



EUROPE — A FRESH START

The Schuman Declaration
1950-90



This publication is also available in the following languages:

ES	ISBN 92-826-1216-3	La declaración Schuman 1950-1990: Una idea nueva para Europa
DA	ISBN 92-826-1217-1	Schuman-erklæringen: Nye planer for Europa — 1950/1990
DE	ISBN 92-826-1218-X	Eine neue Ordnung für Europa — 40 Jahre Schuman-Plan (1950-1990)
GR	ISBN 92-826-1219-8	1950-1990: 40 χρόνια από τη Διακήρυξη Schuman — Μια νέα ιδέα για την Ευρώπη
FR	ISBN 92-826-1221-X	Une idée neuve pour l'Europe — La Déclaration Schuman 1950/1990
IT	ISBN 92-826-1222-8	Una proposta nuova all'Europa — La dichiarazione Schuman 1950/1990
NL	ISBN 92-826-1223-6	Een nieuw idee voor Europa — De verklaring van Schuman — 1950/1990
PT	ISBN 92-826-1224-4	Uma nova ideia de Europa — A Declaração Schuman — 1950/1990

Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication.

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1990

ISBN 92-826-1220-1

Catalogue number: CB-NC-90-003-EN-C

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Printed in the FR of Germany

Europe — A fresh start

The Schuman Declaration 1950-90

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Cover: J.M. Folon, watercolour, for the Commission of the European Communities.

Manuscript completed in January 1990.

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Introduction

The European Community is celebrating its 40th birthday. On 9 May 1950, when he proposed the creation of a community of peaceful interests to Federal Germany and any other European countries that wanted to join in, Robert Schuman performed a historic act. In extending a hand to recent enemies he wiped away the bitterness of war and the weight of the past. But he also sparked off a completely novel process in the international order by suggesting to the old nations that they should pool their sovereignty, to regain the influence that none of them was capable of wielding alone.

The European Community, which has been developing day by day since then, constitutes the grand design of the late twentieth century. It draws its motive force from the generous visionary dream of the founders, born of the war and inspired by a will to create among the nations of Europe the conditions for a lasting peace. This force is being constantly renewed, spurred by the challenges confronting our countries in a world of radical, rapid change. One has only to consider that the world population will increase from four to six billion over the next 20 years to gauge the scale of the changes to which our societies will have to adapt.

Consider, too, the tremendous yearning for democracy and freedom that is overturning political structures in Eastern Europe and giving a new dimension to the ideal of European unity.

For Europeans the issue is clear-cut. Either they continue to organize themselves, pulling together to make their voice heard in the world, to uphold the democratic ideal and to defend their economic and strategic interests, in which case Europe will continue to represent more than Paul Valéry's 'small cape of Eurasia'. It will be a factor for balance between the superpowers and a factor for moderation in relations between the hyper-industrialized countries and countries with a development problem. Or, alternatively, Europeans will fail to perceive the solidarity which binds them and fail to equip themselves with the instruments to make their common interests a reality, in which case individual economies will be reduced to playing a subordinate role and standards of living will decline. Europe, a mere geographical entity, will come under the influence of outside powers which will extort the price of its dependence and its need for protection.

With the approach of 1993, the target solemnly set by the Member States and the Community's institutions, Europeans, looking back over the distance travelled since 1950, must still find the answers to some basic questions. What are the fundamental values that

they hold dear and how best can these be preserved? What degree of union is desirable, and possible, in order to derive optimum benefit from unity while preserving national identity and the individuality which constitutes the richness of our countries, our regions and our cultures? Can we advance in step, relying on the natural harmony that makes for consensus between the Twelve, or must we bow to conflicting approaches and differentiate the pace of integration? Where are the Community's ultimate boundaries to be set, now that so many nations — Turkey, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans — are asking to join us in the process of unification? How can the ordinary citizen be made to feel part of the Community enterprise, how can an attachment to Europe be fostered to complement and transcend traditional allegiances? These issues of principle must be confronted if Europeans are to avoid running into blind alleys. The answers to these basic questions will determine the precise, technical choices faced day by day by those responsible for running the Community enterprise.

In 1990 the European Community is in good shape. It has lived up to the expectations of those who brought it into being, and has proved worthy of the efforts of those who, over four decades, shielded it from assault from without and helped it to survive innumerable crises. Today, Europeans settle their differences peacefully, having recourse to the law and conciliation. Discrimination and feelings of superiority have been banished from relations between the Member States, which have given the four Community institutions — the Council, Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice — the task of arbitrating and managing their gains as well as their clashes. The standard of living of the ordinary citizen has been substantially raised and is now much higher than it would have been had individual economies not been able to take advantage of economies of scale and higher growth resulting from the common market and the development of trade. The European Community has become a pole of attraction, the focus of the expectations of countries, near or far, that are taking a keen interest in the dynamic of union and want to consolidate their nascent democracies or rebuild their devastated economies. Will the Community be the victim of its own success? Is that success so firmly established that the Community can open its doors to others in the foreseeable future, without risking implosion or loosening the essential ties that ensure a minimum of cohesion?

At 40 the European Community is maturing. It is on the brink of key decisions that will determine its fate. It is well placed to measure how far it has travelled, to reflect on its origins, to draw conclusions for the way ahead.

Will Europe be a political entity? Will the single European market be rounded off by monetary union? What policies need a common framework and pooled resources if they are to find material and effective expression?

Adoption of the Single European Act in 1986 marked the beginning of a period of frenetic activity. In February 1988, by adopting the Delors plan, the Twelve swept away the remains of the past which had poisoned the early 1980s. The ordering of financial resources

up to 1992 has created 'budgetary peace' between the institutions and is providing the necessary solidarity to enable the less prosperous countries to withstand the impact of the large market. Ongoing reform of the common agricultural policy is helping to diversify the range of common policies, releasing additional resources for forward-looking policies such as technological research, environmental protection and vocational training.

The directives needed to complete the single market are following the timetable programmed by the Commission. The point of no return has already passed, giving all concerned the firm conviction that it is better to prepare for change than to bow to it. The Madrid European Council in June 1989 approved the main features of an ambitious programme that is to lead to the attainment of economic and monetary union, on the lines of a phased masterplan proposed by the Commission. In July the Western Economic Summit in Paris gave the European Commission the task of coordinating Western aid to Poland and Hungary, thereby consolidating the Community's role as a committed partner in a world-scale operation and recognizing the existence in Eastern Europe of a situation without precedent since the war, an omen of hope and major developments.

And in June again voters exercised the franchise in the third direct elections to the European Parliament, establishing the vital democratic link between popular legitimacy and European integration. Backed by a mandate designating them as intermediaries between the electorate and the institutions, the 518 MEPs are preparing to give fresh impetus to the advance towards European union as Parliament did in 1984 when it adopted the draft Treaty fathered by Altiero Spinelli.

In 1990 there will be further developments on the institutional front as a result of the Strasbourg European Council's decision on 9 December 1989 to convene an intergovernmental conference on economic and monetary union.

Europe at 40 is flying high. Hopes are commensurate with the ambitions and challenges, but the danger of failure cannot be excluded. At the crossroads of great decisions, options are critical. Those who hold Europe's future in their hands must find this inspiration in the basic method and principles which led to the European Coal and Steel Community, the very first European venture since supplemented by the European Economic Community and Euratom. A 'leaven of change' has been injected into intra-European relations and new effects are being produced every day.

Forty years after it was first put to the test, the Community method, the outcome of the organized dialogue between the Member States and the common institutions, wielding delegated sovereignty, is a shining reality. It is making the optimum contribution to solving the major problems confronting Europeans. It, and it alone, is capable of advancing the cause of European integration.

I — The Schuman Plan: a solution tailored to post-war problems

A. The historical background

Europeans got no respite when the fighting ended. The Second World War was hardly over and the threat of a third, between East and West, was soon to loom on the horizon. On 24 April 1947 the breakdown of the Moscow Conference on the German question convinced the Western powers that the Soviet Union, their erstwhile partner in the fight against the Nazis, was about to become the source of immediate danger for the Western democracies. The creation of the Cominform in October 1947, the Prague coup in February 1948, and the Berlin blockade in the spring of 1949 heightened the tension still further. Western Europeans laid the foundations for their collective security with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty with the United States in April 1949. But the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in September 1949 and repeated threats from the Kremlin helped to spread the climate of fear that came to be known as the 'cold war'.

The status of Federal Germany, which had been directing its own internal affairs since the Basic Law of 8 May 1949 came into force, became one of the stakes of East-West rivalry. The United States wanted to speed up economic recovery of a country on the edge of the continental divide and voices in Washington were already calling for German rearmament. French diplomacy was on the horns of a dilemma: should it yield to American pressure and, flying in the face of French public opinion, agree to the resurgence of German industrial power in the Ruhr and the Saar, or should it dig its heels in, clashing with its main ally and deadlocking its relations with Bonn?

The moment of truth came in the spring of 1950. Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, was given an urgent assignment by his American and British counterparts: to come up with a proposal for reintegrating Federal Germany into the Western concert. A meeting between the three governments was scheduled for 10 May 1950 and France could not shirk her responsibilities.

The political stalemate was compounded by economic problems. A steel crisis appeared to be imminent because of the production potential of the various European countries. Demand was slackening, prices were falling and the signs were that steelmakers, true to the industry's tradition of the inter-war years, would recreate a cartel to limit competition. In the face of the post-war reconstruction effort, European economies could not allow their basic industries to slide into speculation or organized shortage.

B. Jean Monnet's ideas

To unravel this skein of difficulties, which had proved too much for old-style diplomacy, Robert Schuman sought the help of an inventive genius, a man still unknown to the public at large, who had acquired exceptional experience in the course of a long and distinguished international career. Jean Monnet, then General Commissioner for the Modernization Plan, appointed by de Gaulle in 1945 to be the architect of France's economic recovery, was one of the most influential Europeans of the Western world. During the First World War he had organized the common supply system of the Allied forces. Deputy Secretary-General of the League of Nations, a banker in the United States, in Western Europe, in China, he was one of President Roosevelt's trusted advisers and the engineer of the Victory Program which ensured the military superiority of the United States over the Axis forces. Although he never held political office, he had advised governments and had gained a reputation as a pragmatist, whose first concern was efficacy.

Robert Schuman spoke of his concern to Jean Monnet: 'What's to be done about Germany?' was the obsession of that native of Lorraine who was driven by the resolve to ensure that war between France and Germany would never happen again.

Jean Monnet, head of the little team in the rue de Martignac where the Planning Commission had its headquarters, was thinking about the problem too. His main concern was international politics. He believed that the cold war stemmed from rivalry between the big powers in Europe, the prize being a divided Europe. The strain could be eased by promoting a venture of international dimensions whose main objective would be détente and world peace thanks to the effective role played by a risen and reconciled Europe.

Jean Monnet had watched the various unsuccessful attempts at integration after the 1948 Congress organized by the European Movement in The Hague had solemnly called for unity.

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation, set up in 1948, was only given coordinating powers and had been unable to prevent economic recovery in Europe proceeding in a purely national context. The creation of the Council of Europe, on 5 May 1949, showed that governments were jealous of their prerogatives. The Consultative Assembly had no more than deliberative powers and its resolutions, which had to be passed by a two-thirds majority, could be vetoed by the Committee of Ministers.

Monnet became convinced that the idea of erecting a complete institutional edifice at one go was a pipe dream. Resistance from the States would be such that the initiative would be doomed. It was too much to expect States to consent to massive transfers of sovereignty, which would have injured national sensitivities only a few years after the end of the war.

Le 6 Mai 1950

La paix mondiale ne saurait être sauvegardée sans des efforts créateurs à la mesure des dangers qui la menacent.

La contribution qu'une Europe organisée et vivante peut apporter à la civilisation est indispensable au maintien des relations pacifiques. En se faisant depuis plus de 20 ans le champion d'une Europe unie, la France a toujours eu pour objet essentiel de servir la paix. L'Europe n'a pas été faite, nous avons eu la guerre.

L'Europe ne se fera pas d'un coup, ni dans une construction d'ensemble : elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes créant d'abord une solidarité de fait. Le rassemblement des nations européennes exige que l'opposition séculaire de la France et de l'Allemagne soit éliminée : l'action entreprise doit toucher au premier chef la France et l'Allemagne.

Dans ce but, le Gouvernement Français propose de porter immédiatement l'action sur un point limité mais décisif :


Le Gouvernement Français propose de placer l'ensemble de la production franco-allemande de charbon et d'acier, sous une Haute Autorité commune, dans une organisation ouverte à la participation des autres pays d'Europe.

La mise en commun des productions de charbon et d'acier assurera immédiatement l'établissement de bases communes de développement économique, première étape de la Fédération européenne, et changera le destin de ces régions longtemps vouées à la fabrication des armes de guerre dont elles ont été les plus constantes victimes.

To succeed, sights would have to be lowered to specific targets, with enormous psychological significance, and a joint decision-making mechanism introduced which could gradually be extended to new areas.

C. The 9 May Declaration

It could be said that the Schuman Plan was the result of a conspiracy. Towards the end of April 1950, Jean Monnet and his closest colleagues — Etienne Hirsch, Paul Reuter and Pierre Uri — produced a short paper containing the explanatory memorandum and the terms of a proposal which was to turn conventional diplomacy on its head. Far from going through the old-style consultations with the appropriate ministries, Monnet took pains to ensure that the project was handled with the utmost discretion, to obviate the inevitable caveats and counter-proposals, which would have diluted its revolutionary approach and removed the element of surprise. Monnet put his paper in the hands of Ber-



*9 May 1950: the Schuman Plan is made public in the Salon de l'Horloge at the French Foreign Office. Robert Schuman at the microphone; Jean Monnet on his right.
(EC Commission)*

nard Clappier, Schuman's *directeur de cabinet*, knowing that the Minister's decision could influence the course of events. When Schuman returned from a weekend in his native Lorraine and announced 'I've read the proposal. I'll use it', the conspirators knew that their initiative had moved into the political arena. On the morning of 9 May, at the very moment that Schuman was putting his proposal to his government colleagues, a secret messenger from his staff was handing it personally to Konrad Adenauer in Bonn. The Chancellor's reaction was immediate and enthusiastic. He promptly replied that he wholeheartedly endorsed the proposal.

So it was with the dual agreement of the French and German Governments that Robert Schuman made his Declaration at a press conference held at 4 p.m. that afternoon in the Salon de l'Horloge at the Quai d'Orsay. He prefaced his announcement with a few introductory sentences:

'It is no longer a time for vain words, but for a bold, constructive act. France has acted, and the consequences of her action may be immense. We hope they will. She has acted essentially in the cause of peace. For peace to have a real chance, there must first be a Europe. Almost five years to the day since Germany's unconditional surrender, France is taking the first decisive step to rebuild Europe and is inviting Germany to play its part. This will transform the situation in Europe. This will open the door to other joint activities inconceivable hitherto. Europe will emerge from all this; a Europe that is firmly united and solidly built; a Europe where living standards will rise as a result of the pooling of production and the expansion of markets leading to lower prices ...'


The scene was set. This was more than a new technical arrangement subject to the haggling of negotiators. France was stretching out her hand to Germany, offering equal partnership in a new entity which would assume responsibility for joint management of the two countries' coal and steel industries and, in a wider perspective, for laying the foundation stone of a European federation.

The Declaration (see text, p. 43) defines a set of principles: Europe will not be built all at once; it will be built by concrete achievements which first create *de facto* solidarity:

- (i) The age-old rivalry between France and Germany was to be eliminated: the venture would be of immediate concern to France and Germany but would be open to all European nations sharing the same objectives.
- (ii) Immediate action would focus on a 'limited, but decisive target': Franco-German coal and steel production, which would be placed under a common High Authority.
- (iii) The merging of economic interests would help to raise the standard of living and pave the way for the establishment of an economic community.
- (iv) The High Authority's decisions would be binding on the countries that joined. Its members would be independent figures, jointly appointed. Its decisions would be enforceable.

D. Drafting of the ECSC Treaty

If the French initiative, immediately transformed into a Franco-German initiative, were to have any chance of becoming a reality, rapid action was essential. On 20 June 1950 France convened an Intergovernmental Conference in Paris, chaired by Jean Monnet. The three Benelux countries and Italy responded to the invitation and turned up at the negotiating table. Jean Monnet explained the purpose of the discussions which were about to begin: 'We are here', he said, 'to undertake a common task — not to negotiate for our own national advantage, but to seek it in the advantage of all. Only if we eliminate from our debates any particularist feelings shall we reach a solution. In so far as we, gathered here, can change our methods, the attitude of all Europeans will likewise gradually change.'¹



A year after the Schuman Declaration, the first of the three Treaties establishing the European Communities was signed in Paris on 18 April 1951. (Jean Monnet Archives)

¹ Monnet, Jean: *Memoirs*, trans. Richard Payne, London, Collins, 1978, p. 323.

The Conference made it possible to refine the proposed plan. The powers and independence of the High Authority were not challenged, because they were central to the proposal. At the request of the Netherlands, a Council of Ministers which would represent the States and give its assent in certain cases was added. A Parliamentary Assembly and a Court of Justice rounded off the institutional structure, which is still the basis of the Community system today. The negotiators never lost sight of the fact that they had been given a political mandate to devise an organization which was entirely new in its objectives and in its methods. It was essential that the embryonic organization should not be saddled with the shortcomings of traditional intergovernmental agencies: insistence on unanimity; national financial contributions; an executive subordinate to national representatives ...

The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed on 18 April 1951 for a period of 50 years. It was ratified by the six signatory States, and on 10 August 1952 the High Authority, with Jean Monnet as its President, opened for business in Luxembourg.

II — The Schuman Plan: the Community's birth certificate

*'The Schuman proposals are revolutionary or they are nothing ... The indispensable first principle of these proposals is the abnegation of sovereignty in a limited but decisive field ... Any plan which does not involve this indispensable first principle can make no useful contribution to the solution of the grave problems that face us. Cooperation between nations, while essential, cannot alone meet our problem. What must be sought is a fusion of the interests of the European peoples and not merely another effort to maintain an equilibrium of those interests ...'*¹

Jean Monnet

A. The innovatory principles underpinning the first European Community

It took almost a year to negotiate the Treaty of Paris because the talks raised a whole series of basic issues to which Jean Monnet was keen to find the most satisfactory solutions. As we have seen, these were no run-of-the-mill diplomatic negotiations. The delegates appointed by the six governments had gathered around the table to devise an entirely new politico-legal system designed to last. The five short paragraphs of the Preamble encapsulate the philosophy which has inspired advocates of European integration ever since: 'Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten it,

Convinced that the contribution which an organized and vital Europe can make to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations,

Recognizing that Europe can be built only through practical achievements which will first of all create real solidarity, and through the establishment of common bases for economic development,

Anxious to help, by expanding their basic production, to raise the standard of living and further the works of peace,


¹ Jean Monnet, op cit., p. 316.

Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared ...'

'World peace', 'practical achievements', 'real solidarity', 'merging of essential interests', 'community', 'destiny henceforward shared': so many key phrases which embody the embryonic Community spirit and Community method and are as inspirational as ever today.

In 1990 the intrinsic importance of the Treaty of Paris for the European economy is not the same as it was in the 1950s. But the institutional principles defined in it have stood the test of time. They initiated a dynamic process which is still bearing fruit, sustaining a political vision which we must cherish lest we jeopardize all that the Community has achieved.

It is possible to identify four principles deriving from the Schuman Plan, which underpin the present Community edifice:



The ECSC's first steel ingot was cast at Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg, on 30 April 1953. Jean Monnet and the other members of the High Authority mark the occasion. (Jean Monnet Archives)

1. Superiority of institutions

Application to international relations of the principles of equality, arbitration and conciliation which lie at the very heart of democracy is an advance for civilization. The founders had experienced the mindless violence and upheaval which come with war. Their aim was to create a Community where law rather than might would prevail. Monnet frequently quoted the Swiss philosopher Henri-Frédéric Amiel, who said: 'Each man's experience starts again from the beginning. Only institutions grow wiser: they accumulate collective experience; and, owing to this experience and this wisdom, men subject to the same rules will not see their own nature changing, but their behaviour gradually transformed.'¹

To put relations between the States on a peaceful and democratic footing, to exorcise the spirit of domination, to banish nationalism — these were the objectives that gave the first Community its political substance and placed it on a par with the great achievements of history.

2. Independence of Community organs

If they are to discharge their functions, institutions must have the power to act. The guarantees enjoyed by the ECSC High Authority, and passed on to today's institutions, are of three kinds:

- (i) Members were — and still are — appointed by agreement between the governments. They are not national delegates, but individuals exercising their authority collectively. They cannot accept instructions from the Member States. The European civil service too is bound by that same and single Community allegiance.
- (ii) The Community's financial independence is assured by the levying of own resources, whereas intergovernmental organizations are regularly funded by national contributions, which can always be withheld.
- (iii) The High Authority, like the Commission today, was accountable only to the Assembly (now the European Parliament), which could adopt a vote of censure by a qualified majority.

3. Inter-institutional cooperation

Jean Monnet saw the independence of the High Authority as the cornerstone of the new system. But during the negotiations he came to see the need to allow the Member States to defend national interests. It was the surest way of preventing the budding Community

¹ Jean Monnet, *op cit.*, p. 393.

EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS

But effectiveness is another measure of the strength of our institutions. We must never underestimate the inspired approach of the authors of the Treaty of Rome. What demands it makes on us!

First of all on the Commission, which is responsible for seeing to it that the ground rules are observed, for ensuring that commitments are honoured, for implementing Council decisions when the Council sees fit to allow it to do so. From this point of view we are wide of the mark, more precisely of the targets set by the Single Act. But it is above all in exercising its right of initiative that the Commission shoulders its responsibilities; and everyone gives it credit for having defined goals and proposed ways and means of revitalizing European integration.

The Commission intends to retain this dynamic approach, assuming it can come up with new ideas and options. Let us be quite clear here. The Commission must never get drunk on its own powers. It must be strict in applying the principle of subsidiarity. It must be aware of the conditions for a dynamic compromise between the Twelve and to that end endeavour to understand each nation and its people. It must draw conclusions from this and be tireless in the pursuit of consensus. It must have the courage to say no when there is a danger of the letter and the spirit of the Treaty being ignored. And most important of all, it must have the courage to take a back seat whenever this can serve the European cause.

The strength of the law is illustrated in turn by the European Parliament.

I know that there is a debate on the democratic deficit and I have no doubt whatsoever that, before too long, the powers of the Strasbourg assembly will be strengthened further. But we cannot ignore the influence that today's Parliament has had on European integration. Let me just ask you this: do you think that it would have been possible to convene the Intergovernmental Conference that produced the Single Act had Parliament not thrown its weight behind the idea on the basis of the draft European union treaty which it had adopted at the initiative of that great European, Altiero Spinelli?

*Jacques Delors
Bruges, 17 October 1989*

being confined to overly technical purposes. It had to be in a position to act in areas where macroeconomic decisions are taken. Since this was a matter for governments, a Council of Ministers was added to the High Authority. Its role was strictly circumscribed: it was to take majority rather than unanimous decisions and its assent would be required in limited cases only. The High Authority retained sole right of initiative. This prerogative, extended to the present Commission, is vital because it ensures that the Community interest will be defended in a Commission proposal. The dialogue between the four institutions, based on cooperation rather than subordination, began in 1951, each of them exercising its functions within a comprehensive pre-federal decision-making system.

4. Equality between States

Once the principle of States' representation on the Council had been accepted, the delicate issue of relative weight had to be settled. The Benelux countries and Italy feared that they would find themselves in a minority given the scale of their coal and steel production as a percentage of the total, and they argued for the unanimity rule. Germany advocated representation in proportion to production, which, not unnaturally, scared her partners.

Jean Monnet was convinced that only the principle of equality between the States was likely to create a new mentality. But he knew just how hard it would be to persuade six countries of unequal size to forgo the easy option offered by a right of veto. 'The right to say "no" was the large countries' guarantee in their dealings with each other, and the smaller countries' safeguard against the large.'¹ So on 4 April 1951 Monnet met Konrad Adenauer in Bonn to win him over to the merits of the principle of equality:

'I have been authorized to propose to you that relations between France and Germany in the European Community be based on the principle of equality in the Council, the Assembly, and all existing or future European institutions ... Let me add that this is how I have always envisaged the offer of union which was the starting-point of the present Treaty; and I think I am right in saying that this is how you envisaged it from the moment we first met. The spirit of discrimination has been the cause of the world's greatest ills, and the Community is an attempt to overcome it ...'

Adenauer immediately replied:

'You know how much I am attached to equality of rights for my country in the future, and how much I deplore the attempts at domination in which it has been involved in the past. I am happy to pledge my full support for your proposal. I cannot conceive of a Community based on anything but complete equality.' Thus was laid one of the legal principles, with all its ethical implications, which gave the Community concept its full significance.

¹ Jean Monnet, *op. cit.*, p. 353-4.

B. The ECSC — the first storey of the European edifice

Without a peace treaty between the former belligerents, the first European Community was at once an act of confidence in the willingness of France and Germany, and their partners, to sublimate past mistakes, and an act of faith in a common future of progress. Despite ups and downs and some nationalist opposition, the process begun in 1950 was to prove irreversible. The failure of the European Defence Community project, whose fate was sealed on 30 August 1954 when the French National Assembly rejected the Treaty signed on 27 May 1952, did nothing to slow matters down. On the initiative of the Benelux statesmen Paul-Henri Spaak, Jan Beyers and Joseph Bech, a fresh start was made in Messina in June 1955. Progress towards the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community and Euratom, signed on 25 March 1957, was hastened by external events: the Suez crisis and repression in Hungary forced Europe to close ranks. The European Communities established in Brussels and Luxembourg were to expand in terms of substance and membership.

To the general common market were gradually added common policies governing agriculture, trade, the regions, social affairs, research, the environment, education and cooperation with the Third World. In 1972 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the Community. They were followed in due course by Greece, Spain and Portugal on the Community's southern flank.

Although weakened by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979, the Community nevertheless resisted centrifugal forces and consolidated internal cohesion by launching the European Monetary System in 1979.

Like any evolving enterprise, the Community experienced growing pains: the institutional crisis in 1965, when one Member State attempted to challenge majority voting; a financial crisis; when own resources proved inadequate to meet escalating expenditure occasioned by the proliferation of new policies and the soaring cost of the common agricultural policy.

But no Member State, however categorical its demands, has ever contemplated leaving the Community; it is now clearly seen as an irreplaceable framework for both its own development and influence in the world.

In 1984 the European Parliament adopted a draft Treaty on European union, which proposed a quantum leap in the interests of integration. In adopting the White Paper on completion of the internal market in 1985, the Commission headed by Jacques Delors gave material substance to this determination to revitalize Europe and set 1 January 1993 as the deadline.

The Member States signed the Single European Act in 1986, drawing inspiration and finding an institutional method in the Schuman Plan. They supplemented the Treaty of Rome by setting a series of precise targets geared to the major objective of a large, frontier-free market, with a timetable. They revamped the decision-making process by widening the range of decisions to be taken by qualified majority. They restored hope to millions of Europeans by offering them the prospect of broader horizons and giving them the means of adjusting to new world conditions.

Forty years have not weakened the source from which the European Community sprang.

Tomorrow's Europe, now in the making, has everything to gain by meeting its challenges, applying the same principles that led to the flowering of the present Community.

III — Questions and answers for tomorrow's Europe

The unification of Europe is an undertaking of vast proportions. In 1950 Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman were able to offer a practical solution to a series of short-term problems which European governments had to resolve. But they also gave material shape to an old ambition that had long been regarded as a utopian dream. The heralds of the European ideal, Victor Hugo, Aristide Briand, Coudenhove-Kalergi, pleaded eloquently for a coming-together of the people of Europe in peace and fraternity. The inventors of the Community method made it possible to move from the ideal to reality because they were practical, active politicians. Tomorrow's Europe is in the making. It will bear the stamp of its great architects if the initial principles which determined the blueprint are retained among the new options.

A. A strong Europe based on solidarity

Challenges to be met

The prime objective which the signatories to the Single Act have set themselves is the creation, between now and 1 January 1993, of a single market free of the physical, technical and tax frontiers that still hinder the movement of people, capital, goods and services. Although customs duties and quantitative restrictions between the Member States were removed on 1 July 1968, it has not proved possible to do away with internal controls, because the legislation governing product standards, VAT rates and policing procedures still vary from country to country.

While the United States and Japan have a single market, the 'cost of non-Europe' — in other words the fragmentation of the European market — weighs heavily on consumers and taxpayers and has been estimated at ECU 200 000 million.

One effect of the world economic crisis at the end of the 1970s was to trigger the re-emergence of protectionist tendencies, which gave producers unwilling to make the effort to withstand increasingly keen foreign competition an illusion of security.

But in point of fact the proliferation of standards, and hence technical barriers to trade, was steadily eroding the competitiveness of products made in Europe. The absence of

competition in tendering for public works contracts, the retention of finicky customs procedures, the proliferation of national subsidies to industries in difficulty, were sapping the European economy from within. Firms which wanted to get together to acquire an international dimension had their hands tied by restrictions on capital movements.

Implementation of the White Paper proposed by the Commission in 1985, incorporated into the Single Act and spelled out in 279 Commission proposals for directives, is well under way.

On 3 December 1988, half-way towards the 1992 deadline, the Rhodes European Council noted that 50% of the legislative programme for setting up the single market was virtually complete. Some 90% of the proposals programmed by the Commission were already before the Council, and 40% of these had been adopted by the Council. Of these, 70% related to 'technical barriers', that is the harmonization or approximation of standards for goods, but also for services, including financial services.

The full liberalization of the capital market for eight Member States on 1 July 1990 represents a decisive step towards the achievement of economic union and a precondition for the creation of a common financial area. It will give every saver a wider choice in investing his or her savings.

But the Member States have so far failed to reach agreement on the delicate issue of harmonizing taxation on savings, where methods and rates vary from country to country. Some countries will be forced to bring their tax structure into line with those of their main partners to prevent capital draining away. There can be no shirking of the crucial political options, which are already provoking national debates on the relative importance of direct and indirect taxation as a source of revenue. To take matters further, some observers are wondering what margin for manoeuvre will be left to governments in relation to budgetary policy as the need for tax harmonization brings Member States' tax structures closer together.

The opposition which is emerging as the full implications of the single market sink in is a measure of the objective to be attained.

The mutual recognition of thousands of technical standards, the harmonization of legislation rendered more complex by the need to protect the consumer, but which has developed in 12 national settings over the years, represents a gigantic task. National civil services and Commission departments are tackling it together with the help of experts from the Council and standards institutes.

Can the Twelve today — in an infinitely wider context — achieve what the Six achieved for coal and steel in 1951? Necessity is at work again, overturning bureaucratic obstacles and cutting through the red tape of the past.

But the success of the enterprise, which is already producing results in terms of growth rates and modernization, depends on all aspects of the programme being implemented. The single market is an indivisible whole. Its components cannot be selected 'à la carte' according to individual likes and dislikes. Success also depends on completion by the deadline. The Commission and the European Parliament are doing their job in implementing the procedure for the drafting of single market legislation. But the last word lies with the Council or, in some cases where arbitration is necessary, with the European Council. At that level, political will must prevail over national obduracy and self-interest. And at the next stage of the complicated decision-making process, Community directives have to be ratified by parliaments or go through whatever procedures are needed for their transposition into national law.

To sum up, the 1992 challenge means general mobilization: European and national civil servants, MPs, businessmen, trade-unionists, and indeed judges will have their contribution to make to the success of this decisive project, the base-plate of European revitalization and a prerequisite for the prosperity of tomorrow's Europe.

As police checks at the Community's internal frontiers are abolished, the safety of Europe's citizens demands that new policies be applied: the fight against organized crime, international terrorism and the drug traffic must be coordinated if we are to prevent the new, frontier-free Europe becoming a happy hunting ground for criminals.

The aim is both to tighten controls at the Community's external frontiers and facilitate the closest possible cooperation between national police forces. The West German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has floated the idea of a 'federal police force', with Community-wide responsibilities. National legislation on right of asylum and immigration will need to be harmonized, or at least concerted, so that interests such as the basic humanitarian values of each Member State are respected. But a zone of security along these lines presupposes agreement between the Twelve on further transfers of sovereignty. The people of Europe — all 320 million of them — will be more aware in their daily lives of the concept of 'a destiny henceforward shared', to quote the preamble to the first Community Treaty, when measures to protect their persons and their freedoms are taken at European level.

Solidarity within the Community of Twelve itself has always been presented by the Commission as the major flanking policy of the single market, and the key to its success. Jacques Delors was able to say that 'the third stage of the rocket' was in place the day after the European Council reached agreement on 13 February 1988. A financial package had emerged to provide the economically less-favoured or peripheral regions with a substantial increase in assistance from the structural Funds, whose endowment was to be doubled from ECU 7 000 million in 1987 to ECU 14 000 million in 1993. This constitutes the third panel of the Community triptych, the others being the White Paper and the Single Act. Much hangs in the balance: a 'two-tier' Europe, where ultra-competitive regions, providing a focus for capital, investment and sunrise industries, and areas

stricken by industrial decline or chronic structural handicaps, would exist side by side, is a spectre frequently paraded by those who decry the single market, causing concern to the general public.

So solidarity and attempts to boost economic and social cohesion, through the existing Funds (ERDF, ESF, EAGGF Guidance Section, IMPs), is a political as well as an economic imperative, especially for the Mediterranean countries which have recently joined the Community. But it is also an investment in tomorrow's Europe, since potential in terms of productivity, labour and consumption lies precisely in those areas long cut off from the main currents of trade and centres of production. But solidarity presupposes organization. The contributing countries will not be prepared to make financial transfers unless they are matched by radical reform of management of the structural Funds. The new structural Regulations adopted in January 1989 concentrate Community funds on regions and sections of the population that need them most. The apportionment of appropriations earmarked for the development of regions lagging behind was agreed in September 1989: the ECU 36 000 million allocated for the period 1989-93 will mainly benefit Spain (ECU 9 700 million), Italy (ECU 7 400 million), Portugal (ECU 6 900 million), Greece (ECU 6 600 million) and Ireland (ECU 3 600 million).

As the effects of this redistribution make themselves felt in terms of macroeconomic balances, Europe will advance along the road to unity. Europe will gain acceptance as a factor for justice and effectiveness. So the effort must be sustained, with the inevitable financial sacrifices that will generate the assets of tomorrow's Europe.

The social dimension of the European Community is an integral part of the philosophy of the founders. Vocational training and the redeployment of workers hit by the coal and steel crisis are matters covered by the ECSC Treaty. In 1957 the EEC Treaty established a Social Fund and placed further emphasis on the social aspects of the common market. The free movement of workers and the improvement of living and working conditions took shape as long ago as the early 1960s, and the Community then turned its attention to enhancing workers' social rights. The Directives on equal treatment for men and women with regard to recruitment, redundancy and social security, the 1975 Directive on mass dismissals, the 1977 Directive on retention of workers' rights in the event of transfers of companies, the 1980 Directive on protecting workers against dangerous substances, reflect the determination of the institutions to make European integration synonymous with social progress. The Single European Act, by incorporating the new Articles 118a and 118b into the EEC Treaty, gives the Commission additional powers in relation to improvement of the working environment and development of the dialogue between employers and workers. The Community Charter of social rights, presented to the Strasbourg European Council on 8 December 1989, formally defines the main principles which will underpin Community labour law in tomorrow's Europe.

As the President of the Commission recalled in Strasbourg on 13 September 1989, the Charter 'is there to identify us, it shows us to be true to what we are and it is also a message

to all those, both inside and outside the Community, who are trying to find grounds for hope'. The Charter has no binding effect, though the value and impact of a solemn undertaking by the Heads of State or Government must not be underestimated. The Commission for instance has undertaken to implement a work programme that incorporates the Charter's objectives in areas as varied as the reorganization of working time, information and consultation within the company and protection of children and the disabled.

Europe as an entity will make its influence felt if it can keep pace with the times. Jean Monnet, Paul-Henri Spaak and Louis Armand wanted the Community to be 'modern' — they had seen the point as early as 1955 of their countries exploiting the possibilities offered by the peaceful use of atomic energy.

When he presented the Esprit programme on the Commission's behalf in 1984, Etienne Davignon described information technology as the ferment and the catalyst of the third industrial revolution, which would transform our society and determine Europe's performance on the world scene. We had to wake up our old continent, which was trailing the United States and Japan in all areas of the new technologies, where know-how, industrial competition and strategic control are factors to be reckoned with. The Esprit programme is an incentive to firms to cooperate under the Community banner. It is promoting synergy between national research and development efforts and has proved so successful that it has served as a model for other programmes in areas as varied as telecommunications (RACE), applications of new technologies in traditional industries (Brite), biotechnologies, new non-nuclear energies, thermonuclear fusion and the treatment of radioactive waste.

In 1985 the Single Act brought all these programmes together in a multiannual framework that makes research a priority policy flanking other Community activities.

Is Europe making up for lost time? A new awareness, the first step on the way to recovery, is in evidence everywhere. It is being strengthened by a spontaneous regrouping strategy initiated by major industrial combines, and by the success of exercises in cooperation, such as Ariane, Airbus and Eureka, fostered by the Member States.

But all of this requires an enormous effort, constantly regeared to the pace of rapid technological development, to the new economic challenges and to tougher international competition. In July 1989 the Commission adopted a new framework programme for the period 1990-94. Funding is estimated at ECU 7 700 million over five years, and the programme will concentrate on six specific areas.

In 1987 Europe's trade deficit in electronics exceeded USD 8 000 million. Between 1978 and 1991 Europe will have spent some ECU 450 000 million on research, against ECU 330 000 million for Japan and ECU 1 000 000 million for the United States. Poor results are due to the dispersion of efforts. Procedures must be streamlined, more funds made

available, and exchanges of research scientists stepped up — three priorities at national and Community level.

But research and development will not be enough unless it is incorporated into a broader-based industrial policy. There is no agreement between the Member States on such a policy, yet it is obvious that there is an urgent need for Community machinery to give it substance.

Designed as a means of responding through joint action to the vital concerns of the people of Europe, the European Community, as long ago as the early 1960s, launched an environmental policy which has steadily developed ever since. Pressure from public opinion and special-interest groups has played no small part in raising awareness of nature as the shared heritage of all Europeans, and of the threats to the quality of life, the ecosystem and health from uncontrolled exploitation of the planet's resources.

Major accidents over the last 15 years have heightened the sense of urgency and highlighted the vulnerability of industrialized societies when they fail to keep control of the consequences of their economic activities.

Can the European Community be said to have matured fully in this area? In 1972 the Commission put forward a programme setting out the advantages of finding joint solutions. 'Pollution knows no frontiers' was the watchword, and the effectiveness of steps to protect water, air and soil was emphasized, provided they required producers and consumers in all the Member States to abide by similar, strictly observed standards.

More than a hundred directives were adopted — a legislative arsenal from which the institutions can draw the weapons they need. However, they are still faced with the delicate task of enforcement and on-the-spot checks.

The stated aim of the Community's environment policy is to cut down nuisances of all kinds:

- (a) hazardous substances, such as mercury, cadmium and some pesticides, which contaminate drinking or bathing water;
- (b) waste, frequently toxic, of which the 12-member Community produces 2 billion tonnes a year, 80% of it reusable or suitable for recycling as raw materials or for energy production;
- (c) pollution of the atmosphere by lead, sulphur dioxide and suspended particulates; acid rain, a threat to woods and forests, human health and buildings of architectural interest, will gradually be eradicated as new rules on major industrial plants and the use of lead-free petrol in all types of vehicles are put into effect;
- (d) chemical substances offered for sale, if they are potential risks to consumer health, with consumers using more and more detergents, hazardous substances and paint, and given the need for rigorous monitoring of foodstuffs.

The Community has taken heart from the fact that, in 1987, the Single Act made environmental policy a prime objective of European union, and is forging ahead with new initiatives.

It speaks with a single voice in international forums, and is exerting growing influence on the major issues which will shape the future of humanity. The decision taken by the Council on 2 March 1989 to ban the production and use of CFCs (the chlorofluorocarbons used in aerosols) by the end of the century and to cut them by 85% as soon as possible is an example to the rest of the world of determined action by Europeans to protect the ozone layer.

By building in this way on the Montreal protocol, the Community is seeking to face up to the dramatic consequences which the greenhouse effect could have for the entire planet, with the world's oceans warming and expanding, glaciers melting, part of the Antarctic icecap breaking off and sea levels rising by up to 1.5 metres by the year 2050.


Nowadays the campaign to protect the environment is clearly not confined to a few isolated cranks. It has become an integral part of every policy pursued within the Community, be it in the realms of industry, agriculture, energy or research.

The European Environment Agency, approved by the Madrid European Council on 27 June 1989, will be an autonomous body and will coordinate the initiatives and information activities of specialist organizations in the Member States. The Agency will be concentrating its attention on biotopes of major importance in nature conservation, acid deposits and environmental protection in the Mediterranean area. It will disseminate as much information as it can about the state of the environment in the Community and may open its doors to participation by non-member countries bordering the Community.

B. A democratic Europe

When the Fontainebleau European Council in June 1984 decided to appoint an *ad hoc* Committee on a people's Europe, it was acknowledging the existence of a personal and human dimension to European integration.

Since then the Community has set out to identify specific new rights which have been added to the list of rights enjoyed by all its citizens, as nationals of a Member State. The case-law established by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in interpreting and applying the Treaties has confirmed the stand of the founders in opting for a Europe with a human face.



The European Parliament in plenary session in Strasbourg.

Freedom of movement, freedom of establishment, freedom to exercise an occupational activity, the right to rely on Community provisions, equal treatment for all Community nationals — all of these have been made irreversible by the Community. These are being added to by new freedoms and rights made possible by the relaxation of border controls in the lead-up to 1992 — easier crossings, simplified customs papers, larger duty-free allowances for parcels sent by post. Europeans already have a standard European passport and Europe now has its own flag — gold stars on a blue ground — which everyone recognizes as the Community's emblem.

These symbols and concessions strengthen the sense of a shared identity.

But in matters affecting the everyday life of Europe's citizens there is still an enormous amount to be done. Not until the end of 1989 did the Twelve agree the Directive on the right of residence which allows people outside the workforce, pensioners and students to stay in another Member State for as long as they like. No uniform regulations for obtaining a driving licence have yet been laid down. There are still too many amazing cases of people having to pay the price of non-integration as they find themselves faced with outdated and contradictory national rules.

Administrative and bureaucratic borders are not going to crumble overnight. Surely something needs to be done to widen the powers and expand the resources of Parliament's Committee on Petitions, with the responsibility it bears for passing on to Member States the grievances of ordinary men and women whose day-to-day existence is affected by rules which are inconsistent or do not go far enough?

A people's Europe will spring up once we are all fully aware of the roots, values and options for the future which we have in common. Culture and education now need to be tackled. From 1 January 1991 there will be a new system of recognition for university degrees and equivalent qualifications which will extend to all professions the facilities already enjoyed by some.

The aspiration behind the Erasmus programme which the Commission launched in 1987 is to give 10% of the Community's student population the opportunity to study in other Member States for between three months and a year. The Youth for Europe programme promotes exchanges, on very flexible terms, between young people, whether studying, working or unemployed. The scope of schemes like these, and the funds allocated to them, must be appropriate to the enormous information and training needs of young people for whom the European dimension is now a fact of life. As prejudice disappears and people learn each other's languages and approach the study of the continent's history from the same angle, a new generation of Europeans should emerge, once schools shoulder the full burden of their responsibilities towards the Community ideal.

Need one point out that European citizenship can only be seen as a plus for its possessors, in both cultural and legal terms, and that, far from alienating them from their own regions or nations, it will give them the bonus of belonging to a larger, stronger, more diverse entity?

Democracy is not ours as of right: it is a privilege that has to be worked for and worked on every day. It depends on the degree of awareness shown by individuals and their commitment to preserving the values they share. European democracy will be a robust, living thing when generations of young Europeans have got into the habit of living, working and taking decisions together. Giving Community citizens the right to vote and stand in local elections could be the first step in this process, and could eventually lead to multinational lists being put up for European elections.

Europe as a political and democratic entity took a substantial step forward when the Community found itself confronted with the astonishingly rapid and unforeseen developments which set Poland, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia back on the road to political pluralism and personal freedoms. The French President called an extraordinary European Council meeting in Paris on 18 November 1989 at which he and his colleagues agreed in principle to grant those countries massive economic and financial aid, to be linked to their progress towards full political democracy. This was a reaffirmation by the European Community of its aspira-



The Community flag — a symbol of hope for Europe's young people.

tion to be a beacon of stability that would attract peoples who had managed to throw off the shackles in which the tragic course of history and totalitarianism had for too long bound them.

C. The Community's response to the upheavals in the East

The Eastern Europeans' sudden resurgence overthrows the patterns set since the Second World War. We are having to answer new questions, questions masked for so long by the more or less cosy certainties in which Western Europeans cocooned themselves in the 1950s when they organized themselves into the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. It looked then as though the other part of Europe was doomed to a perpetual winter imposed by force of arms and the constraints of ideology. No allowance was made for the fall of the Soviet empire in our short or medium-term forward calculations: our chief concern was to protect the freedom enjoyed by the Western democracies against Communist hegemony.

Today, anything is possible. But the options before us should not induce us to sacrifice the Community's achievement and the solidarity of the West by merging the Western European States into some huge, loose pan-European conglomeration. Nor, on the other hand, must we permit any resurgence of those ancient fears which could be used as the pretext for mutual suspicion, policies of confrontation or national rivalries.

The European Community is going to have to overcome four difficulties. On the face of it, the options open to it are delicate ones, but in reality experience and common sense should clearly show the way ahead.

Now that Hungary and Poland have applied to join the Council of Europe, neutral Austria is knocking at the Community's door, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Bulgaria are rediscovering their roots and their European identity, and 17 million East Germans are clamouring for democracy and freedom, is the Community still the appropriate framework?

Those who have never accepted the federalist aims of the founders already see the Community as a product of the cold war. 'The European Community is dead. Long live Europe!' is the joyous cry from some of them. But they are wrong: when the Community was founded in 1950, no one was forced into anything. It is the outcome of a voluntary commitment, freely entered into by its constituent States. More particularly, there is nothing to replace it. For if the Community in its present form were to disintegrate, after 40 years of patient effort to go beyond narrow-minded national self-interest, to identify and organize our common interests on a democratic basis, what could we reasonably expect? At best, to see our venture watered down into a huge free trade area, with no mechanisms for international negotiation and no policy of solidarity, buffeted on every hand by unregulated competition and the pressures of hegemony. At worst, the Balkanization of the continent, with unbridled particularism and an upsurge of nationalism which would reopen old frontier disputes.

The Community approach advocated by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman has not only made for reconciliation between victor and vanquished and enabled them to set out together on the path to reconstruction and prosperity. It has also introduced a new philosophy of behaviour into international relations, so that States observe between themselves the same arbitration procedures and the same respect for the law as are observed by individual citizens in the liberal democracies. The achievement of the Community constitutes genuine progress along the road of civilization. The Maghreb is already following its lead. Tomorrow, in all likelihood, Central America or South-East Asia will be taking the same course. And it is precisely this achievement — as much a spiritual and moral as a material achievement — which explains the Community's attraction in the eyes of those millions of other Europeans who have never resigned themselves to the rule of force and the law of the jungle.

EUROPE — NECESSITY AND THE IDEAL

History is only interested in the far-sighted and those who think big, like Europe's founders. They are still with us today in the inspiration they provided and legacy they left.

By 'thinking big' I mean taking account of world-wide geopolitical and economic trends, the movement of ideas and the development of the fundamental values which inspire our contemporaries. The founders wanted to see an end to internecine strife in Europe. But they also sensed that Europe was losing its place as the economic and political centre of the world. Their intuition was confirmed before our very eyes, to the point in the 1970s when we had to choose between survival and decline. I shocked many people at the time by constantly arguing this point. Gradually, though, the need for a quantum leap became apparent and created a climate in which a single European market by 1992 could be accepted as an objective. The same dynamism led to revision of the Treaty of Rome — the Single Act — and to what is known as the Delors package, in other words the financial reforms necessary to pay for our ambitious plans. Necessity woke Europe from its slumbers.

By 'far-sighted' I mean being simultaneously capable of drawing on our historical heritage and looking to the future. Futurology has a part to play, but so has a code of ethics for the individual, society and the human adventure. Nothing is achieved without enthusiasm ...

This, frankly, is what we most lack today. I can say, with both feet on the ground, that the theory of the bogymen nation has no place in the life of our Community if it wants to be a Community worthy of the name. The inevitable conflicts of interest between us must be transcended by a family feeling, a sense of shared values.

These include the enhancement of personality through mutual knowledge and exchange. The younger generation is very conscious of this new horizon. It rejects isolation, it wants to experience other ideas, to explore new territory.

Jacques Delors
Bruges, 17 October 1989

If the Community spirit and approach did not exist, they would now have to be invented and put to work for the peoples whose expectations of the European Community are so high.

How are we to deal with the German question? By addressing it from a European standpoint.

The reuniting of a divided Germany is one of the principal aims of European integration, as is the reuniting of all Europeans. This is how the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, meeting in Bonn under the chairmanship of Jean Monnet on 1 June 1964, put it:

'The participation of the German federal Republic in the European Community and in the West has already given the Germans a future shared with the other peoples of Europe. The reuniting of the Germans in the European Community in the making is an essential condition for peace.'

One has to admit the logic of this kind of unitary approach: federal union is the only structure in which 400 million Europeans can live together and go forward in peace. For a Germany which has rid itself of its complexes, the European Community is the only framework capable of accommodating its aspirations and its talents. The Federal Republic resumed its place in the concert of nations and laid the foundations for its prosperity through dialogue and close cooperation with France and its other partners. Would it give these up for a unilateral policy of economic and cultural supremacy over Eastern Europe?

The Germans feel at home in the European Community because, as Jacques Delors has pointed out,¹ it bears their hallmark, both in its federal structures (subsidiarity) and in the content of its common policies (competition and the social market economy, monetary stability and a concern for the environment). It seems highly likely that the Germans in the Federal Republic will not rest until they can share with their compatriots in the East the objectives and procedures of a Community which has served them so well. And such a development, which could one day be extended to the Poles, the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Romanians, the Bulgarians and the Yugoslavs as well, would be in the interests of all the peoples of Europe.

Do events in 'the other half of Europe' mean there should be a break in the pace of European integration?

There are those who think that the Member States should not be expending their energies on going for over-ambitious and controversial objectives — monetary union, the social

¹ Address to the Wissenschaftszentrum, Bonn, 5 October 1989.

dimension or institutional reform, for example — at a time when the changes under way in Central and Eastern Europe have put the West on full alert. Others fear that moving ahead to European union and achieving the targets set for 1993 will widen the chasm between the two halves of Europe still further and complicate the process of making up lost ground and merging, to which everyone's hopes for the future are pinned.

To mark time would not only be suicidal for the cohesion of the 12-member Community and the safeguarding of what it has already achieved — if it were stripped of a social dimension, a stronger monetary base and proper decision-making machinery, the single market would soon collapse under the weight of centrifugal pressures. Still more, though, if the Community is to make the enormous effort of solidarity expected of us by the economies of the countries abandoning bureaucratic socialism, bled dry as they are, then it will have to consolidate its structures and enhance its capacity to create wealth for redistribution.

Is the Western alliance, beneath whose wing the European Community has flourished, doomed to extinction as the demarcation line between the two blocs fades away?

There is every reason to believe that *perestroika* — the restructuring process Mikhail Gorbachev embarked upon in 1985 — has not the smallest hope of succeeding unless the burden placed on the Soviet economy by its enormous arms commitment, estimated at more than 20% of GNP, is lightened. Disengagement from Afghanistan, the Washington agreement on Euromissiles, the offer of comprehensive negotiations on strategic and conventional nuclear disarmament in Europe — all these factors argue for détente, for a relaxation of tension. Now would a world without tension mean that military alliances had outlived their usefulness? Here again, relief at the turn of events does not mean we should refuse to look at the world as it actually is.

The maintenance of political and strategic links between Europe and the United States will continue to be a vital guarantee of Europeans' peace and freedom for a long time to come. Europeans are not yet ready to set up a credible independent defence system of their own, even if political union, a more desirable objective now than ever before, is at last within reach. The Western alliance, our guarantee of freedom of access to the world's shipping lanes, is the bedrock on which the world-wide dimension of Community policy rests.

The price for unification of the whole of Europe at some date in the future will not be an abandonment of the ties that bind us together, ties which more than anything else express our shared attachment to the values proclaimed in the Atlantic Charter — freedom, democracy and human rights. Tomorrow's Europe will not have to choose between its Atlantic loyalties and its new continental dimension: it will find ways of reconciling the two, providing it grows stronger and advances towards political unity.

Conclusion

Prospects following the Strasbourg European Council (8 and 9 December 1989)

Strasbourg is the city which symbolizes European reconciliation and unity. Will the Strasbourg Summit go down in the history of European integration as a key date marking the start of a new drive forward?

There is every sign that the Heads of State or Government of the Twelve and the President of the Commission have realized the scale of the responsibilities they bear as the pace of change in Europe's political landscape quickens. Here at the end of 1989, a year in which there have been so many drastic alterations in the shape of our continent, the stakes are high. With Eastern Europe turning to democracy, the German question rising once more from the mists of the past to which the cold war had consigned it and the United States and the Soviet Union embarking on new forms of cooperation, it has been both urgent and vital for Europe to find its true place again, affirm its identity and fortify the structure within which it must develop.

When they decided to make Italy, as Council President, responsible for convening an international conference in the second half of 1990 to draft a new treaty on economic and monetary union, the Twelve set in motion the process of recovery which the European Community so urgently needed.

In the three-stage plan for economic and monetary union which it put forward on 12 April 1989, the Commission traced the outlines of a Community with one of its most critical components finally in place: exchange rates fixed for good, a European system of central banks to guarantee that the European currency will be jointly managed and stable, greater convergence in the conduct of Member States' economic policies — all these are steps which must be taken to strengthen the single market and ensure economic and social cohesion between all the countries and regions that make up the Community.

Monetary union and economic integration are two long-standing ambitions which the six founding States set themselves as long ago as 1969. We have had to wait two decades to see the plan mature, with the first step being taken in 1972 when the 'currency snake' saw the light of day, and the establishment of the European Monetary System in 1979 serving as a harbinger of what was to come.

The thrust of the Strasbourg decision, though, is first and foremost a political one. By overcoming the reluctance which is the almost automatic reflex of those who wield the monetary power that is a repository of national sovereignty, the European Community's leaders showed their intention to make the Community take a quantum leap along the road to union. The pace of events in Europe is speeding up, and we must speed up in building an integrated Europe — this was the gist of the European Council's message. The convening of an intergovernmental conference sets off a formal procedure for revising the Treaties, the outcome of which will be to authorize fresh transfers of powers, once ratified by the national parliaments, from national to Community level.

We see, then, that the institutions set up since 1950 on the initiative of Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet are responding well to the aim of their founders: broadening the scope of democratically and efficiently organized collective action to cover the new arenas of interdependence among Europeans. 'We are not forming coalitions between States, but union among people,' Jean Monnet was fond of saying. In deciding to strengthen the European Community and attack one of the bastions of State sovereignty, the Twelve have adopted this vision as their own, for only a stronger Community can hope to meet the aspirations of the peoples now throwing off their chains. Designing the form which the greater Europe now emerging is to take has become the Community's major responsibility. Acknowledged as it is both by its traditional partners in the European Free Trade Association and by its more recent partners in Eastern Europe as the robust and compelling focus around which the whole continent will have to organize, the Community has no choice but to advance along the path of unity.

A frontier-free Community in 1993, a financial Community from 1 July 1990, a monetary Community when the intergovernmental conference has completed its work — its duty now is to become to an even greater degree a Community in which democracy flourishes and the will of the people is paramount. When the Community Charter of fundamental social rights adopted in Strasbourg is put into practice, its effect must be to harmonize workers' individual and collective rights while consolidating those they have already won. An increase in the powers of the European Parliament is seen as a natural concomitant of the widening of the Community institutions' areas of jurisdiction, to offset the loss of powers of scrutiny which disturbs national parliaments as more and more of the legislation adopted is drafted in Brussels. The process of reform decided on in Strasbourg, then, must not be confined merely to the technical aspects of economic and monetary union. If it is to be a full and legitimate reform, it must include the democratic checks and balances needed to ensure that the new mechanisms of power are monitored and encouraged by popular representation. What makes the expression of the people's will a still more vital feature of the reform is that the Commission itself is asserting its executive authority in a structure on federal lines and with federal powers.

History obeys the dictates of a logic which cannot be predicted. The best people can hope to do is create conditions which channel spontaneous movements and use the energy they generate for constructive purposes. Because it is grounded on firm foundations, because

four decades of common resolve and dialogue within the same institutions have established the practice of international democracy, the European Community has shown it is equal to the occasion. The division of Europe into two opposing camps is ending in circumstances of peace and hope. The will to unity centres on the concept of a Europe of strength and solidarity, and the invaluable mechanism set up by a handful of brave visionaries in 1950 is now showing its paces. The Community ideal is stronger and newer than ever.

Declaration of 9 May 1950

'World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.

The contribution which an organized and living Europe can bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20 years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united Europe was not achieved and we had war.

Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity. The coming together of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place concern these two countries.

With this aim in view, the French Government proposes that action be taken immediately on one limited but decisive point. It proposes that Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe.

The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims.

The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries with the basic elements of industrial production on the same terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification.

This production will be offered to the world as a whole without distinction or exception, with the aim of contributing to raising living standards and to promoting peaceful achievements.

In this way, there will be realized simply and speedily that fusion of interests which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions.

By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace.

To promote the realization of the objectives defined, the French Government is ready to open negotiations on the following bases:

The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in the shortest possible time the modernization of production and the improvement of its quality; the supply of coal and steel on identical terms to the French and German markets, as well as to the markets of other member countries; the development in common of exports to other countries; the equalization and improvement of the living conditions of workers in these industries.

To achieve these objectives, starting from the very different conditions in which the production of member countries is at present situated, it is proposed that certain transitional measures should be instituted, such as the application of a production and investment plan, the establishment of compensating machinery for equating prices, and the creation of a restructuring fund to facilitate the rationalization of production. The movement of coal and steel between member countries will immediately be freed from all customs duty, and will not be affected by differential transport rates. Conditions will gradually be created which will spontaneously provide for the more national distribution of production at the highest level of productivity.

In contrast to international cartels, which tend to impose restrictive practices on distribution and the exploitation of national markets, and to maintain high profits, the organization will ensure the fusion of markets and the expansion of production.

The essential principles and undertakings defined above will be the subject of a treaty signed between the States and submitted for the ratification of their parliaments. The negotiations required to settle details of application will be undertaken with the help of an arbitrator appointed by common agreement. He will be entrusted with the task of seeing that the agreements reached conform with the principles laid down, and, in the event of a deadlock, he will decide what solution is to be adopted. The common High Authority entrusted with the management of the scheme will be composed of independent persons appointed by the governments, giving equal representation. A chairman will be chosen by common agreement between the governments. The Authority's decisions will be enforceable in France, Germany and other member countries. Appropriate measures will be provided for means of appeal against the decisions of the Authority.

A representative of the United Nations will be accredited to the Authority, and will be instructed to make a public report to the United Nations twice yearly, giving an account of the working of the new organization, particularly as concerns the safeguarding of its specific objectives.

The institution of the High Authority will in no way prejudice the methods of ownership of enterprises. In the exercise of its functions, the common High Authority will take into account the powers conferred upon the International Ruhr Authority and the obligations of all kinds imposed upon Germany, so long as these remain in force.

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European Communities — Commission

Europe — A fresh start — The Schuman Declaration 1950-90

Pascal Fontaine

Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities

1990 — 47 pp. — 16.2 x 22.9 cm

European Documentation series — 3/1990

ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT

ISBN 92-826-1220-1

Catalogue number: CB-NC-90-003-EN-C


This booklet reflects upon the content and spirit of the Schuman Declaration, drawing attention to the significance in today's circumstances of a statement which was the wellspring of the European Community.

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The European Community is coming up to its 40th birthday. It is reaching the age of maturity, the age at which men and women take stock of the past and map out a course for the years ahead. Like many 40-year-olds, it has to take major decisions which will shape its future.

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This publication clearly illustrates that the Schuman Declaration, which marked the beginning of a bold experiment 40 years ago, is still a force to be reckoned with.



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OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
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ISBN 92-826-1220-1



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