



Plaintext Information in Network Protocols

Green Locks Are Not Enough

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#sf19eu • Palacio Estoril Hotel, Estoril, Portugal • Nov 4 - 8

About me



- Simone Mainardi
- Engineer, PhD born in 1986
- Joined Luca Deri and ntop in late 2015
- Used to be a pure data scientist
- Now more close to a software developer







- Introduction and motivation
 - Encrypted but not so encrypted
 - Secure but not so secure
- Plaintext information in network protocols
- Discussion and conclusion

Following Along



- Pcaps and docs available at
 - <u>https://bit.ly/328e5As</u>
- Screenshots shown during the presentation, look at the filename!

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- Encryption is increasingly used in network protocols
- Fundamental to protect
 - Internet browsing
 - Online transactions
 - Instant messaging
 - Email
 - VoIP
 - • •



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Transport Layer Security (TLS)

~20 years since TLS 1.0

Cryptographic Protocols

- Cryptographic protocols necessary for the encryption of network communications
- Most popular is the

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 C tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446 $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 6961 Updates: 5705, 6066 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721

tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246

tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246

Category: Standards Track

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

The TLS Protocol Version 1.0



January 1999

April 2006

August 2008

August 2018

What is the TLS



 Cryptographic protocol providing endto-end communication security over the networks

← -	C atatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8446/										
•••••	Datatracker Groups Documents Meetings Other User										
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 8446 Obsoletes: 5077, 5246, 6961 Updates: 5705, 6066 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721											
	The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3										
Ab	bstract										
	This document specifies version 1.3 of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. TLS allows client/server applications to communicate over the Internet in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,										

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tampering, and message forgery.



Where is the TLS



• Implemented in libraries and network applications

- OpenVPN and other VPN tools
- Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC)
- Web Browsers (Chrome, FF, Opera, IE, ...)
- Web Servers (Apache2, nginx, ...)

• • • • •

TLS and HTTPS



- Probably everyone has experience with HTTPS
- HTTPS is HTTP transported
 over TLS
- Browsers and websites that use HTTPS are employing TLS encryption

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www.digicet.com

Encryption Makes Us Feel Secure



- We feel secure when we know our traffic is encrypted
 "No one can look at it!"
- We feel secure when we see the locks or a comfortable light-green while browsing the web
 - "It's something private just between me and the website!"
- But actually...

Fact #1: Encrypted != Secure [1/2]



• Encrypted != Secure

- A secure communication must be encrypted
- An encrypted communication is not necessarily secure
- Security depends on the cryptographic protocol (e.g., TLS), on its implementation (bugs?), on how cryptographic keys are managed, ...

Fact #1: Encrypted != Secure [2/2]



- Secure if...
 - ...the data being transferred is encrypted?
 - ...the parties exchanging information are who they claim to be?
 - ...the data has not been forged or tampered?
- TLS has vulnerabilities and is subject to attacks as basically any other protocol

Fact #2: Plaintext Information in Encrypted Network Protocols [1/2]



- Cryptographic protocols or protocols that support encryption may carry certain plaintext information
- They will do that almost surely at least during the initial setup phase
 - Initial TLS handshake
 - Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) or Google quick

Fact #2: Plaintext Information in Encrypted Protocols [2/2]



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11 0.169344	192.168.1.159	151.11.50.139	TCP 66 54902 - 4433 [ACK] Seq=644 Ack=1462 Win=131008 Len=0 TSval=1065084772 TSecr=14798	
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EC poi	nt formats Length: 3			
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			▶ Tag/value: SNI (Server Name Indication) (l=15): mail.google.com	
			▶ Tag/value: STK (Source Address Token) (1=58)	
			▶ Tag/value: VER (Version) (l=4): 0024	
			▶ Tag/value: CCS (Common Certificate Sets) (l=16)	
			▶ Tag/value: NONC (Client Nonce) (1=32)	
			▶ Tag/value: MSPC (Max streams per connection) (l=4): 100	
			▶ Tag/value: AEAD (Authenticated encryption algorithms) (l=4), AES-GCM with a 12-byte tag and IV	
			▶ Tag/value: UAID (Client's User Agent ID) (l=24): beta Chrome/43.0.2357.45	
			▶ Tag/value: SCID (Server config ID) (l=16)	



Fact #3: Plaintext Information in Network Protocols [1/2]



- Still a great deal of network protocols are plaintext or carry plaintext information
- Computers and network protocols have born and evolved when security was not an issue
 - Small, local networks (e.g., university labs) in which all the participants were trusted
 - Build something that 'just works'



Fact #3: Plaintext Information in Network Protocols [2/2]



- Even today when security is a main concern, certain network protocols didn't evolve in that sense
- Among the most common protocols which disseminate plaintext information there are
 - DHCP
 - DNS and mDNS
 - SSDP



This Talk is About...



- Fact #1: Encrypted != Secure
- Fact #2: Cryptographic protocols or protocols that support encryption may carry certain plaintext information
- Fact #3: Still a great deal of network protocols carry plaintext information





- This talk is NOT about
 - Cryptographic protocols
 - TLS vulnerabilities / attacks / pitfalls
 - Network Encryption / Decryption
 - SSL Man-In-The-Middle





- This talk is about
 - Understanding how certain protocols disseminate plaintext information
 - Seeing which information is actually disseminated in plaintext
 - What it can be done to prevent it

Protocols Shown in this Talk



- Protocols
 - TLS
 - DNS
 - mDNS
 - DNS-SD
 - SSDP
 - DHCP
- ~10 minutes per protocol
 - Basic overview with real examples
 - No deep-dive

The Building Blocks of the TLS



- TLS actually consists of two protocols
- Only one actually carry encrypted application data
- TLS v 1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0

C tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8446

These properties should be true even in the face of an attacker who has complete control of the network, as described in [RFC3552]. See Appendix E for a more complete statement of the relevant security properties.

TLS consists of two primary components:

- A handshake protocol (<u>Section 4</u>) that authenticates the communicating parties, negotiates cryptographic modes and parameters, and establishes shared keying material. The handshake protocol is designed to resist tampering; an active attacker should not be able to force the peers to negotiate different parameters than they would if the connection were not under attack.
- A record protocol (<u>Section 5</u>) that uses the parameters established by the handshake protocol to protect traffic between the communicating peers. The record protocol divides traffic up into a series of records, each of which is independently protected using the traffic keys.



The TLS Handshake



- Before actually exchanging encrypted data, two parties willing to use TLS must perform an handshake
- Allows the server and client to
 - Authenticate each other
 - Negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys
- Involves a series of back-and-forth packets between client and server

The TLS Handshake in Packets



Expression... +

• Shown TLS v 1.2, 1.3 fewer packets but still plaintext


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12 0.106626 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TCP 66 50241 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=5109 Win=130048 Len=0 TSval=1003545513 TSecr=1494676274 13 0.111389 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 151 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 14 0.111495 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 151 Application Data 15 0.111653 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 555 Application Data Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 512 ▼ Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 508 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)	10	0.106566	192.168.1.159	91.198.174.192	TCP	66 50241 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=2881 Win=129600 Len=0 TSval=1003545513 TSecr=1494676274
13 0.111389 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 151 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message 14 0.111495 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 151 Application Data 15 0.111653 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 151 Application Data Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) TLSv1.2 TLSv1.2 555 Application Data Version: TLS 1.0 (1int Hello TLSv1.2 TLSv1.2 555 Application Data Version: TLS 1.0 (int Hello TLSv1.2 TLSv1.2 555 Application Data Version: TLS 1.0 (int Hello TLSv1.2 TLSv1.2 555 Application Data Version: TLS 1.2 (int Hello (1int Hello 1int H	11	0.106566	192.168.1.159	91.198.174.192	TCP	66 50241 → 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4097 Win=128384 Len=0 TSval=1003545513 TSecr=1494676274
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TLS Client Handshake: Example






P Host name is sent in plaintext, along with other information

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TLS Server Handshake: Example





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TLS Handshake: Plaintext Information [1/2]



• Server Name Indication (SNI)

- From the browser
- Similar to the HTTP virtual hosts

• Cipher Suites

 Sets of (more or less secure) algorithms to secure the communication Server Name Indication extension Server Name list length: 20 Server Name Type: host_name (0) Server Name length: 17

Server Name: www.wikipedia.org

•	Cipher Suites (1	7 suites)
	Cipher Suite:	Reserved (GREASE) (0x3a3a)
	Cipher Suite:	TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0×1301)
	Cipher Suite:	TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0×1302)
	Cipher Suite:	TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 (0x1303)
	Cipher Suite:	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (
	Cipher Suite:	TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x
	Cipher Suite:	TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (
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TLS Handshake: Plaintext Information [2/2]



- Server Certificate
 - Common Name
 - Alternative Names
 - Validity
 - Plaintext in TLS 1.2
 - Encrypted in TLS 1.3

- RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-commonName=*.wikipedia.org)
 - RelativeDistinguishedName item (id-at-commonName=*.wikipedia.org) Id: 2.5.4.3 (id-at-commonName)
 - ▼ DirectoryString: uTF8String (4)

uTF8String: *.wikipedia.org

•	Extension (id-ce-subjectAltName)
	Extension Id: 2.5.29.17 (id-ce-subjectAltName)
	GeneralNames: 39 items
	▼ GeneralName: dNSName (2)
	dNSName: *.wikipedia.org
	GeneralName: dNSName (2)
	dNSName: wikimedia.org
	GeneralName: dNSName (2)
	dNSName: mediawiki.org
	▼ GeneralName: dNSName (2)
	dNSName: wikibooks.org

🗸 validity

How to Use TLS Handshake Data: SNI [1/2]



- SNI to profile users
 - *.facebook.com -> social media
 - *.bloomberg.com -> news
 - Services
 - SimilarWeb, Webshrinker, Symantec, Cyren
- Censorship in Korea

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https://www.wikipedia.com:443/				
	Current catego			
	Reference Last Time Rated/R			
		CRECCALEGOLY CLIECK Results for your request: Full URL https://www.wikipedia.com Cregories: Categories: Categori		

🗘 🗋 bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/south-korea-is-censoring-the-internet-by-snooping-on-sni-traffic/

South Korea is Censoring the Internet by Snooping on SNI Traffic

By Sergiu Gatlan

🛅 February 13, 2019 🛛 🔯 06:19 PM 🛛 🜉

How to Use TLS Handshake Data: SNI [2/2]

- SNI for HTTPS blocking / throttling
 - ntop's ntopng Edge
 - Trustwave's Web Filter
 - Sophos UTM
- SNI for Alerting
 - Suspicious or malicious host names

Past Alerts Flow Alerts							
Flow Alerts							
					10 -	Турет	Severity-
	Date/Time♥	Severity	Alert Type	Description			ctions
	18:10:29	Warning	Suspicious Activity	A SSL Certificate Mismatch [Client Certificate: mydomain.es] [Server Certificate: mydomain.it] [Flow: 192.168.2.222:43794 😅 194.247.56.15:443] [TCP] [Application: SSL] [Info: mydomain.es]		Explo	re Delete

How to Use TLS Handshake Data: Certificate and Cipher Suites



- Sever Certificate validity
- Cipher Suites to check if hosts in your network are using algorithms which are (deemed to be) secure
 - Entities maintain guidelines for TLS with regard to

SP 800-52 Rev. 2

network security

Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations

 Date Published: August 2019
 DOCUMENTATION

 Supersedes: SP 800-52 Rev. 1 (April 2014)
 Publication:

 Author(s)
 C* SP 800-52 Rev. 2 (DOI)

 Kerry McKay (NIST), David Cooper (NIST)
 C* Local Download

How to Use TLS Handshake Data: Fingerprinting



- **Fingerprinting** to profile SSL/TLS Clients
 - Good, bad, expected, unexpected, unsecure
- A fingerprint (almost surely) identify a client
- JA3 (https://github.com/ salesforce/ja3)
 - Uses fields in the client hello

TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Turne Handshake (22)			
Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)	JA3 fingerprint for the standard Tor client:		
Length: 224			
W Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)	e7d705a3286e19ea42f587b344ee6865		
Length: 220			
Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) ◀ ▶ Random	JA3 fingerprint for the Trickbot malware:		
Session ID Length: 0			
Cipher Suites Length: 38 ▶ Cipher Suites (19 suites) ◀	6734f37431670b3ab4292b8f60f29984		
Compression Methods Length: 1			
▶ Compression Methods (1 method) Extensions Longth: 111	JA3 fingerprint for the Emotet malware:		
Extensions Length: 141 -			
Extension: elliptic_curves	4d7a28d6f2263ed61de88ca66eb011e3		
Extension: ec_point_formats Extension: signature_algorithms			
Extension: next_protocol_negotiation			
▶ Extension: Application Laver Protocol Negotiation			
← → C a raw.githubusercontent.com/salesf	orce/ja3/master/lists/osx-nix-ja3.csv		
83e04bc58d402f9633983cbf22724b02, "Charles, Goog	le Play Music Desktop Player,Pos		
424008725394c634a4616b8b1f2828a5, "Charles, java, eclipse"			
be9f1360cf52dc1f61ae025252f192a3,"Chromium" def8761e4bcaaf91d99801a22ac6f6d4,"Chromium"			
fc5cb0985a5f5e295163cc8ffff8a6e1."Chromium"			

e7d46c98b078477c4324031e0d3b22f5, "Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client" ed36017db541879619c399c95e22067d, "Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client"

Protection Against TLS Handshake Eavesdroppers



- Encrypted SNI as an extension of TLS v 1.3
 - The server publishes a public key on a well-known
 DNS record
 - The client then replaces the plaintext SNI with an encrypted SNI, encrypted using a symmetric encryption key derived using the server's public key

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The Domain Name System (DNS)

- System to map symbolic names to IP addresses
 - e.g., wikipedia.com -> 1.2.3.4
- Hierarchical and distributed architecture
- Defines the DNS protocol
- Ultra-long history
 - Tens of RFCs

Network Working Group P. Mockapetris Request for Comments: 883 ISI November 1983 DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION and SPECIFICATION

This memo discusses the implementation of domain name servers and resolvers, specifies the format of transactions, and discusses the use of domain names in the context of existing mail systems and other network software.



 \rightarrow C $\widehat{}$ tools.ietf.org/html/rfc882

[Docs] [txt|pdf] [Tracker]

Obsoleted by: <u>1034</u> , <u>1035</u> Updated by: <u>973</u>		
Network Working Group	P. Mockapetris	
Request for Comments: 882	ISI	
-	November 1983	

DOMAIN NAMES - CONCEPTS and FACILITIES

This RFC introduces domain style names, their use for ARPA Internet mail and host address support, and the protocols and servers used to implement domain name facilities.



[Docs] [txt |pdf] [Tracker] Obsoleted by: <u>1034</u>, <u>1035</u> Updated by: <u>973</u>








- The DNS protocol (almost surely) kicks in every time a name is used to identify Internet resource
 - ping google.it
 - curl www.wikipedia.org
- To resolve a to an IP address, the DNS client queries a DNS server
 - The DNS client issues a **DNS query**
 - The DNS server responds with a **DNS query response**
- DNS server IP address is known to the DNS client

DNS Query: Example





DNS Query Response: Example



🗧 🗧 🚨 🖬 sf_	dns.wikipedia.pcap				
$\blacksquare \blacksquare \boxtimes \otimes \blacksquare \blacksquare \boxtimes \boxtimes \land \leftrightarrow \Rightarrow \cong \overline{\bullet} \bullet \blacksquare \blacksquare \blacksquare \odot \circ \circ \bullet \blacksquare$					
Apply a display filter < #/>	Expression				
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info					
	d query 0x3adc A www.wikipedia.org				
← 2 0.042680 8.8.4.4 192.168.1.159 DNS 122 Standard	d query response 0x3adc A www.wikipedia.org CNAME dyna.wikimedia.org A 91.198.174.192				
Type: A (Host Address) (1)					
Class: IN (0x0001)	Sf_tls1.2.wikipedia.pcap				
Answers					
www.wikipedia.org: type CNAME, class IN, cname dyna.wikimedia.org Name: www.wikipedia.org	📶 📕 🥖 🕲 🖿 🖺 🕱 🗳 🧣 🜩 ≌ 쥼 👱 📃 🔍 Q, Q, 🎹				
Type: CNAME (Canonical NAME for an alias) (5)	Apply a display filter <%/> Expression +				
Class: IN (0×0001)					
Time to live: 13507	No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info □ 1 0.000000 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TCP 78 50241 → 443 [SYN] Seg=0 Win=65535 Len				
Data length: 17	2 0.052954 51.198.174.192 192.168.1.159 TCP 74 443 + 50241 5 445 Seq-0 Ack=1 Wim				
CNAME: dyna.wikimedia.org	3 0.053037 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TCP 66 50241 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=132				
dyna.wikimedia.org: type A, class IN, addr 91.198.174.192 Name: dyna.wikimedia.org	4 0.053469 192.168.1.159 91.198.174.192 TLSv1.2 583 Client Hello				
Type: A (Host Address) (1)	▶ Cipher Suites (17 suites)				
Class: IN (0x0001)	Compression Methods Length: 1				
Time to live: 118	Compression Methods (1 method)				
Data length: 4	Extensions Length: 401				
Address: 91.198.174.192	<pre>Extension: Reserved (GREASE) (len=0) V Extension: server_name (len=22)</pre>				
[Request In: 1]	Type: server name (0)				
[Time: 0.042680000 seconds]	Length: 22				
0000 50 32 37 eb bb 40 bc cf 4f 0f 6e 49 08 00 45 80 P27 · @ · 0 · nI · · E ·	▼ Server Name Indication extension				
0010 00 6c f1 bb 00 00 78 11 81 f2 08 08 04 04 c0 a8 ·l····x····· 0020 01 9f 00 35 ca 87 00 58 1b ba 3a dc 81 80 00 01 ···5···X ·····	Server Name List length: 20				
0030 00 02 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 09 77 69 6b 69 70 ······w www.wikip	Server Name Type: host_name (0) Server Name length: 17				
0040 65 64 69 61 03 6f 72 67 00 00 01 00 01 c0 0c 00 edia org ······ 0050 05 00 01 00 00 34 c3 00 11 04 64 79 6e 61 09 77 ·····4····dyna w	Server Name; www.wikipedia.org				
0050 05 00 01 00 00 34 c3 00 11 04 64 79 6e 61 09 77 ·····4····dyna.w 0060 69 6b 69 6d 65 64 69 61 c0 1a c0 2f 00 01 00 01 ikimedia	0000 b8 27 eb 2b 90 f1 50 32 37 eb bb 40 08 00 45 00 · ' ++ · P2 7 · @ · E				
0070 00 00 00 76 00 04 5b c6 ae c0 ····v··[····	0010 02 39 00 00 40 00 40 06 6b f1 c0 a8 01 9f 5b c6 9. a.a. k				



- All the resolved names are plaintext
 - Even if all the subsequent communications are encrypted



How to use DNS Data



- Names to passively profile users similar to what has been seen with the TLS SNI
- The ISP or even a Free-Wifi bar can easily get their hands into the DNS traffic

DNS Queries Interception [1/2]



- As there is no encryption / authentication, queries can be intercepted
 - Transparently redirect the DNS queries to a DNS server chosen by the ISP (or an attacker)
 - The DNS server can respond with arbitrary IP addresses
- Interceptions can be made for various purposes
 - Censorship
 - Displaying ads
 - Collecting statistics
 - Blocking malware
- The point is that they are not authorized by users and are difficult to spot

DNS-based content filtering OpenDNS, CleanBrowsing

[3 blockopendns.com/msin?wc=Ew1oGwt8B3RA88Ru8w68CxUJThYCEA%3D%3D&url=888888157166687067908076156880788ablock=Anree

If you think this shouldn't be blocked, please contact your re This site was categorized in Social Networkin

DNS and other services

ntop	A - 8		Q Search Host	j 🖵	I III AT&T Wi-	
ystem Setup						
Operating Mode	Global DNS					
Network Interfaces	Enforce Global DNS Enable DNS forging to force the devices to use the specified global DNS.		On Off			
Interfaces Configuration	DNS Server Preset			1		
DNS Configuration	You can select a featured DNS servers from the list or specify your custom DNS servers.	CleanBrowsing - Security			Cie	
Captive Portal					We	osit
Bandwidth Control	Primary DNS The Primary DNS server		185.228.168.9			
Date and Time					Acce	ss to
Security	Secondary DNS				beer	bloc
Misc	The Secondary DNS server		185.226.169.9		Dom	ain: I

DNS Queries Interception [2/2]



Protection Against DNS Eavesdroppers: DoH



- DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
- TCP port 443
- Third-party observers can't look at DNS requests
- Supported by recent browsers (FF, Chrome)

→ C a tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8484					
[Docs] [txt pdf] [draft-ietf-doh] [Tracker] [Diff1]					
	PROPOSED STANDARD				
Errata ExiInternet Engineering Task Force (IETF)P. HoffmRequest for Comments: 8484ICPCategory: Standards TrackP. McMarISSN: 2070-1721MozilOctober 20					
DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH) Abstract					
This document defines a protocol for sending DNS que DNS responses over HTTPS. Each DNS guery-response p					


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into an HTTP exchange.



Protection Against DNS Eavesdroppers: Firefox DoH





Act	ive DNSove	HTTP	S Flows						
.01			OT IOWS	10 - Hosts- Si	atus - Dire	ection+ App	lications 🔻 -	Categories -	Protocol- IP Version-
	Application	Protocol	Client	Server	Duration	Breakdown	Actual Thpt	Total Bytes	Info
Info	TLS.DNSoverHTTPS ©	TCP	172.20.10.4 🛋:49289	mozilla.cloudflare-dns.c 🍱 :https	01:59	Client Server	0 bit/s 🕹	21.77 KB	mozilla.cloudflare-dns.c
Info	DNS.DNSoverHTTPS 🕲	UDP	172.20.10.4 🛤:34208	1.1.1.1 🖼 :domain	< 1 sec	Client Server	0 bit/s 🗕	204 Bytes	mozilla.cloudflare-dns.c
Appl	📕 🔏 💿 🛅		ि ९ 🗢 🟓 🛔		. ♀ ፹				
	y a anapiay mean maapie								Expression
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Protection Against DNS Eavesdroppers: DoT



- DNS over TLS (DoT)
- TCP port <u>8</u>53
- System-wide
- Linux: systemdresolved (systemd >= 239)
- Linux/Win/OS X: DNS Privacy Daemon stubby

→ C a tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7858	
[Docs] [txt pdf] [draft-ietf-dpri] [Tracker] [Diff1] [Diff2] [Errata]
Updated by: <u>8310</u>	PROPOSED STANDARD Errata Exist
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Request for Comments: 7858 Category: Standards Track ISSN: 2070-1721	Z. Hu L. Zhu J. Heidemann USC/ISI A. Mankin Independent D. Wessels Verisign Labs P. Hoffman ICANN May 2016
Specification for DNS over Transport Layer	Security (TLS)

Abstract

This document describes the use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) to provide privacy for DNS. Encryption provided by TLS eliminates opportunities for eavesdropping and on-path tampering with DNS queries in the network, such as discussed in <u>RFC 7626</u>. In addition, this document specifies two usage profiles for DNS over TLS and provides advice on performance considerations to minimize overhead from using TCP and TLS with DNS.

Protection Against DNS Eavesdroppers: systemd-resolved DoT



					sf_dns_dot.pcap
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No.	Time	Source	Destination		ength Info
<u>г</u> (1 0.000000	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TCP	74 58290 → 853 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=707761427 TSecr=0
	2 0.034926	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TCP	74 853 → 58290 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=60192 Len=0 MSS=1380 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=2386231
	3 0.034971	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TCP	66 58290 → 853 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0 TSval=707761462 TSecr=2386231312
	4 0.035180	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2	264 Client Hello
	5 0.067922	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TCP	66 853 → 58290 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=199 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=2386231346 TSecr=707761462
	6 0.085177	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185		3135 Server Hello, Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
	7 0.085210	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TCP	66 58290 → 853 [ACK] Seq=199 Ack=3070 Win=62592 Len=0 TSval=707761512 TSecr=2386231362
	8 0.086210	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2	151 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
	9 0.086307	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2	89 Application Data
	0.086419	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2	128 Application Data
-	1 0.117127	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TLSv1.2	342 New Session Ticket, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
	2 0.117158	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TCP	66 853 → 58290 [ACK] Seq=3346 Ack=369 Win=61440 Len=0 TSval=2386231395 TSecr=707761513
	3 0.128189	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TLSv1.2	178 Application Data
	4 0.128316	192.168.1.185 192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TCP	<pre>66 5 89 Aubuntu@ubuntu:~\$ systemdversion</pre>
	5 1.288536 5 1.288620	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2 TLSv1.2	133 Asystemd 240
-	7 1.320299	8.8.8.8	8.8.8.8 192.168.1.185	TCP	
-	8 1.331239	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TLSv1.2	66 8+PAM +AUDIT +SELINUX +IMA +APPARMOR +SMACK +SYSVINIT +UTMP +LIBCRYPTSETUP +GCRY
	9 1.373326	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TCP	FT +GNUTLS +ACL +XZ +LZ4 +SECCOMP +BLKID +ELFUTILS +KMOD -IDN2 +IDN -PCRE2 defa
	0 2.970121	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2	⁸⁹ Ault-hierarchy=hybrid
-	1 2.970205	192.168.1.185	8.8.8.8	TLSv1.2	
	2 3.001785	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TCP	<pre>133 Aubuntu@ubuntu:~\$ cat /etc/systemd/resolved.conf grep -v \# 66 8</pre>
	3 3.011624	8.8.8.8	192.168.1.185	TLSv1.2	167 A
-		0101010	1021100111100	1 LOTITL	[Resolve]
					DNS=8.8.8
					Domains=~.
					DNSOverTLS=opportunistic
					ubuntu@ubuntu:~\$ systemctl restart systemd-resolved

• Resolve host names to SSN: 2070-1721

IP addresses in (small) networks

- No need for a DNS server
- IP UDP multicast packets
- Only resolves host names ending with .local

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The multicast DNS (mDNS)

February 2013

Multicast DNS

Abstract

As networked devices become smaller, more portable, and more ubiquitous, the ability to operate with less configured infrastructure is increasingly important. In particular, the ability to look up DNS resource record data types (including, but not limited to, host names) in the absence of a conventional managed DNS server is useful.

simone@devel: ** avahi-resolve-host-name -4 Simones-MacBook-Pro.local Simones-MacBook-Pro.local 192.168.2.126 simone@devel: ** ping -c1 Simones-MacBook-Pro.local PING Simones-MacBook-Pro.local (192.168.2.126) 56(84) bytes of data. 64 bytes from 192.168.2.126: icmp_seq=1 ttl=64 time=1.00 ms --- Simones-MacBook-Pro.local ping statistics ---1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 1.009/1.009/1.009/0.000 ms

si∎one@devel:~\$



mDNS Implementations


- Apple
 - Bonjour (mDNSResponder)
- Linux & BSDs
 - Avahi (avahi-daemon)
 - systemd-resolved
- Windows
 - Bonjour for Windows (mDNSResponder.exe)
 - Link-local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) not actually mDNS but similar

mDNS Query: Example



simone@devel: ** avahi=resolve=host=name =4 Simones=MacBook=Pro.local
Simones=MacBook=Pro.local 192.168.2.126

sf_mdns_avahi_name_lookup.pcap • Query sent X ۲ C to Apply a display filter ... < %/> Expression. No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info 224.0.0.251 1 0.000000 192.168.2.222 224.0.0.251 MDNS 85 Standard query 0x0000 A Simones-MacBook-Pro.local, "QM" question 2 0.000198 192.168.2.126 MDNS 143 Standard guery response 0x0000 A, cache flush 192.168.2.126 AAAA, cache flush fe80::bb:af48:f82e:a77a NSEC,. 224.0.0.251 163 Standard query response 0x0000 A, cache flush 192.168.2.126 AAAA, cache flush fe80::bb:af48:f82e:a77a NSEC, • UDP with 3 0.000275 fe80::bb:af48:f82e:a77a ff02::fb MDNS Ethernet II, Src: SuperMic d4:cc:f9 (00:25:90:d4:cc:f9), Dst: IPv4mcast fb (01:00:5e:00:00:fb) src/dst ports Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.2.222, Dst: 224.0.0.251 User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 5353, Dst Port: 5353 Multicast Domain Name System (query) 5353 Transaction ID: 0x0000 Flags: 0x0000 Standard guery Name is Ouestions: 1 Answer RRs: 0 Authority RRs: 0 carried in Additional RRs: 0 Queries plaintext in a Simones-MacBook-Pro.local: type A, class IN, "QM" question Name: Simones-MacBook-Pro.local [Name Length: 25] standard 00 5e 00 00 fb 00 25 90 d4 cc f9 08 00 45 00 40 00 ff 11 6f 50 c0 a8 Ga a · · · oP · · · · e9 14 e9 00 33 27 0a 00 00 00 00 00 01 DNS packet 00 00 13 53 69 6d 6f 6e 65 73 2d 4d ······S imones-M 0040 61 63 42 6f 6f 6b 2d 50 72 6f 05 6c 6f 63 61 6c acBook-P ro local 0050 00 00 01 00 01



• Setting the name on OS X System Prefs->Sharing ••• System Preferences

Can use dig

Simones-MacBook-Pro.local

\$ dig @224.0.0.251 -p5353 +short \ "Simones-MacBook-Pro.local" 192.168.2.126


Can reverse lookup

\$ avahi-resolve-address 192.168.2.126 192,168,2,126 Simones-MacBook-Pro.local

192.168.2.126

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
mDNS: Tips & Tricks to Play with It



Advertising Services with mDNS



- mDNS per-se does not provide information device types and services
- Advertise information about network services that a device offers
- DNS Service-Discovery (DNS-SD) RFC 6763
 - Allows clients to discover services, and to resolve those services to host names using standard DNS queries



Discovering Services With DNS-SD

DNS-SD Service Discovery: Example [1/3]



Queries Responses	Simones-Mac-mini: " simone\$ dns-sd -B _servicesdns-sdudp Browsing for _servicesdns-sdudp DATE:Sun 15 Sep 2019 17:34:30.426STARTING							
Known-Answer	Timestamp A/R	Flags if Domain	Service Type	Instance Name				
	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_nfw				
Suppression to avoid	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_airplay				
wasting network	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_raop				
5	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_touch-able				
capacity with	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_appletv-v2				
repeated transmission	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_udp.local.	_sleep-proxy				
of those answers	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_ssh				
or those answers	17:34:30.426 Add	36.	_tcp.local.	_sftp-ssh				
	17:34:30.426 Add		_tcp.local.	_companion-link				

• •	•								sharkfest_mdns_dns-sd_servicesdns-sdudp.pcap
		۲	۵ ۹	(=	2 7	速 📃 🔳	⊕ Q	. 0	Ŧ

•

	mdns				Expression +
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
	4.835305	192.168.1.159	224.0.0.251	MDNS	88 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QU" question
	4.836013	fe80::1432:96d0:d46c:82e3	ff02::fb	MDNS	108 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QU" question
	4.895118	192.168.1.122	192.168.1.159	MDNS	160 Standard query response 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local
	4.896890	192.168.1.160	192.168.1.159	MDNS	209 Standard query response 0x0000 PTR _airplaytcp.local PTR _raoptcp.local PTR _touch-abletcp.local PTR _appletv-v2tcp.local PTR _sleep-proxyudp.local
	4.901520	192.168.1.100	224.0.0.251	MDNS	106 Standard query response 0x0000 PTR _nfwtcp.local
	4.903034	fe80::ba27:ebff:fe2b:90f1	ff02::fb	MDNS	126 Standard query response 0x0000 PTR _nfwtcp.local
	5.840141	192.168.1.159	224.0.0.251	MDNS	307 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QM" question PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local PTR _airplaytcp.
	5.840778	fe80::1432:96d0:d46c:82e3	ff02::fb	MDNS	327 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QM" question PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local PTR _airplaytcp.
	8.849890	192.168.1.159	224.0.0.251	MDNS	307 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QM" question PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local PTR _airplaytcp.
	8.850581	fe80::1432:96d0:d46c:82e3	ff02::fb	MDNS	327 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QM" question PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local PTR _airplaytcp.
	17.8694	192.168.1.159	224.0.0.251	MDNS	307 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QM" question PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local PTR _airplaytcp.
	17.8701	fe80::1432:96d0:d46c:82e3	ff02::fb	MDNS	327 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _servicesdns-sdudp.local, "QM" question PTR _sshtcp.local PTR _sftp-sshtcp.local PTR _companion-linktcp.local PTR _airplaytcp.

DNS-SD Service Discovery: Example [2/3]



	🔚 sharkfest_mdns_dns-sd_ssh_tcp.pcap	
🚄 📕 🖉 🔘 🔚 🖺 🗙 🗳 🤗 🖛 🖷 🖉 👱	<u> </u>	
mdns		🗙 🐋 💌 Expression 🕂
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length In		
	tandard query 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local, "QU" question tandard query 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local, "QU" question	
		cache flush 0 0 22 Simones-MacBook-Pro.local TXT, cache flush TXT AAAA, cache flush fe…
5 1.220678 192.168.1.159 224.0.0.251 MDNS 144 S	tandard query 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local, "OM" question PTR Simone\342\200\23	231s Mac minisshtcp.local PTR Simone's MacBook Prosshtcp.local
	tandard query 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local, "OM" question PTR Simone\342\200\23	
	tandard query 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local, "QM" question PTR Simone\342\200\23 tandard query 0x0000 PTR _sshtcp.local, "QM" question PTR Simone\342\200\23	
<pre>v Simone's MacBook Prosshtcp.local: type SRV, class IN, cache Service: Simone's MacBook Pro Protocol: _ssh Name: _tcp Type: SRV (Server Selection) (33) .000 0000 0000 0000 1 = Class: IN (0x0001) 1 = Cache flush: True Time to live: 120 Data length: 28 Priority: 0 Weight: 0 Prort: 22 Target: Simone's MacBook Pro.local > Simone's MacBook Prosshtcp.local: type TXT, class IN, cache v Simone's MacBook Prodevice-infotcp.local Type: TXT (Text strings) (16) .000 0000 0000 0001 = Class: IN (0x0001) 0 E Cache flush: False Time to live: 4500</pre>		
Data length: 32 IXI Length: 28 IXI: model:MacBookProll,1	Simones-Mac-mini:~ simone\$ dns-sd -B _sshtcp	
TXT Length: 10	Browsing for _sshtcp	
TXT: osxvers=18	DATE:Sun 15 Sep 2019	
	17:34:37.338STARTING	
	Timestamp A/R Flags if Domain	Service Type Instance Name
	17:34:37.339 Add 3 6 local.	_sshtcp. Simone's Mac mini
	17:34:37.339 Add 2 6 local.	_sshtcp. Simone's MacBook Pro

DNS-SD Service Discovery: Example [3/3]



🕒 🗢 🔚 sf_mdns_dns-sd_printer.pcap		
📶 📕 🖉 🕲 🔲 🖺 🖄 🖄 🔍 🗢 🛎 🖀 🛧 👤 🜉 🦳 🔍 🔍 🔍 🏋	O C Frinters & Scar	nners Q Search
🖡 Apply a display filter < %/>		
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length info 1 0.000000 192.168.2.126 224.0.0.251 MDNS 194 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _universalsubipptcp.local, "QU" question PTR _univer 2 0.0000594 fe00::bb:af43:f82e:a77a ff02::f MDNS 224 Standard query 0x0000 PTR _universalsubipptcp.local, "QU" question PTR _universalsubipptcp.localsubipptc		Print Scan
3 0.101480 192.168.2.125 224.0.0.251 MDNS 707 Standard query response 0x0000 PTR OKI-MC342-3618F5ipp.tcp.local PTR OKI-MC342-3		EPSON WF-2630 Series
 ▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 5353, Dst Port: 5353 ♥ Multicast Domain Name System (response) Transaction ID: 0x0000 ▶ Flags: 0x5400 Standard query response, No error Questions: 0 	• Offline, Last Used	Open Print Queue Options & Supplies
Answer RRs: 2 Authority RRs: 0 Additional RRs: 3		Add Q. Search
▶ Answers ♥ Additional records ♥ OKL-HC342-3618F5ipptcp.local: type SRV, class IN, cache flush, priority 60, weight 0, port 631, target oki-mc342-361bf5.local 	Default IP Windows	Search
Shrytec (N. Hr. 3) Protoci (, 1) Name: Type: 5KV (Server Selection) (33)	Name OKI-MC342-361BF5	∧ Kind Boniour
.000 0000 0000 0001 = Class: IN (0x0001) 1 = Cache flush: True Time to live: 7200	+	
Data length: 25 Priority: 60 Weight: 0		
Port: 631 Target: 0kz=mC342-361bf5.local		
W OKT-MC342-361BF5, jpp.,tcp.local: type TXT, class IN, cache flush Name: OKT-MC342-361DF5,_jpptcp.local Type: TXT (Text strings) (16)		
.000 0000 0001 = Class: IN (0x0001) 1	Name: OKI-MC34	2-361BF5 2
Data length: 512 TXT Length: 9	Location:	
TXT: txtuers=1 TXT Length: 8 TXT: qtotal=1	Use: AirPrint	0
TXT Length: 111 TXT: pdl=application/octet-stream,application/vnd.hp-PCL,application/postscript,application/pdf,image/jpeg,image/urf TXT Length: 12 TXT: rp=ipp/print		Add
TXT: ty=0K1 NC342		

DNS-SD: Tips & Tricks to Play with It



Can use avahi-browse

	\$ avahi-browseall				
	+ docker0 IPv4 apt-cacher-ng pro	xy on devel		_apt_proxytcp	local
	+ enol IPv4 apt-cacher-ng prox	y on devel		_apt_proxytcp	local
	+ enol IPv4 Simone's MacBook P	_companion-linktcp	local		
	+ enol IPv4 Simone's MacBook P	SFTP File Transfer	local		
	+ enol IPv4 Simone's MacBook P	ro		SSH Remote Terminal	local
•	Can use dig \$ dig @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 -t pt [] ;; ANSWER SECTION:	r _sshtcp			
	_sshtcp.local. 10	IN	PTR	Simone's\032MacBook\032Pr	osshtcp.local.
	;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: Simone's\032MacBook\032Prossh. Simone's\032MacBook\032Prossh. Simone's\032MacBook\032Prodevi Simones-MacBook-Pro.local. 10 Simones-MacBook-Pro.local. 10	_tcp.local. ce-infotcp IN	10 IN TXT " p.local. 10 : AAAA	n	



Names to passively profile users

• Apple devices are particularly open in their default hostname choice of the users' first and last names





- Port scanning
 - _ssh._tcp
- Service type enumeration
 - Meta-query: "_services._dns-sd._udp.<domain>"
 - \$ dns-sd -B _services._dns-sd._udp
- OS versions, details, information
 - Sent in TXT and SRV records





 mDNS and DNS-SD are just specifications for how to name and use records in the existing DNS system, it has no specific additional security requirements over and above those that already apply to DNS queries and DNS updates

mDNS and DNS-SD: Secure? [2/2]



- An **attacker** can respond to typo-ed domains, race against valid domains, and advertise services that don't really exist
- If not properly configured, mDNS may reply to queries from outside the link local network!
 - Publicly (Internet!) disclose software and services, as well as other potentially sensitive information, suchlike hostname, internal network configuration settings, model number, etc
 - Amplification attacks: requests for all services with a spoofed source IP address

← → C ▲ kb.cert.org/vuls/id/550620/
 OVERVIEW
 Multicast DNS implementations may respond to unicast queries that originate from sources outside of the local link network. Such responses may disclose information about network devices or be used in denial-of-service (DoS) amplification attacks.

The Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) [1/2]



- Similar in spirit to mDNS-SD, SSDP is used for the advertisement/ discovery of network devices and services
 - Step 1 (**Discovery**) in the Universal Plug and Play (UPnP) technology which enables "<u>seamless proximity networking in</u> addition to control and data transfer among networked devices"
- Likely that home devices support UPnP and hence SSDP
 - They can be easily discovered by your computer or phone
- Devices, for example when they join the network, can query for specific devices and their services
 - Internet gateways, audio systems, TVs, or printers

The Simple Service Discovery Protocol (SSDP) [2/2]



- IP UDP (port 1900) multicast packets carrying HTTP
- Discovery
 - Advertisement
 - For example when a device is newly connected to the network
 - Search
 - Look for available devices and offered services

SSDP Advertisement: Example



sf_ssdp_samsung_remote_control.pcap	Multicast/Unicast NOTIFY message				
Apply a display filter < %/>	- Multicast/Officast NOTITET message				
	 Notification type and subtype (NT and NTS), 				
No. ^ Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info Location					
	Inrigue Service Name (USN) Server				
Frame 47: 408 bytes on wire (3264 bits), 498 bytes captured (3264 bits) Ethernet II, Src: SamsungE_Be:dd:be (d0:66:7b:08:dd:be), Dst: IPv4mcast_7f:ff:fa (01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa) Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.2.6, Dst: 239.255.250 User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1028, Dst: Port: 1900 Simple Service Discovery Protocol	••• • • • 192.168.2.6:52235/dmr/Samsu × +				
▼ NOTIFY + HTTP/1.1/\n ▶ [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): NOTIFY + HTTP/1.1/r\n] Request Method: NOTIFY	← → C ① Not Secure 192.168.2.6:52235/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml				
Request VPT: HOST: 239.255.255.250:1900\r\n CACHE-CONF. CACHE-CONF. LOCATION: http://journel.off.22235/dmr/SensungMRDesc.xml\r\n	<pre>v<root urn:schemas-dlna-org:device-1-0"="" xmlns="urn:schemas-upnp-org:device-1-0" xmlns:df="http://schemas.microsoft.com/window
<script/>
= corrections</pre></td></tr><tr><td>NT: urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:ConnectionManager:l\r\n
NTS: ssdp:alive\r\n</td><td>▼<specVersion>
<major>1</major></td></tr><tr><td>USN: uuid:937746b0-6777-c90a-8328-e7817dc2926e::urn:schemas-upnp-org:service:ConnectionManager:1\r\n</td><td><major ///minor></td></tr><tr><td>SERVER: Linux/9.0 UPnP/1.0 PROTOTYPE/1.0\r\n CONTENT-LENGTH: 0\r\n</td><td></</td></tr><tr><td>\r\n</td><td></td></tr><tr><td><pre>[Full request URI: http://239.255.256:1900*]</pre></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>0020 ff fa 04 04 07 6c 01 76 7e 36 4e 4f 54 49 46 59 ·····l·v ~6N0TIFY</td><td><pre><deviceType>urn:schemas-upnp-org:device:MediaRenderer:l</deviceType></pre></td></tr><tr><td>0030 20 2a 20 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 0d 0a 48 4f 53 * HTTP/ 1.1HOS
0040 54 3a 20 32 33 39 2e 32 35 35 2e 32 35 35 2e 32 T: 239.2 55.255.2</td><td><pre><df:X_deviceCategory>Display.TV.LCD Multimedia.DMR</df:X_deviceCategory></pre></td></tr><tr><td>0050 35 30 3a 31 39 30 30 0d 0a 43 41 43 48 45 2d 43 50:1900· ·CACHE-C
0060 4f 4e 54 52 4f 4c 3a 20 6d 61 78 2d 61 67 65 3d 0NTROL: max-age=</td><td><pre><dlna:X_DLNADOC xmlns:dlna=">DMR-1.50</root></pre>				
0070 31 38 30 00 0a 4c 4f 43 41 54 49 4f 4e 3a 20 1800··LO CATION: 0080 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 31 39 32 2e 31 36 38 2e 32 http://1 92.168.2	<pre><friendlyname>Mainardi's LED TV</friendlyname></pre>				
0000 2e 36 3a 35 32 32 33 35 2f 64 6d 72 2f 53 61 6d .6:52235 /dmr/Sam 0000 73 75 6e 67 4d 52 44 65 73 63 2e 78 6d 5C 4d 0a sun4MReB sc.xml	<pre><manufacturer>Samsung Electronics</manufacturer></pre>				
00b0 4e 54 3a 20 75 72 6e 3a 73 63 66 65 6d 61 73 2d NT: urn: schemes- 00c0 75 76 6e 70 2d 6f 72 67 3a 73 65 72 76 69 63 65 upn-org:service	<pre><manufacturerurl>http://www.samsung.com/sec</manufacturerurl></pre>				
00d0 3a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 4d 61 6e 61 67 :Connect ionManag 00e0 65 72 3a 31 0d 0a 4e 54 53 3a 20 73 73 64 70 3a er:1. NT S: ssdp:	<modeldescription>Samsung TV DMR</modeldescription>				
0010 61 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a 55 53 4e 3a 20 75 75 69 64 alive U SN: uuid 0100 3a 39 33 37 37 34 36 62 30 2d 36 37 37 37 2d 63 :937746b 0-6777-c	<pre><modelname>UE40D6500</modelname> UPnP Step 2:</pre>				
0110 39 30 61 2d 38 33 32 38 2d 65 37 38 31 37 64 63 90a-8328 -e7817dc 0120 32 39 32 36 65 3a 3a 75 72 6e 3a 73 63 68 65 6d 2926e::u rn:schem	<modernumber>AllShare1.0</modernumber>				
0130 61 73 2d 75 70 6e 70 2d 6f 72 67 3a 73 65 72 76 as-uppp- org:serv 0140 69 63 65 3a 43 6f 6e 6e 65 63 74 69 6f 6e 4d 61 ice:Conn ectionMa	<pre><modelurl>http://www.samsung.com/sec</modelurl> </pre> <pre> Description </pre>				
0150 66 61 67 65 72 3a 31 0d 0a 53 45 52 56 45 52 3a nager:1- SERVER: 0160 20 4c 69 6e 75 78 2f 39 2e 30 20 55 58 6e 50 2f Linux/9 .0 UPnP/	Seriarwander>20001224DFR Seriarwander				
0170 31 2e 30 20 50 52 4f 54 4f 54 59 50 45 2f 31 2e 1.0 PROT OTYPE/1. 0180 30 0d 0a 43 4f 4e 54 45 4e 54 2d 4c 45 4e 47 54 0··CONTE NT-LENGT	<pre><udn>uuid:937746b0-6777-c90a-8328-e7817dc2926e</udn></pre>				
0190 48 3a 20 30 0d 0a 0d 0a H: 0 ····	<sec:deviceid>KLCFP7UYYVAGO</sec:deviceid>				

SSDP Search: Example



- M-SEARCH HTTP multicast request
- Namespace (fixed, MAN), Search Target (ST), User Agent
- Example is an iPhone looking for remotelycontrollable TVs

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A	oply a	a display filte	r <೫/>								
No.		Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info		User-Agen	t	
	176 177	117.052496 117.058389 117.058396 117.058397	192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7	239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250	SSDP SSDP SSDP SSDP SSDP	221 186	M-SEARCH # M-SEARCH # M-SEARCH # M-SEARCH #	<pre>HTTP/1.1 HTTP/1.1</pre>	i05/13.1.3 i05/13.1.3	UPnP/1.1 UPnP/1.1	ConnectSDK/1.6.0 ConnectSDK/1.6.0 ConnectSDK/1.6.0 ConnectSDK/1.6.0
<pre>Ethernet II, Src: Apple_ce:28:53 (58:40:4e:ce:28:53), Dst: IPv4mcast_7f:ff:fa (01:00:5e:7f:ff:fa) Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.2.7, Dst: 239.255.250 User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 58825, Dst Port: 1900 Simple Service Discovery Protocol M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1\r\n [Expert Info (Chat/Sequence): M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1\r\n] Request Method: M-SEARCH Request Method: M-SEARCH Request WEI: *</pre>											
	Hos		5.250:1900\r\n	:MediaRenderer:1\r							
	Use	r-Agent: iOS/	13.1.3 UPnP/1.1	ConnectSDK/1.6.0\							
0000		: "ssdp:disco 00 5e 7f ff f		8 53 08 00 45 00	··^··Xa N·(S	E .			0		
0010 0020 0030 0040 0050 0050 0050 0050 0090 0090 009	00 ff 43 6f 72 6f 52 6f 2d 2e 2d 2e 4e	fe 16 00 0 fa e5 c9 07 6 48 20 2a 20 4 37 43 3a 20 3 32 35 30 3a 3 32 35 30 3a 3 26 3a 73 63 6 72 67 3a 64 65 65 64 65 7 4 73 74 35 50 6 33 20 55 50 6 63 74 53 44 4 3a 20 25 50 6 63 74 53 44 4 3a 20 22 73 44 5 22 04 0a 44 5	$ \begin{smallmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 11 & 08 & 58 & c \\ c & 00 & bb & 5f & 55 & 48 \\ 8 & 54 & 54 & 50 & 2f & 32 \\ 3 & 3 & 39 & 2e & 32 & 32 \\ 1 & 39 & 30 & 30 & 00 & 08 \\ 8 & 65 & 6d & 61 & 73 & 22 \\ 5 & 76 & 69 & 63 & 65 & 32 \\ 2 & 65 & 72 & 3a & 31 & 04 \\ 4 & 3a & 20 & 69 & 4f & 52 \\ e & 50 & 2f & 31 & 2e & 32 \\ b & 2f & 31 & 2e & 32 \\ b & 2f & 31 & 2e & 32 \\ 6 & 47 & 3a & 64 & 70 \\ \end{bmatrix} $	0 a8 02 07 ef ff d 2d 53 45 41 52 1 2e 31 0d 0a 48 5 35 2e 32 35 a 53 54 a2 07 55 d 75 70 6e 70 2d a 4d 65 64 69 61 d 0a 55 73 65 72 3 2f 31 33 2e 31 20 43 6f 6e 6e e 30 0d 0a 4d 41 9 73 63 6f 76 65	CH * HTT P/1. ost: 239 .255 .250:190 0 • 5 rn:schem as- org:devi ce:M Renderer :1 -Agent: i0S/ .3 UPnP/ 1.1 ectSDK/1 .6.6 N: "ssdp:idiz r" -MX: 5	-SEAR 1. H 5.255 5T: u Uppp- Media User (13.1 Conn 3. MA scove					

Discover a Remotely-Controllable TV with SSDP: Example





				2	 		sf_ssdp_samsung_remot	te_control.pcap	Advertisement
A A	pply	a display filte	r <೫/>						
No.		Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info		Location	
	165 166 167 168	105.984359 106.008052 106.031944	192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6	239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250 239.255.255.250	SSDP SSDP SSDP SSDP SSDP SSDP	351 NOTIF 398 NOTIF 406 NOTIF 408 NOTIF	Y * HTTP/1.1 Y * HTTP/1.1 Y * HTTP/1.1 Y * HTTP/1.1 Y * HTTP/1.1 Y * HTTP/1.1	http://192.168. http://192.168. http://192.168. http://192.168.	2.6:52235/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml 2.6:52235/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml 2.6:52235/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml 2.6:52235/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml 2.6:52235/dmr/SamsungMRDesc.xml
		10		× 2	← ➡	🛋 sf.	f_ssdp_samsung_remote_con		2: Description
	pply a	a display filter	<೫/>						
No.		Time	Source		Protocol Leng			Location	
-	189 190 191 192 193 194	118.723542 118.726718 118.727930 118.727937 118.728038 118.729342	192.168.2.6	192.168.2.6 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.7	TCP TCP TCP 1 TCP 1 TCP TCP	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	SamsungNRDesc.xml HTTP/1.1 2458 (ACK) Seq=1 Ack=207 Win 2458 (PSH, ACK) Seq=1 Ack=2. 2458 (ACK) Seq=139 Ack=207 2458 (ACK) Seq=139 Ack=207 2235 (ACK) Seq=207 Ack=3035 200 OK		
							🚄 sf_ssdp_samsung_r	remote_control.p	
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A R	pply	a display filte	er <発/>						
No.	200	Time	Source	Destination		ol Length In		Location	
	309 310 311		192.168.2.7 192.168.2.6 192.168.2.6	192.168.2.6 192.168.2.7 192.168.2.7	TCP TCP TCP	66 55	0260 → 55000 [PSH, ACK] Se 5000 → 50260 [ACK] Seq=66 5000 → 50260 [PSH, ACK] Se	Ack=141 W	





- Plaintext information which can unveil devices types, characteristics and software version
 - User Agents
 - iOS/13.1.3 UPnP/1.1 ConnectSDK/1.6.0
 - Servers
 - Linux/9.0 UPnP/1.0 PROTOTYPE/1.0
 - USNs
 - 937746b0-6777-c90a-8328e7817dc2926e::upnp:rootdevice





Services Enumeration

- Advertised in NOTIFY messages
- Perform queries with M-SEARCH
- OS and other applications versions, details, information
 - Advertised both in M-SEARCH and NOTIFY messages



SSDP: Secure?



- "To be found by a network search, a device shall send a unicast UDP response to the source IP address and port that sent the request to the multicast address."
- Amplification attacks: requests for all services with a spoofed source IP address

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Stupidly Simple DDoS Protocol (SSDP) generates 100 Gbps DDoS

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)




- What happens right after a host has connected to the network?
 - After the **ethernet** cable has been plugged
 - After the WiFi has been successfully joined
- To use the network an host typically needs at least to
 - Have an IP address
 - Know the IP address of someone who is in charge of carrying its traffic to the internet (i.e., the **gateway**)
 - Know the IP address of the **DNS server**
- The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) is used to tell the newly connected host all the necessary information to use the joined network

DHCP: Basics



- DHCP client on the host
- DHCP server on the network
- UDP, 4 phases (DORA)
 - Discover
 - Offer
 - **R**equest
 - Acknowledgement



DHCP Discover: Example



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udp.port==67 udp.port== 68	🗙 🚽 👻 Expression 🕂
	endor class identifier Info
	ndroid-dhcp-9 DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0xf035f406
13 35.930970 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.121 b8:27:eb:2b:90:11 c:21:19:da:03:90 68 67 DHCP 342	DHCP Offer - Transaction ID 0xf035f406
14 35.966873 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 67 68 DHCP 356 Galaxy-A7-2018 ar	ndroid-dhcp-9 DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0xf035f406
15 35.975489 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.121 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d 68 67 DHCP 342	DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0xf035f406
Magic cookie: DHCP	
v Option: (53) DHCP Message Type (Discover)	
Length: 1	12:52 主 主 一 一 145% 血
DHCP: Discover (1)	< About phone Q
v Option: (61) Client identifier	< About phone Q
Length: 7	
Hardware type: Ethernet (0x01) Client MAC address: SamsungE aa:d3:9d (cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d)	Galaxy A7 (2018)
	Galaxy A7 (2018)
▼ Option: (57) Maximum DHCP Message Size Length: 2	Edit
Maximum DHCP Message Size: 1500	
<pre>mailum Drc Hessage Size: 1500 * Option: (60) Vendor class identifier</pre>	Phone number Unknown
Lenath: 14	Model number
Vendor class identifier: android-dhcp-9	Serial number mener Landed
v Option: (12) Host Name	
Length: 14	IMEI BRITERING BRITERING
Host Name: Galaxy-A7-2018	
v Option: (55) Parameter Request List	Status
Length: 10	View the SIM card status, IME), and other information.
Parameter Request List Item: (1) Subnet Mask	Legal information
Parameter Request List Item: (3) Router	
Parameter Request List Item: (6) Domain Name Server	Software information
Parameter Request List Item: (15) Domain Name	View the currently installed Android version, baseband version, kernel version, build number, and more.
Parameter Request List Item: (26) Interface MTU	
Parameter Request List Item: (28) Broadcast Address	Battery information
Parameter Request List Item: (51) IP Address Lease Time	View your phone's battery status, remaining power, and other information.
Parameter Request List Item: (58) Renewal Time Value	
Parameter Request List Item: (59) Rebinding Time Value	Looking for something else?
Parameter Request List Item: (43) Vendor-Specific Information	Looking for admetring else:
v Option: (255) End	
Option End: 255	
Padding: 00	

DHCP Offer: Example



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udp.port==67 udp.port == 68				Expression	+
No. Time Source Destination Source Destination Des	st Sour Prot	ocol Length Host Name	Vendor class identifier	Info	
12 35.930227 0.0.0.0 255.255.255 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff.ff.67	68 DHC	P 344 Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0xf035f4	
35.930970 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.121 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d 68				DHCP Offer - Transaction ID 0xf035f4	
14 35.966873 0.0.0.0 255.255.255 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 67			android-dhcp-9	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0xf035f4	
15 35.975489 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.121 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d 68	67 DHC	P 342		DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0xf035f4	
Your (client) IP address: 192.168.1.121					
Next server IP address: 0.0.0.0					
Relay agent IP address: 0.0.0.0					
Client MAC address: SamsungE_aa:d3:9d (cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d)					
Client hardware address padding: 00000000000000000000					
Server host name not given					
Boot file name not given Magic cookie: DHCP					
<pre>w Option: (53) DHCP Message Type (Offer)</pre>					
Length: 1					
DHCP: Offer (2)					
v Option: (54) DHCP Server Identifier					1.1
Length: 4					
DHCP Server Identifier: 192.168.1.100					
v Option: (51) IP Address Lease Time					
Length: 4					
IP Address Lease Time: (600s) 10 minutes					
v Option: (1) Subnet Mask					
Length: 4					
Subnet Mask: 255.255.25.0					
v Option: (3) Router					- 1
Length: 4					
Router: 192.168.1.100					
🔻 Option: (6) Domain Name Server					
Length: 4					
Domain Name Server: 208.67.222.222					
v Option: (15) Domain Name					
Length: 10					
Domain Name: ntop.local					

DHCP Request: Example



•	sf_dhcp.pcap
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A	pply a display filter <%/>
No.	Time Source Destination Source Destination Dest Sour Protocol Length Host Name Vendor class identifier Info
	12 35.930227 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255.cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 67 68 DHCP 344 Galaxy-A7-2018 android-dhcp-9 DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0xf035f4
	13 35.930970 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.121 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d 68 67 DHCP 342 DHCP Offer - Transaction ID 0xf035f4_
	35.966873 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.255 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 67 68 DHCP 356 Galaxy-A7-2018 android-dhcp-9 DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0xf035f4
1	15 35.975489 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.121 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d 68 67 DHCP 342 DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0xf035f4_
	r Option: (61) Client identifier
	Length: 7
	Hardware type: Ethernet (0x01)
	Client MAC address: SamsungE_aa:d3:9d (cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d
	Option: (50) Requested IP Address
	Length: 4
	Requested IP Address: 192.168.1.121
	poption: (54) DHCP Server Identifier
	Length: 4
	DHCP Server Identifier: 192.168.1.100
	v Option: (57) Maximum DHCP Message Size
	Length: 2
	Maximum DHCP Message Size: 1500
	v Option: (60) Vendor class identifier
	Length: 14
	Vendor class identifier: android-dhcp-9
	<pre>v Option: (12) Host Name</pre>
	Length: 14
	Host Name: Galaxy-A7-2018
	Option: (55) Parameter Request List
	Length: 10
	Parameter Request List Item: (1) Subnet Mask
	Parameter Request List Item: (3) Router
	Parameter Request List Item: (6) Domain Name Server
_	Parameter Request List Item: (15) Domain Name

Broadcasted DHCP in a Small Network

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e	th.dst == ff:ff:ff	:ff:ff:ff										Expression +
No.	Time	Source	Destination	Source	Destination					Host Name	Vendor class identifier	nfo
Г	1 0.000000	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	88:bd:45:d9:6d:a6	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67		DHCP		Galaxy-A3-2017	android-dhcp-8.0.0	HCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x29404c1c
	3 1.053107	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	88:bd:45:d9:6d:a6	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67		DHCP		Galaxy-A3-2017	android-dhcp-8.0.0	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x29404c1c
	5 10.279607	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	58:40:4e:ce:28:53	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67		DHCP		iPhone		DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x1f4b7e8b
	7 12.290459	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	58:40:4e:ce:28:53	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		iPhone		DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x1f4b7e8b
	9 34.880545	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0xf035f406
	10 35.380496	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9	DHCP Discover – Transaction ID 0xf035f406
	12 35.930227	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9	DHCP Discover – Transaction ID 0xf035f406
	14 35.966873	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	cc:21:19:aa:d3:9d	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9	DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0xf035f406
	16 48.912781	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	78:31:c1:bd:5e:24	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Simones-MBP		DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0xc2a7c233
	18 60.037611	0.0.0.0	255.255.255.255	74:e1:b6:c6:da:a9	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		iPaddiLabriella		DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x90396f27
	20 117.781577		255.255.255.255	00:24:e4:74:f0:ee	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP	342			DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x14b38c73
	22 118.797668		255.255.255.255	00:24:e4:74:f0:ee	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP	342			DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x14b38c73
	24 122.805210		0.0.0.0	00:24:e4:74:f0:ee	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP	342			DHCP Release – Transaction ID 0x34d8125e
	25 140.051067		255.255.255.255	b0:ee:7b:fd:f5:fd	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		TV Box - 140		DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x55c5946f
	27 153.966058		255.255.255.255	60:03:08:d5:56:38	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Mainas-Apple-TV		DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x7822a88
	28 153.966712		255.255.255.255	60:03:08:d5:56:38	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Mainas-Apple-TV		DHCP Discover – Transaction ID 0x7822a89
	30 155.362404		255.255.255.255	60:03:08:d5:56:38	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Mainas-Apple-TV		DHCP Discover – Transaction ID 0x7822a89
	32 156.401173		255.255.255.255	60:03:08:d5:56:38	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Mainas-Apple-TV		DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x7822a89
	34 202.334896		255.255.255.255	d0:66:7b:0e:dd:be	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP	590			DHCP Discover – Transaction ID 0x19f46911
	36 203.340650		255.255.255.255	d0:66:7b:0e:dd:be	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP	590		udhcp 1.14.3-VD Linu…	DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x19f46911
	40 252.553526		255.255.255.255	38:9d:92:17:f5:39	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		EPSON17F539	udhcp	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x36b1a56d
	41 252.559651		255.255.255.255	38:9d:92:17:f5:39	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	BOOTP	342			Boot Request from 38:9d:92:17:f5:39 (SeikoEps_17:f5:39)
	43 253.560168		255.255.255.255	38:9d:92:17:f5:39	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		EPSON17F539	udhcp	DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x36b1a56d
	47 323.181935		255.255.255.255	58:40:4e:ce:28:53	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		iPhone		DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x1f4b7e8d
	51 331.462211		255.255.255.255	50:32:37:eb:bb:40	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		Simones-Mini		DHCP Request – Transaction ID 0x4a23af3d
	53 377.282160		255.255.255.255	78:31:c1:bd:5e:24	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		DESKTOP-E7D8H40	MSFT 5.0	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x8b64e948
	54 378.284014		255.255.255.255	b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	68	67	DHCP	342			DHCP Offer - Transaction ID 0x8b64e948
	55 378.351718		255.255.255.255	78:31:c1:bd:5e:24	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP		DESKTOP-E7D8H40	MSFT 5.0	DHCP Request - Transaction ID 0x8b64e948
	56 378.374263		255.255.255.255	b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	68	67	DHCP	342			DHCP ACK - Transaction ID 0x8b64e948
	57 385.284609	192.168.1.165	255.255.255.255	78:31:c1:bd:5e:24	ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff	67	68	DHCP	342	DESKTOP-E7D8H40	MSFT 5.0	DHCP Inform – Transaction ID 0x63739331

How to Use DHCP Data: Discovers and Request [1/2]



- DHCP Discovers and Requests are sent in broadcast
- Every host on the same subnet sees all the DHCP discovers and requests
- Passively determine
 - All the MAC addresses connected to the network
 - All the host names of all the devices connected to the network
 - Associations between IP and MAC addresses

How to Use DHCP Data: Discovers and Request [2/2]



- Host Name / MAC address
 - Associate devices to people (Simones-Mini: the Mac Mini of Simone)
 - Determine device types (Galaxy A7)
- Vendor class identifier
 - Determine the DHCP client and, thus, the operating system

	s	f_dhcp.p	сар		
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Dest	Sour	Protocol	Length	Host Name	Vendor class identifier
67	68	DHCP	348	Galaxy-A3-2017	android-dhcp-8.0.0
67	68	DHCP	360	Galaxy-A3-2017	android-dhcp-8.0.0
67	68	DHCP	342	iPhone	
67	68	DHCP	342	iPhone	
67	68	DHCP	344	Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9
67	68	DHCP	344	Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9
67	68	DHCP	344	Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9
67	68	DHCP	356	Galaxy-A7-2018	android-dhcp-9
67	68	DHCP	342	Simones-MBP	
67	68	DHCP	342	iPaddiLabriella	
67	68	DHCP	342		
67	68	DHCP	342		
67	68	DHCP	342		
67	68	DHCP	590	TV Box - 140	
67	68	DHCP	342	Mainas-Apple-TV	
67	68	DHCP	342	Mainas-Apple-TV	
67	68	DHCP	342	Mainas-Apple-TV	
67	68	DHCP	342	Mainas-Apple-TV	
67	68	DHCP	590		udhcp 1.14.3-VD Linu.
67	68	DHCP	590		udhcp 1.14.3-VD Linu.
67	68	DHCP	590	EPSON17F539	udhcp
67	68	BOOTP	342		
67	68	DHCP	590	EPSON17F539	udhcp
67	68	DHCP	342	iPhone	
67	68	DHCP	342	Simones-Mini	
67	68	DHCP	343	DESKTOP-E7D8H40	MSFT 5.0
68	67	DHCP	342		
67	68	DHCP	369	DESKTOP-E7D8H40	MSFT 5.0
68	67	DHCP	342		
67	68	DHCP	342	DESKTOP-E7D8H40	MSFT 5.0



How to Use DHCP Data: Fingerprinting



• Fingerprinting to guess the OS

• The order in which the DHCP client asks for certain options is relatively unique and identifies the specific operating system version

🗢 🗢 Default (bash)	XXI O Stateppeap	
pi@raspberrypi: ~ (ssh) • 3t1 Default (tepdump) • 3t2 Default (bash)	x3 <u>+</u> 📶 📕 🔬 💿 🛅 🖹 🙆 🔍 🖛 🏓 🚟 🗿 🝨 拱 🚍 🔍 Q, Q, I	
Simones-Mac-mini:Downloads simone\$ curl -XGET \-H "Content-Type: application/json" "https://api.fing	nk.org/ap	
i/v2/combinations/interrogate?pretty=true2key=	rprint":" 📕 bootp.hw.mac_addr == 08:00:27:f0:35:be	Expression +
1,15,3,6,44,46,47,31,33,121,249,252,431 "dhop_vendor": "HSFT 5.0"}' python -m jeon.tool % lotal % Heceivea % Xrena Hvenage Scher Time Time Time Current	Packet: Go to	packet Cancel
A lotal A Received X Xtera Hverage Sport Line Time Time Current Dioad Upload Total Spent Left Speed	No. Time Source Destination Source Destination Dest Sour Protocol Length Host Name	Vendor class identifier
100 575 100 467 100 88 785 141:: 785	53 377.282160 0.0.0 255.255.255 78:31:c1:bd:5e:24 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:	MSFT 5.0
	54 378.284014 192.168.1.100 255.255.255.255 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:f68 67 DHCP 342	
'device': (L 55 378.351218 0.0.0.0 255.255.255 78:31:c1:bd:5e:24 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff 67 68 DMCP 369 DESKTOP-E7D8H40 56 378.374661 329.168.1.108 255.255.555 DM:27:eb:2b:99:f1 ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:f6 67 DMCP 342	MSFT 5.0
"con_be_more_precise": true,	56 376.37425 192.166.1.166 253.255.255.255 78:31:c1:05:96:11 fiftifiint:11:11 68 67 MHCP 342 DESKTOP-E708H40	MSFT 5.0
"child_devices_count": 12,	58 385.285249 192.168.1.100 192.168.1.165 b8:27:eb:2b:90:f1 78:31:c1:bd:5e:24 68 67 DHCP 342	
"child_virtual_devices_count": 1,		
"created_at": *2014-09-09T15:09:50.0002",	v Option: St. Parameter Request List	
"id": 1,	Length: 13	
"name": "Hindows OS",	Parameter Request Lipeter: (1) Sugnet Mask	
"parent_id": 16879,	Parameter Request List Items (IS) D main Name	
"parents": [Parameter Request List Item (3) Roater Parameter Request List Item (6) Doalin Name Server	
1	Parameter Request List Iter (4) NetBlo ver TCP/IP Name Server	
"created_at": "2017-09-14T18:41:06.0202",	Parameter Request List Item: (46) NetBIOS over TCP/IP Node Type	
"ld": 16879,	Parameter Request List Item: (47) NetBIO5 over TCP/IP Scope	
"name": "Operating System",	Parameter Request List Iter: (31) Perform Router Discover	
"porent_id": null, "updated_at": *2017-09-18T16:33:10.0002",	Parameter Request List Item (33) Static Route	
"virtual_porent_id": null	Parameter Request List Tiem: (121) lassless Static Route Parameter Request List Tiem: (249) rivide/Classless Static Route (Microsoft)	
Virtual_parent_1d : natt	Parameter Request List Tier (252) revolute/Proxy autodiscovery	1
	Parameter Request List Item: (43) Vendor-Specific Information	
"updated_at": "2018-11-09T14:52:53.0002",	0000 ff ff ff ff ff f7 3 31 c1 00 00 45 00 ·····x1 ··^\$··E·	
	0010 01 49 30 5C 00 08 80 11 09 49 08 00 00 0f ff f 180,	
1. fingerbar		
"device_none": "Deersting System/Hindows OS",	0040 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 27 f0 35 be 00 00 00	
"score": 58,		
"version": ""		
3		
Simones-Mac-mini:Dawnloads simone\$		





- DHCP does not include any mechanism for authentication
- Vulnerable to attacks
 - Cannot really trust the response (a 'rouge' DHCP server could respond and tell hosts malicious information such as a DNS server or gateway)
 - Malicious clients can easily exhaust DHCP server resources such as the pool of available IP addresses



Take-Home [1/2]



- Facts
 - Cryptographic protocols or protocols that support encryption may carry certain plaintext information
 - Still a great deal of network protocols carry plaintext information
- Plaintext information can expose information about you, your habits, the devices you use, their features and software



Take-Home [2/2]



- TLS, DNS, mDNS, DNS-SD, SSDP, DHCP are just a few examples
- Make sure you trust the networks you connect to, and you trust those who connect to your networks
- Remove personal information from your devices (e.g., Simone's MacBook Pro)
- Use of VPN and DoH/DoT at minimum