries where conflict has already caused so much pain.

In October 1998, the Secretary-General of the United Nations submitted a mine action policy document to the General Assembly as part of his report on assistance in mine clearance (A/53/496). The mine action policy document, entitled *Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Policy*, aimed to foster the ability of the United Nations to support affected countries and populations, strengthen the ability of the United Nations to support and build upon collective anti-mine efforts of the international community, and to build the credibility of the United Nations in terms of transparency, accountability, and effectiveness.

For more on United Nations Mine Action, see the Electronic Mine Action website at *http://www.mineaction.org/* or enrol in the Peace Operations Training Institute course entitled *Mine Action: Humanitarian Impact, Technical Aspects, and Global Initiatives*.

A Canadian Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officer (third from right) talking to Croatian police officers in Daruvar. (UN Photo #46560 by S. Whitehouse, July 1992)

For more on SSR and the rule of law, see the publication by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) entitled *Rule-of-Law Tools for Post-Conflict States*, available at: *http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ Publications/RuleoflawVettingen.pdf.*

Ninety-nine Kosovar Albanian prisoners were released from Serbian jails and reunited with their family members in Pristina on 10 March 2001. (UN Photo #19854 Ky Chung, March 2001)

SSR and Other Rule Of Law-Related Activities

SSR is an essential component of efforts to re-establish and strengthen the rule of law. Progress in the area of SSR is critical to the success of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and helps define its "exit strategy," which is largely dependent on the ability of national security actors and institutions to function effectively. Depending on its mandate, a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation may be called upon to assist in the restructuring, reform and training of the national police and/or armed forces. Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations also play a catalytic role in the strengthening of national judiciary and corrections systems, and have also been mandated by the Security Council to promote legal and judicial reform or support the development of essential legislation.

Protection and Promotion of Human Rights

The abuse and violation of human rights is at the heart of most modern conflicts and is also a consequence of them. Many of the worst human rights abuses occur during armed conflict and the protection of human rights must be at the core of action taken to address it. All United Nations entities have a responsibility to ensure that human rights are promoted and protected by and within their field operations.[12] Most United Nations multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are therefore mandated to promote and protect human rights by monitoring and helping to investigate human rights violations and/or developing the capacity of national actors and institutions to do so on their own.[13] The integration of human rights and the sustainability of human rights programmes should always be a key factor in the planning of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations.

_____

12 Decision No. 2005/24 of the Secretary-General's Policy Committee on Human Rights in Integrated Missions directs that human rights be fully integrated into peace operations and all human rights functions coordinated by one component.
13 The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is responsible for

Restoration and Extension of State Authority

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are frequently called upon to support the restoration and extension of State authority. In order to generate revenue and provide basic services to the population, the State must be able to exert control over its national territory. Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations may support the restoration and extension of State authority by creating an enabling security environment, providing political leadership or coordinating the efforts of other international actors. Support to the restoration or extension of State authority may include efforts to develop political participation, as well as operational support to the immediate activities of state institutions. Where relevant, it may also include small-scale capacity building or support to larger processes of constitutional or institutional restructuring.

Electoral Assistance

The holding of free and fair elections is often written into the peace agreement underlying a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and represents a major milestone towards the establishment of a legitimate State. Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are usually mandated to play a direct role in efforts to organize, monitor and carry out free and fair elections through the provision of security, technical advice, logistical support and other forms of electoral assistance. To this end, the electoral component of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations is normally staffed by experts recommended by the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division (EAD) of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA).

Although multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations may be required to initiate a limited number of critical peacebuilding activities, they are neither designed nor

_____

providing expertise, guidance and support to the human rights components of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations.

equipped to engage in longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts. This is normally the work of development actors within the UNCT, as well as key partners outside the United Nations, who have the resources and technical expertise required to effectively undertake long-term institution and capacity-building activities.

Nevertheless, experience has shown that, in the short-term, a United Nations peacekeeping operation may have little choice but to initiate longer-term institution and capacity-building efforts, due to the inability of other actors to take the lead. Whenever a United Nations peacekeeping operation is required to engage in activities of an institution and/or capacity building nature, it is essential that it be adequately resourced and that it seek out the requisite expertise. In such circumstances, the United Nations peacekeeping operation's efforts should remain focused on preparing the ground for those actors within and outside the United Nations system with the mandate to provide long-term peacebuilding assistance.

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) assists the local population with elections. Voters wait on line outside a polling station in a suburb of Maputo. (UN Photo #99294 by P. Sudhakaran, October 1994)

2.5   Supporting Other Actors

There are a number of areas in which the role of United Nations peacekeeping operations is limited to facilitating the activities of other actors within and outside the United Nations system, when requested, and within the limits of their mandate and available capacity. The promotion of socioeconomic recovery and development and the provision of humanitarian assistance are two critical areas in which multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations play a more limited supporting role.

Socio-economic recovery and development is critical to the achievement of a lasting peace. Experience has shown that security sector and other reform programmes are unlikely to succeed if not supported by transparent and effective economic management and civilian oversight systems. DDR efforts are likely to fail unless sustainable, alternative livelihoods can be provided to demobilized combatants.

Similarly, the return of refugees and other displaced populations is more likely to be smooth and sustainable if the special needs of these persons are taken into account in programmes designed to promote socio-economic recovery.

The British aid agency, OXFAM, installing a water supply system at Stankovac 1 near Brazde. Stankovac 1 is the first major reception site established by NATO, with UNHCR's support, several kilometers from the Kosovo border. (UN Photo #76370 by JJ Davies, April 2009)

The promotion of socio-economic recovery and development is the responsibility of development partners within and outside the United Nations system. Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are rarely mandated to play a direct role in the promotion of socio-economic recovery and development, nor do they have ready access to the requisite expertise and programmatic funding. Nevertheless, United Nations peacekeeping operations may assist the work of development partners by using their influence with the national authorities to encourage key reforms, or using the good offices of the SRSG and/or the DSRSG/RC/HC to help mobilize donor funding and attention for key development activities.

Responsibility for the provision of humanitarian assistance rests primarily with the relevant civilian United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the range of independent, international and local NGOs which are usually active alongside a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The primary role of United Nations peacekeeping operations with regard to the provision of humanitarian assistance is to provide a secure and stable environment within which humanitarian actors may carry out their activities.[14]

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations often implement Quick Impact Projects (QIPs), which are small-scale projects, designed to benefit the population. QIPs may take a number of forms, including infrastructure assistance or short-term employment generation activities. QIPs establish and build confidence in the mission, its mandate and the peace process. They are not a substitute for humanitarian and/or development assistance and are used by United Nations multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations to support the mission's objectives, by building confidence in the mission's mandate and the peace process.

_____

14 Depending on the situation, and when specifically requested by the relevant organizations, the peacekeeping operation may also need to provide more direct forms of assistance to humanitarian actors, such as escorting convoys or transporting humanitarian aid and personnel. Specific requests for assistance should be managed through standing coordination structures

Coordination and consultation with humanitarian actors[15] in regard to administration of QIPs is essential to help alleviate humanitarian concerns regarding the danger of conflating political-military activities with their humanitarian operations. The mission should be aware that humanitarian actors may have concerns about the characterization of QIPs, or Civil Military Coordination (CIMIC) projects, "hearts and minds" activities, or other security or recovery projects as being of a humanitarian nature, when they see these as primarily serving political, security or reconstruction priorities.

At the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), Pakistani peacekeepers and Liberian villagers repair a flooded road on the outskirts of Voinjama, Liberia. In efforts like this road repair, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) make small, easily implemented improvements to the living conditions of local residents. (UN Photo #120802 by Eric Kanalstein, April 2006)

_____

of the mission, and with reference to the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator.
15 The term 'humanitarian' is often applied loosely to a wide group of actors and activities, whereas many in the humanitarian community take a more restricted interpretation to embrace only those delivering life-saving assistance delivered in accordance with the Humanitarian principles. United Nations peacekeepers should respect this distinction.

Chapter 2 Quiz

1. Peacekeeping is:

a. Clearly defined in Chapter VI of the UN Charter;

b. One among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security throughout the world;

c. The only intervention taken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security throughout the world;

d. Established to address the root causes of a conflict.

2. Peacekeeping is:

a. Applied regardless of the consent of the parties to the conflict;

b. The only intervention taken by the United Nations and other international actors to maintain international peace and security throughout the world;

c. A technique designed to preserve the peace where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers;

d. Established to address the root causes of a conflict.

3. Conflict prevention:

a. Was first applied in 1948;

b. Requires the consent of the parties to the conflict to a peace enforcement operation;

c. Involves the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict;

d. Is defined in detail in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.

4. Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes falls under the category of:

a. Peacebuilding;

b. Peacekeeping;

c. Peace enforcement;

d. Peacemaking.

5. Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, but it differs from peace enforcement in that:

a. Peace enforcement may be undertaken in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter;

b. Peace enforcement may be implemented at the discretion of the SRSG;

c. Peace enforcement may be undertaken at the request of either party to the conflict;

d. Peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level.

6. What is increasingly reflected in the United Nations peacebuilding architecture?

a. The original concept of peacebuilding as described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter;

b. A growing recognition of the linkages between the UN's peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles;

c. Recognition of the sequential nature of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding;

d. Recognition of the primacy of reconstruction over peacekeeping or peacemaking.

7. When and where did the practice of UN peacekeeping begin?

8. The new generation of "multi-dimensional" United Nations peacekeeping operations:

a. No longer include military observers, as did traditional peacekeeping operations;

b. Are carried out in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN Charter;

c. May employ a mix of military, police, and civilian capabilities to support the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement;

d. Include various forms of military capabilities but no civilian resources.

9. Summarize the distinctions of the three core functions of multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations.

10. While the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation may help to address conflict in the short-term:

a. It is unlikely to result in a sustainable peace unless accompanied by peacebuilding programmes and activities designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict;

b. A nation must depend on a mixture of foreign aid and its own military power to develop its own long-term solutions;

c. Regional organizations must quickly replace United Nations peacekeepers to build a sustainable peace;

d. Only ongoing peace enforcement can permanently stem violence.

Which of these statements best reflects the philosophy of UN peacekeeping?

11. Multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations often implement QIPs. Define QIPs.

ANSWER KEY

1B, 2C, 3C, 4A, 5D, 6B, 7 1948 in the Middle East (UNTSO), 8C, 9 (1) Create a secure and stable environment; (2) facilitate the political process and good governance; and (3) provide a coherent and coordinated framework for all in-country activity, 10 A, 11 Quick Impact Projects – small scale projects designed to benefit the local population

CHAPTER 3
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES FOR
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

CHAPTER 3

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

3.1 Applying the Basic Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping

3.2 Other Success Factors

After studying Chapter 3, the student should be able to:

- Understand and be able to discuss the basic principles of UN peacekeeping: consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force;

- Understand and be able to contrast impartiality from neutrality; and

- List and briefly discuss some success factors that predict the successful outcome of a UN peacekeeping mission.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www. peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/364/ lesson-3*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

Peacekeeping – particularly traditional peacekeeping – is guided by several principles. These include the consent of the parties to the conflict to the deployment of UN peacekeepers; the impartiality of the missions and the individual peacekeepers as they interact with all parties to the conflict; and the non-use of force by peacekeepers, except in self-defence and in defence of the mission.

While these three principles serve as the main guides to UN peacekeeping missions, several additional factors are fundamental to the success of a mission. Among these success factors are the legitimacy of the UN peacekeeping mission (both in fact and in perception), the credibility of the mission, and the promotion of a sense of national and local ownership. These factors focus on building respect for a mission, cooperation between a mission and the region under conflict, and the empowerment of the parties involved to work towards a solution. Ultimately, only the parties to the conflict can bring an end to the conflict. Through an understanding of these principles of peacekeeping and their mutually supporting relationships, UN peacekeeping missions can

3.1 Applying the Basic Principles of United Nations Peacekeeping

Although the practice of United Nations peacekeeping has evolved significantly over the past six decades, three basic principles have traditionally served and continue to set United Nations peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security:

- Consent of the parties

- Impartiality

- Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate

These principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing. It is important that their meaning and relationship to each other are clearly understood by all those involved in the planning and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations, so

that they are applied effectively. Taken together, they provide a navigation aid, or compass, for practitioners both in the field and at United Nations Headquarters.

Consent of the Parties

United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict.[1] This requires a commitment by the parties to a political process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process. The consent of the main parties provides a United Nations peacekeeping operation with the necessary freedom of action, both political and physical, to carry out its mandated tasks. In the absence of such consent, a United Nations peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace.

In the implementation of its mandate, a United Nations peacekeeping operation must work continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the peace process moves forward. This requires that all peacekeeping personnel have a thorough understanding of the history and prevailing customs and culture in the mission area, as well as the capacity to assess the evolving interests and motivation of the parties.

The absence of trust between the parties in a post-conflict environment can, at times, make consent uncertain and unreliable. Consent,

_____

1   The Security Council may take enforcement action without the consent of the main parties to the conflict, if it believes that the conflict presents a threat to international peace and security. This, however, would be a peace enforcement operation. It may also take enforcement action for humanitarian or protection purposes; where there is no political process and where the consent of the major parties may not be achievable, but where civilians are suffering. Since the mid-1990s, enforcement action has been carried out by ad hoc coalitions of Member States or regional organizations acting under United Nations Security Council authorization.

particularly if given grudgingly under international pressure, may be withdrawn in a variety of ways when a party is not fully committed to the peace process. For instance, a party that has given its consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation may subsequently seek to restrict the operation's freedom of action, resulting in a de facto withdrawal of consent. The complete withdrawal of consent by one or more of the main parties challenges the rationale for the United Nations peacekeeping operation and will likely alter the core assumptions and parameters underpinning the international community's strategy to support the peace process.

Peter Maxwell (left), Head of UNMIS' regional office in Malakal, meets with Salva Kiir Mayardit (right), President of the Government of Southern Sudan and First Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan. (UN Photo #133913 by Tim McKulka, December 2006)

The fact that the main parties have given their consent to the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation does not necessarily imply or guarantee that there will also be consent at the local level, particularly if the main parties are internally divided or have weak command and control systems. Universality of consent becomes even less probable in volatile settings, characterized by the presence of armed groups not under the control of any of the parties, or by the presence of other spoilers.[2] The peacekeeping operation should continuously analyze its operating

_____
2   Spoilers are individuals or parties who believe that the peace process threatens their power and interests, and will therefore work to undermine it.

environment to detect and forestall any wavering of consent. A peacekeeping operation must have the political and analytical skills, the operational resources, and the will to manage situations where there is an absence or breakdown of local consent. In some cases this may require as a last resort the use of force.

Impartiality

United Nations peacekeeping operations must implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity.[3] United Nations peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.

The need for even-handedness towards the parties should not become an excuse for inaction in the face of behaviour that clearly works against the peace process. Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.

Notwithstanding the need to establish and maintain good relations with the parties, a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality. A mission should not shy away from a rigorous

_____
3   Humanitarian actors also use the terms impartiality and neutrality as two of the fundamental principles of humanitarian action, along with humanity and independence. However, their meanings are different. It is important to be aware of these differences, in order to avoid misunderstandings. For the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, in particular, impartiality means being guided solely by needs, making no discrimination on the basis of nationality, race, gender, class, or religious/political beliefs; while neutrality means to take no sides in hostilities or engage, at any time, in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.

application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation, but before acting it is always prudent to ensure that the grounds for acting are well established and can be clearly communicated to all. Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation's credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties. Where the peacekeeping operation is required to counter such breaches, it must do so with transparency, openness and effective communication as to the rationale and appropriate nature of its response. This will help to minimize opportunities to manipulate the perceptions against the mission, and help to mitigate the potential backlash from the parties and their supporters. Even the best and fairest of referees should anticipate criticism from those affected negatively and should be in a position to explain their actions.

Non-Use of Force Except in Self-Defence and Defence of the Mandate

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence dates back to the first deployment of armed United Nations peacekeepers in 1956. The notion of self-defence has subsequently come to include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent the peacekeeping operation from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council.[4] United Nations peacekeeping operations are not an enforcement tool. However, it is widely understood that they may use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate.

The environments into which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or pose a threat to the civilian population. In such situations, the Security Council has given United Nations peacekeeping operations "robust"

_____
4   See para. 4 of the Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973), of 27 October 1973, (S/11052/Rev.1). [Editor's note: Report provided as Appendix H.]

UNMEE armoured personnel carrier (APC) patrols the area of Senafe. (UN Photo #45329 by Jorge Aramburu, February 2001)

All Means Necessary

Students may not be familiar with the term "all means necessary" or "all necessary means." These diplomatic words authorize the use of force to achieve a given intent, which is described in the mandate. However, the use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional, and appropriate manner within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate.

mandates authorizing them to "use all necessary means" to deter forceful attempts to disrupt the political process, protect civilians under imminent threat of physical attack, and/or assist the national authorities in maintaining law and order. By proactively using force in defence of their mandates, these United Nations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed.

Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should

Use of Force

Judgements concerning the use of force are likely to be the most critical that the UN commander will make in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. The results of use of force need to be measured and balanced against its effect on consent versus the requirement to contain and de-escalate the conflict. The use of force should be controlled by the following guidelines:

- **Minimum Necessary Force:** Minimum necessary force is defined as the measured application of force or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate, and appropriate, and confined to the specific and legitimate intended target.

- **Legal Framework:** The UN mandate with the appropriate article from the UN Charter; the mission and national rules of engagement (ROE); and international, domestic, and host nation law all contribute to the legal framework within which force may be used. Peacekeepers should be trained and familiar in their responsibilities concerning the use of force and should be prepared to use it when appropriate, such as in the face of a hostile act or intent.*

When the use of force is not appropriate or its use must be restrained, alternatives that can be used to gain and maintain the initiative include:

- Negotiation and mediation;
- Rewards and penalties;
- Deterrence;
- Control measures;
- Threats and warnings; and
- Non-lethal use of force.

* A hostile act is an action where the intent is to cause death, bodily harm, or the destruction of designated property. Hostile intent is the threat of imminent use of force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in hostile intent is required before the use of force is authorized.

not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter. Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorized by the Security Council.

A United Nations peacekeeping operation should only use force as a measure of last resort, when other methods of persuasion have been exhausted, and an operation must always exercise restraint when doing so. The ultimate aim of the use of force is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking to harm civilians; and not to seek their military defeat. The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, within the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate. In its use of force, a United Nations peacekeeping operation should always be mindful of the need for an early de-escalation of violence and a return to non-violent means of persuasion.

The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation always has political implications and can often give rise to unforeseen circumstances. Judgments concerning its use will need to be made at the appropriate level within a mission, based on a combination of factors including mission capability; public perceptions; humanitarian impact; force protection; safety and security of personnel; and, most importantly, the effect that such action will have on national and local consent for the mission.

The mission-wide ROE for the military and DUF for the police components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation will clarify the different levels of force that can be used in various circumstances, how each level of force should be used, and any authorizations that must be obtained by commanders. In the volatile and potentially dangerous environments into which contemporary

peacekeeping operations are often deployed, these ROE and DUF should be sufficiently robust to ensure that a United Nations peacekeeping operation retains its credibility and freedom of action to implement its mandate. The mission leadership should ensure that these ROE and DUF are well understood by all relevant personnel in the mission and are being applied uniformly.

3.2   Other Success Factors

United Nations peacekeeping operations continue to be guided by the basic principles of consent, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. The experiences of the past 15 years have shown that in order to succeed, United Nations peacekeeping operations must also be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population. The United Nations recent experience with multi-dimensional peacekeeping has also served to highlight the need for United Nations peacekeeping operations to promote national and local ownership, in order to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace.

Legitimacy

International legitimacy is one of the most important assets of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The international legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is derived from the fact that it is established after obtaining a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The uniquely broad representation of Member States who contribute personnel and funding to United Nations operations further strengthens this international legitimacy. So too does the fact that United Nations peacekeeping operations are directed by the United Nations Secretary-General, an impartial and well-respected international figure, committed to upholding the principles and purposes of the Charter.

The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground. The firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises

The legitimacy of a UN peacekeeping operation rests on many foundations. One of these is the point that UN peacekeeping operations are directed by the UN Secretary-General. Here, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan is shown meeting with women of the Kalma Camp as he toured to gain a first-hand impression on the humanitarian situation in the Darfur region. (UN Photo #77090 by Evan Schneider, May 2005)

its mandate, the circumspection with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its legitimacy.

The perceived legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is directly related to the quality and conduct of its military, police and civilian personnel. The bearing and behaviour of all personnel must be of the highest order, commensurate with the important responsibilities entrusted to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and should meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. The mission's senior leadership must ensure that all personnel are fully aware of the standards of conduct that are expected of them and that effective measures are in place to prevent misconduct. Civilian, police and military personnel should receive mandatory training on sexual exploitation and abuse; and this training should be ongoing, as troops rotate in and out of peace operations. There must be zero tolerance for any kind of sexual exploitation and abuse, and other forms of serious misconduct. Cases of misconduct must be dealt with firmly and fairly, to avoid undermining the legitimacy and moral authority of the mission.

Experience has shown that the perceived legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation's presence may erode over time, if the size of the United Nations "footprint" and the behaviour of its staff becomes a source of local resentment or if the peacekeeping operation is not sufficiently responsive as the situation stabilizes. Peacekeeping missions must always be aware of and respect national sovereignty. As legitimate and capable government structures emerge, the role of the international actors may well need to diminish quickly. They should seek to promote national and local ownership, be aware of emerging local capacities, and be sensitive to the effect that the behaviour and conduct of the mission has upon the local population.

A Danish United Nations military observer, watched by several orphans, constructs shelves for the Juba Orphanage in Juba, Sudan.
(UN Photo #116896 by Arpan Munier, November 2005)

Credibility

United Nations peacekeeping operations are frequently deployed in volatile, highly stressed environments characterized by the collapse or degradation of state structures, as well as enmity, violence, polarization and distress. Lawlessness and insecurity may still be prevalent at local levels, and opportunists will be present who are willing to exploit any political and security vacuum. In such environments, a United Nations peacekeeping operation is likely to be tested for weakness and division by those whose interests are threatened by its presence, particularly in the early stages of deployment.

The credibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is a direct reflection of the international and local communities' belief in the mission's ability to achieve its mandate. Credibility is a function of a mission's capability, effectiveness and ability to manage and meet expectations. Ideally, in order to be credible, a United Nations peacekeeping operation must deploy as rapidly as possible, be properly resourced, and strive to maintain a confident, capable and unified posture. Experience has shown that the early establishment of a credible presence can help to deter spoilers and diminish the likelihood that a mission will need to use force to implement its mandate. To achieve and maintain its credibility, a mission must therefore have a clear and deliverable mandate, with resources and capabilities to match; and a sound mission plan that is understood, communicated and impartially and effectively implemented at every level.

The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation will generate high expectations among the local population regarding its ability to meet their most pressing needs. A perceived failure to meet these expectations, no matter how unrealistic, may cause a United Nations peacekeeping operation to become a focus for popular dissatisfaction, or worse, active opposition. The ability to manage these expectations throughout the life of a peacekeeping operation affects the overall credibility of the mission. Credibility, once lost, is hard to regain. A mission with low credibility becomes marginalized and ineffective. Its activities may begin to be perceived as having weak or frayed legitimacy and consent may be eroded. Critics and opponents of the mission may well exploit any such opportunities to this end. The loss of credibility may also have a direct impact on the morale of the mission personnel, further eroding its effectiveness. Accordingly, the maintenance of credibility is fundamental to the success of a mission.

Promotion of National and Local Ownership

Multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are increasingly involved in efforts to help countries emerging from protracted internal conflict re-build the foundations of a functioning State. The terms of the peace process and/or the Security Council mandate will shape the nature of a

peacekeeping operation's role in this area. In some instances, state and local capacity may be so weak that the mission is required to temporarily assume certain functions, either directly, as in the case of transitional administration, or in support of the State. Other situations require less intrusive support to state authority, and sometimes no such support at all. The nature and scale of a particular United Nations peacekeeping operation's role will depend on its mandate, the gravity of the situation on the ground, the resources the international community is willing to invest and an assessment of the availability of capable, credible and legitimate partners within the host nation. Each of these variables may change during the course of a United Nations peacekeeping operation's lifetime and require adjustments in the peacekeeping operation's approach.

National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation's core activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local and ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors. Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.

Partnerships with national actors should be struck with due regard to impartiality, wide representation, inclusiveness, and gender considerations. Missions must recognize that multiple divergent opinions will exist in the body politic of the host country. All opinions and views need to be understood, ensuring that ownership and participation are not limited to small elite groups. National and local ownership must begin with a strong understanding of the national context. This includes understanding of the political context, as well as the wider socio-economic context.

A mission must be careful to ensure that the rhetoric of national ownership does not replace a real understanding of the aspirations and hope of the population, and the importance of allowing national capacity to re-emerge quickly from conflict to lead critical political and development processes.

The first day of school at Fatu-Ahi. The building which was burned by rebels following the referendum has desks and benches made by Portuguese peacekeepers with UNTAET.
(UN Photo #31571 by Eskinder Debebe, March 2000)

The mission will need to manage real tensions between the requirement, in some instances, for rapid transformational change from the status quo ex ante, and resistance to change from certain powerful actors who have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. The ownership of change must be built first through dialogue. Political, financial and other forms of international leverage may be required to influence the parties on specific issues, but those should only be used in support of the wider aspirations for peace in the community.

The activities of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation must be informed by the need to support and, where necessary, build national capacity. Accordingly, any displacement of national or local capacity should be avoided wherever possible. A multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation may be obliged, in the short-term, to take on important state-like functions, such as the provision of security and the maintenance of public order. However, these functions should be conducted in a consultative manner. The aim must always be to restore as soon as possible the ability of national actors and institutions to assume their responsibilities and to exercise their full authority with due respect for internationally accepted norms and standards. In building national capacity, women and men should have equal opportunities for training. Targeted efforts may need to address gender inequalities. increase their effectiveness by using the principles as an analytical tool to help guide their activities.

Chapter 3 Quiz

1. **What are the three basic principles that have traditionally served and continue to set United Nations peacekeeping operations apart as a tool for maintaining international peace and security?**

2. **Please choose the best completion of the following sentence. The principle of impartiality means that United Nations peacekeeping operations:**

   a. Should not penalize either side;

   b. Must implement their mandate without favour or prejudice to any party;

   c. Must penalize both sides at the same time;

   d. Must be prepared to provide peace enforcement if needed.

3. **A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation, but before acting it is always prudent to ensure that the grounds for acting are well established and can be clearly communicated to all. Failure to do so may result in undermining the peacekeeping operation's _____ and _____, and it may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties.**

4. **The principle of non-use of force except in self-defence dates back to the first deployment of armed United Nations peacekeepers in 1956. However, it has now been nuanced, and peacekeepers may:**

   a. Use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, if acting in self-defence and defence of the mandate;

   b. Never use force under any circumstances;

   c. Use force as may be decided by each Troop-Contributing Country;

   d. Use force as may be decided by individual peacekeepers on the ground.

5. **The environments into which United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed are often characterized by the presence of militias, criminal gangs, and other spoilers who may actively seek to undermine the peace process or prey upon the civilian population. In such situations, the Security Council may give United Nations peacekeeping operations:**

   a. Strict instructions to monitor the situation;

   b. Authority to negotiate with militias, criminals, and other spoilers;

   c. "Robust" mandates authorizing them to "use all necessary means";

   d. Opportunities to request further guidance depending on realities on the ground.

6. **What are the two main differences between robust peacekeeping and peace enforcement?**

7. **What is the source of the international legitimacy of a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation?**

8. **Experience has shown that the perceived legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation's presence may erode over time if:**

   a. QIPs do not provide the expected results on schedule;

   b. The size of the United Nations "footprint" and the behaviour of its staff becomes a source of local resentment; or if the peacekeeping operation is not sufficiently responsive as the situation stabilizes;

   c. The Security Council fails to provide sufficient funding for the mission to carry out the mandate;

   d. Troop-Contributing Countries impose additional requirements on the mission.

9. **The credibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is a direct reflection of the international and local communities' belief in the mission's ability to achieve its mandate. What is credibility a function of?**

10. **National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. Partnerships with national actors should be struck:**

    a. As quickly as possible in accordance with QIP policy;

    b. With one party to the conflict first, and then with the other;

    c. With due regard to impartiality, wide representation, inclusiveness, and gender considerations;

    d. From a business best practice perspective, with return on investment as a goal.

ANSWER KEY

1 Consent of the parties, Impartiality, Non-use of force except in self-defence or defence of the mandate, 2B, 3 credibility; legitimacy, 4A, 5C, 6 The differences are level of use of force and the presence of consent. "Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement involves the use of military force at the strategic or international level, and does not require the consent of the main parties", 7 The Security Council mandate. "The international legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is derived from the fact that it is established after obtaining a mandate from the United Nations Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The uniquely broad representation of Member States who contribute personnel and funding to United Nations operations further strengthens this international legitimacy. So too does the fact that United Nations peacekeeping operations are directed by the United Nations Secretary-General, an impartial and well-respected international figure, committed to upholding the principles and purposes of the Charter", 8B (The other answer choices are issues of credibility.), 9 A mission's capability, effectiveness, and ability to manage and meet expectations, as well as to deliver its mandate, 10C

PART II

PLANNING UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS are likely to be far more effective when deployed as part of a United Nations system wide response based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities, and on the willingness of all actors to contribute to achieving common objectives. Integrated planning is at the heart of the United Nations' efforts to develop such a response.

CHAPTER FOUR
DECIDING TO DEPLOY A UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

CHAPTER FIVE
PLANNING A UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

CHAPTER 4
DECIDING TO DEPLOY
A UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

CHAPTER 4

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 4, the student should be able to:

- Understand the factors that the Security Council will take into account when making a decision to establish a new peacekeeping mission;

- Understand the purpose of the Strategic Assessment and the Technical Assessment Team in planning for a UN peacekeeping mission;

- Understand some of the lessons learned in recent years regarding what will contribute to the success of a peacekeeping mission; and

- Understand the importance of and reasons for consulting with Troop-Contributing Countries (TCCs) and Police-Contributing Countries (PCCs).

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www. peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/365/ lesson-4*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

What should the international community and the United Nations do when a situation – political, social, or military – begins to deteriorate and wide-spread suffering seems likely? When should action be taken, and by whom? There is no one-size-fits-all answer to these questions. When a situation arises, the issues surrounding a possible intervention must be addressed carefully and individually. The United Nations Security Council is the body that is responsible for making the collective decision to intervene in response to any particular set of circumstances, but as a particular situation worsens, consultations – sometimes outside any formal UN body – may take place among Member States, the Secretariat, the parties on the ground, regional actors, and potential contributing countries. If the Security Council decides in favour of an intervention, its members must then systematically approach questions regarding the nature of the intervention, including who will actually provide the intervention, what its goals will be, and how to best deal with the real situation on the ground.

Depending on the situation, the United Nations Secretary-General may decide to convene a Strategic Assessment of the situation and consult with Member States, including the potential host government and TCCs/PCCs, and may dispatch a Technical Assessment Mission to the field in order to observe the situation and report back directly. Based on the findings and recommendations of the Technical Assessment Mission, the United Nations Secretary-General normally issues a report to the Security Council, recommending options, and it is then up to the Security Council to pass a resolution authorizing the United Nations peacekeeping operation.

As the Security Council makes this decision, there are several factors that must be taken into account and many actors who must be consulted. It is vital that the decision-making process include the parties to the conflict, as well as the TCCs/PCCs. If the Security Council adopts a resolution to authorize the PKO, its mandate must be clear and its success measurable, but once established, the PKO must frequently respond to previously unknown variables. This uncertainty requires that the PKO be allowed the flexibility to react to realities on the ground as the situation unfolds.

4.1   Assessing the Options for United Nations Engagement

It is the prerogative of the United Nations Security Council, acting in its capacity as the organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to determine when and where a United Nations peacekeeping operation should be deployed. The Security Council responds to crises on a case-by-case basis and it has a wide range of options at its disposal. Nevertheless, without prejudice to its ability to do so and to respond flexibly as circumstances require, the Security Council has indicated that it may take the following factors into account when the establishment of new peacekeeping operations is under consideration:

- Whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security;

- Whether regional or sub-regional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation;

- Whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement;

- Whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate;

- Whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated;

- Whether the safety and security of United Nations personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or factions regarding the safety and security of United Nations personnel.[1]

→ *For additional background information, see* **Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/1994/22, of 3 May 1994,** *provided as Appendix I.*

The United Nations Secretariat plays a critical role in helping the Security Council determine whether the deployment of a United Nations

---

1   Statement by the President of the Security Council S/PRST/1994/22, of 3 May 1994.

peacekeeping operation is the most appropriate course of action, or whether other options for United Nations engagement should be considered. As a particular conflict develops, worsens, or approaches resolution, consultations will normally take place among Member States, the Secretariat, the parties on the ground, regional actors, and potential contributing countries. One or more of the parties may even insist on a United Nations role as a precondition for signing a peace agreement.

During this initial phase of consultations, the United Nations Secretary-General may decide to convene a Strategic Assessment of the situation, involving all relevant United Nations actors, with the aim of identifying possible options for United Nations engagement. The Strategic Assessment would likely involve consultations with Member States, including the potential host government and TCCs/PCCs, as well as regional and other intergovernmental organizations, and other key external partners. The Strategic Assessment allows United Nations planners and decision-makers to conduct a system-wide analysis of the situation, identify conflict resolution and peace-building priorities, and define the appropriate framework for United Nations engagement.

As soon as security conditions permit, the Secretariat usually deploys a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to the country or territory where the deployment of a United Nations mission is envisaged. The role of the TAM is to analyze and assess the overall security, political humanitarian, human rights and military situation on the ground, and the implications of an eventual United Nations peacekeeping operation. As such, the TAM may also consist of representatives from several departments and offices within the Secretariat, as well as the specialized agencies, funds and programs, and should involve relevant actors from the UNCT.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the TAM, the United Nations Secretary-General normally issues a report to the Security Council, recommending options for the possible establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including its size and resources. The Security Council may then pass a resolution authorizing the United Nations peacekeeping operation's deployment and determining its size and mandate.

4.2   Key Lessons for Planners and Decision Makers

Pressures to halt the slaughter of civilians or avert a humanitarian catastrophe may lead the Security Council to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation in circumstances that are far from ideal. Nevertheless, the Secretariat has a responsibility to provide the Security Council with an accurate assessment of the risks associated with its decision to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and ensure that its mandate and capabilities are tailored to the requirements of the situation. The lessons learned over the past six decades indicate that a United Nations peacekeeping operation is unlikely to succeed when one or more of the following conditions are not in place.

A Peace to Keep

A United Nations peacekeeping operation can only succeed if the parties on the ground are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process. A United Nations peacekeeping operation deployed in the absence of such a commitment runs the risk of becoming paralyzed or, worse still, being drawn into the conflict. The signing of a cease-fire or peace agreement is an important indicator of whether or not the parties are ready to engage in a political dialogue. However, the signing of a cease-fire or peace agreement may not always translate into a genuine commitment to peace, particularly if the parties have done so as a result of international pressure.

Judging the parties' real intentions is never easy and the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation always entails an element of risk. Nevertheless, in gauging the parties' level of commitment to a peace process, the Secretariat should always be prepared to tell the Security Council what it needs to know, rather than what it may want to hear. If the parties do not appear committed to resolving their differences through peaceful means, the Security Council should be encouraged to explore the full range of options at its disposal, such as the deployment of an advance mission, or the reinforcement of mediation and other peacemaking efforts.

Positive Regional Engagement

Many of the crises before the Security Council are regional in character. Rarely can the problems in one state be treated in isolation from its neighbours. The attitude of neighbouring states can be as important a factor in determining the viability of a peace process, as the commitment of the local parties, some of whom may even be acting as proxies for neighbouring states. The role regional actors or organizations may be playing in the conflict must be carefully examined by the Secretariat and the Security Council when the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is under consideration. A managed, positive and supportive regional engagement strategy can pay enormous dividends in encouraging the parties to stay the course and prevent the spread of conflict. To exclude regional actors from the peace process may have a more detrimental effect than managing their participation.

A group of young combatants of the Sudanese Liberation Fighters attend a meeting addressed by Jan Pronk, SRSG for the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), during the negotiations for a settlement with their commanders who failed to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement. (UN Photo #133992 by Fred Noy, October 2006)

The Full Backing of a United Security Council

While the establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation only requires nine votes from the Security Council's fifteen members, anything other than unanimous Security Council backing can be a serious handicap. Divisions within the Security Council are likely to send mixed messages to the parties, and may undermine the legitimacy and authority of the mission in the eyes of the main parties and the population as a whole. Any perception that the Security Council is not fully committed to the implementation of a peace agreement is likely to embolden spoilers at both the local and regional levels, as well as hamper contributions from Member States. On the other hand, by showing the parties that it is actively engaged in the peace process and is determined to stay the course, the Security Council can greatly enhance a United Nations peacekeeping operation's impact on the ground.

A Clear and Achievable Mandate with Resources to Match

When the Security Council decides to deploy a United Nations peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat must help to ensure that the mandate is clear and achievable. Since the credibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is dependent on it being able to carry out its mandated tasks, it is important to ensure that the mandate reflects the level of resources that contributing nations are able and willing to provide. There must be reason to believe that Member States will be ready to finance the operation, to contribute the necessary military and police personnel and to provide it with political support, on a continuing basis. If the situation on the ground requires the deployment of capabilities that a United Nations peacekeeping operation is unlikely to have, the Security Council should be encouraged to consider alternative options.

The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is just the start of a long-term but volatile peace and capacity-building process. In recommending to the Security Council the resources and capabilities needed for the peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat and its partners should also conduct a rigorous

assessment of the requirements for longer-term engagement. In conducting this assessment, worst case scenarios should be examined as an aid in planning. Planning based solely on short-term engagement and best-case scenarios has rarely proven to be a successful basis for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping mission and should be avoided.

If changing circumstances on the ground warrant an adjustment to a mission's mandate, this should be done explicitly on the basis of an objective re-evaluation of the United Nations role. If a change in mandate entails a significant increase in the number, scope or complexity of the tasks assigned to a mission, the Secretariat should seek the necessary additional resources to match a revised mandate. Similarly, if the mission's role is augmented or diminished, then the types and amount of resources required should also be adjusted.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon (right) holds a meeting with the Heads of the United Nations Country Team. (UN Photo #203281 by Mark Garten, October 2008)

4.3 The Importance of Consultations with Contributing Countries

The United Nations has no standing army or police force. For every new United Nations peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat must seek contributions of military, police and other personnel from Member States who are under no obligation to provide them. Sustained consultations with TCCs/PCCs and other contributing countries at all stages of the planning and decision-making process are therefore critical to the success of any United Nations peacekeeping operation.

→ *In* **Security Council resolution 1353 (2001), of 13 June 2001, on Measures for Cooperation with Troop Contributing Countries***, the Security Council recognized the importance of consulting with TCCs. UNSCR 1353 is provided as Appendix J.*

Consultations with TCCs/PCCs may take several forms and should be held at all key stages in the life of a United Nations peacekeeping operation, including:

a. The development of the concept of operations and the elaboration of the mandate of a new operation;

b. Any change in the mandate, in particular the broadening or narrowing of the scope of the mission, the introduction of new or additional functions or components, or a change in the authorization to use force;

c. The renewal of the mandate;

d. Significant or serious political, military or humanitarian developments;

e. A rapid deterioration of the security situation on the ground;

f. The termination, withdrawal or scaling down in size of the operation, including the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peacebuilding; and

g. Before and after Security Council missions to a specific peacekeeping operation.[2]

_____

2   Security Council resolution 1353 (2001), of 13 June 2001, on Measures for Cooperation with Troop Contributing Countries.

Since United Nations peacekeeping operations would not be possible without the participation of contributing countries, it is critical that every effort be made to ensure that they are fully consulted on any decisions that may affect their personnel on the ground. Additionally, regular consultations with contributing countries provide the Secretariat with a valuable opportunity to consider their views on a range of strategic and operational issues.

Standing Police Capacity

While the United Nations has no standing army or police force, since 2007 there has been developed a standing police capacity (SPC). The core functions of the SPC are to provide a start-up capability for the police component of new UN peace operations; and to provide advice, expertise, and assistance to the police components of existing UN peace opeations in the field of institutional law enforcement capacity-building. As of June 2010, the SPC stands at 25 sworn officers and 2 support staff, based at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. They are drawn from 23 Member States, and 25% are female officers.

Source: DPKO Policy Directive, 1 May 2006. Establishment, Functions and Orgniazation of the United Nations Standing Policy Capacity (SPC).

French soldiers building a sandbag bunker at Sarajevo Airport. (UN Photo #121850 by John Isaac, September 1992)

Chapter 4 Quiz

1. It is the prerogative of
_____, acting in its
capacity as the organ with primary
responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security, to
determine when and where a United Nations
peacekeeping operation should be deployed.

2. List the six factors the Security Council
could take into account when the
establishment of new peacekeeping
operations is under consideration:

3. As a particular conflict develops or worsens,
the United Nations Secretary-General may
decide to convene a:

a. Technical Assessment Mission;

b. Strategic Assessment of the situation;

c. Cooperative Country resolution meeting;

d. Civil-Military Coordination project.

4. The roles of a Technical Assessment Mission
(TAM) are to:

a. Analyze and assess the overall security,
political, humanitarian, human rights and
military situation on the ground, and the
implications of an eventual United Nations
peacekeeping operation;

b. Evaluate the likelihood of success of a United
Nations peacekeeping operation based on the
presence of violence, political stability, and
democratic processes of a nation;

c. Coordinate cease-fire agreements to avoid
spoilers interrupting the peacebuilding process;

d. Facilitate the planning of multi-dimensional
United Nations peacekeeping operations
and assess the likely implications of a United
Nations peacekeeping operation.

5. Experience over the past six decades
indicates that a United Nations peacekeeping
operation is unlikely to succeed when one or
more of several conditions are not in place.
List four such conditions.

6. In recommending to the Security Council
the resources and capabilities needed for
the peacekeeping operation, the Secretariat
and its partners should also conduct a
rigorous assessment of the requirements
for longer-term engagement, and should
carefully examine what as an aid to
planning?

a. The most likely scenarios;

b. Best-case scenarios;

c. Similar historical scenarios;

d. Worst-case scenarios.

7. Why is it is critical that every effort be made
to ensure troop- and police-contributing
countries are fully consulted on any
decisions that may affect their personnel on
the ground?

a. Because Security Council resolutions require
the approval of the contributing countries;

b. Because United Nations peacekeeping
operations would not be possible without the
participation of contributing countries;

c. To ensure the contributing countries continue to
pay their assessed contributions;

d. To request the input of the police- and
troop-contributing countries on tactical
decisions.

ANSWER KEY

1 The United Nations Security Council
2 (1) Whether a situation exists the
continuation of which is likely to endanger or
constitute a threat to international peace and
security, (2) Whether regional or sub-regional
organizations and arrangements exist and
are ready and able to assist in resolving the
situation, (3) Whether a cease-fire exists
and whether the parties have committed
themselves to a peace process intended to
reach a political settlement, (4) Whether a
clear political goal exists and whether it can
be reflected in the mandate, (5) Whether
a precise mandate for a United Nations
operation can be formulated, and (6) Whether
the safety and security of United Nations
personnel can be reasonably ensured,
including in particular whether reasonable
guarantees can be obtained from the principal
parties or factions regarding the safety and
security of United Nations personnel, 3B, 4A,
5 (1) There is a peace to keep, (2) Positive
regional engagement, (3) The full backing of
a united Security Council, and (4) A clear and
achievable mandate with resources to match,
6D, 7D

CHAPTER 5
PLANNING A UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATION

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 5, the student should be able to:

- Know what an integrated mission is;
- Understand the rational behind mission integration;
- Understand what the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) is; and
- Know the purposes of the IMPP Guidelines.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www.peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/366/lesson-5*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

In Chapter 2, some of the responsibilities of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations were discussed. These included DDR, mine action, security sector reform, and other rule of law-related activities, the protection and promotion of human rights, electoral assistance, and the support to the restoration and extension of state authority. In Chapter 3, the basic principles of UN peacekeeping were discussed – consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. However, once a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation has been mandated, all aspects of the mission must be planned with careful coordination and foresight. This planning process requires an integrated approach that will harmonize the efforts of a variety of actors – military, police, and civilian; UN and non-UN; local, and external; government, non-government, and private. The successful engagement and integration of this broad range of actors requires an Integrated Planning Approach.


United Nations Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson (second from right), and his African Union counterpart, Salim Ahmed Salim (right), meet with Hassan Al Turabi (left), leader of Popular Congress Party, one of the leaders of the Sudanese political parties that they met during their joint mission, at the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) Headquarters in Khartoum. (UN Photo #141808 by Fred Noy, March 2007)

5.1 The Integrated Approach

As discussed in Chapter 2, United Nations peacekeeping began during the Cold War as a tool for managing inter-state conflicts. Since then, a new generation of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeepse multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as one part of a broader international effort to assist countries making the transition from conflict to sustainable peace.

Successful recovery from conflict requires the engagement of a broad range of actors – including the national authorities and the local population – in a long-term peacebuilding effort. The rationale for the integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations is to better assist countries to make this transition from conflict to sustainable peace. A multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation is likely to be far more effective when it is deployed as part of a United Nations system-wide response based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities, and on a willingness on the part of all United Nations actors to contribute to the achievement of common objectives. Integrated

planning is at the heart of the United Nations efforts to develop such a response.

An integrated mission is one in which there is a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at the country-level. This strategy should reflect a shared understanding of the operating environment and agreement on how to maximize the effectiveness, efficiency, and impact of the United Nations overall response. Structural or programmatic integration between United Nations actors must be driven by an assessment of whether or not it will add real value and improve the impact of the United Nations engagement. An integrated mission's structure should be derived from an in-depth appreciation of the specific country setting and an honest assessment of the United Nations capacities to respond effectively. It should be driven by the United Nations strategy for that country and the resources available to the United Nations.

Integrated planning may, at times, appear to slow the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. Therefore, a balance must be struck between the need to ensure that developmental, human rights, gender and other perspectives are fully taken into account, and the need to deliver a timely and effective humanitarian and

Example of the UN's Integrated Mission Structure

Source: UN Senior Mission Leaders Course

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent system-wide approach to assist countries emerging from conflict. The UN system uniquely has the ability to employ – under a unified leadership – a mix of civilian, military, and police capabilities in support of a fragile peace process. They are often deployed alongside a variety of national and international actors with widely differing mandates, agendas, and time horizons.

security response. Finding such a balance is not easy and requires cooperation, coordination and communication. Ultimately, integrated planning helps to ensure that all the actors in the United Nations system, when deployed in the field, are pointing in the same direction.

Forcing integration where it is not needed may well be counter-productive. Chapter 7 provides more detail on managing integrated missions in the field. In situations where there is little or no peace to keep, integration may create difficulties

for humanitarian and development partners, particularly if they are perceived to be too closely linked to the political and security objectives of the peacekeeping mission. In the worst case, integration may endanger their operations and the lives of their personnel. Integrated planning should also bear these worse case scenarios in mind and ensure appropriate dialogue, communication and contingency planning.

5.2   The Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP)

The United Nations has adopted an Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) to facilitate the planning of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations.[1] The IMPP is intended to help the United Nations system arrive at a common understanding of its strategic objectives in a particular country by engaging all relevant parts of the United Nations system. It aims to ensure that the right people are at the planning table, that the right issues are being discussed, and that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate integrated thinking and planning.

Full application of the IMPP may not always be necessary or feasible since the deployment of an integrated mission is just one among a range of possible options for United Nations engagement. Nevertheless, even in situations requiring a more traditional United Nations peacekeeping response, every effort should be made to ensure that planning is conducted in close coordination with relevant United Nations system partners and other key stakeholders.

The IMPP should be driven by a realistic assessment of existing capacities at country-level, in order to avoid duplication of effort and ensure the most efficient use of the United Nations limited resources. Any plans based on overly ambitious, unfunded or aspirational capacities must be carefully scrutinized at this stage to avoid unrealistic planning assumptions. The UNCT should, therefore, be involved in the IMPP from the outset and continue to play an active role in planning efforts within the context of an integrated mission. These considerations should be factored into the IMPP and reflected in the accompanying budgetary process.

The IMPP does not and cannot take over all other planning processes. The number of international and national actors involved in efforts to support

the process of post-conflict recovery means that, in practice, planning cannot always be fully coherent or integrated. These actors have different roles, decision-making processes, deployment time-lines, procedures, budgetary pressures and supervising authorities. However, the IMPP does provide an inclusive framework to engage external partners, such as the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), regional organizations or bilateral donors. The cooperation of such external partners is necessary for the United Nations to achieve its broader objectives.

Peacekeeping planners need to be aware of the other assessment and planning processes that may be going on alongside the IMPP and actively seek to create substantive linkages between

Integration of Planning

Source: UN Senior Mission Leaders Course

While peacekeeping missions are primarily concerned with creating the conditions for stability and security, there are a number of functions within this role that overlap with those of humanitarian and developmental actors. The purpose of integrated planning is to ensure coherence of planning, especially in those areas where such overlaps occur. This is demonstrated in the diagram above.

them wherever possible. Such processes include the Consolidated Humanitarian Appeal (CHAP)/Consolidated Appeal (CAP), Common Country Assessment (CCA)/UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), Joint Assessment Missions (JAM)/Post-Conflict Needs Assessments (PCNA) and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). The IMPP should draw on and capture any elements contained in these parallel planning frameworks that are relevant to the achievement of the United Nations overall strategic objectives. Development of these linkages will help prevent circumstances in which uncoordinated initiatives create friction and spark conflict among the many actors.

The IMPP should be seen as a dynamic, continuous process allowing for activities and objectives to be revised, as the mission's understanding of its operational environment grows and as that environment itself changes. Significant developments at the country level – for example following national elections, or a changed political, security or humanitarian situation – may require a change in the United Nations strategic objectives, or a reconfiguration of the overall role and/or

capabilities of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. Such a revision may also be requested by the United Nations Security Council. In such situations, the SRSG/HOM will be responsible for revising the strategic framework guiding the United Nations system's activities on the ground as the basis for the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, which is ultimately responsible for deciding whether the mission's mandate should be revised.

Chapter 5 Quiz

1. **United Nations peacekeeping began during the Cold War as a tool for managing interstate conflicts. Since then, a new generation of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations has emerged. These multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations:**

   a. Follow the same approach as Cold War-era peacekeeping missions but incorporate modern technology;

   b. Are deployed as one part of a broader international effort to assist countries making the transition from conflict to sustainable peace;

   c. Follow a more complex approval process in the Security Council;

   d. Are deployed exclusively in cases of interstate conflicts.

2. **What is the rationale for the integration of activities undertaken by the United Nations?**

   a. To better assist countries to make the transition from conflict to sustainable peace;

   b. To avoid duplication of resources;

   c. To provide peacekeeping as inexpensively as possible;

   d. To permit a variety of nations to participate in the peacekeeping process.

3. **A multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation is likely to be far more effective when integrated planning is deployed as part of a United Nations system-wide response due to:**

   a. A clear and shared understanding of priorities and on a willingness on the part of all United Nations actors to contribute to the achievement of common objectives;

   b. An effective and streamlined chain of command;

   c. An integration of UN mission resources and staff;

   d. Increased communication between the UN mission staff, the Secretariat, and the Security Council.

4. **An integrated mission's structure should be derived from:**

   a. The standard mission organization plan as promulgated by DPKO;

   b. The doctrine of the troop-contributing countries as pertaining to the specific events on the ground;

   c. Similar structures at other integrated missions;

   d. An appreciation of the specific country setting.

5. **Integrated planning may, at times, appear to slow the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. However, between what needs must a balance be struck?**

6. **When should the UNCT be involved in the IMPP?**

   a. Only during the implementation phase;

   b. Only when the mission is preparing for transition/hand-over;

   c. From the outset and thereafter;

   d. Only when problems arise within the nation's governing bodies.

7. **List some of the core characteristics and purposes of the IMPP.**

ANSWER KEY

1B, 2A, 3A (though all answers important), 4D, 5 A balance must be struck between security and humanitarian action/development. "A balance must be struck between the need to ensure that developmental, human rights, gender and other perspectives are fully taken into account, and the need to deliver a timely and effective humanitarian and security response", 6C, 7 The IMPP is a shared vision and understanding of the mandates among all UN actors. The IMPP is tailored to the specific characteristics of each country setting in an effort to maximize UN effectiveness and efficiency.

PART III
THE ART OF SUCCESSFUL MANDATE IMPLEMENTATION

The arrangements for directing and managing modern United Nations peacekeeping operations are distinct from those of other organizations, particularly those only deploying a military capability. United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into a complex, multidimensional enterprise, involving personnel from a wide range of nationalities, disciplines, and professional cultures pursuing multiple lines of activity. likely to be far more effective when deployed as part of a United Nations system wide response based on a clear and shared understanding of priorities, and on the willingness of all actors to contribute to achieving common objectives. Integrated planning is at the heart of the United Nations' efforts to develop such a response.

CHAPTER SIX
Deployment and Start-Up of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

CHAPTER SEVEN
Managing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

CHAPTER EIGHT
Supporting and Sustaining United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

CHAPTER NINE
Maintaining Support for the Mission

CHAPTER TEN
Transition and Exit

CHAPTER 6
DEPLOYMENT AND START-UP OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 6

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

6.1 Typical Phases of Deployment

6.2 The Mission Start-Up Process

6.3 Managing the Mission Start-Up Process

After studying Chapter 6, the student should be able to:

- List and describe the three broad phases in the lifecycle of a United Nations peacekeeping operation; and

- List and describe the four notional stages in the mission start-up process.

Introduction

Once the decision has been made to deploy a UN peacekeeping mission, and once the planning process is completed, it is time to begin the process of deploying on a mission. The life-cycle of a peacekeeping mission can be thought of as having three broad and overlapping phases – mission start-up, mandate implementation, and transition to hand-over and withdrawal.

The mission start-up phase itself can have several overlapping notional stages: pre-deployment, rapid deployment, mission headquarters start-up, and functional component and field office start-up. In this chapter, the three phases of deployment will be introduced, and the four phases of start-up will be discussed individually.

6.1   Typical Phases of Deployment

Part III of this document addresses some of the major challenges facing United Nation peacekeeping operations during the various phases of deployment. Although the trajectory of each United Nations peacekeeping operation evolves differently, for planning purposes the lifecycle of a United Nations peacekeeping operation can be divided into the following broad phases, shown simplistically in Figure 3 below:

- Mission Start-Up

- Mandate Implementation

- Transition (hand-over, withdrawal and liquidation)

In general, the scale and tempo of operations rise steadily during initial deployment and start-up, reaching a plateau during mandate implementation, and finally tapering off once hand-over and withdrawal begin. Although they are conceptually distinct, the various phases of the mission lifecycle may overlap. There will also be spikes of activity during implementation as critical milestones and tasks are achieved, for example, during a large DDR programme, or during the period leading up to an election, or the critical months and years following formation of a government.

Each phase of deployment presents its own specific challenges. During startup, the mission strives to reach an initial operating capability (IOC), and eventually a full operating capability (FOC) so that mandate implementation can begin in all areas of deployment. During the implementation phase, efforts are focused on carrying out the tasks set out in the Security Council mandate and achieving the objectives set out in the mission plan. The process of handover, withdrawal and liquidation begins following a decision by the Security Council. It involves the departure of mission personnel following the hand-over of all remaining tasks to partners, and the final disposal of mission assets and infrastructure in accordance with United Nations rules.

The remainder of this chapter describes the United Nations mission deployment and start-up concept, and the challenges associated with managing the mission start-up process. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 describe the challenges of managing, supporting

Figure 3: Typical Phases of Deployment

and sustaining large integrated missions, as well as managing their impact on the host country. Finally, Chapter 10 turns to the challenges of transition, hand-over to partner organizations and withdrawal.

The Indian contingent of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), consisting mostly of women, arrives in Monrovia to begin its tour of duty. (UN Photo #138288 by Eric Kanalstein, January 2009)

6.2   The Mission Start-Up Process

The first months after a cease-fire or peace accord are often the most critical for establishing a stable peace and bolstering the credibility of a new operation. Opportunities lost during this period are hard to regain. The General Assembly has thus endorsed a requirement to be able to establish a traditional peacekeeping mission within 30 days and a multi-dimensional mission within 90 days of the authorization of a Security Council mandate.

In reality, there is no set sequence of events for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The lead time required to deploy a mission varies and depends on a number factors, particularly the will of Member States to contribute troops and police to a particular operation, and the availability of financial and other resources. For missions with highly complex mandates or difficult logistics, or where peacekeepers face significant security risk, it may take several weeks or even months to assemble and deploy the necessary elements. The 90-day timeline for deploying the first elements of a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation is, thus, a notional target.

The term 'mission start-up' is used to describe the earliest phase of establishing a mission in the field. During mission start-up, the main priority is to bring internal mission processes, structures and services to an initial level of operating capability so that mandate implementation can begin across the mission area.

As shown in Figure 4, the mission start-up process covers several notional stages, even though these may overlap in practice, as follows:

• Pre-deployment is largely a Headquarters responsibility and involves many tasks such as the United Nations budgetary process, pre-deployment visits to TCCs/PCCs to assess readiness, the negotiation of a Status of Mission/Status of Forces Agreements (SOMA/SOFA), the mobilization of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), and the tendering of major supply and service contracts for the mission;

• Rapid deployment involves the deployment of a small advance team to commence the establishment of mission premises and other prerequisite infrastructure and administrative systems, to allow for the reception of larger numbers of staff and contingents as start-up progresses;

• Mission headquarters start-up is the period when the mission leadership team arrives, managerial and command and control systems are formed and increasing numbers of substantive and support personnel begin arriving in-mission to help achieve an IOC. It also involves the establishment of liaison offices and logistics hubs, if required; and

• Functional component and field office start-up occurs alongside the establishment of the central structures of mission headquarters and involves the coordinated establishment of the different substantive civilian, police and military command and managerial capacities. It also involves the start-up of sector headquarters and field offices of the mission.

Figure 4: The Mission Start-Up Process

6.3   Managing the Mission Start-Up Process

Mission start-up can be a fast-paced and seemingly chaotic experience. Small numbers of staff are pitted against time to put in place the foundations of a complex, new mission, often in unknown and volatile operating environments. At the same time, new staff and contingents begin to deploy and begin scoping out initial operations. Mission leaders must also use these early weeks, sometimes referred to as a 'honeymoon period,' to push ahead political progress with the parties so as to sustain the momentum of the peace process. During this critical phase, it is essential that mission leaders and personnel adhere to the basic principles of United Nations peacekeeping, as outlined in Chapter 3 above, and actively seek to establish the mission's legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the parties, the host population and the international community, as a whole.

Effective leadership and strong managerial skills are at a premium during start-up. If basic systems and procedures are not established early on, this can cause compounding confusion as the mission rapidly expands during start-up. If effective and streamlined institutional processes to control the

fragmentation of a large and diverse mission are not installed during the start-up period – such as establishing mission decision-making forums, information sharing and information management protocols, reporting lines, etc. – they will become increasingly difficult to introduce later.

Leadership and conflict management are essential skills for a mission startup manager. Few, if any, of the mission staff will have worked together before. Peacekeeping personnel will come from diverse national and professional backgrounds (including from significantly different civilian, military and police working cultures), which may cause friction in a pressurized start-up environment. Internal tensions must be managed proactively, during the early months, to minimize misunderstandings and avoid resentments that could pollute staff relations over the long-term. Mission leaders must underscore the need for all components to work towards shared objectives under the leadership of a cohesive and collaborative mission leadership team.

Chapter 6 Quiz

For the following set of questions, match the phase of the mission start-up process in the left column with the correct description from the right column.

1. **Pre-deployment**

2. **Rapid deployment**

3. **Mission headquarters start-up**

4. **Functional component and field office start-up**

a. Involves the deployment of a small advance team to commence the establishment of mission premises and other prerequisite infrastructure and administrative systems, to allow for the reception of larger numbers of staff and contingents as start-up progresses.

b. Occurs alongside the establishment of the central structures of mission headquarters and involves the coordinated establishment of the different substantive civilian, police and military command and managerial capacities. It also involves the start-up of sector headquarters and field offices of the mission.

c. Largely a Headquarters responsibility and involves many tasks such as the United Nations budgetary process, pre-deployment visits to TCCs/PCCs to assess readiness, the negotiation of a Status of Mission/Status of Forces Agreements (SOMA/SOFA), the mobilization of Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), and the tendering of major supply and service contracts for the mission.

d. Is the period when the mission leadership team arrives, managerial and command and control systems are formed and increasing numbers of substantive and support personnel begin arriving in-mission to help achieve an IOC. It also involves the establishment of liaison offices and logistics hubs, if required.

5. **In general, the scale and tempo of operations rise steadily during _____, reaching a plateau during _____, and finally tapering off _____.**

6. **During the implementation phase, efforts are primarily focused on:**

a. Drafting initial planning documents for DPKO approval;

b. Carrying out mandated tasks and achieving the objectives set out in the mission plan;

c. Recruiting needed personnel and reaching staffing objectives;

d. Implementing QIPs.

7. **The process of handover, withdrawal, and liquidation begins following a decision by _____.**

8. **The term _____ is used to describe the earliest phase of establishing a mission in the field.**

9. **As identified in this chapter, list some of the essential mission start-up tasks needed to be addressed by mission leaders.**

10. **Internal tensions during the mission start-up process must be managed _____, during the early months, in order to minimize misunderstandings and avoid resentments that could pollute staff relations over the long-term.**

a. Administratively;

b. Proactively;

c. By the TCC/PCC;

d. By DPKO.

ANSWER KEY

1C, 2A, 3D, 4B, 5 initial deployment and start-up; mandate implementation; once hand-over and withdrawal begin, 6B, 7 the Security Council, 8 mission start-up, 9 Some of the tasks include: Adhering to the UN's basic principles, including legitimacy and credibility, Pushing ahead political progress with the parties to maintain momentum of the peace process, Establishing effective institutional processes, and Establishing sector headquarters and field offices, 10B

CHAPTER 7
MANAGING UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

CHAPTER 7

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 7, the student should be able to:

• Understand the relationship and flow of information between United Nations Headquarters and the missions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels;

• Understand the responsibilities of several actors regarding the management of UN Peacekeeping Operations, including the responsibilities of the UN Secretariat, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Head of Mission, and others; and

• List and briefly describe some of the structures found in large integrated missions that facilitate integration between the mission's components.

Introduction

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are complex organizations that undertake challenging missions in environments that can sometimes be hostile. Therefore, arrangements and lines of authority must be established to guide, direct, manage, and control UN Peacekeeping Operations. Integrated Missions involve military, police, and civilian components, each with its own institutional culture and level of authority, but there must be structures in place to coordinate and control these various resources in pursuit of a common goal. These structures and lines of authority and accountability must provide two-way communications that start with the Security Council and connect the Secretary-General, the UN Secretariat (including DPKO and DFS), the Head of Mission in the field, and the various Component Heads deployed in the field.

Alain Le Roy (ninth from left), Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, accompanied by Alan Doss (left), Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Head of the United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), visits the Mugunga II camp of the Internally Displaced Persons to asses the impact of the ongoing unrest. (UN Photo #204837 by Marie Frechon, November 2008)

7.1   The Relationship between Headquarters and the Field

The arrangements established by the United Nations to direct and manage its peacekeeping operations are distinct from those of other organizations, particularly those only deploying a military capability.[1] This is largely due to the fact that United Nations peacekeeping has evolved into a complex, multi-dimensional enterprise, involving personnel from a wide range of nationalities, disciplines and professional cultures pursuing multiple lines of activity.

As depicted in Figure 5, the levels of authority in United Nations peacekeeping operations are not as clear-cut as they are in military organizations. This difference must be noted when the United Nations is working in the field with partner organizations.

Within the United Nations Secretariat, DPKO is responsible for providing United Nations peacekeeping operations with policy guidance and strategic direction, while DFS is responsible for providing logistical and administrative support.

In order to ensure unity of command at the Headquarters level, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support reports to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on all peacekeeping related matters. Standing Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs), located within DPKO and managed by the Office of Operations (OO), bring together, in a formal structure, political, military, police and mission support personnel, supported by other specialist capacities as required, to provide integrated teams to support missions, and to provide integrated policy advice and guidance for senior DPKO and DFS staff. These teams enable delegation of decision-making and increased accountability; and they provide a principal entry point for missions, TCCs/PCCs and partners to engage in the planning and conduct of integrated peacekeeping operations.

In the field, the Head of Mission (HOM) exercises operational authority over the United Nations peacekeeping operation's activities, including military, police and civilian resources. In the case of military personnel provided by Member States, these personnel are placed under the operational control of the United Nations Force Commander or head of military component, but not under United Nations command. However, once assigned under

---

1   See DPKO Policy Directive on Authority, Command and Control for United Nations Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations (2007).

Compression of Levels of Command

Figure 5 illustrates the unique compression of levels of command which characterizes UN field missions. There is no separate operational level of command in the UN structure. This is unlike national or regional command mechanisms (such as NATO or the EU), which usually deploy intermediate operational level headquarters in support of their field operations. In the UN, there is no intermediate level of command between the mission headquarters in the field and UN Headquarters in New York.

While working at the strategic level when in UNHQ (during discussions with the Security Council or the Secretariat), the Head of Mission represents – with his/her Mission Leadership Team – the operational level of command in the field. This has positive implications for the speed of decision-making between the strategic and tactical levels and makes UN operations particularly cost effective in terms of ratios of headquarters' staff to deployed personnel.

Figure 5: Authority, Command and Control in Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations operational control, contingent commanders and their personnel report to the Force Commander and they should not act on national direction, particularly if those actions might adversely affect implementation of the mission mandate or run contrary to United Nations policies applicable to the mission. Member States may withdraw their contributed personnel from the mission through advice to United Nations Headquarters.

In integrated missions, the SRSG/HOM is a civilian who reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at United Nations Headquarters.[2] The SRSG/HOM is given significant delegated authority to set the direction of the mission and to lead its engagement with the political process on the ground. The SRSG/HOM is responsible for coordinating the activities of the entire United Nations system in the field and is assisted in this task by the DSRSG/RC/HC, who is expected to serve as the principal interface with the UNCT.

The SRSG/HOM and his/her deputies form part of a Mission Leadership Team (MLT). The core membership of the MLT is comprised of the heads of the major functional components of the mission. The MLT is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the mission's activities. In the absence of a standing "operational headquarters"

2   For missions of a military nature, the Secretary-General may appoint a Force Commander or Chief Military Observer as Head of Mission.

structure, United Nations Headquarters and the mission headquarters must form a strong and collegial relationship to ensure that the mission can quickly and effectively leverage political support for its operations on the ground. The United Nations Headquarters personnel and the mission's MLT need to play mutually supporting roles, both in developing a political strategy for the mission and in managing the operations and resources to support that strategy.

7.2   The Challenge of Mission Integration and Coordination

Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the United Nations engagement in countries emerging from conflict. The United Nations has the unique ability to employ a mix of civilian, police and military capabilities, under a unified leadership to support a fragile peace process. At the same time, United Nations peacekeeping operations are almost always deployed alongside a variety of external actors, with widely differing mandates, agendas and time horizons. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is thus further compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the United Nations and the range of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflict and post-conflict settings.

In essence, an integrated mission is a strategic partnership between a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT, under the leadership of the SRSG and the DSRSG/RC/HC. The SRSG is "the senior United Nations representative in the country" with "overall authority

This illustration shows the command and control arrangements within a United Nations integrated mission.

René Garcia Préval (centre), President of Haiti, holds a meeting with the members of the Security Council mission to that country, lead by Jorge Urbina, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations. (UN Photo #355013 by Marco Dormino, March 2009)

over all the activities of the United Nations" and is responsible for "ensuring that all the United Nations components in the country pursue a coordinated and coherent approach."[3] The DSRSG/RC/HC is responsible for the coordination of both humanitarian operations and United Nations development operations, and for maintaining links with governments and other parties, donors, and the broader humanitarian and development communities for this purpose.[4]

Ultimately, successful integration and coordination requires a high degree of sensitivity to the interests and operating cultures of three broad sets of actors:

• Mission components

• UNCT members

• External partners

Integration is more than just a matter of bureaucratic reporting lines. Figure 6, below, presents a simplified view of what is, in fact, a highly complex operating environment.

---

3   Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions, Clarifying the Role, Responsibility and Authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordination, 9 December 2005, para. 5.

4   Ibid., para. 18–19.

Integrating the Mission's Components

The various components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation – civilian, police, military and support – come under the direct authority of the SRSG/Head of Mission (HOM) and the MLT. In large integrated missions, the MLT is normally supported by the following structures, which are designed to facilitate integration between the mission's components:

• A Joint Operations Centre (JOC) that collates situation reports and operational information from all mission sources to provide current situational awareness for the mission. The JOC also acts as a crisis coordination hub.[5]

• A Joint Mission Analysis Centre (JMAC) that provides integrated analysis of all-sources of information to assess medium and long-term threats to the mandate and to support MLT decision-making.

• An Integrated Support Service (ISS) that harnesses all logistical resources of the mission.

• A Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) to coordinate the provision of logistical support, in accordance with MLT priorities.

Although the components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation have the same mandate, share a single budget, and depend on the same integrated support services, there are significant cultural differences, both national and professional, within and between them. Many civilian organizations and government departments routinely function with a high degree of tolerance for ambiguity and highly flexible management models. At the same time, military staff tend to seek to minimize ambiguity by making informed assumptions within a strong planning culture. Mission leaders and staff must seek to reconcile these differing "institutional cultures," while being careful not to stifle the cultural diversity that constitutes one of the United Nations main strengths.

---

5   See DPKO Policy Directive on JOCs and JMACs, 1 July 2006. In this context, the term "joint" refers to the internal collaboration required between all mission components to achieve shared objectives under a single leadership team.

Figure 6: The Challenge of Mission Integration

EXTERNAL PARTNERS

UN COUNTRY TEAM

MISSION COMPONENTS

Integrating the United Nations Effort

As discussed in Chapter 5, integrated planning allows the United Nations system to maximize the impact of its engagement in countries emerging from conflict by ensuring that its activities are guided by a common strategic vision. However, integration does not mean that all United Nations actors on the ground should be physically integrated or subsumed under a single structure. Moreover, while the members of the UNCT come under the overall authority of the SRSG/HOM, in reality, they are governed by mandates, decision-making structures and funding arrangements that are quite distinct from those of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. As a result, integration among the members of the broader United Nations family cannot simply be imposed by edict from above, and can only be achieved through a constant process of dialogue and negotiation between the actors concerned.

There is no "one-size-fits-all approach" to achieving integration among United Nations actors in the field. There is a range of implementation modalities through which an integrated mission may pursue common United Nations objectives in its mandated areas of activity. In some areas, for example, human rights or electoral assistance are fully integrated into the mission's activities, and the relevant components of the United Nations peacekeeping operation are usually staffed by personnel drawn from the lead department or agency concerned. Others, such as DDR, see

a looser arrangement driven by joint planning and conduct of programmes by different actors. Alternatively, the delivery of humanitarian assistance is conducted by humanitarian agencies, as a parallel activity, under the coordination of the DSRSG/RC/HC.[6] The United Nations system should decide at the country-level which implementation modalities are best suited to the achievement of its common objectives. To this end, individual United Nations actors may need to revise their respective country programmes, annual work plans, and other frameworks to reflect the new plans that have been developed.

Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the SRSG/HOM, supported by the DSRSG/RC/HC and the other members of the MLT, to define the United Nations system's strategic priorities at the country-level and to ensure that the activities of all United Nations actors contribute to the achievement of the mission's strategic objectives. The SRSG/HOM must always consider the views and concerns of the various constituencies within the mission in order to ensure that, to the extent possible, activities undertaken in one area do not undermine other aspects of the mandate. Senior

---

6   Where the DSRSG/RC/HC is supported by an office of the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), OCHA will normally serve as the humanitarian coordination office. Where appropriate, the OCHA office may remain outside the mission structure to facilitate access by the broader humanitarian community.

mission leaders and staff must ensure that any friction remains manageable and that the United Nations family remains in control of the dynamic, in order to ensure that others do not exploit the differences between United Nations actors. This entails a respect for the diversity of approaches being pursued in a post-conflict context and the need for international strategies to evolve over time along with the peace process.

Two peacekeepers of the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) review their plans for the day at Bhimbar UN Field Station, Pakistan. Their mandate is to be a neutral party in the India and Pakistan situation.
(UN Photo #99350 by Evan Schneider, October 2005)

Coordination with External Partners

The large number of international and national actors implementing activities in post-conflict environments precludes the development of one common plan or strategy, much less one common structure or programme. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the peacekeeping operation to meet regularly and share information with all actors, and to harmonize activities, to the extent possible, by seeking their input into the mission's planning process and to respond actively and substantively to requests for cooperation. Examples of such actors include:

- Bilateral and multilateral donors, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as NGOs or contractors working for donors;

- Non-United Nations led military formations deployed nationally, under the aegis of a regional organization or as part of an ad hoc coalition;

- The diplomatic corps and other regional or international political actors;

- The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other components of the International Movement, as well as other independent humanitarian actors, such as humanitarian NGOs.

These actors normally pursue independent agendas, which may or may not coincide with the strategic priorities identified by the peacekeeping operation. Some may be operating according to widely different timelines and work methods, or they may simply not be capable of engaging in intensive cooperation due to the periodic nature of their engagement in the country. In these circumstances, proactive sharing of information by the mission is still important, even if the intensity of cooperation is limited.

Humanitarian actors, such as the ICRC, have as an institutional imperative to maintain a high level of visible independence from political-military structures to ensure the safety and feasibility of their actions and personnel. United Nations peacekeepers must be cognizant of the concept of "humanitarian space," which can be understood as the space created through respect for the humanitarian principles of independence and neutrality. It is in this space that humanitarian action takes place. As such, a clear distinction must be made between politically motivated actions to end conflict and move toward national development, and apolitical humanitarian assistance based exclusively on impartial response to assessed need, aimed at saving lives, alleviating suffering and maintaining or restoring the dignity of people affected by conflict. Maintaining this distinction better assures humanitarian agencies safe and secure access throughout a conflict zone.

It is incumbent upon the peacekeeping operation to regularly meet and share information with all actors and, to the extent possible, harmonize activities by seeking their input into the mission's planning process. This includes the sharing of

non-operationally sensitive geospatial data. The mission may also be requested to assist with large-scale humanitarian responses in extremis. For this eventuality, the MLT, through the DSRSG/HC/RC, should seek to establish effective information sharing and coordination mechanisms to ensure maximum coherence and to prevent any adverse impact on humanitarian and development operations. Due to the high turnover of some mission personnel, coordination arrangements and induction programmes should be designed to minimize the burden on partner organizations.

Alain Le Roy (left), Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, shakes hands with one of the national police officers during a five-day visit of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti. (UN Photo #316006 by Marco Dormino, January 2009)

Conceptual Models of Integration in UN Peace Operations

In more hostile environments, where there is not universal consent and there is an associated need to use more force, the issue of humanitarian space affects the levels of integration achievable between the mission and the humanitarian actors. This diagram illustrates the options considered by OCHA.

Chapter 7 Quiz

For the following set of questions, match the structure from the left column to the function in the right column.

1. **Joint Operations Centre**

2. **Joint Mission Analysis Centre**

3. **Integrated Support Service**

4. **Joint Logistics Operations Centre**

a. Provides integrated analysis of all sources of information to assess medium- and long-term threats to the mandate and to support MLT decision-making.

b. Harnesses all logistical resources of the mission.

c. Collates situation reports and operational information from all mission sources to provide current situational awareness for the mission. Also acts as a crisis coordination hub.

d. Coordinate the provision of logistical support, in accordance with MLT priorities.

5. **Within the United Nations Secretariat, the Department of _____ is responsible for providing United Nations peacekeeping operations with policy guidance and strategic direction, while the Department of _____ is responsible for providing logistical and administrative support.**

6. **The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support reports to the _____ on all peacekeeping related matters.**
a. President of the Security Council
b. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs
c. Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations
d. Deputy Secretary-General

7. **In the field, the _____ exercises operational authority over the United Nations peacekeeping operation's activities, including military, police, and civilian resources.**
a. Military Adviser to the Secretary-General
b. USG for Peacekeeping
c. President of the Security Council
d. Head of Mission

8. **While serving on a UN Mission, military personnel provided by Member States are placed under the operational control of the _____.**

9. **Despite TCCs retaining full command of their troops assigned to UN operational control for peacekeeping, contingent commanders and their personnel, once assigned, report to the _____.**

10. **Successful integration and coordination of a UN mission requires a high degree of sensitivity to the interests and operating cultures of three broad sets of international actors. Please list them.**

11. **Briefly discuss the institutional cultural differences that might be expected between civilian and uniformed staff on a UN Mission.**

CHAPTER 8
SUPPORTING AND SUSTAINING UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 8, the student should be able to:

• Understand the roles and functions the United Nations Department of Field Support plays in support of missions;

• Understand the challenges associated with Human Resources Management at field missions; and

• Understand the challenges and responsibilities relevant to the security of personnel serving on United Nations peacekeeping missions.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www.peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/369/lesson-8*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

United Nations field operations constitute a large and far-flung network of sophisticated and complex organizations – peacekeeping missions and others – operating under very difficult circumstances. The number of operations and personnel deployed on these operations will vary over time with the opening and closing of missions, but since 2002 there have been between 50,000 and 100,000 military, police, and civilian personnel deployed at any one time across 25 to 32 operations. It is no small task to support this large a population deployed at any one time, but the responsibility falls to the United Nations Department of Field Support (DFS).

Logistical support of UN Missions requires the coordination of delivery mechanisms. This photo shows offloading of a UN cargo airplane at the UN Mission in Sudan. (UN Photo #171017 by Tim McKulka, March 2008)

8.1   United Nations Logistics and Administration

As discussed in Chapter 2, United Nations peacekeeping operations have evolved to encompass a wide range of mandated tasks. The administrative, logistical and other specialized support arrangements for United Nations peacekeeping operations are crucial for the effective implementation of these tasks. The relationship between the military, police, substantive civilian and support components of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is, therefore, of crucial importance.

At the United Nations Headquarters level, DFS is responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including personnel, finance, field procurement, logistical, communications, information technology, and other administrative and general management issues. In the field, the support component of a United Nations peacekeeping operation provides administrative and logistic support services that enable the mission to carry out its core functions in an effective, coordinated and timely manner, consistent with the regulations and procedures prescribed by the United Nations.

Mission assets are distributed to all mission components on an equitable basis, depending on functional need and assessed priorities. Delivering common support services is part of the administrative functions of a United Nations

peacekeeping operation and falls under the responsibility of the Director of Mission Support (DMS) or Chief of Mission Support (CMS). The DMS/CMS reports directly to the SRSG/HOM. The DMS/CMS has up-to-date information on the status of all resources available within the mission, and direct access to all available means of acquiring items.

United Nations peacekeeping operations are often deployed in environments which are both volatile and unpredictable, and where host nation infrastructure is minimal or severely degraded. Within this challenging operating environment, United Nations peacekeeping operations undertake a broad spectrum of civilian and military tasks, which may need to be sustained over several years. Moreover, an operation may be required to switch to a more robust posture and back again at various points in a mission's lifecycle and may need to switch the emphasis of operations between different components of the mission, for example, to support a DDR programme, an election or a security operation.

A mission support element which is flexible enough to adapt quickly to changing circumstances on the ground allows for greater internal capacity to respond to the mission's substantive operations. This requires good logistic planning, communication and resourcing, and close

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) aid workers load emergency shelter supplies on the trucks for distribution to the survivors of the cyclone "Nargis", across the Mae Sot northwestern border between Thailand and Myanmar. (UN Photo #177787 by UNHCR, May 2008)

integration between the uniformed and support components of a mission. Most of all, it requires strong integrated planning and priority setting among the mission's leadership team. It also requires flexibility in the management of mission assets by the mission's support element.

The logistic and administrative support for United Nations operations is more complex than many other logistical support models. This complexity is due to the requirement to support contingents deploying with widely varying levels of self-sufficiency, and the differing requirements between military contingents, civilian staff, police and military observers. United Nations operations are also subject to financial accountability procedures which do not align operational responsibility with budgetary accountability. Accordingly, the system of United Nations logistics is not well designed to support high-tempo, short-notice military operations. This helps define a point beyond which a United Nations peacekeeping operation is not able to escalate.

United Nations peacekeeping operations function through a mix of civilian contracted services procured by the United Nations and military support capabilities, provided through 'lease' arrangements between the United Nations and contributing Member States.[1] When formed military units are

1 Generally, contingents arrive with between

deployed to a mission, the logistic support concept is based on the integration of United Nations-provided and contingent-provided resources to support all components of the mission. All of a mission's support resources are managed jointly through an integrated civilian and military logistics support service and a common administrative system throughout all United Nations missions.

The consolidation and integration function of integrated support services is focused in a JLOC, which is staffed by military and civilian logistics personnel and coordinates the logistical needs of all mission components. The JLOC often becomes a focal point for cooperation and mutual assistance on logistical issues between the United Nations peacekeeping operations, other agencies and NGOs.

Mission support elements must comply with strict rules and regulations and are sometimes criticized for not being responsive enough to operational requirements, especially during crises.

30–90 days of supplies to maintain self-sufficiency. During that period, the United Nations enters into service contracts to provide the bulk supplies of a mission, such as water, rations, laundry, waste disposal and some transport services. Contingents bringing their own equipment are paid for the lease of this equipment by the United Nations, based on agreed reimbursement rates.

Financial accountability controls for United Nations peacekeeping are essential, and demanded by the Member States. Yet, for the system to work effectively in support of the mission leadership, they need to be balanced with operational principles of flexibility and responsiveness, and administered with a view to effective risk management.

8.2   Human Resource Management

Attracting and retaining qualified personnel is a critical support function in United Nations peacekeeping operations. As stated in Article 101 of the Charter, securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity is the paramount consideration in the employment of United Nations staff and the determination of conditions of service. The international and national staff and uniformed personnel of a United Nations peacekeeping operation are its most valuable assets and must be managed carefully. Being a United Nations peacekeeper requires extraordinary professionalism, dedication and self-restraint. The vast majority of the women and men serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations around the world do, indeed, possess these rare qualities. Yet, recent experience has shown that the actions of a minority who do not possess such qualities can result in irreparable damage to the reputation of the mission and the United Nations, as a whole.

Given the difficult environments in which many United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed, turnover rates for international personnel can be high. The conditions of service in many United Nations peacekeeping operations make it extremely difficult to attract qualified and experienced personnel. In the field, the provision of adequate welfare arrangements for both uniformed and civilian personnel is not only crucial for maintaining morale, but is also a key tool for preventing the instances of gross misconduct that have marred the United Nations peacekeeping record. Missions should make an effort to establish welfare committees and provide recreational facilities for peacekeeping personnel, within their existing resources. In particular, the civilian and military leadership within the mission must make an effort to ensure that funds allocated by TCCs/PCCs for the welfare of uniformed personnel actually

reach their intended beneficiaries and that the welfare needs of civilian staff, which are often neglected, are also addressed.

Individual personalities are a major factor in any United Nations peacekeeping operation. Even when the necessary coordination mechanisms and processes are in place, it is vital to ensure that key positions are filled by the right individuals with the right skill-sets. Ultimately, it is the example and guidance provided by the senior leadership of a United Nations peacekeeping operation that will unite the components and ensure that the United Nations system is working as a team.

The selection of senior mission leaders must be a carefully considered process. Mutual respect and the ability to transcend "turf" issues are essential qualities for the successful management and integration of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations. Education and training are vital to ensuring that the appointment of senior mission leaders is not a "lottery." Prior to assuming their functions, senior mission leaders should be given adequate training and preparation on the challenges that they are likely to face in the field. All personnel in leadership positions should exemplify the highest standards and should be held accountable for their behaviour and performance. If not performing up to expectations, they should be counselled and, if necessary, removed from the mission.

Susana Malcorra (centre), Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, is greeted by United Nations honour guard as she arrives at the headquarters of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in El Fasher, Sudan. (UN Photo #496763 byAlbert Gonzalez Farran, November 2011)

8.3   Security of Personnel

The primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and assets rests with the host government. This responsibility flows from the government's inherent function of maintaining law and order, protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction, as well as from the special responsibility enshrined in the Charter.[2]

The Designated Official (DO), usually the senior-most United Nations official in a country, is responsible for the security of United Nations staff. When appointed DO, the SRSG/HOM is accountable to the Secretary-General (through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security) for the security of all civilian personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized departments throughout the country or designated area. The DO is supported by the Chief Security Adviser (CSA), Department of Safety and Security (DSS), and the Security Management Team (SMT), which oversees United Nations security arrangements in country. The SMT's composition and standing operating procedures are articulated in the DSS Field Security Handbook.

While the safety and security of staff and facilities is largely situation specific, some key standards have been developed, such as the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS). These standards are established, implemented and monitored at the direction of the CSA and the DO. These standards apply to both international and national staff. While uniformed personnel do not fall under the United Nations security

_____

2   Under Article 105 of the Charter, the United Nations is entitled to enjoy such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes. Additional diplomatic privileges are accorded to United Nations staff members and premises in times of international crisis, by the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the Specialised Agencies and, more explicitly, by the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated personnel, which obligates all signatories to ensure the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel deployed in their territory.

management system, the heads of the military and police component should work closely with the CSA to ensure that the best possible security arrangements are put in place for all personnel. To this end, the respective heads of component will determine the best balance between operational necessity and the security of uniformed personnel. The heads of the military and police components are accountable to the HoM for the security of uniformed personnel.

Security in Practical Terms

Systems developed between government, community, and the individual to ensure personal security and safety in the more stable environment of a sending state are no longer applicable in the unfamiliar and likely unstable environment of a peacekeeping mission.

In peacekeeping missions, the host governments are primarily responsible for UN personnel within its borders and airspace, as part of legal agreements with the UN organization (e.g., the SOFA) and also as an implicit responsibility of Member States in the UN Charter. The UN's Security Management System is designed to reinforce this responsibility where host nation capacity is weak or does not exist.

However, peacekeepers must not loose sight of their own responsibilities for their personal security. It is insufficient to rely on expectations and ideals or to apply standards from a different system, place, culture, or time. Peacekeepers must accept radical change and firmly take on increased personal responsibility and vigilance for their own security and safety in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments.

The full DSS Field Security Handbook may be downloaded from *http://www. peaceopstraining.org/resources*.

Chapter 8 Quiz

1. At the United Nations Headquarters level, the _____ is responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations.

2. Delivering common support services is part of the administrative functions of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and falls under the responsibility of the _____ or _____.

3. A mission support element has to be flexible in order to adapt quickly to changing circumstances on the ground in support of the mission's substantive operations. List some of the capabilities needed to provide this flexibility.

4. Why is it that the logistic and administrative support for UN operations is more complex than many other logistical support models?

5. The consolidation and integration function of integrated support services is focused in a Joint _____, which is staffed by military and civilian logistics personnel and coordinates the logistical needs of all mission components.

6. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and assets rests with _____.

7. The senior-most person who is responsible for the security of UN staff is called the _____.

8. What is the name of the security standards that have been developed and are established, implemented, and monitored at the direction of the CSA and the DO?

a. ATP1A;

b. The Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS);

c. The Unit Security Plan (USP);

d. The Standard Training Modules (STMs).

ANSWER KEY

1 Department of Field Support (DFS), 2 Director of Mission Support (DMS); Chief of Mission Support (CMS), 3 Flexibility requires: (1) Good logistic planning, communication and resourcing, and close integration and understanding between the substantive and support components of a mission; (2) Strong integrated planning and priority setting among the mission's leadership team; and (3) A strong, supportive ethos within the management of the mission's support element, 4 There are many reasons, but the complexity is due to the requirement to support multinational contingents deploying with widely varying levels of self-sufficiency, as well as the differing requirements between military contingents, civilian staff, police, and military observers. UN operations are also subject to financial accountability procedures which do not align operational responsibility with budgetary accountability. Accordingly, the system of UN logistics is not well designed to support high-tempo, short-notice military operations. This helps define a point beyond which a UN peacekeeping operation is not able to escalate, 5 [Joint] Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC), 6 The host government, 7 Designated Official (DO), 8B

CHAPTER 9
MAINTAINING SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION

CHAPTER 9

9.1 Managing Mission Impact

9.2 Communications and Outreach

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 9, the student should be able to:

• Explain why it is important to consider how a United Nations peacekeeping mission will be perceived in the host country and community;

• Explain why it is important for peacekeepers to be mindful of the unforeseen consequences of their actions; and

• Understand how effective communications and outreach can enhance the mission's ability to achieve its mandate.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www.peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/370/lesson-9*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

United Nations peacekeeping missions exist within the context of the political environments of the host country, and the realistic management of public awareness and public perceptions about the mission are essential for the maintenance of consent for the mission, as well as the achievement of the mission's success. The existence of the UN mission and the presence of mission military, police, and civilian personnel can have profound social, economic, and environmental impacts – both positive and negative. Perceptions of the mission will be impacted by the culture and traditions of the local population. Mission personnel must be cognizant of the unintended consequences of their presence, behaviour, and actions, which, if not managed appropriately, can affect the legitimacy of the mission.

Public communications and mission outreach should not be left to chance. Effective public information is a political and operational necessity. It is important that the mission staff ensure that the mandate and objectives of the mission are fully understood by the host population and other key actors.

9.1 Managing Mission Impact

United Nations peacekeeping operations must be aware of and proactively manage their impact, both real and perceived, in the host country and community. United Nations peacekeeping operations are highly visible and generate high expectations. Accordingly, United Nations peacekeeping personnel should be careful to mitigate the possible negative consequences of the mission's presence. United Nations peacekeeping personnel must adhere to national laws, where these do not violate fundamental human rights standards, respect local culture, and maintain the highest standards of personal and professional conduct.

Personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations should be alert to any potential, unforeseen or damaging consequences of their actions and manage these as quickly and effectively as possible. Poor driving and vehicle

accidents and lax waste management practices are just some of the negative impacts that may seriously undermine the perceived legitimacy and credibility of a mission, and erode its popular support. The size of a United Nations peacekeeping operation's human and material footprint is likely to have a direct bearing on its impact, or perceived impact, in the community. Missions should be aware of the possible side effects they may generate, including:

• Social impact (for example, in the conduct and behaviour of staff);

• Economic impact (for example, on housing and staple foods and materials);

• Environmental impact (for example, waste management or water usage).

Military personnel of the Chinese engineering company of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) operate a tractor to rehabilitate a 1.8 kilometer long road to allow greater access to the Ruzizi One Dam Power Plant, the only source of electricity for the east of the country.
(UN Photo #185627 by Marie Frechon, April 2008)

Social impacts such as different cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs may create friction (e.g.: employment of women in non-traditional gender roles, mixing and socialization amongst genders, drinking, gambling, inappropriate behaviour, etc.). United Nations peacekeeping operations also have a major impact on the host economy, by pushing up the price of local housing and accommodation, or placing demands on local producers for staple foods and

materials, placing such items out of reach of the local community. All of these have the potential for creating friction and discontent within the local population and they should be continuously monitored and managed by the mission's leadership.

In assessing mission impact and devising strategies to address it, the mission should be careful to ensure that the differential impacts on men and women, as well as children and vulnerable groups, are considered. Although no mission can control all of the side effects of its presence, it must undertake due diligence in managing its own impact. Where problems do arise, they should be addressed swiftly and honestly. At the same time, rumours and vexatious or erroneous accusations against the mission must be countered with vigour to maintain the good reputation of the international presence.

Students who wish to learn more about the possible social, economic, and environmental impacts of UN Peacekeeping Missions are referred to *Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations* by United Nations University, Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric De Coning, and Ramesh Thakur.

9.2   Communications and Outreach

Effective public information is a political and operational necessity. Its overall objective in United Nations peacekeeping operations is to enhance the ability of the mission to carry out its mandate successfully. Key strategic goals are to maintain the cooperation of the parties to the peace process, manage expectations and garner support for the operation among the local population, and secure broad international support, especially among TCCs/PCCs and major donors. Public information should be thoroughly integrated into a United Nations peacekeeping operation at all stages of planning and deployment. The mission's Chief of Public Information should be a key actor in the senior leadership's decision-making process.

Electrical technicians of the Communications Information Technology Section of the United Nations Mission in Liberia works on the radio tower in the Bomi County. (UN Photo #325801 by Christopher Herwig, February 2009)

From the moment a peacekeeping operation is authorized, the United Nations must be able to ensure that the mandate and objectives of the mission are fully understood by the host population and other key actors. Consideration of the role that public information will play in the future peacekeeping operation, as well as the structures and resources that will be required to support that role, must begin at the earliest possible stage. A public information assessment gauging the most effective ways of reaching the population should, thus, be conducted prior to the launch of any field mission.

Effective communications and outreach will enhance the mission's ability to achieve its mandate and contribute to the security of mission personnel. A well designed and skilfully implemented communications strategy will increase confidence in the peace process, build trust among parties to a conflict, and generate support for

national reconciliation. It will establish the mission as a trusted source of information and help counter the negative effects of irresponsible, hostile and controlled media. If the parameters of United Nations activity are clearly laid out and explained to the local population and other target audiences, fear and misunderstanding will be minimized, disinformation will be corrected, and the impact of those who wish to damage the peace process through rumour and untruth will be minimized. In addition, mission public information activities should be geared towards helping establish an environment that promotes the development of free and independent media, and the adherence to the highest journalistic ethics and standards.

The mission's public information campaign provides an opportunity to reach out to key groups within society, whose voices may not otherwise be heard, and to promote consensus around the peace process. Use should be made of local public radio and television, if available, as well as traditional forms of public information dissemination, such as the local community and religious groups. Where no local dissemination capacity exists, a United Nations capability should be deployed at the earliest stages, while helping concurrently to build local capacities.

The Role of Public Information: To Inform, To Influence, and To Protect

- Informs and builds public support for the peacekeeping mandate and the peace process and, thereby, contributes to consent;

- Informs mission personnel, UNHQ, donor governments, and TCCs/PCCs of the mission's progress;

- Influences target audiences by designing and implementing communications strategies in support of the mission's mandated tasks; and

- Protects the image of the mission by managing media relations.

Adolf Ogi (centre), Special Adviser of the UN Secretary-General on Sport for Development and Peace, leads a 3,000-metre run, with participants from all of Liberia's 15 counties, to mark the start of the 'Sport for Peace' soccer tournament that began with the lighting of an Olympic-style torch, in Monrovia, Liberia. (UN Photo #140231 by Eric Kanalstein, March 2007)

Chapter 9 Quiz

1. **When deployed, UN peacekeeping operations are highly visible and generate high expectations both within the local population and the international community. Therefore, it is important that peacekeeping operations:**

a. Endeavour to implement their mandate as quickly as possible;

b. Proactively manage their impact in the host country and community;

c. Try to control and manage local infrastructure;

d. Create a dependence of the local population on the UN mission.

2. **Effective public information on a UN peacekeeping mission is a political and operational necessity. Which of the following is considered a key strategic goal of public information within a mission?**

a. Creating a situation of instability for spoilers;

b. Managing expectations and garnering support for the operation among the local population;

c. Building a network of support for any and all future UN missions in the region;

d. Establishing the UN as a vital part of the host country's political system.

3. **List three of the possible causes of social impacts and frictions that may arise due to differences between cultural norms of mission staff and host country customs.**

4. **Effective communications and outreach will enhance the mission's ability to achieve its mandate and contribute to the security of mission personnel. A well designed and skilfully implemented communications strategy is principally designed to do which of the following?**

a. Provide the mission with a revenue source as it sells advertising opportunities to local businesses;

b. Provide mission HQ with an easily available means of communicating with mission personnel;

c. Serve as a morale booster as it provides mission staff with news and entertainment from their home countries;

d. Increase confidence in the peace process and generate support for national reconciliation.

For the following set of questions, match the mission impact from the left column to the example in the right column.

5. **Social impact**

a. Waste management or water usage

6. **Economic impact**

b. The conduct and behaviour of staff

7. **Environmental impact**

c. Housing and staple foods and materials

ANSWER KEY

1B This question speaks to the principle of national ownership while attempting to manage public expectations and respect cultural sensitivities, 2B, 3 There are many, and all, if ignored, contribute to the perceived loss of legitimacy of the mission. Examples might include: insensitive mixing and socialization amongst genders; public drinking and gambling; acts of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and other forms of serious misconduct; arrogant and reckless driving; price inflation; and the cornering of markets for scare products to the detriment of the local community, 4D The answer to this question lies within the key roles of public information to inform, influence, and protect, 5B, 6C, 7A

CHAPTER 10
TRANSITION AND EXIT

CHAPTER 10

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

After studying Chapter 10, the student should be able to:

- Recognize the multiple non-United Nations actors in peace operations;

- Understand the process of evaluating a mission for conclusion and determining whether to transition the responsibilities of peacekeeping to other actors;

- Understand the growing involvement of regional agencies and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security;

- Understand the difficulties and challenges associated with the hand-over or conclusion of a mission; and

- List and discuss some of the benchmarks that might be considered when determining if the process of peace consolidation is sufficiently advanced to allow for the termination or hand-over of mission responsibilities.

To view a video introduction of this chapter by the course author General Robert Gordon, you can either log in to your virtual classroom, go to *www. peaceopstraining.org/users/media_page/371/ lesson-10*, or use your mobile device to scan the QR code to the left.

Introduction

The United Nations is often called upon to solve long-standing and intractable problems, but United Nations peacekeeping missions are never intended ab initio to be permanent or even long-lasting operations. Contemporary peacekeeping missions are a multidimensional response to a range of social, political, and economic problems, which all contribute to undermining security. While attempting to tackle the broad range of problems in a holistic way, the principle role of a UN peacekeeping mission has been achieved once it has consolidated the conditions for a secure and stable environment. The identification of these conditions and the decision for a subsequent drawdown of a mission require dialogue and consensus between the mission, the host nation, and UNHQ.

UN peacekeeping is no longer the only instrument for addressing issues of international peace and security. Increasingly, this has become the business of regional organizations who partner with the United Nations in a variety of ways, creating new opportunities for combining the capabilities of both UN and non-UN actors to manage complex crises. The management of these partnerships require a mutual understanding and good planning, especially during transition.

10.1 Partnerships and Transition Planning

No single organization can presently conduct all of the multifaceted tasks required to support and consolidate peace processes. Partnerships are thus indispensable to the success of the international community's efforts in post-conflict settings. Chapter 5 and 7 have provided guidance on how to manage the relationship with partners in the planning and conduct of ongoing operations. This chapter focuses on two important aspects of partnership: the transition from other security actors to a United Nations peacekeeping operation; and the hand-over of responsibilities from a United Nations peacekeeping operation to United Nations system partners and others, as it prepares to withdraw.

The United Nations is no longer the only actor conducting peace operations. The number of peace operations mounted by non-United Nations actors doubled between 1988 and 2008. The African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have all mounted major operations of their own (in most cases with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council); and they are making concerted efforts to increase their capacities in this area.

General Martin Luther Agwai, Force Commander of the United Nations/ African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), shakes hands with the Commander of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) Unity faction. (UN Photo #171413 by Albany Associates, March 2008)

The growing involvement of regional agencies and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter, has created new opportunities for combining the capabilities of United Nations and non-United Nations actors to manage complex crises. In several instances, troops and police deployed as part of a regional organization-led peace operation have been "re-hatted" upon the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. In some cases, United Nations peacekeeping operations consisting only of civilian and/or police personnel have been deployed alongside forces under the command of a regional organization. The Security Council

has also authorized the deployment of a "hybrid" peacekeeping operation, in which elements from the United Nations and a regional organization are deployed as part of the same mission under joint leadership. Although cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the area of peace and security has tended to occur on an ad hoc basis and is often dictated by political expediency, new more systematic partnerships are emerging.[1]

In circumstances where a United Nations peacekeeping operation is required to assume responsibility from a non-United Nations led peace operation, an effort should be made to develop a mutually agreed joint transition plan outlining the modalities, steps and timeframe for achieving transition and the assumption of United Nations responsibility. In addition to detailing when and how responsibilities will be transferred, such a plan should spell out any implications for the UNCT and other partners, in order to ensure consistency of approach and timing with the overall mission planning process. Emphasis should be placed on security and how to ensure maximum stability at a moment of potential weakness, including as a result of any mismatch in capabilities and tasks.

From left to right: United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONUCI) Force Commander, General Fernand Amoussou, FAFN Chief of Staff, General Soumaila Bakayoko, FDS Chief of Staff, General Philippe Mangou and Licorne Commander, General Antoine Lecerf, signing on the withdrawal of the Impartial Forces from the Zone of Confidence. (UN Photo #142758 by Ky Chung, April 2007)

---

1   The Joint Declaration on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management was signed in September 2003.

10.2   Hand-Over and Withdrawal

The United Nations engagement in a country which is emerging from conflict rarely begins with the deployment of a peacekeeping operation and is likely to continue long after its withdrawal. In most cases, the UNCT will have been on the ground long before the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation and will be responsible for supporting the process of long-term recovery once the peacekeeping operation has withdrawn. In some instances, a United Nations peacekeeping operation may be preceded by or deployed alongside a United Nations special political mission or peace-building support office. Some United Nations peacekeeping operations have also been succeeded by integrated offices, headed by an Executive Representative of the Secretary-General (ERSG).[2]

Ultimately, it is the prerogative of the Security Council to decide whether a United Nations peacekeeping operation should hand-over responsibility to another United Nations body or non-United Nations entity, and withdraw. Nevertheless, the Secretariat and the United Nations peacekeeping operation have a responsibility to ensure that the Security Council's decision is based on an honest assessment of real progress made towards the achievement of a sustainable peace.

As discussed in Chapter 2, traditional United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed as an interim measure to help manage a conflict and create conditions in which the negotiation of a lasting settlement can proceed. A traditional United Nations peacekeeping operation can be said to have successfully completed its mandate once the states concerned have arrived at a mutually agreed settlement to their conflict. Since they have little direct involvement in diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, some traditional peacekeeping operations are deployed for decades, due to the absence of a lasting political settlement between the parties.

---

2   Integrated offices consist of the members of the UNCT and may be augmented by the presence of military and police specialists.

Determining whether a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping deployed in the aftermath of a violent internal conflict has successfully completed its mandate is far more challenging given the number of complex variables involved. Experience has shown that a domestic peace is truly sustainable when the warring parties are able to move their struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where disputes can be settled peacefully. The deployment of troops and police must be accompanied by efforts to restore the State's monopoly over the legitimate use of force; re-establish the rule of law and strengthen respect for human rights; foster the emergence of legitimate and effective institutions of governance; and promote socio-economic recovery. The decision to shift the focus of the United Nations engagement from stabilization to longer-term peacebuilding must, therefore, take into account the degree of progress made in each of these critical areas.

The transition from a United Nations peacekeeping operation to subsequent phases of United Nations engagement should be factored into the planning process from the outset, with a view to clearly delineating the roles and responsibilities of the various United Nations actors on the ground. Reliable benchmarks and indicators are required to determine when the United Nations peacekeeping operation can begin the process of hand-over and withdrawal, without jeopardizing ongoing efforts to consolidate the peace.

There is no standard "check-list" of benchmarks applicable to all situations. The specific benchmarks used will differ from situation to situation, depending on the underlying causes of the conflict and the dynamics at play. They must be developed in close collaboration with the rest of the United Nations system, the national authorities, civil society, and other relevant stakeholders, taking into account the United Nations longer-term strategic goals.

Care must be taken to identify appropriate benchmarks that reflect real progress towards the consolidation of peace in the country. Indicators should not simply be measurements of international community inputs to a peace process, which may present an incomplete picture. Examples of key benchmarks that may be used to determine at

Two inmates of the Becora jail learn carpentry skills under the Justice Prison Project of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in collaboration with the National Prison Service of the government of Timor-Leste. (UN Photo #290932 by Martine Perret, January 2009)

which point the process of peace consolidation is sufficiently advanced to allow for the hand-over of certain mission responsibilities include the following:

- The absence of violent conflict and large-scale human rights abuses, and respect for women's and minority rights;

- Completion of the DDR of former combatants (male and female, adults and children) and progress in restoring or establishing responsible state institutions for security;

- The ability of the national armed forces and the national police to provide security and maintain public order with civilian oversight and respect for human rights;

- Progress towards the establishment of an independent and effective judiciary and corrections system;

- The restoration of State authority and the resumption of basic services throughout the country;

- The return or resettlement and reintegration of displaced persons with minimal internal disruption or conflict in the areas of return or resettlement; and

- The successful formation of legitimate political institutions following the holding of free and fair elections where women and men have equal rights to vote and seek political office.

Wherever possible, benchmarks should be established through dialogue with national interlocutors. The mission should seek multiple sources of validation regarding this progress and should not shy away from reporting on a deteriorating situation. In this respect, United Nations peacekeeping operations should resist the temptation to report overly optimistic assessments of progress against key benchmarks.

Depending on the evolving situation, it may be appropriate for the benchmarks to be amended over time. Whatever the benchmarks adopted, they should be regarded as interim objectives in the broader effort to build a self-sustaining peace, the realization of which will allow the international community to progressively shift the focus of its post-conflict assistance from stabilization to long-term peacebuilding and economic recovery.

The withdrawal of a United Nations peacekeeping operation should be planned and conducted in close consultation with all relevant partners and national stakeholders, to ensure minimal disruption of international programmes as a result of the mission's departure, and to minimize the impact on the host population and environment. As a final contribution to the institutional learning process, it is important that an effort be made to capture any remaining lessons learned at the end of the mission by conducting After Action Reviews (AARs) and/or End of Assignment Reports (EoARs)[3] that may benefit those responsible for the planning and conduct of future United Nations peacekeeping operations.

A convoy of trucks, provided by the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the International Organization for Migration, transports the internally displaced families to their homes under the security watch of the United Nations Police, the Formed Police Units of Portugal and Pakistan, and the National Police of Timor-Leste. (UN Photo #172813 by Martine Perret, March 2008)

---

3   After Action Reviews (AARs) and End of Assignment Reports (EoARs) are tools developed by DPKO to facilitate the capturing and sharing of lessons learned from the field.

Chapter 10 Quiz

1. **Which of the following statements best reflects why partnerships are indispensable to the success of the international community's efforts in post-conflict settings?**
   a. The United Nations is required by international law to integrate the contributions of other organizations;
   b. No single organization can presently conduct all of the multifaceted tasks required to support and consolidate peace processes;
   c. The inclusion of non-UN organizations adds a sense of legitimacy to a mission;
   d. The United Nations does not want to be perceived as monopolizing international efforts.

2. **Between 1998 and 2008, the number of peace operations mounted by non-UN actors:**
   a. Decreased;
   b. Remained constant;
   c. Doubled;
   d. Tripled.

3. **List four of the non-UN actors that have mounted major operations of their own since 1998, often with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council.**

4. **The growing involvement of regional agencies and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter, has created:**
   a. A need to revise Chapter VIII to identify relationships more clearly;
   b. New opportunities for combining the capabilities of UN and non-UN actors to manage complex crises;
   c. A need to revise International Law;
   d. A need to revise the Geneva Convention.

5. **What is a hybrid peacekeeping operation?**

6. **In circumstances where a United Nations peacekeeping operation is required to assume responsibility from a non-UN-led peace operation, an effort should be made to develop a mutually agreed joint transition plan. This transition plan should include:**
   a. When and how responsibilities will be transferred;
   b. Implications for the UNCT and other partners, in order to ensure consistency of approach and timing with the overall mission planning process;
   c. Security measures and how to ensure maximum stability at a moment of potential weakness, including as a result of any mismatch in capabilities and tasks;
   d. All of the above.

7. **Ultimately, it is the prerogative of the _____ to decide whether a United Nations peacekeeping operation should hand over responsibility to another United Nations body or non-UN entity and withdraw.**

8. **When can a traditional United Nations peacekeeping operation be said to have successfully completed its mandate?**

9. **List three examples of common benchmarks that may be used to determine at which point the process of peace consolidation is sufficiently advanced to allow for the hand-over of certain mission responsibilities.**

REFERENCE DOCUMENTS

ANNEXES 1 AND 2 are reproduced here as part of the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* text.

THE SUBSEQUENT APPENDICES contain materials referenced in the content of the course. They have been reproduced here for the student's convenience.

APPENDICES K AND L are excerpts from chapters published in *Principles for the Conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSO)*, a course previously offered by the Peace Operations Training Institute. These appendices depart from the overarching principles of planning and management presented in DPKO's doctrine and, instead, focus on the specifics of peacekeeping in the field. While these documents provide information on specific behavioural procedures, they cannot give the student detailed instructions for every situation. Instead, they suggest perspectives and provide general guidelines that might be applied in a variety of circumstances.

Annex 1: United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrine Framework

United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrine Framework

As shown in the diagram below, the United Nations peacekeeping doctrine framework is currently divided into six major guidance "series" (1000–6000), which provide basic reference codes for the organization and management of internal DPKO/DFS policy and guidance materials. Each series is further subdivided into specific thematic and/or functional areas.

DPKO/DFS Policy and Guidance Index

1000-Series: Capstone Doctrine

The 1000-series covers the basic principles and key concepts underpinning the planning and conduct of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as their core functions and the main factors affecting their success. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines sits at the highest level in the 1000-series. 1000-series guidance also includes the Handbook on United Nations Multi-dimensional Peacekeeping Operations. All subordinate guidance must be consistent with the principles and concepts set out in the 1000-series.

2000-Series: Headquarters Support to Operations

The 2000-series contains guidance on DPKO/DFS headquarters roles, responsibilities and functions in support of field missions. Specific areas covered in the 2000-series include: command and control and executive direction; mission planning and budgeting; recruitment and force generation; deployment and mission start-up; political analysis and briefings; and reporting, monitoring and operations management.

3000-Series: Management and Integration of Operations

The 3000-series covers the management and integration of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the field. Documents in this series are intended to provide guidance on arrangements for the effective planning, management and integration of operational and support capabilities in the mission. The 3000series also contains guidance on the effective execution of managerial responsibilities related to the safety, integrity and oversight of the mission and its resources. Specific areas covered in the 3000-series include: mission command and control; political analysis and diplomatic activity; mission planning; safety and security; crisis management; and conduct welfare and discipline.

4000-Series: Multi-dimensional Operations

The 4000-series contains guidance on the employment of military, police and substantive civilian capabilities within a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The use of guidance in this series will vary depending on the deployed mission capabilities, and should be seen as modular. Guidance in the 4000-series also draws on and must be consistent with the principles and concepts set out in the 1000-series. Specific areas covered in the 4000-series include: political and civil affairs; military; law enforcement (police); legal and judicial; corrections/prisons; human rights; DDR; SSR; mine action; and elections.

5000-Series: Field Operations Support

The 5000-series contains guidance on the integration and employment of all support resources in a mission with the aim of providing timely, efficient and effective support to meet mandate priorities. Guidance on mission support capabilities should be consistent with and should directly support the operational and managerial requirements identified in the 3000- and 4000-series. Specific areas covered in the 5000-series include: logistics support; movement control; strategic deployment stocks; aviation; surface transport; engineering; communications and information technology; medical; finance; and procurement and contract management.

6000-Series: Headquarters Management and Administration

The 6000-series sets out the managerial and administrative procedures governing the functioning of DPKO and DFS as specialized, field-focused, operational arms of the United Nations Secretariat. Specific areas covered in the 6000-series include: planning, budget and oversight; human resources and travel; and writing and records.

Annex 2: Selected Glossary of Acronyms and Terms*

Selected Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

AU	African Union
CAAC	Children and Armed Conflict
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
Cease-fire	A temporary stoppage of war, which may also be undertaken as part of a larger negotiated settlement. A cease-fire marking the permanent end of war is referred to as an armistice.
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CMS	Chief of Mission Support
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
Conflict Prevention	Any structural or diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict.
Contingency Plan	A management tool used to ensure adequate arrangements are made in anticipation of a crisis.
Designated Official	The senior-most United Nations decision-maker on safety and security issues, in a given country.
DFS	Department of Field Support
DMS	Director of Mission Support
Doctrine	The evolving body of institutional guidance that provides support and direction to personnel preparing for, planning and implementing UN peacekeeping operations.
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSRSG/RC/HC	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/ Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FC	Force Commander

Good Offices	The authority and legitimacy afforded by one's moral stature or gained through one's position or function that allows one to perform beneficial acts for another. This authority and legitimacy allows individuals to act as third-party mediators in various types of disputes.
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HOM	Head of Mission
HOMC	Head of Military Component
HOPC	Head of Police Component
Humanitarian Assistance	Material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises. The primary objective of humanitarian assistance is to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity
Humanitarian Space	This means the ability of humanitarian agencies to work independently and impartially, without fear of attack in pursuit of the humanitarian imperative
Hybrid Operation	A peace operation involving the deployment of military, police or civilian personnel from two or more entities under a single structure
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFI	International Financial Institution is a generic term referring to the World Bank, IMF and other international or regional development banks
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process Integration The process through which the United Nations system seeks to maximize its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner
Integrated Mission	A strategic partnership between a multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation and the UNCT based on a shared vision among all United Nations actors as to the strategic objectives of the United Nations presence at country-level
IPBS	Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy

ISS	Integrated Support Services
JLOC	Joint Logistics Operations Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JMAC	Joint Mission Analysis Cell
Multi-dimensional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations peacekeeping operations comprising a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Parties	Persons or entities involved in a dispute
PCC	Police Contributing Country
Peace Agreement	A formal treaty intended to end or significantly transform violent conflict
Peacebuilding	Measures aimed at reducing the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict, by strengthening national capacities for conflict management, and laying the foundations for sustainable peace
Peace Enforcement	Coercive action undertaken with the authorization of the United Nations Security Council to maintain or restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression
Peacekeeping	Action undertaken to preserve peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers
Preventive Diplomacy	Diplomatic efforts to avert disputes arising between parties from escalating into conflict
Peacemaking	Action to bring hostile parties to agreement

Peace Operations	Field operations deployed to prevent, manage, and/or resolve violent conflicts or reduce the risk of their recurrence
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
QIPs	Quick Impact Projects
RC	Resident Coordinator
Robust Peacekeeping	The use of force by a United Nations peacekeeping operation at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend its mandate against spoilers whose activities pose a threat to civilians or risk undermining the peace process
ROE	Rules of Engagement
Rule of Law	A principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards
SDS	Strategic Deployment Stocks
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SMT	Security Management Team
SOFA/SOMA	Status of Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreement
Spoilers	Individuals or groups that may profit from the spread or continuation of violence, or have an interest to disrupt a resolution of a conflict in a given setting
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TAM	Technical Assessment Mission
Traditional United Nations Peacekeeping Operations	United Nations peacekeeping operations conducted with the consent of the parties to a conflict, usually States, in which "Blue Helmets" monitor a truce between warring sides while mediators seek a political solution to the underlying conflict
Transition	The hand-over of responsibilities between a non-United Nations led peace operation to a United Nations peacekeeping operation; or from the latter to other United Nations or non-United Nations actors upon the successful completion of its mandate

Transitional Administration	A transitional authority established by the Security Council to assist a country during a government regime change or passage to independence
TRM	Transitional Results Matrix
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
United Nations-Led Peace Operation	A Peace operation authorized by the United Nations Security Council and conducted under the direction of the United Nations Secretary-General

* The list does not provide authoritative United Nations definitions. It is intended to assist with understanding the usage of terms in this document only. Official United Nations definitions are being considered in the context of the ongoing terminology deliberations of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on the basis of the DPKO Interim Glossary of Terms.

Appendix A: List of UN Peacekeeping Operations

MISSIONS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

List of UN Peacekeeping Operations

BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO*	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH*	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO*	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo

ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
UNAMA	United Nations Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMID*	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation
UNDOF*	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Force
UNFICYP*	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNIFIL*	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission
UNISFA*	United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK*	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL*	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS*	United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNMIS*	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT*	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP*	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI*	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group In Lebanon
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone

UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNPSG	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO*	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

* Ongoing operations, as of November 2011.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948

On December 10, 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and proclaimed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the full text of which appears in the following pages. Following this historic act the Assembly called upon all Member countries to publicise the text of the Declaration and "to cause it to be disseminated, displayed, read and expounded principally in schools and other educational institutions, without distinction based on the political status of countries or territories."

PREAMBLE

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realisation of this pledge,

Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

(1) Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

(2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

(2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

(2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

(3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

(2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

(3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

(4) Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

(1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

(2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.

Article 29

(1) Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

Appendix C: Secretary-General's Bulletin on International Humanitarian Law

Secretariat

6 August 1999

Secretary-General's Bulletin

Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law

The Secretary-General, for the purpose of setting out fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces conducting operations under United Nations command and control, promulgates the following:

Section 1
Field of application

1.1 The fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law set out in the present bulletin are applicable to United Nations forces when in situations of armed conflict they are actively engaged therein as combatants, to the extent and for the duration of their engagement. They are accordingly applicable in enforcement actions, or in peacekeeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-defence.

1.2 The promulgation of this bulletin does not affect the protected status of members of peacekeeping operations under the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel or their status as non-combatants, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians under the international law of armed conflict.

Section 2
Application of national law

The present provisions do not constitute an exhaustive list of principles and rules of international humanitarian law binding upon military personnel, and do not prejudice the application thereof, nor do they replace the national laws by which military personnel remain bound throughout the operation.

99-23042 (E)   090899

Section 3
Status-of-forces agreement

In the status-of-forces agreement concluded between the United Nations and a State in whose territory a United Nations force is deployed, the United Nations undertakes to ensure that the force shall conduct its operations with full respect for the principles and rules of the general conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel. The United Nations also undertakes to ensure that members of the military personnel of the force are fully acquainted with the principles and rules of those international instruments. The obligation to respect the said principles and rules is applicable to United Nations forces even in the absence of a status-of-forces agreement.

Section 4
Violations of international humanitarian law

In case of violations of international humanitarian law, members of the military personnel of a United Nations force are subject to prosecution in their national courts.

Section 5
Protection of the civilian population

5.1 The United Nations force shall make a clear distinction at all times between civilians and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives. Military operations shall be directed only against combatants and military objectives. Attacks on civilians or civilian objects are prohibited.

5.2 Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.

5.3 The United Nations force shall take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event to minimize, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian property.

5.4 In its area of operation, the United Nations force shall avoid, to the extent feasible, locating military objectives within or near densely populated areas, and take all necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects against the dangers resulting from military operations. Military installations and equipment of peacekeeping operations, as such, shall not be considered military objectives.

5.5 The United Nations force is prohibited from launching operations of a nature likely to strike military objectives and civilians in an indiscriminate manner, as well as operations that may be expected to cause incidental loss of life among the civilian population or damage to civilian objects that would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

5.6 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against civilians or civilian objects.

Section 6
Means and methods of combat

6.1 The right of the United Nations force to choose methods and means of combat is not unlimited.

6.2 The United Nations force shall respect the rules prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law. These include, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons, is prohibited.

6.3 The United Nations force is prohibited from employing methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.

6.4 The United Nations force is prohibited from using weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.

6.5 It is forbidden to order that there shall be no survivors.

6.6 The United Nations force is prohibited from attacking monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, the United Nations force shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes which might expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property is strictly prohibited.

6.7 The United Nations force is prohibited from attacking, destroying, removing or rendering useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking-water installations and supplies.

6.8 The United Nations force shall not make installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

6.9 The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this section.

Section 7
Treatment of civilians and persons *hors de combat*

7.1 Persons not, or no longer, taking part in military operations, including civilians, members of armed forces who have laid down their weapons and persons placed *hors de combat* by reason of sickness, wounds or detention, shall, in all circumstances, be treated humanely and without any adverse distinction based on race, sex, religious convictions or any other ground. They shall be accorded full respect for their person, honour and religious and other convictions.

7.2 The following acts against any of the persons mentioned in section 7.1 are prohibited at any time and in any place: violence to life or physical integrity; murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; collective punishment; reprisals; the taking of hostages; rape; enforced prostitution; any form of sexual assault and humiliation and degrading treatment; enslavement; and pillage.

7.3 Women shall be especially protected against any attack, in particular against rape, enforced prostitution or any other form of indecent assault.

7.4 Children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any form of indecent assault.

Section 8
Treatment of detained persons

The United Nations force shall treat with humanity and respect for their dignity detained members of the armed forces and other persons who no longer take part in military operations by reason of detention. Without prejudice to their legal status, they shall be treated in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as may be applicable to them *mutatis mutandis*. In particular:

(a)   Their capture and detention shall be notified without delay to the party on which they depend and to the Central Tracing Agency of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in particular in order to inform their families;

(b)   They shall be held in secure and safe premises which provide all possible safeguards of hygiene and health, and shall not be detained in areas exposed to the dangers of the combat zone;

(c)   They shall be entitled to receive food and clothing, hygiene and medical attention;

(d)   They shall under no circumstances be subjected to any form of torture or ill-treatment;

(e)   Women whose liberty has been restricted shall be held in quarters separated from men's quarters, and shall be under the immediate supervision of women;

(f)   In cases where children who have not attained the age of sixteen years take a direct part in hostilities and are arrested, detained or interned by the United Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from special protection. In particular, they shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except when accommodated with their families;

(g)   ICRC's right to visit prisoners and detained persons shall be respected and guaranteed.

Section 9
Protection of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel

9.1   Members of the armed forces and other persons in the power of the United Nations force who are wounded or sick shall be respected and protected in all circumstances. They shall be treated humanely and receive the medical care and attention required by their condition, without adverse distinction. Only urgent medical reasons will authorize priority in the order of treatment to be administered.

9.2   Whenever circumstances permit, a suspension of fire shall be arranged, or other local arrangements made, to permit the search for and identification of the wounded, the sick and the dead left on the battlefield and allow for their collection, removal, exchange and transport.

9.3   The United Nations force shall not attack medical establishments or mobile medical units. These shall at all times be respected and protected, unless they are used, outside their humanitarian functions, to attack or otherwise commit harmful acts against the United Nations force.

9.4   The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect and protect medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, as well as religious personnel.

9.5   The United Nations force shall respect and protect transports of wounded and sick or medical equipment in the same way as mobile medical units.

9.6   The United Nations force shall not engage in reprisals against the wounded, the sick or the personnel, establishments and equipment protected under this section.

9.7   The United Nations force shall in all circumstances respect the Red Cross and Red Crescent emblems. These emblems may not be employed except to indicate or to protect medical units and medical establishments, personnel and material. Any misuse of the Red Cross or Red Crescent emblems is prohibited.

9.8   The United Nations force shall respect the right of the families to know about the fate of their sick, wounded and deceased relatives. To this end, the force shall facilitate the work of the ICRC Central Tracing Agency.

9.9   The United Nations force shall facilitate the work of relief operations which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction, and shall respect personnel, vehicles and premises involved in such operations.

Section 10
Entry into force

The present bulletin shall enter into force on 12 August 1999.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**
Secretary-General

———————

Appendix D: Security Council Resolutions 1325 (2000), 1612 (2005), and 1674 (2006)

United Nations

S/RES/1325 (2000)

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 October 2000

Resolution 1325 (2000)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4213th meeting, on 31 October 2000

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1265 (1999) of 17 September 1999, 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000 and 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, as well as relevant statements of its President, and *recalling also* the statement of its President to the press on the occasion of the United Nations Day for Women's Rights and International Peace (International Women's Day) of 8 March 2000 (SC/6816),

Recalling also the commitments of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (A/52/231) as well as those contained in the outcome document of the twenty-third Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled "Women 2000: Gender Equality, Development and Peace for the Twenty-First Century" (A/S-23/10/Rev.1), in particular those concerning women and armed conflict,

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the primary responsibility of the Security Council under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Expressing concern that civilians, particularly women and children, account for the vast majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, and increasingly are targeted by combatants and armed elements, and *recognizing* the consequent impact this has on durable peace and reconciliation,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building, and *stressing* the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,

Reaffirming also the need to implement fully international humanitarian and human rights law that protects the rights of women and girls during and after conflicts,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to ensure that mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take into account the special needs of women and girls,

Recognizing the urgent need to mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and in this regard *noting* the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (S/2000/693),

Recognizing also the importance of the recommendation contained in the statement of its President to the press of 8 March 2000 for specialized training for all peacekeeping personnel on the protection, special needs and human rights of women and children in conflict situations,

Recognizing that an understanding of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process can significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security,

Noting the need to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls,

1.   *Urges* Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict;

2.   *Encourages* the Secretary-General to implement his strategic plan of action (A/49/587) calling for an increase in the participation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and peace processes;

3.   *Urges* the Secretary-General to appoint more women as special representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf, and in this regard *calls on* Member States to provide candidates to the Secretary-General, for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster;

4.   *Further urges* the Secretary-General to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations field-based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel;

5.   *Expresses* its willingness to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and *urges* the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component;

6.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to Member States training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women, as well as on the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peace-building measures, *invites* Member States to incorporate these elements as well as HIV/AIDS awareness training into their national training programmes for military and civilian police personnel in preparation for deployment, and *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure that civilian personnel of peacekeeping operations receive similar training;

7.   *Urges* Member States to increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts, including those undertaken by relevant funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Fund for Women and United Nations Children's Fund, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevant bodies;

8.   *Calls on* all actors involved, when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to adopt a gender perspective, including, inter alia:

(a)   The special needs of women and girls during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b)   Measures that support local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements;

(c)   Measures that ensure the protection of and respect for human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary;

9.   *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect fully international law applicable to the rights and protection of women and girls, especially as civilians, in particular the obligations applicable to them under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto of 1977, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and the Protocol thereto of 1967, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 1979 and the Optional Protocol thereto of 1999 and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 and the two Optional Protocols thereto of 25 May 2000, and to bear in mind the relevant provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court;

10.   *Calls on* all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of violence in situations of armed conflict;

11.   *Emphasizes* the responsibility of all States to put an end to impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes including those relating to sexual and other violence against women and girls, and in this regard *stresses* the need to exclude these crimes, where feasible from amnesty provisions;

12.   *Calls upon* all parties to armed conflict to respect the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps and settlements, and to take into account the particular needs of women and girls, including in their design, and recalls its resolutions 1208 (1998) of 19 November 1998 and 1296 (2000) of 19 April 2000;

13.   *Encourages* all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependants;

14.   *Reaffirms* its readiness, whenever measures are adopted under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, to give consideration to their potential impact on the civilian population, bearing in mind the special needs of women and girls, in order to consider appropriate humanitarian exemptions;

15.   *Expresses* its willingness to ensure that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women, including through consultation with local and international women's groups;

16.   *Invites* the Secretary-General to carry out a study on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, and *further invites* him to

submit a report to the Security Council on the results of this study and to make this available to all Member States of the United Nations;

17. *Requests* the Secretary-General, where appropriate, to include in his reporting to the Security Council progress on gender mainstreaming throughout peacekeeping missions and all other aspects relating to women and girls;

18. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

———————

Resolution 1612 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5235th meeting, on 26 July 2005

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1261 (1999) of 25 August 1999, 1314 (2000) of 11 August 2000, 1379 (2001) of 20 November 2001, 1460 (2003) of 30 January 2003, and 1539 (2004) of 22 April 2004, which contribute to a comprehensive framework for addressing the protection of children affected by armed conflict,

While noting the advances made for the protection of children affected by armed conflict, particularly in the areas of advocacy and the development of norms and standards, *remaining deeply concerned* over the lack of overall progress on the ground, where parties to conflict continue to violate with impunity the relevant provisions of applicable international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict,

Stressing the primary role of national Governments in providing effective protection and relief to all children affected by armed conflicts,

Recalling the responsibilities of States to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other egregious crimes perpetrated against children,

Convinced that the protection of children in armed conflict should be regarded as an important aspect of any comprehensive strategy to resolve conflict,

Reiterating its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and, in this connection, its commitment to address the widespread impact of armed conflict on children,

Stressing its determination to ensure respect for its resolutions and other international norms and standards for the protection of children affected by armed conflict,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 February 2005 (S/2005/72) and stressing that the present resolution does not seek to make any legal determination as to whether situations which are referred to in the Secretary-General's report are or are not armed conflicts within the context of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto, nor does it prejudge the legal status of the non-State parties involved in these situations,

Gravely concerned by the documented links between the use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and stressing the need for all States to take measures to prevent and to put an end to such trafficking,

1. *Strongly condemns* the recruitment and use of child soldiers by parties to armed conflict in violation of international obligations applicable to them and all other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict;

2. *Takes note* of the action plan presented by the Secretary-General relating to the establishment of a monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict as called for in paragraph 2 of its resolution 1539 (2004) and, in this regard:

(a) Underlines that the mechanism is to collect and provide timely, objective, accurate and reliable information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and on other violations and abuses committed against children affected by armed conflict, and the mechanism will report to the working group to be created in accordance with paragraph 8 of this resolution;

(b) Underlines further that this mechanism must operate with the participation of and in cooperation with national Governments and relevant United Nations and civil society actors, including at the country level;

(c) Stresses that all actions undertaken by United Nations entities within the framework of the monitoring and reporting mechanism must be designed to support and supplement, as appropriate, the protection and rehabilitation roles of national Governments;

(d) Also stresses that any dialogue established under the framework of the monitoring and reporting mechanism by United Nations entities with non-State armed groups in order to ensure protection for and access to children must be conducted in the context of peace processes where they exist and the cooperation framework between the United Nations and the concerned Government;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to implement without delay, the above-mentioned monitoring and reporting mechanism, beginning with its application, within existing resources, in close consultation with countries concerned, to parties in situations of armed conflict listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General's report (S/2005/72) that are on the agenda of the Security Council, and then, in close consultation with countries concerned, to apply it to parties in other situations of armed conflict listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General's report (S/2005/72), bearing in mind the discussion of the Security Council and the views expressed by Member States, in particular during the annual debate on Children and Armed Conflict, and also taking into account the findings and recommendations of an independent review on the implementation of the mechanism to be reported to the Security Council by 31 July 2006. The independent review will include:

(a) An assessment of the overall effectiveness of the mechanism, as well as the timeliness, accuracy, objectivity and reliability of the information compiled through the mechanism;

(b) Information on how effectively the mechanism is linked to the work of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations;

(c) Information on the relevance and clarity of the division of responsibilities;

(d) Information on the budgetary and other resource implications for United Nations actors and voluntary funded organizations contributing to the mechanism;

(e) Recommendations for the full implementation of the mechanism;

4. *Stresses* that the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism by the Secretary-General will be undertaken only in the context of and for the specific purpose of ensuring the protection of children affected by armed conflict and shall not thereby prejudge or imply a decision by the Security Council as to whether or not to include a situation on its agenda;

5. *Welcomes* the initiatives taken by UNICEF and other United Nations entities to gather information on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in violation of applicable international law and on other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict and invites the Secretary-General to take due account of these initiatives during the initial phase of implementation of the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3;

6. *Notes* that information compiled by this mechanism, for reporting by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and the Security Council, may be considered by other international, regional and national bodies, within their mandates and the scope of their work, in order to ensure the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict;

7. *Expresses* serious concern regarding the lack of progress in development and implementation of the action plans called for in paragraph 5 (a) of its resolution 1539 (2004) and, pursuant to this, calls on the parties concerned to develop and implement action plans without further delay, in close collaboration with United Nations peacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams, consistent with their respective mandates and within their capabilities; and requests the Secretary-General to provide criteria to assist in the development of such action plans;

8. *Decides* to establish a working group of the Security Council consisting of all members of the Council to review the reports of the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3 of this resolution, to review progress in the development and implementation of the action plans mentioned in paragraph 7 of this resolution and to consider other relevant information presented to it; *decides further* that the working group shall:

(a) Make recommendations to the Council on possible measures to promote the protection of children affected by armed conflict, including through recommendations on appropriate mandates for peacekeeping missions and recommendations with respect to the parties to the conflict;

(b) Address requests, as appropriate, to other bodies within the United Nations system for action to support implementation of this resolution in accordance with their respective mandates;

9. *Recalls* paragraph 5 (c) of its resolution 1539 (2004), and reaffirms its intention to consider imposing, through country-specific resolutions, targeted and

graduated measures, such as, inter alia, a ban on the export and supply of small arms and light weapons and of other military equipment and on military assistance, against parties to situations of armed conflict which are on the Security Council's agenda and are in violation of applicable international law relating to the rights and protection of children in armed conflict;

10. *Stresses* the responsibility of United Nations peacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams, consistent with their respective mandates, to ensure effective follow-up to Security Council resolutions, ensure a coordinated response to CAAC concerns and to monitor and report to the Secretary-General;

11. *Welcomes* the efforts undertaken by United Nations peacekeeping operations to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of their personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including predeployment awareness training, and to take disciplinary action and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of misconduct involving their personnel;

12. *Decides* to continue the inclusion of specific provisions for the protection of children in the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping operations, including the deployment, on a case-by-case basis, of child-protection advisers (CPAs), and requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the need for and the number and roles of CPAs are systematically assessed during the preparation of each United Nations peacekeeping operation; welcomes the comprehensive assessment undertaken on the role and activities of CPAs with a view to drawing lessons learned and best practices;

13. *Welcomes* recent initiatives by regional and subregional organizations and arrangements for the protection of children affected by armed conflict, and encourages continued mainstreaming of child protection into their advocacy, policies and programmes; development of peer review and monitoring and reporting mechanisms; establishment, within their secretariats, of child-protection mechanisms; inclusion of child-protection staff and training in their peace and field operations; sub- and interregional initiatives to end activities harmful to children in times of conflict, in particular cross-border recruitment and abduction of children, illicit movement of small arms, and illicit trade in natural resources through the development and implementation of guidelines on children and armed conflict;

14. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to ensure that the protection, rights and well-being of children affected by armed conflict are specifically integrated into all peace processes, peace agreements and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning and programmes;

15. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to abide by the international obligations applicable to them relating to the protection of children affected by armed conflict as well as the concrete commitments they have made to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, to UNICEF and other United Nations agencies and to cooperate fully with the United Nations peacekeeping missions and United Nations country teams, where appropriate, in the context of the cooperation framework between the United Nations and the concerned Government, in the follow-up and implementation of these commitments;

16. *Urges* Member States, United Nations entities, regional and subregional organizations and other parties concerned, to take appropriate measures to control illicit subregional and cross-border activities harmful to children, including illicit exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in small arms, abduction of children and their use and recruitment as soldiers as well as other violations and abuses committed against children in situations of armed conflict in violation of applicable international law;

17. *Urges* all parties concerned, including Member States, United Nations entities and financial institutions, to support the development and strengthening of the capacities of national institutions and local civil society networks for advocacy, protection and rehabilitation of children affected by armed conflict to ensure the sustainability of local child-protection initiatives;

18. *Requests* that the Secretary-General direct all relevant United Nations entities to take specific measures, within existing resources, to ensure systematic mainstreaming of CAAC issues within their respective institutions, including by ensuring allocation of adequate financial and human resources towards protection of war-affected children within all relevant offices and departments and on the ground as well as to strengthen, within their respective mandates, their cooperation and coordination when addressing the protection of children in armed conflict;

19. *Reiterates* its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that, in all his reports on country-specific situations, the protection of children is included as a specific aspect of the report, and expresses its intention to give its full attention to the information provided therein when dealing with those situations on its agenda;

20. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report by November 2006 on the implementation of this resolution and resolutions 1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), and 1539 (2004) which would include, inter alia:

(a) Information on compliance by parties in ending the recruitment or use of children in armed conflict in violation of applicable international law and other violations being committed against children affected by armed conflict;

(b) Information on progress made in the implementation of the monitoring and reporting mechanism mentioned in paragraph 3;

(c) Information on progress made in the development and implementation of the action plans referred to in paragraph 7 of the present resolution;

(d) Information on the assessment of the role and activities of CPAs;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of this matter.

———————

United Nations

Security Council

S/RES/1674 (2006)

Distr.: General
28 April 2006

Resolution 1674 (2006)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5430th meeting,
on 28 April 2006**

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its various resolutions on children and armed conflict and on women, peace and security, as well as its resolution 1631 (2005) on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, and further reaffirming its determination to ensure respect for, and follow-up to, these resolutions,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations as set out in Article 1 (1-4) of the Charter, and to the Principles of the Charter as set out in Article 2 (1-7) of the Charter, including its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States, and respect for the sovereignty of all States,

Acknowledging that peace and security, development and human rights are the pillars of the United Nations system and the foundations for collective security and well-being, and *recognizing* in this regard that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Expressing its deep regret that civilians account for the vast majority of casualties in situations of armed conflict,

Gravely concerned with the effects of the illicit exploitation and trafficking of natural resources, as well as the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, and the use of such weapons on civilians affected by armed conflict,

Recognizing the important contribution to the protection of civilians in armed conflict by regional organizations, and *acknowledging in this regard*, the steps taken by the African Union,

Recognizing the important role that education can play in supporting efforts to halt and prevent abuses committed against civilians affected by armed conflict, in particular efforts to prevent sexual exploitation, trafficking in humans, and violations of applicable international law regarding the recruitment and re-recruitment of child soldiers,

Recalling the particular impact which armed conflict has on women and children, including as refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as on other civilians who may have specific vulnerabilities, and stressing the protection and assistance needs of all affected civilian populations,

Reaffirming that parties to armed conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of affected civilians,

Bearing in mind its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, and *underlining* the importance of taking measures aimed at conflict prevention and resolution,

1.   *Notes with appreciation* the contribution of the Report of the Secretary-General of 28 November 2005 to its understanding of the issues surrounding the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and *takes note of* its conclusions;

2.   *Emphasizes* the importance of preventing armed conflict and its recurrence, and *stresses in this context* the need for a comprehensive approach through promoting economic growth, poverty eradication, sustainable development, national reconciliation, good governance, democracy, the rule of law, and respect for, and protection of, human rights, and in this regard, *urges* the cooperation of Member States and *underlines* the importance of a coherent, comprehensive and coordinated approach by the principal organs of the United Nations, cooperating with one another and within their respective mandates;

3.   *Recalls* that deliberately targeting civilians and other protected persons as such in situations of armed conflict is a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, *reiterates* its condemnation in the strongest terms of such practices, and *demands* that all parties immediately put an end to such practices;

4.   *Reaffirms* the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;

5.   *Reaffirms also* its condemnation in the strongest terms of all acts of violence or abuses committed against civilians in situations of armed conflict in violation of applicable international obligations with respect in particular to (i) torture and other prohibited treatment, (ii) gender-based and sexual violence, (iii) violence against children, (iv) the recruitment and use of child soldiers, (v) trafficking in humans, (vi) forced displacement, and (vii) the intentional denial of humanitarian assistance, and *demands* that all parties put an end to such practices;

6.   *Demands* that all parties concerned comply strictly with the obligations applicable to them under international law, in particular those contained in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 and in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977, as well as with the decisions of the Security Council;

7.   *Reaffirms* that ending impunity is essential if a society in conflict or recovering from conflict is to come to terms with past abuses committed against civilians affected by armed conflict and to prevent future such abuses, *draws attention* to the full range of justice and reconciliation mechanisms to be considered, including national, international and "mixed" criminal courts and tribunals and truth and reconciliation commissions, and *notes* that such mechanisms can promote not

only individual responsibility for serious crimes, but also peace, truth, reconciliation and the rights of the victims;

8. *Emphasizes* in this context the responsibility of States to comply with their relevant obligations to end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international humanitarian law, while recognizing, for States in or recovering from armed conflict, the need to restore or build independent national judicial systems and institutions;

9. *Calls on* States that have not already done so to consider ratifying the instruments of international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and to take appropriate legislative, judicial and administrative measures to implement their obligations under these instruments;

10. *Demands* that all States fully implement all relevant decisions of the Security Council, and in this regard cooperate fully with United Nations peacekeeping missions and country teams in the follow-up and implementation of these resolutions;

11. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to ensure that all peace processes, peace agreements and post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning have regard for the special needs of women and children and include specific measures for the protection of civilians including (i) the cessation of attacks on civilians, (ii) the facilitation of the provision of humanitarian assistance, (iii) the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, (iv) the facilitation of early access to education and training, (v) the re-establishment of the rule of law, and (vi) the ending of impunity;

12. *Recalls* the prohibition of the forcible displacement of civilians in situations of armed conflict under circumstances that are in violation of parties' obligations under international humanitarian law;

13. *Urges* the international community to provide support and assistance to enable States to fulfil their responsibilities regarding the protection of refugees and other persons protected under international humanitarian law;

14. *Reaffirms* the need to maintain the security and civilian character of refugee and internally displaced person camps, *stresses* the primary responsibility of States in this regard, and *encourages* the Secretary-General where necessary and in the context of existing peacekeeping operations and their respective mandates, to take all feasible measures to ensure security in and around such camps and of their inhabitants;

15. *Expresses its intention* of continuing its collaboration with the United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator, and *invites* the Secretary-General to fully associate him from the earliest stages of the planning of United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions;

16. *Reaffirms* its practice of ensuring that the mandates of United Nations peacekeeping, political and peacebuilding missions include, where appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, provisions regarding (i) the protection of civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical danger within their zones of operation, (ii) the facilitation of the provision of humanitarian assistance, and

(iii) the creation of conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and *expresses its intention* of ensuring that (i) such mandates include clear guidelines as to what missions can and should do to achieve those goals, (ii) the protection of civilians is given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, including information and intelligence resources, in the implementation of the mandates, and (iii) that protection mandates are implemented;

17. *Reaffirms* that, where appropriate, United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions should provide for the dissemination of information about international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law and the application of relevant Security Council resolutions;

18. *Underscores* the importance of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in the protection of civilians affected by armed conflict, and, in this regard, *emphasizes* (i) its support for the inclusion in mandates of United Nations peacekeeping and other relevant missions, where appropriate and on a case-by-case basis, of specific and effective measures for DDR, (ii) the importance of incorporating such activities into specific peace agreements, where appropriate and in consultation with the parties, and (iii) the importance of adequate resources being made available for the full completion of DDR programmes and activities;

19. *Condemns in the strongest terms* all sexual and other forms of violence committed against civilians in armed conflict, in particular women and children, and *undertakes* to ensure that all peace support operations employ all feasible measures to prevent such violence and to address its impact where it takes place;

20. *Condemns in equally strong terms* all acts of sexual exploitation, abuse and trafficking of women and children by military, police and civilian personnel involved in United Nations operations, *welcomes* the efforts undertaken by United Nations agencies and peacekeeping operations to implement a zero-tolerance policy in this regard, and *requests* the Secretary-General and personnel-contributing countries to continue to take all appropriate action necessary to combat these abuses by such personnel, including through the full implementation without delay of those measures adopted in the relevant General Assembly resolutions based upon the recommendations of the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping, A/59/19/Rev.1;

21. *Stresses* the importance for all, within the framework of humanitarian assistance, of upholding and respecting the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence;

22. *Urges* all those concerned as set forth in international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Regulations, to allow full unimpeded access by humanitarian personnel to civilians in need of assistance in situations of armed conflict, and to make available, as far as possible, all necessary facilities for their operations, and to promote the safety, security and freedom of movement of humanitarian personnel and United Nations and its associated personnel and their assets;

23. *Condemns* all attacks deliberately targeting United Nations and associated personnel involved in humanitarian missions, as well as other humanitarian personnel, *urges* States on whose territory such attacks occur to

prosecute or extradite those responsible, and *welcomes* in this regard the adoption on 8 December 2005 by the General Assembly of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel;

24.   *Recognizes* the increasingly valuable role that regional organizations and other intergovernmental institutions play in the protection of civilians, and *encourages* the Secretary-General and the heads of regional and other intergovernmental organizations to continue their efforts to strengthen their partnership in this regard;

25.   *Reiterates* its invitation to the Secretary-General to continue to refer to the Council relevant information and analysis regarding the protection of civilians where he believes that such information or analysis could contribute to the resolution of issues before it, requests him to continue to include in his written reports to the Council on matters of which it is seized, as appropriate, observations relating to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, and encourages him to continue consultations and take concrete steps to enhance the capacity of the United Nations in this regard;

26.   *Notes* that the deliberate targeting of civilians and other protected persons, and the commission of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed conflict, may constitute a threat to international peace and security, and, *reaffirms in this regard* its readiness to consider such situations and, where necessary, to adopt appropriate steps;

27.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit his next report on the protection of civilians in armed conflict within 18 months of the date of this resolution;

28.   *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Appendix E: Security Council Resolution 1645 (2005)

United Nations

S/RES/1645 (2005)

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 December 2005

Resolution 1645 (2005)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5335th meeting, on 20 December 2005

The Security Council,

Guided by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the 2005 World Summit Outcome,[1]

Recalling in particular paragraphs 97 to 105 of that resolution,

Recognizing that development, peace and security and human rights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing,

Emphasizing the need for a coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation with a view to achieving sustainable peace,

Recognizing the need for a dedicated institutional mechanism to address the special needs of countries emerging from conflict towards recovery, reintegration and reconstruction and to assist them in laying the foundation for sustainable development,

Recognizing also the vital role of the United Nations in preventing conflicts, assisting parties to conflicts to end hostilities and emerge towards recovery, reconstruction and development and in mobilizing sustained international attention and assistance,

Reaffirming the respective responsibilities and functions of the organs of the United Nations as defined in the Charter and the need to enhance coordination among them,

Affirming the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict, where they are established, in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership,

---

[1] Resolution 60/1.

Emphasizing, in that regard, the importance of supporting national efforts to establish, redevelop or reform institutions for effective administration of countries emerging from conflict, including capacity-building efforts,

Recognizing the important role of regional and subregional organizations in carrying out post-conflict peacebuilding activities in their regions, and stressing the need for sustained international support for their efforts and capacity-building to that end,

Recognizing also that countries that have experienced recent post-conflict recovery would make valuable contributions to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission,

Recognizing further the role of Member States supporting the peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts of the United Nations through financial, troop and civilian police contributions,

Recognizing the important contribution of civil society and non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, to peacebuilding efforts,

Reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding, and stressing the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution and peacebuilding,

1. *Decides*, acting concurrently with the General Assembly, in accordance with Articles 7, 22 and 29 of the Charter of the United Nations, with a view to operationalizing the decision by the World Summit, to establish the Peacebuilding Commission as an intergovernmental advisory body;

2. *Also decides* that the following shall be the main purposes of the Commission:

(a)   To bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery;

(b)   To focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and to support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development;

(c)   To provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, to develop best practices, to help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and to extend the period of attention given by the international community to post-conflict recovery;

3. *Decides* that the Commission shall meet in various configurations;

4. *Also decides* that the Commission shall have a standing Organizational Committee, responsible for developing its own rules of procedure and working methods, comprising:

(a)   Seven members of the Security Council, including permanent members, selected according to rules and procedures decided by the Council;

(b)   Seven members of the Economic and Social Council, elected from regional groups according to rules and procedures decided by the Council and giving due consideration to those countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery;

(c)   Five top providers of assessed contributions to United Nations budgets and of voluntary contributions to United Nations funds, programmes and agencies, including the standing peacebuilding fund, that are not among those selected in (a) or (b) above, selected by and among the ten top providers, giving due consideration to the size of their contributions, according to a list provided by the Secretary-General, based on the average annual contributions in the previous three calendar years for which statistical data are available;

(d)   Five top providers of military personnel and civilian police to United Nations missions that are not among those selected in (a), (b) or (c) above selected by and among the ten top providers, giving due consideration to the size of their contributions, according to a list provided by the Secretary-General, based on the average monthly contributions in the previous three calendar years for which statistical data are available;

(e)   Giving due consideration to representation from all regional groups in the overall composition of the Committee and to representation from countries that have experienced post-conflict recovery, seven additional members shall be elected according to rules and procedures decided by the General Assembly;

5. *Emphasizes* that a Member State can only be selected from one category set out in paragraph 4 above at any one time;

6. *Decides* that members of the Organizational Committee shall serve for renewable terms of two years, as applicable;

7. *Also decides* that country-specific meetings of the Commission, upon invitation of the Organizational Committee referred to in paragraph 4 above, shall include as members, in addition to members of the Committee, representatives from:

(a)   The country under consideration;

(b)   Countries in the region engaged in the post-conflict process and other countries that are involved in relief efforts and/or political dialogue, as well as relevant regional and subregional organizations;

(c)   The major financial, troop and civilian police contributors involved in the recovery effort;

(d)   The senior United Nations representative in the field and other relevant United Nations representatives;

(e)   Such regional and international financial institutions as may be relevant;

8. *Further decides* that a representative of the Secretary-General shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission;

9. *Decides* that representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and other institutional donors shall be invited to participate in all meetings of the Commission in a manner suitable to their governing arrangements;

10. *Emphasizes* that the Commission shall work in cooperation with national or transitional authorities, where possible, in the country under consideration with a view to ensuring national ownership of the peacebuilding process;

11. *Also emphasizes* that the Commission shall, where appropriate, work in close consultation with regional and subregional organizations to ensure their involvement in the peacebuilding process in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter;

12. *Decides* that the Organizational Committee shall, taking due consideration to maintaining a balance in addressing situations in countries in different regions in accordance with the main purposes of the Commission as stipulated above, establish the agenda of the Commission based on the following:

(a) Requests for advice from the Security Council;

(b) Requests for advice from the Economic and Social Council or the General Assembly with the consent of a concerned Member State in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and with which the Security Council is not seized in accordance with Article 12 of the Charter;

(c) Requests for advice from Member States in exceptional circumstances on the verge of lapsing or relapsing into conflict and which are not on the agenda of the Security Council;

(d) Requests for advice from the Secretary-General;

13. *Also decides* that the Commission shall make the outcome of its discussions and recommendations publicly available as United Nations documents to all relevant bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions;

14. *Invites* all relevant United Nations bodies and other bodies and actors, including the international financial institutions, to take action on the advice of the Commission, as appropriate and in accordance with their respective mandates;

15. *Notes* that the Commission shall submit an annual report to the General Assembly and that the Assembly shall hold an annual debate to review the report;

16. *Underlines* that in post-conflict situations on the agenda of the Security Council with which it is actively seized, in particular when there is a United Nations-mandated peacekeeping mission on the ground or under way and given the primary responsibility of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter, the main purpose of the Commission will be to provide advice to the Council at its request;

17. *Also underlines* that the advice of the Commission to provide sustained attention as countries move from transitional recovery towards development will be of particular relevance to the Economic and Social Council, bearing in mind its role as a principal body for coordination, policy review, policy dialogue and recommendations on issues of economic and social development;

18. *Decides* that the Commission shall act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members;

19. *Notes* the importance of participation of regional and local actors, and stresses the importance of adopting flexible working methods, including use of videoconferencing, meetings outside of New York and other modalities, in order to provide for the active participation of those most relevant to the deliberations of the Commission;

20. *Calls upon* the Commission to integrate a gender perspective into all its work;

21. *Encourages* the Commission to consult with civil society, non-governmental organizations, including women's organizations, and the private sector engaged in peacebuilding activities, as appropriate;

22. *Recommends* that the Commission terminate its consideration of a country-specific situation when foundations for sustainable peace and development are established or upon the request by national authorities of the country under consideration;

23. *Reaffirms* its request to the Secretary-General to establish, within the Secretariat, from within existing resources, a small peacebuilding support office staffed by qualified experts to assist and support the Commission, and recognizes in that regard that such support could include gathering and analysing information relating to the availability of financial resources, relevant United Nations in-country planning activities, progress towards meeting short and medium-term recovery goals and best practices with respect to cross-cutting peacebuilding issues;

24. *Also reaffirms* its request to the Secretary-General to establish a multi-year standing peacebuilding fund for post-conflict peacebuilding, funded by voluntary contributions and taking due account of existing instruments, with the objective of ensuring the immediate release of resources needed to launch peacebuilding activities and the availability of appropriate financing for recovery;

25. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly on the arrangements for establishing the peacebuilding fund during its sixtieth session;

26. *Calls* on relevant bodies and Member States referred to in paragraph 4 above to communicate the names of members of the Organizational Committee to the Secretary-General to enable him to convene the first constituting meeting of the Committee as soon as possible following the adoption of the present resolution;

27. *Decides* that the arrangements set out above will be reviewed five years after the adoption of the present resolution to ensure that they are appropriate to fulfil the agreed functions of the Commission and that such a review and any changes as a result thereof will be decided following the same procedure as set out in paragraph 1 above;

28. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

—————

Appendix F: No Exit Without Strategy

United Nations

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 April 2001

Original: English

No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of United Nations peacekeeping operations

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1.   On 15 November 2000, the Security Council, in an open debate, undertook a critical examination of how and why it decides to close a peacekeeping mission, or significantly change the mandate of a mission so that it enters a new phase in its operational history. In the course of the open debate, statements were made by all 15 Council members and 19 non-members, testimony to the great deal of interest generated by this topic (see S/PV.4223 and Resumption 1).

2.   In a letter from its President dated 30 November 2000 (S/2000/1141), the Security Council requested me to submit a report on this issue, including an analysis and recommendations, taking into account the responsibilities of different organs of the United Nations system and the views expressed at the 4223rd meeting of the Security Council. The present report has been prepared in pursuance of that request.

3.   The question at the heart of this discussion is what factors the Security Council should assess in deciding to launch, close or significantly alter a United Nations peacekeeping operation. As Security Council members will appreciate, drawing hard and fast conclusions is difficult, given the unique circumstances of each conflict and the varying degrees of international support each peace operation evokes. This notwithstanding, broad lessons and guidelines are relevant to these difficult decisions. The question is of central importance for both the Council and, more broadly, other organs and agencies of the United Nations system as a whole.

II. Two issues

4.   Throughout the 1990s, the United Nations has faced many difficult and complicated conflicts. While it is possible to point to several successes during this past decade, it must also be acknowledged that there have been cases where efforts fell short of objectives. As is noted in the non-paper on this question (S/2000/1072, annex, para. 1), more than once during the last 10 years the United Nations has withdrawn a peacekeeping operation, or dramatically altered its mandate, only to see the situation remain unstable, or sink into renewed violence.

5.   In order to address these issues, I divide this report into two sections. The first, building on the useful and frank debate held in the Security Council in November 2000 on no exit without strategy, contains questions and guidelines, drawn from the experience of peacekeeping and peace-building of the last decade, which the members of the Council may wish to consider as they decide to launch, close or significantly alter the mandate of a peace operation. This section will conclude with observations on cooperating with regional organizations and some conditions for a successful exit from Kosovo, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and East Timor.

6.   In the second and concluding section, key aspects of the roles of the Security Council, the General Assembly and other United Nations organs and agencies are considered. These roles begin well before an operation is actually established. As a number of members remarked during the Council's deliberations in November, a good exit or transition strategy depends on a good entrance strategy.

III. Guidelines for an exit strategy

7.   Discussions on whether to "exit" or significantly alter a peacekeeping operation may be prompted by three circumstances: successful completion of the mandate, failure or partial success. In all of these instances, there are a number of issues to be considered when debating the closure of a mission, or passing responsibility to another United Nations or regional body.

Completion of the mandate

8.   As many members of the Security Council noted in the November debate, the ultimate purpose of a peace operation is the achievement of a sustainable peace. An international peace is sustainable when two States have arrived at a mutually agreed settlement to their conflict, respecting each other's political independence and territorial integrity and recognizing common borders, which they have demarcated or have agreed to have demarcated. I would encourage Member States to make greater use of the International Court of Justice to settle those disputes, as has been done very effectively by Honduras and Nicaragua to settle a dispute concerning the Mosquito Coast. Another example is the decision of Chad and the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to submit their dispute over the Aouzou Strip to the Court, for judgement, a judgement whose implementation was supported by deployment of the United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG).

9.   Even with a full commitment of the political will needed for an international settlement, the United Nations plays an essential role in facilitating both the restoration of mutual confidence and the rehabilitation that help make an agreed border and a negotiated peace work. As in the case of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), peace-building activities include monitoring the separation of forces and technical assistance in humanitarian mine action, while coordinating with other international actors and agencies of the United Nations system that are assisting in the return and resettlement of refugees and the internally displaced.

10.   A sustainable domestic peace presents even more complex challenges. It becomes sustainable, not when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural conflicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of State sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance. In many cases, an effective strategy for realizing that objective is to help warring parties to move their political or economic struggles from the battlefield and into an institutional framework where a peaceful settlement process can be engaged and future disputes can be addressed in a similar fashion. To facilitate such a transition, a mission's mandate should include peace-building and incorporate such elements as institution-building and the promotion of good governance and the rule of law, by assisting the parties to develop legitimate and broad-based institutions.

11.   As discussed in the Security Council on 5 February 2001, peace-building is an attempt, after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of present hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution. Strengthening State institutions, increasing political participation, engaging in land reform, strengthening civil society, finding ways to respect ethnic identities: all are seen as ways to improve the prospects for peaceful governance. The aim of peace-building is to build the social, economic and political institutions and attitudes that will prevent the inevitable conflicts that every society generates from turning into violent conflicts. In effect, peace-building is also the front line of preventive action.

12.   Domestic peace has typically been most sustainable when it has gone beyond a stable truce or the mere capacity to deter armed rebellion. Successful cases have often included reformed systems of governance that are responsive to people's basic needs at the local, regional, and national levels. Sustainable development is indispensable to such a peace. This can only be achieved by the local population itself; the role of the United Nations is merely to facilitate the process that seeks to dismantle the structures of violence and create the conditions conducive to durable peace and sustainable development.

13. Peace-building strategies for United Nations engagement should therefore be "strategic" in the ordinary sense of that term, matching means to ends. Although a peace-building strategy must be designed to address a particular conflict, broad parameters that fit most conflicts can be identified. Strategies should address the local sources of hostility by coupling local capacities for change with whatever international commitment is available to assist the process. It is this interaction of international commitment, or its absence, with local capacities and factional hostility that shapes the prospects for successful peace-building. Few peace-building plans work unless regional neighbours and other significant international actors desist from supporting war and begin supporting peace. The end of cold war competition was thus an important precondition for the blossoming of major peace-building components within the peacekeeping operations of the early 1990s.

14. The characteristics of the parties must be taken into account in planning peace-building activities. For example, the more hostile and numerous the factions, the greater the numbers of displaced, and the larger the presence of vulnerable groups (conditions prevalent, for example, in Somalia in 1992), the more difficult the peace process will be and the more international assistance and authority will be needed if peace is to be established.

15. In less hostile circumstances, international monitoring might be sufficient to establish a self-enforcing peace. Monitoring helps to create transparency among partners lacking trust but having compatible incentives favouring peace. Peacekeeping and related assistance can also reduce tradeoffs — helping, for example, to fund and certify the cantonment, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, as was done in El Salvador with the assistance of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and in Mozambique with the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). In these circumstances international coordination and assistance can be crucial to overcoming hostility and solving implementation problems.

16. The best signal that peacekeeping will succeed is a comprehensive peace settlement. Going beyond a simple agreement to stop fighting, it should address the root causes of the conflict and establish either the semi-sovereign institutions that are needed to manage a peaceful transition — as the Supreme National Council did in Cambodia — or itself embody the agreed terms of reformed sovereign institutions — as, for example, the Salvadoran peace treaties did. In these favourable circumstances, an international peacekeeping presence itself can deter violations, because of the possible costs of abrogating international agreements and triggering further international involvement in domestic affairs.

17. In more hostile circumstances, operations under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations can help to solve commitment and cooperation problems by directly implementing agreements, or raising the costs of violating peace agreements. In these cases the use of force to resist attempts by the parties to prevent the operations from fulfilling their mandates should be — and typically is — authorized and resourced in support of or as a substitute for a comprehensive peace treaty, as in the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) in Croatia or the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively. Such robust support may be required to overcome deep sources of distrust and powerful incentives to violate agreed provisions of the peace. As in Kosovo, the existence of hostile, multiple factions that lack coherent leadership complicates the problem of achieving self-enforcing peace. Instead, conscious direction by an impartial international agent to guarantee the functions of effective sovereignty and respect for human rights can become temporarily necessary.

18. War-torn countries also vary in economic and social capacity. Some war-torn countries, such as the former Yugoslavia, started out with considerable economic development. Even after the war, they may still have considerable social capacity in the form of an educated population. Others began poor and the war impoverished them further (Angola, Cambodia, the Sudan). In both cases, reconstruction is vital; the greater the social and economic devastation, the larger the multidimensional international role must become. International economic relief and productive jobs are the first signs of peace that can persuade rival factions to truly disarm and take a chance on peaceful politics. Local populations will benefit from international assistance in the reconstruction of institutions, including a unified army and police force and the even more challenging development of a school system that can assist in the reconciliation of future generations.

19. The strengthening of legitimate institutions as a simultaneous and/or follow-on element of a peacekeeping operation, therefore, is often central to United Nations involvement in countries trying to put a civil conflict behind them. This raises another important issue related to the success of such a transition: the availability of the resources required to implement the mandate, ensuring that the operation and its partners have the necessary technical and administrative tools and capacity to address critical elements of the programme, such as re-establishing civil administration and basic civil infrastructure, as well as effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

20. The United Nations system has recently identified three key objectives whose fulfilment has often brought about successful, comprehensive peace-building:

(a) **Consolidating internal and external security**. This involves the deployment of peacekeepers and/or military observers to ensure security or negotiate access in order to promote security sector reform, including the creation of a neutral police force broadly representative of the community; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; judicial and penal reform; and mine clearance and capacity-building for mine action.

(b) **Strengthening political institutions and good governance**. This requires the creation or strengthening of national democratic institutions, political parties and other participatory mechanisms, including the media; capacity-building for government and civil society; technical assistance in human rights; civic education and training; electoral assistance, including the development of electoral law, a code of conduct, and electoral councils; and support for the fight against corruption.

(c) **Promoting economic and social rehabilitation and transformation**. This involves fostering conditions for resumed economic and social development; sustainable return and reintegration of displaced persons and refugees; confidence-building measures conducive to national reconciliation; stimulation of maximum involvement of civil society, especially women, and of national non-governmental organizations; attention to the needs of youth, especially young men; providing social services (health education, water and sanitation); providing sustainable sources of livelihood to demobilized soldiers and returning refugees and displaced persons; job creation, microcredit schemes and the promotion of income-generating activities; reconstructing roads, bridges and railways to provide access to war-devastated areas for resettlement and agricultural production; and psychosocial trauma counselling for war-affected groups.

21. Given the potentially large challenges and costs such comprehensive peace-building often encompasses, it is essential to ensure that all key parts of the United Nations system are fully engaged in a collaborative and constructive fashion. I wish to highlight this point because no single department or agency can be expected to devise and implement, on its own, all the elements of a comprehensive peace strategy. As a number of Security Council members said last November, a successful peacekeeping exit depends on a collaborative and inclusive United Nations system and the effectiveness of other international actors, including the international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations that are not part of the operation.

22. The work of these actors, including United Nations agencies such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank and various bilateral and multilateral humanitarian and developmental agencies (governmental and non-governmental) must continue long after the peacekeeping operation has withdrawn. In order to ensure a smooth handover to these entities, preparations should be made from the early stages of a peacekeeping operation. The closer these partners are associated with the peacekeeping operation throughout its presence in the mission area, the greater the likelihood that they will be well placed to carry the peace-building process forward. The practice of appointing the United Nations Resident Coordinator as Deputy Special Representative or Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General facilitates this transition, allowing an early revival of development programming and a smooth handover from the peace operation personnel to the United Nations country team, composed primarily of representatives of operational agencies. Likewise, at Headquarters, the forging of closer institutional links between the intergovernmental and internal United Nations entities responsible for peace and security and development,

respectively, should enable policymakers to maintain the strategic direction of a peace-building process. Considerable progress has been made within the United Nations in improving institutional coordination and further efforts towards this objective are ongoing.

23. Frequently, the improved security situation that accompanies a peacekeeping deployment results in a dramatic improvement in the economy of the mission area. Both public and private investment tends to rise, as does the flow of non-military foreign assistance. However, when a large operation withdraws, this can have a highly visible, negative effect, both on businesses that had thrived by providing goods and services to the mission and on local personnel who had worked for it. In many cases, these effects are limited to specific sectors and do not outweigh overall improvements in the economy, but they are real nonetheless. This is another reason why a carefully planned transition is essential, so that the gains made during a peacekeeping deployment can be sustained.

24. It must be acknowledged, however, that a comprehensive strategy, such as that advocated above, is not always possible in the short run. There are occasions when the most that can be hoped for is to establish a stabilizing presence based on a limited agreement. When for example the opportunity arises to consolidate a ceasefire and thereby contain the conflict and reduce human suffering, that opportunity should not be lost. In those circumstances, once a modicum of stability has been achieved, and the passions of the war have subsided, the improved political environment can enhance the chances of forging and implementing a lasting peace.

25. Even when a mandate has been successfully completed, the Security Council may still wish to review the situation. Are current achievements sustainable in the wake of a withdrawal? Could they be consolidated in a follow-on mission by the United Nations or a regional organization? Are the requisite capacity and resources assured? Will the next phase leave the situation better than the previous one?

Failure to complete the mandate

26. In other cases, the Security Council may determine that the situation on the ground has fundamentally changed, or that the mission is not making a positive contribution and that there are no apparent prospects for its doing so. Withdrawal might be made in recognition of the fact that failure sometimes occurs because conditions for an orderly transition to post-conflict peace-building do not materialize. The experiences of the United Nations in Angola and Somalia, for instance, illustrate that, while peacekeeping operations can make the difference between war and peace under the right conditions, they are not the appropriate tool under other circumstances, especially when the parties concerned adamantly refuse to cooperate or to abide by their own commitments. In such cases, however, other tools, such as authorized action by regional organizations, or multinational operations with the consent of the host State, or governmental or non-governmental initiatives to mediate a peace, might prove fruitful. Mission closure, as a result of the failure of the parties to abide by their agreements, does not represent an end to the responsibility of either the United Nations system or the Security Council, nor need it signal an end to the Council's involvement. Council members individually and collectively should consider what forms of leverage are available to address the conflict, including the recruiting of "Friends of the Secretary-General" to lend their influence to the restoration of peace. Given the stakes inherent in outright failure and withdrawal, the Council may wish to visit the crisis area, to signal its continuing interest; to gather first-hand information; and to promote new thinking and strategies among Council members about possible next steps.

27. When the members of the Security Council themselves are unable for a variety of reasons to maintain their commitment to seeing the mission through to a successful completion, the questions to be asked should focus on what alternatives to a United Nations peace operation are available for making a positive contribution. In this regard the continuing engagement of the humanitarian agencies, when their activities can be pursued in a fashion that does not endanger the lives of their personnel, will not be an adequate substitute for peacekeeping but can be essential for mitigating the effects of the withdrawal of the peace operation.

28. In the past decade, the experiences of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), one inter-state and one intra-state but both exiting without a follow-on strategy, have shown that closure can be costly in both financial and human terms. UNPREDEP was fulfilling its mandate,

monitoring the volatile borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and seemingly successfully deterring both cross-border attacks and lesser destabilizing incursions, when the Security Council chose to end it in 1999. Current border challenges by armed insurgent groups operating with bases in Kosovo might have been avoided had UNPREDEP been permitted to continue, albeit in reduced form. The genocide in Rwanda that followed the Council decision to radically reduce, rather than reinforce, the capacities of UNAMIR has occasioned soul-searching and painful assessments of responsibility, including those made by the Independent Inquiry. Failure by both the Secretariat and the Security Council to prevent or halt the genocide once its extent became known has been documented. It is also worth noting that when the international community belatedly accepted responsibility for addressing the humanitarian crisis in the Great Lakes region, the consequent costs of refugee assistance vastly exceeded the largest estimates of the costs of a reinforced UNAMIR. For example, in financial terms, the actual cost of UNAMIR was $4.37 million; the annual cost of the additional 5,000 soldiers the Force Commander, General Romeo Dallaire, thought were needed to prevent or stop the genocide has been estimated at $500 million; the cost of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda and the region consequent on the genocide was in excess of $4.5 billion.

Partial success

29. Between clear-cut success and failure there lies a large grey area. When confronted with an ambiguous situation, the Security Council may consider withdrawing an operation that is making a positive contribution in some respects but is being stymied in others. In this uncertain realm, it might be helpful to ask the following: Has the peace operation had a positive impact on the lives of those caught in the crisis? Is the country better off than it would have been without a United Nations peacekeeping operation? Fundamentally for the purposes of this report, are the gains sustainable if the operation were to be withdrawn? These types of question may be appropriate when a mission has achieved many aspects of its mandate but is unable to meet all of its goals.

30. The decision-making process is further complicated in situations where the mission has a less encouraging record and an uncertain outlook, and/or casualties or other costs have exceeded expectations. In such cases, the Security Council should critically re-evaluate the mission's mandate. Is a lower-profile but open-ended mission the best alternative in the absence of a political solution? If the decision is to stay the course, is there a capacity to deter emerging war entrepreneurs or spoilers and/or to counter them through political means? What re-designs in the exit strategy might, as discussed above, successfully assist a transition to a more stable situation or a sustainable peace?

31. The experience in Haiti in 1993 illustrates just such a situation. It was found that the terms of the Governors Island Agreement could not be implemented, given the intransigence of the Cédras regime. The United States of America and the elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, then approached the Security Council with a view to authorizing a multinational intervention. Following the transition from the multinational force to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the United Nations took over the peacekeeping and peace-building functions, providing security, helping to build an effective police force, and assisting in reconstruction and rehabilitation. UNMIH and its successor operations supported the Haitian elections and cooperated with the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), which promoted human rights, and the Organization of American States Electoral Observation Mission. These activities together contributed to a restoration of the legitimately elected Government.

32. In this connection, I wish to highlight a critical hindrance to the ability of the United Nations to implement successfully and efficiently the type of long-term, multiphase mandate that has been suggested throughout this report. It is the weak link of voluntary funding to support programmes which are not part of the peacekeeping operation per se, but on which the ultimate success of the mission may depend. Such voluntary contributions often materialize late or not at all, leaving the peacekeeping operation as an insufficient single prong in what was intended to be a multi-pronged strategy. For example, if an operation is ultimately to hand over its functions to national authorities who require training and equipment, are donors prepared to provide the means? If the operation is to provide stability while the boundary is being demarcated, as in the cases of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and UNMEE, is

there money for the boundary commission? If there is a window of opportunity to remove the war option by demobilizing and reintegrating combatants, are there resources to move this process past the point of no return? Understanding the inherent problem of moving major, long-term expenditures to assessed contributions, Council members may wish to exercise their influence individually and collectively to help muster the requisite voluntary contributions in a timely manner.

33.   This is important at the outset of a peacekeeping operation, as well as at the time when it is phased out and replaced with a follow-on presence, such as a peace-building mission. This funding gap will have to be addressed if the Security Council is to enjoy a record of achievement in helping to foster successful peacekeeping exits as well as a self-sustaining peace in their aftermath.

34.   Resources can never be a substitute for the political will of the parties. When the parties are prepared to cooperate, however, an adequately resourced United Nations presence can be crucial to the consolidation of peace. Action to remedy this funding gap in future cases of transition would constitute a highly positive and tangible result of the debate that was initiated by the Council on 15 November 2000, and that will continue with consideration of the present report.

Operations under Chapter VIII of the Charter

35.   While provision for cooperation with regional organizations is made in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, this has become an important aspect of peacekeeping only in the last decade. By bringing together the motivation and knowledge of local actors with the legitimacy, expertise and resources of the world Organization, in certain situations these partnerships have enhanced the international community's work for peace.

36.   At the same time, the ability of regional organizations to contribute may be limited by a number of factors. Conflicts will continue to erupt in areas where regional organizations lack the resources or expertise to respond effectively; where there are no compelling interests that could spur intervention by major powers; or, alternatively, where major powers have strongly opposed interests that can be reconciled only within a universal forum. There may be political

opposition to regional deployment in a particular case, either within the organization or from a host country. Even where regional organizations are capable of contributing, the use of multiple organizations in a single mission area can cause problems of coordination, and greater difficulty in constructing a coherent end-strategy for an operation.

37.   For the United Nations, there are concerns that delegation to others can imply a lesser degree of commitment or engagement on the part of the international community; that it could lead to unequal response to conflict in different places; or that inappropriate actions could be taken in the name of the United Nations. The Security Council's continuing will to act, including through deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations, is crucial.

38.   Four specific lessons can be extracted from this experience:

- First, those who will be responsible for implementing a peace agreement should be present during the negotiation phase.

- Second, it is important for the main actors in negotiations to assess realistically the capacity and comparative advantage of different implementing bodies.

- Third, the lines of reporting and division of labour must be unambiguous; otherwise what would ideally be strength in diversity of contributions becomes weakness because of incoherent or self-cancelling efforts.

- Finally, for the potential of these partnerships between the United Nations and regional organizations to be enhanced, it is desirable that regional organizations seek to develop their capacity to bring to the field not only military peacekeepers but also other relevant personnel, such as police and judicial or penal experts. These efforts may require support by the wider international community.

Kosovo and East Timor

39.   The cases of Kosovo and East Timor reflect important differences in circumstances and illustrate well the challenges of a successful exit strategy. In the case of Kosovo, the mandated benchmark for the exit of UNMIK is tied to a determination of the final status of the territory. No agreement which would command

the necessary support of the parties and the international community appears in sight on this question at this time.

40.   In keeping with the mandate, the operation has begun to devolve increasing autonomy and self-government to Kosovo, while avoiding any actions that would prejudge the outcome on final status. This requires my Special Representative to retain certain powers, and an operation capable of supporting him in that role.

41.   In the meantime, there is an unavoidable tension between the aspirations of people in Kosovo and the mandate given by the Security Council. There seems no alternative, in these circumstances, to a continuing UNMIK presence, and the strict implementation of resolution 1244 (1999), until such time as an agreement on final status can be reached.

42.   In the case of East Timor, the situation is much clearer. The mandate of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is to prepare East Timor for independence, which will be granted, after which UNTAET will be closed. In order to ensure that independence is successful and viable, a follow-on peacekeeping mission will be required to support the new State. The new operation should include military and police components. In addition, the international community will still need to provide substantial civil administration expertise to support the East Timorese.

43.   The essential requirement in the case of East Timor is to ensure that the enormous sacrifices of the East Timorese, the substantial investments of the international community, and the cooperation of the parties required to bring about a successful transition to independence are not squandered for lack of international attention and support for the new State. At the same time, it is important to move towards a normal development assistance framework as quickly as is responsibly possible.

IV. The roles of the Security Council and other principal organs

44.   In conclusion, I will address the particular roles of the Security Council and other principal United Nations organs and agencies in formulating and implementing these vital decisions. A good exit strategy results from a good entrance strategy. In this

connection, the Security Council is expected to reach agreement on a clear and achievable mandate based on a common understanding of the nature of the conflict. The Secretariat should provide the candid and well-informed analysis that the Security Council's decision on an effective peace strategy will require. The members of the Council are expected to use their influence to ensure from the outset that the necessary means of implementation are available, and it is up to the General Assembly to authorize a timely budget allocation. Perhaps most importantly, as a mandate approaches its expiration date or if there are calls for the operation to be closed, it is especially useful for the Security Council to engage in a thorough and frank discussion, both among its members and with troop-contributing countries, of the rationale for renewing the mandate, withdrawing, or significantly downgrading the United Nations presence. In making that decision, the Council may wish to continue and to expand its practice of visiting conflict areas, because of the obvious benefits reaped by decision makers from such first-hand experience. This can be an essential complement to reports by the Secretariat and information that each Council member may obtain through its own channels.

Designing a strategically informed mandate

45.   An effective response to a conflict depends on the Security Council members developing a common understanding of the nature of the problem. I endeavour to provide in my reporting the best, most pertinent information available to the Secretariat, including that obtained through the dispatch of fact-finding and technical missions to the area. Analysis of this information is inherent in the preparation of my reports, the purpose of which is to provide all Council members with a common point of departure for discussion and decision-making, identifying options for action as appropriate, coupled with a realistic appraisal of the risks and opportunities of each.

46.   This appraisal should assist the Council in deciding on a realistic scope for United Nations involvement. For example, does the situation lend itself to an operation that can assist the parties to achieve a self-sustaining peace, as was the case, for example, in El Salvador, Mozambique and Namibia? Or is it more appropriate to think in terms of a longer-term, stabilizing presence, because no self-sustaining political solution is in sight as was the case, for

example, upon the establishment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)? As discussed above, does the proposed authority of the international mandate — whether monitoring, multidimensional assistance, or enforcing — fit the nature of the conflict and the local resources available and ensure sufficient capacity to develop a sustainable peace? Should the Council's response be confined to one country, or can the situation be meaningfully addressed only on a subregional basis?

47.   At this critical point in the decision-making process, there is a particular pitfall to be avoided. When the situation is extremely difficult and the Security Council cannot muster the collective will to address it, there may be a temptation to use the instrument of peacekeeping in circumstances for which it is not suited, as it was used in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). This can alleviate political pressures in the short run but dooms the operation to eventual failure. There are also broader repercussions, not least the damage that is done to the credibility of the Organization itself, of the Security Council in particular, and of peacekeeping as a viable tool for the maintenance of international peace and security.

48.   Given that decisions made at this early stage are fundamental to an operation's success, it is crucial to strengthen the Secretariat's capacity to provide credible, impartial analysis to support the Council's deliberations. With this in mind, I wish to note with appreciation the support extended thus far for the reform initiatives set in motion by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations. The task is unfinished, and I look forward to a continuation of this support so that we can quickly build a Headquarters capacity that is prepared to meet the demands of the early twenty-first century.

49.   I wish to stress that sound and efficient information gathering and analysis must be an ongoing process, throughout the life span of any United Nations involvement; it cannot be limited to only the earliest stages of Security Council deliberation and action. After a course is decided upon by the Security Council, events on the ground may change or new information may come to light which affect the assumptions and calculations upon which earlier decisions were made. The Security Council must have the same quality of supporting analysis when undertaking periodic reviews

or when contemplating a substantial change in a mission's mandate.

Implementation

50.   Once the Security Council has settled on a course of action, it often has a major role to play in consolidating support for the plan among the parties, regional actors, troop-contributing countries, and Member States more generally. Each of these can be crucial to the mission's ultimate success or failure. The support of the parties, however, remains a fundamental element in this regard. As deployment proceeds, Council members are often in the best position to shore up that support and, in the process, to gauge the possibility of the emergence of spoilers. Both the Security Council and the Secretariat must resist the temptation to identify and frame a mission's objective in an optimistic light; they must instead be prepared for worst-case scenarios. While this sort of planning mind-set rarely leads to lower budget estimates, it is a matter of public record that, on many occasions, when significant complications arose in the field, United Nations forces have been caught under-staffed, under-equipped and limited in their range of action by mandates that were too narrowly defined.

51.   Gaining the support of potential troop contributors is likely to be an easier task if they are effectively consulted on the mandate that the Council eventually adopts, or on the mandate changes that may become necessary as the operation unfolds. In this regard, I am encouraged by the spirit of cooperation signalled by the establishment of a Security Council working group to address this and related issues.

52.   No matter how carefully a mission is conceived and tailored to the circumstances, it cannot succeed — and thereby withdraw on the basis of an accomplished mandate — without the timely contribution and deployment of personnel, material and funds. The increasing complexity of mandates, while a necessary response to the types of challenge facing the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security, has compounded this problem. It has become critically important that Governments provide specialized units and individuals capable of implementing these mandates. Recent examples would include provisions for judicial and penal services, civil administration or civil engineering tasks and executive policing. While there will almost always be a need for the timely contribution of well-trained and equipped

troops, these are not by themselves sufficient for the success of most operations. Member States must be prepared to supply the specialized capacities, military and non-military alike, to see these mandates through.

53.   The General Assembly can play a crucial role in implementing a recommendation of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations regarding peacekeeping budgets. The Panel suggested that a small percentage of the operation's first-year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission for the design — with the advice of the United Nations country team's resident coordinator — and funding of quick impact projects in the area of operations. I hope the General Assembly, through its Fifth Committee, will support this recommendation, on a case-by-case basis, when budgets for future peace operations are presented. Likewise, the Panel recommended that the Assembly consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of multidimensional peace operations for the first phase of an operation. Accordingly, I intend to include comprehensive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in my plans for future peace operations, as appropriate, so that the Security Council can consider including aspects of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in the operations' mandates and the General Assembly can review proposals for funding demobilization and reintegration programmes, in the start-up phase, in mission budgets. I am pleased, in this connection, to note the willingness of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations to explore the concept of earmarking a small percentage of a mission's first-year budget for quick impact projects and its call for the timely provision of adequate resources for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes when they are mandated by the Security Council as part of a peacekeeping operation.

54.   At the request of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council has recently created an ad hoc advisory group on countries emerging from conflict, with a special focus on Africa. As one representative of a Member State suggested during the Security Council debate, this work should also yield important results in informing the smooth handover from peace operations to the longer-term efforts of the

United Nations to promote durable peace and sustainable development.

Rationales for leaving, staying, or altering the mandate

55.   At what point in a peace process should the Security Council consider closing a mission, or significantly downgrading its involvement in a situation? In the simplest of terms, any such decision would appear to be influenced by success or failure as judged in relation to the mandate given to the operation by the Council. However, it is in the grey area between clear success and failure that a decision becomes complex.

56.   In some cases, the Security Council has determined that the mission achieved its mandate. In Mozambique, it was concluded that ONUMOZ had accomplished its objectives, and that there was no need to renew the mission's mandate. In the case of El Salvador, similarly, ONUSAL succeeded in helping the parties towards a lasting peace. At the time of the Mission's withdrawal, however, there were still some aspects of the accords that had not been implemented. As a result, and at the request of the parties, the United Nations maintained a smaller presence after ONUSAL was withdrawn in 1995. In other circumstances, as noted by Council members in the November debate, follow-on peace-building missions, such as the Peace-building Support Offices in the Central African Republic and Tajikistan, have been established to assist the Governments concerned in consolidating the stability achieved through the peacekeeping operation.

57.   More challenging than these situations, however, is deciding upon a course of action when success is proving elusive. Given the unpredictability of conflicts, this is by no means an unusual circumstance. How long should the operation remain? Would the alternative be renewed fighting? Is there a reasonable prospect for progress resulting from a continued United Nations presence? Is this the "least bad" option? If the answer to those questions were yes, the argument for persevering would be strong. During the Council's November debate one representative aptly noted that, if the Security Council does not deal with the causes of conflict, the United Nations will be reduced to dealing with the consequences of conflict, meaning that agencies … such as the United Nations Children's Fund, the Office of the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme will end up paying the consequences.

58. In other circumstances, finally, the Security Council may determine that, in the absence of sufficient commitment and cooperation on the part of the parties, there is no rationale for maintaining the peacekeeping operation in place. In Angola and Somalia, for example, the Council concluded that withdrawing the missions was the only viable course of action. Reconciliation cannot be imposed. A peacekeeping operation is the wrong instrument if the parties are bent on war and its presence may become a hindrance to conflict resolution. In the latter circumstances, however, adequate provision must be made for continuing progress already made towards a self-sustaining peace, or, should a premature closure of a mission become necessary, mitigating the humanitarian consequences of the decision reached by the Council.

Annex

Key questions in the life of a peacekeeping operation

Mandate formation	Periodic or episodic review	Consideration of withdrawal
What is a realistic scope for United Nations involvement? A multidimensional effort with the appropriate level of authority to achieve a self-sustaining peace? A longer-term stabilizing presence?	Is satisfactory progress being made, and is it anticipated that existing trends will continue?	If the mandate's objectives were met, should they be reviewed in new circumstances?
How will we know that the mandate has been achieved? What are the benchmarks by which to judge success?	Do parties and troop-contributing countries continue to support the mission and its objectives?	What are the views of parties and troop-contributing countries?
If success (and hence a successful exit) depends on activities not funded through assessed contributions, can we be assured that voluntary funding will be available in time?	If spoilers have surfaced, what leverage does the Security Council have at its disposal to induce them back to the peace process?	Are current achievements sustainable in the wake of a withdrawal?
Why have the parties agreed to the proposed mandate?	Do donors continue to support the elements funded by voluntary contributions?	Could these achievements be consolidated in a follow-on mission? (United Nations or regional organization? Is funding assured?)
Does their consent and cooperation result from war weariness; from the conclusion that they can get as much or more through the peace process than on the battlefield; from pressures from key internal constituencies; from pressures brought to bear by erstwhile supporters or other external players?	If fundamental problems exist, are they the result of inappropriate objectives?	If the mission's impact has been very limited, should the Security Council revisit the original objectives?
	For those elements lagging in implementation, how can they be assisted?	If there is little prospect of achieving the mandate, is the mission nevertheless making a necessary contribution which warrants its extension? Should the original objective be revised to reflect this reality?
	Does the original time frame continue to make sense?	With a mixed record, and dim prospects, what are the costs and benefits of remaining and withdrawing?
Whatever the factors involved, are consent and cooperation sustainable as	Have any political alternatives appeared since the mission's launch?	If the mission is deemed a failure, what other

Mandate formation	Periodic or episodic review	Consideration of withdrawal
the peace process moves forward? (For example, if a party enters the process on the assumption that it will win an election, and it later becomes apparent that it will lose, will it still be in a position to pursue the war option? If so, will the Security Council have leverage with which to forestall this possibility?) What will be the alternatives in the event that spoilers emerge, or parties who may have accepted a ceasefire for the sole purpose of buying time within which to rebuild their war capacity? How viable is the war option for the parties, and how can it be made less attractive or practical? Are the necessary troops, police and other personnel available in the short term? or in the medium term? If this mission is to provide a longer-term, stabilizing presence, is it likely that personnel contributors will be available throughout the life of the operation? Have we prepared our respective publics for the risks and costs, or promoted an understanding of why these are warranted?		means does the Security Council have to play a positive role in this situation?

Appendix G: Foreword to the IDDRS

UNITED NATIONS   **NATIONS UNIES**

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
--
FOREWORD TO THE INTEGRATED
DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION STANDARDS
December 2006

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is a prerequisite for post-conflict stability and recovery. Of course, there can be no substitute for national leadership and the political commitment of warring parties to disarm and demobilize. But in a peacekeeping environment, a successful DDR programme depends heavily on the ability of the United Nations system to plan, manage and implement a coherent and effective DDR strategy.

As a leading partner in this work, the United Nations is well placed to collate knowledge and to develop common standards. These *Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS)*, along with their accompanying *Operational Guide to the IDDRS* and *DDR Briefing Note for Senior Managers,* draw upon the accumulated experiences, lessons learnt and best practices of the United Nations system. Developed jointly by staff members from peacekeeping missions, UN country teams and headquarters, they provide guidance and operational tools for all aspects of the DDR process. They are also intended to serve as a repository of new knowledge by means of the UN DDR Resource Centre (www.unddr.org).

I introduced the IDDRS in my report to the General Assembly (A/60/705), and this guidance now forms the substantive basis on which Member States engage with and support DDR programmes. The IDDRS have also been formally adopted by all 15 members of the Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, as well as the United Nations Executive Committee on Peace and Security. This means they are the definitive resource for all our staff working on DDR issues, at every level in headquarters, integrated missions and UN country teams, and will be the reference from which all current and future programmes are planned, implemented and reviewed.

As with all guidance documents, the IDDRS need to be tailored to the specific context of our work; they also need to be updated regularly to reflect the latest lessons and needs. I hope that all colleagues and partners working in this vital area will find the IDDRS a useful tool, and I encourage you to provide feedback and comments so that our knowledge in this evolving field can be expanded continuously.

Kofi A. Annan

UNITED NATIONS

SECURITY

COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/11052/Rev.1
27 October 1973

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of
Security Council resolution 340 (1973)

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973 in which the Council, among other things, decided to set up immediately a United Nations Emergency Force under its authority and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect.

Terms of reference

2. (a) The Force will supervise the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973), which reads as follows:

"1. Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22 October 1973;".

(b) The Force will use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting, and co-operate with the International Committee of the Red Cross in its humanitarian endeavours in the area.

(c) In the fulfilment of its tasks, the Force will have the co-operation of the military observers of UNTSO.

General considerations

3. Three essential conditions must be met for the Force to be effective. Firstly, it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council. Secondly, it must operate with the full co-operation of the parties concerned. Thirdly, it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit.

4. Having in mind past experience, I would suggest the following guidelines for the proposed Force:

(a) The Force will be under the command of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General, under the authority of the Security Council. The command in the field will be exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the consent of the Security Council. The Commander will be responsible to the Secretary-General.

/...

73-22960

The Secretary-General shall keep the Security Council fully informed of developments relating to the functioning of the Force. All matters which may affect the nature or the continued effective functioning of the Force will be referred to the Council for its decision.

(b) The Force must enjoy the freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for the performance of its tasks. The Force and its personnel should be granted all relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. The Force should operate at all times separately from the armed forces of the parties concerned. Consequently separate quarters and, wherever desirable and feasible, buffer zones will have to be arranged with the co-operation of the parties. Appropriate agreements on the Status of the Force will have to be concluded with the parties to cover the above requirements.

(c) The Force will be composed of a number of contingents to be provided by selected countries, upon the request of the Secretary-General. The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation.

(d) The Force will be provided with weapons of a defensive character only. It shall not use force except in self-defence. Self-defence would include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council. The Force will proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict will take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council.

(e) In performing its functions, the Force will act with complete impartiality and will avoid actions which could prejudice the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned which in no way affect the implementation of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 340 (1973) and operative paragraph 1 of resolution 339 (1973).

(f) The supporting personnel of the Force will be provided as a rule by the Secretary-General from among existing United Nations staff. Those personnel will, of course, follow the rules and regulations of the United Nations Secretariat.

Proposed plan of action

5. If the Security Council is in agreement with the principles outlined above, I intend to take the following urgent steps:

(a) I propose, with the consent of the Security Council, to appoint the Commander of the Emergency Force as soon as possible. Pending the Commander's arrival in the mission area, with the consent of the Council given at its meeting of 25 October 1973, I have appointed the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General E. Siilasvuo, as interim Commander of the Emergency Force, and have asked him to set up a provisional headquarters staff consisting of personnel from UNTSO.

S/11052/Rev.1
English
Page 3

(b) In order that the Force may fulfil the responsibilities entrusted to it, it is considered necessary that it have a total strength in the order of 7,000.

(c) The Force would initially be stationed in the area for a period of six months.

(d) In my letter of 25 October to the President of the Security Council, I proposed, as an urgent interim measure and in order that the Emergency Force may reach the area as soon as possible, to arrange for the contingents of Austria, Finland and Sweden now serving with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to proceed immediately to Egypt. I am at present actively engaged in the necessary consultations, bearing in mind the considerations in paragraph 4 (c) above, with a view to making requests to a number of other Governments to provide contingents of suitable size for the Force at the earliest possible time. As the Members of the Council are aware, this is a complex matter in which a number of factors have to be taken into account. I shall report further to the Council as soon as possible.

(e) In addition to the countries requested to provide contingents for the Force, I propose to request logistic support as necessary from a number of other countries, which may include the Permanent Members of the Security Council.

Estimated cost and method of financing

6. At the present time there are many unknown factors. The best possible preliminary estimate based upon past experience and practice is approximately $30,000,000 for a Force of 7,000, all ranks, for a period of six months.

7. The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter.

UNITED NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/PRST/1994/22
3 May 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3372nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 3 May 1994, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "An agenda for peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"Aware of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council has begun its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General entitled 'Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping' of 14 March 1994 (S/26450). The Security Council welcomes the useful account the report provides of the measures the Secretary-General has taken to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to undertake peace-keeping operations. The Security Council notes that this report follows the report of the Secretary-General entitled 'An Agenda for Peace' (S/24111) and that it responds to the statements made by successive Presidents of the Security Council on 'An Agenda for Peace', including in particular the statement made by the President of the Security Council on 28 May 1993 (S/25859).

"The Security Council notes that the report 'Improving the capacity of the United Nations for peace-keeping' has been transmitted to the General Assembly and also notes that the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations has made recommendations on the report.

"Establishment of Peace-keeping Operations

"The Security Council recalls that the statement made by its President on 28 May 1993 (S/25859) stated, inter alia, that United Nations peace-keeping operations should be conducted in accordance with a number of operational principles, consistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. In that context, the Security Council is conscious of the need for the political goals, mandate, costs, and, where possible, the estimated time-frame of United Nations peace-keeping operations to be clear and precise, and of the requirement for the mandates of peace-keeping operations to be subject to periodic review. The Council will respond to situations on a case-by-case basis. Without prejudice to its ability to do so and to respond rapidly and flexibly as circumstances require, the

Council considers that the following factors, among others, should be taken into account when the establishment of new peace-keeping operations is under consideration:

- whether a situation exists the continuation of which is likely to endanger or constitute a threat to international peace and security;

- whether regional or subregional organizations and arrangements exist and are ready and able to assist in resolving the situation;

- whether a cease-fire exists and whether the parties have committed themselves to a peace process intended to reach a political settlement;

- whether a clear political goal exists and whether it can be reflected in the mandate;

- whether a precise mandate for a United Nations operation can be formulated;

- whether the safety and security of United Nations personnel can be reasonably ensured, including in particular whether reasonable guarantees can be obtained from the principal parties or factions regarding the safety and security of United Nations personnel; in this regard it reaffirms its statement of 31 March 1993 (S/25493) and its resolution 868 (1993) of 29 September 1993.

"The Security Council should also be provided with an estimate of projected costs for the start-up phase (initial 90 days) of the operation and the first six months, as well as for the resulting increase in total projected annualized United Nations peace-keeping expenditures, and should be informed of the likely availability of resources for the new operation.

"The Security Council emphasizes the need for the full cooperation of the parties concerned in implementing the mandates of peace-keeping operations as well as relevant decisions of the Security Council.

"Ongoing Review of Operations

"The Security Council notes that the increasing number and complexity of peace-keeping operations, and of situations likely to give rise to proposals for peace-keeping operations, may require measures to improve the quality and speed of the flow of information available to support Council decision-making. The Security Council will keep this question under consideration.

"The Security Council welcomes the enhanced efforts made by the Secretariat to provide information to the Council and underlines the importance of further improving the briefing for Council members on matters of special concern.

"Communication with Non-Members of the Security Council (including Troop Contributors)

"The Security Council recognizes the implications which its decisions on peace-keeping operations have for the Members of the United Nations and in particular for troop-contributing countries.

"The Security Council welcomes the increased communication between members and non-members of the Council and believes that the practice of monthly consultations between the President of the Security Council and competent groups of Member States on the Council's programme of work (which includes matters relating to peace-keeping operations) should be continued.

"The Security Council is conscious of the need for enhanced consultations and exchange of information with troop-contributing countries regarding peace-keeping operations, including their planning, management and coordination, particularly when significant extensions in an operation's mandate are in prospect. Such consultations can take a variety of forms involving Member States, troop-contributing countries, members of the Security Council and the Secretariat.

"The Security Council believes that when major events occur regarding peace-keeping operations, including decisions to change or extend a mandate, there is a particular need for members of the Council to seek to exchange views with troop contributors, including by way of informal communications between the Council's President or its members and troop contributors.

"The recent practice of the Secretariat convening meetings of troop contributors, in the presence, as appropriate, of Council members, is welcome and should be developed. The Council also encourages the Secretariat to convene regular meetings for troop contributors and Council members to hear reports from Special Representatives of the Secretary-General or Force Commanders and, as appropriate, to make situation reports on peace-keeping operations available at frequent and regular intervals.

"The Security Council will keep under review arrangements for communication with non-members of the Council.

"Stand-by Arrangements

"The Security Council attaches great importance to improving the capacity of the United Nations to meet the need for rapid deployment and reinforcement of peace-keeping operations.

"In this context the Security Council welcomes the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report of 14 March 1994 concerning stand-by arrangements and capabilities. The Security Council notes the intention of the Secretary-General to devise stand-by arrangements or capabilities which Member States could maintain at an agreed state of readiness as a possible contribution to a United Nations peace-keeping operation and welcomes the commitments undertaken by a number of Member States.

"The Security Council welcomes the request by the Secretary-General to Member States to respond positively to this initiative and encourages Member States to do so in so far as possible.

"The Security Council encourages the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to include civilian personnel, such as police, in the present stand-by arrangements planning initiative.

"The Security Council also encourages the Secretary-General to ensure that the Stand-by Arrangements Management Unit carry on its work, including the periodic updating of the list of units and resources.

"The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to report by 30 June 1994 and thereafter at least once a year on progress with this initiative.

"The Council will keep this matter under review in order to make recommendations or take decisions required in this regard.

"Civilian Personnel

"The Security Council welcomes the observations made by the Secretary-General in his report in respect of civilian personnel, including civilian police, and invites Member States to respond positively to requests to contribute such personnel to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

"The Security Council attaches importance to full coordination between the different components, military and civilian, of a peace-keeping operation, particularly a multifaceted one. This coordination should extend throughout the planning and implementation of the operation, both at United Nations Headquarters and in the field.

"Training

"The Security Council recognizes that the training of personnel for peace-keeping operations is essentially the responsibility of Member States, but encourages the Secretariat to continue the development of basic guidelines and performance standards and to provide descriptive materials.

"The Security Council notes the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations on training of peace-keeping personnel. It invites Member States to cooperate with each other in the provision of facilities for this purpose.

"Command and Control

"The Security Council stresses that as a leading principle United Nations peace-keeping operations should be under the operational control of the United Nations.

"The Security Council welcomes the call by the General Assembly (resolution 48/43) that the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the

members of the Security Council, troop-contributing States and other interested Member States, take urgent action on the question of command and control, notes the comments of the Secretary-General in his report of 14 March 1994 and looks forward to his further report on the matter.

"Financial and Administrative Issues

"Bearing in mind the responsibilities of the General Assembly under Article 17 of the Charter, the Security Council notes the Secretary-General's observations and recommendations on budgetary matters relating to peace-keeping operations in his report of 14 March 1994 and notes also that his report has been referred to the General Assembly for its consideration.

"The Security Council confirms that estimates of the financial implications of peace-keeping operations are required from the Secretariat before decisions on mandates or extensions are taken so that the Council is able to act in a financially responsible way.

"Conclusion

"The Security Council will give further consideration to the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General."

Appendix J: Security Council Resolution 1353 (2001)

United Nations

S/RES/1353 (2001)

![UN Logo] **Security Council**

Distr.: General
13 June 2001

Resolution 1353 (2001)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 4326th meeting, on 13 June 2001

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 1318 (2000) of 7 September 2000 and 1327 (2000) of 13 November 2000 and the statements by its President of 3 May 1994 (S/PRST/1994/22) and 28 March 1996 (S/PRST/1996/13), and all other relevant statements by its President,

Recalling also the statement of its President of 31 January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3),

Taking into consideration the views expressed at its debate on the subject "Strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries" at its 4257th meeting on 16 January 2001,

Reaffirming its commitment to the Purposes of the Charter of the United Nations as set out in Article 1, paragraphs 1 to 4, of the Charter, and to the Principles of the Charter as set out in Article 2, paragraphs 1 to 7, of the Charter, including its commitment to the principles of the political independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of all States, and to respect for the sovereignty of all States,

Reaffirming its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security, *reiterating* its commitment to enhance the capacity of the United Nations in this area, and *emphasizing* its willingness to take all necessary steps within its competence to that end,

Recalling the relevant recommendations in the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (S/2000/809), and *reaffirming* its support for all efforts to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Stressing the need to ensure the safety and security of peacekeepers and other United Nations and associated personnel, including humanitarian personnel,

Stressing the need to improve the relationship between the Security Council, the troop-contributing countries and the Secretariat to foster a spirit of partnership, cooperation, confidence and mutual trust,

Recognizing the need to strengthen cooperation with troop-contributing countries, as part of a series of measures to ensure more coherent and integrated concepts of operations and to enhance managerial efficiency and operational effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping operations,

Noting that relevant provisions contained in the annexes to the present resolution pertain also to strengthening cooperation with countries contributing civilian police and other personnel,

1. *Agrees* to adopt the decisions and recommendations contained in the annexes to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* its Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations to continue its work on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to establish and support efficient and effective peacekeeping operations;

3. *Undertakes* to follow closely the implementation of the agreed measures for cooperation with troop-contributing countries, and requests its Working Group for Peacekeeping Operations to assess within six months of the adoption of this resolution the efficiency and effectiveness of the agreed measures, consider their further improvement taking into account the proposals of the troop-contributing countries and to report to the Council on these matters;

4. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex I

A

Statement of principles on cooperation with troop-contributing countries

The Security Council

1. *Recognizes* that its partnership with troop-contributing countries can be strengthened by the assumption by Member States, in particular those with the greatest capacity and means to do so, of their shared responsibility to provide personnel, assistance and facilities to the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security;

2. *Encourages* Member States to take steps to bridge the commitment gap with regard to personnel and equipment for specific United Nations peacekeeping operations;

3. *Emphasizes* the importance of troop-contributing countries taking the necessary and appropriate steps to ensure the capability of their peacekeepers to fulfil the missions' mandate, and *underlines* the importance of bilateral and international cooperation in this regard, including in the area of training, logistics and equipment;

4. *Underlines* the importance of ensuring that national contingents participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations receive effective and appropriate support from the Secretariat, including in the area of training, logistics and equipment;

5. *Stresses* the need to ensure that the Secretariat is given sufficient human and financial resources to fulfil these tasks, and that these resources be used efficiently and effectively;

6.   *Underlines* that consultations between the Security Council, the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries should enhance the ability of the Security Council to make appropriate, effective and timely decisions in fulfilling its responsibilities;

7.   *Underlines also* the need to maintain a comprehensive approach to improving the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations from their conception, including in preparing contingency plans for volatile situations, and promoting cohesive exit strategies;

B
Operational issues

1.   *Encourages* international cooperation and support for peacekeeping training, including the establishment of regional peacekeeping training centres, and *stresses* the need for technical support from the Secretary-General to such centres;

2.   *Requests* the Secretary-General to include information on his consultations with troop-contributing countries in his regular reports to the Security Council on individual peacekeeping operations, and *undertakes* to take account of the views expressed in these consultations and in its meetings with troop-contributing countries when taking decisions on such operations;

3.   *Also requests* the Secretary-General to convene assessments meetings with interested delegations, in particular troop-contributing countries, at appropriate stages of each peacekeeping operation as a part of his efforts to draw the lessons that can be learned, which should be taken into account in the conduct and planning of current and future operations;

4.   *Further requests* the Secretary-General to take into account in the conduct of peacekeeping operations and in the regular lessons-learned process, the operational experiences of national contingents while in the field or following departure;

5.   *Undertakes* to inform troop-contributing countries fully of the terms of reference of missions of the Security Council involving peacekeeping operations and subsequently of the conclusions of the missions;

6.   *Expresses* its view that the conduct of reconnaissance visits to the mission area by countries committing troops can be highly valuable in preparing for effective participation in peacekeeping operations, and *encourages* support for such visits;

7.   *Urges* the Secretary-General to take further steps to implement the proposal of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations to create integrated mission task forces, and to pursue other related capabilities to improve United Nations planning and support capacities;

8.   *Stresses* the need to improve the information and the analysis capacity of the United Nations Secretariat, with a view to improving the quality of advice to the Secretary-General, the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries;

9.   *Stresses also* that the Secretariat's advice to the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries should include a range of recommendations for action

on the basis of an objective assessment of the situation on the ground, rather than what Member States are presumed to be willing to support;

10.   *Underlines* the importance of an effective mission-specific public information and communications capacity within peacekeeping operations, in particular through campaigns to improve awareness of the objectives and scope of the mission within the local population in the mission area;

11.   *Stresses* the need for an effective public information programme to generate international public support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, and *stresses* also in this regard the need for special programmes, in particular in troop-contributing countries, to project the contribution of peacekeepers;

12.   *Underlines* in this regard the need for an effective public information capacity within the United Nations, and *takes note* in this regard of the proposals made by the Secretary-General to strengthen Secretariat planning and support for public information in peacekeeping operations (S/2000/1081);

C
Other mechanisms

1.   *Undertakes* to continue to consider the possibility of using the Military Staff Committee as one of the means of enhancing United Nations peacekeeping operations;

2.   *Expresses* its belief that Groups of Friends of the Secretary-General, as well as other informal mechanisms which might include troop-contributing countries, Security Council members, donors and the countries in the region, can play a useful role in increasing the coherence and effectiveness of United Nations action, and *stresses* that they should conduct their work in close cooperation with the Security Council;

D
Follow-up

1.   *Expresses* its intention to assess within six months the efficiency and effectiveness of its meetings with troop-contributing countries, with a view to the possibility of further improvement to the current system, including through the consideration of specific proposals of troop-contributing countries for new mechanisms;

2.   *Decides* to strengthen cooperation with the troop-contributing countries in addition to and on the basis of the principles and provisions contained in the resolution and the present annex by improving and expanding existing consultation mechanisms as elaborated in annex II, with a view to ensuring proper reflection of the views and concerns of troop-contributing countries.

Annex II
Format, procedures and documentation of meetings with the troop-contributing countries

The consultations with troop-contributing countries will take place in the following formats:

A.   Public or private meetings of the Security Council with the participation of troop-contributing countries;

B.   Consultation meetings with the troop-contributing countries;

C.   Meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries;

A
Public or private meetings of the Security Council

1.   The Security Council will hold public or private meetings with the participation of troop-contributing countries, including at their request, and without prejudice to the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, in order to ensure a full and high-level consideration of issues of critical importance to a specific peacekeeping operation;

2.   Such meetings may be held, in particular, when the Secretary-General has identified potential troop-contributing countries for a new or ongoing peacekeeping operation, when considering a change in, or renewal or completion of a peacekeeping mandate, or when there is a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground, including when it threatens the safety and security of United Nations peacekeepers;

B
Consultation meetings with the troop-contributing countries

1.   Consultation meetings with troop-contributing countries will continue as the principal means of consultation, and will continue to be convened and chaired by the President of the Security Council;

2.   Such consultation meetings may be convened, including at the request of troop-contributing countries, as appropriate at different stages of peacekeeping operations, including:

(a)   Mission planning, including the development of the concept of operations and the elaboration of the mandate of a new operation;

(b)   Any change in the mandate, in particular the broadening or narrowing of the scope of the mission, the introduction of new or additional functions or components, or a change in the authorization to use force;

(c)   The renewal of a mandate;

(d)   Significant or serious political, military or humanitarian developments;

(e)   A rapid deterioration of the security situation on the ground;

(f)   The termination, withdrawal or scaling down in size of the operation, including the transition from peacekeeping to post-conflict peace-building;

(g)   Before and after Council missions to a specific peacekeeping operation;

3.   The following parties will be invited to these meetings:

(a)   Countries contributing troops, military observers or civilian police to the peacekeeping operation;

(b)   Prospective troop-contributing countries as identified by the Secretary-General;

(c)   Relevant United Nations bodies and agencies, when they have specific contributions to make to the issue under discussion;

(d)   Other bodies and agencies, as observers, as appropriate;

(e)   Countries that make special contributions, such as other civilian personnel, contributions to trust funds, logistics, equipment and facilities and other contributions, as appropriate;

(f)   The host country/countries, as observers, as appropriate;

(g)   The representative of a regional or subregional organization or arrangement, contributing troops as appropriate;

(h)   Regional organizations, as observers when not contributing troops, as appropriate;

4.   Such consultation meetings will, as appropriate, include consideration of:

(a)   Preparations for the establishment of a peacekeeping mandate by the Security Council;

(b)   Operational issues, including the concept of operations, mission planning, authorization to use force, the chain of command, force structure, the unity and cohesion of the force, training and equipment, risk assessment and deployment;

(c)   Significant concerns of or recommendations by the Secretary-General, as set out in his report, a briefing note from the Secretariat or the Secretariat's oral briefing;

(d)   The specific concerns of troop-contributing countries, including those communicated to the President of the Security Council;

(e)   Progress in the accomplishment of the mission's tasks in different areas or mission components;

5.   The following measures will be ensured to improve the quality and effectiveness of such consultations:

(a)   An informal paper setting out the agenda, including issues to be covered and drawing attention to relevant background documentation, will be circulated by the President of the Security Council to the participants when inviting them to attend these meetings;

(b)   The Secretary-General should ensure, within the constraints of the Security Council's programme of work, that reports requested by the Security Council on specific peacekeeping operations are issued in good time to allow the timely holding of meetings with troop-contributing countries before discussion among Security Council members;

(c)   The Secretariat should also make fact sheets available to all participants at the beginning of these meetings;

(d)   The Secretary-General should ensure, where possible, that briefings are given by senior personnel working with the mission in the field;

(e)   The Secretary-General should ensure that briefings consist of an objective assessment and analysis of the political, military, humanitarian and human rights situations, where appropriate;

(f)   The Secretary-General should add value to the briefings by making them more user-friendly, including through the exploitation of information technology;

6.   The following arrangements will be made to ensure timely and appropriate communication of the concerns and views of troop-contributing countries, as expressed at the consultation meetings, to the members of the Security Council so that these concerns and views can receive due consideration:

•   The President of the Security Council will prepare, with the assistance of the Secretariat, and make available a summary of the content of such meetings;

•   The summary of discussion will be distributed to Council members in advance of informal consultations or of the next meeting on the relevant peacekeeping operation, where appropriate;

C
Meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries

The Security Council supports the existing practice of meetings between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries to discuss matters concerning specific peacekeeping operations, and also the participation at such meetings, where appropriate, of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, Force Commanders and Civilian Police Commissioners.

Other forms of consultations

The Security Council notes that the forms of consultations mentioned herein are not exhaustive and that consultations may take a variety of other forms, including formal or informal communication between the President of the Council or its members, the Secretary-General and the troop-contributing countries and, as appropriate, with other countries especially affected, including countries from the region concerned.

Appendix K: The Nature of Conflict

Causes of Violence

There are many theories as to the general causes of violence. A basic understanding of these causal factors of violence can help the peacekeeper design a strategy for their elimination. Causal factors are generally categorised as relating either to individuals or groups.

a. **Individual:** There are identifiable causes of violence in individuals which must be addressed if individual acts of violence are to be countered. As violence relates to an individual, fighting may be viewed as a physiological response which can be caused by selective education, propaganda, discrepancies between preferred and actual states of circumstance, and violations of basic survival and social needs. All of these causal factors may be further fuelled by frustration, drugs, alcohol, or success (power as a potentiator).

b. **Group:** It has been suggested that groups with mixed status are most likely to employ violence as a means of redressing their immediate position. Examples of such mixed groups would be: a numerically superior group with a declining share of a society's wealth; or, a wealthy group with only little political power; or, a military group with little wealth or power. Each of these might employ violence to improve their lot. Such discrepancies in groups can be exploited by those interested in inciting violence by further creating the "us" versus "them" dynamic, which promotes group cohesion through the creation of an external enemy.

Escalation

Whether between individuals or groups, once violence begins, it is prone to escalate. Escalation occurs when a conflict increases in intensity or when incidents related to the conflict occur more frequently. Escalation occurs very quickly when there is increased intransigence, hatred, and a spiral reaction which becomes increasingly difficult to counter. De-escalation techniques that highlight promoting cooperation and consent should be used to control and counter escalation.

De-escalation

There are three crucial tasks to carry out to further de-escalation: controlling the physical violence in a conflict, creating an atmosphere conducive to the promotion of consent and negotiation, and facilitating settlement and resolution. De-escalation can be described as a process involving five broad, overlapping phases which need to be coordinated into a comprehensive plan, as follows:

a. Separating the belligerent parties so as to stop the fighting. Whether or not they can be separated depends upon the nature and origins of the conflict and the means available to end it. Military actions must be coordinated with political ones, at all levels.

b. The employment of management techniques, incentives, as well as sanctions to support diplomatic efforts that would change the operational environment and bring about a settlement.

c. Using consent-promoting techniques to create the environment of trust and confidence that is necessary for political resolution.

d. Employment of diplomatic activities at the strategic level in order to produce conflict resolution. This includes two steps: the "settlement" portion in which the situation is stabilised but the sources of the conflict remain; and the "resolution" portion in which the conflict has been terminated with little risk of recurrence.

e. Finally, the conditions and causes that gave rise to the conflict are confronted and eliminated, mainly by using civilian, diplomatic, and humanitarian agencies to prevent a recurrence of violence. Reconstruction considerations, however, also need to be addressed throughout the process. It is expected that the long-term requirements of peace building alleviate the inclinations to use force and other aggressive techniques.

Appendix L: Techniques that Promote Consent

<u>Negotiation, Mediation, Arbitration, and Conciliation</u>

Description

Terms may be defined as follows:

a. Negotiation refers to direct dialogue between parties. If the PSO force is the negotiator, members of the UN troops will play an active role to achieve particular ends while protecting their own interests. For example, such negotiations might take place to secure the safe passage of humanitarian relief supplies.

b. Mediation describes the activities of a go-between who connects parties in a dispute. In this role, the UN peacekeeper has no position of his own to guard. Instead, he acts as the means whereby opposing parties communicate with each other and he encourages them to identify and reach solutions that are mutually agreeable.

c. Arbitration is used to control situations which might turn violent. In arbitration, an authoritative third party provides a binding judgement and imposes a settlement, after considering the opposing positions.

d. Conciliation describes how agreements resulting from successful negotiation, mediation, and arbitration have a reconciling effect on the opposing parties in a conflict.

The ultimate aim of negotiation and mediation is to reach agreements to which all parties have freely consented and which will help to contain or to de-escalate the conflict. In most PSO environments, there is initially less initial scope for arbitration, because arbitration requires a degree of control in a situation that may take some time to establish. At the tactical level, conciliation will normally reflect compromises reached between the aims of the participants and the PSO force.

Significance

Chapter 2 highlights the key significance of promoting and sustaining consent in PSO. Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter emphasizes the importance of negotiation, enquiry, mediation, and conciliation as the chief means of settling disputes. By using negotiation and mediation, positive relationships between the factions and the PSO force are formed, enabling them to reach agreement and promote the process of conciliation. As the PSO Force create objective and effective negotiations that are controlled and fostered at every level, a climate of mutual respect and cooperation develops. Therefore the techniques of negotiation and mediation are thought to be the primary and most potent means of developing peaceful, agreeable, and lasting solutions to conflict in all aspects of a PSO.

Requirement

Negotiation and mediation are required at all stages of a PSO and need to be exercised at every level. Consequently, all participants of a UN mission are involved, from senior commanders who meet with faction leaders, to individual soldiers at isolated observation points who find themselves trying to de-escalate an incident or arbitrating a dispute. Confrontations may be sudden and unexpected, and negotiation and mediation may be instantly required, without time for preparation, in situations where life and limb may be at stake.

Complexity

Negotiation sessions are generally characterized by the fact that, at all levels, there is representation by numerous interested parties. Some will be directly involved in the main conflict, others will have peripheral interests related to the conflict. UN negotiators must keep in mind that relationships between the representatives are often complex and competitive. All representatives are likely to play a role in the outcome of the negotiations. Participants may represent the broadest and most complicated range of interests, perceptions, bargaining tools, and cultural approaches; and, each element that is presented may interact and possibly conflict with that of the others. Finally, the interplay of personalities will contribute significantly to the course and outcome of the negotiations.

Conduct of Negotiations and Mediation

Negotiations and mediation may be conducted as part of a deliberate process; or, these processes may occur as an unplanned method of controlling and de-escalating an incident. In the case of de-escalation of an incident, it is important to remember that the commander involved at the incident is part of the problem; he must set the scene for others to resolve it, usually at the next level up the chain of command (assuming there is a higher level). When there is no chain of command, identifying other people of influence (such as the local mayor or chief official) is critical to resolving the problem.

Identifying and addressing sources of the incident and finding the best level to address it lies at the heart of preventing further incidents. Essentially there are three stages in the process of negotiation and mediation. They are: preparation, conduct, and follow-up. Each stage requires extensive consideration, research, and care, and is described below.

Preparation

First, the peacekeeper should define a clear aim and seek to determine what he wants to achieve. Identifying an aim means taking many factors into account, including the objectives and capabilities of those in conflict as well as a realistic appraisal of what is feasible. In practice, the initial aim may be no more than to get competing factions to meet; the aim is likely to be refined as the meeting progresses.

In preparation, a role reversal simulation with the negotiator playing the absent party, and someone else playing his role, is often very useful. Also, before negotiating have in mind the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) and brain-storm creative options which can be explored with the other party without commitment.

Specific preparations initially include researching the background and history of the issue to be discussed and taking into account all previous reports relevant to the issue. The negotiator or mediator should conduct a survey of the arguments and opinions that the belligerent parties may wish to put forward. Next, he should identify the options, limitations, minimum requirements for a settlement, and areas of common interest and possible compromise. During negotiations, the underlying interests, not stated positions of the other party must be carefully analyzed. If negotiating, the peacekeeper should be clear on which points he must win or protect, and those that may be used as bargaining chips. He should also make a thorough study of the participants who will attend the meeting, obtaining information about their cultural origin, personality, degree of authority, influence, habits, and attitudes. If the UN mission hosts the meeting, specific arrangements should take account of the following:

(a) <u>Location</u>:

The site should be secure and neutral during the conduct of formal negotiations or mediation. In the case of de-escalation of an incident, personnel who are key to defusing the problem should be identified. They should be persuaded to conduct negotiations away from the crowd and away from other outside pressures, preferably in a secluded place that is appropriate for conducting negotiations, such as a nearby barn.

(b) <u>Administration</u>:

Organizational details for a meeting place should include making arrangements for arrival and departure of those attending, the provision of parking, communications, meals, and refreshments. Vehicles of the PSO force may often be the only means of transporting delegates to and from meetings, and such a transport requirement may demand considerable time and effort. The meeting itself requires an agenda, a seating plan, and note-takers. Interpreters and other specialist advisers on such subjects as weapons, unexploded ordnance, economics, culture and religion may also be required at the meeting. Meetings may continue for considerable periods of time; thus commanders should expect to feed all those who attend. Such administrative details are important and can make a considerable difference to the attitudes of the participants.

(c) Attendees:

Those who attend a negotiation meeting should be at an appropriate and equal level of rank. Great offence may be caused if senior representatives from one faction are required to meet with junior representatives from another. To avoid unmanageable numbers of attendees, the size of each party should be specified and checked in advance. What weapons can and cannot be brought into the meeting should also be announced in advance. Rules for bodyguards must be established, and PSO commanders should bring their own bodyguards with them. Protocol must be meticulously upheld.

Conduct

In the case of mediation, the parties in conflict should confer with the go-between in separate locations. In the case of negotiations, on the other hand, meetings would be held openly in one location with all the parties present. Although it may be extremely difficult, the first item on the agenda should be for the participants to agree on the purpose of the meeting. If the UN peacekeeper is hosting the occasion, he should remember to offer the customary salutations and exchange of courtesies, ensuring that all parties are identified and are introduced to each other. Refreshments are normally offered. Some introductory small talk is useful and polite to help make everybody feel at ease and to assess the mood. The following principles should guide the negotiation:

(a) Preserve Options:

The opposing sides should be encouraged to give their views first. This enables the negotiator to re-assess the viability of his own position. If possible, he should avoid taking an immediate stand and be wary of making promises or admissions unless absolutely required.

(b) Restraint and Control:

Belligerent parties are often deliberately inflexible. They may shamelessly distort information and introduce irrelevant items into the agenda in order to distract attention from areas that might embarrass them. Nonetheless, visible frustration, impatience, or anger at such tactics can undermine the negotiator's position. Forcing issues (even if valid) may achieve only a short-term gain and embarrass or discredit another party. In the long term, such gains result in loss of goodwill whose effects can last a long time. In addition, any loss of face is likely to increase the belligerence of faction leaders. Thus, face saving measures by the negotiator is

in the long term best interests of all parties. Therefore respect should be shown for the negotiating positions of other parties at all times, and proper rules of procedure should be followed. In general, speakers should not be interrupted. However, incorrect information should be corrected, if necessary, with appropriate evidence. And at all times, facts should take precedence over opinions.

(c) Agreement:

If necessary, the negotiator should remind participants of their previous agreements, arrangements, accepted practices, and their personal pronouncements. However, this should be done tactfully and with scrupulous accuracy. It may be appropriate to remind participants that they cannot change the past, but if they wish to, they have the power to change the future.

(d) Compromise:

Any areas of partial agreement or of consensus should be carefully explored to see if they contain grounds for compromise solutions between parties. It can be noted that common interests between factions may offer answers to seemingly intractable differences.

(e) Closing Summary:

Any negotiation or mediation should be finalized with a summary of what has been resolved. This summary must be agreed to by all participants and, if possible, it should be written down and signed by the principal participants. Finally, before a meeting is concluded, the time and place for further negotiation should be agreed upon.

Follow-up

Effective follow-up on what is negotiated is every bit as important as the successful negotiation itself. Without such follow-up, achievements by negotiation or mediation will be meaningless. The outcome of the negotiations or mediation must be communicated to all interested parties. Background files should be updated with all pertinent information, including personality profiles of the participants to the agreement. Agreements should be monitored, implemented, or supervised as soon as possible. The period immediately following a negotiated agreement is the most critical. To preserve the credibility of the negotiating process, what has been agreed must be made a reality; and, if there is any breach of the agreement, it should at least be marked by an immediate protest.

Individual Qualities

The individual qualities and personality of the negotiator or mediator play a most important role. If negotiating beyond the immediate needs of the issue under discussion, he must remain scrupulously impartial. During a mediation, because of the need to instil trust in all parties, he must demonstrate absolute impartiality and discretion at all times. He should continually take care to avoid giving away information or confidences about third parties that may be of value to their opponents. He must be firm, fair, and friendly, while demonstrating a mastery of detail, tact, patience, a sense of proportion, resourcefulness, and objectivity. On matters of principle, the mediator or negotiator must be insistent without being belligerent. He should never lie or adopt an arrogant or patronizing manner. He should maintain the highest level of dress and deportment at all times.

Languages

Planning the correct mix and distribution of language skills is a fundamental element of negotiations. Commanders should be practised in the art of using an interpreter.

Community Information

Terminology

The psychological dimension of a peacekeeping mission is a prominent and critical element of campaign activity that deserves close attention. It is thinking, attitudes, and minds that have to be changed. Any means of influencing perceptions, particularly those of the parties in conflict, are important. Community information therefore plays a vital role in PSO, where one makes a clear distinction between community information and public information. Public information builds attitudes in a world-wide context and is governed by the agenda of the media. Community information, on the other hand, targets selected audiences and is a direct tool of the commander.

Aims of Community Information

Community information aims to influence the emotions, perceptions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of target audiences. It is a non-lethal means of creating compliance and cooperation within a commander's area of operations. Specifically, community information seeks to promote popular support and thus to discourage armed opposition to the UN mission. Community information attempts to portray an honest representation of the competence, credibility, resolve, achievements, and human face of the UN Force, and at the same time, tries to emphasize the responsibility of local nationals to resolve their own differences. It seeks to educate and enlighten. Community information may also take a coordinating role by broadcasting items such as warnings, future intentions of the controlling authorities, and details of agreements reached between opposing factions.

Principles

A community information campaign should follow the following general principles:

(a) Impartiality:

When appropriate, the impartiality of the PSO force must be repeatedly stressed. Nothing should be communicated that might prejudice the force's perceived impartiality. In peacekeeping the "enemy" is anarchy, atrocity, and starvation.

(b) Cultural Knowledge:

It is vital for peacekeepers to have a thorough understanding of the local culture, including its dialects; an active effort must be made to gain this understanding. Socio-cultural studies and opinion surveys should be conducted to identify prevailing attitudes and expose misconceptions and misunderstandings that can then be addressed through the community information campaign.

(c) Coordination and Integration:

As a psychological activity, community information projects must be coordinated and integrated with other activities that seek to determine and influence local perceptions. Other activities include military information operations, civil affairs projects, and public information. Aviation and electronic warfare assets may be required to support community information activities.

(d) Truth:

Community information will serve no purpose if it is not believed. Truth that can be demonstrated and observed must therefore be the foundation of community information materials. Exposed lies or evident propaganda create profound damage to the long-term credibility and viability of any community information programme.

(e) Style:

Community information material should be presented as public service announcements. They should not appear to be patronizing, arrogant, or blatantly manipulative.

Community Relations

Nature and Purpose

Community relations is an element both in public information and in community information programmes. It is defined as the deliberate fostering of social contact with the local population. The purpose of community relations is to create favourable local perceptions and to encourage a cooperative response to UN peacekeeping activities.

Conduct

Community relations may be encouraged by sponsoring formal occasions such as sports days, musical concerts, displays, recreational outings, and informal gatherings. Such events may be large or small. At a minor level, community relation activities may also be conducted on a daily basis by small and specialized teams that can present things of interest and entertainment in various ways. Community relation occasions should avoid being blatantly manipulative; they should be characterized by a relaxed informality. Nevertheless, events should be carefully planned and executed in order to avoid undue security risks. Finally, to ensure that community relations programmes are conducted in a way that maintains the PSO force's perceived impartiality, all elements of the local population should be included.

End-of-Course Exam Instructions

General Information

The End-of-Course Exam is provided as a separate component of this course. It covers the material in all the lessons of this course, including any material found in the course's annexes and appendices. The exam may be found in your Student Classroom at *https://www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_index*.

Format of Questions

The exam consists of 50 multiple-choice questions. Each question gives the student a choice of four answers marked A, B, C, and D, with only one of these being the correct answer.

Time Limit

There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions carefully, and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one sitting, he or she may save the exam and come back to it without being graded. The "Save" button is located at the bottom of the exam, next to the "Submit my answers" button. Clicking on the "Submit my answers" button will end the exam.

Passing Grade

To pass the exam, a score of 75 per cent or better is required. An electronic Certificate of Completion will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade, and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the exam, which can likewise be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. Those who fail the second exam will be disenrolled from the course.

Acknowledgements

The Peace Operations Training Institute would like to thank the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section of DPKO for their permission in reproducing the text of the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* document.

The Institute also wishes to thank General Gordon for his role in bringing this document to press. General Gordon co-drafted the Principles and Guidelines doctrine for DPKO and was instrumental in its finalization and approval. Educated at Wellington College, Berkshire and Cambridge University, General Gordon joined the British Army, in which he served until his retirement in 2005. During his military career, he was actively involved in UN peacekeeping operations, first serving with the UN in Cyprus. In 1994, he commanded UN Sector South West Bosnia (UNPROFOR) and the British Forces in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. He also served as the Force Commander of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) from 2002 to 2004. Upon forming his own consulting company in 2005, he has worked on numerous contracts for UN DPKO, the World Bank, the British Government, and others as a consultant on peacekeeping operations. He is a Senior Adviser to the Folke Bernadotte Academy of Sweden in support of the Challenges Forum Secretariat and Special Adviser to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre of Canada in support of their African peacekeeping training programmes. In 2005, he helped develop UN DPKO's senior mission leadership (SML) training programme and since then has been senior mentor on all 11 UN courses and facilitator of DPKO's Senior Leadership Induction Programme. He has also been the Director of Studies for all the AU SML and Regional SML courses. Since 2007, he has been the senior mentor for the training and development of the African Standby Force's capability in East Africa (EASBRICOM). In cooperation with UN DPKO, he is currently helping develop conceptual thinking about operational considerations for senior leaders within multidimensional peacekeeping missions, as part of the Challenges Forum initiative.

Courses at the Peace Operations Training Institute

Course Name	English	French	Spanish
An Introduction to the UN System	✓	✓	✓
Civil–Military Coordination (CIMIC)	✓	✓	✓
Commanding UN Peacekeeping Operations	✓	✓	✓
The Conduct of Humanitarian Relief Operations	✓	✓	✓
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)	✓	✓	✓
Ethics in Peacekeeping	✓	✓	✓
Gender Perspectives in UN Peacekeeping Operations	✓	✓	✓
The History of UN Peacekeeping: 1945 to 1987	✓	✓	✓
The History of UN Peacekeeping: 1988 to 1996	✓	✓	✓
The History of UN Peacekeeping: 1997 to 2006	✓	✓	✓
Human Rights	✓		
Implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in Africa	✓		
Implementation of SCR 1325 (2000) in LAC	✓		
International Humanitarian Law and the Law of Armed Conflict	✓	✓	✓
Logistical Support to UN Peacekeeping Operations	✓	✓	✓
Operational Logistical Support	✓	✓	✓
Advanced Topics in UN Logistics	✓	✓	✓
Mine Action	✓	✓	✓
Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution	✓	✓	✓
Preventing Violence Against Women	✓	✓	✓
Principles and Guidelines	✓		
United Nations Military Observers	✓	✓	✓
United Nations Police	✓	✓	✓

The Peace Operations Training Institute is committed to bringing essential, practical knowledge to students and is always working to expand its curriculum with the most up-to-date and relevant information possible. POTI's latest course list can be found at *www.peaceopstraining.org*, which includes the courses' increasing availability in Portuguese and Arabic. Visit the website regularly to keep abreast of the latest changes to POTI's curriculum.

Peace Operations Training Institute®